

SWORD VERSUS SHIELD: THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON RIVALRY

by

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Abstract

The Impact of Democracy on Rivalry

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The democratic peace deals with pairs of states that are least likely to fight. Rivalry scholarship deals with pairs of states that are most likely to fight. By putting the two phenomena together, one can examine the effects of democratization on the conflict behavior of states. Does democratization exacerbates existing tensions or mollify them? I argue that when a rivalry between a democracy and a non-democracy becomes jointly democratic, the rivalry as a whole deescalates. Since the institutional explanation of the democratic peace, unlike the case for the normative explanation, is power sensitive, I infer that the magnitude of de-escalation itself should be also conditioned by the relative power between the rival states. In so doing, I am in essence, applying the logic of the democratic peace to the domain of enduring rivalry.

I test the theoretical expectations using both statistics and case studies. Using data on conflict behavior from the Correlates of War and on regime characteristics from the Polity project, I conduct two sets of quantitative tests using logistic and survival analysis. I also use the rivalry between Peru and Ecuador over a disputed border from 1979 to 2000 as a case study. I split the rivalry into two time periods based on the direction of dyadic regime change. Overall the evidence supported the theoretical expectation that

democratization ameliorates conflict, even within rivalry. Furthermore, I found more support for the institutional explanation compared to the normative alternative.

The research makes three contributions to the literature. First, I identify regime change in rivalry as a domain suitable for a critical test of the democratic peace and conduct one such test. Second, I investigate behavioral change in rivalry rather than just rivalry termination. The field knows that democracy helps to terminate rivalry but lacks a theory of how this comes to be. I provide a first cut at such a theory. Third, I address the cost-benefits analysis of democratization. Contrary to works which assert that democratization increases the likelihood of war, I demonstrate evidence that democratization does not exacerbate on-going rivalries.

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On a more personal note, I want to thank Unice Soh (she knows why) and acknowledge the indirect influence of my brother, Bann Vei Tan.

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Chapter One

Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy. Democracies do not attack each other; they make better partners in trade and diplomacy. (Clinton 1994)

...The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. ...So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. (Bush 2005)

1. Introduction

In late January of the year 2011, severe protests broke out in Egypt which eventually brought about the downfall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak. When asked about the events in Egypt at a security conference in Munich on the 5th of February 2011, the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton warned:

There are risks with the transition to democracy. It can be chaotic. It can cause short-term instability. Even worse and we have seen it before, the transition can backslide into just another authoritarian regime.¹

The reaction of the United States towards the potential democratization of Egypt was remarkable both for its cautiousness and its explicit articulation of underlying policy assumptions.² It is the articulation that is of interest. In broad theoretical terms, what are the international consequences of regime transitions, especially democratic transitions? The US is presumably concerned with the implication of an Egyptian transition on the future of the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords. It must be asking if the democratization of Egypt will lead to a revival of the Egyptian-Israeli rivalry. Secretary Clinton's

¹ One can view a video recording of her speech at the following newsite: BBC, 2/5/2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12373071> (last accessed 2/5/2011). The quote illustrates a mindset amongst some policymakers that democratization must destabilize international security.

² Since Egypt under President Mubarak was a long term US ally, the US was understandably reluctant to endorse the opposition's demand that Mubarak step down immediately. For a timeline of the Egyptian transition, see <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12425375> (last assessed 2/21/2011).

reference to democratic transitions causing “short-term instability” suggests one possible view. In this dissertation, I suggest another.

The conflict behavior of democratizing states already within hostile militarized relationship known as a rivalry is the primary focus of this dissertation. I argue that democratization deescalates even within a rivalry context. The premise behind this argument is that long term entrenched hostility towards an opponent state develops its own constituencies who benefit from the continuation of the status quo. For example, during the Cold War, institutions developed in both the US and the USSR who benefited from the continuation of the US-Soviet rivalry. Democratization changes the composition of those constituencies. Consequently, it should also cause interstate conflict behavior change, even in rivalry. Since the prospects for peace, according to democratic peace theorizing, is greatest in a jointly democratic dyad,³ it follows that democratization into joint democracy is more likely to result in deescalation.

Given the dual nature of my research focus, I draw from both democratic peace and rivalry research. I ask three related questions. First, what is the impact of democratization on conflict propensity within the democratic peace literature? In the discussion that follows from this question, it will become apparent that democratization is just one type of regime change, and therefore a consideration of impact of other types of regime transitions is useful. Second, what is the impact of democratization on conflict propensity within rivalry? In the discussion that follows from this second question, I argue it is necessary to go beyond the selection effect of democracies in rivalry. I use

³ I follow the convention of classifying dyads or pairs of states according to their dyadic regime type. There are three types of dyads: democratic dyads have two democracies, autocratic dyads have two autocracies and mixed dyads have one of each.

existing accounts of rivalry termination to derive implications for the conflict propensity of rivalries that fail to terminate. Third, how can we distinguish between the institutional and normative accounts of the democratic peace using the conflict behavior of democratizing states? In the discussion on this question, I argue that the relative power between the rivals state can be used to distinguish between the alternative accounts.

For the rest of the chapter, I will devote one section to discuss each of the three research questions. I will follow up by explaining the structure of the dissertation. Finally, I will summarize the anticipated significance of the research. In so doing, I address what the research is about (section 2, 3, 4), how I intend to conduct it (section 5), and the significance of this research (section 6).

2. The effects of democratization on conflict propensity from the democratic peace perspective.

The democratic peace, or the absence of wars between democracies, is and remains one of the more robust findings in International Relations (Kant 1795; Babst 1972; Doyle 1983; and many, many since). If democracies enjoy pacific relations with each other, the spread of democracies may accordingly, pacify international relations. Democratization, thus becomes, a strategy for promoting peace. Prominent policy-makers within the United States (Clinton 1994, Bush 2005) have interpreted this implication as an imperative for democracy promotion.

Mansfield and Snyder (1995a, b) however, challenged this policy implication in two high profile articles with their finding that democratization itself increases the prospect for war. They argued with democratization, a previously closed polity opens itself up to increased political demands by the populace. The old elites, who now face

competition from a new set of elites, react by adopting nationalism as a strategy of political mobilization. By playing the nationalism card, even elites who are not otherwise overtly nationalistic, must be seen to defend the nationalistic or risk being deemed non-patriotic. When all domestic factions are engaging in nationalism, the foreign policy of a democratizing state captured by overt nationalism tends to be excessively belligerent. The wars that democratizing states engaged in are thus a by-product of a belligerent foreign policy.

The findings by Mansfield and Snyder attracted critical attention (Thompson & Tucker 1997, Enterline 1996, Gleditsch and Ward 1998, Oneal and Russett 1997, Maoz 1998).⁴ Mansfield and Snyder addressed some objections in subsequent works (Mansfield and Snyder 2002a and b, 2005). They modified their argument to claim that incomplete democratization, or transitions from autocratic to partially democratic regimes (anocracy), increase conflict propensities (that is, the onset of war and of militarized disputes). Their modified argument distinguishes between mature democracies, which have the institutional capacity to cope with demands for political participation without resorting to nationalism as a mobilization strategy, and anocracies⁵ which do not. The tenor of their argument is clear, democratization is posited to increase conflict propensity.

This constitutes the first distinct perspective on the democratization-conflict linkage.

⁴ Thompson & Tucker (1997) could not replicate Mansfield and Snyders' 1995 findings. Enterline (1996, 1998a and b) and Gleditsch and Ward (1998, 2000) found evidence for the opposite, that democratization reduces conflict propensity and that the geographical context matters. Oneal and Russett (1998) and Maoz (1998) questioned whether a monadic research design can address the dyadic democratic peace phenomenon. See Daxecker (2007) for an overview of the 'democratization causes war' literature. See also Rousseau (2005) for a discussion between the condition and the process of democratization.

⁵ Anocracy is a category used in Polity IV to denote hybrid regimes with a mix of democratic and autocratic characteristics. They can be thought as a middle ground between democracy and autocracy.

Within the democratic peace scholarship, four other perspectives emerged in reaction to this dangerous democratization thesis. If, Gleditsch and Ward (1998: 53) reasoned, the resort to nationalism provides benefits to elites during democratization, the same dynamic should occur between elites in mature democracies. The fact that such dynamic do not frequently occur in mature democracies suggest that the democratic peace and dangerous democratization are contradictory phenomena. This view is furthermore buttressed by an empirical finding that democratization decreases conflict propensity (Gleditsch and Ward 1998, 2000; Enterline 1996, 1998a and b; Bennett and Stam 2004). This idea, that an extension of the democratic peace logic to democratizing states should imply a peaceful transition, constitutes a distinctive and diametrically opposite view in the literature.

If regime change in a democratic direction is pacifying, does that suggests that regime change in an autocratic direction, or autocratization, is dangerous? A literature based on from the informational approach to interstate conflict (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001) suggests that autocratization might be perilous. Under the informational approach, clear signals of intent resolve conflict. The credibility of such signals differs by regime-type. Democratic leaders tend to send clearer signals compared to autocratic leaders because they face a higher domestic audience costs for foreign policy failures.⁶ This has the effect of making signals from democracies more credible compared to signals from autocracies. It follows that autocratization reduces the quality of the signal sent and hence

⁶ Autocrats can cope with foreign policy failures with direct repression, an option that is not available to democratic leaders.

increases conflict propensity (Daxecker 2007). Dangerous autocratization is therefore a third perspective in the literature.

A fourth perspective focuses on the composition of the dyad rather than on the direction of regime change. According to the autocratic peace literature (Werner 2000; Peceny, Beer, Sanchez-Terry 2002), the management of domestic affairs is a potential source of interstate conflict. Dyads with states that manage their domestic affairs in a similar fashion, joint democracy or joint autocracy, should have lower conflict propensity compared to mixed dyads with states that are politically dissimilar. It follows that regime transitions into similar democratic or autocratic dyads should be less conflict prone. Transition into mixed dyads however, should have higher conflict propensities. Political dissimilarity constitutes the fourth perspective in the literature.

The fifth perspective focused on the act of regime change itself rather than on the direction of change. A state undergoing regime change may be the target of foreign adversaries who seek to exploit its temporal instability. Elites within the transitioning states may in turn, seek foreign conflict as diversion from their domestic problems. These dynamics are not unique to democratizing states alone (Daxecker 2007: 535). Furthermore, from the informational viewpoint, regime transitions disrupt both the preferences of the transitioning states and the clarity of the signals it sends. This increases the chance of miscommunication which in turn increases conflict propensity. I term this the political instability thesis to capture the fifth perspective on the effects of regime transition in the literature.

A review of extant literature revealed a lack of consensus on the effect of democratization on conflict propensity. Two of the five perspectives, the dangerous and

pacific democratization thesis are in direct contradiction with each other. The other three perspectives posit autocratization, political dissimilarity and political instability as alternative candidates for increased conflict. Although I do evaluate the effects of non-democratic transitions,⁷ the emphasis will be on the effects of democratization on conflict behavior within rivalry. This emphasis is reasonable given the normative premium Western democracies, especially the United States, place on democracy promotion. If democratization exacerbates existing tensions, policy-makers may have to balance their desire for democracy with their need for international stability. If on the other hand, democratization ameliorates international conflict, the case for democracy promotion is bolstered. In either event, policy-making can be improved by an examination of the empirical record.

3. The effects of democratization on conflict propensity from the rivalry perspective.

This section addresses i) the concept of rivalry, and ii) explains its use as a domain for testing. It will follow by iii) reviewing two accounts of the effects of democratization on conflict perspectives within rivalry. It also addresses concerns based on iv) the rarity of democratization in rivalry, and on v) the representativeness of democratic rivalry.

A rivalry is a long term repeated conflict between the same pair of states. If interstate relationships can be placed on a cooperative-adversarial spectrum, some pairs of states would be placed on the cooperation end, for example the special relationship

⁷ I evaluate the effects of the non-democratic regime transitions quantitatively in chapter four, and qualitatively in chapter six.

between the United States and United Kingdom, while other pairs would be placed on adversarial end, for example, India and Pakistan (Thompson 2001a). One advantage of rivalry is its ability to cut through the background noise of international relations to focus on the key dynamic. The essence of the Cold War for example is the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The core of the South Asia security complex is the rivalry between Pakistan and India. Similarly, international security in the Middle East revolves around the multiple Arab-Israeli rivalries.

This dissertation uses the enduring rivalry as the domain with which to test the theoretical expectations. While there are three conceptions of rivalry, enduring rivalry (Klein et al. 2006), interstate rivalry (Bennett 1998) and strategic rivalry (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2008), they are variants of the two themes (see also, Cox 2010: 3). The theme is to either emphasize the number of militarized disputes (the enduring rivalry approach) or actor's perceptions and issues of disagreement (the strategic rivalry approach); or a combination of these two (the interstate rivalry approach). I decide on enduring rivalry conception for two reasons. First, the enduring rivalry conception is widely used in the rivalry literature. This is a fact recognized even by the proponents of the major alternative, the strategic rivalry conception (for example, Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2008:37).⁸ Using a mainstream data makes for an easier cumulation of knowledge.

