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THE UNITED STATES AND OKINAWA; A STUDY IN DEPENDENCY RELATIONSHIP

by

HERBERT A. KAMPF

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1972

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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PREFACE

The United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands covered a period of more than one quarter century and involved a multitude of interrelated problems both within the archipelago and in the sphere of Japanese-American relations. The size and complexity of the subject matter made it necessary at the outset to make specific choices concerning the scope of this study and the intended approach.

It was decided to limit the study to the events that took place within the Ryukyu Islands from the time of the American landings in the spring of 1945 until the Japanese-American Joint Communique of November 1969 which announced the return of the Islands to Japan. It was felt that this would make possible a concentration on a subject which has been studied infrequently until now, American rule over an Asian people. The problems created by this rule for American foreign policy were left out, except for a minimum of background information. The period from the Joint Communique of November 1969 to the reversion of the archipelago in May 1972 was also, for the most part, excluded. This was done in the belief that this was merely a transition period and that whatever could be learned about American rule over the Ryukyus would be revealed in the period when this rule existed in its entirety and not when it was being liquidated.

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It was also felt that to conduct this study chronologically would result in mixing many different problems and in making it more difficult to obtain an over-all view of any particular problem. It was therefore decided to proceed topically.

The study is divided into five major parts, each consisting of two chapters and concerned, respectively, with political and legal matters, the economic aspects of political questions, the every-day problems created for Okinawans by the American military presence, the nature of the Okinawan reversion movement, and the decline in the ruling power's authority during the last years before the reversion agreement.

The first two parts are concerned largely with American actions in the Ryukyus, the next two parts with the Okinawan reaction to this, and the final part with the interaction of both rulers and subjects during the last years of full United States administration.

This study was conducted on the assumption that the most meaningful analysis would entail breaking down the many complex problems encountered into their smallest practical component parts and then subjecting them to what might be described as "examination under enlargement." This was accomplished by subdividing each chapter into sections and by gearing the analysis to this relatively "mini-level." The study then returns from the micro- to the macro-level by gathering together the separate parts at the end of each

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chapter and again in the final conclusions.

Unfortunately, breaking down a complicated problem into separate components for independent study is an ideal that can never be fully realized. The different aspects of any problem under examination, be they political, economic, administrative or psychological, do not exist in a vacuum and are all interrelated parts of a complex whole. The breakdown into separate components, while necessary to avoid confusion and to isolate separate factors in a relationship, is to a large extent artificial. This has resulted in some unavoidable repetition, particularly when different aspects of the same problem come up in various chapters. This repetition, however, is useful in that it helps relate the particular aspect under examination to other aspects of the same question taken up earlier under another heading.

While the analysis has been undertaken from the points of view of both the rulers and their subjects, some problems may tend to be presented more from the American than from the Okinawan standpoint. When this occurs, it is because the author feels that the unique aspects of the Okinawan dependency relationship will be found in the challenges it presented to the United States.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
PREFACE		iv
LIST OF TABLES		xi
Chapter I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS	21
	The International Setting of the Okinawan Dependency Relationship	22
	The Objectives of American Rule	31
	The Legal Foundations of United States Administration and the Legal Status of the Ryukyu Islands	35
	The Period of Officially Acknowledged Military Government	45
	Early Local Self-Government	49
	Military Rule	52
	The Basis of Local Self-Government After the Peace Treaty With Japan	66
	The Post-1957 Legal Control Over Okinawan Affairs	73
	Conclusions	83
	Notes	87
III.	THE MANIPULATION OF THE OKINAWAN POLITICAL PROCESS	94
	The United States and the Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa	99
	The "Affaire" Senaga	115
	Reform From Above, a Case Study	122
	Increased Autonomy	140
	Conclusions	162
	Notes	168

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Chapter Page

IV. THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE ASSISTANCE TO OKINAWA 177

What the United States Inherited in the Ryukyu Islands 179
United States Aid 184
Japan's Economic Involvement in the Ryukyu Islands 206
Conclusions 228
Notes 234

V. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS 242

The Financing of Okinawan Prosperity 244
Foreign Investments 248
Economic Growth 257
The New Prosperity 260
The Unnatural Economy 265
Economic Comparisons With Japan 276
The Great Gap 287
Conclusions 301
Notes 309

VI. THE LAND PROBLEM - A CASE STUDY 318

The Basic Problem 320
American and Okinawan Attitudes on Land 325
Taking the Land and Returning it to the Owners 328
Paying for the Land 333
After the Crisis 345
Conclusions 350
Notes 356

VII. EVERYDAY ISSUES ARISING IN A STRATEGIC DEPENDENCY 360

Some Unavoidable Psychological Irritants ... 362
The Japanese Flag and Japanese Holidays 366
American Attitudes Toward Okinawans 368
The Gap in Living Standards 375

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Chapter Page

Crimes and Misbehavior on the Part of Some Servicemen 377
Military Accidents and Nuisances 382
A Sitting Duck on a Powder Keg 388
Restrictions on Political Rights 399
A People Without A Nationality 406
A Final Word on Irritants 409
Conclusions 413
Notes 418

VIII. THE ATTITUDINAL BASIS OF THE REVERSION MOVEMENT-SUPPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 425

The Economic Basis of Okinawan Supports for American Rule 427
Non-Economic Supports for American Rule 441
The Gradual Decline in Supports for the American Regime 446
Negative Okinawan Attitudes Toward Japan and the Japanese 454
Conclusions 468
Notes 474

IX. THE SENTIMENTS, NATURE AND LEADERSHIP OF THE REVERSION MOVEMENT 479

The Sentiments for Reversion 480
The Nature of the Reversion Movement 491
The Role of Schoolteachers in the Reversion Movement 500
Conclusions 521
Notes 527

X. THE STRUGGLE FOR REVERSION AND THE DECLINE IN AMERICAN AUTHORITY 531

Okinawan Politics Around the Reversion Issue 533
Opposition, Demonstrations and the "Twin Court Cases" 547
The Transformation of the Political Climate. 559
Partial Reversion Plans 564
A Scandal and the B-52 Bombers 571
Conclusions 577
Notes 584

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Chapter Page

XI. THE LAST YEAR BEFORE THE REVERSION DECISION .. 590

The November 1968 Election 591
The Climax of the B-52 Crisis 600
The Final Struggle for Reversion 609
The Joint Communique of November 1969 624
Conclusions 628
Notes 638

XII. CONCLUSIONS 645

BIBLIOGRAPHY 664

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LIST OF TABLES

Page

The Quadrangle of Main Factors Affecting American Decisions Concerned with the Okinawan Dependency Relationship 26

United States Aid to, and Administrative Expenses in, the Ryukyu Islands, 1947-1958 185

Ryukyuan Income Derived from the United States in Fiscal 1968 197

Ryukyuan Exports of Sugar and Pineapple Products, 1964 and 1968 218

Ryukyuan Per Capita National Income and Gross National Product, 1955-1969 258

Ryukyuan Economic Growth, in Percentages, 1956-1968 .. 259

Gross National Product Per Capita, Per Capita National Income and Average Annual Income Per Worker in the Ryukyu Islands and in Japan, in 1955 and 1965 and in 1956 and 1964 278

Consumer Price Indexes in the Ryukyu Islands and in Japan, in 1955 and in 1965 279

National Income Per Capita and Disposable Income Per Capita in the Ryukyu Islands and in Japan in 1961 and in 1966 283

National Income Per Capita and Disposable Income Per Capita in Twelve Japanese Prefectures and in the Ryukyu Islands in Fiscal 1963 284

Per Capita School Expenditures during 1964 and Number of Students per Classroom in 1963 in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands 290

Comparisons in Medical and Dental Facilities and Personnel between Japan and the Ryukyu Islands 292

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Page

Opinion Survey on Okinawan Uneasiness Resulting from the Presence of the United States Bases 397

Opinion Survey of Okinawan Views on the Value of the United States Bases for East Asian Security 398

Opinion Survey on the Relative Importance Placed by Okinawans on Various Proposed Reforms 410

Opinion Survey of Okinawan Views Concerning the United States 412

Opinion Survey of Okinawan Views on the Economic Value of the United States Bases for Their Personal Livelihood 438

Opinion Survey of Okinawan Demands from the Japanese Government 464

Opinion Survey of Okinawan Views on Reversion and on Other Proposals for Their Future Political Status .. 489-490

Schoolteachers' Salaries in One Japanese Prefecture and in the Ryukyu Islands 501

Opinion Survey of Okinawan Reactions to the November 1969 Joint Communique on Reversion 627-628

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands* provides a case study of American foreign rule that developed when this type of rule was no longer politically fashionable and the Western democracies felt compelled to liquidate their overseas possessions. Beginning as a wartime military occupation, United States administration of Okinawa turned into a semi-permanent, peacetime form of alien rule, without ever losing its security raison d'être. As a result, this study could not follow the traditional approach used in studies of colonialism.

Alien rule has usually been referred to as "colonialism." Since the ideological and historical overtones of this term have made it lose its objective analytical utility, the author prefers, in connection with Okinawa, to use interchangeably the terms "foreign rule," "alien rule," and "dependency relationship." These are defined as the exercise of political control by one nationality over another under circumstances in which this situation is clearly recognized by both parties, undesired by the subject population and

---

*The terms "Okinawa" and "Ryukyu Islands" in most usages mean the same thing and will generally be used interchangeably in this study. A more comprehensive discussion of the two terms will be found in the next chapter.

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where both peoples inhabit geographically distinct areas, making possible an ultimate political separation between them.

The successful practice of foreign rule is in our age limited to a few types of situations. A partly modernized ruling power can, for instance, successfully control a relatively underdeveloped population, as the Portuguese do in their various overseas territories. One ethnic group, or even one tribe, can similarly control other groups, as the Arabs control Druzes and Kurds in Syria and Berbers in Morocco, and Iranians control Azerbaijanians.

Foreign rule can also be successfully imposed by totalitarian powers whose ideology is so intense and dynamic that they can effectively combine repression with novel forms of political manipulation. Because of their ideology these states are unusually determined to retain their control, and they are able to recruit among the subject population followers who place a supposed mutual cause above their own national aspirations. Great Russians, for example, successfully control the Ukranians and the many other nationalities of the USSR, as well as the East European satellites. Striking examples of such imposition of foreign rule are the Soviet involvement in the Czechoslovakian revolt of 1968, and the Chinese Communist domination of Tibet.

A third category for the successful exercise of foreign rule involves situations where the ruler is much larger, richer and more powerful than the subject population, or where the subject is completely dependent economically on

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its governors. The existence of either or both of these conditions makes demands for self-determination impractical unless special factors, such as influences originating from the international system, help activate the claims of the local inhabitants. In the case of Italian rule over the South Tyrolian Austrian minority, for instance, international influences have not been sufficiently intense to make a local secessionist movement effective. In Okinawa, however, native opposition to American alien rule grew as the importance of international factors increased.

This work, the first comprehensive public study of United States rule in Okinawa,[1] looks at American rule as essentially the problem of obtaining Ryukyuan acceptance for a foreign administration geared to the exploitation of the archipelago's strategic advantages, and of the native reaction to these efforts.

As a democracy interested in the friendship of Japan, the nation from which Okinawa had been severed, and as a great power engaged in a struggle for influence in Asia and Africa, the United States had to gain the reasonable acquiescence of the local population for its regime in order to turn its rule over the Ryukyus into an asset. Ideally this meant, to use Anil Seal's concept concerning British rule over India, a small number of aliens governing the native masses by generally relying on the cooperation of a minority among the local population and on the passivity of most of the remainder.[2]

In analyzing the problems the United States faced in

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attaining this objective, a variety of factors have to be considered. The extent to which the pursuit of the strategic American objective helped to increase or decrease the Okinawan acceptance of United States administration will be examined. Of major concern will be the particular approach used by the United States in governing the Ryukyu Islands and its influence on the acceptability of American rule to the local population.

Such an analysis of American rule in Okinawa raises the question of the extent to which American policies pursued in the Ryukyu Islands reflected the national characteristics and traditions of the United States. It also suggests a comparison with American foreign rule in other overseas possessions to determine whether there exists a distinctive American style in governing dependencies.

Although such a comparative study is beyond the scope of this dissertation, as a point of departure, it is useful to look at some American traditions that might have influenced the policies pursued in Okinawa, and briefly review the American experience with other overseas possessions acquired since 1898.

Few nations could have been more encumbered by their traditions than the United States in its practice of foreign rule. The United States came into existence as separate European colonies that later succeeded in winning jointly their independence through a successful revolution. The same American colonists who fought against foreign rule,

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however, had themselves been invaders who had settled on the shores of a distant continent and appropriated land belonging to the indigenous inhabitants. After winning their independence, the citizens of the new nation embarked on a major expansion that resulted in their taking over a substantial portion of the North American continent. While this was happening, the United States was relatively sheltered from the realities of world power politics and expressed its disapproval of the expansionism of other nations.

The puritan tradition, with its emphasis on high moral principles to justify actions, reinforced this inconsistency and enabled embarrassing realities to be ignored. Territories were thus acquired in North America not for the purpose of ruling other populations but for settlement and later voluntary incorporation into the Union as political units possessing the same rights and privileges as those that had founded the Republic. The aboriginal inhabitants whose lands were taken were few in numbers. They had made only a very limited use of a vast and wealthy continent and were also very primitive. It was therefore not considered unjust that they were driven from their ancestral soil and into reservations, nor was this called "imperialism." Finally, as Hans Kohn has pointed out, the idea became prevalent in the United States that the term "empire" applied only to an overseas, or a "sea," empire and not to a "land" empire.[3]

When the United States became a great power and found herself obliged to shoulder heavier international responsi-

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bilities, this heritage condemned her to frequent contradictions between words and deeds, between her ideology and the actions she found it necessary to take, and sometimes between the different policies she pursued. In the field of alien rule these contradictions translated into a taking over of dependencies, with apologies and denials that traditional dependency relationships were involved. The result, set forth in detail in the course of this study, was that the American Government developed in Okinawa the democratic institutions that were bound to undermine its own rule.

In 1898 the United States embarked on a new course in her expansion. The peoples brought under American control from that time on could no longer be dismissed as mere aborigines. Their population density was much higher, and they inhabited lands that Americans were as a rule not interested in settling and that were separated from the United States by that crucial salt water. Finally Americans began to recognize that they were engaged in the very practice they had so frequently condemned when indulged in by other powers, and public opinion within the United States became very much divided over the new expansionism.

Different administrations pursued different policies in respect to the overseas possessions. In the first decades of this century the Republicans were generally greater supporters of the new expansionism while the Democrats tended to advocate what would today be called "decolonization."[4] The two major political parties were, however, not always

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consistent on the question. To cite one example, Woodrow Wilson's administration greatly increased local autonomy in the Philippines and even asked the Congress to grant them independence, while simultaneously bringing Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic under much stronger American control.[5]

The contradictory forces and ideas influencing American policy were not confined to the first decades following the year 1898. Between the two world wars the United States began to liquidate part of its overseas empire and occasionally displayed great sympathy for independence movements in Ireland and India. During the Second World War American leaders seriously supported the idea of granting independence to all non self-governing territories. At the same time, the United States helped to work out the compromise in the United Nations Charter under which the objective of political development was to be "self-government or independence" in the trust territories, but only "self-government" in other non self-governing territories. To complicate matters further, during the Second World War the Armed Forces of the United States wished to see the Japanese Mandated Islands in the Western Pacific annexed by the United States, rather than placed under a United Nations Trusteeship. The needs of the United States Army and Navy were accommodated in Articles 82 and 83 of the United Nations Charter, which provided for "strategic areas" to be established within certain trust territories.[6]

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Since the end of World War II, defense policy has also created other contradictions for the United States, as with the policy to be pursued toward the overseas possessions of friendly or allied nations.

The Ryukyu Islands were placed under United States administration in 1945, and within the next six years there evolved the policy of retaining the archipelago for security reasons, on a more or less permanent basis, after the peace settlement with Japan. In this case, the conditions existing since the end of the Second World War compounded the contradictions encountered earlier in other dependencies governed by the United States. In addition to the special relationship between the Ryukyus and Japan, a nation whose friendship is of great importance to the United States, the cold war and the late stage in the history of Western dependency relationships in which the American administration of Okinawa was begun have greatly complicated the problems faced in this latest overseas dependency.

The contradictions and confusion within the United States itself on the subject of foreign rule were reflected in the administration of its dependencies.

The formal overseas expansion of the United States began in 1898, when the Western era of imperial domination was already past its prime, and the cruder form of domination that had characterized earlier periods was giving way to more benign principles. Ruling powers now had to justify their dominion over subject peoples not only in terms of

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organizing the world politically and spreading Western laws and institutions, but also in terms of benefiting the native populations.[7]

Where the United States acquired dependencies for material reasons, these reasons were often strategic, as with Okinawa, the Panama Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, Guam, Samoa and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

Feelings of guilt and the consequent need to justify its foreign rule prompted the United States to accord an ambiguous legal status to its overseas possessions. The peculiar status given to a dependency such as the Philippines was that of "unincorporated territory."[8] The inhabitants of a dependency of this sort were not American citizens in the full sense of the word. They were governed only in accordance with "fundamental" principles of the Constitution of the United States, but not all constitutional rights applied to them. They were required to accept the ideology of the English-speaking peoples, but the Congress could at any time sever the connection between the United States and the "unincorporated territories" and deprive their inhabitants of the status of United States nationals or citizens.[9]

Thus the newly acquired possessions were placed under the American flag, but were not incorporated as full-fledged, or even prospective, members of the body politic. At the same time, the United States was able to claim that it was not engaged in the practice of foreign rule.

The American style of governing overseas dependencies

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could best be characterized as "apologetic."

It appears that the United States, from the beginning of its rule over the Philippines, had intended to grant ultimate independence. The primary American goal in this dependency was not economic gain, and the United States even assumed many of the costs that dependent peoples have usually had to pay for their development, and stressed education more than any other ruling power in the Far East.[10] Thus constitutional issues and the development of legislative and political processes constituted a primary goal of United States policy in the Philippines. The Filipinos were trained for self-government in an atmosphere that made it almost impossible for a large American community to flourish in their islands.[11]

As a rule, no large-scale settlement of Americans or of other outsiders took place in the overseas possessions. The major exception was Hawaii, which was destined for complete incorporation into the Union. There was, however, a movement of American businessmen into the other dependencies.

The United States generally permitted as much freedom of political expression in her overseas territories as could be found in the dependencies of any ruling power. The local customs of the dependent populations were respected and as a rule no attempts were made to transform them into Americans. There existed, however, some apparently unavoidable limits to this liberalism. Filipinos could, for instance, only enjoy "the greatest autonomy and the greatest liberty com-

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patible with the high purposes and the obligations which the United States had contracted with the most civilized nations of the world." Despite the great respect shown for local customs, these had to give way when they conflicted with a great principle of American government.[12]

In traditional American thinking economic growth and prosperity were matters left largely to private initiative. Education, on the other hand, had long been a government responsibility. One of the time-honored functions of the system of free public education has been to provide training for citizenship in a democratic society. As the United States has always seemed to consider the spread of democracy throughout the world a kind of "civilizing mission " on her part, an additional reason existed for encouraging educational and political progress in her dependencies. As a result, in a dependency like the Philippines the United States accomplished more in the political and educational spheres then in the field of economics.[13]

American enthusiasm for the democratic form of government was responsible for the granting of wide autonomy to the overseas possessions within a few decades of their acquisition. Of the two United States dependencies with a real potential for independence one, the Philippines, was ultimately given this status and the other, Puerto Rico, was given the right to opt for independence whenever its inhabitants should so desire.

The Philippines became the first Western dependency in

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Asia to achieve independence through the voluntary action of the ruling power.[14]

In 1950, the Congress gave Puerto Ricans the right to draw up their own constitution. When this had been completed, in 1952, Puerto Rico became a "free and associated state" with a greater degree of local self-government than any American dependency had ever enjoyed before. The United States then informed the United Nations General Assembly that, whenever the Legislature of Puerto Rico adopted a resolution asking for more complete self-government or even for independence, the President would recommend to Congress that this be granted.[15]

Whether intentionally or accidentally, American overseas possessions usually became economically dependent on the United States. In 1909 the Philippine Assembly, to cite one such instance, petitioned Congress not to institute free trade, meaning the duty-free import of Filipino products into the United States. The request was not granted and, ultimately, a degree of economic dependence developed that made it necessary for the free-trade policy to be extended for twenty-eight years after the Philippines became independent in 1946.[16]

Many Puerto Ricans have long feared that independence might mean that economic ties with the United States would be cut. The small number who want independence also want special economic arrangements, including subsidies and tariff preferences.[17]

Attitudes within the United States in regard to the

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dependencies have always been mixed. Some business groups that had acquired interests in the Philippines and in Puerto Rico opposed independence and frequently tried to exploit the general American lack of concern with the dependencies in order to manipulate the situation to their own advantage. At the same time, a fear of Filipino competition, mainly connected with the dairy, cottonseed and beet sugar industries, turned other domestic American interests into advocates of Philippine independence. But the predominant attitude within the United States concerning the overseas possessions was one of apathy, confusion and neglect. Americans were not particularly interested in "foreigners," whether these were legally United States citizens and nationals or not.[18]

The general lack of American interest in the overseas possessions is not surprising. The United States' size and wealth providing Americans with almost unlimited opportunities at home, the business orientation of the population, the geographical distance from the other power centers of the world, the long non-involvement in international politics and the resultant feeling of security, all combined to deprive the United States of a compelling national reason for acquiring overseas dependencies. The guilt feelings concerning the practice of foreign rule and the resulting uneasiness about the dependencies were not calculated to increase American popular involvement in their affairs. Consequently it was often impossible to detect a clear purpose in the policies pursued in the dependencies, and at times it even seemed

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doubtful that there had ever been any meaningful reason for acquiring the dependencies.

According to a former Governor of Puerto Rico, Rexford G. Tugwell, the only justification for keeping Puerto Ricans citizens of the United States but without a state of their own and without real representation in Congress might have been the acknowledgement that the situation was temporary, coupled with a declaration of intentions for the future. For several decades no such declaration was forthcoming, however, and Washington apparently had no intention of issuing a statement of specific overall policy aims for Puerto Rico.[19]

In the view of the Ambassador of the Philippines to the United Nations, Salvador P. Lopez, United States policy toward his country was one of "indecision and drift," pursued by a divided government. Not even President McKinley seemed at the time of acquisition to have had any idea as to what to do with the new dependency. Moreover, as the United States had entered what represented for it a new field, no officials could be found in Washington with any experience in governing overseas dependencies.[20]

The lack of experience in governing dependencies, the guilt feelings caused by the exercise of dominion over alien populations, and the general apathy and neglect concerning overseas possessions probably all contributed to the disorganized, haphazard, manner in which the new territories were all too frequently administered.

In the opinion of former Governor Tugwell, the creation

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of some sort of "colonial office" in Washington was long overdue, but he could find no desire in Congress or the country at large to set up such a department.[21] It was not unusual for the United States Government to place overseas possessions under military or naval administration for periods of many years. The Bureau of Insular Affairs, which supervised Puerto Rican affairs, was until 1934 a part of the War Department. Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands were for many years under Navy administration.[22]

Thomas R. Adam has described the typical Governor of an American overseas dependency as virtually isolated in his territory, without any proper channels of communication with his home government. He has to deal individually with all the different departments, commissions, bureaus and Congressional Committees whose areas of jurisdiction touch on any question affecting his territory. In practice, the Governor has to linger at the back doors of Congressional Committees, or in departmental waiting rooms, hoping for any casual favors he can get for his territory.[23]

In the experience of former Governor Tugwell, any Governor with a real desire to improve conditions in Puerto Rico often found that the various Washington bureaus, agencies and Congressional Committees gave him the "run around" and accorded the lowest priority to his requests for funds and for the appropriate laws and regulations. Only a Governor with the proper connections in the capital was able to accomplish anything. According to Tugwell, the general feeling in

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Washington was that Puerto Rico was a political waste, and for this reason it was best to forget about the territory and keep the issues foggy. The Division of Territories remained a governmental organization manned by personnel that hardly reached beyond the level of clerks and secretaries. It lacked the necessary specialists and technicians and had virtually no objective beyond maintaining international contacts with the territorial government.[24]

These traditionally ambiguous American attitudes toward, and practice of, alien rule provides the relevant background for an examination of the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands. As will be shown, this administration resembled in many ways those of the older overseas dependencies. But there were also some significant differences. This study will attempt to account for these differences in terms of the changed circumstances under which the responsibility for governing Okinawa was assumed.

In short, the two main subjects of this study are: The problems facing the United States in obtaining Okinawan acceptance for an alien regime whose sole purpose was the exploitation of the archipelago's strategic potential and the effects on the Okinawans of what could be called "the American style of foreign rule" in the achievement of this objective.

These two central ideas, as well as the evidence uncovered during the course of the study, suggested a number of additional questions of concern to this work.

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According to various schools of political thought, a highly industrialized power such as the United States is motivated to rule over alien populations for strictly economic reasons. To what extent, then, would official American interest in Okinawa, when compared to American interest in economically more important territories, like Puerto Rico or the Philippines, tend to confirm or to disprove this contention? The standard for judging "official interest" in a dependency will, in this case, be the degree of reluctance in granting effective autonomy or independence, on the assumption that the greater the interest in an overseas territory, the less willing the ruler will be to relinquish his control.

In the course of her administration of the Ryukyu Islands the United States made a number of serious errors, apparently avoidable, that seriously complicated her administration of Okinawa. While human errors are unavoidable, did those that were made suggest a relation to the American style in governing overseas territories? For instance, must the United States oppose leftist movements and depend on smaller conservative ruling groups?

At a certain point, local acquiescence to the continuation of the alien American regime appears to have ended, and the dependency relationship entered a new and far more difficult stage. Was this change related to the peculiarly American characteristics reflected in the policies pursued in the archipelago? To what extent were these characteristics responsible for the many contradictions encountered during

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the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands?

Why did the Okinawan reversion movement start when it did? Did the United States have to grant widespread local autonomy in order to gain acceptance for its rule? Finally, what role did events within Okinawa play in the final decision of the United States Government to return the Ryukyu Islands to Japan?

It is hoped that this study will contribute to an understanding of what happened in Okinawa after the United States took over the administration of the archipelago, and of the particular American style in governing dependencies.

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NOTES

[1]The non-classified research conducted, in Western languages in particular, on Okinawan political problems has been rather limited. In the twenty-seven years since United States Forces landed in the Ryukyuan archipelago various articles have treated this subject and related questions, and classified studies on different aspects of the Okinawan problem have been conducted either by, or for, the United States Government. More comprehensive non-classified works have mostly concerned themselves with specific problems that arose as part of the larger question or with Ryukyuan history, geography or anthropology.

As examples of these writings it is possible to mention James W. Tull, The Ryukyu Islands, Japan's Oldest Colony, America's Newest; An Analysis of Policy and Propaganda, dated 1953; Mikio Higa, Politics and Parties in Post-war Okinawa, (1963); and George H. Kerr, Okinawa, The History of an Island People, (1958). Unfortunately, this excellent history of the Ryukyus ends more or less with the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. In the late 1960's Professor Douglas H. Mendel, Jr. conducted a study on Okinawan attitudes toward the Vietnamese war, and John Yellin was writing a master's thesis at Columbia University on the Okinawan issue in Japanese politics. In 1969 E. Morris completed Okinawa, a Tiger by the Tail, a combination history, discussion of contemporary problems and narrative based on the author's personal experiences in the archipelago. In 1966 a dissertation on the civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands during the 1950's was completed by Robert Foster Hewett, Jr. In 1970 Akio Watanabe's The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-U.S. Relations was published dealing, as the title indicates, with those aspects of the problem that concerned the relations between the two countries.

[2]Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 8-9.

[3]Hans Kohn, "Reflections on Colonialism," The Idea of Colonialism, ed. Robert Strausz-Hupé and Harry W. Hazard (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 7-8.

[4]Julius W. Pratt, "Anticolonialism in United States Policy," ed. Strausz-Hupé and Hazard, op. cit., pp. 117-122.

[5]Ibid., pp. 123-124 and David Bernstein, The Philippine Story (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947), pp. 91-97 and 100-101.

[6]Julius W. Pratt, "Anticolonialism in United States Policy," ed. Strausz-Hupé and Hazard, op. cit., pp. 126-132.

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See also articles 73B and 76B of the United Nations' Charter.

[7]Salvador P. Lopez, "The Colonial Relationship," The United States and the Philippines, The American Assembly of Columbia University (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 26-27.

[8]Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[9]Thomas R. Adam, Modern Colonialism, Institutions and Policies (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), pp. 15-17. See also DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).

[10]Lucian W. Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," The Politics of the Developing Areas, ed., Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 96-97.

[11]Ibid., pp. 96-97 and Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 89-108, 129-155.

[12]Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 83, 85.

[13]Lopez, "The Colonial Relationship," ed. The American Assembly of Columbia University, op. cit., p. 21.

[14]Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 129-155.

[15]Pratt, "Anticolonialism in United States Policy," ed. Strausz-Hupé and Hazard, op. cit., pp. 140-143.

[16]Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

[17]Rexford Guy Tugwell, The Stricken Land, the Story of Puerto Rico (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1947), p. 71.

[18]Ibid., p. 70. See also Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 125, 129.

[19]Tugwell, op. cit., p. 71.

[20]Lopez, "The Colonial Relationship," ed. The American Assembly of Columbia University, op. cit., pp. 10-13, 26-27.

[21]Tugwell, op. cit., p. 71-73.

[22]Ibid., pp. 2, 3, 70. See also Adam, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

[23]Adam, Loc. cit.

[24]Tugwell, op. cit., pp. 71-74 and also elsewhere.

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CHAPTER II

THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS

An analysis of the various problems encountered in the Okinawan dependency relationship must begin with an examination of the purposes, origins and nature of the governmental system established by the United States in the Ryukyu Islands. This, of necessity, has also to include a brief outline of the larger international setting within which American rule over Okinawa was conducted.

This chapter will perform this function by first presenting the international setting of the Okinawan dependency relationship, and then by analyzing the American reasons for governing the archipelago, the legitimation of United States rule, its legal foundations and status and the nature of the regime that existed in the Ryukyu Islands. This chapter will also examine the development and structures of both the native and foreign strata in the twin-layered form of government established by the ruling power in Okinawa.

From a clarification of the larger setting and of the nature of the administrative system found in the Ryukyu Islands under American rule, the study will in subsequent chapters be able to proceed to an analysis of the

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many problems which in so many cases were either based on, or else influenced by, these factors and by the fundamental objective that brought them into being.

The International Setting of the Okinawan Dependency Relationship

While studying the reflection of internal American characteristics and national traditions in the Ryukyuan policies of the United States, it will be recognized that these policies had to undergo a certain modification in order to accommodate themselves to the local and international conditions prevailing during the period of American administration.

These particular conditions were based on two important facts. One of these was that Okinawa had formed part of a large and important nation before coming under United States administration. The second fact was the existence of a world-wide power struggle which was responsible for the American decision to retain control over the Ryukyu Islands after a peace treaty had been concluded with their former mother country.

Before proceeding with an analysis of the internal dimensions of the Okinawan dependency relationship, which forms the main subject of this study, the relation to these international factors must be briefly outlined in order to identify the respective influence of the local and international aspects of the problem on American policy decisions in regard to the Ryukyu Islands.

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The most important factors affecting United States decisions can be narrowed down to a quadrangle made up of strategic and international political considerations, Okinawan internal factors, Japanese domestic politics and Japanese-American relations.

For the purposes of this study strategic and international political considerations form a single unit. This is done partly out of a desire to simplify the constellation of factors that affected United States policy, and partly because the two are really different aspects of the same global power struggle that prompted the American decision to retain Okinawa on a more or less permanent basis after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

What could be expected to have constituted a fifth factor, American domestic politics, exerted only negligible influence. This can be explained in terms of a general characteristic of dependency relationships.

In a democracy the legislature, as a body, usually exercises a lesser degree of control over dependency affairs, and it might be added over military and foreign affairs generally, than it does over domestic matters. This indicates, in part, a lower degree of public interest in the problems of the dependencies. In the United States, there has traditionally been found to exist a distinct lack of concern for the overseas possessions. This situation left the field wide open for the manipulation of dependency affairs at the executive and Congressional Committee levels

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on the part of any interest group with a stake in one of the overseas possessions. It will be brought out in this study that in the case of Okinawa the only groups displaying a serious interest were the armed services, the military sympathizers and the professional economizers belonging to various Congressional Committees, and State Department officials worried about the effects of Ryukyuan policy on Japanese-American relations. United States policy toward Okinawa was thus basically determined by interactions between the Pentagon, the State Department and the Congressional Committees controlling the purse strings. The White House had to act frequently as the mediator. Under these circumstances the Ryukyu Islands could hardly have constituted an issue in domestic American politics, even if at the last moment, when the decision on reversion had already been made, some Senators felt that Okinawa could be used for pressuring Japan on her textile exports to the United States and to re-assert the Senate's influence on foreign policy making. For these reasons, with the exception of some discussion of the military-diplomatic-Congressional Committee triangle of intra-governmental politics, very little attention is devoted in this study to the influence of domestic American politics on Ryukyuan policy.

It should be pointed out, however, that Okinawa possessed a potential for entering domestic American politics. This could have occurred if the situation within the Ryukyu Islands had deteriorated to the point of

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
attracting widespread attention in the United States. As throughout the period of American rule this never materialized, domestic American politics have been left out from the quadrangle of main factors determining United States policy toward the Ryukyus.

Basically, the quadrangle of main influences worked out in the following manner: Considerations of American strategy affected both Okinawan internal factors and Japanese politics; Okinawan internal factors, in turn, influenced both Japanese politics and strategic and international political considerations; Japanese politics, for their part, were expected to affect Japanese-American relations once a certain pressure point was reached, and this was naturally bound to influence strategy and international politics. The internal Okinawan factors also exerted a direct, but weaker, influence on Japanese foreign policy. Their greatest ability to influence Japanese foreign policy was indirect, through the effects they could have on Japanese domestic politics. For the sake of greater clarity this complex interrelation is pictured in diagramatic form on the following page.

The main concern of the United States rested with strategic and international political considerations, mainly the former, and with the related field of Japanese-American relations. Relations with Japan were felt to be of the greatest importance for both their intrinsic value and their bearing on the strategic picture in the Far East.

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The Quadrangle of Main Factors Affecting American Decisions Concerned with the Okinawan Dependency Relationship



Not included in the quadrangle of main factors, but under some circumstances a potential factor: domestic American politics.

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In a direct way, domestic Okinawan developments only exerted a secondary influence on American policy. Indirectly these developments were, however, considered to have been a major factor in United States decision making. Due to the small size of the Ryukyu Islands, and due to their economic dependence on the United States, it would have been theoretically possible for this country to suppress strong opposition to its rule for an indefinite period of time. The United States was, however, indirectly vulnerable to determined Okinawan pressure in three ways.

Being a democracy the United States was not in a position to take the stronger and more effective measures that a dictatorship could use in order to neutralize opposition. There existed a limit to the degree of suppression that could have been carried out without turning Okinawa into a negative factor in domestic American politics. The suppression that, within the permissible limits, could be undertaken tended frequently to stimulate opposition rather than to discourage it, particularly during the last years of the dependency relationship.

The United States was also vulnerable to Okinawan pressures because the Ryukyus constituted only a very small portion of the Japanese nation which had regained its independence in 1952. The United States had a vital interest in the continued friendship of Japan, and the effects of Ryukyuan opposition on domestic Japanese politics, and through this on future Japanese-American relations, repre-

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sented an important factor which American policy could not ignore.

Finally, a sufficiently serious deterioration of political conditions within the Ryukyu Islands would undoubtedly have affected the operational efficiency of the military installations located there, and would have hurt the United States in the struggle with the Communist Powers for influence over the "Third World," by casting Americans in the role of oppressors of an Asian people. This represents the direct feedback effect of internal Okinawan factors on strategic and international political considerations.

In the chapters to follow, whenever internal Ryukyuan developments will be judged to have played a part in influencing United States policy toward the archipelago, the above must be kept in mind. In other words, American policy was only secondarily influenced by such direct effects of possible Okinawan unrest as greater complications and higher costs in governing the Ryukyu Islands. What worried mostly the United States Government were the indirect effects that difficulties in Okinawa might have had on Japanese-American relations and on other strategic and political aspects of the world struggle with the Communist Powers. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the interest of the United States in governing the Ryukyus was from the late 1940's on restricted to their strategic value for this struggle.

Unfortunately, a detailed examination of all the

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factors affecting United States policy in the Ryukyu Islands is too large a task for this study. Doubtless, cold war strategy and the role of the Okinawan issue in Japanese domestic politics and in Japanese-American relations were significant in American decisions about the Ryukyu Islands. They were, however, not the only factors in these decisions and do not comprise the subject of this study. The international influences are introduced at this point in order to place the study of United States administration of Okinawa in its proper perspective. Although this study concentrates on developments within the Islands, strategic considerations, which shaped the entire dependency relationship, deserve some elucidation here.

The Ryukyu Islands are located south of the southernmost main island of Japan, and only a few hundred miles from the coast of what constitutes the heart of mainland China. This position makes it possible for airpower based on Okinawa to operate effectively over the entire expanse of land and water found between southeastern Siberia and the islands of Indonesia. The Ryukyus are also very useful for ground operations, both as a jumping off point for direct assaults and as a staging and support area for hostilities conducted almost anywhere within the Far East. Their insular position makes them invulnerable to direct overland attack, the form of warfare in which continental powers such as China and the USSR would enjoy a great advantage, and makes it possible to rely for their defense primarily

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on the air and naval power in which the United States has traditionally excelled.

The United States conquered the Ryukyu Islands in a costly battle that took place toward the end of the Second World War, with the intention of utilizing them in the expected invasion of Japan. For reasons unconnected with Okinawa this invasion never took place. At the end of World War II American strategists had thought of retaining the Ryukyus to guard against a resurgence of hostile Japanese military power. This eventuality was soon ruled out. Because of this Okinawa lost temporarily its strategic usefulness and was neglected for a few years. Moreover, as all of Japan was then under United States military occupation, there was time to delay the final decision on the future status of the archipelago.

In 1949, the victory of the Communist Forces in the Chinese Civil War created suddenly a new and important role for Okinawa and, one year later, the Korean War contributed much to drive this point home. The United States included in the peace treaty with Japan a clause permitting American administration of the Ryukyu Islands after the termination of the military occupation of Japan in 1952.

This action was based on the desire of American military leaders to possess within the Far Eastern area at least one major, strategically located, base under complete United States control. In a base of this sort the armed forces of the United States could, in theory, be free from

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the limitations imposed normally on military installations situated on land under the sovereignty of another state and subject to the changing political moods which may occur within that state. The inability of Japan to bargain as an equal in the negotiations for a peace treaty conducted while she still found herself under American military occupation, provided the United States with an opportunity to acquire a particularly suitable Far Eastern base under ideal conditions.

The American decision makers had separated the Ryukyu Islands from Japan and had placed them under United States jurisdiction on the assumption that only through this could the strategic advantages provided by their location be fully enjoyed. They then proceeded on the further assumption that only by controlling all aspects of the internal affairs of the Ryukyu Islands would it be possible to safeguard the American right to govern the archipelago.

No one is today in a position to judge whether these assumptions were fully justified or not. For better or for worse, they formed the basis of American policy toward Okinawa until 1969, or at least until one or two years prior to that date. These assumptions are, of course, closely related to the question studied here.

The Objective of American Rule

The United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands can only be understood in terms of these assumptions concerning American strategic needs in the Far East.

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The efficient operation of the Okinawan military bases and their continued free use on the part of the United States became the "raison d'être" of American rule and the basis of its policies. This definition of the role of the United States in the Ryukyu Islands was to provide both advantages and disadvantages for their inhabitants and to limit Washington's options in governing Okinawa.

That this view of United States rule in the Ryukyus dominated the thinking of virtually all important United States officials connected with the affairs of the archipelago is brought out in countless statements on this subject.

In the annual Congressional hearings held in Washington to consider Ryukyuan problems the testimony of the first important witness appearing on behalf of the government agencies connected with Okinawan administration began almost invariably with a statement similar to the following sample introduction given in 1966:[1]

> The United States has but one reason for continuing to exercise in the Ryukyus those plenary rights of administration granted by Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. This reason is the Ryukyu Island's singular strategic value to the security of the United States and the free world. These islands, centrally located with respect to vital areas of the Far East, provide a major link in our forward defense barrier in the Pacific. Our base in Okinawa is essential. The presence of our military base there provides us the capability to bring our military power to bear rapidly in the event of aggression.
>
> The validity of the foregoing statement has been forcefully demonstrated during the past year, when we were able rapidly to redeploy troops and supplies from Okinawa to Vietnam.

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> Our unilateral flexibility of decision and movement lies in the exclusive administrative rights held by the United States under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. The continuation of this unilateral flexibility is essential."

Throughout the 1960's the annual Budget messages sent by President Kennedy and President Johnson to the Congress contained a sentence reading as follows:[2]

> To protect the security of the free world, the United States will continue responsibility for the administration of the Ryukyu Islands as long as conditions of threat and tension in the Far East require the maintenance of military bases in the islands.

The Special Report No. 7 on United States-Japan Political Relations of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies states that it is "barely conceivable that the Ryukyuan bases can retain some United States operational significance under Japanese administration."[3]

United States Senator John O. Pastore expressed the matter more bluntly, in language that left no doubt: "We are only in Okinawa because we don't want Peiping to take over Tokyo. Let us face it. That is why we are there."[4]

In June 1962 the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Lieut. General Paul W. Caraway, wrote to the newly appointed Civil Administrator of the Ryukyus, Dr. Shannon McCune, welcoming the latter's decision to accept the appointment and adding some pertinent information: "... As I told you when we met in Washington, you will find your duties and responsibilities heavy and exacting. They will require of you a considerable political adroitness, since we must manage these islands for a particular purpose,

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which in turn does not provide any great amount of flexibility in our actions..."[5]

The maintenance of United States administration over the Ryukyu Islands which made possible the military "unilateral flexibility of decision and movement" carried with it an additional problem. This was pointed out by the incumbent Civil Administrator of the Ryukyus, Stanley S. Carpenter, who declared in the fall of 1968 "We have learned from history that a military base cannot be effectively operated in an area where the people are hostile to its presence." He added further that it was the task of the United States Administration in the Ryukyus "to maintain on the part of the Ryukyuan people a reasonable acquiescence to the presence of the United States base and to the continued administration of these islands by the United States."[6] Similar views were repeated on many other occasions by various American government officials.

No study of the problem of Okinawa can ignore the basic formula for American policy in the Ryukyus. The security interests of the United States and of the Western World demanded the free and efficient use of the Okinawan bases by the Armed Forces of the United States. This objective required the direct American administration of the Islands and, in turn, was dependent on the establishment of conditions in the Ryukyus that would maintain among the local population a climate of acceptability for the American presence, without, however, yielding any of the rights of

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sovereignty possessed by the United States in the archipelago.

For more than two decades this formula guided American policy in the Ryukyu Islands and helped to enhance the military posture of the United States in the Far East. Unfortunately, this formula possessed not only a very limited flexibility, but its last part represented a basic contradiction. As a result of this, conditions were brought into being that were ultimately to defeat the first parts of the formula, which required direct American rule over Okinawa in order to ensure complete freedom in the use of the military bases.

The Legal Foundations of United States Administration and the Legal Status of the Ryukyu Islands

United States rule over the Ryukyu Islands enjoyed from the beginning a sound legal basis. However, strategic and political considerations compelled the United States to give the archipelago an ambiguous status that after 1952 could best be characterized as a glorified military occupation maintained after peace had been restored.

On March 26, 1945, the first landing was carried out by United States Forces in the Ryukyu Islands, on April 1st the battle for the main island of Okinawa began and within the next few months the entire archipelago was conquered. The culmination of this operation came on September 7th, when all Japanese Forces in the Ryukyus south of 30 degrees North Latitude surrendered. This action came just one week

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after the surrender of the Empire of Japan to the Allied Powers represented by General Douglas MacArthur.[7]

The United States thus originally acquired the Ryukyus by right of conquest, through military operations, in a war in which the United States was the defending party. United States military control was at first exercised in accordance with customary international law, as well as in keeping with the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907 (36 Stat. 2259). As the sole occupier, the United States was charged with the responsibility for providing government, including all measures necessary to preserve public order and safety.[8]

The United States governed the Ryukyu Islands for seven years as part of the wartime and postwar occupation of Japan. When, at the end of this period, Japanese sovereignty was restored, United States administration of the Ryukyus became based on treaty rights.

Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace signed on September 8, 1951 by most of the Allied Powers and Japan, and ratified on April 28, 1952, reads as follows:[9]

> Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Islands and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands,

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including their territorial waters.

There can be no question in terms of international law concerning the validity of the treaty rights over the Ryukyu Islands granted by this article to the United States. The Japanese, however, agreed to include this provision in the peace treaty while still under powerful American military occupation. Understandably anxious to regain their full sovereignty by means of this treaty, the Japanese Government had lacked free choice when it turned the Ryukyus over to United States administration. The Indian Government raised this point during the Peace Treaty negotiations. It was to constitute one of the reasons given by this government for refusing to attend the Peace Conference held in San Francisco in September 1951.[10]

Article 3 of the Peace Treaty gave the United States the right to exercise "all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction" over the Islands, "pending" an American proposal to place the Ryukyus under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, with the United States as the sole administering power. This matter remained "pending," with the United States exercising the supreme governmental power over the Islands, from 1951 until 1972, when the Ryukyus were returned to Japanese administration. For a number of reasons the proposal to the United Nations was never made.

A strategic trusteeship would have given to the United States the basic military rights needed in the

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Ryukyus. It would have had as its chief advantage whatever moral support could be derived from receiving the sanction of the United Nations for the existence of the American base-oriented regime. It is, however, most probable that this difference between an internationally recognized "trust" given to the United States over the Ryukyus and American administration of Okinawa under some other legal formula would have been regarded in Asia, where moral justification was most needed, as constituting mainly a difference in names. In either case, a predominantly White United States would have been ruling over an Asian people. It is furthermore highly doubtful if the United States could ever have received the desired trusteeship from the United Nations. A strategic trusteeship requires the approval of the Security Council and the USSR would almost certainly have exercised its veto against any such proposal made by the United States.[11]

The Japanese had always hoped that the Ryukyus would be returned one day. For this reason they disliked from the very beginning the idea of a United Nations Trusteeship. Trusteeship status would only have made any later changes in status more difficult. As some of the Allied nations desired at the time that the Islands should never be returned to Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had preferred to leave any future decision on the status of Okinawa solely to the discretion of the United States and Japan. Premier Yoshida and the American Chief Delegate to the Peace

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Conference, John Foster Dulles, agreed therefore to include the passages concerning a United Nations Trusteeship in the Peace Treaty, with the apparent understanding that in reality the United States would hold actual power in the Ryukyus for a vaguely defined period of time.[12]

After the ratification of the Peace Treaty the United States never considered seriously placing the Ryukyus under a United Nations Trusteeship. In 1952 John Foster Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "there has been no final crystallization of thought within the United States Government as to how to exercise the rights and privileges given us by Article 3." A little later the future Secretary of State added "we are not obligated even to apply for trusteeship." He further explained that the article in question stated merely that if the United States would apply for a trusteeship then Japan would concur.[13] Fourteen years later a high official of the Defense Department could only declare, at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, that the United States Government had "no plans whatsoever" for turning the Ryukyus into a United Nations Trusteeship.[14]

For many years important organs and officials of the United States Government saw American rule over the Ryukyus as a more or less permanent condition. In 1964, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway explained to a Congressional Committee that the United States tenure of the Ryukyus was indefinite, as it was due to tensions not

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of the United States' making.[15]

Secretary of State Dulles declared in December 1953 that the United States would continue to exercise the powers and rights possessed by her over the Ryukyus "so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East." This was interpreted by the House Armed Services Committee to mean that United States administration and responsibilities over the Ryukyus "are not provisional or temporary in nature," and that the United States was the "de facto sovereign."[16]

On September 5, 1951, while serving as Chief United States Delegate to the San Francisco Peace Conference, John Foster Dulles both clarified and complicated the legal status of the Ryukyu Islands by declaring that Japan would be permitted to retain what he called "residual sovereignty" over the archipelago. This statement seemed to emphasize that Okinawa would be returned to Japan some day through a bilateral arrangement.[17]

Through this declaration Dulles intended apparently to soften the impact of the detachment of the Ryukyus from Japan on both the Japanese and the Okinawans, by reminding them that the American interest in the Islands was exclusively strategic in nature and that Okinawa would be returned to Japan once its military role will have ended. Dulles must also have been influenced by the traditional American practice of devising a legal status for the dependencies which is intended to hide the existence of alien rule, satisfying thereby the democratic conscience of

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the United States.

There also existed, in particular from the Japanese point of view, a more precise legal meaning to the expression "residual sovereignty." This derived from the fact that, unlike what was done in the case of the Kurile Islands, Taiwan, Korea and other specifically enumerated areas, the Japanese Government had not declared in the Peace Treaty in regard to the Ryukyus that it "renounces all right, title and claim."[18]

The term "residual sovereignty" was interpreted in the House Armed Services Committee as an imprecise expression in international law, reflecting what is called Nudum Ius Soveranitatis, and therefore constituting nothing more than a kind of formal title of sovereign that did not confer on Japan the right to exercise any true sovereignty. According to a 1962 Congressional report, the only right retained by Japan as a result of the statement on residual sovereignty was the right to expect that the United States would not transfer the Ryukyus to a third party.[19] This meaning was also given to residual sovereignty in 1964 by Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes who added that "it means we don't have the total sovereignty so somebody must have what was left."[20]

On August 12, 1954, the United States District Court for Hawaii helped to clarify the meaning of residual sovereignty by ruling that an Okinawan resident of Honolulu was still a Japanese national, subject to the Alien Regis-

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tration Act. In this decision Judge J. Frank McLaughlin drew a distinction between United States de facto and Japanese de jure sovereignty over the Ryukyus. He cited the previously mentioned statement of John Foster Dulles at San Francisco, as well as a letter from the State Department's legal advisor, dated May 14, 1952, confirming that "sovereignty remains in Japan and the inhabitants are Japanese nationals."[21]

It can be seen from the concept of residual sovereignty and from its varying interpretations that the relationship between the United States and the Ryukyus was unique, not only when compared with other relationships which the United States has had with foreign states, but also when compared with the relationship normally existing between the National Government and territories under United States sovereignty.

Because the Islands had never been ceded by Japan they were not considered to be United States territory and United States statutory law was, as a whole, not applicable to the archipelago.

The law in the Ryukyus in force under American rule consisted of Japanese statutes enacted prior to 1945, and of the enactments of the local government and the United States Civil Administration, including those carried over from the earlier military government.[22]

United States Public Law 86-629 (the Price Act of 1960) contained in Section 6 the clause "Nothing in this

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Act shall be construed to extend the application of any law of the United States to the Ryukyu Islands which would not otherwise be applicable there."[23]

The peculiar legal status of the Ryukyu Islands under American rule is brought out in many ways. With the American conquest in 1945 the Ryukyus were effectively severed from Japan and Japanese postwar legislation was not, of itself, extended to the archipelago. A memorandum from General MacArthur, dated January 19, 1946, formally separated the Ryukyus from Japanese administration.[24] Japan, however, never ceded the Islands and the United States recognized Japanese residual sovereignty over the Ryukyus and refused to regard them as United States territory.

The special remaining legal connection between Japan and the Ryukyus continued to be brought out throughout the period of American administration. Japan was, for instance, the only nation permitted to maintain a diplomatic unit in Naha, the capital of the Ryukyus. It was called the "Southern Areas Liason Office" and was under the control of the Japanese Prime Minister, rather than under the Foreign Ministry.[25] When, in 1967, Ryukyuan fishing vessels were seized repeatedly by Indonesian authorities in their territorial waters, the United States felt that the primary responsibility for the protection of Okinawan vessels and their crews rested with her. Nevertheless, the United States also agreed to cooperate with Japan in this matter and raised no objections when the Japanese Ambassador in

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Jakarta intervened with the Indonesian Government in an effort to obtain the release of the vessels and their crews.[26]

An analysis of Japanese economic assistance to the Ryukyus and of Tokyo's increasing involvement in various consultative bodies connected with policy making for the Ryukyus will be presented in Chapter IV. This will bring out in greater detail the special connection that continued to exist between Japan and Okinawa during the period of United States administration.

The above discussion of the legal status of the Ryukyus reveals a very unusual status for the peacetime administration of a territory. A province was detached from one state, placed under the administration of another state that then declared it had not annexed this territory and that, out of military necessity, it was compelled to exercise de facto sovereignty over it. The new ruler then announced that this administration would continue only as long as military necessity for it existed and that the first state retained residual, sometimes called de jure, sovereignty over the territory concerned. To this must be added that the new ruling power had placed the territory under what amounted to a military administration, although it was termed officially a "Civil Administration." The conclusion must then be reached that this rather ambiguous status represented the unusual situation of a wartime military occupation continuing after the peace

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treaty had been signed and had come into effect. It is difficult to find another characterization for the status of the Ryukyu Islands between 1952 and 1972.

The American tradition of according an unusual status to the overseas territories was thus continued in the case of Okinawa. In the years when the movement for reunion with Japan became a serious problem for the United States, some Americans claimed that the peculiar status of Okinawa encouraged Okinawans to support this movement. It was charged that the concept of residual sovereignty indicated that the United States had no desire to retain permanently the Ryukyus and that Okinawans were, therefore, afraid to commit themselves to a greater support for American rule in the belief that this would be counted against them when Japanese rule is restored. Although the evidence presented in subsequent chapters does not support this view, an examination of the legal status of the Ryukyu Islands under American rule would not be complete without mention of this argument.

The Period of Officially Acknowledged Military Government

This period, which lasted from 1945 to 1952, can be characterized as one of frequent changes, some confusion and a great deal of neglect during the first four years, followed by increasing interest in the Islands and generally greater progress from 1949 on. The lack of a strategic role for Okinawa between the surrender of Japan in the late summer of 1945 and the victory of the Communist Forces in

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the Chinese Civil War in 1949 was responsible for this situation.

Although Okinawa was of no military use to the United States during the late 1940's, it was kept under American control in the expectation that some use for it would probably be found in the future. This resulted in a general neglect of the Ryukyus, and they soon turned into a sort of "forgotten backwater" for the Armed Forces of the United States, frequently serving as a dumping ground for second or third-rate military personnel. This was a regrettable status for a territory that had been largely devastated by the war and whose inhabitants were dependent on the American Armed Forces for their very survival.

In 1949 the so-called Vickery Report to the Department of the Army helped to make the Pentagon aware of the neglect of civil affairs in the Ryukyus and started a process of change. The events of that year in China and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 focused once more the attention on what had in Army slang come to be called "The Rock." The building of the great military bases dated from that period.[27]

A brief outline of the origins of Military Government and of local self-government, as well as of the major events in these fields during the late 1940's, will be presented in this and in the next subchapter.

Military Government was established on the same day, March 26, 1945, that United States Forces made their first

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landing in the Ryukyus, in the portion known as the Kerama Islands. Vice Admiral R. Kelly Turner, Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, was named Military Governor. By April 3rd a new Military Governor had been appointed, Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General of the Tenth Army. On April 5th, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander of all United States Forces in that part of the Pacific, issued an order placing the inhabitants of the entire archipelago under the authority of the United States Forces. As the American Forces gradually conquered the Ryukyus the Military Government spread over the Islands. By the time all hostilities of any importance had ended in the Ryukyus on June 21, 1945, practically the entire archipelago had come under United States military administration.[28]

Because American rule over the Ryukyus had begun in wartime, and as during the seven years following the surrender of Japan that nation also found herself under United States military occupation, no stigma was attached at the time to an official acknowledgement that Okinawa was under military rule.[29]

During the first years of the occupation there were several changes in command that reflected wartime and postwar military reorganizations. The Ryukyus were switched back and forth between the Army and the Navy. Within eight days of the first landing in the archipelago the post of Military Governor had been transferred from an Admiral to a General, but the overall responsibility for military

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government had remained with the Navy. This responsibility was, however, turned over to the Army early in August 1945, returned on September 21st of that year to the Navy, and finally transferred back to the Army on July 1, 1946, being placed at that time under the Commanding General, Army Forces Western Pacific.[30]

Within the first year of American rule over the Islands the Military Authorities took a symbolic action that may give some indication of their thinking on, and of their future plans for, the archipelago.

During the middle ages as well as later, from the early seventeenth to the late nineteenth centuries when it had enjoyed a semi-independent status as a monarchy paying tribute to both China and Japan, the archipelago was known as the Kingdom of the Ryukyus. With their official incorporation into the Meiji Empire, in 1879, the Ryukyus became a Japanese prefecture named "Okinawa," after the most important island in the archipelago which also contained most of the population. During the first months of the occupation the United States Authorities had used generally the Japanese name "Okinawa" for the entire island chain. On February 1, 1946, however, the name "United States Naval Military Government, Okinawa," was changed to "United States Naval Military Government, Ryukyu Islands." Thereafter, the American Authorities went usually out of their way to call the inhabitants of the archipelago Ryukyuans, and not Japanese or Okinawans. The aim of this

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policy was apparently to give the impression that the United States was not administering a part of the population of Japan, but a distinct national group that needed a separate governmental status.

In the struggle for the reversion of the Islands to Japan the difference between these two names was to play a symbolic role, as will be seen in subsequent chapters. The United States insisted on using the name "Ryukyu Islands," a reminder of the historical period when, in a curious parallel with the conditions existing between 1945 and 1972, the Islands did not form an integral part of Japan and owed their allegiance to two foreign powers. The reversion movements in both the archipelago and Japan were equally adamant on employing the name used during the time when the Islands had been a Japanese prefecture, Okinawa.[31]

Early Local Self-Government

The fact that the Islands were placed under military, or naval, rule did not mean that no measure of local autonomy was granted to the inhabitants. As early as August 15, 1945 approximately one hundred representatives of various local districts gathered at Ishikawa to discuss the establishment of an Okinawa Advisory Council, and five days later elected fifteen members of this council. On September 20th, only thirteen days after the final surrender of the remaining Japanese Forces in the archipelago, the Ryukyus were divided into sixteen districts, men and women over the age of twenty-five were given the right to vote and elections

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for councilmen were held. On the 25th, elections for sixteen district Mayors were also held.

On April 22, 1946, a Central Okinawan Administration was created and two days later a Ryukyuan, Koshin Shikiya, nominated for this office by the Okinawa Advisory Council, was appointed as the first Chief Executive of the new Administration. The functions of the Okinawa Advisory Council were then transferred to the new Chief Executive and to the Administration's new departments, council members later becoming heads of the twelve departments. The Okinawa Advisory Council was dissolved on April 26th and an Okinawan Assembly was established. On May 12, 1946, the Miyako Democratic Party was formed and on May 23rd the Chief Executive convened the new Okinawan Assembly. On December 1, 1946 the Central Okinawan Administration was renamed Okinawan Civilian Administration. Between June 1947 and February 1948 at least six political parties were formed, including two People's Parties and two Socialist Parties, these last two soon merging into a single party. In February 1948 popular elections were held for city, town and village Mayors and Assemblymen.[32]

On October 1, 1949, the Military Government established an Assembly for a Provisional Government of Okinawa and on the 29th the Okinawan Civilian Administration designated assembly districts and assemblymen from each district, an action that was approved by the Military Government two days later. On December 21, 1949, Provisional Government

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Assemblies were established for the four groups of islands (Guntos) into which the Ryukyus had been divided, namely, Yaeyama, Miyako, Okinawa (the main island) and Northern Ryukyus. On January 1, 1950, the Military Government formally established the four Gunto Governments. On the 20th an Interim Ryukyu Advisory Council was established, pursuant to Military Government Ordinance No. 1, and on May 10, 1950, Military Government Teams were established for the four Guntos. On September 17, 1950, elections were held for Gunto Governors and on the 24th for Gunto Assemblymen in all the Guntos except for the Northern Ryukyus, where elections were held on October 22nd and October 29th, respectively.[33]

It should be noted that only in the fall of 1949, when Okinawa had once more acquired a strategic role, did the Military Government take steps to bring into being a more effective, semi-autonomous, government for the entire archipelago. The formation of the four Gunto Governments was the first part in this process. When the decade of the 1950's began the impending signing of a peace treaty that would restore full sovereignty to Japan, while leaving the Ryukyus under a separate United States administration, made it even more urgent to "normalize" the governmental arrangements in use in the Islands by transforming the open wartime and postwar military occupation into a regime with a more permanent, peacetime, character. It is to these developments, that included the establishment of

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the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and the seeming civilianization of the Military Government, that the study will now turn.

Military Rule

On December 5, 1950, General Headquarters, United States Far East Command, issued a basic directive redesignating the Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands as the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and changing the title of the Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands to that of Deputy Governor, U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. The actual change in names was carried out ten days later. The title of Governor of the Ryukyu Islands was held by the United States Far East Commander, with Headquarters in Japan. Two years later any use of the word "occupation" to denote the presence of the armed services of the United States was dropped in favor of the term "United States Forces."[34]

The United States Administration of the Ryukyu Islands substituted the word "civil" for the word "military" in its official title. The word "civil" seemed, however, to have as its main meaning a concern with civilian affairs in the Ryukyus, rather than a real change in the military character of the Administration.

In 1965, almost fifteen years after the change in names, an official directory chart of the U.S. Civil Administration showed the following composition: the of-

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fice of the High Commissioner was headed by Lieut. Gen. Watson, the High Commissioner, and included a civilian Political Advisor, a Special Assistant who was a Colonel, an Information Officer, also a Colonel, a Secretary, a Major, a Language Aid, a Major, and an Administrative Officer, who was a Commissioned Warrant Officer.

USCAR itself had as its highest official under the High Commissioner a Civil Administrator who was now a civilian, Gerald Warner, but who until 1962 had been a Brigadier General. Going down the chain of command, the Deputy Civil Administrator was a Colonel, the Executive Officer, also a Colonel, the Chief of Administration, a Lieutenant Colonel, the Director, Comptroller Department and the Director, Economic Affairs Department, were both civilians, the Director, Public Health and Welfare, was a Lieutenant Colonel, the Director, Education Department, was a civilian, the Director, Public Works Department, was a Colonel, the Directors of the Judicial and Labor Departments were both civilians, as was the President of the Land Tribunal, the Director of the Legal Affairs Department was a Colonel, and two Civil Administration teams in charge of two lesser groups of islands were headed by a Master Sergeant (Acting Chief) for Miyako and a Major for Yaeyama.[35]

From the above it can be seen that out of seven high officials in the Office of the High Commissioner, including the High Commissioner himself, only one, a

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political advisor, was a civilian. Seven of the fifteen top officers of USCAR mentioned were civilians. Six of these were, however, found in the relatively more technical and lower positions. Of the four leading officials listed first, only one, the most important of all the Civil Administrator, was a civilian. As mentioned, this represented, however, a relatively late development.

The civilian officials and employees of USCAR were usually personnel from various United States Government agencies, such as the State Department or the United States Information Agency, assigned to the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. These civilian officials had generally begun their service in USCAR during the administration of High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, that started in August 1964. Previous to this their positions had been filled by Army Officers.[36]

The directory chart showing the majority of USCAR's highest officials to be military men, and the civilians to occupy in most cases the lesser positions, thus represented the upper echelons of the Civil Administration after it had undergone some "civilianizing" reforms during the 1962-1965 period. To this must be added the statement made by former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, to the author, that the High Commissioner was the only real power in USCAR and that even the Civil Administrator was limited in his actions to what the High Commissioner told him to do.[37] It should be noted that the High Commissioner had, legally,

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to be a military officer. It must also be remembered that the only reason for the American presence in the Ryukyus was the maintenance of military bases, with all other governmental activities designed merely to further this objective. The conclusion could then be reached that the main result of the transformation of the Military Government into the Civil Administration was the change in names.

The form of rule exercised by the United States over the Ryukyu Islands was, in fact, from the very beginning until the very end a military regime. Following the immediate postwar years this provided for most Okinawans a source of additional resentment, reinforcing the original indignation at having been separated from Japan and placed under the rule of another nation, without any attempt made to ask for their approval. The Okinawan opposition claimed repeatedly that military rule was harmful to the welfare of the Islands and asked for its replacement by a completely civilian government, as a temporary reform measure before the actual reversion of the archipelago. So much was said and written against the military nature of American rule that the question of whether or not this provided an inherent disadvantage for the local population must be examined in some detail.

Since the only interest of the United States in the Ryukyu Islands was strategic, and as the American administration of the archipelago was carried on solely for the purpose of guaranteeing the effective operation of the

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military bases located there, it should come as no surprise that the Defense Department was given the responsibility for administering the Islands. Okinawans, and not merely the opposition, charged that this placed them automatically at a disadvantage, and that the Army Authorities in charge of their government leaned too heavily toward military needs, to the neglect of civilian interests, which were subordinated to American military interests. This was not only considered harmful to Ryukyuan interests but also to the "pride and dignity" of the inhabitants.[38]

The Department of Defense never denied the military orientation of the United States Administration. It has been seen earlier in this chapter that the American purpose in ruling the Ryukyus was stated clearly by representatives of the Department of Defense at practically every Congressional hearing examining the problems of the Islands. It will be seen in the course of this study that whenever these same representatives of the Defense Department asked for Congressional appropriations for aid to the Ryukyus, they usually justified these as necessary for making the American presence in Okinawa more acceptable to the inhabitants, and helping thereby to maintain the effective operation of the bases.

An illustration of the military interest orientation of many of the economic benefits flowing from the American presence can be seen in the situation that existed in parts of the main island and in some of the

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smaller and more remote islands, like the Daitos. In these areas, where no military or related facilities were to be found, conditions had in many cases not changed greatly by 1964 from what they had been before 1945. In some of these localities there was, for example, no electricity or safe drinking water and poor health conditions, such as the infection of almost two thirds of the small population of the Daito Islands with trachoma, were generally the rule.

Progress for these neglected localities came only after the U.S. Army Special Action Force began in November 1964 a new type of counterinsurgency training program. This involved the training of civic action teams in ways of improving the living conditions of South Vietnamese villagers, so as to win their support and make them less responsive to Vietcong propaganda. As the terrain, the climate and some of the other conditions found in these remote parts of the Ryukyus bore a great resemblance to those in Vietnam, the Special Action Force found an ideal training ground in the Islands. As part of its training, it immediately went to work, helping the inhabitants and improving local conditions.[39]

Another indication of the motive for aid given to the Okinawan population emerges from testimony presented before the House Appropriations Committee by a representative of the Army Department. While supporting a request for $960,000 in the fields of public health and welfare,

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this official claimed that "This amount will permit operations to prevent and attack disease (giving priority to those types that might threaten the security of the base and the health of the United States Forces)."[40]

While the military orientation of most American activities in the Ryukyu Islands cannot be denied, the conclusion should not be drawn that this represented a strictly negative factor for the local inhabitants. Okinawans also derived great economic benefits from the military use of their islands by the United States. It will be seen in Chapters IV and V that the American interest in the strategic value of Okinawa resulted in an economic development which was unprecedented in the history of the archipelago. If the United States had decided in the early 1950's to govern the Ryukyus for a non-military purpose, there could then have existed a true civilian administration in the Islands. The economic benefits to the inhabitants would, however, have been far smaller in such a case. It is difficult to think of any purpose other than the establishment and maintenance of sizeable military bases that could have prompted the United States, or any other nation for that matter, to engage in massive construction programs and in other expensive activities to develop the Ryukyu Islands.

Unfortunately, the Okinawans also suffered definite disadvantages from the military priorities orientation of the United States Administration. It is, however, neces-

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sary to ask if these disadvantages resulted from the fact that military men predominated in the American Administration, or if they had their origin in the exclusively strategic interest of the United States in the Ryukyu Islands. It should be obvious that the American purpose in governing Okinawa would not have been affected by the composition of USCAR's personnel. The question to be examined then is, exactly what difference would the substitution of civilians for the military personnel of USCAR have made in the welfare of the Okinawan population?

It could be assumed that differences might exist between Army Officers and civilian officials in regard to experience, responsibility to different organizational chains of command, attitude to,or sympathy for,the local population, priorities, and general psychological effect.

In 1954 a student of the problem had reached the conclusion that the quality of the military personnel stationed in the Ryukyus was such that there was no reason to believe it would have been possible to recruit civilian officials of greater abilities. This belief was based on the absence, at that time in the United States, of a cadre of dedicated civil servants trained in dealing with Asians. Under these circumstances, it would have been possible to recruit for service in Okinawa mostly men who were motivated by adventure, high salaries, or a desire to escape some problem in American society. These would certainly not have constituted an improvement over the Army

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personnel serving with USCAR.[41]

The same observer believed that if a civilian had been appointed as High Commissioner, the question of his place within the governmental hierarchy would have arisen. If he had been made responsible to the Army Department this might not have differed much from the old chain of command. If, on the other hand, the new civilian High Commissioner had been made responsible to a civilian government agency, then the Civil Administration and the Army in the Ryukyus would have had to answer to two different authorities. This would have raised problems, such as that of divided responsibilities, which might have been justified in the postwar occupation of Germany. There both the State and War Departments participated. In Germany there were, however, involved complex problems of quadripartite administration, international diplomacy, the establishment of a democratic government in Bonn and the rehabilitation of a major industrial nation in a four power context, all tasks involving a great deal of diplomacy. The much simpler and more military nature of the problem of Okinawa would not have justified this division of authority with all the administrative problems created by it.[42]

The most common complaints made against the predominantly military composition of USCAR were that military men had, when compared to civilians, a poorer understanding of the Okinawan mentality, that the Army treated the local inhabitants condescendingly, and that it usually

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favored its own interests over the welfare of the Islanders.[43] These general accusations touch on both the basic American purpose in governing the Ryukyus and psychological matters.

When it comes to the basic American purpose in governing Okinawa it is correct to say, as has already been seen and will be demonstrated throughout this study, that the United States had only a military interest in the Ryukyus and that therefore military matters commanded, as a rule, the highest priority. It must not be forgotten, however, that this military orientation also brought benefits to the local population and could certainly not be blamed on the Army officers serving with USCAR. A civilian High Commissioner would have had to make the same allocation of priorities as was made by the military High Commissioner.

A policy of placing the interests of the local population ahead of military interests would have deprived the American presence in the Ryukyus of much of its raison d'être. The United States did not, after all, govern the Islands in order to prepare them for self-government or in order to solve their social or economic problems. The United States governed the Ryukyus in order to enjoy the maximum freedom in the use of the bases located there. The United States provided benefits for the Okinawan population because of obligations arising from American rule over, and from the military use of, the Islands, and

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because of the need to make the American presence more acceptable to the local inhabitants. The benefits provided and the attention paid to Okinawan interests represented only means to help achieve the primary, military, aim of the United States in the Ryukyus. For this reason, under any American Administration of Okinawa the military needs had to have the highest priority assigned to them.

Once recognition is given to the basic American aim in the Ryukyus, then the deprivation of the right of self-determination suffered by the Okinawans through United States rule over their islands could be justified as a temporary sacrifice necessary for the defense of the Free World, which also included Japan, the nation considered by Okinawans to be their motherland. If, however, the order of military-civilian priorities in the administration of the Islands had been reversed, then the question could have been raised as to what justification would have remained for depriving Okinawans of the right of self-determination. The Ryukyus did not need to be governed by the United States for the primary purpose of improving the welfare of the local population, with, as a secondary aim, the maintenance of military bases that should not be permitted to interfere with the interests of the inhabitants. This could have been achieved under Japanese administration as well.

It was possible to question the entire American purpose in governing Okinawa, and this was repeatedly

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done. It was also possible to criticize the United States for not doing more for the inhabitants of the Ryukyus. Once, however, the United States had decided to govern Okinawa for the purpose set forth earlier, then this government had to be carried on with the allocation of priorities actually made and it would have made no difference if the personnel of USCAR had consisted of soldiers or of civilians.

As far as the personal attitude of the military officers of USCAR toward the Okinawan population is concerned, both former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II and Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, who was the chief Okinawan spokesman in Japan and advisor to the Japanese Cabinet on Ryukyuan matters, made the same point in interviews with the author. This was that the Army Officers assigned to the Civil Administration not only looked after the interests of the local population, but also developed toward Okinawans an attitude similar to that usually adopted by civilian bureaucrats toward persons and groups which they are assigned to work with or supervise.[44] In other words, the military, no less than the civilian personnel of USCAR, developed a "clientele" attitude toward their charges and, according to Dr. Ohama and one other source, disagreed at times with the officers of the combat forces in Okinawa and with their own superiors in their efforts to advance the interests of the local inhabitants.[45]

General Watson, in a partial disagreement with the

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two other sources mentioned, did not feel that there existed during his administration any situation which could be described as a real conflict between Army Officers serving with USCAR and Officers engaged in purely military duties. He did add, however, that, as a compensatory factor, USCAR also had many American civilians working for it who spoke Japanese "and who saw things the Japanese way."[46]

Having eliminated four out of the five categories mentioned above in which it was stated that differences could exist between civilian and military officials, there remains only the psychological effect and it is in this that the difference must lie.

Both General Watson and Dr. Ohama told the author that, in fact, the only real advantages of a change from military to full civilian personnel in the United States Administration would have been psychological. General Watson explained that this change would have given to Okinawans less of a feeling of being ruled by their conquerors. Dr. Ohama expressed the belief that as administrators military officers tend generally to irritate a civilian population more than civilian officials do. He also pointed out that as a result of their experiences during the Second World War Okinawans had developed an aversion to military men and that this worked against the Army personnel of USCAR. He added, however, that a completely civilian administration would have made no

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real difference in policy and would have provided only a psychological advantage.[47] This assertion is all the more significant if it is kept in mind that it was made by one of the outstanding spokesmen of the reversion movement.

The psychological disadvantage resulting from the predominantly military composition of USCAR consisted mainly in a resentment felt by much of the Okinawan population at the idea of being placed under military rule. Such resentment is caused by the view of a military organization as a rigid hierarchy in which superiors give orders to inferiors. To be ruled by military officers therefore conveys an impression of being at the receiving end of orders that are shouted out and are expected to be obeyed implicitly. Whether this impression is correct or not, to be ruled by army officers, when the normal state of a civilian population in time of peace is to be governed by other civilians, creates an image of being considered unfit for anything except such a supposedly authoritarian regime. When the suspicion of being treated as inferiors was involved, the fact that the military administration actually behaved in the same way as a civilian administration would have done,made no difference in the resentments felt against military rule. The great issue of military rule seems then to have been a psychological irritant largely unrelated to other political or to economic questions.

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The Basis of Local Self-Government After the Peace Treaty with Japan

The transformation of the governmental system of the Ryukyus into a system with a more permanent, peacetime, character was not restricted to the seeming civilianization of the Military Government. Four months after the United States Administration had its name changed, the American Authorities began the process of forming an archipelago-wide and partly elected central government which would be more appropriate for the period following the conclusion and ratification of a peace treaty with Japan. It was hoped that this reform would also satisfy some of the demands for greater autonomy which were already heard at that time in Okinawa.

Pursuant to USCAR Proclamation No. 3, a Provisional Central Government of the Ryukyu Islands was established on April 1, 1951. As the name indicates, it was expected to be only the forerunner of a more permanent government, which was set up the following year. Both the Chief Executive and the members of the Assembly of the Provisional Government were appointed by the United States Administration.

Following USCAR's Proclamation No. 13 of February 29, 1952, the new and permanent Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) was established on April 1, 1952. On the same day the Provisional Central Government was dissolved and the phase-out of the four Gunto Governments began. On

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March 2, 1952, shortly before the inauguration of the new Government, the Ryukyuan people elected the members of the GRI Legislature in what was probably the first all-Ryukyuan free election in history. A prefecture-wide direct election based on universal suffrage had never taken place under Japanese rule.[48] Under both the Provisional Government and the GRI the local population enjoyed most of the basic liberties found in a democratic nation.

The Government of the Ryukyu Islands consisted, basically, of the popularly elected Legislature, known as the Assembly, and of a Chief Executive appointed by the United States Governor. For many years the Chief Executive could only appoint his executive staff with the approval of USCAR. He could veto a bill passed by the Assembly but this veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature. When the GRI was originally established it possessed nine executive departments.[49]

The method of appointing the Chief Executive of the newly created GRI was a great disappointment to most Okinawans. It was seen by them as a step away from autonomy, a contradiction within a governmental reform that was supposed to grant greater autonomy to the local population. Needless to say, this method of choosing the highest magistrate of the local Ryukyuan government became immediately a point of contention between the United States and the Okinawan population. This issue was not eliminated until the United States agreed to the

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popular election of the Chief Executive in 1968.

Much of the Okinawan disappointment could be attributed to the fact that during the previous period, when the Ryukyus had been divided into four groups of islands called Guntos, the chief executives of these four governments, known as Governors, were, as was seen above, popularly elected.

Not all Americans agreed at the time with the new method of choosing the Chief Executive. Even some Army officers sympathized with the Okinawan viewpoint. At a press conference on November 14, 1951, Colonel James M. Lewis, Civil Administrator of USCAR, stated that, in his opinion, the Chief Executive should be popularly elected. General Mathew B. Ridgeway, who as United States Far East Commander was Governor of the Ryukyu Islands under the then prevailing chain of command, declared in 1952 that "the structure of self-government will be completed with the election of the Chief Executive."

The Chairman of the opposition Socialist Masses Party of Okinawa, Tsumichiyo Asato, who once had served as the elected Governor of Yaeyama Gunto, claimed that American officials had assured the former Gunto Governors at the time the Government of the Ryukyus was established that the appointment method for the Chief Executive was only meant to be temporary. Chobyo Yara, who was to become in 1968 the first popularly elected Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands, also declared that he remembered

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this promise. He added that this pledge was considered so firm at the time that it prompted the Legislature of the Ryukyus to pass the November 15, 1952 Chief Executive Election Law, providing for the public election of the Chief Executive on the first Sunday of March 1953. The election date was nullified on January 9, 1953 by USCAR Ordinance No. 95 and the entire Chief Executive Election Law was set aside by USCAR Ordinance No. 100, on January 26, 1953.[50]

In the course of this study no public opinion polls were encountered that would provide an exact idea of the strength of Okinawan feelings in the early 1950's concerning the inability to elect the Chief Executive of the GRI. An opinion survey conducted by the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun in September 1967, when this question had been an important issue for many years in Okinawan politics, can shed light on local opinion in this matter during this late period in United States rule.

In this opinion poll the participants were asked to list the most important improvements which they felt should be made in the Ryukyus, pending the ultimate reversion of the Islands. Multiple answers were permissible. The demand for the popular election of the Chief Executive was chosen by 41 per cent of the respondents. It was surpassed only by the desire for freedom of travel to Japan, which was the first choice of 45 per cent.

Besides the evidence presented by a public opinion poll, other signs were not lacking to show how the Okinawan

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population felt concerning the method of selecting the chief magistrate of their government. The opposition parties considered this a prime issue. By 1962 the Ryukyuan Assembly, although controlled by the generally pro-American Liberal Democratic Party, had passed a unanimous resolution asking for the popular election of the Chief Executive.[51]

The United States Authorities had their reasons for refusing to acceed to this demand. These were based on the American belief that the effective military use of the Okinawan bases required the maintenance of United States control over the local population.[52]

More specifically, the American Authorities were afraid that a popular election of the Chief Executive might produce a winning candidate who would turn out to be a "hostile" leader and refuse to cooperate with the United States. This was a distinct possibility, despite the fact that the generally pro-American Democratic (sometimes named Liberal Democratic) Party regularly controlled the Legislature. This control was made possible in part by a variety of electoral devices that will be explained in the next chapter. In an election in which the entire archipelago would constitute a single election district for choosing a Chief Executive, there always existed the possibility that the opposition parties would form a coalition which, by basing its appeal on the growing nationalistic sentiments for a return to Japan, would win the election and place into the highest Ryukyuan Government

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office a man committed to achieve reversion. There also existed the additional fear that the popular election of the Chief Executive would produce a winner from a left-wing party who would not be able to work harmoniously with the conservative dominated Legislature.[53]

To these fears of the American Administrators of Okinawa it is possible to add the obvious fact that a Chief Executive dependent on a popular majority for his election would be most sensitive to different pressures than an appointee of USCAR.

Former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway summarized this fear to the author by explaining that the Chief Executive represented the link between the United States Administration and the local Government of the Ryukyu Islands. It was believed that through popular election the Chief Executive would become more responsive to popular agitation and therefore less effective, more independent, and less amenable to the demands of the United States Administration. He would also constitute one more official who could claim a mandate from the people.[54]

When the United States Government finally gave in to Okinawan demands in 1968 and permitted the election of the Chief Executive by a popular majority, there arose the opportunity to find out whether these fears had been justified. As will be seen in Chapter XI, the reality did not quite match the predictions. An opposition candidate was elected, but he did not by any means turn out to be as

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uncooperative as had been feared. It must, however, be added that if a different candidate had been elected some of the fears of USCAR could have come true.

The United States Authorities decided to deny to Okinawans the right to elect the chief official of their government on the assumption that the effective operation of the military bases required not only American sovereignty over the Islands but also the exercise of direct control over the daily lives and affairs of the Ryukyuan population. This assumption remains unproven. The minimum needed to assure the freedom in the use of the bases was a de facto sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands and a general supervision over their affairs. This was necessary for purposes of international law, to permit the establishment, use and maintenance of the military bases, and to enable the United States to hold in reserve the supreme political power which could be used to interfere in Okinawan affairs whenever a situation arose, or threatened to arise, which might impair the efficient operation of the bases. It must be pointed out that this is not the same as the actual control over Okinawan domestic affairs which were only remotely related to the operation of the bases. This problem will reappear in the course of the study and will then be examined in a somewhat different context.

At this point it should be noted that the belief in the necessity for complete control over local affairs caused the United States to pursue policies which generated

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resentment among the Okinawan population. The insistence on an appointed Chief Executive represents only one example of this. While for more than two decades they gave an impression of making the freedom in the use of the bases doubly secure, these policies may have shortened American rule over the Islands. The tendency to make United States control over Ryukyuan affairs doubly, and sometimes even triply, secure will now be examined in greater detail.

The Post-1957 Legal Control over Okinawan Affairs

Control over any political system is exercised normally in both a formal and an informal manner. By the formal manner is meant the exercise of powers legally and constitutionally granted to a governing authority to carry out its assigned functions. By the informal manner is understood the use of the formal powers of government in combination with every available resource which it is politically wise to use at any one time in order to manipulate the entire political process to conform with the objectives of the governing authority.

The last part of this chapter will examine the formal manner in which the United States attempted from 1957 to assure the paramountcy of its position in the Ryukyus. The following chapter will deal largely with the less formal methods used for this purpose.

The formal, legal, powers of USCAR can best be understood from a reading of Executive Order 10713, of June 5,

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1957, later amended by Executive Order 11010 of March 19, 1962 and by Executive Order 11395 of January 31, 1968.[55] These Executive Orders, issued by three Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, respectively, were the basic law of the Ryukyu Islands during more than half the period of United States administration. This period is particularly important because it witnessed most of the reversion struggle and during it Okinawa became a serious problem for both the United States and Japan. Moreover, the governmental arrangements in force before 1957 did not differ basically from those in use after that date. An examination of the Executive Orders can therefore provide not only a good picture of the legal powers possessed by USCAR after 1957, but also of those enjoyed by it throughout the duration of United States administration. It should also be pointed out that the distribution of powers outlined in this basic law constituted no mere legal formalism. The provisions of the Executive Order were closely correlated with actual governmental practice in the Ryukyus. For these various reasons they deserve to be studied in some detail.

Following the preamble and the introductory Section 1 declaring that all the powers reposed in the United States under Article III of the Treaty of Peace "shall be exercised in accordance with this Order," Section 2 declared that "The said powers shall be exercised by the Secretary of Defense, subject to the direction and control of the

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President of the United States." The Secretary of Defense was empowered to delegate his functions to "such officials or organizational entities of the Department of Defense as he may designate." In practice this was used to give to the Department of the Army the responsibility for administering the Ryukyus and meant the continuation of the arrangement in use since July 1946.[56] Section 3 made the Secretary of State responsible for the conduct of foreign relations with respect to the Ryukyus.

Section 4 deals with USCAR and provides for its head to be known as the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands. This represented a change from the previous situation in which the United States Far East Commander, whose headquarters were in Japan, was Governor of the Ryukyu Islands and was represented by a Deputy Governor on location in Okinawa.

This change was made for various reasons, one of which was a reorganization of United States Forces in the Far East undertaken in 1957. This reorganization involved the withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces from Japan and a correspondingly increased role for the Okinawan bases. It was timed to coincide with the build-up of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.[57]

Section 4 further required that the High Commissioner "shall be designated by the Secretary of Defense ... from among the active duty members of the armed forces of the United States." Provision was also made for a Civil

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Administrator who "shall have such powers and perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the High Commissioner." This statement must be read with the comment of General Caraway in mind, namely, that the High Commissioner was the only real power in USCAR and the Civil Administrator was dependent on the High Commissioner. In this matter it must, naturally, always be remembered that such a situation only held true if the High Commissioner was a strong-willed man who had his own ideas on the problems confronting him. In other cases, when there were different personalities involved, subordinate officials may have influenced their superiors to follow their own way of thinking.

Sections 5 through 9 deal with the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. In Section 6 the GRI was given the right to redistrict the legislative election districts "with the approval of the High Commissioner." In Section 7 the High Commissioner was required to report all laws enacted by the GRI Legislature to the Secretary of Defense who, in turn, was to report these to the Congress. Sections 8 and 9 describe the powers and duties of the Chief Executive of the GRI. These were generally patterned after those of the President of the United States. The Chief Executive supervised and controlled the executive agencies and instrumentalities of the GRI, had a veto over bills passed by the Legislature, although this could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of that body, possessed a "pocket veto" and also an "item veto" on bills involving appropriations. These

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sections also provided for the manner of selecting the Chief Executive, which was changed on two later occasions, and for the popular election of the heads of municipalities.

In Section 10, which deals with the judiciary, criminal jurisdiction could not be exercised by local Ryukyuan courts over "(a) members of the United States Forces or the civilian component thereof, (b) employees of the United States Government who were United States nationals and, (c) dependents of the foregoing ..." except, in most cases, for those dependents who were Ryukyuans. In cases involving Okinawans in which the GRI courts held jurisdiction, it was provided that "Criminal jurisdiction may be withdrawn from the courts of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands by the High Commissioner in any case which affects the security, property, or interests of the United States and which is so designated by him."

A system of USCAR (American) courts was maintained under the Executive Orders with jurisdiction over the cases Ryukyuan courts were not permitted to handle. These naturally included "any case or controversy of particular importance affecting the security, property, or interests of the United States, as determined by the High Commissioner." When, at the discretion of the High Commissioner, cases were withdrawn from the GRI courts, these were to be transferred to USCAR courts. Such action could be taken at any stage in the proceedings and could "be subject to trial de novo in the discretion of the court of the Civil

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Administration." In Section 10, paragraph b(2), the power of transfer of jurisdiction was given to the High Commissioner in civil as well as in criminal cases in which a member of the U.S. Forces or the civilian component thereof, an employee of the U.S. Government who is a United States national, or a non-Ryukyuan dependent of one of the foregoing, was a party.

In Section 10, paragraph 4(d), the highest USCAR appellate court was given jurisdiction to review not only cases tried in the inferior USCAR courts, but also cases decided by the highest court of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, in which there was involved a conflict of decision between the highest GRI and the highest USCAR court, a question of United States, foreign or international law, or the interpretation of any treaty or of any act of Congress, of a Presidential Executive Order, or of an action of the High Commissioner. In this latter class of legal interpretation cases the highest court of appeals of USCAR could exercise its power of review not only if one of the parties appealed to it but also "if no such appeal be taken, upon petition, ... presented to the court by the chief legal officer of the Civil Administration." The only real equality between USCAR and GRI courts consisted in the fact that neither system was empowered to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Government, or over any of its agencies, unless the Congress had conferred on them specific authority to do so.

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In Section 11, "The High Commissioner may, if such action is deemed necessary for the fulfillment of his mission under this order, promulgate laws, ordinances or regulations." Moreover, if he considered it to be "important in its effect, direct or indirect" on the security of the Ryukyus, on foreign relations with respect to the Ryukyu Islands, on the foreign relations of the United States or on the "security, property or interests of the United States, or nationals thereof," the High Commissioner was given extensive powers. These included the authority "in respect of Ryukyuan bills, laws, or officials, as the case may be, to (1) veto any bill or any part or portion thereof, (2) annul any law or any part or portion thereof within 45 days after its enactment, and (3) remove any public official of the GRI from office." The limitations on the High Commissioner's veto represented a 1962 reform. Previous to this the veto was unlimited.[58]

The High Commissioner was also given the power of reprieve, commutation and pardon. Finally, it was stated that "The High Commissioner may assume in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority in the islands, if such assumption of authority appears mandatory for security reasons." However, should the High Commissioner have chosen to assume this exercise of full authority he would have had to report this promptly, "together with the reasons therefor," to the Secretary of Defense who would then, in turn, have had to inform the Secretary of State.

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In Section 12, the High Commissioner was directed to preserve to the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands the usual basic liberties "enjoyed by people in democratic countries," and some of these were then enumerated.

As can be seen from a reading of the provisions of the Executive Orders that formed the basic law of the Ryukyus, the United States Authorities were left with the power to do just about anything they pleased, should they feel this to be necessary to preserve or advance the interests of the United States. In some cases the United States Administration was provided with double authority to overrule the local, supposedly autonomous, government. As an instance of this it is possible to mention that not only could just about any case be transferred by the High Commissioner from a local GRI court to an American USCAR court, but the highest USCAR court of appeals could review almost any action originating in a GRI court that had not been transferred. Or, to cite another example, the High Commissioner could not only "promulgate laws, ordinances or regulations" of his own, he could also veto any action undertaken by any organ or official of the GRI and he could even assume the full exercise of authority over the Islands if he felt it to be necessary. This represented a triple "safety device" for the United States. It is hardly necessary to add that, in the final analysis, sovereignty still rested with the United States. This meant that the entire Government of the Ryukyu Islands could have been

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legally changed, reformed, or even abolished by Washington.

