A DEFENSE OF AN ICONIC THEORY OF MUSICAL EXPRESSION

by

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INTRODUCTION

The idea that music, or indeed any art, can express emotion may be traced with ease back to the beginning of Western philosophy. It was this expressive potential of poetry and music that so disturbed Plato. And Aristotle's theory of tragedy presupposes the power of that art to arouse the emotions of pity and fear. Yet it is not until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that expression is made the central function of art. Thus Wordsworth could write in 1800, in his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, that "poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings."[1]

Later, near the end of the nineteenth century, we find more systematic attempts to formulate a theory of art as expression. In 1878, Eugene Véron distinguished between two kinds of art: the decorative, "whose main object is the gratification of the eye and ear, and whose chief means of gratification of form are harmony and grace of color, diction, or sound";[2] and the expressive, which exists "to express the feelings and ideas, and through them to manifest the

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[1]For a thorough discussion of the emergence of the expression theory of art see M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), Ch. 4

[2]"Art as the Expression of Emotions," in A Modern Book of Aesthetics, 3rd ed., edited by Melvin Rader (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 58.

power of conception and expansion possessed by the artist."[1] Expression, Véron believed, is the chief characteristic of "modern art."

Tolstoy, writing in 1898, gave expression an even more central place in his theory of art, attaching special emphasis to the impact works of art have on their audience. Here is Tolstoy's famous definition of art:

> To evoke in oneself a feeling one has once experienced and having evoked it in oneself then by means of movements, lines, colors, sounds or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others experience the same feeling--this is the activity of art.
>
> Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also experience them.[2]

It is an irony of the history of the expressive theory of art that the weaknesses in Véron's and Tolstoy's positions had already been demonstrated in anticipation, as it were, by the great nineteenth century Viennese music critic Eduard Hanslick, whose little book The Beautiful in Music, first appeared in 1854. (Hanslick's critique of these early views of musical expression will be considered in Chapter I.)

Although the concept of expression plays a prominent role in much eighteenth and nineteenth century aesthetics, it has received more thorough philosophic treatment in the twentieth century with the writings of Croce, Collingwood, Dewey, Ducasse, Langer, and many others. As the twentieth century has progressed, expression

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[1] Ibid., p. 59.

[2] "What is Art?," Trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 123.

theorists began to concentrate more on the expressiveness of the work of art and less on the relation between the work and the artist, or the effect of the work on the audience. Indeed most of the very recent writers on expression have chosen to ignore these latter factors entirely.

In the essay that follows I will concentrate almost exclusively on the problem of expression with regard to one art, that of music. The greater "purity" of this art affords us the opportunity to study expression uncomplicated by the representational powers of the visual arts and the purely linguistic expression found in literature.

It will prove convenient to begin this analysis with an examination of Hanslick's critique of Romantic views of musical expression. In this way we will be able to focus sharply on the differences between nineteenth century and more recent views of expression. A discussion of Hanslick's critique will also provide opportunity to formulate and analyze many of the central issues in the recent literature on expression.

My major concern in the remainder of the paper is with the question of how musical expression occurs, or stated somewhat differently, of how we are able to attribute to some arrangements of tones, qualities and characteristics that we normally attribute to other things such as persons. It is an interesting fact of musical experience that some arrange-

ments of tones are so readily described as turbulent, others as sad, and still others as gentle. Surely this fact is in need of explanation. In Chapter II, I shall examine several theories which purport to account for this phenomenon of musical expression.

In Chapter III, I will take what I believe to be the most important of the theories discussed in Chapter II--the theory that music is expressive because of a structural or qualitative resemblance between it and what it expresses--and reformulate it in a way that makes it clearer and more amenable to empirical investigation. After reformulation of the theory, I will offer evidence from diverse sources which I believe supports this theory of musical expression.

CHAPTER I

HANSLICK'S CRITIQUE OF THE EXPRESSIONIST THEORY OF MUSIC

Perhaps the earliest critique of the expressionist view of music is to be found in Eduard Hanslick's (1825-1904) little book The Beautiful in Music first published in 1854. Hanslick, although not a philosopher, is an important figure in the history of musical aesthetics. As the music critic for the Wiener Zeitung, and later as a Professor of Music at the University of Vienna, Hanslick became one of the leading anti-Wagnerians of his day. A friend and champion of Brahms, Hanslick devoted his literary talent to defending a formalistic aesthetics of music and denouncing the extreme expressionist views of the Romantics.

In spite of his anti-expressionist zeal, however, Hanslick never argues that music has nothing to do with feeling or that it never moves us; rather he contends that it does not represent feelings, and further that the extent to which a particular composition or performance does move us has nothing to do with its artistic worth. Music need not have any effect upon our emotions at all, even (or perhaps especially) when we are listening carefully and understanding

most fully. I intend to examine the way in which Hanslick defends these positions: but to do so it will be necessary first to reconstruct his arguments as they are found here and there throughout his book, and present them in a more systematic fashion. Hanslick wrote at a time when the view that music is primarily a means for either releasing or arousing emotions was very widely accepted by musicians, critics, and the public. His concern was to correct what he took to be the excesses of this view of music. Although Hanslick was a skilled writer, his style is the polemical style of the critic. Thus it will be necessary to separate his arguments from their rhetorical trappings.

Let us note, first, that Hanslick uses "expression" in two different senses.[1] Most often he uses it to mean representation; but sometimes it means excitation. The first usage is the more common, and for the most part Hanslick appears to use "expression" and "representation" interchangeably, though he does not always let us know which meaning he has in mind. This observation is worth making at the outset because it is possible, as we shall soon see, for expression to be construed as meaning something quite different from either representation or excitation.

Hanslick begins his argument by making a distinction. Most writers on music, he says, confound "sensation" with

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[1]Eduard Hanslick, The Beautiful in Music, trans. Gustav Cohen, with Introduction by Morris Weitz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), pp. 9, 20.

"feeling," moving uncritically from one concept to the other.[1] Music undoubtedly is something which affects our sensations--we do after all hear it--but whether it similarly affects our feelings is, Hanslick believes, an entirely independent question. Feelings cannot be deduced from sensations. The excellence of music is beauty and beauty is not felt but contemplated, the organ of contemplation being the imagination which, for Hanslick, belongs to the intellectual rather than the affective side of our nature. Throughout his analysis Hanslick makes a very sharp distinction between feelings and intellect, his own sympathies lying clearly with the latter.

In what immediately follows I will present (in a series of numbered paragraphs) Hanslick's key arguments against what he understands as the expression theory of music. The numbering is purely for ease of reference and no other significance should be attached to it.

Hanslick's Arguments

1. Hanslick's first argument concerns the subjectivity of feelings and the wide disparity in judgments regarding what feelings a particular composition expresses. The philosopher of music, Hanslick believes, should aim at discovering the objective laws of music. Feelings are subjective: reaction to a work varies with the mood, excitability, experience, and maturity of the listener. The same

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[1]Ibid., p. 10.

listener may be deeply moved by a given composition on one instance and not on another, while his evaluation of the beauty of the work remains constant. Mozart's contemporaries thought his music "the most perfect expressions of passion, warmth and vigor,"[1] while today, says Hanslick, we attribute these effects to Beethoven's music--in contrast to the "Olympic classicality" of Mozart. Anything can produce emotion, including music, but the emotional effects of music are "vague and secondary,"[2] they are not essential to it.

2. Closely related to the argument just presented is another argument which Hanslick uses several times: expression, Hanslick believes, presupposes the existence of an "invariable and inevitable causal nexus"[3] between the expressive object and the feeling it excites, but since emotional reactions vary, as we have seen in the first argument, there can be no such constant causal nexus.

3. A philosophically more sophisticated argument is developed by Hanslick early in Chapter II. Definite feelings and emotions cannot possibly be presented in music because such feelings are a part of a broader ideational context which music simply cannot represent. Writes Hanslick:

> The feeling of hope is inseparable from the conception of a happier state which is to come, and which we compare with the actual state. The feeling of sadness involves the notion of a past state of happiness. These are perfectly definite

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[1]Ibid., p. 14. [2]Ibid., pp 13-14. [3]Ibid., pp 14,24.

> ideas or conceptions, and in default of them--the apparatus of thought, as it were--no feeling can be called "hope" or "sadness," for through them alone can a feeling assume a definite character. On excluding these conceptions from consciousness, nothing remains but a vague sense of motion which at best could not rise above a general feeling of satisfaction or discomfort. The feeling of love cannot be conceived apart from the image of the beloved being, or apart from the desire and the longing for the possession of the object of our affections.[1]

Very simply Hanslick's argument is that definite emotions are always inseparably united to definite ideas, and since the latter cannot be conveyed by music, the former cannot either.

4. If music cannot express (represent) definite emotions, a reasonable question to ask is: can it express indefinite emotions? Hanslick considers this possibility, but rejects it. What this claim probably means, he explains, is that it is the function of music to reproduce "the dynamic element of an emotion."[2] Hanslick, in the very next sentence, concludes that this theory is untenable, because "to 'represent' something 'indefinite' is a contradiction in terms."[3] Unfortunately, he offers no justification for this assertion. He goes on to say, "the function of art consists in individualizing, in evolving the definite out of the indefinite, the particular out of the general. The theory respecting 'indefinite feelings' would reverse this process."[4]

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[1]Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[2]Ibid. [A more careful analysis of the meaning of the concepts, definite and indefinite emotion, will be undertaken in my response to Hanslick's third argument.]

[3]Ibid., p. 38.

[4]Ibid.

From these considerations Hanslick reaches the conclusion that music cannot express indefinite emotions either.

5. Finally, there is another very interesting argument which crops up at several points in Hanslick's work.[1] It is stated most fully in the preface to the seventh edition where Hanslick explains that he never maintained that music was "destitute of feeling," but merely that it does not represent (express) feeling. "The rose smells sweet, yet its subject is surely not the representation of the odor; the forest is cool and shady, but it certainly does not represent 'the feeling of coolness and shadiness'."[2] Thus feelings may be legitimately predicated of music, but it is quite another thing to say that feelings are expressed or represented by the music. "The 'representing' of something always involves the conception of two separate and distinct objects which by a special act are purposely brought into relation with each other."[3] The conclusion which seems to follow from this argument is that is is proper to say of music that it is gay, sad, triumphant, majestic, etc., but it should not be said that music expresses or represents these qualities as if they were something separate from the music.

I will now evaluate each of these arguments from the point of view of more recent theories of musical expression.

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[1]Ibid., pp. 4-5, 53, 74.
[2]Ibid., p. 4.
[3]Ibid., p. 5.

Analysis of Hanslick's Arguments

1. Hanslick's first argument concerns expression as evocation or excitation. Briefly the argument is that since what a given piece of music evokes varies considerably from time to time and from place to place (feelings being a very subjective matter), the expression (excitation) of emotion is too changeable and subjective to be a central factor in musical experience.

This argument, as Hanslick states it, does not even apply to most recent theories of artistic expression, because it presupposes that the emotion expressed is a real emotion felt by the listener. While probably no one would deny that one may have, or even frequently does have, emotional responses to music, most modern expression theorists deny that such responses are essential for expression. When we attribute expressive qualities to music, we mean to say something about the music and not about how we feel while listening to the music. Thus "the music is sad" means something quite different from "the music makes me sad." The second statement is not necessary for the justification of the first. I may perceive the expressive character of a work without undergoing any emotional reaction at all. If I am feeling weak and inadequate, heroic music does not necessarily transform me, even when I am fully aware of the heroic character of the music.

The above remarks are sufficient to show that we may predicate feeling terms to music without undergoing the feelings predicated. Almost all recent writers on artistic expression have regarded the former as central to expression, but not the latter. Thus in discussing musical expression we do not have to concern ourselves with the subjective emotional reactions of listeners.

However, even after taking this change in the understanding of expression into account, it is possible to re-word Hanslick's argument so that it does apply to non-excitation theories of expression. For regardless of how expression is understood, widespread disagreement concerning what is expressed by any work might well be thought to undermine the objectivity of expression to such an extent as to raise serious questions as to its importance in the aesthetics of music. Thus a modern-day Hanslick might argue in the following fashion: if expression were a (or the) major purpose of music (or any art) there would have to be a high degree of unanimity about what is expressed. But there is not a high degree of unanimity at all. Indeed, there is notorious disagreement about what any given piece of music expresses. Therefore, expression must be at most a minor and incidental aspect of musical experience.

(a)

For ease of reference, let us call this argument the variability argument. The first observation that must be made concerning it is that its factual premise--that there

exists wide disagreement concerning what any given piece of music expresses--is far from being a demonstrated fact. Carroll C. Pratt, the well-known psychological writer on musical aesthetics, has conducted experiments which point to the opposite conclusion.[1] In one such experiment, Pratt selected four musical passages: the beginning of Brahms' First Symphony; forty measures from the middle of Mendelssohn's overture to A Midsummer Night's Dream; the transition from the third to fourth movements of Mozart's string Quintet in G-minor; and a passage from the third movement of Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony. Several "experts" from a department of music agreed that Brahms' passage could best be described as stately; the Mendelssohn, sprightly; the Mozart, wistful; and the Tchaikovsky, vigorous. These same passages were then played to 227 college students. The students were asked to match the four adjectives with the four musical examples. If the students had made their judgments by chance, they would have been expected to get 25 percent of their answers "correct." In fact their agreement with the "experts" ranged from 92 to 99 percent. Pratt repeated this experiment with 113 students using selections from more recent and less familiar composers. This time the "correct" matchings ranged from 70 to 97 percent, still far above chance.

Similar results, using different and sometimes more complex experimental designs, have been attained by Schoen,

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[1]The Meaning of Music (Hightstown, N.J.: McGraw-Hill, 1931: reprint ed., New York: Johnson Reprint, 1968), pp. xvii-xx.

Gatewood, Mull, Herner, Winold, and Farnsworth. Other researchers, however, have obtained what appear to be contradictory results. Much of this evidence has been evaluated by Beardsley who concludes that these discrepancies in experimental results can be explained by the fact that some investigators misled their subjects by asking questions which tended to direct them away from the music and towards how the music made them feel, what the composer was feeling, or what picture it called to mind. When these kinds of questions are asked, Beardsley observes, "the responses begin to diverge."[2]

Another crucial element in the experimental design of such studies concerns the source and nature of the adjectives used to describe the music. Obviously, if the subject is given the responsibility of creating his own descriptions (as has been done in some studies), it will be difficult to

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[2] Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958), p. 329. Beardsley's work contains a critical bibliography of the relevant studies in this area (pp. 356-58). For an even more complete discussion of the relevant literature see Paul R. Farnsworth, The Social Psychology of Music, 2nd ed., (Ames: University of Iowa Press, 1969), pp. 78-90. Farnsworth concludes: "Research by Schoen, Gatewood, Mull, and others has demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt that synonymous words will be employed with some consistency to describe the character of much of our Western music whenever the listeners are drawn from roughly the same subculture." (p.80.)

compare the results of different subjects. And if too many adjectives are provided, some of them nearly synonomous with others, the study is bound to reveal much wider disagreement than if only a few very divergent descriptions are presented.

(b)

Even if disagreement does exist concerning what a given piece of music expresses, however, we need not conclude willy nilly that expression is a wholly subjective and relative matter. A questionable assumption frequently made by writers and experimenters on this topic, regardless of which side they take, is that if the recognition of what music expresses is an objective matter, everyone ought to agree about what is expressed. However, objectivity is rarely, if ever, a matter of universal consensus.[1] Indeed, it frequently happens that only a minority of people possess the ability to make certain kinds of perfectly factual discriminations. Most of us can not even come close to identifying the pitch of an isolated note played on a familiar musical instrument such as a piano. At most we might guess that the note comes from the upper, middle, or lower register of the instrument. Yet a sizable minority of people can make such identifications with ease. Likewise, the average college

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[1] In the remarks that follow I shall rely heavily upon arguments developed in three articles by Frank Sibley: "Aesthetic Concepts," The Philosophical Review, 68 (October 1959), pp. 421-450; "Critical Judgment of Aesthetic Values," The Philosophical Review 74 (1965), pp. 135-59; "Objectivity and Aesthetics," The Aristotelian Society 42, Supplement, (1968), pp. 31-54.

freshman very often cannot tell whether a given sentence is grammatical or properly punctuated, and may even feel his teacher is being arbitrary and unfair when correcting his sentences. Yet we would not conclude from this that grammar and punctuation are subjective matters (a conclusion all too often reached by many of today's college students).

There are two reasons why judgments regarding such things as pitch and proper grammar are objective even though only a minority can make the necessary discriminations. First, there is agreement amongst the minority who are capable of making the judgments. Secondly, there are specifiable rules, standards, or procedures for making and justifying the discriminations. Let us examine the second criterion first to see if there might exist any such rules for determining what a given piece of music expresses.

In the attempt to discover such standards and procedures, it is necessary first to notice that expressive properties are, what are sometimes called, derivative properties. What this means is that they are dependent upon certain other properties an object possesses. Thus the expressive property serenity is apt to be predicated of music when it possesses certain other properties such as: slower than average tempo; softness of volume; long sustained tones; absence of abrupt changes in rhythm, tempo, or volume, etc. Doubtless a more accurate and more complete list could be developed, but I think there would be little

disagreement with the claim that we predicate serenity of music that possesses some such properties as these, and that we make the predication because it has these properties. Yet it is doubtful that "serene" or "serene music" simply means "quiet, slow, etc." Probably no set of conditions is either logically necessary or sufficient for music to qualify as serene. One can be reasonably certain that there are no logically necessary conditions, since it is at least conceivable that a composition be serene even if it were, say, fast. Fast serenity is unlikely, but not contradictory.

Whether any set of conditions is logically sufficient for music being serene is more difficult to decide. It is always conceivable that a piece of music could possess all the properties in a given list and yet not be serene, it might be sad or lethargic instead, or perhaps it could be expressively nondescript. (I have no intention of arguing in this essay that all music expresses emotion.) Rather than there being a set of logically sufficient conditions for application of an expressive predicate, it would be better to say that there are certain discoverable empirical regularities of the form: music is usually serene when it possesses characteristics x.y.z.... " Or to be more conservative, "Western music since the Renaissance is usually serene when it possesses the characteristics x.y.z,..." (How universally any such rules apply could only be determined by empirical investigations.) In either case, the point I

wish to make is that expressive musical properties are dependent upon specifiable objective properties of the music, and are dependent in certain regular ways that could be stated in general law-like statements.[1] My claim is not that we consciously use such generalizations when describing the expressive character of a work, but we must at least perceive or hear the relevant properties upon which the expression depends and, if we were asked to justify our characterization, we could (or at any rate a good critic could), indicate the features of the music which give it that expressive character.

There are two ways in which these remarks are relevant to the issue of the objectivity of expressive descriptions. First, a claim that music expresses A can be defended by pointing out certain relevant features of the music, and if necessary, a law-like generalization could be invoked to the effect that music possessing features x.y.z.... usually does express A. Secondly, before someone can be competent in assessing the expressive character of a work, he must be able to perceive the relevant non-expressive characteristics. The powers of perception involved in this may vary considerably. In some cases expressive predication can be made with very little skill or knowledge as, for example, in designating obvious instances of sad music. In such cases probably little is

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[1]It may also be asked why music possessing a particular set of properties expresses a given quality rather than another. The consideration of this question will have to wait until Chapters II and III.

involved beyond the general familiarity with the music of a culture which any member of the culture who is beyond infancy is apt to possess. However, when the musical expression is unclear, ambiguous, or the identification is to be made more precisely, greater skill is required. Moreover, expressive descriptions very often refer to performances rather than simply to compositions. Under these circumstances the knowledge called upon in recognizing and describing the expression may be quite extensive. Consider the following remarks by a reviewer of a recent recording of Italian arias:

> Like Callas, Scotto has always known the value of a small gesture, which often can be more telling than a broad one. She does not yield to the temptation to belt out the Manon Lescaut arias, for example, but sings them intimately. Both are soliloquies, and she sings them with an affecting inwardness, presenting a more fragile Manon than is usual on the stage today. Most sopranos who sing Musetta in La Boheme make her a ridiculous exhibitionist. In "Quando m'en vo" here Scotto's Musetta is feminine and charming; her interpretation of the famous waltz is flirtatious but a bit pensive. In "Flammen perdonami" from Mascagni's Lodoletta, she seems to reach out and clutch weakly at your wrist as she expires in the snow.[1]

No doubt more is involved here than merely describing the expressive qualities of the performance--rarely are such descriptions given in isolation from comments on technique, style, etc.--but surely the main thrust of the passage is to urge that Miss Scotto sings these arias not only with skill

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[1]William Livingston, "The Arrival of Renata Scotto," Stereo Review 35, No. 3, (September 1975), p. 116.

but with appropriate expression; and the reviewer accomplishes this task by describing the expressive character of the performances. What needs to be noted is the knowledge that is presupposed in making such descriptions. The reviewer must be very familiar with operatic music in general, with the particular works reviewed, with other performances of the work, and with certain aspects of vocal style and technique. There would be little point in asking the man on the street whether the Manon Lescaut arias are sung with an "affecting inwardness" or whether Miss Scotto's interpretation of the waltz Musetta sings in La Boheme is "flirtatious but a bit pensive." Only a relatively small group of people could make, or even understand what is meant by, such descriptions.

(Here it should also be noted that making, or even recognizing, appropriate expressive descriptions may also require certain linguistic skills which not everyone possesses. Perhaps everyone understands what "sad" denotes in reference to music, but when the metaphors are less standard, like our reviewer's "affecting inwardness," relatively few people would understand the description. Thus linguistic deficiencies may also account for disagreement concerning musical expression.)

