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CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN AND THE EMPIRE OF  
ROMANCE.

CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, PH.D., 1979

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1979

CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN AND THE EMPIRE OF ROMANCE

by

JOANN PECK KRIEG

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate  
Faculty in English in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1979

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in English in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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## Abstract

CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN AND THE EMPIRE OF ROMANCE

by

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The development of the romance in America received its initial thrust from Charles Brockden Brown whose novels present what can be called a divided reality. The division is the result of the discrepancy between the Utopian expectations attached to America, and the often disappointing reality. How to present that discrepancy without betraying the spirit of the revolution was a very real problem for Brown who had chosen for himself the role of moralist in the world of letters. Since that world was almost non-existent in America at the time, it was up to Brown and others of his generation to create one, and this creation demanded a degree of authority for which Brown felt himself ill prepared.

Out of a background of reading which predisposed him to the romantic tradition in English literature, Brown attempted to formulate a literature of rational morality that would acknowledge mind as a spiritual as well as a physical entity.

To achieve this end he employed allegory not only as a literary but as a rhetorical device, discovering areas of philosophic investigation by categorizing them and representing them fictionally. By means of this representational writing he moved American fiction toward what was to become its dominant mode, symbolization. Brown's major movement, however, was toward the topical segregation of ideas which led to his employment of the American scene as a romantic topos.

In his four romances, Wieland, Ormond, Arthur Mervyn, and Edgar Huntly, America becomes a learning environment where the sensational psychology of Locke is linked with the experiential world of Spenser's Faerie Queene and Shakespeare's The Tempest. Behind the facades of the sentimental novel, the Gothic, and even the fairy tale, Brown explores the most important philosophical ideas of his time, allowing reason, determinism, and materialism to assume allegorical proportions and to hold forth against carefully posed opponents. When his personal experiences were such that he despaired of man's ability to rationally comprehend the world of nature, which in America seemed always on the verge of overwhelming civilization, Brown became the first American author to attempt to define the American romance by distinguishing the romancer from the historian and declaring the superiority of romance.

This study investigates Brown's allegorical mode and its function as an instrument in his rejection of the ultra-rationality of his time. It does this by viewing the romances as a dialogue between Brown and his closest friend, Elihu Hubbard Smith. The dialogue is shown to exist not only within

the contexts of individual works such as Wieland and Ormond, but also between the nearly simultaneous compositions, Arthur Mervyn and Edgar Huntly, each of which expresses a different viewpoint. Particular attention is given to the subject of the yellow fever and the social and political problems posed by its presence in the early republic and their effects on Brown.

The romantic conception of America has always been greater even than her historical reality. Charles Brockden Brown was the first American author to realize that it was America as a state of mind which determined her role as the empire of romance.

## PREFACE

This study owes much to Professor Angus Fletcher's examination of Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode. In fact, it could have not proceeded beyond the first intuitive apprehension of Brown's particular blend of ideas and images without Professor Fletcher's analysis of the elements of the allegorical mode. For its particular application to the novels of Brown and to the cultural matrix from which they took shape, the writer accepts full responsibility, especially for any errors in judgement and interpretation. A very great debt of gratitude is owed to Professor John Hollander who saw a potential value in this study and provided the encouragement and guidance needed to bring it to completion.

I would also like to thank The Historical Society of Pennsylvania for granting permission for the reproduction of the two pages from Brown's Copybook, the Yale University Medical Library for making available the unpublished portions of the diary of Elihu Hubbard Smith, and the Princeton University Library for permission to quote from materials contained in the Samuel Miller Papers.

J.P.K.

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## INTRODUCTION

The enigma of the American novel and its early development along undeniably romantic lines continues to intrigue reader and critic alike. In the nineteenth century the authors themselves seemed to experience a felt need to explain what they were doing. Hawthorne, Simms, Cooper, and James all prefaced their works with discussions of what constitutes the distinction between a romance and a novel. In the twentieth century critics have taken up the discussion offering definitions which vary in their degrees of usefulness. Lionel Trilling, in a rather negative appraisal, has held that the novel, which for him is defined by its "classic intention," i.e., "the investigation of the problem of reality beginning in the social field," has never developed in America.<sup>1</sup> He extends his argument in a discussion of the English novel as a medium for the examination of class distinctions and interactions within a society.

By thus yoking the English and American novel into one tradition it is possible to dismiss much of American prose fiction as having missed the mark. Richard Chase, however, has emphasized the necessity of recognizing "a radical divergence" within that tradition. The divergence, which is not a distinct break, is the development in America of a fiction which is decidedly eccentric, highly imaginative, and in a word, romantic. In side-stepping the issue of an exact definition of "novel" and "romance," however, Chase finds it necessary to revert to the view of reality displayed in each

as a means of separating one from the other. The novel, he says, "renders reality closely and in comprehensive detail" while "the romance, following distantly the medieval example, feels free to render reality in less volume and detail."<sup>2</sup>

Marius Bewley, in his study of the eccentricity of American fiction, sees as its cause an underlying tension, a division, in the American society which, proving insusceptible to attempts at artistic unification, has thrown the balance away from the social medium of the English novel and toward the depiction of the struggle itself. This, he believes, is especially true of the American novel before James.<sup>3</sup>

Combining these views, we arrive at the problem of the American author in attempting to picture the divided reality with which his society presents him. The degree of faithfulness with which he does this would determine whether or not he is a writer of novels or of romances. What then if the reality, faithfully reproduced, is so bizarre that it assumes the proportions of romance? What if the divisions within a society are not so much those of class as of ideology which clash in an atmosphere of such terror that the only instrument of reconciliation becomes death? These are the problems presented by his society to the early American novelist. Out of them came the polarities which are the basic structure of American fiction, and the mythical, symbolical, and allegorical elements which heighten the tension between the polar opposites became the means by which the writer expressed the unreal nature of his reality.

Of the three, allegory more than any other mode deals with

the confrontation of opposing forces, and studies in the allegorical roots of American fiction have been fruitful. Most of these stress the importance of Nathaniel Hawthorne's influence but few have looked for an American source for Hawthorne outside of the New England Puritan tradition. Those studies which begin with Charles Brockden Brown, the first American novelist to complete a body of work, connect him to Hawthorne only through the Gothic mode. Indeed, Brown has long suffered from being relegated either to the Gothic school or to the Godwinian school of polemical novels. While his works contain elements of these and of other models, such categorizations ignore the basic fact that they are, above all else, romances, and the first to be written by an American.

In the absence of a prior native tradition Brown did appropriate the popular literary forms of his day, the Gothic and the sentimental tale. It will be seen, however, that though these are the surface forms, the underlying structures are those of allegory. The primary reason behind this seems to have been Brown's natural predisposition towards that mode. Beyond this there lay a deep appreciation for the great figures of English literature, Shakespeare, Milton, and Spenser, all of whom were participants and developers within the conventions of moral allegory. Above all, there was Brown's sincere desire to present himself to the world of literature in the role of a moralist, a role to which allegory is well suited as is the world of romance which always held Brown enthralled.

Like his near-contemporaries in England, Shelley, Keats, and Coleridge, Brown took his Gothic impulse from the German

romantic movement, particularly that pioneer piece of medievalism, C. M. Wieland's allegorical romance, Oberon. Known to Brown in Sotheby's translation done in Spenserian stanzas, he links it with Spenser's Faerie Queene in a magazine editorial in which he calls for a similar "translation" to be done of that work.<sup>6</sup> The world of Oberon and of Faerie Queene became, in a sense, the experiential world of which Brown wrote. For the America of his romances, though made concrete by specific place names and dates, is always, on some other level, a Fairy Land like Spenser's which John Hughes<sup>7</sup> referred to as "an Utopia, an imaginary Place."

It is at this precise point that an entry can be made into the very special world of Brown's making, for it was the contention of his first biographer and friend, William Dunlap,<sup>8</sup> that Brown was "an Eutopist." The statement has been repeated in virtually every major study of Brown, often with references to specific Utopian aspects of his writings. The quest for a virtuous society which motivates the Utopist was shared by many of Brown's contemporaries both in America and Europe and, indeed, it was considered by most of them that America would be the site on which the long-delayed hopes of mankind would be realized. Among these was Brown's closest friend, Elihu Hubbard Smith and, as this study will show, it was he and not Brown who was the Utopist.

The ensuing study is, in a way, the story of the friendship between these two men, Brown and Smith, who were born in the same year and were destined to play significant roles in the establishment of literature in the new republic. Charles Brockden

Brown is, of course, the more pre-eminent of the two because of his now generally acknowledged distinction as the first American man of letters. His friend, Smith, is less well known except to those aware of the publishing history of American literature. To these he is familiar as the editor of the first anthology of American poetry, and as the individual responsible for the publication of the first of Brown's prose works to be set in print, Alcuin. He was also the editor of the American edition of Brasmus Darwin's The Loves of the Plants, and holds a distinguished place in the medical history of this country as the initiator and editor of the first American medical journal, The Medical Repository.

What is revealed through a close examination of the relationship between these two is the degree to which Smith not only lent Brown support and counsel, but also the degree to which he served as an adversary against whose arguments and opinions Brown tested his own beliefs. Warner Berthoff, a noted critic of Brown's work, has pointed out the use Brown made of his narratives to discover and test ideas rather than to promulgate them, and both his biographer Harry Warfel, and R. W. B. Lewis have suggested that writing served as a therapeutic function for Brown aiding him in the working out of emotional problems. Both of these speculations prove correct when Brown's fictions are examined against the background of letters and diary entries which record much of the emotions and expectations invested by both Smith and Brown in their relationship.

Even more interesting is the discovery that though Smith was the man of science, it was Brown who developed the habit of experimentation in which he tested the philosophical theories which Smith embraced without question. Utopian designs which Smith hoped to see implemented in the near future in America were viewed by his friend as useful only as distant goals. In the four romances for which Brown is best known he subjects to the test of experience most of the Utopian ideas which Smith held most dear. Still, the Utopian expectations, which for many had been subsumed into the idea of progress, were very much a part of the American experiment. The apparent contradiction between the surface reality which forms a part of Brown's novels, the historical reality of yellow fever, of Indians, and of political terror, and the imaginary, romantic arena in which is waged the battle between good and evil, becomes the very basis of the underlying premise of American fiction, the dichotomy between the ideal and the reality of America.

The inclination to make of his fictions a sort of laboratory in which to conduct experiments in morality came out of Brown's reluctance to offer as absolutes moral dictums which in practise might prove untenable. His experience with the study of law had no doubt made him cautious in the matter of absolutes, yet it was his intention to present himself as what he termed a "moral painter" of the American scene. The entire American society was, indeed, one great experiment undertaken as a nation at just about the time Brown embarked upon his career. The type of social engineering which appealed to Utopists

such as Smith, however, held no charms for Brown who seemed far more conscious of the dangers of such manipulation. As Dunlap tells us, Brown sought to allow through his method of fictional presentation an argument to be made on both sides of a moral or philosophical issue.<sup>11</sup> Out of this, he believed, would emerge not a dogmatic statement based on one individual interpretation of right and wrong, but a moral practise applicable to the life of his readers.

As will be seen, this reluctance to assume an authority was not simply a gesture toward democracy, but a response to the awareness which came in the wake of Locke's studies of the mind and of its responses to sensory perception, a highly individualized process which obviated, for a time, the value of a single standard of morality. If each man's behavior stemmed from his own perception of what constituted right and wrong, upon what authority could Brown hope to speak of a universal standard of morality? Rationalism which he had hoped to make the basis of his moral portraits depended upon the ability of the individual to commune with himself introspectively and find within himself the authority for his behavior. With the inner life of the individual dependent upon the manner in which he perceived the world, however, there was little hope of arriving at a consensus of what constituted virtue. Nothing, it seemed, that depended upon individual perception for its interpretation could be trusted, not even the record of history.

In an essay which appeared in The Monthly Magazine in 1800 Brown discusses the problem of human motivation in terms of

"The Difference Between History and Romance." The discussion not only applies to the difficulty in fictional presentation, but more importantly, to the difficulty of knowing what is objectively true and what is the result of subjective interpretation. The terms "history" and "romance," Brown says, "have never been very clearly distinguished from each other." While it would seem that "one dealt in fiction, and the other in truth," he claims that we would find ourselves "somewhat perplexed" if we attempted to apply these distinctions. Confining himself first to the province of natural history, Brown defines the historian as one who

carefully watches, and faithfully enumerates the appearances which occur. He who adorns these appearances with cause and effect, and traces resemblances between the past, distant and future, with the present, performs a different part. He is a dealer, not in certainties, but probabilities, and is therefore a romancer.<sup>12</sup>

In the area of human actions, which he says is the chief subject of romance, the function of the historian may be observed, but merely recording the actions of men is insufficient since curiosity demands to know the motives for the actions. These motives "which cannot be certainly known" and are "the topics of conjecture. . . come within the province, not of history, but romance." Thus the sphere of history, Brown concludes, "is extremely narrow" and "must be limited to what is known by the testimony of our senses." But he adds,

Useful narratives must comprise facts linked together by some other circumstance. They must, commonly, consist of events, for a knowledge of which the narrator is indebted to the evidence of others. This evidence, though accompanied with different degrees of probability, can never give birth to certainty.

How wide, then, if romance be the narrative of mere probabilities, is the empire of romance? This empire is absolute and undivided over the motives and tendencies of human actions. Over actions themselves, its dominion,<sup>13</sup> though not unlimited, is yet very extensive.

Brown's use of the word "empire" to denote the authority of motivation over the actions of men provides the key to the present investigation of the roots of the American romance. "The Empire of Reason" has become a popular designation for the new republic in America, but here it refers to the rationalists' faith in reason as source of absolute moral authority. Brown did not concur in this belief and he states his case against it by subjecting reason to trial and testing in his fictions. The form of the test is that of the intrusion of mystery into the rational scene, an intrusion which in each case confounds and confuses the reason of those involved.

In 1798 Brown began to write about the greatest mystery of his time, the yellow fever, which annually presented a challenge to rationality and threatened to destroy the future of the infant nation. There was no source of authority on the subject of yellow fever, only a confusing barrage of strongly held opinions and even more strongly held prejudices. Nature seemed to hold full sway even over man's most earnest efforts to understand the causes of this mystery which lay beyond the reach of reason. Many of the conclusions reached by both scientists and laymen at the time were the result of rather specious reasoning. Behind this speciousness lay a variety of motives, ranging from a desire for self-advancement to political partisanship. Among the medical conclusions arrived at was that

of the nonimportationists, like Elihu Smith, who contended that the source of the fever lay within the country itself. To support his argument Smith used the historical accounts of plagues which had appeared in other times and places and applied the historians' conclusions about these to the situation presented by yellow fever. The extent to which Smith was wrong and the price he paid for his error were both great, and the occurrence convinced Brown that the mystery with which man is surrounded in the world is the final authority.

Smith's disastrous attempt at the role of historian led to his friend's essay on the differences between the functions of history and romance.

Brown argued for a recognition of the distinction between the aims of the historian and the romancer, but behind the argument lay the need to justify his own style of writing, in a sense, his own authorial authority. A natural inclination toward allegory and romance led Brown to depict the mystery surrounding human actions in a series of representations which earned for him his reputation as a Gothic writer. As will be seen, however, these representations attest to the appreciation of Spenser, which he publicly avowed, as well as a keen discernment of romance as a literature of learning in which the experience that lies beyond innocence fashions virtue.

Though claiming the right of the romancer to depict truth in his own way, Brown was well aware of the possibility of an unconscious motivation even in the romancer. The accusations of willful self-deceit which he hurls at Elihu Smith in Edgar Huntly may have been intended for himself as well, for he shortly

thereafter left off the writing of romance and seemingly renounced his former work. Brown's fear of his own intentions as a writer came partly from the national attitude toward "poetic fictions" inherited from the New England Puritans. The Puritans were, of course, Renaissance men who accepted the English Renaissance theory of poetry as Sidney had delineated it in his Defense of Poetry. Sidney sanctioned poetic imitation, or, "counterfeiting" as "a figuring forth--to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture--with this end, to teach and delight."<sup>14</sup> New England Puritanism emphasized this moral function of poetry, allowing it the status of philosophy which the great ethical poets of their literary tradition had given it.<sup>15</sup> Since there were few, if any, among their number who could achieve such invention, the lack led to a distrust of those lesser poetic attempts which seemed only to distract the Christian from more godly pursuits.<sup>16</sup>

By the late eighteenth century when the youthful Charles Brockden Brown dreamed of writing an epic poem on the discovery of America, poetry was no longer considered an aspect of philosophy, but had become instead the handmaiden of history. Such poetry as can be found in Joel Barlow's The Vision of Columbus and Timothy Dwight's The Conquest of Canaan is but an attempt to provide a new application for the Puritan theory of Providential history. Poetry suffered still further in eighteenth century America from an impulse toward realism which derived from the influence of rationalism, but regardless of the influence or the direction the subject considered to be the only one of any literary value was the subject of America.

Brown felt the same pull but it was the treatment of the subject which troubled him. His inclinations were toward the world of romance while the demands of his society were towards realism and history. Some of his personal problems occasioned by this split are revealed in the examination of his exchange of letters with Smith. Others become obvious only by relating his magazine articles and essays to his fictions. Complicating these conflicting demands still further was the problem of how to portray realistically an enemy whose threat to the young nation's survival surpassed in fury any that romance could devise.

In the throes of rebellion, warfare, and the establishment of a nation it had become easy for Americans to forget that their new-found authority could face a challenge from a rival power here on the continent which they now called theirs. The Empire of Nature began to be felt soon after the birth of the nation with a force that few of that generation had known. In the minds of most Americans the pestilence that blighted the land could only have originated elsewhere and been brought to her shores by agents of destruction. To these same minds those who insisted otherwise, who claimed that the source of contagion lay within the nation, were enemies of the republic eager to use any opportunity to further the claims of democracy in America. To men like Brown who sought to maintain their equilibrium in the midst of the divisions generated by the yellow fever epidemics it was nature's ability to thwart the steady progress of mankind toward moral perfection which proved the greatest source of terror. That nature should take arms

against the social and political experiment undertaken in America seemed to Brown to constitute a display of tyranny greater than any shown by repressive governments ancient or modern.

The empire of nature in America became Brown's greatest theme, one which provided him the material for what remains one of the truly outstanding pieces of realism in American literature, the scenes in Arthur Mervyn of Philadelphia during the yellow fever epidemic, as well as the matter out of which he devised his most romantic scenes, the nightmare landscape in Edgar Huntly. Leslie Fiedler has noted the embarrassment of many an Americanist at Brown's exaggerated and grotesque style. He comments on the set-piece of the anthologies, the excerpt from Arthur Mervyn referred to above, and implies that only when the nightmare qualities of reality equal the nightmares of Brown's imagination is his style rendered acceptable to the American literary taste.<sup>17</sup> Unfortunately, this seems to be true; yet it is precisely this conjunction of real and imagined horror which drove Brown to the limits of his capabilities as a writer. By far the most grotesque aspect of the historical reality of America in the 1790's was the yellow fever. The greatest of American writers have taken as their theme the corruption of the American dream mirrored in the corruption of her society, but none has had so forceful an image of that corruption as did Brown in the recurring plagues. The very lack of adequate medical knowledge of the fever at the time prevented him from equating it too specifically with any one cause. Thus in Arthur Mervyn, while working within the conventional Christian allegory of the contagion of sin

yet forced to deal with the question of the origin of the evil, whether internal or external to the political body, Brown shifts the emphasis from the purely allegorical image toward the more open-ended symbol. It may well have been this which led Hawthorne to include among the great writers who appear in his "Hall of Fantasy," "our countryman, the author of  
18  
Arthur Mervyn."

In the cyclic return of the yellow fever Brown saw more than a disastrous decimation of the population in the new nation (10,000 it is estimated in Philadelphia in 1793 alone). In it he saw the ruination of his hopes for the steady progress of enlightenment toward the eventual perfection of man and society. It was the experience of these epidemic years that made Brown vitally aware of the foolishness of attempting to fashion a philosophy, or formulate a morality, that concentrated only on man whether singly or collectively. "Man may be considered as one, and alone; or he may be considered as a member of a community, and connected with others..." he had declared in his early youth; but after the summer of 1798 when Smith died of the fever and Brown himself fell ill of it, he knew with a certainty born of horror that in America man would always have to be considered in another dimension as well as man in nature. Here was an empire against which that of reason quailed, an empire which combined with what Brown was to term the "absolute and undivided" empire of romance over human motivation to extend still further its sway.

Arthur Mervyn and Edgar Huntly viewed, as they are in this study, as companion pieces, reveal the way in which Brown

eulogized his dead friend, Smith, in one book while at the same time creating another in which he pilloried him for his unwillingness to acknowledge the extent to which he himself was subject to the empire of romance. It is nothing new to say that the American romance is set against a symbolic landscape or that Edgar Huntly is the first instance of it. What is gained from the examination of that work in relation to Arthur Mervyn is an appreciation of the two based not only on their individual merits but as parts in the last of Brown's dialogues of discovery. The habit of distributing conflicting ideas into parts led eventually to his treatment of ideas as topics, or places, in which they could be contained and dealt with. Such a place is the topos of romance, the learning place where truth is perceived, and is the exact opposite of a Utopia where truth has already been attained.

As long as the empire of nature held full sway Brown saw no possibility for the advancement of man's knowledge, but when the experiences of the plague years had begun to recede into memory he was able to gain a new vision of the future. In that vision the dystopian nightmares dissolved and the dream of future perfection became embedded in the idea of the American continent as an integral body stretching toward the continent of Europe. The dream of "manifest destiny" replaced that of the New World Garden and the New Jerusalem, but the quest was essentially the same, the quest for greater empire.

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## CHAPTER 1: THE EMPIRE OF REASON

Although Charles Brockden Brown was born in 1771, into a Pennsylvania Quaker family which had taken no part in the Revolutionary War, he was nonetheless part of a revolutionary movement, a member of that first generation of native Americans to be born subjects of the King and who died as citizens of the United States of America.<sup>1</sup> His was a brief lifetime spanning only some 39 years, but it was spent in or near the two centers of political and cultural activity in the new nation, Philadelphia and New York. Every current of new thought that was sparked by the intellectual movements in the enlightened cities of Europe eventually vibrated in these two places. Little or none of this intellectuality made its way into what passed as literature in the new nation, however, since literary efforts were largely confined to political subjects. The closest thing America had to a literary establishment was that coterie of New England writers, the Hartford Wits, whose efforts on behalf of the ratification of the constitution led them further into the defense of what they considered to be the marks of the true American revolutionary: a reverence for the order established by that constitution, and an abhorrence of anything which would further disturb the status quo of the New England way of life.<sup>2</sup>

The Wits, originally Joel Barlow, Lemuel Hopkins, John Trumbull, and David Humphreys, were later joined by a second group, men such as Timothy Dwight, Mason Cogswell, and Elihu Hubbard Smith. All were well educated, of good families, and most were financially secure. In the eventful first decade of

the new republic the Wits, with the notable exception of Joel Barlow, vigorously supported the Federalist Party whose members constituted the first elected government of the United States. Within that Party it was generally believed that wealth and privilege would be the hallmarks of the nation's leaders and that the protection of their interests would prove to be the protection of the best interests of the country.

There were those in the nation, however, who felt that independence from Great Britain had not entirely freed them from tyranny since they believed they saw in the Federalists the making of a new aristocracy, one which because of its close proximity would be even more difficult to unseat than had England's. Such thoughts were given momentum by the revolution in France which, before its degeneration into anarchy and terror, was looked upon by many Americans as a greater step toward democracy than their own efforts had produced. The decade of the 1790's was almost totally devoted to the opposing viewpoints of these two factions. Every local issue was seen in terms of international issues, and the conflicts between nations were reflected in the conflicts between neighbors in the newly federated States, particularly between the neighbors<sup>3</sup> in the rapidly growing cities of the Eastern seaboard states. No writer could remain aloof from such momentous issues and so the polemical nature of the nation's literature continued to prevail. When Charles Brockden Brown decided to abandon the legal profession which his parents had chosen for him and enter the world of letters, he chose not to become a part of the political scene. Instead he hoped to wield some moral influence

through his writing, to be what he termed a "painter of moral pictures." Such an ambition might well have endeared him to the Connecticut Wits had he not come under the influence of a defector from their ranks.

Brown's first contact with America's literary establishment began in 1790 when he met Elihu Hubbard Smith, a young native of Litchfield, Conn. who was attending Dr. Benjamin Rush's medical lectures at the Pennsylvania Hospital in Philadelphia where Brown lived. Smith, who had graduated from Yale College at 15, later attended Dr. Timothy Dwight's Academy at Greenfield Hill and then studied medicine with a local Connecticut doctor before deciding to study with America's leading physician. At home in Connecticut, Smith was one of the minor Hartford Wits, a group then composed of Mason Cogswell, Theodore Dwight, Richard Alsop, and Smith. Together they produced the Echo, a series of verse satires imitative of the Anarchiad, The Progress of Dullness, and other productions of the major Wits. While in Philadelphia Smith engaged in a series of poetical letters done in the Della Cruscan style which appeared in the Gazette of the United States in 1791. It has long been known that Smith's contributions to this series were those signed "Ella," and that those signed "Birtha" were the products of his close friend, Joseph Bringham<sup>4</sup>, Jr. Recent scholarship has established that the third party to the poetical triangle whose poems were signed "Henry" was Charles Brockden Brown.<sup>5</sup> Two years later Smith, probably with Brown's assistance, edited the first anthology of American poetry which consisted principally of the works of Connecticut poets. In 1797 Smith would publish

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Brown's first major literary effort, Alcuin.

Smith and Brown were exact contemporaries but, according to William Dunlap who was an intimate of both, exact opposites.

Writing after their deaths Dunlap says:

No two men were ever more sincerely attached to each other than Charles Brockden Brown and Elihu Hubbard Smith, yet in many particulars no two men were ever more different. Both under the necessity of being economists, Brown acted as if he had no use for money while Smith systematically calculated his resources and contracted his wants rigidly within the reach of his means. Brown was without system in every thing; Smith did nothing but by rule, and was as strict an economist of his time as of his money. Brown was negligent of personal appearance, even to slovenliness, while Smith was in cleanliness, neatness and attention to the proprieties of dress, a perfect model, and seemed to make the purity of his clothing an index of the purity of his mind. Brown was in mixed company, often silent and absent, Smith entered readily into the views and conversation of those around him with the ease of a man of the world. Their long and intimate intercourse tended to assimilate them in some of these particulars, and in none more than in the necessary attention to personal appearance and propriety of dress. They were both journalizers of the passing events of their lives, their studies, their thoughts and their actions; but in this as in other things, Brown was fitful and irregular, while Smith was uniform, diligent and orderly.<sup>6</sup>

This lengthy description is given here in its entirety because of its excellent depiction of the closeness of the friendship between the two men despite their obvious difference. Less obvious were the philosophic differences which separated them and which underlie much of Brown's writing.

The scope of these differences seems to have ranged widely, encompassing the major philosophic issues of the day: materialism, rationalism, progress, human perfection, and freedom of the will, among others. Smith was the better educated and probably the better read and more articulate of the two;

certainly he was the more opinionated. He believed everything was reducible to science and that reason, were it to prevail everywhere, would bring to an end all the evils of the world. Smith envisioned the perfect society which would be attainable just as soon as the proper environment for perfection was established and men were educated to make the right moral choices toward which he believed their nature inherently disposed them.

Brown, whose education prior to his apprenticeship to the Philadelphia lawyer, Alexander Wilcocks, had been entirely gained at the Friends' Latin School conducted by Robert Proud, was no doubt much impressed by his new friend's college background and literary connections.<sup>7</sup> From Dunlap's description of Brown's silences and Smith's ready flow of conversation we can surmise that Brown found it easier to explore the philosophic attitudes being absorbed by the members of the Friendly Club through the medium of his fictions. Brown seems to have gone through various stages of agreeing and disagreeing with Smith's ideas, but there is no real indication that he ever agreed with him on the subject of a perfect, or Utopian, society. Smith's diary reveals him to have been a Utopist but in spite of the claim made by Brown's biographer, William Dunlap, there is little in Brown's writing to support the idea that he shared this predilection. He seems never to have altered the opinion he offered to a group of friends when he was still a law apprentice. At that time he referred to "an idea of perfection" which is often "the object of contemplation with philosophers" but which tended to fade away when tried "by

the unfailing test of experience."<sup>8</sup> Since the idea of Utopia is central to the differences between Smith and Brown it is worth examining the treatment this idea receives in Brown's writings.

In the same year that Smith published his anthology of American poems, 1793, Brown wrote two letters which now constitute the earliest of the four remaining "Ellendale" fragments, portions of a novel Brown worked on for some two years before he abandoned the idea. The fourth and most complete fragment is the "Adini" story which Dunlap published in his 1815 biography of Brown.<sup>9</sup> This, along with the other fragments, seems to explain Dunlap's claim that "His [Brown's] journals of this time were interspersed with lines and scraps of Eutopias, which are left in so unfinished a situation as to be unintelligible."<sup>10</sup> The scraps of Utopias were probably related to the figure of Adini who intimates that he is, or hopes to be, "a ruler in Socratic land." Dunlap no doubt assumed that the Utopian plans which were designed to represent those of Adini were actually Brown's, and continued his comments by adding "In common with many ardent minds filled with a love of their fellow creatures, he [Brown] sought for some plan by which to improve and secure human happiness."<sup>11</sup> Dunlap may have forgotten that in 1795 when Brown was hard at work on his novel, he wrote to his future biographer revealing his intention to offer in the work a substitute for Christianity, a new "system of morality perfect in all its parts."<sup>12</sup> At about the same time Brown wrote to another friend, Joseph

Bringhurst:

I really think that Christianity: that is the belief in the divinity of Christ and future retribution, have been pernicious to mankind. I deny the superhuman authority of any teacher, and a future retribution.<sup>13</sup>

The presentation of a new system of morality is quite a different thing from the presentation of a Utopia. Judging by the characterization which Brown gives to Utopists in his fictions he would not have wished to be considered one of them. Adini, in the fragment which Dunlap provides, bears some resemblance to Mrs. Radcliffe's Italian and is a very mysterious figure. Though a frequent visitor to the home of Mr. & Mrs. Ellen whose estate, Ellendale, is outside Philadelphia, his origins remain unknown to them. He hints darkly of his wishes to foment revolution in Europe, and claims knowledge of a world of intellectual beings living somewhere in the area between America and Asia which appears on maps as nothing but water. It is when he announces that he has actually been a visitor to More's Utopia that Mr. Ellen concludes he is a victim of enthusiasm "equal to that of a Boehme or a Swedenborg."<sup>14</sup>

Mr. Ellen, who has also denigrated Columbus' purpose in seeking the New World as being purely mercantile and has referred to the founder of Pennsylvania as "that wild and incorrigible enthusiast," is no doubt meant to be Brown's spokesman for reason, equally opposed to religious sentiment and to nationalistic propaganda. When it is recalled that Elihu Hubbard Smith's nom de plume was "Ella" it is not hard to see that the Ellendale novel was very much associated in Brown's mind with his friend. Certainly Smith reveals an almost fearful

anticipation of Brown's work in progress in a diary entry:

. . . I feel no small curiosity to see how my friend will manage his plot. But I have no doubt of it's being worthy of its Author. What different sentiments will it excite! And how much rancour, & misrepresentation must he encounter! And not he alone, but all those who are united to him, by the ties of friendship, & bonds of resembling opinions. Hitherto, in respect to public misfortunes, our lives have glided forward, smoothly enough. A calm like this can not be durable. Storms & tempests hover over our heads, ready to burst, or are gathering in slow & sullen vengeance, to break, & overwhelm us with destruction. But I trust that we shall put forth the conductors of virtue, & turn aside, or disarm the lightnings of superstitious fury.<sup>15</sup>

Just what it was that Smith expected Brown to write which would bring down on their heads storms and tempests of "superstitious fury" is uncertain since the work remained uncompleted. It is not difficult to guess, however, that whatever the new system of morals the author intended to present, it would have been based on the philosophic concepts of rationalism. It is difficult for us today to appreciate the degree to which rationalism in its religious form, Deism, was held in disrepute by most Americans. Despite the fact that the "founding fathers" of the new nation were almost all free-thinkers and adherents to the religious principles which had evolved out of the European Enlightenment, Deism was never accepted in orthodox New England or even in the more sophisticated states of New York and Pennsylvania although it was tolerated in both. Prior to the French Revolution, however, it was possible for many Americans to be deistical in their thinking while remaining within the ranks of established Christianity. This changed when

the forces in France brewed a blend of revolution and anticlericalism which by the end of the 1790's had made Deism<sup>16</sup> synonymous with Satanism in Federalist America. Though he does not single out France for discussion, Charles Brockden Brown once offered his own summary of the eighteenth century's religious controversy in Europe.

There was in that century, according to Brown, a movement away from the considerations of the prior century, i.e., Protestantism vs. Rome, and "a controversy gradually arose as to the truth of religion and more especially, of Christianity itself."<sup>17</sup> The inhabitants of Europe, he says, came to question "the truth of any form of religion whatsoever," and in place of "ancient denominations, mankind began to assume the distinctions of christian and infidels: or religionists and atheists." All of these issues, he claims, received "a thorough discussion" in the course of the century.

Brown says nothing of a comparable public discourse having existed in the United States, and indeed it did not. There was never a point at which the truth of religion and/or Christianity itself was openly questioned in America. Ethan Allen's Reason, The Only Oracle of Man (1784), which was denominated by Timothy Dwight "the first formal publication in the United States, openly directed against the Christian<sup>18</sup> religion," was in reality much more of an impassioned attack on New England Calvinism. Joel Barlow found a haven for his rational belief not in America but in France, and men like Adams, Jefferson, and Washington made their greatest contributions to free thought in the political sphere, though Jefferson did

later incur the wrath of the conservative clergy for his  
deistical writings.<sup>19</sup> Others, such as Elihu Palmer and Thomas  
Paine, suffered for their public avowals of the principles of  
Deism. Paine's return to this country from France in 1802  
was far from the triumph the one-time hero of the Revolution  
might have expected. The publication of his The Age of Reason  
in 1794 had so inflamed whole segments of the American population  
that the remaining years of Paine's life, all of which were  
spent here, were made quite miserable by those who hounded him  
even beyond the grave.<sup>20</sup>

Still, despite the fact that in the public mind rationalism  
was "the republican religion," among the intellectuals and  
professional men in America the philosophy which had found its  
highest expression in the English language through the words of  
Lord Shaftesbury remained a viable alternative to Christianity.  
William Dunlap's diary provides a glimpse of one such group of  
men in an entry recording a meeting of the Friendly Club, a  
New York group in which Smith, Brown, and Dunlap were members:

Kent, Smith, Johnson & me made the little  
party but it was very pleasant. Kent remarked  
that men of information were now nearly as free  
from vulgar superstition or the Christian  
religion as they were in ye time of Cicero  
from the pagan superstition -- all, says he,  
except the literary men among the Clergy.<sup>21</sup>

Kent, Smith and Johnson were all graduates of Yale and all  
shared a Calvinist background. Kent later in his life referred  
to Smith as "a wit and a fine scholar, but a terrible Freethinker."<sup>22</sup>  
This was, however, after Kent had become a judge of the New York  
State Supreme Court and Chancellor of the New York Court of  
Chancery and had gained an international reputation for his

Commentaries on American law. Johnson, too, was later to achieve a legal reputation in both the New York Supreme Court and Court of Chancery. Smith, the "terrible Freethinker," was probably the only avowed Deist in the group; as such he was in criminal violation of Connecticut law when he lived there. Even while living in New York he once fantasied a return to Connecticut and prosecution "on the Statute against Blasphemy."<sup>23</sup>

Rationalists were in most cases republicans but the politics of Brown and his contemporaries are a little more difficult to pin down. A certain imprecision regarding political terms is widespread in the writing of the time reflecting a desire on the part of many to avoid engaging in the hysterical rantings of men such as William Cobbett, who, though English, was the most notorious of the Federalist polemicists. Educated gentlemen of the period were expected to display a "liberal," that is non-partisan, understanding of the political aims of the nation. Elihu Smith once wrote that "A Federalist, & a Democrat, in the party-acceptation of those terms, are equally detestable . . . ." All that was needful for the "just" man to do, he continued, was to "reflect & observe, at a distance from public life a few years . . . [and] he will advocate federalism on the foundation of democracy."<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, Smith's diary and his attempt at creating a plan for a Utopian state reveal him to have been decidedly republican.

Brown's philosophical and political leanings were, in the decade of the 1790's, much like those of his friend, Smith. Following Smith's death, however, Brown became much more conservative. One obvious reason was his increased dependence upon the patronage

of the generally better educated Federalist element of the population for the support of his literary ventures. Just two months after the death of Elihu Hubbard Smith the Rev. Samuel Miller wrote to Dr. Jedidiah Morse, renowned Federalist clergyman of Charlestown, Mass. and noted American geographer. Miller was soliciting Morse's influence on behalf of the proposed Monthly Magazine and American Review to be edited by Charles Brockden Brown. The publication, he assures Morse, will be "one that will be decidedly favourable to the interests of morality and religion."<sup>25</sup> Dr. Morse demurred, expressing fear that the magazine would be "too Democratical," so the following spring Miller wrote again. Concerning Brown he says:

You may, I believe, fully confide in him as a Federalist. Of his learning and taste there can be no question. There is a society, or club, of some ten gentlemen, who meet once a week to consult about the magazine, and concert plans to make up its contents and to promote its interests. Of these ten, seven are decidedly Federalists, the other three are a little Democratic, but remarkably mild and moderate men. I am not at liberty to mention their names, but am persuaded you need be under no apprehension respecting the work in a political point of view.<sup>26</sup>

One of the things which Brown would have had to live down as a product of a "too Democratical" youth would have been his first published prose work, Alcuin. Interesting now only for its position as the first treatise in America on the subject of women's rights, the history of Alcuin's publication is further evidence of the influence Elihu Hubbard Smith has on Brown's writing and offers another proof of Brown's anti-Utopian stance. In July, 1797 Smith wrote to Brown in Philadelphia that Mr. Joseph Dennie, editor of The Farmer's Weekly Museum in New Hampshire, had formed

a good opinion of Smith's literary accomplishments from some letters Smith had addressed to him regarding various pieces produced in the weekly newspaper. As a result, Dennie had requested Smith to write some essays for the paper but Smith preferred that Brown undertake the project. Believing that Dennie would pay for such essays, Smith urged Brown to "send some little Fragment" which he intended to add to the "several Scraps" which Dunlap had already given him to be sent to Dennie.<sup>27</sup>

The Museum was a staunchly Federalist newspaper of good reputation and with a circulation of about 3,000 copies weekly. Smith reminded Brown of this adding:

Here is an opportunity for an adroit disperser of the truth; if he be careful to make his approaches with gentleness, & to intermis the lighter pictures of fancy, & the delicate effusions of literature.<sup>28</sup>

A month later Smith received from Brown Alcuin; A Dialogue, Parts I and II, which he read and enjoyed and circulated among his friends. But Dennie never replied to the letter in which Smith suggested that Brown might be better suited to the task of writing. Having already solicited the work from Brown, however, Smith no doubt felt some responsibility toward him, and in March, 1798 T.&J. Swords printed, under the guidance of E. H. Smith, Alcuin; A Dialogue. The edition included only Parts I and II although Brown had sent Smith Parts III and IV in time for publication. Smith had some reservations as to the propriety of these, however, and they did not appear in print until Dunlap<sup>29</sup> included them among Brown's unpublished works in the Life.

Alcuin is a dialogue on the rights of women whose participants are Alcuin, a young schoolmaster, and an articulate and intelligent widow, Mrs. Carter, who maintains her brother's house and is "always at home." At a social gathering over which Mrs. Carter presides, Alcuin engages his hostess in conversation. She quickly turns his questions to a discussion of woman's place in the American post-revolutionary society. When she is finally able to make Alcuin take her seriously she finds him to be a typically liberal thinker who assents to her ideas and utters all the properly supportive phrases before pointing out the moral superiority of woman as a reason for keeping her removed from the sordidness of worldly enterprise. Mrs. Carter argues for her right to vote and to gain an education, and to be generally included in the new society as an equal of its men.

Part III finds the pair together again a week later. Alcuin tells of his imaginary journey to "a far distant region," an island on which was located a Paradise of Women. Here the sexes lived in full equality, undifferentiated by dress, education, or labor. Absent from the whole scheme of things in this Paradise is marriage. Mrs. Carter, unlike Mary Wollstonecraft, is not interested in "that detestable philosophy which scoffs at the matrimonial institution" and "consigns us to the guidance of a sensual impulse . . ." Her objections to marriage are to society's interpretation of that institution, not to the institution itself. She advocates equality of rights and responsibilities for the marriage partners, and in concluding her argument for divorce echoes the political arguments of the day by declaring that marriage "is an union founded on free and mutual consent . . . . As soon as

the union ceases to be spontaneous it ceases to be just."