In 1961 a correspondent from Okinawa reported that it was, in fact, necessary for all GRI laws to be approved by USCAR both before and after going through the legislative process.[59] As late as 1969, the United States officials were acknowledging that the GRI was not really autonomous, as it was able to exercise only powers delegated to it by the High Commissioner. By that time successive High Commissioners had delegated more authority to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. This authority or any portion of it, was, however, legally revocable at any time.[60]

When discussing the legal authority of government officials it is necessary to add an important caveat: it is not always politically possible, or even desirable, to exercise all the power that is legally held. This principle applied to the American Administration of the Ryukyus as to any other governmental body. In the exercise of its powers the United States Civil Administration had to consider not only the political reaction in Okinawa but also the effect in Japan and, to a lesser degree, the possible consequences in the United States and in Asia.

The actual use of USCAR's legal prerogatives depended on the personalities of the High Commissioners and of their immediate aides, and also on the period of time involved. In the early and middle years of the American regime power was often wielded in a more open manner than was the case during the last years. In 1956, for example, USCAR did not

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hesitate to veto the Basic Education Law passed by the GRI Legislature that had been patterned after the Japanese law of the same name. This was apparently done for none other than the petty reason that in the law's preamble the words "as Japanese people" had been inserted. The word "Japanese" was at the time taboo with the American Authorities.[61]

Actions of this type were, however, not always typical of the policies of USCAR, particularly during the later years when political considerations inhibited the open exercise of its legal authority to a much greater extent. Moreover, the Americans did not always exercise all their legal prerogatives. Examples of this can be found in the Okinawan judicial system. Although USCAR courts had special rights and exercised exclusive criminal jurisdiction over Americans connected with the Armed Forces and the government, all persons were expected to obey the laws of the GRI. Americans were, however, tried in their own courts for violations of local law.[62] It should also be noted that by 1967 the trial of Ryukyuans in USCAR criminal courts had virtually ceased.[63]

In contrast to earlier practice, in the last years before the November 1969 reversion agreement USCAR exercised great care, wherever possible, not to interfere in the functions of the GRI. In 1967, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Ferdinand T. Unger described USCAR's new policy to a committee of the House of Representatives. General Unger explained that it was the American practice to review projects desired by the Ryukyuans, to investigate the proposals and, if the American

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Authorities felt it would be a mistake to undertake a particular project, to inform the Okinawans of this. If, however, the latter felt strongly about it and depending also on the costs in dollars involved, USCAR might give in to the Ryukyuans with the comment: "No, we don't think this really helps the overall picture."[64]

Conclusions

Political Science has often been divided into "government" and "politics." This chapter has, appropriately, dealt mainly with the first division of the discipline. In it an examination was made of the reasons why the United States had chosen to administer the Ryukyu Islands, of the legitimation of American rule, of the legal status given to Okinawa and of the governmental system established in the archipelago.

This system revealed a series of contradictions resulting from the basic contradiction presented by the existence of a dependency relationship under modern conditions. The ruling power must secure a minimum acceptance from the subject population for an undesired regime. Moreover, the alien regime has to exist under circumstances which intensify local dissatisfaction with it. The United States was, in a way, faced with the necessity of attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable.

Washington felt the need to administer a territory belonging to a nation in the friendship of which great importance was placed. The democratic ideology prevalent in United States during the second half of the twentieth

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century, however, rules out territorial annexations and government without the consent of the governed. The resulting compromise was a legal status under which the United States administered the Ryukyu Islands while Japan was declared the ultimate owner of the archipelago. In the meantime, Okinawa formed a part of neither nation and the Okinawans had no real nationality, a problem concerning which more will be said in subsequent chapters.

The exclusively strategic interest of the United States in Okinawa required a military administration. The need to make this government more acceptable to the native inhabitants demanded, however, the outward appearance of a civilian institution.

The American democratic tradition and the international image which this tradition requires the United States to maintain resulted in the teaching of democracy and in the need to establish seemingly democratic governmental institutions. The perceived necessity of governing the Okinawan population against its wishes resulted, however, in these same institutions being denied the autonomous authority to which they were theoretically entitled and in the impossibility of granting to the Ryukyuans the most fundamental democratic right, that of choosing their own form of government. The United States was compelled to encourage political development in the archipelago, while simultaneously denying to Okinawans the logical goal of this development.

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In the establishment of the Ryukyuan governmental institutions the United States was faced with two alternatives, the pursuit of either of which was bound to hurt American interests in the long run. To give in to the desires of the local inhabitants meant granting autonomy to a point where the dependency relationship would ultimately have ceased to exist. On the other hand, the pursuit of a different course of action could only result in a progressively greater alienation of the Okinawan population and in the dependency relationship being undermined in another manner. Similar situations will appear throughout this study.

The only way in which the United States could hope to manage these contradictions was by engaging in complex political maneuvers aimed at securing for as long as possible the necessary Ryukyuan acceptance of the unwanted American regime. In this maneuvering the United States found herself, however, handicapped by her own traditions which taught ideas contradicting many of the practices found in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands. The Americans preached democracy, a theory based on equality. The United States Civil Administration had, however, to be placed in a position of clear superiority over the local Ryukyuan government. Moreover, the military character of the American regime and the special legal status given to Americans were seen by Okinawans as accentuating the inferior position which they occupied under the alien

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regime. These conditions were, needless to say, not calculated to increase the Ryukyuan acceptance of American rule.

The concept of residual sovereignty indicates that the United States did not expect her rule over the Ryukyus to be permanent. Washington had, however, hoped to govern Okinawa for a long period of time. Success in this endeavor required the United States to obtain the reasonable acquiescence of the local population to a long-time continuation of American rule. Despite the contradictions encountered in her rule over Okinawa, the United States succeeded in gaining this acquiescence for more than two decades. This was accomplished largely through the creation of political institutions which were based on democratic principles but denied the most fundamental democratic right, through the manipulation of Okinawan politics and through the extension of economic aid. This chapter was concerned with the first part of this formula, with political and governmental institutions. These would fall under the division of political science called "government." In the following chapter the concern will be with the second part of the above formula, which comes under the division of the discipline known as "politics."

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NOTES

[1]U.S., Congress,House,Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 1406, To Accompany H.R. 12617, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, p. 2. A very similar introduction can also be found in the reports of the annual Congressional hearings on appropriations for the Ryukyu Islands.

[2]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Strategy and Science: Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970's, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 265, statement by Professor Albert Wohlstetter, University of Chicago and the Rand Corporation.

[3]Ibid., p. 265. The report is dated May 1968, and was issued in Washington, D.C.

[4]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1965, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 548.

[5]Letter from Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway to Dr. Shannon McCune, dated June 2, 1962, The General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 22.

[6]The New York Times, February 10, 1969, p. 6:4-6, article by Takashi Oka.

[7]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 26 March 1945-30 June 1965, pages not numbered, the information is listed chronologically. (Mimeographed).

[8]U.S.,Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 1406, 1966, op. cit., pp. 6-7. The United States is a signatory to this convention and it has been ratified by the Senate, thereby becoming part of the law of the land.

[9]Fred L. Israel, (ed.), Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967, Vol. IV (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967), pp. 2642-2643. See also USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

[10]The New York Times, July 31, 1951, p. 1:6,7, p. 5:7; also August 26, 1951, p. 1:6, p. 6:1,2.

[11]Joseph W. Ballantine, "The Future of the Ryukyus," Foreign Affairs, An American Quarterly, July, 1953, pp. 671-672.

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Under the international trusteeship system established by articles 75 to 91 of the United Nations' Charter the stated aim was to promote the advancement of the territories concerned and "their progressive development toward self-government or independence." The functions of the United Nations in regard to the ordinary trusteeships are to be exercised by the General Assembly with the assistance of the Trusteeship Council. Article 82 of the Charter provided for the designation in trusteeship agreements of "a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies." Under Article 83 the functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas are to be performed by the Security Council with the assistance of the Trusteeship Council "subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations." This limitation is not included with regard to non-strategic areas.

In the introductory chapter it was noted that the strategic trusteeship provisions were included in the Charter of the United Nations in order to satisfy the security requirements of the United States in the former Japanese Mandated Islands.

Hanson Baldwin wrote in The New York Times on November 13, 1946 that when President Truman announced at the time that the United States was willing to place the former Japanese islands in Micronesia under United Nations Trusteeship, with the United States as the sole administrator, the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands were left out of the announcement. The reason was believed to have been the lack of agreement within the United States Government concerning the future of these last named islands. In the case of the Ryukyus, their sizeable population when compared to the other islands was a major reason for the difficulty in arriving at a decision concerning their future. While some in the government had thought of turning the Ryukyus over to China, the State Department had felt that they should be retained by Japan and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended the same status as was envisaged for the Japanese Mandated Islands. Under the plan of the Joint Chiefs it was anticipated that only the main island of Okinawa and its immediate outlying islands would be considered a strategic area and thereby barred from inspection by the agents of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

The Soviet Union did not object when the Security Council approved the strategic trusteeship agreement over the former Japanese Mandated Islands in 1947, as this was part of a quid-pro-quo agreed to earlier with the United States, that included Soviet acquisition of the Kuriles and of Southern Sakhalin. It was considered virtually

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unthinkable that the USSR would not object in the Security Council to a similar strategic trusteeship agreement with regard to Okinawa.

[12]The Yomiuri (Tokyo), January 18, 1969, p. 5:1-5. That fears concerning the future implications of trusteeship status on the prospects of a reunion between Japan and the Ryukyus were widespread at the time in both Japan and in Okinawa can be seen from the opinions expressed by Okinawans residing in Japan. At the time of the San Francisco Peace Conference they petitioned the powers attending this conference to return the Ryukyus and the Bonins to full Japanese control. They explained that, as they saw it, trusteeship status would inevitably result in ultimate independence for the Ryukyus. This was precisely what they wanted to avoid. Their only desire was a return of the Islands to Japan. See The New York Times, September 5, 1951, p. 7:6.

[13]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, pp. 51-52.

[14]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on H.R. 12617, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, p. 5657.

[15]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1965, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 165.

[16]House Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 1406, 1966, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

[17]Consulate General of Japan in New York, Japan Information Service, Japan Report, Vol. XVI, N. 3 (February 1, 1970), p. 4.

[18]House Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 1406, 1966, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

[19]Ibid., pp. 5-6. See also Nihon Keizai (Tokyo), as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, May 1967, No. 7, pp. 4-5. (Mimeographed). The report referred to is the Price Report.

[20]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 22.

[21]Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 126-127.

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[22]House Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 1406, 1966, op. cit., pp. 5-6, 12.

[23]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 723 to Accompany H.R. 4903, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1967, p. 27.

[24]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Contribution to Certain Inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands for Damages Suffered Between August 15, 1945 and April 28, 1952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 3. See also Nampō Dōhō Engokai, Okinawa Problem, the Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan (Tokyo: Nampō Dōhō Engokai, 1967), p. 72. (Mimeographed).

[25]Mendel, op. cit., p. 127.

[26]Okinawa Times, as translated in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, May 26, 1967. (Mimeographed).

[27]"Okinawa: Forgotten Island," Time, November 28, 1949, p. 24. See also The New York Times, March 3, 1947, p. 10:5; and George H. Kerr, Okinawa, the History of an Island People (Tokyo and Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1958).

[28]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates. See also Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau, "Okinawa, Some Basic Facts," Japan Reference Series, No. 2-69 (Tokyo: 1969), p. 4.

[29]House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Contribution for Damages Suffered in the Ryukyu Islands, Hearings, 1965 op. cit., p. 3. At this hearing the following description of the first seven years of American rule was given: "The presence of United States Armed Forces in the Ryukyu Islands constituted a military occupation from June 21, 1945 until April 28, 1952." On the latter date the United States-Japan Peace Treaty went into effect.

[30]USCAR, Public Affairs Division, Office, Civil Affairs and Military Government of the Ryukyus, The Ryukyu Islands, Publication No. 3, (4th ed.: July 31, 1957), pp. 62-66. See also USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates. Some of the additional changes in command of the first months of American Military Government included the appointment of Marine Corps Major General Roy S. Geiger as Military Governor on June 18, 1945 and his replacement on July 31st by Army

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General Joseph W. Stilwell, who had been named to the position only five days after his predecessor was appointed. The transfers of Okinawa from the Navy to the Army, back to the Navy, and finally back to the Army once again, involved reorganizations of Military Government Headquarters so as to conform to the regulations of the two armed services. By October 1947 a Ryukyu Command (RYCOM) was created and its Commanding General became the Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. In the years before the issuance of the 1957 Executive Order dealing with the governmental structures of Okinawa, the United States Far East Commander, with Headquarters in Japan, was Governor of the Ryukyu Islands and was represented by a Deputy Governor on location in the archipelago.

[31]Takashi Oka, The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, p. 30. See also Lawrence Olson, "Japan and the United States in Okinawa," East Asia Series, XII, No. 1, Japan (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1965), pp. 2-3; and USCAR, The Ryukyu Islands, Publication No. 3, op. cit., p. 64. Out of a desire to be neutral in the dispute over names and also to show that the two names mean basically the same thing, both are used interchangeably in this study. Whenever the term "Okinawa" will be used to designate the main island, as distinct from the entire archipelago, notice to this effect will be given.

[32]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates. See also Ballantine, Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 667.

[33]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

[34]Ibid., under the appropriate dates. See also USCAR, The Ryukyu Islands, Publication No. 3, op. cit., pp. 13, 69.

[35]U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, Office of the Adjutant General, Directory Chart, Headquarters U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, November 1, 1965, in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 10. See also The New York Times, June 24, 1962, p. 2:4-6.

[36]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 34 as well as information provided by Dr. Nathaniel Thayer, formerly from the United States Embassy in Tokyo and former Executive Director, The Japan Society, New York.

[37]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

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[38]Ralph Braibanti, "The Ryukyu Islands: Pawn of the Pacific," The American Political Science Review, December 1954, p. 990. See also The New York Times, August 17, 1967, p. 11:1.

[39]The New York Times, March 11, 1965, p. 4:3-5. (Article by Robert Trumbull).

[40]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 267.

[41]Braibanti, op. cit., p. 993.

[42]Ibid., pp. 992-993.

[43]The Yomiuri (Tokyo), January 27, 1969, p. 5:8.

[44]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970; interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[45]Braibanti, op. cit., p. 992 is the other source referred to. His information naturally covers only the period up to 1954 when the article in question was published. Interview with Dr. Ohama took place on September 8, 1970.

[46]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[47]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970; interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[48]USCAR, The Ryukyu Islands, Publication No. 3, op. cit., pp. 19, 69. See also USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates; Mendel, op. cit., p. 143; and The New York Times, April 3, 1951, p. 4:1; March 1, 1952, p. 3:4; and September 21, 1952, VI, p. 63.

[49]The New York Times, March 31, 1951, p. 2:8. See also USCAR, The Ryukyu Islands, Publication No. 3, op. cit., p. 19.

[50]Washington Post, December 27, 1965, p. A1:5-6, A15:1-4 (Article by Rafael Steinberg). See also USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

[51]Committee for Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Public Opinion Surveys on the Okinawan Problem, January 1969, p. 11. (Mimeographed). See also The New York Times,

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December 10, 1962, p. 17:2; April 15, 1956, p. 7:1-3; January 19, 1958, IV, p. 6:3-4, and November 20, 1964, p. 3:4. These represent just a few of the many newspaper reports that document Okinawan dissatisfaction with the method of choosing the Chief Executive of the GRI.

[52]Mikio Higa, "The Reversion Theme in Current Okinawan Politics," Asian Survey, (Berkeley, Cal.) VII, No. 3 (March 1967), p. 162.

[53]Washington Post, December 27, 1965, p. A1:5-6, A15:1-4.

[54]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, February 12, 1970.

[55]Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Reference Materials, January 1969, pp. 67-76,contains the full text of the amended Executive Order. This text can, naturally, be found elsewhere as well.

[56]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, pp. 135-136.

[57]The New York Times, June 22, 1957, pp. 1:8, 4:3.

[58]The New York Times, March 20, 1962, p. 23:1-8.

[59]The New York Times, September 4, 1961, pp. 1:7-8, 6:4 (article by A.M. Rosenthal).

[60]The New York Times, February 16, 1969, p. 3:4-8; and April 6, 1969, VI, p. 90.

[61]Sakanaka Tomohisa, "The Present Status of the Okinawan Reversion Movement," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), January-March 1968, p. 33.

[62]U.S., Department of the Army, Headquarters, Helpful Hints for Personnel Ordered to U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, 7388 (May 1967), DEP., DA-PAM 608-11.

[63]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance for 1968 Hearings, 1967, op. cit., p. 151.

[64]Ibid., p. 134. See also The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, p. 90.

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CHAPTER III

THE MANIPULATION OF THE OKINAWAN POLITICAL PROCESS

In the popular view, foreign rule is a government imposed by a ruling power which relies mainly on its military forces, on its police and on a few local collaborators to enforce its will on the subject population. In most instances this view matches only in part the reality. A dependency relationship maintained in this manner would represent the most inefficient form of alien rule and would constitute a case in which the governing power had failed to meet the basic challenge presented by the situation. Such a dependency would, in most cases, be more of a liability than an asset for the ruling power and a democracy would rarely attempt to continue for a long time the exercise of its authority under these conditions.

If a situation of this sort had existed in the Ryukyu Islands it is easy to see what the consequences would have been for the United States. Due to the small size of Okinawa it would have been militarily possible for the American Government to impose its will on the local population for an indefinite period of time. The political problems created in the process would, however, have outweighed the advantages derived from any United States administration of the

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archipelago and would soon have defeated Washington's purpose in governing the Islands.

An American administration based on little more than the crude exercise of military or police power would have become far more costly and would have encountered,ultimately, intense, and probably even violent, opposition. This would have impaired the effective operation of the military bases and sooner or later the friendship and alliance with Japan would have been undermined. American prestige in the developing areas of the world would also have been tarnished by such a situation. In the end, strong domestic opposition would have arisen in the United States against the continuation of American rule over the Ryukyu Islands. The relatively long period of American administration of Okinawa would not have been possible had other factors, more favorable for the United States, not been present.

In governing the Ryukyu Islands, the United States enjoyed various political, psychological, economic and other assets. These helped to create a limited Okinawan acceptance of the American regime, and simultaneously provided USCAR with the means of manipulating the local political process so as to facilitate the efficient administration of the archipelago.

The legal authority and the military power of the United States over the Ryukyu Islands were among the most important American assets in the archipelago. They were, however, most useful in making possible the American regime

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by remaining background factors that were generally not called into action. The mere existence of American legal authority and military power encouraged cooperation with the United States and assisted USCAR's manipulation of the local political process.

When, in 1945, the United States conquered the Ryukyu Islands and forced the surrender of the entire Japanese Empire an image of overwhelming military power was created. For many years, until the local inhabitants began to realize that a democratic ruling power would never apply its military might against them in an effective manner and that, consequently, they had little to fear from it, the image of American strength helped to inhibit strong Okinawan opposition to the foreign regime. Even after this had ceased to make a great impression on the local population, Okinawans were at all times aware of the legal authority of the United States to veto the actions of their local government, to dismiss its officials, to enact through USCAR ordinances the measures which the GRI might be unwilling to take and, should this prove necessary, even to assume direct rule over the archipelago and to reorganize the Government of the Ryukyu Islands into a more pliable institution. Okinawans were also aware that the United States possessed, at least theoretically, the physical power to enforce all the above measures against any local opposition. For many years this realization represented a very important background factor in inducing local cooperation with the American regime. The legal power to

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interfere in Ryukyuan affairs was used to a greater or lesser extent at different times. Most of the time, however, the existence of this power made its exercise unnecessary. American military power was hardly ever called upon to enforce the decisions of USCAR, and in the rare instances in which this was done it was, most probably, not needed.

The potential presented by American legal and military power was reinforced by an Okinawan economic dependence on the United States and on the institutions established by USCAR. Together, these factors provided the United States with a capability for manipulating Okinawan politics, with the result that, in most instances,the Government of the Ryukyu Islands enacted measures which the American Administration wanted and only in a minority of cases did USCAR find it necessary to exercise openly its legal prerogatives. Because of this,the form of local self-government existing in Okinawa can be described as a democratic system by the consent of an occupying power that continued to retain the essential rights of sovereignty in its own hands, and that stood over the Government of the Ryukyu Islands to provide it with whatever guidance was felt to be necessary.

Under modern conditions the most logical way for a ruling power to manipulate the political situation in a dependency consists in aiding a sufficiently cooperative political party to gain power and to maintain itself in that position. This principle applies to both democratic and totalitarian ruling powers. The differences between them

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lie mainly in the tactics which may be used.

Had the local Okinawan government been controlled by anti-American opposition parties, then the use of the legal and economic power of the United States to pressure the GRI into pursuing policies desired by USCAR would most probably have resulted in an open break between the American and Ryukyuan layers of government. This would have forced the United States to fall back on the open and crude use of its authority over the Islands, and created precisely the kind of situation which would have defeated the purposes of the United States in the archipelago and that was to be avoided at all costs. Control of the local Ryukyuan government institutions by a basically friendly and cooperative political party was therefore a main prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the American regime.

It was very useful for the United States that throughout the period of her rule over the archipelago the Ryukyuan Assembly was controlled by either a party or a coalition meeting the above requirements. Until the Chief Executive was chosen by popular vote, this office was also held by Okinawans who were friendly to the Americans. Until the late 1960's, this situation made it possible for the United States to control Ryukyuan affairs and the policies of the GRI, without having to wield constantly its formal legal powers. If this ability to dominate Okinawan affairs faded during the late 1960's, during the 1950's and early 1960's the local Ryukyuan decision making process could be

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described as one in which orders descended generally from USCAR to the GRI for enactment into laws or executive decisions.[1]

As the title indicates, this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the manipulation of the local political process on the part of USCAR. The attention will be directed first to American efforts aimed at insuring the control of Okinawan governmental institutions by friendly political forces. The focus will then shift to a consideration of American attempts to reform certain undesirable conditions in the Islands and to one of the most crucial problems facing a ruling power in a dependency: If, and when, concessions to local demands for greater autonomy should be granted.

The United States and the Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa

The Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP), sometimes known under the name of Democratic Party, was the political grouping that most closely cooperated with the United States Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. Both the Americans and their local opponents acknowledged this relationship. The Okinawan opposition called the OLDP the "pro-American party." An American Army officer, in a letter written to his former commander, Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, referred to the OLDP as "The U.S. supported party."[2] It is also interesting to note that the Liberal Democrats were designated as conservatives in both Okinawa and Japan.

The attitude displayed by officials of the United

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States Administration toward this party and the concern shown by them for the OLDP's fortunes at the polls emerge more clearly from other comments appearing in the correspondence of USCAR functionaries.

On March 29, 1965 Civil Administrator Gerald Warner wrote to his former superior, the retired High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Caraway, that "The D.P. (Democratic Party) is doing well thus far in local elections and we are taking steps to insure, as far as possible, that they make out Okay in the November 1965 legislative election."[3] On September 20, 1965 Mr. Warner wrote:[4]

> We are increasingly busy as the time for the next legislative election approaches - 14 November. The opposition parties - OSMP (Okinawa Socialist Masses Party), OSP (Okinawa Socialist Party) and OPP (Okinawa People's Party) have formed a coalition and plan to field a candidate in each district but are having difficulties as might be expected in a number of key areas, a falling out among thieves. The DP does not appear to be as concerned about this coalition as are those of us who watch it from the sidelines. Needless to say we are not just sitting by idly watching, but it is as difficult as it was when you were here to get key GRI people revved up to real action.

Still another hint concerning the activities of USCAR on behalf of "The U.S. supported party" is provided in a different letter written to General Caraway by one of his former subordinates who, in May 1965, commented: "The Democratic Party is shedding tears about a lack of funds for the forthcoming election and isn't receiving much support from their mentors in Tokyo ... The elections should (as viewed at present) and if WE spend enough, improve the DP position. November will tell."[5] The "we" was written in

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capitals by the author of the letter.

The above quotations do not provide any specific details of assistance given to the OLDP. They do, however, offer a glimpse of American attitudes toward Okinawan politics and seem to show that USCAR was not leaving the outcome of elections to pure chance. For actual evidence of attempts to influence the outcome of elections it is necessary to turn to other sources.

One simple way to affect election results consists in arranging the electoral laws and the boundaries of election districts in a manner calculated to favor one political party. These particular regulations were drawn up in the Ryukyus by the GRI and USCAR. While there was nothing unusual or distinctly undemocratic about the Ryukyuan election laws, the opposition charged that their net effect was to place it at a disadvantage.

The Ryukyu Islands were divided into election districts, each of which sent to the Legislature the candidate receiving a plurality of the votes cast. This system, which Okinawans called the small electoral district system, is the one used in the United States and in Great Britain and can in no way be called undemocratic. It is, however, generally recognized that this system tends to work in favor of one party gaining a clear majority in legislative elections and against the existence of many small parties. It is thereby useful in helping to achieve political stability. The Okinawan opposition parties were opposed to this system.

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The Socialist Masses Party and the Socialist Party favored the adoption of a medium-size electoral district system in which there would be a plural election of legislators from each district. The pro-Communist People's Party, for its part, wanted to see a major, or large, constituency system established in which the entire archipelago would become a single election district, and proportional representation would be used.[6]

The "Small District" system lends itself to the practices of malapportionment and gerrymandering and it was charged repeatedly that both methods were used to help provide the OLDP with its control over the Legislature. As happens in many other countries, the conservative party, the OLDP in this case, received its largest support in rural areas. These were to be found mostly in some parts of the main island of Okinawa and in the less developed and more sparsely populated "outer islands." The three opposition parties, on the other hand, polled the largest number of votes in the urban areas, particularly in those of the main island. Not only the opposition spokesmen but also foreign correspondents, such as Thomas Pepper from the Baltimore Sun, pointed to rural over-representation, resulting from unequally populated districts, as one of the reasons for the conservative control of the Legislature.[7] As far as gerrymandering in election districts is concerned, former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway told the author that if there existed any, this was strictly the result of action on

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the part of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and not the responsibility of the United States Civil Administration.[8]

The clearest evidence of malapportionment was presented in an article written by Professor Mikio Higa, of the University of the Ryukyus, analyzing the November 1965 elections. He noted that the OLDP won in 15 out of a total of 16 districts classified as rural, while the opposition parties took 12 of the 16 urban districts. Of those districts containing more than 15,000 voters, 3 were rural and 11 were urban. All urban districts contained more than 13,600 voters, but 5 rural districts had fewer than 10,000 voters. The number of eligible voters ranged from a low of 9,015 in one Yaeyama district (rural and outer island), to a high of 25,538 in one district of Naha, the capital.[9]

When, furthermore, figures indicating the popular support received by the various political parties are examined, these show that the OLDP was by no means the favorite of a majority of the voters, and that it was not at all times the party with the largest popular following. A public opinion survey taken by the Okinawa Times during the summer of 1968, to cite one example, showed the Socialist Masses Party to have, as it had in the previous survey, the highest support among those polled. It received the approval of 32 per cent, a gain of 6 per cent in about one year. The OLDP supporters numbered only 26 per cent of the sample, 2 per cent more than the previous year.[10]

Another opinion survey, this one conducted by the

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Ryukyu Shimpo from February 26th through March 3, 1968, found that 34.7 per cent of those polled supported the existing small constituency system, 25.6 per cent preferred a large constituency system and 12.7 per cent favored a medium constituency system. The remainder of the sample either had no opinion or else suggested a still different electoral system. These results show that even though the existing system was supported by more respondents than any other, more of these opposed it than supported it, 38.3 per cent against 34.7 per cent. As could be expected, support for the small constituency system was lowest in the city of Naha, where only 26.9 per cent favored it and 53.6 per cent supported one of the other two systems.[11]

These polls show that a party which by the late 1960's was the favorite of only about one quarter of the electorate, and which was not even at all times the most popular party, won a majority of the seats in most legislative elections. Moreover, these election victories were won under an electoral system receiving only minority support in Okinawa.

In the actual elections the Liberal Democratic Party received, naturally, a larger percentage of support than in the preference polls mentioned. The difference could be explained as probably due to the system of small election districts and to the long-time conservative domination of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. Both of these realities must have convinced many voters that they would

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be wasting their votes by casting them for one of the opposition parties.

In some of the eight elections held between 1952 and 1968 for the Legislature of the Ryukyus, an interesting relation can be found between votes polled by various parties and the actual number of seats won. In 1954 the Socialists received 116,374 votes and won 12 seats while the Democrats won 12 seats with 111,407 votes. Three Independents, who usually voted with the conservatives, were elected with 13,930 votes while the People's Party ended up with 18,315 popular votes, but with only 2 seats in the Legislature.[12]

In 1956 the Democratic Party, until then dependent on the votes of the Independents for its control of the Legislature, received the first clear majority under its own name. With a little less than half of the popular votes it won 16 out of the 29 seats in the Assembly. The People's Party with 6 per cent of the votes received only one seat.[13] The results of this particular election do not seem to show any unusual discrepancy between popular votes and the number of seats which the parties could have been expected to win. In the next election, however, the discrepancy working in favor of the conservatives reappears once again. In this contest, held in 1958 at the height of the land payments crisis to be described in Chapter VI, the Democratic support dropped sharply from 193,000 to 81,000 votes and its legislative representation went down to 7 seats. The Socialist and People's Parties with the same total number of popular

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votes ended up, together, with only 5 seats in the Legislature.[14] Once again the Democrats needed the Independents to control the Legislature.

In the elections held during the 1960's the Democrats maintained a clear majority in the Legislature. In 1960, after the settlement of the land payments dispute, they won 22 of the seats.[15] In 1962 their representation went down to 17 seats.[16] In 1965 the conservatives won 19 seats in a Legislature which had been enlarged to have a total membership of 32 and that had its term of office lengthened to three years.[17] In the last general election held before the reversion agreement, in 1968, the conservatives lost the archipelago-wide contest for the Chief Executive but still managed to retain a bare control of the Assembly with 17 seats.[18]

The discrepancies found between the popular vote and the number of candidates elected by each party could perhaps be explained by reasons other than malapportionment or gerrymandering. It is, however, noteworthy that whatever discrepancies existed always worked to the advantage of the Democrats-Liberal Democrats. To this must be added the finding that the conservatives did not generally command as much as half of the popular vote. It is therefore necessary to agree with the opposition claim that under a different electoral system a coalition of opposition parties would in all likelihood have found itself, at least on some occasions, in control of the Legislature. This eventuality

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came to pass during the one election in which the Ryukyus formed a single district, the contest for the office of Chief Executive in 1968.

From the above it is reasonable to conclude that the electoral system used in the Ryukyus was, together with the apportionment practices, instrumental in helping to maintain during two decades of United States administration the conservative and relatively pro-American Liberal Democratic Party in control of the Legislature of the Ryukyu Islands.

Besides helping to establish and maintain an electoral system favoring its friends, the American Administration was at times accused of interfering in a more direct manner in election contests. This involved, generally, situations where the aim was to prevent the election of openly anti-American candidates.

Under USCAR Ordinance No. 144, from March 16, 1955 until February 15, 1965, a permit was required from the GRI for publishing or printing newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets, or circulars.[19] As was seen above, the GRI was controlled by a conservative dominated Legislature and, at the time, by an American appointed Chief Executive. This regulation was, however, generally interpreted in a liberal manner and did not prevent a large volume of pro-reversionist and anti-American literature from making its appearance in Okinawa. Occasionally it could, however, become the basis for actions such as the one undertaken on November 6, 1962, when the GRI police armed with court

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warrants moved across Okinawa to confiscate illegal election material, much of it of an anti-American nature.[20]

The United States Administration attempted also to control open Communist influences in the Ryukyus. While this practice may not have been in accord with a maximalist interpretation of democratic rights, under the circumstances justification for it could be found. In April 1956 the Deputy-Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, Lieut. Gen. James E. Moore, explained the problem to the Ryukyuan Assembly in these words: "It would be inconsistent for the United States to spend vast amounts of its treasure to make these islands a bastion of defense against outward Communist aggression and yet countenance Communist infiltration of the body politic."[21]

The American Administration repeatedly warned the Okinawans against Communist influences[22] and took some practical steps to keep these away from the Ryukyus. Travel restrictions which were intended mainly to prevent Communists and their sympathizers from coming to the Islands were put into effect, and at times left-wing activists who were not native Ryukyuans were deported from the Islands. As one high-ranking Army officer told the Senate Appropriations Committee, "... one of the advantages of United States control of Okinawa is that we can control access to the islands and thus we can screen the individuals who come in ..."[23]

The attempts to influence the outcome of elections

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had as their main purpose the control of Communist and openly anti-American activities. Justification for this could be found not only in a desire to prevent those who might make the American stay in the Islands extremely difficult from being elected, but also in the need to prevent the development in Okinawa of an atmosphere completely hostile to the United States. These considerations sometimes led American Authorities to intervene directly in election contests, in actions that usually called forth a great deal of criticism and did not help to improve the image of the United States in the archipelago.

In April 1956, Kisaburo Owan, a member of the Legislature from the pro-Communist People's Party, claimed that without the interference of United States Authorities his party could have obtained more than the 6 per cent of the total vote which it actually polled. The Army admitted having advised voters not to support Communist candidates.[24]

Until December 7, 1966, when it was finally rescinded by order of High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Ferdinand T. Unger, a clause in USCAR Ordinance No. 68, Article 22, provided for the disqualification from public office of any candidate who had been convicted of "a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude and who has not received a pardon."[25] This Ordinance was used repeatedly by USCAR to prevent opposition candidates from either running for office or else, if elected, from serving. One such instance was the case of Tengan Choko who, as coalition candidate of the opposition

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parties, had defeated the conservative candidate for the Legislature in April 1956 but had his election annulled, with a new election ordered, on the ground that he had violated a USCAR Ordinance and had thereby been disqualified from serving in office.[26] The disqualification of four opposition candidates during the 1965 election campaign because of their past convictions on crimes involving moral turpitude provides another example.[27] Still another such case, the disqualification of a winning candidate named Takatora Tomori in 1966, became for another reason a "cause célèbre" and is discussed in detail in Chapter X.

The disqualification from office of persons with a criminal record does not in itself constitute an objectionable or a politically motivated practice. In this particular case there are, however, reasons for believing that the primary aim had been to prevent politically embarrassing individuals from holding office. Opposition candidates were sometimes disqualified from holding office because of previous convictions that consisted of nothing more than a minor or a technical violation of election regulations, as will be seen in the course of this study. The attitude of USCAR when the person convicted of a previous violation happened to have been a pro-American politician is also illustrative of the purposes of Ordinance No. 68, Article 22.

On December 2, 1965, Civil Administrator Gerald Warner wrote to former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway asking him "... to help our mutual friend Katsu Hoshi."

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According to this letter, at the time Hoshi was elected to the Legislature in 1962 the question of his eligibility had been raised "by virtue of his having been convicted of a felony in 1954." This did not prevent him from serving out his term of office and of being re-elected in the 1965 election. At that time, however, his opponents became more insistent on disqualifying Hoshi and Mr. Warner noted that "it is clearly indicated that the political opposition plans to bring a court case against Hoshi." The Civil Administrator then wrote that he had been informed that General Caraway had granted a "verbal pardon" to Hoshi on November 10, 1962 and had declared him eligible to hold the position of member of the Legislature, but this "oral pardon" had never been recorded. Therefore, the letter continued:

> ...I would appreciate it if you could confirm action allegedly taken in 1962 ... as you are aware the results of the election for the Legislature are extremely important to the United States, and should Hoshi in a post-election decision by G.R.I. courts be declared ineligible to hold office because we are unable to show that he was in fact granted an oral pardon in 1962, as all had been led to understand, then we will be faced with some serious political difficulties both inside and outside the legislative body...

The letter concluded by asking if the retired High Commissioner would be willing to make out an affidavit confirming the verbal pardon.[28]

General Caraway, whose integrity was always of the highest order, answered that he did not issue a "verbal pardon," that he had never heard of the concept of a "verbal pardon," and that the "fortuitous unearthing of an affidavit

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from me at this time" would create more political difficulties than would be the case by "confronting the problem with the tools at hand." His advice concerning "the tools at hand" was that the incumbent High Commissioner could issue a pardon, although he indicated that, politically, this would not be an easy action to take.[29]

In this episode Civil Administrator Warner was not attempting to engage in anything of questionable honesty. Instead, he was merely trying to maneuver as best as he could, by utilizing all the many legal resources available to him, in order to carry out his duty which consisted of maintaining in Okinawa political conditions that would enable the United States to continue the effective operation of its military bases. The exchange of letters is of interest because of the light it sheds on the uses to which Ordinance No. 68, Article 22, was put.

The organization of the Golden Gate Club provides still another example of the ways in which USCAR tried to develop in the Islands a political atmosphere favorable to the United States.

This club was described in 1963 in the Providence Journal as "composed of several hundred young Okinawans, politically colorless though deemed conservative, who studied in America under the Exchange of Persons and the National Leaders Programs." The Okinawan Political Left called the Golden Gate Club a pro-American association that "does not represent the real Okinawa."[30]

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The United States Administration and its local supporters attempted wherever possible to place the "Golden Gaters" into positions of importance. In December 1965, an Okinawan acquaintance wrote to retired High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway concerning the then Chief Executive that "One of the good things Mr. Matsuoka did was that he appointed Golden Gate Club members to important posts." He then gave a few examples: Kudeken, who was appointed Director of the Planning Department (of the GRI); Soin Kayo, the Director of the Agriculture and Fisheries Department; and Yoei Miyara, the Chief of the Public Information Bureau.[31]

General Caraway, in an interview with the author, described the Golden Gate Club as "potentially the finest fifth column for the United States."[32]

In its efforts to create a political climate either favorable or at least tolerable for the American military presence in Okinawa, the United States Civil Administration is thus seen to have used many of the standard methods employed by a ruling power to make its position more secure in a dependency. These included the disqualification of certain hostile candidates by means of a USCAR Ordinance, the support of a friendly political party and of its candidates, and the arrangement of electoral laws so as to favor this party. The United States Administration was active not only at the level of political parties and elections but also at the level of the individual. This

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meant the sending of promising young Okinawans to the United States so that they might pursue higher studies and, hopefully, become more sympathetic to the American purpose in the Ryukyus. It also involved the appointment of friends of the United States to the highest positions in the Islands in order that, among others, these might appoint still more Okinawans with pro-American sympathies to key positions.

Important as these methods were, they represented only a part of the legal and political resources that were available to USCAR. The United States Administration also had behind it the prestige of American power and enjoyed the control over important economic resources. Moreover, it possessed the legal means to determine the basic rules under which politics were carried on in the Ryukyus, the ability to interfere directly in the political life of Okinawa, the power to change the rules of the political game when this was found to be necessary, and even the authority to govern directly through USCAR Ordinances and Proclamations.

During the many years when all these resources could be used freely USCAR almost always succeeded in having its will carried out. Only a concerted and prolonged political campaign enjoying the support of much of the Okinawan population, and usually one that succeeded in mobilizing large-scale support in Japan as well, was able to compel the United States Administration to give in to the desires of the local inhabitants. Such successful Okinawan campaigns were rare until the late 1960's, and some of these will be

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analyzed in later chapters. In each of the following two subchapters a case study will be presented depicting situations in which the American Authorities, by utilizing the various political resources discussed until now, were either partly or else fully successful in achieving their objectives. The first of these concerns a particular political dispute and the second covers the term of office of one of the best known of the High Commissioners. It should be noted that both took place before the late 1960's.

The "Affaire" Senega

On December 25, 1956, Kamejiro Senaga, Secretary-General of the pro-Communist Okinawa People's Party and the man who was considered to be the leading left-wing and anti-American agitator in the Ryukyus, was elected Mayor of Naha, the capital and largest city of the archipelago. Senega was a former newspaperman who in 1954 had been convicted of harboring a criminal, a political colleague from the Left, and of giving false evidence. He had served eighteen months out of the two year sentence imposed for these offenses.[33]

Senega was elected with only forty per cent of the votes cast. Even this limited victory would not have taken place without the presence of special circumstances. The conservative camp opposing Senega's candidacy was divided. Following the previous local election, two laboring communities containing many low-paid military base workers, Shuri and Oroku, had been joined to Naha City.[34] Finally, even in the largest Okinawan city and with the benefit of

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these unusual advantages, Senega could most probably not have won this limited victory without the assistance of the intense feelings generated in the Ryukyus at that time by the land payments dispute, which will be taken up in Chapter VI.

Despite his earlier conviction on two criminal charges, Senega could not be barred from taking office as, at the time, Ordinance No. 68 only disqualified candidates for the Legislature who had been convicted of a felony and not pardoned. Mayoral candidates had not yet been included in the disqualification provisions.

Within two days of Senega's election the non-Communist members of the Naha City Council, who included twenty-seven of the thirty Councilmen, accused the Mayor-elect of being a Communist, declared their refusal to cooperate with him and pledged to form an anti-Communist front to oppose his policies in the Council.[35] Following his election victory, Senega had acknowledged his need for American help and had claimed that the United States Authorities had nothing to fear from him, that he wanted reversion but did not advocate "that the Americans get off the island" and that "things will go on as usual after I take office." Nevertheless, as soon as Senega took office in January 1957 the Bank of the Ryukyus, in which the United States Government held a majority of the stocks, refused, pending a review of the new Mayor's policies, to lend funds for reconstruction work to the Naha City Government. As a result of this action city contractors terminated their contracts,

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twenty-five public works projects came to a standstill and four thousand persons were thrown out of work.[36]

On June 17, 1957, the Naha City Council voted, twenty-four to six, its lack of confidence in Mayor Kamejiro Senega. According to local law, a vote of non-confidence in the Mayor on the part of the City Council had to be followed either by the Mayor's resignation or by a new election for the City Council. Under the last-named alternative, if a second vote of non-confidence in the Mayor had taken place following the election of a new council, then the Mayor's resignation would have become mandatory. Senega chose to dissolve the City Council rather than to resign and declared to his supporters that, should the new Council again express its lack of confidence in him then, after resigning as required by law, he would once more be a candidate for Mayor.[37]

Under the local municipal election procedures then in force there existed no zoning or geographical restrictions, anyone regardless of residence could vote for any candidate for Councilman, and the thirty candidates with the largest number of votes were declared the winners. For an understanding of the climax of the "affaire Senega" it is also necessary to point out that under local law the City Council could only take a vote of non-confidence if a quorum of two-thirds of its membership was present. This meant that the successful election of only eleven of Senega's supporters would have been sufficient to block such a negative vote against the Mayor.

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The absence of electoral districts enabled Senega's People's Party, in the municipal election held on August 4, 1957, to increase its representation in the City Council from three to six. This electoral arrangement also made possible the election of four Independents with pro-Senaga platforms and of two Senaga supporters from the Socialist Masses Party. These twelve successful candidates received thirty-eight per cent of the votes cast, almost the same percentage as Senaga had obtained the previous December. Senaga's backers now could, by staying away from Council meetings, prevent the existence of the two-thirds quorum needed for a vote of non-confidence in the Mayor. Without a possible defection on the part of the four Independents the conservatives in the City Council were, therefore, not in a position to oust Mayor Senaga.[38]

When Kamejiro Senaga had first been elected American officials in Okinawa had refrained from commenting and had denied having any part in the non-cooperation movement launched against the new Mayor. When, however, by November 1957 a second vote of non-confidence could not be obtained, USCAR intervened, ostensibly in response to two petitions. These had been presented, respectively, by seventeen Naha City Councilmen, and by twenty-four Mayors and various leading businessmen. Both petitions asked for the removal of the controversial Mayor of Naha on the grounds that the City Administration had broken down. High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. James E. Moore obliged the petitioners by

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announcing four changes in the Ordinances in effect in the Ryukyu Islands. The new changes allowed a majority quorum of a municipal council, by a majority vote of the entire body, to carry out any second vote of non-confidence in a Mayor, permitted the City Council to elect a temporary Mayor, authorized the American-appointed Chief Executive to decide disputes between the City Council and the Mayor, and disqualified convicted felons from serving not only in the Legislature but in all public offices as well. After these changes had been made, the City Council ousted the incumbent Mayor by means of a second vote of non-confidence, and Senaga was now effectively barred by his previous conviction from serving in any public office.[39] This episode was referred to by local Americans as "Operation Heave-ho."[40]

Apparently forgetful of a similar mistake that had contributed much to Senaga's original electoral victory, within a few weeks of winning this questionable success the United States Administration helped to defeat its own purposes by finally agreeing to a reform measure that all political parties had urged for many years but which it had until then always postponed. This was the merger of Mawashi with Naha City on December 17, 1957.

In the election held on January 12, 1958 to elect a new Mayor, the candidate of the Left-wing bloc, the anti-American Saichi Kaneshi who was at the time an associate of Senaga, defeated the moderate candidate Tatsuo Taira by one thousand votes. An analysis of the election returns

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revealed that without the merger of Mawashi with Naha City Taira would have won by 3,000 votes. Both candidates attributed the results of the election to what they called the "indignation of the voters" over the High Commissioner's actions which had brought about the ouster of Senaga. Many observers regarded the victory of Kaneshi as a blow to American prestige.[41] It can be seen that the legal changes made by General Moore had created considerable resentment, because even the conservative candidate felt compelled to criticize them.

After the election of Kaneshi as the second consecutive Mayor of Naha suspected of anti-American feelings and of pro-Communist sympathies, General Moore called on him to conduct his administration "in a responsible manner" and "consistent with those same principles of democracy which enabled him to be elected." The High Commissioner even agreed to meet with Mayor Kaneshi, in the first encounter between a high United States official and a local Leftist.

In the early part of his administration Kaneshi was believed to have been under the influence of former Mayor Senaga. One reason for this belief was his prompt reinstatement of five of Senaga's ousted appointees to the City Administration.[42]

An attempt was made also to remove Kaneshi from office by having him indicted, on April 19, 1958, on charges of violating electoral regulations during the March 16th legislative election. He was charged with using an offi-

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cial automobile while campaigning for a new Left-Wing party, the Minren.[43]

Kaneshi remained as Mayor of Naha despite this attempt to oust him. Before the end of the year the land payments dispute had, however, been settled and Kaneshi severed his connection with Senaga who was by that time considered to be politically "forgotten." The new Mayor turned out to be a man with whom the American Administration could work. In December 1961 a Liberal Democrat, Junji Nishime, was once again elected as the Mayor of Naha[44] and "normalcy" returned to the government of the Okinawa capital.

It is possible to conclude from the above that, although the American Authorities had reason to be concerned about the election of a suspected Communist to a high office in Okinawa, and in Senaga's case they probably had not been wrong in this, it was not necessary to over-react each time a Left-winger won an election for an Executive position. The granting of concessions which presented no real problem for the United States,as in the matter of land payments, turned out to be the best defence against victories at the polls by avowed anti-Americans. Concessions were preferable to actions which were seen by Okinawans as a high-handed wielding of USCAR's authority to redraw the political rules of the game when by accident the wrong candidate happened to win an important election. USCAR and the GRI, who between them were responsible for the electoral laws and the districting regulations that helped to keep the Legislature

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safely in conservative hands, could probably have avoided the entire Senaga-Kaneshi episode by paying a little more attention to the boundaries of municipalities. This would have obviated the need for the cruder methods used eventually, which turned out to be at least partly counter-productive.

It would also not necessarily have turned out to be a disaster for the United States if the ruling powers in the Ryukyus had been a little more patient with an occasional undesirable public official, and had waited to see what he would do and how the political situation was going to develop, before resorting to more drastic measures. These could always have been invoked as a last resort and were known to carry with them a political price. This was not to be the last time that such a course was followed by USCAR, as later chapters will show. The "affaire Senaga" also serves to illustrate how few inhibitions were felt during the 1950's by USCAR in the exercise of its formal authority. By the late 1960's actions of this sort were to become unthinkable.

Reform from Above, a Case Study

There exists a universal tendency to blame the incumbents in a government for most of the ills and injustices found within the territory under that government's jurisdiction. This tendency is even stronger in a dependency where the government is alien and unwanted by the local population. In Okinawa the United States Administration, and particularly its military nature, were held regularly responsible for countless problems in almost any field. The implication of

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this criticism was always that reversion to Japan, or at least the granting of greater local autonomy, would result in improvements in whatever was wrong.

A study of this sort would not be presenting a true picture of the situation if it failed to point out that, as in many similar situations involving dependencies, the quality of the foreign government imposed on the local inhabitants was generally superior to the performance of their own government. This naturally did not prevent, if anything it might even have intensified, the Okinawan resentment of American rule.

Attempts by a foreign ruling power to reform conditions in a dependency will have a triple negative effect on the ego of the local inhabitants. Such reforms point to weaknesses and iniquities within the native society, they imply a certain superiority on the part of the rulers who are cast in the role of teachers vis-a-vis the natives, and they require for their execution the open use of the superior authority of the foreign rulers. This last-named action makes the rulers appear more than ever as the masters over the native subject population.

Largely for these reasons, the administration that did more than any previous one to reform conditions in the Islands also drew the greatest criticism. While engaged in its well-intentioned efforts it inadvertently brought out in sharp relief the inferior position of Okinawans under American rule.

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It was not difficult to find instances of incompetence, dishonesty, or irresponsibility in Ryukyuan public and business activities. It is hardly necessary to point out that Okinawa was not unique in this respect. Similar conditions can, in varying degrees, be found just about anywhere in the world, not excluding the United States. Unfortunately, whenever they were present such conditions stood out within Okinawan institutions because, by contrast, after the 1949-1952 period they were to be found to a much smaller degree within USCAR.

During the earliest years of American rule, Okinawa, as if waiting for a new military role, was languishing in neglect. At that time corruption involving collusion between Americans and Okinawans was no rarity in the Islands. What was usually involved in this was the distribution of American supplies to the Okinawan population, contracts, or just special advantages for various individuals. With the renewed American interest in the Ryukyus that developed around 1949, and with the ensuing re-organization of the United States Administration, a "cleanup" occurred and from then on the record of USCAR was greatly improved.[45]

On the Ryukyuan side, however, these deplorable conditions not only continued but, if anything, they increased as the economy expanded and opportunities for greater illicit profits appeared. Unsavory connections between the GRI and the business world, scandals in financial circles and the excessive gap between rich and poor that these

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conditions helped to bring about, were prevalent. Until the beginning of the 1960's when this situation was beginning to emerge into the open, and when Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway was appointed as High Commissioner, it was claimed that USCAR "had been turning a blind eye to these political and economic evils."[46]

A Japanese correspondent in Okinawa described some of the conditions that had arisen by the early 1960's. These included extravagances such as prosperous shops paying less income taxes than office girls, banks risking their depositors' money through loose loans, a public utility company earning undue profits and bus companies appropriating the depreciation funds of average vehicles to pay dividends to the company executives.[47]

The malpractices were sometimes of a cruder nature and even involved those who should have been the most respectable businessmen. Needless to say, not even an energetic reform administration was able to root out these misdeeds.

In April 1965, almost one year after this administration had left office, an official of the GRI, Kanwa Hokama, wrote to retired General Caraway that the head of a prominent food company and former President of the Chamber of Commerce had been arrested on charges of extortion and attempted extortion against various other businessmen and against the Speaker of the Legislature. The author of the letter added that in February of that year he had also been obliged to file charges against the only certified public accountant

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in Okinawa, on suspicion of violation of trust, forgery of books, possible embezzlement of funds and other misdeeds.[48]

When the attention is turned away from private abuses and directed to the actions of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, conditions and practices are encountered which do not reflect favorably upon that institution.

As has been noted earlier, under the governmental system existing in Okinawa both the local government and the United States Administration had the power to enact legislation. Former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II explained to the author that under this arrangement the Legislature of the Ryukyus would often fail to pass important, but politically unpopular, legislation, leaving the onus for this on the High Commissioner.[49] This provides at least a partial explanation for the necessity of having on the books many USCAR regulations dealing with matters with which the GRI should more properly have been concerned. The Legislature, for its part, would sometimes devote its lawmaking activities to the adoption of measures that were "impractical but politically fruitful."[50]

Examples of this and of other forms of governmental irresponsibility are, once more, not difficult to find. The taxation system put into effect by the GRI under the dual system of government resulted in the levying of relatively high taxes on the necessities of life, and of lower taxes on luxury and high grade merchandise.[51] General Caraway told the author that under his administration the

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GRI tried to reduce taxes for Okinawans, already substantially lower than those in existence in Japan, and to make up the difference by increasing taxes on foreigners living in the Islands, an action which he blocked in his capacity as High Commissioner.[52]

In his famous speech delivered at the regular monthly dinner meeting of the Golden Gate Club in Naha, on March 5, 1963, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway accused the Government of the Ryukyu Islands of a number of specific acts of irresponsibility. These included numerous attempts to divert for "purposes other than the benefit of the workers" sums collected for the unemployment insurance fund once the GRI had been made the custodian of these funds, the licensing of two competing sugar mills located across the street from each other in Nishihara at a time when there existed no economic justification for this, with the result of bringing harm to the entire economy, and the lack of regulation of banks. This last named condition permitted Ryukyuan banks to operate for many years with almost complete license and to engage in such practices as having the directors make with their depositors' money unsecured loans to companies headed by themselves.

General Caraway also spoke about the GRI Assembly passing a Medical Service Bill without providing the necessary inspections and penalties for non-compliance to insure that medical institutions meet the required standards, and of attempts to place on the taxpayer, through the local

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Workmen's Accident Compensation Bill, the "normal and proper liability of the employer for on-the-job injuries suffered by the workers." In the field of labor relations the High Commissioner accused the GRI of refusing consistently to differentiate between "actions that may result in a modicum of violence that are a part of a labor dispute, and acts of violence which are not a part of that dispute but are in fact criminal acts."[53]

An American who had been stationed in Okinawa summarized the conditions which the above mentioned practices had helped to create by the early 1960's. He wrote how, when he looked back at the time he spent in the Islands, he felt that he saw "The same abyss yawns between moneyed and poor, the same disparity of numbers in each category as one can find anywhere in Southeast Asia. There is the same disinterest in improving the situation, the same terrible preoccupation with the moment. All of this covered with a horrible travesty of our institutions..."[54]

This, basically, was the situation in the Ryukyus to which USCAR had hitherto turned a "blind eye" and which existed early in 1961 when the reform minded Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway assumed the office of High Commissioner. Shortly after his appointment was announced General Caraway was described in a Japanese newspaper as an intellectual general rather than a fighting general. Because of this he was considered to be particularly well-suited for his delicate new assignment.[55]

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The new High Commissioner soon set himself to the task of reforming the many abuses he found in the Ryukyus. In order to accomplish this he made almost full use of the legal and political means at his disposal. Whenever the local Government of the Ryukyu Islands failed to pass the required legislation General Caraway did not hesitate to utilize the powers vested in his office under the Executive Orders to achieve his goals.

When the GRI Legislature failed to enact a law to curb banking abuses of the kind enumerated above, a USCAR measure carried out the needed reform.[56] To enforce the new regulations, a High Commissioner's Ordinance established, in September 1962, a Financial Inspection Agency within the GRI.[57]

General Caraway told the author how he had removed the management of the United States-controlled Bank of the Ryukyus, the largest in the Islands, and how he carried out a reform of this institution with the aid of information supplied to him by members of the Golden Gate Club.[58]

Among other changes carried out, it is possible to mention the reorganization and merger of the two sugar mills engaged in wasteful competition, a drastic reduction in electric power charges which had been kept artificially high by a power distribution cartel, and the exposure of corruption among high and previously respected Ryukyuan bankers, leading to a number of indictments. In July 1962 a Grievance Committee was established to hear complaints or

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charges concerning personal or professional misconduct on the part of any attorney possessing a limited license to practice law before USCAR courts. New and revised rates for land rental payments were introduced in July 1963. These resulted in an over-all increase of approximately sixteen per cent in the receipts of Okinawan landowners above the rates fixed by the 1958 reform described in Chapter VI. The wages of Ryukyuan employees of the United States Government were also raised. In the case of office secretaries, the monthly maximum wages were increased from $70 to rates varying between $80 and $200. In 1963 the High Commissioner brought about the enactment by the GRI Legislature of a Workmen's Accident Compensation Insurance Act and introduced trial by jury through one of his Ordinances.[59]

General Caraway left virtually no stone unturned in his efforts to ameliorate the lot of the Ryukyuan population. He explained to the author that in order to improve the employment prospects of the local inhabitants he went so far as to have dismissed Japanese and Filipino citizens holding positions which Okinawans could fill.[60]

Like so many other reformers, General Caraway was obliged to exercise a strong, direct and personal control over governmental matters in order to carry out his numerous and often unprecedented reforms. General Caraway's view of his role can be best understood in the light of his earlier mentioned assertion that the High Commissioner held the only real power within the United States Civil Administra-

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tion. This statement describes the command structure of USCAR during the incumbency of General Caraway. The author was told by the former High Commissioner and by former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer that the Caraway Administration pursued its goals with single-minded purpose, fighting off in the process the attempts of the United States Department of State and of the Japanese Government to increase their influence over Okinawan affairs. The aim in this was to permit as little interference as possible from these two, quite different, sources in the military-controlled administration of the Ryukyu Islands.[61]

The High Commissioner distrusted the politicians and officials of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. This is quite understandable in view of the conditions that these men had permitted to develop and in view of the opposition they offered to the enactment of General Caraway's reforms.[62]

This distrust, together with the great desire to enact the necessary measures, caused General Caraway to rely frequently on the United States Civil Administration rather than on the GRI. General Caraway, perhaps more than any other High Commissioner, made use of the authority which USCAR could exercise over the local Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The Civil Administration supervised closely the activities of the GRI and vetoed any local measures that did not meet with American approval. As many as seven of these were vetoed during the fall of 1962. In the end, USCAR Ordinances and regulations had to be used frequently to

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achieve the reforms desired by the American Administration.[63]

In regard to this free use of High Commissioner's Ordinances, General Caraway explained to the author that he never enacted any Ordinances in order to contradict a policy of the local Ryukyuan government, but only to fill in gaps when the GRI failed to act. He commented further that, with the many powers possessed by the United States in Okinawa, there always existed the possibility of maneuvering and of taking preventive measures that would avoid situations which could lead to open confrontations with the local population, while still pursuing only the policies desired by the American Administration. General Caraway contrasted the smoothness with which his policies had been successfully carried out, with the difficulties and the confrontations encountered by his successors during the last years of United States administration.[64]

As a general comment on the political style of High Commissioner Caraway, it should be pointed out that he succeeded to a remarkable degree in carrying out his will in the Ryukyu Islands, without provoking the kind of large-scale and open opposition which was to beset USCAR during the late 1960's, and force it occasionally to give in to local demands. Although there was no lack of Okinawan criticism of General Caraway's leadership style, the most serious political difficulty encountered during his entire term of office, the longest of any of the High Commissioners, was the Chief Executive crisis of 1964.* The exact reasons

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for this success are hard to determine. It is, however, possible to give the time during which General Caraway held office as one probable reason. The Okinawan reversion movement did not reach its peak until the late 1960's. General Caraway's reputation for determination and firmness probably represented another factor which helped to prevent the political pot from boiling over.

By this time it must have become evident that the style of government used by General Caraway corresponds to what is commonly known as paternalism. By this is understood governing a people to provide benefits for it, but without granting any effective rights of self-government. This approach is best illustrated by the contents of the previously referred to Golden Gate Club speech of General Caraway.* In this address the High Commissioner went beyond exposing malpractices within the local Ryukyuan Government and told his audience frankly that additional governmental functions could be delegated to the GRI only as it developed greater responsibility and became more effective. He proceeded to list the numerous shortcomings of this government to show that it was not ready for this and summarized his point by adding:[65]

> In the Ryukyus, as elsewhere, men must earn the right to wield power, political, or economic, or social; it is not to be bestowed carelessly upon the adolescents, the weakling, or the incompetent, no matter how loudly he may shout for it...

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*See pages 127-128 of this chapter.

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> The cry for "autonomy," for complete freedom from all restraints, for power to rule without responsibility or demonstrated competence is a false 'aspiration of the people." It is, unwittingly or wantonly, a scream to hide incompetence; irresponsibility; disloyalty to the community which vested authority in it; or it is a shield for Special Interest and Special Privilege fattening on the Remainder of the Community.
>
> See it for what it is and reject it.
>
> It is, in fact, almost the last myth left to the political hacks and the economic quacks.

It is easy to see that this speech called forth a great deal of criticism among Okinawans, whose ability to govern themselves was being questioned.[66] In 1968, the High Commissioner added a comment to the manuscript of this address, which he had preserved. He noted that this particular speech had been one of his most controversial but that "The Ryukyu legislators and the Executive Branch GRI tried to say they were misunderstood and abused by the HICOM (High Commissioner). In fact they 'got the message' and even improved their performance for the rest of the time I was there. The people themselves supported me wholeheartedly."[67]

In a way this comment tells a great deal about the Okinawan reaction to General Caraway's efforts to impose reforms from above. There was much opposition to the High Commissioner's methods, particularly from politically conscious elements in both the Ryukyus and Japan. Criticism came not only from the opposition, which was to be expected, but also from the ranks of the pro-American OLDP. Akio Nagamine, the Speaker of the Legislature, declared after General Caraway's departure from the scene that "the Ryukyuan

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people opposed the direct control exercised by General Caraway" which, he stated, violated the basic policy of the United States of encouraging autonomy in the Ryukyus.[68]

Besides the opposition to the "Caraway Whirlwind," as some called it, a great deal of respect and appreciation was expressed in Okinawa for the progress accomplished under the energetic and outspoken High Commissioner. Admiration for his accomplishments were voiced by businessmen, by some GRI officials and by others who a few years after General Caraway had retired, and at a time when such language could bring them no favors, wrote to him that he had succeeded in accomplishing what none of his predecessors had ever been able to do. These correspondents added that, as far as those in the Islands who were still engaged in unwholesome practices were concerned, they wished that the Caraway "iron fist" could once again "come down on their heads." Even the Chairman of the opposition Socialist Masses Party, Tsumichiyo Asato, while criticizing his direct control over Okinawan affairs, praised the controversial High Commissioner's sense of justice.[69]

The policies of General Caraway, as clarified to the author, were based upon the assumption that the maintenance of administrative control over the Ryukyus was essential for the continued effective operation of the military bases. In order to achieve this, the United States had simultaneously to improve social and economic conditions in the Islands and retain the paramount powers of government in its own

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hands. Any concessions on autonomy would begin the gradual erosion of American authority that would inevitably end up with reversion to Japan and with the loss of any meaningful use of the bases. The policy of gradual concessions initiated under his successor was felt by General Caraway to be in part responsible for the process that, within five and one half years of his departure from Okinawa, was to place the United States in the position of being compelled to agree to the reversion of the Ryukyus.[70]

It is well-known that such a policy of refusing to grant concessions to demands for greater autonomy runs counter to currently accepted views concerning the strength of modern nationalistic feelings. Moreover, according to the view expressed at the beginning of this subchapter, economic and governmental reforms provide no substitute for self-government. Such reforms can, instead, arouse greater resentment by bringing out more sharply the inferior position in which the subject population finds itself in regard to its rulers. If a foreign ruling power is to maintain a minimum climate of acceptability for its regime among the local population, it must at one time grant concessions to the demands of its subjects.

This is, however, not to be understood as meaning that the only reasonable course for the rulers of a dependency to follow consists in granting political concessions. A dependency is by its nature based on the lack of consent of the governed. A policy of far-ranging concessions can

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therefore be followed only when the ruling power is prepared to initiate the process which will, within a limited period of time, lead to full self-determination rights for the subject population. Concessions usually bring forth demands for still further concessions and a foreign ruling power moving sufficiently far in this direction may discover that it has set out on a course from which there is no turning back, and which will soon lead to the liquidation of the dependency relationship. This is very closely related to the time-honored idea that a revolution normally takes place not when conditions are at their worst and when the rulers are in their most uncompromising mood, but when conditions are beginning to improve and when concessions have already been granted.

From this it would appear that in the age of nationalism the government of a dependency is not a simple matter and requires a great deal of adroit maneuvering. A dependency relationship has under modern conditions only a limited life expectancy as it is founded not on the consent, but on the opposition, of the great majority of the governed. Under these circumstances, the ultimate objective of the ruling power can consist, at best, in the maximum possible prolongation of the duration of the dependency relationship. The means to this end would include a refusal to grant concessions at one time and, at other times, a willingness to give in to local demands. For the rulers it is a question of what concessions to grant and when. The most difficult

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problem to decide is, probably, when to abandon a policy of no concessions.

In the case of Okinawa, it is interesting to note that both former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer and Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, who in the matter of concessions represented the view opposite to that of General Caraway, expressed an opinion to the author that on one point agrees with General Caraway. According to this view, had no concessions been granted to the Okinawans after General Caraway's departure and had the United States continued steadfastly on this course, then Washington would not have come to the point where, by November 1969, it felt compelled to agree to the reversion of the Ryukyus. Professor Reischauer and Dr. Ohama both added, however, that in such a case there would certainly have occurred in the end, probably some time in the 1970's, something akin to a revolutionary "explosion." This would not only have made the continuation of American rule politically impossible. It would also have ended any possible Okinawan acquiescence to a military presence of the United States in the post-reversion Ryukyus, and in all likelihood would have permanently damaged Japanese-American relations as well.[71]

It would then appear that while concessions on local autonomy could not be withheld endlessly, neither would it have been in the best interests of the American purpose in the Ryukyus to have granted them too soon. It is with this in mind, and by examining the results of his administration,

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that the policies of General Caraway must be judged.

Proceeding along this line of thought it is found that during General Caraway's term of office the reversion movement had not yet gathered the momentum it was to gain in the late 1960's. It was, therefore, possible to refuse to grant any real political concessions at that time and to carry out some very useful reforms from above, reforms which the local Ryukyuan government did not seem inclined to undertake on its own initiative. It was also possible to do this without creating in the process major difficulties for the American administration of Okinawa. It will be seen that after General Caraway retired from office it was still not too late to embark on the policy of concessions which was to reach its climax within a little more than five years in the decision to return the Ryukyus to Japan. It will also be noted in this study that by the time the reversion decision was finally announced, American-Japanese friendship had not been damaged and the United States was still in a position to assure for itself more limited base rights in post-reversion Okinawa.

The conclusion would seem to be that General Caraway's refusal to grant political concessions did not cause any long-range damage to American interests in either the Ryukyus or in Japan. The denial of increased autonomy may then be justified by the lack of any compelling necessity to grant such concessions during the 1961-1964 period. To have acted differently might have constituted a premature grant of

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autonomy that could have shortened unnecessarily United States rule over the Ryukyus.

It must, however, be added that such a policy could not have been pursued indefinitely. Sooner or later political concessions would have had to be made to the Okinawans. Although there may be disagreement concerning the wisdom of embarking on the new policy at that time, a more liberal policy on concessions was begun under General Caraway's successor.

Increased Autonomy

The first moves in the direction of granting greater autonomy were made by the United States Government about three years before the policy of political concessions was actually inaugurated in the Ryukyu Islands.

The initial stimulus for this was provided, in part, by the conference held between President John F. Kennedy and Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in the summer of 1961. This summit meeting was instrumental in making the new administration aware of the conditions existing in the Ryukyus at the time General Caraway began his term of office. In October 1961, a United States Government survey team, under the chairmanship of Carl Kaysen, was sent to the Islands to study their social and economic problems and to see what could be done to strengthen the political and economic foundations of "the billion dollar United States base," as the New York Times put it.[72]

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This survey team completed its mission in February 1962 and made recommendations concerning social and economic matters, to be discussed in the following two chapters, and also pertaining to the governmental system of the Ryukyus. These findings favored the granting of a greater voice to the Okinawans in the management of their own affairs and contradicted the ideas then prevailing in the Department of Defense.[73] President Kennedy seems to have compromised the opposing views held by the Kaysen mission and the State Department on the one hand and the Pentagon on the other, in the famous declaration which he issued on March 19, 1962, thereafter known as the "Kennedy Statement on Okinawa," and also in certain amendments which he made on the same day to Executive Order 10713, of June 5, 1957.

The compromise consisted essentially of recommendations for additional economic aid to the Ryukyus, of a verbal recognition that Okinawa was a part of Japan and would one day be returned and of a few minor modifications in the governmental structures of the Ryukyus. These did, however, not affect the paramount control that USCAR could exercise over the Islands whenever it saw fit to do so. At least for the following six years, if not until the November 1969 joint communique on reversion, this remained the essential nature of the concessions which the United States was prepared to grant to Okinawan demands.

The Kennedy Statement included among its most noteworthy passages the following:[74]

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> I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look forward to the day when the security interests of the free world will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty. In the meantime we have a situation which must be met in a spirit of forbearance and mutual understanding by all concerned. I have directed that a number of specific actions be taken to give expression to this spirit by the United States, to discharge more effectively our responsibilities toward the people of the Ryukyus, and to minimize the stresses that will accompany the anticipated eventual restoration of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese administration...

The President then proceeded to list the changes he had made in the original Executive Order 10713, through his own Executive Order 11010, of March 19, 1962. These consisted of:

1) The Chief Executive of the GRI was to be appointed by the United States High Commissioner on the basis of a nomination by the Legislature. Should, however, the High Commissioner decide that the nominee of the Assembly was unacceptable, then he still retained the right to name a Chief Executive without any Legislative nomination.

2) The veto of the High Commissioner over GRI legislation, formerly unlimited in nature, was now restricted to bills affecting military security, foreign affairs and United States property.*

3) The term of the Legislature was extended to three years and the Assembly was given the right to enlarge the number of legislative electoral districts beyond the previous twenty-nine districts and to alter their boundaries,

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"with the approval of the High Commissioner."

4) The Civil Administrator was to be a civilian, rather than a Brigadier General, in order to emphasize that his functions were governmental and not military in nature.

The Kennedy Statement also included a passage which was to form the basis for later Okinawan claims that the "Statement" had intended to grant greater autonomy to them than turned out to have been the case. In it there was expressed the intention of[75]

> Carrying on a continuous review of such controls as may be thought to limit unnecessarily the private freedom of inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands with a view to eliminating all controls which are not essential to the maintenance of the security of the United States military installations in the Ryukyus or of the islands themselves.

As can be seen from a reading of these passages, whatever concessions may have been granted to the GRI, they did not actually reduce the powers possessed by USCAR. This resulted not only from the very limited nature of the concessions made but also from the fact that the interpretation of the Executive Orders was left to the United States Administration and to its American courts. These "concessions" to Ryukyuan autonomy did not prevent or limit the fully legal execution of the direct rule policy of High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Caraway. The statement recognizing the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese Homeland, and looking forward to the day when the Ryukyus could be returned to Japan, made an impression on some Okinawans and on some Japanese, but it did not differ too much from Dulles'

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"residual sovereignty."

The only part of the Kennedy Statement from which Okinawans could claim that greater autonomy should have been given to them was the last-quoted passage, promising the elimination of all controls not essential for the security of the bases or of the Islands themselves. Even this passage could, however, lend itself in practice to widely varying interpretations. These could range from the minimalist meaning which the Caraway Administration placed on it, through the wider interpretations of the succeeding High Commissioners, all the way to a maximalist approach in which anything not directly connected with military matters should have been left to the Okinawans to determine. In a situation perhaps reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court's varying interpretations of what did and of what did not constitute direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce, the same leeway could exist in deciding what was essential for security purposes and what was not, and whether only direct or also indirect effects on security matters should be kept under USCAR's control.

The episode of the Kaysen Report and the Kennedy Statement touched off a controversy between the Departments of State and Defense.[76] General Caraway told the author that due to the opposition of the Defense Department, and also because President Kennedy did not press the matter at the time, little came out of the report beyond the phrases of the Kennedy Statement and the very minor amendments to

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the original Executive Order.[77] Ambassador Reischauer expressed the belief to the author that the recommendations of the Kaysen Report for greater autonomy were not acted on at the time due to the policies of USCAR and of the High Commissioner.[78]

Even if the United States Government was in the early 1960's not yet prepared to grant real autonomy to the Okinawans, the desire for this, and particularly for the public election of the Chief Executive, was strong and consistent among the Ryukyuan population and had been voiced in the 1950's as well as during the 1960's. As an example of this, it is possible to bring up once again the unanimous resolution passed in December 1962 by the conservative dominated Legislature of the Ryukyus, asking for the popular election of the Chief Executive.[79]

Another indication of Okinawan feelings at that time is provided by the split within the generally pro-American Liberal Democratic Party, which occurred during the summer of 1964.[80] This dispute centered around the question of autonomy and was probably a factor in the change in tone and in the policy of minor concessions inaugurated during the administration of General Caraway's successor as High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II.

General Watson explained in an interview with the author that he had been sent to assume the office of High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands with the basic instructions from Washington to "make the United States presence

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more palatable to the Okinawans," but without reducing the authority of the High Commissioner in the process.

This statement probably describes best the original American intentions in the new policy of concessions to Ryukyuan demands for greater autonomy.

General Watson explained further that he was given the right to make limited reforms in order to make the American presence more acceptable in the Islands. He added, however, that he did not believe the reforms made in line with this new policy had really been necessary during the 1964-1966 period when he served as High Commissioner.[81] Among others, this opinion would lend to General Caraway's policy of no concessions support from his successor,who had been sent to Okinawa with instructions to pursue a different policy.

New York Times correspondent Robert Trumbull wrote on the occasion of his 1965 visit to Okinawa that the policies of the new administration seemed to be based on the recognition that Okinawans preferred Japanese to American rule and that, consequently, as long as the United States governed the Islands the charge of "colonialism" could not be avoided. The only thing to be done under these circumstances was to make every effort to reduce frictions. Trumbull added that this recognition seemed in itself to constitute an important new psychological concession from the American side.[82]

One basic approach of the new administration to the

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problem of reducing friction and irritants connected with the American presence was to worry less about the merits of specific policies pursued by the GRI and to substitute for this a greater freedom of action for the Ryukyuans, with the attendant opportunity for them to make their own mistakes.[83]

In his first appearance before the Legislature of the Ryukyus, in August 1964, the new High Commissioner asked for the constructive cooperation of the Legislature in the political difficulties that had arisen at the time in connection with the split within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. He also declared that he would welcome the assumption of wider responsibilities on the part of the Assembly and pledged to seek ways of gradually transferring more functions from USCAR to the GRI.[84]

One American practice that until then had constituted a major source of irritation for Okinawans was the enactment of legislation by means of USCAR Ordinances. The new administration set out to undo the resentment generated by this by drastically reducing the number of such Ordinances. General Watson, in what constitutes an obvious illustration of the advantages of having the members of a friendly political party in control of the Ryukyuan government, explained to the author the way in which this was repeatedly done. It consisted in the High Commissioner privately informing the Chief Executive of the GRI that the latter should publicly ask for a particular USCAR regulation to be rescinded.

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General Watson would then officially annul the regulation in question.

General Watson added, however, that although the leaders of the GRI would usually check with him before making public demands for changes, it sometimes happened that Chief Executive Matsuoka had to appeal for reforms without checking with the High Commissioner or even against his advice.[85]

In the above manner, High Commissioner's Ordinance No. 56, dated October 14, 1964, rescinded thirty-nine items of High Commissioner legislation described as "either obsolete or adequately covered by other laws.[86] Between 1965 and the end of 1966, the number of Ordinances and other items of High Commissioner legislation was further decreased from one hundred forty-five to eighty-nine. In the late 1960's this number was reduced to a still greater extent.[87]

The removal of irritants and the transfer of more responsibilities to the local government were also accomplished in other ways. For instance, in 1965 the Joint Foreign Investment Board, consisting previously of Americans and Ryukyuans, was reorganized into an all-Ryukyuan agency. In another reform, USCAR Proclamation No. 24, of January 7, 1965, permitted the Chief Executive to appoint the directors of the various Ryukyuan Government departments, as well as other GRI personnel, without the approval of the High Commissioner. Still another example is provided by change No. 23 to USCAR Ordinance No. 144, made on February 4, 1965, which deleted the requirement of procuring a GRI Permit

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for publishing or printing newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets or circulars.[88]

Under the new relationship between USCAR and the GRI the Ryukyuan laws no longer had to conform to American standards down to their details. The Ryukyuan Assembly was, instead, permitted to pass its own laws. The United States Civil Administration was still there to advise the GRI. However, USCAR no longer stepped in to block legislation, even if it was dissatisfied with it, unless, to quote the High Commissioner, "it hampers our military mission."[89]

The concession to local autonomy which probably attracted the greatest attention was an amendment to Executive Order 10713, signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson on December 21, 1965. This provided for the election by the Ryukyuan Assembly of the Chief Executive, who was to serve in office until the end of the term of the Legislature which had elected him. This change seemed to transform the Chief Executive into the equivalent of a Prime Minister in a Parliamentary system of government. In reality, this turned out to be far from the actual state of affairs.

Under the new arrangement, should the Assembly fail to select a new Chief Executive within a "reasonable" period of time, as determined by the High Commissioner, the latter was empowered to appoint a temporary Chief Executive who was to serve until the Legislature had elected a successor. Moreover, by using his veto power over acts of the Legislature the High Commissioner could prevent someone who was,

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in his opinion, a "dangerous person" from becoming Chief Executive, even if he was elected by the Legislature.[90] Finally, as explained by the High Commissioner at a press conference, since the Chief Executive was to remain in office during the entire remaining term of the Legislature that had elected him, the Assembly could not remove the Chief Executive through a vote of non-confidence and neither could the Chief Executive dissolve the Assembly, which was elected for a fixed term of office.[91]

A different way of looking at this last reform was presented by a former Chief Executive of the GRI, Seisaku Ota, who welcomed it as an advance over the previous system but pointed to obvious contradictions inherent in the new structure of the Ryukyuan Government. This government now contained a mixture of features found in both the Parliamentary and the Presidential systems. Ota noted that under the new arrangement the Chief Executive was elected by the Assembly and, although he was thereafter no longer responsible to it for the remainder of his term, he still retained a veto power over the actions of this Legislature.[92]

Still other comments were expressed concerning this very limited concession to Okinawan autonomy. One comment noted that it seemed as if the United States Authorities had waited to take this step until late in December, after the results of the November 14, 1965 election were safely in. This electoral contest determined the composition of the Legislature that would elect the next Chief Executive.

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There was also speculation that the main effect of the new system would not be a strengthening of the voice of the Okinawan electorate, but an increase in the influence of the conservative party which habitually controlled the Legislature.[93]

On October 2, 1966,Lieut. Gen. Watson departed from the Ryukyus and exactly one month later the investiture ceremony was held for the new High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Ferdinand T. Unger.[94]

The new High Commissioner continued the policy of minor concessions, whenever this was consistent with the basic control exercised by the United States. He added, however, a new note to it.

In June 1967 General Unger announced that he had drawn up a list of twenty-nine additional laws and regulations enacted by USCAR which would be rescinded when the GRI produced substitute legislation more in keeping with Japanese practices.[95] A little earlier, on May 23rd, the High Commissioner had announced a symbolic concession that had been refused until then, the flying of a combination of the Japanese flag and of a special pennant from all Ryukyuan ships. On July 27, 1967, representatives of the Government of Japan and of USCAR reached agreement on procedures and details relating to the transfer to the Japanese Government of the authority to issue passports and identity papers to Okinawans traveling outside the archipelago. On June 14, 1968, Japanese nationals over twenty years of age who had

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resided in the Ryukyus for more than three months were given the right to vote in Okinawan elections.[96]

The last three symbolic concessions are mentioned because they indicate a new attitude toward Okinawan identification with Japan which had appeared by 1967 in official American policy. This new attitude had developed slowly and with much hesitation over a period of many years and became generally accepted in 1967. By giving official expression to it, General Unger formally injected the new note in the policy of concessions. The evolution of the new American attitude can be traced through several official statements of policy issued between 1957 and 1967.

In the official communique given out following the summit meeting held on June 22, 1957 between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, the passages dealing with Okinawa started out with the statement "The President reaffirmed the United States' position that Japan possesses residual sovereignty over these islands." This formula was, more or less, repeated at the time of the June 22, 1961 Kennedy-Ikeda meeting. The Kennedy Statement of March 19, 1962 went a little further. It recognized the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland, and looked forward to the time "when the security interests of the Free World will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty." This was, in turn, followed by the Joint Communique of January 13, 1965 that emerged from the first summit conference between Prime Minister

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Eisaku Sato and President Lyndon B. Johnson, and which produced mainly a repetition of this formula.

In contrast to the very limited change in attitude found in the statements issued between 1957 and 1965, a definite departure from the American policy line adopted in 1951 can be noted in the 1967 Joint Communique. The second Sato-Johnson conference of November 14 and 15, 1967 produced a statement which declared that the two leaders[97]

> ... agreed that the two governments should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over these islands to Japan and in the light of these discussions.
>
> The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that, with a view toward minimizing the stresses which will arise at such a time as administrative rights are restored to Japan, measures should be taken to identify further the Ryukyuan people and their institutions with Japan proper and to promote the economic and social welfare of the Ryukyuan residents.

This last joint communique also agreed, as a token of American good will, to return the Bonin Islands to Japanese jurisdiction. As far as Okinawa was concerned, it came just about as close as was possible to a definite promise on reversion without giving an actual date. This was, however, not a completely unexpected development. It was foreshadowed by various precedent-breaking statements made by the new High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Unger.

On February 3, 1967, in an address to the Legislature of the Ryukyu Islands, he had become the first High Commissioner to officially mention reversion by referring to the

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1962 and 1965 Presidential declarations on this subject, and by stating that "... we are both looking forward to the earliest possible date when circumstances will permit reunification with Japan. In this context, you and I are striving for the same objectives." In the meantime, until the security situation in the Far East "clarifies," General Unger urged the Okinawans "to devote a considerable portion of your time and energy in planning for that day when the situation in the Far East will allow reunification with Japan."[98]

The need to prepare for a return to Japan, which was now assumed to be definite and no longer lay merely in the indefinite future, was repeated by High Commissioner Unger a few months later.[99]

These important psychological concessions had been made necessary by a change in Okinawan and Japanese attitudes that was taking place during the 1966-67 period. This change represented one of the most significant, perhaps the most important, development of the entire period of American rule over the Ryukyus. References to this period will appear throughout the study, particularly in the last three chapters. The change in Okinawan and Japanese attitudes resulted not only in psychological concessions, but also prompted the United States to give in to long-standing Ryukyuan demands of a more concrete nature.

Early in 1968 the United States finally granted to the Okinawans what for seventeen years had been considered

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one of the most important possible concessions in the direction of local autonomy. In an address to the opening session of the Legislature, on February 1, 1968, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Unger announced that the Executive Order constituting the basic law of the Ryukyu Islands had been amended to provide for the popular election of the Chief Executive. He was to be chosen by a plurality of the votes cast, provided that these represented at least one fourth of the total. The election was to be held simultaneously with the legislative elections and the Chief Executive was to serve for the same term as the Legislature.[100]

At the time this decision was announced, Japanese political observers attributed the new concession mainly to the fact that, in the previous months, the demands for reversion in both Japan and Okinawa had "heightened speedily." This was found to be the case particularly after the Sato-Johnson November 1967 summit conference. This would represent an interesting comment on how concessions can beget further concessions. Other political observers felt that the United States Government had reached the conclusion that, as a result of various political developments, the political risks involved in the popular election of the Chief Executive had been greatly reduced. These developments included the strength displayed by the Liberal Democratic Party in the Assembly, and the gradual acceptance by Okinawan political parties of the influence of their Japanese counterparts, a situation examined in Chapters X and XI.[101]

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The Chief Executive election held in November 1968 resulted in the victory of the opposition candidate. Shortly after this political setback for the United States,on November 20, 1968, it was announced in Washington that Lieut. Gen. James B. Lampert would, early in 1969, replace Lieut. Gen. Unger, whose term of office as High Commissioner had almost expired. In Tokyo, Japanese Foreign Office sources expressed the opinion that the designation of General Lampert had been expected, but that the timing of the announcement had been advanced as a result of the defeat of the pro-American candidate in the Chief Executive election. These sources added that the outgoing High Commissioner had been so enthusiastic in his efforts to improve relations with the Japanese and the Ryukyuans that situations had occurred in which his opinions had differed sharply (one dispatch used the word "clashed") with those of the United States Government. The Foreign Office had, however, no objection to the designation of General Lampert and did not expect this to result in any changes in policy.[102]

The basic policies of the United States in Okinawa were not modified as a result of the change in High Commissioners, and outwardly there was much to give the impression that despite concessions and setbacks the situation in the Ryukyus remained unchanged. Early in 1969 General Lampert still testified before a Congressional Committee, in the traditional manner, that the granting of increased self-rule to the Okinawans, a policy he approved of,

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"... does not mean that the full authority held by me under Executive Order 10713 is in any way disturbed."[103] Despite these misleading appearances, virtually every person familiar with Ryukyuan affairs whom the author met during the spring and summer of 1969 felt it to be a foregone conclusion that the decision to return Okinawa to Japan by 1972 would be announced at the time of Prime Minister Sato's planned visit to Washington, in November of that year. This turned out to be the case.

When an examination is conducted into the two basic approaches tried by the United States in governing the Ryukyu Islands, direct control with a refusal to grant any concessions on self-government and gradual concessions, then it becomes evident that neither could have resulted in an indefinite period of American administration. The basic reason for this can be found in the rejection, under modern conditions, of alien rule. The United States was faced with a dilemma through which it was possible to maneuver for more than twenty years, but which precluded an indefinite continuation of American rule.

The opinions of former Ambassador Reischauer and of Dr. Ohama have already been mentioned to show that, should a policy of no concessions have been continued during the middle and late 1960's, the United States administration of the Ryukyus, with undiminished rights, could have continued longer than it actually did. This would, however, have ended in all likelihood in what has been termed "an explo-

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sion" which would have seriously damaged, if not altogether wrecked, the hopes for future friendly relations and cooperation in the defense of the Far East between the United States and the Okinawans, as well as between the United States and Japan. These opinions as well as our general knowledge of the significance of nationalism in our time make it seem certain that sooner or later a policy of gradual concessions had to be inaugurated.

The United States Government had assumed that the defense of the Far East required complete freedom of action in the use of the Okinawan bases on the part of its armed forces. This, in turn, was felt to depend on continued, direct American control over the Ryukyu Islands and over their internal affairs. If this view is accepted, and if the previously expressed limitation on the duration of American rule over the archipelago is kept in mind, then the best policy for Washington to pursue was the one which would have secured the longest possible period of direct United States administration without damaging future American relations with the Ryukyus and with Japan in the process. In consequence of this, from the American point of view, the exact time when the policy of concessions had to begin was of the greatest importance. If this was done too late it could have hurt future relations with Japan and with the Okinawans. If, on the other hand, this was undertaken too soon it would have ended prematurely the United States control over the Ryukyus and the attendant freedom in the

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use of the bases.

Should the above reasoning seem too cold-blooded and heedless of the human element involved, it must be remembered that the defense of the Far East was considered a matter of vital importance by both the United States and the Japanese Governments, and that the American regime in Okinawa was not one of "colonial oppression and exploitation." Instead, this regime carried with it both advantages and disadvantages for the Okinawans, a situation which created for most of them mixed feelings on the question of whether reversion to Japan should be achieved at an early date, or delayed for a number of years. Under these circumstances it is not unreasonable to assume that as long as the Okinawan population gave a limited acceptance to the American regime and did not voice any unusually strong objections to it, the inconveniences suffered by this population from the military base regime could not have been acute to the point that their continuation represented an inhumane act on the part of the United States. Therefore, the previous calculation of the optimum policy for the United States is not devoid of consideration for the Ryukyuan population.

Whether the policy of concessions was inaugurated at the right time is a question which can never be answered accurately. It would appear from the development of United States-Okinawan and United States-Japanese relations during the years prior to the writing of this study that the moment chosen was not too late. There are differences of

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opinion on whether it came too soon.

As mentioned earlier, General Watson expressed to the author the belief that concessions made to the Okinawans in the direction of greater self-government were not really necessary during his tenure of office. He also expressed the view that American rule over the Ryukyus could have been prolonged if, at a sufficiently early date, the United States Government had ruled out clearly any possibility of reversion within the foreseeable future. This would have prevented the excessive rise of expectations in this matter. In General Watson's opinion, many concessions short of an actual reversion decision could still have been made to appease Japanese and Okinawan feelings. Among these he included the repeal of additional USCAR Ordinances and increased economic aid, particularly for education.[104]

It should come as no surprise that Dr. Ohama and former Ambassador Reischauer expressed a somewhat different view to the author. They agreed that a policy of no concessions during General Watson's administration, or additional delays in the announcement of a reasonably early reversion date, could have prolonged the period of direct American rule over the Ryukyus. Dr. Ohama and Ambassador Reischauer added, however, that such a course would have increased greatly the danger of an ultimate violent reaction.[105] ChaptersVIII through XI will shed more light on this problem by analyzing the changing mood of the Ryukyuan population during the last years prior to the 1969 rever-

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sion decision.

It is clear that the United States could not have administered the Ryukyus endlessly without granting concessions on local autonomy. Likewise, it soon becomes evident that such concessions not only constituted stop-gap measures, at best, but that they were self-defeating in the long run. As former Ambassador Reischauer explained to the author, the concessions that the United States felt compelled to make bore a similarity to a policy of appeasement in that they bought only a limited amount of time, while they simultaneously encouraged the hope for ultimate reversion and generated demands for still more concessions.[106] This was noted by Civil Administrator Gerald Warner at the very beginning of the period of concessions, when he pointed out that the transfers of functional authority to the GRI were making "little real impression" on the Okinawans who were "basically ... always pushing to attain ... prefectural status and return of administrative rights to Japan."[107]

The concessions on autonomy could not have made a lasting impression on the Okinawan population. Besides the fact that under modern conditions limited autonomy is no substitute for the nationalistic aspiration of self-determination, the concessions made by the United States were never intended to grant real self-government and were always arranged so that the ultimate, real, power rested only in American hands. As the United States had defined its role in the Ryukyus, no other course was possible as long as it

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was desired to continue the American regime for a substantial period of time. To have granted real self-government would have resulted ultimately in self-determination, and this would have ended the American regime in Okinawa and the freedom of action in the use of the bases. The limited concessions which were made had a double effect. They succeeded in appeasing somewhat the feelings of the local population. At the same time, they also played a role in the decline in American prestige and authority that took place during the late 1960's. In such a situation, neither concessions nor their denial would have made it possible for the United States to maintain indefinitely its rule over the Ryukyu Islands. The existence of this basic contradiction reduced the problem to one of maneuvering as efficiently and as gracefully as possible. For these reasons authorities on Okinawan affairs like Ambassador Reischauer favored the granting of concessions at the time they were made. Self-defeating as they were, the alternatives would have been worse.

