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BIELSKI, JAKOW

**SITUATIONAL AND DISPOSITIONAL DETERMINANTS OF MUTUALITY-
ALIENATION IN DYADS**

City University of New York

PH.D.

1980

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SITUATIONAL AND DISPOSITIONAL DETERMINANTS
OF MUTUALITY-ALIENATION IN DYADS

by

Jakow Bielski


A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
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1979

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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The City University of New York

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. HISTORICAL ANTICEDENTS	4
Social-self Theory and Development of Consciousness	4
The Personal-social Dichotomy: Its Effect on Mutuality-Alienation	5
Conceptual Framework for Dyadic Contingencies	7
Dispositional Self-consciousness	12
Dyadic Interaction and Focus of Attention	15
Relation of Contingencies and Attentional Determinants of Mutuality-Alienation	17
The Situational Factor	21
The Therapeutic Group	24
The Interpersonal Perception Method (IPM)	28
III. GENERAL PLAN AND HYPOTHESES	32
Predictions	33
IV. METHOD	35
Subjects	36
Critical Measures	40
V. RESULTS	44
Pre-treatment Effect of Total Consciousness	44
Treatment Comparisons-Situational	50
Dispositional	54
Social and Personal Relations	58
Analysis of Variance for Matched- Mismatched, Situational and Sex Dyads	64
Regression Analysis	71
The Mutuality-Alienation Dimension	73
VI. DISCUSSION	78
APPENDIX 1 - The Self-Consciousness Scale	91
REFERENCES	93

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	t-Tests of Low and High Consciousness subjects	46
2.	Correlation Coefficients	47
3.	Summary of Analyses of Variance of the Performance of Situational Groups on the IPM (as Dyads)	51
4.	Means of the Situational Groups	53
5.	Summary of Analyses of Variance of the Performance of matched and mismatched Dyads	55
6.	Means of matched and mismatched Dyads- Dispositional Manipulation	56
7.	Means of the Social and Personal Relations of the Situational Groups	59
8.	Means of the Social and Personal Relations of matched/mismatched Dyads	61
9.	Means plotted for social and personal relations of the Situational Groups and matched-mismatched Dyads	63
10.	Analysis of Variance for situational, matched-mismatched and sex Dyads	67
11.	Multiple Classification Analysis of situational, matched-mismatched and sex Dyads	69
12.	Summary statistical output from the major dependent measures Regressed (Multiple) on Sex, Situational (SG), and Matched-Mismatched Dyads	72
13.	Matched-Mismatched and Social Groups Centroids in Reduced Space	74
14.	Matched-mismatched visual display of the M-A Dimension	76
15.	Situational Groups, visual display	77

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this research is the person-to-person interaction by different dyads on a dimension of "mutuality-alienation" (M-A). The dyad, as a unit, possesses four possible classes of interaction - 1) pseudocontingent, 2) asymmetrical, 3) reactive and 4) mutually contingent (Jones and Gerard, 1967). Depending on the dominant interaction at the time, certain "person-to-person" (as well as "person-to-self") attributional and relational effects follow. It is proposed that these four dyadic contingencies can be varied and observed by the use of certain dispositional and situational factors.

The dispositional factor is manipulated by introducing individuals to the dyad who differ in amount and direction (private, public, and social anxiety) of self-consciousness. Private self-consciousness indicates major concern with attending to one's 'inner' thoughts and feelings (e.g., "I reflect about myself a lot") whereas public self-consciousness stresses a generalized awareness of the self as a social object (e.g., "I'm very concerned about the way I present myself"). Finally self-consciousness in the form of social anxiety is characterized by discomfort in the presence of others (e.g., "I have

trouble working when someone is watching me").

The second, the situational factors, produce effects differing in the M-A dimension via the qualitative/quantitative form and content of the social exchange inherent in dyads from diverse social groups. For example, college Sophomores and sports-team partner are representative of everyday normal groups, whereas therapeutic groups, whose purpose is to temporarily increase certain tensions and conflicts through counternorms and culminating in new insight (synthesis) tend to stress an increase in dialectic dialogue (Rettig, 1979). These two groupings, 'normal' and 'therapeutic' are in contrast to an extreme group, social deviants (drug users) whose effect, although perhaps not obvious, is that of disavowing both the conventional, as well as the above described beneficial counternormative attributions thereby tending to create attributional instability (idiosyncratic chaos).

The question of which variable, self-consciousness (dispositional) or social grouping (situational) is the more powerful determiner of M-A is answered by varying either of these variables for the purpose of creating dyadic conditions that are reciprocally satisfying or alienating. The resulting interactions are expected to give rise to conjunctive and disjunctive interpersonal perceptions, as studied by Laing (1966).

Laing showed that in dyads levels of interpersonal perceptions are indicated by the way in which one person's position is experienced by the other, i.e., each person becomes

aware of how he looks in the eyes of the other. 'I respect you and you respect me. But I don't know that you respect me. I do know, though, that you know that I respect you. And, I do not know that you know that I don't know that you respect me' (Laing, 1966). It is expected that by varying dispositional and situational dyadic group composition, alienation (disjunctive interpersonal perceptions) and mutuality (conjunctive interpersonal attributions) as manifested in cross-personal attributions, will be revealed.

The mode of analysis is not a classical experimental laboratory study, but comes under the general rubric of 'quasi-experimental'. Thus, it suffers from the lack of experimental controls, from shortcomings in sampling from natural groups, with unequal Ns and differing dropout rates. However the lack of a control group and randomized sampling is handled by sampling diverse social groups which theoretically have differing postures along the mutuality-alienation dimension, making the study a comparative one.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Social-Self Theory and Development of Consciousness

Early in self-development the possibility and necessity for mutuality-alienation (M-A) occurs and with it the experience of self-consciousness. Social-self theorists (Cooley, Mead, Simmel, Goffman, Durkheim) note that the self operates in the social realm and uses feedback to guide its ongoing stream of consciousness. For that consciousness to appear, moreover, the individual must have a verbal community which teaches him to make his own action discernable to himself and available for group scrutiny and evaluation. Only when the response of the 'other' is integrated with his own experience can the individual appear in his experience as a 'self' (Mead, 1934). Thus, the necessity for mutual contingencies (e.g., mother-child) occurs at the earliest stages of self-consciousness with a significant 'other' pressing for the development of a 'self'.

Simmel examines the dyad for its qualitative/quantitative dimensions of special significance for the individual:

Its specific character is determined by the fact that for the participants the relationship does not appear as as special structure over and above them. It may appear to an outsider

as an independent, superindividual unity; this is not the case for the individuals concerned. They are aware of the fact that it rests immediately upon the one and the other. The whole does not obtain a superpersonal life independent of its bearers. The group ceases to exist if one individual departs, which is not the case with combinations of more than two elements. The individual has not beside himself a multiplicity of other individuals which ultimately constitutes a higher unity. He has beside him only one other individual, and the dependence of the whole upon himself and his co-responsibility for all collected action is more clearly visible. He cannot hide behind the group either in omission or in commission, and the result is that the individual enters into the relationship with a much greater part of his personality than is the case in larger groups. The dyadic group, in contrast with all other groups of more numerous elements, is characterized by the fact that it does not grow into a higher, superindividual unity.
(Simmel, 1971, pp. 132-33).

The Personal-Social Dichotomy: Its Effect on Mutuality-
Alienation

It is conceptually possible to classify dyadic interactions either as self-produced or as socially produced in

evoking stimulus controlled behavior. In the personal, self-produced set, stimulation is made up of such elements as personal goals, plans for obtaining goals, and patterns of self-attribution. Stimulation from the social realm includes elements comprising a definition of the situation (roles) and the stimulation produced by others, i.e., other attribution (Jones and Gerard, 1967).

Considering the above dichotomy, especially in the face-to-face situation, the resulting dyadic scene can range from one extreme to the other. One end, representing the first set of self-produced stimulation, may become a ritualized, stylized alternation of predetermined role sequences much as two actors reading a script, each relatively unaffected by the immediately preceding role enactment of the other. The other extreme (social stimulation) could evolve into a primitive, unplanned reactivity, often characterized by impulsive hyper-emotionality. It has been argued by Durkheim (1951) that chronicity of both extremes leads to ultimate alienation -- suicide.

Similarly, G.H. Mead divides the self into a dual perspective -- the "me" and the "I". The "Me" is the organized attitudes of society about oneself that one brings into a situation; derived from the socialized point of view of the other by which the individual gauges his experience -- and the "I", the experiencer, is the reaction to these socialized attitudes of the community, the way they appear in his experience (1934, p. 196). To the extent that the "I" experiences a synthesized structure of the "Me", self-to-self


mutuality occurs as well as a feeling of authenticity or aliveness. If, on the other hand, the individual is incapable of striking a dialectical¹ synthesis between "Me" and "I", (e.g., in the event of overcontrol in the "Me" or unchecked impulsivity in the "I") he is alienated from society and himself.

Durkehim calls such an extreme "Me", a condition of "anomic suicide," and the "I" in its extreme, "egoistic suicide." Both, he claims, seem to be a reaction to immortality, the 'disease of the infinite.' Alienation results when a basic dialectical self-relationship is lost and rigidification of polarities occurs. Thus, in the "Me" orientation reflective intelligence is affected and immoderately over-nourished, and in the "I" perspective "emotion is over-excited and freed from all restraint (1951, p. 287).

In the first, thought, by relying exclusively in itself, has no feeling experience as its object left; in the second, emotion, or passion has no recognizable bound; it has no rational goal left... the former (reflective intelligence) is lost in the infinity of dreams, the second (passion) in the infinity of desires. (1951, p. 287).

Conceptual Framework for Dyadic Contingencies

Jones and Gerard (1967) schematize dyadic contingencies, representing the dominant source of stimulation by solid arrows as follows (p. 352):



- 1) Pseudo-contingency -- Dyadic exchange with minimal social stimulation, each individual concerned predominantly with his own plans. Since this is a dialogue, talking and listening roles are maintained (lack of interdependence).
- 2) Asymmetrical contingency-- The response of one person is mainly determined by self produced stimuli, i.e., plans, while that of the other by social stimuli (power relation).
- 3) Reactive contingency-- The response of one is largely conditional on the preceding response of the other; the implication being the absence of plans (lack of autonomy).
- 4) Mutual contingency-- The response is partially determined by the preceding response of the other and partially by internal plans (dialectical relation between autonomy and interdependence).

The above model, unfortunately, does not help clarify how one knows which stimulus-controlled set is dominant for a specific dyad at a given time. However, the diagram does introduce a way of looking at dyads through the dimension of M-A. This becomes significant in a person-to-person interaction when contingencies 1, 2, 3 govern the behavior of individuals. For instance, contrasting the effects of the contingencies along M-A of a separated exchange of plans (1-pseudo) with a ritual-like, purposeless reactivity (3-reactive) can cause either extreme to lead to one-sided alienation (2-asymmetrical).

In pseudo-contingency both individuals are alienated from each other, while in asymmetrical and reactive contingencies at least one person is alienated from himself, and both from their purposes. The difference in alienation arises especially when 1, 2 and 3 are contrasted with 4:

...the intersection and joint modifications of individual communicative plans are featured in mutual contingency and it is here that we can begin to appreciate the complexity of partial give-and-take in the dyad where behavior is neither exclusively governed by roles nor totally "captured" by incoming social stimulation.
(Jones and Gerard, 1967, p. 512.)

The give-and-take of mutuality opposes strict role relations as well as reactive engrossment. And a corresponding view of M-A is Buber's I-Thou versus I-It relationships.

It is the I-Thou relation that is fully mutually contingent, experienced as authentic and constitutes a case of genuine dialogue. Thus, if genuine dialogue is to arise, everyone who takes part in it must bring himself to it...They must be willing on each occasion to say what is really in their mind about the subject of conversation...No one can know in advance what it is they have to say (Buber, 1970).

The possibility for personal relationship thus exists between persons as they move from role-directed "surface" contact toward shared interdependence of more than externally structured roles. This mutuality, the antagonistic force to alienation connotes personal discovery (Rettig, 1979). If a relationship is to develop past a level where only public attitudes are exchanged, the interactants must risk self-disclosure. They must reveal more and more about their unique selves, and end up sharing emotionally significant attitudes or feelings (Jones, et. al. in Attribution Theory -- non-common events and veridical attribution).

Mutual awareness can be viewed as a concomitant social perception process which results in two persons not only knowing each other, but each perceiving what the other knows about him. Each knowing the other knows he knows...ad infinitum. This spiral of shared attributions has been investigated primarily in dyads varying in disturbance (Laing, 1966). For instance, disturbed as compared with non-disturbed marital partners showed significantly more mismatched attributions about self and other. Furthermore, all subjects were better

able to predict attributions in the social realm (X to Y and Y to X) than in the personal realm (X to X and Y to Y). Greater accessibility to the necessary interdependent relation than merely to the self-to-self relation was used to explain these findings.

