CLAIMING MODERNITY THROUGH AESTHETICS: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT GERMANY AND TURKEY

by

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

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Claiming Modernity through Aesthetics: A Comparative Look at Germany and Turkey examines how modern nationhood is established and consolidated through the arts in two locations that are generally conceptualized as fundamentally different from each other. Based on over fourteen months of fieldwork this dissertation traces parallels and divergences in cultural policies, artistic practices and patronage systems. The study tries to move away from the notion of 'lack' and belatedness in Turkish modernization by showing that in Germany similar preoccupations regarding the mutual expressiveness of art and modernity have existed. I argue that all historical specificities notwithstanding both the German and Turkish case exemplify struggles with the normativity of modern power, in which the interdependent projects of nationalism and modernity have impacted how the socio-political function of art is conceptualized. This approach allows for using art as a foil to discuss a variety of topics that range from the configuration of citizenship, national memory and censorship to the intertwinedness of economic dispossession and the composition of private and public art collections. At the center of this ethnographic interrogation are the paradoxes of modernity that manifest themselves in tensions between understandings of art as an universal human expression and a particularly national one; its role as a civilizing agent and its, at times, troubling uses in mass

incitement; and between art as a deeply personal articulation, a common good – and – a commodity. I show that artworld actors in Berlin and Istanbul reconcile tensions arising from these contradictory understandings of art that comprise a variety of different commercial, private, public and political interests by referring to its purported civic impact. In this process sanctioned nationalized art histories and discourses of civic cultivation through the arts are frequently mobilized even by respondents who generally frame their (artistic) practices and understandings of art in opposition to these official discourses.

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"Die Einwanderer wären gar nicht erst aufgebrochen, hätten sie gewusst, dass ihre Kinder in Deutschland eine billige Emanzipation angehen und sich in spießige Gören verwandeln würden."
– Feridun Zaimoğlu –

To my family: Ebru, Ergin, Melek, Tom

Without whom none of this would have been possible. I hope I turned out better.

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Introduction

> *"Seltsam sei es und ungerecht, sagte Gauß, so recht ein Beispiel für die erbärmliche Zufälligkeit der Existenz, daß man in einer bestimmten Zeit geboren und ihr verhaftet sei, ob man es wolle oder nicht. Es verschafft einem einen unziemlichen Vorteil vor der Vergangenheit und mache einen zum Clown in der Zukunft."*
> *"It is curious and unjust, said Gauß, quite an example for the pathetic haphazardness of existence, that one is born in a certain time and tied to it, if one wants to or not. It affords one an unseemly advantage vis-à-vis the past and makes one into a clown in the future (*Daniel Kehlmann *Die Vermessung der Welt* 2005)."

"Claiming Modernity through Aesthetics: A Comparative Look at Germany and Turkey" examines how the historical specificities of modernization and nation-building impact the production and consumption of art. Based on ethnographic research in Berlin and Istanbul, the study traces parallels and divergences in the formation of cultural policies, artistic practices and patronage systems, and elucidates how artists, critics, curators, sponsors, officials and others engaged in artistic production conceptualize their work and the socio-political function of art.

Due to the challenges arising from the comparative dimension, this project warranted multiple research trips. After an exploratory visit in the summer of 2004, the main research period lasted 14 months and was equally divided between Istanbul and Berlin (June 2005 to August 2006). I conducted follow-up visits each winter and summer from 2006 to 2008. Each of these visits drove home the point that, at times, things in the artworld move so fast that any assessment, preliminary as it might be, could only a few months later easily make one into a fool – or a clown – as Kehlman imagines the mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauß to say.

Over the course of my research, political, personal and artistic alliances in Istanbul and Berlin's artworld were forged or broken. Long-standing patterns, both spatial and organizational changed course, sometimes expectedly and at other times unexpectedly. By mid-2008, for instance, Berlin's post-wall art scene began moving back into the Western parts of the city, a development that would have been hard to fathom during my initial research stay in 2004. While throughout my time in Berlin much emphasis was given to the fact that the city did not have a *Kunsthalle* or another institution with the financial means to exhibit current works of the world-renown artists that reside there, Thomas Demand, one of Berlin's most famous international artists, will finally open his first solo-show in one of the city's major museums (the *Neue Nationalgalerie*) in September 2009.

Istanbul, in turn, has seen a veritable explosion in the numbers of its independent arts spaces and initiatives. Few thought these projects would be able to survive due to the lack of public funding available both from the municipal and the central governmental level, and yet they continue to prosper. When I began my research on cultural policy in Istanbul the term 'multiculturalism' was only timidly used. Now it is part and parcel of all cultural policy discourses and beyond. Of course, none of these examples comes to mean that 'all has changed,' nor do they in themselves signify major paradigm shifts. They are, however, reminders that like all ethnographic contemplations, this one too captures only a particular moment. The following interrogation is thus also based on the realization that despite the fleetingness of the artworld (less with regard to currently prevalent styles, but more pertaining to its composition and conceptual preoccupations) there are some enduring discourses that have left traces in both Germany and Turkey and

that are worth exploring. Some of these discourses may speak more to the general constitution of cultural policy in modern nation-states themselves (at least in the European context) than the two urban locations, Istanbul and Berlin.

A notable asymmetry fashions this dissertation's point of departure: Whereas German art is now understood as unquestionably modern, art from Turkey is often judged according to its merging of 'traditional' and 'modern' currents, thus implying that 'modernity proper' is external to Turkey (or inversely, that Turkey is on the periphery of modernity). Yet, Turkey's attempt to align itself with the 'West' by 'modernizing' its artistic canon in the 1920s (Stokes 1992) predates West-Germany's post-1945 shift towards explicitly "Occidental cultural policies" (Knoblich 2001) geared to counter longstanding anti-western and anti-modernist currents.

Similarities do exist, however. With both countries arriving relatively late on the nation-state scene and long maintaining authoritarian governing structures, the idea of cultural commonality, rather than civic citizenship, was emphasized (Akçam 2004, Naumann 2001). This notion of 'culture' comprised artistic production as an integral expression of peoplehood and emerged in distinction to either a 'foreign' civilization (France in the case of Germany, Elias 1978) or a discredited civilization of the past (Nazism, Knoblich 2001; the Ottoman Empire, And 1984). The emphasis on cultural commonality in German and Turkish nationalism also entailed comparable searches for a distinctive artistic style for the dual purpose of creating (and representing) internal cohesion and assert modern nationhood – and ultimately Western belonging (Bozdoğan 2001, Belting 1993). I use the phrase 'assert modern nationhood' here to indicate that

against prevalent notions, both locales have at different times been confronted with considerable doubts concerning their 'modern-ness.' However, this is not to argue for "different kinds of modernity" in the two national frameworks (e.g. Hannerz 1996), but to analyze respective experiences of and struggles with the "normativity" of modern power (Scott 1999) as they impact policies governing the arts.

In both locales pronounced state support for the arts has been bound to the idea that aesthetic education is a civilizing agent, formative for modern personhood (Glaser 1997, Sağlar 1994). Turkish and German (including the former GDR; Glaser 1997) cultural policies have equally claimed that state-funding for the arts secures freedom, democracy and pluralism, all values that are in keeping with the concept of modernity (Hamilton 1996). Given these congruencies, this project seeks to understand the relationship between artistic production and conceptions of modernity by comparing the practices in the artworld in the two locales. Yet, this perspective is not to obscure the limitations of Turkey's modernization project, its long unfulfilled "promise of citizenship" (manifest in limitations of the freedom of expression and of democratic governance structures etc.; Keyder 1997). Rather, I argue for an understanding of modernity not as a contained phenomenon but as a shared trajectory encompassing politics, economy, society and culture in divergent locations (Kahn 2001, Mitchell 2002).

But how, then, are nationalism and claims to modernity reflected in current cultural policies? To what extent is the circumstance that Germany's belonging to the West is no longer questioned, while Turkey still struggles to be acknowledged as such reflected in contemporary art and cultural policies? And, if so, in what ways? My study approaches this question based on an ethnographic study of the artworld, and particularly

the visual arts,[1] in Berlin and Istanbul based on interviews with artists, critics, art historians, arts managers, corporate sponsors, foundation and government officials on their respective understandings of art and working practices. This provided a basis for identifying where conceptions of art overlapped or conflicted, and examining if there was a joint vocabulary in the description of art and its socio-cultural and political function within and between the two locations. One issue that I was particularly interested in during my research was how the intentions, and possibly varying interests, of the different actors that together constitute the art world are mediated in the production and reception of art. Historical and present evaluations of the local art scene, and rationales behind sponsorship and funding policies were likewise addressed. In addition, I undertook observations at contemporary arts institutions, interviews with audience members, visited studios, exhibitions, performances and conferences, and reviewed print media and policy papers.

The Anthropology of Art

Anthropological inquiries of artistic expression have historically speaking predominantly focused on so-called 'indigenous art', meaning the art of 'Others.' An early premise of anthropology that 'a people's art' is informed by and expressive of 'their culture' (for example ritual practices or religious beliefs, Geertz 1984), also included interrogations of if and how the very notion of art can be transposed from one society to another (Boas 1955, Anderson 1992, Murphy/Perkins 2006, Welsh/Venbrux/Rosi 2006).

[1] Although the focus of this study is primarily on the visual arts, I also conducted a number of interviews with performance and theater artists, dancers and filmmakers to better understand the divergences and parallels between these different artistic genres, and gain further insights into the constitution of the artworld in both locations.

While these inherently comparative approaches posed challenges to a unversalist, 'Western' notion of art (Kroeber 1979 [1957], Gerbrands 1969), anthropological knowledge production also influenced certain manifestations of modern art. In the early 20th century, for instance, the notion of *primitivism* at once denoted the still prevalent dichotomy between 'ethnic' and 'Western' or 'modern' art, while conflating the two in respect to their central category of authenticity (Rubin 1984, Price 1989, Errington 1994). As 'indigenous' art has increasingly appeared in 'Western' museums and galleries and by way of the tourist trade, and artifacts are being circulated and appropriated globally at a growing rate and speed (Graburn 1976, Jones 1993, Myers 2002; Appadurai 1986 and 1996), the interrogation of the concept of 'Western' art and its constitutive properties has frequently made its way into the discipline by analyzing its mediation through the market (e.g. Plattner 1996). This is an important nexus given that the emergence of the modern conception of art is correlated with its commodification in the 18th century. The development of this notion and its elaboration in Enlightenment thought as debated by aesthetic theorists is relevant for my project since it still informs conceptualizations of art today (Woodmansee 1994, Williams 1983, see Chapter 2). Closely related to the conception of modern art is the distinction between high and low art; a distinction that has been most forcefully taken on by Cultural Studies, mainly by employing de Certeau's notion of appropriation (de Certeau 1984) and Bourdieu's analysis of taste (Bourdieu 1984). Arguing that blanket assumptions about the reception of popular culture as a passive process are a fallacy, Cultural Studies has, with few exceptions (Morley 1986, Radway 1991), limited its analysis to textual interpretation. By highlighting people's contradictory and often unintended appropriations (Brunt 1992), however, this body of

literature has contributed to extending the notion of what counts for art (see Zolberg/Cherbo 1997).

But as art is credited with "heightened consciousness" (Royce 2004), reflecting life (Marcus/Myers 1995, Stokes 1999) or a critique thereof that enables 'agency' (MacClancy 1997), the state, apart from few examples (Svašek 2002 and 2007, Kosnick 2008, Winegar 2006, Price 2007), often remains absent from the anthropology of art. Although a considerable body of historical scholarship exists on the importance of aesthetic expression in nationalist movements and nation-building processes,[2] anthropology, like Cultural Studies, has tended to focus on artists or audiences (although often in the abstract), mostly out of an interest in highlighting the 'agency' and 'resistance' of individual and collective actors in the field of cultural production (MacClancy 1997, Schneider/Wright 2006). Others have emphasized the transnational networks that are formative for artists and artistic production (Wulff 1998, Nippe 2009). Overall it seems that the anthropological analysis of the artworld has been more comfortable with a notion of cultural politics 'from below' than cultural policies 'from above.' This suspicious stance has, as Stuart Cunnigham notes, contributed to framing cultural policy as a tool of manipulation rather than actively engaging with its potential for cultural critique (1992).[3]

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[2] Interestingly however cultural policy documents tend to cite anthropological conceptions of art – although they often do so in a problematic manner, e.g. by employing theoretical angles on 'culture' that have long been criticized in the discipline itself (see Chapters 3 and 7).

[3] For the social sciences art has continued to present an empirically difficult phenomenon for which a certain impact such as pleasure and catharsis, well-being and emancipation are often assumed. However, these effects are hard to trace in practice, thus leaving a "comfortable lack of specificity that underwrites most discussion of the arts" (Csikszentmihalyi 2003, 1), or rather, of the perception of art. More recently anthropologist have elaborated on the disciplinary affinity of art and anthropology, in part because artists themselves have increasingly employed methods and terminologies of empirical research and anthropological theory (e.g. Plattner 1996, Schneider/Wright 2006). I would be cautious to emphasize such congruencies too strongly, not least because, as argued throughout this dissertation, art is generally

Yet nation-states have aimed to regulate the arts from their very inception and aesthetics have played an exponent role in the "making of national culture" (Fox 1990), rendering the nation tangible (Hobsbawm 1992) and asserting certain notions of modernity (Sherman/Rogoff 1994, Duncan 1995*)*. As I will describe in Chapter 1, with the establishment of the Turkish Republic the idea of the "Turkish synthesis" (Gökalp 1959) aimed to refine 'Turkish' folk culture following 'Western standards', namely rationality. This rapprochement to the West employed orientalist motifs in its argument that Turkish art was to distinguish itself from other "Eastern" artistic repertoires, deemed irrational and overly emotional (Stokes 1992, Öztürkmen 2002). Yet ambivalences arose trying to reconcile "the modern" and its universalistic claims with the "national" assertion of distinctiveness. Similarly, the quest for 'German particularism' thrived on strong anti-modernist sentiment (Mommsen 2000, Weber 1915) regarding modern, international conceptions of art as incommensurable with "German-ness" (a notion that reached its height in the category of "degenerate art" during the Nazi-regime). Although, for instance, the expressionist avant-garde radically broke with these premises in the early 20th century, it is only after WWII that Germany has favored cultural policies that situated it firmly in the artistic heritage of classical "Western" canons (Belting 1993, Naumann 2001).

As the literature elaborates on the respective historical trajectories (Mommsen 2000, Repp 2000, Tekelioğlu 2001) the question arises how these past developments are impacting contemporary art scenes, especially since the internationalization of art worlds has been intensified through globalization processes (Marcus/Myers 1995, Appadurai

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understood as an expression of a different order, and thus is not necessarily bound to rules valid for other types of interventions, be they political or scholarly, even if it uses the same vocabulary.

1996, Bydler 2004). In attempting to answer this question my research extends Danto's definition of the artworld (1964) as an interplay of institutional spaces, practices and authoritative theories to an assemblage of diverging intents and motivations, of the many different actors that together constitute the artworld. It thus presents an inquiry into the socio-political dimension of art by juxtaposing official claims about the nature of art with the practice of aesthetic production and reception,[4] and aims to account for commonalties and differences in the articulation and projection of modernity in the debates on aesthetic production and reception in Germany and Turkey.

In his study "Art and Agency," Alfred Gell proposes that "the anthropology of art cannot be the study of the aesthetic principles of this or that culture, but the mobilization of aesthetic principles (or something like them) in the course of social interaction" (1998, 4). Gell's motivation for this statement was twofold: on the one hand he aimed to discuss how agency manifests itself or emerges out of the artwork itself, and on the other it marked an effort not to simply transpose conceptions of aesthetics rooted in one particular historical and socio-cultural contexts to another. While both of his points present important interventions, I am most interested in how different references to aesthetic theories, and particularly the civic impact accorded to art, are mobilized in claims to modernity. As such the analysis presented in this dissertation is not art

[4] George Dickie (1995 [1984]) and Howard Becker (1982) are, along with Danto, credited for establishing the framework for the institutional study of art. Becker's meticulous account of the different actors within the artworld is important because it explicates the continuities between the realms of amateur and professional art, and the interdependencies between nonprofit and commercial venues. Yet, Becker like Dickie, who has a rather static view of the arts settings in which artists, audiences and others are conceptualized as "role bearers" (1995, 220f.), tends to underplay the power differentials that account for much of how the artworld constitutes itself. This is why I draw predominantly on Danto's definition – and spelling – of the artworld (which is not to indicate a singularity or homogeneity, but to draw attention to the intersection of practices, authoritative theories and actors that are assembled in said artworld).

historical – in fact, art history, in the sense of visual exegesis, notably forms a minor part in the theoretical approaches employed here. Rather this is an interrogation how we talk about art as a decidedly international phenomenon in national frameworks, and why it remains vitally bound to these national frameworks. In order to do so the dissertation follows Janet Wolff's call for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of art in society, by drawing on studies of nationalism, modernity, (art) history, cultural policy and aesthetics along with anthropological and sociological perspectives on the arts (Wolff 1992).

The Question of Comparison

While being formative for the empirical material and theoretic framework presented in this dissertation, its subtitle "a comparative look at Germany and Turkey" is also slightly misleading in that this study does not deliver a systematic comparison in the classic anthropological sense. Rather, the comparative perspective presents a vehicle to think through a set of interrelated questions regarding the relationship between art and modernity, the political productivity and governance of art. Terry Eagleton has noted that "when one speaks of art one speaks of other matters as well" (1990, 3). Accordingly, the following inquiry aims to address what is revealed and what is obscured in the political deployment of art for representational purposes, and the ways in which nationalism and claims to modernity are imposed on, reflected and framed in the arts in Germany and Turkey.

Viewed in this vein the following is also an inquiry into the question of what happens if we approach two seemingly disparate examples – Germany and Turkey – not

in terms of radical alterity, but as equal. I posit that such a perspective not merely contributes to deconstructing orientalist perspectives, but also that the joint analysis of these two locations allows for more contoured insights into how art is constituted institutionally and politically.

When I talk about the historical legacies of the doubts and insecurities regarding the modernness of Germany and Turkey, I do not mean to perpetuate theories of the Germany's *Sonderweg* or tropes of Turkey's continual belatedness. To the contrary, one substantial task of this study is to show how scholarly applications of, and self-descriptions using these concepts reveal often-obscured political preoccupations in both national contexts that have also been reflected in the engagement with and the governance of art. This does not mean, however, that I am proposing that the artistic heritage and lineages of German and Turkey and Ottoman Empire exhibit the same inherent 'qualities,' aesthetically or otherwise. Instead, by way of thinking through these two cases together, we might also arrive at a different framework for how we perceive, understand and categorize art emerging from Germany and Turkey. As such I take this comparative look as an occasion for what Wolf Lepenies has called "lessons in diminished particularity" (Lepenies 2006, 9-11) – a point to which I will return again in the conclusion of the dissertation.

How we approach artistic production from Turkey today is often based on the notion of radical alterity that has marked much of the scholarship on the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, although historians such as Selim Deringil (1998a) have shown that the Ottoman Empire saw itself (and was regarded) as part of the "concert of Europe"

at least since the Berlin conference of 1878, if not earlier. Yet these interventions have done little to decenter the notion that with the onset of the Renaissance, Western Europe reigned in an era of progress and reason, while the Near and Middle East remained mired in tradition and despotism. Recently a number of studies have begun to suggest a different image, arguing that the relationship between 'the West' and the Ottoman realm was actually much closer during the Renaissance than formerly assumed, emphasizing interlocution, exchange and parallelisms between these geopolitical areas. In "Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West" (2000), art historians Lisa Jardine and Jerry Brotton firmly situate the origins of Renaissance culture in a "two way material exchange" between the Ottoman Empire and Christian European powers, thus contradicting the standardized notion of the Ottoman Empire as a formative "Other" to a nascent understanding of 'Europeanness.' Instead Brotton and Jardine propose that elites in the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe laid claims to the same heritage, which also expressed itself in through a shared iconography (2000, 11 and 183-184).[5] They trace the patronage of the same artists in their respective courts, the exchange of paintings, commemorative coins and medals along with "cultural currencies" on diplomatic missions. Adopting this approach, Brotton and Jardine highlight how these exchanges were based on and furthered a shared and mutually intelligible visual repertoire, one that was circulated, produced and reproduced across these geopolitical locations.

[5] Within this shared iconography Brotton and Jardine discuss, for example, depictions of St. George who represents a soldier-saint in Islamic portrayals as well as equestrian art. According to the authors, especially the latter case is often categorized as arising from the (Western) classical tradition (one such classification is proposed by Panofsky for instance; 2000, 172). In contrast, they suggest that equestrian art has to be contextualized not only with regard to the 'Asian' origin of horses, but also in the framework of trade and competition between the Ottoman Empire and Western powers.

A similar description of mutual exchange – and vivid competition – that also resulted in a transfer of knowledge in both directions is given by art historian Rosamond Mack (2002). Mack's account also speaks against the stereotypical notion of Islam as solely a "carrier civilization" (Asad 2002, 217) that preserved but did not develop classic thought and scholarship. One last example that I would like to point to from the field of comparative literature is Walter G. Andrews and Mehmet Kapaklı's "The Age of Beloveds" (2005). Focusing on the "long 16th century" as a period cultural, political and social upheavals" and of "intense mutual attention" (2005, 26), the authors are not surprised to find a shared interest in love, especially self-sacrificing love, for the absolute ruler, god and "beloveds of all sorts" (2005, 27). Andrews and Kapaklı argue that analogous socio-political conditions and the shared grounding in Hellenic heritage expressed itself through parallels in the genre of devotional poetry as much in the urban centers of the Ottoman Empire as in Rome, Venice and London.[6] Together these historical studies make the today prevalent conception of radical alterity and the extent of its normalization all the more notable.

Germany/Turkey –Turkey/Germany

There is of course, another history of encounters that, although not the focus of this dissertation, also (in)forms the historical backdrop of this inquiry, that between Germany and the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey respectively. The predominant focus in present-day interrelation between Germany and Turkey is on a unidirectional labour migration starting in the 1960s. This focus has obscured the

[6] Often describing the affection between two men, this devotional poetry was also subject to similar onslaughts of moral panic in all of these locations.

constant two-way stream of travelling military personnel, political refugees, monies, scholars, artists and ideas that preceded it (Emre 2003). While the alliance with Germany that the Ottoman Empire entered during WWI is still remembered, the fact that the two states were also bound together economically, not least by way of the debts that Germany threatened to default on, is rarely acknowledged today (Güçlü 2000). Other often forgotten connections can be found in historical accounts, from the protestant Bavarian farmers who joined the Ottoman army to flee religious oppression in their homelands in the 16th century (Andrews/Kapaklı 2005, 27) to the Ottoman military men who came to Prussia to get insights for reforming their own army structure in the later 1800s, or, in the *Kaisserreich*'s colonial designs on the Ottoman Empire (Dahlhaus 1990). There are also more troubling aspects of Germany and Turkey's history of economic and intellectual exchange and political allegiance: German race theory, before being applied to Jewish and other 'unwanted' populations, was first elaborated upon by German scientist through the example of Ottoman Armenians, whom German officials and industrials saw as major obstacles to their economic and political aspirations in Anatolia (Kaiser 1997, Anderson 2007).[7] While Turkey often prides itself for taking in Jewish refugees during WWII Reisman 2006 and 2007), the fact that it did little to protect its Jewish expatriates in Berlin in the same time period, for instance, has received little notice. These are but a few examples that point to different facets of the long-standing relationship between the

[7] Anti-Armenian sentiment was further fuelled by the disregard for Eastern Christianity, and suspicions of possible Armenian-Russian collaboration. Liberal politician Friedrich Naumann even labeled the Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896 against the Armenians acts of "self-defense" (cited after Anderson 2007, 101; see also Kaiser 1997). This also explains why during the Genocide (1915-1917), at times, German groups and politicians aligned themselves only hesitantly with plight of their Christian brethren.

Ottoman Empire, and later the Turkish Republic, and its German counterpart that the cities of Berlin and Istanbul also bear witness to.[8]

"Istanbul is not Turkey," "Berlin is not Germany"

Although Istanbul and Berlin may seem like 'natural choices' for a comparative angle on Germany and Turkey, it should be noted that both are characterized by an extensive infrastructure of arts venues supported by private and public sources and have gained considerable attention in international art markets. After its postwar reconstruction, West-Berlin, cut off from the rest of the federal Republic, and deprived of its agrarian and industrial hinterlands became a cultural showcase, a display of 'democracy' and 'freedom' to the other half of the city, and the other, socialist Germany. However, as will become apparent throughout the dissertation, only particular types of arts and culture events were funded during the years of division. From the late 1960s onwards it was mainly Berlin's subcultural flair that attracted predominantly young people to the city.[9] As Berlin had lost a considerable part of its population and thus its labor force both due to the war and the division, it became a major destination for labor migration from Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey beginning in the late 1950s. While the city's cultural scene has thus always been very lively, if fringe, it has lately been fundamentally invigorated by the move of the German capital to Berlin. An array of programs were instated to rekindle the city's status as a cosmopolitan center for the arts,

[8] Berlin's former mayor Ernst Reuter was among those to emigrate to Turkey during the Nazi era most well-known today, and when strolling over Schöneberg's *Monumentenfriedhof* one can find inscriptions on tombstones dating to the 19th and early 20th century that bear witness to quite a number of persons, entrepreneurs, military officials, adventurers and archaeologists, who had ventured from Berlin to Istanbul seeking opportunities or offering their services in an Empire for which the German *Kaiserreich* had its own economic and political designs.

[9] An added attraction was that male Berlin residents were exempt from the military draft.

its glory days before the National Socialists' rise to power. One of these programs is the "Capital Cultural Foundation" financed by the federal government – for which the city has become a flagship project, the symbol of a young and vibrant *Berliner Republik*. Artists in Berlin are also eligible for another federal fund – the *Bundeskulturstiftung* – as well as project stipends by the Berlin senate and various funding categories on the local level. Berlin has an array of museums and galleries as well as nonprofit arts spaces, some of which will be addressed in more detail throughout the dissertation. Another trend that will be discussed are the recent cutbacks in Germany's formerly much famed arts funding structure (Germany has only recently been overtaken by the Netherlands in terms of the ratio of per capita funding for the arts). A significant difference to the situation of artists in Turkey is that German artists who at some point could live from their artistic works can apply to enroll in a special social security program, called the *Künstlersozialkasse*. However, most artists I interviewed who needed additional financial means generally took on service jobs, or, if their former employment status allowed, applied for unemployment aid.

Although not the formal capital of Turkey, Istanbul has long been a center for the arts in Turkey (as it had been in its imperial formation) with a range of exhibition and performance venues, art schools and foundations that attract artists from all provinces. Many of Istanbul's new arts institutions and museums have emerged through private, rather than state initiatives (an issue that I shall return to in Chapter 5). Istanbul has also experienced a veritable explosion of alternative and independent art spaces in the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, after the strict delimitation on associations enacted by the

military junta (that had closed numerous civil society and cultural organizations after the 1980 coup) were gradually lifted in the past two decades (Ünsal 2006).

Similarly to Germany there are state-administered as well as municipal and local funding categories, along with the cultural initiatives of political parties. But as artists and cultural managers note, Turkey's funding system (especially outside of the arts academies) is often difficult to navigate. Since the 1980s funds for contemporary art projects were, comparatively speaking, rather small, but this has been changing as the Turkish authorities have discovered the 'soft power' of cultural exchange and arts programs in diplomatic efforts within EU negotiations (see chapter7). The low level of government support for the arts also explains the vital role in artistic production and presentation played by the foreign cultural institutions located in the city of Istanbul (such as the Goethe Institute, British Council, Institut Français, as well as, for instance, the Swedish consulate, see Chapter 7).

That the art scenes of both cities have over the past decade garnered much international attention for their artistic production, is also due to the acclaimed biennials they host and that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Like Berlin, Istanbul draws artists from throughout the country (and abroad), and both cities play distinct but parallel roles in the national and artistic imaginaries of their respective context. Berlin and Istanbul are taken to symbolize past and present East-West divisions (and the bridging thereof); one being a capital of the past – the other the capital of a once again united Germany.

It is, of course, important to remember that, as many artworld actors in Istanbul and Berlin note, "Istanbul is not Turkey" and "Berlin is not Germany." The concentration

on these two metropoles also means that in the German case less attention is given to the manifestations of German federalism – especially in cultural policy. It also means that I am ultimately looking at a city where much art is produced, but in contrast to Cologne, Düsseldorf and Munich, little is sold (see Chapter 2).[10] There is in this study thus also a certain lack of attention to the make-up of pre- and post-unification East Germany, the disinvestment it experienced, as well as to its new center for painting, the now much famed Leipzig school. The focus on Istanbul in the Turkish case obscures another established center, Ankara, as well as the many new 'centers' in Izmir and Antalya. It also leaves out the thriving contemporary art scene in Diyarbakir, now joined by the seemingly unlikely cities of Kars and Kayseri, where independent art festivals and cultural policy initiatives have recently flourished.

When I began my fieldwork in Istanbul in the summer of 2005 and told interlocutors that I would be staying for seven months, it was not uncommon to hear that the Istanbul artworld is "so small" that it should not take me more than a few weeks to meet and talk to "everybody." My own assessment was, however, just like after completing the main research period in Berlin, that I had barely scratched the surface, not least because I could rarely make it to a fraction of the events, conferences, exhibitions and panel discussions that took place every week. I have often wondered where this perception of small scale might come from and why it persists in Istanbul despite the rapid increase in art spaces and other kinds of artistic fora. One way of explaining it might be the concentration of the contemporary art scene on the – geographically

[10] It also means omitting the fate of the old West German capital, Bonn, where some government galleries still stand, but population and visitor numbers have dwindled.

speaking – European side of the city, and here often in *Beyoğlu*. This perspective discounts a range of activities in other parts of the city, including *Kadiköy* on the Asian shore. Another way of making sense of the perception of small scale, however, might be that in contrast to what many Berlin artists described as an atmosphere of "*Nebeneinander*", i.e. a being next to each other that suggests a low level of mutual engagement, artists in Istanbul are frequently said (and say of themselves) to be in "each others' business." My understanding of this divergence in sociability in the arts setting of Berlin and Istanbul is based on the fact that state institutions, especially after the 1980s coup were seen as unreliable – or for political reasons undesirable – to work with among artists. This has led to a situation where a few key figures, especially curators and critics, emerged who for many artists presented the only alternative for facilitating local exposure and foster international connections. While in Berlin too, artists emphasize the importance of personal and professional networks in order secure grants, exhibition opportunities and international circulation, the above described public funding situation makes these connections all the more important in Istanbul.

How the recent multiplication of private and institutional actors in Istanbul's artworld will play out in this respect remains to be seen, but during my research I experienced firsthand that these close professional connections (that were frequently personalized, see Chapter 2) also create an environment in which gossip can be as much a source of vital information as it can be a favorite pastime. The same is true for Berlin, where gossip, rumor and off-the-record remarks[11] play an important role, not least because they present ways to counteract, undermine, circumvent or highlight the

[11] Off-the-record remarks that are referred to in the dissertation are only correlated to the professional designations of respective interlocutors, and generally do not entail characteristic specifications in order to maintain anonymity.

dependency structures between artists, curators and critics, and to navigate the internal politics of the artworld in its narrower sense. As research progressed in both locations, I learned that it was vital to make clear that I was not seeking to be aligned with any of the often antagonistic camps in each setting (see also Kosnick 2007). This often also included remaining as vague as possible about to whom I had spoken previously, as interlocutors scrutinized both the choices of my interviewees and the order in which I proceeded.

Having grown up in Germany with parents who had immigrated there in the later 1960s and early 1970s respectively, a trajectory that in Turkey is connoted with the rather unflattering label '*almanci*,'[12] I expected some unpleasant encounters with regard to my background. This was indeed at times the case, while my coming via New York and the fact that since 2004 there has been an increased interest in immigrant cultural production from Germany also played into the dynamics of my fieldwork interactions. My arrival in Berlin, in turn, coincided with the much publicized discussion on making speaking German mandatory in schoolyards, a so-called "Muslim test" designed to ascertain the commitment of Muslim immigrants who applied for naturalization to the German constitution (featuring such questions as "would you allow your daughter to wear a mini-skirt?"), and lastly, the then still ongoing Danish caricature-scandal that led many politicians and journalists alike to conclude that Islam and democracy are utterly incompatible. These debates had also been followed closely in the artworld with the result that, in the first few weeks, many interlocutors wanted to discuss these and other issues of my personal background with me. After an initial phase of frustration, I decided to conduct a considerable part of my interviews in Berlin in English to avoid these kinds

[12] Seemingly neutral in pointing to the destination of migration, the term *Germaner,* actually connotes an image of uneducated rural populations that went to Germany, and generally tarnished the image of Turkey abroad by their unwillingness (or inability) to fit into their 'host societies.'

of questions that my designation as an *Ausländer* (foreign national) seemed to invite. The translations of the interview excerpts cited throughout the dissertation that were conducted in Turkish and German, as well as of the respective literature, are my own (unless indicated otherwise).

Outline of the Dissertation

Chapter 1, *Grounds of Comparison: Modernity, Nationalism and the Arts,* further lays out the theoretical framework of the study that I have already sketched in this introduction. Here I highlight continuities and ruptures in German and Turkish nation-building and paths to modernity and how these trajectories have been reflected in debates on the arts. *ArtWorlds – Of Friends, Foes and Working for the Good* (Chapter 2) begins with an overview of the emergence of the modern conception of art. Interrogating how aesthetic theories are reflected in the daily practices of the artworld in both Berlin and Istanbul, it shows how narratives of art as a "social good" serve to deproblematize institutional and personal dependency structures in the artworld. These rationalizations mirror official Turkish and German past and present cultural policies that have been based on modernist notions of aesthetic education as a civilizing agent, formative for modern personhood, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 (*Cultural Policy – Educating or Producing Modern Citizens?*).

Despite the intensified globalization of artworlds, national representation plays a vital role in cultural policy debates as modernity is perpetually claimed by the state through the vehicle of art. This circumstance, compounded by the fact that Germany and Turkey are acutely aware of how they are perceived abroad, will be further discussed in

Chapters 4 and 5. *The Art of Forgetting* (Chapter 4) addresses the partial silences in national art histories art as well as those surrounding prominent collections that are historically related to the dispossession of minorities – be it in the shape of artworks or of financial assets that funded art collections. I argue that these silences are often connected to what is perceived as deviations from the modern paradigm, be they artistic or political. Chapter 5, entitled *The Politics of Art,* takes an anatomical look at two art scandals, one surrounding the exhibitions *Regarding Terror* (Berlin) thematizing media perceptions of the *Red Army Fraction*, and the other, *Freekick* (Istanbul), mainly featuring Kurdish artists, to discuss different modalities of censorship. Focusing on the Istanbul and Berlin Biennials *The Business of Art* (Chapter 6) examines the proliferation of urban of art spectacles. Advanced by a different set of actors in each city this enterprising of art integrates conceptions of 'cultural entrepreneurship' and the 'creative industries' while romanticizing and profiting from both, art and business. The final chapter, *The Governance of or through Culture?* (Chapter 7), interrogates how the differential imaginaries of Germany and Turkey are currently being recast in discussions on EU enlargement and a nascent European cultural policy.

Chapter 1: Grounds of Comparison: Modernity, Nationalism and the Arts

"Germany and Turkey are incomparable." (German anthropologist, Frankfurt 2003)

"That's like comparing apples and pears, … it just doesn't work – you can't do that! Especially when it comes to art." (Another German Anthropologist, Frankfurt 2003)

"You will find that the questions regarding modernization that you are asking are of minor – if at all – relevance for the German context. (Senior German Anthropologist, Berlin 2006)[13]

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"The difference between the arts settings of Berlin and Istanbul? What difference? There is none" (Vasıf Kortun – curator, Istanbul 2005)

The above statements might seem expectable given that, especially from a European perspective, Germany and Turkey are usually conceptualized in terms of radical alterity. So different are their contemporary positions that the former is frequently cited as model for successful modernization while the latter is regarded as seriously flawed, if not failed. Similarly, Germany's artistic lineages are firmly established within the Western canon, while those of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey respectively are considered to be outside thereof. The assumptions underlying these evaluations and the first three of the above quoted statements have in part inspired the following exploration.

At the core of this inquiry is the argument that despite dominant notions there have been considerable contingencies and insecurities regarding both Germany's and

[13] These three quotes reflect the standard initial reactions I received after presenting my research project at different occasions, both formally and informally. It might be interesting to note that the answers were given by three generations of anthropologists.

Turkey's "modern-ness" due to the particularities of their respective state-formations and geopolitical positions. However, the idea here is not to argue for "different kinds of modernity" (e.g. Hannerz 1996, Gaonkar 2001) in the two national frameworks, but to analyze respective experiences of the 'normativity" of modern power (Scott 1999) as they manifest themselves in cultural policies. To illustrate this proposition, this chapter sketches the interlocution between the debates on state-formation and those on art and aesthetic as national expressions in the contexts of Germany and Turkey. Here, I am comparing and contrasting two narratives of the role of the arts in the claim for modernity and nationhood. For this purpose, the following discussion pays less attention to individual artists, or specific artistic schools, styles, and forms, but rather focuses on the discourses among state actors and theoreticians in both locations. Thus, I address art mostly in the generalized and abstract way that is frequently inherent in the debates on nationalism and modernity. In order to set the theoretical framework and to show how conceptions of modernity and of art have been historically correlated with conceptions of citizenship and in the manufacturing of modern citizens in Germany and in Turkey, I necessarily employ a very broad-stroked perspective that will be nuanced and differentiated in the remainder of this study. In this first step, I privilege those commentaries and critiques that highlight similarities rather than differences. In accordance with the fourth introductory quote by Istanbul-based curator Vasıf Kortun, I propose a methodological overemphasis of similarities to counter the generally assumed radical alterity between Turkey and Germany. Once we have challenged this perspective, I argue, we might be able to reevaluate not just what the parallels, but also the

differences, in both instances can tell us about the ways in which concepts and questions of nationalism and modernity have impacted the arts and vice versa.

The Aesthetics of Constructing a People

> "If a nation is rich in art and its people skilled in the arts, it can achieve a full life of its own. A nation that cannot do this is like a man who is lame or lacks a limb, who is invalid and crippled. But for what I have to say, even this comparison is not adequate. If a nation is cut off from the arts, one of its vital arteries is severed" (Mustafa Kemal cited in And 1984, 217).

In his essay "The Nation Form: History and Ideology" Étienne Balibar argues that myths of national origin derive their ideological efficacy by claiming to be manifestations of a peoples' "destiny," i.e. expressing the self-determination of 'a people.' It is on the basis of the definition of peoplehood that the nation-state is portrayed as the culmination of a directional, rational "project" that unfolds linearly and cohesively (Balibar 1991b, 86-87). Yet in the German as in the Turkish case (as with nationalist movements in general) the very definition and conception of this 'people' has been a contentious question.

In Turkey the constitution of this people has to be analyzed with regard to the specificities of the transition from a highly heterogeneous empire to a homogeneously conceptualized republic. It was and has been through the very construction and reification of 'a people' that the population could be mobilized in the War of Independence (1919-1922) and nationhood and state organization could be legitimized and made acceptable internationally as evidenced by the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty that marked the

establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.[14] Germany, by the same token, in order to achieve nationalhood, had to bridge the fragmentation between a conglomerate of principalities and free cities that had emerged out of the remnants of the Holy Roman Empire. These geopolitical entities were frequently denominationally divided, and maintained their own borders and taxation systems until 1871, when the German state was established, following the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. Similarly to Turkey, the mobilization for a cohesive nation-state came out of the experience of a series of military defeats (see Chapter 3). The unified German state this is often described as having emerged and developed by way of "defensive modernization," a term that suggests a somewhat flawed modernization processes due to its characterization as reactive, rather than active. Despite the widespread usage of this term, this 'flaw' is rarely, if ever addressed as such. Instead scholars frequently discuss Germany's modernization under the heading of *Sonderweg* – an idea elaborated in the 19th and early 20th century from within Germany which projected a 'special path' for the country's modernization due its particular history and geographical location that were seen to set it apart from other Western powers and explain the persistence of authoritarian governance structures (Kocka 1999, Lepenies 2006, 9-11).[15]

[14] In the case of Turkey the constitution of the nation has been a very conflicted and violent process. It was produced actively not just through far reaching methods of 'social engineering' and so-called populations exchanges, but also through the violent expulsion of entire populations as well as the Armenian genocide (Akçam 2004, Hirschorn 2003). In turn, the demographic policies and genocidal actions orchestrated by the National Socialist regime that fundamentally homogenized Germany's population, can partially be understood as an effort in state-consolidation that was furthered by the population exchanges and expulsions and repatriation of ethnic Germans from Poland and other Eastern block countries after WWII.

[15] For a periodization of the different permutations of *Sonderweg*-thesis as a political program till 1945, an object of critical theory in trying to explain the Germany's "fascist and/or totalitarian perversion" after WWII (Kocka 1999, 41), and then beginning in the late 1960s a gradual revision of the idea of Germany's particularity to the extent to which the perception of Germany as 'modern' has been normalized, see Kocka 1999.

Although the constitution of the respective states, Germany's unification in 1871 and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, were 52 years apart, both national histories are frequently characterized through the trope of belated arrival on the nation-state scene. This historical feature is often seen to cause a sense of inferiority that is thought to express itself in mass psychological manifestations as well as in principles of governance, and to produce insecurities regarding their position in "the modern world." It is also employed as an explanatory device for the compensatory politics exhibited in both cases, i.e. the proneness for authoritarianism, and consequently state-led modernization (see for example Akçam 2004, Jung/Picolli 2001, Naumann 2001, Ozment 2004).

Both German and Turkish nationalist movements shared an awareness that art presented in a national framework can be employed to appeal to, instill, and reflect ideas of 'collective identity.' Nationalists on both sides have argued that art is and should be expressive of 'the culture' that demarcates a people. Together with factors such as shared language and history, aesthetic expression has been likewise regarded as characteristic for and reifying of a homogenous nation. It is in this context that artistic production has often been conceptualized as performing a legitimizing bond to a supposedly coherent and communal past, very much like the "invented traditions" that Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger have argued are an outstanding feature of modern nation-state formation (1992).[16] The following sections explore some of the ways in which the search for a cohesive nation has expressed itself in the realm of the arts.

[16] Hobsbawm defines "invented tradition" as a "set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual; or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past" (1992, 1). It is then from this continuity that practices subsumed under the emblem of tradition derive their authority, even if the relation to the past that they project is only upheld by virtue of repetition. The term 'invention' here does not necessarily imply that these practices have a fictitious basis, but that their sense of continuity or antiquity is "invented."

Modernity: Distinction from and Rapprochement to the 'West'

German Particularism and the Search for distinctly German Art

Art historian Hans Belting argues that the search for a distinctly German art by the Romantics in the later 18th century was an attempt to bridge Germany's political division into a multitude of semi-independent principalities. Together with the Reformation this political fragmentation had accounted for regionalism in the arts (1998, 17). The visual arts were particularly impacted through the Reformation, in the process of which "art had to choose its religion" (Belting 1998, 13). Painting was generally outlawed in protestant Germany and only few official and designated positions for painters were available, leaving artists with little room for experimentation outside the prescribed motives and styles. It is this process, which produced a "divided German artistic tradition" – the emergence of *Zweierlei deutsche Kunst* (i.e. two kinds of German art), protestant on the one hand, and catholic (notably also often referred to as "Mediterranean"[17]) artistic expression on the other. In order to overcome this division, a number of visual artists turned to classical rather than religious themes. By linking themselves to Greek styles and motifs, they turned to antiquity to establish aesthetic cohesion across the Germanies.[18]

On a second plane, the search for a uniquely German artistic style also has to be analyzed in the framework of the German nationalist project that emerged in response to Napoleonic occupation (1804-1815). The quest for forging a sense of German unity

[17] That historically speaking, the categories 'catholic' and 'Mediterranean' were so readily equated throughout the 18th century points to a rather different conception of Europe – and Germany's place within it – than the binaries between North and South, West and East that have habitually framed not only political but also scholarly discussions on Europe after World War II.

[18] According to Belting Goethe saw the Romantics' "lack of self-confidence" as the reason for their turning to older forms (1998, 23).

gained even more heightened urgency when the revolutionary unification attempt of 1848/49 failed, and with this failure the "project of aligning Germany's cultural identity with the putative modernity of the French Revolution [...] collapsed" as well (Mah 1990, 60). Historian Harold Mah argues that for German intellectuals such as G.W.F. Hegel and Heinrich Heine, the French Revolution had marked the arrival of modernity, since it "eliminated traditional obstacles to social equality and constitutional government" and thus was regarded as "the realization of Enlightenment" (Mah 1990, 4), even if they were shocked about the violent turn the revolution had taken. The question they were faced with was to explain if and when Germany itself would arrive at a revolutionary state. According to Mah there were increasing doubts as to whether Germany was equipped to meet the "standard of reason and modernity" exhibited by the French, especially since the reforms that had been instated during Napoleonic rule were promptly superceded by Prussian reactionism (1990, 5). In a parallel argumentative move, first Hegel and then twenty years later Heine, tried to align German philosophy and thought with French political practice, and it was through this homology that Germany's modernity was claimed by both.[19] Yet, questions remained of how to explain this discrepancy between thought and practice, theory and politics as well as the non-existence of a specifically German art style. For many German thinkers the answer to these questions lay in the experience of the Reformation, which emphasized *Innerlichkeit* – inwardness, rather than outward action.

Innerlichkeit was seen as intrinsic to German political life as it projected on its artistic trajectory, and that it was regarded as both a possible path and an obstacle to

[19] While Hegel believed that revolutionary action was still to follow out of this German disposition, Heine was advocating for a change in 'German culture.' Heine argued that inwardness, although perceived as an emancipating force in German society, in the end only sustained and perpetuated authoritarianism.

Germany's modernization can already be traced in Friedrich Schiller's "Aesthetic Letters" (which he began to write in the mid-1790s). Art theorist Martha Woodmansee identifies two projects in Schiller's writings. At times Schiller was in line with Enlightenment theories emphasizing the emancipatory potential of aesthetic education as a facilitator of self-government, the establishment of a rational state – and ultimately freedom. This seemingly subversive stance however was contrasted by the position he developed in the second part of the "Letters." Here freedom is not located in the external political context, but takes the form of an inward aesthetic experience that produces an internal freedom and 'consoles' the individual in face of repressive regimes, alienation, and social disintegration that prevail in the modern condition (especially in Letters Five and Six, see also Woodmansee 1994, 73). In this second elaboration, aesthetic experience accommodates the socio-political status quo, rather than challenging it.

Mah argues that Germany's self-image of the country of *Dichter und Denker*, poets and thinkers, developed in distinction from "what they had perceived as their tutelage" to French civilization (1990, 5; see also Naumann 2001). By emphasizing cultural autonomy and uniqueness of the German spirit (*Geist*) and its physical manifestation in the *Volk*, Germany was distinguished from France and England, both seen to represent the cold rationalization and calculating nature of the modern world – "*Kaufmannsgeist und kalte Verfeinerung*"[20] (Naumann 2001, 53). Historian Hans Mommsen shows that this current of *deutschvölkisch*-orientation in the arts at times exhibited succinctly anti-modernist stances and relied on anti-Western polemics

[20] As commentators often point out the German term *Gesellschaft* (society) not only forms the counterpart to the organically conceptualized *Gemeinschaft* (community), but also denotes incorporated enterprise and thus plays into the dichotomy between the two concepts elaborated by Ferdinand Tönnies, or rather the anti-modernist perception thereof.

(Mommsen 2000, 257-58), despite the opposition of various artists' movements, such as first the impressionist and later expressionist painters. Yet, Germany was overall striving to be on par with the Western powers of France and England in its military and economic capabilities as well as its imperial ambitions.

In an atmosphere that was shaped by insecurities pertaining to Germany's position in the modern world and uncertainties about the existence and shape of a 'German artistic tradition,' the emergence of modern art, a decidedly international movement, only polarized the German artworld further. The notion of *Überfremdung*[21] – foreign infiltration – as well as that of degeneracy as threatening both German art and German 'national character' became commonplace in official discourses on the arts and engendered isolationist cultural policies (and politics, see below) towards European neighbors and as well as the application of censorship to domestic artistic production. Yet Wilhelm II.'s expectation of "*Kunst im Dienst der Staatsidee*" – arts in the service of the state – was not necessarily met with approval by artist themselves, especially since the arts became increasingly restricted by official policies. Historian Wolfgang Mommsen shows that modernism in the arts, slowly winning ground in Germany, expressed a critique of bourgeois hegemony, and at times hinted at the fragmentation of this social strata or voiced discomforts with the modern condition (Mommsen 2000, 8). These tensions, according to Belting,

> "[…] prompted Wilhelm II. to denounce modern art saying that it does nothing more than portray misery as more loathsome than it is.' This was even more incomprehensible to the Kaiser, 'since we the German people, have made great ideals part of the public good, while these same ideals have disappeared more or

[21] *Überfremdung* and 'degeneracy' are frequently thought of as conceptions that are rooted in National Socialist ideology. However, the vocabulary of 'foreign infiltration' and 'degeneracy' along with that of 'smut and trash' in assessing the state of art and popular culture were already prevalent in the Whilhelmine period and widely employed in the Weimar Republic (von Saldorn 2002, 311), before their usage peaked in the NS era.

> less from other nations.' [...] Anti-modernists of those years advised artists to look to German art of the past for models to imitate. For them, modern art was as un-German as the Gothic and the renaissance, which art historians would have so liked to define as German" (1998, 62-63).

The debate about German-ness in the arts became especially heated towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, when German artists began to critique the acquisition practices first of the National Gallery in Berlin (founded in 1896 and tellingly dedicated *Der Deutschen Kunst – To German Art*) when it added non-German artists to its collection.[22] The protests gathered further momentum in then 'Bremen art controversy' of 1911. After the purchase of a van Gogh painting by the *Bremen Museum*, the manifesto entitled *Ein Protest deutscher Künstler* ("A protest of German artists"), portrayed this acquisition as endangering German traditions and revealed great concern regarding funding for the arts in Germany: The 'investment' in foreign artists was seen not only as resources lost for German artists, but also as hampering the development of German art market (Belting 1998, 67).

The "Turkish Synthesis": Rationalizing the Nation and Artistic Expression

The Turkish Republic, at least in the first seven years of its inception, started out on a slightly different path in the search for a 'national' artistic expression and its attempts at positioning itself in the modern arena. In his theoretical writings Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), a poet and sociologist and one of the chief ideologues of Turkish nationalism and himself of Kurdish ancestry, tried to walk the thin line in which Turkish nationality was being disjoined from descent as well as from a shared Ottoman past – that

[22] That the acquisition and exhibition practices of the National Gallery in Berlin remain contentious to this day, albeit for different reasons, will be further discussed in Chapters 2 and 5.

for him, as for many Republicans was long discredited.[23] Instead, he enthusiastically envisioned the creation of a "new man" and a "new people" as an entity encompassing all former Ottoman citizens. As I will outline below this seemingly inclusivist proposition and the civic impetus it suggests would prove rather fragile in practice however, and was soon to move into ethnic conceptualizations of Turkish citizenship. Since the criteria for national belonging could not be entirely based on future orientation, i.e. a completely reformed language, culture and society as initially projected, Gökalp developed the idea of the "Turkish synthesis." His argument, although strongly reminiscent of Herderian approaches, without ever referencing the latter, makes a distinction between civilization – *medeniyet* – and culture – *hars*[24] – and thus Ottoman civilization and 'authentic Turkish culture' respectively (1959, 107). Subsequently Ottoman civilization was portrayed as a complete travesty and not genuine to Turkey since it was, according to Gökalp, essentially based on copying Persian and Arabic cultural practices, especially in the field of the arts (1959, 262). This Turkish modernization discourse employed Orientalist motifs in its critiques of Ottoman, and by extension Arab and Persian societies, and what was respectively identified as "their cultures" (see Said 2003).[25] It thus established a

[23] It should be noted that Gökalp only lived long enough to see the first year Republic, and that his ideas are today mainly refracted through Mustafa Kemal's policies. For instance, although Gökalp elaborated on cultural Turkism, he did not necessarily do so in imagining a republican state (Parla 1985).

[24] The Ottoman expression *hars* has been gradually replaced by the term *kültür*, not least because of the successive language reforms since the 1930s aiming to eliminate Arabic and Persian words (Mardin 2002). Although still in active use in cultural policy documents from the late 1980s (see Kantarcıoğlu 1987), the cultural administrators I spoke to were not aware of that the term *hars* had been so broadly employed only two decades ago. Not just a terminological shift, the notion of *kültür* bears many structural resemblances to the German understanding of *Kultur* (cf. Wolf 1964).

[25] The dichotomization and ensuing value judgments of the West-East divide in Kemalist ideology essentially follow the discourses that Edward Said describes as "Orientalism" (2003). Said defines Orientalism as a disciplinary discourse that produced "the Orient politically, historically, militarily, ideologically scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period" (2003, 3). He argues that in the process of producing authoritative knowledge on the Orient and its alleged characteristics, the very notion of West emerged as well (2003, xvii and 5). While the West is portrayed as the site of reason, progress and superiority, the Orient is regarded as effeminate, irrational and fatalistic. The modernization

rupture from the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently legitimized an array of socio-cultural engineering measures to which I will return in a moment. However, it also engendered a continuity on another plane of orientalization – one that has been even more consistent than the discrediting of the Ottoman past – namely the contradictory identification of the Anatolian 'heartland' as the source for both Turkey's renewal and incomplete modernization. Playing out to this day, this discourse, instead of criticizing government policies of systematic disinvestment and the failure to secure citizenship rights (e.g. freedom of speech, the right to express ethnic diversity), it is the rural population of Turkey that is faulted for stifling the country's modernization and preventing Turkey's acceptance by European governments as an equal partner.[26]

But back to the early Republican period for now: As Ottoman backwardness was most commonly bemoaned, this backwardness was deemed to be rooted in an adherence to Islam, or at least a version of Islam that prevented 'development,' because it was infused with unreason and superstition. In contrast, 'Western civilization' and especially

measures that Turkey has established in its history are infused with an internal application of related stereotypes.

[26] It is important to remember that although in contemporary portrayals Anatolia as 'the heartland' of Turkey, the same is not necessarily true for the Ottoman Empire. In analyzing what she calls the "region of Turkey" Navaro-Yashin states that formerly the Balkans "had been central to the Ottoman polity" (2002, 46), and only with the end of the war with Russia (1877-78) and the resulting break-away of the Balkan territory did this focus shift to Anatolia. She proposes that not least because of the centrality of the Balkans for the Ottoman imagination and economy, the Empire never saw itself apart from the modernization processes of Europe (see also Quataert 2005). This proposition not only calls the notion of 'Westernization' as applied to the Ottoman Empire into question, but also raises the issue how the central authority of the Empire viewed its own 'peripheries', and whether the relationship between heartland and periphery could be conceptualized as colonial. Deringil attributes what he calls "borrowed colonialism" to the late Ottoman Empire, which he describes as a "survival tactic" so as not to become a colony itself (2003, 313). While Ussama Makdisi, in contrast, speaks of 'Ottoman imperialism', he and Deringil seem to concur that in the respective cases of their inquiry, Mount Lebanon and Libya, modernization efforts and civilizing missions were proof that "Ottoman reformers understood [that] the modernity of their Empire depended on the reformation of the periphery as a foil to modern Ottoman identify" (Makdisi 2002, 47). It is also interesting to note that the Ottoman modernization policies described by both Makdisi and Deringil resemble those policies that will be discussed as social engineering measures implemented in the early Turkish Republic.

'Western science' were regarded as exemplary.[27] Yet, the Turkish synthesis was not envisioned as a total emulation either, rather it was to provide a framework for refining 'Turkish' folk culture according to 'Western standards.'[28] Although sharing thematic concerns and bearing structural similarities to earlier reforms during the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1876) (see Deringil 1998a), these efforts were discounted as elitist imitations of a likewise reified 'Western' culture that were detached from people's everyday experience. Taking folk culture as a basis from which to build a new 'Turkish civilization' would not only entail the recovery of a Turkish culture "out there," but a modification thereof to match the standards of the statetist modernization project and to equal European modernity. As Yael Navaro-Yashin argues this modernization effort was based on a contradictory parallelism of discovery (or recovery) and 'refinement,' in the course of which "Turkishness" was not just portrayed as compatible with modernity but to some extent even congruent with it (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 11-12). Anatolian folklore[29] was to

[27] While the notion of 'Westernization' is frequently employed in the literature that deals with both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, one has to keep in mind that this term is oftentimes applied retrospectively. In the context of the republican era, 'Western' could signify French (e.g. language reforms), Swiss (e.g. legal code), or Swedish (when it came to reforming folk dance), Hungarian (when it came to new notation systems in music). In the case of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, 'Western' could also denote German ties (e.g. with regard to military re-organization and railway-building). As of now, I have not been able to clarify from the accessible literature from when on the concept of "batılaşma" (Westernization) is explicitly used by the historical actors themselves. For a detailed analysis of how the concepts of 'modern', 'western' and 'secular' in both self-representations and scholarly works on Turkey actually obscure more than they explain see Parla/Davison 2004.

[28] This idea entailed the sending of urban middle-class teachers and doctors to Anatolia to collect information about "Turkish folklore" and learn about "Turkish ways" while at the same time contributing to the 'modernization' of rural populations (Navaro-Yashin 2003, 48). A similar practice was put into place for painters and sculptors**,** not dissimilar to Soviet Painting tours (see Chapters 3 and 4).

[29] As mentioned above, since its inception modern Turkey has faced the dilemma of defining Anatolia as the heartland of the republic, while at the same time portraying the its population as stifling national modernization efforts. Raymond Williams analyzes similar processes of romantization and devaluation of the English countryside, and the obscuring of the economic interdependence between the countryside and the urban centers in his study "The Country and the City" (1973).

provide the material for Turkish culture and to prove Turkish affinities to European civilization, while distinguishing Turkey from its Arab neighbors.[30]

These cultural engineering measures had been preceded by major waves of 'demographic engineering,' first in the Ottoman Empire in form of the Armenian Genocide in 1915-1917,[31] and then through the compulsory Population Exchanges[32] that were part of the legal basis of the establishment of the Turkish state as per the Lausanne Treaty (Hirschon 2003). Both of these measures paved the way for a (confessionally) homogenized nation-state. In addition, it is important to remember that in the Lausanne Treaty the concept of minorities covers Armenian, Greek and Jewish populations (but not other non-Muslims), while the founders of the Republic "projected for all Muslim citizens of Turkey a Turkish national identity" (Kirişci 1998, 228; see also Deringil 1998b, 217), meaning that despite the purported secular make-up of the Turkish state, citizenship and minority rights are based on religious affiliation. However, to attain the above outlined goal of the creation of a 'new people' the founders of the Republic, among them first and foremost Mustafa Kemal, envisioned far-reaching re-education efforts. The early years of the republican era were accompanied by a range of social engineering methods designed to produce the 'Turkish' nation that entailed, among other things, the introduction of the Latin alphabet, the modernization and implementation of a centrally directed school system in 1929 (Kaplan 2006, 2-19), and the reshaping of the

[30] The notion of 'Arabization' (which in some instances parallels the German notion of *Überfremdung*) has been frequently employed to devalue artistic expression related to the Middle East (e.g. see Stokes 1992). I have encountered this label several times as a measurement for the quality in the genre of "oriental dancing": 'Arab' dancers are stereotypically believed to work from a more simplified movement repertoire, while 'Turkish' dancing is deemed to be more intricate and difficult to master.

[31] It is important to note that during the course of the Armenian Genocide other religious minorities such as Assyrian Christians were persecuted and murdered as well. For longitudal interrogations into demographic engineering in the late Ottoman Empire see for example Şeker 2007 and Zürcher 2008.

[32] The forced migration of 'Greeks' and 'Turks' respectively, was organized around religious denomination, and not ethnicity or language.

built environment (Kasaba 1997, 24). Indeed, even the body of the citizen itself became the focus of the internal civilizing mission. Fez, turbans, and sharvals had to be replaced by Western attire; men were to wear suits, veiling was forbidden for women. The state also tried to regulate religious practice by assuming control of the religious education of Imams. While official discourses portrayed this move as one to ensure 'moderation,' it also presented an attempt to bring religious authorities firmly under the auspices of the state (Meeker 2002). These social engineering methods in conjunction with the preceding violent demographic homogenization were integral building blocks in the making of modern Turkey, in the process of which modernization and turkification have in large parts been equated, and in turn have rendered expressions of diversity (be they ethnic, linguistic or religious) a conceptual threat to the very foundation – and sovereignty – of the Turkish state (see also Chapter 4).[33] As such the discourses and practices reinforcing national homogeneity have become subject to periodic consolidation that is also reflected in cultural policies, and thus will be taken up repeatedly throughout the dissertation.

Similarly to other aspects of Ottoman civilization, the new Republican elite branded Ottoman art as backward. Just as in the overriding modernization project there was a search for a "Turkish synthesis" in the arts as well. To uncover the "Turkish genius" as Gökalp formulated it (1959, 262-265), Turkish artists had the choice to draw on Western, folk or Eastern artistic repertoires (see also And 1984, 219). While the latter

[33] Given this background it is not surprising that the mere assemblage of population statistics (both historical and contemporary) is a highly sensitive political issue in Turkey that is frequently met with state-censorship, unless it is in line with officially sanctioned narrative (one such example are Justin McCarthy's population statistics for the late Ottoman Empire which project, comparatively speaking, small numbers for Christian and Jewish populations, in part due to the sources that McCarthy employs. His analyses are based mainly on official Ottoman documents, rather than statistics collected by respective religious communities, e.g. see McCarthy1983). Peter Andrews and Rüdiger Benninghaus' precarious long-term study that surveyed different Anatolian regions and lists 47 self-identifying ethnic and ethno-religious groups (Andrews/ Benninghaus 1989) presents a notable exception to this thrust.

was regarded as morbid, the former two were to become the basis for a new national and modern art. The "harmonious blend" that was to emerge from this synthesis would at the same time form a distinctly "Turkish art" (And 1984, 215 and 222).

But what did the Turkish synthesis look like in practice? As Orhan Tekelioğlu and others have shown, folk music was regarded as the primary source for the musical synthesis, one that was to be achieved with reforms based on Western musical principles, namely the introduction of polyphony: "Folk tunes were to be collected, categorized, reworked according to Western methods, and made polyphonic" (Tekelioğlu 2001, 95). To secure these reforms monophonic music education was banned in public and private schools in 1927. Another measure that Stokes highlights in his study "The Arabesk Debate" is the "Turkification of lyrics" (1992, 66). Within the national project, in which homogenization was regarded as essential for the modernization process, ethnic diversity indicated a supposed affinity to a "backward Orient" that was governed by what could be called the 'aesthetics of irrationality.' Western music as expressing "logical, systematic, and [engaging] rational thinking" thus emerged as a counterpoint to Eastern music, which in its structure as well as in its lyrical content was deemed irrational, morbid and overly emotional (Stokes 1992, 12). In an attempt that was described as a civilizing mission for music, acclaimed "Western" musicians and composers such as Paul Hindemith and Béla Bartók were invited to Turkey in 1932. While Hindemith took on the task of assembling a national orchestra, Bartók was commissioned by the state to modernize the musical notation system (Stokes 1992, 50ff, Tekelioğlu 2001, 107).[34]

[34] For similar practices of bringing in expertise from abroad in order to 'modernize' architecture and sculpture see Bozdoğan (2001), Nicolai (2004), Öndin (2003), and Chapter 3.

But Tekelioğlu as notes "these reforms were, however, challenged by a handful of skilled musicians as well as by the audience's traditional Ottoman music" (2001, 93); and "Turkish music listeners, showed little interest in polyphonic music being composed by the Turkish composers or the Western classical music played in free concerts or broadcast on radio" (2001, 96). Martin Stokes in turn shows that Turkey's rural population "unable to hear the music that they enjoyed, either turned off their [radio] sets, [...] or tuned into Egyptian radio, which was easily available as a result of its high broadcasting frequency" (1992, 93). To counter the growing popularity of Egyptian musical films the Turkish government even resorted to a temporary, if unsuccessful ban thereof in 1948.[35]

Similarly, the folk dance reforms of the 1920s aimed at the 'refinement' of different local movement repertoires, codifying even improvisational the customary improvisational sequences by limiting the patterns from which they could be drawn, so that "randomness" would be eliminated and dances would become more "rigid" (Öztürkmen 2002, 129). But as Arzu Öztürkmen's analysis demonstrates these reformed and 'modernized' dance forms were also renamed to denote "geographical administrative units rather than ethnic ones" (2002, 32). By negating their often disparate ethnic roots, movement repertoires were merged and modified into new canons that were then presented as regional dances. This is further evidence that ethnic differences (even) in dance practices were regarded as disruptive for the nation-state process, and reveals reformers' preoccupation with (ethnic) homogenization. It seems that to this day regional

[35] Analogously, people in Western Thrace tune into Greek radio stations to this day. Tekelioğlu and Stokes are notable exceptions as the contestation and fervent discussions accompanying these 'reforms' in the arts are rarely reflected in public memory and scholarship on the issue (for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 3).

difference provides a "tamed" frame of reference for diversity that is deemed permissible or at least less disruptive than 'cultural' ones (see also Chapters 4 and 7).

The above outlined trajectories of both German and Turkish cultural policies have operated under nationalist imperatives that constructed an officially sanctioned alignment with both tradition and innovative currents, an attempt to claim cultural, and by extension political, modernity. It is interesting to note that despite Turkey's and Germany's divergent modernization processes, i.e. explicit rapprochement to the 'West' in the first case; initial rejection and subsequent alignment after 1945 in the second (see below), religion in both contexts has been historically regarded as stifling for the arts and deemed as one of reasons why respective artistic repertoires had fallen behind other European powers (in the case of Germany foremost France and England).

One of the prevalent stereotypes that is still propagated by those forces in Turkey that claim Kemalist heritage[36] is that Ottoman art fell behind Western art in the 16th century because of dogmatic readings of Islam. The beliefs that they are referring to here were held by some Sunni Muslim groups that opposed depictions of persons, in an understanding that god's creation could not be mirrored. This view does not differentiate between different periods of the Ottoman Empire and obscures the existence of social actors to whom these religious presets did not apply, for instance the works of Armenian painters within the empire (Kürkman 2004), or those which diverged from these understandings, including rulers at the Ottoman court themselves (see Chapter 3). Even less polemic commentators tend to see Ottoman art as limited, and consider miniature and calligraphy as merely 'decorative genres' that do not easily fit into, for example, the

[36] See for example http://www.ataturk.org/culture.htm

framework of visual art developed in the 19th century in Western Europe.[37] In contrast to the contemporary Egyptian artists discussed by Jessica Winegar (2006), artists in Turkey do not really have to "reckon" with the legacy of an 'treasured' artistic heritage of past civilization. They are faced with a complete rupture rather than a comparison to cultural accomplishments of old.

In the German case it was the Reformation that was long seen to have impacted artistic production and accounted for a "divided German artistic tradition."s It was this processes that hindered Germany (especially in the visual arts and to a lesser extent in the realms of letters and music) from stepping out of what nationalist commentators perceived as the shadow of French civilization, from which German *Kultur* was to distinguish itself.

While the motif of distinction from "the West" was elaborated by German intellectuals and politicians very much till the end of WWII, we find that their Turkish counterparts employed the idea of rapprochement in their nationalized conception of art, an approximation to Europe through the "rationalization" of aesthetics. It was in this 'rationalization' where the claim to modernity expressed through arts was seen to reside. There is another notable divergence between the two national contexts that can be traced in Max Weber's thoughts on the relationship between the modern condition, rationality, art and religion:

> The development of intellectualism and the rationalization of life change this situation. For under these conditions, art becomes a cosmos of more and more

[37] This position discounts however the long existing dialogue and the exchange patters of artifacts, paintings and commemorative coins, for instance, between the Ottoman Empire and Western European powers throughout the Renaissance documented by Lisa Jardin and Jerry Brotton (2000) that suggest a shared visual vocabulary between these geopolitical locations.

> consciously grasped independent values, which exist in their own right. Art takes over this-worldly salvation, no matter how this might be interpreted. It provides a *salvation* from the pressures of theoretical and practical rationalism (1958 [1915], 342; emphasis in original).

While for Weber art takes on the function of relief from the rationalism of the modern world, Turkish policies decidedly attempted to achieve rationality in artistic expression to establish the country's modernity. Yet both quests for a national artistic style were legitimized through their respective definition of culture. In the German case this culture was construed in distinction to a 'foreign' civilization, i.e. France, while in the case of Turkey it was to distinguish itself from a civilization of the past, the Ottoman Empire. Both French and Ottoman civilization were characterized as corrupting and oppressive influences to which all ties had to be severed, not least through strategies of systematic forgetting.

The Role of Forgetting in the Narratives of Artistic Lineages and 'Normalization'

Occidentalizing Germany

Given this background the question is however, how are – if at all – these historical debates impacting today's discussion on the arts and cultural policy in Germany and Turkey? While this issue will be elaborated throughout the dissertation, I would like to briefly point to two interrelated processes systematic forgetting – or rather selective silencing of historical lineages – as well as the normalization of others (cf. Trouillot 1995). That these twin processes of forgetting and normalizing are both tenacious and tenuous and intermittently marked by phases of recovery, especially in the arts will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

The discourse of German particularism in the arts along with its socio-political manifestation in the *Sonderweg* was deemed as discredited and discarded with the end of WWII and replaced by what art historians and cultural policy scholars frequently refer to as *Occidentalism*, i.e. the conscious shift through which German art was reinterpreted as decidedly "European art in a western tradition" (Belting 1998, 34). Significantly aided by the cultural policy directives of the Allied Forces (Nickel/Schrön 2002) German *Kulturpolitik* after 1945 exhibited a systematic and concerted effort to omit the *deutsch-völkische* currents in the history of German art in favor of "restorative cultural policies" that aimed at situating Germany firmly in the artistic heritage of Western classical canons that were now conceptualized as Western (Knoblich 2001, 7). Not only did this conception of the 'the Occident' provide a "historical model for the political restoration of western Europe after the war, which was premised on the existence of the eastern block" (Belting 1998, 37), but also helped European integration by obscuring its violent collective past, be it the history of class divisions, religious warfare or the occurrence of two World Wars (Schneider 2004), with the many complicities of Nazism as just the latest instance of a history ordained to be forgotten (Mazower 1998).

This discursive move of tying Germany into the lineage of both the geopolitical configuration of Europe and the canon of modern art was 'successful' in that its respective Western belonging is normalized and not even questioned anymore today. The usage of very term "restorative" in itself indicates that the nature of this interpretative shift is obscured indeed. As Belting notes by referring to eurocentric conceptualization of the category of art itself:

> "Art history was easily adapted to the parameters of European art because, strictly speaking, art had always been synonymous with European art. No special

> 'European' concept need be developed to justify discussions of an artistic tradition that raised no doubts regarding nationality" (1998, 36).

While this narrative suggests a successful alignment of Germany not just with modern conceptions of art but with modernity and 'the West' in general, I would argue that there have been considerable doubts among European powers regarding Germany's modernity due to the above outlined trajectory and its National Socialist past that resurfaced again with the fall of the Berlin wall and repeatedly during the initial phase of Germany's unification. During this time widespread concerns were voiced that a stronger and territorially integrated Germany might come with a renewed potential for military aggression.[38] In an article entitled "Uneasy about the Germans," Arthur Miller in 1990, while professing to be in favor of reunification, expressed these insecurities with regard to German modern-ness, by asking, "Does the Federal Republic of Germany arouse lofty democratic feelings in its citizens' minds, or is it a system that is simply a matter of historical convenience invented by foreigners?" After all, he argues, the Federal Republic came into being without shedding "a drop of blood" for democracy; instead democracy was 'merely' handed to the Germans, leaving questions as to how committed Germany really could be to this form of governance that it had not struggled for: "Paradoxically, perhaps, West Germany is the first great society born of peace; if it is to achieve a deep sense of identity it will have to be real, not slyly apologetic, an identity reflecting the evil past and the present resurrection together" (Miller 1990).

In its reunification treaty Germany countered these anxieties by defining itself as a *Kulturstaat* – a culture state – and thus as distinct from its pre-1945 predecessors of a

[38] A worry that was voiced within Germany through a myriad of rallies under the Motto "*Nie wieder Deutschland*" – "Never again Germany" in the months leading up to the official unification agreement, as well as through the frequent reference to François Mauriac's postulation: "I love Germany so much that I am glad that there are two of them" (cited after Isaacson, Jackson, Ogden 1989).

Kulturnation (with its Prussian, Whilhemine, and NS connotations in the context of which both *Kultur* and *Nation* signified a call for expansionist military action). This assertion was not only employed to diffuse external worries about the possible aspirations a unified Germany might have and the potential courses it might take, but, according to Michael Naumann, it also provided a degree of *Selbstvergewisserung* – self-assurance – since the treaty guaranteed cultural pluralism (interestingly referring to the *kulturellen Bestand* of the GDR, i.e. its cultural heritage and not as one might think to the multicultural make-up of Germany, Naumann 2001), and reinforced the understanding that art itself is a prerequisite for culture (Scheytt 2003, 6). Although today the antithetical conceptualization of civilization and culture is often portrayed to have been reconciled in Germany since the end of WWII (see Lepenies 2006), this conceptual rift has produced an enduring legacy in understandings of German citizenship that privilege cultural bonds over civic ones. As the treaty remains ambivalent about what this 'German culture' is really constituted of, it has – changes to naturalization laws notwithstanding – also perpetuated organicist conceptions of German citizenship, in which the innateness of culture is emphasized rather than notions of socialization or enculturation (Stolcke 1995). I would argue that the employment of the culture concept as a basis of the German state leaves open the possibility to conflate culture and ethnicity, and thus a *völkisch* notion of *Kultur* that was supposed to be discarded after 1945. A telling example in this context is the discussion around the formulation of a German "*Leitkultur*" – "lead culture" that was initiated during the national election campaign in 2000. Originally intended to make a statement about 'German core values' that immigrants where supposed to adhere to, it backfired once politicians were asked to define this very "essence of Germanness."

Usually their definitions circled around concepts of liberal democracy, secularism, and Judeo-Christian tradition – all factors that while in keeping with the dominant standard narrative of modernity – have been strongly contested in the German path to modernity.

While the move to *Occidentalism* obscured the long history of anti-modernist and anti-Western sentiment within German arts and politics, German policies in general and cultural politics in particular have contributed to another erasure after 1989, this time of East Germany's Socialist past, and hence its artistic legacies. Accordingly the question if and how to conceptually fit and practically display East German art within the reconceptualized trajectory of German modernity has periodically become an issue (Belting 1998, 36; Wolbert 2001). The same is true for artistic works (and architecture) created under or related to fascism or to inner-German terrorism (see Chapter 5).

It is interesting to note that in my initial discussions, conversations and interviews with visual artists in Berlin, there was little reference to this historical trajectory or the national framework. The representations of their artworks oscillated very much between local connectedness (especially with neighborhood initiatives such as *Quartiersmangement* funding agencies) and references to the international artworld. Cultural policy officials like Torsten Wöhlert, press secretary of Science, Research and Culture division of the Berlin Senate on the other hand very much reflected the issues discussed above. When I asked him about his opinion of the role of private sponsorship in the German arts sector, he noted that Germany – in contrast to the U.S. – could not rely on private monies to sustain arts and cultural programs since it had "destroyed its *Finanzbürgertum* (finance bourgeoisie) in 1933," a process that had irreversibly marked Germany in a general and in Berlin in a particular fashion. While one could content that

Wöhlert's take on the issue is informed by his East German up-bringing and educational background and the fact that he represented a city government composed of Social Democrats (SPD) and Socialists (PDS), his view is congruent with that of Michael Naumann, former cultural advisor to Chancellor Schröder. He too legitimizes Germany's current policies predominantly based on the experience of and the responsibilities arising from Germany's Nazi past (Naumann 2001).

Turkifying Turkey

While Germany has sought and largely succeeded to normalize its Western belonging, Turkey has sought to normalize another series of ruptures, first and foremost created by Turkification – but also those that ensued from military coups and other types of systematic violence – that have also engendered repeated disjunctures from and reinterpretation of its artistic heritage. This has manifested itself, for instance, in the obfuscation of the non-Turkish or non-Muslim backgrounds of important artists and architects, as well as in the neglect of artistic collections and archeological finds that reveal the incongruencies in officially sanctioned historiography (see Chapter 4).

I have already indicated that in the Turkish case the mutually dependent projects of nationalism and modernity have been tied to the notion of ethnic homogeneity and that in this process the very notion of ethnic diversity has become a conceptual threat. Şerif Mardin describes this process by stating that

> "Between 1918 and 1939 Turks embarked on a major identity switch, this involved a change in status, from subjects of a multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan empire to citizens of a republic that set down and affirmed its Turkishness. […] This process was met by Western commentators with either spirited or tacit approval, the change being seen as a step towards Turkish modernization. Such approval however, has eluded an important question: how was this transition possible? […] After all the antithetical quality of 'Ottoman' and 'Turk' was a theme all

> knowledgeable commentators on Turkey had asserted in the past" (Mardin 2002, 115). [39]

That neither the 'identity switch' nor the social engineering measures that facilitated them were easily accepted is manifest in an array of intermittent consolidation efforts on part of the state, such as the establishment of the Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) in 1931, or, for that matter, initiatives like the "Citizen speak Turkish!"-campaign which criminalized the usage of 'other languages' in public (see Bali 1991, 102-148). The Turkish Historical Society periodically intervenes in public discussions by further elaborating narratives about national homogeneity and revising 'Turkish history' in order to accommodate respective official ideologies not just in terms of how 'Turkishness' is construed, but to delimit how divergent ethnic backgrounds can be expressed within the framework of the Turkish nation-state. That the Historical Society was instrumental in laying the ideological groundwork for practices of inclusion and exclusion (and thus privileges and inequalities) becomes visible in the following example: During times of growing unrest in the Kurdish provinces in the 1980s the Turkish Historical Society invented and propagated the so-called "mountain-Turk-thesis." According to this thesis Kurds do not actually represent an ethnic entity but are "mountain Turks" who have "forgotten" their original language and were left speaking a broken form of Arabic.[40] The Historical Society, in its reification of a common Turkish

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[39] While European commentators are recorded to have referred to the Ottoman Empire as ruled by "Turks" as far back as the 15th century (thereby using the ethnic label of the ruling elite), this was not part of a self-description employed within the empire itself. In fact, for the Ottoman elite, the denotation "Turk" was for the most part a derogatory term associated with the "backwardness" and "warmongering" of their Central Asian ancestors who came into Anatolia with the likes of Genghis Khan (see Kirişci 1998, 231).

[40] Étienne Balibar argues that the imaginary singularity of national formations has to be continually (re)constructed by recurring on history (1991b, 87). The Turkish Historical Society has been instrumental in reworking racist and discriminatory narratives vis-à-vis Turkey's minorities, in a process that can be described through Balibar proposition in that, racist theories are not just spontaneous expressions of "the

identity has also periodically endorsed explanatory models relying on biology, which seems to be in direct opposition to the postulated inclusive envisioning of Turkish citizenship by Gökalp referenced earlier.

In a paradoxical movement 'Turkish citizenship' relied on turning religious affiliation into an ethnic one, while the denotation 'Turk' was simultaneously attempted to be divorced from its ethnic content. This shift (quite similarly to the German conception of citizenship) always left open the possibility of returning to the "ethnic option." Although the early Republic seemed to try to forge a sense of belonging apart from ethnicity, the authoritarian process of "nationalization from above," as Keyder argues, did not allow for a conceptualization of the population as an "aggregate of individuals." Consequently this "collectivist vision" – or, as Taha Parla frames it, corporatist integration of state and society (Parla 1985) – was expressed in organicist terms, and from the late 1930s onward relied increasingly on a "homogeneity deriving from ethnic unity" (Keyder 1997, 42).

In recent years there has been a reinterpretation of Ottoman history from official Turkish channels, yet these reevaluations mostly circle around notions of its military grandeur and glory. With the upsurge in discussions around Turkey's historical and present-day diverse ethnic and religious make-up, the purported "cosmopolitanism"[41] of the Ottoman Empire has also been (re)emphasized in scholarship, activism and the arts. I

masses," but that they have to be "rationalized by intellectuals" in a process that is seeking to mirror "scientific proof." It is through this rationalization process that racist doctrines become "democratized," i.e. accessible to a national majority irrespective of class affiliations (1991a, 17-19).

[41] As 'tolerance' and multiculturalism have increasingly become conduits in claiming modernity (see Chapter 7), it has become somewhat commonplace to describe the diversity of the Ottoman Empire and especially the make-up of Ottoman Istanbul as "cosmopolitan" in recent years (e.g. Ors 2006). Notably, however, these propositions do not address the question to what extent to notion of cosmopolitanism is actually applicable to imperial contexts.

found a growing awareness among artists in Istanbul of the ill-fitting pieces of Turkish (art) history due to the wholesale dismissal of Ottoman past and especially of its artistic heritage. At the same time the standardized narrative of Turkey's incomplete modernization that is seen to have a direct impact on the arts is still very much alive – albeit in different interpretations. Some artists proposed that Turkey never experienced modernity, but jumped to 'postmodernity' right away – including its artistic repertoires – or, alternatively is caught somewhere in between (see also Kahraman 2002). Overall, however, there seems to be a growing dissatisfaction with the fragmented history and eurocentric narrative of modern art that is dominating the international scene. This dissatisfaction expresses itself in a rising interest in the recovering and reworking of different artistic heritages from Anatolia. That this recovery itself might be a problematic process, and the question of how it takes place is discussed in Chapter 4.

A conversation with two young female calligraphy artists revealed the long-standing prejudices against genres that are rooted in religion, as their works are still frequently met with dismissal and suspicion. They also recounted difficulties in finding sources that dealt comprehensively with the historical trajectory of their art form, the limited number of resources for training and research, which is mostly delegated to private initiatives and settings. This is due to the fact that especially since up until the 1980s these genres were mostly bracketed out in art history programs. Even today Ottoman and Middle Eastern art are either discussed apart from European developments or not at all, as university curricula frequently equate art history with 'Western' art history. Those who focus on 'Turkish art' more concretely are only slowly discovering

the controversies, debates and developments that have been obscured in much of republican art history and its state-sanctioned and directed manifestations.

While another set of artists and art historians I spoke to, in turn, are trying to rediscover the experimental art scene of Turkey that existed before the 1980s coup, most contemporary art books, despite growing criticism, still tend to begin in the late 1980s and even more so in the 1990s, and thus at a point when art from Turkey gained enhanced international visibility (for examples see Kortun/Kosova 2004), begging the question of not just why they leave out a considerable part of modern art history in Turkey, but also who the intended audience of these discursive productions is supposed to be.

