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The political education of the Israeli society

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THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE ISRAELI SOCIETY

by

NINA HANAN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

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Abstract

THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE ISRAELI SOCIETY

by

Nina Hanan

Adviser: Professor Dankwart Rustow
Co-Adviser: Professor Marshall Berman

Education and politics are interdependent. Education is shaped by social norms, values and prejudices, yet it also provides the means for social control through acculturation and training. Our concerns in this study are: to what extent has education in Israel been affected by political considerations, and what has been the educational impact on political identifications and commitments? Do changes in education correspond to fundamental events transpiring within Israel, or do they mask these changes? Can new educational policies revive or invalidate a society's core values?

Time after time, critics have pointed an accusing finger at the educational institutions as largely responsible for undesirable social phenomena. In the 1970's and 1980's, the strengthening of anti-democratic tendencies - militarism, chauvinism and intolerance - became apparent. These manifestations alarmed educators and public officials who viewed such occurences as signaling the betrayal of basic humanist and Jewish traditions.

Observers have suggested that this phenomenon is mainly the result of historical turning points, particularly the wars of 1967 and 1973, and the 1977 political upheaval. Although the impact of such events on the Israeli public cannot be denied, our contention is that the newly manifested worldview is part of an ongoing process that began early. In order to understand the striking characteristics of this evolutionary process, we chose to look at the educational institutions as reflecting and affecting a changing political culture. Our purpose was to ascertain the dominant ideas and values found both in educational work and within the political domain.

Our study indicates that the political and educational agenda are interwoven. The prominent elements that have dominated the agenda are nationalism, defense and celebration of war victories. The preoccupation with security has overshadowed other social and political concerns, and the defense ethos has eclipsed previous core values and goals that were set to determine the raison d'etre of Israel. Indeed, Israeli educational resources have been mobilized to magnify and legitimize these priorities. This process was initiated by Labor's leadership soon after the establishment of the state, but the compromise of its propounded ideals had begun earlier. Gradually, the public has succumbed to the leadership's interpretation of its predicament, and eventually gave its support to the opposition party more explicit in its nationalistic intentions and commitments.

Acknowledgements

I am greatly indebted to Professor Dankwart Rustow for his guidance and direction in focusing this research, and Professor Marshall Berman for his unfailing counsel and friendship. A special thanks is due Professors Philippa Strum and Michael Brown for their support.

This effort could not have been accomplished without the encouragement of my friends, especially Jeanne Giniger, Hanna Yogev, Zvi (Chibbi) Spalter, Pnina and Michael Daniel, Stanely Rappaport, Zvi Rappaport and David and Iris Dotan. Finally, I thank my parents Joseph and Yona for their affection and caring, my son Amir, my father and mother-in-law, and above all, Che.

I am also grateful to L.C. for the songs.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The study of education involves more than the examination of instruction and curricula. Since education is connected to the rest of society, its character is shaped by social norms and values and prejudices, including some that are unconscious and unnoticed. Education is used everywhere as an instrument for political and social control. In addition - and this is especially important in modern societies - it acculturates, trains and unifies heterogeneous populations. Thus, inevitably an educational system is at once a product of political forces and a force in politics.

Since schools are shaped by the society around them, it is asking too much to expect them to be agents of radical change. But it is not so radical to ask schools to transmit and promote officially proclaimed values such as justice, mutual aid and tolerance. If a social environment does not measure up to these values, or if a government violates them, students should know how to be responsible citizens, to think critically, to work and organize for change.

Scholarly concern with the relationship between education and the polity is not new. It goes back to Plato and Aristotle. Social scientists today still say: "As is the state, so is the school," or "What you want in the state, you must put into the school."[1] Education

cannot be conceived of as an autonomous social system. Some of the concerns raised in this study are the following: how educational institutions are influenced and shaped by changes in a nation's political, social and ideological structures; and how education promotes, enhances or undermines the good or just society, as envisioned either by a state's founding members, its current leadership, and its contending political movements.

It is widely acknowledged that education is a necessary ingredient in every society in the socialization of the young for the purpose of perpetuating the existing arrangements. Durkheim has emphasized the need of society to socialize through education by transmitting "fundamental values" and "essential principles."[2] In discussing political socialization, Almond and Verba point to a tendency to generalize from one social sphere to another; namely, that patterns and modes of behavior acquired early in the family and in schools are related to the wider social sphere. Thus, non-political structures are influential in shaping political attitudes.[3] Values transmitted in the various social spheres, notably in schools, have a clear and deliberate aim: to prepare the young to become a cohesive and united people and socially useful individuals. There, they can be presented with their nation's heritage and glory, become engulfed with its destiny, and develop a unique and separate identity among the world of nations. Evidently, educational institutions serve as a vehicle conducive to the formation of The Citizen. "For education," Aristotle noted, "is therefore <u>the</u> means of making (the polis) a community and giving it unity."[4]

The questions that philosophers, educators, and critics have raised have not been limited to the role of the school in general, but also to its teaching. Derek Heater discusses the controversial issue long debated in Britain: how to teach politics? What kind of political education (if at all) should be conveyed to the students? Should the teaching of politics take the established form of government for granted, or should other models of government be discussed with equal "objectivity"? Could widespread interest in politics be proven a dangerous enterprise and a destabilizing force? What consequences might be expected if political education raises the level of political consciousness and leads to the critical examination of various issues, thus replacing the passive, stagnant acceptance of the status quo? Interestingly, Heater points out that the fear of indoctrination from the Left is more intense than the fear of indoctrination from the Right: "It is a fear of a radical undermining of the established system, the sowing the seeds of revolution in young fertile minds."[5] In addition, the issue of pedagogical style of presenting the material is of great concern. Three main approaches may be discerned: (1) traditional approach - the syllabus is heavily biased towards the description of institutional machinery either in its contemporary operation or with its historical background. The purpose is to make the students undestand how the system of government works, accepting it as it is. (2) reformist approach - have students understand that politics is about resolutions of real issues and that institutions are only means to an end. (3) radical approach - focus on a critical evaluation of doctrines, policies and methods, undertanding the interdependence between local, national and international politics,

and recognizing that status quo or stability are not necessarily a virtue.[6]

The role of education in achieving specific goals is of great importance in our study. To what extent is education emphasized as a catalyst in social transformation, or as a means to perpetuate a distinct outlook. Educational policies reflect the wishes and relative strength that various groups are able to exert in order accomplish educational and other non-educational goals. Thence, the changing political context has serious repercussions for the educational institutions and their ability either to keep afloat or play a role in influencing these changes.

As we shall see later, in the case of Israel, several immigrant groups attempted to imbue educational work with a new and revolutionary character consonant with the needs and conditions of the growing society. The values and the way they were transmitted emerged from the needs of the time. However, this educational experiment has been considerably transformed due to various political factors and ideological changes.

In the present study of education and politics in Israel, it is important to understand the major role that Zionism played not only as a national liberation movement, but also as the source of inspiration for the creation of a new society and a new man. The content of Zionist ideology on its many variations shaped the educational outlook of the society.

The attempt to shape a new man and identity in a new society whose structure and values could be determined independently by Jews was the main purpose of Zionism. As a national liberation movement,

Zionism required first an act of negation, freeing Jews from the oppressive and crippling conditions in which they lived in the Diaspora. More, it was a rebellion against a historical destiny, through an act of affirmation challenging this destiny and forging a new and free political, economic, social and moral existence. (The justification and criticism of the Zionist enterprise and the ensuing conflicts with the Palestinians and the Arabs will not be discussed here. Later in the study, the dimension of the conflict and its effects and relevance on Israeli society will be considered). For some, the idea of settling the land in Palestine was a matter of individual emancipation and personal self-determination as much as, if not more than, national self-determination.

It has been pointed out that messianism (belief in a messiah; the expected deliverer of the Jews) has played a pivotal role in the Zionist Movement exceeding even the nationalist message. A considerable part of the movement absorbed from religious and Jewish history messianic elements, but formulated them in a secular fashion, sometimes in anti-religious terms. To this messianism Zionism offered a renewed content, one that would alter dramatically their hitherto distorted political existence and unproductive alienated lives. Zionism is a post-Emancipation phenomenon, notes Shlomo Avineri. It emerged as a political force in the second half of the 19th century, the best century Jews had ever experienced. They were allowed to partake in community life seemingly on an equal footing with the non-Jews. Religion was less a discriminating characteristic; indeed, it was not a crucial factor in the self-identity of many Jews and non-Jews alike. Instead, people began to define themselves in terms of

nationality.[7] Although many European Jews truly perceived themselves as part of the community, it became evident through numerous incidents (pogroms and the Dreyfus Affair) that they were not necessarily viewed so by others, but rather, as Jews first. The dilemma of the modern, secular Jews was that they were perennially judged as THEY, regardless of the extent of their integration into the WE. The awareness of their inescapable predicament generated the need for self-determination on an equal footing with their various "hosts." For them, Zionism was a protest movement attempting to heal the Jewish individual and nation, and education served as a major instrument for this purpose. Its main function was the cultivation of the consciousness of those ready to act in order to bring about revolutionary changes.

Zionist thought contains many different ideas about the basis and elements forming the new society in a new land. Would the new society be, as Moses Hess hoped, one devoid of exploitation where complete equality, participation, true communal life and labor would be cherished? Or, in A.D Gordon's vision, would it be a society where individual self-actualization would occur through agricultural labor and connectedness to the soil, thus celebrating the "religion of labor" as an instance of self-emancipation? Or, as Theodor Herzel envisioned, the establishment of a "normal," independent, bourgeois society for Jews patterned after western societies? Or a society dictated and ruled by religious tenets only?

It was noted by some observers that Zionism has ended, because it so succeeded, with the establishment of the State of Israel. This view has alarmed many, prompting them to call attention to the alienation and estrangement of young Israelis from Jewish national consciousness,

and to their lack of connectedness, visible in their ignorance of Jewish history and literature that address the inner conflicts and longing for redemption while in the Diaspora.

Many point an accusing finger at the educational institutions as one of the major sources of this indifference. Accordingly, Zionism has become merely a notion shelved as a historical moment, a moment actualized at the end of the road to liberation. Thus, the widespread and urgent concern with educating the young generations so that they would deeply feel the commitment to maintain the unique experience of national and personal renewal. Later in the study we shall discuss specific programs and attempts to inculcate, in the schools, Zionist and Jewish consciousness, through intellectual and emotional experiences.

It is not the purpose of this study to discuss the many currents within the Zionist movement, nor the many contributors to Zionist thought. The main approaches will be reviewed in the following chapter when we examine the essential educational trends in the Yishuv during the pre-state era, and the conflicts between them and the eventual unification of the educational system.

In the last two decades, especially in the 1980's, several educators and officials have been troubled by anti-democratic phenomena taking place in Israel: fanaticism, militarism, chauvinism and a general intolerance on the part of a segment of the population (often the youth). They view these forms of expressions not merely as a betrayal of the basic ideals of the Jewish state, but also as dangerously polarizing and polluting the body politic.

It has been argued that particular turning points and major events in Israel, such as the wars of 1967 and 1973 and the 1977 upheaval, were mostly responsible for the manifestation of a new outlook. Undoubtedly, such momentous events have contributed to changes in public mood and behavior. Nonetheless, our contention is that these occurences are part of an ongoing process that began early. As a way of unraveling these developments and recognizing some of the salient features characterizing them we chose to look at the role of one of the major institutions in Israel, i.e., educational institutions, as contributing to and reflecting the changing political culture. In examining the changes that have occured in Israeli society, and concomitant fundamental concepts underlying education, we can discern several major themes. The dominant themes in education which reflect a particular political mood, especially on the part of the leadership, have, in turn, been absorbed and interpreted in an extreme form in the Israeli society. The purpose is to trace the major political and educational motifs characterizing the Israeli society from the pre-state (Yishuv) era to the present time. We begin by looking at the ideological and educational pluralism in the pre-state period culminating in the elimination of the Workers Trend under the leadership of the Labor party. After the establishment of the state, the educational policies and approaches fashioned to solve Jewish ethnic problems resulting from mass immigration are examined. Following the 1967 war, we discuss the relationship between politcal processes and educational policies until the 1977 political upheaval that brought the oppsition Likud party to power. Finally, we study the political and ideological movements inspired by right-wing Zionism and

legitimized by the Likud party, and the efforts to counter them through new educational programs and political activism.

Historically, the political parties in Israel have vied for the control of the educational network, perceiving it as a vital and central policy goal. Some of the concerns in this study are: To what extent has education been affected by political considerations, and what has been the educational impact upon political identifications and commitments? Do changes in education correspond to fundamental events transpiring within Israel, or do they mask these changes? What role does education have in serving as a legitimizing instrument for a particular ruling party? Can it contribute, even unkowingly, to delegitimizing its creators and rendering consent to the opposition? Can new educational policies revive or invalidate a society's core values? What are the long term implications for national consensus or its absence?

In Chapter II we discuss the social and ideological characteristics and educational organizations in the pre-state era (Yishuv). At the time, there was a rigorous and separate planning of education and society according to a well defined set of ideals. Three major educational trends existed, each following its own interpretation of Zionism. All three trends stressed the pivotal role of education in erecting a new society. In the 1950's, with the process of consolidation into a sovereign state, the major preoccupation and priority became the state itself. Although Mapai (Labor) was the dominant political party, it came to endorse the idea of unity (previously despised as a General Trend slogan) in the educational system and the military. Thus, the priority of the Workers

Trend's leadership shifted from society-building to nation-building, and education was adapted to an etatist worldview, though still containing diluted Labor beliefs. Nationalism and Jewish consciousness were stressed in the schools and they became the major elements integrating and cementing the Jewish population.

Chapter III examines the manner in which the immense ethnic gap was addressed in the 1960's, especially in the schools. Education was considered the major vehicle by which to solve ethnic disparity and, consequently, unite the Jewish groups. In spite of official declared concerns with unity and integration of the exiles, the Sephardim remained "outside" the society. In the schools, the curricula clearly excluded Sephardic culture and input. They were viewed and categorized as unequal and primitive. Although over the years the disparity among pupils, in elementary schools and to a lesser degree in high schools, seemed to decrease, in fact, the gap between the two ethnic groups has remained pronounced. Sephardic dissatisfaction was expressed in protests and by their voting against Labor. Indeed, in 1977 a large percentage of Sephardim voted for the opposition Likud party. The failure of the educational institutions and political leadership to reverse the Sephardim's maltreatment and address adequately etnic problems is analyzed.

Chapter IV examines the political evolution and educational policies during the 1967-1977 period. As Labor's programs thinned and its radical features were de-emphasized, nationalism and war victories were increasingly accentuated. In the schools, as well as through the influence of socio-political events, these elements became predominant. Even when curricular changes were instituted in order to

reduce ideological content in the study material, basic problems remained. Social, political and cultural diversities were not reinforced, and the pupils continued to be affected by the stereotypical images and views of their milieu. Further, although pupils learned the mechanics of the political system, they were not prepared to become involved or concerned with social and political affairs. As far as the Israeli-Arab sector, Arab education has been depleted of its own cultural identity and political dimension and context, and, instead, was adjusted artificially to an overwhelming Israeli perspective.

Finally, in Chapter V, we discuss the striking characteristics of the Israeli society after the Likud party came to power, and the emergence of extreme manifestations of right-wing militant and intolerant groups. On the other hand, we note some attempts made to counter extremism by introducing new programs, such as "Education for Democracy" in the schools and the army. We also consider the political alternatives suggested by opposing groups.

When we look at the evolution of the Israeli society, a striking thread is noticable. The political and educational agenda are interwoven, both moving in a clearly visible direction. The prominent elements dominating the agenda are nationalism, defense and the celebration of victories over the ever-threatening enemies. The dimension of the conflict with the Arabs and Palestinians overshadows all other concerns. The defense ethos and preoccupation with security have been inculcated through every available channel that they finally determine the raison d'etre of Israel. The results have not only led

to neglect of internal problems, such as polarization between Jewish ethnic groups, but also to a continuous effort to subdue the enemies.

Undoubtedly, when the citizenry experiences an urgent sense of threat to its immediate survival, all other concerns become secondary. Indeed, the leadership has emphasized the survival issue by relating the Jewish history of persecution to the present predicament of possible annihilation. Israel's educational resources have been mobilized to magnify and legitimize these priorities. Hence, one should not be surprised that the population increasingly manifested its willingness to harness all energy to meet this interest. It seems that the public has succumbed to the leadership's interpretation of its predicament, and consequently became so engaged that it finally gave its support to another leadership more explicit in its nationalistic intentions and unwavering in its commitment to realize them.

Notes for Chapter I

1. James S. Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development, (Princeton, New Jersey: Prinecton University Press, 1965), p. 6.

2. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 243.

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4. Ernest Barker, ed., The Politics of Aristotle, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 51.

5. Derek Heater, "Political Education: Present Condition and Future Problems," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1979), p. 145.

6. Ibid., pp. 149-151.

7. Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 13.

CHAPTER II

IDEOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL TRENDS IN THE YISHUV AND THEIR UNIFICATION IN THE 1950's

Education is strongly connected to changing social, political and cultural conditions, being affected by them and, in turn, participating in drawing the unfolding image of the society within which it has been produced. In order to locate the sources that engender educational policies during various periods, we have to understand the interdependence among ideological, political, economic and social forces within the society at any given time, while simultaneously assessing the impact of leaders and political movements upon the direction and effects of the policies pursued. It is of great importance to examine the changes that Israeli society has undergone, that is, the characteristics and outlook that have become increasingly dominant over the decades. By examining the direction and content of the educational institutions and the society's shifting worldview we can discover a strong connection between the two.

The various groups within the Zionist movement viewed education as a vehicle for the realization of their respective goals and values. For them, Zionism was not "merely a political movement, or even a socio-political movement, but, primarily, an educational movement."[1] In this chapter we discuss the main separate trends of education in the Yishuv, each trend reflecting a particular content and operating

according to its vision of Zionist objectives. In 1953, legislation was enacted that purported to undertake the unification of education under the leadership of Mapai, which had gained political hegemony already in the Yishuv. It is of interest to follow the shift of emphasis, priorities and fundamental values in education once the trend system has been eliminated. We will see, however, that the Religious Trend retained its autonomy, the General Trend values became predominant and that the Workers Trend was cancelled almost completely except in the kibbutz movement. Moreover, political motives were the predominant factors leading to the transformation of the educational system, and those political priorities, defined as such by the leadership, were translated and absorbed into educational work.

1. Social, Ideological and Educational Characteristics of the Yishuv

Educational work was pursued already during the Yishuv, i.e., prior to the estabilshment of the state of Israel in 1948. A brief description of the Yishuv's mode of operation and character will be helpful in understanding the formation of Israeli political culture. Our discussion refers to the new Yishuv, namely, the national community that developed beginning with the first Aliya of the 1880's, while the old Yishuv refers to the traditional Jewish society in Palestine.[2] In the Zionist movement, ideology preceded and guided the later settlements in Palestine. Indeed, the ideology of rebellion played an important part in the Aliyot to Palestine as if the nation was saying: "I rebel, therefore I am."[3] The Yishuv, under the British Mandate in Palestine, was an evolving and separatist society. Several organizations operated within the Jewish sector: the Jewish Agency, the National Council (Vaad Leumi) and local bodies. The National

Council was elected by most of the adult members of the Jewish community. The Yishuv elected its representatives to the Elected Assembly (Asefat Hanivharim), which chose the National Council as its governing body. The Yishuv was a political society, a state within a state. Its goal was to function autonomously in the areas of immigration, security, "foreign" policy (with regard to the mandatory government and the League of Nations), religion, social services (especially health and education). It resigned itself to the mandatory government's control of the police, legal system and various services (post office, trains, ports etc.). Inevitably, there was tension between the mandatory authorities and the Jewish institutions, particularly with regard to immigration. But there was also tension among Yishuv members who differed on the need for "Hebrew labor" which resulted in separate Jewish and Arab economies. Clearly, the desire, by some to create an independent Jewish economy was divisive.[4]

Although the commitment to Zionism was commonly shared and cherished by the various Jewish groups, they differed in their interpretation of Zionism in general, as well as on the immediate goals and policies. The Revisionists' aim, under Jabotinsky, was to create the independent national home for Jews through a political movement, not through colonization. They believed that emphasis on colonization would weaken their political activities. Increasingly, however, the inclination toward pioneering and colonizing empowered the workers' groups. In 1930, Mapai (Israel Workers' Party) was created and it became dominant in the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor). The latter's functions were both economic - operating industries and training pioneers - and political - getting as many immigration certificates as possible and attracting newcomers.[5] The

immigrants were organized into small groups which were tied to associations, movements and political parties. In these groups they underwent both ideological and vocational training for the future new life. The various hachshara (preparation) groups gained practical experience while living in communal settings. These groups were small, cohesive, ideologically committed ones, and although they did not stress institutional organization they became later the nuclei of the future institutions.[6]

The attempt to alter radically their existence, socially, politically, culturally and economically was reflected especially in the pioneering work between the 1920's and the 1940's of groups that turned toward agricultural settlements. In particular, the members of the second and third Aliyot were active in the affairs of the Yishuv and they represented various elites, notably, the political elite. Their influence was not due to their numbers, but to their dedication and determination. Undoubtedly, the political culture and social structure of the Yishuv were dominated by the revolutionary spirit and practices of the second Aliya.

Their ideology called for submerging present needs in order to realize future goals: attending to collective needs through personal self sacrifice and deprivation. The concepts of futurism and collectivism were defined as halutziut; that is, pioneering, which meant that personal self actualization came through work for the community and took precedence over individual desires - the general will transcending the will of all. In sum, the image of the pioneer was characterized by lack of interest in immediate rewards of position or material comfort; emphasis on agricultural work and manual work in general without the exploitation of others' labor; stressing the

importance of living in a special type of community conducive to the development of the ideal society; concern with self defense, independence and the revival of the Hebrew language and culture.[7]

Israel Galili asserts that during that period a fundamental process in the history of the Jewish people was underway: the creation of a working class out of the immigrants. By settling the land and building independent workers' economic sectors in agriculture and industry, a real socialist foundation was set. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, had a historical weakness because it did not have solutions to the problems of the country and people and their approach was in complete contradiction to the needs of immigrants.[8] Hence, workers' hegemony was necessary not just in order to insure higher standards of living but, indeed, to insure the community's existence. The conflict between the workers and the bourgeoisie was not limited to issues of pay and working conditions, but focused also on the structure and image of the Israeli society. In sum, paving the ways and setting the goals for the youth to follow were the tasks of socialism in realizing the Zionist endeavor.[9]

Undoubtedly, an elitist thread was implied in the notion of the halutz (pioneer) or avant-garde. Under ideological inspiration, the leadership positions became later on the source of rewards, prestige and power. The elite, however, was not monolithic in its detailed views and plans for the future. It broke into sub-groups, each fighting over top positions. The internal conflicts involved numerous groups within the Labor movement, the Religious groups and the Revisionists. Nevertheless, the Jewish community succeeded in developing a system of national institutions whose authority emanated

from the solidarity and identification felt by many Jews regarding their basic aspirations.

Although ideologically and politically the Zionists embraced different parties and movements, they harbored a common goal. They were determined to establish an independent Jewish society - rejecting Jewish existence in the diaspora, thus making a revolutionary leap by creating a society with a new economic base and a unique social content. True, the specific content and symbols seemed often to be in contradiction: the productive pioneer, the bourgeois citizen or the religious student.

The manner in which the educational policies were fashioned during the Yishuv is connected to the structure and forces of the Zionist movement and its institutions. The objectives of Zionism, the course of the movement's development and its internal and external struggles shaped many of the aims considered by the educational network. Consequently, such processes as centralization and decentralization within the movement, the relationship between the "center" and the "field" activists, the establishment and dissolution of coalitions, the confrontation between religious and secular Zionists, and the struggles between Socialist Zionists and General Zionists, all influenced the structure, power and allocation of resources for education. Within the Zionist organization, later the Vaad Leumi, there were several bodies that shaped educational policies and managed the educational system:

(1) Educational Committee - it included representatives from the Vaad Leumi governing body, the Teachers Federation and the Governmental Educational Department. Many representatives were chosen in proportion to the strength of political parties. The

committee's tasks included the determination of the budget for education, teachers' salaries and the level of education required for teachers.

(2) Trends' Inspection Committees (education was set up in three major separate trends which will be discussed in Sec. 2) - each committee concentrated on its own trend's budgetary proposals, appointment of teachers and principals, the preparation of curriculum and inspection of the schools. These committees were the dominant bodies influencing and managing the educational system. Each trend was autonomous regarding educational policies, being closely connected and representing the major political parties (or groups).

(3) Educational Department - it was established in order to manage the educational system and determine its policies, but its influence was minimal. The department was headed by executives and inspectors from each trend.[10]

The political forces consolidated and institutionalized the ideological awakening and commitment of the teachers as well.[11] Indeed, the interdependent relations between the various political factors and the Hebrew teachers were responsible for much of the direction of educational policies, at least up to the 1950's.

The Hebrew Teachers' Organization (Agudat Hamorim) was established in 1903, under the auspices of the Zionist movement, and the Teachers Center (Merkaz Hamorim) prepared a tentative plan for elementary school curriculum in 1907 as well as a plan for testing teachers in 1910. Further, the Teachers Union (Histadrut Hamorim) published textbooks, organized teachers' training, and established a

"language committee" to determine a homogeneous vocabulary in the various subject matters taught at school.

The Hebrew teachers, many of them writers and journalists, believed that the task of the Zionist cultural revolution was primarily theirs. Teaching signified for them engagement in Zionist activities which entitled them, they thought, to a special place among the leading elite. Many of them were liberal Zionists who envisioned a society based on private enterprise with the farmers as land owners constituting the significant economic class.[12] Nonetheless, the political elite was dominated by the socialist Zionists who, as we saw, differed ideologically.

The teachers knew that in order for them to preserve their status they had to come to some kind of mutual understanding with the pioneering elite. They were ready to recognize the elite's decision-making power in the nation building process but they demanded, in turn, the power to inspect the schools. In this way, they hoped they could fortify their position as the cultural elite. The Teachers Union, in fact, demanded authority in the educational system but the Halutzim turned them down. The socialist plan was to form a new society and, therefore, maintaining control over the educational institutions was imperative to them. The political party, they believed, had an educational function inseparable from its political and economic ones.[13]

As Mapai (Israeli Workers Party) gained strength, achieving control over all the educational activities, including the teachers, seemed possible. The confrontation between the two organizations was inevitable. The Histadrut (General Workers Union) was disturbed by the proclivity of the Teachers Union, which was not part of the Histadrut,

for independence and its attempt to influence educational policies. Their refusal to join the Histadrut was retaliated against by reducing their salaries. The teachers called for a strike but they soon realized that they had few financial resources to maintain their struggle, a fact that clearly weakened their position while strengthening Mapai and the Histadrut. (Between 1927-1945 the Teachers Union initiated six strikes without the support of the Histadrut). The teachers' position increasingly declined and their salaries were low compared to clerks and bureaucratic officials. They were the only group that suffered periodic pay cuts even when economic conditions improved.[14]

Although educational work was considered an important priority, the Zionist Histadrut in the 1920's reduced the educational budget by 50%, no longer providing financial support to kindergartens or to secondary schools, concentrating only on developing elementary education. Even for this sector, however, the resources were limited The decrease in allocating educational resources was implemented, according to the Zionist leadership, because "productive" enterprises such as settlements and industry had to be encouraged, while the responsibility for "non-productive" services could be transfered to the Yishuv.[15]

The transfer of the "ownership" of the educational network from the Zionist Histadrut to the Vaad Leumi (National Council) was accompanied by conflicts and struggles among organizations, parties and interest groups. The Teachers Union objected to this transfer, viewing the decentralization of education as its eventual disintegration.

The political parties were also divided over the issue of transfering education. The religous objected to it, and the parties of the left supported it. In 1923 it came into effect and the Yishuv became largely responsible for its operation. While in 1919 the Zionist Organization paid for 88.7% of the educational budget as compared to the Yishuv's 11.3%, in 1933 it was 10.3% vs. 72.2%, and in 1945, 8% vs. 82.5%.[16] The transfer of the educational network to the Va'ad Leumi reflects the development and consolidation of the center in Palestine. Now the intensive educational and political activities of the parties, and the activities of the teachers played an important role in determining educational policies.

2. The Educational System in the Yishuv: General, Religious and Workers Trends

The educational system in the Yishuv (until 1953) was divided into three major school trends: (1) Religious - Mizrahi, (2) General and (3) Workers. The existence of these trends was acknowledged and mandated by the Zionist Committee in London in 1920. Another trend - Agudat Israel - was an extreme religious trend set against the Zionist movement and the usage of Hebrew. It became completely independent in 1920 and was recognized as such in 1953. There were many conflicting ideological interpretations regarding Hebrew education, and the various goals and contents thereof constituted the ideological bases for the trends in education. These three were, in fact, parallel centralized systems, each autonomous and responsible for its own key decisions; i.e., the appointment of teachers, principals and inspectors, as well as the determination of the curriculum. This type of organization was perceived as a viable solution to ideological

pluralism. Education was pursued through the various political parties, and each was assured of equal rights and separate representation in the Yishuv. The trends constituted, then, pedagogical schools of thought and organizations providing services to their members through political parties.

The connection between the various ideological interpretations of Zionism and the essence of the new Hebrew education was reflected in the teaching and fashioning of education in Israel. It is of interest to examine, briefly, the roots and the sources of influence on these trends. Z. Zohar, one of the educational leaders in the Hashomer Hatzair (The Young Guardian),[17] contends that the roots of educational philosophy in the workers trend was the reality in Eretz Israel during the period of the second Aliya, when the Hebrew workers realized that there was no possibility of working jointly with the Hebrew farmer. Their movement promulgated the ideology of Labor (avoda) and educational ideas grew out of this atmosphere and were operationally suited to the new evolving reality.[18]

Shimon Reshef points out that the influence on the Workers Trend can be traced to the new educational ideas between the 19th century and the inter war period. Hebrew pioneers looked at modern pedagogical ideas for direction and adopted these new methods, creating a synthesis between pedagogical concepts and social ideologies, such as return to labor and establishing a communal Hebrew society.[19] Yehuda Ron-Polani also addresses the source of inspiration for the Workers' educational movement. He believes, however, that essentially there was no outside influence, but rather, an authentic type created from everyday life, its source being the reality of Eretz Israel.[20] Others argue that though the Hebrew educators were influenced by the European

pedagogical experience, the strongest influencing forces were the real needs of time and place in Palestine. It would seem that educational work was a synthesis of ideas from various sources and the contextual milieu, namely, the basic needs of the Hebrew workers.

There are many opinions as to the sources of influence on the shaping of the General Trend. Many considered the new Hebrew school a stereotypical reproduction of the European school. Lam thinks that these new schools were modeled after the modern schools in Europe in the 19th century, all under the influence of nationalist movements. According to him, the General Trend adopted a ready model, and they only translated it to the existing conditions in Palestine.[21]

An outstanding figure who gave meaning and eventually shaped the General Trend was Ahad Ha'am (1856-1927), who viewed Zionism as a movement of Jewish national renaissance accompanied by spiritual, moral and cultural renewal. According to him, the establishment of an independent Jewish state void of culture and spirit would lack a solid foundation. In The Jewish State and the Jewish Problem he observed:

> "The secret of our people's persistence is...that at a very early period the Prophets taught it to respect only the power of the spirit and not to worship material power...a political ideal which is not grounded in our national culture is apt to seduce us from loyalty to our own inner spirit and to beget in us a tendency to find the path of glory in the attainment of material power and political domination, thus breaking the thread that unites us with the past and undermining our historical foundation...".[22]

Therefore, Ahad Ha'am and his followers demanded that educational and cultural work be included in the officially proclaimed goals of the Zionist Histadrut.

The interpretation of Zionism, mainly as spiritual and cultural revival, did not reflect only the view of Ahad Ha'am. Many in the Zionist movement came to the decision in 1901 that the education of

the Jewish people toward their spiritual renaissance was one of the most significant foundations of Zionist undertaking, and that members had to stress it in their work. Possibly, this decision which emphasized the education of the Jewish nation in a nationalist spirit, not referring explicitly to religious factors, encouraged the religious Jews to organize separately in the Zionist Histadrut and create the Mizrahi.

Ahad Ha'am felt that education in the hadarim (religious schools) did not inculcate nationalism in the hearts of the children, and that the responsibility for changing this education should be taken by the Zionist movement. The movement, therefore, had to create a common ideological base for the Jewish nation, namely, nationalist renewal.

The meaning that Ahad Ha'am attached to Zionism as a nationalist movement did not negate Judaism, but created harmony between them. In Judaism he found qualities that rendered the Jews a unique nation. Accordingly, in order to realize the goals of Zionism, educational work must be placed in the center, achieving a spiritual Jewish nationalism through the study of general humanist notions, though emphasizing Jewish history, law, culture, literature and national language. In learning these subjects the Jewish youth would obtain indirectly, implicitly, unconsciously, and even unknowingly nationalist feelings and love for the country and nation. All the notions taught would enter the youth's heart and endow the pupil with a Jewish nationalist spirit.[23] And so, every child's character from birth would be formed and develop under nationalist influence rather than through the pupil's own will. According to Ahad Ha'am "a complete national life involves two things: first, full play for the creative faculties of the nation in a specific national culture of its own,

and, second, a system of education whereby the individual members of the nation will be thoroughly imbued with that culture, and so molded by it that its imprint will be recognizable in all their way of life and thought, individual and social.... If the individuals are not imbued with the national culture, the development of the nation will be arrested, and its creative faculties will suffer atrophy or dissipation."[24]

Education in every subject would involve nationalist elements. Even subjects that constitute general human knowledge, such as mathematics and natural science, would not be completely free of nationalist components. Needless to say, these elements would be most pronounced in geography, history, Hebrew, literature and Bible. Hebrew would provide a national identity for the youth's inner world, and in Bible and Jewish literature he would find his piece of the national ego. Hence, an organic moral bond would be created between the individual and the nation, where man and Jew can be integrated into one entity. The purpose was to break the dualism that Jewish youth experienced, their daily life separated from national life, the latter enclosed in a spiritual ghetto.

Observers point out that Ahad Ha'am did not intend the Jewish youth to confront or struggle with ideas. His approach did not call for the examination of tradition and values, but instead, the teachers were to impress a burning and devoted love for Jewish nationalism. Ahad Ha'am explicitly noted that such learning would occur unconsciously, subliminally and indirectly enter the minds and hearts of the youth who would accept it passively, rather than weight it discriminately.[25] He emphasized the study of the Bible, believing that it would offer a spiritual experience which must be appreciated by

secular nationalist Jews, and thus, unite all Jews - religious and secular - in one national consciousness. In a letter to Magnes in 1910 he said: "We have to make the synagogue itself the house of study...Judaism is fundamentally national, and all the effort of the 'Reformers' to separate Jewish religion from its national element have had not result except to ruin both the nationalism and the religion. Clearly, if you want to build and not to destroy, you must teach religion on the basis of nationalism with which it is inseparably intertwined".[26]

Suppoters and students of Ahad Ha'am attempted to implement these ideas in Palestine. Haim Zutah (a General Trend teacher), for example, added from the experience of German elementary schools the discipline, order, and curricular planning, and concluded that in a nationalist education the Jews must follow suit rendering their nationalism the basic dynamic idea, similar to the Germans' placement of their kaiser and his worship at the center.[27] Zutah was sent to Jaffa to an all girls' school, an important school, since its basic plans constituted the foundations of the official curriculum of the General Trend in 1923. The school was established in 1882 with the First Aliya, and gradually all subjects were taught in Hebrew to increase national consciousness and bridge the gap between Jews of different countries. Ahad Ha'am wished this school to become a model for the quintessential Hebrew school, but not become the possession of a particular social group or class. In sum, there were four major factors that constituted the essence of the desired school: (1) The school would not serve a particular social group or class; (2) The school would be a general national institution; (3) Curricular planning would stand at the

center of school activities: (4) The curriculum would combine general humanist studies with national spirit.

The purpose of the General school was to serve as a base for the nation's destiny and a place for all its people, by producing a generation that would carry the national culture and transmit it to the next generations. This was to be done forcefully and authoritatively, by conquering the student's spirit. According to this educational process, the student is the material or the tabula rasa upon which educators try to imprint a particular shape, and such a conquest was seen as an absolute right. As Shaked points out, such an approach was the source of constant tension between the teachers and students. The teacher was the carrier of the cultural baggage and was not ready to tolerate any kind of rebellion, but willfully imposed his ideas. He did not recognize the rights of children and childhood.[28]

It is interesting to note that in the 1920's the General educators added another element to their curriculum: labor. It was added after strong criticism directed at the General Trend schools, accusing them of being nothing but an exact replica of the European schools. Although including labor in the curriculum, it was stressed that the most crucial value of the General Trend school was that it healed the young generation of the dualism between man and Jew.

Nevertheless, the centrality of the national motif dictated the components of the curriculum. The teaching of the Bible instilled national, moral and aesthetic values. Religious teaching was not emphasized, but the celebration of the heroes was intended to generate the pupils' enthusiasm. The teachers' goal was to have their pupils identify completely with the content and spirit of the book. If a teacher was unable to cover the Bible in class, the pupils were

expected to complete it on their own.[29] Moreover, the landscape and nature surrounding the country had to be absorbed in order to prompt a psychological, historical revolution in the children's attitudes toward the existence of a new Jew/man in his homeland. Thus, they prepared the children to be rooted in, and not be alienated from their milieu. Most important, however, the teaching of history and literature exposed them to the world of Judaism. In history, the emphasis was not on relations, values, and principles but on personalities and heroes.

Lam asserts that Ahad Ha'am and his followers were in fact the proponents of the view that conceived of education mainly as acculturation. Accordingly, the authoritative allocation of cultural resources and tradition had to conquer the pupils' souls rendering them culturally "correct" individuals. The pupils had to meet these standards of learning, identifying with the content and shaped so as to mimic the ideal image of the citizen offered to them.[30]

Although the intention was to transcend party lines and strict ideological guidelines, it was decided that the General Trend would be under the auspices of the Center parties, in particular The General Zionists. A number of General Trend leaders objected, arguing that their schools were completely apolitical, stating their aim as the establishment of schools unconnected to political parties. But, in fact, the General Trend was supported by the bourgeoisie who voted consistently for the Center General Zionist parties. The General Trend was closely tied ideologically also to the Center. The emphasis on apolitical education was one of the Center's slogans. The Center parties, to a large extent, saw their activism ending with Aliya itself, thereafter beginning the process of "normalization of the

Jewish nation".[31] The Center did not reinforce readiness to forgo individual and selfish wants for the colective well being; their main preoccupation was to forge national unity through the development of a new Jewish cultural basis. In the 1920's and 1930's, many in the Labor movement felt that the bourgeoisie - landlords, merchants and farmers - were pursuing a struggle limited to their narrow class interests. In 1932, Ben-Gurion declared that "Landlord" Zionism was losing even its national content and becoming a Zionism of class interests. Their nationalist slogans, according to him, were used to accomplish their private objectives. He argued that such class Zionism was estranged from Hebrew labor and relied instead on "the black and militant arm of Landlord Zionism, Revisionism, which absorbs its distorted pathos out of class hatred and enmity toward organized workers."[32] Further, they often denied work to Hebrew workers while their own children lived comfortably, but when they did hire workers they exploited them. Ben-Gurion maintained the workers' interests coincided with nation interests. The working class was not interested in the existence of classes. Real national unity could only be built on equality and shared interests which have always been the workers' objectives.[33]

Education for the Workers Trend, however, had a class content and was an instrument in class struggle. They viewed class consciousness as necessary in order to revolutionize Jewish existence. They considered the idea of national unity, as propounded by the General Trend, premature and in fact a deception.

Labor, and in particular Hebrew Labor in Eretz-Israel, was conceived as a human-social ideal, representing Zionism. Even people like Aharon David Gordon, who opposed the notion of class struggle, identified labor as a vehicle or expression of national revival.