Similarly, interpersonal communication theories point up alienating norms in everyday social interaction. For instance, Goffman's (1959) "dramaturgical" approach and Berne's (1964) "game" analogue basically analyze the 'technique' of manipulation, deception, and misrepresentation between persons which leads to a 'norm of distrust (Shippee, 1977, pp. 57-62).' Also, other social psychologists working with the concept of alienation note that 'the structure of modern society, with its increased compartmentalization of roles (selves) leaves persons less than the sum of their parts. The synthetic aspect of self, of social performance (e.g., Buber's "I-It", Goffman's "image-management" and Jones' "common information" Theory) does not feel original and meaningful. Thus, social role performance is alienating, especially when traditional ideals of honesty and spontaneity "threaten" routine functioning. Disturbingly, these ideals are delegated to the realm of childhood; and the adult appears delusional, separate, and insignificant (Johnson, 1973, p. 42).' The synthetic order of conventional social performance opposes "chaotic" spontaneity, thus resulting in alienation.

Dispositional Self-consciousness

The concept of self-awareness, the crux of social self theories, encompasses an inherent dual perspective of consciousness (I-Me; actor-observer, Jones and Nisbett, 1971). Evidence of this dichotimization of consciousness has accrued by experimentally varying it by the use of a mirror or a camera, to observe the self in the objective (me), or the involved, subjective (I), state of awareness (Duval and Wicklund, 1972). These perspectives are directions of consciousness and affect such behavior as aggression (Scheier, Fenigstein, and Buss, 1974), attribution (Duval and Wicklund, 1973), and self-esteem (Ickes, Wicklund, and Ferris, 1973).

The above findings are all based on the mirror and/or camera effect (Storms, 1973) and are hence situational manipulation. In contrast, Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) stress the importance of consciousness response styles based on individual differences. They note that: "Some individuals chronically think about themselves, scrutinize their behavior, and dwell on their thoughts." At the other extreme are individuals..."whose absence of self-consciousness is so complete that they have no understanding of either their own motives or of how they appear to others." (p. 522).

To test for individual differences, Fenigstein et. al. (1975) constructed a self-consciousness scale, which revealed two basic components of self-consciousness, plus a third dimension of generalized social anxiety. The first dimension consists of a "cognitive private mulling over the self," and the

second "emphasizes an awareness and concern over self as a social stimulus." The authors note that the private dimension is similar to Jung's introversion (Jung, 1933) in that attention is internal, but is more specific in that it deals only with "thoughts and reflections in relation to self." (1975, p. 525).

The second component, public self-consciousness, is similar to Mead's concept of "Me" and occurs when another's perspective is assumed by the subject, thus viewing oneself as a social object. The third dimension of social anxiety derives from instances in which one has been a social object and received negative outcomes. It is an inhibitive 'noise' variable when extremely high--forcing socially correct responses, and when extremely low--causing chaotic spontaneous reactivity.

In a study investigating "relationships between the Self-consciousness Scale and the amount of time required to report the self-relevance of groups of socially desirable and socially undesirable trait terms" (Turner, 1978), it was found that the High Social Anxiety subjects took significantly longer to respond, especially to socially undesirable self-descriptive adjectives. High Privates had the shortest response time and High Publics were intermediate.

High Privates generate longer self-descriptions in an open ended format (Turner, in press), and more predictively valid self-reports (Scheier, Buss, and Buss in press; Turner, 1978). Their self-reflective habits tend to make them more

aware of themselves and thus spend less time pondering the self-relevance of any list of traits or attributions, at least for the self-to-self relation.

The Social Anxiety subscale was found to be a valid indicator of social discomfort (Turner, 1977). The more socially anxious subjects were, the more their reported opinions were conforming to that of an expert communicator's announced position. Thus they avoid possible negative public attention which may have resulted from opposition to the communicator. Furthermore, High Social Anxiety subjects are more concerned about the social implication of their responses, and they require significantly more time to identify self-relevant traits, especially unconventional and socially undesirable ones.

Studies on the three dimensions of consciousness show clear discriminant validity of the subscales (Carver and Glass, 1976; Turner, Scheier, Carver and Ickes (in press)). "In general, the three subscales are independent of measures of social desirability response style and are only minimally intercorrelated (r 's equal of less than .3)" (Turner, 1978, p. 456).

Further research with the scale shows that people classified as "High Privates" behave similarly to subjects exposed to a mirror (Scheier and Carver, 1977). They appear more responsive to an immediate affective stimulus than persons low in private self-consciousness, despite the lack of any overall difference in emotionality.

The Public self-conscious subscale does not include the social discomfort component (r 's - .02, .21 and .21) (Carver & Glass, 1976, 1976; Fenigstein et al., 1975; and Turner et al., in press). High Publics see themselves more as social objects and tend to conform to social expectations, though not as much as High Social Anxiety subjects. This dimension is seen to affect attributions of self more in interpersonal terms. For example, High Publics are more likely to accept personal responsibility for rejection when rejected by a peer group than low Public Ss (Fenigstein, 1974).

A general conjecture of the present research is that, whether on the Private, Public, or Social Anxiety dimension, extreme dispositional self-conscious in the dyad should lead to alienating contingencies. Dispositionally moderate Private or Public self-consciousness as well as mild Social Anxiety allows the individual the perceived necessity, as well as the required flexibility (e.g., switching between private and public) for plans to be socially modifiable on a mutual contingency basis.

Dyadic Interaction and Focus of Attention

Spontaneous dyadic exchange ("genuine dialogue") is unplanned but relies on some commitment to dyadic unity for the continuation of the communication. Thus, to achieve spontaneous behavior, some forms of social insurance are found in everyday conversation including face saving devices, mutual expectations, deference in demeanor and manners, as well as some ceremonies stressing obligations and the importance of

"give and take" between persons.

"(the individual) must be sympathetically aware of the kinds of things in which the others present can become spontaneously and properly involved, and then attempt to modulate his expression of attitudes, feelings, and opinions according to the company."

(Goffman, 1959, p. 116).

Moreover, Goffman sees this as a bridge between persons allowing them,


"...to meet for a moment of talk in a communion of reciprocally sustained involvement.

It is this spark, not the more obvious kinds of love, that lights up the world."

(Ibid, p. 117).

There are at least five theoretical possibilities for a focus of attention in a dyadic interaction -- four of which seem alienating, but perhaps more frequent than the fifth.

The following is a schematic of the possibilities:



As shown, possibilities one through four represent diff-

erent forms of alienation, five being the only situation which permits for genuine mutuality, via spontaneous involvement. In the first condition, alienation is due to an absence of personal and social attention to the point of dyadic interchange. The second case leads to alienation (as in pseudo-contingency) because of self-absorption (narcissism) inherent in prolonged self-reflection. Similarly, the third possibility arrives at alienation with the 'other' as an exclusive object of attention, thus omitting consideration of self. The fourth condition is a perspective from which interaction is viewed 'quo-interaction', i.e., a detached observer like position from which the progress of "the interaction" is monitored. The fifth, point (content) attention allows mutuality by creating a unique dyad based on its own emerging process and it thus indirectly forms the social relation.

Relation of Contingencies and Attentional Determinants of M-A


Jones and Gerard's dyadic contingencies are schematization of possibilities not of actualities. The two types of arrows of the main and the secondary sources of stimulation represent qualitative distinctions in approach. For example if a pseudo contingency dominates, then minimal interaction follows; if mutual spontaneous involvement occurs, then the interaction "comes off" (Goffman). The use of nomenclature connoting relative frequencies, however (e.g., secondary, dominant) suggest that perhaps all the contingencies occur to some extent for every interaction at one point or another, with

mutuality the common goal. Which contingency occurs under what conditions is left for future research.

This same reasoning may be used for Goffman's attention theory where attentional styles are statistically distributed over the course of a conversation in such a way as to maximize point-conscious behavior and involvement obligations. Basically both theories represent qualitative approaches to the problem of defining social contact since no means are given for converting the arrows to specific vector values. They are therefore in need of quantification.

On the other hand Fenigstein and Scheier's (1975) approach represents an a priori classification of an individual's self-reflective style of attention, a response habit which predetermines his main source of stimulation. This makes it possible to operationalize the arrows of stimulus-controlled behavior and posit a specific vector, thus forming 'matched' and 'mismatched' dyads, as follows:

I pseudocontingency (high self-centeredness, little interdependence)




The private vector dominates to the extent that private self-consciousness outweighs its reciprocal public vector. For two individuals with high private consciousness allocation of attention would be on X's plans for X and Y's plans for Y.

With little interdependence, the possibility for mutual point-consciousness decreases in favor of self-consciousness, and the interaction does not "come-off" due to the relative lack of spontaneous exchange.

Social anxiety, the third component of consciousness, acts as a distractability scale in that it blankets the elements that comprise the private and public vectors with 'noise' not allowing any unique (message) stimuli to emerge. It is expected that only socially desirable, conventional attributions should occur (or chaotic attributions due to extreme idiosyncrasy).


II asymmetrical contingency (X high self-centeredness, Y high interdependence)



High private person X is dominated by his own plans (a), which are not easily modifiable by Y's low private self-consciousness. At the same time Y's high public self-consciousness(d) makes him see himself as a social object who is easily modifiable. Since X's private vector is high, compared to Y's, his over-control of the dyadic space will accentuate the self-conscious behavior for X, as well as the other conscious behavior for Y. Hence this uneven allocation of attention will precipitate a shift from the official point of conversation to self for X, while Y becomes conscious of the high private X, as a source


of faulty communication, thus blocking mutual spontaneous involvement.

III reactive contingency (high interdependence, low self-centeredness)



For both X and Y high public interactive input determines responses, but their personal plans do not control the developing interdependent social spiral. Attention is on socially desirable inputs and "interaction" consciousness. Monitoring the appropriate and 'correct' progress of interdependence in the interaction dominates, with little attention by each to their own or the other's plans.

IV mutual contingency (balanced autonomy and interdependence)



Plans, private vector (a) and (c) are modified by each via social inputs, the public vectors (b) and (d). Attention can be allocated to the point since there is no over-representation of self-conscious, other-conscious, or interaction-conscious behavior. Thus relatively little social anxiety develops anticipated from negative outcomes. Spontaneity results in

both the personal and social realm and leads to both high autonomy (control) and high interdependence (giving up behavior control).

To summarize, the use of the Self-consciousness Scale makes it possible to form dyads composed of individuals with known scores for Private, Public and Social Anxiety. The dyads can be made to 'match' thus increasing the frequency of mutuality by creating conditions for spontaneous behavior, or 'mismatch' creating an environment where mutuality would occur less often and alienation more.

The Situational Factor

Attributions are assumptions about self and other which are partly backed by evidence and partly by imagination. To get at the effect of matched versus mismatched dyads, an attributional baseline, a range for the relational assumptions of everyday social contact, needs to be mapped.

Laing shows that disturbed and non-disturbed marital partners were found to be better able to predict the other's attributions in the interdependent, social aspect of the relationship over the personal and autonomous aspects, i.e., X:Y Y:X over Y:Y and X:X. (It is not known whether this relation remains true for same-sexed dyads). Laing also explains the finding by noting 'higher visibility of the social elements', concluding that the personal is more impenetrable than the social.

However, it is proposed that dyads would best approximate the optimal theoretical chance of behaving efficiently (purposefully) by having veridical cross-personal assumptions whether in peer or other role relations, i.e., conjunctions in the personal realm. To assume otherwise would mean that the situational contingencies would be determinative and one's own plans, could not be accomplished. A sampling bias in favor of social stability over personal knowledge may have occurred in Laing's study.

Naturally occurring dyads tend to develop a set of normative assumptions about self-and other which allow for mutuality. These assumptions can be tapped by checking the attributions about their social and personal relationships. It may be expected that conjunctive attributions are the norm in a just-world (Lerner, 1966), even when contingencies are skewed (asymmetric), notwithstanding each member's position on the dispositional factors (Private, Public and Social Anxiety). For example, an asymmetric contingency between parent and child can be expected to promote development. Likewise, a business relation, a teacher-student relation, benefits both individuals, regardless of the distribution of the dispositional factors. Even if the assumption is made that the dyad is mismatched on relative vector strengths (e.g., the child's high private vector compared with that of the parent), development persists, and situational roles rule over dispositional factors.

For actual development or purposive action to occur, a stable set of attributions is required in order to pay attention to the official (shared) point of conversation. If that is not so, much time and energy will be spent in stabilization, in resolving self-conscious, other-conscious, interaction-conscious behavior. Such allocation of attention would not allow much time for point-conscious, spontaneous communality.

Some attributional stability in the self-to-self relation is necessary, since otherwise every situation would control the individual's view of himself. For positive outcomes, self-esteem (self-to-self positivity) rises while negative outcomes lead to a low self image. The chaos of situationally controlled attributional pattern is quite dysfunctional since positive and negative outcomes can occur many times in one interaction. If, on the other hand the attributions to self are extremely rigid, social inputs have no impact and there is little reason to communicate in the first place.