The Modernity in Question

Given this brief overview of how contingencies and questions around national distinction, modernity and Western belonging have been reflected in the history of cultural policies in both Germany and Turkey, the question arises of not only why German art is understood as modern but how to explain that Germany is today firmly established as Western while Turkish art as well as the Turkish state are still struggling to be acknowledged as such? How can we explain this asymmetry since Turkey's attempt to align itself with Western modernity by rationalizing artistic expression in the 1920s predates West-Germany's shift to "Occidental cultural policies" that were only established after 1945? In order to approach these questions I would like to discuss two interrelated issues that set the frame for the remainder of this dissertation. On the one hand one has to take into account how modernity is conceptualized in the social sciences, anthropology and history, and how these conceptualizations relate to theorizations of

contemporary and historical political, economic, social and cultural conditions of the Middle East, and more specifically the Ottoman Empire as well as Turkey. Secondly, one has to keep in mind how the concept of Europe (itself a very fragile feat) has been envisioned and constructed as both a geo-political entity as well as an area of supposed cultural affinity and how Germany's position therein has been 'normalized.'

Timothy Mitchell begins his essay "The Stage of Modernity" by outlining the two central questions regarding "our time as the era of modernity" (2000, 1). The first periodization has been shaped by a multitude of interrelated debates ranging from literary criticism and French post-structuralist thought to feminist critiques and post-colonial studies. It fundamentally questions the idea of a linear development of modernity, as well as modernity's endowment with an emancipatory potential that will eventually benefit the world's population at large.[42] While some theorists have identified this phase with the end of modernity, in what has come to be called the postmodern turn, Mitchell argues that "[t]he name it is given, [...], identifies it only in terms of the stage it claims to move beyond" (Mitchell 2000, 1). Others propose that rather than representing a rupture with modernity, we are actually experiencing "late modernity," i.e. the logical unfolding of the modernization project (see Beck 1996).

The second question that Mitchell identifies, and the one that is more relevant for the context of this inquiry, interrogates the location of modernity. Dominant historiographies have commonly spatialized and ascribed the philosophical tenets,

[42] In anthropology the uncertainty that arose through this deconstruction of taken-for-granted categories is referred to as "the crisis of representation." This perspective questions the very existence of a reality outside the means of its depiction. In light of these ideas, ethnographic accounts are no longer viewed as objective reproductions but as subjectively constructed representations of social worlds. Instead of being considered duplications of reality, the knowledge that is conveyed through ethnographies is seen as partial and contingent (see Clifford and Marcus 1986, see Clifford 1988).

economic processes and political institutions of modernity to the West (or as Mitchell rightly interjects more recently in the 'global North'; 2001, 1). Consequently, the "Rest" of the world, to take Stuart Hall's expression for a reified notion of the East and the "underdeveloped" South, was merely left to follow its model, struggling to catch up (Hall 1996, see also Ahıska 2003). As Mitchell states "the destiny of those regions has been to mimic, never quite successfully, the history already performed by the West" (2000, 1). In the field of anthropology this has become especially apparent in discussions about nationalism outside the West as the geographical location of the so-called "first nation-states," a discussion that I shall return to in a moment.

To further map the grounds of comparison and set the background for analyzing the ways in which the arts serve as a vehicle for claiming modernity, the following sections provide an overview of how continuities and ruptures in modernization trajectories are discussed in the contexts of Germany and Turkey. More specifically, I analyze how the notion of belated modernity has served as an explanatory model for a range of predicaments in Turkey, and the different ways in which the German *Sonderweg* has been both refuted and reified in Germany's recent history. As will become apparent in the remainder of this study, these two issues are intimately intertwined with how nationalism and modernity are imposed on and reflected in debates on the arts (and the artworld) in Germany and Turkey.

The Impasses of the "Belated Modernity"-Concept

> "Schließlich stammen wir aus einer Tradition der verspäteten Moderne […] –
> After all, we come from a tradition of belated modernity" (Shafak 2006).

Although in the American political context Turkey is frequently cited as a modern and democratic nation-state that provides a model for the present reconfiguration of the Middle East, Western European actors and academics as well as their counterparts in Turkey, like writer Elif Shafak, have long framed Turkish modernity as an incomplete appropriation of modern political thought or even as a historical failure. Scholars who engage in the perpetual diagnosis of Turkey's deficient modernization generally attribute this failure to its state-directed, or top-down modernization process – a kind of governance which is opposed to the idea of a modernity "proper" (see Kasaba 1997, 31). As Germany's state-led modernization trajectory is often described in a similar manner, albeit with vastly different outcomes, this purported causality cannot explain why the trope of belatedness has been central not only for the entirety of Turkey's republican history, but for most of the last century of the Ottoman Empire as well. That Turkey's history and current political, economic, and socio-cultural make-up, and consequently the artistic production emanating from within its borders, is exclusively evaluated under the paradigm of 'belated modernity' creates many blind-spots that can be traced in even the most critical scholarship on the region. Much of the theorizing on Turkey still has its conceptual roots in the discipline of orientalist studies and draws on a body of work that as Talal Asad and Roger Owen have aptly described has "sought to describe Islamic political life [as a non-European form of rule] by looking for absent kinds of concepts – liberty,' 'progress,' 'humanism' which are supposed to be distinctive of Western civilization" (1980, 35). The notion of 'belated modernity' has hence become an

explanatory model for almost all political, economic and social predicaments in Turkey, including its cultural policy formations. This standardized narrative has led not only to obscuring continuities of, for instance, citizenship laws between the Ottoman Empire and present-day Turkey, but also the manifold historical connections between the two and the European context (see Deringil 1998a, Brotton/Jardin 2000). Furthermore this stance also reproduces the official myth of the radical rupture between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.

Meltem Ahıska, for instance, argues that the reification of an "always-already late" political structure has served to deflect attention from the 'Kurdish problem'[43] as well as from uneven development within the country by correlating it not with governmental policies, but by attributing these issues, for instance, to the conservatism and traditionalism of the Republic's eastern provinces: "Instead of concentrating on the present problems and their solutions the hegemonic imaginary looks beyond the present with the aid of an already-late and always postponed ideal." Ahıska argues that the discourse of belated modernity does not only displace the root causes of an array of socio-economic and political inequities, but also creates a sense of static-ness (rather than movement) that contradicts the very understanding of modernity (Ahishka 2003, 352).[44] Reflecting on the internal perpetuation of orientalist stereotypes within Turkey, she further posits that:

> "Just as the West always refers to the notion of the East to assert its hegemony, Turkey reproduces the reified images of the West to justify its regime of power in its boundary management of dividing spheres, regions and people along the axis of East and West" (2003, 368).

[43] Taha Parla poignantly notes that the "Kurdish problem," just like the "Armenian problem" along with a cohort of other problems that are on the daily political agenda of Turkey might actually best be understood as a "Turkish problem" (Parla 2007).

[44] Viewed in this vein one could argue that in Fabian's terms "coevalness" between Turkey and 'the West' is "denied" from both within and without (see Fabian 1983).

Ahıska's statement has implications beyond the ways in which historical and contemporary governance is justified in Turkey. It can also be read as critique of the (inadvertent) complicity of scholarly works that perpetuate of the trope of belated modernity as an explanatory model that ultimately displaces the historicity of modernity onto a "polarity of East and West" (Ahıska 2003, 368). It is this displacement that has been normalized, or rather, that is mirrored in the normalization of Turkishness (and its internal east/west division alluded to above).

Even more nuanced approaches, such as sociologist Cağlar Keyder's article "Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s" (1997), tend to perpetuate rather crude dichotomies of modernity and tradition. Keyder, for instance, argues that the statetist equation of modernization with Westernization prevented the elaboration of what could have been a "Turkish" modernity, one, that, for example, could have been formed in a changing understanding of Islam (1997, 37). Although he attempts to break away from the idea of a mere mimicking of modernity, his frequent usage of the "local" still juxtaposes the modern to a local that appropriates modernity instead of developing correspondingly. Not only does this kind of argument again presuppose a modern, distinct West, but categories such as modernity and tradition become reified once again. In his interrogation of nationalism in the post-colonial setting of South Asia, Partha Chatterjee has repeatedly cautioned neither to naturalize the formation of nation-states as the inherent political form of a homogenous modernity, nor to see later forms of nationalism as mere imitations of Western models (e.g. Chatterjee 1986). Especially works that have emerged in the field of subaltern and postcolonial studies have shown that European modernity was not only facilitated by colonial exploitation, but also that

many modern conceptions of race, gender and nationhood, as well as techniques of governance and policing, actually emerged out of and were originally developed in the colonial encounter (Tolen 1991, Stoler 1992, Viswanathan 1989). Yet, as Mitchell convincingly argues, to stop the argument at seeing "modernity as a product not of the West but of its interaction with the non-West" is to perpetuate a "European-centered dualism" (2000, 3). To decenter this perspective we must take into account that the West has likewise appropriated knowledge gained from occupied societies and incorporated it in their modernization projects 'back home' (Tolen 1991).

In the case of Turkey the question of who actually represents the modernizing force is complicated further when one takes into account what Yildiz Atasoy calls the "competing claims for modernity" within the Turkish Republic (Atasoy 1996). Historically, Islam has been identified as an obstacle to Turkey's modernization, in an argument that by sweeping generalization has equated Islam with rural Anatolia, and frequently has attributed to Islamists an understanding of modernity as limited to Western technology (Kasaba 1997, 22f). Accordingly, the advent of political Islam in Turkey has posed a series of conceptual problems for this narrative. Anthropologist Esra Özyürek has argued that what could be regarded as a recent manifestation – or derivate – of the trope of belatedness, has taken the form of "nostalgia for the modern" in which the early republican past is taken to symbolize true modernity in opposition to the rise of political Islam (Özyürek 2006). But Özyürek indicates that what is at stake is more than the question of what role Islam may have in public life and politics. Rather this nostalgia for the modern presents an emotive affiliation to and longing for the early republican period

that corresponds with class structural attachments as it is most 'fervently promoted' by the former bureaucratic elite of Turkey that experienced a considerable loss in social standing and economic capital when the neoliberalization measures introduced under the military rule of 1980-1983 began to favor a rising business elite (2006, 3-17).

Despite the portrayal of the rise of political Islam as a regressive development, it was the current Islamic-based government that in August 2002 finally passed laws to grant minorities the right to broadcast, publicize and educate in their respective languages. The reforms also entailed the lifting of martial law in eastern Anatolian provinces and the removal of the death penalty. Precarious as the recent reforms might be, they represent a step towards the demands of the EU and domestic as well as international human rights groups.[45]

These timid changes notwithstanding, I agree with Keyder's analysis in which he identifies the unfulfilled promise of citizenship as the limitation of Turkey's modernization project that manifest itself in circumscription of freedom of expression and democractic governance. In the vein of Mitchell, however, I would argue for an understanding of modernity not as a contained phenomenon but as a shared trajectory encompassing politics, economy, society and culture in divergent locations. Or as Joel Kahn puts it: "modernity is something that encompasses the West and the Rest from the very start" (2001, 663). Rather than asking questions about a "Turkish kind of modernity" either by way of dichotomizing tradition and modernity or proposing "multiple modernities," I would like to question the "Turkish experience of modernity"

[45] Yet a myriad of anecdotal accounts and incidents, such as the arrest of a bus driver in Eastern Anatolia on the grounds of repeatedly playing a tape with Kurdish songs reported by Human Rights Watch, indicate the tenaciousness of the situation (HRW 2003, 365-366).

as Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba propose it (1997, 3). It is with this understanding that I regard the arts as a site at which to approach this question, by investigating the history of official policies governing the arts in the Turkish Republic and the political and cultural premises that have guided them.

Heightened Modernization or Anti-Modernism? German Nationalism, Nazism and the Quest for Establishing Germany's Western Belonging

Apart from the already mentioned ambiguities in 'Germany's path to modernity' and the anti-Western sentiment before as well as during the Wilhemine period, National Socialism is regarded as a – or rather *the* – rupture in Germany's modernization trajectory – one that generates periodical concerns about Germany's belonging to the 'civilized West.' Broadly speaking there are two poles between which this phase of German history is conceptualized. On the one hand, the Holocaust emerges as a unique and singular event based on a specific constellation in German history, culture and politics that ultimately can only be explained outside the modern condition, or, as a temporary deviation rooted in German particularism (Repp 2000, 6; cf. Blackbourn/Eley 1984). On other hand of the spectrum, we find the notion of the Holocaust expressing a "heightened version of the norm" of modernity that in principle is rooted in the modern condition, and especially the bureaucratic apparatus that it produces and relies upon (Bauman 1989). The following outlines a number of positions that are located along this continuum and shows how they impact contemporary evaluations of Germany's modern trajectory.

In "Modernity and the Holocaust" Zygmnunt Bauman firmly situates the Holocaust within modernity.[46] In his analysis modernity emerges as a "necessary condition" of the Holocaust as an industrialized, rationalized and bureaucratic endeavor. Starting from the premise that the Holocaust cannot be explained by solely pathologizing the perpetrators, he posits that moral indifference was produced through "routine bureaucratic procedures" (1989, 17), allowing 'ordinary people' to be transformed into the perpetrators of these horrendous acts. Bauman argues that when this capability converges with the "design of a better, more reasonable, and rational social order," in this case a racist ideology, genocide occurs (Bauman 1989, 95).[47] In the conclusion of his study Bauman's argument takes an interesting turn when he asserts that it was Germany's existence as a modernity without democracy, i.e. the absence of democratic checks and balances, that "allowed the Holocaust to happen" (Bauman 1989, 111). However, he does not reflect on the implications of his argument for the standard definition of modernity or the conception of the "West."

I would like to juxtapose Bauman's analysis with Uli Linke's study "German Bodies. Race and Representation after Hitler" (1999), since she similarly aims to emphasize continuities rather than ruptures in regard to National Socialist ideology within the course of German history before 1933 as well as after 1945. Yet her premise forms a counterpoint to Bauman in that Linke sees a continuum in terms of the

[46] Bauman posits that the 'myth' of modernization is constituted by the claim of defeating barbarism (Bauman 1989, 12). Just as Balibar's thoughts on the myth of national belonging and Hobsbawm and Ranger's notion of 'invented tradition' these mystifications point to the seeming paradox of modernity in which it can claim both change and immutability (see Balibar 1991b, Navaro-Yashin 2002).

[47] Although Goetz Aly's recent study "Hitler's Volkstaat" (2005) has earned much criticism for being 'too functionalist,' his argument might carry Baumann's a bit further. Rather than referring to an abstract notion of a "more reasonable and rational social order," Aly posits that the dispossession and annihilation of Jews and as well as military occupation practices during WWII contributed to the broadening of the German middle class and created an 'investment' of a large social strata in National Socialist policies. Since theses processes have impacted the artworld in many respects, this issue will be taken up again in Chapter 4.

"ambivalence" towards modernity in the political imagery of Germany; in this case one that is "infused with racial violence" (Linke 1999, 1). Rather than discussing this fact, Linke merely states that this "ambivalence" towards modernity was primarily expressed through the site of the body. Linke's analysis relies on psychological notions such as pathology and the unconscious and not on the rationality of modern bureaucracy that Bauman highlights. It thus resonates with Eric Wolf's proposition that National Socialist Germany is "better understood as a movement akin to the cargo cults and ghost dances studied by anthropologists than as a rational deployment of means to pragmatic ends" (Wolf 1999, 197-198).

Linke posits that nudity in German "Freikörperkultur" was part of the symbolic "postwar [WWI] rejection of modernity" where corporeality was juxtaposed to the "unnatural, decadence and impermanence" of modernity (Linke 1999, 65). Here nakedness was employed as a symbol against consumerism and bourgeois authority. German nationalism could insert itself into this body-cult since it converged with anti-urban rejection of "modern life worlds" and juxtaposed to it the rediscovery of the pure natural body. It is this imagery that Linke regards to be still alive in present-day political representations. Yet, she agrees with Bauman in that they both regard the conception of race as a modern invention (see Bauman 1989, 31-82). Both also concur that the Holocaust relied on the interlocution of modern science, technology and bureaucracy. But Linke sees the possibility of the Holocaust as arising from this very ambivalence towards modernity and not from modernity itself. For Linke aligning the Holocaust with modernity has "both the potential of distancing as well as making everyone complicit"

(Linke 1999, 215). Rather than exploring the issue further it seems that the very utility of this argument seems too troubling for her to pursue.

While Linke leaves the ambiguities in Germany's modernization trajectory untouched but states their relevance for the present, Steven Ozment proposes a different take on German history (Ozment 2004). He explicitly wants to move away from defining Germany solely based on the 12 years of Nazi-reign and from diagnosing a disposition for genocide in the peculiarities of German history. Trying to 'emancipate' Germany from this part of its past, he argues for placing the German experience into the larger European framework. In contrast to Mark Mazower's interrogations into the European complicities in Nazi policies and contingencies of the emergence of liberal democracies (Mazower 1998), Ozment conceptualizes the Third Reich as a temporary breakdown in Europe's triumphalist trajectory by identifying the Nazi-regime as an outlier of "the new experiments of the 20th century." While, according to Ozment, the Napoleonic occupation of the Rhineland furthered democratic ideals, Germany has "always feared anarchy more than tyranny," as "the Germans" did not share the American and French "optimism" in the capabilities in humankind, which is the main reason why neither the French nor the American revolution were fit to be models for the Germanies (Ozment 2004).

Sweeping as Ozment's propositions might be, his interjection, along those by Bauman and Linke, plays into the larger context of so-called German *Historikerstreit*[48]

[48] This historians' debate or rather dispute was originally prompted by Ernst Nolte's proposition that Nazism grew out of fear of communism, and especially Stalinism (see his *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* originally published in 1963). Two main camps emerged in the ensuing debate: The revisionist fraction has aimed at 'normalizing' National Socialism as part of the totalitarian regimes in Europe, while the critical historians maintain that the Holocaust also needs be analyzed as part of a particular German trajectory. This discussion was reignited after Germany's reunification, when the search for a 'new national

that I will briefly discuss in the following passages by drawing on Stefan Berger's comprehensive overview "Historians and Nation-Building in Germany after Reunification" (1995). On one end of the spectrum, Nazism appears again as the German version of 'European totalitarianism'; its particular manifestations is portrayed as an overreaction to the "communist threat" (Berger 1995, 198). On the other end, there is the attempt to 'rescue' national history by emphasizing National Socialism as deviation that emerged out of the German *Sonderweg*. Interestingly Berger notes that the Hitler regime with its welfare state ambitions and partial educational and housing reforms also exhibited modernizing elements in its policies (Berger 1995, 197f). This assertion complicates the picture further, because it identifies claims to modernity during the *Third Reich*, while, for instance, the nationalsocialist reliance on an exclusionary definition of the 'national body' is at odds with the notion of modern citizenship.[49]

Some of the interjections that Berger presents revolve around what could be called the 'question of Germany's geopolitical belonging.' Küttner, for example, diagnoses an "overidentification" of Germany with the West after 1945 that devalues German achievements of the past (Berger 1995, 202). This statement deserves attention since it emphasizes that historically Germany was not part of the West per se. At the same time however, East German history is being completely marginalized, and the East German experience is being negated in the realm of the everyday (see also Berdahl 1999) as well as in its scholarship and in its political and artistic lineages. This discrediting of

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self-understanding' (*neues nationals Selbstverständnis*) set in. It is this second phase of the historians' debate that I focus on in this discussion.

[49] It is important to reiterate that notions of 'modernity' and 'Western belonging' were at times congruent in the German context. At other times, however, economic and military power was regarded as reliant on German *Kultur* – thus setting Germany apart from France and England, and emphasizing Germany as a *Mittelmacht* – intermediary power between East (Russia) and West.

the GDR is intertwined with the revisionist project of the "renationalization" of German identity (Berger 1995, 206). In the work of historian Christian Meier, for instance, Berger identifies the tendency of a "return to national history as a means of overcoming the reunification crisis" (Berger 1995, 207) to an extent to which the history of division is completely obscured. The unification then, like the overcoming of National Socialism, appears in Meier's analysis as the path to 'normalizing' German national identity,[50] despite the anxieties that were expressed in the lead-up to Germany's reunification; anxieties that were further intensified by the wave of anti-immigrant acts in the early 1990s.

From this perspective, German critical historiography, instead of totalitarianism or the Holocaust itself, becomes the culprit and bears the responsibility for the failures in the reunification process, because it contributed to the muting and tabooing of nationalism (i.e. the expression of *nationalist sentiments*) in Germany – which is now again considered to be a natural phenomenon (Berger 1995, 209-210). While there is a consensus that the first half of twentieth century was dominated by a 'modernization crisis,' Berger also states that "there is still a consensus amongst critical historians that what is regarded as the central achievement of the Federal Republic after 1945, namely Western orientation, should not be given up by the reunified Germany" (Berger 1995, 215). It is, yet again, interesting to note that for Berger as for the scholars he references "Western orientation" is not or simply a given – but had to be actively produced.

[50] Meier as other conservative historians dismisses Habermas' idea that a 'constitutional patriotism' can indeed create something akin to national identity (Meier 1990; see also Berger 1995, 200).

I would like to end this brief review with some of the ideas put forward by Kevin Repp and Jeffrey Herf that both propose a middle ground, albeit in different ways. Repp attempts to reassess German history before 1945 by conceptualizing it as an "alternative route to modernity" (2000, 2). Setting out with a description that reflects the uneven development within Germany, especially after 1871, he posits the existence of a "dual Germany"[51] one that at once exhibits "anachronistic political structures" (e.g. the absence of a liberal democracy) combined with modern welfare state policies (see also Mommsen 2000, 76). This search for alternatives, so his argument goes, can only be traced outside the political apparatus, in the realm, which he labels the space of "anti-Politik," taking the highly evocative and easily misunderstood expression from Werner Sombart. In his analysis, Repp hence searches for reformist approaches in German associative life, including in the (for him only seemingly) conservative movement of the *Heimatvereine*:[52]

> "Decrying the rationalizing, alienation, depersonalizing forces of modern industrial capitalism as the evisceration of living *Kultur* by mechanistic *Zivilization* at the same time as they sang the praises of modern science and technology, Wilhelmine reformers felt just as at home with the discourse of cultural despair as they did with the discourse of progressive optimism" (Repp 2000, 14).[53]

[51] It is interesting to note that the notion of duality is a recurring theme in German history, first employed after the Reformation and then in Wilhelmine Germany – and lastly in the division of East and West German after WWII.

[52] For a similar interpretation of these 'provincial' associations see Celia Applegate (1990). Applegate proposes that the notion of *Heimat* is a modern conception that proliferated a understanding of regional allegiance to the nation. While she rightly argues that some *Heimat* associations like those she focuses on in Rheinish-Pfalz were vehicles to express dissent to Bavarian dominance within Germany, for instance, Applegate downplays the ideological relationship between *Heimat*, nature, regional and national character central to these associative practices that would become increasingly pronounced in the national socialist *blood and soil* ideology and that served to integrate regional attachments into an homogenously imagined German *Reich*. Her study is important however, as it illuminates the importance of regionalism in the German context due to the long history of fragmentation, and thus gestures towards the meaning of the regional in Germany's federal incarnation.

[53] George Mosse argues that German *Kultur* in the nationalist project was also linked to the rising notion of respectability. Accordingly the opposition towards 'French civilization' was frequently expressed by discrediting French morals. Overall he interprets the emphasis on "respectability" as a means of distinction by the rising bourgeoisie against both the lower classes and aristocracy – the former portrayed as lazy, the other as desolate and corrupted. He further posits that the notion of respectability provided stability in an epoch of rapid change, e.g. by focusing on controlling sexuality (Mosse 1985, 5-9; cf. Elias 1978).

That the joining of modern technology and German *Kultur* was a difficult endeavor, however, becomes evident in Jeffrey Herf's interrogation of "reactionary modernism" as he labels the balancing act that characterized both the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich's attempts to argue that modern technology was not only reconcilable with, but actually arises from *Kultur* (Herf 1984, 157ff.); a proposition that bears structural resemblances to the conception of the "Turkish synthesis."

Without going into the many detailed examples that Repp and Herf outline in their respective studies, I propose a different approach in evaluating both Germany's and Turkey's path to modernity, including their nation-state formation and the related articulations of cultural policy by trying to break away from situating them within or outside a notion of modernity that is conceptualized as exclusively Western. Instead I suggest interrogating the trajectories of Germany and Turkey, not as searches for "alternative modernities," but as struggles with the "normativity of modern power," while trying to account for contingencies and ambiguities in both cases.

Modularity or Normativity?

In the introduction to his highly influential study "Imagined Communities" Benedict Anderson argues that nationalism, the political manifestation of modernity, "became 'modular,' capable of being transplanted with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations" (Anderson 2003, 4). His notion that the model of the nation-state, once it was established, became available for "pirating" (2003, 81) leaves out the implications of power differentials that

led to the objectification of nationalism as the inherent political form of a homogeneously conceptualized modernity.[54] It is in this context that I find anthropologist David Scott's thoughts on modern power to be especially productive since he tries to account for these power differentials by emphasizing that the narrative of "modernity was always-already inserted into a normative discourse" (Scott 1999, 17). Drawing on observations by both Michel Foucault and Talal Asad, Scott argues that modern power relies on and produces a political rationality in which "premodern possibilities are not only no longer conceptually approachable except in the language of the modern, but are no longer available as practical historical options" (1999, 23).[55]

This perspective opens a different path by which to approach both Turkish and German nationalism and their respective modernization processes, and how these processes have been reflected in policies governing the arts – and makes a comparison on an equal footing possible by conceptualizing both as manifestations of struggles with the normativity of modern power. It allows us to not only keep in mind that Germany's capability for modernity was questioned, but also that modernity was at times outright rejected in the fields of both politics and the arts, and to understand periodic insecurities about Germany's modernity, as in 1945 or 1989/90, not as deviations, but as constitutive for the German political and cultural landscape – without proposing a simple determinism. This perspective also avoids reducing Turkey's history to a sheer mimicking of Western European models and opens a path for comparing the trajectories

[54] As mentioned above a very forceful criticism that deals with the issue of modularity, has been put forward by Partha Chatterjee. His interjection also warrants the question, why a specific kind of nation-state formation is favored vis-à-vis other possibilities and tries to project alternative types of political organization with in the state-form (Chatterjee 2002, 3-13).

[55] Accordingly, Bruno Latour proposes that those who "resisted" his modern form of power "*became* pre-modern" (2001, 38; emphasis added), rather than proposing that they *stayed* pre-modern.

of both the German and Turkish arts worlds, their aesthetic approximation to 'the West' and their attempts to claim modernity through aesthetics. Highlighting the normativity of modern power emphasizes continuities within respective historical trajectories as well as narrative ruptures, similarities, and differences in the two discussed locales without resorting solely to tropes of accomplished or failed modernization. I argue that both narratives, albeit starting from different historical socio-political situations, struggled and are still struggling with similar issues that emerged from the normativity of modern power, even though one country is now firmly established in the West while the other is still regarded outside of it.

The following chapter outlines the emergence of the modern conception of art, and then describes present-day constellations of the artworld in Berlin and Istanbul. More specifically it investigates how the relationships between different artworld actors are framed in both locations. The subsequent chapter will also begin to give insights into how the divergent processes of normalization and the standardized modernization narratives play out in the settings of Istanbul and Berlin. Despite the pronounced international character of contemporary art, it is at the intersection of these narratives (and the way in which they are employed as explanatory models in both locations) with the practicalities of the artworld that the reference to the 'national' reinsert itself, at times implicitly and at others explicitly. This reinsertion appears not only when art is discussed in the concrete or the abstract, but also when practices that are integral to the artworld such as collecting and sponsorship are thematized.

Chapter 2: Artworlds – Of Friends, Foes and Working for the Greater Good

This chapter aims to bring together two strands of inquiry: on the one hand it deals with the theoretical underpinnings that are inherent in the modern conception of art, and on the other it draws on empirical material that elucidates how these understandings of art are taken up by an array of artworld actors (primarily artists, gallerists, collectors, museum personnel and sponsors[56]) when they describe their own work as well as their relationships with each other. To this end, the chapter begins with a highly selective sketch of the emergence of the modern conception of art by taking as a starting point the commodification of literature in the late 18th century (Woodmansee 2004, cf. Mortensen 1997). Art theorists and social scientists alike have emphasized that throughout the 20th century (the set-backs of totalitarianism, two World Wars and their respective propagandistic machineries that tried to circumscribe art in particular fashion notwithstanding) we have witnessed a successive broadening and pluralization of definitions of what constitutes art (see Zolberg/Cherbo 1997, Iversen 2007, Lucie-Smith 1996).[57] However, as I hope to show in the following discussion, when art is talked about in the daily settings of the artworld (including that of cultural policy, see Chapter 3) a set of larger, historical discourses and lineages pertaining to the 'nature of art' are always invoked as well. From the legacies of classical thought that have addressed art both as

[56] Since Chapters 1 and 3 deal with the state as an actor in the artworld in more detail, I have for the most part omitted references to the state in this chapter due to reasons of scope. However, I want to point to the fact that relationships with the state are often framed as antagonistic as well, while state actors in turn often – and stereotypically so – portray artists as 'unruly children.'

[57] Examples that are often referenced in this context are the acceptance of photography as an artform, the critical interventions around 'ethnic' and 'primitive' art and the reinterpretation of popular genres, such as street art, all of which contributed to this pluralization and cut through notions of 'center' and 'periphery' in the artworld (see e.g. Graburn 1976, Price 1989, Zolberg/Cherbo 1997, MacClancy 1997, Myers 2001). That this broadened understanding of art owes much to extended notions of culture and creativity will be taken up again in Chapters 4 and 7. However, I will show that these celebratory approaches have also in part obscured, or refrained from critiquing the persistent power differentials within the international artworld and beyond.

corruptive and enriching, distracting and cathartic, to Enlightenment elaborations on the civilizing impact of art, from the critique of the Frankfurt School to formalism and to the institutional theory of art these seemingly discrete theoretical takes on art are frequently merged in the day-to-day operations of the artworld (Belfiore/Bennet 2008).

The commodification of literature presents a useful entry point for the visual arts as well because it crystallizes many of the contradictions that are inherent in the modern conception of art and thus – to a certain extent – in modernity itself: It is in this moment that we can discern the intimate and contradictory relationship between the modern conception of art and the market. As art becomes framed as a highly individual expression it is also – especially under the impetus of romantic nationalism – increasingly interpreted as a manifestation of the national collective. It is also at this historical conjuncture that art is defined as increasingly autonomous (from both society and the market), and while art is accorded a universal value, only the few, the 'select' and educated are deemed able to appreciate it for 'what it really is' (e.g. see Eagleton 1990). As we will also see in the following chapter, art is seen as an educative and didactic tool based on shared experiences, yet its appreciation requires formal knowledge. As art is further elaborated as presenting a civilizing agent (Arnold 1869), it is also identified as a transformative means for society as well as an escape from that society: a means of governance as well as a challenge to it.

As the second part of the chapter will demonstrate, many of these motifs, such as the civic impact accorded to art or its autonomous character, are regularly employed both in the artworld and the broader public, without much questioning or reference to the historical contexts out of which they arose. Instead they present pragmatic shorthands for

different interests that are projected on and through the arts. The central argument of this chapter is that the antagonisms and interdependencies between different artworld actors, as well as the contradictions in the daily workings of the artworld are mediated through these shorthand characterizations and commonplace understandings of art that implicitly or explicitly portray it to be contributing to the greater good. Thus, I posit that those relationships in the artworld that are frequently framed in antagonistic terms do not simply or necessarily reflect interpersonal issues or individual conflicts of interests, but are indicative and reflective of the above outlined contradictions that the modern conception of art is both based on and produces.

The Modern Conception of Art: Defining Moments and Selected Debates

In order to contextualize how different artworld actors frame their activities, the following gives a brief and highly selective overview of the emergence of the modern conception of art, and points to some of the major debates in aesthetics that are at the heart of how we understand art today. As a lead-in to this discussion, I follow aesthetic theorist Martha Woodmansee whose study "The Author, Art, and the Market" traces the genesis of the modern conception of art by "explor[ing] a single decisive moment in the evolution of 'art' – the moment in the late eighteenth century Germany when 'art' achieved something close to its modern form" (1994, 7). According to Woodmansee this watershed moment can be located in the beginning of the commodification of literature in the 18th century. It is also in the course of this process that the distinction between "high" and "low" art arises and that the arts become separated from both the crafts and the

sciences (e.g. arithmetic, geometry and astronomy) with which they were formerly aligned (Williams 1983, 41).[58]

Woodmansee begins her interrogation with the imitation theory of art, an approach that can be found as early as in the writings of Socrates, and that has also been – even if differently elaborated on by more contemporary scholars (Danto 1964, see below). In its 18th century manifestation this line of thinking deemed art as largely imitating nature, and it was the quality of this imitation that distinguished individual works of art (as well as art from non-art). However, in 1746 the writer and theorist Abbé Charles Batteux claimed that art's raison d'être was not to merely copy the natural world, but rather to provide an "imitation of beautiful nature," i.e. the presentation of a "composite ideal" of the observable (Woodmansee 1994, 14). The notion of a composite ideal assembled through art engendered a shift in the second half of the 18th century as to how to assess works of art. Art was still defined by its common "capacity to move the audience," but its aesthetic value was now based on the relationships between its "components parts." This focus on inner harmony and symmetry as indicators for aesthetic accomplishment (Woodmansee 1994, 16) laid the groundwork of the formalist school in art theory (see Greenberg 1961). A similar view is advocated by contemporary art philosopher Richard Eldridge who maintains that it is through considering form and content, not context, that we can uncover the 'truth' that an artwork presents (Eldridge 1995 [1985], see also Devereaux 1995).

[58] Raymond Williams notes that while the term 'science' is used interchangeably with 'art' during the 14th and 15th centuries, it comes to distinguish skills that require theoretical, in contrast to practical knowledge from the mid-17th century onwards (1983, 277). The arts as a specialized human activity now comprised painting, sculpture, poetry, music as well as dance and architecture. Dance and architecture have at times been seen as hybrid categories since dance was long positioned in the vicinity of sports (i.e. physical adeptness), while architecture tends to be understood a point of convergence between the arts and sciences.

Batteux's position was further elaborated by Karl Philipp Moritz in his "*Versuch einer Vereinigung aller schönen Künste und Wissenschaften unter dem Begriff des sich selbst Vollendenten*" (1785). In this essay Moritz states that the value of an artwork is determined by its internal attributes, and thus its "inner purposesiveness" (*innere Zweckmässigkeit*; Woodmansee 1994, 12). Moritz' propositions challenged the prevalent Enlightenment notions of the time that conceived artistic expression as a potential source of "aesthetic self-instruction." While recognizing good intentions in these approaches, Moritz discounted the didacticism they implied as an instrumentalization of art for purposes outside its proper scope. His critique fell on fertile ground, since many writers and literary theorists alike felt that Enlightenment thought on art was ultimately accompanied, even marred by the profit motive of the emergent and quickly expanding book market that catered to Germany's growing literate middle-class. This tension already foreshadows some of the questions around the instrumentalization of art for other ends that will be repeatedly addressed throughout the dissertation, although in contrast to Moritz' stance the moral or civic impact is frequently regarded as intrinsic to art.

Art historian Preben Mortensen proposes that Moritz' arguments are likely to have influenced Kant's "Critique of [the Power of] Judgment" which appeared in 1790. Here, Kant elaborated on art's potential for "subliminal instruction" through the contemplation of beauty as "a symbol of morality" (see Kant 1987, 228; section 59), in which aesthetics (at least potentially) becomes a bridge between his 'philosophy of morals' and the philosophy of nature' and a cognitive vehicle through which we can realize our common humanity (see also Mortensen 1997, 160).[59] At the same time

[59] While Mary Devereaux adheres to a reading of Kant that emphasizes his separation of the aesthetic from other values – religious, moral and political (1995, 42), Eleonora Belfiore and Oliver Bennet emphasize his

however, art became more and more suspect to manipulation (see Woodmansee 1994, 28ff), as the commodification of literature leveled the way for art to be negotiated in terms of supply and demand – a condition that Moritz (like Schiller) was acutely distrustful of. In an attempt to counter these developments, Moritz defined works of art as self-sufficient (*selbstgenügsam*) and thus indifferent to the contexts out of which they emerged and the interests of an audience that was now more and more framed in terms of consumption. This emphasis on disinterest also engendered a stratified view on taste, a distinction, in Pierre Bourdieu's sense (1984), between the masses that consumed "art" and the few 'men of rarified taste' (connoisseurs), who were able to exercise true appreciation (Zolberg 1990, 155-161; Mortensen 1997, 175-183).[60] As art becomes incommensurable with both the market and the masses, the question of taste came increasingly center-stage. In his essay "On Standards of Taste" (1969 [1757]) Hume argued that beauty does not arise from formal properties alone (although they need to be fully taken into account, 258), nor can it be solely comprehended by reason. While Hume conceded that a good critic distinguishes himself through practice and experience, the ability of comparison and the freeing from prejudice (1969, 262), his notion that judgments of taste are based on feelings potentially opens the possibility to appreciate art to all. These seemingly contradictory understandings of taste as acquirable for all on the one hand, and stratified and differently distributed on the other is also reflected in the

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elaborations on the link between art and morality: "Despite the fact that the moral and aesthetic judgments belong to different categories on the grounds that the former is based on abstract concepts and has universal validity, and the latter is non-conceptual and can thus only aspire to subjective universality the connection of the aesthetic and the moral is reiterated throughout the *Critique*" (2008, 129).

[60] Woodmansee argues that Schiller's distinction between the "elect" and the uneducated masses who only seek the "emotive and sensuous" (and not the now highly esteemed disinterested pleasure) has to be read as an attempt to enhance the prestige of his own style of work which he saw endangered by the commodification of literature and the demands of the book market (1994, 73f).

political usages of art (and conversely the importance that is at least discursively given to arts education, see Chapter 3).

The commodification of literature and the growth of the book market led to a second shift regarding questions of authorship and copyright that inform our conceptions of art today. Woodmansee describes how the developing book market while lending unprecedented exposure to literary work, fueled an antagonism between authors and book dealers. Since artistic works were understood as mere reflections of "truths" and observations of the world that were ultimately accessible to everybody, artists often only received a only nominal honorarium for their work. Their subsistence strategies were further undermined by the absence of regulations that are today bundled under the category of copyrights, resulting in numerous unauthorized reprints of their work by different publishers who were engaged in a veritable price war. It is in this context, Woodmansee argues, that a debate about the very character of artistic creativity arose. Rather than seeing art as the skilled representations by an artist of what is "out there," it became an imaginative creation that transcended nature (Williams 1983, 82) and originated in his (and this was at the time strictly confined to men, see Woodmannsee 1994, 103-109, McRobbie 1993) individual genius.[61] While this shift in understanding emerged in an effort to strengthen the artist's position *vis-à-vis* the market, it simultaneously obscured the embeddedness of artistic developments *in* the market,

[61] The conception of creativity that pertains to individual originality and innovation associated with the arts becomes established in the course of the transformations that Woodmansee describes. While previously creation had been understood as 'divine' activity (e.g. Augustine stated that those who are created can not create themselves), the 18th century definition of creativity encompassed the individual's capacity to imagine things beyond nature. Together with the notion of genius, creativity is closely related to the emerging understandings of the individual in Enlightenment philosophy (see Williams 1983, 83).

including the very conceptualization of art as a profession in its own right (Baxandall 1972, Kempers 1987).[62]

This interpretative shift had wide-reaching ramifications not only for the establishment of copyrights and the redefinition of art (and with it the artist's role in society), but also led to "new strategies of reading." This transformation can be exemplified by juxtaposing Pope's neoclassical approach to reading in which the reader recognizes his/herself in the artist's writings with Herder's conception that through reading one explores the intellectual workings of an "Other." Accordingly, literary criticism became an endeavor in the "recovery of a writer's meaning" (Woodmansee 1994, 55). The formalistic conception of art together with the notion of individual genius further solidified an understanding in which art and artistic production were portrayed as autonomous from their respective social context as well as from the evaluation of the audience (Mortensen 1997, 151-154, Belfiori/Bennet 2008).

Since the notion of the autonomy of art will appear throughout the dissertation in different forms – and as a vehicle to argue for a wide range of often contradictory ends – it is worth pausing on this issue for a moment. Although Walter Benjamin proposed that in the 'age of mechanical reproduction' the idea of *l'art pour l'art* –was finally revealed for what it really was, i.e. mere semblance (*Schein*; 2003 [1936], 22), the idea of the autonomy of art has remained a staple in how we talk about art today, not least because it

[62] Kempers traces the professionalization of the arts in renaissance Italy through the emergent art market as well as interpersonal relationships between patrons and artists on the backdrop of state-formation. This shift in the 18th century, however, was long preceeded however by the gradual establishment of art as an profession that can be traced to painting in the 15th century, which Banxandall analyzes as a 'deposit of a relationships' including that between an artist and his client' (1972, 1) as the form and content along with the material of thus commissioned artworks was subject to the negotiation and (the basis of payment) between the two.

is politically versatile. Terry Eagleton describes this versatility, which he investigates as part of a bourgeois class project, rather poignantly:

> "[…] the idea of autonomy – of a mode of being which is entirely self-regulating and self-determining – provides the middle class with just the ideological model of subjectivity it requires for its material operation. Yet this concept of autonomy is radically double-edged: if on the one hand it provides a central constituent of bourgeois ideology, it also marks an emphasis on the self-determining nature of human powers and capacities, which becomes in the work of Karl Marx and others, the anthropological foundation of a revolutionary opposition to bourgeois utility. The aesthetic is at once […] the very secret prototype of human subjectivity, and a vision of human energies as radical ends in themselves which is the implacable enemy of all dominative or instrumentalist thought" (Eagleton 1990, 9).

This double-edgeness can be traced in the parallels and divergences between the 18th century conception of art, exemplified by Schiller, for instance (see Chapter 1) and the critical theories of the Frankfurt School. They share a similar disillusionment with Enlightenment ideas (the earlier theorist through witnessing the terror following the French revolution, and in the case of Adorno and Horkheimer, because of the experience of fascism). But although they are using analogous conceptions of art, their aims are diametrically opposed. While Schiller seems to call for depoliticizing the arts, Adorno wants to restore their critical potential.

Critical Theory, Aesthetics and Mass Culture

Theodor W. Adorno's critique centers around the distinction between art proper and mass culture.[63] According to Adorno mass culture by virtue of being driven by profit motives, and thus, bound to the rules of the market and those who govern it, is devoid of

[63] Adorno's most well known essay on this topic is "Kulturindustrie, Auklärung als Massenbetrug" (The Culture Industry, Enlightenment as Mass Deception), a collaboration with Max Horkheimer that was first published in 1947, while they were still in American exile. During the remainder of Adorno's stay in the U.S. as well as after his return to Germany in the late 1950s, he further elaborated on the issues that he and Horkheimer raised. It is these later elaborations that the following discussion in based on.

any critical potential. Although seemingly depoliticized and under the guise of mere entertainment, it is yet ideologically infused and instrumental in 'duping' the masses into political consent. Adorno implies that art should deal with peoples' realities (a similar stance is advocated by Gramsci 1991) and reveal social conflicts, but instead mass culture addresses social conflicts only by resorting to "romantic deception" (e.g. in the form of "Hollywood endings"; Adorno 1991, 79). Robbed of its critical essence, all that art in its mass cultural manifestation has to offer is "aesthetic semblance" (*Schein*). This totalizing effect of the culture industry emerges from its claim to be based on popular cultural expression while it is in fact subordinated to and based in the capitalist production process, thus making the audience nothing but consumers.[64]

Although Adorno claims to be disillusioned with the promises of the Enlightenment, he falls back on bourgeois notions of individuality and rarified taste without attempting to resolve these contradictions. His conception of art seems to correspond with the theories of Schiller and his contemporaries; e.g. he refers to "the obligation to the internal artistic whole" (1991, 95) that satisfy genuine needs and aesthetic autonomy. But while the former aim to separate art from politics, it is the very autonomy of art that for Adorno signifies its political potential. Although in his opinion all art is corrupted (or at least co-opted) to a certain extent, Adorno had special regard for

[64] In the course of his argument Adorno draws eclectically on examples of music (especially jazz), dance, and film. The pivotal expression of mass culture according to Adorno is located in the growing advertising industry. Advertising conflates art and reality, since here the works of art are not 'just' turned into marketable commodities but are created as exchange objects (see also Jay 1984, 122). However the advertising industry conceals this process, playing on the theme of individuality while attempting to standardize the human condition via consumption. So all-encompassing is this standardizing effect of mass culture that it penetrates the realm of what we might think are the most personal experiences such as the "sensuous pleasure" of dancing which turns people into "a collective through the adaptation to an over-mastering arbitrary power" (Adorno1991, 95).

expressionism as well as for the writings of Beckett, Kafka and Celan. These works, to him, integrated artistic autonomy into an awareness of their social and political situatedness.[65] The unresolved tensions in Adorno's writings have resulted in contradictory deployments of his arguments: For instance Adorno (or the Frankfurt School in general) is at times invoked to criticize reputedly "elitist notions" of art that operate through an outdated distinction of "high and popular art" (Gençay 2005, see Chapter 5); and at other times employed to criticize the cooptation of public art events through corporate sponsorship (see Chapter 6). Usages of the first kind tend to neglect that in his later writings (composed in the 1950s and 1960s and mostly published posthumously) Adorno distinguishes between popular culture as an authentic expression of the masses, i.e. the working class, and mass culture, directed by the culture industry and devoid of political impetus. In the "Culture Industry Reconsidered" Adorno explains this differentiation:

> "We replaced that expression [mass culture] with 'culture industry' in order to exclude from the outset the interpretation agreeable to its advocates: that is a matter of something like a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves, the contemporary form of popular art. From the latter the culture industry must be distinguished in the extreme" (1991, 98).

This distinction finds its way into early Cultural Studies in Britain through the works of Richard Hoggart (e.g. 1957) and Raymond Williams (e.g. 1958), who critiqued

[65] One explanation for Adorno's strongly expressed suspicion of mass culture and any mass phenomenon for that matter is offered by Martin Jay, who states that "the sources of Adorno's concept of the culture industry [...] are to be found in his own experience with the new technologized, anonymous mass culture of the Weimar area, Nazi pseudo-folk culture and American popular culture in the 1930s and 1940s" (Jay 1984, 120). This experience was formative also for the work of his collaborator Max Horkheimer, who poses a fundamental critique of the 'rationality' of modernity, and explains why these authors see the Enlightenment project as a historical failure (proof of which they saw in the tyranny of the Third Reich as well as in Stalinism). Rather than portraying Adorno as a mere elitist, Jay contextualizes Adorno's critique of mass culture and his evaluation of high culture in terms of a grander dialectic. In his view, Adorno acknowledged both the critical as well as the ideological dimension of everyday culture. All culture for Adorno, high or low "contained a moment of barbarism" (Jay 1984, 119). Interestingly, however, Adorno vehemently doubted that research with audiences was of any value for a critical understanding of culture, which should only be theoretically investigated, since individual tastes were irrelevant according to him (Jay 1984, 118).

the elitist conception of "high culture" at the cost of devaluing of working-class cultural production as "low-culture." They share with Adorno a highly critical stance vis-à-vis the culture industries, which in their view undermined popular culture. It was not until the 1980s that first British and then American Cultural Studies by way of incorporating the theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau reinterpreted popular culture from a manipulative device into an arena in which the push and pull between 'structure' and 'agency' play out. Drawing on an anthropological understanding of 'culture' that encompasses everyday experiences and practice and highlighting people's contradictory and often unintended appropriations cultural studies contributed to debunking notions that the reception of mass media and popular culture (as well as art) presents a unilinear and manipulative process (e.g. Morley 1986, Radway 1984). In this process however, cultural studies has encountered another problem: that of diagnosing 'resistance' everywhere. Take for instance Rosalind Brunt's proposition that women who read romance novels, but reject the gender roles portrayed in them, are "organic intellectuals" (Brunt 1992). Brunt merely evokes Gramsci's concept without considering if and to which extent readers produce counter-hegemonic discourses to the ones perpetuated in romance novels. Do they indeed create alternative positions of authoritative knowledge? It seems that de Certeau's notion of tactics as the way in which individuals deviate from prescribed instructions 'how to do things' is often more useful in these types of arguments than the concept of resistance (1984).[66] Yet, the question of aesthetic reception, actual and imagined remains vital for the practices of artworld actors, while

[66] De Certeau juxtaposes the level of hegemonic operations, as the realm of "strategies" with "tactics" as the realm of the "other," the weak, the consumer. Everyday practices like talking, shopping, reading, moving around, cooking are tactical in his opinion. They are "tricks" or productive appropriations that do not function as modes of capitalization (1984).

also often presenting an unknown since what art does or means to the audience is difficult to ascertain both empirically and in the abstract.

I will return to the question of the audience in a moment, but first I would like to reiterate that the above-sketched perspectives on art can be found, in varying proportions, in contemporary approaches as well. At times they are portrayed as mutually exclusive, at other times they are merged in the daily workings of the artworld. Despite their differences, most authors share the view that art presents an essential human feature that enriches our lives. The notion that art reflects or induces experiences and emotions – is as much invoked and desired, as it is discounted in favor of 'disinterested' conceptualizations of art. John Dewey and Robin Collingwood, for example, see art and its reception as generating and relying on shared experiences (see Dewey 1995 [1934]; Collingwood 1969 [1945]). This view is contrasted by more formalistic approaches to art as presented by Richard Eldridge, who states that art should be judged by how its "form and content" correspond and are satisfactory towards each other (1995, 242).

Other tensions remain as well: The modern conception of art as personal expression is both rooted in the art market and tries to distance itself from it. In a seemingly contradictory fashion this rootedness in the market facilitates an emancipatory conception of art and at the same time undermines it. Inherent then in the modern production and consumption of art is the suspicion of complicity with the market and the powers that be (Adorno/Horkheimer 1969; see also Baudrillard 2005, 25-29 and 89-97), and a preoccupation with art as valued 'in itself' in contrast to presenting a vehicle for other ends, including the so-called 'secondary impacts' accorded to art in cultural policy (see Belfiore/Bennet 2008). Together with the developments sketched in Chapter 1 we

are confronted with a picture in which we can discern that as art becomes incorporated into the commodity maket, it also is reinterpreted as a deeply personal expression emerging from the individual genius; as it becomes a vehicle for moral education it also becomes a common good in the formation of romantic nationalism, and somewhat contradictorily develops into a civic marker. With the rise of nationalist ideology art becomes even more so designated to be a civilizing agent, formative for modern personhood (including in the form of self-cultivation, as in Humboldt's notion of *Selbstbildung*). As Jacques Rancière proposes our contemporary definition of art arises from modernity and thus art is often taken as a manifestation of Enlightenment thought (or "cultural modernity" in Charles Taylor's sense) thus producing a complex (and at times perplexing) self-referentiality (Rancière 2004).

I hope the above gives if only a small insight that these conceptualizations are both interrelated and yet in fundamental tension towards each other and that they may help contextualize some of the understandings of and approaches to art presented in the following, and explain why relationships within the artworld are framed as antagonistic or amicable, not only on an interpersonal level but also structurally.

Arts and the Audience

Theoretical approaches to art always carry with them presumptions about the affect and effect of art; about what happens in the eye of the observer. While artist and audience have so far been discussed as separate entities which they remain even in Cultural Studies approaches, I want to briefly draw attention to a compelling intervention by English historian and philosopher Robin Collingwood, entitled "The Artist and the

Community" which originally appeared in 1945, before turning to more concrete examples from my fieldwork. Counteracting claims to the autonomy of art, Collingwood understands art as a fundamentally collaborative process between the artist and his/her respective audience (as well as a dialogue with other artists) (1969 [1945], 484-495). This collaborative process lies not only in the response of an audience to an artwork, but also in the consideration of the audience during the production process.[67] For Collingwood it is not by way of expertise or formal knowledge that an audience enters into this collaborative process.[68] Rather, their access to and understanding of an artwork presupposes that artists and audiences share certain sentiments, interests and concerns that the artist expresses on 'their behalf.' In contrast to George Dickie's view, the audience is not just but one 'role-bearer' in the institution of the artworld (see Dickie 1995 [1984], 220f). Instead, the audience is constructed as active participants in the creation and reception of art, based on an empathic process that draws on shared emotions, and it is these shared emotions that mark the audience as a community, as suggested in Collingwood's title.

In practice the question if audiences need prior knowledge and of what kind in order to enter into this interaction remains an object of contention. Understandings of art appreciation as intrinsically human are weighed against the considerations of arts education and acquired taste when the relationship between art(ists) and audiences is discussed in both Germany and Turkey. A common trope in contemporary evaluations of

[67] Collinwgood thus dismisses notions of "aesthetic individuality," the originality of the artistic genius as well as questions of intellectual property by commenting: "[...] this fooling about personal property must cease. Let painters and musicians steal with both hands what they can use, wherever they can find it. And if anyone objects to having his own precious ideas borrowed by others, the remedy is easy. He can keep them to himself by not publishing; and the public will probably have cause to thank him" (1969, 492).

[68] Collingwood states that they have to be "intelligent" and "determined" (1969, 486), but these are rather vague qualifications of a potential audience's properties.

art tends to be located in the combination of the mimetic spectrum (indicated above by Batteux and Moritz as presenting one extreme) and realist theories. Arthur Danto proposes that much of art today can be conceptualized as exhibiting aspects of reality that remain otherwise unseen, a proposition that he illustrates through the analogy of a mirror image (Danto 1964, 571). Susanne Neumann (Berlin, Fig. 1-3) and Ahmet Öğüt (Istanbul, Fig. 4-7) are but two examples of artists who explicitly draw on everyday images and situations in many of their works citing exactly this reason.



Fig. 1-3: Susanne Neumann's work for the sculpture park *openArt* in Roverdo/Trii (Switzerland, 2004-2006). For this work, Neumann photographed the local segment of a cross-country *Autobahn*, which she then transformed into paintings as well as postcards and other memorabilia (e.g. the above depicted chocolates). The installation included a model replica of a 15-meter long stretch of the autobahn in the sculpture park.



Fig. 4-7: Ahmet Öğüt's *Somebody else's car* (2005) documents how Öğüt transforms the cars of unsuspecting strangers into taxicabs and police cars respectively.

When I asked artists about the role the audience plays in their production processes, most identified the consideration of the spectator's gaze as a vital factor. Prior knowledge was frequently regarded as helpful but not necessary, especially when expressing shared experiences was foregrounded. Yet, as Inci Eviner explains capturing a moment that constitutes a "shared experience" and is yet intensely personal can be a difficult feat (Fig. 8-9):

> "To find something common between my own stories and those of others is both easy and difficult. On the one hand I want to be very heartfelt (*çok içten olmak istiyorum*), and the other I want to be one and the same with others, I want to be alone and together; I want to be very different and yet the same, I want to speak out of the shadow of others. [...] There is [in the work process] always a moment in which these different poles, the things that look contradictory come together. It is a short moment, but that is the moment I need to catch (*o süreyi yakalamam lâzım*). It is this moment that is both me, and the other."






Fig. 8: Inci Eviner, from *Korkma, sana bir şey olmaz* (Don't be afraid, nothing will happen to you, 2006). Fig 9: Inci Eviner, *untitled* (1998).

Others indicate that thinking about the potential audience and how they perceive a piece can at times even be stifling to the work process and indicate that the balance between a personal, artistic expression and intelligibility is often delicate. Berlin-based artist Christian Niccoli explains this process in the following manner (Fig. 10-13):

> "The viewer plays a role of course, or at least partially. I always ask myself will the viewer get this point? If not, then I am doing something wrong. I want to communicate with the viewer, but this does not mean that I want to take the viewer by the hand. […] The problem with contemporary art is that it is difficult to understand, most of the time it is absolutely incomprehensible, especially if you don't know the history. So you have to keep that in mind as an artist."




Fig. 10 and 11: Video stills from Christian Niccoli's *Splash* (2008). In connection to this work, Nicolli said he wanted to capture the drifting state of many young Berlin-based artists that "might dress and live well, but have very little perspectives for the future in terms of employment and social security."






Fig. 12 and 13: Images from the installation of *Splash* at *Künstlerhaus Bethanien* (Berlin, 2008)

Other artists I spoke to both in Istanbul and Berlin try to consciously overcome the demarcation or division between artist and audience by developing decidedly collaborative projects. *ODA Projesi* (Room Project) an artist collective by Özge Açıkkol, Güneş Savaş and Seçil Yersel, officially formed in 2000, embodies these kinds of efforts. Renting a share in the neighborhood of *Galata*, they opened their home for a variety of projects that according to Seçil Yersel were guided by the following questions: "We asked ourselves, how do relationships determine a space? How can we share a room

with others? Are we (as artists) hosts or are we neighbors? How can we use the space outside of normalized exhibition formats?" Rather than producing artworks or performances in the classic sense, the collective invited neighbors, other artists as well as social scientists to come and use their space. Projects such as "Birthday and Wedding" during which the artists and children from the quarter planned a birthday celebration for Özge Açıkkol and also invited a neighboring bride who was preparing for her wedding to discuss what celebrations involve, were explicitly based on generating and discussing the shared experiences of a celebration. Although the day was photographically documented the 'art project' ultimately resided in these interactions, experiences and conversations (Fig. 14-15).[69]



Fig. 14 and 15: The courtyard in front of *Oda Projesi*'s apartment during one of their events.

An example from Berlin in this context is Susanne Bosch whose work is mostly located in public spaces (Fig. 16-17). Bosch stresses that she does not treat public space as an "extension of the gallery, where something is exhibited for an audience." Rather her projects are often participatory in nature and thus entail negotiation with those who inhabit, claim and utilize the spaces that Bosch sets her work in on a daily basis.

[69] Since *Oda Projesi* was evicted from the apartment due to the gentrification of the *Galata* district they have continued by working through mediums such as newspaper, radio, and postcards. The fact that many of their projects do not or only secondarily produce tangible objects and are not intended as performances has led repeatedly to questions how the works of *Oda Projesi* actually constitute art.

Experiences of working in the public space have motivated Bosch to take courses in conflict management, which she sees as an important tool for the kinds of debates she tries to facilitate.





Fig. 16 and 17: Susanne Bosch's installation *Mensch weg/Insan yitmis/Meri helazbune/ Person disappeared* (2004) exhibited in the display windows of SOX36 on Berlin's Oranienstrasse in Kreuzberg. The photographs and collages featured persons who had disappeared and documented the narratives of the families who were searching for them.

Bosch's formulation on how she conceives of public space also points to a certain distancing from the formal or sanctioned outlets of the artworld. Artists often voice their disapproval of the insularity and self-referentiality of the artworld and often take pride in their works being "successful" or resonating "outside the bounds of the artworld," as Berlin-based artist Bernardo Giorgi put it. He and many others stated on different occasions that the artworld is often "more involved in taxing itself" and than in "generating productive conversations." Yet, while a certain amount of antagonism and distancing from the artworld is frequently gestured at, there is an interesting push and pull in this relationship between individual artists and the assemblage of the artworld. Many artists note that much of their time is spent on professional networking in order to

get projects on the way or meet curators, pointing to the interdependency that characterizes the artworld.[70]

A slightly different take on the limitations but also the possibilities of the institutional constitution of the artworld is raised by Banu Cennetoğlu. Talking about the motivation behind her project "The List" which exhibited the names of 7,000 refugees who have been recorded (and identified) to have died trying to "enter the fortress Europe" on public billboards throughout Amsterdam (Fig.18 and 19), she notes:

> "When I came across this list, I thought how much can I achieve as Banu Cennetoğlu, as a the 'simple citizen' so to speak, to make this list visible? Quite little, really. But when I use my profession, my professional connections much more so. That's why I used my art network. In this project, I specifically calculated in the audience. It is not really my production or my work, this is really about making the list reach people."



Fig. 18 & 19: Banu Cennetoğlu's *The List* (Amsterdam, 2007).

In this instance the artworld and its disciplinary history does not present an obstacle for reaching and communicating with a broader public (or audience) as alluded to by Niccoli above. Instead of taking an oppositional stance towards the artworld, Cennetoğlu, at least in this instance, employs her position as an artist as a vehicle to transcend the artworld in its narrower sense.

[70] One issue that was repeatedly raised by artist who had studied at classic arts academies was that while their education did not really relate to their current artistic practices, it either afforded them a network of people with which they still work, or alternatively taught them how to network.

Mediating between Art and Audiences: Critics, Arts Writers and Curators

As art has its own disciplinary history and presents a provenance of knowledge and connoisseurship, it is also in need of mediation, both in terms of exposing audiences to works of art (that they may not be able to see in person) and providing the discursive context within which works are discussed. In this mediation between artists and audiences in the broader sense as well as the artworld in its narrower formation, critics (or arts writers) often assume a vital role. While in the international art world the death of the art critic has been proclaimed repeatedly, and artists have increasingly taken to writing about their own works either because they have simply not yet been 'discovered and written-up,' or as one artist from Istanbul formulated it "to get the important points of my work across, instead of waiting for write-ups that are completely beyond the point" (not bad critiques mind you), or simply because applying for the world-wide grant economy requires "artist's statements." Even so, artists still very much rely on reviews of their work in arts magazines and the daily press to enhance their visibility ('get their names out') and to generate interest in and different perspectives on their work. Major German newspapers (such as *FAZ*, *Süddeutsche*, and the weekly *Die Zeit* as well as Berlin-based *TAZ*) include culture and arts pages, often called *Feuilletons,* that not only feature reviews of exhibitions, but are often fora for cultural critique. As a curator from Berlin remarked on the constitution and number of *Feuilletons* during our interview "the Feuilleton is a place where everyone thinks they can say something about art because they think they understand what it's about and how we should do our work. That's why we have so many Feuilletons."

In Istanbul some respondents posited that true art criticism does not exist in Turkey, pointing to the fact that some newspapers run more event announcements than analyses of exhibitions and performances.[71] However, *Cumhurriyet, Radikal and Milliyet* and even the smaller left-leaning *Birgün* have daily arts sections with a number of critics writing for them. *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet* also publish monthly journals exclusively dedicated to art with a wide variety of contributors. One notable issue in the context of Istanbul, however, is that some curators tend to write quite regularly especially in arts journals making for a potential situation in which conflicts of interest could be discerned. Yet, how this particular concentration of power plays out in the daily workings of the artworld was for the most part avoided by respondents. It is interesting to note that (in contrast to Germany) the notion of lack or deficiency is foregrounded in the Turkish context, naturalized through the larger discourses of belated modernity – obscuring the more concrete issues of interdependency and power differentials that are likely to considerably impact the manifestation of art criticism.

In Istanbul as in Berlin a considerable number of artists note that they find most art writing bad, aloof and too abstract. An internationally successful, mid-career artist from Berlin put it in harsh, but unequivocal terms by stating: "if I have to read another art magazine I am going to throw up," and a gallery worker who had just recently quit her position conceded: "one good thing about leaving the gallery world is that I don't have to read that stuff anymore." Indeed, as the title of the chapter indicates, relationships in the artworld are formulated along antagonisms, apart from those concrete relationships and

[71] It is interesting to note that this is in stark contrast to the variety of art reviews in early republican times in Turkey, when art was very controversially discussed (see Chapter 3).

interactions that are deemed 'successful' or 'productive.' Thus it is not surprising that "good" arts writers on the other hand are highly respected, and some artists like Susanne Neumann take on some of the responsibility for the state of arts writing by maintaining that the more information one provides for reviewers the better informed assessments of the work will be. When I asked Brigitte Werneburg, editor of the culture section of the TAZ, how she ensures that her reviews do the respective artworks and artists justice she responded that she "can really only work with what people offer you. How good is the press material? How well is the concept explained to me? That is really the duty of the gallerist or the curator. It is their task to make the artist look good or even better than s/he is." But she also echoes the sentiment alluded to above about the state of arts writing: "Anyone who reads art- or catalogue-texts knows that the problem lies in these theory texts that are not written in any understandable way, let alone clear German." Werneburg sees the role of her articles to provide insights from the art scene to the broader audience of a daily newspaper and to offer state-of-the art news on Berlin galleries and museums as well as on the international art-scene. "Our goals is to build a bridge," as she says, "between the reader and the artworld" in an intelligible fashion.

We can find a similarly expressed interplay of collaboration and antagonism, interdependency and power differentials when artists talk about curators. The authority of the curator and established curatorial practices have been subject to critique over the past two decades in the international artworld (for a comprehensive overview see Rogoff 2002, Obrist 2008) and these developments have been mirrored in both Istanbul and Berlin (see also Chapter 7). Yet curators remain important mediators between artists,

artworks and the audience: They provide the conceptual framework in which works are presented and discussed, by way of selecting and bringing together different artists and works under a specific thematic or set of questions. In addition, they often take on the practical roles of securing a space for the exhibition (unless they are institutionally affiliated), raise funding and deal with the logistics of an exhibition, write press releases, prepare catalogues and work on outreach for a given event. A common discontent with regard to curators on the part of artists in both Berlin and Istanbul is that they are (somewhat paradoxically so) less interested in the specific work that an artist contributes. Rather they are often said to adhere to "hip themes" that are superimposed on the works instead of seriously engaging them. But as with other arenas of antagonism in the artworld, once asked more concretely, artists also volunteer stories about curators (some of world renown, others working on much smaller scales) whom they like to work with, always stressing their exceptionality. On the topic a Berlin-based artist remarked:

> "You know, curators for me are really somewhere between business and idealism. Yet, you have to rely on them, get them interested in your work and this interdependency can make situations rather tense and sometimes even depressing. You might have noticed that in the artworld everyone is really friendly on the surface. You can't fight, you can't have a controversial discussion. It's like in the business world, because you never know if you need this person in the future. So you also can't really be friends with them, can't really share your thoughts. There are of course exceptions, like Anselm Franke. Do you know him? He is one of the rare curators who is all about the art, who really wants to discuss issues, and for whom this is not just a business."

Curators themselves frame their work as facilitating the communication between audiences, artists and artworks. This communicative and mediating function (in conjuncture with logistics and monies) also makes for their authority to define and frame the perception of artworks that at times diverges from artists' intentions. While the reference to the business-side corresponds with one of the actual roles that curators

assume, it is also a shorthand – or an image – expressing this power differential of defining and framing an artist's work in a particular manner, i.e. the thematic of a show.

Disgruntlement with the power differentials vis-à-vis curators, commercial galleries and the institutional outlets of the artworld, such as museums, have also led artists to search for alternative exhibiting strategies. In Berlin this has manifested itself from the late 1990s onward in the establishment of *Produzentengallerien* (producer galleries) formed by groups of artists who create their own exhibitions spaces and often *employ* curators to work for *them*.[72] In Istanbul this development has been mirrored by the formation of artists' initiatives (for an overview see Tan 2006), but also by artists taking on the task of curating exhibitions with and for their peers. Talking about her experience of taking part in *Freekick*, an exhibition curated by artist Halil Altındere (for a detailed discussion of this exhibition see Chapter 5), Inci Eviner notes:

> "There is a new reality now, that artists without having to consider the professional sphere of curating can create their own art settings. This is what Halil showed for the first time in Turkey, he showed this courage. This is a very important development: Instead of moving into existing spaces, we can create our own. Curators of course do not feel the need for that, and they should not have to; either way they would not care. Instead of waiting for a galerist or a curator, artists today are creating their own spaces and this is a good thing."

[72] Some of these alternative projects broke apart after a few years; others became extremely successful, taking on a more institutionally solidified character, such as *Galerie Wohnmaschiene* in Berlin, Mitte.

In the Gallery: Friendship, Trust and Risk

Gallerists[73] are frequently both sought after and under scrutiny by artists. Their motives are always questioned with regard to whose interests gallerists ultimately have in mind – those of artists, buyers, or themselves, as they might not always intersect. In Istanbul as in Berlin artists recount their attempts to find a gallery to represent them as anxiety-inducing endeavors. It was not uncommon to hear from interlocutors how they were excitedly working away to update their portfolios, and a few weeks later, after having tackled the fear of rejection and then experienced it, retreated to the hope of 'simply' being discovered and picked-up for representation, or working up the courage to try again at some other point, but "not now." Some like Banu Cennetoğlu quite consciously steer away from the established gallery system because the commercial apparatus they are embedded in does not really correspond with their artistic practices:

> "I don't work with galleries these days. After a few experiences I found that although I work in a format that makes gallerists' eyes shine – after all photographs have a real market – it does not really work for me. The way I use photographs, I do not work with its valued mechanisms of high-resolution prints and limited editions. Gallerists tend to want very clean, very commercial stuff. I mainly work through copies. Oftentimes I even tear the photos apart once the installation is over, so I am not really a very profitable artist for a gallery. This does not mean that I categorically reject to work with galleries. Maybe I just have not found the right one yet.

[73] I use the term 'gallerist' (German: *Galerist* or *Galeristin*; Turkish: *galerici*, sometimes also *galeri sahibi*, gallery owner) as it was the standard expression employed by interlocutors and in respective publications. In American English the expression 'art dealer' seems to be more common, with gallerist being understood as a 'European' invention that deflects from the obvious connection between art and the market by way of commodification. The German equivalent for art dealer, *Kunsthändler/in* is generally used for those who work mainly in the secondary art market, e.g. the reselling of artworks, rather than brokering sales between artists and collectors directly. Gallerists in turn represent artists, exhibit them and mediate between artists and potential buyers (for an insight into how the term gallerist is gaining traction in the New York artworld see Glueck 2005).





Fig. 20 & 21: Banu Cennetoğlu's pamphlet *15 Scary Asian Men* (2005), features photographs of solitary men on the sidelines of the highway that leads to the bridge Bosporus bridge connecting Istanbul's European and Asian shores. Printed on light copy-paper, the work exemplifies Cennetoğlu's choice of materials that she explains above.

That gallerists' rationales entail calculations of marketability also deters many video artists from pursuing possible gallery affiliations. As one Berlin-based video artist in his mid-twenties noted, "as long as I have not made a name for myself it's not worth trying to find a gallery to represent me. Video is already a difficult format." Needless to say, for those who at some point had gallery presentation and then were dropped, because their works did not sell as expected, the topic was especially uncomfortable.

Those who have gallery representation often describe their individual relationships with gallerists as comforting and as providing a safe haven in which the business-side of things is out of their hands and taken care of. Having a gallery affiliation means not only relative security in being granted periodic exhibitions, but also representation at the year-round cycle of art fairs where much of the buying and selling of art is done (see Chapter 7).[74] These artists often framed their relationship with gallerists as friendships, and in terms of mutual respect and personal fondness, but as one gallery worker[75] in Berlin explained:

[74] For instance, some related the strategy of building up an artist slowly, raise prices responsibly over time, and regulate the amount of works by an artist that are out on the market at any given time, to counter the possibility of a sudden drop in prices.

[75] It is important to note that apart from the gallery owner, assistants play an important role in the day-to-day workings of a gallery and are responsible for a range of areas from accounting to press releases. Off the

> "Not all artists want to be cuddled – although many do and some even ask for considerable amount of attention by calling the gallerist every two weeks and invite them for studio visits to show their newest work. Others are quite content with a distant, business-like relationship in which the gallery is just another trading place (*Umschlagplatz*) for them."

However there were narratives that featured "other gallerists" who treat "their artists unfairly, and are only after quick gains." In these descriptions, gallerists and artists appear antithetical to each other, as one is interested in business and the other in art proper; artists and gallerists are construed in antagonistic terms although their existence is symbiotic in nature. Another aspect that was raised repeatedly was the suspicion of favoritism towards other artists who "receive more care" or traction because more time was invested on part of the gallerist in representing "them" to potential buyers, both private and institutional.

The going gallery commission teeters around 50%, with gallerists generally determining the price of an artwork[76] allowing for a 20% collector's discount at their discretion. There is a notable interdependency and power differential between artists and gallerits: Without the work of the artists the gallerist cannot exist and yet because the latter are on the business-side of things, deal with public relations and enhance visibility, secure shows and frequently help represent artists vis-à-vis public institutions, artists both aspire to have gallery representation while dreading the dependency it creates. Gallerists

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record, gallery assistants often recount long working hours and little pay in conjuncture with what one assistant called a work environment that seems a "pool of egocentric, moody people and penny pinchers." In the German context, they are often referred to as "Galleriemäuse" – the gendered nature of the word 'mouse' in German already points to the fact that gallery assistants are predominantly female. Many of them see the difficult working positions and the little regard they receive for their efforts as paying their dues within the artworld to eventually advance in the gallery system.

[76] An exception to this convention are high-profile artists. As one gallery worker put it: "If an artists like Jeff Koons names an amount that he wants to receive for a work you – as a gallerist –just count your blessings that you are representing him, and don't challenge the artist's decision."

in turn frame their work as a service to artists (Turkish: *hizmet*, German: *Dienst am Künstler*) as well as to buyers, frequently employing the language of friendship. Nuran Terzioğlu's (*Galeri Apel*, Istanbul) statement below exemplifies this conceptualization:

> "The relationships we have with our artists is one of friendship, very amicable. When you look at our website you will see that we list their direct contact information. We have endless trust towards each other, really like a family. When you look at other galleries, the relationship between gallerists and artists is more business-like (*ticari*, also meaning commercial). It is impossible to get an email address or the phone number of the artist through them. In contrast, we have a very respectful relationship."

Murat Pilevneli (*Galerist*, Istanbul) and Anne Schwarz (*Max Hetzler*, Berlin) made similar statements, with Pilevneli further laying out the different dimensions of this relationship:

> "We are the representatives of the artist. I see myself as an advocate (*savunucu*) for the artist and at the same time as his/her friend – that is the type of relationship we have. If that is not possible I do not work with a person. At the same time I also see myself as someone who opens new grounds for them."

Like Terzioğlu, Pilevneli too emphasizes that they do not seek a monopoly and exclusivity with the artist. In Berlin as in Istanbul gallery workers took great care to highlight that artists are granted "absolute freedom" – autonomy – in determining concepts and selecting pieces for exhibitions. Pilevneli also mentions that instead of "suffocating artists" he helps "his" artists get representation (with other galleries) abroad rather than retaining a gatekeeper position. The latter has recently come under scrutiny, since given the strength of the art market during my research period, galleries were said to be intervening in lending negotiations with museums more forcefully. It is important to remember that galleries and museums rely on each other in several regards: For instance, loans from galleries are often used to prop up museum collections for thematic exhibitions, especially as acquisition capabilities of museums decrease due to lack in

public funding. The contentiousness and interdependency that characterizes the relationship between museums and galleries is described by Britta Schmitz of the *Hamburger Bahnhof Museum* (Berlin) as follows:

> "Galleries are important for us as well since they draw our attention to certain artists. But this also means – and this has certainly increased – that gallerists intervene much more than they used to, and advise artists where to exhibit and under which conditions. There has been an extreme increase in that. I presume New York has always been like that because it's always been a very tough market. For us this is of course very new. I would say this has been a global impact really, and has also made it very difficult for artists who are not represented by galleries, especially these big galleries."

While in Schmitz' description the power differential seems to have clearly shifted towards private galleries it is important to remember that being included – either in a temporary exhibition or permanently by acquisition into a museum's collection remains an important validating factor for artists both in its ideal dimensions (i.e. not just being a market phenomenon, but being acknowledged by the old institutional setting of the artworld), and in its economic implications, since museum approval generally translates into value-added to existing and future works. That much of these power differentials may play out behind the scenes was further brought to my attention when interlocutors in Istanbul who had taken part in exhibitions at the *Istanbul Modern*, recounting feeling pressured to gift one or two works to the museum, citing exactly this rationale.[77]

Gallerists also frame their work as in the service of the broader public – after all, they are open for all passers-bys – although they tend to admit that their focus is on reaching those that are potential buyers. Audiences (including myself) frequently note

[77] I was unfortunately unable to corroborate this information since the public relations department of the *Istanbul Modern* did not return my calls and email request for an interview. I did speak however to one of the administrators of the museum's educational program as well as two affiliated curators, Ali Akay (who was briefly the director in 2005) and Levent Çalıkoğlu (who became the director of the museum in 2008); see Chapter 4.

that they find the atmosphere of private galleries intimidating. All gallerists I spoke to highlighted the element of mediation or translation between the artist and the (potential) buyer that they see as part of their "duty." As one Berlin-based gallerist put it: "A buyer and an artist may not necessarily get along, they may not like or understand each other. So what we are providing for them, what we are really doing is to translate between the two parties." This emphasis on translation points again to the fact that the "position" of an artwork or an artist is not necessarily self-evident and indicates the potentially diverging interests in art of the parties involved.

However, not all art lovers and buyers are conceived of as the same. Off the record, gallerists tend to distinguish between "serious" collectors who along with money spend considerable amounts of time studying a particular artist or a specific school of art. Those who dedicate their lives to collecting, know when to buy and when to sell a piece – not to make profit, but in order to reinvest in other works that make a given collection "stronger," e.g. more coherent are talked about with admiration. In contrast, other collectors "may have money, but no taste and understand nothing of art. They only collect because it is considered good form (*zum guten Ton gehört*). But money isn't everything." While some collectors' motivations are thus under scrutiny, gallerists' general descriptions of their relationships with buyers highlight elements of trust and speak of bonds (that surpass that of 'sheer' business relations), service and friendship.

Before delving further into how collectors themselves frame their practices and how they express their attachment to and involvement in art, let me turn briefly to Stuart

Plattner's ethnographic study of the St. Louis art market, "High Art Down Home" (1996). Plattner comes to a similar portrayal of how collectors describe their relationships with art dealers as personally meaningful. He relates the existence of these highly personalized relationships to the fact that the risk in art transactions is perceived as rather high. This risk, according to Plattner, results from the asymmetrical knowledge between art dealers and buyers, especially as art prices are increasingly hard to comprehend by laypeople (1996, 17).[78] Plattner thus compares the art market to another market constellation in which transaction risks tends to be great, peasant trading markets (1996, 200). He proposes that here as in the art market the emphasis on personal relationships and steady trading partners (instead of going for the highest bidder when opportunity arises) presents a longstanding strategy to lower this risk. While the element of risk reduction is valid in this context, I propose that expressions of friendship[79] and other modes of emotional and ideal attachments do not only alleviate the perception (or existence) of risk. They also help to mediate the contradictions that arise from treating art as a commodity – a concern that is both historically formative and theoretically portrayed as detrimental to the modern conception of art. Viewed in this vein, I see motifs of friendship, service and mediation as conduits to deproblematize a whole range of relationships within the

[78] Plattner argues that the success of the impressionists in Paris presented a watershed moment in the formation of the art market, because it proved the viability of artistic movements apart from state patronage through a contractual dealership model that offered artists living stipends in return for a predetermined number of paintings. But more importantly, the impressionists also established a precedent that art qualified as outrageous at one moment could not only become profitable, but also valued in an aesthetic and social sense. A second shift, according to Plattner occurred through the postmodern turn in social thought that produced a crisis in authority, and with regard to the art market made pricing more risky (Plattner 1996, 20 and 31). Other developments could also be referenced, for instance, the advent of modern and conceptual art further unsettled appraisal models that were employed during the Renaissance period such as 'invested' worktime, materials and techniques (see Baxandall 1972, Kempers 1987).

[79] There is, of course, another facet of friendship relations that anthropologist Maruška Svašek explores in her study on the Czechoslovak artworld, i.e. their function as networks of professional favoritism and security (2002). For the scope of this chapter I am however more concerned with the question what role the trope of friendship plays in the daily workings of the artworld.

artworld, both on a personal and on a structural level that are employed to make different interests in art compatible with each other.

I want to draw attention to a second argument that Plattner makes in this context, the answer to which may serve to reiterate some of the points made in this chapter and think about their further implications. Plattner asks:

> "But why should profiting from art be morally censured in a thoroughly capitalist society? I hypothesize that the discomfort comes about because different social classes interact in the art world: collectors who are upper middle class or affluent cannot avoid confronting the difference between themselves and the typically poor artist who make the work they covet. So long as they concentrate on discussing their love for art and aesthetic theory, this potentially embarrassing difference can remain in the background" (1996, 192-93).

While I do not necessarily mean to refute this point, I would like to point to the fact that while artists themselves might very often be poor, they predominantly come from middle class backgrounds, and respective educational formations. The discomfort that Plattner describes and that I also frequently found might indeed be relayed to the moment in which artworks crystallize themselves unequivocally as commodities. There is another facet connected to the obscuration of the commodity character of art that Plattner points to – one that the interviews I conducted also suggest: "This [concentration on aesthetic theory] suits artists, who tend to be uncomfortable admitting that their creative work serves the rich above all other groups in society. It suits the serious collectors, who, as shown in this chapter, truly love art and are fascinated by the artists" (1996, 193). Indeed most artists although they aspire to live from their artistic work feel uncomfortable with the marketplace as well as the fact that art remains, as Halil Altındere points out (see Chapter 5), a rather elitist realm from which artists frequently try to distance themselves, by contemplating wider audiences in the production of artworks or by trying to break down barriers between artist and audience through collaborative

projects. Viewed in this vein the focus that Plattner presents actually serves a discursive deflection from the major tension in the artworld, i.e. the very condition under which art is produced and consumed.

On Collectors and Their Narratives: Accumulating Public Goods in Private Hands

Artists, gallerists and collectors are not simply connected by way of the artworks that are 'exchanged' among them, but the mediation of this exchange through the art market is both necessary and conflicted. They are necessary to artists as sales are a major component that allows them to live from their art. By the same token they are conflicted because in these interactions associations of art as "making a personally valid statement" and aiming "to advance our cultural vision" (or an "transcendental aesthetic experience"; Plattner 1996, 6-7) collide with its constituted-ness as a commodity, the (monetary) value of which is a topic of great contention (see above).

Scholars have examined practices of collecting under different analytical perspectives be they material, psychological[80] or symbolic, often drawing on Bourdieu's theory of distinction as animating the collecting impetus (Pearce 1995, Baudriallard [1968] 1994, Elsner/Cardinal 1994). While the following passages touch on some of these issues such as how collectors frame their own activities and subjective motivations, what I am most concerned with here is the problematic that arises from accumulating

[80] In her survey monograph on colleting Susan Pearce defines a collection as "a group of objects, brought together with intention and sharing a common identity of some kind, which is regarded by its owner, as in some sense, special or set apart" (Pearce 1995, 159). Pearce walks the reader through different approaches to collecting, including psychoanalytical ones in which the 'affection' and passion for objects is a transference of sexual desires (see also Baudrillard 1994). She distinguishes three planes on which to analyze collecting, i.e. as practice, poetics and politics: "If practice shows us what kinds of meanings objects and collections have been given in social tradition, and poetics tells us how individuals have worked within and through these institutions to make meaning for themselves a discussion of the politics of collecting brings these two together to show why and how collected objects are subject to different valuations and the importance which this has" (1995, 33).

public goods (i.e. art) in private hands. Taking the cases of three collectors, one from Germany (Thomas Olbricht) and two from Turkey (Sema Çağa and to a lesser extent Ahmet Merey) as examples, I show how their engagement with art is not only framed in terms of personal attachments, passion and devotion, but as a "responsibility" towards artists and 'the public.' It is this notion of responsibility toward the public that collectors cite to explain why they make their personal collections publicly available. I argue that the processes of 'going public' (as well as the often-referred category of being a "serious collector") is conceived of as a service to society and thus a contribution to the greater good. These types of rationalizations not only serve to mediate (and alleviate) the above-outlined tension, but also place collecting art firmly within the parameters of philanthropic activity, and thus, the conceptions of modernity and progress frequently connoted with it (Şeni 2008).[81]

Like the arts' involvement with the state, the intersection of art with the market is seen to be constitutive for the artworld as well as detrimental to it and thus as conducive to the autonomy of art (and artistic development) as endangering it.[82] Collectors remain along with the now globalized grant economy (both in the form of artists' residencies and individual project support) an important source of (potential) income for many artists that I met during my research. Historically, private collectors of different scales were

[81] During her introductory remarks to the Symposium "Philanthropy and Patrons in the City. Toward a Contemporary Urban and Cultural Policy" (January 25, 2008; Istanbul), historian Nora Şeni distinguished between charity as often religiously connoted and philanthropy as bound to notions of modernity and progress; with the latter also being understood as countering the retreat of the state from certain types of services for its citizens.