Conclusions

Looking back at the previous two chapters, the dilemma confronting the United States in the matter of concessions on local autonomy is seen as one of the major, but not as the only, contradiction encountered in the Okinawan dependency relationship. The attempts to reconcile the irreconcilables, described in the second chapter, were

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naturally in the same category. They involved the necessity of somehow creating a limited form of self-rule and an appearance of democracy in a political system based on the denial of the most fundamental democratic right, the right of a people to select its own form of government.

The ambiguous legal status given to the Ryukyu Islands represented another contradiction. It was designed to permit an indefinite period of American rule, while still acknowledging that the Ryukyus remained, somehow, a part of Japan, only temporarily separated from the Japanese motherland. This status was needed to soften the effect of the detachment of the Ryukyus from Japan on the Japanese and on the Okinawans, and to reconcile the democratic and anti-foreign rule traditions of the United States with the necessity of governing a dependency at a time when this no longer seemed appropriate for a democracy.

The complicated political manipulations that had to be undertaken can be regarded as a reflection of the inner contradictions of the Okinawan dependency relationship. These, in turn, derived in large part from the fundamental problems present in any dependency relationship, and outlined in the introduction to this study.

American rule could not in the long run be acceptable to the Okinawan population as, aside from other disadvantages which it presented to the Ryukyuans, it could not prevent placing them in a clear position of inferiority. The very fact that the paramount power rested with the

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United States made this inevitable. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands had been created by the Americans and only exercised its powers at their pleasure. At every turn Okinawans were reminded of the superior authority and position of the United States. As a result of the existence of the dependency relationship the Okinawan population was automatically placed in an inferior position. Unfortunately, various American policies only served to emphasize this status.

The military nature of USCAR, which had been made necessary by the exclusively strategic interest of the United States in Okinawa, was particularly resented because of its unintended effects on Okinawan self-esteem. The actions of the United States Administration during the Senaga affair only emphasized to what extent the supposedly autonomous institutions of the Ryukyu Islands were actually dependent on the Americans. The local resentment caused by this revelation was demonstrated by the reaction of all sections of the Ryukyuan population to the manner in which Mayor Senaga was ousted. The efforts of the Caraway Administration to carry out reforms from above helped to accentuate the inferior position occupied by the Okinawans and thereby showed that even well-intentioned and constructive measures taken by the ruling power can have a negative effect on the dependent population.

The contents of the last two chapters illustrate a major cause for the contradictions encountered by the

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United States in administering the Ryukyu Islands. The policies of the United States reflected in many ways its internal characteristics, and were modified to a limited degree only by the conditions encountered in Okinawa and in the Far East during the period of American rule.

Perhaps the most obvious, and the most superficial, example of the rulers' tendency to reshape a dependency in their own image was the American insistence during the 1950's and early 1960's on having the laws enacted by the GRI conform to American standards down to minor details. Even the needed reforms carried out by the Caraway Administration displayed a strong inclination to improve Okinawan conditions in terms of American values.

The sources of American policy could, however, be traced to the traditions and experiences of the United States in more fundamental ways.

As a democratic nation the United States had to establish in Okinawa a form of local self-rule bearing the greatest resemblance possible under the circumstances to a democratic, autonomous, government. Moreover, unlike the practice of a modern totalitarian regime, the United States could not create merely the outward forms of a democratic government and then rob it of its essence by denying all political liberties to the local inhabitants, and by permitting the existence of only one political party that would be completely under its control. The United States was obliged to grant a minimum of meaningful political

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freedom. This was sufficient to make possible the appearance of an effective opposition, but not enough to satisfy the Okinawan desire for genuine self-government. Thus, the liberty granted played its part in undermining the American regime.

It will be seen in later chapters, more clearly than has been the case until now, how the political traditions of the United States made any effective suppression of opposition impossible, once the reversion movement began to assume more serious proportions. When faced with such a situation during the middle and late 1960's, the only course of action open to USCAR was to follow the traditional American response pattern to a determined political drive on the part of significant population groups. This consists at first in paying lip service to the demands voiced and in making changes giving the appearance of concessions, while using simultaneously political manipulation to negate the essence of the reforms which have been seemingly enacted. When, however, the demands for change persist, intensify and display a potential for assuming threatening proportions, then there follows a gradual surrender to the opposition campaign. An all-out confrontation will usually be avoided, regardless of whether the requested changes are reforms demanded by substantial sections of the population, or whether they constitute merely special privileges for a particular interest group. The policy of the United States in regard to concessions on local autonomy represented an illustration

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of this response pattern. It was also the only course of action open to a democracy under the circumstances encountered in Okinawa.

The influence of American ways and traditions on United States policy in the Ryukyu Islands, the special problems caused by the exclusively military interest of the United States in the archipelago and various conditions inherent in alien rule, were largely responsible for the many contradictions encountered in the Okinawan dependency relationship. The existence of these contradictions was a major factor in limiting the duration of United States administration. The fundamental nature of these contradictions made necessary adroit maneuvers in order to achieve the difficult objective of gaining the reasonable acquiescence of the Okinawan population to a maximum prolongation of American rule, while causing only a minimum of strain on United States relations with Japan. This maneuvering was accomplished through the often contradictory nature of the political institutions created in the Ryukyu Islands, through the constant manipulation of the Okinawan political process and by means of the economic benefits which the military presence of the United States brought to the local population. It is to this aspect of the American regime that the study must now turn.

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NOTES

[1]Correspondent Nakazawa, "Americans of Okinawa," Part II, Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 12, 1963, translation found in The General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 22.

[2]Letter under the heading "H.Q. USARYIS (SGS)," signature not legible, to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated December 4, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 10. The letter heading stands for Headquarters, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands.

[3]Letter from Civil Administrator Gerald Warner to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated March 29, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 19. This letter was written on official USCAR stationery.

[4]Letter from Civil Administrator Gerald Warner to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated September 20, 1965, Ibid., Box No. 24.

[5]Letter under the heading "H.Q. USARYIS," under signature "Gail," dated May 19, 1965, Ibid., Box No. 24.

[6]Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo, as translated in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, March 6 and 8, 1965. (Mimeographed).

[7]Consulate General of Japan in New York, Japan Information Service, Japan Report, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (February 1, 1970), p. 5. See also M.D. Morris, Okinawa, A Tiger by the Tail (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1968), pp. 197-198; and Baltimore Sun, November 16, 1968, p. A2:3-4.

[8]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[9]The Weekly Okinawa Times, December 25, 1965, p. 6 (article by Mikio Higa). A copy may be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 10.

[10]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, trans. and ed., Okinawa Times Public Opinion Survey in Connection with Various Okinawan Problems, July 27-28, 1968 (November 1968), p. 11. (Mimeographed).

[11]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, trans. and ed., Third Ryukyu Shimpo Public Opinion Poll (April 1968), pp. 10-11. (Mimeographed).

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[12]The New York Times, April 1, 1954, p. 36:8.

[13]The New York Times, April 4, 1956, p. 15:1-2; and April 11, 1956, p. 10:3.

[14]The New York Times, March 20, 1958, p. 3:4.

[15]The New York Times, November 15,1960, p. 7:1-6.

[16]The New York Times, November 13, 1962, p. 17:1.

[17]The New York Times, November 16, 1965, p. 5:2.

[18]The New York Times, November 12, 1968, p. 3:3. In the references just presented (No. 12-18), the degree of interest commanded by Okinawa elections in the United States can be gauged by how far back in the pages of the New York Times they were reported. The 1958 election was given greater prominence because of the land crisis, to be described in Chapter VI. By 1965 the situation in the Ryukyus was becoming such that a legislative election was no longer a subject to be buried in the back pages.

[19]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 26 March 1945 - 30 June 1965, pages not numbered, the information is listed chronologically. (Mimeographed).

[20]The New York Times, November 7, 1962, p. 36:2.

[21]The New York Times, April 4, 1956, p. 15:1-2.

[22]Ibid.; and The New York Times, August 21, 1952, p. 2:6.

[23]U.S.,Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 84. See also Tokyo Shimbun, February 22, 1970, as appearing in USCAR Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, February 1970, No. 2, p. 38 (Mimeographed); and USCAR Public Affairs Division, Office, Civil Affairs and Military Government of the Ryukyus, The Ryukyu Islands, Publication No. 3 (4th ed., July 31, 1957), p. 29.

[24]The New York Times, April 15, 1956, p. 7:1-3.

[25]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Continuation, from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967, pages not numbered, the information is listed chronologically. (Mimeographed). See also Mikio Higa,

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"The Reversion Theme in Current Okinawan Politics," Asian Survey (Berkeley, Cal.) VII, No. 3 (March 1967), p. 164.

[26]Sakanaka Tomohisa, "The Present Status of the Okinawan Reversion Movement," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), XV, (January-March 1968), p. 32.

[27]The Weekly Okinawa Times, December 11, 1965, p. 2:2; and December 25, 1965, p. 6. Copies of these two editions may be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 10.

[28]Letter from Civil Administrator Gerald Warner to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated December 2, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 8.

[29]Copy of letter from Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.) to Civil Administrator Gerald Warner, dated December 17, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 8.

[30]The Providence Journal, December 2, 1963, p. 2:3-6.

[31]Letter from Nobuo Takaramura to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated December 21, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 10.

[32]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, February 12, 1970.

[33]The New York Times, December 27, 1956, pp. 1:8 and 10:5.

[34]The New York Times, January 6, 1957, p. 11:1; and August 4, 1957, p. 27:1-4.

[35]The New York Times, December 29, 1956, p. 2:6.

[36]The New York Times, January 3, 1957, p. 11:1; January 6, 1957, p. 11:1; and November 26, 1957, p. 6:3.

[37]The New York Times, June 18, 1957, p. 7:5; and August 4, 1957, p. 27:1-4.

[38]The New York Times, August 4, 1957, p. 27:1-4; and August 6, 1957, p. 4:3.

[39]The New York Times, January 6, 1957, p. 11:1; November 25, 1957, p. 17:3-5; and November 26, 1957, p. 6:3. See also USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

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[40]Herbert Passin, ed., The American Assembly of Columbia University, The United States and Japan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 74.

[41]The New York Times, January 13, 1958, p. 1:8 and p. 17:2-3; and January 14, 1958, p. 9:3-7. See also USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

[42]The New York Times, January 15, 1958, p. 11:6-7; January 21, 1958, p. 6:6; and January 29, 1958, p. 5:1.

[43]The New York Times, April 21, 1958, p. 3:3.

[44]The New York Times, December 22, 1958, p. 1:7-8; and December 19, 1951, p. 18:6.

[45]Correspondent Nakazawa, "Americans of Okinawa," Part III, Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 13, 1963, translation found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 22.

[46]Miyasato Seigen, "Hopes and Realities in Okinawa," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), XII (April-June 1965), p. 163.

[47]Correspondent Nakazawa, "Americans of Okinawa," Part V, Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 15, 1963, translation found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 22.

[48]Letter from Kanwa Hokama to Lieut. Gen Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated April 27, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 19.

[49]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[50]The New York Times, August 12, 1964, p. 14:1. The author of this article, Emerson Chapin, repeats the charges made by Lieut. Gen. Watson.

[51]Nampō Dōhō Engokai, Okinawa Problem, the Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan (Tokyo: Nampō Dōhō Engokai, 1967), p. 70. (Mimeographed).

[52]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[53]Remarks by Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, at the Regular Monthly Dinner Meeting of the Golden Gate Club, Harborview Club, Naha, Okinawa, 5 March 1963, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 19. This is apparently the original copy used in delivering the address.

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[54]Letter written from 1643 Macon Street, McLean, Virginia, signature illegible, to Lieut. Gen. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated October 10, 1965, Ibid., Box No. 24.

[55]Tokyo Shimbun, December 5, 1960, as appearing in United States Forces in Japan, H.Q., Office of Information Services, Japanese Press Translations, December 5, 1960. A copy may be found in Ibid., Box No. 11.

[56]The New York Times, May 13, 1962, p. 6:1-3.

[57]USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

[58]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[59]The New York Times, January 13, 1964, p. 40:3-4. See also USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates; USCAR, Okinawa Press Translations, No. 42, April 22, 1964, p. 8 (Mimeographed); and Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963, Vol. XI, (RCS CSCAMG-5), pp. 39-44.

[60]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[61]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969; and interview with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970. Intimations of friction between the Military Authorities in Okinawa and the State Department as well as signs of apprehension concerning Japanese efforts to increase Tokyo's influence over Ryukyuan affairs appear in some of the correspondence found in the General Caraway Papers. Among these could be mentioned a remark added by General Caraway to the manuscript of the previously referred to Golden Gate Club Speech, after its delivery, that "... by this time I had learned how to short-circuit the anguished cries from Dept. of State, U.S. Ambass. Tokyo and the Japanese Govt."

Other examples would include the remark written by General Caraway to his friend the Governor of Bermuda: "... while Japan, the dispossessed owner (of Okinawa) with a reversionary interest, sits nervously and watches me for fear I'll smash a tea cup." General Caraway also wrote to General Frederick H. Smith, the retiring Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, that "... I have been deep in Japanese 'investigators,' all trying to muscle in on the United States controls of Okinawa. If you were to see the problems, you would find that they look the same as they did when we were conducting operations by U.S. Forces

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Japan versus Ambassador MacArthur."

See Remarks by Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, at the Regular Monthly Dinner Meeting of the Golden Gate Club, Harborview Club, Naha, Okinawa, 5 March 1963, Remarks added at the last page, signed PWC 1968; Letter from Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway to the Hon. Julian A. Gascoigne, Governor of Bermuda, Hamilton, Bermuda, dated January 25, 1962; and Letter from Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway to General Frederick H. Smith, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., dated July 2, 1962, all in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Boxes No. 19 and 22 respectively. (The last two letters can both be found in Box No. 22.)

[62]Just before the end of his term of office, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway wrote "... poor, bumbling, bag ridden men in the Legislature, the Executive branch or the Judiciary. They are beaten before they can start." See letter from Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway to Yoei Miyara, Naha, Okinawa, dated July 28, 1964, and also letter from Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway to his brother, Brig. Gen. Forrest Caraway, April 20, 1963, Ibid., both in Box No. 22. The above remark is from the first mentioned letter. In interviews with Lieut. Gen.Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969 and February 12, 1970, a distinct distrust of the local Okinawan leadership was expressed by General Caraway.

[63]John Barr, "Trouble in Paradise: Okinawa," Aspect (Great Britain), August 1963, p. 26. See also Higa, Asian Survey, VII, No. 3, op. cit., p. 155; and Seigen, Japan Quarterly, XII, No. 2, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

[64]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[65]Manuscript of the Golden Gate Club address, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 19.

[66]The New York Times, March 8, 1963, p. 4:7.

[67]Manuscript of the Golden Gate Club address, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 19.

[68]The New York Times, March 8, 1963, p. 4:7; July 31, 1964, p. 2:6; and August 16, 1964, p. 26:1. The last two articles are by Emerson Chapin.

[69]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in Okinawa Press Translations, op. cit., No. 110, p. 1; Correspondent Nakazawa, Yomiuri, Part 3, op.cit.; Letter from GRI official, Giichi Ishigaki to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, dated November 6, 1967; Letter from Nobuo Takaramura, President, Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation, to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway,

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dated December 12, 1967; and Japan Times (Tokyo), April 25, 1964, all in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., in Boxes No. 8, 22, 19, 21 and 22, respectively. See also The New York Times, January 13, 1964, p. 40:3-4.

[70]Interviews with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969 and February 12, 1970.

[71]Interviews with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970 and with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[72]The New York Times, September 4, 1961, pp. 1:7-8, 6:4; and October 1, 1961, p. 46:3.

[73]The New York Times, March 8, 1962, pp. 6:1, 14:5; and March 20, 1962, p. 23:1-8.

[74]The New York Times, March 20, 1962, p. 23:1-8.

[75]Ibid., and Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Reference Materials, January 1969, pp. 67-75.

[76]The New York Times, June 24, 1962, p. 2:4-6.

[77]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[78]Interview with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970.

[79]The New York Times, April 15, 1956, p. 7:1-3; January 19, 1958, IV, p. 6:3-4; December 10, 1962, p. 17:2; and November 20, 1964, p. 3:4. These provide just a few examples covering an eight year period to illustrate consistent Okinawan demands for greater autonomy.

[80]The New York Times, August 16, 1964, p. 26:1.

[81]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[82]The New York Times, March 21, 1965, p. 27:1-3.

[83]Letter from Colonel W.P. Wansboro, Commandant, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia and former Deputy Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated September 29, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 24.

[84]The New York Times, August 12, 1964, p. 14:1.

[85]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

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[86]USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit, under the appropriate dates.

[87]U.S.,Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 151.

[88]Ibid., p. 151. See also USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

[89]Washington Post, December 26, 1965, pp. A19:1, A21:1-2. In this article,written by Rafael Steinberg, many of the specific changes made by the Watson Administration are discussed.

[90]The Weekly Okinawa Times, December 25, 1965, p. 1:3; and January 1, 1966, p. 2:1-2. Copies of these may be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 10. See also The New York Times, December 21, 1965, p. 28:6.

[91]Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., December 23, 1965. See also Higa, Asian Survey, VII, No. 3, op. cit., p. 162.

[92]Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., December 22, 1965.

[93]Washington Post, December 27, 1965, pp. A1:5-6, A15:1-4. (Article by Rafael Steinberg). See also Higa, Asian Survey, VII, No. 3, op. cit., p. 162.

[94]USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, Continuation, 1966-1967, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

[95]The New York Times, June 7, 1967, p. 2:4-6.

[96]USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, Continuation, 1966-1967, op. cit., under the appropriate dates; and USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Selected Chronology of the U. S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Continuation, from 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968, pages not numbered, the information is listed chronologically. (Mimeographed). See also The New York Times, May 16, 1967, p. 12:2-5. (Article by Richard Trumbull).

[97]Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Reference Materials, op. cit., pp. 45, 52, 55, 59-60, 64-65.

[98]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July

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1966 to 30 June 1967, Vol. XV (RCS CSCAMG-5), pp. 310, 312. See also Tomohisa, Japan Quarterly, XV (January-March 1968), op. cit., p. 35.

[99]The New York Times, June 7, 1967, p. 2:4-6.

[100]Okinawa Times, Ryukyu Shimpo, Jiho, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., February 2, 1968.

[101]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 5, 1968, p. 4:1-2.

[102]Mainichi (Tokyo) and Tokyo Shimbun, both November 21, 1968, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., November 1968, No. 24, pp. 31-32. See also Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., November 21, 1968; and The New York Times, November 21, 1968, p. 5:4 and November 22, 1968, p. 2:6.

[103]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 248.

[104]Interview with Lieut. Gen Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[105]Interviews with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970, and with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[106]Interview with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970.

[107]Letter from Civil Administrator Gerald Warner to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated March 29, 1965, on official USCAR stationery, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 19.

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CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE ASSISTANCE TO OKINAWA

When the American Armed Forces conquered the Ryukyu Islands in the spring of 1945 the United States had to assume responsibility for the welfare of the poorest and most backward corner of Japan, and in particular for the archipelago's main island, which had suffered during its conquest a degree of devastation equalled by few other places on earth during the entire war.

Since the widespread destruction had been triggered by the action of American forces the United States was under a much greater obligation toward the Islanders than it would have been if it had assumed power over the Ryukyus in a different context. The immediate response of the Military Government was to feed the destitute population, rebuild the war-damaged areas and do what it could to return conditions to normal and later, wherever possible, to improve these beyond the pre-war levels.

Some efforts were made to raise the economic standards of the Ryukyus even during the period when they appeared to be waiting to assume some new military importance for America, and when in other respects they were the victims of neglect. However, real economic progress came only after the United

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States saw a new strategic role for the Islands. During the 1950's the establishment of large military installations brought to Okinawa the greatest prosperity in its history, and fears concerning the political foundations on which the effectiveness of the bases rested resulted in a dramatic increase in American aid during the decade of the 1960's. Once again the policies pursued by the United States in the Ryukyus were determined by strategic considerations, something not unexpected in view of the exclusively military interest of the United States in these Islands.

Unlike American actions in other fields, that resulted mainly in Okinawan dissatisfaction with the rule of the United States, in the economic sphere the American presence had a more positive effect. Although American accomplishments in certain areas and for some groups in the Ryukyus were unsatisfactory compared to the performance of the Japanese Government in the main islands of Japan, they nevertheless created supports among the local population for a limited continuation of the American regime. For many years the inhabitants of the Ryukyus thus found themselves in a dilemma as far as their nationalistic desire for a reunion with Japan was concerned.

The economic and social welfare of the Okinawan population is thus of special interest for this study in that it represented the one field in which the United States could build up supports for its rule. It was also the only area in which, without compromising its formal administra-

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tive rights, the United States could make an almost infinite number of concessions to Ryukyuan demands and to the Japanese desire to become more intimately involved in the affairs of what was almost the only territory lost during the war that held out a good promise of being one day returned to Japan. But through neglect or unwise economies, it was in this field that the United States Government lost the greatest number of opportunities.

What the United States Inherited in the Ryukyu Islands

From the late fourteenth to the early seventeenth centuries the Ryukyu Islands had, in large part due to their location, prospered as an entrepot for trade among neighboring countries. When the Ryukyus were conquered by the Satsuma Clan of Southern Japan in the early seventeenth century, they found themselves for the first time under a kind of dual sovereignty somewhat resembling the conditions which were to exist under the United States administration in the twentieth century. The actual rulers were Japanese but nominal sovereignty still resided with China, to whose Emperors the Okinawans sent mutually profitable tribute missions.

During this period most of the profits of the Okinawan maritime trade went to the Satsuma domain. When the Kingdom of the Ryukyus (Ryukyu Han) was abolished in 1879 and the Islands were transformed into a Japanese prefecture, the overseas commerce for all practical purposes

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came to an end. This trade was terminated for a number of reasons, one being the general re-arrangement of Far Eastern commerce that took place when the Western presence in this part of the world began to make itself felt. With the formal incorporation of Okinawa into the Japanese Empire the decline in local prosperity that had begun as a consequence of the seventeenth century Satsuma conquest was accelerated and the Islands sank into deep poverty. The historian George H. Kerr has described the period that began for the Okinawans in 1879 as truly "colonial," because[1]

> ... the lion's share of profit and the power to make economic policy for the prefecture did not rest with them. They had no effective representation at the national capital, and few Japanese at Tokyo felt much interest -- economic, political, or humanitarian in the welfare of the Okinawans.

In the period before 1945 Okinawa was the poorest Japanese prefecture[2] and was never self-supporting, being subsidized by the central government to the extent of 20 per cent of its prefectural income. In 1937 the Japanese Government spent $1,619,949 for Okinawa and in 1940 $1,284,899.[3]

In the years 1934 to 1936 the average annual per capita income was $60 for Japan as a whole but only $25 for Okinawa. Even if the figure for the Ryukyus is translated to the value that it would have represented in terms of 1953 prices, this would still amount to only $70. The central government did provide, however, hospital and wel-

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fare facilities considered adequate for that time and for that part of the world and comparable to those then in existence in other Japanese prefectures.[4]

Former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway, in an address before the 1966 Pacific Northwest Assembly of the University of Oregon, further described some of the conditions in which the pre-World War II Ryukyuan population of 500,000 lived. Their diet generally consisted of sweet potatoes with fish four times a month and rice four times a year. Meat, in the form of pork, was a rarity.[5]

According to statistics presented at a Congressional hearing only about thirty motor vehicles were to be found in Okinawa before the Second World War.[6] In the smaller Sakashima and Yaeyama Islands of the Ryukyu chain cart roads were the main arteries of transportation. Telephones, filtered running water, electricity, medical centers, concrete school houses and libraries were either rare or completely unknown. These innovations made their appearance mainly under the post-war American regime.[7]

In the spring of 1945 the main island of this poverty-stricken archipelago became the scene of a bloody battle that killed more than 110,000 of the civilian inhabitants and destroyed 90 per cent of the homes. The fighting as well as the subsequent flight of a large part of the surviving population resulted in the complete confusion of local property records, creating a problem that was to plague Okinawa for many years. The number of

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livestock, which had stood at 262,000 in 1940 was found to have fallen to 3,800 in 1946.[8] During the hostilities American bulldozers completed the ruin of much of the island's agriculture by destroying, sometimes in a matter of minutes, terraced fields that the Okinawans had painstakingly laid out for more than a hundred years.[9] The survivors of the main island's population emerged from this holocaust almost entirely dependent on the United States for their sustenance.

The Armed Forces of the United States at first supplied about 80 per cent of the food, clothing and other essentials needed by the local inhabitants. One and one half years after the battle the American Authorities still had to provide more than half of Okinawa's food requirements, making available 17 million pounds of foodstuffs a month. Many Okinawans possessed in those early days no other clothes besides oddments of castoff U.S. Army uniforms. In an effort to rebuild the shattered economy, the Armed Forces of the United States had by late 1946 made available to the local population 600 tons of fertilizers, 4,000 agricultural tools, 25,000 gallons of fuel oil to be used as insecticide, 18 landing craft for use as fishing boats and a variety of mechanical equipment. They had also reconstructed some cement plants and, partly by utilizing American lumber, had rebuilt 12,963 of the 95,000 houses that were estimated as being needed. They also provided schooling for some 100,000 children and put back into operation various health, sanita-

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tion and control programs. Ironically, the United States even unintentionally supplied the bits and pieces of equipment stolen from military installations which formed most of the stock-in-trade used by Ryukyuans in the brisk smuggling exchange taking place at the time with neighboring Taiwan.[10]

During the earliest period of American rule no real currency was in use in the war-shattered Islands and whatever trade existed had reverted to barter.[11]

In the early years of postwar reconstruction, in which Ryukyuans were down to a daily ration of 1500 calories consisting largely of rice, sweet potatoes, vegetables and Army "C" rations, the difficulties of the Islands were further compounded by a variety of other problems. These included, in the beginning, a shortage of males caused by the wartime military draft and by the emigration of laborers from the poverty-stricken archipelago. This resulted in a population composed of 45 per cent juveniles, 38 per cent females and only 17 per cent adult males.[12] At a somewhat later period this shortage of usable manpower was followed by the opposite condition. A high birth rate combined with the repatriation of Okinawans from various parts of the lost Japanese overseas empire brought about a general increase in the population from an estimated 400,000 at the end of the 1945 battle to 540,000 by the middle of 1948.[13] The typhoons that regularly ravage Okinawa constituted another serious obstacle during the difficult reconstruc-

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tion period.[14]

General Caraway told the author that the first years of United States administration were devoted basically to the rebuilding of Okinawa island and that during this period the inhabitants lived mainly, in one form or another, on American aid.[15] By 1953 the Ryukyuan economy had been rehabilitated to the prewar level.[16]

United States Aid

The assistance extended to the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands during the first years, from 1945 to 1947, was provided by the Armed Forces of the United States. From 1947 to 1958 the United States Government also extended aid, amounting to more than $164 million, under the GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) program.[17]

After 1950, particularly during the years of the Eisenhower Administration, the funds spent for the Ryukyus were cut considerably. This was done partly because of the Islands' lesser need for assistance by the early 1950's, when reconstruction had made considerable progress, and partly as a result of the low spending policies adopted by the new President. In explaining this new Eisenhower policy to the author General Caraway pointed out that the reduction in spending affected not only aid programs but everything else as well, including outlays for the building of the military bases.

An examination of the amounts appropriated for the

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Ryukyu Islands, which were always higher than the sums actually spent, indicates a sharp reduction in the last years of the Truman Administration. This was followed by further decreases during the early Eisenhower years which continued until the total amount of the aid was reduced to insignificant sums. The 1958 annual USCAR report, as well as earlier ones, printed the following figures, the upper one in each case representing the amount appropriated and the lower one showing the total spent (in thousands of dollars):

1947-49	1950	1951	1952	1953
$56,554	$51,988	$39,631	$15,122	$10,830
48,065	49,581	36,745	13,257	9,220
1954	**1955**	**1956**	**1957**	**1958**
$ 2,845	$ 3,016	$ 2,907	$ 2,273	$ 2,546
1,741	1,904	1,678	1,025	1,111

During these years the United States spent for administrative purposes in the Ryukyu Islands the following additional sums (also in thousands of dollars):[18]

1947-49	1950	1951	1952	1953
$ 8,489	$ 2,407	$ 2,886	$ 1,865	$ 1,610
1954	**1955**	**1956**	**1957**	**1958**
$ 1,104	$ 1,112	$ 1,229	$ 1,248	$ 1,435

American assistance was reduced to almost meaningless figures after reconstruction had been basically completed and an economy-minded and free-enterprise oriented administration had been installed in Washington. It could thus

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be concluded that American decision makers felt that, once war damages had been repaired, the economic stimulation provided by the continued American military presence was sufficient for further economic growth in the Ryukyus. While this thinking had a great deal to be said for it, it will become apparent in later chapters that there continued to exist in the Ryukyus, despite the general progress, pockets of neglect that resulted in general dissatisfaction or strong complaints on the part of some groups. These remaining areas in which development lagged behind the progress achieved in Japan could easily have been corrected through the expenditure of relatively small sums of money.

Since the Okinawan desire for reversion to Japan had always been strong and was for many years balanced in the minds of the local population mainly by the economic advantages associated with continued American rule, it is difficult to understand why the United States Government failed to exploit this advantage fully. More development aid could have safely been provided to make the American military presence more palatable to the local inhabitants without jeopardizing American political control over the Islands.

As frequently happened in such situations, the refusal to spend more for the Okinawan economy did not originate with United States officials stationed in the Ryukyus, who usually recognized the inadequacy of the appropriations allocated. The blame for this can more properly

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be placed with the Congress and the Bureau of the Budget, who were often accused of seeing Okinawa primarily in narrow military terms.[19] It can be considered shortsighted to have thought of the military interest in such limited terms as to neglect, even if only in part, the economic supports for the indispensable political foundations on which the continued effective operation of the bases ultimately rested.

From June 1958 assistance to the Ryukyu Islands was provided through annual Congressional appropriations made specifically for this purpose.[20] During the first years of the new system, appropriations were made without specific authorizing legislation and were subject to various parliamentary maneuvers. In order to overcome this difficulty some legal basis for these appropriations was necessary. There also existed a desire to permit the retention and expenditure of the revenues of the GRI and of USCAR. Those purposes were realized through the enactment of Public Law 86-629, the Price Act of 1960, which authorized an annual appropriation of up to $6 million for the Ryukyu Islands.

Although the new law had aimed to regularize appropriations for the Ryukyus and protect these from parliamentary maneuvers by determining an amount considered to be reasonable for that time in Washington, within two years one of the unintended effects of the Price Act was to limit the amount that could be spent for direct aid to the archipelago. This happened at a time when United States Government officials began to show a greater awareness of the

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need for additional economic assistance to the Ryukyus as a means of shoring up the political foundations of the military bases.[21]

In the summer of 1962, the new administration of President John F. Kennedy, made aware by the Kaysen Report of the situation in Okinawa, announced a new policy of increased economic aid for the Ryukyus. This was done through the same statement in which some minor changes in Executive Order 10713 had been made. Congressman Melvin Price agreed to introduce the bill that would amend the act bearing his name and increase the appropriations for the Ryukyus.[22]

The appropriations had previously been set at $4.713 million for fiscal 1959, at $5.675 million for 1960, at $6.089 million for 1961 and at $7.174 million for 1962 (including some additional funds from other sources besides the basic appropriation fixed at $6 million). Despite the fact that $25 million was now being sought for aid to the Ryukyus, the direct assistance was raised to only $8.948 million for fiscal 1963.[23]

The requested increase in assistance for Okinawa was not granted because of opposition in the Congress. Congressman Otto E. Passman who, as General Caraway explained, controlled more than any other member of the House the budget for the Ryukyus, symbolized some of this opposition when he declared during the hearings for the 1963 appropriations: "I think a lot of people in the Ryukyus are getting along a

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lot better than some people are in The States ... They have learned to like the taste of caviar, pink champagne and fillets and do not want to go back to hamburger."[24]

The direct appropriations were again raised, to only $9.996 million for fiscal 1964, but were finally increased to $14.360 million for 1965 and then remained at this level for three years, having been set at $14.767 for 1966, $14.932 for 1967 and $15.042 for 1968. It is interesting to note that only the 1969 appropriation reached $20 million.[25] By that time, as will be seen in Chapter XI, financial aid could no longer influence the political future of the Ryukyus. Even at that late hour the direct appropriations did not reach the $25 million figure that had been called for as far back as 1962.

After the 1962 appropriations hearings Representative Passman was invited to visit the Ryukyus a number of times and, as a result, began to show a greater understanding of the problems of the Islands and of the viewpoint of USCAR.[26] In March 1964 he declared at the annual hearing on appropriations for the Ryukyus that after several visits to the Islands "I found no indication and I do not think that there is any record that would positively indicate they (the Ryukyuans) would rather be under Japanese control than American."[27]

Such an attitude could indicate another possible reason for the Congressional reluctance to appropriate larger sums for direct assistance to Okinawa. In addition

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to the usual tendency of members of Congress to reduce executive appropriations requests as economy measures, there apparently existed on Capitol Hill a lack of understanding concerning the political situation in the Ryukyus and the need for more assistance as the most effective method to tone down the demands for reversion and for the increased autonomy that the United States was so unwilling to grant.

This Congressional reluctance to increase substantially direct aid for Okinawa was even more pronounced in the Senate than in the House of Representatives. At least on two occasions, in 1962 and again in 1967, the House had agreed to raise the authorized aid (as distinguished from appropriations) to the requested limit of $25 million but the Senate did not go along with these proposals.

The Senate action of 1967 resulted in political embarrassment for the United States in the Ryukyus. On the strength of a promise from Washington that the Administration would obtain a sufficient increase in the legal limit on aid to the Islands, the Government of the Ryukyus had added $5.3 million to the budget it was preparing early in 1967. When the Senate failed to act in time and the Administration bill for an increase in the aid limit expired as a result, the GRI budget was thrown into confusion. The parties of the Left strongly attacked the Liberal Democrats for depending on American assurances that the money would be forthcoming, and anti-American sentiment

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increased in Okinawa. The Chief Executive of the GRI, Seiho Matsuoka, declared that, as a result of this, progress would be impeded in such areas as education where the Ryukyus were already lagging behind Japan. He added "It is a very bad situation ... For only $5.3 million, there is much anti-American talk these days."[28]

While the Chief Executive of the GRI had his own reasons for dramatizing the need for additional aid to his government, it cannot be denied that such actions on the part of the Congress, resulting from the fragmented decision-making process prevailing in many areas in the United States Government, unnecessarily complicated the already difficult position of the United States in the Ryukyus. This could be considered another example of "penny wisdom" and "dollar foolishness" on the part of the National Legislature.

A Senate action blocking an aid measure for the Ryukyus, which had been requested by the Administration, passed by the House of Representatives, and in addition had been promised to the GRI and counted on by the Ryukyuans, is an outstanding example of poor intra-governmental coordination and bad diplomacy. It must also be pointed out that, as will become evident in later chapters, the injection of relatively small sums of money would have made it possible to improve considerably many if not most of the social and economic conditions that were weakening the limited Okinawan acceptance of American rule.

What has been written thus far represents a case

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against the Congressional failure to appropriate additional funds for assistance to the Ryukyus. While the author subscribes to this criticism of Congress, the problem under discussion cannot be understood unless the contrary case is also presented and at least some of the reasons behind the Congressional reluctance to appropriate additional funds for Okinawa are examined.

Congressional attitudes were influenced by the realization that the United States was, in addition to direct aid appropriations, contributing in many other ways to the economic and social well-being of the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands.

For example, in fiscal 1963 $8.948 million was appropriated in direct aid to the Ryukyus. In addition, the United States provided during the same year: $800,000 for a special fund to help Okinawans emigrate from their crowded islands; $2.7 million in U.S. value worth of commodities for a relief and school-lunch program under Public Law 480, Title III; $5.4 million in loan funds with a twenty-year repayment period to the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation to purchase surplus commodities under Title IV of the same law; and another loan fund appropriated by Congress from the Treasury for the construction of the Kin electric power plant.[29]

The above still is not an exhaustive list of American contributions to the Okinawan economy in 1963.

Mention must also be made of the USCAR General Fund

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and Corporations. These had their origin in various revenue-producing assets purchased or established from funds provided earlier by GARIOA, as well as from subsequent appropriations, and retained by USCAR for security, technical or economic reasons.[30] In fiscal 1963 an additional $8.7 million derived from the operations of this American-donated USCAR General Fund and were used to aid the Okinawan economy.

When this aid, as well as the previously mentioned assistance to the welfare of the Ryukyus, is taken into account, then the total funds contributed amounted not just to the $8.948 million appropriated under the limitations of the Price Act but to $26.5 million. In addition to all this there existed still other forms of aid under different headings. This situation caused Congressman Passman to complain that as far as American assistance for Okinawa was concerned, "there are nine to fifteen spigots and all are running over."[31]

Up to this point the concern has been with actual aid given to the Okinawan population. This does not, however, cover all the material benefits derived by the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands from the United States. Although these additional benefits were merely a by-product of American expenditures made to serve American military ends in the archipelago, they represented, no less than outright assistance did, contributions to the Ryukyuan economy resulting from the military presence of the United States. The sums of money involved in these incidental benefits turned out to be much larger than those derived from direct

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assistance.

One source of such benefits was the rentals paid for land used by the United States Forces or Government. These amounted to $3,897,851.01 in fiscal 1963 and to $4,423,937.44 in fiscal 1968.[32]

The largest income earned by the Ryukyus from the American presence was naturally derived from the vast expenditures made by the United States Government for the building and maintenance of the military installations and also from the large sums spent by the tens of thousands of American soldiers and citizens, as many as 85,000 in 1964, whose presence in Okinawa was a result of the existence of the bases.[33] This particular source of income was of such importance that it is taken up in detail in the next chapter under an analysis of the Ryukyuan economy.

Another form of revenue was provided by compensation payments that can be considered as aid because the United States was merely under a moral, but not under any legal, obligation to pay them and only decided to do so for political reasons.

The $22 million Ryukyuan Compensation Act was belatedly enacted in October 1965 to pay the Ryukyuans for damages suffered and for the previously uncompensated use of Okinawan real and personal property, resulting from the activities of the United States Forces and from "tortious acts by members of the Armed Forces." The compensation paid covered liabilities incurred by the United States

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between August 15, 1945, when Japan formally announced its decision to surrender, and April 28, 1952, when the United States-Japan Peace Treaty went into effect.

The United States Government decided to pay for these claims even though its legal liability had ended with the signing of the Peace Treaty. This was done in part on the recommendation of the High Commissioner and with the purpose of generating goodwill and improving the image of the United States in the Islands. This aim was clearly stated in the hearings preceding the passage of the compensation act. It was pointed out during these hearings that a Legislative election would be held in November 1965 in the Ryukyus and that pro-American Okinawans felt the pre-Treaty claims had to be rapidly settled in favor of the local claimants to avoid the creation of another anti-American issue in the Ryukyus and to make possible a continued peaceful occupation of the archipelago by the United States. Although $55 million had been originally claimed, only $22 million were ultimately appropriated and paid to 80,000 Ryukyuans who had presented a total of 180,000 claims.[34]

The Americans did not fully accept the view that compensation paid for damages resulting from actions of United States Forces, or payments for goods and services received in Okinawa, did not really represent "aid." All economic advantages derived from the presence of the United States were considered to be benefits, included in the general category of assistance or at least related to it.

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Outright aid, the payment of compensation that the United States was not legally obligated to pay, and disbursements for goods and services received, all shared a common denominator: The fact that, after the initial repair of war damages, the aim behind all these expenditures was the efficient operation of the military bases.

Regardless of how well, or how badly, the Ryukyus would have fared had they remained a part of Japan after the Second World War, it cannot be denied that before 1945 Okinawa was the poorest prefecture of Japan, that it possessed no important resources outside of its strategic location and that all of its amazing post-war progress was the result of benefits received from the United States as a consequence of the American interest in the strategic location of the Islands.

Even the export of goods to the United States could in a way be considered a form of aid. Without the American interest in the exploitation of the strategic resources of Okinawa it is doubtful if any Ryukyuan merchandise would have been of real interest to the United States or if any of its officials would have cared to encourage the import of such goods into the United States.

If this American interpretation of the benefits flowing from the military presence of the United States in the Ryukyus is kept in mind, then it is possible to arrive at the following tabulation of income derived from the United States in fiscal 1968, perhaps the last year in

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which it was possible to believe that the American administration of Okinawa might continue for a much longer period of time:[35]

Expenditures by U.S. Government and Personnel	$197.8 million
U.S. Government Grants and Loans	38.9 million
Capital Transactions (Public and Private)	8.3 million
Exports of Goods and Services to the U.S.	15.7 million
Grand Total	$260.7 million

A few points have to be kept in mind when this table is examined. It should first be noted that the total of all U.S. Government grants and loans naturally covered more than the formal Congressional appropriations under the Price Act, which amounted that year to only a little more than $15 million. It should also be realized that the more than $260 million received from American sources represented more than forty per cent of the entire 1968 Gross National Product of the Ryukyu Islands, which in that year came to $644.4 million.[36]

Moreover, it should also be remembered that the Ryukyu Islands had not been self-supporting since they became a Japanese Prefecture in the nineteenth century and that during 1968 they incurred a trade deficit amounting to $290 million, or not much less than half of the entire Gross National Product. Only the American contribution and the aid re-

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ceived from the Japanese Government made it possible to balance the books at a level that permitted Okinawans to enjoy what was by far the highest standard of living in their history.[37] This lends some support to the American contention that all sums received from United States sources could in some way be regarded as a kind of assistance to what was otherwise an economically unviable territory.

In fiscal 1969, the overall United States financial expenditures in and contributions to the Ryukyus amounted to $271 million and were expected to reach $288 million during fiscal 1970. Of this last sum, $34.6 million represented appropriated aid, outside of any loans, and was divided about equally between direct aid and assistance from the USCAR General Fund.[38]

It should be noted, however, that during 1969 and 1970 inflation was decreasing the value of the U.S. Dollar by 5 or 6 per cent annually and that as a consequence the increase in the actual purchasing power of United States expenditures was, in fact, non-existent.

On February 3, 1970, Chief Executive Chobyo Yara stated that according to the United States budget message for fiscal 1971 the recommended direct aid for the Ryukyus would amount to only $6.952 million, a fraction of the sum appropriated the previous year.[39] By that time the reversion agreement had already been concluded, the economic responsibilities for the Ryukyus were shifting more and more from the United States to Japan, and a date for reversion

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in the not too distant future had already been determined. The main American political motivation for large-scale assistance to Okinawa had disappeared.

It should not be surprising that once the hope for an indefinite continuation of direct United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands had been given up and a definite date for reversion had been set, the United States lost most of its interest in aid for Okinawa. This assistance, like everything else that the United States had done during its rule over the archipelago, had served only one purpose, to make possible the continued direct American administration of Okinawa, which in turn was believed to have been essential in order to guarantee the unhindered and effective use of the military bases.

There is no lack of evidence to show what leading United States officials considered the purpose behind the aid extended to the Ryukyus. The reasons for the belated payment of compensation to Okinawans who held claims going back to the 1945-1952 period have already been pointed out. In that case, as well as in the examples to be presented, the statements by high officials and supporters of increased benefits for the Ryukyu Islands testifying before congressional committees always justified aid for Okinawa as necessary in order to gain a greater acceptance for the American military presence among the local population. As this testimony was presented with the aim of persuading the members of these committees to approve increased

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appropriations for the Islands, it could be argued that the connection made between economic aid and military interests might not have reflected the true thinking of the officials concerned but might instead have constituted a kind of "sales talk." While this possibility cannot be entirely dismissed it must also be pointed out that there is no real reason for doubting that when military officers or Pentagon officials were recommending additional aid they could well have been thinking of the effects of this assistance on the climate of acceptability in Okinawa for the American base regime. Moreover, the type of arguments these officials used to obtain increases in aid for the Ryukyus from members of Congress indicate the lines of thought of leading Congressmen who had the decisive voice in these matters.

In 1964, Under Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes, in the course of testimony presented before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, made the following remarks:[40]

> It is essential to our military operation there to preserve a pleasant and peaceful situation as far as the Ryukyuan people are concerned.
>
> The aid to Okinawa is not foreign aid but is really in a major sense a military expenditure.

In August 1965 an American newspaperman reported from Okinawa that[41]

> ... U.S. Authorities count heavily on the rising standard of living to keep the islanders in a state of 'reasonable acquiescence' to the cold fact that there is not the slightest chance the United States will voluntarily surrender control of Okinawa as long as Peking continues to menace all of Asia.

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In 1967 Senator Hiram L. Fong, of Hawaii, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that as far as the Liberal Democratic Chief Executive Seiho Matsuoka was concerned "to his pro-American administration the increase of the present ceiling (in the amount of aid that could be appropriated for the Ryukyus) is urgent."[42]

According to a report published in various Okinawan newspapers, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army James V. Siena stated at a closed hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 24, 1968 that the first popular election of the Chief Executive, scheduled to be held in November of that year, was "a matter of great interest to the United States" and that increased aid for the social and economic development of the Ryukyus would be helpful in decreasing the number of supporters of the opposition candidate Chobyo Yara.[43]

At another congressional hearing Congressman Passman expressed the view that the reversion activity in Okinawa had increased by many millions of dollars the amount of money given by the United States to the Ryukyu Islands.[44]

The aid extended by the United States to the Ryukyus was aimed not only at providing general benefits to improve the political climate and the acceptance of United States rule in the Islands as a whole. It was often directed at specific groups and at particular parts of the archipelago where the benefits received would be particularly useful from the point of view of American interests in Okinawa.

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A later chapter will examine the crucial role played by the Ryukyuan schoolteachers in the Okinawan reversion movement and the peculiar economic dissatisfactions that provided an important part of their motivation. At this point it should be mentioned that for a number of years the United States made available to the GRI funds to increase the salaries of these same schoolteachers.

In 1967, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Unger expressed to the Senate Armed Services Committee his belief that the United States should pay for one-third of the teachers' salaries, as a contribution to the educational program, which took up over 30 per cent of the entire GRI budget.[45]

When, in fiscal 1969, the United States withdrew $1.847 million from funds to be appropriated to aid the payment of schoolteachers' salaries, the GRI deferred a large number of small projects it had planned to carry out with its own resources and used the savings made to pay the teachers their full salaries.[46] This action on the part of the conservative-dominated Government of the Ryukyu Islands can be interpreted as indicating either a great concern and a top priority for education, or a fear of the political influence of the schoolteachers, or perhaps both.

In President Johnson's proposed budget for fiscal 1970, $17.5 million was included as directly appropriated aid for the Ryukyus. Of this sum by far the largest single item, $6 million, was intended as "Assistance for Ryukyuan teachers, salary payments."[47]

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The development aid received by certain remote corners of the Ryukyus, previously discussed, underscores the extent to which United States aid was directed toward Okinawan groups connected with the American purpose in the Islands. The Daitos, some other minor islands and even isolated parts of the main island of Okinawa found their development neglected until the U.S. Army's Special Action Force, late in 1964, found them useful for counterinsurgency training and brought them many benefits in the process.

From what has been written so far it is evident that the United States used economic and social aid to the Ryukyus as a convenient and politically safe method for lessening Okinawan discontent and for gaining greater local acceptance for the continued existence of the American base regime. It is clear that this aid was increased as the political situation in the Ryukyus became more difficult for the United States and that the direct appropriations voted by Congress by no means constituted the only form of assistance extended.

Most of the benefits derived by Okinawans from the military presence of the United States were advantages received from the sale of goods and services to the Government and citizens of the United States in the pursuit of the American military purpose in the Islands. But they cannot be put down as contributions authorized by the Congress out of a far-sighted desire to provide Okinawans with a positive interest in the continuation of United

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States administration. Most of the benefits received from the United States presence can then be seen as only incidental to Congressional appropriations intended for the armed services of the United States. The only appropriations reflecting an understanding of the need for assistance to make the bases politically secure were those that extended direct aid to the Ryukyus in one form or another.

Actual aid appropriations, including all contributions outside the direct appropriations made under the Price Act, were never much more than $40 million in any one year. In later chapters instances will be seen in which the addition of only a few million dollars could have, and in the case of the land payments crisis actually did have, great practical effects in the Ryukyus.

Over the years these limited sums could probably have eased many of the problems encountered by the United States. Moreover, even if additional annual outlays of as many as thirty or forty million dollars had been needed, this would not have represented unusually large sums when it is remembered that of the $197.8 million designated as "Expenditures by U.S. Government and Personnel" in 1968, the greater part represented the cost of maintaining the military installations, and that the expense of building the bases ran into billions of dollars.[48]

The connection between American aid for the Ryukyus and the political foundation of the bases was clearly expressed by Deputy Under-Secretary of the Army for

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International Affairs Harry C. McPherson, Jr. when he told the Senate Committee on Appropriations in 1964:[49]

> We did have a rather rough period in the late 1950's when we cut our aid to Okinawa down very substantially. The level of aid has been increasing again and I think with that increase we stand a better and better chance of maintaining the reasonable acquiescence of the Okinawan people to our presence there.

As in so many other cases of United States Government policy making, in the matter of aid for Okinawa the executive agencies were generally ahead of the Congress in their appreciation of what the needs of the hour called for.

The policies pursued by the United States in connection with assistance to the Ryukyus represented a partial success and a partial failure, mainly because of the attitude of the Congress. The net effect was to create unnecessary difficulties for the United States in Okinawa.

The subject of aid to the Ryukyus is, however, not exhausted by an examination of the assistance provided by the United States out of its own funds. Because of the special connection between Japan and the Ryukyus and the low key in which the Japanese Government chose for many years to press its claims for the return of Okinawa, there existed another great potential for aid to the Islands. Although it involved no cost to the United States Treasury, for political reasons the United States Government did, however, not always care to make use of this source. It is to this dimension of aid to the Ryukyus that the study must now turn.

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Japan's Economic Involvement in the Ryukyu Islands

It has been pointed out that Okinawa had until 1945 been a Japanese prefecture and that when, in 1952, the United States formally separated the Islands from what their inhabitants had come to consider as the Japanese homeland, this was done with the understanding that Japan retained "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus and that the Islands would be returned to Japan when the security situation in the Far East permitted. The special remaining connection between Japan and the Ryukyu Islands was expressed in a variety of ways.

It was not illogical to assume that the Japanese Government would share with the United States at least a part of the burden for the economic and social well-being of the territory that was expected to revert one day to Japan. This expectation was particularly justified after Japan had successfully recovered from the destruction of the Second World War and had embarked on her spectacular post-war economic development.

Not only was it logical and proper for Japan to contribute to the development of Okinawa, but the Japanese Government also had a definite interest in playing its part.

Former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer explained to the author that Japanese aid extended to the Ryukyus was mainly motivated by a desire to keep in contact with the former prefecture.[50] At the very least, such a

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connection would remind the Okinawans that the Government in Tokyo was still, in a way, "their" government and had not forgotten them.

In the last years before the 1969 reversion agreement, when it began to seem more likely that the determination of a date for reversion no longer lay in a vague and indefinite future, the Japanese Government acquired an additional interest for a close association with Okinawan affairs. Japan desired to see the procedures used in the Government of the Ryukyus, as well as in the educational system and in other aspects of Okinawan life, brought as much as possible in accord with those used in Japan so as to minimize the strains that would inevitably occur during the expected transition to Japanese administration.[51]

In addition, the "Japanization" of Okinawan institutions would bind the former prefecture more closely to Japan and constitute an additional pressure for the earliest possible reversion of the archipelago. In view of the role that foreign aid has played in international politics during the last generation as a means for spreading influence, it was also natural to expect Japanese assistance for the Ryukyus to increase Japanese influence in the affairs of the Islands and to place the Japanese Government in a better position from which to bring about this "gleichschaltung" of Okinawan and Japanese institutions. Increases in Japanese aid, as a high official of the Japanese Foreign Office expressed it in September 1967, had to be accompanied

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by an increase in the Japanese Government's voice in the affairs of the Ryukyus.[52]

For the same reasons that the Japanese Government wanted to extend aid to Okinawa, the United States Government at first preferred not to have this assistance given and later accepted it only on a limited basis, taking as much as possible care that it should not result in any real increase in Japanese influence.

Ambassador Reischauer described to the author how the United States Government was at first suspicious of accepting any aid at all from Japan. When it did decide to accept some, the amount was limited to about one-third of what the United States contributed. Later in the 1960's, the American attitude underwent a complete reversal, and the United States expressed the desire to receive as much Japanese assistance as possible for the Ryukyus.[53]

During the 1950's the United States either refused to accept Japanese assistance or else only permitted a minimum. By the end of the decade, however, signs of Japanese participation in Okinawan development were appearing. By early 1960, a New York Times report mentioned that United States Authorities in the Ryukyus were encouraging some Japanese aid. A "High U.S. Official" was quoted as saying:

> We think of the increased association of the Ryukyus with Japan as an administrative step to ease tensions, in the hope that this will have the effect of reducing the demand for reversion. There is no major change of relationship.

The Japanese and Okinawan understanding of this develop-

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ment turned out to be the exact opposite of what the Americans considered it to be. The Japanese and the Ryukyuans, according to this article, regarded each new agreement for the use of Japanese educators, scientists and technicians in the Islands as a small step toward their goal of reversion.[54]

This news item illustrates the two motivations behind the limited Japanese assistance extended at the time to the Ryukyus.

There existed still another reason for the American willingness to accept some Japanese aid at the beginning of the 1960's: sheer necessity. A second New York Times article, in November 1960, mentioned that reductions made a little earlier by Washington in the USCAR budget had resulted in the elimination of a number of key positions in United States Government services in fields like transportation, communications, education, fisheries and public health. Because of this and because of the difficulty of sometimes obtaining the needed personnel from the United States, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Booth stated, the United States Administration had expanded the field of its reliance on Japan, at least as far as technical specialists were concerned.[55]

In the same year, 1960, Japanese Government monetary contributions to the Ryukyus began with the very modest sum of $125,000.[56]

To some extent after the June 1961 Kennedy-Ikeda

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conference, and even more after the Kaysen Report and the March 1962 Kennedy Statement, the United States Government changed its policy from one of occasionally accepting some Japanese aid to one of encouraging this assistance and endeavoring to regularize it, although only within certain carefully defined limits. Despite the recognition in Washington that Japanese influence on policy decisions would grow with the aid supplied, the new policy was decided on for the same reason that the other changes introduced by the Kennedy Statement were made, namely, to avoid difficulties caused by the rising pressures for reversion which were already then being felt in Okinawa and in Japan.[57]

General Caraway explained to the author that he was very suspicious of Japanese attempts to become more closely involved in the affairs of the Ryukyus and during his term as High Commissioner did not encourage Japanese aid beyond the levels agreed on between the two governments. He was aware of the political implications of this aid and did not wish to see any situation develop in which the administrative rights of the United States would become impaired in any way.[58]

General Watson, who succeeded General Caraway as High Commissioner, was less worried about Japanese influence in the Ryukyus and was far more sympathetic to increased Japanese aid and to measures aiming to bring about closer contacts and identification between Japan and Okinawa. It was during his administration that some

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precedent-breaking steps were taken in this direction. Okinawa was for the first time connected into the Japanese microwave television network, thereby subjecting the Ryukyus to much stronger Japanese cultural influence. Moreover, Japanese Prime Minister Sato visited the Islands in the first such postwar visit by a Japanese Premier, and Japanese assistance started to rise significantly during the incumbency of General Watson.[59]

The amount of aid extended by the Government of Japan in the six years after the 1962 policy of encouraging greater contributions from that source was announced shows: In fiscal 1963 $2.8 million, in 1964 $5.0 million, in 1965 $5.2 million, in 1966 $8.0 million, in 1967 $16.1 million, plus $1 million for disaster rehabilitation, and in 1968 $25.8 million, plus an additional $2.9 million also for disaster rehabilitation.[60] In fiscal 1969 the assistance provided by the Japanese Government amounted to $34.9 million and an additional $7.8 million was provided in long-term loans. For fiscal 1970 the figures originally planned for direct aid and for long-term loans were, respectively, $48.5 million and $14.7 million.[61]

The steep rise in Japanese assistance from 1966 on came after the United States Government had in September 1965 taken another step toward encouraging Japanese aid for the Islands. The Japanese Government was asked to increase greatly its aid and thereby assist in the more rapid achievement of the American goals of raising living standards

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and improving social and economic conditions in the Ryukyus. According to High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Unger, the Japanese Government responded "enthusiastically" to this request and provided the greatly increased aid budgets for 1967 and 1968.[62]

By October 1966 the United States Government was proposing to the Japanese Government an aid increase of over $30 million annually. This proposal was regarded by the Chairman of the Japan Liberal Democratic Party's Okinawa Problem Special Committee, Soichi Usui, as indication of an American understanding on the need for "Japanese participation" in the administration of Okinawa. It helped to bring about a situation where, during the last years of the decade, the amount of Japanese aid surpassed the amount of American assistance to the Ryukyus.[63] In November 1966, in his first news conference as High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Ferdinand T. Unger declared that he would welcome any Japanese economic aid as long as it would effectively contribute to the welfare of the Ryukyuan people.[64]

It was the policy of the United States during those years to encourage the Japanese Government to contribute large sums of money to the Ryukyuan economy and to the welfare of the Islands, thereby helping the United States to raise the standards of living of the Okinawan population. This in turn would help reduce Ryukyuan discontent with American administration and thereby make possible the prolongation of United States rule. This willingness to tap

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the potential of Japanese aid to the Ryukyus for a purpose suiting American interests did not mean, however, that the United States Government, and particularly its authorities in Okinawa, agreed with Japanese and Ryukyuan leaders that an increase in Japanese aid should be accompanied by an increase in Japanese influence in Okinawa.

On September 20, 1965, in the same month in which the United States Government had asked the Japanese Government for a large increase in its aid to the Ryukyus, and during the administration of High Commissioner General Watson, who had taken a much more positive attitude toward this Japanese assistance, Civil Administrator Gerald Warner wrote to retired High Commissioner Caraway that:[65]

> ... We are willing to accept usable and absorbable GOJ (Government of Japan) aid provided it does not interfere with United States administrative rights and military security. The GOJ keeps pushing and the recent visit by Prime Minister Sato gave added impetus to this push. However there are limits beyond which GOJ cannot be permitted to go as all of us well know.

The same idea, with a modification, was repeated in 1967 by High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Unger in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee when he declared:[66]

> It seems proper here to refer to a question which has been asked before: 'Are we not trying to keep up with or stay ahead of Japan in the aid business?' The answer to that is quite flatly, 'No.' Our policy is to accept useful and usable aid from Japan, as long as it does not interfere with the United States administration or the effective operation of the military bases.

From the Japanese side, other aspects of this assistance should also be mentioned.

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Although the aid extended by the Japanese Government to the Ryukyus was by 1969 substantial, it amounted to only a quarter of what GRI officials believed necessary to effect the transition from an economy centered around the bases to one adapted to the Japanese market framework after reversion.[67]

The total amount of this aid was, moreover, less than the assistance extended by the Japanese Government to prefectures under its administration. This was emphasized by the opposition Chief Executive Chobyo Yara in August 1969 when he asked that Japanese aid for Okinawa be raised to the prefectural level.[68]

Since the Japanese Government was not responsible for administering the Ryukyu Islands, it cannot be entirely blamed for giving less assistance to Okinawa than to a prefecture under its own administration. At the same time it could also be argued that as both the Japanese and the Ryukyuans were insisting that Okinawa was a part of Japan, and as the living standards in the Ryukyus were lower than in most parts of that country, it would not have been entirely unreasonable to expect the Japanese to spend on the Ryukyus resources equal to those given to the average Japanese prefecture, at least until conditions in Okinawa had been raised to the average level of the main islands of Japan.

Still another interesting aspect of Japanese aid to Okinawa is the portion devoted to the salaries of the

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politically troublesome schoolteachers. High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. James B. Lampert told the House Committee on Appropriations in 1969 that at the request of the United States Government the Japanese Government began in fiscal 1967 to contribute 50 per cent of the costs of compensating elementary and junior high school teachers in the Ryukyus.[69] As was the case with American aid to Okinawa, by far the largest single item in the Japanese aid budget of the late 1960's appeared under the heading "Schoolteachers' salaries." In the Japanese fiscal years 1967-1968 and 1968-1969, this amounted, respectively, to $8,218,667 and to $9,315,128, or in the first instance one-third and in the second a little less than one-quarter of the total.[70]

It may seem curious that the Japanese Government, which was on record as favoring the reversion of the Ryukyus at the earliest possible time, should have placed such a high priority on helping pay the salaries of the schoolteachers. As dissatisfaction with the terms of their employment was a main factor in stimulating the reversionist zeal of these schoolteachers, increases in their salaries should, if anything, have set back the cause of reversion. The Japanese Government may, however, have had as reasons for this action not only a desire to cooperate with its trans-Pacific ally and to avoid friction with the United States, but also a need to remove much of the incentive for other political activities carried on by the schoolteachers.

These activities, as will be pointed out later, were

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directed not only toward the speedy reversion of the Ryukyus but also against the Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa, which was closely connected with the Japanese party of the same name, and in favor of the Okinawan opposition parties, associated with the Japanese political opposition.

As was the case with United States assistance, the Japanese Government also provided benefits to the Ryukyus that did not appear in the budget under the title "Aid."

The Japanese Government made available what amounted to assistance to Ryukyuans in the form of pensions and annuities, stemming mainly from obligations incurred before and during the war, when the Islands had been under Japanese administration. These amounted to $11,485,860 in the Japanese fiscal year 1967 and to $12,113,414 in the Japanese fiscal year 1968.[71] Such payments did not constitute aid in the sense that they represented something given without any obligation to do so, but could be classified as benefits flowing from Japan to Okinawa, comparable to the flow of United States dollars in the form of payments for services rendered, for merchandise received or for damages suffered.

The import of Ryukyuan sugar and pineapples into Japan represented, by contrast, a very definite form of aid to the Islands that the Japanese Government hoped one day to regain.

High Commissioner Unger explained to the House Committee on Appropriations that the cost of producing sugar in the Ryukyus was much higher than elsewhere in the world

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and that Japan had traditionally subsidized the Okinawan sugar industry. This was done during the period of American administration in two ways, by exempting Ryukyuan sugar from the extremely high Japanese import duties of $115 per metric ton and by then paying for this sugar, when imported into Japan, $218 per metric ton, compared to an estimated average world price of $50 per ton in the middle and late 1960's. Under these unusually favorable conditions the Japanese bought up during the late 1960's the entire Ryukyuan sugar crop.[72]

Although, according to the testimony of Congressman Passman at another Congressional hearing, the price of sugar is subsidized all over the world,[73] the subsidy paid by Japan for Ryukyuan sugar was at that time probably the highest in the world.[74] Japan also paid to Okinawa a much higher price for sugar than to any other country or territory.[75] The artificially protected price of sugar made its cultivation as a cash crop more profitable for Ryukyuans than the growing of rice, the staple food. Only about 50 per cent of the rice needed in the archipelago was raised locally, the remainder being imported, a large part of it from the United States.[76]

The Okinawan pineapple industry was protected by the Japanese Government, which remitted to Okinawa the 55 per cent import duty and restricted the imports of foreign pineapple products into that country.[77]

The total export sales of these two commodities were

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as follows, between 1964 and 1968:[78]

	(In millions of dollars)				
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Sugar Products	$40.1	$53.4	$47.4	$40.2	$48.8
Pineapple, Fresh and Processed	9.7	9.8	12.7	16.0	13.5

When the benefits derived by the Ryukyus from Japanese pension and annuity payments and from the subsidized imports of sugar and pineapple products are taken into account, it becomes evident that the Japanese Government, like the United States Government, was in fact helping Okinawa to an extent much greater than indicated by the sums formally contributed as aid. This may justify the Japanese extending less direct assistance to the Ryukyus than to the prefectures under their administration. It also points to the highly artificial nature of the Ryukyuan economy and the local prosperity, a problem that will reappear in the course of this study.

The net impression conveyed by the above, that the Japanese Government may have been rather generous in its aid extended in one form or another to Okinawa, was disputed by some American officials and Congressmen. In their view, by giving assistance to the Ryukyu Islands the Japanese Government not only acquired political advantages but also established a commercial relationship between Okinawa and Japan that provided some important benefits for the latter.

At a 1965 Congressional hearing Deputy Under-

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Secretary of the Army for International Affairs John M. Steadman agreed with Congressman Otto E. Passman that Okinawa[79]

> ... is a tremendous outlet for Japanese commodities and one of their best customers so that they have maybe more reason to subsidize Okinawa than we have because they have a tremendous market there.

Four years later High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Lampert, appearing before the same committee, also concurred with Congressman Passman in the view that Japanese assistance to the Ryukyus had helped build an economic relationship that was profitable to Japan.[80]

These opinions were based on export figures to the Ryukyus that, according to the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, amounted to $170.9 million in 1965 and to $229.8 million in 1966, thereby making Okinawa the fifteenth best customer of Japan in 1965 and the twelfth best customer in 1966. In this last-named year Japanese exports to the Ryukyus were larger than those to Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. or India.[81]

In fiscal 1967 Japanese exports to the Ryukyus amounted to $249,249,000 and constituted 73.6 per cent of all Ryukyuan imports. In the following year, fiscal 1968, they were up to $276,991,000 and accounted for 74.1 per cent of all Ryukyuan imports. The Ryukyu Islands, in turn, sold to Japan only $70,242,000 in 1967 and $78,355,000 in 1968. These figures amounted to 90.7 per cent of all Ryukyuan exports in 1967 and to 89.7 per cent in 1968.[82]

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It must be added that the view of the Japanese-Okinawan economic relationship as profitable for Japan derives some additional support from the conversion of the Ryukyuan economy in 1958 from "B" Yen to United States Dollars. This meant that for the years mentioned all Japanese exports to the archipelago earned U.S. Dollars.[83]

It should also be remembered that various countries, including Japan, have extended economic aid, paid reparations for war damages, or taken both steps, in order to be able to open new export markets in various foreign countries. Viewed in this light, Japanese assistance to the Ryukyus not only helped provide political advantages for Japan but may also have been instrumental in providing a good customer. To the argument that Okinawa was in any case bound to become an important export market for Japan because of its cultural, historical and geographical proximity, it is possible to answer that, had Japan not assisted the Ryukyus generously it could have earned the resentment of the Ryukyuans and encountered difficulties in selling Japanese goods in Okinawa. The ambivalent attitude of the Okinawans toward the Japanese, a matter that would bear on such a possible development, will be discussed in detail in Chapter VIII.

Japanese assistance to the Ryukyus was helpful in bringing about a relationship with Okinawa that was profitable for Japan. But the primary aim of this aid was political. It was intended to help maintain a Japanese presence in the Ryukyus and to increase Japanese influence

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in the affairs of the Islands. It was hoped in Japan that a situation would thus be created constituting what could be called a kind of "partial de facto reversion." This, in turn, would constitute only a step on the road to the final goal, the complete reversion of the archipelago. It can be assumed that such political motives were sufficiently important for Japan to justify its aid to the Ryukyus even if no economic advantages could be derived from this assistance. It would not be unreasonable, then, to say that the prime objective of Japanese assistance to Okinawa was political and that the economic advantages derived represented a secondary, or perhaps only an incidental gain.

In view of the political objective of the Japanese aid programs it would be in order to examine how Japanese assistance could be translated into both a presence in, and influence over, the Ryukyus. The Japanese presence manifested itself in a number of institutions that could be lumped together under the name "joint committees."

As early as August 13, 1952, the Japanese Government had established a Southern Liaison Office in Naha as part of the re-organization of the Ryukyuan governmental arrangements made after the signing of the United States-Japan Peace Treaty. The activities of this bureau, the only diplomatic representation of any nation outside the United States in the Ryukyus, were for many years confined to such typically consular functions as overseas travel.[84]

When direct Japanese aid to the Ryukyus began in the

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early 1960's, there arose a need for a body to coordinate this assistance with other economic and social welfare activities being carried out in the Islands. An agreement was reached between the Japanese Foreign Minister and the American Ambassador to Japan, on November 2, 1962, to establish a United States-Japan Consultative Committee and a United States-Japan-Ryukyus Technical Committee.[85] These two bodies were, after some delays, finally inaugurated on April 25, 1964, the Consultative Committee meeting in Tokyo and the Technical Committee in Naha. Their purpose was co-ordinatory. In the Consultative Committee the United States Ambassador communicated to the Japanese delegation the areas in which Japanese aid was desired and in the Technical Committee details were worked out and specific proposals prepared.[86]

The importance attached by the Japanese to the Consultative Committee can be seen from the rank of the Japanese delegates. While the American side was represented by the Ambassador in Tokyo, the Japanese representation consisted of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office. On the Technical Committee the three parties were represented, respectively, by the Chief Executive of the GRI or his representative, a representative of the High Commissioner and an official designated by the Director-General of the Japanese Prime Minister's Office.

In the first five years of their establishment, the

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Consultative Committee met only seventeen times and the Technical Committee twelve times. On February 2, 1965, less than one year after it had been set up, the Consultative Committee had its functions broadened to include consultation not merely on Japanese aid but also on other matters in which Japan and the United States could "cooperate in continuing to promote the well being of the inhabitants of the islands."[87]

During the first years of operation of these committees the Americans were aware of the need for additional aid to Okinawa but were at the same time fearful of anything that might be interpreted as "a foot in the door for the return of Japanese political authority." In order to forestall such an eventuality, the American representatives on these two committees were instructed to keep a firm grip in the matter of initiative, so that only the United States should determine in which fields aid was to be administered.[88]

American attitudes are revealed in a letter from Civil Administrator Gerald Warner to his former superior, retired Lieut. Gen. Caraway. In this communication, dated March 29, 1965, Mr. Warner wrote:[89]

> The Consultative Committee promises to become active and to endeavor to poke its nose into things. We of course balk at anything that might interfere with U.S. administrative, etc, rights.

The apparent gap between the stated official purposes of these committees and the view of them taken by USCAR officials may have something to do with the traditional

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differences in outlook between a home government and its functionaries administering a distant territory. Such differences were not always absent between the policy makers in Washington and the officials of the Civil Administration in Okinawa.

The meeting held in Washington between President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato on November 14 and 15, 1967 produced another tripartite advisory body. The Joint Statement issued after this conference included the following passages:[90]

> The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that, with a view toward minimizing the stresses which will arise at such time as administrative rights are restored to Japan, measures should be taken to identify further the Ryukyuan people and their institutions with Japan proper and to promote the economic and social welfare of the Ryukyuan residents. To this end, they agreed to establish in Naha an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands. The Governments of Japan and the United States of America and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands will each provide a representative and appropriate staff to the Committee. The Committee will be expected to develop recommendations which should lead to substantial movement toward removing the remaining economic and social barriers between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan proper. The existing United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo will be kept informed by the High Commissioner of the progress of the work of the Advisory Committee. It was also agreed that the functions of the Japanese Government Liaison Office would be expanded as necessary to permit consultation with the High Commissioner and the United States Civil Administration on matters of mutual interest.

This communique provided measures for integrating the economy and the institutions of the Ryukyus with those of Japan as a preparation for an apparently impending

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reversion. It is, moreover, of some importance to note that the Joint Statement transformed the Japanese Government Southern Liaison Office in Naha into a consultative body as far as USCAR was concerned.

The policy of integrating and bringing about the gradual identification of the divergent institutions and systems in existence in Japan and in the Ryukyus in order to ease the way for eventual reversion was pursued during the last years of the 1960's by the Japanese Government with the agreement of the United States and was usually referred to by its Japanese name "ittaika."[91]

The new Advisory Committee officially came into existence on March 1, 1968 and was to hold regular meetings at least twice a week. By October of that year it had made a total of twenty-seven recommendations.[92]

The Japanese Government originally wanted the Advisory Committee to submit recommendations on political questions, such as the popular election of the Chief Executive of the GRI or possible Okinawan participation in the proceedings of the Japanese Diet. As could be expected, the United States opposed this. On January 3, 1968, in a meeting with Chief Executive Seiho Matsuoka and other leaders of the OLDP, High Commissioner Unger declared that the purpose of the Advisory Committee was the elimination of economic and social obstacles standing in the way of the speedy return of the Ryukyus to Japanese jurisdiction, while all political problems were to be taken up by the Consultative Committee

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in Tokyo. General Unger also promised to respect the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and to carry them out as far as they came within his powers of execution.[93]

It is interesting to note that the Consultative Committee, which had originally only served to coordinate Japanese aid, was now expected to deal with political questions as well. This represented a further sign of the growth of Japanese influence through the operation of the joint committees that had their genesis in Japanese assistance to the Ryukyus. As far as the pledge of the High Commissioner to respect the decisions of the Advisory Committee is concerned, it must be remembered that not only were these restricted to non-political matters but that the representative of the High Commissioner was in a position to veto any proposal before this Committee.

On April 17, 1969, in his first press conference since assuming the office of High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. James B. Lampert repeated General Unger's definition of the scope of the Advisory Committee's permissible activities, and added that among its responsibilities was the drafting of a long-term economic plan. He emphasized that matters concerning the military uses of Okinawa by the Armed Forces of the United States, such as the stationing of B-52 bombers, the calls made by nuclear powered submarines in Okinawan ports and the control of radioactive contamination, were outside the jurisdiction of the Advisory Committee.

Many Okinawans, including members of the Liberal

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Democratic Party, felt that the High Commissioner's remarks constituted an improper "interference" adversely affecting the independence of the committee, since it was not an agency under the High Commissioner and was supposed to have the right to make its own recommendations. They also noted that the representative of the High Commissioner was in any case in a position to block the consideration of political and military matters by the Committee. The three main Okinawan opposition parties maintained that the limitations of the Advisory Committee had thus been proven and for this reason they intended to put forward strong demands for its abolition.[94]

During 1968 and 1969, well before the November 1969 reversion agreement, some Japanese sources felt that basic, though informal, changes had taken place in the decision-making process concerning the internal administration of the Ryukyu Islands. These sources claimed that the "once total Okinawan obedience" to American rule was fast disappearing with the rising expectation of early reversion to Japan. In line with this situation they believed that USCAR's checks on GRI bills and budget drafts were no longer as rigid as they used to be, and that United States officials had come to respect what the Ryukyuan Government Administrators had in mind. This change in the attitude of the civil administration had occurred mainly since the November 1967 Sato-Johnson conference. Simultaneously, the influence of the Japanese Southern Liaison Office in Naha on the Govern-

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ment of the Ryukyu Islands had been "quietly growing." These observers further pointed out that, whereas in earlier years the Americans had possessed the strongest voice in the deliberations of the United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo, by 1968 the Japanese were finally in a position to formulate their aid to Okinawa along the lines they desired. The political analysts of the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun went so far as to conclude that there might have been a move underway from purely American rule toward a kind of informal, joint, United States-Japanese control over the Ryukyus.[95]

Conclusions

The above belief turned out to be too optimistic from the Japanese point of view. As is seen in other parts of this study, the United States retained at least until the reversion agreement the same power to make basic decisions concerning the status of the Ryukyus and, what was for the Americans, the all-important military use of the bases.

When, however, it comes to those internal administrative matters over which the need for complete American control had long been questioned, there can be no doubt as to the considerable growth of Japanese influence, the increase in the GRI's local autonomy and the loss of the United States' ability to carry out independently her will during the last years before the final reversion agreement.

The need for the United States to agree to the popu-

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lar election of the Chief Executive, the final disposition of the "Twin Court Cases" late in 1966 and the need to obtain the intervention of the Japanese Government in order to prevent a potentially dangerous general strike early in 1969, all to be described in later chapters, represent only a few examples of the decline in American authority during the second half of the 1960's. To these could be added the necessity for agreeing to the "ittaika" process and to the language of the Sato-Johnson November 1967 Joint Statement, in order to show that the freedom of action possessed by the United States in the internal affairs of Okinawa was certainly not what it had been only a few years earlier during the administration of General Caraway.

Many factors account for this decline but there are good reasons for believing that the assistance policies of both Japan and the United States played a part.

American aid policy limited the amounts available for the Ryukyus in a manner that is hard to understand when the political, military and economic stakes involved in Okinawa are taken into account. This policy helped perpetuate a situation in the archipelago which, as will be seen in the next chapter, reduced the economic incentives that could have made Okinawans more willing to accept a few more years of United States administration, and thereby partly contributed to the weakening of American authority and to the necessity for agreeing to the reversion of Okinawa by 1972.

The Japanese, by contrast, while not extending

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unlimited assistance, were able to utilize their aid not only as a way of maintaining a presence in their former prefecture but also as a lever for increasing their influence there. This was accomplished through the use of the joint committees and the skillful exploitation of the American need for continued Japanese cooperation and assistance. It should be pointed out, however, that the Japanese Government would not have been able to turn this situation to its advantage to such a degree had not the failure of the United States Congress to appropriate more aid for Okinawa created the opportunity for Japan to step into the picture.

It must be pointed out that, from the American point of view, there also was a positive aspect to Japanese aid. By improving conditions in the Ryukyu Islands and by partly satisfying the Okinawan desire for enlarged contacts with the main islands and for increased Japanese involvement in the archipelago's affairs, Japanese aid helped make the United States administration more acceptable to the local population. In the long run, however, Japanese assistance had a negative effect on the position of the United States in the Ryukyus. The aid extended by Japan increased that country's influence in the archipelago, to the detriment of the influence, prestige and authority of the United States. As will be seen in the last major division of the study, an alien regime becomes even less acceptable to the local population when its prestige and authority begin to decline.

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The aid policies of both governments thus contributed to the partial replacement of United States influence by Japanese influence in the internal administration of the Ryukyu Islands.

This represented one of the subtle ways whereby effective United States control over the internal affairs of Okinawa was undermined. It also illustrates the connection between economic assistance and political influence and the role that such aid can play in a dependency relationship.

United States policies on assistance to the Ryukyu Islands reflected a variety of American practices and attitudes. The United States poured large resources into Okinawa for the support of the destitute population that survived the battle for the main island, and for reconstruction. However, as soon as conditions had returned to normal United States aid dropped to insignificant levels. This is consistent with the American tendency to alternate between heroic efforts when confronted by a major challenge and indifference and inactivity as soon as the immediate goal seems to have been attained, an inclination noted by Gabriel Almond in his study of the American people and foreign policy.

Large-scale assistance was extended to Okinawa as a moral obligation and a form of charity to persons in dire need, a frequent practice in the United States, the nation with the world's outstanding record of private philanthropic activities. Once conditions seemed to have returned

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to a state of normalcy, the traditional American attitude of providing minimal governmental assistance and of relying mainly on supply and demand and private enterprise for the achievement of economic well-being, in disregard of long-range factors, reasserted itself. This was particularly the case during the years of the economy-oriented and free-enterprise-minded Eisenhower Administration. Reliance on military spending to stimulate private enterprise in the effort to bring about prosperity is also not unknown in the United States.

The American interest in the Ryukyu Islands was strictly strategic. The narrow military view of the problems encountered in Okinawa frequently excluded other considerations no less important in the long run in securing the local acquiescence to the American regime on which the free use of the bases ultimately rested. This limited outlook, present in many of the aid policies pursued in the Ryukyu Islands, and the absence of long-range, overall, planning reflected an American tendency to concentrate on individual, often technical, problems in disregard of the wider implications of the question concerned and the long-range effects of efforts to cope with the preoccupations of the moment.

Last but not least, the Congressional reluctance to provide sufficient aid to Okinawa reflects the national legislature's tradition of reducting the appropriations requested by the Executive Branch and generally displaying

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a lack of understanding for many of the complicated problems with which it is expected to deal. The assistance that was appropriated for the Ryukyu Islands thus failed to exploit fully the political potential of such foreign aid for gaining the maximum local acceptance of the continuation of United States administration.

In a different way, the dependence of the Okinawans on aid received from their conquerors and governors must have constituted humiliation not calculated to increase their acquiescence to their condition under alien rule.

Important as the subject of assistance was, it represented only one dimension of the economic aspect of the Okinawan dependency relationship. The following chapter will turn to other and, in some cases unexpected, aspects of Ryukyuan economic and social development.

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NOTES

[1]George H. Kerr, Okinawa, the History of an Island People (Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1958), pp. 408-409 for the quotation, pp. 83-148 for the early commercial prosperity, pp. 151-248 for the Satsuma conquest and its aftermath, also elsewhere, pp. 342-419 for developments after Commodore Perry's first visit to Japan, and, in particular, pp. 400-409 for the post-1879 conditions in the Ryukyus. See also The New York Times, April 17, 1956, p. 16:3-4.

[2]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Strategy and Science: Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970's, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 246.

[3]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 201. See also The New York Times, April 1, 1946, p. 9:1-2.

[4]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 11. See also USCAR, News Release 68-123, May 3, 1968, p. 3.

[5]Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), address, The University of Oregon in Cooperation with The American Assembly, The United States and Japan-Pacific Northwest Assembly Report (University of Oregon, February 10-13, 1966), p. 14. A copy may be found in The General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 11.

[6]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 78.

[7]The New York Times, April 28, 1956, p. 2:3.

[8]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, p. 30; and March 3, 1947, p. 10:5.

[9]Time, November 28, 1949, p. 24.

[10]Ibid., p. 24; and The New York Times, April 1, 1946, 9:1-2; and November 7, 1946, p. 25:1.

[11]The New York Times, April 1, 1946, p. 9:1-2. See also M.D. Morris, Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1968), p. 158. It took at least two years to return the Ryukyu Islands to a money economy. Beginning

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with May 1, 1946 some wage payments had been made in currency. For a certain period of time military payment certificates, which could be used only by authorized personnel within the limits of United States Military Establishments and in accordance with certain rules, were issued by the armed forces. These did not, however, constitute a real currency as Americans could not employ them locally and Okinawans were not permitted to make ordinary use of them. These certificates were finally recalled on March 10, 1947 and were replaced on August 1st of that year by a special issue of an occupation currency called "B" Yen that was valued at 120 to the U.S. Dollar and was worthless outside the Ryukyus. On July 21, 1948 the "B" Yen became the only legal tender permitted in the Ryukyu Islands. See USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 26 March 1945-30 June 1965, pages not numbered, the information is listed chronologically. (Mimeographed).

[12]The New York Times, April 1, 1946, p. 9:1-2.

[13]The New York Times, February 26, 1947, p. 3:1; and August 11, 1948, p. 9:2.

[14]The New York Times, October 13, 1945, p. 5:1; and Time, op. cit., p. 24.

[15]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[16]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Special Study Mission to the Far East, Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan, November 7-December 12, 1965, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, pp. 52-53.

[17]Ibid., pp. 52-53.

[18]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968, Vol. XVI (RCS CSCAMG-5), p. 325. See also The New York Times, November 20, 1960, p. 2:3-5.

[19]Lawrence Olson, "Political Relations," The United States and Japan, Herbert Passin, ed., The American Assembly of Columbia University (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 57-91.

[20]House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Study Mission to South and East Asia Report, op. cit., 1966, p. 52.

[21]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 7.

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[22]The New York Times, March 20, 1962, p. 23:1-8.

[23]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for 1967-1968, op. cit., pp. 325-326. See also The New York Times, September 14, 1962, p. 17:2; and October 24, 1962, p. 18:4.

[24]David Wurfel, "Okinawa, Irredenta on the Pacific," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver, B.C., Canada: University of British Columbia), Winter 1962-1963, pp. 373-374. Also interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[25]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 326.

[26]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, February 12, 1970.

[27]Miyasato Seigen, "Hopes and Realities in Okinawa," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), XII (April-June 1965), p. 163.

[28]The New York Times, September 22, 1962, p. 50:1; April 5, 1967, p. 46:2; and June 1, 1967, p. 7:1. Additional evidence is provided in the first-named article on the different attitudes of the House and the Senate toward appropriations for the Ryukyus.

[29]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, pp. 260-264. Much of the Okinawan emigration was directed to South America, particularly Bolivia.

[30]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report No. 1406 to Accompany H.R. 12617, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, pp. 9-11. The assets under the USCAR General Fund and Corporations included cash, electric power generation and transmission facilities, bulk petroleum distribution facilities, warehouses, a refrigerating plant, domestic housing and installations for water distribution. These facilities were designed to provide services for Okinawans, to earn revenues for the United States Forces, or for both. The USCAR assets had by 1966 acquired a value of $88.905 million and an annual earning capacity of $11.9 million. These institutions sometimes reinvested some of their earnings and in theory constituted a trust estate "whose principal beneficiary and whose sole remainderman is the Ryukyuan people." Their funds could not be used as substitutions or augmentations for United States military appropriations or for other United States Government Agencies' fund requirements.

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[31]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations Hearings, op. cit., 1963, pp. 260, 262, 264.

[32]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1967-1968 Report, op. cit., p. 317.

[33]The New York Times, March 22, 1964, p. 14:1-5; and August 11, 1964, p. 16:1-5. See also House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, op. cit., 1969, p. 253.

[34]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, H.J. Res. 251, To Authorize a Contribution to Certain Inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands for Damages Suffered Between 1945 and 1952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, pp. 3-12. See also The New York Times, October 14, 1965, p. 43:8; and October 28, 1965, p. 7:1.

[35]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, News Release 68-355. December 31, 1968, pp. 1-2.

[36]Ibid., p. 2.

[37]Lieut. Gen. Ferdinand T. Unger, The High Commissioner, Excerpts of an Address, USCAR, Public Affairs Department, News Release 69-20, January 20, 1969, p. 6.

[38]English Language Portion, Shurei no Hikari (Naha, Okinawa: The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands), May 1970, p. 18.

[39]Nihon Keizai (Tokyo), February 3, 1970, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, February 1970, No. 2, p. 5. (Mimeographed).

[40]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, H.R. 9499, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 84.

[41]James McC. Truitt, "Troubled Keystone," Newsweek, August 30, 1965, p. 36.

[42]Senate Committee on Armed Services, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands Hearings, 1967, op. cit., p. 3.

[43]Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, October 5, 1968. (Mimeographed).

[44]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., p. 255.

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[45]Senate Committee on Armed Services, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands Hearings, 1967, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

[46]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., p. 186. (Testimony by High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Lampert).

[47]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, News Release 69-11, January 16, 1969, p. 1.

[48]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[49]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, H.R. 11812, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1965, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 548.

[50]Interview with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970.

[51]The New York Times, August 17, 1967, p. 11:1. (Article by Robert Trumbull).

[52]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., September 28, 1967.

[53]Ibid.; and interview with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970. The two Okinawan newspaper articles mention American efforts to prevent an increase in Japanese influence as a concomitant to the assistance extended.

[54]The New York Times, February 28, 1960, p. 25:1.

[55]The New York Times, November 20, 1960, p. 2:3-5. (Article by Robert Trumbull).

[56]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 99.

[57]The New York Times, March 16, 1962, p. 1:6, 2:5; and March 20, 1962, p. 23:1-8. See also Herbert Passin, ed., The American Assembly, op. cit., p. 75; and Mainichi (Tokyo), February 14, 1967, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., February 1967, No. 2, p. 5.

[58]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, February 12, 1970. See also Mikio Higa, "The Reversion Theme in Current Okinawan Politics," Asian Survey (Berkeley, Cal.), VII (March 1967), p. 155, who expresses much the same idea.

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[59]Washington Post, December 26, 1965, A19:1 and A21:1-2. (Article by Rafael Steinberg).

[60]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 5157.

[61]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., pp. 168-169. The figures presented are based on United States Government Fiscal Years. Different figures will be obtained when the calculation is made according to Japanese Government Fiscal Years, which do not run concurrently with those of the United States Government.

[62]Senate Committee on Armed Services, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands Hearings, 1967, op. cit., p. 5.

[63]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., October 19, 1966. It is useful to compare the figures on United States and Japanese aid to the Ryukyu Islands presented earlier in this chapter.

[64]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., November 3, 1966.

[65]Letter from Civil Administrator Gerald Warner to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated September 20, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 24.

[66]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1967 op. cit., p. 94.

[67]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, pp. 30, 89-92. (Article by Takashi Oka).

[68]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), August 16, 1969, p. 3:6.

[69]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., p. 170.

[70]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 58.

[71]Ibid., pp. 57, 59.

[72]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1967,

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op. cit., pp. 91, 146. An example of how the Japanese Government regarded sugar subsidies as the equivalent of aid is provided by its reaction to a request made by the Ryukyuan sugar growers in 1967. These had asked the Japanese Government to raise the price to be paid for the 1967 crop from $218 to $222 per ton. Tokyo did not accede to this demand but, instead, increased its aid to the Okinawan economy by $833,000, which amounted to the additional income that Ryukyuan producers would have received had their request been granted. This had the advantage of benefiting the entire economy by this amount, rather than merely the sugar growers.

[73]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., p. 183.

[74]The New York Times, May 6, 1969, p. 12:2. (Article by Philip Shabecoff).

[75]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on H.R. 12617, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, p. 5647.

[76]Senate Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1964, op. cit., p. 562.

[77]Kaoru Inaizumi, The Okinawan Economy - Present and Future (Naha, Okinawa: Research Department, Bank of the Ryukyu Islands, July 1968), p. 8.

[78]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 79.

[79]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill 1965, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, pp. 65-66.

[80]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., p. 183.

[81]Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., June 26, 1967.

[82]United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Facts Book FY 1968, p. 10-5.

[83]The New York Times, January 13, 1959, p. 80:6-8.

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[84]USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates. See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 2, 1968, p. 4:3-6.

[85]USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

[86]Lawrence Olson, "Japan and the United States in Okinawa," East Asia Series, XII, No. 1, Japan (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1965), p. 5. See also USCAR, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration, 1945-1965, op. cit., under the appropriate dates.

[87]Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau, "Okinawa Some Basic Facts," Japan Reference Series, No. 2-69 (Tokyo: 1969), pp. 8-9.

[88]Herbert Passin, ed., The American Assembly, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

[89]Letter from Civil Administrator Gerald Warner to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated March 29, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 19. This letter was written on official USCAR stationery.

[90]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 233.

[91]"Okinawa Some Basic Facts," Japan Reference Series, No. 2-69, op. cit., p. 12.

[92]The Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, A Report by the Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands on its Progress During the Period 1 March 1968 - 18 October 1968 (Naha, Okinawa: The Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, 1968), pp. 1-3. (Mimeographed).