It is proposed then, that a diversified sample of dyads in different environments will, or should, have the most stable attributions about self. Whether or not (or to what degree) the other can match one's own attributions remains an open question. Laing found more 'straight flushes', i.e., matched attributions in interpersonal relations than intrapersonal. It appears then, despite the theoretical importance of stable self-to-self relation, in Laing's sample the self-to-self and other-to-other (intra) relations are more problematical, "each person's relation to self is in a sense more

impenetrable to the other than the self-other or other-self relation." (p. 101). However in naturally occurring dyads, as well as in dyads composed of group therapy members, the stability of attributions remains to be tested.

The Therapeutic-Group

In the therapeutic-group certain normative assumptions which operate in natural groups may be temporarily suspended in favor of counternorms. Bech (1958) states,

...much of the favorable therapeutic results accomplished by group therapy stems from the fact that the patient is placed in an artificially structured, temporary social system and sub-culture that, in the areas where change is the therapeutic goal, is rendered as rapidly as possible the inverse of the social system and culture in which these specific original maladaptive learnings took place. (pp. 98-128).

Rettig (1979) describes the small group's counternormative formation as follows:

The introduction of counternorms, by actual transgression, by the revelation of past violations, or by encouraging imagination and fantasy is a slow continuous process in which the gradual import of one counternorm begets the next. For example, publicly shared confidentiality slowly evolves into reciprocal self-disclosure, both proscriptive in American society. Mutual self-disclosure may, in turn encourage more uninhibited expression of negative emotions. Public display of aversive feelings (anger, hurt, sobbing), within the protective atmosphere of an understanding face-to-face group, may eventually lead to the dialectic

discovery of dissociated, undesirable urges, each tinged with high anxiety and judgments of self-condemnation and guilt. The most common aversive self-perceptions emerging from the play of norms and counternorms appear to relate to the themes of worthlessness (Adler), violence and lust (Freud). (p. 28).

Attributive assumptions that are quite appropriate in natural groups may be dissuaded and a new conformity reinforced. Conventionality and role behavior are counterproductive in this milieu. Behavior such as image-management, disinterest, lack of attention or detachment, all useful in the context of the larger functional society, are attributed under counternormative assumptions to be over-identification, avoidance, or loss of control in the personal and social realm.

Rettig continues:

Obedience, deference, and politeness are likely to bring forth dialectic inquiries about rebellion against authority, anger and the desire to be safe. The difference between what various group members regard as normative (normal) emerges as a critical factor

in personality structure when dialectically challenged by counternorms since they are likely to produce a differential rate of change. (p. 29).

Thus, it is expected that dyads in therapeutic groups reflect the tensions between norms and counternorms in their attributions-both for the personal and social - when compared to 'natural' dyads, but not to the extent of a maladaptive extreme group.

In summary, the three theories, dyadic contingency model, bi-directional self-consciousness, and attentional focus, present a common theme of collectivity and communication. Throughout their analysis all three posit a desired direction in communicative goals. In dyadic contingencies it occurs through mutual contingency. Self-consciousness supposes that mutually balanced vectors allow for plans to be implemented only when attention is on the point and spontaneous behavior becomes possible. Throughout it is taken for granted that two persons operate in a collective medium which necessitates that both share a similar set of personal and social assumptions. To the degree that these assumptions coincide a situation is defined, and communication, in Buber's sense of a genuine dialogue, is possible.

Consider the impact of two extreme imaginary assumptions about the nature of interhuman communication (Ichheiser, 1970). In pseudo and asymmetrical contingencies, in extreme private,

and in self-and situation-consciousness attention the following might occur:

If human personality consisted only of elements belonging to the individually perceivable world -- this is our first imaginary assumption -- then no communication and no social contact between human beings would take place. There should be no collective medium in which and through which intrahuman relation could operate. Language and the whole of human culture could never come into being. Each individual would actually approximate a kind of Leibnizian 'Nomad-without-windows'.

The second extreme imaginary assumption operates in reactive contingency, in extreme public and in other-directed attention,

If...human personality consisted only of elements collectively perceivable then no mediating communication between personalities would be necessary. The personalities would interpenetrate each other directly. They would be open to each other without any communication, and there would be nothing private to be revealed. There would not obtain any meaningful distinction between inner and external personality and one personality would be practically the duplicate of another.

However, persons come to 'know' others indirectly with the extent of mutuality, flexibility between vectors, and

spontaneity determining interpersonal communication. Thus communication, though unique for every dyadic unit, can be mapped on a collective medium.

Ichheiser concludes:

...returning now from our imaginery excursion to our real world -- human personality is partly visible and partly invisible, since it is partly rooted in the collectively perceivable area and belongs with other parts to the world collectively non-perceivable, communication has to take place. In communication the inner personality of one individual interacts with the inner personality of another but does so indirectly (content and point attention) in the medium of the collective universe. It follows that the raw material of social perception, that is, the data which serve as a basis of the interpretations and misinterpretations shaping the image of personality belong altogether to the collectively perceivable world. (p. 28)

The Interpersonal Perception Method (IPM)

The dependent variable will be an abbreviated form of the IPM developed by Laing, which "is designed to measure and provide understanding of the interpenetrations, or the conjunctions and disjunctions of two individuals in respect to a range of key issues with which they may be concerned in the context of their dyadic relationship." (1966, p. 51)

The first application of a technique similar to IPM was used by Dymond (1949) to measure empathic ability about six character traits in the dyad. "In the first part the individual was asked to rate himself, on a five point scale, on each of six characteristics. In the second part he was asked to rate some other individual on the same six traits. In the

third part he was asked to rate the other individual as he believes this other would rate him. In the fourth he must rate himself as he thinks the other would rate him."

(p. 127). Empathetic ability was derived by matching predictions of one to the other's actual ratings.

As in the IPM, the questions are based on dual perspective of self which in the dyad become a four-fold perspective for self and other. Specifically: 1) A's rating of A (self rating), 2) A's rating of B, 3) how A thinks B would rate B (or A's opinion of B's rating of B) and 4) how A thinks B would rate A (B's rating of A).

In the present research, an abbreviated form of IPM uses the four-fold directionality of attributions (A:A, A:B, B:B, B:A) about issues which pertain to interdependence and autonomy. The position of each member of the dyad will be matched with that of the other to see whether, in relation to those key issues, they 1) agree or disagree, 2) understand or misunderstand the position of the other, and 3) realize or fail to realize what the other feels about himself (see elaboration by Laing, Phillipson and Lee).

Criticism of the IPM is based on its 'being a paper and pencil test of emotionally meaningful material administered in a relatively neutral atmosphere where some private feelings are socially desirable and other undesirable' (Orne, 1962; Jahoda, in Laing et al., 1966). Note however, that in the present research the statements of each member of the dyad are not scored as they stand, but are matched and the

interpersonal perception of both combined, thus resulting in a common dyadic pattern of M-A. "The criticism is not a powerful argument against the IPM because long practiced collusion between the dyadic members would be necessary to manufacture a pretense of agreement." (Jahoda, Ibid). Furthermore, such seeming collusion, if present, indicates conventionality and alienation.

¹Extreme response styles oppose mutuality and are antithetic to dialectic thinking, which "comprehends itself, the world and each concrete object in its multitude of contradictory relations" and is regarded as the "Final period of cognitive development." (Riegel, 1973, p. 351).

On the philosophical plane the same tendency toward rigidification occurs when the inherent mutuality between finitude/infinitude, possibility/necessity, and consciousness is lost and "Fear and trembling and the sickness unto death," results (Kierkegaard in Lourie, 1970). Despair, or alienation, in finitude/infinitude, is the despair of infinitude due to the lack of finitude, and reciprocally, the despair of finitude is due to the lack of infinitude. In possibility/necessity, the despair of possibility is due to the lack of necessity, and the despair of necessity is due to the lack of possibility.

In the context of dialectics, taking account of extreme-response-style's function of control via polarization, alienation of consciousness can take a triple form. Despair, or alienation results from not being conscious of having a self, of not willing to be oneself, and finally, paradoxically, willing to be oneself in a dialectic relation with all of its contradictions.

Evidence of the above theory has accrued from psychopathology and interpersonal communication research. In psychopathology, polarizers with the rigidity of over-reaction tend to be neurotic, and depolarizers with the rigidity of underreaction tend toward schizophrenia. To both polarize and depolarize is to be normal. Extreme response styles hinder mutuality in person-to-person relations. Self-disclosure research based on work by Jourard has shown a main factor for reciprocity between self and other. Furthermore, it has been found that too much disclosure and too little hinder the relationship via liking. A moderate level, neither too high, nor too little, can best fit the dyadic contingency model of mutuality and its inherent dialectical process of midrange responding which incorporates aspects of polarities.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL PLAN AND HYPOTHESES

Previous research with dyadic cross-attribution by Laing (1966) found disturbed marital partners producing significantly more disjunctions when compared to non-disturbed partners. Furthermore, his total sample indicated that the social aspects of the marital relationship contain more conjunctions than the personal ones. However, because of his unique sample (opposite-sexed intimate dyads, from England), an everyday attributional baseline to ascertain the normative range for inferring mutuality needs to be established in naturally occurring ('natural') dyads, dyads from therapeutic small groups ('therapeutic'), and in 'extreme' dyads.

Towards this end diversified social groups were sampled. And, since the possibility exists that an opposite-sex factor may have produced the findings by Laing, the present experiment studied only same-sex dyads. Extreme order (conjunctions based only on socially correct responses) and extreme chaos (totally idiosyncratic attributions) are considered alienative. Hence, in the continuum of order to chaos some normative baseline is formed in which the middle ground defines the normal range of mutuality.

The situational observation is intended for baseline

determination, as well as for the determination of differences in M-A by 'natural', 'therapeutic', and 'extreme' dyads. The dispositional manipulation consists of 'matching' and 'mismatching' dyads according to their relative scores on the Self-consciousness Scale (ScS), where it is expected that consciousness matched dyads would operate at a baseline and mismatched dyads would move either towards extreme order (alienation of conventionality) or extreme chaos (alienation of confusion, not knowing where one is in relation to the other).

It is proposed that Mutuality-Alienation (M-A) varies for dyads of different environments. Specifically, because dialectical counternorm formation in the therapeutic dyad differs from that of norm-abiding 'natural' groups, therapeutic dyads should show the increased tensions, conflicts and resolutions of the dialectic experience by some increase in disjunctions, but not to the extent of extreme dyads for whom resolutions do not occur.

Furthermore, for all dyads it is expected that the intrapersonal self-to-self and other-to-other relations are more stable than self-to-other and other-to self relations. Whenever extreme conventional order or chaos occurs the inferred contingencies are pseudo, asymmetrical or reactive, while the attentional styles are self, other and situation conscious.

Predictions: The following seven major hypotheses are made:

1) That the mutuality-alienation dimension cannot be predicted from an individual's dispositional consciousness style

alone. The vectors comprising consciousness come into play only in a dyadic unit.

2) Performance of the situational groups would differ on M-A. Regular dyads would be normative, exhibiting high conjunctions, while therapeutic dyads will show more disjunctions, and extreme dyads most disjunctions.

3) Performance of matched dyads would differ from mismatched along the M-A dimension. Matched dyads are expected to be centrally located at the mutuality baseline while mismatched ones should polarize and show increased conventionality or chaos.

4) Attribution in the personal realm should be more stable than in the realm of social relations for both situational groups and matched-mismatched dyads.

5) That matched-mismatched dyads will account for more variance than the situational differences and sex differences because vector matchings are more determinative of dyadic contingencies than environmental variations in groups.

6) There are no sexual differences.

7) That matching-mismatching will reveal the theoretical straight line M-A dimension of Order---Mutuality---Chaos more than situational variations in groups.

CHAPTER IV

METHOD

The experiment is a comparative study using quasiexperimental design. It lasted approximately two and a half hours and each member of the dyad was seen in at least two different sessions. First came the administration of the Self-consciousness Scale. Approximately two weeks later, all dyads spent about thirty minutes in a dyadic interaction. Finally, the Interpersonal Perception Method directly following the dyadic interaction was administered. Most subjects served in more than one dyad (one dyad for matching and the other for mismatching). This was done to get comparisons for different dispositional matchings. When an individual was partner to more than one dyad, each dyad was analyzed as a separate unit in the matching-mismatching procedure and pooled for the situational groups' observation.

The procedure for matching and mismatching subjects in a dyad was counterbalanced as follows. When subjects were used in more than one dyad (all groups except the Sophomores in natural dyads) the Experimenter assigned partners by alternating between either a matched or a mismatched partner on the basis of levels of the vectors comprising total consciousness. However, some Self-consciousness Ss who originally

had agreed to participate in the experimental phase, withdrew. This necessitated secondary choice replacement Ss who generally did not have scores that were as representative of the population from which they were drawn (especially Sophomores) and whose scores were neither as far apart (for mismatching) nor as close together (for matching) as the originally designated Ss dyads. Thus, the desired consciousness distance in matched and mismatched dyads was not always as optimal as it could have been.