[82] For historical approaches that examine the relationship between artistic developments and art markets, including the professionalization of artists see Kempers 1989 (looking mostly at patronage and commissioned works in renaissance Italy) and North and Ormond's analysis of the emergence and shifts in art markets by comparatively looking at the sales and auctions of paintings, jewelry, antiquities and other artifacts throughout Europe between 1400-1800 (1998).

instrumental in the establishment of modern art by providing a counterforce to state-sanctioned and -supported artistic preferences. While the art market boom of the past seven years, only shortly interrupted by the 'new economy' bust in the early 2000s, has brought big international collectors into the spotlight (be it Pinault, Lauder, and Saatchi, or Stoschek, Flick, Eczacıbaşı and Koç), artists point to the fact that it is frequently smaller collectors who are vital in securing the livelihoods of individual artists (see also Plattner 1996).[83] After all, many interlocutors maintain that in the case of Turkey the lack of a broader collector tier has stifled the development of art outside the state academies.

That the examples in this chapter focus on larger collectors is not to obscure this important dimension added by occasional buyers, or discount the commitment and role of those with too little resources to be registered in the glossy media outlets and annals of the artworld. Rather the concentration lies on larger collectors because of their capacity to influence official cultural policy and the exhibiting practices of public institutions. My fieldwork fell into a period in which there was much talk of the international "art bubble" (Monopol 2006, 46-47) which according to the prevalent narrative was based on unprecedented influx of money into the art market (often described through the euphemisms of "new money," "young collectors," as well as "speculators" with seemingly unrevealable identities, yet believed to be out there). Because the tale of the "bubble" was always accompanied by predictions of an immanent burst, a few words about the situation of the art markets of Berlin and Istanbul to preface the following discussion might be useful.

[83] While it is of course relative what makes a small versus a large collector, the collections discussed in this chapter are in the range of 1,000 pieces and above. Plattner's ethnography "High Art Down Home," however, shows how collectors of quite different scale (and geographical location) are actually interconnected through the system of the art market and the institutional setting of the art world (Plattner 1996, see also Becker 1982).

Most interlocutors in Berlin emphasized that the art boom in Berlin has always been more one of producing and exhibiting than of market activity, mostly brought about by the "*Aufbruchstimmmung*" as Berlin artist Florian Zeyfang characterized the atmosphere after the fall of the wall. This enthusiastic embarking on new beginnings was sustained by the (for German and European conditions) low costs of living and the abundance of living and studio space, especially in the then quickly deserted parts of East Berlin which presented not only a draw for artists from all corners of Germany, but also from abroad. In tandem with the continued subsidies pouring into the city to showcase the new capital of a united Germany that also engendered an arts 'grants economy' designed to (re)vitalize the city, alternative subsistence strategies were possible for many artists who flocked to Berlin since the early 1990s. A substantial number could survive by bartending or waiting tables (or by freelancing in web design or for advertising) a few times a week, while pursuing their artistic work the rest of the time.[84] The proliferation of performance and exhibition spaces was aided by a combination of low rents and lax regulations regarding building use that allowed for makeshift galleries – a laxity that first existed by default and then was to some extent sustained by the city's municipality, on the initiative of mayor Eberhard Diepgen and his successor Klaus Wowereit. Both mayors saw these flexible structures as conducive to the city's creative capital, and as part of a marketing device to position Berlin as a capital of the arts. What did not take hold however, were the attempts to bring different types of industries to Berlin, e.g.

[84] A considerable number of artists I interviewed in Berlin intermittently received unemployment benefits. Even under the new restructured welfare category of *Hartz IV* (that established in 2005 joins the tiers of unemployment aid and social security support and has been critiqued for contributing to the impoverishment of the unemployed rather than helping them reintegrate into the workforce) the average living costs in Berlin still allowed many of them a decent living. The *Kindergeld* (child or family allowance) assistance that the German state provides presents another source of potential income for artists with children, leading one artist to call her elementary school age son – jokingly – her "sponsor."

publishing from Munich, advertising from Hamburg, banking from Frankfurt, despite all incentives. By 2006 many German newspapers and publishers had closed their Berlin offices, leaving often only correspondents and freelance contributors behind, not least because local ad revenues could not be secured (see Babias 2006b).

Most poignant for a country's capital, this circumstance is telling for the city's economic state and a testament to the legacy of German federalism (especially in its post-WWII incarnation). While many artists live and show their works in Berlin, money from selling art is generally made elsewhere; most notably in Cologne, Düsseldorf, and Munich.[85] International buyers present an exception to this trend, with Berlin's art scene being an added attraction for tourists visiting the city.[86] As in Istanbul, so in Berlin, success abroad vital. In Istanbul mainly because of the low level in contemporary arts funding (especially since culture and tourism have been subsumed under the same administrative unit since 2003; an exception here presents film), and in Berlin because despite the high productivity levels, little buying and selling of art is being done. How the recent economic downturn will influence the specific situation in Berlin remains to be seen. While the expected fall in art sales themselves might be of less concern, the city has been essentially bankrupt for the past five years. Looming budget cuts due to decreasing

[85] In short: Those cities where both old money and the beneficiaries of the post-WWII *Wirtschaftwunder* reside, and where many of the top tier galleries started out and maintain their main branches.

[86] In this regard, arts writer Henricke Thomsen labels Berlin a "transit space" and explains the "tragic-comic role" of Berlin in the global art sector through the example of the recently opened branch of the London gallery *Haunch of Venison* owned by François Pinault who is also the majority stake-holder of the auction house *Christie's*. Pinault's entrance into the gallery sector has become, says Thomsen, a source of anxiety for many in the artworld since this move potentially opens the door for *Christie's* to push into the primary art market and to dictate and inflate art prices. While the presence of world-class galleries might augment Berlin's status in the artworld, these types of connections can drive up artworks' prices, thus making it harder for local institutions to acquire any of these works due to their limited budget. Berlin's position as a "stage" (*Schauplatz*) for exhibiting contemporary art hence does not translate into a situation where these works are or will be accessible to the local public (Thomsen 2007).

tax revenue and waning federal subsidies are expected to further impact arts funding for state institutions as well as individual district and neighborhood (*Kiez*) programs.

In the case of Istanbul, as public funding for contemporary art is minuscule, budget cuts due to the economic downturn are not expected to aggravate the situation further. Many artists and curators I interviewed support themselves (between project monies and grants) by teaching art or art theory at universities, and to a lesser extent in public schools or after-school programs. Others – although hesitant to speak about their situation – seem to have to (and can) rely on personal or family means. However, independent arts organizations that mainly depend on private funding have recently reported that corporate support, even if previously committed, has been increasingly difficult to secure.[87] Yet, it seems that large collectors from Turkey remain in the game, and are frequently seen at art fairs and international biennials where sales are still made (according to anecdotal accounts by artists as well as reports posted on the international arts list-serve e-flux). Another question is however, how the economic crisis will influence the sale of artworks produced in Turkey, especially the buying habits of foreign collectors, whose number has been continuously rising in recent years – so much so that in 2005 *Galerist* director Murat Pilevneli stated that at least 50% of his clientele is from abroad. This fact counteracts the long-held notion that art from Turkey is only of interest

[87] Since Istanbul's nomination in 2007 as one of the European Capitals of Culture (along with Pécs and Essen) for 2010 the hopes of many artworld actors have been pinned to the project monies provided by the European Union and the additional funds that they expected to be able to raise in conjuncture with the city's nomination. However, due to administrative difficulties, infighting in the program committee and partial misappropriation of funds for the restoration of historical sites in the city through the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and its municipal branches, these hopes have not yet materialized.

to local and national markets and illustrates the recent increase in interest in art from Turkey, along with that from the Balkans and the Middle East (see also Chapter 7).

Collecting art is frequently portrayed as a rather new occurrence in Turkey, enabled and underwritten by the market liberalization policies first by the military junta and then the Özal government in the 1980s as well as global economic restructuring processes. In these types of narratives the long absence of art collectors is mainly attributed to a missing bourgeoisie, due to belated modernization and stifled economic development (Keyder 1987 and 1997). One argument that is rarely if ever made in this context is that Turkey lost, expelled and decimated significant proportions of its non-Muslim bourgeoisie through genocidal violence, population exchange, and the wealth tax (see Chapter 4) – the ramifications of which with regard to artistic production and collecting activities are still to be studied in full. Another often-advanced notion is that broader collecting practices only began in the 1980s, which Pilevneli regards as a gross misrepresentation. Instead he proposes:

> "There have always been collectors, but of course the make-up of any given collection and how it develops depends on what you are offering collectors. So what we were missing really were serious collectors in contemporary art from Turkey – these were the people that were in the minority. They only emerged along with the spaces like *Galerist* that made it [contemporary art from Turkey] available to them. […] So the change we initiated was not the generation of interest in, but of the exhibition opportunities for contemporary art."

Despite the divergent constitutions of the art market, the way collectors frame their activities, and the general problematic inherent in the practice of collecting are similar in both locations. Collecting is framed as intensely personal – not least because it presents a way of relating to the world (Baudrillard 1994, Pearce 1995). While collectors themselves may and often do speak of 'their' works in highly personal terms, with frequent tropes being passion, love, and preciousness from which they do not want to part

– the very nature of the modern conception of art as a public good differentiates artworks from other collectibles, lets say stamps or vintage cars.[88] As the motives of art collectors often come under scrutiny, the following passages give an insight into how they position themselves vis-à-vis this scrutiny and how they portray their activities that are associated with badges of both prestige and suspicion.

Notes from the Collector's Forum: Thomas Olbricht – Collecting between Passion and Profit(ability).

At an event in the Collectors' Forum series, organized by Artforum[89] in June 2006 at the Hyatt Hotel, prominently located in walking distance from Berlin's *Postdamer Platz*, directors of museums and contemporary arts organizations as well as an array of arts writers have gathered along with around 150 well dressed art enthusiasts of what an artist I met once called "the pearl necklace brigade." Hors d'oeuvres prepared by an award-ward winning chef and drinks are served by a fleet of waiters and waitresses at the entrance to the Grand Ballroom. Today's speaker is (and this is emphasized by the moderator Rose-Maria Gropp, then acting cultural editor of the *FAZ*) *Professor Dr. Dr.* Olbricht, an endocrinologist by training, who made his fortune in pharmaceutical research. By passion however, Olbricht is one of Germany's most well-known art collectors. When asked about the criteria for building his collection mainly focusing on contemporary art and photography, Olbricht states that he collects according to themes, rather than thinking about different "artists' blocks" or "artists from A to Z." His

[88] While these types of objects, over time, can also be accorded historical value because they are signifiers of a common history and present documentations thereof (as indicated in the German term *Zeitzeugnis*), it seems to me that art today is very much understood as a public good beginning from its original production.
[89] Established in 1995, Artforum is Berlin's biggest commercial art fair; for more detail see Chapter 7.

preferences, Olbricht says, emerge mostly from his sensibilities ("*aus meinem Gefühl*") and "the subconscious." "Just as all art, irrespective of style, deals with life, that is what I also do. I occupy myself with life. No more and no less." While surely all collecting can be viewed as a creative process, Olbricht's analogy between his collecting and the thematic of art can frequently be found in collectors' accounts. They carry within them an approximation between the creative work of the artist and that of the collector, who through a particular assemblage can highlight divergent aspects of the collected artworks.[90] What animates his collecting, Olbricht professes, is the hunter's instinct that, in his case, "reacts to color and figurative painting" (and judging from the selection he showed via a Power Point presentation composed for the occasion, often also reacts to erotically tinged themes; a fact that, while never explicitly raised by Olbricht, induced periodic giggles from the audience). Olbricht's description of collecting as a primal instinct, speaks to Susann Pearce's analysis of the motifs of hunting and "prize

[90] Another facet of this kind of approximation can also be found in stories on personal interactions with artists: Although Olbricht at first rather vehemently states that he prefers not to meet the artist because it may influence the way he thinks about an artwork, he recounts not without a considerable amount of pride his meeting with Larry Clark, who according to Olbricht is a role model for generations to follow because he "not only documented but also lived sex, drugs and rock'n roll." He continues by saying: "Maybe I can quickly tell the story, actually there is a great story about every work in my collection. I had the opportunity to visit Larry Clark with Ute Eskildsen, director of the photography collection of the des Folkwang Museum, which is one of the best and largest photographic collections in Germany. She knows amost everyone and we had the opportunity to visit Larry Clark in his apartment in New York. Larry Clark is approximately my age, meaning well over 50 but not yet 60. [Once we arrived] he locked his young girlfriend in the adjacent room and produced a box from under his bed so we could look at some of his vintage prints. He allowed me to pick and choose and said: 'tax free.' I asked how we could do this since I did not have enough money on me. He said I should just send it to him. And then I asked do you know how many editions you made of these prints? And he wrote of the back of the prints, 3 maybe 4 I really don't know I was on drugs (*laughter from the audience*) When there were problems with the bank transfer I invited him to Essen. We spent two beautiful days together and then came back to the issue of payment. He took the money and put it in a plastic bag. I said: 'Larry this will not work.' Shortly afterwards I received a call from him from the airport in which he said 'you have to get me out of here' (again laughter from the audience). I cleared the situation with customs saying that he received the money rightfully – although it is still a mystery to how we got away with it. I told him that he might get into trouble at the U.S. border as well since you are not allowed to take in more than $10,000 in cash, […]. 8-9 hours later he called saying 'Thomas, I got it, I got it through nobody stopped me – I walked right through. And this story remains connected for me to the photographs."

possession" in collecting (1995, 183): "Notions like 'hunt' and 'quest,' and ideas of collections as prey or trophy, bring before us the play of dominance and control which collecting involves, painted in the brightest colours" (Pearce 1995, 184). Inherent in the metaphor of the hunt is the notion of an "achievement through struggle" (Pearce1995, 184) and competition (Plattner 1996, 179) illustrated by Olbricht's account of his quest to acquire a particular painting by Gerhard Richter that had been previously unavailable:

> "I downright had to hunt it down for more than six years. I knew where it was, but just could not get it. And it became more and more expensive, like the houses on Sylt.[91] It was in the possession of the art dealer who showed it in his Mannheim gallery in 1967. Finally, I had my shot at it and I got it."

Notably, Olbricht did not divulge what it took to convince the previous owner to part from this painting after more than 30 years.

Asked how he chooses artworks, Olbricht's principle is seemingly simple: "I look for quality in an artwork, and quality is the staging of something that no one sees, but I notice all of a sudden." This statement is very much in line with Enlightenment thought on aesthetics, in which art allows one to perceive and hence connect to the world in ways previously unseen (see above, also Danto 1964). It is also telling insofar as that it refers to the allure that art has by two kinds of association, namely the appreciation of and identification with (what is at least believed to be) the perspective of the artist, and by owning a piece of art (and assembling it in a collection through an creative act). Walking the audience through his slideshow, Olbricht also concedes that the way in which he puts artworks in relation to each other is often "banal." Moving from a John Curry painting of a man gazing intently afar to an image of a thinly clad woman (according to Olbricht one

[91] Sylt is part of the North Frisian Islands and a popular resort for German celebrities.

of the first carbon color print photographs to be produced in the U.S.) with the words "I imagine him to be looking at something like this," Olbricht takes the opportunity to reiterate that he is not knowledgeable in the arts – at least not formally: "I am not someone who like an art historian picks everything apart and interprets something into it, but the artist does not do that either." This statement is in stark contrast to his and other collectors' portrayals of their practices as entailing the constant study of artistic works.[92]

Although, as Plattner states "most collectors learn to speak of art in terms commonly associated with romantic or familial love" (1996, 167), and in Olbricht's case passion, the latter also admits that personal taste alone "of course" cannot guide the collection. A balance has to be struck between "passion and reason" ("*Leidenschaft und Vernunft*"), which also means thinking about the collection in economic ("*betriebswirtschaftlich"*) terms. Given the present heights of the art market, Olbricht states that it is hard "*even as a* serious collector" (*seriöser Sammler,* also meaning sincere or reliable) to "withstand the temptation to also sell a piece in light of the prices that can be achieved […] just from an economic perspective there are some opportunities that I cannot pass up to cede a piece even if only to invest in something new." That Olbricht uses the term "*abgeben*" (to cede or hand off) with regard to works that he resells could be taken as indicative of the discomfort that many artworld actors face when recognizably (or primarily) treating art objects as commodities. This issue also comes up in the discussion of his general selection criteria that, according to Olbricht, include:

> "What kind of artist is this? Does he already have a certain renomé? Where is he represented and by whom? In which museums has he been shown? When these

[92] The proposition that one can understand art without necessarily explaining it plays again on the notion of art as intrinsically human and thus accessible to all. Olbricht's statement implies that formal knowledge of art can also be hindering to the communication between an artistic expression and the audience.

> criteria are applied you won't get an artist whose works can be bought cheaply (*für 'nen Appel und 'n Ei*)."

Thus Olbricht's language shifts from a very personal connection to a piece to standards of how the artworld as an institutional setting has thus far evaluated the body of work of an artist. Individual passions and desires are then not first and foremost bound to the art object itself but mediated by and refracted through the judgment of experts. That these types of rationalizations have little to do with a particular work in the first place, becomes even more contoured in his follow-up explanation:

> "I try to find out if the artist will have the potential for me to create added value (*Wertschöpfung*). Many artists will be angry with me now for saying so, but that's just the way it is. From a hundred artists only one will remain anyway. That's what I think. And after all I have five children and they also should be able to inherit some of my money."

Yet he distinguishes himself from those who buy art solely for investment purposes. Like other collectors in Germany and elsewhere, Olbricht is quick to complain about speculative buyers[93] who are "ruining it for everyone," including artists, by being

[93] Speculative collecting is generally understood as buying art for investment purposes. With the relatively steady rise in art prices (in contrast to boom and bust-prone investment 'objects' of the 'new economy', or recently, real estate) art has been propagated as a relatively 'safe' and lucrative investment, especially since the early 2000s (collectors' handbooks such as Richard H. Rush' *Art as an Investment* make similar predictions as early as 1961). Due to the special status of 'cultural goods' in the EU arena profit margins for re-selling artworks are tax-free, thus adding attractiveness to acquiring artworks for investment purposes. However, newspapers and arts publications have been filled with contradictory projections: While Claudia Herstatt posited in 2006 that 5-10% investment in art was becoming a standard for hedge funds (Herstatt 2006), there were also calls for caution, including from the newly formed German *Verband unabhängiger Kunstsachverständiger* (Association of Independent Arts-Experts or Appraisers). Its co-founder Karl Schweizer's (himself the art advisor to UBS Bank) warned that in the long run only a handful of artists per generation will gain more value (cited in Gehrman 2009). In November 2007 Georgina Adam declared in the *Art Newspaper* "that the party isn't over yet" and that the "strong liquidity in the global system" would ensure art prices to climb. She projected that even if younger artists' appraisals – always associated with more risk – were to cool off slightly, those already established and the 'classic masters' would be sure to gain in value. Although BBC online reported in the November 2007 that the auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's sold only half of the works on display (among those unsold were Picassos and Rothkos, BBC 2007), the Independent ran an article in October 2008 that proclaimed that "art has become a viable option for investors" (Deakin 2008). News pieces such as this often cited the London based Fine Arts Fund (with a minimum investment of 250,000 Euro), which is, according to Gehrman (2009), one of the few that has – so far – survived the current economic crisis. Two notable consequences are generally argued to arise from this particular development in art prices and sales: According to German art historian and critic Isabelle Graw it has created a conflation or rather confusion between the market value

uninterested in the art, uniformed, and at fault for driving art prices to their current heights.[94] This trope is notable in two ways: First, it makes a distinction between collecting art purely as an investment and collecting art for art's sake (where value added appears as a byproduct, but not a goal). In light of Olbricht's earlier discussion of his selection criteria this seems to be a rather questionable distinction. Secondly, it may very well be that "speculative buyers" are not interested in art in the same way, or invested in studying it as 'serious' collectors claim to, yet both 'groups' are frequently advised by the very same set of experts and art scouts (see also Rush 1961). This in turn, points to another contradiction: although collectors mostly speak in the first person singular when outlining their practices, they generally work closely with advisors (gallerists, art dealers or appraisers). This, which Olbricht thematized very late in his presentation and only when he took questions from the audience, does not present an exception, but tends to be one of the more obscured facets of the workings of the art market.

Connecting to the world: Sema Çağa

There is another kind of collecting – or buying of art that is frequently frowned upon by those who identify as serious collectors – the "decorative buyer." Gallery workers in Berlin and Istanbul sometimes jokingly, sometimes in an unnerved fashion

(*Marktwert)* and the symbolic value (*Symbolwert*) of an artwork, resulting in the maxim that "good art is art that sells" (Windsor 2007). Graw thus proposes that under the current conditions the symbolic value of an artist's body of work is based on its economic value, instead of emerging from the conversations between "art historians, critics, museums, exhibitions, curators, etc." which focus primarily on artistic innovation (see interview with Werneburg 2009). Consequently art prices have not only become the primary lens through which we see art (Kinsella 2007), but a constitutive part of the artwork itself.

[94] It is interesting that although numerically speaking art prices are at new heights, the assessment of overpricing seems to be a cyclical occurrence. In her 1960 autobiography Peggy Guggenheim, for instance, already bemoans the advent of speculative buying and ensuing price levels. Contemplating her regrets with regard to works that she sold and others, which she could not buy, Guggenheim notes: "However, I comfort myself by thinking how terribly lucky I was to have been able to buy all my wonderful collection at a time when prices were still normal, before the whole picture market turned into an investment market" (1960, 110; see also 171-173).

refer to what a former gallery assistant of *Galerie Max Hetzler*, describes as customers with "decorative challenges." These come into the gallery with request such as "I am looking for a yellow contrast image (*Kontrastbild*) to set off my furniture." This concern was seconded in Istanbul by Ayşe Çoskun of *GF Sanat Evi*, who often referred to these kinds of buyers as those who "look for something to put above the sofa" and "are in dire need to be educated about art." Another Berlin-based interlocutor explained her assessment of these customers by noting that she "found it aggravating when people talked about art only in the same way as they are talking about cars, or what have you." Her stance reinforces that despite its commodification art remains an object of a different order – an issue that is as much at the heart of the modern conception of art as it is in the debates of the Frankfurt School.

But it is exactly along these lines – supposedly distinguishing the serious from the 'decorative' collector – that Sema Çağa began to venture into collecting mostly modern art from Turkey. Çağa and her husband, both lawyers, who met at *Istanbul* University, became interested in modern art when they moved into their first flat and wanted to make a home for their young family in the early 1970s (see also Hayatlı 2002). I had a chance to meet Çağa and listen to her presentation at the conference "Philanthropy and Patrons in the City. Toward a Contemporary Urban and Cultural Policy" hosted by the *Pera Museum*[95] and *SantralIstanbul*[96] and organized by historian Nora Şeni. Here Çağa

[95] Opened in 2005 by Ina and Suna Kiraç, with a permanent collection of Orientalist paintings and Anatolian weights, the *Pera Museum* reserves two floors for rotating collections, which so far have spanned selections from arts academy graduation classes to Miro and Akira Kurosawa. Located at Tepebaşi the Museum is set to expand its research center, the *İstanbul Araştırmaları Enstitüsü*, and has been waiting for the Istanbul municipality to approve its plans to erect an auditorium, library and screening room complex, designed by Frank Gehry, across the street on a lot that is currently occupied by a building housing the state television channel TRT.

repeatedly states that the impetus for her becoming a collector arose from the excitement and inspiration that experiencing art brought to her life. While she emphasized that her family valued museum visits as part of their education and stated that she became interested in and studied classic modernists such as Picasso early on, she seemingly contradicted these statements by insisting that before seriously embarking on collecting she had no prior knowledge of art. Much care was laid in her narrative that she had received a German education and that her husband had been educated in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, which also afforded them the opportunity to frequently travel to Europe. The collectors' traditions in these geographical regions served as further inspirations. References to personal background, education and travel outside of Turkey are often employed as explanatory devices that have, I propose, two implications: Firstly, they serve as a mechanism of distinction in which the subject sets him/herself apart from the uneducated and uninterested (in art and culture that is) masses in the Turkish context, who are not necessarily themselves to blame but are seen to embody the country's belated modernity. Secondly, these references also serve to reconcile highly personal interests and artistic preferences with the needs of society to which collectors are ultimately responsible and to whom they make their collections accessible.

While Çağa does not employ the motif of the hunter's instinct, she frames her engagement with art in no less personal terms:

> "Please permit me to share with you, that underneath it all [my activities as a collector] is however a highly personal inclination (*son derece kişisel bir kaygı)* from my experience of living in the city. There have been times when I have felt utterly alone in the crowd. In those periods art was a real refuge for me in the lap of which I could find peace (*huzur*), and elude the loneliness of an environment full of altercations […]. Here art opened a door for me and showed me the way.

[96] Opening in the summer of 2006 *SantralIstanbul* is located on Bilgi University's *Eyüp* campus, and derives its name from Istanbul's first electricity plant that was renovated to house the museum complex.

With her trembling voice Çağa underlined the gravity of emotional connection that the experience of art afforded her; and the form and content of her explication can be read as manifesting conceptions of the affect produced by art. Today, however, she continued, her outlook on life has changed. The intimacy that she feels with artistic expressions now offers a consoling loneliness that she actively seeks out. This sense of intimacy through collecting is also expressed in Walter Benjamin's notes on his collection of rare books: "[…] for a collector – and I mean the real collector, a collector as he ought to be – ownership is the most intimate relationship that one can have with objects. Not that they come alive in him; it is he who lives in them" (1968[1931], 67).[97] Çağa's narrative on her collection encompasses both art as a mirror of modern life in the city and a remedy to it. It offers a refuge as Weber describes (1958, see Chapter 1) and presents a communicative tool with which she relates to the world not merely through exposure to art but through its collection (see also Baudrillard 1994, Pearce 1997). Her narrative of collecting is thus tied into her search of finding a place in the world.

Responsibility, Sacrifice, Service - Collecting Art for the Greater Good

Like Olbricht, Çağa foregrounds the possibility inherent in art to view the world through the artist's eyes. This however requires personal effort, immersion into the artworks, and studying to understand an artists and his/her life to fully appreciate the work and collect in an informed fashion (see also Rush 1961). While Olbricht contends that every collector has a good amount of vanity, he, like Çağa, frequently switches

[97] Benjamin continues: "So I have erected one of his dwellings with books as the building stones, before you, and now he is going to disappear inside, as is only fitting." (1968 [1931]: 67). While Benjamin's contemplation is one of decidedly inward pleasure, we will see that the collecting of art for the collectors portrayed here always has an outward component.

registers to express humility and respect for the artist and his/her work. Not having formally studied art, or rather art history is an important aspect in these types of proclamation, as is the patience and hard work required by collectors to familiarize themselves with different artists and their works. This also entails extensive traveling to educate oneself about new art (as well as historically important works) and to pursue the acquisition of works. Similar tropes were also raised by Ahmet Merey at the same event. Merey, who specializes in "Turkish art" and is part of a family that has been collecting for four generations (see also Başaran 2008),[98] highlights the sacrifices in terms of time, effort and money that collecting often involves. He notes that "it's sometimes difficult to even find something to dress up in properly for an event as the present one," adding that he has had to part from other goods and possessions in order to be able to acquire certain paintings. When connected to the process of making private collections public, collectors' sacrifices are not only personal in nature, but signal sacrifices for the greater good of society. In the cases of Çağa and Merey assembling and preserving works of art, and specifically Turkish art, is an endeavor in which they also set themselves apart from an unresponsive state that does little to preserve its artistic heritage (see Chapter 4). For Olbricht it seems this sacrifice is borne especially by his children who suffer 'losses in their future inheritance' because of their father's passion for art. However, Olbricht too sees himself as a better-suited guardian of contemporary art than Germany's "dusty" museum system, a condition that he had bemoaned a year prior when the *Folkwang Museum* direction had expressed reservations vis-à-vis an "erotic picture" by David Nicholson from his collection (Lorch 2005).

[98] Merey and his wife have also established a contemporary art competition for students Mimar Sinan University that grants material support and stipends for at least two students per year.

What sets Çağa's and Merey's narratives apart, however, is the way they explicitly connect their engagements to local and national audiences. Olbricht, hailing from Essen himself, is closely engaged with the local Folkwang Museum, and aides in bringing contemporary German artists through residencies to the industrial Ruhr region. He also posits that it is really German collectors that bring innovation into German museums. Yet Çağa and Merey's considerations speak even more directly to national cultural policy and social history. Merey, noting the disengagement of the Turkish state with its artistic legacy, resulting in the public's deprivation of its artistic heritage, posits that he wants to contribute to the conservation and proliferation of knowledge on Turkish painting. Merey repeatedly emphasizes that an important part of his family legacy is their early interest in figurative painting and portraits, which he sees as exceptional for a Muslim family that began collecting in the late 19th century – and can be read as an attempt to counteract the notion that artistic developments and appreciation in Turkey were stifled due to religious biases against figurative painting.[99] Çağa also stresses that she comes indeed from an old *Istanbullu* family – a discursive device employed by many persons of her social standing and cultural capital for the purpose of distinction from internal migrants (and displaced Kurds) often portrayed as having 'taken over the city.' This type of narrative also positions Çağa and Merey as vanguards of modernization in their native contexts. Coming from a family whose fate and history has been bound to Istanbul, she diagnoses that "many old Istanbul inhabitants withdraw and resign in face of

[99] Similar to Çağa, Merey highlights the western orientation of the family through educational ties and travel. He emphasizes repeatedly that his great-grandparents generation were high-level military men and bureaucrats, doctors and lawyers and that "at that time few Muslims" were in this position. They were according to Merey "western" oriented and collected furniture and paintings, some of which were acquired during travels abroad. In these types of narrative westward orientation becomes almost by default a prerequisite for appreciating art. After 1909 the family collection moved into buying art of their contemporaries. Merey also mentions that his grandfather commissioned two paintings that are now part of the Istanbul Modern collection and that represent the emancipation of the 'Turkish woman.'

the changes that 'their beloved' city has experienced" especially in the last forty years. Çağa proposes that in contrast to this fatalistic stance she aims to put her means in service to the city, along with those who build schools, hospitals and libraries that "bear their family names." What Merey and Çağa's narratives share is the emphasis on arts collectors as documenters, guardians and motors of modernization.

Çağa claims that although she finds it of course very flattering and inspiring to be viewed as a philanthropist, public acknowledgement is not necessary or what she is after. After all she says she is just an art lover:

> "You may call me a philanthropist or a collector…if you want to label me I would choose to say that I am concerned with the dreams that carry us through our lives and that remain even after we are gone, after our deaths. […] We render ourselves visible through our artworks."

The ideas of a legacy and the durability of a collection both for the respective immediate family but also for society as a whole join Merey's and Çağa's cases with Olbricht's account. While collections are portrayed as ultimately very personal, there are also considerations of coherence, complementation and completion in the ways in which collectors describe their collections. I would argue that these recurrent themes arise from the fact that both the symbolic and the monetary value of collections rely (despite the emphasis on personal preferences and meaning-making within these practices) on processes of objectification through the institutional and authoritative framework of the artworld, and thus the 'correctives' that arts experts provide.

Many collectors contend that with a growing collection comes a growing responsibility that needs to be taken on by the collector since "collecting art is not like amassing any kind of other objects in the corner of your house." Collectors of a certain

scale see service to the public as a call to societal duty – an understanding that speaks to the modern conception of art as a public good. While Çağa's argument for making her collection public rests on a notion that this is required by a modern(ist) stance ("*çağdaş tavırlar gerektiriyor bunları"*) is somewhat prevalent in Turkey, it shares with the German context the conception of serving the greater good through art. But how to make collections publicly accessible is in itself a contentious debate that will be further discussed in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say here that due to the decrease in public funding, board members and donors of museums have become increasingly powerful, and as Britta Schmitz noted with discomfort – have likewise increasingly sought to influence acquisition practices throughout the *Nationalgalerie* that the *Hamburger Bahnhof* is part of. It is a notable factor that board members and donors of museums tend to be collectors as well (see also Plattner 1996) as are for instance a number of the members of the "Association of Friends of the *Nationalgalerie*," which has recently led to a shift that Britta Schmitz describes as follows:

> "The general consensus used to be that the director of the *Nationalgalerie* makes the suggestions and then the board agrees. Now we have a commission that comprises two seats to represent the donors association, and they have vehemently inserted themselves into the discussion of what to acquire. This is a new situation for us and I am unsure if it is indeed a good model. After all we [the museum curators and the director] know the museum collection very well, and argue from within the collection while people from outside who have their own ambitions (*die ihre eigenen Ambitionen haben*) now also want to determine the collection and I believe that this creates a certain imbalance."

This imbalance that Schmitz refers to is borne out of the fact that donors are likely to lobby for the acquisition of artists that they themselves collect. To relegate this inclination to personal preferences alone would be shortsighted. Rather these preferences also present a strategy to ensure an increase in value of personal collectibles through the sanctioning function of the museum described above.

A slightly different yet analogous situation has emerged in Istanbul and is amplified as a number of museums, most notably *Sabancı*, *Istanbul Modern*, *Pera* and the *Elgiz Museum* directly and exclusively rely on family collections for their permanent collections. Surely the details of these vary: While in the case of *Sabancı* for instance the collection has been donated to the museum, the *Eczacıbaşı* collection (i.e. the permanent collection of the Istanbul Modern) as well as the paintings exhibited in the *Pera Museum* have remained in private possession and are only on loan to the museums by the respective families (at least at time of my research). This means that apart from the increase in value that these artworks experience, the owners can withdraw them from the institutions whenever they see fit. Either way, in both cases museums as public institutions that are to serve the public and as such are either supported by public monies as in Germany or receiving tax and other logistical benefits as in Turkey are thus intimately entangled with economic calculations of the private kind.

Corporate Sponsorship: Of Social Responsibility and Economic Byproducts

> *It is vital to convince people in the economic sector of the importance of arts and culture for our societal system (Gesellschaftssystem) and animate them to become engaged in arts and culture. This is not only a matter of money; what is at stake here is the spirit (es geht um den Geist) that is needed to achieve this. (Jürgen Zeh; introductory remarks at the Corporate Cultural Responsibility Conference, Berlin 2006)* [100]

Few practices have come under so much scrutiny in the artworld as those of corporate sponsoring, an area that even more so than collecting is constituted by and illustrates the antagonisms and interdependencies between art and economy

[100] Jürgen Zeh is the director of the *Arbeitskreis Kultursponsoring* (AKS) a working group of the *Bund der Deutschen Wirtschaft e.V.* (the Federation of German Industries). Founded in 1996, the working group encompasses representatives of more than 60 corporations, and works on sponsorship guidelines and lobbies for legal measures that enable sponsorship measures, such as tax deductions.

(Adorno/Horkheimer 1969, Lash/Urry 1994, Graw 2008). Yet given the low level of state-funding in Turkey, especially for independent art (i.e. artistic activities not under the auspices of the state, such as art academies or municipal theaters) and the rollbacks in state-funding in Germany calls for 'public-private' partnerships have intensified in both national contexts since the late 1980s. Identifying it as adversarial to the inner workings – and integrity – of art, individual artists find corporate sponsorship often difficult to deal with. Outright financial interests are seen in stark contrast to artists' descriptions of their own work framed as "deeply personal expressions," "commentaries," "interventions," "positions" and "ways of connecting to the world." A compounding factor in this context is that arts sponsorship is usually subsumed under corporations' marketing, communications or Public Relations departments.[101] Arts organizations are, on the other hand, despite diagnosing an incongruency of goals, very open to working with private funders, and to the additional financial or material resources they help secure. Many organizations stress that private sponsorship can be most efficiently attained by fostering personal relationships, not least because this allows for a more direct "mediation" or "translation" between the sectors of arts and business.

In the following, I want to briefly spotlight a couple of issues regarding how corporate or private sponsors position themselves in the arts and cultural sector and the framework they use to describe their activities. In Turkey as in Germany corporate funders across the board portray themselves as upholding artistic "autonomy" and

[101] Few corporations in Germany have foundations such as *Schering*, for instance, and mainly support art through their above-mentioned corporate departments. In Turkey many banks have galleries or cultural centers that bear their names but are likewise not endowed, but receive money funneled through the corporate PR and communications budgets.

"freedom" (often proposing that the state with its political interest is much more likely to intervene in the arts than private sponsors). In doing so, they also depict their sponsoring activities as more or less divorced from day-to-day economic activities. In the German context there is also an interesting emphasis on art sponsoring as "*Chefsache*," a distancing move that suggests that sponsoring is a task too important to be left to marketing departments that only conceive of art as advertising and cannot appreciate the social importance of these projects.

In Turkey this distancing is structurally speaking slightly easier, since most corporate sponsors have their own foundations, or cultural centers. However, the monies are often funneled through the corporate structure by way of PR and marketing departments. Görgün Taner of *IKSV*, the *Istanbul Arts and Culture Foundation*, established by the Eczacıbaşı corporation as well as Derya Bigalı of *Akbank Culture and Arts Center* frame their activities much more in terms of serving (*hizmet*) the public and providing "meeting points" between the arts and said (mostly unspecified) public. Taner in addition stresses that the *IKSV*'s mission is "educational"[102] in nature. The same holds true for *SantralIstanbul*. This arts center and exhibition complex incorporated into the private, private *Bilgi University* funded by Oğuz Özerden, similarly presents its relationship with the state and its institutions to be weaker than can be discerned on second sight (an issue taken up again in Chapter 4). Today, sponsorship in Turkey as in

[102] Taner notes that award-winning director Nuri Bilge Ceylan once said that he learned about cinema by attending the Istanbul Film festival organized by the IKSV, although he quickly added this statement should, of course, not be overrated and surely presented – in part – a nicety.

Germany is cast in terms of "corporate social responsibility"[103] and based on the proclaimed insight that "corporations ought to give back" to society.

According to statistics provided by the *Kulturkreis der deutschen Wirtschaft* (a division created under the umbrella of the *Bund der Deutschen Wirtschaft e.V.,* the Federation of German Industries that "advocates for culture as an indispensable resource for society"), corporate funding for the arts only makes for 5-10% of culture and arts related spending budgets in Germany.[104] Given this relatively low number it was all the more surprising to witness the confidence and self-perception of German industrials and finance giants during a conference entitled "Corporate Cultural Responsibility" organized by the *Bund der Deutschen Industrie* (BDI). Bernd Ziesemer (editor in chief of the economic daily *Das Handelsblatt*) and moderator of the day highlighted the importance of sponsorship in a decidedly national framework by referencing corporate contributions to "German culture" and its "blooming landscapes."[105] "What is still missing," he contends "and this is a very German condition, is the introduction of the element of competition to motivate *Kultursponsoring* by monitoring it through rankings," much like Businessweek's yearly ranking of U.S. corporations who lead in arts sponsoring.

[103] While the conference was entitled Corporate Cultural Responsibility, many the speakers interchangeably employed the term corporate social responsibility. This slippage between the cultural and the social points to a conflation that is also inherent in the modern conception of art as providing an ethical impetus in social formation and consolidation.

[104] In an interview conducted with *Kulturkreis* director Martin Fuchs in February 2008, he too highlighted that the commitment by the German industries to culture with 150 million Euros is very low considering that sports events are sponsored by the same constituency with 2.7 billion Euros.

[105] The notion of "blooming landscapes" was coined by Chancellor Kohl when he projected swift economic development in East Germany after the reunification.

What is certainly not surprising is that all participants were rather aware that their involvements in arts and culture were perceived as marketing ploys. Werner Michael Bahlsen[106] opened his statement by saying:

> "Businesses (*Unternehmen*) today – not the owners – but the businesses are the descendents of the aristocrats, the archbishops, the great noble families. It is businesses with their long traditions that have made art possible."

However it quickly becomes apparent that Bahlsen's notion of supporting the arts is intimately connected to branding activities, most notably to the employment of artists to design packaging and print ads. He adds that there is a natural synergy between artistic engagements and concerning yourself with a product that "has a lot to do with aesthetics" (in his case, biscuits). Equating the often controversial approaches of artists to their disciplinary history with the development of a brand that needs to stay contemporary, Bahlsen vehemently objected to interventions of his co-panelists who proposed that this explicit link between art and the daily business of marketing presents an instrumentalization of art. One speaker for whom Bahlsen's take on arts sponsoring seemed to be too close to comfort was Frank-Peter Martin (*Bankhaus Metzler*), who went through great pains to stress that art should not be instrumentalized. But exactly how such a 'disinterested' support of art through business was to be done emerged as a matter of contention. Ulrich Schweickart (*Atlanta AG*) proposed *"*the crux is if you define arts and culture funding as a marketing tool, if art is instrumentalized in the service of the company and its products, then art is being raped. This constitutes aggressive sponsoring." While positing that sponsoring activities are necessary "in order to attain tax advantages," he also stated that

[106] Bahlsen is the director of a family-owned business, established in 1889 that specializes in backed goods.

> "sponsoring can get problematic. Take the example of an American orchestra that performs under the name of a corporation, we are not at that point yet in Germany – thank God! Instrumentalization of arts and culture is not only misleading but it's also dangerous. A marketing section that is engaged in arts and culture always asks what good is it for the business? But really the question should be what good does it do for society?"

The harshness of Schweickart's choice of words certainly invoked the historical connotations of the NS instrumentalization of art. While imbued with the idealistic notion that considerations of the greater good have to be at the forefront of sponsoring activities, Schweickart adds "this does not mean that a bank, a business, a corporation has to adhere to the Calvinistic principle: *Tu' gutes, rede nicht darueber* (do good, do not talk about it)." Martin and Ulrich Weber (*RAG Aktiengesellschaft*) also emphasized that it is "only right and legitimate to advertise the cultural engagement of companies." Yet Michael Roßnagel (*Siemens Arts Program*) stressed that successful sponsoring in the arts is that which orients itself towards the needs of art itself. While he mentions that art sponsoring enhances employees' working motivations (since it allows for positively connoted and socially prestigious ways of identifying with the business), he seems to suggest that this impact has the status of a beneficial by-product:

> "Art has to be the clear focus of sponsoring and cannot be instrumentalized for the aims of the business; or to say it loosely based on Immanuel Kant: Art must never solely be a mean, but always also an end. (*Um es frei nach Immanuel Kant zu sagen: Die Kunst darf niemals nur Mittel sein, sondern immer auch Zweck*.)

It seems that it is no coincidence that Roßnagel chooses to refer to Kant, one of the most important German thinkers to have explored the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. That the quote is slightly skewed by the tentativeness of the formulation "never *solely* […], but always *also*" indicates that a non-instrumental take on art sponsorship is hard to achieve. Consider the following words by Bernd Ziesemeier:

> "Walter Benjamin once wanting to characterize capitalism's impact on the realm of culture said that we are in the era of the reproducibility of the artwork. He meant it more critically (*Er meinte das eher kritisch*). I too would say that we are in the era of reproducibility and we want positive examples of arts sponsoring to be reproduced, and I think that this event will contribute to enhancing awareness of what we can do in this area and show how this can impact businesses in turn."

Like the deployment of Kant, the reference to Benjamin is skewed and rather unnecessary in terms of adding anything to the arguments that Roßnagel and Ziesemeier present. Despite their seemingly thin or for lack of better word 'banal' use of these philosophers, there seems to be a perceived need to connect sponsoring activities to critical traditions of thinking about art in society and frame sponsorship under ethical considerations.

A striking parallel between corporate sponsors both in Germany and in Turkey is that they cast themselves as civil society actors. As Aydın Uğur of *Bilgi University* maintains "we do not operate like a private business at all, we really see ourselves as a civil society initiative." This sentiment is echoed by Schweickart who maintains that arts sponsorship has become a question of legitimation and of "moral (self-)responsibility" ("*moralische Selbstverantwortung*") as well as self-representation of corporations: "We can no longer be one-dimensional economic entities, nor can we be solely shareholder-oriented, but we have to think of society. Corporations are, just as NGOs or foundations, private organizations of civil society. This attitude," he adds "is a vital indicator for the degree of civilization (*Zivilizationsgrad*) in a society." Again this distancing from the economic processes and the for-profit enterprise and the approximation to civil society actors feeds into the motif of the greater good in which advertising or other financial gains appear as byproducts rather than a central consideration in sponsorship activities.

While many of the expressions of antagonism reviewed in this chapter reveal tensions that are, structurally speaking, at the heart of the modern conception of art, the personalization of the interdependent and often asymmetrical relationships within the artworld and their framing as friendships presents a strategy to overcome, or at least deproblematize these tensions. A second strategy, one that resonates with the understanding that art fundamentally contributes to the greater good, manifests itself in the notion that by way of extension all artworld activities, be they private or institutional, for profit or nonprofit, serve 'the public.' What or who constitutes the public in question is open to interpretation and can (depending on context and the position from which it is invoked) denote and bridge different geographical and socio-political assemblages. The public thus can connote 'civilization,' society, the nation, different permutations of the 'local community' – the city or the region.

However, these mediating discourses operate not only on the level of the social (or socio-political) and the civic, they also reference and merge different strands of aesthetic theory that are at times banalized and at others complicated in order to express, accommodate and reconcile divergent interests in and expectations regarding the role of art. The references to aesthetic theories present pragmatic processes that call attention to a series of assumptions about the arts. They are notably both specific (with regard to the historical background out of which they emerged) and yet generalized (and taken for granted) in that their usage is evocative, rather than substantive and rarely – if ever – accompanied by any explanation. As these pragmatic shorthands are generally accepted without questioning, they are also extremely versatile and can be employed from an array of often contradictory positions and in the pursuit of different interests. How these

pragmatic processes are reflected in the formation of official cultural policies is the topic of the following chapter.

Chapter 3: Cultural Policy – Educating or Producing Modern Citizens?

> *"Bei der Literatur is es ja so, dass jeder glaubt, er weiss wofür sie gut sein soll. Der, der schreibt, hat meistens ganz andere Probleme."*
> *"Everyone believes that they know what literature is supposed to be good for. More often than not, the one writing has quite different problems"*
> Jörg Fauser - Rohstoff (1984, 215).

What is art good for? How does the branch of government in question, that of cultural policy, bridge the 'quite different problems,' to use Fauser's formulation, that the artist might be concerned with that of a 'greater social good?' After all, it is exactly the notion that art contributes to the greater social good that has rendered it a specialized and thus legitimate realm of government and governance in the European context.

We can find variations of this rationale in Turkish as well as in German (and notably also in former GDR) state policies, all of which have been based on the modernist notion that aesthetic education and experience are civilizing agents, formative for modern personhood. This assumption constitutes the foundation of the state's proclaimed *duty* to support the arts and its *mandate to* enable access to the arts for its citizens.[107]

This chapter takes a closer look at some of the claims inherent in and explicitly made about the governance of art by outlining the trajectories of cultural policy in

[107] It is also this disposition – or rather mission – that Harry Gelb the protagonist and hero against all odds of Jörg Fauser's autobiographical novel *Rohstoff* encounters after a reading in Montabaur (Rhineland-Palatinate). Here, the local priest, who heads the youth initiative that invited Harry, tries to involve him in a discussion on the societal role – *gesellschaftliche Aufgabe* – of art with the words "the arts need to be more integrated into societal processes" (1984, 215). But Gelb, like Fauser, a recovering heroin addict in search for literary beginnings that herald new possibilities of expressing the revolutionary spirit of the 1970s, has quite different problems than doing his share for the good of society. These new beginnings (*Neuanfänge*) were to set Fauser and his generation apart in both form and content from the dominant Group 47 writers in post-WWII Germany (which included Günter Grass), which they found too stale and wedded to bourgeois principles – while moralizing against NS times (see Weidemann 2006, 65).

Germany and Turkey. As the intersection between official cultural policy and different artworld practice in the contemporary setting is addressed throughout the dissertation under varying thematics, this present chapter lays special emphasis on the historical background.

The goal of the chapter is to transcend the frequently crude portrayals of arts and cultural policy as mere instruments of governmentality and state representation, or, to put it even more simply – as a means rather than an end. Instead, I suggest that cultural policy is indicative of how society (collectivities) and individuals within that collectivity are conceptualized by state actors and of ways in which the affects and effects of art and aesthetics are imagined and understood.

In order to provide a more nuanced picture of what the governance of culture actually entails, I will try to account for different elements that constitute cultural policy and sketch some of the underlying political and socio-economic processes that shape policies and the practices that emerge from them. However, I would like to preface this exploration with two caveats: The first is a note on the usage of 'culture' in this chapter (and the dissertation as a whole), whereby I do not mean to employ the term in a reifying and bounded way, but rather to denote the realm of culture as it is operationalized in government. The second pertains, yet again, to the framework of comparison. It is not – nor can it be – my intention to diagnose if the 'accomplishments' in 'German' and 'Turkish' art are comparable from an art historical perspective. Rather, what I am attempting here is a comparison of the interaction between official cultural policy and artistic production. As I will outline in this and the following chapters, it is important not just to regard cultural policy as a regulatory mechanism for the production of art, but also

one of that 'frames' the reception thereof. This historical overview is designed to provide a more longitudal understanding of cultural policy as a particular formation in policy and administration that, in its present form, is bound to nation-state formation.

The Scope of Cultural Policy - The Object of Inquiry

While much of the recent literature has conceptualized cultural policy as an element of governmentality (Miller/Yúdice 2002), and thus a modern form of state power, it is be helpful to discern the different dimensions that cultural policy might involve at particular political and historical conjunctures.[108] Cultural policy and the administrative units nominally preoccupied therewith emerged out of the governmental domain of education, and are a testament to the pedagogical thrust of the state's governance of the arts. Apart from the intricacies of formal schooling (European) education ministries generally tended to focus on language policies and provisions[109] – a concern pertinent both in the formation of nascent nation-states and their periodic consolidation. Cultural policy as a separate entity of government emerged in the Western European context only in the second half of the 20th century. While Ahearne contends that the French ministry of cultural affairs founded in 1959 presents the first "in the Western democratic world," and regards previous cultural policy formations as *avant-la-lettre* (Ahearne 2003, 127), it is interesting to note that Turkey had a – even if short-lived

[108] Dahlhaus right points to the emergence of modern cultural policy, including education, as rooted in processes of secularization processes which shifted domains previously supported and governed by the church under the auspices the state (1990). It is also at this intersection that philanthropy arises as a form of charitable giving outside the religious setting (see also Miller/Yúdice 2002).

[109] However, it is important note that language policy in England for instance goes back to the 1400s, as does the Castilian notion of 'Language is Empire,' dating to 1492 (Miller/Yúdice 2002, 5-6).

– ministerial unit for art from 1923 to 1924 (most probably related to the construction of new government buildings, war memorials and other symbols of the new republic).

Despite this administrative separation, the domains of language and education[110] remain in dialogue with that of culture – not least because as officials stress that access to art – or rather the ability to understanding art is bound to respective levels of education. This assumption is confirmed by some and negated by other cultural producers, in part because it can be taken to refute the universalistic claim of art as intrinsically human. It also yields the suspicion of elitism (through distinction in Bourdieu's suggested sense) and thus presents an assessment of art and the artworld that not all respondents agreed or maybe wanted to agree with (see Chapters 2 and 5).

Cultural ministries in both Turkey and Germany are, in addition to their focus on arts policy in the narrower sense, concerned with museums and cultural heritage[111] and assume responsibility for state theaters, ballets and operas.[112] The working objects of cultural ministries converge with other administrative units and fields of governance in the realms of libraries (run and funded by either the state, municipalities, or both), media, broadcasting, publishing and film funding provisions. Market regulations, laws concerning charitable giving, taxation and questions of copyright may or may not fall directly under the governmental unit of culture. As I will argue in Chapter 7 these

[110] In the German case education is located on the regional level of the Länder. Although some of the states apply the term *Bildung* mostly these administrative and decision-making units are labeled *Kultusministerium*. The term *Kultus* etymologically stands for ecclesiastical or religious affairs thus pointing to the fact that education and school administration was long under the domain of the Church rather than the state. In accordance with the overall centralized make-up of Turkey both the realms of education and that of culture are centrally directed.

[111] Although the focus in this dissertation is mainly on contemporary art, it is important to keep in mind that the arts and heritage are intrinsically connected, and reference each other in policy formation and in the larger context of (national) cultural representation.

[112] Their city counterparts in turn are supported in large parts by municipalities, as are community arts centers, with some (federal) state support.

regulations concern the artwold vitally and connect it with other domains of (supranational) governance as well as with the marketplace, since they impact the pricing of 'cultural or artistic commodities and services' and influence support of culture and the arts, not least through the private sector. What is explicitly subsumed under cultural policy as an administrative unit, thus only presents a fraction of what cultural policy actually entails.

Cultural policy operates through and brings about peculiar kinds of tensions. Toby Miller and George Yúdice, two of the foremost thinkers on the subject, begin one of their recent explorations of the topic by stating that "culture is connected to policy in two registers: the aesthetic and the anthropological" (2002, 1). While the first is "framed by interests of cultural criticism and history" and marks differences within a given population, the second "articulates differences between populations." According to the authors, "cultural policy refers to the institutional supports that channel both aesthetic creativity and collective ways of life – a bridge between the two registers." I am interested in this bridging not only in the dimension explicated by these authors: cultural policy is at heart a bureaucratic endeavor based on the implementation of policies, while pointing at ever high-held ideas and ideals that all too often seem contradictory if not adversarial to the rationales and mechanics with which 'culture is administered.' While cultural policy is proclaimed to operate apart from considerations of expediency and functionality, the institutional settings though which it is governed suggest otherwise.

Another tension generated by and integral to cultural policy is that between its universal and specifically national – and at times nationalist – thrust. Miller and Yúdice

cite a declaration assembled during the Mondiacult conference of 1982, one of the many cultural policy conferences hosted by UNESCO since the 1960s. Here the signatories, among them Germany and Turkey state:

> "Culture gives man the ability to reflect upon himself. It is through culture that man expresses himself, becomes aware of himself, recognizes his incompleteness, questions his own achievements, seeks untiringly for new meanings and creates works through which he transcends his limitations" (cited after Miller/Yúdice 2002, 190).

Miller and Yúdice highlight that both self-criticism and self-appreciation – and I would add self-knowledge – of citizens, are thought to be promoted through cultural policy. It is at this intersection that they see cultural policy as a form of governance that is caught between a 'transformative' and a 'functional' sphere (Miller/Yúdice 2002, 2f). Their argument is developed through inserting a discussion of govermentality, the rise of modern power in which cultural policy emerges as a part of the state's "duty of care" (ibid., 5). Both history and administrative units bind cultural policy to national frameworks, while the generality of cultural policy claims transcend – and must necessarily so – these boundaries, by bringing national and international developments into dialogue, and to mirror each other. By the same token, culture and the arts are portrayed to be autonomous both from politics and the market, because they are conceived of as rooted in the realm of ethics and moral formation. However, culture and the arts are also highly politicized, not least through their very integration into the state apparatus. Not infrequently the arts are thus conceptualized (on the part of the state) to be inherently good. Exceptions to this case are likewise not infrequently met with censorship and other control mechanisms, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

Cultural policy thus may direct, regulate, administer, facilitate, promote and/or control culture and the arts. It may exhibit a protectionist stance by preserving cultural heritage or by instating national quotas vis-à-vis market pressures (Canada and France and their provisions regarding radio programming in French come to mind in this respect). This notion of protection might also reference the proposed 'autonomy of art' that is constitutionally guaranteed in both Germany and Turkey. The didactic impetus of cultural policy may be at times implicit and other times more explicit, as in the 'revolutionary' cultural policy approaches exhibited in early Republican times in Turkey (Köksal 2004). Generally cultural policy takes on multiple roles, and the boundaries between its different aspects are blurry at best. Whatever functions it might assume, there is one singular reason deemed legitimate – *officially speaking* – in modern nation states to fund the arts, and that is its proposed *civic impact*. The formulation of this civic impact, of course, may differ – be it 'that art communicates our common humanity,' 'allows us to reflect critically upon ourselves and the world,' or 'enhances democracy.' The thrust, I propose, is nonetheless the same as cultural policy is inherently underwritten by philosophical takes on aesthetics – and especially aesthetic education. Interestingly however, these philosophical underpinnings are rarely explicitly referenced in full, but are presented in the form of pragmatic shorthands (see Chapter 2).

Not all of these functions are named by those who implement and oversee them. Officials stress some aspects more than others. The instances portrayed below are designed to probe the following questions: What conceptions of art are being put forward? What is the concrete impact that art is believed to produce or, to be more

precise, how do the workings of art translate into this proposed civic impact? What does the governance of culture aim at with respect to the constituency it addresses? Viewed in this vein, the title of this chapter is meant to question of the type of governance manifest in cultural policies and to interrogate what the notion of 'governmentality' entails in this context. According to the scope of the dissertation this discussion is concerned with claims to modernity underwrite cultural policies. It is also an investigation of what at different times has been considered conducive to or disruptive of the civilizing project – a project that in both the German and Turkish contexts is frequently portrayed as in need of maintenance, development and safeguarding against an always looming *specter of reversal* (albeit what is feared to be reversed to differs, e.g. fascism on the one hand and backward Islam' on the other, see Chapter 1).

Early Beginnings – Cultural Policy in Nation-State Formation

The following sections deepen the inquiry into the emergence of cultural policy as a particular form of policy and administration in Germany and Turkey. Rather than attempting a comprehensive overview with regard to the genesis and development their cultural policies, I present a selective narrative, spotlighting instances that aim to counteract long-standing and standardized assessments of cultural policy from within and without these two national contexts.

Integral parts of what constitutes cultural policy today, such as provisions concerning official language use, reach back to imperial configurations. As patrons of the arts rulers, elites and religious authorities contributed to much of cultural policy *avant-la-lettre*, as have laws and regulations on public decency. Yet cultural policy in its present

form is intimately related to nation-sate formation, and it is against this backdrop that they have to be explored. I have already discussed the trope of belatedness that Turkey and Germany share in their arrival on the nation-state scene, albeit under vastly different circumstances, in Chapter 1. There is however another interesting convergence: in both cases a turn to culture and education came out of the experience of military defeat to be (Topuz 1998, Belting 1993). As previously discussed, Germany's late unification and experience of failed revolution in the 19th century fed into motifs of inwardness in intellectual and artistic production paired with romantic streaks that increasingly related to nationalist longing. In contrast, a series of territorial losses initiated periodical outward orientations of the ruling elites of the Ottoman Empire beginning in the late 18th century. This westward gaze – at times transfixed on France and at others on the Germanies (Prussia in particular), was understood as a way to overcome not only perceived military shortcomings but also cultural ones. That the narrative of belatedness is – for the most part – a closed chapter in Germany's history in the perception of public actors and academics alike results not simply from its divergent artistic production and its socio-economic and political conditions, but is clearly correlated to the restorative cultural policies and the multi-facetted interventions of allied forces following another military defeat of Germany, that of World War II.

I will juxtapose the German case with that of Turkey where the "need" to catch-up to an ever-leading West, and especially Europe has persisted not only throughout more than 80 years in Republican times, but can be traced back to the 18th century Ottoman Empire (Ahıska 2003). I have already began to probe the motif of what could be called 'Turkey's continued belatedness,' and in this and the following chapters, I will further

ask what conditions are obscured and sustains through this narrative: the pronounced incongruence between policy discourses and practices in the realm of culture and the arts, different historical seizures that have produced blindspots in art history due to the persecution of minorities and a series of military coups that remain largely undertheorized, as do the repeated episodes of erasing and repressing Turkey's intelligentsia. Alongside serious and persistent economic and structural problems these issues help to explain why Turkish cultural policy has remained 'unsuccessful' in its quest for becoming recognizably - or acknowledgeable as – modern, so to speak.

The subsequent chapters will further outline how, despite the intensified globalization of art worlds (Appadurai 1996), national representation plays a vital role in cultural policy and that modernity is perpetually claimed by the state through the vehicle of art. It is in the discussions on the capacities and expediencies of art, ranging from civic education to self-realization and economic development, that understandings of society at large and what it means to be modern are revealed.

Although German and Turkish cultural policy trajectories exhibit common concerns (with each other as well as on a more general plane), the institutional make-up through which 'culture' has been governed differs considerably – warranting that the narratives assembled here be configured to reflect this divergence. Chapter 1 already outlined characteristic features of cultural policy debates in the German *Kaiserreich* and the early Turkish Republic. Here, I pick up a couple of strands that allow us to view German and Turkish cultural policy trajectories in a different light than generally presented. In the case of Germany this means looking at instances in which foreign rather than domestic policy concerns have shaped domestic cultural policy.

PART ONE: Germany

Colonial Aspirations: "Kulturpolitik" as "Grossmachtpolitik," Foreign Cultural Policy and National Renewal

As to the nation-state stage, Germany was a late contender in the scramble for colonial influence. Pursuing thus predisposed interests in Southwest Africa (1884) and the Pacific, Germany's expansionist designs were severely impacted by the *entente cordiale*. In an attempt to outmaneuver these limitations, Germany turned to the realm of culture as a lubricant to accelerate its power-political (*machtpolitisch*) and economic aspirations. It was predominantly the Ottoman Empire that served as a testing ground for the foreign cultural policy (*auswärtige Kulturpolitik***)** of the German *Kaiserreich*, while similar initiatives in China, Argentina, Brazil and Chile remained much smaller in scope (Dahlhaus 1990, Illich 2007). Very much in the vein of Nipperdey's famous summation of German politics "in the beginning there was Napoleon," i.e. France – it was once more against – and in competition to – French interests, influences and policies that Germany tried to establish itself as a 'cultural actor' in the Ottoman Empire from late 1880s onwards. As in its contemplations of and efforts for a revolution, and of becoming a nation, however, Germany was late – yet again. France's *pénétration culturelle*, cemented by an efficient network of schools and missions, fortified by the capitulations and a tight relationship with the Ottoman state through an array of exchange programs, German officials had to come to terms with the fact that French had become a second (semi-official) language in many parts of the Empire (Dahlhaus 1990, 83). Yet, Germany was not to be deterred, officially hailing first its ties to Ottoman Empire and then the Republic of Turkey as closer than those to any "other European country" (Grothusen

1967, 167), while preparing an array of different gameplans for parceling out spheres of influence and geopolitical areas for future occupation of an Empire expected to disintegrate in the near future.[113]

However, as historian Friedrich Dahlhaus' study on German cultural policies in the Ottoman Empire highlights, the operationalization of culture wielded certain problems (1990).[114] One of these crystallized itself in the question of *how* culture was to be employed as a means of governance, especially since *Kultur* was long seen as an anti-political category (1990, 13; Chapter 1), or, at least one that is and should be located outside of the political realm. German foreign cultural policy thus had to face the longstanding conundrum that culture was understood as both as penchant of national belonging and as an autonomous realm operating under a set of suppositions that, in theory, limited its possible instrumentalization (see Abelein/Sprenger 1968).

This is not to say that culture and the arts were excluded from political debates in Germany at the time; quite to the contrary they presented a fiercely embattled subject. Historian Volker Berghahn notes that post-unification Germany (1871) was artistically conservative, characterized on one side of the spectrum by the rise of so-called *Heimatkunst* (Applegate 1990) and on the other by "exactitude and romanticization" (1994, 133), especially in officially sanctioned artistic production. Germany's unification gave rise to an unprecedented amount of opportunities for artists and architects as the

[113] These plans persisted during the German-Ottoman alliance of WWI, and as the leadership of the Committee for Union and Progress was acutely aware of this underlying agenda of their German partners, periodically led to strains on this partnership of convenience. Although a considerable part of the CUP leadership was either sympathetic to or had actual ties with Germany, its policies were clearly geared towards national economic autonomy and the curtailing of political concessions, such as the capitulations.

[114] Dahlhaus identifies three phases in the history of German-Turkish relations for the time period between 1914-1928: 1) The "political and economic penetration" of the Ottoman Empire through European Powers, 2) The German-Ottoman alliance of World War I, and 3) the reestablishment of relationships after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, beginning in 1924 (1990, 8-9).

'young nation' commissioned an array of new ministerial buildings as well as schools and museums all of which were to be designed, renovated and filled with expressions and documentations of its coming into being. War memorials also presented a considerable part of this productivity, and a similar fervor manifested itself in newly constituted Turkey almost three decades later (Bozdoğan 2001). Reparation payments and rapid industrialization contributed to a growing bourgeoisie constituting an extended patronage basis that was especially interested in portraits, and that stimulated an emergent art market. Just as Wilhelm II. had made the arts *Chefsache*, his son Friedrich III. "appointed himself guardian of the Prussian museums and tried to influence their acquisition policies" (Berghahn 1994, 136). The growing currents of modernism were to be contained, and the state found an ally in the likes of Anton von Werner, a painter who in 1875 became the director of the Berlin Academy of Arts, and was set to battle stylistic innovation. This battle was aided in late 19th century through censorship regulations, by way of anti-Socialist legislature and provisions for *lèse majesté*, obscenity and blasphemy charges (Berghahn, 1994, 140).

Although Dahlhaus does not discuss these domestic struggles around culture and the arts and how they may have impacted cultural policy formations abroad, he points to another dimension that makes foreign cultural policy a particularly sensitive area of intervention – that of its 'presentable' objectives. Even more so than in the context of the nation-state itself, foreign cultural policy yields questions of power and power differentials as it aims to influence a sovereign entity and consequently presents a delicate balancing act. The public exchange between cultural historian Karl Lamprecht and Reichschancellor Bethmann-Hollweg (1910) illustrates forays into early German

foreign policy, probing the willingness both on the side of the state and of the public to support cultural initiatives abroad not just in theory, but also financially. It also rendered culture a legitimate means to extend political *"Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten und Handlungsspielräume"* – possibilities to mold and act in territories outside of Germany *proper* (Dahlhaus 1990, 61). In his interpretation the timidity expressed in Bethmann-Hollweg's statement that Germany as a young *Volk* would not yet be able to pursue cultural policies like that of France or England, were but deflective moves to gain public support for its geopolitical aspirations abroad (see also Engel 2003, 35). Other participants in the discussion, such as *philosopher and diplomat* Kurt Riezler, were much more outspoken proponents of foreign cultural policy, portraying power political success as firmly routed in the status that culture was given in expansionist designs.

The spectrum of positions on and formulations of foreign cultural policy ranged from *Kulturpflege* (culture care) abroad and *Propaganda* to *kultureller Selbstdarstellung* (cultural self-representation) and *kultureller Expansion* (cultural expansion). Volkhard Laitenberger (1976) posits that with the exception of the *Auslandsschulpolitik* beginning 1906, late Wilhelmine Germany did not exhibit 'modern' policy traits *and instead was characterized by* sporadic and uncoordinated initiatives that lack a recognizable plan. Dahlhaus, however, relegates the tense debates on the structure and scope of foreign cultural policy to two factors: Firstly, Germany's economic situation. Following the founding boom in German economy carried by reparations and unified political and financial structures that allowed for rapid industrialization and the development of transport (railway) and communication networks, the country's "retarded growth" (von

Saldern 2002) brought about considerable budget fluctuations, culminating in the depression of 1873.

Secondly, the intense competition by the multitude of official *and unofficial* actors (including faith-based groups and entrepreneurs partially funded by the state) in German foreign cultural policy including the *Auswärtiges Amt* (Foreign Ministry), *Reichsmarineamt* (Naval Ministry), the *Preussische Kultusministerium* (the Prussian Ministry of Education), and to a lesser extent the *Reichsamt des Inneren* (Ministry of the Interior). As the archeological excavations and the Oriental studies efforts of the *Kultusministerium* gained momentum, for instance, both the Foreign Ministry and the Naval Ministry tried to gain predominance over these activities, soon feeding into the competition between military and 'civilian' agendas for government funding and influence in Ottoman Empire.

A key term in foreign cultural policy efforts was that of "*kulturelle Erneuerungsbestrebungen*" (efforts for cultural renewal), whereby signaling the vitality of German culture to the world would rejuvenate Germany's inner cultural make-up as well. This line of thinking gained currency at the turn of the century not only – as one might infer – in national-conservative camps. In the lead up to World War I a declaration signed by 93 intellectuals, artists and other public figures, assembled many persons who are generally seen to be liberal or progressive. The playright Ludwig Fulda, politician Friedrich Naumann, historian Karl Lamprecht, as well as Max Planck and Theodor Wiegand[115] were among the signatories of this piece entitled "*An die Kulturwelt*" (1914) that aimed at protesting the accusation that Germany was provoking war, and instead

[115] From 1899 till 1911 Wiegand worked for the museums of Berlin as a Foreign Director and science attaché at the German embassy in Istanbul. He had also been awarded the rank of captain in the 4th Ottoman army under Cemal Pasha.

proclaiming its innocence (Mommsen 1994, Ungern-Sternberg/ Ungern-Sternberg 1998). But the declaration did more than that: it also equated German military might with that of its culture by stating that "Without German militarism, German culture would have long been effaced from the earth (*Ohne den deutschen Militarism wäre die deutsche Kultur längts vom Erdboden getilgt*)."

Contemplating the declaration historian Hans Mommsen shows that the trope of a 'European culture' in crisis (triggered by discernible disillusion with the promise of the progress of modernity), and that of violence and catastrophe as potentially elevating and inspirational avenues out of this crisis, were by no means limited to the German avant-garde (see also Berghahn 1994, 134ff). However, he argues that it was foremost in Italy's futurist movement and on the German cultural stage that war was highlighted as a cleansing and rejuvenating element, specifically for 'national culture' and 'national art.' War, then, was not only 'approved' on the basis of national, but also of aesthetic interests. Max Beckmann echoed this turn. When writing to his publisher he called the advent of World War I "*eine wunderbare Katastrophe*" (a wonderful catastrophe, cited after Mommsen 2004). The communal war effort was thought to bring about a renewal and revitalization of the German spirit and of German art, not least by weeding out weak and uninspiring artistic currents, leaving only those most vital, strong and true to the 'German essence.' The idea of war as a collective and cathartic experience that would bridge the rift between artistic elites and society, and it is in this vein that the support of Gerhard Hauptmann, Thomas Mann, and Max Liebermann (first president of the Berlin Secession) of Germany's war effort has to be understood. As with Beckmann, so with many of his contemporaries, the pain and terror of the actual experience of war

fundamentally changed this perception; subsequent artistic works and their themes tended to speak to these concerns and traumata (often through religious references, Mommsen 2004). It is these latter positions, critical of war and violence, that the above artists are remembered for in present-day Germany. In an editorial commemorating the 90th anniversary of the outbreak of WWI, Hans Mommsen notes that the *völkisch* inflections and the outright nationalist stances of some of these artists' earlier works and statements are astounding to German audiences today (Mommsen 2004) – as their works and personal biographies are remembered (and rehearsed) in quite a different manner.

It is against this backdrop of growing nationalist sentiment that aspirations for economic and political influence abroad through the vehicle of culture were made broadly acceptable. Not only the German right, but other political factions too (including those labeled liberal) rallied around the idea that culture was endowed with a persuasive and thus instrumental force of its own, that it could function as an *ideologisches Trägermodel* (ideological carrier model; Dahlhaus 1990, 42) that would help overcome Germany's sidelining in international affairs. Initiatives mostly focused on schooling and research (archeology and language studies), and to a lesser extent on the arts 'proper.'[116]

Beginning in 1913 Freiherr von Wagenheim oversaw this expansion of German schools ensuring that they would be located along the lines of German economic influence, especially the much coveted Berlin – Baghdad railway project. To expand beyond it, German officials feared, might be interpreted as an implicit judgment on local schools. Although German efforts seem minuscule in comparison to the network of French educational facilities (in 1913 more than 500 French schools served 54,000 while

[116] Press policies, hospitals and missions were also categorized as foreign cultural policy areas.

the 30 German schools catered to 5,000 students in the Ottoman Empire) they were able to coordinate their activities with the ruling Committee of Union and Progress' (CUP) school reform. Yet, this momentum was short-lived, due to both financial reasons and the growing tensions arising from increasing articulations of the nationalist and Turkic agenda of the CUP.

The establishment of the German Orientinstitut was likewise fraught with difficulties. A private initiative, the *Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung* (German Turkish Association) involved in the foundation of the institute, had suggested a jointly governed institution, but German researchers insisted that it should be directly under *Reichs*leadership. Caution was to be exercised not to appear to be scalping archeological artifacts, since this would incite Turkish 'resentment.' Artifacts had become an increasingly sensitive and politicized issue, especially as nascent 'Turkey' tried to establish itself as a *Kulturnation* in its own right. While the antiquities law of 1899 prominently overseen by Osman Hamdi Bey – himself a painter and archeologist – had stipulated that foreign institutions such as the *Königlich Preussische Museumsverwaltung* were to retain only half of their findings, a further revision of the law in 1906 ordered that all excavated artifacts be turned over to the Ottoman state (Topuz 1998, Shaw 2003).[117]

In the meanwhile, Austro-Hungarian advances into the Ottoman Empire and especially their cultural activities were observed with ever-growing suspicion by German officials. The "Deutsche Kunstausstellung in Konstatinopel" was initiated in 1917 by the

[117] Negotiations were headed by Theodor Wiegand, a signatory of the aforementioned declaration, who proved diplomatic when he convinced local governments that his concern was the protection of antiquities for Syria and Palestine and not for that of his employers the *Preussische Museumsverwaltung*. However, his sphere of influence dwindled as the Ottoman Empire lost many of the important excavation sites to the advancing *entente* powers. A last attempt to influence legislature in favor of Germany with military alliance of the Ottoman Empire becoming compromised under the heavy losses it was taking, was Ambassadors Bernstoff suggestion to use possible debt relief as a pawn in the antiquities negotiations (Dahlhaus 1990, 213) – the latter concern persists in German-Turkish relations till today.

private organization "Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kunst im Ausland," but interestingly it was only possible to raise the insurance money when the German embassy circulated the rumor that the Austrians were planning an exhibition for the very same time period. The event was billed as an excellent vehicle to portray Germany as a *Kulturvolk* (1990, 204-5), and as a non-intrusive avenue of foreign cultural policy since it could be classed as a 'cultural exchange' rather than propaganda.

I have discussed Dahlhaus' work in some detail not only because he examines a very little known area of connection, that of cultural policy, between Germany and the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic respectively, but also because it presents an attempt to grapple with the rather complex picture of the *Kaiserreichs'* engagement with cultural policy as a geopolitical tool. Over and over again, Dahlhaus points to the many ad-hoc procedures and the use of foreign cultural policy for short-term goals, as opposed to sustained strategies, and wonders to which extent it presented a modern or non-modern policy formation – a question rarely raised in the German context. As mentioned above, he relegates this unsteadiness to economic factors and competition among different government branches. But his argument takes a problematic turn when he posits that German foreign cultural policy was left to mimic the models of other imperial powers not only because it was a belated effort, but because a "*national geprägte Kulturidee*" – a nationally coined notion of culture – was lacking in Germany (Dahlhaus 1990, 49 and 57) making it impossible to design and implement a comprehensive foreign cultural policy. But this claim leaves out the entirety of the inner German debates around culture and art and their roles in Germany's position in Europe and the world (Lepenies 2006). Dalhaus'

analysis, weak as it might be, nevertheless allows us to raise three interrelated questions to understand the above-described tensions in a different manner: to what extent was the 'most German of all virtues,' *Kultur,* understood to be transferable? What was cultural influence supposed to achieve? And finally, what were Germany's ultimate designs on the Ottoman Empire (and how did these, if at all, change with the establishment of the Turkish Republic)?

I contend that in contrast to the French *mission civilisatrice*, the German notion of *Kultur* may not render itself to the same type of dissemination. The former entails a certain permeability and thus the possibility for incorporation into the French – civic – nation (manifest also in present conceptions of French citizenship that allow integration, although needless to say, discrimination persists). The German understanding of *Kultur*, on the other hand has been much more closely bound to descent as well as territory, and consequently is less easily transposed to realms outside.[118]

So what then was culture to do and how was it to be implemented abroad since the transfer of culture was not to produce 'Germans'? Germany's cultural policy efforts in the Ottoman Empire, just as those of the *entente* powers, speak to a notion that has become increasingly prominent again in the past decade – that of culture as 'soft power' (Chapter 7). The Leitmotiv in this context was "der Handel folgt der Sprache" (trade follows language) – it was culture, and in this case specifically language, that was to pave the way for Germany's economic interests, essential for Germany's *Weltmachtpolitik*. As Dalhaus notes:

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[118] While Stolcke (1995) and Balibar (1991a) argue that biology as the basis of belonging has been discredited, and instead culture has moved to the forefront, it is also important to note that the way in which culture is employed in political discourses is versatile in that it can move in and out of biological. As such the two categories are at times used interchangeably.

> "At the turn of the century critical voices of German publishers and the daily press increasingly bemoaned that the dominance of French as the language of transport and administration for the Anatolian railway, might lead to the *German character* insufficiently establishing itself in the expansion of the railway system" (1990, 83; emphasis mine).

So it was *the* 'German character' that was to be transmitted through language and culture together with '*Wertevorstellungen*' – ideals or moral concepts – that would in turn act as a *Bindung* – a connection of favorable inclination – powerful enough to dissuade resistances on part of the leadership of the ruling Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). Not only was cultural policy seen as essential for power-political displays, but no cultural policy could be pursued without a power-political agenda, as expressed in the slogan '*Keine Kulturpolitik ohne Machtpolitik'* that was put forward by the so-called "liberal imperialists" predominantly a group of university professors that were part of the above-mentioned coalition.[119]

Kulturkampf and Modernization Pains: The Fight against Modernism

After the end of WWI the debates within Germany related to the rise of modernism increased. Modernism had gained momentum in Germany at the end of the 19th century and connected German artists thus inclined stronger with their counterparts in France, England, Austro-Hungary, and Italy. Prior to the war, the Berlin Secession

[119] While Dahlhaus mostly argues that German policies did not question the territorial integrity of the Empire, but rather regarded it as a market and source of raw materials, Illich (2007) posits that Germany's goal was outright occupation (at least until the declaration of the Turkish Republic) and subjugation – through cultural might. It may be this imagining of subjugation that found its popular and aesthetic (counter-)expression in form of "Orientschwärmerei" among the *Bildungsbürgertum* of the Reich (Dahlhaus 1990, 40). This fascination with the 'Orient' played with romanticism and exoticization as much as with fantasies of submission (Said 1979). Dahlhaus points out that, apart from the much publicized exchange between Lamprecht and Bethmann-Hollweg, most cultural policy directives can be teased out only from memoirs and secret documents. He interprets the secrecy of the documents as a protective measure against the other competing European powers, giving it the guise of a decentralized policy rather than a highly coordinated one. Yet, further examination is needed to determine if the described secrecy was actually a concealment of ultimate goals.

(from the Academy of Arts and against Werner's leadership) was formed around the controversy of the Edvard Munch exhibition in 1899[120] and while a turn to the classics remained on the agenda of state-supported art, a second rift ensued between the expressionist[121] and impressionist camps in 1910. Here the debates centered on the question of social responsibility versus individual creativity and removedness from politics and ideology, leading to the New Secession in Berlin. Authoritarian government notwithstanding, groups such as the *Blaue Reiter* and *Die Brücke* found opportunities to exhibit outside of the capital, exhibiting in Munich and in Hamburg's *Kunsthalle* not least because of a growing stratum of private patronage and the competition between local and regional elites and governments. (In contrast, the Ottoman Empire lost many of its centers of artistic innovation and opportunity such as Damascus, Baghdad and Thessalonica). But the struggle against modernism, at times judged as outright 'degenerate,' at others too exaggerated of a progress (rather than healthy one), was only one front in the 'Kulturkampf' that stretched to the podiums of the Reichstag. Other fronts lay in the war against popular culture and particularly music and film, domains increasingly regarded as susceptible to falling prey to 'Americanization.' Less confrontational than applying censorship, was the idea that a more 'moderate modernity' could be aspired to by democratizing access to the arts and promoting artistic approaches "rooted in the cultural life of the people and their everyday activities" (von Saldron 2002, 307; and 253ff).

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[120] The members who voted by a small margin to close the Munch exhibition were scandalized by its "colors and motifs "(Berghahn 1994, 136).

[121] The *Kaiser* personally intervened to keep expressionism out of museums by denying the budget for acquiring paintings of the Barbizon school. Hugo von Tschudi, director of the *Nationalgalerie*, however managed to raise the missing 400,000 marks from private donors – leading him to be dismissed from his post (Berghahn 1994, 151). Still this incident also evidences the limits of the Kaiser's reach vis-à-vis these new artistic developments.

In addition, as rural to urban migration accelerated and the Weimar Republic saw unprecedented efforts of unions and parties to organize popular education. This political organizing also brought about the foundation of worker's choruses, theaters and libraries diversifying artistic production in the Republic even further (Berghahn 1994, 160-162).

The newly founded Weimar Republic, General Gröner postulated, was missing the basic parts and parcels of foreign policy, "power, army, fleet and money," and hence identified culture as an important foreign policy vehicle. In former foreign minister Gottlieb von Jagow's words '*Kulturpropaganda* was the only means left to Germany after Versailles' (Dahlhaus 1990, 243). But was cultural policy indeed a substitute for or path to power-politics? Von Saldern documents that across party lines culture and the arts were once again summoned as expressions of ethnic vitality and strength, a force both for economic aspirations and politics. But in 1923 Dr. Schwering of the Center Party, for instance, bemoaned that the Republic had not yet been able to produce "a great artist" whose work adequately reflected (self-proclaimed) German standing in the world (von Saldern 2002, 253). His colleague Dr. Schreiber echoed even more clearly Gröner and Jagow's previous assessments. The transcript of the 109th session in the Reichstag on December 3, 1929 reads as follows:

> "The Germany of today in this postwar period, stripped to a large extent of its weapons and the means to defend itself and no longer radiating power, is bound to its position in the world to proclaim its *ethical and cultural* strength on international cultural markets and thereby influence the peoples of this planet and the civilized world (cries of 'very good' from the Center Party). This is a new thought, a progressive thought" (cited after von Saldern 2002, 253; emphasis mine).

While a *Kulturkampf* raged in Germany its presentation abroad was increasingly streamlined. What emerged appears to be a convergence of the idealist notion of some

factions that Germany first and foremost had to present itself as a *Kulturnation*, and the pragmatist stance that culture was one of the less conspicuous ways to gain influence abroad (Dahlhaus 1990, 244). This renewed attention to culture and the arts manifested itself in the restructuring of the German Foreign Office, persistent funding issues notwithstanding.[122] In 1920 a division for the arts, music, theater and *Wissenschaftsaustausch* (knowledge exchange) was established along with the *Propaganda* division, which worked closely with the Foreign Press Office. Yet, due to both financial and political pressures, Germans living outside the borders of the Republic became a new priority, the proclaimed goal being to tie them more closely to the 'motherland' by demonstrating *deutsche Weltgeltung*, i.e. German standing in the world – a policy that later formed an important component in national socialist mobilization under the '*Heim ins Reich'* directive in Eastern Europe. Yet this radicalization was still to come, and, for the time being, the internationalization of scientific and cultural life together with Germany's entry into the League of Nations in 1926 shifted foreign cultural policy language from that of *Kulturpropaganda* – to *Kulturwerbung*. Cultural promotion as Franz Thierfelder, president of the German Academy in Munich phrased it in 1931, was not to aim at 'Germanization,' but rather to reflect the world through German eyes (this changes, considerably so, beginning 1933 see Engel 2003, 41).