The second reason has to deal with the role of relative power in rivalry. The strategic rivalry conception tends towards the view that rivalries are more likely to occur

⁸ This may be changing. The strategic rivalry conception seems to more popular in recent years.

and be sustained between equally strong rivals (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2008: 52). By contrast, the enduring rivalry is agnostic view on this issue (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 25; Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006: 342). This difference is crucial since I leverage relative power as a means to differentiate between alternative explanations of the democratic peace (as will be discussed in a later section). If power disparity is to serve as a control variable in my research design (in my quantitative chapters), I need a rivalry conception that *does not* include power parity as a condition of rivalry formation in the first place. Otherwise, biases in the rivalry dataset construction may threaten the inferences that can be made about the role of power disparity in interaction with democratization. Thus, given my substantive research focus, the enduring rivalry conception is preferable.

Why use rivalry as the domain for theory testing? There are theoretical, methodological and pragmatic reasons for its use.

Theoretically, not all dyads are equal in their conflict propensity. A given pair of state, say Switzerland and Tibet may lack the capacity to fight while another given pair, say, the United States and Canada may lack a reason to fight. A subsequent finding that such dyads do not fight is trivial. What is needed, in order for the absence of conflict to be meaningful, is a way to narrow the population to cases that have a realistic chance of fighting.⁹ This is what rivalry as a domain provides. By zooming in on pairs of states with a history of militarized conflict with each other, the focus shifts from the peace between

⁹ One alternative is to use the Politically Relevant Dyads (PRDs, Bremer 1992), which are pairs of states which are contiguous or which involve major powers. The problem with PRDs, according to Kinsella and Russett (2002) is that they capture the opportunity aspect of conflict but not the motivational aspect of conflict. Rivalry in their framework could constitute both an opportunity and a willingness to fight, since rivals by definition has had a history of fighting.

two random states into the peace between two rivals. Unlike the former, the later is a substantively interesting phenomenon that requires explanation.

Rivalry is also appropriate as a domain because of the prevalence of nationalism within it. Under the dangerous democratization argument (Mansfield and Snyder 2005) elites use nationalism as a mobilizational strategy to secure their power. In such an environment, especially ethnic co-nationals in disputed territories are involved, leaders tend towards what Huth and Allee (2002: 758) terms a “pragmatic nationalist bias”. They opt for continued stalemate rather than the alternative policy of conciliation. It is a pragmatic choice because leaders who offer unreciprocated cooperation within a rivalry tend to lose their jobs (Colaresi 2004). By focusing on rivalry, one is selecting an environment where such nationalism is most likely to be found.¹⁰ This is thus a hard test for the pacific democratization argument but an easy test for the dangerous democratization argument.

Methodologically, rivalry appeals because its analytic focus reduces the effects of confounding variables. By focusing on the conflict behavior of the same pair of states over time, the history of the rivals, the identity of the participants, the conflict history, the motivations for conflict, and interference by third party states would have been held constant because it is the same rivalry pair (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 108). This construct approximates a natural experiment where we examine the effect of democratization on conflict behavior, holding all other confounding variables at their constants.

¹⁰ I thank Micheal Colaresi for this suggestion.

Democratic Peace research tends to study the effects of democratization on conflict propensity--which is a general concern. By contrast, rivalry research tends to study rivalry termination (a recent example would be Cox 2010) which is a specific concern. As a consequence, accounts of the effects of democratization on conflict behavior are more developed within rivalry research compared to their democratic peace counterparts. To promote the cumulation of knowledge, it makes pragmatic sense to build upon existing studies (Bennett 1997; Prins and Daxecker 2007) of the effects of democratization within rivalry. Since both studies focus on rivalry termination and my focus is on conflict behavior within rivalry (as discussed later), I am extending their respective arguments onto conflict behavior within rivalry. What follows is a synopsis of the two accounts, with a detailed exposition in Chapter Four.

Under Bennett's group policy preference model, a leader needs the support of internal groups in order to maintain power. A common way to satisfy these groups is to enact policies they prefer. Under a rivalry, groups who benefit from the prosecution of the rivalry are likely to favor its continuation. Consequently, "policy change is most likely when the groups supporting a state's leader change" (Bennett 1997: 373). Democratization, Bennett posited, is a source of such change (ibid. 379). Democratization changes the composition of internal support groups, in so doing allowing for deescalatory policies to emerge.¹¹

Under the informational model, both information asymmetry and non-credible commitments can cause bargaining failures (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001). As a kind of

¹¹ To be sure, Bennett's 1997 argument is rather complex. Here I am interpreting his arguments in terms of deescalation/escalation. In chapter four, I interpret his argument in terms of the risk of militarized disputes.

bargaining failure, Prins and Daxecker (2007) argues rivalry persists due to the absence of credible commitments rather than to information asymmetry. This is because rivals already have repeated militarized confrontations with each other and consequently have updated and accurate information (no information asymmetry). Since democracies send credible signals due to its higher domestic audience costs, democratization helps to end rivalry by allowing democratic rivals to make credible commitments. Democratization, therefore, ameliorates rivalry and eventually terminates it by making deescalatory policies more credible.

I address at this point two related concerns on the use of rivalry. The first is on the rarity of the phenomenon in question. Democratization is an infrequent event and a rivalry is already a subset of the universe of all dyads. Putting the two together may generate a population that is too few in number to study. Even if the phenomena in question is rare (and I argue it is not), it can have intrinsic importance and hence be worthy of study. For example, the multiple regime changes occurring in the Middle East in 2011 are clearly rare events (before the Arab Spring, the Middle East had heretofore been characterized by stable autocracies) that can have dramatic consequences for the foreign policy of the United States. Epidemics, wars, and economic depressions are three statistically rare phenomena that are nevertheless, that have consequences important enough to receive scholarly attention.

The concern with rarity may also be misplaced. Here, it is crucial to distinguish between a variable and values of a variable (Fearon 1994). The democratization of Ecuador in 1979 is a value in the independent variable, democratization. The variable democratization includes both cases where democratization occurred and where

democratization did *not* occur. When couched in the broader concern of regime change, of which democratization is just one type of, the number of transitions increases considerably to 33.¹² To give a sense of the transitions involved, I am listing all 40 regime transitions in table 1 below:

The second concern is with the representativeness of democratic rivalry. We know that democracies tend not to become rivals in the first place and that transitions to democracy tend to end rivalry (Bennett 1998; Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl 2000). The trends suggest that democracies actively select themselves out of rivalry. One inference from this selection effect is that those democratic rivalry that do remain are unlikely to be representative of democracies or of rivalries in general (Lemke and Reed 2001, 459; Lemke and Reed 2002, 82; Goertz, Jones, and Diehl 2005, 755). Some even observed that “if a rivalry has occurred in a democratic dyad, this means that the democratic peace has in some sense already failed” (Goertz, Jones, and Diehl, 2005, 755). This in turn suggests that transition to democratic rivalry, short of promoting rivalry termination, has little effect on conflict behavior within rivalry. Whether such transitions do affect conflict behavior within rivalry is an empirical question to be researched rather than ruled out by a conceptual fiat. Afterall, some democratic rivalries do exist. Presumably policy-makers would like to know the conflict behavior that can be expected in such pairs.

¹² As explained in chapter four, the number of cases of the unit of analysis, militarized disputes, N, is 1083.

Table 1: List of all regime transitions.¹³

<i>Transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry</i>			
No	Rivalry dyad	Country under transition	Transition year
1	Ecuador-USA	Ecuador	1979
2	Russia-USA	Russia	2000
3	Russia-Canada	Russia	2000
4	Honduras-El Salvador	El Salvador	1984
5	Russia-Norway	Russia	2000
6	Russia-Turkey	Russia	2000
7	Syria-Israel	Syria	1954
8	South Korea-Japan	South Korea	1988
9	India-Pakistan	Pakistan	1988
10	India-Bangladesh	Bangladesh	1991
11	Honduras-Nicaragua	Nicaragua	1990
12	Venezuela-Guyana	Guyana	1992
13	Russia-Japan	Russia	2000
<i>Transitions from mixed to autocratic rivalry</i>			
No	Rivalry dyad	Country under transition	Transition year
1	Chile-Argentina	Chile	1973
2	France-Russia	France	1852
3	Greece-Bulgaria	Greece	1936
4	Cameroon-Nigeria	Nigeria	1984
5	Uganda-Kenya	Uganda	1969
6	Kenya-Somalia	Somalia	1969
7	Somalia-Ethiopia	Somalia	1969
8	Ethiopia-Sudan	Sudan	1971
9	China-Burma	Burma	1963
10	France-Germany	France	1852
11	Germany-Italy	Germany	1933
12	Uganda-Sudan	Sudan	1971
<i>Transitions from autocratic to mixed rivalry</i>			
No	Rivalry dyad	Country under transition	Transition year
1	Ethiopia-Sudan	Sudan	1986
2	Syria-Jordan	Syria	1954
3	China-Philippines	Philippines	1987
<i>Transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry</i>			
No	Rivalry dyad	Country under transition	Transition year
1	Ecuador-Peru	Peru	1992
2	Belgium-Germany	Germany	1933
3	Greece-Turkey	Turkey	1980
4	Russia-Ukraine	Russia	1993
5	France-Germany	Germany	1933

¹³ Specific dates on the regime transitions and attendant militarized disputes are available in Table 2, in Chapter 4.

4. Differentiating between explanations of Democratic Peace.

Accounts of the democratic peace fall into two main groups, the normative and structural account.¹⁴ Normative accounts emphasize the preferences democratic polities generate (the median voter, Doyle 2005: 464; Downs 1957) which allow even disputing democracies to agree upon the procedural norms of conflict resolution (Dixon 1993, 1994).¹⁵ Structural accounts emphasize the institutional constraints of democracies that enable them to signal, to deter and to fight, if not better than, then at least differently from non-democracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999).¹⁶

Normally, having multiple explanations for the democratic peace phenomenon is not necessarily a problem since it reflects the use of multiple perspectives to address the issue. As a research program (Lakatos 1978) however, it is a concern that we may end up with two bodies of research that is too large for any disconfirming evidence to overturn. If so, we may be unable to determine which explanatory account is better (Clifton 1993:

¹⁴ While there are other explanations of the democratic peace, for example, the constructivist account, the democratic peace as a macrohistorical learning process and so on, I will concentrate on the mainstream understanding of the democratic peace, of which the normative and structural are the dominant schools.

¹⁵ There are three main types of normative explanations. The first type focuses on the liberal ideology that allows democracies to respect each other's sovereignty (Doyle 1983a & b). The second emphasizes the similarity in the political interests of democracies (Gartzke 1998, 2000; Oneal and Russett 1999). The third emphasizes on the norms of conflict resolution that are used in interstate conflict (Dixon 1993, 1994, 1996, Dixon and Senese 2002). In the dissertation, I rely on Huth and Allee (2003) excellent re-articulation of the normative model. Since Huth and Allee is clarifying the logic in Dixon's work, I am therefore using the third type of normative explanation in this dissertation.

¹⁶ There are five broad types of structural explanations. The first emphasizes the will of the people or the preference of the mass publics to shape democratic foreign policy (Kant 1795/1983: 113; Babst 1964: 9). The second focuses on the impact of changes in the international political system on the behavior of democracies (Cederman and Gleditsch 2002; Rousseau 2005: chp 7). The third emphasizes the decisional constraints on policy-makers (Morgan and Campell 1991). The fourth emphasizes the distinctive signals that democracies send in international bargaining games (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001). The last emphasize the incentives leaders acquire due to the size of their respective selection institutions (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003). While I use a mix of structural explanations in the dissertation, I tend to rely on the selectorate account, especially its emphasis on the political survival of leaders. This is because the selectorate account specifies the specific conditions under which democracies can be belligerent. This is useful when setting up a critical test of competing explanations of the democratic peace.

201). This is bad not only for the purposes of theory-building but also for the sake of policy-making. For example, given the limited budgets for democracy promotion, should the priority be the strengthening of state institutions (for example, building the court, law and order) or the inculcation of democratic norms (for example, teaching respect for the rule of law). The answer to this policy concern depends, in part, on which accounts, the normative or the structural is generally more effective in promoting the democratic peace.

What is needed then is not another test of either account individually but a test of both accounts against each other (Russett and Maoz 1993). This is harder than it would seem because both the normative and structural accounts tends to makes the same prediction at similar levels of democracy. For example, at high levels of democracy both the normative account and structural accounts predict low conflict since both democratic norms of political bargaining and democratic institutional constraints are present. Similarly, both accounts predict high conflict at low levels of democracy. What is needed, rather, are scenarios where the two accounts differ in their predictions due to different levels of normative and structural restrains.¹⁷ Russett and Maoz (1993) termed such scenarios “critical tests”¹⁸ because they allow one to distinguish between the accounts.

I use relative power between the rivals to generate a critical test of the two accounts. Unlike the normative account, the structural account is power sensitive. A leader may be able to overcome the institutional constrains imposed by a democracy if

¹⁷ Russett and Maoz (1993: 633, Figure 1) have a nice table summarizing the four permutations by which the two accounts can vary relative to each other.

