EDUCATION IN HOPE:
CRITICAL PEDAGOGIES AND THE ETHIC OF CARE

by
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Abstract

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In the last half of the twentieth-century, critical pedagogies developed to challenge dominant educational models. While critical pedagogies have long argued that ethics is at the heart of their endeavors, the details of the ethical models reflected by critical pedagogies has gone largely unexamined. This dissertation argues that the critical pedagogies of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and a group of scholar/activists working within the fold of feminist pedagogy all reflect an ethic of care. Carol Gilligan first introduced the concept behind an ethic of care in the early 1980s. Subsequent work within the field of feminist ethics, psychology, and education has expanded and refined the concept of an ethic of care. This dissertation seeks to make clear the connections between critical pedagogies and an ethic of care.

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 *Education, ethics, and politics*

This dissertation will argue that education is never politically or ethically neutral. I will argue that contemporary educational praxis, the theory and practice of what goes on in our classrooms, rests on an ethical grounding that is at odds with our nature as social beings; that much contemporary pedagogy flies in the face of *who* and *what* we are as a species and does a disservice not only to the students in our classrooms but to the societies in which these students assume their roles as citizens. I will explore the relationship between an alternative ethical grounding, the ethic of care, and the critical pedagogies of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and feminist pedagogy; arguing that these critical pedagogies are rooted in an ethic of care; that an ethic of care has something important to say to and about critical pedagogies while critical pedagogies have something equally important to say to an ethic of care.

Why does any of this matter? Education plays a part in social continuity and change. The social change I desire is geared towards more democratic, participatory, and egalitarian forms of life, while stressing the need for healthy and positive relationships between individuals. These values are reflected in an ethic of care and in critical pedagogies. Education, to help bring about my desired social change, must reflect an ethic of care. Critical pedagogies, I maintain, already represent an ethic of care; I want to show how critical pedagogies represent an ethic of care because to me the relationship between them seems very obvious but has yet to be formally explicated.

The concerns of care theorists and figures in the field of critical pedagogy share much common ground. I do not think this is coincidental; the ethical mooring of critical

pedagogies is an ethic of care. Recognition of this relationship can help both critical pedagogies and an ethic of care. An ethic of care can benefit because education can be used to help spread the values and characteristics of a care ethic from schools to the larger society; critical pedagogies that recognize the importance of an ethic of care can help challenge unspoken ethical assumptions that militate against care in schools and society. Critical pedagogies can benefit from an ethic of care in that, where critical pedagogies rely on a vague appeal to ethics (e.g., Freire's humanization or the "ethics of solidarity and difference" [Welch, 91]) an ethic of care is more fully developed and can provide the ethical foundation upon which to ground critical pedagogies. Critical pedagogies stand to give an ethic of care teeth by furthering the realization and significance of an ethic of care through transcending the boundary between the moral and political realms. An ethic of care can show various critical pedagogies--from Dewey's, Freire's, feminist pedagogy's to others--what their common ground is, which may aid in promoting solidarity and cooperation among the various strands.

1.2 *My life as a student and a teacher*

In chapter four I will be discussing the concept of positionality and I would be remiss if I did not discuss my own standpoints and how I have come to occupy them. In the following paragraphs I will attempt to center myself, highlighting a few personal details pertinent to this dissertation, while attempting to avoid a descent into solipsism. I think this may help make my interest in the topic of ethics and education clear. I have been a student for nearly thirty years and I have been teaching for eleven. My father was a bus driver for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and my mother is still a

secretary--solid working class jobs though everyone in my neighborhood considered ourselves middle class. Neither my mother or father went to college but they stressed the importance of education to my brother and me. Accordingly, school was something I took and continue to take very seriously.

I was educated in a Catholic elementary school (K-8) in Queens, not so much because of my parents' religious convictions, but because they wanted to keep me out of the local public school system which they viewed with suspicion. My own laziness and trepidation saw me attend a Lutheran high school across the street from my elementary school instead of joining the majority of my friends for a bus or train ride to a high school. When it came time to attend college part of me wondered if I was "smart enough" to go; to hedge my bets I took every civil service exam I could. I was accepted into the City University of New York's Queens College and attended for four years. I declared my majors in History and Political Science based in part on the availability of courses and the charismatic personalities and passion for their field exhibited by professors like Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, John Gerassi, and Andrew Hacker. As I got closer to graduation I started to consider graduate school; my dream had become pursuing a Ph.D but again I did not know if I had what it took to do so. In the following five years I earned a Masters degree in Political Science and a Masters of Education in Special Education from North Carolina State University.

I started working as a freshman in high school and never stopped. By the time I was finishing my Masters in Political Science at NC State I had started teaching in a middle school in rural North Carolina. Like many other states, North Carolina had a shortage of qualified teachers. I had been working for a group home system, "shadowing"

emotionally disabled students inside and outside their schools and enjoyed the work, so when the opportunity to teach in the Johnston County school system presented itself I did not hesitate. I entered a "lateral entry" program at NC State that garnered me my initial teaching certificate and Masters degree in an eleven-month whirlwind of course-work on top of my work-day.

My first exposure to the field of critical pedagogy came when I read Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* while a graduate student. My studies of Marx and Engels and interest in education had led me to Freire's works and then Ira Shor's. I remember writing Ira Shor a letter asking him how teachers like myself produced surplus value in a capitalist economy. He took the time to write me back in detail and I later got the chance to meet and talk to him in depth at a National Coalition of Education Activists (NCEA) conference in Washington, D.C.

My first exposure to an ethic of care was when I took a course with Joan Tronto at the CUNY Graduate Center. The course was a Western political theory survey class and Joan did not have us read any of her works on an ethic of care. However, I had developed the habit of looking up what my professors published and reading what interested me. I read *Moral Boundaries* and felt I was privileged to be a participant (if only as a spectator) of an exciting, relatively new field of inquiry that had real meaning to my life and others'. From *Moral Boundaries*' bibliography I tracked down other works in the field and have spent the last five years reading as much as I can and watching the debates within and about the field unfold.

I have been fortunate enough to teach in a variety of locales. As a resource room teacher at Selma Middle School in North Carolina I worked with students who were

labeled learning and emotionally disabled; kids transitioning from adolescence to young adulthood with the fluctuations between maturity and immaturity that goes with the age; and the occasional “life skills” kid (usually mildly mentally retarded) placed in my class because he was higher functioning than the other kids in the school’s program. As a Peace Corps volunteer on the island nation of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, I spent a school year serving special needs students at a school that was privately-funded but housed in a government building. The students I dealt with there were vastly different than my experience with fifth-through-eighth graders in North Carolina. In Kingstown and the small villages around the mainland I encountered children of various ages with disabilities I had only read about in textbooks in my education program. From the Caribbean I traveled to east Asia and spent a year teaching English-conversation for a private language institute (called a Hogwan) in Ichon, South Korea. My students at SISA Hogwan paid tuition and ranged in age from kindergarten to adult; most of my classes were either early in the morning before the businessmen and women started their work day or after the regular school day when parents sent their children to Hogwan for additional courses in English-conversation, computers, and math.

For the last eight years I have been teaching at Fox Lane High School in Bedford, New York. The Bedford Central School District comprises Bedford Hills, Bedford Village, Pound Ridge, and Mt. Kisco. When people hear I teach in Bedford they think of this northern Westchester district’s celebrity residents, people like Martha Stewart, comedian Chevy Chase, actress Susan Sarandon, designer Vera Wang, and former US Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. I was initially surprised to find how diverse the district actually is. While Bedford is home to horse farms and Pound Ridge’s median family

income is $168,000, Mt. Kisco's population is 25% Hispanic (most recently arrived immigrants) and features group homes and government-subsidized section 8 housing. Twelve percent of students in my high school are eligible for free or reduced lunch.

My experience within Fox Lane High School has been unique. I spent my first four years off the main campus as a Special Education/Social Studies teacher at Hillside, one of the district's two alternative high schools. The students at Hillside were largely there for disciplinary reasons and because of this Hillside had a bad rep. An underserved rep, I would argue, as the incidents of violence at Hillside were and continue to be fewer in number than on the main campus. The students at Hillside, ones who did not quite fit in on the main campus, tended to take ownership of our program and were proud of it. In the time I taught at Hillside we never had more than thirty students at one time, about half of them were white, and most of them came from lower socio-economic families.

For the last four years I have been working in the K.E.A. program on the main campus. K.E.A. stands for Keys to Emotional Awareness and the profile for a student in the program is one described as anxious and emotionally fragile. The first thing that struck me upon transferring to K.E.A. from Hillside was the difference in student demographics. My first year in K.E.A. all the students were white and almost all came from middle-class or wealthy households. I remember thinking (sarcastically), wow, there are no emotionally fragile black or Hispanic kids on the main campus. Fox Lane High School's main campus houses 1300 students and K.E.A. serves no more than twenty of them at any one time.

My teaching assignments at Hillside and K.E.A. could not be more different. At Hillside I was responsible for teaching all the social studies classes: US Government and

Economics, Global Studies, World History, American History. In addition I often taught at elective class, one of my own creation, such as Social Studies and Film. What this translated to is four to five preps per day, meaning I taught four to five different classes per day; compare this to a typical social studies teacher on the main campus who has two daily preps, say teaching two US History and three Government classes. The teaching load—planning lessons, teaching, grading homework assignments and exams—was enormous for me at Hillside and many was the day I left work feeling like I had just managed to keep my head above water. There was always work to be done and I could have easily spent an additional three to five hours a night at home doing it.

My duties in K.E.A. are completely different. I teach resource rooms, periods where students come to my classroom to work on their homework in various subjects. I also accompany certain students—perhaps the more anxious ones or one of our autistic kids—to their academic classes where I support them in a variety of ways, from taking notes to checking for understanding, from running flak for them with their teachers and their classmates to generally re-learning the material so I can help them do their assignments later in resource room. I have no classes to teach, thus no lesson plans to come up with. My prep periods are spent tracking down assignments for the kids in my resource rooms from their other teachers. Aside from the occasional educational evaluation that needs to be scored or written up, I really do not have any work to take home with me at the end of my day.

One thing I do not have to do in K.E.A. is grade students. Resource rooms are classes that do not carry credit and are not pass/fail courses. I really believe this allows me to have a different kind of relationship with students than when I was responsible for

assigning them a grade. At Hillside when I assigned grades I had a personal policy that as long as a student tried their hardest I would pass them in a class. This did not mean I "gave away" good grades; in fact I did fail students who had the ability to pass but refused the necessary effort. Away from the main campus and the prying eyes of administrators and department chairs, at Hillside with kids the majority of whose parents I never saw more than once a year, I was free to my own devices.

The Bedford Central School District itself has been an interesting place to teach these last few years. When I first entered Bedford the district had just emerged from the "Satan trials" where school personnel were accused of fostering pagan religious practices amongst the student body[1]. In the last two years controversy has swirled around an elementary school student who was sexually abused by her step-father and the allegation that her teachers and principal did not report it (Hu, 06); the Board of Education's buy-out of superintendent Deborah Jackson's five-year contract for $650,000 and the provision of health care coverage for Jackson and her family for the remainder of Jackson's life (Slivka, 07); and the failure of two district budgets to garner voter support this past May[2]. Given the economic climate, this years' negotiations between the school district and the Bedford Teachers' Association (my union) and the Bedford CSEA (the

[1] A group of Roman Catholic parents charged that Bedford had violated the Establishment Clause by promoting pagan religious practices through: the activities of an after-school Middle School club dedicated to playing the card game, *Magic: The Gathering*; the making of an image of the Hindu god Ganesha and the crafting of "worry dolls" in a fourth grade class; the liturgy of an Earth Day celebration which read in part, "[w]e came from the Earth, we're part of the Earth and we're all involved in this cycle. One day we'll become [dead] and then we'll go back to the Earth"; the playing of a Native American prayer on a meditation tape while students filled out paperwork; and the district's D.A.R.E. program, targeted for "the encouragement of the expression of attitudes and feelings deriving from the 'inner sel[f],' with the goal of spontaneously producing insightful understanding, without the need for a 'wise man' [i.e., a god] to give instruction" (Altman vs. BCSD, 99-7969). The Bedford Central School District won on appeal.

[2] In 2008 Bedford and Mt. Vernon were the only school districts in Westchester County not to pass their budgets.

union including teachers' aides, maintenance men, office personnel, etc., who, incidentally, have been without a contract for almost three years) should be interesting, especially in light of the recent move by the superintendent and three assistant superintendents to freeze their salaries and increase contributions to their health insurance premiums from 10 to 20% (Gorman, 09). Nationally we usually hear about the low state of teachers' pay; in the Bedford district a vocal group that favors the privatization of public school draws attention to the "outrageous" salaries of the teachers I work with[3].

I have personally been involved in one impartial hearing that was appealed to the federal level and resulted in a victory for my school district. The case came about four years ago when the students of one of my parents withdrew their son from our school and placed him in a private "boot camp" out west. The young man had a history of alcohol and other drug abuse and had several run-ins with the law. He had been warned that he faced arrest and jail time for his next infraction. His parents sued the school for tuition remission and ultimately lost their appeal in district court. Unfortunately for this family, because of the ways schools currently function, they [schools] are responsible for students during the school day and not outside of it. I mention this because I really do feel if our schools were places where an ethic of care suffused classrooms and relationships the outcome in his case would have been different. At the time I had no qualms testifying in favor of my school district; that its and my responsibilities to this child encompassed the school day; that once the boy went home he was his parents' concern and if they

[3] To my knowledge the highest annual salary of one of my teaching colleagues was $160,000: this for a man who had been in the district for thirty-plus years, taught extra classes, coached, and advised after-school student clubs. In a country where the median salary for a high school teacher is $49,420 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 08), $160,000 is a lot of money. However, I would argue that most people who work for a living are *underpaid*. That said, I cannot afford to live in my school district so it is not my tax money that is contributing to teachers' salaries. One local taxpayer maintains a website (http://joegiardina.net) that, though vehemently anti-teacher union, is nevertheless often very amusing.

could not control him they should not expect the district to assume the sixty thousand dollar cost to send their boy away. I mention this because the challenges an ethic of care and critical pedagogies face are structural in nature; the structure of our schools and societies that help shape our thoughts, actions, and justifications.

My attempt to position myself would be incomplete if I failed to mention that I not only read about critical pedagogy and an ethic of care, I am also able, in my own small way, to contribute to the discussion. When I had completed my course work in the Political Science department at the Graduate Center, I started taking classes outside of the department with professors I wanted to study with. Unfortunately Virginia Held's classes always seemed to start in the early afternoon when I was still working, but I was able to finally take classes with Ira Shor. When I saw that the Urban Education Department (then a relatively new department at CUNY, which was one of the last major university systems to create such a program) was offering a course called Critical Pedagogy with a professor named Joe Kincheloe, I looked Kincheloe up on the internet, tracked down one of his books, and signed up for the class. To make a long story short, Joe gave me the opportunity to write a book for a series he and his wife Shirley Steinberg were editing, and thus my academic writing career was born. In the past few years I have been able to explore topics that interested me[4] and have briefly touched upon the idea that an ethic of care is somehow related to critical pedagogies.

This dissertation is my attempt to make clear the relationship between an ethic of care and various critical pedagogies. I have been selective in the critical pedagogies I

[4] In *The Politics of Education*, Sense: 2006; *Critical Pedagogy and the Everyday Classroom*, Springer: 2008; *Unrepentant Radical Educator: The writings of John Gerassi, edited and with interviews by Tony Monchinski*, Sense: forthcoming, 2009.

have chosen to consider. On the one hand there were the ones I was most familiar with, such as Paulo Freire's and the work of those who have followed him, from bell hooks and Michael Apple to Joe Kincheloe and Maxine Greene. Herein I have chosen to focus on Freire's critical pedagogy as his is the foundation for much of the work of the others. On the other hand I include John Dewey, who's philosophy is not usually considered a critical pedagogy only because critical pedagogy itself as a field did not come into existence until the 1970s. I knew little about feminist pedagogy at the outset, but as soon as I started reading in it I did not want to stop. The connections between Dewey, Freire, and feminist pedagogy cried out to me; as I ventured further into the care literature a similar relationship seemed obvious to me.

1.3 *Overview*

In the following chapters I will show what makes critical pedagogies different than normal classroom practices and procedures and an ethic of care different from the dominant contemporary ethical models; I will then turn to the task of showing how critical pedagogies reflect an underlying ethic of care as their moral base. Chapter 2 will consider what critical pedagogy is and what various critical pedagogies have in common. The concepts of power, ideology, and hegemony are introduced and explicated for their relevance to critical pedagogies and an ethic of care. Chapter 2 considers two disparate knowledge theories, critical pedagogy's social construction of knowledge and the dominant positivist framework. The specific forms positivism takes in classrooms and schools, from teacher practices to federal legislation, is elucidated in order to show the

dominance of this epistemology in the lives of students, teachers, and schools. In chapter 2 I will argue that all education is political, including critical pedagogies.

If all education is political and all political visions are ethically grounded, then all education adheres to moral considerations, stated or implied[5]. Chapter 3 considers an ethic of care in light of other forms of ethical thinking available to us today. The chapter begins with a discussion of what an ethic of care means to the various care theorists working in the field and what these meanings have in common. An ethic of care is then compared to more common extant ethical models with an emphasis on the place of individual autonomy and human sociability; particularism and universalism; responsibilities, obligations and duties; and reason and emotion. In chapter 3 I consider some of the many ways care is contained and denigrated in our society and schools. From scripted reading programs to high stakes testing, from the commodification of grades to stage-based moral reasoning models, schools work against caring relationships and an ethic of care.

In chapter 4 I turn to the common ground between an ethic of care and the critical pedagogies of Dewey, Freire, and feminist pedagogy. These critical pedagogies have not always been explicit in recognizing the moral salience of their projects; when the moral nature of their tasks is discussed it tends to be done so in vague abstractions, raising more questions than providing answers. Sometimes criticized or championed as a "feminine"

[5] Critical pedagogies recognize themselves as politically engaged because they recognize all education as political. But not everyone in education accepts that education is a contested political field. All too often we are asked to accept that school is a politically neutral site or *should* be. What seems to happen is that "extremes" are identified (often by those on the opposite side of the spectrum or those who consider themselves neutral and objective) and these extremes are labeled political. For instance, liberal professors who invoke their country's constitutional guarantee of free speech to criticize that country and its institutions are considered *political*. Proponents of creationist-inspired challenges to Darwinian evolution such as "intelligent design" are labeled political. The idea is that the political in education is relegated to the fringes and that the vast majority of what constitutes education and schooling is not politically engaged. Critical pedagogies lay bare and refute this assumption.

form of moral thinking, an ethic of care has transcended gender to be inclusive of males and females. Similarly, while feminist pedagogy remains dedicated to uncovering and overthrowing the special forms of oppression women suffer in society, as a critical pedagogy it aims at challenging oppressions outside of gender alone. Feminist pedagogy is firmly rooted in an ethic of care. An ethic of care was being explored and developed as a field towards the end of Paulo Freire's life. Freire never downplayed his intellectual and spiritual debts to Marx and Christianity, but I hope to show the moral vision underlying his pedagogy is one of an ethic of care. John Dewey's moral vision is often considered, like much of the man's thinking, a pragmatic vision. Here however I will make the case that Dewey was a care theorist long before care was a recognized field.

If an ethic of care and critical pedagogies were the norm in education our schools and societies would look vastly different. In chapter 5 I consider some of the first steps we can take towards realizing an ethic of care through critical pedagogies in our classrooms and schools. Education has and will play a part in social change and social change has and will play a part in the form and content of education. If our schools began to mirror an ethic of care through critical pedagogies the effects could conceivably ripple upwards; the likelihood of this is much greater if concomitant steps are taken to promote an ethic of care at the local, state, and federal level. Therefore in chapter 5 I briefly recommend and explore some reforms that could foster an ethic of care through critical pedagogies at the level of the classroom, the school, and society. My task in this chapter is not to be exhaustive but to spark a conversation, a discussion that will be on-going and reflective of the needs, desires, and aspirations of the people and communities involved in an unfolding dialogue.

I would like to end this introductory chapter with one caveat. In much of what follows I will adopt a critical tone towards contemporary educational theories and practices and moral thinking and individual moral thinkers. I do not approach these thinkers or their thoughts lightly or disrespectfully; mine is not a holier-than-thou attitude. The idea of universal public education has profoundly democratic potential; it is up to us to make sure that potential is realized and constantly renewed. The availability of affordable educational opportunities is, in part, what makes this dissertation possible. When I argue against the ideas of individuals such as Kant in chapter three, it is not to downplay or deny Kant's contribution to moral thought. In fact I would argue that Kant's ideas, revolutionary for his time, had latent democratic potential; but Kant's time is past and clinging to his ideas or other models that impede human flourishing does none of us good. The future ahead of us is open to our agency and united action for creation and redefinition; while we must draw upon and understand the past the responsibility is on us to chart our own course, to, in the words of Myles Horton (98), "make the road by walking."

Chapter 2: Critical pedagogies and contemporary education

In the next two chapters I seek to show what makes critical pedagogies (chapter 2) and an ethic of care (chapter 3) different from contemporary educational practice and moral models. Critical pedagogies are as diverse as the people, times, and locals that inspire and employ them. In this chapter I begin by discussing what various critical pedagogies have in common (sec. 1). I explore the concepts of power, ideology, and hegemony (sec. 2), terms prevalent in the critical pedagogy field but equally applicable to the field of ethics (chapter 3). The social construction of knowledge (sec. 3), the epistemological model of critical pedagogy is contrasted with contemporary education's reliance on positivistic models (sec. 4). The specific forms positivism takes in classrooms (sec. 5), federal legislation (sec. 6), and the ideological agenda behind these are explored. In this chapter I seek to illustrate critical pedagogy's charge that all education is political, inclusive of any critical pedagogy.

2.1 *Critical pedagogies*

There is no trite one or two sentence definition of what constitutes a critical pedagogy. Joe Kincheloe, hinting at the social construction of knowledge (discussed below), warns that "[A]ll descriptions of critical pedagogy—like knowledge in general—are shaped by those who devise them and the values they hold" (04: 7). Paulo Freire's critical pedagogy seeks to "make oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed" with the hope that "from that reflection will come liberation" through concerted political action (97: 30). Peter McLaren defines critical pedagogy as "a way of thinking about, negotiating, and transforming the relationship among classroom teaching,

the production of knowledge, the institutional structures of the school, and the social and material relations of the wider community, society, and nation-state" (00: 35). Henry Giroux recognizes critical pedagogy as a *political* pedagogy aiming to connect "understanding and critical engagement with the issue of social responsibility and what it would mean to educate students to not only critically change the world but also be responsible enough to fight for those political and economic conditions that make its democratic possibilities viable" (06: 209-210). There are male and female scholars working in feminist pedagogy who take Dewey and the critical pedagogies of Freire, McLaren, Giroux and others to task (discussed in chapter 4).

Despite nuances stemming from positionality and temporality, activist scholars in critical pedagogy have much in common in their definitions and deployments of critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogies are approaches to educational praxis that share the three facets of being lived, descriptive, and prescriptive. By *lived* I signify that critical pedagogies of all stripes are conceived as praxis', with praxis constituting "action and reflection" (Freire, 85: 155). Praxis involves theorizing practice and practicing theory. Praxis is thinking about what you're going to do before you do it; considering why you're going to do it that particular way and not another; and then reflecting on what you did and how you did it and the ensuing results. Or as Carolyn Shrewsbury explains, it is possible to extend theory "to action, and action can come back to inform theory and that can lead again to action" (96: 13). Critical pedagogies involve an ever-evolving working relationship between theory and practice, a relationship that is always in progress, involving a constant give-and-take, a back-and-forth dialectical informing of practice by

theory and theory by practice. Hence critical pedagogies are lived and enacted, never stagnant exemplars or consigned merely to theory.

Critical pedagogies are *descriptive* in that they critically analyze the world we live in. A teacher-student-scholar informed by critical pedagogy does not take the status quo as inevitable or unalterable. Critical pedagogy looks at the ways the pedagogical, political, social, and economic aspects of life play out and inform one another. Critical pedagogies ask: why are things the way they are? Why do schools, political systems, and ethical paradigms look and function the ways they do? Who benefits from particular ways of doing things, from specific institutional arrangements and structures? Why? Who suffers and how? Because their starting points are the spatially and temporally grounded lives of students, teachers, and societies, critical pedagogies are context specific and eschew one-size fits all, how-to designs. In other words, critical pedagogies recognize that the experiences of a working-class non-white female attending a city university on Staten Island will differ markedly from those of a white male from an affluent family attending an Ivy League school or a Native American on a reservation (Shor, 97; Grande, 04).

Critical pedagogies are *prescriptive* in the sense that they are normative. While allowing one to critically understand our world, critical pedagogies as praxis demand we work to change that world. Critical pedagogies offer suggestions for change, but, again, not cut and dried blue prints. Critical pedagogies reaffirm what Dewey (93) referred to as the "democratic faith" in human beings' ability to make and remake our worlds. Critical pedagogies aim to allow one to marshal reason and emotion in the service of understanding, transcendence, and transformation. At the same time, any critical

pedagogy must hold itself up to the same standards of criticism, assessment, and judgment it makes of other pedagogies (Luke, 92). As Freire explains, a critical pedagogy must continually be "made and remade" and as a practitioner of critical pedagogy "I must be constantly open to criticism to sustain my curiosity, always ready for revision based on the results of my future experience and that of others"(97: 30; 85: 11). Any critical pedagogy, like the human beings it works to humanize, remains unfinished and incomplete, a work in progress.

In this dissertation I will be arguing that John Dewey's pedagogy was a critical pedagogy long before the term *critical pedagogy* was in existence. The roots of critical pedagogy as a field are often traced back to Paulo Freire's activism and scholarship from the 1970s onward, especially by the field's North American adherents. Freire himself was clear that his pedagogy owed much to his Christianity, the liberation theology movement in Latin America, and his studies of Marx and Engels. Peter McLaren is often credited with the introduction of the term *critical pedagogy*. Contemporary scholars in the field are tracing critical pedagogy's roots back to W.E.B. DuBois, Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, and others. (There is no general agreement amongst scholars in the field that the roots stretch back this far). This genealogy illustrates critical pedagogy's multi-methodological form of research, what Denzin and Lincoln call *bricolage* from the French term for a handyman/handywoman who uses various available tools to complete a task (Kincheloe, 04: 64). The interests and concerns of the men and women involved in the field of critical pedagogy are diverse and their methods of exploring and addressing these concerns vary widely. Where some (usually those within

critical pedagogy) view a multi-methodological approach as a strength, others (outside the field) have criticized it as a weakness.

Dewey, Freire, and feminist pedagogy view education as inherently political and never neutral. Each is explicit regarding the political and ethical nature of what they are doing. Critical pedagogies argue that power suffuses education. Critical pedagogies uncover what they see as the façade of neutrality and objectivity in order to expose power at work in the field of education, much like Dorothy's Toto revealed the "Wizard" behind his curtain. Kincheloe notes that "proponents of critical pedagogy understand that every dimension of schooling and every form of educational practice are politically contested space" (04: 2). Critical pedagogies are unapologetically *political* pedagogies; they are *engaged* pedagogies. Every critical pedagogy seeks to level its own forms of power towards the creation of alternatives and counter-ideologies. Thus, though this dissertation nominally concerns ethics and education, its starting point is power and the manifestation of power in the form of distinct ideologies.

2.2 *Power, ideologies, and knowledge*

I believe that to understand power and the power of ideologies one must look for them at work in the interstices of our daily lives. Traditionally power has been conceived in negative terms: as a boot in the neck; the king dictating to his subjects; the state encroaching on the liberties of individuals; the parent forbidding the child or the teacher the student. Power has often been conceived as repression, and indeed this manifestation of power has and does exist, but it is not the only expression power assumes, nor is power always negative. Many men and women in the field of critical pedagogy draw on Michel

Foucault and his conception of power (Kincheloe, 04; Jardine, 05; Shor, 96). Foucault posits that "power would be a fragile thing if its only function were to repress, if it worked only through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage, and repression, in the manner of a great Superego, exercising itself only in a negative way" (80: 50). Foucault sees "the interdiction, the refusal, [and] the prohibition" as "power in its frustrated or extreme forms" (88: 118). In point of fact, "if power were never anything but repressive" Foucault challenges, "if it never did anything but say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it?" (80: 119).

The positive aspect of power – positive not in the sense that it is good, though power *can* and *must* be used for things we consider good– does more than repress and negate. Power "traverses and produces things, it induces pleasures, forms knowledge, produces discourse"; power "circulates" through and among individuals in "a net-like organization" with individuals acted upon and acting themselves as "vehicles of power", each "also always in the position [of] simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power"; the relations of power, being, "above all, productive" (Foucault, 80: 98 & 119; 88: 118).

Power is wielded by individuals, on individuals, and through individuals. It is understandable that relations of power so often appear one-sided, for when power is not wielded democratically[6], imbalances in its exercise and applications occur. The important point here is that this power which conditions is not some abstract, non-embodied power floating in the ether. It represents the interests of some over others, of some person,

[6] Democratically, in the sense—in part--that power and the ways it is employed is always critically examined and revisited.

gender, race, class, nation, etc. over another. It is played out in distinct relationships between individual human beings.

I would like to give some examples of the ways power works in schools on students and teachers, but before I do so I need to explain the relationship between power, ideology, and hegemony. These are important terms in the field of critical pedagogy because they help to explain the reality we inhabit at any given moment, whether that reality involves the normalizing and "othering" of the lifestyles and biological dispositions of individuals in a given milieu, the knowledge theory suffusing contemporary educational practices, or the moral models dominant at a given time in human history. That which comes "naturally" to us reflects power at work, the hegemony of particular ideologies. Ideologies here signify systems of thought and belief, or as Anthony Giddens defines them "shared ideas or beliefs which serve to justify the interests of dominant groups" (97: 583). Peter McLaren defines hegemony as "the maintenance of domination not by the sheer exercise of force *but primarily through consensual social practices, social forms, and social structures produced in specific sites such as the church, the state, the mass media, the political system, and the family*" (06: 173; unless otherwise indicated, emphasis always in the original).

Ideologies are created *by* people and it is the people creating and perpetuating particular ideologies that stand the most to gain from them. Ideologies are inhabited; they are lived out in our heads and by our bodies, born out by our actions, transmitted by our words and deeds. Goran Therborn (80) explains that ideologies condition what we consider real, good, and possible. We are immersed in powerful ideologies, and our

immersion is often so total and the force of the ideology so hegemonic that we remain ignorant that any ideology is in play at all.

Heterosexuality and homophobia are hegemonic in American public schools. As a public high school teacher I can attest that nearly every day homophobic remarks are made and hate speech is tolerated. In classrooms and in hallways, students dismiss subjects and peers as “fags,” “gay,” and “homo.” When asked, most explain that “gay” doesn’t mean “homosexual,” that it means “stupid” or “boring” as in the complaint “Math is gay.” There are the students who deride others or subject-matter as “homo” and admit they mean homosexual by it, opining there is something “wrong” about homosexuality, something effete and effeminate about gay men especially and male peers who are labeled “homo” or “gay” or “fags” in particular. When she discusses homophobic speech in her classroom, Lenore Gordon is “usually told that a gay man is an ‘effeminate’ man,” that for her students “saying that a boy is like a girl is the worst insult imaginable” (07: 87); Homophobia and homophobic speech often coincide with misogynistic attitudes.

Dismissing something or someone as “gay” is very common in classrooms. What messages do the reactions of teachers to such hate speech send? Imagine a teacher who hears “so-and-so is homo”, “school is gay,” and “he’s a faggot” nearly every day. Each day that teacher has a choice. He can remind the students who use such language that it is not appropriate for school. This might get students to stop using the words for a class period but it does not address the deeper meanings of why using these derogatory words is wrong.

Our teacher can call students on their use of the words each and every time. He can explain to students that there is nothing wrong with being gay and they should not

belittle people who are by using the words they do in the ways they do. This may lead to heated discussions and arguments in the classroom and situations where the teacher has to exert his authority and end the debate by noting that such words and terms, however meant and however one feels about homosexuality, is not appropriate in the classroom and school.

From my experience, more often than not teachers disregard the comments. Usually most of the other students seem to ignore the comments as well, unless an insult is addressed to them directly. If the teacher chooses to discuss the use of these terms each time, she may find herself losing valuable instructional time and bringing more attention to an issue that may have just passed quietly had she paid it no heed. But the danger resides in Gordon's acknowledgment that "if adults criticize other forms of name calling but ignore anti-gay remarks, children are quick to conclude that homophobia is acceptable" (94: 86). In this way heterosexuality is accepted as the norm, homosexuality as a deviation from this norm, and anti-gay hate-speech as tolerable form of expression and discourse.

There is a more common way in which homosexuality is marginalized and othered in American public school classrooms. I refer to the tacit and explicit endorsement of heterosexuality as the default norm. As a high school teacher I have been guilty of this and here is an example illustrating my culpability. Some students I teach are resistant to doing what I would like them to do and to what will help them be successful as far as success is measured in schools. For instance, where I might like "Troy" to come into class, settle down and take out any homework from the night before, Troy needs to be reminded to do all of the above on a daily basis. Day in and day out, this can be

frustrating for me. Instead of yelling or commanding Troy to do the things I would like to see done, I often try to employ some form of humor to get him to comply.

Whenever I give assignments, Troy never writes them down. He has a ledger for copying assignments from the board; he has pens. But Troy is not the type of kid who will just write things down because I ask him to; He will not write things down unless he is explicitly *told* to do so. He has inculcated authority to such a degree that, at the same time as he challenges it (by not writing down assignments when he is expected to or even asked nicely to do so), he will obey authority when it specifically and firmly directs him to do so (as in "Troy, write this down. Now," with the ominous now implying *or else*). I do not like to tell Troy to write things down in this authoritarian tone but I have found he responds to it. In general I prefer not to order students around and flex my authority muscles unless I need to or the process of pedagogy requires it.

Instead I opt for humor with Troy. If Troy does not write the assignment down, I will ask him why he is not doing so. Usually he will shrug or tell me he just does not want to, that he will "remember" the assignment. In turn I will say something to the effect of, "Troy, why do I get the feeling that if I were Pamela Anderson and I just put my phone number on the board, you'd be the first guy to write it down?" This is usually good for a few laughs, from both Troy and other students in his class. And time after time it works, as Troy copies down the assignment without my having to order him to do so, thereby avoiding a possible confrontation.

But what am I assuming with this example? I am assuming that Troy is heterosexual. Further, I am assuming that Troy is attracted to women like Pamela Anderson. My seemingly innocuous example assumes and validates heterosexuality and

the idea that a certain type of female is attractive. In addition, if I revealed that Troy is white, perhaps I am further assuming a certain type of relationship, one that doesn't cross the color line.

Am I over-thinking the whole situation? After all, the strategy *works*. It avoids conflict and gets results. But why does it work? And at what price? What if I did not assume Troy was heterosexual or that he finds Pamela Anderson type-women desirable? What if I attempted to cajole Troy instead with a male example (e.g., "Troy, why do I get the feeling that if I were Brad Pitt…") or with that of a woman who is not considered conventionally beautiful? To do so would court the laughter of the class at Troy's expense, and his anger towards me as his peers and his own first thought would not be that the teacher is seeking to be inclusive and trying not to make any assumptions about Troy. Instead, Troy and the class will probably think I am putting him down, disrespecting him.

I think this example speaks to the assumption and hegemony of heterosexuality– and a very circumscribed form of heterosexuality at that—as an ideology structuring subjectivities in our classrooms. High school students feel the sting and understand what it means when they are derided as a "fag" or "gay," but what does it mean if someone called you *too* straight or a "flaming heterosexual"? Commensurate labels exist, for example, "playboy," or "playa'," but they do not carry the opprobrium of the other words, much as the terms "cracker," "honky," and "whitie" lack the visceral force of the word "nigger" when used as a slur by whites against blacks. Though steps towards diversity, toleration and acceptance have been made in the United States, the norm of heterosexuality is still hegemonic in our public schools.

The school and its classrooms continue to be sites of power, where the formation of identities and subjectivities is on-going. Echoing Foucault, I would like to stress that power, operating through the hegemony of ideologies, is not always the power of a dominant individual or class over a dominated individual or class. Much power operates in the form of what Paulo Freire (72) borrowing from Amilcar Cabral (79) calls "horizontal violence", where the oppressed commit acts of dehumanization against one another, as when Troy's classmates dismiss one another with homophobic speech.

2.3 *The social construction of knowledge and critical pedagogies*

Critical pedagogies view epistemology as a contested field of knowledge production and dissemination. What do John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and feminist pedagogy have to say about where knowledge comes from? For Dewey things are "what they are experienced as", with meaning "conceived in terms of social procedure and social consequences," and "right or correct meaning is that which social custom prescribes and sanctions" (in Westbrook, 95: 130; Dewey, 93: 17). Dewey sees truth as a social notion in motive, content, and criterion, and "[t]elling the truth … means designating things in terms that observe the conventions of proper social discourse" (93: 12). "Reality is never just simply the objective datum, the concrete fact, but is also men's perception of it," notes Freire (85: 51). "Knowledge," he opines, "emerges only through invention and re-invention through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other" (Freire, 97: 53). Part of the potential of a critical pedagogy for Freire is "to create the possibilities for the production or construction of knowledge" (01: 30).

Frances Maher and Mary Kay Thompson Tetreault speak of the "multidimensional and positional view of the construction of classroom knowledge" as feminist pedagogies "create their own meanings" (94: 9 & 10). Janice Raymond explains that "[w]omen need the knowledge and the understanding of our own truth" (in Culley, 85: 50). Annie Macdonald speaks of "*communities of meaning*, epistemic communities that are defined … by shared experiences and ways of understanding and being in the world" (02: 120). The epistemologies of Dewey, Freire, and feminist pedagogy all adhere to what has been called a social construction of knowledge.