It is obvious that Brown has designed Alcuin's invention of a Paradise of Women as a device by means of which Mrs. Carter's quite radical arguments can appear in a far more reasonable light. Indeed, she tells him that she regards his excursion into the visionary world of Utopia as an attempt "to subdue our incredulity, as to the effects of [its] new maxims . . . by engrossing the fancy and charming the affections."<sup>31</sup> Alcuin is then, like the dialogue between Adini and Mr. Ellen in that fragment, a contest between a visionary and a rationalist in which the arguments of the rationalist gain credibility by contrast with the preposterousness of those of the visionary. Regardless of the premise or the argument, Brown's mind seems most often to have turned to the method of debate for the presentation of ideas. What is particularly interesting is the frequency with which he endows one of his antagonists with Utopist tendencies.

The fullest discussion of Utopian designs appears in Memoirs of Carwin, the Biloquist which Brown began in the summer of 1798 but did not publish until 1803 when he was in need of material for the Literary Magazine he was then editing. After attempting to finish it at that time he gave it up entirely. The Memoirs is the story of Frank Carwin the ventriloquist who figures prominently in Wieland. In it we learn how the young Pennsylvania farm boy acquired his biloquial talent and how he came under the influence of Ludloe who becomes his patron and who proposes to him membership in a fraternity devoted to some scheme of human perfection. Ludloe argues against private property and against the idea that because of inherent defects in the moral constitution of men

governments are necessary to the social institutions of mankind. It is his belief that the progress of man could be unlimited were it not hindered by government. Ludloe is actively engaged, in ways which are never revealed, in establishing a place of "Utopian felicity, where the empire of reason should supplant that of force . . . ."<sup>32</sup>

Ludloe, whom Carwin describes as "the eulogist of sincerity," expounds the Godwinian theory which Brown had imbibed the summer before writing the Memoirs when he read Political Justice. Smith and Brown were both very much impressed with Godwin's work and in 1796 Smith was recommending it to a number of his friends. He seems to have had some reservations, however, about Godwin's belief that all that was necessary for the achievement of a perfect human society was the universal practice of sincerity and the absence of any other form of government. When Brown read the Enquiry he evidently wrote to Smith praising it. Smith seconded the praise but raised the objection that Godwin was too general in his approach with the result that "while he batters down every thing before him, he erects nothing on the ruins."<sup>33</sup>

This is essentially what Ludloe does in his sweeping condemnations which lead to little more than pictures of a perfectly just society, pictures which "filled the imagination" of young Carwin. The young man becomes enamoured of the idea of a perfect society. Drawing on the example of the European colonists who, once removed from the "depravity" of Europe where all hope of reformation was useless, had adopted in the

New World a system of government under which "they enjoyed a degree of happiness far superior to their parent state," he suggests to Ludloe a further plan of colonization:

Let a few, sufficiently enlightened and disinterested, take up their abode in some unvisited region. Let their social scheme be founded in equity, and how small soever their original number may be, their growth into a nation is inevitable. Among other effects of national justice, was to be ranked the swift increase of numbers. Exempt from servile obligations and perverse habits, endowed with property, wisdom, and health, hundreds will expand, with inconceivable rapidity into thousands and thousands, into millions; and a new race, tutored in truth, may, in a few centuries, overflow the habitable world.<sup>34</sup>

The difference between Ludloe's and Carwin's Utopian ideas does not amount to the easy indentification of reason vs. enthusiasm that can be made in the Adini fragment or in Alcuin. There is, nonetheless, a vast difference between the two men since one is essentially a revolutionary who claims the state of man is such that all and any means are legitimate in effecting change. (Thus the fraternity to which Ludloe belongs is a secret organization engaged in covert activities in various countries.) Carwin, on the other hand, is a reformer and would translate the abstract ideals of justice into reality. Once again, though, the plan of colonization which Carwin offers seems to have originated with Elihu Hubbard Smith rather than with Brown.

In August of 1796 Smith undertook the composition, in some nineteen pages in his diary, of a piece entitled simply "Utopia." He evidently had some hope of publishing it but since it was never completed and was deleted from the published Diary it has gone unheeded. Quite within keeping with what was to

become a convention of the American Utopian genre, Smith places his ideal state within the United States of America, locating it approximately where Columbus, Ohio was later to arise. The purported reason for the Utopia is "for the purpose of shewing what improvements are compatible with the present condition of man in our country," a purely reformatory rather than revolutionary

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intent. It presents a picture of the State of Utopia "lately admitted into the Union." Research into the background of Smith's "Utopia" reveals that he had in mind his native state of Connecticut and its attempt to establish a statewide system of education based on the common school fund which was the result of the sale in 1795 of three million acres of Western Reserve land. He had already made known to a member of the Connecticut legislature his thoughts on the structure which the state should give to the new system, and it is basically the same as the structure he outlines in the "Utopia."

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The idea for a new and Utopian state located in the Ohio Valley no doubt originated in the great interest generated in Smith's home state by the small party of settlers led by Gen. Moses Cleaveland who set out in the spring of 1796 to establish a "New Connecticut" in the remaining half million acres of land in the Western Reserve. The constitution upon which Smith bases his ideal state differs from that of Connecticut and the other New England states only in that it anticipates the democratic thrust which the Western states would give to the republican concept of government already established in the East. There is no provision for an established church, and the voting privilege is extended to all males of good character over the

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age of twenty-one, without reference to race or property. Democratic and Utopian though the state may be, it has chosen to align itself with the federal government of the United States. This is a clear indication that Smith believed the perfect society could be achieved within the borders of this nation and within the boundaries set by its constitution.

When Charles Brockden Brown borrowed Smith's idea and incorporated it into Carwin's colonization plan, he made one important modification. Whereas Smith's Utopian state is referred to as having been "lately admitted into the Union" and is presented as a contemporaneous event, Carwin speaks of a colony whose justice and equity cause it to prosper and expand so that its original population will grow into thousands and then millions, eventually, "in a few centuries," overflowing the world. Carwin's notion of a progressive advance toward perfection is thus set against Ludloe's contention that such perfection is immediately attainable in the proper environment and did, in fact, already exist in a remote spot peopled by his brothers of the secret society. As proof of this he allows Carwin to "discover" a map on which are located two islands in close proximity to each other lying in the area between the equator and the south pole which appeared on other maps only as watery expanses.

Behind this modification on Brown's part lies the controversy which arose in the latter part of the eighteenth century over the varying interpretations of the ideas of progress and perfection. The idea of reformation, so popular in the seventeenth century, was replaced in the succeeding century by that of progress

and, for some, by the idea of perfectibility. The theory of an inevitable progress of knowledge and human achievement which informed the thinking of virtually all the eighteenth century philosophes was teleological just as the religious thought of earlier centuries had been. But the removal of a religiously prescribed telos had, for a time, left a vacuum in the formulation of new historical philosophy. Pierre Bayle's non-providential approach to history had provided the impetus for the substitution of progressive theories, but both the goal and the means of achieving it remained obscure for some time. In the histories of Voltaire, Turgot, and Hume the theory of progress provided the means toward an end; in Condorcet and Godwin the end was designated as human perfection. Condorcet made of it a wholly human process, but in order to eliminate the possibility of domination by individuals of forceful genius, he invested in a society rather than in a government the power to decide its own rate of progress based on reason and utility. Godwin, who in his ambition to see all forms of control dwindle saw even in such collective restraint a threat to the individual, wished instead to rely on sincerity of motive as the criterion for a morally defined perfection.

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At some point in his life (exactly when has yet to be determined), Brown apparently tested Godwin's theory of sincerity as it might relate to the historical progress toward perfection of a political body isolated by nature from its neighbors. The "Sketches of a History of Carsol" published by William Dunlap in his biography of Brown has been adjudged only part of the overall history of the Carrill-Orme family which Brown never

completed. The Carsol sketches recount the history of a Mediterranean island in terms of the men who had successively exerted the greatest amount of influence, for good or bad, on the government of the island. These include its first conqueror, an enthusiast who was the cause of a rebellion and religious war, a martinet who establishes a police state, a benevolent dictator, and a communist who initiates a system of land redistribution. The significant fact about each of these men and the one thing that is common to all of them is their sincerity of motive. Each does what he believes is best in his own time for the development of the state. No negative judgement is made by the author regardless of how immoral the act, so long as the end is to Carsol's benefit.

The history of Carsol over a two thousand year span is thus a record of uneven temporal progress in which human agency provides the catalyst. Though it was mistaken by Dunlap as a Utopian work, the sketches of Carsol's history can hardly be viewed in that light. <sup>39</sup> Instead, we find that here as in the article in which he attempts to distinguish history from romance, Brown is very much concerned with the question of human motivation as it relates to history. In the "Sketches" he presents, without editorial comment of any kind, the actions of different men in different times. The only thing that can be concluded from the unadorned recital of these observations is that each man acted sincerely. Yet in drawing this conclusion the region of history, as Brown defined it, is left behind and the line crossed into the region of romance. Having done so it becomes easy to see that the

"Sketches" are a cyclical rather than a progressive history in that the general utility is made subject to the aims of successive men with varying results. Brown studiously attempts to steer his reader clear of such inferences, however, and may have only been experimenting with a mode of fiction that would as closely as possible emulate that of history. If that is the case, Dunlap's ascription of a Utopian design proves Brown's point that human curiosity is not content with viewing facts in their natural state but will combine and rearrange them to suit speculation.

The only light which Brown himself has shed on the Carsol "Sketches" appears in "Walstein's School of History," an article he published in The Monthly Magazine in the summer of 1799.<sup>40</sup> That article presents a fictitious professor of history, Walstein, as a model historian whose books are considered exemplary to those who came after him. His technique is said to have involved a "minute explication of motives," a "tissue of causes and effects," and a unity and coherence of design combined with purity of style. The object of all this art was to present a moral picture, one in which models of "right conduct" will incite men to imitation. Walstein is said to have created two works of history, one the life of Cicero and the other that of the Marquis of Pombal.<sup>41</sup> Brown claims Walstein reasoned that each of these men could be made models of behavior since each exhibited an authority which flowed from intellectual vigor. Though they lived in different times and different conditions, both promoted the general happiness by

the best means which human wisdom could suggest. . . . Both were right in their means as in their end: and each, had he exchanged conditions with the other, would have acted like that other.<sup>42</sup>

A brief synopsis of the history of Pombal is then provided and it is here that the Carsol "Sketches" are either prefigured or echoed, depending upon the date of their composition. The island is Portugal and Pombal is the narrator, but the historical events which he is said to relate are essentially those of Carsol. The Roman Catholic Church is the enemy against whom Pombal struggles and his conflict with it is exalted by Walstein as an example of virtue.

That portion of the article which deals directly with Walstein is brought to a close with this, and the work of a pupil of his, Engel, is considered. It is said that both men believed "that the narration of public events, with a certain licence of invention, was the most efficacious of moral instruments," but that "abstract systems and theoretical reasonings" were too difficult for the common man to grasp. Furthermore, it is explained, the sphere of influence of the common man is the one which the moralist hopes to influence and "a mode by which truth could be conveyed to a great number was<sup>43</sup> much to be preferred." Later Brown adds to this, "While it may seem best to purify the fountain, rather than to filter the stream, the latter is, to a certain degree, within our power, whereas the former is inpracticable."<sup>44</sup> The example given of Engel's work is the life of "Olivio Ronsica," whose story is that of Arthur Mervyn set in seventeenth century Europe. Engel provides a tale, Brown says, which is impossible to read

without "some degree of moral benefit" and "much pleasure."

It is impossible to know when this article was written because at the time of its publication Brown was using all the essays and pieces of short fiction he had on hand to fill the pages of the Monthly Magazine since his friends had failed to supply the magazine as they had promised. <sup>45</sup> It is quite likely though that the essay refers to that point in 1795 when Brown abandoned work on the "new system of morality" for which Smith waited and turned his attention to writing novels that would capture the attention of a wider number of readers. At the same time he may well have made the commitment to a literature which would aim to reform society not by attempting, as Smith would have, to reform its institutions but by reforming individuals within society. In this connection, one further reference to "Walstein" should be made. In considering the careers of Cicero and Pombal, the subjects of Walstein's histories, he notes that both chose to "labour for the public good" through means of "legal or ministerial authority," which method he says was insufficient. The more effective means, he claims, of "assailing popular errors and vices [is] argumentatively and through the medium of books. . . ." The fate of Cicero and Pombal teaches us, he concludes, "that a change of national opinion is the necessary prerequisite of revolutions." <sup>46</sup>

Behind this decision to aim at the improvement of individual morals lay a basic disagreement between Brown and Smith over the subject of human perfectibility. Smith professed to be a firm believer in the ability of man to achieve

perfection not in some future time, but just as soon as a new environment of freedom would allow its realization.<sup>47</sup> Brown disagreed, believing that man would gradually progress toward greater and greater degrees of perfection. In his depiction, in Ormond, of an arch-Perfectibilian Brown reveals his conviction that morality acts as the necessary brake on the human desire for perfection and the bid for ultimate power inherent in that desire. Not until the slow progression of knowledge and moral behavior had sufficiently lessened the defects of humanity would the "new race, tutored in truth," to which Carwin refers,<sup>48</sup> be ready to possess the earth. Utopia represented, for Smith, the new moral environment in which man would be perfectly happy; for Brown Utopia was the perfect environment which moral man would someday create.

Brown's anti-Utopian stance was thus based on a view of the human condition which differed radically from that of his friend. Like most Utopists, Smith was eager to create a society in which mankind would conform to a standard of behavior. In his Utopia, a state in which no natural divisions exist, all the inhabitants engage in agriculture and cottage industry, and even the temperature and climate of the state are even. Brief though the description of the new state is, there is a certain mediocrity about it which is peculiar to such ideal creations. Commerce and manufacturing are made impossible by the absence of transportation facilities and thus the choice of labor is severely curtailed. Children enter school at the age of three or four and are molded by the state into useful and productive citizens. There is an internal harmony existing

in the state that is said to result from the absence of party spirit, the prompt administration of justice, and "the universality of political, moral, and economical information among people of every condition." All of this contradicts what Brown refers to as "the actual state" of man which in no way resembles the cloistered virtue of Smith's Utopia.<sup>49</sup>

Certainly Smith was not alone in his Utopian desires. It was an age when, as Henry Steele Commager has said, the imaginations of enlightened men "teemed with Utopias."<sup>50</sup> Every philosophe great and small carried in his head or in his pocket a plan for an ideal society, and poets like Coleridge and Southey believed that on the banks of the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania they could, in just a few hours a day, carve out a Pantosocratic society. Yet, strangely, Charles Brockden Brown, the creator of American romantic fiction, did not succumb to this most romantic of ideas. Perhaps he was more keenly aware of the fact that here in America such dreams were likely to come true and men ought therefore to be more careful in their dreaming. At a very deep and fundamental level, however, Brown seems to have objected to the predictability of Utopian existence, to its extreme rationalism and its lack of spontaneity. Although Brown is thought of as a writer of Gothic fictions, it would perhaps be closer to the truth to speak of him as a writer of mysteries since the moral standard he attempted to arrive at in his works is always worked out through the format of a mystery, the mystery of the human mind, of human behavior, and even the mystery of disease, one of the most universal forms of evil.

This insistence on mystery is the basis of Brown's anti-Utopianism and of his wish to be viewed instead as a moralist. Morality involves the necessity to choose, a privilege which Utopia would deny. The mystery surrounding the individual human choices that govern behavior became one of Brown's primary interests as a writer of fiction, and the freedom to make such choices he saw as an absolute necessity for the attainment of a truly virtuous society. Smith would have the citizens of a republic of virtue automatically virtuous, the products of a moral environment, but Brown would have them choose first to be virtuous citizens and then to produce a moral environment. The grounds upon which each man rejected Christianity had a great deal to do with their varying determinations in this matter. The Christianity of Puritanism which had viewed the colonization of America as a step toward the establishment here of the New Jerusalem had left its legacy in the political concept of America's sacred role in history which accompanied the founding of the nation. The national "mission" became that of establishing the first truly moral society which would serve as a model to the world. Smith, who quite rightly saw the connections between the psychology of John Locke and the writings of Jonathan Edwards on the freedom of the will, believed that the philosophy of rationalism was the next obvious step forward in what he termed the "improveable science" of morality and was therefore the system which should prevail in the new society. In evident agreement with Edwards' contention that man did not possess a will that was truly free, Smith concentrated on man's capacity for improvement, or in his own words, on man as "an improving animal." Given this capacity

he looked to the two areas of influence to which Utopists had traditionally turned for the perfecting of humanity: heredity and education. In a letter to his dear friend, Theodore Dwight, younger brother of Dr. Timothy Dwight, Smith couched his explanation of the doctrine of perfectibility in the scientific terms which belong to Utopian psychology:

Man is an animal created with certain capacities. These are not unlimited; for then, he would cease to be man; but they are improveable; & this in two ways: First, culture or exercise -- which we call Education; secondly, by an hereditary propagation of that culture -- to a certain degree.<sup>53</sup>

The same letter, however, contains a statement which brings us closer to the root of Brown's disagreement with Smith on the subject of free choice. Smith argues that despite the outcome of our actions, we must nonetheless act virtuously: "To allow men the liberty of refraining from the performance of their duty is to inculcate vice, and to put the knife to the root of virtue, even before the tender blade appears."<sup>54</sup> It is this refusal to allow men the freedom to choose good or evil which Brown seems to have reacted against. It is difficult to directly substantiate such a claim since Brown left no letters or journals in which he expresses his convictions as did Smith. What we do have, however, are his created fictions in which he subjects to the trial of human experience the theories of scientific morality by which Smith hoped to see humanity molded. Brown too had rejected Christianity, on two major points according to an earlier quoted letter: retribution in an afterlife, and the divinity of Christ. The first of these two points involves the same question of motivation based,

in Christianity, on the fear of punishment and the promise of reward, that underlies the utopian psychology designed to produce a conditioned virtue. The second involves the matter of absolute authority which Brown's friend Smith believed, and tried to make him believe, resided solely in rationality. Brown was reluctant to allow reason to assume the empire which he denied to religion. A world in which reason ruled seems to have had as little attraction for him as did a Utopia in which men were not allowed the liberty to be vicious. Evil, with the mystery of irrationality that surrounds it, was not so easily put aside by Brown as it was by his more scientific friend.

Even Brown's method of trying out his fictions on his friends by writing letters to them filled with invented situations and self-characterizations caused Smith to undertake what he believed to be a necessary correction of his friend's error. "Why do you so much delight in Mystery?" he demands of him. "Is it the disease of Will? or of Habit? . . . .<sup>55</sup>  
The man of Truth, Charles! the pupil of Reason, has no mysteries." This is precisely what Brown seems to have feared would become true of man in a Utopian setting. As to the style of his writing, Smith wisely recommends to Brown a greater simplicity, but wraps his advice in an absurdity that must either have infuriated Brown or reduced him to laughter: "The pen of poesy,<sup>56</sup>  
Charles, is not often that of Philosophy & Truth."

In the year after he wrote this letter, however, Smith's sincere efforts to help Brown get started as a professional writer pushed these differences aside. Brown left Philadelphia

and came to live with Smith at 45 Pine Street in New York City. In an apparent effort to correct his "errors" Brown sought to provide, in Wieland, rational explanations for even the most bizarre creations of his fertile imagination, but never was the philosophy of rationalism so cast in a frame of mystery as in that first American romance. In one of his corrective letters Smith had once accused Brown of wandering<sup>57</sup> "in a world of your own creation." It is an apt reproof from one who would have preferred a world of his own making in which men could not wander from the path of virtue nor stray into the woods of error. Even in his youth Brown had been capable of a greater perspective on human nature and its dreams of perfection. Though he expressed doubt that such dreams could ever be realized, he saw in them their true value:

When we set before our eyes an object, as the end of our endeavours, however exalted and far beyond our reach, and lend our exertions solely to that object, our continued struggle will at length raise us to that elevated pitch of knowledge or of virtue, in which the imperfection of our nature is capable of supporting us.<sup>58</sup>

This is the stuff of which literature is made, not Utopian fancies or scientific formulations for a perfect society. The striving of one man after an object, exalted and far beyond his reach, whose imperfect nature is raised in the struggle between the choice of good or evil to a level higher than that which it has known, is the format of true romance and of moral allegory. It is this which Charles Brockden Brown brought to the world of American fiction, a world which was, in large part, one of his own creation.

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22. Letter from James Kent to his son, 15 April 1847, quoted in Introduction to The Diary of Elihu Hubbard Smith, 14.
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31. Ibid., 88.
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  39. Dunlap claimed the "sketches must all be considered as introductory to his favorite prospect of a perfect system of government." See Dunlap, Life, I, 359.
  40. See The Monthly Magazine, Aug.-Sept., 1799, Vol. I, 335-38, 407-11. The article also appears in H. Warfel, The Rhapsodist and Other Uncollected Works of Charles Brockden Brown, 145-156. Subsequent references will be to Warfel since it is more available.
  41. Warfel provides Pombal's dates, 1699-1782, and says he was a virtual ruler of Portugal from 1750 to 1777 who opposed both aristocratic and Jesuit influences. See Warfel, 146 n.
  42. C.B.B., "Walstein," Warfel, 147.
  43. Ibid., 150.
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46. C.B.B., "Walstein," Warfel, 150. In the Carsol "Sketches" Arthur Carrill chooses to combat the Church through the written word. Berthoff makes no reference to the "Walstein" piece in his article on Brown's historical "Sketches."
47. See Smith's letter to Theodore Dwight dated 22 Nov., 1796 in his Diary, 256-266. At times Smith becomes enmeshed in his own definitions of such terms as progress, perfection, and perfectibility. For a review of the meaning of these terms in 18th century America see Gilbert Chinard, "Progress and Perfectibility in Samuel Miller's 'Intellectual History,'" Studies in Intellectual History (Balt.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), 94-122. Miller was the brother of Dr. Edward Miller, one of Smith's co-editors on The Medical Repository.
48. C.B.B., "Memoirs of Carwin," 307.
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50. Henry Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1977), 3.
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52. Smith to Dwight in the letter of 22 Nov. 1796 referred to above.
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## CHAPTER 2: THE ALLEGORICAL MODE

Early in 1793 Brown wrote, in a letter to his friend Joseph Bringham, of a dream once related to him by his late wife in which she and he wandered "in the region of romance . . . in Spencer's (sic) fairy land."<sup>1</sup> Both the wife and the dream were pure fictions, an example of the "mist of error" which Elihu Hubbard Smith claimed Brown allowed to surround him, "blocking out the sun of Truth."<sup>2</sup> In his writing Brown seems often to have wandered in "Spencer's fairy land," and for this reason F. O. Matthiessen's appraisal of his art touches closely the heart of it. Matthiessen believed that "Brown's turbulence was the product of a passionate imagination that transformed the mechanical horrors of the Gothic novel into something really felt, as he explored a mysterious borderland between fantasy and reality."<sup>3</sup> This mysterious borderland was much closer to Brown's idea of Utopia than was Smith's ideal state. Like Spenser's Faery Land, which John Hughes termed "an Utopia, an imaginary Place," it is a place of experience, in essence the same as that region where the actual and the imagined worlds meet in the romances of Nathaniel Hawthorne.

Hawthorne, in his preface to The Blithedale Romance says that in America in 1852 "there is as yet no such Faery Land, so like the real world, that in a suitable remoteness, one cannot well tell the difference . . . ." He then insists that:

This atmosphere is what the American romancer needs. In its absence, the beings of imagination are compelled to show themselves in the same category as actually living mortals; a necessity that generally renders the paint and pasteboard<sup>4</sup> of their composition but too painfully discernible.

Yet even Hawthorne realized that another before him had made an excursion into this world of Faery. In "The Hall of Fantasy" wherein he enshrines those who "in every age have been rulers and demigods in the realms of imagination," he claims that though hidden in "an obscure and shadowy niche" there is nonetheless a bust of "our countryman, the author of Arthur Mervyn."<sup>5</sup> The fact that Hawthorne accords Brown this honor based on his authorship of Arthur Mervyn is especially interesting since that book deals with the historical evil of yellow fever in America in much the same way as do Hawthorne's on the evils associated with Puritanism, that is, in a mixture of realism and romance. And half a century before Hawthorne expressed regret for the historical necessity which caused him to assign an actual setting to his imaginary events in The House of the Seven Gables, Brown was eagerly attempting to provide a peculiarly American cast to his fictions by using native themes and by making use of specific cities and streets as their locale. Like Spenser's Faery Land which was contemporaneous with Elizabeth's England, Brown's borderland "between fantasy and reality" draws on the two realms in much the same manner as Spenser drew on the "other world" of medieval folklore and enchantment to make reference to the New World of Columbus.<sup>6</sup>

Brown himself provides us with an idea of the importance he attached to The Faerie Queene. In 1805 when he was editing The Literary Magazine and American Register Brown wrote an article for that monthly suggesting a "modernization" of either all six books or only the first, which he claimed "is entire in itself." Calling attention to the then current translation of

Wieland's Oberon as "a poem written in the genuine Spenserian manner," Brown exhorts

What an inestimable banquet would the  
translator of Wieland provide for us  
by taking the Fairy Queen in hand, and  
bestowing the same bewitching numbers  
and style upon a poet who deserves them  
at least as much as Wieland.<sup>7</sup>

The reference to the "genuine Spenserian manner" of Wieland's Oberon could possibly mean Sotheby's use, in his English translation of the work, of the Spenserian stanza in place of Wieland's original ottava rima. More likely though Brown was alluding to the richly romantic and allegorical matter of Wieland's poem, seeing in it the same qualities that he saw in Spenser's. Oberon, which was first an extremely popular poem in Germany, quickly became recognized as a masterpiece of modern European literature. It offered imaginative and sensuous language, a subject matter that was exotically oriental and medieval, and a supernatural machinery which won high praise for its effectiveness.<sup>8</sup> William Taylor, a pioneer of German literary criticism in England, claimed the poem revealed "a unique logic" in that the fates of the mortals depicted in the work were so intimately linked with those of Oberon and Titania as to make their supernatural intervention believable.

Taylor's comments were part of a series of articles on the "Collected Works" of C. M. Wieland which appeared in the London Monthly Review in 1798. The article devoted to Oberon was the longest in the series and included a detailed summary and analysis of the poem which was till then almost unknown in England. It succeeded in creating great interest in Wieland

and lead to Sotheby's translation the following year. The Monthly Review was avidly read by literary people in America such as Elihu Hubbard Smith. Each month Smith noted in his diary the contents of the issue just completed (usually the issue that had appeared in London three months earlier), often appending his own comments. On 1 Jan., 1798 he notes his appreciation of the Taylor articles:

The name of this writer is a security for pleasure. Few articles are more elegant than those which relate to Wieland's works. I read both the critic & the author with delight -- nor I do know the name of any poet, whose writings I equally desire to read in the original tongue."<sup>9</sup>

It is interesting to trace the chronology of events that link this series of articles to the writing of Brown's first novel, which bears the name of the German poet, and to see how the presentation of a rational system of morality acquired a supernatural machinery.

In July of 1798 Brown was living with Smith in New York and was hard at work on Wieland. On 11 July, 1798 Smith's diary reads: "Finished Brown's 'Wieland' -- as far as he has carried it." Then, continuing the entry, he adds that he, Brown, and a third friend, William Johnson, "read the Story which furnished the hint for a part of 'Wieland.'" <sup>10</sup> This latter is a reference, no doubt, to the story of the murder some years earlier by a New York State farmer of his entire family which served as the basis for Theodore Wieland's murder, <sup>11</sup> in Brown's novel, of his wife and children.

On 23 July, 1798 T. & J. Swords began the printing of Wieland, the greater part of it having already been written.

Two days later Johnson, Smith, and Brown, had, according to Smith's diary, "a long conversation, chiefly on a suitable catastrophe to his [Brown's] Tale; & we concluded the evening by reading the article of the Monthly Review which contains the analysis of Wieland's Oberon."<sup>12</sup> Brown continued the writing of Wieland and at the same time began writing "Carwin." Smith was nightly engaged in correcting copies of Wieland as they came from the printer, and on Friday, 14 Sept., 1798, just five days before his death, Smith notes in his diary, "Brown's 'Wieland' published today."

Wieland is the story of a young German-American whose grandfather is said to have been the first member of the family to display the literary talent for which the name Wieland was later to be famed. The family is reduced in rank by marriage, and the son of this talented man becomes apprenticed to a London merchant. In early manhood he comes under the influence of the pietistic writings of the Camisard sect and is converted. He emigrates to America with the intention of preaching the Gospel to the Indians, but is diverted by the prospect of prosperity in the New World. His success as a farmer leads him to marry and settle in the Schuylkill River valley of Pennsylvania where he again takes up his religious practices and soon becomes an enthusiast who twice daily retreats to a private temple to worship. This temple, which Brown calls "the Temple of his Deity," is a small columned structure which Wieland has built on a natural promontory on his estate. Neither wife nor children are enjoined to worship there but Wieland makes it the focal point of his life. He

becomes obsessed with a sense of guilt for having abandoned his missionary efforts and eventually melancholia overtakes him. With strong foreboding he leaves his bed one midnight to repair to the temple for prayer. There he is all but consumed in a spontaneous combustion and dies during the night.

Wieland's wife dies soon after, leaving an orphaned son and daughter. Young Theodore Wieland marries and his sister, Clara, takes up residence in a smaller house on the Wieland estate. Between these two homes stands the temple which Wieland, his wife and children, his wife's brother, and Clara fashion into a Temple of Reason in the style of the late eighteenth century. Here they read, discuss, enjoy music, and act out plays. Wieland, however, displays a temperament remarkably similar to his father's in that his studies of the Latin classics reveal the same degree of intensity and enthusiasm which the elder Wieland brought to the study of the Scriptures.

The world of the Wieland family is notably isolated so that they seem to form a society unto themselves. Into this neatly structured world enters Frank Carwin, a renegade Pennsylvanian who is fleeing some mysterious European past. Carwin is possessed of a biloquial, or ventriloquial, talent and in order to avoid detection when he trespasses on the Wieland property, he secrets himself in the temple and projects his voice hoping to divert attention away from his hiding place. Theodore Wieland believes the voice to be a supernatural one since it emanates from the temple and, stimulated by it, his enthusiastic nature fastens on the idea of a private daemonic revelation to which he must accede. Madness quickly overcomes

him and soon, believing he is acting in obedience to his God, Wieland murders his wife and children and later tries to kill his sister, Clara. When Carwin, acting out of repentance for the havoc he has wrought, adminishes him in the daemonic voice, Wieland plunges a knife into his own heart ending the reign of terror which his private daemon has unleashed on an ordered society.

Carwin also uses his second voice to terrify Clara as a test of her character and to impugn her virtue in the eyes of Theodore's friend, Henry Pleyel, whom he sees as a rival. These actions form the sub-plot in which Clara's sanity is as sorely tried as is her brother's. Heredity and temperament seem once more about to plunge Clara into the same kind of insanity which engulfs Theodore, but Brown affords her a habit of mind which is her salvation, the habit of introspection. Because of this the book's first person narration by Clara has occasioned unfavorable criticism, much of it valid. <sup>13</sup> Before opening a door behind which lurks a menacing villain Clara indulges in a page or more of subjective questioning of her emotions, her motives, her thoughts, and her expectations. There is far more intended by this, however, than the mere build up of tension in the reader. Wieland, Henry Pleyel, and Frank Carwin all take their respective turns at narration, but none of them reveals the degree of self-consciousness that Clara does, and each acts precipitously at some point in response to some inner compulsion. Clara, however, breaks this pattern; she defies the daemonic voice when Carwin directs it against her even though she trembles at her own daring. In order to

do so she draws on the strength provided by her introspection, the rendering of which is not the stylistic fault on Brown's part which it has been termed, but rather the point that Brown is trying to make.

Perhaps it was Elihu Hubbard Smith's fervor in promoting the theories of William Godwin that caused Brown to look elsewhere for another presentation of the philosophy of rationalism. Or quite possibly he was already familiar with the writings of the principal exponent of English rationalism, Lord Shaftesbury, to whose work Brown's novel owes a great deal. The comparison between Wieland and Shaftesbury's essays begins with the "Letter Concerning Enthusiasm" written by Shaftesbury in London in 1708 at the height of the Camisard furor. The Camisards, a Protestant sect, had their roots as much in rebellion as in religion because of their armed revolt against state and Roman Catholic officials in the Cevennes region of France where they originated. Claiming that mysterious lights and voices in the hills of their province had convinced them of the urgency and sanctity of their cause, the sect members continued the revolt until the royal troops put down the last action in 1705 when the remnant of the movement fled into England.<sup>14</sup> Shaftesbury's "Letter" was an attempt to dissuade his countrymen from following the French Prophets, as the Camisards were commonly known, who had already converted some 300 Londoners, among them presumably, Charles Brockden Brown's fictional ancestor of C. M. Wieland, the Wieland senior<sup>15</sup> of his novel.

In his "Letter" Shaftesbury distinguishes between enthusiasm and fanaticism. He begins with the observation that the

capacity for enthusiasm is innate in human nature, but must be kept within the bounds of true and good-natured religion rather than being allowed to carry us into fanaticism and gloomy melancholy. False, or melancholy, enthusiasm was seen by Shaftesbury as the source of both fanaticism and religious persecution. As a safeguard against this he recommends the practise of introspection since, he says, ". . . it would be well for us if, before we ascended into the higher regions of divinity, we would vouchsafe to descend a little into ourselves, and bestow some poor thoughts upon plain honest morals." <sup>16</sup> It is precisely this practise which proves to be Clara Wieland's safeguard against enthusiastic madness.

In his "Advice to an Author" Shaftesbury provides what might almost be considered the scenario for Wieland. Again the great exponent of rationalism recommends the art of self-investigation which he here calls "soliloquy." By this method, he says, a man becomes two distinct persons, teaching and learning at once. Then, as if providing the groundwork for Brown's novel, he continues with the idea of the ancients, "That we have each of us a daemon, genius, angel, or guardian spirit, to whom we were strictly joined and committed from our earliest dawn of reason, or moment of our birth." <sup>17</sup> Shaftesbury interprets this to mean that "we have each of us a patient in ourself; that we then became due practitioners, when by virtue of an intimate recess we could discover a certain duplicity of soul, and divide ourselves into two parties . . . ." <sup>18</sup> Thus we become pupil and preceptor in ourselves and advance in morals and true wisdom in accord with our ability to practise the art

of soliloquy as it is exemplified by poets and philosophers,  
"composing matters in our breast, and establishing that  
subordinancy which alone could make us agree with ourselves  
and be of a piece within." <sup>19</sup> The obligation to do this,  
Shaftesbury claims, was esteemed by the ancients "a more  
religious work than any prayers, or other duty in the temple."  
The mystic, or "imaginary saint" however, is never capable  
of soliloquy: "Instead of looking narrowly into his own nature  
and mind, that he may be no longer a mystery to himself, he  
is taken up with the contemplation of other mysterious natures,  
which he can never explain or comprehend." <sup>20</sup>

Here then is Brown's Theodore Wieland, the mystic who is  
incapable of contemplating himself but is wholly taken up  
with the contemplation of other mysteries; while Clara, his  
sister, demonstrates that clarity of thought symbolized by her  
name and which Shaftesbury extols as the happy result of  
introspection. In their antithetical roles Clara and Theodore  
Wieland are both subjected to the same daemonic agency, Carwin's  
projected voice. The fact, established later in the book, that  
such agency can work to either good or evil is first suggested  
just prior to the introduction of Carwin into the Wieland  
community when Clara comments that at this period her brother  
was engaged in a project of "collecting and investigating the  
facts which relate to that mysterious personage, the Daemon of  
Socrates." <sup>21</sup> Through the agency of Carwin's counterfeit daemon  
Theodore's own daemonic voice is stirred into action and he  
mistakes it for divine revelation. Clara, on the other hand,  
is capable of resisting the impulse to distort enthusiasm into

fanaticism, as Shaftesbury defines the two. In an introspective soliloquy she struggles to maintain her equilibrium, to be both pupil and preceptor:

My opinions were the sport of eternal change.  
. . . I had no grounds on which to build a disbelief. I could not deny faith to the evidence of my religion; the testimony of men was loud and unanimous; both these concurred to persuade me that evil spirits existed, and that their energy was frequently exerted in the system of the world.<sup>22</sup>

And then:

Where is the proof, said I, that daemons may not be subjected to the controul of men? The dreams of superstition are worthy of contempt. Witchcraft, its instruments, and miracles, the compact ratified by a bloody signature, the apparatus of sulphurous smells and thundering explosions, are monstrous and chimerical . . . . That conscious beings, dissimilar from human, but moral and voluntary agents as we are, somewhere exist, can scarcely be denied. That their aid may be employed to 23  
benign or malignant purposes, cannot be disproved.

This internalization of what in a pure allegory might be represented as a symbolic battle between the personifications of Belief and Uncertainty is part of the warfare between the good and evil of enthusiasm vs. fanaticism which informs Wieland, and is only one of a number of allegorical elements present in the book. The enthusiastic capacity which Shaftesbury claims is innate in all men appears here as Clara's will to believe, and in Wieland Belief councils in a very different manner from the figures who represent Reason in such dialogues as Alcuin and the Ellendale fragment. In those Reason was unalterably set in opposition to Belief with no apparent means of reconciliation. In this instance, however, rationality does not require Clara to dismiss as pure fancy the belief in a daemonic world, that is, a world of spirit; she reasons only that the creatures of

such a world must be made subject to the mind of man and not be allowed to possess him. Clara's introspective questioning of her own belief is set against her brother's unquestioning obedience to the dictates of his belief. Like the daemon of Socrates which Theodore has studied, his own daemon enforces a type of "moral" behavior on him which robs him of his freedom and makes of him an automatic respondent much like the automatically virtuous citizens of some Utopian society. <sup>24</sup>

Obviously what Brown gained from Taylor's review of Oberon was the reinforcement he needed for a belief he was loathe to abandon, the belief in a world of mystery. The strange combination which Brown achieves by blending the romanticism of Wieland's preternatural world with Shaftesbury's rationalism comes, no doubt, out of his own desire for both worlds. Through Shaftesbury and Wieland he seems to have been able to bring the two strains together, achieving a compromise between two systems of thought while synthesizing two disparate psychological needs. Once it is apparent that this is Brown's purpose, the characterization of Theodore Wieland becomes clearer. Allegory, the literary mode which conventionally has served as the instrument of reconciliation, is the same one in which individuals behave with the exaggerated mannerisms of men possessed by forces outside themselves. <sup>25</sup> Rather than daemons being subjected to the control of men as Clara reasons they must be, Theodore Wieland is controlled by his daemon.

Brown may have consciously made use of the allegorical mode because of its didactic function. The epigram which appeared on the title page of the first edition of Wieland with its

reference to "mazy paths" into which "the double-tongued are sure to stray" seems a deliberate attempt to draw on earlier poetic forms of moral allegory.<sup>26</sup> In sum, though, the didactic function seems to have been far less important than the romantic possibilities presented by the mode. Theodore Wieland's demonic behavior serves the moral function of Brown's tale, but he goes beyond that in suggesting at one point that Carwin's vocal ability is symptomatic of yet another example of a man who remains a mystery even to himself. The conflict of desires which causes the would-be rapist, Carwin, to unintentionally cry out against himself in what is actually his own voice and at the same time the voice of the "other" within him is a stunning portrait of the duplicity of soul which Shaftesbury claims makes each of us "a patient in ourself." But above and beyond that, it is a highly romanticized use of imagery, one of a number of such images which appear in the work, as amplification of theme.

The most obvious image in Wieland is the temple that stands midway between the houses in which, following Theodore's marriage, the brother and sister dwell separately. It represents not only their father who built it, but their common heritage of religious fanaticism. As a cosmic structure familiar from allegorical literature, the temple is conventionally viewed as a microcosmic site from which the macrocosm can be affected through ritual and rite.<sup>28</sup> It is, however, a fixed image, one which does not allow for alteration to accommodate a new cosmology. Thus the attempts of the younger Wielands to remake their father's temple of worship into a temple of reason proves

an ineffectual gesture as far as Theodore Wieland is concerned. The association of the temple with Deity leads to Wieland's conviction that the voice of the ventriloquist which he hears issuing from it is indeed the voice of God.