¹⁸ Critical tests allow “the analyst to use observation to distinguish between two or more competing explanations of the same phenomenon.” Clark, Golder and Golder 2012: 26.

the opponent state is significantly weaker militarily (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 242). By contrast, a leader who truly respects democratic norms will not seek to exploit an opponent state just because it is weaker militarily (Huth and Allee 2003: 111).¹⁹ By focusing on democratic rivalries with power disparity - where one democratic rival is militarily stronger than its democratic opponent - I should be able to differentiate between the two accounts. The structural account predicts escalation (since the stronger rival expects to win) whereas the normative account predicts deescalation (since democratic norms do not discriminate over military power).

Despite Russett and Maoz injunction to scholars to search for critical tests more than a decade ago, there has been few works to take up this challenge (Huth and Allee 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2003: 251-252; Rousseau 2005; Schultz 1999). My contribution is to highlight a domain, transition into democratic rivalry, where a critical test may be conducted. My methodological innovation is to use relative power in addition to democracy in order to differentiate between the accounts.

5. Empirical Approach and Findings

To study the effects of democratization on conflict behavior in rivalry, I draw upon research in both the democratic peace and in enduring rivalry. From the democratic peace, I derived the intuition that the prospect for peaceful behavior is greatest between two democracies. Applied to the domain of rivalry, this suggests that the pacifying effects of democracy are most likely to be observed when rivalry becomes jointly democratic.

¹⁹ This is an extension of the normative logic. In democracies, parties who won an election respect the rights of the parties who lost an election (are hence politically weaker).

Therefore, I argue that transitions from a mixed rivalry to a democratic rivalry, compared to other types of regime transitions, should tend towards deescalation. To test this argument, I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods.

For the quantitative section, I use data from well-established projects, the Polity and the Correlates of War projects, to build a dataset of conflict episodes between enduring rivals from the years 1820 to 2001. One could compare the conflict behavior of democratic rivalry with its non-democratic rivalry-counterparts cross-sectionally or longitudinally. Both types of comparisons have been used in the quantitative international conflict literature to address different types of research questions. I follow the same logic in this dissertation.

I make cross-sectional comparisons of transitions involving democratic dyads with those involving non-democratic dyads by using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and logistic analysis in chapter three. The choice of models there is guided by nature of my operational dependent variables, of which I have two. My measure of rivalry termination, *terminate*, is dichotomous in nature and hence is best addressed with a logistic regression. My measure of the interlude between outbreaks of conflict, *interlude*, is continuous in nature and hence the use of basic regression (OLS) will suffice. I also exploit the continuous nature of *interlude* to conduct a critical test between the normative and structural explanation. I ask if the conflict behavior after a transition to democratic rivalry is affected by the relative power between the rivals.

I also make longitudinal comparisons of effects of different transition types on conflict behavior in chapter four. Longitudinal comparisons play to the methodological strength of rivalry. By focusing on the same rivalry pair across its dyadic regime types,

many of the variables that would otherwise be confounding are ‘factored out’ by virtue of the fact it is the same rivalry pair. To capture the temporal nature of the interlude in between outbreaks of organized violence, I use survival analysis, specifically the Weibull and the Cox models (Cleves et al., 2010). The use of survival analysis allows one to directly compare the magnitude of deescalation after democratic transitions with other types of non-democratic transitions.

Between chapter three and four, I have explored the effects of regime change using two types of analysis and with multiple models. The use of different models also doubles as a robustness check. If the deescalatory pattern of conflict behavior after democratization holds for both models, we gain an increased confidence in the theoretical logic.

For the qualitative part of the dissertation, I use the rivalry between Ecuador and Peru over a disputed border from the years 1979 to 2000 as a case study. This case was chosen because it experienced regime changes in both democratic and autocratic directions. The variation in regime change, allows for different expectations for conflict behavior. I divide the rivalry into two distinct periods based on the type of regime change, democratization or autocratization. In chapter five, I examine the rivalry from 1979 to 1991 to determine the effects of democratization. In chapter six, I examine the rivalry from 1980 to 2000 to determine the effects of autocratization. Within each period, I examine conflict behavior of both rivals²⁰ in two prominent conflict episodes. The aim is to determine if the conflict behavior after regime change, matches the theory.

²⁰ Both sides have to be examined since the democratic peace logic is dyadic.

Since I devote two chapters for each method and thus, have a total of two large-N studies and two small-N cases studies (chapters three to six), *this dissertation utilizes multiple-methods in its investigation* of the effects of regime change on conflict behavior.

In the following chapter, I use the insights from the democratic peace and rivalry literatures to build a stylized account of the way democratization can affect conflict behavior within rivalry. I use the account to generate hypotheses. I follow up by testing one set of hypotheses using linear regression in chapter three, and another set using survival analysis in chapter four. For the next two chapters, I use the Ecuador Peru rivalry as a case study. In chapter five, I examine the rivalry during its period of democratic transition from 1979 to 1991. In chapter six, I examine the same rivalry during its period of autocratic transition from 1980 to 2000. After presenting the analysis and the evidence in chapters three to six, I highlight the main findings and examine their significance in the concluding chapter seven. The last section of this introductory chapter will spell out the significance of this research.

6. Significance of the Research

In studying the impact of democracy upon rivalry, I am essentially applying the logic of the democratic peace onto rivalry. It makes the following theoretical and policy-relevant contributions.

This research speaks to the rivalry scholarship because it addresses a gap in the literature about the conflict behavior of democratic rivalry. We already know that democracy tends to select out of rivalry, if necessary, by ending their rivalry after democratization. Beyond this selection effect, not much is known about the conflict behavior of democratic rivalry. What do rivalries *do* when they are not busy terminating?

If democratization acts as a “political shock” (Goertz and Diehl 1995) that ameliorates conflict within rivalry even if it does not immediately end it, we would have learnt more about the *short term* effects of democratization.

This short term effect of democratization (conflict amelioration) in conjunction with its long term effect (the selection effect) further suggests a pathway to rivalry termination. Generally, rivalries may end with a whimper or a bang. The former occurs when the disputes that constitutes a rivalry becomes so sporadic and distant from one another that the rivalry is considered over. The later occurs a rival, presumably the stronger of the two, impose it terms on the opponent after a decisive conflict. This research suggests that democratization increases the peace-spells in between outbreaks of militarized violence so much so that eventually the rivalry itself peters out. If so, democratization is ending rivalry with a whimper.

This research also speaks to the democratic peace scholarship in three areas. First, it provides a nuanced response to the democratization cause war argument. I compare the conflict propensities of democratic-rivalry-transitions with their non-democratic counterparts. I do so in the context of rivalry, which is the scenario most likely to generate the mechanics of nationalism that is prominent in Mansfield and Snyders’ (2005) account. If, as my results suggest, democratization does not escalate, even within rivalries, which are already the subset of dyads most prone to conflict, we have more reasons to doubt the veracity of the democratization causes war argument.

In the Lakatosian spirit of seeking explanations with excess empirical content (Lakatos 1978), the dissertation creates a critical test of democratic peace explanations by holding the variable of relative power constant while varying the variable of democracy

(democratization). The application of the logic of critical tests to the domain of democratic transition in rivalry constitutes the second contribution of this research to the democratic peace literature.

Third, this research also studies the effects of autocratization. Even though the emphasis of the dissertation is on the effects of democratization, I also examine the effects of autocratization (in chapters four and six). This examination follows from an implication of my main argument. If I argue that democratization deescalates, does regime change in the opposite direction – autocratization - escalates? That is, I am extending my argument to see if its logic is reversible. The implications are important because democratization may not succeed. Xenias (2005) reminded us that after all, democratic backsliding does occur. Policy-makers need to know what to expect from their autocratizing rivals.

There are policy implications to this research as well. The normative aim of studying rivalries, and indeed of all conflict studies, is to understand the conflict dynamics with the intention of *ameliorating them* where possible. The intuition behind a focus on democratic rivalries is the presumption that democracies are more amenable to benign foreign mediation than autocracies. One can think of several contemporary hotspots, such as for example, the Middle East where a counterfactual Arab democracy might (or might not) change the rivalry dynamics in the Arab-Israeli mixed rivalry. This is not such a hypothetical scenario as the recent Arab Spring demonstrates. To reuse the Middle East policy example, even if the democratization of Egypt fails to end the Egypt-Israeli rivalry, does democratization exacerbate or ameliorate the existing tensions? What is the general pattern in such transitions? Presumably, this is of interest to policy-makers.

Chapter Two

1. Introduction

The first chapter introduced the research questions, reviewed the literature and established the significance of the research. This chapter articulates a *restricted theory of democratic rivalry*. The aim is to spell out the policy proclivities of the different dyadic regime-types under rivalry. These are then used to generate the hypotheses which will be tested empirically in subsequent chapters.

The chapter starts with an overview of the theory (1.1), elaborates on the axioms, assumptions and notations (2) used to build the theory. These allow the theory to generate four sets of hypotheses, the across-dyads hypotheses (3.1), the within-dyads hypotheses (3.2), the interaction hypotheses (3.3) and the regime-change hypotheses (3.4). The chapter will conclude by summarizing the hypotheses (5).

1.1 Overview of the theory

A restricted theory of democratic rivalry seeks to explain the policy proclivities of rival states, the dependent variable, using the filters of dyadic regime type, the independent variable, and using relative power as the moderator variable. This is summarized with a table of different dyadic policy proclivities (see table 1).

Drawing from democratic peace research, I argue that democratic dyads have a policy predilection towards de-escalation under conditions of power parity (cell 1 of table 1). However, under conditions of power disparity, the structural and normative explanations of the democratic peace diverge in their expectations, and hence the prediction is mixed (cell 3).

In mixed dyads, where the influence of joint democracy is absent, I expect rivalry dynamics to dominate dyadic policy proclivities. A rivalry is a hostile militarized relationship of a long term nature and as such, it engenders a domestic political environment in which hawkish preferences dominate. It is actually risky, for the incumbent elite, who seek to retain leadership tenure, to select dovish policy options such as de-escalation. As a result, between equally powerful rivals, the dyadic policy predilection is toward rivalry maintenance (cell 2) which is materially wasteful (for the rival states) but politically safe (for the leadership of those states). Between power disparate rivals however, the stronger rival is more likely to escalate in a dispute. The weaker rival in this case is the target of escalation, and its policy proclivity is basically overridden by its rival's actions (when attacked, it has no choice but to respond accordingly). The resultant outcome (cell 4) is thus escalation.

Table 1: Relationship between regime type, relative power and policy outcome.

		Dyadic regime type status	
		Democratic (D-D)	Mixed (D-A)
Relative Power	Power parity	De-escalation 1	Maintenance 2
	Power disparity	Mixed 3	Escalation 4

Note that the relationship between regime-type and dyadic policy predilections presented in table 1 portrays a static framework. The empirical claim is essentially that democratic dyads have a different conflict propensity in rivalry compared to their non-democratic

counterparts. This is captured by cross-sectional comparisons of dyadic conflict propensities in a rivalry context (section 3.1). Since the research question is on the effects of democratization, I posit that changes in the dyadic regime status, should exhibit corresponding behavioral change. Such arguments are dynamic in the sense that it deals with changes in behavior compared to the prior condition (section 3.2). The third part of the theory deals effects of democratization moderated by the relative power between the rivals. Since these hypotheses deals with the interaction of dyadic regime with relative power, I term them interaction hypotheses (section 3.3). The fourth part of the theory makes longitudinal comparisons of different types of regime change and conceptualizes conflict behavior as the risks of outbreaks of militarized disputes. Since such a conception contains temporal information, I term the resultant expectations temporal hypotheses (section 3.4). In addition, the theory relies on axioms²¹ to which I now turn to.

2. Axioms, Assumptions and Notations

2.1 Notation

For the sake of narrative convenience, I stylized two generic rival states, State X and State Y. Each state has two key attributes, its regime type: democracy (D) or autocracy (A); and its relative power: stronger (S) or weaker (W).

In a generic scenario (such as in the section 3.1) without regime change, the attributes of rival states are fixed at their given values and are not subject to change. For

²¹ Axioms in common usage has two meanings. The first emphasizes their nature as self evident truths for which no further proofs are provided. The second, more commonly used in logic and in mathematics, emphasize their nature as postulates or assumptions for the sake of examining the consequences that follow from them. It is the second meaning that is in used here, although I do attempt to justify, where possible, the axioms I make.

example, if rival state X starts out as the stronger of the rivalry dyad, its advantage in power is assumed to remain the same. Where the attributes are not explicitly considered in a generic scenario, the attributes are considered to be held at their given value and hence excluded from direct theoretical consideration.

In a scenario where democratization is considered (sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4), the state that underwent democratization (from A to D) is denoted to be rival state X while the state that starts as and remains as a democracy is denoted to be rival state Y. In the referent scenario of democratization with power disparity (section 3.3), the state that underwent democratization and is the stronger of the dyad is denoted to be rival state X while state that remain as a democracy and is the weaker of the pair is denoted to be rival state Y.²² In the scenario where the comparison is between different types of regime transitions (section 3.4), relative power is treated as control variable (rather than as a moderator variable in section 3.3) and factored out of the analysis. Hence either state X or Y could be the stronger rival in section 3.4.

Additionally, in all scenarios, the theory describes two types of processes as notational shorthand. The first, *domestic logic*, deals with how democratization within rival state X affects its policy proclivities. The second, *international logic*, deals with the interaction between state X and state Y.