"Knowledge acquired in school – or anywhere, for that matter—is never neutral or objective but is ordered and structured in particular ways," explains Peter McLaren. "Knowledge is a *social* construction deeply rooted in a nexus of power relations" (86: 169). A social construction of knowledge holds that human beings create knowledge and ascribe meaning and definitions to terms and concepts; that our epistemologies originate *with* us and *within* us and not outside of or beyond us. But, McLaren warns, "some forms of knowledge have more power and more legitimacy than others … Certain types of knowledge legitimate certain gender, class, and racial interests" (Ibid). Not all human beings bear equal weight in creating and assigning meaning and knowledge. Institutionalized education plays its role in this because "schools confer legitimacy on the knowledge of specific groups" (Apple, 96: 64).

I think the social construction of knowledge is readily understandable in the social sciences. For example, in schools Christopher Columbus has been taught as a courageous and intrepid adventurer and explorer or as an avaricious imperialistic-figure responsible for the enslavement and deaths of millions of Native Americans, and sometimes

something of both (Bigelow & Peterson, 98). The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been taught as necessary less a million or more American lives be sacrificed island-hopping to conquer Japan, or as a warning to the Soviet Union at a time when Japan was on the verge of capitulating, a tocsin of American military/technological superiority at the beginning of the Cold War (Alperovitz, 96). These may appear as mere alternative, competing "interpretations" of events and people, but just such interpretations provide the foundations for accepted knowledge. A 2006 Florida law states that American history be viewed as "knowable, teachable and testable", and as "factual, not as constructed" (Norton, 06). Legislation like this is not so much a challenge to a social construction of knowledge as it is a privileging of one construction of said knowledge and indicative of positivism in the social sciences and humanities. Certain forms of knowledge and ways of knowing are legitimized, and Becky Ropers-Huilman explains that knowledge "viewed as complete and true in a given social context varies over time, and those whose knowledge is most highly regarded in any such context are often defined as those with the greatest power" (98: 6).

The field of critical pedagogy has been very good about exploring the social construction of knowledge in the social sciences and humanities. However, one area that needs further exploration is the extent to which a social construction of knowledge holds in the "natural" sciences, from biology to physics. Work in this area is being done (Harraway, 90; Maturana & Varela, 92; Thompson, 87; Varela, et. al., 92). Figures in critical pedagogy, adhering to the bricolage multi-methodological approach, have started to incorporate this information in their own scholarship (Kincheloe, 08).

Critical pedagogies hold that contemporary educational praxis rewards certain forms of knowledge over others (Apple, 04). The imprisoned Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci (05) argued that all people who think are intellectuals but societies do not recognize all thinking people as intellectuals. Intelligence has historically been constructed as a fixed entity that resides in individuals and is limited by the individual's own genetic make-up. Fixed and measurable, past times saw intelligence "measured" by means of ascertaining cranial capacity (often by filling skulls with shot), measuring skull circumference and brain weight, and using IQ tests to ascertain the amount of "g" in each individual person's mind (Gould, 96). Those doing the measuring usually came from the groups deemed naturally more intelligent, and more often than not the members of economically and politically less powerful groups in society were found to be deficient. As Kincheloe posits, "what is labeled intelligence can never be separated from what dominant power groups designate it to be" (04: 6).

Because it sees intelligence as culturally relative and socially constructed, critical pedagogy views intelligence as a stacked deck as schools reflect certain forms of cultural capital and ignore others. Gramsci points out that before "the child of a traditionally intellectual family….Ever enters the class-room he has numerous advantages over his comrades, and is already in possession of attitudes learnt from his family environment: he concentrates more easily, since he is used to 'sitting still'" (05: 42). Some children show up to school with advantages over others because school mirrors their "cultural capital" more so than the cultural capital of other students'. Favored forms "are made so because of specific taken for granted assumptions," explains Michael Apple, "they are … historically and ideologically 'conditioned'" (95: 130). Hence children who come to

school fluent in *standard* English, which is taken for "correct" or "proper" English, have an advantage over students who speak non-standard English or another language in the home and community environment. Or, for that matter, what is a non-white student to make of "flesh-colored" crayons and paint used in class when the flesh-tone represented differs markedly from their own? Usually the child is looked upon as the one with the deficit, as the one who does not fit the mold of what a student is expected to be, who does not fit the school, and not vice versa.

The valorization of certain cultural capitals over others, of the construction of what is deemed intelligence and what is not, is seen in the school curriculum. In an era when technical standards-driven curriculums masquerade as value-free, one must not be fooled. Curriculum "represents the *introduction to a particular from of life; it serves in part to prepare students for dominant or subordinate positions in the existing society*" (McLaren, 86: 183). By rewarding certain forms of intelligence and cultural capital, curriculums, designed by human beings, define what is deemed knowledge and intelligence and what is not. Giroux likens curriculum to "a narrative or voice" (88: 165). Critical pedagogy challenges people to ask who gets to speak, whose voice is considered authoritative, and why.

For clarity's sake I want to be clear that I am not against all students being able to communicate in one language so as to understand each other. That isn't the problem. Nor do I think all forms of knowledge are equally valid at all times. The problem comes when we accept as intelligence and knowledge certain prescribed forms without asking how these came to be the accepted forms. So, for example, in my special education graduate course work, I learned about the supposed "six-hour retarded kid" (Hallahan &

Kauffman, 97). This is the student who appears completely normal *outside* of school, but in school is supposedly not capable of succeeding. There are no six-hour retarded kids. There are just some kids whose lifestyles and cultural capitals do not reflect the lifestyle and cultural capitals their schools champion. Some of these children may never be successful in school, but that does not mean they are stupid, and to brand them retarded—a word carrying the stigma it does--is reprehensible.

Instead of accepting facts and knowledge on the face of things, critical pedagogies ask teachers and students to question *where* those facts come from, how that knowledge is generated, why the emphasis placed on it is, and who that knowledge benefits or who's worldview it incorporates. The classroom environment and school itself are open to discussion for critical teachers and students. Giroux opines that "the commonsense values and beliefs that guide and structure classroom practice are not *a priori* universal, but social constructions based on specific normative and political assumptions" (94: 247).

2.4 *Just the facts*

Critical pedagogies work to expose the epistemological position contemporary educational approaches adhere to. Positivism is a knowledge theory holding that *true* knowledge, things we can really know (be positive about), is scientific knowledge, based on natural phenomena, their properties and relations, and that this knowledge is empirically verifiable (Kincheloe, 05: 16). I would argue that where the social construction of knowledge's explanatory potential is strong in the social sciences and humanities but weaker in providing explanations in the natural sciences, positivism faces the exact opposite dilemma. Positivism has been as hegemonic and influential as it has

been because it seems to work so well in the realm of the natural or "hard" sciences. That said, the explanatory potential of the positivist framework leaves much to be desired in the social sciences.

Nonetheless, proponents of a positivistic epistemology argue that the methods of studying the physical world can be applied to the study of the social and educational worlds. Positivism holds that the apparent neutrality and objectivity of the researcher in the physical sciences is desirable and can be applied to the study of human beings, our relations and the institutions we create (Kincheloe, 05). For example, one presenter at a conference on the scientifically-based research behind *No Child Left Behind* (NCLB), noted that, in her estimation and anticipation, "at some point the use of scientific research as a basis for educational practice will become routine"[7].

A major point of contention critical pedagogies have with positivism is that not all forms of knowledge can be quantified or labeled "scientific." For instance much of what goes on in classrooms from kindergarten to graduate school is, arguably, more art than science. When a first grade teacher sits down with her students in their reading circle in the morning, she gets a feel for each and every student, for the classroom "vibe." Does one little boy look unhappy or troubled? Should the teacher ignore this because she lacks quantifiable data telling her the boy is being picked on in the schoolyard or that his parents are fighting at home? Most teachers, and, I would argue, most *good* and *caring* teachers, will react to the boy despite the lack of empirically verifiable knowledge called for in the positivistic framework.

[7] At the time, Valerie Reyna was a deputy at the Office of Educational Research and Improvement. The text of her speech, delivered at the "Proven Methods: Scientifically Based Research" seminar, is available online at http://www.ed.gov/nclb/methods/whatworks/research/page_pg3.html).

The drive to use the same methods to study the physical and educational/social worlds, rooted in a positivistic epistemology, marks much contemporary educational praxis and is clearly seen in the drive for the scientific management of schools and teaching (Lagemann, 00). Critical pedagogies, on the other hand, warn against the application of positivist epistemology to education and reject outright the idea of scientific management in schools. Though it appears we can isolate and control factors in empirical studies of physical phenomena, "[w]hen we remove individuals from their social context," Kincheloe cautions, "we may have destroyed their natural setting that makes them who they are" (05: 17).

Critical pedagogies see positivism itself as a social construction, an ideological position meant to mask power and privilege at work (Kincheloe, 05). In *The Feminist Classroom*, Francis Maher and Mary Kay Thompson Tetreault argue that an expanded conception of what counts as knowledge, expanded to include the perspectives of women, non-whites and others, "challenges the authority of traditional paradigms, showing them to be embedded in history rather than enshrined truths" (94: 5). Kincheloe accuses positivism of a form of "objectivism," which he defines as "the understanding that the goal of education is to produce and consume a body of neutral data that fails to engage in a variety of knowledge produced in diverse ways in differing cultures and historical eras" (05: 12).

Critical pedagogies challenge positivism's notion that knowledge itself is impartial. Where a positivistic epistemology views teachers and students as seekers of knowledge that is fixed and objective, critical pedagogies view teachers and students as co-creators of engaged knowledge. For example, Shirley Parry explains that "Feminist

pedagogy promotes the awareness that knowledge is not a discrete body of 'truths' that the instructor knows and imparts to students," but rather "that students themselves are capable of active learning and that this, rather than passive receiving, is what works best" in education (96: 45). Gail Cohee argues that feminist pedagogy "emphasizes the development of epistemological frameworks that stress both the subjective and communal reality of knowing" (98: 3). Amie MacDonald speaks of "epistemic communities" of students and teachers creating and critically analyzing knowledge together (02: 120).

I will now explore two concrete examples of positivism at work in schools. The social studies department in my high school has devised a heuristic they call *the perfect paragraph*. The perfect paragraph is meant as a guide, an outline of what a "perfect paragraph" should be, should look like, and should contain. Arguably, there is no such thing as a perfect paragraph. The name itself sounds like it refers to a Platonic form. Perhaps it is this name I object to, conveying as it does the idea that there is one and only one acceptable format constituting an acceptable paragraph.

It is important to point out that no one in administration has imposed the perfect paragraph format on the teachers in my high school. Inside and outside the history department teachers in my school have embraced the perfect paragraph themselves, and I understand why. Part of the problem is that the perfect paragraph addresses a very real need in my school. Students enter ninth grade and they cannot write a paragraph; they cannot express themselves with written language. A heuristic like the perfect paragraph provides a model for what constitutes the nuts and bolts of an acceptable paragraph. The problem is not when students look to the perfect paragraph rubric for guidance; the

problem is when teachers penalize students for not following the rubric. The issue is seeing one and only one way of doing things as the right way, the correct way, and not acknowledging that this way is but one of many and has been chosen by people as the model to follow.

Other curricular forms mirroring positivism are imposed on teachers. Scripted reading programs provide teachers with pre-packaged curriculums. These are usually approved and adopted at the district level and when they are their use is more often than not required. They are touted as "teacher-proofed" materials that are "scientifically-based," and they promise "results." Maybe I am sensitive to it because I am a teacher, but the term "teacher-proofed" is alarming. "Scientifically-based" and "results" sound good, but critical pedagogy urges us to consider the effects of scripted-reading programs on teachers and students.

Imagine two teachers, both charged with the same task: helping their students learn to read. One teacher is allowed a great deal of discretion and the ability to formulate her own goals, the processes she will use, and her evaluative criteria. She can decide if she will implement a whole word approach to teaching reading, a phonics approach, or a combination of the two. A second teacher is also expected to teach reading to her children. This teacher has to follow a set of prepackaged curricular materials in the form of a scripted reading program. His school provides this teacher a set of standardized materials, including statements of objectives, the curricular content and materials needed, pre-specified teacher actions and comment scripts and appropriate student responses, and diagnostic and achievement tests.

Michael Apple urges that we look at the "curricular form" at work in both cases and ask, "What is this doing?" (82: 255). In the first situation, the teacher herself designs and specifies her goals, processes, outcomes and evaluative criteria. The teacher working from the scripted reading program relies on other people, not himself, to have decided what these are. Conception is divorced from implementation; teachers are expected to execute the plans of others. Apple wonders what effects these programs have on students when the people designing scripted reading programs usually do not live in the areas where the programs will be used. The designers cannot account for the particular nuances of behavior and language in particular regions. The program could confront kids as another form of academia divorced from their lives (Meyer, 03).

Apple calls one of the effects such programs have on teachers "deskilling." The skills teachers possess, he argues, "such as curriculum deliberation and planning, designing teacher and curricular strategies for specific groups and individuals based on intimate knowledge of these people," are devalued. In the factory or the classroom, deskilling

> has usually involved taking relatively complex jobs…jobs which require no small amount of skill and decision-making, and breaking them down into specified actions with specified results that less skilled and costly personnel can be used or so that the control of the work place and outcome is enhanced (Apple, 82: 251-252)

Taylorism and the assembly line are probably the best known examples illustrating the relationship between technical control and deskilling in the name of efficiency (Callahan, 62). In a similar manner and not coincidentally, when teachers are handed a scripted reading program the expectation is that they will just follow the script, that all they *need* to do is follow the script. Teachers who refuse to do so have been fired (Jaeger, 06).

Others have found the corporate designers of these programs in their classrooms, chastising them in front of students for deviating from the program and going through their personnel files (Quinn, 07).

Apple argues further that scripted reading programs, which dictate the technique teachers are expected to use, are a form of technical control forced upon teachers. These programs reflect an epistemology of positivism in so far as their designers assume there is a correct way to teach reading and that their program captures and makes this technique available to teachers. Apple argues that technical control necessarily means deskilling, but it also brings with it a form of *reskilling*. "While the deskilling represents the loss of craft, the ongoing atrophication of educational skills, the reskilling involves the substitution of the skills and ideological visions of management" (Apple, 82: 256). Teachers learn to internalize these ideological visions much as Grace Clement (96) argues that nurses in hospitals learn to internalize the standard operating procedures of a hospital's rules and regulations, or they leave the field.

Despite their consequences for pedagogy, technical controls like scripted reading programs can be attractive. Administrators and boards of education in the public eye need to ensure accountability and control; overworked teachers on the look out for something practical may look to scripted reading programs as time savers; worried parents want to make sure that the education their children receive is of the highest quality, and scripted reading programs are advertised as such. Technical controls such as scripted reading programs can be seen as all these things to all these people. The state that implements technical controls "*legitimate*(s) its own activity by couching its discourse in language that is broad enough to be meaningful to each of what it perceives to be important

constituencies, yet specific enough to give some practical answers to those who, like teachers, 'require' it" (Apple, 82: 260). There are students who will learn to read from scripted reading programs. State education departments that implement technical controls are arguably providing a more efficient production process in schools (Apple, 82).

2.5 *Critical pedagogies and the Banking System of Education*

The prevalent form of education in classrooms today is a positivist model. In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Paulo Freire labeled it a "Banking System of Education," one in which the teacher's task "is to 'fill' the students with the contents of his narration" (97: 52). Such a conception of education, Ira Shor opines, views students as deficits waiting to be filled (92: 32). This "'banking concept of education'" is criticized by Freire and others as turning students "into 'containers', into 'receptacles' to be 'filled' by the teacher. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are" (Freire, 97: 53). Freire opines that in a banking system, education "becomes an act of depositing" by "bank-clerk teachers" (97: 56).

What does a banking system of education look like in practice? It is a form of education where students sit and listen to their teachers, absorbing what they are told. It is a form of education where teachers lecture in one-way transmissions of knowledge; hence Freire's claim that "education is suffering from narration sickness" (97: 52). A banking system is one where students memorize facts and repeat them when appropriate; where a discerning student listens to what a teacher says, puts it into her own words, presents the information to the teacher and is awarded for it. Freire argues that

superficiality and rote memorization of facts are encouraged by a banking system of education with its "ready-to-wear approach" that "serves to obviate thinking" (97: 57).

Freire and other scholars in the critical pedagogy tradition argue that a banking system of education has adverse effects on students, teachers, and the content of education itself. Receiving information and knowledge as passive entities, students become more passive still. The ontological position of a banking system of education sees students *in* a pre-existing world, not *with* a world they help create and recreate (Shor & Freire, 87). Learning (usually) about the "great" individuals and ideas in a discipline and not the social movements behind them, following the history of the world as it unfolds in uncritical texts, students view academic subjects as something over which they have little control, as subjects with little pertinence to their lives. "The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them," explains Freire, "the less they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of that world" (97: 54). The world is not viewed as something students help create but as something they must conform to. Thus "the educated individual is the adapted person," maintains Freire, "because she or he is better 'fit' for the world" (97: 57).

Freire argues that this adapting or fitting to a world accepted as beyond a student's control benefits "the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed" (97: 54). Freire's oppressors seek to change the consciousness of the oppressed, not the conditions and institutions that oppress them, "for the more the oppressed can be led to adapt to that situation, the more easily they can be dominated" (97: 55). Freire argues further that people cannot become truly human

through a banking system of education because humanization is reached through inquiry and praxis, which a banking system of education contains and squelches. “Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other,” he opines (Freire, 97: 53).

The banking system of education, its critics maintain, instills a harmful authoritarian relationship of teachers over students. Shor and Freire (87) have argued that the banking system of education sets teachers and students up in a necessarily antagonistic relationship. Teachers know and possess knowledge; students do not. In a banking system of education, where teachers are viewed as “bank clerks” and knowledge as finite and pre-existing, teachers come to be viewed as experts on and disseminators of this information. This is not to deny that teachers have expertise and are better versed in certain subject areas than their students; they have spent years studying their subject and many keep abreast of developments in their field. However, when a teacher is viewed as omniscient, student passivity may increase as students wait for teachers to impart *the* truth. Further, when teachers get used to being looked at as authorities and experts and when expertise is equated with omniscience, will they be comfortable admitting “I don’t know” when they do not? Or will they attempt to skirt around an issue or otherwise avoid it?

Instead of inquiring into a subject critically with their students, critical pedagogy accuses teachers in the banking framework of disseminating the pre-approved ideas of others in the form of official curriculums. This gets back to Michael Apple’s criticism of technical controls, that teachers are left to implement and convey the ideas of others. A

banking system of education deprofessionalizes teachers in so far as it discourages their active research and scholarship in an academic field. What message do curriculum materials that are touted as "teacher proofed" send? How often are elementary or high school teachers viewed as scholars or intellectuals? Universities themselves have been criticized as devaluing teaching in favor of research (Golden, in Cohee, et. al., 98: 17). The structure of the school day, including the teaching load, propagates the form of a banking system of education. What room is there for research and individualized class planning when, for example, a high school teacher teaches five or more classes and has contact with over a hundred students each day?

Freire realized that there are teachers who really do care for their students, their subject matter, and the art of teaching but in their daily practice rely on a banking system of education, noting that "there are innumerable well-intentioned bank-clerk teachers who do not realize that they are serving only to dehumanize" (97: 56). The banking system of education is usually the model of education teachers themselves were exposed to as students; they learn that this is the correct way to teach and they teach in much the same way. Shor notes that in the classroom, the traditional lecture format rooted in the banking concept of education provides teachers "a safer, more reassuring way to teach" (92: 192). Many students accommodate themselves to this form of education, which serves to further legitimize it. Students are socialized from an early age as to what education *looks* like; if education does not look this way, students can get apprehensive. When you have been in school for enough years you get an understanding of what form you think education should take. If a teacher is not complying to that form, he may be viewed as incompetent rather than as progressive and humane. By college and graduate

school, when students are paying to attend classes, any form of education that deviates from this norm is suspect as a possible waste of your own or your parents' money.

Freire was adamant that a critical pedagogy can not rely on the methods of a banking system of education, opining that "true humanists…cannot use banking educational methods in the pursuit of liberation, for they would only negate that very pursuit" (98: 73). Yet on the surface he appears to contradict himself when discussing the lecture format. Lecturing is familiar at all levels of education; arguably it is the prime method of a banking system of education. However, Freire maintains "that not all kinds of lecturing is banking education. You can still be very critical while lecturing" (87: 40). For Freire, "the question is the content and dynamism of the lecture, the approach to the object to be known. Does it critically reorient students to society? Does it animate their critical thinking or not?" (87: 40).

Because Freire conceives of a critical pedagogy as a liberatory pedagogy, he assumes that the "content and dynamism" of such lectures will necessarily be progressive. He does not consider the idea that a right-wing critical pedagogy could exist and he does not consider this because for Freire most education is already a banking form of education which, by definition, is right-wing. It would appear that, for Freire, what makes the lecture format suitable for a critical pedagogy are the intentions of the teacher. Is she seeking to propagate information and transmit accepted truths or remake the world with her students through a critical examination of reality and subject matter?

Though much critical pedagogy literature talks of the importance of dialogue, it would seem that the lecture format is often inevitable. After all, academic disciplines have been built up around knowledge in a field and there are academic themes that

teachers need to pass on to their students (Shor, 92). What marks a critical pedagogy is the teachers' and students' stance to the knowledge under examination (hooks, 94). A critical pedagogy understands that knowledge taken as the truth today may not be so tomorrow or a generation from now (Kincheloe, 08). Critical pedagogy considers the knowledge in a field critically and understands that knowledge to be continually made and remade (Freire, 97: 53).

A critical lecture should be eye-opening and thought-provoking for students, Freire argues, only half jokingly describing a situation where "they [students] listen to you as if you were singing to them!" (Shor and Freire, 87: 40). Reliance on such a style risks demagoguery, but again, for Freire, the intentions of the teacher negate such an effect. The critical teacher is not there to dupe or indoctrinate students; he is in the classroom working for his own liberation and the liberation of students (Freire, 97).

A banking system of education can also be criticized for the effects it has on the subject matter of education. The banking system of education reflects a positivistic epistemology where knowledge is viewed as finite and immutable. Or, if mutable, knowledge only changes when those deemed capable of affecting its change do so. When knowledge is viewed in such a way fields of study can be seen as collections of impersonal facts and data. They can also be seen as "dead" in the sense of finalized and not evolving.

2.6 *The political economy of No Child Left Behind*

When we discuss education in contemporary America we do so in language that is rooted in a positivistic epistemology. Terms like *high standards*, *scientifically-proven*,

and *highly-qualified* are the words that the discourse is carried on in. The language of the debate and the meaning behind the language is hegemonic. While no one will argue against *high standards* or *accountability*, not everyone agrees on what these terms mean. The meaning seems to be taken for granted, which speaks to the ideological import behind the language employed. Many people hear *scientifically-proven* and leave it at that, not bothering to delve into the science behind what, we are assured, is thus proven.

Scholars and activists in the Critical Pedagogy tradition argue that the Bush Administration's No Child Left Behind legislation is rooted in positivism. Many go further and argue that NCLB was purposefully designed to help dismantle public education (Karp in Meier and Wood, 04). Here I will explore both of these charges and attempt to show how NCLB's reliance on an epistemology rooted in positivism may have the effect of facilitating the privatization of America's public education.

NCLB is a federal law that measures progress through performance on standardized test scores. Individual states are mandated to test their public school students annually in math and reading in grades three through eight, at least once in high school, and three times in science between the third and eleventh grades (www.ed.gov/nclb). Though NCLB does not require the use of multiple-choice standardized exams, these are usually the tests that individual states rely on as they tend to be the least expensive to purchase and administer. The United States Government Accountability Office estimated that the use of multiple choice tests to ascertain progress or lack thereof under NCLB for 2002-2008 would cost states $1.9 billion, versus the $5.3 billion exams combining multiple choice and open-ended questions would cost (www.gao.gov).

The repercussions of this underfunding at the individual state level are becoming apparent. Connecticut sued the federal government, arguing that NCLB forced that state's education department to test all students and that the money Washington provided to do such would not cover the costs (Dillon, 05). Connecticut's standardized exams include essay questions and problems requiring that students explain how they arrived at an answer. Then-Federal Education Secretary Margaret Spellings noted that, although the tests Connecticut uses are "instructionally sound," they "go beyond what was contemplated by N.C.L.B." (Winerup, 06). Federal officials recommended the state save money by changing their exams to multiple-choice tests and cut out the open-ended writing parts. A federal judge dismissed Connecticut's case (Dillon, 08b).

State curriculums come to mirror the material found on these exams, part of what critics decry as "teaching to the test" (Au, 04). Some critics maintain that, because schools and their staff and students face punitive measures should they fail to demonstrate NCLB's Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP), standards are set lower than higher. Currently there are large disparities in what states consider to be proficient performance (Cronin, et. al., 07). A RAND study (Stetcher, 06) of reading in the fifty states and the District of Columbia found that students who were deemed proficient on their individual state's standardized reading exams did not achieve reading proficiency on the National Assessment of Educational Progress, a federal test often referred to as "the nation's report card". A University of California research study found that twice as many fourth grade students in twelve states scored proficient on their states' reading and math tests than on the NAEP (Basken, 06).

Multiple choice exams are ideally constructed to represent a positivistic epistemology. On these exams knowledge tends to be certain, with right and wrong answers clear. Some critics claim that multiple choice exams are inadequate because they function as a form of trivial pursuit; for example, either you know George Washington counseled a policy of neutrality in his farewell address or you do not (an actual New York State Regents question). Unlike Connecticut's state exams, on a multiple choice test a student's thought process and rationale for an answer are not apparent. The answer is either correct or incorrect. NCLB favors criterion-referenced tests, focusing on whether a student knows the required content of a state's standards or not (Wenning, et. al.: 08). Criterion-referenced tests are generally less expensive to implement and score than norm-referenced exams (Ibid). NCLB does not measure and reward individual student growth from the beginning to the end of the school year.

NCLB advocates "effective, scientifically based instructional strategies" (Public Law 107-110). The term "scientifically based research" appears one hundred and nineteen times in NCLB's text (Ibid). NCLB's conception of "scientifically based research" fits the positivistic paradigm. NCLB and its supporters favor quantifiable data. At the 2002 conference on NCLB and the *scientifically-based*, Valerie Reyna dismissed anecdotal or qualitative data as not scientific, on par with superstition and tradition. The same experimental rules and logic apply, Reyna maintained, "whether you are talking about a treatment for cancer or whether you're talking about an intervention to help children learn" (www.ed.gov'nclb/methods/whatworks). Qualitative data is viewed as lacking in objectivity and rigidity. However, much data in educational studies is

qualitative in nature, based, as pointed out before, on teacher observations and intuitions and the unpredictable outcomes of interactions between teachers and students.

NCLB promotes the Reading First Program as a "scientifically-proven" program in teaching children to read. According to NCLB, Reading First engages in "scientifically proven language and literacy activities" and "scientifically based instructional materials and programs" (PL 107-110). Reading First's "scientifically based" reading programs promote phonics instruction.

An examination of Reading First and the "science" and "experts" behind it raises concerns about the masking of an ideological agenda in the guise of positivism. Reading First was recommended by the fifteen-member National Reading Panel (NRP) in their National Reading Panel Report. Gerald Coles (03) looked at the members of the NRP and their research. Of the fifteen, all viewed the reading process as a hierarchy of skills process, a process consonant with phonics instruction. Of the fifteen, almost all of their individual research in the field was quantitative and empirical. One panel member was a National Institutes of Child Health and Development (NICHD) researcher; the NICHD advocates phonics instruction. Another researcher promoted NICHD (phonics) reading instruction in her home state. One edited a journal that put out a special issue on NICHD reading research that was guest-edited by NICHD-supported reading researchers. Interestingly, there were no beginning reading teachers on the NRP.

In reaching their recommendation, the NRP claimed to screen 100,000 reading studies dating back to 1966. The NRP partitioned all the reading research they looked at into *scientific* and *unscientific* categories; phonics approaches fell into the scientific category. Of the initial 100,000 reports, only 428 were given closer attention, and of these

428, only 38 were used by the NRP to base their conclusions and write their report. Coles (03: 47-104) contrasted the Panel's report and the 38 studies and found many discrepancies, such as: the NRP report claimed a Norwegian study showed that phonemic awareness training boosts children's reading and spelling performance, when in fact the study in question showed the exact opposite; any phonics awareness boost that students received did not last past kindergarten; one study cited contained a control group with no reading activity; the NRP misinterpreted one report as showing a small difference between two groups of children when in fact the difference was statistically significant. Such discrepancies raise questions about the scientifically-proven basis of the NRP's recommendations. Coles notes that the Panel's report "does not explain that its chosen model of decontextualized word-level reading [phonics] is based on a theory; rather, it implies that it is a scientific fact" (03: 44).[8]

Scholars and activists in the field of critical pedagogy have not been alone in criticizing NCLB, but they have been very vocal in charging that one aim of NCLB is to undermine public education so that it can be privatized. The argument holds that NCLB's Adequate Yearly Progress cannot be met. With students disaggregated into subgroups including free and reduced lunch, black, children with disabilities, American Indian, and English language learners, 95% of all students in each subgroup in every school are expected to achieve AYP in reading and math by 2014 (PL 107-110). Because the measure of AYP increases annually, critics maintain it gets harder to meet AYP year by year (Huddleston, 08). For example, in Minnesota 247 schools did not meet AYP in 2005; 483 failed to in 2006; and in 2007 almost half of Minnesota's public schools, 937,

[8] Coles himself does not argue against the efficacy of a phonics approach. What he does argue against is a reliance on the phonics approach alone. He favors a "pro-choice [conclusion] that allows teachers to choose the method of skills instruction they want to use" (03: 127).

did not meet AYP (Fitzgerald, 08). In 2004, 22% of Massachusetts public schools—which rank high nationally on the NAEP, SATs, and college attendance rates—had failed to make AYP for two or more years; it is predicted that three-quarters of that state's schools will fail to meet NCLB's performance standards by 2014 (Moscovitch, 05). Schools that fail to meet AYP for seven years face "corrective action and restructuring", which can mean such a school will be replaced by a charter school; have most or all of its staff, including the principal, replaced; or be turned over to the state or a private management group (PL 107-110).

Schools can be labeled as failing to meet AYP and in need of improvement if every population category meets its goal except one. Because of this, Alfie Kohn claims that NCLB has a built in "'diversity penalty' such that the more subgroups that attend a given school, the lower the chance it will be able to" make AYP (in Meir & Wood, 04). Of California's 9,500 public schools, over 1,000 are considered chronic failures and by 2014 all 6,063 schools serving the poor will be labeled such (Schemo, 07). Less critics think that NCLB unfairly scapegoats poor and non-white children, 59 % of schools serving the most affluent students in Massachusetts are expected to fail to meet AYP standards by 2014 (Moscovitch, 08). A University of Chicago study (Neal & Whitmore Schanzenbach , 07) found that teachers have been ignoring high-ability students to focus on meeting minimum proficiency.

In summation, NCLB can be viewed as mirroring a positivistic epistemology in two ways. One, its measurement standards—scores on criterion-referenced multiple choice exams—reflect a positivistic theory of knowledge. Secondly, the methods NCLB

and its supporters advocate—scripted reading programs like Reading First—are positivistic in that they claim to identify the correct and best ways to teach content.

The idea that American public schools should be privatized is not new but has gained strength in the past decade. People who favor the privatization of education include those who ascribe the shortcomings of public schooling to a system of "government schools"; those motivated by conservative ideology; and those who stand to gain from privatizing education. Businesses and individuals are already enjoying a boon from NCLB (Pepper, 06). One provision of NCLB is that students from low-income families be provided "supplemental educational services," (i.e. tutoring) outside of the school day. The private companies that provide tutoring typically receive $1,800 per child (Saulny, 06a)[9]. People who help states write grants to receive funds for Reading First materials have made hundreds of thousands of dollars from the sale of curriculums and exams related to the program (Schemo, 07). A company owned by then-President Bush's brother Neil sells instructional software that prepares students for the standardized exams in their states (Carlson, 03). Demand for standardized exams outstrips supply, with the industry enjoying record profits at the same time that repeated errors on the tests themselves raise concerns (Arenson, 06; Herszenhorn, 06; Winerip. 06).

The drive for the privatization of American education mirrors privatization seen in other industries. Elizabeth Minnich and Si Kahn (05) describe the tactics that those favoring privatization use. First, the people and organizations who favor privatization actively work to malign and undermine the institution they want to privatize; they argue

[9] The original idea under NCLB was that the school itself could not provide its students tutoring. Due in part to the fact that supplemental educational services are largely going unused, that has been amended so that school staff can tutor their own kids (Saulny, 06).

that nationalized or public institutions are failures or are not as successful as they could be. Concurrently, those favoring privatization work to break the system they criticize; for example, by promoting financial cuts to public institutions which may already be underfinanced. Advocates of privatization then "support private, for-profit alternatives, offer to reward people for using these services, and of course, do not make up for the funds this takes away from the public services" (Kahn & Minnitch, 05: 13 & 14).

For years Americans have been told that our public school system is failing our children. Newspaper articles decry the fact that 63% of fourth graders asked cannot identify correctly—from four multiple choice answers—the first permanent English settlement in North America (Dillon, 07). A popular television show pokes fun at the fact that most adults have forgotten facts readily available to a typical fifth grader. Americans are constantly warned that our students do not measure up to those in other industrialized countries (Dillon, 07). What these supposed failures and shortcomings mean exactly, how they are measured, and whether they are even true are questions seldom given much attention in the public eye. Such assertions are taken, apparently prima facie, as true. Voices challenging such assertions do not get wide circulation (Bracey, 97).

What methods of addressing the purported shortcomings of American education have been offered? There have been calls for a national curriculum and national standards (Hulbert, 07; Ravitch, 05: A23). There has been legal action. For example, the Campaign for Fiscal Equity sued New York State and won its case with the New York State Supreme Court finding school funding in the Empire State unconstitutional. New York State was told to provide the New York City school system an additional $5.6 billion annually plus a one-time $9.2 billion for building and renovation of facilities. After two

appeals by then-Governor Pataki the State was ordered to "consider" providing at least $2 billion more to New York City schools annually. (www.cfequity.org)

Most means of addressing perceived or real public school shortcomings often weaken the institution of public education. Advocates of "school choice" argue that parents should be able to send their children to a different school if their child's school is not meeting their needs (Friedman, 62). Educational vouchers are certificates issued by the government that parents can use to help pay for their children's education at the school of their choice, including private schools. NCLB allows students to transfer from their "failing" school to attend a "successful" school inside or, in some cases, outside of their home district; failure and success are determined by a school's standardized test scores. President Bush's original proposals for NCLB included an option that would have provided funds for parents of children in failing schools to send their children to private schools; a compromise in the House dropped NCLB's voucher provision and accepted the supplemental services provision which was seen as "a sort of voucher demonstration project" (McGuinn, 06: 168). Vouchers[10] have caught on and are popular in certain states; for example, Milwaukee spends over $100 million a year on vouchers used by over 18,000 students (Borsuk, 06). Parents in some states who choose to send their children to private schools may be eligible for partial reimbursement through tuition tax credits. Tuition tax credits directly reduce such parents' income tax bills and critics denounce them as another form of educational voucher (Miner, 02/03).

[10] One criticism of the voucher movement is that it takes the lowest performing students from a failing school and puts them into a better performing school, which lowers the later school's performance (Goodkin and Gold, 07). Private schools that accept voucher students can select the students they allow to attend their school, whereas public schools must accept voucher students from other public schools (Zimmer & Buddin, 06). If there is not enough room for these students room must be made (Ibid).

The charter school movement has received a lot of support from Washington, DC and NCLB. Charter schools, which are alternatives to public schools, receive public funds and have been founded by teachers and parents, non-profit groups, universities, and corporations. Following Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, half of the public schools that had been destroyed in the flooding were handed over to charter schools financed by $24 million in federal aid, establishing New Orleans as "the nation's pre-eminent laboratory for the widespread use of charter schools" (Berger, 07: B6; Saulny, 06a: A19; Tough, 08).

The corporations that run charter schools do so for profit, and the charter school movement has been criticized as part of the privatization push in public education. How is money to be made by charter schools? Charter schools receive federal money for each student that attends. Teachers in charter schools make less money than teachers in public schools and are usually not unionized. Chris Whittle, founder of the educational management organization Edison Schools, which manages charter and public schools throughout the United States, once claimed that if each of six hundred students in a school did one hour of unpaid administrative work per day it would equal the same amount of work completed by 75 salaried adult staff (Saltman, 05: 136). NCLB allows students in failing schools to transfer to charter schools in their districts. As charter schools are usually free of many of the rules, regulations, and statutes that apply to other public schools, they have drawn criticism as lacking oversight and accountability (*New York Times* editorial, 06: A24). Further, studies by the Federal Education Department itself have found that charter and private school students do not outperform public school students on the NAEP (Schemo, 06: A14).

Though advocates of privatization often themselves depend on state subsidies and protectionist measures, publicly they praise free markets, self-reliance and malign government. Arguably, NCLB helps promote a message of self-reliance and individualism. Johnny failed the Regents; Ms. Smith is not qualified to teach Math; P.S. 119 did not make AYP. Raymond Horn notes that "In educational systems that are test focused, accountability for teaching and learning is individual not social" (04: 6). NCLB and its reliance on standardized testing to measure progress focuses on individual schools and their students and teachers and not on the political, economic, and social milieu in which education occurs.

The phenomenon of the "six-hour retarded" child speaks in part to the disconnection of schooling from students' lives. Critics like Dewey charge that students come to school but leave their minds behind. "If he had a purely abstract mind," Dewey notes, the student "could bring it to school with him, but his is a concrete one, interested in concrete things, and unless these things get over into school life he cannot take his mind off them" (90: 80). Schools are disconnected from children's lives in many ways: in the cultural capital reflected in the classroom; in the presumption that active children (and their teachers) must be made to attend to academic tasks, which more often than not means being able to sit still for long periods of time and listen to one-way teacher talk; in the perceived futility of learning things that apparently have nothing to do with one's life. The very fact that subject matter is not related to the student and her life is a message in itself. It is saying to that student that she and her concerns are not important, that *this* (usually abstract, disconnected, academic knowledge) is what is important.