Subjects

All subjects were volunteers. They were administered the Self-consciousness Scale as part of a general survey in various classes (Psychology, Dance Therapy) and in a park used for athletics. Whenever possible Ss were then selected on the basis of their consciousness scores reflecting the population distribution (randomization was not always possible) and asked to participate in a 25-45 minute dyadic interaction during the experimental phase. After the interaction all Ss were administered the IPM for the cross partner attribution measurement. Debriefing followed in which Ss were explained in detail the purpose of the experiment.

I Natural Dyads

a) Of 24 female Sophomores survey subjects 6 volunteered to participate in the interaction and attribution phase. They formed 3 dyads which interacted in a small group laboratory 1-3 weeks after administration of the Self-consciousness

Scale in class. All Ss were acquaintances of each other from class and one of the dyads were 'friends'. Five of the Ss were White and one was Hispanic. Ages ranged from 19-21. The selection process consisted of the Experimenter appearing at the class with the best possible formerly acquired survey Ss combinations for matching and mismatches (as well as population representation). However it soon became apparent that the Experimenter's prior matching of dyads was not successful since Ss were not always willing to "volunteer" for the interaction phase. An alternative procedure was then devised in which the Experimenter asked which of the previously surveyed Ss would participate in the subsequent experiment and matched them up accordingly. The one dyad which consisted of 'friends' (see above) and was self-matched, was judged to be a mismatch for experimental purposes because of a large difference in social anxiety. The following were the obtained population means for Self-consciousness; Private=26.2, Public=19.3, Social Anxiety=16.2, Total=62.2. The sample means were Private=25.5, Public=16.6, Social Anxiety=10.3, Total 52.4.

The major difference between the population and sample Ss was the somewhat lower Social Anxiety obtained for the sample Ss. This is not unexpected since final selection was dependent on volunteering and low Social Anxiety Ss seem more conducive to do so.

Instructions to all Ss were deliberately verbally ambiguous. This was accomplished by not issuing any experimental instruction prior to the dyadic interaction and confining

directions only to giving the location of the laboratory and answering further questions only when pressed by the Ss. When Ss questions about the purpose of the interaction persisted they were told "it's just to see how dyads interact". Whenever Ss requested additional guidance the Experimenter's instructions were for them "to get to know each other". It was assumed that this ambiguity would suffice to create additional social pressure which needed to be resolved in the interaction. Thus the dispositional factors would come more into play than if the interaction had been structured by the Experimenter.

b) There were 22 male athletic survey Ss of which 15 Ss formed a total of 13 dyads. In the nature of the sport (paddleball) teams are composed of two partners that spend approximately 30-45 minutes in a game as a dyadic unit. These Ss were also required to interact, in addition to their regular game context, for about 30 minutes. Subjects were all volunteers. There was a one week interval between administration of the Self-consciousness Scale and the IPM. Ages ranged from 19-35 years. Twelve Ss were White, two were Black and one Hispanic. Educational levels ranged from no college, some college, to graduate level.

All experimental Ss knew each other for at least one year but may not be considered to be 'friends'. However through athletic competition they were familiar with each other's styles.

Of the 22 surveyed Ss 5 (23%) dropped out. This necessitated various dyadic combinations where matching and

mismatching was not as optimal as desired. However the sample means still approximated the population means. Population means (N=22) were Private= 24.95, Public=12.86, Social Anxiety= 8.9, Total=46.71. The sample means were (N=15) Private=24.9, Public=13.13, Social Anxiety=9.4, Total=47.5.

II Therapeutic Dyads

a) Four female graduate students composed 4 dyads and 3 male graduate students 3 dyads. The experiment took place during a three month graduate course in small groups. All subjects were White and ages ranged from 26-37. The Experimenter's instructions were again ambiguous. There were no dropouts although 2 female subjects reacted negatively to the experimental procedure. The dispositional means were (N=7) Private=30.75, Public=21.0, Social Anxiety =10.25, Total=62.0.

b) Nine female graduate students of a dance therapy program formed 7 dyads and 2 males one dyad. The experiment was conducted during the final weeks of a small-groups course. Because of time limitation the interaction phase was omitted and these Ss only cross-attributed (one week following the Self-consciousness Scale). However, note that these Ss probably spent 30 minutes as dyads, in addition to being together in an intensive and somewhat intimate course, because they were all students of the same program, dance therapy, for a substantial period of time prior to the small group. Population means were (N=14) Private=28.0, Public=20.6, Social Anxiety= 13.3, Total=61.9. The sample means were similar (N=11)

Private=26.7, Public=20.3, Social Anxiety=14.7, Total=61.7.

All Ss were White.

III Extreme Dyads

Three male extremes formed 3 dyads. The extreme classification results from a) Ss were heavy users of marijuana, alcohol, cocaine, and two of three were occasional users of heroin, b) all three had spent time in jail for various non-violent offences, c) all three have been in psychotherapy. The same general procedure was used with the required 30 minute interaction at least one week after the administration of the Self-consciousness Scale. All Ss were White and aged between 28-31 years. Two of the three graduated from college and all knew each other for over a year.

Critical Measures

The Self-consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss, 1975, see page 12 and Appendix #1) consists of twenty-three questions which are distributed as follows for determining the private, public and social anxiety vectors: private-10, public-7, and social anxiety-6. Sample questions for private are (5 point scale): "I'm always trying to figure myself out", "I never scrutinize myself" (item reversed for scoring); for public, "I'm concerned about the way I present myself", "I usually worry about making a good impression"; and for social anxiety, "I have trouble working when someone is watching me", "It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations".

The stability of scores over time is reported to be (Fenigstein, et al.), .80 for the total scores. Test-retest correlations for the vectors are private .84, public .79, and social anxiety .73. The data show no significant sex differences.

The Dependent Variable - IPM

As previously discussed (see page 28, IPM) the IPM developed by Laing forms the dependent variable. Dual perspectives of each individual give four relations in the dyad, i.e., for interdependence X:Y and Y:X, for self-observation X:X and Y:Y. For each of the four relations there are three perspectives from which attributions are made; direct or first order for connoting agreement versus disagreement, second order indicating understanding versus misunderstanding, and third order for realization versus failure to realize. Since there are 15 dyadic issues (e.g., understanding of each other, mutual respect, liking, responsibility to self and other, having or not having a warped view of self and other, etc.), a total of 180 attributions are produced by each subject and 360 by the dyad (3 perspectives x 4 relations = 12 subquestions x 15 issues = 180 attributions). All answers are restricted to the degree of truth the subject feels and is indicated in the affirmative by (+) or (++) and in the negative by (-) or (--). While space is reserved for unsure responses, it was seldom used.

Examples of the questions are, for first order, direct perspective indicating agreement or disagreement: How true

do you think the following are? for the X:X relation referring to X "I respect myself?" for the same X:X relation asked of Y "Does he respect himself?"

Two positives (single or double) denote agreement (conjunction) while one positive and one negative indicates disagreement (disjunction).

For second order perspective (understanding vs. misunderstanding) one person's first order perspective is compared to the other's second order, which is a prediction of the direct perspective. For example, Y is asked, "I am honest with myself?" while X is asked what he thinks Y would answer to the question, How would you think he (Y) has answered the following? "I am honest with myself?" (quotation refers to Y).

For the third order perspective indicating realization versus failure of realization X is asked "What would Y say to the following?", "I think a lot of myself" (2nd order perspective for X) while Y is asked, "How would He think you have answered the following?" "I think a lot of myself" (Y's 3rd order).

In summary:

- 1) Comparison between one person's direct 1st perspective and the other's direct perspective on the same issue, results in agreement or disagreement.
- 2) Comparison between one person's second order perspective and the other's direct perspective on the same issue results in understanding or misunderstanding.

3) Comparison of one person's third order perspective, i.e., "How would He think you have answered the following?", and the other's second order perspective, i.e., "How would He answer the following?", on the same issue results in realization or failure of realization.

4) Comparison between one person's third order perspective and his own direct perspective gives the feeling of being understood or misunderstood.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

In this chapter the logical plan of the results is presented. First, subjects are treated as individuals and are divided into low and high total consciousness via the Self-Consciousness Scale. Then pre-treatment testing is performed on their respective means, as well as correlations of the vectors to the IPM scores (Hypothesis 1). Next as dyads, treatment comparisons for the situational observation of the social groups (SG) and dispositional manipulation of matching and mismatching (M-M) will be discussed (Hypothesis 2 & 3). Social and personal relations are compared for both SG and M-M (Hypothesis 4). The relative strength of M-M, SG, and Sex is analyzed (Hypothesis 5 & 6). And finally, the M-A dimension is derived (Hypothesis 7). Thus, the general plan of this section is to demonstrate that consciousness has no effect, that subjects do not differ prior to treatments, that only when they are dyads do differences arise which are caused by sampling from diverse social groups and the matching-mismatching procedure.

Pre-treatment effect of total consciousness

In order to test whether consciousness (ScS) on an individual level effects M-A (Hypothesis 1) Ss were separated

on the basis of low and high consciousness scores and t-Tests were performed on their respective IPM scores. The results of the analysis indicated that while the two groups did differ significantly on the three consciousness vectors (private, public, and social anxiety) which comprise total consciousness, they did not differ significantly on any of the dependent IPM measures (see Table 1 and IPM).

It can be concluded that total consciousness on the individual level fails to distinguish among individuals' M-A performance. Thus it may be assumed that differences among groups which do occur following treatment in dyads could not be explained by differences in individuals' pre-treatment consciousness scores per se.

Further evidence of the above conclusion can be seen from the correlation coefficients (see Table 2). The highest vector to dependent variable correlation being .219 for social anxiety to agreement.

TABLE 1

t-Tests of Low and High Consciousness Subjects SPSS

Group 1=Low TConsc
Group 2=High TConsc

AV=Average
IT=Social Relations
AT=Personal Relations
T=Total (Social + Personal)

GROUP 1 - TCONSC		GROUP 2 - TCONSL		T-TEST									
				POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE					SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.	T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	
AVPRVT	GROUP 1	35	2.5121	0.475	0.083	1.22	0.275	-3.01	66	0.004	-3.00	64.97	0.004
	GROUP 2	35	2.8429	0.431	0.073								
AVPUB	GROUP 1	35	1.7403	0.687	0.120	2.06	0.006	-0.93	66	0.000	-0.93	64.97	0.000
	GROUP 2	35	2.9037	0.421	0.071								
AVSOCAL	GROUP 1	35	1.3939	0.441	0.077	2.35	0.017	-0.09	66	0.000	-0.10	64.90	0.000
	GROUP 2	35	2.5190	0.675	0.114								
ITAGREE	GROUP 1	35	11.2121	2.484	0.432	1.09	0.003	-0.58	66	0.577	-0.56	65.32	0.577
	GROUP 2	35	11.5429	2.381	0.402								
ATAGREE	GROUP 1	35	41.0000	24.816	4.320	1.97	0.079	-0.00	66	0.382	-0.00	65.41	0.380
	GROUP 2	35	46.7714	24.996	4.901								
TAGREE	GROUP 1	35	52.2121	23.754	4.135	1.89	0.049	-0.97	66	0.338	-0.97	65.28	0.335
	GROUP 2	35	58.3143	28.029	4.738								
ITDAGR	GROUP 1	35	37.4242	21.568	3.755	1.17	0.054	0.06	66	0.955	0.06	65.47	0.955
	GROUP 2	35	37.1143	23.350	3.947								

TABLE 2

	CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS										Conj.	Disjunct.
	Consc.	Prvt.	Pub.	Socax.	Agree	Disagree	Und	Mund.	Realize	Realz		
Consciousness	.582	.821	.691	.094	.073	.021	.113	-.060	.091	.032	.037	
Private	.582	-	.223	.055	-.085	.101	.157	.188	.076	-.152	.140	.008
Public	.821	.223	-	.423	.067	.080	.135	.050	-.043	-.134	-.069	-.012
Social Anxiety	.691	.055	.423	-	.219	-.033	.057	.008	-.159	.194	.009	.091
Agree	.095	-.085	.067	.219	-	-.165	.156	.439	-.112	-.061	.387	.097
Disagree	.073	.101	.080	-.033	-.165	-	.118	.068	.143	-.052	.180	.608
Understand	.021	.157	-.135	.057	.156	.118	-	.382	.114	.078	.704	.415
Misunderstand	.113	.188	.050	.008	.439	.068	.334	-	.003	-.063	.429	.439
Realize	-.060	.076	-.043	-.159	-.112	.143	.114	.003	-	-.150	.369	.115
Failure of realization	-.053	-.152	-.134	.194	-.061	-.052	-.078	-.063	-.150	-	.248	.167
Conjunctions	.032	.093	-.069	.009	.387	.180	.704	.429	.369	-.248	-	.500
Disjunctions	.037	.008	-.012	.091	.097	.608	.415	.439	.116	.167	.500	-

The individual's level of consciousness (low versus high), as well as the component vectors comprising that consciousness (Private, Public, Social Anxiety) do not influence conjunctive or disjunctive attributions, i.e., the particular kinds of contingent interaction in which he was involved while in the dyad. Thus the dispositional factor, on an individual level, cannot predict the styles of attention that the individual will actually use in a specific dyad (self, other, situation and point consciousness).