We must now turn to a consideration of the other criterion of objectivity previously mentioned: agreement among members of the class of people who do possess the knowledge and skills necessary for making the judgment or discrimination. As was previously mentioned, objectivity does not

require the agreement of everyone willing to venture an opinion on a subject. It does seem, however, that if there exists an objective way of making judgments on a particular matter, a reasonable level of agreement must be attainable among those capable of making the judgment objectively. Thus consensus within a specifiable group must be at least a consequence, if not a precondition, of objectivity.

In certain cases, such as the recognition of particular colors, there are no rules or procedures which can be stated for making the judgment, because colors are simple, unanalyzable qualities. If someone wanted to justify his judgment that a particular object is a toothbrush, he could point out certain features of the object which all toothbrushes have, e.g., bristles and a handle. But the claim that an object is yellow cannot be similarly justified. Yellowness is not analyzable into anything simpler. Thus the recognition of simple properties like color must rest very heavily upon consensus. Even here, however, the consensus might not have to be a majority consensus. The mere fact that a minority agreed in its judgments and was conscious of exercising greater refinements of discriminations, would make a strong case for the objectivity of its judgments, although, to be sure, it may be difficult to convince the majority of this objectivity.

Even when we consider complex and derivative properties like those found expressed in music, the reliance upon consensus cannot be entirely eliminated, for before any correlations

can be made between a dependent property and the properties upon which it depends, it must be agreed that the expressive label does apply. That is, before it can be empirically discovered that sad music possesses a particular set of properties, it must be known that given pieces of music (possessing these properties) are sad. Hence, consensus must actually precede the formulation of rules connecting expressive properties with the other properties on which they depend. Rules may then be used to reinforce the consensus, but there can be no doubt that the recognition that a particular expressive property belongs to the music is temporally and logically prior.

Are we then caught in a vicious epistemological circle? We must recognize that the music expresses A before we can create any empirical generalization correlating A with other musical properties. Yet we justify the claim that the music expresses A by showing that it possesses the other properties. I think it can be shown that the problem is not quite so serious. But first we will have to take a more careful look at the nature of expressive properties and how they differ from and resemble other kinds of properties.

Suppose one were asked to justify the claim that a given figure was a square (had the property of being square). This could be done by pointing out that the figure has four sides of equal length connected by right angles. In this case, note that it is not necessary first to discover that the figure

in question is a square and then that squareness is correlated with four-sidedness, etc. That a square has four sides, etc. is not a matter of empirical regularity, but of definition: "square" simply means a four-sided equilateral polygon with right angles. Thus no empirical investigation is necessary.

Empirical concepts are not quite as neat as mathematical ones. Here it may be difficult to determine where definitions end and empirical generalizations begin. Do horses by definition have four legs, or is this an empirical discovery? If by definition, then the situation is exactly like the case with "square." If by empirical discovery, then we can identify the animal as a horse by other criteria and investigate whether all horses do indeed have four legs. Thus the epistemological problem we had with sadness in music does not arise. What then is the difference between the property sad as applied to music and properties like squareness or horseness such that an epistemological circle seems to emerge in the former case but not in the latter ones?

Let us look further by considering the case of sadness as a property of persons. Here we get closer to the sad music case. We identify a person (other than ourself) as sad by noticing certain kinds of sad-indicating behavior. Yet by designating him sad we do not merely mean to indicate the behavior, but some state or condition which lies behind

the behavior. "Sad" does not simply mean behaving in a particular way. We have to know something about feeling sad or being sad before we can correlate sadness with particular behavior patterns. Presumably I know what I feel like when I behave in such and such a way and thereby infer how others feel when they behave similarly. Do we then have an epistemological circle? No. We do justify our judgments that someone is sad by pointing out certain behavior patterns, but our entire knowledge of what sadness is does not come from observing the sad behavior of others. We have a more direct way of experiencing sadness in our own case.

How does this compare with sad music? We justify the judgment that music is sad by pointing out that it possesses certain characteristics. However, just as we know something about sad feeling before we formulate empirical generalizations connecting it with sad behavior, perhaps we also know something about sad music before we discover that it possesses characteristics x, y, z, etc. But what is it we might know about sad music before any law-like generalization is made? Here we are forced to raise the question of why sad music possesses just the particular set of characteristics that it does rather than any other. It now seems likely that we attribute an expressive property like sadness to the music not merely because the music possesses some set of qualities x, y, z, etc., and all sad

music possesses these qualities, but because there is some deeper connection between the label "sad" (or other things denoted by "sad") and the properties x, y, z, etc. What this connection is we shall have to try to discover in the next two chapters. Even here, however, we can note that if such a connection can be made explicit, then my predicating "A" of a particular piece of music may be defensible on grounds involving a connection between A-ness and certain properties of the music, thereby reducing our reliance upon consensus as a requirement for objectivity.

(c)

Thus far I have tried to show how disagreement concerning what is expressed by a particular musical work is not as widespread as is sometimes supposed, and that when it does occur, it does not necessarily follow that expression is subjective and relative. I would like now to argue that some variability in understanding what music expresses may be an inherent and not undesirable feature of musical experience. This can happen either through expressive ambiguity or through expressive vagueness or indefiniteness. (I make no distinction between the last two concepts.)

Expressive ambiguity occurs when two or more qualities are expressed simultaneously. Some obvious examples of ambiguous expression can be found in literature as well as music. Is Faulkner's <u>As I Lay Dying</u>, for example, a comic or a tragic work? The difficulty in answering this

question in an either-or way results from the fact that both elements are so tightly interwoven that the same events within the novel take on tragic and comic meanings simultaneously. Yet it happens that some readers--whether because of temperament, poor attention, or preconception--are almost totally blind to one of these dimensions until it is carefully pointed out to them. Thus variations in response can arise from the genuine ambiquity in expression. When one reader finds the work amusing and another finds it sad, there is disagreement, but neither reader is wrong; both are partially correct.

Such ambiguity is common in music. One frequently finds in the writings of music critics such paradoxical descriptions as "gay melancholy," "furious calm," or "sweet sorrow." Not that all expressive ambiguity need involve opposing moods or qualities; yet these are probably the most interesting and important cases. Indeed, although it is not part of my present purpose to develop or defend a theory of musical value, it seems to me likely that the ability to express conflicting or opposite feelings is one of music's many alluring qualities and a not insignificant source of musical value. The completely unambiguous expression of an easily identifiable feeling is not in itself very interesting. However, when the tension set up by a prolonged presentation of opposite qualities--as, for example, in so much of Bach's music--the result is very intriguing indeed.

Thus when ambiguity gives rise to disagreement concerning what is expressed, this does not constitute evidence against the objectivity of expression.

Vagueness or indefiniteness of expression arises when it is difficult or impossible to determine which of several related qualities is expressed. Alan Tormey observes that it is difficult to determine whether the Ravel Pavane is expressive of tenderness, of yearning, or of nostalgia.[1] Or again whether a given Kollwitz drawing is expressive of despair, anxiety, resignation, or fear.[2] In cases like these we find agreement within a general area, but we cannot fix definitely upon a single quality because the expression itself is indefinite. Hanslick, as we have seen, denies the possibility of indefinite expression. But surely his own theory[3] that music can express the dynamic properties of feelings or the motion of an emotion without any specific emotion being expressed, allows for such a possibility.

On the basis of the theory that expressive properties are dependent or derived properties, it is possible to account theoretically for how expression can be vague. Let us suppose that music has expressive property A whenever it has the non-expressive properties a,b,c, d, and e, and that it expresses B when it possesses properties a, b, c, f, and g.

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[1]The Concept of Expression (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 133.

[2]Ibid., p. 135.

[3]Hanslick, Ibid.,p. 24.

Now, if a given work (or part of a work) possessed a,b, and c, but did not possess either d,e,f, or g, it might not express either A or B, but some indefinite or indeterminate state between them.[1]

Before turning to Hanslick's second argument, I would like to summarize my position with respect to the variability argument: 1) Variability is not as great as has been frequently supposed; 2) Universal agreement is by no means essential for objectivity when other criteria can be given; 3) Variability can result from the inherent ambiguity or vagueness of musical expression and can be accounted for in a way that does not damage the objectivity of expression.

2. Hanslick's second argument, in which he denies that music can be expressive because no causal nexus has yet been established between music and feeling, can be dealt with more briefly than the first. This argument draws our attention to the great difference between the way musical expression is usually understood today and the way it was viewed by those Hanslick had criticized. If expression is seen as either the result of the artist's feeling or as evoking a feeling in the spectator, expression might indeed presuppose causality. And this, to be sure, is a perfectly good sense of the term expression. If I tremble

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[1]Using the same model, ambiguous expression might occur when, for example, a work contained a,b,c,d,e,f, and g. (assuming d and e are not incompatible with f and g).

from fear and thereby give expression to it, the fear may well be said to cause my expression of it. However, almost all recent philosophical writers, while not denying that something like this can be involved in artistic expression, have preferred to concentrate on a different aspect of the problem. In artistic expression, it is now generally agreed, regardless of whether the artist himself felt or underwent what his work expresses, and regardless of whether or not his audience undergoes the same experience or feeling, the work itself must actually possess the qualities expressed. The other two questions, involving what happens in the artist and audience, are regarded as secondary psychological matters. Admittedly, it would be awkward if we had to determine what an artist or an audience felt in order to know what works of art express. Imagine the absurdity of having a well-accepted expressive description of a composition refuted by biographical research.

Thus in modern versions of expression theory, there is no question of finding a causal nexus between music and feeling for the very simple reason that feelings as such are not involved. To say the music is blissful or robust, or that it expresses these qualities, is completely different from saying I (or anyone else) is robust or blissful. To predicate a feeling term of music is not to hypostatize the existence of a feeling in the artist, listener, or, least of all, in the music itself.

It may of course be a contingent psychological fact that actual feelings give rise to musical compositions expressing those feelings and that music evokes emotions in its listeners. My point is simply that the claim that music expresses a feeling is logically independent of these psychological circumstances and is verified or falsified on completely independent grounds.

(I shall argue in Chapter III that there is another kind of musical expression, not involving the expression of emotion, where causality between what is expressed and the expression of it, is involved in and may even be necessary for, expression.)

3. Hanslick's argument, that music cannot express definite emotions because it cannot express the ideas which are a part of the context of an emotional situation, is a perfectly valid and appropriate observation if "definite emotion" is understood in a certain sense. Certainly music cannot, to take an extreme example, express the specific sorrow I feel when my Aunt Margaret dies, because such a feeling involves specific ideas and memories which music alone (without words, pictures, etc.) cannot possibly convey, not the least of which is the idea of Aunt Margaret herself.

However, by "definite emotion" Hanslick appears to mean something quite different from what the above example would suggest. Consider this statement: "The feeling of love cannot be conceived apart from the image of the beloved

being." It is no doubt the case that one cannot be in love without an object of some sort which is loved; but that one cannot conceive of the feeling of love without the image of the beloved seems unwarranted. A human being normally loves a great many things in the course of his life and loves them in different ways. He loves himself, his parents, his siblings, dog, home, possessions, etc. In each case, the love has an object. Love is always love of something, this must be granted. But after loving so many different objects, it would be odd if I could not conceive of the feeling of love by itself, that is, if I could not abstract the feeling from the concrete experiences. Were this not possible, it is difficult to imagine how we could even have a word for the feeling. Thus the concept love may, upon analysis, be shown to always involve an object, but this is far from saying, as Hanslick does, that it cannot be conceived without an image of the object.

In spite of these defects in Hanslick's argument, the observation that some emotions are object-directed is significant. Perhaps this is why purely instrumental music is rarely said to express object-directed emotions such as love, fear, or hatred. Feelings such as sadness, serenity or elation, however, which are not nearly so object-directed, are frequently predicated of music. It is quite possible to be sad without being sad for or about anything. Yet even non-object-directed feelings like sadness, Hanslick believes,

cannot be expressed by music because "sadness involves the notion of a past state of happiness."[1]

If Hanslick simply means that happiness and sadness are correlative terms such that each has meaning only in relation to the other, his point may be well taken. Perhaps we can only understand what sadness is by contrasting it with its opposite. But this way of "involving a notion of a past state of happiness" is not sufficient to support Hanslick's argument that an emotion cannot be expressed by music because it is inseparable from some larger ideational context. Surely the way in which sadness "involves the notion of a past state of happiness" does not make the idea of sadness inseparable from its ideational context. No idea of happiness need be contained in every expression of sadness. If this were the case, sad facial expressions would also be ruled out unless they simultaneously conveyed an idea of a past happiness.

It is instructive to compare Hanslick's position on the expression of definite emotions with that of the American composer Roger Sessions.

> I believe that music "expresses" something very definite, and that it expresses it in the most precise way. In embodying movement, in the most subtle and most delicate manner possible, it communicates the attitudes inherent in and implied by, that movement; its speed, its energy, its elan or impulse, its tension or relaxation, its agitation

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[1]Ibid., p. 21.

> or its tranquility, its decisiveness or its hesitation. It communicates in a marvelously vivid and exact way the dynamics and the abstract qualities of emotion, but any specific emotional content the composer wishes to give to it must be furnished, as it were, from without, **by means of an associative program.** Music not only "expresses" movement, but embodies, defines, and qualifies it. Each musical phrase is a unique gesture and through the cumulative effect of such gestures we gain a clear sense of a quality of feeling behind them. But unless the composer directs our associations along definite lines, as composers of all times, to be sure, have frequently done, it will be the individual imagination of the listener, and not the music itself, which defines the emotion. What the music does is to animate the emotion; the music, in other words, develops and moves on a level that is essentially below the level of conscious emotion. Its realm is that of emotional energy rather than that of emotion in the specific sense.[1]

Here Sessions takes the position that musical expression is very definite in what it expresses--"the dynamics and abstract qualities of emotion"--but agrees with Hanslick that definite emotions cannot be expressed without the addition of what he calls rather vaguely, an "associative program," presumably words, titles, dramatic context, etc.

Hanslick himself says something very similar.

> A certain class of ideas, however, is quite susceptible of being adequately expressed by means which unquestionably belong to the sphere of music proper. This class comprises all ideas which, consistently, with the organ to which they appeal, are associated with audible changes of strength, motion, and ratio: the ideas of intensity waxing and diminishing; of motion hastening and lingering; of ingeniously complex and simple progression, etc. The aesthetic expression of music may be described by terms

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[1]The Musical Experience of Composer, Performer, Listener (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950; paperback ed., 1971), pp. 23-24.

> such as graceful, gentle, violent, vigorous, elegant, fresh--all these ideas being expressible by corresponding modifications of sound.[1]

Shortly after the passage just quoted Hanslick asks: "What part of the feelings, then, can music represent, if not the subject involved in them?" He answers: "Only their dynamic properties. It may reproduce the motion accompanying psychical action, according to its momentum: speed, slowness, strength, weakness, increasing and decreasing intensity. But motion is only one of the concomitants of feeling, not the feeling itself."[2]

It would seem from these passages that Hanslick agrees with Sessions: music is expressive, and what it expresses is definite, but not definite emotions. Music, both Sessions and Hanslick agree, express what Susanne Langer calls the form or the morphology of feelings. On this interpretation of Hanslick, which I believe is the correct one, Hanslick is something of an expression theorist himself, although he does not attach great importance to this kind of expression.

Before we can proceed further with Hanslick's arguments regarding the expression of definite and indefinite emotions, some conceptual clarification is in order. Hanslick's terminology suggests that he is talking about two kinds of emotion. However, it is difficult to know how definiteness

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[1]Ibid., pp. 22-23. [2]Ibid., p. 24.

or its opposite could possibly be properties of emotions. Surely what Hanslick must have in mind by these locutions is the precision with which we can identify an emotion. Sometimes it is a perfectly clear matter that a person is angry. In such a case we might say, somewhat awkwardly, that he is suffering from a definite emotion (that of anger) when we mean that it is definite that he is suffering the emotion. On other occasions it may be difficult to determine what emotions a person is undergoing; hence we may attribute to the person indefinite emotions when it is only the state of our knowledge that is indefinite.

On the basis of the preceding analysis it is better to distinguish between identifiable and unidentifiable emotions rather than definite and indefinite ones.

Once the question of definite and indefinite expression is thus reformulated, it can be seen that it has already been answered in our previous discussion of vagueness and ambiguity (in the analysis of Hanslick's first argument). Sometimes the quality expressed can be identified with precision in a way with which most listeners would concur. On other occasions, however, identification of what is expressed (even when there is agreement that something is expressed) is very indefinite.

4. Hanslick's argument against the expression of indefinite emotions has received sufficient treatment in the preceding paragraphs, but I would like to add a comment on his contention that "to represent something indefinite is a contradiction in terms." Unfortunately, it is not at all

clear just what Hanslick intends by this. Presumably he does not mean that indefinite representation is impossible, (which it certainly is not), but that the representation of an object which is indefinite is impossible. But what could an indefinite object possibly be? Indefiniteness cannot actually be a property of an object. We might, however, call an object definite if it is easy to identify, and indefinite if it is not easy to identify. Thus defined, there are "indefinite objects," but it must also be admitted that it is perfectly possible to represent them. A good photograph of an object difficult to identify could thus be said to be a definite representation of an indefinite object.

Summing up the whole issue of definite versus indefinite expression, it seems to me clear, based upon listening experience, that music sometimes expresses very definite feelings or qualities such as triumph, longing, or serenity but on other occasions music is highly indefinite in its expression, so that it is difficult to decide which of a number of related, or even conflicting, adjectives is the most appropriate description.

5. We turn now to Hanslick's most interesting argument, the one in which he admits that feelings may be legitimately predicated of music, but the music ought not to be said to express or represent them because "the 'representation' of something always involves the conception of two separate and distinct objects which by a special

act are purposely brought into relation with each other."[1]

It might be thought that this argument would apply only to a theory which equates expression and representation, in which case we could avoid it entirely by simply distinguishing between them. However, the force of Hanslick's argument is not so easily dodged as can be seen by Beardsley's recent reformulation of it:

> The Expression Theory has called our attention to an important fact about music--namely, that it has human regional qualities. But in performing this service it has rendered itself obsolete. We now have no further use for it. Indeed we are much better off without it. 'The music is joyous' is plain and can be defended. 'The music expresses joy' adds nothing except unnecessary and unanswerable questions.
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> For 'express' is properly a relational term; it requires an X that does the expressing and a Y that is expressed, and X and Y must be distinct. When we say that a rose is red, we have only one thing, namely the rose and we describe its quality; in exactly the same way, when we say the music is joyous, we have only one thing, namely music, and we describe its quality. There is no need for the term 'express.'[1]

Here Beardsley urges that it is improper to call anything expression unless the expressive object and the thing expressed, Beardsley's X and Y, are "distinct." It is not perfectly clear, however, what Beardsley means by "distinct." Surely he would have to admit that it is possible to make a distinction between a work of art and what it expresses, i.e., a conceptual distinction is possible.

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[1]Ibid., p. 5.
[2]Beardsley, pp. 331-2.

Perhaps what Beardsley means by saying that the X and Y are distinct is that what is expressed is not a property of the object. A word and its meaning are normally distinct in this way: the word expresses its meaning, but does not possess it. Thus understood expression and possession are mutually exclusive categories. However, there are other obvious uses of the concept expression where possession is not excluded, e.g., when someone expresses a feeling he has. Here the feeling is both possessed and expressed by the person.

Perhaps it will help us to understand Beardsley's requirement that the two terms of expression be distinct if we examine the whole controversy that provides the context for his analysis. Since the early fifties, and even before, there has been much written on the distinction between two-term and one-term theories of expression. Two-term theories are those that stress the separation between the expressive object and what it expresses (Beardsley's X and Y). Clearly any theory which construes expression as representation or evocation would be a two-term theory, for the expressive object either represents or evokes something other than itself. Thus the conceptions of expression that Hanslick criticized were all of the two-term variety.

Even though the two-term theory antedates Hanslick, the classic statement of it, the one usually referred to in

the recent critical literature on the subject, is to be found in Santayana's The Sense of Beauty.[1] In any version of the two-term theory, the first term is the work of art itself or one of its elements, e.g., a color or a melody. The second term is whatever is expressed by the first: a feeling, a mood, or any tertiary quality. According to Santayana, the first term comes to suggest the second only by having been associated with it in past experience. Many recent writers (e.g., Hartshorne, Tomas, Arnheim, Langer, Bouwsma, Tormey, Hospers, Reid, Sartre, Gombrich, Wollheim, Pratt, Goodman, and Beardsley) have rejected this separation maintaining instead that the expressive qualities we attribute to works of art are real (even if metaphorical) properties of the works themselves.

The question still remains, however, what precisely is being rejected by this repudiation of the two terms? Some opponents of the two-term theory of expression present their case in ontological language maintaining that expressive qualities are in the work of art rather than in the beholder. Thus Vincent Tomas, in his now classic article on the subject, writes "from the phenomenological point of view, feeling import is 'literally in' aesthetic objects in

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[1](New York: Scribner's Sons, 1896), Part 4.

precisely the same sense that colors are."[1] But Tomas' way of presenting the case for a non-dualistic theory of expression reduces the whole two-term, one-term controversy to absurdity. Even the two-term theorist agrees that the feeling qualities appear to be in the music. (For Santayana, if this was not the case, artistic expression could not occur). Thus the disagreement must concern whether feelings just appear to be in the music or are really there. However, since the term "in" is certainly being used metaphorically here[2]--it is not spatial location that is at issue--the controversy reduces to one of whether feelings only appear to be metaphorically in the music or whether they are really metaphorically in the music. When we add to this the problem of where the music is--"in" the sound waves, "in" the score, "in" the listener, or "in" the composer's head--we can no longer be sure what the whole controversy is about.