So why does education seem to work for so many? After all, many scholars working in critical pedagogy were and are successful in formal institutional settings. There are kids who do well and actually like school. “Unpleasant, because meaningless, activities may get agreeable if long enough persisted in,” explains Dewey (90: 206). We humans have a tremendous ability to adapt to our environments, and our brains remain demonstrably plastic throughout our lives. Teachers, who usually conformed to similar educational models and succeeded themselves, “attempt to surround the material with foreign attractiveness, making a bid or offering a bribe for attention” or fall back upon “counterirritants,” such as “low marks, threats of non-promotion, staying after school, personal disapprobation, expressed in a great variety of ways, naggings, continuous calling upon the child to ‘pay attention,’ etc.” (Dewey, 90: 148). Teachers usually succeed through some combination of the two to secure our students’ attention, but this attention is “partial” and “divided”; it “always remains dependent upon something external” and “is always for the sake of ‘learning’, i.e. memorizing ready-made answers to possible questions to be put by another” (Ibid).

That said, perhaps school does not work for as many students as we are led to believe it does. American high school regularly inflate everything from their daily attendance rates to their graduation numbers, fearing the punishment low figures will bring under NCLB. In New York State alone the official state graduation rate is 77% versus the federal government’s 65% calculated graduation rate for New York (Dillon, 08a). It has been estimated that only 70% of a million American high school students who start ninth grade actually graduates four years later (Dillon, 08b). The frustration this has engendered resulted in then-Education Secretary Margaret Spellings amending

NCLB, requiring states to use a single federal formula to calculate and report high school graduation rates (Dillon, 08b). Adherence to a single federal formula does not ensure against all sorts of questionable practices aimed at reducing or obscuring the true number of drop outs, everything from erasing dropped students from the ledgers to "credit recovery" schemes that allow students who lack credits to make them up by means other than re-taking a class or attending summer school (Gootman & Coutts, 08).

In this chapter I have sought to highlight the differences between critical pedagogies and contemporary educational practices. Doing so has required the introduction of the concepts of power, ideology, and hegemony, prevalent concepts in the critical pedagogy literature. Critical pedagogy's methodology and epistemology were contrasted to dominant methodological and epistemological models. Examples of positivist epistemology—the banking system of education, scripted reading programs, NCLB—in contemporary education were considered. In chapter three I will consider power, ideology, and hegemony in light of prevalent moral models versus an ethic of care. Chapter four will explore the relationship between an ethic of care and critical pedagogy.

Chapter 3: The ethic of care

When what came to be known as an ethic of care first appeared in Carol Gilligan's *A Different Voice*, the response was immediate. Gilligan, and especially Nel Noddings after her, were accused of championing a form of moral segregation and essentialism, the idea that men and women thought differently about ethics and moralized differently *because* of their gender. Other critics seemingly welcomed Gilligan and Noddings' project but sought to reconcile it with the moral models both women were criticizing. Subsequently, Gilligan and Noddings amended and clarified their views while maintaining that the differences between an ethic of care and other models of ethics were nevertheless very real and very important. Today much has been written about an ethic of care, a moral model that continues to polarize its champions and critics, and one of the preferred methods of said critics continues to be an attempt to subsume care to other, more established ethical models.

In this chapter I will highlight what I see as the major differences between an ethic of care and other forms of ethics with an eye to establishing an ethic of care as the ethical basis for the critical pedagogies of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and feminist pedagogy (in chapter 4). Much like the previous chapter where various definitions of critical pedagogy were distilled to basic points of agreement among practitioners, this chapter will begin by contrasting various definitions of an ethic of care and showing what all share (section 1). I will consider the social basis of morality versus a view of morality that sees it transcending human beings through a discussion of Margaret Urban Walker's "theoretical-juridical" and "expressive-collaborative" models of morality (section 2). In section three I will focus on what I see as the major distinctions that continue to separate

an ethic of care from other moral models, namely how care bridges the gap between particularistic and universalistic models of morality; the form autonomy assumes in an ethic of care; the distinction of a responsibility in an ethic of care that unites people as a community from the concepts of duties, rights, and obligations; and the complementary relationship between reason and emotion in an ethic of care. I will turn to some of the many ways care is contained by the state, in society, and (with extra emphasis given the concerns of this dissertation) in schools (sections 4 & 5). In the sixth and final section of this chapter I will briefly consider whether people's lives are or should be separable from their moral and pedagogical theorizing.

3.1 *An ethic of care*

Throughout the following sections I will be arguing that the universalistic ethical models (what Urban Walker will call *theoretical-juridical models*, see below) now in place actively sabotage our schools and keep us from the realization of what Freire called "humanization," a fuller, better humanity (92: 84). My aim is critical and normative; I believe nothing short of a complete ethical overhaul is necessary, in our classrooms and societies. I will make the case that we must adopt a morality more in line with our natures as social beings and not to conform with outdated models that justified market imperatives and reified individualism for an historical era when such were, arguably, progressive (progressive in the sense of compared to what preceded them). Fortunately we do not have to reinvent the wheel. In the last three decades much has been written and theorized about such an alternative ethic, the ethic of care.

What is an ethic of care? The scholarship surrounding this ethic uses a variety of names and terms. *Care*, *caring*, the *ethic* or *ethics of care*, *care ethics*, all are used by different authors and sometimes more than one is used by the same author. There is a certain sense in which these terms are compatible if not interchangeable, and it is these underlying similarities that I hope to make clear here.

Petra Bowden notes that the "caring perspective" is marked by "a concern for care, responsiveness and taking responsibility in interpersonal relationships, and by a context-sensitive mode of deliberation that resists abstract formulations of moral problems" (97: 6). Selma Sevenhuijsen notes that "care" is directly related to "the activity of caring," with care "primarily seen as an ability and a willingness to 'see' and to 'hear' needs, and to take responsibility for these needs being met" (98: 83). Diemut Bubeck defines "caring-for" as "the meeting of the needs of one person by another person, where face-to-face interaction between carer and cared-for is a crucial element of the overall activity and where the need is of such a nature that it cannot properly be met by the person in need herself" (in Kittay & Feder, 02:163).

Where Bubeck (95: 9 & 137) sees care as "fundamentally other directed and beneficial to others" and argues that one cannot rightfully *care* for oneself, Daniel Engster notes that "caring need not always involve another person" (07: 32). Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher see an ethic of care as, in part, encompassing the maintenance and well-being of the self. They define caring as "*a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible,*" noting that this "world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web" (93:

103). Nel Noddings has been interpreted and criticized as promoting the idea that sustaining relationships is the highest priority of an ethic of care, even if these relationships are not healthy ones (Clement, 96: 41). Noddings defines a "*caring relation*…in its most basic form, [as] a connection or encounter between two human beings—a carer and a recipient of care, or cared-for" (92: 15). Petra Bowden explicitly refuses to even attempt to formulate a definition of "'caring' or any of its grammatical variations" (97: 17).

Virginia Held, who herself would not offer a definition of care for several years, only a few years ago wrote that "There is not yet anything close to agreement among those writing on care on what exactly we should take the meaning of this term to be" (06: 29). Yet for all their nuances and differences, I think that a consideration of the definitions offered above and a review of the literature reveals certain features of an ethic of care common to most if not all care ethics theorists. There are at least two points of mutual agreement bridging the differences between care ethics theorists. First, an ethic of care does not rely on abstract, disembodied, generic models of individuals as other models do. Care theorists consider it a danger to take some abstract individual as the starting point for an ethical model because such an individual is supposed to be representative of all rational humanity but cannot conceivably be. Urban Walker explains that such a "normative subject"

> is not (typically) a woman; but he or she is also not a child, a person of disadvantaged economic, educational, or professional position, or someone of despised racial, caste, ethnic, sexual, or religious identity. It is not someone with temporary, chronic, or progressive disabilities. This moral agent is none of us at all times, and many of us at no times (97: 23).

Because of the way it is conceived, the gender of the prototypical normative subject is taken for granted: he is male. As Urban Walker shows, women are othered, viewed as deviations from the norm. A certain type of man—arguably white, mature in age, heterosexual, of the Judeo-Christian faiths, well educated and well off financially—is the exemplar of this normative individual. Other people are assumed to be compatible with this model or at least capable of role-playing (in Kohlberg's sense, discussed in section 5 below) and seeing themselves thus. A result of this is that the man who sees in himself the abstract individual of the universalistic models lacks "the conceptual framework for thinking about the moral or political implications of their masculinity" (Sevenhuijsen, 98: 50). This man takes his standing for granted, accepting his positionality as the norm to be aspired to, or that against which all others are measured.

The individual as conceived by care ethics theorists is embedded in a host of relationships with others, relationships that allow for her individuality. An ethics of care starts with people *as* they are and *where* they are, taking account of their positionality and standpoints, the relationships between them and the responsibilities that are assigned and assumed within these relationships. Bubeck (95: 138) speaks of care's "irreducibly social nature" and its "face-to-face interaction"; Noddings of the "cared-for" and "carer" or, elsewhere, "the one-caring" (84); Sevenhuijsen notes that an ethic of care involves the moral concepts of "responsibilities and relationships rather than rules and rights" (98: 107). Concepts of relationships and responsibilities highlight the primacy of the self *with* others, together, whereas the discourse on rules, rights, and duties does not necessarily imply such.

A second area where care ethics theorists agree is in seeing an ethics of care (like critical pedagogies) as praxis. We learn to care, in part, as we learn to be cared for, and we learn to care by caring. "To develop the capacity to care," suggests Noddings, "one must engage in care giving activities" (02: 19). Tronto and Fischer speak of care as an "activity"; Clement of "caregiving activities" (96: 53); Bubeck of the "meeting of needs;" and Kittay of "dependency work" (98: 98). The ethic's theoretical aspect is only realized in action and reflection upon that action. "[W]e cannot understand care unless we practice it," notes Sevenhuijsen, and "our practicing of care can also be improved in quality by trying to understand it as well as possible" (98: 23). Care "involves both thought and action," explains Tronto, noting "that thought and action are interrelated, and that they are directed toward some end" (93: 108).

At a first glance, then, we can safely say that an ethic of care starts with people as they are and their relationships to others. Care avoids making abstract generalizations of individuals and their relationships, recognizing what Petra Bowden (97: 3) calls "the ethical irreducibility" of both specific situations and specific people. Further, an ethic of care requires action with reflection on that action. For reasons discussed in section 3 below, an ethic of care is fundamentally different from other ethical models, although the concerns of these models are in no way anathema to a care ethic. Care is part of a type of moral theorizing Urban Walker labels an "expressive-collaborative view," which she contraposes to the "theoretical-juridical view" assumed by other models[11].

[11] This is a distinction recognized by scholars outside of care ethics theorists and their critics, albeit in slightly different language. Michael Steinberg, for one, speaks of an "ethics of how," which he sees "implicit in the work of Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, and other so-called feminist ethicicts", versus an "ethics of what" comprising universalistic ethical models (05: 119).

3.2 *The origins of an ethic of care*

In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels argued that "[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas," that "the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force" (95: 64). Subsequent scholarship and debate, Marxian and otherwise, challenged the economic determinism associated with this charge, a debate that worked its way into the field of critical pedagogy. Among others, Paulo Freire and Michael Apple refuted a deterministic base-superstructure argument. Freire (98: 26) maintained that humans and, by extension, our institutions are *conditioned* but not *determined*. Apple (82) teased out the distinctions between reproduction and production and showed that culture and schooling are contested grounds upon which ideologies are continually developed and challenged.

One of Marx and Engels' lasting contributions to the history of thought is the idea that our ideas come from us and our relationships, that ideas originate with and are passed down among communities of people. These include our ethical ideas and what we conceive of as morality. "[M]orality has always been class morality," posited Marx and Engels, "it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or, ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against the domination and the future interests of the oppressed" (78: 726). Marx and Engels were challenging the view of morality as disembodied, transcendent, and eternal, of a morality divorced from individuals and their lives. They warned against a form of epistemic privileging that did not recognize itself as such. Marx and Engels cautioned students of history against "saying that these or those ideas were dominant at a given time" by ignoring "the individuals and world conditions which are the source of the

ideas," which would lead to "the phenomenon that increasingly abstract ideas hold sway, i.e. ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality" (78: 65). In other words, Marx and Engels saw the power of the "ruling class" as extending to the creation and maintenance of ideas, including ethical ideas, ideas that constitute ideologies. These ideologies are accepted as "the ideas" of an historic period and are hegemonic until challenged and replaced.

In a similar manner, Margaret Urban Walker argues that "[m]orality arises and goes on between people," that moral knowledge is "situated" in the sense that "it is made possible and is limited by where it comes from and how it is achieved" (98: 5 & 6). Walker warns of moral philosophers who "are typically casual about their own positions to know what they claim to represent and theorize" (98: 49). Moral philosophers, and Walker includes herself, are "within the plane of morality, not outside or above it," despite attempts by some to position themselves as detached observers and analysts and not actors or participants in the creation and maintenance of morality (98: 4 & 5).

Walker introduces two models or templates for moral inquiry which I believe are germane to this study. The hallmark of a *theoretical-juridical model* of morality is "the representation of morality as a compact, propositionally codifiable, impersonally action-guiding code within an agent, or as a compact set of law-like propositions that 'explain' the moral behavior of a well-formed moral agent" (98: 8). Such a model upholds a "purified core of purely moral knowledge" (Ibid). The theoretical-juridical model has served as "the template, the master form, of much" contemporary ethics, and Walker identifies consequentialist, Kantian, contract, and rights-based theories as part of this model (98: 36 & 7). The theoretical-juridical model of morality in its various

manifestations is hegemonic, with "its dominance … reflected in its disappearance from view as a distinct project within … moral philosophy" (Walker, 98: 36).

To a theoretical-juridical model, Walker contrasts an expressive-collaborative model. Where the theoretical-juridical framework "demotes a great deal of what is known, felt, and acted out in moral relations to 'nonmoral'—merely factual or collateral—information," an expressive-collaborative model "pictures morality as a socially embodied medium of understanding and adjustment in which people account to each other for the identities, relationships, and values that define their responsibilities" (Walker, 98: 8 & 61). In other words, ethical theories "always issue from the experience of a particular human community" and reflect the relationships and responsibilities of these communities (Frazer, et. al., 92: 1). Where a theoretical-juridical model "represents morality itself as if it were…a surprisingly compact kind of theory or some kind of internal guidance system of an agent…[making] morality look as if it consists in, or could be represented by, a compact cluster of beliefs", an expressive-collaborative template of morality views morality as "interpersonal and collaborative", consisting of "identities" and "practices" that are context specific (Walker, 98: 8, 10, 14, 17). Sevenhuijsen opines that the "construing of moral identities" is "inherently a social practice, something which we do and make within human relations and within specific social and political contexts" (98: 56). Walker locates an ethic of care within the expressive-collaborative framework (98: 108).

Widely regarded as originating in the works of Carol Gilligan and her criticism of Lawrence Kohlberg[12], the ethic of care was initially recognized as a form of "feminist" or "feminine" ethics by its critics and its early theorists (e.g., Noddings, 84). Olena Hankivsky (04) demarcates first and second-generation care theorists and posits that first generation care theorists were guilty of or lent themselves to an essentialist or naturalist interpretation of care. This essentialist or naturalist charge can be stated thus: is there something reflective of women or womanhood in general and motherhood in particular about the ethic of care?

The writings of first-wave care theorists sometimes seemed to lend credence to this view (Larrabee, 93). Carol Gilligan wrote of "two ways of speaking about moral problems," a justice perspective evidenced mostly by males and "a different voice" evidenced mostly by females (82: 1 & 2). This different voice, Gilligan maintained, represented a mode of moral thinking concerned with the "activity of care" by women who "judge themselves in terms of their ability to care" (82: 17 & 19). Gilligan explained that in her research "I have found that women's moral development centers on the elaboration of … the importance of intimacy, relationships, and care" (82: 17). Noddings views the ethics of caring as arising directly from women's ontology (84: 8). Furthermore, "Our ethic of caring springs from woman's conception of her ethical self as one-caring" (Noddings, 84: 182). The mother-child relationship is Noddings' model of natural caring and one she continually turns to. For example, Noddings identifies motherhood as "probably the prototypical caring relation" (84: 75); opining that "there is reason to believe that women are somewhat better equipped for caring than men",

[12] Although some care ethics theorists trace the formulation of an ethic of care to other sources. For example, Virginia Held (06:26) credits Sara Ruddick's 1980 essay "Maternal Thinking" as the beginning of the ethics of care.

stemming in part as "a result of the construction of psychological deep structures in the mother-child relationship" (84: 97). Noddings laments the lack of care in schools, marked by "the systematic dehumanization of both female and male children through the loss of the feminine" (84: 192-193).

Though I recognize the important ground that early care theorists such as Gilligan and Noddings were treading and the significant ideas they helped introduce, both warrant some criticism. First, Noddings and Gilligan seem to recognize that the justice ethic is socially constructed and coded a "male" ethic but each fails to recognize that labeling an ethic of care a "feminist" or "feminine" ethic could be equally a social construction/codification[13]. Caring, care labor and an ethic of care may appear "natural" to women because of the ways womanhood and motherhood have been constructed in society and the ways care has been contained and constrained. There is a danger in accepting the view of care as being natural to women, a danger Grace Clement spells out explicitly:

> If caring is a natural expression of women's personality, then questions about the just distribution of caregiving responsibilities do not arise. Men, or those for whom care is not "natural," cannot be expected to be caring. However, women can be expected to be caring, and, since they are simply expressing themselves, need not be given special credit for their care (96: 54).

A second criticism pertains to Noddings specifically. Grace Clement charges Noddings with a "false universalism", arguing that, for Noddings, "mothers seem to represent all women" and in defending the ethic of care as a feminine ethic she

[13] Gilligan later (95) differentiated between a "feminine ethic of care" and "a feminist ethic of care", noting that a feminine ethic of care is "premised on an opposition between relationships and self-development" whereas a feminist ethic of care "begins with connection," does not demand female- or self-subordination, and is the "voice of the resistance" (122-123).

(Noddings) takes "the experiences of a specific, nonrepresentative group of women as *women's* moral experience" (96: 3). Yet, not all women who care are mothers or want to be mothers. Further, "[p]arental care is not an appropriate model for public care," warns Julie Anne White, "because we do not want to treat fellow citizens in need of care as though they were incompetent children" (00:84). Adopting Noddings' model of mother as natural care agent as the basis for a public policy implementation of care is problematic because it may give rise to forms of paternalism.

"In situations where we act on behalf of the other because we want to do so," Noddings writes, "we are acting in accord with natural caring" (84: 79). Noddings presents her own dichotomy between "natural caring" and "ethical caring." She views an ethic of care as arising from women's nature (84: 8). As a paragon of natural caring, Noddings has in mind the model of the female mother[14], noting that "a mother's caretaking efforts on behalf of her children are not usually considered ethical but natural" (84: 79). I would agree with Noddings that there is a "fundamental universality in our ethic" of care; something about an ethic of care is, to a degree, "universally accessible" (84: 5). Where I disagree here with Noddings is in seeing this something as somehow reducible to women and the mother-child relationship. Everyone is involved in caring relationships at one time or another, yet, not everyone is a woman, and not every woman is a mother.

In the next section I will explore some of the major differences between an ethic of care and other forms of morality consonant with Walker's theoretical-juridical template. In chapter four I will show how an ethic of care is the ethical foundation for the

[14] Care theorists like Kittay (99) are clear that "mothering" is not an activity limited to women or mothers alone.

critical pedagogies of Dewey, Freire, and feminist pedagogy. Briefly, however, allow me to outline some of the common ground uncovered between an ethic of care and critical pedagogy at this early stage. Walker notes that an expressive-collaborative model of morality, such as an ethic of care, "functions both descriptively and normatively": descriptively it aims "to reveal what morality 'is'"; normatively, it "aims to suggest some important things morality is 'for'" (98: 60). Critical pedagogies undertakes a similarly descriptive and normative task. Expressive-collaborative models like an ethic of care view morality as "constructive," meaning "the materials for assigning responsibilities are given, but exactly how to go on with them, how to make them work in particular cases, and where and how to extend or modify them, may not be" (98: 62). Critical pedagogies are similarly constructive, providing frameworks and concepts to understand oppression and dehumanization without dictating corrective measures. Activists and scholars in critical pedagogy maintain that their critical eye be turned on their own selves, assumptions, and practices. Walker adopts Sandra Harding's "strong objectivity" to challenge the homogeneity of "epistemic communities," urging feminist moral theorists and others to challenge and understand their own homogeneity and not just take such for granted (Walker, 98: 58; Harding, 93).

A word about the potential of an ethic of care. Marx and Engels argued that "each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled…to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society", which it can do "because under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class" (95: 65-66). Though an ethic of care is often associated with women and feminists, it is not an ethic for women or

feminists alone. It is an ethic that originated with feminists who were challenging the patriarchal order that oppressed women but has evolved with the potential to represent not only other oppressed groups in society, but all people. In the sections and chapters that follow I hope to show that an ethic of care fosters democratic, egalitarian, and participatory relationships and institutions in society. Hence, if the history of ethical thought can be viewed as one where the sphere of democracy has been expanding, with an ethic of care we are potentially on the verge of a radically democratic reconception of moral life, and if this ethic is realized in society and its institutions, truly democratic attainments in all aspects of our lives.

3.3 *The individual, the social, and the ethic of care*

Since Carol Gilligan's initial critique of Kohlberg, critics have been trying to discredit an ethic of care. This refutation has assumed two forms. The first method of attack has been to say, that in effect, an ethic of care is already a part of an extant moral model. The compatibility of care with everything from virtue ethics to Confucianism assumes this guise (Halwani, 03; Li, 94; Luo, 07). In a moment I will consider specific incidents of this proposed compatibility involving Neo-Kantian scholars and, in section 5, with Lawrence Kohlberg. A second method of refuting the ethic of care has been to argue, in effect, that while feminists and care ethics scholars may be guided by good intentions, they are woefully misguided in their moral theorizing. These attacks are often intertwined and leveled by individuals with varying levels of hostility towards and sympathy for an ethic of care. Some Neo-Kantian scholars, apparently taking especial umbrage with what they view as care's direct attack on Kant and his ethical system, have

re-visited, re-interpreted, and otherwise plumbed the depths of Kant's moral philosophy to show, in John Paley's words, that not only does "Kant's moral theory include the ethics of care," "Kant's ethic of care" is in fact "an improvement on the ethics of care" (02: 141). Thus we are told that Kant has "outlined an ethic of care," implicit in the categorical imperative (Nagl-Docekal, 97: 117); that Kant provides distinctions that adequately deal with concerns broached by feminists (O'Neill, 89); or that care can be understood as a Kantian imperfect duty (Korsgaard, 89). Other theorists sympathetic to the ethic of care argue that it would be better off if it assumed more of the form of Kant's moral model, again, perhaps by being conceived of as a duty (Miller, 05; Engster, 07).

Several scholars critical of an ethic of care base their criticisms on earlier formulations of the ethic. For example, Paley and Nagl-Docekal focus on Gilligan, Noddings, and Baier, with little sense of the evolution within the field of care ethics or the disagreements care ethicists themselves have with the founding mothers of the field. A pointed instance of this is the insistence that the ethic of care claims to be anti-universalistic when in fact--these scholars' "gotcha" moment—"it tacitly presupposes precisely such a conception" (Nagl-Docekal, 97: 101). In other words, this line of criticism holds that care theorists champion the particularistic over the universalistic in theory but contradict themselves by relying on a universalistic form. Focusing on early care theorists alone makes such a charge understandable. Nel Noddings has argued against principles in ethics, writing that "we, as ones-caring, will not even define the principles by which [another] should live" (84: 102)[15].

[15] Noddings argues that moral principles, because they are principles, are universifiable, meaning that people and their situations are viewed as fungible; therefore the particularities of the people and their relationships are ignored (84: 84). Noddings also argues that when principles are established, exceptions to them are established concomitantly. She uses the example of killing, explaining that when a principle

Yet the discourse around the ethic of care has evolved since its inception thirty-plus years ago. Among others, Olena Hankivsky (04) and Daniel Engster (07) argue that care has room for and can make use of principles. Eva Kittay contemplates (but ultimately rejects) the addition of a third, caring principle to Rawls (98: 113). However, even when appealing to principles (discussed in chapter four), the ethics of care remains unique and distinct from other forms of moral thinking. The moral principles care theorists appeal to are not fixed; they are flexible guides to action capable of further revision. They are principles that recognize the uniqueness of the individual and her relationships without demanding that the individuals guided by them hold such as inviolable or untethered from human life and interactions (Hankivsky, 04). Bubeck argues that a carer may move in her thought from a concrete situation to a more abstract and principled way of thinking about the particular situation, but must always return to the realities of the particular situation itself before acting (95: 155). In the language of Benhabib (92), even when a care ethicist consults principles, he returns not to a "generalized" but to a "concrete" other.

Care theorists argue that the archetypical individual of the theoretical-juridical models of moral theory is disembodied and abstract, disconnected and unencumbered, rational and reasonable. Where individual autonomy in an ethic of care can be coupled with respect for others, the respect of the theoretical-juridical models "is quite compatible with nonassociation" between individuals (Baier, 93: 298). Relationships are secondary to this individual's autonomy and even perceived as possible threats to individual

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forbidding killing is established, also established are the principles detailing the exceptions to the prohibition of killing. "Supposing…that we are moral (we are principled, are we not?)," Noddings writes, "we may tear into others whose beliefs or behaviors differ from ours with the promise of ultimate vindication" (84: 2). Noddings, in an essentializing maneuver, subscribes the principled approached to the father and not the mother (84: 2).

autonomy and judgment. The abstract individuals of these models act together only when it benefits them to do so, or when acting together is in accord with universal principles.

From the perspective of an ethic of care, relationships between human beings are not optional; they are primary. A care ethic is "thoroughly relational" (Noddings, 02: 14). For care ethicists, relationships are not forms of attachment rational actors always *choose*. At the very beginning of our lives we are born into relationships with other people we depend on, and these are relationships we depend on, relationships that matter. Both literally and figuratively, we are reared to stand on our own two feet. Annette Baier offers that "A person, perhaps, is best seen as one who was long enough dependent upon other persons to acquire the essential arts of personhood. Persons are essentially second persons, who grow up with other persons" (85: 84). When we are old enough and mature enough to walk through life alone we seldom do so, choosing instead to surround ourselves with people we appreciate and people who appreciate us, with people we care for and people who care for us. Furthermore, each of us face and will face what Eva Kittay calls "inevitable dependencies", which are "times in our lives when we are utterly dependent" on other people (98: 76). From birth to death, in illness and injury, we need others, and these instances do not count the joyous times we share and wish to share with others. Particular relations between particular individuals may be options, but relationships in general are not. These are facts of life an ethic of care recognizes and embraces.

Care theorists are not alone in making the case that human beings are social animals who depend on and thrive from our connections with and to others. Primatologist Frans de Waal, for one, challenges traditional ethical models with their emphasis on an

autonomous individual capable of existing outside social relationships, explaining that "we have been group-living forever. Free and equal people never existed. Humans started out…as interdependent, bonded, and unequal" (96: 4). de Waal maintains that his studies of our primate cousins drives this point home. Furthermore, he argues that our thoroughly social nature is evident when we consider that solitary confinement is viewed as the most extreme punishment humans can imagine outside of the death penalty (96: 5).

Care recognizes that *who* we are, our ways of feeling about ourselves, our being and existence—in a word, our ontologies—depend on our relationships with others. Different relationships, different selves, different conceptions of self. For example, when I am at work I feel the competent, capable professional; when I visit my parents there is still a part of me that feels, despite my age, despite my wife and children, despite anything I may have accomplished in my life, a part of me still feels a boy to my mother and father. I do not mean I feel infantilized by my parents or our relationship. I just sit in a different relationship to my mom and dad than I do to my wife, to my colleagues at work, my professors at graduate school, my students, and my peers. I often *feel* different in these various contexts.

Consider, for example, our sense of humor. The same joke told by a student, a co-worker, or a family member may elicit different responses from us. A student tells the joke and we might think it is a funny joke but we have to tell the student that it is not an appropriate joke for the student to be telling his teacher or to be telling in school. A co-worker tells the same joke and we may not feel it is an appropriate joke for our colleague to be telling in the workplace. But at a family gathering we roar with laughter when the same joke is told by an uncle. Our contexts, our place is relationship to others, carry with

them specifics of what is allowable or not, of what is acceptable or not, of what is to be encouraged or discouraged. When a Christian, an atheist, and a Jew view the cross, what does each feel and think of as they contemplate it? In a similar vein, Kincheloe suggests that we "consider how a classroom is perceived by a class clown, a traditionally good student, a burnt-out teacher, a standardized test maker, an anti-standards activist, a bureaucratic supervisor, a disgruntled parent, a nostalgic alumnus or a student with feelings" similar to the Columbine High School shooters (05: 9).

Where does the individual stand in the metaphors—from webs to weaving a fabric to circles and chains—that care theorists use and the relationships they envision? Care theorists view autonomy as socially mediated. An individual's autonomy is not possible without the nurturance of the self by others and is maintained by our relationships with others. Clement notes that "we *learn* to become autonomous, and we learn this competency not through isolation from others, but through relationships with others" (96: 24). Tronto posits that "it is a part of the human condition that our autonomy occurs only after a long period of dependence, and that in many regards, we remain dependent upon others throughout our lives" (93: 162). As I noted above, we *learn* to stand alone.

Autonomy is necessary for care. The autonomy that care theorists favor is an autonomy with the "capacity to reshape and cultivate new relations, not to ever more closely resemble the unencumbered abstract rational self of liberal political and moral theories" (Held, 06). It is an autonomy perhaps better understood as a "mutual autonomy" or "heteronomy" (Bubeck, 95: 144 ; Held, 06: 55). How exactly do social-relationships make personal autonomy possible? John Paley quotes Hannah Arendt, that "it is precisely by applying critical standards to one's own thought that one learns the art of critical

thought" and works towards autonomy (Arendt, 82: 42), then notes "[t]his is the kind of observation that is hard to find in writing on the ethics of care" (Paley, 02: 136). In point of fact, Grace Clement argues that autonomy involves critically evaluating the choices you make and that this self-examination is socially mediated, taught us by family, friends and teachers (96: 24). Without this component of critical reflection, of praxis, an important element of care is missing. An individual who has "unthinkingly and uncritically followed the caring practices into which she has been brought up can seem in outward appearance to be caring," explains Held, "but will be unable to truly recognize and appreciate care" (06: 55). Held is also adamant that care promote "the competent autonomy of the cared-for" and not just that of the care-giver (06: 83).

An ethics of care helps one understand how the theoretical-juridical models of morality ignore power relationships. The positionality of individuals is ignored in these models, which assume an abstract, rational, detached individual as their starting point. Such homogenous conceptions of the individual, Held notes, treat "the economically powerless and the economically powerful as if they were equally autonomous" (06: 81). In fact they are not and cannot be. For example, the economically better off enjoy longer and better lives than the economically less well off; Money, it would seem, can indeed buy happiness (Leonhardt, 08).

This recognition--that power is not evenly distributed, that individuals face unique circumstances stemming from their distinct positions in society, positions they may not have chosen to occupy--points to another major difference between an ethic of care and other models of morality. In the theoretical-juridical framework, morality is something

you can *do* outside of, even in spite of, the political forms in which one lives; morality is intellectualist, individualist, impersonal, and socially modular (Walker, 98). Care theorists do not see an ethic of care as separate from political life; a care ethic depends on democratic institutions and relationships and is aimed at fostering these. But much other ethical theorizing operates from the assumption that the moral and political realms are separable, what Tronto identifies as a "moral boundary" ignoring the fact that "all moral arguments are made in a political context" (93: 3). For example, though the connections are not always elucidated, political policy choices reflect normative dimensions. Hankivsky (04) explains how government policies are chosen from a spectrum of alternatives and that the choices made are guided by the values of those choosing. Even the questions we ask are guided by our values. Hankivsky posits that "values direct the questions we ask, determine what information we consider to be important, select the actors that we see as integral to the policy process, and determine the consequences of choosing to react or not to react to a specific social problem or issue" (04: 31-32). Adopting a dichotomy between the moral and political carries with it the risk of reducing moral theorizing to a mere intellectualist exercise while masking the conception of morality that underlies the political reality we inhabit.

One of the unintended consequences of conceiving the political and moral as separable is to lend credence to other unhelpful, even harmful, dualisms. From Plato's forms to Descartes mind-body dualism to Kant's noumena and phenomena, the juxtaposition of two concepts one to the other helps us think through these concepts. Yet we should remain wary. This dissertation has touched on several dualisms already, from natural caring and ethical caring to expressive-collaborative and theoretical-juridical

models of morality. Val Plumwood (93) sees dualisms themselves as problematic because of the way they are conceived. She argues that dualisms are "formed by domination and subordination and constructed as oppositional and exclusive" (Plumwood, 93: 31). Sevenhuijsen warns that when we view the contrasting concepts of a dualism as "mutually exclusive opposites," the concepts then serve as "mechanisms of exclusion" with one item--usually the first of the proffered pair—considered superior to the second (98: 47).

At this point I would like to consider a dualism that has generated much literature and debate within and outside an ethic of care, the dualism between care and justice. The care that makes justice possible has often been taken for granted, assumed, much as Plumwood warned of dualisms that "[result] from a certain kind of denied dependency on a subordinated other" (93: 41). Perhaps because some care ethics theorists and their critics view Carol Gilligan's critique of Lawrence Kohlberg's justice reasoning model as the starting point for an ethics of care, much has been made about the primacy of care or justice, one over the other. For example, working within the care perspective, Virginia Held has written that care is "probably the most deeply fundamental value" and that care can and does exist without justice (06: 17). Other theorists argue that justice should be primary in the public sphere but care primary in the private. A liberal convergence approach exemplified by Susan Moller Okin (91) and William Kymlicka (01) attempts to assimilate care within a justice framework.

As the care/justice debate continues, another line of argument holds that the dualism between care and justice may be an unhelpful one. Clement argues against taking care or justice as primary because it leads to a never ending spiral where "whenever we

find a way in which one ethic seems to be more basic than the other, we can find another way in which the other ethic is still more basic" (96: 117). Sevenhuijsen wonders why such an emphasis has been placed on the compatibility of the care and justice frameworks and further why one should be derivative of or framed in terms of the other (98: 39). She uses the example of the compatibility of human well-being and justice in Aristotelian virtue-ethics to make the argument that it need not be a situation of one or the other in the care-justice debate (Sevenhuijsen, 98: 59). Though care has so long been marginalized and justice assumed as primary in ethical thought does not mean that care ethics theorists will or should dismiss justice. Though the two have been theorized in opposition to one another does not mean we have to accept this as a necessary dichotomy.

There are care ethics theorists who argue that justice needs care and care needs justice (e.g., Bubeck, 95; Kittay, 98; Tronto, 93). Clement has argued that persisting in setting the two against one another results "in uncaring forms of justice and unjust forms of care" (96: 2).Though Held maintains that in the absence of justice there will still be care, we should wonder what kind of care would this be and what would it look like? Much as an ethic of care refutes the view of people as abstract individuals unencumbered by relationships to others, care and justice are perhaps best viewed as "mutually interdependent" (Clement, 96: 109). Some care ethics theorists maintain that care can only be fully realized in just societies. For example, a just society would take steps to make sure that care labor was financially rewarded, and that care providers and care receivers were held in high regard. Bubeck, for one, opines that a just society would prevent the vulnerability of care providers "through suitable social institutions" (95: 13).

Such a line of argumentation refuses to assign moral primacy to either care or justice and looks for the ways in which the two inform one another.

While an ethic of care that neglects justice in theory would result in an impoverished care in practice, the concepts of duties, rights, and obligations can be problematic for some care theorists[16]. Should our relationships and interactions with others be guided by obligations and duties? Does the notion of abstract rights subtract something fundamental from the human individual? Though, as noted, care theorists from Slote (07) to Engster (07) choose to argue for an ethic of care with the language of obligations, rights, and duties, here I would like to briefly explore the idea of *responsibility* uniting people. At a first glance the word responsibility and the notion of responsibility guiding caring relationship sounds nicer, somehow more user-friendly than (possibly) impersonal obligations, rights, and duties. Further, where obligations and duties sound like things we have to do, the notion of responsibility seems somehow to maintain the individual's sense of autonomy even as she cares for others and her self. Nevertheless I do not think the mere difference between responsibilities versus obligations, rights, and duties is semantic, nor do I think their differences stem solely from their connotations; I think there are substantive differences between them, important differences for an ethic of care that takes the individual and his relationships with others as primary.

[16] But not all, as certain care theorists explicitly argue in terms of obligations, duties, and rights while upholding the uniqueness of the individual, her relationships with others, and her responsibilities. For instance, Elisabeth Porter holds that an ethic of care "necessarily encompasses a concern for [a person's] equality and rights" (06: 108). Engster argues that we have an obligation to care for one another because we are dependent on each other, that "showing we have a moral obligation to care for others…demonstrates that we should organize our social policies, practices, and institutions to support" caring relationships and an ethic of care (07: 37 & 40).