In the dyad that same dispositional factor may in fact predispose the individual to bring about a particular interaction. Thus it is possible that Ss' response bias when they are used more than once (matching-mismatching) could influence the IPM scores more than Ss used once, the dyad is considered an independent unit of analysis. In order to test that Ss used twice do not differ from Ss used once subgroups from the same social groups ('normal' - Play and Sophomores; 'therapeutic' - Small-group #1 and Small-group #2) are compared.

In the Sophs	sub-group 6 Ss composed 3 dyads
Play	sub-group 15 Ss composed 13 dyads
Small-group #1	7 Ss composed 7 dyads
Small-group #2	11 Ss composed 8 dyads

If the trend of the within group variation for Sophs (used once) does not differ from that of the Play group (used twice) than the independence of the dyad as a unit of analysis is confirmed. Similarly Small-group #1, where all

Ss were used twice, should not differ from Small-group #2, where dyads are composed of more single Ss.

Analysis of Variance: Multiple Classification

Analysis for Situational Sub-groups

Unadjusted deviation-Eta (population grand mean = 0)

	Total Agreement
Play	5.68
Sophs	8.20
Small-group #1	-5.33
Small-group #2	1.78
Extremes	-25.14
	Total Understanding
Play	4.45
Sophs	4.01
Small-group #1	-4.18
Small-group #2	0.80
Extremes	-15.66
	Total Realization
Play	5.19
Sophs	3.78
Small-group #1	-3.45
Small-group #2	0.49
Extremes	-19.55

The sub-groups exhibit similar trends in variation from the grand mean. Thus the within group variance when Ss are used twice, although somewhat different (sampling from different populations) from their comparable sub-groups, do not indicate a break in the expected trend of 'natural' and 'therapeutic' groupings.

Treatment comparisons

In order to test for differences among the situational observation treatment groups a one-way analysis of variance was performed on 18 dependent measures (see Table 3). Twelve of the measures distinguish among situation groups at a significant level, with Agreement+Understanding (A+U) and Disagreement+Understanding (D+U) significant at $p < .001$ and Agree, Disagree, Understand, Misunderstand, Agree+Misunderstand (A+M), Feels Misunderstood, Realize, Fail to realize, Total conjunctions and Total disjunctions significant at $p \leq .05$. The F-ratios for Disagree and Misunderstand, Realization+Understanding of partner (R+U), Failure of realization + Understanding of partner (F+U), Feels understood, F+M (of partner) were not significant.

Therefore it was concluded that the five groups produced significantly different attributions and differ along M-A in the directions expected. Natural dyads, including sport partners and college Sophomores, give predominantly normative attributions, producing the highest number of conjunctions, whereas therapeutic dyads' attributions, coming from an environment where normative and counternormative attributions clash, show increased disjunctions, but not to the extent of the extreme group dyads' chaos. These findings support Hypothesis 2.

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF THE PERFORMANCE OF SITUATIONAL GROUPS ON THE IPM (AS DYADS)

	Source	Sum of Squares	df	MS	F	Significance
Agree	Between groups	2741.09	4	685.27	5.785	.0015
	Within groups	3435.38	29	118.46		
Disagree	Between groups	2752.50	4	688.13	5.768	.0015
	Within groups	3460.00	29	119.31		
Understand	Between groups	1168.07	4	292.02	2.935	.0375
	Within groups	2885.37	29	99.50		
Misunderstand	Between groups	1137.06	4	284.27	2.860	.0411
	Within groups	2882.71	29	99.40		
Agreement and Understanding	Between groups	4463.46	4	1115.87	5.933	.0013
	Within groups	5454.10	29	188.07		
Agreement and Misunderstand	Between groups	228.60	4	57.15	3.846	.0126
	Within groups	430.92	29	14.90		
Disagree and Understand	Between groups	1131.36	4	282.84	9.851	.00001
	Within groups	832.64	29	28.71		
Disagree and Misunderstand	Between groups	365.48	4	91.37	1.452	.2423
	Within groups	1824.76	29	62.92		
Realize	Between groups	1624.80	4	406.20	4.829	.0041
	Within groups	2439.47	29	84.12		
Fail to Realize	Between groups	1575.18	4	393.80	3.931	.0114
	Within groups	2904.85	29	100.17		
Realize+Undg (of partner)	Between groups	3682.50	4	920.63	2.401	.0728
	Within groups	11119.88	29	383.44		

Realize+Misund. (of partner)	Between groups	258.38	4	64.60	1.564	.21
	Within groups	1197.88	29	41.31		
Failure of R+ Unds(of partner)	Between groups	450.14	4	112.54	1.420	.35
	Within groups	2824.27	29	97.38		
Failure of R+ Misund.(partner)	Between groups	326.75	4	81.69	1.420	.25
	Within groups	1667.87	29	57.51		
Feels Under- stood	Between groups	2216.61	4	554.15	1.278	.30
	Within groups	12574.13	29	433.59		
Feel Misun- derstood	Between groups	1531.91	4	382.98	3.734	.0143
	Within groups	2974.13	29	102.56		
Conjunctions	Between groups	78990.62	4	19747.66	4.379	.0068
	Within groups	130789.14	29	4509.97		
Disjunctions	Between groups	57164.29	4	14291.07	4.687	.0048
	Within groups	88420.18	29	3048.97		

TABLE 4

MEANS OF SITUATIONAL GROUPS : Group 1=Sport partners, Group 2=Sophs
 Group 3=Small-group G.C., Group 4=Small
 group H.C., Group 5=Extremes

(DYADS)		Agree	Disagree	Understand	Misunderstand*
Total Mean		90.4	29.5	93.3	26.6
Group 1		96.1	23.7	97.7	22.2
2		98.6	21.5	97.5	22.0
3		85.1	34.8	89.1	30.0
4		92.2	27.7	94.1	25.0
5		65.3	54.6	77.6	42.0
		**A+U	A+M*	**D+U	D+M
Total Mean		84.2	6.1	9.0	20.6
Group 1		91.6	4.4	6.1	17.6
2		92.6	5.7	4.0	17.6
3		77.1	7.9	11.5	23.1
4		87.2	4.8	7.0	20.7
5		52.0	13.3	26.0	28.6
		* Realize	Fail to R*	R+U(partner)	R+M(partner)
Total Mean		94.8	24.3	83.4	9.1
Group 1		100.0	19.9	93.1	7.0
2		98.0	21.3	92.3	6.0
3		91.4	28.5	79.8	11.5
4		95.2	21.8	76.5	9.2
5		75.3	43.6	59.3	15.6
		F+U(partner)	F+M(part.)	Feels Understood	
Total Mean		10.3	17.7	101.0	
Group 1		4.3	15.2	108.0	
2		4.3	17.3	109.0	
3		8.8	19.7	99.0	
4		20.3	16.6	92.5	
5		18.6	26.3	86.0	
		* Feels Misunderstood	*Conjunctions	* Disjunctions	
Total Mean		15.3	660.3	160.4	
Group 1		11.3	700.0	127.0	
2		10.3	697.0	132.0	
3		20.4	636.0	182.0	
4		12.5	649.0	162.0	
5		33.6	532.0	272.0	

R+U(of partner)=Feels understood correctly *p ≥ .05
 R+M(of partner)=Feels misunderstood correctly **p ≥ .001
 F+U(of partner)=Feels misunderstood incorrectly
 F+M(of partner)=Feels understood incorrectly

N=34 N Group 1=13 Group 2=7 Group 3=7 Group 4=8 Group 5=3

To test the dispositional effect of matched versus mismatched dyads (Hypothesis 3) an order-to-chaos classification system was evolved, based on initial dispositional scores; Order 0 1 2 3 4 Chaos . Whenever a subject had more than one partner the matched vectors dyad was classified centrally either in group 1, 2, 3 along the continuum, whereas when the same subject was mismatched the dyad would be accorded a polarity classification either 0 or 4 . Analysis of variance of the five groups indicated high significant differences on all the dependent measures (minimum significance .001) (See Table 5).

All 18 F-ratios were significant in distinguishing among matched versus mismatched dyads. Hypothesis 3, that matched dyads would be at baseline and mismatched would polarize toward extreme order or chaos, was confirmed. Note that the situational groups dyads' scores did not reach significance for Disagree plus Misunderstanding of partner, Realization plus Understanding of partner, Failure of realization plus Understanding of partner, Failure of realization plus Misunderstanding of partner as well as the Feeling of being understood, but these variables were all significant under differential matchings.

TABLE 5

SUMMARY OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF THE PERFORMANCE OF MATCHED AND MISMATCHED DYADS

	Source	Sum of Squares	df	MS	F	Significance
Agree	Between groups	4387.56	4	1096.89	17.782	.00001
	Within groups	1788.91	29	61.69		
Disagree	Between groups	4410.84	4	1102.71	17.750	.00001
	Within groups	1801.66	29	62.13		
Understand	Between groups	3012.09	4	753.02	20.970	.00001
	Within groups	1041.35	29	35.91		
Misunderstand	Between groups	2961.56	4	745.39	20.871	.00001
	Within groups	1038.21	29	35.80		
Agree and Understand	Between groups	7371.16	4	1842.79	20.987	.00001
	Within groups	2546.40	29	87.81		
Agree and Misunderstand	Between groups	413.30	4	103.33	12.169	.00001
	Within groups	246.23	29	8.49		
Disagree and Understand	Between groups	1043.89	4	260.97	8.225	.0001
	Within groups	920.11	29	31.73		
Disagree and Misunderstand	Between groups	1232.72	4	308.18	9.334	.0001
	Within groups	957.52	29	33.02		
Realize	Between groups	3148.46	4	787.12	24.783	.00001
	Within groups	921.07	29	31.76		
Fail to Realize	Between groups	3010.65	4	752.66	23.846	.00001
	Within groups	915.35	29	31.56		
R+U (of partner)	Between groups	6640.01	4	1660.00	33.243	.00001
	Within groups	1448.11	29	49.93		

R+M (of partner)	Between groups	732.28	4	183.07	8.020	.0002
	Within groups	661.96	29	22.83		
F+U (of partner)	Between groups	825.92	4	206.48	11.172	.00001
	Within groups	535.96	29	18.48		
F+M (of partner)	Between groups	828.51	4	207.13	6.352	.0008
	Within groups	945.61	29	32.61		
Feels Understood	Between groups	2942.54	4	735.64	14.415	.00001
	Within groups	1479.93	29	51.03		
Feels Misunderstood	Between groups	2942.54	4	735.64	14.415	.00001
	Within groups	1479.93	29	51.03		
Conjunctions	Between groups	155796.66	4	38949.17	33.880	.00001
	Within groups	33339.22	29	1149.63		
Disjunctions	Between groups	115756.47	4	28939.12	29.53	.00001
	Within groups	28417.08	29	979.90		

TABLE 6

MEANS OF MATCHED AND MISMATCHED DYADS-DISPOSITIONAL MANIPULATION

Groups 0 to 4		-- 0=ORDER		4=CHAOS	
		Agree	Disagree	Understand	Misunderstand
Total Mean		90.4	29.5	93.3	26.6
Group 0		109.0	11.0	108.7	21.3
1		102.0	17.7	105.0	17.0
2		95.5	26.5	95.5	24.6
3		89.0	30.9	92.4	27.5
4		72.0	48.0	78.0	41.5
		A+U	A+M	D+U	D+M
Total Mean		84.2	6.1	9.0	20.5
Group 0		105.7	3.2	2.25	8.7
1		101.2	.75	1.5	16.5
2		88.7	4.5	6.7	20.0
3		82.3	6.5	10.0	20.9
4		59.8	12.0	18.0	29.5
		Realize	Fail to Realize (of partner)	R+U (of partner)	R+M (of partner)
Total Mean		94.0	25.0	86.2	8.5
Group 0		108.0	12.0	105.5	2.2
1		102.7	17.2	101.7	1.2
2		97.3	22.6	90.2	7.1
3		96.5	23.4	86.0	10.4
4		77.4	42.0	62.1	15.1
		F+U (of partner)	F+M (of partner)	Feels Understood	Feels Misunderstood
Total Mean		6.9	18.2	104.0	15.4
Group 0		2.2	10.0	115.0	4.5
1		.75	16.2	118.0	2.0
2		5.12	17.5	107.7	12.2
3		6.5	17.0	103.0	17.0
4		15.8	26.0	89.2	30.7
		Conjunctions	Disjunctions		
Total Mean		666.0	158.0		
Group 0		764.0	70.0		
1		734.0	103.0		
2		684.0	145.0		
3		666.0	156.0		
4		549.0	259.0		
R+U (of partner) = Feels understood correctly					
R+M (of partner) = Feels misunderstood correctly					
F+U (of partner) = Feels misunderstood incorrectly					
F+M (of partner) = Feels understood incorrectly					
ANOVA all p < .001					
N=34	0=4	1=4	2=6	3=11	4=7

Social and Personal Relations

In order to see which set of relations, social or personal are more stable, dyads' means are reported by situations (see Table 7). Inspection indicates that the major dependent variables, i.e., Agree, Understand and Realize, tend to be conjunctively higher in the personal realm than the social. The reciprocal variables, i.e., Disagree, Misunderstand and Fail to realize, though separately scored, show the identical pattern in reverse, where the social aspect of the relationship has less stability than the personal, thus confirming Hypothesis 4. Furthermore, analyses of variance were performed on the social, as well as personal means and the resulting values indicate that the various groups generally differ within the personal but not the social realm. This confirms that the previous findings for the situational groups' total means and adds the additional information that where groups differ (and they do, see Table 3) it is due to differences within the personal relations, since the social relations are generally chaotic for all groups.