²² The justification why this is the referent scenario is provided in section 3.3.

2.2 What a theory of change entails

My aim is not articulate a general theory of rivalry. Rather, it is identify the extent to which democratization changes conflict behavior within rivalry. Given this focus, only factors that are posited to account for behavior change,²³ in this case posited to be democracy, are relevant. This focus serves to exclude from theoretical consideration, i) an account of the evolution of rivalry; and ii) an account of the causes of democratization and powershifts. Each needs elaboration.

First, a theory that seeks to explain rivalry evolution or why rivalry start, persist or end has a bigger domain than one that merely seeks to explain sources of potential changes in rivalry behavior. Such a theory would also have to deal with the potentially recursive effect of rivalry upon democracy, namely that democracies that persist in rivalry tend to become authoritarian. This is not to claim that such a project is impossible, rather the point is that such a theory is likely to be comprehensive and include other concepts and independent variables that mutate, in effect, the research project into a theory of rivalry. That might be appropriate if the research project is designed to study rivalry per se, but can be a distraction if, as in this case, the focus is the effects of democratization on conflict behavior in rivalry.

Second, given the research focus on the impact of changes in democracy upon rivalry behavior, an explanation of rivalry change does not require an explanation of democratization nor for that matter, an explanation of causes of power shifts. These are treated as *exogenous* to the theory. They are taken as *given*, as a starting point for theory

²³ For an elaboration of the implications of theory focus on behavior change see Welch 2005.

building and are not in themselves the focus of the theory. This is a routine practice in *comparative statics*, a method more commonly used in economics, where the aim is to study the change in the endogenous variable (example the equilibrium price of oil) as a result of changes in the exogenous variable (example, reduction in supply of oil), holding everything else constant (Cameron and Morton 2002).

In sum, a theory of change in rivalry behavior is *not* a theory of rivalry.

2.3 What a *restricted* theory entails.

Given a typology of three dyadic regime types (autocratic rivalry, mixed rivalry and democratic rivalry), there are six possible permutations of dyadic regime changes. They are from i) from an autocratic rivalry to a mixed rivalry; ii) from a mixed rivalry to an autocratic rivalry; iii) from a democratic rivalry to an autocratic rivalry; iv) from an autocratic rivalry to a democratic rivalry; v) from a mixed to a democratic rivalry; and finally vi) from a democratic rivalry to a mixed rivalry. Given that the core claim of the democratic peace, that two democracies are unlikely to fight one another, is a dyadic phenomenon, I would expect the pacifying effects of democracy to be most strongly manifested in democratic dyads. Conversely, if the pacifying effects of democracy fail to manifest in democratic rivalry dyads, there is less reason to expect pacification in mixed and autocratic dyads. This suggests a focus on transitions that *end up in democratic dyads*. There are two transition types which fit this criterion: from a mixed to democratic rivalry (type v) and from an autocratic to democratic dyad (type iv).

Logically, transitions from autocratic to democratic rivalry should be extremely rare. Rivalries are already a subset of all possible dyads in the international system and

transitions within rivalry are a smaller subset of those. Transitions in both rivals within the same period of conflict, by the logic of conditional probability should be extremely rare. In fact in the data (see Table 1 of all regime transitions in Chapter 1), there were no cases of transitions from autocratic rivalry to democratic rivalry (type iv).²⁴ This suggests a focus on the transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry (type v). This focus is also suitable given the state of democratic peace theory, which is conventionally understood to be stronger on the conflict behavior of democracies compared to non-democracies.²⁵

Thus for the sake of a clear narrative the emphasis when theory-building is to focus on the change from a mixed to democratic rivalry. When elaborating on auxiliary aspects of the theory, for example in the discussion on regime-change hypotheses (3.4), the effects of other types of regime change are also considered.

2.4 Actors and their motivations under a rivalry context.

The aim of this section is to make explicit the preferences of the key actors. This allows me to model the conflict behavior of rival states in later sections.

In a given rivalry between two rival states, it is assumed that both states will calculate the expected costs, in terms of resources expended, and the expected benefits, in terms of control over disputed territory or international prestige gained, of prosecuting the rivalry. When the benefits exceed the costs, states have incentives to prosecute the

²⁴ There were also no cases of transitions from democratic to autocratic rivalry.

²⁵ Zinnes (2004) argued that inferences on the behavior of democracy are usually couched in the negative. For example, the normative and structural constraints that inhibit democracies from interstate violence are posited to be absent in autocracies. This state of affairs may be changing given the new round of scholarship on autocracies (for example, Weeks 2012).

rivalry; and conversely, when costs exceed benefits, they have incentives to terminate the rivalry.²⁶ This costs-benefit analysis changes when we take domestic politics into account.

Within a rivalry, while the states involved may be the *principal*, it is the decision-making elite within each rival state that acts as the *agent*. The motivation of the rival state, the principal, is to ensure national security while the motivation of the decision-making elite, the agent, is to maintain leadership tenure. While the motivations of the agent and of the principal may coincide, it is the difference in motivations that creates the agent-principal dynamic. Specifically, it can be rational for the decision-making elite, the agent, to decide on a policy that may hurt national security if by doing so, its prospects for leadership tenure are enhanced. This is significant because it creates a theoretical motive for policy options, rivalry maintenance or escalation, other than rivalry de-escalation.²⁷

For the elite to be concerned about maintaining tenure there has to be a moderately competitive leadership environment.²⁸ The decision-making elite within a rival state can be divided into the incumbent elite and the opposition elite. The incumbent elite already hold office and seek to maintain it, while the opposition elite seek to become incumbents. The choice of policy options in rivalry constitutes just another (foreign) policy arena for leadership contests.

²⁶ Note though, when the costs exceed benefits, the rivalry is unlikely to emerge in the first place. As a result, this scenario is theoretical uninteresting and hence not developed further.

²⁷ This also helps to distinguish my account from that by Prins and Daxecker (2007). In their account, rivalry is *ex-post* inefficient (Prins and Daxecker 2007: 22). As a result, they have to explain why the most efficient policy option, rivalry termination (de-escalation in my framework), is not chosen (which they do by focusing on the conditions of bargaining failure). My framework, by contrast, treats rivalry maintenance as efficient for the elite in some scenarios. As a result, rivalry maintenance is the default policy choice. This dovetails with the method of comparative statics. If rivalry maintenance is the policy default, then *change, as deviations from prior behavior*, becomes easier to identify and hence, operationalize.

²⁸ Both the selectorate theory (Buono de Mesquita et. al. 2003: 16-18) and dynamic two level pressure theory (Colaresi 2005: 16) make the same assumption of a competitive leadership environment.

However, because it *is* a rivalry context, the effective policy space that the elite can maneuver in is constrained. After-all, rivals *do* have a history of conflict. A rivalry context promotes both a high threat perception and intense mistrust of the opponent rival state's intentions within domestic politics. This in turn accentuates the domestic processes of threat inflation and of rivalry outbidding. The former, threat inflation, refers to the way information about foreign policy is monopolized by elite to exaggerate the threat value of the opponent rival state (Snyder 1991).²⁹ The later, rivalry outbidding (Colaresi 2005) refers to the *incentives* elite have to inflate threats. External threats promote domestic support for the elite deemed to be defending the national interest. The catch, according to Rivalry scholarship (Vasquez 1993; Colaresi 2004a), is that *both* sets of elite, and not just the incumbent, are aware of this "rally around the flag effect". As strategic actors, seeking to win domestic support and to avoid the domestic penalties of being seen to be weak on national defense,³⁰ elite have incentive to outdo each other with bellicose policies against the opponent rival state. Colaresi termed this process of elite competitive outbidding, which is similar to the ethnic outbidding described in the ethnic conflict literature (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), as "rivalry outbidding" (Colaresi 2005: 25-35). As an illustration, in the Israeli-Gaza conflict of 2008-2009, Tzipi Livni, the Israeli Foreign Minister and a contender for executive leadership, had to adopt a hard line policy against Hamas just as tough as her challenger for leadership, Ehud Barak, Israeli's Defence Minister.

²⁹ While Snyder's *Myths of Empire* explained imperial overreach through coalitional logrolling, it is the informational asymmetry between the elite and the lay public that is pertinent and emphasized here.

³⁰ Diversionary theories of war (cf. Mitchell and Prins 2004) emphasize the benefits of adopting hard-line policies.

Colaresi (2004a: 558) emphasized the political penalties of not adopting hard-line policies.

The rivalry context tends to tilt the domestic balance of power between elites who favor hardline policies (the hawks) and those who don't (the doves) in favor of the former (Vasquez 1993, Colaresi 2004a). The rivalry context also creates what Huth and Allee (2002: 71) termed a "pragmatic nationalist bias", a situation whereby accommodative policies are more politically risky than policies that lead to diplomatic stalemate.³¹ They note that a third alternative, a policy to escalate a dispute might generate short term domestic support but if it should subsequently fail or should prove costly, they will also entail risk of losing political support. Thus they concluded that the "political risk to which leaders are most sensitive, then, are those associated with accommodative diplomatic policies or the failed use of military force" (ibid).

This logic applied in terms of my theory suggests that when international variables are held constant, *a rivalry context creates policy predilections for elites*. For the incumbent elite, the maintenance policy option is less politically risky in terms of risk to leadership tenure, all other things being equal. It reaps the benefits of a rally around the flag and avoids the responsibility of the potential costs of a military escalation should the oppositional elite attempt to outbid.

By contrast, the other two policy alternatives of rivalry de-escalation and escalation entail more political risk because i) the outcomes of these policies are subject to the vagaries of strategic interaction with the opponent rival; and because ii) they afford opportunities for the oppositional elites to challenge the incumbents.

³¹ Huth and Russett were referring to a context of territorial disputes, the logic of which, I am appropriating for this section of my theory. They do have a different set of expectation for rivalry which I address briefly in section 4.

In the case of a policy option of de-escalation, the incumbent elite are vulnerable to the opposition charge of ‘selling out’ the country. It takes reciprocal cooperation from the opponent rival state for the incumbent elite to withstand domestic criticisms (Colaresi 2004a).

In case of a policy option for escalation, the risk is that a failed or costly military escalation will hurt the incumbent leader’s tenure.³² In addition, there may be regime-specific post-conflict punishment for the elite (Goemans, 2000). It takes a high prospect of military victory, for the incumbent elite to consider escalation (Bueno de Mesquita, et. al. 2004).

In summary, under rivalry, the policy predilection of the incumbent elite tends toward rivalry maintenance due to their concerns for leadership tenure. While the policies of escalation and of deescalation entail more political risks, such risks can be mitigated in specific circumstances. A policy of de-escalation is more politically feasible with reciprocity from the rival. Similarly, a policy of escalation is more politically feasible when the chance of failure is low. Because the policy default is towards rivalry maintenance, this account also provides a rationale why rivalries tend to be stable and durable. Unless circumstances change, elites on both sides have incentives to maintain the status quo.

³² Note that a policy of rivalry escalation posts difficulty for my theory because the prospect for a military victory, upon which the political risks to the elite depends, is *not* directly modeled. It is possible for a prospect of a military victory to be high enough to negate the political risks, in which case, a policy of escalation is as political safe as a policy of maintenance. It is also possible for the prospect of a military victory to be low enough to increase political risks, in which case, a policy of escalation is as politically risky as a policy of de-escalation. For now, I get around this issue by holding the international level variables, such as how the opponent rival state reacts, constant. *As a result, the predilection of the elite toward escalation is somewhat indeterminate*, it varies depending on the specific circumstances.

2.5 The assumption of the rivalry persistence

This section deals with two types of international level dynamic that potentially impact upon the model. In brief, the first type deals with the assumption of rivalry existence and the second type deals with the interaction of the different policy options. Both are given axiomatic treatment and justifications are given.

First, although a rivalry can terminate in any dyadic stage, given my focus on the change in rivalry behavior when a mixed rivalry becomes democratic, I take as *given* the existence of a rivalry during its mixed dyadic stage.³³ This approach is similar to that adopted by Goertz, Jones and Diehl (2005: 748-9) to study rivalry maintenance. In my case, the theoretical purpose of this assumption is to establish a referent group, conflict behavior of mixed rivalries, with which to compare deviations in conflict behavior from.

I adopt the same approach towards power disparity. While the power disparity may be such as to allow a rival to prevail over another, leading to eventually rivalry termination, I assume for the sake of theory building, the existence of the rivalry.³⁴ The significance of this assumption is demonstrated in the next type of international level dynamics, interaction of the different policy options, to which I now address.

Second, although the emphasis of my theory is to explain the policy predilection of the *individual* rival state, there remains the issue of the interaction of policy choices between the two rivals. This can be described generically in the following way. Given two generic rivals, states X and Y, they may at each round of militarized dispute, select

³³ I thank Peter Liberman for bringing this point to my attention.