"When I hear care discussed as a matter of special obligations," warns Gilligan, "I hear the vestiges of patriarchy" (95: 125). Selma Sevenhuijsen is adamant that responsibilities are different from rules and rights (98: 107). Obligations and duties speak to formal rules and impartiality whereas responsibility "is a term…embedded in a set of implicit cultural practices" (Tronto, 93: 131). Responsibility, notes Tronto, does not rest on "formal bonds, previously stated duties, [or] formal agreements" (93: 132). Walker (98) has argued that the practices characteristic of morality are practices of responsibility, by which she means

> In making each other accountable to certain people for certain states of affairs, we define the scope and limits of our agency, affirm who in particular we are, show what we care about, and reveal who has standing to judge and blame us. In the ways we assign, accept, or deflect responsibilities, we express our understandings of our own and others' identities, relationships, and values (98: 16)

Though they may not always be freely chosen, responsibilities function in such a manner as to enhance individual autonomy and social solidarity at the same time. Responsibilities, notes Walker, "shape, correct, and enliven individuals' senses of responsibility and strengthen the common fabric of trust" (98: 95). Noddings and Baier speak of the ways in which responsibilities transcend the individual. Noddings (06) raises the example of a fifth-grade bully, Bob, and asks, "Do his classmates share any responsibility for his behavior? Do his parents? His teachers? By asking this set of questions, I am not suggesting that Bob bears no responsibility for his acts" (112). Noddings speaks of "shared responsibilities" and uses Bob the bully and his classmates, family, and teachers as an example of the ways in which we can come to understand Bob's acts in order to prevent such future acts by Bob and others. Baier cautions that we must not cling to the idea "that moral responsibility must divide without remainder into

the bit that is mine and not yours, and the other bits that belong exclusively to other specific individuals", that doing so will necessarily "limit the sorts of shared action we engage in" and "drastically limit our ability to reform our inherited schemes of cooperation for the better" (97: 315-316). Responsibilities are not static; they require "constant evaluation" (Tronto, 93: 131).

An ethic of care has been misconstrued to be "other-directed" at the expense of the self[17]. Walker speaks of an "integrity problem", the idea that "responsibility ethics might seem to defeat personally meaningful life-ordering by visiting a veritable plague of commitments on us" (98: 108). In this context, Rebecca Whisnant (04) speaks of "centering oneself" when caring for others. "Self-centering," she notes, "involves a kind of primary attention to one's own projects and perspectives that protects one from dissolution or subsumption" (04: 202). Care should not be seen as synonymous with servitude and subordination of the self to others (Sevenhuijsen, 98: 58). To fail to care for oneself "impairs one's capacity to function as a fully responsible moral agent"

[17] Tove Pettersen (08: 114) opines that "the ethics of care requires us to develop a sense of moral responsibility for everyone", which raises the question: How does an ethic of care determine the spatial, temporal, and affective limits of our responsibility to others? After all, one may over-extend himself in the provision of care; there is a tipping point where the amount of care one provides to others cared-for or to the number of others cared-for diminishes the quality of the care we provide them or that we are able to provide additional others or our own persons. Michael Slote and Pettersen, among others, have sought to provide guidance on this issue. Slote (07), couching his argument in terms of obligations and not responsibilities, argues that empathy provides a basis for distinguishing the strength of our obligation to provide care for another. As an example he notes that we feel greater empathy for (and therefore it is more morally salient upon us to try and provide care for) a person we see drowning than for a starving person halfway around the world we do not know or see but can help by donating to a relief organization. Pettersen differentiates thick from thin care: Thick care "requires a personal relationship between the carer and the cared-for, where one's knowledge of the other is detailed and discriminating"; Thin care "is what the carer does for people she doesn't know well, when her information about them is general and incomplete," such as donating to a relief organization to combat starvation on another continent (08: 114). Our caring responsibility is first and foremost for those nearest and dearest to us, for those whom we know or are capable of knowing (like a person we see floundering in a body of water). Of course we do not ignore the person starving on the other side of the world, but we cannot allow our attempts to care for this person (by say, donating all our money to a relief organization) to diminish our abilities to care for our immediate others and our own selves.

(Whisnant, 04: 202). Failing to care for the self detracts from the care we can provide others. As will be seen in chapter four, the idea of responsibility to the self and others is central to critical pedagogies.

Another major dualism that has been the subject of discussion in and around the ethic of care is the relationship between reason and emotion. Justice models trump reason over emotion but, again, some care theorists recognize this as another unnecessary dichotomy. Daniel Engster holds, "Emotion and reason are both necessary for the development and maintenance of caring persons and a caring society" (07: 39). Emotions such as empathy evolved early in our human species, allowing us to appraise the emotional states of others and respond to them (de Waal, 06: 27). Just as I yawn when someone else yawns, I often laugh when others are laughing. Emotional contagion seems to exist and its effects are actively sought out or avoided. Bubeck points out that care-givers frequently derive the emotion of joy from the activity of caring for others (95: 149). Consider how bleak our lives and our classrooms would be without sympathy and empathy, without sensitivity and responsiveness.

We often act spontaneously based on the feelings and emotions a situation brings forth within us. Reasoning and emotion are related as both are parts of our moral repertoires. Care needs reason. Emotional attachment is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for an ethic of care. Engster argues that though one's particular affection for another may enhance the quality of caring delivered, one need not feel special affection for others to effectively care for them (07: 35). Reason is a tool at our disposal that can aid us in delivering appropriate forms of care; our reasoning ability itself is socially-

mediated (Sevenhuijsen, 98: 61). “When we care,” Noddings posits, “we must employ reasoning to decide what to do and how best to do it” (02: 14). There will be times when deliberation will precede immediacy, when we will have to think about and reason over the care we will provide and the care we will need. If we are going to construct classrooms and societies where care is central, our ability to reason and strive for justice will prove invaluable.

3.4 *Care contained*

Given that the boundary between morality and politics is an unhelpful and misleading one, the dominance of the theoretical-juridical models of morality over an expressive-collaborative model like the ethic of care carries with it real world implications. The marginalization of care in ethical thinking has only been challenged in the last thirty years. Many of the institutions that shape our lives and that we inhabit have actively contained, downplayed, and ignored care, and continue to do so. From the realm of theory to the policies of the state, in our society and in our schools, care has been discounted and rendered peripheral. In this section I would like to discuss some of the ways care has been contained in our society through its policies, in our relationships to self and others, leaving the specific ways care is marginalized in schools to section 5.

When a boundary is erected and maintained between the political and the moral and an ethic of care is marginalized within the moral, it is difficult to conceive of care as a political idea. Hence the institutions of our society and government do not reflect care. Hankivsky identifies a “gap between theoretical and public policy analysis” of care with the result that government policies do not reflect care and actually can be seen as working

against care (04: 1). Paul Kershaw, writing in light of Canadian government policy, explains how the Canadian government's employment leave policy operates in such a way to constitute what he calls a "moral hazard apparatus" (05: 130). In Canada a parent can take thirty-five weeks off work for parental leave while being paid 55% of their salaries. Kershaw shows how more Canadian women in heterosexual couples decide to stay home on parental leave than fathers because the husbands generally earn more and losing 45% of the husband's income is a financial hit many Canadian families cannot sustain (05: 131).

Despite this criticism, it is worth noting that the Canadian employment leave policy is generous compared to other countries. For example, the United States does not provide paid maternity leave, making it and Australia the only two industrialized countries in the world not to do so. America's Family and Medical Leave Act allots twelve weeks of *unpaid* job-protected leave for parents who work at large companies. Workers in America who want to spend time with their newborns often cobble the time together from any vacation, sickness, or personal days they may have accrued if they have jobs that provide such. When our daughter was born I took two weeks off work to help care for my wife and two year old son. I knew ahead of time that I was going to take at least a couple of weeks off and planned to write a letter to let my principal know so she could plan for my absence. My union advised me to word my letter to the effect that I would be home helping to care for my wife, and not to mention taking care of our twenty-one month old son. Caring for my children, as far as my school district's absentee policies is concerned, is not an acceptable form of care, whereas attending to the needs of

my wife after childbirth are (which I find perplexing because taking care of our kids while she recuperates is a way of caring for Myoungmee).

The liberal tradition's conception of the citizen and citizenship drives a further rift between care and politics. Citizens are supposed to be independent and capable of looking after themselves (Hankivsky, 04: 5). Independence and self-reliance have their place and are important facets of each individual. However, the problem is that "[T]his norm of self-sufficiency and the related view of human nature assumes each citizen to be a detached individual," explains Sevenhuijsen, "whose aim is autonomous behavior, who needs nobody and who recognizes dependency and vulnerability only in others. It means that care figures in politics as a handicap, as a burden or as a 'necessary evil'" (98: 28).

A moral boundary between the private and public spheres also works to marginalize care (Tronto, 93). Liberal conceptions of citizenship locate citizenship in the public sphere where all are, theoretically, able to transcend their differences and meet as equals, or as Sevenhuijsen puts it, citizenship within the public sphere "means transcending the particular in order to recognize and guarantee a common will and a common good and interest" (98: 48) I think a common will, common good and common interest are, potentially, a lot harder (though not impossible) to agree upon when we take people as they actually are with their various relationships and interests and not as the exemplars called for by the theoretical-juridical models. That said, I suspect the common will, common good, and common interest decided upon by people when we account for our differences in addition to our similarities have the potential to be very satisfying and fruitful though necessarily always open to revision and reformulation. The theoretical-juridical models practice a power evasion in the sense discussed in chapter two in that

their model of the individual happens to represent a narrow interest as the *common* interest. When society and its institutions proceed on this assumption of the transcendence of the particular, we quickly uncover power at work and see who benefits and who does not benefit in society. I think illustrations of the ways care is classed, raced, commodified and gendered in society help make this apparent.

Care is classed in the sense that if you have the economic means you can pay someone to do your care labor. When Tronto writes that "care is privileged irresponsibility," she means that "those who are relatively privileged are granted by that privilege the opportunity to simply ignore certain forms of hardships that they do not face" (93: 120-121). Tronto uses the example of race, arguing that if you are white you have more opportunities than blacks, whether you are aware or not that your skin color accords you these opportunities (93: 121). Similarly, if you are not disabled you may never be aware of the lack of accommodations and access to public buildings facing people who are. If you are not in the position of needing care or needing to provide care to someone, you do not notice that your not needing care or not needing to provide care allow you more opportunities that someone caring or receiving care. If you are wealthy enough you can hire home health aides, pay for child care, etc.

Care has been commodified to the extent that a dollar value can be placed on nearly all forms of care labor, from child care to nursing homes to hospital stays. Hankivsky (04) argues that care can help us understand that we value things in qualitatively different ways, that not everything need necessarily or should have a dollar sign attached to it. She challenges economic evaluation methodologies involved in cost of illness studies: How do we place a dollar value on an arm, a year of missed work, or a

life? How much is a parent's love for their child *worth*? Why does it seem so natural that we can assign everything a price or try to do so? Hankivsky quotes Schumacher to the effect that attempting to quantify the unquantifiable is "absurd" but "what is worse and destructive of civilization is the pretense that everything has a price, or, in other words, that money is the highest of all values," what Karl Marx called the "universal equivalent" (Schumacher in Hankivsky, 04: 101; Marx, 90: 163). Because commodification is hegemonic in our world, alternate forms of determining something or someone's worth become harder to broach (Hankivsky, 04: 99).

Care labor has traditionally not been considered *work* because the labor associated with care—from raising children to caring for the elderly—has been relegated to the private sphere of the home. Further, it is work that has been (in Sevenhuijsen's term) "gender-loaded", considered "women's work," and gone unremunerated (98: 111). Yet care labor occurs in the private and public spheres. However, when care labor takes place outside the home, it has fallen disproportionately on women, non-whites, and people of lower socio-economic status. Where it has been paid, care work is often underpaid. Consider the mean salaries of jobs usually associated with care labor here in the United States[18]. The mean annual wages of a home health aide are $20,850; of crossing guards, $23,460; teacher assistants, $22,820. The annual average wage of a high school teacher, $41,619, is considerably higher than these other jobs. Yet a more instructive comparison may be between teaching and another profession that requires a similar amount of time spent in school. Where a Masters degree is required to teach high school in America, lawyers spend three years in law school following their undergraduate years and the

[18] All figures come from the United States Government's Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov/bls/blswage,htm).

mean annual wage for their profession is $118,280. Extant labor rules classify home health aides for the elderly as "companions," exempting employers from federal standards governing overtime and minimum wages; incidentally, personal and home care aides are expected to be the second-fastest growing occupation in the United States from 2006-2016 (*New York Times*, 09).

The structure of care labor in the public sphere can work against the provision of optimal care. Grace Clement (96) discusses how bureaucracies and care-givers in the public sphere come into conflict. In an institution like a hospital the nurses and orderlies get to know patients best, but it is usually the doctors' and often administrators or administratively predetermined hospital policy that dictates treatment and the terms of care. Impersonal bureaucracies follow general rules, principles and procedures, which, in Clement's hospital example, means "that patients cannot be treated as unique individuals but as instances of general types" (96: 63). In situations like this, not only may patients not receive the best form of care they should, but care-givers find their autonomy circumscribed, their work dictated for them by others. With its emphasis on specialization and hierarchization, bureaucracies further undermine caregiving.

Bubeck thinks it inevitable under present conditions that care workers will always be exploited[19]. Carers "will always give considerations of care more weight than considerations of justice if the two conflict, and this, in turn, implies that they will continue to care even in situations which are clearly exploitative" (Bubeck, 95: 13). Kittay sounds a similar warning when she opines that "the dependence of dependent persons obligates dependency workers in ways that situate them unequally with respect to others who are not similarly obligated" (98: 76). For example, since we made the

[19] A logical conclusion given Bubeck's insistence that care is always other- and not self-directed.

decision that my wife would stay home and care for our children during their toddler years—because we could not afford to give up my salary—my wife's career and continuing education have been put on hold.

Due to the way care is viewed and care labor allocated today, care-givers and care-receivers are viewed differently. Julie Anne White posits that "the delivery of 'care' in the current institutional context tends to evolve as a paternalistic practice, assuming a permanent class of caregivers and a subordinate class of dependents, and privileging the expertise of caregivers in the process of defining needs" (00: 17). As an example, White discusses the New Futures Project which aimed at reducing teen unemployment, teen pregnancy and the school drop out rate in select cities. White holds that New Futures failed because the experts and institutions involved spent their time communicating with one another and failing to communicate with the people the Project was intended to effect (00: 22).

Care has been maligned as synonymous with weakness, dependence, and neediness. These, we have been socialized to believe through our culture's championing of the rugged individual, are necessarily bad things. Thus we ourselves often deny that much of the care we receive is care and that much of the care labor we perform is related to care (Tronto, 93: 120). Care-receivers have been maligned as free loaders and stereotypes of their extremes are exploited for political gain. In his 1976 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan warned of a "welfare queen" with "80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards" who is "collecting veteran's benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands….[and] collecting social security on her cards"; a person supposedly with "Medicaid, getting food stamps, and … collecting welfare under each of her names"

(*Washington Monthly*, 03) The actual woman Reagan referred to used two aliases to collect $8,000 (Ibid). An urban legend exists of the welfare recipient driving her Cadillac to collect her food stamps.

It stands to reason that the "welfare queen" is just as much a myth as the "self-made man." Julie Anne White claims the distinction between these two centers "on the question of who meets their respective needs: Are these needs met privately in the context of the family or the economy? Or are they met publicly by the state?" (00: 156). White suggests that when we pose the question this way we come to see that what we are really talking about are relationships and these are relationships of interdependence. Care has been viewed as a private activity, consigned to the household (Tronto, 93: 119). "Reliance on family and friends in the private sphere is acceptable," notes Hankivsky, "but individuals are expected to transcend dependency once they enter the public realm" (04: 5). Dependency on government is viewed as weakness, "considered to be the exception and not the norm" (Hankivsky, 04: 5). The government that provides too much to private individuals (excluding corporate individuals) is maligned as a "nanny state."

Care and care labor have long been associated with women and consigned to the private sphere and this has effects on the relationship between men and women and their psyches. Kershaw claims that men have enjoyed a "patriarchal dividend," which grants them a form of "irresponsibility for care" (05: 130; 90-92). This is lamentable when it comes, for example, to parenting, because when fathers take care of their children it may actually make it easier for them to develop a disposition towards caring and an ethic of care (Sevenhuijsen, 98: 112). Sevenhuijsen argues that the collective cultural image of what it means to be masculine, having been tied to career, self-sufficiency, and

invulnerability in the public sphere, may actually hinder men's ability to develop a caring disposition (98: 111-112).

As care and care labor have been associated with women, and masculinity defined in contradistinction to femininity, some men may find care carries an image difficult for them to surmount. Bubeck argues that men who care often see doing so as opposed to their self-interest whereas "women are more likely to feel powerful when involved in caring for others" (95: 167). Though care and caring labor as society now holds them may be perceived as "emasculating" by some men, I think we have to question Bubeck's assumption and wonder how many women feel powerful when involved in caring for others. After all, women are often *expected* to readily assume the labor of care in our society today, at whatever costs to themselves and their careers. This is part of the "feminine mystique" Betty Friedan (63) spoke out against. Clement argues that unpaid care work in the family compromises the careworker's autonomy because such work usually requires women to be subservient to the other members of the household and to enjoy being such (96: 59). As Sevenhuijsen so aptly observes in the context of motherhood in the private sphere of the family, "If a woman fulfills the image of the self-sacrificing moral mother there will always be a pedestal waiting for her" (98: 49). The male has often been conceived as the family "bread winner" and great importance has been placed on his labor, which, in its higher forms, is conceived in terms divorced from the body as a career or a profession. Clement explains that, because "professional status is traditionally achieved through increasing formal, theoretical education and through specialization," it means "to be an autonomous worker, one must be a professional, but to be a professional, one must shed personalized caregiving tasks" (96: 64). At a time when

citizenship is still conceived of in terms of participation in the public sphere's marketplace, women seeking work outside the household often have to find jobs that can first accommodate their care labor at home (Clement, 96: 60). Further, as so much care labor goes unsung, unrewarded, and at the expense of another, the care we receive may leave us harboring a sense of shame and guilt (Kittay, 98: 103).

3.5 *Education and the crisis of caring*

Nel Noddings warns of a "crisis of caring" in American public schools (84: 181). The structure of American public schools and the practices within them hinder the development of caring relationships. This crisis of caring is apparent in classroom practices from grading to the moral theories that influence education; from the hierarchical structure of institutional, formal education to the excessive competition schools foster between individual students while ignoring or downplaying affective ties.

Our most influential notions of moral development today owe much to the theoretical-juridical framework. Lawrence Kohlberg's "cognitive-developmental theory of moralization" has long been considered *the* authoritative model of how we make moral judgments. Kohlberg's influence on contemporary moral thinking is enormous, spanning ethics to political thinking to education. There are advocates of his ideas who wish to see his theories adopted and followed in school settings (for example, see Hersch, et. al., 79). Despite Kohlberg's undeniable influence on the field of moral reasoning, his reliance on Kantian notions of morality places his theory of moralization at odds with critical pedagogy and an ethic of care.

Let us briefly consider Kohlberg's model so as to contextualize various criticisms of it. The cognitive-developmental theory of moralization is a cognitive, sequential, hierarchical model. Kohlberg presents six stages that he holds correspond to a child's moral development and age. His methodology involves his "Moral Judgment Interview," a series of dilemmas one is read, followed by questions that ask what the solution to each dilemma is and why. The forms one's reasoning takes when providing answers to the moral dilemmas allows Kohlberg to place one on his moral stage continuum.

The best known of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas is his third, involving the fictitious Heinz and his wife (81). Kohlberg asks us to imagine that Heinz's wife finds her life threatened by cancer. A drug exists that can save her, but the pharmacist who sells it is charging ten times its worth, pricing it well out of Heinz's reach. Heinz pleads with the druggist but to no avail, at which point he considers breaking into the drug store when it is closed and taking the drug for his wife. After presenting Heinz and his dilemma to participants, Kohlberg asks them a series of questions beginning with whether or not they think Heinz should steal the drug and why. Subsequent questions delve into the reasoning behind participant's answers, questions such as: If Heinz does not love his wife, should he steal the drug for her? Or, if it was not his wife but a stranger or even a pet animal he loves should he still steal the drug? Or, as it is against the law to steal, if Heinz steals the drug is his action morally wrong?

Kohlberg placed participants along his moral spectrum based on their answers to these and other questions. For example, what Kohlberg labeled stage two (preconventional) reasoning holds that if Heinz can get away with it, it is fair for him to steal the drug his wife needs. Kohlberg found that participants at this stage of reasoning

think stealing the medication fair because Heinz is pursuing his own self-interest. The idea that Heinz's wife is a human being distinct from her husband who needs the medication for herself was not a part of stage two reasoning. Stage five reasoning (one of Kohlberg's two postconventional or principled stages) sees Heinz stealing the drug as permissible because if Heinz universalized his action more good than harm would ensue.

Carol Gilligan, an associate of Kohlberg's, studied his work for gender bias and found that the subjects in Kohlberg's original study were all pre-school males. These participants in his original study formed the basis for Kohlberg's dissertation and the source of his longest longitudinal data sample. Gilligan argued that Kohlberg dismissed females, never mentioning "boys" in his original index because he assumed the children he studied were male (82: 18). Yet Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg was more than methodological; she felt that substantially he got it all wrong. Gilligan argued that boys and girls, males and females, reason *differently*, that there are "two ways of speaking about moral problems" (82: 1). Gilligan attributed to males a reasoning predicated on a morality of justice and rights made possible through formal, abstract thought by disinterested, detached actors. Women, she posited in contrast, are guided by "a different voice," a mode of thinking contextual and narrative, centered on responsibility and relationships (82). Criticisms of Gilligan's methodology—such that much of her early work involved only girls and that her different voice morality was itself gendered—ensued (Larrabee, 93; Tronto, 93: 82-85).

Kohlberg and his associates, while admitting that their early studies centered on males and deserved the criticism it brought, refused to accept the existence of two dueling moral orientations and revised his moral stages model. They replied that girls are

just as capable of justice reasoning as boys and can reason just as well as boys (83: 130). Kohlberg proposed "a dimension along which various moral dilemmas and orientations can be placed," from the "standard hypothetical justice dilemmas" and justice orientations to the personal moral dilemmas and care orientation. Kohlberg and his associates did not question what criteria made such "standard justice dilemmas" standard in the first place. Kohlberg and his associates maintained that stage six justice reasoning is inclusive of a care ethic (83: 137-138). Attempting to subsume Gilligan's perceived different voice fits into the hierarchical nature of Kohlberg's six-stage model.

A normative element pervades Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental model. While he claims universalizability for his model, Kohlberg remains clear that it be "understood as a hierarchy based upon successive structural integrations" (83: 39). Hence a stage six moral thinker is a *better* moral thinker than a stage two moral thinker. Non-urban, traditionally oriented peoples rarely if ever reach the higher levels of moral reasoning in Kohlberg's model. Kohlberg never asks but the implication is there: if such moral reasoning is universal, then what's wrong with these mostly non-white, non-urban people that they cannot reason the way their cosmopolitan progressive cousins can? Kohlberg's theory can be viewed as elitist because very few people ever reach the higher stages. Tronto posits that part of Kohlberg's cachet is the fact that he tells people in power what they want to hear, namely how wonderfully moral they are, as "being relatively well off and well schooled seems to be a necessary, if not sufficient condition, to achieve the highest forms of morality" (93: 76).

Kohlberg and his associates explain that "justice is the structure of interpersonal interaction" and is exemplified by the ability to role-play (83: 93). Kohlberg's role-

playing ability is the ability "to react to the other as someone like the self and to react to the self's behavior in the role of the other" (in Hersch, et. al., 79: 49). Given that throughout this dissertation I have been arguing in favor of an ethics of care based on relationships, empathy, and attentiveness to the needs of others *contra* the theoretical-juridical models, I understand how it may appear a bit disingenuous of me here to criticize Kohlberg's notion of role-playing, which, on the face of things, seem to lend itself to empathy and relating to other people. Allow me to demonstrate otherwise.

Kohlberg stresses "reversibility as the ultimate criterion of justice," reversibility being the "property of a justice structure of moral operations which enables the structure to construct solutions to dilemmas in such a way that these solutions can be considered acceptable or just from the points of views of all relevant parties" (83: 95). He explains that at the highest stages of his moral reasoning model, "reversibility implies a conception of justice as 'moral musical chairs', a conception which requires each person to systematically take the position of everyone else in the situation" (Ibid). Reversibility is exercised through role-playing.

One problem with Kohlberg's role-playing ability and any reversibility that comes from it is that such role-playing takes as its starting point an individual self that is fungible with any other individual self, one that "can assume the role of anyone in a given moral dilemma" (Tronto, 93: 70). Hersch, et. al. (79: 49) give as an example of the importance of role-playing the three-year old who cannot put himself in the place of his headache-ridden mother, a three-year old who gets impatient and angry when his beleaguered mother cannot amuse him. At a later age and moral reasoning stage, the child can put himself in his mother's position and understand something of what she might feel

returning home from a day's work outside the home with a headache and such understanding can inform his subsequent behavior. The example is fine to a point but role-playing from Kohlberg' stage four onwards involves group commitment and a concomitant exclusion of others from the fold.

Tronto (93) explains that new role-taking opportunities may not be available to non-group members. Further, non-group members may experience opportunities differently than group members. This speaks to Held's point (06) that theoretical-juridical models ignore power relationships. Thus when Frederick Douglass' abolitionist-minded neighbors in Rochester, New York asked him to address a crowd in celebration of July 4th in 1852, Douglass asked them to consider "What, to the American slave, is your 4th of July?" (97: 127). Objectified, the other as non-group member may not be able to see herself in the other person's position. She may not be able to see herself and her position as the other person sees her and it (Tronto, 93: 73). Such objectification in Kohlberg is followed by assimilation, with group members deigning to reintegrate the formerly excluded others, assuming those originally outside the fold similar to themselves. But as Tronto notes, assuming such "presumes that all of the harms of racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, anti-Semitism, etc., can simply be forgotten by morally mature persons" (Ibid). If those previously excluded cannot "get over their hang-ups," they are viewed as lesser morally, incapable of forgiving and forgetting harms done, harms that may have granted group members their membership to begin with. Hence Kohlberg's moral reasoning theory is hegemonic, telling "the story of moral development from the standpoint of those who have remained on top throughout the entire process" (Ibid).

Kohlberg himself is clear regarding his indebtedness to the theoretical-juridical ethical models, particularly Kant's (83: 73). Like Kant, Kohlberg holds that conscious, deliberate reasoning leads to informed moral judgment. For Kohlberg, moral judgment "involves reasoning from and to principles" through role-playing and reversibility (83: 79). Hence Marc Hauser's claim that "Kohlberg out-Kanted Kant in his view that our moral psychology is a rational and highly reasoned psychology based on clearly articulated principles" (06: 16). Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moralization continues to be influential in schools and colleges of education, helping define the moral background against which education unfolds.

The institutional structure of formal education also works against an ethic of care. Schools are bureaucracies and within these bureaucracies relationships that should be highly personalized and emotional are depersonalized and generic. With their emphasis on "expertise," bureaucratic schools foster paternalistic and authoritarian relationships between teachers and administrators and students. No matter how down to earth and humane a teacher may be, she and her students are reminded of her power and their power relationship when she assigns a grade.

Noddings views grading as "an intrusion upon the relationship of the one-caring and the cared-for" imposed on teachers from above (84: 193). Further, Noddings adds that when teachers are forced to grade students they cannot help but objectify students to a certain degree. Just as universalistic ethical models assume an abstract figure in the rational, disembodied, autonomous individual, schools as institutions make similarly damaging assumptions in the archetype of the teacher and the student. For example, grades play a part in a person's self-image and self-esteem. If you get enough good

grades you *become* an A student in the eyes of your parents, relatives, teachers and yourself. If you get enough low grades the opposite is just as true. Kozol describes a school in the South Bronx where students are not referred to by their names but by "Level 4" or "Level 2" depending on their reading level in a scripted literacy program (06: 74).

Critical pedagogies charge contemporary educational praxis with rewarding an extreme form of individualism, encouraging competition over cooperation, fostering an instrumental attitude towards education, foisting an education largely divorced from students' lives on pupils, and validating certain forms of knowledge over others while maintaining that this knowledge is neutral and value free. Critical pedagogies level these criticisms from political and ethical positions of their own; but these positions are usually explicitly stated where contemporary educational praxis' starting points more often than not are not. Kincheloe posits that all "education is a political activity", that "any time teachers develop a pedagogy, they are concurrently constructing a political vision" (04: 9). Feminist pedagogy, as a critical pedagogy, is committed to improving women's lives (Cohee, et. al., 98: 3). Carolyn Shrewsbury writes that "feminist pedagogy is concerned with gender justice and overcoming oppressions" (96: 9). Barry Kanpol holds that "critical pedagogy incorporates a moral vision" (94: 27). Freire argues that "the nature of ethics is inherent in all forms of educational practice," that "the best way" to achieve our ethical vision "is to live it in our educative practice, in our relations with our students, in the way we deal with the contents of what we teach" (98: 23 & 24). But what kind of ethical vision is being lived out in contemporary classrooms?

Critical pedagogies feel much of what goes on in classrooms today promotes competition over cooperation, encouraging division versus solidarity between students, teachers, schools and communities. Ubiquitous "my child is an honor student" bumper stickers carry with them the implicit message that *your* child is not. Traditional seating arrangements in classrooms promote student isolation at individual desks, often in uniform rows. In the United States where school funding is driven by community tax revenues, schools in wealthy districts have more resources--from cleaner and better equipped facilities to better paid staff—than schools in impoverished neighborhoods, leading to what Jonathan Kozol has labeled "apartheid schooling."[20]

Virginia Held (93) refers to a "bourgeois self", characterized as isolated, egoistic, and guided by reason—in short, the abstract individual of the theoretical-juridical models. This self is well known to us today because it is the default model that to a greater or lesser extent informs our ontologies, our ideas of who and what we are or how we should be. It is a self predicated on the market model for all human interactions (Held, 93: 70-71); a self forged in an historical era when the market impetus was a revolutionary, even democratizing force; a self created in Europe and, via emulation but more often imposition, the development model for much of the rest of the world. We are constantly told that we are competitive individuals, always have been, and always will be. Yet skeptics like Alfie Kohn (92) wonder why, if competition is something inhering within our species, we humans need to be socialized into competitive relationships from infancy?

[20] For instance, the Manhasset Public School District (where, incidentally, 91% of students are white) in New York's Long Island spends $22,311 per pupil whereas only a few miles away the New York City Public School system spends $11,627 per student (and 72% of students are black and Hispanic) (Kozol, 06: 324).

This is the self that permeates schools. Jonathan Kozol describes his visit to one Seattle school where children begin their day chanting in unison, "if it is to be, it is up to me." What message can a child bring away from this other than that success or failure is completely in the hands of the individual? Instead of encouraging cooperation and compassion, such mantras help instill a survival of the fittest mentality of rugged individualism. Kozol notes that such a chant is "an odd thing"; odd because

> we are asking them to say something which, while they have no way of knowing this, is simply not the truth….Does a school board or school system have no role in this? Do Congress and the courts and local legislators have no role in setting up the possibilities of what is 'to be,' or not to be, within these children's opportunities to learn? (06: 35).

The entire system of grading promotes competition over cooperation among students, teachers, and schools. In the era of NCLB, much rides on the grades from standardized test scores. Grades serves as gate-keepers: to students seeking to pass courses, move on to the next grade or even graduate; to teachers' laboring in school systems that have adopted "merit pay"; to schools needing to show NCLB's "adequate yearly progress" if they hope to remain open. Bertell Ollman (00) has argued that grading represents a commodification of the education process. Indeed, students talk about "getting an A" as if an "A" were something floating around in the firmament capable of being apprehended.

Though most schools will impose a uniform grading scale on teachers, meaning an A is between 92 and 100, teachers themselves can usually come up with their grades in the manner of their choosing. This is troubling because grading is not an objective science and grades lack objective meanings. Most of us who assign grades think we have some idea of what an "A" or an "F" means, but sometimes grades are not so clear cut.

Marni Terkel and Susan Neiburg Terkel discuss the results of a study where 22 teachers were asked what a grade of B means:

> Their answers varied but most were straightforward and clear about their grading policies. Later, these teachers were told that their own child received a C in a college course. Interestingly, when a family member got the C, the majority of teachers felt they needed more information before they could say what it meant (Terkel & Neiburg Terkel, 01: 20).

As someone who grades, I want to be clear that though grading is a subjective endeavor, what I object to is not its subjectivity or grading itself—grading can be used to help a student understand and chart her improvement—but the over emphasis being placed on grading alone and usually the grades on standardized test scores at that. The subjectivity of grading can be used to help students—for example, grading students on the improvements shown throughout a course versus on some objective standard alone—although critical pedagogies argue it is often used to hurt them. This emphasis on grading and the rewards and punishments that go along with it is indicative of a positivism in education discussed in chapter two.

Grading undermines cooperation in other ways. If a teacher gives an assignment and everyone in her class masters the material will everyone in that class receive an A? Not likely (Terkel & Neiburg Terkel, 01: 30). Teachers buy into the sorting and ranking functions of grades and grading. Not everyone can be an A student, can they? Teachers who give too many high grades are not usually looked at as professionals who have helped their students achieve mastery. They are viewed as “easy graders”, as “giving grades away” (again, note the commodification metaphor). Administrators will keep a close eye on such teachers. If good grades are scarce commodities, there is no way everyone could deserve a high grade, is there? Students jockey for position in class, in

college admissions, and elsewhere and oftentimes the indicator of achievement is a letter or number grade greater or lesser than another students'.

The way standardized tests are normed ensures there will always be winners and losers when it comes to the grading of these exams. Norm-referenced tests judge individual students against a collective of students that age or grade level. Norm-referenced tests "tell that one student is more or less proficient than another, but do not tell how proficient either of them is with respect to the subject matter tasks involved" (Kohn, 00: 14). Norm-referenced tests do not tell us how much a student learned at school. These tests provide percentiles that rank student achievement. As Raymond Horn clarifies, percentiles and stanines "do not provide information about the student's performance of the standard's criteria. A student could meet the requirements of the standard but rank low if other students exceeded the standard's criteria" (04: 83). The implications of this situation are spelled out by Kohn:

> No matter how many students take [a Norm-referenced test], no matter how well or poorly they were taught, no matter how difficult the questions are, the pattern of results is guaranteed to be the same: Exactly 10 percent of those who take the test will score in the top 10 percent, and half will always fall below the median (00: 14).

As a special education teacher I have to explain to parents what the percentile ranks of norm-referenced tests mean. It usually sounds something like this: "Sally scored in the 97th percentile on the vocabulary sub-test of the Test of Written Language [T.O.W.L.]. This means that Sally scored higher than 97 percent of everyone who takes this part of the test." With norm-referenced tests it is always going to look like someone is not doing well. Sally, for the sake of argument, might have answered eighteen out of twenty questions the way the test takers want her to; Mike may have answered fifteen out

of the twenty the way he is supposed but winds up with a much lower percentile ranking because the overall scores for the norm are high.

Note that I did not say "Sally scored eighteen out of twenty questions" correct. I write that Sally might have answered so many questions "the way the test makers want her to" with reason. Norm-referenced tests like the T.O.W.L. come with scoring rubrics that contain acceptable answers. If a student's answer does not correspond with one of the acceptable answers, that student is supposed to be marked incorrect. So, for example, on the sentence-combining subtest of the T.O.W.L., if a student is supposed to combine two sentences and does combine them in a way that makes sense and is probably how we would do it in "real life" but her answer is not listed in the rubric, I am supposed to mark her wrong. And again, because norm-referenced tests rank kids by percentiles, the whole spirit of competition soldiers on.

Just as individual students are pitted one against another for rewards and honors, so are schools thrust into competition against one another. With legislation like NCLB, today's schools are judged more and more by student performance on standardized tests, a supposed indicator of accountability and the upholding of rigorous standards. With various penalties looming, schools quickly do what they feel they must to ensure higher test scores. Classes deemed non-essential to improving test scores—including art, music, recess, even in some cases geography and science—are jettisoned in favor of more intensive math and language instruction (Kozol, 06: 118-120; Hemphill, 06). A mercenary attitude takes hold: students are paid for good grades and attendance, in some cases for each book they read (Bosman, 07). The carrots to students include cash, from $50 for a perfect score on a fourth grade standardized exam to five hundred dollars for

the year (Medina 07 & 08); raffles for students whose winner gets to choose between a new car or ten thousand dollars (Belluck, 06); students are given everything from cell phones that transmit text messages that "promote achievement" to Pizza Hut pizza and McDonalds Happy Meals (Medina, 08; Elliot, 07). The sticks extended children with poor grades include banning them "from all aspects of extracurricular life, including athletic contests, academic clubs, dances and plays" (Hu, 08).

What kind of messages do such rewards and punishments send students about education? Clara Hemphill visited a kindergarten in a Brooklyn, New York charter school, a classroom with "no blocks, dress-up corners or play kitchens", a classroom where there is "no time for show and tell, naps or recess" but "there is homework every night", where students "sit quietly with their hands folded as their teachers drill them in phonics, punctuation and arithmetic" (06). The classes in this school, named "Achievement First", go from 7:30 AM until 4 PM. "They do not socialize and learn to share," one teacher in the school tells Hemphill of students denied recess and play time, "There is a lot of fighting now" (Hemphill, 06).

Care is not explicitly taught in schools (Noddings, 84 & 06). If we accept, as critical pedagogy maintains, that schools are not politically or morally neutral sites, then perhaps we can understand the importance of this absence. Care could be taught. Morals and politics are being taught, explicitly and through the workings of what is referred to as the "hidden curriculum" (Giroux & Penna, 83). If individuals and their personalities, their relationships, obligations and responsibilities are truly important to a society, that society's educational institutions can and arguably should make exploration and discussion of these facets possible. Unfortunately the institutional structure of American

public education often works against the maintenance of caring relationships. For example, in middle and high school, American students move from subject class to subject class, each with a different teacher. A lack of continuity across grade levels is the norm. Your ninth grade Global Studies teacher will not be your tenth grade World History teacher. What kind of relationship can a student and a teacher be expected to develop inside a classroom where there are twenty five or more kids, a state-mandated curriculum to adhere to, standardized tests to prepare for, and only forty-two minutes each day to do so?