When social and personal means are inspected for matched and mismatched dyads the above pattern reappears (see Table 8), where the personal realm carries more conjunctions than the social realm. Furthermore, analysis of variance indicates that within the social and personal relations almost every measure (except F+M social) differentiated the groups on the order--mutuality--chaos dimension.

TABLE 7
 MEANS OF THE SOCIAL AND PERSONAL RELATIONS OF THE SITUATIONAL GROUPS
 (DYADS)

	p= .06	Agree		p= .006	p= .06	Disagree		p= .006
		Social	Personal			Social	Personal	
Total Mean		43.5	47.0			16.5	12.9	
Group 1		45.4	50.7			14.6	9.1	
2		48.0	50.6			12.0	9.3	
3		41.4	43.7			18.5	16.2	
4		44.7	47.5			15.2	12.5	
5		32.0	33.3			28.0	26.6	
	.24	Understand		.09	.27	Misunderstand		.09
		Social	Personal			Social	Personal	
Total Mean		44.2	49.0			15.7	10.9	
Group 1		45.6	52.0			14.3	7.9	
2		47.6	49.6			12.3	10.3	
3		42.4	46.6			17.5	13.0	
4		45.0	49.1			15.0	10.8	
5		36.6	41.0			23.0	19.0	
	.04	A+U		.003	.16	A+M		.01
		Social	Personal			Social	Personal	
Total Mean		39.7	44.4			3.6	2.5	
Group 1		42.1	49.4			3.2	1.2	
2		45.6	47.0			2.3	3.3	
3		36.2	40.8			5.1	2.7	
4		42.1	45.1			2.4	2.4	
5		25.3	26.6			6.6	6.7	
	.005	D+U		.00001	.65	D+M		.34
		Social	Personal			Social	Personal	
Total Mean		4.5	4.5			12.1	8.4	
Group 1		3.5	2.6			11.1	6.6	
2		1.7	2.3			10.3	7.3	
3		6.1	5.4			12.4	10.7	
4		3.0	4.0			12.5	8.3	
5		11.7	14.3			16.3	12.3	
	.24	Realize		.002	.30	Fail to Realize		.004
		Social	Personal			Social	Personal	
Total Mean		40.5	49.8			14.4	9.9	
Group 1		46.3	53.7			15.6	6.3	
2		45.0	50.6			12.0	9.3	
3		43.8	47.6			16.1	12.4	
4		45.0	49.8			12.5	9.3	
5		37.7	37.6			21.3	22.3	

Group 1=Sport partners Group 2=Sophs -- 'real' groups
 Group 3=Small-group G.C. Group 4=Small-group H.C.
 Group 5=Extremes

		.22 R+U(of partner).04		.19 R+M(of partner).63	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
Total Mean		39.0	44.3	5.1	4.0
Group	1	42.4	50.6	3.9	3.1
	2	45.6	46.6	2.0	4.0
	3	37.4	42.4	6.4	5.1
	4	36.8	39.6	5.2	4.0
	5	27.3	32.0	10.0	5.6

		.49 F+U(of partner) .35		.89 F+M(of partner).11	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
Total Mean		5.7	4.5	10.5	7.1
Group	1	3.2	1.1	10.3	5.0
	2	1.6	2.6	10.6	6.6
	3	5.0	3.8	11.1	8.5
	4	10.0	9.8	9.5	7.1
	5	9.6	9.0	13.0	13.3

		.29 Feels Understood .28		.01 Feels Misunderstood.03	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
Total Mean		49.6	51.4	8.6	6.7
Group	1	52.8	55.7	7.1	4.2
	2	56.3	58.3	3.6	6.6
	3	48.5	51.0	11.4	9.0
	4	46.2	46.2	6.2	6.2
	5	40.3	46.0	19.6	14.0

		.14 Conjunctions .004		.18 Disjunctions .004	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
Total Mean		315.6	344.6	93.8	66.6
Group	1	328.0	371.9	84.1	43.7
	2	342.0	355.6	73.6	58.3
	3	306.4	330.4	102.0	80.2
	4	314.0	335.3	92.0	70.6
	5	258.0	274.3	140.6	131.6

.....

p=F prob. Analysis of Variance

TABLE 8

MEANS OF THE SOCIAL AND PERSONAL RELATIONS OF MATCHED/MISMATCHED
DYADS

		Agree		Disagree	
p=		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
.0001	Total Mean	43.4	47.0	16.5	12.9
.0003	Group 0	54.0	55.0	6.0	5.0
	1	49.0	53.0	11.0	6.7
	2	45.5	48.0	14.5	12.0
	3	41.4	47.6	18.5	12.3
	4	35.1	36.8	24.8	23.1
		Understand		Misunderstand	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
.0003	Total Mean	44.2	49.0	15.7	10.9
.0004	Group 0	52.2	56.5	7.7	3.5
	1	49.5	53.5	10.5	6.5
	2	46.0	49.3	14.0	10.6
	3	42.7	49.7	17.2	10.2
	4	37.0	41.0	22.8	19.0
		A+U		A+M	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
.0001	Total Mean	39.7	44.4	3.6	2.4
.03	Group 0	51.5	54.2	2.5	.75
	1	48.2	53.0	.7	0.0
	2	42.3	46.3	2.8	1.6
	3	37.4	44.9	4.0	2.5
	4	28.8	31.0	6.2	5.7
		D+U		D+M	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
.003	Total Mean	4.5	4.5	12.1	8.4
.01	Group 0	.25	2.0	5.7	3.0
	1	1.0	.5	10.0	6.5
	2	3.7	3.0	11.0	9.0
	3	5.2	4.7	13.2	7.6
	4	8.4	9.7	16.4	13.4
		Realize		Fail to Realize	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
.0001	Total Mean	45.0	49.8	14.8	10.1
.0002	Group 0	50.5	57.5	9.5	2.5
	1	49.7	53.0	10.2	7.0
	2	46.7	50.6	13.2	9.3
	3	45.3	51.1	14.6	8.8
	4	36.7	40.7	22.8	19.1
		R+U(of partner)		R+M(of partner)	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
.00001	Total Mean	40.2	45.9	4.6	3.9
.004	Group 0	50.0	55.5	.25	2.0
	1	48.5	53.2	1.25	0.0
	2	43.1	47.1	3.6	3.5
	3	39.2	46.7	6.0	4.4
	4	28.4	35.7	8.1	7.0

		.0003 F+U (of partner) .0001		.18 F+M (of partner).008	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
Total Mean		4.0	2.9	11.0	7.1
Group 0		1.7	.5	8.0	2.0
1		.7	0.0	9.5	6.7
2		3.0	2.1	10.2	7.2
3		3.6	2.9	11.0	5.9
4		8.8	7.0	14.5	12.2

		.0001 Feels Understood .00001		.0001 Feels Misunderstood .0001	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
Total Mean		51.3	53.0	8.6	6.8
Group 0		58.0	57.5	2.0	2.5
1		58.0	60.0	2.0	0.0
2		53.3	54.3	6.6	5.6
3		50.3	52.6	9.6	7.3
4		43.0	46.2	17.0	13.7

		.0001 Conjunctions .00001		.0001 Disjunctions .00001	
		Social	Personal	Social	Personal
Total Mean		318.2	347.8	93.0	65.0
Group 0		367.0	397.7	51.0	19.7
1		355.0	379.5	63.0	40.2
2		331.2	353.0	82.0	61.3
3		313.1	353.1	97.0	59.2
4		262.0	287.0	140.0	119.0

p=F prob. Analysis of Variance

In order to test for differences among matched-mismatched, situational groups, and sex, one way analysis of variance was performed on twenty IPM measures (see Table 10). The results indicate that matched-mismatched differed significantly on all 20 dependent measures, situational groups on 8 variables, and sex on 9 of the dependent measures, thus confirming Hypothesis 5.

To establish the groups' relative contribution to the above significant findings all scores were transformed into a standardized format. Significant standardized scores (adjusted for the independent variables' deviation from the grand mean = 0) are reported for each group's contribution and directionality within the analysis of variance variables, using multiple classification analysis (see Table 11). Within matching-mismatching, the most highly significant effect, groups show the relative contribution to the Order-(0)--Mutuality-(4)-Chaos continuum (M-A) for social and personal (as well as total) agreement; total misunderstanding, personal failure of realization, social, personal and total disagreement and understanding, and personal and total realization plus understanding of partner (which is also the feeling of being understood correctly). The reciprocal scores, i.e., for agreement, understanding and realization give scores of the exact same magnitude but with opposite directionality.

As can be seen from the multiple classification analysis (Table 11), the continuum begins with a high negative score contribution of the mismatched order group (0), indicating alienation, and continues through the matched central groups

(1, 2, 3) pointing to mutuality, until reaching the opposite polarity of the mismatched, i.e., chaos (4), high positive scores.

For social groupings (SG) the general pattern is that the sport-partner dyads consistently attribute predictively (conjunctions), but not to the level of the extreme order group of M-M, indicating normative attributions instead of alienation of order. Thus, for personal disagree, while the extreme order group (0) is at -6.71 sport-partners are lower at -4.24. The same pattern holds for total disagree (0)=16.39 while sport-partners=4.26; for social D+U (0)=3.22 while partners=-2.71; for personal realization plus understanding of partner (0)=9.14 while partners=4.57. Furthermore to confirm the general result that 'natural' dyads are not within the alienation range of the continuum, Sophomores, who show more disjunctions with the 'natural' classification than partners, are nevertheless lower than the chaos (4) groups in personal disagreements, personal failure of realization, personal and total realization plus understanding of partner, and are even lower than group (3) (tending towards chaos) in total disagreements.

The no-sex differences Hypothesis (6) was slightly disconfirmed in that results indicate that males have more disjunctions; for disagree males=3.97 while females=5.67; for misunderstanding males=2.89 while females=4.13. Because males have more disagreements they also have a higher possibility for disagreement+understanding (D+U) and this is con-

firmed, males=2.68, while females=3.83. Finally, females also feel understood correctly (R+U of partner) more than males.

TABLE 10

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SITUATIONAL, MATCHED-MISMATCHED, AND SEX

Variable	Group	DYADS		F	Sign
		M-M=matched	mismatched		
SG=situational groups		df	MS		S=sex
Agree	M-M	4	405.60	10.34	.0001
	SG	4	177.02	4.51	.01
	S	1	205.72	5.24	.04
Disagree	M-M	4	409.08	10.23	.0001
	SG	4	177.95	4.45	.01
	S	1	204.00	5.10	.04
Understand	M-M	4	366.79	17.60	.0001
	SG	4	60.86	2.92	.06
	S	1	108.54	5.21	.04
Misunderstand	M-M	4	366.79	17.75	.0001
	SG	4	60.84	2.94	.06
	S	1	108.56	5.25	.04
Realize	M-M	4	312.88	11.98	.0001
	SG	4	41.31	1.57	.23
	S	1	39.16	1.49	.24
Fail to Realize	M-M	4	305.49	12.21	.0001
	SG	4	40.85	1.63	.21
	S	1	42.30	1.69	.21
A+U	M-M	4	665.53	13.58	.0001
	SG	4	302.84	6.18	.001
	S	1	460.85	9.40	.005
A+M	M-M	4	39.82	7.09	.002
	SG	4	17.39	3.09	.05
	S	1	32.65	5.81	.03
D+U	M-M	4	72.78	7.48	.002
	SG	4	124.42	12.79	.0001
	S	1	93.25	9.58	.007
D+M	M-M	4	175.79	6.24	.004
	SG	4	22.53	.80	.54
	S	1	37.97	1.35	.26

R+U (of partner)	M-M	4	702.40	24.53	.0001
	SG	4	133.83	4.67	.01
	S	1	166.98	5.83	.03
R+M (of partner)	M-M	4	108.91	8.49	.001
	SG	4	31.37	2.45	.09
	S	1	45.09	3.52	.08
F+U (of partner)	M-M	4	73.50	3.17	.04
	SG	4	19.51	.84	.52
	S	1	.94	.04	.84
F+M (of partner)	M-M	4	103.20	3.58	.03
	SG	4	17.24	.60	.67
	S	1	27.41	.95	.35
Social conjunctions	M-M	4	4811.11	5.04	.004
	SG	4	350.55	.37	.83
	S	1	688.47	.72	.40
Personal conjunctions	M-M	4	3368.34	4.46	.008
	SG	4	1537.30	2.04	.12
	S	1	1348.99	1.79	.19
Total conjunctions	M-M	4	15883.48	18.58	.0001
	SG	4	3108.76	3.64	.019
	S	1	3960.08	4.63	.04
Social disjunctions	M-M	4	3607.96	4.22	.01
	SG	4	176.37	.21	.93
	S	1	411.40	.48	.49
Personal disjunctions	M-M	4	2509.07	3.60	.019
	SG	4	1309.15	1.88	.15
	S	1	1239.88	1.78	.20
Total disjunctions	M-M	4	11785.24	14.63	.0001
	SG	4	2228.46	2.77	.05
	S	1	3079.68	3.82	.06