³⁴ This approach is not unusual. In Goertz, Jones and Diehl (2005: 748) study of rivalry maintenance, they noted that empirically most MIDs do not end with one side prevailing. In fact, around two-thirds of all MIDs end in stalemate. They conclude, that “power preponderance is not correlated with the outcome” (ibid) and yet include the variable as a control in the same study (ibid; p.765).

from a menu of three policy options: Escalate (E), De-escalate (D) or Maintain the status quo (M). The *international logic* refers therefore, to the non-directed dyadic combinations of the policy choices and its expected impact upon the rivalry as a whole.³⁵ Given three policy options, there are nine possible combinations. However, if the order of combinations does not matter (repetitions are allowed), that is, if I treat the combinations as non-directed dyads, there are six combinations, which are represented by the table 2 below:

Table 2: Dyadic Outcomes.

	Rival state X policy option	Rival state Y policy option	Anticipated effect on the rivalry.
1	E	E	E
2	E	M	E
3	E	D	E
4	M	M	M
5	M	D	M
6	D	D	D

E = Escalate
M= Maintain
D= De-escalate

When two rivals chose the same policy options, the overall conflict trend in the rivalry is magnified in the same direction. For example, when two rivals opt to escalate, I expect overall conflict trend to be escalatory. Likewise, when both sides opt to de-

³⁵ This notion of a ‘effect on the rivalry as a whole’ refers to the rivalry baseline, similar to notion of the Baseline Rivalry Level (BRL) used in the literature (Diehl and Goertz 2000).

escalate, the overall conflict trend is deescalatory. When two rivals choose *dissimilar* options, the more escalatory option is *assumed to dominate the less escalatory one*. That is, when rival X opts to escalate, the overall effect on the rivalry is escalatory even if rival Y opts to de-escalate. As a result of this dynamic, it takes a considerable amount of political will to generate rivalry de-escalation. Both sides must opt for de-escalation for an overall deescalatory trend to emerge.

Policy combinations E-M and E-D result in rivalry escalation because most states will respond in kind when confronted with a military provocation even if they had originally intended otherwise (before provocation).³⁶ After all, it takes two to make peace but only one to start a war.

Policy combination M-D results in rivalry maintenance, because without reciprocal cooperation from state X, elites of state Y are vulnerable to rivalry outbidding by their internal domestic opposition. This is consistent with the logic presented in section 2.4 and with the rivalry literature (Colaesi 2004a).

In this framework, a rivalry may end (terminate) in one of two ways. The rivalry in an escalatory trend may conclude with one rival prevailing over the other. In that eventuality, the rivalry is ending on the victor terms. Alternatively, a rivalry in a broad de-escalatory trend may experience fewer and fewer episodes of militarized disputes between the two rivals. In that eventuality, the rivalry is petering itself out and ending peacefully.

³⁶ This is assuming both rivals are approximately equal in power and hence retaliation in kind is a viable option.

For the sake of isolating the effect of regime change upon conflict behavior, I assume rivalry persistence. To be precise, for the purpose of theory building, I assume during the mixed stage of the rivalry (D-A), the rivalry *persists*, at least until the rivalry dyad becomes democratic and then the assumption may be dropped (or alternatively tested).

This theory of rivalry change is a snap shot of policy proclivities of a single round of dispute between two rivals. It already presumes a rivalry context, which is why I assume rivalry persistence. The interaction of policy options is an extension of the implications of the domestic logic which I make explicit in this section but is not otherwise directly tested in chapter 4. My theory does not model directly how the outcome of one dispute affects the outcomes of a subsequent round in a rivalry (rivalry evolution) other than to assume rivalry persistence. A theory of rivalry change is not, in other words, a theory of rivalry evolution. In a later section (4), where the aim is not model-building but rather model-testing, this assumption is relaxed to account for selection effects (explained again in section 4).

2.6 Exceptions

The theory explains the conflict behavior of the rivals using regime-type as the independent variable. The theory does not account for idiosyncratic or systemic factors that can affect the policy choice but are not otherwise understood to be a function of regime-type. Examples of idiosyncratic factors could be the sudden death or incapacitation of a key decision-maker undermining a coalition who favors de-escalation. Another could be the risk propensity of the leadership. Presumably, a risk acceptant

leader might engage in a military escalation despite low odds of success. Examples of systemic factors could be the emergence of a new defensive technology that entrench the status quo.

Finally, the empirical claims made in this theory are all *probabilistic* in nature even if for the sake of exposition, they may have been couched in deterministic terms.

3.1 Across-dyads hypotheses

In this section, I deal with expectations of conflict behavior *across* dyadic categories. Democratic rivalries are posited to have different policy predilections compared with their non-democratic counterparts.³⁷

The Lakatosian hardcore (Lakatos 1970) of the democratic peace research program is that regime type affects conflict behavior. Its main empirical finding is the absence of wars between democracies although democracies by themselves are no more war-prone than other regime types. Subsequent research since Doyle's seminal account (1983a & b), has vastly expanded the empirical domain from war to include other phenomena such as militarized disputes (MIDs), alliances, deterrence, and war fighting strategies, issues that traditionally preoccupied peace research (for an excellent but dated review, Ray 1995; for a recent and concise review see Huth and Allee 2002). Therefore, there is no *a priori* reason why explanations created to account for the democratic peace cannot be extended to the domain of rivalry. I start with the established literature and use it to make cross-dyadic comparisons.

³⁷ In this section, I demarcate only between democratic and non-democratic dyads because democratic peace theory is agnostic about the conflict behavior of non-democracies.

We know that democratic rivalries are rare (Hensel, Goertz and Diehl 2000). This suggests that democratic dyads have some way of keeping their political disagreements from escalating into militarized disputes. As a result, democratic dyads i) do *not* form as many rivalries as their non-democratic counterparts and/or ii) they tend to end their rivalry once they are democratic.³⁸ Perhaps, this state of affairs is due to the conflict resolution techniques of democracies (Dixon 1993). Perhaps, it is due to the incentives of democracies to try harder in wars (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2004). Either way, both explanatory tracks would suggest that the conflict propensity of dyadic democracy is different from their non-democratic counterparts, *even* in a rivalry context. Works that takes this suggestion and extends it onto rivalry include Bennett (1998), Cornwell and Colaresi (2002), and Prins and Daxecker (2007). All three works found that rivalry termination is more likely when the participants are democracies, and especially when the dyad is jointly democratic. This leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: Democratic dyads terminate their rivalry more often than their non-democratic counterparts.

This hypothesis is essentially a replication of established research. Whereas previous work emphasized interstate rivalries (Bennett 1998) and strategic rivalries (Cornwell and Colaresi 2002; Prins and Daxecker 2007), my research emphasized enduring rivalries.³⁹ I expect H1 to be strongly supported by the data as it is a replication of existing findings.

³⁸ We can treat the inferences as conceptually distinct variables or as aspects of the same latent variable. In the first case, the first inference concerns rivalry initiation, while the second inference concerns rivalry termination. In the second case, both inferences are aspect of the latent variable, say propensity towards rivalry or rivalry duration. For the purpose of exposition, I treat it as aspects of the same latent variable, although I acknowledge a distinction between the inferences.

³⁹ Although Prins and Daxecker (2007) do use enduring rivalry as a robustness check, they made their preference for the strategic rivalry conception clear (cf. *ibid.*, p. 30, footnote 30).

3.2 Within-dyad Hypotheses

In this section, I deal with the effects of democratization within dyadic categories. When a mixed rivalry transits into a democratic rivalry, the extant literature argues that rivalry termination is likely (Bennett 1998; Cornwell and Colaresi 2002; and Prins and Daxecker 2007). The literature starts with the assumption that rivalry typically settle in an equilibrium that is resistant to change. It takes an exogenous shock, such as that provided by democratization of the rival state, to change the underlying propensity towards rivalry maintenance. The hypothesis this suggests is as follows:

H2: Mixed rivalries that become democratic are more likely to terminate their rivalry compared those mixed rivalries that did not become jointly democratic.

How could that be so? Part of the explanation of why rivalry termination occurs has to include a sense of how rivals states behave in such a way as to make rivalry termination more likely. If rivalry termination is the result of a rivalry petering itself out, I theorize that democratic rivalries should exhibit an overall de-escalatory trend. I justify this inference in two ways, by axiomatic fait and by precedence.

For the first way, I start with the permutations of policy options laid out in the previous section 2.5. There, I imposed a rule that a more escalatory policy dominates the less escalatory policy in determining overall conflict trend. This imposition follows from the intuition that deescalation is harder to achieve (since it needs two willing parties) than escalation (which only needs one party).⁴⁰ As a result (it helps to refer back to table 2 “Dyadic Outcomes” here), for rivalry deescalation to occur, it is necessary by for both

⁴⁰ This intuition assumes that the rivals are relatively equal in power.

sides to select deescalation as their policy option. Thus, by axiomatic fait, a given democratic rivalry tends to exhibit a deescalatory conflict trend.

There is a second way to justify this inference is rely on established precedence. Here, I draw from the normative and structural explanations within the democratic peace to infer that democracies deescalate more often within MIDs. For example, Senese (1997) draws from the same two explanatory traditions to make a similar inference (ibid, p. 3).⁴¹ I go the additional step and infer that since rivalry are partially composed from MIDs,⁴² democratic rivals are more likely to select deescalation compared to their non-democratic counterparts.

With this inference in mind, I argue when a mixed rivalry transits into a democratic rivalry, there is a change in policy proclivity of the democratic rivals from *maintenance to de-escalation*. This claim of course, assumes that overall trend of a mixed rivalry is towards maintenance. This assumption is consistent with research by Huth and Allee (2002: 78-9) on the conflict behavior of democracies in rivalries. In what they termed their hypothesis PA2i, they assert that:

when the other state in a territorial dispute is an enduring rival, democratic and non-democratic leaders are likely to engage in similar patterns of conflictual diplomatic and military behavior. (ibid: 79)⁴³

That is, Huth and Allee argued that states in territorial disputes behave according to what we would otherwise expect their regime-type, even when the opponent is a rival state.

⁴¹ Note though that Senese did not find empirical support for this inference. By citing Senese work, my point is merely that such an inference is logical and has been made by others before me.

⁴² This is because under enduring rivalry, dispute density is part of the definition of rivalry.

⁴³ There may be a conflict of interpretation over the nature of hypothesis PA2i between page 78 and page 79 of Huth and Russett (2002) work. I adopted the elaboration on page 79 to be closer to the authors' intent.

This tendency toward rivalry maintenance is also supported by research from the Rivalry side. For example, rivalry researchers developed the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PEM, cf. Diehl and Goertz 2000) which posits that enduring rivalries quickly developed a pattern of usually hostile interactions that is relative stable over time. Once locked in stasis, policies that maintain a rivalry become the default (Goertz, Jones, Diehl 2005). This tendency is also reinforced by a domestic leadership environment under a rivalry context which favors hardline policies advocated by ‘hawks’ (Colaresi 2004a). Colaresi argued that the hawks can still dominate even if their hardline policies should subsequently fail, such as by suffering a defeat in a war. This is because postwar leadership replacement under a rivalry context entails a higher transition cost than it does in a non-rivalry context (Colaresi 2004b). Collectively, both Rivalry and Democratic Peace research suggest that under mixed rivalries, a proclivity towards rivalry maintenance is not unreasonable.

If the policy proclivity of both rival states (X and Y) is towards rivalry maintenance under a mixed rivalry, what should we expect to happen when the same rivalry dyad becomes democratic? For each state, there are conceptually only three possibilities. The policy proclivity of each state, relative to its prior condition, can increase, decrease, or remain the same. This corresponds to the conflict policy options of escalation, de-escalation or rivalry maintenance respectively.

I argue that after a mixed rivalry becomes democratic, the policy proclivities of the democratic rivals should change towards de-escalation. There are two theoretical ‘moving’ parts to this argument. First, there is the *domestic logic* which deals with the political transition within state X that changed its policy predilections. Second, there is

the *international logic* which deals with the interaction between the established democratic rival, state Y, reacting to its transitioning rival, state X. Although both logics operate jointly, the emphasis is on the domestic logic.

Why would policy change when an autocracy becomes democratic? Here I draw from the structural and normative explanatory traditions of the Democratic Peace.

The structural explanation adopted here emphasizes the preferences of the political support base or the selectorate of the elite.⁴⁴ Under a rivalry context, it is assumed that powerful domestic constituencies develop who benefit from the continuation of a rivalry. Domestic elite who desire office tenure, a foundational assumption in the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita, et. al. 2003), must cater to their preferences of such groups in some capacity in exchange for their political support.⁴⁵ A direct way to do this is to simply implement policies, in this case policy stance towards the opponent rival that are in line with the preferences of the selectorate. With the implementation of their preferred policies, such groups gain in resources and political influence, which in turn increase the probability influencing subsequent policy choice. As a direct corollary, “policy change is most likely when the groups supporting a state’s leader change” (Bennett 1997a: 373).

With democratization, new groups can dominate or the preferences of the old constituencies can change. Either path allows new policy preferences to emerge. Elite

⁴⁴ The logic presented here draws mainly on the work of Bennett (1997a) with minor elements of selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita, et. al. 2003). Note that I am using the term selectorate broadly and not in its formal theoretical sense.

⁴⁵ There is a possibility of the leader resorting to diversionary conflict tactics. However, as research by Mitchell and Prins (2004) showed this is hardest to achieve in a democracy. As a result, it is simply more efficient to provide for the selectorate directly.

respond to the new preferences by changing the states' policies accordingly. This change in policy proclivity of state X through strategic interaction with the opponent rival (the *international logic*), brings about different subsequent rivalry outcomes. The structural account of conflict behavioral change is represented in the following causal diagram:

Figure 1: Structural explanation of change in conflict behavior.