Accordingly, confrontation with nature had to occur through a return to physical labor. Furthermore, Judaism signified both a religious and a national phenomenon which could exist only in working the land (biblical land), within which self actualization of the Jew as a man could take place. Gordon affirmed the belief that the character of Jews in the Diaspora was divided, unable to exist either as whole Jews or whole men, condemned to lead passive lives. Only in the Land of Israel, where Jewishness could be taken for granted, would Jews be able to ignore their Jewishness and focus instead on settling and working the land, thus integrating the human and the natural into one entity. In the Diaspora, Jewish existence was a parasitical one, rendering them the living dead. Only through labor within nature could the Jews become alive and sustain themselves as productive human beings.[34] Gordon maintained that "Jewish life in the Diaspora lacks this cosmic element of national identity; it is sustained by the historic element only... We, who have been uprooted, must first learn to know the soil and prepare it for our transplantation... We, who have been torn away from nature, who have lost the savour of natural living- if we desire life, we must establish a new relationship with nature, we must open a new account with it."[35] Essentially, it meant that without the connection to the soil the return to Zion would be barren, indeed, it would be nothing but the continuation of exile. Labor Zionism meant to him an attempt to create an economic base for the Jewish community in Palestine founded on the Jewish labor. Thus, the process of liberation incorporated political, psychological and socioeconomic elements. Jews would become alive and productive, labor serving as a major means in creating a vibrant political culture.

During the Second Aliya, the Labor movement adopted labor as its pivotal idea in the political, cultural and social life of the nation, viewing it as a precondition for the actualization of the Zionist enterprise carried by the workers. Shapira points out that during that epoch "a shift in socialist perception occurred from the view that they were the founders of a Jewish working class to the perception of themselves as the builders of an economy and bearers of responsibility for building a society."[36]

The ideal of labor became then a central point around which educational work clustered. Labor leaders began their work at the end of the 19th century. Many believed that Zionism could only be realized through Hebrew work. But upon arrival in Palestine they became completely disenchanted with the Jewish farmers, who seemed eager to avoid work themselves, prefering to employ cheap labor. Efshtein, for example, began teaching in schools there in an attempt to bring the young generation close to nature by working the soil. He and others were known for their mode of teaching - exploring the roads, rocks, climbing, walking and studying the landscape, activities which strengthened their feelings that the land and nature would be the catalyst for redemption. Their teaching method was to present real, concrete, perceptible, sensual objects enabling the pupils to become immersed in natural phenomena. Basically, he wished the schools to teach the new generations to become productive, creative and independent, repealing the alienated, distorted lives they led before, and, consequently, bringing about national and personal regeneration.[37]

David Idelson, Ron-Polani and Moshe Beigal were among the first to conceive of the idea of labor as pivotal in child education. This

would be conducive to developing a harmonious relation between the body and spirit preparing the young for moral, creative and productive lives.[38] The teachers pointed out that the countryside must be allowed to penetrate the schools, so children could know their surroundings intimately. The teaching of the sciences, for example, must be rendered concrete and accessible, and to that end fewer books were to be used and more field trips, conversations, movement and games pertinent to the subject matters had to be undertaken.

Furthermore, they attempted to fashion a teaching environment where the teachers did not merely lecture while their pupils listened passively, but one where the pupils were involved in thinking and training for pioneering activities. In 1919, Carmi asked his colleages to establish a collective for teachers, and quoting Gordon he said: "We and our children are in danger of developing only one aspect of our body i.e. our brain, while the other components are allowed to degenerate. In the Diaspora this was unavoidable- we were pushed away from labor and creativity, especially within nature. But such a degraded and passive life cannot be justified in Eretz Israel."[39] He suggested that while teachers live communally, they be paid equally; that they divide their day into teaching and farming and that they expose children in urban areas to natural sorroundings - working in the orchards, dairy farms and chicken-coops.[40] In sum, education was intended to be consonant with the image of the Halutz.

In the first Teachers Association meeting in 1920, Idelson noted that labor must be taught in two fashions: as a profession and as corrective approach. In 1922, Idelson and Ron-Polani established the Workers School (Beit-Sefer Amlani) in Tel-Aviv.[41] They proposed that

the new schools be adapted and attend to values and needs in the Yishuv: labor, free creative activities and self management.

When the school opened a circular was sent to parents which described its aims as follows: (1) The knowledge that children need to absorb would be provided according to their ages through Labor. (2) The child would be trained to engage in labor and develop his worldview by partaking in communal activities and through independent work. (3) The curriculum would be set in such a way to allow, always, for theoretical knowledge and labor to be connected.[42]

Consequently, in 1926, the Workers Trend in education was established. The founders determined that labor constituted the condition and measure for erecting a new society, and to that end systematic educational activities were to follow humanist principles of mutual help, solidarity, and participation in the collective endeavor.[43]

They strongly criticized the existing schools of the General Trend as too limited, narrowly planned, overly disciplined, intolerant and inelastic. The method was frontal teaching in rooms with naked walls, no exictement discerned in the classroom, but only renditions and repetitions after the teachers. They seemed to impart to the pupils a condensed version of past events in spite of the fundamental changes occuring in the world, especially for Jews. The critics believed that the pertinent political, economic and cultural questions for the present and future state of affairs were not addressed. Instead, what ought to be cultivated was the ability to think critically and imaginatively and develop the sense of improvisation and enterprise. Labor teachers tried to place at the center of study the learning process itself as a dynamic living experience, rather

than introduce well defined planned lessons listened to passively. The Workers Trend did not have defined plans and the teachers were the ones who excited the pupils with their personality, knowledge and particularly through their eros - libidinal powers.[44] They tried to form an environment consonant with life instincts required for self realization.

Furthermore, national education and hachshara (training) meant the involvement in real and concrete activities, and, consequently, labor served as a pedagogical tool as well as a process and an end for human development. Work in a perennially creative environment, it was believed, would develop the body and mind, render active participation a pleasure and a challenge whether one eventually engaged in manual labor or scientific research. The ideal was to have people who could function as autonomous thinkers and builders, bent on developing their individuality yet happy to work jointly for the common interest.

How was this educational work to be done? Beigal and others suggested that teachers should not provide pupils with ready made, well defined contents, but, instead, devise an approach where the pupil was active in the process of learning and, as much as possible, according to his inclination and interests. They must be helped to discover nature and life on their own. Indeed, the pupil was placed at the center of the educational process, rather than placing the books and "inanimate" material there. The young generation was to be freed of complete subjugation to the curriculum, books and teachers, and would learn out of the real needs, conditions, context and milieu in which it lived. To reiterate then, the pupil's character was the pivotal interest, and the status and function of the curriculum was secondary, serving only as a means to aid the pupil's growth. Learning

would occur mainly through continuous contact with the environment in the bosom of nature where curiosity could spring and be nurtured. The teacher's function was not to convey information as the set truths, but to serve as a guide and counselor, an experienced older friend supporting and advising the younger ones. Moreover, the belief was that a planned, unchanging curriculum signified the end of development, connoting regression rather than progress.[45]

According to Ron-Polani, the knowledge obtained in the General Trend schools did not remain the child's spiritual property, but was only memorized for a short period of time. The child should be allowed to absorb the knowledge necessary to serve him in the present, and, therefore, the teaching methods were more important than the content, since they would remain as tools the child could always employ. Furthermore, educational work must be based upon the child's inquisitivness, his needs for social interaction, play and work. The conditions and tools for such a purpose could be found in the kitchen, farm and library using newspapers, books, farm, garden instruments and flora and fauna.[46]

During the Second Aliya the Labor movement adopted these values both as conditions and as means to establish a new society. Settlers whose vision of Zionism coincided with Labor's established new living arrangements - kibbutzim and other collective settings. In such an atmosphere children understood that physical labor was necessary for the existence of their society, that mutual help and accountability were important values and that their relationaship to the soil was not as to private property, but that it represented a communal value.

The children were expected to become autonomous beings not subjugated to authority. In this community, every individual

contributed according to the best of his abilities and recieved out of everyone's social contributions. Every individual had not only the right to vote and decide, but the obligation to do so. In fact, this was a society of workers - a comradeship - not merely utilitarian, but an educational association.

Organizing educational work in a special setting, Hevrat Yeladim (Children's Society) was suitable to the goals of the Hevrat Ovdim (Workers Society) whose basic ideas were, education for Labor and independence; mutual aid and Halutziut. The Children's Society was based upon self management and a democratic way of life: (1) physical labor constituted the general framework; (2) general equality was a fundamental value; (3) independent work, service to the community and cooperation were paramount; (4) friendly relations between teachers and pupils, and (5) partnership and solidarity between all members of the community.[47]

The importance of the Children's Society was not due to its external style. The mechanech (teacher-educator) was a guide and a partner. The children were encouraged to raise questions and bring up issues that might be difficult and embarassing to the teachers. The ideal of education in the Workers Trend was not to produce conformists who accepted the elders' wishes, bur active participants able to shape their environment. Some maintained that the Children's Society had to exist side by side with the adult society, not within it. As for the curriculum, the emphasis was on making the connection and showing the interdependence among various subject matters, rather than studying themes as unrelated entities. Thus, when children worked in the garden planting lettuce, onion and carrots, the plants constituted the material for studying arithmetic. They conversed about different soils

and plants growing there, gardening tools and their respective functions, geography and topograpgy, fertilizers and worms and the food chain.[48] Thus, they could understand the connection between many aspects of life: theoretical study and real needs, poetry, literature and nature. In manual labor, the child used all of his vital senses. Physical labor did not merely mean training the children to use tools and materials in order to control the technical world around them, but developing habits of working cooperatively and without exploiting the labor of others.

It is of special interest to mention their attitude to the Bible. By bringing the children in contact with original Hebrew folklore, teaching the Bible served as an educational tool for the formation of a new Hebrew character. Some teachers, however, opted to teach the Bible without God, believing that the main characteristic of biblical folklore was its human pathos. Interestingly, such collections of biblical stories were rejected and even though many educators agreed with this ideological outlook they were not prepared to delete God's name completely.[49] In the 1952 curriculum proposal for the educational institutions of Hashomer Hatzair Kibbutz movement it is stated that "We do not educate on the basis of the Tanakh (Bible) towards socialism, although we can make use of the prophetic books for deepening social consciousness".[50] Thus they selected from the Bible the notions that affirmed their concept of social justice such as charity for the poor and peace. Simultaneously, they rejected the depiction of Israel's special status and mission.

The Workers Trend tried to find the balance between ideology and pedagogy. According to them, the latter prescribed for the development of the individual as a whole, placing him/her at the center. They

called their schools batei hinuch (houses of education), as they are still called in the kibbutz today. There, the child was the pivot of educational work, and his education was an evolving process within the context of ideas and values guiding the Labor movement. The corresponding pedagogy was founded on discovering the living connection between, on the one hand, the principles of activism, self-propelled intiative, peer criticism and the free choice of study material (done by mutual agreement between the educator and the pupil), and on the other hand, the social system based on the free exchange of ideas, a model of participatory democracy and preparedness to abolish exploitation.

Mizrahi, the third trend in education, was accepted by the Zionist directorate in 1920. The religious Zionists experienced many conflicts regarding the Zionist ideology with its revolutionary motif - demanding a radical change in Jewish life. They wanted, in fact, to base the future Jewish society on the Halacha (laws of the Talmud).

On the one hand the religious Zionists rebelled against the destiny of Jews, asserting the need for an independent Jewish society, which implied a modern state, but on the other hand, they remained loyal to the precepts of their faith and tradition. The conflict and dualism were twofold then: the disagreement between the religious themselves on the degree of orthodoxy and compromise, and between them and the secular Jews, among them many anti-religious.

The tendency to secularize historical, religious symbols and read biblical texts secularly prompted in the religious Zionists the need to struggle and somehow solve the problems independently in their own schools.[51] Therefore, their brand of education developed into a unique, separatist and monolithic system. The Mizrahi education

attempted to combine the religious and traditional tenets with modern education, the former providing the values and moral grounds, and the latter the neccessities for living in a modern society in cooperation with other Jews in the common enterprise of nation building.

In the Mizrahi curriculum, religious studies comprised 50% of the time, while the study of Hebrew, social and natural sciences were limited. This plan was to meet the major goal of the Mizrahi, namely, the education of an observant Jew. Accordingly, prayer as a daily routine had a pivotal place, engendering in the pupil religious feelings and commitments. Interestingly, the study of English and mathematics was not significantly limited, a fact that points to the pragmatic and utilitarian concerns of the Mizrahi.[52] Clearly, the study of general subjects was relegated to the realm of necessity, while religious studies served as the building blocks of the spiritual world within which the individual's essence took shape. The distinction between worldly concerns and moral existence legitimized the study of non-religious ideas.[53] These schools prepared the pupils to understand the social and political forces around them. In educating them to accept the duties of citizenship they were taught, also, to attempt to realize their goals politically. In many of the religious Zionist writings the theme of national rebirth is explained as aiming toward spiritual development requiring personal change, as well as the immediate duty to partake in all aspects of social development. The commitment and complete readiness to pursue these sacred goals reinforced their involvement in political stuggles over the shape of the Israeli society.

In the 1930's the strength of the religious views was already apparent. The secular worldview of Mapai's (Israeli Workers Party)

leadership was weak because of their inability to divorce Jewish Religion from nationalist tradition, and thus they eventually bowed to religious pressures and demands. The religious parties had an ideological advantage due to the intensity of their beliefs and refusal to compromise any aspect of it as compared to some of the socialists, especially among the leadership. This situation was unravelled after the establishment of the state, when decisions regarding the unification of the educational trends were taken. Labor's basic principles were compromised, undermined and distorted by the leadership itself. As Shapiro concedes, in every society there exists a considerable gap between the proclaimed ideology and the reality, between ought and is, the former serving as a guiding and educating force. In Israel, however, the gap between ideology and reality has been too wide, hinging upon the most fundamental and vital principles, and so the ideology can no longer serve as a guiding power.[54]

3. Mamlachtiut and the Unification of Education

The three trends we have discussed hitherto constituted a decentralized answer to the Yishuv's pluralism and, in fact, they were three centralized yet parallel systems of education. The inspection, verification and overseeing of education was done not by the parents and community but by the political parties.

In 1953 the Knesset adopted the State Education Law, aimed at terminating the parallel systems and creating, instead, a uniform system. The law declared that "state education means education provided by the state according to a curriculum, without ties to

party, ethnic or any other organization outside the government and under the supervision of the Minister of Education or one appointed by him."[55]

We saw before that the curricula, methods of teaching, budgetary considerations, inspection of the schools and appointment of teachers were determined by the separate trends according to their ideological orientations. Since the unification of the educational trends new loci of power have been established. The educational system has become centralized and policies have been determined by the Ministry of Education. The authority to control and manage the educational system has been implemented by three persons: (1) the Minister of Education and Culture, who is a member of the cabinet, representing one of the political parties in the coalition government; (2) the Director General of the Ministry, who is a civil servant appointed by the cabinet to be the chief administrator of the system; (3) the Director of the Religious Education Division in the Ministry, appointed by the Minister of Education to control religious education.[56]

The Minister's bureau is at the helm serving as a link between the political and bureaucratic offices. When the Minister's aides, the Director General or another source, come up with ideas and they are able to introduce them in the Ministry bureau, the nucleus for future educational policies is set. The next stage requires lobbying the Treasury Ministry. The Deputy Minister's bureau has an important political function. It allows the parties that participate in the coalition government to exert influence over educational policies. Indeed, the choice of the Deputy Minister is a crucial decision regarding coalition bargaining.

The function of the unit for religious education is not limited to the religious aspects of religious education. In fact, it determines the overall educational policies of this sub-sytem. It constitutes an independent office for religious education within the Ministry. It is not bound by the political decisions of the Ministry since it views itself as a parallel educational system free to develop independent policies, including areas that are not directly connected to religious education. Over the years, it exerted pressures to widen its authority and has become a hierarchical system whose presence is felt in every unit, department and region of the Ministry. Its policies serve as directives for country wide and local inspectors.[57]

The Ministry controls budgetary allocations, curricula, learning standards and teacher licensing. Local authorities implement the Ministry's directives. The curriculum (for state schools) is determined exclusively by the Ministry, as are the teachers's salary scales and the allocation of resources for school services, construction and maintenence.

The Mapai party saw itself as leading the people from class to nation in spite of the fact that it was class based, and its power, authority and interests were class bound.[58] The purpose of the left wing in the socialist Zionist movement was to bring about the proletarian revolution. Ben-Gurion, a socialist Zionist, disagreed claiming that such a goal was irrelevant and impossible since neither a working class nor a capitalist bourgeoisie existed. Instead, he contended that the aim was to build an economy by broadening the social and power base of the Labor movement. Furthermore, he emphasized that the primary need was to build a nation state and run

it properly: "...a well ordered state is not an outcome of well ordered morals, but an outcome of a well ordered an educated citizenship."[59] The contradiction between mamlachtiut (etatism), adopted officially by Mapai itself, which previously denounced it as opportunism and deception used by its foes, was artificially mended and legitimized. Now, the real workers' interests were to be reconciled with the new interests and needs dictated by the pressing conditions for nation building.

Ideological fervor seemed to subside as the process of normalization, political independence and the spirit of nationalism became the dominant characteristics. Clearly, the overriding objective to be pursued in the schools became loyalty to the state. The question is, however, to what extent does this notion dominate other values, and how could the schools translate it into educational work? Simultaneously, and as a consequence of statehood, other changes resulted: First, the realization of mamlachtiut - primacy of the state - precluded the implementation of ideological pluralism; second, drastic demographic changes following mass immigration required immediate steps; third, the state established centralized bureaucracy in education; fourth, the Arab-Israeli conflict raised questions about education for peace within the context of war. The educational system was no longer a voluntary system of a homogeneous public, encouraging ideological variety within, and was transformed into a system servicing a socially, ethnically, and economically heterogeneous public. The teachers, previously committed to a variety of ideological outlooks, were no longer the emissaries of the movement, but civil servants.[60]

Mamlachtiut was basically realized in Ben-Gurion's personality and leadership, and was initiated from "above." The beginning of this perocess in education can be traced to 1949 with the Mandatory Education Law (the first education law in the state, and one of the first laws passed by the Kenesset). The parents were obligated to send their children ages 5-13 to a free, public school. Moreover, employers had to free youth ages 14-17 to attend classes if they had not previously completed their elementary education.[61]

Ben-Gurion's vision or objective of growing from "class to nation" connotes his intentions to secure the sovereignty of the state by subduing the secondary centers which were relatively autonomous during the Yishuv. Indeed, the Israeli Defense Army (IDF), was the first arena that made the realization of these aims possible, and the educational system was the second.

To a certain extent, mamlachtiut - by overriding class interests, diminished the achievement and work, the institutions and organizations created especially to serve workers interests and needs. One has to question whether Mapai intended to abandon its original worldview or actually continue to maintain it while enlarging its base. Many Mapai members wanted to preserve the class content but used the concept of Mamlachtiut as a way to legitimize and attract a large non-proletarian clientele. They believed that workers education could be applied to all Jewish inhabitants through the unification process. But now, instead of having workers education as one trend among many, there would be an all encompassing state education not officially under the auspices of any particular party, but de facto under Mapai

which was the largest party. Consequently, Labor's political hegemony would render its social philosophy a public property.

Mamlachtiut as an idea and a source of inspiration was unable to substitute for the previous ideas found in the different trends and the lack of ideological tension emptied education of real content introducing, instead, a one dimensional nationalist element.

Critics point to the static state of the educational system operating within a changing environment. This system lacked mechanisms for renewal to integrate the changes. No solution could be found to balance out the process of centralizing management with divergent ideas. In the Kibbutzim and in the religious schools there continued to be vitality in the material and its relevance to the pupils' lives, by focusing on the specific commitments (socialist or religious) and daily activities to realize them. But the state itself, as a source of educational influence, with its task of absorbing and integrating exiles from different backgrounds, emphasized mamlachtiut as the commom denominator, thus rendering education inflexible and frozen. Perhaps, it could have been wiser, and a true reflection of reality, to leave the trends intact mirroring the opinions and commitments of the citizens in a democracy. After all, the religious (state schools and Agudah) retained their independence, as did the Kibbutzim.

A minority in Mapai and Mapam (United Workers Party) objected to Ben-Gurion's concept since they did not believe that the Labor movement could succeed in transforming the whole educational system into a Workers Trend and therefore demanded instead that it be strengthened as a separate trend. In a letter to Ben-Gurion several years later, Israel Galili notes that the nullification of the trends

had cost the Labor movement one of its best tools of pioneering and stripped Socialist Zionism of its educational mission.[62] Hankin expressed alarm about the authoritarian conception of the state which enfeebles both the ideal of halutziut (pioneering) and the idea of democracy, substituting instead adoration of the state. Pluralism was undermined by extrapolating the military model into the social arena.[63] This group, however, failed where the religious groups succeeded. The latter remained as they were: insulated, subsidized, and more influential politically and educationally than they were before.

The Workers Trend had been established when socialist ideologies and parties were strong in many countries. Following World War II their strength and impact decreased especially in Palestine, and solidarity with Holocaust survivors led to an emphasis upon the Jewish condition: solving the national problems of the Jews took precedence over other problems. Inevitably, some of the justification of socialist ideology and solidarity across national boundaries lost its relevance also in education.

Eventually, Workers education increasingly resembled the General Trend's. Moreover, a religious sub-trend in Workers education was formed, in order to influence Oriental immigrants and recruit them as a large bloc of voters.[64]

The passage of the 1953 State Education Law sealed the period of ideological pluralism in the educational system. In reality, the Workers Trend was the only one that was completely undermined and is almost extinct, since in many ways the state education system was a continuation of the General Trend's idea of a uniform school.

Paragraph II of the Law stipulates ideas and values intended to constitute the foundation of state education: "education will be based upon the culture of Israel, scientific achievements, love of country, loyalty to the State and people, training in agricultural work and craftmanship, pioneering preparedness in accordance with the desire to form a society founded on freedom, equality, tolerance, mutual help and love of humanity."[65] These general ideas were reached by the majority of the participants, primarily, because they lacked precision. From an intellectual standpoint, the law did not add a thing, but in fact, it diminished the real meaning of these ideas and rendered them lifeless concepts devoid of guiding or educational power. Not one teacher could have known how to act, merely by reading this paragraph, which was nothing more than a proclamation, making it virtually impossible to distinguish between those who followed it or those who abrogated it.

In spite of the fact that ideological pluralism in education was disallowed structurally, some remained. For religious and Kibbutz education, the law did not close off the option for expressing particularist ideologies.

The political problem that the religious groups were facing was how to maintain their trend intact without postponing the adoption of the State Education Law. Actually, they believed that by supporting the law they would get, in return, a guarantee that their trend would exist independently; that is, all trends would be dismantled except theirs.

The arguments and disagreements about this law involved political considerations rather than educational ones. Every decision about the

schools' structure, direction, activities and scope was, to a large extent, a political decision. The question is, what and whose interests were served by particular decisions? The 1953 law was a decision that served certain political needs of the parties supporting it, especially the immediate and short range need to abolish the parties' control of education. When the parties were the ones responsible for their respective educational networks, those participating in educational work were truly committed ideologically and involved in their party's policies. They could try to influence and change those aspects or decisions made by party officials if they deemed it imperative. However, when the state "owned" education, there was less room for such activities because the educational personnel were less committed, the parents less involved and the bureaucracy too large. As the parties were held at arm's length away from education, a vacuum was created in the educational system. The ideological direction that education received previously from the parties became the function of the state. The parties could, at least potentially, provide education with guiding ideas while the state could not. According to Lam, in the state system the relationship between the educational institutions and its clientele is not as personal, immediate and connected. Thus, education could only mimic the style of ideological direction - one acceptable to or tolerated by the various parties - rather than make an effort to produce mechanisms which would forge an original direction suitable to the new reality.[66]

State education meant that education must be under the state's sphere of influence and rule, and that it carries the complete responsibility for the manner in which the development of the youth is

directed and realized. But since the largest party was composed of Labor supporters, should one have expected education to be tailored accordingly? What are the different interpretations that can be derived from, or applied to the 1953 Law? Is the meaning etatist, with the highest value or priority being bestowed upon the state, although other values are recognized as well? Is the meaning totalitarian, with all the decisions being made by the state without contributions, input or disagreements from any other source? The General Zionist interpretation was that education ought to be apolitical. This view was opposed by those who claimed that a general, neutral education does not exist in the world today, just as a neutral state, devoid of a definite social image, does not exist.

Ben-Zion Dinur, the Minister of Education at the time and a Labor party member, asserted that the state cannot give up or put aside its basic responsibilities for education: developing the personal abilities and talents of its citizens (the human image), or their social skills (social image), in addition to molding the national image. The state would betray its calling if it transferred elsewhere the role of attending to the moral beliefs, intellectual and technical capabilities and talents of the citizens as well as to the social content presented in the schools.[67] During the discussions in the Knesset in regard to the 1953 Law, Dinur noted that the meaning of state education lies in the fact that the state accepts full, unhesitant and undivided responsibility for education. The state does not only render it mandatory for parents to safeguard their children's right to an education, but also offers a free education. The state is the responsible agent for the manner in which such obligations are

carried out. The state, then, has to direct and guide the development of the young generation.[68]

Dinur had the task of organizing the ministry, establishing its status among the teachers and the public and setting its functions. His attitudes toward the teaching of the bible, patriotism, and the uniform curriculum are very telling.

His suggestion about the teaching of the bible is based upon the same principles used in the General Trend: the aim is to clarify for the pupils the connection between the Bible and the country of the Bible. He emphasized the realism in the prophecies, the uniqeness of artistic description, all within the historical framework.[69] Furthermore, the stress upon Jewish essence built on a general moral and universal worldview and the usage of the Hebrew language as spiritually unifying for the nation was deemed critical. The focus on patriotism as an educational value can be seen as a direct continuation of the nationalist worldview held by the General Trend. Dinur adds, however, that the necessity to cultivate loyalty to the state must be related to Jewish history. After all, "our legacy of political education is sparse and poor. We have always been politically, socially, morally and spiritually dependent and enslaved... Patriotism enhances experiences and emotions that unify people and connect them to their past, present and future. The history, language and literature taught should not be measured by the quantity and facts mastered, but by the intensity of will to live together in solidarity...."[70]

The uniform curriculum expresses the major effort to realize the principles of state education. It was set to bring unity in three

areas:ideological - eliminating ideological variety; cultural - consolidation of a plan on the basis of the ruling cultural tenets during the Yishuv, and socially - a uniform and equal attitude to everyone in the educational system, regardless of ethnicity, social and economic status.[71] This, in fact, meant submitting any differences due to ethnicity, country of origin or ideas, to an imposed plan from above.

Yizhar remarks that the shapers of educational policies pretended to have at their disposal sublime values to serve as the cornerstone for educational work. But often all they have are simple slogans so general that they can be adapted to every circumstance, and interpreted in so many different ways that it becomes futile to object to them or argue about their merit.[72] Indeed, as Eden argues, although specific objectives were set for each subject matter, they were stated ostentatiously and were too ambitious. For example, the study of history was to "nurture the childrens' recognition that the lofty notions of Torat Israel, the vision of the prophets about the millennium, Jewish diligence in studying the Torah, the preservation of religious manners, the deep belief in the Eternal Will, the incessant ties to the homeland and the belief in redemption - all provided our people with the will to withstand its enemies and maintain its independence, and brought the nation back to its homeland to establish the state of Israel."[73]

Banai compares the educational plans after the unification with Labor's curriculum created by the Workers Trend. While the new curriculum, the basis for which is found in the State Education Law, promulgated certain values without closely defining the specificity of

the goals, the Workers Trend stressed explicitly its educational aims and the means by which to achieve them. While the former pointed in very general terms to the importance of such values as patriotism and loyalty to the people, the Workers Trend (refered to hereafter as the Teudah) discussed the concrete manifestations of this love and loyalty and the way to bring them about effectively.

Further, the law assumed education to be based on scientific achievements (developments), while the movement emphasized education (haskala) not as possessing intrinsic values but as a means for renewal and for building the new society. In the law it was merely said that children would be trained in agricultural work, but in the Teudah training was viewed as moral and practical preparedness - instilling love for labor and an understanding of the connection between physical and spiritual elements. Thus, the dynamic side of education was considered pivotal: education for a passionate pursue of equality and justice without exploitation or class division. The law, however, presented an intention to seek equality, which Banai sees as a passive commitment, in addition to another element altogether missing in the law; i.e., the importance attributed to a comprehensive solidarity among the peoples of the world.[74] In sum, in spite of the fact that the law certainly included tenets easily identified as labor inspired, they may be seen as a watered down, unprincipled compromise of the essential values of the Workers Trend. Accordingly, a great number of secular children became exposed to teaching of Jewish consciousness, not merely in its secularized historical form. Consequently, socialism was surpassed by nationalism - nationalism with a Jewish face. The Jewish content meant not just the frame of

national liberation, but one filled with religious meaning and tradition; i.e., a conservative content rather than a revolutionary one like the workers' Teudah. (In 1962, some Labor members pointed to changes resulting from already weakened labor values. They viewed the social and ideological deterioration as a process that had already begun, with the youth being devoid of ideals and embracing instead materialism.).

In 1954 and 1955, the Ministry of Education published curricula for state elementary schools and state religious schools for grades 1 through 8. In the preface it was stated that: "The curriculum must be based in its entirety on state education goals, accurately expressing the need to accomplish them... and, thus, it is forbidden to have within the curriculim or the daily life of the school anything that would contradict these goals.... Therefore, curricular planning must be concieved as spiritually unifying since it is based upon the legacy and values of the nation's history, given to the teachers, the state's guardians, to transmit to the growing generation."[75] Further, it was stated in the Law, that in every subject matter and in every grade, the Ministry would determine what the teachers ought to teach, so that exactly the same material would be taught without any difference; that is, a uniform curricular plan would be applied in all schools in Israel. This uniform plan was intended to bring about the intellectual and cultural equality among children of different backgrounds, thusly, realizing the integration of the exiles.

The law and the curriculum stress centralized authority and control to prevent the recapture of the local school system by the

parties, which were viewed as less able to attend to the needs of immigrants from "backward" countries.

Curriculum for grades 5-8 was organized around basic and supplementary areas of instruction. The latter was to fill but 25% of weekly hours (30-35 hours). The course of study enumerates 10 such supplementary programs. Additional programs could be added subject to approval by the Ministry, after being requested by 3/4 majority of the parents in a given school district. The suggested supplementary programs were those that strengthened Jewish tradition through emphasis upon prayers, customs, rituals and language studies; literature involving the Bible and Mishna; gardening, nature studies, manual arts and home economics. In addition, religion and Talmud were introduced to boys and girls. However, few schools seemed to avail themselves of the right to choose supplementary programs.[76] This was criticized as being merely a gesture and, indeed, this section of the law has hardly been invoked except by the Kibbutz schools.

It is important to note that within this relatively large variety of supplementary studies, there were really no programs that dealt with ethnic problems in Israel, or with Jewish-Arab animosity. Furthermore, the Ministry exhibited a readiness to increase emphasis on the teaching of Jewish consciousness in State schools.[77]

The demand for greater stress on Jewish tradition in the State schools was defended not as an attempt to adopt the dogmas of their religious counterparts, but rather as an inclination to take greater cognizance of the Jewish tradition and legacy. To clarify this the Ministry said: "The aim of this program is to impart to the youth knowledge of Jewish life and of the Jewish past and create an

environment and attitude which prepares young people to be profoundly influenced by, and absorb our national values."[78]

Nonetheless, this program has been opposed by both orthodox and secular Jews. The former saw in it signs of insincerity and cynicism on the part of the non-religious teachers in handling religious subject matters. The latter saw it as a violation of the non-religious concept of the public school and capitulation to the clerics and religionists.

Adar criticizes the idea of a uniform program as undermining both the teachers' and pupils' ability to maintain their unique characteristics, thus rendering educational work mechanical.[79] By strictly following the decisions of the Ministry, the teachers began to loose their pedagogical conscience and the individual differences among the pupils could not be attended to. Adar calls attention to pupils of disadvantaged backgrounds and their difficulty to adjust to these educational conditions. Undoubtedly, individual differences were ignored in order to achieve complete cultural-national unity.

Education was conceived primarily as a valuable vehicle promoting national unity, but the ideology of Mamlachtiut turned out to be an obstacle in addressing the needs of the heterogeneous population. Heightening etatist inclination in a young state can be very destructive. The attempt to enhance national unity has been viewed as paramount in Israel. But could education be expected to become a creator of culture rather than a transmitter of culture? Is culture made in the schools?[80] This path would prove to be counterproductive, and instead of unity it would bring schism. The excessive amount of material compressed into the curriculum reflects the conception of

elementary school not as a first step in education but as self contained. The uniform curriculum was based on the belief that a uniform culture could be created - a measure that pointed to lack of confidence in the teachers and a tendency to ignore pupils' needs. Interestingly, Mizrahi showed greater flexibility towards the teachers, allowing them to select and organize their material. Perhaps because their worldview was clear and explicit there was no fear of undue deviations.

The adoption of the State Education Law could mean one of two things: either the law was set to answer the immediate needs of the parties, creating a centralized system whose framework consisted of loose and unclear ideas open to various interpretations (then, why cancel the trends?), or the Law was an attempt to define precisely the direction and content of education, in which case, according to Lam, it was an improper act since such a plan ought not be legislated in a democratic country. A democratic regime is unable to pass laws that determine the unchangeable content of education, just as it cannot have laws determining the beliefs, opinions and views of the citizens.[81]

The true result of inter-party negotiations in formulating the law was that, in the final analysis, education was left without a real direction. Essentially, paragraph II was not prepared to guide educational work, and yet, every gesture that seems to contradict it is considered unlawful. When a law is supposedly directive, yet, is de facto powerless to direct, education remains without any guiding presence. The centralization of management is interpreted as the centralization of ideas, and instead of having a teacher decide on how

to pursue the educational work according to individual judgement, he awaits to be guided from "above." The consequence was the perpetuation and emphasis upon uncontroversial educational goals. Although the new curriculum differs from each trend's curriculum, the wording is very general. The Law asserts that education will follow the Culture of Israel, not the Tradition of Israel, which may be interpreted as meaning that education will not be absolutely religious. Education was set to adopt scientific achievements but not the spirit of science, which may mean that it will not be completely secular. Also, some of the essence of the Workers Trend such as freedom, equality and solidarity was included, but it specified pioneering preparedness and not Halutziut and its actual realization.[82]

Mamlachtiut could not be imposed as a one time decision. It should have been, if anything, an evolutionary process where each trend struggles with social, economic and political ideas, finding a way to balance its particular proclivities with the general interest of the people and the state. The question that the negotiators or representatives struggled with during the discussions about the Law should have been left open ended rather than closed for further developments; formulae arrived at due to political compromise cannot be truly educational, but could only reinforce a detachment, contempt and alienation from worthwhile values impossible to put into effect. Ideologically, a paradox existed: the concept of Mamlachtiut came out of Zionist Halutziut activities during the Yishuv, but the wording or draft purposefully ignored the great variety of the ideas of Zionist Halutziut, and thus resulted in an undefined, foggy ambivalent view.

Following the 1977 political upheaval, many critics from the Labor movement became nostalgic about pre-state Labor values. They lamented the crumbling of the ideological fervor of the Workers Trend, gradually undermined by the growing influence of individualistic values and the thirst to mimic the apparent wealth and comfort of the West. The question raised by Arik Carmon is important: Would not the developmental path of the Israeli society in the last three decades have eliminated the ideological variety in education even without the State Education Law? Had the 1953 Law never been passed, would the modernization process have taken the same course, influencing educational goals and creating new needs? Could the educational Trends have survived for long? The implication of his argument is that certain natural changes occured within the society, pushing it fron an ideological orientation and essence to a post ideological one hastened by the impact of technology and bureaucratization.[83] Accordingly, the corresponding changes in education, and the willingness of former ideologues to submit to and even welcome them was not the direct result of the law but emanated from changed orientation and conditions in the Israeli society.

These changes are reflected in the routinization of the value of labor. During the Yishuv era, as we saw, labor was assigned a crucial role in the movement's pronouncements and curriculum. Education for labor prepared the pupils to become active in the collective endeavor designed to build the country and society. Gradually, however, emphasis had shifted to the least radical element - national redemption. It did not require change in social structure but stressed internal strength and unity to withstand assault from outside.

Concomitantly, in the educational system discussions have increasingly centered on training for particular skills needed for the economy and for the individual's survival. The shift from ideological to practical education systematically developed. In the first decade following the establishment of the state, the idea of labor was included in the declarations of educators and of the Ministry of Education. The Yishuv's educational leaders continued, or at least tried, to shape education in the period of state's infancy with labor still a cherished ideal. During the first few years after the establishment of the state the intention was not the elimination of values inherent in the Workers Trend. The trend was eliminated as a separatist framework but its content was not supposed to perish. The objective of many labor supporters was to include this content into a general mandatory educational framework. Bash was among the participants during the political discussions regarding unification, and he testified to the fact it was explicitly emphasized and agreed by many that labor content would be preserved in the state education system. In the 1970's, Bash expressed his regrets at having favored the elimination of the trends system, viewing the neglect of the teaching of labor as a serious flaw.[84] The place of labor as a major value in education receded in importance for the young state, but was kept alive in some public statements because of habit and, perhaps, to assuage some dissatisfied Halutzim.

Nevertheless, in the late 1950's, Minister of Education Zalman Aranne (of the Labor party), specified that education had two functions to fulfill: (1) addressing the needs of the state, and (2) meeting the state's responsibility toward the individual pupils by

training them in specific areas to acquire needed skills. Thus, the schools would diminish the gap between learning and life. Children ought not be allowed to grow up without preparation for holding a job, and, hence, there is nothing wrong with imposing on them a particular type of training or vocation beginning at age 12.[85] In addition, he emphasized the necessity of developing Jewish identity and viewed the schools as primary agents for such a task. Some of the themes he suggested are as follows: (1) The teaching of the prophets; Mizva (good deed) - among people and between them and God; Kidush Ha'shem (martyrdom); contradiction between morality and reality; morality of the nation and society according to state laws. (2) Israel and its Torah. (3) The relationship between Israel and other nations. (4) Diaspora and redemption. (5) The prophecies. (6) Halutziut in the Jewish nation. (7) Heroism in national history and literature. (8) Vision of the Israeli state. (9) Foundation of manual labor in the cultural heritage. (10) Man - his essence and value.[86]

In 1963, Eban noted that "The primary importance of education is that it constitutes a significant factor in the state's progress. First and formost, our security is dependent upon education... Two factors - the strengthening of the Arab nation, and its reluctance to abandon revenge - determine the framework of security needs. Against that, what hope do we have, if we do not take advantage of the balancing and compensatory power of technology.... Technology provides power in the hands of those who can make use of its advantages. This is the security aspect of education."[87]

Following unification, the strong influence of Mizrahi and General Trend ideas are apparent in the new curriculum. Whereas Jewish

studies (Scripture and Oral Law) constituted 23 weekly hours out of 220 hours for grades 3 - 8 in the Workers Trend, they now constituted 27 out of 172 hours. Hebrew lessons changed from 36 to 25 hours, social studies from 35 to 24, natural studies from 47 to 35, labor (gardening and crafts) from 36 to 24. The increase in the study of Oral Law and Scripture is significant since it led to the elimination of studying the Labor movement in the higher grades of elementary school. Not only were fewer hours dedicated to the study of agriculture, but the previous meaning attached to it - as social and moral principles - were deleted, and the stress was on efficiency instead.[88]

In contrast, the kibbutz movement has attempted to preserve important labor aspects, both in its daily way of life as well as in education. In spite of the changes undergone by the kibbutz, mainly due to industrialization and modernization, it has retained ideological principles found in the Workers Trend. In the history curriculum, for example, in addition to studying Jewish history and the Zionist movement, other topics have been emphasized: socialist thought, developments in the Third World (and the Middle East), national movements, imperialism and colonialism. Educational work, therefore, corresponds to an ideological inheritance grounded in the vision of man and society.[89]

4. <u>The Shift and Routinization in Labor's Ideology</u>

The political and social processes that Israel has gone through in the first decades following the establishment of the state have had an impact on the nature and character of the educational system and

its pedagogical method. Historically, there are two tendencies influencing the interdependence between school and society, and the two are in contradiction with each other and in constant tension. Firstly, the pedagogical direction emanating from a collectivist orientation molding the goals and content of education so that the needs of the collective (general will) are paramount, and secondly, a pedagogical orientation measuring the sucess of the individual through rewards, achievements and diplomas, rather than emphasizing the imperative of the public good. The remnants of an ideological society coexist with the symbols of education in a post-ideological reality. Systematically, the second orientation became dominant in all sectors of education.[90] The question is whether we are witnessing a post-ideological era, as Carmon contends, or whether a different, substitute new ideology, i.e., an extreme form of nationalism and militarism sometimes justified according to religious tenets, gradually beginning to dominate the political culture. Nonetheless, even after four decades, one cannot claim that the first orientation had dissappeared altogether. It has been pushed aside yet brought up now and again in public debates and is still found on the agenda. Due to its persistent existence, however brief and abstract, perhaps it moderates to some extent the second tendency.