In the first part of the book the temple is the scene of the elder Wieland's near-immolation. Without directly proclaiming the phenomenon a result of Wieland's religious fanaticism, Brown conveys the idea of an "inner light" of enthusiasm which becomes an explosion of flame: "A light proceeding from the edifice, made every part of the scene visible. A gleam diffused itself over the intermediate space, and instantly a loud report, like the explosion of a mine, followed." <sup>29</sup>

Wieland is removed to his bed where, Brown says, "the disease thus wonderfully generated . . . gave place to death." <sup>30</sup>

The reference to disease provides the link between image and idea, in this case the claims of materialism, especially as they found expression in the work of America's pre-eminent physician, Dr. Benjamin Rush. In 1786 Dr. Rush published An Inquiry into the Physical Causes Upon the Moral Faculty and made the single most important contribution to American scientific materialism. In it he defined the moral faculty as a function of the mind similar to memory and imagination. Thus not only was Shaftesbury's "Moral Sentiment" transferred from the emotive to a more mechanical state, but morality was removed from the area of the Will, where Jonathan Edwards had placed it, and labelled a purely biological function subject to impairment. Among the ways in which Rush claimed the moral faculty could suffer impairment were through the use of spiritous

liquors, fevers, and "excitability," a condition resulting from excess stimulation. The idea of excitability he had acquired from Dr. William Cullen, the leading light of the College of Medicine at Edinburgh where Rush had studied. Cullen's theory concerned stimuli which produced changes in a living organism. A healthy body was said to be in a mediated state of stimulation but the presence of disease indicated either too low or too high a state of stimulation, or excitement.<sup>31</sup> Fevers and madness were the most obvious manifestations of too great a state of excitement and Rush pushed Cullen's theory a step further by concluding that insanity was simply a state of fever which could be reduced by the administration of purges.<sup>32</sup>

All of this was made familiar to Charles Brockden Brown when he lived in New York with Elihu Hubbard Smith. While Brown was writing Wieland Smith was daily treating cases of fever and insanity at the New York Hospital.<sup>33</sup> Brown dutifully footnoted his fiction, referring his readers to similar cases of spontaneous combustion brought on by too much stimulation, but the "facts" of morality as explained by scientific materialism resulted in too mechanical a process for Brown.<sup>34</sup> The premise upon which Wieland is based, the inherited tendency toward a particular form of madness, is demonstrated in Theodore Wieland but contradicted in Clara Wieland.<sup>35</sup> The necessity which appears to be operating when the younger Wieland responds automatically to the stimulus of a mysterious voice is negated by his sister's exercise of faith and reason when subjected to the same stimulus. Moral choice is thus returned to the sphere

of human freedom rather than necessity, a statement which Brown underscores by repeating the fire image. Near the end of the book when Clara lies ill in a state of fever and near insanity from the realization of her brother's guilt, her room suddenly bursts into flames as if the catastrophe which befell her father is about to be repeated. Her rescue and the destruction of the house of Wieland point the way to Clara's recovery and to her freedom from the past through a new life with Pleyel in "the ancient world" of Europe.

Images such as biloquialism to portray an unreasoned response to moral dictates as well as the twofold nature of human motivation, and spontaneous combustion as a sign of religious conviction gone awry elevate Brown's work above the level of naive allegory in which images are little more than ideas writ large. Instead these images work outward from the subject matter they delineate, functioning as physical manifestations of inner psychological states. <sup>36</sup> As a result the work serves the didactic purpose of moral allegory but derives a singular power from the imagistic links which Brown establishes between the underlying philosophy and the fiction. A notebook in which Brown wrote the outline of Wieland and what little we know of some of his earliest attempts at fiction supply some insight into his natural tendency toward the allegorical mode.

The outline is essentially that of the 1798 novel except that the first part is divided into acts as if it were originally intended as a play; later the chapter divisions appear. Originally, too, the names of the second generation of Wielands are Charles and Caroline. Charles marries a woman named Charlotte,

and their estate is variously referred to as Carfield, Carhill, and Cardale. Pleyel appears as Philip, and Carwin as Macruve. One page of the notebook is filled with lists of names, probably intended for characters. In one group of twenty-five names every one begins with "Car." Above some plot notes appears the following: "5 Males and 5 female characters. Extremes of virtue and vice in both sexes. Virtue nurtured by suffering. Vice triumphant."<sup>37</sup>

To consider first the matter of the names, we have Brown's own words on the subject of the identification of an author with his characters through the device of naming. In 1792 Brown wrote to his friend, Joseph Bringhurst, that some years before he had written at the command of his then beloved, Henrietta, a romance "after the manner of Rousseau."<sup>38</sup> The work, an epistolary novel supposedly entitled "The Story of Julius," was, he says, a series of letters between Julius Brownlow; Julietta, his twin sister and closest confidante; Mrs. Brownlow, their mother; Lauder Ellen, a fellow student and friend of Julius; Caroline Monthievers, who is Julius' betrothed; and Sophia Wentworth, his true love. In the letter to Bringhurst Brown says that the similarity of Julius' last name to his own is intentional: "I believe in every work of this kind the character of the writer such as it really is, or such as he imagines, or wishes it to be, may be found. I confess that at this time my ambition extended no father than to act and speak like Julius."<sup>39</sup>

It is uncertain whether Brown continued in this belief, but it seems fairly obvious that the many characters in his

works who bear names beginning with "Car" owe them to the Latin form of Charles, Carolus. If he did in fact persist in his desire to be identified with his characters by name, then Mrs. Carter in Alcuin is one such avatar and the Wieland brother and sister may have originally been intended to represent antithetical parts of Brown's psyche. The extent to which Brown could carry this psychomachia is staggering, as the cast of characters for "The Story of Julius" reveals. To begin with, no trace of the story has been found and perhaps it never was anything more than an idea in Brown's mind, just as Henrietta at whose command he claimed to have written it never existed. Henrietta was a character in an exchange of letters between two young lovers which constituted a plan for an epistolary novel Brown began early in the 1790's. <sup>40</sup> At times she is called Harriet, but is most often Henrietta. The letters from her lover bear Brown's own initials, and Henrietta is most likely the female counterpart of Brown who was at that time using the name Henry in the exchange of Della Cruscan poetic letters between himself, Smith, and Bringham.

Henry and Henrietta are one of the male/female complementaries which appear frequently in Brown's work, usually in the guise of brother and sister, but at times as lovers. <sup>41</sup> When, as in Edgar Huntly and in Wieland, a brother and sister are set in opposition to each other, it is the brother who dies. The multiplicity of projections in the real or imagined piece, "The Story of Julius," thus involves something like this: Henrietta, who is probably the female part of Brown (Henry) has commanded him to write a romance about a set of twins,

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Julius and Julietta who are also projections of Brown by reason of their surname, and in which Julius' betrothed but unloved mistress is named Caroline, who can only be seen as a foreshadowing of all the "Car" characters yet to come in other works.

These multiple projections, all owing their genesis to the same central character, Henrietta, who represents Brown, form a kind of Psychomachia and in the course of the exchange of letters which supposedly formed the work, may well have engaged in the type of dialogue which characterizes almost all of Brown's writings. The dialogues, which are a refinement of the battles between the Vices and Virtues of Prudentius, provide the point, counterpoint action found in most moral allegories. Twinned characters often function in such pieces as representatives of the opposing sides and Brown's original choice of names for the Wieland brother and sister, Charles and Caroline, seem to indicate that he thought of them as twins, like Julius and Julietta Brownlow in "The Story of Julius," and as figures for two opposing sides of his own nature. Though the change of names from Charles and Caroline to Theodore and Clara better reflects the enthusiasm of the one and the clarity of thought of the other, the figures in their final evolution remain in antithetical relationship. The original schema calling for five male and five female characters to display the extremes of vices and virtues is thus subsumed into the appositeness of the central characters.

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The one character in Wieland whose name does begin with "Car" is Carwin, the bilquist whose talent becomes the agency through which Theodore Wieland succumbs to madness. Brown

never condemns Carwin and allows him to offer a comprehensive statement in his own defense.<sup>43</sup> It is quite possible that Carwin's projected voice is a metaphor for the authorial voice and that the bilquist's protestations of innocent intent reflect Brown's uneasiness about the author's role in a society that still frowned on fiction. There is evidence in Wieland to support the idea since the two places in which Carwin hides and from which he projects his voice are the temple and Clara's closet. The first of these, representing as it does the sacredness of a religious site, corresponds to the author's incursion into the sacred confines of religion and morals, and the second reflects eighteenth century America's fear that young women would be corrupted by reading novels.

The connection between the projected, or authorial voice, and the architectural imagery is one which can best be made in a later chapter after the function of such imagery in each of the romances has been noted. For now it is enough to indicate that each contains one or more architectural images and that they are virtually the only type of imagery Brown employs. Dunlap claims that though he has no idea how or where it was derived, Brown had a "passion" for architectural study and would sit for a whole day with his compasses and pencil, absorbed in designing an imaginary castle or cathedral.<sup>44</sup> A copybook of Brown's contains a number of such designs, two pages of which are reproduced with this study.

In Wieland the sudden sounding of the voice within areas that are particularly associated with virtue and morality raises the question of whether or not evil can be excluded from such

an enclosure or if it will not arise spontaneously. The question is, of course, basic to Utopianism and crucial in the determination of whether the evil society produces the evil man or vice versa. Those who, like Elihu Hubbard Smith, would remove man from one environment and place him in a new one in the hope of founding a Utopia, believe that evil is created by the institutions of a society and not by its men. In order to test the validity of this belief, Brown subjects the Utopian atmosphere of the Wieland estate to a test in the form of an intrusion, essentially harmless, into its confines. The Temple of Reason and the "temple" of Clara's virtue, her bedroom, are both invaded with the result that the Wieland community is destroyed. But it is destroyed by the reactions of the individuals to the intrusion, not by the intrusion itself. Theodore Wieland cannot assimilate the new and mysterious element introduced and reacts violently. Pleyel allows his faith in Clara's virtue to be overturned by the sound of Carwin's voice in her room and abandons her. Only Clara is capable of maintaining an equilibrium in the face of mystery which allows her to accord it a place in the scheme of things known and unknown. Wieland is not a Utopia, but it is an experiment in Utopian design, one which ultimately comes to rest on the belief that a society, no matter how perfect, only reflects the individuals who compose it and that it is they who choose to make it good or evil.

Discarded from the original outline for Wieland, along with the early choice of names and the cast of ten characters,

was the schema, "Virtue nurtured by suffering. Vice triumphant." Vice does not triumph in Wieland; indeed, since it is a moral allegory, it can not. But though Virtue is nurtured by suffering, there is no clear cut sense of victory. Instead, with Clara's departure for Europe there is conveyed the notion of retreat, of Virtue's withdrawal from the scene of battle. When the same thing happens at the end of Brown's second novel, which is an even more obvious allegory, the suspicion grows that though the immediate battles are won Vice will ultimately triumph in this New World Fairy Land, if only by default.

Ormond, or, The Secret Witness, published in 1799, is closely allied to Brown's 1798 treatise on the situation of women in America, Alcuin. Not only is its heroine, Constantia Dudley, an example of the new woman Brown envisioned in that work, but, like Alcuin, Ormond is a dialogue. The difference is that Alcuin is only a dialogue, a Socratic dialogue between two persons who hold contrary philosophic views, while Ormond is closer to being an allegorical debate between two representatives of opposing ideologies. Constantia Dudley is superior to Mrs. Carter in education, and Ormond is certainly not to be compared to the provincial New England schoolmaster, Alcuin. Nevertheless, Ormond does seek to be Constantia's mentor and instruct her in the tenets of Necessitarianism, and therein lies the ground for their debate.

Constantia Dudley is the fortunate recipient of a truly superior education given her by her cultured and artistically gifted father, Stephen Dudley, who finds his duties as a merchant irksome. Eager to be free of business matters, Dudley makes

a full partner of a young man who not only relieves him of unpleasant tasks but ultimately of all his funds. With the family plunged into poverty, disasters follow one another quickly: Constantia's mother dies, her father takes to drinking and later goes blind, and yellow fever breaks out in the city of Philadelphia where the Dudleys live. Through all these vicissitudes Constantia, a girl of only sixteen, acquits herself as a model of virtue. Especially in the instance of the epidemic does she display unusual courage and prudence, caring for stricken neighbors and maintaining her household throughout four months of near-starvation conditions.

But Constantia's greatest trial is yet to be faced. She meets and is greatly attracted to Ormond, a man of education and breeding. He is, however, an exponent of radical and atheistic sentiments whose life is dominated by deceit. The immediate threat that Ormond poses to Constantia is his adamant stand against marriage and his determination to either convince Constantia that it is an unnecessary social ritual or, failing that, to pretend to accede to her notions of marriage in order to entrap her. Beyond this danger lies another, the threat to her entire concept of human nature and thus the encounters between these two take the form of a series of ideological debates ranging mostly over matters pertaining to man and his social environment.

Ormond's conception of human nature is that it is permanently set in one direction by early influences, is destined by these influences to be either good or bad, and that once set in motion it is incapable of deviating from its course. Efforts toward

the amelioration of society, therefore, are useless, in his view, since each man is caught up in the total corruption of the society at large. He tells Constantia:

A mortal poison pervaded the whole system by means of which every thing received was converted into bane and purulence. . . . The principles of the social machine must be rectified, before men can be beneficially active.<sup>45</sup>

In such a hopeless condition individual motives matter not at all and the most that can be hoped for is a reasonable degree of personal happiness.

On the whole, Ormond's theories can safely be said to be those of such necessitarians as Priestley, Volney, and Holbach, among others. Constantia, on the other hand, represents the arguments of such environmentalists as William Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, and others for whom the determining factors of education and the cultural and political mores of a society which affected the lives of individuals, were viewed as susceptible to change. It must be pointed out that there was a great deal of shading in the opinions of theorists on both sides of the issue and that education was extolled as the answer by both necessitarians and environmentalists.<sup>46</sup> In this instance Charles Brockden Brown appears to be on the side of Godwin and especially of Mary Wollstonecraft. His Constantia Dudley is the proof of women's capability, given the right educational background, of equaling men in wisdom and virtue. Ormond, however, contradicts these same theorists who likewise maintained that education would allow man to exercise that moral behavior toward which his nature tends.

In the first half of the novel Constantia learns through her own experiences that conditions can be altered. First her social condition changes as her family's fortune falls; then when yellow fever is first noted in the city Stephen Dudley despairingly prepares his daughter for the worst:

For a time, we in this quarter will be exempt; but it will surely reach us at last, and then, whither shall we fly? For the rich, the whole world is a safe asylum; but for us, indigent and wretched, what fate is reserved but to stay and perish? If the disease spare us, we must perish by neglect and famine. . . .We shall die, but not until we have witnessed and endured 47 horrors that surpass the powers of conception.

At first Constantia is overcome by panic, for she has no prior experience by which to be guided; but instead of starving during the months of epidemic, the Dudley household survives on Constantia's timely provision of food. Even when her humanitarian impulses lead her to risk infection in order to care for her stricken neighbors and Constantia contracts the fever, she recovers from it, a fact that directly contradicts her father's prophecies. So strongly does Brown emphasize Stephen Dudley's belief in a pre-ordained fate that when he is inexplicably blinded one is forced, despite the difference in gender, to think of the allegorical figure of Fortune who 48 blindly allots men's fate.

From the experience of having survived the epidemic Constantia learns that events are not beyond human control, and this knowledge becomes a weapon in her duel with Ormond. In attempting to dissuade her from sailing for England, a move which would put her beyond his reach, Ormond tries to convince

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Constantia that he has a supernatural knowledge of all her thoughts and actions as well as of her future destiny. He predicts a final disaster which will leave her longing for death. Constantia quails before such a prediction and flees the city to await elsewhere the date of sailing. Ormond pursues, breaks in on her when she is alone, and menaces her with what Constantia refers to as "an evil worse than death." Ormond insists there is no recourse for Constantia other than submission to what fate has decreed, but her rational experience of life contradicts this. She threatens suicide but Ormond insists that "Living or dead, the prize that I have in view shall be mine." Without further hesitation Constantia seizes a small desk knife and plunges it into his chest, killing him instantly.

The allegorical aspect of this debate between Freedom and Necessity is bolstered by the representatives of female types who surround Constantia supplementing her education, and whose major characteristics are revealed in their names. Helena Clives, darkly beautiful in the Grecian manner, is Ormond's mistress, whose life is devoted to passion and who kills herself when she learns of Ormond's desire for Constantia. Martinette de Beauvais, who is very much on the order of Spenser's Britomart, has taken up the male role and attire to protect herself from the perils of European social instability. Sophia Wentworth is Constantia's closest friend whose wisdom counterbalances what she describes as a "defect" in Constantia's character, her lack of religious faith. Conversely, Martinette and Helena learn from Constantia's example, and rounding out the education theme, the book ends with Sophia saying:

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It is now finished; and I have only to add my wishes that the perusal of this tale may afford you as much instruction as the contemplation of the sufferings and vicissitudes of Constantia Dudley has afforded to me.<sup>49</sup>

The personification which is so evident in the novel is even pointed to by Ormond, who in one of his confrontations with Constantia says "Your name is Constantia. T'was given you, I suppose, that you might be known by it."<sup>50</sup> Constancy, or Fortitude, imaged allegorically as a fortress, implies an imperviousness to the winds of fortune, a point which Brown<sup>51</sup> is anxious to drive home. Following the convention he portrays Constantia in a fortress-like setting for her final contest with Ormond. When she flees the city in order to escape the fate Ormond has predicted for her, Constantia takes refuge in a country house in New Jersey which her father has left to her. Her friend, Sophia, expresses her fears for Constantia's safety by lamenting the fact that "There was no fortress guarded by barriers of stone and iron and watched by sentinels that never slept, to which she might retire from his strategems."<sup>52</sup> Sophia is wrong, however, because the country house becomes Constantia's fortress, the temple in which Brown places his icon of Constancy. The mansion was built to the specific design of Stephen Dudley who was also responsible for the design of his daughter's education. Of his architectural taste, Brown says:

In his view, cultivation was subservient to the picturesque, and a mansion was erected, eminent for nothing but chastity of ornaments and simplicity of structure. The massive parts were of stone; the outer surfaces were smooth,

snow-white, and diversified by apertures and cornices, in which a cement uncommonly tenacious was wrought into proportions the most correct and forms the most graceful.<sup>53</sup>

Once inside this monument to classical line and form, the purity of its design and the balance of its proportions seem to exert an influence on Constantia so that like its cement she too becomes "uncommonly tenacious." It is in this fortress that Freedom triumphs over Necessity, and the villain falls.

The imagery in Ormond is very slight since the characters personify ideas, and for this reason the fortress image stands out. It is not, however, the only instance in the book when Brown's affinity for the architectural image surfaces. Ormond claims to be a secret witness to the most private things transpiring in the town house Constantia first shares with her father and then remains in alone after his death. She is as unable to comprehend this ability as she is to understand how her father could have been murdered in his bed with no one having gained access to his room by normal means. When the truth behind both phenomena is revealed, Constantia learns that the vacant and unattended house next door to her own is owned by Ormond and that he has repeatedly gained entry to the Dudley residence through a secret door joining the two houses.

This is, of course, similar to the situation in Wieland where Carwin conceals himself first in the temple and then in Clara's closet, and here, as there, the image functions in the same way with Ormond as the unwelcome intruder into the area set apart by the presence of the virtuous Constantia. The sense of horror which must have been aroused in Brown's earliest

readers by the idea of Vice spying on Virtue for the purpose of corrupting her is heightened by the particular form of evil in which Brown has cast his villain. While the Society of the Illuminati is never mentioned by name in the book, there is every reason to believe it is this group to which Brown refers when he makes Ormond a member of a secret society with Utopian aims.<sup>54</sup> The Bavarian Illuminati were Perfectibilians whose chief aim was the establishment of a perfect society. By the time Ormond was published Perfectibilians and their aims had become a subject of supreme importance in the United States.

In 1798 when the United States, still led by the Federalist Party, expected imminent attack by the French, President John Adams issued a fast day proclamation urging the people of America to implore Heaven's mercy on the nation. In Charlestown, Mass. the Rev. Jedidiah Morse, the noted theologian whose support for the Monthly Magazine and its editor Samuel Miller would soon solicit, delivered a sermon on the perils in which the nation stood from sources within as well as without its ports and borders.<sup>55</sup> The peril within to which he pointed was the Order of the Illuminati, whose alleged presence in America he had been alerted to by John Robison's Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All the Religions and Governments of Europe (1797). Once the alarm had been sounded it was no time at all before ministers and statesmen throughout New England and into New York and Pennsylvania were issuing warnings and predictions in sermons and speeches. For men such as Yale's President Timothy Dwight, who for years had inveighed against what he saw as the triumph of infidelity in America, Morse's trumpet sounding

provided the impetus for a fresh assault on the forces of secularism which they believed were turning the nation away from its God-ordained destiny.

56

From May, 1798 when the fast day was observed to November of that year the turmoil continued, fed even further by the translation into English of the first of four volumes by the Abbe Barruel entitled Memoirs of Jacobinism (1797). On the Fourth of July Dr. Dwight addressed the citizens of New Haven on The Duty of Americans at the Present Crisis. The crisis, as Dwight saw it, was the direct connection between the threat of French invasion and the attempts, pointed out by Robison, of conspiratorial forces such as the Free Masons, the Illuminati, and other secret societies, to overthrow the government of the United States. The duty of Americans was, therefore, to return to the observance of religion and to realize that the freedom celebrated on that day meant a freedom from the affairs of Europe and had nothing to do with the so-called liberty proclaimed by the French Revolution.

57

In November the Rev. Morse took to his pulpit on the occasion of the Thanksgiving Anniversary to renew his attack on French Illuminism. This time he implicated Tom Paine, the Deistical Societies, and the Democratic Societies, which Morse as a good Federalist referred to as "Jacobin Clubs instituted by Genet."

58

When Elihu Hubbard Smith was presented by Dr. Morse with a copy of Morse's fast day sermon on the subject of the Illuminati Smith duly noted it in his diary with no further comment.

59

William Dunlap, whose wife's sister was married to Dr. Timothy Dwight, read both Robison's book and Dwight's address and commented

in his diary on the apparent similarities between the characters of the two men though, he added dryly, of the two Robison had "more knowledge of the World." Robison's book he saw as

A strange mixture of knowledge, prejudice, truth and error, and another proof of the avidity with which we make every circumstance bend to the favourite System. With what perseverance these religionists believe or pretend to believe the necessary connection between Religion and morality: with what impudence inculcate that without Religion a man cannot be virtuous.<sup>60</sup>

By the time Ormond was published, however Elihu Hubbard Smith was dead, William Dunlap was busy with his own projects in the theatre, and Charles Brockden Brown was anxious for the success of the Monthly Magazine and American Review which he was editing. That success depended in large measure on its acceptance by Federalists and the religious orthodoxy. Therefore, Ormond's connections to a secret society, his wild social theories, and his immoral way of life are all designed to take advantage of the then current fascination with the Illuminati and also to rid the author of any lingering suspicions which might have been aroused by the publication in the preceding year of the somewhat radical Alcuin.<sup>61</sup> To Brown's credit he did not back down in the novel on his claims for women and the enormous potential he believed was being wasted by their lack of education. His heroine is extremely well-educated for a young woman of her time, a fact which, Brown shows, enables her to cope with the exigencies of life with great capability. His one concession in this area to the New England clergy is Sophia Wentworth's comment about Constantia's "defect of character," her lack of interest in religion. Despite this concession,

however, Constantia's virtue is clearly established, a virtue which, William Dunlap must have been pleased to note, owed nothing to religion.

Secret societies and plans for establishing a Utopia actually have no direct bearing on the plot of Ormond, but Ormond's Perfectibilian theories and his reasons for their endorsement indicate that Brown saw very clearly the motives of such men. In one of his debates with Constantia Ormond attempts to convince her of the extent of his powers by claiming:

Tomorrow I mean to ascertain the height of the lunar mountains by travelling to the top of them. Then I will station myself in the track of the last comet, and wait till its circumvolution suffers me to leap upon it; then, by walking on its surface, I will ascertain whether it be hot enough to burn my soles.<sup>62</sup>

The speech links him, of course, to Milton's Satan, a comparison which was commonly made (usually without crediting the source) in the anti-Jacobin literature of the day. Most frequently such comparisons played on the theme of anarchy and often on the idea of Satan as the corrupter of virtue.<sup>63</sup> Brown, however, by opposing Ormond's arguments on necessity to Constantia's on free will draws on the idea of Satan as the subverter of man's freedom. As Constantia's friend, Sophia, says:

Ormond aspired to nothing more ardently than to hold the reins of opinion -- to exercise absolute power over the conduct of others, not by constraining their limbs or by exacting obedience to his authority, but in a way of which his subjects should be scarcely conscious.<sup>64</sup>

Clearly Brown was doing more than simply using a contemporaneously lively issue to gain an audience; he was making another statement about the idea of perfection and the unacknowledged motivation

behind it, the desire for power. Brown was convinced that attempts to achieve a perfect society could only result in the loss of freedom and in a Procrustean bed of discontent.

What makes Ormond so fascinating, to Constantia as well as to the reader, is the enormous energy of the character. Seemingly capable of such things as omnipresence and omniscience, the attributes to which the sub-title refers, the force of his personality makes even his wildest boasts seem plausible, and enhances his single name with a quality of transcendence. All of this energy is, however, the mark of his demonic possession.<sup>65</sup> More so even than Theodore Wieland, whose madness is triggered by the agency of another, Ormond is so possessed by the idea of necessity that he is entirely ruled by it. Only if we give heed to his theory of what Brown calls "the social machine" can we understand his behavior. Ormond is said to believe that

Man could not be otherwise than a cause of perpetual operation and efficacy. He was part of a machine, and as such had not power to withhold his agency. Contiguosness to other parts -- that is, to other men -- was all that was necessary to render him a powerful concurrent.<sup>66</sup>

It is this conviction that makes Ormond even less than the personification of an idea; it reduces him to the level of a piece of machinery which can only function according to a given pattern.<sup>67</sup>

What Brown manages to convey with the full force of the true allegorist is the totally mechanical nature of Ormond and the complete loss of freedom which results from his convictions. Driven by his daemon to pursue singlemindedly his own ends,

Ormond is unable to withdraw from the contest even when he encounters resistance from Constantia. The restraints imposed upon the novel by its ideological considerations are suddenly burst and the intellectualizing comes to an abrupt end. Ormond rapidly degenerates from a suave, sophisticated man of the world into a raving maniac.<sup>68</sup> Unable to believe that Constantia is capable of an act so outside the moral framework of her cultural environment, he seems not even to consider the possibility that she might direct the knife against him. With one free act, however, Constantia refutes, finally, the doctrine of necessity.

There is no question but that Charles Brockden Brown was a novelist of ideas.<sup>69</sup> Keenly aware of the multitude of ways in which philosophic theories were rapidly evolving and replacing each other in his era, he seems to have been eager to argue their positions and test their premises. Had he continued to do so, as with Alcuin, in the style of Robert Bage's novels of purpose which were so much admired by Elihu Hubbard Smith, he probably would never have gained an audience.<sup>70</sup> Historically Brown was part of what Peter Gay has referred to as

a comprehensive effort--of physicists, epistemologists, and literary critics as much as of historians--to secure rational control of the world, reliable knowledge of the past, and freedom from the pervasive domination of myth.<sup>71</sup>

Temperamentally, however, he was drawn to another age when science and art both had their roots in poetic myth and allegory. In all likelihood Brown would have brought this temperament to bear on the composition of the epic American poems he had

hoped to write.

The subject of the American continent had evidently appealed to Brown for quite some time since Paul Allen claims that at the age of sixteen Brown had sketched the plans for three epic poems, one on the discovery of America, another on Pizzaro's expedition against Peru, and a third on Cortez's expedition to America.<sup>72</sup> Though the epics probably never went beyond the stage of sketches, there's every reason to believe that Brown would have followed the style of Spenser whose epic romance, The Faerie Queene, is structured on the same archetypes of temple and labyrinth which also lend structure to Brown's romances.<sup>73</sup> Brown's interest in the subject of continental America remained constant and the temple archetype which provides the model for the various architectural images he employs is the outward sign of the inner spiritual vision associated with the New England colonization and with the institution of a new nation in North America. The labyrinth is the predominant image in Edgar Huntly, but it is an American landscape labyrinth and its traverse is made a specifically American experience.

Brown's desire to write epic poetry on the subject of Renaissance voyages of discovery eventually gave way to a fictional method the object of which was the discovery of ideas. The design of images and the pattern of doubles and personifications which inform that method point most obviously to the allegorical mode and to a desire to carry over into fiction that form of romantic epic which is particularly Spenserian and which also attracted Brown to Wieland's Oberon.

The blending of fiction with contemporary events that occurs in Ormond and in Arthur Mervyn presages Brown's movement toward the concerns of historiography, something to which Spenser had also given more than a little thought. In a subsequent chapter it will be seen that when Brown became interested in the problems of writing fictionalized history he defended the historical romance, as did Spenser in his letter to Raleigh, on the grounds that the method of the romancer differed from that of the historian. Even Brown's narrative method in Arthur Mervyn, his one completed historical romance, can be traced to this letter. The narrative in Arthur Mervyn follows Spenser's model in that it "thrusteth into the midst," of events and from that point has recourse to its hero's past and projects into his future.<sup>74</sup>

The lengthy but unfinished work on the "History of the Carrils and the Ormes" is, as David Lee Clark has pointed out,<sup>75</sup> set in England as is Faerie Queene, and the marriage of the two families, the Carrils and the Ormes, brings peace to the kingdom as did the marriage of the Houses of Lancaster and York. In the names of these two families may lie a hint of what Brown was hoping to see effected in America, the reconciliation of two opposing "houses" of thought, the radical republicans and the more conservative Federalists. We have seen how he made use of names beginning with Car to symbolize himself. If Orme is an anagram for More and is a reference to the creator of Utopia, there is a possibility that Brown hoped for a reconciliation of his anti-Utopian views with the Utopian aspirations of his friend Elihu Hubbard Smith.

It is fairly obvious from the psychomachic nature of Brown's early attempts at fiction that though the dialogue which informs the most successful of his later works is a dialogue between himself and his closest friend, it is even more importantly a dialogue between two antithetical aspects of his own psyche created perhaps by the dichotomy between his temperament and his time. In the effort to synthesize the two Brown married them in a dream of fiction and, as he wrote in the letter to Joseph Bringham, allowed them to wander "in the region of romance. . . in Spencer's fairy land," where through trial they would become virtuous and whole.

## REFERENCES

1. C.B.B. to Joseph Bringhurst, undated. Quoted in Bennett, "Canon," 158-9.
2. Smith to Brown, 27 May 1796. See Smith's Diary, 171.
3. F.O. Mattheissen, American Renaissance (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941), 201.
4. Nathaniel Hawthorne, Preface, The Blithedale Romance, 1852.
5. Hawthorne's "Hall of Fantasy" is but one of his many architectural images. L.C. Suddarth in an unpublished dissertation, "The House That Hawthorne Built," Univ. of Wisconsin, 1976, shows these images to be ambiguous, linking continuity and tradition with imprisonment and isolation.
6. A. Bartlett Giametti points out that in Faerie Queene, Book II, Proem 2 and Book III, Canto 3 the Spanish view of the New World is given through references to Peru, while in Book II, Canto 10 it is tied to the world of British folklore and myth in the Antiquitee of Faery Land which Guyon reads. See Giametti, "Primitivism and the Process of Civility in Spenser's Faerie Queene," First Images of America, Fredi Chiappelli, ed. (Berkeley: Univ. of Ca. Press, 1976) I, 72.
7. C.B.B., "Spencer's Fairy Queen Modernized," Literary Magazine and American Register, III, 21 (June, 1805), 424.
8. Warner W. Beyer, Keats and the Daemon King (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1947), 20. In his study of the influence of Wieland's Oberon on Keats, Beyer discusses Sotheby's translation.
9. Smith, Diary, 413.
10. Ibid., 455.
11. Carl Van Doren made the original connection between the two murder stories in "Early American Realism" The Nation, 99 (Nov., 1914), 577-78.
12. Smith, Diary, 457.
13. Fred Lewis Pattee in his Introduction to Wieland (N.Y.: Hafner, 1926), xxxviii makes the classic case against Clara's introspection. He implies that Brown did it only to intensify the reader's suspense and claims "the method became a mannerism with Brown. . ."

14. This particular summary of the history of the Camisards is based on that given in John Symonds, Thomas Brown and the Angels (London: Hutchinson Publishers, 1961), 15-17.
15. For an account of the actual connection between Shaftesbury and C.M. Wieland occasioned by the subject of enthusiasm see Charles Elson, Wieland and Shaftesbury (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1913) and John A. McCarthy, "Shaftesbury and Wieland: The Question of Enthusiasm," Studies in 18th Century Culture, Ronald C. Rosbottom, ed. (Madison, Wisc.: Univ. of Wisc. Press, 1977), 79-95.
16. Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, "A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm," Characteristics, John M. Robertson, ed, (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963), I, 10-11.
17. Ibid., 112.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 113.
20. Ibid., 116.
21. C.B.B., Wieland or the Transformation (N.Y.: Hafner Publishing, 1926), 55.
22. Ibid., 203.
23. Ibid., 204.
24. Werner W. Beyer makes the distinction, in Keats and the Daemon King, between the "unclean" demons of Judeo-Christian lore and the good daemons, "those beings of the vast and mysterious invisible world." over which Oberon rules. See Beyer, Intro., 15, 16. Angus Fletcher makes the same distinction in Allegory, The Theory of A Symbolic Mode (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1964) Intro., 19 n.
25. See Fletcher, Allegory, pp. 331-336 on allegory as the language of compromise, accommodation, and syncretism.
26. The epigram reads: From Virtue's blissful paths away  
The double-tongued are sure to stray;  
Good is a forth-right journey still,  
And mazy paths but lead to ill.
27. Rosemond Tuve, Allegorical Imagery (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966), p. 135 discusses the amplifying function of the image in relation to the theme of the allegory.
28. This definition from Lord Raglan, The Temple and the House (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1964), p. 135, is based on the intimate connection between temples and rituals.

29. C.B.B., Wieland, 18.
30. Ibid., 20.
31. See David F. Hawke, Benjamin Rush, Revolutionary Gadfly (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 374, 375-76.
32. In a letter to John Seward dated 28 Dec. 1796 Rush claims to have had success in treating acute mania by copious bleeding, purging, salivation, and cold baths. "I consider it as a state of fever. No wonder that it yields to the common remedies for fever." The Letters of Benjamin Rush, L.H. Butterfield, ed. (Princeton Univ. Press, 1951), II, 784.
33. Smith was made a member of the hospital staff in 1796 and his Diary recounts a steady round of hospital and house calls from then on.
34. Brown documents the death of Wieland senior by referring to a French scientific journal which is said to have carried a report of such an occurrence.
35. As substantiation for this Brown refers to Erasmus Darwin's Zoonomia which Smith read and made frequent references to in his diary and his letters.
36. Donald A. Ringe, in his chapter on "Charles Brockden Brown" in Major Writers of Early American Literature, Everett Emerson, ed. (Madison: Univ. of Wisc. Press, 1972), sees the temple, the closet, and the cave in Edgar Huntly as symbols of the mind and of the psychological states of the characters.
37. C.B.B., Common Place Book, .03398, Brown Papers, The Historical Society of Pa.
38. The letter, dated 20 May, 1792, is 17 pages long and is probably the actual manuscript of "The Story of Julius" though in it Brown claims the manuscript is lost. See Bennett, "The Letters of C.B.B.," 170.
39. Quoted by Bennett, "The C.B.B. Canon," 153.
40. David Lee Clark mistook the "Henrietta" letters for an actual correspondence between Brown and a young lady. See C.B.B.: Pioneer Voice of America, 53-107. They have subsequently been determined as fictional. See Bennett, "C.B.B. Canon," 144.
41. These characters do not correspond to the archetypal figures of male and female principles, but are either doubles or antitheses. Examples of both uses will be made clear in discussions of the individual works.

42. Edward Honig, Dark Conceit: The Making of Allegory (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966), 57-88 discusses oppositional relationships in allegory. See also Fletcher, 190-191 on doubling in allegories.
43. David Lyttle, "The Case Against Carwin," Nineteenth Century Fiction, 26 (1966), 257-269 reviews the arguments. One of the most interesting evaluations of Carwin remains that of John Greenleaf Whittier who refers to him as "a demon in human form" who perceives Wieland's state of mind and "wantonly experiments upon it." J.G. Whittier, "Fanaticism," The Writings of John Greenleaf Whittier (Houghton, Mifflin, 1894), VII, 392.
44. Dunlap, Life, I, 258.
45. C.B.B., Ormond, edited with Introduction by Ernest Marchand (N.Y.: Hafner Publishing, 1937), 93.
46. Briefly, the two viewpoints met in agreement on the belief that education would establish the proper environment in which man could exercise that morality toward which he was, by the necessity of his nature, inclined. See Howard, The Connecticut Wits, Chapter IX for a discussion of the importance of education in both philosophies.
47. C.B.B., Ormond, 30.
48. See Howard R. Patch, The Goddess Fortuna in Mediaeval Literature (N.Y.: Octagon Books, 1967) on the blindness of Fate.
49. C.B.B., Ormond, 242.
50. Ibid., 124.
51. See Rosemond Tuve, Allegorical Imagery, 135.
52. C.B.B., Ormond, 218.
53. Ibid., 220.
54. Lillie D. Lashe, The Early American Novel (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1907) was the first to make the connection.
55. The Fast Day Sermon of 9 May 1798. For details see Vernon Stouffer, New England and the Bavarian Illuminati (N.Y.: Russell & Russell, 1918) 229-233.
56. Most of Dr. Dwight's career was devoted to the struggle against "The Triumph of Infidelity" which he envisioned in his 1788 poem. See Stouffer, 246-252, for the part Dwight played in the Illuminati score.

57. On the same day Dr. Dwight's brother Theodore, Elihu Hubbard Smith's friend, delivered a similar address at Hartford in which he linked the revolutionary government in France with the Illuminati. See Stouffer, 253.
58. Jedediah Morse, A sermon, Preached at Charlestown, November 29, 1798, on the Anniversary Thanksgiving in Massachusetts, Boston, 1798. The reference to Genet is, of course, to the representative of the French government who arrived in this country in 1793 and caused a division among the people here. The Democratic Societies, to which he gave encouragement, were seen by the Federalists as instruments of French subversion.
59. See Smith's Diary, 456.
60. William Dunlap, Diary, I, 321.
61. Ernest Marchand, Introduction to Ormond, xxix, thinks Brown assigned his own opinions to his villains in order to air them without incurring blame. I don't believe this is the case, and in this instance it seems to me that Ormond corresponds to Alcuin in that dialogue, serving as the extreme that makes Constantia's "liberation" more acceptable.
62. C.B.B., Ormond, 211.
63. George F. Sensabaugh, Milton in Early America (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964) gives an account of these applications. Brown's copybook contains an article taken from Relf's Gazette of 24 Jan. 1799 entitled "Barruel Amended." It claims to extend the Abbe Barruel's Memoirs of Jacobinism to the original source: the anarchy of the angels which led to their revolt under Satan's leadership.
64. C.B.B., Ormond, 147.
65. Fletcher describes the daemonic agent in allegory as one who acts as if possessed, one whose acts touch both the human and divine spheres, and one whose actions are free of the moral restraints of ordinary men since his morality serves only his own end, the mastery of others. Allegory, 68. Ormond fits this description perfectly.
66. C.B.B., Ormond, 93.
67. The same kind of mechanistic inexorability pervades Carwin's defense when he refers to his biloquial power and asks "Had I not rashly set in motion a machine, over whose progress I had no controul, and which experience had shewn me was infinite in power?" Many years ago F.C. Prescott, "Wieland and Frankenstein," American Literature, II (May 1930) 172-73 suggested Carwin's words as a possible link to Mary Shelley's work. See also Fletcher, 65-69, on daemonic mechanism.

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68. Donald A. Ringe, C.B. Brown (N.Y.: Twayne Publishers, 1966), 61, complains that Brown turns Ormond into a "veritable madman" at the end of the book, a turn of events for which, he claims, we are ill prepared. We are not so ill prepared, however, if we see Ormond as a personification of his own deterministic theories.
  69. David H. Hirsch, "C.B.B. as a Novelist of Ideas," Books at Brown, 20 (1965), 165-184, says that Brown presents ideas in the guise of fictional characters who were rendered inarticulate by his ineptitude or timidity.
  70. Smith so admired Bage's Hermesprong that he intended to dramatize it. Brown did actually begin the play but abandoned it. See Smith, Diary, 290.
  71. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, Vol. I, The Rise of Modern Paganism (N.Y.: Knopf, 1966), 36.
  72. Allen, 11.
  73. Angus Fletcher, The Prophetic Moment, 11. It is Fletcher's thesis that Faerie Queene is a prophetic poem and that prophetic literature employs two great archetypes, the temple and the labyrinth. Brown's fear of the idea of prophetic literature will be discussed in a later chapter.
  74. See Spenser's letter to Sir Walter Raleigh in which he distinguishes between the methods of the poet and the historiographer.
  75. Clark, 41.

## CHAPTER 3: THE EMPIRE OF NATURE

Philadelphia: An Elegy

Imperial daughter of the West,  
Why thus in widowed weeds recline?  
With every gift of nature blest,  
The empire of a World was thine.

Late brighter than the star that beams  
When the soft morning carol flows,  
Now mournful as the maniac's dreams,  
When melancholy veils his woes.

What foe with more than hostile ire  
Has thin'd thy city's thronging way!  
Bid the sweet breath of youth expire,  
And manhood's powerful pulse decay?