State X before regime change:

Rivalry context (given) selectorate develops preferences elite adapt to maintain tenure policy proclivity towards rivalry maintenance [feedback cycle as selectorate grows in influence]

State X democratizes:

Regime change selectorate change new preferences elite adapt policy proclivity change to rivalry de-escalation [international interaction long term rivalry de-escalation]

The normative explanation adopted here emphasized the normative preferences of the elite. Under a rivalry context, leaders with hawkish preferences dominate the domestic political environment. It is their preferences which translate into conflict policy proclivities that maintain a rivalry. While there may be elites with more dovish policy preferences, they tend to i) appear more hawkish “in anticipation of the electoral penalty for overcooperation” (Colaresi 2004a: 558-559), or ii) be in the ranks of oppositional elite; iii) or in some cases be forced into exile. In the first case, the hawkish tendency of the incumbent elite is reinforced. In the later two cases, the dovish elite, by virtue of their exclusion from incumbency (section 2.4), do not directly influence foreign policy choices.

With democratization, there is a replacement of one set of incumbent elite-the hawks, with another set-the doves. This is because with the removal of the previous

hawkish incumbents tilts the domestic balance of power between the hawks and the doves in favor of the doves, at least temporarily. Each of the three cases in which dovish elites are silenced now undergoes a different dynamic. In the first case, dovish leaders from the old incumbent elite might no longer feel compelled to act hawkish. Elites from the previous regimes might even attempt to demonstrate new preferences in an effort to distance themselves from the old regime.⁴⁶ In the second and third case, dovish leaders who were previously from the oppositional side or was in exile now has the power as the incumbents to actually implement their dovish policy preferences. The rationale is direct, if the dovish elite were not willing to change their principles in order to gain power,⁴⁷ there is little reason for them to change preferences once they are *in* power. Therefore, the new elites are more likely to have a dovish set of preferences compared with the previous incumbents. It follows that when the set of incumbent elite changes, the policy proclivity changes accordingly. This change in policy proclivity of state X through strategic interaction with the opponent rival (the *international logic*), brings about different subsequent rivalry outcomes. The normative account of rivalry behavioral change has the following causal diagram:

⁴⁶ This is the converse of Colaresi (2004a: 558-559), “doves in hawks feathers” argument. With democratization, one could say that now it is the hawks who now don dovish feathers in an attempt to white wash their past.

⁴⁷ The dovish elite had refused to compromise on their dovish principles to the extent of being relegated to the ranks of the oppositional elite or alternatively, exile.

Figure 2: Normative explanation of change in conflict behavior

State X before regime change:

Rivalry context (given) dovish elite dominated by hawkish elite policy proclivity towards rivalry maintenance

State X democratizes:

Regime change elite change (hawks replaced) new elite more likely to be doves
new preferences policy proclivity change [international interaction long term rivalry de-escalation]

Thus far, I elaborated a *domestic logic* of policy proclivity change in state X based on the structural and the normative perspectives. Both predict a policy change from rivalry maintenance towards rivalry de-escalation. The difference is that the structural account emphasizes changes in the selectorate whereas the normative account emphasizes changes in the elite.

However, to determine the overall conflict trend, I still need an account for the interaction between the two rivals (the *international logic*). For that, I rely on a straightforward application of the democratic peace. Specifically, it takes two democracies to create the democratic peace. The conflict ameliorating tendencies of democracies only start to operate *after* a mixed rivalry becomes democratic.

From the structural side, I rely on the international conflict implications of the selectorate theory (Buono de Mesquita et al. 2003). There are two specific claims that are pertinent here. First, the selectorate theory argues democracies compared with autocracies, will devote more resources to the prosecution of wars. Although all leaders prefer to win wars, the resources spent on war prosecution *reduce* the income available for the provision of private goods for the winning coalition. The rate at which this *reduction*

matters politically depends on the size of the winning coalition. In autocracies, the winning coalition is small and each member share of the total supply of private good is high. This is a situation of concentrated benefits. The corollary is that when that supply is being diverted to the war effort, the forgone benefits hurt the small winning coalition proportionately more. By contrast, in democracies, the winning coalition is large and each member share of the total supply of private good is low. This is a situation of dispersed benefits. The corollary is that when the supply is diverted to war-fighting, dispersed benefits translates into only dispersed costs and hurts the large winning coalition proportionately less. As a result, democracies compared to autocracies, can afford to devote proportionately more resources to the war effort without threatening the tenure of its leaders. Compared to autocracies, democracies try much harder in war. This leads to the second specific claim that democracies exercise strategic selection in the choice of their opponents. Democracies are mutually deterred from conflict with each other because they know each side commit heavily to a war, making the political costs of military conflict high.

Applying the selectorate logic onto my given rivalry scenario, when rival state X undergo change from autocracy to democracy, there is a corresponding expansion of the winning coalition. State X as a new democracy, with a large winning coalition, is more likely to commit resources into a conflict should its preferred policy option of de-escalation fails. The greater-resources-commitment advantage that State Y had as a democracy is negated now that State X is also a democracy. The leadership of State Y is

aware of this.⁴⁸ As a result, both sides have strong incentives to select deescalate. Conflict between them is too politically costly for the leadership of both sides. As a result of both side opting for de-escalation, the trend is towards rivalry de-escalation (cf. row 6 of table 2).

From the normative side, I rely on the normative political bargaining account developed by Dixon (1993, 1994, 1996) and codified by Huth and Allee (2003: chp 5). The normative account stress the sense of self-imposed restraint, which Dixon termed the norm of bounded competition that only democrats exhibit in the resolution of political conflicts. This norm is in turn externalized into foreign policy conflict with other states.

Applying that normative logic to my rivalry scenario, the claim is that the replacement of the elite within rival state X changes elite norms. As a result, both sides exhibit the normative restraint, bounding political competition by ruling out the use of force in international conflict. Since both democratic rivals opt for de-escalation, I expect a corresponding de-escalatory trend in the rivalry. To build this claim four auxiliary points are necessary.

First, during the period of a mixed rivalry, the democratic norms of state Y are dominated by the non-democratic norms of state X.⁴⁹ Even if state Y prefers rivalry de-escalation, it is more likely to switch norms and adopt the policy of rivalry maintenance in respond to state X policies.

⁴⁸ This is the selection effect of democracy, derived in this case, from the second specific claim of the foregoing paragraph. It parallels case 4 (democracy versus democracy) of the selectorate model, which also model interaction of polities by their dyadic regime type (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003: 244).

⁴⁹ On the literature on norm switching in mixed dyads, see Maoz and Russett 1993 and Axelrod 1984, 1986.

Second, with regime change in state X, the set of hawkish elite is replaced by one of three possibilities: i) the doves can revert to their true preferences, ii) the oppositional elite takes over or iii) the previously exiled elite takes over. In each case, following the argument presented in the domestic logic, it is more likely that the new elite will have dovish preferences and hence more likely to use democratic norms of political bargaining.

Third, with regards to the *perception* of the externalization of democratic norms of the elite in state X by elite in state Y, Dixon and Senese, argued it is not a problem because of the transparent nature of democracy. After all, they argued, “democracy cannot be conducted in secret” (Dixon and Senese 2002: 549).

Fourth, with regards to the perception of the *democratic* nature of state X by state Y, Gartzke (1998; 5) made the wry but pertinent observation that: “[d]emocracies are able to make the appropriate distinctions, even if academics are not.” The argument here is that the perception of the nature of the opponent rival state operates on the gestalt level that can be accurate even if the individual decision-maker disagrees. Gartzke in his elaboration gave the example of elections, where individual voters can be irrational but collectively and the electorate as a whole is rational (ibid).⁵⁰

Given the democratization of state X in a mixed rivalry, the international and domestic logics collectively operate to cause a change in the policy proclivity of both rival states (diagrammatically, this is a change from cell 2 to cell 1 in table 1) This leads to the main hypothesis of the theory:

⁵⁰ It is important because Gartzke was making the comment in the context of a critique of a democratic peace, whereas here I am using it in a context of explaining how perceptions can work.

H3: When a mixed rivalry becomes democratic, the overall conflict behavior changes from rivalry maintenance to de-escalation.

To clarify, the claim is that both state X and state Y change their policy proclivities after regime change. State X changed its policy proclivity due to the *domestic logic*, and State Y changed its policy proclivity due to the *international logic*.

The counterarguments centered on the other two possibilities of policy proclivity change after a mixed rivalry becomes democratic, towards escalation and towards rivalry maintenance. Each has its own set of associated literature which will now be briefly examined.

The literature arguing for policy change towards escalation has two variants. The first variant centers on the ‘democratization causes war’ argument (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). According to this counterargument, democratization promotes the use of nationalism as a mobilizational strategy by competing elites. This in turns generates a belligerent foreign policy which increases the chance of war between democracies.⁵¹ A problem with Mansfield and Snyder’s argument is that their key independent variable is “incomplete democratization” (anocratization) and not democratization as it is in my case. Since my theory dichotomize regime types into two values (democracy or autocracy) and use it to generate three dyadic regime types, autocratic (A-A), mixed (D-A) or democratic (D-D); anocracy is simply not directly measured in my framework. The simplest way to fit ‘incomplete democratization’ into my framework would be a transition from mixed rivalry (D-A) to an intermediate category (D-incomplete D) and back to a mixed rivalry (D-A) since the transition for state X in question did not actually complete into full

⁵¹ I examine this argument in greater detail in the section on temporal hypotheses (2.4).

democratization (hence the adjective “incomplete”). Such a conceptualization of regime change would be simply too complex to model within my theoretical framework.⁵²

The second variant of the argument for policy change towards escalation centers on the diversionary theory of war literature, aptly reviewed by Mitchell and Prins (2004). In their formulation, external use of force rallies internal political support for a leader. This gives the leader an incentive to divert attention from domestic crises with foreign adventures, especially when there is domestic turmoil.⁵³ This diversionary incentive is magnified for democracies because unlike autocracies, they cannot suppress dissent directly with the domestic use of force. Furthermore, the rivalry context provides both an opportunity rich environment and a “clear target with which to divert” (Mitchell and Prins 2004: 945). However, Mitchell and Prins found no empirical support for this version of diversionary democratic rivalry behavior. They found instead that although democracies have the greatest incentive to divert, they have the least opportunity to do so due to the transparency inherent in democracies. This transparency grants opposition the same access to information the incumbent has and thus makes democratic diversions difficult. When this is coupled with the belief that democracies will be tough opponents (we already know democracies fight harder from selectorate theory), opponents state exercise strategic selection and avoid targeting democracies in domestic turmoil even in the context of rivalry (ibid: 958). The logic of diversion to my framework implies two things. First, it suggests that while the democratic elite of state X may desire escalation as

⁵² Consider for example, what happens to the elite. Do the elite in the autocratic regime return after incomplete democratization? If not, who replaces the autocratic leadership?

⁵³ Mitchell and Prins had a deteriorating economy in mind with their notion of domestic turmoil. Applied to my case, regime change in state X would itself approximate their notion of domestic turmoil giving democratic leaders incentive to divert attention.

diversionary tactic, the elite of state Y, cognizant of the true capacity of state X, will strategically avoid a confrontation with rival Y and seek instead de-escalation. Second, it suggests that the elite in State X would have a hard time justifying a policy of escalation to populace and the opposition who have access to pertinent information. In other words, the logic of diversion when applied to my theory does not yield a counter-argument that democratic rival X should opt for escalation.

The second counterargument centers on a policy proclivity towards rivalry maintenance after regime change in state X. This is based on the notion that the rivalry context overwhelms domestic imperatives. Regimes may come and go but the rivalry endures. I characterized this particular argument as implicit because it has, as far as I am aware, yet to be formulated as an empirical hypothesis to be explicitly tested. This makes establishing this particular literature difficult since I am essentially proving an implied relationship. Perhaps the closest articulation is in a nuanced argument by Goertz et al. (2005) in which they assert:

We suspect that democracy will have a reduced (though perhaps still significant) impact on rivalry maintenance as compared to its impact on other violent conflict behavior. Recall that we are assuming that a rivalry exists, and relatively few rivalries involve two democratic states (Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl 2000). Thus, joint democracy has already had some significant impact on keeping states out of violent interactions (Kinsella and Russett 2002). Indirectly, joint democracy is related to our concern with conflict management. Democratic states have a better track record of resolving disputes between themselves (Dixon 1993) than other pairs of states. Thus, our second mechanism of rivalry maintenance – the failure of conflict management – is likely negatively correlated with joint democracy. *Nevertheless, if a rivalry has occurred in a democratic dyad, this means that the democratic peace has in some sense already failed.* (italics added) Although democracy can mitigate the noxious effect of rivalry (Cornwell and Colaresi 2002), we hypothesize that its negative effect on rivalry maintenance will be less than its impact on keeping dyads out of rivalry altogether. That is, joint democracy, is likely to have a stronger effect on rivalry prevention than its absence has on rivalry maintenance. (Goertz et al. 2005: 755).