In the 1980's, the tension between the two approaches is fed by the fact that the educational system is not ready and cannot afford to recognize openly achievement through cut throat competition (hesegiut) - one of the post ideological values - as an educational value, since it reinforces inequality. One of the stated aims of education in Israel is to bring about equality in the classroom, diminishing the

gaps among students of different backgrounds. In other words, it seems that the educational network reflects, in its declaratory dimension, the lack of readiness of a portion of the society to accept the changes occuring in their code of values. In the Israeli society there is, then, a dualism regarding the proper values, and the schools are torn between the two directions. It seems, however, that the values encompassing ideas of a different, naive age are but a nostalgic residue that cannot be thoroughly buried. To some degree they represent the society's raison d'etre and the dreams of time past, yet, the striving and actions of the population and the leadership point to the practical, modern, achievement-oriented, individualistic direction. The modern necessities are coupled with a realistic appreciation of Israel's predicament, namely, constant war leading to justification of its conduct.

Carmon maintains that, following a war, the ideological tendency is manifested. It would seem, however, that war and the period following it is characterizied by justification and enthrallment with the events which is not post ideological, but very ideological, however different than what Carmon had in mind. It is the ideology of conquest and victory and self righteousness.

Although education was assigned a pivotal role in the establishment of the new society and the various groups insisted on instilling their particular version, the educational content was finally determined by political criteria. The compromise and accomodation of principles was most pronounced for Labor. By abandoning its values it became ready to appropriate its foes' nationalist face, which it deemed a popular way to recruit supporters

and enlarge its power base. Though labor ideas and practices dominated the essence of the young society, the leaders perhaps believed that such a way of life could be carried out only by the few. For the many, however, more accessible and appealing concepts were needed, those that would serve to cement the precarious ties among a heterogeneous population. Indeed, they opted for functional images easily transmitted and able to produce consensus. The General and religious trends did not compromise their worldviews. The latter not only remained autonomous, but also able to introduce increasingly and vehemently its beliefs, however diluted, to the state schools. As for the former, its essential nature was absorbed therein.

Ideas and material were compressed into the curriculum so that mostly simple sentiments could be elicited. The effort and imagination necessary for maintaining values, which anyway conflicted with reality, were subdued. Thus, Labor leaders legitimized the worldview that brought the demise of their original intent, steadily elevating those who were naturally more inclined to such ideas. They allowed, partly by default, for the accentuation of this worldview that begot a life of its own, positing before them the choice to follow suit or abdicate. They chose the former perhaps hoping to reverse the process that got out of hand.

Could it have been expected that the impoverishment of labor ideals would be reversed eventually when, in fact, the founding generation had gradually to relinquish its reign and allow the second generation to assume leadership? The second generation - a post-revolutionary one grew up in a milieu which was molded with the labor and vision of their elders, and was constantly in the shadow of living

legends whose influence permeated all facets of life. In contrast to the leaders the young generation's worldview was spiritually poor and one dimensional. The founding generation's Weltanschauung was rich, containing a large array of values, ideas and goals according to which it attempted to fashion the society's and its own destiny. The young generation was not engaged in experiments to engender and implement an original social philosophy. Indeed, the ideological vocabulary was the product of the elders' initiative, so they remained spiritually dependent, or, as Shapiro maintains, actually barren.[91] When living ideas become merely "an hereditary creed to be received passively, not actively - when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as the first, to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its beliefs present to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all the belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent."[92] In his discussion about routinization of charisma, Max Weber points to the unintended consequences of charisma. Accordingly, the charismatic movement characterized by creative, imaginative and spontaneous leaders or ideas gradually deteriorates into an ordinary routine predicament and the original doctrines "are intellectually adjuusted to the needs of the stratum which becomes the primary carrier of the leader's message..."[93] Further, as the original doctrines degenerate, expediencey is taken for the ultimate value and the charismatic movement becomes routinized into traditionalism and bureaucratization. The living power of the guiding ideas decline and they could only mimic them with resentment and admiration perennially stu[illegible] the oedipal stage of development. The connection between the halutzim who strove to redeem the land and liberate their persons,

and the youth's devotion to preserve their heroes' endeavor, mainly through fighting, was inevitable. Since they could not become philosopher-kings they became the guardians - the warriors preoccupied with safeguarding the polity. Shapiro contends that post elementary education constituted a crucial agent in the political socialization of the younger generation. While workers education efforts centered mostly in kindergarten and elementary schools, the General Trend held most of the high schools.[94] There the teachers tried to find the middle course between liberal - individualistic interpretations of the General Trend and the collectivist ideals of the Workers Trend. The result was a simplistic nationalist approach whose supreme aim was to train students to become the redemptive army set on the mission of establishing the Jewish state. National Jewish ethnocentrism was significantly pronounced, emphasizing the superiority of Jewish culture and the need to safeguard its uniqueness from outside contamination. Accordingly, studies that digressed from this narrow path were condemned as cosmopolitan, in fact, as anti-Zionist.

More importantly, the messages that the young absorbed from various quarters imposed on them paradoxical demands: the image of the Halutz who conquers land through labor was revered, yet parents, many of them Halutzim themselves, encouraged them to become professionals - vocations publically despised when compared to the Halutz. Thus, the parents' desire for upward mobility was transmitted to their children without, of course, their dropping the ideological pronouncements that celebrated collectivism and self sacrifice. In short, a definite contradiction was created and the students continued to declare their will and commitment to Halutziut while simultaneously preparing for

professional careers.[95] The discrepency between proclaimed beliefs and reality was a pattern found in the schools and reinforced at home. The young mended this dissonance by becoming bureaucrats dealing with Halutziut theoretically at the office desk, drafting others to join and pursue the actual work. They lacked a political education since they hardly ever studied the functions and modes of operation of a political system. In the high schools the ideas and structure of a democratic system were not fathomed and they did not learn to recognize the legitimacy of conflicting interests nor the need for divergent opinions in the course of public debate.[96] This limited instruction deprived them of the development of tolerant attitudes toward that which was different and unfamiliar. Further, the founding fathers' expectations of their successors could not be fulfilled. Their own worldview emerged out of two factors: (1) rebellion against their elders, and (2) the particular system of values they fashioned. Their demands of their followers were paradoxical, since it was impossible to rebel against the founders and simultaneously to integrate and absorb the values they propounded in their entirety. When the young exhibited a tendency to rebel they were accused of denying the core values, but when they followed their leaders unquestioningly they were depicted as too dependent.[97]

Nationalism remained the most vibrant force and the common denominator encompassing both idea and practice. It is not surprising that the educational institutions increasingly became depleted of ideas and values, bent mostly on combining military training with nationalist concepts. Especially after unification, old values were transformed into historical data rather than vital guiding force. The

majority of Mapai agreed to accomodations and compromises in spite of their political hegemony because, in fact, they were not really compromising. Some of the disappointed Labor supporters, especially the left wing, were authentic in their cry. The rupture between ought and is crystalized then, but it certainly did not originate in 1953. It was an inevitable process begun in the Yishuv, when the founding generation failed to impart to its successors the vision and needed tools to maintain the revolutionary dynamics and rendered them, instead, obedient executors lacking foresight and imagination.

The outlook of the second generation was compatible with the requirements of the law and curriculum whose objectives combined a diluted version of labor and liberal pronouncements which they had learned to recite, and an overall nationalist perspective that they identified with. Their preparation was so limited and skewed that they lacked the flexibility to confront and struggle with new problems and changing conditions. Nevertheless, it was this generation's role to shoulder the responsibility for the consolidation of the growing society. Indeed, the major task the new state had to undertake, in the 1950's, in order to achieve its telos was the absorption of many immigrants whose origin and background differed extensively from that of the Yishuv. Zionist realization, after all, was contingent upon the ingathering of the exiles. Therefore, the manner in which the educational system and the political elite approached this quest should be examined. In principle, the attempt to integrate the immigrants into the society reflects the extent to which they were equipped to understand and resolve this burning problem.

Notes for Chapter II

1. Zvi Lam, "Ideological Tensions - The Struggle Over Educational Goals," Education in Israel (Hebrew), ed., Chaim Ormian, (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1973), p. 74.

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3. Yehuda Gothalph, The Labor Movement - Its Foes and Allies (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1981), p. 8.

4. Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

5. Ibid., p.37.

6. Ibid., pp. 9-24.

7. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, "The Yishuv as a Political Society," The Israeli Political System (Hebrew), ed. Moshe Lissak and Emanuel Gutmann, (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1979), pp. 23-24.

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12. Yonathan Shapiro, An Elite without Successors - Generations of Political Leaders in Israel (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1984), p. 66.

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21. Zvi Lam, "Ideological Tensions - The Struggle Over Educational Goals," op. cit., p. 71.

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23. Ziva Shaked, "The Mirror Image of the National Ideology in the Educational Activities of the General Trend and the Workers Trend," (M.A. Thesis, Tel-Aviv University, 1979), p. 6-8.

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25. A. Roznov, "The Image of the Halutz in Zionist Thought," Perspectives on Educational Work in Ahad Ha'am and A.D. Gordon (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Yahdav Publication, 1977), p. 38-44.

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27. H.A. Zutah, A Teacher's Way (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: Reuben Mas Publication, 1938), p. 47.

28. Shaked, op. cit., p. 27.

29, Ibid., p. 32.

30. Zvi Lam, "The Israeli Teacher: The Routinization of a Mission," in Ackerman, Carmon and Zucker, op. cit., pp. 570-571.

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95. Ibid., p. 87. When asked what is the most important occupation necessary for building the country 80% answered agriculture. But when the same students were asked what kind of vocation they intended to choose, only 46% answered agriculture.

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CHAPTER III

EDUCATION FOR INTEGRATION: THE ETHNIC PROBLEM

Polarization in Israeli society among various groups has undoubtedly intensified. The intolerance and explicit prejudice between the groups has burst out especially in the political arena in the last decade. The proposed solutions to the issue of "two peoples" have ranged from inactivity, believing that time would heal and unify, to social and educational reforms, to the questioning by some of the legitimacy of the social and political order altogether.

In this chapter we examine the educational policies pursued firstly in order to bridge the wide gap in scholastic achievements between the Sephardic and Ashkenazi pupils, as well as their intent to afford a common integrative roof to merge the exiles. Educational policies evolved during several decades, beginning with the uniform curriculum applied to all pupils, followed by compensatory education provided to the "culturally disadvantaged" (teunei tipuah), attempts to reform the educational structure and, finally, the suggestions and recognition (by some) of the need to combine Sephardic culture with the dominant culture in schools and society. Already during the first decade of independence, it became evident that the major declared objective of integrating the exiles was not met. Social, economic and educational disparities between the two ethnic groups were immense.

Many officials viewed the schools as an important means to socialize the Sephardim in a manner consistent with the dominant social norms, rendering the Jewish groups a people.

This chapter is concerned with the connection between inter-ethnic relationship in society and in schools. The Sephardim have been excluded from contributing to national cultural life because they have been viewed as primitive. The Sephardic pupils have been categorized as culturallly disadvantaged and consequently were subjected to disparaging attitudes from teachers and Ashkenazi pupils. Moreover, disparity in political power has always existed, but gradually Sephardic voting power has increased. It has been pointed out by observers that the dissatisfaction and disillusionment of the Sephardim with Labor has had political repercussions - protests and voting for parties other than Labor. Since this study tries to discern dominant themes both in the educational and political arenas, the treatment of the Sephardim must be viewed as a major issue reflecting the basic political approach to defining, understanding and suggesting solutions to an explosive social problem. Our pupose is not to single out the cause responsible for the present state of affairs. However, by recognizing the political and educational vision and main inputs to resolve divisiveness among Jewish ethnic groups, we can point to predominant concepts found on both agendas and their connection to the nature of social relations.

The success in forging unity among the Jewish groups is pronounced mostly in one dimension, and can be attributed to instilling a commitment to nationalism, particularly through the need to defend the besieged state from the danger posed by its enemies.

But, in addition, observers have pointed to other measures of success; for example, increase in intermarriages and decreasing gap in scholastic achievments, especially for lower grades but also in the high schools. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that in the 1980's the problem of "two peoples" still exists. The division among the groups is exhibited in the political arena where Labor is seen as the Ashkenazi party and Likud as the Sephardic party. Also, the economic and social gaps continue to overlap with ethnic origin. After four decades of statehood, the division has not been mended.

The focus in this study is on the interdependence between the educational institutions and the political establishment. Education has been a subject of political struggle and manipulation with the purpose of solving or masking social problems. Several questions will be addressed henceforth: how was education to serve as a major vehicle to transcend ethnic factionalism and redress inequalities; what were the values underlying the educational approach and which methods were employed; finally, how successful have they proven to be?

In order to comprehend the connection between educational policies and social developments we must begin by considering additional questions: what has characterized the relations between the ethnic groups in Israel; how was contact between them initially established; to what extent have their respective goals have been co-existent or mutually exclusive, and most importantly, how has the structure of these relations been translated into the educational institutions and, in turn, the manner in which the schools have affected inter-group relations? What we seek to investigate is how

education was meant to contribute to social justice and what the ideal conditions were that the policy makers envisioned to create.

1. The Ethnic Setting

A brief note about the ethnic groups in Israel is in order. According to Yohanan Peres, two useful criteria for analyzing the ethnic structure are: (1) origin (Jewish or other), and (2) degree of integration in modern civilization. The classification and graduation in Israel is, therefore, Ashkenazim, Orientals and Arabs.[1] An ethnic group in our context has been defined as a social unit determined according to the origin and identity of the group, as well as by the views of the surrounding environment. In this study, the special treatment given to the Sephardic groups is a significant social factor in their being molded into a separate ethnic group. Edot Ha'mizrah (Oriental communities) are Jews from north Africa and the Near East (descendents of Jews from Spain), and the words Orientals, Mizrahim ans Sephardim are usually used interchangeably. The Ashkenazim are European and North American Jews, many of whom include the pioneers who arrived in Palestine early in the century.

Significant demographic changes for the ethnic groups have occured. In 1947 the Ashkenazim constituted an absolute majority of 78%. In 1968 the groups achieved numerical equality, and since then the Sephardim have slowly become a majority of about 55%.[2]

Smooha defines the relation between these two ethnic groups as a "dynamic paternalism co-optation model" rather than one of thorough dominance, the latter implying complete exclusion, while the former allows some limited entry and participation in the political and

social life.[3] It seems,however, that one could verify the validity of this distinction as one examines the change that occured along the dominant-subordinate matrix over the last decades, and the extent to which "limited inclusion" could potentially alter the status quo without social upheaval.

The Sephardic immigrants were not among the active shapers of the new society; rather, they were placed within the new context and assigned a certain role. For the most part, they were not actively involved in the making of Zionism as a national liberation movement. From the inception of the Zionist movement the attitude of the Zionist institutions toward the Oriental Jews was one of indifference and discrimination, compared to their treatment of the European Jews.[4] This was reflected in two ways: (1) distribution of certificates of Aliya (immigration permits) to Palestine, and (2) helping Jews with difficulties ensuing as a result of Zionist activities in their countries of origin. Zionist activity in North Africa, for example, was not attended to seriously, and in fact, the Zionist leadership was not interested in their immigration. Moreover, Hebrew teachers were not sent to the Sephardic communities in Muslim countries even though they offered to pay for their expenses, nor were books sent, except for a few in Yiddish and German.[5]

In 1897, when the first Zionist Congress took place in Basle, the North African Jewish community sent Atali as their representative and also dispatched a letter to Herzl refering to him as "our Master, God's representative", to express their identification with the urgency of Zionist activities. Indeed, in the early 1900's they

founded several organizations: "Love of Zion," "Sons of Zion" and others.

But when a large number of Jews requested permits to immigrate, their calls remained unheeded inspite of the fact that they explicitly proclaimed their willingness to settle anywhere in Palestine. At the time permits were given by the British Mandatory authorities, and each year a quota was set and the certificates were distributed by the Jewish Immigration Department. The latter consistently demonstrated a preference for Eastern European Jews while Oriental Jews were denied. No wonder that many already felt like "step children" being openly discriminated against by the Jewish Agency. In April 27, 1912, the Israeli Office sent a letter to the Zionist Central Office objecting both to the immigration of Morrocan Jews, and to the establishment of Zionist Information Centers (Merkazei Hasbara) in Morroco and Tripoli.

Nevertheless, the Zionist organization in North Africa was able to obtain permits from the British Consul. Ironically, the Zionist Institutions refused to let the immigrants who arrived in Jaffa enter. After a long, humiliating wait there, the immigrants had to go back. Evidently, although Zionist activities in many Oriental communities such as Egypt, Lybia, Morroco, Syria, Iraq and others took place, their voices were not heard in the political life of the Zionist arena worldwide.[6] It should be noted, however, that in the early 1900's the need to reach out to the "natural workers" led to contacts with Sephardic Jews, Yemenite, Curd and Syrian. According to Jonathan Frankel, in 1912, fifty eight Yemenite workers had been settled in Palestine. These settlers were religious and their wives worked in domestic service. Some in the Yishuv felt "that they carried things

too far when they cut short their work early in order to hurry home on Friday afternoons or when they come late after their communal prayer at dawn." Although Ben-Gurion and Arthur Ruppin (who was the director of the Zionist Organization office in Palestine) wanted to bring more Yemenite to settle in Palestine, not everybody shared this view. The opposing claim was that the Yemenites would depress wages and make it harder for the Russian Jews to gain a foothold in agricultural endeavor.[7]

In spite of the fact that Sephardic culture had been flourishing for many centuries, and the Sephardim enjoyed a high status in various communities within which they lived, toward the end of the nineteenth century they were viewed as marginal compared to the Ashkenazim who dominated the Yishuv and its institutions. It was presumed that the Oriental communities suffered from a complete lack of education and had not been exposed to cultural benefits for many generations. This was not completely accurate. According to Menahem, historians have ignored the history and culture of Oriental Jews, which led to a distorted perception of the public concerning the character and essential nature of education in these countries. Consequently, the inclination was to view education there taking place only in the backward and primitive "Heder" or "Talmud Torah" (religious schools). The traditional education was dominant until the end of the 19th century, especially in peripheral areas. This educational network was composed of three different levels: Heder, Talmud Torah and Yeshiva. Children learned there under difficult conditions with a Rabbi. The method was individualistic depending on the level of the child. The children studied biblical texts, prayers and the alphabet.

In addition, modern educational institutions were attended by Jewish students and were categorized as follows. (1) Foreign education - these were schools created by Europeans or missionaries and the curricula were similar to the ones in Europe. Tuition was expensive, so primarily rich families sent their children there. (2) Philanthropic Jewish education - established especially by "Alliance," "Ort" and "Magen David." The curriculum was the same as in France and the politics and culture of France were studied. The declared policy was to raise the educational level of Jews in order to make it easier on them to partake in the political, economic and cultural life of the countries where they lived. Poorer children were accepted and such schools were established first in major cities and later in peripheral places. (3) Hebrew education - institutions established by communities and entrepreneurs, which transformed the Heder and Talmud Torah into modern schools. In these schools fewer Jewish subjects were taught, and there was an increase in the teaching of history, and geography of the specific country, Israel and the Hebrew language. Traditional learning gave way to modern studies and Jewish students attended the American and French Universities in Beirut. The Ottoman Empire had permitted Jews to attend schools of higher learning.[8] It is clear, therefore, that the picture depicting all Oriental Jews as illiterate was false and emanated either from genuine ignorance about their conditions or from extensive prejudice. Though not all Jews there were exposed to these studies, the stereotypical generalization about Sepharadic Jews is extreme. Were all European Jews educated? Yet many educated Sepharadim were treated badly.

The Zionist fathers did not show serious consideration toward the Oriental Jews, and up to 1945 they were not consulted or recruited to the movement. Zionism was portrayed as a movement aiming to liberate all Jews "but European Jews tended to think and act as if the rest of the world counted for rather little, and did not really need to be consulted or recruited."[9]

2. The Sephardim as a Marginal Group: Their Inferiority in the Schools and Their Cultural Exclusion from National Life

The ingathering of the exiles should have meant that all Jewish immigrants could partake in the nation building endeavor. But this was not the case. The seeds of the new society were sown without including resources that the Sephardim might have added. In fact, their past-history, tradition and literature - was not integrated in the society, and as we shall see later, not much of it was mentioned in school texts. Only external and folkloric remanants survived: clothing, food, jewelry and songs, all as unique and exotic artifacts and symbols, but the essentials of Sephardic culture were not to serve as building blocs for the new polity. At most they represented a form of entertainment and ornaments similar to other western societies' marketing of various commodities for consumption. For many years and essentially to the present day, the Mizrahi Jews were told to assimilate into the Ashkenazi-Western-Israeli culture.

Looking at the curricula during the years, it is evident that the major topic considered as a common denominator has been Zionism. But even this subject, which ought to transcend the differences among the ethnic groups was taught from a perspective foreign to the Sephardim.

History lessons for the 5th grade used as a background the following: (1) U.S. War of Independence, (2) the French Revolution, (3) the Industrial Revolution, and (4) national movements in Europe. These subjects are, of course, relevant to understanding nationalism in the modern era, including Jewish nationalism, but they were discussed in terms not familiar to the Sephardic students or their parents. In addition, when Jewish History followed General History the topics were as follows: (1) Hassidism, (2) Enlightenment and Emancipation, (3) Anti-Semisim, (4) Jewish center in Russia, (5) Lovers of Zion, (6) the First Aliya, (7) the Zionist movement - Pinsker (atressed the need for Jewish autoemancipation due to Jewish failure at integration), Hess (attempted to synthesize socialism and Jewish nationalism) and Herzl (considered to be the father of the Zionist movement), (8) the revival of the Hebrew language, (9) the Russian Revolution - the changes undergone by the Jewish community in Russia, (10) the Second Aliya, (11) the rise of the Nazis, (12) World War II - the annihilation of the European Jews, (13) World Jewry following the Shoa (Holocaust), (14) the British Mandate, and (15) the Israeli War of Independence.[10]

As can be seen, even the particular Jewish and historical impetus to understanding the present Israeli system was foreign to the Sephardim, since within this historical context, they had not played much of a role in the past nor contributed to the present state of affairs. The people who planned the curriculum neglected the alienating effects of such material on the Sephardic pupils, and set out to construct it as if the learning material, values and recipients were all Western. In fact they did not exhibit much flexibility in their choice.

The curriculum, indeed, did not offer an avenue for mutual integration or for learning about the many dimensions of the various cultural heritage or legacy brought by the different groups. Oriental culture was either hardly mentioned, but if it was, it was not presented as equally valuable to the modern Western culture.

Only later it was officially recognized that cultural pluralism, if not the ultimate goal, had at least to be a step in the process of nation building so as not to alienate completely the Sephardic children. In the 1970's, the Ministry of Education and Culture decided to pursue a policy that encouraged the recognition and teaching of Oriental culture.

In 1951 Prime Minister Ben Gurion observed that "...the government does not wish to preserve the Yemenite culture, rather we wish to get the Yemenite immigrants to adapt to the Israeli way of life, to Israeli freedom, to Israeli equality, to Israeli social conventions... we wish to eradicate any differences between the Yemenites and any other Jew. We do not want the attitude to women and children to remain as it was in Yemen."[11] Here the goal of cultural assimilation is stated bluntly. A decade and a half later, during a conference at the Hebrew University, Minister of Education and Culture Aharon Yadlin stressed that ethnic amalgamation is a lengthy and difficult process. He added further that "...the assumption about the need for a 'melting pot' and a 'pressure cooker,' hence for pushing particular values on all Jews, would only cause tension and unnecessary explosion. I do not consider cultural pluralism a final goal, but see it as important in a transient epoch in order to render it easier for everyone to adapt to and accomodate one another."[12] Ten

years later a change had taken place in the educational institutions, at least in the official attitude toward the culture of the Oriental Jews. Eliezer Shmueli, who headed the Ministry of Education and Culture in 1976, reported in a circular the Minister's plan to expand the inclusion of Sephardic culture and traditions. It asserted that lack of knowledge of the past history of these communities, unfamiliarity with their literature and values deeply harms the ability to recognize the common fate of Jewish communities both in the East and West."[13]

In spite of the fact that some changes occured later in the educational aims and vision, there are still objections and attempts to counter the incorporation of material about and creative achievements of the Sephardim in the curricula. Some continue to view the abolition of ethnicity as the pre-condition or pre-requisite for the success of educational and social integration. Klein and Eshel,for example, believe that "one of the necessary conditions for a successful amalgamation between groups, where significant social, cultural, and intellectual gaps exist, is the willingess of the minority (emphasis added) to be 'swallowed' within the majority, to immitate and mimic them in behavior, dress, manners and speech."[14] This view stands in contradiction to the hope that one day a unified culture composed of various ethnic elements will be created as part of the ultimate aim of national unity and the ingathering of the exiles. Agasi and Balas echo this vision, voicing their objection to the Ashkenazi image seen as the legitimate Israeli model to be internalized, but contending rather that many types of Israelis must coexist on an equal footing in a pluralist society.[15]

As we can see, over the years many debates transpired concerning the standing of Sephardic culture in the Israeli society in general, and in education, in particular. These deliberations have had actual repercussions. Unfortunately, as Shtal points out, too often decisions were made by people who were not very familiar with Sephardic culture, and who did not always clarify and precisely define the basic assumptions or goals they set to examine. Thus, distortions in curricula planning, in schools and in society abound. Not only has the division between Ashkenazi and Sephardic pupils been reinforced at school, but the Sephardic pupils themselves being subjected to such one sided approach to Jewish culture and history, became confused and uncertain of their own identity.

In order to establish a unified, integrated society and do away with the division between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, inevitably a new and serious division was substituted, namely, between the young Sephardim and everything associated with their past - history, parents, culture and community. They were truly expected to replace one culture with the other since the two were categorized as mutually exclusive. The one was progressive, modern, enlightened and desirable, and the other was backward and primitive. It is interesting to note that the Ashkenazim of the Second Aliya (1903-1914) who came with the explicit purpose of negating their immediate past experience in bourgeois western societies, in fact, reintroduced these elements into the new society. For these Ashkenazim, therefore, and for later Ashkenazi immigrants, the Israeli society did not constitute a radical change requiring fundamental acculturation. For the Sephardim, however, these conditions created a feeling of anomie, since they

could no longer find a sense of security anywhere. Alienated and in some cases contemptuous of their familiar values, unable to alter their parents' worldviews and convert them into the new outlook, yet unable themselves to be accepted as full fledged members, they remained like Camus' stranger.

In order to be immersed in any culture, socialization has to come about through a variety of parallel avenues to reinforce particular values. Socialization is more effective when overlapping through the family, peer groups, school and community. For the young Ashkenazim in general, the information absorbed from these various sources did not create any cognitive dissonance or emotional split, but was harmonious and complementary. The collective commitment to the state and the land, and the pioneering spirit of early Zionists together with individual striving for success, were rewarded both at home and at school.

For the Sephardic children the pattern of behavior was different. In a sense they were forced to choose between loyalty to the state's authority over social and personal domains and their parents' authority, contingent upon the power of each to distribute rewards and punishments. The Sephardic children who often came from a patriarchal and authoritarian culture were thrown into a new and frightening situation. A reversal of the traditional hierarchy and role took place. The father could no longer command absolute respect as one who possesses knowledge and wisdom since within the new society he could manage his daily affairs less effectively than his young children. Lacking fluency in the Hebrew language and ignorant of acceptable social manners, he lost the importance that was attributed to him in

his old milieu and became increasingly dependent on his children for direction. The old structure of family dynamics broke down and both parents and children were required to reshape completely their norms according to a code over which they had no control.

According to Simon and Ben-Meir, the elder new immigrant and his children have undergone simultaneously an identity crisis usually characteristic of teen agers.[16] The older immigrant is shaken by the reality he is thrown into and has to awaken from dreams and fantasies he held about the new and perfect society. He becomes suspicious of everything and everyone. Since he experiences numerous difficulties in coping and understanding the new reality, he feels inadequate and ashamed, thus becoming a lonely stranger. He is at the periphery of the society, angry at the power center, yet wishing to be closer to the center, rebellious in his dismay yet feeling he is "unlucky," and were he to be "lucky," he would be able to join the center. As for the children, they are confused at the helplessness of their parents, some of them voicing an ironic hope, "I shall be an Ashkenazi when I grow up". Children who rebelled against their parents' way of life were viewed by their family and by themselves as sinful traitors.[17]

Concurrently, a major schism was taking place between the two ethnic groups, which were seen as unevenly developed. The Sephardic children were designated as "culturally disadvantaged," in need of intellectual rehabilitation and total acculturation, after they had been stripped of their Levantine heritage. This is a notion which includes two components, a descriptive and a prescriptive one. The descriptive part points to the elements the child is lacking, and represents a comparison between two groups. One group constitutes the

normative model, hence its members identify with and support the values and norms of the established class, while the other group is different with distorted norms, constituting, thus, an anomaly. The prescriptive constituent contains detailed plans set on compensating, rehabilitating, molding and healing the socially abnormal group. It is claimed, then, that the aim is to educate the members according to certain norms and values in order to elevate them to the needed, accepted and enlightened standards of behavior.

The term "culturally disadvantaged" is discriminatory, implying that certain groups are socially and culturally peripheral, and connoting a gap and a hierarchy that has clearly been reflected in the educational institutions. Avinon observes that the conception "culturally disadvantaged" is at best mistaken and confusing, and at worst a myth which was created to cover up the process of social selection at schools in order to maintain and reproduce the stratification in the society at large.[18] According to Adler teunei tipuah has a positive connotation since the population is not composed really of backward pupils but of those who have a good possibility to advance if resources are invested in them.[19]

One has to question whether such a process where the Sephardim had to denounce their original identity to become born again citizens has in fact been counter-productive and impoverishing of their cultural resources. Perhaps resentment generated in the young educated Sephardim over the years toward the direct and indirect disrespect shown to their family and history led them finally to reject Labor paternalism as a failure in its "white's man burden" mission.

Basically, the Sephardim had to comply with the designation of a culturally destitute group. Although this was not always the case, their cultural beggage was not considered to have significant intrinsic values. Interestingly, many Ashkenazim as well as Sephardim have accepted the explanation for inequality between the groups as emanating from the overwhelming problems created during the period of mass immigration in the 1950's. The burden of absorbing many immigrants from backward environments into a young and small society (650,000 Jews) was intensified by the continuous struggle with the Arabs. The compliance with such an explanation is seen as a pivotal factor in itself and contradictory information did not undermine this view. For example, Sephardic Jews who immigrated to the West did much better than in Israel. European immigrants in the 1950's received a greater share than the Sephardim. Finally, the gap between Israeli-born Separdim and Ashkenazim is greater than for the immigrant generation, in spite of the fact that the youth are supposedly being raised in a non-backward, progressive society.[20] The reaction of some officials was that although children were born to a particular family and grew up in a deprived environment, their suceess or failure should not be determined accordingly. Some attributed to education the explicit aim of overcoming ethnic division by salvaging the backward.

It seems that in spite of the fact that education was regarded as a major vehicle in bridging the discord between the groups, not enough effort was invested toward solving the problem as the officials defined it, let alone the way they avoided defining it. One difficulty that officials and educators faced initially was the lack of qualified teachers. Moshe Avidor, Director General of the Ministry of Education

in the early 1950's, pointed out that "...the young state had to choose between tens and thousands of newly arrived children out of school until sufficient numbers of competent teachers could be trained, or accepting ill prepared teachers."[21] The obvious question is which ethnic group has been exposed to the ill prepared teachers more frequently and in greater numbers, and what the long term effects were of such an exposure.

The large wave of immigrants in the late 1940's and 1950's was composed mostly of Sephardic communities. A special project designed to train teachers for immigrant settlements were begun in 1954-5. Most students, immigrants themselves, were given a complete year of intensive instruction in Pnimiot (dormitory institutions), especially open to them in Ber-Sheba and Nahalal. Students promised to teach for three years after graduating wherever they were assigned by the Ministry of Education, and in 1956 there were indeed 300 students. Up to this day fresh graduates and women soldiers provide a large turnover of teachers that serve mostly an Oriental clientele in developing towns, rather than the permanent faculty found in the center of the country, particularly in urban areas.

In general, the elementary schools are mostly neighborhood schools, and the population of pupils attending them is usually homogeneous in its social and economic backgound. In order to classify the need for its involvement and degree of help, the Ministry of Education and Culture categorizes the schools according to their measure of development. In developed schools only 0-27% of pupils were falling behind. Mixed meant that 25-75% of the pupils fell behind, and backward and deficient schools were those where 76-100% of the pupils

fell behind. It was found that 53% of the backward pupils attend schools where the majority of pupils are alike, and 92% of the pupils classified as lagging attend religious state schools where the majority of the children are in a similar predicament.[22]

In sum, the structure of the Israeli school reinforced the propensity for the scholastic failure of Eastern children. As was pointed out, to succeed in school a child needs to have a western background or unusual ability. Reforms suggested to alter this pattern were not accepted enthusiastically. An important aspect of this problem was and still is demographic, however. A large number of Eastern Jews live in developing towns which are for the most part situated in rural areas. The towns do not produce their own teachers and those already holding positions elsewhere are not attracted to positions here.[23] Many others in urban areas continue to live in a segregated manner and in inferior conditions.

The performance of the two groups of pupils indeed indicates a serious malfunction. Peres' research, conducted in the 1960's, shows a vast gap in the educational achievements of the two groups. The average number of school years for the Sephardic child was 6 as compared with 9 for the Ashkenazi child. This was especially accentuated for women, with the Sephardic woman having 4 years as compared with 9 years of schooling for her Ashkenazi counterpart. Thus, when looking at the percentage of ethnic group representation at the different levels of education, one is able to foresee the kind of occupation and status that each would possess. The conclusion according to Peres is self evident; Oriental representation in the

educational institutions resembles a pyramid - as we move further up the educational ladder fewer of them are to be found.[24]

A study analyzing the connection among occupation, ethnic origin, and the length of time the immigrants have lived in Israel (Vetek) examined the period of 1960-1970, a decade in which enormous economic developments caused significant changes in occupations. The year 1961 marked the end of large waves of immigrants and crystalized ethnic differences. The year 1970 was an important year since it connoted the time when the second generation joined the manpower in society and established a status in the occupational composite in Israel. The major conclusions of this study are the following: (1) The ethnic factor has grown in influence regarding occupational achievements in these ten years, namely, the ethnic factor has had a strong influence independently of education and Vetek; (2) Among the second generation there are ethnic differences, no smaller than found among the immigrants' generation.[25] These results stand in contradiction to previous hopes voiced by scholars that ethnic factors would not be as strong a determinant amongst the second generation and that upward mobility of the Sephardim would decrese the gap.

Although since the 1960's the gap in elementary schools has begun to decrease in the 8th grade, the dimension of the gap was still constant between 1966-1971.[26] What reinforced this phenomenon was that additional schools have been created: night classes, clerical training, agricultural and vocational schools. Very few of the Ashkenazi pupils attend these schools because they bestow lower status on their graduates, and instead, they attend academic high schools leaving the Sephardic pupils to fill the vacuum created. Parallel to

that and as a consequence of it, many Orientals have moved from manual labor to become technicians and skilled workers.

Absorbing children into vocational schools was part of the attempt to solve social problems. The economic and technological changes in the Israeli society were accompanied by a transformation of the ideological environment. Precisely at a time when the idea of labor lost its place as one of society's most cherished values, vocational education emerged.[27] The withering away of labor as a value was replaced by a functional interpretation of it. Vocational training was justified on economic, social, and technological grounds rather than ideological and philosophical commitments of social justice.

At the end of the 1950's, vocational schools served as one of the main compensatory means of the educational networks, in general, and of the high school, in particular. For most of these students this was the only route through which to earn an education beyond what the law prescribed. Academic high schools continued to maintain a selective, elitist structure. Most of the students who found it impossible to enter academic high schools were of Asian-African origin and the vocational schools increased their participation in the educational process. Their attendance there was proportionately higher than their numbers in the population. For example, in 1977, 63% of Sephardic pupils enrolled in vocational training while they constituted 58% of the population.[28] In 1966, out of a thousand pupils 124 attended academic high schools as compared to 143 in 1970 and 199 in 1980. In vocational high schools, the numbers grew from 153 to 233 and to 380 respectively.[29] This of course does not mean that the rest of the

Sephardic pupils went to academic high schools, but rather, few went to academic high schools while others dropped out.

Lissak noted that in the 1960's vocational occupations were already seen as lower status compared to professional, managerial and commercial positions. Vocational schools, in fact, prepared pupils for entering and partaking in the economic system at a lower status and position. Students have shown that their expectation and motivation for upward mobility are already low at school, since they have been labelled unsuitable for occupations requiring complex knowledge.[30]

The hierarchy between the different paths is clear. The gap has been relegated to a higher level of education, not only the academic high schools but also the university. At the university what is noticeable is a self imposed selection process, in which the Sephardic students tend to choose less those occupations that may offer a higher status and income compared with their Ashkenazi cohorts. The former more often choose to study Judaica and literature, while the latter select natural sciences, engineering and medicine. Peres observed that the differences in choosing the course of studies does not merely reflect the fact that the Orientals are less prepared before arriving to the university, but also, that certain areas possess more status and require tough competition and intensive studying without the burden of supporting a family, which the Sephardim are less able to do.[31] The Sephardic students are under-represented among MA and doctoral students. For 1972-1973, Ashkenazi students were 2 to 3 times over-represented at the graduate level. The percentage of Sephardic students increases at a slow rate. In fact, second generation

Sephardim, with 16 years of schooling or more, constituted 2% compared to 2.8% for the first generation.[32]

As has been noted before, the differences in performance are evident early on. Looking at tests given at various stages of schooling, this is well apparent. It is reflected in the national achievement test (seker) given to 8th graders and cancelled in 1973, which to a considerable degree determined pupils' futures. In accordance with the results of the test it was decided whether a pupil would attend an academic, vocational or agricultural high school. Grades recorded between 1957-1970 show that 60% of the Sephardim did not get even a C (70) as compared with less than 30% of the Ashkenazim.[33]

The gap between the groups has been evident both in primary and secondary schools, but in the former it has been reduced quantitatively yet less qualitatively. Since the national achievement test served as a screening test for the entrance to high school, it was decided in the late 1950's to lower the admission standards for Sephardim whose failure rate in the test averaged 2 to 3 times that of the Ashkenazim.

In the matriculation examination (bagrut) of 1968/9, a high school graduation examination determining the pupil's capability of pursuing academic studies at the university level, 80% of the Ashkenazim taking the test passed it as compared with 60% of the Sephardim. And the percentage of the Sephardim that failed the test was twice that of the Ashkenazim. It is interesting to note that between 1964-1970, the gap between the groups increased even further. It was not only due to a higher rate of failure of the Sephardim but

because the Ashkenazim improved their performance. In sum, in the two basic national achievement tests which decide the students' future course of study and occupation, the Sephardim lagged behind significantly.

In January 1965 at the request of the Prime Minister's office, several educators and sociologists prepared a report dealing with the youth problem in the Morasha district in Tel Aviv. The area was characterized by low income housing and education. Eighty percent of the inhabitants were of Asian and African origin and 2/3 migrated to Israel between 1948 and 1952. Ten percent of the youth were educated in Israel, but most of them belonged to a marginal society retaining values and guiding principles of their countries of origin. Half of the youth constituted unskilled labor and they saw their social status as similar to their parents', namely, they had no aspirations about their occupational level, believing their unskilled work to be a permanent state. Sixty percent saw their lack of education and ability as obstructive to advancement. Interestingly, the researchers point out that many of the youth seem to accept the values of the Israeli society as legitimate, regarding individual ability and education as pre-requisite for mobility, and since they possessed neither, they were resigned to a marginal existence.

The study about Kfar-Shalem in Tel-Aviv showed similar tendencies. The educational facilities there were not suited to elementary school graduates. Most of the 20-30 age groups had no vocational training and 1/3 were unemployed. The conclusion was that these youth did not break the cycle of poverty bound by parental heritage.[34] Peres had suggested that the gradual increase in education

for the parents, concomitant with reducing the size of the family or adjusting it to economic and educational means available, are two basic means condusive to decreasing the gap between the groups. An obvious obstacle, according to Smilanski, to using these measures is that the roots of the problem are not being addressed. He calls attention to this issue partly when asserting that even if the economic conditions could be equalized between the different groups, the gap in educational achievement would not disappear because of the different priority and stress that each ethnic group places on education. According to Peres, however, when the educational level of the older generations (parents) is higher, and is coupled with adapting the size of the family to the economic and educational means they are able to afford, measures are created for narrowing the gap between the groups in their achievements at school. It is said that the Sephardim put less of an emphasis and a priority on education, while the value of education as a goal and a means for economic and social mobility is strongly rooted in the Ashkenazi conscience.[35] Indeed, it has been observed that the families of disadvantaged children provide lesser encouragement to succeed at school, particularly because of objective factors: crowding, lack of optimal conditions for homework, the absence of books and newspapers and little leisure to engage in discussions. The relationship between these variables and the rate of failure at school has been found to be significant yet not easily modifiable.[36]

Ironically, the original notion found in the Labor movement philosophy up to the 1950's was to give each occupation and profession the same social status and pay. Thus, education would be a channel of

improvement (the educated laborer), rather than a channel of differentiation.[37] Needless to say, this policy has not been successful and aroused as early as the 1950's much objection on the part of the professionals who demanded a higher pay than simple workers, claiming that their contributions to society were more significant than the workers'.