[93]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), January 4, 1968, p. 3:4; and January 13, 1968, p. 3:7.

[94]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), April 18, 1969, p. 1:3-5. (Article by Kazuhisa Ikawa).

[95]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 2, 1968, p. 4:3-6. See also "Okinawa Some Basic Facts," Japan Reference Series, No. 2-69, op. cit., p. 8.

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CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Any examination of a territory's economic and social conditions should begin with a brief look at its basic historic, demographic and geographic characteristics.

In the previous chapter it was pointed out not only that Okinawa was in 1945 the poorest and most backward prefecture in the Japanese Empire, but also that the island containing the greater part of the Ryukyuan population had been thoroughly devastated by the military operations of the last year of World War II. The destitute Okinawan population that emerged from this holocaust had become dependent on the assistance of the Armed Forces of the United States for its very survival and faced an economic future almost as bleak as the disastrous reality that engulfed it.

The Ryukyu Islands are one of the most densely populated areas in the world. In 1966, with a population of 943,000, Okinawa had a density of 1,112 inhabitants per square mile. This compared with 921 inhabitants per square mile in Taiwan, 693 in Japan, 424 in India, 289 in the Philippines and only 54 in the United States. Even in 1945, when Okinawa's total population amounted to about half the 1966 figure, the Ryukyus faced serious problems of overpopulation. The demographic situation is even more critical

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on the main island, where the population density increased from 1,245 inhabitants per square mile in 1955 to 1,492 in 1965.[1] To make matters worse, only a fraction of the area of the Ryukyus is made up of arable land, and the few minerals found scattered throughout the Islands scarcely exist in commercially exploitable quantities.[2]

These difficult natural conditions were aggravated by the lack of those man-made resources that have often compensated other poorly endowed lands. Even before the disastrous 1945 battle, the Ryukyus possessed no real industry and had long been considered economically deficient. Even as recently as the 1960's it was felt that, for the foreseeable future, the nation that governed the Islands would have to provide large-scale assistance if local living standards were to be maintained at a "decent level."[3]

From an economic standpoint, it was probably a stroke of good luck for the Okinawans that the United States found such great interest in the only important resource possessed by their islands, namely their strategic location. This resulted in large-scale United States Government investments, the stationing of tens of thousands of free-spending American servicemen and civilians, some private investments, a newly found interest in the Ryukyus on the part of Japanese tourists and, last but not least, the infusion of sizable American and Japanese development assistance. The net effect was to bring to the archipelago the greatest prosperity it had ever known.

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Unfortunately, this affluence was marred by some basic flaws. For both the Americans and the Okinawans some politically significant gaps were permitted to remain between the Ryukyus and Japan, the nation considered by most Okinawans to be their motherland. These gaps became particularly evident during the 1960's, when the Japanese economy made such spectacular progress. From the Ryukyuan point of view, the foreign-based prosperity was to a large extent artificial in nature and rested on a potentially dangerous foundation, military bases. Even more important for this study is the effect this prosperity was to have on the political attitudes of the local inhabitants. It created for most Okinawans a dilemma between nationalistic feelings and material interests, and this ambivalence constituted the main factor in their willingness to accept a long-term prolongation of American rule.

The Financing of Okinawan Prosperity

Under modern conditions the development of a backward and neglected territory requires the infusion of substantial amounts of capital. Almost all the capital received by Okinawa during the period of United States administration derived, directly or indirectly, from American exploitation of the strategic resources of the archipelago.

The role of United States military installations in the financing of Okinawan development is most easily seen in the sums spent for the building and maintenance of the

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bases and in the spending of American service personnel and their civilian component.

Various estimates have been given at different times for the amount involved in the construction of the military installations. From the middle of the 1950's these estimates always exceeded the billion dollar mark and sometimes came to a multiple of this figure.

During the second half of the 1960's about 50,000 Ryukyuans were employed by the United States Forces, and it was estimated that an additional 50,000 local inhabitants were indirectly dependent on the American military presence for their livelihood in such occupations as services, wholesale and retail trade and construction work. These two groups together constituted about 25 per cent of the total labor force.[4]

In the previous chapter the total expenditures of the United States Government and its personnel were seen to amount to $197.8 million in fiscal 1968. During that year the total external receipts of the Ryukyu Islands came to only $413.1 million. American expenditures had totaled $197.4 million out of total external receipts of $361.3 million in fiscal 1967, and $152.4 million out of total external receipts of $298.8 million in fiscal 1966.[5] The actual sums spent by the United States Government for the military installations, excluding the spending of servicemen and attached civilians, amounted in 1967 to $102.3 million, or 51.1 per cent of the total figure presented above for that

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year.[6]

It was shown in the previous chapter that every form of American assistance extended to the Ryukyu Islands was based on the military use of Okinawa by the United States. Even the aid provided for the reconstruction of the main island after the 1945 battle stemmed from American interest in Okinawa's strategic location as a base for further operations against the main islands of Japan. Without this interest there would have been no battle of Okinawa and no need to rebuild the island.

As far as Japanese aid is concerned, some of this would have been forthcoming even if the United States had never shown any interest in the Ryukyu Islands. Pensions and annuities would naturally have been paid regardless of whether the United States or Japan administered Okinawa. The Japanese Government would in any case also have subsidized the growing of crops such as sugar or pineapples, although it is quite possible that the amount of this subsidy might have been much smaller had the Ryukyus never been separated from Japan. Okinawa received some assistance from Tokyo before World War II and would have qualified under Japanese administration for the same kind of aid that the central government extends to its poorer prefectures. The question of how the Ryukyus would have fared financially had they remained under Japanese rule will be examined in detail later in this chapter. At this point it is necessary only to recall that the evidence presented in the previous

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chapter shows that, regardless of how much Okinawa would have received from Tokyo had the Ryukyus remained united with Japan, most of the actual aid received from the Japanese Government during the period of United States administration was politically motivated and resulted from the American presence in the archipelago.

The growth in Japanese tourism in the Ryukyu Islands, to be described later in this chapter, would probably never have occurred had Okinawa remained under Japanese administration. The Ryukyus became an attraction for the Japanese because of the publicity generated by the reversion movement, and also because their being under American rule enabled Japanese travelers to visit a convenient, nearby "foreign" country at low cost.[7]

Besides benefiting from military and related expenditures, foreign aid and tourism, a territory with few meaningful commercially competitive exports can also secure development capital by attracting foreign investments. In the case of Okinawa under American rule, these presented an interesting episode that will be examined in the next subchapter. Before concluding this subchapter it is, however, necessary to point out that all outside investments, whether American or Japanese, came as a consequence of the fact that the United States governed the Ryukyus.

At this point it can be stated that practically all the funds contributing to the spectacular economic development of Okinawa analyzed in this chapter flowed, in one form

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or another, from the military presence of the United States in the Ryukyu Islands.

Foreign Investments

Under the conditions existing in the Ryukyus during the period of American administration, only private foreign investment could have developed the basis for a normal civilian economy that would not have constituted a mere appendage to the military installations. For a variety of reasons very little investment capital came to the Ryukyus until the late 1960's.

By June 30, 1966, after more than two decades of American rule, foreign investments totaled only $19.666 million and involved 270 separate investors. Of this sum, $10.86 million had been invested by Americans, $6.40 million by Japanese and $2.406 million by other businessmen.[8]

The limited size of these investments can be ascribed in part to the natural economic limitations of the Ryukyu Islands, such as the lack of exploitable raw materials and the small internal market. Despite these economic disadvantages the Islands did, however, possess certain assets representing a potential for industrial development. The geographic location of Okinawa, the skills acquired by those inhabitants who had worked for the Americans, the relatively low wages prevalent in an Asian land, and the military presence of the United States, all made possible the establishment of industries in the crowded archipelago.

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The United States Administration took steps to turn these assets into economic growth. The conversion of the Ryukyuan legal tender, on September 16, 1958, from "B" Yen to United States Dollars provided a number of advantages for local commerce. The establishment in 1960 of a free-trade zone, in pursuance of a USCAR Ordinance, made available an area adjoining the Naha Commercial Port into which merchandise could be brought tax-free for temporary storage, display, repackaging, processing, or for other operations.[9]

Unfortunately, these measures were alone insufficient to generate a large inflow of capital. A policy of attracting foreign investors was also needed. Once the Government of the Ryukyu Islands had acquired control over this field from USCAR, it was regularly accused of placing restraints on foreign investments. These restraints were apparently aimed at small business investors who, as can be seen from the figure presented above, represented virtually the only group that through 1966 had shown any interest in Okinawa.

Hostility to small foreign investors, expecially if they happened to come from the United States, represented a consistent policy on the part of the GRI throughout the period of American rule. General Caraway told the author that during his term of office as High Commissioner he had blocked an attempt on the part of the GRI to nationalize some American businesses. He also expressed the opinion that American businessmen would have no future in the

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Ryukyus after the Islands reverted to Japan.[10]

Criticism of this unfriendly attitude toward foreign investments brought forth promises from the local Ryukyuan Authorities during the 1968 election campaign to liberalize their investment policies. Despite these, the GRI law passed at that time by the conservative dominated Legislature on this subject represented no real improvement. Neither had the administration of the progressive Chief Executive Chobyo Yara shown any real inclination by the middle of 1969 to modify this policy in regard to small business.[11]

A number of reasons could be given to account for this hostility to what would normally seem to constitute one of the essentials for economic development under a free enterprise system.

Small businessmen do not make large investments. Moreover, they generally either relocate in, or else send trusted representatives of their own nationality to the country in which they have invested. This means that small business investments bring to a territory like Okinawa little capital, but a relatively large number of foreign residents who differ from their local employees in both nationality and economic position. During the period of American administration a certain number of professionals from the United States had moved to the Ryukyus. American small businessmen and professionals often competed with their Okinawan equivalents. Chapter VII will point to the

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personal frictions that developed between Americans and Ryukyuans and to an unequal relation that frequently appeared between the two.

Dr. Nobumoto Ohama expressed to the author the view that American businessmen had enjoyed in Okinawa under United States rule some privileges, mainly in the form of larger tax exemptions, that were greater than those they would have enjoyed in their own country.[12] By the 1960's this had resulted in some efforts on the part of the GRI to raise the income tax rates of foreigners.[13] The ill-feelings created by this situation among the Okinawan population must have been intensified by the consistent opposition of local American businessmen and professionals to the idea of reversion. This opposition originated in the fear that reversion would spell the effective end of their activities in the Islands.[14]

Thus it is not difficult to see why the Okinawans did not particularly welcome resident American businessmen, who in so many ways seemed to them to form an integral part of the United States presence of which they desired to rid the Islands. In a reaction that is typical of dependencies all over the world, the Ryukyuans were not eager for these foreigners to stay on, apparently, for more to come.

Before leaving the subject of small business it should be pointed out that, regardless of the opposition of this small resident community of American businessmen and professionals to reversion, their actual influence on

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United States policy, particularly in the matter of the return of Okinawa to Japan, had been either extremely small or else entirely non-existent. This was the unanimous opinion of all these intimately connected with Ryukyuan affairs who were interviewed by the author, including General Caraway, Dr. Ohama, former Ambassador Reischauer and General Watson.[15]

If Okinawans took a dim view of small business investment in their islands, this did not hold true of large American business enterprises, which could bring to the Islands much larger investments than the small businessmen could. Since major United States corporations were interested in fields where no Okinawans were to be found and which local entrepreneurs as a rule had no hope of entering, they were not in competition with Ryukyuan commercial interests. Moreover, it is often the practice among very large corporations to send only a minimum number of managers and technicians from the home country to their foreign divisions or affiliates, to use the maximum number of local employees and to engage in programs for training native technicians to replace foreign personnel wherever possible. In this manner, not only are additional opportunities created for the local population but the foreign presence, with its potential for friction and misunderstanding, is kept at a minimum.

A double standard in regard to large and small foreign business enterprises is by no means uncommon among the

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developing nations. The same African or Asian countries that may be expelling virtually an entire European, Chinese or Indian middle class of businessmen and professionals and replacing these with members of their own ethnic groups, are often simultaneously encouraging investments on the part of very large foreign enterprises. These nations seem to prefer large amounts of capital with a small number of foreigners to small amounts of capital accompanied by a large number of foreigners.

For American big business, Okinawa under United States administration held no special attraction. An archipelago about to revert to Japan and become an integral part of that country was, however, of great interest, mainly as an instrument for bypassing the restrictive Japanese laws on foreign investments and, so to say, "slip into Japan through the back door" the moment reversion took place.

On February 10, 1969, USCAR announced the award to Esso Standard (Okinawa) Ltd. of a contract for the establishment of a $55 million oil refinery with a capacity of 80,000 barrels a day.[16] This important concession represented only one of four such agreements. Within a period of one year similar contracts and licenses were granted to the Gulf, Caltex and Kaiser oil companies for the erection of oil refineries and oil storage facilities at a total investment of $217 million.[17] This amount should be compared to the less than 20 million dollars that businessmen of all nations had invested in the Ryukyus until 1966.

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The combined refining capacity of the newly planned installations amounted to 205,000 barrels a day, while the demand in the Ryukyus at the time was for only 30,000 barrels a day.[18]

According to the Director of the Bureau of Mines of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Japan led the world in 1968 in the amount of imported crude oil and was the world's third largest consumer of oil products, after the United States and the U.S.S.R. This same official further explained that during the period of American occupation of Japan oil capital from the United States had dominated the Japanese market. After the Peace Treaty went into effect, he said, a 55-45 ratio was set for the sales shares of the Japanese oil market allocated, respectively, to companies affiliated with foreign and Japanese capital, with the further target of ultimately placing these two shares on an equal footing. The Director of the Bureau of Mines, fearing that the newly found interest of the American oil companies in Okinawa would create a large loophole in the shares fixed for Japanese and foreign petroleum concerns, warned the representatives of the companies concerned that they could not only expect Japanese oil policies to be fully applied to Okinawa after reversion, but that even before this measures would be taken to avoid confusion in Japanese oil production and distribution.[19]

This warning, made before the signing of the con-

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tracts, did not prevent their award. The American companies must have felt that their government would protect their interests in the reversion arrangements expected to be reached with Japan, and thereby enable them to gain the desired access to the Japanese market.

Neither Japanese oil policies nor the displeasure of the Japanese Government was able to dissuade the Government of the Ryukyu Islands from "easily" approving the applications of the United States petroleum companies for the construction of the facilities concerned.[20]

The entire controversy, it should be noted, began almost two years before the November 1969 reversion agreement but after the issuance of the 1967 Sato-Johnson Joint Communique, which is a tribute to the political foresight of the companies concerned.

The oil producers were not the only large American firms to realize the business potential represented by Okinawa on the eve of reversion. In October 1969, much to the distress of the Japanese MITI, the GRI had approved what was termed the "advance" into Okinawa of the Fairchild Corporation (Electronics Industrial Division).[21]

After the reversion agreement was concluded, early in 1970, Texas Instruments Company, National Semi-Conductor Company[22] and the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) made attempts to establish themselves in the Ryukyus and MITI charged that their purpose was to move into the Japanese business market at a later date. At that time, the Japanese

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capital investment laws concerning the electronics and aluminum industries had not been liberalized.

Five large American banking firms, including the Bank of America and the First National City Bank, moved to acquire shares in the USCAR-controlled Bank of the Ryukyus, the largest in the Islands. This action drew the strong criticism of Japanese banking circles. The Government of the Ryukyus, which had earlier adopted an unfriendly policy of its own when it came to American investments of another kind, disagreed with the Japanese Government in the matter of these large-scale investments on the grounds that they were important for the economic development of Okinawa. On the other hand the Japanese Government, which strongly objected to the "advance" of United States capital into the Ryukyus, announced its intention to give preferential tax treatment to Japanese firms after reversion so as to encourage them to move into Okinawa.[23]

Dr. Ohama told the author that USCAR had not put any pressure on the GRI to grant licenses and contracts to the large United States firms mentioned earlier. Dr. Ohama explained that, instead, he himself had advised the Government of the Ryukyus to approve the proposed investments of these large companies on the ground that this was not only good for the Okinawan economy, but would also stimulate Japanese firms to do likewise.[24]

The entire episode points to the fact that, despite the Ryukyuans' intense feelings of Japanese nationalism and

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their strong desire for reversion, Okinawan and Japanese interests did not always coincide. This matter will be taken up further in a later chapter.

One last point needs to be made in connection with the sudden enthusiasm for the Ryukyus displayed by many large American business firms on the eve of reversion. Although these companies could have been expected to show a definite interest in the return of Okinawa to Japan as soon as they had established themselves in the Islands, the author was told by General Caraway, Ambassador Reischauer and General Watson that they did not attempt to exercise any pressure in Washington either in favor of reversion or against it.[25]

The story of foreign investments in Okinawa was, in a way, one of contradictions. The Ryukyuans did not favor the type of investments that would have been forthcoming from small American businessmen, who may have been willing to come to the Islands in order to establish businesses there. On the other hand, American big business, whose investments the Okinawans wanted, found nothing of interest in the Ryukyus except the promise of reversion.

Economic Growth

The military interest of the United States in Okinawa brought about an economic development of the archipelago that turned out to be remarkable.

An examination of the growth in per capita income

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and in gross national product, after allowance is made for currency depreciation, provides two very useful indicators of economic development.

The prewar Ryukyuan per capita income of $25 per year, previously referred to, translates to about $70 annually in terms of the 1953 price level.[26] Between the mid-1950's and the mid-1960's the Okinawan price level did not rise appreciably, so that a general price index set at 100 for 1955 would in terms of 1965 values come to about 107. The consumer price index also set at 100 for 1955 would rise to 114 by 1965.[27]

It is therefore possible to compare the rise in per capita income and in the gross national product without the figures for the 1955-1965 period being excessively distorted by hidden inflationary price increases.

With the per capita national income adjusted to $70 for the years 1934-1936, the following table giving a few sample years, could be presented:

	1955	1960	1963	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Per Capita National Income	$149	$202	$301	$366	$424	$497	$580	$653
Gross National Product (millions of dollars)	$131.2	204.1	310.8	386.6	452.8	543.0	644.4	727.0

During the years not presented in this table, both the per capita national income and the gross national product

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rose in proportion to these figures.[28]

The only qualification to be added is that as a result of inflationary pressures created by the war in Vietnam, prices started to rise more steeply from 1966 on. The cost-of-living index advanced by 5.8 per cent during fiscal 1967, and by 4.2 per cent in fiscal 1968. In Naha City the general consumer price index rose from 99.1 in fiscal 1965 to 114 in fiscal 1968.[29] Even if allowance is made for this, the growth reflected in the above figures is still quite impressive.

The rate of economic growth in the Ryukyu Islands, in terms of the annual increase in the gross national product, can be expressed in percentage figures adjusted for inflationary price increases. In the table below this is done by employing both constant dollars, where one particular dollar value is utilized, and 1968 value dollars, where the value of the United States monetary unit in that year becomes the standard. Because of the two different standards employed, different percentage figures are arrived at for the sample years presented.[30]

Percentage Growth by Fiscal Years

Unit of Measure	1956	1960	1963	1965	1966	1967	1968
Constant Dollars	14.8	13.7	15.0	12.4	13.6	12.1	13.7
1968 Value Dollars	8.2	15.2	17.2	14.4	17.1	19.9	18.7

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When compared to various Asian nations, the Ryukyuan per capita national income of $580 for 1968 contrasted unfavorably with $922 for Japan, but very favorably with some of the other countries of the area. In 1966, when this figure stood at $424 for Okinawa, it was only $115 in South Korea.[31] In 1963, when the Okinawan per capita income was $301, it was $150 in Taiwan, $130 in the Philippines and only $85 in Indonesia. In 1962 it was $98 in Thailand and $92 in Vietnam.[32]

Under American rule the formerly underdeveloped Ryukyus also underwent significant industrialization. The agricultural population which in 1950 formed 76 per cent of the total, had decreased to about 38 per cent by 1965.[33] By 1968 only 30.8 per cent of the labor force was to be found in farming, forestry, fishing and hunting. In fiscal year 1968, manufacturing generated a national income of $107.1 million. The number of manufacturing establishments had reached 3,900 with an employment of 32,000 persons. By contrast, because of the scarcity of mineral deposits, mining and quarrying brought to the surface products valued only at about $3.0 million.[34]

The New Prosperity

The development of industry and the dramatic rise in the gross national product and in per capita income, resulting from the presence of the military bases, reflected an overall growth in the Ryukyus that was impressive. At the

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same time, the military origin and the military connection of many of the most important improvements in Okinawa were everywhere in evidence.

The generation of electric power rose from 181.5 million kilowatt-hours in 1955 to 1.070 billion kilowatt-hours in fiscal 1968. This power was supplied in 1968 by the Ryukyus Electric Power Corporation, owned by USCAR as part of its General Fund. Electricity was generated in four power plants owned by this corporation and in four other plants owned by the Armed Forces of the United States. In fiscal 1968, the civilian economy for the first time surpassed the military services in the consumption of electricity, using 51 per cent of the power supplied jointly for civilian and military purposes.[35]

The average daily consumption of potable water rose from 16.2 million gallons in 1958 to 37 million gallons in 1968. Of this last figure, 22 million gallons represented civilian consumption. The Integrated Islands Water System, operated in the late 1960's by the U.S. Army, and the Naha City system provided the main water supply of Okinawa. The Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation, an instrumentality of USCAR, purchased water at cost from the Army for resale to the local communities, primarily through their municipalities.[36]

In 1964 construction started on a system of gravity sewers for the main population centers of Naha and Koza.[37]

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In the field of transportation a regular interisland air service was established and operated for a number of years by an American airline. As a result of Okinawan agitation against this company, the service was turned over to a jointly owned Japanese-Ryukyuan airline.[38]

On June 30, 1968, there were 77,704 motor vehicles licensed by the GRI, not including motorbikes and scooters. In 1941 there were only 200 motor vehicles in the Ryukyu Islands. The few miles of prewar, coral-surfaced roads had by June 1968 grown to a network of 2,000 miles, exclusive of farm roads. These included roads maintained by the U.S. Army. The tonnage of Ryukyuan vessels of 5 Gross Tons and over increased from 18,417 Gross Tons in 1952 to 60,655 Gross Tons in 1967. The number of telephone subscribers in the Ryukyus had by 1968 reached 46,923. This represented an impressive achievement if it is kept in mind that the telephone system of Okinawa was almost completely destroyed during the 1945 battle.[39]

Other signs of what by Asian standards was considered to be affluence included the possession in 1964 of a television set, a radio and an electric fan by one family in three, and the ownership of refrigerators by 12.3 per cent of the population.[40] In 1968 there were an estimated 3,000 color television receivers in use, although an unspecified number of these was presumably owned by Americans.[41]

Under United States rule Okinawa had become sufficiently attractive, had acquired enough hotels and tourist

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facilities and had drawn enough attention, mainly in Japan, to become a center for overseas visitors. The number of tourists had risen from 33,867 in 1962 to 134,884 in 1968. In the last-named year these visitors spent an estimated 27 million dollars in the Islands. Eighty-four per cent of them came from Japan, while only 12 per cent came from the United States. An easing of tourist visa regulations in 1965 was helpful in bringing about this increase.[42] Perhaps the final symbol of having "arrived" in the world of tourism was achieved by Okinawa in October 1969 when construction was begun on a Hilton International Hotel.[43]

By 1964 it was noted as still another sign of prosperity for at least a section of the Ryukyuan population that many elegant cabarets, restaurants and theaters, which had once catered exclusively to Americans, had converted themselves to serve an all-Okinawan clientele.[44]

It could be argued that all these signs of prosperity were merely typical of a development taking place in other countries as well, and that the United States Administration could not claim any special credit for the coincidence that the inevitable post-World War II progress happened to take place while the Americans were governing the Ryukyus.

There were consistent claims made to the effect that Japan had progressed more rapidly than the Ryukyus and that Okinawa would have been better off all along had it remained a part of Japan. This question is very difficult to answer. Later in this chapter an attempt will be made to examine

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some of the bases of the claim that more progress would have been made under Japanese rule. At this point it should be remembered that the Ryukyus possessed only one real resource, their strategic location, and that the entire prosperity that actually did come to pass, as distinct from what might have been, was based on the American exploitation of this resource.

It is also instructive to mention two news items from the period of American administration that seem to point to a direct connection between Okinawan prosperity and the military presence of the United States. One is the finding that in 1964 wages paid by the United States Forces were on the average 45 per cent higher than those paid in the private sector of the economy.[45] The other is a New York Times report from April 1957 which noted that in the Amami Islands, located north of Okinawa and also placed under United States administration by the Japan-United States Peace Treaty but returned to Japan in 1953, conditions had worsened considerably when the Americans left and Japanese administration resumed.[46]

These two items provide some evidence for the view that while the progress achieved in Okinawa may have been due to its occurrence during the twenty-odd years following the end of the Second World War, it could also be attributed in part to the particular use to which the United States was putting the Ryukyu Islands.

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The Unnatural Economy

A one-crop, or one-product, economy is not an unusual phenomenon in the less developed parts of the world. A backward territory, seemingly bypassed by the economic advance of other parts of the world, may suddenly experience a great boom because it possesses a scarce resource in great demand in the outside world at that moment. The Amazonian rubber prosperity of the turn of the present century and the prolonged Middle Eastern oil boom are two outstanding examples of this phenomenon. Such development, however, usually leads to an economic collapse when the outside demand for the all-important product is reduced or disappears altogether, as happened with Amazonian rubber.

In the case of the Ryukyus the great prosperity was caused almost exclusively by Washington's need for the strategic location of the Islands.

In the previous chapter figures were presented showing that in fiscal 1968 the Ryukyus received or earned, in one form or another, $260.7 million from the United States and $28.7 million in Japanese aid, for the most part politically motivated. This last figure does not include the $12,113,414 paid by the Japanese Government in annuities and pensions, which were in a somewhat different category. In addition to this, special subsidies enabled the Islands to sell to Japan $62.3 million-worth of their overpriced and uneconomical sugar and pineapple products. When these figures are added up they show that fully $363.8 million, mor more than

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half of that year's gross national product of $644.4 million, originated in the military use of Okinawa by the United States rather than in normal, peacetime, economically viable activities.

Another measure of the economic dependence of the Ryukyus on the American military presence could be found in the number of Islanders whose livelihood was tied to the United States.

An Okinawan newspaper article, late in 1965, spoke of 50 per cent of the population being directly or indirectly dependent on the military bases for their livelihood.[47] High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Unger stated in 1967 that 60,000 Okinawans gained their sustenance through the presence of the United States Forces and through other associated activities.[48] The Japanese newspaper Asahi Evening News calculated early in 1969 that 100,000 Islanders, or 25 per cent of the working population, were directly or indirectly economically dependent on the Americans and their bases.[49]

If these estimates do not completely tally, it is to some extent due to the different times when they were made and even more to the difficulty in deciding exactly what population groups should have been included in the dependent category. It is not difficult to see that this could have been defined as encompassing anything from the number of Okinawans who directly worked for, or sold goods and services primarily to, the Americans up to almost the entire Ryukyuan population.

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It could be reasoned that if those persons who were directly dependent on the United States lost their livelihood, then those who provided services or sold merchandise to them would also find their economic foundations undermined and this would, in turn, similarly affect a still larger circle of Ryukyuans. This could be carried even further, for Okinawans who were dependent on politically motivated Japanese assistance could also be considered indirect beneficiaries of the United States military presence in the Islands.

In addition to this overall dependence on the American presence, it is possible to relate Okinawan prosperity in time and place to the ebb and flow of American military activity.

The main island was destroyed at the time of the American conquest, and in the years that followed the local population was largely supported by the United States Forces. The Ryukyus went through a difficult reconstruction period, until Washington found a new military function for them. With the building of large military facilities Okinawa finally completed its post-war reconstruction and soon embarked on a period of phenomenal economic growth. The 1957 reorganization of United States Forces in the Far East came at about the same time as Executive Order 10713 somewhat remodeled the Ryukyuan governmental structures and a currency reform brought further stimulation of the local economy.

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The direct, large-scale involvement of the United States in the Vietnamese war in 1965 provided an important new role for the Okinawan bases. This brought about a large increase in United States military activity and resulted in a three-year boom for the Ryukyuan economy.[50] By fiscal 1969, a shift in American defense spending caused a reduction in new military construction and in on-the-spot procurements for the war in Vietnam. Consequently the Okinawan rate of economic growth that, when measured in 1968 value dollars, had ranged between 17.1 per cent and 19.9 per cent during the previous three years, suddenly dropped in the same fiscal year 1969 to 8.5 per cent.[51]

Moreover, just about all observers of the Okinawan scene agreed that a possible closing of the military bases, unaccompanied by a massive new program of emergency assistance from the outside, would have resulted in a certain and total collapse of the entire economy.

When attention is shifted from an overall view of the economy to the situation in various parts of the main island or in different sectors of the economy, a direct relation is also found between military activity and the material well-being of the Okinawans.

In 1965 entire districts that depended on the patronage of United States service personnel of their entertainment, restaurant and shopping facilities saw their fortunes moving from prosperity to depression and back to prosperity as troops left for Vietnam, or as ships brought

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in more men who stopped over on their way to the war in Southeast Asia.[52]

In fiscal 1966, the per capita income of gainfully employed persons was $385 in what were termed primary industries (agriculture, forestry and fishing), $1047 in secondary industries (manufacturing, mining and construction), and $1402 in tertiary industries (trade, finance, real estate, public utilities, transportation, communication, services, government and the U.S. Forces). Qualitatively, similar differences in income between these three sectors generally occur in most economies. In this particular case the quantitative gap between them, pointing to the great income differentials between rural and urban areas, seems to reflect a basic distortion caused by the base-oriented economy.[53]

The more a particular sector of the economy was involved with the military installations, the higher was the income it produced.

In 1968, the primary industries earned only 10.8 per cent of the national income of the Ryukyus, while the secondary industries earned 19.1 per cent and the tertiary industries 70.1 per cent of the total. The service sector with its close connection to the United States Forces is once again seen to have been abnormally inflated.[54]

Between the years 1950 and 1965 the population of the Ryukyus increased by 33.6 per cent. This increase was, however, unevenly distributed. In the northern part of

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the main island the population decreased during this period by 12.8 per cent and in the Miyako Islands it decreased by 6.4 per cent. In both of these areas farming predominates and the "base ratio," the proportion of the region utilized by United States installations, was respectively 7.5 per cent and 0.02 per cent. In the Yaeyama Islands, where also very few base installations could be found, the population nevertheless rose by 18.2 per cent. In the central part of the main island, where the base ratio was 34.4 per cent, population increased by 48.4 per cent, while in the southern part of the main island, where the base ratio was only 3.9 per cent, the population increased by a spectacular 65.3 per cent. The city of Naha, however, with its entertainment, manufacturing, shopping and other businesses reflecting the military presence of the United States, is located in this last area.[55]

Many of these activities, catering to American service personnel on leave from the central part of the island, represented the most lucrative economic contact that the local population had with the United States Forces. The area in which they were located naturally experienced booming business conditions.

Not only was the Okinawan economy, and the great prosperity of the 1950's and the 1960's, completely dependent on the military presence of the United States, but the way in which this presence developed produced an intermingling of the bases with the civilian activities of the Ryukyus

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to such an extent that it was hard to see how the two might ever be separated again.

Earlier in this chapter it was seen that the generation of electricity and the supply of water were provided by the military authorities jointly for civilian and military purposes. In the case of electric power the greater part of it until 1967 had been used by the bases. This almost made it appear as if the civilian supply represented a kind of service provided by the armed forces after their own needs had been taken care of. A similar situation existed in other areas of Okinawan life.

The major roads of the main island were mostly military highways used by both civilian and military traffic. Roads No. 1 and No. 13, running along the eastern and western coasts of the island respectively, were called main arteries of the Okinawan economy and were used extensively by civilians. They were, however, controlled by the United States Forces and traffic was directed by military personnel. By 1967 Naha Commercial Port had become so crowded that incoming vessels often had to wait for a number of days until a berth became available. This condition was caused in part by an increase in civilian freight traffic and in part by the great expansion of military and related shipping. When the special military port facilities were filled to capacity, ships were diverted from them to the civilian port, where they were given priority in berthing over commercial vessels. At the Air Force-controlled Naha Airport, military and

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civilian planes often stood side by side and military plane accidents sometimes interfered with the schedules of private airlines.

In the crowded central part of the main island, in particular, where more than one-third of the area was taken up by base facilities, the military installations were so intermingled with civilian activities that odd situations often resulted. To cite two examples, B-52 bombers were landing at Kadena Air Force Base separated from a busy street by wire netting. When farmers were permitted to cultivate requisitioned lands not yet used by the armed forces, they sometimes did this right next to military installations. In one case farmers were working in fields alongside a hangar housing Mace-B missiles.[56]

General Watson explained to the author his belief that the complete intermingling of the military facilities with the civilian economy would have made it impossible to return to Japan the administrative rights over the Ryukyus, and at the same time, retain for the United States the complete freedom needed for its military activities. Any division of authority between Japan and the United States would have resulted in countless problems that ultimately would, in all likelihood, have limited American freedom in using the bases. General Watson cited, as an example, the problem of a water shortage -- something not unknown in Okinawa -- and asked what would have happened if sovereignty were divided.[57]

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Such problems accounted for the United States' lack of interest in the various plans proposed for partial or "functional" reversion, to be described in a later chapter.

A large part of the Okinawan population, in particular the business community and responsible political leadership, was well aware of the economid dependence of Okinawa on the military presence of the United States. Even the reversionist Chief Executive Chobyo Yara, elected on a platform calling for a speedy return of the Islands to Japan, conceded in 1969 that the Ryukyus were not economically prepared for reversion and that such a step would present the population with severe problems. He declared in an interview that "our biggest task will be to save the economy."[58] A later chapter will explore the effects of this economic dependence on the political thinking of Okinawans.

Philip Shabecoff, a New York Times correspondent who visited the Islands in 1969, described the economy in the following terms:

> What Okinawa has, therefore, is a hothouse economy artificially maintained by foreign funds. There is no export industry and little industry of any kind outside that supporting the military bases.

This same newspaperman expressed the belief that "American policy seems to have pushed the Okinawan economy into a dead-end street." He gave as reasons the feeling that military spending would not increase above the then high level occasioned by the war in Vietnam. Instead, it

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would most probably decrease and eventually even disappear altogether after reversion. He also declared that the Civil Administration had done little in the way of planning for a future civilian economy unconnected with the military industries. One basis for this accusation was Shabecoff's belief that most of the skills and facilities attending the military bases were non-transferable to civilian pursuits.

Although the wages provided by the United States military establishment had made the Okinawan worker one of the highest paid in Asia, his productivity had not increased proportionately. He could not, therefore, compete with workers in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea who were attracting light industries through their low wages and high productivity. Finally, Mr. Shabecoff wrote that the Okinawans appeared to have emulated a kind of "American way of life" in the form of high consumption and installment buying, with the result that the demand for imports was excessively high and the accumulation of capital reserves for investment in domestic industry low.[59]

Considering the dependence of the Okinawan economy on the American military presence and the lack of natural resources of the Islands, it could well be asked how the hundreds of millions of dollars could be obtained to maintain this high standard of living should the United States bases ever be completely withdrawn from the Islands. Although this is not contemplated under the 1969 reversion agreement, such a step, without massive compensatory assistance

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from Japan, would mean the total collapse of the Ryukyuan economy and the development of a potentially explosive situation. To obviate this threat in the newly recovered prefecture, the Japanese Government would be obliged to pay the bill.

The sudden disappearance of the military presence of the United States from the Islands would also mean the end of American protection and its replacement by the limited strength of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Given their close proximity to the mainland of China, the Ryukyuans could then become an attractive target for Communist infiltration, especially if the archipelago was in a state of economic discontent as a result of the withdrawal.

In order to prevent such a situation from developing, the Japanese Government would have to provide large-scale economic assistance, and would have to encourage the emigration of Okinawan wage earners or entire Okinawan families into the crowded main islands of Japan. The Government might also find itself obliged to strengthen its armed forces. These actions would have to be continued until, through still greater investments, a viable civilian industry capable of replacing the bases was created.

If such were the case the relatively high Okinawan standard of living would continue under a normal peacetime economy. The Ryukyuans would, however, have to thank the United States for this, because American policy, having brought prosperity to Okinawa in the first place, would

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also have left the Japanese Government no choice but to turn the temporary affluence caused by the presence of the bases into a permanent condition. Considering the poverty and neglect that was the lot of the Ryukyus under the pre-1945 Japanese administration, it would then not be entirely incorrect to say that the American interlude was vital for building a prosperous Okinawa.

The position of the United States bases as the source of all material blessings in the Ryukyus brings to mind a passage from classical Greek literature. Herodotus once called Egypt "an acquired country," the gift of the river Nile. If he had visited the Islands during the 1950's or the 1960's he would have had to describe modern Okinawa as the gift of the American military bases.

Economic Comparisons with Japan

The role of the United States as the agent that lifted the Ryukyus into the twentieth century, and their dependence on the United States for the continuation of this newly-found prosperity, were widely, but by no means universally, recognized in Okinawa. There remained within the archipelago what could be termed "islands of dissatisfaction." By these are meant both groups which felt that they themselves, if not the Ryukyus as a whole, would have been better off had they never been separated from Japan, and sectors in Okinawan social and economic development whose progress lagged behind that of the main islands.

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These beliefs and the greater prominence they assumed during the 1960's were a major factor undermining the limited economic supports that did exist among the Okinawans for the United States regime. The last two subdivisions of this chapter will therefore examine the causes for this discontent.

It is well known that the degree of economic satisfaction or dissatisfaction felt by most people is determined not only by the absolute standard they have reached and by the progress made but, even more, by a comparison with others and with what has been achieved in terms of their expectations.

In view of the closeness of the Ryukyus to Japan and of the strong identification of most Okinawans with that country, it was natural for the inhabitants of the Islands to compare constantly their situation with that of the Japanese main islands and to wonder if their standard of living would have been higher had their archipelago remained a part of Japan, regardless of whether meaningful comparisons could have been made in all fields.

In the course of her history the United States has achieved unprecedented economic progress and the American standard of living is the highest in the world. At the same time, the United States, for a long time, remained substantially behind many other advanced nations in the field of social insurance. It should not, then, come as a surprise that in the course of her administration of the Ryukyu Islands the United States effected dramatic economic

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progress but neglected questions of social insurance.

It has been shown in this chapter that the living standards of the Okinawan population rose impressively under the United States administration. But Japan, making remarkable economic progress during the 1950's and the 1960's maintained living standards consistently higher than those in the Ryukyus. This resulted in much inconclusive speculation and in many invidious comparisons of the two.

When a comparison was made between Japan as a whole and the Ryukyu Islands then the Japanese living standards generally turned out to be higher. The following tables compare the fiscal years 1955 and 1956 with 1964 and 1965 for four significant indices in both Japan and Okinawa:[60]

Gross National Product Per Capita

	1955	1965	Per Cent Increase
Ryukyus	$167	$396	137 per cent
Japan	270	729	170 per cent

Per Capita National Income

	1955	1965	Per Cent Increase
Ryukyus	$149	$366	144 per cent
Japan	209	582	178 per cent

Average Annual Income Per Worker

	1956	1964	Per Cent Increase
Ryukyus	$377	$756	100 per cent
Japan	539	894	66 per cent

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Consumer Price Index

(Not the same as the general price index mentioned earlier in this chapter that rose only about 7 per cent during this period in the Ryukyus).

	1955	1965	Per Cent Increase
Ryukyus (Fiscal Year 1961 equals 100)	94.4	108.9	14.5 per cent
Japan (Fiscal Year 1960 equals 100)	90.7	126.0	35.3 per cent

In these tables only the gross national product and the per capita income were both consistently more favorable in Japan than in the Ryukyus. The average annual wage per worker was regularly higher in Japan than in the Ryukyus, but it rose faster in the latter than in the former. Moreover, the greater increases in the consumer price index in Japan than in the Ryukyus meant that the average worker's wage was rising even more rapidly in the latter when compared to Japan than is apparent from the table. It follows that the greater increase in the per capita national income in Japan than in the Ryukyus was less impressive than the second table would indicate.

When the wages paid to employees of the United States Forces in the Ryukyus and in Japan are compared, then it is found that these workers earned an average of $1144 a year in Japan but only about $1000 per year in Okinawa, with the highest salaried among them receiving $2522 in Japan compared to $1678 in the Ryukyus.[61] This is not

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surprising. The wages paid to local workers by the United States Forces in every country are related to the local wage standards. Since the average wage of all workers in Japan was higher than in Okinawa, the American Forces paid salaries accordingly.

Once more it must be remembered that if other factors, such as actual price levels and taxes paid, are included in the equation, then the advantage in salaries enjoyed by military employees of the United States in Japan when compared to those in the Ryukyus turns out to be less than the tables would indicate.

Reed J. Irvine, Adviser in the Division of International Finance of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, wrote in 1967 that while the average monthly wage in Japan for establishments employing five or more workers stood at $112 in 1966, it was only $85.29 for the same year in the Ryukyus. He added, however, that prices were lower in the Ryukyus and if the ancient Japanese standard of the rice equivalent of wages was used, then the same 1966 average monthly wages bought 405 kilograms of rice in Okinawa but only 267 kilograms in Japan. Mr. Irvine also noted that the price of rice was lower in Okinawa than in Japan because the Ryukyus, a rice importing territory, permitted the free import of that commodity while in Japan the price of rice was kept high in order to subsidize domestic production.[62]

The rice equivalent of wages was thus more favorable

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for the Ryukyu Islands due to special factors that kept the price of rice high in Japan and low in Okinawa. Moreover, the rice-equivalent-of-wages standard indicates only the ability to buy a single, though very important, product. At the same time, it could be argued that a low price for the staple food of the Orient reduces the general food bill of a family and leaves correspondingly more for other purchases. This could make a significant difference in the general standard of living.

Tax rates for Japan as a whole in fiscal 1966 amounted to 21.2 per cent of the national income, or $133.58 per capita, and were in a similar percentage range in 1964 and 1965. The overall tax figure for the Ryukyus came to only 13.3 per cent of the national income, or $56.57 per capita in 1966. This reflected the considerably larger economic base enjoyed by Japan, as well as the prosperity of the preceding years, that enabled it to sustain a proportionately larger tax burden.[63] These figures still further reduce the gap in per capita national income and average workingman's wages between Japan and the Ryukyus.

Once more, to indicate the problems presented by statistics, it should not be forgotten that the tax rates of the Ryukyus have been compared with those of Japan as a whole. It will be shown later that a comparison with a prefecture as poor as Okinawa yields different results.

Despite the above data reducing the difference between the Japanese and the Ryukyuan standards of living,

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there is no doubt that the standards for Japan as a whole are higher than those of the Ryukyus. This is not surprising if one considers that the resources of Japan, even on a per capita basis, are so much greater than those of the Ryukyus and that the Japanese averages have always been higher. Given the poverty of the Ryukyu Islands, standards of living there could only rise to the Japanese level through large infusions of outside assistance.[64]

In view of this traditionally higher Japanese standard of living, a mere comparison of statistics to show that this was still the case during the 1960's is only of limited usefulness. Since the present analysis aims to consider whether the Ryukyu Islands might have fared better after the Second World War under Japanese than under United States administration, two different sets of figures will have to be examined. A comparison will first be made between the increases in per capita income in Japan as a whole and in Okinawa from the 1930's to the 1960's. The Ryukyus will then be compared in various ways to particular Japanese prefectures.

In the 1934-1936 period the annual per capita income was $25 in Okinawa and $60 in Japan. In 1968 it stood at $580 in the Ryukyus, compared to $922 for Japan. This indicates a more rapid rise for Okinawa than for Japan. When the lower prices and lower tax rates prevalent in the Ryukyus are taken into account an even faster increase for Okinawa is evident. This more rapid progress in raising

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living standards in the Ryukyus than in Japan is more meaningful than the discovery that a gap still existed between the two in 1968.

This particular statistical argument can, however, like all such arguments, be countered with other facts and figures. The above comparison does not, for example, tell anything about the basic health of the two economic systems. It should also be noted that a comparison of the increases in standards of living during the 1960's only, would show a somewhat faster rise in Japan as a whole than in the Ryukyus, as the following table indicates:[65]

National Income, Per Capita	Fiscal Year 1961	Fiscal Year 1966
Japan (figures revised in 1966 in conformance with International Monetary Fund standards and revised 1960 census data)	$387	$709
Ryukyu Islands	237	426
Disposable Income, Per Capita (this means personal income less taxes)		
Japan (1966 revised figures)	$317	$602
Ryukyu Islands	236	402

When a comparison of national income and disposable income, on a per capita basis, is made between the Ryukyus and twelve Japanese prefectures, including some of the wealthiest as well as some of the poorest, this table is obtained:[66]

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Prefectures	Fiscal 1963 National Income Per Capita	Fiscal 1963 Disposable Income Per Capita
1. Tokyo	$893	$688
2. Tukushima	361	346
3. Kagawa	436	410
4. Ehime	397	372
5. Kochi	378	366
6. Fukuoka	488	446
7. Saga	351	360
8. Nagasaki	338	336
9. Kumamoto	353	336
10. Oita	349	337
11. Miyazaki	333	309
12. Kagoshima	285	286
Ryukyu Islands	299	285

This table shows that the burden of taxation, while heavier for Japan as a whole than for the Ryukyus, fell in Japan particularly on the wealthier prefectures. In some of the poorer ones it was actually lower than in Okinawa.

This explains the testimony given before a Congressional Committee in 1969 by High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Lampert to the effect that, had Okinawa with its equivalence to a poorer Japanese prefecture been a prefecture of Japan at the time, it would have qualified under Japanese laws and practices to receive grants-in-aid from the national government in Tokyo, totaling more than the amount its citizens would have had to pay in national government income taxes. According to General Lampert, it was estimated that the Ryukyus would have received about $145 million in Japanese Government aid while their tax contribution to the national government would have totaled only about $74 million. In addition, the Japanese National Government would

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have assumed some functions that under United States administration were carried out and paid for by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.[67]

It should be remembered, however, that Okinawa also received Japanese Government aid under United States administration. If this amount is subtracted from the $71 million that would represent the surplus of Japanese aid received over and above the sums paid in national taxes under Japanese administration, then the resulting difference would be far below the amount received in economic benefits from the American presence. In other words, a changeover from United States to Japanese administration would have represented a great economic loss for Okinawa, unless the Japanese Government extended to the Ryukyus assistance far in excess of what was normally given to a prefecture of a similar condition of affluence, or the United States continued to maintain its bases and to provide Okinawa with aid even after reversion.

One last word must be added concerning the comparison of Okinawa with the various Japanese prefectures. The table above compared Okinawa to only twelve Japanese prefectures. Out of a total of 46 such prefectures, the Ryukyus were in 1961 at about the income level of Shimane Prefecture which occupied the 41st place in terms of annual personal income. During the remainder of the decade, however, Okinawa declined in this relative ranking.[68] This would indicate greater progress made by the Ryukyus than

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by the poorest prefectures of Japan from the pre-war period, when Okinawa was the poorest of all the prefectures, at least until 1961, when the economic development of the Ryukyus once more fell behind that of the Japanese main islands. A similar point can be made by comparing Okinawa to the twelve physically closest prefectures of Japan. The Ryukyuan per capita income, in this case, ranked behind eleven of these.[69]

Besides showing that economic statistics can be used to support opposing political claims, the impression received from the statistics comparing the economic development of the Ryukyus with that of Japan, is a mixed one. The standard of living during the 1950's and the 1960's was higher in Japan than in the Ryukyus, as it had also been before the war. Okinawa, on the other hand, made more rapid progress than Japan as a whole since the pre-war period. During the 1960's, however, as the new Japanese prosperity, so to say, "moved into high gear," the Ryukyus fell behind Japan in their relative economic growth. Okinawa, the poorest prefecture of Japan until 1945, improved its rating until the early 1960's when compared to the other prefectures, but then started once more to fall into a lower rating. Had Okinawa exchanged United States for Japanese administration, however, and lost all American benefits in the process, then it would have been very much the worse for this change.

This last statement seems to be the most significant

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for any attempt at a comparison. While Okinawa, lacking any meaningful natural resources, in all probability, made greater economic progress under United States administration than it would have under Japanese rule, reversionist spokesmen were able to select and emphasize those statistics appearing least favorable for the American presence, a practice, it should be added, that is by no means restricted to the Ryukyus.

The Great Gap

The previous conclusion refers to economic progress and would to American eyes be the most important indicator of material well-being. Not all populations, however, agree on what constitutes material well-being. The Ryukyuans measured material well-being not only in terms of personal income, which is usually highest for persons who happen to be of such age and physical fitness to make the most of any economic opportunities offered. They also value educational and health facilities and even more social welfare legislation, and in this they found their islands lagging well behind Japan. When there was talk of the Japanese worker being better off than his Okinawan counterpart, much of the difference lay in social welfare conditions and in compensation in later life, which workers in Japan, but not always workers in the Ryukyus, received.[70]

For this reason it is useful to survey briefly organized labor and social, educational and health development in the Ryukyu Islands, and to make some comparisons

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with Japan.

The labor movement in the Ryukyu Islands grew from a total trade union membership of only 286 in 1954 to 17,792 or 12 per cent of all wage earners in 1960, to 33,156 members or 18 per cent of all the wage earners in 1964, and to 51,879 or 23.1 per cent of all wage earners by 1968. In 1968 the organized workers belonged to a total of 162 labor unions, 78 of which were affiliated with the Kenrokyo Labor Federation, 20 with the Zenokiroren Federation, and 64 were independent unions. The membership was divided among these two federations and the independent unions respectively in the order of 40,804, 1,201 and 9,874, revealing how small many of these unions were.

Among pertinent labor legislation it is possible to mention the 1953 Trade Union Act, which recognized trade unions and safeguarded workers against so-called "unfair labor practices," the 1953 Labor Relations Adjustment Act ensuring collective bargaining and the settlement of labor disputes, and the 1953 Labor Standards Act regulating wages and hours, annual leaves, severance pay, workmen's compensation, working conditions and the like. Notice must especially be taken of the famous USCAR Ordinance 116, which applied mainly to employees of the U.S. Forces. Besides regulating the working conditions of military employees, it prohibited strikes in military and other essential industries. In this last category were included public utilities and transportation.[71]

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In 1967 unemployment in the Ryukyus, estimated at less than one half of one per cent, was among the lowest in the world.[72]

Japan, a country with a population more than one hundred times that of the Ryukyus and the world's third largest industrial nation, had a total union membership of 6,896,208 in 1949, divided among 36,507 unions. The membership later declined, but by the end of 1964 it had once more risen to a similar level. There existed several labor federations, but almost all the trade unionists, a total of 6,664,000 members,[73] were affiliated to the four largest federations.

When the differences in size and in industrialization between Japan and Okinawa are taken into account then the Ryukyuan labor movement was, relatively speaking, not much smaller. The Japanese movement also tended to have many very small unions. The main difference between the two, for the purposes of this study, seems to have been the denial of the right to strike to a sizable section of the Okinawan labor movement, namely those involved in military and other essential industries.

In education, the number of public school classrooms in Okinawa had increased from 2,276 in 1953 to 8,311 in 1969, with an estimated 9,400 for 1970.[74] In 1968, a total of 283,289 students were attending schools from the elementary to the University level, in addition to 13,139 children

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in kindergartens and 859 persons studying overseas. In that same year eight institutions offered degree courses beyond the high school level. One of these was the University of the Ryukyus, founded in 1950 under American sponsorship, with a faculty and staff of 548, a student body of 3,579 and an attached junior college with 398 students.[75]

While these figures are impressive, a comparison of per capita school expenditures and pupils per classroom between Okinawa and Japan reveals a definite gap in the latter's favor:[76]

1964 Per Capita School Expenditures

	The Ryukyus	Japan
Elementary schools	$ 45.34	$ 96.68
Junior High schools	68.12	99.20
Kindergartens	24.25	61.21
Senior High schools (day)	130.67	180.69
Senior High schools (night)	70.93	150.02

Number of Pupils per Classroom, 1963

	The Ryukyus	Japan
Elementary schools	43.3	36.0
Junior High schools	46.9	42.3
(Others not given)		

Considering Japan's generally higher standards of living and greater wealth, these statistics are not surprising. To Okinawans, however, these figures served as a reminder that, should the Islands revert to Japan, they would then be subject to Japanese laws on education and receive Japanese funds for education, which presumably

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would raise their schools to the level of the main islands.

When the 1945 battle for Okinawa ended, no facilities of any importance in the field of public health remained. The United States Administration took measures to remedy this situation. By 1952, the Ryukyus already possessed four main hospitals, two leprosaria, three tuberculosis hospitals, one mental hospital, five health centers and seventeen dispensaries.

Large-scale public health programs were also undertaken. When a filariasis eradication campaign was begun in the Miyako Islands in 1965, the rate of infection soon dropped from 18.9 per cent to 3 per cent. In 1961 the U.S. Army supported and organized a mass immunization program that resulted in the virtual elimination of poliomyelitis from the Ryukyus.[77] Under other programs carried out under United States administration, malaria in the Islands was eradicated and for six consecutive years until 1968 no cases were reported. The chlorination of water was extended to many small communities until by 1968 about 56 per cent of the Ryukyuan population was served by municipal water systems with water quality as high as, or higher, than the international standards set by the World Health Organization.[78]

Perhaps the greatest achievement in medicine, sanitation and nutrition was the raising of the average Ryukyuan life expectancy. According to the GRI Statistics Agency, life expectancy had risen by the mid-1960's to 68.02 years

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for newborn baby boys and to 74.65 years for baby girls, compared to 67.32 years and 72.34 years for the same categories in Japan. This placed Okinawa in the second highest group of countries in terms of average life span, after Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands.[79]

Despite these achievements, and in view of this last named success to some extent paradoxically, Okinawa lagged behind Japan in some important areas of public health and sanitation. After many years of United States administration some unexpected pockets of backwardness and neglect still existed in the Ryukyu Islands.

The following table brings out some of the deficiencies existing in 1964 when compared to the main islands of Japan:[80]

	The Ryukyus	Japan
Doctors per population	1 for 2,444 persons	1 for 898 persons
Dentists per population	1 for 9,087 persons	1 for 2,772 persons
Nurses per population	1 for 1,106 persons	1 for 439 persons
Hospital Beds per 100,000 population	396	826

In 1961, these differences began to attract some attention in Washington and as a result the Kaysen mission was sent to the Ryukyus to investigate local conditions. New York Times correspondent A.M. Rosenthal reported Okinawans as saying, at the time, that the large and wealthy

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United States could have provided more than the one hospital for the mentally ill, in existence since before 1952, and the less than 400 beds for 20,000 tuberculosis victims.[81]

In 1963 Naha, by far the largest city in Okinawa, was still without underground sewers, despite the prosperous appearance of some of its sections. It was noted earlier that construction on sewers had begun only in 1964. The water supply was also inadequate.[82]

In a matter only partly related to problems of public health, it was estimated that the number of families still in need of improved housing in the Ryukyus in 1969 was three to four times what it was in comparable prefectures in Japan, such as Saga or Kochi Prefectures in the southern part of that country.[83]

Some of the remaining gaps between the Ryukyus and Japan are not entirely accounted for by differences in wealth and in standards of living. The gaps in certain areas were far greater than the differences in per capita national income or in per capita gross national product. Moreover, deficiencies in education, public health, sanitation, and particularly social insurance, were constantly drawn to the attention of the Okinawans since they affected their daily lives. If the United States Administration had spent a limited number of additional millions of dollars, not large sums when the total United States investment in the Ryukyus is considered, the gaps that later proved to be politically very costly could have been greatly narrowed

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or eliminated.

The greatest dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions in the Ryukyus was probably caused by the long absence, and later by the relative inadequacy when compared to Japan, of the various social insurance programs.

In Japan, the first health insurance laws for workers and pension systems for government employees dated from the 1920's. In 1938, a National Health Insurance Law covering additional groups of the population went into effect. More welfare legislation was enacted in the late 1940's and, with the signing of the United States-Japan Peace Treaty in 1951 and the return of sovereignty when the treaty went into effect in 1952, the Japanese Government passed a large number of laws providing unemployment insurance, social security, retirement and various other benefits.[84]

In Okinawa in January 1960 an unemployment insurance law was finally passed providing basic coverage for commercial and industrial employees in establishments with five or more Ryukyuans.[85] Other forms of insurance, such as workmen's compensation, medical insurance or retirement benefits, were still lacking. Referring to this situation, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Booth admitted in 1960 that the governmental system established by the Americans in the Ryukyu Islands "lacks a lot of refinements that a United States Administration should have." This condition was at the time judged to have been one of the factors responsible for Okinawan demands for reunion with Japan.

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Many Okinawans were of the opinion that reunion would bring to the Islands the benefits of the various social insurance laws in effect in Japan, and local political leaders openly cited this point as an argument for reversion.[86]

In 1960, a bill in the GRI Legislature to establish a comprehensive medical insurance plan came to nothing because of USCAR disapproval. The United States Administration argued that there were not enough doctors in the Ryukyus to implement the promises made in the legislative proposal. Other social insurance plans were discouraged by the Civil Administration due to a lack of funds. High Commissioner Booth declared at the time: "The local economy is too poor to support these programs. This deficiency should be remedied."

Officials of the GRI pointed out that their financial capability in this matter had been restricted by the removal from their jurisdiction of a large portion of the land and other taxable properties, thus narrowing the tax base of their government. The logical reaction of Okinawans to their own inability to finance social insurance laws was to ask why the United States, which in those years limited its directly appropriated assistance to $6 million, did not provide more aid to make such programs possible.

Economists estimated at the time that the establishment of the necessary social insurance schemes and certain other benefits that would match existing programs in Japan would have cost the American taxpayer very little and would

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only have added a small percentage to the large sums being spent for the military bases and their upkeep. Many Americans were of the opinion that no more than five or ten million dollars were needed. Nevertheless, action in this matter was slow and often inadequate, and in the early 1960's American opposition to the enactment of new social insurance laws created bad publicity for USCAR and made it appear that the United States Administration was blocking the establishment of such benefits for the Okinawan population.[87]

In February 1961, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan proposed that the Japanese social security laws be applied to the inhabitants of the Ryukyus. A delegation was sent to Okinawa for this purpose, and also to try to establish in the process the Japanese Government's participation in Ryukyuan governmental affairs.[88] In view of what has been said in the previous chapter concerning the politics of Japanese aid to the Ryukyus and the prevalent American attitudes toward this assistance, it is not surprising that nothing came out of this particular proposal.

Progress was made in the field of social insurance during the politically crucial decade of the 1960's. However, in view of the general recognition in most American circles familiar with Ryukyuan problems that dissatisfaction in this area contributed to the intensity of the reversion demands, this progress was inexplicably and inexcusably slow.

A small step was taken in December 1961. During that

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month the High Commissioner's Ordinance No. 42 went into effect. This Ordinance provided for workmen's compensation benefits, but only for the employees of USCAR corporate instrumentalities, the Ryukyuan Property Custodian and contractors working for the United States Forces.[89] Despite a certain amount of talk on this subject, little else had been accomplished in the way of social insurance legislation.

By 1963, after the Kaysen Report, the Kennedy Statement, the raising of the statutory limit on direct aid to the Ryukyus contained in the Price Act, and a great many other plans, General Caraway had to inform the House Committee on Appropriations that there still existed in the Islands only "very limited" social insurance and assistance for dependents and handicapped persons provisions, and no medical insurance, retirement or pension programs.[90]

Effective in January 1964, a workmen's accident compensation insurance program was instituted, but it applied only to those working in hazardous industries with firms employing five or more persons. A limited medical insurance program for employees of the government and of enterprises with five or more employees and for their dependents went into effect in July 1966, with benefits payable as of October 1966. At about the same time, in July 1966, a public service personnel retirement annuity program went into effect covering those employed by the GRI, the Ryukyu Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation, the municipal-

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ities and the politically troublesome schoolteachers.[91]

Aside from the limited coverage provided, these new measures, in the opinion of Okinawans, sometimes compared unfavorably with Japanese social insurance laws. The 1966 medical insurance program was, for instance, criticized by Ryukyuans because it provided cash benefits rather than benefits-in-kind. The defenders of the Ryukyuan system in the Civil Administration countered this criticism with the argument that a benefits-in-kind program is subject to serious abuse and that the Japanese Government, facing financial difficulties in its own medical insurance program, was at the time considering some drastic modifications.[92]

Regardless of the relative merits of the two medical insurance systems, it must be remembered that the United States was in the Ryukyus for a special purpose and most American policies in the Islands were aimed at serving this purpose. It would thus have seemed more important for the Americans to pursue policies designed to increase local acquiescence to their regime and give the Okinawans the program they wanted rather than provoking unfavorable comparisons with Japan even though USCAR claimed its own program was more efficient. If the Japanese Government was considering modifications in its own medical insurance law, the American purpose would have been better served by first copying the Japanese system and then copying the Japanese reforms. Should a little money have been wasted in the process, it would have been worth it if the strategic

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importance of the Ryukyus was as great as United States spokesmen declared it to be.

By the middle of 1968, the GRI Legislature was finally in a position to move toward the passage of the National Pension Act No. 137, the Welfare Pension Act No. 136, and partial amendments to the Medical Insurance Act and the Public Service Personnel Retirement Annuity Act. The Pension Act, the most noteworthy of these measures, provided for contributory and non-contributory pension programs for old age, disability, widows, widowed mothers, and guardians and orphans. It covered Ryukyuan residents between twenty and sixty years of age not eligible under other laws. These measures, the absence of which had long served to stimulate demands for reversion and opposition to United States administration, had been in the planning stage for at least two years before their adoption.[93]

In 1967, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Unger had to admit to the House Armed Services Committee that, while social insurance programs in Japan were completely in operation, the two major programs of this kind mentioned above in the Ryukyus, and providing for workmen's annuities and old age and survivors insurance benefits, were not scheduled to be completely operational until the early 1970's. He also had to add that the gaps between Japan and Okinawa in welfare, education and the standard of living in general could not be closed in one or two years. General Unger explained one of the problems responsible for the difficul-

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ties facing his administration in this field by declaring that:[94]

> Annually we have the difficult but most interesting problem of developing programs and budgets that will be acceptable to three separate governments.

In retrospect, Dr. Nobumoto Ohama told the author that although the social welfare and insurance legislation of the Ryukyus was improved during the 1960's, it never equalled the standards prevailing in Japan during that decade.[95]

The importance placed by Ryukyuans on their social welfare and insurance situation was revealed by a poll conducted in Okinawa and in Japan in early October 1969 by the Japanese Mainichi newspapers in cooperation with the Ryukyu Shimpo. This survey showed that, while the average Japanese was mainly interested in the Ryukyus as a tourist attraction, the chief attraction of Japan for Okinawans lay in medical care, education, and social security programs.[96]

On April 1, 1970, social welfare assistance benefits in the Ryukyus were finally raised to the minimum monthly levels then prevailing in Japan and it was planned to extend the Japanese annuity and welfare pension systems to Okinawa before the end of that year.[97] At that time, the United States-Japan Joint Communique providing for the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration by 1972 was already several months old. It should be noted that plans to raise gradually the Ryukyuan public health, educational and wel-

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fare services to levels comparable with Japan had been initiated by President Kennedy as far back as March 1962.[98]

Conclusions

For the United States, improving the material welfare of the Okinawan population provided an opportunity to build up local supports. In contrast to the situation existing in the field of government, where reforms were in the long run counter-productive and where often either of two courses open to the United States proved ultimately to be self-defeating, in economic and social matters there existed during many years almost endless opportunities to increase the acquiescence of the Ryukyuan population to a continuation of American rule. In trying to build up supports in these fields the United States could only lose money, a resource in ample supply for the limited needs of the small Ryukyuan archipelago.

The United States had done a great deal to exploit this potential for local supports. American economic policy in Okinawa showed, however, an apparent irrationality. The United States was prepared to risk the friendship of Japan, her most important ally in the Far East, for the sake of directly governing the Ryukyus. She had laid out billions to establish and maintain the military bases there and spent additional millions to make the bases politically secure. Having made this great and costly effort, the United States then failed to provide a few extra million dollars to help prolong her rule over the archipelago, and

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secure the freedom to use the bases, during a critical period in East Asian security history. Given the importance of the Okinawan bases, it is difficult to understand why the Congress failed to allocate the limited sums needed to close the gaps between the Ryukyus and Japan in social insurance, health and education which loomed so large in Okinawan eyes.

It could be reasoned correctly that the United States did spend a great deal for Ryukyuan development and that Okinawa did not have the only important claim on funds. However, large sums had already been spent on the Okinawan bases, and the archipelago was small in size and its needs limited. What was involved was not the raising of Ryukyuan standards of living to the level of the more prosperous prefectures of Japan. American policy is criticized for failing to provide in time the limited additional sums that would probably have proven sufficient to close the remaining gaps between Okinawa and Japan in social insurance and in a few other areas.

It has been pointed out, and will continue to be seen throughout this study, that economic dependence on the United States had placed the majority of the Okinawan population in a dilemma between nationalistic aspirations and economic necessity. This dilemma was the basis for a limited local acceptance of American rule.

The dramatic progress made by Japan during the 1960's was one of the factors responsible for weakening these economic supports. As Japanese living standards rose more

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rapidly than Okinawan living standards, and as the gaps in educational, health and social insurance services between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan became more obvious, more Okinawans began to question the advantages to be derived from a prolongation of American rule. The United States Government responded to the intensification of reversion sentiments that resulted from this and other developments of the decade by increasing its assistance to Okinawa and, from 1964 on, by making minor political concessions.

Despite an awareness in various governmental circles in Washington of the increasingly difficult political conditions encountered in the Ryukyu Islands, and in spite of the resultant efforts to cope with them, steps taken in the economic and social spheres proved to be only half-measures. This situation would correspond to what has been described in the introduction to this study as a failure to prevent avoidable difficulties. This failure can be attributed to a combination of neglect, a poor appraisal of Okinawan political conditions resulting in a belief that everything would work out well even without larger aid appropriations, underestimation of the importance placed by another people in social insurance, and the fragmented decision-making process within the United States Government.

Two examples representing a direct transfer of American practices to policies pursued in Okinawa provide an important reason for the American failure to avoid preventable complications. First, the traditional American

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concentration on unplanned economic growth and prosperity through individual initiative, to the general neglect of social security, was projected onto the culturally different Ryukyu Islands. And similarly the Congressional practice of cutting the appropriations requested by the Executive frequently undermined the effectiveness of its policies and did not enhance the popularity of the United States Administration.

In a close parallel with another traditional American tendency, the development of Okinawa was for the most part undertaken without any long-range comprehensive planning.

Within the first few years of United States administration, the American approach to the Ryukyu Islands alternated between great interest and neglect. In the period immediately following the conquest of the archipelago, an impressive effort was made to rebuild the ruin caused by the war and to rehabilitate the population. Once this task seemed to be completed, the welfare of the Okinawans was largely left to the economic side-effects of building and operating the military installations. When the demands for reversion and for autonomy intensified, larger aid appropriations came forth, almost in direct proportion to the deterioration of the political climate. There seemed to exist no development programs aimed at anticipating and preventing difficulties before they appeared. Instead, the measures taken could in too many cases be described in Churchillian terms as "too little and too late."

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The Ryukyu Islands stumbled into a prosperity based on military expenditures, an experience also not unknown in the United States. The Ryukyuan standard of living soared to undreamed-of heights, and Okinawa entered the twentieth century through an artificial economy. Great as the achievements were under United States administration, they seem to represent largely the lucky consequences of a series of accidents. Although the Americans intended to improve greatly the material well-being of the Ryukyuan population, they never carried out their intention in a systematic, planned manner. The United States does not appear to have consciously brought about either the impressive prosperity, or its unnatural foundations, or even the resulting Okinawan dependence on her military presence.

From the Ryukyuan point of view the newly found affluence seemed for many years precarious. The high standard of living appeared to be tied to the continuation of a peculiar military-political situation, involving both a perceived American need for the strategic location of Okinawa and strong pressures for reversion in the archipelago and in Japan. Only under these special circumstances would the United States continue to maintain her expensive military presence in the Ryukyu Islands and provide aid, and only in this unusual situation would the Japanese Government continue its large-scale assistance. Under normal peacetime conditions there appeared to be no economic future for the Ryukyu Islands.

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In the early 1970's, however, the vagaries of politics appear to promise a brighter future for the Okinawans. The Japanese Government seems to be in the position of having to provide civilian substitutes for the military installations and turn Ryukyuan prosperity into a permanent condition based on a peacetime economy, whenever the United States should either drastically reduce its presence in Okinawa or eliminate it altogether. In this way the Ryukyu Islands, having been accidentally lifted into the twentieth century by the American exploitation of their strategic location, are likely to benefit from yet another unexpected consequence of United States administration. The net effect of the American interlude will then turn out to have been positive for Okinawa, on a long-term as well as on a short-term basis.

Okinawans had, however, to pay largely what could be called a "psychological price" for receiving this apparently permanent admission to the twentieth century. They had to endure more than a quarter century of alien rule and of a large-scale military presence, many of the disadvantages of which will emerge in the following chapters. In almost every respect, the military-oriented dependency relationship unwittingly placed the local inhabitants in a humiliating position. This proved to be the case even in the economic sphere where American rule provided great benefits for the Ryukyuan population.

Okinawans became dependent on foreign assistance and

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the various aspects of the economy not based on aid were subject to the needs, even the whims, of their conquerors and rulers. There was no possibility of achieving economic independence or of competing in a world market on a basis of equality with other nations. Despite the prosperity and modernization derived from the dependency relationship, the local population was in economic matters placed in a position of clear inferiority vis-a-vis its rulers.

The United States found in the economic and social development of the Ryukyu Islands the greatest opportunity for building supports for her regime. Largely by accident and partly through the aid extended, definite supports were built up for a long, but not indefinite, continuation of American rule. However, the reflection of various traditional American characteristics in the policies pursued in Okinawa made impossible the full exploitation of the potential existing in the economic sphere for increasing the local acceptance for United States administration.

Important gaps remained in the field of material welfare between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan. As usually happens, with the passage of time, dissatisfaction with the alien regime increased for a variety of reasons, the local population began to take the achievements made under United States rule for granted and the gaps and weaknesses of the dependent economy assumed greater significance. The American failure to correct shortcomings in Okinawan social and economic conditions, stemming from a reluctance to

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spend more money at an earlier time, was during this period to have the maximum effect in undermining the support for the American regime.

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NOTES

[1]United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Facts Book FY 1968, pp. 5-5, 5-6.

[2]Ibid., p. 5-3.

[3]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill 1965, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, pp. 68,96.

[4]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969; and U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 180. See also Kaoru Inaizumi, The Okinawan Economy - Present and Future (Naha, Okinawa: Research Department, Bank of the Ryukyu Islands, July 1968), p. 5.

[5]Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation, Analysis of Economic Statistics, Fiscal Year 1968 (Naha, Okinawa: Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation), p. 16.

[6]Inaizumi, op. cit., p. 5.

[7]The New York Times, October 5, 1969, VIII, p. 8:3-4. The interest held by Okinawa for Japanese tourists was also revealed in conversations with Japanese visitors to the United States. It seems that an added attraction of a trip to the Ryukyu Islands was the opportunity to take out a passport, which is usually not granted as easily in Japan as it is in the United States.

[8]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 152.

[9]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968, Vol. XVI (RCS CSCAMG-5), p. 83. See also The New York Times, January 13, 1959, p. 80:6-8. Sales from this free trade zone had reached a peak of $4.1 million in 1966 but had then gone down to only $2.1 million by 1968.

[10]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[11]The New York Times, May 13, 1962, p. 6:1-3; and May 6, 1969, p. 12:3. See also U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and

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Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, pp. 251-252.

[12]Interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[13]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., pp. 219-222. This refers to an attempt made during the late 1960's to raise the taxes paid by foreigners. General Caraway, in an interview on November 20, 1969, told the author about a similar attempt made during his administration which he blocked in his capacity as High Commissioner.

[14]The Wall Street Journal (New York), November 12, 1969, p. 40:1-4.

[15]Interviews with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969; Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970, Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970; and Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson II, May 19, 1970.

[16]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, News Release 69-40, February 10, 1969, p. 1.

[17]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., pp. 219-222.

[18]Mainichi (Tokyo), November 14, 1969, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, November 1969, No. 24, p. 20. (Mimeographed).

[19]Mainichi (Tokyo), January 25, 1968, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., January 1968, No. 1, pp. 15-16.

[20]Mainichi (Tokyo), January 28, 1968, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., January 1968, No. 1, p. 16.

[21]Yomiuri (Tokyo), October 12, 1969, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., October 1969, No. 22, p. 1.

[22]Mainichi (Tokyo), February 19, 1970, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., February 1970, No. 2, p. 34.

[23]Nihon Keizai (Tokyo), March 15, 1970, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., March 1970, No. 4, pp. 2, 28; and Mainichi (Tokyo), May 30, 1970, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., May 1970, No. 8, pp. 30-31.

[24]Interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

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[25]Interviews with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, February 12, 1970; Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970; and Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[26]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, News Release 68-123, May 3, 1968, p. 3.

[27]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill Hearings, 1965, op. cit., pp. 62-63; and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, H.R. 12617, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, p. 5637.

[28]USCAR, Comptroller Department, Ryukyu Islands National Income Statistics, FY 1955-FY 1968 (Urasoe, Okinawa: Comptroller Department, November 1968), pp. 1-2. See also Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Okinawa, Position Paper on Reversion (rev. ed.; Koza, Okinawa: Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Okinawa, April 17, 1970), p. 1; and Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, November 26, 1969. (Mimeographed).

[29]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 51.

[30]USCAR, Ryukyu Islands National Income Statistics, 1955-1968, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

[31]The New York Times, May 25, 1969, IV, 17:4-7.

[32]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill Hearings, 1965, op. cit., p. 64

[33]The Weekly Okinawa Times, December 25, 1965, p. 2:3-5. A copy may be found in the General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 10.

[34]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., pp. 83, 91, 92, 192.

[35]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., pp. 167-168. See also Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 121; Morning Star (Okinawa), May 16, 1964, II, p. 3:1, a copy may be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 25; and House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1967, op. cit., p. 135. Most of the electric power plants owned by the Armed Forces belonged to the U.S. Army.

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[36]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., pp. 167-168; and USCAR, Public Affairs Department, News Release 68-248, September 3, 1968, p. 2. See also USCAR, Facts Book FY 1968, op. cit., pp. 9-25 and 9-26.

[37]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 131.

[38]Ibid., p. 133; and Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964, Vol. XII (RCS CSCAMG-5), pp. 153-154. See also letter from Civil Administrator Gerald Warner to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated September 20, 1965, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 24; and USCAR, Facts Book FY 1968, op. cit., p. 9-2. The inter-island air service was provided by Civil Air Transport, on charter for the Naha Air Terminal Company until July 1, 1964, when a United States airline, Air America, replaced it. Following Okinawan agitation directed against this firm, Air America was in turn replaced by Southwest Airlines, owned 51 per cent by Japan Air Lines and 49 per cent by various Ryukyuan interests. Most of the personnel of the new airline was provided by Japan Air Lines and by Japan Domestic Airlines. These two companies also undertook to train Okinawans for various technical positions with Southwest Airlines.

[39]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 135; and USCAR, Public Affairs Department, News Release 68-123, May 3, 1968, p. 5. See also USCAR, Facts Book FY 1968, op. cit., pp. 9-1, 9-13 and 9-15.

[40]The New York Times, March 22, 1964, p. 14:1-5. The information was provided by a survey.

[41]USCAR, Facts Book FY 1968, op. cit., p. 20-3.

[42]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 86. See also The New York Times, March 28, 1965, p. 16:4.

[43]The New York Times, October 5, 1969, VIII, p. 8:3-4.

[44]The New York Times, January 13, 1964, p. 40:3-4.

[45]Reed J. Irvine, "Are Wages Depressed in Okinawa?" Oriental Economist (Tokyo), May 1967, p. 311. Mr. Irvine was, at the time he wrote this article, Adviser, the Division of International Finance, The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

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[46]The New York Times, April 7, 1957, VI, pp. 60, 62, 63. (Article by Robert Trumbull).

[47]The Weekly Okinawa Times, December 25, 1965, p. 2:3-5. A copy may be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 10.

[48]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 27.

[49]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), April 8, 1969, p. 4:1-3.

[50]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967, Vol. XV (RCS CSCAMG-5), p. 53. See also The New York Times, August 29, 1965, p. 5:1. Numerous other newspaper articles published over the years in The New York Times and elsewhere testify to the role played by the Okinawan bases in the Vietnamese war. In chapters X and XI the controversy resulting from the use of Kadena Air Force Base for B-52 raids in South Vietnam will provide one example, mainly for the 1968-1969 period. In an interview with the author on May 19, 1970, Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II spoke about the importance of the Ryukyuan bases for the military operations conducted by the United States in Vietnam.

[51]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), April 8, 1969, p. 4:1-3. See also USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Memorandum to News Media 69-15, April 17, 1969, p. 3. In this shift in military expenditures the total number of dollars spent by the United States Forces remained the same. As inflation had, however, somewhat reduced the value of the American currency, the actual expenditures became, in fact, smaller. In addition to this, as mentioned in the text, there occurred a shift in spending away from new military construction and procurements in Okinawa and toward other purposes. The net result was the large drop in the rate of economic growth and this provides an illustration of how sensitive the Ryukyuan economy was to the slightest changes in local United States military activities.

[52]The New York Times, May 9, 1965, p. 2:4; and August 29, 1965, p. 5:1.

[53]Inaizumi, op. cit., p. 6. See also USCAR, Ryukyu Islands National Income Statistics, 1955-1968, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

[54]Inaizumi, op. cit., p. 6. See also USCAR, Ryukyu Islands National Income Statistics, 1955-1968, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

[55]Inaizumi, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

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[56]Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), June 21, 1967, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., June 1967, No. 10, pp. 42-44.

[57]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970. See also Asahi Shimbun, Loc. cit., which makes a similar point.

[58]The New York Times, May 6, 1969, p. 12:1. (Article by Philip Shabecoff).

[59]Ibid., p. 12:1-3

[60]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., p. 5637.

[61]Senate Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1965, op. cit., p. 181.

[62]Irvine, Oriental Economist, May 1967, op. cit., p. 311.

[63]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, H.R. 4903, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 5159.

[64]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., pp. 5657-5658.

[65]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 4903, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands Hearings, 1967, op. cit., p. 5155.

[66]Ibid., p. 5155.

[67]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., p. 169.

[68]Inaizumi, op. cit., p. 2.

[69]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., pp. 5632-5633.

[70]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 11-12. This testimony was presented by Colonel Sitterson, the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army.

[71]U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Conditions in the Ryukyu Islands, Labor Digest

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No. 24, 1963, pp. 2-3. See also Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., p. 191.

[72]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 4903, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands Hearings, 1967, op. cit., p. 5161.

[73]Warren M. Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 171-173. See also Chitoshi Yanaga, Japanese People and Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 102.

[74]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

[75]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., pp. 165-168. See also The New York Times, January 17, 1954, p. 74:8.

[76]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., p. 5636.

[77]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, News Release 68-123, May 3, 1968, p. 7.

[78]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., pp. 156-161.

[79]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., February 8, 1965. The figures given are based on the December 1, 1960 census.

[80]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., p. 5651.

[81]The New York Times, September 4, 1961, pp. 1:7-8 and 6:4.

[82]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 266. Testimony presented by Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, the High Commissioner.

[83]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

[84]Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 340-345.

[85]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966, Vol. XIV (RCS CSCAMG-5), p. 248.

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[86]The New York Times, June 20, 1960, p. 1:7; and November 20, 1960, p. 2:3-5. The last article was written by Robert Trumbull.

[87]David Wurfel, "Okinawa, Irredenta on the Pacific," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia, Winter 1962-1963), p. 370. See also The New York Times, November 20, 1960, p. 2:3-5; and September 4, 1961, p. 1:7-8 and p. 6:4.

[88]The New York Times, February 26, 1961, p. 14:1.

[89]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1965-1966, op. cit., pp. 248, 250.

[90]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations Hearings, 1963, op. cit., p. 267.

[91]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1965-1966, op. cit., pp. 247-250. In an effort to provide centralization in what seemed to be a growing field of government activity, the Government of the Ryukyu Islands established on August 1, 1965 an Insurance Agency. It was established as an organ independent of the Welfare Department, soon had its name changed to "Social Insurance Agency" and was charged from the beginning with administering all existing and future insurance programs.

[92]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1966-1967, op. cit., pp. 228-229. From the patient's standpoint the main drawback of a cash benefit system, such as the one then in use in the Ryukyu Islands, was that doctors or hospitals have to be paid out of the patient's pocket and only afterward can an application for reimbursement be made from the appropriate government agency. The Okinawan population tended to compare this unfavorably with the benefits-in-kind method in effect in Japan at that time. Under this system the patient only has to lay out nominal amounts from his own funds and the medical purveyors, rather than the patient, have to apply to the government for reimbursement.

[93]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., pp. 195-196; and Report for Period 1965-1966, op. cit., p. 248.

[94]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 4903, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands Hearings, 1967, op. cit., pp. 5149, 5151.

[95]Interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[96]The Mainichi (Tokyo), November 4, 1969, pp. 1:5-6, 2:2 and 8:1-2.

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[97]Japan, Consulate General in New York, Information Service, Japan Report, Vo. XVI, No. 5, March 1, 1970, pp. 6-7.

[98]The New York Times, March 20, 1962, p. 23:1-8.

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CHAPTER VI

THE LAND PROBLEM - A CASE STUDY

With this chapter the study proceeds to its third major division, the effects of the dependency relationship on the personal lives of the Okinawan population.

The primary emphasis in this study so far has been on the larger political and economic questions encountered in the Ryukyus, with the effects on the local population treated mainly as illustrations of specific conditions created by the various problems analyzed. By contrast, this section will take up the particular developments resulting from the American use of Okinawa as a major military base, and their negative effects on the private lives of Okinawans will be treated to a much greater extent.

The first chapter of this division will be concerned with the competition for land between Okinawan landowners and the American bases, an economic issue that was to assume crisis proportions during at least one period of United States administration.

Arable land has long presented a major problem in the densely populated parts of the Far East and becamsea serious political issue in many dependencies. The establishment of the main United States military base for the Western

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Pacific in one of the most overcrowded corners of East Asia and the ensuing needs of these military installations for land gave rise to one of the more serious land problems encountered in dependencies and served as a major source of local opposition to the American presence.

A brief mention of some basic demographic, geographical and agricultural facts concerning the main island of Okinawa, where almost all the military bases were located, will provide the setting in which the land problem evolved. The total area of Okinawa island, excluding the other Ryukyu Islands, is 453.99 square miles or 290,555 acres. The population of this island was 758,777 on October 1, 1965, representing a density of 1671 inhabitants per square mile. The main island covers 53.5 per cent of the total land area of the Ryukyu Islands and includes 81 per cent of the population.[1]

The northern two-thirds of Okinawa island are rugged and mountainous and the most desirable, level lands are found mainly in the sourthern part. For this reason most of the inhabitants are concentrated in the south, where the capital, Naha, with about one-third of the population (257,177), and the island's four other cities are located.[2]

The total arable land area of Okinawa island totals only about 80,000 acres. In the mid-1960's the number of farm households stood at 71,700, accounting for about 30 per cent of all Okinawan households. The size of the average land holding was only about one acre per owner.[3]

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The value of land, already a scarce commodity in Okinawa, was rising still higher as a result of a population increase of about 20,000 per year.[4]

One bright spot in the agricultural picture is the climate, which makes possible a growing season throughout the entire year, thereby providing a steady form of employment for all members of a farm family. In most of these households the children and elderly persons who normally could find work only on their own or on a neighboring farm were completely dependent on the soil for their livelihood.

The local population's ties to the land were reinforced by the traditional status attached to land ownership. The right of ownership rests with the head of the family and is passed on to the eldest son after the father's death. Like many other Orientals, Ryukyuans hold special feelings concerning the ownership of land that Americans as a rule cannot understand. They will, for instance, never sell land for money.[5]

The small, overcrowded island of Okinawa, with a farm population subsisting on minuscule land plots to which it was attached by sentimental and traditional bonds, was called upon to provide the land for the United States to set up its most important bases in the Far East.

The Basic Problem

Even before the United States decided to turn Okinawa into the keystone of its defensive system in the Far East,

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the Ryukyuan problem of population density was considerably aggravated by an unrelated American policy. As part of the post-World War II Allied program of repatriating to their former homeland the millions of Japanese subjects who had settled in the many lands conquered by their armies, the United States brought back to the Ryukyus about 200,000 persons of Okinawan origin.[6]

Not long after the completion of this large-scale repatriation, the United States Forces proceeded to acquire large tracts of land for their new enlarged bases on the main island. As could have been foreseen, the combination of massive repatriation and massive land requisitioning resulted in considerable overcrowding, in the displacement of many thousands of inhabitants and in a general dissatisfaction locally with this situation as well as with the methods of acquiring the land and of paying for it. The local opposition movement was quick to exploit this discontent.

By the middle of 1956 United States military authorities had taken over a total of 42,953 acres of land in Okinawa, including about 21 per cent of the entire cultivable area. At the time expansion plans called for the acquisition of additional acreage that would ultimately have brought the total up to 85,843 acres.[7]

The total of American-held lands never reached this figure, but it did eventually exceed 76,000 acres, most of these acquired during the 1950's. This acreage was

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obtained from two basic sources, private and municipal properties, and public domain lands allocated to the United States without charge by the Ryukyuan Property Custodian. These two categories of land amounted, respectively, to 51,780.08 acres and 23,989.89 acres in 1963 and to 51,585.28 acres and 24,098.87 acres in 1968.

These figures show how little the total of American-held lands had changed during most of the 1960's.[8] In that decade the acreage used by the United States took up about 26 per cent of the main island's land area and about 14 per cent of the total land surface of the entire Ryukyuan Archipelago.[9]

The land areas requisitioned for the use of the bases could also be expressed in other figures to show more clearly the effect of this policy on a part of the local population.

During the 1950's, when most of the ground needed by the United States Forces was acquired, more than 44,000 landowners had been dispossessed. By far the largest number of these new "displaced persons" resettled in what had already constituted the most crowded part of the main island, the south-central portion, where most non-agricultural employment opportunities were to be found. In the process the population density of the southern sector of Okinawa island was raised to 2,000 inhabitants per square mile.[10]

The average size of the displaced owners' holding, a mere eight-tenths of one acre, shows how valuable and scarce arable land was in the regions primarily chosen for

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the location of the bases.[11]

Many military bases could not be located in the more mountainous and less densely populated northern part of Okinawa, since this area was usable mainly for training and maneuver grounds. In addition, many of the military installations, in particular airfields, needed relatively large expanses of level ground, to be found mostly in the overcrowded south-central portion of the island, which thus received both the bulk of the displaced owners and the highest concentration of bases.

In this sector of Okinawa island military installations often occupied some of the choicest parcels of level ground and a substantial number of cities, towns and villages had more than half of their total municipal areas taken up by the military establishments. In Koza City, 67 per cent of the total area was covered by military facilities; in Yomitan village the total was 79 per cent; and in Kadena village it rose as high as 88 per cent.[12]

Some indication of the dislocation created among the local population by the presence of large military forces and by what constituted only the early stages in the construction of the bases is provided by the testimony of High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Watson at the Congressional hearings on the payment of compensation to Ryukyuans for damages suffered during the 1945-1952 period. General Watson stated that during those early years 3255 buildings had been destroyed "in making land available for United States housing

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and other necessary buildings." In the process 1332 wells and 941 tombs were also destroyed, damages estimated at over one million dollars were caused to various kinds of trees and to tea plants, two water points with a combined flow of one and one-half million gallons of water per day were taken over, nine fishing cooperatives utilizing 243 fishing vessels and employing 712 fishermen were excluded from taking fish in inshore waters, and 3751 buildings had to be removed by the owners at their own expense.[13]

In the process of acquiring land the American Authorities naturally paid a certain amount of compensation to the affected Okinawans and frequently did what they could to minimize the difficulties in which the local population found itself.

Efforts were made to resettle some of the displaced inhabitants in uninhabited areas of Yaeyama and Irimote Islands as well as in northern Okinawa. However, by 1959 only 500 persons had moved into the newly created communities.[14]

Whenever acquisitioned land was not being used by military installations, the United States Forces permitted local farmers to till it until the ground was actually needed.[15] In some cases, as for instance at Kadena A.F.B., Okinawans even received the right to cultivate land within the boundaries of military bases.[16] When a plot of land was considered no longer essential it was, as a rule, returned to its owners. In 1957 approximately 2,260 acres

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of land were relinquished in this manner.[17]

Unfortunately, even with the best of intentions the United States Forces were unable to remedy the basic cause of the sufferings of Okinawan landowners: the perceived strategic necessity of building a giant military base in a small and already overcrowded island.

American and Okinawan Attitudes on Land

Considering the widely different cultural backgrounds of Americans and Okinawans it should come as no surprise that they looked at the land in completely different ways and that this resulted in serious misunderstandings which complicated the problem even further.

The very units of measurement used by the two peoples symbolize their divergent approaches to land problems. In land-rich America the surface of the soil is measured in acres but in tiny Okinawa one of the units of measurement is the Tsubo, equal to 3.3 square meters or roughly a plot of 33 square feet. This is the equivalent of the corner of a nice-sized living room in the United States.

When Americans grow up and become financially independent they leave their parents' homes and usually do not think twice about taking up residence in another city or state. With this background it was very difficult for Americans to understand, and they certainly could not have been expected to foresee, that for traditional and sentimental reasons Okinawans would stubbornly cling to a tiny

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area of poor land.[18]

In the United States the soil is generally considered to be in the category of a business asset, an item that can be bought and sold depending on the profits to be realized from such a transaction. With this in mind Americans usually felt that if they paid an Okinawan farmer what they considered a fair price for his land and then provided him with an opportunity to earn more money in some other occupation than he could have earned on his farm, or if compensation was provided elsewhere in another form, then this constituted at least reasonable if not profitable indemnification.