Three points in response are in order. First, the authors are claiming that the presence of rivalry implies the absence of the democratic peace (in the italicized portion of the quote). This seems to be the intuition motivating this line of counter-argument. Unfortunately the authors do not pursue this line of logic as an empirical hypothesis. In fact, they opt to test for the selection effect of democracy instead. This is the basis for my claim that this line of counterargument remains at the level of an implied intuition.

Second, there is the related issue of the logic of their intuition. Why shouldn't the democratic peace apply to rivalries beyond its selection effect? If the democratic peace logic applies to intense conflict that interstate wars represent, it is not unreasonable to postulate it can apply, in some other manner beside selection effect, onto mere concentrations of militarized disputes that rivalry represent.

Third, Goertz et al. (2005) argued in the aforementioned quote, in effect that joint democracy has a *negative effect* on rivalry maintenance. That is, even the researchers on rivalry maintenance agree that a joint democratic rivalry is unlikely to maintain a rivalry for long. Applying that argument to extract policy proclivities in my context, it implies that after a mixed rivalry becomes democratic, a policy proclivity towards rivalry maintenance should be unlikely. In other words, even the researchers on rivalry maintenance disagree with the conclusion of this second counterargument.

3.3 Interaction Hypotheses

The discussion thus far has been on a generic rivalry scenario. I will now add to the basic model, the variable of relative power. This addition is necessary to create the

conditions where the normative and structural expectations diverge. Power disparity is necessary in other words, for a critical test of the Democratic Peace.

The traditional literature on the role of relative power in conflict propensity may be broadly divided into two opposing camps, the balance of power theory (Waltz 1979) and the power transition theory (Kugler and Organski 1989). The balance of power perspective is that war is least likely between equally powerful states. The power transition perspective take the opposite view that war is most likely when in situations of power parity. Applied to a rivalry context, a substantial proportion of rivalry researchers take the view that rivalries are likely to occur and be maintained between equally powerful states, otherwise the stronger actor will simply overwhelm the weaker actor (Vasquez 1993; Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2008). This view of the role of relative power in rivalry would dovetail more with the balance of power perspective than with the power transition perspective.⁵⁴

With this theoretical role of relative power in mind, the generic rivalry scenario described in the previous section can be characterized as a situation of power parity. The research focus is now the impact of dyadic regime change between two unequal rivals. When a mixed rivalry becomes democratic, state X, the state that underwent democratization, can either be the stronger or the weaker rival of the pair. Therefore, there are two possible permutations when a mixed rivalry becomes democratic. In the first permutation, state X is the stronger rival while in the second permutation, state X is the weaker rival.

⁵⁴ Note that the fit is not perfect, this is because balance of power and power transition were theories designed to explain major power war (and hegemonic war) and not the conflict behavior in militarized disputes.

For the purposes of a critical test, only the first permutation is theoretically relevant. This is because state X does not have the requisite military strength to ensure a successful escalation against state Y in the second permutation. Consequently, both the structural and normative perspective would make the same prediction of a policy change towards de-escalation in the second permutation. Given that a critical test requires theoretically divergent predictions, the second permutation is hence excluded from theoretical consideration. Table 3 summarizes the differences between the two permutations.

Table 3: Two Scenarios of Democratization given Power Disparity

		When a mixed rivalry becomes democratic (D-A D-D).	
		Permutation 1: State X is stronger	Permutation 2: State X is weaker
Policy expectations for the rival after regime change according to the type of account.	Normative perspective	De-escalate 1	De-escalate 2
	Structural perspective	Escalate 3	De-escalate 4
Is this a critical test?		Yes	No
Included in the theory?		Yes	No

In the first permutation, we start with a mixed rivalry consisting of a strong autocratic state X with a weak democratic rival state Y and examine their policy proclivity in a given round of dispute. Anticipating a later discussion, keep in mind that a theory of rivalry *change* requires only an explanation of the effects of a *given* change in the independent variable upon the dependent variable and is *not* an explanation of changes in the independent variable. This is, a theory of rivalry change is *not* a theory of rivalry. Given power disparity, the stronger autocratic rival might use its military advantage and opt for the policy option of escalation. If that happens, it does not matter what the policy proclivity of the weaker democratic rival would have been because it would be forced to respond in kind. Recall in section 2.5 that a policy of escalation dominates all other options (cf table 2). In effect, the preference of the stronger rival overrides the preference of the weaker rival. Additionally, given a series of militarized disputes in which the stronger rival repeatedly choose to escalate and do indeed prevail due to its relative strength, there is the possibility that the rivalry might terminate on the stronger rival terms. In that eventuality, there would have been no prior state with which to make a comparison with and hence no theory of rivalry change would have been possible. Therefore, for the sake of theory construction, I treat as an axiom that a mixed rivalry with power disparity persists long enough for dyadic regime change to occur. Such an axiomatic treatment would have been problematic if I am proposing a theory of rivalry evolution but is justifiable if I am only proposing a theory of change in rivalry behavior.⁵⁵ In addition, this axiomatic treatment is necessary to create a critical test of

⁵⁵ This distinction was elaborated upon in Chapter 1, section 2.2.

the democratic peace explanations. Therefore, I take a mixed rivalry between unequal rivals (strong autocracy versus weak democracy) as a *given* and focus on what happens when it becomes democratic.

Again, I start with a mixed rivalry between two unequal rivals. State X is autocratic (A) and is the stronger (S) of the two rivals. State Y is democratic (D) and is the weaker (W) of the two rivals. Power disparity is held as a constant and does not vary after democratization because its role is to act as a control variable. When the mixed rivalry becomes democratic, both the *domestic* and the *international logic* are at work. I apply both the structural and normative perspective in turn for both logics.

For the *domestic logic* using the structural perspective, when state X democratizes, there is an expansion of the winning coalition. The new democratic elite, cognizant of the increased size of the winning coalition, face an increased pressure to deliver public goods such as a foreign policy success. By contrast, this imperative was less salient for the previous autocratic elite. While the previous autocratic elite also desire victory over the opponent rival state, they recognize that the national resources used up in the prosecution of the conflict *reduces* the amount left over for the production of private goods, which is key to maintaining the support of their small winning coalition. As a result, the new democratic elite should exhibit a policy proclivity towards escalation secure in the knowledge that power disparity in its favor makes the chance of policy failure small. The reward of successful escalation, foreign policy success, is a public good that increases its chances for leadership tenure. The conjunction of low risks and high reward makes the options of rivalry de-escalation unnecessary and rivalry maintenance suboptimal for the democratic elite of state X.

On the side of the weaker democratic rival (state Y), they face exactly the same institutional pressure to deliver policy success but have fewer resources with which to work. Power inferiority ensures that continued confrontation (escalation) will lead to military defeat, and that maintenance merely delays the same outcome. Thus, their preference is to de-escalate, to cut their losses, and use the national resources that would have otherwise been consumed in prosecuting the rivalry for the production of other public goods, which aids their leadership tenure. However, due to the policy of state X towards escalation, state Y may not have that opportunity to exercise their preferences. If attacked by state X, state Y may retaliate (if the power disparity is not too great) or capitulate (if the power disparity is too great). Either way, a policy of escalation by state X dominates the policy choice of state Y (as explained in section 2.5). The result of a transition into democratic rivalry according to the structural perspective is a series of one-sided attacks and coercive attempts by the stronger democratic rival X against the weaker democratic rival Y. The overall conflict trend is therefore towards rivalry escalation:

H4a: When a mixed rivalry with power disparity becomes democratic, the structural explanation predicts a change from rivalry maintenance towards escalation.

By contrast, the normative perspective argues that the power disparity between states X and Y should not affect their conflict behavior towards each other. Recall that part of what it means to *be* an democratic elite is to internalize the norm of bounded competition and use it in political conflict resolution. Such a norm dictates certain rights and limits in the treatment of the oppositional elite. This in turn implies indifference to the relative power between the domestic elites. For example, the losers of a democratic election are accorded a role as the loyal opposition and the winners of a democratic

election must respect certain limits, such as to follow the due process, to its power even though it won the election (Dixon 1993, 1994). After democratization, I expect a circumscription of the domestic use of force in the resolution of political conflict in state X.

The normative perspective makes a second critical assumption, that the domestic democratic norms of conflict resolution are *externalized* in international conflict.⁵⁶ It is this step that combines both the *domestic* and *international logics* (making it difficult to demarcate between them conceptually). Here, just as is the case for domestic political conflict, where election winners must respect the election losers; in the case of international conflict (in rivalry), democratic elite from the stronger rival, state X must exercise some restraints in its dealings with their fellow democratic elite from the weaker rival, state Y. To do otherwise, for example by using excessive force in interstate bargaining, would be a violation of the norm of bounded competition; and a violation of such a crucial norm would render the entire normative perspective as a theoretical alternative to the structural perspective moot. This implies that between democratic rivals, *relative coercive power is irrelevant to the conduct of democratic political bargaining process*.⁵⁷ Once this theoretical step is adopted, the standard normative account of bargaining between democracies presented by Dixon and Senese (2002) can be applied.

⁵⁶ I reviewed the normative literature making this assumption in chapter 2, pp. 75-76.

⁵⁷ An example may help, consider the occasional fishing disputes between United States and Canada or between Iceland and United Kingdom. In both cases, the clear military advantage of US and the UK are irrelevant to the resolution of the disputes. Likewise for land disputes between democracies (say modern day democratic Germany and Poland), relative military power is less important in conflict resolution in such cases.

Applying this normative perspective to my given rivalry scenario, both democratic rivals state X and Y, should change their preference for rivalry maintenance to rivalry de-escalation, as this would be in keeping with their norms of bounded competition. This yields the following hypothesis:

H4b: When a mixed rivalry with power disparity becomes democratic, the normative explanation predicts a change from rivalry maintenance towards de-escalation.

In sum, power disparity within rivalry after democratization creates an opportunity for a critical test. It relies on the distinction between the structural account which is power sensitive and the normative account which is not.

3.4 Regime Change Hypotheses

While the preceding sections concentrated on the effects of one specific type of regime change-democratization, this section broadens the inquiry to consider other types of regime transition.

We know from the democratic peace literature that there are five distinct perspectives on the relationship between democratization and interstate conflict.⁵⁸ In brief, the dangerous democratization thesis (Mansfield and Snyder 2005) argues that democratization increases conflict propensity while the pacific democratization thesis (Gleditsch and Ward 1998, 2000; Enterline 1996, 1998a, 1998b, Bennett and Stam 2004) argues for the opposite. The dangerous autocratization thesis (Enterline 1996: 191;

⁵⁸ These five perspectives were discussed in the literature review in chapter 1, section 2.

Enterline 1998a: 404; Thompson and Tucker 1997: 445; Daxecker 2007: 544) argues that autocratization increases conflict propensity while the political dissimilarity thesis (Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Werner 2000) argues that only transitions to a mixed dyad increases conflict propensity. The political instability thesis (Daxecker 2007: 535) by contrast argues that all regime transitions increases conflict propensity.

Given these five perspectives, the theoretical task is to integrate them into a rivalry context. The closest analogue in the rivalry literature is the one on rivalry termination (Bennett 1997; Prins and Daxecker 2007). With regards to conflict behavior of democratizing states, Bennett argues:

. . . democratization should increase the probability of long-term rivalry settlement. However, this is not necessarily inconsistent with Mansfield and Snyder's finding that democratization and autocratization lead to war. Rivalry termination often follows relatively soon after a dispute or war between rivals, as such conflicts may settle disputed issues decisively or lead rivals to negotiate seriously over those issues. It is possible for democratization (or autocratization) to lead to a war or dispute that then results in rivalry settlement (Bennett, 1997: 379).

In his formulation, the same increase in conflict propensity could promote rivalry termination. Bennett finds that democratizing dyads terminate quickly. I build on this idea to ascertain whether the change to joint democracy alters the risk of subsequent fighting and hypothesize that it alters rivalry behavior in favor of pacification even before rivalry termination.

Prins and Daxecker present the other theoretical alternative based on the informational approach to crises bargaining (Prins and Daxecker 2007). They treat the persistence of rivalry as a kind of bargaining failure. Both information asymmetry and non-credible commitments are causes of bargaining failures. Since rivals already have repeated militarized disputes with each other, information asymmetry is less likely to be

the issue. Rivalry persists due to the absence of credible commitments by both sides. Since democracy promotes rivalry termination by increasing both trust (due to the transparency of the democratic decision-making process) and the costs of defection. It follows therefore that democratization should ameliorate rivalry.

Since both the issue-resolution and informational dynamics perspectives seek to explain rivalry termination and my research focus is on conflict behavior within rivalry, I have to extend their logics to account for variation in dispute patterns following regime change within a rivalry.⁵⁹ In the case of Bennett, democratization could *increase* the chance of conflict, at least in the short-term (Bennett, 1997: 379). In the case of Prins and Daxecker, democratization could *decrease* the chance of conflict (Prins and Daxecker 2007: 25-27). The former dovetails more closely with the dangerous democratization thesis while the latter dovetails with the pacific democratization thesis.