No Gothic foe's ferocious bard,  
Fearful as fate, as death severe;  
But the destroying angel's hand,  
With hotter rage, with fiercer fear.

From the Columbia Centinel,

Oct. 23, 1798.

The "hotter rage" and "fiercer fear" which the Philadelphia elegiast deplored proved to be the last of the great yellow fever epidemics in that city. The "empire of a World" to which Philadelphia had aspired as the capital of the new republic was soon to be denied her, for the Congress, spurred on by the recurring onslaughts of the fever in the present capital, was already planning to cut a new one out of the wilderness. Some positive action such as this was necessary to offset the stirring of old fears occasioned by the return of yellow fever to America so soon after the establishment there of a new nation.

These resurrected fears had much to do with the Utopian expectations attached to the discovery of America, expectations which were perhaps best expressed by John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government: "In the beginning all the world was America." The allusion in that statement to the Edenic paradise constituted one side of the image of America which was formed in the minds of Renaissance Europeans and which persisted into the eighteenth century. The very "otherness" of nature which that image encompassed and which America made real had become the source of an obverse, anti-Utopian image. The overwhelming abundance of nature in the New World taxed the vocabulary of the European tongues and a literature deficient in natural description turned for expression to that which was familiar from poetry and mythology. Thus in the minds of Europeans, the New World became at once the site of the Golden Age or the Earthly Paradise, and a howling wilderness, a place of demons.<sup>1</sup>

The "true relations" of the wonders of America penned by Renaissance travelers to her shores were transmuted into legends which circulated in the villages of European nations so that the steady stream of immigrants who later poured into the new nation were convinced that all things, including human nature, would be made new in the New World. The literature of the New England Puritans had, of course, furthered both images of America, but in the main, the Puritans upheld the Utopian image by emphasizing their belief that the wilderness could be made into the site of the New Jerusalem by the people of God.<sup>2</sup> Later, the institution of a self-proclaimed republic of virtue and the growth of a self-conscious national pride brought with it a deliberate attempt to blend the sacred and secular aspects of American Utopianism as can be seen in such nationalistic epic poetry as Timothy Dwight's The Conquest of Canaan and Joel Barlow's The Vision of Columbus.

The second half of the eighteenth century did, however, see a different kind of "traveler" to America's shores, travelers who never left home but who told tales which lengthened the dark shadows of America's anti-image at a moment in history when she could ill afford it. It began with the great French naturalist, George Louis Leclerc, le Comte de Buffon, and his Histoire naturelle (1749). Buffon raised the question of whether America represented the world in an embryonic state, or the ruins of a corrupt nature. His attempt to place America within the chronology of natural

history led him to expound what he thought was a scientific and, in the eighteenth century sense of the word, a philosophical explanation for America's origins, one which emphasized the newness of the continent and designated it the last of the land masses to have emerged after the Deluge. With scarcely a pause, Buffon jumped from this premise of nature in embryo to the conclusion that in such a state decay is inevitable:

In this state of abandon, everything languishes, decays, stifles. The air and the earth, weighed down by the moist and poisonous vapors, cannot purify themselves nor profit from the influence of the star of life. The sun vainly pours down its liveliest rays on this cold mass, which is incapable of responding to its warmth; it will never produce anything but humid creatures, plants, reptiles, and insects; and cold men and feeble animals are all that it will ever nurture.<sup>3</sup>

So it began, and while it would be unfair to accuse Buffon of anything but the most sincere of motives, the same cannot be claimed for some of those who followed in his path. What originated as an attempt on his part to answer the questions which had surrounded America since its discovery soon became the premise of a whole new range of fantasy. The Abbé Raynal, a Jesuit and very much a man of the world of European politics, published a four-volume history of commerce between the old and new worlds in which he distorted Buffon's theory. In America's native inhabitants, he claimed, "Everything points to some sickness from which the human race still suffers. The ruin of this world is still imprinted on the faces of its [America's]

inhabitants."<sup>4</sup>

Raynal's opinions received wide attention in Europe, as did the published results of the travels in America of Peter Kalm, a young professor of botany at the Swedish University and former student of Carl Linneaus. Kalm traveled through most of the colonies of North America talking with just about everyone of note, including Benjamin Franklin and John Bartram, America's outstanding botanist whom Linneaus had highly praised. Kalm's account of his travels, published in 1752, revealed his fears for the future of the country: the temperature fluctuated too widely; the soil was rich but was easily ruined by cultivation; oak timber quickly rotted so that ships built in America lasted but a few years. Insects were said to abound, and Kalm included a long list of them, singling out the "mosquitoes, a kind of disagreeable gnat" as particularly noisome. Most detrimental of all though, in Kalm's estimation, was the "inconstant" weather which caused the population to be weakened by "the intermitting fever; and many people are forced to suffer it every year, together with other diseases."<sup>5</sup>

Because he had actually visited the United States and Canada, Kalm's work was of some substance and pointed out matters of true importance. It was soon to be forgotten, however, because of the much more sensational Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains (1768,9), written by the Abbé Corneille De Pauw. From the first page of the two-volume work De Pauw's thesis is firmly stated: "C'est sans doute

un spectacle grand et terrible de voir une moitié de ce globe tellement disgraciée par la nature, que tout y était ou dégenère ou monstreus."<sup>6</sup> He never deviates from this, offering, in what is little more than a compilation of earlier attacks made by others, every scrap of speculation and fact that could be found as evidence of its truth and either denying or avoiding contradictory evidence.

The theories put forth by this body of literature suddenly took on great importance when the colonies declared their independence from England, declaring themselves a new nation. The climate of a nation had been determined by Montesquieu as the deciding factor in its prosperity.<sup>7</sup> This environmentalist theory, which gradually broadened to include all the institutions of a society as part of its climate, became a major consideration in the minds of those, both in Europe and America, who hoped to see the United States fulfill the Utopian hopes of the world.<sup>8</sup> Just one year after the colonies declared their independence, and when interest in America was at a peak, the English historian William Robertson published his History of America. It repeated the findings of Buffon, Kalm, Raynal, and De Pauw, and, in an effort to refute those primitivists who were apt to view the New World in terms of a garden paradise, Robertson played on the anti-image of America by pointing out that when the English began to settle in America "they termed the countries of which they took possession 'The Wilderness.'"<sup>9</sup>

With the passage of time, Buffon gradually regained his

reputation in America, Kalm's Travels became a reference source for amateur horticulturists such as William Dunlap, and De Pauw's "dissertations on the Egyptians and Chinese" were read "with pleasure and instruction" by Dr. Elihu Hubbard Smith.<sup>10</sup> In 1803, however, the entire matter surfaced again with the publication in France of C. F. Volney's Tableau du climat et sol des États Unis. An English translation was printed in London the following year and became available in America. Despite this, an American edition was prepared and published in Philadelphia the same year, its obvious purpose being the addition of a refutation of the author's damaging comments on America. The refutation appears in the form of footnotes offered by the translator, Charles Brockden Brown.

C. F. Volney was a man of many accomplishments in many fields, including politics, philosophy, science, and literature. He embraced, and had written widely on, the rationalist and materialist philosophies in works which Brown and his friends in The Friendly Club had read and discussed. In 1795 Volney, who was a supporter of the French Revolution, fled the terrorist government of Danton and Robespierre, arriving in Philadelphia in October. In the spring of the following year he began his travels through the United States and managed to see almost all of them. His book, which was intended as the first of two volumes, dealt exclusively with the geology and climate of the states. For information on the first of these subjects Volney acknowledged a great debt to Dr. Samuel Latham

Mitchill, who was one of Elihu Hubbard Smith's co-editors in the publication of the nation's first medical journal, The Medical Repository.<sup>11</sup> Volney and Mitchill shared more than just geological information; they were both ardent democrats and both were devoted to Thomas Jefferson.<sup>12</sup> In 1798, when the tide of feeling against France reached its peak in the United States, Volney returned home.

Whether or not Volney's attitudes towards America were influenced by the strong anti-French attitudes he experienced here is hard to say, but his Tableau is yet another account of America's climate done in the same vein as those of Buffon, Raynal, and De Pauw. Charles Brockden Brown's aim in undertaking this, his only work of translation, is obvious from the nature of his footnotes and from his preface in which he daringly praises Volney for producing so accurate a book on such a vast subject after only a brief residence.<sup>13</sup> "Instead of reproaching him," he says, "for the mistakes committed, we should grant him liberal applause for the truths he has attained."<sup>14</sup> Throughout the work Brown offers editorial comments, usually contradictory, so that his presence is felt by the reader and each of his objections noted. He defends America's climate, temperature, Indians, even her citizens' habit of drinking hot tea, against Volney's attacks. It was not simply Brown's change in politics which caused him to take so strong a stand against the French democrat, but a circumstance which had a direct bearing on his swing to a more conservative political philosophy. That circumstance--the prevalence in this

country of yellow fever--contributes to the obvious ire with which Brown treats Volney's discussion in Chapter X, "Of the reigning Diseases in the United States." It was a subject that had become extremely painful and distressing to all Americans, but especially so to the inhabitants of the Eastern seacoast cities.

In its essence, Volney's claim that the "reigning diseases" in the United States were traceable to climate had been offered by earlier critics who believed America's climate had a strange propensity for producing fevers, a propensity which they thought permeated the very atmosphere of the country.<sup>15</sup> At the time, terms such as "intermittent" and "remitting" when applied to fevers, covered any incident of illness from seasonal colds and diarrhea to malignant diseases of the respiratory system. Contagious fevers, however, were those dread diseases of smallpox, cholera, and yellow fever. Cholera remained a European disease, but smallpox and yellow fever were known in early America where for a time the same confusion existed between smallpox and syphilis as it did in Europe. Following the custom of Europeans, Americans eventually came to distinguish the two according to the size of the skin eruptions accompanying each disease. Syphilis became known as the "large pox" and frequently as "the French pox," while variola became the "small pox."<sup>16</sup>

The best medical and historical evidence indicates that yellow fever entered the New England colonies in 1693 when it is believed to have been brought into Boston harbor by

British trading ships from Barbados.<sup>17</sup> In the eighteenth century there were major outbreaks in Charleston, New York, and Philadelphia which peaked in 1745, diminished to about the year 1760, and then disappeared until 1793. The sudden reappearance of the disease after some thirty years, and its impropitious timing (coming as it did so soon after the establishment of the republic) was a source of great consternation to citizens of the new nation. When the years 1791, 93, 94, 95, 97, and 98 all brought epidemics of yellow fever to cities ranging as far apart as New Haven, Connecticut and Charleston, South Carolina, all the Utopian hopes and the bright visions of America as "a fairer Pisgah" began to fade.<sup>18</sup>

Volney reviewed the two medical theories which had evolved in the United States during the eighteenth century as explanations of the yellow fever. These two theories, which divided the American medical profession into two distinct camps, involved both causes and treatments of the disease. The first group drew on traditional ideas about epidemic fevers and declared it to be an infectious, contagious disease imported into the United States from some outside source, with the West Indies considered the most likely culprit. The other theory was that the fever was of local origin, not inherent in the nature of America, but the result of miasmatic vapors rising from the preponderance of filth which daily accumulated in the cities of the Eastern seaboard. Since these cities, the vital shipping ports of the new nation, were the sites of the

repeated outbreaks of the fever, any theory offered had to be considered with a view to its effects on the nation's economy.<sup>19</sup>

As long as there has been a human awareness of the existence of contagious diseases there has been a belief in isolation and quarantine as a remedy. Damaging though this would have been to the shipping interests of the nation, it was viewed by the importationists as a temporary measure which would have no overall or lasting effect on the mercantile businesses. The anti-contagionists, however, with their talk of miasmatic influences in the air sounded to many like spiritualists rather than men of science, and it was feared that a general acceptance of the idea that yellow fever originated in American cities would cause foreign ships to avoid those cities and make American ships unwelcome in foreign ports. Admonitions of the local origin theorizers toward greater cleanliness, both personal and civil, met with resistance and open hostility from a people who still knew nothing of the existence of microbes.<sup>20</sup> The controversy continued to take on wider implications as each year the epidemics brought the death toll higher until eventually it had become a political, religious, and moral issue as well as a medical problem.<sup>21</sup>

After reviewing the arguments on both sides, Volney indicated his belief in the local origin theory and his doubt that the fever was in all cases contagious. Brown takes a very negative attitude toward Volney's review of the controversy, denigrating in his footnotes Volney's

remarks on both sides of the issue. In one such note he questions both the importationist and the local origin arguments by asking:

Why, exclaims one, did not the equal or greater filth and impurity of our towns generate the fever before 1790? and why, may another exclaim, did not our intercourse with the West Indies import that disease sooner? an intercourse more incautious and unguarded than at present.<sup>22</sup>

Then, dismissing both sides, he adds:

The rage for explaining every thing, and the dogmatic spirit that imagines the causes of every thing within our reach, is as prevalent now as in the darkest ages of the world.<sup>23</sup>

A few pages later he continues in much the same vein adding a personal attack:

Volney, and all violent controversialists, have not minds large enough to see the real complexity and obscurity of this question, or to admit the possibility of opposite opinions being adopted or defended with disinterested motives.<sup>24</sup>

Obviously by 1803 Brown no longer saw history as a steady progress toward an era of enlightenment but rather as a tortuous process of periodic returns to a darker age. Behind this emotional response and overt questioning of the motives of partisans on both sides of the yellow fever issue lay a bitter personal experience which caused him to alter not only his convictions but his ambitions as well.

Brown had not been in Philadelphia during the worst of the yellow fever epidemics, in 1793. He prudently left the city, as did thousands of others, and stayed with Elihu Hubbard Smith and his family in Litchfield. Later, in 1795,

during the epidemic of which he wrote in Ormond, he was in Perth Amboy, New Jersey visiting with William Dunlap. It seems likely, however, that at least as early as 1795 he entertained intentions to write a story based on an epidemic situation. Smith's diary for the months of September and October, 1795, contain a first-hand account of what it was like to remain in a city in which the fever was spreading rapidly. He records a conversation with Dr. Amasa Dingley in which he mentioned to Dingley "my friend's (C.B.B.) plan, for a Tale -- & was surprised to see the tears trickle down Dingley's cheeks; & to find him, for several minutes, unable to make any reply."<sup>25</sup> From this it would seem that the original plan was for a sentimental tale which is not what Brown eventually wrote.

Despite this early interest, nothing of Brown's concerning the fever appeared in print until early in 1798 when "The Man At Home" was published in installments in Philadelphia's The Weekly Magazine.<sup>26</sup> One episode included a brief sketch of the fortunes of an Irish girl who emigrates to Philadelphia along with the family she works for, their demise in the 1793 epidemic, and her subsequent fortunes.<sup>27</sup> Here too is the story of Baxter and his French neighbors which later appeared as Chapter VII of Ormond, as well as a story of three men discussing the comparative evils of a tyrannical government and of an epidemic.<sup>28</sup> The Weekly Magazine also published, in the spring of 1798, the first nine chapters of Arthur Mervyn.<sup>29</sup> Late in that same year Brown entered into an agreement with the publisher,

Hugh Maxwell, to complete the work.<sup>30</sup> In the meanwhile, he had been frantically trying to keep up with the printers who were already setting the pages of Ormond which Brown had not yet finished writing.<sup>31</sup> In December of 1798 he wrote to his brother that the end of each day found him "thoroughly weary" from his writing tasks.<sup>32</sup>

It is no wonder he was weary. The bulk of Brown's literary output is limited to the years 1798 and 1799. In those two years he wrote Wieland, the long fragment, "The Memoirs of Carwin," Ormond, Arthur Mervyn, and Edgar Huntly, as well as editing The Monthly Magazine. In addition, this period included the death of Elihu Hubbard Smith and his own bout with the yellow fever. It seems almost prophetic of what the year would bring that it should have been the year 1798 in which Brown first began to publish pieces which made use of yellow fever material. In August of that year Elihu Smith was correcting proofs of Wieland and reading a manuscript copy of "Sky-Walk," a novel which Brown had finished late in 1797.<sup>33</sup> This novel was in the process of being printed in Philadelphia when the epidemic in that city brought death to the publisher and destruction to the printed portion of the book.<sup>34</sup> At the same time that his work was becoming a casualty of the epidemic in Philadelphia, Brown and his friends, Smith and William Johnson, with whom he was spending the summer, were coming under the same baneful shadow in New York.

Dr. Smith had devoted a good deal of his time and attention to the question of yellow fever and he easily

persuaded Brown that the fever was non-contagious and curable, and that the neighborhood in which they were situated (Pine St.) was a healthful one, far enough removed from the low-lying dock districts to which the fever was usually confined.<sup>35</sup> Smith adhered firmly to the local origin theory and to the Rush method of treatment of the fever, one which employed bleeding and various forms of purging in order to reduce the fevered and overstimulated state of the body. The three friends maintained a bravado as the fever came closer and closer to their door, but Smith was more and more engaged in the care of the sick and his day and night exertions taxed his strength.<sup>36</sup> He was never a robust man and the never-ending fatigue of those summer months took a great toll. On 11 September a new danger was added when word arrived at the Pine Street house that a Dr. Joseph Scandella, whom Smith had met the previous month, was in the city, ill, and in need of a place to stay. Smith immediately had him join the three friends; once there he was placed in Smith's own bed where he remained as a patient.

Dr. Scandella, a native of Venice, Italy, had been visiting in the United States for a year and was about to embark for home from New York when he learned that friends in Philadelphia were ill with yellow fever and so he returned to that city. Unable to save his friends, he remained in Philadelphia only long enough to attend their dying and then went on to New York. By the time he reached that city he was already ill and no boardinghouse would

receive him. He turned to Smith, a fellow physician, and was not refused.<sup>37</sup> Describing the situation in a letter to his brother, Brown says that "A nurse was impossible to be procured, and this duty therefore devolved upon us."<sup>38</sup> Smith was the first to weaken and Brown says that while Scandella lay in one compartment of the house, "a spectacle that sickens our hearts to behold, and not far from his last breath, . . . in the next our friend Elihu Hubbard Smith is in a condition but little better."<sup>39</sup>

On 16 September Scandella died and William Johnson removed Smith to the home of Horace Johnson, his brother, where Drs. Miller and Mitchill, who were both friends and colleagues, attended him. By the time Smith died on 21 September, Brown had also contracted the fever and was being treated in the home of Dr. Miller. Surprisingly, Brown survived and, with William Johnson, left the dismal scenes of the city to join William Dunlap in Perth Amboy. In a letter to his brother James, written just four days before Smith's death, Brown says that prior to Scandella's death Smith had realized the enormity of the danger in which he had placed himself and had determined "as soon as his friend Scandella had recovered or perished and his present patients had been gotten rid of, to withdraw from town."<sup>40</sup> This is the only indication that had he lived Smith may have reconsidered his strongly held belief that the fever was not contagious.

Never one to withhold judgement on any subject, Smith had formed firm opinions on every aspect of the yellow

fever issue, an issue which had become the focal point of a major division between persons of good intent, but of opposing political philosophies. Though the division had its roots in the very conceptualization of the government of the United States, it was reactivated in 1793 when President Washington issued a proclamation of United States neutrality in the war between England and France. While this established the nation's official position, it did little to stop the Federalists, both in the government and out of it, from continuing to try to involve us on England's behalf. Nor did it do much to stop the republicans from trying to involve us on the side of France. One event after the other in that fateful decade tended toward the splitting of the American citizenry into two rival factions. Every local and national issue became a reflection of the international struggle in which America supposedly had no part. With the election of John Adams as President in 1796 the anti-French forces received considerable support. In 1798, however, the French themselves, through the infamous XYZ Affair, dealt the finishing blow to United States-France relations and the term "Jacobin" was applied to all things hated and feared in America.

The XYZ Affair occurred in the spring of 1798 and by summer the conspiracy scare discussed in an earlier chapter had gripped the nation. Books, pamphlets, speeches, sermons, and newspaper articles kept up a steady stream of warnings and "proofs" of Jacobin infiltration into American politics, religion, and daily life. Federalists, for the

most part, seemed to honestly believe that evidence of such activities could be seen in the establishment of the Democratic Societies, in the Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, in the opposition to the Jay Treaty, in the falling off of belief in traditional Christianity, in the support given by thousands of Americans to what they saw as a sister republic in revolutionary France, and in the spread into several areas of Europe of the revolutionary movement.<sup>41</sup>

The conspiratorial theory, however, which swelled into significance with Jedidiah Morse's speech, centered attention on the ever-increasing numbers of immigrants in the Eastern seacoast cities. While earlier waves of immigration had been primarily from Germany and England, the late 1790's saw a sudden influx of French and Irish in numbers sufficient to raise the fears of many, notably the Federalists.<sup>42</sup>

These new immigrants, unlike the Germans who had sought the farming regions of their new country, tended to remain in the cities where they arrived, settling in the cheapest, most crowded areas, usually in dock-side neighborhoods. It was in just these neighborhoods, of course, that the yellow fever always seemed to make its first appearance; and the connections which soon were made between the foreigners and the fever seemed as patently clear to many Americans as did the connections between revolutionary France and the democratic movement in American cities.<sup>43</sup> When the Rev. Timothy Dwight declared in his speech on "The Duty of Americans at the Present Crisis" that

Americans had had their own bad experience with Jacobins, and that "All contact with them has been pestilential" he seems to have chosen his words carefully and intentionally.<sup>44</sup> The importation theory which explained the presence in America of yellow fever as having been brought to her shores by ships and persons arriving from foreign nations coincided nicely with the Federalist belief that France was in the business of spreading revolution like a plague.<sup>45</sup> An open declaration of war against France was sought by many in the Federalist party in 1798 but it was not forthcoming. The government chose instead to concentrate its efforts on the domestic scene. Beginning with amendments to the 1795 Naturalization Act which increased the residency requirement for citizenship from five to fourteen years, Congress rapidly passed the Alien Act which empowered the President for two years to deport any alien deemed a threat to the nation's security, and then the Alien Enemies Act which provided for the apprehension and deportation of male aliens who were subjects or citizens of a hostile nation. Finally, within just thirty days of the amending of the Naturalization Act, the Sedition Act was passed. This new law extended the panic reaction to include citizens of the United States by providing for the imprisonment of anyone, citizen or alien, who attempted to foment insurrection or who wrote, published, or uttered any false or malicious statement against the President, Congress, or government of the United States.<sup>46</sup> The importationists had won.

Against this background of terror, and while Fort Jay

in New York's harbor was being readied to repel a possible invasion by the French, the summer of 1798 waned and an epidemic of yellow fever, second only to that of 1793, struck the seaport cities. There was no law which could deport the suspected importers of yellow fever nor one which could imprison the advocates of the theory of its local origins, but both these groups quickly became as unpopular with the Federalist majority as were the supposed alien revolutionaries and the native seditionists. At the time that Charles Brockden Brown was writing Ormond, late in 1798, there was a concerted effort on the part of Federalists to forestall continued references to yellow fever as "the American plague" by establishing France as its source.<sup>47</sup> In the face of this, Brown was actually courageous in lifting the "Baxter" episode from an earlier work published in The Weekly Magazine some months before and placing it in Ormond as Chapter VII. This chapter, which bears no real relationship to the rest of the novel, treats sympathetically a French immigrant couple, father and daughter, and shows them to be victims, but not a source of yellow fever. Their neighbor, Baxter, who becomes convinced that he has been exposed to the fever because of the illness of M. Monrose, does indeed contract the malady and dies of it. Brown, however, holds him up as "an example of the force of imagination," and insists:

He had probably already received, through the medium of the air, or by contact of which he was not conscious, the seeds of this disease. They might have lain dormant, had not this panic occurred to endow them with activity.<sup>48</sup>

Brown thus carefully distinguishes between the necessitarian doctrine of his Perfectibilian villain, Ormond, and the theories of yellow fever which proclaimed it to be universally contagious and foreign in origin. No connection whatsoever is made between Ormond and yellow fever, and the epidemic itself is shown to have benefitted Constantia and Stephen Dudley almost as much as it harmed them. Instead, fear and panic are presented as the culprits and susceptibility to illness as the result of over stimulation.

These are all reflections of the convictions of Elihu Hubbard Smith on the subject of yellow fever. After the epidemic in New York in 1795, Smith wrote a series of letters on the fever to a Connecticut friend, Dr. William Buell, which were later published by Noah Webster.<sup>49</sup> In these he sets forth his reasoning for adopting the belief that the fever was not imported but was the result of conditions which prevailed especially in the regions of the docks. In the fourth letter this region receives particular attention because of its inhabitants who were, Smith claims, the principal sufferers in the epidemic. As he outlines the backgrounds of these inhabitants, immigrants all, he shows them to be victims not only of the fever, but of poverty and oppression in their native lands which had weakened their physical constitutions. Often, he claims, they are further victimized by those who have, for a profit, enticed them to this country where, in the seaport cities in which they land, they are met with more of the same poverty and oppression they thought to have left behind them.

The effects of a change of climate and diet, and the adoption of manners and customs, such as drinking of alcoholic beverages and the abstaining from bathing (which Smith declares to be as detrimental to the natives of this country as to immigrants) are all put forth as reasons why the greatest number of those who died of the fever in 1795 were foreigners.<sup>50</sup>

What Smith does in this letter is to reverse the cause and effect relationship between the fever and foreigners which had been proposed by those importationists, such as the members of the College of Physicians at Philadelphia, who issued an official resolution declaring that yellow fever "had never been known to generate in Philadelphia or in any other part of the United States, but had in all instances been imported."<sup>51</sup> With the exception of Dr. Edward Stevens, who was a declared Federalist, most of the members of the College of Physicians maintained the apolitical, liberal stance of the eighteenth century gentleman.<sup>52</sup> Opposing the College and its resolution, however, was a group of doctors who argued the theory of local origin for yellow fever and who were, without exception, ardent and outspoken republicans.<sup>53</sup> Dr. Benjamin Rush who was, in addition to being an outstanding physician, a vociferous republican, resigned from the College of Physicians when it refused to accept his arguments against the importation theory.<sup>54</sup>

Rush, and those who sided with him, advocated sanitation as the remedy for the spread of the fever, and Rush went on

to further widen the breach between the two schools of thought by denouncing as ineffectual the method of treatment followed by most of the members of the College. This method, based on the use of stimulants and referred to as "the bark and wine cure," derived from the theory that the body systems, once attacked by the fever, became dangerously depressed and needed stimulation to restore the proper equilibrium. Rush believed that the presence of fever always indicated a state of excitability which in all instances could be relieved by bleeding and purging.<sup>55</sup> The Rush cure came to be known as "the Republican cure," a distinction which Rush furthered by teaching nonmedical personnel to administer it.<sup>56</sup> This was viewed as another affront to his former colleagues on the College of Physicians and, rightfully, as further proof of Rush's democratic tendencies.

The personnel called upon by Rush to aid him in the 1793 epidemic were blacks, women, and men of the lower class, who in most cases were paid by the provisional government which took over when the city, state, and federal governments all abandoned the people of the capital city. In their place volunteer Guardians, mostly Quakers, formed an emergency government by committee in much the same fashion as had been done in France in the wake of Louis XIV's fall. These Guardians served as overseers of the sick, the orphaned, and the dead, arranging for the removal of diseased persons to the Bush-Hill hospital, and for the mass burials which were conducted daily. The only persons available for such work were those who either could not

leave the city for financial reasons, or those who, out of humanitarian sentiments, chose not to. The Guardians came from the latter group while the workers they directed were from the former.<sup>57</sup>

Blacks, Quakers, and French emigrants appear to have made up the major portion of the work force in the plague-ridden city. The blacks and the French were solicited for the work mainly because it was believed that they were not susceptible to the fever. There was, of course, some truth to this since in the case of those French emigrants from the revolutionary turmoil in Santo Domingo, continued exposure to the disease had provided them with some degree of immunity. As for the blacks, we now know that the blood cell mutation termed Sickle Cell Anemia is the result of an adaptation to the Aëdes aegypti mosquito which transmits yellow fever and which originated in Africa.<sup>58</sup> Despite this advantage, members of both these groups did often contract the disease. The French, however, through their experiences in the West Indies, were less inclined to view the fever as necessarily fatal. The man who took over the administration of the Philadelphia lazaretto, Bush-Hill, at the height of the dreadful epidemic was Dr. Jean Devèze, a refugee from Santo Domingo who, with the inspired assistance of the very wealthy French-born merchant, Stephen Girard, actually made Bush-Hill into a place of treatment rather than simply a death house. Both men were open and fervent democrats as was Dr. George Logan, one of Philadelphia's outstanding Quakers who returned

to the city from his retirement home in order to be of assistance during the plague.<sup>59</sup>

All of these men, Rush, Devèze, Girard, Logan, and Matthew Carey, whose account of the 1793 plague was to provide Charles Brockden Brown with numerous details of which he made use in his Arthur Mervyn, were republicans, and some were members of the Democratic Society in Philadelphia.<sup>60</sup> Almost all of the Guardians who provided a local government during the epidemic were at the least republican, if not openly democratic. While the republicans accused the Federalists of cowardice in leaving the city, recent scholarship has shown that it was the belief in the contagionist theory which led both republicans and Federalists in large numbers to flee.<sup>61</sup> Since the great majority of republicans, however, did not believe the importation and contagion theories, they remained behind and performed the needed services. The benevolent actions of the Guardians were made all the more conspicuous by the manner in which many who, though forced by circumstances to remain in the city, refused to venture out of their homes to offer assistance. In Part I of Arthur Mervyn, Brown's hero is a representative of all those who performed nobly during the epidemic. In Part II Arthur's motives for thus behaving are questioned, and accusations are hurled at him based on some rather sketchy tales concerning his origins. In much the same manner, when the epidemic of 1793 had subsided, those who had acted as Guardians were criticized by the returning Federalists and their actions termed those

of "upstarts" seeking political advantage. One such "upstart" republican, Israel Israel, who gave unstintingly of his time and labor during the worst weeks of the epidemic, used his "plague record" as a platform in the fall elections. The overwhelming support he received from grateful citizens of his district was overturned by the returning Federalists who demanded a new date be set for the voting because of the absence of many from the city at the time.<sup>62</sup>

Because the fate of many of those who died of the fever was determined by their poverty, the yellow fever epidemics became the first political issue to divide Americans along social and economic lines. Those who maintained summer homes outside the city went to them at the first hint of the fever. But in many cases those who sought refuge in other cities or in the countryside were not welcome at inns or boardinghouses (often not even at the homes of friends or relatives) because of the fear of contagion.<sup>63</sup> Condemned to remain in the city without food supplies or adequate medical services, the poor suffered and died by the thousands. As Stephen Dudley says in Ormond, "For the rich, the whole world is a safe asylum; but for us, indigent and wretched, what fate is reserved but to stay and perish?"<sup>64</sup> In Arthur Mervyn, the common graves of the victims of yellow fever, "the pits opened alike for the rich and the poor, the known and the unknown," seem to suggest that the only true equality in the new society is the democracy of death.

All of this, of course, bears the marks of Elihu Hubbard Smith's influence on Brown for it must be remembered that

Brown was among those who fled the city at times of epidemic. Smith, on the other hand, was made fully aware because of his profession of all the facets of the problem of yellow fever. In a personal letter Smith once wrote:

I have mingled like other practitioners, with the sick in every part of the city, at every stage of the disorder; ate with them, conversed with them, assisted and watched with them . . . I have thought of nothing else, talked of nothing else, and written of nothing else than this same fever.

Men of the medical profession, such as Smith, were often the only persons who really saw the conditions to which the poor of the city were left by those who abandoned it at the first hint of the autumnal illness. Such personal observation was completely in line with the new concept of medical practice begun at that time in the clinics in France. The concept, which emphasized the necessity of seeing the actual ailments possible to man rather than simply studying about them in texts, was part of the heightened medical consciousness in that country where the practice of medicine was viewed as an aspect of political activity.<sup>67</sup> In the movement toward that Utopian society in which disease would be totally eradicated, it was believed by the French revolutionary government that the medical profession could eventually replace the clergy. Subsidized by the national government and with an acknowledged and recognized authority to exercise power over men's bodies in the same manner that priests did over their souls, doctors would no longer be motivated by self-interest. With no particular profit to be gained from a prevailing state of

ill health, medical men would assume the priest-like role of ministering to the sick and, more importantly, doing everything possible to prevent illness.<sup>68</sup> The idea of preventive medicine was still a long way off, as was governmental support of civil sanitation, but the seeds of those comprehensive movements were contained in this new concept of medicine.

Smith's experiences in the 1795 epidemic in New York City not only forced him into a position where he saw, clinically, the bodily illnesses of his patients, but also into that area of epidemiology now referred to as community health. In October of that year he recorded in his diary a climb up Bunker's-Hill for the purpose of surveying the town. Then, concentrating on a particular area, "the lowest part of the city," he marks its boundaries, the types of buildings contained therein, the condition of its streets relative to water, sunlight, and air, the condition of the people who live there, and the prevailing winds off both the river and the land as they pertain to it.<sup>69</sup> From this kind of mapping out in words the areas where the disease was most prevalent, it was but one step to the introduction in the pages of The Medical Repository of medical cartography. The map of the area which appeared in print in 1798 was done by Dr. Valentine Seaman, friend and colleague of Smith's at the New York Hospital. Seaman uses the map in his argument against the importation theory, claiming that it is putrid vapors in certain areas of the city which kindle fever in persons predisposed to illness.<sup>70</sup>

Thus the first use of medical spot maps in which an area is isolated for study was not for the purpose of quarantine, but to establish a relationship between disease and some other factor within the area.<sup>71</sup>

The pursuit of the mysterious factor to which the presence of yellow fever could be linked in a given area led the purveyors of the local origin theory into many a blind alley. Dr. Rush thought at one point that it might be the coffee beans left to rot on the docks of Philadelphia, while Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchill believed New Yorkers had poisoned their city by using as land fill all manner of garbage and offal. Sickness, he maintained, was a punishment for uncleanness, an evil which he pointed out was not necessarily inherent in cities.<sup>72</sup> And, writing to his fellow physicians in an article in The Medical Repository on "The Plague of Athens," Elihu Hubbard Smith concluded that history showed that the source of the Athenian plague had been local, a point which, he says, "ought to make us careful how we overlook the more obvious sources of pestilential disease in our search after those which are foreign and remote. If local causes originated a pestilence in Athens, local causes may generate a Yellow Fever in Philadelphia -- and New York."<sup>73</sup>

Spurred on by such articles, the largely republican medical profession continued to press its claims on government, urging the clean up of the nation's cities as the first step toward a healthier society.<sup>74</sup> The role of the physician was viewed by these republican scientists as

one of active intervention for which Rush's repeated use of the lancet became an apt metaphor in the hands of the Federalist press.<sup>74</sup> Meanwhile in the opposing camp, that of the contagionists and importationists, there were continuous efforts made to establish a connection between the disease and revolution. Irish immigrants often suffered from this connection because of Ireland's steady resistance to England, but on the whole the attempt was mainly to prove yellow fever a new strain of "the morbus gallicus," revolutionary fever.<sup>76</sup> Importationists were convinced of a direct relationship between the ships arriving in Philadelphia from Santo Domingo where the slaves were in most horrible revolt against their French masters, and the ghetto-like neighborhoods near the docks crowded with foreign-speaking immigrants. It was here that the almost annual sieges of yellow fever originated, and here that violence and crime were bred. Here, too, the Democratic clubs flourished and republicans sought support by encouraging greater and greater participation on the part of citizens in the machinery of government. Soon the seemingly disparate elements of immigrants, refugees, crime, yellow fever, and democracy (which at the time was most often used as a synonym for anarchy) were lumped together not only in the disorderly streets of Philadelphia's slums, but in the minds of its more prosperous citizens as well.<sup>77</sup> By the time the "Jacobin" conspiracy scare began in 1798, Americans were ready to believe anything.

While his medical training led Dr. Smith in the

direction of an environmental factor as the causative agent of yellow fever, Charles Brockden Brown seems to have viewed poverty as a contributing factor to a larger disease which threatened the life of the republic in a far more insidious way than did European conspirators. In Ormond he dwells on the subject of poverty, referring at one point to "the endless forms which sickness and poverty assume in the obscure recesses of a commercial and populous city."<sup>78</sup> In a footnote he calls attention to an essay by Count Rumford (Benjamin Thompson) in which can be found the recipe for the type of corn meal with which Constantia Dudley nourishes her household during the months of epidemic.<sup>79</sup> In the issues of the Monthly Magazine for 1799 he reviewed separately the series of essays written by Rumford. The first of these reviews begins, "The subject of the first essay is the cure of a disease in the political body, which he [Rumford] calls mendicity, and which, indeed, in all its extents and bearings, may be regarded as the only evil to which a community of men is liable."<sup>80</sup> This interesting reference to mendicity, or poverty, as a "disease in the political body" serves as a reminder that with the exception of Franklin's humorous treatment of the subject, the only pictures we have of poverty in early American society are those provided by Brown.

Recent studies of social and economic conditions in eighteenth century America have corrected earlier views of this period as ushering in an "Age of Benevolence."<sup>81</sup> It has long been known that as early as 1712 the Philadelphia

City Council made a distinction between the poor, or working poor, and paupers. While adultery may have earned a scarlet "A" in seventeenth century New England, early eighteenth century Philadelphia forced paupers to wear a badge with the letter "P" on their right sleeve.<sup>82</sup> Class distinctions which had begun to fade were sharply heightened in the closing years of the century by the high mortality rates among the poor, many of whom had crowded into the city seeking employment because they could not be accommodated on the small farms in surrounding areas. Conditions such as these were not easily depicted in novels by authors dependent upon a reading public that was sensitive to any hint of criticism of their infant nation. Even for Brown, abstractions such as Reason, Enthusiasm, Freedom, and Necessity lent themselves more readily to the moral allegory in which the remedy for evil was most often the surgical expedient of the knife. There were far more complex issues, however, which needed to be explored and in Ormond, Brown, through his narrator, Sophia Wentworth, explains his preoccupation with the subject of yellow fever:

It is above all things necessary that we should be thoroughly acquainted with the condition of our fellow-beings. Justice and compassion are the fruit of knowledge. The misery that overspreads so large a part of mankind exists chiefly because those who are able to relieve it do not know that it exists. Forcibly to paint the evil, seldom fails to excite the virtue of the spectator and seduce him into wishes, as least, if not into exertions, of beneficence.<sup>83</sup>

In Ormond the fever and poverty are dealt with explicitly but remain secondary to the real theme of the book, its

ideological debate. The most important treatment of the subject is in Arthur Mervyn and, though it is never mentioned there, in Edgar Huntly.

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22. Brown, View, 249 n.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 252 n.
25. Smith, Diary, 61.
26. The essays appear in thirteen issues running from 3 Feb. to 28 April, 1798.
27. No. II, 10 Feb., 1798.
28. No. 5, 3 March, 1798.
29. The chapters appeared between 16 June and 25 August, 1798.
30. Maxwell printed Part I, but because he was slow in honoring commitments Brown had Part II issued in New York. See Warfel, 185.
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32. C.B.B. to Armitt Brown, 20 Dec., 1798. See Dunlap, Life, II, 93-94.
33. Smith's entry for 30 March, 1798 indicates this. See Smith, Diary, 434.
34. Clark, 159.
35. Brown indicates this in a letter to his brother James written 25 Aug., 1798.

36. See Brown's letter to his brother James, 4 Sept., 1798 and Smith's Diary for the period 27 Aug. to 15 Sept., 1798.
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44. Timothy Dwight, The Duty of Americans in the Present Crisis (New Haven, 1798), 22.

45. It is interesting to note that Blake's "America" uses a pestilential cloud as a metaphor for the weaponry of the Virgin (America) hurled against her oppressor, Albion. The cloud is later unleashed on America by Albion's Angel but is repulsed by the American people and the energy of Orc finally drives the plague winds onward until England feels its effects in every quarter of her society. Blake's poem was printed in Oct., 1793 when American cities had just finished burying their dead from the great yellow fever epidemic. The association of pestilence to revolution was not America's alone.
46. John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951) presents the full history of these laws.
47. Pernick, 582.
48. C.B.B., Ormond, 58.
49. A Collection of Papers on the Subject of Bilious Fevers Prevalent in the U.S. for a Few Years Past, compiled by Noah Webster, Jr. (New York, 1796).
50. Letter Fourth, "Some circumstances relative of the principal sufferers by the Fever of 1795," appears on pages 79 to 90. The poor of Ireland are singled out for special attention by Smith, because of their wretched condition, as are the French for their laudable cleanliness.
51. Pernick, 563.
52. Brown's use of the name Stevens for the anti-importationist doctor in Arthur Mervyn may have been an attempt to appear non-partisan.
53. One of them, Dr. Michael Leib, founded the Phila. Democratic Society. Another, Dr. James Hutchinson, who was Physician of the Post in Phila. refused to bar the ships filled with refugees from Santo Domingo on the ground that there was no danger of contagion. Hutchinson died in the epidemic that ensued. See Pernick, pp. 564-570 on the political make-up of Philadelphia's medical profession.
54. The effects which Rush's stand on the subject had on his life are told in Joseph McFarland, "The Epidemic of Yellow Fever in 1793 and Its Influence Upon Dr. Benjamin Rush," Medical Life XXXVI (1929), 465-489.
55. Powell, Bring Out Your Dead, 64, 125, 292.