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[1] "The Concept of Expression in Art" from Science, Language, and Human Rights, the 1952 Proceedings of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952), pp. 127-44. Reprinted in John Hospers (ed.), Artistic Expression (New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts, 1971), p. 255.

[2] When Tomas asserts that the feeling import is "literally in" the music he encloses "literally in" in quotation marks presumably to warn us that he is using the phrase in a non-literal way. Thus he seems to mean that feelings are non-literally literally in the music.

If not an ontological issue, then what is the controversy over dualistic theories of expression? Surely one thing that all advocates of the one-term theory want to maintain is that the feelings which are expressed are not subjective feelings the listener has while listening: you do not have to be blue while listening to blues; musical feelings are more objective than this and are experienced as properties of the music rather than of us. However, I think there is little here with which Santayana would disagree. True, Santayana does speak of arousal of emotion, but he also maintains that for expression to be aesthetic the feeling must be entirely infused with the object so that the two appear as one.[1] What makes Santayana a two-term theorist then is not <u>where</u> the feeling is or appears to be, but <u>how</u> it got there. For Santayana, expressive properties are acquired properties. They are added on to the object by the process of association.[2] It is in this sense that the second term is separable from the first, a genetic rather than an ontological separation.

Two-term theorists, then, have failed to recognize that feeling qualities can be perceptual qualities of objects. They seem to suppose that because feeling terms are used in describing works of art, real feelings must be involved and hence must originally be a subjective state of the listener

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[1]Ibid., p. 197.

[2]In Chapter II we will consider the adequacy of the theory that expressive values are acquired by association.

(viewer, etc.) which is either projected on to, or associated with, the more objective qualities of the music. They refuse, in other words, to accept the direct evidence of their senses: that such things as sadness and joviality can, in some sense, be heard (and seen) as well as felt.[1]

Leaving aside the ontological question then, Tomas' position becomes: feeling import "belongs" (however this word is understood) to the aesthetic object just as colors do. If this is the case, then Hanslick's and Beardsley's argument makes sense, and it would be just as strange to say "the music expresses sadness" as it is to say "the rose expresses redness." But is this the case? Do expressive properties belong to works of art <u>in the same way</u> that other qualities, e.g., color or pitch, belong to them?

Hanslick is certainly correct in his observation that we do not say the forest expresses coolness or the rose expresses redness, but why don't we? We might very well say of a painting of a forest that it expresses coolness. And the term "expression" is appropriate here, I would like to suggest, precisely because we do not and cannot <u>feel</u> the coolness, we <u>see</u> it. The coolness does not belong to the painting in the same way that it belongs to the forest; nor does redness belong to the rose in the same way that sadness

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[1]Whether everything music expresses can be regarded as a perceptual property of the music will be considered more critically in Chapter III.

belongs to the music. The difference is not that sad music makes us feel sad (most often it does not), while the rose only looks red. The difference is that "sadness," in its primary sense, is descriptive of sentient beings. To say "I am cool" is to speak of the way I feel or of the way the room feels. But to say "the music is 'cool'," is to speak neither of the way I feel nor of the way the music feels--it is not to speak of feeling (or even temperature) at all.

If this analysis is correct, then there is a difference between the way expressive and non-expressive predicates are applied to objects; and it is precisely this difference (a difference which is in no way affected by the rejection of the two-term theory), which is preserved by our use of the term "express" in statements like "the music expresses sadness." Thus expressive qualities may indeed be properties of the expressive object, but they are properties in a somewhat peculiar sense. This peculiarity is indicated by labeling them expressive properties.

Returning to the original Hanslick-Beardsley argument with which we began, it must be concluded that their fundamental insight was correct: the qualities attributed to music are not separate entities referred to or represented by the music. Yet even granting the correctness of their insight, I do not choose to follow them in refusing to use the term expression in connection with music. My reason is simply that "expression" need not connote any such separation.

Thus, my disagreement with Hanslick and Beardsley is entirely semantic. Hanslick, equating expression with representation, quite properly denies that music expresses (represents) moods or feelings. Similarly, Beardsley prefers not to say that music expresses emotions, but only because "expression," for him, connotes a separation between the expressive object and what it expresses. On the other hand, I recommend that we retain the concept expression and employ it to indicate (among other things to be discussed in Chapter III) a particular kind of property of objects, including works of art.

All in all, it seems that Hanslick's arguments have little impact upon more recent formulations of expression theory. This is no discredit to Hanslick, for recent theoriests have had the advantage of knowledge of his arguments against earlier theories of musical expression and have, therefore, been able to avoid the pitfalls which he helped to point out. In examining Hanslick's arguments in detail, however, we have been able to focus on some of the central concerns of twentieth century writers on expression and thereby to see how recent theories of expression differ from their Romantic ancestors. I would like now to turn to the consideration of a single problem with which any complete expression theory must contend: the problem of how music is able to express the things it does.

CHAPTER II

THEORIES OF MUSICAL EXPRESSION

Various theories have been presented in the last eighty years or so which purport to explain how works of art are expressive. Some are two-term theories which explain how expressive qualities came to be attached to works of art, and others are one-term theories which explain why works of art are appropriate objects for expressive descriptions. I propose to examine these theories and assess the contribution of each to explaining the phenomenon of musical expression.

Theories which attempt to account for artistic expression can be classified into five types: 1) The associationist theory, that music is in itself bereft of any expressive properties and that they can be added to it only by association; 2) The empathy theory, the view that expressive properties are empathetically projected into the music by the listener; 3) The similarity theory, which maintains that we find such things as feelings in music because of some structural or formal similarity between feeling and music; 4) The inseparability theory, which denies the distinction between sensation and feeling and

maintains that all sensation possesses an immediate affective dimension; 5) The metaphorical possession theory, according to which feelings and other tertiary qualities are metaphorical properties of music.

In the analysis that follows I shall try to demonstrate that the first two theories cannot possibly account for most musical expression; that the third is more promising, but vague; and that the fourth and fifth are either reducible to, or complementary with, the third and together with it, constitute the most adequate theory of expression yet developed.

The Association Theory

Santayana is the most famous proponent of the association theory which is, as we have already seen, a two-term theory. Santayana differentiates between what he calls the object presented and the object suggested. The first object acquires the second as something entirely extraneous to it. Unfortunately, Santayana does not analyze in any detail how, when, or where this association occurs. He seems merely to assume that expressive qualities cannot be the direct content of experience, and therefore the only way of accounting for their apparent presence in objects is through some past association. Yet, for Santayana, all expression constitutes artistic expression.

> For expression to be an element of beauty, it must of course, fulfil another condition. I may see the relations of an object, I may understand it perfectly, and may nevertheless regard it with entire indifference. If the pleasure fails, the very substance and protoplasm of beauty is wanting. Nor, as we have seen, is even the pleasure enough; for I may receive a letter full of the most joyous news, but neither the paper, nor the writing, nor the style, need seem beautiful to me. Not until I confound the impressions, and suffuse the symbols themselves with the emotions they arouse, and find joy and sweetness in the very words I hear, will the expressiveness constitute a beauty; as when they sing, Gloria in Excelsis Deo.
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> The value of the second term must be incorporated in the first; for the beauty of expression is as inherent in the object as that of material or form, only it accrues to that object not from the bare act of perception, but from the association with it of further processes, due to the existence of former impressions.[1]

The paradoxical nature of Santayana's theory is immediately apparent: for aesthetic expression to take place we must not be aware of the fact that the expressed quality is attached to the object only by association. If we are aware of this, aesthetic expression fails and we are merely reminded of a pleasant past experience.

> We say explicitly: I value this trifle for its associations. And so long as this division continues, the worth of the thing is not for us aesthetic.
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> But a little dimming of our memory will often make it so. Let the images of the past fade, let them remain simply as a halo and suggestion of happiness hanging about a scene; then this scene, however empty and uninteresting in itself, will have a deep and intimate charm; we shall be pleased by its very vulgarity. We shall not confess so readily that we value the place for its associations;

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[1] Ibid., p. 197.

> we shall rather say: I am fond of this landscape; it has for me an ineffable attraction. The treasures of the memory have been melted and dissolved, and are now gilding the object that supplants them; they are giving this object expression.[1]

Thus, for Santayana, aesthetic expression can take place only so long as we are ignorant of the fact that the second object is connected to the first by association. The world, it seems, is a beautiful place for those with short memories. Ignorance may not be bliss, but it is beauty.

A serious defect in Santayana's theory is that the few examples he provides us with always involve purely personal associations such as those an individual might have with a house, a letter, or a landscape. Any theory of expression which rests upon personal and accidental associations makes a mockery of both art and aesthetics. A musical composition could then have different associated "meanings" for each listener depending upon his past personal experiences. Presumably a person who was introduced to the funeral march from Chopin's B-flat Minor Sonata at a romantic moment will thereafter regard the movement as the expression of tender emotions (providing of course that he has succeeded in forgetting the circumstances when he first heard it).

I am not arguing that such personal associations do not influence our response to, and understanding of, works of

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[1] Ibid., pp. 194-5.

art, but simply that when they do, it is an obstacle to be overcome, a prejudice which constitutes a barrier to perceiving the work correctly. It is only too easy for one's reaction to particular works of art, styles, or schools to be based upon personal associations, but in so far as this is the basis of one's perception, we normally (and properly) regard it as suspect. Such associations must be recognized and overcome before perception of the true expressive qualities of the work can occur. Thus if associationism is to make any contribution to understanding artistic expression it is essential that the conditions under which the associations occur be more universal elements in human experience. For example, a theory of the expressive qualities of color might plausibly be based on universal associations. Red may be universally associated in human experience with blood and fire, green with vegetation, blue with the sky, etc.[1]

With music, however, whatever plausibility association theory has, is lost for the simple reason that the sounds which make up almost all music are not found anywhere outside of music. Green exists in nature; musical tones usually do not. Associations with pitch and timbre would have to be

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[1]For a more extended discussion of association theory and the expressive properties of color see Charles Hartshorne, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934; reprinted by Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1968), pp. 250-7.

created within musical experience itself and made a part of our musical education. It is manifest, however, that the formation of such associations is not a part of our musical education. We do not have to be made to feel sad when we are first exposed to a particular melody so that we can thereafter recognize its sadness. The conclusion that association cannot possibly account for most musical expression is therefore inescapable.

In spite of these considerable defects in association theory, it must be admitted that there is a way in which association does sometimes contribute to musical expression. Sometimes a composer will introduce into a work a theme which has established associations as, for example, when the theme of the Dies Irae is inserted into a symphony. This theme is not merely another sad melody, but carries with it a wealth of associations from the Roman Catholic Requiem Mass. Similarly, a composer may quote from a well-known folk melody conjuring up images of folk traditions or history. Such cases, while clearly legitimate instances of musical expression, are relatively infrequent. The kind of expression they introduce is very different from the kind most recent philosophers have discussed because the ideas expressed are not in any sense properties of the music but are extra musical associations.

It might be tempting to refuse to classify such associated meanings as instances of expression on the grounds that what is expressed is not a property of the expressive object, but such an expedient would be rather arbitrary and run counter to established usage of the concept expression. I think it preferable, therefore, to conclude, contrary to prevailing philosophical opinion, that in some instances of musical expression that which is expressed is not a property of the music.[1]

The Empathy Theory

Another theory which has been offered as an explanation of artistic expression is the theory of Einfühlung (literally, "feeling into") or empathy. Like association theory, empathy theory was not invented with music primarily in mind. Another feature empathy theory shares with associationism is that it is inherently a two-term theory. Since physiognomic properties cannot literally belong to works of art, empathy theorists argued, they must be projected into them by the observer. To quote Vernon Lee, the earliest writer to present the theory in English, we say that the mountain rises because

> we cannot look at the mountain, nor at a tree, a tower or anything of which we similarly say that it rises, without lifting our glance, raising our eyes and probably raising our head and neck, all of which raising and lifting unites into a general

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[1] In Chapter III I will offer many other examples of musical expression where what is expressed cannot be construed as a property of the music. In these examples, however, association is not the basis of the expression.

> awareness of something rising. The rising of which we are aware is going on in us. . . .
>
> It is a case exactly analogous to our transferring the measuring done by our eye to the line of which we say that it extends from A to B, when in reality the only extending has been the extending of our glance. It is a case of what I have called the tendency to merge the activities of the perceiving subject with the qualities of the perceived object.[1]

This projection of a kinesthetic activity on to an external object might well be sufficient to account for some instances of artistic expression, but it is hardly a necessary condition as Lee seems to think. When viewing a small photograph or painting of a mountain, one need not move his eyes or head at all (or may move them downward rather than upward), yet the mountain can still be seen as rising. Moreover, how are we to account for the expressiveness of a color or a tone quality? What bodily movement accompanies these perceptions? Lee's kinesthetic version of empathy theory is probably most effective in accounting for some of the expressive properties of architecture. No doubt the impact a cathedral has on us has something to do with the physical sense of space and with the movement of eyes and head upwards. It is significant that these qualities are not as well conveyed in a photograph or drawing. Cinematography, however, precisely because of the movement of the camera can grasp [illegible]ry

[1]Violet Paget [Vernon Lee], The Beautiful: An Introduction to Psychological Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), pp. 61-3.

effectively. Here, however, it is only the camera that moves and not the head or eyes of the viewer, thus removing any possibility of an actual kinesthetic basis for the expression.

For other proponents of this school, empathetic projection is more a matter of spiritual identification of ego and object than any projection based on real (or imagined) muscular movements or attitudes. "Empathy means, not a sensation in one'e body, but feeling something, namely, oneself, into the aesthetic object."[1] However even this more spiritual version of empathy theory is open to serious objections.

The question that must be raised concerning any form of empathy theory is this: why is a particular object susceptible to one kind of empathetic projection rather than another? Surely the only answer is that there must be some quality or qualities the object possesses by virtue of which it is a suitable object for this rather than that projection.[2] Once this is seen, it seems the empathy theorist

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[1] Theodor Lipps, "Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Sense Feelings," reprinted in Rader, Ibid., p. 381.

[2] It may of course be objected that the projection does not rest so much upon a quality of the object, but upon something the viewer does or undergoes before the object. Thus, to use Lee's example, the mountain rises because we raise our eyes as we look at it. Still, however, we raise our eyes before the mountain only because the mountain is high. If our physiological response were not related in a regular way to an objective feature of the object, there would be no basis for projecting the response into it. Thus what we do before the object (raise eyes, etc.) must itself be rooted in an objective property of the object.

either must fall back upon associationism--the defects of which we have already demonstrated--or else rest his case upon some similarity of structure between the object and the feeling projected. In the latter case we must ask precisely what advantage the empathy theory has over the similarity theory. The empathy theory, it seems, must add one of two things to the similarity theory: a) If it is a kinesthetic form of the theory such as Lee's, it provides some physiological basis for the projection. But in doing so, as we have already seen, expression becomes very limited, for it can only occur when we are undergoing some kinesthetic activity while beholding a work of art, e.g., we can perceive the rigidity of the statue only when we make ourselves rigid. Surely such muscular responses are not necessary for the perception of tertiary qualities. b) If the extreme kinesthetic form of empathy is rejected, the only difference between it and the similarity theory of expression is that the empathy theory adds a dubious mental process of projection. It is not enough to find the music agitated because its rhythm and tonality resemble emotional agitation. We must project our agitation into the music. It is very doubtful that any such mental process occurs and we have every right to demand that the defender of empathy theory offer evidence that it does.

It is worth recalling at this point what leads the empathy theorist to hypostatize such an act of projection. He is convinced, and quite correctly, that feelings belong

only to perceivers of works of art and not to the works themselves. Secondly, he observes, again correctly, that expressive qualities in some sense appear to be "in" the works. From these two facts he erroneously concludes that since feelings belong to us and not to the objects, we must project our feelings into the work. The mistake in this argument is that of assuming that a real emotion need be present. Once this assumption is made, the door is open for asking where the emotion exists. To this question only one answer seems possible--it exists in the listener. Hence it is concluded that we must project our feelings into the music. In fact, however, when we are listening to agitated music, nothing need be literally agitated, neither listener nor music.[1]

In spite of the inadequacy of any theory of musical expression based solely upon empathy, it is possible to discover a significant way in which empathy does contribute to musical expression. The kinesthetic experience of performing music, particularly singing, may contribute to the sense of tension and relaxation that is a component

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[1]Perhaps a distinction once made by Lucius Garvin is relevant here. Garvin suggests that it is better to say that the music has the feel of agitation rather than the feeling. When we feel that the rock is heavy we do not ourselves feel heavy; nor does the rock have the feeling of being heavy. Similarly music has the feel of gaiety, agitation, or whatever without the feeling having to exist anywhere. "Emotion, Expression, and Symbolic Meaning," The Journal of Philosophy 55 (1958):115.

in much musical expression. The listener who hears a singer reach for a high note may well recall (or even experience) the effort and tension involved in singing such a note; and these memories of one's own kinesthetic experiences no doubt contribute to the sense of tension in the musical passage. Thus the presence of tension and relaxation we find in music may in part result from projections based on memories of our own effort in performing such passages.

It is also possible that empathetic projections are made based on purely imaginary kinesthetic experiences. For example, even one who has never played a violin may be able to imagine the physical difficulty in playing very rapidly or executing double stops. The imagined tension from such vicarious kinesthetic experiences may also be projected into the music and contribute to its expressive quality.

However, it must be cautioned that unless these remembered or imagined performing experiences are very widely shared, as they no doubt sometimes are, the projections they lead to would be too personal or idiosyncratic to be relevant to musical expression, i.e., to what the music expresses rather than how a given individual <u>per accidens</u> reacts to it.

There are certainly cases where this condition of universality is met. The relative tension of high notes versus the relaxation of low notes undoubtedly results in part from the universal human experience of singing such notes. Here, however, we come very close once again to expression based upon similarity, a subject matter to which we now turn.

The Similarity Theory

A more promising attempt to account for musical expression has been made by C.C. Pratt and Susanne Langer. And here, as was not the case with association and empathy theory, we have an account of artistic expression that has been developed with special attention to music. What these writers have in common is their conviction that the secret of musical expression lies in a formal resemblance between the structure of music and the structure of human feeling. Langer has given the most complete development of this theory; indeed no contemporary philosopher has written as extensively on the problem of musical expression as she has.[1] For this

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[1]Mrs. Langer originally developed a similarity theory of musical expression in Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942; paperback ed., New York: Mentor, 1951). She expanded her theory to the other arts in Feeling and Form (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953). Other writings by Mrs. Langer relevant to our topic are: Problems of Art: Ten Philosophical Lectures (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), Philosophical Sketches (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), and Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, Vol. I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

reason I propose to examine her views at length.

Langer's theory of musical expression is very different from those that Hanslick criticized. In fact she echoes his criticisms of all those who would make music self-expression, the arousal of emotions, the representation of emotions, or a language of emotions. In spite of her argument with Hanslick, however, Langer maintains that music, and indeed all art, is the expression of feeling. Her theory differs from most earlier expression theories both in (a) what is expressed and (b) the way expression takes place.

(a) In the interest of developing a theory of music which would account for the importance she believes it actually has, Langer wished to dispel the idea that music is merely a discharge of, or a technique for evoking, emotion. To this end she differentiates sharply between emotion and feeling. Feeling is "whatever is felt in any way, as sensory stimulus or inward tension, pain, emotion or instinct;"[1] And it is, she maintains, "the mark of mentality."[2] "Emotions" are only one of the things which can be felt; they are particularly intense feelings for which we usually have a name, e.g., joy, anger, or sorrow.[3] Music, then, expresses not

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[1] Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, Vol. I, p.4.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Problems of Art, p. 22.

merely emotion but all kinds of feeling, or, to be more exact, music expresses what Langer calls the morphology of feeling.

> The tonal structures we call "music" bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling--forms of growth and of attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and dreamy lapses--not joy or sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy of either and both--the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. Such is the pattern, or logical form, of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure, measured sound and silence. Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life.[1]

Feelings then, Langer contends (on what evidence is not perfectly clear), have a formal or logical structure can be abstracted from the feelings themselves. The composer is such an abstractor, and what he creates in tones is sensible forms which resemble the dynamics of feeling. Yet this way of stating Langer's point of view can be misleading, for the composer does not examine his feelings, abstract their form, and then reproduce that form in sound. He works directly with the medium of his art and creates a form that strikes him as significant. This "significant form," as it happens, resembles subjective feeling patterns, but not necessarily feelings the composer has had. Indeed, it is possible, Langer believes, that the composer creates formal patterns of feelings no one has ever had.

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[1]Feeling and Form, p. 27.

(b) Turning our attention from the content to the manner of expression, Langer's view is that the work of art acts as a symbol or symbol-like device which has as its import some morphology of human feeling. The "art symbol," which is the work of art itself in its symbolic or expressive function, does not represent or denote feeling. Works of art, unlike linguistic symbols, have no denotation; they do not refer. But they do have a kind of "meaning," or import as Langer prefers to call it in her later writings. Art symbols are not symptoms of the composer's feelings and need not arouse any feelings in us; rather they present an abstract pattern of feeling for our contemplation. Music, therefore, is more edifying than it is emotionally exciting.