[122] To make the 'ultimate' comparison: In 1924 France's expenditure for foreign cultural policy, including traveling exhibitions and theater performances, was estimated to be 5 Million Francs (thus overtaking the U.S. in its efforts). In 1923 German documents even projected an increase in the French budget to 60 Million – 20 times higher than the earmarked amount by the German government for foreign cultural policy. According to Engel referring to France's efforts formed a regularly used tool for augmenting still scarce cultural budgets and France in turn closely monitored German activities as well (Engel 2003, 41).

In this chapter I will not delve into arts and cultural policy during National Socialism – which arguably presents one of the most studied periods with regard to the instrumentalization or instrumentality of art and aesthetics in political and propagandistic designs. Rather I will return to this time period when thinking about partial silences in national art histories, focusing specifically on the issues of accumulation of art works on the basis of systematic dispossession in Chapter 4 (see also below).

Nullstunde Deutschland

While the lead-up and then the experience of WWI had impacted not only the cultural policy trajectory of Germany, but also its artistic dispositions, German cultural policy post-1945 is frequently portrayed as preoccupied with a democratizing thrust, an explicit endeavor that cherishes the critical potential of art. Often forgotten in this kind of narrative is that Germany did not simply reinstate pre-National Socialist artistic and cultural policy approaches (Naumann 2001), nor did the country immediately turn to the type of arts and culture funding and an extended notion of culture – or *Soziokultur* – that led to the cultural infrastructure that Germany became famous for from the 1970s onwards. The "Stunde Null" – the "zero hour" was not about mere restoration, but entailed an element of reinvention that was carried in part by the allied occupation. Military personnel and cultural attaches as well as returning émigrés who contributed significantly to the reconstruction of both the Germany's cultural policies and artistic positions. Certainly this formation of national cultural policy from without presents an element very little discussed in German cultural policy research, maybe not least because it goes against proposed the inherency of *Kultur* and what it is taken to stand for. While

much of the literature on West German cultural policy formation operates from a basis and foregrounds the need for (cultural) restoration and rehabilitation after 1945 – the role that allied forces played in this process is rarely discussed.

Writing on nascent Federal German cultural policy, Rob Burns and Wilfried van der Will notably point to what has been called restorative cultural policy after WWII in Germany, as "a commitment to a largely bourgeois concept of culture" (2003, 133). It is important however to state clearly that this bourgeois concept of culture was not simply a turn to high culture, but also an omission of anti-modernist and anti-western sentiment that had marked so much of German artistic production. It also displayed an articulated anti-communist component, which needs to be correlated with a conscious move on part of the allied forces, and specifically U.S. efforts.[123] As I argued before, in Chapter 1, the refashioning of Germany's artistic heritage entailed a systematic and concerted effort to omit the *deutsch-völkische* currents in the history of German art – based on a reinterpretation of artistic lineages to fit into a Western framework. This shift was reflected in the constitution of federal administrative units (it is only recently that Germany has produced a central agency that coordinates arts and cultural efforts of the

[123] A recently published annotated version of Carl Zuckmayer's *Geheimreport* (2001) provides an interesting insight into the formation of post-WWII Cultural policy of the German Republic as well as key personnel in this endeavor. Zuckmayer (1896-1977) was a German dramatist and playwright and most famously penned "Der Hauptmann von Koepenick" and the screenplay for "Der Blaue Engel." After his plays were banned in Germany, he first moved to Austria and then fled to the United States, where he was commissioned by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of the CIA, in 1943 to produce "character portraits," profiles of artist, writers and actors, musicians and publicists – people deemed of importance in German cultural life - and thus in public opinion. The ideological backdrop of this initiative, according to Schrön and Nickel, was the notion that modern warfare could not only rely on military activity, but the people of 'a nation' had to be mobilized – and that for this mobilization, artists and intellectuals would be of tantamount importance (2002, 409). In the end, OSS member Louis A. Wiesner stated that the compiled OSS materials were not used in denazification process, not least because NSDAP files made the former blacklists unnecessary (Nickel/Schrön 2002, 466). Yet the time, money and effort poured into these reports and the thrust they exhibit are at the very least indicative of the effects accorded to art and culture in rebuilding Germany, and reveals what types of art and culture was deemed appropriate in this endeavor thus reflecting on what could be categorized as restorative.

state on a national level). It also meant the reprinting of banned books, the translation of literary works produced during the NS regime outside of Germany, and changes in curricula that outlined how German artistic heritage was to be taught at schools (Lepenies 2006, 128-137).

The distinctly material basis that enabled this shift in memory and representation manifests itself in the activities of the *Kulturkreis der Deutschen Wirtschschaft* (the culture circle of German industry) housed by the Association of the German Industry in Berlin (see Chapter 2). Established in 1951 this nonprofit organization was originally composed and managed by leading figures of the post-war economic boom in Germany – the *Wirtschaftswunder* – aided to no small extent by the German Marshall Fund. The initial goal of the *Kulturkreis* was the rebuilding and maintenance of "deutschen Kunsterbes," German artistic heritage, an endeavor that according to their founding mission statement (Grasskamp/Ulrich 2001) was stifled by the limitation of governmental funds for the arts. In a conversation with the executive board of the *Kulturkreis* in early 2008, the director Stephan Frucht – a musicologist and concert violinist by training, explained this initial mission referring to the idea that in the *Nullstunde,* Germany was in need of being tied into modernity ("*Deutschland an die Moderne anzuknüpfen"*): "With the economic upswing (*Aufbau*) the German economic sector assumed its cultural responsibility to bring back (*wiederzurückholen)* works of art and to complete museum collections (*kompletieren*)." Furcht's reference to the repatriation of artworks points to the fact that the Nazi administration while infamously organizing book burnings had taken a more pragmatic stance when it came to visual art (see also Chapter 4). Apart from

the spectacularized exhibition of degenerate art[124] the NS regime actually sold a considerable part of state collections and confiscated modernist works to art connoisseurs in neighboring countries, and thus had to be re-bought from their current owners. Furcht's choice of words, i.e. his formulation that Germany was to be tied into modernity, rather than tied *back* into modernity points both the realization that the very *Kunsterbe* that the *Kulturkreis* was trying to reinstate had not only to be brought back but reinterpreted as being part of a larger project of Western modernism, and that the German industrial sector's complicity and benefiting from the war economy, forced labor and systematic dispossession could be likewise reworked in this process as part of a modernizing and civic force. The main thrust of the Kulturkreis' mission has since shifted, with the 1970s being mainly dedicated to ideological controversies around economic influence on the cultural sector and more recently the shift towards portraying corporate support for the arts not as a public relations tool but rather one that can be characterized along the arts patronage of old (*Mäzenatentum*). Yet, this founding principle remained on the organization website till spring 2008, but has since been replaced by more general assertions on the centrality of art in social life (culture as basic need – *Kultur als Grundbedürfnis*) rather than a reference to the specificities of the German experience – a fact that might be indicative of another stage in the normalization process, that moves away from identifying the 'German Catastrophe' as the structuring

[124] Opening in Munich on July 19, 1937 this exhibition initiated by Goebbels and managed by Alfred Ziegler, the president of the *Reichskammer für bildende Künste*, exhibited 650 of the 16,000 works of art confiscated by the Nazi regime that spanned styles from Expressionism, Impressionism, Dadaism and Neue Sachlichkeit to Surrealism and Kubism. It toured 12 cities and drew over 3 million visitors (for a more in depth discussion of cultural policy during the NS regime see Michaud 2004). Notably the exhibition also made public selling prices of the exhibited works, and displayed them along with statements such as "paid from the tax pennies of the laboring German Volk" (Saldern 2002, 343).

element of German cultural policy, and an alignment with what is commonly acknowledged as 'Western' or 'modernity proper.'

The Shift to Soziokultur

With the political upheavals of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the static and elitist conceptions underlying Germany's cultural policy too came under increasing scrutiny (Knoblich 2001, 3) and were pitted against the emerging notion of *Soziokultur*. *Soziokultur*, cultural policies that were framed as social policies, according to Hermann Glaser and Karl Heinz Stahl (1974), developed out of a critique of the 'restorative cultural policies' of postwar Germany. Philosopher Herbert Marcuse described these policies as exhibiting an "affirmative" understanding of (high) culture, one that obscured the actual social conditions of the majority of the population (see Knoblich 2001, 7). Only a break away from this idealized bourgeois canon and the extension of the culture concept to everyday dimensions would reclaim aesthetics as well as politics, so Glaser and Stahl argue, and thus enable social critique. To add the prefix *Sozio* (and not *Sozial*), according to Knoblich, signified this extension and proposed a holistic approach that emphasized equal opportunity, access and participation that was contrary to an elitist and hegemonic conception of high culture. Thus *Soziokultur* was envisioned as a bridge for the gap between culture and public space, audience and artist, professional arts and the alternative scene (Knoblich 2001, 10) – a shift which is in some ways not dissimilar to earlier initiatives in Turkey. The aim was a pluralization and politization of "aesthetic practices" and a turning away (at least in theory) from the motto of "the true, the good and the beautiful" – *Dem Wahren, Guten, Schönen* that projected the neutrality of the

unpolitical *Kulturmensch* (Knoblich 2001, 3), a conception which came to signify the silences surrounding Germany's National Socialist past and the political and social conditions that had enabled it.

A central figure in the rethinking of what cultural policy in a democratic society may look like, was Hilmar Hoffmann. When commissioner of Culture of the Frankfurt Municipality, Hoffmann pushed the idea of reorienting cultural policy even further in his collection of essays – *Kultur für Alle* (culture for all) where he called for not just a democratization of culture (one of unlimited access away from established canons and parameters of expertise) but the development of a cultural democracy (1979, 19) to ensure that everyone is able to "meaningfully" partake and benefit from *gesellschaftliche Reichtum* – societal wealth (1979, 12). Rather than a discursive opening of the notion of *Kultur*, Hoffmann explicitly demanded a new historical consciousness – *Geschichtsbewusstsein* – of the country's cultural institutions such as museums (1979, 104 ff) in which art history not that of a 'great nation' – but as the history of man (today he would probably say humanity) would be told. But to achieve this goal, Hoffman proposed, to make access to culture indeed available for all would entail extending the infrastructure of public transportation, limiting the length of the workday (regulating working hours), and offering affordable continuing education in municipalities and communes, the city as much as rural areas. Only policies to this effect, so Hoffmann, the democratization of culture and the development of a cultural democracy would end what has become 'the most German of distinctions' – that between culture and civilization. A distinction that as Hoffmann posited had served to justify the worst barbarism of the 20th century. Similar to the Turkish case this extension and redefinition of the culture concept

entailed a look at anthropology, and a problematic source at that: Hoffmann cites E.W. Mühlmann's elaborations on culture as a way of life, "the entirety of typical forms of life of a population including the bearing state of mind (die tragende Geistesverfassung), especially value judgments" (cited after Hoffmann 1979, 13).[125]

However the conception of *Soziokultur* could not escape certain inherent tensions and contradictions. Although its definition entailed and extension of the meaning of culture beyond the confines of (traditional) high art institutions and tried to integrate *Alltagskultur - everyday culture* (reinterpret it within a creative process) it could not – nor did it mean to escape the notion that "art needs connoisseurs," "Kunst braucht Kenner" as Brecht had once put it (see also Hoffmann 1979, 14). Instead however it entailed a different approach to education way from specialized knowledge to social skills, nurturing creative potential and "learning to learn" (das Lernen lernen). Ultimately, it also remains questionable to what extent these shifts indeed changed the connotations of *Kultur* within the German context, especially as *Kultur* (and its historical connotations) made its return in the 1990s, both in the reunification debate and the discussions of citizenship and immigration.

As mentioned in Chapter 1 the recasting of Germany as a *Kulturstaat* treaty played an important role in dissuading fears (both domestic and abroad) that arose in the process of re-unification. Another important facet is the insistence on cultural pluralism in the framework of federalism that was also vital in West-German state formation and

[125] Mühlmann's accommodation of the NS regime and his role in the Third Reich only became subject to public discussions in the later 1980s (see Gernt 1987).

refashioning of its cultural and artistic lineages after 1945. Explorations of Germany's cultural policy tend to stress its pronounced decentralized, federal make-up (Pommerin 1996, Burns/van der Will 2003), especially when comparing and contrasting it with the French model (Ahearne 2003). Generally, policy researchers relate the federal make-up of Germany – and rightly so – as an antidote to National Socialist centralization and *Gleichschaltung*. However, to read these decentralization policies solely through this lens, as *Rob Burns and Wilfried van der Will (*2003) largely ignores that most of the German federal states draw on historical, geopolitical precedents of former principalities. They thus reflect Germany's pre-unification (i.e. pre 1871) political composition, as well as struggles and counter-struggles for earlier forms of centralization and decentralization under Prussian dominance. It is thus important to note that the Allied reconfiguration of German administrative units rested on both these precedents and a concerted effort to dissolve Prussia.[126] Likewise important to understand is that the cultural sovereignty of the Länder rests on a default line, i.e. it gains prevalence as long as the *Grundgesetz* does not proclaim otherwise. Yet, the significance of federalism in cultural matters came to the fore in the debates surrounding the creation of the position for a Federal Undersecretary for Culture by the Social Democratic-Green Party coalition in 1998. Especially politically conservative camps charged the government with "Left-wing Wilhelmism." Despite the considerable protest by the Länder, there has also been a growing understanding that especially in the process of European integration a the coordination of cultural programs through a federal agency could be justified as presenting "German cultural interests," and

[126] Prussia continues to exist, however, in form of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation (*Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitzt*) located in Berlin.

protecting national heritage and arts funding against the impetus of EU homogenization (van der Will/Burns 2003, 128; see also Chapter 7).

In conversations with German cultural policy officials like Torsten Wöhlert and Ingrid Wagner, they continually emphasized that the government agencies that award funding, have no preset notion of art but rather are guided by notions of culture. Whenever I asked what this notion of culture entails both deproblematized this turn by substituting it through political ideas of pluralism and freedom of expression and by pointing to the fact that not they, but the appointed juries, composed of artists and other artworld actors as well as politicians, made decisions on funding. That German officials legitimize arts funding based on Germany's foundation as a "*Kulturstaat*," i.e. a specific understanding of German culture – is rarely raised by artists rather by curators and critics. Artists in Berlin tend to see state-involvement in the arts as irrelevant or benign (episodes were this assessment is broken are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5) – their concern mostly being directed at cutbacks in state-funding, or expressed periodically around museum politics. Berlin's particular situation, with a wide-range of municipal and federal funding and alternative venues surely contributes to this situation.

In contrast, the artists that I spoke to in Istanbul are keenly aware of state-guided attempts to manipulate artistic expression, especially since the 1980 coup a significant part of the contemporary art scene has rejected any workings with the state – although these attitudes are in part and only slowly changing, as I will show towards the end of the following historical overview of cultural policy in Turkey.

PART II: Turkey

Dismantling an Empire, "Creating a Republic of Fine Arts"[127]

Much of the literature on Turkish cultural policy focuses on the early Republican area (1923-1938, and to a lesser extent the single party period up to 1950) and thus the directives instated under Mustafa Kemal. While this concentration may be in part explained by the allure that new beginnings and radical (some may say revolutionary) overturns yield, it has also reinforced a narrative of rupture between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic and produced a seeming image of unchageability More than just a focus, the early years of the republic have been rendered as explanatory model for almost all predicaments that Turkey has faced since (see Chapter 1). Surely, the seizures manifest in sheer scope of social engineering under the heading of both modernization and Turkification warrant and explain this thrust to some degree. However, it partly also reflects the 'success' of the Republic in severing itself from its Ottoman past first by language barriers, and subsequently by disciplinary boundaries. Ottoman sources remain mostly the domain of historians while social scientists tend to begin with 1923, or following the language reform in 1926. Communication between the disciplines has, remained rather patchy. Another striking feature in Turkish cultural policy research is the glaring absence of discussions that cover the time period between 1950 to the late 1980s mirrored in art historical accounts as well. Considering that these years span three military coups (1960, 1971, 1980) that were accompanied by incarcerations of artists and public intellectuals, this omission is all the more perplexing.[128]

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[127] İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu – Yeni Adam 3 (1934, 6).

[128] A similar omission concerns the frequent reorganization of the governmental units dedicated to culture and the arts, before and after the Ministry of Culture was instated in 1970. Generally the reorganization of

The Republican discourse was, by virtue of emphasis, not one of renewal as described in the German case but one of creation. From the parliament as well as from the Ministry of Education there was a consistent stream of declarations that positioned art not as decoration but as necessity (Öndin 2003, 70). These proclamations speaking to a belief in the transformative power of art, make the political practices, and frequent lack of support for the arts throughout Turkey's history all the more striking. The following overview is thus also an illustration of the problems that arise from this foregrounding of the transformative power of art in a political environment that simultaneously struggled to assert and maintain authoritarian control.

As previously outlined Germany was long bound to an ethnicized understanding of 'the nation,' which was regarded as the source of artistic creation (an art in turn was seen as a manifestation of the nation). In contrast, the emergent Turkish Republic oscillated between ethnic and civic conceptualizations of citizenship, and initially subscribed to the notion of creation, including the creation of a 'new man.' There is another divergence between the two national contexts that is worth noting before delving further into the issue of cultural policy formations in the late Ottoman Empire and its modulations throughout republican times: While the German Reich after its unification pursued expansionist policies, the Ottoman Empire was territorially speaking geared towards consolidation. Enlightenment thought, the French revolution and the rise of nationalism within and without its territories, a succession of wars and territorial losses, from the take-over of Egypt by Napoleon (1798) and the Balkans wars (1912-1913) successively raised the necessity of reforms. But it was the question of what reforms

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these units are noted but not commented on. An exception to this tendency, is the merging of the Ministries of Culture and Tourism in 2003 that many interlocutors (even state officials themselves) criticized.

should look like, and where their orientation should lie that repeatedly became an embattled issue.

Works on cultural policy formations during Ottoman times are sparse – and often – maybe retrospectively rather than inherently so – tend to categorize any type of innovation as " Westernization" efforts. One such account of a westward orientation is given by Hıfzı Topuz[129] whose narrative sets in with the reign of Selim III. (r.1789-1807). Similarly to the German case a string of defeats on the battlefield were understood to result not only from military but also from cultural failings, and sparked debates on reforms of both the armed forces and culture. This was not the first time that military and artistic innovation intersected in policy in the Ottoman context: military academies were the primary educational institutions where foreshortened drawing was first officially sanctioned and where three-dimensional painting in topographic perspectives was introduced in 17th century (Wijdan 1997, 5, cf. Chapter 1).

Besides reforming the educational and organizational structures of the army and the navy, great importance was given to the translating important scientific and literary works into Ottoman, and establishing permanent embassies in European capitals. But these developments were countered with reactionism, as Topuz maintains, from religious conservatives – feeding thus into the well rehearsed image that Islamic forces have been to blame for regressions in Ottoman and subsequently Turkish history, including that of the arts. The ascension of Mahmud II. (r. 1808-1839) is characterized by Topuz as

[129] Topuz, a journalist by profession, has produced one of the very few comprehensive monographs dedicated solely to the history cultural policy in the Turkish context (apart from Öndin, 2003). What makes his account interesting is that he firmly situates Turkish cultural policy within the framework of the developments and initiatives of UNESCO.

another concerted reform effort,[130] including compulsory elementary school education (in Istanbul) and an overhaul of military and medical academies. Defining these actions as part and parcel of cultural policy formations, Topuz also points to the *Tanzimat* reforms declared in 1839 under Abdülmecit I. (r. 1839 - 1861), in the course of which arts education was specifically mentioned in the regulations and established along the sciences as part of the extension and yet another reform of the educational systems. It is this context that the foundation for the Istanbul Archeological Museum was laid (Shaw 2003, 11) and the fine arts academy was founded (alongside other educational institutions like those for teachers instruction, political science, engineering, and an array middle/high schools). The fine arts academy was established under the auspices of the aforementioned Osman Hamdi *Bey,* a lawyer painter and archeologists whose military training and education were oriented towards the Germanies, and who had studied painting in France (Shaw 2003). A series of language overhauls (which continued throughout republican times) attending to the simplification of Ottoman, the flourishing of multi-language publications and the introduction of ballet at court are presented as further significant markers in the modulation of Ottoman cultural policy (Topuz 1998, 52). The author then jumps, and notably so, from the 1860s to the aftermath of the 1908 revolution during which the *Turkish Hearths* (*Türk Ocakları***)** were established through private initiatives. Among the founding members were artists and intellectuals supported by the CUP along with public intellectuals and literary figures such as Ziya Gökalp, Halide Edip Adivar, and Yahya Kemal. Part of the popular education movement of which art and literature were integral parts, the institutional setting of the *Turkish Hearth*

[130] Like his predecessors since the 15th century, Mahmud II. extensively commissioned portraits and exhibited them in government buildings thus further calling into the question stereotypical assessments on figurative painting in the Ottoman Empire (see Chapter 1).

movement first advanced shifting notions of Turkishness that later solidified into discernible nationalist and overtly chauvinist tendencies (Üstel 1997, Zürcher 1998, 180; cf. Taylor 2008).

Among the founders was Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver (1885-1966), a poet, translator and writer, who also became the first Minster of Education upon the announcement of the Republic. Although his tenure was short-lived, 11 months in 1920-21, and then another nine months in 1925 before he was elected into the Grand National Assembly in 1927, it is worth to look at Tanrıöver's activities in more detail since the way he is treated in cultural policy literature is emblematic for the state of scholarship on the issue. Mentioned in passing by all authors dealing with cultural policy because of his duties as the director of the *Turkish Hearths* and his engagement in the Ministry of Education – they do not interrogate his activities in the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey. However, as historian Rifat Bali demonstrates Tanrıöver played a decisive role in (re)phrasing article 88 of the constitution, the very article that defined the delimitation of Turkish citizenship. One year prior to the parliamentary debates on the constitution, giving a speech a teachers' conference Tanrıöver declared "the one who speaks Turkish, is a Muslim and carries love for Turkishness is a Turk. We seek in him unity of language, religion and goals" (quoted after Bali 1999, 102). In the debate on article 88 which in its original form stated that without distinguishing between religion and language all inhabitants of Turkey were Turks, the representative of Yozgat province, Ahmet Hamdi requested the article to denote those inhabitants of Turkey that accept 'Turkish culture.' Following Hamdi's suite Tanrıöver entered this discussion as Bali so carefully outlines with an agenda that explicitly connected religion to citizenship and

culture to property. The basis of Tanrıöver's argument was (and this type of thinking prevails in nationalist camps in Turkey to this day) that local religious minorities were clandestinely conspiring with foreign capital. As the "Turkification" of capital and workplaces belonging to foreigners was discussed by parliament, Tanrıöver argued that this incorporation would entail the removal of Greeks and Armenians working that worked in these foreign businesses. If they were to be unconditionally categorized as Turks, so he argued further, their removal would no longer be possible – as they would be protected by citizenship rights. Tanrıöver's initiative would lay the groundwork for further 'Turkification' measures including comprehensive dispossession, the legacies of which can be traced to configurations of present-day Turkey (Chapter 4). At the end of these debates article 88 was reformulated stating that all in habitants of Turkey regardless of religion and language a regarded as Turkish *citizens* – not as Turks however.[131] Given that constitutional decisions played out against the backdrop of massive demographic engineering measures of the Armenian Genocide and 'population exchanges,' this article thus was the basis – and messenger – for further socio-cultural engineering measures geared to homogenizing the republican constituency and the Turkification of the economy that were to come in the following decades (Bali 1999, Aktar 2008).

Topuz claims that Tanrıöver was himself critical of the increasing radicalization of the *Turkish Hearths* because of the racist and expansionist (i.e. Turanist) designs that took hold in these associations. Yet, his activities in parliament suggest that he was most troubled by the religiously oriented elements that formed in the hearths. Thus it is

[131] As Bali states: "This to some extent a confirmation of the fact that minorities are 'Turks' in terms of 'citizenship,' yet unless they are Turkified in their language, ideals and culture, they will not be socially accepted as 'Turks' (1999, 104).

interesting to note that Topuz' portrayal aims to separate Tanrıöver (and like-minded intellectuals and activist) from overtly nationalist legacies.

The Turkish Hearths were closed in March 1931. Confiscating their property the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP) under Mustafa Kemal's lead instated in their stead the *halk evleri* (People's Houses) – with a similar starting mission, namely to 'protect and develop' Turkish culture' (Topuz 1998, 55). These *People's Houses* entailed the following divisions: language, history and literature, the fine arts, performance/drama (*temsil*), sports, social services, continuing education programs, publication, village divisions, history and museums.

Duygu Köksal describes cultural policy initiatives of the 1930s and 1940s as populist both in terms of sources of art production and the addressees. It was out of realistic depictions of the 'people' and their daily lives that national art was to be born (2004, 101). The *People's Houses* offered that art classes with a two-pronged goal: to create amateur artists and audiences for the arts. This pairing of arts training as audience building reveals one of the ways in which the effect or affect of art is understood to unfold itself. It is the practices of artistic production – amateurish as it might be – that is believed to enable access to the arts and a socialization into the nation**.** The fervor with which this initiative was pursued found its numerical expression in 970 art exhibitions organized in the People's Houses across Turkey between 1932 and 1940 (Özsezgin 1998, 35).[132]

[132] Interestingly, however, as Köksal argues that these activities also gave way to discussions on local versus national art (2004, 102). Unfortunately she remains silent on how this debate played out.

The People's Houses

Like the *Turkish Hearths* before them the *People's Houses* did not only provide a nexus for education and cultural activities throughout Anatolia that relied on ideas of a national/ist incorporation through cultural production, but also presented crucial sites for 'essential' research into folklore (Öndin 2003, 80-81) from which a new Turkish culture was to be crafted (Navaro-Yashin 2002, see Chapter 1). Interestingly Öndin states that the closing of the *Turk ocaklari* and the establishment of the *halk eveleri,* which Mustafa Kemal himself described as a social revolution (Öndin 2003, 81) were to mend two specific shortcomings of the *Hearth* movement. Firstly they were to function as a "bridge between *aydin* (intellectuals, as in enlightened) and *halk* (the folk or people)." Secondly, the *hearths* were thought to have fallen short in the nationalization of culture *(kültürün millilestirmesi;* Öndin 2003, 80). In order to streamline the founding principles of People's Houses with the "six arrows" of the Republican Party program (republicanism, nationalism, populism, laizism, statism and revolutionism), the mandated two-fold mission of this institution was to facilitate the populations' appropriation of the social reforms (making the social reforms their own, *benimsemek***)** (Öndin 2003, 84) and *çağdaslaşma* (i.e. modernizing, becoming contemporary).

The *Peoples' Houses* exemplified a fluid understanding between folklore, crafts and the fine arts, as well as between professional and amateur art. The even mandated collaborations between professional artist and amateurs in their charters. Mustafa Kemal himself, quite contrary to Western conceptions, did not seem to draw a strict distinction between art and folklore, and accordingly between artists and artisans. According to Metin And his arguments were very much in line with Ottoman perceptions that were

opposed to the European compartmentalization of art and did not distinguish between the fine and "applied" arts (1984, 218) – although the Republican elite never referred to this legacy. This stance is illustrated in a speech by Kemal given to artisans in Adana on March 1923:

> "[...] But I must emphasize it is not enough to produce individual artists. Men cannot wholly successfully work alone. [...] if this collective activity is a physical necessity, it is clear that working for a common goal is essential. As a first truth we must realize that if we want progress in the arts, people of the same profession and art must unite and cooperate" (Mustafa Kemal quoted after And 1984, 218).

Here arts and crafts are conceptualized as collective enterprises, in the sense that they contribute to the evolution of society (or new Turkish civilization).[133] However, this fervor of activities was by no means restricted to rural areas nor the national playing field alone. Topuz points to an only recently acknowledged site of cultural policy formation and implementation – that of the municipal governments. While his narrative dwells most extensively on the example of Istanbul, the early Republican era also witnessed the foundation of an extensive web of state, municipal, city-bound and regional theaters and performance venues contributing to a growing cultural infrastructure.[134]

Öndin argues that although all of these initiatives were ultimately of modest scale the yearly exhibitions and awards initiated in the early republican period were conducive to broadening the segment of private collectors (2003, 127). This trend was strengthened in the İnönü era (1938-1950) when legal and economic policy changes allowed for easier capital accumulation, and thus a widening bourgeoisie.

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[133] This resonates with Gökalp's ideas that the individual (and this seems strikingly different from Enlightenment notions) cannot be the site of cultural innovation and renewal (Kadioğlu 1996, 5).

[134] These initiatives also manifested themselves in the foundation of a permanent translation bureau, the assemblage of new encyclopedias, and the reform of the state conservatory in Ankara overseen by then Education Minister Hasan Ali Yücel (Topuz 1998, 67).

But as artist Cemal Tollu noted early on, neither the emergent art market nor the state pension that many artists received through their teaching engagements at state academies generated enough income for them to live on. Hasan Ali Yücel (Minster of Education 1938-1946 and founder of the village institutes) joined the call of artists for government support and state patronage – *develet himayesi* (Öndin 128). Notably, this originally positive connotation of state patronage had by the time of my fieldwork become a highly contentious label, designating both 'bad art' and political opportunism on part of artists. Others argued that the solution would lie in the rise of overall economic and social welfare, that in turn would stimulates the arts and the art market, and that ultimately expenditure on the arts in the face of economic problems presented an unnecessary luxury. There were thus a divergent views of causalities – on the one hand the understanding that investing the arts would in itself contribute to the development of the country and the uplifting of its constituency versus an understanding in which a strong economy would have in its trail a developing art market and invigoration of artistic production. In contrast to post-unification Germany, nascent Turkey after WWI and then a war of independence did not receive reparations, and consequently did not experience the economic upward slope that enabled Germany's rapid industrialization (*Gründerzeitboom*) and contributed significantly to a growing bourgeoisie.

But it were not solely economic factors that hindered developments in the arts in the national arena. As the establishment of the Republic brought with it the both the possibility and the necessity of artistic and aesthetic reinvention of the built environment, painter Namık İsmail pointed out that local artists "because of lack in experience" were

much less called upon than artists from abroad. Quite often it was their German colleagues who were commissioned to design new government buildings, provide paintings and design sculptures and memorials (see Öndin 2003, 72 ff). Party preferences were, so Köksal, also evident in the choice of recruiting instructors for the Fine Arts Academy in Istanbul (2004, 103). It is interesting that "lack of experience" and the preference to appoint art teachers from abroad seem completely naturalized in narratives of Turkish art history and cultural policy formation. One question that is rarely asked, however, is if these choices signify something beyond these widely accepted reasons. For instance, were these decisions at all motivated by the loss of craftspeople and artists (both due to the harrows of WWI, the war of independence, genocidal action and population expulsion and other demographic engineering measures)? To what extent was the choice of artists from above related to attempts of solidifying the proposed rupture between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (even though there is political continuities, see Akçam, 2004)?[135]

What makes for Revolutionary Art?

Let us now turn from the conditions of artistic production to questions of style, content and audience in the early Republican era, debates that are now frequently obscured in the monolithic portrayal of development in both Turkish cultural policy and artistic production. One issue that was hotly debated for instance was the question if

[135] To amend the situation, Ismail suggested that more opportunities should be consciously given to "Turkish artists," including political (and propaganda) posters and advertising campaigns as one avenue of making a living (Öndin 2003, 131f). Some arts-advocates proposed government-led programs similar to the U.S. Public Works of Art Project (P.W.A.P.) instated by President Roosevelt (1933 – 1934) – but others contended that the world's greatest work of art had been produced under duress. Again this attitude attested to a mode of thinking in which the position of artists – economic and otherwise – would automatically amend itself once the expected overall economic upswing would set in.

divan literature should be taught in schools, and could be incorporated into the formation of a canon of authentic Turkish art. This debate included to what extent divan literature[136] could be translated, and if translated versions thereof would be intelligible without knowledge of the genre's Arabic and Persian roots. During the 1930 Turkish and Literature Teacher's Conference (*Türkçe ve Edebiyat Muallimleri Kongresi*) the suggestion that Arabic and Farsi should remain in the school curricula to avoid a disconnect to Ottoman cultural heritage of divan literature (Öndin 2003, 63) was forcefully rebutted by member of parliament Necmeddin Sadak with his pamphlet "Elifbe ile Kültür Elde Edilir mi?" which questioned the utilization of the Arabic alphabet even rendered itself to the 'production of culture (see also Tekelioğlu 2001).

In this context Duygu Köksal's article "Art and power in Turkey: Culture, aesthetics and nationalism during the single party era" (2004) provides an interesting counterpoint to many of the one-dimensional accounts in which a heavy-handed and monolithic state altered form and content of aesthetic production in this nascent nation for times to come. She argues that while during the single-party era (which ended in 1950) the state was indeed "the major actor in shaping cultural policies in Turkey" the way in which the governance of culture was executed diverged from that of its European counterparts, because a) "the peculiarities of the regime's search for national identity did not provide for a considerable rejection of modernist and avant-garde currents" and b) both Republican elite and intelligentsia did not have a single, cohesive and coherent plan that "would have been able to sustain total control over the cultural sphere" (2004, 92). Similarly to Sibel Bozdoğan in her work on architecture in the early republic (2001). Yet

[136] As Andrews and Kalpaklı indicate the question of divan literature was further compounded by the fact of its often homoerotic content (2005).

while the state did not object avant-garde aesthetics per se, it faced considerable problems when it came to inherent critiques of modernity or 'challenges of bourgeois society' (unless these critiques were aimed of portraying modernity as undermining 'Turkish culture' Köksal 2004, 100).

Most significantly Köksal highlights the 'dialogue' with Soviet models of cultural policy implementation (and I would add aesthetic tendencies and preferences. However, an exhibition in 1937 on Soviet painting and sculpture it seems more positively by intellectuals and reformist close to the RPP than by visual artists themselves. Similarly to the Soviet model, the Turkish state established 'painting tours of Anatolia,' from which the government selected works for acquisition and exhibition for official buildings (Chapter 4). While the very influential *D group* (which while taking an overtly modernist stance tried to join cubism and local aesthetics; Tansuğ 1986, 179-190) welcomed the opportunity of the painting tours of Anatolia as a source of creating "a new synthesis of form with content" (Nurullah Berk 1938, 5), they were rather critical of state intervention, not only because of they rejected the propagandistic instrumentalization of art, but also found these types of intervention stunting to artistic development.

To be clear, it was not the engagement with the political that was criticized on part of the artistic community, but the fact that overtly exhibitions like the RPP sponsored "Exhibition on the Revolution" in Ankara 1933 were designed to be in the service of the state. In contrast to many of her colleagues, Köksal points to the internal critiques that accompanied these exhibitions (2004, 102). In this case the artistic quality was bemoaned as inferior in order to accommodate the politically opportune theme of the positive connoted notion of art as an indicator – and representation –of the revolutionary spirit -

devrimci ruhunun göstergesi (Öndin 2003, 10) – for many mutated in a mere illustration an important critique that is often forgotten today.

Köksal's article opens a window on the breadth of discussions on cultural policy by mapping the political and aesthetic positions of three periodicals that were published in the early republican era. The journal *Ülkü* foregounded a moral component; it was the 'character' (104) of the new Turkish citizen was at stake. Fine arts were regarded as a vehicle to transmit and instill revolutionary principle in this young constituency – that counter the former (artistic) manipulation of outside forces during Ottoman times and a removed elite – now was to be introduced to and produce itself authentic artistic expressions that would fulfill "the spiritual and mental needs of a much wider population" (105). While *Ülkü* was published by the Ankara People's House and featured state officials and leading RPP members, *Kadro*, which was originally supported by the RPP regime, was closed down after only two years in 1934. At times closer to party lines than at others, this periodical according to Köksal, took on a distinctly third-worldist perspective. For Yakup Kadri one of the foremost cultural commentators among the *Kadro* writers deemed not just ideological but material changes (socio-economic), as essential for the development of an audience and a market for the arts, and thus for the emergence of true and characteristic artistic innovation. It was the Soviet approach to 'art for the people' that was taken as a marker rather than its aesthetic bent. According to Köksal the *Kadro* team shared an anti-imperialist and civic nationalism while emphasizing collectivist approaches that were not dissimilar to inclinations in fascist Europe and the Soviet Union of the time (2004, 109). It was this collectively (of the nation) that was to be addressed in works of art.

The third journal that Köksal includes in her overview is *Varlik*, first published in 1933, and likewise sanctioned by the RPP. Concentrating mainly on literature and language a similarly revolutionary tone abounded in the contributions to Varlik. Yet, the "West" that was taken as a referent in this publication took its cues quite strongly from European fascism, the nationalist orientation that was exhibited here encompassed both ethnic and biological components (Köksal 2004, 112). Soviet approaches were seldom addressed, much less taken into consideration as a possible model for the Turkish context. What the authors proposed was not realism per se, but an analytic endeavor that was to be pursued in the arts – under a humanistic perspective nonetheless. Hasan Ali Yücel, then Minister of Education (1939-1945) had been instrumental in bringing the notion of "Turkish humanism" to the fore. This brand of humanism was portrayed to emerge out of a "Turkish Renaissance and a European-Turkish civilization" by situating the 'birthplace of civilization' in Anatolia (not Mesopotamia) and linking the latter to a Greek-Latin genealogy – and thus aligning Turkey in a different way with Europe.[137]

Her more nuanced approach notwithstanding, Köksal falls back on operating from a broad stroked understanding modernization as westernization in her analysis. As I have previously noted, Western orientation from an Ottoman or Turkish perspective is problematic as an explanatory model, not least since it may at different times entail a

[137] The above-mentioned notion of "Turkish Humanism" changed the premises of national cultural policy in two significant ways: a) a rejection of the dichotomy of East and West. Before heading the Ministry of Education Yücel had published texts by both Mevlana and Goethe, stating that for him these were not testaments of different cultural trajectories but complementary texts that signified the common cultural heritage of mankind – *insan eseri* (quoted after *Öndin* 2003, 87); b) (as indicated above) a relocation of the civilizational lineage of 'Turkish' culture by linking Anatolia not to Mesopotamia, but to Greek-Latin descent (*Öndin* 2003, *56)*. The Greek-Latin lineage would after WWII be the exact lineage that the European idea was to claim for itself – and still does – notably, as an exclusionary mechanism vis-à-vis Turkey.

gaze toward France, Germany, or Switzerland and Sweden for that matter (see Chapter 1). A few points come to mind that are worth noting here. To what extent can Germany serve as a Westernization model given its internal contradictions and fluctuating positioning as non-western and anti-modern? As Köksal herself presents materials that show that the cultural actors of the early Republican time likewise looked to the Soviet Union and South America, I would like to reiterate the question of what westernization comes to mean in specific instances and at specific times, and ask if modernization can indeed be equated with notions of 'Westernization.' Modernization in early republican times, in some ways similar to the German case – and probably for similar reasons – was portrayed as a balancing act that was supposed to be non-imitative and aware of the implication of the social upheavals brought about by the modern condition. Turkey's case is also interesting since the aggressive modernization discourse and policies set in at a time when Western Europe is increasingly preoccupied with the ills of the modern condition – a fact that cultural actors in Turkey were quite acutely aware of.

The İnönü Period (1938-1950): Intensifying 'Turkification'

İnönü' s succession of Mustafa Kemal (1938-1950) marked a number of notable shifts, including the consolidation of equating the RPP with state. Accordingly İnönü was declared both national chief and permanent party chair. The İnönü regime was along with the solidification of the idea of "Turkish Humanism" also characterized by an intensification of anti-Ottoman rhetoric. İnönü himself repeatedly emphasized that the revolutionary changes of the RPP were in no way continuation of the reform efforts of earlier regimes but rather a complete departure from them (see Öndin 2003, 86), and an

attempt to sever the regimes ties to the continuity of parts of the bureaucratic classes from the Ottoman Empire.

That the question of how to bring art to the people remains intertwined with dispossession in the name of the modernizing spirit, becomes evident again as the İnönü government ordered to the closing of the *People's Houses* which supposedly did not – or not sufficiently reach populations in the rural areas period. In their stead the *Village Institutes* (1940) were established. Portrayed as part and parcel of the RPP's principle of populism, the village institutes were closely tied to the Ministry of Education, not least trough a program instated to train 'village teachers' who in turn were to work as educators in these rural areas. Development was at the forefront of this far-reaching agenda, development through education to be more exact. In these educational programs the arts were again highlighted as essential. In contrast to the People's Houses programs however, art appreciation was part of enhancing peoples' cultivation, an avenue of elevating overall educational levels, rather than arts education in the narrower, more focused sense that was geared to train emergent artist as well as connoisseurs (Öndin 2003, 103). Like the Peoples' Houses, the *Village Insitutes* were sites for researching 'Turkish folklore' as well as for incorporating rural populations into the party structure. The village institutes were important organizational tools in implementing land reforms and land redistribution processes and thus vital tool for challenging rural power structures, especially with regard to leverage of large landholders.[138]

[138] That these measures did not necessarily take hold is documented in Michael Meeker's study on the Black Sea region where he argues that despite superficial accommodation of state-guidelines, long-standing power structures between religious authorities, big landowners and rural populations actually remained in place (2002).

Notably however, these initiatives were not sufficiently accompanied by the government services that were much needed for the development that the state had been promising to its citizens. As historian Erik Zürcher notes while electricity provisions for rural Anatolian villages stayed under 1% till up into the 1950s, state control in form of tax collectors and gendarmes had clearly made their marks throughout Turkey's countryside early on (Zürcher 2004). The "suppression of expressions of popular faith," a ban on trade unions and strikes that persisted until 1945, rising costs of living during the WWII period, budget crisis and inflation all contributed to the withering popularity of the İnönü regime.

While in the İnönü period capital accumulation becomes possible for some – Zürcher posits that the Turkish bourgeoisie was unsettled by the wealth tax (*varlik vergisi*) that targeted the non-Muslim business community, and in Zürcher's words "was no longer prepared to accept [the] position of a privileged, but essentially dependent and politically powerless, class" (2004, 207). In addition the *ciftci topraklandirma kanunu*, i.e. the land distribution program together with low pricing and taxing of agricultural produce alienated large landowners from the regime.

Although the now leading Democratic Party (DP) put forth a rhetoric of supporting culture both monies and administrative positions in the field of arts and culture were curtailed, including an abrupt end to the country tours program. Shortly after the Democratic Party came to power in 1950 the People's Houses were closed and only reopened three years after the 1960 coup – yet by then as Topuz notes the organizational structure and networks it that it had inhabited were no longer viable (1998, 57). Why

these had indeed been a thorn in the eye of the DP is not discussed at by either Topuz nor Öndin. Again we have to look to historian Zürcher who argues that this move centered on breaking the tight control of provincial branches of RPP over theses institutions. But there is another factor that is rarely made explicit in these processes as they highlight the connection of the cultural sector to financial and infrastructural assets, which were seized during this wave of shut-downs (Zürcher 2004, 223). The *Village Institutes* were also closed down by the Democratic Party (DP) regime, as they offered a structure for all sorts of oppositional organization (at times alluded to under the heading of "communist threats").

This is where Öndin's study stops and Topuz' timeline is broken, setting in again only with Turgut Özal's coming to office as Prime Minister (1983-89). Topuz legitimates this rupture by declaring the end of cultural policy with the DP regime, notably referencing the 'populist' and religious basis of its constituency and orientation of policies (1998, 70). He forgoes any mention of the three military coups, mentioning only the transformation in popular culture that followed massive internal migration movements (while leaving the significant factor of migration abroad aside). With regard to the economic liberalization of the Özal era, it is the diversification of media, not least the privatization of Television other broadcasting that marked the European contexts overall in the 1980s that he points to – as well as what he calls – the state's withdrawal from cultural policy. (I will attempt a different interpretation of this process below and in the remainder of this dissertation.)

Two broader issues become obscured in this approach one more closely related to artistic expression, the other in terms of how we can understand cultural policy. Topuz

and others who have abstained from looking more closely at the time period between 1950-1980 and often even up till the 1990s leave out the experimental artistic approaches for instance of early experimental video art of the like of Nil Yalter, many of the non-state theater initiatives, such as the *Dostlar Tiyatrosu*, and the multitude of artists and intellectuals, such as Gülsün Karamustafa, who at these times of great political upheaval were active in a variety of aesthetic and political struggles.

The Official Story Line

It may come as little surprise that from inside the cultural ministry itself similar historical blindspots are perpetuated. In his introduction to his documentation "Culture in the Government Programs of the Turkish Republic" (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükûmet Programlarinda Kültür*) published by the Ministry of Culture in 1987, Selcuk Kantarcıoğlu begins like all introductions and overviews on cultural policy (be they German or Turkish) with the question what 'culture' is and elaborates on the difficulties of talking about policy of a societal realm that is – as he like his German colleagues states is – always ill-defined (see also Hoffmann 1979, see above). The culture-concept that Kantarcıoğlu on behalf of the Ministry operates from spans both heritage and way of life, *hars* (culture) and *medeniyet* (civilization), the arts as well as an extended notion of the culture of the everyday. Kantarcıoğlu thus starts with a terminological exploration, citing a variety of definitions of culture. He points to the Latin root of the term that refers to cultivating the land as well as to what he calls "Western European" interpretations of culture as "higher public knowledge." He reiterates Mustafa Kemal's statement that culture forms the foundation of the Republic before moving to Malinowski, Kroeber and

Kluckhon's takes on culture, which range from the accumulation of traditions to economic strategies, from political organization to the arts and heritage as well as to both historical and contemporary (and changing) formations regarding religion, economy, society, politics and national culture (1987, 2-3). One reference stands out, however, that is T.S. Eliot, whose *Three Senses of Culture* was translated and published by the Ministry in 1981.[139]

In this essay, originally published in 1948, Eliot approaches 'culture' as a developmental category that may connote firstly individual qualities, secondly those of a group or class, and thirdly society as a whole. It is an essay that criticizes Mathew Arnold dealing with culture exclusively in the individual sense whereas the complexity of contemporary society demands that we must engage the interrelation of the three, so Eliot's argument goes. Most notably Eliot takes issue with Arnold's understanding of religion as a part of culture. Instead Eliot argues that culture should be understood as developing in relation to religion. This seems to be an important point, read against the backdrop of the 1980 coup in Turkey which witnessed the reinforcement of the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis'[140] by the military junta. This political and ideological move included the instating of religious instruction at schools and reaffirmed the officially sanctioned version of Sunni Islam, and this version only, as part and parcel of being Turkish. It also

[139] The choice of these authors seems notable, especially since Kantarcıoğlu's review coincides with increasing criticism of the static and bounded notions of culture that had been cemented in the discipline by anthropologists themselves. While this circumstance may be indicative of the state of Turkish anthropology, it is the reliance on T.S. Eliot's elaborations on the topic that is even more puzzling, and thus deserves a closer look.

[140] While the military in Turkey is generally portrayed to be staunchly secular, this assessment leaves out that the military coup of 1980 for instance advanced the notion of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis not only discursively, but also in a wave of mass conversion of remaining Armenian villages in Anatolia. For a detailed analysis of secularism as a redefinition of the place of Islam rather than a separation between state and religion in Turkey, see Ceren Özgul's forthcoming dissertation "From Citizen to Minority: Legal Reform and 'Double- Conversion' in Turkey." Furthermore the 1982 constitution drafted under the military regime reinforced 'religious culture' and *ahlak* (moral) as required courses in elementary and middle schools (see the 1982 constitution article 24 paragraph 4, and Kantarcıoğlu 1987, 26).

implicitly reiterated that non-Muslim are – and cannot be part of Turkish culture. Viewed in this vein the Ministry of Culture and its policies were yet again engaged in the delimitation of Turkish citizenship and in a renewal of the exclusionary practices demonstrated above in Tanrıöver's intervention in the legal delimitation of Turkish citizenship almost 60 years prior.[141]

The constitution of 1982 that was ratified under the military regime, strongly emphasized national unity and the integrity of Turkey's borders and reaffirmed Turkish as the only official language (surely prompted by the uprising of the PKK) and clearly assigned the cultural ministry to be part in the implementation/safeguarding of these principles, the Özal era gave prevalence to marketing approaches within the ministry, clearly shifting it towards tourism (1987, 22) and instating a copyright and communications department.

The policy documents and stipulations for cultural policy that Kantarcıoğlu has assembled notably defy the linear account of cultural policy that is all too often given in the Turkish context. Turkish cultural policy has had to navigate a set of contradictions

[141] Kantarcıoğlu 's documentation includes graphical overviews of the different formations that the administrative units dedicated to culture and the arts have gone through and makes it possible to see how the governance and administration of 'culture' shifts over the years. We learn that in 1920 a special department for monuments existed (1987, 17), that in 1923 *hars* and *kültür* formed a department in the Ministry of Education (1987, 18) while in 1933 the term *kültür* no longer appears in any of the administrative units of the ministry, instead different museums and the library system hold their own departments (1987, 19). In 1944, there is another structural overhaul that brings about a diversification and specialization of sub-bureaus now including a directorate for the fine arts and different educational components as well as discipline (*talim*), *terbiye* (training, education, cultivation) and sports. In 1971 the undersecretaryship of culture is taken out of the Educational Ministry and established as an autonomous one. But in 1977 they are merged again although now under the title of *Milli Eğitim ve Kültür Bakanlığı* (Ministry for National Education and Culture). In 1978 the ministries of culture and education are separated again, till the Cultural Ministry is merged into the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2003. But how to explain all this commotion? Unfortunately a detailed research and analysis of these shifts transcends the scope of this dissertation, nonetheless it is interesting that the literature on cultural policy in Turkey barely notes these changes, and certainly does not discuss them in any kind of depth. They may be indicative that the question of cultural policy remains a concern, even if it was only addressed in a window-dressing fashion of forming and (re-)forming different administrative units. The restructuring that was conducted under the military regime in 1981, for instance, led to an organizationally more bundled make-up of the ministry that exhibited less departmental specialization.

that persist to this day some of more general nature while other are correlated to the specificities of the Turkish nation-building project:

1. As the foundation of the Turkish Republic is supposed to be expressed by culture, what this culture is supposed to consist of, how it is transmitted – and taught in formal education poses a general problem. In this context language provides an interesting example, and formed a prevalent concern throughout republican history not only because of the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual make-up of Turkey, but also because language as a means and expression of national unity, like cultural expression, was to portrayed both as authentically Turkish but disjointed from its Ottoman heritage. To this end the Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Association) was founded in 1932. While the simplification of Turkish and the elimination of Arabic, Persian, French and later English loanwords have been heralded as national integration measures, Kantarcıoğlu cites in passing remarks by Members of Parliament who thematize successive language reforms in 1969 (see Kantarcıoğlu 1987, 143f) and replacement of vocabulary as measure that alienate the public for the benefit or the fancy of a small elite group. It is in these primary documents that we can find contestations to the authoritarianism that Turkish cultural policy is mainly discussed under.

2. Like other nation-states Turkey too has had to claim an historically and archeologically documented past as a tool for legitimizing its present form as well as expressing the 'civility' that is connoted with the upkeep of tangible heritage, a major concern that is also promoted through supranational agencies such as UNESCO. But Turkey has been faced with an exceptional multitude of archeological artifacts and historical/archival documents that directly contradict, much of its mythical national

foundation, especially when it comes to its demographic make-up and the ways in which its current constituency has been historically produced. It is against this backdrop that the Turkish Historical Society - *Türk Tarih Kurum* was established in 1931 – an association that has long and not without desperation struggled to prove, for instance, that Kurds are actually Turks (see Chapter 1). The Turkish authorities have often dealt with artifacts, sites and archives that prove incommensurable with official historiography through outright destruction, or, with neglect (always veiled by pointing to missing financial resources).

3. Despite the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression censorship or deligitmization attempts are a relatively normalized occurrence. The modalities of censorship will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, suffice to say here that the government control over artistic expression together with the two problem fields above repeatedly points to rifts between officially postulated cultural policy and actual practices on the ground.

Contemporary Cultural Policy in Turkey: Policy by Default or Design?

The most frequent assessment that I encountered with regard to cultural policy in Turkey was that it is non-existent. Cultural critique and curator Fatoş Üstek for instance underlined this statement by arguing that only 1% of the Ministry for Culture and Tourism's budget were going towards the arts.[142]

[142] However, I was not able to verify this information so far, as Turkish cultural agencies are very coy about given out actual budgets, be it on the state or municipal level, although this situation might actually be changing, as Turkish government authorities, and especially the cultural sector try to recast themselves as more 'transparent' (see also Chapter 7).

Implicitly, but less often voiced, this comes to mean that the Turkish state does not actually pursue a programmatic cultural policy, but a solely regulatory approach to art. Most cultural producers, curators and critics argue that decision-making processes on the state level are not institutionalized, but arbitrary and person-related. While some artists and other artworld actors categorically reject any type of dealings with state agencies, others have increasingly sought dialogue and collaboration with municipal officials, initiatives surrounding Istanbul's European Cultural Capital candidacy presenting a prominent case in point.

In contrast to the prevalent view that Turkey "does not have an arts policy," I would like to propose that the Turkish state – by what it does as well as what it *does not do* – actually creates and produces a framework that is *successful* in "harnessing" arts and cultural and artistic initiatives which are either privately sponsored or independently organized. By selectively claiming these initiatives for itself, and, at certain points functioning as a sponsor thereof, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, as well as the Istanbul Municipality, are actually very much in accord with recent developments in other European metropolises such as Berlin (see Stevenson 1999, see Chapter 6 and 7). Thus, in some ways, Turkey provides a prime example that many of the developments that are relegated to the contemporary arts today actually can flourish apart from the kind of democratization for which they are taken to be expressions.

The advanced openings of two high-profile locations, the *Istanbul Modern Museum* and the *SantralIstanbul* exhibition and performance complex, that perfectly

accommodated Prime Minister Erdogan's schedule – EU accession talks in the first, national election in the second instance – illustrate these harnessing efforts for two projects that apart from aid in obtaining construction permits, have largely lain outside of the state subsidiary. Although recent cultural policy papers, such as the *XI. Kalkınma Planı* and the *Kültür Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu*, do not provide any provisions that are specifically geared towards contemporary art, state representatives tend to emphasize their roles as facilitators in allowing for private arts and cultural centers to flourish in the past twenty years – without, of course, acknowledging the intersection of economic liberalization that were reigned in with the military coup of 1980 out of which these private initiatives emerged (see Yardimci 2005, 105ff; Gürbilek 1992, 14ff; Chapter 6).

While at the beginning of my fieldwork artists jokingly noted that the Cultural Ministry and municipal cultural department are filled with bureaucrats who had been banished their for failing in other divisions in state administration, the Turkish government has recently initiated a far-ranging training program for 2,000 new cultural administrators. This program which is notably implemented in cooperation with the private *Bilgi University* in Istanbul is another indicator that the government tries to shed the Cultural Ministry's bad reputation.

While some of the artists I spoke to categorically ruled out any collaboration or consultation regarding funding with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism for their projects (see also Tan 2006, 21), initiatives such as the non-for-profit performance space *garajistanbul* has been among the growing number of arts organizations that have tried to (re)open the dialogue with municipal, city district and more recently state level administration, often noting that it was their "right" to request government assistance –

and accountability – in cultural matters. A similar view was expressed by filmmaker Hüseyin Karabey who maintained that one ought to constantly engaged the state: "Even if you only end up forcing them to reject your proposal, eventually they have to acknowledge your existence." Indeed, Karabey after 10 years of failed attempts, was finally awarded a grant for his last film *Gitmek* in 2007 – although notably the Cultural ministry almost prevented the screening of the film at a Swiss festival (see Chapter 5). Another exception to this wholesale rejection of engaging with the state is the field of theater. Throughout their history state and city theaters in Turkey have come under harsh criticism be it for their conservative, non-innovative stance on program selection or – depending on the current administration the censorship and control that they have been exposed to. Their quota system that regulates the percentage of native playwrights versus foreign plays that they perform has periodically come under attack. Yet, the plays, operas and ballet performances during my research period rarely ceased to be sold out. In part this was surely aided by the subsidies that these institutions receive that allow for students and senior citizens' discounts and initiatives like the '1 play for 1 Lira' program. For a number of performance artists that I spoke to, employment in municipal theaters, and the civil servants status and working schedules they entailed, provided them with the security of a regular income and the time for their independent artistic work; an important factor given the limited funding opportunities for performance art from private foundations.

But longstanding suspicions remain – and it seems that it has been especially the last military coup of 1980s that has cemented a turning away from the state on the part of artworld actors. This point was driven home when I joined an informal meeting in

January 2008 with a group of cultural administrators who work in different arts initiatives in Istanbul. We were trying to understand the newly instated sponsorship regulations aimed at easing and making private sponsorship fiscally more attractive. It turned out that none of us was able to understand the rather cumbersomely formulated document, nor did any of us consider contacting the government agency listed underneath the announcement of the new law in order to get further information. Another episode worth mentioning here, is my attempt of trying to arrange for an interview with the newly forming Ministry of Culture following the elections in June 2007. While at the time no one was yet available to speak with me, an undersecretary in the Ministry made it his personal mission (through repeated calls and even offers to call me back on my landline as to avoid me from incurring any costs) to navigate me over the phone through governmental websites, to ensure that I would find all new legislation as well as the passages on culture and the arts in the newest five-year development plan – much to the surprise to all the interlocutors that I share this anecdote with. Together the above examples may speak to the newly found awareness on part of official cultural policy makers and official of representation value of culture and the arts in the Turkish context (see also Chapter 6).

The accommodating and at times contentious relationship between privately funded arts centers and organizations was thematized in a conversation with curator and director of the *Platform Contemporary Art Center* (funded by the Garanti Bank), Vasıf Kortun. Kortun was among the many interviewees whose response to my question regarding their assessment and interaction with official cultural policy was a fast and clear: "What cultural policy?" Yet, and not without defiance, Kortun recounted his dealings with state officials, mostly in order to obtain funding for travel of artists. "I

make it a point," he said, "to specifically mention things like: 'Yes, we have a young Kurdish artists here and we need you to cover his/her travel expenses." Kortun seemed content with his "small rebellions" especially since the Ministry is generally forthcoming on the issue.[143] Kortun mentioned another incident that points to the fact that government agencies identify him and other artworld actors as representing Turkey abroad: following the withdrawal of Kortun and a number of 'Turkish' artists from a German exhibition entitled *Fokus Istanbul* (for a more detailed account of the incident, see Chapter 7) Kortun received a call from the cultural ministry reprimanding his actions and the negative image that these would evoke in the German press. This reaction from the Ministry also speaks to the above outlined strategic claims on part of the official apparatus on 'informally' organized and carried artworld activities.

One facet of cultural policy that is frequently overlooked is, and that especially vital in the Turkish context, is that foreign cultural policy as it is subsumed under the competencies of foreign relations departments and thus outside the realm of cultural ministries proper. Many artist and curators noted for instance that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has frequently proven to be more accessible for arts organizations and often willing to pay airfares or offer other small kinds of logistical help through the *tanıtım fonu* (a fund that is earmarked to promote Turkey's image abroad). In Germany in turn, I met with a number of artists who had been funded through the Goethe Institute to

[143] Another artist once humorously mentioned that internationally prolific curators such as Kortun and Beral Madra who have facilitated the breakthrough of many artists from Turkey into the international art circuit, and who have long been the main two experts that foreigners consult when interested in exploring artistic positions from Turkey, actually could be regarded as unofficial cultural ministers. Although surely meant in jest, this comment pointed to the issue of representation, and especially representation abroad.

produce or show works abroad which in turn allowed them to support their living and working arrangements in Berlin.[144]

[144] Burns and van der Will (2003) argue that because there was no federal ministry of culture in Germany, it was the German Foreign Office that reflected on the "concept of culture as a policy area" on a national platform. As with the Turkish Foreign Ministry, so in the case of Germany, those agencies and government departments that are concerned with outward representation often prove more flexible and open to innovation than their counterparts in the domestic arena.

Chapter 4: The Art of Forgetting – Selected Episodes

> *"Denn was er an Kulturgütern überblickt, das ist ihm samt und sonders von einer Abkunft, die er nicht mohne Grauen bedenken kann. [...]Es ist niemals ein Dokument der Kultur, ohne zugleich ein solches der Barbarei zu sein. Und wie es selbst nicht frei ist von Barbarei, so ist es auch der Prozeß der Überlieferung nicht, in der es von dem einen an den andern gefallen ist."*
>
> *"For without exception the cultural treasures he surveys have an origin, which he cannot contemplate without horror [...] There has never been a document of culture, which is not simultaneously one of barbarism. There is no document of culture, which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free from barbarism, barbarism also taints the manner in which it is transmitted from one owner to the other" (Walter Benjamin 1968, 256).*

The preceding chapters have already outlined some of the parameters along which national (art) histories in Germany and Turkey are reinterpreted and reconfigured, and how the dynamics of forgetting and remembering play out in the arena of cultural policy and politics. Here, I want to present several examples, some of which are more interrelated than others, that further illustrate these dynamics. Instead of providing a linear or coherent narrative, the instance assembled here trace, or rather begin to trace, different trajectories and lineages of forgetting and obscuration that are intimately involved with artistic production or reception (or both) in Germany and Turkey. In conjuncture with the subsequent chapter that provides a more detailed analysis on what types of expressions are silenced, deligitimized, or censored, the questions that guide the thematization of these examples are: What happens to artistic production that does not fit into the carefully crafted official narratives? How are these silences broken or reified in artistic and political debates given the supposed civic impact of art?

Some of the episodes discussed in this chapter speak closely to the dialectic between 'culture' and 'barbarism' thematized by Adorno (1967[1949]) in his question on the possibility of poetry after Auschwitz. This particular dynamic is also expressed in the introductory quote by Benjamin, and in Norbert Elias' thinking about the civilizing process that does not evolve linearly, but intermittently exhibits decivilizing moments (Elias 1978). This is especially the case when the accumulation of artworks is based on systematic dispossession.[145] Other instances present deviations from 'the modern paradigm,' i.e. they do not fit into how modern politics are imagined and understood in the German and the Turkish context, exemplified here by East German artistic production or works brought back from the Anatolian painting tours that contradicted the Republican self-representation of a rapid modernization of its heartland. As such art can also disrupt the processes of normalization that I have previously outlined, and present points of potential recovery that may or may not entail calls for political responsibility.

"Not Without My Nazi"

In an article entitled "*Nicht ohne meinen Nazi*" (Not without my Nazi)[146] in the German weekly *Die Zeit*, Norbert Seitz dedicates himself to the phenomenon of the *NS Vergleich*, i.e. the deployment of Nazi-analogies, particularly those designed to discredit a political opponent (Seitz 2002). Seitz wonders about the persistence of this discursive tool, given what he calls the highly developed "*Geschichts- und Gedächtniskultur*." The 'culture of remembrance' that Germany emerged after a period marked by silence and

[145] As Micha Brumlick notes Benjamin did not yet know to which extent his words would come true, and was thinking rather of the slave work of antiquity, the dependencies of the middle ages, and the labor relations of early capitalism (2004, 7-8).
[146] Seitz, of course plays, here on the title of the novel *Not without my Daughter* by Betty Mahomoody (1988).

forgetting ("*Vergessenheit"*) in the Federal Republic (until the 1960s) and the antifascist "obsession" (*Versessenheit*) of the East German political landscape, that after the unification evolved into a "relatively homogenous collective memory" to put in the words of Aleida Assmann und Ute Frevert (1999). Seitz goes on to cite the "tortuous debates" regarding monuments and commemorations as further evidence of these developments (see Kramer 1996 282-292, Ahearne 2003, 144; Till 2005).

Seitz, I think, rightly notes the wide-ranging engagement with the history of the Third Reich as a project in modern Germany that to some extent is unparalleled in its sheer scope of the memoralization of atrocities, dictatorship and Genocide. Periodic shockwaves, however, still shake present-day Germany when formerly unknown facts about NS times come to light – at least if they are of a certain kind. Günter Grass' announcement of his membership in the Waffen-SS was one such instance (which he announced in an interview with the *FAZ*, see Schirrmacher/Spiegel 2006). Much quieter, but ultimately more important recent interventions point to the problematics of incomplete denazification of German legislation that prevented many Nazi-perpetrators from being convicted as they were tried under NS rather than federal law (Perels 2006). Other confrontations have also proceeded more timidly, like inquiries into the role of German anthropology in the Third Reich (Gerndt 1987), or, the involvement of Rudolf von Laban, the 'founder of modern dance in Germany' and the NS cultural policies (Kant 2004).

As I have previously argued and as will be picked up again in the following chapter, the legacy of Nazism presents an important factor in Germany's present-day

cultural policies. *Aufarbeitung* or *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, i.e. the coming to terms with the National Socialist past have also been central themes in philosophical, historical and sociological scholarship in and from Germany, as well as formative for strands in German politics (and legislature, see Chapter 5). This type of confrontation or thematization is, apart from a few exceptions, eerily absent from Turkish politics and scholarship (see below). The experience of the Third Reich was also formative for a range of cultural production, memoirs, novels, films, monuments, and artworks, too numerous to be adequately referenced and discussed in the framework of this chapter. What I would like to focus on here instead is a curious double-bind that arises from the "selective memory" and memoralization of the Nazi reign that Götz Aly (2005), among others, has most recently and forcefully reiterated on the one hand, and a particular fall-out from NS arts policies with regard to existing (state) art collections on the other. [147]

This double-bind arises from the NS regime's purge of modern art from the possession of German institutions (Chapter 3), and the fact that in turn some of the most prolific art collections inside (and outside of Germany) today have been assembled by the heirs of Nazi fortunes (both in forms of monetary assets and artworks). Much thought has been given how to address Nazi atrocities, and if aesthetic approaches to and representation of the subject are indeed possible (Adorno 1967, Friedländer 1992). The restitution of stolen artworks has likewise periodically come to public attention. But the problem of how to present art accumulated on the basis of aryanization and forced labor,

[147] The importance given to art by the Nazis poses somewhat of a conundrum for Germany to this day. "At least the Nazis had culture," is as much a stereotypical phrasing as a widely used one (see Lepenies 2006, Mantilla 2007). As Wolf Lepenies shows the NS leadership ensured that it was made known that during the bombing of Dresden "the loss of great works of art hit Hitler much harder than the destruction of large residential districts. German propagandists allowed this to be known, convinced that Hitler's reaction would be seen as a sign not of his brutal disregard for human suffering but of his artistic sensibility that the war had not been able to destroy" (2006, 3).

i.e. different modes of systematic dispossession,[148] has been more difficult to address. One such case is that of the Friedrich Christian Flick Collection, which I will discuss in more detail in the following.

I want to be clear here that do I mean to reduce insecurities about Germany's moderness to "twelve years of Nazi rule" (Ozment 2004; see also Chapter 1 for a contextualization of the German experience of modernity), nor do I want to perpetuate a different incarnation of the "not without my Nazi"-motif" (see also Mazower 2008).[149] Accordingly, the issue at hand is not to imply that Flick or those who supported the exhibition of his collection at the *Hamburger Bahnhof*, and helped shape the highly questionable conditions attached to this loan, are of national socialist inclination. Rather I want to point to the intertwinedness of NS cultural and economic policy with present-day configurations of collecting and exhibiting.

"Dirty Money" – Flick's Engagement with the Hamburger Bahnhof

> *"The enormous amounts required to build an art collection, be it the old masters or contemporary art, needs to be earned first, and the way in which it is earned is never unsoiled (sauber)." Brigitte Werneburg*

[148] Over the past decade more detailed information has emerged outlining Germany's plans prior to invasions of 'art capitals' to confiscate pieces deemed 'great works of art' and bring them to the German heartland (Nicholas 1995, Feliciano 1998, Engels 2003). The power and importance accorded to art is evidenced by these plans that preceded military action, making its 'protection,' appropriation and transfer to Germany part and parcel of the Germany's reordering of Europe (Engels 2003, 431).

[149] Thus this inquiry is not supposed to feed into the tendency to take Auschwitz as an ultimate explanatory concept, a line of argument so aptly criticized by Mark Mazower in his analysis of Giorgo Agamben's work. Here, Mazower cautions against divoring Auschwitz from its historical manifestation, by taking it as a paradigm of modernity or a philosophical concept: "My impression is that for Agamben these differences, these statistics, stories of growth and decline, are all ultimately beside the point. He is not interested in historical change, but in what he sees as the deeper meaning, the potentiality, that interpretation may glean from certain historical occurrences. His main concern is to find clues that will allow us to move toward redemption, to chart the course to a new politics, a way out of a fallen world" (Mazower 2008, 32).

Long before Friedrich Christian Flick made headlines as by seeking a home for his contemporary art collection – first in Zurich and then in Berlin – he had been gracing German tabloids that were fascinated by his jet-set life style which he supported with his multi-million Deutschmark inheritance from *Flick Holdings* founded by his grandfather Friedrich Karl Flick (1883-1972). The Flick empire began in the Weimar Republic with steel and expanded to coal. Once Flick senior ventured into the business of transportation in the early 1930s, he was well-positioned for the re-armament contracts of the NS regime that would soon come to power. He quickly advanced to Germany's largest weapons producer (Kessen 2004, 56) by donating to the NSDAP and becoming part of the *Freundeskreis Reichsführer SS*. This circle of businessmen around Heinrich Himmler, did not only get preferential treatment for government contracts, but was also the main (corporate) beneficiaries and motor of aryanization procedures, i.e. the dispossession of Jewish-owned business and the redistribution of their assets (Stallbaumer 1995, Hayes 1996, 13; Kessen 2004, 71). In 1947 Flick senior was put on trial in Nuremberg. The charges revealed he had enriched himself further on the account of 48,000 forced laborers, mostly Eastern European Jews. He was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment at Landsberg, of which he only served three – due to the amnesty procedures that the American occupation forces, soon more preoccupied with cold war power constellations than the NS legacy in the German industries, instated. Furthermore, Flick more or less managed (even from prison) to circumvent compliance with decartelization directives (which were voided by Chancellor Adenauer in 1951; Kessen 2004, 75). During his lifetime Flick refused to pay the 5 Million DM compensation (which at the time amounted to 2,000 DM per surviving – and eligible – forced laborer)

that his representatives had negotiated with the Jewish Claims Conference (Kessen 2004, 81). For Flick this compensation payment was nothing short of an admission of guilt that he was in no way willing to submit to. This blockage was also upheld by his grandsons, Friedrich Christian and Gerd-Rudolph, when they took over the company in the early 1970s before selling most of their shares three years later. The charges at Nuremberg and his refusal to pay compensation notwithstanding, Flick senior was awarded the *Bundesverdienstkreuz with Stern and Schulterband* for his accomplishments in furthering the German industries. Still, scandal followed the Flick family as it became public knowledge that the company (and the family) had been engaged in a tax evasion scheme that entailed a network of bribed politicians in 1983. This scandal ultimately led to sale of the company and its subsidiaries to Deutsche Bank for 5Billion DM. The theme of tax evasion has marked the attention to the family ever since: some Flick heirs took on Austrian nationality to enjoy tax advantages while making profit from their German investments. Friedrich Christian Flick himself has long taken up domicile in the tax haven of Switzerland for the same very same reasons.[150]

While according to his own narrative Friedrich Christian Flick began to collect old masters in the late 1970s and then started his contemporary art collection in the mid-1980s (Frehner/Steiner 2001), Peter Kessen and others, who have done independent research, posit that Friedrich Christian Flick only turned to contemporary art in 1995, and within five years amassed 2,500 works of art, among them whole series (*Werkreihen*) by Bruce Nauman and Martin Kippenberger (Kessen, 2004; Wernerburg 2004). When news of his wholesale buys of art emerged, many commentators suspected that Flick was

[150] Notably, members of the Thyssen family have for several generations adopted similar practices of changing citizenship for tax purposes – a factor that has also aided them in assembling various strands of what later became the Thyssen- Bornemisza art collection (see Lichtfield 2006, below).

seeking to "whitewash" his fortune and distance himself from his questionable public image as a "spoiled party-boy" by turning himself into a patron and connoisseur of the arts (Babias 2006a). Indeed, Flick himself went on record to proclaim that he wanted to set "a different level" of the public perception of his family name, one that counteracted the persisting NS connotations. In a 1997 letter to his uncle Flick, stated that "the art collection will give my children and descendants a constructive and meaningful possibility to built a new identification with our name" (cited after Babias 2006a). To this end, however, the collection needed to be shown in public. Flick offered it to the city of Zurich, where he notably proposed to build a museum to house his collection, in addition to financing upkeep and storage. But the Zurich authorities declined, shying away from the anticipated controversy as Flick's stance on reparation payments had become abundantly clear. Not only had Flick during the three years that he (co-)managed the Flick concern upheld the refusal to pay into compensation funds, but he had also turned down the request to donate into the forced labor fund from his personal means, although compensation payments had gained renewed urgency as with the dismantling of the Eastern Block a growing number of former forced laborers had become eligible for restitution. Predominantly living under impoverished conditions and suffering from the long-term health issues that they had incurred due to the hard labor and exposure to chemicals involved in the production of hand grenades, for instance, these former laborers were in dire need of financial support.[151]

[151] Still, Flick continued to reject to donate money in any official or unofficial way, relaying the responsibility of any kind of compensation payments to the Deutsche Bank who had bought the Flick concern. He insisted that while he believed that he had inherited the responsibility for the actions of his grandfather, he had not inherited the latter's guilt and refuted the claim that any financial support on his part would indeed help to alleviate the suffering of the forced labor survivors (cited in Frehner and Steiner 2001). Deutsche Bank eventually paid the equivalent of 5 million DM into the compensation fund. Due to

Thus Flick saw himself confronted with the situation of having 2,500 works and nowhere to show them. According to the research undertaken by Berlin-based artists Renata Stih and Frieder Schnock, as well as critic Brigitte Werneburg, help came in the form of Flick's financial advisor, Eberhard von Koerber, board member of the *Kulturkreis der Deutschen Wirtschaft* of the *Bund der Deutschen Industrie* (Association of the German Industries, see Chapter 2). Von Kroeber was also close a friend of then chancellor Gerhard Schröder and together they came up with the idea to bring the collection to Berlin, the *Hamburger Bahnhof Museum for Contemporary Art* to be more exact.

When news of the impending arrangement between Flick and the *Hamburger Bahnhof* so fortuitously facilitated by people in high places surfaced, Renata Stih and Frieder Schnock felt that the particular problematic posed by the Flick collection had to be addressed from within the artworld, and in the processes created works that became important vehicles in animating public debates on the collection. When I asked them about the genesis of their project on the Flick collection, Frieder Schnock began by summarizing their view on the situation: "a tax evader lets his collection be shown in Germany, subsidized (*alimentiert*) by public institutions which then have less money for other projects. The lender is a *Gesellschaft* registered on the tax-free island (*Steuersparinsel*) of Guernsey." Indeed, Flick does not officially own the works but buys, lends and sells them through his company Contemporary Art Ltd. This fact alone, as Renata Stih interjected, should have hindered any legal arrangements between Flick's

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inflation and the fact that after 1989 survivors form the former Easter block residents also became eligible the actual amount of compensation per person decreased considerably (Kessen 2004, 67).

company, the city of Berlin and the state museums as it presents a violation of EU guidelines against tax evation. Both artists reiterated that they had no doubt that Flick's primary goal was to add value to his collection: "When we heard that a collection that had never been exhibited before was to be lend to Berlin for 7 years we knew that the goal was a to enhance its value by exhibiting it in a public museum."

In trying to secure funding for a project to raise awareness for the intricacies of the deal between Flick and the city of Berlin, Stih and Schnock presented a project proposal to the New Society for Visual Arts (NGBK), a grassroots arts organization composed of artists, critics, curators and other artworld actors. They had to move carefully, however, since the grants administered by the NGBK are financed by the *Klassenlotterie* (national lottery). On the committee of this funding body were some of the very same politicians who also signed off on the "secret contract" detailing the particulars of Flick's loan to the city. Schnock recounts:

> "We gave our proposal the code Name *Der Weiße Ritter* (the white knight), an economic term used for the candidate of choice (*Wunschkandidat*) who takes over an ailing business in order to save it, as a stand-in for the current art scene in Berlin, which now was to be occupied by a big collector."

And Renata Stih added:

> "We wanted to draw attention to several issues: the fact that the Nazi heirs are basically still run the country, the issue that the Flick concern never investigated and published its history in the Third Reich, and that a tax evader was trying to enrich himself through public subsidies by the city of Berlin."

To this end they conceived two projects. A publication with the title "The Art of Collecting" chronicling some of the controversies that had accompanied the Flick fortune, and the posters depicted below, which they displayed both in

the vicinity of the *Hamburger Bahnhof* and throughout the city (Fig. 22 and 23).[152]



Fig. 22: "Tax Evaders show your treasures" in front of the Chancellery (Berlin 2004)



Fig. 23: "We demand: Free Admittance for former Forced Laborers " (Berlin 2004)

The broad exposure of these posters was aided by a group of people who, upon learning of Stih and Schnock's initiative, contacted them in order contribute money to the project allowing the artists to rent advertising trucks. It was also through these "anonymous" donors that the artists learned that Schröder was planning to soon step back from his positions as Chancellor and take on an

[152] As Stih noted: "This was the first time we used advertising space. You know, these days we are so desensitized when it come to advertising, so we wanted to create a challenge to that."

advisory position in the Ringier Publishing house in Zurich. This position was said to have been secured by Flick's above-mentioned financial advisor von Kroeber. (A year later, Schröder did indeed step back and proceeded in the manner projected by the anonymous donors).

But not everyone looked kindly on Stih and Schnock's project. The directorate of the *NGBK*, fearing to risk future collaborations with city and state institutions, tried to hinder the distribution of the publication based on a formality.[153] The directors of the *Hamburger Bahnhof* were likewise not pleased – although Stih and Schnock found allies within the institution, too. "Flick himself," Stih said, "did not try to intervene against our project because this would have outed him as a enemy of art (*Kunstfeind*). Thus it was vital for us in this case that our work was perceived as art."

The controversy soon became more heated, when the weekly *Der Spiegel* ran images of the posters by Stih and Schnock along with an article on the debates surrounding the Flick collection. Chancellor Schröder, compelled to take a stance, stated in the lead-up to the first exhibition curated from the Flick collection at the *Hamburger Bahnhof*: "Art, to be sure, is not a monument (*Kunst, so viel is gewiss, ist kein Mahnmal).*[…] We would punish people if we were not to show this collection" (cited after Goeheler 2006, 215). Schröder's statement is notable, not least because of the importance given to art as a vehicle for remembrance in German cultural policy. Klaus-Peter Lehman, director of the State Museums of Berlin, came forward arguing that the Flick collection presented an invaluable opportunity for Berlin that "won't cost the city a cent" (cited after Werneburg 2004). But as Brigitte Wernerburg reported, the installation

[153] Director Leonie Bauman's decision rested on a formality that a nonprofit organization was not allowed to sell publications. Subsequently, Stih and Schnock made it available online and distributed it for free.

of the first exhibition from the Flick collection alone cost the city 144,000 Euro (which included travel, accommodation and honoraria for the exhibited artists and their assistants, Werneburg 2004; see also Wulf 2004). Trying to diverge from both the costs of the Flick deal and deproblematize its assemblage, *Kulturstaatsministerin* Christina Weiss resorted to pointing out that exhibited works by Martin Kippenberger and Bruce Nauman criticizing dehumanizing conditions in the modern world, would actually help heal the wounds of Nazism. In a similar vein, Lehman proposed Flick should be commended for dedicating himself to art that would have been "burned in Nazi times" (Kessen 2004, 119).

The first exhibition of the Flick collection opened at the *Hamburger Bahnhof* in late September 2004. Over the coming months, it drew a large crowd of 250,000 visitors. The contract, this much is known today, allows Flick to sell of works from the collection at the *Hamburger Bahnhof* at any time. While the debates were raging, Flick stood firm on this position on forced labor compensation. Instead, he established a foundation in his name in Potsdam battling "Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance," in order to build "something for the future, rather than the past." Eight months after the opening Flick changed his position unexpectedly, by paying into the forced labor fund. "Of course we can't help but think that we have contributed to Flick's change of heart," Schnock remarked humorously." And Stih added: "The pressure really came from New York, where people said, 'if you do not pay into this fund you will not sell a single picture here again.'"[154]

[154] In 2007 Flick also donated a series of works to the museum, after much public pressure was applied.

Flick's, sister Dagmar Ottmann, long critical vis-à-vis her brother's resistance against commissioning a full investigation into the family holdings during the Third Reich, initiated such a study when the debate first erupted (see Ottmann 2004). Still, it is notable that this inquiry has taken such a long time to emerge, and that there has overall been little attention to the relationship between private art collections and National Socialist economic policies. One of the reasons might be found in the recent work of historian Götz Aly, a study entitled "*Hitler's Volkstaat*" (2005). Aly argues against the isolation of Nazi perpetrators from those to whom the NS regime was 'merely' attractive. Instead he suggests that the systematic dispossession of Jews and others in Germany and the occupied territories, supported not only the war machinery and the NS welfare state, but also ensured that a broader segment of society could partake in middle class consumption on the basis of confiscated goods and living space.[155] Hence, Aly posits that a substantial segment of the German population was complicit in thus redistributed property, which in his opinion accounts for the selective memory regarding the longitudal processes and impacts of NS economic policies that are still not fully addressed in Germany today.

It may come to little surprise then that David Litchfield's account on the Thyssen family "The Thyssen Art Marcabre" (2006) was mainly discussed with regard to a short episode presented in the book suggesting that the sister of the prolific art collector Hans Heinrich "Heini" Thyssen-Bornemisza, Margit Batthyány, was present at the execution of Jewish forced laborers at her castle in Reichnitz. Surely, this episode renders itself to the easy scandalization mentioned by Seitz above. What is not discussed, however, is that the

[155] Writing in 1936 Benjamin had proposed that the Nazis were ruling by aestheticizing politics not least because they left property relations untouched (2003, 42). He did not live to witness the unfolding large-scale dispossession (and redistribution) that was yet to follow.

collection that was expanded substantially by Thyssen's father from the late 1920s till the end of WWII, features many works of missing provenance, and many others that were bought cheaply from Jewish collectors under duress in the early NS era. The dpa obituary on Hans-Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza on April 28, 2002 read "Ein großer Sammler ist tot (A Great Collector is Dead)." There was no mention of the controversies surrounding many pieces in the collection that were well-known even before Litchfield's book appeared. His collection, which Thyssen-Bornemisza gifted it to the Spanish state in 1992, remains a major tourist destination in Madrid.

One issue that has not been addressed yet, but that I turn to in the following passages is what made the Flick Collection desirable for the city of Berlin in the first place. I would like to suggest an answer to this question by looking at another collection housed by the *Hamburger Bahnhof,* that of Erich Marx.