56. Actually the political lines converged on these methods of treatment, but the newspapers fostered the distinctions. See Pernick, 573-4.
57. See Minutes of the Proceedings of the Committee Appointed on the 14th September, 1793 (Phila., 1848) for details of the conduct of the city in the absence of elected government.
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59. For the full story of Deveze's contribution, see "Jean Devèze," Annals of Medical History, VIII (1936), 210-238. Logan's detailed reports of the plague and of his activities during it are contained in the Logan Papers, Pennsylvania Historical Society.
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61. Pernick, 580.
62. Israel Israel's story, as well as that of others like him, appears in John K. Alexander, "Poverty, Fear, and Continuity, An Analysis of the Poor in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia," The Peoples of Philadelphia, Alan F. Davis and Mark H. Haller, eds. (Phila.: Temple Univ. Press, 1973), 13-35.
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64. C.B.B., Ormond, 30.
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66. Elihu Hubbard Smith to Mason Cogswell, 29 Sept., 1795.
67. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (N.Y.: Random House, 1973), 31.
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69. See Smith's entry for 20 Oct., 1795, "Facts Relative to The Fever," Diary, 75-6.
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71. Ibid., 260. Stevenson claims the anticontagionists probably invented the method as part of their endeavors to establish a cause and effect relationship between disease and some other factor. Dr. Valentine Seaman (1770-1817) was on the staff of the New York Hospital when Smith was; his account of the 1798 N.Y. epidemic is one of the best in the genre. The spot map appears in The Medical Repository, Vol. I, #3, Feb., 1798, opposite p. 316.
72. See Rush's An Account of the Bilious Remitting Yellow Fever, as it Appeared in the City of Philadelphia, in the Year 1793 (Phila., 1794). For Mitchill's theory see James Hardie, An Account of the Malignant Fever Lately Prevalent in New York (N.Y., 1799).
73. Elihu Hubbard Smith, "The Plague of Athens," The Medical Repository, Vol. I, No. 1, 29. The article was one of a series Smith began in which he traced the history of epidemic diseases, always writing from the viewpoint of local origin as the cause. See also "The Pestilential Fever in Grenada," Medical Repository, Vol. I, No. 4, and "The Pestilential Disease Which, at Different Times, appeared in the Neighbourhood at Syracuse," Medical Repository, Vol. II, No. 3.
74. Pernick, 569.
75. This eventually ended with Rush's libel suit against William Cobbett, which Rush won, and a similar suit against John Tenno, publisher of the Gazette of the United States, which never came to trial. See Benjamin Rush, Autobiography, George W. Carver, ed. (The American Philosophical Society: Princeton Univ. Press, 1948), 99.
76. William Cobbett had much to say on the subject of Irish immigrants. See especially "Irish Rebels," Porcupine's Gazette, 28 Nov., 1798. For a study of the Irish and Federalists, see Edward C. Carter II, "A 'Wild Irishman' Under Every Federalist's Bed; Naturalization in Philadelphia, 1789-1806," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 94 (July, 1970), 331-346.
77. The connections between all these various elements of social history are drawn in the articles by Alexander on poverty in 18th century Philadelphia, and Pernick's on yellow fever and politics.
78. C.B.B., Ormond, 206.
79. The footnote appears in Chapter VI which is devoted to a presentation of life in a Phila. "alley" where the Dudleys live. During a yellow fever epidemic two hundred of the three hundred persons said to be living in the alley die within the course of three weeks.

80. C.B.B., Review of Rumford's Essays, Monthly Magazine, May, 1799, 256. Brown was greatly impressed by Rumford's accomplishments on behalf of the poor of Bavaria, and his introduction into the plot of Ormond the problems of the city's poor may well have been the result of his reviewer's task as editor of the Monthly Magazine.
81. See Gary B. Nash, "Poverty and Poor Relief in Pre-Revolutionary Philadelphia," William and Mary Quarterly, 33 (1976), 3-30 for the corrective.
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## CHAPTER 4: THE EMPIRE OF ROMANCE

It was in the year 1800, the year in which Part II of Arthur Mervyn appeared, that Brown published the article in The Monthly Magazine entitled "The Difference Between History and Romance."<sup>1</sup> There, in the same manner in which he sets in opposition ideas and individuals that are the subjects of his fictions, Brown attempts to gain a perspective on each of these categories by separating their respective parts and thus distinguishing one from the other. To base this distinction on the criterion of truth is unjustified, he claims, since the inclination of the mind is not to be satisfied with a mere recital of facts, but to reach beyond these to speculate on their causes and eventually to rearrange them to accord with certain inferences. His emphasis throughout, however, is on the recording of natural facts vs. the recording of the actions of men. The experimentalist, he claims, who observes and records appearances may be termed an historian, but

He who adorns these appearances with cause and effect, and traces resemblances between the past, distant, and future, with the present, performs a different part. He is a dealer, not in certainties, but probabilities, and is therefore a romancer.<sup>2</sup>

Brown is, in part, offering a justification for his own role. He makes a brief catalogue of the mode in which first the historian and then the romancer delineates truth.

Among these are the following:

An historian will form catalogues of stars, and mark their positions at given times. A romancer will arrange them in clusters, and

dispose them in strata, and inform you by what influences the orbs have been drawn into sociable knots and circles.

An electrical historian will describe appearances that happen when hollow cylinders of glass and metal are placed near each other, and the former is rubbed with a cloth. The romancer will replenish the space that exists between the sun and its train of planetary orbs, with a fluid called electrical; and describe the modes in which the fluid finds its way to the surface of these orbs through the intervenient atmosphere.<sup>3</sup>

This is not, in fact, an apology for myth making, but rather for that displacement which occurs in romance where a truth that would be explained metaphorically in myth is instead linked by association to a fact.<sup>4</sup> Thus Brown, when he had wished to convey the truth that superstition inflames men, had associated the "facts" concerning the possibility of a spontaneous combustion of the human body with the mysterious fiery death of a religious enthusiast.

Very much on Brown's mind, however, in the wake of the 1798 yellow fever epidemic was the evidence of his own experience that even those who claimed to be impartial observers or experimenters were often influenced by the same tendencies of mind as were romancers to rearrange their observations into conformity to some prior conclusion. Those of his readers who were aware of Elihu Hubbard Smith's painstaking research into the history of plagues as they had appeared at various times in European countries, may have agreed with Brown that though Smith believed he had remained entirely within the realm of natural history, his conclusions relative to the yellow fever were really more a matter of conjecture than fact. Since Smith's conclusions, as well

as those of his fellow scientists, were based on the narratives and findings of others, the possibility of error was even further increased by the impenetrable tangle of human motivation at every level of the process which destroyed all hope of accuracy. Such motives, Brown claimed, were

modifications of thought which cannot be subjected to the senses. They cannot be certainly known. They are merely topics of conjecture.<sup>5</sup>

Two years later the same sentiments would be expressed much more openly in a footnote to Volney's discussion of the yellow fever when Brown branded "all violent controversialists" on the subject as men unable to admit "the possibility of opposite opinions being adopted or defended with disinterested motives."<sup>6</sup> In Brown's mind, then, there was no doubt that his friend had allowed himself to be influenced in making a scientific judgment, by his rationalist and republican beliefs while at the same time persisting in the belief that unlike the importationists, his motives were pure. In the last and most extensive of his dialogues, Brown allows Arthur Mervyn to represent Smith's side of the yellow fever controversy. Yet while doing so he was almost simultaneously composing Edgar Huntly which presents the opposing theory. The question of personal motivation only hinted at in Arthur Mervyn is fully explored in Edgar Huntly, and the guise of innocence assumed by the hero of the former is matched by the naivete of the romance, while the education of the hero of the latter takes the form of a moral allegory. By viewing

the two as parts of a whole it is possible to see the extent of the empire of romance over the actions and motives of men as Brown saw it, and as it was to develop in the literature of America.

Arthur Mervyn, Or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 was published in two parts.<sup>7</sup> Part I begins with the narration of a Dr. Stevens who tells how, while the city of Philadelphia was beset by an epidemic, he befriended a young man, Arthur Mervyn, whom he found in the street outside his home, obviously ill of a pestilential fever. When the youth is recovered he tells of having left his father's farm because he had been replaced in his father's will and affections by the father's second wife, a young and coarse serving girl. His adventures after leaving home include the loss of his money and his possessions, becoming the victim of a trickster on his first night in the city, and asking a loan of a man on the street only to have the man take him into his home, feed and clothe him magnificently, and finally offer him a position as his secretary.

Arthur's new employer, Thomas Welbeck, has living with him a young woman, Clemenza Lodi, whom Arthur subsequently learns is pregnant and unmarried. Welbeck is engaged in commercial enterprises which later turn out to be criminal. When a stranger appears and challenges Welbeck to a duel which proves fatal to the stranger, Welbeck tells Arthur the story behind the incident. It mainly involves Welbeck's seduction of the stranger's sister (not Clemenza Lodi), and the collapse of his business ventures. Arthur helps his

employer bury the victim and while rowing Welbeck across the river to New Jersey, sees him suddenly leap from the boat in apparent despair. Mervyn leaves the city the following day, taking nothing from Welbeck's house but a book which had belonged to the unfortunate and now missing Clemenza Lodi.

Back again in the country, Arthur meets the Hadwin family who are concerned for the future husband of one of the Hadwin daughters. The young man, Wallace, is employed in the city, where an epidemic of yellow fever has broken out. Arthur soon returns to the city in search of Wallace and hoping to discover the whereabouts of Clemenza Lodi. On this, his second, trip to the city Arthur sees mankind at its worst, both in suffering and in inflicting suffering on others. Nevertheless, there are some who willingly risk the disease to help the unfortunate victims.

One of these, a kindly, elderly man, tells Arthur that the disease is the result of uncleanness in the city. After locating Wallace and sending him back to the Hadwins, Arthur decides to offer his services at the city hospital, but is overcome by the fever and stumbles into a vacant house which turns out to be Welbeck's former home. While there Arthur comes face to face with the revived Welbeck who accuses him of having stolen bank notes totaling twenty thousand dollars which were hidden in Clemenza Lodi's book. Arthur has, indeed, found the notes and has them with him intending to return them to Clemenza when and if he finds her. Hoping to get Arthur to give up the notes, Welbeck claims they are forgeries. Arthur believes him and, in an attempt to prevent

them from causing any further harm to anyone, burns them. Welbeck becomes enraged, screams at Arthur that the notes were genuine, and rushes from the house. Arthur follows in the hope of finding the old man who had explained to him the cause of the fever, but he loses his way and is found by Dr. Stevens. At this point Part I ends with the narrative having come fully around to the point where it began.

In Part II, Arthur leaves Dr. Stevens and returns to the Hadwins where he learns that Wallace has never arrived home and that Mr. Hadwin, who had gone to the city to seek him, has contracted the fever and died. One of the Hadwin girls dies soon after Arthur's arrival and Arthur buries her, after which he aids the other daughter, Eliza, to escape from a brutal uncle who has stolen her inheritance. Having placed Eliza with friends, Arthur goes in search of Clemenza Lodi who, he has learned, is in a brothel where Welbeck has left her. He rescues Clemenza, as well as a Mrs. Achsa Fielding who has innocently spent the night there unaware of the nature of the establishment. He then goes on to visit Thomas Welbeck in debtor's prison. From Welbeck he retrieves a money belt belonging to the family of the stranger slain in the duel at Welbeck's house, and is soon off to Baltimore to return the money. When he returns to Philadelphia Arthur asks Mrs. Fielding to take Eliza Hadwin into her home. She agrees to do so, but when Arthur visits Eliza he falls in love with her benefactor. Though Mrs. Fielding is a woman six years older than himself, a

widow and mother, at the end of the novel Arthur is looking forward to marrying her, after which they intend to sail for England, her birthplace.

Arthur's story is, most obviously, that of an initiation, and so it has been seen by a number of critics.<sup>8</sup> It is the story of a youth who meets evil for the first time and must either resist or succumb to it; as such it is a romance. To stop at that point, however, and fail to examine the specific kinds of evil with which Brown is working, the methods he uses to represent those evils, and the consequences to his hero of succumbing, is to come away from the work without an appreciation for the position it holds midway between the romance tradition as it had existed in English literature and as it was to develop in American literature.

Arthur Mervyn, as its full title makes clear, is a fictionalized history of the events of the year 1793 in the city of Philadelphia during the most devastating of the yellow fever epidemics in America. It is a romanticized version of history according to Brown's own definition of romance as opposed to history; that is, the author has chosen to offer conjectures as to the causes and motives behind the actions and events described rather than merely describing the events alone as would an historian. The importance which Brown attached to this matter of motivation had to do, in part, with the theory of progress which viewed mankind as building always on the accumulated wisdom of the past. The problem which he saw in this was the fact that

the human channels through which this wisdom passed were unreliable. Historians did not merely describe the events and acts in human history, he claimed, but ascribed to them meaning and purpose, and therein lay the danger:

Actions of different men, or performed at different times, may be alike; but the motives leading to these actions must necessarily vary. In guessing at these motives, the knowing and sagacious will, of course, approach nearer to the truth than the ignorant and stupid; but the wise and the ignorant, the sagacious and stupid, when busy in assigning motives to actions, are not historians but romancers.<sup>9</sup>

Whether naturalists like Buffon or recorders of phenomena such as Thucydides, historians distorted the facts, Brown believed, by filtering them through subjective, though unacknowledged, biases, and this subjectivity he termed the major ingredient of romance.

Still another reason for Brown's interest in the subject of motivation was his struggle to portray in his fictions the superiority of a new rationalist ethic, predicated on altruism without the hope of reward in this life or the next. Evidence that he continued to deal with this problem in writing Arthur Mervyn appears in a letter Brown wrote to his brother James in February of 1799. Defending the incident in Part I in which Arthur burns the bank notes, a plot detail to which James had objected, Brown says that the money had to be destroyed because Arthur "is intended as a hero whose virtue, in order to be productive of benefit to others, and felicity to himself, stands in no need of riches."<sup>10</sup> Obviously Brown was

interested in moving beyond the narrow view of virtue presented by Richardson's Pamela; Arthur's virtue had not only to prove felicitous to himself, but produce benefit to others. A decade earlier Brown had written, in connection with a discussion of man's place in the natural community, "Man may be considered as one, and alone; or he may be considered as a member of a community, and connected with others."<sup>11</sup> Arthur Mervyn is concerned with the second of these two possibilities, portraying man as a member of a society, and the opportunities for both beneficial and detrimental consequences as a result of the relationship.

Rationalists like Elihu Hubbard Smith and Charles Brockden Brown hoped to provide a more humanitarian basis for morality than the rewards and punishments of Christianity. The fact that actions undertaken for the benefit of mankind in general often led to the improvement of the individual actor, was a fact that seems to have troubled Brown more than it did Smith. Smith was absolutely certain of the purity of his motives at all times. His diary for September 1795 reveals him to have been undergoing a great deal of soul-searching regarding his future prospects. His medical practise in New York City was quite small, hardly affording him enough to live on, and he considered either returning to work in his father's apothecary shop in Litchfield or becoming a book seller. The attractions of the city were many for the twenty-four year old, and the prospect of resuming life in a small town under the watchful eyes of his devout parents was not a

happy one. Smith cut his expenses to the bone, dismissing his barber, eliminating wine from his table, and generally placing himself at a mere subsistence level so that he might continue in the city.<sup>12</sup> As the epidemic of that year grew worse he made plans to visit his parents in Connecticut, but cancelled them in order to care for a friend who had become ill with the fever. The friend recovered and, as Smith noted in his diary, "Now, I have no business."<sup>13</sup> His determination to remain in the city after that seems to have been motivated by somewhat more than altruism if we may judge by the flow of his thoughts as recorded in the diary:

But the prospect is, that the present Fever will become more general. Should [it] be as much so, or half as much so, as in Phila. in 1793, my presence will be useful; as there will as much business as all the Physicians can do. Some of my friends may be taken with it. At any rate, it will have a bad appearance, in the eyes of the country people, & will injure the city, if any medical man, however unimportant his presence may be, shall be known to have quitted it.<sup>14</sup>

The quite understandable mixture of motives evident in Smith's words seems to have escaped him entirely. His expectations of a widened practice due to increased contacts made in the course of the epidemic did not materialize and the following month he attempted to analyze in his diary his feelings with regard to that fact. If, he reasons, the disease is contagious though he has staunchly maintained his disbelief in this possibility then he is better off for not having been brought into contact with persons who suffer from it. Or if fatigue is a contributing factor in the

illness he may have so overworked himself in an extensive practice that he may well have joined his patients in their condition. On the other hand, he reminds himself, money is only to be gotten through such an extensive practice. Yet there is the fact that in an epidemic many of those who require a physician most are unable to pay: "Here would be loss, fatigue, anxiety, & risk, without any profit."<sup>15</sup> The compensating factor then would be his increased knowledge of the disease, and this remembrance seems to set off a whole new train of thought in which he sees himself as the only one capable of obtaining such knowledge, unprejudiced by an adherence to a particular theory. After all, he asks himself, don't many die because of the various and opposite modes of treatment being offered? And is this not a result of the "ignorance, pride, stupidity, carelessness & a superstitious veneration for foreign writers, & a mean jealousy of an illustrious writer of our own country . . .?"<sup>16</sup> He, of course, would apply Dr. Rush's treatment and thus save many; which thought causes him to swell with altruism and a sense of the highest motivation:

And, with a mind, armed, as mine is against terror, & the idle fear of death; with a spirit animated by a sacred love of truth, & filled with an ardent humanity & tender zeal for the welfare of my fellow creatures; could there be any danger that I should be sick? or, if sick, that I should die? It is on the best principles that I wish, for greater employment.<sup>17</sup>

Brown, who seemed better able to distinguish between rationalism and rationalization than did his friend, would no doubt have seen the potential for romance in this entry.

And, since Smith was in the habit of making his diary available to Brown for reading when they were together, he may well have read and retained the idea of a young man who would benefit both himself and mankind by his actions in a time of communal disaster. It is not Arthur Mervyn's actions during the epidemic that raise questions regarding his motives but rather his quickness to take advantage of any situation in which he finds himself and the readiness with which he ingratiates himself to anyone who seems in a position to be of help to him in furthering his advance.<sup>18</sup> Yet Arthur repeatedly protests his innocence, and so successfully that he has become, for one critic, the original American Innocent.<sup>19</sup> Others have questioned this designation though, and among these James H. Justus reveals a deep perception in declaring "All the evidence suggests that Brown, for all his advocacy of the enlightened, libertarian view of man, never confused the utopian idea of what man should be with what man was."<sup>20</sup>

It is precisely this conflict between the real and the ideal on which Brown capitalizes in bringing to the American literary scene a new Arthurian romance in which ogres and dragons are replaced by self-interest and pestilence, with the pestilence serving as a metaphor for the self-interest, and an Arthur whose surname hints at that of the magician Merlin. Virtue tried by experience is the theme carried over from the English romance tradition, but the peculiarly American addition is the element of natural evil and the possibility of profiting in this life from its conquest.

The need to come to terms with nature in America, to affirm and at the same time tame it, appears for the first time in American fiction in Arthur Mervyn. What must be remembered, however, is the fact that "nature" here is not the nature of Cooper's wilderness or of Melville's seas, but rather the mysterious force which threatens to overwhelm the new civilization which Arthur represents. Since Arthur is the first representative in American fiction of the republic of virtue, it is particularly important that the conventions of the romance tradition on which Brown draws be observed in interpreting the meaning of his story.

The most striking thing about Arthur Mervyn is its beginning, and it is strange not to find the opening scene commented on by critics of the work. Dr. Stevens, the narrator, describes the man whom he sees resting against the wall near his home thus:

He leaned his head against the wall, his eyes were shut, his hands clasped in each other, and his body seemed to be sustained in an upright position merely by the cellar door, against which he rested his left shoulder. The lethargy into which he was sunk, seemed scarcely interrupted by my feeling his hand and his forehead. His throbbing temples and burning skin indicated a fever, and his form, already emaciated, seemed to prove that it had not been of short duration.<sup>21</sup>

The doctor claims it is obvious that the man's disease "was pestilential." This is certainly an inauspicious beginning and when, some three pages later, it is established that this is indeed Arthur Mervyn, the hero of the novel, the reader whose cultural matrix includes the literature upon which Western civilization rests realizes that Arthur's

infected state reveals him not as the Edenic Adam, but as, to use Emerson's phrase, "a god in ruins."

To be infected, as in the Latin infectio, means to be stained, tainted, spoiled, or polluted. The idea of infection as a type of sinfulness runs through Western literature as does the complementary idea of pestilential disease as a form of divine judgement on man.<sup>22</sup> Only if we are willing to deliberately blot out these centuries-old conventions is it possible to accept Arthur Mervyn as an American Adam, unless the reference be to a postlapsarian Adam whose fall and subsequent rise will be fortunate in the exact sense that Brown intends when he says that Arthur's virtue is "productive of benefit to others, and [of] felicity to himself." The allegorical mode, so natural to Charles Brockden Brown, asserts itself in this work in his use of the yellow fever as a source of infection and also as a general miasma, or agent of pollution. Brown manages to convey the idea that the epidemic could either be occasioned by the miasmatic air which hangs over the city or is the result of it. It permeates the air of the city, lending its presence to his purpose without being identified by the author as either cause or effect. One man offers his explanation and it happens to be the explanation of the local origin theorists, but the allegory of the pestilence as a type of that self-interest which characterizes the life of the city does not really depend upon an explanation of its cause. All the theories offered by diverse medical, political, or religious parties dissolve into the one image

of plague which is both cause and effect, God's judgement and man's sin.

Running counter to this somber theme, however, is the progressive action of the story which includes all of Arthur's efforts to correct the ills of a corrupt society. The theory of a local origin of the fever supplies Brown with a field of battle in which Arthur can contend against the demonic agents of corruption.<sup>23</sup> Here the action is not riveted in introspection or ideological debate, but instead takes on the rapid forward movement of formulaic romance of the type which Northrop Frye has described as "sentimental," based on the folktales and Märchen of Europe.<sup>24</sup> There are probably few other instances where Professor Frye's designation of such romance as a "secular scripture" is so peculiarly apt, for in Arthur Mervyn Brown uses a Scriptural theme as the basis for his allegory adapting it, in romance form, to a rational application. The Biblical concept of the corruption of the body as a simile for the pollution of the soul is carried by the conventional plague motif. But by removing the source of the contagion from the supernatural to the natural realm, the theme becomes the vehicle for a rationalistic morality tale fashioned out of the elements of the traditional folktale.<sup>25</sup>

Märchen motifs appear in other works by Brown, such as in the unfinished "Stephen Calvert" where there is much confusion surrounding the identities of the twin brothers, in "The Memoirs of Carwin" and in Ormond, both of which make great use of the theme of mimicry and, in the latter work,

Ormond's use of disguises to move unknown within the servant class. In Arthur Mervyn, however, it is not simply elements of folktales which appear; Arthur's story is fabulous from beginning to end. Arthur is the victim of a stepmother who alienates his father's affections and displaces him in his father's line of inheritance. Leaving his country home, Arthur sets out to seek his fortune in the city. In one day's time he is deprived of the three coins which made up his entire purse, and he loses his bundle of clothing. Once inside the city, Arthur meets a trickster who conducts him to a room in an inn claiming it is his own and offering his bed for the night. There he leaves the country lad who soon discovers a baby boy in the bed. This surprise is followed quickly by the entrance of a man into the room, and Arthur hides in a closet. He hears the man indicate to the babe in soothing tones that he is its natural father and entertains hopes of getting his wife to cease grieving over the loss of their own child and accept this one as a foundling. The wife enters, agrees to raise the child, and Arthur, hiding in the closet, is party to a most important and poignant moment in the lives of these three persons. In this happier parallel to Arthur's own situation vis-a-vis his stepmother, lie traces of the stories of unorthodox birth which form part of the pattern of the typical hero of myth and Märchen. The incident has no further bearing on the plot and may have been simply one of Brown's false starts which led nowhere, but the coincidence of the stepmother theme and Arthur's subsequent marriage to a woman he calls

his "Mamma" follows a pattern of birth, death, and rebirth which runs through the story.

Arthur is associated through physical resemblance with two young men, both of whom are dead from the time the story begins. He carried with him as a sort of talisman a miniature portrait of one of these young men who was nursed in his final illness by Arthur's own mother before her death. In addition to these identifications with death, Arthur states that of his parents' five children he alone still survives. As the others have all died at about twenty years of age, Arthur who is eighteen does not expect to live more than another two years. The establishment of the new family centered on the boy child which takes place while Arthur is shut up in the womb-like closet seems to indicate a rebirth of the hero within the city, the scene of what will be his greatest exploits.

After his escape from the inn where the foundling is so happily provided for, Arthur meets Thomas Welbeck. In another scene strongly reminiscent of the folktale, Arthur is provided by Welbeck with an abundance of marvelous clothing all of which fits him perfectly. Surveying himself in a mirror Arthur allows that "Some magic that disdains the cumbrousness of nature's progress, has wrought this change."<sup>26</sup> The "magic" which surrounds so much of Arthur's story while he is in Welbeck's house is explained later when Arthur learns that Welbeck is a counterfeiter. Like Spenser's Archimago, Welbeck is capable of making many things appear to be what they are not, including the facts

surrounding his manner of living and the truth about the young woman who lives with him. Welbeck is even capable of counterfeiting suicide and though he plunges into the Delaware River in apparent despair, we are not at all surprised when he reappears in Philadelphia days later.

Arthur's quest for the young man, Wallace, who turns out to be the trickster (just one of the many coincidences which in true romance fashion abound here) whom he met on his first night in the city, is typical of the quests filled with trials and testings of romance heroes.<sup>27</sup> The actual entry into the plague-stricken city is like a descent into hell and Arthur is filled with dread:

I began now to feel some regret at the journey I had taken. Never, in the depth of caverns or forests, was I equally conscious of loneliness. I was surrounded by the habitations of men; but I was destitute of associate or friend. I had money, but an horse, shelter, or a morsel of food, could not be purchased. I came for the purpose of relieving others, but I stood in the utmost need myself.<sup>28</sup>

As Arthur makes his way through the near-deserted city streets, noxious odors rise toward him and he claims "not so much to smell as to taste the element that now encompassed me . . . Some fatal influence appeared to seize upon my vitals; and the work of corrosion and decomposition to be busily begun."<sup>29</sup> The overwhelming influence of some unseen power capable of initiating a corrosion within him produces a shock of revulsion and nausea in Arthur. Instantly aware of the touch of death, his response to it after a momentary weakening is one of invigoration. The worst has happened: he has inhaled the essence of decomposition, and from that

point on Arthur realizes, "My state was no longer hazardous; and my destiny would be totally uninfluenced by my future conduct."<sup>30</sup> Had Adam ever expressed relief at the loss of the burden of an immortality that hinged upon perfect obedience he might have done so in just such words. All the resemblances to dead men, the talisman he carries, and his position as the sole surviving child of his parents, all point to the same thing, the mortality which Arthur shares with all men. Death rules all men in all places -- even in the New World, even in America, even in the new republic. It is a crucial moment of awareness and acceptance for Arthur and a moment equally crucial for the future development of American literature, for it is the moment when for the first time nature's secret knowledge is whispered, "The word final, superior to all," as Whitman would call it, the word "Death, death, death, death, death."<sup>31</sup>

In the year following that in which Part I of Arthur Mervyn appeared, Brown published an article in the Monthly Magazine on the portraits of Death as they appear in art and literature. Using Milton's lines from Paradise Lost, "Black as night;/Fierce as ten Furies; terrible as hell" as a prime example of the way in which Death has been allegorized by painters and poets "as a person or agent," Brown comments on what he feels is a "trite" image (Black as night), on a "comparison without meaning" (Fierce as ten Furies), and on a simile based on "an affinity [that] is rather moral than poetical" (terrible as hell). He offers

as "The most powerful and magnificent conception that was ever formed of Death . . . the commonplace of 'The King of terrors.'"<sup>32</sup> The image, he concedes, has no relation to the crowns, swords, or skeletons usually employed to depict death poetically. These would only enfeeble the image, he insists, as would an attempt to paint it. "Such images," he concludes, "it is the peculiar prerogative of poetry to call up; but the fault of the painter is essentially committed by the poet, when he attempts to exhibit such a portrait of his terrific majesty as a painter might copy."<sup>33</sup>

The idea of death as the king, or greatest, of all terrors appears also in an article published still later in The Literary Magazine where Brown compares "Pestilence and Bad Government." The article is in the form of a story told by a man who says he was recently engaged in conversation with two others concerning the disorders in a distant republic. The disorders arise from the ascendancy of one party to political power, the party which to that time had been "undermost." The new rulers proceed to revenge themselves on their adversaries in a manner that almost exactly parallels the actions of the French revolutionary government during the Reign of Terror. A second man compares this to the sufferings of the citizens of Philadelphia in 1793 when, he says, "the inscrutability of the causes that produced the deaths, the duration of the calamity, and the proportion of the number of slain," made the miseries of the plague even greater than that of a tyrannous government.<sup>34</sup>

These two articles provide some insight into the

difficulties Brown experienced in creating a suitable portrait of Philadelphia in the grip of a terror made all the more terrific by its inscrutability. In the second article he tries to counter the analogy between the terror in France and the terror in Philadelphia, drawn often by those who hoped to see the two firmly linked in the public mind, by claiming the latter was far worse. The other article is of much greater interest, however, because of Brown's natural inclination toward allegorization. It reveals his dissatisfaction with the figures of Death made familiar in poetry and painting, and his eagerness to move toward a new method of representation. Skeletal Death arrayed in kingly garb would not serve to depict an evil claimed to have arisen in a republic. Brown was not interested in making a political, but a moral statement. The fact that death rules over all men, in a republic as well as in a monarchy, was intended to remind Americans that they were not in some way exempted from the obligations and responsibilities of individuals in the human society. His greatest problem, however, was the lack of precise knowledge of the source of this particular agent of death. How much easier it was for the importationists to image the cause of yellow fever in the foreigner, the revolutionary, the Satanic disrupter of Eden's innocence. Brown's hero is an American, stained and polluted by his country's prevailing fever, a victim not of a subtle foreign attack, but of an evil which has arisen within. In order to sustain his metaphor of the fever as a manifestation first of the

sickness of self-interest which he sees as America's moral affliction, and second of all the pockets of social corruption with which cities are conventionally associated, Brown must devise an image protean enough to bear the weight of multiple applications.

The aural perception which in Wieland sets off Theodore Wieland's hallucinations, the voice from without which looses the madness within, is the precursor to Brown's symbolic representation in Arthur Mervyn. In Wieland the voice of Carwin is the daemonic agency, but the impossibility of defining the agency of death by yellow fever intensified the need to move even further in the area of imagery. Death "Black as night" he labels "trite" and so the visual sense will not serve. One of the most distinctive things about a city felled by plague is the deadly silence of its deserted streets, and so sound is not the answer. His subject offered little that could be rendered in tactile imagery, and the odor of death and decay was not easily conveyed in words to which no objection could be raised. The fetid air which Arthur Mervyn seems to taste even more than smell is a sensory perception which will not transcribe into any concrete image, and so Brown is forced away from the familiar imagery of allegory toward a literary depiction of an amorphous, shadowy, "nonentity" which no painter could portray.<sup>35</sup> The very vagueness of the theory that argued for a local origin of yellow fever gave rise then to an open-minded symbolism which in the next century, and in the hands of one who would place Brown in the "Hall of Fantasy"

because of his creation of Arthur Mervyn, would become the dominant literary technique in American literature.<sup>36</sup>

The moral allegory in which Brown condemns the callousness and self-interest that arises from the belief that yellow fever is contagious, forms an integral part of the book's romance. The birth, death, and rebirth cycle of the romance couples Arthur's infection by the yellow fever with his infection by the other prevailing disease of the city, the self-interested fever for advancement to which he succumbs on his first day in Philadelphia. On that fateful day Arthur meets Thomas Welbeck by approaching him on the street and asking him for a loan of money. He has just fled the inn where he was imprisoned for a good part of the night in the closet of the room of the newly formed family. In the process of escaping, he has lost his shoes and presents a beggarly appearance which he refuses to verify, and hence the request of a "loan." When Welbeck takes him into his house and offers him employment as his secretary, Arthur offers as proof of his ability with the pen a line from Shakespeare, "My poverty, but not my will consents." The words may be seen as a feeble attempt to absolve himself of future culpability, but absolution will not so easily be obtained.

Once arrayed in his new finery Arthur is immediately engaged in speculation as to his future with Welbeck: "Perhaps Welbeck would adopt me for his own son. Wealth has ever been capriciously distributed. The mere physical relation of birth is all that intitles us to manors and

thrones."<sup>37</sup> And in another moment he is contemplating the possibility of marriage with the beautiful lady of the house whom Welbeck had introduced as one worthy of "the respect due to my daughter." Arthur daydreams about stories in which an old nurse's loyalty has served to conceal the identity of one nobly born, and how, as in the case of the Stuarts, whole nations have taken up arms to defend a claim of royal birth made by one who can never prove it. The capriciousness of birth, he concludes, fixes our lot "among peasants or princes."<sup>38</sup> Behind these musings lie more than Arthur's ardent desire for upward mobility. The same doctrine of perfectability proclaimed by William Godwin and heralded by Elihu Hubbard Smith as the ground on which to build the structure of a new morality, informs this veiled but not less Faustian wish to discover that one's "true" identity has been concealed and that the long exile from one's rightful place in the kingdom is over. Those who see in Arthur an Adamic innocent become party to his own fantasy, as unaware as he of his true motives.<sup>39</sup>

The setting for this dream of self-aggrandizement is another of Brown's architectural images. Before approaching Welbeck Arthur has wandered the city streets, penniless and alone. Later, in recounting the experience to Dr. Stevens, he tells of turning into a street largely uninhabited:

Presently I reached a pavement, and a painted fence, along which a row of poplars was planted. It bounded a garden into which a knot-hole permitted me to pry. The inclosure was a charming green, which I saw appended to an house of the loftiest and most stately order. It seemed like a recent

erection, had all the gloss of novelty, and exhibited, to my unpractised eyes, the magnificence of palaces . . . . How wide and how impassable was the gulf by which we were separated!<sup>40</sup>

The effect of the description is to make the reader feel that the house might not have existed prior to Arthur's arrival, so magical is its quality. The lofty edifice, which contains every inducement to the flesh which life can offer, is the home of Thomas Welbeck who will offer Arthur sanctuary within its walls. Here closets overflow "with clothes and linen of all and of the best kinds," and black servants serve at tables laden with silver and china," and, to complete the picture, a lovely and mysterious lady is held in bondage by the evil Welbeck. The house soon becomes the scene of murder and of Welbeck's confession to Arthur of his multiple crimes, including the rape of the lady, Clemenza Lodi. After Welbeck plunges into the river, the palatial mansion (which Arthur learns Welbeck never really owned but only rented) is pillaged by the servants of all its appointments and fittings.

Despite his good intentions to remain untouched by his surroundings, Arthur compromises himself by remaining in Welbeck's employ and acting in his interests even after he has ample reason to believe his employer's business ventures are criminal. When he again ventures into the city he learns the extent to which the disease of self-interest, to which he himself had succumbed, contributes to the epidemical disease and its sufferings. The experience of Wallace, the young man whom he now seeks, roughly parallels his own. Wallace too had been in the employ of a man who,

though not a criminal, saw the epidemic as an opportunity to reap a profit in the absence of competitors. After assuring Wallace that there will be no danger if they do not traffic with infected persons and promising to care for the youth if he should become ill, the employer abandons his clerk at the first sign of his illness. Wallace is removed to the Bush-Hill lazaretto, a place which is a scene out of hell, partly because of the callousness of its attendants whose sole motivation for remaining with the dying victims is the ample payment made for their services. Panic on the part of all but a few has left the sick of the city to suffer the agonies of the fever, alone, without even a cup of water to ease their pain. Women, children, the elderly, and the poor, all the weakest of society's members, are the prime targets of this double tyranny, the tyranny of disease and selfishness. From an elderly inhabitant of the city who has remained behind to offer what assistance he can to those in need, Arthur learns that the origin of the yellow fever is to be imputed "not to infected substances imported from the east or west, but to a morbid constitution of the atmosphere, owing wholly, or in part to filthy streets, airless habitations and squalid persons."<sup>41</sup> By thus removing the source of the epidemic from the realm of the supernatural to that of the natural, the responsibility for the conditions which cause the plague as well as the means of its eradication are both shown to lie within the sphere of human activity. In his preface to Arthur Mervyn Brown says that the evils of

pestilence have been "fertile of instruction to the moral observer, to whom they have furnished new displays of the influence of human passions and motives."<sup>42</sup> The key word here is "human," in that the pestilence is not portrayed as the result of Divine wrath but of human behavior which Brown chooses to delineate in this work in human rather than demonic terms. The only demonic presence in the novel is the all-pervasive miasma, the fetid exhalation of a society corrupted by its elevation of individual over communal interests.

The next time that Arthur sees the house which initiated his downfall it is one of many left darkened and abandoned in the general flight from the fever. In the grip now of the dread disease, Arthur sinks to rest on the steps of a house and realizes it is the very one where he had lived as Welbeck's secretary. Though the house is locked, Arthur gains entry through a partly open window. He reaches Welbeck's former bed-chamber which is considerably altered from its former opulence: "The bed was naked of covering. The cabinets and closets exhibited their fastenings broken. Their contents were gone." Despite its present condition Arthur determines to remain:

This chamber should be the scene of my disease and my refuge from the charitable cruelty of my neighbours. My new sensations conjured up the hope that my indisposition might prove a temporary evil. Instead of pestilential or malignant fever it might be an harmless intermittent. Time would ascertain its true nature; meanwhile I would turn the carpet into a coverlet, supplying my pitcher with water, and administered without sparing, and without fear, that remedy which was placed within my reach.<sup>43</sup>

Here, in the very house where he had been first infected with the disease of self-interest, Arthur hopes that like that earlier fever, this one too will prove only a temporary evil. It is then that the "resurrected" Welbeck returns and tries to wrest from Arthur the bank notes which belong to Clemenza Lodi. When Welbeck claims the notes are forged, Arthur puts them to the torch rather than allow them to further infect others. With the last vestige of selfishness burned away, Arthur stumbles out into the night to be taken in by Dr. Stevens. To this priest of the new morality he confesses all his wrongdoing, is forgiven, and restored to health.

The principal allegory ends with Part I but in Part II Arthur, now recovered from both forms of the city's prevailing fever, sets about the knightly business of restoring the kingdom. He sets aside for a time Dr. Stevens' suggestion that he study medicine in order to take up the causes of a number of persons in distress. His adventures are too numerous and episodic to recount in detail, but they amount to Arthur bringing light to every dark corner of a society which claims to be virtuous but is a counterfeit and fraudulent copy of what a genuinely virtuous society should be. The comparison to the New Jerusalem is implicit in that this is the national myth against which Brown's portrait of the capital city is cast.<sup>44</sup> When Arthur brings solace--and Dr. Stevens-- to the counterfeiter Thomas Welbeck in what is most probably the Walnut Street Jail, we cannot help but be reminded that the paper money issued to

pay for the building of the jail in 1775 carried a picture of the structure and the superscription "To Counterfeit is DEATH."<sup>45</sup>

The fact of Arthur's complicity in Welbeck's affairs raises the question of whether or not he should share Welbeck's punishment. A friend of Dr. Stevens does indeed question this as well as other rumors concerning Arthur. There are those who accuse him of having maligned his stepmother and stolen from his father. Arthur refuses to defend himself, insisting that he should be judged by his actions and not by the words of others.<sup>46</sup> Brown goes out of his way to emphasize Arthur's lowly origins and the emotions stirred in him by his first sight of the luxury in which others lived. When he first sees Thomas Welbeck's house he exclaims, "How wide and how impassable the gulf by which we were separated!" and the further comparison between their relative states brings the following:

At a distance from luxury and pomp I viewed them, perhaps, in a just light. A nearer scrutiny confirmed my early prepossessions, but in the distance at which I now stood, the lofty edifices, the splendid furniture, and the copious accommodations of the rich, excited my admiration and my envy.<sup>47</sup>

The envy which stirs in Arthur at the sight of luxury occasions his fall, but Brown does not wholly condemn him for this. Arthur at least is willing to seek employment so that he might better his condition, but Welbeck enters into a life of crime because, he says, "My pride regarded as vile and ignominious drudgery any employment which the town could afford."<sup>48</sup> When Arthur repents of his avarice

he becomes as diligent in well-doing as he was in Welbeck's service. He restores the stolen property of others, succors the ill, buries the dead, comforts the widowed and orphaned, visits the imprisoned, and rescues the virtuous.