Although Langer regards works of art as symbols, she stops short of calling art a language. The symbols which make up a language have each a conventional and definite meaning, or perhaps several definite meanings. A word has the meaning it does because it has been established by an (usually) arbitrary convention; and its meaning, once assigned, remains relatively fixed. In contrast, a tone has no import whatever outside of a musical context. It is the composition as a whole which has import and its import is not a matter of convention, but belongs to it by virtue of the fact that it structurally resembles the dynamic patterns of feeling. Langer sometimes calls works of art "presentational

symbols" to emphasize that they present their import rather than represent it. The import, she insists, is present in the work and not something artificially attached to it as is the meaning of a word. Thus Langer's is a one-term theory of artistic expression.

Another difference between language and music is that language always has a syntax, a system of rules which tells us how symbolic elements may be combined in order to make meaningful statements. Thus the combination of English words "the cow jumped over the moon" makes sense, but "jumped moon cow the the over" does not, because the second string of words, unlike the first, violates the rules of English grammar. Music, Langer maintains, lacks any such rules for combining elements into a meaningful whole.[1]

The aspect of Langer's theory that has been given most attention by her critics is her contention that works of art are symbols. It is usual for philosophers whose primary concern is language or science to restrict the usage of the term symbol to linguistic and mathematical symbols which possess reference and conventional meaning. Nagel, for example, in a definition frequently quoted by Langer, defines "symbol" as "any occurrence (or type of occurrence), usually

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[1] One could make a very persuasive case for regarding the principles of Classical composition and Schoenberg's rules for dodecaphonic composition as involving a kind of musical syntax. Langer might object to this on the grounds that such syntax does not involve rules for creating musical "meaning," i.e., for determining the import expressed. However, such a sharp separation between form and content would run counter to Langer's general theory of expression.

linguistic in stature, which is taken to signify something else by way of tacit or explicit conventions or rules of usage."[1] Here, according to Nagel, a symbol must stand for or signify something outside of itself, and it must acquire this signification by convention. If this is the only legitimate use of the term, Langer surely should not call works of art symbols. She herself says as much in her article of 1956, "The Art Symbol and the Symbol in Art."[2] Here she acknowledges criticism from Nagel and Melvin Rader and indicates that she will follow the latter's suggestion and speak of a work of art as an "expressive form" rather than an "art symbol" on the grounds that works of art do not have signification.[3] Curiously, Langer does not abandon the term either in that essay or in her subsequent writings. Usually, however, she refers to a symbol in Nagel's sense as a "genuine symbol" to distinguish it from her own usage.

Perhaps it is because Langer uses "symbol" in a philosophically unorthodox way that her theory of art has generally been misunderstood as meaning that works of art "stand for," "represent," "signify," or "denote" feelings.

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[1] Ernest Nagel, "Symbolism and Science" in Logic Without Metaphysics and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956), p. 109.

[2] Problems of Art, pp. 124-139.

[3] Ibid., p. 127.

Given the usual philosophical definition of "symbol," this misinterpretation is understandable. Yet this is certainly not her meaning as is made especially clear in her more recent writings where she says, for example, "Works of art, which I am sure have import, but not genuine meaning, are symbols of a sort, but not of the sort Nagel defined; for neither do they point beyond themselves to something thereafter known apart from the symbol, nor are they established by convention."[1] Elsewhere she has written that the art symbol "is a symbol in a somewhat special sense, because it performs some symbolic functions, but not all; especially it does not stand for something else, nor refer to anything that exists apart from it. According to the usual definition of symbol a work should not be classified as a symbol at all."[2] In the same context she states that the art symbol "does not connote a concept or denote its instances."[3]

In Philosophy in a New Key Langer's position on this matter was not as clear as in the passages just quoted. Nonetheless, most of her language, even in that earlier work, reinforces the above interpretation. Rather than speaking of works of art as "representing," "standing for," "signifying," "referring," etc.--which are the terms her critics use in presenting her theory--she speaks of works of art as "presenting,"

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[1] Philosophical Sketches, p. 60.
[2] Problems of Art, p. 132.
[3] Ibid., p. 133.

"expressing," "articulating," "revealing," "formulating," or "projecting." There is, however, one apparent difference between the way she states her theory in Philosophy in a New Key and in her later writing. In New Key she maintained that music has a connotation[1] although no denotation.[2] But in her later writings, as we have just seen, she denies that the art symbol possesses either denotation or connotation. This leaves us with the curious kind of symbol which has import, yet does not point to anything beyond itself. Langer expresses it this way:

> But what is meant by saying it does not connote a concept or denote its instances? What I mean is that a genuine symbol, such as a word, is only a sign; in appreciating its meaning our interest reaches beyond it to the concept. The word is just an instrument. Its meaning lies elsewhere, and once we have grasped its connotation or identified something as its denotation we do not need the word any more. But a work of art does not point us to a meaning beyond its own presence. What is expressed cannot be grasped apart from the sensuous or poetic form that expresses it. In a work of art we have the direct presentation of a feeling, not a sign that points to it. That is why "significant form" is a misleading and confusing term: an Art Symbol does not signify, but only articulate and present its emotive content; hence the peculiar impression one always gets that feeling is in a beautiful and intergral form. The work seems to be imbued with the emotion or mood or other vital experience that it expresses. That is why I call it an "expressive form," and call that which it formulates for us not its meaning, but its import. The import of art is perceived as something in the work, articulated by it but not

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[1] pp. 93, 193, 203.
[2] p. 93.

> further abstracted; as the import of a myth or a true metaphor does not exist apart from its imaginative expression.[1]

As mentioned previously, Langer has often been misunderstood on this matter of works of art not standing for or representing what they express. Typical of these misunderstandings is Nagel's review of Philosophy in a New Key. Nagel asks what is symbolized by what Langer calls presentational symbols, of which works of art are instances. "Mrs. Langer is quite definite on the point that in any situation of symbol meaning there must be a subject, a symbol, a conception and an object. . . . What object is symbolized . . . . ? What other than itself, does a sensory form 'represent'?"[2] The answer to Nagel's questions is that nothing is represented; there is no object. Langer does not say, as Nagel maintains, that all symbols have an object to which they refer, but merely that signs and denotative symbols do. Here is the complete passage from which Nagel quoted only a portion: "In ordinary sign-function, there are three essential terms: subject, sign and object. In denotation, which is the commonest kind of symbol-function, there have to be four: subject, symbol, conception and object."[3] (Italics mine.)

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[1] Problems of Art, pp. 133-4.

[2] "A Theory of Symbolic Form," in Nagel, Ibid.,p. 356.

[3] Philosophy in a New Key, Mentor edition, pp. 63-4.

It is apparent, however, that not all symbols have a denotation even if they do possess connotation. The word "unicorn" would be an example of such a symbol. For Langer, music too is a non-denotative symbol. "There is, however, a kind of symbolism peculiarly adapted to the explication of 'unspeakable' things, though it lacks the cardinal virtue of language, which is denotation. The most highly developed type of such purely connotational semantic is music."[1]

This error of construing Langer's theory as a representation theory leads Nagel to the following unwarranted criticism: "According to her, the primary function of music is to represent patterns of emotional tension, which are presumably simply 'given' to and apprehended by the composer in some fashion or other."[2] This is the precise contrary of Langer's intention: hers' is a theory of music in which the artist is a creator not an imitator.

Allow me to formulate once again this difficulty interpreters have had in understanding Langer's theory of expression. If a work of art is a symbol, then it would seem that it must point to something beyond itself. This something beyond then becomes the true concern of artistic interest making the work itself a mere means to an end. But if there

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[1]Ibid., p. 93.
[2]Ibid., p. 359.

is nothing beyond to which the work points, then it is not a symbol.

To resolve this dilemma we must formulate Langer's theory more precisely. The import of a work of art is presented in the work itself. It is a new creation and not some previously existent meaning for which the artist has just found a symbol. Yet the import does have to do with life, with human experience and feeling. It does therefore bear some relationship, a relationship of analogy or similarity of form, to things already known. But it does not copy, represent, or refer to them. The import of a work of art is inseparable from the symbol which presents it; it cannot be otherwise expressed. Artistic import in this respect is very different from the conventionally assigned meaning of words. When we coin a new word, both the denotation and connotation of the word can be grasped and expressed without the word. (How else could we define it?) In the act of definition, therefore, we merely bring the word and its connotation together. There is no connection between them other than the arbitrary one established by the definition. A poem, on the other hand, carries its meaning in a different way. It consists of words which have established meanings and sentences which can be understood outside of the poem. But when the sentences which make up the poem are understood in their strict propositional meaning, we do not have the

meaning of the poem. Indeed, the full meaning of the poem can never be expressed outside of the poem itself. We may interpret the poem, but our translation will always be partial and inadequate; it can never take the place of the poem.

Thus the more precise answer to the question, does the art symbol point to something beyond it, is both a partial yes and a partial no. No, it does not point to any independently existing (or statable) object (or concept). But, on the other hand, neither is the import of a work of art something that belongs wholly and exclusively to the work, e.g., a purely musical meaning[1] that has no relation to anything outside of music.

We now have, I think, a fairly clear picture of what Langer means when she calls a work of art a symbol. Whether she uses the term symbol properly is not our concern here as long as we understand what she means by it. For present purposes, what is important is Langer's contention that music is expressive by virtue of some similarity of form between it and what it expresses. Unfortunately, it is just this aspect of her theory which is especially vague; and, it seems, as she presents the theory, necessarily vague. For if

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[1]By a purely musical meaning I have in mind a formalistic theory of musical meaning such as Leonard B. Meyer's theory of "embodied musical meaning" according to which music has meaning of a purely internal kind achieved by one portion of a composition "pointing to" or "indicating" another portion. Meyer's views will be examined in detail in Chapter III.

I understand Langer correctly, it is only in works of art that we are able to "conceptualize" or symbolize feeling. If this is so, it is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to "get at" feelings (or more precisely, the morphology of feelings) sufficiently to determine the plausibility of her theory. In other words, to establish that there exists a similarity between music and feeling, both must be independently observable so that a comparison of their respective forms can be made.

The above argument requires more precise development. For Langer, all knowledge rests upon the ability to symbolize the object of knowledge. Feelings, of course, can be symbolized in a very general way by the words we use to denote them. But only in works of art are feelings symbolized in a more subtle way that takes account of their qualitative dimensions. Thus we have no way of knowing what the forms of feelings are except by means of works of art. But if this is so, we can never independently observe the forms of feeling to see if they do indeed resemble the forms of works of art. Hence the claim that works of art structurally resemble the forms of feeling cannot be verified.

In Chapter three we will attempt to find a way out of this dilemma.

The Inseparability Theory

Another theory which might be thought to account for musical expression precisely reverses Hanslick's assumption concerning the separation of sensation and feeling. Hanslick had thought that writers on music were sometimes lead to the conclusion that music expresses feeling simply because they failed to distinguish between sensation and feeling. Music, he acknowledged, has much to do with sensation, since we do hear it, but has no essential connection with feeling. Yet, Hanslick thought, because no clear distinction is usually made between these concepts, the conclusion that music affects our feelings is sometimes vaguely inferred from the fact that it affects our senses. A very interesting thesis offered more recently by Charles Hartshorne is that sensation, far from needing to be distinguished from feeling, is really inseparable from feeling.

Hartshorne does not attempt to put forth a theory of musical expression, or even a theory of artistic expression. In fact, his concern is not with art at all, but with sensation and feeling. In Hartshorne's view, there is no need to explain how feelings "get into" sense objects because sensation is itself a sub-category of feeling.

> The "affective" tonality, the aesthetic or tertiary quality, usually supposed to be merely "associated with" a given sensory quality is, in part at least, identical with that quality, one with its nature or essence. Thus, the "gaiety" of yellow (the peculiar highly specific gaiety) is the yellowness of the yellow. The two are identical in that the "yellowness" is the unanalyzed and but denotatively identified x of which the "gaiety" is the essential description or analysis.[1]

Hartshorne is opposed to the "dualism" of sensation and feeling assumed by traditional empiricism which treats sensation as purely cognitive. Against this view Hartshorne urges: "The feeling tone of a color is not. . . something over and above the color; it is just the color itself in its intelligible essence."[2] Empiricists have handled the problem of sensation to suit their own theoretical interests: sensation is something which provides data to be used by the mind for cognitive purposes. But such uses of sensation are a very late development.

> The primitive function of the senses is action and not information. How strange, then, to regard the feeling tone which is admittedly a normal factor in sense experience, and is the only intrinsic reference to action which the experience as conscious involves, as though it were a mere associative accretion, instead of, as the biological data indicate, the primordial matrix out of which sensory qualities are evolved, the very stuff out of which they are made![3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 7.
[2] Ibid., p. 98.
[3] Ibid., p. 111.

Thus construed, sensation is far more primitive than theoretical curiosity. The animal, if he is to survive, must react quickly and appropriately on the basis of his sensations. They must provide him immediately, not merely with the appropriate facts, but with the appropriate feelings. It is only with great difficulty that children learn to see the world with the detached objectivity of a modern adult. "Motion is to the child, as an observer of animals can hardly doubt it is to animals, simply the manifest presence of life. This experience is a feeling before it is a thought; as immediately given, motion is an aliveness."[1] Hartshorne concludes: "The implication is that of the two factors the affective is the more primitive and fundamental, and the sensory a specialization of this primordial function."[2]

A similar point of view has been forcefully stated by the Gestalt psychologist Rudolf Arnheim who is worth quoting on the subject at length.

> The impact of the forces transmitted by a visual pattern is an intrinsic part of the percept, just as shape or color. In fact, expression can be described as the primary content of vision. We have been trained to think of perception as the recording of shapes, distances, hues, motions. The awareness of these measurable characteristics is really a fairly late accomplishment of the human mind. Even in the Western man of the twentieth century it presupposes special conditions. It is the attitude of the scientist and the engineer or of the salesman who estimates the size of a customer's waist, the shade of a lipstick, the

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[1] Ibid., p. 105.
[2] Ibid., p. 128.

> weight of a suitcase. But if I sit in front of a fireplace and watch the flames, I do not normally register certain shades of red, various degrees of brightness, geometrically defined shapes moving at such and such a speed. I see the graceful play of aggressive tongues, flexible striving, lively color. The face of a person is more readily perceived and remembered as being alert, tense, concentrated rather than as being triangularly shaped, having slanted eyebrows, straight lips, and so on. This priority of expression, although somewhat modified in adults by a scientifically oriented education, is striking in children and primitives, as has been shown by Werner and Köhler. The profile of a mountain is soft or threateningly harsh; a blanket thrown over a chair is twisted, sad, tired.
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> The priority of physiognomic properties should not come as a surprise. Our senses are not self-contained recording devices operating for their own sake. They have been developed by the organism as an aid in properly reacting to the environment. The organism is primarily interested in the forces that are active around it--their place, strength, direction. Hostility and friendliness are attributes of forces. And the perceived impact of forces makes for what we call expression.[1]

Once this point of view has been made explicit, it is very difficult to disagree with it, for certainly emotional response is more fundamental and primitive than cognitive apprehension. No doubt traditional empiricist theories of experience have misled us on this matter.

Hartshorne's thesis then is that sensation is inseparable from feeling (the former being a sub-category of the latter). "Sensation is what feeling becomes when externally localized in phenomenal space."[2] Yet this thesis is not as

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[1]Art and Visual Perception (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 430.

[2]Ibid., p. 135.

radical as it at first seems. For by "identity" Hartshorne means only "not completely separate" or "continuous with." After a brief discussion of the theory that tertiary qualities are attributed to objects because of similarity, Hartshorne concludes:

> The stress upon similarity is distinguishable only in degree from the identity theory.[1] For by this latter we mean that a certain subclass of feeling tones is the class "sensory qualities," but that the classification of the latter in this manner signifies merely that the similarities between them and the classes of feeling tones not identical with them are more important than the differences.[2]

In a more recent article,[3] Hartshorne makes it perfectly clear that he accepts the similarity theory of Pratt and Langer (the theory "that there are structural resemblances between patterns of feeling which music communicates. . . and the patterns of perceived qualities of sound"[4])

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[1]Hartshorne speaks of his theory as the "identity" theory. However, if sensory qualities are a subclass of feelings the two cannot be identical. For one category to be a subclass of another it is essential that some difference exist between them. Thus I have called Hartshorne's position the inseparability theory rather than the identity theory.

[2]Ibid., p. 179.

[3]"The Monistic Theory of Expression," The Journal of Philosophy 50 (1953): pp. 425-34.

[4]Ibid., pp. 426-27.

and also that he regards his own views as a complementary theory based upon qualitative (rather than a structural) similarity between feeling qualities and sensations qualities.[1] "We have what Peirce calls 'iconic' signs. Morgan[2] speaks in passing of 'structural-iconic relevance.' Well, add 'qualitative-iconic' relevance (Peirce recognized both structural and qualitative icons) and you have the essential core of my theory."[3]

Later on the same page he adds: "The dictum, 'sense qualities are feeling qualities,' means that they resemble the qualities of non-sensory feelings in such a fundamental way that it is a verbal question whether we call them all 'feelings' of two diverse sorts or say that the non-sensory feelings alone are 'feelings,' while the others are 'feeling-like' aspects of experience."[4]

As I have already indicated, Hartshorne makes no attempt to derive a full-blown theory of musical (or artistic) expression from his theory of sensation, but it is clear what the implications of his theory are in this respect. Some aspects of musical expression are "contained" in the structure of music, but others are "contained" within the sensible qualities themselves. Timber, pitch, intervalic

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Hartshorne refers here to Douglas N. Morgan's article "The Concept of Expression" which is a rejoinder to Tomas' article by the same title and was printed together with it (Tomas, Ibid.)

[3] Ibid., p. 428

[4] Ibid.

relations, and percussive accents, all carry immediately with them certain tertiary qualities which contribute to the expressiveness of the music of which they are a part. These qualities are immediately perceived as belonging to the sounds themselves by virtue of some analogy with the quality in question. Admittedly, the notion of qualitative similarity is vague and would be difficult to analyze (for it is doubtful that any neat criteria of qualitative similarity can be formulated), yet that the notion does make strong intuitive sense can be demonstrated by considering an example of such a similarity. Fortunately, Hartshorne provides us with an excellent analysis of one instance of qualitative similarity when he discusses Joseph Auslander's poetic description of the sound of a fife.

> When a poet wishes to describe sounds, he may use such an expression as "the silver needle notes of a fife." Note that the "thinness" of fife notes is not the only ground of the comparison to a needle. A sharp object is not merely a thin one, e.g., a thread, but one with an extremity both thin and firm, i.e., strong, intense. Hence only high notes can be "sharp." But the comparison with "silver" leads still farther. The brightness of the fife notes, i.e., their intensity or high pitch, is not mere intensity, just as a bright color is not merely intensity. There is in both cases some quality other than this which is present in an intense degree. If the sound quality of which pitch is the intensity were utterly different from the color quality of which brightness is the intensity, it then could not be the case that the fife notes should seem so beautifully comparable to the appearance of silver. For the intuitive aptness of this comparison is far more complete than any single abstract factor of strength could explain. Were strength the only common trait involved, the diversity

> of the other factors would render this unique ground of the analogy so obvious it must long ago have been subject to clear analysis. Besides, one has only to perceive the likeness in question to see that it is not a mere matter of equal strength of otherwise indifferently diverse qualities. The directly perceived fact is a similarity in all basic respects between certain sounds and a flash of silvery color.[1]

This very fine analysis of Auslander's phrase demonstrates not only the appropriateness of the phrase, but, once again, the subtlety that may be required in rendering analysis of expressive descriptions. I think it will be agreed that Hartshorne does succeed in showing that the appropriateness of the phrase rests upon similarities between qualities such as silver and the sharpness of a needle and the sound of a fife.

Hartshorne's theory of the affectivity of sensation, then, complements rather than competes with the similarity theory. What is more, however, he fully understands the greater importance of structural similarity. "In all the arts . . . it is such formal elements as pattern or melody rather than single (visual or auditory) qualities that are of primary importance."[2] Taken together, the Pratt-Langer theory and the Hartshorne theory constitute a unified theory of expression through similarity.[3] Let us call this broader

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[1] The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, pp. 74-5.

[2] Ibid., p. 182

[3] Vincent Tomas (Ibid., pp. 260-2) is certainly wrong when he contrasts the Langer-Pratt to the Hartshorne theory of expression as though they were conflicting views.

theory, which accounts for expression in terms of qualitative as well as structural similarity, the iconic theory to distinguish it from Pratt and Langer's similarity theory. Here I follow Hartshorne's precedent in using Peirce's term; but I do not mean to suggest that expression is what Peirce calls iconic signification. As with the similarity theory, the iconic theory does not require that works of art signify what they express.

The Metaphorical Possession Theory

Another theory of artistic expression has been developed recently by Nelson Goodman.[1] Goodman accepts the now widely held view that what a work of art expresses is a property of the work. Expressive properties, he maintains, are real properties of works of art, but they are possessed by the works in a non-literal way; they are figuratively or metaphorically possessed. Thus music may be literally in the key of B-minor, but it is metaphorically sad.

Metaphorical possession, however, is not a sufficient condition for expression. For Goodman, expression is a species of symbolization: the work must refer to what it expresses. Yet the expressive object cannot be said to denote what it expresses. Indeed, precisely the reverse is the case: the music is denoted by the name of the property

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[1] Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968), Ch. 2.

it expresses. Sad music refers to, symbolizes, or stands for sadness; but "sad" denotes the music (or a property of the music). The former mode of symbolization Goodman calls exemplification. As with expression, however, the exemplification too must be metaphorical. For if the expressed property were literally exemplified by the work, it would be literally possessed as well.