A Marriage of Convenience? – The Hamburger Bahnhof and the Collection of Erich Marx

The Hamburger Bahnhof – Museum für Gegenwartskunst, is a museum for current ("*aktuelle Kunst*") as it is sometimes called, or, contemporary art that focuses mainly on works from the 1960s onwards. Funded by the state, it is part of Berlin's *National Gallery* that comprises four main institutions: the *Alte Nationalgalerie* housing a 19th century collection located in the *Museuminsel*-complex, the *Neue Nationalgalerie* featuring modern art (in Germany often referred to as "klassische Moderne"), the said *Hamburger Bahnhof* as well as the *Sammlung Berggruen* – all of which are under the

umbrella of the *Stiftung Preussische Kulturbesitz*. Since its inception in 1996 the *Hamburger Bahnhof* has become the stage for two high-profile (and ongoing) controversies, the above-described Flick Collection on the one hand and the collection of Eric Marx on the other. Both of these controversies not only illustrate the entanglements between private collections and public museums (Chapter 2), but are also intimately intertwined with Germany's quest to modernity – and ultimately normalization.[156]

While the *Alte Nationalgalerie* re-opened as early as 1949 – its collection mainly intact since the NS regime had not found it objectionable and thus abstained from dismantling it – other museums in Berlin and throughout the country found themselves in a position in which modern art had basically been expunged from German public collections, either through misappropriation into private hands or state-directed sales, often abroad. Although the Nazi regime happily burned books, its stance on modernist art was much more pragmatic as its sale turned out to be highly lucrative, and costumers be it among their own (most infamously Hermann Göring who seemed to have very little ideological qualms when it came to accumulating modernist art), in Vichy France or Switzerland, for instance, were easy to find (Petropoulos 1996).

When the *Neue Nationalgalerie* was founded the objective thus became the "resuply" (*Nachkauf*) of artworks of this lost period. As Britta Schmitz, Senior Curator, at the *Hamburger Bahnhof* explained this acquisition strategy was dominant throughout 1970s and 80s, leaving the art of the time by the sidelines. In the late 1980s the New National Gallery was finally at a point to rebuild its collection and ventured into current

[156] According the museum's website its name *Museum für Gegenwart* is not only in name but also in spirit the successor of the *Nationalgaleri*e's Department of Contemporary Art. Opening in 1919 it was dedicated exclusively to what was then called "living art," and closed down by the Nazis in 1937 (for more detailed information see http://www.hamburgerbahnhof.de/text.php?id=98&lang=en).

art. Although the museum directorate could only do so on a modest scale, due to the lack of necessary funds, it became evident that the space of the *Neue Nationalgalerie* would not be sufficient to accommodate these newer acquisitions as well. At the time, Berlin-based entrepreneur Erich Marx, a real estate developer, owner of a chain of rehabilitation clinics, and avid collector of Andy Wahrhol, Cy Twombly, Anselm Kiefer and Joseph Beuys came forward to offer his collection as a permanent loan to the state of Berlin. Marx and his art dealer Heiner Bastian (who also acted as the curator of the collection) made for a well-connected team. Bastian had not only advised and co-built the Marx collection, but also facilitated a number of advantageous connections for Marx in Berlin's institutional artworld that put him on the board of a number of museums. In addition, Marx's business ventures provided him with an extensive political network. Berlin's senate, seeing this offer as a match of great convenience, a fortuitous opportunity to fill significant gaps in its emergent collection of contemporary art – not only accepted the offer, but made the integration of the Marx collection a precondition for establishing the new museum: "We were only granted the *Hamburger Bahnhof* by the politicians because we agreed to integrate the Collection Marx," recounted Britta Schmitz. Schmitz also mentioned that some commentators feared early on that Marx's power might overshadow that of the museum director and enable him to highjack the museum-to-be's agenda. As Frieder Schnock and Renata Stih pointed out during our interview, it was only through the scandal around the Flick collection that the public became aware that the conditions of the Marx loan had never been made public in their entirety either.

One of the conditions stipulated by Marx and his high-powered advisor, Bastian that is subject to public knowledge is the fact that the collection is designated to be part

of the museum's permanent display. Bastian (who has only recently resigned) thus curated rotating shows on the basis of the collection. As Schmitz put it: "As you know private collectors like their works to be on permanent display. Consequently, the museum's own, if modest, collection is a bit marginalized, not least because the Marx Collection occupies the largest rooms in the museum."

In contrast to the Flick collection, Marx's is an unlimited loan to the museum – yet his case is in many ways exemplary for the interdependencies and antagonism between public museums and private collectors that is compounded in Germany by the realities that the resuply of modern art has significantly impacted museums' abilities to extend their collections to the present day.[157] That individual collectors are interested in having 'their' works shown in museums has several reasons: loan agreements defray storage and insurance costs, entail tax breaks for the owner of the collection as well as an increase in prestige and value of the exhibited works. Storage as well as insurance tend to be costly endeavors, tax breaks are granted because loans to museums are classified as "*gemeinnützig*" (benefiting the public). It is notable that the last point, the gain in value of artworks displayed in museums has only very recently come into discussions within the German artworld – and here most notably through Isabelle Graw who has poignantly shown the interconnections between museums, galleries and the market (2006, 2009). Ethnographic and sociological approaches to the artworld (Becker 1982, Plattner 1996) have also not addressed this interdependency – although all of these works – just as institutional theories of art (Danto 1964, Fraser 1986, Iversen 2007) – note the importance for visual artists to be exhibited in museums as a stepping stone both for

[157] The museum also houses the Collection Manzona and is connected to the Museum Berggruen, these however have been gifted to the museum and do not pose the above outlined problems.

gaining professional renomé and consequently achieving higher prices in the art market (as well as enhanced chances in the grants economy). Despite the often-referenced rise of the art market, the institutional settings of art, museums and galleries remained intertwined (in the German case) as the museum retains much of its sanctioning 'aura.' However, as Schmitz explains (and this might also account for the lack theoretical attention to these circumstances) the balance has tipped with big collectors having the necessary financial means to buy large scale installations, and to outbid museums in the secondary markets, for example. While much of this dynamic is also at work outside of Germany, it is important to keep in mind the particular legacy of the NS era that further circumscribes the power differentials between public museums and private collections in terms of assembling collections.

The Puzzle of the 'other' German Art: Artistic Production from the GRD Era

In 1999, when Weimar acted as the Cultural Capital of Europe, the Weimar State Museum organized an exhibition with the title "The Rise and Fall of Modernism." Divided in three sections, the show featured works from the first two decades of the 20th century (many of which were formerly part of the collection of the *Palast der Republik*[158]), paintings that emerged between 1933 and 1945 (including works from Adolf Hitler's private collection, displayed for the first time in postwar Germany), and

[158] Completed in 1976, the *Palast* hosted the East German Parliament. After lengthy and controversial debates the building was demolished in early 2006. While some cited asbestos contamination as the main reason for the demolition, others diagnosed that this decision was nothing short of yet another attempt to erase East German history (for an overview of the debates, see Schug 2007). In its place, the Berlin Senate has decided to rebuild the *Berliner Stadtschloss* that, formerly at the same site, had been largely destroyed in WWII. The *Stadtschloss* was demolished by the GDR government that regarded it as a symbol of 'Prussian imperialism.' Throughout 2005, the *Palast* housed an interim project, entitled *White Cube*, that functioned as a stand-in for the much needed, but non-existing *Kunsthalle* in the city, and showed contemporary art produced in Berlin.

finally East German works, covering the post-WWII period up till Germany's reunification.

The Cologne-based curator Achim Preiß, who assembled the exhibition, categorized the works on display as representing "three styles of the Anti-Modern of the 20th century," i.e. the "academic conservative art," the "image production of National Socialism," and "Socialist Realism" (Preiß 1999, 10). In her review of the exhibition and the protests it elicited, anthropologist Barbara Wolbert notes that already the very location of Weimar made the show a rather loaded event: "Weimar, home to Schiller and Goethe, founding place of the first German Republic, and the town in walking distance from the concentration camp Buchenwald, is itself a politically vexing place" (Wolbert 2001, 57-58). Wolbert posits that the exhibition's narrative reinforced "Germany's shame" about the past. She notes that this shame was expressed by the tripartite display in which art from the early 20th century was regularly framed and hung at the museum walls, whereas the paintings from Hitler's private collection were arranged as if they were in an art depot, with paintings resting against boards arranged on the floor level. Wolbert goes on to describe that the artworks from the German Democratic Republic were similarly presented.[159] In addition the latter were, however, either unframed and shown with their original trimmings, or framed with heavy unfinished wood. Resting on the concrete floor, they appeared as if they had been just been taken down. This last part of the exhibition, Wolbert argues, left especially visitors with East German background with the impression that they were witnessing the de-arrangement of their past. East

[159] The GDR division of the show was sub-sectioned into "official" and "unofficial," and thus state-sanctioned and dissident East German art. Unfortunately, Wolbert does not discuss this part in much detail. Jonathan Osmond recounts, however, that one of the artists shown in the "unofficial" section was likewise incensed by the manner of display and tried to remove his work from the exhibition, and was arrensted in the process (2000, 500).

German politicians like Wolfgang Thierse, then President of the German Parliament, along with members of the Academy of Arts raised their voiced in protest against the wholesale devaluing of 'East German culture' and artistic heritage. Some interpreted the presentation of the exhibition as yet another manifestation of West Germans' (*Wessis*) persisting arrogance vis-à-vis the East and its population, a display of "triumphalism" of the West over the East (Rautenberg 1999; Bretts 2002, 546). Two artists initiated court-proceedings against the show arguing that the manner of display was violating their personal dignity. One of the lenders, the *Leipziger Sparkasse* withdrew a painting by Hans Hendrick Grimmling that it had contributed to the exhibition, likewise dissatisfied with the manner of display (29 other paintings followed suit in this exodus; see Wolbert 2001, 59). Reviewing the exhibition, Roger Cohen of the *New York Times* (1999) posited that it was the equation between Nazi and East Germany art by way of display that elicited the strong critiques, while the curator went on record proclaiming that those protesting the show were simply unable – or unwilling – to face and reflect on their recent history, i.e. their GDR past (cited after Rauterberg 1999).

Given the strong reactions that the exhibition elicited from audiences and East German artists alike, Wolbert argues that the example of *The Rise and Fall of Modernism* presents an instance that contradicts Carol Duncan's conceptualization of the museum visit as a ritual in which the visitor submits more or less to the prescribed narrative of the curator. This narrative is in Duncan's analysis firmly situated in the national framework (with the *Louvre* presenting the proto-type for this experience) and thus functions as a vehicle for citizenship education (1995, 7-47).

While in the case of the Weimar exhibition, the narrative suggested through the arrangement of the artworks might have indeed been rejected, it is also important to note that the categorization of art produced in the GDR as anti-modern, rather than an alternative claim to modernity has very much become commonplace. This particular interpretation of socialist art had already been questioned by Georg Lukács in 1938, when he critiqued the proposed lineage from naturalism, impressionism, to expression and surrealism as the only way to conceptualize the development of modern art. To suggest that it was indeed only an increasing tendency of deviating from realism that rendered art modern, he argued, would obscure the impact of such authors as Gorki, Thomas and Heinrich Mann on modern literature (Lukács 1955 [1938], 212).

Knowledge of the GDR cultural scene is to this day extremely limited, and mostly focuses on dissidents, such as Heiner Müller – or those who at some point fled to (and have been thus appropriated as Western) the Federal Republic, such as Gerhard Richter. West as well as East Germans (geographically speaking, i.e. in terms of the place of upbringing) who I interviewed were generally quick to dismiss any kind of visual or performance art of the former GDR as artistically bankrupt, or, as one curator put it simply consisting of works that "lagged decades behind their Western counterparts at the time." Hans Gerhard Hannesen of the Academy of the Arts in Berlin which was "joined" with its East German 'sister'-institution in 1993, too noted, that art produced in the GDR was at best a historical documentation, and mostly "outdated" ("*überholt*").

Art historian and curator Eckhart Gillen presents a notably exception to this trend, and has put together comprehensive overviews of visual art production from the German Democratic Republic. Gillen has worked for more than twenty years in Berlin's

Museumspädagogischer Dienst, and is one of the curators that the city employs through its incorporated contractor *Kulturprojekte* Berlin, to conceptualize exhibitions and design accompanying educational programs. In 1985, Gillen began research on an exhibition entitled *Deutschlandbilder*, which after a long preparation opened in Berlin's *Martin Gropius Bau* in 1997. In this exhibition, Gillen took a longitudal approach, positing that another division had preceded the separation of the allied-occupied West and Soviet-occupied East sectors, ultimately cemented by the errection of the Berlin Wall in 1961: a dual Germany, he stated, began to exist in 1933, marked by those who stayed and arranged themselves with the NS rule, and those who had to leave, the émigrés, some of which were never to return. He outlined that while the Russian as well as the Eastern European avant-garde has now unquestionably been integrated in Western art history, socialist art – or art produced in the Eastern block – is discounted on principle. "There is," he suggested,

> "a seeming unwillingness to really study East German artists. People are just too comfortable to do it. It is easy to discount Bernard Heissig, for instance, as an official GDR state artists (*Staatskünstler).* But a closer look reveals that while Heissig produced official and commissioned pieces, he also painted an number of pictures that never saw, could not see the light of day in the GDR. In one of the panel discussions that accompanied *Deutschlandbilder*, Heissig himself recounted how he practiced self-censorship and camouflaged some of his works by painting them over, or, at times, destroyed works after their completion."

Gillen highlighted another understudied aspect of the GDR arts setting. Prominent artists like Heissig, also ensured that their students in the arts academy had "more freedom," and tried to "protect" or shield them from the authorities. These stories, Gillen maintained, have yet to be recorded and studied in full (see also Svasek 2002) along with a more nuanced look at the divergent artistic developments in different eastern European states (see Reid/Crowley 2000). Gillen also pointed out that the 'resistance' to discuss

these issues is not only to be located in the Western German echelons of high art, but among former GDR artists as well. Georg Baselitz, who grew up in the GDR, but fled to the West when the East German government ordered him to leave the academy and work in a coalmine for a year, for instance, explicitly stated that he would not want to be part of *Deutschlandbilder* if any GDR artists would be included in the show. When I asked Gillen how he managed to include Baselizt in the end, he laughed and said "I simply shrugged it off, and went through private collectors of his works, and they were happy to loan them to me."

While research into the history, politics, and everyday life in East Germany has been surfacing, even if slowly, works on cultural policy in the former GDR are still rare. In part this is surely related to the wholesale dismissal of the GDR's very existence. But it is also due to the fact that more than 40 years division not withstanding, cultural and artistic reunification was envisioned much easier, not least by referring to an "inalienable cultural heritage" that the two German states shared (Burns/van der Will 2003, 144).

The equation of National Socialist artistic production with that of the GDR that marked the above discussion on the Weimar exhibition, is paralleled in public discourses on social and political memories of the German division, as Daphne Berdahl shows in her ethnographic study on the East German border-town of Kella (1999). Berdahl traces how the debates on the comparability between fascism and Stalinism were soon extended to East German socialism. Consequently addressing the GDR past was framed as *Vergangheitsbewältigung*, a term that was originally coined in engagements with the legacy of Nazism, and in which the past is understood as something that needs to be

overcome (1990, 215ff). These revisions and reevaluations were also at the heart of the German historians' debate (Chapter 1), which aimed at repositioning Germany by normalizing and justifying not just its desire for reunification but also Germany's 'Western belonging.'

The obfuscation of the East German past might at first sight not be surprising, when we consider the vast literature on forgetting and remembrance in the realm of nation-building and beyond, yet this particular erasure of East German art as art – and its unequivocal framing as propaganda – is notable in at least three ways: As Gillen points out, artists along with curators and museum directors have in the dual, inner-German contexts always been strong communicators (*Kommunikatoren*). Immendorf's travels to East Berlin come to mind, for instance, as do the many acknowledgements garnered by Heiner Müller in the West. Secondly, as mentioned above, this erasure also engenders a retrospective homogenization of the different artistic activities and practices, official and unofficial throughout the 54 years of the German Democratic Republic. Finally, it also obscures different phases in East German cultural policy that up until the Bitterfelder Weg (1959)[160] was marked by efforts – at least by the Artists League and its president Johannes Becher[161] – to keep artistic alliances across German sectors alive and "preserve a cultural policy for united Germany." It was only in the 1960s that a framework for a "national culture in the GDR" was developed (Stephan/ Lennox/Lennox 1974, 74).

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[160] The *Bitterfelder Weg* presents a turning point in GDR cultural policy. On the one hand, the *Bitterfeld* conference marks the shift to a concerted effort to bind artists stronger to the state structure. On the other, it also popularized the idea of reeducation of GDR population into a "literary society," i.e. into both the creators and audiences of East German national literature (Stephan/ Lennox/Lennox 1974, 86).

[161] Himself an expressionist poet and émigré to Moscow, Becher was instrumental in facilitating dialogues with churches in the GDR as well as with émigré artists who returned to West Germany. It was also Becher who convinced Mann to take part in the Goethe and Schiller celebrations in 1949 and 1955 in the GDR (Stephan/ Lennox/Lennox 1974, 1974, 78). Becher was eventually marginalized, not least because of his inclusivist stance.

Turning to Turkey: Missing Accountability

In Chapters 1 and 3 I have already outlined some of the parameters, factors and events in the history of the Turkish Republic that have led to processes of obscuration and forgetting, as well as initiatives to recover different artistic lineages. Turkey's own brand of normalization encompasses a wide range of demographic and social engineering measures that have directly and indirectly, some times more visibly than others impacted the plurality (or long non-plurality) of debates on and the perception of artistic heritage.

Although public memory and recovery have come to the forefront in recent scholarship on Turkey (Ors 2006, Özyürek 2006 and 2007, Duft 2009), there has been in this body of scholarship little convincing arguments as to how to explain this upsurge in interest, especially with regard to the 'multicultural' make-up of the Ottoman Empire and its republican successor. In Chapter 7, I will discuss in more detail how cultural pluralism and diversity have emerged as a threshold in discourses of Europeanization that have significantly impacted how cultural policy is framed in Germany and Turkey. While many commentators are celebrating this recovery from the longstanding impact of "organized amnesia" (Özyürek 2003, 3), I content that the way in which this recovery happens is also vital to consider.

Speaking at a conference on "Imperialism, Art and Restitution" (2004),[162] former Cultural Minister of Turkey Talat Halman[163] after bemoaning the state of illicit trade of antiquities, and generally advocating a swifter restitution of art objects and antiquities

[162] The conference took place at the Washington University School of Law (March 26-27, 2004), and the proceedings were published in a book by the same title, edited by the organizer John Henry Merryman in 2006.

[163] Taking office in 1971, Halman is often said to be the first Minister of Culture in Turkey. However, it would be more correct to say that he shaped the Cultural Ministry in its present form, see Chapter 3. Among other duties in the cultural sector, Halman also served as a member on the UNESCO Executive Board from 1991-1995.

poached from the present-day territory of Turkey, admits that the Turkish government, too, has not afforded its cultural and artistic heritage the protection and care they deserved. Noting as one example the rejection by of the Calouste Sarkis Gülbenkian collection by the military junta (May 1960-October 1961) in 1961, Halman qualifies this move as a "mind-boggling" decision (2006, 44). But is it mind-boggling indeed? Born in Istanbul in 1869, Gülbenkian, of Armenian descent made his money in the oil trade, including the establishment of the *Turkish Petroleum Company* in 1912. He was an avid collector of art from Egypt and the Far East; his main collection however centered on Mesopotamian, as well as Ottoman, Islamic and Armenian art. Given the proposed rupture between the Turkish Republic and its Ottoman predecessor, as well as Gülbenkian's personal background and the presence of Armenian art in his collection, it is not too surprising that he was turned down by the Turkish government, even though he had offered not only to donate his collection, but also to defray all operating costs of the proposed museum. Indeed, Turkey has a long history of turning down collections, and discarding or reinterpreting archeological finds and historical facts that do not readily fit or contradict the civilizational narratives and frameworks of Turkish historiography crafted by the Historical Society. Thus far, there has also been no literature from within Turkey that has addressed Turkey's problems in maintaining both its archeological and artistic collections, like the one in the state-owned *Istanbul Painting and Sculpture Museum*, which also houses the works donated to and acquired by the Academy of Arts in Istanbul by its alumni. While these shortcomings are generally acknowledged and explained by missing funds, the overall situation is in stark contrast to the importance given to art and cultural heritage on the level of political discourse. Off the record,

however, many respondents relayed this situation to unwillingness of the government rather than financial inability.

The Problem of Missing Provenance

I have shown above, there is in the German context an increasing awareness that systematic dispossession during the NS era has facilitated the accumulation of wealth that has partially been channeled into the assemblage of art collections. This type of accumulation practice as well as the role that the confiscation of artworks has played in processes of collection-building is rarely discussed publicly in Turkey. As historian Bedross der Matossian (2007) shows the massacres and deportations of Armenians and other Christian minorities such as the Assyrians between 1915-1917 were accompanied by a concerted and coordinated effort to confiscate their 'abandoned' properties. Supplementary laws were enacted quickly to make these 'transfers' legal as the genocidal violence proceeded.[164] Der Matossian posits:

> "The issue of confiscated goods – or the appropriation of "Armenian capital" during the Armenian Genocide – needs to be examined thoroughly to demonstrate the extent to which confiscated capital played a role in the economy of the then-newly born Turkish Republic, for example. In this case, the institutional continuity is evident as it starts during the Ottoman period (confiscation) and ends during the Turkish Republic (appropriation)" (2007, 9).

This kind of research, which would involve scrutinizing land registries and title deeds, has been an extremely sensitive issue, and access to the respective Ottoman archives has been restricted, as a matter of 'national security' in Turkey (often, if only, informally admitted this means to shield the Republic from potential restitution claims).

[164] As Der Matossian describes the rationale of these supplementary laws was based on Enver Pasha's exclamation at the time: "*Yok Kanun, Var Kanun, Yap Kanun*" (If there is no [corresponding law], then make up law and [thus] you have law" (Der Matossian 2007, 9).

As Der Matossian states (and if the German case is any indication) this process of confiscation was economically formative for the establishment of the Republic. Given the restrictions on archival material, one can only speculate how the confiscation of property plays into the legacies of present day collections of industrialist families. However, sociologist Cağlar Keyder has suggested that the question of complicity and the inherent connection between genocidal violence and the formation of a Turkish bourgeoisie still needs to be addressed (1997, 43; Akçam 2004). A second related issue is also raised by Der Matossian's above quote. It refers to later episodes in the Turkification of the national economy and the labor force, including in the public sector (see Aktar 2000 and 2009, 40-50, Bali 1999, 424-495) that I have already pointed to in Chapter 3. This Turkification of the economy was aided by the wealth tax, instated in 1942 (and abolished in 1945). The fficially proclaimed goal of this tax was to raise money to close the deficit in the state treasury, curtail black market activity and counteract and discourage war profiteering. The application of the law, however, quickly showed that only minorities were to be targeted through this one-time tax (Güven 2005, Bali 1999). As historian Ayhan Aktar shows, the then head of the Financial Revenue Office in Istanbul, Faik Ökte "put together names of the businessmen accumulating extraordinary profits due to war conditions by classifying them according to ethnic and religious background" (Aktar 2009, 42), marking Muslims and non-Muslims with an added category of 'crypto-Jews' and foreigners. Rifat Bali (1999) in turn describes how in the process of collecting this tax, not only monetary assets, but entire households including goods such as antiquities and artworks were confiscated by government officials (their whereabouts are not subject to public knowledge today). Those who could not pay were

sent to labor battalions. In the aftermath of this episode many of the remaining non-Muslim minorities, especially the Jewish and Rum (Greek) population left the country, followed by a second exodus after the "events of 6-7 September 1955," a riot during which Christian- and Jewish-owned businesses were ransacked and demolished by 'spontaneously formed mobs' in order to 'avenge' the purported bombing by Rum (Greek) activists of Mustafa Kemal's birth-house in Thessalonica. In fact, a bomb had been set off in the yard of the Turkish Consulate, which was, like the ensuing riots, planned and executed by Turkish security forces (for a detailed account see Güven 2005). Both of these episodes, the wealth tax and the riots, albeit contested both within Turkey and from abroad were legitimized by playing on the motif that minorities were ultimately 'guests' or foreigners, and thus in league with foreign powers who are construed to be continuously impeding on Turkey's sovereignty.[165]

Taken together these issues present only two instance that warrant further research on he provenance of both capital and artworks in the Turkish context that still needs to be undertaken.

The Case of the Missing Paintings

As previously mentioned, between 1938-1942 the Turkish government instated so-called painting tours, the *Yurt Gezileri*. Artists from the urban centers of Istanbul and Ankara were sent to different Anatolian provinces, and predominantly rural areas, where they were supposed to learn about the lives of peasants and act as what in contemporary terms could be called 'transfer bodies,' by taking on an educational mission vis-à-vis the

[165] This type of stereotype is often related back to the capitulations in the later Ottoman Empire, in the process of which some Christian minorities were also able to attain foreign nationality (see Quataert 2005).

local population. Ali Avni Çelebi, Zeki Ahmet Kocaman, Refik Ekipman, Nurullah Berk and Hale Asaf as well as Cemal Tollu, Abidin Dino, Elif Naci and Zeki Faik İzer, Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu and Eren Eyüboğlu were among the notable participants of this government program. Not all of these artists were necessarily in line with the government's predilections; many of them were indeed pronounced leftists. What they shared, however, was a notion that the painting tours provided an opportunity to meet the 'real people' of Anatolia. Interestingly, as Turan Erol notes, from the 650 painting only 80 are "available for public view" (Erol 1998, 72). The fate of the missing paintings is rarely questioned. Nilüfer Öndin suggests that many of were lost or destroyed in the process of dismantling the People's Houses[166] throughout the Anatolian provinces in 1951 (see Chapter 3), and due to "lack of space" (2003, 172). This does not explain, however, how the substantial number of paintings stored in Ankara disappeared. One artist and one art historian that I spoke to suggested, independently from each other, that the paintings were discarded because of their "minor artistic quality." While it might very well be that the artistic quality of these paintings could be doubted, or that the new Democratic Party regime simply sought to dismantle the cultural legacy of the Single Party era, other aspects might also warrant consideration.

Take for instance the example of painter Hulusi Mercan. Returning from Tunceli (Dersim) in 1943, Mercan found himself faced with an official interrogation regarding one of his paintings with the theme of "*Tezek*" (dried cow dung), thus indicating that while the proposed goal of these painting tours was to capture the 'everyday life of the people,' the subject chosen by Mercan was not really what the government had in mind.

[166] Visiting artists were hosted by the local braches of the People's Houses and frequently donated or left some of the paintings produced during their stay as 'gifts' to the local population. Often staying two months or longer, artists were generally expected to bring back six paintings (Yilmaz 2005).

In addition, Mercan's destination had from 1938-39 witnessed one of the most horrific string of massacres executed by the Turkish military against its Kurdish (Zaza-Alevi) population, as well as deportations, and resettlement measures (Beşikçi 1990, van Bruinessen 1994). Given this background it is difficult to imagine that even if not reflected in Mercan's artwork, the government might have questions regarding his observations during the time in the region.

The experience of Avni Arbaş who was on a painting tour in 1942 in the province of Siirt (in southeastern Turkey, inhabited by Kurds, Arab and Turks), also points to the issue that maybe not necessarily the art produced, but the observations of the artists overall presented a problem. In his autobiographical account Arbaş noted that none of his letters in which he described his impressions and thoughts on the region had made it to their addressees. He proposed that they must all have gotten lost, or, fallen prey to censorship (cited after Erol 1998, 91).

Another set of paintings that is lost to day, is Abidin Dino's *ibrik* series, which dedicated itself to depictions of the long-sprouted water pitcher, a tool of every day life in Anatolia which Dino became preoccupied with during his painting tour in Balıkesir in 1939 (Aköz 2004). Neither government officials nor art critics of the time (such as Baltacıoğlu) seemed too pleased with the paintings that failed to represent – or, in their opinion – even unduly distorted the modernization efforts that the political establishment wished to project (Erol 198, 56).

Curating Modernity from a Private Collections

In December 2004, the Istanbul Modern Museum opened its doors to much public attention both in Turkey and abroad. Upon the request of Prime Minister Erdoğan[167] who was instrumental in securing the necessary permits, it was opened earlier than originally planned in order to coincide with the resuming of Turkey's EU accession negations. Relying mainly on the private collection of paintings by founder and director Oya Eczacıbaşı and her husband Bülent, the permanent collection at the time of the opening was supplemented with loans from the Nejat Eczacıbaşı Foundation and collection (i.e. Bülent's father). The entrance floor that houses this permanent exhibition was shortly thereafter joined by a downstairs area for contemporary art with changing exhibitions curated by Rosa Martinez, as well as areas for video art and photography, and a screening room. Although the initial display of the permanent exhibition, then entitled "Observation/Interpretation/Multiplicity" did not explicitly make the claim of representing the history of modern painting in Turkey, the museum's name (suggesting to it be a reflection of the modern city rather than the taste of a particular pool of collectors), and the timespan presented (from the early 20th century to the early 1980s) was taken by many artists, curators and critics alike to suggest differently.[168] The works were grouped

[167] *SantralIstanbul* is after the *Istanbul Modern* the second flagship project that Erdoğan intervened in by mediating and facilitating the obtaining of the necessary permits. Although never officially confirmed on part of the government, several persons working at *SantralIstanbul* relayed to me that Erdoğan asked for a pre-opening to coincide with the last stretches of his national re-election campaign in 2007. To accommodate the Prime Minister's wishes, this early opening featured three exhibitions conceptualized by the Centre Pompidu (Contemporary Perspectives), the ZKM (Touch Me İstanbul), and MUSAC (An Interpersonal Journey). While some artists and other artworld actors welcomed the fact that Erdoğan deemed the contemporary arts as important enough to request this early opening during a politically sensitive time, others boycotted and critiqued these developments as an instrumentalization of art for political self-representation and gains.

[168] Apart from the modernization narrative accorded to the exhibition, many commentators generally questioned the rationale behind exhibiting the family collection. One artist forcefully noted: "What I really can't stand at all is this notion that 'we at least are doing something for the public' as if that was a good thing in itself. We have to stop this nonsense, either something is good or it is bad. But you can't just

not chronologically, but under different "themes" such as "Enchanted Landscape-Counter-City," "Mystery of the Mind – Beyond Intuition," and "Touching Time," in order to "provide us the chance to learn, explore and feel one of the most important elements of modern Turkish art with the help of a diverse approach" as curators Ali Akay, Levent Çalıkoğlu and Haşim Nur Gürel announced (Akay/Çalıkoğlu/Gürel 2004, 16). When I asked co-curator Levent Çalıkoğlu on his takes of the criticism, our conversation took various turns: "Just because the museum is called 'Istanbul Modern' does not mean that we lay claims on the genealogy of modern art. That's why we suggested a thematic organization. We never claimed that we could do a historical overview." Still this did not really answer why the introductory text to the exhibition referenced the "most important elements of modern Turkish art." As I tried to question the presentation of the exhibition further, Çalıkoğlu replied that the criticism was to be expected when curating mostly out of one family collection, and that he too wished that they could have included other (private and institutional) collections as originally planned. These, however, withdrew, he noted, most probably because they were planning to raise their profile through similarly constituted, independent exhibitions. Towards the end of our conversation Çalıkoğlu suggested that the educational, cultivating impact of the Istanbul Modern on local audiences might – under the given circumstances – trump the question of curatorial integrity:

> "Look what we are doing here is basically educating the audience, this is what you have to take into consideration. Otherwise these discussions are rather snobbish and unrealistic, […] but we have deal with the realities. Of course, there can and should be criticism, but this museum is a beginning. Up to 2,500 persons visit the museum per day. This is what I see as a success. Of course, it is a very

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assemble paintings in a building like you assemble furniture in your house and call it a museum that supposedly serves the public."

> problematic institution. I myself acknowledged that, and this is the reason why, I only acted as the director for one month, when it was first opened."[169]

One issue that captured my attention repeatedly was that the socio-political or historical context both in the permanent exhibition as well as temporary ones was never addressed. This became especially visible in a retrospective on Fikret Muallâ Saygı (1903-1967) in which the accompanying texts to the works focused solely on Saygı's psychological state; a childhood injury that had left him crippled in his right foot, the early loss of his mother, his alcoholism, the loneliness of his years in Paris, and unrequited love for various women was also thematized. Mentioned in passing was that he "feared the police" because when in Turkey he had been taken into police custody due to an "misunderstanding," in the course of which he was badly beaten. That Saygı had been a close friend of writer and poet Nazim Hikmet who himself was persecuted for "communist activities," and that beatings and torture were widespread in the case of political prisoners was nowhere mentioned. When I addressed this point in an interview with Ali Akay, who again co-curated this exhibition together with Çalıkoğlu and Gürel about the lack of political context given, he answered rather sternly that he did not think that this was part of their task as curators: "these are things that people can read in books." In part, Akay's assertion contradicts or rather limits the educational impetus described by Çalıkoğlu above to simply aesthetical matters, pointing further to the fact that Turkey's belatedness and need to catch up – in this case with cultivating audiences – is employed at strategic points (see Chapter 3).

[169] I should note that Çalıkoğlu has resumed the position of artistic director since the summer of 2008, and that the initial display of the permanent works was changed one year after the opening of the *Istanbul Modern* and supplemented by newly acquired works.

The Istanbul Modern has, it seems, repeatedly shied away from other political issues when composing Turkey-related events and shows. While the different modalities of censorship will be further discussed in the subsequent chapter I want to point out here that silencing mechanisms in private institutions are even less visible, harder to trace. Two persons who had worked with the *Istanbul Modern* museum, noted that the administration had asked the word "Kurd" (and its permutations) to be stricken off the exhibition texts –an incident that again was relayed off the record.

Art critic Ali Artun has been amongst those to most forcefully criticize the Istanbul Modern, including the fact that a private museum presents itself as public institution, while being dominated by a family collection gaining in value through the exposure in the museum it created. While in our conversation Artun suggested that these types of imbalances arise from the weak or missing institutionalization of art in Turkey, another reading is possible as well (see also Artun 2005). I would suggest that institutions such as the *Istanbul Modern* or the *Sabanci Museum* for that matter are actually rather strong, and thus can enact the types of obscuration outlined above.

In addition, private museums and cultural centers, including the galleries that are part of banks tend to be bound rather closely to the state, exhibit less critical stances than, for instance, the personnel working at the *Istanbul Painting and Sculpture Museum* (who are notably often themselves artist who graduated from the state academy). As sociologist Sibel Yardimci shows, the Eczacıbaşı family (who has also inaugurated the *Istanbul Foundation for Culture and the Arts*, see Chapters 5 and 6) have a history of deep intertwinedness with state actors, especially in their 'Kemalist' incarnation, citing Mustafa Kemal extensively in their catalogues for the Istanbul Festivals, and especially in

the past inviting state officials and military figures to their symposia on cultural policy developments (Yardimci 2005, 105-113). Another telling example in this context that involves another industrialist family that has established a string of private cultural institutions, is that of that *Aksanat* (the culture and arts center of *Akbank*, the banking leg of *Sabanci Holding*): its inaugural exhibition in 1983 featured the paintings of Kenan Evren, the leader of the military coup d'état of 1980 (and president till 1989).

Instances of Recovery

While art – and the artworld – is involved in, reflects or is subject to obscurations within national (art) histories, it can also animate and be part of periods of recovery of memory, remembrance and commemoration. Frieder Schnock and Renata Stih's intervention discussed above presents such an instance. As I will discuss in the next chapter, art is often regarded as a "protected space" which should not be subject to the restrictions that other expressions might incur and thus is at times deemed more suitable to transcend long-standing taboos. Two such examples are the exhibition V*ernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944* on the crimes of the German *Wehrmacht* that in Berlin was hosted by the arts space *KunstWerke* (2001)*,* the other called *6-7 September, 1995* showing photographs of the riots on said "events" was organized by the gallery *Karşı Sanat* in Istanbul in 2005. Many other examples could be named, but I want to end this chapter by briefly pointing to a notable development with regard to these types of recovery in the Turkish context, specifically with regard to the Armenian Genocide.

In the last few years a growing number scholars and public intellectuals from Turkey have advocated in different shapes and forms an engagement with the Armenian Genocide. Given the resistances within Turkey to address this issue politically (apart from denial), many of them have proposed an empathetic approach; one that – to use a widely employed phrase by interlocutors – allows to recognize and mourn together the human suffering surrounding the events of 1915. At the heart of this call for highlighting 'the human element' is the notion that an empathetic engagement with the Genocide will pave the way first for an emotional and then a political understanding thereof and thus presents an important step towards reconciliation. It is in this context that individual narratives, mostly in the form of biographies as well as other forms of aesthetic and cultural production have been pointed out as a preferred vehicle to address what is ultimately a political issue. Especially artistic approaches are privileged because, so the assumption goes, art is supposed to correspond with emotionality in a very effective and judgment-free manner, and presents the possibility of understanding 'common humanity.' While in previous decades Armenian, Greek or Jewish artists had to change their names or obscure their backgrounds to be accepted by broader audiences, they now find themselves celebrated. Interest in the history of artistic production by minorities has likewise increased (Tütüncüyan 2008, Güllü 2008) and musical evenings that feature songs in Ladino, Arabic, Armenian, Zaza and Kurdish by the group *Kardeş Türküleri* or the performance space *garajistanbul* were regularly sold out during my research.

These approaches – at times implicitly and at times explicitly – rely on the method of historical empathy, as a tool to understand and come to terms with the past (Davis/Yeager/Foster 2001). Here, empathy is part of a didactic tool, one that, I would

add, might also inhabit a certain type of asymmetry. The proponents of an empathetic approach rarely take into account what Carolyn Dean has coined "the fragility of empathy after the Holocaust" (Dean 2004). She reviews critical debates that have not only questioned the 'effectiveness' – so to speak – of empathy in face of the Holocaust, but also the very possibility of empathy with human suffering in what has frequently been called the Shoa-industry and the magnitude of images it has produced. These discussions focus on the ambiguities between approximation and distancing processes that empathetic perception might entail: Who can one be empathetic to? Does moral sensibility necessarily rest within a call for responsibility and action? Is there maybe as Kluger writes a narcissistic element in empathy through which one "enjoys one's own sensitiveness" and yet 'annihilates what is being contemplated' (2004, 8-9) – frequently in an exploitative fashion (2004, 13). These remain questions often unasked in the debate in Turkey, as does the question of political responsibility that is so explicitly raised in the works on the Flick Collection by Renata Stih and Frieder Schnock. That the discussion on 'aesthetic reconciliation' in Turkey rarely involves the mentioning the official recognition of the Armenian Genocide seems to further evidence what historian Louis Fishman has described as a situation in which minorities in Turkey are seen as "living artifacts," or as an interlocutor put it 'curiosities,' or remnants of a purportedly 'cosmopolitan' Ottoman past. These often nostalgic assessments are – although opposed in intention – not dissimilar from official portrayals in Turkey, where now the Empire's religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity is sometimes cited as having a model character for tolerance in "our globalized world."[170]

[170] Interestingly the model character is emphasized not in reference to Turkey's own policies but as a possible inspiration for neighboring countries as early as the late 1990s (see Borovali 1997).

This move in official representations of a multicultural past and its 'domesticated,' or unthreatening remnants is frequently discussed under the heading of "Imperialist Nostalgia" (see Bilal 2006, Ors 2006), a term coined by Renato Rosaldo (1989). Although his very evocative phrase of Imperialist Nostalgia as "mourning for what one has destroyed" (1989, 107) is often cited by critical scholars, Rosaldo's proposition that nostalgia "conceals" the persistence of power differentials and complicity remains largely absent from these discussions.

In an essay on remembrance Vincent Crapanzano stresses aesthetic dimensions as integral to commemoration and remembering. Taking monuments as an example, he however also draws attention to "the contradiction between the aesthetic and the historical" by stating that:

> "With the aesthetic reduction of the historical, the monumentalized event suffers a loss of representational immediacy – of stature. The originating event, its first significance, is doubly displaced – from the event to the monument, from the historical to the aesthetic realm" (2004, 169).

With regard to the issue of reconciliation with Turkey's minorities, which is, at the moment, discussed primarily in aesthetic – or aestheticized terms – an additional aspect of removedness or displacement seems to be at play: that between intention and perception. Sincere as the calls for reconciliation might be, they have not yet unequivocally advocated the political recognition of and responsibility for the systematic violence of the past (or the present for that matter), thus leaving the aesthetic interventions they advance or support without a place in the political realm. This is in stark contrast to the German case, where despite all limitation, this kind of violence in the case of the *Third Reich* has been addressed on a wide scale, including politically and legally.

Chapter 5: The Politics of Art – The Modalities of Censorship

Throughout the preceding chapters I have argued that the proposed civic and cultivating impact of art presents a mediating discourse between divergent and often contradictory interests in and understandings of art on the part of different actors. While judgments on what makes good art and for whom, when, and in which contexts may differ considerably and depend on a variety of factors including personal and art historical evaluations, or market(ing) strategies, the civic capacities accorded to art rely on the assumption that art and aesthetic expression are inherently good. It is this assumption about the civic impact that renders the arts a provenance of government – and an avenue through which to make claims to modernity.

There are, however, exceptions and limits to the notion of art's inherent beneficiality that, when reached, are met with measures of censorship. The very existence of an array of regulatory mechanisms and procedures that form censorship apparatuses defining and upholding these limits, speaks to the transformative power associated with the aesthetic, and to the need to control and regulate this potential. It seems that in the hands of the right people, the right ideology and the right politics the arts can unfold into civility[171] – but in the wrong hands, the wrong ideology and the wrong politics art might harbor danger, be harmful or threatening to this very civility.

In his article "The Ontology of Censorship," Frederick Schauer rightly states that as censorship moved from the process of preclearance to "a larger range of state actions

[171] Some argue that aesthetics in the hands of 'bad' ideology is actually not art but propaganda (Burt 1994b, Clark 1997). However, scholars seem to skirt at least two issues: Does this mean that art is not ideological or civilizing as such, but can be put to in the service of a good or bad ideology? What weighs more significantly: the intention of the artist or the political context in which an artwork is shown?

against the spoken or written word" (1998, 147) the notion of censorship has often floated in considerable grey areas:

> "When it is argued that an act of censorship might emanate not just from the regulatory apparatus of the political state but also from the everyday conditions of social life, it is time to examine the relationship of the censored to the uncensored, and thus the constrained from the unconstrained, the coerced to the uncoerced, and the externally imposed to the internally generated" (1998, 147).

He goes on to argue that:

> "When we think about just what it *is* to censor – when we think about the ontology of censorship and not just about the epistemology that enables us to identify it – we may discover that the very idea of censorship collapses. We may find that there is no subset of human behavior that we can identify solely because it restricts our communicative possibilities, since all human behavior both constitutes and restricts our communicative possibilities" (ibid.,149, emphasis in original).

However Schauer also suggests that while descriptively problematic, the concept of censorship might have ascriptive qualities, "marking the conclusion that some things are to be treated differently to others" (ibid., 149). Rather than using censorship in a programmatic or polemic sense, i.e. a facile critique of the state or its agencies, it is this ascriptive quality that I am interested in. Censorship does not solely consist of explicit bans by the state – in fact such bans may be only a small portion of those acts of censorship I wish to consider here. One approach that seems fruitful in this regard is Richard Burt's definition of censorship as the "administration of aesthetics" encompassing the "locus of different, dispersed kinds of regulations" (Burt 1994a, xi). While the notion of censorship in the arts is broadly discussed in the literature on authoritarian regimes, Burt's definition opens a perspective on censorship that sees beyond straightforward banning and suppression of artworks to processes of (partial) silencing to include the exploration of the continuum between criticism and censorship, incentives for self-censorship, and delegitimization as well as modes of foreclosure that

authoritatively frame the production and reception of artworks (Burt 1994, Butler 1998, Brown 1998). Accordingly, this chapter employs censorship as an umbrella term for the many effective ways in which these strategies are employed by different actors at different nexuses of power, be it the direct involvement of state institutions or by individuals who invoke state interests. That such silencing processes take place on different levels is also stressed by Ruth Gavinson who points out that freedom of expression has come under scrutiny even in the absence of state prohibition or punishment (1998, 43):

> "A variety of other mechanisms exist that effectively silence. These include self-restraint by speakers themselves, effective censorship by peers and superiors, a variety of market devices, social implementations of norms of unacceptability, and the systematic marginalization of groups of people who are discouraged from speaking their minds and feelings (Gavinson 1998, 43f).

There seems to be a consensus among lawmakers and politicians (as well as audiences) that "not all aesthetic traditions are uniformly enlightening and liberating" (Devereaux 1995, 49). Yet how to distinguish between expressions that are "enlightening and liberating" from those that are not is rarely specified. The case studies presented here map out instances in which censorship mechanisms are set in motion in Germany and Turkey and what types of expressions they aim to delimit and contain. As most of these instances do not present complete suppressions, I try to move away from the image of a unified state that enacts censorship, shifting the attention to the different actors and stakeholders in silencing efforts.

Interestingly, censorship is rarely discussed as a phenomenon existing in Western

European democracies.[172] In contrast, restrictions on freedom of expression in Turkey are in the spotlight, not least in the context of the EU accession negotiations. What both Germany and Turkey have in common, however, are regulations on public decency, e.g. pertaining to the protection of minors – which is highly normalized and rarely scrutinized, especially when it comes to pornography (Human Rights Watch 1989, Ohmer 2004).[173]

[172] The discussions on freedom of artistic expression, in the U.S. however, often referred to under the heading of "culture wars" were very animated throughout the 1980s and 1990s. A considerable part of these debates centered on decisions of the National Endowments for the Arts, for instance, whether the NEA should be free to fund works deemed pornographic and demeaning to women or offensive to religious sentiment. Engendering discussions on the understanding of freedom of speech and restrictions on the First Amendment they gave rise to at times curious coalitions between Christian fundamentalists and feminists by virtue of alignment rather than agenda (e.g. see Fenner 1995, Devereaux 1995, Post 1998). In the cases I recorded during fieldwork, pornography played no role and religion played only a minor one (see below): In the trail of the Danish cartoon affair the anticipation of potential breaches vis-à-vis religious sentiment led to the canceling of a staging of Mozart's *Idomeneo* at the *Deutsche Oper* in Berlin in September 2006. The reason, (then) director Kirsten Hams explained was an anonymous phone call after a preview raising concern that Muslims may find a beheading scene of Jesus, Mohammed and Buddha inciting, leading her to contend that the opera may only be performable under police protection, although no threats had been made. A wave of protest ensued, portraying Hams' decision as either a prostration to "radical Islamism" or alternatively giving into an unwarranted Islamophobia. The only point that critics agreed on was that it was acase of self-censorship and the *Deutsche Oper* reinstated the piece in October 2006 to a sold out run. In view of the events journalist Marcia Pally stated that "censorship has a bad name, [t]here is no better publicity" for an opera that was long regarded as one of Mozart's "inferior" works (Pally 2006; see also Bax 2006, Brug 2006, Frank 2006). The second case of preemptive censorship was based on threats made by "a group of young Muslim men" against an exhibition by the caricature collective Surrend at *Galerie Nord* in Berlin (Elke Buhr 2008, see also Bozic 2008). The show featured a picture of the Kaaba in Mecca with the title "Stupid Stone." The exhibition was closed for a week, and reopened under protection through a private security firm.

[173] As so poignantly demonstrated by Marjorie Heins (former director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Art Censorship Project, 1991-98), censorship becomes much more broadly acceptable when argued that the depictions in question may harm those understood to be most vulnerable, i.e. children and minors. Yet she argues that thus defined censorship measures often present an entry point for much broader infringements upon freedom of expression than one might assume at first sight, such as attempted bannings of online access to sites such as Planned Parenthood from public libraries, because of explicit sexual descriptions – even though they are for educational purposes (Heins 2001, 6-7). Heins also highlights cultural and legal differences in assessing what constitutes harmful content for minors. An instructive example in this context is the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case that painter Josef Müller leveled against the canton of Fribourg for confiscating sexually explicit paintings of his from an exhibition after visitor had complained about their impact on his young daughter. The decision stated that it "is not possible to discern 'a uniform European concept of morals'" (European Court of Human Rights May 24, 1988 at 9, 22 case of Müller and others, series A. no 133 cited after Heins 2001, 205).

As censorship is justified on the basis of anticipated 'harm' (Fenner1995, 3) the question remains what exactly it is that is thought to be harmed. Regardless of whether they are taken to protect 'moral' or religious standards, civility, decency, persons, property or even aesthetic standards themselves (Shusterman 1995),[174] silencing mechanisms present a tightrope walk between individual liberties (including the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the arts and the artist) and the welfare of society and thus a historically highly contingent category (Serra 1995).[175]

Two exhibitions and the debates surrounding them form the core of my inquiry: *Regarding Terror* (Berlin), which focused on media perceptions of the *Red Army Faction*, and *Free Kick* (Istanbul), which featured works referencing the 'Kurdish issue.' militarism, torture and social marginality in Turkey. Both exhibitions are instructive in terms of the problems that explicitly political art poses for policymakers and sponsors, despite protestations to the contrary. Cultural policy officials often postulate that the critical impetus of art is not simply tolerated, but desired, because it nurtures processes of societal reflection and mirrors the maturation of society and the political system. Accordingly, the strong reactions that both exhibitions evoked present interesting points of inquiry with regard to the state's mandate to support the arts and for probing the boundaries between arts and politics. Rather than providing a deep historical discussion

[174] Playing devil's advocate, Shusterman considers the possibility of aesthetic censorship, i.e. censorship that targets what is "aesthetically objectionable" (1995, 60). Artists themselves, for instance may employ aesthetic censorship, when they suppress or even destroy their own works as part of the creative or editorial process. Shusterman's intervention raises the question if these types of aesthetic interventions can be categorized as self-censorship. My sense is that questions of both intent and power would have to be more closely interrogated to further this argument.

[175] It is important to note that while many U.S. authors operate from the notion of free speech as an unfettered right in the 'liberal tradition.' Germany and Turkey while constitutionally guaranteeing freedom of expression also clearly delimit free speech. In Germany this delimitation sets in a) when violations to the rights (especially the right to dignity) of individual persons occur, and b) when speech or other forms of expression can be construed as incitement of the masses. In Turkey freedom of speech is most clearly delimited when conceived as a threat against national sovereignty and territorial integrity; this includes insults against the state and its institutions (for a more detailed discussion see below).

of what constitutes censorship (e.g. see Kelly 1997), this chapter relies to a large extent on fieldwork material, interviews, documents and reviews that together allow for more detailed insights into when explicitly political art presents a problem and for whom.

I argue that explicitly political art poses a transgression in that it breaches the boundaries that art is supposed to operate in – one that poses a challenge and is at certain strategic points met with silencing efforts, be they financial, political, or legal. Rather than complete suppressions these efforts aim to delegitimize and discourage, but also to restore and consolidate the distinction between the operational realm of the arts and that of politics. Germany and Turkey have specific historical issues, i.e. the Nazi past (and Western belonging) and the question of territorial integrity (and concomitantly sovereignty) respectively, that form the backdrop of what is identified as harmful and to which most censorship cases can be traced.

Finally, the following exploration, in conjuncture with the previous chapter, also offers some thoughts on the question of whether a political statement in the realm of art is different from one in that of politics, and vice versa. Or asked differently, what happens to a political statement when it traverses from the realm of politics to that of the arts, given of course, that this delineation is indeed possible and productive.

All is well in the Federal Republic?

Running an exploratory literature search on censorship in Germany, one might come to the conclusion that censorship ceased with the end of World War II, o, more precisely, with denazification and the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany.

What John Borneman (1992) described as the mirror-imaging process with regard to the "Two Berlins," was likewise true for the two German states. It was long integral to West-Germany's self-understanding that 'here' freedom of expression reigned, while the 'other' Germany, the GDR, censored and repressed those not in line with government, or, in this case, party ideology[176] (for a counterargument on the ubiquity but obscured nature of censorship in West-Germany, see Hoffmann 1979, 21-25).

However, it is especially its National Socialist past that has shaped Germany's constitutionally manifested understanding of freedom of expression *and* its limits. More than just constituting the boundaries of the beneficiality of art, aesthetic expressions that are categorized as or connote "Nazi art" are frequently characterized as downright damaging or dangerous. To this day films produced in the Nazi era such as "*Jud Suess*" (1940)[177] remain banned in Germany (under Article 130, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the German penal code) because of the blatant Anti-Semitism they display – which, according to German legislation, falls under the offense of incitement of the masses

[176] Mikhail Iampolski's article "Censorship as the Triumph of Life" challenges common understandings of censorship in the Soviet Union (1995). In contrast to more subtle or obscured versions of state censorship that prefer to operate away from the public eye, he looks at broadly publicized and ritualized forms of censorship. He highlights a period during the 1920s and 1930s in which censorship was publicly discussed, and censored films were written up in much more detail than non-censored films, with the intent to offer "redemption" or restoration. These discussions focused particularly on battling formalism, which was seen as a limitation to both life and on art. Iampolski presents cases of filmmakers and writers who publicly responded to their works being censored through postures of self-indictment and 'therapeutic confessions.' Yet, he argues that this 'open' mode of censorship maintained an obscuring effect.

[177] The movie was a grossly reinterpreted adaptation of Lion Feuchtwang's novel (1925) by the same name by Veit Harlan (often referred to as "Hitler's favorite filmmaker"), and was declared compulsory viewing for the SS and the police forces by Himmler. Banned by the Allies, it remains so to this day in Germany. Although Harlan was first cleared through a denazification panel in 1947, he was the only film director to be tried for his artistic work during the Third Reich. The Hamburg State Prosecutor charged him with crimes against humanity "on the grounds that his film had incited viewers to countenance the murder of the Jews" (Tegel 2000, 215). Harlan was acquitted by a jury that concluded "the charges that the extermination of the Jews was a result of the film were deemed not 'provable.' especially as the decision for the 'Final Solution' was made later" (Tegel 2000, 216). Harlan characterized himself "not [as] a Nazi, but also not an opponent of the Nazis," and stated: "My party is art, my politics love for the fatherland" (cited after Tegel 2000, 227).

(*Volkverhetzung*).[178] As such, incitement of the masses constitutes an offense against the first article of the German constitution guaranteeing human dignity. Whereas art and film students in the U.S. might watch Leni Riefenstahl's "*Triumph des Willens*" (1935) and analyze it according to its aesthetic and ideological components, only excerpts of the film are permitted to be shown in Germany, mainly for educational purposes,[179] as it violates a specific subsection of the "incitement of the masses"-law that prohibits the glorification of National Socialism.[180] Yet, it seems that the specificities of the ban reveal an understanding in which the aesthetics of the film are deemed so powerful that watching it in its entirety is feared to be so persuasive and damaging that it may topple all education on Nazi atrocities through German school curricula, and indictments of this past in political discourse.

The question of what can be identified as National Socialist aesthetics has haunted postwar Germany, especially when it comes to legally interpreting and judging

[178] The penal laws subsumed under the concept of incitement of the masses are part of the laws pertaining to offenses against the public order (*Straftaten gegen die öffentliche Ordnung*) and as such have precedence over the constitutionally stipulated freedom of the arts and sciences (Article 5 paragraph 3 of the German Constitution, the *Grundgesetz*). Contemplating debates on instating incitement laws in Israel after Yitzak Rabin's murder, Ruth Gavinson argues these types of laws are problematic because of they assume a causal relationship between an inciting speech and an action (1998). She argues that causality is contingent upon a complex web of factors that is difficult to ascertain. Incitement laws thus carry the risk of self-censorship rather than addressing the circumstances that give rise to hate speech. The German stance on the issue, however, is that nonintervention in inciting speech produces the impression of (tacit) consent by the state.

[179] The film can also be watched at the Documentation Center of Nazicrimes in Nuremberg. There have been periodic calls to lift the ban of this and other films from the NS area, for instance by Lorenz Jäger, columnist for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2002). Arguments for lifting the ban interpret such a step as expressing the vitality and maturity of German democracy, while yet others argue against censorship on principle, and propose to embed screenings of these films in educational programs. It remains to be seen how the German government and legal apparatus will deal with the fact that many of these films are readily available through the internet. So far, authorities have been rather inconsistent with regard to regulating online content: while, for instance, member of parliament Lutz Heilmann (*Die Linke*) was able to attain a temporary injuncture against *wikipedia* for featuring an entry in which he was identified as a collaborator with the former East German *Staatsicherheit* (*Stasi*) until this entry was removed, no such actions have yet been taken against *youtube* versions of Riefenstahl's films.

[180] The glorification of National Socialism is forbidden under article 130 – paragraph 3 of the German penal code. What constitutes 'glorification' has repeatedly come under question, but can in principle be understood to apply to any portrayal that does not unequivocally condemn Nazism.

expressions made in the realm of artistic production. One case that has caused ongoing deliberations in the press, among political factions and the *Bundesprüfstelle für jugendgefährdende Medien* (the Federal Department for Media Harmful to Young Persons) is that of the music group Rammstein.[181] Although none of their songs have been indexed, a 1998 music video featuring clips from Leni Riefenstahl Olympics movie "*Fest der Völker/Fest der Schönheit*" had to eliminate all National Socialist Symbols (banned through the German Penal Code Article 86a) before it was allowed to be aired on German television.[182] In 2005, the *Verfassungsschutz* of North-Rhine Westphalia, a state agency that audits potential offenses against the constitution, made the assessment that the group cannot be categorized as extreme rightwing (*rechtsextrem*), and was deploying NS reference ironically rather than literally. Still, the permissiveness, appropriateness and moral responsibility inherent in engaging with and invoking images from Germany's Nazi past in art or entertainment continues to be debated in German *Feuilletons* and frequently includes questioning the underlying motivation of artists who do so.

One could argue that the above examples are connected to the specificities of the German past and thus present somewhat of an exception. After all *Mein Kampf* is still banned in Germany (as it is in Austria), but available in many of its neighboring countries. Yet the fervor with which the bans are upheld and discussed seems to be based

[181] Debuting in 1995 the group's name both derivates from the Ramstein Air Force Base (Kaiserslautern, Rheinland-Pfalz) – widely known for the tragic death of 70 people caused by a plane collision during a military aviation show in 1988 – and signifies large rocks that are used to block roads. That discussions around and scrutiny against Rammstein was especially heated throughout the 1990s is certainly also related to the post-unification rise of Neo-Nationalsocialist parties in Germany, especially the *Nationale Partei Deutschlands* and the *Republikaner*.

[182] Another video for their song *Mein Teil* was restricted to airing after 10pm as it was categorized by the *Kommission für Jugendmedienschutz* (KJM) as unsuitable for minors ("emotionally overwhelming, fear inducing and threatening" 2005, 39) because of combining images associated with cannibalism and oral sex, and the depiction of violence and pain. For the full report see http://www.blm.de/apps/documentbase/data/de/jugendschutzbericht_2_04.pdf.

on an understanding in which all things (Neo-)Nazi have an allure beyond control. The vigilance with which these bans are guarded (or periodically demanded) are of course also an important part of Germany's self-representation to the international community, an up-holding of its promise of 'never again' and taking political responsibility for its NS past. It is in this vein that Lawrence Douglas identifies the criminalization of Holocaust denial in Germany as legitimizing the existence of the Federal Republic. Legally cementing the imperative of remembering, it also severs the Republic's ties with National Socialism through a "posture of obsessive mindfulness" of its past (Douglas 1998, 73) vital in establishing Germany's occidental belonging (see Chapter 1).[183] While Burt notes that the standardized narrative in the U.S. tends to present censorship as being deployed from the 'right' of the political spectrum against the 'left' (Burt 1994a), Germany has in its postwar history most visibly curtailed expression from the political 'right.' however not exclusively so, as the following cases will illustrate.

Fassbinder's "Garbage": Ambiguity and the Specter of Nazism

Rainer Werner Fassbinder's play "*Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod*" ("Garbage, the City and Death") was conceived whilst Fassbinder was working in Frankfurt in 1975. Although this play was neither censored nor banned in the strict, legal sense, its staging has been for the most part successfully suppressed in Germany for the past 30 years, despite several attempts to perform it.

[183] Instated in 1985 as an addition to article 130 of the penal code, this law – often referred to as a measure against the *Auschwitzlüge* – was only able to pass parliament with a stipulation that also criminalized the denial of the forced expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe on insistence of the conservative CDU/CSU faction that was holding the majority at the time.

Fassbinder came to Frankfurt in 1974 and joined the *TAT* (*Theater am Turm*), an experimental theater group. The play was loosely based on two novels by Gerhard Zwerenz, *Bericht aus dem Landesinneren* (1972) and *Die Erde ist unbewohnbar wie der Mond* (1973) – both providing a critical look at the urban redevelopment frenzy that swept through Frankfurt at the time, centering particularly on the *Westend*. A neighborhood populated mainly by the city's Jewish bourgeoisie before 1933 (see Markovits et al. 1986, 7), the district had turned into desolate housing for low-income families and squatting students from the adjacent Johann Wolfgang Goethe University by the 1970s. When developers in concert with the city administration tried to clear the buildings of these unwanted dwellers the so-called *Häuserkampf* (housing battle) broke out. For the play, Fassbinder had synthesized one character (called Herr Mauerstamm in the novels) into a developer named only the "Rich Jew."[184] Published by *Suhrkamp* in 1976, the play was quickly met with attacks from cultural critics as an allegedly anti-Semitic showcase, and the publisher discontinued the publication only a few months after its first release. Scholars have suggested in retrospect, that the play's real problematic lay not in the text itself, but in its reception (Markovits et al.1986, 13). David Barnett, for instance, has argued that the outcry that the play produced especially among conservative Christian-Democrats presented an attempt of the German right to thwart suspicions of persistent anti-Semitism, and an overall move to reduce fascism and anti-Semitism to its

[184] Many commentators recognized Ignatz Bubis, a prominent real-estate developer responsible for much of the redevelopment of the Westend, to be the real life model on which the character was based; Bubis later became the Chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. Maskovits notes that "Zwerenz strongly objected to Fassbinder's creation of the 'Rich Jew,'" whereupon Fassbinder promised to rewrite the role calling the new character "'Rich Poor Jew' to convey that after Auschwitz even the richest Jew remained poor as well" (Markovits/Benhabib/Postone 1986, 8). This rewrite was never realized, however, as the scandal broke out before Fassbinder could return to the play.

National Socialist manifestation (2004, 30).[185] Notably, protests against the play presented the first time that German conservatives and the small Jewish community of Frankfurt formed an alliance demanding the ban of the play's performance from the city's mayor Walter Wallmann. Although he was personally against the performance of the play, Wallmann did not want to turn to legal and political measures to prevent it. Many of the city's left-leaning intellectuals while also wary of the possible impact and direction of play, opposed a ban that would amount to censorship, on principle. Some critics demanded that the characters uttering anti-Semitic statements should wear Nazi armbands as to resolve any possible ambiguities and to clearly demarcate that those uttering anti-Semitic statements on stage did not represent "normal Germans" (Barnett 2004, 33f). Barnett suggests that the anxieties about potential misreadings have to be understood on the background of what he identifies as a philo-Semitic taboo paired with latent anti-Semitism in Germany at the time.

Several attempts were made to perform the play, but every time a theater company took it on, it was eventually dropped under public and political pressure. Discussions around "Garbage" flared up again in 1984 (the seventh attempt to produce the play, which as Fassbinder had stipulated in his will was only to be premiered in Frankfurt, Paris or New York) when Ulrich Schwab wanted to showcase it at the *Alte Oper* (Frankfurt's prestigious opera house), and once more in 1985 when the *Schaupiel*

[185] Philosopher Seyla Benhabib argues that the discomfort that many readers had with the play is induced by other characters voicing anti-Semitic views, sentiments that according to Benhabib, Fassbinder regarded as deep-seated in German society (Markovits et al. 1986, 17). Barnett notes that *Garbage* should be interpreted together with Fassbinder's *Nur eine Scheibe Brot* (Only a Slice of Bread) – with which it was originally published, since it is about a director who tries to make a film about Auschwitz, but "stumbles upon a lack of empathy with the victims in his actors and his team" (2004, 40).

Frankfurt (part of the municipal theater network) planned another staging. Both attempts were unsuccessful. The last attempt in particular was aimed at restoring Frankfurt's image as a city open to controversy and discussion, a cosmopolitan melting pot, instead of a locus of censorship (Barnett 2004, 34). By then sensitivities with regard to possible anti-Semitism had sharpened even further: the Bitburg incident had transpired,[186] Ernst Jünger had been awarded the Goethe prize, and then chancellor Kohl had called for a "normalization" of Germany by overcoming the ever-looming 'guilt-complex' of the *Third Reich*. While all of these events were interpreted as Germany's desire to return to full sovereignty, they were also accompanied by growing protests (Postone et al. 1986, 24). Against this backdrop the renewed attempt to perform Fassbinder's play led to the occupation of the stage by members of Jewish community in Frankfurt (who had copied and thus multiplied the tickets allocated to them in order to infiltrate the performance space).

The following two planned public showings were cancelled, but billed one as a repeat rehearsal, "Garbage" ended up being performed for a closed audience of theater critics.[187] An amateur club at the Ruhr University in Bochum performed the play in 1979

[186] The visit to the Bitburg cemetery by Reagan and Kohl was originally billed as a symbolic act of reconciliation. When it became known, however, that the military cemetery also hosted the remains of members of the Waffen-SS, protests erupted. A hastily added concentration camp visit did not dissuade the protests (in which notably the Jewish community was joined only by members of the Green Party.The SPD tried to stay out of the affair because it did not want to alienate (!) potential voters in the upcoming local elections) leading to the "first major Jewish protest in the history of the FRG" (Barnett 2004, 34).

[187] A similar strategy of closed screenings was also applied for a documentary entitled *Beruf Neonazi*. Filmed in 1993 it followed Bela Ewald Althans, then a rising star in Germany's Neonazi scene. Never officially banned, it was deemed dangerous and seductive especially for young audiences. The problem seemed not only to be that the film captured Althans denying the Holocaust during a visit to a concentration camp (an offense for which he was later convicted), but that Althans' eloquent and charismatic appearance and his background (he was educated in a the liberal *Waldorf*-school system and raised by politically conscientious parents) did not fit the image of the 'asocial' Neonazi that had long dominated the Federal Republican imagination. The documentary has recently been broadcasted in conjuncture with an 'educational' program on Neonazis (2007) and updated material on Althans who came out publicly after his

unbeknownst to its publishers. Another staging of "Garbage" planned by the *Maxim Gorki* Theater in Berlin in 1999 was cancelled, while performances in New York and Tel Aviv took place without any incidents.[188]

Barnett's analysis of the reactions to the play mainly operates from Baudrillard's theory on the simulacra and the simulacrum to address an important question in this context: What is the relationship between an aesthetic approach to a subject and its counterpart, its manifestation in reality? What kind of transfer is assumed between two? What makes for the ambiguity between showing unsanctioned or undesired political positions and condoning them? These questions come up repeatedly in both the German and Turkish cases that follow. The first example is that of an exhibition entitled *Regarding Terror* intended to interrogate 'medialization' of the *Red Army Faction* (*Rote Armee Fraktion*, *RAF*) – an urban guerilla group according to its own definition and a homegrown gang of terrorists for others – that emerged in Germany in the late 1960s.

"Regarding Terror" at KunstWerke, Berlin – Anatomy of a Scandal or How (not) to do an Exhibition on German Terrorism

> "Seven years after its self-disbandment the Red Army Faction remains an irritating topic (*Reizthema*). Already in the summer of 2003 there were massive protests when an unauthorized concept of the gallery was made public, and led critics to accuse the initiators of making the terrorists into pop-icons. After controversial debates KunstWerke founder Klaus Biesenbach reworked the concept, delayed the start of the exhibition for a year and forewent (*verzichtete auf*) public funding" (Mehlig 2005).

The above account given by journalist Holger Mehlig in *Der Spiegel* surely is one way of narrating the controversy that surrounded *Regarding Terror: The RAF Exhibition*

release from prison. He has since then been banned from the National Movement, and works as an event promoter.

[188] Although a delegation headed by Bubis intervened to ensure that the director of the play agreed not to tour the play throughout Israel, and perform it in Berlin, as originally intended (Barnett 2004, 38-39).

(*Zur Vorstellung des Terrors: Die RAF Ausstellung)* at the *KunstWerke* in Berlin. The Red Army Faction (*RAF*) had assembled itself in the late 1960s from disillusioned splinters of the *Sozialistischer Deutsche Studentenbund* (Socialist German Student Union, *SDS*),[189] the experience of the Frankfurt housing battles, the reaction to the murder of Benno Ohnesorg,[190] and the overall backlash against the student and protest movements of the 1960s. What began with bombings of shopping malls and other buildings symbolizing the power of the state turned more violent and directed against persons who for the *RAF* symbolized the continuity between the Third Reich and the Federal Republic, the particularly German brand of well-connected industrialists, high officials and politicians. For almost 28 years, reaching its height in what came to be known as the German Fall (*der deutsche Herbst*) in 1977, little animated the German public imagination and made it hold its breath so much as "the war of the six against 60 million" (among them most prominently Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe, and Ulrike Meinhof) as Heinrich Böll called it in an essay that urged for a moderate approach and discussion of inner-German terrorism (1972). Böll's interjection, like all calls for moderation that followed him, was met with veritable outcries and accusations of *Staatsfeindschaft* (being an enemy of the state).

A closer look at the conception and realization of the exhibit and the impact of the protests it induced, however, reveals that the controversy was far more complex than Mehlig's description suggests. What is portrayed here as a decision to simply "forgo"

[189] Initially the student arm of the Social Democratic Party, the SDS became part of the extraparlimentarian opposition after the SPD excluded all SDS members in 1961 when rifts occurred e.g. in regard to Germany's rearmament program and the entry of the SPD into a "big coalition" with the CDU/CSU in 1966.

[190] Benno Ohnesorg (1940-1967), who had been active in the pacifist student movement, was murdered by a policeman during a peaceful protest against the visit of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in Berlin in 1967. His death became a symbol for the student movement for the oppressiveness of the German state.

public funding was actually one of the largest attempted and partially successful censorship-campaigns that has been publicized in (West-)Germany's postwar history. The director of the government agency that had granted the funding for the project, the *Capital Cultural Foundation* (*Hauptstadtkulturfond*, HFK), Adrienne Goehler, lost her position over this very controversy.[191] The controversy – or rather the tone of the controversy – also entailed Klaus Biesenbach's appearance at the center of the exhibition, even though it had originally been conceived by co-curators Ellen Blumenstein and Felix Ensslin,[192] who had done much of the groundwork. In part this was a strategy to calm the situation as Biesenbach was a well-known figure with considerable authority in the German artworld, and by that time had already been designated to soon take over P.S.1 in New York, bringing him, and by extension the *KunstWerke*, even more of an caché than before. It also led to unlikely alliances, including the involvement of Gerhart Baum (of the Free Democratic Party, FDP) who between 1978 and 1982 headed the Federal Ministry of the Interior as part of the socialdemocratic-liberal party coalition government, and thus the manhunt for the *RAF*. Quoted with the words "this exhibition is important. Art enables us in a special way to approach the time of federal German (*bundesdeutschen*) terror" (Peters 2005), he became the patron of the online auction (held from December 12-22, 2004) that secured the realization of the exhibition after the half of the federal grant (i.e. the portion that when the scandal broke out had not been spent yet) it had originally been awarded was returned. Baum's position on the exhibition

[191] Members of the review committee that awarded the application were along with Goehler, Undersecretary of Culture Christina Weiss (independent), *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur*'s Thomas Flierl (*PDS*), Berlin Mayor Klaus Wowereit (*SPD)*, and Volker Ratzman (*Die Grünen*). In a first step the *Bund* disempowered Goehler from her voting rights, although the drawn-out process of letting her go concealed this fact from the public eye, as finding a qualified and comparable replacement proofed more difficult than originally expected by the federal government.

[192] Felix Ensslin is the son of *RAF* member Gudrun Ensslin. He grew up in foster care after his mother went underground in 1967 to found the *RAF* (Furlong 2005).

presented a notable exception. Despite his place in Germany's political establishment, he stood his ground against all criticism including that of his party leaders Guido Westerwelle and Friedrich Merz who were among those demanding the termination of the *Capital Cultural Foundation*'s subvention of the show.[193] Finally, although Mehlig rightly states that the exhibition's concept was changed, the controversy remained the prism that refracted (and delimited) the presentation, reception and reviews of the exhibition that eventually emerged.

The first media outlet to pick up on the story was the daily German tabloid *Die Bildzeitung*. Running the headline "Why is Berlin paying 100,000 Euros for a scandalous exhibition about *RAF*? " the paper further stated that it was "the pinnacle of tastelessness to devote an exhibition to such crimes" (cited after Hohmann 2005, and *Das Parlament* 2003). *Bild* thus reprised the role it played for much of the years between the late 1960s and the 1980s in the 'hunt for sympathizers' (*Jagd auf Sympathisanten*).[194]

It is worth, I believe, quoting Ellen Blumenstein's own account on the genesis of the project at more length, because it allows for juxtaposing the process of conceptualizing the exhibition and the ensuing critiques, and because it illuminates divergent understandings of the relationship between politics and art, history and the

[193] Baum has stood his ground against all criticism and recently reiterated it in a response to Jan Philipp Reemtsma in whose eyes a political discussion of the phenomenon *RAF* was misleading since what motivated them was a thinly veiled "lust for violence" (Reemtsma 2007). Baum emphasized a need for more than a mere "demonization of terror," and suggested: "[We need to] make more of an effort to understand the complex situation of that time. The brother of the assassinated diplomat Braunmühl once said 'my outrage against the murderers is inseparably connected to the question: did the terrorists fall from heaven or did they grow out of the soil of this society'" (Baum 2007).

[194] Its founder, Axel Springer, became a target first of the student movement and then of the *RAF* not least because of the paper's conservative stance and the sway it had over German public opinion. Charging him with right-leaning populism, the take-over and dismantling of the publishing house were demanded, and the *RAF* placed bombs into the paper's headquarters in Hamburg in 1972. Controversy has followed Axel Springer as he has been a staunch supporter of Israel and because the paper refuses to print election adverts by the German *Linkspartei*. Springer's role in the Third Reich also remains somewhat of a mystery, although the paper he was running then was shut down, he never left Germany, but also was not sent to a concentration camp, as other political adversaries were.

present. The interview was conducted in May 2006, one year after the show and almost two years after the scandal broke out.

> "It was a very long process […]. What we started with was a very small and very inarticulate idea to do something about the *RAF*. I wrote my masters thesis on experimental film and theater in the 60s, and before that I worked a lot on the Second World War, and its aftermath. So I kind of worked myself through German history, and when I ended in the 60s, just before '68. I was born in '76, and I had a very strong feeling in my time of growing up till the fall of the wall, that '68 and German terrorism had completely shaped the world I was growing up in. That's why I was concerned with these subjects and I met a few people who were dealing with the same issue for different reasons. […] I realized that there has not been anything substantial on the issue in the [visual] arts. Obviously the third generation is still so occupied with the subject and no one has yet put his/her finger on it. I went to Klaus Biesenbach and suggested 'lets do something about this at KunstWerke' and he said, 'yes let's do something! Go ahead and find a way.' So I went to the *Hamburger Institute for Social Research* and asked people 'can you imagine to do something together' because I also had the feeling that everybody was reading the *Baader-Meinhof Komplex*,[195] which was done in '80s I guess, and which was kind of the bible on the issue. I noticed very early, it [the concentration on this one book] is like re-writing the history, like *Schindler's List* it was re-writing, like, you know, in a way putting a particular foil onto things. And that people today also don't have any knowledge about that period of German history, so the idea was that it was really time to start working through this history together with historians. Until the scandal broke out we were really trying to work out a format that would bring documents, history and art together. We were struggling very hard, but after one year and five or six meetings with […], filmmakers, historians, intellectuals, writers, trying to find out how this could function, we realized that it was not working, because one would always be the illustration of the other. Artwork would become showcase; objects and the documents would be the proofs that the art is right. So just before this public discussion erupted, we decided that this couldn't be the way of doing it."

The "public discussion" erupted in July 2003 when a preliminary proposal of the exhibition with the working title "*Mythos RAF*" was leaked to Hergard Rohwedder. Rohwedder was the widow of Detlev Rohwedder who had been assassinated by the *RAF* in 1991 in his function as head of the *Treuhand*, the government agency in charge of

[195] A popular book dealing with *RAF* by *Spiegel* editor-in-chief Stefan Aust that long had the status of mandatory reading for those identifying with the German Left. Published in 1985 the book also widely popularized the thesis that the deaths of Baader, Irmgard Möller and Ensslin were not suicides but actually executions staged as such. In the fall of 2007/08 Aust retracted from this thesis when formerly inaccessible recordings of the inmates communications were made available to him that supposedly indicated that they planned to take their lives in a fashion that would animate their movement to see them as martyrs and to take their brand of revolutionary action further.

privatizing East German public enterprises and property. Neither the identity of the leak and the circumstances under which it occurred, nor said proposal have been made public in their entirety as of yet, and Blumenstein as well as Goehler, with whom I also spoke about the topic, preferred to remain silent on the details of this process.

Hergard Rohwedder together with Hanns-Eberhard Schleyer, the son of former president of the German Employers' Association (*Arbeitgeberverband*) Hanns-Martin Schleyer,[196] wrote a letter in the name of the surviving family members (*Hinterbliebene*) of *RAF* victims addressed to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and to the Minster of the Interior, Otto Schily[197] (Steltenberg 2003). This letter has likewise not been published in full, but the protest of the families was conveyed by Pascal Pfitzenmaier from *Deutsche Welle* in the following manner: the bereaved families feared that the exhibition was designed to make the *RAF* into a legend and glorify it ("*Legendenbildung und Glorifizierung*"). This fear centered especially on one question with regard to the *RAF*'s agenda that the authors of the letter quoted from the initial working concept of the exhibition, i.e. "Which ideas, ideals have retained their value and can not be discounted as naïve? ("*Welche Ideen, Ideale haben ihren Wert durch die Zeit beibehalten und*

[196] Schleyer who had been active in the NSDAP and had the rank of *Untersturmbandführer* in the SS returned to Germany after being a prisoner of war in 1947. He was kidnapped by the *RAF* on September 5, 1977; his driver and bodyguard were killed in the process. The kidnappers demanded the release of all *RAF* prisoners, but the German government refused to negotiate with them even after members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine highjacked the Landshut aircraft on October 13, 1977 and backed their demands. After the Landshut landed in Mogadishu and the hostages were freed, the Stammheim deaths occured and the kidnappers decided to kill Schleyer on October 19, 1977. To this day it has not been ascertained who pulled the trigger for the three deadly shots.

[197] In the 1970s Schily had been an attorney for *RAF* members, and then rose to political fame as a member of the Green Party opposition in the 1980s. He switched party affiliations in 1989 and became a member of the SPD, attracting a lot of attention because of his conservative stance on questions of 'inner security' and immigration as Minister of the Interior from 1998-2005. Another former *RAF* lawyer Horst Mahler, once instrumental in penning the urban guerilla manifesto with Baader and Meinhof, shifted even further to the right by becoming the chief ideologue of the nationalist *NPD* in 2000. While Mahler is portrayed by some as a poster child for left-wing orientation gone wrong, Dorothea Hauser argues that he actually embodies the largely unadressed anti-Semitism of parts of the German Left in its logical conclusion (Hauser 2005).

können nicht als naiv abgetan werden?") (Pfitzenmaier 2005, for another reprint of excerpts of the letter see Seeßlen 2007).

As the letter equated the call for a more nuanced discussion of the ideas and ideals that motivated the *RAF* and the events that had animated its genesis – the student movement, the legacy of Nazism and the persisting power and capital structures (denazification notwithstanding) – with condoning their violent actions, it reenacted a pattern of *Staatstreue* and *Sympathisanten* that many in Germany had thought to be obsolete (Güntner 2005, Pfitzenmaier 2005).[198] The same dichotomization between those 'true to the state' and those sympathizing with the terrorists had undergirded much of the debate on the *RAF* in the 1970s and 80s.

I asked Adrienne Goehler, who in her function as the director of the *Cultural Capital Foundation* had been instrumental in securing funding for the project, how she understood the emergence of the scandal. In her own assessment:

> "It was I believe a mixture of many things, as it often is. Clearly it was party politics (*Parteipolitik*). It was quite clearly based on the personal connection of a spouse of an important person who had been assassinated by the *RAF* to an important politician in a federal state. It was the discomfort (*Unbehagen*) of the opposition with the government's politics (*Regierungspolitik*). And finally, it was the apparently easy hystericization of the media."

Goehler added that the issue was taken up as a lead-in for the campaigns for the upcoming national elections in 2004. She recounted that the timing of the public outcry at first made her think that this scandal was manufactured, blown-out of proportion by the infamous tabloid *Die Bild* in order to bridge what is generally known in Germany as the

[198] Güntner agues that there are no more *RAF* sympathizers because the relationship between state and people has changed – even normalized, and thus transcended the suspicion of living in a police state (Güntner 2005). This normalization, he posits, has also enabled empathy with the victims of leftwing terror, although as I will discuss below this is still a contentious issue.

Sommerloch, the news-drought that frequently occurs during the holiday months of the summer. After all, Goehler had convened a press conference after the committee had decided to fund *Regarding Terror* in order to address head-on the potential problems and question that might ensue from this decision back in 2002. Like Blumenstein, Goehler was taken by complete surprise by the timing and scale of the scandal:

> "The crazy thing was that when we looked at the project, I thought (*whistles*) this is a truly explosive proposal. That is why with what I see it maximum amount of care possible, I decided to convene a press conference, and to include both exhibition organizers and curators so that there is immediately the possibility to talk about any arising questions. It did not interest *a-ny-body*, not the *Feuilleton*, no one. Later it was the politics desks [of the newspapers] that brought it on the agenda. I thought by making it transparent from the beginning we would take the edge off, and I said to myself okay, the Republic is further after all than I originally thought. She [the Federal Republic of Germany] says, 'yes, this also needs to be worked on.' All but one person in the decision committee including Christina Weiss [then Undersecretary for Culture] were extraordinarily enthused by this project. I curbed the enthusiasm a little bit, saying 'another title needs to be found so that no one thinks that the *RAF* will be exhibited here,' that would have been indeed a stupid idea. And when the first alarmist troops arrived so to speak, I kept saying, yeah, yeah, the *Sommerloch*. But of course it never calmed down again, and this is how it is in this *Mediakratie*, they always need a person to wear that hat, and that was me. And yet, I would do exactly the same again today."