As we can see, implementing ideas of equality encountered numerous obstacles. A major constraint in developing the vision of equality among the ethnic groups has been all along such that the Mizrahi Jews were not viewed, nor did many of them conceive of themselves as participants in the modern Zionist endeavor. They did not share, nor could they identify with, the vision propagated by the Ashkenazi pioneers. The political and educational system and social values in Israel reflected the cultural mood of European immigrants who saw Israel becoming - at least after its foundation - a modern, technological, western solution to the Jewish problem.[38]

The socialist pioneers of the Second Aliya were not very numerous, and although many participated in the building of Kibbutzim and other agricultural settlements, a great portion became over the years the country's ruling elite, urban, rich and educated. Those who remained in the Kibbutzim did not open their doors, nor their regional schools, to their neighbors in the developing towns. There was a deep concern expressed to keep Orientalism or its retarding effects from the body politic. Eban as Foreign Minister made his view clear: "So, far from regarding our immigrants from Oriental countries as a bridge towards our integration with the Arab speaking world, our object should be to infuse them with an Occidental spirit, rather than allow

them to drag us into an unnatural Orientalism."[39] Ben-Gurion also warned of the danger of Levantinization: "We do not want the Israelis to become Arabs. We must struggle against the spirit of the Levant which destroys individuals and societies. Rather, we have to safeguard the authentic Jewish values that were consolidated in the Diaspora." And "Moroccan Jews are uneducated. Their manners are those of the Arabs. Perhaps in the third generation the Mizrahi Jew will be different somehow. But I do not see it yet. The Moroccan Jew had absorbed much from Moroccan Arabs. I do not wish to see here a Moroccan culture. I do not see what contributions it will make."[40]

Nevertheless, during this period the Jews in the Middle East and North Africa were being considered as additional sources of needed manpower. Many Jews in Europe and the U.S. at the time were affluent middle class and could not be expected to immigrate to Israel to become laborers and dwell in underdeveloped areas. An effective way to attract them was to have them join the Israeli ruling elite, bureaucracy and privileged classes, by providing for them better housing and administrative and academic jobs. There was no longer the romantic wave of the intellectual laborer who glorified working the land as a personally fulfilling religious experience. But there was a need for laborers nontheless.

The general trend was, it seems, for the old and new Ashkenazi immigrants to settle in urban occupations, while the Yemenites and Persians entered agriculture. From the former's perspective, other immigrants had few needs since they were used to a lower standard of living in their country of origin. (The same reasoning has been applied to Israeli Arabs and to Palestinians). The Yemenite Jews were

employed for seasonal work by Jewish settlers, while the women worked as domestic servants. Until they immigrated to Israel, many of them lived in an environment similar to the Ashkenazi shtetl in Europe, in large commercial urban centers. They did not have a history of farming and peasantry and were involved in commerce, retail, trade and craftmanship. Some Eastern immigrants were part of the cultural elite, but upon arriving in Israel they were automatically relegated to a low cultural rank reflected in the general fear of Levantinization. When doctors, merchants and lawyers arrived from Iraq, they were offered only manual labor and were depicted as primitive and backward people.[41] These immigrants, who in fact were cultured even by Western standards, became socially dislocated and what took place was their proletarization. They (the small Oriental elite) did not constitute the proletariat before and did not entertain the same ideals found amongst the Second Aliya of intentional downward mobility and celebration of the worker, especially the agricultural worker, but rather, they were placed in these positions. Nevertheless, they played an important role in all aspects of agricultural development. They provided much of the manpower, and the number of agricultural settlements rose from 326 in 1948 to 728 in 1960.[42] Thus, agricultural settlements served the purpose of tying the settlers to the land economically if not ideologically.

The derogatory views and attitudes toward the Orientals are reflected in textbooks, where the contempt felt for their "primitive" conditions is evident. A fifth grade school book was the subject of a scandal over the way it presented the history of Jews in Arab countries:

> "The Jew was forbidden to give his children any sort of general education, the children's learning was limited to religious studies which were also only permitted in the framework of the Jewish Talmud Torah schools. Jewish girls like Muslim ones were married at 6 to 9 years and boys at 13. The fate of Jews in Iraq and Syria was the same. The general atmosphere in Muslim countries affected Jewish life as well. There was little spiritual activity during the 19th and 20th centuries, and the economic situation of Jews was dominated by poverty and hardship. The Jews lived in a ghetto like quarters, poor housing which did not meet hygienic requirements. They suffered from serious illness like the plague, and worked at primitive crafts and small scale retail."[43]

We can see that there was a cultural assault on the identity of the Oriental Jews which contributed to the overlap of class and ethnic origin. Since their lives in the past were described as taking place in a Hobbesian state of nature - short, brutish, nasty and poor - even unfavorable conditions in Israel could be seen as an improvement. This line of thought characterizes the Ashkenazi establishment and their policies, and is evident when comparing the favorable conditions given to Russian and Euro-American immigrants. The latter, it was believed, should be provided with conditions that approximated the lives they left behind, including housing and occupations, so they would not experience excessive dislocation and thereafter opt to return to a more comfortable life. In the case of the Sephardim, it was assumed that they were used to worse conditions and anyway could not opt to go back.

Furthermore, the schools were not suitable for them. The ideal image to emulate generated in the society and reinforced at the schools was the middle class urban family or the Kibbutz Halutz in a Sabra (Israeli born) socialist society. This was not an image in which the Orientals could recognize themselves. The schools did not aid in creating different ideal images to suit a larger variety of people.[44]

As was noted before, there is still in the schools little or token mention of history, literature or other cultural achievements of the Orientals in the last five hundred years.

When the educational authorities structured the curricula along western characteristics they ignored almost completely, until recently, the history and tradition of the Sephardic communities. This approach does not conform to the assumption according to which significant representation of different cultures is viewed as essential for the success of inter-ethnic interaction in education. Contact under these conditions would reinforce equality among the pupils and prevent self deprecation of the Sephardim.

For many Sephardim, the contradictions between the western approach in education and the traditional learning at home were often detrimental. They were aware of the contempt that the society at large and their own teachers as well showed toward their history. Teachers were condescending and prejudiced had low expectations of pupils of particular origins. Research shows their attitudes and evaluation of written papers to be different when they belived the student to be Sephardic or Ashkenazi because of the student's name.[45] Undoubtedly, the teachers were expressing a subjective opinion based on their prejudice, since the papers did not really belong to the written "ethnic" name. They often rejected offers and suggestions by Sepharadic pupils and humiliated them because they were not familiar with the particulars of their pupils' culture. The holidays celebrated at school followed Ashkenazi customs. Interestingly, even Sepharadic teachers tended to negate and undermine their own customs, stressing the acceptable norms instead. In books for children and youth, the

Sepharadim were depicted as "dirty, poor, neglected and black." Their roles in literature were those of shoe-shiners, servants and beggars.[46]

The depiction of the Sephardim may illustrate the severity of the problem. I shall quote at length from a newspaper article called "The truth about the human material." The writer says that

> "a serious and threatening question is posed by the immigration from North Africa. This is the immigration of a race which we have not yet known in this country... Here is a people whose primitiveness reaches the highest peak. Their education level borders on absolute ignorance. Still more serious is their inability to absorb anything intellectual... But above all there is a basic fact no less serious, namely, the lack of all the pre-requisites for adjustment to the life of the country and, first of all, chronic laziness and hatred of work... Has it been considered what will happen to this country if this will be its population? And to them will be added one day the immigration of Jews from Arab countries? What will be the face of the state of Israel and its level with such a population? They will 'absorb' us and not we them. The special tragedy of this absorption is... that there is no hope even with regard to their children; to raise the general level out of the depths of their entire existence - this is a matter of generations."[47]

Although it is not clear to what extent this article was representative of popular feelings, it attempted to influence policy makers to restrict Morrocan immigration.

The stereotypical conception of the Mizrahil Jew as "primitive, culturally deprived" and ignorant, dictated the attitudes of the Zionist institutions toward them from the dawn of the Zionist movement till the present day, and is reflected in the depiction of Sephardic characters in the Hebrew literature, the media, films and theatre.[48]

The fact that Sephardic culture has not been absorbed into Israeli culture, but rather has been undermined, is clear. Shtal has explored the various componenets of Sephardic culture: history, way of life, prayer, language, folklore, art, music, dance, literature and

journalism. He argues that these elements have remained, for the most part, marginal and neglected in Israel. Not only were they excluded from the curriculum but when Sephardic pupils were questioned about customs, beliefs and holiday rituals, their answers were often ridiculed. They were humiliated and their experiences were considered unimportant, irrelevant and incorrect. These pupils could not recount their own practices and customs nor express them in essays or drawings, being told exactly what to portray. Even in religious schools, where the Sephardic pupils have often constituted the majority, the arrangement and version of the prayers followed Ashkenazi customs.

In the libraries very few books could be found about Sephardic way of life. A small percentage of books by Sephardic authors were included in library collections even though many more have been written. Museums have exhibited predominantly Western art compared with Sephardic or Islamic exhibits. Indeed, it is often repeated that the numbers of Sephardim that visit museums or attend concerts has been significantly smaller than the Ashkenazim. However, when exhibits were meaningful for the Sephardim (such as the exhibit about Jewish life in Morocco, shown at the Israel Museum in 1973) large numbers of Sephardim, many more than expected, attended.[49] As for Sephardic music, it has been depicted as monotonous. The Sephardim have been seen as lacking knowledge and interest in music although music and dance have always fulfilled an important part of their lives.

Many Sephardim have asked that their poetry and music be included in the curricula since they have had a deep emotional attachment to these forms of expression. But most of the songs and poems in the

schools have been of European origin.[50] Sephardic folklore, fables, humor, aphormism, proverbs, epigrams and songs have been transmitted orally from one generation to another. Very rarely has there been a serious attempt to collect and preserve them in writing in order to include them among the cultural treasures of Israel. Important aspects of the Sephardim way of life were expressed elaborately, especially in weddings, births, mournings and holidays. It was reflected in their songs, speech, food, clothing and artifacts, yet most remnants have been preserved in private collections and are gradually disappearing.

The purpose of preserving the rich Sephardic tradition is not to develop it into a separatist cultural mode, but rather to include it within the cultural treasures of the nation. As Shtal reminds us, it is necessary for all immigrants to undergo changes in their way of life and orientation. But these changes must not imply shattering and assaulting the Sephardic cultural content. When only one culture is presented in the schools as correct, and Jewish culture is interpreted accordingly while other forms of Jewish expression are categorized as primitive and undesirable, Sephardic pupils tend either to withdraw in the face of such an affront or internalize the presented values as the only correct ones. In the latter case, what has been required of them was to deny and reverse all they have known and felt hitherto and assume the "correct" Jewish identity. It should be noted that especially in the last decade Sephardic writers, such as Sammy Michael, Yehuda Burloh, Mordechai Tabib, Shimon Balas and others, have become better known to the public. Nonetheless, Shtal has collected a bibliography of hundreds of sources which have not received public attention. He refers to discussions in the Ministry of Education and

Culture that it was impossible to add chapters on Sephardic Jewry to the history curriculum since the program was already extensive. The purpose, according to Shtal, is not merely to add Sephardic history mechanically, but, instead, the curriculum must be reorganized to allow for the combination of Sephardic and Ashkenazi cultures while deleting some existing content when necessary. In this way, all children will learn about their culture and history and take pride in their contributions to national culture.[51]

3. A Changing Approach: Educational Reforms for Integration

As we have seen, the Sephardim have been outsiders in their own country. A large disparity in scholastic achievments between the Sephardic pupils and their Ashkenazi counterparts has existed. Scholars and officials recognized that the mechanisms or means employed to bridge the gap have not proven useful.

In the 1960's, the state had adopted a policy of special fostering - compensation for severe deprivation and nurturing in general, which was meant to increase equality of opportunity in education by uplifting and upgrading the disadvantaged. Hence, a policy of compensatory education was launched assuming that the culturally deprived population could be potentially transformed for the better. Abba Eban, the Minster of Education in 1962 reflected this mood in his speech to the Knesset: "The causes of the communal gap lie in environmental conditions...One half of our population comes from communities which, since the decline of Islamic culture, have had no educational history or environment. Their children, now in Israel, are the first generation for centuries to be educated at all...A problem

created over five centuries cannot be solved in a year or two...The conservatives in our educational debate who oppose special projects and insist on the 'same education for all' are in conflict with the nature of man. Men are not equal in their intellectual receptivity. There are gallon containers and half pint jars. Our responsibility is to fill each of them up to full capacity. It is no use pretending that their capacity is the same."[52] Eban's idea was to adopt two different approaches and treatments toward the ethnic groups rather than an equal approach for all pupils.

Clearly, the ignorance about the Mizrahi past created additional difficulties which the Sephardic pupils had to face and this was the study material itself. Since the declared policy was to integrate the different ethnic groups, one might expect that the material included in the curriculum would be such that students of various backgrounds could understand it and thereby be instilled with a sense of community. However, this was not the case. Instead, critics pointed out the following deficiencies: the uniformity of the curriculum did not take into account individual or group differences among children; the detailed elaboration of the official curriculum led to the mechanization of the teachers' work; the curriculum was compiled mostly by Ashkenazi teachers and adapted to the ability and characteristics of Ashkenazi children. The underlying philosophy and conceptual framework was western and not adapted to the Oriental outlook. Further, in composing the curriculum, not enough experts on immigrants' problems and on relevant public policy issues were involved. Thusly, the teaching methods made little allowance for the specific needs of Asian-African children. The problems peculiar to

Eastern children were neglected by many educators.[53] How do we reconcile this kind of criticism which again implies that the Orientals had no previous exposure to education, especially Western education, and could not relate at all to Western concepts with Menahem's assertion that this is a wrong assumptiom, and that the Sephardic communities were educated in either religious, Hebrew or Western schools? Perhaps even the critics, well intentioned as they were, were prejudiced themselves and actually entertained the same false assumptions as the policy makers.

According to observers, the curriculum was heavily slanted toward European traditions, and the teachers were predominantly European, which gave the European pupils an advantage. Thus, as long as Middle Eastern children were treated as if they were European, the students were unlikely to perform well. Similarly, approaching children as if their cultural heritage was empty would not lead to a desirable result.

Indeed, in 1963, Minister of Education Zalman Aranne (in the 1940's and 1950's he pressed unsuccessfully for the development of compensatory education) established a committee headed by Professor Y. Prawer whose purpose was to examine the possibilities of extending the laws for mandatory education. After long deliberations, the committee determined that prior to increasing the mandatory school years, the educational structure had to be reformed. The major recommendation of the committee was to enact a law for free mandatory education that would add two more years of schooling to the existing eight years. The additional years would take place while changes within the educational institutions occurred by creating a middle school, grades 7-9, which

would constitute an independent unit organizationally and educationally.[54]

A second committee, a parliamentary committee, determined that the two goals of the reform were: (1) improvement in the quality of schools, and (2) their ethnic integration. In 1968 the Knesset accepted the recommendation of this committee to change the structure of post elementary education, known as the Reforma. The objectives of the educational policies were to add to post primary education about 50,000 children while, simultaneously, raising the level of studies. Additional hours would be devoted to studying various subjects, especially the natural sciences, and a new relevant curriculum would be introduced through modern teaching methods. It was further emphasized that the teachers must all be university graduates, and that their social status would be raised. All the available innovative means would be employed, and the school would be organized in such a way that continuous ethnic integration could be facilitated and encouraged.[55] On June 13, 1971 the Supreme Court rejected the plea of a group of parents to allow their children who were assigned to an integrated school in Jerusalem to attend another school. This decision echoes the official line of negating ethnicity as a dividing social factor and the declared policy of complete ethnic amalgamation. Yet, since there are no legal distinctions between Orientals and Ashkenazim, it only compounds the former's difficulties. In securing protective or compensatory legislation, for example, Israel lacks a specific law against ethnic discrimination. Several bills were introduced by non-Ashkenazim Knesset members between 1959-1965 but none was accepted. Acknowledging the gap as serious could have

undermined the proclaimed ideology of equality and was disconsonant with the philosophy that propounded freedom and rights for all. The usage of ethnicity as a criterion for defining the needy population was undesirable. The reason was ideological since absorption of immigrants was to proceed within a context of national unity and uniformity. Emphasizing ethnicity as a differentiating factor was contradictory to this ethos. Acknowledging ethnic polarization would jeopordize the efficiency of a state and society at war.

The central committee for the implementation of the reforms has asserted that its major aims were to raise the educational level and decrease the gap among the pupils and to encourage them to mix socially, so as to create opportunities for the disadvantaged to become integrated in the mainstream. Among the many suggestions, the committee had recommended that all elementary school graduates be allowed to continue their studies in post elementary institutions automatically, thus eliminating the previous selectivity of the Seker. Second, it recommended review of zoning so as to ensure the heterogeneity of the school population. A certain balance had to be maintained between children of different classes and ethnic groups in order to achieve amalgamation.[56]

In the schools, kitot em (heterogeneous classes) were to be established, in which the same material would be taught at a diverse learning rate, exposing the pupils to a common educational experience in subjects that foster national unity, but still allow them to develop intellectually according to individual abilities. In reforming the school system, the planners of the Comprehensive school hoped that in creating a heterogeneous educational organization pupils would be

able to develop their various abilities under one integrative roof. In addition to integration, the purpose was also to diagnose weaknesses in pupils at an early enough stage and prepare them for the senior classes.[57] The units in which pupils study according to their abilities were homogeneous: the advanced units were populated by Ashkenazim and the others by Sepharadim. Within the classes they attended together there was a strong awareness of the scholastic differences between the pupils that overlapped with ethnicity. Children expressed their preference in social interaction for those with similar scholastic achievements, and so the separation was inevitably based on ethnicity.[58]

One of the aims of the reform was having the school become part of the neighborhood. The fact that the elementary, middle and high schools were connected from the beginning of the school years to the end established continuity rather than dispersion of the children upon completion of elementary school. Studies showed that 58% of those 8th grade graduates in the new schools continued their studies in the upper classes. The expectation was that many pupils would be likely to continue their study since the school constituted a neighborhood institution.[59]

In actuality, however, ethnic division persisted. Particular ethnic groups have aggregated in certain neighborhoods over the years leading to de facto segregation in the schools. In 1971-2, 3/5 of all primary school pupils were Sephardic but 2/5 of them attended classes in which they contributed an overwhelming majority of at least 75%, and 1/5 attended almost completely segregated classes (95-100%). Segregation in the Religious State Schools is even greater, since

84.2% of the pupils there are Sephardic, and Sephardic religious Jews tend to live in much more ethnically homogeneous areas than non religious Sephardim. And in post primary schools where Sephardim constituted 35.6% of the pupils in 1966-67, the majority (63.1%) of them attended classes where fewer than 25% were Sephardim.[60]

The reforms did not eliminate gaps. The condition of pupils of different ethnic groups reflected clearly the predicament of the population in all facets of life. A 1965 report stated that the need for welfare increases every year, indicating the worsening of the situation. About 20% of the new immigrants reach the welfare office upon arrival and, in fact, for many of them it constituted the first contact with the state and its institutions. Around 1965, many had requested welfare. From 1961 to 1963 a 300% increase in the number of applications occured. For example, in Ashdod, families on welfare increased from 89 to 263. In another developing town, Dimona, in 1960 there were 75 families on welfare. Between 1960 and 1963, the number of inhabitants there increased threefold but the number of families requesting welfare increased 15 times.

The interesting part of this report is the questions raised at the end. Although the authors emphasize the gravity of the situation and the detrimental effects on the body politic, especially on such a young state, they ask: whose responsibility is it to provide welfare? Is it the entire responsibility of the state, the family, or the central and local governmental institutions? At a time when socialism was still the official creed and during a period when it was obvious. that most needy immigrants were of Mizrahi origin and did not have well established families in Israel, and hence lacked connections with

central or local government, it seems that even entertaining the possibility of shifting the responsibility to the family or to local organizations shows little determination to overcome these problems. From the facts reported, the authors were aware of the great disparity in economic and social status in the population and observed that there was no improvement over time but rather that the situation was deteriorating. In 1969 it became apparent that more officials were aware of the many social problems, particularly in education.[61]

In the Labor Party (Ma'arach) platform of 1969 it was stated that with the beginning of the third decade since the establishment of the state, serious problems would have to be addressed. In the first decade the educational institutions were involved with the absorption of hundred of thousands of immigrant children. Laws were promulgated and curricula devised. During the second decade, the educational institutions attempted to focus on post primary and academic education. By the third decade it has become clear that the basic problems still were in existence, namely, the need to narrow the gap between the quantity and quality of available human resources needed for the development of society and state, preventing dropping out of elementary school as well as post primary school and the university. But most importantly, the urgency to narrow the ethnic gap in education and to quickly adapt the educational institutions to pupils that belong to a wide array of backgrounds was clear.

It is stated that with shared efforts of the government, teachers, parents and local administration, the Ministry of Education has succeeded in accomplishing some important objectives: (1) About 50% of children ages 3-4 attended kindergarten. (2) Over 94% of 5 year

olds were enrolled in compulsory pre-school kindergarten. (3) Over 98% of 6-13 year olds studied in State elementary schools. (4) About 73% of pupils between the ages of 14-17 attended educational institutions. (5) 82% of all 8th graders (graduating class) studied an additional year in high school. (6) 69% of them studied 2 more years, 58% studied 3 more years, 40% studied 4 more years. (7) About 11,000 pupils recieved the Bagrut (high school matriculation diploma). (8) Over 170,000 were fed at school. (9) About 150,000 elementary school children of "deprived backgrounds" (quotation marks in original) were involved in the different activities aimed to improve their conditions. (10) 41% of students ages 14-17 whose parents immigrated from Islamic countries attended post primary institutions. (11) In post primary education some kind of balance had been reached among academic, vocational and agricultural schools; namely, 51.6% attended academic high school, 34.7% attended vocational, and 13.7% went to agricultural schools.[62]

During the second decade the government invested significant resources in construction, for both primary and post primary education so classes would be less crowded, and it planned to build additional high schools in developing towns. It was stated that the government supported 50% of the poor children in elementary schools through tuition wavers. Thus, both the Labor platform and the parliamentary committee saw educational policies as crucial in solving social ills by generating national unity and eliminating ethnic tension.

The Ma'arach platform clearly shows how the social policies are interwoven with the educational policies. It is stated there that the fundamental objectives were to create a progressive society in Israel

in which economic and social gaps would be narrowed, the main goals being equality and social justice. The urgent priority was the fight against poverty. The plans to carry out these aims were specified as follows: (1) a committee composed of cabinet members would be appointed to address these burning issues, (2) additional research would be directed to improve social services, (3) equitable income distribution would be stressed with the explicit aim of augmenting the general income of the lower classes and increasing the services and benefits rendered to them, especially in developing towns, and (4) the poor groups would be brought up to a determined standard of living.

To ensure a decent standard of living to families with numerous dependents the following measures were to be in effect: national health insurance, aid to needy mothers, rehabilitation of deliquents, reduced taxation, special services to children of working mothers, and the improvement of the quality of life in poor neighborhoods. Moreover, a considerable improvement in the living conditions in developing towns was to be pursued as well as allocating additional housing units for poor families, building social centers and creating new jobs.

Interestingly, a survey conducted in 1971, examining public opinion about burning issues and the evaluation of the effectiveness of governmental policies, indicates that 2/3 of the public believed that the government does less than needed to improve the conditions of the poor. However, the public perceived a weak link between the economic status and the ethnic background of groups. Also, 2/3 believed that inter-ethnic relations were rather good. Among those questioned, only 30% believed that there was a link between economic

plight and ethnicity, while 70% said that seldom (or very seldom), does ethnicity determine economic and social conditions. This was a response that ran across ethnic groups.[63]

In 1971, Treasury Minister Pinhas Sapir, Governor of the Bank of Israel Israel Horowitz, and Secretary of the Histadrut Izhak Ben-Aharon, set up a committee whose aim was to examine the changes in income distribution and the extent to which the social gap has increased/decreased over the passing decade. According to the committee's findings, between 1963 and 1970, the standard of living improved for the urban Jewish population as a whole. The average income increased 5% a year. Between 1963-64, the lower 10% of the population experienced a 35% increase in their income as compared to an average increase of 26% for all families. Nevertheless, the lower 10% of the population earned only 2.2% of the total income. During the recession of 1966-1967 all incomes were adversely affected but the poorer groups were hit the hardest and inequality in income distribution increased significantly. By the end of the recession the committee noted that inequality in income distribution decreased and an amelioration in the relative condition of the poorer classes occurred. The standard of living of Sephardic Jews improved relative to that of all other families. Yet, their income constituted only 70% of all other families.[64] Since 1981 Orientals families make 80.8% that of the Ashkenazi families, but since their families are larger, their per capita income is only 55% that of the Ashkenazim.[65]

The committee pointed out that during the recession when the economic gap was very pronounced, there was hardly any fermentation or social protest. But in the years following the recession, when

unemployment decreased and improvement in overall conditions was apparent, protests ensued and dissatisfaction voiced against poverty and economic and social inequalities. The committee notes that one of the main factors contributing to such a gap was the wide difference in education. Yet, although educational achievements of the various ethnic groups, particularly for the young generation, are improving, the process is a very slow one.[66]

Even though certain policies intent upon reversing inequalities were pursued, e.g., social welfare entitlement programs mentioned before, other factors external to the social and economic system influenced adversely the existing situation. The reparations from Germany that many Ashkenazi families received caused a further increase in inequality, since these families had generally already a higher income. Finally, contrary to a former assertion, changes in the level of education did not affect considerably a decrease in inequality between 1963/4 and 1980/81. Ginor indicates that in 1981 67% of Ashkenazi youth attended post-primary education compared to 46% of Sephardic youth. The gap in post-primary education continues significantly for the second generation (Israeli born), and, indeed, in 1981 42% of second generation Ashkenazi attended post-secondary education compared to 12% Sepharadim, while in 1961 20% attended compared to 5% respectively.[67]

The income gap, of course, is concomitant with the gap in higher education. Still, in the 1980's the income gap is much larger than the educational gap. One contributing factor may be the quality of education which is not computed when the average number of years at school is compared. The income gap also corresponds to geographical

location. The average income for families in developing towns is much lower than in urban central areas, especially when the family size is considered. The population in most of the developing towns is of Sephardic background.[68]

Since economic gaps have been seen as related to educational gaps, efforts and policies were pursued to treat both. It should be noted that as complaints and criticism began to amass from various quarters, increased pressure was exerted on officials to include Sephardic input in the educational institutions. The Knesset plenum instructed its Educational Committee to study "the urgent actions needed to salvage Mizrahi heritage." The Educational Committee set a special subcommittee that included Knesset members from various political parties. They examined existing curricula and reserach and the way in which culture and art were reflected in the media. After lengthy deliberations the Educational Committee in the Knesset came to the following conclusions in 1974: (1) The immigration of the Sephardic Jews to Israel will be written in history as one of the greatest events in the annals of the Jewish people, and the realization of the Zionist enterprise cannot be mentioned without it. (2) Sephardic Jewry has taken an active part in every step in the creation of the State of Israel, beginning in pioneering settlements and including the defense of the State. (3) The Committee recognizes the social, economic and cultural inequality in Israel. This has undermined the self image of individuals and groups of Sephardic origin and has instilled prejudice amongst pupils and teachers. This predicament is partly due to the ignorance about cultural wealth of these communities. (4) The Israeli society has not paid attention to

the spiritual-cultural crisis that beset the Sephardim, nor to their ensuing needs. Furthermore, the educational system does not educate toward knowledge and recognition, which has resulted in contempt amongst young Sephardim concerning their own legacy. (5) As a result of depiction of the Western culture as the dominant, normative culture by the media and in the schools, the Sephardim experienced frustration, inferiority, alienation and indifference. (6) The Committee determines, sadly, that the educational institutions have committed grave mistakes by neglecting the legacy and culture of the Mizrahi.[69]

Therefore, the committee recommends the following measures to be adopted: devising new curricula for all grades that would describe the history of all Jewish communities, and presenting literary works to reflect this history. To achieve this task, teachers will have to be retrained and taught accordingly. And importantly, this additional material will be considered as mandatory studies. On the basis of these recommendations, a center was established in the Ministry of Education and Culture called "The Center for the Incorporation of Mizrahi History in Education and Culture," and, in fact, it has published five volumes on this subject. However, a basic problem still exists.

The Center was established in an attempt to introduce the public, mostly the pupils, to Mizrahi history and literature and acknowledge their contributions to the making of the Jewish nation, but achieved much less than desired. In fact, these studies were not included in the material covered for the matriculation examination, nor in the curricula at Teachers' Colleges. Furthermore, even when teachers

wanted to introduce the Center's material as supplementary studies, they became reluctant to take on such responsibility since their primary task was to prepare the students for the Bagrut. Nor were most of the students themselves interested in studying additional material on which they would not be tested. Hence, although efforts have been made, especially in the last decade, to incorporate the history of Sephardic Jews, mostly separate books came out, rather than new all inclusive history books.[70]

4. Labor's Educational Policies and Social Objectives: An Evaluation

In the Israeli society, by and large, ideology and social policies have been strongly acclaimed as promoting equality, unity and integration of the exiles. Accordingly, the educational system is seen as a convenient channel through which egalitarian values and support for peripheral groups can be realized. In his study about relations between central and peripheral groups and their respective educational levels, Kashti asserts that in a society whose population is of diverse origin and culture and/or a society marked by a high degree of class distinction, any educational change will tend to become self-obstructing. When changes in the educational system are implemented by central groups whose aim is to achieve social and cultural equality, opposite and undesired effects will inevitably result. This is due to the dominant position and orientations, social and cultural, of the central groups themselves. The obstructive process occurs, according to him, in many developing countries as well. In Israel, the rate of participation in education of pupils from Sephardic families; i.e., peripheral groups has increased but it is limited in scope. Indeed, as

we have pointed out already, pupils from peripheral social groups were directed to vocational and technical schools where predominantly role socialization takes place, whereas the Ashkenazi pupils attend schools whose principal aim is status orientation.

The comprehensive schools established through the reforms were to change this predicament. But they ended up becoming merely a combination of two or more separate schools regarding orientation. Just as before, the academic high schools emphasize intellectual development as compared to the other schools which stress a practical and vocational direction. What this means is that no fundamental change or reform has taken place but that the differentiation of the previous school system has been maintained in the new school system. The hierarchical structure of the original schools has been transferred to the comprehensive school which still reinforces the process of social selection, where academic skills and central group values are predominant. As Kashti correctly asserts, the underprivileged children are encouraged to participate in the mainstream culture and aspire to upward mobility through the school, yet the school itself uses those yardsticks of success with which middle class children are mostly familiar. It is no wonder that this kind of participation in the culture will be, in fact, obstructive for pupils who do not come from mainstream groups.[71]

In this case, the content of the ideology - equality and integration - has not proven to be very relevant or effective. Those proclaiming the ideology nonetheless conspicuously continue to preserve the status quo by maintaining the real power relations and infusing education with values alien to peripheral groups. As long as

the center groups remain structurally intact and their cultural values predominate, in spite of mostly mythical social and economic creed of equality, no real change can transpire.

As we have seen, the school was more than merely one of the socializing factors in the society. It was the main agent superseding and often negating the other contributing factors of socialization. Its aim was to desocialize or act as a counter socializing agent for a particular group of people - the Sephardim, many of whom were of lower class. The other Sephardim, who did not belong to the lower classes, voluntarily shed their hampering ethno-identity. The school has partly failed in its mission of improving ethnic group relations and even caused some new tensions. The authorities did not emphasize enough the need of association in their planning of school zones. Often, by not studying in the same school students from various backgrounds have not had the opportunity to associate. Though perhaps not purposefully, segregation persists.[72]

The official policy regarding ethnic integration has changed during the years. Educational integration meant to officials, especially initially, the opportunity for pupils of different ethnic groups to meet and interact within a common educational framework. This view reflects the organizational characteristics of allowing groups to meet but it is not addressed to other aspects of group interaction. Hence, the differences in their economic and class status, their Vetek (years in Israel), their living arrangements (Kibbutz, Moshav, city, developing town) were not examined directly although it was evident that many of these factors were related. Moreover, it was not explicitly stated whether integration should be

defined as a goal in itself or as a means to achieve other ends. Amir and Balas discuss the evolution of the educational policies directed at social integration and they point to three main stages. The first stage took place from 1948 to 1962, a period when educational integration was not among the important priorities in the official policy. Only in the early 1960's, did officials became increasingly aware that serious social problems could no longer be avoided and that the demographic composition was a significant factor. Thus, the notion of "special fostering" of disadvantaged children was formulated. The second stage, from 1963 to 1968, was the consolidative one and resulted in the Reforma, the Comprehensive Schools, and the realization that integration must take place in higher educational institutions.[73] During this period the Ministry of Education and Culture focused on finding ways to enrich the "culturally deprived." Programs included long school days, new textbooks composed especially for the "teunei tipuah" and tutoring. The intensity of planning and carrying out the plans was pronounced but the optimism reflected during the first stage was replaced by doubts and dissatisfaction with the primary results. The Comprehensive Schools were built initially in developing towns, and serviced essentially a homogeneous disadvantaged population. The intention was to build, eventually, Comprehensive Schools all around the country, and have groups of various ethnic and economic background attend them. To what extent the idea would be accepted, particulerly among the privileged population was not completely clear, and the question of making the programs compulsary was also questionable. At any rate, at the time the main goals were the improvement of educational achievements of the "teunei tipuah" and

narrowing the educational gap among the groups. (Numerous parents objected to busing, and it has taken a long time and much efforts for the kibbutzim to participate in absorbing disadvantaged population.) Gradually, integration became the central issue. Although the idea itself was not the main cause for the reforms, it was always concieved of as a chrished ideal - unifying the Jewish exiles in the State of Israel. This ideal, it was believed, could be achieved through a natural course as the people meet at school, in the army, and in other social arenas, rather than through planned activities. In 1966, however, integration became an explicit aim included in the educational programs, and in 1968 it became a declared national aim.[74] The third stage took place during the 1970's. It was stated that social integration of the ethnic groups is paramount and must be acted upon at once.

Klein and Eshel contend that in spite of the fact that integration has been propounded a desirable goal, there was no clear and acceptable definition of what integration entails. When integration is conceived of as a goal, the association of a heterogeneous population under a common educational roof implies that this accomplishment in itself constitutes the realization of the goal. However, when integration is defined as a means to achieve specified national and educational aims, there is a need to search and detail the ways to bring them about. The specific goals envisioned by some were equal educational opportunities, improvement in the achievements and performance of disadvantaged pupils, narrowing the gap between them and other pupils, and changing the perceptions of the non-Sephardic population towards the Sephardim, thus effecting better

social relations among them. Although resources were invested to improve schools in disadvantaged areas, the services they offered remained inferior in comparison with other schools. The performance of disadvantaged children improved in the elemantary schools, but they still lagged behind in high school and the university. Not enough diverse study material has been incorporated in the curriculum. Further, although the parent population supports educational integration in principle, some have expressed concern that their children may suffer if the level of study is reduced and that they may be negatively influenced by the behavior of "culturally disadvantaged."[75]

It may also be difficult to engender agreeable social relations among the groups when they are in unequal positions socially economically and educationally, and live in a segregated fashion. Pupils of heterogeneous backgrounds who attend the same schools find it difficult to associate truly since they each come from different homogeneous communities. Ashkenazi pupils are often condescending toward the Sephardim, and although Sephardic pupils improve scholastically they suffer emotionally and socially.[76] The benefits accruing to pupils in the Comprehensive Schools were not greater than the losses they incurred. Similar findings were made about inter-ethnic contact in the army.[77] The relations among these groups reflect polarization more than interaction, expressed especially during the last election campaigns.

The explanations of the rift and tension between the ethnic groups and the methods employed to evercome them reflect the officials' worldview of the problem. In Israel, the ethnic conflict

has often been seen as serious only in the short run but the hope was that the rupture would be mended in view of the fact that the fundamental ethnic identity of the groups is a common one, namely, their Jewish identity. The process of integration has not been completed, some argue, since not enough time has lapsed to eliminate gaps in education, occupation and geographical segregation. It has been asserted further that the disadvantaged status of some groups has been used as a political tool, which in turn has slowed down the nullification of ethnicity as a significant factor. Politicizing and ideologizing ethnicity is counterproductive. Instead, integration in the educational institutions, new educational methods, rehabilitation of neighborhoods, intermarriages, and inclusion of Oriental traditions in the mainstream are needed for successful ethnic amalgamation. But if ethnic integration is well under way, why does equality between the groups lag so far behind? Since many of the Sephardim have absorbed a western Israeli mentality, why are their achievements in education and occupation so much lower than their Ashkenazi counterparts?

Smooha points out that this approach is accepted in Israel by many, partly because it complements the official nationalist ideology which denies ethnicity as a key factor detrimental to nation building. It clearly serves the interests of the ruling Ashkenazi elite and some of the Sephardic elite, who interpret the emergence of ethnic consciousness as separatism and view it unfavorably.[78] Is it not reasonable to assume that the Ashkenazim would try to hold at bay the entrance of the Sephardim to positions that would threaten their interests? Further, how can social integration really be achieved if the Sephardim continue to inhabit deteriorated and segregated

communities? How can educational reforms, intermarriages, and rehabilitation of neighborhoods, all attempted, break the overlapping of the ethnicity-class structure? And if, indeed, ethnicity has been significantly receding as a factor, why do so many Sephardim feel disadvantaged, discriminated against, alienated and hateful? And finally, to what extent does the claim of successful progress of integration policies clear the Ashkenazi conscience and prevent any other viable option for the Sephardim?[79] The roots of the problem have not been addressed and since Mamlachtiut - the primacy of the state - was invented, it masked the growing class polarization. Further, Israel has undergone a precipitous industrialization, which accentuated the ethnic division of labor.

It is clear that in the four decades of statehood, the overlap of class and ethnicity has not disappeared. True, certain changes have occurred, e.g., intermarriages as well as the entrance of Mizrahim into professional occupations, including high governmental positions. But it is questionable whether such changes constitute a definite indication of the transience of polarization in the Israeli society. In the 1950's the Orientals served as cheap, unskilled or semi-skilled labor placed in Ma'abarot (transit camps for immigrants) or shipped to developing towns.

The entrance of a mass of Sephardic immigrants did not harm or undermine the Ashkenazi dominance established in the Yishuv but strengthened it even further. Most of the Sephardim were lacking in some vital characteristics needed for success there. They had large families, lacked vocational training and did not have political connections. In actuality, they were helpless, vulnerable refugees who

were to be manipulated. The official ingathering of the exiles became, in fact, a policy of "paternalism and cooptation." Their culture was assaulted, they became totally dependent for their existence and were used to solve some burning national problems such as the establishment of additional agricultural and farm settlements, the enlargment of the army, and the added manpower for swift industrialization.[80]

These new immigrants were absorbed into low echelons of society. The dichotomy between the Ashkenazim and Sephardim was to a large extent class based. Swirski maintains that "the Israeli bourgeois is Ashkenazi... Most of the symbols and processes of bourgeois control of the economy, politics, education and communication are familiar to him since childhood through his home and neighborhood... He is used to finding Ashkenasim in parallel positions to his and Sephardim in lower positions. The Jewish laborer is Mizrahi... Whereever he goes the Mizrahi social condition is justified according to Mizrahi characteristics: numerous children and low education. The Mizrahi is accustomed and excpects to find other Mizrahim in similar social positions and Ashkenasim above him."[81] The Sephardim had replaced the Ashkenazi proletariat who advanced to while collar jobs and the middle class.