TABLE 11
 MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF SITUATIONAL, MATCHED-MISMATCHED
 AND SEX DYADS (only significant differences)

Measure	Variable	Adjusted for Independents		Situational group	
		Group	Deviation		
Social Disagree	M-M ORDER	0	-9.68	1	1=sport-partners
		1	-5.04	2	2=Sophs
		2	-0.59	3	3=small-group G.C.
		3	2.29	4	4=small-group H.C.
		4	4.47	5	5=extremes
Personal Disagree	M-M	0	-6.17	1	SC -4.24
		1	-4.77	2	1.14
		2	0.07	3	3.92
		3	0.50	4	0.75
		4	5.69	5	6.09
Total Disagree	M-M	0	-16.39	1	-6.94
		1	-9.81	2	1.99
		2	-0.52	3	6.83
		3	3.44	4	0.41
		4	10.16	5	11.04
Total Misunderstand	M-M	0	-15.07		
		1	-8.73		Male 2.80
		2	-1.12		Female -4.13
		3	1.59		
		4	12.38		
Personal Fail to realize	M-M	0	-6.79	1	SG -4.26
		1	-1.18	2	3.90
		2	-0.30	3	2.63
		3	-0.37	4	1.22
		4	5.48	5	5.40
Social D+U	M-M	0	-3.22	1	-2.71
		1	-2.96	2	0.47
		2	0.69	3	2.77
		3	1.73	4	-0.10
		4	0.02	5	5.07
Personal D+U	M-M	0	-1.40	1	-2.02
		1	-3.01	2	-1.07
		2	-0.65	3	1.10
		3	1.12	4	-0.17
		4	1.50	5	7.73
Total D+U	M-M	0	-4.63	1	-4.74
		1	-5.97	2	-0.59
		2	0.05	3	3.87
		3	2.86	4	-0.27
		4	1.51	5	12.81

R+U(of partner)=Feels Understood correctly

				SG			
Personal R + U (of partner)	M-M	0	9.14	1	4.57		
		1	5.59	2	-5.26		
		2	0.71	3	-3.83		
		3	-0.03	4	-1.02		
		4	-9.17	5	-2.87		
Total R+U (of partner)	M-M	0	18.52	1	6.12	Male	-3.59
		1	14.07	2	-5.40	Female	5.13
		2	2.20	3	-6.96		
		3	-1.62	4	-0.07		
		4	-18.65	5	-4.71		

According to normative-counternormative-chaos theory (see page 33) the therapeutic dyads should show more disjunctions than the baseline groups of M-M and less than the chaos group (M-M #4) and this holds true when differences are significant. Thus, therapeutic groups have more personal disagreements than the baseline (central) mutuality Group 2 and even Group 3; they contribute positively to total disagreements while baseline Group 2 does so negatively, they fail to realize more often and contribute less to R+U of partner than the baseline group. Furthermore for all of the above dependent variables they exhibit more conjunctions than the chaos group (4), indicating conflicts but not to the degree of the alienated group.

Regression Analysis

In order to test which variable best fits the data, a multiple regression was done on the major dependent measures with sex, situational groups and matched-mismatched dyads. Since the M-A dimension is conceptualized as a linear continuum for situational groups and matched-mismatched dyads (Hypothesis 7), and analysis of variance indicates that within SG and M-M only one type of dyad differs from the grand mean, the regression analysis should point out if and for which variable linearity reveals the M-A dimension as a continuum (see Table 12).

TABLE 12

SUMMARY STATISTICAL OUTPUT FROM THE MAJOR DEPENDENT MEASURES REGRESSED (MULTIPLE) ON SEX, SITUATIONAL (SG), AND MATCHED-MISMATCHED DYADS

Measure	Variable	Multiple R	R ²	R ² Change	F
Social agree	Sex	.2868	.0822	.0822	2.08
	SG	.4106	.1686	.0863	.57
	M-M	.7589	.5760	.4074	28.82
Personal agree	Sex	.1763	.0311	.0311	2.39
	SG	.4153	.1725	.1414	2.21
	M-M	.6745	.4550	.2825	15.55
Social Underst- anding	Sex	.2441	.0596	.0596	1.23
	SG	.3676	.1352	.0756	.39
	M-M	.7158	.5124	.3772	23.20
Personal Underst- anding	Sex	.1237	.0153	.0153	2.89
	SG	.4502	.2026	.1873	3.78
	M-M	.6923	.4793	.2766	15.94
Social Realize	Sex	.2153	.0463	.0463	.73
	SG	.3283	.1078	.0615	.22
	M-M	.6653	.4427	.3349	18.03
Personal Realize	Sex	.1052	.0111	.0111	2.88
	SG	.4557	.2076	.1966	4.13
	M-M	.6912	.4778	.2702	15.52

Measure	Variable	Multiple R	R ²	R ² Change	F
Total Agree	Sex	.2723	.0742	.0742	5.19
	SG	.4813	.2317	.1576	3.09
	M-M	.8413	.7078	.4761	48.87
Total Under- stand	Sex	.2270	.0515	.0515	5.65
	SG	.4901	.2462	.1887	4.73
	M-M	.8559	.7326	.4924	55.25
Total Realize	Sex	.1893	.0358	.0358	3.61
	SG	.4605	.2120	.1762	3.53
	M-M	.8025	.6440	.4319	36.39

Note-all Fs with 3 & 30 df.

- Sex Correlates with SG .8081 and has two groups
- SG and M-M have five categories

As can be seen (Table 12) matching-mismatching explains approximately 50% of the variance of the social and personal dependent measures, while social groupings explain about 20%. On the lower portion of the Table (#12) it can be seen that for the total scores, although the social groupings maintains 20%, matching-mismatching rises to about 70%. (The sign of R indicates all relationships are positive as well as the relative strength of the relationships).

The Mutuality-Alienation Dimension

In order to visualize the M-A dimension for both social groups and matched-mismatched dyads discriminant functions are extracted and group centroids are presented (see Table 13). Discriminant analysis statistically distinguishes between groups possessing a set of discriminating variables in which each group is expected to be theoretically characterized by different positions on these variables. The objective of the analysis is to weigh and linearly combine the discriminating variables so that the groups are forced to be as statistically distinct as possible (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner and Bent, 1975).

TABLE 13
M-M CENTROIDS OF GROUPS IN REDUCED SPACE

Group	Function 1	Function 2	Actual group	Predicted group membership					
				N	0	1	2	3	4
ORDER 0	1.8819	-0.1295	0	4	4	0	0	0	0
1	0.7542	-0.1531	1	4	0	4	0	0	0
2	0.1771	0.0563	2	8	0	0	7	1	0
3	-0.1703	0.1582	3	11	0	0	1	10	0
CHAOS 4	-1.4412	-0.1573	4	7	0	0	0	0	7
		58.03%			23.71%				
		Relative percentage		94.12% of grouped cases correctly identified					
Sign.		.001			.023				

SG CENTROIDS OF GROUPS IN REDUCED SPACE

Group	Function 1	Function 2	Actual group	Predicted group membership					
				N	1	2	3	4	5
Sports 1	0.2600	1.1182	1	13	13	0	0	0	0
Extreme 2	2.6387	-0.8094	2Ext	3	0	3	0	0	0
Small-g 3	-0.4077	-0.8815	3	7	0	0	7	0	0
Small-g 4	-0.6035	-0.6450	4	8	0	0	0	8	0
Sophs 5	-1.1647	-0.3083	5Soph	3	0	0	0	0	3
		Relative percentage		100% of grouped cases correctly identified					
Sign.		.0001			.184 N.S.				

The M-A dimension, for both, is revealed by the position of the group centroids in standardized geometric space. The extracted discriminant functions are used as axes of the geometric space thus showing the spatial relations among the groups. The weighting coefficients identify the variables which contribute most to differentiation and are similar to factor analysis in this respect. For M-M it is expected that the Order (0) --- Chaos (4) dimension (function) will adequately line up the groups in geometric space. For SG Normative (Groups 1 (sport) and 5 (Sophomores)) --- Coun-

ternormative (Groups 3 and 4) --- Extremes (Group 2) are the expected factors which should discriminate between the groups (see Table 14 for M-M, Table 15 for SG).

For M-M, as can be seen from the groups' positions in standardized space, the order-to-chaos dimension does reveal the M-A dimension in the expected manner. Group (0), extreme order, is opposite to extreme chaos (4) thus defining polarities. Groups 1, 2 and 3 lie inbetween in a close approximation to a straight line. In fact regression analysis indicates that this is indeed a regression line and that it is significant and Hypothesis 7 is thus confirmed.

For SG, the normative-counternormative-extreme dimension does not resemble the straight line predicted for the M-A dimension, as regression analysis previously indicated. However, Group 2, the extremes, does lie opposite Groups 1,3,4, 5 and is clearly separated from the other groups by an increase in abnormal disjunctions. Also, normative 'natural' groups (1 and 5) differ from each other but are clearly separated from counternormative therapeutic groups, while the extremes are separated from all groups by their chaotic disjunctions. Since discriminant function 2 (vertical axes) is not significant for SG a new dimension of Abnormal-Normal emerges from this analysis if all groups are dropped unto the horizontal plane.

TABLE 14

MATCHED-MISMATCHED DYADS
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS

STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

TEMPORAL MAP OF DISCRIMINANT SCORE 1 (HORIZONTAL) VS. DISCRIMINANT SCORE 2 (VERTICAL). * INDICATES A GROUP CENTROID.





TABLE 15
SITUATIONAL GROUPS
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS

STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

TERMINOLOGICAL MAP OF DISCRIMINANT SCORE 1 (HORIZONTAL) VS. DISCRIMINANT SCORE 2 (VERTICAL). * INDICATES A GROUP CONTINUO.



CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

The mutuality-alienation issue has become especially important in recent years particularly in affluent societies. Structured chiefly on the basis of roles, highly industrialized societies exhibit tendencies for alienated contingencies -- between, as well as within individuals -- contributing to insanity (Laing), breakdowns (Goffman), and anomie, which in turn may lead to suicide (Durkheim).

The present experiment is addressed to this mutuality-alienation issue as it occurs in everyday dyadic interaction. The dyad is the chosen unit for study, since in it the individual bears most fully the brunt of the developing moment. Once defined, this moment serves as an official, shared point of exchange governing behavior (e.g., the attentional alternations of its members). And, consequently, the moment's stimulus control implications are considered as different contingencies (pseudo, asymmetrical, reactive, mutual) which allow or disallow the possibility for social contact in the form of mutuality versus alienation. Examination of the resulting social fabric for patterns of conjunctive and disjunctive degrees of personal and social attributions shows that an attributional baseline for mutuality can be established with polarities of

alienation (i.e., extreme conventional order and chaos) extracted, clearly revealing a mutuality-alienation dimension.

Both situational and dispositional factors influence degrees of mutuality-alienation, with the first of these, the situational factor, determinative because dyads of diverse social groups -- such as therapeutic groups, college Sophomores, and sports-team partners, as well as a maladaptive extreme group -- tend to interact differently, drawing differing attributional conclusions. Sophomores and sports partners were found to operate at a level of everyday regular dyads and attribute normatively. Therapeutic groups stress counternormative values (Rettig, 1979); while extremes are deviants who disavow the normative as well as the beneficial counternormative range and attribute "chaotically". By comparing the dyadic patterns of the above social groups, a normative-counternormative range is established in which the total population mean defines mutuality and where the position of each of the social groupings indicates the kinds of dyadic relationships and their controlling contingencies.

The dispositional factor characterizes dyadic relationships by the habitual focusing of consciousness of the individuals interacting in it and is comprised of private and public self-consciousness and social anxiety. Private self-consciousness refers to the elements of control exerted in the dyad in which the individual attends to his 'inner' thoughts and feelings. Public self-consciousness is a mode of giving up behavioral control by attending to oneself as a social object

and 'being to the other what the other wants me to be'. And, the third component, social anxiety, is discomfort in the presence of others, where there is concern with resolving self, other, and interaction consciousness (see page 17) with attention wavering in relation to the communal point (content) of the conversation.