While Blumenstein did not go into the details of how the working concept of the exhibition made its fragmented way into the public, she answered questions about the genesis of the controversy by saying:

> "You can talk about the concrete reasons and the overall tendencies in society. The concrete reason was there was a concept that was given out to someone that shouldn't have read it. Then they published it, or more precisely, sent it to families of the victims of the terrorists and they were, and this is a specific German situation, they are very *well* connected in German politics. Obviously, these high politicians and industrialists are very interconnected in Germany. So then the families started to put pressure on politics, really on the high level of politics, and we were dealing with the Minister of the Interior, with the Foreign Minister[199] and the Chancellor, which is crazy. You normally never deal [with

[199] The foreign minister at the time, Joschka Fischer, never emerged publicly to comment on the exhibition (neither did Chancellor Schröder – in contrast to his intervention in the Flick exhibition, see Chapter 5), but

> these kinds of people] directly. And so, what made it possible that their intervention would be taken so seriously and having such a strong effect, first of all is very superficially the German guilt complex. There is still no way of discussing the *RAF* unemotionally, even more so than the Second World War, because it effected everyone form every side and almost everyone from my parents' generation had some kind of experience with this because it changed the society so much. So it's very emotionally still. And the tendency two, almost three years ago, was what you see even stronger now, a conservative backlash. So the conservative way of thinking or seeing was the *RAF* as the excluding, how can I say that … if you try to put it theoretically the *RAF* is like the scapegoat for the whole society you can define yourself through them, [they] are the bad ones. So everybody else can be connected and can be the community again. And the *RAF* was that, making it impossible to criticize anybody else from inside the structure…"

Blumenstein's assessment of the controversy was that the *RAF*, in the past as today, points to a larger rift across German society which explains the highly emotional fervor with which debates around the *RAF*, including its thematization in an exhibition, have been conducted. It also produces a sense of foreclosure by making the question of whether one can condemn the actions of the *RAF* and yet criticize German society on shared grounds barely possible (see Butler 1998, Brown 1998 below). This rift remains if mostly obscured, not least because, as journalist and lawyer Butz Peters points out, the engagement with the *RAF* has produced a legal, social and political legacy that persists to this day (Peters 2004). This legacy includes a string of legislation that extended the power of the state, techniques of interrogation, wiretapping and interception of private communication, a high-security prison built specifically to both try and incarcerate *RAF* members (Stammheim, Stuttgart), as well as the instatement of solitary confinement protocols (including sensory deprivation) that undermined both German legal principles

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the fact that he was engaged behind the scenes is important since the issue seems to have been discussed also in terms of Germany's image abroad. Goehler interpreted Schröder's silence on the matter as a tacit approval of the pressure that was exerted on the HKF and the exhibition organizers.

as well as international human rights conventions.[200] These measures, all designed to assure the *inner Sicherheit* (inner security), were once subject to fierce debates and critiques – most prominently in Böll's *Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum*, but became normalized and rendered acceptable in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. I will return in more detail to the societal rift that the *RAF* has come to stand for below, but for now, let us turn to the fallout of the scandal on the *KunstWerke* and how the exhibit came to be re-conceptualized due to the pressure ensuing from the letter. Gaby Horn, who at the time worked at *KW* in preparation of the Berlin Biennial hosted by the institution, remarked in our conversation:

> "The debate was really bad for the project, especially with the scandal reaching the parliament. There was no longer the possibility to do the research in a quiet and calm manner, because everyone was watching the project. The whole institution was really in a state of a breakdown. I was here working for the Third Berlin Biennial at the time, and I came to the courtyard one morning and I saw all these media people, reporters from TV, radio and the press. It was really crazy. It was good that we did the exhibition after all. […] I spoke to Klaus Biesenbach and told him, 'look, we have to do this exhibition because, otherwise, we will always be the institution who wanted to do this exhibition, but gave up because of the scandal and the debates.' This would have been like a Damocles sword over our heads."

Blumenstein sketched the reconceptualization process in the following manner:

> "Once the scandal broke we had to do the exhibition and we had to do it quicker than originally intended. This was a period during which we were completely insecure about how to do it, because we knew there had to be a connection to the facts and to public memory. This is how we came up with the idea of an archive, because archives, I think, are a very clear form, they are more about the collection, not the selection. We had the feeling that this could work because archives, first of all they are introduced into the field of exhibition anyhow, you have so many artists' archives and everybody would understand it as supplying the thing with a background. The whole media history was a double connection, because the phenomenon of the *RAF* only existed because of the media and the imagery that the artists use themselves is very based on these media images, so to make the artworks understandable … It was actually the idea of a historian that

[200] This legacy resurfaced recently during the G8 meetings in Heiligendamm (2007), where police and *Bundesanwaltschaft* presented repressive surveillance measures as preventive procedures, and justified them by arguing that former *RAF* members were involved in the protests and possibly planning attacks.

> we were working with. One day, when I came to his office, he said 'look what I have.' and he had *Bildzeitung*-covers, and they were so amazing. […]. Out of this idea grew the more elaborate set-up of taking five different papers from different important dates in the history of the *RAF* to juxtapose with the artworks. This is how we came up with the final concept."

Critiques: Between Missing Abstraction and Inadequate Renderings of Reality

By the end of the summer of 2003 the debate had subsided only to flare up again as the opening date in February 2005 neared. The final exhibition included, as Blumenstein indicated above, works that dealt with the media representation of the *RAF* in the wider sense, drawing on both the group's self-image and those produced by the media, politics, and public discourse. Artworks were juxtaposed with newspaper covers. The third element of the exhibition was the archive, a reading room that featured newspapers clippings, scholarly articles, and documents pertaining to the *RAF*. The 250 showcased artworks themselves spanned pieces created contemporaneously with the events of the *Deutsche Herbst*, the *RAF* trials and the deaths of Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin and Raspe, as well as commissioned works, often by younger artists – representatives so to speak, of what Blumenstein called the "third generation."

KunstWerke returned the remaining funds to the *Cultural Capital Foundation*, since both the *Kanzleramt* and the *Kulturstaatsministerin* Christina Weiss (who after being on the committee that had original granted the funding changed her position on the show) demanded not only a reconceptualization of the exhibition, but also a mandatory pedagogical program to accompany it. This program was supposed to be designed by the *Bundeszentrale for Politische Bildung*, an institution that directly answered to then Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily (Werneburg 2005). Many commentators interpreted

the return of the funds, the *KW*'s refusal to work with the *Bundeszentrale* and the previous withdrawal from its cooperation with the *Hamburg Institute for Social Research* as a retreat to 'art as such' (Pfitzenmaier 2005, Reemtsma 2005). This critique was frequently met with statements by the curators emphasizing that the arts could not be expected to render a complete picture of the historical and political context of the time, and that their focus was on the production of (media) images that had surrounded the *RAF*.

In the end, the exhibition's budget was completed through an online auction for which artists had donated works, including Marina Abramovic, Andreas Gursky, Thomas Demand – some of whom did not personally take part in the show, but maintained that this gross intervention of the political apparatus into the artworld was uncalled for.

The prevailing criticisms of the exhibition can be roughly distinguished into three strands. Two were mostly voiced by journalists (who do not usually write on art), politicians, some experts on the *RAF*, and the victims' families.[201] Firstly, this camp critiqued the show for focusing on the perpetrators instead of the victims (see also Beckstette 2005), and as a result for failing to educate (*aufklären*) the visiting public on the crimes of the *RAF*. The proponents of this argument thus suggested, although never explicitly, that art exhibitions on a political issue should encompass a clearly delineated pedagogical thrust. Secondly, the curators were faulted with not having contextualized the works historically. This, so the argument went, further obscured the violence

[201] This position was most prominently represented by Anne Siemens as well as Ulrike Meinhof's daughter, Bettina Röhl. In 2007 Siemens, whose father was assassinated by the *RAF* published *Für die RAF war er das System, für mich der Vater. Die andere Geschichte des deutschen Terrorismus* [For the *RAF* he was system, for me the father. The other history of German terrorism] a book that largely popularized the argument that a clearer stance for the victims needs to be taken. Bettina Röhl has likewise been critiquing the fascination with the terrorists on the expense of the attention dedicated to the victims of *RAF* violence.

perpetrated by *RAF* members, and instead exhibited a fascination with the *RAF* and fed into the 'myth' that the *RAF* had engineered about itself. Thirdly, and this critique was mainly leveled from the artworld itself, "Selbstbeschneidung [self-circumscision]" (Pfitzenmaier 2005), an artistic inconsequentiality (Fanizadeh 2005, Werneburg 2005), an "aesthetic vampirism" was attested to the event that according to critics capitalized on a spectacular topic while avoiding clear aesthetic and political positioning (Eller 2005). Each of these strands of appraisal raise questions about the relationship between arts and politics as much as between the *RAF* and wider German society.



Fig. 24: Thomas Schütte *Ferienhaus für Terroristen* (*Holiday Homes for Terrorists*) *I + II* (2002)

Neither side was to be dissuaded from their opinions and everyone found ample evidence in citing artworks and their arrangement in the physical exhibition space as proof of priorities gone wrong on part of the organizers. Hans-Peter Feldmann's photography cyclus "*Die Toten,*" albeit placed in the central room of mezzanine of the *KW*, and thus in some way also in the center of the exhibition was criticized for assembling the pictures of

RAF members along with those of their 'targets' without any commentary or description, although art critics generally lauded the works affective impact (see Pflüger 2005, Peters 2005). In a similar vein Ulrich Speck countered curator Felix Ensslin's statement that the production of the phantasm *RAF* was to be interrogated through the exhibition, by claiming that it was the phantasm itself that took center stage (Speck 2006).

The content of Thomas Schütte's "*Ferienhaus für Terroristen* (Holiday Home for Terrorists) I, II + III" and its placement at the entrance of the exhibition, motivated art and cultural critic Brigitte Werneburg to make the following statement:

> "The holiday homes, however, present more of a riddle than enlighten the challenge that makes terrorism into a motif for art. It may well be that terrorists go on holiday too. The political or legal engagement with the Red Army Faction however has been on hold for a while [*hat seit geraumer Zeit Pause*, inferring that the engagement may be out, on a break]. Quite another set of terrorists is keeping the former *RAF* defendant Otto Schily, Minister of the Interior, busy. No one needs to discuss that the *RAF* failed in every respect, yet the project of this exhibition […] induced debates. Seemingly political, they present more of a reflex on the still undealt with past of left-wing terrorism in West Germany. Schütte's elegant holiday homes may very well substantiate those critics that withdrew the already awarded funds from the *KunstWerke*, as they feared the show would nourish anew the 'Mythos *RAF*.' […]The placement of Schütte's work at the beginning of the exhibition is consistent with this background story. Because his work is one thing for sure: a declining (*Absage*) of the exemplary critical potential of art" (Werneburg 2005).

The reflex that Werneburg tried to put her finger on and that Blumenstein described as a conservative backlash (in contrast to a critical inquiry) also surfaced in the reviews of artworks that had long ago garnered international acclaim. Joseph Beuys' "Dürer, ich führe persönlich Baader + Meinhof durch die Dokumenta V" (1972) received the following comment:

> "The exhibition also documents the credulity, the will to missionize and the at times boundless naïveté of artists in dealing with the protagonists of terror. Joseph Beuys, whose work from 1972 reminds of rally banners and which is likewise on display, really believed that the top-terrorists could be reintegrated into society through the aid of art. Unfortunately, the story ended slightly differently" (Büsing/Klaas 2005).



Fig. 25: Joseph Beuys *Dürer, ich führe persönlich Baader + Meinhof durch die Dokumenta V* (*Dürer, I will guide Baader + Meinhof personally through the Documenta V,* 1972)

In an article published in the *Die Welt* Friedrich Pflüger of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) went as far as to say Beuys was a "trivializer" and qualified the exhibition as glorifying violence (2005). Surely much could be criticized with regard to Beuys' personal politics and his often utopian approach to the subject. It is notable however that what is billed as Beuys' naïveté, as his "collegial expression of solidarity" (Henniger 2005) also shows traces of an understanding of art that was underwritten by the political establishment of the time itself: namely that arts programs provide valid tools for social rehabilitation. Taking into account that the 1970s were characterized by this understanding, furthered by the Social Democratic agenda of *Soziokultur*, in which art was ultimately seen to provide an avenue to cure many ills of modern society (including aggression and violence), may allow a different, less indicting interpretation of Beuy's intervention, in contrast to Pflüger's rather narrow reading. Another interesting

example in this context was the likewise exhibited cyclus by Gerhard Richter, Baader-Meinhof:



Fig. 26: Gerhard Richter Baader-Meinhof (1988); part of his *Atlas* series, which he started in 1962.

"In his *Atlas Tafeln* Gerhard Richter shows blurry pictures of Baader & Co. This awards them something sanctified, mystical. What the spectator does not learn, however, is that Baader, Ensslin und Raspe had been convicted by the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart in 1977 for four murders and numerous other capital crimes to 'life in prison.' Meinhof and Meins were already dead at the time. Meinhof had hanged herself in her cell, Meins had died from the results of a hunger strike [actually he had died as a result of the court-ordered forced feeding, BK]. At the center of the exhibited works are the perpetrators. Not the victims."

So wrote Butz Peters in his review of *Regarding Terror* (2005). Again, it is interesting that his interpretation leaves out a whole corpus of work that has already been produced on Richter's artistic intervention. Initial critiques when Richter presented his work in Germany were very akin to that of Peters, especially from political ranks (Storr 2000). Richter's work seems to me to question exactly the faultline of what we see and what is obscured; after all his *Atlas Tafeln* were all paintings based on photographs that had been widely circulated in the German press at the time, often with highly sensationalist headlines as well as those circulated by the German authorities themselves. Peters' critique is notable in another regard, as his assessment implies that artworks assembled in the exhibition do not adequately represent the reality from which they emerged. In his opinion they present a mere reduction or retreat to art, an argument that was made repeatedly, and this retreat was generally interpreted as a move by the curators to avert further attacks on the exhibition (Güntner 2005, Reichelt 2005; see also Spreen 2005). This is a highly problematic statement when we return to the previously discussed conceptions of what art, and particularly contemporary art is understood to be (Chapter 2). This is not to delegitimize Peters' intervention; after all I have argued myself that the question of contextualization may be pivotal for how perception is framed (see Chapter 4). But why is the same not demanded when the exhibited issue at hand is not German terrorism, but for example that of social marginality or immigration? One by one Peters picks artworks and juxtaposes them with facts, in order to emphasize his point that the exhibition does not inform about the actual events of the time. Turning to a painting of Meinhof by Johannes Kahrs, Peters notes:

> "Painted in the year 2001, twenty-five years after her death. The depiction of the prisoner in remand resembles the horrible images of KZ inmates; the tattered clothes, the hands held up. This is how Meinhof defined herself in her incarceration, she spoke of 'Auschwitzphantasies.'[202] The photo that served as Kahrs' model was taken in 1973 at the detention facility in Köln-Ossendorf. No one had ordered Ulrike Meinhof to raise her hands, she did it by herself (*sie tat es von sich aus*). However, the spectator does not sense this" (Peters 2005).



Fig. 27: Johannes Kahrs *Meinhof* (2001)

For Peters it seems art has not met its mission in this exhibition, it has not fulfilled its function. At one point he states that: "The 'art' gives the *RAF* an aesthetic, it never had (*Die "Kunst" verleiht der RAF eine Ästhetik, die sie niemals hatte*)." Employing quotation marks he thus also questions if the shown work can indeed be categorized as "art" proper. I have quoted Peters' review in some detail because it is symptomatic for much that has been written on the exhibition. As mentioned above, Peters himself is not an art critic, but an expert on the *RAF*, not that that disqualifies him from commenting on

[202] The motif of being prisoners of war and, at times, of Nazi victims was frequently employed in the *RAF*'s self-representation, as was the image of German society being held hostage by the state (Greiner 2007).

art in any shape or form. It is, I think interesting, that he evokes a position of authority – quite forcefully so from which he makes a string of assumptions about art that are contentious, not least because the curators' stated goal was to thematize the production of images in relation to the *RAF* – and not the adequate depiction of reality that so many critics seemed to call for.

There is another problem, however, that his statements give occasion to think about, and that is the question to what extent the *RAF* was producing its own aesthetic, one that was underscored in its medial reflection– which was exactly the crux of *Regarding Terror.* Much seems to suggest that the *RAF* members, especially Baader who was trained as an artist, were quite aware of their own aesthetic positions.[203] Thomas Hecken's exploratory study on the ideational connections between the avant-garde and terrorism shows that *RAF* communiqués frequently employed the notion of avant-garde to describe their own activities, likening their action to that of a current in the arts that proposed to leave the ivory tower and to revolutionize life through aesthetic approaches (Hecken 2006, see also Werneburg 2005a).[204]

As the student movement trailed out without bringing about the radical changes it set out to, and as some members began "the long march through the institutions," the thinkers of the extreme left in Germany discussed three possible options for furthering their cause: going into factories and working alongside the working class, founding a

[203] There are also frequent references to *RAF* members as being artistically inclined, and although the issue of self-stylization is rather hard to grasp, the *RAF* members are often said to have had a particular style with their sunshades, leather jackets and disheveled hair that expressed their oppositional attitude. In the late 1990s, this perception was translated into a highly popular T-Shirt design sporting the logo "Prada-Meinhof" that was criticized for portraying oppositionality as a consumption choice, belittling the crimes of the *RAF* and lacking any knowledge of its actual history and impact.

[204] Ralf Hanselle points to what he calls "another synergy" between *RAF* and the artworld through the example of Christian Klar who was offered an internship with the Berliner Ensemble through its director Claus Peymann upon his release. Hanselle described it as another instance in which "former urban guerrilleros are attempting to find resocializational refuge in theaters and galleries" (Hanselle 2005).

popular socialist (mass) party, or going underground to engage in urban guerilla warfare. The latter emerged as the only viable option for the *RAF* as they believed that "agitation and propaganda" would only be accomplishable in the foreseeable future through the intervention of the "avant-garde" (Hecken 2006, 99). Believing that a mobilization of the masses by 'merely' highlighting already visible injustices could not be accomplished in a consumption based society that was marked by a "deformation of proletarian class consciousness" as Horst Mahler put it in the *RAF*'s 1972 manifesto for urban warfare (cited after Hecken 2006,101), the *RAF* chose to perpetrate violent acts. These attacks were intended to force the state to unmask itself and the brutality of its rule, that up to this point, so the *RAF*, had been veiled. Only this final unmasking through the avant-garde would awaken said class-consciousness.[205] The *RAF* stuck to this logic, and vowed to continue on until this goal was reached, even when after the bombing of the Springer publishing house and American army barracks in 1972 almost all of its members were arrested.[206]

When I asked Blumenstein how she perceived the critiques of the exhibition and if there had been any talk about what an artistic engagement with the *RAF* could or should accomplish, she stated:

> "Very little … this is where you can see the conservative backlash very clearly. It was basically about the definition what art is allowed to do. The politicians said what they could not have said back then, in the 1970s: It was like a *l'art pour l'art* argument. This was one part of the discussion. The other was not about art at all. It was about 'can you do something about *RAF* without condemning them'? They wanted us to there say, 'we know the RAF were the worst, they are evil and they are bad.' no buts, no ifs. That's what they expected from us. But of course it's not like that. Nobody is questioning that they killed people, but you

[205] The Parisian protests of May 1968 were often used by the *RAF* as an example of the masses joining the avantgarde.

[206] Hecken clarifies that the relationship between avantgarde and terrorism a rather one-sided approximation, and cautions to establish any kind of causality between the two, although avantgardist approaches were often meshed with images of violence, e.g. in Breton's much cited amok phantasies.

> have to stay within reason. It was like 25 people supposedly terrorizing a state for 25 years, c'mon! So there was no willingness to be self-critical on part of the state. But the more interesting thing was about what art can do and can not do and it was completely, it was shocking how conservative even the Green Party members, the socialists or left politicians and the public reacted to this and it was only very few articles from of course people outside of Germany who were even questioning these reactions or really. That was very, very shocking and we didn't expect it at all."

When our conversation delved into her understanding of the social responsibility of art, Blumenstein reflected on both her views of the core of the *RAF* exhibition as well as her general understanding on the subject matter:

> "What we did there was to at look how perception, how society filters into the making of art, into dealing with your daily life, into your world. Because many of the artists did not in the first place say 'I am doing something about *RAF* now.' what they did was much more using this opportunity to take a position towards society, because the *RAF* functioned so much as a symbol, as a projection space, or a mirror of broader society. From the beginning it was important for me to use the *RAF* for reflecting on German society. […]. In the end it's about how you as a subject connect yourself to society. […] What interests me are people who bring themselves in. Not because they are talking about themselves, but because in the way in which they relate to society you see a lot about the possibility of your own desires... Yes, right now this interests me a lot, explicitly in political terms."

Blumenstein further explained that she sees her role as a curator explicitly in communicating these types of concerns and processes. It was this particular facet of the curator's role that then *KW* director Klaus Biesenbach emphasized in an interview with the Berlin based *TAZ* after the scandal had erupted. Biesenbach maintained that visual art makes accessible experiences and provides insights on a different level than spoken language, thus presenting an important, if different, form of communication that is mediated by the curator. On the question of how he reacts to the critique that the exhibition presents a transgression of "good taste," he answered:

> "I take the critique seriously. […] I do not want lack of clarity regarding our intentions. I know however that it is part of my curatorial duties to avoid misunderstandings in perception. It may sound conservative, but when I selected

> works, […], I employ beauty and truth as criteria (*habe ich Schönheit und Wahrheit als Kriterien*). This may sound banal, but it means that artistic quality has to be tested in relation to the content that a work transmits. To test this has surely not been easy in the engagement with the *RAF*. […] Yet, it is traditionally art, in the sense of the monument (*Denkmal*), the memorial, the *Mahnmal*, that does the work of mourning (*Trauerarbeit*). You only have to look around Berlin to see which crimes and traumas of German history are visualized and made public through the arts. What is at stake are the victims, the grief about the victims, the processing of history and hopefully, learning from history. That is why the same people who usually commission monuments should not tell me in the case of the *RAF*: Stop, art has no business here" (Fricke/Lautenschläger 2003).

Biesenbach, perhaps in face of the crisis that surrounded the exhibition, 'withdrew' or placed himself on an easily recognizable and legitimate ground in terms of what art is and can be, by referring to beauty and truth. In contrast, Ensslin stated that the communication of intents of an exhibition also means pushing the boundaries of what might be regarded as acceptable, especially when art is addressing political issues. Replying to the charges that some critics had made about the 'impertinence' of the works included in *Regarding Terror*, he contended:

> "For me art does not work by taking a topic, be it in pedagogizing it, or putting it in a narrative form and then releasing it for consumption. […] Such an approach would also be unpolitical. Where cracks are obscured and identities are fixed, this relationship should be broken through the artworks. In that case impertinence is and should be allowed" (cited after Werneburg/Fricke 2005).

Regarding the Inconceivability of German Terror

Still the question remains what ignited the debate at this very conjuncture? What accounts for the fervor with which it was leveled? What hindered the communication of the curators' intents? How can we understand this 'distortion.' the incongruency between intention and perception that played out along the lines of a partisanship that was long overcome? The reactions can hardly be relayed to the artworks alone since much of the debate arose before the exhibition had even materialized.

Gaby Horn situated the *RAF* exhibit and others hosted by *KunstWerke* as engagements with images of reality rather than reality itself. In her own words these shows were not "documentations of history," but contemplations on "how history is reflected in art," and on the role images play in this reflection in the century of "new media." Yet no other *KW* program to date has elicited the same public outcry that *Regarding Terror* was confronted with. As Adrienne Goehler pointed out, this situation was all the more notable, since the exhibition had been preceded by the release of two films *Die Innere Sicherheit* (2000) and *Blackbox BRD* (2001), both dealing with the history of German terror and the *RAF*, and both subsidized by state agencies (not federal funding however). How can we account for the divergent perception of these movies and a visual arts exhibition?[207] This was a question that she too was unable to answer. Maybe it was that these films while released to critical acclaim, but also some critiques of rendering the *RAF* members into pop icons, went largely unnoticed. Maybe it was the march of this topic into what had been considered one of the most distinguished, and edgy, contemporary art institutions to date that has critically shaped much of the image of the 'new.' post-unification capital Berlin.

Horn also suggested that the *RAF* chapter in German history constitutes "a kind of forgotten history," one that younger generations neither experienced nor are learning about in school. "Through the scandal," she noted "politicians and parliamentarians woke

[207] Another very notable point that did not come up in the controversy surrounding the *RAF* exhibition is the breadth of literary production, both fictional and autobiographical, on the issue of German terror and the *Innere Sicherheit*. For a detailed review of this literature in comparison to literary and cinematic (self-)depictions of the militant Left in Italy, see Max Henniger's "Humbler Killers: Literary and Cinematic representations of the German and Italian militant Left 1970-1999" (2004). Again the question remains how we can explain that while some of these literary renderings were forcefully critiqued, none of them did elicit the kind of strong response that the *RAF* exhibition encountered.

up to it, and thought they really needed to do something about it but they couldn't in an art institution, because art is really a protected space. You can't control it."

Maybe it was this lack of control, exactly because many aesthetic approaches maintain what was so frequently criticized, an ambiguity of what is depicted and the reality from which they draw that makes them especially problematic vis-à-vis a history that remains largely unaddressed. Thus the exhibition, or rather the perception of the exhibition, could not draw on an already ongoing (plurality of) discourse(s) on the history of German terrorism, it was foreclosed in the sense that the issues it raised were designated unspeakable and delegitimate (Butler 1998). As art is frequently conceptualized as a protected space (Devereaux 1995) and proclaimed to be autonomous, and because there is no political framework to address the exhibition, scandalization emerged as the main avenue of thematization. That the topic of the exhibition explicitly drew on the image production surrounding the *RAF* may have exacerbated this situation because it foregrounded the interrelation between the aesthetic strategies employed in the self-representation of the *RAF* and the way in which this impetus was taken up and capitalized on by the media, thus also pointing to a possible complicity between the two.

Other factors that converged and might explain the scale of criticism were the end of prison sentences of some former *RAF* members and associates, and pardon petitions by surviving *RAF* members Christian Klar and Brigitte Mohnhaupt. At the same time the focus on international terrorism has also redrawn attention to how 'homegrown' terrorism should be understood and responded to. Ulrich Greiner maintains that the German state has failed to deal with terrorism, not least because it has not captured any perpetrators or solved open cases after 1985 (Greiner 2007). This despite the fact that some *RAF*

members flew to the GDR only to find themselves in the reunified Germany (Förster 2005) – a component of the relationship between the two German states that has remained unaddressed to this day. This, he argues has contributed to a deep seated and persistent trauma in German society. This feeling of failure – on a collective as well as individual level – was recently reiterated by former chancellor Schmidt in an interview with *Die Zeit*, where he maintained that he still feels caught up in a web of guilt (di Lorenzo 2007). Others however have stylized operations like the freeing of the Landshut in Mogadishu, or the arrests that have been made into a victory, and the fight against inner German terrorism as heroic epic of the righteous, who won in the end.

Yet, a comprehensive historical processing (*Aufarbeitung*) that critics demanded from the exhibition has never been undertaken, neither on the side of the political establishment, nor that of German intellectuals (the recent works of *Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung* present a notable if still not broadly publicized exception). Especially conservative political camps have increasingly framed the *RAF* discussion as *Vergagenheitsbewältigung*, a term that was long reserved for Germany's dealing with its National Socialist past, and that has to some extent played into the revisionist equation of fascism and communism, rightwing and leftwing ideology (Chapter 1). In the introduction to this chapter, I mentioned that most censorship cases in Germany can be traced to issues around its Nazi past. This is surely not exclusively so, and in the conclusion I will point to the new directions that censorship efforts are taking in the Federal Republic. However, it is notable that the *RAF* debate implicitly speaks to these concerns in three registers: by equating *RAF* crimes to that of the Nazis, by couching the history of the *RAF* in the terminology of dealing with the Nazi past, and/or by admitting

the historical intertwinedness of Germany's National Socialist legacy and the emergence of the *RAF* as an answer to this legacy (misguided as its expressions and manifestations might be).[208]

The silence that surrounds the *RAF* stems in part from the fact that alignment with both the victims and the perpetrators is rather problematic. Quite like their American counterparts of the *Weather Underground*, *RAF* members came predominantly, if not exclusively from solidly middle-class backgrounds (*"aus der bürgerlichen Mitte der Gesellschaft*," Greiner 2007). Well-educated (many had scholarships of the prestigious German *Studienstiftung*) and coming from the midst of the society, they were soon seen as turning against it with a vengeance.

Both Blumenstein and Goehler argue that the *RAF* made visible certain rifts in German society, which have also complicated potential identification with the victims. Both financially and politically influential many of the victims of *RAF* violence had indeed profited from the National Socialist legacy. To point to this positionality of the victims is often read as arguing in line with the terrorists, yet the influence that the victims' surviving families had in this affair speaks to the position of power from which they still operate – a power position that might have caused also a sense of resentment in the general population, although I am only speculating on this point. This might however

[208] Jeffrey Herf has recently published a passionate account in which he situates the *RAF* as well-anchored in the German Left, as well as in left-wing Anti-Semitism, and argues that instead of discussing the formation and political position of the *RAF* in isolation it needs to be contextualized within international terrorist networks and the context of the cold war (Herf 2009). While I in part agree with Herf in that the *RAF* should not be seen as a solely German occurrence, my concern in this chapter is how the RAF framed their motivations as well as the public perception in Germany as decidedly related to national history.

explain why the call for the mourning for the victims has only come up very recently, and again reveals the fascination of the German media and public with the *RAF*.[209]

Antje Vollmer of the *Green Party* served on the advisory board for *Regarding Terror* and has been active in seeking dialogue with former terrorists and supporting their pardoning initiatives. Vollmer has repeatedly called for cracking the myth of the *RAF*, but also for the interrogation of the processes that led to its emergence and the reactions of both state and society. She emphasizes more strongly than Peters that the attempts to defeat the *RAF* have significantly undermined Germany's constitution as a *Rechstsstaat* (rule of law), for instance by lifting the protection against self-incrimination in *RAF* trials. Instead the *RAF* members were given higher sentences for withholding self-incriminating information. Noting that a constitutional state is based an understanding that there can be no "just sentence" between victim and perpetrator,[210] she contends that much of the fervor against former *RAF* members presents a revanchist backlash against those of the 1968 generation that have been perceived to rule Germany since (see Bollman/Reinecke 2007).

To conclude let us turn once more to the question of what has gone wrong in the case of *Regarding Terror,* and to the doubled interplay of arts and politics it presents. In summation Goehler described the controversy surrounding the exhibition with the words:

> "I regret to see that politics has not been able to say, 'terrorism is an anxiety-inducing theme. In good enlightenment tradition (*aufklärender Tradition*) we need to start looking at our past, at the factors that contributed to it […]. Take it

[209] The focus is, however, mainly on high-profile victims. Often forgotten are the drivers, passer-bys, and policemen, who caught 'in the line of fire' also lost their lives.

[210] In an interview printed by *TAZ*, Vollmer further clarifies her position by saying: "You cannot make decisions through the plebiscitary, that would be barbarism. It is absurd if the *Bild* asks the people (*das Volk*), how long Christian Klar should atone. All Pontius Pilatus got in a plebiscitary trial was 'crucify him,' although he himself was convinced that Jesus was innocent. There has been a populist slide in western societies. You can see this also in the debates around torture" (cited after Bollman/Reinecke 2007).

> as an occasion, as the arts address it, we to need to work on this in politics with our means.' There was no trust in this [process]."

Goehler repeatedly expressed regret that the opportunity to initiate a "collective learning process" was not taken (cf. Goehler 2006, 213-215). She frequently referred to politics (*die Politik*) meaning not necessarily the bureaucratic state apparatus but that of political factions both institutional and beyond ("the establishment") that can exert pressure without an official ban, but through 'mere' delegitimization. This delegitimization ensured, contrary to the title of the exhibition *Zur Vorstellungen des Terrors* (with *Vorstellung* having a number of meanings that range from association, to imagination, introduction and conceivability), that the *RAF* (as a German phenomenon) remained inconceivable, unimaginable, and unspeakable for most of the debate.

All is in Shambles in the Turkish Republic?: On the (Un-)Persuasiveness of Missing Letters

With three military coups, and an overall governing structure that for the most part is qualified as authoritarian, Turkey's overall human rights record and its handling of its constitutionally guaranteed but practically embattled freedom of expression have been the issue of much criticism. The periodic intensification of book confiscations, imprisonments, killings, disappearances, and systematic intimidation have given rise to frequent concerns by *Helsinki Watch*, as well as Turkey's own human rights organizations and have led Yaşar Kemal to note that the prison is the school of Turkish writers (Kemal 2008, see Mirza 2009). Surely much has changed since the burning of archives, paintings, films like those of Yilmaz Güney by martial law commanders before turning the government over to civilian forces in 1983 (HW 1989, 95), and in the waves

of the legal reforms throughout this last decade. While Kurdish broadcasting has only slowly been extended, the almost comical manifestations of the ban of the letters Q, W, X is still upheld (as they exist in the Kurdish, but not the Turkish alphabet). That Kurdish music videos are now produced in Turkey is surely a far cry from the incident in which singer, songwriter and poet Ahmet Kaya was tragically met with a flurry of silverware upon announcing his desire to shoot a clip in Kurdish and invited those courageous enough to go along at an awards ceremony in 1999. But then again, as the saying goes, much has stayed the same.

The preclearance censorship board for film and music instated by the last military junta was abolished in the 1980s (although rumors that it remained in effect circulated for a long time). However it seems that copyright protection mechanisms overseen by the Ministry for Tourism and Culture have at times extended their powers to also controlling contents. Charges leveled against writers and publishers generally fall into two categories: political and obscenity charges (the latter, as in Germany is generally filed under the 'harmful to minors' category, see also HW 1989, 5). Many visual artists in the history of the Turkish Republic have been charged for political expressions, but more often than not this has been because of their activities outside of rather than inside the artworld. Gülsün Karamustafa for instance was indicted and convicted in 1971 for sheltering a political refugee (she only regained her passport and her right to travel abroad in the 1980s). Karamustafa long remained silent on the issue, although her work has certainly always stretched into the political, and more recently has turned to the

political trials and tribulations of the country during the 1970s and 1980s as well as her own court case (see Heinrich 2007).


Fig. 28: Gülsün Karamustafa *Sahne* (*Stage*, 1998)

In February 2009, the newspaper *Zaman* reported that according to the Turkish Telecommunications Directorate 1,591 websites were blocked in the past year. According to the report half of these blocks "were issued due to the content involving the sexual exploitation of children online." Other charges included online prostitutions, gambling, narcotics acquisition. 52 websites were blocked because of "crimes against the memory of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk," among them most prominently *youtube* (Demirbaş 2009).[211]

By far the most attention however has focused on article 301 of the Turkish Penal code that in its original wording punishes 'insults against Turkishness.'[212] While visual

[211] While earlier bans were only temporary, *youtube* has been offline, although circumventably so, for over 18 months. In the summer of 2008, many Istanbul-based arts spaces blocked their own websites, to protest online censorship in Turkey to no avail. A temporary block of the blogspot.com domains in Turkey likewise hit many artists, arts organizations and nonprofit galleries that rely on this convenient and financially advantageous way of putting event announcements and documentations online.

[212] While the article used to refer to aspects conceived of as denigrating "Turkishness," the wording has been amended, allegedly for clarification purposes. These changes include replacing "Turkishness," with references to the "Turkish nation." The maximum penalty was lowered form three to two years, and the Ministry of Justice (and thus political authorities) gained oversight over approving commencement of investigations as of April 30, 2008 (see Law no. 5759). While the government presented these amendments

artists have not been convicted under this article as of yet (see below), musicians, writers and journalists have been battling with charges on the basis of 301. Turkish officials have countered criticisms of article 301 by pointing to a range of other similar laws against insulting the state and its institutions (including the national flag) in the European arena, and by positing that it is not the law itself but its application that is problematic. All too often article 301 has been turned into a free for all tool for curtailing free speech and especially anything that could be conceived as insulting or denigrating to the state and the Turkish military.[213] Together these components have been mainly employed to thwart expressions that question the officially sanctioned version of Turkish historiography, as they are interpreted to threaten the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic. References to the Armenian Genocide and Turkey's multi-ethnic and multilingual make-up outside the defined boundaries of 'tamed diversity' (Chapters 1 and 4) can all be interpreted as threatening to Turkey's territorial integrity (postulated in article 3 of the Turkish Constitution – *Anayasa*, 1982) and thus have been equated with terrorism, including expressions that can be conceived of as 'separatist propaganda' (see also HW 1993, 17-18). As such all of these charges represent delimitations to the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression (article 26 of the Turkish constitution) and of the freedom of the sciences and the arts (article 27).[214]

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as answering the national and international condemnation of article 301 as a violation of free speech, criticism has persisted, since "the change signifies a clarification in the wording, but not in the content, and so does not contribute to expanding the enjoyment of freedom of expression" (Algan 2008, 2241).

[213] Along with criminalizing insult and denigration of the "Turkish nation," paragraph 2 of this article also used to forbid alienating the public from and "cooling" its appreciation of the military (*askerden soğutmak*). In the new version of the law 'only' the denigration of the Turkish military remains an offense (Algan 2008).

[214] Freedom in the arts and sciences is also explicitly delimited in that this right "shall not be exercised for the purpose of changing the provisions of Article 1, 2, and 3 of the Constitution" which lay out the state form, the characteristics of the Republic and its territorial integrity, official language, national anthem and

Despite protests in Turkey and abroad, an array of prolific journalists and artists as well as scholars has been indicted under article 301. Writer Orhan Pamuk and singer Bülent Ersoy were tried (and acquitted) for statements they made outside their artistic fora. In the first case, Pamuk had referred to the Armenian Genocide not by label but by number of people murdered and stated that in the war between government troops and the PKK 30,000 people had been killed in an interview with a Swiss daily *Der Tagesanzeiger*. Ersoy was charged for stating that if she had a son she would not send him to the army (military service in Turkey remains compulsory) during a live TV broadcast. Writer Elif Shafak, on the other hand, was charged for statements that characters in her novel *The Bastard of Istanbul* utter with regard to the Armenian Genocide. After a much publicized court case she too was acquitted. Shafak's trial is interesting in terms of comparing the German and Turkish cases because it plays into similar mechanisms as both the *RAF* exhibition and Fassbinder's play where thematizing an issue (i.e. the Armenian Genocide, German terrorism, Anti-Semitism in Germany) is equated with condoning it. In Shafak's case words spoken by characters in a novel are conflated with the author's opinion,[215] although needless to say it should not really make a difference to begin with. However this type of conflation in the arts remains notable.

capital. But as the Human Rights Watch Report from 1999 reveals what constitutes, for instance, a threat to territorial can be interpreted rather broadly (HW 1999).

[215] Shafak's case is structurally similar to that of five actors who starred in a 1987 Istanbul municipal production of Richard Soudee's *A Thousand and One Night* and were charged because of "immoral dialogues and actions" they portrayed in the play (HW 1989, 97). Like Shafak the actors were acquitted, but a point was made by permitting an indictment in the first place. As in Pamuk's case Shafak's trial has certainly made nationalist attacks and threats including staging rallies in front the courthouse an acceptable occurrence.

Halil Altındere: Satanism, Vandalism, Terrorism – What is Political about Political Art?

For the last 10 years no other artist in Istanbul's contemporary art scene has been labeled 'political' as much and as often as Halil Altındere. Of Kurdish descent, Altındere grew up in Deriş, a small village near Mardin, and studied to become an art teacher in Adana (in the early 1990s). Deciding not to go into the state education system as a civil servant, Altındere moved to Istanbul in 1996 to further study at the Painting Department of Marmara University's Fine Arts Faculty. Rather than elevating the political to a mission or explicit focus in his work, Altındere describes his work quite differently, to him it simply reflects his experiences and the world he lives in:

> "I believe that an artist's worldview, his/her way of living, political and aesthetic stance are all one. When we look at my works, because they are influenced by the political, societal, economic, religious, and gender relations out of which they emerge they are influenced by the *everyday* [uses English term here], they are nurtured by it, emerge from it. Thus if we were to say that I have been producing art in the professional sense for the past 10 years, we can see two, three different periods, that express different concerns. Especially since I entered the arts stage in '95, and began international circulation with the Istanbul Biennial of 1997 my works often one-to-one were connected to Turkey's political situation, and that's what I became to be known for. What was the political situation then? In the '90s there was a tense, we can't say civil war, but [*laughs lightly*] then again we can say that. This also registered in the big cities. The *Cumartesi Anneleri*,[216] Susurluk, rising nationalism for instance also was reflected in and impacted (*yansidi*) some of my works. The identity cards related works I did in '97 likewise fall into that category, [as does] *Ya Sev Ya Terk Et* (*Love it, or leave it*). At the time this slogan was everywhere as graffiti on the walls and in the media, and I transformed it into something else. But when I was criticizing nationalism people from the artworld asked me 'why are you criticizing nationalism this much? You are risking counternationalism.' Yet, six months after I did *Ya Sev Ya Terk Et* the MHP came to power. […] In between I produced more biographical works such as *My Mother likes Popart*, works with ammunition and lead, those could really be categorized as autobiographical. After 2000 my works related to Istanbul's subculture, and have dwelled on those who are on the margins. The area where I live, the circles I enter and leave, the marginality of subcultural

[216] The Saturday Mother's was a group of mothers who protested the political disappearances of their children (in police custody) beginning in May 1995. As celebrities like Sezen Aksu started to join them and public support for their cause grew, so did police repression, forcing them to discontinue their vigils in May 1998.

> settings influenced my work. Thus it is in the nature of the artist to bring in political issues, but then again that is up to each and every artist, I suppose.





Fig. 29: Halil Altındere *My Mother love Fluxus, because Fluxus is anti-art* (1999).
Fig. 30: Halil Altındere *Ya sev ya terk et* (*Love it or leave it*, 1998) features Erden Kosova and Halil Altındere; with Kosova (whose last name references the stretches of the Ottoman Empire to the Balkans) exiting the picture to the West and Altındere to the East.

In pursuing this path Altındere has not been a stranger to controversy. In 1998 he was invited to participate in the exhibition entitled *Scorpion* in Berlin, curated by Fulya Erdemci and Réne Block. Altındere contributed a series of commemorative stamps to this show featuring persons who had been 'disappeared' by the Turkish police and secret service. Another of his works was a reproduction of a One Million Lira banknote that showed a picture of Atatürk (as the original banknotes did). In Altındere's rendition, however, Atatürk was covering his face with his palms, in an expression of shame, not least with regard to the accelerating devaluation of the country's currency – if not Turkey's political predicaments. Debates broke out especially with regard to the banknote and his identity card works (see below) as both represented documents issued by the government. Parliamentarian Lütfü Yalman went so far as submitting a motion to censor in parliament. According to Altındere much concern was expressed that "artists like him" should not be "sent abroad" as their works were "tarnishing Turkey's image." Yalman's interjection that the likes of Altındere should not be sent abroad is especially interesting given the lack of state support for the contemporary visual arts in Turkey. As previously

discussed the *tanitim fonu* – for the most part – aides artists on very modest scales by paying airfares, for instance, a fact that interestingly does not deter state actors to portray themselves as patrons and facilitators of the arts (see also Chapter 7).[217]

Although the motion was eventually turned down, debates continued in the newspapers and in TV programs. Altındere himself declined to appear on television, but in his stead artist Bedri Baykam and curator Beral Madra answered the call to defend the freedom of art. Interestingly, a few years later, Baykam (a member of the Republican Peoples Party, *CHP*, and part of Turkey's particular brand of the nationalist left) became an outspoken opponent of Altındere's work, but more on that shortly. These debates also marked a string of criticisms that Altındere has been frequently incurred from the artworld itself, including that of dabbling in Kurdish propaganda – a charge that was assembled by virtue of him being Kurdish and oppositional, rather than any direct association (see also below). In fact Altındere very rarely refers to and often refuses to speak on issues of ethnicity in interviews and public statements (see also Evren 2008b, 14-17). The incident also marks one of many occasions on which Altındere has been compelled to explain that what he does is indeed art: "I said this is not an identification card, this is art. An identity card is the thing we carry in our wallets, this is an enlarged image of an identity card, intervened upon by the artist it becomes an artwork, and has to be evaluated accordingly."

[217] Notably, the picture of the one million lira banknote was, despite the initial outcry initiated by Yalman and others, later repeatedly utilized by the daily press in commentaries and news on Turkey's economic policies and condition.





Fig. 31 & 32: Halil Altındere *Dance with Taboos* and *Dance with Taboos 2* (1997).

"Satanism, Vandalism, Terrorism, these are the three different concepts that I got in trouble with," Halil Altındere stated with his mixture of good spirit and awkwardness when we met for an interview. It seemed like an irresistible pun, although nominally the last trial was not about terrorism per se, but a charge of publicly denigrating the Armed Forces of Turkish Republic under article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. It was a very fitting pun, however, not least because as I have argued above, the offenses bundled under article 301 are implicitly equated to that of terrorism by being regarded as threats to Turkey's territorial integrity and political sovereignty.[218]

The ironies of the court cases brought against Altındere mirror in many ways the elements of irony in Altındere's own work. When he worked on a piece entitled *Deconstruction of a Death* (1999), Altındere brought a coffin to his home to integrate it into the installation. According to police records, neighbors who had witnessed the coffin

[218] This interpretation was originally cited as the rational for augmenting punishment by one-third for these offenses when they were 'perpetrated' abroad. This clause however has been dropped from the amended version of 301.

being brought into the house, but did not see it leave again alerted the police anonymously.[219] It was under the suspicion of Satanism – at the time subject to scandalizing headlines and an onslaught of moral panic in the Turkish press (see also Evren 2008, 86-89) – that Altındere's house was raided and he was taken into custody, along with the body of evidence, i.e. the coffin. What ensued at the police station, recalls Altındere, was a deliberation between him and the police officers on the nature and characteristics of an artwork. The investigation was eventually dropped, as no connection to Satanism could be ascertained, but here as in the following cases Altındere was forced to explain that his works are works of art. It is not without humor that he recounts numerous run-ins with the authorities who have challenged him on this point.

A year prior to the Satanism case, Altındere conducted an unsolicited performance at *Urart Galeri* (Istanbul). Spray painting a dollar sign on a painting by Esat Tekand,[220] he was charged subsequently with vandalism. When Altındere argued in the court that his intervention presented an act of artistic appropriation, the judge replied with the question: "Who do you think you are? Do you think you are Picasso?" The trial swayed, however, on account of an expert witness, Dr. John J. Cook of Marmara and Bogazici University. Cook testified that Altındere's performative intervention on the painting was well within the framework of art history, and that it was not a destructive, but a constructive artistic act. Cook gave evidence to his statement by showing that Tekand's piece had originally been priced at $6,500 but since Altındere's intervention a collector had offered to it acquire for $10,000 (for a reprint of Cook's affidavit see Evren

[219] While this particular complaint was phoned into the police station, the Turkish government has since instated a website that makes anonymous denunciation (especially of online contents) rather easy, see http://www.ihbarweb.org.tr/ihbar.html?subject=8.

[220] Entitled Coyote II, Tekand's painting was a reference to the Coyote performance of Joseph Beuys in 1974.

2008, 81). Cook further elaborated that Altındere's modification of the painting did not constitute vandalism but added value, as the painting was now signed by two artists as it were; a fact that, as Altındere pointed out, unfortunately did not console Tekand. Cook's testimony, which spoke to the artistic value of the intervention and managed to cast Altındere's action in terms of clear economical gain, resulted in the dismissal of the charges. As in the previous cases the question of what constitutes art and what makes it recognizable as such were at the heart of the matter.[221] The same is true in German court cases pertaining to artworks, as only an artwork ascertained as such is privy to the protection that the law provisions for artistic expressions and its producers. The banning Henry Miller's *Opus pistorium* in Germany, for instance, is based on the argument that the book does not fall under the type of original artistic work that the constitution guarantees to protect, because it was commissioned (Eisfeld 1987, Ohmer 2004).

But it is the third charge that Altındere was confronted with for curating an exhibition in the framework of the 9th International Istanbul Biennial in 2005 that I would like to turn to in more detail, because similarly to the *RAF* case, it presents a transgression of art into the political sphere that was met with both aesthetic critiques and delegitimization attempts.

[221] Although in this case unintended, the increase in the value of the painting also follows the logic of what Burt calls "censorship as enacted trope" and "dramatization" that can enhance the circulation and sales of artworks (Burt 1994a, xvii-xiv). Similarly, to Devereaux he argues that the NEA controversies, for instance, resulted in high visitors' numbers at exhibitions, as did the controversy and the calls for censorship of the *Sensation* exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum (see Devereaux 1995, 50).

Free Kick, Istanbul: It's Art, not Politics

Biennial curators Vasif Kortun and Charles Esche invited Halil Altındere[222] to put together a show in the "hospitality zone" located in an old storage building adjacent to the Istanbul Modern museum. This zone also hosted an exhibition by art students[223] and an arts book archive in the entrance area. The second floor of the building was designated for panel discussions and events organized by the Istanbul-based 'alternative' music and politics magazines *Roll* and *Express* and featured the exhibition *İmalat Hatası* (manufacturing defect) by the *Hafriyat* (excavation) collective that played on the trope of Turkey's 'failed modernization' or as they put it themselves: "the 3rd world is a manufacturing defect of modern utopia." But it was Altındere's adjacent *Free Kick* (*Serbest Vuruş*) that attracted the most attention. *Free Kick* took its name from a photographic work by Cengiz Tekin by the same title featuring a soccer player clad in the Turkish national team's uniform taking a free kick against the team of an assembled (civilian) family whom the observer might identify as Kurdish. According to Altındere the exhibition brought together 34 artists of three generations and works that commented on Turkey's recent political history. Rather than as a biennial event he positioned the show as a follow-up to his first curatorial work *I am Sad to Kill You* (2003). In his own words "if we call the first exhibition a 'warning.' then *Free Kick* is like a pitched battle (*meydan savaşı*)" (cited after Altunok 2005). Similar to the *KW* interventions (Chapter 5), Altındere not only showed contemporary visual art, but also included documentaries on the *Cumartesi Anneleri* and on torture in Turkish prisons.

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[222] Apart from his curatorial contribution Halil was also represented at the main Biennial event with a video of his performance "Miss Turkey."

[223] Entitled "Lost in Translation" and generally discounted by many interviewees in a rather hushed manner pointed out as being of a quality that should not have been included in the biennial framework (see also Antmen 2005).

Together with the Biennial, the Hospitality zone opened its doors on September 16, 2005 and when Altındere's interview with Altunok appeared on October 2 he had already an idea that what was shown in the exhibition in conjunction with recent events (the attack on the 6-7 September exhibition, the delay of the conference on Armenians at the end of Ottoman Empire, and renewed attention to what in Turkey is conspicuously referred to as the 'Kurdish Question') had contributed to *Free Kick* being like "a bomb that is about to go off" (cited after Altunok 2005). And off it went, first in the artworld itself and then in the Courts of the Beyoğlu district.



Fig. 33: Cengiz Tekin *Serbest Vuruş (Free Kick,* 2005).

"Harsh" (*sert*) was the adjective most used when it came to *Free Kick*. Explicitly political in its orientation it seemed to pose a series of problems to reviewers as much as authorities. In contrast participating artists, like Inci Eviner expressed their appreciation for Altındere's vision. Altındere chose photographs that seemed "too harsh," "too crass for previous exhibitions" of Eviner's. They were part of a series of pictures taken during her explorative visits with families living in the neighborhood of Tepebaşı – a quarter of Istanbul once inhabited by Christian and Jewish minorities during the Ottoman Empire and the early republican years and now mainly home to Roma families, displaced Kurds

and illegal immigrants.[224] Eviner noted her appreciated that the exhibition not simply assembled individual pieces, but that the works corresponded and together made for a strong political statement (see also Chapter 2).



Fig. 34: Inci Eviner *From the Families Series* (2004)

Calling *Free Kick* the "naughty child" of the Biennial, art critic Ahu Antmen notes: "[…] in an institutional framework like the one provided by the Istanbul Biennial (meaning by the 'father') Halil Altındere's *Free Kick* provides a platform for a clearly oppositional stance and is like the naughty child that is allowed to shout as much as it wants." Yet she maintains, "the *Free Kick* is not turned into a goal" because:

> "Putting its finger on wounds in Turkey, foremost the 'Kurdish issue.' politics, the military, military coups, torture, issues of identity, gender, this exhibition, although it wants to offer a much needed platform for debate, falls into the trap of all 'engaged' art. While its curator Halil Altındere states 'I have not made a representational exhibition with obvious political discourses that wants to send a message to society. I have not been interested in accusatory works, nor in those that trade in trauma and tragedy.' Yet, *Free Kick*'s political discourse is obvious, its message is obvious, its complaints (*şikâyetleri*) are obvious. Let it be obvious then, but is there not more depth through which these traumas, these tragedies that open the psychological wounds of society could be transmitted?" (Antmen 2005).

[224] Eviner's art studio had for over ten years been located in an old Armenian monastery in the Tepebaşı district. Due to the minority foundation laws in Turkey that allow for state appropriation of minority property is not used for its 'intended purpose' the monastery the government has attempted to expropriate the premises from the Armenian community, and the monastery has been locked into a court case with the Turkish government since 2006.

What Antmen missed here she further stated was a sense of abstraction, the lack of which, she contended, left the works with a mere pop art aesthetic, a favoring of content over form – without a 'deeper' aesthetic engagement.[225] Antmen's judgment that there was too little abstraction or sublimation from the reality the artworks drew from presents an interesting counterpoint to the critiques of the *RAF* exhibition were ultimately too much abstraction from reality (or a one-sided abstracting) were taken issue with. Altındere seemed to be quite aware of the criticism that his own work as well as his curatorial endeavors lacked (aesthetic) abstraction. He addressed this issue, when I asked him about what role an (imagined) audience plays in his work process.

> "This is an important question for me, one that I am frequently confronted with. I have often been criticized on that account. I have been told that my works are very narrative, and very vulgar. 'The idea of the metaphor is lost on you (*metafordan yoksunsun*)' and so on. I say 'yes' because contemporary art still has a very small audience, is consumed and produced by a small segment of society, and we can say that it is still a rather elitist. As artists we are complaining about this situation. But we have to counter what we are complaining about by broadening our audience through our works. In the exhibitions I make, the artists I choose, and in my own production, I do not aim at a certain elite, or small group; rather I want to include broader segments of society, get a reaction from them, include them into something transformative. These are the types of works and exhibitions I do, and I see that the audience comes and has a good time. It is important that they have an emotional connection. They do not have to have any kind of prior knowledge of contemporary art. Rather they can enter a dialogue with the works from the standpoint of their own knowledge (*birikim*). Because our works are nurtured by everyday life, the spectator can engage in a dialogue with them, there is no problem in that regard. This also made for a lot of the excitement around *Free Kick,* for all the people that were coming by, and this

[225] Antmen reviewed Altındere's subsequent show much more favorably, calling it dynamic, thought-provoking and hopeful for the future of contemporary art in Turkey, although it featured a similar composition of participants and analogous political thematics. However, Antmen notes that this time it is not Kurdish identity (why this is problematic, she does not say) that is at the center but, identity overall is the main topic: "from Turkish identity to 'Almancı' identity, from woman's identity to citizen's identity, from the artist's identity to homosexual identity, there are not one but many identities present. Maybe this was a conscious decision by Altındere, maybe he wanted to answer criticisms that he is producing 'Kürtçülük' through the medium of art. He will know the reasons himself, but as a result, this time he first and foremost embarks on a creative search […], and his efforts to provide a platform for young artists is worth to be commended" (Antmen 2007).

> explains why the curators of the *Documenta* invited me.[226] It's not that I produce work based on the latest curatorial practices or that only deals with the internal problematics of art. What we do is more social, more current, and in this process we also give importance to the spectator (*izleyici*)."

The 'pitched battle' thus continued on the pages of newspapers and magazines, even though it seemed most artworld commentators preferred to make their disapproval known off the record, labeling the exhibition all sorts of things from "facile" to "disgusting." The daily *Birgün* printed three responses to Antmen's review, one of which was by Gökhan Gençay, who accused Antmen of an elitist, "Frankfurt School"-based criticism, an outdated distinction between high and pop(ular) art. While he conceded that some of the works may not live up to the high aiming (*iddialı*) concept,[227] he harshly criticized what he identified as Antmen's patronizing and infantilizing perspective (Gençay 2005). Artist Şener Özmen interpreted Antmen's evaluation of the exhibition as revealing her stance on curatorial processes. He relegates her differential views of *Free Kick* and the adjacent *Center of Gravity,* a star-studded exhibition curated by Rosa Martinez favorably reviewed by Antmen, as disapproving of the collectivist approach taken by Altındere, which foregrounds interactions between works rather than individual artists. He challenged Antmen and those sharing her opinion to ask themselves "why the children who are creating oppositional expressions are met with such hard (*kati*) and fast tendencies" (Özmen 2005) and suggested her critique may not merely reflect aesthetic preferences, but also political ones. Özmen's proposition might also suggest that, at least

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[226] Roger M. Buergel and Ruth Noack, the curators of the documenta XII. invited Altındere to curate a similar exhibition in Kassel. As Altındere outlines below, however, he does not curate on commission, although he has been repeatedly invited to do so – and thus was represented in Kassel with a solo work, as well as in his function as publisher of *art-ist* magazine.

[227] Much (off-the-record) criticism was voiced, for instance, of Erinç Seymen's inclusion in the exhibition. He was featured with a video that was very ambiguous, showing two masked men in a SM, or alternatively, a torturer-tortured relationship, with one of them being forced to eat what appeared to be excrements. His piece was located adjacent to a small room that hosted a video on torture and thus was highly evocative, and as I found extremely moving and disturbing at the same time.

in the framework of the artworld, political preferences may be easier to discount than aesthetic ones. Interestingly all of these interventions draw on the father-child binary introduced by Antmen, a stereotypical motif frequently employed to illustrate the authoritarian structure of Turkey's political trajectory (Sirman 1990), as well as to the intergenerational conflicts in the artworld (Madra 2008, Kortun/Kosova 2005). Finally, Ferhat Özgür proposed that Antmen and other 'high art critics' could not appreciate or understand the polyphony of the works and their subject matters as well as their interaction with each other and (2005).

A slightly more differentiated discussion than the rather high-tempered exchanges above was put forward by Aysegül Sönmez. Sönmez, similarly to her colleague Antmen, saw the *Hospitality Zone* as a space of freedom. She joined a seemingly endless line of commentators utilizing analogies that like the title of the show by drawing on the world of soccer to concede that "a free kick is realized but the ball does not find the frame" (Sönmez 2005). She agreed that the exhibition wants to deliver a tough blow to the viewer, but argues that some of the selected pieces were "dragged" into the political framework rather than being inherently political. Sönmez' interjection is one of the few that took into account the physical space of the exhibition and stated that the works deserved a different arrangement to fully unfold their effect, individually as well as collectively. It is in this regard that the curator has fallen short, has left the "political commentary on the paper or on the wall," hence implying that the impact of the artworks is non-transcendent. The thus arranged pieces, she contended, were leaving the spectator at bay and gave the event more of an air of an art archive than an exhibition. Yet she maintained that the show has certain transformative energy that "is hard to escape"

(Sönmez 2005, 10). Going further than other reviewers Sönmez also took into account the instructional support or lack thereof for the exhibition as she noted that the Biennial directorate and curators had provided the exhibition space and paid the rental fees, but not secured any other material support for this 'free zone' (2005, 9). A factor, which she posited, weakened the potential strength of the exhibitions located there. Both Antmen and Sönmez suggested that the exhibition is both inside and yet outside the biennial. As Antmen noted, "[i]t is as if the Biennial is taking responsibility for this exhibition and yet it is not." The precariousness of this relationship was also reflected in the fact that the foundation that hosts the Biennial, the *Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts* (*IKSV*), did not officially intervene on Altındere's behalf when he was later put on trial for the exhibition.

The polarization vis-à-vis the exhibition continued. While much of it was relegated to a murmur beyind the scenes painter Bedri Baykam (who had once stepped up to defend Altındere's work) published an unrelenting attack against *Free Kick* and its curator on his website. It is worth quoting at some length, because it is to some extent symptomatic of said murmur. In his opinion, *Free Kick* produced a narrative in which

> "the Republic was founded on a false premise, Kurds are oppressed, Turkey is a country under military-police rule in which every oppositional person can be tortured at any moment. [...] As someone who in 1988 when it required courage to openly address torture and fascist oppression and who took serious risks in opening "İç Manzaralar II" [as a statement] against torture and censorship, surely no one will accuse me of conservatism or fascism! If Turkey were indeed the type of country that this exhibition is making it out to be the show itself would have been closed down on the first day. But that an honorable and respected institution like the *Eczacıbaşı Vakfı* would host such an exhibition that aims to exacerbate a cheap enmity against the Republic and covertly (?) defends a separatist organization is rather surprising. Yes, art is free. But if such an impervious exhibition is presented during such a critical political period, then critiques cannot be avoided. It goes without saying that free critique is a prerequisite for a free artworld. Surely in Turkey where the concept of criticism is hindered, the Altındere-issue is skipped in the press. For the press the right

> alliances […] are of course more important. What becomes clear is that Altındere, as Orhan Pamuk, has chosen a path of expression in which we are presented in the way that the 'West wants to see and is able to understand,' it shows that Altındere exhibits the same opportunism, is trying to take the same wind in his back. […]. But my darling, one ought not to bring these many contradictions in front of the West's eye (*batının gözüne sokmamak lazım*)[228]" (Baykam 2005).

Baykam goes on to state that he has no doubt that Altındere will be vastly successful in the eyes of Western commentators, and deserves applause for mastering this feat so easily. Then, in a harsh turn he postulates: "Our southern artist does not understand that there is a huge gap between criticizing fascism and crushing the Republic." Together with his thinly veiled comment above, insinuating that Altındere's exhibition presented a defense of the *Kurdistan Workers' Party* (PKK), Baykam once again conflates Altındere's ethnic background (likewise thinly veiled under the euphemism "southern") with his artistic and political stances. In a conversation with artist Burak Delier, art and cultural critic Erden Kosova proposes that this and similar charges against Altındere and others reveals not Altındere's political leanings but are indicative of a resurge of nationalism as much as of the friction between the modernist and contemporary art camps in Turkey. "In the past few years a strong reaction has formed against […] 'contemporary and 'conceptual' art, even a repugnance one could say. […] We have witnessed that the expression of 'the PKK extension to the artwold' has been used for Halil Altındere" (Kosova 2007). Kosova relegates these reactions to an aesthetic in Adorno's sense (and thus employs Adorno as shorthand for an elitist focus to high art), and a conservatism, that discounts the developments of the last forty years in Turkey's artworld including the political bent of contemporary art.

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[228] It is notable that Baykam does not seem to suggest that the 'contradictions' do not exist, but rather to proposed some sort of "patriotic self-censorship" in that these predicaments should not be not revealed to Western observers (cf. Herwig 1987, who looks at this brand of self-censorship in Germany prior to WWI).

While Baykam saw Altındere's show as yet more proof that he was meddling in the business of *Kürtçülük*, a negatively connoted way of describing Kurdish identity-based politics, rather than that of art, arts writer (recently turned) gallerist Azra Tüzünoğlu was among those who argued that what was at stake here was the collective thematization of traumatic events in Turkey's recent past. These events had shaped the childhood years of many of the participating artists and together their works so Tüzünoğlu "produce a map of consciousness" (2005, 101). She too uses the metaphor of this time not of insolent, but wounded children. As with the examples above this turn strikes me as problematic, as many artists and intellectuals have proclaimed an attempt to move away from these categorizations. Yet it seems that the father-child binary provides a convenient, at times advantageous shorthand to convey the position of oppositionality and powerlessness.[229]

Altındere himself reflects on his motivation for *Free Kick* by putting it in relation to his previous project:

> "*Free Kick* is in some ways a continuation of *I am sad to kill you*. Both were exhibitions that tried to bring together people that are not in the center, that are on the margins, and to construct a new center. The institutions and the curators here mainly work with artists from three big cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir or with artists that have a certain CV, and that are a bit more docile (*uysal*; also meaning agreeable), that cause trouble neither for themselves nor for you. As someone who is now coming from the center, from Istanbul, I wanted to break this pattern. In my first curated exhibition I brought together artists from 16 different cities, many of whom showed their works for the first time in Istanbul. They did not know each other beforehand when they came together in these exhibitions something amazing happened, new beginnings, future collaborations, new collectives. they formed new alliances, new friendships, a very different kind of togetherness emerged, very different kinds of expressions. So the first aspect was to break this notion of center through the range of participants, from the east, from the southeast, from the south – there were artists from everywhere.

[229] Similarly to the trope of belated modernity the state-as-father metaphor is frequently employed as an explanatory model for undemocratic dependency structures.

> The second aspect was to create a space for all kinds of liberalistic (*özgürlükçü*) approaches, for young people. This is very important because there are some things that only people at the beginning of their career have the guts to do, later, after a certain age you have quite different responsibilities, and might not pursue topics in the same way. The rebelliousness of young artists excites me very much, that's what pushed me to do exhibitions anyway, when I see an artist's work and when it gives me that feeling of excitement, when I see a few works like that I think why not bring these together in an exhibition? This is my technique of 'curating.' making exhibitions if you will; I don't work in an institution or do exhibitions on commission. If there are no works that excite me I don't do it, that's why they happen every two years or so. Good works emerge and that's when I decide to put together a show."

Curator on Trial: It's Critique, not Insult

About a month after the opening an 'unidentified visitor' filled a complaint about the exhibition with the public prosecutor's office, and on October 13, 2005 the 2. Beyoğlu District Criminal Court to order the confiscation of the exhibition catalogue (Ergün 2005). The court's decision rested on three images (featured in both the exhibitions and the catalogue) that depicted military references such as rank insignia and uniforms on the grounds that they constituted a public denigration of the Turkish Armed forces.[230] The following day police officers raided Altındere's office, but were unable to locate any catalogues, since all of them had been distributed during the opening of the exhibition.

[230] The court's confiscation verdict stated: "It is understood that [the catalogue] publicizes pictures that mark the Turkish Army as a target that needs to be attacked under any circumstances and in every way, and exhibiting bad intentions, it essentially publicly denigrates the Turkish armed forces" (cited after Ergün 2005).





From left to right: Fig. 35: Demet Yoruç *Hulk* (2004); Fig. 36: Murat Tosyalı *Obedience* (2004); Fig. 37: Burak Delier *Guard* (2005)

Twelve days later, the 3. Beyoğlu Criminal Court of First Instance (*Asliye Ceza Mahkemesi*) overturned the confiscation decree after Halil Altındere's brother and lawyer, Murat Altındere, appealed the decision. This time the court stated that "according to the currently valid domestic legal regulations articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) have precedent here and in accordance with these articles the confiscation decision is hereby overturned."[231] The decision further read:

> "None of the photographs that were cited as the grounds of the confiscation decision breached the limitations stated in these articles. Even though the artistic value of the photographs is debatable, even if they bring to mind the use of force, and even though they will not be met with approval by a large majority of society, as long as their content conforms to the ECHR norms, we must remember that a democracy needs to be able to endure all these expression of affectivity (*demokrasinin bütün bu duygulanımlara katlanmak olduğu unutulmamalıdır*)" (cited after Ergün 2005; for a reprint of the decision see Tüzünoğlu 2005,102).[232]

In our conversation Altındere noted that this had been the first time that an art catalogue had been confiscated in Turkey. The defense, he recounted, was yet again

[231] I thank my colleague Ceren Özgül for pointing out that international conventions ratified by Turkey, including the ECHR, supercede Turkey's domestic law including the constitution, and that in practice, however, adherence to this clause varies considerably.

[232] The lawyer of the defense, Murat Altındere, argued with regard to Murat Tosyalı's work that "the military insignia integrate with the body, that actually people carry these insignia in their civil life [as well]. There is thus a concretion between insignia and the body. But there is no insult" (cited after Ergün 2005).

grounded in the insistence that

> "the images were works of art and that it is in the nature of art to critique freely. We referred also to paragraph 4 of article 301, in which expressions that serve to critique do not constitute an offense and clarified that art presents what we call 'open works' (*acık yapıt*) – in the sense that they are open to interpretation. We prepared a portfolio with examples from art [history] and that's how we saved ourselves from this affair."

There are several notable issues and interesting inconsistencies in this episode. On the one hand we have a complaint filled against supposedly insulting material. Although required by law, the identity of this initial plaintiff was never revealed by the prosecution, but rumors circulated that it was lodged by a military widow, or alternatively, a mother who had lost her son in the army.[233] This presents an interesting parallel to the *RAF* case, as in both instances affected family members whose interests were in part congruent with that of the state initiated silencing procedures. Once these pictures where brought to the prosecutor's attention, he deemed that a case could best be made in the form of a denigration against a state institution, rather than on the basis of personal injury. But even so, the question remains why the case initially only centered on the confiscation of a catalogue instead of the closing of the exhibition. Was it indeed the reprinted and easily circulatable image that was the problem here? Or was it solely out of a calculation that the motion to close an exhibition that was under the auspices of the powerful and openly republican *IKSV* and part of a very popular and much praised biennial would have caused a major international scandal? In addition, it seems, the confiscation attempt of the catalogues was not very rigorous. Although Altındere had rightly stated that the copies that were in his possession were distributed during the opening, the catalogue actually

[233] It seems that when censorship is enacted in the form of preclerance, it relies completely on government agencies and institutions, while when preclearance is abolished, persons acting as proxies for the state seem to become important.

remained available; I was able to purchase it at a bookstore close to Altındere's office while the confiscation order was still in effect. Upheld only for a short while, enforced rather 'weakly' (or inconsistently) and quickly overturned, what *did* this order actually accomplish? Four interconnected points come to mind: Firstly, the confiscation order did succeed in delegitimizing the exhibition to a certain extent. It gave the court not only the opportunity to investigate if a denigration had indeed taken place – by probing the rather hazy boundaries between what constitutes an artistic critique and an insulting 'depiction' or portrayal, but also to comment on the artistic merit of the works – lack of expertise in this regard notwithstanding. Secondly, the temporary ban was successful in so far as it did discourage newspapers and other media outlets to show the pictures in question, hence suppressing a possibly much broader circulation. Thirdly, by categorizing the depictions of militarism rather than the state practices that gave rise to these depictions as problematic, it successfully deflected the critique from the 'thing itself' to its depiction. And finally, this delegitimizing move allowed for identifying Altındere himself as a target.

Accordingly, the turmoil did not end here. The Beyoğlu Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (*Cumhuriyet Savcılığı*) opened criminal proceedings, this time against Altındere personally. The cited ground was once more public denigration of the Turkish Armed Forces under article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. A prison sentence of two years was demanded by the prosecution, but Altındere was acquitted of the charges on April 13, 2006. Reflecting on the indictment and the trial more than a year later, Altındere still expressed his surprise that it was not against the artists themselves but against him that charges were brought, but contended that he had been perceived as the

"instigator" (*azmettirici*) and thus responsible for the exhibition's content. While this last court case had Altındere worried, he seemed not aversed to taking on the risks, to continue presenting works that are potentially controversial.

> "[…] I think if someone is saying whatever he or she wants to say through the medium of art (*sanat yolu ile*), its risk needs to be taken. I believe that art knows no boundaries and one needs be prepared to bear the consequences. I believe this, and whenever I believe in something, I have made every effort and give all my support to help realize the works of a lot of artists. As I said before, in the first exhibition I curated, a lot of participants from the east. They brought with them a new aesthetic language. A language that grew out of their everyday lives, the political contexts they are in. Their experiences are different, their visual, aesthetic and political language is different. It was very enriching and created a lot of excitement. At the time a lot of people were independently working on Atatürk, because Atatürk is an icon so to speak, and there are laws that protect this icon. In the exhibition we showed these works in a concentrated fashion, yet nothing happened at the time. But *Free Kick* was different, because the Biennial is a more popular outlet, it is a media event, more people saw it. Among those people some felt uncomfortable with a couple of works and went to the prosecutor with the catalogue and invited the prosecutor to do his duty, and his duty he did.

Altındere's statements further reveal that much of the silencing apparatus in Turkey is highly inconsistent. What set *I am sad to kill you* indeed apart from *Free Kick*? What rendered one artistic depiction of state critique more or less threatening than the other? Was it indeed the higher exposure that a biennial brings?

Instead of speaking from a position of victimization, Altındere, tongue-in-cheek but equally serious, stated that his court cases also served to educate judges and prosecutors on the parameters of contemporary art and the legal framework of art. "In some ways it was good that I was charged" he said,

> "because my cases will constitute precedents for others. At least we will have an impact on future decision-making processes this way. It was difficult for me because there were no precedents I could rely on. When I submitted a manifesto, the judges had no idea if what I was doing was related to art or not, and in some ways the prosecutors also did not know what to do with it."

Laughing he added: "I brought these court cases before them for educational purposes."

All of Altındere's cases share that his defense not solely relied on freedom of expression, but insisted that the works and exhibitions he produces do indeed constitute art the critical impetus of which cannot be equated to insults. The notion that even if political in address art has to be treated differently than political speeches or other types of critical expression, reiterates both the unity and the disparateness of arts and politics.




Fig. 38: Ahmet Öğüt
The charges against Altındere are dropped
(2006)

Discretionary Power and Discouragement

The above discussed examples illustrate that what is often subsumed under the blanket notion of censorship entails different techniques, such as silencing, suppression, confiscation, incarceration, discouragement and/or deligitimization. They also speak to the variety of actors that are engaged in silencing processes. In Turkey, for instance, local governors have some leeway to suppress films, musical and theatrical performances at their own discretion, if they believe that an arts event may disturb the public order. This

regulation goes back to 1986 when post-release censoring powers were extended to the governorial level giving them power to enact a ban even after approval by the national film and music censorship boards set up by the military junta but dispended in early 1990s.[234] Although censorship is in principle illegal in Turkey, suppression of 'free expression' can be exerted on the grounds of disturbance of the public order be it with regard to morals, health, customs or traditions apart from the already discussed perceived threats to national security, and territorial integrity. Concomitantly the police also have discretionary powers to suppress arts events without necessarily having to draw on the legal apparatus.

The Helsinki Watch report on Turkey from 1989 makes two further important points in this context: a. that the legal process is very expensive for plaintiffs who seek to reverse bans, a fact that in itself might constitute a discouraging factor for those affected by censorship to even attempt legal remedies, and b. interviews they conducted suggest that the experience of censorship directly impacts future creative efforts, and that this type of discouragement engenders and perpetuates self-censorship, often described as a paralyzing experience.

That the procedures and tactics that were documented in the late 1980s are still being employed, despite the many legal changes that have taken place, becomes evident in the case of Ahmet Öğüt's video animation "*Hafif Zırhlı"* (*Light Armoured*). The piece was screened as part of *Yama* (i.e. patch), an exhibition project 'located' on a large advertising LCD screen mounted on the prominently positioned Marmara Pera Hotel in

[234] One interesting example in this respect is Ali Özgentürk's film *Su da Yanar,* the portrayal of a filmmaker working on a project about Nazim Hikmet that is eventually censored. Ironically Özgentürk's film was banned through the office of the Istanbul Governor. The Governor never saw the film but relied on the judgment of a police officer – a practice that the report surmises may be more regular and widespread than one might assume (HW 1989, 93).

Istanbul's Tepebaşı neighborhood. Sylvia Kouvali, the curator of *Yama* at the time, had arranged with the hotel management to use the screen as a 'different kind of public art space' and show videos by a different artist every month, after sunset. Öğüt's animation featured a generic armored military vehicle that is periodically hit by small stones, almost comically so, since the stones are too small and their trajectory too unmotivated to inflict any damage on the massive vehicle. The installation had been up for 20 days, when on September 4th, 2006 a police detail congregated on Taksim Square to halt a demonstration protesting the deployment of soldiers to Lebanon, became aware of the video. According to several newspaper reports the officers in charge saw in the animation "an endangerment of the public order," a call to "terrorist acts" and "a provocation of terrorism" (Sönmez 2006, Sabah 2006, Yildiz 2006). Who these terrorists might be was never specified, but the mere invocation of a thus categorized threat seemed sufficient grounds to demand the immediate discontinuation of the screening by a police commando sent to the hotel.

In a press statement reprinted in the Istanbul-based arts magazine *art-ist* Kouvali recounted the aftermath of the incident as follows:

> "The following days the lawyer of The Marmara Hotels negotiated and discussed with police officers about art and its limits […]. In the mind of the censor, the work was about nothing more than insult and provocation and shutting it off, was considered a protection towards society. The hotel […] was very patient, very well informed and completely supportive of the artist and curator. Unfortunately, the policemen refused any other screening of this work and after a lot of pressure put on the representatives of The Marmara Hotel, 'yama' was informed not to continue screening it" (*taken from the English original*, Kouvali 2006).



Fig. 39: Ahmet Öğüt
Hafif Zırhlı
(*Light Armoured*, 2006)

Again the discussion centered on what art is and what it is supposed to do, and according to Kouvali, despite the best efforts of the hotel management and lawyers and herself, the police personnel was not to be dissuaded. Öğüt was never charged with any offense, no trial ensued. Nor did he seek legal action to curtail the police's intervention. As such his case could be categorized as one of successful suppression and discouragement without the deployment of legal measures. After all if Altındere's experiences are any indication, a legal battle could have been taken up and most likely won. Öğüt, however, stated in an interview with newspaper *Sabah* that he felt his artistic intervention had been successfully brought to the public for almost three weeks and categorized the early end of the screenings as just another indication that 'true freedom of artistic expression' was still a while away in Turkey (*cited after Sabah/anonymous 2006*).

The police also intervened one year later, at the opening of a poster exhibition at the *Hafriyat* gallery entitled '*Allah Korkusu*.' 'The Fear of God' had been written up by

the Islamicist newspaper *Vakit*[235] that had scandalized the show by the mere merit of its title. Intimidated by the recent rise of nationalist sentiment, the storming of an exhibition on the events of 6-7 September, 1955 by an 'angry mob' (see Chapter 5), and staged demonstrations at the 301 related trials of Orhan Pamuk and Elif Shafak, the *Hafriyat* collective asked for police protection for the opening. A police detail arrived only to find some of the exhibited posters 'objectionable' while exploring the premises, and to return with an anti-terror detail (Saymaz 2007, see also Serin 2007).


Sanat adı altında, sövgü kültürü inşa ediliyor.
"Allah Korkusu" temalı afiş sergisi, açılmadan tepki topladı

Küstah sergi

KÜLTÜR SANAT SERVİSİ

"Allah Korkusu" temalı afiş sergisi, 10 Kasım tarihinde Hafriyat Karaköy'de açılacak. Sergiye katılan sanatçılar, ürünleriyle Allah korkusunun insan üzerinde meydana getirdiği tahribat(!) ve değişimi anlatmaya çalışacak. Sergının içeriğine bir anlam veremediklerini belirten vatandaşlar ise, amacın sanat olmadığı görüşünde. Gazetemizi arayan okurlarımız, sergının neye ve kime hizmet edeceği konusunda endişelerini dile getirerek, bu tür girişimlerin provokasyon amaçlı olduğunu belirtiyorlar.

ALLAH Korkusu

Fig. 40: Vakit's headline "An Impertinent Exhibition" accompanied by the statement: "under the cover of the arts a culture of profanity is being established."

What is interesting in this case as in the different legal run-ins by Altındere above is that neither the Ministry of Culture, nor the cultural offices on municipal or district levels spoke out in support for the artists.[236] What had shifted in late 2007 however it

[235] In a riff on the exhibition's title and *Vakit's* attack the culture and arts desk of the daily *Radikal* printed a news item on what they perceived as making Hafriyat into a target (*hedef göstermek*) entitled: *"Birilerinin Sanat Korkusu (Certain People's Fear of Art)*," see http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=238040.

[236] It seems that it is a general tendency in the Turkish context in which the Ministry for Culture rarely if ever intervenes on behalf of artists. One notable exception seems to be Fikri Sağlar who after taking office in 1991 openly addressed the restrictions on freedom of expression, and for instance, lifted bans on

seemed, was that the press reported broadly on *Vakit*'s heading "*Küstah Sergi*" ("An Impertinent Exhibition"), which most likely contributed to the investigation being dropped without charges. That much of the right-leaning, republican press entered the chorus may very well be due to the fact that this attack on the 'freedom of the arts' came from the Islamist camp. Either way the police's intervention presented a discouragement, even more so because their presence at the opening was originally meant to provide a measure of protection.

The one case in which the Ministry of Culture and Tourism actually did intervene was that of Hüseyin Karabey's film *Gitmek* (literally: going, leaving; English title *My Marlon and Brando*), and it did so in a rather contradictory fashion. The Ministry co-funded Karabey's film, a first for the filmmaker whose previous proposals had been rejected for many years. Upon completion the film was by accepted a number of prestigious international film festivals, including the *Tribeca Film Festival*. The Turkish consulate in New York actually co-sponsored a panel discussion on the movie together with the *Moon and Stars Project* (a nonprofit Turkish cultural foundation located in New York*),* and notably Karabey went on to be awarded the best newcomer director in fiction award at *Tribeca*. The movie went on to tour festivals all over the world, and in December 2008, was released in Turkey to much critical acclaim. Around the same time *Gitmek* was also scheduled to be shown at a festival in Switzerland entitled *Culturescapes Turkey*, that was co-sponsored by the Turkish Ministry for Culture and Tourism with the substantial amount of 400,000 Euro. Before the first screening took

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domestic and foreign literary works instated by the military junta (see Sağlar 1992, 34-35).

place the film was suddenly taken out of the program because an aid to the Public Relations Secretary of the Ministry, İbrahim Yaza, had threatened to withdraw the funding if this screening of *Gitmek* went go ahead. Karabey himself declared that he had heard about this censoring motion through the press (see alsoYardimciel 2008). He was never contacted by the Ministry (or the festival organizers), but expressed confidence that the issue would be amended momentarily. In the ensuing debate it emerged that Yaza had acted on his own account without an order from his superiors, and without their knowledge. But instead of the rectification that Karabey expected in the following days the transcript of an interview with Yaza by German journalist Kai Strittmaier (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*) emerged where he proclaims that in 'sensitive times like these' (bombardments of Northern Iraq through the Turkish Army, and bombings of army vehicles and buses attributed to the PKK) the depiction of a "Turkish girl falling in love with a Kurd" was out of the question (see Radikal 05/11/2008). During a press conference Minster of Culture and Tourism Günay came forward trying to diffuse the situation, by stating that censorship efforts on part of his department were out of the question, citing the films national release as a proof to the contrary. Pressed by questions, he answered, however, that it would be only natural that the Turkish state as a main sponsor of the festival would make requests pertaining to the program if they impact the image of Turkey. He implied that local organizers had referred to southeastern Anatolia as 'Kurdistan' to which his department had not been able to remain silent ("*Türkiye'nin bir bölümünün bir başka isimle isimlendirilmesi karşısında sessiz mi kalmalıyız?"* cited after *Radikal* 2008, see also Önderoğlu 2008). The film was eventually screened on the initiative of the cinema directors who had already received copies of the film and could

not be compelled otherwise. Again, this case exhibits many inconsistencies, and pressure was exerted even beyond the boundaries of the Turkish state, this time by way of threatening financial recrimination, without recourse to legal action.[237]

More recently, artists have tried to develop collective strategies in order to overcome the types of discouragement described above. For instance, in the wake of the assassination of Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink on January 19, 2007 Istanbul artworld actors were among those who publicly expressed that Dink had been made a target for nationalists, especially through his trials under article 301. To protest censorship and the type of targeting it breeds, a number of artists that I worked with engaged in a self-indictment campaign, by going to the public prosecutor's office and publicly rereading the statements that lead to Dink's trial. They demanded to be tried for thus violating article 301 just as journalists who had previously reprinted Dink's respective articles, with the aim of jamming up the system. Their self-indictments were rejected, as were their appeals to the public prosecutor's decision. This effort also entailed the assemblage of a wider group of artists who got together as the *19 Ocak Kollektifi,* which grew out of, as some participants described it, the feeling of helplessness and desire to contribute to awareness and discussion through their medium, art. Among their goals was also to show solidarity with the Armenian community of Turkey, and with politically persecuted and oppressed segments of society in general. Much discussion ensued in the group how and what they could contribute. Several

[237] This is not the only time that the cultural ministry of Turkey has first funded and then tried to deligitimize projects. Other examples include Handan Ipekci's *Hejar* or the movie *Son Cellat* that was notably supported by the Ministry with 250,000 Lira but then delimited through rating measures, which is an important mechanism for restricting access and circulation of movies in particular. For more details see http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yasam/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&Kategori=yasam&KategoriID=&ArticleID=1013322&Date=08.11.2008&b=Son%20Cellata%20sansur.

projects have grown out of these engagements, including one entitled *Münferit* (individual, sole, lonely, isolated), an installation with the names of victims of politically motivated assassinations by the state or proxies of the state, and persons who died during incarceration and interrogations. To circumvent the dynamics of intimidation and potential indictments, the names of the participants remained unpublished, and works were presented only under the name of the collective.