In 1956 Lieut. Gen. James E. Moore, Senior United States Commander in, and Deputy Governor of, the Ryukyus, asserted that land acquisitions by the Armed Forces of the United States, which had been the subject of bitter complaints by Okinawans of all political persuasions, had been more than counterbalanced by the vast amounts of United States dollars poured into the Islands.[19] When in 1957 Okinawans, who had already become resigned to the requisitioning of land needed for military purposes, displayed irritation because crop land had been taken for an eighteen hole golf course, the American answer was that "the former occupants of the golfing area are now making more by working on the links than they ever earned from their farms."[20]

This type of answer failed to take into account

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Okinawan attitudes toward land and the possibility that Okinawans might have preferred to earn their livelihood as farmers rather than as servants or employees on an American golf course. The reduction of an independent farmer and landholder to the role of caddy, serving the entertainment needs of conquerors who had come to dispose over his land, emphasizes the inferior position that Ryukyuans had come to occupy within their own islands.

Moreover, providing financial compensation or advantages in exchange for land could not have been very satisfactory to Okinawans if according to tradition land was never to be sold for money. High Commissioner Watson testified to this effect when he told a committee of the House of Representatives in Washington: "It has been my experience in the year I have been there that they (the Ryukyuans) are quite averse to selling their land to an outside national or outside individual or representative of a national government."[21]

In Ryukyuan society land ownership was a status symbol. Ownership rights passed from father to son, the transfer of land from one owner to another was rare, and the soil represented not only the main source of livelihood but was also at the core of social organization. In such a society even adequate financial payments could not have provided compensation for the attachment to the land.[22] And as will become apparent, the financial payment by Americans was not always considered adequate by Okinawans.

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Taking the Land and Returning it to the Owners

From the above it is evident that the needs of the United States Forces for land would even under the best circumstances have presented a formidable problem. Unfortunately the problem was compounded by some of the policies pursued by the United States during the first half of its administration and by the confused land ownership situation left as a legacy of the 1945 battle.

In the course of these hostilities the main island was devastated, vast stretches were turned into charred ruins and the land register was completely destroyed. The ensuing confusion was only partly remedied by the existence at that time of a society that was still more or less traditional. In a traditional society everyone knows how much land he and his neighbors own, and landowners usually accept each others' titles without question. A certain amount of disagreement over the exact boundaries of landholdings could not, however, be prevented, and this represented an additional complicating factor when United States Forces requisitioned land for their own needs.[23]

Land ownership patterns in Okinawa meant that the acquisition of land by the military resulted in a temporary or long-term loss of effective possession not only for a small class of landowners but also for many thousands of small farmers who owned at least some plot of ground. It was estimated in 1970 that 54 per cent of the farmers were owners, 32 per cent were combination owners and tenant

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farmers, and only 12 per cent were pure tenant farmers.[24]

The dissatisfaction expressed by Okinawan proprietors over American land policies began with the methods of land acquisition for the armed forces.

The 1955 report on Okinawa of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations pointed to the land expropriation policies and to the low rentals paid by the United States Authorities as the most serious problem on the island of Okinawa at the time. The report charged that under the American system of land acquisition then in use the final decisions were always left with the United States. Okinawan owners whose land was taken could have recourse to an Appeals Board, but the American Authorities had the right to choose the members of this Board and were empowered to seize the land even while appeals were pending. Moreover, it was charged that while 38,000 out of the 44,000 landowners whose property had been expropriated up to that time had filed appeals, "only four cases have been settled."[25]

The same point was made by the American Civil Liberties Union when it wrote a year later to Representative Melvin Price, the Head of a House Armed Services Subcommittee that had reported a little earlier on the land problem, to protest that lands in Okinawa had been taken "without the people having any power or rights whatever under the military government to dispute this decision."[26]

In reforms introduced later during the 1950's the United States tried very hard to accommodate the wishes of

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Okinawan landowners, as far as was consistent with military necessity. Ultimately an entirely revised payments system that satisfied the dispossessed owners at least in the matter of financial compensation was introduced. However, the reforms, which came only after most of the land had already been acquisitioned, did not and could not satisfy the basic demand of the Okinawan who, to use the words of M.D. Morris, asked for "the privilege of refusing to rent his land."[27]

Under the later policy the United States Authorities did their best to avoid acquiring any plot of land unless this was judged to be really essential to meet military needs. As High Commissioner Watson explained to a House Armed Services Subcommittee, there now existed a system

> Where the military service desiring the land must completely justify the land and provide information which includes such things as whether or not the man may continue -- the owner may continue -- to farm the land, if it is farmland, or he may continue to use it even after we have taken control of it, whether any standing improvements must have to be removed, whether some other land in another area would not do better. In other words the military service must completely justify the requirement for this land.

General Watson went on to elaborate that the final decision on the need to acquire additional ground was made by the High Commissioner. After such a decision had been made the military authorities were obliged to check with the GRI to find out what the impact would be on the owner and whether the Government of the Ryukyus possessed any other land on which he could possibly have been resettled.[28]

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The above paragraphs show that, at least after the reforms of the late 1950's, the United States Administration was trying its utmost not to cause any avoidable sufferings or inconvenience to dispossessed landowners. However, in order to meet the main demand of most of the owners, that their land should not be taken in the first place, the Americans would have had to move their bases elsewhere. This for obvious reasons they would, or could, not do.

Unfortunately the United States needed bases in Okinawa, the bases required land and, as most Okinawans who owned such land were not ready to part with it voluntarily, the American Administration had no choice but to exercise its powers of eminent domain in order to acquire the needed areas. This is really no different in essence from what happens in any other country or territory when land that the owners do not wish to give up is needed for a public purpose.

In Okinawa, however, the amount of land needed for this particular public purpose represented an unusually large part of the entire island, and the large-scale land acquisitions were made in an overcrowded territory where the people could not easily afford this widespread use of the power of eminent domain. Moreover, this power was exercised by an unwanted foreign government for a purpose not really considered by most owners to be in the public interest.

While many of the difficulties caused by the American

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use of Okinawa were unavoidable, there were some hardships that could have been prevented.

The United States Administration usually returned to Okinawans land no longer needed for the military bases, but it was often returned in a condition that made it impossible to farm. A representative of the Real Estate Division, U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that lands were, for example, returned while covered with a road or an airfield runway. The witness explained that restoration claims of this nature were included in the Okinawan compensation demands then being considered by the committee.[29]

It should once again be noted that these hearings, which resulted in Congress authorizing the payment of compensation to Okinawans for damages suffered during the 1945-1952 period, were held only in 1965.

A thirteen-year delay in the payment of compensation for damages, even if the American obligation to pay was only moral and not legal, and the return of land in an unusable condition can certainly be termed preventable sources of friction with the local population. Given the endless unavoidable irritants caused by the American presence in Okinawa and the often stated need to obtain the reasonable acquiescence of the Okinawans to American rule, it becomes hard to understand the thoughtlessness which permitted these unnecessary hardships to contribute to the alienation of the Okinawan population.

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Paying for the Land

When the Americans ceased to acquire land by seizure carried out as part of a military occupation and when compensation for land taken was first considered, it was proposed that rent be paid to Okinawan owners at the old Japanese pre-war rate. This translated to three or four cents per tsubo and amounted to about ten dollars a year for a family of five owning a small plot of land.[30]

As this did not seem to be a serious method for compensating landowners, a different system was adopted for normal, non-occupation uses of land in the Ryukyus. This early payment policy, as well as some of its results, were described by High Commissioner Watson to a House Armed Services Subcommittee in the following terms:[31]

> Initially, and subsequent to the occupation policy of land seizure under the rules of land warfare, the United States agencies acquired a so-called "determinable estate" interest which gave the United States full use and possession of the land with a single payment to be made in full at current fee value, title remaining with the Ryukyuan owners. By 1958 this method of land-taking had generated violent opposition because landowners were convinced that title to lands taken under the determinable estates procedure had passed to the United States and that their lands were completely lost to them by subterfuge.
>
> This conviction gave rise to unusually serious consequences because of the unique traditional relationship of a Ryukyuan to his land holdings.

The Okinawans were, as General Watson indicated, dissatisfied with the method of payment. They also objected strongly to the amount of compensation given to them.

According to the previously mentioned report of the

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Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Okinawan owners of land taken for military purposes were receiving only one-ninth of the sum demanded as payment.[32]

Differences of opinion between Americans and Okinawans on the amount of compensation to landowners for the use of their property concerned both the percentage of the land's value to be paid and the valuation to be placed on the land itself.

The United States Authorities had originally calculated the value of farmland on the basis of the remainder, after deducting the volume of labor and the cost of fertilizer from the price of the crops. This is economically correct, in terms of the portion of the crop value to be assigned to the land. At least it is so in a different cultural setting. In Okinawa conditions were not quite the same. As a Japanese correspondent in Okinawa described it: "The Okinawan farmer, however, does not as is usual in the Japanese sense of life, take into account his and his family members' labor and self-supplied fertilizer..."[33]

In other words, when the Okinawan farmer looks at the value of his crops as a basis for determining the value of his land, his crops are worth to him not what an accountant will calculate in the United States but everything which he has put into them. Unlike the American accountant he does not deduct the value of his labor on the assumption that he could earn the same amount elsewhere as an employee. He might not have been able to find work at the time, and he

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might never have worked for an employer apart from a neighboring farmer. To the Okinawan the land was worth the full value of what it brought forth. Once again differences in cultural background produced misunderstandings, and United States policy was based on American practices.

By 1956 United States authorities in Okinawa were agreeing with local landowners that a more just basis for the valuation of farmland would be three times the annual value of the crops. An even more serious dispute was occasioned by the percentage of this valuation to be paid for land use and also by the timing of the payments. Regardless of the basis of valuation to be decided upon, the United States preferred to pay the entire rent for the land in a single lump sum. Okinawans, for their part, wanted to receive a regular annual income for the use of their land. Aside from the convenience of a guaranteed income this seemed to reassure them that they had not lost title to their land. In those cases where the Americans did pay an annual rental, this was set at 6 per cent of the value of the land. Okinawans were, however, demanding the full value of the annual crop as rental, plus damages and resettlement compensation. The final decision in this dispute could only be made by the United States Congress. In terms of the total expense to the American taxpayer it was calculated at the time that yielding to the Okinawan claims would have cost the United States $8 million per year, in place of the $1 million paid under the old system,

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plus a total of $14 million as outright compensation for damages, resettlement and other costs.[34]

Since a base cannot in the long run function very effectively against the determined opposition of the local population and since the American investment in the military bases on Okinawa ultimately ran into billions of dollars, it becomes very difficult to understand the wisdom of a policy permitting a potentially dangerous political situation to develop over a number of years in order to save a lump sum payment of $14 million plus an extra $7 million annually.

This was not, as has been seen in the previous chapters, the only situation in which a refusal to spend a few million dollars at the right time caused political complications.

The reluctance to increase the amount and change the timing of the compensation paid for land use resulted in the problem becoming acute in the mid-1950's. The dispute reached its climax in a political crisis which was only resolved in 1958 when the United States acceded to the demands of Okinawan property owners.

In an action demonstrating the seriousness of Okinawan dissatisfaction over this issue, a delegation composed of the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and of six members of the Assembly traveled to Washington in May 1955 to protest the single-payment plan before the House Armed Services Committee and to ask for increased compensation for the use of Okinawan lands.

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Largely as a result of this a subcommittee of the above-named committee under the chairmanship of Congressman Melvin Price, subsequently known as the "Price Committee," was sent to Okinawa to investigate the entire problem and to report to the Congress on the Ryukyuan land situation. To the great disappointment of Okinawans this subcommittee reported in June 1956 that the United States would need more land for its bases in Okinawa and that farmers should be recompensed for this by means of a lump sum, or "package" payment, amounting to about twenty years' expectable revenue. This proposal was almost immediately rejected by local property owners, who charged that the formula represented, in effect, a purchase of land and not a rental. They demanded, instead, an annual rental equivalent to the land's earnings when farmed, to be paid for as long as they were prevented from working their soil.

The dispute soon caused a political furor on the island, and not just among landowners. The entire Government of the Ryukyu Islands, including the elected legislature and a small army of elected Mayors and Village Chiefs, threatened to resign en masse. Lieut. Gen. James E. Moore, Deputy Governor of the Ryukyus asked these local officials to postpone what would have been a very embarrassing maneuver at least until the Congressional report could be studied with greater care. He also chose this occasion to announce that land rentals would be tripled beginning July 1, 1956.[35]

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Despite this concession the wave of opposition that had been set in motion did not abate. On June 22nd the Okinawan press reported that 150,000 people had attended 55 separate meetings on the night of June 20th in order to protest the American plan. The next day General Moore changed to a harder line when he told a delegation of protesting Okinawans that the proposed plans represented "the final position of the United States Government." He also called the American position reasonable and advised the delegation:[36]

> This is not a time to listen to men who for political reasons, subversive reasons, or reasons of personal gain whip up agitation on the part of the people, particularly when the people haven't had an opportunity to understand the full implications of the report.

The agitation was also felt in Japan. The Japanese Socialist Party and various organizations of Okinawan residents of Japan announced their intention to hold mass rallies and to engage in other activities to protest the plan. One June 20th the Japanese Cabinet of Premier Ichiro Hatoyama agreed, but "with a notable lack of enthusiasm," to the requests of Okinawans and of their friends in Japan to intercede with the United States in the matter. The next day the Japanese Government's intercession took the only form possible under the circumstances. Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu handed to United States Ambassador John M. Allyson the protests of Okinawan landowners. These had come to include an additional demand for a time

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limit on American land tenure, to replace the existing system of indefinite tenure.[37]

The United States seems to have reacted to the developing crisis with the familiar technique of combining conciliation with pressures to discourage opposition.

On July 5, 1956 General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Commander in Chief of United States Forces in the Far East and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, issued a conciliatory declaration stating that the United States would henceforth requisition only the bare minimum of land needed by the defense installations in Okinawa.[38] Later that summer, as part of the second half of the "carrot-and-stick" method, American Authorities placed Koza, a major entertainment center for troops stationed in Okinawa, off limits to United States service personnel. The ban was, however, soon lifted after the mayor promised not to permit any more anti-American gatherings in his city.[39]

These actions on the part of the United States Authorities did not, however, solve the problem of the payments for land use and resentment continued among the local population. In December 1956 this resentment was credited with bringing about the election of Kamejiro Senaga, the leading left-winger in the Ryukyus and Secretary-General of the pro-Communist Okinawan People's Party. He ran and was elected Mayor of Naha on a platform opposing American administration of the Islands.[40]

The United States must have regarded the victory of

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a suspected Communist as a danger signal that could no longer be ignored. Early in January 1957 General Lemnitzer announced a new policy on the land question. This included a reiteration of his earlier declaration about a sharp reduction in land acquisitions, henceforth to be limited to the "absolute minimum" needed for the bases, together with a promise to return land to its owners whenever the needs of the international situation would permit. A more specific announcement about "substantial" acreage to be returned in the near future was also made.

On the subject of payments the new policy provided for a different land appraisal basis and a proposed compensation schedule which, it was claimed, would yield to the owners an immediate lump-sum payment "a great many times more" than the rents then being paid by the United States. It was also announced that a plan was being developed under which landowners would be able to deposit either all or a part of the lump payments in an interest-paying government fund for cooperative use. This would provide property holders with the annual income they had been demanding.[41]

The new policy of restricted military land acquisitions, of reappraisals of local crops at a higher value, and of more substantial payments to Okinawans for their land succeeded in allaying some of the unrest in Okinawa and in improving American-Ryukyuan relations.[42]

The problem was, however, not yet solved. The main demand of Okinawan property holders, an end to the lump

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payments, had not been met. By February 1958 only 700 out of the estimated 50,000 landowners in the island had accepted lump sum payments for their land, for a total of $1,661,000, despite the efforts of various local banks to persuade landowners to accept the lump payments and then deposit them in the banks.[43]

At a press conference in Washington in April 1958 Secretary of State Dulles acknowledged the resistance of Okinawan property owners in a characteristic diplomatic understatement: "We have taken note of the fact that the present policy did not seem to win complete favor among the Okinawans." He also announced that a review of United States land acquisition policy in Okinawa was under way.[44]

In the end the United States found it prudent to yield also on the last major point in dispute.

In June 1958 the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and five other members of his government made a second trip to Washington. They assured the Americans that if only the single payment method were abandoned the impasse on the land problem could be solved. The Okinawans succeeded in convincing the representatives of the Army, the Defense Department and the State Department of the correctness of their view, and as a result of these talks the High Commissioner was authorized to hold joint Ryukyuan-American land conferences. From these conferences, held later in 1958, there emerged still another United States land policy in Okinawa.[45]

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Under the new policy two categories of land were adopted: land that the United States did not expect to occupy for a long time, held under a temporary lease of less than five years, and land that the military services expected to use for a considerable period of time and held under an indefinite lease. All leaseholds were acquired by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands under a master lease arrangement with the United States. Those landowners whose land was taken for a considerable period of time, under an indefinite lease, received the option of either accepting yearly rentals or receiving an advance rental for ten years. A Land Tribunal was set up to which landowners could appeal when they felt themselves to be the victims of an injustice.

One of the most interesting aspects of this settlement was that its success was due not only to the terms of the solution but to the Okinawans being given an opportunity to participate in its formulation. Major General C.K. Gailey, Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Department of the Army described to the House Committee on Appropriations the satisfaction felt by Okinawans when a land rent control committee they had formed had "sat across the table with USCAR" and laid much of the groundwork for the solution of the problem. Their approval of the new policy, he explained, resulted not only from its contents but also from the fact that "they were able to come up and work it out with us... That, in my opinion, is

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one of the biggest factors in the solution."[46]

The American Authorities were provided with a fine example of the principle that, particularly under modern conditions, there seems to exist an almost universal desire to participate in the political decision-making process. The acceptance of a policy depends not only on its contents but also on the way in which it is arrived at and on who helped to make the decisions or at least was given the impression of having been permitted to help. Even a "good" paternalistic policy seems to be no substitute in our time for decisions reached with the participation of the governed. This should have been one of the major lessons learned by USCAR from the land payments dispute on ways of winning a greater Okinawan acceptance for American rule.

The new land policy had been worked out late in 1958, was approved by Washington and announced on November 26, 1958, and became law when the High Commissioner's Ordinances Numbers 18 and 19 were promulgated, respectively, on January 13th and 21, 1959.[47]

Through the combination of this and the earlier reforms, the Okinawans had won those of their basic demands that the United States could meet without liquidating its bases on their island. Additional land acquisitions were reduced to a minimum, remunerations were greatly increased and, most important of all, the highly unpopular obligatory lump sum payments were abolished. The basic demand, that the land be returned to the farmers could obviously not

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have been granted. The Okinawans realized this and seemed at the time to have become largely reconciled to it. On other points of contention their demands had, however, been met and the landowners appeared to be relatively content. For a limited period the anti-American opposition was much reduced and an era of comparative goodwill seemed to prevail in United States-Ryukyuan relations.

Less than one month after the settlement was announced the New York Times wrote: "Leftist leadership which a year ago seemed to be making great headway, now appears to have been thoroughly repudiated by the 831,000 people of the Ryukyu Islands." According to this article Kamejiro Senaga, the ousted Communist Mayor of Naha, who only a year earlier had been a public idol, seemed to be forgotten. "The leftists have lost heavily in recent elections," the article continued, and the Socialist Mayor of Naha, whose election in January had been considered a humiliating political defeat for the United States, had broken with Senaga and his supporters and turned out to be a man with whom the Americans could work. "The key to the change in political climate" the Times wrote, "has been the recent settlement of the problems arising out of the acquisition of land for bases." According to American officials in Okinawa, the prevailing general satisfaction over the new formula for land payments was expected to cost the United States no more than $6 million a year.[48]

For a relatively small sum of money spent at the

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right time the United States could have avoided an unpleasant and, for its military posture in the Far East, a potentially dangerous situation. Instead, for several years a policy had been pursued that could be termed "penny wise and dollar foolish."

This should have been the second important lesson learned from the great land payments dispute.

For a possible explanation of this failure to prevent an avoidable error a number of reasons could be given. These would obviously include shortsightedness on the part of some, neglect on the part of others and a feeling by many American officials that somehow everything would work out well even without acceding to the demands of Okinawan landowners. The shortcomings of the pre-1958 land policy could, however, be found largely in the influence of various internal characteristics of the United States. The policies pursued reflected American attitudes toward the soil, and the fragmented decision-making process existing in the United States Government resulted in a slow response to a situation requiring only small additional appropriations of funds.

After the Crisis

The great land payments crisis had been resolved, and excitement and agitation over the land question was never again to reach the intensity of the middle and late 1950's. Nevertheless, some aspects of this problem con-

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tinued to stimulate opposition to American rule over the Ryukyu Islands.

It will be seen in the last chapters of this study that Okinawan opposition during the 1960's was based largely on rising feelings of Japanese nationalism in both the Ryukyu Islands and Japan rather than on specific grievances, as had been the case during the 1950's. During the 1960's, the land problem was to serve as just one additional source of dissatisfaction feeding the reversion movement, rather than constituting the focus of resentment as had been the case in the period discussed in the last pages.

If Okinawan opposition to American rule were to be depicted in the form of a graph, the land payments crisis would cause the curve to rise sharply, while the 1958-1959 solution would be reflected in a sudden sharp drop. The curve would remain for some time at a low point and would then begin to rise once again as it moved deeper into the 1960's.

For a number of years one continuing source of discontent related to the land problem could obviously be found in the American failure to pay until 1965 compensation to Okinawans for damages to crops and for the use of land between 1945 and 1952.

An irremediable cause for dissatisfaction arising from the land question had, naturally, its origins in the fact that even with satisfactory compensation many land-

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owners would still have preferred to receive back their property and resume their former life as farmers.

Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize that, even if land acquisitions by the Americans were reduced to a minimum, it did not mean that the bases never again required any additional land.

During the 1960's the United States no longer needed to take over land on the massive scale of some of the earlier years when most of the bases were built, and there were many instances in which it was possible to return some land to its owners. But there were also many cases where it was necessary to acquire additional land for the bases.

Whenever this happened resentment and agitation once more appeared in the affected villages. Okinawan sensitivity on this issue is underlined by the rumors, usually unfounded, that circulated during the Vietnamese war concerning alleged American plans to take over additional large tracts of land and greatly expand some of the bases.

When in 1966 the High Commissioner made some remarks about the planned construction of a new military port and hinted that "some sacrifice of the people cannot be helped," this aroused enough apprehension among the local population for the Legislature of the Ryukyus to adopt on June 10th of that year a unanimous resolution opposing the further requisitioning of land for military purposes. This was by no means the first such resolution adopted by the Assembly during that decade.[49]

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Whenever the United States found it necessary to take over new land during the 1960's great caution was exercised to minimize the resulting inconveniences to the local population. Every effort was made to find out if some other plot of land already under the control of one of the military services could not do for the purpose, or if it would not be possible to reclaim some land, or to acquire a new tract of non-arable land in a sparsely populated rural area where the population might even benefit economically from the introduction of a military installation. When there existed no alternative to taking over a new plot of farmland, every effort was made to acquire it on a voluntary basis and, in the words of the 1967 report of USCAR activities, "to refrain from the use of condemnation procedures, as outlined in HICOM (High Commissioner's) Ordinance No. 20, except as a last resort."[50]

Most significant for Okinawan farmers in this new and more considerate policy was the inclusion of the words "except as a last resort." This meant that local property owners still could not say "no" to an American request to take over their land.

The reaction of Okinawans was described in the same 1967 USCAR report in the following words: "Despite these efforts, any new land requirements of the U.S. Military Forces continued to be met with strong local opposition and remained a key political issue during the reporting period."[51] It should be kept in mind that the

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period covered by this report, made seven to eight years after the 1958-1959 settlement, was one in which the demand for reversion to Japan was becoming more intense.

During the 1960's the Okinawan press reported many minor incidents involving the acquisition of land by American Authorities. These reflected the local farmers' fears that, as one 1966 account put it, "a bulldozer may be brought into the village suddenly and without notice" and the villagers' lands taken over by the foreign government.[52]

A 1967 news item reported a twenty-four hour vigil by local inhabitants at Kyan to prevent a visit by authorities implementing land acquisition policy and an incident in which three hundred Okinawans prevented a survey team from accomplishing its mission in Namisatobaru.[53] Another typical news report, from 1968, described the villagers of Gushikawa-Son as "jubilant" upon receiving formal notification from the U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa, that some lease contracts were being terminated, thereby releasing about forty acres of farmland.[54]

In addition to the military encroachment on Ryukyuan lands, private citizens of foreign countries were causing concern to Ryukyuans by displaying a great interest in the local real estate. In September 1965 the Government of the Ryukyu Islands felt it necessary to enact a "Law for the Control of Acquisition of Permanent Legal Interests in Land by Non-Ryukyuans." The purpose of this measure is stated

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in its name. When Chief Executive Matsuoka signed and promulgated the new statute he spoke of the necessity for it from "the viewpoint of the people's fear."[55]

Conclusions

The land question is thus seen to have constituted in one form or another a serious problem throughout almost the entire duration of United States administration in the Ryukyu Islands. Only during one relatively brief period, following the settlement of 1958-1959, did this question fail to arouse significant opposition to the American presence. Considering the high population density in the main island, the limited availability of arable land and the decision of the United States to establish extensive bases on Okinawa, this problem was unavoidable.

The requisitioning of land for bases brought great hardships to a section of the Okinawan population. For the local inhabitants the only positive aspect of American land policy was the relation between the acquisition of land and the economic benefits flowing from the presence of the bases. Displacement from their ancestral lands was a price Okinawans had to pay to make room for the military installations that brought rapid modernization to their islands. In a way, a parallel could be drawn between the forced migration of Ryukyuan farmers to the urban areas as a result of the requisitioning of their lands for military needs and the role played by land enclosures in the early

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stages of industrialization in eighteenth century England.

But this presents the positive side of difficulties and suffering which is only appreciated long after these have become a part of history. Okinawan landholders did not take such a historical-philosophical view of their plight.

The main interest of the land problem for this study lies in its handling by the United States Authorities and in the resultant effects on the local inhabitants and on their willingness to provide a limited acceptance for the American regime.

The competition between American bases and Okinawan farmers over desirable land represented a conflict of interests inherent in the decision to build large military installations on a small and overcrowded island. The basic problem could not have been avoided. What could have been prevented were some of the policies adopted by the ruling power which served only to aggravate the inevitable negative effects of the land question. Once again, the most objectionable policies pursued by the United States were those representing a mixture of carelessness and the transplantation into a Ryukyuan setting of American attitudes and methods.

The American authorities had always acted as if land could be treated in Okinawa as a commodity to be bought, sold or leased in the same manner in which this is done in the United States. Likewise, Americans found it difficult to understand why an Okinawan might not be satisfied with a forced exchange of his family farm for a better paying

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position elsewhere. In its efforts to obtain land for bases the American Administration adopted measures that might perhaps have been accepted in the United States but which could only create serious difficulties in the Far East.

American land policy also unwittingly placed Ryukyuans in an inferior position in respect to their rulers.

Farmers lost their proud status as independent landholders and were in many instances obliged to accept employment that turned them into the subordinates of Americans and made them dependent for their livelihood on the conquerors. Okinawans could not have failed to notice the ease and the apparent lack of hesitation with which United States Authorities, in disregard of all local tradition, were for many years able to order them off their ancestral lands and to dispose of the soil in any manner suiting American interests. Likewise, it could not have escaped the attention of Ryukyuans that their stake in the land and their feelings concerning it were at all times considered to be subordinate to the needs of their rulers.

This was bound to impress those who found themselves at the wrong end of the land requisitioning process with the low position they now occupied in respect to their conquerors.

USCAR received an impressive demonstration of the fact that much of the opposition generated by the land

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problem originated not in the actual methods of land acquisition and compensation but in the manner in which American decisions on these subjects were made. This was seen from the results obtained when Okinawans were allowed to help work out a solution to the land payments dispute at a series of joint American-Ryukyuan conferences. It should be remembered that the success of the 1958-1959 settlement was due not only to the terms of the solution adopted but also to the Okinawans having been given an opportunity to participate in its formulation. This made the difference between being treated as inferiors who are given orders from above and being treated as apparent equals.

Unfortunately the United States did not learn early enough the two great lessons taught by the land crisis of the late 1950's. By giving Okinawans either the opportunity, or at least the illusion, of participating in the formulation of the policies affecting them and by spending an extra few million dollars at an early stage the Americans stood the best chance of gaining the reasonable acquiescence of the Ryukyuans to the maximum possible continuation of the American regime.

United States land policy antagonized the Okinawan owners not only by requisitioning their lands but also by using methods and by providing compensation based on American experience, without much regard to the relevance of these techniques for the Ryukyuan setting.

The long failure to allow Okinawans to participate

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in the attempts to resolve the problem both aggravated the situation and made it far more difficult to find an acceptable compromise. The virtual exclusion of Ryukyuans from the formulation of land policies throughout most of the 1950's can presumably be attributed mainly to the long-time insistence of the United States Administration on retaining complete control over all decision-making concerning internal Okinawan affairs.

Finally, the reluctance to spend additional funds on the Ryukyu Islands for whatever was not seen as a direct and necessary military expenditure helped to make it impossible for a number of years to find a satisfactory compromise in the land payments controversy. This tightness of the purse in measures intended to increase the acceptability of the American regime to Okinawans has on more than one occasion in this study been attributed to the fragmented decision-making process prevailing in the United States Government.

From this it would appear that the great land payments crisis of the 1950's represented one of the complications arising in the Okinawan dependency relationship which, on the basis of knowledge available at the time the dispute arose, could easily have been avoided. Efforts to account for the failure to prevent this unnecessary difficulty would lead once again to neglect, to a feeling that the situation would straighten itself out without spending additional money, to an insistence on keeping every aspect of internal

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Okinawan affairs under exclusive United States control, and above all to the projection of American traditions and ways into the policies pursued in the Ryukyu Islands.

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NOTES

[1]Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau, "Okinawa Some Basic Facts," Japan Reference Series, No. 2-69 (1969), p. 2-3.

[2]Ibid., p. 2.

[3]M.D. Morris, Okinawa, A Tiger by the Tail (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1968), p. 78. See also Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), May 11, 1970, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, May 1970, No. 8, pp. 3-4. (Mimeographed).

[4]The New York Times, April 16, 1956, p. 10:3-6.

[5]Morris, op. cit., p. 78.

[6]The New York Times, April 16, 1956, p. 10:3-6.

[7]The New York Times, June 20, 1956, p. 8:3.

[8]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963, Vol. XI (RCS CSCAMG-5), p. 297. See also Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968, Vol. XVI (RCS CSCAMG-5), p. 23.

[9]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, H.R. 12617, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, p. 5648.

[10]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1960, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 188. See also The New York Times, May 26, 1955, p. 12:4-5.

[11]The New York Times, April 16, 1956, p. 10:3-6.

[12]Yomiuri (Tokyo), October 17, 1969, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., October 1969, No. 22, pp. 23-24.

[13]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, H.R. Res. 251, Contribution to Ryukyuans for Damages Suffered Between 1945 and 1952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, pp. 16-17.

[14]House Committee on Appropriations, Mutual Security Appropriations Hearings, 1959, op. cit., p. 188.

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[15]The New York Times, April 16, 1956, p. 10:3-6.

[16]The New York Times, February 21, 1969, p. 12:1-4. (Article by Takashi Oka).

[17]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., p. 5649.

[18]The Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 14, 1963, p. 4. (Article by Naha correspondent Nakazawa).

[19]The New York Times, April 4, 1956, p. 15:1-2.

[20]The New York Times, April 7, 1957, VI, pp. 29, 60.

[21]House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.J. Res. 251, Contribution to Ryukyuans Hearings, 1965, op. cit., p. 33.

[22]The New York Times, April 7, 1957, VI, p. 60.

[23]The New York Times, April 1, 1946, p. 9:1-2; and March 3, 1947, p. 10:5. See also Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), May 7, 1970, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., May 1970, No. 8, p. 2; and Morris, op. cit., p. 74. In order to create a new register independent surveys were conducted by Okinawans utilizing strings, sticks and other makeshift equipment. From these primitive and inadequate methods maps and a new register were brought into existence. These were still in use during the 1960's. As a result of this many cases arose in which there was a difference between the area entered into the new register and the area actually possessed by various landowners or acquisitioned by the United States. This naturally became a source of endless confusion and seems destined to leave behind it a legacy of problems that may continue even after reversion.

[24]Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), May 11, 1970, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., May 1970, No. 8, pp. 2-4. The subject of land reform would provide an example of confusion that might continue after reversion. The land reforms carried out in Japan after the Second World War were never extended to Okinawa. During the period of American administration the pre-war Japanese Farmland Adjustment Law, which aimed at the maintenance and preservation of farmland, was enforced without modification. As the Japanese Government has announced its intention to apply all Japanese laws to Okinawa after reversion, it is easy to see that the confused land ownership situation in the Ryukyu Islands may cause many problems when the Japanese land reform laws are extended to the archipelago.

[25]The New York Times, May 26, 1955, p. 12:4-5.

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[26]The New York Times, July 27, 1956, p. 23:7.

[27]Morris, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

[28]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., p. 5648.

[29]House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.J. Res. 251, Contribution to Ryukyuans Hearings, 1965, op. cit., pp. 33-34. Testimony by Felipe T. Santos. One of the claims of this sort under consideration by the subcommittee concerned Nishihara airfield.

[30]Morris, op. cit., p. 76.

[31]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., p. 5648.

[32]The New York Times, June 17, 1955, p. 1:4.

[33]The Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 14, 1963, p. 4. (Article by Naha correspondent Nakazawa).

[34]The New York Times, April 16, 1956, p. 10:3-6.

[35]Morris, op. cit., p. 77. See also The New York Times, June 20, 1956, p. 8:3; and July 5, 1956, p. 3:8.

[36]The New York Times, June 22, 1956, p. 6:3.

[37]The New York Times, June 20, 1956, p. 8:3; and June 22, 1956, p. 6:3.

[38]The New York Times, July 5, 1956, p. 3:8.

[39]The New York Times, August 14, 1956, p. 7:3

[40]The New York Times, December 27, 1956, pp. 1:8 and 10:5.

[41]The New York Times, January 5, 1957, pp. 1:6 and 4:4.

[42]The New York Times, January 20, 1957, p. 6:1-2.

[43]The New York Times, February 13, 1958, p. 6:3.

[44]The New York Times, April 16, 1958, p. 10:3-5.

[45]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., p. 5649. See also Morris, op. cit., p. 77.

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[46]House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 12617 Hearings, 1966, op. cit., p. 5649. See also House Committee on Appropriations, Mutual Security Appropriations Hearings, 1959, op. cit., pp. 154-155.

[47]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 26 March 1945 - 30 June 1965, pages not numbered, the information is listed chronologically. (Mimeographed).

[48]The New York Times, December 22, 1958, p. 1:7-8.

[49]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, June 11, 1966. (Mimeographed).

[50]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967, Vol. XV (RCS CSCAMG-5), pp. 27-28.

[51]Ibid., p. 28.

[52]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., June 12, 1966.

[53]Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., April 13, 1967.

[54]Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., May 1, 1968.

[55]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., September 9, 1965.

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CHAPTER VII

EVERYDAY ISSUES ARISING IN A STRATEGIC DEPENDENCY

This chapter, more than any other, analyzes the difficulties created in the daily lives of Okinawans by their status as subjects of a dependency that existed solely to serve the strategic ends of a foreign ruler.

A number of grievances, real and imaginary, will be examined. These represent to a large degree the reaction of Okinawans to the conditions they found in their archipelago under American rule and formed a major ingredient of the soil out of which the reversion movement grew. This chapter and the previous one are of special importance for this study because the success or failure of an alien ruling power in winning the necessary minimum acceptance of the local population is determined largely at the level of the native inhabitants' daily lives.

The most basic of all Okinawan causes for resentment was being governed by foreigners. At the level of everyday life this status manifested itself by placing the local population in a distinctly lower position when compared to the rulers.

When alien rule unwittingly placed Okinawans in an inferior position, neither the benefits derived from the

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American regime, nor reforms undertaken by it, nor any other advantages that might have been associated with the American presence could in the long run have provided a substitute for government by those whom Ryukyuans considered their own people. Rupert Emerson has aptly brought out the significance of such a situation when he wrote that in our time self-government is preferred over good government.[1]

In the case of Okinawa the problems created by alien rule were aggravated because not only were the governors of a different nationality but they also spoke a totally unrelated language, possessed a largely unfamiliar culture and belonged to another race, thus multiplying the possibilities for misunderstandings and complications between the two groups.

The Okinawan dependency relationship not only presented the local population with the unavoidable causes for irritation and resentment found under any form of alien rule. The presence of large military installations on a small and densely populated island was a source of additional hardships for the local population. The land question, one of the most crucial problems, was dealt with in the preceding chapter. This chapter will examine a series of further difficulties related to the strategic uses made of Okinawa that were to offset for an increasingly large number of Okinawans during the 1960's the benefits derived from the presence of the bases, and helped to undermine the limited supports enjoyed by the American regime in the

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Ryukyu Islands.

Some Unavoidable Psychological Irritants

Okinawans not only found themselves in the inferior position assigned to a people under foreign rule but also experienced an aggravation of this condition by having become economically dependent on their rulers.

The basic resentment felt toward alien rule was expressed in a resolution adopted on November 4, 1967 by the Legislature of the Ryukyus. This stated quite frankly that "Rule by a different race over twenty-two years has become for the people of Okinawa an unbearable pain."[2]

A Japanese author, Miyasato Seigen, was not impressed by the points raised in January 1965 by High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Watson to the effect that under American rule Ryukyuans were enjoying more local self-government than they would as a Japanese prefecture, and were not obliged to pay anyone the taxes collected by the central government in Japan. Miyasato Seigen replied in the following words, reminiscent of Rupert Emerson's view:

> On the contrary, they (the Okinawans) argue that reversion to Japan, which would make them part of a sovereign nation, and merging with the rest of the Japanese race to which they belong, thereby putting themselves under laws passed by their own elected representatives, would not constitute diminishing of their own right to self-determination." In fact, reversion for them, stands for the recovery of that right. The most serious mistake America has so far committed in Okinawa is, through excess of zeal in the defense of the Free World, to forget to look at things from the standpoint of the inhabitants under its rule and to try to understand their wishes.[3]

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That foreign rule is made even more objectionable when it is linked with economic dependence on the alien regime is brought out by Dr. Thomas C. Schelling, of Harvard University, who testified before a Congressional Committee early in 1969 that:

> I think the real problem is going to be how to take care of an island, or some islands, with about three quarters of a million people who absolutely depend for their livelihood on an American presence which they despise. They are in precisely the position of a colonialized people who dislike Americans precisely because they are in the demeaning position of depending on us, not only for jobs on the bases, but for raising foodstuffs and being cleaning women, providing consumer goods and services to the Americans. They get about a quarter of their gross national product by working directly for either the American Government or American consumers. They know it..."[4]

Baltimore Sun correspondent, Thomas Pepper, elaborated on this theme in 1968 by describing how economic dependence on, and employment by, the Americans had created in the Ryukyus a distinct inferior-superior relation based on a racial division of labor. He wrote that the United States military presence had "... unwittingly, practically emasculated the Okinawan man's sense of self-respect," since employment for men was, for one reason or another, usually degrading. Working on the bases meant "kowtowing" to the Americans. Employees of the GRI were, until late in the 1960's, required by their own government to show an inordinate tolerance for Americans. Even the most important businessmen were not exempt from this requirement. As most of these depended on transactions with Americans they also had to perform their share of "catering" and "kowtowing."[5]

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While the work done by men under foreign rule involves a lowering of their self-respect, some types of work carried out by women are inevitably far more damaging to the national ego.

Throughout history conquerors have taken the women of the conquered while usually denying to the subject males similar liberties with their own females. Moreover, for reasons which cannot be gone into in this study and that are apparently not fully understood by psychologists, racist feelings have all too often been associated with real or imaginary sexual contacts between various races. The peculiar propaganda carried on by Julius Streicher in his newspaper "Der Stürmer," as well as the well-known traditional attitude in the American South as to what is permissible and what is not in sexual relations between the races can serve as reminders that certain patterns of male-female contact can involve very definite feelings of a superior-inferior relationship between races or nationalities.

A former officer of the United States Marine Corps who during the second half of the 1950's spent two years in Okinawa, described in Harper's Magazine the role to which a section of Okinawan womanhood had been consigned in the military-base-oriented economy.

He wrote that since the American conquest of the island, prostitution had gone up one hundred per cent and involved in his time an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 women:

> In the central area of Okinawa, where the big Army, Air Force and Marine bases are located, one

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> passes through towns and villages where every building is a combination of bar and brothel with families sleeping in the back.

He next described one such establishment near the town where he was stationed:

> The father presided at the bar, the mother and three daughters were the hostesses and prostitutes, and the two younger children solicited business on the street. Our servicemen tend to consider every woman they see a prostitute and treat them accordingly, and in some areas of the island they are right. But in other parts of the island they only succeed in insulting women and making lasting enemies.

This former officer further noted that American health regulations required a U.S. serviceman infected with venereal disease to identify the girl who had transmitted the sickness to him. This was done to enable United States medical authorities to find and cure the carrier of the disease. Even this beneficial American activity created resentment among Okinawans. They pointed out that the United States Authorities provided this free treatment but made no attempt to curb either prostitution or the white slave trade and concluded that the Americans condoned and encouraged prostitution, presumably as a service for their soldiers.[6]

All of this is, naturally, not unusual where there is a large military base. It is also more or less inevitable under the circumstances. If, however, it involves contacts between soldiers of an alien race and the women of what is, in fact, a conquered people that has become economically dependent on its conquerors, then what could otherwise be dismissed with a shrug of the shoulders and an expression

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to the effect that "boys will be boys" can cause serious insult and psychological injury to those in the role of the subject nationality. That this was a serious problem for Okinawa is demonstrated by the frequent references in the Ryukyuan press, particularly during the 1960's, to demands for the control or suppression of the "oldest profession" in the Islands.

The resentments among Okinawans at having to live under foreign rule, at finding themselves obliged to depend to a great extent on foreigners for their livelihood and at seeing some of their women degraded to serve the pleasures of the conquerors, serious as these were, can be considered as unavoidable consequences of the American decision to build a large base on a relatively small island acquired through conquest.

The Japanese Flag and Japanese Holidays

Not all irritations endured by Okinawans were, however, unavoidable. Some resulted from American errors of judgment and others were caused by either neglect or poor behavior on the part of some individuals.

Among the preventable irritants are two which were purely symbolic. They originated in the mistaken idea that the Okinawan population could be divorced from its Japanese nationalistic feelings and in a rigid interpretation of international law. Symbolism is often closely connected with emotions and the cases in question served to remind Okinawans that they were a conquered people, with all the

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attendant implications of inferiority.

Throughout most of the period of American rule Ryukyuan vessels were prohibited from flying the Japanese flag. Instead, they were provided with a special ensign, neither Japanese nor American. This, ironically, seemed to match the legal status of the Ryukyus, a condition of being neither independent, nor a part of Japan, nor a part of the United States.

Former United States High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway explained to the author that it was feared the flying of the Japanese flag on Okinawan vessels would in naval parlance have indicated Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyus and thereby weakened the American claim to hold the full administrative rights over the Islands. Most United States officials including President Kennedy accepted this position.[7]

Although this American policy was probably correct in terms of international law, it can be seriously questioned whether, in fact, an earlier concession on this point would have in any way weakened the legal position of the United States in Okinawa, or made any difference in the intensity of the reversion movement or in the vigor with which the Japanese Government would have tried to translate its residual sovereignty into actual sovereignty. It should become apparent in the course of this study that there were so many other, and more important, factors affecting the course of the reversion movement that the flying of one flag or another was not very likely to have made much dif-

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ference. If anything, it was the refusal to permit the Japanese flag to be flown that caused resentment and may have added the reversion movement.[8]

The restrictions on flying the Japanese flag sometimes brought hardships to Okinawan ships and fishing boats, as these occasionally ran into difficulties in various waters as "vessels of an unidentified nationality."[9]

The refusal for many years to permit Japanese holidays to be celebrated as legal holidays in Okinawa caused additional annoyance in the Islands. May 3rd, Japanese Constitution Day, was,for example, not made a legal holiday in the Ryukyu Islands until April 21, 1965, when the Chief Executive of the GRI signed and promulgated the appropriate bill into law.[10]

Although it may have seemed important to the USCAR officials who at the time made the decisions,in retrospect it seems that in these matters the United States Authorities created additional and unnecessary psychological irritants by imposing a legal symbolism which turned out to have been as annoying for the Okinawans as it was useless for the Americans.

American Attitudes Toward Okinawans

When two sizable groups of people differing greatly in customs, language and general culture are brought together there generally appears some hostility between them and each tends to believe that its own ways are somehow better, or

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superior, to those of the other. And thus each group will usually conclude that the other is inferior. When, in addition, the two happen to occupy unequal positions in relation to each other it is virtually unavoidable for the more advantageously placed group to look down on the other.

In the case of Okinawa the Americans enjoyed a far higher standard of living. They had conquered the Ryukyuans and had ever since held the more powerful positions in government and usually in the economy as well. Moreover, the Americans came from a society marked by a traditional contempt for the non-White races. Such American attitudes were not calculated to increase the Ryukyuans' acceptance of the United States' administration.

This is not meant in any way to reflect negatively on either Americans or Okinawans. Once the two nationalities were brought together under the above conditions, an attitude of superiority in respect to Okinawans was bound to develop among many, if not most, Americans in the archipelago.

That much of this superiority feeling came from simple misunderstandings between members of two quite different cultures is brought out in an article by a Japanese correspondent who visited Okinawa in 1963. The author reminded his readers that about 55,000 Okinawans were, at the time, working either directly or indirectly for the Americans, usually in subordinate positions. Because most Okinawans did not know English too well they were often slow in understanding their American employers and misunder-

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stood instructions given to them. This resulted in American impatience and in the Okinawans being labeled as "stupid," or at least in Americans forming this opinion of them in private.

The author described two frequently recurring types of incidents that illustrated the problems caused by cultural differences.

When an Okinawan maid is scolded by her employer she usually lowers her eyes, a sign of submissiveness and of "feeling small" in Japan. Americans, however, considered this behavior "rebellious" and felt that the maid should have received her scolding "sincerely" by fixing her eyes on her employer.

For the second kind of incident a more specific occurrence is cited. American Military Police arrested a soldier for stealing merchandise from a pawn shop. They took the soldier back to the scene of his crime, returned the goods and asked the shopkeeper: "Is it all right if we do not indict the soldier, because it is a minor offense and he is a youth with a future before him?" The shopkeeper, whose English was not very good, interpreted this as "Did you have all the stolen goods returned?" and therefore answered "O.K." The offender was released on reprimand and the Military Policemen left. The shopkeeper was dissatisfied, firmly believing that the Americans were "tyrannical" and would not even punish one of their own men when caught committing a crime. The story spread throughout

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the town and Americans commented: "The Okinawans, despite their withdrawal of indictment, spread rumors which are contrary to the facts, behind the scenes. They are rebellious, they are stupid." The correspondent added that similar episodes were not unusual.[11]

This last example illustrates not only how Americans acquired negative views of Okinawans but also how the cultural gap created mutual misunderstandings.

The local inhabitants naturally became aware of the way in which they were looked down upon and resented this. Professor Mikio Higa, of the University of the Ryukyus, wrote that one of the attitudes concerning Okinawa which had to be "debunked," or ended was the image of Okinawans as "an underdevelopped minority race somewhat different from the Japanese." In his opinion this view was held consciously or unconsciously by many Americans and even by some Japanese from the mainland.[12]

Dr. Kanjun Higaonna, the well-known Okinawan scholar who caused a sensation in the Ryukyus by changing his position from one of hostility to the United States to one of friendship, told the then High Commissioner Booth that the principal advice he could give to Americans on their future relations with Okinawans was to "get rid of their superiority complex."[13]

There were situations in the Ryukyus where the inhabitants were actually discriminated against or else received the impression that they were being discriminated

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against.

When Americans reserved for themselves a beach such as the one in Ishikawa, one can only wonder whether the reason for this was not connected with some of the attitudes described earlier. That such a situation did not help to make the American presence more acceptable is shown by a demonstration on Easter Sunday 1965 when four hundred Okinawans besieged the beach and shouted slogans like "Yankee go home" and "Give us back our beach."[14]

As explained earlier in this study, Americans living in the Ryukyus were subject to American and not to Ryukyuan law, even for offenses not involving military security. They could be tried only in American and not in local courts and were not subject to punishment for offenses punishable under Ryukyuan but not under United States law.[15]

The need to exempt Americans from local law, thereby placing them in the status of a superior, privileged minority, was highly questionable. The traditional justification for extraterritorial status did not apply in this case. As the United States High Commissioner could veto virtually any law passed by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, there hardly existed a danger of any local law being enacted that would be considered unacceptable by American legal standards.

A similar criticism could be directed against another practice which also hints at a desire to keep Americans in a separate and higher position in respect to the local population. This concerned the limitation of Okinawans working

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for the United States to positions in which they would supervise other Okinawans, but never Americans.[16]

The separate American beaches, the separate court jurisdictions for Americans and the restrictions on promotions could be considered as simple ethnic discrimination that might easily have been avoided. It is, however, possible to take the view that, regrettable as some of these actions may have been, there was also a certain inevitability about them. Americans and Okinawans found themselves in a situation that encouraged feelings of ethnic or racial bias. This alone could have prompted the Americans to differentiate between themselves and the local population. Moreover, the American insistence on holding the supreme power in the Ryukyus, while keeping them legally separated from their own country, led to divisions between rulers and subjects emphasizing both the superior position of the former and the legal separation of Okinawa from the United States.

In the first months following the April 1945 landings in Okinawa the United States strictly enforced a rule against fraternization with the local population. While this must have appeared to be an unfriendly policy to Okinawans, it could at least not be considered an act of discrimination directed only against Ryukyuans, or even against Japanese in general. The same regulations were in force in the very first period of the occupation of Germany. Unfortunately, the same could not be said when "No Okinawans Allowed" signs were still found in 1952.[17]

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A more lasting source of irritation for Okinawans must have been the differentials in the wages paid to the indigenous population and to foreigners working in the Islands. The rates varied according to the nationality of the wage earner. For example, wages paid to Americans in the middle 1950's ranged from $1.00 to $6.00 per hour. For Filipinos they varied between 40 cents and $1.60 per hour, for Japanese from the mainland between 20 cents and 40 cents and for Okinawans only between 8 cents and 21 cents.

Valid reasons were offered to justify these differences. The United States Far Eastern Command noted at the time that the scale had been based partly on technical skill levels, that wages had to be based on the "comparable economies" of the workers' home countries and that the basic wage for Okinawans was the "highest in the history of the Islands."[18]

It was also virtually impossible to attract Americans, Japanese or Filipinos, especially those possessing skills, for work in Okinawa unless they were paid wages at least equal to those prevalent in their own countries. It might also be added that to raise substantially the wages paid to Okinawans would not only have created a financial problem for the local American Authorities, but would also have been economically unnecessary as Okinawans were already earning what were considered to be high wages by local standards.

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The problem was that even if the wage differentials based on nationality were founded on sound economics and might have seemed reasonable to an outsider, to Okinawans they represented an endless source of resentment. When cases occurred, such as the one in which a large raise in salary was received by an Okinawan woman born in Hawaii, and working at an American operated establishment, the moment she took out United States citizenship papers, then the feelings of the local population of being discriminated against were definitely not relieved.[19]

The Gap in Living Standards

The great difference in living standards between Americans and Okinawans also kept the two groups apart. This form of separation, to be certain, was not designed in advance in order to place Okinawans in a disadvantageous position. Once the United States began to realize the importance of her Ryukyuan bases it was only natural for the Armed Forces to see that American soldiers and civilian employees in the Ryukyus lived under conditions at least as good, if not better, than those they were accustomed to at home. If these conditions happened to have been much higher than the Ryukyuan standards, this was not the fault of anyone in the United States. The average Okinawan, however, saw Americans living a life which compared to his own standards, looked like the life style of a privileged upper class and emphasized his position of inferiority vis-a-vis his rulers and former conquerors.

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During the 1960's, the Americans in Okinawa lived in a world of their own, separate from the local population. In many cases Americans resided in luxurious sections behind wire fences patrolled by sentry dogs. Inside these sheltered areas they could live, shop, go to church, and seek entertainment, without ever having to make more than an occasional visit into "Okinawan Okinawa."[20]

On an overcrowded island where the average per capita annual income was in the low to middle three figures range, Americans enjoyed their luxurious world of post-exchanges, new automobiles, television sets, golf clubs, slot machines, servants and model concrete homes.[21]

Many, if not most, of the Americans in the archipelago enjoyed a standard of living higher than at home, a fact of which they were well aware.[22]

The American Authorities tried to improve relations between their private citizens and soldiers and the local population and to overcome the animosities and resentments unintentionally aroused among Okinawans. Military personnel and their dependents were encouraged to act as ambassadors of good will among the local inhabitants. Many of them devoted long and enthusiastic hours to work for underprivileged children, to teaching English, to exploring Ryukyuan arts and crafts and similar activities. There were the usual marriages between servicemen and local girls, 224 of these in 1955, 645 in 1963, 579 in 1968. Nevertheless, except for such base-oriented towns as Koza,

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Kin, Kadena and Ginowan, where flourished the countless auxiliary services which servicemen and their families seem always to require, Okinawans and Americans generally went their respective ways and lived in two separate worlds.[23]

And of these two worlds the American was by far the more luxurious, a fact that was obvious to Okinawans.

Crimes and Misbehavior on the Part of Some Servicemen

For a variety of reasons deserving further study, military servicemen of any nationality tend to have a high crime rate when stationed in a foreign country or otherwise far removed from their usual home environment. Okinawa was no exception.

The causes for this may include the sense of freedom which comes from being in a location where servicemen are known only to their fellow soldiers, boredom with military routine, a reaction against military discipline during off-duty hours, the somewhat unnatural life of the barracks, instruction in techniques of violence, uncertainty about the future in time of war, and so on.

During the years immediately following the 1945 surrender of Japan the United States had, as mentioned earlier, not yet found a role in the postwar world for its dearly acquired island-base. Those were the years when Okinawa was termed in Army slang "the rock," when "more than 15,000 U.S. troops whose morale and discipline have probably

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been worse than that of any United States force in the world, have policed 600,000 natives who live in hopeless poverty," and when "Okinawa had become a dumping ground for Army misfits and rejects from more comfortable posts." The crime rate in those years reflected these conditions. In the six months ending in September 1949 United States servicemen committed 29 cases of murder, 18 cases of rape, 16 robberies and 33 assaults.[24]

In 1955, long after the end of the above mentioned period, a report of The Japan Federation of Bar Associations charged that the crimes committed by American soldiers had created discontent in the Islands and complained that even in cases of murder adequate compensation had not always been paid to victims or survivors.[25]

In 1970 Ryukyuan sources announced that American servicemen were being held responsible for 778 crimes and incidents in 1969 and for 345 such actions in the first five months of 1970.[26]

Besides specific crimes against Okinawans, American servicemen had been frequently involved in acts of drunkenness, hoodlumism and street fighting that seemed to serve no purpose except to give bored soldiers an opportunity for "entertainment" or for "letting off steam."

The former Marine Corps Captain quoted earlier in this chapter attributed the servicemen's rioting as due, at least in part, to the lack of healthy entertainment facilities and to the inadequate housing in which many of

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the troops were still quartered during the 1950's. He also reported that in 1956 thirty per cent of the patients in American hospitals in Okinawa were there because of injuries sustained in street fighting.[27]

A reading of the Ryukyuan press provides repeated examples of rioting and unruly public behavior on the part of United States servicemen.[28]

The United States military presence in Okinawa also brought with it the racial discord between members of the Black and White races, which unfortunately seems to pursue Americans wherever they go.

Racial segregation manifested itself in separate "honky tonk" areas for Black and White soldiers. In 1964, it was reported that the Old Koza section of Koza city, the second largest metropolitan area in the Ryukyus, had become a racially segregated entertainment area, frequented only by Negro servicemen, where violence flared occasionally when Whites tried to enter the district. This came about despite United States Army regulations forbidding discrimination and providing for the withdrawal of official approval to deal with American servicemen from any bar or restaurant proprietors found discriminating against Negroes.[29]

Racial animosities led on repeated occasions to rioting, especially during the late 1960's. In one particular instance, as many as three hundred and fifty servicemen were involved.[30]

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Dr. Nobumoto Ohama told the author that this rioting and racial discrimination created a bad impression on the Okinawan population but that it was only one of several factors having such an effect.[31]

American servicemen at times engaged in actions creating ill will and resentment among the local population for which it seems impossible to find any excuse. Deliberate desecrations of the Japanese flag took place in what were, apparently, not just isolated incidents. Early in 1965 High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Watson found it necessary to remind all military personnel, military employees and their dependents to exercise every caution not to desecrate the Japanese flag and to give up the idea that they were still "oocupying" Okinawa.[32]

In 1967 there was a report that servicemen ravaged the graves of villagers located within a Marine Corps camp in Kawasaki, Gushikawa-son. According to the Gushikawa village authorities, graves were dug up, urns shattered and bones used to decorate rooms and for other purposes.[33]

The offenses committed by United States servicemen seemed to have reached, at least by 1966, a level that prompted the Japanese Government to express its concern lest these actions stimulate the anti-American feelings of the Okinawan population and exert an "unfavorable effect on the local political situation." When Prime Minister Sato met with President Johnson in Washington in January 1966 he found it necessary to request an intensification

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of military discipline in Okinawa.[34]

A repeated complaint of the local population concerned the restrictions placed by USCAR Ordinance No. 87 on Ryukyuan Authorities in dealings with military offenders.

The GRI police had been given the right to arrest American servicemen only when the latter were caught in the act and no Military Police were present. In traffic incidents the Ryukyuan police normally could not make an arrest even when witnessing flagrant violations of a traffic law. It was permitted to do so solely when personal injuries had been caused. Only United States Military Courts could try servicemen offenders. The outcome of these military trials were not announced outside the military reservations, and it was usually not possible for Ryukyuans to obtain confirmation on the execution of a sentence. Okinawans also charged that compensation paid for damages caused by United States Forces was less than what was customary in Japan.[35]

This judicial procedure resulted in charges by Ryukyuans that American military personnel committing crimes or causing traffic accidents were usually cleared by their own courts and sent home.[36] Regardless of whether or not these accusations were true, what matters is that they were believed by Okinawans.

Americans were also accused of committing acts of brutality and of showing disregard for the lives of Okinawans in situations in which United States servicemen were not

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exclusively responsible.

From the beginning of the American occupation in 1945 poverty-stricken Okinawans had been tempted to enter military areas declared off-limits to them either to look for materials thrown away by the United States Forces or to try to steal what they could. These acts frequently resulted in the shooting of Okinawans by American sentries or in their accidental injury and death when they entered military firing ranges.

Such incidents, usually followed by various types of protests on the part of Okinawan organizations and by unfavorable publicity in the local press, provided political ammunition for the opposition parties in the Ryukyus and in Japan.

One publication of the Nampo Doho Engo Kai charged the United States Forces with having killed eighteen Okinawans in such cases between 1953 and 1956. This pamphlet claimed that even under pre-war "Japanese Imperialism" actions in which Japanese military personnel had shot and killed civilians in the Ryukyus were unheard of. It also complained "We were deeply shocked and surprised to find out that our Ryukyuan's life was distinctly looked down (sic)."[37] (The text of this pamphlet contains many mistakes in English).

Military Accidents and Nuisances

Armed services even in times of peace characteristically have higher accident rates than normal civilian life.

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This is caused, in part, by the handling of dangerous weapons and materials and by training in the performance of a type of activity in which the slogan "safety first" could be replaced by one to the effect that "risks-must-be-taken-and-casualties-will-occur."

The resulting inevitable accidents affect not only the members of the armed forces but also, in many cases, civilians who happen to be near the scene of military activities.

In an island with an area of only 453.99 square miles and a population density of 1671 inhabitants per square mile,[38] as many as 60,000 troops frequently engaged in intensive training exercises. The attendant damage and injury rate to civilians from military accidents was very high.

A reading of the Ryukyuan press, and often of the Japanese press as well, reveals the constant occurrence of such accidents. Following are some examples.

In the course of a parachute drop exercise on March 23, 1965 a three-ton jeep trailer fell with great noise at a bus stop in Onna-Son without, however, causing any injuries.[39] On June 12, 1965, in a repetition of the same kind of accident, an eleven year old girl was killed in Yomita-Son. This particular tragedy brought forth a wave of protests in Okinawa.[40]

On May 19, 1966, an Air Force KC 135 jet tanker crashed during take-off from Kadena Air Force Base, killing

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all ten crew members aboard and also an Okinawan sitting in his car on nearby Highway 16.[41]

Early in 1968 Kadena Air Force Base Commander Col. Frank E. Marek announced that "aviation fuel was found in the sixteen wells which have been contaminated in the village of Kadena-Son in the past eight months," and that compensation would be paid and efforts made to prevent such pollution in the future.[42]

On November 19, 1968, a bomb-laden B-52 bomber exploded on take-off from Kadena A.F.B. The ensuing explosions sent flames 450 feet into the sky, damaged 139 houses and shattered more than 200 windows.[43] This particular accident brought forth particularly strong protests in both the Ryukyus and in Japan, as will be seen in a later chapter when opposition to the use of Okinawa as a base for B-52 raids in the Vietnamese War will be discussed.

Minor and less spectacular occurrences that sometimes also resulted in a loss of life took place far more frequently. For example, a man gathering sea shells at the Kumae coast was killed by a stray bullet from a military firing exercise on August 8, 1964.[44] And on January 13, 1965 a stray shell exploded in front of a store in Ota-Ku, Onna-Son, this time without causing any casualties.[45]

In 1965, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Watson testified in Washington at the Congressional Hearings on the bill authorizing compensation payments for damages suffered by Okinawans between 1945 and 1952. The High Com-

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missioner gave figures for "tortious damages" during this seven-year period resulting from accidents and physical violence for which the United States Forces were responsible. These included 346 Ryukyuans killed and 382 injured. Negligence on the part of United States Forces caused 257 accidents, the most notorious of these having been the explosion of an ammunition-laden LCT at a wharf on Ie Shima in 1948. In this tragedy 107 persons were killed instantly and 77 were seriously injured.[46]

At times merely the fear of accidents was sufficient to harm the Ryukyuans. On December 14, 1968 a newspaper report concerning the alleged detection of radioactivity among shellfish caught outside Naha harbor resulted in a fifty per cent drop in the price of fish in Tomari Port, notwithstanding the fact that the catch was found to be free of any unusual radioactivity.[47] The Okinawans had long believed that visits by American nuclear submarines contaminated their waters with radioactive material. The above incident reflected the insecurity induced among the local population by the presence of so many modern weapons on their crowded main island.

Apart from the real and imaginary dangers, the military installations were also of nuisance value to the Okinawans. The noise made by jet aircraft is a case in point. High Commissioner Watson told another Congressional hearing about situations in Okinawa "... where our jet aircraft are making so much noise that the school children

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for a great part of their school day are unable really to study. They can't study during those times because those jets are so noisy."[48] In 1969 villagers near Kadena A.F.B. complained that the noise from B-52 bombers prevented them from sleeping at night.[49]

In addition to the noise produced by jets, there were other annoyances caused by the military use of Okinawa. In a northern Okinawan village the local inhabitants complained that the 1000 kilowatt Voice of America transmitter, directed at the Chinese Mainland and at North Korea, interfered with their radio and television reception.[50] On a certain day in 1965 firing practice conducted by Army troops near the local Junior High School in Ginoza-Son repeatedly interrupted classes, and at one point smoke resulting from the shooting infiltrated the classrooms and caused the children to flee in panic.[51]

Following this brief description of some of the harmful effects of the military bases on the daily lives of Okinawans, a clarification is needed in order to put the matter into its proper perspective. As is usual in such cases, the crimes committed by United States servicemen and the accidents and nuisances caused by the American military presence in Okinawa did not mean that normal life had become impossible in the main island.

To provide a parallel with a situation familiar to many Americans, more or less normal life continues in a city such as New York despite the high crime and automobile

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accident rates and, most of the time, most of the inhabitants are not directly affected by either of these two activities. A visitor could easily spend a considerable period of time in New York without seeing a crime committed or witnessing a real accident. The same can be said concerning Okinawa, where great economic progress under the American regime took place despite what has been described above.

It is possible to obtain an idea of the total effect of the military bases on the life of Okinawans from the results of a public opinion poll taken in Okinawa by the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun, on September 12th and 13, 1967. To the question, "Have you ever suffered inconvenience or damage because of the existence of American military bases?", only 14 per cent of the respondents answered "yes" while 86 per cent answered "no."[52]

These results provide a quantitative basis for placing the harmful effects of the military installations in their proper perspective. They seem to confirm that despite the damage and the nuisances resulting from the large-scale American military presence, most Okinawans were not personally affected. Nevertheless, although only fourteen per cent of the local inhabitants had suffered direct damage or inconvenience from the existence of the bases, the attitudes of a much larger portion of the population were affected. The friends and relatives of persons involved in these incidents, as well as many other Okinawans

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who had heard about them, came to resent the United States bases and feared that sooner or later they or their next of kin might find themselves victimized under similar circumstances.

Without exaggerating the effects of the military crimes, accidents and irritations in Okinawa it is necessary to recognize the existence of these problems and, above all for the purposes of this study, to understand their contribution in the shaping of the Okinawan reversion demands.

A Sitting Duck on a Powder Keg

There could be found in Okinawa a more fundamental objection to the presence of the bases than the crimes, accidents and nuisances caused by them. This was the fear that the military and strategic role of Okinawa could result not only in many small incidents involving loss of life or limb and property damage, but also in a major catastrophe which might engulf the entire island or a large part of it.

It was felt that such a disaster could result from anyone of three eventualities. One of these was a possible accident of disastrous proportions, such as the explosion of a nuclear weapon or the large-scale escape of chemical or bacteriological warfare materials. The second fear concerned the danger of a massive attack launched against Okinawa because of its role as a base for United States combat operations, as in the case of the

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Vietnamese War. The third nightmarish possibility was a large-scale conflict involving the entire Far East, possibly even provoked by the presence of the advance bases in the Ryukyu Islands.

Although these may all have been highly unlikely eventualities, what must be kept in mind when studying the local reaction to the presence of the bases is that the Okinawans gave wide credence to them.

It should not be forgotten that during the 1945 battle for Okinawa 110,052 civilians were killed, or roughly one-fifth of the entire population of the Islands at that time.[53] This amounted to the second highest percentage of losses suffered by any people during the Second World War, being surpassed only by the losses of the Jewish population of Europe, that found itself the victim of a four-year campaign of systematic extermination. These memories of 1945 must be kept in mind if one is to understand Okinawan attitudes toward war.

It is not difficult to find examples of Okinawan fears of a possible disaster resulting from the presence on their small main island of so many modern weapons of mass destruction.

An article appearing in the New York Wall Street Journal on July 18, 1969, reporting an earlier accident in Okinawa in which twenty-five Americans had been injured in a poison-gas leak, resulted in the revelation that such weapons had been stored for a number of years in various

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overseas depots, one of these being Okinawa.[54]

This admission immediately called forth storms of protests both in Japan and in the Ryukyus. Okinawan newspapers devoted large portions of their front pages to this news sensation. The reversionist Chief Executive Chobyo Yara promptly declared that if the reports were true "... The presence of horrible nerve gas weapons jeopardizes our lives and thus it is absolutely unforgivable."[55] Within four days of the Wall Street Journal article, on July 22nd, the Legislature of the Ryukyu Islands had passed a unanimous resolution demanding the removal of all United States chemical and bacteriological warfare weapons from the Islands.[56] On July 25th seventy-four extremist students broke into the USCAR offices in Naha and tore down the American flag as a gesture of protest.[57]

In the first days of this new excitement most Americans in the Ryukyus considered the incident a blow to the already diminishing prestige of the United States in the Islands. One American remarked that only "two things have saved us from a complete fiasco, one was that all those injured were Americans. The other was the Appllo flight."[58] Whether or not this last remark was entirely accurate, it is illustrative of the atmosphere created by the incident.

By May 1970, several months after the final reversion decision, the effects of the announcement of the presence of poison-gas in Okinawa had not yet died down. As all information concerning the storage sites of the gas

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had been withheld from the local population, reports indicated that almost anything connected with the bases had become a source of fear for Ryukyuans. The mere sight of smoke rising from an ammunition depot was enough to throw many Okinawans into an uproar, as suspicions immediately arose that the smoke might be connected with poison-gas.[59]

The Okinawan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensui Kyo), an organization apparently specializing in the spreading of horror stories concerning United States armaments, attracted attention by claiming that there were stored in the main island 50,000 tons of poison-gas consisting of sixteen different varieties, including VX-type gas or "weapons of instantaneous massacre," as they were termed.[60]

Okinawan resentment was further aroused by the fact that despite a United States Defense Department announcement of December 1969 that the poison gas would be transferred from Okinawa to an Army storage site in Oregon, this move had not been carried out by May 1970. The main reasons for this delay appeared to have been the State of Oregon's objections to having the gas stored there and the refusal of Washington State to have it transported through its territory. This naturally led to complaints that the United States Government will respect the uneasiness of its own people concerning the storage of poison-gas on American soil, but will pay no attention to the fears of Okinawans. The charge of "unreasonable discrimination by the United

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States against the people in Asia" was leveled.[61]

Even though part of this episode took place a few months after the final reversion agreement was signed, it is illustrative of the mood prevailing in Okinawa in relation to the presence of weapons of mass destruction. The sensitivity of Okinawans to anything related to modern warfare applied in particular to nuclear weapons and to whatever could be connected with them, an attitude shared with their compatriots from the main islands of Japan.

In 1961, long before the reversion movement had become a major problem for the United States, the conservative-controlled Assembly of the Ryukyus had unsuccessfully asked the United States Government to halt construction on four launching sites intended for presumably nuclear-armed Mace-B missiles.[62]

It was reported at the time of the crash of the bomb-laden B-52 bomber in November 1968 that the big explosion, which was followed by additional explosions every twenty minutes with flames leaping high into the air, so terrified Okinawans who witnessed it that until they discovered what actually happened it was feared a nuclear war might have started.[63]

The terror that nuclear weapons induced in Okinawans extended to any form of nuclear energy used by military forces. The mere fact that nuclear-powered submarines visited the port of Naha repeatedly occasioned rumors to the effect that waters near the mooring berths of the

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submarines were radioactive. The rumors persisted despite an investigation that revealed the levels of cobalt-60 to have been far below those creating any public hazards. Okinawan fears were not in any way lessened by the fact that, despite some local opposition, nuclear submarines also visited Japanese ports and nuclear-powered merchant vessels were being built in that country.[64]

The full effect on the Okinawan population of the presence of "super-weapons" on their small and crowded island was perhaps best expressed in a report of the Japan Bar Association, issued in fall 1969 after an investigation by one of its fact-finding missions in the Ryukyus. This report pointed out that nuclear bombs and biological and chemical weapons believed to be stored in Okinawa were creating "invisible terror" for the inhabitants even if they caused no actual damage to them.[65]

The war in Vietnam greatly intensified Okinawan fears that the presence of American bases on their soil, and the use of these bases by the United States in a war raging elsewhere in Asia, might provoke a counterstrike against their island bastion by the enemies of the United States, or perhaps even spark a wider war in the Far East.

The use of Okinawa as a base for direct combat operations in Vietnam was evident in a number of ways, but the B-52 raids based on Kadena Air Force Base dramatized this role. Already in 1965, when the first B-52 attack from an Okinawan base against South Vietnamese targets

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had taken place, the Legislature of the Ryukyus had passed a resolution calling for the "suspension of such acts of war."[66] In later years, when the large bombers flew regularly out of Okinawa, the activities of the B-52's were evident to anyone driving around the area of Kadena A.F.B. This left no doubt in the minds of many Okinawans that the giant American planes were on their way not just to carry out combat operations but, as they saw it, to kill other Asians in Vietnam.[67]

The memories of World War II as well as traditional racial animosities between Westerners and Asians must undoubtedly have contributed much to this feeling, which in itself represented an additional complicating factor in the ability of the United States to freely use its Okinawan bases for military operations elsewhere in Asia.

When the American involvement in Vietnam first began military secrecy prevented Okinawans from knowing about their island's participation in that war. The local inhabitants knew nothing about the goings on behind the high fences surrounding United States military installations and only learned of their island's involvement in the war when newspapers brought this to their attention. Within a short time, however, most Ryukyuans began to realize that the Marines who had first landed in Vietnam had come from Okinawa and that American planes bombing Vietnamese targets used the island as a staging area. Ryukyuans, already worried by the hostilities in Vietnam, now began to fear

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that should the conflict in Southeast Asia involve the United States in a larger war their islands would become a prime target. Moreover, it had long been felt among the local population that the missiles and bombs stored in Okinawa constituted the main United States nuclear capability in the Far East, and therefore would logically be the first target in the Pacific area for an enemy armed with similar weapons. The combination of these two facts made the Okinawans feel that, as one American correspondent put it, "they are sitting-almost literally-on a nuclear warhead."[68]

It must not be forgotten that Okinawans knew from past bitter experience what it meant to be a major military base. The decision of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces to exploit the strategic significance of Okinawa was responsible for the bloody battle that took place in the spring of 1945, in which over one hundred thousand inhabitants lost their lives and the island was devastated. With the addition of nuclear, thermonuclear and other modern weapons of mass destruction, a role as a major military base could prove virtually suicidal in a future war. Under these circumstances it is not difficult to understand why Okinawans were not particularly impressed by the argument that they must make sacrifices for the peace and security of Japan and Asia. This argument had also been used by the Imperial Japanese High Command during the last Great War.

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Chief Executive Chobyo Yara expressed this feeling late in 1968 when he noted that B-52 bombers were not allowed to be stationed in Japan, but in Okinawa they could come and go freely. He added that Okinawans felt this was unjust, that Okinawa was always being used and sacrificed, and also that military bases lead to war rather than maintain peace.[69] It was widely accepted in Japan as well as in the Ryukyus that the presence of military bases in Okinawa would not prevent war but, instead, would mainly provoke conflict.

Two months later Yara elaborated on these views. He acknowledged that certain geographical locations, such as Gibraltar, Singapore and Okinawa, seemed to have been placed by fate in positions of strategic importance. He added, however,[70]

> It would be different if we ourselves had accepted this as our fate, but we had nothing to do with the choice. We Okinawans have our demands too. We want our own freedom and our happiness. Why should we alone be denied self-government for the sake of Asian peace and security?
>
> Both the Japanese and American Governments should take serious account of this feeling of ours -- that we have always been sacrificed for the sake of a military-affairs-come-first policy.

This introduces the idea, to be elaborated in the following chapter, that Okinawans blamed not only the United States but also Japan for their plight.

Various public opinion surveys conducted in the Islands show how widespread some of these feelings concerning the presence of the bases in Okinawa were among

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the local population. In September 1967, the previously referred to Asahi Shimbun poll asked its respondents whether they would agree to the immediate reversion of Okinawa, under the stipulation that the United States should be permitted to use its bases freely and to bring in nuclear weapons. Only 9 per cent agreed, while 63 per cent disagreed with this proposal. Another 4 per cent answered "it cannot be helped," 2 per cent gave other replies and 22 per cent had no opinion.[71]

Two years later another Asahi Shimbun survey came up with similar results. It was felt by 60 per cent of those polled that the Japanese Government should not permit direct United States combat operations from Okinawa, if after reversion the United States-Japan Security Treaty were fully applied to the Ryukyus and the American Government asked for such permission in prior consultations with the Japanese Government.[72] The sentiments against the free use of the bases are thus seen to have been not just transitory but persisted over the years.

In July 1967, a Ryukyu Shimpo survey asking its respondents what they thought of the presence of United States military bases on Okinawa came up with the following results:

Feel extremely uneasy	45.5 per cent
Feel slightly uneasy	30.0 per cent
Do not feel uneasy	5.7 per cent
Feel assured	1.2 per cent
Don't know	15.4 per cent
Others	2.2 per cent

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This would indicate that three-quarters of those polled felt at least some uneasiness concerning the presence of the bases.[73]

On the problem of whether the existence of the bases created security or insecurity for Okinawa, or for the Far East in general, the Asahi Shimbun September 1967 poll posed two main questions. Asked if the bases in Okinawa were necessary for the peace of the Far East and for the security of Japan, the respondents replied:

Agree	28 per cent
Disagree	40 per cent
Other replies	3 per cent
No replies	29 per cent

When it was asked if the bases on Okinawa gave rise to the danger of attack, and thus created insecurity, the answers were:[74]

Agree	65 per cent
Disagree	15 per cent
Other replies	2 per cent
No reply	18 per cent

Similar results were obtained in a public opinion survey conducted three months later by another polling organization, Tokyo University's Sociology Research Room (Institute). Here 59.3 per cent of those questioned believed that the existence of United States bases in the Ryukyus endangered the peace of the Far East and the safety of Japan, including Okinawa.[75]

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Restrictions on Political Rights

The most important Okinawan political complaints have already been discussed. These concerned the separation of the Ryukyus from the Japanese political system together with the attendant imposition of foreign rule on the Islands, both performed without any attempt to consult the local population, and the subsequent denial of effective autonomy in purely local matters. At this point the study will examine the Okinawans' charge that the existence of the American regime had caused infringements on their personal political rights.

Executive Order 10713 of June 5, 1957, the basic law of the Ryukyu Islands under United States administration, provided in Section 12 that "... the High Commissioner shall preserve to persons in the Ryukyu Islands the basic liberties enjoyed by people in democratic countries, including freedom of speech, assembly, petition, religion and press and security from unreasonable searches and seizures, and from deprivations on life, liberty or property without due process of law."[76]

A constitutional guarantee of these basic rights does not, however, mean that no limitations at all can be placed on them. In the case of Okinawa the above-mentioned provision in the Executive Order did not, for instance, prevent the previously referred to Proclamation No. 144 prohibiting the issuance or possession of publications denouncing the Civil Administration and making violators

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subject to punishment.[77]

This particular proclamation represented a violation of the basic democratic rights guaranteed under the Executive Order. Justification for actions of this kind could not be made in terms of democratic principles, but only as a requisite for maintaining the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands that in itself constituted a violation of the fundamental democratic right of national self-determination. This regime, in turn, could only justify its existence as being necessary for the defense of the non-Communist world. For a democratic state it is, however, not sufficient if its rule over a dependency, and the actions necessary to maintain this rule, can only be legitimated in terms of international law. The democratic principle of national self-determination must also be taken into account. For the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands this proved to be an insoluble problem.

The overwhelming majority of the Okinawan population was basically opposed to the regime established by the United States over its islands and wished, whether at an earlier or a later date, to be reunited with Japan. The United States governed the Islands first by right of conquest and later under rights derived from a treaty signed with Japan. While, under international law, this meant that the Japanese Government consented to American administration of Okinawa, it could be argued that, according to democratic principles, the United States was not necessarily

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entitled through this to deny the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands their right of national self-determination. A government can relinquish its rights over a particular territory, but the right of governments to transfer population groups to different jurisdictions without their consent could easily be challenged.

Once the basic right of self-determination was denied, other democratic rights deriving from or related to it could no longer be granted in their entirety, as their full enjoyment would sooner or later have undermined the American position in the archipelago. In other words, an unwanted alien government can, even with the best of intentions, neither grant all the wishes of the inhabitants nor permit full freedom for the opposition.

Under these circumstances the United States Authorities could not really be blamed for attempting to outlaw denunciations of American rule. On the contrary, it can be considered to their credit that this particular proclamation was never strictly enforced, as witness the open and ultimately successful Okinawan opposition movement.

Instances in which the American Administration could be accused of attempting to stifle opposition can be cited, but even though the intention was probably to hamper those trying to end the American regime, there existed as a rule some legitimate pretexts for these actions on the part of USCAR.

The Okinawa Prefectural Council for the Return to

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the Fatherland, perhaps the leading reversionist organization, complained in 1965 that military base employees were being dismissed from their jobs on the charge of having made fraudulent statements on their employment application forms concerning their affiliations with particular political parties or groups.[78] To require prospective employees to state their political affiliations on an employment application form is generally considered an invasion of personal rights. It is, however, an acceptable practice in the United States and in most other nations for persons seeking employment in defense work. Moreover, making fraudulent statements on an application is usually considered a valid ground for dismissal.

As already mentioned in an earlier chapter, the United States Authorities had, in 1954, prosecuted Kamejiro Senaga, the leader and Secretary-General of the allegedly pro-Communist Okinawa People's Party, as well as four others on charges of perjury and hiding a member of an underground left-wing group.[79] Whatever the motives behind this prosecution may have been, the charges involved the violation of laws that in themselves were not politically repressive and which would be considered acceptable in a democratic state. The arrest of another leader of this same party, Kisaburo Owan, together with twenty-six party members on the charge of "Printing and circulating inflammatory materials," was more difficult to justify in terms of the normal, permissible practices within a democratic

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nation. This action becomes even more suspect since United States officials had openly stated that one of the Okinawa People's Party's main demands was the return of Okinawa to Japan.[80]

In August 1956, the United States Far East Command, which at that time had overall charge of the administration of the Ryukyus, refused to allow a committee of five Socialist members of the Japanese Diet to visit Okinawa to investigate the military acquisition of farmland on the island.[81] This type of action, already referred to in an earlier chapter, could again be justified as the regular practice of most nations which refuse to admit into territories under their administrative control foreigners who can be expected to engage in political activities considered detrimental to their interests. In this particular instance, however, the Okinawan population would hardly have regarded a Japanese from the main islands of Japan as a "foreigner." An action of this sort could be regarded as typical of measures that were perfectly justifiable from the American point of view, but not at all so from the Okinawan standpoint.

The American Administration also attempted to discourage opposition by exerting indirect pressure. In 1956, six male students were expelled from the University of the Ryukyus on charges of "instigating anti-American activities." The New York Times news item reporting this expulsion added: "The action followed withdrawal of private American

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support to the Ryukyu University."[82]

It would be possible to make a case both for and against the action undertaken by private American citizens, with which USCAR presumably was not entirely unconnected. In a democratic setting, academic freedom should not be interfered with, but neither are citizens of the United States under any obligation to contribute to the support of an institution permitting activities hostile to their country.

The examples presented above show that some measures taken by the United States Authorities could come under the category of "political repression." In most cases, however, there was no direct repression involved. Instead, the Authorities either used indirect pressures, as in the case of the dismissed University students, or else merely waited for a political opponent to run afoul of an ordinary law for which he could then be legitimately prosecuted. Considering the difficult position in which the United States Administration found itself, it cannot be entirely blamed for indulging in these practices. It must also be added that such actions were not frequent and occurred mainly in the 1950's, when the Okinawan opposition movement was not yet as strong as it was to become at a later time and when the American Authorities were consequently less limited in the type of measures they could undertake. This would seem to imply that an unpopular regime, both in a dependency and elsewhere, may often be able to engage

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successfully in repressive, or repressive-like, measures only when these are least needed.

All in all, the American regime cannot be said to have been repressive. The proof of this lies in the freedom with which the Okinawan opposition carried out practically all of its activities, including the countless and often highly militant anti-American demonstrations, to be covered in the last chapters. This, naturally, did not prevent the opposition from claiming that Okinawans were denied their basic civil rights by being forced to live under a code of penal law constructed along military lines and intended to suppress opposition.[83]

It is significant to note that not only former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Watson, but also the outstanding spokesman for Okinawan reversion in Japan, Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, told the author that in their opinions there had been no real denial of any basic rights in the Ryukyus under United States administration.[84] They apparently did not include the right of national self-determination among the basic rights.

However, in this as in other studies of political attitudes, it must once more be remembered that what mattered was not the actual situation, but the situation as perceived by those involved. Even if the American regime respected the personal liberties of Ryukyuans and even if it granted them more rights than they had ever enjoyed in their history, under the incessant propaganda

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of the opposition and with the imposition of an unwanted alien rule, many Okinawans ended up by agreeing that they were being deprived of basic personal rights.

This belief was brought out by a 1967 public opinion survey in which only 10 per cent of the respondents thought that human rights were protected in the Ryukyus at the time; 6 per cent felt there had been recent improvements and 53 per cent believed that human rights were not protected.[85]

A People Without a Nationality

It was explained earlier in this study that the United States acquired the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands with only one real purpose in mind, to be able to enjoy complete freedom in the military use of the Islands for as long as the political and military situation in the Far East might require. There was no intent to annex the Ryukyus permanently. To demonstrate this and thereby make the protracted detachment of Okinawa more palatable to the Japanese, while also calming the democratic conscience of the United States concerning the practice of foreign rule, John Foster Dulles had come up with the idea of "residual sovereignty." This seemed to emphasize that American rule, despite its indeterminate duration, was only temporary and that the lost prefecture would one day return to its homeland.

These requirements resulted in a legal status for

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the Islands that satisfied the strategic needs of the United States and acted somewhat as a palliative for the injured feelings of Japanese nationalism. However, even though it held out an ultimate hope of redemption to the Ryukyuans, this status also left them without a real nationality. For Okinawans it seemed that the United States and Japan typically solved Okinawan problems at the expense of the Okinawans.

The effects of this novel international status were explained in 1962 in the following terms by Major General J.E. Theimer, Chief of the Office of Civil Affairs, Department of the Army, when he appeared as a witness before the House Appropriations Committee:

> The Ryukyuans, as you probably are aware, are in a peculiar position in that they are for many purposes not regarded as United States citizens and for many purposes they are not regarded as citizens of another country.

General Theimer elaborated that Ryukyuans were, for instance, not included at the time in the Japanese quota for immigration to the United States, and when traveling abroad used a Ryukyuan travel document with the same force and validity as a passport, although some Okinawans had used Japanese passports.[86]

In the early years of American rule the awkward nationality status of Okinawans resulted in some irritations as aggravating to them as they were unnecessary. When Ryukyuans wanted to travel abroad they were subjected to stringent travel regulations because they had, in a way,

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become "stateless." When the Japanese Peace Treaty was ratified the many contractors and laborers from the main islands of Japan working at the time in Okinawa had their status changed, began to be regarded as friendly nationals and started to enjoy various new benefits, such as higher wages and American post-exchange privileges. Two years later Okinawans were, however, still regarded as enemy nationals and denied these privileges.[87]

Resentment was also created among both Okinawans and Japanese because under the American regime they had to have special documents to travel in what they considered a single country. Japanese tourists needed a permit, the equivalent of a visa, to visit the Ryukyus[88] and Okinawans needed, under Proclamation No. 147, special documents to visit Japan, a situation that occasioned a protest resolution on the part of the Legislature of the Ryukyus.[89] According to one news report, Okinawans residing in Japan felt it to be "tragic and humiliating" to be required to have a passport to return to their home town within what they considered to be the same country as Japan.[90]

It should be added that for at least some of the last mentioned irritants there existed a real justification. The Americans needed to exercise some control over travel into and out of an area of great military importance. As usual, however, the Okinawans and the Japanese were not willing to accept fully an explanation of this sort. Most of them saw no real need for American bases in Okinawa,

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except possibly as an aid to the local economy. They mainly noticed the division of their country and the inconveniences and annoyances brought to them by this division and by the American military-base regime.

A Final Word on Irritants

Following the chapters dealing with the major political and economic problems encountered during the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands, and at the end of the division of this study devoted to the day-to-day issues that arose under the American regime, it would be useful to look at some opinions formed among the Okinawan population after almost one-quarter of a century of foreign rule.

Various opinion surveys provide an insight into the relative importance placed by Ryukyuans on the various problems encountered under United States rule, as well as into the resultant attitudes they developed toward Americans and America.

In the public opinion poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun on September 12th and 13, 1967 in both Japan and the Ryukyus, the following question was asked in the Ryukyus, with the possibility of more than one answer:

> It may take time before the Ryukyus are returned. Therefore, apart from the reversion issue, what in the Ryukyus do you think should be improved or accomplished above all? Please state what you wish to convey to the U.S. and the U.S. Civil Administration.

The answers, apparently indicative of the relative importance

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placed by the respondents on their various complaints, were as follows:[91]

Freedom of travel (to Japan)	45 per cent
Public election of the Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Government	41 per cent
Stamp out crimes committed by U.S. soldiers	30 per cent
Have those decrees and orders repealed which are objectionable to the Ryukyuans	28 per cent
Return judiciary rights to the Ryukyuans	39 per cent
Settle the problem of land used by U.S. Forces	9 per cent
Increase U.S. aid	15 per cent
Eliminate noise of aircraft, etc.	21 per cent
No answer	16 per cent

Like other opinion surveys this one also contains some apparent surprises, such as finding limitations on travel to Japan at the head of the list. That a purely political question such as the public election of the Chief Executive occupied second place is undoubtedly due to the persistent campaign waged around this issue. It should come as no surprise if the land problem appeared near the bottom of the list considering that this poll was taken in 1967. It most probably would have been near the top in any survey taken during the 1956-1958 period.

Studies examining Okinawan attitudes toward the United States and Americans as a people also carry with them their share of surprises.

The 1945 United States invasion of the Ryukyu Islands in a battle in which 110,052 Okinawans were killed and the main island devastated seemed, at least in the

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judgment of Takashi Oka, Japanese correspondent for the New York Times, not to have caused among the local population resentment "to any discernible degree" against the American occupiers. Instead, Okinawans seemed to place most of the blame for this disaster on the Japanese, who they feel sacrificed Okinawa so that the main islands of Japan might be spared an invasion.[92]

General Watson, former High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, told the author that personal relations between Americans and Okinawans had generally been good.[93] The evidence presented in this study seems to bear out this statement, at least as far as outward relations were concerned. If one considers the dependence of Okinawans on the Americans, the great politeness characterizing Japanese behavior (and present-day Okinawan culture is basically Japanese) and if it is kept in mind that the demonstrations and the confrontations were the exception and not the rule during the period of United States administration, then there is really no reason to doubt that the day-to-day contacts between Americans and Okinawans were generally good. A friendly outward behavior does not, however, always have to correspond to the real feelings of the individuals concerned.

In this matter public opinion polls can once again assist in throwing some light on the question. In 1967 a team of sociologists and psychologists from Tokyo University polled a sample of 1200 Okinawans on their feelings

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toward Americans. About 45 per cent of those questioned answered that they would not mind having Americans as "close friends," but only 33 per cent wanted them as neighbors. An unspecified "several" per cent indicated they would not marry an American.[94] It can be concluded that the majority of the respondents would prefer not to have Americans as close friends. In a Japanese cultural setting this percentage may, however, not be as negative as it might appear. Japanese generally display a great deal of insecurity when dealing with foreigners and feel ill at ease in their presence. They are often reluctant to form a close friendship with any foreigner. The unwillingness of Okinawans to have Americans as "close friends" could then apply to other nationalities as well and may not necessarily have been directed at their rulers as such. What is more significant is the reluctance of two-thirds of the Ryukyuans to have Americans as neighbors, a relationship less demanding than close friendship.