In the 1960's and 1970's, however, significant changes occured. Some of the Sephardim were able to achieve middle level positions in various sectors, and many adopted the Israeli culture. Their assimilation coupled with the weakening of the Labor movement rendered them to some extent less dependent on the establishment. This, however, was not so sweeping a transformation as to shake the social

and economic order. Ethnic equality was not achieved and the class-ethnic overlap continued to consolidate. Most of the poverty is to be found amongst the Sephardim and the proletariat is mostly Sephardic (not including in both instances the Israeli Arabs and Palestinians). The occupational middle level is mixed-it is composed both of Ashkenazim and Sephardim, but the elite is almost completely Ashkenazi. This class-ethnic arrangement is transfered from one generation to the next without much opposition, partially because this schism is attenuated by the following factors: (1) The Mizrahim themselves are divided, 2/5 have entered the middle classes while 3/5 remain in the lower class; (2) Beneath them, socially, economically and politically, are the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians, who constitute the lowest class and the cheapest manpower; (3) The penetration of the Mizrahim into strategic, sensitive positions - for example, Herut's Central Committee is significant; (4) Increased inter-ethnic marriage (In the 1970's, the percentage of intermarriages was about 19%); (5) Concentration of votes to parties in power gives a bargaining leverage, especially to individuals attempting to secure a high office such as prime minister, president and chief of staff; (6) The Sephardic protest is constant, from the Black Panthers to Ohalim, as are activities by intellectuals; (7) The head-on collision with the Labor movement, the latter viewed as the Ashkenazi power center of dominance.[82]

Though it is true that the voting patterns of the Mizrahim may be seen as as expression of coalescence of power of a large interest group, one must ask to what extent it can be translated into effective pressure for fundamental changes. Did they perceive, for example, the

Likud's economic and social policies as corresponding to the needs of the voters? What is the value of seeming political power when the social and economic gap is still stable? Before the 1977 elections a Sephardic literary publication voiced its criticism of all political parties, self-adornment with some Sephardic names. "Indeed, it is a pretty decoration, but does it constitute true representation? What is the nature of such ornaments? What has it contributed? What can it contribute to this Knesset? How many more Knessets will be satisfied merely with decorations of Mizrahi names, while relegating the vital question of equality outside its and the government's walls?"[83] The sincerity of the Ministry of Education and Culture in its promise to incorporate the Sephardic legacy in the schools was also questioned. It was viewed as part of an election campaign necessity to seduce voters. But, "the state will continue to pay for the cold-blooded murder of Mizrahi culture," some said, viewing the pronouncements as aimed to silence and anaethetize the public.[84]

Several themes have been discerned so far. (1) Education has been viewed as a major instrument equipped to undertake the task of improving social problems. To that end, efforts and programs have been pursued with little success. (2) The gap between the groups has not receded but rather intensified, increasingly acquiring a political dimension. (3) The Sephardim continue to feel neglected, deprive and separate.

The political leadership has not facilitated the birth throes of Sephardic absorption into the Israeli society. Upon arrival, a wide gulf between the newly Sephardic immigrants and the Ashkenazi <u>vatikim</u> (early pioneers) was revealed. While the <u>vatikim</u> and the new Ashkenazi

immigrants had a common language (Yiddish), the Sephardim were not understood. As far as most European immigrants were concerned, fostering communications was the responsibility of the absorbing personnel, but it was the problem of the Sephardic immigrant.[85]

The feelings of deprivation and exclusion were conceived upon initial contact with the absorption and labor offices. These experiences reinforced their presentiment that their problems were not attended to seriously, and that the authorities wished to preserve their failing conditions to prove that they were "dirty and primitive." Some of them contended that "in Morocco we studied in 'Alliance,' and here we are discriminated against. They send us the worst teachers so we will remain behind. Do you know why they gathered us in these neighborhoods? So they can encircle us with soldiers as they did in Vadi Salid."[86] The very fact that part of the public experienced a sense of alienation and banishment has social implications. The gaps were not the consequences of objective and insurmountable factors but the result of the way that the authorities approached and treated these problems.

As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the succeeding generation of political leaders was ideologically impoverished. They lacked the essential components and characteristics to engage in a thorough evaluation of the immense task they faced. They could not comprehand that an incomplete solution was not only inadequate and unjust but intrinsically explosive. The programs launched did not sufficiently promote the well being of the poorer population. The direct and indirect attitudes of the ruling elite and the secure public did not encourage diversity but required precipitated

conformity. At best, the officials proved a paternalistic approach toward a clientele they treated as deficient not only in skills but in their humanity.

The establishment of justice was apparently not conceived as their primary function or conviction. The superficial remedies could not rectify the profound wounds imprinted on the Sephardim's minds and souls. The worsening of this predicament became the inevitable course of development. It can no longer be denied that ethnic polarization has been aggravated and that there are two peoples - two Israels. They coexist and are occasionally unified mainly due to external threat, itself magnified by the leadership. Nevertheless, the underlying schism is solid and the apparent common end of nationalism has not successfully concealed the problems. Beneath the pronouncements about unity and solidarity lurks a real and distinct abyss.

Education has not transformed the conditions of vast disparities between the ethnic groups. It has not succeeded in humanizing enough the strained relations to bring them to mutual recognition. Consequently, some of this embittered population has chosen ways to manifest its refusal to remain outside the power center. From protest groups, like the Black Panthers, to systematic voting for the Likud, a party seen as the opposition to the establishment, they registered their discontent.

Notes for Chapter III

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CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL CHANGES AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES: 1967 - 1977

Following the 1977 elections, observers, including Labor leaders, expressed surprise at the "new" ultra-nationalist phenomenon and the drastic shift in public mood. It was recognized that satisfaction with Labor's performance has lessened, but the results seemed still unexpected. Although phenomena such as the conservatism of the young, accentuated religiosity of secular Israelis and extreme forms of nationalism are usually identified with Likud's reign, fundamental changes transpired long before that in social attitudes, values and behavior, as well as in the educational field. Schweitzer maintains that the upheavel of 1977 occured seventeen years too late. Indeed, in the 1960's Mapai's programatic way came to an end, through its internal leadership crises and loss of ideology.[1] (My contention has been, as shown previously, that Labor's ideological transformation can be traced to an earlier period).

This chapter examines the changes undergone by Labor as less radical aspects of its ideology became predominant. Nationalism and Jewish ethnocentrism, with the celebration of victorious wars, have been increasingly stressed. Similar trends have occurred in education, as particular ideas and orientations have been included and emphasized. Indeed, Carmon maintains that the centralization in

curricular planning and choice of textbooks have been conducive to teaching the outlook of those at the helm, namely, emanating from above.[2]

My concern is to discern patterns of development, or evolutionary trends, in the political and educational realms. The contention is not that the educational curricula alone led to the 1977 election results or to the increasing belligerence of a segment of the population. However, it is important to examine the educational work as an influential factor on the behavior and attitudes of the young. It is also essential to identify the dominant ideas absorbed and transmitted by the educational institutions since they reflect and express the prevailing political beliefs.

In order to understand the Israeli political culture during the post 1967 war era, we will first describe the major political developments during this period. Then we will examine curricular planning and educational objectives as well as extra-curricular themes absorbed both in the schools and in the society at large. Finally, the attitudes and belief systems of various segments of the population will be elucidated.

1. The Political Process - Major Events and Issues

In 1977 the Likud came to power with 43% Knesset seats compared to Labor's 32%. Public opinion polls taken in 1977 prior to the elections indicated decreased support for Labor and increased backing of Likud.[3]

Explanations attempting to decipher the change in public mood pointed to discontent with officials' corruption, exhaustion of

ideals, decay and inertia of Labor, and increased support of the Likud by the young, especially the second generation Sephardim. Until 1977, the Likud constituted the major opposition party. Labor was at the helm of power, politically, economically and socially. It was regarded as "the establishment" because it dominated every sector: government, labor unions, the army and the Jewish Agency. The power structure was such that the Ashkenazi elite determined the values and policies in every domain.[4] Although during the Ben-Gurion era Labor was able to win Sephardic support, the pattern of Sephardic voting for the right wing had been set since the 1950's and 1960's. From 1969 on, the trend became clearer. In 1981, the preference to one of the two large parties by each of the ethnic groups was 2:1 (Sephardim for Likud, and Ashkenazim for Ma'arach). In 1984, the picture is similar. Ashkenazim constituted 70% of Ma'arach voters, while 60% of the Likud voters were Sephardim.[5] Ethnic voting and disenchantment with the system are important factors, yet, alone, they do not clarify sufficiently the changes taking place within the public itself.

By the early 1960's Labor exhausted its national agenda.[6] How did it reach such a low ebb, unable to offer a direction or carry out basic decisions? Why did it become its own shadow and finally its anti-thesis?[7] Was it doomed to failure because of original sins - colonizatory activities, ethnic polarization, abdication to the religious parties and compromise of the socialist experiment? The precise date of its fall may be debated. For now it can be said that the process of deterioration reached its height when the contradiction between public needs and the answers provided by the leadership became

acute. A new agenda was needed either by the party in power or by a new power base.

Bentov recalls the early pioneering era when socialism attempted to pave a new way like a stream of pure water within a marsh, overflowing and growing in public and political life. From the 1950's on, however, different kinds of ideas were substituted. Before, Bentov says, people "ate in order to live, later they lived in order to eat."[8] The motivation changed, equality was eliminated though still proclaimed as an ideal, and many became concerned with money and status. When Bentov pointed out in a meeting that the government provided exaggerated support, especially financial, for the bourgeoisie - the individual business people, Ben-Gurion replied, "So what, we can take it back from them at will."[9] Did he really think the party could take anything back? At any rate, his reply reflects the party's orientation - pragmatic, opportunistic but still self-consciously ideological. Increasingly, however, pragmatism and opportunism remained alone, without the ideological foundation.

Gradually, Labor's altered agenda, although not thoroughly planned and perhaps inevitably resulting from unresolved conditions of enmity with the Arabs and partly due to the need to inflate the value of Zionism, rendered nationalism of the chosen people - an etatist ethos - the most meaningful raison d'etre. Ben-Gurion's paternal image, and the loyalty and identification with the state and its leader, bestowed a definite identity on the individual Israeli. The aura of the founding fathers associated with giving life and content to Zionism, building the settlements, creating social and economic networks and finally establishing the state, planted a feeling of

gratitude and love. Hence, the perception of Mapai as the producer of the national vision and actualizer of the dream, constituted the sustenance that fueled the legitimacy of its own rule. Increasingly, however, the Labor Party became the quintessential victim of its own pragmatism.[10] It ignored the social repercussions that must follow an economic policy. While the plan to attract investors, interest businessmen and provide incentives brought wealth to some Israelis, the social and economic gaps widened. Previous declared values such as equality, solidarity, mutual responsibility and public accountability were replaced. Growth, competetion and individual achievements measured by wealth and status, coupled with an unquestioned dedication to defense, became imperative.

The fast inclination toward capitalism brought a steady fall in the people and leadership, and corruption amongst the latter burst out. This phenomenon did not occur over night. Mapai's agenda, rather than socialist, became proliferated with mamlachtiut and bourgeois elements. The result was a growing gap between its self image as still socialist, and its actual performance.[11] In the 1960's, when Levi Eshkol succeeded Ben-Gurion, some members were alarmed by the "increasing strength of 'normal' capitalistic trends in shaping the Israeli society," and concerned over the party's status and future, since the party no longer reflected or represented its original economic goals and class basis.[12] But their desire to inject the party with a new dynamism and to draw a clear line between Labor and the bourgeois capitalist sector was not fulfilled. Eshkol was not ready to meet Mapam's minimum demands for the elimination of housing slums, increased grants for large families and increased budget for Arab

villages. The depletion of Labor's content and the continued class polarization with the stress on Mamlachtiut, constituted the bourgeois nationalism which Ben-Aharon and others had warned against. According to them, it would bring one day a religious-right wing coalition to power.[13] The public, consciously or unconsciously, was disenchanted with the personal rivalry within the party, and in 1966, when a deep economic crisis beset the country, the days of Labor seemed numbered.

But in 1967, the public was full of gratitude toward the government, when the IDF and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan won the war. The victory succeeded in masking the many existing problems with a cloud of euphoria. The public which lacked, or was deprived of, social values and ideological direction, now found palatable elements - victory, strengh, conquest, and defeating the enemy - to serve as the new agenda. In fact, from this point onward a large part of the Israeli public, part of the press, the right-wing parties, many members of the religious parties and sections of the Labor Party were swept by chauvinistic feelings and expansionist desires. The new borders were viewed as securing the existence of Israel which could, under no circumstances, be traded. The military victory was celebrated in songs and stories about the commanders, battles and acts of heroism. The country seemed engulfed and seduced by war and adulation for Israeli might as represented by the army commanders and soldiers. The political leadership was highly esteemed since it was associated with the mililtary leadership- the guardians of the polity.

These views were expressed, in an extreme fashion, by the "Land of Israel Movement," interchangeably called "Greater Israel Movement" or "Movement for an Undivided Israel." Although the people

participating in the movement were a minority of the public and government, they were vocal and the press carried their message extensively. In their Statement of Principles, they said: "The Six-Day War has opened up a new and and decisive era for the people and the State of Israel. The Jewish nation has come into the possession of its reunited and undivided territory. We have as little right to reject the gift of victory as to abandon the State of Israel. ...and no Israeli government, however constituted, is entitled to surrender any part of this territorial integrity.... The two prime endeavors on which our future existence depends are immigration and settlement."[14]

Others, like Ben-Aharon, then the Secretary of the Histadrut, asserted that Labor Zionism never assumed the possibility that the Jewish people in its state would rule other people. Indeed, a segment of the population did not feel comfortable nor correct in annexation and conquest, and would have preferred peace and mutually recognized borders to occupation. Essentially, however, public attention was lured away from economic and political crises into the realm of the possible. The conquered lands were no longer historical or biblical places but real, and the feeling of ownership, interwoven with religious and nationalist tones, dominated the mood. The political agenda was no longer barren, but reflected the public preoccupation with enlarged territories valued for the security dimension and the emotional attachment they generated.

The extensive stress on nationalism and its Jewish and religious content, however, was in existence prior to the 1967 victory and certainly long before the 1977 upheaval. Yet, after the 1967 war, the issue of returning territories for peace constituted an item in public

debate, military might turned into the central underlying motif considered a pre-condition for national existence. The Israeli army, which was always valued as the protective arm of the state, was elevated significantly and it was perceived as the highest branch in the land - higher than the government. Furthermore, it was the war that saved the country from a deepening economic crisis: jobs were created, industries were active, construction was abundant and even Palestinians were recruited in the labor market. For many, this seems to be the desirable arrangement - peace through strength and coexistence with the conquered population through their acceptance of Israeli superiority as a fait accompli.

Schwitzer points out that political authority and rule, during this period , was not identified with the Prime Minister but with Minister of Defense, Dayan, who prior to that represented a very small party in the process of disintegration (Rafi).[15] Between 1967 and 1973 Dayan was crowned as "king of Israel," reminiscent perhaps of King David, a beloved hero with divine inspiration, a brave soldier-excelling in his military and erotic prowess. Evidently, there was national consensus in having him at the helm. He represented some of the liberal-left in advocating humane and enlightened attitude toward the Arabs, and spoke for the nationalist-right who saw him actualizing the dream of a greater undivided Israel.[16] More than a political solution, he represented, a transitory emotional solution, cathartic in nature, a poetic nationalist existence. It provided a sense of purpose but also reintroduced a state of confusion: What will the outcome be? Can there be a realistic appraisal of the situation when the post-euphoric momentum subsides? The conditions of war and enmity

were not axiomatic as before, but an area of debate as to the nature of the struggle, perhaps for some, struggle as a value in itself.

Prior to the war it seemed that Labor was doomed to fall. Its original ideas were no longer the raison d'etre of the movement and party, and instead, the personal needs and wants of the leadership were dominant. Certainly, Labor was loosing its spiritual hegemony. It did not adequately address the neglected "other Israel," the results of colonizatory activities and the rift between the classes in a "classless" society. Although the party was saved in 1967, the conditions were ripe enough to legitimize the platform of the religious-right: historical right to the biblical land for the chosen people, and heroism of the few in facing many enemies bent on its destruction. The undercurrents of such developments must have been growing until they finally sprang full bloom. After all, the society was the outcome of a colonizatory endeavor and military struggle prior to 1967. However, from a given "natural" condition of environmental enmity, the new state of affairs originated redemptive, heroic, mystical, religious and poetic qualities. When the struggle became an affirming act in itself, the "Never Again" used later by Begin and other groups, rather than constituting an adjacent and undesirable consequence resulting from other aims, became the life force of the Israeli political culture.

The 1967 war, although consolidating and uniting the Israelis, led segments of the population toward introspection. Could peace be achieved precisely following a victory, territories (or a portion thereoff) returned and a different relationship begun with the neighbors? Should Israel initiate talks and offer concessions? Are the

territories worth the dead, the chaotic and bewildered atmosphere ensuing after the conquest? Can the Arabs be trusted? And in later years, do they (or at least some of them) also have rights to the land?

Originally, the Zionist parties and movement were ideological and they differed primarily in their vision of the Jewish state, namely, its internal character. The division between hawks and doves on the question of war crystalized in the post 1967 period and it reflects Israel's dilemma to the present day, often overshadowing concerns and ruptures between rich and poor, religious and secular and Ashkenazim and Sephardim. Questions about co-existence with the Arabs, return of which territories for peace, and the legal status of the occupied territories and people, have become major points. The question of Palestinians' rights and the need to treat them as a legitimate concern, i.e., as a political issue and not merely as a security factor, has increasingly preoccupied the country. Since 1967, the debate over the right of Palestinian self-determination, and even, over the recognition of a Palestinian entity, has intensified. Particularly since the 1973 war, the Palestinian question has become central. Are the Palestinians a nation? Do they have rights on Eretz Israel? Who should represent them? Should they participate in negotiations and peace talks? What ought Israel's position be vis-a-vis their wish for an independent state?[17]

As may be recalled, Jewish national renaissance meant for many, the conquest of Hebrew labor. Through labor, the Jew was mending his split and wounded self, connecting it with nature, becoming integrated with the previously alienated world and, hence, able to create a vital

culture. It also meant intentional proletarization in order to build a productive life. Following the 1967 war and the increased economic activity, Palestinian labor was absorbed in agriculture, industry and services. A division between Israeli Arabs, Palestinians and Jews became pronounced. (Arab Israelis have been second class citizens.[18]) The Palestinians, unorganized and unprotected by unions and professional associations, earn much less and are, often, partially and seasonally employed. They constitute a proletariat, unprotected professionally, poorly paid, sporadically employed and under suspicion when a problem erupts, while the Israelis position themselves as "masters."[19] Critics deploring this predicament point, primarily, to the harm done to the Israeli body politic. They lament the loss of ideology and spiritualilt in Jewish life, the enthusiam and love of labor being replaced by greed and arrogance. They warn that the Israeli society is in danger of losing its soul and sense of purpose, and that the habit of having a conquered population subservient to it is corrupting. And since these workers are second class citizens, they would be let off first during an economic crisis which could lead to open, perhaps explosive, resentment.

As early as 1969, Prime Minister Golda Meir refused to recognize the Palestinians as a people. In that year she renewed the National Unity Government in an alliance with the opposition. Labor, lacking the propensity, vigor and imagination to offer its own ideas, did not seem to be overly anxious to unite with its historical foe, as was repeated in 1984. No longer was the difference between the two held as historical antagonism between a socialist, non-imperialist party and a right wing, capitalist and imperialist one. The new agenda that was

created, haphazardly though inevitably, through gradual distortions and decreased Labor engagement with its declared values, became consonant with the right-wing agenda, or at least, not found objectionable enough to shake Labor out of this path. The pervasive argument or justification for not facing party rotteness, has long been the issue of security. Nevertheless, the life of conspicuous consumption continued. The Unity Government with its large base could perhaps provide temporary stability but not quality. The alliance, it would seem, decided not to decide as far as social problems were concerned. From 1967 to 1970 (the period of unity), numerous strikes took place and taxes were raised, yet the parties proved unable to consolidate a policy. What does such a step mean for voters and democracy? How are their choices of an alternative to be expressed? How long can a broad based government be seen as desirable by the leadership even though it is paralyzed? What remains of separation of powers, if most of the Knesset members comprise the government, not through the choice of the voters, but by a marriage of convenience? And importantly, why did this situation come about and what does it imply about Labor?

Labor's actions emanated from an array of factors. The fossilization of Labor was long under way, and in spite of the Knesset seats it still managed to receive, the public held the party in increasingly low esteem, and the young showed a lack of interest in joining political parties, Labor in particular. Indeed, party members, such as Horowitz, Ya'akobi and others confirmed the need to appeal to the young and offer them positions and opportunities to institutionalize their political involvement. Apparently, Labor seemed

more impenetrable than Likud, although the latter's leadership was also old and Ashkenazi. Critics from Labor ranks recommended the revival of ideological and spiritual content, democratization of internal proceedings, and disintegration of the oligarchic character of the party.[20]

As for Labor's platform, in the 1973-74 Government Yearbook it was stated that the

> "main goal of the government in the coming year is to achieve peace with its Arab neighbors. However, the Government supports the necessary enlargement of the army in order to assure its power and ability to protect the state and overpower its enemies... The Government will continue to build Jerusalem as the enetrnal capital of Israel. The population [in the city] will increase, industries and investments take place and the rights of all residents assured... [It will] continue to support the rights of citizens regardless of religion, nationality, ethnicity and class and allow freedom of conscience... We will proceed with settlements [in the occupied territories]."[21]

Furthermore, equal opportunity through education for all, with special attention to the Teunei Tipuah is affirmed. There is a need to "deepen education for Jewish-Zionist values and humanitarian ones, as well as knowledge about our nation's history and legacy, history of the Yishuv, the struggles involved in the establishment of the state and the wars to defend its existence."[22] The needs for mutual tolerance and religious freedom are enunciated; thus, the government would prevent religious or anti-religious oppression, subsidize religious education and ensure non-Jewish minoroties' practices.

The government declared its intention to integrate the non-Jewish minorities in all aspects of Israeli life while respecting their religious and cultural uniqueness, and provide educational, health and welfare services. In addition, it was set to support local and municipal activities through some measure of decentralization. It also

promised equal pay to Arab workers for the same type of work and stated that efforts would be made to absorb Arabs into governmental offices and public institutions in order to have them partake in public responsibilities.[23] Although one may discern a readiness for rapproachment with the Israeli Arabs, the Ma'arach position had, inevitably, to alienate and disillusion many. During a Ma'arach meeting in 1975, Ya'akobi, then Minister of Transportation, declared his party's position as follows: (1) Support the need for territorial continuity from the Mediterranian Sea to Sharm-el-Sheikh; (2) Keep an enlarged and united Jerusalem; (3) Retain a foothold in the Golan Heights; (4) Secure the border with Jordan; (5) Object to the establishment of a separate Palestinian state. Of course, he said, the rest is negotiable.[24]

Even Labor's young leadership, Rabin, Peres, Allon, Ya'akobi and others did not seem able to offer a renewed agenda. The question of borders and territories remained a pivotal issue. In spite of the fact the some members in the party (Lova Eliav and Yosi Sarid, for example) objected to the inclusion of too many territories, they remained in the party, presumably, believing they could influence it in a different direction. Still, the preoccupation with military issues dominated the political agenda, and the dualism between it and social reforms were too pronounced. Labor, with Mapai leadership, exhausted its ideas, and no longer could pave the way in initiating plans and originating idea, rather, it was preoccupied with its own political survival. Schweitzer contends that since the party still had a massive power base (Personnel, bureaucracy, industries, unions), and had at its disposal organizational expertise, it was able to surface again

and again in the troubled water.[25] It can be said that Labor has educated (or re-educated) the public in a particular direction. Its ideological shift is clear, although occasionally self criticism was raised. Several Labor members pointed to the widening gap between the founding ideals and the actual practices. Finally, Ben-Aharon's warning came to fruition, and a religious-right wing coalition assumed political leadership.

Our contention is that the fanaticism and uncompromising militancy, accentuated with Likud's rise to power, has not flourished in a vacuum. The arrogance, the confidence in one's right and might, the temptation to act out of spite, willful rejoicing in "splendid isolation," has become pronounced since 1967. The popular song "The Whole World is Against Us" has become the national credo. This is not to suggest that Likud is merely a replica of Labor, but that the latter prepared the ground for its success. Thus, as Harkabi argues, the two political approaches were fundamentally different schools of thought, two political cultures embodying ideas at variance.[26] Nonetheless, in spite of their differences, Labor has appropriated the symbols and ethos of power used by its historical foe. As we shall see next, the departure from Labor's founding ideals has been evident also in the educational institutions. Emphasis of particular themes in the curriculum is congruent with a political-ideological orientaion.

2. Educational Policies - Curricular Planning

In this section we review the major educational and curricular planning and objectives in the 1960's and 1970's. The focus of this

examination is on the political and social themes promulagated through educational policies.

When we look at the curriculum for History in elementary schools, in 1961, for example, it seems to have prepared partially at least a fertile ground for the nationalist outburst exhibited in later years. The goals of teaching history were stated as follows: (1) Provide the pupils with knowledge about the great past of the Israeli nation, its spiritual heritage, activities and vision. (2) Teach the pupils that our nation, the tiniest among the gentiles, maintained and protected, during 2000 years of exile, its religion, customs and ideas, and did not efface itself in regard to the great gentile nations and their cultures. Further, it did not cease to exist as one nation all over the Diaspora. (3) Cultivate in the pupils' hearts love toward our cultural treasures and awaken in them the will to behave accordingly; implant in their hearts admiration for the great holy figures and heroes and generate in them the feelings and desires to follow in their path. (4) Teach important historical events in order to understand the spiritual and material forces operating in society. (5) Render pupils aware that our nation, one of the most ancient ones and the first to become monotheistic, cultivated high social ideals and served as a progressive moral force in the world. (In the Religious schools it is added that the pupils must be made aware that they are the sons of the Israeli nation chosen by God and, thus, act to be deserving as God's nation; that in world history, the miracle of Israel's existence continues and is reflected by Divine Providence; that the fate of the nation is dependent on the observance of the Torah, and that there is a danger in spiritual and national

assimilation.) (6) Cultivate the awareness that the exalted elements in Torat Israel, the vision of the prophets, Jewish diligence in learning the Torah and the deep faith in Israel, constitute the perennial connection with the motherland and faith in its redemption. This gave the nation the power to withstand its enemies and maintain its independence, bringing the Jews back to their land to integrate all the exiles and build anew the State of Israel. (7) Generate awareness that the creation of the State of Israel is the result of longings and faithfulness kept for generations, and due to the efforts and achievements of the Halutz Movement. (In the Religious Schools it is added that the miraculous establishment of the State reflects God's supervision.) (8) Implant in the pupils love toward the State and the will and motivation to work for it in order to protect its existence; to develop and strengthen it in the spirit of Torat Israel's values and the vision of the prophets. (9) In the elementary schools, the history of the Israeli nation will be taught in depth, and from other nations' history only the elements that illuminate the relationship with Israel will be adressed. It is noted that the teachers must stress that Jewish life in the Diaspora was dependent on external factors, a dependency causing a spiritual split raising problems of double loyalty. It should be clarified that, in exile, the Jews developed autonomous communities around the synagogue with various social institutions, and that in spite of their minority status they fought to maintain their national uniquness and solidarity. Finally, that the State needs to correct distortions emanating from assimilation and from a weakened link to Jewishness.[27]

Although the nationalist motif, evident in the curriculum cited above, was expected to remain in the curriculum, there has been a growing emphasis on preparing the students for future vocations and replacing labor as an educational, pioneering and collective ideal. In fact, in 1966, the Center for Curricular Planning was established in the Ministry of Education and Culture. Its declared intention was to attend to the needs of the pupils and society by adopting a better suited curricular content. Since the society was seen in a constant state of flux, it was decided to leave educational goals open-ended and to determine them in accordance with the needs of the heterogeneous student population. Carmon argues that the kind of connection between educational goals and social ideals found in the past was absent in this plan. The new goals were congruent with an achievement oriented approach characteristic of modern Western societies.[28] What has occured was that that a new type of relationship was established between the society, possessing a changed ideological outlook, and the educational institutions. The plan was adopted at the same time as the Reforma (discussed in Chapter III). Various subjects were to be taught in a matter-of-fact manner.

In studying the Bible it was stated that: (1) the pupil will learn the biblical world and its various manifestations (faith, culture, society and economy); (2) the pupil will study Erez-Israel and its landscape in order to comprehend the connection between the people and their country; (3) he will recognize the human values and experiences and their meaning for the individual and society; (4) the pupil will learn to read the Bible independently; (5) the pupil will develop an appreciation for the biblical characters and values.[29]

Geography was to be studied in an academic manner devoid of the ideological values found in previous curricula. The goal was to acquire factual information and develop intellectual curiosity, whereas before it was stated that "the objective of teaching geography is to root the children in Erez-Israel, in the land of our forefathers; the birth place of the Hebrew nation - within which the State of Israel was renewed... serving as a place for longimg and aspirations for the Israeli nation, wherever it is. ...to impart them the recognition that it is our natural home, the foundation for creating our national culture in spirit and body."[30]

According to the new plan, the number of hours dedicated to studying the natural sciences was doubled for grades 7-8. Art, music and Physical Education hours were reduced from 10.8% of weekly hours in 1956 to 9.9% in 1968.[31] As for History lessons, although numerous themes about Jewish history and Zionist activities were included in the 1970's, other topics in world history have been added.

In Civics, the following topics were to be introduced: (1) the individual - a link within the society; (2) social groups (family, youth movements etc.); (3) the nation; (4) the state (sovereignty over territory and population, and the purpose of independence); (5) international relations (conflicts between states and nations, wars and cooperation); (6) the U.N.; (7) the Declaration of Independence; (8) citizens' rights; (9) elections; (10) citizens' responsibilities; (11) political parties; (12) the Knesset; (13) the government; (14) the judiciary; (15) local government; (16) religious institutions; (17) the president; (18) democracy; (19) dicatorship; (20) problems and issues in Israel (immigration and settlement, absorption and

integration, Jews and Arabs, foreign policy, security and economic independence); (21) summary - the responsibilities of every citizen to assure the special existence of the state and its democracy. The civics course was to be studied over a period of 32 hours. Six hours were used for introducing topics (1)-(6), sixteen hours were dedicated to topics (7)-(17) and four hours to (17)-(18). Topic (20) was discussed in four class hours (the teacher would choose two issues for discussion), and two hours were assigned for summary (21).[32]

Civics lessons for Religious State Schools emphasized different concerns. For example, the synagogue as a socializing agent was included in topic (2). Topic (3) added divine elements to the historical process in the formation of the nation, and emphasized the uniqueness of Israel as a "holy people." Topic (4) included the divine mission of the state. Topic (5) added the relationship toward other nations according to the laws of the Talmud, and Israel as "a people unto itself." Topic (7) stressed God's promise of the land to the Jews. The Law of Return was added as an independent topic. Topic (12) discussed legislation in the Knesset and the Talmud. Topic (15) was expanded to include the Chief Rabbinate and local Rabbinate, Religious Council, Religious courts and the court chief justice in Talmudic times. The summary included the necessity to study Talmudic laws as reflected in matrimonial laws, the Law of Return, the Sabbath, belief in redemption and knowledge of the Torah. It was determined that civics, in Religious State Schools, should be viewed as an integral part of Divine teachings since the State of Israel is seen as a stage in the redemptive process, and historical phenomena are rooted in messianic beliefs.[33]

The planners of the curricula for state schools intended the pupils to be exposed to the material in such a way that they could exercise a choice in interpreting it. But, in spite of the fact that several new textbooks were introduced, Carmon concludes that still in the 1970's and 1980's, social political and cultural diversity are not treated in the curricula in a systematic and meaningful way. The subject matters are not conducive for student identification with their cohorts, i.e., the Mizrahi or Arab students. The pupil does not learn to make himself aware of the problems of a heterogeneous society. Upon leaving school, he does not posses the capability to judge and evaluate wisely social issues. Instead, he remains exposed to the influences of stereotipical outlooks prevalent in his society. Even in Civics, the pupil learns the technical workings of the system, but he is not prepared to assume responsibility and become involved in political and social affairs.[34]

What does the pupil learn in school? What are the values imparted to him? The matter-of-fact teaching and individualistic trend is instrumental in becoming achievement oriented, expecting material rewards. Concomitantly, there is a significantly lesser concern with collective interest. The collective commitments stressed are nationalism and preparedness to defend the state. The planners never declared openly that achievement and success were values to be cherished. Therefore, there is often a hurried attempt by officials and educators, especially following crises (wars or anti-democratic manifestations), to urge the schools to revive the "educational orientation," namely, educating according to values rather than any teaching material.

Politicians and educators have always been aware that there is a strong interdependence between social ideals and educational work. In the early 1970's it became clear, at least to some Labor members, that confusion and uncertainty regarding long cherished ideals about state and society were rampant among the youth. Therefore, the Ministry of Education decided, in 1972, to plan an experimental project that would shape education to enhance social ideals. The participants intended to analyze the necessities faced by the Israeli society and consider changes needed both for education and society. They hoped that their suggestions would reach teachers, principals, inspectors and the public at large. Since the social system constitutes the foundation upon which values and ideals for education are defined, then, when national and social policies are unclear, confused or paradoxical, educational policies become inadequate.[35]

They asserted unequivocally the obligation to educate according to the following themes: (1) Definition and meaning of Jewish identity; (2) Continuous evaluation of the Zionist idea; (3) Social and cultural problems encountered with absorption of immigrants; (4) Awareness of social justice - challenges for the individual and society. The team noted the problematic nature of defining social goals due to the following factors: the society has a Jewish majority and a non-Jewish minority, the society has a western and modern image yet contains traditional elements, and the eruption of conflicts between eastern and western cultures within it. Furthermore, they stressed the need to alter paragraph 2 of the State Education Law so it would define general aims of education for all Israeli pupils (Jewish and non-Jewish), specifying particular aims for Jews, Arabs

and Druze. It was also mentioned that the budget allocated had been excessively reduced.[36] The author addressed the need to bridge the gap between Jewish pupils of different ethnic groups so that ethnicity would not affect achievement. Education for the non-Jewish minorities was inadequate; therefore, the idea of educating the Druze and Arabs within the domain of their unique cultures and as loyal Israeli citizens was deemed reasonable.

The intention of the project's architect was not to destroy the existing educational system but only to introduce some changes within. Education, it was reiterated, absorbs its authority and inspiration from national and social policies, and since the society has exhibited inner contradictions, how can pupils be expected to be active, involved and creative when their society is apathetic? How can they truly be taught the meaning of social justice when the population has become increasingly materialistic and individualistic?

Clearly, this is an appeal to the political leaders to develop guidelines for the public and attempt to solve problems efficiently, rather than look for political solutions through inter-party bargaining which only mask problems. (For example, secular-religious conflicts are artificially mended through compromises resulting from the coalition between the parties.) When addressing the gap between the educational networks in the Arab and Jewish sectors (facilities, teachers and curricular content), the deficiency is noted both on a human and social aspect and seen as a grave political mistake. Notwithstanding the built-in conservatism of the educational system, they recommended the fashioning of an inner mechanism that would allow for changes and initiatives to take place.

The distinction made between the visible gap for Ashkenazim and Sephardim vs. Jews and Arabs is interesting. The Sephardim were viewed as encountering difficulties because they were uprooted from their country of origin into a different social and cultural environment, which caused a personality and group crisis. The Arabs, on the other hand, grew up organically in a rooted and stable socio-cultural environment, undergoing late modernization and, consequently, lagging in their studies as well. However, the crisis of uprootedness for the Arabs, changes imposed by the Jewish immigrants, and the experience of alienation in their generic, but no longer their "own," society is not mentioned. Their historical dislocation was ignored. It seems that the description of past and present problems for both Arabs and Sephardim is somewhat distorted. The issues of class polarization, estrangement and humiliation are not viewed sufficiently as blocking the possibility of progress and healing.

The urgent neccesity specified in the report was to have a clear definition of Jewish identity and of Zionist goals, thence, finding ways to solve social problems between Jewish ethnic groups and Jews and Arabs. The fact that a small country subjected to continuous security pressures and threats, experiencing war as a perennial phenomenon influences the life style and worldviews of the population, causing them physical and moral isolation, was a given. Elad Peled pointed out that there is national consensus that Zionism is the legitimate expression of Jewish self determination, but also, that there is a desire to provide equal opportunity, i.e., social justice for all citizens regardless of religion, nationality and class (at least in the law). But what does it actually mean? Firstly, by virtue

of lacking Israeli citizenship, the Palestinians are excluded from access to these rights. Secondly, de facto segregation and discrimination against Israeli Arabs exists. They are often stopped by the police without apparent reason, having to produce their identity card, and are sometimes beaten. The fact that they do not serve in the army, in a country where service is compulsory for Jews and confers upon the discharged a certain status for future occupation, automatically renders them inferior. Even when some Jews, such as the Black Panthers, did not serve in the army, they were viewed as parasites and unequal. Equality is mentioned in the law, yet class distinctions clearly exist. Finally, since a "state of siege" is admitted, how can the mentality of the population be altered?

It is proposed that the Israeli society continue to fulfill its destiny as the "chosen people," namely, pursue personal and social justice. The educational institutions must, therefore, find effective ways to aid the disadvantaged, providing separate education for the Jews, Arabs and Druze. Thus, the common aims for all pupils are as follows: (1) Prepare conditions where the pupil's endeavor would be to achieve a meaningful quality of life; (2) Develop their spiritual curiosity and efficiency in completion of tasks; (3) Reinforce independent and critical thought; (4) Teach responsibility to the family, environment and the state; (5) Encourage involvement in public affairs, volunteer work and loyalty to the community; (6) convey the importance of social relations, opennes and tolerance of others. For Jewish pupils, it was recommended to help the youth build a whole personality as a Jew by identifying with the historical roots and the nation and strengthening Jewish awareness of the connection

with Erez-Israel. Arab education was to be based on Arab culture and scientific achievements. The desire for peace between Israel and its neighbors, studying Jewish culture, love of country (Israel), and loyalty to the state were considered common interests for Jews and Arabs. Hence, the overall goal was to mold a Jewish-Israeli society where Jewish values and loyalty to the state were paramount, while preserving a place for minorities' cultures.

The intention of the project's participants was to integrate the various groups in the Israeli society and attempt to bridge the cultural and political gaps between them by providing the same ideological foundations, yet allowing them freedom to explore their respective unique attributes. However, even if these new conditions were fulfilled, profound asymmetries would remain. The political culture would be unequivocally Jewish-Israeli-Western, in spite of the fact that some Arab and Sephardic themes could be introduced.

It would not have been unreasonable to assume that after the 1973 debacle, when governmental and military mistakes pointed to collective hubris, an attempt to forge some kind of initiative to alter this adverse predicament would appear. Interestingly, during the 1975 school year, in 30 schools, for the first time the subject of the Arab-Israeli conflict was studied as such. Of course, events pertaining to the conflict have been studied before, but never in a systematic, better informed format. The material was prepared in the Center for Curricular Planning during 1973/4, and came out as an experimental curriculum. These students were tested in comparison with a control group, comprised of high school students with similar backgrounds but who did not study the subject in this format. The

research team defined the aim of the project as "....to enable the pupil through historical data, to strengthen his view of the just cause of the Jewish people in their struggle for national independence and existence. Thus, the pupil will be introduced to various aspects of the conflict. They will also learn of the other side's position through primary sources... "[37]

They added, further, that in studying the conflict, tolerance for others and learning to debate in a rational manner could be achieved. In sum, the goals of the study were: (1) Ideological - national objectives i.e., appreciate the just causes of Jewish nationalist struggle for independence; (2) Universal values - tolerance, rationalism and rules of debate; (3) Didactic objectives - learn to analyze documents, participate in group discussions and prepare lectrures. The hypothesis was that certain factors influence the attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. (Palestenians were not mentioned as a variable in the conflict.) A relatively high socio-economic background would lead to a liberal approach, in general, and to this conflict, in particular, and the pupils were likely to entertain rational considerations rather than emotional ones because of the systematic study they pursued; i.e., knowledge leads to a rational and liberal approach.[38]

The questionnaire included items that implied directly and indirectly cultural bias, nationalism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, antagonism to a minority, and on the other hand, willingness to cooperate and mutual respect. Some questions addressed the pupil's perception of himself, his identity, identification and connection with the state and its Jewish content, and its legitimacy basis -

historical/religious/legal/work or defense. Other questions dealt with readiness for contact and exchange with Arabs: study their literature, live in proximity with them, attend the same schools and intermarriage. Also, the degree to which the Arabs were perceived (or not) as equal citizens with whom direct communication was deemed desirable, whether during economic crisis they would be fired first, whether they should be given help in housing and education, whether they should be allowed to fill political posts and were they discriminated against. Moreover, they were asked whether the Arabs' occupation in "dirty labor" was due to their ability, or because they were not allowed to become upwardly mobile. The attitude toward and responsibility for Palestenian refugees were raised and the possibility and kinds of solutions to the conflict were discussed. Finally, governmental policies were evaluated.