Education can be viewed in many ways, as a means to an end, as an end in itself, or as something of both. Critical pedagogies argue that contemporary educational praxis fosters an instrumental rationality towards education, encouraging the idea that education is not an end but a means to secure employment or slots in the next higher rung on the educational ladder. Aside from the fact that advanced education often is a necessary but not a sufficient assurance of employment, such an attitude towards education downplays the inherent joys of learning for learning's sake as well as for reasons other than mere narrowly circumscribed employment or educational stakes. Almost all students are expected to follow a college track during their elementary through high school years. College attendance is not necessarily for everyone, as colleges produce more drop outs than graduates and the economy is not providing enough jobs justifying college degrees (Redovich, 05: 1; Chronicle of Higher Education, 06). Nel Noddings (92) wonders if tracking itself is the problem or the emphasis placed on the college track above all others. Assuming that all students are capable of and want to attend college assumes a uniform

student undifferentiated from her peers and ignores entire facets and nuances of unique individuals.

3.6 *Caring lives, lives of care*

A final, brief point worth noting in the context of moral models and the people who help conceive and perpetuate them. To what extent do the personal lives and personalities of the men and women who present us with our moral models matter in the content of those models? Should they? As our ideas are born of our experiences and our interactions with others, our society, and our world, I would argue they do matter. John Paley, for one, would seem to agree with me. Defending Kant as a care ethicist, Paley (02: 142) targets nursing ethicists who reference Heidegger, whose "membership [in] the Nazi party and his aspiration to become the philosopher of Nazism make him a dubious point of reference for the ethics of *caring*", and, I would add, rightly so.

Yet if Paley's critical lens is to be turned on Heidegger, as well (in a different way) as on Gilligan and Noddings, then it appears a bit incongruous for him to ignore certain of Kant's views as irrelevant to deontological moral theory. Kant differentiated between passive and active citizenship and explained *who* could work their way from the former to the later; His notion of citizenship relegated women, like laborers, to passive citizenship and put active citizenship beyond their grasp (Kant, 70: 139-140; Baier, 97: 305 & 307; Mendus, 87). Though by most accounts a gentleman in his personal life, Kant wrote some disparaging things about women, opining that they are incapable of principled thought and carry books merely to be seen carrying books (78: 219; 74: 171). Kant ascribed to a hierarchy that placed reason above emotion (Schott, 97; Sedgwick,

97). Though Kant did indeed feel that pursuing one's own perfection could and should result in the happiness of others, the happiness of others is not the primary motivation of an actor in his model. This last paragraph may appear harsh but is not meant as a personal attack on Immanuel Kant; his thought, I would argue, was progressive and even democratic in its implications given his age, but ours is a vastly different time. As Kant viewed his as an age of Enlightenment but not an enlightened age, perhaps it is not unfair to view Kant himself as a man of the Enlightenment but not an enlightened man.

In chapter four I will turn to the critical pedagogies of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and feminist pedagogy and show how they are rooted in an ethic of care. A few brief highlights serve to show that Dewey and Freire's personal lives were marked by strong, lasting relationships and attachments they actively worked to enrich. Dewey (Westbrook, 91; Martin, 02), who wrote his dissertation on the psychology of Kant, worked alongside other social activists like Jane Addams and Ella Flagg Young; he established his Laboratory School in an attempt to give life to his pedagogical ideas; he was a charter member of the first teacher's union in New York City; he headed the commission in Mexico that investigated charges of treason leveled against Leon Trotsky by the Soviet Union; he was married to his first wife, Alice Chipman, for 41 years until her death, and remarried to Roberta Grant Lowitz with whom he adopted two Belgian war orphans towards the end of his life. Paulo Freire (Collins, 77; Schipani, 84; Taylor, 93) developed literacy programs among impoverished workers and peasants in Brazil, Chile, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and other countries; he was arrested and exiled to Chile in 1964 by a military dictatorship but returned to his native Brazil to serve as Secretary of Education; he subjected himself to his own critical lens and embraced his critics and their right to

criticize him, refuting their criticisms or adopting his ideas where he deemed it appropriate; devastated by the death of his wife Elza, whom he had been married to for 42 years, Paulo found his love and hope renewed in his marriage to Maria Araujo. In chapter four I will discuss the roots of feminist pedagogy in the second-wave feminist movement. Attempting to take seminal figures in this field and individually note their rich relationships and contributions to variety of associations here would be unwieldy. At this point let me note that feminist pedagogy has usurped certain tendencies that would segregate the field to women alone in the name of working against all forms of oppression, with an especial emphasis and concern on the oppression women face in society.

Despite attempts to incorporate an ethic of care into various other ethical models, an ethic of care remains significantly different from these models. An ethic of care balances a particularistic concern for individuals and their relationships with a comprehensive approach to practicing ethics that makes use of flexible principles; an ethic of care recognizes the primacy of relationships in the constitution of the self; an ethic of care views autonomy as socially-mediated and capable of enriching the self and others; an ethic of care refuses to partition morality and politics and views the political as a path towards the realization of the moral; an ethic of care refuses to perpetuate divisive dichotomies and looks for the ways justice, reason, and emotion inform and can enhance each other. An ethic of care is a flexible ethic responsive to contexts and communities and demands autonomy and agency from individuals; after all, “It is up to the agent to judge how much care to give and where to give it” (Pettersen, 08: 121). In the next

chapter I will explore the ways in which critical pedagogies share these characteristics with an ethic of care. Possible ways in which critical pedagogies can promote an ethic of care in schools and society will be considered in chapter 5.

Chapter 4: Critical pedagogies and an ethic of care

The contention of this dissertation is that all educational theories and practices reflect moral visions. In chapters two and three I made the case that contemporary educational praxis is rooted in universalistic ethical models that take as their starting points competition between abstract and anomic individuals. Here I will argue that critical pedagogies reflect an ethic of care. I contend that the critical pedagogies of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and a variety of feminist-identifying scholars, female and male, reveal an underlying ethic of care. I will show that critical pedagogies and an ethic of care are linked through the concepts of teacher-student mutuality and positionality; democratic authority and dialogue; caring protection and the relationship of the individual and her autonomy to the wider social whole.

I will begin the argument chronologically with John Dewey, proceed through Paulo Freire and then to feminist pedagogy. Because of the often intricate and myriad ways each influenced the other, there is significant overlap between all three groupings and I will strive to show this where possible and pertinent. When each individual theorists or group of theorists is considered I will focus on two or three areas of their thinking where I argue an ethic of care is illustrated and not strive to be exhaustive; however, it is my hope that when taken as a whole, this chapter will conclusively support my claim.

4.1 *John Dewey and an early ethic of care*

It may appear, at first, somewhat incongruous to consider Dewey's a critical pedagogy and his moral standpoint an ethic of care. Critical pedagogy is usually

associated as a discipline with Paulo Freire and the ethic of care is usually regarded as barely thirty years old, but John Dewey was born in 1859 and died in 1952. Scholars and activists in the field of critical pedagogy often overlook Dewey as a forerunner to their field, citing Antonio Gramsci and the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt (the "Frankfurt School") as progenitors of critical pedagogy (Kincheloe, 04; Giroux, 06). The radical nature and implications of John Dewey's social and educational thought often go unappreciated. John Dewey was no mere reformer; he was a radical through and through if we accept the etiology of the word *radical* as meaning change at the root level. Greater appreciation of Dewey's contributions to critical pedagogy are coming to light, as is scholarship detailing Dewey's contribution to feminism (e.g., Seigfried, et. al., 02).

To what extent do John Dewey's ideas reflect an ethic of care? That is the issue here. Recent scholarship in the field has looked beyond Carol Gilligan to earlier figures in American history and their nascent formulation of what could be considered a care ethic. For example, Dorothy Rogers argues that the political philosophy of Marietta Kies and Lucia Ames Mead anticipated the ethic of care (04). Kies earned her PhD in philosophy at the University of Michigan under Dewey (Ibid). Maurice Hammington argues that Jane Addams exemplifies an embodied care ethics (01; 04). Addams and Dewey were close personal friends and Dewey's pragmatist philosophy developed through discussions and action with Addams and other women of his day (Fischer, 02; Seigfried, 02). Thus Dewey had close personal and professional connections to nascent care theorists, but how is care reflected in the philosophy and life of John Dewey?

For Dewey and many care ethics theorists, ethics is lived out, reflected in our associations and interactions with others, in our institutions and societal forms, including our educational and political arrangements. Dewey and care ethics theorists agree that individuals and society, education and democracy, morality and politics are all inextricably entwined, with each a means in itself in Dewey's sense (98a: 253) of means as a guide to action, each a means to the others, none signifying a mere end. In the following discussion of the connections of Dewey's thought with an ethic of care I will begin with the individual. This is a suitable starting point given the seriousness with which Dewey regarded the individual self and its rightful place in a "renascent liberalism" (98a).

4.2 *Dewey: the individual, the social, and care*

One area of significant and key overlap between John Dewey's thought and an ethic of care is each's emphasis on the individual's being part of a social whole. In chapter 3 we looked at care ethics theorists conception of the relationship between individuals and their societies, of the ties that bind but often go under-appreciated or are purposefully overlooked. Here let us consider Dewey's perspectives on the individual as part of a social whole, one's relational ontology, one's autonomy and Dewey's criticism of "bourgeois" or "laissez-faire individualism" (98a: 170).

For John Dewey, the individual and society need each other and make one another possible (98a: 230). In his pedagogic creed [1897] Dewey spoke of the individual as "a social individual" and society as "an organic union of individuals" (98a:230). Dewey felt there was no denying that human beings, like any other natural phenomena, are "related

and associated" (98b: 54). "Selfhood is not something which exists apart from association and intercourse," he opined (98b: 348).Dewey saw the individual as intimately connected to her society through associations with others. It is not so much that society allows for a better and more fruitful individuality, which he felt it could and should; Dewey argued that society was not possible without individuals and that individuality is not possible without society. "If we eliminate the social factor from the child we are left only with an abstraction," Dewey wrote, and "if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left only with an inert and lifeless mass" (98b: 230). Dewey warned that "[i]ndividuals who are not bound together in associations, whether domestic, economic, religious, political, artistic or educational, are monstrosities" (84: 41).

Dewey did not seek to deny an individual's autonomy but wanted to show how autonomy is grounded in group living. Society, he opined, should be structured through its institutions and the relationships it encourages to give the individual "command of himself…to train him so that he will have the full and ready use of all his capacities" (Dewey, 98: 230). Dewey ascribed to the "belief in the capacity of every person to lead his own life free from coercion and imposition by others provided the right conditions are supplied" (98: 342). He refused to conceive of autonomy as the privileged half of a dualism; he envisioned autonomy and community as complimentary, similar to Val Plumwood's (93) idea of non-antagonistic dichotomies. Dewey envisaged freedom's "essence" as the establishment of "conditions which will enable an individual to make his own special contribution to a group interest" (44: 301). He spoke of "a justly organized social order" wherein "the very relations which persons bear to one another demand of the one carrying on a line of business the kind of conduct which meets the needs of

others, while they also enable him to express and fulfill the capacities of his own being" (98b: 349). He spoke of a satisfaction arising from the individual's social fulfillment (84: 27).

As discussed in the previous chapter, there are theorists—care theorists as well as others--who explicitly argue that the notion of the abstract individual that permeates universalistic ethical models is rooted in the rise of capitalism in the west. John Dewey levels a similar argument. Dewey feels that with the development of economic and political liberalism the idea of the individual as we conceive of her today was created. What started out as a mental faculty intended to allow the individual to critically inspect and contribute to her social milieu was perverted to serve ideological interests. A "legitimate intellectual individualism," meant to allow individuals to critically examine and revise former beliefs, was purposefully misshaped as a social and moral individualism (44: 297). An emphasis on the individual and the individual mind that was meant to bring about "greater freedom *in* nature and society" was instead twisted to mean isolation from the world and one another (44: 294). Dewey criticized an economic and political individualism which champions "private pecuniary profit" and continues to exist because of a "desire for perpetuation of that regime" (84: 44). In many important ways the individual is the starting point for Dewey's thought, but he is clear that an economic and political individualism actually "undoes the individual" (84: 30).Dewey remained adamant that "a stable recovery of individuality waits upon an elimination of the older economic and political individualism" and that this recovery will depend in large part on an "economic revision" (84: 36).

Another area of agreement between Dewey and most care ethics theorists regards the scope of care encompassing the self. Granted, care theorist Diemet Bubeck (95) argues that care is exclusively other-directed, that care is only care when it is aimed at satisfying a need for another that that person could not meet themselves. Yet Bubeck's point of view is at odds with that of many other care theorists who see care as including "our bodies, our selves" (Tronto & Fisher, 90; Held. 06; Clement, 96). Teachers like Elizabeth Porter who identify as feminist teachers feel that "*caring authority* brings together concerns of 'others' and of 'self'" (96: 75). It is with these theorists that John Dewey agrees. "No one would say that deliberate care for one's own health, efficiency, progress in learning is bad just because it is one's own," Dewey posits. "It is moral duty upon occasion to look out for oneself in these respects" (98b: 346). For Dewey, self-interest, pursuing a course of action that furthers the interests and aims of the individual, is not synonymous with selfishness. Such acts and interests become selfish only when they ignore the claims and interests of others. "An act is not wrong because it advances the well-being of the self," opined Dewey, "but because it is unfair, inconsiderate, in respect to the rights, just claims, of others" (98b: 346).

Not always referred to as such, a relational ontology pervades care ethics. We are who we are as individuals because of the relationships we are born into and choose to cultivate. Similarly, while never labeling it a relational ontology, Dewey spoke of a stimulation of the child's powers by the demands of the social groupings she inhabits (98: 229). In Dewey's conception, selfhood depends on "association and intercourse" with others (98b: 238). Throughout Dewey's thought runs the idea that individual and the social are complimentary and not antagonistic. Not only is self-interest capable of

benefiting the social whole to which one belongs, Dewey argues that the other side of the coin is just as tenable, that "Interest in the social whole of which one is a member necessarily carries with it interest in one's own self" (98b: 349). We are born "organic beings" and become human through association with others; our "helpless infancy…depends upon the assistance of associated action" which brings us into the social fold and teaches us to be human (Dewey, 27: 105 & 154). Though individuals all with the capacity to choose and act, we are nevertheless socially constructed and conditioned, and "[*W*]*hat* [one] believes, hopes for and aims at is the outcome of association and intercourse" (Dewey, 27: 25). Social living and interactions can bring about a qualitatively better self because such a lifestyle actively seeks out and embraces "the connections necessary to its growth" (Dewey, 98b: 350).

Paulo Freire and feminist pedagogy agree with Dewey that we are socially conditioned. Because human beings are conditioned and not determined, Freire opined, we are capable of achieving consciousness of the ways in which we are conditioned and to actively challenge this conditioning (98: 26). If we were merely determined beings, posited Freire, we would be no different than other non-human animals and would lack any sense of agency and meaningful autonomy (05: 3). Feminist pedagogues like Karen Warren (98) speak of the importance of recognizing (and then acting to change) the "malestream curriculum" entrenched in schools that perpetuates the subjection of women in patriarchical classrooms and societies.

Dewey argued that one's regard for self and others is part of "a more normal and complete interest: regard for the welfare and integrity of the social groups of which we form a part" (98b: 349). As an example of a social group we all belong to Dewey offered

the family, which he maintained "is something other than one person, plus another, plus another," and in fact should be viewed as "an enduring form of association in which the members of the group stand from the beginning in relations to one another, and in which each member gets direction for his conduct by thinking of the whole group and his place in it" (98b: 249). Dewey argued that if we conceived of selfhood as relational, as "something exiting in relationships to others and not in unreal isolation, [then] independence of judgment, personal insight, integrity and initiative, become indispensable excellences from the social point of view" (98b: 350). Dewey is arguing that attributes sometimes dismissed as selfish when they are used to promote the individual self at the expense of the whole need not be viewed necessarily as such.

At this juncture it is worth noting that Paulo Freire's views and the views of much feminist pedagogy agree with Dewey and care ethics theorists as to the synergetic relationship between the individual and her society. Freire was adamant that his critical pedagogy denies that people are "abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people" (97: 62). Human relationships with the world, maintained Freire, are plural, and to be human means to engage in relationships with others and with this world (74: 3). "The pursuit of full humanity," explained Freire, "cannot be carried out in isolation or individualism, but only in fellowship and solidarity" (97: 66). Our schools encourage competition between individuals that pits student against student and dampens social solidarity; Kathleen Gallagher argues "a community must be created in a classroom, it does not naturally exist" (00: 74)

4.3 *Dewey: Education for democratic change*

Individuals, born organic beings, learn to be human, and for Dewey the process by which they learn is what constitutes education. Dewey defines education broadly as "a regulation of the process of coming to share in the social consciousness" (98: 234). Similar to the way he argued against relegating democracy to a mere political form, Dewey warned against an "unduly scholastic and formal notion of education" (66: 5). Education is not consigned to schools but constitutes all the relationships and interactions by which we learn how to live as individuals in association with others (98: 234). Education is the means by which new members of a group are fitted to the group, the means by which the individual is fitted to the social; hence Dewey viewed the individual as "an inheritor of the funded capital of civilization" (Dewey, 98: 229). This is necessary, Dewey opines, because education serves for the realization of the individual and the realization of her society. Education is guidance and direction towards the flourishing of the individual and her society (44: 40). Dewey argued that education is "the fundamental method of social progress and reform"; that "through education society can formulate its own purposes, can organize its own means and resources, and thus shape itself with definiteness and economy in the direction in which it wishes to move" (98: 234).

In this context John Dewey emphasized that schools be recognized as "the primary and most effective instrument of social progress and reform" (98: 234). Much as a care ethics theorist like Nel Noddings warns of a "crisis of caring" in schools in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Dewey offered a similar warning pertaining to

the schools of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. “The tragic weakness of the present school,” he indicated, “is that it endeavors to prepare future members of the social order in a medium in which the conditions of the social spirit are eminently wanting” (90: 15). Dewey found this social spirit--a sense of the interconnections and relationships between students, teachers, and subject matter in the formal institutional setting of schools--not only lacking but militated against. School should not be viewed as training for social life, argued Dewey, schools *are* social life (98: 248). But much of what goes in the classrooms of Dewey’s day and our own works against “the social spirit”. For example, Dewey decried “the isolation of the school—and its isolation from life” (90: 75).

Dewey found it reprehensible that the subject matter of schooling had so little if any direct connection to students’ lives; that when “the child gets into the schoolroom he has to put out of his mind a large part of the ideas, interests, and activities that predominate in his home and neighborhood” (90: 75). Such a situation was worthy of disdain to Dewey because one of the most important aims of education is to allow and encourage the individual to continue their education, and he felt that schooling dampened the development of this yearning (98: 25). Dewey viewed “all communication as education” and therefore criticized “the ordinary schoolroom…with its rows of ugly desks placed in geometrical order, crowded together so that there shall be as little moving room as possible” and asked that we imagine “the only educational activity that can possibly go on in such a place”, passive listening (90: 31). Paulo Freire and feminist pedagogy share similar views on the importance of school being connected with students’ lives, views that will be explored below in the discussion of Freire’s problem-posing

education and its commitment to dialogue and the importance feminist pedagogy places on positionality.

Not only do John Dewey and care ethics theorists agree about the reflexive relationship between the individual and the society to which she belongs, they also agree on the reflexivity of morals and politics. More and more, care theorists are arguing that an care ethic has to be recognized as a political value; that the moral boundary between the realm of moral thought and the realm of political life must be dismantled (Tronto, 93; Kershaw, 05). Care ethics theorists are arguing that care must take place in a democratic social order in order for relations of human dependence to be recognized and transcended (Tronto, 93: 163); that care calls for increased state support (Held, 06); that care is a way of framing political issues and getting people into politics (Tronto, 93: 179); and that, because the dictates and assumptions of the market are so out of touch with human relationships, care is "probably at heart anti-capitalistic" (Tronto, 93; Held, 06).

Freire, like Dewey, was clear that the ethical position he championed had to be pursued through politics, writing that political struggle "should be undertaken in the name of ethics, obviously not the ethics of markets but rather the universal ethics of human beings,--in the name of the needed transformation of society that should result in overcoming dehumanizing injustice" (04: 35). Sevenhuijsen notes that "[h]ow we care depends to a great extent on how we give shape to our society" (98: 147). Institutions—including political and economic systems and schools—that militate against care and democracy must be rethought, reshaped, and rebuilt.

Within this context of politics as a legitimate sphere for the pursuit and realization of moral values and social justice I want to discuss the reflexivity between Dewey's idea

of democracy as “a way of life” and education as the “midwife” to democracy. Dewey’s vision of democracy informs the individual and her morality at the same time that the individual and her morality inform his understanding of democratic forms and experience. Dewey conceived of democracy as “more than a form of government” and warned that “the democracy that is solely political denies itself” (93: 110 & 96: 146). Jay Martin argues that Dewey marked “a profound shift, which we have not yet begun to absorb, in understanding democracy not as a political system, or a body of rights, or as the excrescence of such documents as the declaration of independence or the constitution, or as a system of legislation or legal authorities, but as a way of life” (02: 495). Dewey argued that democracy can only thrive where it pervades all facets of human experience; that a truly political democracy cannot exist except “where democracy is social—where, if you please, it is moral” (93: 121). He was clear that society must be democratic, and democracy must suffuse all realms of human life.

Dewey was widely hailed, by supporters and critics, as an exponent of democracy and democratic forms, “the protagonist of democracy” (Sheldon, 21: 320) This commitment to democracy resulted in his being labeled a reformist liberal, basically a charge of “not being radical enough”, by segments of the left that embraced Marxism and other forms of socialism (Boisvert, 95). Robert Westbrook argues that “Dewey was the most important advocate of participatory democracy, that is, of the belief that democracy as an ethical ideal calls upon men and women to build communities in which the necessary opportunities and resources are available for every individual to realize fully his or her particular capacities through participation in political, social, and cultural life” (95: xv). Dewey was committed to a form of deliberative democracy through

reflexive cooperation, "the habit of amicable cooperation" (Dewey, 98: 342; Honneth, 98; Kosnoski, 05). He believed that "one cannot share in intercourse with others without learning—without getting a broader point of view and perceiving things of which one would otherwise be ignorant" (98: 264). Dewey felt that human disagreements, taken "as far as possible…out of the atmosphere and medium of force [and] violence," could be mediated by a deliberative democratic process in which we treat "those who disagree—even profoundly—with us as those from whom we may learn" (98: 342). Dewey knew that differences of opinion would invariably arise, but he looked to democracy "to bring these conflicts out into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they can be discussed and judged" (98: 331). Dewey defined the task of democracy as "forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute" (98: 343).

Similarly, the argument has been leveled that an ethic of care must be pursued through the democratic institutions of a democratic society. Joan Tronto argues that the values of caring, which include attentiveness, responsibility, nurturance, compassion, and the meeting of others' needs, are values that must be discussed and agreed upon, made and remade (93: 3). Care is not dictated by some *for* others; care involves a constant give and take between the one providing care and the one receiving care (Tronto, 93; Noddings, 84). In a democratic politics of care model, the role of cared-for and the one-caring will be fluid and never static (White, 00: 156). Forms of care that fail to meet this requirement give ways to authoritarian, top-down models of caring in danger of objectifying the care receiver. Noddings explains that "caring is completed in all relationships through the apprehension of caring by the cared-for," an appreciation and

understanding of care that allows the one cared-for "to be more fully himself in the caring relation" (84: 65 & 73). Care, like critical pedagogies, is context specific and, as Olena Hankivsky puts it, "context sensitive", necessarily meaning care "will vary among different cultures" according to the needs and expectations of the people and societies where the caring relationships are lived out (Hankivsky, 04: 32; Tronto, 93: 103). Across borders and boundaries, an ethic of care and care labor in a democratic society has the potential to unite care-giver and care-receiver in what Sevenhuijsen refers to as a form of "caring solidarity" (98: 147).

"To be realized," Dewey said of democracy, "it must affect all modes of human association, the family, the school, industry, religion" (93: 242). Dewey was very clear regarding the implications of his conception of democracy; huge changes in the economic, political, and social life of society were needed and new institutions would be necessary (98: 325 & 339). For instance, though Dewey was very critical of the Soviet Union in his day, he recognized the need for a "socialized economy" if democracy was to truly become a way of life (98: 335).

Dewey was clear that the political state, as an institution, is always an amalgamation of individuals, and he argued that it could and should be used to bring about human flourishing. He defined a good state as one in which "the officers of the public" work to "render the desirable associations solider and more coherent," militates against "injurious groupings," and "gives the individual members of valued associations greater liberty and security" (Dewey, 27: 71). Dewey refused to accept stasis in the life of the individual and her society; as such he did not see the state as a static entity. The formation of a state is "an experimental process," an unfinished project, as unfinished as

the men and women who are constantly changing and evolving and pursuing new means which are then reflected in the state (Dewey, 27: 33). The state itself develops to provide some regulation of the unintended consequences of associated behavior, to channel individual action towards favorable outcomes (Dewey, 27: 52). Dewey argued that as people used their intelligence to judge consequences through a deliberative democratic process the state will necessarily grow and evolve (27: 45).

Democracy is interested, Dewey believed, "in deliberate and systematic education" because democracy is "a form of social life in which interests are mutually interpenetrating, and where progress, or readjustment, is an important consideration" (93: 110). Education is a necessity in a society which is constantly changing because its members must be "educated to personal initiative and adaptability", as "only education … can guarantee widespread community of interest and aim" (93: 111 & 122). For Dewey, democracy survives, thrives, and spreads by constantly being recreated and renegotiated, adapted to the times and places where it is cultivated. Democracy depends on "social and emotional traits" that "do not grow spontaneously on bushes" but "have to be planted and nurtured" and "are dependent upon education" (93: 122). "Democracy," Dewey wrote, "has to be born anew every generation, and education is its midwife" (93: 122).

Dewey argued that the school must be a much greater "vital social institution" (98: 248). Schools had to be reconstituted as educational institutions, a task Dewey attempted with his experimental school in Chicago (Fishman & McCarthy, 98). For Dewey it was not enough that schools teach democracy; schools must teach democracy by modeling it (98: 234). The types of democratic relationships Dewey, Freire, and

feminist pedagogy want to encourage in schools extend to the subject matter and milieu within which education occurs. As Francis Maher and Mary Tetreault explain,

> many so-called 'democratic' pedagogical approaches entail giving female students and other 'minorities' equal rights or 'access' to classroom discourse *as individuals*, ignoring the power relations within and outside that continue to disadvantage them as members of oppressed groups and leave the language and terms of the discourse unchanged (94 :218).

More than just a mode of associated living and a means of life, Dewey conceived of democracy as a moral idea (98: 343). Dewey believed that "the best and deepest moral training is precisely that which one gets through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unity of work and thought," which, for children, begins in the family and then the school (98: 231). Hence education is moral and the moral responsibility of the school is to society (98: 234 & 343).

4.4 *John Dewey's critical pedagogy and the ethic of care*

In what ways does John Dewey's conception of ethics reflect an ethic of care? There are three major areas where I believe Dewey's ethical thinking mirrors a care ethic: his genealogy of morals; how he views the connections between morality and emotion; and his argument for moral principles.

"*Moral conceptions and processes grow naturally out of the very conditions of human life,*" wrote Dewey (98b: 354). He was adamant that moral conceptions and processes grow out of life conditions and therefore cannot be universalistic (98b: 354). Like his own critical pedagogy which he argued had to be context specific in that it reflects the interests and lives of the students, Dewey argued that morality would also be context specific and would evolve to meet the changing relationships and social

conditions humans find ourselves in (98b: 325). Dewey viewed morality as a continuing process, open to revision, and never as a finished product (98b: 322). At the same time he argued that for morals it was now or never, that morality means action, that our moralities had to develop out of the present moment and situations we find ourselves in (98b: 325 & 342). Our actions cannot be separated from our conception of morality, because our actions have consequences for ourselves and others.

Dewey argued that our moral judgments should be guided by the question, what kind of self, our own and others, is being furthered and formed by our courses of action and the institutions we establish and perpetuate (98b: 346)? With this concern in mind, Dewey felt it was clear that "a moral judgment upon an act is also a judgment upon the character or selfhood of the one doing the act" (98b: 342). For Dewey it was not enough that we be critical and able to answer the question what kind of self is a moral judgment furthering; his answer was prescriptive, our moral judgments and acts had to be towards human flourishing, what Freire would call humanization (discussed below). "Our moral measure for estimating any existing arrangement or any proposed reform is its effect upon impulse and habit," he wrote. "Does it liberate or suppress, ossify or render flexible, divide or unify interests?" (98b: 326).

Just as Dewey refused to accept a universalistic morality outside of human beings, he also refused to accept a fixed innate morality. Dewey explained that "judgments of value are not mere registrations of previous attitudes of favor and disfavor, liking and aversion, but have a reconstructive and transforming effect upon them, by determining the objects that are worthy of esteem and approbation" (98b: 330). Dewey noted that "there are common human affections and impulses which express themselves within

every social environment—there is no people the members of which do not have a belief in the value of human life, of care for offspring, of loyalty to tribal and community customs, etc." (98b: 339). Dewey advised against confusing these innate impulses and affections with our individual intuitions, favoring a constant critical evaluation of our intuitions. He warned that we not be guided by our intuitions alone, as "every intuition, even the best, is likely to become perfunctory and second-hand unless revitalized by consideration of its meaning—that is, of the consequences which will accrues from acting upon it" (98b: 331). Dewey argues that universalistic moralities themselves originated in experience but became fixed and rigid; that these were transformed from a mode of individual and social interaction with the world to prescriptions and rules (98b: 336).

As discussed in the third chapter, care ethics theorists do not devalue emotion and feeling in favor of reason. The necessity of such dualities is critically examined. In the field of feminist pedagogy, teachers argue that the "crucial task" is to connect reason and emotion (Maher & Tetreault, 94: 211). Feminist teachers "confront the popularly understood schisms…between reason and the emotions" in an attempt to reconcile the two (Culley & Portuges, 85: 2). Just "because emotions are felt does not mean that there is no reason in them" argues Joan Cocks, who refuses to view reason and emotion as "antagonistic opposites" (85: 180).

Dewey, Freire, and feminist pedagogy warn against an excessive reliance on reason alone, arguing that reason has all too often served to justify our prejudices. Feeling and emotion have a place in morality, argued Dewey, as moral judgments *require* feeling and emotion. Two examples Dewey offered were resentment and affection. Resentment, "ranging from fierce abhorrence through disgust to mild repugnance," is needed to

understand evil (98b: 332). Similarly, Paulo Freire spoke of "just anger", an anger "justified in the face of the denial of human rights" aimed at the individuals and institutions denying people's rights (98: 71). Dewey' second example of an emotion with a rightful place in morality, affection, ranging "from intense love to mild favor," is necessary to apprehend the good of our actions and consequences (98b: 332).

There is a visceral element to morality for Dewey, who notes that a "person must *feel* the qualities of acts as one feels with the hands the qualities of roughness and smoothness in objects" (98b: 332). Freire maintained that the "entire body knows," that one "cannot know rigorously while deprecating intuition, feelings, dreams, and desires" (98: 105). Dewey argued that our emotions and our feelings towards people, objects and courses of action play a necessary part in the human condition, noting that "*emotional* reactions form the chief materials of our knowledge of ourselves and of others" (98b: 332). For Dewey sympathy, which he considered "the tool, *par excellence,* for resolving complex situations", is the "animating mold of moral judgments" (98b: 333).

Yet we cannot, Dewey warned, "dispense with every cognitive element" in our moral judgments (98b: 332). Or, as Freire put it, we "cannot rely on intuition alone" (93: 106). Dewey advised against an over-reliance on certain affective ties. He warned against the limits of compassion and its unintended effects on others; that compassion could work in a paternalistic manner to infantilize and objectify those we feel compassion for (98b: 348). Dewey also recognized that "[w]hat is sometimes called a benevolent interest in others may be but an unwitting mask for an attempt to dictate to [others] what their good shall be, instead of endeavor to free them so they may seek and find the good of their own choice" (98: 262). Care ethics theorists warn against "pathological forms of

care" that give rise to paternalism, maternalism, and the infantilization of the care-receiver (Tronto, 93; Hankivsky, 04; White, 04). Grace Clement argues that the quality of the relationships is what matters in an ethic of care; that "[o]ne of the criteria for healthy caring relationships is that they allow for the autonomy of their members" (96: 42). (Tronto, 93: 170).

Dewey, Freire, feminist pedagogy and care ethics theorists value personal autonomy so highly that none want to see compassion leave the individual unequipped for autonomous decision-making and self-responsibility. Dewey felt that acts of charity and benevolence were important, "demanded under certain emergencies," but incidental and not essential principles of morals (98b: 350). Indeed he saw philanthropy on the part of the wealthy and powerful in industrial society as a misguided outlet for suppressed social feelings (Dewey, 84: 44). Similarly, Freire differentiated between "assistentialism" and providing assistance (03: 46). "Authentic help," he explained, "means that all who are involved help each other mutually, growing together in the common effort to understand the reality which they seek to transform" (Freire, 78: 8). Freire decried "the paternalistic mentality of assistance programs" but championed "giving assistance so as to create a stimulus" (96: 98 & 112). The important thing, he opined, is to help people and nations help themselves (Freire, 74: 12). Virginia Held is clear that care is not the same as charity (06: 44). Grace Clement would agree, noting the difference between "offering a hungry person food" and "doing what would most help this person—for example, challenging the social structures that allow people to go hungry" (96: 46).

Freire placed a great emphasis on hope, which can be seen as an emotional component in his thought. Hope, Freire opined, is indispensable to human existence, an

"ontological need" (03: 77 & 93; 92: 2). The "dehumanization of an unjust order is cause for hope" in Freire's estimation, because awareness of the situation carries with it the potential for human agency to work to change the concrete situation (97: 73). Freire spoke of the "radical nature of hope", of "knowing I can intervene to make things better," of how hope "demands action for realization" (98: 53; 92: 2). Hope, which Freire conceived as a form of "revolutionary futurity", demands a "vision of tomorrow" (03: 45). Freire spoke of hope as an optimistic striving shared between teachers and students, of teachers working with their students to "unveil opportunities for hope," and advocated "a kind of education in hope" (98: 69; 92: 3). If our futures were predetermined, argued Freire, hope would be impossible (04: 34).

John Dewey was not against the use of reason as a critical tool but he did warn of its reification as something transcending human beings' critical faculties and relationships. Dewey defines reason as "a function which moderates and directs impulses by considering the consequences they entail" (98b: 317). As he saw it, reason served a positive role in human history in that it "was a powerful factor in the negative and dissolving criticism of doctrines having nothing but tradition and class interest behind them; it accustomed men to freedom of discussion and to the notion that beliefs had to be submitted to criteria of reasonableness" (Dewey, 44: 298). Reason turned people away from prejudice, superstition, and brute force by inculcating in them the habits of argument, discussion, and persuasion (44: 298). Yet Dewey laments that reason did a better job of destroying old falsities than of creating new ties between people. With the advent of industrial society, reason ceased being a lived critical faculty and was "elevated to a higher order of dignity and named eulogistically by virtue of what it accomplishes, or

the order and system it introduces into the succession of acts which constitute conduct" (Dewey, 98b: 317). Reason was re-conceived as "a formal logical faculty…set up in distinction from tradition and history and all concrete subject matter" (44: 298). Reason became indicative of "something complete in itself apart from subject matter," now marked by its hostile attitude toward historical institutions, its disregard of the influence of habit, instinct, and emotion as operative factors in life," all of which leaves it "impotent in the suggestion of specific aims and methods" (Dewey, 44: 299).

In discussing what he sees as the proper use of reason, Dewey discusses the difference between moral principles and rules, a different consonant with some care ethics theorists. Dewey argued that moral principles are tools for analyzing special situations (98b: 338). Moral principles vary and should be relevant to our social situation (Dewey, 98b: 340). Moral principles are guides to action and not prescriptions. Consonant with this belief, Dewey opined that "about the only general proposition which can be laid down is that the principle of equity and fairness should rule" (98b: 348). Principles are passed down through the generations and if not constantly critically evaluated become fixed, which is exactly what Dewey thinks happened to universalistic moral models and their principles (98b: 336). Moral principles "are thought of as if they existed in and of themselves and as if it were simply a question of bringing action under them in order to determine what is right and good. Instead of being treated as aids and instruments in judging values as the latter actually arise, they are made superior to them. They become prescriptions, rules" (Dewey, 98b: 336). Sounding similar to Dewey, Diemut Bubeck notes that "principles cannot be applied mechanically: the application of principles requires sensitivity to the features of the particular situation as well as

imaginative sympathy" (95: 221). Olena Hankivsky's three "principles of care"—contextual sensitivity, responsiveness, and consequence of choices (04: 32-38)—are flexible guides to action between people in caring relationships, not rigid rules.

Dewey argued that principles are intellectual, "methods in judging suggested courses of action"; whereas rules are practical, "habitual ways of doing things" (98b: 338). He likened rules to "cooking recipes," noting that genuine moral principles do not prescribe courses of action but provide an intellectual "*tool for analyzing a special situation*, the right or wrong being determined by the situation in its entirety, and not by [a] rule as such" (Dewey, 98b: 338).Principles are context specific and Dewey saw justice as a context specific moral principle. He argued that justice must be conceived as a moral principle that "signifies the will to *examine* specific institutions and measures so as to find out how they operate with the view of introducing greater impartiality and equity into the consequences they produce" (98b: 338). In Dewey's estimation justice is not impartial, disembodied, or abstract; it is a guide for action that results in greater human flourishing.

That Dewey's view on morality is consonant with a social construction of knowledge epistemology is illustrated in his discussion of moral principles, where he is careful to avoid relativism. Our moral "obligation is to discover *what* principles *are* relevant to our own social estate" (98b: 340). For Dewey our interrelationships with others, our social embeddeness, is beyond dispute. This means that the moral principles which are related to our social situations must reflect these situations and relationships and will necessarily vary somewhat in their manifestation. "It is the insistence on a uniform and unchanging code of morals," Dewey felt, "the same at all times and places,

which brings about the extreme revolt which says that they are all conventional and of no validity" and gives rise to moral relativism (98b: 340).