Not all properties which can be metaphorically predicated of a work of art are exemplified. A valuable paining may be described as a gold mine, but it does not examplify that quality, i.e., if someone wanted to know what being a gold mine meant, we could not show him by pointing to the painting, or to any number of paintings which are gold mines. An object cannot exemplify a property without possessing it, but it can possess it without exemplifying it.[1]

To see if Goodman's analysis of expression constitutes an advance over the other theories we have examined, it will be necessary to give closer attention to his concepts of metaphorical possession and metaphorical exemplification.

Metaphorical properties differ both from literal properties and from non-properties. Literal possession is not examined by Goodman, but is taken as understood. When a

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[1]This claim will be examined critically later in this chapter.

property (or a label) is predicated of an object in accordance with the ordinary range of meaning of the term--color for things seen, loudness for things heard, etc.--the predication is literal and may be either true or false according to whether the property is or is not present. Metaphorical predication arises when a term is applied to an object in a way that involves an extension of the predicate beyond its usual realm of applications to a foreign realm, as when loudness, for example, is predicated of a color.

Thus a metaphorical property is not a special kind of property, but a property designated by a term being used metaphorically.

Goodman does not try to offer a firm definition of "metaphor." The closest he comes to a definition is his charming remark (which exemplifies while defining) that "a metaphor is an affair between a predicate with a past and an object which yields while protesting."[1] Thus the metaphorical predicate both does and does not apply to the object. Taken literally, the predicate (usually[2]) does not apply, but, considered figuratively, it in some way fits. But "fitting" is only half the story, as Goodman recognizes. "When there

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[1] Languages of Art, p. 69.

[2] A painting that is metaphorically blue may also be literally blue, but usually the metaphorical predicate does not apply literally.

is metaphor, there is conflict."[1] Metaphor requires attraction as well as resistance."[2] This resistance is presumably what other writers have called the tension of metaphor.

What needs further examination here is how and why a property can be predicated of something to which it does not literally belong. Why, as we have asked before, can feelings be predicated of music when it is obvious that only sentient beings literally have feelings? To say that music metaphorically has feelings (or has metaphorical feelings) is not sufficient, because it leaves unanswered the question of what the literal property--the feeling--and the music have in common such that the predicate applies. Our question, then, it might reasonably appear, can only be answered by supposing that there exists some affinity or similarity between the music and what it expresses. If this interpretation were accepted, then metaphorical predication rests upon an antecedent similarity, and the metaphorical possession theory might be reducible to the iconic theory of expression.

However, it seems that Goodman rejects this interpretation (that metaphor always rests upon a pre-existent similarity) in a very subtle way. On the subject of metaphor

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid.

and simile Goodman writes:

> Is saying that a picture is sad saying elliptically that it is like a sad person? Metaphor has often been so construed as elliptical simile, and metaphorical truth as simply the literal truth of the expanded statement. But the simile cannot amount merely to saying that the picture is like the person in some respect or other; anything is like anything else to that extent. What the simile says in effect is that person and picture are alike in being sad, the one literally and the other metaphorically. Instead of metaphor reducing to simile, simile reduces to metaphor; or rather, the difference between simile and metaphor is negligible. Whether the locution be "is like" or "is," the figure likens picture to person by picking out a certain common feature: that the predicate "sad" applies to both, albeit to the person initially and to the picture derivatively.[1]

The point of this difficult remark seems to be that the creation of a metaphor does not rest upon the perception of an already existing similarity, but rather the similarity, what Goodman calls the "common feature," somehow rests upon the fact that the metaphor applies. To this end Goodman quotes with approval Max Black's intriguing but perplexing remark: "It would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently existing."[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 78.

[2] "Metaphor," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 55 (1954-55); Reprinted in Joseph Margolis (ed.), Philosophy Looks at the Arts (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), p. 227. Quoted in Goodman, Ibid., p. 78, note. Another interesting view on the subject of metaphor and similarity is that of Paul Henle ["Metaphor," Paul Henle, (ed.), Language, Thought and Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 191.], who has suggested that metaphor always rests upon antecedent similarities, but may simultaneously "induce" other new similarities.

Unless one holds an idealism according to which similarities come into existence only when they are formulated, it is difficult to see how this view could be justified. Admittedly, there is something almost magical in the poetic creation of metaphor. But even so it accords more with our ordinary understanding of the world to say that the poet discovers a similarity never before noticed than to say that he creates one. To be even more precise, the poet leads us to the perception of a non-obvious congruity between objects or events that has not previously been noticed. Thus with some exaggeration he may be said to have "created" it, so novel is his discovery. However, it is very significant that the attempt at metaphor may fail if the congruity cannot be made. A poet cannot liken any two objects and create a metaphor. This fact is evidence that metaphors must rest upon a similarity already in existence.[1]

Moreover, the situation in predicating metaphorical properties to music is usually very unlike that of the poet's use of metaphor. It is the extreme originality of the poet's metaphor that gives Black's claim (that the poet creates rather than discovers the similarity) what plausibility it has.

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[1]It is not my contention that all metaphor rest upon similarity. It may be possible, as Wheelwright maintains [Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 78-86], that some metaphor rests upon juxtaposition rather than on transference or congruity. My contention need only be that when a "common feature" is involved, as it is in Goodman's analysis of expression, the similarity must in some sense be there so that the metaphor can be made.

However, when the pedestrian music lover says that the music is sad, he is not creating anything, but merely pointing out an obvious similarity between the music and a variety of specifiable features connected with sadness.

It seems safe to conclude then that metaphorical properties may be attributed to music only when there exists a similarity between the music in question and certain features connected with the quality metaphorically predicated. But here we must ask another crucial question: is similarity a sufficient condition for metaphor? Is the fact that A resembles B sufficient for the creation of a metaphor? If simile is simply the likening of any two objects, presumably we could create a simile by saying A is like B. And if a metaphor is simply an elliptical simile, then A is B will constitute a metaphor whenever A and B resemble each other in any way at all. That this fails as a formula for creating metaphors is abundantly clear as soon as we plug in any two similar objects for A and B. Thus, since Mozart's 40th Symphony is like his 25th in that both are in the key of G-minor, merely stating this likeness would be a simile and to say Mozart's 40th is Mozart's 25th would be a metaphor.

From the above it can be seen that even if similarity is a necessary condition for metaphor, it certainly is not a sufficient condition. This, I think, is part of what Goodman was getting at in the quotation above when he denied that

metaphor was merely an elliptical way of saying that something is like something else. But as Goodman recognizes, even simile involves much more than the comparisons of similars. Now I think we can understand better the significance of Goodman's contention that "instead of metaphor reducing to simile, simile reduces to metaphor; or rather the difference between simile and metaphor is negligible."[1]

It is obvious then that Goodman's metaphorical possession theory involves something more than the mere ascription of similarity. An additional requirement for metaphor has already been noted above: metaphor is a matter not only of congruity, but of resistance or tension as well. The object metaphorically described must, as Goodman puts it, "yield while protesting." Although most writers on metaphor agree that some element of resistance or tension is involved in metaphor, no one has yet successfully analyzed this factor. As a result resistance makes a weak, even if necessary criterion, for the formation of metaphor.

Leaving aside for the moment Goodman's second criterion of expression, exemplification, what is the difference between the iconic theory of expression and the metaphorical possession theory? If my analysis of Goodman is correct, both theories make similarity a necessary condition for expression. But what does the metaphorical possession theory involve beyond

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[1]Ibid., p. 78.

the notion of similarity? The resistance criterion, though perhaps valid, is not very illuminating. A more straightforward way of explaining what metaphorical possession involves (beyond similarity) is to say simply that it involves possession (or predicability). In other words, the expressive label or description must actually be predicable of the expressive object (even if we cannot successfully analyze the conditions, beyond similarity, which make this predicability possible).

When we now recall that Pratt, Langer, and Hartshorne are all one-term theorists who believe that expressive objects possess what they express, it is difficult to see any significant difference between the metaphorical possession theory of expression and the similarity theory. The only difference seems to be one of emphasis: while Goodman stresses possession and conceals the notion of similarity in the concept metaphor, Langer, Pratt, and Hartshorne more explicitly stress similarity and treat possession as a separate requirement.

(In the final chapter we will have to consider more carefully whether possession or predicability is a universal and necessary requirement of artistic expression.)

Goodman's other criterion of expression, metaphorical exemplification, certainly involves something that is not inherently a part of the iconic theory. Similarity does not necessarily involve reference; exemplification, Goodman

believes, does. "Exemplification is possession plus reference. To have without symbolizing is merely to possess, while to symbolize without having is to refer in some other way than by exemplifying."[1]

But if an object does not exemplify every property it possesses, under what circumstances does it exemplify a possessed property? The tailor's swatch, Goodman says, "exemplifies only those properties that it both has and refers to."[2] So the addition of reference is what turns a possessed property into an exemplified one. But under what conditions does reference occur? Goodman's answer to this question is not very clear. The closest he comes to an answer is when he says: "If possession is intrinsic, reference is not, and just which properties of a symbol are exemplified depends upon what particular system of symbolization is in effect."[3] Goodman does not, however, proceed to tell us what he means by a system of symbolization being in effect. All that follows the last statement quoted is a further example involving the tailor's swatch: "The tailor's sample does not normally function as a sample of a tailor's sample: it normally exemplifies certain properties of a material, but not the property of exemplifying such properties. Yet if offered in response to a question

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[1]Ibid., p. 53.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.

about what a tailor's sample is, the swatch may indeed exemplify the property of being a tailor's sample."[1]

What this example seems to indicate is that an object can indeed exemplify any property it possesses if someone chooses to use it for that purpose. What else could be meant by Goodman's suggestion that possession is more intrinsic than exemplification? An object possesses those properties that it does possess and exemplifies those (possessed) properties we use it to exemplify. If this is the case, the class of potentially exemplified properties is coextensive with the class of possessed properties.

Exemplification, like other kinds of reference, rests upon convention, except that here the convention itself has a prior condition--the object must first possess the property. Thus an object may exemplify any property it possesses provided only that someone uses it for that purpose.

However, even if the class of properties metaphorically possessed were identical to the class of properties metaphorically exemplified, there is certainly a difference between saying that a property is possessed and saying that it is exemplified, for the latter, unlike the former, involves reference. This, at least, is Goodman's claim. We must now see if exemplification does involve reference and if this provides us with another criterion of expression.

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[1]Ibid., pp. 53-4.

As common sense would have it, objects quite by themselves possess their properties but do not ordinarily exemplify them unless they are used for that purpose. Any object (natural or man made) which possesses a property can be used by someone for the purpose of exemplifying that property, but unless or until it is so used it is questionable how appropriate it would be to say that it exemplifies it. Of course there are some objects, like a tailor's sample, which are made explicitly for the purpose of exemplifying certain properties. Thus we would say of a tailor's swatch that it exemplifies such and such a property. But it would be less natural to say that a pine tree exemplifies pine-treeness, although to be sure it could be used for this purpose.

Leonard Linsky has made exactly the same point in his illuminating analysis of reference.[1] According to Linsky, reference belongs to words or expressions in a derivative and secondary sense. In the primary sense, it is people who refer. Words, which may be used for referring, may not in themselves have reference. For example, in a given context, the pronoun "him" may have a very clear reference, but the word "him" by itself does not refer to anything.

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[1] "Reference and Referents" in Charles Cantor (ed.), Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1963); Reprinted in Thomas M. Olshewsky (ed.), Problems in the Philosophy of Language (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 338-50.

When one turns from the reference of words to the kind of reference involved in exemplification, Linsky's point is even stronger. Words which have an established meaning may, in the derivative sense, be said to have reference, for they were created (in part) to refer to or represent something. But it would be stretching language considerably to attribute reference to objects which may be used to exemplify their properties but were not, like the tailor's sample, created for that purpose. Things in themselves do not refer and, hence, if exemplification involves reference as Goodman maintains, do not exemplify.

It may be useful in this connection to distinguish between two senses of "exemplify," a passive and an active sense. In the more passive use of the word, an object may be said to exemplify all of the properties it possesses. (Even in this sense, however, it may be stretching usage a bit to include metaphorical properties.) What must be noticed, however, is that exemplification in the passive sense certainly does not involve reference. In the more active sense of "exemplify," when someone actually uses the object in question for the purpose of exemplification, reference is involved, but is attributed most directly to the one who uses the object and only derivatively to the object itself.

The question we must ask then is whether works of art and musical composition exemplify in the active or the passive sense. Surely musical composition may be used for the purpose of exemplification. A given work may be used, for example, to exemplify the Classical style. Even here, however, it would be odd to say that the work refers to the style or has the style as its referent, although to be sure the teacher who uses it as an example refers to the style. What happens, then, when we remove music from any context where it is being used as an example? Does it then exemplify and refer to all of its properties? When music is loud, does it exemplify loudness and refer to it? If not, how much less likely it is that it exemplifies and refers to its metaphorical properties. If sad music exemplifies anything, it is more reasonable to say that it exemplifies sad music rather than sadness or metaphorical sadness.

As Linsky convincingly shows, referring is a more active process than meaning:

> One can ask, "Why did you refer to him?", but not "Why did you mean him?" One can say, "Don't refer to him!", but not "Don't mean him!". "How often did you refer to him?" is a sensible question, but "How often did you mean him?" is not. One can ask, "Why do you refer to him as the such-and-such?", but not "Why do you mean him as the such-and-such?". I can ask why you refer to him at all, but not why you mean him at all.[1]

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[1]Ibid., p. 341.

Given this active nature of "referring," the most plausible way to argue that works of art have reference (rather than saying they have meaning) is by arguing that this is the intention of the artist in creating them. Presumably a painter who paints in a representational style intends to represent just those objects which are represented in his painting. Thus it might be said that the artist (and derivatively the painting) refer to the objects represented, though this may not be the primary function of the painting.

With expression, too, it is no doubt frequently the case that it is an artist's intention to express just what his work does express. When this is the case, it might be said that the artist and (derivatively) the work refer to the quality expressed. However, Goodman, like most other recent writers on expression, does not want to make artistic expression dependent upon artists' intentions. To be sure expression can be a fully intentional act on the part of the artist. But even so, there are sound reasons we have already discussed for not making claims about expression depend upon assumptions concerning the intentions of artists. It is, after all, works of art that are expressive. It would be unfortunate if we had to know the artists' intentions in order to determine the expressiveness of a work. Furthermore, works of art may be expressive in ways that the artist never intended. Thus, as long as we wish to give primary emphasis to the expression of works rather than of artists,

There is little ground for regarding expression as reference.

My conclusions regarding Goodman's theory of expression then are: 1) Goodman's claim that expression is metaphorical possession differs only in emphasis from the claims made by the iconic theory. 2) The claim that expression is metaphorical exemplification is either false, if "exemplification" is taken in the strong, active, or primary sense, or trivially true, adding nothing to the first criteria of metaphorical possession. 3) Similarly, Goodman has not made a satisfactory case that expression is a species of reference. Indeed, as with exemplification, if "reference" is used in its primary and non-derivative sense, it must be concluded that works of art do not refer to what they express. The only sense in which it can be said that works of art do refer to what they express is the rather trivial sense that anything can be used for the purpose of referring to or exemplifying any of its properties.

I hope to show in the final chapter, however, that Goodman's new way of formulating the central claims of the iconic theory is useful for purposes of verifying that theory.

Chapter III

REFORMULATION AND DEFENSE OF ICONIC THEORY

From the preceding chapter it is apparent that the most promising attempts to account for musical expression are those made by Pratt and Langer, Hartshorne, and Goodman. It is also evident, as I have interpreted these writers, that we have here not three theories of expression, but one which accounts for expression in terms of qualitative or structural similarities between music and what it expresses, with the additional requirement (soon to be called into question) that the expressive description be predicable of the expressive object. The task that remains is to see what reasons or evidence can be found for either accepting or rejecting this theory. However, before this can be achieved it will be necessary to state the iconic theory somewhat more precisely.

Not only are the formulations of the iconic theory we have looked at vague, but, as we have seen, Langer's way of stating her version of the theory renders it very nearly unverifiable in principle because the forms of feelings, which music is supposed to express, are not observable independently of the music. Hence no direct comparison can be made between the music and what it expresses.

Pratt also finds the task of confirming the similarity theory almost hopeless owing to "the absence of an acceptable phenomenology of emotion."[1] If we cannot get beyond Langer's and Pratt's dilemmas, the iconic theory will have to remain a piece of interesting speculation. But perhaps the matter is not so hopeless. I think we can find a way of formulating the theory that will make it both clear and defensible.

Reformulation of Iconic Theory

I would like first to observe that in attempting to find evidence for the iconic theory it is not really necessary to set out looking for such things as "forms of feelings." If we employ a more Goodmanesque formulation of the theory, what we are looking for is resemblances between properties of music and properties of other things denoted by expressive terms or expressive descriptions. In other words, we do not need to discover what the form of sadness is and then compare this form with music, we need only to discover similarities between music and other things denoted by the label "sad." And since many things denoted by "sad" are observable, the task is no longer an impossible one even if we do not possess an "acceptable phenomenology of emotions." Certain kinds of observable behavior, for example, are denoted by the label

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[1] "Aesthetics," Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 12, Paul R. Farnsworth, ed., (Palo Alto, California: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1961), p. 83.

"sad" and can readily be compared with sad music.

A second clue for empirically investigating the iconic theory may be taken from the hypothesis developed in Chapter I: that expressive properties are dependent properties. If it is true that expressive properties can be connected by empirical generalizations to certain other objective properties of music so that music possessing properties x.y.z.... is usually described as sad, then it would be reasonable to suppose that properties x.y.z.... are the ones we are interested in when comparing the music with other things denoted by "sad." In other words, it is x.y.z.... that are apt to resemble the properties in objects or events denoted by the expressive label.

To be more explicit, I think it is possible to enumerate three separate claims. Two of these claims are straightforward empirical generalizations; the other is a claim of explanation, i.e., a claim that a given phenomenon is explained by a given fact or set of facts. Here are the three claims:

(1) There exist regularities which can be formulated in law-like statements (whether statistical or universal) of the form: music possessing objective properties x.y.z.... expresses A.

(2) In works possessing x.y.z.... and expressing A, x.y.z.... usually (nearly always, I believe) resemble properties of other objects or events denoted by "A."

(3) When x.y.z.... resemble properties of other objects or events denoted by "A," this fact explains why music possessing x.y.z.... expresses A.

I would now like to make a few observations regarding each of these properties.

(1) This claim has of course already been stated in Chapter I. There, however, I simply asserted it. Here I shall offer evidence in support of it. It should be apparent also from Chapter I why the generalization is stated in the "logical direction" it is: viz., "music possessing objective properties x.y.z.... expresses A" rather than "music expressing A possesses objective properties x.y.z..... " The reason is simply that it is possible that a different set of objective properties may result in the expression of the same quality.

I am presupposing in making this claim that there already exists general agreement concerning what any given musical example expresses. Obviously this agreement will be more or less attainable depending on the musical examples chosen and the specificity of the expressive descriptions. However, the theory can only be tested if agreement can first be reached, for if it cannot be agreed that a given piece expresses a particular quality there is no point in trying to explain why it does.

By an objective property of the music I mean anything that can be literally and demonstrably predicated of the music or of a performance of the music as, for example, mode,

tempo, or harmonic structure. Obviously some of these properties will be more important than others, but which properties are most significant is best determined by empirical investigation. Similarly, I see no reason to restrict in advance the sorts of things that might count as expressive descriptions. It might be tempting to say that all such descriptions must be, in Goodman's sense, metaphorical, i.e., they must apply metaphorically to the music. However, as I hope to show, this requirement is too restrictive, although it does hold in many cases of musical expression.

(2) This proposition creates greater difficulties. Surely a central problem here is with the vagueness of the terms "similarity" and "resemblance." The problem is that virtually anything resembles anything else in some way. Hence there is the danger that the claim will be trivially true and thus of minimal explanatory value. At least, however, with the present formulation of the iconic theory, we are not merely looking for similarities between music and something as intangible as feelings, but for similarities between specific features of music and other things which are publicly observable. Moreover, in many cases, these similarities will be very easy to observe and may even be quantifiable. Tempo, for example, can be measured in terms of the number of beats per minute and compared with the

speed of walking, breathing, etc. In general, when the similarities are structural (rather than qualitative), recognition of them should present no great difficulty. Judgments of qualitative similarity, however, are more problematic. The obvious danger in attempting to verify (2) is that any similarity, no matter how remote or ad hoc may be accepted just to make the theory seem plausible. Thus the reader must be on guard to be sure that alleged similarities are sufficiently strong and specific to give (2) the explanatory power required by (3).

If it should happen that similarities cannot be found involving all of the objective properties (e.g., similarities can be found for x and y, but notz), the results will still be significant for it will indicate that expression partly depends upon resemblance. One may hold the iconic theory without believing that all expression is a matter of iconicity. Have we not already seen ways in which association and empathetic projection can contribute to musical expression? Thus the failure to find an iconic justification for each expressively relevant feature of the music will not be disastrous to the iconic theory . My hypothesis is that most, but not all, expression rests upon iconicity.