The general indications of the study were that the student population, including the control group, attending the non-vocational high schools were rather homogeneous. Most have a relatively high socio-economic status, and their fathers' education was relatively high. Many were active in Youth Movements, which is a selective activity, and the percentage of religious pupils amongst them was low.[38] Both groups exhibited anger and dismay toward historical treatment of Jews in the world, and both had the same, strong identity as Israeli-Jews. Furthermore, both groups felt strong ties to the state and saw their future in the country, not abroad. As for the legitimacy basis of the state: 50% viewed the historical/religious ones as such, 20% viewed work, sacrifice and military action as the basis, and a minute percentage saw the legal or international aspects

as determining factors. When asked about Arabs' rights to the land 30% said they had no rights at all, 50% said they may have some right but not equal to the Jews, 14% said they had equal rights and only 1.5% believed the Arabs had more of a right. As for the presence of discrimination against Arabs the answers were divided equally: 50% agreed and the other 50% thought there was no discrimination at all.

The researchers categorized the responses, in general, as "moderately liberal." It is true that when questions implying direct animosity and discrimination or explicitly disparaging statements full of negative stereotypes were introduced, the pupils refrained from agreeing with such flagrant remarks. However, when asked about letting Arabs (Israeli citizens) fill political positions most thought they should not occupy national political positions, 40% agreed to positions dealing with Arab affairs only and 10% believed no position should be given. Indeed, from the overall responses 50% had stereotypes about the Arabs, 50% viewed the Palestinians as enemies-competitors. Fifty percent thought the Palestinians had too many rights and too much in general. More than 25% believed it was not necessary to study Arabic but 90% thought Arabs should study Hebrew. A very small percentage, in fact 1%, believed that there was a good chance for peace, 55% thought there was hardly any chance and 21% saw no chance at all. Similarly, a small percentage viewed the conditions of war or peace as dependent mainly on Israel.[39]

The conclusion was that the hypothesis, that a group with more information will have a more rational and liberal approach, was not confirmed. There was little difference between the experimental and control groups. Yet, a moderately liberal position was more prevalent

among these high school students. Direct expressions of stereotypes were rejected but latent entertainment of stereotypes existed. A better social position for Arabs was accepted, but political positions were unacceptable. It was believed that Arabs were employed in "dirty work" because they lacked other skills and not because of Israeli discrimination. Further, 75% believed that religious-nationalist considerations must be weighted when negotiations about territories take place.[40]

Importantly, the majority did not blame itself or criticize governmental policies for the existing political situation, nor did they think that additional steps could have been taken to achieve peace. The students showed strong nationalist allegiance, little self criticism, and considered Israeli political interests as far exceeding the Arabs'. It would seem that although the student population in both groups may have been better informed than other groups, in general, they could only discern and refrain from supporting direct deprivation of and discrimination against Arabs. Yet, they felt that Israel was not responsible at all for the causes or solution to the conflict and thus, they were content with the status quo envisioning a solution rather as an unlikely eventuality.

The attitudes to Arabs, in general, may be characterized as suspicious, and the treatment of the Israeli Arab citizens was not much better. When we examine the curricula for the Arab sector, for example in 1957 and even 1975, the orientation and disrespect in regard to their own history, and the attempt to "Judaize" or "Israelize" them is clear, notwithstanding the great emphasis placed

on the Israeli nation's uniquness and the appreciation for its effots to maintain such separatism in the Diaspora.

How ironic it is to read Benor's report asserting that, initially, it seemed forced and artificial to teach Jewish history and nationalisn; i.e., "Israelism," to Arab pupils, but increasingly, the writer noted, there was considerable improvement, and the older pupils seemed to have developed an Israeli sense of belonging.[41] At the time there seemed to be a great deal of uncertainty about methods and content as far as Arab culture, language, geography and history were concerned. Yet, the aims of Hebrew teaching were clear and determined: (1) Learn about the Jewish people and culture. (2) Language as a means of direct contact with the Israelis. (3) A means to cultivate good Israeli citizenship. It was decided to include Hebrew prose, poetry, biblical texts and description of daily Israeli experiences. Nevertheless, there was difficulty in finding teachers since Jewish teachers were not interested in jobs in Arab schools, and thus, it became necessary to train Arab teachers in Hebrew language and culture.[42] The most serious problem was the curriculum itself. Before 1957 three different plans were tried but found unsatisfactory. Until Hebrew textbooks could be devised for the Arab schools, Hebrew language and literature were taught according to texts used for Jewish pupils (Netivot, Shearim, Mikraot Hadashot). It was easy to realize, however, that they were not suitable to Arab schools, since the texts were full of national themes permeated with emotions which could offend the Arab child.

Clearly, pronounced insensitivity was exhibited toward the Arab child. What did the Ministry of Education try to convey to Arab

students? What kind of values, knowledge, impressions and sentiments could be expected to arise there? When one compares the amount of general history, Jewish history and Arab history taught (number of hours and pages) in the elementary schools, Jewish history clearly is studied much more and given more time than Arab history.[43] In grades 6 and 7, not only is Jewish history more emphasized, but in fact, there is not one separate chapter dedicated to Arab History. The latter is included within a chapter that covers the Ottoman Empire.[44] There is, however, a chapter about Jewish history entitled, "The ties of diaspora Jews with Eretz Israel from the 11th to the 17th century." A similar situation is manifested in grade 8, where again there is not one separate chapter discussing Arab History, but references are made in various sub-sections of the book. On the other hand, 9 chapters of Modern Jewish history are presented: (1) Yearning for Erez-Israel for political independence; (2) Aliyot (waves of immigration); (3) The beginning of the Zionist movement; (4) The rejuvenation of the Hebrew language; (5) Leaders in the Zionist movement and agricultural settltments; (6) British mandate and the Balfour declaration; (7) Halutziut - Kibbutz, Moshav and other communal settings; (8) The 1948 War of Independence (U.N. resolution and Declaration of Independence); (9) The Israeli political system.[45]

In high school, not only is Jewish history emphasized more, but particular periods are stressed differently. Thus, Arab history during the Middle Ages is covered extensively, but modern Arab history is neglected, and out of 30 chapters in the textbook not one examines Arab history during the 18th and 19th centuries. Interestingly, the Ministry had asserted that although the books did not include any

chapter on Arab history of that period, the teachers were expected to cover it. Jewish history of the same period is discussed at length, i.e., economic changes during the 18th and 19th centuries, cultural changes in the 19 century, Jewish struggle for equal rights, internal Jewish autonomy, religious reforms, the inception of Jewish nationalism, Jewish socialism, the Jewish press and anti-semitism. Evidently, the specific content and issues of modern Jewish history introduced to Arab students pertaining to independence, equal rights and accomlishment of long sought goals is stressed. Indeed, content analysis shows that in Jewish history, strong nationalist emphasis and detailed study of Zionist values are present, compared to barely mentioned Arab nationalism.

In sum, in the high schools as in elementary schools, the nationalist emphasis is pronounced in the study of Jewish history, especially in modern times. The Zionist movement, the Jewish settlements in Eretz Israel and the Zionist activities in the Jewish communities around the world are discussed at length in numerous chapters. Modern Arab history, on the other hand, is only included as sub-themes under various headings. The nationalist Arab movement and the Palestinian national movement are hardly mentioned.

In the study of Arab literature and language subjects such as winter, spring, nature and the effects of poverty on society are offered. Paletinian poets or writers are not studied while Israeli writers describing Jewish life, labor, national yearnings and Kibbutz life are. Both in elementary and high schools the Arab poems introduced pertain to description of the environment and nature or to love and death. As Miari indicates, although modern Arab poetry is

rich with national themes which deal with struggle they are not mentioned at all, yet many works about Zionism are studied.[46]

It has been argued that the purpose of teaching Hebrew literature and language in the Arab sector is "to bring the pupil closer to the ideals, views and experiences of the developing Jewish nation during various historical periods, and witness the strong ever-existing historical tie between the people, the land and culture. It is important to show the achievements and efforts of the many generations to bring about national renaissance and cultural and social rejuvenation... "[47]

One must wonder what the planners thought when they omitted a significant part of Arab history and culture in the Arab sectors as well as in the Jewish schools. Some kind of resentment should have been expected to emanate fron the Arab students, purposefully deprived of their history, and ignorance and disrespect on the part of Jewish students. Within such a context, could the possibility of a peaceful, equal relationship with the Arabs be entertained, when erasing part of their significant past is legitimized, and to that extent their de-humanization acceptable? Ironically, many Arabs have adopted C. N. Bialik, the national Jewish poet, as their own. His poetry symbolizes the yearning of a people for its country and the longings of its soul to unite with the land. In a 1987 television documentary, Israeli Arabs complained of being deprived of their history and culture, and told of their attempts to retrieve their identity in the privacy of their homes.

3. "Extra-Curricular" Political Education

Israeli society has always been in a state of preparedness for war. Lam reminds us that in spite of the fact that peace is declared as the most desirable state, when war seems necessary or inevitable, the perspective about war and peace narrows considerably and victory is viewed as the only relevant and wished for result.[48] Social norms, as reinforced by education in the schools, youth movements and pre-military training, postulate that citizens must be prepared for war. Hence, war is seen as a legitimate mode of operation. The vision of a peaceful world is a long range hope attainable in the millenium, and so it is conveyed in the schools, while the urgency and readiness for altruistic sacrifice of life and the glory in the solidarity of fighters are primarily stressed. Although war is considered evil within a utopian context, the present conditions are believed to call for struggle and, therefore, war is justified and victory yearned for. Consequently, education for peace and abhorrence for war are not viewed as obligatory under the present conditions. Educational work has been directed toward enhancing in the young the will to fight by displaying the right causes and indicating the justified expected results.

Nevertheless, wars, heroism and commemoration are part of daily preoccupation, and the need to immortalize the soldiers is a central national and educational enterprise. According to the Ministry of Defense, efforts must be made to keep the fallen soldiers' memories alive, "carry their actions in our daily thought and keep them fresh in our hearts." In commemorating them, the nation expresses its gratitude to those "who gave their lives in the battles of Israel." In

addition to offering spiritual aid to their families, the rest are enabled "to absorb hope and faith for the future - the future of the people in Zion, and the Jews all over the world."[49] Orbach stressed the need to link the memories of the Shoah (Holocaust) with the memories of the soldiers. The Shoah, he said, recalls the deep hatred for Jews as Jews. The moral lesson derived from the wars is that the rejuvenated nation would protect its independence in any conditon and under all circumstances, never giving up its most precious achievement - the state. Moreover, the families of the dead, including the orphans, should not expect special treatment and benefits, nor should the wounded. These families should not claim that they made a sacrifice for the country. Following the 1973 War, families of dead and wounded soldiers were critical and accusatory toward the army and government. Orbach saw it as a weakening and divisive phenomenon, and warned that children must be educated toward readiness to sacrifice, thus forging a uniting cause in the country, overriding ideological differences.[50] Viner considers the families of dead soldiers a moral power providing social energy. Accordingly, it is wrong for education to "secularize" and individualize their experience; rather, it should add sacred energy to the nation.[51] It has been emphasized that a memorial day for the soldiers is not enough, and that there is a need to use educational work and facilities to have teachers, parents and students participate in celebrating the causes for which the dead gave their lives, and making a commitment to follow in their footsteps. Hence, the sacrifice of lives is not seen as merely unfortunate and inevitable but the need to legitimize these sacrifices as an educational aim is stressed.[52]

Indeed, the readiness and the perception of the inevitability and even desireability of the struggle as sanctifying is evident in the thinking of many. Lissak affirms: "I write for all the fathers alive or dead, whose children were buried in military cemetaries...those who buried their children in war instead of being buried by their children in peace time. Our children have fallen for one and only goal: so that we, their parents and brothers will never taste again the assaults and pogroms of Kishinev, Aushwitz and Treblinka."[53] Avneri adds that the feeling os siege and its recognition must become an educational foundation and a principal goal for the Information Center (propaganda), as well as guide for the economic, political and cultural activities in Israel and the Diaspora.[54] Evidently, the sense of siege and the continuous struggle are seen as positive, educational and strengthening rather than as alienating and lonely. This is echoed by Bar-Yosef: "This struggle is a challenge to Zionism. Whoever wants to participate in it is a Zionist; those who do not are not Zionists, period." And further "A nation in siege pays more than nations who are not, but also gains much: national unity, a social life which is interesting and lively, a healthy daily life and the maintenance of a work ethic...We can improve our lives with siege. Not everything is so dark in a state of siege."[55] This mode of thinking indicated an acceptance of the difficult predicament, even a masochistic joy derived from painful and seemingly insurmountable obstacles. One can no longer define this mood as apathtic, but rather as active welcoming of anguish.

The state of war has led not only to the sanctification of the dead heroes but also to the militarization of daily life. In 1971,

Professor B. Akzin, Provost of Haifa University, caused a stormy debate by asserting that the university had used and would continue to use the services of the Shin Beit (security police) in determining academic appointments, a procedure that had led to the rejection of Mahmud Miari's candidacy as a lecturer. Spokespeople for other universities criticized his stand and many Haifa University faculty joined the protest. Interestingly, the Student Organization in Haifa supported Akzin's decision. The main issue debated was whether security considerations should be involved in determining academic positions and whether such a step threatens academic freedom.[56]

Professor Aktzin stressed the need to be sensitive to the security of the state and, therefore, not to ignore individuals and groups who may constitute a danger to Israel, whether they are actually terrorists or involved in dissemination of propaganda. Such people should not fill teaching positions that allow them the opportunity to influence students. When asked if he thought such considerations could undermine academic freedom, he replied that academic freedom pertains to non-restriction of the teacher's choice of material, while the case in point deals with preventing an undesirable candidate from getting a teaching position. Nevertheless, Haifa faculty members requested information regarding previous similar cases and demanded an explicit commitment that, henceforth, appointments would be based on academic qualifications only. Akzin replied that he intended to continue using the Shin Beit services. One has to wonder about the criteria used to judge individuals as constituting a security threat. Rozenfeld pointed out that since, obviously, actions are not the sole or main determinants, then could

the criteria be the individual's unconscious, his dreams and repressed wishes, to be interpreted by the Shin Beit.[57] Clearly, according to Akzin, political pronouncements would be considered a factor in future appointments. In short, by virtue of being an Arab and a political person, an individual is suspected of endangering the state though he may be clear of any crime. Those who support this state of affairs, Rozenfeld affirmed, have put themselves above the democratic laws categorizing an individual as dangerous although his actions are legal. This anti-democratic, repressive practice indicate the rooted bias, social and political prejudice toward the Arab minority. The fact that an Arab academic career must go through the Shin Beit points to a high tolerance of injustice.

This incident exemplifies the domination of security concerns over many areas of life. The militarization of civic life is certainly an alarming trend, and when it is coupled with the politicization of the army one must wonder whether, under these circumstances, the polity can operate democratically and independently of the military (security) umbrella. The fact that many military officers have been absorbed, almost automatically, into political life (the parties, parliament and local municipalities) points to a tendency to interweave politics and the military. This may set the tone and direction of the party in power and simultaneously harm the democratic process of mobility and advancement of non-military personnel in the political life.

In 1952, Ben-Gurion explicitly set the guidelines of the military, asserting its role as merely the executing arm of the government rather than an independent locus of decision making. The

idea of de-politicization of the army was maintained, at least in principle, until 1967.[58] Nontheless, in early 1969, an attempt to abrogate the principle of separation between the army and the state was made. Apparently with the initiative of the Secretary of the Labor Party (Sapir) and his assitant, (reserve army General Israel Garnit), a Center of Information for army commanders was planned. Strong pressure was exerted by the Knesset and through public opinion the plan was cancelled, yet in retrospect it seems that a trend was set in motion and the army begot special political interests negating Ben-Gurion's norms. Indeed, the relative ease with which high ranking officers have been able to advance in politics reflects the increased interdependence between it and the military. Army commanders in sensitive, key positions, knowing their future could be assured soon after release, may act in a way consonant with the interests of a particular party, or in consort with some people, perhaps within the party vying for power. In short, the interests they advance may not represent the general interest, but their own.

Zeev Schiff, one of Israel's leading journalists, pointed out that the transfer of generals to the political life, although not a new phenomenon, accrued a new dimension following the 1967 war. During the war and the period preceding it, many politicians became aware of the importance of the military elite in relation to the timing of political decisions. The military victory elevated the status of the military compared to that of the politicians, although the latter bathed in that light too. Since then, political leaders have shown readiness and even enthusiasm in consulting with generals, exchanging ideas not limited to military matters with them. During the War of

Attrition, in the early 1970's, this course became accentuated resulting in military lobbying for political issues. Thus, they tried to influence issues such as secure borders, retaining the territories, continued settlements there and adjusting relations with the superpowers. The personal rivalry within the political elite led ministers and Kenesset members to adopt "their own" generals and advisers in order to advance their position, thus reinforcing and increasing the presence of the lobby.[59]

In an interview with the newspaper Davar former Chief-of-Staff Haim Bar-Lev affirmed that this phenomenon is connected to the 1967 war. Until then, he said, army commanders were isolated and their activities defined by and restricted to their profession and function. But since the victory, many became public figures, heroes, perceived as knowledgeable in political affairs as well. The media which accompanied them during the war introduced them to the public in a flattering heroic manner and when they were discharged from the service at the age of 40 or 50, they could not be expected to accept an entry level position. Rather, they were recruited to the top political arena where they had established previously strong contacts and friendships.[60] The parties saw in them a serious potential factor in election time and tried to pursue them, and they, in turn, joined not always because they identified with the platform or ideology. In fact, they were a relatively inexpensive means to improve a party's image.[61]

After the 1967 War, some began to wonder if the separation between the state and the army is even desirable. It would seem that such a symbiotic relation was inevitable. Israeli society is always

"enlisted" or "drafted." The priority in policy making is the security issue - Israel's strategic position. Can any political decision be made which is not connected, directly or indirectly, to military questions? The political conditions since the Yishuv era only amplified the likelihood of a pact between them and blurred the line between the issues. It has become acceptable to seek the same kind of expertise for political and military topics, and bargaining and hinting at possible positions in government to many still in military service. In 1969, Hok Hazinun (the cooling period law) was passed.[62] Its purpose was to bar any immediate transfer of high ranking officers from military service to political activity by limiting their candidacy, unless they were discharged 100 days prior to the elections.

S. Yizhar explains that since the 1973 war was a shocking event it made people feel that the "collective I" was in danger hence raising questions about the future and meaning of the nation. One available way to grapple with these questions was to look into the past, as far as Abraham, to review the inception of the Hebrew nation to inquire, for example, about the promised land: was it a promised myth?[63] What more and for how much longer would the public be required to sacrifice? It would seem that the prevalent ideas and themes in Israel during this period were conducive to a collective reaction and perception. The various channels, political and educational, reinforced particular characteristics of Israel's contextual milieu. Consequently, the population accepted the accentuation of these aspects, often uncritically.

4. Attitude Formation and Participation

We have tried to illuminate the manner in which the society's outlook and values has been shaped. To that end, education in the schools, as well as extracurricular activities, echoed political objectives. In this section we will observe citizens' attitudes that reflect the existing political currents and beliefs.

A 1964 study investigating the attitude of Israeli youth toward accepted social ideals and their readiness to carry them out, showed that they expressed a strong identification with ideals, such as peace with the Arabs and peace in the world, but felt helpless and ignorant about personal involvement and actions to realize them. The researchers asserted that categorizing such ideals as foremost is due to the influence of official and educational propaganda, yet the youth did not observe around them nor were they offered concrete means to pursue them, facts that point to the failure of education and leadership to bridge the gap between ideological pronouncements and reality. The only means to bring about any ideal, according to the youth, were institutional, indicating their helplessness and abdication to the institutions which set the values on the agenda and the ways to achieve them. The researchers conclude that it is evident that young people were trained to memorize, repeat and appreciate certain ideals as lofty ones, yet they were unable to connect them with the reality within which they lived. Further, they did not learn at school, nor were they made aware later, of available means to pursue cherished values.[64]

A public survey of people over the age of 20 indicated that they were pessimistic vis-a-vis any prospects for peace, ready for only

slight territorial concessions if under considerable American pressure, felt "least worried" about "the fighting ability of the IDF but "most worried" about Israel's security. They also expressed belief in most of the government's pronouncements. Yet, in the same survey, 2/3 of those questioned believed that the government does less than necessary to ameliorate the condition of the disadvantaged population, criticized Israel's propaganda efforts as weak, were dissatisfied with governmental services, and expressed decreased appreciation for the performance of the government, especially the economic aspects, although still approving its activities in general.[65]

A 1974 study compared value perceptions of American and Israeli youth regarding their view of the good life. The researchers were interested in the dualism exhibited by the Israelis to become, on the one hand, a normal nation like all others, and on the other hand, the urgency in their sense of mission to be unique. The questionnaire presented 13 paragraphs describing various forms of the good life. The results showed similarities between the groups in their preference of diversity of actions and rejection of passivity. Israeli emphasis on action was socially oriented - directed to the immediate contextual milieu of war and security, and the youth appeared restrained and more conservative than their American contemporaries. On the social level, this phenomenon was manifested in a quest to preserve the status quo and to refrain from abrupt upheavals. Service to the country in a state of siege and the need to fight for survival was percieved as paramount. One explanation for Israeli conservatism was that in a turbulant context and in a state of almost constant emergency, most of the energy is directed outside towards buffering the survival

pressures, the yearning for stability, leading to conformity and support of existing institutions' policies. To some extent, it echoes the 1964 study mentioned before, where youth expressed worthwhile ideals but felt helpless in bringing them to fruition, relying on the institutions instead.[66] The authors of the present study claimed that the task of managing the environment becomes so primary that other tasks, such as self-examination, raising social consciousness and implementing social change are seen as lower priorities. The youth, in general, were less critical politically, and while their counterparts in the United States and Europe were protesting, Israeli students were saying "We have 'real' problems, we do not have time to make up and deal with new ones."[67] The conclusion was that Israeli youth were preoccupied with "instrumental-patristic" values, namely, with goal-directed tasks. This "is well suited to attaining instrumental ends-for example, a frontier society engaged in a struggle for existence." The American youth, on the other hand, were involved in "expressive-matristic" values, implying feelings, intimacy, self-exploration, nurturance and close affiliation.[68]

In a forum of young Mapam members discussing the post 1973 era and the burning issues faced by the Israeli society, a clear consensus existed on the wars fought to protect the state. The emphasis was on renewing the Zionist-Halutz commitment, criticizing those who got rich at the expense of public funds, noting the deepening gaps between Jewish ethnic groups and warning about religious extremism. Accordingly, they set out to prove that the religious, in fact, serve the expansion of a capitalist, exploitative and unjust society. Instead of focusing on the relation between man and God, the concern

ought to be on the interaction of man with his fellow man. The real debate, they noted, was over the spirit and shape of Zionism.[69] However, in spite of the fact that some members called for a debate and a struggle within Labor' ranks to prevent control of the public by the militants, many noted that there was too much self-criticism bordering on masochism, within Mapam. Golan asserted that setting any pre-conditions for the existence of the state, such as "internal moral qualities," should never be requested. Even though changes were needed, one could not affirm Nahman Syrkin's view that "A Jewish State must be Socialist, or it should not be at all." Further, military might was still a necessity to ensure Israel's existence whether in war or peace, especially since the Arabs wanted to annihilate Israel.[70] In fact, Bower stated that it was illusory to believe that the key to peace was in Israel's hands, since the Arabs were not interested. There was an obvious need for self defense rather than dangerous altruism.[71] Holovsky persisted in the same vein, noting that excessive self criticism was present in the critics' camp, that perfection has limits, that there is an urgency to increase the number of Jews in Israel, and that might and quality must be combined in the polity.[72]

Clearly, there is still significant preoccupation with Israel's existence inspite of its military might, and the national agenda according to the left-of-Mapai critics is dominated by issues of security, strength, Jewish Aliya, reduced self criticism and Zionism. The forum's declared purpose was to re-evaluate governmental policies, offer alternatives following introspection, but the discourse often resembled the leadership's discussion of priorities. There were no

practical suggestions to effect change, nor were the various criticisms trenchant enough or even welcomed by the majority of attendants. The Labor party was not dismissed and there was no serious attempt to revise Zionist aims, nor were the mistakes and problems created by Zionism viewed, even partially, as the prelude to the wars that followed. On the contrary, a reaffirmation of Zionism and stress upon security dimensions faced by a society in a state of siege were accentuated. Granot indicated that Israel is divided into two camps, Zionists and anti-Zionists. He categorized the Revisionists as anti-Zionists, who are not satisfied with an independent Jewish state but desire Israel to be a Middle Eastern superpower - an empire.[73]

Notwithstanding Mapam's criticism of official corruption, they merely pointed to it as undesireable, not asking why it came about. Concomitantly, they applauded the good qualities exhibited by Israelis in the face of wars: self-sacrifice, readiness to being tested in difficult conditions, heroism and bearing the responsibility of Zionist justice. Even the reluctance to move away from the 1967 borders was not seen as an indication of chauvinism, but viewed as simple human fear.

Undoubtedly, the worldviews entrenched in the Israeli society, even the relatively non-chauvinist ones, have taken shape within definite parameters, and according to a paradigm circumscribed by a reality, dictated through conditions of conquest and resulting from perceptions of besiegement. Hence, the criticisms offered were handicapped from their inception, unable to make a meaningful leap above the imprisoning reality. Up to a certain degree, they were able to voice disenchantment, displeasure with corruption, inequality and

militant religiosity, but could not disassociate themselves from the historical reasons leading to this predicament, nor from the inevitable results; i.e., wars. They only called for brushing off certain spots, but the call was limited in scope. They opted to amend what they thought were aberrations advocating a return to pure labor ideology, continuing to state the Zionist aims as paramount, never questioning its responsibility for the consequences. In sum, though any criticism is a welcome alternative to total conformity with devastating conditions, it was not the call for a new path or era that could have been expected from the symposium's declared intention to re-evaluate social and moral issues in view of the "earthquake" of the 1973 war. The desire for peace was pronounced, but the perception of the Arabs and Palestinians as the eternal threat rendered their call as mute as Likud's and Labor's.

But even those who were able to voice criticism, for example in discussions with Professor Swirski at the University of Haifa, expressed alienation mainly due to the remoteness of the political leadership from society, and the convoluted bureacracy. They accepted, however, the notion that the state was the embodiment of the citizens' collective will and the body representing the historical, Jewish being. Swirski notes that when they talk about the state they always refer to "us" or "we."[74] Youth's main criticism was aimed at the leadership which has become merely a "managerial class," a privileged one impermeable to prospective newcomers. A young Labor activist described the shortest path, if at all possible to a key position: "you need a long tongue."[75] The students believed that, at least, one must be a conformist agreeing with every ideological pronouncement and

policy in order to have a chance of entering the party ranks. Further, they viewed the parties as lacking internal democracy, keeping the public from influencing policies. The critics were those interested in politics as a career finding their way obstructed. In sum, most of the criticism was aimed at the structural deterioration of the parties into closed, non-ideological bodies promoting the self interest of their members in order to perpetuate their existence.

Rubinstein has pointed out that many young people avoid engaging in politics because there is little access for them since the political system is so centralized and the party mechanism chooses itself- appoints its own members.[76] He observes, moreover, that among the students there is hardly a minority that engages in dialogues and critical suggestions and that there is reticence at meeting ministers and other public officials for discussions.[77] The intense political participation and debates of the Yishuv days have atrophied. As we saw early on, political education was central in those days. Gradually, it degenerated into education for conformity filled with blind recitations and renditions of particular ideas and beliefs whether congruent with the reality and needs of the children or not.

It was easier to educate youth to protect their country from enemies than to require daily thought and commitment to a just society. The use of simple language to appeal to "territorial instinct" is less complicated than education for democracy - equality, self restraint and tolerance. One can be a good soldier and still pursue selfish interests. The need for constant preparedness for war became the justification for the militarization of thought and education. Lavi attests to the fact that youth are proud to be

ignorant about politics. When the time to vote for the first time came, the discussions were not about the parties or ideas, but whether to vote at random, or place a "blank" ballot out of spite.[78] Alush echoes this view saying that youth are disgusted by politics, calling each other "politician" as a symbol of disapproval and disgrace.[79] Although these views point to the youth's aversion towards politics, it is of interest to listen to their perception of personal engagement when war or, at least, the threat of war is present. One pupil testifies that "before the war I was very egocentric. The problems that concerned me were personal ones. In spite of an awareness about social problems, I did not care enough to fight for their improvement...suddenly everything has changed. I do not see myself as an individual but as a part that must carry the responsibility for the survival of my people. I never felt so responsible for what will happen, as an Israeli and as a Jew."[80]

Interestingly, however, other critics like Benari and Amster asserted that excessive self-criticism on the part of the youth was leading to nihilism and loss of purpose. According to the former, Zionism has lost its fervor. Writers and intellectuals, in Israel and abroad, criticize the Zionist vision, thus planting nihilism in the youth's hearts and alienating them from the national independence movement, as well as reinforcing decreased admiration for Zahal.[81] Amster added that a way must be found to strengthen Jewish nationalism, since "our spiritual immunity depends on the dimension of Israel's physical borders."[82] His attempt to look for the causes of weakness in the public's beliefs led him to conclude that present teachers and leaders are not as fully committed to Zionist ideas as

their forerunners. In the past, they were convinced that their path was a just one. The second and third generations did not have to embark on the rejuvenation of the Jew and of the Hebrew language nor on the fertilization of the desert. All they had to do is carry on the miracle in pride without an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Nevertheless, they have an inferiority complex, especially in regard to the Arabs.

The author believes that these generations lost their historical memory and hence feel indebted to their enemies and destroyers. Since they are disconnected from the past, they are indifferent to the nation's future and they exhibit an "allergic responsibility toward their neighbors who do not wish for peace." After four generations of Zionism, some feel responsible for the fate of the world, carrying the "original sin" of Zionism's founding fathers. Education has contributed to this predicament and books and newspapers are full of defeatism and self incrimination when no crime committed. The responsibility of the spiritual disease and emptiness experienced by the youth lies with defective education from kindergarten to the university, incorporating and imitating the West, neglecting Judaism, and following Marxism and Socialism enthusiastically. This cosmopolitanism is due to lack of rootedness, brought by the New Left, which is anti-historical and anti-social.[83] Thus, they created a contradiction between two nations living in one country, thereby undermining the Jewish right to the land while raising the question of Palestinians' rights. The educational institutions, it was noted, failed forcefully to disseminate the idea of Zionism as a liberation movement, cultivating loyalty to the state, neglecting to introduce

relevant themes, for example, heroic songs and poems after the 1973 war.

Geula Cohen (Knesset member of the extreme right wing Ha'Thia party) reiterated the criticism directed at the Ministry of Education, referring to a circular presented to teachers advising then to prepare material in case Israel returned the territories. It was mentioned that since many pupils were born into an enlarged Israel, they might experience a crisis with the realization that they would live in a smaller Israel. When the circular was made public, the Ministry immediately said that it was an unofficial document taken out of context and should not be viewed as threatening. Cohen, however, asserts that the content was not accidental but a direct result of the defeatist attitudes found in the curricula. Moreover, before the 1967 war, the curricula did not emphasize enough that Jerusalem, Hebron and other historical places are an integral part of the undivided Israel, and even though they are not yet in Israel's hands, the Jews have the right to all those places and must continue to long for the day that the nation would return to the beloved places. And since she was unable to find such explicit language in the curricula, she concluded that the "seeds of withdrawal" were planted long ago. Now that Israel has gained these places they must be referred to as liberated and not occupied territories, the latter obstructing the natural connection to the homeland. In conclusion, she pointed a finger at education as the cause of casualties, including the real casualties of war.[84]

In sum, these critics' solution to potential introspection, confusion and uncertainty of youth is to sow an unshaken belief in the absolute right of Israel to pursue policies regardless of consequences

to its neighbors. The feeling of ownership of the land must be cultivated in the schools, as a natural right without any hesitancy. Hence, the commitment of the state to exist in the enlarged territories must be affirmed absolutely. Lam likened the Arab bloc to the Nazis' aim to annihilate the Jews. The army's heroism and American frienship should be appreciated, though the "Americans have not yet understood communism and we should warn them about it."[85] The justifications for Israel's position are couched, therefore, in historical, religious rights, as well as defence against cosmopolitanism, Marxism and the left in general. As shall be seen in the next chapter, this call appealed to many youth who turned to extreme right wing movements for direction. Perhaps the educational institutions and the leadership have succeeded, after all, in meeting those critics' visions in spite of themselves.

Notes for Chapter IV

1. Avram Schweitzer, Upheavals (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Zmora, Bitan Pub., 1984), p. 9.

2. Arik Carmon, "Education in Israel - Issues and Problems," eds., W. Ackerman, A. Carmon & D. Zucker, Education in an Evolving Society, (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1985), p. 160.

3. Asher Arian, Politics and Government in Israel (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Zmora, Bitan Pub., 1984), pp. 240-247, (Tables 3:8 and 4:8).

4. Don Perez and Sammy Smooha, "Israel's Tenth Knesset Elections - Ethnic Upsurgence and Decline of Ideology," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Autum 1985), p. 511.

5. Arian, op. cit., pp. 227-228.

6. A telling example of Labor's condition is reflected in Rabin's reference to Galili's comment: "When a complex discussion takes place and there seems to be no solution in sight, and it is impossible to render a decision on a particular issue, the question becomes how to end the meeting." Bentov suggests that for a long time the public was inclined to view the people at the helm as being in control and able to make forceful decisions, even though these may have been incorrect or wrong decisions. Those who could find ways to "end" a meeting, perhaps by choosing an erroneous political compromise rather than truly solve aproblem, those who offered sophisticated formulae rather than policies, remained long in positions of authority. This was Labor's mode of operation for a considerable length of time, and finally brought about its demise. See Mordekhai Bentov, The End to Social Immobilism (The Third Way to Socialism - The Israeli Experience), (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1981), p. 62.

7. Ibid., p. 62.

8. Ibid., p. 64.

9. Ibid., p. 65.

10. On May 1, 1947, Golda Meir affirmed that her party's aim was to achieve "present day (modern) socialism." (See Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 28.) If this declaration mystifies us, it is clear that in the 1950's an entrepreneurial class was consolidated (though begun prior to that period) determining social conventions and modes of management and reaping profits with the encouragement, subsidies and patronage of Mapai's government.

11. Ben-Aharon, one of Ahdut Haavoda leaders, resigned from the government in 1962, suggesting that the Labor Party must create anew a workers' movement. He further proposed to freeze the income of half the citizens and increase the income of the lower 25%. His purpose was to use the power of the "renewed" workers' party to

redistribute the national income. The discourse contained plenty of criticism and enmity toward those who became rich at the expense of others, especially at the expense of public funds. Basically, his intention was not to alter Labor's positive balance of power but to endow it with a legitimacy widely supported by a union of workers' parties, and free the Israeli society from dependence on foreign aid, a factor that destroyed its image and values. See Perez Merhav, The Israeli Left, (New York: A. S. Barnes and Co., 1980), pp. 222-224. Also, Dan Shavit, With Ben-Aharon, (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Kibbutz Meuhad, 1984), pp. 117-118, 149-150.

12. Merhav, op. cit., pp. 225-226.

13. Interestingly, even Ben-Aharon in his critical essay does not discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict. It seems that the relation was internalized as a "natural" condition (Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 34). In the first decade of the state , the issue of possible solution to this conflict, the position of Israel in the Middle East, the fate of the dispossessed refugees and Jewish ethnic problems were not the pivotal concerns. Rather, keeping the party afloat and preoccupation with economic growth while maintaining a spirit of loyalty to the state were deemed paramount. The content of sometimes declared ideals was not the priority which the leadership made clear in their behavior, their hunger for status and their endless internal strife. How could any well meaning person not develop a significant amount of cynicism in view of conspicuous and explicit indifference to values? No one seemed immune in the face of the corrosive effects of capitalism and many became consumed with flagrant careerism.

14. Merhav, op. cit., p. 260. Also, Giora Goldberg, The New Right: Personal Freedom and Social Order (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Kivunim, 1987), p. 169.

15. Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

16. Goldberg, op. cit., p. 170.

17. I would like to quote at length from Ben-Gurion's lecture in 1937 about the problem of rights over Eretz Israel: "Arab residents deserve all civil rights and political rights not only as individuals, but also as a national community, same as Jews in Eretz Israel. But only the Arab residents deserve them, it is their motherland. The Arabs of other countries, Syria, Iraq, Saudi have their own countries and lands. They do not need, nor possess the rights, politically or morally to Eretz Israel. This is different, however, for the Jewish nation which lacks such homeland everywhere and Eretz Israel is the only one. All Jews are part of it. The idea of a bi-national state endangers Jewish rights, since it presupposes Arabs and Jews in a similar relationship to Eretz Israel. Eretz Israel should not solve the problem of two peoples, but only one - which has no other country of his own anywhere in the world. This solution is not at the expense of Arab residents here. There is enough space for Jews and

non-Jews. We cannot ignore morally and politically the existence of Arabs here and their just rights and needs as citizens, and as a national community, but we cannot out of false piety create here rights for all Arab countries who do not need this country." (Lecture delivered in the Histadrut Council, February 7, 1937).

18. Rustum Bastuni, "The Arab Israeli," Israel: Social Structure and Change," ed. M. Curtis and M. Chertoff, (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1973), pp. 409-419.

19. Even the Sephardim, having always been at the bottom of the occupational pyramid, feel part of the master class now that many menial jobs are filled by Arabs, and they are reluctant to leave this new station. It has resulted in a class of modern Gibeonites "cutting trees and drawing water."

20. Introductory notes to "The Decline in Party's Status," Harayon, 33-34 (November 1974), p. 35. (Hebrew)

21. Israel Government Yearbook, 1973-74. Department of Information Publishing Service, Government Publication, Jerusalem, March 1974, p. 35.

22. Ibid., p. 42.

23. Ibid., p. 45.

24. Gad Ya'akobi's speech in a Ma'arach meeting, May 26, 1975.

25. Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 73.

26. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Fateful Decisions (Hebrew), (Tel-Avis: Am Oved, 1986), pp. 89-98.

27. History Curriculum for Elementary State Schools and Religious State Schools. Ministry of Education and Culture, Jerusalem, 1961.

28. Carmon, "Education in Israel - Issues and Problems," op. cit., p. 151.

29. Ibid., p. 151.

30. Geography Curriculum for State and Religious State Schools, Grades 1-5, Ministry of Education and Culture (Jerusalem, 1959).

31. Carmon, op. cit., p. 155.

32. Civics Curriculum for State and Religious State Schools, Grade 7, Ministry of Education and Culture (Jerusalem, 1968).

33. Ibid.

34. Carmon, op. cit., p. 160.

35. Elad Peled, "Education in Israel in the 1980's," Presentation of a plan to the Ministry of Education and Culture, June 1976, p. 23.

36. Ibid., pp. 24-26.

37. Israelit Phoken and Ada Moskowitz, "Teaching the Subject of 'The Arab Israeli Conflict' - Examination of the Students' Position," Center for Curricular Planning, Ministry of Education and Culture, 1975.

38. Ibid., p. 23.

39. Ibid., pp. 41-45.

40. Ibid., p. 66.

41. Y. L. Benor, "Comments on Arab Education in Israel," Megamot, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1957), p. 93. (Hebrew)

42. Curriculum for Arab Elementary Schools - Preface to Subject Matters. Ministry of Education and Culture, Jerusalem, 1959, p. 1.

43. Shaul Shoneh and Mahmud Miari, ed., "Comparative Review of Curricular Content in Arab Schools in Israel," Planning Arab Education for the 1980's. A Ministry of Education Project, January 1975, p. 7.

44. Ibid., p. 8.

45. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

46. Ibid., pp. 40-50.

47. Yochanan Peres, "Natinalist Education of Arab Youth in Israel," Megamot, Vol. 16, No. 1 (October 1968), p. 25. (Hebrew)

48. Zvi Lam, War and Education (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1976), pp. 20-21.

49. Ilana Shamir, ed., "Commemoration and ist Meaning: Various Aspects of Immortalization of Zahal's Soldiers," Department of Soldiers Commemoration, Ministry of Defense (March 1976), p. 14.