In sum, John Dewey's thought reveals what we today refer to as an ethic of care. For both Dewey and care ethics theorists, ethics is embedded in our associations with others and reflected in the institutions we create and perpetuate, including democratic political forms. For Dewey and care ethics theorists, the individual and society compliment each other and make the other possible. Dewey is clear that the mechanism by which this occurs is education, and he defines education broadly. Yet Dewey's conception of education—be it in schools or elsewhere—stresses the importance of democratic institutions and relationships to instill democratic character structures which in turn strengthen these democratic relationships and institutions. Dewey and care ethics theorists (like Tronto and Fisher) refuse to accept moral boundaries between politics and morality, between the private and the public, between emotion and reason.

4.5 *Freire: the ethics and politics of education*

Care ethics theorists discuss the values and properties of care. As mentioned in section 4.3, Joan Tronto cites attentiveness, responsibility, nurturance, compassion, and the meeting of others' needs as values of caring (93: 3); Virginia Held notes that all care involves attentiveness, sensitivity, and responding to others needs (06: 39); Berenice Fisher writes that attention and protection are properties of caring in "asymmetrical, mutual dependencies" (01). Selma Sevenhuijsen names "empathy, intuition, compassion, love, relationality and commitment (the willingness to make connections)" "important epistemological values or 'epistemological virtues' in the feminist ethic of care" (98: 61).

Bubeck argues that “the most important cognitive capacities, attitudes, and skills (and corresponding virtues) in carers are attentiveness or receptivity, responsiveness, and the ability to respond in the right way to the cared for and her needs” (95: 143).

Paulo Freire was explicit that ethics were at the heart of his critical pedagogy. Ethics, he felt, is inherent in all forms of educational practice (98: 23); he was equally clear that the teaching of content cannot be separated from the ethical education of students (98: 87). In this section I will explore these properties and values of care and argue that Freire’s critical pedagogy coherently embodies several of them. I will explain how an ethic of care is engendered through (in Freire’s language) a relationship of student-teacher mutuality via dialogue in a problem-posing, co-intentional education in which the teacher balances democratic authority against both authoritarianism and permissiveness in a quest for conscientization with the goal of greater humanization.

Commenting on feminist teachers’ adoption of Freire’s ideas, Frances Maher notes that “[t]he relevance of Freire’s work for women is ironic because Freire never mentions women” (85: 47). Paulo Freire in particular and critical pedagogy in general have drawn criticism from some scholars who identify as feminist teachers. Early on in his writing Paulo Freire did not directly address questions of gender (Culley & Portuges, 85: 3; Weiler, 96). These early works are peppered with sexist pronouns and Freire relied on “binary categories such as oppressors and oppressed, and on a metanarrative of human liberation” (Weiler, 96: 368). bell hooks feels that Freire “constructs a phallocentric paradigm of liberation—wherein freedom and the experience of patriarchal manhood are always linked as though they were one and the same” (94: 49).

Elizabeth Ellsworth (92) argues that critical pedagogy is permeated by "repressive myths" that perpetuate relations of domination; that the critical in critical pedagogy is a code word hiding its meaning and goals; that the rules of reason are reified in the classroom of the supposed critical teacher, as is the authoritarian nature of the teacher/student relationship. Ellsworth, like Weiler, is also critical of Freire's vaguery on the subject of humanization and what it might actually look like (92: 99). Carmen Luke (92: 25) criticizes critical pedagogy's "masculinist subject;" accuses critical pedagogy of relying on conceptual dualisms; and feels that critical pedagogy argues for emancipation in liberal conceptions of equality and participatory democracy that are entrenched in the male individualism of the private sphere. Further, Luke views critical pedagogies "[g]ranting voice to girls in the public sphere of the democratic classroom [as] an add-on tactic of incorporation" (92: 98). Luke traces critical pedagogy's problems, in part, to the "deeply embedded masculinist standpoint in Dewey's democratic vision" (92: 33).

Several of these criticisms demand immediate rebuttal. Carmen Luke is correct that Freire and others in critical pedagogy argue in favor of equality and participatory democracy; she is incorrect in assuming that these are necessarily and essentially rooted in "the male individualism of the private sphere." Freire and others in critical pedagogy look to expand democracy and equality and this expansion directly challenges "male individualism" and the public/private dichotomy. Luke charges that critical pedagogy, by "encouraging critical classroom dialogue and legitimating personal voice *within* the extant structure of schooling and contemporary society and culture, assumes that institutionalized interpretive 'praxis' will or should somehow enable the dismantling of the contradictory patriarchal structures and supporting discourses" (92: 37). Critical

pedagogy assumes no such thing. Dewey was clear that "[t]he educational task cannot be accomplished merely by working upon men's minds, without action that effects change in institutions" (98a: 325). Freire was equally clear when he expressed the idea that "[t]he structures of society, like the capitalist mode of production, have to be changed for society to be transformed" (87: 175).

The "repressive myths" that Ellsworth accuses critical pedagogy of fostering include " 'empowerment,' 'student voice,' 'dialogue,' and even the term 'critical'" (92: 91). How do these function as repressive myths? According to Ellsworth, "Strategies such as student empowerment and dialogue give the illusion of equality while in fact leaving the authoritarian nature of the teacher/student relationship intact" (92: 98). The fact that power exists in human relationships including within the classroom and has been abused does not mean that the teacher's authority must be abandoned. Critical teachers facilitate dialogue and student empowerment without surrendering their authority and power in the classroom; they seek to share power where and when possible while always maintaining the right to use their authority to ensure the safety of their students and the process of pedagogy itself.

Leveling a criticism similar to Kathleen Weiler, Ellsworth argues that critical pedagogy in classrooms speaks in vagaries and "consistently strip discussions of classroom practices of historical context and political position" (92: 92). Recognizing that critical pedagogies are context specific, Freire and other critical educators may speak in generalizations only because they were convinced that "Experiments cannot be transplanted; they must be reinvented" (78: 9). Similarly, Freire and others in critical pedagogy do not deign to lay out a blue print for future society; hence they speak in

general terms of humanization. Purposefully avoiding minute details when he adumbrates his "utopian dream," Freire speaks of "a society that is less unjust, less cruel, more democratic, less discriminatory, less racist, less sexist" (93: 115).

Ellsworth charges critical pedagogy of fostering "a unity of voices and goals—a possibility unproblematically assumed and worked for in critical pedagogy" (92: 109). Critical pedagogies champion context specificities and sensitivities that allow those who suffer from various forms of oppression to understand what unites them with others who suffer different forms of oppression. For example, I have taught history classes where the discussion of slavery and institutionalized racism in America led Italian-American students in class to roll their eyes and make barely concealed racist remarks. I would immediately bring into the discussion the experiences of early Italian immigrants in America, the case of Sacco and Vanzetti, the origin and meaning of epithets like *wop* and *dago* to help illustrate the theme of oppression and how different groups experience it. Themes in critical pedagogy are often purposefully left vague so that the teachers and students can flesh them out from their own experiences in their own contexts (Freire, 97: 82).

Ellsworth in particular is troubling because though she seems to be very aware of the oppressions different groups have faced, she herself seems to support an essentialist position that would keep these groups from uniting to effectively challenge the institutions that allow these oppressions to continue. Though she explicitly denies an essentialist standpoint, Ellsworth makes some disconcerting statements that seem to support such a view. For example, she writes that "[m]y understanding and experience of racism will always be constrained by my white skin and middle-class privilege" (92:

100). Though it is true that words like *nigger* and *red-neck* may never carry the sting for Ellsworth that they do for a black person or a low-income southerner, I believe Ellsworth can very well imagine the weight these words carry for these groups. Further, Ellsworth explains, "I brought to the classroom…a social subjectivity that has been constructed in such a way that I have not and can never participate in the collective process of self-definition, naming of oppression, and struggles for visibility in the face of marginalization engaged in by students whose class, race, gender, and other positions I do not share" (92: 101). The danger inherent in Ellsworth's position is that we do not see past our differences to collectively enact social change that will benefit us all.

There are feminists and feminist teachers who can point out the shortcomings and mistakes of critical pedagogy and Paulo Freire without abandoning either entirely. bell hooks approvingly points out that Freire's critical pedagogy itself "invites a critical interrogation of the flaws in his work" (94: 49). Freire the man was also open to critical investigations of his work and his person, noting that "I must be constantly open to criticism and sustain my curiosity, always ready for revision based on the results of my future experience and that of others" (85: 11). hooks relates an anecdote where Freire lived up to his words. She confronted him, "with courtesy," about his own sexism at a University of Santa Cruz workshop:

> Immediately individuals spoke against me raising these questions and devalued their importance, Paulo intervened to say that these questions were crucial and he addressed them. Truthfully, I loved him at this moment for exemplifying by his actions the principles of his work. So much would have changed for me had he tried to silence or belittle a feminist critique (94: 55).

As hooks and Weiler understand, Freire responded to criticism and his critical pedagogy was a work ever in progress. Freire himself admitted "I have learned much

from feminism and have come to define my work as feminist, seeing feminism closely connected to the process of self-reflexivity and political action for human freedom" (92: x). For hooks "it is difficult to find a language that offers a way to frame critique [of Freire] and yet maintain the recognition of all that is valued and respected in the work" (94: 49). Where Luke and Ellsworth seem to find critical pedagogy in general and Freire's in particular irredeemable, Kathleen Weiler and bell hooks counsel that we not dismiss the entirety of Freire's critical pedagogy because of his shortcomings.

Paulo Freire is not usually considered a care ethics theorist. Yet care is a theme permeating his work. Freire speaks explicitly of progressive teachers caring for the well-being of their students (98: 125); that the teacher needs a caring and loving attitude toward the student (98: 65). John Dewey's life and theory was inspired and nourished by his faith in human beings, as was Paulo Freire's. Freire was clear that this faith in the potential of human beings required love, which he viewed as "a commitment to others" (97: 70). Freire quoted Argentinean revolutionary Che Guevara approvingly that "the true revolutionary is guided by strong feelings of love. It is impossible to think of an authentic revolutionary without this quality" (Guevara in Freire, 97: 70). The irony that Che Guevara met his end in a Bolivian school house would not have been lost on Freire (McLaren, 00).

One criticism of Freire is that his stated goal, the humanization of all people, sounds nice but is too vague. Kathleen Weiler posits as "one of the most striking qualities of Freire's thought: his tendency toward inspirational but decontextualized generalizations" (96: 363). Quoting Freire, Weiler asks, "Who can argue with a 'dream of liberation that never reaches a plentitude?'" (96: 370). Within this context of what Weiler

(96: 370) labels “broad and almost mystical abstractions which may be inspirational”, what does humanization actually mean?

For Paulo Freire, human beings are unfinished beings, capable of continuous development, of becoming more human. He conceived of the human condition as one of essential unfinishedness (98: 79). Unlike other animals, Freire maintained that we are aware of our incompletion, which “implies for us a permanent movement of search” (98: 57). The search—education, broadly conceived--is towards human flourishing, what Freire calls humanization. Because all humans are capable of being more human and capable of being aware that we can be more, Freire viewed humanization as humanity’s “historical vocation” (98: 52). He argued that human beings are conditioned by the institutions and circumstances of their lives but not determined by these (98: 26). If we were determined, choice would be impossible and unnecessary. Since our fate as a species is not written in stone, since our “future is problematic and not inexorable, the human praxis…requires decisions, severance, and choice. It requires ethics” (Freire, 96: 164). Severance, that is, with practices, institutions and relationships that negate the humanity of ourselves and others; the making of decisions and choices that further the humanization of all. “Our historical unfinishedness demands” choice, opined Freire, and this capacity to choose necessarily implies ethics (98: 57).

The ethics Freire champions are an expressive collaborative model of morality (Urban Walker, 98). Like Dewey, Freire sees human beings as connected, as associating naturally; hence, for Freire, humanization means that “I cannot be if others are not; above all, I cannot be if I forbid others from being” (03: 59). Thus Freire speaks of “the ethics of universal human aspiration,” which he considers the “ethics of solidarity” (98: 116).

Freire's ethical outlook is necessarily relational as he recognizes we are all in the world together and our interconnectedness necessitates the struggle towards being more human as a species-level project.

For Freire, immorality and a lack of ethics rests with those who want to maintain an unjust order (98: 61); he opined that allowing concrete situations of misery to persist is itself immoral (98: 75). As ethical beings capable of choice, capable of making ethical and unethical decisions, Freire felt that human beings had to act to change the world (98: 75). The dream of humanization, he opined, demands we act to realize it (92: 84). Political struggle, he argued, "should be undertaken in the name of ethics" (04: 35). The fight, as he explained, is one of all human beings toward being more, to overcome obstacles to the humanization of all (96: 160). He remained adamant that one must use one's freedom to help others achieve greater humanization; exercising one's freedom in a way that only maximized one's own freedom represented what he disapprovingly called an "individualist attitude" (87: 109). "I don't believe in self-liberation," Freire made clear the connection of individual autonomy and the humanization of the species, "Liberation is a social act" (87: 109).

Freire was clearly against capitalism and the "ethics of the market." He railed against the "perverse ethic of profit" and counseled refusal of the "dictatorship of the marketplace" (98: 115).He considered himself a democratic thinker and attributed his concern with dehumanization in part to his Christianity and the liberation theology movement in Latin America (Freire, 96: 86; Schipani, 84). At the same time, Freire could not deny his indebtedness to Marx (93: 134). He was adamant that "democracy cannot be rooted in the ethics of the market" (Freire, 04: 25).

Like John Dewey, Paulo Freire conceived of education as an inherently ethical pursuit aimed at achieving greater humanization. Also like Dewey, Freire conceived of education broadly. For Freire, all forms of education—formal, informal, or nonformal; institutional or otherwise--are rooted in humanity's unfinished nature. "It is our awareness of being unfinished that makes us educable," explained Freire (98: 58). Further, education has to be an ongoing activity because of this unfinished character of human beings and the transformational character of a reality that shapes us while we shape it (97: 65).

According to Freire, because education forms human beings, education cannot be separated from moral formation (98: 34). As humans are ethical, meaning we are "ethical beings who in our ethicality are capable of being unethical", education must be ethical and must actively pursue the ethical (Freire, 98: 115 & 57). It is in our incompleteness, Freire wrote, an incompleteness of which we are capable of being aware, that education as a permanent process is fixed (98: 58). Freire opined that as we recognize our unfinished nature, "it becomes obvious that we are 'programmed' to learn, destined by our very incompleteness to seek completion, to have a 'tomorrow' that adds to our 'today'" (98: 79).

4.6 *Freire: the teacher-student relationship and a problem-posing education*

The ethics of care are not universalized in the sense of existing outside of human beings and their relationships. Hence we must look to the concrete relationships between people to see the values of care at work. On a normative theoretical level, the values of care are consonant with Freire's notion of humanization, but I wish to turn here to an

actual human relationship to illustrate the values of care in Freire's philosophy. I speak of the relationship between teacher and student in Freire's critical pedagogy.

Paulo Freire differentiated between systematic education and educational projects. Systematic education is indicative of a banking system of education and positivist epistemology, of a teacher-student relationship where the teacher occupies a superior position and the student an inferior one. Educational projects, on the other hand, are "carried out with the oppressed," within school and society; in schools Freire's educational projects are marked by teacher-student mutuality (97: 36). The oppressed, Freire explained, be they students in a school, workers in an industrial society, or peasants in an agrarian one, need to play a reflective part in their own liberation or those who claim to be working on their behalf—teachers, political leaders, revolutionaries—are objectifying them (97: 47). Freire's critical pedagogy, which he referred to as a "problem-posing education", a "co-intentional education", or a "liberating education", reflects teacher-student mutuality.

Freire's concept of teacher-student mutuality is perhaps best explained in contrast to the usual model the teacher-student relationship assumes. As discussed in section 2.5 on the banking system, a teacher in the traditional pedagogical model is viewed as the expert to the students' ignoramus. Freire argued that in this prevalent model of education, the teacher "cognizes" a subject—studies it in college, prepares a lesson on it—and then "narrates" it for the benefit of the student who only has to absorb it and not cognize it for herself (97: 61). Teachers are the subjects of this form of education and their students mere objects to be "domesticated" to the status quo (98: 80). Teachers in this model usually do not consider what they are doing as political, and many will even go to great

pains to keep what they perceive as their politics out of their classrooms less they unduly bias students or get in trouble.

Freire's critical pedagogy does not deny that there are differences between teachers and students, but Freire does maintain that these differences must not be antagonistic (87: 92). In Freire's critical pedagogy, teacher and student both meet as "Subjects" of the educational process, which assumes nothing less than a transformative nature of each, the subject matter involved, and, potentially, their greater society (97: 51). "Authentic education is not carried on by 'A' *for* 'B' or by 'A' *about* 'B,'" explained Freire, "but rather by 'A' *with* 'B,' mediated by the world" (97: 74). Teacher-student mutuality is marked by "cooperation between Subjects" (Freire, 97: 149). In Freire's critical pedagogy the teacher and student are "both together in unshakable solidarity" (97: 110). The teacher in Freire's critical pedagogy respects himself and his students (98: 87). This means, in part, that the teacher in the classroom does not strive to be silent or objective or neutral on matters of politics, but has to be radically democratic (Freire, 87: 157). Teachers and students cognize together through a problem posing education that seeks to foster critical consciousness, what Freire called *conscientization*. Nel Noddings acknowledges a form of teacher-student mutuality when she writes of the desirability of an "apprentice relationship" between teacher and student (84: 178).

Freire proposed that there is "no teaching without learning," that "Whoever teaches learns in the act of teaching, and whoever learns teaches in the act of learning" (98: 31). The teacher in Freire's model of teacher-student mutuality learns as she teaches; she learns about herself, about her interpretation of the world and her place in it, about her students and the conditions they live in, about her subject matter, etc. In Freire's

critical pedagogy, the teacher "is no longer merely the one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught…with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach" (97: 61). Teacher and student are united as "teacher-student with student-teachers", the two "jointly responsible for a process in which all grow" (97: 61). Frances Maher and Mary Tetreault speak of feminist teachers who "define their authority in terms of their feminism by consciously positioning and modeling themselves as knowers and learners for their students" (94: 128). Freire likens the thinking of the teacher in a domesticating model of education to "the thinking of the master" versus the thinking of the teacher in his critical pedagogy to the "thinking of the comrade" (97: 113).

Freire (92: 36) recounts an impromptu game he played with Chilean farmers that illustrates this "thinking of the comrade." Freire was engaged in a conversation with the farmers when they suddenly became quiet. He asked them why they were not talking and was told "You're the one who should have been talking, sir. You know things sir, we don't." Freire suggested he and the farmers play a game where they would trade questions back and forth and each would get a point when the other could not answer. The university-trained Freire asked questions like "What is the importance of Hegel in Marx's thought?", questions the farmers could not answer; the farmers asked questions like "What's a contour curve got to do with erosion?", questions Freire could not answer. The game ended in a tie, ten to ten. With this game Freire was demonstrating teacher-student mutuality, the teacher-student student-teacher relationship of all engaged in a process of appreciating the knowledge of the other and learning from one another.

In a problem-posing education, "people develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come

to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in transformation" (Freire, 97: 64). Problem-posing education reflects Freire's ontological vision in that it "bases itself on creativity and stimulates true reflection and action upon reality, thereby responding to the vocation of persons as beings who are authentic only when engaged in inquiry and creative transformation" (97: 65). The teacher in Freire's critical pedagogy who engages students in a problem-posing education poses "the problems of human beings in their relations with the world" (97: 60). It is a form of education aimed at making students and teachers "unquietly critical," of allowing each to "apprehend reality in order to intervene in it" (93: 24; 04: 60). Freire was clear that problem-posing education was more than exploring and understanding the problems we face in our world and our relationships with the world; problem-posing education "is revolutionary futurity" as teacher and student consider and construct alternatives to the dehumanizing relationships and institutions that condition our lives (97: 65).

Freire's critical pedagogy, a problem-posing education, is rooted in dialogue, and it in this reliance on communication between student and teacher that the values of care are concretized. Freire conceives of dialogue as a necessity for the human species and the relationships engendered within it. Because "human existence cannot be silent," dialogue, he argued, "is an existential necessity, by which people achieve significance as human beings" (97: 69). Cooperation, a prerequisite for humanization, "occurs only among Subjects" and "can only be achieved through communication," that is, dialogue (Freire, 97: 149). Dewey held similar views. Language, which he called "the cherishing mother of all significance" and "the tool of tools," is a relationship because it presupposes at least two people and "an organized group to which these creatures belong, and from whom

they have acquired their habits of speech" (Dewey, 98b: 51 & 57-58). Language is synonymous with action, for Dewey, because "[t]hrough speech a person dramatically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many roles, not in successive stages of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama" (98b: 52).

Freire was clear that dialogue cannot be a form of "crafty domination" of one person or group of persons over another; the "domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is conquest of the world for the liberation of humankind" (97: 70). Dialogue between people who are equally Subjects can only exist when there is deep love for the world and for other people (Freire, 97: 70). Dialogue represents a horizontal relationship between people as Subjects and facilitates student-teacher mutuality (Freire, 97: 72 & 61). Feminist teachers like Ardeth Deay and Judith Stitzel argue that dialogue is important because "we need a strategy that simultaneously allows us to learn who our students are while providing avenues to where we would like them to be" (98: 94). Dialogue requires an "*a priori* faith in people," held Freire, "an intense faith in humankind, faith in their power to make and remake, to create and re-create; faith in their vocation to be more fully human (which is not the privilege of an elite, but the birthright of all)" (97: 71).

To a greater or lesser degree, all of the values of care—from attentiveness and sensitivity to compassion and empathy—rely on communication between human beings, on dialogue. Nel Noddings speaks of "inclusion," wherein "the teacher receives and accepts the student's feeling toward the subject matter; she looks at it and listens to it through his eyes and ears" (84: 177). This, Noddings argues, allows the teacher to step out of her frame of reference and into the students' (84: 24). Olena Hankivsky takes issue

with Noddings' inclusion when she describes responsiveness as differing "from trying to imagine what it would be like in another person's situation. Responsiveness constitutes a unique way of listening to and observing those who are different from us" (04: 35). What Noddings' inclusion and Hankivsky's principle of responsiveness have in common is that both are grounded in dialogue, in communication between people in relationships. This dialogue is predicated on the value of attention or attentiveness; hence Berenice Fisher's insistence that attention "constitutes a prior condition for every other aspect of caring" because "without attention no caring can take place" (01: 120).

In a similar vein, Paulo Freire spoke of "listening democratically" (98: 107). Listening, he opined, is extremely important when engaging in dialogue and Freire identified the "discipline of silence as the sine qua non of dialogical communication" (98: 104 & 105). The teacher is *obliged* to be a listener, to comprehend the student's cognizance of an issue, of where she is coming from in relation to the topic of discussion (Freire, 98: 106). Similarly, Noddings writes that when a teacher asks a question and the student answers, the teacher receives not only the answer but also the student. "What [the student] says matters, whether it is right or wrong, and she [the teacher] probes gently for clarification, interpretation, contribution. She is not seeking the answer but the involvement of the cared-for", the involvement of the student in the process of education (Noddings, 84: 176). Freire stressed the importance of "listening 'connectedly' and without prejudice to what the other is saying" (98: 107). Tronto counsels a form of "absence of will", the ability "to suspend one's own goals, ambitions, plans of life, and concerns, in order to recognize and to be attentive to others", as a first stage of care (93: 128).

A dialogue that includes democratic listening does not mean all parties in the dialogue will always agree. Dewey explained that "[t]o take as far as possible every conflict which arises—and they are bound to arise—out of the atmosphere and medium of force, of violence as a means of settlement into that of discussion and of intelligence is to treat those who disagree—even profoundly—with us as those from whom we may learn…as friends" (98: 342). Disagreement with those we respect, maintained Freire, is a right and a means to grow and develop knowledge (96: 148). Henry Giroux posits that "knowledge has to be made problematic and has to be situated in classroom social relationships that allow for debate and communication" (81: 106).

"The purpose of dialogue," opines Nel Noddings, "is to come into contact with ideas and to understand, to meet the other and to care" (84: 186). Noddings feels one can disagree with the particularities of another's beliefs but identify with "what he feels"; she argues that this shared intensity of feeling reconnects those involved in the dialogue and connects both to caring (84: 186). Dialogue and discussion, even over issues people disagree strongly about, represent "cooperative undertakings in which both parties learn" maintained Dewey (98: 342). "Contradiction. Conflict. This is the stuff of feminist pedagogy," posit Meredith Love and Brenda Helmbrecht (07: 49). Tronto promotes a vision of care that "does not require that conflict be eliminated, or that pluralistic groups be merged into a unity" (93: 168). In our classrooms we must not seek to squelch disagreement, as "attempting to purge the classroom of conflict never creates a 'safe space,' for to cleanse the classroom of discord is also to cleanse it of difference" (Colwill and Boyd, 08: 236). Dewey argued that dialogue which makes room for the expression of conflicting ideas and opinions and the potential for individual growth through this

articulation of difference is a hallmark of democracy. He writes, “To cooperate by giving differences a chance to show themselves because of the belief that the expression of difference is not only a right of the other person but is a means of enriching one’s life-experience, is inherent in the democratic personal way of life” (Dewey, 98: 342).

Dialogue allows the teacher in Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy to begin to comprehend the necessity of care in her relationship with her students; the context-specific forms of addressing that this need requires for fulfillment. Dialogue, marked by democratic listening, allows the teacher to be attentive to the needs of his students. To understand what others want and need we must listen to them and engage them in dialogue, dialogue aimed at what White calls a “democratic politics of needs interpretation” (00: 155).

Clearly, however, Freire’s emphasis on dialogue, highlighting the importance of democratic listening, is not a tool through which the teacher manipulates the students. Listening allows for the growth of both parties in a dialogue. “Listening,” explains Freire, “is a permanent attitude of the part of the subject who is listening, of being open to the word of the other, to the gesture of the other, to the differences of the other” (98: 107). Through dialogue, Subjects learn and grow by confronting their differences (98: 59). Freire saw dialogue as “democratic relationship” affording one the opportunity “to open up to the thinking of others, and thereby not wither away in isolation” (92: 103). “The purpose of dialogue,” Nel Noddings posits, “is to come into contact with ideas and to understand, to meet the other and to care” (84: 186). Dialogue allows for the “sealing together of the teacher and the students in the joint act of knowing and re-knowing the object of study” (Freire, 87: 100). Freire viewed a commitment to a problem-posing

education through dialogue as “a sign of the educator’s democratic stand” (03: 92). Freire saw dialogue as nourished by love, humility, hope, faith, and trust (74: 40).

4.7 *Freire, democratic authority, and the ethic of care*

Freire wanted to be clear what dialogue meant and what it did not mean. Dialogue does not mean that all students must always talk, each and every class session (Freire, 87: 102). Dialogue does mean that teachers must provide classrooms permeated by a sense of protection, where each student’s unique voice can be heard. Yet the hearing of individual voices with unique perspectives does not mean that each of these individual voices is equally valid. Freire was clear that dialogue does not negate the teacher’s expertise and that the teacher must practice a form of democratic authority to protect the pedagogical practice (98: 81).

Freire never denies the “directive role necessary for educating” that the teacher in his critical pedagogy must assume (87: 171). The teacher brings “a reading of the world” to her classroom, and her job is not to deny her perspective. By “offering her or his ‘reading of the world,’” Freire explained, the “progressive educator” brings “out the fact that there are other ‘readings of the world,’ different from the one being offered as the educator’s own, and at times antagonistic to it” (92: 96). A commitment to “learning and re-learning,” to “making and re-making,” does not mean that a teacher does not know (Freire, 87: 101). The progressive educator must “demonstrate his or her competency to the students” (Ibid). Nor does such a commitment mean “that every time, in every course, in every term, the educator changes his or her knowledge about this or that object” (Freire, 87: 101). “For example,” Freire offers, “by discussing dialogue every day with

students, I am not changing every day my understanding of dialogue" (87: 101). It is possible to "arrive at the level of some certainty, some scientific certainty of some objects, which we can count on" (Freire, 87: 102). Yet Freire says progressive educators need to be aware of the historicity of science itself, which "means that all new knowledge comes up when other knowledge becomes old, and no longer answers the needs of the new moment, no longer answers the questions being asked" (87: 102).

Care ethics theorists argue that an ethic of care requires competence. "[M]aking certain that the caring work is done competently must be a moral aspect of care if the adequacy of the care given is to be a measure of the success of care" posits Tronto (93: 133). In the classroom, the teacher comes to the students situated in a personal history constituted in part by her own education, knowledge, and understanding. She is not a blank slate and to deny her knowledge is to do a disservice to her students. The creation of knowledge itself depends on the uses of authority (Maher & Tetreault, 94: 20). Authority is necessary to instill discipline, a form of authority over the self, in students. "Too many of the things that students learn these days," explains Carla Golden, "cannot be generalized to apply to their lives beyond [school], but learning how to discipline oneself is one skill that will continue to have relevance" (98: 22).

Freire was clear that there would be times and situations when the progressive educator may have to forego dialogue in favor of the "inductive moment" wherein the teacher "cannot wait for students to initiate their own forward progress into an idea or an understanding, and the teacher must do it" (87: 157). One might wonder how this "inductive moment" differs from the dissemination of official knowledge from a "domesticating educator," and Freire proffers an answer. At the same time that "the

liberating educator starts assuming the responsibility of being inductive, he or she looks for the process to overcome the inductive moment, in order to transform it into a comradery, that is, a moment undertaken by students themselves and not only by the teacher" (Freire, 87: 157).

At the same time that he acknowledges her expertise, the progressive educator in Freire's critical pedagogy must practice humility. The security of the progressive educator "does not rest on the false supposition" of the teacher's supposed omniscience. "On the contrary," explains Freire, "it rests on the conviction that there are some things I know and some things I do not know" and "[w]ith this conviction it is more likely that I may come to know better what I already know and better learn what I do not yet know" (98: 120). Dialogue "demands humility" because dialogue only exists when "dialoguers engage in critical thinking," where teacher and student are engaged in a process of critical consciousness and re-creation (Freire, 97: 71 & 73). Never denying the expertise of the progressive educator or the necessity of her facilitating and guiding the process of pedagogy and democracy in the classroom, Freire nevertheless counseled that "Once in a while, teachers should call students' attention to a small conflict that led to an outburst of explosion resulting in an antidemocratic behavior on the teacher's behalf. They should ask: 'Why did I allow myself to become lost in this way?'" (93: 121). Freire felt that by exposing their own foibles for critical reflection with the students, teachers help establish trust between themselves and their students (97: 72).

Protection is one of the properties or values of care identified by various care ethics theorists; it is found in the critical pedagogies of Paulo Freire, John Dewey, and feminist pedagogy. Eva Kittay's concept of *doulia* requires social and political

arrangements where care-givers themselves are protected as they provide care (02). Berenice Fisher (01) speaks of fostering "holding" in feminist classrooms. Holding, a form of "caring protection", "refers not only to the original physical holding of a child but to the process of creating a set of emotional conditions under which the child can survive and develop" (Fisher, 01: 121). Clear rules and expectations, Fisher opines, are an "important feature of creating a holding environment" in the classroom. Clear rules and expectations require the wielding of power on the part of the teacher as one who facilitates the process of pedagogy.

All critical pedagogies struggle and have struggled with the proper use of authority in the classroom. John Dewey criticized the "new education" of Stanley Hall and others for abandoning the teacher's responsibility to use his authority to guide the educational process in favor of leaving the child to her own independent development (98: 241). Dewey, in turn, was criticized for his own schools being too permissive (Edmondson, 06). The development of explicitly feminist pedagogies have been marked by disagreement and debate over the use of authority and power in the classroom (Freedman & Stoddard Holmes, 03; Hirschmann & Di Stefano, 96). Paulo Freire differentiated between authority or "democratic authority" and authoritarianism, on the one hand, and on the other, authority versus permissiveness, or as he called them the tyranny of authority versus the tyranny of liberty (92: 14). Dewey argued that those who sought to force development upon the child in an authoritarian manner and that those (like Hall) who wished to leave the child alone were equally guilty of failing to see that development is a definite process that unfolds under its own law only when certain conditions are provided (98: 241).

The problem with authority from a critical pedagogical point of view is that while critical pedagogies rail against the misuse of authority to stifle certain voices and perspectives and privilege others, a form of authority is necessary for the progressive educator in her classroom. “The question of asserting authority and power is a central concern to feminists precisely because as women they have been taught that taking power is inappropriate,” explains Weiler (91: 461).Yet when the teacher’s authority is lacking or perceived as lacking, trouble ensues. Ellen Carillo recounts how, “because I did not take on the authoritarian role that my students expected, they rejected my teaching practices”; her teaching practices, relying on questioning students, discussion and dialogue, were not considered “active teaching” by her students in their course evaluations (07: 29 & 32). Professors who identify themselves in class as feminists consistently score low marks on student evaluations (Collins, et. al., 98).

John Schlib (85) recounts how, in a Women’s Studies class he co-taught with a female professor, college students interpreted his colleagues’ remarks as radical while receiving his own-admittedly “explicitly partisan judgments”—with less hostility. Schlib also found it somewhat disconcerting how students seemed more comfortable asking him questions about feminism because they seemed to view him not as a feminist himself but as a spectator to the movement (Ibid). Susan Stanford Friedman argues that authority is necessary in the feminist classroom (85: 207). Weiler opines that, because women have been socialized to avoid wielding power, in a sense “the feminist teacher’s acceptance of authority becomes itself liberating to her and to her students” (91: 461).

Paulo Freire never denied the authority of the teacher in the classroom, be it her authority on a subject or her authority to lead the class and protect the voices and bodies

of all students in that class. There is a scene in director Gene Saks' 1974 musical, *Mame*, where Manhattan social maven Mame (Lucille Ball) takes her recently-orphaned nephew to enroll in headmaster Ralph DeVine's "School of Life", a "progressive" school. Though her nephew is apparently nonplussed, the liberal-minded Mame is herself concerned by the goings-on at the school. They walk into a schoolroom where students in various states of undress as Native Americans chase one another around the classroom; paint, depant and battle one another with toy swords; drop water-filled bags out the window onto pedestrians on the street below; all while headmaster DeVine himself sits naked amongst the chaos reading a strategically placed broad sheet newspaper. Paulo Freire was clear that such permissiveness in the name of freedom actually denies freedom and is just as egregious as a misuse of authority or authoritarianism. He warned of a "permissiveness devoid of limits" (Freire, 04: 9); that a "permissiveness in the name of freedom works against freedom" (Freire, 96: 93). For Freire, not only does the authoritarian teacher deny his and his students' ethicality and humanization, so does the permissive teacher, as both "are equally disrespectful of an essential characteristic of our humanness, namely, our radical (and assumed) unfinishedness, out of which emerges the possibility of being ethical" (98: 59). This unfinishedness requires direction and guidance which come through the democratic use of authority.

Authority and freedom, for Freire, are not necessarily mutually antagonistic (04: 9). Freedom without limits, Freire opined, is impossible (98: 96). Much as Dewey conceived of laws as "structures which canalize action" towards desired consequences, Freire conceived of authority as "indispensable to the development of the learner's freedom" (Dewey, 27: 54; Freire, 96: 163). Freire envisaged authority as an invention of

freedom (96: 150). All freedom itself, thought Freire, contains the possibility that it may itself become authority to further freedom (97: 159).

It is in this context that I take issue with Nel Noddings' conception of "confirmation." Confirmation occurs "[w]hen we attribute the best possible motive consonant with reality to the cared-for, we confirm him; that is, we reveal to him an attainable image of himself that is lovelier than that manifested in his present acts" (Noddings, 84: 193). Noddings provides examples of confirmation in the classroom. The teacher who catches a student cheating on an exam "may begin by saying, *I know you want to do well*, or, *I know you want to help your friend*. She begins by attributing the best possible motive to him…She does not resort to punishment, because the rules are not sacred to her" (Noddings, 84: 178). Further, "we do not give zeros for work missed because of unexcused absences, nor do we subtract points for late work, nor assign detentions or other punishments. All of these punitive moves work against the development of subjective responsibility that is required for continuous construction of the ethical ideal" (Noddings, 84: 201).

While critical pedagogies seek to help students and teachers achieve a conscientization that can help foster political action outside the classroom, these pedagogies also seek to impart survival skills to students. As an example, Freire explains that "language is an ideological problem" with value judgments that determine *standard* or *correct* unrecognized as value judgments (87: 71). The liberatory educator will not punish the non-standard language speaker, nor will she chastise them to speak "correctly" or "grammatically". She will, however, "teach correct usage while also criticizing its political implications" (Ibid). When contemplating whether the liberatory educator has

"the right to say 'I am a revolutionary so I don't teach the 'good' English?", Freire answered with a resounding no (Ibid). Our students must be able to survive in the world at the same time that they are capable of criticizing and working to transform it.

Sticking to Noddings' examples, teachers who allow students to cheat on exams, teachers who do not take off points for assignments handed in late (barring extenuating circumstances) and teachers who do not assign detentions arguably err on the side of Freire's permissiveness and do their students a disservice. "Coherently democratic authority," Freire reasoned, "works to build genuine discipline" (98: 86). Students who "get away" with cheating in our classrooms while their teachers tell them "*I know you want to do well*" or hand assignments in late (or not at all) are not acquiring the discipline they will need to be successful in school and the wider world. Intellectual discipline, Freire argued, is "absolutely indispensable" in the process of conscientization and social transformation; what lessons regarding intellectual discipline does a student learn when his teacher allows him to cheat on an exam or does not hold him accountable for infractions of rules in class? And will his teachers in other classes and grades be as equally "confirming" as the teacher in Noddings' examples?

Noddings (84: 99) is clear that care is a "tough ethic," but with her example of confirmation she appears to fail to realize that there will be times when this toughness extends from the teacher to the student, albeit always in a humane manner. Teachers practicing a critical pedagogy and an ethic of care in their classroom must be tough on their students to protect the process of pedagogy, to protect her students from discrimination in class, and to model caring and democratic relationships in the classroom. Berenice Fisher favors a form of caring authority over Max Weber's notion of

authority. Where Weber favored an impersonal, rule-governed authority, Fisher speaks of a caring authority that "does not remove itself from the immediate context but attends to its details" (01: 114). Caring authority requires dialogue and communication to "take the perspective of the other" and understand what that person requires (01: 114).