Concluding Remarks: On the (In)Visibility of the Unspeakable

In the introduction to his edited volume "Ethics and the Arts" David E. Fenner proposes that much of twentieth century art in both its scope and form goes

> "outside the boundaries of the aesthetic to make [its] most provocative statements. Audience members are now forced – because of the moral, spiritual, patriotic challenges in art – to consider works under their attention more broadly. How one ought to respond to a work of twentieth century art is not merely an aesthetic matter. If it were simply an aesthetic matter, then many of the most provocative and engaging works of recent art would be innocuous and facile" (1995, 2).

One could surely question if before the 20th century there had been indeed a strict concentration on aesthetic matters, and interject that formalist theories of art still insist that the aesthetic should at the very least be one of the grounds on which artworks ought to be judged. For the examples in this chapter, however, Fenner's statement offers an opportunity to think once again about the often ambiguous boundaries between arts and politics, if they indeed exist. A question remains: is a statement in the domain of the arts different from one in the realm of politics, and if so, how? Mary Devereaux posits that with political art in particular we face a dilemma, in so far as we

> "either […] embrace the political character of art and risk subjecting art and artists to political interference, or we protect art and its makers from political

> interference by insisting upon their 'autonomy.' but at the cost of denying the political character of art and its broader connection with life" (Devereaux 1995, 42).

Ultimately this dilemma brings us back to the double-edged conception of the autonomy of art as both protecting and weakening the impact of art (Chapter 2). When art makes a political statement, or a statement on politics, it may also elicit a response from the political sphere (and not just from the realm of the artworld in the narrower sense that has its own set of politics as previously discussed).[238] Goehler, for instance, argues that the political dimension of art, even if foregrounded does not or should not automatically translate into giving the political apparatus the right to intervene or judge art in a manner that is adversarial to the inner workings of art (e.g. assessments of artistic merits). Devereaux too argues that while the autonomy of art should not be reified in its formalist incarnation (that it frequently relies on), one should rule on principle in favor of the arts whenever government and artistic interests collide (Devereaux 1995, 52-55). But as she notes herself, these processes rarely work this neatly in practice. The issue is complicated by the circumstance that artist themselves, frame the autonomy of art in formalistic terms at times, especially in the defense against political intervention. In his trial, Altındere, for instance, insisted not on freedom of expression per se but rather on art as a different kind of expression to which certain rules and constrictions that govern other forms of expression do not apply. Although his work might be seen as a far cry from formalistic frameworks, it is the latter that have informed the very existence of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of art. Klaus Biesenbach moves even closer to evoking formalist

[238] She contends that while the shift towards a more political understanding of art has "increased the potential for art to arouse controversy and engage widespread public interest" (1995, 50), it has also led to a diminished attention to "the many 'nonpolitical' elements that makes art art." The question of how an artwork addresses an issue has been neglected in favor of "what the work says." This shift in the framing of art produces the concern "that by abandoning the separation of art and politics, we reduce art to propaganda" (1995, 51); a concern that was raised repeatedly in both of the above discussed exhibitions.

principles by taking recourse to "beauty" and "truth" to justify the content *RAF* exhibition. His critics on the other hand bemoaned both the shows "retreat to art" (and thus to a 'pure' notion of art as divorced from politics) as well as "a lack of critical positions," thus illustrating that the argument of the autonomy of art can be employed for diametrically opposed purposes. As such the *RAF* case constitutes a transgression of art into the political sphere that was met with both aesthetic critiques and political delegitimization attempts.

But then again not all political expressions in the arts are seen as transgressive and are met with censoring strategies. As I have argued above the limits of the freedom of artistic expression in Germany are circumscribed by incitement laws that are explicitly based on the country's Nazi past, and the *RAF* as a phenomenon and the reactions of the German state to its emergences are in part problematic because they are, depending on perspective either strategically linked or likened to this past. In the Turkish example these limits are reached when aesthetic (along with scholarly and political) approaches that counter official national narratives are construed as threats to the country's 'territorial integrity' (and that over the past 30 years have been equated to terrorism). Yet, the cases also show that even within theses fields of delimitation there are considerable contingencies: the domain of the unspeakable remains, and necessarily so, unclearly mapped. An unambiguous demarcation thereof would present blatant and recognizable censorship, incompatible with 'modern politics' – which as I have argued throughout this dissertation is a special concern in both the German and the Turkish contexts.

The insistence on modern politics is not only a question of self-perception but in most of the discussed cases is also linked to anxieties about perceptions abroad: the Fassbinder case pointed to issues of anti-Semitism and the legacy of Nazism, the *RAF* brought up questions of homegrown terrorism and how Germany responded to that challenge. Attacks against Altındere were often couched in statements that "the likes of him" should not be send abroad as "they were tarnishing Turkey's image." Notably, Germany's delimitation of free speech with regard to Nazism is taken to both indicating and hampering its modern-ness, but generally approved and originates in the bequest of the 'West.' In Turkey those upholding the sanctity of territorial boundaries also see themselves as defenders of Turkey's modernity, while in the eyes of the 'international community' and its domestic opposition, censorship mechanism are proof of Turkey's deficient modernization and lack of democratic structures. These particular sensitivities do not come to mean that the state has a single, unified interest or position. After all, other types of artistic production on the *RAF* or critical works that Altındere produced have not been met with the same reaction. Yet, the way in which freedom of expression is delimited in Germany and Turkey allows for 'citizens' and state institutions (including the police) to invoke state interest in order to limit free speech. Thus it is actually in the encounter of art and politics that the unspeakable itself is constituted and reconstituted.

In a seemingly contradictory fashion these instances also create a situation in which 'everyone' seems to be able to makes judgments on art, in which art moves from the specialized provenance of some (experts) to that of everyone albeit in a restrictive and circumscribed fashion, exactly because they present interventions in politics. Paradoxically however, as apparent in the *RAF* case, everyone can talk about art, but not

everyone is sanctioned to make a statement on the *RAF*. At the same time, the cases discussed in this chapter also play into a certain notion of the inability to distinguish between the allegorical and the literal that is not only applied to children (see Heins 2001, 3), but interestingly to adults as well. The debates that I have presented and the anxieties surrounding them rest on assumptions about the way in which the reception of artworks translates into actual behavior and attitudes. They thus equate showing an issue with endorsing it, and it is this equation that underwrites the calls for "cultural regulation" (Post 1998).

While the delegitimization attempts in the case of *Regarding Terror* and *Free Kick* are, at least to some extent, public and visible, other attempts at silencing remain obscured or harder to detect. While the voicing of the unspeakable constitutes a transgression met with silencing efforts, partial as they may be, the contemplation (as well as the non-contemplation) of the unspeakable remains invisible to the public (other than by the absence of its possible manifestations). Judith Butler widens the notion of censorship not only to follow speech, but as an element of power that may precede speech, and thus constitute the citizen-subject through constraints and foreclosure. She further argues that as censoring a text remains incomplete, so does uncensoring a text (1998, 255). This brings us to the issue of self-censorship that is difficult to address in empirical research or when studied in the present (in contrast, for instance, to retrospective self-reflection, see Haraszti 1987). The Helsinki Watch report from 1989 stated "Turkish writers openly admit censoring themselves for fear of bannings, confiscations and court charges" (1989, 5). However, the authors concede that this information stems from numerically very small sources. In my own research too the issue

of self-censorship came up frequently in the Turkish context – yet it was always attributed to third persons – phrases like "X would never dare to go that far," "Y would never address this out of fear to loose popularity," or "they have roadblocks in their heads" were just like much backroom talk delegated to hushed remarks, unnamed persons or wishes to stay off the record. The formation of the *19 Ocak* collective also presents a counter-strategy to both censorship and the self-censoring impetus. Altındere repeatedly referred to censorship as an experience that is particularly detrimental to the development of young artists. He noted the self-perpetuating dynamic of censorship by noting "If someone is confronted with censorship early on, this experience will turn into self-censorship later, breed more censorship over time." This understanding was echoed by a number of arts educators who emphasized the importance "freedom" in both aesthetic and political formation of young artists. In Germany self-censorship has recently been increasingly addressed with regard to media and journalism (e.g. see Prantl 2007), while foreclosure and other modalities of self-delimitation are rarely discussed in the arts.

That self-censoring dynamics appear in censoring environments as well as those that do not 'officially' or easily recognizably censor is argued by a variety of authors. Judith Butler (1998), Wendy Brown (1998) and Richard Post (1998), for instance, posit that censorship is not merely limiting, but productive.[239] Censorship is constitutive in the sense that it controls both access to expression and the form of expression (see Bourdieu 1991). Censorship thus emerges as a norm and even as the very condition for free expression working through an array of "techniques and tactics of domination" (Post

[239] An interesting facet of this productivity is taken up by Patterson in his *Censorship and Interpretation* (1984). He argues that since the birth of the novel took place under the conditions of preclearance, censorship regulations were formative for the use of metaphors, different literary genres as well as emergent interpretative traditions.

1998, 4). While not restricted to the state as such, the discussed cases present examples in which states interests and official historiography are invoked in order to mobilize delegitimizing mechanisms.

As Butler notes censorship leaves traces not least because it reconfigures whatever it operates on. Such traces are visible in the reconceptualization of the *Regarding Terror* and in the news coverage on *Free Kick,* and also mark the different incarnations of self-censorship. Furthermore "[…] the mechanism of censorship is actively engaged in the production of subjects but it is also engaged in circumscribing the social parameters of speakable discourse" (Butler 1998, 251).[240] Viewed in this vein we can say that censorship mechanisms produce and constitute a multiplicity of interconnected subjects: the subject of the unspeakable and the subject of art as well as constituting (or reconstituting) the state.

Interestingly, the manner in which censorship and silencing mechanisms work and are addressed in Turkey leads to a high visibility of censorship and thus, at times, also to very visible responses. In contrast, in Germany where the impression abounds that expression is free, censorship has largely disappeared from the public discourse and takes on forms that are not as visible. It is striking to note that the de-facto suppression of Fassbinder's play is rarely labeled as censorship (at the time only the Frankfurt's *Green Party* opposition stuck to this label) and is instead framed in terms of Germany's problematic past, and as an exception. It is likewise notable that in the extensive press survey I conducted with regard to the *RAF* exhibition, I only came across the notion that

[240] Yet, as Butler maintains, foreclosure does not lead to the 'exhaustive reduction' of agency, rather "agency becomes possible on the condition of such a foreclosure" that "set[s] the scene for the agency of the subject" (Butler 1998, 256). In her opinion the questions then becomes which rules and "social forms" are alterable and which are not (ibid., 257).

the processes at work might consitute censorship once, and only in the form of "censorship light" (*Zensur light*, Reinecke 2003). This does not mean however that different modalities of censorship do not exist in Germany.

In our interview Gaby Horn doubted any negative or long-term impact on the *KunstWerke*'s access to public funding as a result of the scandal. Yet, the *RAF* scandal led to Goehler's dismissal. This considerably changed the composition of the *Hauptstadtkulturfond*, put the foundation under political scrutiny and set a precedent very likely to influence future decisions. This relates to the point raised by Barnett in his inquiry into the Fassbinder case, if only in a footnote. He argues that Germany's federal arts funding structure is more susceptible to interventions by politicians than Britain's local arts council system, for instance (2004, 34; FN 23). Cultural departments in Germany generally award funding through artistic advisory committees. While the composition of committees is public knowledge, the ways in which committees are chosen are not. Much of the related silencing mechanisms thus remain invisible in Germany.[241]

Anja Ohmer argues that censorship in Germany is further obscured since increasingly individuals rather than state institutions launch court cases which result in censoring mechanisms, for instance by claiming that a work is violating their *Persönlichkeitsrechte,* their right to privacy and personal dignity (Ohmer 2004). While

[241] In Fenner's view non-funding is not necessarily censorship, but a statement about the government's assessment of what is culturally or socially important (1995, 4). Similarly, Sanford Levinson sees funding preferences as the operative realm of silencing rather than of suppression (1998).

the notion of 'personal honor' is an ill-defined term, both socially and legally, it is nonetheless protected by article 1 of the German Constitution.[242]

As government funding is very limited in Turkey, possibilities for intervention in the production process are likewise limited, making post-release silencing and delegitimization efforts much more visible. As I will describe in the following chapter Istanbul's municipal cultural departments are especially adept at claiming private initiatives for themselves, and, having discovered the rentability of art, are increasingly open to at least logistically supporting arts organizations. This has, however, also led to increased control over content – or at least attempts in that regard.[243] As much of the support for the arts comes from privately funded cultural institutions, it is at this locus that censoring mechanisms are often hidden (Burt 1994a, see also Chapter 4).[244]

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[242] The banning of Biller's novel *Esra* is such a case. Chronicling the relationship between the narrator and his relationship with Esra, the work was found to injure the right to personal honor of Biller's former real-life partner. The individual person is further more protected from immaterial harm through insults, denigration, libel and the like through different provisions in the German Penal Code. The verdict read that Biller had failed to sufficiently sublimate and abstract the character from the person it was based on and who had subsequently sued him for it. Biller's *Esra* had been locked in a legal battle since it first appeared in 2003, and was on and off the bookshelfs until the ban was confirmed in the last instance in October 2007. Biller and the publisher Kipenheuer and Witsch were also ordered to pay 50,000 Euro compensation for personal injury – this verdict however was overturned in February 2008. *Esra* has since then become a landmark case for the tension between the rights of the individual and the freedom of the arts in Germany. It remains to be seen if this shift will also be more applicable to explicitly political art, and, for instance, if Turkey will move more into this direction as well.

[243] An area where this type of control has been traditionally higher and seems to become more of an issue are the municipal theaters. According to a dramaturge that I spoke to, AKP officials are reading and marking-up entire plays. I have, however, not been able to corroborate these types of interventions, since they were relayed to me repeatedly as anecdotes after my main research period, and often attributed to a new confidence and expression of control after the reelection of the AKP majority in 2006.

[244] One such instance is Aksanat's *Hayalet Cizgi* exhibition curated by Ali Akay and Levent Calikoğlu. Here Ahmet Öğüt and Şener Özmen participated in a group exhibition with their *Coloring Book* series, printed in an edition of 500 copies for the show. A few days before the opening, Öğüt received a copy and realized that two of the drawings were missing from the booklet: One, showed the image of a Hezbollah fighter in front of a bookrest with what is presumably a Koran, speaking on a cell phone with a propped up rifle next to him; the other involved a sexual act with a donkey. The curators had removed the images in question from the booklet on the request of *Aksanat*'s director. Upon inquiry Öğüt was told that the images might be disturbing to the children, who taking arts classes on the upper levels of the building might see the exhibited copies of the *Coloring Book*, and that the center's administration had equal say in the final decisions of the selection of artworks (a right that they supposedly rarely insist on, according to my interview with the director Derya Bigalı). Öğüt has since then refused to work with the organization.

Throughout this chapter I have argued that explicitly political art poses a transgression in that it is seen as breaching the boundaries within which art is supposed to operate – one that poses a challenge and is at certain strategic points met with silencing efforts, be they financial, political, or legal, that are not necessarily complete, but that consolidate and separate the operational realm of the arts and that of politics. While censorship – on principle – is regarded as incommensurable with modern politics in both Germany and Turkey, the enactment of silencing mechanisms in the cases assembled here is at the same time presented as guarding modernity and civility, by foreclosing purported anti-Semitism, delegitimizing discussions on domestic terrorism and its implications, or silencing perceived threats to territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

Chapter 6: The Business of Art. Art Spectacles in the Contemporary Metropolitan Order

Drawing on a set of observations from the Biennials of Istanbul and Berlin, this Chapter examines the proliferation of large-scale urban art events and traces parallels and divergences in the discourses and practices that account for the 'spectacularization' of art in the contemporary metropolitan order. One could certainly argue that some of the elements discussed here are by no means new. The spectacularization that I refer to, for instance, takes its cues from the history of "festival exhibitions" and the "spectacular imperial displays" of world fairs, first held more than 150 years ago (Ferguson/Greenberg/Nairne 2005, 48). Like their historical predecessors, contemporary arts festivals and biennials are often presented as engaging a broader public than 'conventional' art formats. What sets them apart, however, is that in cityscapes increasingly characterized by income-polarization, gentrification and social segmentation, urban art spectacles have become a vital and pronounced economic development strategy. This new spectacularization and enterprising of art is based on a convergence of economic interests, cultural policy and artistic practices, three realms generally conceptualized as pursuing opposing interests and operating logics. I argue that together they form the basis for a type of city marketing that is intimately connected to and based on discourses of "cultural entrepreneurship" and policies centered on the "creative industries" that are currently restructuring international artworlds and within which artists and other cultural workers are increasingly understood as service providers for global metropolises. As I will show, although spearheaded by different sets of actors or interest groups, that seemingly occupy different positions within the local and international artworld and that are heirs to divergent cultural policy trajectories, this

development is strikingly similar in Berlin and Istanbul. Proposing that parallels arise only in part from congruent economic, social and political processes, I see Istanbul and Berlin as locked into an internationalized circulation of ideas pertaining to the uses and pliability of art – and especially of art spectacles for urban renewal, image making and city marketing – or as it is often referred to – branding. Urban art spectacles are seen to enhance the city's representational prestige and to provide incentive for (foreign) investment, as well as a draw for tourism.

Enter the Urban Arts Event

This inquiry operates from the proposition that a multitude of contemporary urban art festivals can be conceptualized within the framework of urban spectacles that have been increasingly taken up by anthropological literature (Bossevain 1999, Knecht/Soysal 2005). These approaches are mainly geared to build upon and reevaluate an anthropological corpus of works regarding carnivals, rituals and other forms of communal festivities. Rather than focusing on the communal revivalism that these kinds of events might or might not entail, the following is an interrogation of the artistic, political and economic variables that contribute to the spectacularization of art at a time at which art spectacles emerge as the preferred form of presenting art in the urban setting. I use the notion of preferred here not to indicate artistic predilections – although participation in biennials and prominent art fairs such as Frieze (London) or Art Basel have become indispensable stepping stones in artistic careers – but those of sponsors and municipalities, since due to their reach, large-scale events and festivals enhance the city's visibility and are considered lucrative. Although mega-exhibits such as "Genie und

Wahnsinn" (Genius and Madness, Berlin 2006)[245] or the Picasso Retrospective of Istanbul (2006) could have likewise served as interesting examples, I posit that taking biennials as an entry point to this discussion is productive for the following reasons: a) their focus on contemporary art, b) their pronounced international character, c) their status as self-declared fora of artistic experimentation away from market pressures, d) their formation as events that at once claim globality and site-specific uniqueness (Hanru 2005, cf. Harvey 2002), and e) because of the increasing number of biennials launched in geo-political locations that have long been regarded as 'peripheral' (Kortun/Hanru 2003) such as Sao Paulo, Havana, Dakar, Gwangju, Taipei, Buenos Aires, Busan, Shanghai, Cairo, Centinje, Tirana and Athens. Among them, the Istanbul Biennial has challenged the narratives of its triumphalist historical predecessors, the Great Exhibition of London 1851, the Paris Universal Exposition 1867 or the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago – to name just a few benchmarks in the spectacular display of industrial and colonial might (Çelik 1992, Mitchell 1991).

Thus, one way of establishing the ascription "spectacle" to this increasingly prevalent, and, as I argue normativized manifestation, surely is the reference made by interlocutors and the literature to the descent of Biennials from world fairs, that can especially be traced in the longest running biennial of Venice, originating in 1895.[246]

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[245] Britta Schmitz from the *Hamburger Bahnhof* pointed out that the donors' association of the Museum, the *Verein der Freunde der Nationalgalerie*, particularly favored these kinds of "blockbuster exhibitions," such as "MoMA in Berlin." Initiated and funded by said association, the 2004 show according to their website exhibited more than 200 works from the New York institution and drew a record audience of 1.2 million (see http://www.freunde-der-nationalgalerie.de/website/mainset.html). The website further references the visitors' numbers, the scale of the event and notably not only the money earned from admission fees but also from the sales at the museum shop as indicative of its success. In her description of this new preference Schmitz added that "this is not how we used to do it. These events have a different gain from the arts (*haben auch einen anderen Nutzen an der Kunst*)."

[246] Both Berlin Biennial curator Massimiliano Gioni and Istanbul art critic Ali Artun, for instance, repeatedly raised this point, as the Venice Biennial is still organized in pavilions that represent different

Another, however, is their very characterization as "events" – and here I am using the notion of an event as it is tinged by marketing approaches. Never 'just' an exhibition, these events are designed to deliver an encompassing experience denoted by an array of accompanying programs that are to "contextualize" either the included artworks or the overall of concept of the show. These additional elements range from academic lectures (providing the theoretical background), films (offering a "different, more popular and accessible medium of visualization"), to the notorious DJ-dance party (highlighting the fun, entertaining aspects of the whole endeavor), and lest it be forgotten – the endless arsenal of related merchandise. I posit that to approach urban art events such as large-scale exhibitions, biennials and performance festivals from this perspective might help to break away from prevalent romanticized modernist conceptualizations of art in general, to highlight some of the current shifts in the workings of the artworld, and to contextualize the larger social, political and economic dimensions that contemporary art inhabits today. I suggest that over the past 15 years or so we have witnessed an interesting convergence between economic interests, cultural policy and curatorial and artistic practice based on a (re)conceptualization of art as a vital (urban as well as national) economic development strategy. The reconceptualization is centered on two corresponding notions that have gained currency in the realms of arts policy and arts management as well as those of funding and sponsorship: "cultural entrepreneurship" (Langeley/Abruzzo 1989, McLaughlin 1991) on the one hand and the "creative industries" (Florida 1992) on the other. Again, I do not suggest that either the

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countries. More recently the Venice Biennial has also incorporated a Roma pavilion as well as a Kurdish one – thus beginning to integrate stateless 'nations' (a move that does not really circumvent the dynamics of national reification, or the normativity of the nation-state, for that matter). While the *Documenta* in Kassel was established (1955) as an "antithesis to propagandist and national rivalries before 1939," critics remark that this event too has maintained a Western bias (Vanderlinden/Filipovich 2005, 21).

spectacularization or the enterprising of art are new, but rather that the specificities through which this enterprising is configured, the discourses it brings together, the positions and strategies it entails have reassembled.

In his review article on "The Anthropology of Theater and Spectacle" William Beeman proposes that the spectacle diverges from the theater "in terms of the expectations of the audience" (1993, 380). He further defines the spectacle "as a public display of a society's central meaningful elements [...]. The meaningfulness of a spectacle," he further posits, "is usually proportionate to the degree to which the elements displayed to the public seem to represent key elements in the public's cultural and emotional life" (1993, 380). While some of the following examples from the biennials of Berlin and Istanbul respectively may indeed give some clues with regard to important elements in the "cultural and emotional life" of the two locations, the focus of this chapter is on what is portrayed as desirable and viable connections between art and the economy, especially in the urban environment. I posit that together, these facets under which to evaluate art have led to a normative understanding if not of the content, then at least of the form in which art events should be displayed (Fig. 41 and 42).





Fig. 41 "i keep an eye on" by Ines Tartler (Berlin, 2006), Fig. 42 "Bu da geçer yahu" ("This too shall pass") by Fuat Şahinler, Murat Şahinler, Ayten Başoğlu and Yakup Çetinkaya (Istanbul, 2005) was realized as part of the 2nd Pedestrian Exhibition curated by Fulya Erdemci and Emre Baykal that coincided with the 9th Istanbul Biennial. It has become common practice in Istanbul and Berlin to conceptualize accompanying arts events and programs. The above artworks are but two examples of interventions that were not officially part of the respective biennials, but were displayed in public spaces in the vicinity of the biennial locations.

Biennials: Last Resort for Artistic Experimentation or Venues for Exquisite Commodification?

The Istanbul and Berlin Biennials took place over a period of six weeks in September 2005 and April 2006, respectively. While the 9th Istanbul Biennial (IB9), curated by Vasıf Kortun and Charles Esche[247] had as its very theme the city of Istanbul itself, the 4th Berlin Biennial (BB4), curated by Maurizio Cattelan, Massimiliano Gioni, and Ali Subotnik,[248] borrowed its title from Steinbeck's novel "Of Mice and Men."[249]

[247] Vasıf Kortun serves as the director of the internationally renowned *Platform Contemporary Art Gallery* (sponsored mainly by Garanti Bankası, see Chapter 3), Esche is the director of *Van Abbemuseum* (Eindhoven), which featured a contemporaneous exhibition also called "Istanbul" during the Biennial.

[248] Cattelan has risen to fame due to his provocative works that reference the art market, including the organization of the 6th Caribbean Biennial (November 10-17,1999) for which he, together with Jens Hoffman, invited ten of his friends to take a break from the artworld on the island of St. Kitts. Gioni works as an independent curator and Subotnik is a publicist based in New York. Together they founded the *Wrong Gallery* in 2002 (Chelsea, New York).

[249] The Berlin Biennial was mainly funded by the *Federal Cultural Fund* and *BMW,* and to a lesser extent by the *Allianz* insurance corporation. The Istanbul event attained 'symbolic' support from the city and the Ministry of Culture through permits, while financial and material support was raised from a wide mix of private sponsors, such as *Koç Holding*. Both events however, were financed in part by *Culture 2000*, a cultural initiative operating under the EU-umbrella. In both cases the biennials were notably established through private initiatives and not by state or the respective municipalities. It is interesting to note in this context that the subsequent Istanbul Biennial of 2007 for the first time obtained government money, through the Foreign Ministry's PR fund, the *tanitim fonu*, that covered 4% of the Biennial budget – most probably due the international acclaim and especially EU-European interest that its predecessor generated.

Introducing the concept, or as they insisted tongue in cheek, the "non-concept," the BB4 curators state:

> "We believe that art is about the experiencing of possible worlds, getting diverted from or immersed in a reality we had previously overlooked. So, don't think this is a show about Berlin. Even if it takes place in one of the city's streets, it is not a show about Auguststrasse, or even about Mitte in the year 2006. If we were to be tremendously ambitious, we would say our Berlin is just a landscape of the mind, it only exists in our heads: So it could be *anywhere* – and yet it could only possibly exist here, this street is an archetype or maybe just an example: it is real and yet completely imaginary" (2006, 23; *emphasis added*).

In contrast Kortun and Esche open the catalogue of the IB9 with the following statement:

> "This biennial is for and about Istanbul. We have sought *to address* the environment in which the work will be shown and to place art in a dialogue with different aspects and observations of the city itself. This has meant asking artists to stay in the city and produce *new work*, as well as selecting work that might shed light on the particularities of Istanbul in comparison with cities elsewhere. It has also meant *rejecting dramatic or historical locations in which* to show the art in *favour of more* modest living and working environments in the city. […], it will hopefully provoke a new awareness of some common perceptions or a reassessment of the personal clichés that we all carry in our heads. This is what we believe art can do to and for us, and how it can, in its own way, change the world" (2005, 9; *emphasis added*).

Besides the possibilities that art might entail, these positions seem to provide diametrically opposed starting points. On one side of the spectrum, the BB4 curators present, to a seemingly undefined audience, "a landscape of the mind." On the other end, we find a "biennial for and about Istanbul," and by extension for and about the region, as Kortun and Esche emphasized during numerous panel discussions. Despite stating very different intentions, both biennials exhibited striking parallels in the form in which artworks were presented. Taken together, and viewed within the context of an increasing number of biennials worldwide, these two art events raised an interesting set of issues that were tended to in contrasting ways.

The staging of the artworks

Both biennials utilized a dispersed set of locations as exhibition venues, favoring sites usually inaccessible to the public. As many art critics and visitors noted these sites were often more impressive than the artworks themselves (Hohmann 2005, Stange 2006). In Istanbul, for instance, stunning – one might say spectacular – views of the city and the Bosporus competed with the works on display. On second sight, however, the actual staging of the artworks varied considerably. In Berlin they were shown in different locations along the 920 meter long Auguststrasse in the Mitte district (Fig. 43). Infamous as the city's poorhouse in the 18th century, Augusstrasse later emerged as an important center for Jewish life in Berlin and as an iconic site for the Weimar Republic's art scene when Sternberg set his movie "The Blue Angel" (1930) on this very street.[250]



Fig. 43: Shot of Auguststrasse with *KW*, the institutional host of the Biennial, on the right.

The most evocative location in this context certainly was the Jewish Girls School, built in 1927 (Fig. 44-47). Closed down by the National Socialists in 1943, it was renamed the Bertholt Brecht Highschool during the Socialist era, only to be closed down

[250] While the State Cultural Minister Neumann highlighted these factors in his opening speech for the BB4, he did not refer fate of this very Jewish community only a few years later.

yet again in the process of German reunification. Having been restituted to the Jewish Central Committee of Germany, the building was the only biennial location subject to the tight security measures in place for Synagogues, Jewish schools and community centers throughout Germany, intensified after waves of right-wing violence in the 1990s.




Fig. 44-46: Exterior and Interior of the Jewish Girls' School; Fig. 47: Portrait of the school's namesake, interior.

Within this set-up the work of Polish artist Robert Kusmirowski, entitled "Wagon (2006)," a life-size train wagon, eerily reminiscent of the cattle cars that transported millions of people to concentration camps during the NS regime, received a lot of attention. This work was identified as especially haunting by visitors during the guided tours that I accompanied because of its historical and spatial connotations and the juxtaposition of the light materials it was built of with the heaviness of the memories it invoked. (Fig. 48)



Fig. 48:
Robert Kusmirowski,
Wagon (2006)

It is interesting to note in this context that the curators incessantly stressed that the location had remained unaltered. The desolate wallpapers, crumbling walls, and the accumulated dust seemed to speak to this assertion.[251] Together with Gioni's "we kept everything as we found it"-mantra the arrangement of the site played intentionally into what could be called 'the spectacle of authenticity' – an over-dramatized version thereof that at times enhanced and at other times overpowered the present artworks. That the curators were highly aware of the weight that the space carried became quickly apparent during the interview that I conducted with assistant curator Zdravka Bajović. Bajović noted that much discussion was devoted in the curatorial team to ascertain which artworks could 'stand-up' or 'hold their own' in this historically loaded environment. She also recounted that the BB4 curators – with their event opening about six months after the Istanbul Biennial – were rather surprised when they saw the Istanbul event and noticed the structural resemblance especially with regard to the staging of the artworks and the selected locations. I raise this point not to imply that there was an imitative factor – quite to the contrary. The lead-time for both biennials was between 23-18 months, so both

[251] Interviewees who were involved in the production of the exhibition alleged that the location was carefully staged, walls had been moved to make room for larger artworks and redecorated again to fit into the overall decrepit vintage look. I was however unable to officially verify this information.

concepts had long been in the works. Rather my sense from these two specific events as well as previous biennials and art exhibitions in both cities is that the recovery of normally inaccessible places or the re-conversion of industrial spaces has become a standardized way of presenting and experiencing art in the urban setting and thus could point to the experiential facets of and the expectations tied to the spectacle that Beeman describes.

In Istanbul the exhibition sites were dispersed – in walking distance – throughout neighborhoods of Beyoğlu and Galata, reaching down to the *Antrepo*, a former warehouse located at a now defunct loading dock at Karaköy's waterfront (adjacent to the Istanbul Modern museum), making accessible otherwise unused buildings such as the Garibaldi building (founded by the Italian Opera Society in 1863) or an old tobacco depot (Fig. 49).




Fig. 49: Map of IB9 locations

While employing a wider set of locations than previous Istanbul Biennials that centered on prominent historical sites like the cisterns of the Sultanahmet district, it nonetheless did not break away from concentrating on areas already known for their artistic and entertainment caché, all of them located on the European shore of the city. As Charles Esche commented, the organizers and curators had not been "brave enough" to truly make a biennial for all of Istanbul, which would have required further inclusion of more remote or "underserved" parts of the city.

Among the locations, Deniz Palas featured a similar, yet different play with reality and specific (national) historical connotations to that of Kusmirowski. Michael Blum's "A tribute to Safiye Behar" introduced the audience to a fictional character of the same name and presented a 'reconstruction' of her office, diaries and photographs (Fig. 50 and 51).





Fig. 50 and Fig. 51: Michael Blum, A tribute to Safiye Behar (2005)

Behar, we learn, was not only an important Marxist and feminist of Jewish descent, but also a close confidant, and, as the displayed correspondences between the two revealed, a lover of Mustafa Kemal, asserting considerable influence on his political thinking

especially with regard to women's rights. The detailed set-up, the letters and photographs together with interviews and testimonies of Behar's great-grand son, now a successful businessman in New York, generated many animated discussions among visitors. While Kusmirowski reproduced or reenacted history – a history that is very present in Berlin – Blum's fictionalized history pointed to silences and taboos in the Turkish context, with Behar's emigration addressing a painful part of the national past, the repression of its minorities. It also pointed to the discursive erasure in the official narrative on Ottoman history and Republican history of the very existence and prominent roles of minority members in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Did Behar leave because of the wealth tax imposed on non-Muslims in the 1940s, the pogroms of 6-7 September 1957 against minorities or for entirely different reasons? Why had no one heard about this Jewish lover, confidant and intellectual collaborator of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the father of all Turks nonetheless)? These were some of the questions raised by visitors.

Mobilizing the memory of Jews in Europe, both works presented critical recoveries of the former Jewish presence in both Berlin and Istanbul (and by extension Germany and Turkey). As Andreas Huyssen (2003) argues recoveries as these are interestingly not incompatible with the post-1989 marketing of memory by the cultural industries. Huyssen assessment that remembering and commodification are not necessarily mutually exclusive (2003, 18ff) manifests itself particularly in official, state-initiated 'celebrations of diversity' that have become vital markers in cities' self-representation. There is, however, another convergence between the history of Jewish absence in Berlin and Istanbul (as with non-Muslims in general in the case of the latter) and the reconfiguration of the urban space that I shall return to again below. Taken

together the works by Kusmirowski and Blum also point to parallel processes in which claims to authenticity and site-specific uniqueness emerge as much as an economic currency for the city that hosts the biennial as a positioning tool in the international art circuit for respective biennial organizers, while also presenting an aesthetic currency (and element of play) in the works of art and their staging.

Cross-Referencing the Art Market

While the Istanbul Biennial featured mostly commissioned works, up to 80% of the artworks shown in Berlin belonged to galleries and private collections. The sources of these works were prominently displayed on the tags accompanying each piece. It is important to remember that taking part in a biennial not only increases the 'sellability'-factor of artists in international art markets but also make artworks by biennial-artists gain considerably in value.

Another issue connected to market pliability (or, in turn the refusal to accommodate the market), as Vasıf Kortun pointed out to me, are the accompanying catalogues. In Istanbul the printed matters encompassed a compilation of short introductions to the exhibited artists and their presented work. More emphasis was given to an edited volume with artistic, curatorial and sociological reflections on the city and artists' books published in the framework of the IB9. According to Kortun these books resulted from a conscious decision not to use publications to provide potential collectors with color prints of the exhibited works, but rather to generate discussions on the conceptual framework of the biennial. He argued that although this procedure would certainly not deter potential buyers, it would also not make it easy for them to identify

works they want to acquire beforehand. Whereas in Berlin, the catalogue provided information on and large prints of actual pieces as well as the artists' gallery affiliation, thus resembling the 'sales' catalogues presented in commercial galleries and art fairs,[252] lenders to the Istanbul Biennial were listed in the back of the catalogue without being correlated to the actual artists and works that they represent. Esche and Kortun repeatedly highlighted, not without pride, their refusal to cater to international collectors, museum acquisitionists and critics, "the frequent flyer crowd" as they called them. This strategy also entailed foregoing the usual social functions, which the attending clientele tends to expect. The effectiveness of this 'pose' can surely be questioned as their refusals are likely to have added allure to the event, and their decision did not discourage the international arts crowd. After all who would turn down a trip to much-hyped Istanbul, especially if a home institution pays for it? The BB4 organizers in turn employed the exact opposite strategy ensuring that the press covered the most 'exclusive' parties and using every chance for photo ops. Portraying all avenues for publicity as an opportunity to invigorate Berlin's art scene, they welcomed coverage from the most upscale art magazines to Italian MTV stunts.

The Way in which 'Multiculturalism' and Diversity were addressed (or not)

The persistent orientalist bend in the conception and design of contemporary art exhibitions and the often eurocentric selection of participating artists has been increasingly criticized both within and without the artworld (see Chapter 7). Yet, the

[252] However, the BB4 curators also published a second catalogue under the title Checkpoint Charlie. Conceptualized as a democratization of the biennial it featured black and white reproductions of works collected during their extensive studio visits throughout Germany. This move caused controversy because it was seemingly printed without the artists' consent. Those who protested against it noted its low quality, as layout and paper resembled that of a fanzine rather than that of a glossy art catalogue.

Berlin Biennial presented a line-up consisting of the usual who-is-who of the western European and U.S. American art scene (including few prolific Eastern Europeans). Neither the 'nonwestern' diversity of Berlin nor that of the international art scene was reflected, inspiring Nigerian curator Okwui Enzewor to declare during a panel discussion on the state of biennials worldwide: "For the first time, in a long time, I feel that I am not object of an exhibition. This show is all about White angst."

The curators of the Istanbul Biennial in contrast stated that they explicitly wanted to "stay away" from what they identified as "generic internationalism" and instead incorporated mainly artists from the Balkans as well as the Near and Middle East. *Freekick*, a part of the Biennial put together by guest-curator Halil Altindere, featuring highly 'politicized' works on Turkey's diverse demography elicited a lot of attention from visitors and local authorities alike (see Chapter 6). Similarly, Jakup Ferri's "An artist who does not speak English, is no artist," a video in which the artist explicates this very predicament in his own broken English, thematized the artist's marginality as he lives and works in Prishtina. Yet, the very fact that his work was part of the Biennial indicates that he has already arrived in the center of the artworld, albeit being subject to orientalizing evaluations of his work by virtue of being a 'post-socialist subject' (see also Muka 2004).

The Commercial Cooptation of Biennials

Throughout the 9th Istanbul Biennial different artists' groups and cultural centers organized public discussions, some closely related to the exhibition and its conceptual framework, others pertaining to current trends in the local and international artworld.

Issues of sponsorship, power relations within and outside of Istanbul's artworld, commercial cooptation, and the ethics of curating, collecting and producing art were discussed in a very controversial and often rather fervent manner. It was no exception that specific artists and curators were confronted with accusations by both artworld actors and 'lay' observers of being handmaidens to the political and economic establishment. During a panel discussion organized by the alternative music and politics magazines *Roll* and *Express* at the *Antrepo* location harsh critiques were leveled against the institutional organizer of the Biennial, the *Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts* (IKSV), as it is funded by the *Eczacıbaşı* industrial group and has historically strong political ties to Kemalist forces (see Yardımcı 2005, Chapter 4). The accusation that Biennial participants were "selling out" to corporate sponsors was repeatedly raised. One female audience member argued that "artist should stop cooperating with these sponsors at any cost, even if this means that they have to stop producing art or starve" and asked rather confrontationally "what is it that you think you do for the public, for humanity?" While this particular intervention carried with it much pathos and surely very romanticized notions of art that render themselves to easy scandalization in face of the private financial support that the biennial has to rely on, arts writer Erden Kosova, himself wary of the influence of big corporations within the Biennial context, tried to steer the discussion in a different direction. He proposed to take the funding, but to "bring down the system from inside" by exhibiting aesthetically and politically oppositional works and concepts. Even seemingly positive remarks such as curator Ali Akay's interjection that the Biennial had heightened Turkey's image in Europe were forcefully rebutted by art critic Ali Artun during a second panel discussion that took place a few days later. In the course of our

interview as well as during a roundtable discussion he forcefully stated: *"sanatın davası Erdoğan davası aynı olamaz"* – "the aims of art can not be the same with those of Erdoğan," the Turkish Prime Minister. Implying that the intentions of the biennial organizers were aligned – even if only by default – with those of the government, Artun questioned the goals of the curators as well as for whom and what the Istanbul Biennial was actually for: Was the city's image at stake, a service to 'its public,' or Turkey's international self-presentation, especially with regard to the EU, by way of an artistic flagship project?

Interestingly the issue of commercial cooptation was rarely, if at all, addressed during the Berlin Biennial. One journalist made an implicit criticism that I recorded during the opening press conference. He interrupted director Gaby Horn, then acting director of the *KunstWerke*, which hosts the Berlin Biennial while she was acknowledging the string of institutional and private sponsors saying: "This is a press conference! The acknowledgements you are making are not very interesting for our reporting as journalists." The intervention elicited applause, and Horn seemingly uncomfortable promised to wrap up her speech promptly. Thomas Girst, the director of the *BMW Cultural Communication Group*, one of two main private sponsors of the BB4, had preceded Gaby Horn's statement and seemed to have anticipated this kind of reaction. Trying to make light of the contentious relationship between sponsorship and the arts he prefaced his statement to the press by stating: "I know that at these kinds of occasions, the words of the benefactors, the economic partners are always awaited longingly, which is why I will keep my remarks very short." While his words failed to elicit the amusement or good-will of the audience it seemed to aim for, it is notable that

Girst did not use the term 'sponsor,'[253] but framed *BMW*'s support as acting as a "benefactor" and "economic partner." Rather than talking about the affinity of the corporation to the respective arts event, which presents the standard way of publicly framing these types of sponsorship engagements (see also Chapter 2), he quickly moved to an announcement of the Young Curators' Workshop that his company together with insurance giant *Allianz*[254] were hosting in the framework of the Biennial.

Overall, it seemed that the organizers and curators had, for lack of a better expression, 'succumbed to,' or embraced, commercial interests, maybe in part, because for the first time financing had been guaranteed through a commitment of the corporate sponsors *(BMW and Allianz*) and the *Federal Cultural Foundation* (HKF) for two consecutive biennials. This embrace could also be interpreted as breaking a taboo (and thus as somewhat subversive) in that it explicitly, and not without irony, crosses the boundaries between the 'pristine' realm of art and the domain of the art market.[255] Yet these concerns were not verbalized and the lack of controversial debate on the choice of location was striking. After all, *Auguststrasse* and its adjacent streets host some of the major galleries of the city, such as *Eigen +Art*. In other galleries, located in walking distance, one could find quite a few biennial artists' works for sale. While in Bajović's

[253] During our interview Girst noted that BMW periodically employed the services of consulting agencies in order to measure the effect of both regular advertising and the company's culture and arts sponsoring on public perception of the brand. Yet, he stated that "in the end there is no way of ascertaining what is more advantageous in terms of impact on consumers: a two-page advertisement in *Der Spiegel* or supporting the Biennial" – thus implying that eventual economic benefits arising from sponsoring are but fortunate byproducts (see Chapter 2). In contrast, Birol Özalp, now the director of the *Pera Museum* (Istanbul), who had formerly worked with *Yapi Kredi* Bank and Publishing – a frequent sponsor of art events in Istanbul – proposed a direct and measurable correlation between cultural sponsoring activities, corporate profiles and increases in business.

[254] The workshop had invited up-and-coming curators from 15 countries, along with a handful of internationally well-known senior curators; the event culminated in a public panel discussion that I will return to below.

[255] The establishment of a pirated version of the Gagosian Gallery (appropriating the name of a well-known known New York gallery without permission) by the BB4 curators that ran as a parallel event to the Biennial might speak to this speculation.

assessment the Biennial curators managed to both "conform to the art market" (i.e. present works that were attractive to the market) without explicitly catering to it, one of my interlocutors who worked as a guide at the Biennial expressed her discomfort with high-profile visitors inquiring about where to purchase certain artists' works. As she put it: "They behave like they are on a shopping spree; first they window-shop at the exhibition and the next stops are the actual galleries." While speaking to art theorist Wolfgang Ulrich's proposition that it is the speculative interest and pricing in art which has turned it into a spectacle (Ulrich 2007), the emphasis on consumption by visitors and organizers alike seemed at odds with one of the few accompanying panel discussion presented in the framework of the "Young Curator's Workshop" hosted by the BB4. Under the heading "Does the World need more Biennials?" the invited curators emphatically stressed biennials as the sole remaining space for experimentation in the international artworld setting. In this context 'experimentation' was framed as staunchly opposed to marketability, and thus to market rationales. Yet given the set-up of the Berlin Biennial that ultimately resembled an exclusive shopping mall and the way in which audiences seemed to perceive it, one wonders to what extent artistic risk-taking is ensured in an environment dominated by commercial galleries. This is not to make a moral judgment about the two exhibitions. Rather I want to spotlight how different intentions, motivations and interests by an array of actors within the artworlds of Istanbul and Berlin were mediated in the context of the two biennials.

The Question of Differential Perception: Reviewing the Biennials

While there were considerable differences in the debates within the local arts scene on the respective biennials, the promotion and reviews of both events were bound to rather streamlined representations of the city. It is interesting to note, however, that the perception of international critics of the Istanbul Biennial often circled around well-rehearsed themes. In contrast to reviews of the Berlin event which focused more strictly on the exhibition itself, they apparently could not do without mentioning Istanbul as a "bridge between East and West," proposing the novelty of the arts scene (Hohmann 2005), or alluding to the effects of the local cuisine to those unaccustomed (Herzog 2007), despite the fact that the Istanbul Biennial, established in 1987, predates Berlin's, inaugurated in 1997.[256] Notably, in both instances the host city did not give any (Berlin) or only nominal (Istanbul) support. Yet, city officials and local journalists alike, after having highlighted the cosmopolitanism, and by extension the 'modern-ness,' that these events establish for their cities, emphasized the media attention and ensuing attractiveness for tourism[257] and foreign investment that the biennials might entail. An encompassing spectacle the arts event thus presented another item in the city's public relations portfolio along with other urban arts event evoking ever more high-reaching superlatives, such as Fashion Week (Berlin) and Formula One (Istanbul).[258] While it might not be surprising that ascertaining the city as a brand to be marketed in order to attract tourism and other types of business is furthered by city officials, I found that

[256] Due to lack of funding the 2nd Berlin Biennial could not take place as planned in 2000, and only resumed in 2001.
[257] The Christian Democratic politician Monika Grütters noted during an interview with the *Berliner Zeitung*, culture is the foremost contributing factor to tourism in the case of Berlin (see Walter 2006).
[258] This is also true for the label European Cultural Capital that Istanbul has been awarded for the year 2010 along with the cities of Pécs and Essen.

curators and other actors from the art sector often used the same line of reasoning when trying to establish the significance of their respective art scenes in the global circuit. In Istanbul, this was frequently done in order to counter historical particularities of the national arts scene as well as orientalist (self-)perceptions (see Uluç et al. 2006). In Berlin, this discourse was employed to shift the city's image away from that of the "poorhouse of Germany," inefficient, expensive, and "fiscally irresponsible,"[259] to a place where trade, "buying and selling," in this case of art, can be conducted – as *KunstWerke* director Gaby Horn emphasized during our conversation.[260] Amidst these discussions, however, it should also be noted that biennials with an almost year-round circuit covering the times between art fairs or vice versa have become increasingly indistinguishable from commercial art festivals, i.e. art fairs.[261] In Istanbul this is approximation is further enforced by a temporal overlap as the Contemporary Istanbul art fair and the 10th Istanbul Biennial were held simultaneously in 2007. Berlin's Art Forum, which kicks off the international art fair season in late September, is, according to director Anne Maier, proud to be able to provide each stand with an upscale "gallery-look." Although being located in the commercial trade fair complex of Berlin's Westkreuz, the organizers had managed to secure the sole remaining vintage trade hall; a venue that thus embodied an aesthetic affinity to 'refined' art institutions, be they profit or nonprofit. This art fair is

[259] Berlin's household budget was deemed unconstitutional in 2003, because of the large inequity between debt accumulation and investment allocations.

[260] As in Istanbul, so in Berlin, artist-run spaces are often portrayed as alternative avenues for artistic production, yet many of the initiatives in Berlin have either mainstreamed into the commercial gallery scene or proven to be rather unstable. Especially directors of nonprofit arts organizations in Berlin tended to describe market interest as a positive aspect by highlighting the benefits for their own institution rather than emphasizing the long-term effects that the commercial cooptation of art might have on them.

[261] According to the biennial organizers as well as those from the commercial Artforum the clientele is also largely the same, although this is empirically hard to trace. Surely the write-ups in art magazines are similar regarding the extent of the given coverage with some art fairs like London's Frieze even being more broadly covered than both the Istanbul and Berlin Biennials. The visitors' numbers for BB4 and Artforum both circulated around 44,000 in 2006, while IB9 recorded 50,000 visitors in 2005.

notably co-sponsored by public institutions for its accompanying educational programs, and thus resembles nonprofit exhibitions, including the Berlin Biennial. What Lash and Urry have proposed for the cultural industries, namely that "they are becoming, not more of a business, but instead a business *service*, […] whose branding activities and content are more and more coming to resemble that of another business service, advertising" (1994, 142; emphasis in original) holds also true for the arts sector. Here, the realm of the art market and that of "art-proper," i.e. museums, nonprofit galleries and even alternative artist-run spaces, are increasingly approximating each other. Varied as they might be from the outset, commercial on the one hand and supposed forum for artistic experimentation on the other, both art fairs and biennials today are subject to similar economic pressures, cater to collectors more than to the general public, take place in comparable settings, and employ discourses of engaging a broader audience through educational programs. As Berlin's city magazine *Zitty* ran the cover story "Art is Pop. Galleries are the new clubs" (06/2006)[262] and as exhibition openings become the talk of the town, the above outlined approximation of 'art for sale' and 'art for the public good' has found its manifestation in the spectacularization of both. While it might be argued that this distinction is artificial to begin with, it remains nonetheless important as the civic impact of art continues to be the foremost legitimization of art as an autonomous realm, and thus of its protection by the state.[263]

[262] For a similar assessment of art fairs, and particularly Art Miami Basel of 2006, see Schjeldahl 2006.
[263] Secondary valuations such as enjoyment are bound to this civic paradigm in philosophical traditions that correlate aesthetic appreciation, for instance, with moral education (see Chapter 2).

Cultural Entrepreneurship the Restructuring of Urban Space

In order to understand why these market rationales can be voiced and ultimately executed today with very little protest in the case of Berlin and such little consequence (if any) in the case of Istanbul, one has to take into account how intensified global economic restructuring has impacted and articulated itself in the urban realm and has helped to reshape cultural policy into a vital tool for economic development. As these shifts have been extensively discussed in social science literature in relation to 'global cities' and the 'service economy' (e.g. Sassen 1991), I would just like to quickly point to some of the main issues within this development as it pertains to the topic at hand. That I use literature on New York partially as a template here is not to suggest that I see it as a prototype of a linear standardized development or as a model. Rather, I view all three cities as part of a complex of corresponding developments, circulating ideas, traveling personnel and referencing strategies, which are especially well documented in the case of New York.

The urban arts spectacle and its surrounding discourses have emerged from an urban condition marked by growing income segmentation (Mollenkopf/Castells 1991, Nippe 2009, Pine 2008) and gentrification – a development in which artists are both vanguard actors and negatively affected (Smith 1996).[264] In Berlin as in Istanbul individual artists are quite aware of the theoretical critiques and practical implications of the complicities (Ryan/Deutsche 1984) that the arts have in gentrification processes.

[264] In their discussion of the gentrification in New York City's Lower East Side, Deutsche and Ryan criticize the lack of awareness and consciousness of the local art scene, which in their opinion did not try hard enough to resist commercial monopolization and failed to create solidarity with the former residents of the neighborhood (Deutsche/Ryan 1984).

Some assert that this awareness informs their artistic practices, i.e. by conceptualizing collaborative projects that integrate neighborhood actors instead of just using the neighborhood as a locale or marginalizing inhabitants (*ODA Projesi* and Susanne Bosch's work are two such examples, see Chapter 2). Others question these initiatives with regard to their effectiveness and contend that it is their own economic hardship that makes it difficult to counteract their gentrifying presence; they assume a certain automatism of these processes that are difficult to stop. While the importance of a sense of local solidarity between relatively recently arrived artist and long term residents or communities is often highlighted, e.g. in form of frequenting local businesses and establishments and supporting neighborhood associations**,** questions such as how to deal with people who squat in the vicinity of independent art spaces, for instance, can become a topic of fervent debates that entail weighing in aspects of self-representation to potential audiences or sponsors: What type of interventions in the make-up of the neighborhood can be deemed positive and which ones negative and by whom? How to deal with the power differentials inherent in these processes? Here, I want to briefly reference an anecdote regarding the role of institutional arts spaces and organizations in large-scale gentrification processes that has come under increasing scrutiny, and with it a certain purported self-awareness of the topic. During a conference on cultural policy and the city in Istanbul, Aydın Uğur, the rector of Bilgi University (Istanbul), introduced the audience to *SantralIstanbul,* the university's arts residency and exhibition complex that also provides facilities for conferences, film screening and concerts and is located on the premises of the Ottoman Empire's first electricity plant (which as part of the complex has been turned into an "energy museum").[265] In line with Bilgi University offers of free

[265] *SantralIstanbul* is, after the *Istanbul Modern*, the second flagship project that Erdoğan intervened by

continuing education programs, *Santral* too has initiated a number of free arts programs, for instance for local children, designed to foster better relations between the University, the arts center and the populations in the neighborhood of *Silahtarağa* on the outskirts of the historic *Eyüp* district, on which *Santral* now so visibly leaving its mark. Its vicinity is populated to a large extent by Roma, who live in part in run-down old buildings, in part in shantytowns (Fig.52)

mediating and facilitating the obtaining of the necessary permits. Although never officially confirmed on part of the government, several persons working at *SantralIstanbul* relayed to me that Erdoğan asked for a pre-opening to coincide with the last stretches of his national re-election campaign in 2007. To accommodate the Prime Minister's wishes, this early opening featured three exhibitions conceptualized by the Centre Pompidu (Contemporary Perspectives), the ZKM (Touch Me İstanbul), and MUSAC (An Interpersonal Journey). While some artists and other artworld actors welcomed the fact that Erdoğan deemed contemporary arts important enough to request this early opening during a politically sensitive time, others boycotted and critiqued the process, stating that Erdoğan grand opening gestures was designed to endear him to liberal middle and upper-middle class voters.



Fig. 52: The route to *Santral* from the city center (Taksim Square). A free shuttle-service brings students and visitors through the shantytown areas of the *Eyüp* district to the arts and teaching complex. The last stretch of the highway leading up to *Santral* is fortified by concrete walls, and there is a security check-point at the entrance.

Various scholars who work at *SantralIstanbul*, such as Asu Aksoy, have sought to critically thematize the role of the university in the disenfranchised setting that it is located in. In contrast, Uğur passionately portrayed the university as a "civil society actor" trying to have a positive impact on the district, but when pressed to demonstrate these good deeds in more detail and give further insights into *Santral*'s community outreach, the language of civic engagement and urban revitalization turned into a rather condescending statement: "Look even the young people from the neighborhood who park the students' cars already make money, even get rich for their standards." The ease with which this statement was made and the fact that no overt objections were raised from the podium or the audience might indicate that despite the surely well-intended educational programs, the clout of notions such as development and community that are frequently employed serves yet again to deproblematize socio-economic inequalities as well as the impact of *Santral* in the district.[266]

In Berlin the processes of gentrification have been most visible in *Mitte* and *Prenzlauer Berg*, formerly parts of East Berlin (Bauer 2004). The same is – partially – true for *Kreuzberg*, a neighborhood in West Berlin that because of its proximity to the wall became unattractive for its German inhabitants who ventured further West into the city, transforming it into an immigrant quarter from the 1960s onward. On adjacent sides of the former wall, these districts found themselves catapulted into the geographical

[266] In the scope of my fieldwork, I was unfortunately unable to research the perception of these programs by members of the surrounding communities, however one interlocutor, formerly a program coordinator at *Santral* voiced reservations against some of the arts programs offered to local children. She noted: "There may be good intentions, but there is insufficient communication. Take for instance the painting courses for young children. Their parents dress them up in their best cloths since they are going to the 'university' and what ends up happening is that their best outfits are ruined. Of course, it would be a great program if there was enough personnel, if the parents would be better informed what types of programs their children are invited to and if *Santral* was providing the necessary materials including clothing that children can use in these sessions." Apart from the practicalities she recounted here, she was on a more general plain unsure to what extent these types of programs would indeed develop into sustainable and long-terms structures.

center of the capital of a newly unified Germany. In the early 1990s the many deserted spaces in *Mitte* and *Prenzlauer Berg* offered squatting possibilities for 'adventurous pioneers' as well as for makeshift galleries, clubs and performance spaces. As journalist Peter Kessen notes, the very availability of these free spaces for the

> "young Berlin scene is indirectly based on the aryanization policies during the Hitler regime: Jewish Berliners were dispossessed, the GDR transferred the apartments into public property (*Volkseigentum*), the implosion of the *Realsozsialismus* then provided cheap occupiable living spaces" (Kessen 2004, 143).

The same is true for buildings transformed into the Berlin's most prolific spaces for alternative club culture and art such as *Tresor*, *Acud*, and *Haus Schwarzenberg* in the *Hackesche Höfe* (Kessen 2004, 142).[267] Attracting not only national but international attention these neighborhoods were the first to be redeveloped in the early 1990s due to their newly attained cultural caché and central location. During my research I did not find any indication of an awareness of these historical processes among artworld actors. In contrast to these Eastern districts of Berlin, *Kreuzberg*, heralded as a space for 'alternative culture' since the 1960s, has proven more difficult to gentrify due to a long history of disinvestment and strong community advocacy organizations.

In Istanbul, *Galata*, *Tünel* and *Tarlabaşı* in the district of *Beyoğlu* are home to many arts spaces and among the most affected by gentrification (Tan 2006). The exodus following waves of repression (see Chapter 4) against the remaining Greek, Jewish and Armenian communities that had mainly inhabited these neighborhoods along with European expatriates in Ottoman times left many buildings unoccupied. With their owners either unable to claim their former property or locked in court cases over

[267] Due to German partition these East Berlin properties only became available for restitution to the heirs of the original owners after the reunification.

compensation, the disinvestment in the area rendered it a refuge for immigrants stranded at the walls of fortress Europe as well as for Kurds fleeing violence in the Southeast. *Beyoğlu* has been subject to repeated 'urban regeneration' campaigns (Erdoğan, when major of Istanbul, was instrumental in these developments) and then was claimed by the Istanbulite intelligentsia, art studios and galleries, film and advertising executives in whose path came cafés and restaurants. With them redevelopment has intensified since the late 1990s, especially as the strict regulations for foreign investment in Turkey have been lifted.

In both metropoles there is a push by policy makers and city planners to privatize and homogenize (cf. Boyer 1992, Sorkin 1992) public space, not least through exclusionary practices inscribed in the aesthetics of the architectural environment that are frequently also expressed through policing techniques, and in the case of Istanbul also in the expansion of gated communities.[268] These intertwined developments are significant as they have been impacting discussions and changes in the field of arts management and subsequently the notions of the artist him/herself. Let me briefly explain what I suggest by this statement: In the course of governmental cutbacks of social services and welfare expenditures and due to serious dents in the endowments of funding agencies following the stock-market crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, nonprofit arts institutions were among the first to be affected (Yúdice 1999). But with the particular history of cultural policy in

[268] In her study of the parks and plazas of New York, art historian Monika Wagner argues that the aesthetics of the restructured urban space (1993) establish a "sign system of exclusion"; employing materials and art pieces formulates a certain "niveau" of the built environment with which only some can identify while others are excluded. Furthermore, the privatization and control of public space goes hand in hand with an interplay of repressive access policies (through security personal and surveillance methods). Wagner as well Christine M. Boyer share the observation that the artworks presented tend to homogenize and "smoothen" the urban image. Aiming at the creation of coherent landscapes of consumption, social inequalities and conflicts have to be displaced and made invisible (Boyer 1992, Wagner 1993).

Germany (as in Turkey, relatively low levels of funding notwithstanding) that frames art as a duty to citizens and as imperative for the education of 'enlightened,' critically-minded human beings, politicians and policy makers have been quick to state that they are not opposed to supporting the arts per se. Rather, these budget cuts have been portrayed as a chance to reform arts institutions that have become too cumbersome, i.e. have "too many administrative overheads" as I was frequently told during my fieldwork. Others posited that the previous forms of arts organizing had simply become too costly because they supposedly did not operate in an economically efficient or "fiscally responsible" way. With reference to the American model of arts funding, the call for "arts management" as a "more business-like" and "professional" working mode in the artworld has been voiced increasingly in Berlin and Istanbul alike.[269] Until recently, arts institutions in the U.S. as well as in Germany and Turkey were either run by artists themselves or by third persons who had segued into the artworld by way of 'passion' or 'vocation' (often evoked categories in this context), not least due to societal conceptions of art correlating it with meaningful work. Artists in turn have valued the opportunity of holding employment in their own sector, even as administrators, since it provides them with a flexible and understanding environment that allows them to pursue their own artistic work. Confronted with the pressure of implementing for-profit concepts such as "professionalism" and "entrepreneurship," despite mission statements to the contrary, arts organizations as well as individual artists have found themselves in a dilemma of how to

[269] Although the American example of arts management (translated into German as *Kulturmanagement*, while being used as *sanat yönetimi,* i.e. arts management in Turkish) is continuously invoked, there is very little discussion about what this new mode of arts management is supposed to mean for the concrete working conditions of art managers and administrators as well as for artists themselves. It should also be noted that while demands are put on artists to be more business-minded, sponsoring by corporations for urban arts events is simultaneously expressed through notions of social or cultural responsibility (see Chapter 2) in order to thwart off the suspicion of utilizing artistic expression for marketing purposes.

conduct "goal-oriented" work while reverting to for-profit, market-oriented techniques (Anheier/Salamon 1999). In practice, this has not only entailed fundamental changes in day-to-day decision making processes and operations of these organizations,[270] but also led to artists being largely replaced in these administrative positions through marketing and management majors or graduates of arts manager programs that have sprung up at universities in Istanbul and Berlin.

Artists in the Service Economy

> *"The Spectacle is capital accumulated to the point where it becomes image" (Debord 1995, 24).*

But even more importantly, these shifts have implications for how the social and economic dimension of artistic work and the societal role of artists are appraised. On the one hand, economic restructuring processes and ensuing funding pressures have helped to introduce business terminology and for-profit reasoning into the artworld context thus legitimizing the "harnessing" (Stevenson 1999) of what Zukin calls the "the seductive influence of the arts on urban redevelopment" (1995, viii). On the other hand, we are also confronted with a "renewed" interest in the arts as the number of visitors to large-scale exhibitions and art events as well as increasingly circulating art investment portfolios indicate (Blomberg 2005, Deakin 2008, Gehrman 2009). This increased interest in art on the side of consumers, city officials and policy makers (under economic imperatives) has created a perspective in which the arts are conceptualized as a part of the urban economy

[270] This shift has not only impacted practical decisions ranging from payment priorities and funding strategies to artistic choices, has but also closed off a vital source of income for many artists formerly employed within the nonprofit arts sector. Another consequence of the shortage in available funds has been that arts organization of very different size, administrative manpower, operating budget and program content have found themselves applying for the same grant categories.

and artists are ultimately viewed as service providers[271] (Lash/Urry 1994, see above). There are different modes of explaining the rise of the arts sector and its current importance, ranging from emphasizing symbolic connotations to assessing actual financial gains.

Sociologist Sharon Zukin, for instance, argues that the "service economy"[272] deprived of the concrete artifacts of industrial manufacturing, has found in cultural production an abstract means of embodying its own economic growth and vitality. As such art and cultural production add to the prestige of both the city and the businesses it hosts – not unlike the "townscapes" that were intended to represent state power be it in its "republican (e.g., Bologna), monarchical (e.g., Paris), or imperial (e.g., Vienna)" formations "believed to inspire awe, respect, or fear, if not love and loyalty, in the breast of those citizens who peopled the streets and squares of the city and/or the state" (Kapferer 2008, 70).[273] This proposition resonates with the highly evocative introductory quote to this section by Guy Debord which points at an understanding in which the spectacle can be conceptualized as both, the site of the commercial cooptation of art and as the expression of this cooptation. Zukin further states: "With a continued displacement of manufacturing and development of the financial and non-profit sectors of the

[271] While one could argue that court-sponsored artists could retrospectively also be seen as service providers, I would maintain that the institutional and market incorporation of artists clearly marks a shift in the quality of the relationship between artists and sponsors.

[272] I employ the term "service economy" here as it appears in most sources. Yet the notion of "the service economy" is difficult as it comprises highly paid executives in the finance, insurance and real estate sectors as well as restaurant workers, for example.

[273] For the discussion of similar processes of urban redevelopment and urban design to symbolize a class project, more specifically the "triumph of constitutional *Recht* over imperial *Macht*" in fin-de-siècle Vienna, see Schorske 1961, 24-115.

economy, cultural production seemed to be more and more what cities were about" (1995, viii; see also Jameson 1991).[274]

In contrast to Zukin's symbolic approach, a study prepared by consulting giant McKinsey & Co. for the New York State Council on the Arts provides an example that points to an even more tangible role of artists in the urban economy. Mainly addressed to private sponsors and investors, the authors of this study suggest that state funding of the arts should be maintained but not increased. Here, the under-funding of the arts is portrayed as advantageous, since 'under-employed' artists provide a pool of flexible labor – ideal for temporary positions in the city's service economy. As artists are associated with "cultural capital" and, frequently coming from middle class backgrounds, have enjoyed fairly good education, they are welcomed in the labor force of restaurants, galleries, office and temping jobs where employers and customers alike tend to 'flirt' with – and capitalize on – their creative potential.

Positions as blatant as the one taken by NYSCA are rejected by the majority of artworld actors I interviewed in Istanbul and Berlin, although in the case of Berlin, similarly to New York, much of the service sector (especially restaurant workers and advertising related industries) indeed seems to be made up mainly of artists trying to support their artistic work. Yet, it is interesting to note that calls for professionalization are made by quite diverse actors in each location. In Berlin, they were put forward by

[274] In his article "The City Spectacle," Levent Soysal states that arts event of this nature are "neither local nor particular. They borrow from each other, they mimic each other, and they approximate each other. Their discursive and performative vocabulary is gradually but surely resembling each other and becoming the same" (2005, 1). Yet it seems to me that both the local and the particular are incessantly invoked in this type of event – or to put it differently: city spectacles fall into the faultlines of trying to be on par with other international large-scale exhibitions, while local specificity and uniqueness still have to provide an incentive for people to travel to this very metropole in a year-round circuit of art biennials and fairs. This necessary interplay of homogenizing tendencies and maintaining uniqueness in order to remain profitable is also argued by David Harvey (2002).

cultural policy-makers (mostly politicians from the opposition, not the governing coalition which is composed of Social Democrats and Socialists) and then quickly taken up by local art academies as well as some artists and artistic directors for reasons that I will discuss in the following section. In Istanbul, this process has taken a slightly different path as direct government funding for the arts has long been anchored within the academy. However, private arts and cultural centers flourished especially in the 1980s. The call for the implementation of arts management techniques, institutionalization (Artun 2005) and professionalization has recently been voiced by those who administer the newly founded arts management programs at universities as well as some critics and curators. In part these calls are connected to desires for more transparency in the Turkish cultural sector where funding and sponsoring procedures remain often opaque, not least because many of Turkish art and cultural centers are not incorporated under nonprofit laws but operate from the budgets of PR and communications division allocated to them through the respective companies they are affiliated with – and thus are not publicly accountable either (see also Chapter 4). This development is connected to the unprecedented availability of funds due to accession talks with the EU, such as *Culture 2000*, as well as Turkey's geopolitical position vis-à-vis the Middle East, with foreign cultural institutions such as the Institut Français, the Goethe Institut and British Council and embassies located in Istanbul being especially active in this regard. Thus we are confronted with rather divergent instances in which different sets of protagonists are spearheading the very same discourses around the enterprising of art.

Conceiving the Creative Industries

There is a second plane on which cultural policy, economic interest and artistic practice have recently converged: the concept of the "creative industries." It is not to be confused with the "cultural industries" (Adorno/Horkheimer 1969), long held to be cultural policy's 'formative other' (Hesmondalgh/Pratt 2005) – although they are now frequently used interchangeably (see below). The rapidly growing literature on this topic presents different, but interrelated starting points for the formation of an understanding of the creative industries that can be summarized as follows: due to the economic restructuring waves of the 1980s alluded to above, the downsizing of manufacturing, deindustrialization and ensuing rising unemployment, policy makers turned to the initially unintended effects of the arts on urban regeneration as a possible avenue to be actively included in policy-making. Some theorists emphasize the emergence of so-called 'cultural cluster initiatives' in which museum projects are conceptualized along with entertainment, shopping and restaurant complexes (Bianchini/Parkinson 1993), such as Berlin's *Museumsinsel* (literally: museum island; it includes the archeological collection of the *Altes Museum*, the *Neue Nationalgalerie* as well as the *Pergamon Museum*) in *Mitte*, or the above-mentioned *SantralIstanbul*. Others highlight the augmented attention to film and cinema; first on a national then on the European Union level. The deregulation and privatization of the media, broadcasting and telecommunication sector presents another important juncture in this narrative. Cultural policy scholar Nicholas Garnham notes that these processes were not only instrumental for establishing precedents in which the usage of public monies for privatization processes were legitimized (2005, 17; see also Wu 2002), but also for furthering the application of for-

profit management rationales to sectors that hitherto had operated under the paradigm of goal-orientation. But even more crucial for the inception of the "creative industries" and the choice of the very term "creative" was that it opened an avenue to include the computer software sector in the realm of cultural policy. According to Garnham, this allowed "software producers and the major publishing and media conglomerates to construct an alliance with cultural workers and with small-scale cultural entrepreneurs, around a strengthening of copyright protection" (Garnham 2005, 26). That copyright protection emerges as an instrumental factor in trying to establish what actually counts as creativity relies on a significant historical precedent that I have already outlined in Chapter 2, but briefly want to recap at this conjuncture: According to art historian Martha Woodmansee (1994), the decisive moment in the formation of the modern conception of art can be located in the commodification of literature beginning in the later18th century. She describes how the developing book market, while lending unprecedented exposure to literary work, fueled an antagonism between authors and book dealers. Since artistic works were understood as mere reflections of observations of the world that were ultimately accessible to everyone, artists often only received a nominal honorarium for their efforts. Their subsistence strategies were further undermined by the absence of copyright regulations, resulting in numerous unauthorized reprints of their work by different publishers and a price war among them. It is in this context, Woodmansee argues, that a debate about the very character of artistic creativity and the modern conception of art arose. Rather than seeing art as the skilled representations by an artist of what is "out there," it became an imaginative creation that transcends nature and originates in the individual artistic 'genius' (Williams 1983, 82).

While the reference to creativity has secured copyright protection, the overall approximation of an array of economic sectors including fashion, (web) design and advertising, or even the automobile industry, as Richard Florida proposes (2006), to the arts, has made it possible to apply cultural protectionist policies to these very sectors.[275] This is especially significant in the framework of the European Union as well as accession candidate (see Chapter 7), as state sovereignty in 'cultural matters'[276] has become an embattled issue in the EU-integration process with regard to cultural goods, both in their symbolic and their economic dimensions. Furthermore, in order to justify public expenditure for commercial gains that traditionally lie outside the sphere of cultural policy, "creative industries policies [have been] portrayed as democratizing and anti-elitist instead of elitist cultural production that could meet its cost through the market" (Hesmondalgh/Pratt 2005, 5).

It cannot be highlighted enough that the inception of the 'creative industries' does not present a mere terminological shift, as often implied when some use it interchangeably with the 'cultural industries.' Quite to the contrary, this shift is part of a larger strategy through which long-standing tensions concerning cultural policy objectives, for instance, the question whether it should be producer or consumer oriented, are mediated (Garnham 2005, 27). Capitalizing on both the marginality and the prestige attached to the arts, the creative industries discourse has not only obscured the

[275] It is important to note that while Florida in his much cited "The Rise of the Creative Class" (1992) distinguishes between technological creativity (innovation), economic creativity (entrepreneurship) and artistic or culture creativity, the vernacular usage of his arguments in the realm of policy-making and political discourses tends to conflate these distinct categories. Equating these different realms with the conceptions of artistic creativity and cultural goods serves to legitimize the transfer of public funds to support private business and the application of cultural protectionist policies to circumvent international trade agreements that govern the exchange of 'strictly' economic goods.

[276] The notion of cultural sovereignty in the European Community was first established in the Treaty of Rome 1957, and reemphasized in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992; for a detailed discussion of how these rather vague stipulations have been streamlined by the administration in Brussels see Chapter 7.

profiteering strategies implied in this shift, but established the arts spectacle as a preferred outlet. With terminological connotations that speak to the mystique of the arts and matching economic rationales, the arts spectacle thus caters to a diverse array of interests.

The current AKP government's awareness of the representational value of contemporary art as well as of the economic versatility of the creative industries was demonstrated in the convening of a recent conference entitled "21. Yüzyılda Şehir ve Kültür Endüstrileri" (The City and the Cultural Industries in the 21st Century, June 2007)[277] by the Istanbul municipality. Yet this type of integration of art into the urban economy is in parts problematic for city administrations themselves: Both the head of the Istanbul Municipality's Department for Culture, Hüseyin Öztürk, as well as Hakan Bayer, the director of Kültür A.Ş., a corporation founded by the Municipality that administers its cultural programs, showed themselves to be rather aware that Ankara's 2003 directive to subsume culture and tourism under the same institutional umbrella elicits the suspicion that artistic expression is being instrumentalized for marketing purposes and for transferring attention from local audiences to international ones. This development is especially problematic since cultural policy's raison d'être explicitly comprises shielding the arts from market rationales. In my interviews with Öztürk and Bayer, both were keen to emphasize that in their view the protection and autonomy of culture and the arts against the market were paramount. One way of reconciling art and objective regarding the urban economy consists of reasonings in which the actual population addressed by cultural policy becomes the city's professional strata and tourists rather than the city's

[277] Although the Istanbul municipality used the term cultural industries, the thematic sections of the conference actually focused on the creative industries in its broader understanding outlined at the beginning of this section.

inhabitant or its "people." Similarly, in Berlin, city officials stress that their policies have created the environment that is conducive for the art scene, but statements about actual audience profiles are always shaky, not least because comprehensive audience surveys are hard to administer, and thus tend to settle on the category like "those who are interested in art" and "cultural tourists."[278]

While these developments have not gone unchallenged in the two discussed locations, the push towards the 'creative industries' has prompted many artists in Berlin to identify themselves as small-scale creative entrepreneurs. Through its notable double allure (creative and entrepreneurial), this discourse is in part interpreted as an empowering shift, not least because the precariousness of artists' livelihoods is increasingly presented to have model character in an economic environment which no longer can guarantee full-time employment. This point was prominently raised by Adrienne Goehler, the former director of the *Capital Cultural Fund* (*Hauptstadtkulturfond*), who repeatedly referred to Richard Florida's work (2002) during our interview. For her, the model character of artistic practices emerges in a labor market that demands "heightened flexibility, creatively assembled patchwork careers" and "collaborating on a project basis" – all qualities that are, so Goehler, highly developed in the artistic realm. In an era in which the principles of the *Sozialstaat* are no longer tenable, she argued, the economic realm has to learn from the arts, and artists have to legitimize their existence in these changing economic conditions.

[278] Private entities such as the real estate and gallery sector have a vested interest in this development for the reasons sketched above. In Istanbul as in Berlin galleries are establishing either art fairs or so-called "gallery weekends" (featuring coordinated programs and simultaneous openings) that overlap spatially and time-wise with respective biennials. Aiming at expanding interest in the art market, these initiatives are mostly framed as an 'additional service,' or bonus, for audiences.

Goehler's statement might help elucidate the different positions taken by artists in Germany and Turkey. Since artists in Turkey have not benefited from a history of sustained government funding (as state support has been fickle, based on personal relationships and lobbying particularly with regard to contemporary art), they are not subject to the same legitimization pressures faced by artists in Germany. The absence of secured government funding in the former case has granted them more leeway in positioning themselves vis-à-vis these developments and might explain why artist in Istanbul abstained from participating in the above-mentioned conference on the creative industries, organized by the Istanbul municipality, while similar seminars at the Berlin University of the Arts are frequented by their counterparts in great numbers. This is not to draw a positive picture of the results of Turkish cultural policy, especially as this seems to be a rather unintended effect. Rather, I mean to stress that based on divergent funding structures and political practices, certain options have become (un)available for artists in Istanbul that exist in Berlin and vice versa. Despite these differences, the overall developments have produced a situation in which policy makers, corporate sponsors as well as artists and other artworld actors are increasingly employing a joint vocabulary when describing their practices. We are thus confronted with a situation in which different sets of protagonists that are generally thought of as pursuing opposed goals are perpetuating the very same discourses around the enterprising of art.

Before concluding this chapter, I would like to tie the discussion of the creative industries and the interpretative repertoire that the concept has introduced and perpetuated to the self-representation of corporate sponsors. The vocabulary of the

creative industries has further accommodated the conceptual approximation between art and the sponsorship of art. I have already outlined some of these dynamics in Chapter 2, where I analyzed the portrayal of arts sponsorship as social or cultural responsibility. Here, however, I would like to extend the discussion through a couple of examples that illustrate how the kinship between arts and the economic sector is construed by corporate sponsors and the difficulties inherent in trying to frame arts sponsorship in a non-instrumentalizing manner. Some, like Jürgen Zeh (from the board of directors of the *Kulturkreis der Deutschen Wirtschaft*), reflected on the *Kreativpotenzial*, the *creative potential* that he deemed not only formative for the arts, but portrayed as essential for business development, especially at the current economic conjuncture. Another conceptual bridge is often suggested by highlighting that "management today requires creativity and the kinds of leaderships that arts exemplify through their *Grenzgängertum*," the looking and pushing across boundaries and standardized procedures, and the pioneering of new approaches. Frank-Peter Martin of *Bankhaus Metzler* posits that managers can learn from the arts, for example, by asking "what kind of tasks (*Aufgaben*) does a conductor have, what can I learn from that, for my personal development." Similarly, Martin Fuchs from the *Kulturkreis* of the German Industries[279] proposes that engagement with the arts is an engagement with "things that speak to the soul" that also helps to develop now much valued "soft skills" and "cultural competencies" not really taught in business school. It is in these kinds of equations that the purported civic impact of the arts is presented as resulting in more efficient and

[279] That the marriage between economy and the arts is not always as smooth, convenient or accepted as often projected by sponsors becomes also clear in the more recent restructuring of the *Kulturkreis*, which after long having been led by business people, has now put artists themselves at the forefront (also see Chapters 2 and 3). Fuchs, the new director of the *Kulturkreis,* for instance is trained musician and earned his doctorate in Musicology; his new team includes fine artists and art historians.

ethical management and that sponsorship activities are deproblematized. It is through the proposition of a synergy between the workings and goals of art and those of economic enterprise that the issue of the instrumentalization of art is circumvented, and in its stead a 'natural' kinship and affinity of artistic and business innovations is established.

Point of Convergence: The Arts Spectacle

> *"Art in the period of its dissolution, as a movement in pursuit of its own transcendence in a historical society that is not directly lived, is at once an art of change and a pure expression of the impossibility of change." (Debord, 1995, 135)*

Throughout this Chapter I have proposed that the arts spectacle is the preferred articulation of the presented convergence between cultural policy, economic interests and artistic practices. This is not to suggest, however, that the 'spectacular' or the festival character per se impede on any critical intent that contemporary art might entail. Indeed, the art happenings of the 1960s surely show other uses of both. Abbie Hoffman, for instance, interrupted the New York Stock Exchange, dropping hundreds of $1 bills on the floor from the visitors' balcony, leaving traders scrambling for 'actual money.' One could also include the highjacking stunt by writer Franz Jung who, in 1920, forced the fish trawler "Senator Schröder" to take course for Russia – an intervention that his contemporaries categorized as political protest (it was Jung's mission to present a manifesto of the Communist Workers' Party of Germany in Moscow) as well as an artistic act (Adkins 2004, 153f). Berlin-based artist Hans Winkler recounted another interesting example, an intervention staged with his colleague Stefan Micheel under the name of p.t.t.red that shows how a small gesture can elicit a grand effect: After publicly

slapping Mickey Mouse during a Disneyland parade the artists were arrested on the spot (Fig 53).



Fig. 53: p.t.t.red in Disneyland (1997).

Yet, as I have heard many times during my research one also has to concede that continuous shortage of funding and heightened competition for sponsors and audiences has made artistic experimentation increasingly difficult, as it is associated with financial risk (Byrnes 1993). As Goehler noted this is true, for example, for genres like contemporary music that, prestigious as they might be, cannot survive without state subventions. Artistic risk-taking, at least theoretically an integral part of creative work, is more and more a luxury that only few can afford, unless artists are willing to carry all costs themselves – which is becoming increasingly difficult in the changing cityscapes of

Berlin and Istanbul (see above).[280] Given this situation, it is questionable to what extent we are encountering policies for the arts in the creative industries complex or rather art policies that work towards quite different ends.

Similarly, the claims that the festivalization of art engenders wider access or the democratization and extension of the public sphere are at least dubious, if not untenable. While city officials tend to emphasize that art festivals succeed in engaging a broader public than 'conventional' art formats, and thus employ an originally counter-cultural argument of public "space-claiming" (Stevenson 1999), this presents a rather big stretch when taking current social segmentation in the urban realm into account. In most of my conversations with the municipality and organizers in Berlin and Istanbul, these initial statements were retreated from rather quickly and replaced by reasonings in which the actual audiences addressed become the city's professional strata as well as tourists. In the case of Turkey, this claim is further complicated by the fact that the rise of arts festivals occurred simultaneously with repressive political practices following the 1980 coup. As Nurdan Gürbilek recounts:

> "A few years ago a friend of mine posed the following question: 'Could one say that the festivals of the 1980s served to dim the cries arising from the prisons?' This question must have felt too hard, too explicit, too pitiless for those present. No one wanted to answer this question that even though unintendedly so turned into soul searching. Whatever we would have said would have been wrong. At this point the person who asked the question answered it herself: 'To say this would be wrong, but to not say it would be wrong as well." (1992, 14)

During a panel discussion, arts writer Erden Kosova reminded the audience that the Istanbul Biennial was instated in the process of "cleaning up Istanbul's image." This, in his opinion, was also true for the Berlin Biennial, which was inaugurated after

[280] In this context Zukin points to the dilemma that the instrumentalization of the arts as an economic development strategy is increasingly undermining the very basis of creative and artistic production (1995).