He becomes, in short, an active participant in history, joining his personal efforts to the progress of mankind. So conscious does he become of the expediency of immediate action that he is thought of by those around him as "rash," "impetuous," and "precipitate." In prevailing upon the wealthy Mrs. Wentworth to open her home to the unfortunate Clemenza Lodi, Arthur entreats her to "Take her away from that house instantly . . . Shall I hie thither to-day, this very hour--now?"<sup>49</sup> Mrs. Wentworth objects that he is "too hasty. An affair of so much importance cannot be dispatched in a moment." After continued discussion she concedes, "I must reflect upon it. Tomorrow . . ." But Arthur insists, "Let me prevail on you to admit her at once without delay. This very moment may be the critical one. To-day we may exert ourselves with success, but to-morrow, all our efforts may be fruitless."<sup>50</sup> In this insistence on the utility of time Brown reveals the influence of Benjamin Franklin on the American mind. By removing the privilege of time, which Franklin had prudently pointed out was money, from the exclusive purview of the wealthy, he makes of it a tool in the hands of a progressive democrat. No longer concerned only with his own upward mobility, Arthur is anxious to improve the lot of all who cross his path. No door can remain closed to him for long; if entry

is delayed or denied, he enters boldly and, when chastised for this by the lady of one house he has entered peremptorily, answers simply: "I forgot to knock at the door. No evil was intended by my negligence, though propriety has certainly not been observed."<sup>51</sup>

While boldly flinging open doors and windows, letting in light and air to clean up the festering sources of infection which mar the virtuous republic, Arthur steadily advances in the esteem of those who are his superiors in all but the moral sense. As he says, in what might well be considered the slogan of his campaign against corruption, "The past was without remedy; but the future was, in some degree, within our power to create and to fashion."<sup>52</sup> Indeed, the future belongs to Arthur Mervyn, and it is a future made much brighter and more secure by his marriage to the wealthy young widow, Achsa Fielding. This marriage has been criticized by commentators beginning with Shelley and continuing to the present. The objections center mainly on Arthur's rejection of the young and tender Quaker, Eliza Hadwin, for the more mature (she is six years Arthur's senior) and cultured English Jewess whom he calls his "Mamma." Their union is usually seen by readers as final proof of Mervyn's opportunism, especially since the widow has been well provided for by her dead husband.

Surely Brown must have been aware of the possibility of such a reading, and it appears to be a part of his exploration of the mixed motives he believed prompted even the best of men, men such as Elihu Hubbard Smith. In part,

too, the ending is Brown's conscious attempt to prove that good can come out of the greatest evil, even the evil of yellow fever. In the article, "Pestilence Compared to Bad Government" referred to above, the man who claims the Philadelphia epidemic of 1793 was far worse than the Reign of Terror in France is challenged by a young man who tells of his own experience in that epidemic. It seems that when forced to close his shop and seek the safety of the countryside he met there a lovely young widow whom he married and, because of her generosity, has never had to work hard since. Such "happy endings" seem like a modern-day attempt at good public relations on behalf of the city of Philadelphia and this possibility should not be dismissed. In the case of Arthur Mervyn, however, it follows that just as Arthur receives clemency because of his actions on behalf of Clemenza Lodi, so too he is rewarded for his faithfulness to duty by the hand of his lady. Arthur's story is a romance, not unlike those in Spenser's Faerie Queene which Brown so admired, and the conventions are observed. When the kingdom has been restored to health and all wrongs righted, the faithful knight wins the love of the lady. In this instance the lady is alien to the knight in every way, but her culture, her religion, her nationality, her maturity, and her wealth all afford Arthur the home he has not found in either city or country in America. The cycle which began with his "birth" in the inn in Philadelphia and continued with his death to self during the epidemic, finishes with his rebirth through the love of

his new-found "Mamma."

Like Clara Wieland and Constantia Dudley, Arthur Mervyn sails away from America and its fevers. Each of these endings seems to mark a retreat from scenes which even in memory are too painful to bear. Arthur's withdrawal, however, from the scene of his best endeavors and from the now healthy city is harder to understand. His action becomes clearer when the rejection of the homeland is seen as closely tied to his rejection of Eliza Hadwin. Eliza is young, innocent, and piously Christian. Her background is humble and rural. When Arthur urges her to leave her country home for the city she shyly protests, "Such a girl as I, am not yet fit to--live in your city." In a sense it has become Arthur's city, a place for young men on the way up, and Eliza with her country ways and innocent air does not fit in. The lovely, dark-haired Jewess, Achsa Fielding, represents the civilized world of European cities where virtue such as Arthur's, a virtue tried and tested by the experience of evil, is appreciated. Recognition of his worth by such a woman means much more to Arthur than the love of an innocent young girl; as much, no doubt, as recognition of his worth by the experienced world of European taste would mean to a young American man of letters.

The examination of motives which underlies the romance in Arthur Mervyn reaches beyond the immediate question of the relative merits of theories on the origin of yellow fever to the more pertinent question of America's self-conscious pose of innocence. Like Mervyn when he first

comes to town, America protested her innocence and purity of motive in all things. Yet she too was eager to prosper and if in order to do so it was necessary to lay the blame for a succession of epidemics on sources outside her border, then the proper course of action was to draw the cordon sanitaire around the new Eden. The fact that this also served to effectively cut down on the number of refugees and emigrants who were in many instances held politically suspect, was a happy coincidence of the kind that Arthur Mervyn often turns to his own benefit. Yet Arthur acknowledges his fall from innocence, and gains by the experience; good can come out of evil, Brown insists, the fall can be a fortunate one. And, if honestly acknowledged and earnestly repented, it can lead to a new prosperity in which more than just a chosen few could share. Commerce between the Old World and the New, symbolized by the marriage of Arthur and Ascha, would be the happy result of an improved and cleansed environment here. But the society which should have rejoiced at the marriage of the hero and his lady was too busy maintaining its own integrity to notice, and when it did, it cried "Opportunist."

The full extent of the empire of romance as it pertained to the problem of innocence was not to be known, however, through the adventures of only one young American's quest for truth and virtue. Much remained to be said, too, on the subject of the progress of knowledge in the world; specifically, that no man builds on the accumulated wisdom of the past, but each begins his quest for knowledge at the

same point knowing nothing of truth, and must traverse alone the maze of his own life, learning as he goes. There was, it seemed to Brown, no better place to depict this than in the wilderness of America's natural setting where the accumulated wisdom of civilization meant nothing at all to the man battling for survival.

In that fateful September of 1798 when Elihu Hubbard Smith lay dying of yellow fever, Charles Brockden Brown wrote in a letter to his brother James, "My heart sickens at the perpetual recital to which I am compelled to be an auditor, and I long to plunge myself into woods and deserts where the faintest blast of rumor may not reach me."<sup>54</sup> In a sense this is what he did by writing Edgar Huntly, or, Memoirs of a Sleepwalker between the two halves of the positive picture of good coming out of evil that is Arthur Mervyn. Edgar Huntly, which borrows its theme of sleepwalking from the earlier, unpublished "Sky-Walk," is the last of Brown's romances and was written in 1799, the same year in which Arthur Mervyn, Part II was composed.<sup>55</sup> It has been referred to as "his most challenging, the work in which he takes the greatest risks with his imagination."<sup>56</sup> Certainly it is the most challenging of Brown's novels, a dark study of Indian savagery, somnambulism, and madness. It is the intention of this study to meet the challenge presented by this work by viewing it as an obverse of the portrait presented in Arthur Mervyn.

An earlier discussion of Brown's allegorical mode has demonstrated his use of the debat format, in which ideas are

represented by persons, as a means of exploring fully both sides of an issue. His habit of splitting himself into various personae was also shown to have derived from the same desire to create unity out of diversity. Within the four romances Brown displays a progression of these techniques moving from the antithetical brother and sister in Wieland to the personifications of Freedom and Necessity in Ormond, and, finally, to the figures of Arthur Mervyn and Edgar Huntly. The obvious theme of Mervyn's story is the yellow fever epidemic and other forms of pollution in the republic of virtue. It is also the much less obvious theme of Huntly's story, though there it is even more enmeshed with the question of motivation and is, therefore, more difficult to discern. Nevertheless, the book represents the last in Brown's intellectual disagreements with his friend, Elihu Smith, and is the concluding dialogue. As if he were writing out of some unconscious level of his mind, Brown created Edgar Huntly almost simultaneously with Arthur Mervyn. While one supports Smith's belief in the theory of a local origin for yellow fever, the other reveals all the author's doubts about Smith's wisdom in embracing the radical side of every issue. Above all, it reveals his anger at Smith's monumental, indeed, fatal error in believing the fever to be noncontagious, and his despair at man's unavailing attempts to perceive truth.

Edgar Huntly, or Memoirs of a Sleepwalker, is the story of a young Pennsylvanian whose friend, Waldegrave, has been

mysteriously murdered and his body left beneath a huge elm tree to which Huntly returns again and again in the hope of learning something of the murderer. On one such midnight excursion he sees a man digging under the elm. Closer inspection reveals him to be Clithero Edny, a recent immigrant from Ireland who works on a nearby farm. Edny is completely unaware of his actions at the time Huntly encounters him because he is sleepwalking. Huntly sees this as an indication of guilt and determines to get at the truth. He pursues Edny into the wilderness and eventually obtains from him the story, not of Waldegrave's murder, but of Edny's involvement in the affairs of a wealthy European family, of a murder he committed in self-defense, and of his attempt to murder his patroness out of a misdirected sense of "pure benevolence." From all of this Edny has fled to America.

Huntly's compassion is aroused by the story and soon he has begun to identify with Edny to such an extent that he himself sleepwalks, experiencing a sense of guilt much like that which he has observed in his alter ego, Edny. In his sleep Huntly plunges into the surrounding wilderness and wakes after having fallen into a cave. Beginning with the experiences in the cave there follow a series of adventures involving Indians, the rescue of a captive maiden, numerous narrow escapes from death and a final return home where he learns at last that Waldegrave had been the victim not of Clithero Edny, but of Indians. In the course of these events, Huntly acquires a new knowledge

of human nature by experiencing a side of himself he has never known. Despite this new awareness Huntly refuses to accept the word of others that Edny is insane, and sets off a chain of events which allow Edny to make a second attempt on the life of his former patroness who now resides in New York. The attempt fails but the woman, who is pregnant, miscarries, and Huntly is left with the knowledge of his own culpability in the matter.

The structure of romance common to both Arthur Mervyn and Edgar Huntly marks them as companion pieces. Though the conventional elements of romance are not so numerous in the second work, its quest motif is even stronger.<sup>57</sup> Huntly becomes obsessed with Clithero Edny and with the belief that Edny holds the secret of Waldegrave's murder. On this pretext he pursues him relentlessly in what is in actuality a quest for self-discovery. Though Edgar, like Arthur, is engaged in a quest for self-realization, his achievement brings with it no recognition and no reward. The clearest indicator to this contrast between the two heroes is the line of action in their respective stories. Mervyn's tale begins with the hero at a severely reduced level and traces a steady rise; Huntly's story begins when he is at a low point and the subsequent action plunges him even lower, with no compensating ascent. Both are initiation tales, but whereas Arthur displays an autonomy which is surprising for one of Brown's characters, Edgar is a return to the obsessive, daemonic character familiar from Wieland and Ormond, and for this reason he profits not at

all from the initiatory experience. Arthur is so changed by his experience that he can no longer remain in his homeland, while Edgar returns home from his quest sadder but no wiser, because he refuses to believe the truth which has been revealed to him and remains in the grip of daemonic forces.

As in Arthur Mervyn, there is present also in Edgar Huntly a thematic life cycle, but here it begins and ends with death. In the opening pages Huntly returns to the place of his friend's death, and on the closing page the hopes and expectations of another friend are blasted by the loss of his unborn child. There is virtually no relief from the book's central vision of despair, a vision which is heralded at its opening by Huntly's anguished cry, "What light has burst upon my ignorance of myself and of mankind! How sudden and enormous the transition from uncertainty to knowledge!" The nature of his enlightenment is revealed near the end of the long letter which constitutes the book when Huntly exclaims, "Disastrous and humiliating is the state of man!<sup>58</sup> By his own hands is constructed the mass of misery and error in which his steps are forever involved."<sup>59</sup> Thus the key to the overwhelming sense of despair which pervades the work is the fact that the knowledge gained is concerned not as much with the nature of truth, but of error. There is no note of affirmation sounded, only the grim underscoring of the hopelessness of the human condition.

Three words which appear again and again throughout the text emphasize that condition: "maze," "precipice,"

and "verge." The first points to the fact that Huntly's quest is not an adventure, but a learning experience; the others indicate the peril attached to failure. Here, fully detailed, are the "mazy paths" referred to in the epigram to Wieland, and as Huntly hurls himself into their negotiation he is surrounded by life-threatening forces on every side.<sup>60</sup> He repeatedly stands on the verge of some precipice or other and the slightest wrong move will bring instant death. In his three days' trial in the Pennsylvania wilderness Edgar learns the folly of ever believing that man can know--fully and thoroughly--himself or the world in which he lives. And having learned this, he promptly forgets it, bringing disaster to those around him.

In addition to the maze and precipice which dominate the novel, creating a kind of natural architectural imagery, two other images are prominent. One is the "fatal elm," which functions as a kind of tree of knowledge, and to which Huntly returns time and again seeking information about the death of his friend. Later in this discussion the possibility will be raised of a personal significance behind the designation of the tree as an elm. The other image is the chest which belongs to Clithero Edny and which Huntly wrongfully breaks open. Such chests appear in more than one of Brown's works, notably in "The Man At Home" and "The Memoirs of Carwin." As places of concealment they bear resemblance to Falkland's chest into which Caleb Williams intrudes in Godwin's novel. In Edgar Huntly, however, the chest, which is so constructed that only the

release of a secret spring will open it, takes on added significance in that once opened it is impossible to reclose. Thus the chest, like the tree, becomes a symbol of a knowledge which once acquired is irrevocable. The despairing nature of the knowledge which Huntly gains points to the chest as truly a Pandora's box of ills and vices. The image is repeated a number of times in the book; Huntly unearths from beneath the elm a box which Clithero has buried, and Huntly himself has a cabinet in which he conceals letters written by his dead friend, Waldegrave. At times the image changes, becoming large enough to conceal Huntly himself. First there is the cave into which he falls, then an unused oven in which he hides from pursuing Indians, and finally, a natural cliffside shelter where he seeks refuge from the elements and which he describes as "somewhat resembling a coffin shape, and not much larger in dimensions." These last two, the oven, and the cliffside shelter, reject Huntly's presence; the oven collapses from his weight, and the narrowness of the shelter forces him to abandon it. The progress of the imagery, from boxes and cabinets which contain the secrets of persons either dead or presumed dead, to large coffin-like structures emphasizes the womb/tomb theme which culminates in the miscarriage of the unborn child.

Huntly's exclusion from these coffin images seems to indicate that he is not to be made privy to the secret knowledge of death in the way that Arthur Mervyn is. Though the failure is not Huntly's, nevertheless, it works

to his detriment in that while Mervyn gains and grows as a result of a single epiphanous moment in which he is made aware of the truth of his own mortality, Huntly is forced to undergo the difficult process of education in the bewildering maze of error, only to emerge with a still imperfect vision of truth. Arthur Mervyn's story concentrates on human efforts directed against the causes of death and disease and toward the preservation of life, presenting, in all, a positive progressive view of man's efforts. Edgar Huntly in its grim, determined emphasis on violence and death negates all that Arthur Mervyn proposes, concentrating instead on the perpetuation, through man's curiosity and imperfect knowledge, of all that is evil in the world. Arthur and Edgar are yet another of Brown's antithetical pairings, working out their opposing reactions to the mystery of death.

The doubling device which thus embraces the two books narrows and is repeated within Edgar Huntly. It has been generally acknowledged that as Huntly pursues Clithero Edny through the wilds of Pennsylvania the two become more and more identified in his mind, and the identification becomes complete when Huntly duplicates Edny's sleepwalking and even his secretive actions. When Huntly first stumbles on Edny he discovers him in the act of burying something under the elm tree. Later he learns that it was a letter written by Edny's former patroness whom he believes he has killed. So too, when Huntly sleepwalks he conceals the letters of his murdered friend. Noting afterwards the similarity of

their movements, Huntly explains that "The deed was neither prompted by the will nor noticed by the senses of him by whom it was done."<sup>61</sup> Even Clithero's name hints at the essence of his role, which is to teach Huntly how deeply hidden motives can be. The name Clithero, though Irish, carries a suggestion of the Greek kleitoris, meaning "to hide." Huntly is not, however, an apt pupil. Through his total identification with a man he had presumed guilty of murder, Huntly moves to the opposite extreme; he now absolves him from all guilt, claiming as a defense a lack of intention. What Huntly fails to realize is his own motive in declaring Clithero innocent, the desire to declare himself equally innocent. By means of what Angus Fletcher has called the "magical causation" of doubling, Brown conveys the idea that the truth which our shared humanity can teach us is how impossible it is to know another man since each man is, in the words of the subtitle of "Sky-Walk" from which Edgar Huntly is derived, "The Man Unknown to Himself."<sup>62</sup> "How little cognizance," Huntly exclaims at one point, "have men over the actions and motives of each other. How total is our blindness with regard to our own performances!"<sup>63</sup>

The theme of somnambulism could be seen as a metaphor for death, especially in view of the fraternal bond between the mythical Somnus and Mors who dwelt in a great cave much like the one in which Huntly awakens from his sleepwalking. Despite this, the somnambulism does not function here in that way. Instead it strongly suggests the dream visions

of medieval allegories in which the protagonist is led by an untrustworthy guide. Huntly's pursuit of Clithero leads him to the mouth of the same cave in which he himself will later waken from his sleepwalk. The entrance to the cave is so low that he is forced to kneel, and it is in this position of humility that Huntly enters. When he is able to stand erect and proceed he says, "I began to fear that I should be involved in a maze, and should be disabled from returning."<sup>64</sup> In the obscurity of the cave he fears that at every step he might encounter "a bottomless pit." "Had I not been persuaded that another had gone before me," he says, "I should have relinquished the attempt."<sup>65</sup> Though Huntly is awake at this point, the nightmarish danger revealed by the interior of the cave suggests that Clithero's ability to traverse it is in some way supernatural. Since somnambulism was at the time considered to be a form of insanity, Clithero is indeed an unreliable guide.<sup>66</sup> When his example becomes the pattern for Huntly's own behavior, it is clear that Clithero is Huntly's guide into the world of the irrational.

Through their shared experience of the irrational Clithero and Edgar become complementary figures, but there is yet another set of doubles in the book who do not achieve this relationship. In the five chapters in which Clithero narrates the story of his life prior to his arrival in America, we learn of the fatalistic concept that ruled the mind of his patroness, Mrs. Lorimer, concerning her twin brother, Arthur Wiatte. Though identical

in appearance, the brother and sister are antithetical in morality. She is the epitome of all virtues, while he "exceeded in depravity all that has been imputed to the archfoe of mankind." Despite the vast difference between her and her brother, Euphemia Lorimer firmly believes that "The stroke that deprives him of life will not only have the same effect upon me, but will set my portion in everlasting misery."<sup>67</sup> She so convinces Clithero of this that when he kills her brother in self-defense he hastens to her room expecting to find her already dead. Instead he finds her sleeping and realizes that when she wakes she will learn that he is the murderer of her beloved brother. Unable to face that moment, Clithero convinces himself that he will be doing her a kindness by killing her. With this specious motive he raises his dagger to strike at the figure in the bed but is stopped by the victim's outstretched arm. He realizes that it is not Mrs. Lorimer in the bed but her niece who is his intended bride. In the act of fleeing the house Clithero encounters Mrs. Lorimer and blurts out that he has killed her brother. When she falls in a faint he believes she is dead and rushes off for America. Once again Brown has made use of a magical relationship between two individuals as an example of the destructive power of irrationalism.

It is the recital of this tale which first causes Edgar Huntly to feel profoundly sorry for Clithero. At this point he ceases to suspect him of the murder of Waldegrave and believes him to have been totally innocent of all evil

intentions toward Mrs. Lorimer. His attempts to persuade Clithero of his innocence are fruitless, however, and the Irishman withdraws into the wilderness to die. Huntly refuses to allow this to happen and seeks him out in hope of restoring him to his senses. Through all of this Huntly keeps insisting that his reasons for pursuing Edny are entirely benevolent, yet there is more than a hint of maliciousness in his dogged persistence. Clithero must be rescued, he must be restored to sanity, and he must be proven innocent of all wrongdoing; Huntly cannot rest until he is. When, at the close of all his trials in the wilderness, Huntly learns that Mrs. Lorimer is not only alive, but is now the wife of his old friend and tutor, Sarsefield, he refuses to abide by his friend's wishes and tells Clithero of her whereabouts. Only after his well-intentioned act has sent Clithero off in a murderous frenzy to find and kill his former mistress does Edgar realize that "Clithero is a maniac."<sup>68</sup>

Clithero Edny is indeed a man possessed by a daemon. In speaking of the moment when he was poised above the figure in the bed whom he believed to be Mrs. Lorimer he asks, "Was it I that hurried to the deed? No. It was the demon that possessed me. My limbs were guided to the bloody office by a power foreign and superior to mine . . . My doom was ratified by powers which no human energies can counterwork."<sup>69</sup> Present here, as in the arguments of Ormond, is the notion that one's lot in life is fixed by some cosmic system the order of which must be maintained.

But in this instance the notion is not limited to an abstract intellectual argument since there is an aspect of Edny's story which very much involves his allotted place in life. Clithero's narrative, as told to Huntly, begins in the cottage of his father, a vassal on a huge manor in Ireland. His quick mind and manner attract the attention of the lady of the manor house, Euphemia Lorimer, who takes him into her home to be trained as her son's valet-companion. Toward this end Clithero is given an education with the result, he says, that he developed "a thirst of independence, and an impatience of subjection and poverty." He accompanies his master on a continental tour but incurs the young gentleman's displeasure by a too-zealous attention to morality. Sent home to Mrs. Lorimer he enters into a new relationship, one that is essentially that of Joseph in Egypt, as steward and general overseer of the estate. This new position brings him into daily contact with his mistress who treats him with "affability and condescension." Clithero prospers financially, dwells "in pomp and splendor," and enjoys an increasing reputation.

Included in the Lorimer household is Clarice, the abandoned daughter of Mrs. Lorimer's infamous brother, who is now the ward of her widowed aunt. Clithero falls in love with Clarice but despairs of ever marrying her because, as he says, "I was habituated to consider the distinctions of rank as indelible." Fearful of displaying his sentiments, Clithero asks to leave Mrs. Lorimer's employ but she, fully aware of his reason, urges him to overcome his scruples

since, she insists, "There is not the shadow of objection to your union."<sup>70</sup> The marriage never takes place, however, because Clithero is attacked on the street by Clarice's father whom he kills, and this act is immediately followed by the attempt on Mrs. Lorimer's life and the flight to America.

Thus Clithero Edny comes close to realizing what Arthur Mervyn only dreams of when he envisions himself as Thomas Welbeck's son and heir and married to the woman he believes is Welbeck's daughter. Clithero entertains none of Arthur's aspirations but is made to suffer the consequences of overreaching his station because of the misplaced benevolence of his patroness. It is even possible to see Clithero's desire to murder Mrs. Lorimer as a form of revenge against her for catapulting him into a position which could only prove disastrous. Such a sentiment is, in fact, expressed by Clithero when he accuses Edgar Huntly of doing much the same thing:

You, like others, are blind to the most momentous consequences of your own actions. You talk of imparting consolation. You boast the beneficence of your intentions. You set yourself to do me a benefit. What are the effects of your misguided zeal and random efforts? They have brought my life to a miserable close. . . .<sup>71</sup> They have put the zeal to my perdition.

The story of Clithero's movement up the social ladder through the "magical" agency of Mrs. Lorimer provides a double to the main plot in which Edgar Huntly attempts to effect essentially the same kind of change by restoring Clithero's society. The two plots mirror each other and are linked by

the acts of supposed benevolence on the part of Huntly and Mrs. Lorimer toward the same object, Clithero. That the actions of both are inappropriate is made clear at the end of the novel when Clithero is shown to have been totally unfit for the change in status into which he was forced. The destruction which Clithero causes in the Old World social setting is repeated by the disaster he brings with him to the New. In America he blights not only the present, but the future as well, destroying even the unborn.

Slowly the outlines of the yellow fever controversy begin to take shape. Theories concerning its origin and causes, as well as the issues which developed periodically in the political, social, and religious realms, and particularly the erroneous conviction of Elihu Hubbard Smith that the disease was not contagious, all begin to be perceived in the story of the willfully deceived American and the wild Irishman. In his determined efforts to fulfill the role of a father confessor to Clithero Edny ("it shall be my province to emulate a father's clemency"), Edgar Huntly parallels the action of Dr. Stevens vis-a-vis Arthur Mervyn in that novel. Like Stevens, he is easily persuaded to accept both the teller and the tale, and his earliest suspicions of Clithero's guilt are quickly overcome.

When Clithero disappears into the wilderness after recounting his life story to Huntly, his confessor pursues him in the hope of restoring his mind to a "tranquil and wholesome existence." To find him, Huntly is forced to

follow the mazy paths of what might be termed the Cave of the Mind. The path gradually leads outward and at length Huntly finds himself at the summit of a hill. He describes this hill as a wide circular expanse encompassing another and similarly orbed hill. As Edgar stands on the outer circle, gazing past a gulf into which pours a fast-running stream, he is struck by the "sanctity and awe" of the place. He realizes the likelihood that no other human has ever gazed on this place: "Since the birth of this continent, I was probably the first who had deviated this remotely from the customary paths of men."<sup>73</sup>

Suddenly Huntly sees Clithero on the inner hill circle. So impenetrable is the chasm that he might well echo the words of Arthur Mervyn when he first saw the luxurious house of Thomas Welbeck, "How wide and how impassible was the gulf by which we were separated!" Instead Huntly stands "gazing upon" him and then cries out, "Man! Clithero!"<sup>74</sup> This acknowledgement of Clithero has been seen by one critic as a healing of Edgar's psychic split, but such a reading is not sustained by the text since Huntly profits not at all from the gesture.<sup>75</sup> Instead he plunges, as a result of it, into a participation in Clithero's madness. The mazy paths along which Huntly has followed Clithero have led him to deviate "from the customary paths of men," and consequently he gazes on that which no man has ever before seen, the unexplored regions of the mind.

Brown's description of this region is wildly romantic, filled with rocks of "fantastic shapes" and an overall

effect of "a desolate and solitary grandeur." When Huntly emerges, however, the landscape forms an analogue to his act of gazing. The concentric hills form an eye with Huntly on the corona and Clithero, on whom he gazes, in the pupil. As Wieland is dominated by the aural perception, and Arthur Mervyn to a lesser degree by the taste and smell of the plaguey miasma, Edgar Huntly is dominated by the visual intrusion into the privacy of a human mind. This projection of the rationalist sensibility onto a natural landscape is the focal point of Brown's theme. Man's attempts to strip away the veil of human nature are as doomed as are all his efforts to penetrate the world of nature. Like a sleepwalker, he may see but never comprehend the thing he sees.

Huntly's identification with Clithero, his attempt to know the "otherness" of one with whom he would share the fraternal bond, provides him instead with an unwelcome insight into himself. This insight comes to him almost as a "dream vision," though it is actually his own experience after awakening from his sleepwalk. His somnambulism provides the break in consciousness which Northrop Frye refers to as the motif of amnesia that usually precedes the descent adventure in romance literature by means of which the hero receives the truth which he is to bear back to the middle region of earth and its inhabitants.<sup>76</sup>

Similarly, Huntly's overwhelming curiosity about Clithero Edny, symbolized by his breaking open of Edny's locked chest, corresponds to Frye's analysis of the romantic use

of curiosity as a theme, based on the mythical stories of Pandora and Psyche. Professor Frye sees such actions as implying "the collapse of the rightful order in the mind and the separation of consciousness from the proper rhythm of action."<sup>77</sup> This is precisely what occurs in Edgar Huntly. Huntly has insisted that his curiosity is justified since it is governed by reason and will result in knowledge which "is of value for its own sake." His violation of Clithero's privacy, however, indicates the degree to which his reason has been overtaken by his unconscious need to know more of himself by knowing more of Clithero.

When Huntly awakens from his sleepwalk to find himself back in the cave where he had sought for and found Clithero, it becomes obvious that the descent to the underworld is really, in this instance, an inward journey through the mazes of his own mind. In the cave he learns that he, who has never taken a rabbit as game, is capable of killing both man and beast in order to preserve his own life. After leaving the cave he endures three days and nights of testing in a vast circuitous maze which he must penetrate in order to return home. In the course of this adventure he experiences such violence, in himself and others, that he afterward claims, "Passage into new forms, overleaping the bars of time and space, reversal of the laws of inanimate and intelligent existence, had been mine to perform and witness."<sup>78</sup> What this amounts to is that Huntly is now aware of his own capacity for a type

of behavior which he fears is irrational. In recounting his wilderness experiences he both accuses and defends himself:

I had imbibed, from the unparalleled events which had lately happened, a spirit vengeful, unrelenting, and ferocious. But I was not governed by the soul which usually regulates my conduct.<sup>79</sup>

Motivated by the fear that if Clithero's behavior constitutes madness, then he too is, by way of his own behavior, a madman, Huntly refuses to acknowledge even to himself that Edny is moved by any but the most benevolent intentions. In the long run, Huntly has learned little from his descent into the cave of the mind. His powers of discrimination are dulled by his fear of that which he has found there, a knowledge of himself that he would prefer to keep hidden below the surface of his consciousness. In accord with this wish, Clithero, his alter ego, plunges (like the swine in the Gospel into whom the exorcised demons are sent by Christ) to a watery death.

The "otherness" of Clithero Edny, his position in the Pennsylvania community as "the only foreigner among us," his aberrant behavior, and his double role as both victim and villain, isolates him and sets him in sharp contrast to the supposedly rational and moral young American, Edgar Huntly. Yet Huntly convinces himself that "Man to man, I needed not to dread his encounter." The result of these attempts to bridge the gulf between himself and Edny, to draw, as it were, on their shared humanity, is the contagion of madness. After having affirmed in Arthur Mervyn the

theory of environmental pollution as the source of corruption in the New World, Brown now refutes it. In Edgar Huntly, the other half of the dialogue on this subject, the alien is made the source of infection and of contagion. In a complete reversal of Arthur Mervyn's experience in which he goes from sinfulness to virtue by means of his contact with the contagion of guilt, Edgar Huntly is reduced to madness, shame, and rebuke by his unwillingness to acknowledge his own guilty state and that of all men.

There is no reason to assume on the basis of Edgar Huntly that Brown had become an advocate of the importationist theory of yellow fever, nor that he had become a supporter of the Alien and Sedition Acts. These are minor concerns, of little interest now. What does become evident from this reading of the book is the fact that Brown's swing away from the ideals of republicanism, progressivism, and even rationalism toward a more conservative mode of thought and literature dates from the experience of the 1798 epidemic. The impatience with theorizers which surfaces in the editorial footnotes to Volney's arguments on the yellow fever in America is only a less violent reaction to that experience than the one which lies buried in Edgar Huntly.

The same immediacy of emotion evident in the yellow fever scenes in Arthur Mervyn also informs Edgar Huntly, its companion piece. But the realism in the first, which has brought high praise from critics since the time of its publication, becomes a Gothic nightmare of terror and

confusion in the second where the labyrinth in which the young American is forced to learn the error of his ways is not made up of city streets and sordid conditions, but is composed of, in Brown's own words, "the perils of the Western wilderness" and of "a series of adventures, growing out of the condition of our country. . . ."80 The precipice which threatens Huntly at every turn in the wilderness maze is the stern reminder of nature that it is folly for man to believe that he can ever truly know and understand the mystery of his own nature or of the world of nature.

Brown had good reason to deplore the folly of human reason when it presumes to a degree of knowledge not yet attained. When Elihu Hubbard Smith, in the firm belief that the yellow fever was not contagious, took the already ailing Dr. Scandella into the house on Pine Street allowing him to invade the privacy of the three friends and even giving over to him the comforts of his own bedroom, the situation rivalled in horror and potential disaster anything Brown could devise in the way of a Gothic tale with a foreign villain. The barely concealed emotions of grief at the loss of the beloved friend and anger at the presumption which allowed him to place himself and others in such immediate danger are alternately hidden and revealed in Edgar Huntly in much the same manner as Huntly and Clithero bury and unearth manuscripts whose contents haunt them.

The letters which Huntly conceals while sleepwalking

are letters addressed to him by his murdered friend, Waldegrave, and the associations between Waldegrave and Brown's friend Smith are numerous. The general description given of Waldegrave, with the exception of his timidity, is that of Smith, and the fact that Smith served as Secretary of the Manumission Society and as a trustee of its school for the children of slaves is reflected in Waldegrave's position as schoolmaster in a Negro free school.<sup>81</sup> In addition, Huntly reveals midway through his narration that Waldegrave "had adopted, at different periods, different systems of opinion on topics connected with religion and morals."<sup>82</sup> The systems he specifies are precisely those which Smith had adopted and which Brown made the subjects of his allegorized dialogues, rationalism, materialism, and necessitarianism.

The packet of letters which Huntly has preserved against the direct wishes of his dead friend contain arguments written by Waldegrave in an attempt to persuade Huntly of the truth of rationalism. The effort had proved so successful that Huntly was reluctant to let go his new philosophy when Waldegrave repented and converted to Christian beliefs. At his friend's insistence Huntly had agreed to destroy the letters but after Waldegrave's death they became precious momentos and Huntly has reneged on his promise. In addition, he has agreed to make copies of the letters for Waldegrave's sister, Mary, who is Huntly's intended wife. Waldegrave appears to Huntly in a dream and Huntly believes that his look is one of reproach; he

experiences such deep feelings of guilt that he conceals the letters while asleep.

Smith did, in fact, have a sister Mary to whom he wrote long instructive letters on the care and tutelage of her child as well as on the direction her own reading and thought should take. Besides recommending Political Justice to her, however, there is no evidence in the letters Smith transcribed into his diary that he had attempted to undermine her Christian belief. It's quite possible, though, that Brown experienced some sense of guilt regarding his own and his friends' attitude toward religion. Only a few days before Smith's death Brown, Johnson, and Smith wrote a joint letter to William Dunlap at his home in Perth Amboy. In it the three assume a gay air about remaining in the city despite the danger since, they claim, "The Town is the only place for rational beings." They taunt Dunlap for having repaired to his country home where he is "so destitute of intellectual food," and chide him for "christian allusions so frequent" in his letters. "Caute & timido say I," writes Brown, "which for your edification I translate 'slow & sure.'" Johnson adds, "But mind Charles & let us have no allusions to the Vulgar cant of the religionists. . . ." <sup>83</sup>

Within the month Smith was dead and Brown had barely escaped the same fate. After joining Dunlap in New Jersey, Brown and Johnson received a letter from one of Smith's Litchfield acquaintances commissioned by the bereaved parents to enquire after the details of their son's death. The letter contains a postscript asking "Did Smith die a

Diest? (sic) if you require, the answer shall be kept secret."<sup>84</sup> Dunlap notes in his diary that they were relieved not to be able to report anything on the subject since in his final hours Smith had been unable to speak and thus could neither renounce nor affirm his rationalist beliefs.<sup>85</sup>

One final allusion to Smith might appear in Edgar Huntly, though it is much more speculative than those already mentioned. The tree under which Waldegrave was found murdered before the story begins, and which figures so prominently in the novel, is always referred to specifically as an elm tree. Anyone familiar with Smith's home town of Litchfield, Connecticut, where Brown sought refuge while the yellow fever epidemic was raging in Philadelphia in 1793, is aware of the magnificent American elms that still line its wide main streets. These trees were planted early in the 1790's by two of Smith's friends, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. and his brother Frederick.<sup>86</sup> Still more speculative, but nonetheless interesting, is the possibility that a particular tree in New York City which had great significance for Smith, Brown, and William Dunlap may have been an elm. In August of 1796 Smith made the following entry in his Diary:

Dunlap, Brown, & I went to walk. Was it this day, or yesterday, that we revisited the three-partile Tree, emblem of our friendship, which we discovered, & made our own, last year? We had some doubt which stock belonged to each. For each of us had fixed upon his own. We readily agreed that the slenderest one, & which grew in the middle, must be Charles's; &

after many examinations, the reason  
of size determined me that the  
western-most must be mine.<sup>87</sup>

Whether the elm tree is a specific allusion to Elihu Hubbard Smith or not does not lessen its connotations as a tree of knowledge. Coupled with the images of Pandora's box which also appear throughout the book, it points to man's acquisition of knowledge as the source of all evil in the world. The tree and box imagery also carry unmistakable sexual symbolism to post-Freudian readers, but such readings must not be imposed upon Brown beyond noting that they hint at the psychological projections into male and female characters seen in Brown's earlier works, and point to the marriage of opposites which in Jane Talbot concludes Brown's career as novelist.

Such a happy reconciliation was not yet possible for Brown at the time Edgar Huntly was composed. There is no resolution there, no certainty beyond that of the uncertainty and unreliability of human knowledge. Edgar Huntly denies all the brave hopes for a steady progress toward perfection that is the basis of Arthur Mervyn's quest for a virtuous society. Instead the movement of man toward knowledge is shown not to lie along a straightforward path, but one of tortuous windings through a wilderness of error that keeps man forever on the verge of a precipice over which he repeatedly falls. Against these overwhelming odds there was little that Brown could see in the way of hope, not, at least, in the year 1799. The despair which breathes through every page of Edgar Huntly apparently began with

the letter in which Brown announced to his brother the sad news of Elihu Hubbard Smith's death:

Thursday morning. The die is cast. E.H.S.  
is dead. O the folly of prediction and the  
vanity of systems.<sup>88</sup>

He managed to write Arthur Mervyn as a sort of final tribute to the bright hopes of his youth when he had believed that the continued struggles of mankind toward a perfection beyond its reach would at length "raise us to that elevated pitch of knowledge or of virtue" which we are capable of attaining. Its romance formula is that of a folk or fairy tale in which such hopes are tried by what he termed "the unfailling test of experience." And yet the very process by means of which experience is acquired is questioned in Edgar Huntly. The new and enlightened science advocated by men like Elihu Smith was to have included a system of morality superior to that of the "superstitions" of the past. The object of this new science, however, was man, who in the course of study would be subjected to a scrutiny so intense that in its attempts to fully perceive him, threatened to violate him. The authority gained from such a perception would be based not on factual evidence capable of being certified by the senses, but would remain always among what Brown referred to as "topics of conjecture." Incapable of ever knowing himself then, the experience of Edgar Huntly is proof that man is doomed by his own imperfection to unknowingly and unfaillingly repeat his own history again and again, damning himself even as he tries to know himself. Such was the

empire of romance as Charles Brockden Brown defined it  
and as he experienced it.

REFERENCES

1. The article appeared in The Monthly Magazine, II, 4 (April, 1800), 251-53, and has been identified as Brown's by Warner Berthoff in his dissertation, "The Literary Career of Charles Brockden Brown," Harvard, 1954, p. 369.
2. C.B.B., "The Difference Between History and Romance," 251.
3. Ibid., 252.
4. Northrop Frye places myth and naturalism at extreme ends of the literary spectrum, with romance between as the attempt "to displace myth in a human direction . . ." See Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 137.
5. C.B.B., "Difference Between History and Romance," 252.
6. C.B.B., Translator's footnote, C.F. Volney, A View of the Soil and Climate of the United States of America (Phila., 1804), 252. In Jan., 1800 Brown reviewed Noah Webster's A Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential Diseases (N.Y., 1799) in the Monthly Magazine. He deplored Webster's use of ancient history to explain modern events, claiming these are not scientific methods of writing history. See Monthly Magazine II (April, 1800), 297.
7. Part I, printed by Hugh Maxwell of Philadelphia, appeared in March, 1799, and Part II printed by George F. Hopkins of N.Y., appeared in Sept., 1800. See Dunlap Life, II, 98. Edgar Huntly, with the imprint of Hugh Maxwell, appeared in mid-summer, 1799. Warfel, 154.
8. See Warner Berthoff, "Adventures of the Young Man: An Approach to Charles Brockden Brown," American Quarterly, IX (1957), 421-34 and R.W.B. Lewis, The American Adam (Chicago, 1955), 97-98.
9. C.B.B., "The Difference Between History and Romance," Monthly Magazine, 252.
10. C.B.B. to James Brown, 15 Feb., 1799. See Dunlap, Life, II, 97-99.
11. C.B.B., quoted by Paul Allen, The Life of Charles Brockden Brown (Delmar, N.Y.: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1975), 20.
12. See Smith's diary entries in the first two weeks of Sept., 1795.
13. Smith, Diary, 57.