The examples above beg the question of what pedagogy and curriculum development actually look like in class. Instead of relying on exams where students sit isolated from their peers and labor alone, might we be able to implement group exams where students are encouraged to work together in completing an assessment? Instead of assigning a due date and then assigning consequences when a student does not have a finished product the day of, might a teacher be able to set up a system of check-ins where the students' progress towards the completion of the assignment is monitored at specified intervals? To what extent can teachers be flexible with their own and their schools' rules and the consequences of breaking these rules? For instance, isn't there a qualitative difference between a student who uses hate speech in the classroom versus a student who chews gum or forgets to bring her clothes to dress out in Physical Education class?

Freire was clear that as much as "rigor *needs* freedom", freedom needs rigor, and students need intellectual discipline which schools and progressive educators can help imbue (87: 75). Without authority in the classroom, Freire warned, there is only licentiousness in the absence of discipline (96: 93). Freire's remarks are much in line with Dewey's notion or responsibility and the importance of teaching children and students to be responsible. Accountability and responsibility, which today are often considered shibboleths of the right, are necessary for directing individual growth towards desirable outcomes. "One is held responsible in order that he may *become* responsible,"

explained Dewey. “that is, responsive to the needs and claims of others” (98b: 352). Human beings are held accountable so they may learn, “in order that he may learn not theoretically and academically but in such a way as to modify—and to some extent—to remake his prior self” (Dewey, 98b: 351). The connotation of responsibility and accountability is too often negative and backward looking; as Dewey put it, we too often conceive of them as having a “retrospective instead of prospective bearing” (98b: 351). Though, in Dewey’s (98b: 351) words, we “cannot undo the past; we can affect the future”; and instilling a sense of responsibility by holding students accountable when they have not been responsible (as well as lauding them when they have) serves as a means of individual and social growth. That said, “Those who hold others accountable for their conduct are themselves accountable for doing it in a manner that this responsiveness develops” (Dewey, 98b: 352).

“The power of a democratic educator lies in exemplary coherence,” wrote Freire, “that is what sustains his or her authority” (03: 90). By constantly negotiating between the lures of permissiveness and authoritarianism in her classroom, the progressive educator attempts to corral a democratic authority in the service of critical pedagogy. Such a teacher is not content to merely “teach” about democracy and an ethic of care; she understands the need to model democratic practice and caring relationships as much as possible in her interactions with students. She recognizes authority or freedom without bounds as “undisciplined forms of behavior that deny what [Freire is] calling the ontological vocation of the human being” (98: 83).

4.8 *Feminist pedagogies as critical pedagogies*

Though feminist teachers like Ellsworth and Luke are critical of critical pedagogy and feminists adopting it, many feminist teachers conceive of feminist pedagogy as a critical pedagogy. Kathleen Weiler opines that "Feminist pedagogy as it has developed in the United States provides a historically situated example of a critical pedagogy in practice" (91: 450). Many scholars and activists in the field of feminist pedagogy trace the origins of the field to second wave feminism's consciousness-raising practices; John Dewey and the progressive movement in American education; and the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire (Maher & Tetreault, 94; Shrewsbury, 96; Weiler, 91; Valle, 02; Hoffman, et. al., 00; Sandall, 91).

Like other forms of critical pedagogy, feminist pedagogy critically examines reality and promotes humanizing alternatives to this reality. Caroline Shrewsbury notes that "[a]t its simplest level, feminist pedagogy is concerned with gender justice and overcoming oppressions" (96: 9). Compared to other critical pedagogies, feminist pedagogy is unique because of "its attention to the particular needs of women students and its grounding in feminist theory as the basis for its multi-dimensional and positional view of the construction of classroom knowledge" (Maher & Tetreault, 85: 30). Feminist pedagogy is prescriptive and futurist, guided by "a vision of what education might be like but frequently is not" (Shrewsbury, 96: 8). Feminist pedagogy and other critical pedagogies "aim to encourage the students, particularly women, working-class students, and members of underrepresented ethnic groups, to gain an education that would be relevant to their concerns, to create their own meanings, and to find their own voices in

relation to the material" (Maher & Tetreault, 94: 9). Above all, feminist pedagogy is committed to improving women's lives (Cohee, 98).

As Karen Warren notes, contemporary feminism is an umbrella concept sheltering many different types of feminisms but all have in common that "sexism (or, the oppression of women) exists, is wrong, and must be changed" (98: 46). As discussed in the examples of Ellsworth and Luke, not all feminist teachers consider what they are doing as synonymous with critical pedagogy. Similarly, not all feminist teachers argue that feminist pedagogy is consonant with an ethic of care, and even when their pedagogy is consonant with an ethic of care, the connection—like Dewey's or Freire's—often goes unidentified.

Other feminist teachers argue explicitly for an ethic of care in feminist pedagogy. Teaching is a caring relationship (Fisher, 01; Noddings, 84). The concerns of care ethics theorists are the concerns of feminist pedagogy. Where an ethics of care views "persons as relational and interdependent", feminist pedagogy "strives to help student and teacher learn to think in…ways that enhance the integrity and wholeness of the person and the person's connections with others " (Held, 06: 46; Shrewsbury, 96: 9). Relations are "ontologically basic" to an ethic of care (Noddings, 84: 3). Feminist pedagogy is an engaged pedagogy, a pedagogy "engaged with self, the material being studied, with others, with the community, organizations and movements" (Shrewsbury, 96: 8). The metaphors care ethics theorists use--webs, weaving a fabric, circles and chains, mosaics--are spoken of or alluded to in feminist pedagogy by professors like Carolyn Shrewsbury who see the feminist classroom characterized by "persons connected in a net of

relationships with people who care about each other's learning as well as their own" (96: 8).

4.9 *Positionality, conscientization, and feminist pedagogy*

Concerns that second wave feminism was being totalized by a micro-narrative of middle class white female experience led some feminists to champion the concepts of feminist standpoint theory and positionality (Benhabib, 94). Nancy Hartsock (83) theorized a specifically feminist standpoint in light of Marx's historical materialism, though feminists do not agree about Marx's relevance to feminism (Hartmann, 81; Barrett, 97; Nicholson, 97; Hansen & Philipson, 90). The concept of a positionality reflective of one's subjectivity found greater acceptance in feminist circles.

"Feminist pedagogy…makes explicit that how we experience and understand things is rooted in our social position," explains Shirley Parry, and feminist pedagogy "affirms the value of personal experience as a central component of learning" (96: 47). The concept of positionality speaks to "the knower's specific position in any context, a position that is always defined by gender, race, class, and other socially significant dimensions" (Maher & Tetreault, 94: 22). Feminism and feminist pedagogy has played a very important part in uncovering the epistemic grounding of academic disciplines. Appeals to personal experience remain a "centerpiece in the feminist classroom" because "prevailing epistemologies reject out of hand the epistemic practice of appealing to experience in general, and experiences of oppressed and exploited people in particular" (Macdonald, 02: 116).

Feminist pedagogy has highlighted the ways in which traditional disciplines and knowledge have assumed the positionality of white heterosexual males as the objective, neutral, and true representation of reality, and the effects this has on women and others (Maher & Tetreault, 94: 210). For example, Karen Warren explains that "[w]ithout the appropriate prefixes, a discipline such as philosophy masquerades as 'just philosophy,' inclusive philosophy, when it is not. It is Western philosophy, or dominant Western philosophy, or philosophy authored by White heterosexual bourgeois men of the Western world" (98: 46). Not all voices are represented equally, nor are all voices even represented; Mainstream culture and knowledge is not as inclusive as its defenders would have us believe it is (Minnich, 04; Kincheloe, 08).

The positionality of feminist pedagogy is a central concern in an ethic of care. In an ethic of care a theoretical commitment to and appreciation of relationality and social embeddedness proceeds to concrete, actual relationships. Universalistic ethical models precede in the opposite direction, as attempts to fix actual, concrete situations to abstract, universal rules and principles. "[F]rom the so-called 'care standpoint,' responsiveness to other persons in their wholeness and their particularity is of singular importance," explains Marilyn Friedman, "This idea, in turn, points toward a notion of moral commitment which takes *particular persons* as its primary focus" (95: 70). Hence Noddings explains that the forms care and caring relationships take do "not evolve inevitably out of the 'logic of the concept' nor out of a catalog of what is known about persons caring" because both would "require a move to abstraction that tends to destroy the uniqueness of the caring itself" (84: 33). The form of moral commitment in an ethic of care "is specific to that individual and is not generalizable to others" (Friedman, 95:

71). In an ethic of care and feminist pedagogy, individuals and their positionalities are unique and ever evolving and recognized as such.

Awareness of one's own and one's students' positionality allows teachers to better care for their students. "Teachers who know their individual students' histories as well as the histories of their families have a rich background through which to develop judgments about what caring is needed," explains Fisher (01: 128). An explicit identification of positionality on the teacher's part can serve to hearten and inspire students. Noting that secrets "isolate and distance us from others, leading to inauthenticity in relationships," Janet Wright explains how she sees her coming out as a lesbian professor to her college students as a political and ethical act in the classroom. "The argument that one's sexual preference is something private and intimate ('I don't talk about *my* sexuality!') does not apply to coming out," she explains. "Coming out is not a discussion of intimate sexual details, it is a discussion of identity" (98: 193). Further, "Naming and giving voice to one's experience is the first step in learning about domination and how it functions" (Wright, 98: 193). Maher and Tetreault note that "the capacity to develop a sturdy and coherent voice can be threatened by a classroom environment that encourages students to talk about some aspects of themselves but not others" (94: 98). In classrooms and a world where heterosexuality is normalized, a teacher who comes out provides a model for students of *all* sexualities in her classroom (Wright, 98: 197). Wright argues that students feel safer, more respected and trusted when a teacher can be open and honest about her life (98: 195).

John Dewey did not use the term positionality in his writings and speech but the idea resonates in his works. A concern with positionality is evident in Dewey's

contention that “when women who are not mere students of other persons’ philosophy set out to write it, we cannot conceive that it will be the same in viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the standpoint of the different masculine experience of things” (98a: 73). The idea of positionality is also evident in Dewey’s charge that education must start with the child as she is and where she is coming from. Dewey argued that the schools of his day must reconcile the antagonistic gap between the subject matter taught in class and the child’s experiences; he viewed both as limits defining the process of the growth of the individual (98a: 235 & 239). Dewey (98a) recognized the child’s life as an “integral, total one” (237) and the child’s universe as fluid and fluent; he argued that the school must prepare the student for this reality instead of placing an emphasis on abstract learning where the subject matter has no direct relationship to the child’s present experience, where “studies divide and fractionalize his world” (98: 243 & 247). School life, maintained Dewey, should not be divorced from the child’s home life but should grow out of it (98a: 231). The “school must represent present life—life as real and vital to the child as that which he carries on in the home, in the neighborhood, or on the playground,” opined Dewey, because “education which does not occur through forms of life…tends to cramp and deaden” (98a: 231).

Kathleen Weiler notes that “[f]eminist teachers are much more conscious of the power of various subject positions than is represented in” Freire (91: 462). Weiler is correct that feminist pedagogy has explored positionality, especially the positionalities and subjectivities of women, in much greater depth and detail than Freire ever attempted. However, positionality was a central concern in Freire’s work and his notion of conscientization. Freire posited that one cannot be in the world decontextualized, simply

observing life; he was adamant that whoever observes does so from a given point of view (98: 22 & 73). Freire spoke of people's "situationality," of their being "rooted in temporal-spatial conditions" (97: 88). Human beings are not only in the world but with the world, with other people (Freire, 85: 68). Human aspirations, motives, and objectives, opined Freire, are historical (97: 88). Further, reality itself is, in part, people's perception of it (Freire, 85: 51). As unfinished human beings we are not determined, explained Freire, however we are subject to "various (genetic, cultural, sexual, etc.) conditionings that provide us a center of reference" (98: 91). Freire felt critical, scientific knowledge could be generated through peoples experiences in and with the world; that lived experience should be the point of departure in order to transcend it and create this critical, scientific knowledge (93: 77 & 110).

Any educational or political programs must respect the world view of the people involved, Freire reasoned, or risk being a form of cultural invasion (97: 76). In the classroom this means teachers must start with where students are coming from, from the knowledge students bring to school, not merely to legitimate it—some of the knowledge students bring with them to the classroom will be knowledge Freire argued we needed to jettison after a critical examination--but to transcend it (93: 24 & 77).A teacher must understand where her students are coming from, their positionality, in order to apprehend how this impacts their learning (Freire, 96: 90). Students' lived experience and knowledge can be used as a first step towards a "more exact" form of knowledge (Freire, 93: 24).

The concept of positionality is directly related to Freire's concept of conscientization. Freire defined conscientization as "the building of awareness and

conscience" (04: 66). Conscientization, Freire was clear, differed from mere consciousness of the world because conscientization "represents the *development* of the awakening of critical awareness" (74: 15). Conscientization is not possible without consciousness, but not all forms of consciousness necessarily lead to conscientization (Freire, 98: 109). Freire was equally adamant that the "ruling class and oppressors" cannot use conscientization because these are the very groups that benefit from people's being ignorant of their oppression (85: 160). With conscientization, Freire felt, comes the possibility for action and transformation in the name of humanization; thus he viewed conscientization as "a requirement of our human condition" (98: 55). Freire felt conscientization was capable of cutting across positionalities and had the potential of uniting people, noting that

> When people are able to see and analyze their own way of being in the world of their immediate daily life…and when they can perceive the rationale for the factors on which their daily life is based, they are enabled to go far beyond the narrow horizons of their own village and of the geographical area in which it is located, to gain a global perspective on reality (78: 57).

Dewey's formulation of "conscientiousness" is similar to Freire's conscientization and feminism's positionality. Conscientiousness is reflective interest and the conscientious person is always on the lookout for something better. "The truly conscientious person not only uses a standard in judging, but is concerned to revise and improve his standard," explains Dewey, "He is on the *lookout* for good not already achieved" (98b: 334).

Conscientization is very similar to the concepts of voice and empowerment in feminist pedagogy. "In terms of feminist pedagogy," Kathleen Weiler explains, "the authority of the feminist teacher as intellectual and theorist finds expression in the goal of making students themselves theorists of their own lives by interrogating and analyzing

their own experience" (91: 462). Weiler goes on to note that "[i]n an approach very similar to Freire's concept of conscientization, this strategy moves beyond the naming or sharing of experience to the creation of a critical understanding of the forces that have shaped that experience" (Ibid). Voice, a shared, critical awareness of one's positionality, is fashioned in feminist and critical classrooms (Maher & Tetreault, 94: 18). A critical awareness, conscientization, of reality and one's place in it allow for the creation of one's voice, an empowering move with the potential for greater empowerment. "[I]f the classroom setting can help students to understand the workings of potential dynamics in their lives," Maher and Tetreault opine, "then they can begin to challenge them and to create change" (94: 203).

Positionality is not without its potential dangers. Susan David Bernstein counsels against "identity" and "experience" being allowed to form "uncontested categories that…perpetuate a mystification of 'women's experiences' by rendering their representations self-evident, continuous with and reflective of a 'self' and a 'real world'" (92: 121). Maher and Tetreault recognize that "positional consciousness most often emerges in people who are in marginal situations, as part of their resistance to attempts by dominant groups to treat them either as 'people like us' or to categorize them as the 'Other'" (94: 204). The danger to be avoided here is one of "epistemic privilege," namely that "the experience of living an oppressed identity confers upon the oppressed a special privilege, a standpoint, a unique epistemic relationship to reality that permits anyone who has experienced oppression to formulate liberatory knowledge about that oppression" (Macdonald, 02: 118). Amie Macdonald warns against one member of an oppressed social group claiming such privilege and assuming all other people similarly situated

share the same point of view, which can reinscribe racist, sexist, homophobic, and classist ideologies (02: 119).

Macdonald illustrates this danger with an example from her own feminist classroom. She had a student, Rafael, who appealed to his own personal experiences of being young and Hispanic and growing up in a drug infested inner city as proof of Kant's universal moral law, which Macdonald viewed as a "reactionary outcome" of her classroom's consciousness-raising practice. "Listening to Rafael chart out essential elements of Kantian philosophy in terms specific to his own life was exciting for me as a teacher," notes Macdonald, because "it confirmed that he was moving beyond the basic levels of interpretation and understanding, and engaging in application and critique" (02: 119). Yet Macdonald had "to introduce—at that moment of triumph in his analysis—the suggestion that Rafael's account may be only partial" (Ibid). Macdonald argues that this was important to do because she had to impress upon Rafael and her other students that, though "his individual experience *is* a crucial element in the production of knowledge…left uninterpreted and alone, it simply cannot generate comprehensive knowledge" because of the collective nature of the struggle for knowledge (02: 120). Individual mastery has the potential to become part of the social construction of knowledge (Maher & Tetreault, 94: 17).

Another potential danger with positionality is in getting stranded "where you are," or failing to realize the need for solidarity in political action with others who are not similarly situated to enact change across positionalities. William Breeze, who identifies as a feminist teacher, laments that "feminism and feminist pedagogy are still too often seen as the realm of women only, particular sites for *women* to work against male

dominance, rather than sites for a discourse that acknowledges the connection between feminist concerns and issues of race, class, and sexual orientation" (07: 60). American feminism in the 1980s, with its turn towards French postmodern thought, "generated a new set of pressures which have worked against metanarratives," including at times an over-arching concept of feminism (Nicholson & Fraser, 89: 33). Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz explains that identity politics, "articulated by women of color in response to feminism's early elision of racial and sexual difference in its concentration on the universal subordination of 'woman,' pushed feminism from a focus on wom*a*n to a recognition of differences between wom*e*n, and to a demand for a curriculum expanded to include many different 'women's voices'" (02: 177). Berenice Fisher describes identity politics as "a politics in which groups of oppressed people mobilize resistance around a shared identity" (01: 177).

Feminism and feminist pedagogy, Meredith Love and Brenda Helmbrecht counsel, "should be more than just an identity label. It must do. It must signify action" (07: 44). Many of the voices in feminist pedagogy counsel a form of action that works to combat not only gender bias but all forms of injustice. Sandall notes that "the ideas contained in feminist pedagogy have potential to improve education for women and thus *all students* in the direction of democratic reform in the classroom" (my emphasis; 91: 185).

In some circles the term "identity politics" has become synonymous with a form of essentialism. According to Banhabib (94), an appreciation of difference within and between variously positioned groups of women gave way to an identity politics that "loses its theoretical bite and becomes a mindless empiricist celebration of all

pluralities;" an identity politics that threatens to derail feminism by making it "almost impossible to develop a common vision of radical transformation." Henry Giroux notes that "the different subject positions and forms of subjugation…have the potential to isolate and alienate instead of opening up the possibility for criticism and struggle" (06: 53). Jennifer Robertson warns that "wearing these categories as if self-evident does not reveal but can instead actually obscure one's unique personal history, even as these categories impart an illusion of self-conscious identity formation" (02: 788). Benhabib (94) argues further that, because identity politics in America takes place in a redistributionist welfare state, divergent groups often find themselves competing against one another for scarce resources instead of working together to overcome gender oppression.

An ethic of care recognizes that we are all involved in caring relations throughout our lives but that these relations will look different from person to person and culture to culture. Though we are uniquely situated, Virginia Held explains that "if we see the person as an embodied nexus of relations, the relations constituting one [person] are different from those constituting another, and even a small child can be aware that he is different from others. But when the other child is in distress, the relation between them may be upset, and he may wish it would be better" (06: 48). In other words, the importance of relationships in our lives and the importance of the people we are in relationship with, has the potential to overcome narrow self-interest.

Identities and positionalities are fluid; as Berenice Fisher writes, "A white lesbian like myself benefits from white skin privilege. A heterosexual Chicana benefits from heterosexual privilege" (01: 178). Further, where a heterosexual Chicana may weather a

special form of oppression based on her ethnicity and a white lesbian based on her sexuality, both share the experience of an over-arching oppression, not to mention that both experience the oppression of gender in a patriarchal society. A white lesbian may not experience racism as a heterosexual Chicana does, just as the Chicana may not experience homophobia the way the lesbian does; however, both are capable of empathizing with the other and understanding the yoke of oppression each struggles under. To pretend otherwise privileges essentialism and indirectly reinforces the various oppressions. "To the statement that 'we can't have the experience,'" explains Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz, "I can reply that I can't fully know Euripedes' life conditions either, and that does not stop me from teaching Greek tragedy" (92: 186). Carolyn Shrewsbury speaks of "empowering classrooms" as "places to practice visions of a feminist world, confronting differences to enrich all of us rather than to belittle some of us" (96: 11). Feminist pedagogy can reflect and promote an ethic of care by adopting "an approach to curriculum which exposes the actual daily social relations between individuals and groups of individuals" (Gallagher, 00: 73).

We must avoid a form of identity politics that creates "endless add-on categories and subgroups, all of which multiply the ways that people are irreducibly separate from each other" (Maher & Tetreault, 94: 223). The point is "you have to go from the 'center out' by first knowing the place where you are" but not getting stuck where you are at (Ibid: 202). Henry Giroux (06) champions a "border pedagogy" that cuts across positionalities and subjectivities, revealing the commonalities in difference. This is an important concept because "[i]n *all* classrooms, positionalities are at work. Teachers and students may assume, aspire to, and/or directly challenge and undermine the social

structures they inhabit, but they cannot completely step outside them" (Maher & Tetreault, 94: 203). Dewey makes a similar point in the context of the nationalism of education when he writes that "Our unity cannot be a homogenous thing" but "must be a unity created by drawing out and composing into a harmonious whole the best, the most characteristic which each contributing race and people has to offer" (98: 266). Giroux argues that "the different stories that students from all groups bring to class need to be interrogated for their absences as well as their contradictions, but they also need to be understood as more than a myriad of different stories. They have to be recognized as being forged in *relations of opposition* to the *dominant structures* of power" (06: 62). Giroux, Dewey, Maher and Tetreault are speaking for a plurality of voices coalescing together in a unity.

4.10 *The revolutionary potential of critical pedagogies and an ethic of care*

Subjectivity, Kathleen Weiler posits, can help politicize people (91: 458). "The personal discrimination I experienced" as an Hispanic woman, explains Maria Eva Valle, "led me to a new level of consciousness, infusing my political beliefs, cultural experiences, and theoretical perspectives with a yearning for a new way of life based upon equality" (02: 157). Yet oppression does not ensure conscientization; positionality is no guarantee of concerted action to effect change. Amie Macdonald notes that "people who are oppressed may in fact be mystified about the causes and effects of that oppression" (02: 124). Critical pedagogies rooted in an ethic of care can help students and teachers understand oppression through the empowering process of critical consciousness.

Kelly Oliver argues that our subjectivity, our awareness of our positionality, implies moral action to enhance our subjectivity and that of others. "Insofar as we *are* by virtue of our environment and by virtue of relationships with other people," explains Oliver, "we have ethical obligations rooted in the very possibility of subjectivity itself" (02: 330). Eva Valle holds that conscientization "requires us to engage structures of power and domination and to question our complicity in oppression" (02: 159). Schools reflect and reinforce these structures of power and domination, but power and domination need to be confronted society-wide.

The potential of feminist pedagogy and other critical pedagogies rooted in an ethic of care that recognizes and celebrates the primacy and importance of human relationships is immense. Speaking of the revolutionary potential of feminist pedagogy, Becky Ropers-Huilman writes

> The combining of feminism and education has the potential to be subversive—encouraging not just 'exposure' to concepts, but participation in experiences that could change participants' perspectives. This combination can encourage awareness that a dominant culture exists while pushing for an understanding of the subcultures that resist and support it. Feminist education has the potential to foster a hope that it is possible to create new cultures and new futures (96: 19).

The creation of these new cultures and new futures cannot be relegated to political and ethical action in schools alone. Freire, Dewey, and care ethics theorists agree on this point. Because society shapes education according to the interests of those with power, opined Freire, education cannot transform society by itself (87: 35 & 37). Critical study in the classroom can not make social transformation alone (Freire, 87: 175). Where nature once produced insecurity for the many, Dewey argued that institutions, including schools, now produce this insecurity (98a: 324). The school system as it stands

"represents not thinking but the domination of thought by the inertia of immemorial customs" (Dewey, 98a: 270). Therefore change must occur simultaneously at the level of the individual and her character structure and the institutions of society, including but not limited to its schools. As Dewey put it, "liberalism must now become radical, meaning by 'radical' perception of the necessity of thoroughgoing changes in the setup of institutions and corresponding activity to bring the changes to pass" (98a: 325).

Nell Noddings (84; 06) has argued that care is a value that can and should be taught in schools. Yet "simply positing a moral idea of caring will not suffice to make the world more caring," cautions Tronto, "we need as well to be able to translate that moral ideal into practice," which means that "morality and politics must be interwoven to effect change" (93: 152). Dewey argues likewise, that "[t]he idea that dispositions and attitudes can be altered by merely 'moral' means conceived of as something that goes on wholly inside of persons is itself one of the old patterns that has to be changed"; in fact, "[t]he educational task cannot be accomplished merely by working upon men's minds, without action that effects change in institutions" (98a: 325).

Critical pedagogy and care have a necessary place in schools, but they need to be nourished by concerted political action in the greater society. Freire was clear that education could not be "the lever" for transformation of society, though it does play a potentially significant part in the process; he viewed the democratization of schools as part of the democratization of society (93: 25; 92: 97). A critical education should stimulate criticism and action "that goes beyond the walls of the school" (Freire, 87: 35). Freire conceived of the transformation of the world as an educational task in itself (93: 123). The boundary between the moral and political realms needs to be dismantled

(Tronto, 94). “[W]e need to conceive of the ethics of care as a form of political ethics,” maintains Sevenhuijsen, because care takes place within political contexts (98: 147). An ethic of care must be given teeth in the political sphere.

“The greatest educational power, the greatest force in shaping the dispositions and attitudes of individuals,” opined Dewey, “is the social medium in which they live” (98: 335). Margaret Urban Walker argues that “moral understandings are typically effected through social ones,” hence society must respect care (98: 17). Eva Kittay argues for social institutions that foster an attitude of caring and a respect for care (99: 109). Dewey, Freire, feminist pedagogy, and care ethics theorists agree that the social medium in which humans associate must be a democratic one. This democratic milieu must extend beyond politics to all forms of life, including the economy. Tronto is clear that “care is not simply a new cast for old models of socialism, though it is probably ultimately anti-capitalistic because it posits meeting needs for care, rather than the pursuit of profit, as the highest social goal” (93: 175). As Held (06) argues, the ethics of care and the ethics of the marketplace are irreconcilable. Freire would concur, noting that “democracy cannot be founded in the ethics of the market” (04: 25). “[T]here is something to be said for the assertion that the so-called democratic states of the world have achieved only ‘bourgeois’ democracy,” John Dewey noted, “one in which power rests finally in the hands of finance capitalism, no matter what claims are made for government of, by and for all the people” (98: 337). The task, recognized by Dewey, Freire, feminist pedagogy and care ethics theorists, is to fight to “create structural conditions that make a more democratic society possible” (Freire, 96: 160).

None of these thinkers seeks to micromanage a future; their suggestions are just that, and with them comes the recognition that the future social institutions where an ethic of care and critical pedagogies are to be lived will be responsive to the needs of the time and its people. That said, all favor a democratization of the economy. Some form of socialized economy will be necessary to ensure that care labor is not marginalized and that care workers are not exploited (Bubeck, 98). Dewey argued "that socialized economy is the means of free individual development as the end" (98: 335). Freire argued that "the point is to perfect democracy with socialism as its core" (96: 137). Dewey described a philosophy dedicated to democracy as construing

> Liberty as meaning a universe in which there is real certainty and contingency, a world which is not all in, and never will be, a world which in some respect is incomplete and in the making, and which in these respects may be made this way or that according as men [sic] judge, prize, love and labor. To such a philosophy any notion of a perfect or complete reality, finished, existing always the same without regard to the vicissitudes of time, will be abhorrent. It will thin of time…as a genuine field of novelty, of real and unpredictable increments to existence, a field for experimentation and invention (98: 76).

Democracy will set limits to people's capacity for ill will (Freire, 04: 24). The democratic state will attempt to achieve this, in part, by assuming the role of regulator of social relations, responsible for fostering social solidarity (Ibid). Society, posits Bubeck, must work to instill an "equal and equally strong caring orientation among men and women" or the exploitation of women as carers will continue (95: 178).

A strong, centralized state will play an important necessary initial role as our institutions and character structures transition to embody and reflect an ethic of care. Paul Kershaw (05) promotes the concept of "carefair" which is reliant on the democratic state. After detailing the patriarchal division of care in society, Kershaw explains that "[t]he

care*fair* idea implores governments to….redesign public policy in order to change the system of societal incentives in which men make decisions about how much time to allocate between employment and caregiving" (06: 129). Kershaw offers explicit carefair reforms applicable to the contemporary Canadian society in which he writes. For example, he advocates paid worktime reductions over the course of one's life such as having every month of one's maternity and paternity leave deducted from the total amount of employment time one must accrue before becoming eligible for a full pension (05: 139-140).

Dewey championed a democratic faith in individuals and their unfinished nature, a faith seen across critical pedagogies and an ethic of care. "Our faith is ultimately in individuals and their potentialities," he explained, clarifying that he meant an "individuality that operates in and through voluntary associations. If our outward scene is one of externally imposed organization, behind and beneath there is working the force of liberated individualities, experimenting in their own ways to find and realize their own ends" (Dewey, 98a: 322). Ends will not be dictated but discovered by individuals working together towards their attainment. Dewey refused to wager what a new individualism would look like, noting that "Indeed, I do not see how it can be described until more progress has been made in its production" (84: 49). Yet Dewey had hope that democracy would "in time justify itself by generating its own child of wisdom, to be justified in turn by its own children, better institutions of life" (98a: 78). He viewed "the task of democracy [as] forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute" (98a: 343).

An ethic of care needs to be recognized as a political value in order for it to assume wider and deeper meaning in our world. Critical pedagogies that challenge oppression simultaneously champion an ethic of care, effectively breaching the moral boundary between politics and ethics. The historically situated critical pedagogies of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and feminist pedagogy are grounded in an ethic of care that views humans as necessarily interconnected, related, and socially embedded throughout their lives. Recognition of this connection helps to illuminate the radical nature of the challenge each pedagogy poses to the established order; it also helps us comprehend the implications of the normative and prescriptive visions each champions. The task ahead of us requires the praxis of theory and action; the starting point is our here and now, our positionalities. The imperative is to act in relationships of camaraderie and solidarity to further these values and the individuality of the relational selves involved. “In morals, the infinitive and the imperative develop from the participle, present tense,” counseled John Dewey. “Perfection means perfecting, fulfillment, fulfilling, and the good is now or never” (98b: 326).

Chapter 5: Realizing care through critical pedagogies

In this final chapter I offer some conclusions and recommendations as to how we may better foster an ethic of care through critical pedagogies in our schools. I make these recommendations fully cognizant that critical pedagogies and an ethic of care are largely context-specific and actual conditions will help shape the relationships, goals, visions of the people involved and the implementation of their critical pedagogies. That said, I will offer some suggestions based on my limited experience in schools as a student and teacher. These examples will proceed from the abstract to the concrete; for example, I will suggest an alternative view of learning as legitimate peripheral participation and then posit what the forms caring apprenticeships in schools, based on this view of learning, could assume. My recommendations will start from the top (the federal government) and proceed down to the local district and individual school and classroom level. However, a certain level of interdependency between all levels is assumed. For instance, when I advocate abolishing local boards of education and instituting councils of school staff, students, and community members, I assume equitable federal funding which will eradicate individual district's dependence on local tax levies. Similarly, when I argue in favor of testing and grading reforms I do so in the context of flexible national standards dedicated to promoting caring relationships.

5.1 *The possibilities and limits of government as care provider*

As I began to conceive and write this dissertation, Barak Obama ran for and was elected the forty-third president of the United States. The optimism surrounding the Obama campaign and, in these early days, the Obama administration, has been something

to see, and something, I must admit, I have been caught up in to some extent. Perhaps it was the eight years of the Bush Administration, eight years marked by war and economic collapse at staggering costs in dollars, in lives, in worldwide-prestige, eight years of disillusionment and fear. Barack Obama appeared as a beacon of hope to many, a symbol that cut across ideologies and political opinion. Obama the man and Obama the administration have brought optimism to many, an optimism that government can care, that government can be and will be made to work for the people in these dark times. Whether the Obama Administration lives up to perceptions and hopes remains to be seen; for the sake of this dissertation, his presidency is worthy of consideration in the light of the institutional role government can play in caring for its people.

George W. Bush may be remembered as the most unpopular president in American history (Steinhauser, 08). The man and his administration angered many people while in office; the enemies Bush made were at home and abroad and included men and women in his own party (Edler, 07). Republican presidential candidates in the 2008 election took pains to distance themselves from Bush and his policies (Cooper, 08). The election that resulted in his initial victory over Al Gore was criticized, as was the Supreme Court decision to halt the recount in Florida (Elder, 00; Filkins & Canedy, 00). Under the Bush Administration, America went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq but Osama bin Laden was never apprehended and purported weapons of mass destruction never unearthed; America earned the scorn and opprobrium of much of the world (Friedman, 05); the number of people without health insurance reached nearly fifty million (Sack, 08); those without dental insurance reached one hundred million (Berenson, 07); and the

wealth disparity between the richest and everyone else became greater, with the wealthiest enjoying a new "gilded age" (Krugman, 09; Uchitelle, 07).

George W. Bush came to power speaking of "compassionate conservatism" but by the time he left office his administration was viewed as not caring for the American people (Mitchell, 00). For example, when Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, the Bush Administration was faulted for the speed and extent of its response (Medina, 06). "George Bush doesn't care about black people," rap star Kanye West told the audience at the MTV Music Awards (Kilgannon, 05). The Bush Administration endorsed the use of "harsh interrogation techniques" (torture) for "enemy combatants" (Mazzetti & Shane, 09). President Bush favored forcing welfare recipients to work forty-hour weeks or have their benefits cut off, seemingly ignoring the fact that many had child-care issues that would need to be addressed (Toner & Pear, 02). When asked "Does Bush care about people like you?", over half of the respondents to a February 2006 CBS News poll answered "not much"; 30% answered "some" and 17% "a lot" (CBS News, 06).

The Bush Administration was blamed for problems of its own creation and problems inherited--and exacerbated--from previous administrations. For example, deregulation of industry in general and the banking and mortgage industries in particular, which increased under Bush, had its roots in the Clinton and Reagan administrations (Leonhardt, 08; Berke, 88). When George Bush left office the American economy was in danger of complete collapse (Goodman, 08); American workers were being laid off and were unable to pay their mortgages (Nixon, 06); car manufacturers were in danger of going under (Herszenhorn, 08); banks and other financial institutions were failing, seemingly left and right, and threatening to take the rest of the economy down with them

(Norris, 08); it is estimated that the war in Iraq alone will cost two trillion dollars when all is said and done (Leonhardt, 07).

Perhaps the stigma associated with the Bush Administration explained the optimism surrounding the ascendancy of Barack Obama to the Oval Office. Whether it was candidate Obama's promise to scale back in Iraq and "finish the job" in Afghanistan (Obama, 08), his willingness to engage America's enemies, from Iran to Cuba, in civilized discourse (Gordon & Zeleny, 07), or his support of greater government intervention in the economy to save jobs (Baker & Broder, 08), Barak Obama struck a chord with the American people, a chord exemplified in the poll data. 61% of respondents to a January 2009 poll felt that America would now be better off under Obama, compared to 39% who felt America was better off in April 2008 under Bush (Nagourney & Connelly, 09). 79% of respondents were generally optimistic about the next four years as the Obama Administration took office, compared to 64% of respondents at the start of George W. Bush's first term and 70% at Bill Clinton's first term (New York Times/CBS News Poll, 09). 73% of Americans feel Barack Obama can fix the nation's economy within four years; 76% that he will end the war in Iraq within four; and 55% that he can provide affordable health care to all Americans before the end of his first term (IBID).

Obama came into office "riding a powerful wave of optimism" with "Americans confident he can turn the economy around" (Nagourney & Connelly, 09). As of this writing, the wave has not crested. Obama has been compared favorably to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln (Bai, 09; Seelye, 09). Eleven weeks after his inauguration, polls find that the outlook on the economy is brightening, with 63% of

respondents saying Obama is more likely to make the right decisions on the nation's economy (Nagourney & Thee-Brenan, 09). In mid-January, 2009, before the inauguration, 15% of respondents felt the country was going in the right direction; in April 2009, 39% of respondents feel so (Ibid). Two-thirds of respondents approve of Obama's overall performance (Ibid). Above all, Americans feel patient with Barack Obama that he will make the right decisions and lead the country back to prosperity (Ibid).

Perhaps the fact that Barack Obama is a black man in a country that once enslaved black men and women accounts for some of the exuberance surrounding his person. Candidate Obama greatly avoided the issue of his own race on the campaign trail (Thompson, 08). At his inauguration he spoke of "the meaning of our [American] liberty and our creed…", that "a man whose father less than sixty years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath" (*New York Times*, 09). On a certain level, Obama is testament to the American dream that an individual can achieve anything.

Whether time proves the faith and trust invested in the person and administration of Barack Obama deserved or not, this optimism speaks to an underlying belief that government *can* and *should* play a role in providing for its people, in *caring* for its people. Caring behaviors and an ethic of care have historically been exhibited by individuals; the mother-child relationship, for example, has often been used as an example of a caring relationship (Ruddick, 89; Noddings, 84). However, only organized social action can give an ethic of care teeth on a larger scale; without this organized social action caring individuals will be taken advantage of, either actively or by free-

riders who benefit from their own "privileged irresponsibility" of not having to care while others do (Bubeck, 95; Tronto, 93). Without social sanction, through, for example, government policies and programs that support programs that champion caring relationships, an ethic of care does not receive its recognition and just due, even as care and caring relationships continue to manifest themselves.