Germany's reunification. In both instances, Kosova argued, these arts festivals (at least initially) were intended to dissuade negative historical connotations and anti-democratic fears from within and from outside of Turkey and Germany respectively. Although often forgotten today, Germany faced violent outbreaks of anti-immigrant violence in the early 1990s that threatened to seriously hamper its newly found prominence within Europe and the world.

Indicative of the convergence of economic interests, cultural policy and artistic practices, the arts spectacle has come to reconcile three domains that are normally thought of as adhering to different interests and operating logics. Advanced by a different set of actors in each city, this enterprising of art is mediated by notions of 'cultural entrepreneurship' and the "creative industries," and incorporates art in the institutions of the market, while leaving the allure of its emancipatory potential intact. This development, not least expressed in the establishment of a joint vocabulary among different artworld actors, raises questions around the long-held dichotomy between cultural policy as being directed from 'above' and cultural politics presenting contestations from 'below' (Stevenson 1999). A distinction that deserves further scrutiny, especially as we are confronted with the larger paradox that significant funding for contemporary art comes from corporations that are supposedly criticized by the very artists whose work they support. That the enterprising and the spectacularization of art are portrayed as both economically desirable *and* artistically viable (or perhaps even vice versa) we can has further produced a situation in which the political, socio-cultural and economic institutions that art has critiqued have not only incorporated, but also

commissioned works and employed artists that are critical of their governance structures and funding programs (Antmen 2005, Wu 2002). In the next chapter I will turn in more detail to examples of artistic approaches to migration that are 'commissioned' by Germany's governmental arts foundations while immigration regulations are increasingly tightened, and the support that Turkey's cultural ministry lends to exhibitions on the country's multi-ethnic and -religious make-up while minorities are under constant political pressure. However, I want to end with art theoretician Trude Iversen's reflection on the implications of this development on the tradition of institutional critique in the arts since the late 1960s:

> "Institutional critique is normally associated with art practices from the end of the 1960s which are defined on the bases if a criticism of its object – the art institution – which in turn refers to established, organised places where art is presented, collected and distributed. After 40 years of this art practice, which has been characterized as institutional critique for the past 20 of them, it emerges for many people as well integrated – indeed, institutionalized – in the field of art. This raises the current question with which art theory only partially has concerned itself: To what extent does institutionally critical art function *critically* when it is initiated by that which was the object of criticism? Today it is common practices for art institutions to seek sand request this type of at themselves, and that raises the question concerning that differentiates the current institutional critique from institutionalized criticism/critique" (Iversen 2007, 8).

The question if what we are witnessing actually constitutes a shift from "a critique of institutions to an institution of critique" (Iversen 2007, 9), in which, as Debord puts it, art is "at once an art of change and a pure expression of the impossibility of change," (Debord, 1995, 135) is part of the interrogation of the following chapter.

Chapter 7: Governance *of* or *through* Culture?: Practices of Intercultural Dialogue, Cultural Policy and the Making of Europe

> *"The Arts lead the Way to Europe." (comment on the opening of the Istanbul Modern museum in Die Welt Kalnoky December 14, 2004).*
>
> *"Our exhibition is evidence of Turkey's interest in Europe and in joining the European Union. Picasso represents Modernism. We brought him to Istanbul because we believe that Turkey is part of the west and part of that modernity" (Güler Sabancı, director, on the opening of the Picasso Exhibition at the Sakıp Sabancı Museum, cited in Art Newspaper January 24, 2006).*

Claims to European-ness have been and remain an important dimension in both Turkey and Germany's self-representations, domestically and abroad. The lack of agreement on Turkey's European belonging is evidenced in its EU accession negations that are ongoing, if hampered at the moment. Economic adjustments, democratization measures, and human rights guarantees aside, the opponents to Turkey's accession have questioned whether a predominantly Muslim country can exhibit the 'cultural modernity' through which Europe, or rather those speaking on behalf of Europe, has come to describe itself. That art is frequently accorded a special signaling or bridging function in what is at heart a political (and bureaucratic) process both from within and without Turkey, is expressed in the above quotes.

For Germany, after all a founding member of (and as many would maintain the reason for) the EU and its predecessor the European Coal and Steel Community, these claims have been not less vital, as it continues to struggle to shed the image of an aggressor of two World Wars as well as the doubts and anxieties that were reignited as its reunification made it the largest population in the EU. As I have argued in Chapter 1,

within this struggle the country's self-definition as a *Kulturstaat* and the "occidental" reframing of its artistic lineage have been paramount for establishing Germany's Western belonging.

This chapter interrogates how the arts and aesthetic expression are made politically productive, both on the national level and in the processes of European integration especially as notions of cultural pluralism and 'multiculturalism' have emerged as integral markers for modern politics. The notion of 'culture' has loomed large in discourses and polemics regarding European integration and immigration in the European framework. While culture, as in 'fundamental cultural difference,' is identified as the source of contemporary political quandaries, its incarnation as 'intercultural dialogue' is conceived as their solution. Much of the political productivity of 'culture' arises from a constant slippage between the different, often contradictory, meanings accorded to the culture-concept.[281] This chapter thus aims to elucidate how the elevation of culture into a central category in political discourse intersects with recent cultural policy formations in the EU and the national arenas of Germany and Turkey. I argue that this extension of the 'rhetoric of culture' engenders a shift from a governance *of* culture to one *through* culture by relaying an array of pressing political concerns from the realm of social and economic policy to that of 'culture' as in artistic expression.

While cultural activist and politicians alike have emphasized 'culture' as a vital tool in the EU integration process, there is to date very little discussion on how these programs for 'cultural exchange and dialogue' affect artistic production and reception.

[281] As mentioned previously, a small disclaimer on the frequent usage of term "culture" in this chapter too: As explorations of cultural policy continually run the danger of reifying or naturalizing notions of culture themselves, I should clarify that "culture" is referenced here to denote the realms of cultural production (and the arts more particularly) as it is operationalized in different arenas of governance discussed here.

Accordingly, this chapter aims to illuminate the tensions that this nascent European cultural policy has engendered, not least with regard to the EU stipulations on national cultural sovereignty. I propose that while EU cultural initiatives indeed produce a kind of 'Europeanization,' they do so mainly through thematic and institutional incorporation. However, this type of integration tends to recast power differentials within the EU and beyond, despite proclaimed goals to the contrary, as cultural exchange programs tend to reinforce distinctions between 'art proper' and 'ethnic cultural production,' an issue that I will take up through examples that illustrate what happens when contemporary art from Turkey travels to Western Europe, particularly to Germany.

Stumbling across European Cultural Policy

When I began my interviews with artists, administrators, curators and critics about their own work and conditions in Istanbul's artworld in 2005 I found that many descriptions, assertions and assessments were frequently prefaced with the term "*AB sürecinde*," meaning "during the EU accession period" or "process." It took some time to understand that what was used as a standard expression did not necessarily indicate changes initiated by the EU related reform packages put forward by the Turkish government, for instance, those (at least nominally) designed to guarantee minorities' rights to publish or broadcast in their native languages.[282] Instead it was employed to describe an array of activities that did not directly – or necessarily – result from European

[282] Passed in August 2002 these reforms have remained fragile as incidents reported by Human Rights Watch show (see for example HRW 2003, pp. 365-366, and Chapter 1). Apart from official reports I came across many anecdotes with regard to harassment, not in Istanbul but in the Kurdish provinces. For instance, members of the Kurdish theater group *Seyr-î Mesel* and the Arab language music ensemble *Grub Nidal* were regularly taken into police custody for questioning before or after their performances outside of Istanbul.

Union accession requirements. Rather, Turkey's EU candidacy had inspired a range of expectations and incentives in Istanbul's artworld, particularly with regard to funding, some of which present *policy adjustments*, i.e. they are not policy changes required for accession but adjustments to practices of EU member states. Although these expectations, which at the time were most visibly tied to the EU's *Culture 2000*[283] initiative, materialized only slowly into concrete funding opportunities for Istanbul's contemporary art scene,[284] and although arts financing continued to rely mainly on corporate and private sponsorship and cultural workers' self-exploitation, heightened activity and fervor was in the air. The fact that interlocutors related these developments to either EU candidacy requirements in general or to European cultural policies in particular, prompted this inquiry into the premises of EU arts programs, and into how the European Union does – or does not –govern cultural policy of its members and beyond.

At first sight the two locations of Istanbul and Berlin may seem to make for rather disparate examples with regard to the significance of EU cultural programs for the national scene. Due to Germany's well-established federal, state and municipal funding structure, EU-related culture and arts support frequently play a more supplementary role for arts organizations in Berlin, and are often less important for individual artists. Yet, I argue that these programs have nonetheless contributed to the reconfiguration of the way

[283] For a final report of *Culture 2000* which had a budget of €236.5 millions see http://ec.europa.eu/culture/archive/sources_info/evaluation/pdf_word/culture2000_final_report/executive_summary_31012008_EX_EN.pdf. An overview of the follow-up program Culture 2007-2013 can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc411_en.htm. Designated to support "projects and initiatives to celebrate Europe's cultural diversity and enhance our shared cultural heritage through the development of cross-border co-operation between cultural operators and institutions" its budget is €400 million.

[284] As Turkey failed to pay into the *Culture 2000* fund, Turkish arts organizations were not eligible for the program per se. Some arts organizations however were able to access *Culture 2000* funds for certain projects by cooperating with arts organizations from eligible countries.

in which cultural policy and consequently national funding for the arts is framed – especially with regard to 'cultural diversity,' and thus has impacted how arts institutions in both locations represent their work. It has also led to the establishment of activist networks that lobby for the formalized establishment of a European cultural policy.

In contrast to the German case, EU funding has had a very marked effect on the mobility and circulation of contemporary visual and performing artists and artworks in Turkey, especially in Istanbul. It has also led to critical engagement by a broader spectrum of artworld actors, including civil society organizations with the formation and the practicalities of European cultural policy. From the perspective of those who are frequently 'the object' of cultural exchange – those on the margins of Europe (or as I will show internal minority populations), in this case artists from Turkey – these initiatives frequently fall short of their proposed goals by re-inscribing the very stereotypical notions and power differentials that they are supposed to transcend. While these programs indeed produce a type of Europeanization, it is one in which the arts run the danger of being depoliticized in a seemingly contradictory fashion. As I will show, the way that these efforts are set-up unwittingly allows not just for orientalist perception, but also the conceptualization of artistic works from Turkey as 'ethnic' production rather than as art 'proper.' Yet, programs for intercultural dialogue are increasingly becoming the only realm in which progressive approaches to issues of socio-economic marginality, integration and immigration are presented (and supported by both individual state and EU funding), whereas policy making in these arenas has been increasingly restrictive. I posit that two different but related developments form the basis of these conditions: The 'cultural turn' in discourses on EU integration on the one hand, and the institutional

incorporation of the cultural sector into EU-related programs on the other. Together these strands present a nexus at which at times converging and at other times diverging agendas as well as cultural politics and cultural policies intersect.

Background: The Expediency and Mystification of Culture

> *"Relations with the EU have definitely changed the course of art and culture in Istanbul. This started in the 1990s on an individual networking level and gradually developed into an institutional relationship, mainly between private museums, fine arts faculties, artists associations and other NGO's, mostly funded by EU resources, […]" (Madra 2008, 106).*

As research progressed, first in Istanbul and then in Berlin, the influence of EU funding schemes on the contemporary artworld became increasingly visible in both financial and thematic terms. Although the most prolific among them was *Culture 2000,* it had been preceded by so-called *mobility* grants (funded in various permutations by the European Commission since 1994), which allow artists to work outside their 'home countries' within the EU and respective candidate states, and enhance mobility for those considered to be on the margins. A third category was presented by European structural funds designed to further social cohesion and even out development in European regions, which had also begun to translate into the cultural sector. Here, they mostly benefited programs designed to promote *'intercultural dialogue'* between member and candidate states and those on the margins of Europe, and highlighted the role of arts and culture in regional development, including tourism.

The establishment – or extension – of arts and culture funding programs through EU agencies and the impact they generate beyond the confines of EU, as in the case of

Turkey where the formal accession process has been somewhat stagnant, falls at a notable conjuncture when one considers how the concept of 'culture' has been made productive for a variety of political concerns within the European arena from the 1990s onward.[285] I propose that the overtures in the arts and culture sector and the centrality of the concept of culture in public discourse on the EU have to be seen in connection with what has often been termed the "democratic deficit" of the European Union, as well as sharpening economic disparities within and between member states. Other anxieties too have marked the European integration process, namely those expressed in the anticipated homogenizing effects of the EU on the one hand, and immigration on the other. The discussions around national sovereignty of member states throughout the 1990s and the rise of a new right that drew strongly on both anti-European and anti-immigrant sentiments (Balibar 1991, Stolcke 1995) were powerful indicators that economic benefits or freedom of movement 'alone' would not be enough to bind citizens to the European idea, especially as it became clear that these benefits were far from being distributed equally. These inequalities also manifest themselves in the tiered system of (free) movement within the EU (and the Schengen countries), particularly in the limitations on citizens of the new Eastern European member states. Transformed into cheap production centers, the movement of their citizens is still restricted, forcing a considerable number of them into manual and domestic labor in Western and Southern Europe, often under precarious legal circumstances (Anthias/Lazaridis 2000, Hess 2005). As mentioned

[285] As Istanbul-based curator Beral Madra notes the Mondrian Foundation, the Prince Claus Fund, European Cultural Foundation, Roberto Cimetta Fund and Anna Lindh Foundation have been among those providing support for intercultural dialogue and residency programs for artists from Turkey in EU countires (2008, 106). These types of cooperation have been intensified since Istanbul's nomination as one of the European Cultural Capitals in 2010.

above, uneven development, especially in the agricultural sector, has persisted throughout the EU, and has recently also impacted new members such as Cyprus (see Welz 2006).

These developments have led leading intellectuals and politicians to diagnose "*Europamüdigkeit*" (Habermas cited in Nutt 2007). It has also been noted that the EU has experienced a continual legitimation crisis cemented by the lack of an executive apparatus (Böröcz/Sarkar 2005, 156) and by the way in which decision-making powers are distributed among the elected European Parliament, the appointed Council of the European Union and the likewise appointed EU Commission. The resulting governance structure seems to have discouraged the EU's constituency from the electoral process as the successively decreasing voter turnouts for the European Parliament since its inaugural election in 1979 might indicate[286] (see also Shore 2000, Holmes 2000, Wilson/Bellier 2002). In trying to overcome this crisis, pro-EU advocates have frequently relied on portrayals of Europe as not 'just' a geo-political entity, but also an area of supposed cultural affinity. Yet, this reliance on culture has produced a string of contradictions and paradoxes in its own right: While the EU is presented as both the logical result of a shared 'European history and culture,' the raison d'être of cultural initiative is yet to produce this very affinity already claimed in the EU's founding myth.[287]

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[286] According to the European Parliament's website voter turnout has decreased in the following manner: 63% out of an electorate of 191,783,528 in 1979, 61% out of 1984 200,505,752 in 1984, 58.5% out of 244,951,379 in 1989, 56.8% out of 269,261,000 in 1994, 49.8% out of 288 million in 1999, 45.6% out of 342 million in 2004. For a more detailed breakdown see http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/turnout_ep/turnout_table.html.

[287] In addition, his emergent European cultural policy formation has to navigate a set of contradictions regarding its presuppositions and practices that illustrate the conflicting dynamics of integrative and exclusionary potential that the deployment of culture as a central category of identification entails: Arts and culture programs are to reinforce the cultural affinity supposedly characterizing Europe, while at the same time being presented as part of intercultural dialogues that are yet to establish this very same affinity. Inherent in these contradictions is that 'cultural dialogue' and 'artistic exchange' programs also tend to reproduce power differentials within the EU and beyond, even if unintentionally so (see below).

Taking recourse in Jacques Delors' much quoted "No one falls in love with a common market" an array of actors – EU officials, politicians, artists or 'cultural activists,' including nonprofit organizations (such as *Efah*, *A Soul for Europe/Berliner Konferenz*, as well as nationally based cultural institutions) have, albeit for different reasons, focused on 'culture' and especially 'culture proper,' i.e. the arts and other forms of cultural production, as a vital tool in the EU integration process. Much emphasis has been given to the idea of cultural and artistic exchange as endowed with the capacity to bridge national and political divides within the EU and beyond, to engage its constituency in a participatory manner (Staiger 2009), and to produce – or enhance – attachments to and identification with the EU – efforts that culminated in declaring 2008 the Year of Intercultural Dialogue by the European Commission.[288] Politicians and activists alike have stated that "in order to arrive at a more effective civil society the EU ought to be based on a cultural conception," as Steve Austen (*Felix Meritis Foundation*) put it at the 2006 *IETM* (*International Network for Contemporary Performing Arts*) conference in Istanbul. His point was underlined by referencing the much-quoted notion that if the project of Europe were to be initiated again it ought "to start with culture." Cris Shore argues that the heavy circulation of this quote attributed to Jean Monnet is indicative of the EU's myth-making capacities as in fact Jack Lang has long assumed authorship of this assertion (2000, p. 42). That it continues to be ascribed to Monnet may point to the fact that is irrelevant to some extent who said it – as the value of the statement has been broadly accepted in political discourses in the EU today.

[288] A preliminary evaluation of the program is included in the "Council Conclusions on the Promotion of Cultural and Intercultural Dialogue in the External Relations Union and its Member States" published by the Council of the European Union; available online from http://www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu/fileadmin/downloads/documents/240-officialdocuments/081120_Council_Conclusions.pdf.

Sifting through the newest developments and resolutions, announcements and speeches on the issue of 'culture' in 'Europe,' one may feel confronted with a seemingly never-ending stack of quotes. Among them most prominently is the following excerpt from Manuel Barroso's speech at the conference *A Soul for Europe* in Berlin in 2004:

> "The EU has reached a stage of its history where its cultural dimension can no longer be ignored. It would be a mistake to pretend that culture and economy are two totally separate worlds. Without proper attention to knowledge, science and culture, our societies at large, our economies, cannot prosper."

Jean Monnet, the great founding father of a community forged of steel and coal (or rather the trade thereof), and Jacques Delors, the chief architect of the European Economic and Monetary Union, are now likewise presented as even different kinds of visionaries. Ahead of their time, they make appeals from the past, proclaiming that culture ought to be the real foundation of the experiment that is now the European Union. From Denis de Rougemont to Dario Fo and Yehudi Menuhin, artists, intellectuals, and philosophers who have taken Europe into account are quoted and appear as key witnesses whenever an advocate of a culturally "united but diverse" Europe falls short of powerful arguments (e.g. see Commission of the European Communities 2007). Figures past and present and their assessments on Europe are summoned either to alert us to foreground culture in the Europeanization process, that without culture Europe will never be integrated, or to remind us that culture has always been what has bound us, really, underneath it all, the bloodshed, including a series of religious and two World Wars, the animosities, the suspicion, and the mutual stereotypes.[289] Europe's problematic history is also relegated into the background in the *European Agenda for Culture in a Globalized*

[289] There are of course, alternative histories of Europe: Tony Judt's essay on the contingencies of the idea of Europe and its institutional manifestation (1996), and Mark Mazower's work on National Socialism as a European phenomenon (2000) are but two examples.

World that advises member states to "take advantage of Europe's language links with countries and regions outside thereof" (Commission of the European Communities 2007, p. 10). This relationship, of course, has its roots in colonialism – a word not mentioned in any of its possible "post" or "neo" permutations in the document, thus constituting a major blind-spot in the present configuration of cultural policy initiatives on the European Union agenda.[290]

As in public debates, whether in Germany or Turkey, so in my interviews with artists, policy makers, and 'civil society' organizations who try to position themselves in the European playing field, Europe is frequently conflated with the European Union and appears at once historically cemented and naturalized. At the same time, the EU is portrayed as something that needs to be tended to with great care and is still in the process of being painstakingly constructed as it has so far produced a disappointed constituency subjected to a "Europe of politics, business, and bureaucracy" (Wenders 2007, 11), but "without a soul" (Austen, *IETM* conference; Istanbul 2006).

Putting culture at the forefront of the integration process, these propositions also oscillate in a larger field of positive and negative connotations of cultural diversity. When it comes to the relationship between member states, cultural difference is either downplayed or categorized as a benign, enriching element ultimately underwritten by cultural commonalities that, if mediated correctly, will actually be conducive to the Europeanization processes. While EU integration has suffered from 'too little culture' as Steven Austen and the organizers of the *A soul for Europe* conferences would maintain**,**

[290] This type of blind-spot is also indicative for the fall-outs that intercultural dialogue initiatives often produce in terms of their reception (see below).

'too much culture' has emerged as a problem vis-à-vis immigrant populations in an array of political quarters. Despite their differences, the answer to these diametrically opposed conceptualizations of culture as accommodating in the first case and disruptive in the second has been cultural and artistic exchange. Surely the multiple versions of culture are neither equivalent nor synonymous, yet the distinction is often blurred in public discourses on these matters. This also becomes clear in anthropologist Katharina Bodirsky's research on discourses related to the allocation and implementation of European Union structural funds in Berlin and pre-accession financial assistance to Turkey. Bodirsky shows how European Parliament debates on Turkey's accession center on culture as it is seen to relate to democracy and human rights, rather than "economic criteria or the implementation of the *acquis communautaire,* […] which proceed as they should" (Bodirsky 2007, 3).

Thus, while we can find a conflation of culture and politics, i.e. "culture talk" (Mamdani 2002) in the EU sector, the cultural sector has increasingly been "talking Europe." While taken separately, many of the elements explicated in this chapter, such as projections on common cultural heritage, are not new, it is this convergence that has contributed to the emergence of a particular kind of European cultural policy that will be discussed in the following passages.

Unease: Culture, Policy and the EU

Until quite recently, it was commonplace to maintain that there is no such thing as a European cultural policy. After all, the founding principles and regulations of the European Community and the EU expressed in the *acquis communautaire*, while

mentioning culture marginally, do not entail legislation geared towards culture and the arts directly. Article 151 of the Amsterdam Treaty is generally understood to reinforce the national sovereignty of member states in all matters cultural, not least because *it* explicitly states that harmonization is not intended (*Amsterdam Treaty* 151. 5).[291] The article hence reaffirms what is often referred to as the *l'exception culturelle*,[292] the exemption of the realm of culture from the general rules of other sectors in the EU (see Obuljen 2005). But as cultural policy researchers Toby Miller and George Yúdice show for the United States (2002) and as I have argued in Chapter 3 for the case of Turkey, the absence of a cultural ministry or proactive policy-making that is clearly demarcated as such does not equal – or evidence for that matter – the non-existence of cultural policy.

Thus it is important to carefully discern what article 151 of the Amsterdam Treaty actually stipulates. Rather than providing a blanket exemption of culture and the arts from EU legislature and decision-making processes, it regulates that all decisions regarding culture are to be taken unanimously, by agreement of all member states. Furthermore, 'culture' – and this is in principle also valid for other sectors whether economic, social or political – is actually governed through the principle of *subsidiarity*, a bottom-up model that relegates decision making processes and authority to the smallest (local) units with regional, national or supranational national competencies taking over only if they are

[291] Originally article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), this article was transferred into the Amsterdam Treaty as article 151 and reconfirmed the national sovereignty of EU member states in the area of cultural policy. It explicitly states that while cultural cooperation should be supported within the Union, and that while cultural components should be considered in EU directives, no harmonization is intended in cultural matters (see http://www.europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/treaties/dat/ec_cons_treaty_en.pdf).

[292] Although the notion of the *l'exception culturelle* was originally developed in the French context to demarcate the exemption of culture from international trade agreements (such as WTO and GATS), it is now frequently used as a synonym for guarantees of national cultural sovereignty in the EU framework (see also Kiwan/Meinhof 2006, 62-69).

deemed to be better suited for achieving certain goals. Taken together the principles of unanimity and subsidiarity, two provisions that during the Maastricht negotiations were largely publicized as measures that guarantee national sovereignty in the cultural realm, already enable supervisory capabilities on part of the EU (see Niedobitek 1997). One could even go so far to argue that not only the principle of *subsidiarity*, but maybe even the proclaimed 'exemption of culture' already present a *'default'* setting that lays the groundwork for a common and binding European cultural policy. Cultural policy researcher Nina Obuljen posits that despite the notion that there is no official European cultural policy, it is especially through the rules of 'subsidiarity' and exception that there has been a "de facto European cultural policy, even if it is not yet clearly articulated" (2005).

Obuljen substantiates her claim by pointing to an array of EU regulations that affect the realm of culture. Among these is legislation pertaining to (free) movement in the Schengen countries, the EU, and the European Community that impact the mobility of artists, and thus their work and employment opportunities across Europe. Other stipulations with respect to copyright protection, tax systems, and the liberalization of marketplaces and the European common market that regulate competition also bear on the cultural sector. Last but not least, Obuljen references the European Court of Justice hearings that have consequences for 'culture' with regard to state subsidiary in the audio-visual and broadcasting field or fixed book process regulations.

The tensions I have described with regard to cultural policy on the national level (see Chapter 3), namely the instrumentalization or operationalization of the arts in policy,

are even more amplified on the EU level. The governance of culture through EU institutions conjures up unease because it is frequently regarded as interfering with national sovereignty, not least because it is seen to counteract those cultural claims that are deployed to establish national unity.

Trying to get a grasp on the moving target of cultural policy formations in the EU is difficult, partly because it is an emerging field characterized by paradoxes, and partly because the disposition that there is "no European cultural policy" has led to the absence of comprehensive data on policies that actually do impact the fields of culture and the arts. The National Cultural Policy Reviews, which were launched by the Council of Europe in 1985 and continue to the present, for example, are fraught with methodological difficulties, not least because as Obuljen shows, neither their working definition of culture nor that of the 'national' render themselves to "objective" measurements, or as I would put it, as adequate analytical categories. They also fail to sufficiently reflect the regional and local, the institutionalized and the non-institutional realms that together constitute the entirety of the cultural and artistic landscape of any given member state (Breznik 2004, 19-21; Obuljen 2005, 23).

Research has also been hampered by the constant flux and changes in programs pertaining to culture, and the level of fragmentation[293] both in funding programs (supported by different institutional bodies) and oversight over different fields, e.g.

[293] This fragmentation has been recently been reiterated and criticized by the Federation of European Film Directors (FERA) as they have been since 2004 confronted with "Culture, Audiovisual Policy and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) [being] scattered in three different Directorates-General with three different Commissioners in charge" (2009).

heritage, broadcasting and TV, and the arts, on the European Union level.[294] Because there is officially no centrally administered and implemented cultural policy of the Union even the evaluation and monitoring of existing funding schemes through the EU has also proven difficult due to both the compartmentalization and ill-definedness of criteria utilized to award funding. Obuljen asks what constitutes the "European dimension" of an artwork or arts event (Obuljen 2005, 59), and thus questions the central criteria used in award processes. I would like to echo this question by asking which organization best reflects the European idea, the *Berliner Festspiele* or the *Avrupa Kültür Derneği* (AKD, European Cultural Association) in Istanbul? The *Berliner Festspiele* was originally established to organize arts events that would function as a 'window to the West' in the divided Berlin, and whose mission today according to director (and former head of the Goethe Institute) Joachim Sartorius is to "engage the world." But the world is big, Sartorius says, and thus they focus on Europe. Does this arts organization simply by virtue of being in Germany (the self-proclaimed center of Europe) and putting together a newly conceptualized festival of European plays and co-productions for a selected audience called "Spielzeit Europa" express the idea of Europe adequately? Is Europe an intrinsic referent or rather one of practicability here? Or is it perhaps the efforts of the *AKD*, a nonprofit platform of cultural producers and operators who have repeatedly brought together cultural institutions and artists from Turkey and other European countries to bridge nationally divided cultural policies and instead produce and discuss across cemented institutional – and national – lines? This small thought experiment gives a small insight into how blurry the notion of 'the European' can be. That at times

[294] Although a growing number of studies exist, such as the Cultural Policy Compendium, research conducted by EFAH or even by artists themselves, they too tend to reflect the above-described fragmentation of competencies and legislation.

unexpected actors employ Europe as a significant and normative referent is exemplified by an interview conducted with Arnaud Littardi of the *Institut Français* in Istanbul (in 2005). Littardi explained that the organization's mission was "to promote French culture and to establish links between France and Turkey," a goal that he contends is not achieved by presenting "a French culture showcase." Rather he stated: "The process of integration of Turkey in the European Union is very important. So we try to […] help Turkey to join the European Union. Europe now is really the priority of Turkey. So it is our priority as well." Thus Littardi, while acknowledging that his stance may not reflect the position of the French government nor that of its public, situates the *Institut*'s mission well within the framework of European accession and integration, emphasizing repeatedly that he wishes to convey that "France is a good partner for Turkey in Europe."

Why Culture?: The Career of a Concept

In "The Expediency of Culture" Yúdice (2003) presents a narrative in which following the Second World War, first the economic and then the social were the leading paradigms in international politics – before culture replaced them as the foremost domain through which to address an array of political issues. The establishment of the European Union as a descendant of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) can be seen as paradigmatic of this shift. The ECSC's founding logic was indebted to the idea that after the Second World War only an economically integrated Europe bound by trade relations would be prosperous, and hence peaceful. But periodic economic crises and uneven development within the European Union have showed how fragile this presupposition of integration based on economic cooperation would be. Marking the oil

crisis as a departure from the economic paradigm, Cris Shore points to the Copenhagen Summit in 1973 as a turning point at which (with European integration deemed at risk) a language of "social cohesion" was adopted by the European Commission (2006, 12-13), and first forays into the language of a Europe united by a common heritage were made. This idea of a 'shared culture' – past and present – would become paramount[295] as the large-scale economic restructuring processes of the 1980s and 1990s led to the rollback of social rights throughout the European arena (Kalb 2004, vi; Staiger 2009).

The concept of culture had already permeated the international political arena, most notably – although of course not exclusively – through the engagement of Claude Levi-Strauss and fellow anthropologists (among them Max Gluckman and Michel Leiris) with UNESCO on the commissioned report on race.[296] Levi-Strauss' effort to move away from the concept of race and instead look at different – at the time defined as discreet – cultures was mirrored – if distortedly, in a "new rhetoric of culture" that arose on the right of the political spectrum, outlined by Stolcke above (1995, see also Wright 1998: 8). While the concept of culture has been increasingly critiqued and rethought within the discipline of anthropology, these internal critiques have been contemporaneous with a growing "saliency outside the discipline amongst other scholars as well as with lawyers, national governments, international agencies and indigenous activists" (Kaneff/King

[295] Interestingly, while proponents of a "culturally united Europe" frequently point to the genealogy of the focus on culture in European conventions from the *Treaty of Rome* (1957) to the recent *Agenda for Culture in a Globalized World* (2007) (Sassatelli 2006), others maintain that culture presents a belated insertion (Obuljen 2005), rather than the seminal ingredient of what has become the EU of today, by referring to this very same genealogy. Shore presents an inverse genealogy to the one I lay out in this paper. He sees cultural integration much earlier on as a pronounced goal in the Europeanization process and argues that economic policies have been deployed as an inroad for achieving a comprehensive EU cultural policy (2006, 12-15).

[296] The resulting report was first published in 1956 under the title "The Race Question in Modern Science"; a revised version appeared in 1975 under the title "Race, Science and Society" (Paris: UNESCO). For an interesting overview of anthropologists' involvement with UNESCO in this time period see Metraux 1951.

2004, 3-4), for instance, who use it make claims on cultural property in the political sphere. David Scott's examination of the uptake of the culture-concept in political theory suggests that it may these days even be deployed despite anthropology insofar that these approaches are in fact "inattentive to the ideological history of anthropology's culture" (2003: 97). Scott further diagnoses that "[c]ulture in political theory remains oddly undertheorized; it is merely and fundamentally *there*, like a nonideological background, or a natural horizon" (2003: 111; *emphasis in original*). It is exactly this type of normalization of 'culture' not only in political theory but also in wider political discourses that makes many of slippages outlined in this chapter possible.

As culture has been identified both as an obstacle to European integration and as a means to transcend this very obstacle, EU agencies have instated a variety of arts and culture funding schemes aimed at fostering cultural co-operation and intercultural dialogue.[297] Yet the extension of and emphasis on cultural programs on the EU level can be said to coalesce into a nascent European cultural policy as their coordination and implementation provides incentives for harmonization procedures on the part of (potential) participants both structurally and thematically (Obuljen 2005). These incentives notably stretch beyond the confines of the EU to its candidate states. Turkey, for instance, has been increasingly included in these programs despite obstacles in the formal accession process.

[297] Among these programs are European Structural Funds which have also contributed to initiatives promoting *'intercultural dialogue'* and cultural' tourism in regional development and so-called mobility grants for artists. Exclusively dedicated to culture and the arts *Culture 2000* and its follow-up program Culture 2007-2013 (budgeted at €400 million; an overview can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc411_en.htm) have recently been accompanied by initiatives supported through the Year of Intercultural Dialogue program supported by the European Commission (for more detailed information see http://www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu/).

As national and EU cultural policies mirror each other in a notable fashion we can discern similar contradictions arising from elevating culture to a central category in political discourse – and policy. For example, the question of immigration, and more specifically the problems of integrating immigrants (and more recently especially Muslim immigrants, which in today's Europe is somewhat of a tautology), has been increasingly explained by proposing the cultural incommensurability of immigrants' 'cultures' and that of the native population. As Verena Stolcke so aptly argued, "talking culture" has served not only to construct an image of national cultural cohesion, but also to exclude immigrants from access to resources such as employment and other citizenship privileges (Stolcke 1995). Since the 1990s this rhetoric has legitimized restrictive policy initiatives regarding immigration and political asylum. Interestingly, however, this development has been accompanied by an increase of state funding channeled into artistic endeavors – as in *Culture* (i.e. the arts) – that thematize immigration experiences (and to a lesser extent social as well as political exclusion). Doing so often in a critical and progressive manner, these events tend to be billed on the part of officials as expressions of and support for multi*culturalist,* i.e. inclusive, strategies toward the diverse populations within member and accession states.

Some examples from my fieldwork may serve to illustrate how prevalent this thematic focus that relies on a slippage between different notions of culture has become and what types of fall-outs it has produced. In Berlin, the first two months of 2006 alone featured a number of exhibitions and arts events that addressed topics such as EU integration and accession, immigration, "multiculturalism" and minority rights through the lens of cultural difference. Among them were KunstWerke's *The B Zone - Becoming*

Europe and Beyond, which thematized the geopolitical marginality of the Balkans, Turkey, and the Caucasus vis-à-vis Europe and Hebbel am Ufer's two-month multidisciplinary performance festival entitled *Beyond Belonging – migration²*. At the same time *Projekt Migration*, a multidisciplinary research and arts project on display in Cologne, garnered much attention. All of these projects were supported by governmental funding programs such as the *Federal Cultural Foundation* that have recently provided incentives for artists to work on the above issues. Similar incentives have been established in Istanbul through EU-related projects, and the support of embassies and foreign cultural institutions.

Cultural diversity was foregrounded by cultural policy makers and officials that I interviewed both in Berlin and in Istanbul. Analogous to the respective public debates, in Germany this diversity was most notably explored in the context of immigration, while in Turkey the emphasis was on national minorities. Interlocutors in Istanbul's municipal cultural departments portrayed their cultural policy directives as centering on the notion of *barış* (i.e. peace, reconciliation, concord) as their primary goal. In this narrative, arts and cultural policies are to be geared towards societal peace without ever quite defining or naming the actual conflict that 'culture' is to mend. Cultural policy officials tend to refer vaguely to Istanbul's diverse and increasingly changing composition due to "migration" (often a veiled reference to internal displacement) of "southeastern" populations (i.e. Kurds). The state of actual, on the ground politics notwithstanding, art has become the preferred platform on which to address issues of diversity. But many artists rightly note that this often presents an aestheticized notion of multiculturalism that conceptualizes most minorities in Turkey as nostalgic reminders of a multi-ethnic empire

(with the exception of the Kurds – although most Kurdish political factions have abandoned claims for independent statehood, and instead seek cultural autonomy, the existence of an Iraqi Kurdistan has become a source of anxiety for the Turkish government). Relegating their existence to a distant past, this understanding thus aids divorcing their presence from potential political claims (see Chapter 4). Accordingly, it is not surprising that projects such as Attila Durak's surely well-intended *Ebru* exhibition, which ultimately reproduces a pristine picture of diversity through photographs taken of different populations throughout Anatolia and accompanying titles featuring ethnic ascriptions, are happily supported by the Ministry of Culture and an array of private sponsors.[298]

The key here is not that artists work on these issues – in some ways marginality and difference have long been themes addressed by artists – but that government as well as EU funding is made available and provide incentives for these types of artistic engagements at the current political conjuncture. What they produce is a pronounced slippage between culture as a problem (the recognition of cultural diversity within the domain of culture in the incorporated sense of the nation), and culture as remedy (as in addressing and purported solving political problems through artistic production, e.g. by facilitating greater 'intercultural' understanding). Meanwhile, policies that counter systematic discouragement of immigrant children in Germany's educational system, for instance, or an overhaul of accounts that have long vilified internal minorities in Turkish textbooks, are still lacking (Tüzün 2009).

[298] In contrast, as I have discussed in Chapter 5 through the example of *Freekick*, depictions of Turkey's diverse demographic make-up that problematize the violence with which it has frequently been met are confronted with silencing efforts by Turkish authorities.

What Sharon Zukin has described as "the seductive influence of the arts on urban redevelopment" (1995: viii), is also true for the above-described political configurations in which the emancipatory and civic impact accorded to art is used as a stand-in for addressing political predicaments – in this case problematized cultural diversity. State funding for these kinds of arts projects seems to suggest the sanctioning of a pluralistic social make-up even while repressive policies against immigrants in the case of Germany and internal minorities in the case of Turkey remain in place. It is the elusiveness of art that has rendered it the preferred medium for addressing an array of contemporary ills in a seemingly progressive manner even while retrograde and exclusionary politics are enacted, thus leading to a paradoxical situation in which art and cultural production are 'depoliticized' while functioning as stand-ins for political issues. I propose that this displacement of political questions into the realm of cultural policy is indicative of a shift in the focus of governance that has consequences both for how we conceptualize the place of the political in the contemporary order as well as on the way in which we perceive art.

The Governance *of* and *through* Culture: Making Culture Politically Productive

Before delving further into some examples that illustrate the practices emerging from this kind of governance, let me briefly outline three areas closely related to the topic at hand, in which culture and the arts are being made 'politically productive,' and in which culture manifests itself as an area and conduit of governance both across European countries and in the European Union itself.

1. *"Culture Talk" – Extending the Rhetoric of Culture:* The recourse to culture as *the* binding element of Europe and indicator of affinity between European states serves not only to signal a shared history, but one that is deproblematized (Schneider 2004) and underwritten by regulations and conventions on tangible and intangible cultural heritage within the EU framework. Through an interplay of cultural affinity and alterity, it not only defines 'the European' by reinforcing the boundaries of *the* 'fortress Europe,' but also speaks to issues of internal diversity in which immigrants (and currently particularly Muslim immigrants[299]) have been identified as the source of disruptive diversity – while relegating the historical diversity between and within member states (i.e. 'national minorities') to the background. This has been accentuated in the many debates on Turkey's EU candidacy. Here, it has not been simply 'culture' or 'cultural bonds' between the current member states that have been highlighted, but a particular kind of association, one based on a shared cultural modernity (Asad et al. 1999).

The increasing focus on culture deflects from economic and political inequalities and frictions, and takes its cues from the rise of identity politics also inherent in UNESCO's conceptualizations of the "right to culture" in a seemingly contradictory fashion. State agencies and economic actors alike have appropriated the emancipatory claims that culture, and by extension the arts, entail for an array of projects ranging from urban revitalization to copyright regulations. The extension of the rhetoric of culture manifests itself in the vernacularization of the term 'culture' in wider political discourses, by using it as a shorthand in a variety of policy pursuits. Producing and relying on slippages between different notions of culture, this usage of 'culture' as an explanatory

[299] In recent debates in the European context the category immigrant and Mulsim have been increasingly conflated.

and legitimizing means serves to detach problematic issues from their socioeconomic and political conditions (Mamdani 2002). Susan Wright describes this vernacularization as follows:

> "Decision-makers and media commentators often claim legitimacy for their discourses by referring to 'culture, in an anthropological sense' – a phrase which closes off further exploration by claiming that there is *one* (their) meaning of culture which is at once too self-evident to warrant explanation and too deep to be delved into by non-anthropologists" (1998,7; *emphasis in original*).

Viewed in this vein, culture is employed both as an explanatory device and as one of discursive foreclosure. The term culture then can be used to invoke rather specific connotations, and yet is flexible enough to express a variety of concerns that are either taken to be self-evident, or alternatively, in need of expertise.

2. The Creative Industries: The discursive emphasis on culture in the political realm finds its material expression in discussions and practices related the production, circulation and consumption of cultural goods. Culture in the form of tangible and intangible cultural heritage has been both imbued with the symbolic value of constructing European unity but also exhibits an explicit material basis on the European agenda (Blake 2000) and has notably set precedents for the production and circulation of other cultural and artistic goods and services.

An interesting aspect in this context is the dual nature of cultural goods (Obuljen 2005, 71), the symbolic and economic value ascribed to them that is especially contoured in the emergence of the "creative industries" that I have outlined in Chapter 6 (Florida 2006, Goehler 2006). In the EU and beyond, this reference to creativity has helped to secure copyright provisions, to apply cultural protectionist policies to these very sectors on national levels, and to justify public expenditure for commercial gains that

traditionally lie outside the sphere of cultural policy. This move, which actively engages the caché of 'the cultural and the artistic' by equating an array of economic sectors to that of artistic production, has, as sociologist Maja Breznik points out, led to a contradictory situation:

> "European cultural policies foster two goals that produce conflicting effects: through state interventions in the name of 'democratization' they want to broaden access to cultural goods, but through liberalization, once again in the name of 'democratization' they destroy the effects of their own measures and impose limits on the access to culture (Breznik 2004, 50).

3. Culture as Development: Finally, as in UNESCO approaches, so in German and Turkish cultural policy documents and their EU counterparts, culture is framed as a resource, a source of creativity imbued with moral values that enables peaceful cohabitation and triggers economic development (Goehler 2006, Commission of the European Communities 2007, 9; Miller/Yúdice 2002, UNESCO 2002 and 2005).

Since the 1970s, UNESCO has adopted resolutions geared towards the protection of cultural heritage, including intangible cultural expression, originally designed to shield Third World contexts from the fall-outs of predatory capitalism and to protect cultural diversity, particularly those communities that were mobilized under the concept of indigeneity. Early on, UNESCO established a link between 'culture and identity' as well as 'between culture and development,' most recently in the *Convention on the Protection of Cultural Diversity* in 2005. Here the principle of the "complementarity of economic and cultural aspects" is described as follows: "Since culture is one of the mainsprings of development, the cultural aspects of development are as important as its economic aspects, which individuals and peoples have the fundamental right to participate in and enjoy" (2005: 5).

It is from here, again, that the EU has taken its cues to connect culture, identity (in the form of 'European citizenship') and economic development.[300] In the recently published *Agenda for Culture in a Globalized World* we can find the following statement:

> "The role of culture in supporting and fostering creativity and innovation must be explored and promoted. Creativity is the basis for social and technological innovation, and therefore an important driver of growth, competitiveness and jobs in the EU" (Commission of the European Communities 2007, 9).

While the connection between culture, creativity, and by extension, (economic) development is basically identical with that of UNESCO, the issue worth mentioning here is that frequently *Culture* and the link through culture is presented as intrinsically *European*. Not only does "Europe have culture as a very special resource" as a representative of the *Berliner Konferenz,* an initiative that advocates for an official European cultural policy and co-organizes the "A Soul for Europe" conference series, relayed to me during an interview, but according to director Wim Wenders, Europe takes a stance against the U.S., where the commodification of culture is paramount. In Wenders' own words: "We Europeans have our own ways of doing things: Our culture is so important – not to say 'sacred' – to us that we refuse to let it be instrumentalized, either by politicians or industry (2007, 6). [301]

[300] To quote the Commission of the European Communities: "Cultural industries and the creative sector are substantially contributing to European GDP, growth and employment. As an illustration, a recent independent study carried out for the Commission estimated that more than 5 million people worked in 2004 for the cultural sector, equivalent to 3.1% of total employed population in the EU-25. The cultural sector contributes around 2.6% to the EU GDP in 2003, with growth significantly higher than that of the economy in general between 1999 and 2003. These industries and the creativity which they generate are an essential asset for Europe's economy and competitiveness in a context of globalization" (2007: 9).

[301] The argument of non-instrumentalization is rather debatable. The European Cultural Capital initiative, to name but one example, is clearly connected to ideas around economic development and tourism, thus putting the 'disinterested' understanding of support for culture and the arts into question.

Each of the abovementioned areas presents instances in which the EU and its member states use culture as a conduit of governance. Together these different components, i.e. culture as affinity, modernity, political identity and economic impetus, function as a framework for Europeanization as a civilizing process, a socialization into European citizenship as much as into the changing composition of Europe and its labor markets (Börsel/Risse 2003). [302] Probing the realm of cultural policy thus opens a window to understand the ways in which society – and in this case Europe, and its constituency – is conceptualized through the vehicle of arts and culture. It is important to note, however, that this governance through culture is not a solely top-down feat, dictated by government – or EU – institutions. As I have noted, an array of actors, artists, policy makers, and 'civil society' organizations, have focused on the arts as a vital tool in the EU integration process. This is especially the case in face of the unprecedented availability of funds in the arena of EU integration, while national funding is cut back in Germany and lacking augmentation in Turkey. However, the growing investment in art and cultural exchange programs operating from an understanding that individual artists and arts groups can act as vital "transfer bodies" (Rose Fenton, *IETM* conference Istanbul, 2006), has also contributed to a increasing awareness of the problems and contradictions that arise from relying on 'culture' as an integrative force.

Yet, EU funded arts and culture programs present legitimizing tools without necessarily introducing binding legislation, and help to nonetheless normalize and standardize policy formats across member states when it comes to public investment in

[302] In Germany, Adrienne Goehler (2006), former director of the Capital Cultural Fund, has been the one of the most prolific proponents of the notion that the experience of precariousness and demand for flexibility endows the arts sector with a model function for the labor market at the present economic conjuncture, and support for so-called " life long learning" programs that are also called for by the Lisbon Agenda (2008). (Goehler 2006).

private enterprises under the heading of the creative industries, to name one example. Their normative impact transcends the boundaries of the EU and also influences candidate countries. Turkey, for instance, recently instated new sponsorship laws that are harmonized with EU members' legislation although not required by the *acquis communitaire*.

Since the EU operates on the principle of postulated cultural sovereignty, the communications and resolutions by different EU bodies[303] communicate intents, but rarely set up tangible procedures or legislation (the notable exceptions to these are regulations concerning moveable cultural goods and services) – and yet have contributed to considerable harmonization and standardization processes within the realm of cultural production. Politicians and policy makers are quick to emphasize that cultural matters, and specifically those of national interest are bracketed out of the harmonization procedures that characterize Europeanization, and yet as Burns and van der Will argue with regard to the Maastricht Treaty:

> "While Brussels is bound to the treaty to pay heed to the rich cultural diversity of Europe and is not authorized to harmonise legal and administrative regulations of the member states in the cultural sector, it nevertheless has had the effect of standardizing policy formats across the EU in those areas in which it becomes involved" (2003, p. 136).

These harmonization tendencies manifest themselves in policy adjustments, i.e. adjustments that are not made in accordance with the *acquis communautaire*, but present "rule changes not imposed [that] have resulted from a country having decided to follow the majority thinking in Europe, even when it has meant changing some practices specific

[303] For a comprehensive overview beginning with the European Cultural Convention in 1954 the Council of Europe, and its signaling force for the EU, see Obuljen 2005, pp. 22 ff.

to this society" (Obuljen 2005, 52). One example that Obuljen mentions are new regulations regarding the flat rate tax on incomes and goods and deductibles for artists in the case of Romania and Slovakia. Another can be found in changes to sponsorship laws in Turkey intended to better accommodate European funding structures and hence can be related to the anticipated effects of EU accession.

Harmonization processes have not only been furthered thematically, i.e. with the introduced focus of intercultural dialogue (as mentioned above), but also through stipulations like those in the *Culture 2000* program that give preferential treatment to bi-national productions, as well as to events that aim to raise financial support from additional sources. These regulations have led to cooperation and co-sponsoring efforts that, at least at first sight, seem to underline and comply with the notion of cultural exchange and dialogue that EU programs are geared to facilitate, especially between old and new members and candidate states. The programmatic underpinnings of these initiatives have signaling functions beyond the EU apparatus proper: Similarly to the *Berliner Festspiele,* the *Berliner Konferenz*, according to its representative Volker Hassemer,[304] tries to convince national cultural institutions and bi-national initiatives to recast their efforts within a European framework, even if only nominally, in the hopes that these steps will ultimately contribute to larger, "Europeanized" rethinking processes. Hassemer's stance also entails an avenue for positioning Berlin in the European playing field, a "cultural strategy for Berlin" – as he calls it – within the European framework.

[304] Volker Hassemer has been a highly polarizing figure in Berlin's arts and cultural setting, not least because the former Christian Democratic politician is an outspoken proponent for the creative industries. He could be taken to Personify the connection between art and urban development, as he served in the Berlin Senate's division for Urban Development between 1981 and 1983, he then moved to the Department for Cultural Affairs till 1989. He returned to the division for Urban Development again from 1991 to 1996. During this last tenure he made one of his most controversial decisions, to tear down the Lenin statue at the *Platz der Vereinten Nationen*, despite considerable protests.

The question remains, however, of to what extent the usage of Europe as a constant referent actually adds up to changing political attitudes and imaginations, especially as the issue of power differentials and orientalizing tendencies between collaborators (often pairings between what is generally conceptualized as East and Western European countries and institutions) remain basically untouched (Meinhof/Trandafyllidou 2006, 7).

The Practice of Cultural and Artistic Dialog

How counterproductive to proclaimed goals the persistence of these asymmetries and power differentials is also becomes apparent in an example of the arts cooperative *garajistanbul*. The group was invited to an EU funded performance festival in the Netherlands with a piece on female empowerment entitled "*oyunu bozuyorum*" ("I am breaking the Game"). Upon arrival, the performers and team of *garajistanbul* found themselves confronted with organizers in whose minds the play was about "honor killings" in Turkey. "Honor killings" have recently become much-publicized events in the Netherlands as well as in Germany and France where they have been discussed as 'typical Muslim occurrences.' Against this background, the Dutch organizers offered to have a public discussion on the topic. Their Istanbul counterparts had to be insistent and continually clarify that the play was not about honor killings to begin with, but rather about "female experiences, embodiment, and empowerment." Yet, the initial impression on the part of the hosts persisted throughout the troupe's entire stay, and the artists were thus confronted with a particular framework of perception – at least on part of the organizers – that they found themselves unable to challenge even through the performance of the play.

It would be all too easy to dismiss this example as a sheer misunderstanding – or to use polemics towards the Dutch organizers. Instead, I would like to suggest that these 'mis-understandings' have been and will be structurally cemented as long as programs that are to promote cultural dialogue and artistic exchange and the practices connected to them do not fundamentally question the persistent power differentials and stereotypes that underlie them. Unwittingly, they all too often leave intact what József Böröcz has called the "topos of West European moral superiority" (2006, 112). I do not mean to discount the possibility that the play may speak in and by itself to the audience in a different manner or resort to an over-deterministic argument. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the relationship between an artwork and an audience is infused with power with regard to both representation and interpretation (Danto 1964, Bourdieu 1984, Duncan 1991, Rogoff 2002). Progressive as concepts such as cultural dialogue might be thought to be, if unquestioned they may, against all intentions counteract the emancipatory potential accorded to art as well as the postulated goals of co-productions, collaborations and cultural exchange programs. The practice of collaboration alone, as reflexive as it may be conceptualized on the part of art and cultural producers, can not change the framing of artworks and their perception or tear down longstanding patterns of stereotyping and representation (Hall 1997, Spivak 1988). Rather, the very conditions of what constitutes cultural exchange or dialogue need to be more critically and rigorously discussed on the level of policy and scholarship in the European arena.

But there is another asymmetry inherent in the above-described divergence between the organizers' goal of intercultural dialogue and their perception of the play.

The way in which the Dutch organizers understood the play reveals concern with regards to immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants. The equation of these concerns with the contents of an artistic production from Turkey results in sweeping homologies between local immigrant populations and the relationship between them and their country of origin. A similar motif can be detected in the experiences of *ODA Projesi*, an artists' collective from Istanbul. Seçil Yersel, one of the members, recounted that when invited to exhibitions and arts exchange programs in Western Europe their hosts frequently expected them to execute their projects in local immigrant neighborhoods, thus putting them more in the position of, in her words, "social workers," than visiting international artists. Given these experiences she noted that the group decided to abstain from invitations to Western Europe for a while.

Another artist, who was invited to an artists' exchange program in North Rhine Westphalia recounted her surprise and frustration to find that most artist's talks and panel discussions in the framework of the residency quickly turned into informational gatherings. During these, rather than being questioned about the exhibited pieces and working practices, artists from Turkey were expected to give accounts of the country's history – and political situation – and often had to counter the rather simplistic presumptions that their hosts and German audiences voiced. Reflecting on her experiences, she recapitulated the situation by saying:

> "I never asked for nor do I ever want to be in the position of having to represent Turkey – out of all things abroad…. I often wondered what kind of conversations and panels would be organized in the coming year when France is the guest country. I am sure that they will not have to engage in introductory French history and politics lessons."

This has implications for what could be categorized using Irit Rogoff's formulation of the "dilemmas in revisiting urgent social issues from the perspectives of displayed culture" (2002, 65), i.e. the performance by *garajistanbul* was perceived as a display of 'culture' rather than 'art.' It is at these intersections that national multiculturalist cultural policy and the politics of cultural exchange on the EU level mirror each other in a notable fashion that deserves further attention.

In the her study on a diverse range of Turkish language broadcasting in Berlin anthropologist Kira Kosnick posits that:

> "dominant cultural classifications have powerful consequences for the forms of exclusion and inclusion that prevail in ethnically and religiously diverse countries. In turn, these shape the opportunities for engaging in the politics of cultural (self-) representation. Defined as Germans' stereotypical 'Other,' Turkish cultural production in Germany is forced to be continuously concerned with transforming, challenging, or confirming migrant identity labels. Since such labels and the meanings they carry have palpable consequences, affecting laws, policies, and everyday interactions, migrants cannot afford to ignore them. Yet, the power to objectify, to produce cultural classifications and to intervene in public discourse of cultural identity is unevenly distributed among minority and majority groups, and is a highly political issue" (2007, 5).

Kosnick's argument on how power differentials impact classifications in the realm of cultural (and artistic) production is not only true for multicultural cultural policy, but likewise important for understanding the workings of cultural exchange and dialogue initiatives, which likewise "presuppose the prior existence of different cultures as separate and unrelated entities" (Kosnick 2007, 49), entities that are conceptualized differentially and unequally. It is under these premises that the "West" (in this case Western Europe) *has* culture and *produces* art (read as individual expressions) while non-Western immigrants and others subsumed under the label "immigrant" produce – well – culture (i.e. their artists expressions tend to be read as collective ethnic markers).

While some activists on the European platform try to steer away from essentializing definitions of culture, they are nonetheless confronted with the normative framework in which culture is used as a constant referent that they too need to employ while being aware of the fallacies that come with elevating culture to a central category. In my exchanges with philosopher Alfred Pfabigan, a participant of the "*A Soul for Europe*" Forum in Istanbul in 2006, and *Berliner Konferenz* director Volker Hassemer (Berlin), strong proponents of the formation of a common European identity based on shared cultural heritage, both shied away from explaining what this shared cultural heritage is supposed to encapsulate. Pfagian was quick to call 'defining culture' a trap and Vollmer acknowledged that it might be the remnants and reminders of a violent past and the long-standing animosities that unite Europe rather than its proposed commonalities. It is thus important to note that art practitioners are themselves increasingly wary of the established norms, perceptions and presuppositions that underlie politically sanctioned intercultural dialogue programs. Problematizing these catchwords as "facile" and "tired" categories that are hard to fill meaningfully, and pondering the vagueness of the notion of "cultural dialogue," Joachim Sartorius, the former director of the German Goethe Institute, which co-sponsors many arts initiatives and events in the EU framework, put it this way during an interview: "After all these years the idea of cultural exchange has become questionable to me. Take Germany and France, for example: since the end of World War II we have the highest density of exchange and yet I ask myself how well do we actually know each other?" Sartorius voices something that most artworld actors are only able to acknowledge off the record, not least because the vocabulary of intercultural exchange as expressed in notions of "European identity,"

"tolerance" and "cultural dialogue" also presents a normative framework through which funding demands can be communicated to policy makers and officials. As such this vocabulary presents a source of legitimation, a prescription on part of politicians, called for by institutional necessity and sustained by a broadening public discourse that is hard to challenge, especially as it has informed EU initiatives that have certainly allowed for an unprecedented circulation of artists and artworks throughout Europe. Many artists and cultural workers also try to use these official European networks to create informal ones that may offer alternative approaches and enable them to work outside the fold.

Despite this awareness, the civic and emacipatory potential accorded to culture in general and the arts in particular have rendered it a preferred medium through which to address contemporary political problems for policy makers and cultural producers alike. In these processes different understandings of culture and the arts are merged, e.g. qualities such as cultivating impetus, meaning- and sense-making, the realm of everyday experiences that 'culture' is associated with, is joined with understandings of art (as a specific expression of culture) that are at times understood as divorced from the realm of politics and at others as one in which vital critiques of the political can be formulated and alternatives imagined. While in the framework of the EU the focus has been especially on the issue of integration; immigration and cultural diversity have come to center-stage in national contexts where it has wittingly or unwittingly tend to reproduced power differentials and reified notions of distinct and pristine cultures.

To demonstrate this notable conflation of different registers of culture and how it impacts the production and reception of art, let me turn briefly to one further example of experiences of artists from Turkey who have seen a considerable surge of attention from

the established European art world at the current political conjuncture. When invited to cultural or arts exchange programs they often find themselves not so much in the position of international artists, but rather (as alluded to above) classified within the categories of local migrant populations, regardless of whether they contest this ascription or not.

In 2004 Christopher Tannert, director of the *Künstlerhaus Bethanien* (Berlin), and his co-curator Peter Lang began preparations for an exhibition entitled *Urban Realities – Fokus Istanbul*. For this reason both traveled to Istanbul, researched artists in the archive of Platform Galerie, the contemporary art space funded by the *Garanti Bankasi*.[305] They met with curators Fulya Erdemci, Erden Kosova and Vasıf Kortun (himself the director of *Platform*) to arrange for contributions to the catalogue. The organizers had already secured funding through the *Hauptstadtkulturfond*, the Berlin Senate, and their home institution Künstlerhaus Bethanien' and whilst in Istanbul they also negotiated with the aforementioned *IKSV* for additional funding. All was well, it seemed. But when in May 2005 the official invitation letters were sent out that specified the concept and announced which artists and works were selected, a veritable outcry broke out in the Istanbul artworld which ultimately led to the withdrawal of 11 artists from the project (among those were the already introduced Halil Altındere and Gülsün Karamustafa, and other well-known artists such as Hale Tenger and Mehmet Erdener. Erdemci, Kosova and Kortun's too withdrew from their involvement in the exhibition). The refusal to participate as it was relayed in an open letter as well as during interviews that I conducted with three of the artist who withdrew, was based on both conceptual disagreements and

[305] Platform features a large archive of artists' portfolios that can be deposited there without solicitation and can be accessed by visitors, arts professionals and laypersons alike.

financial disparities. It seems that artists from Istanbul were asked to show older works and pay their own way to Berlin, while non-Turkish artists received funding to come to Istanbul and create new works, having all expenses covered. On the other hand, the artists argued that the official concept of the exhibition was "full of clichés about East and West, Christianity and Islam" (Altay et al. 2005, 22). They expressed discontent at being yet again grouped into a regionally themed show – which many diagnosed was the only way their works were being exhibited in Western Europe.[306] "Orientalism" and being categorized as "native informants" rather than artists were also frequent complaints. Tannert in turn also published an open letter going on the offensive, noting that he did not treat "artists from Turkey" as a wholesale group and that decisions about funding had been made on an individual basis (Tannert 2005, 23-25). During our interview, Tannert refuted that Orientalism or something akin to it was at play when conceptualizing the exhibition, and he as Peter Lang felt unduly characterized "after all their efforts, to study the Turkish art scene and learn about Turkey as well." Yet, quasi-culturalist explanations were volunteered by both of them, characterizing the artists' collective letter as typical for Turkey's corporatist political formation, a typical manifestation of the fragmentation and temper of in the Turkish artworld, and its (stereotypically noted) infighting.[307] While Tannert tried to confront the issue head-on, quite aware, as he said, that that this was "ultimately a struggle around the question about the right to represent the Other." He included both letters in the exhibition catalogue and convened a panel discussion – which

[306] Similarly themed exhibitions were for example: *In den Schluchten des Balkans* (2003, Fridericanum/Kassel), *Call me Istanbul ist mein Name* (2004, ZKM/Kassel), or the Şimdi/Now Festival in Berlin 2004.

[307] Ironically Tannert and Lang had initially also invited *Şakir Eczacıbaşı*, the chair of the *Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts,* and photographer by passion, to contribute to the show – as rumor has it to secure additional financial support for the exhibition. By doing so, the curators actually played into the power differentials and alignments that they criticized on part of the artists from Turkey. In the end *Eczacıbaşı* did not take part in the show, but the *IKSV* was one of the co-sponsors.

replayed the above outlined positions and thus went partially array. The *Fokus Istanbul*-affair, as it has become to be known, was never resolved. Like in the case of *ODA Projesi* mentioned above however, the Istanbul artists that I spoke to generally said that they too have been scrutinizing offers from Germany particularly, as not to be further pigeonholed as 'Turkish' artists.

This relates back to Kosnick's observations and her description of "the whiteness of cultural policy" of 'Western,' and in her case especially German, cultural institutions as (Kosnick 2007). Here she does not take whiteness as a racial category but rather as an ascription in which immigrant populations – and ultimately I would argue artists from their countries of 'origin' who are equated with them – are to produce 'culture' not in the sense of art, but of 'ethnic cultural production.' More often than not they are positioned as 'representatives' of 'their communities' and by extension 'their cultures' instead of as individual artists. This type of slippage between culture as aesthetics and artistic production and culture as demarcating not just difference, but an asymmetrical one is not coincidental but directly related to and indicative of the ambiguity that the current political deployment of 'culture' produces.

It is interesting to note in this context that this disposition in German – or Dutch (see above) – arts institutions falls at a conjuncture when anthropologists have traced how the art of 'others' has not only entered the art market (Myers 2002), but also upgraded from ethnographic artifacts to "*arts premiers*" as Sally Price describes in her study of the Quai Branly Museum of Paris (2007). Yet, as Price also shows, this has little if at all impacted how those producing the art were seen "once they found their way into Europe" (2007, 38).

The above examples illustrate yet again that the civic potential ascribed to the arts as well as to the seemingly progressive concepts of cultural exchange intersect with "culture talk" in a fashion that may produce the exact opposite of what they are thought to do. They also show that the asymmetrical relationship between Turkey and the European Union, and especially between Turkey and Germany, is being recast in cultural and artistic exchange programs, where questions of cultural difference come into play on the backdrop of Turkey's accession to the EU and the presence of immigrant populations from Turkey. The persistence of these kinds of conceptualizations is compounded by the fact that cultural producers are all too often trapped by the normative language set by funding descriptions, and have to bend their own visions – and maybe conceptions – to fit into categories that present "a plethora of conservative watchwords – tolerance, intercultural dialogue, European identity" (Kiwan/Meinhof 2006: 60) rather than being able to challenge them.[308] In a similar vein, some of the processes of foreclosure, framing, and circumscription of issues can also be connected to the way in which funding applications and formats are standardized both in form and content be it in the Turkish, German or larger European context (see Chapter 4).

The Parameters of Cultural Exchange and the Politics of European Integration

The above-described dynamics warrant the question: If these programs for intercultural exchange do not facilitate the dialogue that they set out to initiate, what is it then that they actually do? To attempt one possible answer to this question I would like to

[308] Most of the EU funded arts programs explicitly preference projects that are bi-or multinational, and frequently pairings between 'Eastern' and 'Western,' or, member and candidate countries as well as projects that explicitly thematize cultural diversity. It is important to note that these funds are awarded to cover project costs only, and do not contribute to establishing sustainable, organizational structures that could ensure the longevity these emancipatory agendas.

turn to an argument that James Ferguson formulated in his article "The Anti-Politics Machine" (2006). The basic issue that underlies Ferguson's argument is at first sight quite different from the topic of this chapter, but is highly instructive for the case at hand. He takes as his point of departure the Thaba-Tseka development project in Lesotho. Initiated in the early 1970s it originally garnered much attention and high hopes, but was categorized as unsuccessful by 1979. He posits that although the project was branded a failure, it actually ended up engendering results that may help us understand why similar projects remain on the agenda of development politics. Namely it produced an increased incorporation into the state by putting into place administrative structures and government services which ultimately also entail "'services' which serve to govern" (2006, 271). Viewed in this vein the cultural and arts exchange initiatives outlined above do indeed bring about a 'Europeanization' of the cultural sector – even if in a different manner than officially intended. One could thus argue that, like the development projects that Ferguson discusses, EU arts programs too develop "a logic that transcends the question of planners intentions" (Ferguson 2006, 272) including an extension of power, in this case, of the supranational structure of the European Union through the administration and implementation of arts programs and their public perception (cf. Shore 2006). One concrete instance in which such incorporation manifests itself is the establishment of Cultural Contact Points in almost all participating countries of *Culture 2000* and its follow-up program *Culture 2007-2013*. While they are supported through respective national institutions they are also contractually bound to the Directorate General of Education and Culture. I believe that these units should not be understood as simply performing the much-needed task of disseminating information on these programs

and providing administrative assistance. They also signal a further institutional incorporation of the cultural sector into the European arena. Even if only by default, they present vehicles that aid the transmission of normative language in which projects need to be framed in order to be competitive for EU funding.

There is however another aspect that Ferguson raises and that may give us an interesting point of entry for thinking about the multiple roles accorded to arts and culture within the European framework. He argues that by "uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem […] the hegemonic problematic of development is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in the world today" (2006, 273).[309] Analogously, as an array of social and economic predicaments in the European Union are reduced to problematics of either too much divergent culture (as in disruptive cultural diversity) or too little common culture (as in insufficiently realized European cultural identity), arts and culture programs are increasingly presented as progressive avenues to address both. While, for instance, arts projects on the issue of migration have seen increasing attention from funding agencies, and thus have been able to exhibit and perform innovative and critical approaches to this topic, national and EU policies on immigration and asylum regulations have been tightened at the same time. In this way, progressive agendas aiming to challenge and redirect the process of Europeanization could be said to actually aid the consolidation of the very conditions they set out to critique.[310] It is in this regard that it could be argued that they at least weaken, if not

[309] Similarly Mirza (2005) argues that rather than addressing root causes of social exclusion, national cultural policy in Britain increasingly aims to mend the psychological impact of exclusion through the arts.
[310] The "Final External Evaluation of the Culture 2000 programme (2000-2006)" that "[o]verall, the Culture 2000 program has been successful in generating the intended results and impacts but less successful in capturing detailed information and evidence regarding the extent of achievement" (ECOTEC 2008, 9), strikes me as highly problematic and seems to suggest that what constitutes (measurable) success in these programs requires further qualitative research.

depoliticize, artworks and events that address these issues. Recasting asymmetrical relationships within the space of Europe the practicalities of intercultural dialogue programs also put into question the long-held dichotomy between cultural policy as directed from 'above' and cultural politics as marking contestations and "critical-emancipatory practices" from 'below' (Stevenson 1999). The art of integration thus emerges at the convergence of different interests and intents, with at times rather adversarial outcomes, with politicians and EU officials concentrating on the realm of culture, and actors from the cultural sector relating their activities to the formation of a more united EU.

Looking at the European Union one is confronted with a complex picture in which culture is both autonomous and subject to regulation, diverse but common and shared, pointing to past heritage and to future assemblage. Ill-defined at best, culture, and with it the arts, has become a key node of integration and accession. While culture is portrayed as ensuring a more democratized participation, it has also polarized most public debates – economic regulations, stipulations concerning agriculture have, activists' efforts to contrary, been pushed into the background of public perception, media coverage and the European conference circuit. Another paradox is that EU cultural initiatives continue to command relatively modest operating budgets and lack centrally coordinated effort.[311] Thus it could be questioned to what extent the signaling power of these programs transcends the cultural sector proper and how it impacts perceptions of or identifications with the EU in the general population. Yet, it is in these interstices

[311] This is as Staiger outlines not least due to the "relative weakness of the DG in terms of its bearing on EU institutional policy articulation" (2009, 9). Together with the above-described departmental fragmentation this also hinders systematic application of article 151.4 (Gordon/Adams 2007, 9-10).

between discourses on and the operationalization of 'culture' in EU funded programs that we can discern an emerging European Cultural Policy – in lieu of the previously held notion that there is only a 'cultural policy *for* Europe' that aims to reinforce its member states' national sovereignty in the realm of culture. What seems to operate only on Turkey also has repercussions for the German case, not only in form of institutional incorporation and the highly normativized language of intercultural dialogue, but also in terms of framing receptions of both art projects presented in this vein and EU politics. These two locations engender, of course, only two out of many possible examples, suggesting that further research on the ramifications of this nascent policy formation is necessary.

Connotations with idealized and idealistic philosophical underpinnings such as art as a source of civic education and the connection between aesthetics and ethics have rendered the arts a 'successful' medium through which to make the claim for European unity or project an image of acknowledged cultural diversity within the nation-state, while simultaneously evoking the exclusionary potential of the concept of culture in its incarnation as fundamental alterity. The very productiveness of culture in the political areas outlined in this chapter, its prominence in EU integration debates, and in German and Turkish discussions of multiculturalism, its expediency (Yúdice 2003), its seductiveness (Scott 2003) is based on the circumstance that the term can and does constantly traverse the boundaries between these seemingly discreet domains of the political, the social and the economic. These processes, which are not new, but are now brought together in governance efforts by EU and national actors in a novel formation in

which an array of claims and interests are conveyed through the turn to culture. At the same time, the deflection of the political issue of cultural diversity into the realm of the aesthetic also frames art (and thus our perception thereof) – artists' intentions frequently to the contrary – in a particular manner.[312] Art, because of its prestige and proposed autonomy has always been an embattled domain, and the progressiveness associated with contemporary art has made it a target for all kinds of appropriation attempts, be they political or economic. Again, neither the incorporation nor the circumscription of artworks' reception are new by any stretch, but have been reconfigured as politics have relied on the rhetoric of culture. As an array of pressing concerns are being mediated by relying on culture and the arts, questions arise about the place for critical political expressions and interventions. I posit that what we can witness here is not just the governance *of* culture and the arts (i.e. the 'traditional' focus of cultural policy), but the attempt to govern *through* culture not only on the national but also the transnational level. With culture as the main, or rather, most visible object of politics, pressing concerns in the European context like that of integration have been relayed to this realm rather than, lets say, to that of social equity (see also Holmes 2000). In his analysis of the nascent EU culture policy Cris Shore sees its formation as indicative of nothing short of

> "[…] the EU's 'will to power.' By isolating and classifying a specific domain of 'European culture' and then establishing programmes to intervene and order that sector for purposes of employment and social cohesion, EU cultural policy not only functions to bolster the legitimacy of the EU project, it also enlarges the scope of EU power and authority, extending its competences into new 'occupied fields' of governance" (2006,10).

[312] Susan Wright has described similar shifts as indicating "The Politicization of 'Culture'" (1998). I would suggest, however, that they rather present a 'culturalization of politics.' The above-described displacement of social and political problems onto cultural policy goes hand in hand with the deployment of culture for governance, and thus the governance *through* culture.

Rather than wholesale dismissal of the transformative capabilities that art may have in these political processes, it seems important to acknowledge this shift in governance to be able to fundamentally address existing vicissitudes, especially in the wake of the Council's "Conclusion on the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue in the external relations of the Union and its Member States" that in reinforces recent calls for a comprehensive foreign cultural policy on part of the European Union (Council of the European Union 2008, see also van Weringh/Schürmann 2004). As cultural diplomacy and the 'soft power' of culture and arts programs continues to be heralded both in Turkey and in Germany, the EU is preparing to transpose its 'civilizing impact' onto other geopolitical areas – always claiming that Europe, in contrast to the U.S.,[313] 'values culture' and thus operates, even if differentially, from a moral highground (Böröcz 2006).

[313] These recent developments contradict Timothy Garton Ash's notion of the 'benevolence' of Europeanization as an inward process, in contrast to 'Americanization,' which he proposes has a homogenizing and expansionist impetus (2007).

Concluding Remarks

"Lessons in diminished particularity"

Wolf Lepenies begins the first chapter of his "The Seduction of Culture in German History" with the words:

> "if there is anything that can be called a specific German ideology, it consists in playing off romanticism against the Enlightenment, the Middle Ages against the modern world, culture against civilization, and *Gemeinschaft* against *Gesellschaft*. […] Culture was seen as a noble substitute for politics."

Opening with what could be regarded as rather standardized way of imagining and representing German thought, Lepenies, however, makes an unexpected turn when he notes:

> "Having thus described the German ideology in my first book *Melancholy and Society* (1969), I was pleased when Hans Magnus Enzensberger quoted my argument in one of his essays. Pleasure turned into perplexity though, when I realized that he had used my own words to characterize the modern history of – Spain. Thus I was taught an ironic lesson. German history is not nearly as exceptional as the Germans are inclined to believe. Culture has been seen as a substitute for politics at many times and in many places" (Lepenies 2006, 9).

Still, narratives of exceptionalism exist (and persist) for Germany, as they do for Turkey. In Germany they have (re)emerged periodically after WWII, during Germany's rearmament period beginning in 1955, and through commentaries on German reunification, and the rise of anti-immigrant violence and the New Right in the early 1990s. Yet, as discussed above, Germany's normalization efforts have also been 'highly' successful; its 'Western belonging' – not least in terms of its artistic lineage – is no longer questioned.

In the Turkish case, the motif of exception is the legacy of official historiography as much as of scholarship on Turkey. As I have argued in the first chapter of this dissertation, even approaches that aim to diverge from these presets, frequently end up

reifying the very same stereotypical notions: These narratives tend to begin with Turkey's loaded geopolitical location as Western yet Eastern, then turn to assessments of the country being Muslim yet secular, modern yet traditional, democratic yet authoritarian, to name but some of the conceptual dichotomies frequently employed when Turkey is thematized in scholarship – and politics, both from within and without. Alternative positions have, for the most part, limited themselves to a bridging metaphor, in which the dichotomous categories above are merged, the 'yet' substituted by an 'and.' This turn, however, has done little to amend these longstanding categorizations that, manifest in the notion of belated modernity, have served as a shorthand, an explanatory model for all of Turkey's predicaments, including genocidal violence in the lead-up to the Republic's inception, uneven economic development, militarism and limitations of free-speech. In "Provicializing Europe," Dipesh Chakrabarty, turning to "the themes of 'failure,' 'lack,' and 'inadequacy'" that are as ubiquitous in historical and contemporary thought on India as they are in those on Turkey, suggests "a gesture of inversion" in order to transcend this limited perspective: "Let us […] read 'plentitude' and 'creativity' where this narrative has made us read 'lack' and 'inadequacy'" (Chakrabarty 2000, 34-35).

While it might be appropriate to employ "plentitude" and "creativity" to characterize the aesthetic expressions and the multitude of debates, past and present, on the arts emanating from Turkey (as well as from other "artistic peripheries" as they are often called; see Bydler 2004), this study has tried to move away from the notions of 'lack' and 'failure' in Turkish modernization, not least by pointing to comparable debates evidencing that 'in Germany too' similar preoccupations regarding the mutual

expressiveness of art and modernity have existed, and in different shapes and forms continue to do so. By juxtaposing and thinking through the German and Turkish cases together I have argued that – all historical specificities notwithstanding – both present struggles with the normativity of modern power, in which the mutually dependent projects of nationalism and modernity have impacted how the arts are thought about and are presented. It is thus no coincidence that the dissertation ends by discussing the cases of Berlin and Istanbul, their convergences and divergences, in a decidedly European context (in regard to both, the 'idea of Europe' and its institutional manifestation of the European Union).

The deployment and appropriation by state and other actors in Germany and Turkey reveal art as a rich site to interrogate the paradoxes of modernity, and thus conceptions of modernity itself. These paradoxes manifest themselves in tensions between understandings of art as an universal human expression and a particularly national one; its role as a civilizing agent and its, at times, troubling uses in mass incitement; and between art as a deeply personal articulation, a common good – and – a commodity. It is this particular political dimension of art that this study has focused on by analyzing how the paradoxes of modernity are navigated in the artworld. Although their arts policies and legacies have varied considerably, artworld actors in Berlin and Istanbul reconcile tensions arising from contradictory understandings of art by referring to its purported civic impact, frequently drawing on the sanctioned national art histories that are vested in claims for modernity.

Although the evaluations of their art scenes and the realization of their normatively, and thus similarly, formulated cultural policies have varied considerably, artworld actors in Berlin and Istanbul indeed employ a joint vocabulary in trying to reconcile tensions arising from contradictory understandings of art by referring to its purported civic impact, and by framing their activities as contributing to 'the greater good.' What constitutes the greater good it often explicated by drawing on sanctioned national (art) histories that are in both cases vested in claims for modernity. It is in this context that the 'national' as a frame of reference (or explanatory device) reinserts itself, long-standing transnational movements in the arts notwithstanding. This is especially true for those artworld actors that are removed from the more immediate process of artistic production and presentation (e.g. exhibiting) of art. That this is the case for cultural policy makers, politicians and those working in national arts institutions such as museums may come as no surprise. But we also encounter these kinds of narratives from those selling, buying, collecting and sponsoring art, and who, as I have shown, struggle to frame economic gains as mere byproducts of their service to the arts (and thus the artist and vice versa) and 'the people,' where the state falls short to support the arts. This in not to say, however, that the reliance on national (art) histories necessarily presents an affirmation thereof. After all, artists and other artworld actors also employ the dimension of 'the national' as a lens for analytical critique. Indeed, most of the contemporary artists discussed in this study are critical of the state and national narratives. Yet they are also bound to them by way of citizenship – or rather by merely 'being from a place': while artists from Germany can today define and position themselves as international artists without question, their counterparts from Turkey still have to insist to be recognized as

such, and not to be solely categorized (and exoticized) according to their place of origin (Chapter 7). It is in this vein that art from Turkey is marked (whereas art from Germany is not)[314] as the perception and evaluation of artworks (and artists) is related back to nationally connoted frameworks, rather than intrinsic, artistic qualities. This is at least one of the ways in which for artists, too, the 'national' reinserts itself regardless of their personal preferences.

The Politics of Art, The Art of Politics

Anthropologist and social scientist in general have increasingly turned their attention to the artists, their practices (Schneider/Wright 2006) and the "the work [of art] itself" (Becker 2003, Deveaux 2003) as well as to proposing research agendas towards a better understanding of the impact of "art on people's lives" (Csikszentmihalyi 2003, cf. Belfiore/Bennet 2008). Notoriously hard to research, the question of audience reception – (so fervently taken up by Cultural Studies) has again moved center-stage. This is not only the case in academia, but also in cultural policy itself, especially as budget cuts in the cultural sector, both on the national and EU level have given justifications for arts funding heightened urgency. Audience impact studies have so far, however, yielded little 'measurable' results (see for instance ECOTEC 2008), not least because verbalizations concerning the reception of art frequently rely on pragmatic shorthands that straddle the philosophical underpinnings of art as well as mechanisms of distinction (Bourdieu/Darbel

[314] The question remains who is or can be the object/subject of an artwork. For instance, artists from Germany (or Western European artists in general) who produce works during Istanbul residency programs are often said to comment on "Turkish society" or the city of Istanbul, while artists from Turkey who produce work in Germany (or Western Europe for that matter) are rarely if ever noted to be commenting on "German society."

1990). It is through these shorthands that different expectations, divergent concepts of and interest in the arts are mediated (Chapter 2). While further research on the everyday 'verbalization' of the anticipated effects and affects produced by art is needed, I would argue that to avert the risks and allures of romanticizing the impact of the arts, a decidedly institutional approach is vital in these endeavors in order to grasp the different political dimensions of art (including the politics of the artworld in its narrower sense, with its particular make-up, power-differentials and interdependencies). As I have tried to show, these institutional practices, like national historiographies, significantly frame – intendedly or unintendedly – the presentation and perception of art, at times contrary to artists' intentions.

Throughout this study I have tried to trace how art is imagined, especially with regard to its proposed civic impact that, after all, renders it a provenance of government – and an avenue through which to claim modernity in its contradictory facets of both universalism and nationalism. As the arts are frequently interpreted as an extension, or, manifestation of culture, conceptions of citizenship are likewise transposed on the arts in the Germany and Turkey, especially as both countries have ultimately framed citizenship in organicist, and hence ethnic terms.

But it is not only conceptions of citizenship, nationhood and modernity that can be projected on the arts. The constant slippage between *Culture* as in the arts, and culture as a symbolic denominator and an economic and developmental facilitator (in cultural policy and beyond), signals the conceptual capacity of art and 'the creative' to traverse the seeming boundaries between the social, political and economic. The very

productiveness of culture (and the arts) in the national political realm, its prominence in EU arena and its connotation of 'soft power' in diplomatic ventures, especially in addressing issues of cultural diversity and economic development, relates back to Lepenies' statement of culture presenting a possible or actual "substitute for politics […] in many places."

Yet, as I have argued throughout this study, art is also a somewhat unwieldy vehicle for these types of projections, and is as much a conduit of governance as a challenge to it. As Germany and Turkey share an acute awareness of how their the political, social and cultural make-up is perceived both by its own 'publics' and abroad, artistic production that references systematic violence or other 'decilizing moments,' is frequently delegitimized by questioning the relationship between reality and artistic renderings thereof. These decivilizing moment become visible not only in the thematization of the *RAF* and the symbolic and actual violence it was connoted to, but also permeate how certain art collections are financed and assembled (Chapter 4). They appear as historical manifestations in the urban space that bears the marks of dispossession and misappropriation (Chapter 6). While art, at times, underwrites these moments, it can also pose a challenge to them. The interventions by Renata Stih and Frieder Schnock and in the accounts given by *Freekick* (Chapter 5) present but two instances that disrupt the claims of a linearly conceptualized path to modernity by addressing ambiguities in the constitution of modern-ness and notions of 'Western belonging.' As such the concerns and tensions around claims to modernity and 'Western belonging' are expressed in a similar yet historically distinctive fashion, e.g. when it comes to expressions that can be construed as challenges to national sovereignty as in the

case of Turkey, or by referring to the NS legacy in Germany. In these processes the state as well as other artworld actors are constantly engaged in practices that transgress, but also restore the boundaries between politics and art (e.g. by employing the argument of the autonomy of art in a contradictory manner). Rather than ascribing a wholesale resistant impetus to the production and reception of art, further research into how art is being made politically productive, and what actually constitutes the place of the political in art and beyond is needed.

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