Before further discussion of the specific predictions for dyads' position on mutuality-alienation due to situational and dispositional factors, consciousness as on an individual dispositional level has to be dismissed as a potential 'causal' explanation of M-A. If an individual, for instance, with low consciousness is not aware of his motives (low Private) than the developing situation would govern his behavior. If he is not aware of how he appears to others (low Public) than he cannot implement his purpose in a social context. Thus attributions for the intrapersonal self-to-self and other-to-other, and interpersonal self-to-other, and other-to-self relations will be disjunctive (i.e., non-predictable by the other) when compared to the other's actual ratings, and he will then be alienated. For such a hypothetical individual all other are experienced similarly. There can be no uniqueness in interactions since attention will not be with the developing moment, entropy increases, and with it, alienation (Jones and Davis, p. 227, 1965). It is doubtful, however, that such an individual exists among the present, rather sophisticated subject population. The hypothesis that "low consciousness subjects tend toward alienation" will be tested, hence, as a pretreatment

variable prior to further analysis of the contributions of the situational and dispositional dyadic factors. Note that for the hypothesized individual with low consciousness, a ready solution is to learn to attribute in a socially correct (stereotyped) manner, i.e., intrapersonal stability via conjunctions within social "chaos".

To reiterate, there are seven major hypotheses: that neither an individual's dispositional vector distribution (private, public and social anxiety) which makes up his consciousness nor his degree of consciousness (low versus high) are predictive of his ability to jointly share a point in a conversation nor of his predisposition towards M-A (Hypothesis #1). As dyads, situational groups are expected to be distributed along a normative-counternormative dimension in which the central range between normative and counter-normative indicates a mutually contingent relation operating. When dyads' attributional IPM scores indicate positioning at the outer two ranges of the dimension (i.e., high normative or high counter-normative) alienative contingencies operate more often (Hypothesis #2). For the total experimental population intrapersonal relations were expected to show more stability via conjunctions than the interpersonal ones (Hypothesis #3). This prediction is contrary to Laing's findings and is based on the notion that individuals would not interact for any length of time with others who do not reciprocate cross-intrapersonal positivity.

By matching and mismatching individuals in dyads according to their dispositional style, the amount and direction (i.e., X:X, Y:Y, X:Y, Y:X) of social reciprocity and autonomy was manipulated, such that behavioral control was shared (mutuality) or not (alienation) shared (Hypothesis #4). This manipulation, of matching and mismatching, was expected to be more of a factor in determining M-A than the situational groupings or sex (Hypothesis #5). Sexual differences were not anticipated (Hypothesis #6). Thus it was expected that the mutuality-alienation dimension can be extracted from the matching-mismatching procedure revealing polarities of either extreme, conventional attributions, or "chaotic" idiosyncratic confusion, as well as the central range for inferring mutuality (Hypothesis #7).

Of the seven hypotheses, six were confirmed by the findings. Situational groups differ as expected along the cluster of normative-counternormative dyads (#2). Matched and mismatched dyadic classifications formed an Order--Mutuality--Chaos continuum, an indication of a mutuality-alienation dimension (#3 and #7). The intrapersonal relation, i.e., self-to-self and other-to-other were found to be, on the whole, more stable than the social (interpersonal) self-to-other and other-to-self relations (#4).

Matching and mismatching of dyads accounted for more variance in IPM than groups varying in situations and sex (#5). This effect was not due to an individual's dispositional consciousness style per se (#1). Although no sex differences

were expected, some were found (#6). Female subjects had more total agreements and total understandings, and thereby less disagreements than males. They also felt understood correctly to a greater degree than did the males. The normative-counter-normative continuum for various situational groups' position was generally confirmed via a separate normal-abnormal discriminant function. However it accounted for less than half of the linear regression variance than the matching-mismatching procedure. Finally a visual representation of the M-A dimension via discriminant analysis was optimal for the dyadic matching-mismatching (#7). A note of caution must be mentioned here.

Because the IPM uses a high number of measures, e.g., mean total conjunctions of approximately 700 and mean total disjunctions of 128 resulting in 828 bits of information for each dyadic interaction, and since some of the dependent measures were relatively small compared to others (e.g., Agree and misunderstand and Failure of realization and understanding are much fewer than Agree and Understand and Realize and understand) there was a tendency for some standardized discriminant function coefficients to "explode", that is to carry an inordinate amount of weight in determining the discriminant function. Furthermore, because some measures are used in a linear combination (e.g., social and personal agreements add up to total agreements) they were at times dropped from further discriminant analysis whenever they were considered redundant. Thus, direct interpretation of the visual display of the M-A dimension, which is inferred from the order-mutuality-chaos

territorial mappings, must be tempered. However, since regression analysis indicates that a significant portion of the variance was explained (70%) by a straight line, the M-A dimension may be viewed as an order-mutuality-chaos continuum, but not as a normative-counternormative-extreme dimension. (The second discriminant function extracted to plot the situational groups' centroids was not statistically significant, revealing instead a "normal-abnormal" dimension).

Before discussing the findings for the dyads who participated in the experiment, it must be mentioned that some subjects dropped out, and though participating as survey subjects, they refused the attribution (IPM) phase. In the sport-partner group of twenty-two eligible subjects, five dropped out (23%). The mean scores of the surveyed sport-partners for total consciousness was 46.71, while the dropouts' mean was 41.2. In one therapeutic group total consciousness was 62.1 (N=7) while the subject who most negatively reacted to the IPM had a score of 46.0. In the other therapeutic group total consciousness was 61.9 while the one female subject who dropped out when 'confronted' by the IPM, citing acute anxiety, had a score of 54.0. In the extreme group, the three subjects who participated had a mean of 54.0 while one dropout subject, who said the IPM 'makes him crazy' had a score of 16.0. The trend seems clear. Those subjects who dropped out have lower total consciousness scores than their sample peers. One possible explanation is that since the IPM requires respondents to switch perspectives and thereby the direction of their

attention, subjects with lower consciousness find it taxing. However, for the total experimental population, low versus high total consciousness does not show significant differences in IPM scores, hence leaving it doubtful that the absence of these subjects affected the results.

Fenigstein's et al note in introducing the concept of dispositional consciousness style that "some individuals chronically think about themselves, scrutinize their behavior, and dwell on their thoughts" and these are contrasted to others "whose absence of self-consciousness is so complete that they have no understanding of either their own motives or of how they appear to others" (1975, p. 522). Thus Fenigstein et al imply that consciousness, or the lack of it, is casual in determining M-A. However, the present study found that consciousness per se did not affect IPM scores. An individual's degree or style of consciousness (private, public), does not cause alienation. Once language appears, self-dialogue occurs and with it some adaptation to social dialogue (see page 4). And, though the outcome of the self-dialogue may favor a certain direction (e.g., control or the giving up of behavior control), it is generally endowed with a quality of uncertainty and is therefore not a strong 'causal' factor of alienation.

Social anxiety however, does seem somewhat more determinative of a propensity to conclude in favor of assuming or giving up controls. If social anxiety is low the self-dialogue leans towards a "reactive" form of dialogue (Rettig, 1978)

which, though perhaps spontaneous, is largely idiosyncratic, lacks stability, coherence (continuity of purpose), and favors giving up behavioral controls. On the other hand if social anxiety is high, the self-dialogue will generally favor the socially more conventional solutions such as assumption of controls. On the whole, since the element of uncertainty persists on the intra-individual level, it may be concluded that genuine dyadic dialogue can be achieved only by individuals interacting with one another by attending to a common point.

As dyads, the present situational groupings differ from each other on M-A not so much on the basis of a normative-counternormative dimension but on a perhaps simpler normal-abnormal one. On the face of it ordinary dyads (college Sophomores and athletic teams) are positioned near the therapeutic dyads along the normal factor, indicating similarity in normalcy, the extreme dyads tending toward abnormality (Table 15). However, in noting the position of the situational groups with respect to social and personal relations (Table 7) a clear difference emerges that indicates a more balanced degree of social and personal dialogue for the therapeutic groups than for the ordinary dyads (who favor personal conjunctions and social disjunctions) for the major dependent variables of Agree, Understand and Realize, as well as Disagree, Misunderstand and Fail to realize.

On each of the above dependent measures the therapeutic dyads' scores for social and personal relations are closer

to the total population mean than the normal dyads, who are generally well above the mean for Agree, Understand and Realize and below for Disagree, Misunderstand and Fail to realize. The therapeutic groups, with their increase in intrapersonal disjunctions, indicate that change is taking place in both social (an increase in interpersonal conjunctions) and personal relations. They are thus less conforming on the normal factor, less predetermined in their responses, more spontaneous and more uncertain in forming the dyadic relations (a property of genuine dialogue). The ordinary dyads are more predetermined in their cross-attributions towards normalcy, while those of the extreme dyads are almost totally related to the abnormal factor.

Although no differences based on sex were expected, females contributed more conjunctions and males more disjunctions to the 1st (direct) and 2nd order perspectives. The results conform to the stereotypic picture of male/female attentional differences. "Logos, the masculine principle, refers to the discriminating mind, the compartmentalizing mind which separates and refines. It refers to the analytic mind which is continually shaping, forming, observing, inquiring, and directing energy toward a chosen goal, a new structure" (Wickes, 1963, p. 164; Jung, 1963, p. 179) --- disjunctions. While, "Eros, the feminine principle, refers to the psyche which apprehends the "realities of relatedness," of pattern, of intuitive perceptions of feeling situations, of openness to images from the unconsciousness, as well as

to the external environment. The goal of Eros is more complete wholeness "which reunites on a higher and deeper level that which has been separated by the keen blade of perception and differentiation"...which is Logos (Wickes, 1963, p. 228). Females thus are expected to be superior to males in such social skills as memory for names and faces, older females are more interested in social stimuli than older males, and more sensitive to the interpersonal preferences of others (Exline, 1957), and females are said to evidence greater emotional responsiveness to others such as compassion and "active sympathy" (Terman & Miles, 1936). Thus, the finding that females are superior cross-attributers is not surprising, since they apparently learn to use these social skills better than males (from Silverman, 1970).

The most significant finding of the present study pertains to the experimental matching-mismatching procedure. Although not demonstrating an inevitable effect among the interactants, it does produce a significant trend on M-A. This trend can be observed despite different social groupings and across both sexes. The matching-mismatching determines a pattern, despite some fluctuations due to situations and sex, in which matched dyads are clearly interacting on a mutual contingency basis. For mismatched dyads it cannot be predicted in which of the two polarities they will be alienated or that they will 'inevitably' be alienated. However, it can be stated with a high degree of confidence that mismatched dyads will move towards alienation of conventionality (order)

or confusion (chaos) when compared to matched dyads.

In the present experiment the problem of structuring the dyadic encounter was left to the participants who share responsibility and accountability (Simmel). There was no prior basis for deciding who should control the dyad's evolution. For such cases, Davis (1976) proposed three possible solutions to the problem which indirectly describe the possibilities of mutuality: competition for control, sharing of controls, and collusion between a dominant and submissive partner.

Davis (1977) found that prior discussion about the levels of intimacy toward which the subjects were inclined greatly facilitated the occurrence of mutuality in laboratory studies. However, naturalistic encounters usually do not explicate the intimacy component and tend to substitute implicitness for explicitness. It is this tacit nature of dyadic communication to which the present experiment is addressed.

There are, however, interesting similarities in the current findings with those of Davis. In Davis's 'no-prior-discussion' condition a high degree of structure (pseudo-contingency) based on moment-to-moment guidance and responsiveness (reactivity and asymmetry) was found to be necessary for a consensually agreed upon social construction to emerge. Thus alienative contingencies seem to operate before mutuality can occur. The 'prior-discussion' about construction shows that "once there is consensus about superordinate aims,

moment-to-moment guidance and responsiveness lose their importance and a high degree of interactional structure is no longer needed." Hence mutuality can take place. In conclusion it appears that for laboratory analogues and naturalistic investigations, intimacy or mutuality is within the control of the participants and depends on their realization of the congruity of dyadic partners.

Appendix #1

Self-Consciousness Scale Questionnaire

Please answer the following statements as to the degree of truth for you, i.e., very often (4), often (3), sometimes (2), seldom (1), or never (0):

- | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1. I'm always trying to figure myself out. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 2. I'm concerned about my style of doing things. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 3. Generally, I'm not very aware of myself. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 5. I reflect about myself a lot. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 6. I'm concerned about the way I present myself. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 7. I'm often the subject of my own fantasies. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 9. I never scrutinize myself. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 10. I get embarrassed easily. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 11. I'm self-conscious about the way I look. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 12. I don't find it hard to talk to strangers. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 13. I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 14. I usually worry about making a good impression. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 15. I'm constantly examining my motives. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |
| 17. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror. | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (0) |

18.	I sometimes have the feeling I'm off somewhere watching myself.	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)
19.	I'm concerned about what other people think of me.	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)
20.	I'm alert to changes in my mood.	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)
21.	I'm usually aware of my appearance.	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)
22.	I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem.	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)
23.	Large groups make me nervous.	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)

Private = 1, 3^b, 5, 7, 9^b, 13, 15, 18, 20, 22.

Public = 2, 6, 11, 14, 17, 19, 21.

Social Anxiety = 4, 8, 10, 12^b, 16, 23.

b=item reversed for scoring

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