In the September 1967 Asahi Shimbun survey Okinawan participants answered the question "Do you like or dislike America?" as follows:[95]

Like	14 per cent
Dislike	40 per cent
Other replies	34 per cent
No reply	12 per cent

These answers seem to fit the attitudes found in the Tokyo University survey. It is interesting to note that

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when the same question was asked in Japan, 26 per cent of the respondents were found to like the United States and only 19 per cent declared their dislike.

The difference between the responses in Okinawa and Japan indicates that the American use of Okinawa as a foreign base and the experience of alien rule generated hostility not only for the military installations and the administration of the archipelago, but also for all Americans and for their country. It points to the accumulation of irritations and frustrations in the daily lives of Okinawans to which the Japanese were not subjected at that time.

Conclusions

The two chapters of this division of the study afforded an opportunity for seeing the effects of the military-base regime on the lives of Okinawans and the resultant local reaction to American rule. These data can be used as a yardstick in assessing the United States' ability to meet the central challenge presented by a dependency relationship to its rulers, winning the necessary minimum local acquiescence to their regime.

The general impression conveyed by the evidence examined is that while an unaccustomed political freedom during the first years of American rule and the unprecedented prosperity brought by the United States to the Ryukyu Islands built limited supports for the foreign

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regime, almost every other aspect of alien rule and of the presence of the bases had a negative effect on the Okinawan population.

There exists a human tendency to become used to benefits received and to take them for granted, particularly if these involve basic, generalized conditions such as prosperity or political freedom and if these are already enjoyed by those who are used as a basis for comparison or reference. For Okinawans this last role was performed by the mainland Japanese, who came to enjoy during the post-World War II period even greater affluence and democracy.

As a rule developments removed from the sphere of direct personal experience are less important in determining the acceptance of a foreign regime than conditions encountered on a continuous basis in everyday life. If this daily experience happens to involve hardships they will not only be remembered, but have a cumulative effect in building up irritations, frustration and dissatisfaction. In the case of Okinawa a major part of the rejection of the dependency relationship took place at this level.

Many of the negative effects of the American military presence encountered in this chapter could not have been prevented. They involved the unavoidable consequences of both foreign rule and of the activities carried on by the United States in Okinawa, as well as many of the conflicts of interests between governors and subjects inherent in a strategic dependency. While these could not have been

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prevented, it would have been logical for the United States to avoid creating any additional and unnecessary irritants for the local inhabitants, and to try to balance the effect of these negative factors on the Ryukyuans by exploiting as much as possible the existing limited opportunities for building local supports.

In earlier chapters it was seen that the United States failed to utilize fully the possibilities for identifying Okinawan interests with her regime. In this division of the study the failure of the Americans to minimize the negative effects of their military presence clearly emerges.

Besides the unnecessary and serious aggravation of the land question during the 1950's, examined in the previous chapter, there were numerous preventable irritants which were not avoided by the United States. This includes discrimination against Okinawans, whether in court jurisdiction, promotions, wages, offensive signs or exclusive beaches, the non-recognition of the Japanese flag and holidays, the lack of discipline of service personnel and the long delay in paying for damages caused between 1945 and 1952.

Only a limited understanding of the problems involved in a dependency relationship can, however, be gained by enumerating the American shortcomings in Okinawa. A better insight into the problems involved in a dependency relationship is provided by an examination of the sources

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of Ryukyuan alienation which, either because of the nature of the conditions found under foreign rule or as a result of the projection of American traits into the actions of the governors, could most probably not have been prevented.

The meeting in a dependency relationship of rulers-conquerors with subjects coming from a different racial and cultural background and possessing a much lower standard of living must result in the placing of the latter in a distinctly inferior position, that is demonstrated in the everyday contacts between the two groups. In the case of Okinawa, the heritage of American racial attitudes could only have aggravated what would under any circumstances have been an unavoidable and major cause of Ryukyuan alienation.

The concentration of military facilities on a small and over-populated island exacerbated the hardships and irritations for the local population. The United States' ability to carry out, in disregard of the wishes and fears of the Okinawans, military activities that the Japanese Government considered too dangerous for the main islands of Japan, was interpreted by Ryukyuans as enlarging their badge of inferiority.

The democratic nature of American political life meant that Okinawans could not be denied most of the basic civil liberties enjoyed in the United States. At the same time, however, the nature of foreign rule, a form of government lacking the consent of the governed, made it

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necessary to impose some restrictions on these rights. The resulting combination represented a sufficient departure from democratic practice to build resentment against the ruling power, but it was a far cry from the repression necessary to prevent this feeling from being translated into effective opposition.

The ambiguous international status of Okinawa resulted from an American desire to make the separation of the Ryukyu Islands from Japan more palatable to both Japanese and Okinawans, and out of a need to calm the democratic conscience of the United States concerning the practice of foreign rule. This status was, however, to cause additional difficulties for Okinawans and thereby make them more reluctant to accept American administration.

American rule had once again come up against a basic contradiction. The interests of the United States in the Ryukyu Islands required the reasonable acquiescence of the local population for a long-term continuation of her regime. The promotion of these same American interests necessitated, however, the pursuit of policies whose effects at the level of everyday life were in the long run bound to undermine the Okinawan acceptance of United States administration.

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NOTES

[1]Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960). The idea is brought out repeatedly in this book. It should be added that there is no intention here to insinuate in any way that a Japanese administration is less efficient than an American administration. The aim is rather to emphasize that material advantages will, under modern conditions, not cause a people to forego its desire for self-government, which is based largely on emotional reasons. Even if the government provided by USCAR would have been far superior to anything that Japan could have offered, in the author's opinion, Okinawans would still have asked for reversion.

[2]Sakanaka Tomohisa, "The Present Status of the Okinawan Reversion Movement," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), Vol. XV (January-March 1968), No. 1, p. 40.

[3]Miyasato Seigen, "Hopes and Realities in Okinawa," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), Vol. XII, No. 2 (April-June 1965), p. 164.

[4]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Strategy and Science: Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970's, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1970, p. 156.

[5]Baltimore Sun, November 17, 1968, p. A8:1-3.

[6]Barton M. Biggs, "The Outraged Okinawans," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 217 (December 1958), pp. 58-59.

[7]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, November 20, 1969.

[8]Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan (Tokyo, Japan: Nampo Doho Engokai, March 1967), p. 9. See also Lawrence Olson, "Political Relations," The United States and Japan, Herbert Passin, ed., The American Assembly of Columbia University (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 72-73.

[9]Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan, op. cit., p. 9.

[10]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, April 25, 1965. (Mimeographed).

[11]The Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 12, 1963, p. 4. (Article by Naha correspondent Nakazawa). A copy may be found in

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The General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 22.

[12]The Weekly Okinawa Times, December 11, 1965, p. 6. A copy may be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 10.

[13]The New York Times, January 2, 1959, p. 3:1.

[14]The New York Times, April 20, 1965, p. 6:6.

[15]The New York Times, January 27, 1960, p. 23:4 and November 17, 1968, IV, p. 4:1-5. See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), October 11, 1968, p. 3:6.

[16]The New York Times, June 7, 1969, p. 4:3-8.

[17]The New York Times, April 1, 1946, p. 9:2; and September 26, 1952, VI, pp. 62-63.

[18]The New York Times, June 17, 1955, p. 5:1-4.

[19]The Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 14, 1963, p. 4. (Article by Naha correspondent Nakazawa). A copy may be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 22.

[20]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, pp. 89-90. (Article by Takashi Oka).

[21]The New York Times, January 19, 1958, IV, p. 6:3-4. (Article by Robert Trumbull); September 3, 1961, p. 26:1-2; and August 11, 1964, p. 16:1-5.

[22]Baltimore Sun, November 17, 1968, p. 8:1-3. (Article by Thomas Pepper).

[23]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, pp. 89-90. (Article by Takashi Oka).

[24]"Okinawa: Forgotten Island," Time, November 28, 1949, p. 24.

[25]The New York Times, June 17, 1955, p. 5:1-4.

[26]The New York Times, June 21, 1970, p. 8:1.

[27]Biggs, op. cit., p. 59. As an example of apparently aimless violence and misconduct on the part of some American servicemen, mention is made of one gang of Army "toughs" that wandered through the streets of various towns with taped fists and with the sole objective of beating into senselessness as many persons, Americans or Okinawans, as they could find in one evening.

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[28]The New York Times, May 5, 1965, p. 6:1 provides one typical example of such conduct which was even reported in the United States.

[29]The New York Times, March 29, 1964, p. 12:1-5.

[30]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., August 30, 1969. Numerous other incidents are reported in various issues of Okinawa News Highlights. Two examples would be provided by the September 15 and 16, 1969 issues.

[31]Interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[32]Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan, op. cit., p. 55. See also Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., January 15 and 16, 1965.

[33]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., August 24, 1967.

[34]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., December 9, 1966.

[35]Tokyo Shimbun, December 8, 1968, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, December 1968, No. 26, pp. 11-12. (Mimeographed). See also Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., August 3, 1966; and The New York Times, June 21, 1970, p. 8:1.

[36]Kyōzō Mori, "Two Ends of a Telescope," Japan Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January-March 1968), p. 19.

[37]The New York Times, December 29, 1959, p. 2:4; and December 30, 1959, p. 4:6. See also Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan, op. cit., p. 49. The text of this pamphlet contains many faulty English sentences.

[38]Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau, "Okinawa, Some Basic Facts," Japan Reference Series, No. 2-69 (Tokyo, Japan: 1969), pp. 2-3.

[39]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., March 23, 1965.

[40]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., June 12, 14 and 15, 1965. See also The New York Times, June 13, 1965, p. 8:1; and June 14, 1965, p. 37:2.

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[41]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., May 20, 1966.

[42]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., January 16, 1968.

[43]The New York Times, November 20, 1968, p. 30:3.

[44]Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., January 23, 1968.

[45]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., January 15, 1965.

[46]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, H.J. Res. 251, Contribution to Ryukyuans for Damages Suffered Between 1945 and 1952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, pp. 16-17, 30.

[47]Jiho, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., December 15, 1968.

[48]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, H.R. 12617, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, p. 5649.

[49]Mainichi (Tokyo), November 11, 1969, p. 8:7-8.

[50]Ibid., p. 8:7-8.

[51]Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., March 12, 1965.

[52]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Asahi Shimbun Survey (Conducted September 1967) (Reproduced by USCAR: Research and Evaluation Division: 17 October 1967), p. 14. (Mimeographed).

[53]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, pp. 30, 89-90.

[54]The New York Times, July 19, 1969, pp. 1:2-5, 2:7-8.

[55]The New York Times, July 18, 1969, p. 2:2.

[56]The New York Times, July 20, 1969, p. 4:2; and July 24, 1969, p. 10:2.

[57]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), July 26, 1969, p. 1:2-3.

[58]The New York Times, July 22, 1969, p. 3:5-6.

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[59]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., May 17, 1970.

[60]Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), May 26, 1970, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., May 1970, p. 23.

[61]Ibid., p. 23.

[62]The New York Times, April 1, 1961, p. 2:1.

[63]The New York Times, February 21, 1969, p. 12:1-4.

[64]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, pp. 247-248. See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), September 11, 1969, p. 4:6.

[65]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), October 31, 1969, p. 3:6.

[66]The New York Times, August 15, 1965, p. 8:1.

[67]The New York Times, May 25, 1969, IV, p. 17:4-7. (Article by Tom Wicker). This attitude places a definite limitation on the wartime usefulness of Okinawan bases for the United States, and for that matter for any Western Power. With the possible exception of military operations directed against Soviet Far Eastern targets, an unlikely eventuality in the present world situation, the Ryukyu Islands would always be used in conjunction with hostilities involving other Asian nations. On the basis of the experience acquired during the Vietnamese war it would be safe to say that almost any such future use of Okinawan military bases would create resentment among the local inhabitants because of the feeling that their island was serving as a base for the killing of other Asians. This feeling would be promoted to the utmost by Communist propaganda and would result in widespread agitation in both Okinawa and Japan calling for the termination of such operations. The only exception to this behavior would occur if Japan herself would be attacked by another Asian Power and the Okinawan bases were used for the defense of the Japanese homeland.

[68]The New York Times, March 10, 1965, p. 4:5-6. (Article by Robert Trumbull).

[69]Tokyo Shimbun, December 10, 1968, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., December 1968, No. 26, p. 17.

[70]The New York Times, February 16, 1969, p. 3:4-8. (Article by Takashi Oka).

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[71]USCAR, Asahi Shimbun Survey (Conducted September 1967), op. cit., p. 4.

[72]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), October 1, 1969, pp. 1:5-7, 3:2-3.

[73]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Ryukyu Shimpo Survey (Conducted 22-28 July 1967) (Prepared by USCAR, Research and Evaluation Division: 9 October 1967), p. 17. (Mimeographed).

[74]USCAR, Asahi Shimbun Survey (Conducted September 1967), op. cit., p. 11.

[75]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), March 26, 1968, p. 3:6-8.

[76]January 1969 Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Reference Materials (Kyoto, Japan; January 1969), p. 75. (Mimeographed).

[77]Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan, op. cit., p. 69.

[78]Ibid., p. 69.

[79]The New York Times, October 12, 1954, p. 7:6.

[80]Ibid., p. 7:6.

[81]The New York Times, August 12, 1956, p. 12:3-4.

[82]The New York Times, August 19, 1956, p. 12:3.

[83]John Barr "The Ryukyu Islands," British Survey, No. 175 (October 1963), p. 16. See also Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan, op. cit., pp. 68-69. Repeated mention of this and of similar charges can be found elsewhere in the last named publication as well as throughout the literature of the reversion movement.

[84]Interviews with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970 and with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[85]Committee for Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Reference, Public Opinion Surveys on the Okinawa Problem (Kyoto, Japan: January 1969), p. 11. (Mimeographed).

[86]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 75-76.

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[87]Ralph Braibanti, "The Ryukyu Islands: Pawn of the Pacific," The American Political Science Review, December 1954, p. 989.

[88]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 120.

[89]Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

[90]The New York Times, August 10, 1969, p. 9:1. (Article by Kensei Yoshida).

[91]Committee for Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Reference, Public Opinion Surveys on the Okinawa Problem, op. cit., p. 11.

[92]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, pp. 30, 89-92.

[93]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[94]The New York Times, June 10, 1967, p. 3:5-6.

[95]USCAR, Asahi Shimbun Survey (Conducted September 1967), op. cit., p. 14.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE ATTITUDINAL BASIS OF THE REVERSION MOVEMENT-SUPPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES

After six chapters devoted to United States policies in the Ryukyu Islands and to their political, economic and psychological effects on the lives of the Okinawan population, the study now turns to the attitudes created by these factors among the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands.

The political manifestation of the Ryukyuan reaction to American rule was the movement for reversion to Japan. The following two chapters will attempt to analyze the thoughts and feelings of Ryukyuans concerning the situation in which they found themselves and the nature of the movement these sentiments brought into being.

Like any political movement the reversion movement was complex and involved more than just dissatisfaction with, and opposition to, the regime established by the United States, and more than pure love for Japan. This chapter will concern itself with the entangled and seemingly contradictory attitudes of Ryukyuans toward both Japan and the United States, which should be understood if Okinawan opposition to American rule is to be placed in proper perspective. It is hoped that these attitudes will provide

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an insight into the supports enjoyed by the United States during its administration of the Ryukyu Islands.

The term "supports" again needs to be qualified. The expression is not intended to indicate that a substantial section of the Ryukyuan population favored an unlimited continuation of American rule. Very few Okinawans held such a view. Rather, by "supports" is meant only the existence of factors that made large or important groups of Ryukyuans hesitate to support an early return to Japan and, instead, accept either a substantial prolongation of United States administration, or at least an indefinite presence of the military bases.

Okinawan willingness to accept American rule, for whatever duration, stemmed from a variety of causes. The feeling of helplessness in the face of the overwhelmingly superior power of the United States, which had not only conquered the archipelago but had also vanquished the mighty Japanese Empire, was undoubtedly a major factor that lasted well into the 1960's. For some Okinawans this feeling may never have completely disappeared. Okinawans held their compatriots from the main islands of Japan largely responsible for the devastating battle that took place on the island of Okinawa. In contrast, the unexpectedly good behavior of the United States Forces that occupied the Islands in 1945 and the aid given by the Armed Forces during the desperate post-conquest years came as a pleasant surprise and accounted for the Ryukyuans' initial goodwill

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toward the Americans.

Their historical experience with foreign rulers must have played its part in helping the Okinawans accommodate a new conqueror. Between the early seventeenth and the late nineteenth centuries Ryukyuans had learned how to please their conquerors from the Japanese Satsuma Clan while simultaneously maintaining the fiction of a semi-independent kingdom paying tribute to the Chinese Emperors and accepting their suzerainty.[1]

Over the years feelings of gratitude fade and so do the respect and fear of a powerful democratic nation that rarely utilizes its might but achieves its purposes with milder methods. With the passage of time it was the Okinawans' economic dependence on the United States that remained the primary factor in their acquiescence to continued American rule. The first concern will therefore be with economic supports.

The Economic Basis of Okinawan Supports for American Rule

It is only to be expected that the group most willing to compromise reversion demands for economic considerations was the Okinawan business community. No other group was as keenly aware of the dependence of Ryukyuan prosperity on the military presence of the United States, and no other group could measure as directly in terms of dollars and cents the effect of every American move on the local economy.

The position of the Democratic-Liberal Democratic

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Party of Okinawa on the issue of reversion represents perhaps the most obvious long-term reflection of business attitudes on this subject. This party, frequently called the conservative party, was like its Japanese counterpart always considered to be strongly under the influence of business circles. For as long as it was politically possible the Liberal Democrats either opposed or played down the reversion issue.

In the March 1954 legislative election campaign the Democratic Party had stood for full cooperation with the United States Administration and for opposition to all efforts to return the Islands to Japanese control.[2] In the 1956 election campaign the party's platform was described by the New York Times as "favoring cooperation with the Americans and 'soft pedaling' reversionist sentiment."[3] It was not until 1960 that the political atmosphere had changed sufficiently in Okinawa for the Democratic Party to find it expedient to support officially the return of the Ryukyus to Japan.[4] In the coming pages and chapters the later positions taken by the conservative party on the reversion issue will be mentioned. It will be seen that the support displayed during the 1960's was always as low-keyed as the political situation in the Islands permitted for a party with serious ambitions to win elections.

A more direct example of business support for the political status quo is an organization originally named the Council to Oppose Immediate Reversion to Japan and

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later called The Society for the Study of Reversion and Other Problems that was in existence in the last years before the November 1969 reversion agreement. This group was trying to temper the general enthusiasm for reversion with sober economic arguments. Early in 1969 the President of this organization was Narinobu Sueyoshi, the head of a local trading company and the sole representative in Okinawa of the Japanese Mikimoto pearl company. American servicemen, civilian employees and their dependents were the most important buyers of this product. The Vice Presidents of the society included the Chairman of the local Hotel Association and the Chairman of the Gift Shop Guild of Koza City. The hotel and the gift shop businesses similarly depended heavily on American customers. It may also be noted that about half of the city of Koza's annual income of some $15 million was estimated to have originated in expenditures by United States servicemen. Koza itself had grown under the American regime from a tiny pre-World War II hamlet into a city of 66,000 inhabitants. The President of the society was one of the few Ryukyuans who early in 1969 expressed the opinion that the B-52 bombers were quite safe and that it was ignorance that made some Okinawans afraid of them. He also expressed the following views:[5]

> ... we have a problem, though, trying to get this information out to the people. The newspapers won't print it. We print handbills and hold lecture meetings. But it's not easy -- the leftists are very strong here ... I'm not against

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> reversion to Japan, but when? And under what conditions? Who is going to pay the bill? We think these problems should be studied before we rush into reversion for purely sentimental or emotional reasons.

The last arguments brought up by Mr. Sueyoshi were probably economically sound. However, by 1969, as his own words seem to indicate, opinions of this sort were completely out of step with the mainstream of Okinawan thinking.

Among other prominent businessmen who prospered under United States administration and who expressed support for the American position, were Shigeru Yoseyana, President of The First Enterprise Company, Ltd., and Sosei Gushiken, President of Orion Breweries and of the Ryukyu Industrial Federation.[6]

As prospects for a relatively early reversion improved Okinawan businessmen expressed additional misgivings about the consequences of a reunion with Japan. To worries about the possible loss of revenues from American sources was added the fear of competition from Japanese business. By November 1969 Okinawan financial circles were expressing what was described as a "strong sense of crisis" over the danger that Japanese capital, which they viewed as "overwhelmingly strong in competitive power," would establish itself on their islands and cause the collapse of the local financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, with admittedly weak management foundations. The President of the Bank of the Ryukyus, the largest in the Islands, was plainly worried about the prospects of

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becoming aligned with a single Japanese bank after USCAR's fifty-one per cent interest in his firm's ownership was sold and presumably acquired by Japanese interests. The President, Mr. Sakashima, who was also Chairman of the Naha Bankers Association, joined the GRI authorities in charge of financial affairs in asking the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the National Federation of Bankers' Associations of Japan to restrict or control the advance of Japanese finance capital into Okinawa and to help Okinawan finance capital attain self-sufficiency.[7]

The fear in Okinawan financial circles that Japanese capital would take advantage of the Islands' reversion and attempt to dominate the local finances makes a curious and almost amusing parallel with the previously mentioned apprehensions of Japanese business, which feared that even stronger American capital would exploit the reversion of Okinawa as a means for making serious inroads into the Japanese economy. In both cases these fears were expressed and demands were made that the respective governments should step in and put an end to this "advance" of a stronger outside capital into the Ryukyus.

Not only financial institutions but also other business enterprises that had flourished under protected status in the Ryukyus feared ruinous competition from the giant Japanese business combines after reversion.[8] Dr. Shannon McCune, former Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands, explained to the author that the local

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business community had been aware of this danger for a number of years before reversion became imminent.[9]

In October 1969, on the eve of the reversion agreement, the conservative former Chief Executive of the GRI, Jugo Thoma, who now headed an organization called the Association to Build Okinawa for the Okinawans, proposed a plebiscite in the Ryukyus to determine whether the Islands should revert to Japan by 1972. He also planned to appeal to all members of the United States Congress against the reversion of the Ryukyus on the contention that such a step would be harmful to the economic development and the political advancement of Okinawa. The Association to Build Okinawa for the Okinawans, composed mainly of a group of businessmen, openly used slogans such as "We are not in a hurry for reversion" and "We flatly oppose reversion in 1972 which will destroy the livelihood of the masses." The Government of the United States, in the belief that it did not represent any sizable segment of opinion, did not take this group and its proposals very seriously. Some American officials were even of the opinion that the real aim of the Association was not so much to block the reversion of the Ryukyus, for which there seemed to be very little hope by that time, but rather to try to improve the economic position of its members after reversion.[10]

If the Okinawan business community was most clearly aware of how its own prosperity and the entire economy of the Islands were related to the continuation of the

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political status quo, it was by no means the only group to be so.

The great majority of the Okinawan population was well aware of the connection between the military presence of the United States and the reconstruction of the wartime ruins, the dramatic post-war rise in the standard of living and the maintenance of general prosperity in the Islands. With the exception of a few special groups, the most important of which were the teachers, most Okinawans had thus been placed in a dilemma that forced a choice upon them between their nationalistic aspirations as Japanese and their economic interests. During the 1960's in particular this dilemma had been further complicated by an increasing uncertainty about the exact effects of reversion on Okinawan prosperity. The spectacular economic progress of Japan, together with the remaining gaps between Japan and the Ryukyus in education, health conditions and social insurance, raised among many local inhabitants some doubts about the over-all material advantages of retaining the political status quo, although the general belief that Okinawan prosperity depended on the military bases was never undermined in its entirety.

Over a period of many years most Ryukyuans had resolved this conflict of interests through a willingness to postpone for an undefined period the return of their archipelago to Japan. The demand was still for reversion, but "not just now."[11]

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That for many years, particularly during the 1950's, the demand for a reunion with Japan did not mean immediate reversion can be seen from the words of the American-appointed Chief Executive of the GRI, who did not consider it politically unwise in 1957 to urge his compatriots to reconcile themselves to the prospect of American rule for at least another generation. He even expressed the belief that with the passage of time and with the continuing improvement of conditions in the Islands the anxiety for reversion to Japan would diminish.[12]

In the later years of United States rule this willingness to delay reversion weakened considerably and was replaced by a desire for an early reunion with the main islands together with the continued presence of the military bases, but only under the same limitations as applied to American bases in Japan.[13]

In 1967, at a hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee, a high-ranking official from the Army Department summarized Okinawan feelings of the time in these words:

> There is in Okinawa considerable sentiment, particularly among the more affluent, for reversion but retention of the bases. This, indeed, has been the position of some of the major political parties.

He further explained that the reversion sentiments were based more on nationalistic feelings than on a desire to obtain greater economic benefits.[14]

High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. James B. Lampert explained in 1969 to a subcommittee of the same Senate

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Committee that the desire to retain, because of their economic value, the American bases after reversion existed despite the very real resentments and irritations that these military installations had occasioned.[15]

The experience of their northern island neighbors provided Okinawans with a living example of what the economic effects of reversion could be. In 1953 the United States had returned to Japan the Amami O Shima (Islands), whose inhabitants had exhibited intense feelings of Japanese nationalism. A few years later many of the Amamians remembered the small United States Military Government units stationed in their islands mainly for "... arrogance, neglect and misbehavior." Others, however, and particularly businessmen, also recalled that under American rule their economic conditions had been better, largely because of lower prices and taxes. In addition to the comments heard from Amamians, a more immediate lesson was provided by the steady illicit immigration from the reverted Amami O Shima into American-ruled Okinawa, resulting from the better economic opportunities that were to be found in the main island of the Ryukyus, with its many military installations. These opportunities existed particularly for young girls seeking work as hostesses in cafes and teahouses catering to service personnel.[16] By 1960, 11,500 Amamians were living in Okinawa.[17]

It could be added that if the inhabitants of the Amami Islands, which contained no real military installa-

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tions, lost mainly their lower taxes and prices when they were returned to Japan, the Okinawans with their military-base economy had far more to lose through reversion.

When reversion to Japan ceased to be merely a dream to be realized in an as yet unforeseen future but began to appear as a distinct possibility that might occur within a few years, many Okinawans began to think more seriously about the economic consequences of a return to the homeland. Lieut. Gen. Ferdinand Unger, who was High Commissioner of the Ryukyus from late 1966 until early in 1969, described to the Senate Armed Services Committee a change that had begun to make itself manifest by 1967:[18]

> Whereas before a great deal of the discussion was based primarily on emotion, now the people who are involved in the discussion are starting to talk about the economic aspects of reversion, about the political aspects of reversion, and other such things.

When the decision to return the administrative rights to Japan by 1972 was finally announced an American correspondent in Okinawa at the time described local feelings as mixed and "stoic." There were no celebrations, and fears were expressed about the future. Popular talk was that the bases might be reduced, that without duty-free bargains and the glamor of making a trip with a passport outside Japan Japanese tourists may cease to visit Okinawa, that the economy might be hurt, and the like. This correspondent hastened to add, however, that despite all this Okinawans were glad to learn that they would be returned to

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Japan, and no one he interviewed seemed interested in either a continuation of American rule or in an independent state.[19]

At the same time that they complained about difficulties caused by the bases, Okinawans always displayed a great sensitivity to signs that the benefits connected with the presence of the military installations might be reduced in any way. A few days after the reversion joint communique, for example, the United States Authorities announced the planned dismissal over a period of months of from 1,500 to 2,400 base workers. This decision was unconnected with the promised return of Okinawa to Japan and was, instead, merely part of a United States Government program to reduce overseas defense expenditures. Despite this, the announcement stirred up a good deal of excitement in the Islands. The Military Workers Union was expected to resort immediately to "forcible tactics" to resist the American move and considerable political agitation was forecast. The true feelings of Okinawans that were hidden by the uproar were perhaps better expressed by the attitude taken by the nationalist-minded Chief Executive, Chobyo Yara. He first reacted to the news by exclaiming, "What I had been worried about has come true," and by expressing his intention to ask the American Authorities whether these latest measures were part of a planned reduction in the United States bases on Okinawa. A little later, however, he announced that while he would make efforts to obtain the re-employment

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of the dismissed workers, he would not ask the United States Military Authorities to cancel their dismissal program.[20] This attitude seemed to correspond to the contradictory feelings held by so many Okinawans, who wanted both the economic benefits flowing from the presence of the United States bases and the reduction, if not the eventual elimination, of this very presence.

An attempt to quantify these mixed feelings requires an examination of various public opinion surveys touching on some of the questions that have been discussed.

The September 1967 Asahi Shimbun poll asked the question: "Do you think the existence of the United States bases on Okinawa has been of some economic value to your work or to your livelihood?" The answers were as follows:[21]

Some value	29 per cent
No value	61 per cent
Other replies	2 per cent
No reply	8 per cent

When, however, the query did not concern opinions on the value of the bases to the respondent personally, but on their worth for "the economy" in the abstract, different results were obtained.

In April 1967 a team of sociologists and psychologists from Tokyo University, in a sampling of 1,600 persons in various parts of the Ryukyus, found 56.7 per cent to be of the opinion that the American regime had been "of considerable help economically." Almost the same number,

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56.2 per cent, believed that the American administration of the former Japanese territory was "impermissible." There obviously was some overlap in these two views, with at least a few per cent of the respondents holding both opinions. There must also have existed some overlap when the same poll found 88 per cent favoring reversion, but more than half this group, or 47 per cent of the entire sample, advocating a "gradual return."[22]

In a public opinion poll carried out eight months later by the Sociology Research Room (Institute) of the same University somewhat different results were reported. Now only 47.6 per cent of those polled felt that the bases were beneficial to the economy. It is difficult to say whether the difference with the April 1967 survey was due to a shift in opinion, to varying techniques used in taking the polls, or to both of these reasons combined. A slight shift from the previous year in two other questions, however, suggests that opinion may have hardened somewhat against the bases. The same poll reported that 41.3 per cent had favored immediate reversion in December 1966, compared with 47.6 per cent in the December 1967 survey. On the question of a return by stages, the respondents in favor had gone down from 47.1 per cent in December 1966 to 44.5 per cent a year later.

The poll also seemed to indicate in which direction Okinawans were moving in the resolution of their dilemma. Of those polled 74.3 per cent felt that the bases should be

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removed to relieve anxiety about the dangers connected with their presence, even if this should have adverse effects on their livelihood. Only 15 per cent preferred an easier life at the expense of living with the fears caused by the presence of the bases.[23]

It should be noted that this question did not measure Okinawan willingness to endure adverse economic effects for the sake of their Japanese nationalistic feelings, but only for the sake of finding relief from the anxiety that the presence of the military bases was creating. It should also be remembered that, regardless of opinions concerning the value of the bases for "the economy," it has been seen that only 29 per cent of those polled felt that the bases had been of some economic value to them personally. It would then be possible to conclude that the great majority of those willing to hurt the economy in order to eliminate the military installations were presumably respondents who did not feel that they were deriving personal benefits from the existence of the bases, and who were therefore willing to have their anxieties in connection with the bases relieved at the cost of what they believed to be the livelihood of others. Despite this un-heroic conclusion, the polls can be taken as an indication that, regardless of how many Okinawans may have believed that economic dislocations would for the most part be felt by someone else, their ultimate decision on the timing of reversion would no longer be determined primarily on economic grounds.

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The polls are also of interest because they point to a certain shift in Ryukyuan opinions concerning the military presence of the United States around 1967, a fact noted repeatedly in this study.

Non-Economic Supports for American Rule

In view of the primary role played by economic considerations as supports for the American regime, all other factors that worked out in any way in favor of a continuation of United States rule could be grouped together and considered of only secondary importance.

The first of these secondary supports manifested itself when the original American landings were made in the archipelago in April 1945. United States servicemen were at the time surprised at their friendly reception. Before the invasion the Americans had expected to encounter great difficulties in controlling the local population. Instead, they met with cooperation and even found some Okinawans who expressed the belief that they might perhaps be better off in the future under American rule than under the Japanese. Some Americans present at the time, however, wondered whether this was not merely "Oriental talk" aimed at pleasing a new conqueror.[24]

One year later a New York Times reporter found Okinawans to be a basically law-abiding people possessing, with the exception of some petty thievery, a very low crime rate and still accepting the Military Government with "good

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graces."[25] In addition to their desire to please a powerful conqueror, Okinawans had other reasons for appreciating the United States Military Government. They had apparently expected the Americans to behave in the traditionally cruel and arrogant manner of an Oriental conqueror. Instead they were amazed to find that the Americans not only committed no atrocities but even provided them with food and shelter. The Okinawans were naturally grateful for this.[26]

The Ryukyuans also had, as will be seen a little later, their list of grievances against Japanese rule and particularly against the actions of the Japanese Armed Forces before and during the battle for their island. A Japanese student of the reversion movement was to write about this period that, "at the outset of America's administration of Okinawa there was a tendency among Okinawans to regard the American occupation forces as an army of liberation." This same author also noted that there existed no reversion movement during the first years of American rule.[27]

Because the Ryukyus had once formed an independent kingdom and because of the well-known Ryukyuan dissatisfaction with some aspects of the pre-1945 Japanese regime, it had been repeatedly suggested that the most just solution to the problems of the archipelago was to restore its long-lost independence. For a number of reasons the United States never considered this course of action very seriously. These included the economically unviable status of the

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proposed new state, the very limited appeal that this idea had in Okinawa, and also the desire not to antagonize Japan by permanently depriving it of what most Japanese considered to be a part of their national territory.

Even if independence had been acceptable to both the Okinawans and the Japanese, and had then been granted, the fact that the Islands were not self-supporting in terms of an acceptable modern standard of living would have made them in all likelihood dependent on an unlimited presence of the United States bases. Considering the Ryukyuans' weak bargaining position under these circumstances, they hardly could have denied to the United States the use of the bases on its own terms. Such an arrangement would have been almost ideal for the United States until a time, presumably in the remote future, when American strategists might have found the Ryukyus no longer useful. In such an eventuality Okinawa would probably have turned into a permanent liability for the United States. If this is kept in mind and if it is remembered that throughout the period of American administration the Islands were considered of great strategic importance for the foreseeable future, then Ryukyuan independence demands can be regarded as virtually equivalent to supports for the American military presence, or at least for conditions that would have made this presence inevitable.

As this study will attempt to show, independence was never a real possibility for the Ryukyus, if only for the reason that its appeal was very small. This, however,

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does not mean that there never existed any support at all for the idea.

In the very first years of American rule the Okinawa People's Party, later to become the strongest supporter of reversion to Japan, referred to the inhabitants of the Ryukyus as the "Okinawan race" and in one local election campaigned under the slogan "Establishment of a People's Autonomous Government and the Formation of a Constitutional Parliament."[28]

By the middle of 1951 at least four political parties had been organized in the Ryukyus. Of these, one conservative party favored a United Nations trusteeship, a second advocated independence, and by this time both left-wing parties were asking for a return to Japan.[29]

By 1963 there still existed one political party favoring the restoration of the Kingdom of the Ryukyus and another that stood for an indefinite continuation of United States administration and even contemplated statehood within the American Union. Both of these were, however, very minor parties and hardly appeared in the election returns of the period.[30]

In 1968 a lecturer at the University of the Ryukyus described the independence movement in the following terms:[31]

> Even among my friends, there are intellectuals in their fourties and fifties, who believe this, that there is no greater joy for the Okinawan inhabitants than if they could become independent ... I think that this is due more to the scars of

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> 'discriminatory treatment' which they received from the homeland government and the homeland people, before the war, which still ache ... However, they do not mention this openly in public. That is because they know that independence is not possible for them, from the economic standpoint.

There also could still be found in the Ryukyus during the late 1960's two small organizations, one called "Federation of Revolutionary Ryukyu," and the other "Ryukyu People's Association for Revolution." The chairman of both of these groups was a man by the name of Ts'ai Chang, also known under the Japanese name of Shisei Kiuna, who advocated opposition to Communism and either independence for Okinawa or its annexation by Nationalist China. Ts'ai Chang once worked in Taiwan and became very friendly with the Chinese Nationalist regime that established itself there after World War II. He gained the confidence of the Chiang Kai Shek Government and continued to maintain close relations with it after he returned to Okinawa.[32]

But the post-war independence movement never really played a part in the great political debates held in the Islands and, as Dr. Nobumoto Ohama said to the author, independence feelings were never very serious in the Ryukyus, not even during the late 1940's.[33]

Sentiment for annexation by the United States, or for the establishment of a "State of Ryukyu" within the American Union never amounted to much either. M.D. Morris mentions in his book, Okinawa, A Tiger by the Tail, that out of gratitude for what the United States had done in

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the Ryukyus a petition was circulated in 1950 asking for the annexation of the Islands by the United States, but he does not specify how many Okinawans signed. Mr. Morris adds that Washington was not interested.[34]

A search for political supports for the continuation in one form or another of the American-base regime will not lead very far if the purpose is to look for demands favoring either annexation by the United States or independence. More fruitful is a search for Okinawan hesitation over an early return to Japanese rule, with only the timing in question and with no real alternative to reversion put forward.

The Gradual Decline in Supports for the American Regime

A brief survey of attitudes toward the United States and of the political climate in Okinawa between the mid-1950's and the late 1960's reveals the gradual erosion of supports for a lengthy continuation of the American regime, climaxing in the great changes in Ryukyuan opinion around the 1966-67 period.

In the March 1954 legislative election the Democratic Party, as mentioned earlier, still promised to cooperate fully with the United States Authorities and opposed all efforts to return the Ryukyus to Japan. The Socialists urged reversion at the beginning of the campaign but later cooled toward this idea. Only the allegedly pro-Communist People's Party had by that time come around to an unquali-

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fied support of reversion.[35]

In 1956 most Okinawans still approved full cooperation with the United States, and many Americans felt that anti-reversionist and pro-American sentiments might have been heard more frequently had it not been for the "ceaseless Japanese propaganda" and the uncertainty about the ultimate intentions of the United States concerning the future political status of the Ryukyus. It was believed at the time that many Okinawans hesitated to express opinions that might be held against them if and when the Ryukyus were returned to Japan.[36]

Early in 1958 the Socialist Masses Party, generally described as politically "somewhere between the pro-Communist leftists and the conservative Democrats," advocated reversion but only at a later date.[37]

At the beginning of 1959, shortly after the great land settlement was announced, the United States achieved the spectacular public relations success that has been briefly referred to in Chapter VII. Dr. Kanjun Higaonna, a seventy-year-old historian who was considered at the time to be the greatest living Okinawan scholar, had stayed away from Okinawa in a kind of self-imposed exile ever since the Second World War and had vowed in Tokyo never to return to his native Okinawa as long as the Americans were present in the Islands. Dr. Higaonna suddenly experienced a complete change of heart. He returned to the Ryukyus, toured the entire main island and publicly announced that

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he had now decided to spend the rest of his life in Okinawa. He said he had found the Americans were not the conquerors and destroyers he had hitherto regarded them to be but, instead, he "was able to find here in Okinawa Americans as constructors and friends." Dr. Higaonna also admitted to newspapermen that Japanese stories of alleged American oppression of the Ryukyuans, which he himself had helped to spread in Tokyo, were false. Because of the high esteem in which scholars of Dr. Higaonna's stature are held in the Orient this episode was considered at the time as an important propaganda victory for the United States.[38]

The settlement of an important part of the land problem, the conversion to United States Dollar currency, both of which improved economic conditions in the Islands, as well as individual actions such as the "conversion" of Dr. Higaonna, all helped to improve the political position of the United States in the Ryukyu Islands. Conditions appeared to be so favorable that at one point Major General C.K. Gailey, Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Department of the Army, was able in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee to make the optimistic comment that "as a matter of fact, it (the political situation) is very good."[39]

Notwithstanding this superficially favorable situation, as the decade of the 1960's began the political mood in Okinawa was undergoing a slow transformation. One subtle indication of this was a slight change in the

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position of the Liberal Democratic Party. By the November 1960 legislative elections it supported reversion, although still only on a "step by step" basis. Despite this it was, however, still advocating as a more immediate goal increased cooperation among Americans, Ryukyuans and Japanese in governing the archipelago, asserting that "economic improvement can best be achieved through cooperation with the United States."[40]

The period around 1959-1960 could be considered, in retrospect, relatively speaking, as an "era of good feelings" between Americans and Okinawans. This benevolent state of affairs could be attributed to the solution of a number of specific economic problems that had caused much dissatisfaction at a time when the revival of Japanese nationalism had not yet become strong enough to result in renewed agitation against American rule. It should, however, be remembered that even during this felicitous period Americans spoke of the reversion sentiment as something that "was in the air" and would not go away. Needless to say, the relative political calm was not to last long.

During the 1960's political attitudes in Okinawa were changing, but the change was gradual, and it was not until late in the decade that the political situation altered radically.

In 1964 Deputy Under-Secretary of the Army for International Affairs Harry C. McPherson, Jr. could still declare to the Senate Committee on Appropriations that

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"the Ryukyuans have not been, one would say, revolutionary. They have been cooperating with us very well."[41]

One year later this view was confirmed as far as the political attitudes of students, who were very much under the influence of the reversionist-minded schoolteachers, were concerned. The National Education Subcommittee of the Central Education Research Meeting, sponsored by the Okinawa Teachers' Association, conducted a survey of the nationality consciousness of local schoolchildren in the form of a ten-item questionnaire. The results showed, to the chagrin of the schoolteachers, that, despite the strong desire for reversion among junior high school children, there also existed a conspicuous feeling of resignation toward the United States administration of their islands.[42]

A sign of the changing attitudes can once more be detected in the pronouncements over the years of the incumbent Liberal Democratic Party which was the last important political party to demand reversion in a convincing manner. The Liberal Democrats, strongly influenced by the business sector, were late to demand reversion because they were responsible for governing and maintaining good relations with USCAR and because they were politically tied to their governing sister party in Japan, which for many years did not press its demands for reversion. As this party did not lack political acumen, a fact demonstrated by its success in winning most of the elections

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held under the American regime, the political platforms and pronouncements of the Liberal Democrats could be seen as a kind of barometer of what was each year politically respectable while still being acceptable to United States interests in the Ryukyus. For this reason, after the conservative platforms of the 1950's presented above, it is useful to examine some of the party's pronouncements and deeds during the 1960's.

In August 1963 the Liberal Democrats refused to go along with an opposition proposal condemning the United States position in Okinawa as "military and colonial" and to demand immediate reversion. Instead, the conservatives drafted a measure stressing the importance of United States and Japanese cooperation for the economy of the Ryukyus and merely "looking forward" to the return of Japanese administration without pressing for it in the immediate future.[43]

In February 1965 the wealthy and conservative Chief Executive Seiho Matsuoka, the first person elected to the position by the Liberal Democratic-controlled Legislature, declared that the energy spent in promoting the reversion of Okinawa would be better used to advance the people's welfare. He also declared, however, that the first step in this direction was to obtain from USCAR more authority for the Government of the Ryukyus.[44] One year later he elaborated on this theme by stating that "the United States Administrators should be just a small advisory body instead of running our government for us." Neverthe-

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less, he still appeared to be out of sympathy with the reversion movement.[45]

The beginning of large-scale United States combat involvement in Vietnam, together with the use made of Okinawan bases in the prosecution of that war, raised among the local population the fear that the Ryukyus had now been placed in an extremely dangerous position. This situation had generally resulted in increased demands for the removal of the bases, although among some groups it had the opposite effect.

According to a series of articles by New York Times correspondent Robert Trumbull, the escalation of the Vietnamese conflict was responsible for providing some additional supports among the conservative Okinawan leadership for the status quo. The war had apparently made many prominent Ryukyuans aware of the importance of the Okinawan bases for the defense of Japan during what seemed to be a perilous time in the Far East. The conservatives realized that the Japanese Government had quietly agreed to the American retention of Okinawan bases until the tensions in Asia had subsided, although this was not expected to happen in the near future. Conservative Okinawans, as loyal Japanese, did not wish to deprive Japan at such a time of the nuclear protection provided by the bases located on their islands. They explained away the recurrent demands for immediate reversion, heard at the time from the Ryukyuan and Japanese oppositions, as being

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merely intended for local political effect. Some prominent Liberal Democrats declared, however, that while they were not asking for immediate reversion, they did want to receive from the United States a timetable for a gradual transfer of administrative authority to Japan.[46]

Although some expressions of fear concerning the effects of reversion on the local economy were always voiced, the reports of significant public, or semi-public, expressions of support for a long-term continuation of the status quo that have been cited were made only until the middle of 1967. While this does not mean that no such statements of support were ever heard after that date, the year 1967, as has been mentioned repeatedly in this study, witnessed a significant change in Japanese and Okinawan opinions on the reversion question. From 1967 on the demands for reversion became more insistent, and even the conservatives began to modify their support for reversion in the indefinite future to declarations asking for more definite and more concrete plans for a return of the administrative rights to Japan.

The Joint Statement by President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato in November 1967, previously referred to in Chapter III, provides strong evidence for this basic change in the political climate in the Ryukyus and Japan regarding reversion. Until the 1967 year of transition, however, the great mass of the Okinawan population, while never forgetting their ultimate goal of a reunion with

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the Japanese motherland, did not press their reversion demands even close to the point where the situation might have become politically untenable for the United States. Their acceptance of the status quo until then resulted from an Okinawan attitude made up of a mixture of nationalistic feelings, awareness of their economic dependence on the United States, and a resignation to American rule. This attitude helps to account for the general Ryukyuan "submissiveness" that was observed by many visitors to the Islands, and can be considered to have formed the most important support enjoyed by the United States administration of Okinawa.

Negative Okinawan Attitudes Toward Japan and the Japanese

If Okinawans found themselves in a dilemma over their relationship with the United States, their feelings for the Japanese homeland could probably be described in similar terms as a mixture of love and resentment, love for Japan and resentment toward the Japanese.

Okinawans wanted to be reunited with Japan for many reasons. They identified with Japan and its culture and derived a feeling of satisfaction from being part of a great, wealthy and important nation. As independence would have not only created an economically unviable state but also deprived Ryukyuans of these feelings, there seemed to exist no alternative to the American military-base regime except reunion with Japan.

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At the same time, however, Ryukyuans could not forget their pre-war treatment as second-class citizens of Japan and the sacrifice of Okinawa island for the defense of the Japanese mainland. The new Japanese Government's post-war policies, seen as a second sacrifice of Okinawa for Japanese security, kept these memories alive. The mixed feelings of Okinawans toward their Japanese homeland and its inhabitants must be kept in mind no less than Okinawan supports for the American regime before a full understanding of their reversion movement can be gained.

In the Japanese-Okinawan relationship, as in other similar situations, one of the main, if not the most important, reason for the ill-feelings and resentments felt by the Okinawans was their realization that the mainland population looked down on them and discriminated against them. Shinei Kyan, the Chairman of the politically important "Council for the Reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland," told the 1969 Japanese-American Kyoto Conference that

> The past 100 years have been a clear testimony to the fact that the Japanese Government invariably chose to overlook, if not openly discriminate against, Okinawans, whenever it was convenient to do so, ... For about 70 out of the 100 years of Japan's modernization, Okinawans were mercilessly discriminated against and merely tolerated at best, holding Japanese citizenship in name only.

That Mr. Kyan was at the time perhaps the chief Okinawan agitator for reunion with Japan makes these charges all the more remarkable, although it will be seen a little later

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that despite this serious accusation he was able to justify the desire for reversion.[47]

Any investigation of Okinawan attitudes toward the population of Japan reveals constant charges that the mainlanders looked down on Ryukyuans before the war, and in many cases even after 1945. Okinawans complained that for many years they were not considered to be really Japanese but were thought of as a kind of "half and half" breed, not quite Japanese and not entirely Chinese either. Okinawans not only come from a different part of Japan and have inherited a somewhat different cultural and historical tradition but they also frequently differ somewhat in physical appearance. In the words of a Japanese correspondent for the New York Times, Kensei Yoshida, with square shoulders, thick eyebrows and a dark complexion a man is "conspicuous" in Tokyo as a "southerner" among the fair-skinned mainlanders. Before World War II these differences meant that Okinawans were stigmatized as second-class citizens and even "outcasts," according to one prominent Okinawan living in Japan, who were often denied jobs or the opportunity to rent rooms and who in the military and civilian services could usually expect promotion only up to certain ranks.[48]

Okinawans also had political complaints to level against the pre-1945 Japanese regime. In his previously quoted speech Shinei Kyan charged that not until the forty-fifth year of the Meiji era were Okinawans allowed

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some participation in government, and then only "with inequity." It was not until 1920 that "full participation was sanctioned."[49]

To Ryukyuans the pre-war rule of Japan often appeared "oppressive" as their islands were ruled by governors born in the main islands and appointed by the Central Government in Tokyo.[50] In 1956 Tsumichiyo Asato, then Chairman of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party and the leader of the opposition in the Legislature, admitted that Okinawans enjoyed more freedom under the rule of the United States than had been the case under the Japanese. In what was intended as a negative reference to the American Administration Asato added: "We had a military government under the Japanese too, and we are tired of it."[51]

The Ryukyuan complaints that their Japanese compatriots had treated them as second-class citizens and had discriminated against them applied not only to personal relations and political participation but also to the sphere of defense policy. Okinawans felt that their fellow countrymen had sacrificed them in the bloody battle fought in the spring of 1945 so that the main islands of Japan might be spared an American invasion. The Okinawans noted, however, that when Japan itself was threatened with nuclear weapons, it surrendered rather meekly. Many Okinawans had, in addition, some discouraging stories concerning the behavior of Japanese soldiers during the battle, who took food from local children and forced

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terrified civilians, including women and children, from the shelters in which all were seeking protection from the incessant American bombardment.[52] The combination of a strategy that considered Okinawa expendable and of behavior by Japanese troops that sometimes bore little resemblance to the actions of an army defending its own soil or its own people must have been taken by many Okinawans as final proof that the mainlanders did not consider them to be full-fledged Japanese.

A Japanese newspaperman wrote late in 1968 that deep in their hearts Okinawans felt that three great tragedies had occurred in their history. These were the Keicho War and the Satsuma Clan's invasion of the Ryukyus in 1609, when Okinawa first came under Japanese domination, the 1879 change in status when the Ryukyus were reduced to a mere prefecture of Japan, and the 1945 battle for Okinawa. He noted that all of these calamities had been caused by the "homeland people."[53]

Ryukyuans might have found it easier to forget the unpleasant memories of the past had there not appeared before their eyes what they considered to be evidence that the new democratic post-war Japan might not treat them in the future much better than pre-war Imperial Japan had treated them. The most obvious post-war realities to arouse Okinawan suspicions were the Japanese Government's agreement to the treaty turning Okinawa over to American administration and the great difference in the freedom

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of action permitted in United States bases located in Okinawa and in Japan.

Okinawans saw their main island transformed into a fortress bristling with the latest weapons of modern warfare, including nuclear warheads, and a base for combat operations. At the same time the Japanese Government was constantly reassuring its people that, in line with its "three non-nuclear principles," it would never permit nuclear warheads to be brought into Japan, and American military operations from Japanese bases were subject to prior consultations with the Japanese Government. Under these circumstances many Okinawans could not help feeling that once more, as in 1945, their islands were being jeopardized, and perhaps even sacrificed, in order to spare the main islands of Japan a similar fate. This point was repeatedly noted by the two outstanding Ryukyuan advocates of reversion, Shinei Kyan, the Chairman of the Okinawan Reversion Council, and Chobyo Yara, first the Chairman of the Teachers' Association and later the opposition-backed Chief Executive. Yara's remark, cited earlier, about B-52 bombers coming and going freely to and from Okinawan bases while they were not permitted to use Japanese bases, and his statement that "Okinawa should not be allowed to be sacrificed for the sake of the United States-Japan Security Treaty" were typical of such charges.[54]

In personal contacts with Japanese from the main

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islands during the post-war era Okinawans sometimes gained the impression that the mainlanders still looked down on them. In 1960 one investigator reported that Okinawan teachers admitted their annoyance at the superior attitude displayed by Japanese teachers sent to their islands. A similar problem was noted in connection with mainland doctors working in Okinawa.[55]

Many of the post-war policies of the Japanese Government in regard to the status of the Ryukyu Islands were interpreted by their inhabitants as indicative of a continuation of the old treatment of Okinawa as an "expendable quantity."

The first complaint of this nature concerned the willingness of the Japanese Government to sign a treaty in 1951 turning the Ryukyus over to United States administration without the local population having had any say in the matter, or even having been consulted.[56] While the Japanese Government had only a limited choice in 1951 in determining the political status of the Islands, it should still be pointed out that the Japanese Government agreed to American rule over Okinawa in order to expedite the signing of the peace treaty, which enabled the main islands of Japan to regain their independence.

The policies of the Japanese Government after the signing of the 1951 United States-Japan Peace Treaty gave Okinawans the distinct impression that the homeland government, which in their view had abandoned them in 1951,

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displayed no real interest in bringing about the return of the Ryukyus to Japan.

An examination of the Okinawan press, of statements made by prominent Okinawans, and of resolutions adopted by the Ryukyuan Assembly and by various private organizations in the Islands reveals a repetition of the same charges, of which the following are typical examples: the Japanese public is indifferent to the Okinawan desire for reversion; Japanese leaders have not really thought out the economic, political and military problems connected with reversion;[57] the government of Prime Minister Sato is not showing enough determination in urging reversion on the United States Government;[58] "The posture of the mainland government continues to be negative;"[59] the attitude of the Japanese Government toward the problem has resulted in a policy that "thus far has failed from taking full measures for its settlement;"[60] "in the eyes of most Okinawans, the Government of Japan is merely following the basic policy formulated by the U.S. Government."[61] The list could be continued almost endlessly.

Ryukyuan experiences under Japanese rule before the war and the post-war performance of the Japanese Government resulted in a strong distrust of the possible future actions of that government. As a result of this two important suspicions arose concerning the economic welfare of the Islands.

In the previously referred to April 1967 Tokyo

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University survey of Okinawan views the respondents were asked to give their opinion of how the Ryukyus would have fared in terms of material well-being had they remained under Japanese rule after 1945. The answer given by 41 per cent of the participants was "worse off."[62]

The second suspicion was expressed in a view that became popular in 1968, when the reversion movement assumed more serious proportions. Neither Chief Executive Seiho Matsuoka, nor Ryukyu Chamber of Commerce and Industry President Kotaro Kokuba, nor the Chairman of the Okinawan Reversion Council Shinei Kyan cared to refute this suspicion, which was stated by a Japanese newspaperman reporting from Okinawa in the following terms:[63]

> Once we are returned to Japan, we will not be pampered as greatly as at present. It is extremely clear that Okinawa will be treated like a third-rate prefecture. Therefore, before our reversion we must get what is due us, and take what we can get...

The feeling that Okinawans must exploit the unique opportunity presented by the political situation prevailing in the last years before reversion expressed itself in demands for a very large increase in the amount of economic aid given by the Japanese Government to the Ryukyu Islands. By 1969 a fourfold increase was asked.[64]

Another important demand of the late 1960's was more political, or perhaps merely psychological, in nature and concerned the Okinawan request for participation in the Japanese Diet. This demand had by February 1968 resulted

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in the adoption of a unanimous resolution on the part of the Legislature of the Ryukyus requesting permission for such participation from both the Japanese and the United States Governments.[65]

An examination of various public opinion polls of the late 1960's reveals a definite tendency for a substantial segment of Okinawan opinion to blame the Japanese Government for much of the long delay in achieving reversion. In the Tokyo University Sociology Research Room survey of December 1967, 36 per cent of those polled placed the major responsibility for the failure to achieve reversion on the Japanese Government. This represented an increase of 15 per cent for this answer over 1966.[66] In case it should be felt that this constituted only a minority of the respondents, it must be noted that the question specified "the major responsibility." A larger number would presumably have answered in the affirmative to a question asking if the Japanese Government was felt to be responsible for at least "some" of the lack of progress on the reversion demands.

In the September 1967 Asahi Shimbun opinion survey 44 per cent of the respondents answered a question about their feelings toward the mainland by stating one or the other of the various complaints enumerated above. Another 38 per cent merely declared that the attitude of the mainland "could not be helped." In the same poll the participants were also asked what they wanted the Japanese

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Government to do for them "immediately," multiple replies being acceptable. Their answers to this question, which did not concern basic efforts to obtain reversion, were as follows:[67]

Diet seats for Okinawa	41 per cent
Increase aid to Okinawa	34 per cent
Raise educational standards to mainland levels	50 per cent
Provide the same social security benefits as on the mainland	35 per cent
Planned economic development of Okinawa	26 per cent
Increase personnel interchange between the governments of Japan and of Okinawa	8 per cent
Increase Japan's voice in the administration of Okinawa	18 per cent
Change the Okinawan currency from U.S. Dollars to Japanese Yen	7 per cent
Other replies	1 per cent
No reply	16 per cent

This last part of the poll presents a general picture of practical Okinawan demands from the mainland government late in 1967. The great importance placed on Okinawan representation in the Japanese Diet reflects the campaign conducted at that time in the Ryukyus on behalf of this particular demand.

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As the previous examination of negative Okinawan attitudes toward the mainland people and government lends itself easily to a misunderstanding of the complex political thinking of the Ryukyuans, it is now necessary to place these attitudes in their proper perspective.

The criticisms and resentments felt by Okinawans toward their acknowledged countrymen from the main islands of Japan did not in any way signify a non-identification with Japanese nationality, or the absence of a fervent desire to be reunited with what Ryukyuans considered to be their motherland. Okinawan feelings of hostility directed against Japan, real as they were and based as they were on genuine grievances, could more properly be placed in the category of a family quarrel. Some Americans mistakenly interpreted these feelings as proof that, at heart, a large part of the Okinawan population did not really desire reversion. This could not have been further from the truth. Most Okinawans would criticize the homeland people or government and at the same time ask for reversion. It should not be forgotten that much of the post-1951 criticism of Japanese policies was concerned with complaints that the mainland was not doing enough to bring about an early reversion of the Ryukyus. At no time did any sizable portion of the Okinawan population attempt to use the grievances felt toward Japan as a justification for demanding independence, the indefinite continuation of American rule, or any ultimate status for their island chain other than

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reversion to Japan. The maximum support derived by the United States from anti-Japanese attitudes in the Ryukyus was a somewhat greater willingness on the part of the local inhabitants to continue for a few more years with the American regime and with the economic benefits it provided, as a temporary substitute for reversion.

During the long pre-war period of control by the mainland, Okinawans had largely assimilated into Japanese culture and had come to regard Japan as their homeland. Okinawans had sat in the Japanese Diet and held positions in the national government in Tokyo, even if these were usually of a minor nature. No matter how much other Japanese might have looked down on them, Okinawans saw their future as tied to that of Japan, looked up to Japan, and were proud to be able to identify as Japanese.[68]

Considering the differences in race, language and culture between the United States and the Ryukyus, and the purposes and policies of the American administration of the archipelago, no such assimilation into, and identification with the United States could have occurred.

Under Japanese rule a relationship had developed in which Okinawa merely became the lesser member of the family who had made progress in the decades before 1945 and expected ultimately to be accepted as a full member. Association with the United States merely resulted in a superficial assimilation of some American cultural traits. The United States was considered to be a completely dif-

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ferent nation, and Americans if anything encouraged this view. No Okinawans were to be found in the Congress or in the national government in Washington, and none was expected to go there. Due to the cultural and racial differences between Ryukyuans and Americans and to American policy, becoming a member of the American family, even if it had been desired, seemed completely impossible. To be ruled by the United States meant for Okinawans to be permanently consigned to the status of a subject people.

It should be pointed out that the Ryukyuans, naturally, did not expect reversion to mean a return to the political and economic conditions in existence before the coming of the Americans.[69] Okinawans were well aware of the many changes that had taken place in Japan since 1945 and felt that the era of Japanese militarism and exclusiveness had come to an end. They further believed that under the conditions of post-war democracy prevailing on the mainland, and with the advances made in electronic mass communications, many of the gaps that had existed between the main islands and the Ryukyus had been closed. Under these circumstances it was felt that there would be no recurrence of old abuses.[70]

The dependence of the Okinawan economy on the military presence of the United States had placed the local inhabitants in a dilemma which they resolved for many years by demanding reversion but not pressing for it too strenuously. No dilemma of similar importance was, however,

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felt by most Ryukyuans as a result of their animosities and resentments toward the mainland Japanese. These feelings might have made some Okinawans a little less eager for immediate reversion, but few Ryukyuans would have been willing to purposely delay reversion for any considerable period of time for this one reason.

Former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer summarized the situation by stating that despite the resentment caused by their pre-war treatment as second-class citizens, twenty-three years under United States military rule had turned Okinawans into the "most unambiguously patriotic of all Japanese."[71]

The Okinawan Council for Reunion with the Fatherland expressed the apparent contradiction in a more poetic manner. Although it was a leading organization in the struggle for reversion, the Council did not hesitate to call the 1968 centenary of the Meiji Restoration in Japan the centenary of Okinawa's oppression by the North.[72] Shinei Kyan, despite all his criticisms of Japan mentioned earlier in this section, provided a somewhat romantic explanation for the contradiction:[73]

> We Okinawans are real Japanese ... Japan is our mother; Okinawa is the child. After years of separation we want to go back to our parents. Even if our parent is cowardly and lacks the courage to take us back, our desire remains the same.

Conclusions

This chapter provides an opportunity for judging

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how successfully the United States was able to meet the central challenge that a dependency relationship presents to the ruling power, namely the exploitation of all available factors to win sufficient acceptance from the local population so as to make possible a reasonably efficient functioning of the regime.

The three main supports enjoyed by the United States in Okinawa were: the local population's original fear of and respect for the American victors of World War II and the power and wealth of their conquerors; the gratitude felt as a result of the unexpectedly good behavior of the Americans and the help extended by them in rebuilding the main island; and the economic dependence of Okinawa on the ruling power. Together these produced the feeling of resignation among the Ryukyuans that was so useful to the United States. The mixed attitudes of Okinawans toward the main-island Japanese represented an apparent more than a real potential for building supports. The discussion of these attitudes was included here partly because they were sometimes used as an argument to advance the claim that Ryukyuans did not really desire reversion.

One common denominator of all supports found by the United States in the Ryukyu Islands was their temporary nature. Feelings of gratitude wear out after a certain time, usually sooner rather than later. Fear and respect can be maintained only if the ruling power can convince the subject population that it is able, willing and ready

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to apply whatever pressures are needed to enforce its will whenever it is challenged. The democratic nature of the American political system made it impossible for the United States to demonstrate convincingly its willingness and readiness to use the pressures it was theoretically able to apply. More will be said about this in the last chapters.

The longest lasting supports enjoyed by the United States came from the economic dependence of the archipelago on the military presence of the United States. This had placed most of the Okinawan population in a dilemma, forcing upon it a choice between national sentiments and material interests, which was for many years resolved through the simple expedient of supporting reversion at a later and undefined time. This economic dilemma provides the most important reason for the Okinawan acquiescence to more than two decades of American rule. In Chapters IV and V it was pointed out that the United States failed to make the maximum use of the potential presented by economic factors in gaining acceptance for her rule. This, as well as Washington's attitudes concerning aid to the Ryukyus could lead to the conclusions not only that assistance could probably have been used to lengthen further the period of American administration, but also that the economic supports derived by the United States in Okinawa were more the result of accidental circumstances than of a premeditated political plan to bind the Ryukyuan economy to the presence of the ruling power.

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Despite the importance of these economic supports they, too, turned out to be of limited duration. Due to a variety of not always related factors -- which included the spectacular progress of the Japanese economy during the 1960's, the remaining gaps in social welfare between Japan and the Ryukyus, the Vietnamese War, the revival of Japanese nationalism and the accumulation of grievances and frustrations during more than twenty years of foreign rule -- by the late 1960's an Okinawan majority was no longer willing to further postpone reversion for economic reasons. This fact had to be noted in the present chapter although the causes for it go far beyond its scope.

Fear, gratitude and economic factors represent almost the only supports that a democratic power could exploit for its purposes in a dependency. The United States could not do much in the way of ideologically tying the Ryukyuan population to herself. The teaching of the American ideology, democracy, only served to undermine foreign rule.

Nor was the United States capable of utilizing the very small and only apparent potential presented by Ryukyuan independence feelings and hostility to Japan. A totalitarian power might have attempted to exploit these to a much greater extent and could have tried to "re-educate" the local population. Even a dictatorship would have been far from certain to succeed in an enterprise of this sort due to the very limited potential presented by

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the attitudes in question. A democratic ruling power, however, could do almost nothing in this direction. In the next chapter it will be seen that the United States even maintained an educational system in the Ryukyu Islands that raised young Okinawans as Japanese.

The only way in which the United States could have achieved a permanent Okinawan acceptance of continued political association was by assimilating Ryukyuans into American culture and developing among them an identification with America. The Japanese had done this during their more than three hundred years' rule over the archipelago. But the United States was not interested in following suit and probably would not have succeeded had she tried to do so.

Americans were prevented from even attempting to assimilate Okinawans into their culture both by their desire not to antagonize Japan any further and by their traditional attitudes toward overseas possessions densely inhabited by non-White races. It should not be forgotten that the United States expanded over the North American continent with the aim of settling the newly acquired territories with its own and kindred nationalities and then incorporating these into the Union, but for a variety of reasons it took a completely different view of the overseas possessions acquired from 1898 on. Most of these were consigned to the category of "unincorporated territories" and it was many years before one of these possessions, Hawaii,

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was finally given statehood.

The United States had, for modern conditions, been relatively successful in meeting the central challenge presented by a dependency to its rulers. American rule continued for twenty-four years in an efficient form until Washington felt it expedient to agree to the return of Okinawa within a period of three years. This rule could perhaps have been prolonged for a few more years had the United States been willing to exploit more fully the economic possibilities available to it. As it was, the United States' success as a foreign ruler was probably at least as much a matter of chance as of deliberate planning.

In the ultimate success that a ruling power can achieve in a dependency, bringing about the identification of the local population with the ruler, the United States failed and Japan succeeded, despite the fact that Okinawans probably received worse treatment from the latter than from the former. The United States was prevented, because of its own intrinsic character and its international political interests, from even seriously attempting to foster such identification among the Okinawans.

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NOTES

[1]George H. Kerr, Okinawa, The History of an Island People (Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1958), pp. 183-341.

[2]The New York Times, March 15, 1954, p. 25:2.

[3]The New York Times, April 15, 1956, p. 7:1.

[4]The New York Times, November 14, 1960, p. 11:2-6.

[5]The New York Times, February 21, 1969, p. 12:1-4; and April 6, 1969, VI, p. 90. (Both articles are by Takashi Oka).

[6]Letters written by Shigeru Yoseyana, President, The First Enterprise Co., Ltd., Naha, Okinawa, dated March 31, 1966 and by Sosei Gushiken, President, Orion Breweries, Ltd., Naha, Okinawa and President, The Ryukyu Industrial Federation, dated February 2, 1966, both addressed to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), The General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 8. Other letters from Sosei Gushiken to General Caraway may be found in Boxes No. 7 and 22. The letter written by Mr. Gushiken on February 2, 1966 includes a passage which speaks of the need to "make every effort to strengthen the partnership among United States, Japan and the Ryukyus for defense of free nations." This opinion had by 1966 ceased to be politically fashionable in Okinawa and the reversionists would as a rule not have referred to their islands by using the term "Ryukyus."

[7]Nikkan Kogyo (Tokyo), November 18, 1969, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, November 1969, No. 24, pp. 23-24. (Mimeographed).

[8]The New York Times, May 25, 1969, IV, p. 17:4-7. (Article by Tom Wicker).

[9]Interview with Dr. Shannon McCune, former Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands, April 28, 1969.

[10]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), October 28, 1969, p. 1:2-3. See also Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, October 12, 1969. (Mimeographed).

[11]The New York Times, March 22, 1964, p. 14:1-5.

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[12]The New York Times, April 7, 1957, VI, p. 63 (Article by Robert Trumbull).

[13]The New York Times, September 21, 1952, VI, pp. 62-63; and September 3, 1961, p. 26:1. See also Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), p. 145.

[14]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 33. Testimony presented by Mr. Siena.

[15]Mainichi (Tokyo), December 12, 1969, p. 1:4-6.

[16]The New York Times, January 20, 1958, p. 3:3-4.

[17]The New York Times, February 21, 1960, p. 18:1.

[18]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 21.

[19]The Baltimore Sun, November 23, 1969, p. A11:1-3. (Article by Thomas Pepper).

[20]Mainichi (Tokyo), December 5, 1969, p. 1:2-4.

[21]"Asahi Shimbun Poll," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), Vol. 15, No. 1 (January-March 1968), p. 48.

[22]The New York Times, June 7, 1967, p. 2:4. (Article by Robert Trumbull).

[23]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), March 26, 1968, p. 3:6-8.

[24]The New York Times, April 3, 1945, p. 3:1; April 9, 1945, p. 11:2-3; April 20, 1945, p. 8:3-4; and April 30, 1945, p. 8:3.

[25]The New York Times, April 1, 1946, p. 9:1-2.

[26]"Okinawa: Forgotten Island," Time, November 28, 1949, p. 24.

[27]Sakanaka Tomohisa, "The Present Status of the Okinawan Reversion Movement," Japan Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January-March 1968), p. 31.

[28]Ibid., pp. 31-32.

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[29]"Okinawa: Base to Dominate Asia," U.S. News and World Reports, June 22, 1951, p. 26.

[30]John Barr, "The Ryukyu Islands," British Survey, No. 175 (October 1963), p. 16.

[31]Mainichi (Tokyo), October 7, 1968, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., October 1968, No. 19, p. 1.

[32]Shinkichi Eto, "Attitude of Peking and Taiwan Governments on Okinawa Issue," Reference in Relation to the Second Agenda Topic, Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Kyoto, Japan, January 1969, pp. 11-12. (Mimeographed).

[33]Interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[34]M.D. Morris, Okinawa, A Tiger by the Tail (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1968), p. 190.

[35]The New York Times, March 15, 1954, p. 25:2.

[36]The New York Times, April 18, 1956, p. 17:1-2.

[37]The New York Times, March 18, 1958, p. 4:2-3.

[38]The New York Times, January 2, 1959, p. 3:1.

[39]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1960 (and Related Agencies), 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 152. See also The New York Times, February 28, 1960, p. 25:1.

[40]The New York Times, November 13, 1960, p. 36:1-2.

[41]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, H.R. 11812, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1965, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 540.

[42]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., January 26, 1965.

[43]The New York Times, August 29, 1963, p. 3:7.

[44]The New York Times, February 21, 1965, p. 8:1.

[45]The New York Times, March 24, 1966, p. 6:1-2.

[46]The New York Times, March 10, 1965, p. 4:5-6; March 21, 1965, p. 27:3; and June 7, 1967, p. 2:4.

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[47]Shinei Kyan, "Voice of Okinawa," Quarterly Report of the Okinawan Problems (Tokyo, Japan: Assistance Association for Okinawa, Ogasawara and Northern Islands - Nampo Doho Engokai), No. 4 (March 1969), p. 48.

[48]Ibid., p. 48. See also The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, pp. 6, 89-92; August 10, 1969, p. 9:1; and June 7, 1967, p. 2:4.

[49]Kyan, Quarterly Report of the Okinawan Problems, No. 4, op. cit., p. 48. The name "Kyan" is sometimes written in English as "Kiyan."

[50]The New York Times, August 10, 1969, p. 9:1.

[51]The New York Times, April 15, 1956, p. 7:1-3.

[52]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, p. 30, 89-92.

[53]Mainichi (Tokyo), October 9, 1968, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., October 1968, No. 19, p. 5.

[54]The New York Times, February 16, 1969, p. 3:4-8. See also Mainichi (Tokyo), November 12, 1969, p. 1:3; Tokyo Shimbun, December 10, 1968, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., December 1968, No. 26, p. 17; and Ryukyu Shimpo and Jihyo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., April 20, 1969.

[55]David Wurfel, "Okinawa, Irredenta on the Pacific," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia, Winter 1962-1963), p. 362.

[56]The New York Times, February 16, 1969, p. 3:4-8; and April 6, 1969, VI, p. 30.

[57]The Washington Post, November 3, 1967, p. A26:1-6.

[58]Miyasato Seigen, "Hopes and Realities in Okinawa," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), Vol. 12, No. 2 (April-June 1965), p. 165.

[59]Sakanaka Tomohisa, Japan Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, op. cit., pp. 40-41. This sentence is from a resolution adopted by the Assembly of the Ryukyu Islands on November 4, 1967.

[60]Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan (Tokyo, Japan: Nampo Doho Engokai, March 1967), p. 24.

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[61]Toshio Akamine, "Okinawa in Focus: Okinawan Position," Quarterly Report of the Okinawan Problems (Tokyo, Japan: Assistance Association for Okinawa, Ogasawara and Northern Islands - Nampo Doho Engokai), No. 3 (July 1968), p. 12.

[62]The New York Times, June 7, 1967, p. 2:4.

[63]Mainichi (Tokyo), October 9, 1968, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., October 1968, No. 19, pp. 5-6.

[64]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, pp. 30, 89.

[65]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 3, 1968, p. 1:1.

[66]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), March 26, 1968, p. 3:6-8.

[67]"Asahi Shimbun Survey" (Conducted 12-13 September 1967) (Reproduced by U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, 17 October, 1967), pp. 13-14. (Mimeographed).

[68]Kerr, op. cit., pp. 342-458.

[69]The New York Times, April 18, 1956, p. 17:1-2.

[70]The New York Times, August 10, 1969, p. 9:1. (Article by Kensei Yoshida).

[71]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, pp. 242-243. The remarks made by Professor Reischauer were quoted by Congressman Cohelan.

[72]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), July 3, 1969, p. 4:3-6.

[73]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, p. 92.

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CHAPTER IX

THE SENTIMENTS, NATURE AND LEADERSHIP OF THE REVERSION MOVEMENT

In the previous chapter an examination of the main factors detracting from the effectiveness of the reversion movement was undertaken. This provided an explanation of the main supports enjoyed by the American regime in the Ryukyu Islands and, by clarifying the mixed sentiments of the Okinawan population toward the two great powers competing for influence over it, placed the reversion movement in a better perspective. What was performed was, essentially, an analysis of what the struggle for reversion did not represent. From this the study will now turn to what constituted the essence of the reversion movement, the opposition to American rule and the desire to be reunited with Japan.

The supports enjoyed by the United States were, as has been pointed out, of only a limited nature. The feeling of helplessness in the face of the superior American power that had conquered the Islands in 1945, the gratitude for the friendly behavior of the American Armed Forces, the economic dependence on the ruling power and to a much smaller degree the sentiments of hostility toward the mainland Japanese, only induced a willingness on the part of an

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Okinawan majority to accept a fairly long postponement of the date of reversion. Underlying this readiness to compromise with the realities of the Okinawan situation there always existed, however, the basic desire to be reunited with the Japanese homeland. This constituted the dominant attitude of most of the Ryukyuan population throughout the period of United States administration.

The overwhelming desire of the great majority of the Okinawans for a reunion with Japan provided the raw material of the reversion movement. For this raw material to be fashioned into the finished product of a political opposition movement, the leadership of a local elite was needed. This role was performed to a large extent by the Ryukyuan schoolteachers.

The background sentiment, the leadership, as well as the nature of the reversion movement will be examined in this chapter.

The Sentiments for Reversion

Almost from the very beginning of United States administration the dominant factor in Okinawan attitudes was the feeling for reversion. While this sentiment did not always result in political action and at times seemed to lie dormant underneath the surface, its existence could never be denied.

Within the first year of American rule signs could be detected that, despite their gratitude for aid extended

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by the United States, Okinawans wanted very much to be reunited with Japan. As soon as the original shock caused by the battle for the main island and the uncertainties concerning the new conquerors had dissipated, the underlying reversion feelings could be clearly noted.

In 1946 the Commander of United States Army Forces in Okinawa and head of the local Military Government, General Leo Donavan, summarized Ryukyuan feelings in the following words:[1]

> Thanks very much for all you've done for us, but please go away as soon as we are able to stand on our feet economically. We want to live our own lives, but since we've got used to Japanese ways we prefer them.

In the early years of United States administration no organized opposition to the American regime existed and political leaders could be found, usually from conservative backgrounds, who preferred to remain for the time being under American protection. This did not mean, however, that the great majority of the population desired a long-term continuation of United States rule.

The Japanese reversion organization Nampo Doho Engokai explained the absence of real opposition at the time as "due to the economic poverty, spiritual vacuum, social confusion and a difference in relations as are between the victor and the defeated resulting from Japan's defeat in World War II."[2]

Yoshio Higa, at first private secretary to the Governor of the Ryukyus and later Chief Executive of the

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Provisional Government of the Ryukyu Islands, warned repeatedly that the willingness of Okinawan political leaders to continue under American rule was not to be taken as indicating a similar attitude on the part of the remainder of the local population. He emphasized that, quite to the contrary, most Okinawans wanted to return to Japanese rule.[3]

The Okinawan reversion movement was formally organized on April 29, 1951. The date is significant. It came several months before the Peace Conference between most of the allied powers and Japan was convened in San Francisco, at a time when the negotiations on the terms of the treaty were under way and the American desire to retain the Ryukyu Islands had become known. On that day, a number of political parties and groups joined to form the Japan Reversion Promotion Association (Nippon Fukki Sokushin Kisei Tai). At about the same time, various youth leaders organized the Japan Reversion Promotion Youth League (Nippon Fukki Sokushin Seinen Doshi Kai). The two organizations then proceeded to form a number of consultative councils to help in the drive for reversion. Within three months these had collected the signatures of 72.1 per cent of the eligible voters in Okinawa (199,000 out of 276,000) for a petition asking for the return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. This was later presented to Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and to John Foster Dulles, who were attending the Peace Conference as chief delegates of their respective countries.[4]

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American officials tried to clarify at the time of the San Francisco Conference the significance of a United Nations Trusteeship, the status envisaged for the Ryukyu Islands in the draft of the Peace treaty. According to the American officials, it was based on the premise that, at a time to be determined by the Trusteeship Power, the inhabitants of the territory placed under its care would receive an opportunity to express their wishes concerning self-determination. The Okinawans replied that, according to their understanding, the inevitable outcome of trusteeship status would be independence, and pointed out that this was precisely what they were trying to avoid. Their aim was to be reunited with Japan.[5]

The Okinawan reversion movement was organized when it became apparent that a peace treaty would soon be signed between the United States and Japan which would result in the separation of the Ryukyu Islands from the latter country, and in an indefinite continuation of American rule over the archipelago. United States administration was now envisaged not merely as a concomitant condition of a temporary wartime or post-war occupation, but as part and parcel of the presumably permanent peace settlement. This helps to explain both the earlier absence of an Okinawan reversion movement and its organization at that particular time.

The Okinawans failed in the immediate objective which had prompted them to form the reversion movement. The peace treaty, with a clause maintaining United States

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administration over the Ryukyu Islands, was signed and promulgated without anyone paying much attention to the wishes of the local population. The Okinawan reversion movement continued to exist, however, and despite many setbacks and long years of disappointment played its part in keeping at all times the goal of a return to Japan before the eyes of the Ryukyuan people.

The difficulties faced in advancing the cause of reversion during the earliest period of American rule, and the unfavorable conditions encountered by the movement during the first years of its existence, were later described by one of its outstanding leaders, Chief Executive Chobyo Yara, in the following terms:[6]

> Working for reversion was not so easy in the early days, but I had a definite idea, right from the beginning of the American occupation, that we Okinawans were Japanese and that our destiny was as Japanese -- not to be under the Americans nor to be independent. All Okinawans did have the feeling of being Japanese, even in those early days. No one was against reversion to Japan. But the Americans were here, they were all powerful, and people were hesitant to advocate something that they knew the Americans didn't like.

At no time was there a lack of evidence to show what Okinawans regarded as their greatest political ambition.

Shortly after the formation of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands in 1952, one of the first measures of the newly elected Legislature was to pass a resolution calling for a restoration of the Islands to Japan.[7] By 1965, the Ryukyuan Assembly had adopted no less than eleven pro-reversion resolutions, usually by a unanimous vote.[8]

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It could be argued that such resolutions constituted merely a kind of ritual, performed by politicians a majority of whom was really in no hurry to achieve reversion, and who represented interests benefiting from the American regime. While this claim is at least partly valid, it must be pointed out that the necessity felt by these same politicians for performing this almost yearly ritual demonstrates the existence of widespread demands for reversion, even during the 1952-1965 period when the movement did not yet present the United States with insuperable problems.

The 1958 Naha mayoralty election, held in order to choose a replacement for the ousted pro-Communist Mayor Senaga, showed how, even during the less nationalistic 1950's, an unpopular American action could reveal the existence of an almost unanimous dislike of the position occupied by the United States in the archipelago.

It will be recalled that in this contest both candidates, Saichi Kaneshi (People's Party) and Tatsuo Taira (Socialist Masses Party in coalition with others), asked for the immediate reversion of the Ryukyu Islands. They differed mainly in Taira's willingness to work with the Americans while they were still in Okinawa, in contrast to Kaneshi's uncompromising opposition to the entire United States presence, including that of the bases. Although groups sympathetic to the United States could be found within the coalition supporting Taira, even the American Authorities had to agree that no candidate known as pro-

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American had a chance of winning.[9]

Kaneshi won this particular contest and later turned out to be a man with whom the United States Authorities could work. The key to this municipal election can be found in the time period during which it was held. It took place while feelings in Okinawa ran high over the land payments controversy. This helps to explain the strong anti-American position taken by both candidates, as well as Kaneshi's later more moderate stand when the dispute had been settled.[10]

The episode demonstrated the fragility of the supports enjoyed by the United States and the relative ease with which serious difficulties could bring to the surface a virtually united hostility to American rule.

The desire for an eventual return to Japan was the underlying foundation of Okinawan political aspirations, before as well as after the settlement of the land payments crisis. Evidence for this is provided in various reports sent back by American newspaper correspondents from the Ryukyu Islands. In 1960, a year of relatively good American-Okinawan relations, New York Times correspondent Robert Trumbull wrote:[11]

> Another notable new feature in the political atmosphere on this sometimes turbulent island is an apparent acceptance by high ranking Americans here that there is no use fighting the overwhelming popular sentiment favoring the return of the island to Japan.

One year later, another New York Times correspondent, A. M. Rosenthal, stated that despite the absence of any

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special or visible pressures on the United States to return Okinawa to Japan, and despite the absence of any mobs in the streets or of a sense of crisis, the idea of reversion was ever present. It was constantly on the minds of Okinawans, the Americans could not help but be aware of it, in short, it was a feeling that "just would not go away."[12]

In addition to opinion surveys, countless examples could be presented to show the strength of the reversion sentiments. No purpose would, however, be served by an attempt to catalogue the virtual deluge of statements, declarations, resolutions and the like, that poured forth over the years with the single purpose of helping to bring about the reunion of Okinawa with Japan. A simpler way of demonstrating the constantly repeated demands for reversion is provided in the acknowledgments made to this effect by high United States officials connected with Ryukyuan affairs. Once again in these statements, as well as in the information furnished by opinion polls, a definite intensification of reversion sentiments will be noted when the 1966-1967 period is reached.

In October 1966, the United States Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands, Gerald Warner, wrote to former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway and gave his opinion of the Okinawan opposition in the following terms:[13]

> Reversion is still the battle cry of most elements here but these ignore the consequences. The voices of those who know what would happen are not heard.

In 1969, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for

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International Affairs, in testimony before a Congressional Committee, spoke about a "rising impatience" concerning the reversion of Okinawa felt by both Ryukyuans and Japanese.[14]

In the same year High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Unger, in an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, felt compelled to confirm a statement by Senator Stennis to the effect that in every election held in Okinawa over a period of many years "every major candidate ran out on an anti-American or anti-U.S.A. ticket. And speeches uniformly bore that out." General Unger added, however, that in this respect the situation had improved from what it was ten years earlier. He also noted that, although the Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party would also include in its platforms certain anti-American passages, "they will not be quite as profound and quite as critical as will be the similar anti-U.S. platforms of the opposition party." General Unger explained that the conservative party had to take a somewhat anti-American stand because the opposition referred to United States administration as control by an alien race, and derived considerable political ammunition from this charge in its efforts to unseat the Liberal Democratic Party. Under these circumstances, in order to retain a popular following, the Democrats felt it necessary to prove that they were also critical of the rule of the United States.[15]

This statement provides an interesting indication of the political atmosphere in Okinawa during the late 1960's. It should also be pointed out that when General Unger was

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describing the political situation as improved from what it had been ten years earlier, this referred to the year of the land payments crisis, not to the years 1960 to 1966.

For additional evidence of the popularity of the reversion movement it is possible to consult public opinion polls.

The September 1967 Asahi Shimbun survey, conducted both in Japan and in the Ryukyus, asked the basic question "Do you think that the Ryukyus should be returned to Japan or not?" Among both Ryukyuan and Japanese respondents, 85 per cent replied "yes." In Japan only 2 per cent gave a "no" answer, while in Okinawa 4 per cent responded in this way. The remainder either gave a different answer or did not reply at all. When it was asked whether the timing of reversion was more important than the manner in which the Islands were returned or than the future status of the bases, 71 per cent of the Japanese and 70 per cent of the Okinawans answered "yes." Those who said "no" numbered only 8 per cent among the Japanese respondents and 5 per cent among the Okinawans, with the remainder, once again, giving either a different reply or no answer at all.[16]

In the Ryukyu Shimpo survey, conducted from July 22nd to 28, 1967, the persons polled were asked which status they preferred for Okinawa. The answers were:[17]

Immediate and complete reversion	43.8 per cent
Gradual reversion	32.9 per cent
Present status	8.6 per cent
State of the United States	0.7 per cent

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Independent country	0.1 per cent
Territory of Communist China	0.0 per cent
Territory of Taiwan	0.0 per cent
Others	0.8 per cent
Don't know	13.1 per cent
Total	100.0 per cent

These results differ somewhat from the previously mentioned survey. This could be due to technical differences in the way the polls were taken, or it might indicate an 8.3 per cent increase in the demand for reversion between July and September 1967. In this survey, taken in July, only 76.7 per cent of the sample favored reversion, with the majority of these desiring immediate reversion. A total of 8.6 per cent preferred the status quo. An even more radical answer is given by this poll to some of the other solutions proposed for the Okinawan problem. Despite all the talk about Ryukyuans being a different people from the Japanese and really desiring independence, only one tenth of one per cent of the respondents desired this status. The number believing in independence only equaled one seventh of the minute percentage that wanted to become a state of the United States. And nobody at all wished to become a part of either of the two Chinas.

The poll also brought out that 56.8 per cent of the participants expressed at least some sort of dissatisfaction with the United States administration of Okinawa. Of these, 29.6 per cent answered "slightly dissatisfied" and 27.2 per cent replied "very dissatisfied." Only 6 per

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cent expressed some sort of satisfaction.[18]

The Nature of the Reversion Movement

The previous chapter and the first part of the present one have been devoted to the mixed Okinawan feelings underlying the reversion movement, those that detracted from its effectiveness as well as the basic sentiment favoring a reunion with Japan. In order to further explore the nature of this movement a brief examination will be conducted into some of its outstanding characteristics before examining the group that provided the leadership for the reversion struggle.

According to one of the Japan experts of the United States Department of State interviewed by the author, the Okinawan reversion movement could be divided into three distinct stages. In the first, covering the early years of United States administration, an acceptance of the status quo was generally considered to be respectable. Despite the desire for reversion, during the first stage the political parties did not feel compelled to articulate constantly demands for a reunion with Japan. The second stage, including roughly most of the 1950's as well as the early 1960's, was described as an intermediate period, when the advocacy of gradual reversion and of reversion at a later date were politically acceptable in the Islands. According to this analysis, the third stage probably began with the famous 1962 Kennedy statement of policy. It included the

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period during which Okinawan opinion shifted gradually to the view that only reversion by a specific and not too distant date would be acceptable.[19]

This division into three stages, naturally, does not represent the only way of looking at the reversion movement or of dividing it into various periods.

Both former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer and Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, in interviews with the author, expressed the view that Okinawan opposition to the rule of the United States was during the 1950's based on local problems and concerned itself far more with specific issues, such as the land payments dispute, rather than with the larger question of reversion to Japan. By contrast, during the 1960's, Okinawan opposition to the American regime was based on nationalism and was concerned more and more with the demand for reversion.[20]

It was pointed out earlier in this study that the Okinawan opposition to American rule could be depicted on a graph. This would show a gradual rise from the beginning of American rule until a first high point is reached during the climax of the land payments dispute in 1958. Thereafter, the chart would show a definite drop and would remain at a lower level until the early 1960's, when it would begin to rise once again. For the remainder of the 1960's there would be found a steady upward sloping of the curve, going beyond the 1958 high point and culminating in an apex around the time of the November 1969 reversion

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agreement. This view of the variations in the intensity of Okinawan opposition was confirmed to the author by Professor Reischauer.[21]

Local problems, and particularly the intensification of the land payments dispute followed by its solution in 1958, provide an explanation for the variations shown by the graph for the 1950's.

It is somewhat more complicated to account for the steady rise in the curve of Okinawan opposition during the 1960's. Dr. Ohama explained this, in part, by pointing to the situation existing after the signing of the second Japanese-American Security Treaty in 1960. This event increased American dependence on Okinawa for the strategic needs of the Western Pacific, with a consequent further build up of the local military installations and of the nuclear base. This, naturally, brought about an intensification of the problems and frictions generated by the presence of the bases.

Dr. Ohama also offered as a partial explanation for the rise in Okinawan opposition the dramatic increase in the Japanese level of prosperity that took place during the 1960's. As mentioned in Chapter V, this caused the gap between the Japanese and Ryukyuan standards of living to widen once again, and helped to undermine the supports derived by the American regime from the dependence of the Okinawan economy on the military presence of the United States. It should be added that the reappearance of a

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sense of self-confidence and the revival of nationalism in Japan during the 1960's, as well as Okinawa's involvement in the Vietnamese War, also played their part in stimulating the Okinawan desire to be reunited with the mainland. In Dr. Ohama's opinion, around the 1965-1966 period these various factors began to cause a distinct change in the feelings of the Okinawan population on the question of reversion.[22]

This would confirm the assertion, made repeatedly throughout this study, that from 1967 on a changed political climate prevailed in the Ryukyu Islands.