50. Ibid., p. 12.

51. Ibid., p. 20.

52. Ibid., p. 29.

53. Y. L. Lisak, "The Fathers Silent Words," Davar, March 12, 1974.

54. Arie Avneri, Davar, November 30, 1973.

55. Yhoshua Bar-Yosef, Yediot Aharonot, November 30, 1973.

56. Introductory notes to "Security Considerations and Academic Freedom," Be'ad Ve'neged, 45 (May 1971), p. 41.

57. Henry Rozenfeld, Ha'aretz, January 11, 1971.

58. Introductory notes to "Army and Politics," Be'ad Ve'neged, 55 (February 1974), p. 34.

59. Zeev Schiff, Ha'aretz, January 9, 1973.

60. Interview with Chaim Bar-Lev, Davar, August 3, 1973.

61. Shabtai Tevet, Ha'aretz, July 27, 1973.

62. Hok Hatzinun, ¶56 (a)(4), 1969, (Hebrew).

63. S. Yizhar, Davar, April 5, 1974.

64. D. Hans and S. Kroitel, "The Attitudes of Israeli Youth to Social Ideals," Megamot, Vol. 13, No. 2 (August 1964), p. 174ff.

65. Shlomit Levi and Eliyahu Louis, "Public Reaction to Relevant Problems During March-April 1971," Survey of the Institute for Social Research and Communications of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1971.

66. Asya Pazy and Jacob Lomrantz, "Value Conceptions of American and Israeli Youth," The Journal of Social Psychology, 3 (1980), p. 183.

67. Ibid., p. 183.

68. Ibid., pp. 186-187.

69. "One Year After the Yom Kipur War: Social and Moral Aspects," (Symposium), Educational Department of Kibbutz Ha'artzi, February 1975, p. 15.

70. Ibid., p.17.

71. Ibid., p. 33.

72. Ibid., p. 31.

73. Ibid., p. 40.

74. Shlomo Swirski, University, State and Society in Israel: A Study of the Social and Political Consciousness of Isareli Students (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: Mifras, 1982), p. 154.

75. Ibid., p. 177.

76. Amnon Rubinstein, Ha'aretz, April 2, 1973.

77. Ibid.

78. Smadar Lavi, Ma'ariv Lanoar, August 27, 1973.

79. Zvi Alush, Ibid.

80. Quoted in Ma'ariv Lanoar, January 7, 1974.

81. Y. Benari, "Search After Orientation," Harayon, 31-32 (January 1974), p. 40.

82. S. Amster, "The Sources of Defeatism," Harayon, 31-32 (January 1974), p. 9.

83. Ibid., p. 10.

84. Geula Cohen, "When Will the Ministry of Education Wake Up?" Harayon, 31-32 (January 1974), p. 23.

85. Y. Lam, "The Future of the Society in Israel," Harayon, 31-32 (January 1974), p. 2.

CHAPTER V

NEW ZIONISM AND EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

Living under conditions of constant war, or the threat of it, has inevitably influenced educational objectives, at school and outside. Endless celebration of the "chosen people" and the de-humanization of the enemy have fettered the Israelis to their past. Instead of moving into a renewed future, they have been reliving past problems and fighting with those who were not part of that past. This trend of "squaring historical accounts" with the world is anti-historical because the present enemies are not the relevant subject. "But, Mr. Begin, Adolf Hitler died 37 years ago. It is a fact: he is not hiding in Nabatia, Sidon or Beirut. He burned and died."[1] In the context of the war in Lebanon, Amos Oz (a well known Israeli writer) accused Begin of reviving Hitler in order to kill him daily. He reincarnates him in various images: the terrorists, the Soviets, the Iraqis or any one who opposes or fights Israel. It would seem that such a tendency has been exhibited not merely during the war in Lebanon. Consequently, Israel has rendered itself a ghetto and a ghetto with an army is further isolated and harsher than before.[2] Such a development is dangerous, especially since Israeli education presents military service as a supreme objective in the elementary and high schools. Such a trend can entrench conformism in the name of

national interest and state security in the educational institutions and in the pre-military tarining (Gadna). A militarist spirit permeates these institutions under governmental auspices, evading public criticism as a self evident legitimate national endeavor.[3]

In this chapter we shall discuss the dominant characteristics of Israeli society during Likud's reign. We shall juxtapose the extreme intolerance and militarism exhibited by several groups and the alarm it engendered in some quarters. Indeed, critics, educators and army officials have participated in programs directed at re-educating youth in order to reverse, or at least to halt, their undemocratic and fanatical tendencies. We shall also examine the views and activities of groups who oppose the increasing acceptance and legitimation of such extremism. Their educational and political work for peace and democracy was an attempt to revive the fundamental, though neglected, constitution of the Israeli society.

1. Political and Social Characteristics During Likud's Rule

Harkabi has pointed out that Likud and Labor constitute two schools of thought which have always differed on fundamental ideas. The Revisionist assumption was that the long stay in the Diaspora had deprived the Jews of a national will, rendering them a haunted and lazy people. And since in the international arena achievements are accomplished through assertiveness and show of force, Jews must be made to understand the real nature of policy making. The weakness within Jews is a psychological phenomenon and their meek spirit must be replaced by a militarist one. The striking characteristic of this approach is that achievements are obtained through a momentous event,

such as massive invasion or conquests, which are one time explosive historical occurences and solutions. The movement called for conspicuous heroism of the "great deed" for which the individuals should be ready to sacrifice life. Accordingly, through this stirring event the way will be shortened to gain achievements in the superstructure, without exerting too much effort in creating an infrastructure, actually viewing the latter with contempt. Their plan was one of conquest and boldness but devoid of any social and economic content: it did not require the metamorphosis of a people.[4]

The perception of the leader as the supreme commander deserving to be at the helm followed by his loyal supporters was evident during the 1977 elections when chants of "Begin King of Israel!" (taken from the Bibblical story in which the Israelites called upon David to become their king instead of Saul) were repeated. Serving in Begin's cabinet, Moshe Dayan reported that they operated according to a "tradition where the leader is always right, refraining from criticizing or disagreeing with him," and Ezer Weitzman added that "the organization is harsh and inflexible, built upon complete obedience and hierarchical relations between commander and personnel.... I found myself in civil life in an organization where a single commander elicits blind obedience and no one dares to argue with him." And further, "Begin believes in words. He attributes to them a magical quality. A good speech is considered in his view a great deed, and he often finds it difficult to distinguish between the two.... He needs drama in the performance... use of bombastic words... [He] exaggerates and distorts history."[5] We are also reminded of the reverence, secrecy and awe surrounding Begin even when he was not

present but discussed during the election campaign. His assistants were afraid to inquire about or refer to his health when he was hospitalized, and the possibility of his inability to appear in public and participate in campaign promotion was not mentioned as if even the thought could defile the aura of the man.[6]

The tendency to find quick solutions through surgical operations requiring aggressive drastic actions along with symbolic and ceremonial postures is typical of the revisionist school of thought. It placed nationalism at the center as an absolute value and the goals could never be compromised, but rather pursued adamantly with any and all means available. Interestingly, there were no demands from members as far as their life style was concerned. This characteristic was exhibited when Begin courted the population telling them what they liked to hear, delivering luxury commodities at low prices.

Certain Labor's supporters, believing the solution for Israel's security to be a military one, and considering their own party as uncertain and vacilating in regard to the territories, joined Herut. Likud's ardent support for settlements reminded some Labor veterans of their activism and pioneering prior to 1948. Other supporters found in Likud a voice to vent their enmity toward the Arabs and their sense of relief in possessing large territories. In addition, Begin and his people used religion and religious expressions to justify occupation and conquest to legitimize it historically and morally. The explicit emphasis upon religion, evoking longing for and finally settling the homeland, attracted religious youth. In this instance religion and nationalism served each other's cause. A new coalition was thus born:

right-wing, liberal-capitalist, religious zealots, former disaffected Laborites, disappointed Sephardim and alienated youth.

Up to 1977, the direct influence of Herut's thinking on Israeli policies was not considered significant, yet as we argued, the paramount changes in Labor's ideology and actions prepared a fertile ground for Herut's worldview to thrive on. The vacuum created within Labor inevitably led some to look to other quarters for direction. Indeed, in 1977 Likud got the opportunity to translate its ideology and render it explicit. Their values and symbols positioned militarist elements at the center of their spiritual world. The essence of their political movement had always been a gun placed diagonally over the map of Eretz Israel with the words "Thus Only."[7] When coming to power they attempted to bring about all encompassing changes, including economic, social and cultural, but above all, in the way they manipulated the army. Some of the important touchstones occuring since their ascendance to power were: the agreement with Egypt (which deteriorated soon after); economic impairment; war in Lebanon - tragic and divisive; further polarization in the Israeli society-Sephardim and Ashkenazim, Arabs and Jews; lessened support from the international community; worsening of self-image and accentuated isolation.

Many of the events unfolding during Likud's reign emanated from the Jabotinsky-Begin ethos. The success of politicians without a democratic ideology who achieve a majority, in this case by forming a government through a coalition among parties, is alarming. Surely, Israel has lost many of its democratic qualities, especially since the Lebanon invasion.[8] The erroneous judgment of the government is

reflected in all areas, and derives from the method that looks to shortcuts and to drastic and dramatic events to solve major problems without consideration for long term results. Even the educational institutions indulged them regarding curriculum content. Economic policies were irresponsible. The budget for health care, housing and research was reduced, but funds for businesses and housing in the occupied territories were increased. Moreover, the state abandoned many projects pertinent to the secular population, thus neglecting its obligations to farming cooperatives, developing towns and new settlements within the pre-1967 territories.[9] The cult of the strong became celebrated, and violence and brutality were accepted as legitimate. Force succeeded in exorcising former ideals.

Harkabi, Timmerman and Oz do not emphasize enough, as we did, Labor's role in its own decline. They regard Likud's path as a drastic change, an aberration undermining the political culture and resulting in the establishment of a new tragic era. Oz contends that social norms have changed, particularly the concept of war - what is permissible and what is prohibited. Begin had shattered the national consensus and caused a revolution.[10] Some of the methods employed in the territories were not invented by the Likud government but emerged within Israel as it became an occupying force. Still, when comparing Likud's design to the historical pronouncements of the Labor movement, for the latter, power in itself was not celebrated- not as an end, nor as the sole means to achieve ends. Power was not equated with justice, nor was it seen as interchangeable with absolute right ordained by divine authority. Isolation from the world's opinion was not viewed as a desirable condition to take pride in. It is especially astonishing

to find Likud's indifference to international isolation since Begin's mentor historically wished to rely on foreign approval as a source of legitimacy.

Even the agreement with Egypt cannot be seen as a wholehearted attempt to achieve peace. The agreement was supposed to be a first step toward an all encompassing peace within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242, which requires withdrawal from territories conquered in 1967.[11] At the time Arens and Shamir objected to signing the agreement with Egypt claiming that it contradicted Herut's main objective of rule over an undivided Israel, and that the prospect of giving up not only the Sinai, but eventually having to find a compromise in regard to the West Bank, was a tragic error.[12] Nevertheless, Israel signed the agreement stipulating that the fate of the West Bank would be determined by several parties to the conflict, even though Herut had always called for a basic principle of non withdrawal. Israel's posture via-a-vis Egypt implied a readiness to negotiate about autonomy, but its ardent support for the settlements and the "Greater Israel" movement was a denial of such an eventuality.

The invasion of Lebanon confirms not only that peace was not truly sought, but that the agreement with Egypt was a hypocritical and diversionary act to pursue the real agenda. Likud's ideology determined, shaped and directed the war. The war was not a minor battle though it was promised to be a sweeping operation. It became a long and bloody struggle whose purpose and reasons were tied to the aspirations of the leaders. It is not necessary to recount the details of the war and of the decisions (or lack of) leading to it. Shief's and Yaari's book covers these events thoroughly.[13] But it is important

to mention the fact that the government lied to the people, the Defense Minister lied to the cabinet, and the cabinet members were too intimidated and lazy to raise crucial questions - strategic or moral.[14] Indeed, Defense Minister Sharon told a group of commanders that "the cabinet does not have to be presented with all the options presented here."[15] It was a deceptive and fabricated war pursued by brainwashing the public. The real goals were hidden from the people, fighters, Knesset and many ministers.[16] It should be noted that many soldiers stood uncertain and embarassed when information from the army and government contradicted their experience and knowledge about the ongoing events. "In a way, one could claim that the criticism and confusion seeping back from the front are largely responsible for the undermining of morale at home rather than vice versa."[17] The government charged the critics with lack of patriotism and carelessness, but what about the false information to which the people were subjected? What about the lies and exaggerations told of terrorism and its presentation as Israel's foremost concern and threat? Was such distortion an intentionally misleading picture, sentencing so many, on all sides, to death, patriotic and responsible?

The war was not merely a hasty prolonged gamble. It was morally and fundamentally wrong, and according to Oz, Begin's thinking about the usefulness of "wars by choice" led directly to the massive killing in Sabra and Shatila. The author likens this attitude to a desire to behave as horribly as the worst peoples have, because now it is our turn to.[18] As some critics contend, Begin and his people have construed new norms which is why they are working systematically on retroactively "polluting" Zionist history. They are educating the

young to believe that such has always been the state of affairs, that Israelis were always involved in fighting, killing and devastation. The only difference is in the previous governments' false piety and use of language to hide their intentions, while Herut is open and honest about its plans. The gravest danger emanating from this school of thought is in regard to its education of the public. It proclaims the legitimacy and desirability of the use of aggression as an inalienable right, clouding the people's moral judgement, denying anyone - Jew or non Jew the moral right (but not the procedural right) to question such acts, instilling in the young a false sense of history and a set of incorrect "facts" to support this position. A serious rewriting of history is occuring and in public debates deceptive claims are made. The information or misinformation, as well as the pre-packaged ideas filtered to the public, determine to a large extent their choices, loyalties and sense of purpose. Zionism has been transformed from a spiritual "cold civil war" allowing arguments, discussions and dissent, to a one dimensional ideology obssessed with militarism. Questions of what will be <u>inside</u> the state are much less of a concern than the preoccupation with borders. This state of mind which did not start out in 1977 was one of the factors that enhanced Labor's political bankrupcy. Yet, this trend has been accentuated since Likud's victory.

It is important to note that many, even most, Israelis believe that war is often the appropiate solution to the conflict. The invasion of Lebanon began, however, without provocation aiming at a quick solution for the Palestinians, and at instilling a Protectorate; i.e., a government friendly to Israel. The remaining Palestinians,

including those from the West Bank, would have been absorbed in the Lebanon Protectorate and the future Jordan Protectorate, thus changing the face of the Middle East according to Israeli dictate.[19] Harkabi notes that this war was a war for "Peace for the West Bank" rather than "Peace for Galilee," hoping that a serious blow to the PLO would reinforce Israelis' perception that strength and concern combined can defeat the enemy, thus halting the momentum of the peace initiative with Egypt which requires withdrawal from the occupied territories.[20]

Intemperance and excess were not limited to political and military issues. The 1977 upheaval connotes a significant ideological change, and ideology had a role in shaping economic reality for both schools of thought. The position of the new government was that after decades of a centralized and interventionist economy, a new era must be launched, opening the Israeli economy for free competition.[21]

My intention is not to analyze in detail the economic programs and changes purely in economic terms, but to look at the 1977 "economic upheaval" as reflecting the gap between the two ideologies (even if in practice the rift is not as wide as it is philosophically). Labor viewed economics as a tool to bring about particular social and educational goals, as Likud's approach was an attempt to realize an ideological worldview. The former attempted, initially, to find the most effective way to realize collective interests, distrusting the market and viewing profits as rewards for parasitism. Gradually, the government changed its attitude towards the private sector. From its socialist ideal and preferential treatment of the Histadrut, which created a large labor-owned economic sector consisting of communal rural settlements and large transportation

cooperatives and enterprises in construction, it began in the 1960's to rely on private entrepreneurs who used government money.[22]

Inspite of these noticeable changes during Labor's rule, Likud's plans aimed at consolidating a new way of life in Israel. Supporters pointed out that this act of liberalization would free the Israeli citizen to a large degree from usual bureaucratic contact with state agencies dealing with foreign currencies. Accordingly, it would encourage the flow of foreign capital, thus helping with the balance of payments and furthering the development of the economy. Moreover, supporters pointed out that the government surrendered a significant amount of economic control by transfering the decision to the public. It lifted the cover of paternalism, allowing market forces to determine the direction it would take, bestowing responsibility for either success or failure in the public realm. The public was inundated with the idea of freedom, puting Israel, not just the government, to the test. By voting for the Likud the public expressed its wish to do away with "The System" - Labor's system of operation.

Milton Friedman, who was an invited adviser, argued that two different Jewish traditions have been in conflict. On the one hand, he asserted, the 100 year tradition of faith in a socialist paternalist government which negated capitalism and free market economy, and on the other hand, a 2000 year tradition which developed according to Diaspora need for self reliance and voluntary cooperation using Jewish shrewdness to take advantage of opportunities unnoticed by government officials. The so-called 2000 year tradition has become stronger in Israel, finally defeating the socialist tradition in 1977.[23] He reminded the readers that the greatest miracle was the establishment

of the state accomplished through the initiative, inventive ability, improvisation and bravery of free young people who cooperated voluntarily to bring about progress, but that the successes emanated primarily from individual activities.[24] This is perhaps another example of the rewriting of history, since in fact, collective action was not merely natural and necessary to achieve national goals, but it constituted Labor's and the young pioneers' conception of social justice stressing equality, integration and mutual responsibility. In this normative approach, economic, social and educational objectives were interwoven, and each individual perceived the collective interest as exceeding his own idiosyncratic tendencies.

The new government introduced economic changes based on a specific philosophical orientation. The result of the liberalization led to mob frenzy, the disadvantaged sector acquiring luxury items while lacking basic goods previously subsidized. An outburst of pseudo luxury occured while the treasury emptied, and the poor were given the illusion of plenty since, after all, no real improvement for the people was accomplished. It only masked their real misery with toys: western-modern-electronic toys. In fact, considerable harm was done to the poor sector. During Likud's reign "economic growth slowed down, investments decreased, productivity declined and technology lagged behind compared to other industrial countries."[25] Further, agriculture declined: during Labor's rule agriculture increased 10% annually compared to 3.5% during Likud's rule. Industry grew 9.4% annually during Labor's years compared to 4.1% during Likud's. In the years 1955-1971, export increased 13.4% annually while in the Likud years it grew at a rate of 5.1%. The total deficit increased from $2.5 billion

in 1977 to $24.2 billion in 1981.[26] There was an increase in economic and social gaps. The income of the lowest 20% of the population decreased from 8.3 to 6.7% while the highest 20% enjoyed an increase from 36.9% in 1976 to 39.7% in 1981. During the same period, individual income tax increased by 61.5% while corporate tax decreased by 28%. Public housing was reduced in half while housing cost escalated. The price of an average Tel Aviv apartment equalled 4.3 yearly salaries in 1977 and 7.3 salaries in 1981. Unemployment grew from 3-3.5% during the 1970's to 5.2% in 1981.[27] Nevertheless, the Likud occasionally speaks of narrowing social gaps and abolishing poverty. In their 1984 manifesto, they even added to the values of loyalty to country and liberty, the value of equality.[28] Needless to say, as Ben-Hur points out, this looks like a collection of good intentions and nothing more. There is no attempt to clarify how it may be accomplished.[29] She added that although the government has many committees, the Committee of Ministers for Social and Welfare Policy, in existence from 1973 to 1984, was not re-established. Moreover, in 1977 the National Advisory Council on Social and Welfare Affairs was abolished, and Israel was left without a forum where ideas about social problems and suggestion of policies could be discussed.[30] The Likud government launched Project Renewal intended to rehabilitate poor neighborhoods physically and socially, with the inhabitants participating in all stages. While physical improvement occured, social rehabilitation, participation in decision making and education were not accomplished at all. Decision making remained in the hands of a professional minority who did not train or educate the people to assume responsibilty, and in actuality, rendered them more dependent

on guidance and instructions. The participation of the population was merely ceremonial and the project did not encourage local people to assume political roles and achieve a measure of political power. Thus, redistribution of power to beget equality and accessibility for the disadvantaged has failed.

Begin declared that this new program would render Israel a nation like all other nations. He seemed to want the chosen people to be like all others when it comes to freedom from responsibility, whether toward collective welfare, or vis-a-vis the subjugated enemies. Likud's victory legitimized social norms and cultural themes that would determine, in part at least, the future image of the Israeli society. Although Labor abdicated its socialist vision before 1977, Likud attempts to carry and entrench capitalism and the spirit of negative freedom much further. Many began to feel that they lived in material comfort, ignoring the fact that the country's financial reserves were being depleted. The result, as Irving Howe asserts, "is a split between personal life and public conscience; between comforts, trips to Paris, pleasant apartments, and the conviction that something terrible is happening only a bus ride away."[31] The terrible things occuring are the relations of Israel with itself, its lack of introspection and its permanent domination of the Palestinians. The Likud, especially under Begin, was able to divert attention from facing a moral crisis, to a sense of victory. Through nationalist appeal and consumers' merriment, his movement became popular. He did not demand daily effort in either thinking or moral preoccupation with what is just, only expected a readiness to sacrifice life in the seemingly perennial conflict with the enemy.

Conseqently, the population became stupefied. Primitivization of thought, celebration of destructive impulses and infantility become necessary in order to maintain such a political culture. The degradation has reached such a point that even serious mistakes committed by officials have been viewed as undesirable though normal occurrences. Undoubtedly, such passivity and apathy existed during Labor rule as well. But, more so with Likud's ascendence: critics are frowned upon and called traitors. Harkabi remarks that there is no shame or guilt about grave economic errors or military escapades.[32] Critical thought has been impoverished, and creative ideas have given way to bombastic rhetoric, demagoguery, self deception and amorality. Polarization of the population deepened, and expressions of hatred among Jews and between Jews and Arabs increased. The citizens' minds have been terrorized with threats from enemies, with symbols and with vulgarization and banalization of historical memories especially when invoking the Holocaust.

The constant conjuring up of nationalism has come to mean a license to deprive others of human rights and fight them to the death when deemed necessary. The occupation of territories and the continuous oppression of the Palestinians is fueled by irrational pseudo-religious beliefs, endorsed also by secular supporters. Several proponents of these policies suggest that disinformation disseminated by enemy propaganda has influenced world opinion, including some Jews, and that a renewed educational campaign on behalf of Israel is vital. Others are confident that their endeavor is so just that there is no need to convince the hostile world. The use of security needs as an excuse for settlements is a poor one since it is a provocation

committed out of spite. If anything, the settlements are a burden in need of military protection because of their location in the midst of enemy territory, as a constant irritant to the Arab population.[33] The settlements do not decrease the need for military effort but rather accentuate it. Their very presence is an affront, an act of war, a statement of irreconcilability increasing the likelihood of retribution. The policy makers claim that only an "iron wall" will bring the Arabs to accept this predicament, but if they resist it will weaken them, not Israel. Clearly, the various leaders who have proclaimed their readiness to negotiate without a priori conditions have done so under false pretenses. After all, do not the hundred settlements constitute that many preconditions?

Under this dominant ethos many failures have beset Israel, but the population still supports it. Perhaps this ethos did not necessarily mean a series of successes, but a boldness to assert a position, not succumbing to pressure and criticism, keeping the symbol of independence and rebellion alive as a negation of Diaspora meakness. The drama and poetry of daring was attractive to those who believed it was now time for Jews to flex their muscles; that it was a historical moment of no compromise. The celebration of will has become their redemption. The motivation to actualize objectives in their entirety is the source and essence of activism extending beyond the realm of reality, in fact, in spite of it.

Likud's victory was the culmination of an educational campaign, partly unintended and unconscious: its election to power was the matriculation diploma for the many years of exposure to a changing political culture. Benvenisti suggests that on the 7th day of the 1967

war Israel became a different country. Throughout, we have tried to show that the change from the ideal, model society occured long before, but accelerated since then. Since Likud's victory, the nature of the leadership and its internal decision making process, the manipulation of the people by appealing to their less enlightened desires, the behaviour of party supporters during elections and demonstrations and the conduct and intentions of groups associated and valued by the Likud paint a very diturbing picture of the society. In his discussion of the nature of fascist propaganda, Adorno defines it as "psychological because of its irrational authoritarian aims which cannot be attained by means of rational convictions but only through the skillful awakening of portion of the subject's archaic inheritance." Moreover, "fascist" agitation is centered in the idea of the leader, no matter whether he actually leads or is only the mandatory of group interests, because only the leader is apt to reanimate the idea of the all powerful and threatening primal father."[34] Jabotinsky was revered as the movement's primal father and the Sephardim, perhaps, regained in Begin a strong father substituting for their previously weakened and humiliated fathers.

The characteristics of the authoritarian-omnipotent-charismatic-hypnotic leadership may easily be discerned in the leaders' behavior and in the followers' response. The entrenchment of such tendencies in the Israeli society is worrisome. How ultimately democratic could a country be which grants political and civil rights to Jews and legally to Israeli Arabs, yet deprives 1.6 million Palestinians of the same rights? Critics point to the assault on and destruction of the citizens' character and the distorted and immoral education of the

young, who become part of the aggressive and oppressive policies perpetrated upon the occupied population. Fortunately, there is some leakage in the apparent complacency. In fact, the consensus about this state of affairs has been shaken. The war in Lebanon brought forth protests, criticism and refusal to take part in such acts. Since the feeling that there are limits to the demands put upon Israelis to bear the burden of shameful policies is spreading to the army itself, as it has amidst this war, one has to wonder what further steps a government would take to prevent the dissolution of consensus.

Nonetheless, critics were accused of being a fifth column, helping the enemies harm Israel. Censorship existed before but increased and, actually, total disdain was shown toward the media.[35] This trend was accentuated since 1977, when Begin felt that his close relationship with the people did not require the press to serve as mediator. The contact with the Editors Committee (a committee of major newspapers editors) was reduced and further deteriorated when Sharon was appointed Defense Minister. He boycotted them and forbade the Chief-of-Staff to meet with them.[36] During the invasion of Lebanon, information was withheld from the press, and as journalists found out it was concealed from cabinet members as well. Articles were rewritten by the Military Censor, a policy that offended the papers, causing them to assert more of an independent role.[37] In 1983, Attorney General Yitzhak Zamir, defended Kahane's Kach movement's freedom to promote the forceful expulsion of Arabs from Israel. Evidently, such freedom is applied to racist organizations but curtailed in regard to communist, Arab or any other defined as radical. What could be expected next? Lawyers representing accused Palestinians are often

denied access to documents supposedly incriminating their clients, for security reasons. The accused are denied visitations with their families while members of the Jewish underground recieved very short prison terms, support and commaradery from the prison guards and endless privileges allowing them to visit and celebrate with their families. Democracy, it would seem, is limited to Israelis while Palestinians are brutalized physically and spiritually. We have to question the meaning and repercussions of a limited democracy - is it not a contradiction in terms? Children born after 1967 learn, if only by living in such conditions, that Jews have rights which are denied to others. The policy of repression, domination and control, necessarily has implications for the social and moral outlook and ultimately for the education of the citizens. The undermining of a rational and humanist tradition is under way characterized by an outbreak of fanaticism, religious and secular, mandated by the divine or by the natural right of the strong.

We have seen before that in the late 1950's a change in attitude toward religion and tradition occured in the Socialist-Zionist camp. Minister of Education Zalman Aran, a committed socialist, introduced "Jewish conciousness" classes into the public schools. Nostalgia for the Jewish past is discerned by looking for Diaspora literature rather than Israeli literature depicting the youthful pioneer. The Diaspora is no longer negated as before and longings for Jewish tradition have found a new place.

The Israeli public often views the educational system as resposible for the estrangment and detachment of youth from the national Jewish consciouness. Many have insisted that educating the

young generations to recognize the uniqueness of their national renaissace is an urgent national priority.[38] Guy-Chen affirms that such objectives cannot be achieved merely through intellectual experiences and historical analysis and that there is a need to instill emotional aspects by creating emotional identification and experiences early on. Accordingly, subject matter such as history, civics, bible, literature, geography and art would emphasize the uniqueness in the past and present through studies, field trips, films, song and dance rendering the experiences concrete and the beliefs in national regeneration unshaken.[39]

In 1978 it was decided to adopt "Zionist Consciousness" as a project within the district of Tel Aviv for all its schools. The method of presenting this theme to the child was to be introduced by indirect means.[40] It was decided that teachers and principals had to be trained first by "cultivating their souls." The emphasis was on the development from Jewish autonomy in the Diaspora to national independence in Israel. Some of the themes to be covered were: (1) holidays as a vehicle of teaching Zionism; (2) games and quizzes about the geography of Israel, the Jewish nation and the Diaspora; (3) terms pertinent to Zionism; (4) ethnic folklore - songs, dance and movement; (5) comparative analysis between Maccabee wars and the war of independence; (6) pioneering; (7) did Zionism achieve its goals? (8) values: autonomy, emancipation, auto-emancipation, spiritual Zionism and political Zionism; (9) heroes and leaders; (10) Hebrew labor; (11) regions of economic and strategic importance.[41]

In each class there was a "National Corner" that developed throughout the year as each class prepared a "Growing Exhibit." At the end of the year the separate exhibits were gathered and shown. A central bulletin board called "The Country and People" containing historical information about events and leaders was growing as well. Guests were invited to talk about immigration, building the first settlements and developing urban areas. Field trips were related to biblical stories to acquaint the children with particular landmarks reflecting Jewish history. Thus, a strong physical and emotional connection could be established between the children and the land eliciting suitable emotional experiences.[42] The educational effort was directed at presenting Jewish history as culminating in the unique and glorious creation of the state. It was not merely a political achievement but a national and cultural success in erecting a Jewish state. It conferred upon the Jews a sense of mission in producing something more than just another Middle Eastern state: it provided goals and meaning to life that transcended daily needs and preoccupations.[43]

2. Right Wing Extremism: The Rise of New Zionism

In what follows Gush Emunim will be discussed as an activist political, religious and educational movement, undermining the potential to educate the public for democracy and tolerance. The views and approach of a movement which has been considered by many an extreme fringe group, have been absorbed, accepted and institutionalized by the Likud reflecting the danger posed to the remaining enlightened tenets and framework of the Israeli society. The

roots of Gush Emunim ("The Bloc of the Faithful") stem from Bnei-Akiva youth movement of the National Religious Party, which in the 1940's educated the youth according to Halutziut and self actualization within the framework of the religious kibbutz. In the 1950's and 1960's some youth began to search for meaning to their Jewish identity in adddition to that provided by the party. They could not accept the idea that achieving an independent state was the end of the road, nor could they accede to polarization between religious and secular in Israel, where they occupied a minority position, whereas the fate of Zionism was determined by the secular majority. They felt that the right to the Holy Land was divinely ordained for the Jews, that the inferior Arabs had no rights over Eretz Israel having been, at best, passive custodians of the land. In the 1950's many chose to join Yeshivot rather than Kibbutzim.

Gradually, as belief in socialism declined, doubts about socialist legacy were raised and reinforced by the weakened commitment to labor education. The latter tolerated the fact that interpretations of the wars were given more of a religious flavor. The Gush founders viewed wars as part of the redemptive process, and the 1967 victory signified clearly a miracle of God's work, while the 1973 war was a warning and a reminder to continue the work rather than withdraw from it. They demonstrated against any indication to attain peace by territorial concessions and initiated conspicuous settlements in the West Bank. Although continuing to maintain contacts with the relgious party, they created their movement as a direct link to the people actively realizing objectives and establishing facts as a non-parliamentary body acting beyond political and democratic constraints.

In spite of Labor's declared opposition to them, they succeeded in producing a new political reality. Their demonstrations, mass rallies, settlements and violent confrontations with soldiers, people and governmental representatives were many, and after 1977 the government did not attempt to unsettle them (except in the case of Yamit when the Sinai was to be returned to Egypt). They acted illegally, but the lack of governmental reaction legitimized their activities and endeared them to many, including secular Israelis.[44] The settlements were sanctioned later by the Likud government. The mixture of religiosity and power in their sense of mission reached various people. Some ultra-nationalist seculars felt an emotional and political kinship with religious youth dreaming of the "undivided" Eretz Israel, observing that many secular youth were preoccupied with material pursuits. These extremists were ready to join religious groups and let them define ideas and actions according to the Torah and God's precepts. The marriage of secular and religious irrationalism forged a populist movement.

Messianism has always been part of Jewish belief, appearing as a utopian vision with a social and moral content. To pave the way for the Messiah, Gush Emunim attempted to implement the vision through settlement activities. Zionism and the modern polity are viewed as an aspect of redemption, a means within the the modern political context. Achieving nationalist goals means actively aiding the coming of the Messiah, and who better qualified than God's army? They inherited the place of the Revisionist right and Jabotinsky's spirit of chauvinism; militarism, populist-demagogic propaganda for maximalist aims. Their refusal to abide by man-made democratic precepts bestowed on their

project the legitimacy of divine providence. Such a belief system cannot leave room for compromise: "Any concession constitutes a malicious profanation of the sanctity of the land and the covenant between God and Abraham who was promised the land from the Nile to the Euphrates."[45] For Gush Emunim, the militant assertion of Jewish rights was a categorical denial of the rights of other inhabitants, leading to contempt for law and for others' opinions, as well as for the possibility of negotiations. What is worrisome to some Israelis is not merely their disdain for law, but the tolerance and approval of their criminal activities by the government. The light sentences that the Jewish underground received were mentioned before. The fact that they are protected by soldiers and provided with arms when they settle in the midst of the Arab population, provoking and intimidating them and preventing Arabs from going about their business, reflects their success in manipulating the government.

Religious education succeeded in prompting the religious youth actively to seek and promulgate their ideals. These youth were not beset by doubts and confusion about their identity, only searched for better ways to realize their destiny. The secular Jewish youth were confused: they experienced moral dilemmas abour their role in constructing a just society, being seduced by accessible material benefits. They were uncertain about their identities as Jews, and about their connection to a recent past or ancient tradition. Gush Emunim was able to synthesize the elements of religion and messianism with the self-determination and colonizatory activities of the pioneers. They settled the confusion by basing their rights on divine

authority, yet allowing the individuals to participate in shaping a new reality.

The Likud, with the help of Gush Emunim, embarked on social mobilization of aggressiveness, by inundating the public with biblical quotes, reminding all of the bloody historical pursuit of Jews. By eliciting these images they militarized everyday life, showing the people that they really lived in conditions of war and the only recourse was to act for self-preservation. With characteristic complicity the people began, unknowingly, a march toward the abyss. In this place, beset by killing and dying, the living have gone about their business as usual, occasionally complaining, occasionally demonstrating, but mostly voting in a stable, predictable fashion. The Gush activists reacted strongly against this status quo, presenting a way to alter history for Jewish interest and undo the anomie and spiritual impasse of the chosen people.

Their attempt to combine ancient beliefs with modern elements differed from the Zionist founders' initial effort to find a way not to abandon the Jewish legacy, yet to search for a viable way to establish a modern Jewish society. Porat likens the relationship between Jew and his homeland to one between a man and a woman. Jerusalem is the maiden waiting to marry her beloved, and his arrival constitutes redemption.[46] And in a statement of principles concerning "Judea and Samaria" it is said that "... the settlements plan of Jews constitute a pillar of peace."[47] Namely, peace is synonomous with the goals sought by Gush Emunim and war, therefore, is not antithetical to peace, but a means to accelerate the coming of the Messiah. Wars are the beginning of redemption and since all the non-Jews are potential

killers of Jews, suspicion and preemptive actions are imperative. Consequently, peace negotiations with Arabs are inconceivable and undesireable. There will be peace only when they accept uneqivocally the Israeli ultimatum, and until then, Israel shall live by the sword in accordance with God's will. To that end all Jews are called to struggle and sacrifice for the divine precept, and since the sanctification of the Holy Name justifies all actions, opposition to the government and to other Jews,including military opposition is permitted.[48]

Gush Emunim has thrived on the uncertainty, lack of definite goals, dislocation of priorities and dissolution of ideology, offering instead a sense of mission and solidarity in spite of an inimical world. Amidst the poverty of critical thought Gush Emunim found a spiritual vacuum to fill. As we shall see, dissatisfaction and confusion found also different outlets though, most often, they remained helplessly entrenched. The aftermath of the 1973 war raised questions about the nature of the Jewish state that filled many with embarassment: Is, indeed, the whole world against the Jews, and if so, is it the inevitable destiny of the Jews or is it due to particular Israeli policies? Are Israelis doomed to live in perennial conflict with their neighbors, and whose fault or responsibility is it- the Arabs' or the failures of Zionism?[49]

Another group, which seems to have found all the answers in some fountain of truth and similar to Gush Emunim in orientation, is Kach ("Thus") formed by Meir Kahane, former head of the Jewish Defense League. Kach has usually been considered a group operating on the Israeli periphery, but it is visible, loud and activist. Zionism, for

them, is a faith and it represents the pure essence of Judaism as a fortress against the inimical world. The holy land was given to the Jews by God, and withdrawal from any territories is a sin and treason.[50] Further, all Arabs hate Israel and their hatred, coupled with a high birth rate and a hightened political consciousness, threatens Israel. Therefore, the only solution is to remove the Arabs from Israel. This approach, obviously deviating from mainstream solutions, has been reiterated by Michael Dekel, Deputy Defense Minister and by General (res.) Rehavam Zeevi and others from Likud, as late as August 1987, in a Likud forum. The forcible expulsion of Arabs used to be advocated openly only by Kach, but Dekel and others have finally confirmed Kahane's assertion that "I say what you think." In addition to discussing the "transfer" of Palestinians, Knesset member Meir Cohen-Avunadav suggested that such "transfer" be applied also to Arabs within Israel proper. And although Likud and Labor leaders stated their opposition to such ideas, surveys indicated that many in the public approved.[51] In spite of the fact that the group is small, we are witnessing extreme fringes on the right rendered legitimate and their racist violent ideas validated, though Zionism, as a rationalist and secular movement, is unacceptable to them.

It is of importance to note that the supporters (about 50,000) of Kach tends to be young: between 60-70% are under the age of 30; approximately 50% are in their early 20's. Many belong to the National Religious camp, yet others were recruited as immigrants from the United States and the Soviet Union, whose professed anti-communism and ethnocentricity renders them loyal adherents of Kach's solution to the conflict. Among his enthusiastic followers are poor disenchanted and

unemployed people from "developing towns" who feel, and correctly so, neglected and forgotten. Their towns have remained underdeveloped and isolated, lacking resorces and attention. The frustration, however, is not directed at public officials or at the rich suburbs, nor at the settlements subsidized by public monies, but at the Arabs. They vent their hatred, especially, at the Palestinians who, they believe, get jobs at their expense. Kahane has been succesful in implanting this false cause of misery in their minds. Prior to the 1977 elections, Kahane visited Arab villages on the West Bank and urged their annexation. He and his supporters have often demonstrated violently, and members have been accused of trying to smuggle arms from Israel for use abroad and distributing seditious material. Some have been detained, yet in view of Kahane's persistence in disturbing public order and inciting spectators, the authorities have exhibited relentless tolerance, refraining from restricting their activities.

3. Movements for Peace: Peace Now and Yesh Gvul

If Gush Emunim, Kach and other extreme right-wing groups attempted to undermine any sign of readiness for accomodation with the enemy, the Peace Now movement challenged the authorities to pursue peace more aggressively. Within a year of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, a group of army officers, later joined by other citizens, sent a letter to Prime Minister Begin alerting him to the urgent need for continuing the peace process. Accordingly, it was necessary to normalize the relations with Israel's neighbors primarily because the occupation harmed the Jewish and democratic characters of the state.

Further, they stated that the continuous occupation rendered it impossible for them to identify with Israel's direction.[52]

The movement was not partisan but pluralist, offering instead of a detailed platform an overall plan and goodwill to search for peace and justice for its own soul and for the subjugated others. The protestors were of the mainstream, soldiers, reservists and students. They did not pose a threat to the basic political arrangements, but only proposed a re-evaluation of policies and a revitalization of fundamental values. They remind us of the students interviewed by Swirski, whose criticism was aimed at the structural inelasticity of the system no longer able or willing to produce original ideas.