(3) This contention, which is surely crucial to the iconic theory, is more difficult to justify. It is neither an empirical generalization nor a straightforward instance of deductive-nomological explanation. One might attempt to make this explanation conform to the deductive-nomological model by supposing that everything expresses that with which it is iconic. With this additional premise, the

desired conclusion could be deduced. Unfortunately, the premise is certainly false: things do not express everything they resemble. However, as was made clear in the discussion of (1) above, I am not attempting to explain that the expression of A has taken place, but only why the expression, which has occurred, can be characterized or described as the expression of A. To enumerate the sufficient conditions for expression goes beyond the scope of this paper.

Even so, it might be argued that my explanation is in need of a general covering law to the effect that in all expression the expressive object and that which it expresses stand in a relation of similarity. However, I wish to make no such claim. Some kinds of expression may result from association, convention, or even yet undiscovered means having nothing to do with iconicity. My claim is simply that when similarities can be discovered between the music and what it expresses, this fact is sufficient to explain why the music expresses the quality it does.

I am afraid, therefore, that I must rest my case for (3), not on any neat Hempelian explanation, but merely on the intuitive recognition of its plausibility, i.e., on the recognition that similarity can be the basis of expression and meaning. This assumption, it must be admitted, is neither novel nor surprising. Not only is it familiar from Peirce's theory of iconic signification, but many writers on expression have assumed it without even stating it explicitly as, for example, does John Hospers in the following quotation:

> When people feel sad, they tend to exhibit certain types of behavior: they move slowly, they walk softly, they talk in hushed tones, their movements

> are not jerky and abrupt, nor are their tones strident and piercing, and so on. Now music can truly be said to exhibit at least some of these same qualities: music that we immediately identify as sad is normally slow; the interval between the tones is small, with few large tonal intervals; and the tones are not strident but hushed and soft. There is, then, a considerable similarity between the qualities exhibited by the sequence of musical tones and the qualities of people when they are in a certain psychological state, e.g., sadness or grief.[1]

Here Hospers is certainly assuming that music is described as sad when it possesses certain characteristics and that these are "sad-making" characteristics because they resemble aspects of sad behavior. Many other instances of writers assuming the iconic theory will be found throughout the remainder of this chapter.

In the above reformulation of the iconic theory, I have attempted to transform what has been a philosophical theory of expression into an empirical theory, one that makes possible a program of empirical research. Since this theory has just been reformulated, no empirical investigation has yet been conducted in an effort to prove it; nor is it the task of the philosopher either to design or conduct such research. However, as I hope to show in the remainder of the essay, much research and investigation that has already been done is relevant to the reformulated iconic theory and renders it a promising theory for further investigation.

Before turning to an examination of some of this

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[1] "Art and Reality," in Sidney Hook, ed., Art and Philosophy: A Symposium (New York University Press, 1966), pp. 146-7.

evidence, I would like to make one further observation. While all three of the above claims are essential to the iconic theory of expression, thesis (1) has even greater importance in that it is crucial to any theory of expression. For if expression did not depend in some orderly fashion on objective features of expressive objects (or events), I can think of no reason for calling it (whatever "it" might be) expression. In other words, if people were to "perceive" physiognomic properties in objects in a purely random way, so that the physiognomic properties were in no orderly way related to objective features of the objects, I can think of no reason for calling this phenomenon expression.

Hevner's Experiments

The first body of evidence I shall report on concerns only the first of our three theses. This whole question was investigated very carefully, but by no means exhaustively, in the thirties by several experimental psychologists, but principally by Kate Hevner in a series of related studies.[1] Hevner did not formulate any laws of precisely the form suggested by thesis (1), but instead experimented individually with the impact of six variables on musical expression:

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[1]Hevner's research is presented in several different articles but is summarized by her in "The Affective Value of Pitch and Tempo in Music," American Journal of Psychology 49 (1937): pp. 621-30.

major versus minor mode, ascending versus descending melody, firm versus flowing rhythms, modern dissonant harmonies versus classical consonance, variations in tempo, and variations in pitch. Each variable was individually isolated and manipulated for each experiment so that a given composition, for example, could be played once in the major mode and then transposed to the minor, or once at a slow tempo and then again at a tempo approximately twice as fast. However, no listener ever heard both versions of the same composition. Instead different experimental groups were used with each subject rating the pieces on an eight group, sixty-one item check list. (See Table 1) The mood quality expressed by the adjectives within any one group is assumed to be essentially the same.

The subjects were given a new checklist sheet for each composition and were instructed to check as many adjectives as they thought appropriate. The number of adjectives checked in each column were then counted and statistically related to the variables under investigation. From this data relative weights were given to the musical elements in terms of the ratios of the differences to their probable errors ($D./P.E._{D}$). The precise nature of this statistical weighting device need not concern us. It is sufficient to know generally that a higher number indicates a strong correlation and a lower number a weak one. The absence of a number indicates no correlation at all. The general results

TABLE I

Hevner Adjective Checklist

8	7	6	5	4
forceful	soaring	merry	delicate	calm
vigorous	triumphant	bright	light	serene
martial	elated	vivacious	graceful	soothing
ponderous	excited	cheerful	sparkling	lyrical
emphatic	impetuous	happy	playful	poetic
majestic	restless	gay	jovial	leisurely
exalting	stirring	joyous	humorous	gentle
	spirited	carefree	whimsical	
	dramatic		fanciful	
			quaint	
			sprightly	

1	3	2
dignified	sentimental	sad
spiritual	longing	pathetic
solemn	romantic	mournful
sober	plaintive	melancholy
serious	dreamy	depressing
	tender	gloomy
		heavy
		tragic

of Hevner's research can be found in Table 2.

Table 2
Results of Hevner Research

Musical Factor	Dignified Solemn	Sad Heavy	Dreamy Sentimental	Serene Gentle
Mode	Major 4	Minor 20	Minor 12	Major 3
Tempo	Slow 14	Slow 12	Slow 16	Slow 20
Pitch	Low 10	Low 19	High 6	High 8
Rhythm	Firm 18	Firm 3	Flowing 9	Flowing 9
Harmony	Simple 3	Complex 7	Simple 4	Simple 10
Melody	Ascending 4	-	-	Ascending 3

Musical Factor	Graceful Sparkling	Happy Bright	Exciting Elated	Vigorous Majestic
Mode	Major 21	Major 24	-	-
Tempo	Fast 6	Fast 20	Fast 21	Fast 6
Pitch	High 16	High 6	Low 9	Low 13
Rhythm	Flowing 8	Flowing 10	Firm 2	Firm 10
Harmony	Simple 12	Simple 16	Complex 14	Complex 8
Melody	Descending 3	-	Descending 7	Descending 8

What this data indicates is that for dignified or solemn music, for example, firm rhythm is the most important factor, with slow tempo and low pitch second and third respectively. Excitation or elation in music, however, seems not to be influenced at all by mode, but is very strongly a consequence of tempo. With these examples as a guide, the rest of the results of Hevner's studies can be easily read from the table.

Obviously such studies are only preliminary to the kind of law formation I have suggested in (1), but they demonstrate quite conclusively the contention that expressive properties

are derived properties. Moreover, if one were to undertake the formulation of general laws correlating expression with objective properties, Hevner's studies would be a good place to look for hypotheses regarding which objective quality is important for each expressive effect.

Tempo, Physiological and Musical

Hevner demonstrated in her experiments that tempo has a considerable impact on musical expression. But a more far-reaching, even if more speculative, hypothesis regarding the role of tempo in musical expression has been offered by Paul Hindemith.

> If the metric units of progression in our melodic line correspond with our heartbeat tempo, we feel that it progresses without causing any excitement. This immediately reminds us of moods, feelings, and situations, in which our heart and with it our general mental disposition was equally at ease. The image of a complacent mood will change in the same degree as we change the speed of metric-temporal succession in the melodic tone progressions, accelerating or retarding, so that it deviates from the heart's "normal" tempo.... If in our melodic succession the metric units are felt as being slower than the heartbeat, we feel that they evoke memories of quieter and gloomier moods, developing into sadness, dejection, and finally desperation, whereby the deviation from our normal heartbeat tempo determines the degree of somberness in these images of moods. Or, what amounts to the same result, we are reminded of mental situations of the described kind caused by a heart beating more slowly than normal. On the other hand, if the temporal units of the melody are felt as being accelerated against the heartbeat, we will be reminded of moods of alertness, serenity, mirth, and frolicking, the degree of merriness again being determined by the degree of deviation from the heart's natural metronome.[1]

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[1] A Composer's World (Glouster, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1969), pp. 49-50.

Hindemith agrees with Hevner's findings, but carries the matter farther: not only does musical tempo affect the expression of emotional moods, but it does so in a way that corresponds with the way changes in heartbeat accompany normal emotional experiences. I know of no research which attempts to deal directly with Hindemith's hypothesis, but some physiological research is at least relevant to the problem.

In a recent book, Music and Communication, Terence McLaughlin reviews some of this physiological research. The first step of his argument is to note that there is such a thing as normal time. He quotes the ethnomusicologist, Curt Sachs' observation: "Men of today are generally unaware of the fact that there was, is and must be, an average normal time--tempo giusto, as the time of Handel called it. Without the concept of normalcy, we would not be able to rate a tempo as fast or slow."[1] We can judge music as fast or slow only relative to some standard of normalcy, and this standard, approximately 76-80 beats per minute, has a physiological basis: it corresponds to the normal heart beat and to the pace at which an average man walks. Pierre Fraisse (following Wundt and others) has shown that "the duration of 0.75

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[1] Rhythm and Tempo, (London: Dent, 1953) quoted in McLaughlin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 32.

seconds [80 beats per minute = 1.25 beats per second= 0.75 seconds per beat] seems to be a psychic constant corresponding to the duration of the complete process of perception."[1] This is the minimum time it takes to associate two words or to apperceive a 5 to 6 digit number. Fraisse concludes: "Walking, heart beats, movements effected at a spontaneous tempo, and perceptions all follow on at intervals of about 0.7 second, which we consider to be the optimum interval for the function of the nervous centers because it is the most economical."[2]

It seems likely then that music at normal time would be experienced as relaxed, and deviations from this time would tend to create tension. Musical experience, as well as Hevner's studies, confirm this conclusion: excited or vigorous music tends to have a faster than normal tempo, while sad or solemn music is of slower than normal tempo.

Experiments conducted by Dr. Lee Salk[3] suggest that heard changes in heart beat tempo have a direct emotional impact upon infants. He found that when the sound of a relaxed mother's heartbeat was played over a loudspeaker system in a nursery full of new-born babies, most of the infants soon went to sleep; those who did not sleep appeared

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[1] The Psychology of Time, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964), quoted in Ibid., p. 34.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Reported in Ibid., p. 85.

reasonably content. When the record was stopped, many of the babies awoke and some began to cry. When a recording of the rapid heart beat of an excited woman was played, all of the infants awoke immediately and grew tense as if in fear. The first recording was then played again and all grew quiet.

These physiological observations hardly verify the iconic theory. Nonetheless, the results are suggestive. Not only does it seem that there is a physiological basis to the role tempo plays in musical expression, but more important for our purposes, a given tempo apparently has the expressive potential it does because it corresponds roughly to the rate of physiological processes which accompany the experience of the actual emotion. Thus, just as excitement produces a quickening in the rate of respiration and heartbeat so does rapid tempo tend to produce excitement in music.

Clynes' Biocybernetic Research

Another fascinating, even if inconclusive and somewhat perplexing, body of evidence relevant to the iconic theory of musical expression comes from the field of biocybernetics. Manfred Clynes has developed what he believes to be a way of measuring forms of feelings or, what he prefers to call, "sentic states."[1] He argues that each sentic state is expressed by patterns of behavior or emotions which have

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[1] "Toward a View of Man," in Biomedical Engineering Systems, Manfred Clynes and John H. Milsum, eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 272-358.

a characteristic space-time shape. Thus there is a characteristic shape or "essentic form" that expresses sadness and another that communicates joy. These essentic forms do not vary greatly from individual to individual, nor do they vary, Clynes maintains, according to the organ of the body used in their expression.

Clynes has devised a way of measuring these forms experimentally. He asks a subject to press a two-dimensional pressure transducer with the middle finger in response to a verbal request to try to express a particular emotion. The transducer then records variations in both vertical and horizontal pressure over a specified time interval. A series of thirty to fifty attempts is made by each subject, with each attempt lasting approximately two seconds. The essentic form outputs are then averaged on a CAT computer.

Clynes has found that the results are remarkably stable for a given individual at different times and for different individuals. With practice the subjects response stabilizes and responses become more consistent. However, "any attempt to relearn these shapes arbitrarily (e.g., so that the shape for anger is used for expressing love and vice versa) is not successful."[1] Furthermore, attempts to combine different states are not always successful. Some conditions such as love and joy or hate and anger are compatible, but anger and joy, for example, cannot be combined.

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[1]Ibid., p. 333.

It is also interesting to note that Clynes' subjects are not undergoing or experiencing emotions in the ordinary sense, but are merely thinking or concentrating on the feeling. This corresponds to the claim made by many modern expression theorists that emotional expression in art is more an intellectual than an affective process.

Whether Clynes has discovered the forms of feelings and whether these forms are anything like those that Langer has hypothesized, may perhaps be doubted. Surely they are much simpler than the forms envisioned by Langer. But he has at least demonstrated that there exists specific space-time forms which are in some way connected with the conscious attempts to express a number of specific kinds of feelings. That there is so little variation from individual to individual and from time to time, and yet such clear differences from one feeling to another, very strongly suggests that he has discovered an objective connection between feelings (or the attempt to express them) and specific space-time forms. Clynes' conclusion is that these same basic forms are present in any expression of sentic states. "Essentic form is basic to the expressive act in gesture, touch, dance, song, music, and in the tone of voice of speech. In all these, essentic form is the basis of communication."[1]

As helpful as the above conclusion would be for theory we are examining, Clynes offers little evidence in

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[1]Ibid., p. 329.

support of it. He makes no attempt, in the article under discussion, to discover basic patterns in dance, gesture or tone of speech. However, he does make an attempt to discover analogous forms in music. The results, however, are somewhat disappointing. In his experiments with music, Clynes used the same instrument, the two-dimensional touch transducer, but this time his subjects were all highly sensitive professional musicians. He asked them to think of a particular composition as if they were singing or performing it and to press on the transducer as if they were conducting the work. As in the previous experiment many measurements were taken for short intervals (one second) and the results were then averaged on a CAT computer.

These results are interesting. Once again, there was little variation from trial to trial with the same individual or among different individuals. However, the forms produced resemble the forms from other works by the same composer much more than they resemble the essentic forms of any specific emotion. "It became clear that these shapes were related to the personality of the composer in a highly intimate manner. It was found that with some care we could reliably determine pulse-shapes[1] characteristic of individual composers regardless of the particular piece chosen."[2] Thus, whether the musician was asked to think of the second movement

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[1] In the experiments with music Clynes calls the forms produced "inner musical pulse-shapes" rather than essentic forms.

[2] Ibid., p. 337.

of Beethoven's Op. 3, or the third movement of Op. 129, or the first movement of Op. 28, the musical pulse shapes were nearly identical. It was even possible, Clynes found, to distinguish clearly between composers whose styles are usually regarded as very similar. "Mozart and Haydn have very different internal musical pulse-shapes: So have Debussy and Ravel."[1]

The musical pulse-shapes which Clynes has discovered are related to essentic forms only indirectly. They are not identical with the essentic form of any particular emotion, yet the essentic forms of some emotions "fit" the musical pulse-shape and others do not.[2]

> Considering how a given composer, say Beethoven, a meaning of a particular piece or section of a piece is possible only in terms of idiologs of certain sentic states and ortho-essentic forms, e.g., love, courage, and joy and not hate, anger, jealousy, sensuality. It is somewhat like a sentic jigsaw puzzle; certain combinations fit; others cannot possibly.[3]

Furthermore, Clyne believes, the history of music provides evidence of changes in what Clynes calls the "sentic matrix," e.g., the inclusion of sexual longing in the music of a particular period.

It is difficult to know just how to evaluate the impact of Clynes' research upon the iconic theory of expression.

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[1] Ibid., p. 342.
[2] Ibid., p. 339.
[3] Ibid.

Indeed it is difficult to be sure just what Clynes has discovered in his experiments with music. Surely, if every work by a given composer results in the same musical pulse-shape, the pulse-shape does not indicate what the music expresses, for expression often varies considerably from work to work and even within the same work. Clynes himself concludes that a pulse-shape is "an image of one composer's personality."[1] This claim, however, could only be established if there were an independent way of measuring a composer's personality. In the absence of such a measure all the evidence we have is that the shape remains relatively constant throughout the work of a given composer, but varies from composer to composer. A more modest and appropriate conclusion to draw from these regularities would be that pulse-shape is indicative of an individual composer's style. Whether individual style reflects the composer's personality is an independent claim for which Clynes offers no evidence.

In comparing the results of two kinds of experiments conducted by Clynes--those involving essentic forms and those involving pulse-shapes--there is little opportunity to find evidence which would either confirm or disconfirm the iconic theory of musical expression. The closest we get to finding any evidence at all on the subject is Clynes' observation concerning the problem of "fitting" pulse-shapes with essentic

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[1]Ibid., p. 339.

forms. Unfortunately, Clynes says nothing more on this matter so it is difficult to be sure just what he is talking about. However, if it is true that some musical pulse-shapes do not "fit" certain essentic forms, what this would seem to mean is that the expression of certain feelings is not within the repertoire of a given composer. But there is a very serious problem with Clynes' position here. The statement already quoted--that "a meaning of a particular piece or section of a piece [italics mine] is possible only in terms of idiologs of certain sentic states and ortho-essentic forms, e.g., love, courage, and joy and not hate, anger, jealousy, sensuality"--is perplexing in light of his claim that every work by the same composer has the same pulse-shape. What could Clynes be talking about when he speaks of the pulse-shape of a particular work or of a section of a work when his research indicates that as long as the composer is the same, the pulse-shape remains constant regardless of the piece or section of the piece?

All in all, then, Clynes' research is rather disappointing for our purposes. It fails to offer any real evidence either for or against the iconic theory. His most significant finding which has bearing on the problem of musical expression is simply that a single space-time form is in some way connected with the conscious attempt to express particular feelings. Yet, it must be admitted that if Clynes, or anyone else, should ever find good evidence for the claim that "essentic form is basic to the expressive

act in gesture, touch, dance, song, music, and in the tone of voice of speech," his research on essentic forms could prove very important for the whole problem of expression. I would like to add that I find the above statement a reasonable hypothesis for further research.

Deryck Cooke's Theory of Musical Expression

More germane to our thesis is the work on musical expression done by the well-known musicologist Deryck Cooke.[1] Cooke's investigation is certainly not scientific, but it is the most careful and thorough attempt to discover the elements of musical expression. In a direct way, Cooke is concerned only with the first claim of the iconic theory. He attempts to establish very careful correlations between the expressive properties of music and those objective properties on which the expressive properties depend. Although Cooke never even explicitly formulates the question of why a particular sequence of tones has the expressive character it does, there can be little doubt that his work presupposes the truth of the second and third theses of the iconic theory as well.

Cooke's entire book is in many ways philosophically unsatisfying:[2] without ever analyzing the nature of language, he maintains that music is a language; he assumes somewhat

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[1] The Language of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 195

[2] As essays on music by philosphers who are not also musicians are bound to be unsatisfying in some respects to musicologists.

naively (and certainly unnecessarily) that the feelings music expresses must be felt by both the composer and the listener; he repeatedly asserts that we experience the emotions in music without indicating, let alone analyzing, the very obvious differences between actually experiencing anguish and experiencing the expression of anguish in music; and he never even considers the possibility that music might express anything other than feelings. However, Cooke is a musician rather than a philosopher, and it is in his thorough musical analysis, rather than his theory construction, that the virtue of his work lies.

Very simply, what Cooke undertakes is to analyze the elements of musical expression and assemble what he calls the basic terms of musical vocabulary. Cooke restricts his attention to tonal Western music which achieves expression, he believes, through tensions created by pitch, time, and volume. But, for Cooke, the most important factor contributing to expression in Western music is the tonal tensions existing in melody and harmony.

Cooke analyzes each of the elements of expression (pitch, time, and volume) separately, and then attempts to bring them together through a more extensive analysis of two complete symphonies. An inherent defect in Cooke's approach--and one he is well aware of--stems from the fact that musical expression always involves the interaction of several factors. Thus, when tonal and rhythmic tensions are handled separately,

the results may be misleading. Cooke even attempts to attach a particular expressive character to every interval in the major-minor system. Obviously, however, music never consists simply of a single interval, and the expressive impact of any interval depends upon a great many other variables which accompany its appearance in a musical work, e.g., the larger melodic context in which the interval occurs; the supporting harmonies, if any; tempo, rhythmic structure; the relative volume with which the notes are played; etc. Given this analytic, element by element approach, we must expect that Cooke's generalizations admit of many exceptions.

Let us confine our examination of Cooke's theory to what he regards as the most important element in musical expression--tonal tensions in melody and harmony.

Cooke holds the view that Western harmony is not merely a matter of convention, but is a consequence of the harmonic series. When, for example, a string vibrates, it not only vibrates as a whole producing a fundamental pitch, but also vibrates in halves, thirds, fourths, etc., producing a whole series of harmonics. The strongest of these harmonics are audible, at least to the trained ear. Thus the vibration of a single string produces its own harmony, with the octave, the fifth above the octave, the second octave, and the third above the second octave being the first four harmonics, so that the notes of the major triad, the

most fundamental unit in Western harmony, are present in the sounding of any note. It is for this reason, Cooke contends, that the intervals of the third, fifth, and octave sound so consonant to our ears.