The Okinawan reversion movement could be analyzed not only in terms of the timing of its various phases but also according to factors such as originality, initiative, or relation to the Japanese reversion movement.

The relationship between the Okinawan and the Japanese reversion movements was of a somewhat complex nature. The quadrangle of main factors affecting American decisions in the Ryukyuan dependency relationship, described in Chapter II, noted that the principal effect of the Okinawan opposition on United States policy was indirect and resulted from its success in influencing Japanese domestic politics. Through this the Okinawan reversion movement was able to pressure the Japanese Government to demand reversion in a more convincing manner. A similar analysis was presented by two of the personalities interviewed by the author, who were most familiar with the Okinawan and Japanese reversion movements.

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Professor Reischauer explained that, although the Okinawans were ahead of the Japanese in first demanding reversion, the Okinawan movement was incapable of altering the political status of the archipelago through its own efforts. To accomplish this, assistance was needed from the main islands of Japan. In Professor Reischauer's opinion, the Ryukyuan agitation for reversion did not really stir the Japanese into action until the latter were ready for this.[23] This corresponds to the view expressed by Dr. Ohama to the author that it would have taken much longer for Okinawans to achieve reversion without the assistance of the Japanese political opposition. Unassisted, the Ryukyuan reversion movement was not strong enough to apply to the Japanese Government the required pressure to compel it to seek actively the return of Okinawa.[24]

Although the Okinawans had been the first to voice strong demands for reversion, in the specific issues around which the reversion struggle was fought they displayed very little initiative and usually followed the leadership provided by others. Many examples of this could be cited.

The island-wide campaign over the question of military sites received much of its inspiration from an Asahi Shimbun article that appeared on January 13, 1955 and discussed in detail various aspects of the situation in Okinawa. The 1964 split within the Okinawan conservative party over charges that Chief Executive Ota was too subservient to the American Administration, to be mentioned

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at the beginning of the next chapter, was a direct result of a series of articles published a little earlier in the Washington Post under the title "Our Unhappy Asian Bastion." These had been highly critical of American government methods in Okinawa.[25]

Dr. Nathaniel Thayer, former press attaché of the American Embassy in Tokyo, a former Director of the Japan Society of New York and a lifetime student of Japanese affairs, confirmed to the author the Okinawan tendency to turn a local problem into a political issue only after someone else had first taken the initiative in this. Dr. Thayer explained that many "sensations" which suddenly erupted into campaigns of protest, like the "revelations" that poison-gas or nuclear weapons were stored in Okinawa, had been known in the Ryukyus for several years but no one thought of launching protests on these matters until the Japanese press publicized them and the Japanese opposition started their exploitation as political issues.[26]

Former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway told the author that the hard core of the Okinawan reversionists, the group setting the tone for the entire movement, consisted of about six thousand activists sympathetic to the Japanese Socialist Party. General Caraway felt that as a result of this the specific line taken at any one moment by the Okinawan reversion movement was usually a reflection of Japanese Socialist policy.[27]

Former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Watson expressed

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to the author the opinion that emotions played a great part in the attitudes and actions of both Okinawans and Japanese in connection with the Ryukyuan problem. General Watson felt that unlike the Americans, the Okinawans usually reacted too much to the emotional aspects of a situation.[28]

A Japanese and Okinawan emotional overreaction should come as no real surprise if it is remembered that during the middle of the 1960's, the period of General Watson's tenure of office, the Okinawan reversion movement was based mainly on nationalistic feelings, and these always carry strong emotional overtones. Moreover, the Okinawan and Japanese perception of themselves as the weaker side resulted in feelings of insecurity, a condition that can frequently lead to emotional overreaction. The Americans, on the other hand, saw themselves as the stronger party in the dispute and frequently displayed feelings of superiority. The Americans were as a rule officials sent to the Ryukyus for a tour of duty of only a few years, usually with a feeling that the entire Okinawan problem was not a matter of life or death for their country. They were also carefully briefed before their departure on the proper attitudes to display after arriving in the Ryukyus. Under these circumstances the Americans could far more easily afford to be cool, collected and logical in their approach to Okinawan problems.

A previously mentioned Japanese observer of the Ryukyuan scene, Miyasato Seigen, noted an irrational

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Okinawan approach to the reversion question in a different context. He wrote in 1965 that:

> There is a great gap between the opportunism displayed by the Okinawans in their behavior and their desire for the return of administrative authority and increased autonomy. This gap is filled with self-delusion and a retreat into fantasy to avoid unpleasant realities. Whenever a United States-Japan joint statement appears, or a statement of administrative policy, or even the remarks of some politician, the Okinawans seize upon those aspects of it that conform to their hopes,... and lapse into a kind of euphoric feeling that everything has thereby been solved. When the bubble bursts, they are bitterly disappointed, but they never learn their lesson.

The Kennedy Statement of 1962 was given as a specific example of this Okinawan tendency. Mr. Seigen explains that many Okinawans interpreted it to mean that reversion was almost at hand.[29]

These observations would fit the description of a people which feels insecure and is caught in a dilemma. Insecurity can easily give rise to emotional overreaction and in a dilemma, such as the one in which Okinawans found themselves, there is usually a tendency to escape from an unresolvable reality into more pleasant illusions.

This brief examination of the characteristics of the Okinawan reversion movement would not be complete without looking into the frequently repeated charge that the Okinawans were not true Japanese. The Okinawan reversion movement was, therefore, not in the same class as other nationalist movements and was, according to this view, not to be taken seriously. The invasion of the Ryukyu Islands

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by the Satsuma Clan in 1609, the involuntary incorporation of the Islands as a Japanese prefecture in 1879, the hostility felt by Ryukyuans toward mainlanders and the cultural, linguistic and racial differences between Okinawans and Japanese were all offered as proofs of this charge.

In reply to this, it must be pointed out that for most Ryukyuans the events of 1609 and of 1879 long ago became a part of history. Moreover, these events, as well as the hostility felt toward the inhabitants of the main islands, were seen in the previous chapter not to have affected to any important degree the identification of most Okinawans with Japan and their desire to be reunited with that country. It will, therefore, only be necessary at this point to consider briefly the claim that the differences between the inhabitants of the main islands and those of the Ryukyu chain divide them into two separate nationalities.

All the evidence presented concerning differences between Okinawans and Japanese generally ended up by proving that the two groups differ from each other about as much as Bavarians differ from North Germans, or as much as the Marseillais differ from Parisians. The evidence also showed that Okinawans and Japanese differ from each other far less than most Hawaiians differ from the inhabitants of the other forty-nine states of the American Union.

In cases involving similar provincial differences, as well as in those where the differences are more profound,

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the factor ultimately determining whether or not two groups of people form a single nationality is how the two peoples involved view the matter. In the final analysis, whether or not Okinawans are Japanese does not depend on how many differences it is possible to discover between these two populations, but upon whether Okinawans consider themselves to be Japanese, and on whether the Japanese accept them as such. Everything written in this study seems to confirm that Ryukyuans consider themselves to be Japanese and that the mainlanders, despite any remaining tendencies to look down on Okinawans, share this feeling.[30] Whatever doubts may have existed on this point before 1945 were resolved by the long period of United States administration and by the ensuing struggle for the reunion of Japan with Okinawa.

Whatever other shortcomings may have been displayed by the Okinawan reversion movement, it was without any doubt a genuine nationalist movement.

The Role of the Schoolteachers in the Reversion Movement

For a number of partly preventable reasons the Okinawan schoolteachers played the role of the elite group that leads the struggle for national self-determination in a dependency.

Besides the usual complaints and feelings shared with most other Okinawans, the schoolteachers had a reason of their own for desiring to be reunited with Japan. Their great enthusiasm for reversion was complemented by character-

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istics enabling them to play a leading role in the reversion struggle. Their educational background made it possible for them to be very effective as political activists. Their professional position made it possible to influence the younger generation and the general respect commanded by the teaching profession in the Orient gave them a strong voice in their communities. The combination of these factors enabled the schoolteachers to become virtually the driving force behind the reversion movement.

The special reason of the schoolteachers for desiring reversion was largely economic in nature. Among those Okinawans who, because of the remaining economic gaps between Okinawa and Japan, saw their personal interests better served under Japanese than under American rule the schoolteachers were the outstanding group.

The Civil Affairs Directorate of the Department of the Army presented in 1965 to the Senate Appropriations Committee the following comparison between schoolteachers' salaries in the Ryukyus and in the Japanese prefecture of Saga:

	Annual pay in the Ryukyus	Saga Prefecture, Japan, base salaries, annual
Elementary School teachers	$1174	$1358
Junior High School teachers	1151	1375
Senior High School teachers	1208	1597
Average hourly salaries across the board	32 cents	48 cents

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It was also pointed out at this Senate hearing that, in addition to salary differentials, Okinawan schoolteachers were aware of social security and other fringe benefits enjoyed by their Japanese colleagues, which were either present to a much smaller degree or else non-existent in the Ryukyus. As was pointed out in Chapter V, by 1965 the Ryukyu Islands still had no real social security system and Okinawan schoolteachers relied "very heavily on the value that those retirement benefits carry for them as security for the future."[31]

Still another benefit expected by Ryukyuan schoolteachers from reversion was noted in a New York Times report from Okinawa. This mentioned the schoolteachers' belief that their calling would carry greater professional dignity under Japanese school administration than was the case under the American regime.[32]

In the matter of schoolteachers' salaries and of fringe benefits the United States once again permitted the political foundations of a billion dollar base to be endangered through a combination of neglect, lack of understanding and an unwillingness to spend a few million dollars at the right time. As usual, the Congress was, however, not entirely reluctant to allocate funds in order to secure the military interests of the United States in the Ryukyu Islands. The Congressional appropriations aimed at removing the economic motivation for the schoolteachers' extra enthusiasm for reversion proved, however, to have been just

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another case of "too little and too late."

Without having been requested by USCAR to do so, the Congress appropriated, in 1961, $1 million for assistance in raising the salaries of Ryukyuan schoolteachers. This contribution was thereafter continued and made possible a 15 per cent increase in the teachers' wages. The actual effect of this Congressional appropriation was, however, reduced in half when the Government of the Ryukyu Islands later raised the salaries of all its employees, including the schoolteachers. The million dollars appropriated represented then no more than 8 per cent of the higher wages paid to the teachers.[33]

Following these adjustments the salaries of Okinawan schoolteachers still compared unfavorably with those of their Japanese colleagues, as indicated in the table presented above. It should, in addition, be remembered that no real pension or social insurance system was provided at the time. Even this limited Congressional contribution toward reducing the economic incentives of the schoolteachers for a reunion with Japan came only in 1961, fully ten years after the formal founding of the Okinawan reversion movement in which these same schoolteachers had been a leading element from the beginning.

As usual, a variety of reasons were offered in order to account for the tardy and inadequate effort to mend an important political fence in Okinawa. It was explained that the Government of the Ryukyus had, compared to the

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Japanese Government, a relatively low level of income. The United States Government also feared that a complete correction of the situation might "unhinge the relationship with other wages" and decided that it would be best to proceed on a step by step basis, appropriating slightly larger sums every year so as to permit further gradual increases in the salaries of the schoolteachers. By 1965, four years after the first appropriation, the second step in this process was still being debated at a Senate Committee hearing at which Senator A.S. Mike Monroney, who had visited Okinawa one year earlier, described the situation in the following terms:

> They (the schoolteachers) are the leaders and the established spokesmen for the better class of people in the islands and this is a continual thorn in the side of our relationship, yet a very inexpensive one to take care of ... yet we are allowing a little irritation that could be removed by salary adjustments and retirement benefits for these same teachers that were former members of the same organization in Japan.

The Senator concluded that the United States, which was spending large sums for aid to countries not under American jurisdiction, was being "penny wise and pound foolish" in the strategic territory it was administering in the Western Pacific.[34]

While the United States acted indecisively on the question of schoolteachers' salaries the Government of the Ryukyu Islands had on its own initiative, started to pay annual increases to its instructional personnel. Only in the last years before the 1969 reversion agreement did

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the United States finally contribute more substantial sums for educational assistance to the GRI.[35]

The total American aid contribution to the Ryukyuan educational system amounted to almost two million dollars in fiscal 1966 and passed the three million dollar mark in FY 1967. The budget item designated "Benefits for Teachers" remained, however, at one million dollars through FY 1968 and was only raised to an estimated six million dollars in fiscal 1969.[36] In Chapter IV this sum was seen to have amounted to approximately one third of the total in directly appropriated United States aid to the Ryukyus. This represented a belated recognition of the key role played by the schoolteachers in the reversion struggle. By that time, however, political developments had proceeded much too far for these increased benefits for the schoolteachers to have any real effect on the situation in Okinawa.

The importance of economic factors in explaining the reversionist zeal of the Okinawan schoolteachers is only demonstrated partly through an examination of salaries statistics and United States aid intended to raise these. Additional evidence is provided by the compromises the schoolteachers were willing to make in order to achieve the benefits enjoyed by their Japanese colleagues.

The unwillingness of the United States Government to commit itself on a reasonably early date for the return of all Okinawan administrative rights to Japan had, by the middle of the 1960's, convinced some groups within the

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reversion movement of the necessity for trying a different approach. These groups believed that, as an interim measure, it might be possible to achieve the partial reversion of some of the administrative rights on a function by function basis. The proposals made to achieve this end were grouped together under the general heading of "functional reversion plans." In 1966 one such plan for the separate return of the Ryukyuan educational system's administration to Japan, in advance of the full reversion of the archipelago, had become popular in Okinawan reversionist circles. It originated with at least one large group among the schoolteachers.

In an article appearing in a Nampo Doho Engokai pamphlet advocating the separate return of the "educational rights" to Japan, Dr. Nobumoto Ohama noted that under American rule:

> The educational laws enforced in Okinawa are no different from Japan's and the textbooks and teaching materials being used are also the same. With the educational system virtually the same as Japan's, the transfer of the educational rights would entail no confusion.

Dr. Ohama also believed that it was only proper to transfer the Okinawan educational administration to the Japanese Government because the largest part of its aid for the Ryukyu Islands was allocated to their educational system. The author of the article then disagreed with those who contended that there existed no real need to transfer the Okinawan educational administration to the Japanese Government because the archipelago's educational

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system was substantially the same as the one existing in Japan. Dr. Ohama answered this criticism by pointing out that even if the Okinawan educational system was virtually identical to the one found in Japan, it operated under a different political system and was controlled by different authorities.[37]

An unsigned article in the same pamphlet also advocated the idea of educational reversion, but noted that:[38]

> When the reversion of educational rights is realized, ... Faculty members of the University of the Ryukyus will become national public service officials with their allowance systems becoming the same as those of the Japanese national universities... When the teachers' (from the lower schools) salary is leveled up to the standard of that of the teachers in Japan, a tentative measure will be necessary for adjustment of salaries between teachers and other public service officials.

The above arguments seem to show that the special emphasis being placed on a separate return of the Okinawan educational system's administration to Japan had nothing to do with any of its substantive needs. The Ryukyuan educational system was already a virtual duplicate of the one existing in Japan. Instead, the arguments presented would indicate that educational reversion merely represented an attempt on the part of a large group among the Okinawan instructional personnel to obtain for itself the benefits of a reunion with Japan without having to wait for the complete return of the Islands, an event which at the time still seemed far in the future.

Dr. Ohama was the chief Okinawan spokesman in Japan.

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He had to represent Ryukyuan interests and could not ignore the wishes of the group constituting the main moving force behind the Okinawan reversion movement. Under the circumstances, Dr. Ohama only hinted diplomatically at the real reason behind the demand for the separate return of the educational administration. The second article, in contrast, spoke openly of the advantages to be gained from the reversion of the educational rights.

Despite the interest aroused by them in Okinawa where they were also interpreted as steps in the direction of a reunion with Japan, all proposals for "functional reversion," including the plan for a separate return of the educational rights, soon came under strong criticism from the Japanese opposition parties and from various Japanese reversion organizations. These charged that the functional reversion plans were designed to "check the reversion movement" and to "make the military bases permanent." The negative attitude taken by Japanese reversionists who seemed to have nothing to gain from functional reversion would also suggest that those who supported these plans might have been motivated by some interest peculiar to themselves. The popularity of the proposal for educational reversion with an important group of schoolteachers points to a readiness on their part to accept an indefinite delay in the actual return of the Islands, and even to complicate the attainment of this goal, in exchange for the achievement, under a different arrangement, of the benefits expected by them from reversion.

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Leading figures in the Japanese reversion movement expressed fears that this would be the practical result of educational reversion. Tamotsu Sato, business manager of a major Japanese reversion organization, the Okinawa-Bonin Return League Central Executive Committee, declared that functional reversion was designed to "sidetrack" the all-important objective of the reversion movement, which was to attain the prompt and unconditional return of Okinawa. He also spoke of the need to see through the design behind the functional reversion scheme which, in Mr. Sato's opinion, was to weaken the reversion drive of the school-teachers who constituted the driving force of the Okinawan reversion movement. Mr. Sato felt that this would only be the first step in an attempt to render the entire movement ineffective. A similar concern was expressed by others, including Narue Takahashi, business manager of a different reversion organization, Okinawa-Ren, the National Movement Liaison Council for the Return of Okinawa.[39]

Eventually, nothing came out of this proposal as, in addition to the objections from the reversionist camp, the United States never considered it seriously. This episode would support the contention that by the timely spending of an additional few million dollars, to satisfy the school-teachers, or by the adoption of some "functional reversion" scheme, the United States could probably have taken some of the wind out of the sails of the Okinawan reversion movement.

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The examination of the proposal for a return of the educational administration to Japan also sheds some light on another interesting aspect of the Okinawan reversion movement. This concerns the assistance received by this movement from the educational policies pursued by the United States in the Ryukyu Islands.

By enforcing Japanese educational laws and practices in Okinawa, and by permitting the use of Japanese textbooks and teaching materials in Okinawan schools, the United States was carrying out a policy which was undoubtedly very considerate for the national sentiments and traditions of the Ryukyuan inhabitants. It also represented a practical approach from the standpoint of not having to write and to publish an almost complete new set of textbooks and teaching materials in a language in which the United States possessed few specialists qualified to perform this task. This also constituted, however, a policy resulting in the schools of a territory under American administration teaching national allegiance to a state competing with the United States for influence in, and ultimate control over, the territory in question. It is hardly necessary to add that such a policy was sooner or later bound to play a part in undermining whatever local acquiescence existed to the continued rule of the United States.

The irony of this situation is only mitigated by the realization that in the question of educational policy in Okinawa the United States found herself in a dilemma.

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Aside from the technical difficulties of rewriting a complete set of textbooks for all grades in a strange and, for Americans, difficult language, whatever policy would have been pursued by the United States in this matter would have constituted a political liability. To have attempted to teach a new and unwelcome national allegiance to the younger generation might have ultimately done more to undermine the political foundations of American rule than to continue teaching allegiance to Japan. This particular dilemma represented still another contradiction encountered by the United States in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands.

The Okinawan schoolteachers, specially motivated to work for the reunion of the Ryukyus with Japan and aided in their efforts within the insular school system by the educational policy of the United States, rarely failed to exploit an opportunity for advancing the cause of reversion. Abundant evidence can be found of their activism, of their success and of their influence over the Okinawan political scene.

The original Japan Reversion Promotion Association, founded in 1951, had been organized mainly around the local political parties. Less than two years later, in January 1953, this Association was reconstructed into an organization centered around the Okinawa Teachers Association as well as around the Seinen Rengo Kai (Federation of Youth Organizations), the Fujin Rengo Kai (Federation of Women's

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Organizations) and the Federation of Parents-Teachers Associations. The new Japan Reversion Promotion Association became the driving force behind the Okinawan reversion movement. It was further reorganized and expanded in April 1960 into the "Council for the Return of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland." This new organization also included all the Ryukyuan political parties, outside the OLDP, the labor unions and various educational organizations. Both in the reorganized Japan Reversion Promotion Association and in the later Council for the Return to the Fatherland, the Okinawa Teachers Association was always the central, propelling, force.[40]

An example of the close connection between the Teachers' Association and the Council for the Return to the Fatherland can be seen in that the same person, Shinei Kyan, served during the second half of the 1960's as Secretary and as President of the first-named organization, and as Chairman of the second.[41]

The schoolteachers were in a position to advance the cause of reversion in a variety of ways. By possessing the necessary education they were able to provide the movement with effective cadres. Because of the prestige traditionally enjoyed by teachers and scholars in Far Eastern societies, they carried great weight in their communities and were able to influence the general public.[42]

Through their professional work of educating over a period of more than two decades the youth of the Islands,

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the teachers were able to influence the later thinking of more than one generation of adult Okinawans. By means of the same instructional activities the schoolteachers were able to arouse the enthusiasm of many of the students under their care and to induce them to participate actively in the reversion movement, particularly in the many demonstrations staged against the rule and the policies of the United States Administration. In these political-educational activities the Okinawan schoolteachers were assisted by their Japanese colleagues who, with American encouragement, had been brought to teach in the Ryukyuan educational system. The activities of both the Okinawan and the Japanese schoolteachers resulted not only in the spread of pro-reversionist and anti-American feelings among their students, but at times also in encouraging neutralist and left-wing sentiments among their charges.[43]

Another method available to the schoolteachers in advancing the cause of reversion consisted in the direct activities of their own organization, the Teachers' Association. As a typical example of this it is possible to mention the presentation of a petition to Prime Minister Sato in 1965, requesting negotiations with the United States on the question of reversion and charging that rights claimed for Okinawans under the Japanese Constitution were not guaranteed in the Ryukyus.[44]

This last type constituted probably the least important category among the reversion activities of the school-

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teachers. By presenting petitions or resolutions of their own organization, or by lobbying in its name, the teachers represented just one interest group, although an influential one. On the other hand, by leading the reversion organizations, and by agitating in the schools and in the community at large, they were able to influence most of the Ryukyuan population. It was through such activities that the schoolteachers had their greatest impact.

The Okinawan schoolteachers were always in the forefront of whatever would in their view contribute to the advancement of the reversion cause. This could include the leadership of a purely symbolic struggle, such as the successful fight to win the right to fly the Rising Sun flag of Japan in the public schools.[45] It might also involve a serious political campaign, like the election of their former leader Chobyo Yara as Chief Executive of the GRI. As will be seen in Chapter XI, the schoolteachers were a major factor in Yara's victory.

One of the best illustrations of the political significance and power of the Okinawan schoolteachers was provided by the ill-fated attempt made in 1966 to restrict their political activities.

For at least one decade prior to that date the OLDP had shown concern over the political activism of the schoolteachers, which as a rule was directed against it, and had been considering measures for curbing these unscholastic activities of the teachers. The Central Educa-

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tion Committee of the Ryukyu Islands had drafted in 1958 two bills containing such restraints but, as USCAR did not then approve of them, they were never presented to the Legislature. In 1963 two similar bills were again drafted by the Central Education Committee. They were introduced in the Assembly in March of the same year, sent to the Education and Social Committee and by 1964 were again shelved without having been placed under deliberation. This time the objections preventing the bills from being seriously considered came from the opposition parties and from various other organizations.

The problem became more urgent for the conservatives when in the fall of 1965 the OLDP lost the Naha mayoralty election as well as a contest to fill a vacancy in the Legislature. The circumstances attending this electoral defeat made the ruling conservative party feel, in the words of its Secretary-General Kuwae, that it had been "beaten by the Teachers' Association." In consequence of this, the Democratic Party became insistent that something had to be done to enact the twice unsuccessful bills into law.[46]

On May 20, 1966, the Central Board of Education drafted two educational civil service bills. These were very similar to their ill-fated predecessors and provided basic policies for local school districts and for government teachers. The proposed bills contained clauses which the opposition parties charged would ban political acti-

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vities and strikes on the part of schoolteachers and provide for efficiency tests and ratings for instructional personnel. If adopted, the two bills would merely have introduced into the Ryukyus the same type of merit system and the same curbs on political activities as were found in the educational laws of Japan, the country to which the teachers wanted to return the administration of the educational system even before the full reversion of the Islands had taken place. Despite this, the opposition parties and the Okinawa Teachers' Association declared their determination not to accept the proposed reforms under any circumstances. The Democratic Party, in apparent agreement with the opposition on the purposes of the bills, supported them as necessary for "securing the neutrality of education."[47]

A long and bitter struggle, lasting until November 1967, was waged over the bills, soon called the "twin education bills." In the end the attempt to enact them into law had to be abandoned. The schoolteacher-led opposition did not hesitate to take the struggle into the streets and to use violence in its efforts to prevent the Democratic majority in the Legislature from passing the bills.

On February 1, 1967, 10,000 people demonstrated in front of the GRI Legislature. On the next day, there was a repeat performance, this time with the participation of 15,000 demonstrators and the occurrence of some injuries. The result of this was the closing of the Legislature for one hundred days.[48] On February 24, 1967 about 15,000

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teachers, union members and students battled police in a demonstration directed against the twin education bills. In this thirty policemen and demonstrators were injured.[49]

Over a period of several months the Democratic Party leaders were adamant on the passage of the bills. They publicly declared that Okinawan schoolteachers were entitled to the same treatment their counterparts were receiving on the Japanese mainland but that they had also to be subjected to the same controls as their colleagues in Japan.

The conservative leaders saw themselves in a serious crisis. They foresaw their party's defeat in the legislative elections scheduled for November 1968 and in a possible future popular election for the Chief Executive, unless curbs were placed on the political activities of the schoolteachers. They also feared that the possibility of a conservative defeat in a future Chief Executive contest might cause the United States to refuse to permit the popular choice of this official.[50]

Both the political significance of the twin education bills and one of the factors responsible for their demise were brought out in a letter written one and one half years after their defeat by an American official in Okinawa to former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway. According to this official, despite its insistence on the passage of the bills, the Democratic Party leadership was persuaded by USCAR to give up the attempt. It was felt by the author of the letter that the United States Administration had

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through this action played into the hands of the opposition, because the failure to pass the twin education bills was to become one of the most important factors in the subsequent election of Chobyo Yara as the first popularly chosen Chief Executive of the GRI.[51]

As the dispute continued and the Assembly remained closed, additional pressures were building up on the GRI Legislature. More than half of the regular legislative session was being wasted and, in the meantime, more than one hundred other important bills had been kept waiting for action. This situation soon resulted in widespread demands that the Assembly attend to its regular duties, instead of spending its time quarreling over two controversial bills.[52]

The end came on November 22, 1967, when the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party finally decided to drop its demand for the enactment of the twin education bills. It was left to the Legislature to formally dispose of them. The official reason given for this decision was the need to remove a "cause of mutual estrangement and political confusion" among the Okinawan people at a time when, because of the results of the just completed Sato-Johnson summit conference, there existed a need for unity.[53]

On American advice as well as through their own realization the Democratic Party leaders had apparently reached the conclusion that the violent opposition of the schoolteacher-led coalition would have plunged the Islands into chaos should they, as the majority party, have

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attempted to force the bills through the Legislature. Moreover, a forcible passage of the bills might have hurt the conservatives politically more than it would have helped them and laws enacted under such circumstances would have been extremely hard to enforce.

Few events could have better demonstrated the political power of the Okinawan schoolteachers than their ability to prevent the enactment of two bills which a legislative majority had been determined to pass.

One of the more puzzling aspects of the twin education bills episode was the complete opposition of the Okinawan schoolteachers to the enactment of measures similar to those in force in the nation with which they wanted to be reunited. Laws of this sort would presumably have come into force with the achievement of the primary objective of the schoolteachers, reversion, or of their secondary objective, the separate return of the educational administration to Japan.

An important part of the answer would lie in an apparent determination on the part of the schoolteachers to prevent the enactment of any limitations on their political rights, until the attainment of the objectives for the achievement of which the enjoyment of these rights was needed. As far as the efficiency tests are concerned, the schoolteachers did not care for these but they seemed prepared to accept them as part of a reunion with Japan, or of some other arrangement providing the benefits expected from

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reversion.

Still another possible explanation for the above mentioned contradiction could be provided by the familiar expression describing politics as the art of the possible. The Okinawan schoolteachers were strong enough to block the enactment of a law in their small archipelago. Unassisted, they would never have been able to achieve such a success with the national government of Japan. As far as Japanese laws were concerned, the schoolteachers had no choice but to accept these in their entirety if they wanted Okinawa to become a part of Japan.

Once again, in order to avoid a misunderstanding of what has been written, it is necessary to place some of the thoughts expressed in their proper perspective.

Despite the crucial role played by the schoolteachers in the Okinawan movement for a reunion with Japan, the impression must not be created that the reversion demands merely represented something invented by the schoolteachers in order to promote their personal interests. There would have come into existence a reversion movement and this movement would one day have become strong, even without any support from the schoolteachers. In such an eventuality, however, the movement would probably have been much less dynamic, it would only at a later date have become politically significant, and the United States might have administered the Ryukyu Islands for a few more years.

As far as the motivation of the schoolteachers is

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concerned, there should exist no doubt that, outside of any personal benefits connected with reversion, they were no less patriotic toward the Japanese homeland than any other group in the Ryukyu Islands. Moreover, due to their position in society schoolteachers have been activists in other political movements and also in revolutionary movements. In this particular case, the school instructors possessed, however, an additional, and special, interest in the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. This accounted for most of their extra enthusiasm for this cause, and played a major role in the movement to end American rule over the Ryukyu Islands.

Conclusions

The Okinawan reversion movement originated in dissatisfaction with American rule and in the great desire of the majority of the Ryukyuan population to be reunited with Japan. It struggled not only for its primary objective, reversion, but also for the improvement of conditions within the archipelago and for the attainment of greater local autonomy. It was intimately associated with the opposition parties and formed part and parcel of the Okinawan reform movement.

The reversion movement was pitted against the dominant Democratic-Liberal Democratic Party because of the latter's willingness to cooperate effectively with the United States and to play down, wherever possible, the

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reversion demands, and also due to the role of this party as the political arm of Ryukyuan conservatism. In Okinawan society the conservative interest consisted largely of a modern business class that had grown up since the end of the Second World War. There existed a definite logic in the alignment of the forces struggling for change, in domestic matters as well as in the political status of the archipelago, against the forces seeking to preserve the status quo in the first-named issues and willing to accept it in the latter.

In spite of the factors detracting from the effectiveness of the reversion movement that were analyzed in the previous chapter, the desire for reversion constituted the basic, underlying, political striving of most of the Okinawan population. This desire merged with feelings of dissatisfaction in other fields and when conditions for it ripened the demand for reversion became more outspoken. By the late 1960's it created a new political situation within the Ryukyu Islands.

The emotional overreaction of Okinawans to the problems encountered, noted by General Watson, and the frequent retreats into fantasy described by Miyasato Seigen both suggest the psychological stress under which the local population found itself. This would constitute a logical result of the dilemma faced by most Ryukyuans through the contradiction presented by their desire for reversion and their awareness of the realities of the Okinawan situation.

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The irrational and emotional components in their attitudes could also suggest the presence of feelings of insecurity and frustration resulting from the military uses to which the main island was put, and from the inferior position occupied by the Okinawan population in respect to its American rulers. Whatever their exact causes, the emotional factors left their mark on the nature of the Okinawan reversion movement.

The lack of originality of this movement and the ideological leadership it accepted from the Japanese political opposition did not represent an unusual situation. This could be regarded as merely part of the world-wide tendency of smaller nations and peoples to take their political and cultural cues from the leading nations.

The leadership of the Okinawan reversion movement was provided by the schoolteachers. Unlike the elites playing this role in the struggles of other dependencies in Asia and Africa for self-determination, the Okinawan schoolteachers were not driven to this through an inability to find employment commensurate with their skills, or to participate in the formulation of government policy. The Ryukyuan school instructors were fully employed and were specially motivated, instead, by a desire to obtain increased pay, more comprehensive fringe benefits and greater professional dignity through association with a different political system.

It should have been possible for the United States

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to dampen somewhat the reversionist zeal of the Okinawan schoolteachers by removing their special interest in reversion. This would most probably have adversely affected the efficacy of the reversion movement and might have prolonged the period of direct American administration. Despite some belated and inadequate efforts in this direction, the United States failed to remove the special economic incentives of the schoolteachers in working for reversion.

As an explanation for this it would once again be possible to bring up the combination of neglect on the part of some officials and policy makers, shortsightedness on the part of others, the feeling that somehow everything would work out well for American interests without the expenditure of additional money on the Ryukyu Islands and, last but not least, the fragmented decision making process found in the United States Government. The failure to make a serious effort to remove the special interest of the schoolteachers in reversion therefore represents another example of the ruling power neglecting to prevent the appearance of a serious, but partly avoidable, difficulty in its dependency.

Another point brought out in this chapter was the dilemma faced by the United States in educational policy for the Ryukyu Islands, one of the many contradictions presented by this dependency relationship. The United States chose the alternative of permitting the local schoolteachers to use Japanese teaching materials and to instruct their pupils in the Japanese national tradition. This avoided

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the further alienation of the Okinawans that would have resulted from an attempt to raise their children in a different tradition. It also obviated the necessity of producing new textbooks and teaching materials for all schoolgrades in what was for Americans an unfamiliar language. The net result of this policy was, however, an American acceptance, and even support, of an educational system teaching its students allegiance to the nation competing with the United States for influence in Okinawa.

A parallel could be found between this American educational policy in the Ryukyus and the traditional practice within the United States of allowing ethnic groups the privilege of operating their schools and of instructing their children in the national traditions of the group's former homeland, although in the latter case the teaching of Americanism and a greater emphasis on the English language are, naturally, expected.

The great and everpresent desire for reversion on the part of most of the Okinawan population points to the fundamental limitation that confronted the United States in its efforts to meet the basic challenge of the dependency relationship, winning a sufficient local acceptance for the alien regime from the native inhabitants.

The contradiction existing in educational policy only further complicated this task and the American failure to fully exploit every opportunity for reducing the incentives for reversion contributed to the creation of a

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very unfavorable political climate for the United States during the late 1960's. The study now turns to an analysis of this climactic period of the Okinawan dependency relationship, the result of the policies, problems and failures examined in this and in the previous chapters.

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NOTES

[1]The New York Times, April 1, 1946, p. 9:1-2.

[2]Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan (Tokyo, Japan: Nampo Doho Engokai, March 1967), p. 11.

[3]The New York Times, August 11, 1948, p. 9:2; and August 10, 1951, p. 3:8.

[4]Sakanaka Tomohisa, "The Present Status of the Okinawan Reversion Movement," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo, Japan), Vol. XV (January-March 1968), p. 32. See also Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau, "Okinawa,Some Basic Facts," Japan Reference Series, No. 2-69 (Tokyo, Japan: 1969), pp. 10-11.

[5]The New York Times, September 5, 1951, p. 7:6.

[6]The New York Times, February 16, 1969, p. 3:4-8.

[7]Joseph W. Ballantine, "The Future of the Ryukyus," Foreign Affairs, July 1953, pp. 667-668.

[8]Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, April 7, 1965. (Mimeographed).

[9]The New York Times, January 10, 1958, p. 3:4; January 11, 1958, p. 2:3; and January 12, 1958, p. 17:1-3.

[10]The New York Times, December 22, 1958, p. 1:7-8.

[11]The New York Times, November 13, 1960, p. 36:1.

[12]The New York Times, September 3, 1961, p. 26:1-2.

[13]Letter from Civil Administrator Gerald Warner to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated October 3, 1966, The General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 8.

[14]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 239. In this statement Deputy Under Secretary of the Army James V. Siena was quoting the testimony presented by his predecessor one year earlier.

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[15]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, H.R. 4903, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, pp. 28-29.

[16]Committee for Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Reference, Public Opinion Surveys on the Okinawa Problem (Kyoto, Japan: January 1969), pp. 4, 9. (Mimeographed).

[17]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Ryukyu Shimpo Survey (Conducted 22-28 July 1967) (Prepared by USCAR, Research and Evaluation Division, October 1967), p. 11. (Mimeographed).

[18]Ibid., p. 14.

[19]Interview with a Foreign Service Officer who because of his active status in the Department of State preferred to remain anonymous, August 14, 1969.

[20]Interviews with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970 and with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970.

[21]Interview with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970.

[22]Interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[23]Interview with Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, February 24, 1970.

[24]Interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[25]Miyasato Seigen, "Hopes and Realities in Okinawa," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo, Japan), Vol. XII (April-June 1965), p. 166.

[26]Interview with Dr. Nathaniel Thayer, June 7, 1970.

[27]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, February 12, 1970.

[28]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[29]Seigen, Japan Quarterly, Vol. XII, op. cit., pp. 166-167.

[30]Toshio Akamine, "Okinawa in Focus: Okinawa Position," Quarterly Report of the Okinawan Problems, No. 3 (Tokyo, Japan: Nampo Doho Engokai, July 1968), pp. 12-13

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contains a supporting opinion on the actual nationality of Okinawans. See also Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 89-209 for a very interesting discussion on the nature of nationality.

[31]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, H.R. 10871, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, pp. 181-182. See also The New York Times, Janaury 24, 1965, p. 27:4-7.

[32]The New York Times, September 3, 1961, p. 26:1-2.

[33]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 9-10. See also Senate Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1965, op. cit., p. 182.

[34]Senate Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1965, op. cit., pp. 181-183.

[35]Senate Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 4903, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands Hearings, 1967, op. cit., pp. 17-18, 23.

[36]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968, Vol. XVI (RCS CSCAMG-5), p. 326.

[37]Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa Problem, The Most Important Problem Pending Between the U.S. and Japan, op. cit., pp. 5-21, and particularly pp. 18-21.

[38]Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[39]Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., September 13, 1966.

[40]Sakanaka Tomohisa, Japan Quarterly, Vol. XV, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

[41]Nobuo Takaramura, "Waiting for a Blue Sky," The Far Eastern Economic Revue (Hong Kong), Vol. 56 (June 15, 1967), p. 629. See also Quarterly Report of the Okinawan Problems, No. 4 (Tokyo, Japan: Nampo Doho Engokai, March 1969), p. 47.

[42]The New York Times, November 20, 1960, p. 2:3-5. See also Senate Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1965, op. cit., pp. 181-183.

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[43]The New York Times, February 28, 1960, p. 25:1.

[44]Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., January 6, 1965.

[45]David Wurfel, "Okinawa Irredenta on the Pacific," Public Affairs (Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia, Winter 1962-1963), p. 354.

[46]Yomiuri (Tokyo), February 24, 1967, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, February 1967, No. 2, pp. 15-16. (Mimeographed).

[47]Ibid., p. 16; Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., May 22, 1966; and interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, February 12, 1970.

[48]Senate Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 4903, Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands Hearings, 1967, op. cit., p. 24. The information comes from testimony given by High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Ferdinand T. Unger.

[49]The New York Times, February 25, 1967, p. 8:5.

[50]Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), February 2, 1967, as appearing in USCAR, Special Translations, op. cit., February 1967, No. 1, p. 8.

[51]Letter from Raymond K. Harada, DAC., U.S. Army Plans and Research Activity, to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), dated January 2, 1969, The General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 7.

[52]Nobuo Takaramura, The Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 56, op. cit., p. 630.

[53]Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa Times and Jiho, as appearing in USCAR, Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., November 23, 1967.

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CHAPTER X

THE STRUGGLE FOR REVERSION AND THE DECLINE IN AMERICAN AUTHORITY

The previous chapters have been devoted to an examination of the policies pursued by the United States in her efforts to wrestle with the basic challenge presented by the Ryukyuan dependency relationship, and to an analysis of the Okinawan reaction. The material was divided into subjects, irrespective of the time element involved.

In the following two chapters, the last major division of the study, the different components analyzed previously are brought together to examine a major stage of the dependency relationship, the gradual termination of the limited Okinawan acceptance of American rule.

A brief examination of the nature of Okinawan politics and of their increasing concentration on the reversion issue will first be made. Following this,the interaction of the factors discussed until now will be seen in an analysis of the outstanding episodes that took place between 1964 and 1969 in connection with the reversion struggle. It is hoped that this will make possible a more vivid understanding of the problems examined earlier and will provide an insight into an important aspect of the process whereby American rule over Okinawa was undermined.

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In the last years of a waning dependency relationship the rulers' ability to influence the conduct of affairs in the traditional manner declines at an ever accelerating pace. Almost anything that the rulers do to correct this situation seems to have the opposite effect from what is intended. Because the subjects are gradually ending their acceptance of the alien regime and because the rulers are ceasing to command fear and respect among the local population, the negative effects of every error made by the governing power are magnified greatly and the positive steps that are taken fail generally to make a favorable impression.

The relatively mild repressionary measures undertaken by a democratic ruling power that feels world attention focused on its actions fail to frighten the native population. Instead, they only succeed in further increasing local resentments. Once the intangible factors that enabled the rulers to govern with only a minimum of force begin to be undermined it becomes almost impossible to reverse this trend, or to prevent an ever more rapid deterioration of the situation.

What has been described as the last conventional stage of a dependency relationship will be seen to be of special interest for this study. Like many other creations of man, alien rule has a tendency to shed the most light on its internal dynamics when it begins to malfunction.

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Okinawan Politics Around the Reversion Issue

In view of the great appeal held by the reversion demands for most Okinawans, it was quite natural for these to have played an important part in the politics of the archipelago, particularly during the last years of American rule.

The reversion demands possessed virtually all the requirements of a first-rate political issue. Their popularity was matched by the inability of the incumbent leadership to satisfy them.

The governing Liberal Democrats, although no less patriotic toward Japan than the opposition, were for many years prevented by four important reasons from effectively supporting the cause of reversion. These were the economic consequences that an early reunion with Japan would have had for their most important backers and for the Islands as a whole, the desire not to embarrass their sister political party in Japan, some awareness of the importance of the Okinawan bases for the defense of Japan and of the entire Far East, and, last but not least, the need to discharge governmental responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. Success in the last mentioned task depended in large part on the ability to secure the cooperation of the United States Government, which for many years displayed no signs of a willingness to relinquish its administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands.

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Notwithstanding this handicap, the conservatives were, through a combination of factors, able to maintain themselves in power during almost the entire period of United States administration. These factors included an exploitation of the economic issue that had placed most Okinawans in a dilemma, the arrangement of legislative electoral districts to favor the Liberal Democrats, and the extension of the minimum verbal support for the cause of reversion that political prudence required. For a further understanding of the conservative party's success it is necessary to examine briefly some of the cultural and historical influences that helped shape Okinawan politics.

Due to the absence of local or popular originality and initiative in it, the Okinawan reversion movement was seen to have been guided largely by outside influences. The same tendency was, to some extent, found in the general political life of the Ryukyus.

With the exception of the People's Party, all other Okinawan political parties were formed during the early years of United States rule on the initiative of either the American appointed Chief Executive or of locally elected officials.[1]

Former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway explained to the author that, outside of purely local problems, the important issues in Okinawan politics represented merely a reflection of the political struggles waged in the main islands, with each Ryukyuan party dutifully

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repeating the points made by its Japanese counterpart. General Caraway also expressed the opinion that much of the voting in the Ryukyu Islands was determined by leaders who controlled the votes of local groups which were often based on kinship. The buying of votes was a common practice. Because of this he felt that no "mandate" was ever expressed by the results of any election with which he was familiar.[2]

This view of Okinawan politics was confirmed to the author by Dr. Nathaniel Thayer, who in saying this had no intention to minimize the Ryukyuan desire for reversion. Dr. Thayer also described Okinawan elections as being decided, particularly in the rural areas, by various "deals" made between political leaders commanding blocs of votes. Likewise, Dr. Thayer believed that because of this no Okinawan election, not even the crucial 1968 victory of Chobyo Yara in the Chief Executive contest, indicated a real popular desire or a "mandate" for anything.[3]

The agreement on this point of two men who did not often see eye to eye on other aspects of the Okinawan problem is significant. For the sake of fairness it should be added that similar comments concerning the "mandate" expressed by an election could be made about most other countries as well. In most parts of the world the great majority of the voters cast habitually their ballots for one particular party and elections are decided by a small percentage shift in the voting. The main interest of the above comments lies, therefore, in the light they shed on

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the Okinawan political style rather than in what they may indicate about the relation between Ryukyuan election results and popular mandates.

In another matter it is possible to present a more positive aspect of Okinawan politics. Both former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Watson and Dr. Nobumoto Ohama denied to the author the common charge that in areas where the voting did not go according to blocs, many of the voters who supported the Democratic Party did so only because they believed that a conservative legislator would be able to obtain more benefits from the American Administration for their respective districts.

General Watson, in line with his previously mentioned emphasis on the strong emotional element in Okinawan political attitudes, felt that "the pocketbook was not put ahead of emotions." Dr. Ohama expressed the view that Okinawans who voted for the Democratic Party did so not in the hope of obtaining greater benefits but because they agreed with the conservatives.[4]

A different view of Okinawan politics was expressed by Professor Mikio Higa, who is perhaps the outstanding student of contemporary Okinawan politics. According to Professor Higa, at least until 1967 when this statement was made, Okinawan politics consisted essentially of the interaction of local political parties under direct American supervision.[5]

In view of Okinawa's special relation to Japan it is

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not surprising that every important Ryukyuan party was the counterpart of a Japanese party and that a close connection existed between the former and the latter. The parties of the Okinawan political Left had long accepted ideological guidance from the mainland and were the first to formally affiliate with their Japanese counterparts.

The New York Times reported in 1956 that the local Communists, working through the Okinawa People's Party, had taken the lead in agitating for reversion. United States Military Authorities charged at the time that Okinawan Communists had secretly established an efficient system of cells in the People's Party and in the few labor unions then in existence. This enabled them to exercise influence without most Okinawans, even those with leftist sympathies, being aware or willing to acknowledge that Communism possessed any strength in the Ryukyus. Japanese Communist publications confirmed the repeated accusations made by United States officials to the effect that Communist activities in Okinawa were directed by the Communist Party organs in Japan. The affirmed objective of Japanese and Okinawan Communists was to hamper the American use of Ryukyuan bases in counteracting Communist military pressures in Asia. In their eagerness to achieve reversion most Okinawans were apparently unaware of this exploitation of their national aspirations for the promotion of Communist interests in the Far East.[6]

These reports would fit in with what is generally

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known about Communist objectives, methods and chains of command, in particular before the great schism within the world Communist movement emerged into the open.

Within nine days of the formation of the new Okinawa Socialist Party, on February 16, 1958, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) announced the incorporation of the Ryukyuan party into its own organization. The annual convention of the JSP chose to regard the new Okinawan party as one of its prefectural branches and declared the intention to back it in the forthcoming legislative elections through a variety of means, including visits by prominent Japanese Socialists to Okinawa for the purpose of campaigning there.[7]

Other Okinawan parties also maintained close contacts with their Japanese counterparts, but formal connections were established at a later time than was the case with the parties of the Left. By 1967 the interactions between Japanese political parties and their Okinawan ideological partners had increased greatly, with the result of strengthening the reversion theme in Ryukyuan politics.[8]

As will be seen in the next chapter, by the time of the November 1968 Chief Executive election Japanese politics had "moved" into Okinawa to the extent that all but one of the major Japanese parties were engaged in a full-fledged effort to influence this contest. The Japanese parties were considering the outcome of the election as a victory or a defeat for themselves and not merely for their junior partners in the Ryukyu Islands.

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It can be seen from the above as well as from the findings of previous chapters that the major Okinawan parties that took the strongest stand in favor of reversion were to the left of the center of the political spectrum. On the other hand, the party giving the minimum possible support to an early reunion with Japan was a right-of-center party.

The Okinawa People's Party was seen to have had a definite connection with the Japanese Communist Party, while the Okinawa Socialist Party was affiliated with the Japanese party of the same name. The Okinawa Socialist Masses Party was also connected with a related party in the main islands of Japan. It was described as located "somewhere" between the People's Party and a slightly left-of-center position in the political spectrum. By contrast, the Liberal Democratic Party has been repeatedly identified as the spokesman for business interests and as possessing its greatest strength in the rural and less developed areas of the archipelago. The adjective "conservative" has been frequently used to describe this party, not only in this study but also in the Okinawan and Japanese press. The OLDP was also closely identified with the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan.

This would emphasize once again that the political cleavage between demands for change and support for the social and economic status quo coincided in the Ryukyu Islands with the division between active support for early

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reversion and a willingness to accept a long-term continuation of American rule. This must, necessarily, form one of the most significant, if not the most important, factor in the relation between the reversion issue and Okinawan politics.

The discussion of Okinawan politics centering around the reversion issue has, sooner or later, to touch the subject of party factionalism. This topic is of special importance for any understanding of Okinawan and Japanese politics. A particular manifestation of party factionalism was responsible for one of the earliest serious challenges to United States policy during the 1960's.

Japanese and Okinawan politics have traditionally been characterized by a particularly strong form of factionalism. Before the Second World War Japanese party politics were marked by a long series of party splits, followed usually by recombinations of the warring factions into new parties. The first years of the post-war period also exhibited this tendency, although to a lesser extent. In these party splits an important role was played by the ability of each faction leader, in a virtual recreation of the feudal loyalty of a Samurai to his Lord, to count generally on the faithful support of his followers.[9]

This Japanese tradition was encountered to some extent in Okinawa, particularly among the Liberal Democrats, the most conservative among the major parties. The alternations in its name between "Okinawa Liberal Democratic

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Party" and "Okinawa Democratic Party" were in part a reflection of disputes within this badly factionalized party.[10]

In the summer and fall of 1964 the OLDP experienced its most serious internal split over the question of displaying greater independence toward the United States Administration. This crisis is of interest as a case study of an Okinawan intraparty dispute, of American influence over Ryukyuan conservative politics, and of an early episode involving resistance to the United States from the ranks of her most trustworthy supporters in the archipelago.

In a typical dispute in which factional rivalries were mixed with policy differences, the followers of former Chief Executive Jugo Thoma and of Seiho Matsuoka had become increasingly dissatisfied with what they considered to be the excessively subservient attitude displayed by the incumbent Chief Executive, Seisaku Ota, in his dealings with USCAR. The intraparty strife generated by this discontent was aggravated in June 1963 by a bitter struggle over the appointment of a President for the Ryukyu Telephone and Telegraph Public Corporation.

The split widened until by the early part of 1964 the Thoma-Matsuoka factions were in open revolt and demonstrated their defiance of the Ota leadership by attacking openly the United States Administration and enacting on March 4th a $2.4 million tax reduction bill without first obtaining the consent of the Chief Executive. On June 13th

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the Chief Executive announced his intention to resign. Thereupon a dispute broke out among the two factions on whether the resignation should take effect before or after the term of office of High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Caraway was due to end. General Caraway had become a special target of the opposition as a result of his strong and paternalistic administration.

In a stormy session of the Party's Board of Directors thirteen OLDP leaders, including eleven legislators, the Speaker of the Legislature, Akio Nagamine, and the Mayor of Naha, Junji Nishime, resigned from the Party. On June 23rd the dissident leaders organized a political club called the Minsei (People's Government). This group soon began to campaign for autonomy and for the public election of the Chief Executive.

On July 27th an overwhelming majority of the Legislature, consisting of the eleven dissident OLDP members and of the opposition, adopted a resolution demanding the immediate resignation of Chief Executive Ota. This confusion, unprecedented for the Ryukyus, occurred just five days before the August 1st change in High Commissioners.

The new High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, set himself immediately to the task of healing the rift within the dominant conservative party. He indicated his intention to grant more autonomy and to take a more favorable attitude toward Japanese involvement in Okinawan affairs. General Watson succeeded thereby in

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calming the Minsei group to the point where once again it expressed a willingness to participate in the nomination of a Chief Executive. This action was regarded by the opposition parties as a betrayal of a common front. The Minsei Club now became the main target of the opposition attacks and on October 8th established its own political party called the Liberal Party.[11]

General Watson finally succeeded in healing the rift at a meeting which he arranged with the legislators from both conservative factions. This conference turned into an all-night session and the High Commissioner was obliged to use all his ingenuity and to apply whatever pressure was practicable before he could achieve his goal. General Watson retold the episode to the author.

He described how, among others, he had to declare out of order a motion to adjourn, how he was compelled to persuade the reluctant legislators to agree on a vote for a new Chief Executive, how he tried, but failed, to persuade the legislators to vote as individuals and not in blocks. After it had been decided to choose a new Chief Executive out of three, instead of two, of the five candidates who had originally been under consideration, the impasse was finally broken by the High Commissioner's suggestion that the assembled party leaders vote against the candidate whom they liked least, rather than in favor of their candidate. Seiho Matsuoka turned out to be the winner by being least objectionable. The High Commissioner

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explained to the author that Matsuoka had been his personal choice all along.

Even this decisive vote was not the last act in the drama. General Watson, aware of political practices in the Islands, did not consider the meeting adjourned until he had obtained from all the assembled legislators signed statements. These pledged the legislators to support Matsuoka for nomination as Chief Executive and, in case an event such as a riot made a vote on the part of the Legislature impossible, to agree to support a direct appointment of Matsuoka as Chief Executive by the High Commissioner, without a formal nomination on the part of the Legislature.[12]

The event which the High Commissioner had feared and prepared against came to pass later that month. On October 29th a "howling" mob of about 5,000 Left-wing and pro-Japanese demonstrators, to use the language of the New York Times, descended on the Legislature and forced a cancellation of the plans to nominate Matsuoka as Chief Executive. Finally, on November 1st, despite strong protests and a boycott on the part of the opposition members, the eighteen Liberal and Democratic members of the twenty-nine member Legislature nominated Matsuoka as the new Chief Executive. The High Commissioner officially accepted the nominee as a "suitable candidate" and the installation ceremony was held quickly, before some new disturbance could occur.[13]

On December 26th, in a traditional Japanese ending to a traditional Japanese intraparty power struggle, the

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Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party and the Liberal Party merged into a new Democratic Party.[14]

The dispute caused no permanent damage to the political standing of the conservatives. One year later, in the November 14, 1965 election, the "new" Democratic Party won nineteen out of the thirty-two seats in the enlarged Legislature.[15] Two years after this date, at its fifth convention on December 9, 1967, the Democratic Party changed its name back to Liberal Democratic.[16]

The great conservative split of 1964 and its consequences illustrate many of the characteristics of Ryukyuan politics all neatly assembled into a single episode: the emphasis on intraparty power struggles, on factions and on personalities, the willingness of the opposition in a major dispute to take the struggle into the streets, the very accommodating attitude of at least some of the leading elements in the conservative party toward the American Administration, the ever-present dissatisfaction with the dominant role played by the United States in the government of the Islands, and the discontentment resulting from the lack of greater local autonomy.

Even conservative insurgents, unwilling to go so far as to ask for immediate reversion, were not above exploiting these dissatisfactions in order to be able to justify in terms of a patriotic policy what was mainly a political ambition to install their leader as Chief Executive. Once this objective had been attained, these "insurgents" extended

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all necessary cooperation to USCAR. Finally, last but not least, to recall Professor Higa's characterization of Okinawan politics as the interaction of local political parties under direct American supervision, there was the role of supreme arbiter played by the United States Administration.

In the end, USCAR could not permit a continued split within the conservative ranks over demands for increased autonomy. The United States had to have a compliant Chief Executive and a pro-American majority in the Legislature so that effective government, and government acceptable to its own interests, could be carried on. It was the American High Commissioner who ultimately persuaded and pressured the conservative factions to agree on a Chief Executive with whom the United States could work.

The 1964 conservative intraparty dispute can be said to have ended in a manner satisfactory for the United States. The episode did, however, provide a novel experience in the willingness of a part of the Liberal Democratic leadership to exploit openly the local anti-American sentiments in order to achieve political goals. At the same time, the spectacle of the United States Administration succeeding in having its way over Okinawan dissidents in a major dispute was soon to become a rarity. Even this success can to a large extent be attributed to the identity of the group that had presented a challenge to the United States. The Liberal Democrats had no real desire to offer

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consistent and effective opposition to the American Administration.

Opposition, Demonstrations and the "Twin Court Cases"

A political movement desiring to win over or to mobilize for its cause an entire population will try generally to carry out its propaganda in a triple manner. The movement's ideas will be propagated and kept before the eyes of those who are the objects of its propaganda. Any date which can be given a special significance or any incident that the movement can manufacture will be dramatized for its purposes. Last but not least, any special opportunity created by outside events or the actions of an opponent will be exploited to the utmost.

By means of these techniques the Okinawan reversion movement endeavored to mobilize support and political action within the Ryukyu Islands and to obtain the maximum publicity in Japan.

Unfortunately for the reversion movement the two dates most suitable for dramatization came up within a few days of each others. As a result of this, and because of the good weather prevailing on these two dates, the most important reversionist activities had for many years to be concentrated within a relatively brief period of time.

April 28th marked the anniversary of the day when, in 1952, the United States-Japan Peace Treaty went into effect, together with the clause placing Okinawa under

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indefinite American administration. Four days later May Day provided another ideal occasion for demonstrations. In 1965 High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Watson, in testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, described April as the "struggle month," when the weather is as nice as it becomes in Okinawa and when it is pleasant to be out in the streets and to parade. This was consequently when, more than at any other time of the year, rallies and protests were held.[17]

Demonstrations occurred regularly on the above mentioned dates. Typical of those that took place in the period before the great 1966-1967 change in attitudes were the protest staged by 3,000 Communist-led Okinawans on April 28, 1962,[18] and the meetings held in various parts of the Islands on May 1, 1963. Depending on whether the estimates of the opposition or of the GRI are accepted, either 20,000 or 6,000 Okinawans participated in these last-named protests. No violence occurred, but the Government of the Ryukyus was termed a puppet regime.[19] On April 28, 1965 a mass rally was held in Naha with the claimed participation of 80,000 persons.[20]

In June 1960 President Eisenhower's Asian tour provided an opportunity for Okinawan reversionists to stage a major propaganda "coup." Under Communist leadership they tried to spoil the President's stopover on their island. They failed, however, to achieve anything like the success of their Japanese colleagues in Tokyo, whose violent demon-

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strations resulted in the cancellation of the scheduled visit by the American Head of State. When the President arrived an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Okinawans as well as 40,000 Americans lined the streets and definite hostility was shown by portions of the crowds.[21] On the next day, the New York Times reported, however, that only 5,000 persons had actually participated in anti-American displays of hostility and that the chief organizer of these had been the ousted pro-Communist Mayor of Naha, Kamejiro Senaga.[22]

Reversionists not only attempted to obstruct a visit on the part of the American Chief Executive but also tried the same tactic when prominent leaders of the conservative Japanese Government appeared in their islands.

When on July 3, 1964 the Japanese Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, made a brief stopover at Naha Air Force Base, about one hundred demonstrators described as leftists clashed with U.S. Air Force Police and Ryukyuan guards in an attempt to break into the base and to present their demands to the visitor.[23]

One year later the reversion movement was able to stage more effective disruptions when Premier Eisaku Sato paid the first postwar visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to the Ryukyu Islands. Mr. Sato was welcomed by tens of thousands of Okinawans, but activists from the reversion movement and supporters of the political Left staged at least two hostile demonstrations. In the second and larger of these about 20,000 protesters gathered on Highway No. 1

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in front of the Ryukyu Tokyu Hotel and for several hours succeeded in clogging this vital United States military artery and in preventing the Prime Minister from entering his hotel. Premier Sato suffered the humiliation of not being able to spend the night among his acknowledged countrymen and of being compelled, instead, to stay at an American military installation. The local New York Times correspondent commented that these actions "provided a graphic demonstration of the potential strength and obstructive power of anti-American elements with hardcore Communist direction here."[24]

A large-scale American military maneuver always provided a good propagandistic opportunity among a population that had not recovered fully from the psychological aftereffects of the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. In February 1964 the United States Armed Forces staged an airlift exercise named "Operation Quick Release," involving the rapid transfer of 4,000 American troops from Hawaii to Okinawa. This operation was, naturally, promptly denounced as designed to increase Asian tensions and as a danger to the peace of Asia by groups like the Okinawa People's Party and the Okinawa Association Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.[25]

In the final analysis no event had the potential for mobilizing public opinion against the American regime as much as an action on the part of USCAR which unintentionally focused Okinawan attention on the most resented

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aspect of the dependency relationship. This was the superior position occupied by the United States Administration with respect to the local population.

Such an opportunity was provided in June 1966 by an action on the part of USCAR which was quite in keeping with the legal arrangements governing the administration of the Ryukyu Islands and that, therefore, should not have been considered as anything unusual or as likely to provoke a political crisis.

This particular political tempest, which was soon named "The Twin Court Cases," originated in two separate lawsuits that had been brought in the courts of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. One of these involved an action brought by the successful candidate of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party in the 29th electoral district, Takatora Tomori, who had been disqualified under USCAR Ordinance No. 68 from holding office because of a previous conviction. This concerned a fine of $50 that had once been imposed on Tomori for violation of an election law and which he contended did not constitute a felony. A basic "constitutional" question was raised when Tomori claimed that the Legislative Election Law of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands should have prevailed over Ordinance No. 68 of the United States Civil Administration, on the grounds that the Ordinance was allegedly inconsistent with the liberties guaranteed in the basic law of the archipelago, the Executive Order of the President of the United States.

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The second court case concerned a claim filed by the Ryukyu Fishery Company, Ltd. for the refund of a commodity tax imposed by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands on imported mackerel. This, likewise, involved a challenge against the validity of a USCAR Ordinance, No. 17 in this case, under the authority of which the tax had been collected. This legal action was soon nicknamed the "Mackerel Case."

On June 7, 1966, when it appeared that the Court of Appeals of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands was about to pass judgment, High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II ordered both cases transferred to the Civil Court of the United States Civil Administration. This order was issued in the belief that the cases in question affected the interests of the United States by challenging the validity of two Civil Administration Ordinances and, by implication, the validity of all USCAR Ordinances and the basic right of the United States to govern the Ryukyu Islands.[26]

A few days later Civil Administrator Gerald Warner clarified further the reason for the American action. In his explanation, Mr. Warner emphasized unwittingly the superior position of the United States with respect to the native population, and thereby only heightened the Okinawan resentment. He declared that "the propriety and legality of any official act of the United States Administration in the Ryukyus is properly subject to examination by United

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States Authority only."[27]

In view of the governmental status of the Ryukyu Islands the High Commissioner's order was quite legal and did not constitute an unusual or unexpected action. Nevertheless, it immediately called forth a storm of protests from all quarters. The opposition parties announced promptly their intention to carry out an "island-wide struggle" to obtain the withdrawal of the transfer of jurisdiction order. By June 28th a "Joint Council for the Retraction of the Court Jurisdiction Transfer Order" had been formed with thirty representatives from various organizations and headed by Chobyo Yara, the Chairman of the Okinawa Teachers' Association. The first decision of the new council was to hold daily sit-down strikes in front of the Executive Building. These were to be conducted until July 5th when a rally was scheduled to be held.[28]

The opposition was not alone in declaring all-out war against the High Commissioner's order. The conservatives sensed the political impact of this dispute in the Islands and also joined the struggle.

On June 24th, the Democratic controlled Assembly adopted a resolution demanding the retraction of the transfer of jurisdiction order. All factions in the Legislature were very critical of the American action, believing it to be contrary to the High Commissioner's frequent promises to transfer greater authority to the GRI and viewing it as a denial of judicial autonomy. Particular resentment had

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been aroused by the above mentioned statement of Civil Administrator Gerald Warner.

On the 27th, the judges of the Ryukyu Court of Appeals of the GRI were considering a unanimous petition to the High Commissioner asking the withdrawal of the order. The appeals judges were thinking of resigning should this become necessary, although they later disagreed on this proposed step. The Ryukyu Bar Association, headed by the conservative Jugo Thoma who in 1969 was to be active in an effort to delay reversion, condemned strongly the American action. It called it "unprecedented in the world" and "an infringement upon the independence of the judicial authority... intended to utilize the judicial system for administrative purposes." By June 30th the Assembly had passed unanimously another resolution requesting the United States to withdraw the jurisdiction transfer order. It also adopted a second resolution asking the Japanese Government to conduct direct negotiations with the United States for this purpose.[29]

The position of the Japanese Government in this matter had been presented aptly by the Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, Ken Yasui. He declared that the situation was quite regrettable in terms of "national sentiment," but that it constituted a matter concerning which his government was unable to do anything as the transfer of jurisdiction order concerned the validity of USCAR Ordinances and as the authority to govern the

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Ryukyu Islands resided legally in the United States.

A few days later, however, on July 6th, the Japanese Government felt compelled to reconsider its position to the point where Prime Minister Sato promised to take up the problem at a meeting scheduled for the following day with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was then in Tokyo.[30]

On December 2, 1966 the USCAR Civil Court resolved the controversy by handing down a ruling in favor of the Okinawan contentions. It decided that Tomori should be declared duly elected and ruled in favor of the GRI in the "mackerel" case. Most important of all, the American court ruled that "it is considered proper to interpret that the GRI court has the right to examine the validity of laws applied in Okinawa, including Ordinances." Despite this, the opposition parties and the Joint Struggle Council, formed specially to fight the order, still protested against the original transfer of the two cases to a USCAR court.[31]

The "Twin Court Cases" controversy had provided the opposition and the reversion groups with an almost ideal issue. Okinawans had apparently interpreted the concessions on local autonomy granted since the summer of 1964 as part of a slow and gradual transfer of authority from the United States Administration, and as milestones on the road to complete reversion. The refusal on the part of the United States to permit a Ryukyuan court to rule on the validity of USCAR Ordinances seemed to indicate that this had never been American policy and therefore came as a shock to

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Okinawans. The policy of concessions now appeared suddenly to have been a sham and the United States was seen as determined to maintain ultimate control over Ryukyuan affairs and to retain its superior political position over the Okinawan population. Some Ryukyuans even interpreted the High Commissioner's court transfer order as a reversal of the earlier policy of increased autonomy.

The unusually rapid way in which virtually unanimous opposition to the court transfer order emerged in the Ryukyus, with even the most reliable supporters of the United States joining its ranks, indicates that USCAR's action had touched a "soft spot" in Okinawan political attitudes, a point on which the local inhabitants were particularly sensitive. In such a situation the reversionists had a ready-made archipelago-wide following and could step in as its natural leaders.

It would appear from the development of this political crisis that the United States Administration had completely miscalculated concerning the effect its decision would have on the local population. When the court transfer order had been issued it must have seemed to USCAR a legally correct and rather routine step necessary to prevent a theoretical undermining of the American right to rule the Ryukyu Islands. Instead, a potentially threatening political situation had been created from which the best face-saving way out consisted in letting an American court decide the issue in a manner satisfactory to Ryukyuan

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demands. In a way reminiscent of Chief Justice Marshall's action in the historic case of Marbury v. Madison, Okinawans could not object to the contents of the decision while the United States Administration had made its point because the ruling was handed down by an American court.

Moreover, although the United States had conceded the right of a Ryukyuan court to rule on the validity of American ordinances and regulations, USCAR had not lost the legal right to make the final decision in such cases. Any future judgment of a GRI court in a matter of this sort could still be appealed to an American court for final review. This naturally makes it possible to wonder why USCAR had felt it necessary to issue the court transfer order in the first place.

The question becomes even more puzzling when it is realized that the Civil Administration had faced a similar situation two years earlier without issuing an order that was resented by almost the entire local population. In 1964 a lower GRI court had ruled in a different case that USCAR had violated a section of the Executive Order. Jurisdiction was not thereupon transferred to an American court, and the matter was resolved in May 1965 when the Appellate Court of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands overruled the lower court decision.[32]

When the 1966 court transfer order was issued USCAR presumably had reasons for believing that this time the Ryukyuan Court of Appeals would rule in a manner unsatis-

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factory to the United States. Although even in such an eventuality the decision could still have been handled through an appeal to a higher American court, USCAR must have been influenced by the traditional practice of securing double and triple safeguards against the possibility of having United States authority in the Ryukyu Islands undermined in any way.

On the basis of previous practice and precedents USCAR had no reason for believing that its decision would provoke major political difficulties. Actions which could have served similarly as causes for local resentment had been taken repeatedly at other times and had not produced a similarly intense reaction. The United States Administration had apparently underestimated the extent of the changes in Okinawan attitudes taking place at the time. Considering the difficulty in predicting correctly the reactions of a population, particularly when its mood is undergoing a transformation, it is difficult to place on USCAR the full blame for this error. In view of earlier experiences, it was perhaps not easy for the American Authorities to foresee that on this occasion a reassertion of their superior position vis-a-vis the Okinawan population would provoke a political crisis of such dimensions.

A probable explanation for this strong Okinawan reaction would lie in the disappointment felt by Ryukyuans at what was seen as a reversal of the policy of granting concessions on autonomy. Part of the explanation would

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also be found in the decline in American prestige. It becomes more humiliating to accept a position of inferiority in regard to rulers who have become less respected and feared.

The twin court cases controversy can be considered as the beginning of an inability on the part of USCAR, during the 1960's, to have its way in major disputes with the local inhabitants. Moreover, it constituted a first-rate issue unwittingly handed to the reversion movement, and thereby acted as a factor in the further deterioration of the climate of acceptability for American rule.

The twin education bills controversy of the following year was examined in the previous chapter as a demonstration of the political power of the Okinawan schoolteachers. It differed from the twin court cases dispute in that the former involved basically a confrontation between the Liberal Democrats and the opposition while the latter represented a clash between the Americans and what became a united Okinawan front. Considering, however, that the reversion movement had been the moving force in the later as well as in the earlier of these two crises, both could be marked down as major political victories for it. This constituted a new phenomenon for the Ryukyu Islands.

The Transformation of the Political Climate

The intensification of Okinawan reversion sentiments during the 1966-1967 period made itself felt in a number of

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ways. One of these consisted in a large increase in public demonstrations directed against the United States and in favor of various Okinawan demands. The official report of USCAR activities for the period between July 1, 1966 and June 30, 1967 noted that:

> There was a significant rise in the number of demonstration rallies and parades during FY 1967, placing a considerable burden on the GRI police force. The Okinawa Teachers' Association (OTA), the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council (Fukkikyo), labor organizations, political opposition groups, and their supporters staged a total of 202 rallies and marches during the year.

The report then proceeds to bring details on "some of the major demonstrations," held, respectively, on August 1, 1966, October 4, 1966, January 31, 1967, February 24, 1967, April 28, 1967, and June 14, 1967.[33]

From this it would appear that important reversion demonstrations were no longer concentrated mainly around the month of April but had become a year-round affair. To provide additional evidence for this it is possible to mention the record, or near record, demonstrations staged in November 1967, after the close of the period covered in the above mentioned USCAR report. One of these, on November 3rd, involved 20,000 participants, some of whom performed "snake dances" through the streets of Naha.[34] In another instance, in the same city on November 20th, more than 100,000 persons demanded the return of Okinawa to Japan.[35]

To the increase in the number and size of the demon-

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strations the reversionists added in 1968 some novel ways of attracting attention to their cause. These included a protest held in boats at sea between Okinawa and Japan on April 28th,[36] and four months later the deliberate evasion of customs and immigration procedures by Ryukyuan activists entering Japan. This last action was staged in order to dramatize demands for the abolition of travel restrictions between the Ryukyus and the mainland.[37]

Another indication of a significant change in Okinawan sentiments during this period is provided by the second Ryukyu Shimpo public opinion poll conducted throughout the Islands in early December 1967.

One of the questions asked in this survey concerned the opinion of the respondents on the President Johnson-Prime Minister Sato Joint Statement, issued about two weeks earlier in Washington. In this communique the return of the Bonin Islands had been promised and language had been used that made it appear as if reversion was imminent. Of those answering the question, only 4.5 per cent expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the conference. If those who were "somewhat satisfied" are added to this percentage, then the total still came to only 11.8 per cent. On the other hand, 34.7 per cent of the respondents declared that they were either "dissatisfied" or "greatly dissatisfied." Another 33.2 per cent were either dissatisfied with the outcome but still believed that some progress had been made, or else felt that the outcome "cannot be helped under the

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present situation." From this the poll takers concluded that a rough division of the answers would yield a total of 67.9 per cent expressing some sort of dissatisfaction, as against only 11.8 per cent who declared some degree of satisfaction with the outcome of the summit conference.[38]

These results are significant because they indicate an increasing impatience with diplomatic evasiveness on a concrete promise for reversion and a rising expectation that Japanese-American negotiations produce a definite date for a relatively early return of Okinawa to Japan. Neither the unusually promising tone of the language used in the joint communique, nor the return of the Bonins as a token of American good faith, could by that time provide a substitute for a definite commitment on a date for reversion. By 1967 the representatives of almost all political groups in the archipelago were asking that the long-expected reunion with the mainland should take place no later than the early 1970's.

During the fateful 1966-1967 period the climate of opinion on reversion was changing rapidly and, as usual, the conservative party provided a dependable political barometer on the shifting mood of the Okinawan population.

On December 28, 1966 the leadership of the Democratic Party had only included in its "essential policies for 1967" reforms within the context of the American regime, such as educational reversion, Okinawan participation in the Japanese Diet, or the popular election of the Chief Execu-

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tive. No demand was made for an early reversion of the Ryukyus.[39] By October 1967 the Democrats were advocating, through an address delivered by Chief Executive and party leader Seiho Matsuoka, that Okinawan members of the Reversion Study Problem Council "should clearly set the aim of the return at 1970."[40]

On November 5, 1967, in anticipation of the Sato-Johnson summit conference scheduled to take place a few days later, the conservative dominated Ryukyuan Assembly for the first time passed a resolution demanding a commitment for reversion, to be realized by April 1970. This contrasted with earlier resolutions that had only advocated reversion in the abstract.[41]

Dr. Nobumoto Ohama told the author that in January 1968, in a visit to his native island in the Ryukyu chain, he had predicted that reversion would take place by 1972.[42] Later in the same year Dr. Ohama was turning this prediction into a demand and was further asking that the exact time for reversion should be agreed on before 1970. This was intended to make possible a three year transfer period.[43]

The frequently referred to 1967 change in the political atmosphere in regard to reversion is thus seen to have manifested itself in the Ryukyus in a variety of ways. These included a significant rise in protest demonstrations, support for reversion from the conservative party, a refusal on the part of most Okinawans to be satisfied with the

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vaguely promissory language that had previously been accepted, and a strong demand that reversion take place within three to five years.

Partial Reversion Plans

As Okinawan and Japanese impatience mounted because of the failure to make any tangible progress toward reversion, various proposals were advanced for practical steps to bring the Ryukyu Islands and the mainland closer together and to provide a kind of "substitute reversion." These plans, usually involving some form of functional, or partial, reversion, were formulated for various reasons.

The conservative leaderships of both Japan and the Ryukyus felt compelled to counter the constant charges that they were not doing enough to bring about the return of Okinawa. The two Liberal Democratic parties wanted to calm the rising discontent and to maintain their political support by showing some concrete progress toward reversion.

Partial reversion plans seemed to the Okinawan population like steps on the road to reversion and might have provided a form of substitute satisfaction for it, to compensate for the inability to achieve real reversion.

In the previous chapter it was seen that one of the functional reversion proposals, the plan to return the educational system to Japanese control, was motivated by a desire to benefit an interest group, the schoolteachers.

The partial reversion plans had the great advantage of appearing to be in accord with the definition of politics

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as the art of the possible. It was felt that they might be acceptable to the United States because they would have left the basic rights of sovereignty and the freedom in the use of the military bases in American hands. One important proposal for partial reversion was put forward at least as early as the summer of 1966. Its object was to achieve virtually complete functional reversion by returning the administrative rights over the Ryukyuan population on a step by step basis, but without affecting American rights in connection with the military installations.

The proposal was ultimately rejected by all sides. The United States Government did not consider it feasible because of the way in which the civilian and the base areas were intermingled. The feeling was that this would make it impossible to administer separately the civilian and the military sectors. The Japanese political opposition regarded the plan as a device for weakening the movement aiming to achieve the full reversion of Okinawa, and the Japanese Government felt it to be impractical.[44]

A number of other partial reversion proposals were under discussion in the late 1960's. The purpose of one of these was to achieve the economic unification of Japan and the Ryukyus at the private level, as a step toward the ultimate reversion of the Islands. For this purpose the Japanese-Okinawan Economic Promotion Conference, a meeting of private businessmen, had held gatherings since 1966 under the sponsorship of the Japanese Government.

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Various possibilities for bringing about private economic integration were considered at its Tokyo gathering in March 1968 and again a year later when it met in Naha. Nothing that made any real difference in the Ryukyuan situation was achieved, however, and serious economic unification could only be undertaken after the reversion agreement of November 1969.[45]

A partial reversion proposal that was mainly symbolic and psychological in character, and for this reason was at least partly realized, concerned Okinawan participation in the Japanese Diet. The Japanese Government advocated this as part of its program of increasing wherever possible Okinawan identification and unification with the homeland, in preparation for the eventual reversion of the archipelago. The proposal was popular among Okinawans as it made them feel one step closer to Japan, even if the step did not have much meaning. Only the United States Government raised objections to full Okinawan participation in the Diet, because of the peculiar international legal situation that this would have created. On February 2, 1968 the Ryukyuan Assembly approved unanimously a resolution asking both the United States and Japanese Governments to allow Okinawan representation in the Japanese Diet. This constituted the sixth resolution of the Legislature on the subject of Ryukyuan participation in the Japanese national government.[46]

With the political situation becoming more difficult

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in the Islands and with elections scheduled for the fall of that year, it appeared virtually certain by August 1968 that some sort of Okinawan representation in the Diet would be arranged. At the October 9th meeting of the United States-Japan Consultative Committee the decision was finally made to permit the seating of Ryukyuan representatives in the Japanese Legislature. These were, however, to be given no voting rights and their privilege to speak was to be restricted to the Diet committees, limitations made necessary in order to satisfy American objections. The Japanese Liberal Democratic leadership was reportedly concerned that the granting of what amounted to little more than a glorified observer status to the Ryukyuan representatives might hurt the Okinawan conservative party in the elections scheduled to take place the following month.[47]

Only after the November 1969 reversion agreement were steps taken to give Okinawan representatives during the transition period leading to the return of the Ryukyus the full rights and the status of Japanese members of the Diet.[48]

The ever increasing involvement of the Japanese Government in Okinawan affairs, described in Chapter IV, and the simultaneous decline in United States authority can, in a way, be regarded as a form of partial reversion that was certainly unintended by the American side. By 1968 some observers felt that this process had reached a point where the administration of Okinawan civilian affairs had ceased to be a purely American responsibility and had, in

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fact, become a sort of joint United States-Japanese undertaking.[49]

While this opinion may have been somewhat exaggerated, there is no disputing the fact that Japanese influence was rising in the Ryukyu Islands while American influence and authority were declining. Nothing could have better symbolized the latter assertion than the moving of the USCAR offices in December 1967 from the center of Naha to a United States military base in the city's outskirts, Urasoe. High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Unger described this move, and the removal of the American flag from the center of the Ryukyuan capital, as part of a "new phase" which started in Okinawa after the November 1967 Sato-Johnson summit conference.[50] An observer employing less diplomatic language might have described this move as an ominous sign of the measures that had become advisable in order to make the American regime more palatable to Okinawans.

In the end very little came out of most of the proposals for partial reversion. Probably the only meaningful step in this direction was the increasing involvement of the Japanese Government in Ryukyuan affairs. This was achieved very gradually over a period of years and without waging any dramatic campaign over this issue.

The partial reversion plans are notable not so much for their lack of success as for having been proposed in the first place, and for the reaction of the various parties to them. The attention paid to these proposals between

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1966 and 1969 points to the great need felt by Japanese and Ryukyuan conservative leaders as well as by the Okinawan population for some visible progress toward reversion.

The few concessions made by the United States in the direction of partial reversion did not involve any formal or legal loss of United States authority. These concessions did not succeed in reducing significantly the pressures for reversion. It is possible that an American acceptance during the middle of the 1960's of a partial reversion plan that would have involved a formal reduction in United States authority could have succeeded in temporarily lowering the intensity of the demands for full reversion. This might possibly have prolonged the period of over-all United States administration and of freedom in the use of the bases.

The United States refused to consider seriously most of the proposals on the ground that the intermingling of civilian and military areas and facilities made them impractical. The validity of this argument is questionable.

The functional reversion plans were ultimately rejected by the greater part of the reversion movement as it was felt that their acceptance could retard the final return of Okinawa to Japan. This would indicate that these proposals might have had a greater potential for serving American interests than Washington realized. In order to reduce the intensity of the drive for reversion the plans would, however, have had to be carried out at a time when

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the attainment of complete reunion with Japan still seemed a distant possibility and when Okinawans hesitated for economic reasons to ask for an early termination of United States administration. This would refer to the years before 1966 or 1967.

The acceptance of a partial reversion plan would probably have had the greatest effect in prolonging the Okinawan acceptance of American rule between the years 1964-1966. As was seen in Chapter III, by 1964 political concessions appeared to have become necessary. At that time such concessions would also have made the greatest impression on the Okinawan population because of the previous refusal to grant them and because full reversion still seemed far in the future.

For reasons which were brought out throughout this study, the political situation was changing rapidly during the middle of the 1960's and from 1967 on limited concessions ceased to be effective as a way of inducing an Okinawan majority to accept additional years of American rule. By the late 1960's functional reversion would probably no longer have been able to achieve significant results from the point of view of United States interests. It seemed at that time that there existed no longer an acceptable substitute for a definite and reasonably early date for reversion.

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A Scandal and the B-52 Bombers

When the influence and prestige of a foreign ruling power are on the decline events that under other circumstances would produce only moderate difficulties often have an effect that is out of proportion to their actual importance. It would appear that the necessity of enduring inconveniences and hardships caused by rulers who are no longer feared and respected involves a special form of humiliation. Under these circumstances, any unpopular action taken by the governors or by their collaborators provokes a particularly intense form of resentment.

Corrupt practices by government figures are fairly common in most of the world and were certainly not unknown in Okinawa. By the late 1960's their exposure among conservative officials in the Ryukyu Islands seemed, however, to make an unusually strong impression.

A major example of this was provided when, in the fall of 1967, widespread bribery was uncovered among high officials of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands in connection with the issuance of five hundred additional taxi licenses. The affair came to a climax with the arrest and subsequent indictment of Deputy Chief Executive Saburo Odo and other key officials of the GRI. This scandal soon became a major political issue and will be seen to have constituted an important factor in the Liberal Democratic defeat in the 1968 Chief Executive election.[51]

A few months later the Okinawan opposition was

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handed a still more effective issue through an American action that, as in the matter of the Twin Court Cases dispute, should not have appeared controversial in view of the rights enjoyed by the United States in the Ryukyu Islands since 1945.

On February 5, 1968 heavy, long-range, B-52 bombers of the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command arrived at Kadena Air Force Base to conduct operations in Vietnam.[52] This action was to revive in a most acute form all the fears and insecurities ever felt by Okinawans in connection with nuclear weapons and with the presence of the military bases in their midst.

The Okinawans interpreted the arrival of the strategic bombers as part of an enlargement of the functions performed by the American bases. This, in turn, was seen as related to seemingly dangerous developments then taking place in both Indochina and the Korean area. At about that time the Vietnamese War appeared to be escalating as a result of the famous Communist "Tet Offensive" and the U.S.S. Pueblo had been seized by North Korean Naval Forces. These events, together with the nuclear capability associated with the B-52's, raised fears that Okinawa might be in the process of becoming a permanent base for the large bombers, thereby placing the island in even greater danger of Communist retaliatory attacks and multiplying the obstacles to the attainment of reversion.[53]

Given the Okinawan attitudes on the Vietnamese War,

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nuclear weapons and the American military bases, it did not really matter whether there was any basis for these fears. It can be seen today with the benefit of hindsight that the possible dangers had been vastly exaggerated and in some cases were completely non-existent. Even with the knowledge available at the time there existed, however, no real reason for taking the stationing of heavy United States bombers as seriously as the Okinawans did.

At the end of March 1968 a mission sent by the Okinawa Problem and Discussion Council of Japan and headed by its Chairman, Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, visited the Ryukyu Islands and was given an opportunity by Kadena Air Base Commander Major General Jerry D. Page to examine the B-52's. One of the members of the mission, Shujiro Kotani, was considered an expert on these planes and was permitted to photograph the inside of one of the bombers. The results of this investigation led Dr. Ohama's delegation to conclude that the particular B-52 bombers stationed in Okinawa were "not of a type which can be loaded with nuclear weapons."[54]

These findings did not, however, alleviate Okinawan anxieties caused by the presence of the bombers, nor did they in any way reduce the agitation calling for the removal of the B-52's. Long-standing and vague fears have usually a strong irrational element in them and are not easily dispelled by logic. Moreover, the opposition had apparently no intention of permitting a few embarrassing facts to deprive it of an almost ideal issue.

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The United States Military Authorities could, for their part, have been expected to realize that the use of Okinawa as a B-52 base for operations in Vietnam would provoke a political storm. Although this usage was quite natural and perfectly legitimate in view of the rights held by the United States in the Ryukyu Islands, an action of this sort had once before caused difficulties in Okinawa.

On July 29, 1965 twenty-five B-52 bombers based in Guam landed unexpectedly in Okinawa. The official reason given for this action was that the planes had come to take shelter from a typhoon. They subsequently took off from Kadena Air Force Base and raided Communist targets in South Vietnam. This action called forth an outcry from the local population as well as in Japan and shortly thereafter the heavy bombers returned to Guam.

The incident had caused High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Watson to observe at the time that, even though the archipelago was under American administration, the military use of Okinawa by the United States was affected by political factors in the Ryukyus and in Japan. Through this statement the High Commissioner seemed to be casting doubt on the freedom in the use of the military bases that the United States was supposed to be enjoying in Okinawa, and which formed the justification for American rule over the archipelago.[55]

When, in 1968, B-52 bombers were brought back to Okinawa for operations in Vietnam, the political situation

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in the archipelago had further deteriorated for the United States and Kadena Air Force Base was used as a heavy bomber base for what appeared to be an indefinite period of time. This should have led to a realization that the action taken by the United States could result in serious political difficulties.

It would appear that when American military leaders made this decision they had reasoned that the military importance of shortening the flight distance between B-52 bases and targets in Vietnam was worth the political risks involved. It must also have been felt in Washington that the excitement caused by the arrival of the bombers would die down within a reasonable period of time, and that there was not much logic in insisting on the direct American administration of the Ryukyus in order to make possible the unobstructed use of Okinawan bases if this freedom could not be enjoyed in an actual war situation, when it was most needed. Whatever the exact reasoning of the Pentagon may have been, the Okinawan reaction to its decision came swiftly and from all quarters.

Within five days of the arrival of the B-52's, on February 10, 1968, the conservative dominated Assembly of the Ryukyu Islands had adopted a unanimous resolution opposing the use of Okinawa as a base for these bombers and demanding their immediate withdrawal as well as the suspension of all warlike actions based on the Islands.[56]

By February 14th the Okinawa Council Against Atomic

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and Hydrogen Weapons had decided to stage a series of protests, including mass rallies, to express its opposition to the presence of the bombers.[57] Within a few weeks the usual rallies, protests and demonstrations were in full swing.[58] In one of these there occurred the first skirmish between Okinawan oppositionists and American soldiers since the 1960 visit of President Eisenhower. It resulted from an attempt by about 100 members of the Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons and of the Citizens League for Peace in Vietnam to force their way into Kadena A.F.B.[59] Needless to say, the April 28th and May Day rallies had a new theme to add to the usual demands for reversion and for greater local autonomy.[60]

Despite this, within a few months it appeared as if the agitation might gradually fade away and the United States would be able to operate B-52 bombers from Okinawa without paying a prohibitive political price. Other events, like the protests staged in August 1968 against visits by United States nuclear submarines to Naha Military Port, seemed at times to hold the promise of becoming new foci for the Okinawan opposition and of eclipsing the B-52's in this role.

Despite a reduction in the number of resolutions and demonstrations devoted to the strategic bombers, the issue did not, however, vanish. The use of Okinawa as a base for B-52's raiding Vietnam continued to remain an important cause for concern and resentment in the minds of

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Okinawans and to provide fuel for the reversionist propaganda.[61] The presence of the bombers was later considered to have constituted another significant factor in the victory of the opposition candidate Chobyo Yara in the Chief Executive election held in November of that year.[62]

Moreover, as will be seen in the next chapter, the problem presented by the B-52's was of such a nature that it took only one spectacular accident involving one of the bombers to revive the issue and to bring it to a peak of intensity. Because the second part in the agitation over the B-52 bombers came several months later, when the political situation had once again changed, this particular episode has been included in the chapter devoted to an analysis of the last year before the announcement of the reversion decision.

Conclusions

This chapter has been concerned largely with the early and middle years of the decline in American authority and prestige. This was at first a slow and barely perceptable process. By the end of 1967, however, there could no longer remain any doubt that a major transformation in the Okinawan political climate had taken place.

The gradual change in the political atmosphere can be observed at different times during the 1960's in the declining ability of USCAR to have its way in disputes with important segments of the local population.

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During the early years of the decade General Caraway had been able to carry out a strong policy of more or less direct rule without encountering any insuperable difficulties. No part of the Okinawan population had been in a position to pressure the High Commissioner into modifying his policies.

During the summer of 1964 the United States was faced with what appeared to be a challenge to its policies from one wing of the Liberal Democratic Party. The new High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Watson, had, however, still been in a position to control the situation and to end the intra-party dispute to the complete satisfaction of American interests. He was helped in this by the fact that the difficulty concerned mainly the conservatives who had no real desire to bring about an actual break with the United States.

Within two years, however, the ability of the American Civil Administration to have its way over strong Okinawan opposition had become seriously impaired.

In the 1966 Twin Court Cases controversy USCAR had felt compelled to concede to the Okinawans the point in dispute, although the legal effect of this may have been very small. Moreover, the conservatives had joined in a common front against the transfer of jurisdiction order.

The unexpected outcome of this controversy resulted from the unusually strong and nearly unanimous Ryukyuan opposition it had prompted. This local reaction would, in turn, suggest that the court transfer order had struck an

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unusually sensitive note among Okinawans. This note has been explained in terms of a feeling that the High Commissioner's order represented a denial, or a reversal, of the policy of granting greater concessions on local autonomy. It has also been interpreted as resentment caused by an attempt to emphasize the superior position of USCAR over the institutions of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

Actions of this type had been taken by the American Authorities on earlier occasions but had never provoked such a strong reaction. It would appear, however, that a step of this sort is considered less humiliating when it is taken by a ruling power commanding the respect of the subject population. In this case deferring to it represents merely a surrender to the inevitable. When, however, the governors have ceased to be respected and when the local inhabitants have become convinced that no great risks are involved in defying them, then to accede to an order such as the one issued by USCAR in 1966 implies an unnecessary acceptance of an inferior status.