On May 16, 1981, a year prior to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 3000 Peace Now members demonstrated against the likelihood of a war in Lebanon. When the military operation was launched, numerous Peace Now activists were sent to Lebanon. Most expressed their dismay and discontent at the war, viewing it as unjust and useless, but they remained with their troops. The movement mobilized many supporters. They held rallies, demonstrated against settlements, prevented (peacefully) settlers from reaching particular settlement destinations, placed signed petitions in the newspapers and recruited artists, writers and performers for concerts and lectures. Their emphasis was on seizing opportunities for peace. Yet when several reserve officers sent a letter to the Prime Minister requesting not to serve in the occupied territories and refusing to protect settlements there, the movement publicly declared that it did not identify with this position. They claimed that they followed the rules of democracy, and only the elected government has the mandate to order the army to

pursue its missions. They explicitly gave their consent to the government, not challenging its legitimacy, only its wisdom.[53]

Peace Now has attempted to alarm the country about the danger in the rise of New Zionism and the follies committed by adopting the path of Gush Emunim. It has been, in fact, a single issue movement concerned with peace. It has not focused on discovering the roots and causes for the society's moral deterioration, nor with the many ills besetting the Jews and Arabs inside Israel. The movement has not been critical of the primacy of the state and the blind loyalty it elicits from the population, nor with the saturation of the educational curricula with a nationalist and ethnocentric ethos masking the loss of spirit. Many of the protestors have had, certainly, good intentions and honest concerns about war and peace. But they have been the satiated Israelis, mostly Ashkenazi, for whom war constituted an interfering and interupting event in their abundant life style. Their work and efforts must not be underestimated but the fact that they did not see or acknowledge the interdependence between the indifference toward social justice inside Israel, and the oppressive policies and attitudes toward the Palestinians is disturbing. The fact that they did not see the connection between the erosion of mutual responsibility and true solidarity, beyond the one present on the battlefield, and the rise in the primacy of the state unto which loyalty was displaced and in which unity became embodied is bewildering. The fact that they did not notice the relation between the increased emphasis in the schools upon Jewish consciousness, heroism, dismissal of Arab history even in the Arab schools, ignoring ideals of equality, tolerance and justice on the one hand, and the

growing attraction of youth to militarism and affirmation of rights through power on the other is alarming. It is dismaying that they did not take notice of the correlation between the abandonment of a lifestyle and state of mind which called for collective interest and love of labor, with an obsession with efficiency, competition and enrichment.

One has to wonder about the magnitude of events necessary to cause such a movement to begin to challenge the legitimacy of an authority that sentences many to violent and unnecessary deaths and killing, and which encourages coercion and condones internal strife perpetrated by its supporters. The war in Lebanon was, perhaps, a greater earthquake than the 1973 war, not only because of the forceful criticism, protests and actual "refusniks," but because of the potential explosive power contained in the discontented, not daring yet to withdraw their alligiace from a delinquent authority. As for Labor, they opposed the war prior to its inception, but once it started they publicly gave their consent to its limited declared objectives. Only when the IDF went beyond these objectives did they voice their opposition, detecting the fermenting resentment in some quarters. However, when the Communist Party proposed a vote of non-confidence in the government, Labor voted with the Likud.

Dissent was intensified and Likud condemned its critics, especially when Arafat praised Peace Now, accusing the peace movement of stabing the nation in the back and poisoning the wells of consensus. Opponents challenged the war's justification, its necessity and its management. They pointed out that the war was launched not as an act of self-defense and certainly without provocation. Certain

groups, other than Peace Now, conveyed a more fundamental disapproval and challenge to government's decision and authority. Hayalim Neged Shtika ("Soldiers Against Silence") demanded an immediate cease fire, upholding the right and duty of soldiers to criticize governmental policies, even in the midst of war. Netivot Shalom ("Pathways to Peace"), composed of dissenters from within the religious party, were critical of the government and of religious leaders for allowing such bloodshed to take place. Horim Neged Shtika ("Parents Against Silence") constituted a new phenomenon on the Israeli scene, protesting against the senseless death to which their sons were sent. Lo La'Ot ("No to the Insignia") was a group whose members refused either to receive or to wear the insignia given to all those who fought in the war. Yesh Gvul ("There is a limit/border"), included soldiers in the reserve who urged their supporters to refuse to serve in Lebanon, raising the question of obedience and refusal to authority.[54]

By and large, dissenters did not question the government's legitimacy, but instead, criticized the nature of the military operation and the conduct of war. Nevertheless, even though only a minority questioned the government's right to initiate this war, pointing in the midst of war to their unjust motives and false explanations, such an affirmation presented a challenge to the legitimacy of the power holders. Clearly, they viewed the war not as defensive but as a brutal attempt to solve the Palestinian problem by annihilating as many as possible, and creating a protectorate in Lebanon. Consequently, even though the Israeli government was democratically elected, it did not have a mandate to start a war which

was utterly unacceptable to the people. A war that is not absolutely necessary is an absolutely unjust war. Soldiers have a moral right and obligation to disobey particular orders in the present and similar orders in the future. Although refusal to serve in the occupied territories had sprung up following the 1967 war, these protests were wider in scope, though certainly not characteristic of the population. Yediot Aharonot reported in July 11, 1982 that 83% supported the war. Ha'aretz reported in March 30, 1983 that 80.4% felt that the war was justified. At best, some saw the military operation as a "mistake" or a "muddled experience." Civil disobedience committed by drafted reserve soldiers, in time of war, is a transgression of a taboo. But those who felt that the war was a clear instance where an individual may be obligated to abrogate the laws of the land, persisted, often being jailed. The legitimacy of their demands emanated from the basic values upon which the Israeli society was founded, and the government, in their view, violated these values. Their refusal, therefore, was not self-serving or done out of spite, but worked out in accordance with the principle that states that it is morally right to disobey a bad command. As Dan Meron points out in his letter to Yishai Menuchin from Yesh Gvul, "the war was not merely unnecessary (too neutral and forgiving a term), but sinful and destructive." The war was not inevitable, and participating in it meant giving a hand to the oppression of others. However, he agrees that refusal to participate in such a madness is a moral act when done individually, not as an organized group. It would seem that for him such a refusal constitutes the relationship between an individual and his conscience, and that organized refusal ought not be committed against a democratically

elected government.[55] Indeed, such an approach is at variance with Yishyahu Leibovitz's suggestion to violate laws of the land when war is immoral. Heroism and bravery are not consonant with being a warrier; rather, it is the cheapest expression of strength. Moral and humanist commitments ought to be stronger than any commitment to the state. The state must be seen only as a means and instrument to achieve those values. But etatism should never become a value in itself, as prescribed by fascism. People do not owe an unquestioned alligiance to their state as they do not owe a thing to the instruments of labor. They protect both in order to live decently and maximize human potential, but if the demands and exigencies of either undermine his human essence, man has obligation to neither.[56]

4. Education for Democracy

Increasingly, as it became clear that many events reflected racism and resistance to democracy, education for democracy in the schools was launched. Yitzhak Navon, Minister of Education and Culture, asserted that "our educational aim is to embrace the intrinsic meanings of democracy - equality in the value of all people, despite differences of beliefs, origin and nationality. We can live in peace only if we accept wholeheartedly the fact that we are different, yet equal to one another." The emphasis on Jewish-Arab coexistence was one of the most crucial objectives faced by the educational institutions constituting a moral test for Israel. The project "Education for Democracy" purported to involve pupils, parents, teachers, inspectors and councelors, and its aim was to develop in the pupils (in elementary schools) the ability and readiness to live in

cooperation with the Arabs.[57] It was pointed out that there was an urgent need to strengthen education for democracy through an all encompassing and systematic educational undertaking. The necessity to pursue such programs was mostly a reaction to events and phenomena among the public signaling racism and resistance to democracy. Racism and anti-democratic tendencies, it was said, contradicted the basic tenets of humanism, as well as those of Judaism and the Declaration of Independence. Accordingly, the educational challenge constituted a moral test for the Israeli people.

The programs' architects included various topics of study: rights and responsibilities of man and citizen, freedom of expression and organization, social equality and equal justice, majority rule, minority rights, pluralism and tolerance. The first principle of education for democracy was viewing man at the center of social processes. Secondly, there was an emphasis on the cultural-nationalist, Jewish-Zionist values. Since these two principles may conflict occasionally a third principle was to prepare the youth to deal with conflicting values.

The teaching staff was to undergo special training to strengthen democratic attitudes, behavior and ideas, emphasizing civil rights and freedom for minority opinions.[58] The first step was to train teachers to examine their own worldviews as well as their level of tolerance and regard for democracy.[59] Once a week a regular session was to be devoted to discussions about political, cultural and social affairs. This session, known as educator's lesson or education hour, was to serve as a bridge between the school and the outside world. Its aim was to help the pupils become conscious of their own thoughts and

behavior and nurture their willingness to forge good relationships within their social environment.

In what follows, examples of the manner in which several subject matters were to be taught will be presented. The study of motherland and society was to include these topics: (1) people and their homes; (2) homes around the world; (3) our neighborhood; (4) let's get to know the Beduin in our country. The latter was detailed. The intent was to learn about a different life style and develop tolerance and appreciation for the stranger. Accordingly, the following chapters were introduced: the Beduin in the desert, search for water, the camel as a blessing for the Beduin, the Beduin clothes and jewelry, the tent - home of the Beduin, making a living in the desert, artifacts and "migrating furniture" and Beduins' hospitality.[60] In studying civics, it was determined that the objective was to prepare the young generation to partake in social and political life fulfilling their duties and safegaurding their rights. It was emphasized that the State of Israel was founded for the Jewish nation to ingather the exiles. Yet, since the state contained national and religious minorities, the Israeli society must be recognized as pluralistic. In the curriculum, therefore, a tolerant approach, flexibility and openness to opinions must be integrated so that the pupils could develop a sense of belonging to the Israeli society. Further, the Arab-Israeli conflict would be studied by presenting differences of opinions within the Yishuv and in Israel regarding the roots of the conflict and the solutions to it.[61]

When studying, the Israeli Arabs had to be aware of three principles about the state of Israel: its democratic form of

government, its Jewish character and its special security needs. In view of these principles, the legal, social and economic status of the Arab minority is to be examined. As for the study of history, the objectives were: (1) Instill a sense of identification with the nation and state; (2) Cultivate understanding and tolerance regarding the feelings, traditions and life styles of other people and nations; (3) Impress upon the pupils the ability to judge historical events according to universal moral values.[62] The study material would include the following: (1) History of Israel and other nations. The chapter on Greek culture and politics which included Athenean democracy, town meetings and democratic institutions was considered important; (2) Revolutions and changes. This topic contained chapters on the U.S. constitution, the French Revolution, rights of man and citizen and Liberalism; (3) The U.S. and the Soviet Union. The chapters would comprise material on the Bolsheviks and their approach to building a socialist society, as well as the U.S. war of independence, the civil war and individualism; (4) The French Revolution, history and historians. Under this topic the relationship between ideologies and history will be discussed; (5) History of the U.S. - the creation of a democratic system and the establishment of the institutions and procedures to safeguard it. Chapters will address the fashioning of a pluralist society that allows equal right to the various groups; (6) Freedom and equality - various attempts to realize them; (7) The holocaust. This study is composed of two parts. Part I discusses Nazi Germany as a totalitarian and irrational entity which had transformed individuals to anonymous beings devoid of personality and motivated by hatred. Part II centers on Jewish perspective,

namely, minority's rights and values; (8) The Zionist idea and the establishment of s state. The texts would point to the connection between past and present events.[63]

Although the identification with Zionist goals and the deep commitment to Judaism were kept intact, this project was an attempt to foster understanding and tolerance on the pupils teachers and parents. The Ministry sponsored meetings between Arab and Jewish pupils in elementary and high schools. The project Nizanei Shalom (Buds of Peace) was launched to encourage cooperation through proximity and familiarity. The meetings were often organized around common interests such as sports, music, journalism, languages and holidays. Children also visited each others homes and classes. Thus, they learned to respect each others uniqueness yet comprehend that many interests can be mutual, that everyone can contribute to social progress, and Jews and Arabs are equal citizens in terms of their responsibility to the area's progress. In another guidance program counsellors were invited to schools to discuss issues of rights, freedom of expression and prejudice. They reported that a significant number of students (over 50%) tended to categorize minorities as deserving less rights than Jews. The Arabs were often described as dirty and violent. Nevertheless, this effort produced some degree of openness in the students to consider the predicament of minorities from a different perspective.

The spectre of racism in the Israeli society prompted a 1985 forum called "Writers Meeting Against Racism." They addressed themselves especially to the teachers in the audience, asking them to become committed to the idea of democracy and coexistence, initiate

contact between Jewish and Arab youth, exorcise the public from the phobias about its enemies/neighbours. They warned about the youth minds being poisoned by hatred and suspicion and the impact it has on the Israeli body politic and soul.

The need to inculcate ideas and orientations toward democracy was also deemed urgent in the army. An internal IDF pamphlet indicates that the youth exhibits resistance to the survival of a democratic regime. These beliefs, when not explicit, were reflected in their view that only their positions were correct while others' positions were wrong and dangerous and must, therefore, be censored or prohibited.[64] Their own views, however, must be dominant even if the majority of the people objected, and although individual or minority rights were harmed. There was an increase in willingness to silence pulic debates and ignore social tensions and confronation. There was a reluctance to allow a free press as well. Contempt for the law and the tendency to its abrogation were acceptable, justified either on the basis of some principles or only because of convenience. There was an alarming disrespect for the state institutions, for example, the court and the Knesset.[65]

The researchers attempted to find ways to educate for democracy through discussions, films, simulation games and lectures. Their aim was to stimulate thinking and to present problems and dilemmas that require the evaluation of various points of view. In this way, public debate would be perceived as a legitimate phenomenon and the readiness to listen to other views tolerating an opposed proposition could be practiced. During the discourses many topics were raised: public interest and individual will, peoples' duties and rights, the value of

compromise, struggle - should it be violent or peaceful, just trials, institutions - their roles and responsibilities, minorities right to demonstrate, the public's right to be informed, censorship, reality and ideals, and elections - the meaning of choice. The idea of democracy was treated by studying concrete events and also by viewing films such as "Missing." The soldiers were divided into teams, with each assigned a position it had to explain and justify. Finally, each soldier was asked to define the meaning and essence of democracy and citizenship, limits of democracy, role of the media and the virtues and pitfalls of a democratic system.

It has been pointed out, however, that education for democracy in the army presents complex and difficult problems. The army is a bureaucratic and authoritative body that executes civil orders. The soldiers and their commanders are apt to doubt the necessity for such an endeavour. Yeshayahu Tadmor (Education Officer inthe IDF) asserts that the basis for democracy has been shaken in the society at large. Many voices yearn for an authoritarian regime and for the cult of a strong leader. Anti-democratic expressions have become normative values in daily life. He affirms the need for the following measures in the army: (1) Education against militarism - viewing the army as a means or instrument rather than as an ideal; (2) Develop democratic leadership - though commanders are not elected, they should attempt to explain and convince the soldiers of particular policies to foster an atmosphere conducive for free discussions and autonomous opinions; (3) Humanism - stress mutual respect, understand individual feelings and accept differences between people.[66]

It is of interest to juxtapose the state education curriculum with the curriculum pursued in the Kibbutzim. The Kibbutz Arzi Movement's (associated with left-wing Labor camp) history curriculum, in 1979, for grades 9-12 included additional topics which were not emphasized in the state schools.[67] These topics were:

1. Socialist thought - the vision of the good societ.
2. The Workers' movement and the Histadrut.
3. Nationalism and movements for national liberation.
4. Economics - in general and in Israel.
5. The individual and the society in the 1970's.
6. Socialist thought - the vision of the good society.
7. Changes and Movements in Jewish thought.
8. Type of revolutions - a comparison between the American, French, Russian and Chinese revolutions.
9. National Movements, Imperialism and Colonialism.
10. The creation of the working class and its historical function and destiny (According to Marx, Lenin and Marcuse).
11. A united Jerusalem - how?
12. The Kibuta Arzi - collectivist ideas.
13. Judaism - changing historical meaning.

It should be mentioned briefly that the literature curriculum for 1979 included Hebrew poets as well as translations from Arab, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, African and Cuban authors.

In principle the Kibbutz curriculum was not one dimensional, centering on nationalist themes, but included ideas and historical processes that are not necessarily strengthening Jewish nationalism and Jewish consciousness. Still, the Kibbutz youth have proven to be

no less patriotic or dedicated citizens and soldiers. Nevertheless, extreme chauvinism and zealotry have been hardly manifested in this society. Nationalist education there meant, to a lesser degree, the exclusion of others' rights. Consequently, tolerance and readiness to entertain alternative political solutions was not tainted by extremism. Hence, the need for "Education for Democracy" seemed superfluous.

The various attemps made through educational work to confront the existence of an anti-democratic trend are undoubtedly important. However, since educational institutions are not independent or isolated bodies but part of the socio-political fabric, one has to doubt the longevity of their influence on the young. My contention has been that although the process of ideological deterioration intensified in the last decade, thinning of principles and commitments emerged long before. For decades, as long as the ship remained afloat, no real efforts were made fundamentally to solve burning problems. Quick solutions were used to repair schisms, as the policies toward the Sephardim indicate. The withdrawal from the passionate belief in human rights, stated in the Declaration of Independence, was not too bothersome.

In the 1970's, anti-democratic trends were heightened reaching such an apex that they imperiled the institutions and the public officials grasp on them. When it became apparant that power and influence might be wrested from them, many awakened to salvage whatever precarious effectiveness they had through hastened rehabilitative programs. Of course, any measure of willingness to enliven people's consciouness and direct their attention to the danger

of a repressive mentality is to be valued. However, what does education for democracy offer in substance? At best, a humanist view within a structure and context of injustice where subordination and inequality remain rooted. The political and social relations are not metamorphosized from vertical to horizontal ones whether between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, rich and poor, Jews and Arabs. The status quo is kept intact though people are expected to change their feelings, perceptions and attitudes. It offers temporary relief to assuage sensitive consciences and be enlightened even when designated to control the destiny of another people.

The dangers associated with fanatic orientation in the Israeli society went unnoticed for many years. The manifestations of a move to a one dimensional worldview were clear and present. Only when they became so explicit and loud were they attended to with the hope of rectifying their effects instantaneously. Perhaps it is a challenge to overcome one's narrow and immediate political role and discover that the forces of humanism within can become dominant despite the enveloping grim reality. But it is unrealistic, nevertheless, to expect the old and especially the young to undergo transformation when the concrete existing conditions are trenchantly contradictory. It means asking the public to develop a schizophrenic personality: be just though ready to participate daily in an unjust experience.

Notes for Chapter V

1. Amos Oz, The Slopes of Lebanon (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1987), p. 25.

2. Joseph Agassi, Religion and Nationality (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Papyrus - Publishing House, 1984), p. 215.

3. Ibid., p. 215.

4. In 1929, in a document called "priciples of Revisionism," it was noted that "private property and the building of the state are synonymous.... No strikes are allowed.... All decisions will be arrived by arbitration. The Yishuv will have a superior institution of arbitration composed of representatives from different areas.... Strikes and protests will be viewed as national treason and must be fought against." (Dov Bar-Nir, From Jabotinsky to Begin - Portrait of a Movement, Hebrew, Tel-Aviv:Am-Oved, 1982, pp. 25-26). Jabotinsky's movement began to adopt the Nazi and Italian fascist uniform. They were engaged in incitement against Labor labelling them traitors embracing a red rag. The movement itself was undemocratic. Jabotinsky was a revered leader, decision maker and worshipped dictator. The names of the underground para-military organizations are an indication of their essence. The two associated with the revisionists were called Irgun Zvai Leumi ("The National Military Organization") headed by Begin, and LHY - Lohamei Herut Israel ("Fighters of the Freedom of Israel"), headed by Yitzhaj Shamir. On the other hand, the underground organizations identified with Labor called Hagana ("defense"). Bagin was called Ha-mefaked ("The Commander"); Ben-Gurion was called Ha-zaken ("The Old Man"). (Shlomo Avineri, "Ideology and Israel's Foreign Policy," The Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 37, 1986, p. 9.). Avineri makes reference to LHY's manifesto - "The Principles of Renaissance," where they expressed the desire to reassert "Hebrew mastery over the whole Middle East;" saw the need to forcibly "exchange populations" in order to solve the Arab problem and, finally, referred to the coming period in Jewish history as "The age of mastery and redemption." These people were looking to Italy and Nazi Germany in the 1940's as potential allies against Britain (See Shlomo Avineri letter in The Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 39, 1986, p. 111).

5. Bar-Nir, op. cit., p. 33.

6. Alex Ansky, The Selling of the Likud (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Zmora, Beitan - Publishers, 1978).

7. Menahem Dorman, "First Conversation," In the Shadow of War - Conversations at Yad Tabenkin (Hebrew), ed. Menahem Dorman, (Yad-Tabenkin: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1983), p. 14.

8. Jacobo Timerman, The Longest War, (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), p. 85.

9. Ibid., p. 86.

10. Amos Oz, "First Conversation," ed. Dorman, op. cit., p. 49.

11. In 1970, Begin resigned from the Unity government because it accepted the principle of withdrawal according to Resolution 242. Yet, in the agreement with Egypt it is stated that Resolution 242 is valid, that is, as far as negotiations with other parties are concerned. Furthermore, Resolution 338 advises reaching a just and inclusive peace in the Middle East, obviously refering to all parties to the conflict.

12. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Fateful Decisions (Hebrew), (tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1986), pp. 118-119.

13. Zeev Shief and Ehud Ya'ari, The Deceptive War (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Schoken Publishing, 1984).

14. Arye Naor, "The Israeli Cabinet in the Lebanon War (June 5-9, 1982)," The Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1986), p. 4.

15. Shiff and Ya'ari, op. cit., p. 261.

16. Oz, The Slopes of Lebanon, op. cit., p. 15.

17. Yoseph Goell quoted in Timerman, op. cit., p. 35.

18. Oz, "First Conversation," op. cit., p. 48.

19. Timerman, op. cit., p. 78.

20. Harkabi, op. cit., p. 138.

21. The liberalization of the economy was carried out in four simultaneous steps: (1) Devaluation of the Israeli currency; (2) Determining exchange rates according to market forces of supply and demand rather than by the government; (3) Almost complete removal of foreign currency regulations allowing citizens to hold and trade unlike before; (4) Increase of the surplus tax from 8% to 12%, decreasing the subsidies for basic commodities and services as a step toward their repeal altogether. There was talk about abolishing Kupat Holim (sick fund and health insurance). (See, Introductory notes to "Upheaval in the Israeli Economy," Be'ad Ve'neged, 70 (Dec. 1977), p. 3).

22. Yoram Ben-Porath, "Patterns and Peculiarities of Economic Growth and Structure," The Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 38 (1986), p. 47.

23. The Labor governments have wasted money and resources on subsidies and excessive employment. Up to 1973, says Milton Friedman, in spite of socialist obstacles, Israel was able to proceed with high rates of development. But since then, this development came to a halt with 40% inflation. He criticized Labor for using security needs as a justification for economic difficulties and for the inflated national budget. Furthermore, socialist rhetoric coupled

with an inability to deliver promises engendered cynicism, especially among the young people, who reacted as strongly against government interference as did the rest of the world. Many of these young people were Sephardim who opposed socialist rule which favored the Ashkenazim.

24. Milton Friedman, Ha'aretz, August 18, 1977.

25. Ya'akov Ravi, Al Hamishmar, November 30, 1977.

26. Bar-Nir, op. cit., pp. 88-90.

27. Ibid., p. 91.

28. The Likud Manifesto for the 11th Knesset, pp. 8-11.

29. Raphaella Bilski Ben-Hur, "Social Policy in Israel - A Critique," The Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1986), p. 51.

30. Ibid, p. 52.

31. Irving Howe, "The West Bank Trap," The New Republic, July 4 (1983), p. 19.

32. Harkabi, op. cit., p. 151.

33. Arye Shalev, The West Bank: Line of Defense (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hamechad, 1982), pp. 96-103.

34. Theodor Adorno, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda," The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. Andrew Arato, (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), p. 124.

35. True, the limits on the freedom of the press are a vestige from the days of the colonial British Mandate, and the District Commissioners, composed of officials from the Ministry of the Interior, have the prerogative to grant, suspend or cancel licenses to newspapers, and even the Supreme Court cannot force them to explain their decisions to reveal relevant evidence. (See, Moshe Negbi, "Paper Tiger: The Struggle for Press Freedom in Israel," The Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1986), p. 17). Censorship had been selective certainly before 1977, and the Editors Committee, representing the daily Zionist press, cooperated with the government and the army by exercising "self-control and resposibility," choosing to be silent when other papers, especially those in Arabic, were harassed, or when accreditation of such military correspondents as Shalom Cohen from Ha'Olam Hazeh was cancelled.

36. Ibid., p. 26.

37. Ibid., p. 29.

38. Shevi Gai-Ron, "On Education for Zionism - Report on an Experimental Curriculum in Petah-Tikva and its Surroundings," Ha'chinuch, Vol. 3, Nos. 1-2 (November 1977), p.1.

39. Ibid., pp. 2-5.

40. Imanuel Shahrai, "Zionist Consciousness - Project for the Tel-Aviv District," Ibid., p. 7.

41. Ibid., pp. 7-9.

42. Ibid., p. 10.

43. Yoseph Bentoitz, "An Israeli State - A Jewish State," Ibid., p. 14.

44. Tzvi Raanan, Gush Emunim (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Syfriat Poalim, 1980), pp. 55-60.

45. Ibid., p. 80.

46. Janet Audii, "Gush Emunim - Roots and Double Meanings; A Sociology of Religion Perspective," eds. R. Kahane and S. Kopstein, Problems of Collective Identity and Legitimation in the Israeli Society, (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: Academon, 1980), p. 333.

47. "Masterplan for Settlement in Judia and Samaria," quated in Raanan, op. cit., p. 120.

48. Rabbi Kuk, Hatsofe, July 19, 1974, and also in Ma'ariv, April 6, 1976.

49. Introductory notes on "The Perplexity of Youth in the Aftermath of War," Be'ad Ve'neged, 56 (May 1974), p. 3.

50. Yael Yishai, " Challenge Groups in Israeli Politics," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Autumn 1981), p. 547.

51. Uzi Benziman, "Jewish-Arab Relations," Bamahane, Ministry of Defense Publication, September 1987, p. 31.

52. Mordechai Bar-On, Peace Now - The Portrait of a Movement, (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1985), p.15.

53. Ibid., p. 30.

54. Yesh Cvul members sent a letter to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense which reads as follows (my translation: "We officers and soldiers in the reserve army, ask you not to send us to Lebanon. We can bare it no longer! We have killed and died too much in this war. We have conquered, bombarded and destroyed too much. Whay and for what? Today it is clear to us: you are trying to solve the Palestenian problem of a people. You are attempting to force a 'new order' upon the ruins of Lebanon, to shed our blood and the blood of others for the Phalanges. This is not the reason for which we were drafted to Zahal. You lied to us! You

talked about the 40th kilometer, but meant to arrive forty kilometers from Damascus and enter Beirut. There, a vicious cycle of blood awaits us: conquest - revolt - oppression. Instaed, of Peace to the Galilee you brought war without forseable end. For this war, these lies, this occupation - there is no national concensus. Bring the soldiers back home. We have sworn to protect the peace and security of the State of Israel. We are loyal to this oath. Therefore, we ask you to enable us to fulfill our reserve duty within the Israeli borders, not on Lebanon's land." In The Limits of Obedience: The Yesh Gvul Movement, Ishai and Dina Menuchin, eds., (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Siman Kria, 1985), p. 175.

55. Ibid., pp. 28-31.

56. Ibid., pp. 160-173.

57. Yzhak Navon, "Introductory Comments," Education for Democracy, (A Special Circular), (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1985), p. 3.

58. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

59. Ibid., p. 30.

60. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

61. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

62. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

63. Ibid., p. 14.

64. An internal IDF pamphlet for the Officer of Education: "Democracy - Activities for Soldiers," (Planning Department, 1987), p. 3.

65. Ibid. p. 21.

66. Yeshayahu Tadmor, "Educational Dillemas in the IDF," Quality and Quantity in Military Buildup" (Hebrew), eds. Zvi Offer and Avi Kober, (Ministry of Defense, 1985), p. 39.

67. History Curriculum for Grades 9-12, The Kibbutz Arzi Movement, 1979.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

My endeavor in this study was to follow the metamorphosis that the Israeli society has undergone by considering the manner in which this society has been educated. Rather than merely focusing on educational policies and curricular content, I examined the interdependence between political developments, ideological pronouncements and social commitments and educational interests. The attempt to discern the most important features and ideas within the political and educational realms, reveals the direction in which the Israeli society has been evolving.

My initial perception was that a disparity existed between strongly held socialist beliefs, expressed by the Labor leadership, and a political position which progressively became predominantly nationalist. But this study has demonstrated that, although some diluted socialist ideas were included in education, it was primarily geared to meet the fundamental political disposition. Thus, the educational institutions' output was consonant with the political education and worldview transmitted outside the schools. The marriage between education and politics can be said to have succeeded beyond the expectations of the Labor leadership. In principle, the educational institutions mirrored the leadership's departure from a

commitment to society building, its overwhelming concern with security and the embrace of the defense ethos. Other priorities, such as equality, social integration and tolerance, have been scarcely attended to.

Early on, pluralism in education was not transformed into a system that combined or smelted the varying approaches. Instead, the essence of one trend - Workers - was compromised almost completely, leaving the other two trends to determine the direction and orientation of education. Nonetheless, the seeds of ideological dissolution of the Workers Trend occured prior to official unification, a fact that reflects the weakening of its propounders' dream and their successors' dreamlessness. Nation building presented an easier task than society building. The concept of rallying around the national flag was more concrete and could be rendered urgent, eliciting immediate solidarity in view of Jewish history. Defending one's right to be an independent nation was an ethos that many identified with; an ethos that superceded social interests surmounting thorny differences. Once it was absorbed, the readiness to accomplish this goal became dominant and other ideas and people hid in modesty and awe. The wars were undoubtedly reinforcing and expediting factors. When a war was won, it filled the population with pride in their ability and invincibility to thwart the enemies and determine their own destiny. When nearly lost, the war confirmed the perception that might is the only guarantee for survival and that survival should never be compromised for some lofty ideals. Defense became not merely a necessity but a cherished value, and cherished values are celebrated, repeated, taught and nurtured. The constant look outward

and preparedness for imminent conflicts deterred the officials and public from looking inside. The energies expanded for the former were abundant, and little effort and concern were left to invest internally.

As we saw, the attempts to rectify the intense neglect, indifference and outright humiliation of a large group of Jews were unsuccessful. The immigration of Jews was necessary for nation and society building. The treatment of the Sephardim should not stike us with surprise considering that equality and human worth were repressed to allow for the defense of the state orchestrated by the country's patrons. The leadership lacked the resolve to establish justice, and the gap between their spoken word and actions broadened progressively. They viewed these immigrants as non reflecting objects, some eventually trainable to be adjusted to fit the elite's notions of civilization. They were taken as things to be reshaped, transformed and regulated. The idea of tolerating the different, let alone appreciating his content, was inconceivable. In the last decade official declarations about the need for mutual recognition have not been truly resonant. How could this group be considered equal when many of its members are still wretched and the others, if not poor, engage in "non respectable" (low status) work? The two groups have been designated for different social, economic and psychological layers. The fact that some interaction and mobility occur does not alter the basic structure of relations.

The Sephardim have comprised a significantly large segment of voters that strengthen extremism and the power of the right. They have been described as hawks, ardently militant in their opposition to

peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict, bent upon augmenting Israel's power as the only means of security. Although it is true that their voices have been effectively absorbed by the right, they were not the initiators or inventors of the power ethos. The cultivation of nationalism and force was handed down by the Ashkenazi elites, some explicitly systematic in their celebration of power, others adopting it gradually. In fact, the nationalist ethos was the main sacred right given to the Sephardim as citizens while they were deprived of other forms of participation in the life of their society. This right bestowed on them a dimension of equality vis-a-vis other Jews and superiority in relations to Arabs. It is not astonishing that they rejoiced in their scant offering. This was a costly charity. The gift of nationalism, for many Israelis, became a license to be nothing else. More, it was a bait and inducement to carry it beyond limits. Its growth shattered the people and ideas standing in the way, whether Arabs or Jewish "noble hearts." The youth "pioneering" spirit was to conquer land (territory) not soil or character; It was to solidify their positions as warriors. Agriculture was no longer pivotal nor were the glaring social and economic gaps important. It is no consolation that the extreme right wing movements (not parties) include only a small percentage of the population. These movements are not merely sects meeting on the outskirts of town or in the woods. Their vocabulary is used daily, their mode of thinking and action have influenced the behaviour and decision of political parties and their activity has become a fait accompli protected by the army.

An increasingly regimented and militarized society has been the inevitable consequence of a prevasive praxis that aimed to fortify a

triumphant state. Such beliefs overwhelmed the population, subduing their doubts but also thriving on them. More and more people, especially the young, marched into the clutches of a predominantly aggressive mood. Those opposing this trend are often seen as usurping the national spirit and profaning its mission. The army rather than being perceived as an arm employed in the last resort, became the heart - the society's source of existence. Being a fighter conferred respect, trust and responsibility for the public welfare, bringing forth a collective consciousness and mutual accountability only in so far as the state's survival was concerned, while in all other realms individualism was foremost. As the state itself became the highest value, all other meanings became either adjunct to etatism or inferior and negligible. Yeshayahu Leibowitz (Professor of Biology at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and a former editor of the Hebrew Encyclopedia) once said that when the state is place on a level higher than God, the society becomes fascist and preoccupied with idol worship.[1] Indeed, all human faculties have been mustered to revere this ever growing golden calf.

As we have seen throughout, Labor has compromised its calling by betraying its aims: equality, integration, productive labor, placing collective interest before personal material rewards and glory, non exploitation and the achievement of peace. Moreover, the objective of establishing a state as a secular democracy which can provide equal human rights to all its inhabitants regardless of their ethnicity, nationality and religion, has not been met. The desire to build a good society free of discrimination and oppression, where justice, rather than might, would reign supreme, has dissipated significantly. The

ideas of equality and negating material accumulation had eroded long before Labor's loss in the elections. Especially after the 1967 war, the identity of Israeliness connoted to many the fierce warrior bravely defending his country. But, for many others, the dilemma about their authentic identity was pronounced in regard to their Jewish and the Israeli components and the relative importance to be attributed to each. Observers point that the youth feel a much stronger affinity with biblical heroes and contempt for the meek diaspora Jews. In 1970, Minister of Education Yadlin noted that this had become a serious educational problem: "We are trying to close the empty historical gap in the consciousness of the younger generation, which stretches from the heroes of Massada to the first Bilu pioneers. We want them to look back on Jewish history not in anger but with pride."[2] Such statements, even if unintended, constituted part of a trend toward secularizing religious content and the establishment of an "hierocratic" body, whose power to rule emanates and is supported by its monopoly in the bestowal or denial of sacred values.[3] What could be expected from teaching, not merely the history of Jews, but Jewish Consciousness as a subject matter? Did the secular leaders, with their socialist pronouncements, feel so inferior or barren in the presence of strongly committed and uncompromising religious believers that they decided to appropriate a segment of this source of enchanting and influential charismatic ideas? Weiler (Professor of Philosophy at Tel-Aviv University) suggests that the secularists' feelings of inferiority and insecurity led them to allow, perhaps encourage, pupils in the State schools as well as soldiers to attend orthodox Yeshivot in order to witness "Judaism in action," and invite many propagandists to the

schools. Such actions have not endeared the leadership or the party to the pupils and their parents, but had led many pupils to absorb, follow and accept this material at face value, a move soon proven to be counterproductive for its initiators.[4] These attempts to "Judaeize" the Israelis as a means to teach the young about their roots and history have legitimized the fortification of religious politics, deleted critical thought and reinforced traditionalism. This inhibiting state of mind submerged even the possibility of unveiling and demythologizing reality.

The 1973 war served as a catalyst to groups that challenged the government from various perspectives. Their appearance was the result of betraying core values early on, and the indifference and even virtue found in this betrayal. Gush Emunim, as we saw, willed to delegitimize the regime and its ideas by presenting an alternative ideology and a new set of rules. The Land of Israel movement, a secular group, joined them in September 1977, and both incited members for violence and rebellion. Their New Zionism represented a counter ideology whose purpose was to break through the limiting boundaries of political authority. "The state," says Weber, "is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.... The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence."[5] Gush Emunim, Kach, Hathiya and other extreme nationalist groups felt that their allegiance was primarily to God and that they were entitled to certain inalienable rights to determine their destiny without interference by the state or world opinion.

In 1977, the victory of the New Zionism was translated into the electoral vote, and the delegitimation of Labor culminated in its electoral defeat. The number of voters for Labor in 1977 was 430,023 compared to 583,968 for Likud. Shinui (Democratic Movement for Change) received 202,265 votes.[6] The ratio between left and right has changed over the years. The right grew from 8% in 1962 to 16% in 1969, to 39% in 1984. As Arian notes, not only a move to the right is clearly discernable but the term right had gained legitimacy, whereas previously it had a negative connotation.[7] When analyzing the voting pattern, including the center and religious parties, the tendency toward the right and away fron the left is more pronounced. Until 1969, the parties on the left had never obtained less than 64 seats out of 120 in the Knesset, and in fact received up to 69 seats. In 1973 they obtained 59 seats. The center parties, during the same period, received between 27-34 seats, but 43 in 1973. The religious parties had between 15-18 seats. Since the 1973 war, large numbers of soldiers as well as large number of young people have voted for the Likud. In 1973, Likud recieved 41.28% of the vote in the army compared to 39.54% for Labor. This trend became accentuated in 1977 when Likud obtained 46%, Labor 22% and Shinui 16%.[8]

Likud acquired legitimacy by promulgating the symbols of New Zionism. In fact, it rendered itself the representative of New Zionisn and of its vanguard - Gush Emunim.[9] Likud has gained a place in mainstream Israeli politics no loger viewed, as Ben-Gurion and others said it was an extreme delegitimizing force. The momentum to the right was so sweeping that a comfortable place was cushioned for other groups, more vociferous and violent. The left thinned down or lost

votes to each other, seemingly remaining on the political map as a historical relic.

The disenchantment with and the controversy over governmental policies during the Lebanon war ran deep in the Israeli society. True, dissent was not as widespread as one might have thought observing the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, nor were most of them refusniks. Nevertheless, what is significant is not the number of people involved in opposing policies but the kind of questions raised as well as the degree of their intensity. They questioned the need for the many casualties in the war, the rationale of thorough and silent acceptance of military orders, and a few even questioned the validity and legitimacy of a political authority under whose auspices such atrocities were committed. Compliance with conditions that necessitate sacrifice of life are characteristic of the Israeli society. Dying while defending the survival of the state has been accepted as justified, inevitable, and recurrent. Ben-Gurion's view was that "every Jewish mother should know that her son is in good hands; hands that would not hesitate, however, should the need arise, to send him to his death, but hands that would do so only if it is absolutely vital to the nation's survival."[10] This war, however, did not meet the criterion of necessary defense for the country's survival. A father whose son died in the war lamented: "How many years would it have taken the Palestinian terrorists to kill or injure as many Israeli soldiers as these people (the government) did in the course of one week of their damnable war? How much loss and mourning have they caused?"[11]

The anguish in burying the dead has been accepted as a necessary sacrifice for the greater good. Patriotism is not just an idea to revel in but a barometer used to judge the transgressors - the doubters, the critics and the disenchanted. The latter, although few, have persisted in picking the society's conscience and mind. The enlightened protests and educational work cannot by themselves transform the society completely and exorcise all its demons, but they are statements of non-capitulation to force and brutality. Even if they dig into and display the public's wounds, polarizing it, the results may be more that merely cathartic. From isolation, fear and false sense of security and upon the ruins of its fallen spirit, it can venture to recreate itself. The movements and individuals who raise the banner of doubt, if nothing else, reflect hope for a future not yet totally determined. They signal that in the human realm possibilities ought not be limited nor fantasies crushed.

The Israeli society tody is in crisis. It is in the midst of a struggle between possibilities. It will have to choose between two visions: either a continuation of the trend it has pusued for several decades, which can only further accentuate the dilemmas it faces internally and externally, or a readiness to shift toward reconciliation with its enemies and simultaneously harness creative power for social change.

Notes for Chapter VI

1. Michael Shashar, On Just About Everything - Talks with Michael Shashar (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1988), pp. 30, 149.

2. Quoted in Lilly Weissbord, "Delegitimation and Legitimation as a Continuous Process: A Case Study of Israel," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Autumn 1981), p. 531.

3. Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds., H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 294.

4. Gershon Weiler, State and Education (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Papyrus Publishing House, 1979), pp. 35-36.

5. Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 78.

6. Asher Arian, Politics and Government in Israel (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Zmora, Beitan Publishers, 1985), pp. 245, 249.

7. Ibid., p. 363.

8. Ibid., pp. 232-233.

9. Weissbrod, op. cit., p. 535.

10. Quoted in Yael Yishai, "Dissent in Israel: Opinions on the Lebanon War," Middle East Review, (Winter 1983/84), p. 42.

11. Quoted in Ibid., p. 42.

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