Cooke courageously (if somehwat foolishly) attempts to assign a reasonably specific expressive character to each interval in the major-minor system, except for the major fifth and the octave, both of which he characterizes as emotionally natural. He then cites a number of examples of musical themes in which the interval in question is prominant to support his thesis. Let us examine one or two of Cooke's analyses.

The major third, being the fifth tone in the harmonic series (the fourth above the fundamental), has a consonant sound and usually evokes a sense of pleasure or happiness. "The insistence on the 'rightness' of the sense of happiness has been accompanied by an insistence on the 'rightness' of the major third."[1] Cooke here presupposes an iconic view of expression: the major triad evokes a sense of happiness because it is "right" in the domain of music as happiness is "right" in the domain of living.

Cooke not only supports his view of the connection between happiness and the major triad with several musical quotations,[2] but also cites historical evidence. In the

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[1] Ibid., p. 54.
[2] Ibid., p. 56.

Middle Ages, for example, the major triad was frowned upon by the church. However, Cooke maintains, this was not, as has frequently been thought, because the major third sounded discordant to medieval ears, but because it "belonged to the popular, secular life founded on the desire for pleasure,"[1] a theological and moral rather than a musical reason. More recently, "ever since about 1850--since doubts have been cast in intellectual circles, on the possibility, or even the desirability, of basing one's life on the concept of personal happiness--chromaticism has brought more painful tensions into our art-music, and finally eroded the major system and with it the whole system of tonality."[2] However, even today (1956), Cooke observes, "pop music" thrives on the major triad as does the taste of the average concert goer. "And in Soviet Russia, where the official philosophy is one of progress towards material happiness, experiments in non-tonal music are banned, and composers such as Shostakovich have been obliged to persevere with the major triad, to express 'optimism'."[3]

The minor third attains its expressive quality by virtue of contrast with its major counterpart. Compared to the major third, "it has a 'depressed' sound,"[4] and coming very late in the harmonic series (19th), it is "an 'unnatural

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[1] Ibid., p. 54.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., pp. 54-55.
[4] Ibid., p. 57.

depression' of the 'naturally happy' state of things."[1] Therefore, "Western composers, expressing the 'rightness' of happiness by means of the major third, expressed the 'wrongness' of grief by means of the minor third."[2] Musical examples to illustrate that the minor third conveys a sense of sorrow or grief are easy to find and Cooke provides his readers with several.[3]

Cooke, of course, is perfectly aware that it is possible for minor thirds to occur within the context of music which is not sad and for major thirds to occur within the context of music which is not happy. Many other factors may contribute to the expressive character of a musical passage. But that the major third is a happy-making and the minor third is a sad-making characteristic, other things being equal, is not likely to be disputed. (Hevner's research provides empirical evidence which supports this claim.)

After his analysis of the intervals of the major-minor system, Cooke turns his attention to the examination of certain familiar melodic sequences, e.g., ascending 1-(2)-3-(4)-5 (major), ascending 5-5-(2)-3 (major), etc. It is these sequences that he calls "the basic terms of musical vocabulary." Before we can examine Cooke's analysis of these terms, we will have to look briefly at his way of interpreting the role of pitch change in expression.

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[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., pp. 59-63.

There exists an obvious and long standing connection between changes in pitch and ascending and descending motion. Cooke asserts four reasons for this connection:

> (1) By the law of gravity, 'up' is an effort for man, 'down' a relaxation; (2) To sing 'high' notes, or play them on wind, brass, or string instruments, demands a considerable effort; (3) To tune a string 'upwards', one screws 'up' its tension; (4) Scientists, talking of 'high' notes, speak of a 'high' number of vibrations per second.[1]

Thus a musical melody may suggest spatial motion as, for example, when the Resurrexit of the Mass is set to an ascending melody. More subtly, an ascending phrase not only suggests "up" but "out" or "away," the directions that require effort. And a descending melody suggests not only "down" but "in" and "back." Falling notes are yielding to the tensional, 'gravitational' pull back to the lower tonic; rising ones are asserting themselves against that pull."[2] (Again, the iconic theory is implicit.) Thus if the major triad expresses a sense of joy, pleasure, or happiness, the ascending step 1-3 will express an outgoing feeling of pleasure, while the descending 3-1 will express an incoming sense of pleasure. Obviously, as elsewhere, rhythm, tone, color, volume, etc. can affect and alter these tendencies.

We are now ready to look at Cooke's analysis of some

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[1]Ibid., p. 102. Probably only the first two of these reasons is of the kind that would be suggested by the iconic theory. However, in Cooke's subsequent analysis, he seems to forget entirely about the last two reasons.

[2]Ibid., p. 105

basic terms in musical vocabulary. He first considers the ascending 1-(2)-3-(4)-5 in a major key. The conclusion by now should be predictable:

> We have postulated that to rise in pitch is to express an outgoing emotion; we know that, purely technically speaking, the tonic is the point of repose, from which one sets out, and to which one returns; that the dominant is the note of intermediacy, towards which one sets out, and from which one returns; and we have established that the major third is the note which 'looks on the bright side of things', the note of pleasure, of joy. All of which would suggest that to rise from the tonic to the dominant through the major third--or in other words to deplay the major triad as a melodic ascent 1-3-5-is to express an outgoing, active, assertive emotion of joy.[1]

Once again Cooke supports his case with numerous examples.[2]

Donald N. Ferguson devotes an appendix of his book Music as Metaphor[3] to a critique of Cooke's theory. He attempts to demonstrate the inadequacy of Cooke's theory by offering counter examples. "The Parsifal Prelude begins with the unharmonized melodic sequence 1-3-5 (Ab-C-Eb)."[4] Ferguson asks, "Will any hearer find in that phrase an outgoing, active, assertive expression of joy?"[5]

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[1]Ibid., p. 115.
[2]Ibid., pp. 116-117.
[3]Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960. Reprinted: Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973.
[4]Ibid., p. 193.
[5]Ibid.

Although Ferguson takes no note of it, Cooke himself analyzes this phrase. However, he analyzes it in a section where he treats the "term" 1-(2)-3-(4)-5-6-5 which, he maintains, "is almost always employed to express the innocence and purity of angels and children, or some natural phenomenon which possesses the same qualities in the eyes of men."[1] Looking more specifically at the Parsifal theme, we have an ascending 1-3-5-6 followed by a 5-6-5 in the minor, which then falls to the minor third. Ferguson has taken the 1-3-5 out of context. Still, however, his point is well made: 1-3-5 need not express an outgoing sense of joy. One can easily demonstrate this to himself by simply singing 1-3-5 over and over at different tempos and with varying emphases given to the notes. The outgoing sense, which is very apparent when equal emphasis is given to each note, is undermined when the phrase is sung decrescendo, especially at a very slow tempo.

However, what is important for our purposes is not that there are no exceptions to Cooke's basic terms of musical vocabulary, but that exceptions, when found, can be explained in a manner compatible with the iconic theory. In the example just cited, the declining volume of the decrescendo is what undermines the usual outgoing effect of the ascent because the softening is more congruent with the incoming than the outgoing. Similarly the sureness of

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[1]Ibid., pp. 151-4.

the attack with which the 5 is sung greatly affects the expression. When the 5 is sung with a very gentle attack (especially after a short pause) there is a sense of uncertainty and incompleteness which not only undermines the sense of outgoingness but the sense of joy itself. This effect is further enhanced when the fifth is followed by a minor sixth (as in the Parsifal Prelude) which leaves one suspended, awaiting some resolution. On the other hand, if the 5 (of 1-3-5) is attacked firmly, there is an outward, joyous, even heroic quality.

Admittedly there is much to object to in Cooke'e theory of musical expression. Our immediate concern, however, is to appraise its impact upon the iconic theory as I have formulated it earlier. Cooke offers ample and impressive evidence for thesis (1): that expressive properties are dependent in regular ways upon other objective properties of music. However, Cooke's approach is significantly different from the approach previously suggested in my formulation of thesis (1). Instead of isolating a set of objective musical properties (as I have suggested) and trying to show that music possessing these properties expresses a particular feeling, Cooke takes objective musical properties singly and tries to assign an expressive character to each. This approach makes Cooke's theory extremely vulnerable for reasons he well understands--musical expression always involves the interaction of several factors, any one of which may

alter the expressive effects that the others would have without it. Thus if our aim is to try to establish the most universal laws possible, it is better to consider the expressive effect of a combination of properties (melody, harmony, tempo, orchestration, etc.). Cooke's more piecemeal approach, however, is a highly useful preliminary to the kind of law formulation I have suggested, for it tells us what individual factors to look for in formulating the more complicated laws. All in all, it must be admitted that Cooke makes a good case for all of the terms in his musical vocabulary, supporting each with a wealth of examples.

As mentioned earlier, Cooke regularly makes suggestions dealing with the other two claims of the similarity theory--that the objective properties express what they do because they resemble the feelings they express. These suggestions deserve our careful attention. With some musical properties, such as tempo, resemblances to emotions are fairly obvious. Other properties, however, such as the tonal relations, which make up both melody and harmony, are more abstract and appear remote from anything existing outside of music. A merit of Cooke's work is that he makes it possible for us to see resemblances between these tonal relationships and the feelings which music expresses.

Musical tones, Cooke observes, are not merely sounds; they possess dynamic properties. What gives a tone this

dynamic quality is not its absolute pitch, but its position in a tonal context, e.g., as 1,3,7, etc. Certainly the most crucial characteristic of tonal music is the presence of a tonal center, which acts both as a base and a terminal point for all melodic motion. Simply stated, tonal music consists of movement away from and back towards the center. Movement away from the center creates tension; movement back towards the center resolves the tension. These dynamics are of course complicated by the fact that certain other positions, notably the 3rd and 5th, are also relative positions of rest. (Whether the 3rd and the 5th have this position because of the harmonic series, as Cooke maintains, or merely because of an established convention, makes little difference as long as we all experience the resolution of 1 and the relative resolution of 3 and 5.)

Once we recognize that each of the 12 positions within the major-minor system has its own dynamic property through which tensions can be created, we can see how music might relate to feelings and how each interval might have its own peculiar expressive potential(s).

Let us look once again at how Cooke analyzes the expressive character of an interval. We have already briefly examined his analysis of the major and minor third; let us now look at his analysis of the sixth. Once again we have two different sixths to contrast, and, as with the third,

"the major interval is used for pleasure, and the minor for pain."[1] Yet sixths

> differ from the thirds in that they are not fixed as concords in the triad, but have to 'resolve': hence when either is used in its basic character as a dissonance in relation to the tonic triad, it expresses, not a sense of pleasure or pain fixed and accepted, but of being in a state of flux, in a pleasurable or painful context. This effect is enhanced by the fact that in both cases the resolution is on to the dominant--the 'open' note in relation to the 'final' tonic. The feeling is thus not one of possession or acceptance, like the third, but of non-possession, non-acceptance, need.[2]

In this analysis Cooke explains the expressive character of sixths by considering their dynamic function in the major-minor system. Sixths acquire their emotive significance by virtue of the dynamic properties they possess relative to other notes of the system. They are, first of all, not consonant, not being part of the triad. Hence they call for resolution. Their tendency is to move to the closest point of resolution, the dominant. The major sixth, like the major third, suggests pleasure, but because the sixth demands resolution elsewhere, it conveys a sense of need or longing for pleasure rather than a sense of possession. The most significant aspect of the minor sixth is that, like the minor third, it stands a half step from a point of resolution. Hence its anguished sense of being near to resolution while emphatically (painfully) not there.

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[1]Ibid., p. 64.
[2]Ibid., p. 69.

At every step of this argument Cooke is pointing out congruities between the dynamic tendencies of the note and the emotions it suggests. Based on the assumptions that consonance equals pleasure, and dissonance equals pain, Cooke is able to deduce a whole "vocabulary" for musical expression by simply observing the dynamic properties of notes as they move towards or away from resolution, or are points of resolution themselves. In this spirit Cooke comments on the minor seventh:

> In relation to the triad, it cannot rise to the upper tonic, but is drawn towards the dominant; hence it is a kind of 'lost' or homeless minor third on the dominant, whose immediate resolution (on to the major sixth) brings no satisfaction. And being only a mild dissonance (compare the acute minor sixth with its fierce need for resolution) it is not expressive of violent anguish, but of a gentle mournful feeling, which is made the more woeful by its undermining of the normal joyful feeling of a major triad supporting it.[1]

The major seventh functions, in part, as a stepping-stone for the major sixth on the way to the tonic. But it also stands in a semitonal relation to the tonic so that "the 'longing for pleasure' it evokes is so violent as to be almost painful."[2] To this Cooke adds: "It is, moreover, a longing for pleasure in a context of finality,"[3] because it aims at the tonic, unlike the major sixth which aims for

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[1]Ibid., p. 74.
[2]Ibid., p. 75.
[3]Ibid.

the fifth and hence remains in a context of flux.

There are other intervals we might analyze, but the ones we have examined should provide us with a sufficient understanding of Cooke's method.

A serious flaw in Cooke's analyses is his too simplistic and restrictive assumptions: consonance equals pleasure; discord equals pain. Consonance is congruent with much more than pleasure. Indeed, it may fit such a range of feelings, and things other than feelings, that any attempt to list what it can express is bound to be incomplete. Consider, for example, the range of the metaphorical uses of "harmony."

Cooke has then provided us with some valuable insights into the expressive role of tonal dynamics in a way entirely compatible with the iconic theory, but his analysis is marred by his rather narrow conviction that music is the language of emotion. However, if one would substitute for Cooke's "pleasure" and "pain" a wider range of possibilities compatible with consonance and dissonance, the result would be a more adequate (even if vaguer) account of musical expression. Cooke's own analysis of the expressive character of tonal dynamics is best understood as an example of what tonal relations can express, rather than as a literal translation of what they do express.

The Cantometric Research

I would like to turn now to a profoundly different kind of investigation into the expressive powers of music. Some of the most fascinating, extensive, and exacting research related to the whole problem of musical expression has been conducted by the well-known American authority on folk music, Alan Lomax, and his associates at the Cantometric Laboratory in New York City. Once again, this research was not conducted in order to support any theory of musical expression, but it can, I think, be shown to have relevance to the theory under discussion.

Lomax and his associates (consisting of musicologists, linguists, anthropologists, statisticians, programmers, and movement analysts) have developed an ingenious method of investigating interrelationships between folk songs and culture. A unique feature of Lomax's research is the way in which these songs are classified and rated not primarily in terms of melodic structures, scale systems, meter, or, in general, in any of the ways that could be recorded by conventional musical notation, but on the basis of certain features of song performance style. The experience that led Lomax to this investigation was his perception, based on his many years of studying folk songs from all over the world, that in regions where there exists severe prohibitions against female premarital sexual intercourse, women tend to

sing in a highly **nasal** and narrow or pinched tone. Lomax reasoned that this style of singing expressed the tension and anxiety of severe sexual repression. Much later, through an extensive cross-cultural study, Lomax was able to establish that this correlation between female sexual repression and vocal narrowing and nasality does indeed exist.[1]

Let me explain more carefully the precise nature of Lomax's research. Lomax and his co-workers have collected representative samples of folk songs[2] from 250 of the world's cultures. Together with composer and musicologist Victor Grauer, Lomax developed the cantometrics coding system by means of which they, and their assistants, have rated over 3,500 songs on a thirty-seven item scale. The thirty-seven parameters used by Lomax and Grauer include such things as: the relationship between leader and chorus, choral tonal integration, orchestral tonal concert, amount of embellishment, amount of flissando, glottal effect, etc.,[3] each of which is quantified on a thirteen-point scale. The researchers had to rely on their intuitions and experience in selecting

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[1]Alan Lomax, "Social Solidarity," in Alan Lomax, ed., Folksong, Style and Culture (Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1968), pp. 195-6.

[2]So far they have not attempted to extend their investigation to purely instrumental music or art music.

[3]The entire coding sheet is reproduced in the appendix.

the parameters, some of which have proved far more significant than others. However, the rating method is sufficiently simple so that college students without prior musical training can be taught to rate songs on most[1] of the 37 items; and their answers converge to a high degree. (84.7 percent was the mean consensus.)[2] Once a sample of songs from a given culture was noted, the results of these ratings were averaged. (Songs from the same culture tend to be similar on most of the parameters.)

The results of these averages were then statistically correlated with other characteristics of the culture from which they came. When this is done, it is possible to compare, for example, all cultures possessing a given kind of economy to discover what features, if any, of song performance style occur with greater or less than chance frequency. Lomax has taken his cultural data largely from Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, but other well established anthropological sources have been used when Murdock's data was insufficient. On these and related matters Lomax has been assisted by Columbia University anthropologist Conrad Arensberg. Thus far (as of the publication of Folksong

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[1]Rating according to a few of the items requires some musical training.

[2]Alan Lomax and Joan Halifax, "Consensus on Cantometric Parameters," Ibid., p. 112.

Style and Culture in 1968) Lomax has succeeded in discovering significant correlations between the cultural data and all but a few of the thirty-seven parameters.

Before we can see what relevance this work has to the iconic theory of musical expression, we will have to examine some of the results in detail. Even at this point, however, we can note that Lomax's research is close to thesis (1) of the iconic theory, except that instead of looking for correlations between objective properties of music and a given expressive description, Lomax is looking for correlations between objective characteristics of music (to be exact, of performance style of folk songs) and cultural characteristics or traits (which, of course, may turn out to be expressive descriptions of the songs if it can be said that the songs express these cultural characteristics). Lomax's hypothesis (and conclusion) in the cantometric project is that folk songs express or symbolize cultural patterns.[1]

We must now examine some of the results of the cantometric experiments. Many of the most significant correlations Lomax has discovered concern the relationships between cultural complexity and song performance style. Obviously the first task in seeking such correlations is to devise a scale of cultural complexity. Together with

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[1] Lomax, "The Stylistic Method," Ibid., p. 6; and Lomax and Erickson, "The World Song Style Map," Ibid., p. 75.

Arensberg, Lomax devised three-point, five-point, eight-point, and eighteen-point scales of subsistence types. The five-point scale proved most effective for establishing correlations with the song rating data. On this scale cultures are classified according to which of the following subsistence types they belong: extracting (economies dependent on gathering, hunting, and/or fishing); incipient producing ("simple agriculture without animal husbandry prior to European contact"[1]); animal husbandry (again prior to European contact and often including simple agriculture without plowing or large-scale irrigation); plow agriculture (often including animal husbandry); and irrigation agriculture. The hypothesis underlying this research was "that, at any level of production, the song team and the work team operate at a similar level of complexity in communication."[2] Thus, "song style is a reflection and reinforcement of the way a culture gets its work done."[3]

In order to insure that subsistence type is an accurate measure of cultural complexity, the subsistence types scale was further correlated with community size, form (bands, semi-nomadic, hamlet, village, etc.), complexity of political development, class stratifications, and with

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[1]Lomax, "Song as a Measure of Culture," Ibid., p. 122.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid., p. 123.

additional indicators of cultural complexity.[1] Lomax concludes that "The five-point producation scale is a reliable cross-cultural measure of general social complexity, since it has a demonstrable relationship to six other independent and powerful measures of cultural development: size of community, stability of settlement, government controls, stratification, exploitation, and task complexity."[2]

Taking the five-point scale of subsistence types then, as an adequate measure of cultural complexity Lomax succeeds in finding strong correlations between it and several of his song performance parameters. Songs from highly complex cultures tend to be "text heavy" or wordy. Those from simpler cultures are highly repetitious or "nonsense-filled." Lomax explains:

> As the social net that holds the human community together becomes larger and more tightly woven, every individual act demands greater explanation, discussion, and rationalization. Seen thus, the appearance of the ballad, a factual and understated account of events--late in the evolutionary series and only in Western Europe--becomes the more understandable.[3]

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[1]Ibid., pp. 121-8. Lomax is always careful to provide definitions of the categories according to which songs and cultures are rated, as well as all of the relevant statistical data. Charts and graphs summarizing this data are also supplied. In my summary I shall restrict myself to verbal descriptions of some of his findings. If the reader wishes to examine the data, charts, etc. more carefully, he will find them in the pages referred to in Folksong Style and Culture.

[2]Ibid., p. 128.

[3]Ibid., p. 131.

As wordiness varies with cultural complexity, so too does precision of enunciation. "At the lower end of our production scales, among simple producers, singers most frequently slur over the consonants that divide the text into syllabic bits; at the upper end, syllables are carefully marked or fenced by bounding consonants."[1]

Further correlations can be established with the mode of tone delivery. Complex cultures generally prefer a more moderate tone close to normal speech, in contrast to the more flamboyant style more common in simpler cultures. This more moderate explanatory tone of voice, Lomax holds, is better suited for the higher information content of complex societies.

Another result, this one not quite so obvious as some others, is the preference for large intervals (a third, fourth, fifth or larger) in simpler cultures. Lomax explains:

> The preference for large intervals can be seen as a looser and more open-ended way of defining and splitting up musical space than if smaller intervals are sung. The striking occurrence of wide intervals in the songs of most extractor groups may symbolize a less confining, freer, more wide-ranging approach to the use of space (social and/or ecological) for the individual who lives in a simple society where access to land, food, privilege, sex status, and other life resources is open to all members of the community on more or less equal terms.... Strikingly enough, prominence of very narrow intervals (minor seconds and less) turns up in cultures whose members are confined spatially or restricted by a system of rigid status differentiation in their free use of productive and social resources, notably in the area of Old High Culture, and among the authoritarian Australian Aborigines.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 131.
[2] Ibid., p. 136.