14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 67.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. See especially Warner Berthoff, "Adventures of the Young Man: An Approach to Charles Brockden Brown" and James H. Justus, "Arthur Mervyn, American," American Literature, 42 (April, 1971), 304-324.
19. R.W.B. Lewis, The American Adam (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1955), 92-98.
20. Justus, 321.
21. C.B.B., Arthur Mervyn (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962), 3, 4.
22. A concise review of the history of the idea of infection appears in Owsei Temkin, "An Historical Analysis of the Concept of Infection," Studies in Intellectual History (Balt.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), 123-147.
23. The absence of any knowledge of microbes led men to postulate theories of demonic agents which worked, unseen, to corrupt matters. One example is Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchill's theory of Septon, the agent which he believed responsible for material dissolution. In defining Septon he compared it to the corruptive agency of fallen man in the moral sphere. See C.R. Hall, A Scientist in the Early Republic, Samuel Latham Mitchill, 1764-1831 (N.Y.: Russell & Russell, 1962), 30-40.
24. Northrop Frye, The Secular Scripture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1976), 26. See also N. Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), 35.
25. Vladimir Propp, the Russian formalist whose work had a great influence on Levi-Strauss' interpretation of meaning in myth based on form and structure, published a study in 1928 which examined the Russian fairytale and discovers 31 structural elements. See Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale (American Folklore Society, Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1968). Prof. Frederick Keener of Hofstra Univ. has reduced these elements to four movements:

I	Family member leaves home	Test	Hurt
II	Quest	Test	Magic Object
III	Conflict with evil	Test	Victorious & Branded
IV	Returns home	Test	New experiences & Marries princess

A similar work is Stith Thompson, Motif Index of Folk Literature, 6 vols. (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1955-58) which catalogues motifs from all forms of mythical and folk literature of all countries. Propp's work is of particular interest here, however, because of its applicability to Arthur Mervyn and because of the parallel lines of development in 19th century America and Russia of a romantic fiction.

26. C.B.B., Arthur Mervyn, 48.
27. Jung says the trickster figure represents a split off of part of the ego personality to which it stands in relationship; it is not necessarily worse than the ego personality. See C.G. Jung, "On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure," translated by R.F.C. Hull, A Study in American Indian Mythology (N.Y.: Bell Publishing, 1956), 201. There is no indication that Wallace functions as a part of Mervyn, but the idea is an interesting one in view of Brown's earlier discussed tendency to develop such fictional relationships.
28. C.B.B., Arthur Mervyn, 135.
29. Ibid., 137.
30. Ibid., 138.
31. On the importance of death in American literature see Harold Bloom, "Death and the Native Strain in American Poetry," Death in American Experiences, Arien Mack, ed. (N.Y.: Schöcken Books, 1973), 83-96, and also Leslie Fiedler, Love and Death in the American Novel (Dell, 1966).
32. C.B.B., "On the Portraits of Death," The Monthly Magazine, III, 6 (Dec., 1800), 415.
33. Ibid., 416
34. C.B.B., "Pestilence and Bad Government Compared," The Literary Magazine and American Register, VI (July-Dec., 1806), 449.

35. The transference of sensory perception into symbolic representation may have been facilitated for Brown by his knowledge of a system of shorthand which utilized not an abbreviated form of words, but symbols that represented sounds (in the manner of the later Pittman and Gregg systems). One of Brown's copybooks contains pages of these symbols with their corresponding sounds. It appears to be not a system of his own invention, as Dunlap claimed (Dunlap, Life, I, 14), but the one devised by M. Thomas Lloyd, congressional secretary and published in 1793. (See M. Thomas Lloyd, The System of Short-Hand Practised by M. Thomas Lloyd, In Taking Down The Debates of Congress; And Now (with his permission) Published for General Use (Phila., 1973). Letters from Brown to friends written in whole or in part in shorthand prior to 1793 indicate that Lloyd's system may have been available to the legal profession in Philadelphia where Lloyd practiced and Brown was an apprentice. Important to the present study is the demand of this system, for its proper implementation, of the ability to translate an aural perception into a symbol which has been associated with it by prior learning. This is very much what Theodore Wieland does when he hears the voice emanating from the temple: he associates the sound with his father's religion and believes he has heard a revelation symbolizing Deity. On the emergence of symbol out of Lockeian psychology see Charles Feidelson, Symbolism and American Literature (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953).
36. It is difficult to imagine why Hawthorne chose to single out Arthur Mervyn in commending Brown, especially when Wieland would seem to be closer to Hawthorne's own style of writing. No doubt he recognized the moral allegory embodied in the work.
37. C.B.B., Arthur Mervyn, 54.
38. Ibid.
39. As James H. Justus says in a footnote to his article, "Arthur Mervyn, American," "If he is Adamic, he is like an Adam prospering east of Eden." See Justus, 305 n.
40. C.B.B., Arthur Mervyn, 43-4.
41. Ibid., 153.
42. C.B.B., Preface to Arthur Mervyn. Brown's allegorical inclinations appear even here: "It is everyone's duty to profit by all opportunities of inculcating on mankind the lessons of justice and humanity. The influences of hope and fear, the trials of fortitude and constancy, which took place in this city, in the autumn of 1793, have, perhaps, never been exceeded in any age."

43. C.B.B., Arthur Mervyn, 174.
44. The millennialism of the decade that encompassed Brown's romances is discussed in James W. Davidson, "Searching for the Millennium: Problems for the 1790's and the 1970's," New England Quarterly, 45 (June, 1972), 241-261.
45. Martin P. Snyder, City of Independence, Views of Philadelphia Before 1800 (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1976), 94.
46. This seems to be a reference to those Guardians who during the epidemic took over the supervision of vital functions of the city in the absence of any duly authorized government. When the epidemic was over the motives of many of the Guardians (who were mostly republicans) were impugned. In Ormond Brown makes direct textual reference to "the guardians of the public welfare . . . a set of men, self-appointed to the generous office . . ." (Ormond, 54.)
47. C.B.B., Arthur Mervyn, 44.
48. Ibid., 84.
49. Ibid., 343.
50. Ibid., 345.
51. Ibid., 339.
52. Ibid., 254.
53. Peacock claimed that Shelley's almost unbounded enthusiasm for Brown's writing was tempered somewhat by this turn of events and that he saw in it an attempt by Brown to bring the book "to an uncomfortable conclusion." See Berthoff, "Adventures of the Young Man," 432. William Dunlap referred to Eliza Hadwin's abandonment as "unexpected [and] disgusting." See Dunlap, Life, II, 40.
54. C.B.B. to James Brown, 18 Sept., 1798. See Dunlap, Life, II, 9-10.
55. It is believed that part of "Sky-Walk" was set in type but that the type was destroyed when the printer died of yellow fever. See Warfel, 91. Warfel's The Rhapsodist contains that portion of "Sky-Walk" which was published in The Weekly Magazine, March, 1798. See pp. 135-141.
56. David Stineback, Edgar Huntly, or Memoirs of a Sleepwalker (New Haven, Conn.: College & University Press, 1973), Introduction, 7.

57. Dieter Schulz, "Edgar Huntly as Quest Romance," American Literature, 43 (Nov., 1971), 323-335, sees the work as an adumbration of later American quest romances where the quest becomes subverted and the hero loses control of his own destiny.
58. C.B.B., Edgar Huntly, 31-2.
59. Ibid., 250.
60. The epigram to Wieland refers to virtue as a straight-forward path, "and mazy paths but lead to ill." Donald Ringe, "Charles Brockden Brown," Major Writers of Early American Literature, Emerson Everett, ed. (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1972), 273-293, says the mazy paths in Edgar Huntly function as the objective projections of Edgar's mind, indicating that his mental and physical journeys are one. (281)
61. C.B.B., Edgar Huntly, 250.
62. Advertisement for "Sky-Walk," The Weekly Magazine (Phila.), 17 March, 1798.
63. C.B.B., Edgar Huntly, 250.
64. Ibid., 107.
65. Ibid.
66. Of somnambulism, Dr. Rush says it is "nothing but a higher form of the disease [delirium]." Like madness "it is accompanied with muscular action with incoherent or coherent conduct, and with that complete oblivion of both which takes place in the worst grade of madness." Benjamin Rush, Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind (Phila., 1812).
67. C.B.B., Edgar Huntly, 88. Brown's refutation of Mrs. Lorimer's belief bears out Otto Rank, "The Double as Immortal Self," Beyond Psychology (N.Y.: Dover, 1958), 62-101. Rank claims that twins as mirror images of man and his immortal soul reveal rational man's need to believe, in the wake of his rejection of the primitive hero's fusion of mortal and immortal components, that a part of him will live on after death.
68. Ibid., 258.
69. Ibid., 94.
70. Ibid., 72.
71. Ibid., 55.

72. This particular use of plot doubling in English pastoral literature indicates social issues as discussed in William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (London, 1950).
73. C.B.B., Edgar Huntly, 110.
74. Ibid., 111.
75. See Paul Witherington, "Image and Idea in Wieland and Edgar Huntly," Serif, 3 (Dec., 1966), 19-26. Witherington is alone in recognizing the importance of the landscape at this point, but he sees it as the inner and outer aspects of Edgar's split psyche which is healed by his call to Edny. Witherington offers this even as he acknowledges that Edgar's attempt to form a tree bridge between the two hills fails.
76. Northrop Frye, The Secular Scripture, 102.
77. Ibid.
78. C.B.B., Edgar Huntly, 218.
79. Ibid., 182.
80. C.B.B., Foreword, "To The Public," Edgar Huntly, 28.
81. James E. Cronin, ed., The Diary of Elihu Hubbard Smith, Introduction, 14.
82. C.B.B., Edgar Huntly, 132.
83. William Johnson in his portion of the letter to Dunlap, 5 Sept., 1798.
84. The letter was from Uriah Tracy to William Johnson. Tracy, a prominent Federalist senator from Conn., was an old friend of the Smith family whose wife, Mrs. Susan Bull Tracy, had been one of Smith's earliest teachers. (Cronin, Glossary of Names.)
85. Dunlap, Diary, entry for 28 Sept., 1798. Brown's religious struggle appears to date from this incident, and in Jane Talbot (1801) he seems to have recorded much of what he suffered in the way of doubt and confusion after the death of his unbelieving friend. The hero of that work, Henry Colden, has a friend whom he had once tried to convert to disbelief and when the friend is dying he sends for Colden so that he might testify, even to his death, of his belief. Brown himself married the daughter of New York's outstanding Presbyterian clergyman, the Rev. William Linn, and died in Christian belief.

86. James A. Larson, A History of Litchfield (The Historical Society of Litchfield, 1969), 18.
87. Smith, Diary, 199.
88. C.B.B. to James Brown, begun 18 Sept. and completed 20 Sept., 1798. See Warfel, 121-2.

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS -- THE EMPIRE WITHIN, AND WITHOUT

Throughout this examination of the writings of Charles Brockden Brown it has been maintained that he was not a Utopist in the same sense that his friend Elihu Hubbard Smith was. Yet it has become apparent that the idea of America as a kind of Utopia pervades Brown's novels in that he was as vitally interested as was Smith in furthering the image of America as a moral and virtuous nation. The themes of Utopia or of the Promised Land are not so readily discerned in Brown's work, however, because his treatment of them are combined with both the science and the Gothicism of his day. Thus Plato and More give way to Locke and Radcliffe, and Utopia becomes a psychological entity, a state of mind, not unlike the composite of fact and fantasy which made up the early image of America in the European mind.

One such early image became the object of Brown's derision. The islands of perfection which lie in uncharted waters and are known only to the intemperate Utopists in his works (men like Adini, Ludloe, and Ormond), are never seriously considered as sites of new beginnings. Instead they remain visionary rather than political states, the spatial projections of a philosophy which postulated the possibility of human perfection in the present rather than the future. For Brown, as for most men of his time, the quest for Utopia became internalized through the idea of progress, particularly moral progress.<sup>1</sup> To that end he chose for himself the role of moralist in the hope of bringing to

the attention of his countrymen a new standard of behavior, a moral ethic which would move them collectively toward a future perfect state. Such a standard had already been proposed in the system of thought known as rationalism. It remained only for him to suggest through the medium of fiction the superiority of this system and of its morality, based as it was not on the superstition and fear of retribution which motivated the Christian, but on the clarity of mind and the selflessness of the supreme rationalist.

What Brown proposed was a morality suitable to the needs of free men. Free men did not allow themselves to be deluded by others nor ensnared by their own passions as do the protagonists of Wieland and Ormond. Free men--and women--turn inward to discern the truth and act accordingly as do the heroines of those books. Free men rise from a fall, acknowledge the error of their ways, and go forward, reaping benefit to themselves and others in the manner of Arthur Mervyn. For Brown, the emphasis was always on the condition of freedom, a condition which he viewed as threatened by those designers of Utopias, like Elihu Smith, who would trespass on it in the interests of virtue. The fancies of the New England schoolmaster, Alcuin, which made Smith anxious because they proposed as Utopia a Paradise of Women, seem to have been less objectionable to Brown than was Smith's desire to turn society into a vast clinic, to experiment on and treat its moral ills without once acknowledging, even to himself, the latent manipulative intent. Education and the advancement of knowledge were

Smith's hope for the implementation of the perfectionist scheme which he shared with many a philosophe of his time. Not even the terror of the recurring plague of yellow fever could be allowed to stand in the way of these. "It is time," he complained in his diary,

that something was done to relieve the minds of the ignorant from this overwhelming, this destructive Terror: this malady of the mind, a thousand times more dreadful & pernicious than all corporeal evils.<sup>2</sup>

Terror as a malady of the mind became one of Charles Brockden Brown's major themes, but the greatest terror would later be found to lie in Smith's refusal to acknowledge the validity of fear and terror as a suitable reaction to the fever. The very ends of perfection which his friend hoped to achieve were brought into question for Brown by Smith's super-rationality which, in the end, proved to be the greatest irrationality. In one of the best of the modern explorations of the subject of Utopia, George Kateb says that "Starting with the highest ends, the utopian seizes upon the most repulsive means: he begins in charity and ends in terror."<sup>3</sup> There are no better words to describe Brown's reaction to the events of September, 1798 when the most charitable of acts, later to be imitated by his own hero, Arthur Mervyn, ended in a terror greater than any he had imagined in his fictions. Only in tracing the steps of a supreme rationalist who pursues his other, more primitive and less rational self, was he able to portray the madness of pretending that man is capable of forcing nature to yield its secrets. There was no longer any reason, to Brown's mind,

to believe along with the rationalists and materialists that the revelation of nature would provide man with a source of authority. Nature only reflected the inner turmoil of the mind and both remained a veiled mystery, beyond human comprehension. Edgar Huntly, in which the greatest mystery is man himself, is Brown's final answer to Smith's reproach, "The man of Truth, Charles! the pupil of Reason has no mysteries."

The terrors of nature and of the mind provide the themes for Brown's best works, Edgar Huntly and Wieland, but in Ormond the depiction of terror comes a step closer to that association which he makes in Arthur Mervyn, the association of beleaguered virtue and a plagued nation. Due largely to the so-called Reign of Terror in revolutionary France, the word "terror" was given wide application in America in the 1790's and the forms of terror to which the young nation felt itself to be subjected in its earliest years were many and of great magnitude, especially to those responsible for the nation's survival. In an exchange of letters which passed, in 1813, between the former adversaries, Jefferson and Adams, the word "terror" is used variously by both men. Jefferson, referring to the 1790's, claims that "the character of the times" was that of "terrorism," adding, "None can conceive who did not witness them, and they were felt by one party only."<sup>4</sup>

Jefferson was, of course, contending that the tactics of terrorism were directed by the Federalists against the republican forces in the nation. Adams, however, responds

by citing the various forms of terrorism to which the Federalists were subjected in the same period.<sup>5</sup> The list constitutes a brief history of the decade and serves as a reminder not only of the problems with which the Federalist administration was faced, but of the shaky beginnings of the nation and the number of times it might have foundered. The review, as Adams provides it, lends considerable credence to his contention that only through such measures as the military build up, the enforcement of tax programs, and the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts was the nation held together.

Dwarfing all other terrors, however, was the "King of Terrors" to which Brown referred in his magazine article, the death that stalked the plague ridden streets of America's cities in those same years. This is the point at which the political body touched upon the corporeal bodies thrown into common graves like some sort of hideous emblem of equality. This terror, too, caused the question of continental age, so heavily debated earlier in the century, to take on a new significance. To the earlier naturalistic arguments had now been added the philosophical concept of cyclical history which informed to a great degree the national desire for virtue. The process of cyclical history, which was believed to follow a pattern of gradual rise and fall that accounted for the succession of world empires, was often compared to human biology. Thus ours was an "infant" nation in the eyes of most of the world, one which should have been able to look forward to a period of ascendancy and greatness before

becoming subject to the ills and the decline of old age and death which the plague years seemed to signal.<sup>6</sup>

In this manner the question of continental age became entangled with the question of national survival, and the key to the puzzle was believed by many to lie in the behavior of the American people.<sup>7</sup> Studies of the historical chronology of most empires showed that in their infancy their peoples had been industrious, brave, and united in purpose. It was these qualities which were believed to have led to full manly virtue, the condition in which the empires had flourished and achieved power and prestige. This power in turn led to a corruption of morals, the behavior of the people changed, and the nation entered a decline. The colonial period in America was seen by some to correspond to the earliest phase of this cycle, and the success of the revolt against England to correspond to the next. According to this chronology, the factionalism, the growing evidence of self-interest on the part of many Americans, and the increasing unrest of large numbers of people, particularly in the urban centers, were viewed as indications of the beginnings of a national decline. In the minds of those who feared that the close of the eighteenth century would climax the greatest period of history the United States of America would ever know, the return of yellow fever in the last decade of that century was viewed as an apocalyptic sign.<sup>8</sup> Amid the exhortations to return to the faith of the colonial fathers, the ancient association of pestilence with sinfulness made the abandonment of the afflicted city seem less

reprehensible and more a sign of renewed piety.<sup>9</sup>

Arthur Mervyn is an attempt to alter that apocalyptic perception. The plague is treated as an evil very much of man's making and as an opportunity for the young nation to prove itself and achieve the status of manly virtue in which it will flourish and prosper. Like the Arthur of old, young Arthur Mervyn prevails against the "King of Terrors." The young American with such a short life expectancy experiences a rebirth in the capital city of the infant nation and is saved, not by fleeing evil but by experiencing it. His tarnished but repaired virtue becomes the emblem of the American faith in the ability of man to renew himself. Mervyn is the first fictional representative of the nation and, quite fittingly, his romance is the re-enactment of a national survival.<sup>10</sup>

These historical and philosophical concepts which inform Arthur Mervyn are not really those of Brown. They represent his desire to eulogize his dead friend, Smith, by presenting in as brave a fashion as he can command the principles by which the young doctor had lived. The cyclical theory of history, which derives its premise of eventual decline from the idea that all of human history is a fall from an original perfection, is traditionally opposed by a linear view which postulates an optimistic faith in human progress, human achievement, and a Golden Age of perfection which lies somewhere in the future. This latter theory of history lay much closer to Brown's belief than did the theory which pervades Arthur Mervyn, especially Part II of the book.

Brown allows his hero to expound the Godwinian belief which Smith had espoused, the idea that in the proper environment man could be perfect, not become perfect. Arthur's insistence on "now," and "the moment," his impatience with those who hesitate, and his own frenetic activity are all attempts to focus on this one idea, a radically Christian idea, interestingly enough, based on the admonition of Christ, "Be ye perfect," which had been taken up by millennarian groups throughout history.<sup>11</sup>

Smith's study of the history of plagues had confirmed his belief that man was made corrupt by his environment, not by an inherent moral corruption, and in Arthur Mervyn Brown tries to present this belief fairly and emphatically. The result is less than convincing, a result, at least in part, of the underlying structure of a fairy tale that Brown gives to the story. Nevertheless, Arthur is engaged in a quest for a virtuous society, a quest which centers on the city because the millennial expectations of the Christian were focused on the city of the New Jerusalem, an expectation which had become part of the national aspiration in America.<sup>12</sup> Arthur is the representative of the national social body, physically diseased and morally corrupted. The city of Philadelphia, city of brotherly love, is the externalization of an inner state, figured here as in the other novels, architecturally, in this instance by the rented splendor of the house of Welbeck.<sup>13</sup> The city falls far short of both its name and its millennial associations but it becomes the scene, even down to its figura, the house, of Arthur's fall and rise.

There is a close correlation between the architectural imagery and the action of the story. In Part I the action moves outward from the confinement of a closet at an inn to a house described as a mansion, and then to a city. In Part II the houses which signify the corruption of the social body, the prison and the brothel, are exposed by Arthur's entry. The pattern of increasingly enlarged images in Part I carries the forward motion of the quest for the virtuous society, the end toward which Arthur labors; while the pattern of exposure in Part II indicates the means to that end.

If ever there was a felt need on Brown's part to try by the test of experience the belief in an inevitable human progress, it must have been while he was writing Arthur Mervyn. All the evidence of his own experience in 1798 denied that there was even a hope that mankind could progress toward perfection in knowledge and morals; and the thought of a perfect society being made immediately possible by a changed environment seemed little more than a fairy tale. Edgar Huntly, begun even before Arthur Mervyn was completed, is Brown's instrument by which he tries mankind's ability to progress toward Utopia, and the conclusion reached through the experiment, as has been shown, is in direct contradiction to that of its companion piece. The natural wilderness rather than the city is the externalization, in Edgar Huntly, of the inner wilderness, the confusion of the mind which is every bit as great as the confusion of the city in Arthur Mervyn. Arthur's environmental experiment is a

success, and the Utopian hope prevails. The American landscape, however, to which Brown points, in his preface to Edgar Huntly, as "the field of investigation, opened to us by our own country," is another story. It refuses to yield its secrets to the experimenter and becomes a dystopian nightmare of man's own making, the result of his "unholy" quest for knowledge imaged by the tree and the box, images which arise from myths of his original downfall.

The attitudes of anger and despair wrought by the conclusion that mankind is doomed to the eternal repetition of his original fall, is still evident in Brown's 1804 footnotes to his translation of Volney's A View of the Soil and Climate of the United States of America. It is also undoubtedly the basis for his attempt to establish a theoretical distinction between the writing of history and romance. History, he had come to believe, could consist of nothing more than the chronicling of events. Any attempt to interpret or deduce the forces, natural or supernatural, at work in the historical process amounted, he concluded, to the writing of romance since such theorizing is purely subjective and susceptible to misrepresentation either through accident or design. Having issued his caveat Brown proceeded to write some romantic history of his own, not the type of historical romance that we find in the Carsol "Sketches" but a bit of romanticized history in the form of a political pamphlet.

The pamphlet, the first of three Brown was to write, concerned the cession of Louisiana to the French and the preservation of United States navigation rights on the

Mississippi River. It appeared in 1803, the same year in which Brown worked on the translation of Volney's work, and shows the influence of the same mood. It also contains many of the elements of his romances. The anonymous pamphleteer claims to have acquired a document containing a message for Napoleon written by one of his counselors in which the Emperor is advised to use the Louisiana territory as the base of a new empire in America, one which will in the future rival the power of England. It is France's duty, the counselor urges, to seize this opportunity "to propagate a new race of intellectual beings" in the New World.<sup>14</sup> On the strength of this statement it would seem that the fictional counselor is cut in the mold of such Utopists as Adini and Ormond. When he recommends, however, that the first colonists be chosen from among that certain portion of "wretchedness and poverty" which "every civilized nation must have, men whom the pressure of distress compels to great and anxious efforts to improve their condition," it is an echo of the young Frank Carwin's plan of colonization offered in his "Memoirs."<sup>15</sup>

The Emperor is further advised that the extension of his empire into the New World would receive little or no resistance from the Americans. A multitude of reasons are advanced by the fictitious advisor for this lack of resistance, all of which pertain to disunity: diversity of interests resulting from the division of the nation into "inequal states;" the natural division by rivers and mountains of the nation; the presence of a form of government

which allows for too many participants, each with his own interests; the factional divisions of political parties; the dissipation of national energies in the pursuit of money by "a nation of pedlars and shopkeepers;" and the presence within the United States of three sources of potential revolution, the black slaves, the Indians, and the discontented "exiles" from Europe.<sup>16</sup>

The "cast of characters" here, all of them forces that promote disunity, is reminiscent of Brown's early attempts at fiction where the central figure, with whom he was identified, is split into a number of personae. There is also a similarity to Wieland where the idyllic harmony of the Wieland family is shattered by an invasionary force, in the person of the biloquist, which allows the self-interests of the individuals to come to the fore. Clithero Edny and the savagery of the American Indians in Edgar Huntly also find their counterparts in this procession.

In the second half of the pamphlet Brown follows his familiar pattern and offers counter arguments for each of those advanced by the spurious Frenchman, ending by exhorting his countrymen to a spirited defense of the nation's interests rather than their own. The pamphlet amounts to a dialogue between the French counsellor and the American author whose arguments move beyond the internal divisions of nature and government with which the nation is faced, to a concentration on the continental body of land which, he insists, must remain free of European powers. In all of Brown's fiction there is not a more vivid picture of

the unwelcome intruder into the private enclosure:

To introduce a foreign nation, all on fire to extend their own power; fresh from pernicious conquests; equipped with all the engines of war and violence; measuring their won success by the ruin of their neighbors; eager to divert into channels of their own the trade and revenue which have hitherto been ours; raising an insuperable mound to our future progress; spreading among us, with fatal diligence, the seeds of faction and rebellion. . . . What more terrible evil can befall us?<sup>17</sup>

The picture drawn is not only that of the threatened nation, but of Constantia threatened with violation by Ormond, all on fire to exert his power over her mind and body. As the anonymous pamphleteer draws to his conclusion he chastises his countrymen for failing to protest Spain's cession of Louisiana to France:

Such is the melancholy strain which the conduct of the States has hitherto but too well justified. We have looked on with stupid apathy, while European powers toss about among themselves the property which God and Nature have made ours.<sup>18</sup>

The idea of Utopia, the object of mankind's progress and striving after virtue, is now totally identified with the continental body which God has intended to remain purely and wholly an American empire.

This Address to the Government was followed soon after by another pamphlet urging the immediate seizure of the Louisiana territory, but the purchase of the territory by Jefferson put a temporary end to Brown's new career.<sup>19</sup> In 1809, however, he again used the agency of the political pamphlet to argue against the continuation of the embargo which Jefferson had imposed upon the sale of American goods

to foreign nations in an effort to avoid being drawn into the war between France and England. The embargo was a direct threat to the mercantile and shipping interests of the nation in general and of Brown's family in particular, yet this pamphlet does not reflect only these narrow interests, but exhibits a genuine concern for the future of the nation.

It is directed to the Congress, and in order to lend validity to what is essentially an appeal to that body to surmount, in the interests of the nation, the usual factionalism of Federalists backing England and republicans backing France, Brown first declares himself to be a member of neither party. Having thus removed himself from the arena, he attains a position of moral elevation which he realizes will cause some to pass him by "as a visionary." From this height he assumes the role of prophet and openly accuses his country of the self-serving callousness only symbolized in Arthur Mervyn by the noisome miasma of plague-ridden Philadelphia. Claiming that our aim was eventually to profit from the war between England and France, he declares:

If any of them were in want of bread and had nothing to give for it, I am afraid we should not be very anxious to supply their wants. If a famine rages among them, we shall hurry, indeed, to their ports, but merely to profit by the high prices which the famine produces. The evil of others is our good. Their sufferings are our enjoyments: gladly do we hear of their calamities, when they can put anything into our purses.<sup>20</sup>

Anticipating that many in the nation will defend such actions as merely following the example set by Europe

throughout history, Brown concedes this to be so, but adds:

Europe, Britain, has done this: and alas! those who fancied that the spirit of Europe was regenerated or improved by crossing the Atlantic are woefully mistaken. It was indeed quite ridiculous to think that this branch of the European body was exempted from any of the vices of those. How should it happen? What is there in our intellectual constitution that should make us wiser or better than our kinsmen beyond the sea?<sup>21</sup>

The kinship, then, established by the name Arthur and the romance form of his story, is a kinship based on a common fall from grace. The regeneration of mankind so hoped for by the Utopists had not materialized. The American Adam, whose origins some have claimed to find in the writings of Charles Brockden Brown, does not exist, according to that author. More decisively than any modern critic Brown disparages the upward mobility of Mervyn and the nation he represents as a counterfeit of that which had nurtured the dream of a republic of virtue.

In the course of his appeal to Congress to restore normal trade relations, Brown finally and completely rejects the State of Utopia described more than a decade earlier by Elihu Hubbard Smith. He decries the Jeffersonian image of an America devoted to agriculture and cottage industry, a nation of "quiet spectators of the storms that shake the rest of the world, secure in our solitude and in the waste that rolls between them and us . . . ." The self-sufficiency implicit in this image, by which it is hoped we will grow richer and more populous, gives rise to what Brown calls "the picture of a world within ourselves"

which, he claims, is "charming" because it is that of "a potent political body, complete in all its members and organs, and in which no chasm or defect can be found."<sup>23</sup> It is almost impossible to miss the peculiarly medical terminology Brown turns to to describe the perfect political body, of the type that Smith envisioned, whole in the most radical sense of the word. The rejection of the internalized "world within ourselves" as an image of America echoes Brown's much earlier rejection of a literary authority which would allow for an undisturbed contemplation of "the universe within," and marks at the same time his recovery from the reclusive fears engendered by his experience with the yellow fever.

The active rather than the contemplative life which he had once prescribed for himself as a writer is now put forth as the proper role for the nation. It is necessary for America to take risks in order to extend her empire, Brown insists, "to pull down those barriers which separate mankind" and "to enlarge that circle which each man calls his country."<sup>24</sup> As examples of this Brown turns the attention of his readers to the Roman empire in the past and to the China of his day. Both grew and profited, he claims, as a result of conquest, trade, and commerce. It is not his design to advocate the conquest of other nations, Brown insists, but adds, "the present limits of our territory are not immutable. They must stretch with our wants."<sup>24</sup> Still in the role of prophet, he then envisions an America bounded only by the South Sea, the Mexican gulf,

and the polar ices.

This vision, one of the earliest recorded of America's "manifest destiny," is similar to the vision of Columbus in Barlow's epic poem, but with one important distinction, Columbus' vision is a temporal one, tied to the eighteenth century's idea of progress. Brown, who had previously shared this hope now attaches a spatial dimension to it. Earlier spatial Utopias had held no attraction for him; the island of perfection was too remote from the world of experience, and the world within ourselves too subjective. But the vision of an American that touched, as Brown put it, "the other states in the Western hemisphere," and was brought into closer proximity to the nations of Europe, was an image of Utopia he could not resist. The same kind of reversal which Edgar Huntly describes as the "passage into new forms, overleaping the bars of time and space," occurs in Brown in 1809. The perfection which had seemed to be so far off in the future was brought much closer by the idea of the extension of the American empire in the direction of the other nations of the world.

The condition for such an extension, however, as Brown saw it, was the casting off of the mask of innocence behind which America hid her desire for empire. No longer could she pretend not to be a party to the evils abroad in the world. The cordon sanitaire of 1799, the Alien and Sedition Acts, had become the embargo of 1807, but this time Brown was having none of it. His faith in the potential of America restored, he was able now to create a vision, not

only of the more distant future of a continental nation, but even of the near future when all the barriers between America and Europe would be abolished, especially the barrier erected to preserve a pseudo virtue. The essence of this vision is contained in the closing passage of the Embargo pamphlet when Brown reminds the Congress that

The reign of maritime peace in Europe is at hand, and when it arrives, all our embargoes will vanish of themselves; all our fortresses moulder and crumble. The ports of the Eastern World will again be open. Ships of war will no longer overspread the ocean. The great highway will no longer be cut across with dykes, be thrown up into ramparts, or be edged with batteries. All again, for a season at least, will be level, and commodious, and those who choose to pass may pass.<sup>26</sup>

In this connection it is interesting to note that in the four romances which constitute Brown's major contribution to American literature the principal characters of three of them choose to pass over "the great highway" of the Atlantic Ocean to Europe in an effort to escape unpleasant memories in America. Each are characters who have known the attraction of evil and have gained a greater sense of authority from their experience. Edgar Huntly alone continues to insist that his virtue has never known any but the most sincere and benevolent motives, and he alone chooses to remain in America.

The same ground would be gone over, again and again, by others who would come after Brown and who would question the reality of what America is against the dream of what it might have been. The idea of America as a possible Utopia became the controlling metaphor of American literature with

the figure of Adam as the representative man in the New World garden. Nathaniel Hawthorne, who was close enough in time to Brown to fully apprehend his treatment of the idea, developed many of the same themes and was, of course, deeply influenced by the same allegorical and romance conventions as was Brown. The House of the Seven Gables is not so far removed from the Wieland estate, and the beauty of Hester's scarlet "A" shows us what adultery is not in much the same manner as Brown's symbolic miasma reveals what the Utopian or Millennial city is not.<sup>27</sup> The dialogue between those who would insist upon individual freedom as a condition of achieving the ideal society, and those who would mold and reform the individual into a Procrustean conformity is the subject of Hawthorne's treatment of the Utopian theme, The Blithedale Romance, and innocence, real and pretended, is debated in the allegory of guilty innocence, The Marble Faun.

With Hawthorne a convention is established, the American romance convention, but it is one which was first defined by his predecessor, Charles Brockden Brown. The distinction Brown made between history and romance moved American fiction beyond the denotative stringencies imposed upon it by rationalism and a Puritannical fear of the literary imagination. By insisting on the conjectural nature of the romancer's role he opened the way for the connotative and subjective analogues which Hawthorne and Melville would further extend through the multiplication of symbolic associations. The American romance is, furthermore,

a convention within the long established tradition of the English romance, a tradition which provided the required mythos for the convention. Out of the Utopian and millennial dreams of eighteenth century America Brown fashioned a moral landscape, a land of faery, which was at once the world of the real and the ideal, the topos where the dream was subjected to the test of experience.

The insistence on experience as a means to authority can be seen as part of the century's epistemological search for the process by which man acquires knowledge. The question of how we know what we know was of prime importance in the Enlightenment because of the emphasis in that period on scientific knowledge as opposed to the mythologies and religions upon which, it was believed, all knowledge had been based in the past. In a desire to free man of these mythologies and of the fanaticism to which they had often led, the eighteenth century tried to link humanistic concerns with science. The premise that the human mind provided a touchstone for all men of all ages and in all places and conditions, made of mind the universal ground of human experience and thus of human history.

Locke's empirical philosophy which stressed the origin of ideas in sensory experience had given rise to these theories, but the disjunction between this and another of Locke's doctrines became the source of a paradox which permeates Brown's writing as well as that of most major American writers since Brown. Locke's belief that certain moral principles are self-evident was embedded in the notion

of the new republic from the very beginning when its statement of reasons explaining why a declaration of independence from England was necessary declared certain truths to be "self-evident."

Self-evidence, however, became a subjective entity under Locke's sensational philosophy. Since the mind experience through which knowledge was acquired differed from individual to individual, what was self-evident to one man was not necessarily self-evident to all men. Therefore, a morality based on such "self-evidence" lacked the authority of universal validation and ran the risk of being considered a private revelation. This presented a problem not only to moralists, such as Brown, but to historians who had to account for the varieties of development from nation to nation, varieties which unchanging universal principles of human experience should have overruled. Montesquieu's theory of environmentalism and the Abbe Raynal's theory of the superiority of civilization to nature were examples of the historian's attempt to explain these varieties. Both of these met with the same fate as Deism, however, which also attempted to demonstrate self-evident truths without resorting to revelation, claiming that the universal principles of nature would guide man to morality. All such theories which depended upon nature for their substantiation were doomed to failure when nature presented man with a seemingly impenetrable maze of error beyond which truth receded, as it did from those who sought to understand the nature of

the plague which almost annually decimated the cities of the latest in the family of nations.

The American experience with nature in the eighteenth century was not conducive to the propagation of Deistical dogma. Undoubtedly the concentration of Deistical Societies in the American cities was due largely to their physical distance from the immediate experience of nature, and their rapid decline in the yellow fever years points to a disillusionment with the idea of nature as evidence of the existence of a rational and benevolent Deity.<sup>28</sup> Little remained then in the way of an authority for the determination of right and wrong, and the young American who set out to write as a moralist found himself in a position not unlike that of Spenser's Red Cross Knight whose task it was to discern the unity of truth amid a multitude of errors. To mistake the counterfeit for the true was just as perilous in this new combination of science and morality as it was for Red Cross, especially when error was so closely linked with death as it was in the instance of Elihu Hubbard Smith's miscalculations about the yellow fever. The struggle against the tyranny of kings might be justified by recourse to the claim of self-evident truths, but the struggle against the tyranny of error required a definition of moral truth that did not come under the dominion of subjectivity, which Brown termed the empire of romance.

The revelation of the heavenly city made to Spenser's Knight had become a convention of literature and of social philosophy. The dream of a perfect society whether in the

guise of a Utopia or of a New Jerusalem was what might have been considered a self-evident truth since it could claim universal validation. Nevertheless, it was subject to individual interpretation and seemed always to be a part of the future since the world of the present never was conducive to its appearing. The basis of Brown's argument with Elihu Smith, and the reason why their relationship has provided the format for this study, was the differences between their individual understanding of the concepts of what was then termed "moral science," concepts such as progress, perfection, and freedom. Smith accepted the paradox in Locke's philosophy and saw no existing problem in the conflicting ideas of all knowledge as drawn from individual perception, and the possibility of a universal apprehension of self-evident truth. For him, then, Utopia was more than just an idea; it was something which men could agree upon and realize. For Brown it was an individual apprehension, part of the experience of a single mind, subject to the authority of the individual who fashioned it.

In Brown's estimation, Utopia never came under the classification of moral science but remained always in that realm of philosophic contemplation to which he relegated it in his address to the Belle Lettre Society. To subscribe to such a self-created idea of perfection would mean a return to the tyranny of the past, and though Brown was deeply engaged in a search for authority it was not for the purpose of tyranny. The authority he sought was the

validation of his own perception by those of others so that he could presume to speak to and of the human rather than the individual experience. Only then would he feel that he could fulfill his desired function as a writer, that of a moralist. As long as the concepts of right and wrong remained within the province of the individual mind and were not objectively discernible, truth itself was relegated to that world within, which, Brown was to claim, it suited us to imagine because of the power we derive from our ability to control its destiny.

In one of Brown's earliest published pieces, an anonymous essay that was part of a series entitled "The Rhapsodist," he identifies himself with the rhapsodist, who is a writer. There is a revealing description given of the reactions of the rhapsodist to the triumph of conquerors and poets who achieve the laurels which "raised them to the summit of their hopes." The rhapsodist withdraws from the scene of triumph and in solitude fashions a reverie in which he adds to the grandeur of what he has seen:

The clamour of the exulting populace, and the shouts of tumultuous joy, murmur hoarsely in the wind. But he is at this moment engaged in improving the grandeur of the scene, to which he has just been a witness. He is adding to the number of spectators and encreasing hundreds into thousands, and thousands into millions. He contrives a chariot and a train for his hero, worthy the greatness of his exploits, and gives him the dignity and grace of an immortal. --He then pulls down the pageant from his exalted station, strips him of the purple and the crown, turns him loose among the rabble, and places himself in the vacant seat; the sudden shout that invaded his ears, does not interrupt the ceremony of the vision, it only

increases the importance of the imaginary conqueror. He swells with unusual transport, at this new instance of his countrymen's applause, for such in this momentary paroxysm of his frenzy does he imagine it to be.<sup>29</sup>

To this usurper, Brown, claims will be granted a vision denied to others; for him "the impenetrable veil is rent," and he sits at leisure to "survey the scenes and wonders of the universe within."<sup>30</sup>

In addition to providing an illuminating gloss on Hawthorne's "My Kinsman, Major Molineaux," the reverie is evidence of the equation in Brown's mind of the inner world of perception with an empire taken by force. To attempt to take the chair of authority based on one's individual perception of what was right would be to relegate one's self exclusively to the universe of subjectivity. The moralist in a democratic society would have to derive his authority from an experiential source shared with his countrymen. As Emerson was to affirm, the eye had always to be directed outward until it became transparent and saw all.<sup>31</sup>

The usurpation of power by an individual in a republic would constitute an illicit counterfeiting of the democratic process. More importantly, Brown seems to have feared that as a writer he himself might be guilty of playing the counterfeiter. The falsity of Carwin's projected voice, the fraudulence of Ormond's claims, and the bogus business enterprises of Thomas Welbeck which include the counterfeiting of money, all pertain to types of duplicity involving imitation and point to his preoccupation with the idea.

Behind this fear of being termed a magus, an enchanter who could mislead and enthrall, lay the Puritan tradition which looked upon fiction as intended to deceive. Brown found himself in much the same position in this regard as did those sixteenth century English poets like Sir Philip Sidney who felt constrained to issue a Defence of Poetry.

Brown did actually exhibit much the same concerns about novel writing as Sidney did for poetry, principally because the arguments raised against both these forms of imaginative writing were nearly identical. Elihu Smith's contention that philosophy had little to do with "poesy" is answered by Brown in much the same manner as Sidney. The ultimate end of philosophy, as of all learning, Sidney had claimed, was virtuous behavior, and in supplying inspiring examples of such behavior, he insisted, there was nothing that could surpass poetry. So too Brown, in choosing the role of moralist, had determined to present moral pictures which would delight and instruct his readers. Even Brown's desire to distinguish between history and romance follows Sidney's line of reasoning wherein he makes the poet superior to the historian (as Brown does the romancer) because the poet can invent an intelligible world while the historian is held captive to "the truth of a foolish world."