It should be noted that an attempt to protect and reassert American authority at this stage of foreign rule resulted in a political crisis which served mainly to further undermine this authority.

The transformation of the political atmosphere also made itself felt in the demands for autonomy and for reversion assuming a central role in the political life of the Islands. These two issues began to acquire an ever

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increasing importance in Ryukyuan elections and the Liberal Democrats were obliged to adjust to the new situation. Moreover, Japanese politics became more involved with Okinawan politics and the cleavage on social and economic questions paralleled and reinforced the divisions between demands for reversion and a willingness to accept a long-term continuation of the political status quo.

From the standpoint of the Okinawan population the attention devoted to the proposals for partial reversion during the middle and late 1960's indicates a rising impatience with the lack of progress in the direction of a return to Japan, and an apparent desire to overcome the resulting frustration by obtaining what might be called a kind of "substitute satisfaction." This was to be achieved by adopting measures appearing to constitute a "partial" reunion with the main islands. The later rejection of these plans would, however, indicate a hardening of the Ryukyuan position through a refusal to accept limited immediate steps in the direction of reversion. At a time when increased insistence on full reversion made its realization seem nearer, Okinawans became particularly reluctant to risk a delay in achieving their main objective by accepting minor or largely symbolic concessions.

From the American point of view, the refusal to consider the partial reversion plans during the middle of the 1960's, when these could still have made an impression on the local population, may have been a grave error. By

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yielding non-essential administrative rights the United States might possibly have succeeded in gaining Okinawan acceptance for a prolonged American retention of those administrative rights which were of greatest importance to Washington because they made possible the free use of the military bases.

Other signs testifying to the change in the political climate were not lacking. These included the need on the part of the United States to agree to the return of the Bonins as a token of good faith, and the inclusion in the November 1967 Johnson-Sato Joint Communique of language unusually sympathetic to the cause of reversion. The necessity of removing the USCAR offices from the center of Naha represented another symptom of the growing local irritation with the position occupied by the United States in the archipelago.

At this stage of the dependency relationship the steps taken failed to make the desired impression on the Okinawan population. It remains an open question whether they succeeded temporarily in reducing the rate at which the American position in the Ryukyu Islands was deteriorating, or whether they were, instead, instrumental in accelerating it.

The problem created by the deployment of the B-52's is also instructive in this regard. The use of Okinawa as a heavy bomber base for operations against Communist targets in Vietnam called forth serious opposition both in

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the Ryukyus and in Japan, in 1965 as well as in 1968. In view of the brief stay of the B-52's in 1965 it is difficult to compare the local reaction on these two occasions. It is, however, possible to contrast the outcry raised by the presence of B-52's during the 1960's with the use of Okinawa as a base for B-29 raids against Communist targets in Korea between 1950 and 1953. In the earlier war no serious problems were encountered by the United States as a result of this practice.[63]

The dispute caused by the presence of the B-52 bombers represented one major instance during the late 1960's in which the United States did not feel compelled to give in to the demands of the opposition. The controversial planes continued to use Kadena Air Force Base until long after the November 1969 reversion agreement.[64] It should be remembered, however, that this particular matter concerned not merely American administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands but the entire raison d'être of the United States presence in Okinawa. And the American Authorities were in this case able to have their way over the local inhabitants only by dipping still further into the rapidly diminishing reservoir of good will enjoyed by their regime.

The contents of this chapter have been concerned largely with the early and middle stages of the period during which the Okinawan acquiescence to an indefinite continuation of United States administration was ended.

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Until about the middle of the 1960's the United States had been generally successful in meeting the central challenge presented by a dependency to the ruling power and had received the minimum acceptance needed for the efficient maintenance of her regime over the Ryukyu Islands.

From that time on, however, because of various factors, one of which was the decline in American prestige and authority, the United States began losing the necessary Okinawan acquiescence. Once this trend had started it was to continue at a generally accelerating tempo and could no longer be halted. This process is in itself an interesting phenomenon which occurs at one time in most dependency relationships. The internal dynamics of it will be examined more closely in the next chapter, which is devoted to an analysis of the climactic period of this process.

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NOTES

[1]Miyasato Seigen, "Hopes and Realities in Okinawa," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), Vol. XII (April-June 1965), p. 166.

[2]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, February 12, 1970.

[3]Interview with Dr. Nathaniel Thayer, June 7, 1970.

[4]Interviews with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970 and Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[5]Mikio Higa, "The Reversion Theme in Okinawan Politics," Asian Survey (Berkeley, Cal.), Vol. VII (March 1967), p. 154.

[6]The New York Times, April 4, 1956, p. 15:1-2; and April 11, 1956, p. 10:3.

[7]USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Research and Evaluation Division, Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 26 March 1945-30 June 1965, pages not numbered, the information is listed chronologically. (Mimeographed). See also The New York Times, February 26, 1958, p. 5:2.

[8]Higa, Asian Survey, Vol. VII, op. cit., p. 154.

[9]Chitoshi Yanaga, Japanese People and Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964) contains a very good account of Japanese party politics, particularly in Chapter 10. See also Mikio Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa (Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia, 1963) for the most comprehensive treatment of post-1945 Okinawan politics.

[10]Lawrence Olsen, "Japan and the United States in Okinawa," East Asia Series, Vol. XII (Japan), No. 1 (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1965), pp. 6-7.

[11]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, H.R. 10871, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 109. See also The New York Times, July 31, 1964, p. 2:6; and August 11, 1964, p. 16:1-5; and Higa, Asian Survey, Vol. VII, op. cit., pp. 156-158. Some of the information was obtained from an interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[12]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

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[13]The New York Times, October 31, 1964, p. 5:1; and November 1, 1964, p. 8:1.

[14]Higa, Asian Survey, Vol. VII, op. cit., p. 158.

[15]The New York Times, November 16, 1965, p. 5:2.

[16]Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa Times and Jiho, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, December 10, 1967. (Mimeographed). The frequent name changes account for the interchangeable way in which the two names are sometimes used in this study.

[17]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 109.

[18]The New York Times, April 29, 1962, p. 29:1.

[19]The New York Times, May 2, 1963, p. 3:4.

[20]Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., April 29, 1965.

[21]The New York Times, June 19, 1960, p. 23:1-7. Although no violence took place, the newspapers reported that quite a bit of shouting was heard in support of reversion and against the American Chief Executive, and that many anti-American slogans and red flags were displayed. President Eisenhower was taken through back roads to Naha Air Force Base by officials who were concerned over his safety and did not wish to expose him to the shouting crowds.

[22]The New York Times, June 20, 1960, p. 1:7.

[23]The New York Times, July 4, 1964, p. 2:2.

[24]The New York Times, August 19, 1965, p. 4:3; August 20, 1965, p. 4:3; and August 21, 1965, p. 3:6. See also Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., August 20, 1965.

[25]The New York Times, January 21, 1964, p. 17:5; and February 4, 1964, p. 6:5.

[26]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., June 17, 1966; August 1, 1966; and August 2, 1966. See also Higa, Asian Survey, Vol. VII, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

[27]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., June 24, 1966.

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[28]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., June 27, 1966; and June 29, 1966.

[29]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., June 21, 1966; June 24, 1966; June 27, 1966; and June 30, 1966.

[30]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., June 26, 1966; and July 6, 1966.

[31]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., December 2, 1966.

[32]The New York Times, October 16, 1964, p. 29:6; and May 8, 1965, p. 11:5.

[33]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967, Vol. XV (RCS CSCAMG-5), pp. 32-34.

[34]The Washington Post, November 3, 1967, p. A26:1-6. (Article by Richard Halloran).

[35]The New York Times, November 21, 1967, p. 8:1.

[36]The New York Times, April 29, 1968, p. 15:1-3. In this rather unusual demonstration about 200 Okinawans in fishing boats met 1,200 Japanese who came in three larger ships. On the same day a mass rally attended by 100,000 persons was also held in Okinawa island.

[37]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), August 23, 1968, p. 3:2-3; and August 24, 1968, p. 3:7-8. In these protests a few members of the "Japan Peace for Vietnam Committee" successfully evaded the usual customs and immigration requirements when they arrived from Okinawa in the southern Japanese port of Kagoshima. On the next day the "August Struggle Executive Committee," a group demanding the abolition of travel restrictions between the Ryukyus and Japan, helped seventeen Okinawan students to perform the same feat on their arrival in Tokyo aboard the "Himeyuri Maru." The justification for these protests was that no customs and immigration inspections were necessary as the travelers were coming from a territory that was a part of Japan.

[38]"Second Ryukyu Shimpo Public Opinion Poll, 'Okinawan Politics and Reversion Consciousness" (Conducted 1-5 December 1967) (Translated by U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Public Affairs Department, Research

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and Evaluation Division, March 1968), pp. 1-2. (Mimeographed).

[39]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1966-1967, op. cit., p. 323.

[40]Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa Times and Jiho, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., October 29, 1967.

[41]Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa Times and Jiho, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., November 5, 1967.

[42]Interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970.

[43]Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, "Okinawa in Focus: Japanese Position, A Proposal Concerning the Okinawan Problem," Quarterly Report of the Okinawan Problems, No. 3 (Nampo Doho Engokai, Tokyo: July 1968), p. 5.

[44]Higa, Asian Survey, Vol. VII, op. cit., p. 153. See also Ryukyu Shimpo as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., September 13, 1966; The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), August 9, 1968, p. 1:4; and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, pp. 143-144.

[45]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), March 27, 1968, p. 1:2-3; March 29, 1969, p. 1:2-3; and October 28, 1969, p. 3:6.

[46]Sankei (Tokyo), July 31, 1968; and Mainichi (Tokyo), October 12, 1968, both as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, respectively, June 1968, No. 15, p. 29 and October 1968, No. 23, pp. 16-19. (Mimeographed). See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 3, 1968, p. 1:1.

[47]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), August 17, 1968, p. 1:5; and September 23, 1968, p. 1:1. See also Yomiuri (Tokyo), October 11, 1968, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., October 1968, No. 23, pp. 12-13.

[48]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), November 25, 1969, p. 1:2-4.

[49]Interview with Dr. Nobumoto Ohama, September 8, 1970; and The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 3, 1968, p. 4:4-6.

[50]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 2, 1968, p. 4:3-6.

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[51]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968, Vol. XVI (RCS CSCAMG-5), p. 10.

[52]Ibid., p. XXIX.

[53]Economist (Tokyo), March 19, 1968, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., March 1968, No. 7, pp. 1-4. See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 19, 1968, pp. 1:1, 3:4-5; and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., February 9, 1968.

[54]Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 1, 1968, as appearing in Special Translations, op. cit., April 1968, No. 9, p. 2.

[55]Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., July 30, 1965. See also The New York Times, July 29, 1965, p. 15:8; July 31, 1965, p. 3:5; and September 30, 1965, Supplement, p. 3:1.

[56]Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Report for Period 1967-1968, op. cit., p. XXIX. See also Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa Times and Jiho, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., February 11, 1968.

[57]Okinawa Times, Ryukyu Shimpo and Jiho, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., February 15, 1968.

[58]The New York Times, April 13, 1968, p. 7:4. A typical example of these was the protest staged at Kadena Air Force Base on April 12th. On this occasion about 9,000 demonstrators clashed with police.

[59]Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa Times and Jiho, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., May 3, 1968.

[60]Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa Times and Jiho, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., April 29, 1968 and May 2, 1968.

[61]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., August 8, 1968.

[62]From the text of an address delivered by Professor Mikio Higa before the United States Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, November 15, 1968. A copy may be found in The General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 2.

[63]The New York Times, September 16, 1951, VI, pp. 10-11; September 21, 1952, VI, pp. 9, 62-63; and April 28, 1955 p. 14:1.

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[64] The New York Times, September 25, 1960, p. 4:4-6.

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CHAPTER XI

THE LAST YEAR BEFORE THE REVERSION DECISION

In the year culminating in the announcement that the Ryukyus were to be handed back to Japan, American authority declined more dramatically and Ryukyuan demands for reversion became more urgent compared with the preceding years, covered in the previous chapter. Political crises followed each other in rapid order, and the indications that the Okinawan dependency relationship had entered a new phase were unmistakable.

This chapter will examine the climactic period of the last stage in which it was still more or less possible to rule a dependency in the customary manner by relying primarily on political manipulation. Although outwardly this period may not appear to differ greatly from earlier ones, basic changes had occurred in the political atmosphere. These changes almost guaranteed that within a limited time a point would be reached beyond which the dependency relationship could be continued only in a much more coercive manner.

One of the clearest signs of this new stage is that almost every effort of the ruling power to defend its authority produces the opposite effect from what is intended.

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The governors see their prestige and their ability to rule deteriorating, and their attempts to arrest or to retard this process usually succeed only in accelerating it.

The subject population, in this last conventional stage of a dependency relationship, is unwilling to allow the status quo to continue and is much bolder in defying the rulers. Moreover, as the termination of alien rule, long sought after, approaches the local population finds itself in a state of confusion and the local opposition now fears that victory will eliminate much of its raison d'être.

Various phenomena of this stage of foreign rule will be examined in three small case studies, in an analysis of Okinawan attitudes before the reversion agreement, and in the Okinawan reaction to this decision.

The November 1968 Election

The first popular election of a Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands was due to the interpretation given to this event by both the United States and the Japanese Governments, one of the turning points in American rule over the archipelago. Chobyo Yara, the leading opposition candidate, was elected.

The election campaign extended over a period of several months. The electioneering can be said to have begun, at the latest, with the announcement of High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Unger on February 1, 1968 that Ryukyuan voters would have their first opportunity to chose the

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Chief Executive of the GRI in the elections scheduled for November of that year.[1]

By the month of June the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council with its 103 member organizations, the Teachers' Association and the Socialist Masses, Socialist and People's Parties, had all come out in favor of the candidacy of Chobyo Yara, the President of the Teachers' Association. Yara, who at first expressed some reluctance, was nominated as the coalition candidate of almost the entire opposition. The conservatives chose as their standard bearer Junjo Nishime, the Mayor of Naha and President of the Liberal Democratic Party.[2]

The Chief Executive contest prompted the active participation of four out of the five major Japanese political parties to a degree never before known in an Okinawan election. Only the Komeito, whose Okinawan membership was divided over the two candidates, played no role in this political struggle.

The Liberal Democrats supported Nishime and the others worked for Yara. The Japanese Socialists regarded the Okinawan contest as the first step in both the coming struggle to terminate the Japanese-American Security Treaty and the comeback they hoped to make in the Japanese general election that was expected to take place in 1969. The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan felt the need for a conservative victory in Okinawa not only to thwart the Socialists but also to make it possible for the expected

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reversion negotiations with the United States to proceed smoothly. Because of the importance attributed to the Okinawan election, the Japanese ruling party had staked much of its prestige on a successful outcome, and its Secretary-General, Takeo Fukuda, had openly declared "we must win." By August 1968 the Ryukyuan electoral contest was becoming the focal point of the Japanese political situation.[3]

Both camps favored reversion, but the conservative Liberal Democrats adhered to realistic solutions and opposed immediate reversion out of a fear of the economic consequences of such a step. To make their point, they used a popular Ryukyuan cliché that claimed that an exaggerated rush to reunion with Japan would throw the Ryukyuans back into their prewar condition of "living on potatoes and walking barefoot." They also hinted that an opposition victory might delay the attainment of reversion.

The opposition, for its part, called the OLDP "sycophantic" towards the United States, insisted on immediate reversion, and in general demanded ideal solutions in order to obtain some concessions.[4]

The election produced a turnout of 89 per cent of the eligible voters. Yara won with 238,000 votes over Nishime's 206,000. The OLDP, nevertheless, secured 18 seats in the Assembly, against the opposition's 14. As, however, the opposition had also received 52 per cent of the votes in the legislative elections, the conservative victory in the Legislature was attributed less to the

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popularity of the OLDP and its political goals than to the election districts into which the Ryukyus had been divided.[5]

The election results profoundly shocked Japanese and Okinawan conservative circles and also Americans familiar with Ryukyuan problems. Political observers as well as Japanese and Okinawan politicians generally agreed that a main reason for the outcome had been the opposition's insistence on immediate reversion at a time when the Liberal Democrats had conspicuously failed to make this demand. This would indicate that the economic arguments against an early return to Japan, widely accepted for many years, had now been rejected by a majority of the Okinawan voters. The opposition's claim that the economic arguments against reversion represented merely a conservative device to maintain the status quo by diverting popular attention from immediate reversion were judged to have had a wide appeal.[6]

A more detailed analysis of Yara's victory was presented by Professor Mikio Higa, who was designated by the business manager of the American newspaper Okinawa Morning Star as the man responsible for mapping the strategy of the successful candidate.[7] According to Professor Higa, the two main pillars of Yara's victory were his personal popularity and his insistence on immediate reversion. He added that "the foundation of these two pillars is the Okinawa Teachers' Association. In other words, teachers throughout the Ryukyus contributed most to the victory of Yara." Professor Higa then declared that another important

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factor in the election had been the voters' increased political consciousness resulting from the struggles waged by the opposition against the court transfer order, the twin educational bills, and the permanent stationing of B-52 bombers in Okinawa, as well as from the taxi scandal.[8]

The election results were regarded at the time as more than a mere political defeat for the United States. The position of Chobyo Yara as the head of the militant Teachers' Association and one of the top leaders of the reversion movement led many Americans to fear that his assumption of the most important office in the GRI would inaugurate a period of non-cooperation and even friction between the United States Administration and the local Ryukyuan Government.

Even many of the less pessimistic Americans, who did not consider Yara a radical, felt that his lack of governmental experience might hamper his ability to control the coalition that had elected him. If this happened, it was feared that an atmosphere could be created within the GRI which might encourage the Ryukyuan police to turn a blind eye toward demonstrations near military bases. In this case American troops might have to be called on to maintain order. This alternative had always been considered politically dangerous, as clashes between United States military personnel and local inhabitants would almost certainly occur, and this in turn could poison the air in Okinawa and place a severe strain on Japanese-American

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relations.[9]

Fortunately, it turned out that the gloomy predictions concerning the possible effects of Yara's victory had been far too pessimistic. Professor Higa was correct when he pointed out, shortly after the election, that Chobyo Yara was a nationalist but not a socialist. The new Chief Executive advocated immediate reversion and, although he was not happy about the presence of the bases and wanted to restrict the freedom enjoyed by the United States in their use, he was enough of a realist to recognize the importance of the military installations for the Ryukyuan economy. For this reason Yara did not ask for the removal of the bases, and in spite of his strong stand in favor of "immediate reversion" he acknowledged, right after the election, that it would be unrealistic for his administration to attempt to actually achieve this.[10]

It was then recalled that Chobyo Yara had at first hesitated to run for this high office and had finally accepted the nomination for the position of Chief Executive on the condition that he could retain his independence from the parties supporting him, both in his campaign promises and, in the event of his being elected, in the conduct of his administration. Within a few months of the election the High Commissioner spoke of Mr. Yara as being firmly on the side of law and order. He described Yara's attitude toward the United States in the various problems that had arisen as generally cooperative and said,as will be

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seen a little later, that he played a "key role" in averting the general strike originally planned for February 4, 1969.[11]

The American miscalculation concerning the effects of a Yara victory on the internal governmental situation within the Ryukyus points to the possibility that imaginary fears might also on other occasions have led the Americans to pursue policies that unnecessarily alienated sections of the Okinawan population.

Precisely because it was feared that a staunch reversionist like Chobyo Yara might be elected and thereby complicate and embarrass the direct American rule over Okinawa, the United States had for many years refused to permit the popular election of the Chief Executive of the GRI. The opposition was thus given another excellent issue. Instead, it turned out that the election of the man who could be termed "Mr. Reversion" as Chief Executive produced no real problems for the United States in the internal administration of the Ryukyus, and within a few months he was even to play the key role in helping USCAR out of a serious predicament.

Despite this it could be argued that the fears of the United States Administration concerning the popular election of the Chief Executive were somewhat justified. An opposition candidate less reasonable than Chobyo Yara could have been elected to the highest office in the GRI and proved that not all the American fears were imaginary.

Nevertheless, the election of Chobyo Yara had pro-

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found political and psychological consequences, not in the internal administration of Okinawa, but in the political atmosphere within the archipelago, and even more in the thinking of the Japanese and United States Governments.

Politically, Yara's victory helped to make the reversion forces more aware of their own strength and brought into office a Chief Executive backed by the opposition at a time when the Assembly was still controlled by the Liberal Democrats, with the implicit possibility of an executive-legislative deadlock.[12]

The new Chief Executive at first experienced great difficulties in obtaining economic assistance from the Liberal Democratic Japanese Government. The cabinet of Prime Minister Sato was not particularly anxious to contribute to Yara's popularity by granting his requests for additional aid. Only after weeks of bargaining would the Japanese Government agree to provide Okinawa with $63 million in development funds for the following year.[13]

The election of Chobyo Yara was to have even more important effects on the attitudes of the Japanese and United States Governments.

The victory of the opposition candidate reportedly came as a great shock to the government of Premier Sato and the leadership of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, which had made strenuous efforts to prevent such an outcome. The shock recurred a few weeks later when, in the Naha mayoralty election, the candidate of the opposition parties,

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Ryosho Taira, defeated the Liberal Democratic candidate Sotoku Furugen by a wide margin. It now began to appear that Yara's victory did not represent merely a deviating election but could be interpreted as part of a political realignment in favor of the opposition and a sign of dissatisfaction with conservative leadership. Political observers generally agreed that the policies pursued by the Sato government in regard to reversion had been successfully challenged in Okinawa.[14]

Despite some disagreement on this subject, most observers regarded Yara's victory as one of the important factors that forced Premier Sato to take a stronger stand on reversion. The Japanese Prime Minister himself declared on November 11, 1968, immediately after hearing the news of Yara's election: "I will stake my political life on handling the problem of the return of Okinawa."[15] In the following months the Japanese Government, while sending out careful feelers and making cautious probes in various directions, gradually hardened its position on reversion and within one year of the election of Chobyo Yara the great objective had been attained.

The electoral victory of Yara and of the demand for immediate reversion that he seemed to represent was also regarded by an important section of the Japanese press as an expression on the part of Okinawans that they could no longer endure foreign rule and as a declaration of their "spiritual independence" from the United States.[16]

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The most significant effect of the Yara victory was probably the United States' similar interpretation of the election results. When former GRI Chief Executive Jugo Thoma made a last-minute attempt to block the November 1969 reversion agreement with the proposal that a plebiscite be held in the archipelago, United States Government officials let it be known that the State Department did not consider such a referendum necessary. It was felt in Washington that the election of Chobyo Yara on a platform demanding immediate reversion, in effect, constituted a plebiscite on the issue.[17]

It can, then, be said that the month of November 1968 marked the beginning, not merely in terms of the calendar, of the last year in which the United States was able to rule Okinawa without being committed to a definite date for reversion.

The Climax of the B-52 Crisis

Within a few days of the Yara victory, on November 20, 1968, the previously mentioned spectacular crash of a B-52 bomber not only revived the agitation over the presence of these aircraft but succeeded in bringing it to a peak of intensity.

As was to be expected, very shortly after the accident the usual rallies and demonstrations were held and countless statements were issued and resolutions voted on. The Ryukyuan reaction on this occasion, however, seemed unusually strong,[18] and in the opinion of most Okinawans the situation

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seemed to call for more than the standard protest ritual.

By November 23rd the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council and the local anti-nuclear weapons organizations had agreed to form a new special council to lead and to coordinate the campaign for the removal of the B-52's and the termination of visits by nuclear submarines to Okinawan ports. This new group was formally launched by representatives of more than one hundred organizations at a rally held in Naha on December 7th, and was given the name "Joint Struggle Council to Protect Human Lives."

The formation of this latest council also represented a reconciliation between two previously quarreling Okinawan anti-nuclear weapons organizations, affiliated respectively with the Socialist and Communist Parties of Japan.[19]

By December 14th, the struggle against the presence of the heavy bombers was responsible for a protest staged outside Kadena Air Force Base, judged to be the largest demonstration in Okinawa during twenty-three years of American rule.[20]

Shortly after the accident of November 20th, the Okinawa Prefecture Labor Unions Council (Kenrokyo) decided to organize a general strike to demand the removal of the B-52's and to press other reversionist and unionist demands. This strike, originally scheduled for the middle of December, was after two postponements finally planned for February 4, 1969, the anniversary of the second arrival of the bombers in Okinawa. By that date the Military Base Workers'

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Union (Zengunro), the Joint People's Council to Protect Human Lives, the Teachers' Association and virtually every other reversionist and labor organization had joined in the sponsorship of the general strike.[21]

On January 11, 1969, the situation was made even more difficult and tensions were increased still further by what the Japanese Government and the Okinawan opposition regarded as the American response to the strike threat. USCAR issued High Commissioner's Ordinance No. 63, to go into effect on January 25th as a replacement for Ordinance No. 116.

Ordinance No. 63 denied the right to strike to First and Second Category employees, a classification including not only military employees but also anyone working in an essential industry. The new Ordinance also prohibited military-base workers from making contributions to an election campaign and forbade all inhabitants from picketing and holding protests or demonstrations aimed at obstructing the operation of military facilities or important industries. Stiffer penalties were provided for violators of the new regulations.[22]

The American action immediately called forth another storm of protests and demonstrations from Okinawan opposition groups and from the Japanese press and many Japanese organizations. The Japanese Government was reported as "perplexed" by the contents of the Ordinance and the "suddeness" of its promulgation.[23]

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The situation threatened to develop into the most serious crisis ever faced by the United States Administration in the Ryukyu Islands. The opposition groups aimed to achieve more than the paralysis of the entire main island in a general strike in which even farmers and shopkeepers were asked to participate. They also intended to carry out a mass "sitdown" demonstration on military roads leading to the main United States base installations.[24]

The American Authorities showed definite signs of finding themselves caught in a situation which they were not capable of resolving peacefully. Barely twelve days after the new Ordinance was issued. USCAR modified its initial tough stand and, in a sudden display of weakness announced the postponement of the effective date of the Ordinance from January 25th to March 1st. The new Chief Executive declared that this concession would not bring about the cancellation of the general strike.

In the end the Japanese Government had to extricate the United States Authorities from their predicament.

After the announcement that the new Ordinance would go into effect on March 1st, an action in which the Japanese Government may well have played a part, Prime Minister Sato appealed to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and to its Assembly to try to avoid the general strike. He also invited Chief Executive Yara to Tokyo. In their meeting of January 29th Premier Sato could not, however, meet what Chobyo Yara considered the concession

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that would bring about the cancellation of the planned mass protest. This was a definite date for the withdrawal of the B-52's. The most that the Prime Minister could do was to endorse indirectly the impression his Foreign Minister, Aichi, had been trying to convey, namely, that the strategic bombers might be withdrawn at an early date. Yara returned to Okinawa promising to continue his attempts to avoid the general strike.[25]

After great efforts toward this end on the part of both Chief Executive Chobyo Yara and the Japanese Government, the Okinawa Joint Struggle Council for the Protection of Human Rights, which had in the meanwhile taken over the leadership of the planned mass protest, announced on February 1st the cancellation of the general strike scheduled for only three days later.

It was generally believed in Okinawa that the reversion leaders backed down at the last minute mainly because they feared the strike might have undermined the administration of the man whom they had succeeded only three months earlier in electing to the highest office of the GRI. It was felt that a general strike of the type planned could have created a chaotic situation on the main island for which the United States, the Japanese Government and the Okinawan conservatives would all have blamed Chobyo Yara.[26]

The anticlimactic cancellation of the strike led to confusion and mutual recriminations within the reversionist ranks. Those whose expectations had been raised

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too high by the prospects of the strike could not permit the fateful day to pass without some sort of protest demonstration.[27]

Within the reversion movement signs of disunity appeared in the wake of the cancellation of the general strike. Those who had made the decision to cancel were called "traitors" by those who wanted to proceed with the mass protest. Students of the University of the Ryukyus were in violent disagreement, and one thousand of them tried to storm the office of their long-time leader, Chobyo Yara. The Chairman of the Joint Struggle Council for the Protection of Human Rights, Kokichi Kameko, declared his readiness to assume responsibility for the confusion reigning within the reversionist ranks and announced his intention to resign.[28]

The denouement of this episode on the surface gave the United States a victory over the Okinawan opposition. The threatened general strike had not taken place, no "political explosion" had occurred, the reversion forces seemed to have been thrown into some disarray, and the B-52's, the cause of it all, remained on the island to carry out their missions in connection with the Vietnamese War.

A closer study of the crisis and of its consequences would, however, lead to different conclusions. The cancellation of the general strike had no permanent effect on the efficacy of the opposition movement. Only a few months

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later the local labor movement was to carry out an action coming very close to the planned general strike. Moreover, Okinawans continued to be as much opposed as ever to the use of their main island by heavy bombers and to the presence of other weapons symbolizing the destructiveness of modern warfare. This is confirmed by incidents that were to take place during the remainder of the year.

Despite its indirect denial two days later by the United States Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands, a report from the Japanese news agency Kyodo, on October 23, 1969, to the effect that some B-52's based in Okinawa were flying regular patrols near the coasts of Communist China and North Korea armed with thermonuclear bombs, was enough to cause a brief wave of excitement among the Ryukyuan population.[29]

As another sign of continuing Okinawan sensitivity on this subject, it should be remembered that the previously referred to furor resulting from the revelation that poison gas was stored on Okinawa island also took place a few months after the cancellation of the general strike, in the summer of 1969.[30]

The United States Civil Administration could not even pride itself on having averted the general strike by using its own resources. USCAR was compelled to postpone the effective date of the very ordinance which was supposed to have prevented the strike. In the end, the intervention of the Japanese Government and the cooperation of the

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opposition-backed Chief Executive of the GRI proved to be the main factors in averting the threatened mass protest.

The Liberal Democratic Government of Japan had at least two good reasons for wishing to avoid a general strike in Okinawa. In a political action of this sort there was always the possibility that the Ryukyuan police might be unable, or perhaps even unwilling, to control the situation with the result that order could only be maintained through the direct use of American troops. The employment of United States Forces for this purpose always carried with it the danger of unpleasant incidents with the local population which could poison the atmosphere in the Ryukyu Islands, and have a sufficiently adverse effect on Japanese public opinion to pose a threat to the continuation of the Japanese-American alliance.

Premier Sato was also reported to be worried that a failure on the part of his government to prevent the general strike might be taken as an indication by the United States that the Japanese Government did not possess sufficient influence in Okinawa to assure peaceful and orderly conditions around the American bases and could, therefore, not be entrusted with the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands. For Prime Minister Sato and his government, a general strike in Okinawa could only serve to complicate the delicate negotiations with the United States on the question of reversion.[31]

What was most significant about the threatened

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general strike was the inability of the United States Administration to prevent serious political disturbances by the beginning of 1969 without the cooperation of the Japanese Government.

This, naturally, did not mean that the United States had lost the ability to maintain order in the Ryukyu Islands or was about to be expelled from them. The United States obviously possessed ample military resources within the Ryukyus and elsewhere to impose its rule over the small Okinawan population for an indefinite period of time. However, once the dependency relationship could be maintained only by force of arms a situation would have been created that is always very difficult for any ruling power, but which soon becomes politically untenable for a democracy.

In a hostile setting the continuation of United States administration would have become far more costly and the military bases, dependent on local labor and surrounded by the local population, could probably no longer have been operated at maximum efficiency. An American government in Okinawa based mainly on force and suppression would in all likelihood have had repercussions in Japan with serious implications for the friendly relations then existing between the two countries. Finally, such a regime would ultimately have called forth serious criticism within the United States.[32]

In the long run, it would have been self-defeating for the United States to attempt to govern the Ryukyu

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Islands by relying mainly on the use of force. As a rule, a dependency relationship maintained by a democratic power has no future once it ceases to be based primarily on control through political manipulation, and no longer receives the necessary minimum acceptance from the local population.

It must be added that none of this had happened in February 1969. The general strike episode seems to indicate, however, that political conditions in Okinawa had deteriorated to the point where, without the exercise of caution and the early grant of major concessions to the demands for reversion, the United States could have soon found herself in the position of having to maintain her regime through predominantly coercive means. The Okinawan dependency relationship was entering the last stage in which it could still be maintained in the customarily efficient, peaceful, manner.

The Final Struggle for Reversion

During the nine months between the cancellation of the planned general strike and the November 1969 reversion agreement Okinawans showed an increased determination to achieve some "breakthrough" on the reversion question before the end of the year and were certain that this was in fact bound to happen. This period was also marked by the most serious direct confrontation between United States Forces and Okinawan protesters during twenty-four years of American rule.

Direct clashes and confrontations between United

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States service personnel and Okinawan demonstrators had been rare and of only minor significance before 1969, and for this reason have hardly been mentioned in this study.[33] In June 1969 the first significant clash occurred in the course of a protest action that was to some extent a delayed reaction to the cancellation of the general strike four months earlier.

During the first half of 1969, the All-Okinawa Military Workers' Union was engaged in a struggle for higher wages and was protesting the mass dismissals of Okinawan base workers under a personnel reduction policy, that was part of a larger American effort to reduce government expenditures. This dispute was exacerbated by the confusion and frustration felt within the reversion and labor movements as a result of the cancellation of the general strike.

The embittered atmosphere led the Military Workers' Union to carry out on June 5, 1969 a twenty-four hour strike in open defiance of the High Commissioner's Ordinance No. 116, which expressly forbade work stoppages of this sort and provided stiff penalties in the form of dismissals, fines and imprisonment for violators. An open defiance of the laws governing military-base workers had occurred only once before in a precedent-breaking strike that took place in April 1968.

The June 5th action was, however, regarded as a more serious violation of the Ordinance.[34] At one point military policemen moved forward with fixed bayonets to push back

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demonstrators, and in the process slightly injured ten Okinawans. Unfortunately, one of the wounded men turned out to be the head of the largest opposition party, Tsumichiyo Asato, the Chairman of the Socialist Masses Party.[35]

Although most of the remainder of the strike was relatively peaceful, this incident not surprisingly produced cries of outrage in both Okinawa and Japan. To Americans the use of bayonets in riot control, a practice not unknown in the United States, did not appear as a particularly loathsome way of dealing with a disturbance of this kind. Many Americans present in the Ryukyus did not consider this action any more reprehensible than some of the acts of violence committed by Okinawan strikers on that day.

Ryukyuans and mainland Japanese, however, took a completely different view. To them the bayonet represented a weapon of war and not an instrument for use against civilians in a peacetime riot. In view of the pre-war Japanese mystique concerning the samurai sword, which extended to the bayonet carried by ordinary infantrymen, the use of this weapon was a symbolic reminder of a militaristic past that most post-war Japanese and Okinawans would have preferred to remain forgotten. Local political observers generally agreed that in Japan "no postwar government could have used bayonets in a riot and survived."[36]

Once again, USCAR had unwittingly handed the Okinawan

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opposition an ideal issue with which to arouse further hostility against American rule. The "bayonet incident," as it came to be called, brought forth a new wave of protests, resolutions and demonstrations. Although at one point the main island's most important highway was paralyzed and protesters attempted to storm the gate of the U.S. Army Headquarters, no United States troops were used on these occasions and Ryukyuan police handled the crowds.[37]

The "bayonet incident" is yet another illustration of how the rulers, by using in Okinawa a riot control technique which is acceptable in the United States, succeeded in further alienating the local population from their regime. The incident also raises the question as to why there had been a departure from the usual policy of utilizing only Ryukyuan police to control disturbances with American troops ready, but out of sight, if needed. No explanation was given at the time for the stationing of United States servicemen outside the gates of the Army base in Naha, the site of the "bayonet incident,"[38] and their being used to push back the crowd without the GRI police force having lost control of the situation.

In view of the demonstrated ability of the Ryukyuan police to maintain order during previous disturbances and of the strong desire to avoid direct confrontations between Okinawan protesters and United States servicemen, the use of American troops to disperse crowds on June 5th can be considered a serious error that only increased further

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the unpopularity of the American regime.

It should be added that by June 1969 it was no longer politically possible to delay for any considerable period of time the announcement of a definite date for reversion. In view of this, the "bayonet incident" could not have had any real influence on the further duration of the direct United States administration of Okinawa. This incident is of interest partly because it constituted the type of action on the part of a ruling power that is intended to preserve its authority, but which during the last conventional stage of a dependency relationship serves, instead, only to accelerate its decline. The June 5th confrontation is also significant because it portends the political difficulties that would have been regularly encountered should United States rule over the Ryukyu Islands have continued into the period requiring the use of military force for its maintenance.

The events of June 5th provide additional evidence for the assertion that in 1969 the dependency relationship established over Okinawa was in the last stage in which it could have been maintained through predominantly non-coercive means. A strike on the part of the Military Workers' Union in open defiance of USCAR's Ordinance represented an action that, although it was also staged during the previous year, would not have been attempted at an earlier period of American rule. Likewise, the "bayonet incident" and its aftermath can be considered a sign of the loss of

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prestige suffered by the United States Administration.

The use of American troops against Okinawan demonstrators provoked no fear of the greater use of United States Forces in the future and, therefore, did not result in reducing the number of protest rallies. By 1969, Ryukyuans were well aware that, no matter how many soldiers were stationed in their islands, the United States would not undertake any repression in the manner of a traditional Oriental conqueror. They had, in fact, learned that the Americans would take no action which they really had to fear. In consequence of this, the use of United States troops had no deterrent effect on Okinawan activists. On the contrary, as soon as any American action resulted in even light injury to Ryukyuans there immediately followed a flood of hostile publicity that only served to incite further protests.

When a ruling power is no longer feared and the subject people are convinced that their governors are in no position to actually harm them, hatred turns to contempt and mildly repressive measures taken by the rulers produce the opposite effect of what is intended. When the rulers take action to strengthen their position and succeed only in speeding up the process whereby their authority is undermined, this constitutes the most obvious sign that the last stage has been reached in which it is possible to carry on the dependency relationship in the accustomed manner.

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The events of June 5th did not provide the only indication that the Okinawan dependency relationship had come to this stage.

On April 8, 1969, the Legislature of the Ryukyu Islands passed a unanimous resolution asking for a definite date by which the return of Okinawa to Japan would take place. The resolution also called for reversion to be accompanied by the removal of all nuclear weapons from the archipelago and the application of the same restrictions on Okinawan military installations as applied to American bases in Japan. Although the different parties in the Assembly placed varying interpretations on this resolution, all voted in favor of it.[39]

Only some months previous to this, the Liberal Democratic Party, which controlled the Legislature, had not permitted such resolutions embodying the basic demands of the opposition to pass. The conservatives, who always had provided the minimum support for reversion consistent with political realities in the Ryukyus, had finally come around to supporting the full program of the mainstream of the reversion movement.

By 1969 the great majority of the Okinawan population was demanding the announcement, within the same year, of a reasonably early date for the return of their islands. Only secondary consideration was now given to the economic consequences of reversion.

In April 1969 the incumbent High Commissioner, Lieut.

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Gen. James B. Lampert, diplomatically acknowledged before the House Committee on Appropriations the strength of the reversion sentiments and also the seriousness of the political situation faced by the United States. General Lampert told the committee that after assuming office in January of that year he had found in his travels throughout the archipelago only manifestations of good will and friendship for himself and for the United States. The High Commissioner concluded from this that there still existed at the time in the Ryukyu Islands a "reservoir of good will" toward the United States.

A little later in the same testimony General Lampert warned, however, that Okinawans expected "some" progress in the direction of reversion during 1969. He feared that without this the United States might face even greater demands for reversion in both Okinawa and Japan, with a good possibility of "increasingly more aggressive overt acts and demonstrations." The High Commissioner then declared that even though this would make the administration of the Ryukyus more difficult "I do not foresee that the operational effectiveness of our military bases would be destroyed." He added that Okinawans still had mixed feelings on the subject of the bases, desiring both to retain these for their economic value and to be rid of them because of the irritations and the dangers associated with their presence on the main island. By the spring of 1969, the Okinawan fear of the economic consequences of

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reversion had, however, become tempered by the realization that the bases would remain on the island for at least a few years after reversion.[40]

The good will General Lampert referred to need not be entirely dismissed as Japanese politeness to an incoming High Commissioner that was being passed on to a Congressional Committee in order to help create a more suitable atmosphere for the approval of financial assistance to the Ryukyu Islands, although it was probably partly in this class. There undoubtedly still remained in 1969 some good will toward the United States in Okinawa. This good will was, however, more nearly suited to making possible a graceful exit from the dependency relationship rather than continuing it for a much longer period of time. This is attested to by the opinions of others familiar with the situation.

Former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II expressed to the author the opinion that delaying the announcement of a definite reversion date beyond 1969 would probably have created a serious situation for the United States in Okinawa.[41] Former High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway also told the author that by late 1969 the direct United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands had become increasingly difficult and, in his opinion, there no longer might have existed an alternative to reversion. He expressed the belief, however, that policies pursued since his departure from the Islands had

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led to this situation and that a firmer policy on the part of his successors might have produced different results.[42]

By 1969, the United States did not have many options left in terms of the internal political situation within the Ryukyu Islands. The Ryukyuan majority had reached a consensus on all of the important questions before it, except for perhaps one. It was agreed that an early date for reversion should be decided on in 1969, that economic considerations should not affect this decision, that the military installations should be retained for an indefinite period after reversion, and that the American freedom in their use should be limited to what it was in United States bases in Japan. For a long time, however, there existed no agreement on what position to take should the demand for early reversion conflict with the desire to downgrade the bases to the status applicable to American military installations in Japan.

This question turned out to be so perplexing that even the Chairman of the Council for the Reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland, Shinei Kyan, was reported as late as April 1969 as unwilling to commit himself on whether it would be preferable to achieve early reversion with the stipulation that the United States could retain the full freedom in the use of the bases, or whether it would be better to delay the reunion with Japan until the military installations could be downgraded to the status of American bases in the main islands. Kyan was

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quoted at the time as having said "we want immediate reversion, that is our demand. As for what to do about the bases, that is a matter for negotiation between Tokyo and Washington. It is not a matter that concerns us."[43]

For Shinei Kyan this represented a very sensitive point on which to commit himself at that particular time. He was caught between the insistence of the United States on retaining the full freedom in the use of the bases and the long-time demands of his movement for the removal of all nuclear weapons and the restriction of American rights in the use of the bases. Kyan also had to consider the overwhelming desire for reversion and the very small Okinawan majority that seemed ready to accept reversion even at the cost of leaving the United States in possession of its freedom in the use of the bases, should this prove to be the only way of achieving the long-sought reunion with the mainland.

On October 1, 1969, on the eve of the reversion agreement, an Asahi Shimbun public opinion survey reported 51 per cent of its Okinawan respondents, as against 48 per cent of the Japanese questioned, as having answered "yes" to the question, "do you want early reversion with the bases remaining the same as now, in case the United States and Japan cannot agree on the question of the bases and this results in a delay of the return (to Japan)?"[44]

The decision of Prime Minister Sato to visit Washington in November 1969 had for some time been the cause of

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much speculation in both Okinawa and Japan. There was a strong feeling that the planned summit conference with President Nixon would produce either the long-expected reversion agreement, or at least a major step in this direction. A great deal of uncertainty, however, had centered on the question of the future status provided by a reversion agreement for the bases.

The opposition in both Okinawa and Japan suspected that, particularly in this matter, the Premier would agree to conditions which would ignore the demands of the reversion movement and be too close to the position of the United States. This distrust of the Prime Minister led the reversionists to seriously consider opposing Mr. Sato's projected trip to Washington.

On September 3rd the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party's Central Executive Committee decided only after a long and heated debate not to oppose the Premier's journey to the summit meeting with the President of the United States. The party's chairman, Tsumichiyo Asato, expressed opposition to the contents of the negotiations then under way between the United States and Japanese Governments.

A close connection was seen between Mr. Sato's trip and the post-reversion status of the bases. When Chief Executive Chobyo Yara told the press on September 4th that he would not oppose the Prime Minister's visit to the United States, newsmen took this to imply that Yara

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favored giving priority to an early return of Okinawa over the terms of reversion.[45]

In Japan the demand for the Okinawan bases to be downgraded to the status of American bases in the main islands became overwhelming and finally had to be adopted by the Japanese Government as its negotiating position with the United States.[46] The Okinawan reversion movement with its tradition of following the tactics used on the mainland could not have been expected to remain independent of the Japanese stand in this matter, and the status of the bases was becoming an issue as important as reversion itself. Under these circumstances, and with the distrust felt in opposition circles toward Premier Sato, the moderate stand taken by Chief Executive Chobyo Yara and the difficult decision reached by the divided leadership of the Socialist Masses Party were not to represent the final word of the reversion movement on the projected summit conference in Washington.

Within five days of the vote taken by its Central Executive Committee, the Socialist Masses Party reversed its stand and joined the People's Party, the Okinawa Socialist Party and the Progressive Joint Struggle Council of Okinawa in protesting the planned visit of Prime Minister Sato to the United States. This was done on the grounds that "his formula of the Okinawan reversion is not in line with the opinions of Okinawans" and was against their unified plan for "immediate, unconditional and complete

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return to Japanese rule without nuclear bases."[47]

The reversion movement was now taking what must appear as a curious position, particularly since few Okinawans believed it possible, or even desirable, to achieve the more extreme demand for immediate reversion. The Japanese Government had, following long negotiations with the United States, finally adopted the opposition stand and demanded reversion within three years, with all nuclear weapons removed and the bases reduced to the same level as American military installations in Japan, according to the slogan "Kaku Nuki, Hondo Nami." The reversionists, then, were protesting a trip by the Japanese Prime Minister intended to bring about the return of Okinawa to Japan, in line with the conditions traditionally demanded by most of the opposition.

In order to understand this peculiar posture it is necessary to recall the close connection then existing between the Japanese political parties and their Okinawan counterparts and to keep in mind the nature of opposition parties, particularly in Japan and Okinawa. Thus, when the Japanese opposition was using the reversion issue as a principal weapon in an attempt to undermine the Japanese-American Security Treaty and bring about the fall of Sato's Liberal Democratic Party in the coming Japanese general election, the Okinawan reversionists had little choice in the matter and had to criticize the Prime Minister at every turn, regardless of what policies he was actually

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pursuing.

One of the worst calamities that can befall an opposition is the loss of its leading issue through its adoption by the incumbent government. As the opposition obviously does not wish to lose its raison d'être, it is obliged in such a situation to assert that the policy pursued by the government does not correspond to what it is claimed to be. This can only be accomplished by exploiting every existing doubt regarding the integrity of the incumbents. The opposition is assisted in its task by the impossibility of fulfilling in a practical policy the maximalist demands of its most extreme faction.

The Okinawan opposition thus declared that the proposed terms of the reversion agreement did not correspond to the virtually impossible demand for immediate reversion with all bases removed. The opposition efforts were aided by the suspicion, ever present in Japan and in Okinawa, that the shrewd Prime Minister would at the last moment "put over" an arrangement either leaving the United States with the full freedom in the use of the bases or, perhaps, not even representing reversion in the true sense of the word.

The extent of the pessimism in regard to the Sato-Nixon summit conference caused by these sentiments is brought out in one of the findings of the previously mentioned Asahi Shimbun opinion survey, made public on October 1, 1969. The number of respondents who did not

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think that the United States would set a final date for reversion at the time of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington far exceeded those who expected a date to be set.[48]

The Joint Communique of November 1969

The reaction of Okinawans to the joint communique which emerged from the Japanese-American summit conference held in Washington late in November 1969 provides an additional indication of their feelings concerning some of the problems discussed above.

The communique stated that reversion would take place during 1972 and provided for the application to Okinawan bases of the same provisions and restrictions then governing the operation of American bases in Japan. Not only did this automatically include the removal of nuclear weapons, but a very strong hint to this effect was specifically inserted in paragraph 8 of the agreement. The fourth paragraph contained, however, insinuations to the effect that, in case of an emergency occurring in the Korean peninsula or possibly in the region around Taiwan, the Japanese Government might consent to greater freedom in the American use of both Okinawan and Japanese bases. Similar hints were provided for the case of Vietnam, should the war not have ended by 1972.

On the day the joint communique was issued some United States officials claimed that it provided for a

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generally greater freedom in the employment of all American bases located on Japanese soil than had been the case until then. The Japanese and later American interpretations of the communique conceded, however, that all of the fundamental demands of the reversion movement had been granted by the United States, since the special emergency rights in the use of Japanese and Okinawan bases hinted at in the communique depended on the consent of the Japanese Government, which would acquire the final say in these matters. Japan had, as far as was known, undertaken no definite commitment on this subject. Moreover, within five days of the issuance of the joint communique Prime Minister Sato publicly declared that after reversion, in 1972, his government would reject any American demands for the re-introduction of nuclear weapons into Okinawa, even in an emergency.[49]

After the announcement of the reversion agreement, criticism tended to concentrate on the sentences in the joint communique dealing with possible emergencies in and around Korea and Taiwan. The opposition incorrectly interpreted these as a Japanese surrender to American demands and as the assumption of new military responsibilities on the part of Japan. These assertions were made credible in the eyes of many Okinawans who had waited for many disappointing years before reversion was finally announced. When the long-awaited agreement came, the accumulated disillusionment and frustrations were responsible for a feeling that somehow it could not really mean true reversion,

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that there must be found somewhere a hidden "catch."

The combination of these attitudes, of the uncertainties concerning the Island's economic future and of the charges raised by the opposition was responsible for a decidedly mixed reaction to the reversion agreement in Okinawa.

Chief Executive Chobyo Yara greeted the announcement by declaring that he was "overjoyed with emotion" to learn about the coming reversion of Okinawa, but was also dissatisfied because the joint communique made no provision for an immediate return to Japan, nor for a withdrawal of the B-52's.[50]

The three political parties that had supported Yara's election in November 1968 and the Council for the Return of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland showed their displeasure with the terms of the reversion agreement by opposing their Chief Executive's proposed trip to Tokyo for the purpose of greeting Premier Sato on his return from Washington. Yara was not willing to cancel his journey, but in an effort to compromise he obliged his supporters by not appearing at the airport when the Prime Minister's plane arrived on November 24th.[51]

While the opposition was protesting the failure of the joint communique to provide for immediate reversion and for a rapid liquidation of the United States bases in Okinawa, it was simultaneously protesting what would appear as a scaling down of the American military presence, namely

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the dismissal of military base workers as an economy measure. Not even the reversion announcement had apparently been able to resolve fully the Okinawan dilemma that had pitted economic interests against nationalistic sentiments for almost a quarter century.

After the many years of pessimism over the likelihood of reversion and the economic dilemma it posed, the Okinawan population,bombarded by contradictory interpretations of the reversion agreement, showed signs of bewilderment at the entire situation.

The results of a public opinion poll conducted in the archipelago by the Ryukyu Shimpo between November 29 and December 2, 1969 show the extent of this confusion. It must be pointed out that this survey was made after Prime Minister Sato had clearly stated on November 27th that the Japanese Government would never permit the re-introduction of nuclear weapons into Okinawa, and after additional declarations by the Premier that no special conditions had been attached to the terms of the return of Okinawa.

The results of the Ryukyu Shimpo poll were as follows.[52]

Degree of satisfaction with the joint communique:

Satisfied	16 per cent
Fairly satisfied	15 per cent
Dissatisfied but a step forward	32 per cent
Dissatisfied but this was the best that the Prime Minister could have done under the circumstances	17 per cent
Dissatisfied	15 per cent

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The meaning of the joint communique for the post-reversion status of the bases:

It provides for the complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons	10 per cent
Nuclear weapons would not be removed	22 per cent
Nuclear weapons will be brought back in case of an emergency	24 per cent
Do no know what the communique actually means	33 per cent

In addition, almost all respondents opposed the deployment of American combat forces from Okinawa at a time when United States Forces were engaged in combat operations. Few believed that the B-52's and chemical weapons would be removed by the time reversion took place, and 83 per cent replied that they knew what had been discussed by the President and the Prime Minister during their recent summit meeting.[53]

These results seem to indicate confusion and a distrust of the declarations and interpretations issued by the Japanese Government. They also reveal the thinking of Okinawans on what would constitute an acceptable future status for the bases, their impatience to achieve reversion and, last but not least, a distinct pessimism.

Conclusions

In the last year before the reversion announcement a series of events unprecedented during the period of United States administration revealed a dramatic decline in American prestige and authority.

In November 1968, an archipelago-wide election brought

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a leading opposition figure into the highest office in the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. Early in 1969, the United States Administration was threatened with the most serious protest it had ever encountered in Okinawa, scheduled to be held in open violation of its regulations. USCAR tried to handle this challenge to its authority by issuing a new ordinance but ended up by postponing its effective date twelve days later. USCAR was unable to resolve the developing crisis itself, and only the intervention of the Japanese Government averted the planned mass protest. Four months later, a large-scale strike paralyzed much of the main island in direct defiance of the enactments of USCAR, and an attempt by American soldiers to control crowds in front of a military installation only revealed that efforts to use United States troops to maintain order were self-defeating in the long run.

The deterioration of the political situation in the archipelago during the late 1960's, culminating in the events that began in November 1968, played an indirect but important role in the American decision to return the Ryukyu Islands to Japan.

Failure to agree to the return would soon have produced conditions under which United States rule over Okinawa could only be enforced through openly coercive methods. This would have led to endless confrontations and incidents with the local population and these, in turn, would have still further alienated the Okinawans and made American

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administration even more difficult. The close connection established between Ryukyuan and Japanese political parties during the late 1960's, as well as the greater interest in Okinawan affairs and the increased self-confidence displayed in Japan during that period were, more than at any time since 1945, bound to turn the existence of an openly oppressive situation of this sort in the archipelago into a serious threat to Japanese-American friendship. An openly coercive regime in Okinawa would also have had its effects on the image of the United States in the "Third World" and, ultimately, even in domestic American politics.

A political situation presenting the United States with a choice between determining a definite and early date for reversion and risking the above consequences had been brought into existence in the Ryukyu Islands for a variety of reasons. These included the accumulated resentments and frustrations resulting from almost a quarter century of alien rule that had given the native population an inferior status, the problems and fears caused by the presence of the bases, developments in Japan and in Southeast Asia during the 1960's, and the results of the projection of American characteristics and traditions into the policies pursued by the United States in its dependency.

In the final rejection by the local population of any further, long-term, American rule, two of the main themes of this study interacted to help bring into existence the stage of dependency relationship with which this chapter

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is concerned.

Two outstanding factors emerged during this stage of foreign rule, namely the unwillingness of the Okinawans to continue under American administration and the loss of prestige of the United States. The two were interconnected and could be regarded as manifestations of a changed psychological relation between rulers and subjects. They also point to one of the central conditions that determine whether the governors can obtain the minimum local acceptance of their regime.

One of the essentials of a successful dependency relationship is the existence of a certain respect for, or even a fear of, the rulers on the part of the subjects. This is a crucial factor if a small group of the foreign governing officials is to have its orders obeyed without opposition from the subject population and secure the active cooperation of a sufficient number of the local inhabitants. If the rulers are respected and feared, then opposition to them is felt to be hopeless and their regime is expected to continue indefinitely.

The impression of superior power created by the United States conquest of the Ryukyus enhanced the American image in the archipelago long after 1945. The respect felt for the rulers was only added to by their leading role in world affairs after the war. The reflection of American traditions and ways in dependency policy, however, made it virtually impossible for the Americans to preserve this

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image indefinitely.

In order to convey a continuous impression of overwhelming power and derive the maximum benefit from this in a dependency, the rulers must demonstrate not only that they have the necessary strength but also that they are ready and able to use it whenever needed in order to enforce their rule over the local population. A democracy is, for obvious reasons, incapable of accomplishing this in a convincing manner.

The democratic nature of American society placed considerable limitations on the techniques available to the United States in securing Okinawan compliance and suppressing opposition to its rule.

When, during the second half of the 1960's, Okinawan opposition became more effective the American Authorities responded in the same manner as is customary in the United States when faced with determined and intensive agitation. The demands of the opposition were generally met. Although there were exceptions, as with the refusal to withdraw the B-52's in 1968 and 1969, enough examples have been provided throughout this study, and particularly in the last chapters, to show that this happened often enough during the period in question. In addition, opposition was usually met with mild government resistance that did more to encourage than discourage it. The repression indulged in by a democracy serves mainly to irritate the local population, while proving to those who are determined to overthrow the status

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quo that they have little to fear from the rulers.

It is important to point out in this connection that the author does not disagree with the use of humane, democratic ways to deal with opposition, nor with the concessions granted by the United States to satisfy Okinawan demands. Neither is there any intention to question the justice of the reforms asked for by the Ryukyuan population. The aim is rather to emphasize the basic contradiction existing when a democracy practices alien rule under modern conditions. Foreign rule is the antithesis of democracy, it means government against the will of the people and its successful continuation requires the ways of a dictatorship.

The order issued by USCAR prohibiting a general strike and the use of American soldiers to push back unruly crowds both emphasized the superior position occupied by the ruling power. While these measures were humiliating to Okinawans they were far too weak to frighten or to dissuade local political activists from their effort.

A subject population in a dependency relationship has a strong desire to overcome the feelings resulting from its inferior status. This is generally accomplished through situations in which the rulers lose at least temporarily their ability to act as superiors over the subjects. If the latter are momentarily in a position to have their way over the governors, if they are able to outdo them in something, this probably constitutes the best way for the native population to regain its self-esteem.

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The Okinawan opposition had learned during the years of American administration and their many previous protests against, and disputes with, the ruling power that, despite the impressive might of the United States, the governors could be defied almost with impunity. Toward the end of the 1960's Ryukyuan dissidents, having become fully aware of this, began to engage in more daring forms of anti-American activism. This period also witnessed a greater reluctance to continue under United States rule and an increased Japanese interest in reversion. These changes in Okinawan and Japanese attitudes resulted from a variety of causes discussed throughout this study and also from the considerably reduced fear and respect commanded by the United States.

Dissatisfaction with American rule had caused Okinawans to place various forms of pressure on the United States. The realization of how little the United States would do against Ryukyuan acts of defiance, as well as the concessions these called forth, encouraged more impressive deeds of this sort. The feeble American reaction to such pressures both angered Okinawans and convinced them more than ever that the only thing they had to fear was "fear itself." The United States, to use an expression associated with Asia, had "lost face." The dramatic decline in American prestige interacted in a mutually reinforcing relationship with factors making for increased Okinawan dissatisfaction with United States administration.

This process began to approach a climax during 1968

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and thereby brought into existence what has often been called in this study "the last conventional stage in the dependency relationship." The shedding of old inhibitions, the rejection of further alien rule, the realization that the Americans could do very little to counteract the opposition, and the vague feeling that the long-delayed dream of reversion was about to come true produced a variety of responses among Okinawans. One of these was a state of confusion concerning exactly what was happening. A stronger and more definite reaction consisted apparently in an awareness that American weakness provided an opportunity for the local population to place itself more nearly on a level of equality with the rulers.

A surrender to the ineffective repressive measures undertaken by a no longer dreaded ruling power would merely constitute an unnecessary acknowledgment of inferiority. By contrast, a successful defiance of rulers of this sort provides the subjects with an ideal method for bettering the governors in some way, for finding a situation in which they can at last look down on the rulers and transform feelings of hatred into the more gratifying feeling of contempt. The local inhabitants are provided an opportunity for what could be called "proving their manhood."[54]

Once more it must be emphasized that the aim in this analysis is not to prove that the United States should have behaved in the Ryukyu Islands like a totalitarian ruling power, or refused ever to consider the possibility of

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granting concessions to the local population.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that such a course, if it had ever been feasible, would in a different way have ultimately placed the United States in an even more impossible situation, although this would probably have occurred later than 1969. The fact that these two methods of dealing with the Okinawan opposition would in the end have led to the same results only points to the most basic contradiction found when a democratic nation attempts under modern conditions to engage in foreign rule.

The above analysis of the decline in American prestige has been undertaken as part of an attempt to examine some of the basic factors affecting the ability of a ruling power to meet the basic challenge presented to it by a dependency relationship, the need to gain a minimum of acquiescence for its regime. The governing power's success in this endeavor does not exclusively depend on its behaving in the most humane and benevolent manner possible toward the subject population.

The task facing a ruling power is an extremely complex one. It must avoid every possible action that may unnecessarily antagonize the local population. It must, as far as is consistent with the governors' purposes in ruling the dependency, provide the subjects with positive incentives in order to induce the necessary acceptance of the alien regime. At the same time, the ruling power must be able to make itself respected, and even to some extent

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feared, by the local population without incurring in the process the hatred of its subjects. Such a policy would, naturally, echo Machiavelli's advice that, while it would be to the Prince's advantage to be feared, he must under all circumstances avoid being hated.

In order to meet the basic challenge presented by a dependency relationship, the governing power must be able to use both positive incentives and negative pressures effectively. Moreover, it must know what precise combination of these two methods to use at any particular time. As a wealthy Western democracy the United States was admirably suited for the application of the positive incentives, but not the negative means, to secure compliance.

Considering this, the relatively smooth rule exercised by the United States for about one quarter century over the Ryukyu Islands must be regarded as at least a partial success in the adroit manipulation of a dependency relationship.

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NOTES

[1]The New York Times, February 2, 1968, p. 3:5.

[2]From the text of an address delivered by Professor Mikio Higa before the United States Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, November 15, 1968, p. 2. A copy of the address may be found in The General Caraway Papers, Military History Research Collection, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Box No. 2. See also Okinawa Times, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Okinawa News Highlights, February 10, 1968. (Mimeographed).

[3]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), August 12, 1968, p. 1:4; September 27, 1968, p. 1:2-3; October 5, 1968, p. 1:1; and October 9, 1968, p. 1:2-3. See also The New York Times, November 12, 1968, p. 3:1-2; and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., February 10, 1968.

[4]Higa, address before the United States Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, p. 3, to be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), October 22, 1968, p. 4:1-2; and Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., October 12, 1968.

[5]Higa, address before the United States Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, p. 3, to be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit.

[6]Ibid., p. 3. See also The New York Times, November 11, 1968, p. 6:1-2; The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), November 12, 1968, p. 4:1-2; and Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa Times and Jiho, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., October 21, 1968.

[7]Letter from William H. Nelson, Jr., Business Manager, Okinawa Morning Star to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), November 18, 1968, The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 1.

[8]Higa, address before the United States Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, p. 4, to be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit.

[9]The Baltimore Sun, November 16, 1968, p. A2:3-4. (Article by Thomas Pepper).

[10]Ibid., p. A2:3-4; and Higa, address before the United States Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, p. 6, to be found in The General Caraway Papers, op. cit. See also Letter from

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William H. Nelson, Jr., to Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), The General Caraway Papers, op. cit., Box No. 1; The New York Times, November 12, 1968, pp. 1:8, 3:3-5; and February 16, 1969, p. 3:4-8. (Article by Takashi Oka); and Yomiuri (Tokyo), December 9, 1968, as appearing in USCAR, Public Affairs Department, Special Translations, December 1968, No. 26, p. 1. (Mimeographed).

[11]The New York Times, December 17, 1968, p. 4:3-6. See also U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 166. Information provided by High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. James B. Lampert.

[12]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nomination of U. Alexis Johnson as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 29.

[13]The Yomiuri (Tokyo), January 27, 1969, p. 5:8. The Japanese Government's reluctance to continue substantial aid for the Ryukyu Islands proved to be only temporary. As will be seen in the pages to follow, Prime Minister Sato soon came to realize the importance of obtaining the cooperation of the new Chief Executive. Moreover, about one year after the election victory of Chobyo Yara the reversion agreement was reached. It then became imperative to take all necessary steps in order to achieve the maximum possible integration of Okinawan and Japanese institutions by 1972, the year of the scheduled return of the Islands, and to provide whatever assistance would be needed for this.

[14]The Yomiuri (Tokyo), November 12, 1968, p. 4:1-2; and December 3, 1968, p. 1:3-4. See also The New York Times, November 12, 1968, p. 3:1-2.

[15]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), November 12, 1968, p. 1:8; and November 13, 1968, p. 1:4.

[16]The New York Times, November 17, 1968, IV, p. 4:1-5.

[17]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), October 28, 1969, p. 1:2-3.

[18]The New York Times, November 22, 1968, p. 2:4-6. See also Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times,as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., November 22 and 24 and December 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10, 1968, to cite just a few examples of the protests occasioned by this accident.

[19]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., November 24, 1968; and December 8, 1968. See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 3, 1969, pp. 1:2-3, 2:1.

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[20]The New York Times, December 15, 1968, p. 9:1-3.

[21]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., December 6, 1968; and January 13 and 17, 1969. See also The New York Times, January 29, 1969, p. 9:7-8.

[22]Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa Times and Jiho, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., January 12, 1969. See also The Yomiuri (Tokyo), January 12, 1969, p. 1:4; January 14, 1969, p. 1:1; and January 15, 1969, p. 2:3-4.

[23]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., January 12, 14, 15, 16 and 18, 1969.

[24]The New York Times, January 29, 1969, p. 9:7-8; and January 30, 1969, p. 9:3-5.

[25]The Yomiuri (Tokyo), January 25, 1969, p. 1:7-8; and January 30, 1969, p. 1:4. See also The New York Times, January 30, 1969, p. 9:3-5.

[26]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 1, 1969, p. 1:2-3.

[27]The New York Times, February 5, 1969, p. 1:3-6. See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 5, 1969, p. 3:1. The outstanding example of this was a massive rally held in front of Kadena Air Force Base on February 4, 1969, accompanied by an attempt on the part of extremist students to invade the base. The attempt failed, but involved a clash with the police in which forty persons on both sides were injured.

[28]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 3, 1969, pp. 1:2-3, 2:1; and February 4, 1969, p. 3:4.

[29]Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., October 24 and 25, 1969. See also The New York Times, October 24, 1969, p. 11:1; and October 28, 1969, p. 9:1. Typical of the reports published in the wake of this rumor in the Okinawan press was one claiming that the inhabitants of the adjoining village of Kadena were "terrified" by the news.

[30]The New York Times, July 19, 1969, pp. 1:5, 2:7-8; July 20, 1969, p. 4:1-2; July 24, 1969, p. 10:2; and July 26, 1969, p. 2:2.

[31]The New York Times, January 29, 1969, p. 9:7-8.

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[32]The Baltimore Sun, November 16, 1968, p. A2:3-4. (Article by Thomas Pepper). See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), November 12, 1968, p. 4:2.

[33]Ralph Braibanti, "The Ryukyu Islands: Pawn of the Pacific," The American Political Science Review (December 1954), p. 994. See also Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., April 12, 1967. Besides two such incidents noted in earlier chapters, two additional, minor, confrontations described in these two references could be mentioned. These show how little took place and how insignificant was the attention attracted by the confrontations. On December 6, 1953 American troops dispersed a demonstration directed against United States land policy. No actual "bodily contact" was made between American troops and Ryukyuan civilians. In the second incident United States Military Police, on April 11, 1967, arrested twelve leaders, including the Chairman, of the Military Workers' Union for distributing leaflets and addressing union members by means of a loudspeaker in an open area outside a military station in Sukiren. The first of these two incidents was not even mentioned in the American press and the second created mainly a local sensation in the Ryukyu Islands.

[34]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), June 6, 1969, p. 4:1-2. See also The New York Times, June 5, 1969, p. 53:6.

[35]The Washington Post, June 5, 1969, p. A24:1-2. See also The New York Times, June 6, 1969, p. 7:1-4.

[36]The New York Times, June 10, 1969, p. 9:1. Some of the acts of violence committed by Okinawan strikers on that day included throwing rocks at a school bus carrying American children, throwing acid at a passing car, and stopping automobiles and forcibly removing occupants suspected of being on their way to report for work at the bases.

[37]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), June 11, 1969, p. 1:2-3. See also The New York Times, June 11, 1969, p. 9:1 and June 17, 1969, p. 11:1. In the first of these protests, on June 10th, the Military Workers' Union led a demonstration by an estimated five thousand persons which succeeded in completely paralyzing traffic for two hours on Military Highway No. 1, the island's most important road and a vital military artery in case of emergency. The second incident took place on June 16th. The attempt to storm the Headquarters' gate was made by students.

[38]The Washington Post, June 6, 1969, p. A21:1.

[39]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), April 8, 1969, p. 1:1.

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[40]House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings, 1969, op. cit., pp. 165, 239.

[41]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson, II, May 19, 1970.

[42]Interview with Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, February 12, 1970.

[43]The New York Times, April 6, 1969, VI, pp. 89-92.

[44]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), October 1, 1969, pp. 1:5-7, 3:2-3.

[45]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), September 4, 1969, p. 1:4.

[46]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), May 30, 1969, p. 1:5; and August 2, 1969, p. 1:1.

[47]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), September 9, 1969, p. 3:4. The word "protest" was used in referring to Premier Sato's trip in place of the more extreme terms "oppose" or "prevent" in an apparent compromise with the basically moderate policy of Chief Executive Yara which aimed at avoiding the use of such strong language.

[48]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), October 1, 1969, pp. 1:5-7, 3:2-3. Unfortunately the newspaper report did not mention any figures or percentages for this finding.

[49]The New York Times, November 22, 1969, pp. 1:3, 14:1-8; and November 27, 1969, p. 6:1-5. See also The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), November 22, 1969, pp. 1:5-6, 3:4-5; and November 27, 1969, p. 1:1-3. On the subject of Korea paragraph 4 of the Joint Communique declared that "The Prime Minister ... stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security." As far as Taiwan was concerned the language was weaker: "The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan."

On the war in Vietnam the following sentence was, among others, included: "... they (the President and the Prime Minister) agreed that, should peace in Vietnam not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two Governments would fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without

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outside interference."

Other hints concerning possible Japanese flexibility in the freedom provided the United States in the use of the bases appeared elsewhere. For example, in paragraph 7: "The Prime Minister was of the view that ... the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East, including Japan."

The United States had never confirmed nor denied the presence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa. Due to this, paragraph 8 used the following language in regard to nuclear armaments in post-reversion Okinawa: "The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister."

[50]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), November 22, 1969, pp. 1:4-5, 3:1-4.

[51]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), November 28, 1969, pp. 1:1-2, 3:6. See also Mainichi (Tokyo), November 29, 1969, p. 1:5.

[52]The Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), November 22, 1969, pp. 1:5-6, 3:4-5. This provides one example of similar declarations made on this subject by the Prime Minister and by other leading personalities in the Japanese Government.

[53]Mainichi (Tokyo), December 15, 1969, p. 1:1-2. See also Ryukyu Shimpo, as appearing in Okinawa News Highlights, op. cit., December 15, 1969.

[54]In a way the ideas of Frantz Fanon provide support for this interpretation, although in a far more violent way than anything that took place in Okinawa. For Fanon there seems to exist no true liberation for Africans without a bloody struggle in which the subjects murder their masters. A reading of his work, The Wretched of the Earth, provides the impression that only in this manner can Africans truly free themselves of foreign domination and renew their spirit and pride. If it is remembered that in his other work, Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon was very much concerned about Blacks accepting the prejudice of the White World

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concerining their alleged inferiority, then it would appear that a successful revolution against the masters was considered by the author as a way whereby the subjects could regain a feeling of their "manhood" or, in other words, overcome feelings of inferiority. Whatever opinion may be formed concerning other ideas expressed by Frantz Fanon there should exist no doubt that as a Black man born in a dependency and as a psychiatrist he understood quite well the psychological problems of a subject population under foreign rule.

(Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth and Black Skin, White Masks, both New York: Grove Press, Inc. and, respectively, 1963 and 1967).

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CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSIONS: THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN RULE

When the United States conquered Okinawa in 1945 it had intended to use the Islands for the anticipated invasion of Japan and, later, to discharge its obligations toward the local inhabitants by reconstructing the devastated Islands and re-creating normal living conditions. Following a period of a few years, during which Okinawa played no particular military role and no definite American policy toward the Islands seemed to exist, the Ryukyus once again acquired great strategic importance for the United States, and their status was accordingly defined in the peace treaty with Japan. The Pentagon was almost the only part of the United States Government that was interested in Okinawa at the time, and thus American policy was from the beginning militarily oriented.

The basic problem for the United States in her rule over Okinawa was the need to receive a sufficient acceptance on the part of the local population for the alien American regime. First, the United States' success or otherwise in gaining this acceptance, then the reasons for this, should be examined.

The United States was generally successful in gaining the reasonable acquiescence of the Ryukyuan population for her rule, over a period of slightly more than two decades.

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Until the announcement of the reversion decision in November 1969, the United States had governed Okinawa for more than twenty-four years without any difficulties that necessitated the intervention of American troops. During this period most local government officials were willing to cooperate with USCAR. Moreover, except for the last few years, in disputes with the local population the United States Administration was able to have its way in almost all major matters without precipitating a revolutionary situation. For more than twenty years the United States was able to govern the Ryukyu Islands with only a relatively small number of Americans on the spot, and with the active cooperation of the necessary portion of the local population and, in practically all instances, the passive acceptance of most of the remainder. This corresponds to the formula for successful alien rule, outlined in the introduction to this study. It should be remembered that the large number of American troops stationed in Okinawa were not there to keep the local inhabitants submissive but to pursue American strategic objectives elsewhere in the Far East.

At a certain point during its administration the United States, however, began to meet with failures in its efforts to cope with the basic challenge presented by the Ryukyuan dependency relationship. By the late 1960's a large Okinawan majority was unwilling to accept an indefinite continuation of American administration, regardless of those economic or other considerations that in the past had prompted

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Ryukyuan acquiescence. This rejection of the American regime was partly responsible for the decision to return the Ryukyu Islands to Japan in 1972.

It could be said that the Americans decided to return the Ryukyu Islands to Japan because both the local and the international political costs of maintaining the dependency relationship were rising at a time when the strategic value of the bases showed signs of declining due to technological developments and the possible impairment of their effectiveness should dissatisfaction in Okinawa result in serious unrest.

It would theoretically have been possible for Okinawa to have been returned to Japan merely as a result of Japanese insistence and without Ryukyuan rejection of American rule. In actual fact, not only were the Japanese demands for reversion related to Ryukyuan dissatisfaction with the American regime, but it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which this would not have been the case. Any seriously strained American-Okinawan relationship would ultimately have found the Japanese political opposition a sympathetic listener. Likewise, serious Japanese pressure on the United States for a return of Okinawa was bound to affect negatively the limited Ryukyuan acceptance of continued American rule. This, in turn, would have further stimulated Japanese insistence on reversion.

Internal Okinawan developments, then, had a definite though indirect influence on the American decision to return

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the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, although differences of opinion exist on the exact weight to be assigned to these factors in the final reversion agreement. This study has been concerned with an examination of internal Okinawan developments and with the acceptance and later the rejection of American rule that they brought about, regardless of the specific importance of domestic Ryukyuan factors in the decision in favor of reversion.

In addition, the interplay of internal and international influences on the course of events in the Okinawan dependency relationship influenced not only the American decision for reversion, but also the Okinawan opposition to United States administration. The sources of dissatisfaction within the archipelago were, by themselves, sufficient to bring about a rejection of American rule. In view of the vast differences in size, power and wealth between the United States and Okinawa, and in view of the latter's economic dependence on the former, this rejection of alien government could, however, only be translated into an effective opposition movement and have a real influence on American decisions affecting the future status of the archipelago, after international influences had made themselves felt and activated local dissatisfactions. Both the international and the internal dimensions were, therefore, ever present in Okinawan affairs.

The international factors originated in the special relation between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan, in the unfavorable climate existing after 1945 for the practice of

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alien rule by a Western democracy, and in the United States' involvement in a world-wide struggle with adversaries who used the demand for national self-determination in their opponents' dependencies as a prime ideological weapon.

The presence of the bases and the military uses made of the Islands by the United States built both supports for American rule and opposition to it. The economic dependence of the Ryukyus on the American military presence placed Okinawans in a dilemma between their material interests and their nationalistic aspirations. This dilemma was for many years, following the initial period of American rule, the major factor in the willingness of a Ryukyuan majority to accept an indefinite prolongation of United States administration. At the same time, the presence of the bases also presented the local inhabitants with an endless source of fears, real and imaginary, crimes, accidents, humiliations, and the forcible displacement of a section of the population from its ancestral lands.

As the 1960's progressed, the dramatic economic development of Japan, and the consequent greater conspicuousness of the remaining gaps between that country and the Ryukyu Islands, resulted in a weakening of the supports that the material advantages provided by bases had generated. At the same time the establishment of the nuclear base, Okinawa's involvement in the Vietnamese war, and the general increase in tensions in Asia as a result of this conflict also worked against the further acceptance of American rule. The net

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result of these developments was that an ever-increasing number of Ryukyuans began to emphasize the negative aspects of the bases rather than their value for the local economy.

The reflection of American traditions and characteristics in the policies pursued in the Ryukyus, likewise, played an important part in the ultimate withdrawal of Okinawan acquiescence to continued United States administration. In a dependency relationship the rulers often attempt to apply solutions that worked at home to problems in the dependency. This patterning of the rulers' policies emerged clearly in the United States' relationship with Okinawa, and in too many cases it was responsible for decisions that might have been right for American conditions, but were inappropriate for the situation in the Ryukyu Islands.

The reflection of American ways and of American thinking in the policies pursued in the Ryukyu Islands emerges both in the general American approach and in the specific manner in which various questions were dealt with.

United States policies during most of its rule over Okinawa do not appear to have been part of an overall plan to exploit the strategic resources of the archipelago and meet the needs of the local population. Large resources were devoted to the building of the bases and great attention was directed to the strategic problems involved. But the political and economic consequences of these military policies were apparently not taken into account. The American tendency to treat a question as a purely technical

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problem capable of solution on its own terms with little reference to its wider implications was evident in the handling of Okinawan affairs. Problems were faced only after they had become serious.

The basic effects of American rule, whether beneficial or not to the local population, show every sign of having been accidental. Even the economic benefits provided by the bases and the resulting dependence of the Okinawan population on the continued military presence of the United States appear unintentional. Problems were met as they came up, and were usually seen as independent of and unrelated to other problems.

The traditional tendency in the United States is to concentrate on dynamic economic activity and to reward those actually playing a part in this process. For example, America has usually provided the highest standards of living in the world for those able to work, but has long failed to provide adequate security for those citizens not able to provide for themselves.

This and other American characteristics are not unrelated to the situation created in Okinawa, in which great advances in the standards of living of the working population were made while social welfare was long disregarded. American traditions of commercialism, individualism and weak family attachment must likewise have contributed to the belief that monetary payments could have provided adequate compensation for the rupture of sentimental and

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ancestral Okinawan ties to the land. The basing of Okinawan prosperity on military spending, a condition not unknown in the United States, can also be connected with American commercial and technical attitudes interested only in the profits of the moment, without regard for the consequences in other fields and at other times.

Because of the vast resources of the United States and the small size and limited needs of the Ryukyu Islands, the best opportunities for building supports for the American regime among the local population were to be found in the field of economics and Okinawan acquiescence was bought in this way. Two contradictory American national characteristics, however, influenced Washington's policies and had contradictory results. The traditional American materialistic outlook helped to make American policy makers aware of the political importance of extending economic assistance to Okinawa. At the same time, however, the fragmented decision-making process prevailing in the United States Government made it impossible to secure the maximum advantages from this method of building supports for the American regime. The Congress proved unwilling to appropriate at the right time the relatively limited sums which might have helped prolong the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the attendant military benefits.

The democratic nature of the American political system and society affected policies in Okinawa in different ways. The United States felt obliged to establish in the Ryukyu

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Islands democratic institutions of government, even if these were not always granted sufficient autonomous authority, and to permit as much personal liberty as is possible in a dependency relationship. Unlike the practice of some modern dictatorships, the United States was not able to erect a facade of free institutions and then deprive these of their essence as totalitarian powers with an intense ideology can. The United States had to grant a minimum of meaningful liberty to the Ryukyuan population. The result was that the Americans promoted the democratic ideas that helped to undermine their own rule, and restricted freedom just enough to arouse local opposition but not enough to prevent this opposition from becoming effective.

The American traditions of tolerance, cultural pluralism and public encouragement of education were reflected in the promotion of both vocational and academic education, in the respect shown for the native culture and in the existence and support of a school system raising Okinawan children as nationals of Japan, the country competing with the United States for influence in, and control over, the Ryukyu Islands. This last-mentioned practice parallels the American custom of permitting ethnic minorities in the United States to maintain their own schools and to educate their children in their particular national traditions.

The basically democratic, tolerant and conciliatory nature of American society is in part responsible for a pattern of response to opposition demands that can be fre-

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quently noted within the United States, and in the Ryukyu Islands.

When demands for changes are first made they may be ignored, or some token and largely symbolic concessions may be made. If, however, opposition pressures become sufficiently insistent and succeed in winning popular backing or the support of influential groups, or both, then the demands will usually be acceded to. A serious confrontation will as a rule be avoided, regardless of whether the requested changes represent the recognized needs of sections of the population, or merely the claims of a small pressure group for extra benefits.

This pattern of response can be noted in the American reaction in such widely differing matters as the Okinawan demands for greater autonomy, the dissatisfaction with the inadequate social welfare benefits in the archipelago, the Twin Court Cases controversy, and the Twin Education Bills dispute. The pattern was not followed in connection with the agitation over the use of Okinawa as a base for B-52 bomber operations in Vietnam. This particular case, however, was so closely tied to the basic American purpose in maintaining bases in the Ryukyu Islands and the need to govern the archipelago, that the United States predictably refused to yield on this point until after it decided to return the Islands to Japan. In contrast, the November 1969 reversion decision, the most fundamental question to arise in the Okinawan dependency relationship, could be considered an example of the traditional democratic response pattern.

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In Okinawa there was close cooperation between Americans and conservative political forces. Friendship for the United States was consequently identified with opposition to domestic change, and anti-Americanism with the struggle for reform. These tendencies characterized other American dependencies and relations between the United States and other independent states.

In view of the political changes taking place throughout the world in the second half of the twentieth century, this is not always desired by the United States Government. It often seems, however, almost unavoidable as a result of various American national characteristics and of the present position of the United States in world affairs. As a Western-style democracy with a slightly modified free enterprise system, the United States tends to favor regimes and political groups that lean toward a capitalistic economy and either have, or proclaim, an inclination toward at least limited democratic government. At the same time, Washington understandably distrusts political movements that aim to overthrow social, economic or political systems that resemble those existing in the United States.

The involvement of the United States in a worldwide struggle with powers whose internal systems are either based on, or else originated in, Marxist revolutionary ideology provides Washington with additional reasons for considering revolutionary movements hostile to American interests. The opponents of the United States in this world-

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wide power struggle usually support revolutionary movements in other nations because their ideology inclines them to believe that such movements will win in the long run and because the governments arising out of a successful Marxist-type revolution tend to align themselves with one of the Communist great powers. This alignment, in turn, results from a number of factors. These include ideological affinity, the establishment of an economic system generally ruling out capitalistic investments and making the new revolutionary regimes dependent on assistance from similarly endowed nations and also a frequent common interest in additional Marxist-type revolutions at the expense of more conservative political systems. Last but not least, the Soviet Union and Communist China frequently tend to distrust nations possessing ideologies and political and economic systems different from their own for the same reasons that the United States tends to distrust revolutionary regimes.

More simply, when confronted with a non-revolutionary system whose leaders express sympathy for the United States, it would not make too much sense for Washington to help that regime's opponents, whose backgrounds would incline them in favor of one of the two major Communist powers, to overthrow the apparently pro-American incumbents.

The net result is that, in a situation involving a choice in a particular political system between groups supporting revolutionary change and groups associated with the status-quo and willing to go along with at least some of the

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features of a Western-style economic and political system, the United States Government will usually support the latter.

Additional, important similarities between American rule in the Ryukyu Islands and in other overseas possessions could be noted, such as the economic dependence on the United States that developed in virtually all overseas territories under American control and the frequent strategic motive in the acquisition of dependencies.

There could also be mentioned the emphasis on democratic political development and education, the great degree of personal freedom granted to the local inhabitants, the general respect shown for the customs of the local population, and the lack of popular interest in the overseas possessions generally found in the United States.

A comparison between American policies and attitudes in regard to Okinawa and other American overseas possessions also reveals some interesting differences, and points to the contrast between United States rule in the Ryukyus and the classical pattern of European domination over Asia and Africa. The American experience in Okinawa was in many respects quite different from the experience of the Europeans in their dependencies and the lessons learned in the latter case were in some matters inapplicable to the Ryukyu Islands. Examples of this are not difficult to find.

In the European overseas possessions the economic changes introduced by the alien rulers disrupted the traditional economy and created economic forces that undermined

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the dependency relationship. In Okinawa the economy had been virtually destroyed at the time of the conquest and American reconstruction created the most important long-time supports for United States administration. In the European dependencies in Africa and Asia the struggle for self-determination was led by local elites, who had been denied positions and rewards commensurate with their expectations, and who wanted to take over the control of their societies. In the Ryukyu Islands the elite leading the reversion struggle received its special motivation from the desire to obtain the material benefits and the professional standing accorded to its counterparts in Japan.

In the classical pattern of Western rule in Afro-Asia the rejection of dependency status is usually explained in terms of a process set in motion through the modernization introduced by the governing nations. But in the case of Okinawa another set of causes need to be referred to. These include the mixed effects of the military uses made of the archipelago, the special relationship between Japan and Okinawa and certain characteristics of the American style of foreign rule.

The variations between the American experience in the Ryukyus and the European experience in Afro-Asia can be traced largely to the different circumstances under which the two forms of foreign rule were practiced.

The Okinawans were, at the time they came under American rule, partly modernized and possessed a well-developed

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Japanese national consciousness, as well as some familiarity with Western thinking. In other areas of Asia, as well as in Africa, the subject societies were still traditional when they came under European control. Moreover, the United States detached Okinawa from one of the most powerful and important nations in the world and tried to rule over the Ryukyus without damaging American relations with the mother country in the process, a situation not duplicated elsewhere in Afro-Asia. Finally, the dependency relationship existed during a historical period most unfavorable for this type of rule on the part of a democracy, and while the United States was engaged in a world struggle with powers utilizing demands for self-determination in their opponents' possessions as a prime ideological weapon.

Some notable differences can also be found between American policies in Okinawa and those pursued in the older dependencies. These can largely be traced to the changes that had taken place throughout the world between the end of the nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth century. The different policies adopted in the case of Okinawa can be considered as the necessary adaptations to the prevailing local and international conditions in the tendency of the rulers to reflect their own national characteristics in their actions in the dependencies.

By the middle of the twentieth century, when the United States took over the administration of Okinawa, the Western democracies were moving toward the liquidation of their

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overseas empires. The United States had become not only a major participant in the game of international politics but also one of the two chief adversaries in the global power struggle. The United States had also taken upon herself to govern a people whose national sentiments were well developed. Moreover, the laissez-faire policies prevalent in the Western world in 1898 had been replaced by a recognition of the need for a certain amount of government control over the economy, and government spending to assure prosperity. Finally, success in bringing about economic development had become a prime standard for judging a regime's fitness to govern.

For the particular purpose of the comparison made here, the most important result of the changes which took place between the beginning and the middle of the twentieth century was that the United States began to feel a great need for strategic bases located far from home. Thus it insisted on directly administering Okinawa, whereas it had lacked a compelling motive in the acquisition of most of the earlier overseas dependencies.

Strategic value of one sort or another provided the motivation for the acquisition of most American dependencies. It is interesting to note that at the end of World War II, when the United States emerged as one of the two most powerful nations, and for some time was the most powerful, and when there existed at least a theoretical possibility of acquiring economically valuable territories, only two new dependencies, Okinawa and the Trust Territory of the Pacific

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Islands, came under the American flag, and these were taken over for exclusively strategic reasons. The word "exclusive" is justified because both territories possessed no economic value.

The changed international atmosphere in regard to the practice of alien rule on the part of a Western democracy may have made it impractical for control over new territories to be assumed unless it could be justified in terms of self-defense or a greater cause, such as the security of the Free World. Despite this, the American record of retaining strategically valuable dependencies while showing only a limited interest in those possessing an economic potential suggests that economic factors may not have been the most important reasons for the direction taken by the post-World War II American expansionism.

The combination of huge industrial, agricultural and mineral resources, a gigantic internal market and the resulting domestic-oriented trade patterns of the United States has failed to provide Americans with a strong economic incentive for acquiring dependencies. By contrast, the United States emerged from the Second World War with a powerful national-security orientation. Defense was seen as the key to national survival and in due course even became a foundation of economic prosperity. For many years the Congress could most easily be persuaded to appropriate funds for security needs. In such a setting, the perceived need for an important strategic base gave the United States a powerful motive to

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assume control over Okinawa.

This helps to account for many of the other differences between the policies pursued in Okinawa and those followed in the older dependencies. In the case of the Ryukyu Islands, all administrations in Washington pursued basically the same policy until the Nixon administration finally agreed to reversion. The two major political parties did not disagree on Okinawan policy. In contrast to the other overseas possessions, the United States Government adamantly refused to relinquish administrative rights over the Ryukyus, or even to grant meaningful autonomy, until the late 1960's when a variety of circumstances forced the abandonment of American rule. The only indecision and drift that could be found in the case of Okinawan policy occurred between late 1945 and 1949, when the United States had, temporarily, no real strategic use for the Ryukyu Islands.

In Okinawa the United States paid much greater attention to economic development than was the case with the older dependencies. A number of factors made it impossible for the United States to neglect the material well-being of the Okinawans for any long period of time. A major reason was the importance Washington placed on freedom in the use of the bases, which was seen as inextricably tied to direct United States administration of the Islands. Economic assistance was extended in order to gain the "reasonable acquiescence" of the Okinawan population to American rule. This attention to economic growth in a dependency can also be accounted for

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by the greater importance given to government-directed and assisted economic development during the middle of the twentieth century. The international struggle with the Communist Powers for influence and the well-developed nationalism of the Okinawan population also played a role.

If the American style of foreign rule were to be condensed into a single sentence, it could be said that it is apologetic, benign and strategically-oriented in its motivation.

This examination of United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands provides an unusual case study of alien rule, because it came when this form of political domination on the part of a Western democracy was no longer politically fashionable. The study of American rule over Okinawa may also be of some practical interest because, despite the fact that the United States is not likely in the foreseeable future to extend its dominion over new territories, other countries may find parallels where strategic necessities determine the extent and character of foreign rule.

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