Other factors are also correlated with cultural complexity such as embellishment, free rhythm, orchestral complexity, etc., but rather than examine these results, let us instead look at correlations between song performance style and another cultural characteristic, social solidarity. Lomax remarks that among Anglo-Americans tonal unity within a singing group can be achieved only through careful choice of personnel, intensive rehearsal, and the guidance of a director. Yet in some other cultures, perfect unity can be achieved by a casual assembly of comparative strangers.[1] When such tight social unity exists, it tends, as one might expect, to pervade all cultural activities. Lomax has studied films of dance and everyday work in several such cultures and concludes:

> The data indicate that the distribution of a high level of synchrony in movement turns out to parallel that of cohesiveness in singing; the African and Oceanic gardeners, the Central Europeans, and the African gatherers seem to carry out joint activity with a higher level of gross synchrony than do the people of other regions and cultural traditions. The remarkable ability of these peoples to calibrate and coordinate their voices in song is a consequence of the fact that their bodies are already synchronized. Their cultures permit them to fall unselfconsciously into synchrony. The spontaneous and delicate tuning together of voices so that the overtone series of a group of individuals blends together in a unified stream of organ-like purity seems to be a function of bodies long trained to move in unison, not only in dance, but in work and everyday life. The films show us these cohesively inclined people dancing beautifully together, walking in unison, paddling in

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[1]Lomax, "Social Solidarity," Ibid., p. 171.

> incredible synchrony, even splitting conversation into a supportive and matching leader-response pattern where the phrases of two speakers mirror and complement each other like the steps of a pair of dancers.[1]

Here, again, song performance style proves a valid indicator of cultural life style.

The above is just a sample of research conducted at the Cantometrics Laboratory, but even on the basis of this sample, it must be admitted that Lomax's findings are impressive and a highly significant contribution to the understanding of music and culture. Our concern, however, is to determine their bearing upon a particular theory of musical expression. This will prove a more complicated task.

Lomax's claim that song style is an expression of cultural patterns is not likely to be disputed by the general reader. His claim conforms to a perfectly well-established usage of the term "expression." Indeed, it very much resembles ordinary non-intentional expressive behavior, except that here the behavior belongs to a culture rather than an individual and what is expressed is a cultural pattern rather than an attitude or feeling of an individual. Let me explain this analogy in greater detail.

In ordinary expressive behavior something like the following takes place: an individual has a particular feeling or attitude; this gives rise (presumably causally)

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[1] Ibid., p. 201.

to distinctive body postures, gestures, facial expressions and/or tones of voice; and from these indicators a sensitive observer can make inferences concerning the mood or attitude of the person in question. Often these expressions of subjective conditions are not under our control and may be both exhibited and apprehended below the level of consciousness. Thus even when one tries to speak kindly to someone he dislikes, something uncontrollable in vocal tone or body posture may betray the speaker's true attitude.

A similar pattern exists, I believe, in the kind of expression Lomax is studying. Some cultural condition, say solidarity, gives rise (probably causally) to certain ways of singing from which one might justifiably infer that the society from which these singers come is highly integrated. Here, more obviously than with the expressive behavior of individuals, it is not likely that the average listener or participant will be consciously aware that the song expresses the social solidarity of the group. Yet it seems to me very likely that the music does express, and serves to reinforce, group solidarity just as Lomax and his co-workers claim.

If the above argument is accepted, it must be admitted that Lomax is using "expression" in an acceptable sense. But we can still ask, is it artistic or musical expression, and does it exemplify the iconic model of expression? Let us consider the second question first.

Even though Lomax, like Cooke, never explicitly states that similarity is the basis of expression, the fact that he constantly points out such similarities strongly suggests that he assumes that it is. Thus, cohesiveness in singing is not merely causally related to group solidarity but resembles it. Musical complexity is like cultural complexity in that both are complex. More specifically, high text load, one of the complexity characteristics of songs, coincides with the higher information load that must be communicated in every facet of life in more complex cultures. Similarly, moderate explanatory tone is congruent with the transmission of a heavier informational content, i.e., it is the tone of voice characteristic of complex cultures where a high level of information must be communicated. The predominance of larger intervals in simpler cultures Lomax likens to the use of space in these cultures, "where access to land, food, privilege, sex, status, and other life resources is open to all members of the community on more or less equal terms" in contrast, for example, to the quarter note music of India with its high population density and rigid caste system. Finally the preference for pinched or narrow vocal tone in female singing among societies in which pre-marital female sexual intercourse is severely restricted is explained by Lomax by reference to the tension and anxiety produced by sexual repression. The singers, as we might say in American slang, are "up-tight."

I think we can safely conclude that Lomax's work illustrates the two empirical claims of the similarity theory, thesis (1) and (2). And as we have seen, it is Lomax's assumption, one that I think is warranted, that thesis (3) applies as well.

However, even if it is granted that Lomax is talking about a kind of expression, and that qualitative or structural similarity is the basis of the expression, we may still wonder if it is genuine artistic or musical expression. One difference between the expression involved in Lomax's work and the examples of artistic expression we have been concerned with is the apparent presence of a causal link between conditions the songs express and the songs themselves. I have argued previously in this paper that expression in art need not be causally linked to any state or condition which precedes it, e.g., that the composer or performer need not be sad in order to produce sad music. Yet in Lomax's investigation something like this does seem to happen: the cultural condition produces the style of singing which expresses it. However, I have also repeatedly emphasized that there is nothing wrong with this happening. My position has been:(a) that we do not want the claim that the music expresses A to depend upon an entirely separate claim that the composer felt, underwent, or was in the condition A when he wrote the music, and (b) it is probably factually false that the composer need literally

undergo what he is expressing. Thus the mere presence of a casual link does not disqualify Lomax's examples from being instances of artistic expression.

But does not the cantometric kind of expression violate a principle analogous to principle (a) above. We would not say that good choral cohesiveness expressed the social solidarity of the culture unless the culture indeed had social solidarity. Here I think is a real difference between the sort of expression Lomax has studied and what has been classified as musical expression thus far in this paper. Lomax is dealing with the expression of some actually existing prior condition of a culture and not merely with a characteristic or quality of music. Again we are close to the kind of expression involved in ordinary expressive behavior. I grimace with pain and thus express the pain I **am feeling**. If I grimace without experiencing the pain, my grimace is not really an expression of pain.[1]

It seems then that there are (at least) two very different kinds of expression, one exemplified by expressive behavior in which the behavior expresses an attitude, state, or feeling of the subject: the other, exemplified by works of art or natural objects which possess physiognomic or other tertiary qualities. This is the two-term, one-term distinction all over again.

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[1] But merely what Alan Tormey calls a pain expression. (Ibid., p. 39).

What we have to determine is whether expression of the first kind (the two-term variety) can ever qualify as artistic expression. I would like now to offer a few reasons why I think it should.

Let me point out first that there is something peculiar about the kind of expression that has been given primary attention by most recent writers on artistic expression, i.e., the kind of expression where what is expressed must be a property possessed by the expressive object. A peculiar consequence of this kind of expression is that if it is the only kind of artistic expression, then there is no difference at all in the way in which works are art are expressive and the way in which natural objects are expressive. Both merely possess tertiary properties.

A second peculiar consequence of the possession theory is that it would force us to rule out many well-established instances of artistic expression. Thus a common place observation like "Hellenistic sculpture expresses the relative cultural disorder of the Hellenistic period of Greek civilization" must be ruled out as genuine artistic expression on the dubious grounds that cultural disorder is not a tertiary property of the sculpture.

Even granting these peculiar consequences of the possessive theory, it might be argued that it is dangerous to admit as legitimate the kind of expression where what is expressed is some prior condition of the artist or his culture, because what

the artist expresses through his work may not be expressed by the work at all. Freud, for example, has found in the works of Leonardo an expression of the artist's mother-complex. This might well be a legitimate psychoanalytic inference, but it would be peculiar to say that the paintings themselves, as paintings, express this complex. It is Leonardo, assuming Freud is correct, who expresses the complex through the painting. The paintings express something quite different.

I think then there are two reasons for rejecting the kind of expression exemplified in the Freud-Leonardo case as artistic expression: (1) the expression cannot be determined from the work alone, and (2) what is expressed, Leonardo's complex, is not aesthetically relevant. I would like now to develop both of these reasons and show that while they do apply to the Freud-Leonardo case, they do not apply to the kind of expression Lomax has studied or to the example concerning Hellenistic sculpture.

(1) Freud was able to make his inferences concerning Leonardo's complex only by using biographical data and some rather elaborate (and problematic) psychological assumptions. The art critic or art historian is not likely to make any such inferences even after the most careful study of Leonardo's work. The work, as was remarked earlier, simply does not express the complex, even though Leonardo might be said to express it through the work.

However, with the example concerning Hellenistic sculpture mentioned earlier, I think one could gather from the work alone a sense of turbulence in the culture which produced it. Similarly, even if we knew nothing of Classical Greek culture we might well infer from its art that the Greeks held an ideal of serenity, order, and balance. Likewise Medieval painting is apt to suggest, to any careful observer, a culture with profound spiritual aspirations. The archeologist may occasionally find himself in precisely the condition where he has to make inferences regarding a culture from nothing more than the artifacts that remain. Certainly such inferences are always corrigible, but the fact that they are and can be made suggests that works of art do express something of the culture which produces them.

There are two facts which make such inferences possible. First, it is possible to formulate empirical generalizations to the effect that cultures of a particular kind usually produce art works of a certain description. These are just the kinds of laws Lomax has been discovering in his research. Second, but more fundamentally, there exists some iconicity between works of art and the cultural conditions they express as, for example, between the order, balance, and clarity of Classical Greek sculpture and the corresponding moral and political ideals of Fifth Century Athens. Again this corresponds exactly with Lomax's research.

(2) The second reason for rejecting the Freud-Leonardo case as an instance of artistic expression is the fact that even if the critic and art historian were made aware that evidence for a mother-complex could be found in Leonardo's work, they would very likely find this fact irrelevant to their concerns. The mother-complex simply is not part of the artistic meaning or significance of the work, even though it might supply insight into the artist's motivation. Works of art probably can always be used to make inferences concerning their creators just as we might make inferences concerning the artist from his style of dress or tone of voice. But this kind of inference is usually, and I think properly, judged to be aesthetically irrelevant because we do not think it a primary function of art to express its creator's personality.

When works of art express something more universal, however, such as cultural patterns, styles, or conditions, we do usually regard this as aesthetically relevant. The writings of art critics and historians are filled with observations of this kind, as can be seen with the examples already given regarding Greek sculpture. Lomax's work is of exactly this kind. If the writings of music critics and historians do not contain as many references to the expression of cultural conditions and ideals as do writings on the visual and literary arts, this is probably because it has often been thought that music is not as susceptible to this kind of analysis. However, nearly any page of

Paul Henry Lang's Music and Western Civilization[1] will provide examples of how music can be seen as an expression of culture. Lomax's work only provides us with a more scientific account of the same phenomenon.

Allow me to sum up what I believe has been accomplished in this investigation of the relevance of cantometric research to the problem of musical expression. First, what has been discovered in this research can indeed be called expression because of its very close resemblance to ordinary expressive behavior. Second, the expression involved fulfills the criteria of the iconic theory of expression and thus constitutes further evidence for that theory. Third, in spite of the fact that we have here a two-term rather than a one-term variety of expression, it is genuine artistic or musical expression because what is expressed can be determined, to some degree, from the music alone and the expression is relevant to music criticism and music history. Finally, if the above arguments are accepted, it must certainly be admitted that there is a kind of musical expression that does not fit the well-established possession model of expression.[2]

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[1]New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1941.

[2]This conclusion has been argued at length by Guy Sircello in his recent book Mind and Art: An Essay in the Variables of Expression (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). Sircello's arguments are very different from those presented here. I have not attempted to reproduce them because of certain difficulties I believe Sircello has in extending arguments (originally developed in connection with the visual and literary arts) to music. I find the arguments offered above both simpler and more convincing.

Conclusion

A long-standing defect in most writing on expression is the Romantic bias which limits musical expression to the expression of emotion. The work of Lomax serves to correct this bias to a degree by showing how music can also express objective patterns of human culture. I would now like to argue that music also expresses more basic metaphysical concerns of human existence and does so in a way that can be accounted for by the iconic theory. To develop this view it will be necessary first to examine Leonard B. Meyer's theory of embodied musical meaning.

Meyer's theory of musical meaning rests upon a definition of "meaning" from Morris R. Cohen: "Anything is meaningful if it is connected with, or indicates, or refers to something beyond itself, so that its full nature points to and is revealed in that connection."[1] Thus for Meyer all meaning involves reference; but there are two kinds of reference. Reference may be "designative" and point to something different from itself, as a word denotes an object which is not itself a word, or it may point to something like itself in kind as thunder indicates an approaching storm. Both kinds of meaning can be found in music, Meyer believes, but it is the latter kind with which I wish to deal. Meyer calls this kind of meaning "embodied meaning." In embodied musical meaning nothing is referred to beyond the musical work itself. "Within the context of a particular musical style one tone or group of tones

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[1] A Preface to Logic (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944), p. 47. Quoted in Meyer, Music, the Arts and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions in Twentieth-Century Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 6.

indicates--leads the practiced listener to expect--that another tone or group of tones will be forthcoming at some more or less specified point in the musical continuum."[1]

A virtue of Meyer's theory is that it takes full account of the temporal nature of music; we anticipate what we are about to hear while remembering what we have heard. Musical listening then is a process of anticipation and suspense, fulfillment and surprise. This helps to explain how music in an unfamiliar style may lack meaning.

> Embodied musical meaning is, in short, a product of expectation. If, on the basis of past experience, a present stimulus leads us to expect a more or less definite consequent musical event, then that stimulus has meaning.
>
> From this it follows that a stimulus or gesture which does not point to or arouse expectations of a subsequent musical event or consequent is meaningless. Because expectation is largely a product of stylistic experience, music in a style with which we are totally unfamiliar is meaningless.[2]

One of the most attractive features of Meyer's theory is the light it throws on the difficult problem of musical value. A difference, Meyer maintains, between highly sophisticated art music and primitive music (i.e., simple music, not the very sophisticated music often played by so-called primitives) "lies in the speed of tendency gratification."[3] In primitive music resolution (gratification) is immediate. The primitive, Meyer argues, cannot tolerate uncertainty. Maturity, Meyer adds, whether in an individual or in a culture,

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[1] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[2] Meaning and Emotion in Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 35-36.

[3] Music, the Arts, and Ideas, p. 32.

is a matter of being able to forego immediate gratification for the sake of future gratification.[1]

With these observations on the problem of musical value, we begin to see how Meyer opens yet another door for an isomorphism between music and life experience. It is this avenue that I would like to pursue further, but it will be helpful first to examine some remarks on musical value made by Leonard Bernstein.

In The Joy of Music,[2] Bernstein struggles with the task of accounting for the greatness of Beethoven's music. He first attempts to attribute it to one or more of the elements of music--e.g., melody, rhythm, harmony, or counterpoint--in which Beethoven might be shown to excel. Not finding Beethoven superior to other good composers in any of these, he concludes that the greatness of Beethoven's music resides in the sense of inevitability with which it develops. As we listen to Beethoven, we are struck by how his way of developing a musical idea is absolutely right. "When you get the feeling that whatever note succeeds the last is the only possible note that can rightly happen at that instant, in that context, then the chances are you're listening to Beethoven.[3]

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[1] Meyer's analysis suggests the additional hypothesis that musical value, like expression, rests upon similarity: good music resembles maturity in human behavior.

[2] New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954, pp. 24-29.

[3] Ibid., p. 29.

But Bernstein leaves something out of this analysis, the very point which Meyer saw: a trite popular song also develops in a way that seems inevitable. Indeed, its development is so inevitable that it is also predictable, which is precisely why it fails. On the other hand, Beethoven's music possesses that sense of inevitability without ever being predictable.

Bernstein's analysis of musical value complements very nicely that of Meyer. But what neither Bernstein nor Meyer sufficiently explores is the psychological question of why we should be so very interested in abstract tonal processes of expectation, fulfillment, etc. Is it perhaps because they structurally resemble basic processes of human existence? What after all could be more central to human life than the task of providing continuity between past, present, and future? We want our present to be connected to our past in a way that is continuous with it; and our future to develop from the present in a way that is "right," but not altogether predictable. Is this not precisely the way in which so much good music (not only Beethoven's) develops? Could we not even say that good music mirrors in tonal "images" the metaphysical problem of freedom and determinism? A dull life is much like a dull song in which every event can be predicted before it occurs. Conversely, if there is no connection between what has occurred and what will occur, both the life, and its analogue the song, are senseless. Great music presents us with a form in

which spontaneity and inevitability are reconciled.

After writing the above paragraph I found the same thought expressed by Victor Zuckerkandl: "Every step, as it is being made, is free; once made, it is necessary. Freedom in prospect, necessity in retrospect: this duality is characteristic of the type of law that governs tonal motion. The same type of law--freedom in prospect, necessity in retrospect--is above all characteristic of living processes. What is distinctive of music is the fact that in it this law governing life (in a higher sense) becomes audible."[1] Music, in other words, is the making audible of the law of life.

What music and human existence have in common is that both are temporal processes the end of which is undetermined, or at least unknown. Life and music have each their tensions and relaxation, their anticipations and fulfillments, their primary and subordinate themes, their propelling and conflicting rhythms. The composer, although working with the abstractions of tones, is dealing with the problems that concern him (and us) as human beings--the problems of creating unity out of diversity and of preserving meaning and continuity within a temporal development. To make each moment something of interest and value while contributing to an unfolding unity in which individuality is preserved while remaining integral with the whole--this is the task of music and human existence alike.

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[1]Sound and Symbol, Vol. 2: Man the Musician, Trans. Nobert Guterman (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1973), pp. 146-7.

APENDIX

THE CANTOMETRIC CODING SHEET

L = leader; C = chorus.

	Individualized and little integrated ⟷ Groupy and integrated					
1.	Leader ..... Chorus	Solo	L with C (little differentiation)	L with C (alternation of parts)	L with C (overlapping of parts)	Parts independent (leadership submerged in choral activity)
2.	Relation of orchestra to vocal part	Solo	Simple accompanying relation	.....	Heterophony	Orchestra has independent role
3.	Relation within orchestra	Solo	Unison	.....	Heterophony	Part independence
4.	Choral musical organization	Solo	Unison	.....	Heterophony	Polyphony
5.	Choral tonal integration	Solo	Poor	.....	to	Very good
6.	Choral rhythmic organization	Solo	Poor	.....	to	Very good
7.	Orchestral musical organization	Solo	Unison	.....	Heterophony	Polyphony, polyrhythm
8.	Orchestral tonal concert	Solo	Poor	.....	to	Good
9.	Orchestral rhythmic concert	Solo	Poor	.....	to	Good
10.	Text part	Wordy	.....	.....	to	Very repetitious, nonsense
11.	Vocal rhythm	Simple and regular meter	.....	.....	to	Irregular and free meter
12.	Vocal rhythmic organization	Unison	.....	.....	to	Many independent parts
13.	Orchestral rhythm	Simple and regular meter	.....	.....	to	Irregular and free meter
14.	Orchestral rhythmic organization	Unison	.....	.....	to	Many independent parts
15.	Melodic shape	Arched	Terraced	.....	Undulating	Descending
16.	Melodic form	Complex organization	.....	.....	to	Simple organization
17.	Phrase length	Very long	.....	.....	to	Very short
18.	Number of phrases	More than eight	.....	.....	to	One or two
19.	Position of final	Bottom note in scale	.....	.....	to	Top note
20.	Range of melody	Monotone	.....	.....	to	Two octaves and more
21.	Average interval size	Monotone	.....	.....	to	A fifth or more
22.	Type of vocal polyphony	Drone	.....	.....	to	Counterpoint

23. Embellishment	Much	to	Little or none
24. Tempo	Very slow	to	Very fast
25. Volume	Very soft	to	Very loud
26. Vocal rhythm	Completely free	to	Strict tempo
27. Orchestral rhythm	Completely free	to	Strict tempo
28. Glissando (gliding between tones)	Constant voice gliding	to	Clearly separate tones
29. Melisma (note load)	One syllable to many notes, frequent	to	One note per syllable
30. Tremolo (quavering attack)	Much tremolo, frequent	to	Little or no vocal quavering
31. Glottal effect (guttural attacks and with embellishments)	Heavy and constant (glottal ornamentation)	to	No glottal
32. Vocal register (voice placement)	Very high falsetto	to	Very low deep-chest register
33. Vocal width and tension	Very narrow, squeezed, and hard	to	Very wide, open, and mellow
34. Nasalization	Constant and heavy nasal sound	to	Free of nasalization
35. Raspy	Very harsh, noisy, chesty sound	to	Clear and limpid tone
36. Accent	Many notes heavily stressed (very forceful attack frequent)	to	Very relaxed attack (no notes strongly stressed)
37. Consonants	Precise enunciation of consonants	to	Most consonants slurred over and hard to hear

The above is a Xerox copy of the cantometric coding sheet as it is found on pages 22-23 of Folk Song Style and Culture. No doubt it is not fully self-explanitory. However, I include it here primarily as a list of the thirty-seven parameters Lomax used in his investigations. A detailed explation of each of the parameters, together with a description of how the ratings are made, can be found in Lomax, Ibid., pp. 34-74.

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