Elihu Hubbard Smith had projected a Utopia in the American interior, a place which had no access to navigable waters, no commerce beyond its borders, and was untouched by the prevailing winds of change. Brown posited no such state and advocated no such cloistered virtue. Following the

examples set forth in the great epic romances of Ariosto, Tasso, Spenser, and Wieland, he chose to invent a world made intelligible by the exposition of the blind forces that drive villains and the reasoning powers that elevate virtuous men and women. Brown required a moral landscape, a topos, which, like the Faery Land of Spenser that he knew well, was not a far away island isolated from the world of experience. The process by which he arrives at this topos can be traced if we follow his lead and view his works as parts in a discourse. The structure of Brown's corpus of work is a linguistic one which begins with the dialogue in Alcuin. Attention is directed to the method of the work by its title which is also the name of one of its two characters. The eighteenth century New England schoolmaster is identified by only one name, Alcuin, the same as that of the eighth century Englishman whose treatise on dialectic, De Dialectica, made him the first English logician of record.<sup>32</sup> The Alcuin of antiquity is also noted for having brought to the court and nation of France a system of education which suited its needs. He was invited to come to France and implement such a system by the emperor Charlemagne who subjected himself to the learned Englishman as a student. As further evidence of his encouragement of learning in his kingdom, Charlemagne allowed Alcuin to publish treatises in the form of dialogues between the emperor-pupil and the logician-scholar.<sup>33</sup> Through Brown's egoistic use of names derived from the Latin form of Charles, Alcuin becomes a dialogue between himself in the persona of Mrs. Carter and the schoolmaster Alcuin.

The model of an emperor subjecting himself to the lessons of logic is somewhat lost in Brown's attempts to comply with Smith's directive to dispense "the truth," while at the same time being careful to avoid alienating his audience by intermixing "the lighter pictures of fancy, & the delicate effusions of literature." As it turns out, Mrs. Carter's revolutionary opinions on the rights of women represent the radicalism of current French thought while Alcuin represents the more traditional Anglo-American line of thought, a situation which considerably blurs the picture. Nevertheless, Brown's first published fiction does signal the rhetorical mode which gives rise to his allegorical representations.

The dialogue that begins in Alcuin is continued in Wieland where, as has been shown, the rational mental discourse in which Clara engages throughout the book proves to be her salvation. In addition to this interior dialogue there is, in the very format of this work, what amounts to a dialogue between Reason and Superstition in the persons of Clara and Theodore Wieland. When Theodore escapes his captors after being apprehended for the murder of his wife and children he confronts his sister and attempts to convince her that he has acted rightly, in compliance with his private revelation of what is right. The same type of situation has been pointed out in Ormond where the main characters represent Freedom and Necessity and enter into a dialogue which, like that in Wieland, becomes a dialogue to the death, with violence winning over logic in both instances.

This dialogue format Brown no doubt derived from Locke's assertion that morals should be capable of demonstration in an exact science (an assertion which Elihu Smith echoed) since "the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known . . . and so the things themselves be certainly discovered . . . ."34 The personifications and the pattern of battle, however, derive from the Psychomachia and are an outgrowth of Brown's earlier technique in which a number of characters were generated from one character, the author's persona.

The areas of enclosure which are Brown's principal images, and which in each case are so strongly identified with the individual characters to whom they bear relation, must be seen as more than just psychological states, however. These areas--a temple, a closet, a vacant house, a country home which becomes a fortress-like setting for Constancy, and even the house in Alcuin which, though it belongs to her brother, is graced by Mrs. Carter's constant presence--are all derived in some sense from Locke's analogy of the understanding to a dark room into which light enters through the senses, casting an image on the wall of that which lies without. In the companion pieces, Arthur Mervyn and Edgar Huntly, the mind models expand and become the mise-en-scene of the romances. In Arthur Mervyn the mind is not that of an individual but of a people; the city streets are the senses conveying a miasma to the very mind of the nation, its capital. In Edgar Huntly the penetration into one mind is imaged by

the penetration of a cave, and the disorder of another mind by the wildness of the landscape. The final remove occurs when Brown takes to writing political pamphlets where the mind model is still further externalized and becomes identified with the vision of an expanding continent, an image of expanding national consciousness.

These moral applications of a physical science can be traced to Brown's understanding of the human mind. In a disquisition on the mind written by Brown when he was a very young man he attempts to arrive at "the relation, dependance, and connection of the several parts of knowledge."<sup>35</sup> The mind is referred to as the object of moral science, and matter as the object of physical science. He distinguishes mind from matter by claiming that mind is synonymous with spirit. The problem he sees is that although we can have no object of moral science except "that portion of spirit within ourselves [the mind], in this life at least, mind can never be considered except in conjunction with matter."<sup>36</sup> Wishing to avoid the area of metaphysics which, he says, considers mind "in its essence," and distinct from matter, Brown asks if it is not possible to consider the mind "as it acts with relation to something else, just as we consider man in the several lights of a rational creature, and as a member of society?"

We know that our minds are continually employed in the exercise of apprehension, reason, and will: but we know that these operations of the mind are employed upon things outward and foreign to itself. When we view it in these operations, I think we do not view as metaphysicians, we must give another name to the science; perhaps it is logic.<sup>37</sup>

Leaving aside for the moment the reference to logic and concentrating only on Brown's attempt to understand mind as spirit and at the same time as an operational unit functioning in conjunction with matter, it can be understood why the metaphors of mind which appear in his fictions function on both the literal and moral levels. Because of the necessity for them to connote both material and spiritual aspects, they assume the proportions of allegorical images which also serve multipurposes in conveying the literal, historical, moral, and anagogic levels of allegory. No one of Brown's mind metaphors ever achieves this degree of amplification, but the progression from the multiple personalities of his earliest fictional attempts to the employment of models of the mind perceiving, is a measure of some considerable development in technique.

The connection which Brown sees between mind and spirit, so strong a connection that he calls them synonymous, is a major factor in his rejection of the island Utopia. The faraway islands of the visionary, ridiculed in Alcuin and made suspect in Ormond and "The Memoirs of Carwin," when seen as metaphors for mind are shown to be fit subjects for what Brown terms "metaphysics," because they represent mind, as he put it, "in its essence . . . distinct from, and as much as possible independent of matter." Brown's major concern, however, was not with mind in its essence, but with mind as a spiritual entity, the object of moral science which, according to his reasoning, could not even be considered "except in conjunction with matter." Thus

his images are not only of mind, but of mind interacting with the world in sensory experience. His designation of the mind as "that portion of spirit within ourselves" evokes the Rhapsodist's reverie with its image of the universe within, and also Brown's much later reference to the Jeffersonian model of America as the dream of "a world within ourselves." Each of these is rejected in turn, just as was the idea of an island Utopia, and an image substituted that emphasized the activity of the mind.

This activity suggested to Brown the necessity for a science devoted to the study of the operational mind, a study which he proposed be termed "logic," a proposal that is especially interesting in view of his fictional mode. Alcuin's dialogue might be said to form a part of this science of the mind; so too might Ormond which has been shown to be a dialectical controversy between two opposing philosophies. Of all his works, though, Wieland makes the most of the ideal of logical discourse and is for that reason the most interesting of Brown's attempts to offer a study of the mind in operation.

Models of mind abound in Wieland: the temple as a model of the mind held by superstition; Clara Wieland's closet as a model of the rational mind; and the two houses in which the antithetical brother and sister dwell on the Wieland estate, representing two opposing states of mind, and even strangely anticipating a much later knowledge of the bicameral brain. Brown's fear of the potential for fanaticism inherent in the "portion of spirit within ourselves," is imaged in the conflagration in the temple,

an idea which seems to be a combination of the scientific studies of Dr. Smith and the Quaker doctrine of the inner light, that light which brought into sight all of a man's inward motives and outward acts.<sup>38</sup> In Clara's rational discourse we see operations of the mind in the cooperation of reason with that aspect of mind which is spirit, an aspect which manifests itself in Clara's belief in the world of spirit.

The same note of operational activity is emphasized by those metaphors of mind employed by the major romantic poets of the period, metaphors such as the lamp and the overflowing fountain.<sup>39</sup> The latter image also occurs in one of Brown's essays which appeared in 1789 as part of the series, "The Rhapsodist," a denomination he had taken for himself. In describing a rhapsodist Brown claims that he is not unlike a poet: "He meditates amidst the splendor of the morning with the enthusiasm of a poet; and reflects in the silence and solemnity of midnight, with a rapture bordering on devotion."<sup>40</sup> Having touched on the matter of devotion, Brown is immediately led to a comparison of religious enthusiasm to poetic activity: The desire to conduct these varied streams into separate channels and prevent their intermingling is the desire to separate the creative processes of mind from the conflagration of enthusiasm. This would seem to be made more difficult by the fact that both the poet and the rhapsodist, he claims, equally abhor "the clamour of the forum," and "fly to solitude and silence, to musing and to contemplation . . . ."

They tire of "the world's uniformity" and seek "a visionary happiness in a world of their own creation," a tendency which Brown would always distrust and ultimately refute.<sup>42</sup>

In Wieland we find a description of landscape as an image of mind which is further illumined by the footnote F. L. Pattee has provided. In the novel, Pleyel, the friend of the Wielands, grieves over the news (falsely delivered by Carwin) of his beloved's death. He confines himself to his estate and his walks to a portion of the estate bounded by the Delaware River. Of this landscape Brown says:

No scene can be imagined less enticing to a lover of the picturesque than this. The shore is deformed with mud, and encumbered with a forest of reeds. The fields, in most seasons, are mire; but when they afford a firm footing, the ditches by which they are bounded and intersected, are mantled with stagnating green, and emit the most noxious exhalations. Health is no less a stranger to those seats than pleasure. Spring and autumn are sure to be accompanied with agues and bilious remittents.<sup>43</sup>

This rather strange transference from the subject of the heartsick young lover to the agues and remitting fevers occasioned by the landscape of a particular region, is made clearer by Pattee's footnote in which he quotes a letter sent to him concerning this passage. The letter states, in part, "The miry country described is undoubtedly the malarial swamp in the delta formed by the junction of the Schuylkill with the Delaware which has, for long, been colloquially called 'the Neck.'"<sup>44</sup> The text of the novel suggests that the overflow of one river into the other creates an environment as unhealthy in the world of nature

as does the overflow of religious enthusiasm into poetry and philosophy in the world of the rhapsodist's own making.

In contrast to Pleyel's unhappy environs is the scene described immediately after, the scene at Mettingen where lies the Wieland estate. Here the Schuylkill is said to be "a pure and translucent current" whose banks are crowned by fragrant and blooming orchards.<sup>45</sup> The surrounding grounds are enhanced by horticulture which has brought design and art to the natural landscape, and all seems to benefit, both from the river's singularity and clarity and from the cooperation of man and nature. Here, then, is where Brown becomes the Utopist seeking to bring to the regions of the mind the structured regularity which Smith would have brought to an ideal state. The two passages taken together actually constitute an environmentalist argument for the improvement of the mind that is similar to the argument in Arthur Mervyn supporting the local origin theory of the yellow fever. On still another level there is a correlation to the idea expressed in "Walstein's School of History," that if one cannot clean the fountain one can at least filter the stream. Brown's claim that the enthusiasm of religion and the creation of poetry flow from the same fountain would seem to indicate the necessity of a "filter" to prevent the mind from becoming the kind of unhealthy environment depicted in Wieland. That filtering process provides the schema for the daemonic agents in Brown's novels who function in the original capacity of the daemon, as distributors, in this case as

distributors of the mind's operations.<sup>46</sup> The battle lines drawn between characters who personify such opposing forces as Reason and Superstition, Freedom and Necessity represent Brown's attempts to separate and regulate such mind processes as those which he delegates to the poet, the philosopher, and the prophet.

Brown's distributions are set up along various lines, one of which follows the national division over whether allegiance was to be paid to England or to France, a major concern in the United States of his day. Mrs. Carter in Alcuin voices the dangerous and rebellious sentiments which demand human freedom to the namesake of the ancient English scholar who brought reason in the form of logic to France. Ormond's revolutionary ideas and his implied connection to the Illuminati (a name which for Brown may have carried connotations of a fanatic incendiary), place him in the ranks of the dangerous French philosophes. Similarly, the Camisards, the radical Protestant sect into which the elder Wieland is led, were a French group. Despite these examples, it is interesting that Brown never once associates the yellow fever with French immigrants or French thought. On the contrary, he seems to have gone out of his way to include in Ormond the story of Baxter, whose foolish belief that he will contract the fever from his French neighbors Brown points to as the probable source of overstimulation which resulted in his fatal illness.

Another principle of distribution which Brown employs in the effort to achieve the healthful separation of the

creative powers of the mind is the division into male and female principles. The antithetical roles of male and female characters in Brown's major romances has been considered in some detail in earlier discussions of individual works and need not be reiterated here, except to point out the consistency of the note of despair sounded in Edgar Huntly. Only in that work is the female half of the antithesis the half that is subject to irrational fancies. In all other instances it is the female which is superior to the male in this respect, but Mrs. Lorimer's unsupportable conviction that the death of her brother will automatically signal her own death violates this rule.

The most significant distribution of mental functions into categorical parts occurs in conjunction with the biloquialism of Frank Carwin. This peculiar talent is an exact image of the early romantic movement, traced by M. H. Abrams, from the mimetic theory of art to the expressive theory.<sup>47</sup> In it Brown not only combines the imitative with the creative, but conveys a profound sense of terror at the possibility of abusing the creative power. In "The Memoirs of Carwin" Brown provides the background information on Frank Carwin's discovery of his vocal abilities. The teenage farm boy is seeking his father's cows which have escaped into the surrounding hills when he wanders from "the beaten road" and soon realizes that though he "had frequently skirted and penetrated this tract, [he] had never been so completely entangled in the maze as

now . . . ."48 He discovers a narrow pass which would conduct him "though not without dangers and toil, to the opposite side of the ridge," but the practicability of this passage "was to be known only by experiment."<sup>49</sup>

As Carwin undertakes this experiment, he is overcome by fear and raises his voice in the refrain from "The Cowboy's Chaunt," a verse translation which Brown had done of "The Rans de Vauche of Tuscanny" by the Tuscan poet Manotti: "Cow! cow! come home! home!"<sup>50</sup> The echo which returns his words startles him, but when it is repeated a total of five times he loses all fear of his surroundings, forgets his errand, and amuses himself for an hour in echoed dialogue with himself. To this spot he returns again and again for further self-dialogue, until one time, stimulated by a reading of Milton's Comus, he attempts to produce sounds similar to those of an echo, "but produced by other means than reverberation."<sup>51</sup> Through repeated efforts he manages to so control the muscles of throat and mouth that he is able to emulate human speech as though it originated at a distance. To this ability he adds an already acquired facility for vocal imitation.

Carwin's first venture into the purposeful use of this talent is his scheme to imitate the voice of his dead mother and speak to his father when the latter would be most likely to accept the imitation as truth. The boy's father is an ignorant Pennsylvania farmer who discourages his son's desire for an education and who attempts to prevent Carwin from going to live with an aunt who would

better his state in life. Since the father is a superstitious man, Carwin determines to use his imitative power "to counterfeit a commission from Heaven . . . ." He approaches his father's bed at midnight while a storm rages without, but before he can project his mother's voice, he loses his nerve. At this moment he sees, through the window of the bedchamber, flames arising from the barn which has been ignited by lightning. Though he realizes the absurdity of the connection, Carwin cannot help but view the fire as a direct consequence of his intention. Here is an almost one to one relationship being established by Brown between the creative power to ignite and the enthusiastic power to do the same, as happens in Wieland.

Three years later, during which time Carwin has been allowed to take up residence with his aunt and has consequently bettered himself, he has so perfected his biloquial talent that he has trained a dog, whom he calls Damon, to respond to both spoken and unspoken commands and to utter low sounds, on a given command, over which his master carries on what seems to be a conversation between himself and the animal. This trick is described as affording Carwin great enjoyment and as totally mystifying those who witnessed it.

An example of such trickery is provided in the narrative. At a gathering in a country garden where Carwin is present, the company discusses "the subject of invisible beings." From philosophic speculations they turn to poetic creations and there is some disagreement over "the justness

of Shakespeare's delineations of aerial beings." One of the ladies sings a song of Ariel's from The Tempest and as she finishes a voice emanates from a spot above the vine covered arch beneath which the company is embowered. The voice is, of course, that of Carwin singing the words Ariel rhapsodizes at his release from the service of Prospero. Brown quotes the words thus:

In the Cowslips bell I lie,  
On the Bat's back I do fly--  
After summer merrily; etc.      53

The relationship of Prospero to Ariel is paralleled later in the "Memoirs" by the attempt of the Utopist Ludloe to subject Carwin and his biloquial talent to his own purposes, an attempt which, we learn in Wieland, Carwin was only able to thwart by fleeing. It is impossible to avoid the suggestion in this that Brown may have felt himself to be in much the same position as far as his own creative ability was concerned. Elihu Smith's contacts to the literary world and his unbounded energy on behalf of his friend may have amounted to what seemed to Brown to be coercion.

Far more certain is the association of Carwin's trickery, through the agency of the dog, Damon, with his trickery of Theodore Wieland. Clara Wieland's reference to her brother's interest in "the Daemon of Socrates" just prior to the introduction of Carwin into the novel associates his biloquialism with that inner voice which enjoined Socrates to virtuous behavior. To return for a moment to the Quaker idea of the "inner light," often used

as a metaphor for the voice of Christ speaking as guide and judge to the individual Friend, there is a great similarity between this and Shaftesbury's definition (quoted above) of "soliloquy," the art of self-investigation by which, he says, "we become pupil and preceptor in ourselves and advance in morals and true wisdom."<sup>54</sup> The chief, and very important, difference between the two concepts is that one presents an image of a passive mind hearing and receiving the message of the Preceptor, while the other images an active mind engaged in a discourse that involves its various parts, or distributions.

This difference was figured by Brown's contemporaries in England in such opposing images as the Aeolian lyre, upon which the wind played, and the lamp or the overflowing fountain or stream. The lyre stressed the receptiveness of the mind played upon by that which struck the senses, while the other images emphasized the give and take of the mind perceiving and creating out of that which it perceives. Among the English romantics the first of these, the passive image, soon gave way to the active.<sup>55</sup> Their counterpart in America, however, labored under the accusations of his own mind concerning what he no doubt feared were tendencies toward enthusiasm carried over into his creativity from his Quaker upbringing. These accusations were furthered by Elihu Smith's constant admonitions about his friend's capacity for an expressiveness which Smith feared tended toward the irrational.<sup>56</sup>

Over such emotions and the passions which they could

arouse in both the author and his audience, Brown tried to draw the veil of logical discourse. The language of reason, he hoped, would successfully prevent the overflow of thoughts and ideas that merged with the pure creative stream, muddying it so that it became a source of fever and contamination. The universe within, the scene which, as Brown had written, the usurper of literary authority would fall to contemplating after "the impenetrable veil is rent," was the universe of the emotions whose empire threatened that of reason.

The influence which Shaftesbury's rationalism had on the writing of Wieland has been noted in the discussion of that work. Its relevance to biloquialism as a metaphor for the creative power of the mind, however, lies in the use of ventriloquism as a perversion of the rational discourse in which through a division into parts, those of teacher and pupil, truth is arrived at. Biloquialism, the projecting outward of a voice, is the opposite of the inward dialectic that Shaftesbury recommends. As Carwin employs it in Wieland it is an attempt to overcome by trickery the rational processes of another's mind and to falsely establish a voice of authority. All of Brown's dichotomies, his antithetical halves, his multiplication of personalities generated by a central character, and his dialectical format within and between his created works, can all be seen as attempts to arrive at, through a distribution of parts, a definitive and authoritative authorial voice, one which would be rational and not

enthusiastic. The conjunction of fire with the creative power betrays the ever-present fear in Brown's own mind of the capacity for that power to burst into the fanaticism of the type which Brown attributes not necessarily to Frenchmen, but to that inclination of mind which he attaches to such phenomena as the Camisards, the Illuminati, and Utopists.

In the realm of mind where each individual's sensory experience projected a different image into the dark room, it was almost impossible for one man to presume to speak for another, or to ascribe motive and intent to the behavior of another. To do so in the authorial role was to risk becoming a fraud, a biloquial trickster, or even worse, a subverter of the minds of others and an incendiary. This is, in part, the problem which Brown took up in his article on "The Difference Between History and Romance." The difficulty of knowing what had validity for another was what lay behind Brown's problem with fictional motivation, and the conflicting political, philosophical, and even medical theories which inform his romances are merely parts in a distribution he was trying to effect in order to arrive at a definition of the author's moral voice, or, function in a nation which had to that time known only the voice of the theologian/divine.<sup>57</sup>

The peculiar position in which Brown placed himself by his determination to be a man of letters in a nation that offered no literary or cultural tradition forced him to seek some conventional frame of reference in which to place

his American tales. Allegory, beloved of New England's Puritans, was by no means dead in the early republic, as Dwight's The Conquest of Canaan makes clear, and Erasmus Darwin's The Botanic Garden, the American edition of which Elihu Hubbard Smith prepared, brought a whole new application to allegory.<sup>58</sup> Soon after, Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchill chose to introduce his treatise on the "Doctrine of Septon" in the form of an allegorical battle between Septon, the principle of corruption in the physical world, and created matter, thus bringing a materialistic dimension to the long established pattern of spiritual and moral allegorical action.<sup>59</sup> Brown, too, found allegory an agreeable mode, highly suited to his moralistic purposes and rife with the potential for the romantic treatment of his primary subject, the mind as a place of learning.

William Taylor's review of Christoph Martin Wieland's Oberon must have called forth a host of examples from romance literature of places specifically designed as learning environments. Such places, the topoi of learning one might call them, are not the secluded, circumscribed areas represented by the hortus conclusus with which the New World Garden is most often associated. Nor can they be said to correspond to the medical topography of Elihu Hubbard Smith in which an area of disease is cordoned off and studied from without for the source of contamination within. They are, instead, places upon which the world impinges, where the mind and the senses are bombarded by conflicting messages and the test of experience determines

virtue. "The Memoirs of Carwin," which Brown began writing even before Wieland was finished, makes specific reference to two such examples of the romance, Comus and The Tempest. In Comus the Lady's learning place is the "leavy Labyrinth" where she encounters temptation and, after withstanding it, is conducted to the safety of her father's home by a representative of the spirit world, the nymph Sabrina. The Tempest would seem to contradict a basic premise of the present argument since its learning place is an island. But Prospero's island is not so far removed from the world of the Court of Milan that it may not become the refuge of those who enter into "foul conspiracy" with nature's baser elements. Indeed, it is Shakespeare's The Tempest which effectively links the power of rational discourse with sub-human speech in a topos of learning, an island somewhere in the "brave new world."<sup>60</sup>

With each step we come closer to apprehending the way in which Brown drew himself away from the contemplation of the world within, the learning place of the mind, and externalized it in a romantic landscape that would duplicate the process of learning. The fear of contamination abroad in the land brought on by the yellow fever was only a reflection of Brown's own fear of the contamination of the operations of the mind by the miasma of enthusiasm. Having chosen for himself the designation of a rhapsodist, he had attempted to define this in terms of the mental operations it encompassed. Brown was unable, however, to abandon his

belief that the mind has other operations than the rational. The mysterious capabilities of the mind, its capacity for association and image-making, provide the Gothicism in his romances, but also represent his insistence on the poetic function of mind, a function which is singularly--and mysteriously--human. Hence the need to define the rhapsodist as poet, philosopher, and prophet. The definition, however, evokes the image of the seer/sayer and the prophetic theory of poetry which led Plato to insist that art and reason were of no avail to the poet, whose inspiration, he insisted, came only from a divine madness. For this reason Plato excluded poets from his ideal republic, an edict echoed by Elihu Smith in his insistence that Brown abandon mystery in the interests of reason.

Against this same charge Sir Philip Sidney had once fashioned a Defence, but in the wake of Locke's psychology the new Utopia of the human mind presented its own demand for internal harmony. The medical theories of Cullen, Rush, et al., which aimed for the maintenance of physical and mental equilibrium, attempted to purge all sources of stimulation that might, like poets in the Platonic republic, disturb the harmonious balance within and between the mind and body. Brown's remedy for such unwanted stimulation was not banishment, but containment. Despite his own fears, he came to the conclusion that enthusiastic, even incendiary, thoughts were bound to intrude into the most harmonious mental Utopia, just as the voice of Carwin intrudes into the world of the Wielands. But through the example of Clara

Wieland Brown shows that within the mind itself lies the mechanism for effectively dealing with the problem.

On a number of occasions Brown writes of Cicero, the famed rhetorician and logician, as an example of human perfection.<sup>61</sup> In "The Rhapsodist" where he is attempting to arrive at a definition of an author, he cites Cicero's conception of perfection as being "a character of perfect eloquence, adorned with every accomplishment that mind or body is capable of possessing," far beyond that which even Cicero was capable of achieving.<sup>62</sup> The implication is that the writer should seek to emulate this conception of perfection, becoming a rhetorician and logician, practising that form of diagrammatic logic in which categories provide the topics, or places, for thoughts.

This idea, perhaps even more than Locke's description of the understanding as a dark room (though certainly coincident with it), gave rise to the series of spatial models as thought containers, the rooms, closets, temples, and houses which appear in the romances. They represent the architectonic of logic, the arrangement or systematization of knowledge. Similarly, the seemingly pointless architectural drawings which fill pages of Brown's copybooks are not designs for Gothic cathedrals and monasteries as Dunlap thought, but blueprints of balanced and beautifully proportioned rooms set within equally balanced and proportioned structures of the type that Stephen Dudley builds in Ormond. Indeed, some of these designs when given dimension through isometric projection take on the proportions of temples in

which the virtuous Constantia can be easily imagined.<sup>63</sup>  
 Since Constantia's virtue is a product of her education she is a fit goddess for Brown who once declared that "Knowledge may be considered emblematically as a vast temple. . . ." <sup>64</sup>

The movement from the enclosed thought containers to a land mass as a model of mind can be seen in the Carsol "Sketches" where the island of Carsol receives its name from its first conqueror, Charles Martel, but is nonetheless a mind model connected to Brown himself through the naming device he so often used. Created by Brown for the purpose of exploring the theories of historiography set out in "Walstein's School of History," the island of Carsol is designed as a laboratory in which to examine the motivations behind human behavior. In Arthur Mervyn the topical nature of the mind model is given specificity through its connection to an historical event. The topic is the United States of America, in the city of Philadelphia during the yellow fever epidemic of 1793. The pestilence and contagion abroad in this particular place is made that much more terrifying because of America's identification with the Paradise of Eden, of which "that portion of spirit within ourselves," the mind, is a type. Through this externalization of mind, America is shown to be in the same position as Constantia Dudley and Clara Wieland when their reason and their virtue is subjected to assault. The need for the same quick determination is shown to exist in this instance as in those; good and evil must be carefully

categorized and values tried by fire in order that the counterfeit may be distinguished from the true, and a new environment be established here, in this place. All of this Arthur Mervyn performs in a fairy tale of virtue rewarded.

In Edgar Huntly the mind models proliferate, some taking on the aspect of concealed knowledge and others the aspect of outright irrationality. The chests and boxes hidden by Huntly and his alter ego, Clithero, are thought containers whose burial signals the onset of the irrationality which is then mirrored in the natural landscape.<sup>65</sup> Some portion of the reasoning process had been repressed in the telling of the fairy tale; the contagion, which Brown now believed to be the true source of the yellow fever, had been troped into an environmentalist argument and the result is the loosing of error as severe in its consequences as any Spenser might have fashioned in "the wandering wood."

The error, as Brown transcribes it in Edgar Huntly, originates in Huntly's failure to maintain the proper categories. In the name of Reason he wanders through a landscape of his own mind in search of its mysterious irrational parts, allowing himself to become so lost in the labyrinth that reason and its opposite eventually merge into one, just as the landscape of his mind merges into the natural landscape. The doubling which occurs in this work at every level, a doubling of image, of setting, and of characters, accentuates the confusion engendered by

the overflow of emotion into reason.<sup>66</sup> Huntly's ultimate failure, that he learns nothing from his experience, reflects Brown's temporary loss of faith in America as a place where man could extend his empire through learning. The empire of nature seemed to be too great and too powerful to allow man to study it objectively without becoming lost in a maze of subjectivity.

With the passage of time, however, and the remission of the yellow fever Brown captured a new vision of America which resulted in a still greater externalization of the inner world of the mind, the vision of a continental nation. When the integrity of that national image was threatened by an intruder from without, or its commerce sabotaged by an enemy within, Brown once again made his bid for authority by resorting to a familiar pattern. The voice of an imaginary counselor whispering into the ear of a foreign emperor and advising an assault on the virgin republic, or the hand of a President who, because of his inclination toward the more secluded life of a scholar, seemed "well enough qualified for the nice adjustment of quadrants and telescopes, but far too unsteady for managing the helm of government," were equally excoriated by the man who pretended he had left off writing romances and was fully concerned with the writing of history.<sup>67</sup>

Clearly, whether he was writing novels or political pamphlets Brown was primarily concerned with the world of romance, a world whose appearance in literature has been in that branch which might best be termed the literature

of knowledge. Yet there was as little knowledge in Brown's time about the New World landscape as there was of the landscape of the human mind, and he was torn between the desire to know more of both and the fear of what terrors the desire "to know" might uncover. At the beginning of the new century, however, Americans felt the land "lay all before them." Having secured it and rescued its virtue from foreign hands, they were ready to claim it as their reward.<sup>68</sup> Often they would find it in the thrall of a seemingly monstrous Nature, causing them to retreat for a time into themselves where they would find their own authority, even if it meant they'd have to, as Huck Finn would say, "go to hell" for doing so.

The regions of discovery were to prove so vast that the mold of a literature of place and experience would take firm hold on the national imagination. The coveted harmony of mind and body, state and nation, man and nature, is reflected in a fiction which unlike the thrust toward intuitiveness which developed elsewhere in American literature, projects an image of man perceiving, learning, and ultimately knowing. Often it is purely and simply a matter of survival; more often it is a matter of understanding the nature of the world and of himself. The basic model is that of the perceiving mind projected against a country which had existed as a state of mind even before it was discovered. The model is Brown's, and is perhaps best realized in that moment in Edgar Huntly when Huntly stands on a hill that shapes a projection of his

own eye and gazes on a scene which he knows is truly  
"virgin land," land which no eye before his has known. 67

The scene, however original, is anticipated in the Proem to Book II of The Faerie Queene where Spenser, expecting to be queried on the regions wherein Faery Land might be found, counters by asking,

Who ever heard of th' Indian Peru?  
Or who in venturous vessell measured  
The Amazon huge river, now found trew?

Yet all these were, when no man did them know,  
Yet have from wisest ages hidden beene;  
And later times thinges more unknowne shall show.

The American novel is a literature of discovery through experience, and of the extension of empire over two realms, the nation and the self. This is not a subject matter which lends itself to the objectivity of natural history, which is the world of science, nor to social history, the world of the English novel. It is, however, an area over which, as Charles Brockden Brown knew, "the empire of romance . . . is yet very extensive."

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1. For a study of the later romantic internalization of the quest theme see Harold Bloom, "The Internalization of Quest Romance," Romanticism and Consciousness: Essays in Criticism, Harold Bloom, ed. (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1970), 3-24.
2. Elihu Hubbard Smith, Diary, 62.
3. George Kateb, Utopia And Its Enemies (London: The Free Press, 1963), 23.
4. Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 15 June, 1813. The Adams-Jefferson Letters, Lester J. Cappon, ed. (Chapel Hill: Univ. of N.C., 1959), II, 331.
5. John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 30 June, 1813. Ibid., 346-7.
6. Stow Persons, "The Cyclical Theory of History in Eighteenth Century America," American Quarterly, VI (1954), 152-169.
7. Ibid., 159.
8. The extent to which national events became confused with religion in the 1790's is perhaps best exemplified by the sermons of David Austin in 1796 when he preached the necessity of Thomas Jefferson's defeat in order to avert the coming apocalypse. For this and other millennial viewpoints of the decade see James W. Davidson, "Searching for the Millennium: Problems for the 1790's and the 1970's," New England Quarterly, 45 (June, 1972), 241-261.
9. In "A Theological Dissertation on the Propriety of Removing from the Seat of the Pestilence: Presented to the Perusal of the Serious Inhabitants of Phila. and N.Y.," preached in Philadelphia, 1799, the Rev. William Marshall counselled Christians, laity and clergy alike, to flee the cities and not to feel they must "run the risk of sacrificing their lives for the private service of the sick." Marshall quotes the prophet Jeremiah, "He that remaineth in the city shall die -- by the pestilence:but he that goeth forth -- shall live."
10. See Lawrence Buell, Literary Transcendentalism (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1973), 273 for his claim that in American literature the hero is such "essentially by virtue of his re-enactment of the national experience."
11. Millenarians (among whom the Camisards can be numbered) are radical Christian millennialists who believe the kingdom of Christ can be established on earth imminently rather than at a future time. See Norman Cohn, Pursuit of the Millennium (N.Y. Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), 13.

12. The millennial expectation included the image of the temple which the people of God were believed to be building in America. The image provides the structure for Winthrop's "A Modell of Christian Charity," delivered before the Mass. Bay Colonists had even set foot on America's soil. By 1796 the image had acquired a political application: David Austin referred to "the 'Washingtonian' base of the Temple of Jerusalem now in place." David Austin, Dawn of Day (New Haven, 1800), 14.
13. Northrop Frye has pointed out that whether the city is referred to as Jerusalem or not, it is apocalyptically identified with a single building or temple. See Frye's essay on "Archetypal Criticism," Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957).
14. C.B.B., Address to the Government of the United States on the Cession of Louisiana ---. (Phila., 1803), 51.
15. C.B.B., "The Memoirs of Carwin," Wieland, 312.
16. C.B.B., Address --- Louisiana, 70.
17. Ibid., 81.
18. Ibid., 90.
19. Monroe's Embassy, or The Conduct of the Government in Relation to our Claims to the Navigation of the Mississippi River. (Phila., 1803).
20. C.B.B., An Address to the Congress of the United States ---. (Phila., 1809), 19.
21. Ibid., 20.
22. Ibid., 23.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 96.
25. Ibid., 97.
26. Ibid.
27. An interesting parallel to Brown's plague scenes can be seen in Dickens' use of the fog in Bleak House. Robert A. Donovan, "Structure and Idea in Bleak House," ELH, XXIX, 2 (1962), 186-203, points out that Dickens denotes through his use of the fog what justice is not much as Plato presents his portrait of the ideal republic to show what a just society is.

28. G. Adolf Koch, Religion of the American Enlightenment, 292.
29. C.B.B., "The Rhapsodist," II, The Universal Asylum and Columbian Magazine (Phila., 1789), III, 541. See Warfel, 11.
30. Ibid.
31. The allusion is to "Nature," Section I. In this same section Emerson claims that in the woods "we return to reason and faith" (emphasis mine) and that there he feels . there is "no calamity (leaving me my eyes) which nature cannot repair." The emphasis on sight as an aid to reason and faith raises the speculation that for Emerson a loss of sight, such as Milton suffered, could lead to a prophetic poetry that was the result of private revelation, and therefore, suspect.
32. Willbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956), 32.
33. Ibid.
34. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chap. XI, Benjamin Rand, ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), 97.
35. C.B.B., quoted by Paul Allen, Life, 18.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Early Quaker Writings, 1650-1700, Hugh Barbour and Arthur O. Roberts, eds. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Erdsmans, 1973), Intro., 22.
39. M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and The Lamp (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953), 61.
40. C.B.B., "The Rhapsodist," II, Universal Asylum, III (Sept., 1789), 539. See Warfel, 8.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 541.
43. C.B.B., Wieland, 53.
44. Editor's footnote, Ibid.
45. Ibid., 53-4.

46. In discussing the allegorical daemonic agent Angus Fletcher quotes Emil Schneweis in Angels and Demons According to Lactantius (Washington, 1944), 82, as saying that the word demon is derived from daiomai meaning to distribute or to divide, and that the demon is usually a distributor of destinies. (See Fletcher, Allegory, 42-3). Fletcher's interest in the daemon is in its capacity as demi-god and intermediary, and Brown does use the idea in that way in Wieland. Over all, however, it is the idea of distribution that prevails in Brown's daemonic agency; certainly the proper division of fact from fiction in the matter of the yellow fever led to a distribution of destinies.
47. M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, has traced the changing metaphors which signal changing critical theories of poetry. See especially Chap. III, "Romantic Analogues of Art and Mind."
48. C.B.B., "Memoirs of Carwin," Wieland, 278.
49. Ibid.
50. The actual refrain appearing after each of nine stanzas is, "Far, though far ye roam, roam;/Cows, O cows, come home - home." Brown's translation appeared in The Port Folio, (11 April, 1801), 120 and has been identified as the work of Brown. See Randolph C. Randall, "Authors of the Port Folio Revealed by the Hall Files," American Literature, 11 (Jan, 1940), 389.
51. Ibid., 281.
52. Ibid., 291.
53. Ibid., 292.
54. See Barbour and Roberts, Early Quaker Writings, 53, for the discussion of Christ as the inner light in Quaker doctrine.
55. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, 60-2.
56. The Quakers had given birth to a number of more radical sects, among them the "shaking Quakers" who were later known as Shakers. Their founder, Ann Lee, had been converted from orthodox Christianity by Jane and James Wardley, Quakers who had come under the influence of the Camisards when they sought refuge in London and promised the Quakers there "a further degree of light and power." See Edward Denning Andrews, The People Called Shakers (N.Y.: Dover, 1953).
57. Brown's hope for a source of authority in science to replace that of religion can be seen in his review of Noah Webster's Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential Disease --- (1799) which appeared in the Monthly Magazine in four

- installments, Jan. to April, 1800. His reason, Brown claims, would never have allowed him to predict the split into factions and warfare "with the utmost animosity" that had occurred among Philadelphia's doctors as a result of the yellow fever epidemics. He deplores the lack of unanimity among men "of knowledge and experience" because of the lack of confidence it engenders in their science. Monthly Magazine, II (April, 1800), 296.
58. The American edition was published in N.Y. in 1798.
  59. "The Doctrine of Septon" by Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchell appeared in The Medical Repository, I (1797), 183-86.
  60. As a type of the "wild," or uncivilized, man, Caliban is incapable of learning virtue though he can be taught to speak. See Frank Kermode's Introduction to the Arden edition of The Tempest (London, 1964), xxxviii - xxxix.
  61. Brown's admiration for Cicero is apparent in Wieland, too, where a bust of the orator adorns the small temple of reason on the Wieland estate. A fragment entitled "The Death of Cicero" was appended to a printing of Edgar Huntly that appeared after July, 1799. A history of Cicero's life and times is also alluded to in "Walstein's School of History."
  62. C.B.B., "The Rhapsodist," II, The Universal Asylum (Phila., 1789), III, 540. See Warfel, 9.
  63. I am indebted to my husband, John W. Krieg, for undertaking the isometric projection of some of Brown's designs.
  64. C.B.B., quoted by Paul Allen, Life, 29.
  65. Ramism, the dialectical form which so strongly influenced the New England Puritans (See Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson, The Puritans, Boston, 1935, 32-41), did much to contribute to the use of spatial models which after Locke became models of mind. Ramus categorized ideas, giving them places, or topoi, which he claimed could be looked at and analyzed. (See Walter J. Ong, S.J., Ramus, Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 314-15. By the late 18th century and Caleb Williams, curiosity about the secrets of others had led to the image of an opened box.
  66. Robert Rogers, discussing the Psychomachic "soul battle" in The Double in Literature (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1970), Chap. VIII, says that Professor Angus Fletcher's idea of the allegorical hero generating subcharacters must also be applied to the author who creates them all. This study of Brown has made this application based on Brown's admitted identification with his central character in one instance and his implied identification through the "Car" device.

67. C.B.B., Monroe's Embassy ---, 19.
68. The oft-noted absence of mature male-female relationships in the American romance has nothing to do with the homoeroticism Leslie Fiedler has read into it (see Love and Death in the American Novel, (N.Y.: Dell 1967), 348-354) and everything to do with the way in which the romantic quest became associated with the land. Willa Cather's A Lost Lady in which the degradation of the "Lady" is tied to the degradation of the land affirms this idea.
69. Dieter Schulz, "Edgar Huntly as Quest Romance," has pointed out that Brown's vision of the quest turned away from the inward direction of the English romantics who sought "paradises within a renovated man." (The phrase is Harold Bloom's, "The Internalization of Quest Romance," Romanticism and Consciousness, p. 6). See Schulz, 334. This is one of the points of divergence from the English tradition and is occasioned by the merging of the romantic quest with the territorial quest in America.

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