That governments *can* care for their people is evidenced by the welfare states of the modern period. Whether these states introduced social reforms because they were genuinely concerned about the well-being of their people or felt pressure from the political left is debatable. For instance, against a backdrop of popular agitation and a public intellectual life suffused by the influential works of Marx and Engels, Otto von Bismarck's *Staatssozialismus* program promoted health insurance, an early form of workers' compensation, disability insurance, and an old age pension system, all aimed at undermining the socialist challenge to Prussian government with the effect of benefitting the Prussian people on a scale unlike any previous programs (Richter, 65).

Americans need not look to Europe for examples of the welfare state caring for its people. The New Deal in the United States attempted to address the needs of the people and established a social safety net unlike any other in the nation's history. This safety net included the establishment of the Public Works Administration (PWA), the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), all of which provided jobs for the jobless building publicly-useful things like hospitals, schools, and bridges (the FERA also provided monies for direct relief of the hungry); the National Recovery Administration (NRA), which set minimum wages and maximum working hours provisions; the

establishment of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) to help homeowners avoid foreclosure; the Social Security Act (SSA), which set up an insurance system for the elderly, unemployed, and disabled, with benefits to surviving spouses and children added later (Chafe, 03). These agencies and programs and the projects they created and sustained helped people: they provided steady paychecks; a sense of purpose with meaningful jobs that would benefit individuals and those around them; cash payments to the needy unable to work; and a sense of security (Taylor, 09).

There are varying interpretations of the New Deal and assessments of its effectiveness. In the decades following the New Deal historians were overall positive regarding its legacy (Sitkoff, 85: 7). In the 1960s the American left took the New Deal to task. For much of the radical left, the New Deal was Roosevelt's way of saving capitalism (Zinn, 05). These critics often maintain that the New Deal did not go far enough in the provision of social services or the reformation/restructuring of the American economic system (Similarly, I would argue that the New Deal, while it made many people's lives better, did not institute an ethic of care but showed the potential for government to be used as a tool to do so). Organized groups, be they workers or women, were in a better position to make their voices heard and represented through New Deal legislation than other groups not similarly organized. For example, some New Deal agencies discriminated against black people (Skocpol, 95).

In the 1970s the right began a sustained criticism of the New Deal that continues to gain momentum to this day (Sitkoff, 85). For many voices on this side of the political spectrum, the New Deal represented a massive buildup of government and government intervention in people's lives, which, for the ideological right, are negatives in and of

themselves (Shlaes, 07). Even American vice president Hubert Humphrey likened the New Deal to a "philosopher king," albeit "a constitutionally limited and democratically controlled 'king,' who in his accumulated wisdom directs the course to the good life" (70: 48). Roosevelt and the New Deal have been blamed for impeding the machinations of a self-correcting market best left to its own devices[21] (Vedder in Cohen, 09). The New Deal was viewed as an attack on laissez-faire individualism and the Darwinian struggle for survival (Ekirch, 69: 107). The New Deal has been considered by some the origin of the centralized state in America (Leuchtenburg, 63: 211). Even voices that identify themselves as opposed to the right have questioned the efficacy of the New Deal and its policies (Krugman, 08).

Roosevelt himself "personified the state as protector" (Leuchtenburg, 63: 331). "[Y]ou have put a new face upon the social and political life of our country," former Supreme Court Justice John Clarke wrote FDR (in Leuchtenberg, 63: 326). Roosevelt's fireside chats were well received and reassured people that this was a down-to-earth man who actually cared about them (Lawson in Sitkoff, 85). W.E. Leuchtenburg notes that "[i]t became commonplace to say that people felt toward the President the kind of trust they would normally express for a warm and understanding father who comforted them in their grief or safeguarded them from harm" (63: 331). To many of the American people, Roosevelt seemed to care. "Money used to give these children a mother's love and a mother's rearing," he said of orphaned children receiving government funds, "can never be wasted" (quoted in Bremmer, in Sitkoff, 85: 90). FDR and the New Deal were

[21] Similarly, the current economic crisis has apparently not shaken faith in the market system among its devotees—or if it has, they are not admitting it. For example, American economics departments continue to teach that the market automatically adjusts to account for people's rational economic decisions (Cohen, 09).

very popular among the people of the United States if not business leaders, newspapers, and politicians (Hurd, 65). As I have argued throughout this thesis, as reassuring as a benevolent political leader may be, one danger an ethic of care seeks to avoid is that of paternalism (Tronto, 93; Hankivsky, 04; White, 04). People must be educated to make decisions together, decisions that will benefit their lives and be implemented by themselves and the institutions they create and sustain. The importance here of the New Deal and FDR's persona is that both illustrate the idea that governments can be designed and run to care for their people and that people can be and have been receptive to this thought.

The attitudes of the American people towards the role of government as care agent vary. For example, Americans feel strongly about *welfare*. The term itself in American political life conjures up images of social welfare, of assistance to individual persons and families, and often with a pejorative connotation. The phenomenon labeled "corporate welfare" is usually not what Americans think of when they think of welfare (Zepezauer, 04). Martin Gilens (00) has shown that Americans favor state assistance to the "deserving poor," those who are not lazy and are seeking work. Meanwhile, public welfare, Piven and Cloward (93) have shown, has been used to regulate the poor and working class. As discussed in chapter three, Americans are warned about an oppressive "nanny state." John F. Kennedy was lauded for his inaugural request that Americans "ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country"; in fact, if we take seriously the idea that governments are formed *by* the people, *for* the people, we should be comfortable asking how our governments can make our lives better, safer, and more secure.

Without government support there are no guarantees that caring institutions or programs will perpetuate themselves. In fact, governments can be and have been used to roll-back the gains of the welfare state. For example, two of America's most popular presidents worked to curtail the gains established by the New Deal. Ronald Reagan implemented large cuts in social spending that affected education and training, community development, welfare, nutrition, housing assistance, and other antipoverty programs; he sought but did not attain significant cuts in social security and Medicare (Tolchin, 88; Piven & Cloward, 85).Vowing to "end welfare as we know it," Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996, mandating work requirements for social welfare recipients and a five-year lifetime limit on welfare help to needy families (Clines, 96); in the ten years since, the number of welfare recipients has declined but the poverty rate has increased (Berkowitz, 07). Further, Clinton supported the "Don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding homosexuals serving in the military, a policy which resulted in increased harassment and discharges of gay men and women in and from the American armed forces (*New York Times*, 98); he supported free trade economic policies like NAFTA which have harmed workers in America and worldwide (Sterngold, 95; Malkin, 09); and he failed to establish an American national health care system.

As of this writing, President Obama is wavering on previously stated stands on everything from aggressively pursuing national health care for all Americans to investigating the Bush Administration and its culpability in the use of torture in the War on Terror[22] (Pear, 09; Herszenhorn & Hulse, 09). He is peppering his speech with appeals

[22] Interestingly enough, given that *responsibility* "is Obama's favorite word" (Cohen, 09).

to “personal responsibility” and accountability, terms associated more often the political right than a self-avowed “progressive” Democrat (Powell, 09). Comparisons to FDR and hopes for a new New Deal aside, there are voices that recognize and argue that Barack Obama will have to be “pushed” towards being responsive to the people and our concerns, much as FDR was (Piven, 08). There are no guarantees that governments--even nominally democratic ones--when left to their own devices will be responsive to their people, will care for their people, unless organized social action pushes them to do such.

The reforms I contemplate in this chapter are institutional and systemic in nature, based on the belief that institutions condition individuals, on the idea that it is easier to foster caring attitudes and an ethic of care in individuals when these individuals inhabit institutions that promote care and develop caring relationships. The “start up” problem for realizing and promoting an ethic of care in the larger society is that of promoting it on the individual level at the same time that it is promoted at the institutional level. The individual will inform the institutions she inhabits and institutions will inform the individuals that live within them; neither occurs or could occur in a vacuum.

5.2 *Basic principles towards a realization of care in schools*

This dissertation has argued for the importance of critical pedagogies and an ethic of care in schools but has shown that these are largely absent from our schools today. In this final chapter I would like to consider some ways we can foster critical pedagogies and an ethic of care within our classrooms. Two important caveats are in order. For one, there is the way schools *may* look in the distant future versus the way schools can *begin* to look *now* to help achieve that future. In this chapter I will focus on changes that can

begin to be implemented in the short-term, changes that will help lay the path for desirable future growth. Secondly, for critical pedagogies and an ethic of care to influence our classrooms their influence must be felt outside of the classroom itself. Though I will discuss some concrete reforms that pertain to the classroom, I will also be advocating for changes outside the classroom in the wider school building, community- and society- wide, changes that will pave the way for critical pedagogies and an ethic of care within classrooms. I hope to show how these proposed reforms may foster more democratic, participatory, and egalitarian relationships in schools and society, relationships paramount to critical pedagogies and an ethic of care.

As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, an ethic of care cannot draw a line against principles *in toto*. Likewise, critical pedagogies are committed to social justice and one measure of social justice will be that rules and regulations apply to all and do not advantage some at the expense of others. Within this context, Amy Gutmann offers two principles or "limits" of democratic education—nonrepression and nondiscrimination--that serve as starting points from which we may begin to conceive principles amenable to an ethic of care and critical pedagogies in our classrooms A democratic education, Gutmann argues, must preserve freedom of thought and "aid children in developing the capacity to understand and to evaluate competing conceptions of the good life and the good society" (87: 44). For example, if the Miami-Dade School District were democratic and embraced a principle or limit of nonrepression, it would not have banned a series of children's books from its libraries after one parent complained that a single book in the series cast Cuba in a favorable light (Aguayo, 06). Gutmann favors a democratic education that not only avoids discrimination but also teaches values that reduce

discrimination in the rest of society (87: 45). For example, if British secondary schools were democratic and practiced a principle of limit of nondiscrimination, they would not ban the wearing of Muslim gowns or boycott Israeli academics who do not specifically renounce Israeli-government policies towards Palestinians (Cowell, 06; Lyall, 06).

Gutmann offers the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination as "principled limits on political and parental authority over education, limits that in practice require parents and states to cede some educational authority to professional educators" (87: 44). Gutmann's limits can also serve as measures against which educators can compare their praxis'. The strengths of Gutmann's principles, if we keep them in mind, is that they serve to check and limit possible transgressions while allowing for constant evaluation. Their somewhat abstract nature is a source of their strength, as their implementation will be context-dependent, responsive to the schools in which they are applied. Teachers in classrooms can ask themselves and their students if classroom or school-wide practices violate these limits of nonrepression and nondiscrimination.

Olena Hankivsky offers three caring principles to guide social policy which I think can be applied to education. Hankivsky's principles are contextual sensitivity, responsiveness, and consequences of choice. What might each of these look like at work in schools? Hankivsky describes the principle of contextual sensitivity as one which, recognizing "the limitations of utilizing the standard of homogeneity", is attentive to the "complexity and relational qualities of individual lives"; a caring principle of context sensitivity takes "into account particular differences" and discerns which "differences are relevant" (04: 32 & 33). One implication of this principle in schools is that curriculums must be flexible enough to reflect issues of interest to the lives of the students in

particular schools. Curriculums are all too often decontextualized and presented as things everyone should know; critical pedagogies challenge us to ask why these things are worth knowing and from whose perspective they are considered worth knowing. Though, as an ethic of care recognizes, "all humans are specific, concrete individuals rather than abstract, generic beings" (Hankivsky, 04: 32), our uniqueness does not render us incapable of sharing common interests and working together. Hankivsky notes that "[c]ontextual sensitivity allows us to ask political questions about whose needs are taken care of, under what circumstances, and by whom" (04: 34). In this context curriculum development must be seen as a political and moral act (Apple, 79); Curriculums must root out and play a part in defining common interests and then present them to students in ways that show them as being part of the students' organic existence.

The caring principle of responsiveness, explains Hankivsky, "constitutes a unique way of listening to and observing those who are different from us" (04: 35). It is a form of engagement that requires "a commitment to provide the opportunity and a safe space for others to express their 'otherness'" (Hankivsky, 04: 35). One concrete implication of a caring principle of responsiveness applied to the classroom is that teacher-student ratios must be significantly lower than they are. How well can a teacher get to know individual students, where kids are coming from and their needs and dreams, in a class of twenty-five, thirty, or more? While teachers should encourage students to develop their own voices about who they are, where they are coming from, and what part the institutional context of schooling plays in their lives, there are limits that a caring teacher wielding democratic authority must recognize and respect. For example, a student raised in a racist home may come to school with thinly veiled or openly racist contempt for other members

of his class and school community. Expression of this contempt has no place in a caring, democratic classroom as, in part, it violates Gutmann's nondiscrimination limit. A caring principle of responsiveness allows teachers and students to discern "that individuals' accounts of their experiences are socially constructed" (Hankivsky, 04: 35). The social construction of reality can be critically examined and deconstructed to see who it benefits, who it hurts, and how it does this.

An ethic of care carries with it "a responsibility to make connections regarding how those around us are affected by our actions" (Hankivsky, 04: 38). A caring principle that took seriously the consequences of choice entails "considering how decisions affect *real* people and their lived experiences" (Hankivsky, 04: 38). Teachers, administrators, and those responsible for education policy who took a caring principle of the consequences of choice seriously would consider their actions before proceeding with them and then consider the outcomes following their discharge. For example, what kind of schools will we have if local tax bases continue to provide the resources schools depend to operate on versus the implementation of uniform federal funding for all schools? What are the consequences when a teacher reprimands students for using "the f-word" or "the n-word" but ignores homophobic and misogynistic epithets? Within a democratic context, Hankivsky notes that "[o]perationalizing the consequences of the principle of choice would entail a commitment to eradicating inequality and, in turn, to improving [people's] social well-being and quality of life" (04: 39). A commitment to a caring principle of the consequences of choice means acting to realize social justice.

5.3 *Towards a caring pedagogy*

In the contemporary positivist framework, knowledge is assumed to be context-free; learning is viewed as information transfers from one individual (the teacher) to another (the student); the internalization of learning in the individual is assumed. An alternative analytical viewpoint of learning is to conceive of learning as a form of "legitimate peripheral participation" (Lave & Wenger, 08). In a legitimate peripheral participation framework, the learner actually engages in the process, thereby acquiring necessary performance skills, and not gaining a discrete body of truths that can be reapplied later in other contexts (Hanks in Lave & Wenger, 08: 14). Learning conceived as legitimate peripheral participation is responsive to context. William Hanks notes that learning "is a process that takes place in a participation framework", hence "it is mediated by the differences of perspective among the coparticipants" (in Lave & Wenger, 08: 15). Further, according to Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, understanding and experience are "mutually constitutive", because participation "is always based on situated negotiation and renegotiation of meaning in the world" (08: 51). The concept of legitimate peripheral participation draws attention "to the point that learners inevitably participate in communities of practitioners[23] and that the mastery of knowledge and skill requires newcomers to move toward full participation in the sociocultural practices of a community" (Lave & Wenger, 08: 29).

[23] Communities of practice "are groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis" (Wenger, et. al., 02: 4).

Lave and Wenger purposefully avoid attempting to apply the concept of legitimate peripheral participation to schools[24] (08: 39). However, perhaps a consideration of Vygotsky's concept of the Zone of Proximal Development can help us understand what legitimate peripheral participation may look like in schools. Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky viewed all learning as socially mediated, meaning that "*human learning presupposes a specific social nature and a process by which children grow into the intellectual life of those around* them" (78: 88). What we learn, whether a child at school learning her A-B-Cs or an adult at home consulting a manual to program his VCR, reflects knowledge mediated by others: in the case of the child, through the teacher and those who crafted the learning strategies her teachers are implementing; in the example of the adult through the writer of the manual and those who created the technology that allows him to record his television shows. Vygotsky recognized that "[t]he path from object to child and from child to object passes through another person," denoting "a developmental process deeply rooted in the links between individual and social history" (78: 30). This is a dialectical process in that the person ostensibly teaching is actively learning: the reading teacher comes to understand the ways the student grasps the alphabet; the writer of the how-to manual learns from the experience of writing and revising her book and from user feedback. Mastery can be conceived as residing in the community of practice and not in the individual teacher, student, manual-author or VCR-user (Lave &Wenger, 08: 94).

[24] They do so because they are attempting to develop a view of learning capable of standing on its own amidst a context where learning and schooling are often taken as synonymous. "[T]he organization of schooling as an educational form is predicated on claims that knowledge can be decontextualized," Lave and Wenger explain, "and yet schools themselves as social institutions and as places of learning constitute very specific contexts" (08: 40). In their initial discussions on the subject of legitimate peripheral participation and learning, Lave and Wenger found themselves "often contrastive, even oppositional" to contemporary forms of schooling and did not want to get bogged down in critique, promising to do so in future works (Ibid).

Vygotsky viewed all development as owing to social stimuli with social stimuli exerted through the zone of proximal development. He defined the zone of proximal development as "the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers" (78: 86). The ZPD measures "mental development prospectively", defining "those functions that have not yet matured but are in the process of maturation, functions that will mature tomorrow" (78: 86-87).

One of Vygotsky's clearest examples of the ZPD in action and its implications for human development is that of language acquisition in children. Vygotsky argued that social speech gives way to egocentric speech which gives way to inner speech (78: 27). Infants hear adults talking around them and start to imitate what they hear. Some of this imitation is meant to communicate wants, needs, and states, but children also talk aloud to themselves, about themselves, about what they are doing, about how others relate to them, what is called egocentric speech. Vygotsky held that egocentric speech becomes internalized, marking the beginnings of inner speech, and an immediate consequence is that a child's problem-solving ability is improved. Speech and practical activity merge (78: 25). Early speech accompanies a child's actions and then precedes it. Children move from talking about what they are doing (for example, playing with a toy, or identifying a house after they have drawn it) to planning what they will do (for example, sitting down with paper and crayon to draw a house) beforehand (78: 28).

For Vygotsky, learning precedes development because learning creates zones of proximal development (78: 90). The infant who hears adults speaking and imitates them

may not understand the words adults are using or pronounce them as the adults do but through imitation will come to do so. As this example of language acquisition and use illustrates, learning is not development but "properly organized learning results in mental development and sets in motion a variety of developmental processes that would be impossible apart from learning" (Vygotsky, 78: 90). Hence, for Vygotsky, learning precedes development.

How does learning conceived as legitimate peripheral participation mesh with critical pedagogies and an ethic of care? Where critical pedagogies favor knowledge construction through active participation of teachers and students, the legitimate peripheral participation framework of learning views knowledge as "an accumulation of experience—a kind of 'residue' of …actions, thinking, and conversations—that remains a dynamic part of … ongoing experience" (Wenger, et. al., 02: 9). Children in a Vygotskian ZPD approach learn to speak, to think with language, to plan and to set goals through their interactions and encounters with others around them. Knowledge is not handed down from on high or accessed by an independent individual mind; nor is self either genetically or culturally predetermined. Knowledge and self are constantly co-created. Lisa Goldstein (99) has argued that the interpersonal character of the zone of proximal development—being relationship-dependent, intersubjective, and context-specific--resembles a caring encounter.

There are several implications that stem from adopting learning as legitimate peripheral participation perspective in our classrooms and schools. Formal, institutional education should include more experiential learning and project-based assessments. A concept such as the ZPD is a direct challenge to the actual developmental level usually

measured by the grades and scores of Regents exams and intelligence quotients. If Vygotsky was correct that learning proceeds development, then to reward and punish students for their actual versus potential level of development is misguided and short-sighted. Psychometric and classroom testing measures what a student; alone, can do at the moment; such testing and measuring is geared toward ascertaining "the level of development of a child's mental functions that [have] been established as a result of certain already *completed* developmental cycles" (Vygotsky, 78: 85). Critical pedagogies and an ethic of care are interested in the way things are but also in the way they may be.

5.4 *Institutional reforms towards caring schools*

Where the previous section dealt with principles and pedagogical philosophy, in the remainder of this chapter I would like to consider seven recommendations, each more or less dependent on the other. They proceed top-down, from the federal government to the individual classroom, because changes at the top will facilitate changes below. These recommendations include: adopting a uniform federal funding policy for education; adopting flexible national standards; abolishing local boards of education; reforming teacher tenure; eliminating tracking; reforming testing and grading policies; and fostering caring relationships between teachers and students and students and students in our classrooms and schools. These recommendations are not meant to be exhaustive; With them I hope to show the possible intersections of an ethic of care and critical pedagogies in our schools.

a. Institute a uniform, comprehensive federal education funding policy

Funding for public schools in America comes from city and property taxes with supplemental funds provided by individual states and the federal government. This accounts for an enormous amount of the disparity in resources individual school districts face. For example let us consider two school districts in Westchester County: Bedford, where I teach, and Yonkers. Bedford is composed of five towns, the least affluent of which is Mount Kisco; Yonkers is the fourth largest city in the state of New York and the largest city in Westchester. The median family income in Mount Kisco is $68,219; in Yonkers $53,233 (US Census Bureau, 00). Mount Kisco is surrounded by the wealthy towns of Pound Ridge and Bedford Village and the Bedford School District has one high school; Yonkers has eight high schools and no affluent neighbors to bolster tax revenues and their school budget. Bedford is projected to receive $5,291,999 in total aid from New York State, down $778,121 from this school year; Yonkers is projected to receive $214,583,164 in state aid, down $9,353,882 from this year (NY State Dept. of Ed., 09-10). Bedford receives $1,254,000 in federal aid whereas Yonkers receives $15,547,000 (Congressional Research Service, 08).

Schools with fewer resources cannot provide qualitatively similar educational experiences for their students. Therefore school funding must be removed from dependence on local tax revenues and fully funded, equitably, by the federal government. Citizens, including teachers, students, and their parents, should be involved in deciding what a good school looks like and what this costs to run. For example, are after-school clubs and sports teams desirable? Are drama programs and class trips? These things cost money and some districts currently forego them or offer abbreviated opportunities

because of a lack of funds. The ultimate goal will be something like a uniform amount of money for each school district based on what it would cost to run a desirable school district, with the bar defining desirability raised high. In the short-term this may mean inequitable infusions of cash to historically under-financed districts to bring them up to the level of other districts.

Undoubtedly this will cost billions of dollars. A reordering of priorities is called for. Education expenditures are what economists refer to as intangibles; the profits to be accrued from or savings generated by an educated populace are not always quantifiable in the short term. Equitable educational opportunities need to be conceived not as a privilege but as a human right. Further, the money is there. The projected defense budget for the United States in fiscal year 2009 is $515 billion dollars and does not include the billions spent fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Dept. of Defense, 08); compare this to the $68.6 billion federal education budget (Dept. of Ed., 08). Equitable federal education funding is conceivable should the government shift outlays towards war and "defense" to schools and students.

*b. Adopting flexible national standard*s

Affective ties between individuals extend to the groups, communities, and countries these individuals belong to. Hence some form of national standards is necessary. These standards should be vague enough that they are responsive to and capable of being adopted to individual school districts with varying populations. For example, a national standard that sought to encourage and maintain caring relationships would encourage students to study caring relationships and the forms these have taken in

human history to the present day as well as to consider how caring labor has been assigned and at what cost to the individuals involved. Such a standard would start with the assumption that care is a normative goal and then move towards critically analyzing and evaluating the ways care has been provided and maintained in schools. Below I will discuss the need for caring apprenticeships in schools; suffice it to say here, the fostering of caring apprenticeships can be directly related to this standard.

Critical pedagogies and an ethic of care can help students recognize important and just relationships that enhance our lives, relationships that extend from the local to the national and international level. A flexible national standard that looked to the contribution of groups towards social justice could highlight the ills of a society and how those ills were addressed. Like a "caring standard" realized (in part) through caring apprenticeships, the type of standard under discussion here could have an action-component whereby groups of students deliberate and identify a topic of importance to their lives they feel needs correcting or furtherance and then work towards the realization of short- and long-term goals directly related to this concern. In other words, social activism can and should be promoted among school students with the appropriate adults acting as facilitators. Such a standard could help highlight the relevance of history to students' lives as they learn from the successes and failures of social justice movements and work towards the realization of their own visions in a direct, democratic process. At all junctures, centralized hierarchical power relationships should be examined and evaluated for their legitimacy. This, for example, could make contemporary institutional education itself a point of critical investigation and study. As stated throughout this dissertation, the goal is for the values of an ethic of care and critical pedagogies to spread

society-wide, beyond schools alone. This is not going to happen through study alone; praxis demands action for attainment.

The standards a country decides to adopt should be flexible and open to revision. They should be decided by the people they will effect: students and their families, teachers, administrators, and school staff, and community members. I offered two rather vague possible national standards above. I suspect that as our society moves towards realizing an ethic of care in action through critical pedagogies the standards important to a democratic, caring people will evolve out of the concerns that confront us at that particular juncture in time.

That said, one component of national standards that I see the definite need for at this time is a mandatory vocational element as part of the school day. The way public education is structured today, vocational education is usually a separate and (often viewed as) inferior track to the college-prep academic training students are expected to receive in grades Kindergarten through 12. Such a distinction elevates "brain work" over "hand work." From the earliest grades, all students should be exposed and expected to participate in a variety of vocational fields as part of their school day. In chapter 1 I pointed out how America has more college graduates than jobs that require a college degree. A national standard that fostered vocational skills in students would prepare these students to be able to work and contribute positively to their communities and society. Further, an emphasis should be placed on the importance and satisfaction to be gained from manual labor. To this day a vocational or tech component is often viewed as the purview of the students who are not so bright; the "smart ones" take Advanced Placement classes. If all students were taught to respect the value of manual labor by participating in

it we could go far towards erasing this attitude. At the same time, this standard implies concerted political action outside of the classroom to raise the pay of those who work with their hands, thereby making these occupations more desirable and respectable in our society.

c. Abolish Boards of Education

If education is entirely federally funded local boards of education would lose one of their main reasons for existence. In the United States elected officials people local school district's boards of education. Boards of education oversee the operations of a district's public education system, working with the district's superintendent(s). Boards of education are supposed to represent the interests of the community when it comes to the running of the school system; therefore boards of education are involved in everything from negotiating budgets and teacher salaries to appointing staff and granting tenure and levying tax increases. Boards of education are often composed of local businesspeople who can afford the time to run for election and participate.

If the federal government funded public education completely, boards of education would not have to serve as watchdogs over the appropriation and use of public funds. Instead, the citizens of school districts could elect a district school council composed of school and community members. This council should include teachers, administrators, school support staff, and students. The council would be responsible for oversight of the school district and would report back to Washington on how public monies are being used. The council would benefit from frequent elections (perhaps every two years) that saw membership changing in a staggered manner. Membership on the

council should be a paid position; this will provide an incentive for teachers, administrators, and community members who work full time to participate. Students could receive credit towards a class or community service in lieu of cash payments.

d. Reform teacher tenure

Tenure gives teachers job security and a level of comfort that is not guaranteed in its absence. In New York State K-12 teachers are eligible for tenure after three years of teaching on a tenure track[25]. One of the misconceptions regarding tenure is that once it is granted it is impossible to remove a tenured teacher from teaching. Though not impossible the task is extremely costly and time consuming for school districts. In one way this benefits teachers: my school district needs to cut seven million dollars from its 2009-2010 budget; if tenure did not exist, an easy way to do this would be to fire teachers with many years in the district and higher salaries. Administrator impartiality and recognition of merit cannot be guaranteed; tenure helps protect against politically or economically motivated decisions.

A downside to tenure is it allows teachers who do not deserve to be in the profession to remain. Even when guilty of serious infractions, teachers have been protected by tenure's emphasis on process and procedure. I consider myself very sympathetic to my fellow teachers and organized labor (I am a union representative in my building), but I have worked with teachers who I did not feel belonged in the classroom. For instance, one teacher in my district had a history of mental illness and inappropriate (sexual) comments to male and female students as well as using school computers to view pornography during the school day. As much as I felt for this man and his plight, I

[25] Two years for teachers who were previously granted tenure elsewhere.

did not feel he belonged in a setting where he was around young men and women. Eventually he was bought out by the district for $250,000, something which did not make the local media and was not acknowledged at the building level.

So, the question: how can we reform tenure so that we are protecting teachers while ensuring that caring, competent professionals are working with our children? One answer may be in making tenure renewable. A teacher on tenure-track has a series of observations with her department head and building administrators (principal and assistant principals) over the course of three years. These administrators file reports (which the teacher discusses with her administrators and signs) that detail the teacher's strengths and recommended areas of growth. After three years of observations, the school district's superintendent has final say in recommending tenure for the teacher to the local board of education.

If tenure were renewable, a different system of granting it would be necessary. Not all teachers, even good teachers, get along with every administrator or superintendent. Again, economic and political considerations could come into play against a teacher up for tenure renewal with many years experience and a relatively high salary. A tenure committee of the teacher's peers, the schools' students and administrator(s), and community members could replace the existing system. This committee should be peopled by elected men and women, boys and girls, and elections should be frequent (say once a year or at least once every two years). Each member of the committee will bring something different to the committee. Teachers will have their colleagues and their own best interests in mind; "bad apples" reflect negatively on the profession and it is conceivable that teachers will vote against granting tenure to one who

does not deserve it and could sully the profession. Students on the committee will know of the teacher and her reputation. There should be a pool of student committee members large enough to ensure that no current or former students of the teacher are involved in granting or denying that teacher tenure. One important consideration is that community members or administrators not outnumber teachers and students on the committee. A teacher's colleagues and students are the ones who have the most daily contact with that teacher and know her best. Observations continue throughout a teacher's career (though somewhat more sporadically than in her initial tenure-track appointment) and the tenure committee's members should be in charge of these observations and writing the reports. A teacher's tenure could come up for renewal every three to five years.

e. Eliminate tracking

Tracking, or ability-grouping, is the "categorizing of students according to particular measures of intelligence into distinct groups for purposes of teaching and learning" (Wheelock, 92). Tracking takes different forms. In some schools students are homogenously grouped according to their purported ability in separate classes with different expectations. In my high school tracking occurs in the ninth and tenth grade humanities classes (a three period block of English and social studies) with students in each class labeled "academics" or "scholars." The expectations for scholars is higher than that for academics; students are clearly aware of which group they belong to. Advanced placement (AP) classes replace teacher and administrator-imposed tracking in the eleventh and twelfth grades; however, teacher approval is necessary for enrollment in an

AP course[26]. Tracking structures inequality by separating students and differentiating the educational experiences available to them.

Tracking should be eliminated in democratic and caring schools. The methods used to identify students for various tracks rely on static measures of ability and not on aptitude, on actual and not potential development. Heterogeneous grouping, or placing students of various academic achievement levels together in one class, has been shown to positively effect all students involved (Oakes, 85). Students learn from each other as well as from their teachers, so having students of various ability levels in a classroom can help serve as the basis of Vygotskian zones of proximal development. Class sizes and teaching loads should be small enough that teachers are able to realistically differentiate instruction by tailoring their pedagogy to the specific needs of individual students.

f. Reform testing and grading practices

The way teachers test and grade today encourages competitive individualism and militates against cooperation and solidarity. There are surely more ideas for reforming testing and grading policies than I can imagine, but let me briefly mention a few. Sometimes when I tested students I allowed them to take "group tests" where they worked together in small groups with the stipulation that all students would earn the grade of the lowest scoring student in the group. One problem with this scenario were student free-riders who had not prepared and depended on their peers to carry them. For this reason I often would not announce a group test until I was ready to distribute the

[26] South of Bedford the school district in Scarsdale eliminated AP classes in 2007. Students can still take AP exams but are not coached through them or for them in AP classes. 49% of Scarsdale's 2008 graduating 12th-grade class, the first not to have the AP course option, went on to America's most competitive colleges (as determined by Barron's Profile of American Colleges) versus 45% of graduates in 2007. (Hu, 08)

actual exam. Another problem is that no matter how much group test taking and student solidarity I encouraged, at the end of the year students would have to sit alone for their Regents exams, finals, and go on to classes with other teachers who did not practice group testing.

A caring first step would be to eliminate high stakes testing. Tests should be used more in the spirit of Vygotsky's zone of proximal development to discern student potential than to punish and serve as gatekeepers or reward at the expense of the group. There is no reason a student who passes a course but fails a final or Regents should fail to graduate or not be promoted to the next class. When I was responsible for assigning grades and made sure every kid who was trying received passing grades in my classes, I justified it by telling myself I was giving them a chance at a high school diploma; I was not handing them a Masters Degree or a Juris Doctorate. That said, testing and grading reforms should be implemented at all level of education though how this might work in universities and professional schools is beyond my scope here.

There are alternatives to grading more in line with democratic and caring practice. In a class with a credit/no credit option students either get credit for passing a class or they do not. A low grade is not reflected on their academic transcripts. A class with a pass/fail option does not specify whether a student passed with a 65 or a 95. More holistic methods like written evaluations allow teachers to comment on students' strengths and needs in a detailed, narrative form. Portfolios of student work samples let teachers and students measure student performance and discern areas for improvement.

g. Create opportunities for caring apprenticeships in schools

If competition can be encouraged and fostered among students then it stands that compassion, solidarity, and care can be as well. Caring opportunities can be encouraged and nurtured in schools through "caring apprenticeships" (Noddings, 92). What these will look like will depend on the nature of a school and the individuals involved but I have a general idea of the form they may take. Caring apprenticeships will be established and maintained between teachers and students and students and students.

First a few words on the idea of caring apprenticeships and the nature of apprenticeship in such a relationship. Two years ago my high school, which does not have home-rooms, adopted what are called "advisories". Student enrollment at that time was poised to go above thirteen hundred students for the first time; the events at Columbine, Virginia Tech and other schools were fresh in administrations' mind, and a solution was sought to perceived student anomie and dislocation. Advisories were conceived as a means of bringing students together in our school every so often with staff members to get to know one another on a more personal, non-academic level and to disseminate important information when necessary.

I agreed and still agree with the idea behind advisories but see room for improvement in their implementation. For instance, advisories began meeting twice a month for twenty-five minutes; now they meet once a month for the same amount of time. Advisories should meet more often; I would argue on a daily or twice daily basis like a traditional homeroom does in other schools. Advisories are often too large: twenty to thirty students with two staff members. They should be significantly smaller, perhaps five students to every staff member. Advisories are too homogenous: each advisory is

made up of students from the same grade level. If the idea behind advisories is to foster community across difference then it seems somewhat self-defeating to me to group kids who have often been together since middle-school (our district has one middle school) in high school advisories. Instead advisories should be mixed across grades so that any one advisory would have students from each high school grade level. Considering the possibilities and limitations of advisories in my school has informed my thinking about caring apprenticeships and what they may look like.

Apprenticeships are often conceived of as one way transfers of information and skills from a master to a novice; thus Lave and Wenger warn against conceiving apprenticeship "as if it were always and everywhere organized in the same ways as in feudal Europe" (08: 63). Lave and Wenger argue that apprenticeship is a form of legitimate peripheral participation in which "mastery resides not in the master but in the organization of the community of practice of which the master is part" and that learning opportunities in apprenticeships "are, more often than not, given structure by work practices instead of strongly asymmetrical master-apprentice relations" (08: 93 & 94). The roles of masters in apprenticeships are variable across time and place; masters provide "task knowledge" and guidance as the apprentice is welcomed into the community of practice. Lave and Wenger posit that "apprentices learn mostly in relation with other apprentices" (08: 93); apprentices also help a community of practice evolve as they add to the practice and come into mastery on their own.

Caring apprenticeships may assume many different forms. One form I can conceive at this early stage is that of a small class of students with a teacher. The teacher will model the values and properties of an ethic of care and critical pedagogies: from

attentiveness and nurturance to problem-posing and responsibility. The teacher will structure activities and lessons for students that promote care and the critical spirit. These activities do not have to be separate from academic or vocational content. Students will vary in their capacity to care and to exemplify the values of care and critical pedagogies. Teachers will discern which students demonstrate these facilities and which do not and work at promoting care and conscientization through a number of measures: from the way she pairs up or groups students in class (say by putting a student who exhibits a well-developed sense of compassion and responsibility with a student who is not as developed); by confirming and praising the students who demonstrate a caring attitude, thereby tacitly encouraging other students to emulate those praised; by inviting student co-creation of the curriculum and input whenever and wherever appropriate; by always protecting the process of pedagogy through the exercise of a democratic authority in the classroom that champions care, nonrepression, and nondiscrimination. The teacher herself will learn and grow from interaction with her students with the goal being that each make the other a better person and that all work for the betterment of the school, community and society.

Students should be required to identify a social justice issue that directly affects their lives and neighborhoods. Caring apprenticeships may be based around these interests, though measures should be taken to ensure student involvement is participatory (with the stipulation that *all* students must be involved in an issue) and group membership is never completely static. Such issues or interests could include (for example) organizing to make a privately-operated school cafeteria student-run; advocating for specific changes in the school or community to make life better for

immigrants, women, gay-lesbian-bisexual-transgender youth and adults, or any group that faces oppression in a particular locale; the list is endless and will be tailored to the individual schools and students and their concerns. Teachers, administrators, and community members can provide opportunities for students to learn about issues that effect them and their communities and work for change inside and outside the classroom. Credit can be earned for "community participation" to reward students who initially may not comprehend the importance of associated living, democratic participation, and social activism.

Nurturing caring apprenticeships may involve a restructuring of the school day and year. For example, the school calendar should be revisited to consider the efficacy of two-month long summer vacations. If schools are caring, democratic spaces that students look forward to, perhaps extended periods of time outside of school will be unnecessary. Attentiveness, nurturance, and responsibility require contact. The school day does not have to start or end as early as it does. One can imagine students transitioning from their academic and vocational classes with their teachers to their extra-curricular work in and for the community. Schools should serve as community centers outside of academic and vocational hours and involve people from the neighborhood.

All forms of education are based on political and moral visions. The critical pedagogies of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and feminist pedagogy are rooted in an ethic of care. Critical pedagogies and an ethic of care challenge contemporary ethical and educational models with their emphasis on disconnected individualism and competition. Critical pedagogies and an ethic of care advocate for greater cooperation and solidarity to

realize a more egalitarian, participatory, and democratic form of life for individuals, their relationships, and their societies. Critical pedagogies rooted in an ethic of care are an education in hope, a hope for a better tomorrow for all human beings.

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