One issue to be addressed is the appropriate conceptualization of the absence of conflict within rivalry. If the resolution of the issues underlying the rivalry constitutes rivalry termination, the outbreaks of militarized disputes (or MIDs) within rivalry represents symptoms or manifestations of an underlying conflictual relationship. While the absence of outbreaks of violence need not necessarily indicates peaceful relations between rivals, the interlude between conflict outbreaks occupies a conceptual middle-ground between all-out hostilities and a positive peace (Klein, Diehl, Goertz 2008). As such, longer interludes compared with shorter interludes, are more suggestive of conflict

⁵⁹ I explained this stance in chapter 1, section 3. Since I have already discussed the group-policy-preference (Bennett 1997) and rivalry-as-bargaining-failure (Prins and Daxecker 2007) in that section, the discussion here will concentrate on their implications on conflict behavior within rivalry.

amelioration within rivalry. The question is how a disruptive change such as a regime change in rivals, affects the risk of a rivalry experiencing the next outbreak of conflict.

The dangerous democratization thesis implies that the risk of the next outbreak should increase after democratization, yielding the following hypothesis:

H5a: Transitions into democratic rivalry increase the risk of an outbreak of the next militarized dispute.

By contrast, the pacific democratization thesis implies the opposite trend, yielding the following hypothesis:

H5b: Transitions into democratic rivalry decrease the risk of an outbreak of the next militarized dispute.

The dangerous autocratization thesis suggests that only autocratic transitions increase the risk of conflict, implying the following hypothesis:

H6: Transitions into autocratic rivalry increase the risk of an outbreak of the next militarized dispute.

The political dissimilarity thesis argues that only transitions to mixed rivalry (between a democracy and an autocracy) are dangerous. This means that regime transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry and transitions from autocratic to democratic rivalry are likely to increase the risk of conflict, yielding the following hypothesis:

H7: Transitions into mixed rivalry increase the risk of an outbreak of the next militarized dispute.

The last perspective, the political instability thesis argues that all regime transitions, and not just democratizations alone, increase the chance of conflict. It implies the following:

H8: Regime change, regardless of the direction of transition, increases the risk of an outbreak of the next militarized dispute.

4. Conclusion

The restricted theory of democratic rivalry is focused on the change in conflict behavior as a result of regime change in general and of democratization in particular. Depending on the research question, eight hypotheses can be generated from the theory. Hypothesis 1 makes a static comparison of the likelihood of rivalry termination across dyadic regime types. I expect democratic rivalry to have higher likelihood of termination compared with their non-democratic counterparts. Hypothesis 2 & 3 builds on this expectation and extends it by considering the effects of regime change. They are in effect making within-dyad comparisons. Hypothesis 2 compares mixed rivalries that underwent democratic transitions with those that did not. I expect the former group to be more likely to end their rivalry. If rivalry termination is a likely outcome of democratization, I posit that the conflict behavior within rivalry after democratization is also likely to be de-escalatory. This is captured by Hypothesis 3. This democratization within a rivalry context becomes more theoretically interesting by adding the control variable of relative power. Hypothesis 4a captures the structural view of this scenario while Hypothesis 4b captures the normative view. By playing on the fact that the structural perspective, unlike the normative one, is power sensitive, a critical test is created.

This set of hypotheses, H1 to H4b, focused on the effects of democratization on conflict behavior only. The next batch hypotheses, H5a to H8, examine the effects of multiple regime transitions besides democratization on the risk of outbreaks of fighting. Of the five hypotheses, only H5b, derived from the pacific democratization thesis posits that its type of regime change – democratization-reduces the risk of the outbreaks of

violence. The other four hypotheses all claim their respective type of regime change increase the risk of the violent outbreaks. For H5a, it is democratization that is the cause; for H6, it is autocratization; for H7, it is transitions towards mixed rivalry and for H8, it is any regime transition.

The next two chapters will deal with the operationalization of the variables and conduct empirical tests of the hypotheses. Chapter Three will test the first set of hypotheses, H1 to H4b. Chapter Four will test the second set, H5 to H8.

Chapter Three

1. Introduction

In this chapter I conduct a quantitative test of the effects of democratization, concentrating in particular on hypotheses H1 to H4b. I start by discussing how the dataset is constructed in section 2. I follow by discussing the operationalization of the dependent variables, of the independent variables and of the control variables in sections 3, 4, and 5 respectively. After the key variables are operationalized, I discuss the models appropriate to test the hypotheses in section 6. I present the results in the following section 7. The conclusion will summarize the findings in section 8. For the sake of a clear exposition, all the operational names of the variables will be in italics. Similarly, I summarize the main variables under discussion in an introductory paragraph at the beginning of sections (2, 3, 4, and 5).

2. Data

This section explains how the dataset is constructed and discusses the empirical characteristics of data.

To test the theory, I need a dataset containing information on the conflict behavior of democratizing rivalry dyads. Since no single dataset in the well-established projects such the Correlates of War captures all information I require, I have to build my own dataset using data from the conflict literature as the constituent building blocks.

The first issue is the choice of rivalry domain, between the enduring rivalry and the strategic rivalry conception. Preliminary dataset merges done using the latest version

of strategic rivalry (Thompson and Dreyer 2011)⁶⁰ revealed there were no cases of democratic transitions.⁶¹ With no variation in the independent variable, no empirical analysis using strategic rivalry was possible. For this statistical reason, the use of enduring rivalry for quantitative analysis was necessary.

For data on rivalry, I use the enduring rivalry dataset, RIV 5.1 version.⁶² This version is an updated version of the RIV 5 dataset (Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006). As the rivalry dataset is partially derived from the MID dataset (Bremer, Jones and Singer 1996), when the MID dataset widen its temporal domain from 1993-2001 to 1993 to 2006 (from version 3.02 to 3.1), the rivalry dataset was correspondingly updated from RIV 5 to RIV 5.1. Operationally, the density of militarized disputes is used to demarcate rivalries in three types. *Enduring rivalries* have 6 MIDs within a 20 year period. *Proto-rivalries* have 3-5 MIDs within the same 20 year period. *Isolated rivalries* have 3-5 MIDs within the same time period.

For information on regime characteristics, I draw upon the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2003), specifically the “p4v2006” time-series version. Polity data is widely used in the democratic peace literature. I use the time-series version instead of the polity-case version of the data because I need the data to be in the country-year case format for subsequent dataset merge.

⁶⁰ I emailed William Thompson in 2012. He graciously forwards me the latest version of the strategic rivalry dataset.

⁶¹ The cases using strategic rivalry can be downloaded from the following site: <http://silo.hunter.cuny.edu/mlz9QTP9> (last assessed 12/2/12). While the second part of the replication files dealt with survival analysis and is thus not pertinent to the issues raised here, the first part of the replication files dealt with dataset merge and is relevant.

⁶² Theoretical reasons for the use of the enduring rivalry are explained in chapter 1, section 3.

For information on conflict policies undertaken during militarized disputes (MIDs), I rely on Maoz's dyadic militarized disputes (DYMID 2.0, Maoz 2005). Maoz's dataset was meant to be the dyadic version of the MID 3.1 dataset.⁶³ I used Maoz dataset instead of the regular MID dataset because the later has an information gap. At the time of the first stage of dataset construction, approximately from January to April 2007, the MID 3.0 dataset had only information for MIDs from 1993 to 2001. For information on MIDs prior to 1993, one had to turn to the MID 2.1 dataset. Neither versions were ideal because I wanted to work with rivalry data from 1800 to 2006.⁶⁴ Maoz dataset, while not ideal, met my need for a dyadic dataset that covers a similar temporal domain and is coded in such a way as to facilitate subsequent dataset merges.

For information on relative power, I draw upon the National Material Capabilities dataset, version (NMC 3.02; Singer 1987). The NMC dataset measures state power, termed the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC), as a composite index of a state share of the total system population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military personnel and military expenditures.

For information on the physical contiguity, I draw upon the Direct Contiguity Dataset (DCD 3.1; Stinnett, et. al. 2002), specifically, the directed dyad-year-level version (condird). The dataset measures the physical proximity between states according

⁶³ At the time of the first stage of dataset construction, the dyadic version of MID 3.1 was not yet publicly released. Additionally, the COW project team did not systemic code dyadic information for MID before 1993 so even that 3.1 version is not useful for my purposes.

⁶⁴ Waiting for the MID project team to update the dyadic MID dataset to version MID 3.1 did not help because a) it was released on September 2007 and b) its temporal domain remain at 1993 to 2001 (one can examine the different versions of the MID datasets at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>).

to whether they are contiguous by land or separated by bodies of water. In the later case, the dataset also measures the degree of separation by water in miles.

Table 1 summarizes the data in the constituent datasets which I used to construct my resultant dataset. I used conflict behavior (DYMID 2.0) as the initial dataset⁶⁵ and added to it, information on enduring rivalry (RIV 5.1) and information on regime type (Polity IV) in that order. The controls variables were added subsequently after the base set of merges. At the time of dataset construction and throughout the analysis presented in this chapter, I used Stata version 9.2.

Table 1: Constituent Datasets and the data they provide.

Type of information	Main role of that information in the resultant dataset	Constituent Datasets
Regime type characteristics	Independent variables	Polity IV
Conflict behavior	Dependent variables	DYMID 2.0
Rivalry characteristic	Unit of analysis	RIV 5.1
Relative power	Control variable	NMC 3.02
Physical contiguity	Control variable	DCD 3.1

The resultant dataset has 4347 MIDs spread amongst 1213 rivalries, creating 4964 episodes of conflict. Each row represents a single dispute episode between two rivals.

⁶⁵ In Stata terminology, DYMID 2.0 is the “master dataset”, the other constituent datasets are “using dataset”.

Since an enduring rivalry is, by definition, a series of MIDs between the same pair of states, it also means that each row has to be nested within an existing rivalry.⁶⁶

There are therefore two identifier variables in my datasets. The identifier for rivalry, *var96*, ranges from 1 to 1213 and includes all three types of rivalries, isolated, proto and enduring. Hence, there have a total of 1213 rivalries in the data. The identifier for disputes, *disno*, is derived from the MID numbering convention in the Correlates of War project. Some MIDs, especially the multilateral crises MIDs around the WWII period, have more than two state participants. I disaggregate those multilateral MIDs into separate bilateral MIDs. As an illustrative example, consider the MID12, which represents the Munich crisis of 1938 over the Sudetenland between the participant states of Germany, United Kingdom, France, Czechoslovakia, Russia and Belgium. This particular MID is coded in 5 separate rows in my dataset, each between Germany and another of its opponent rivals. As a result, even though there are only 4347 MIDs,⁶⁷ it is possible to have 4946 disputes episodes (or ‘rows’ in the resultant dataset).

The data is coded cross-sectionally.⁶⁸ The unit of analysis is the dispute episode between a given pair of rivals. In the resultant dataset, the number of observational units, *N*, is 4946 with a temporal domain from 1816 to 2001.

⁶⁶ The MIDs that do not belong to a rivalry, operationally MIDs that has a missing value for *var96*, are dropped from the dataset. Additionally, some errors in the coding were found and removed.

⁶⁷ It is 4347 because there is MID numbers start from 2, that is, the *disno* variable have a range from 2 to 4348.

⁶⁸ I recode the data temporally in order to facilitate survival analyses in the following chapter.

3.1 Dependent Variable: Rivalry termination.

My theory suggests two outcomes, rivalry termination and rivalry de-escalation. This section focuses on the operationalization of the former.

A possible outcome of democratization within rivalry is that the rivalry itself may terminate. To capture information about rivalry termination, I create a variable called *terminate*, which has a value of 1 when the rivalry in question has ended and a value of zero otherwise. Since each rivalry has to have a last MID in a given MID sequence, all rivalries (excepting the censored cases, discussed below) will eventually have a dispute episode where *terminate* has a value of 1. The variable only records if a given rivalry ends, it does not code why it ends (example, as result of democratization) or how it ends (example, by deescalation).

The resultant dataset is right censored. We can only know a rivalry has ended only if a new MID does not emerge after a certain time has passed.⁶⁹ As a result, rivalries with MIDs that occurs close to the year 2001, the upper limit of the temporal domain, contains potentially censored information. To address this issue, I adopt from original Riv5 dataset (Diehl and Goertz 2000) the 15 year in between MIDs rule, used to determine whether an MID belongs to part of the same rivalry.⁷⁰ Therefore, I consider all rivalries that are ongoing after the year 1986 (15 years from 2001) to be right censored. For this group, we simply do not know if the rivalry in question has ended since not enough time has lapsed for us to make a determination.

⁶⁹ This is analogous to the determination of cancer remission after treatment. One can only know the treatment is successful only after the fact that the cancer did not resurface.

⁷⁰ The Riv5.1 dataset (Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006: 337-8) used a combination of both a temporal criteria and interpretative elements which makes it considerable more difficult to operationalize. The 15 years rule offers clarity without getting into the case-by-case interpretation that the later operationalization demands.

3.2 Dependent Variable: Interlude

My theory also requires a measure of change in conflict behavior from which to identify rivalry de-escalation. Within the MID dataset (DYMID 2.0), there are three ways to measure this. One can use the hostility indicators, *hihost* and *highact* summarized in table 2 below, which are meant to measure the highest level of hostile state action undertaken in a single militarized dispute. One can use the severity indicators, *fatlev* summarized in table 3 below, which measures the number of battlefield casualties suffered by the opposing state in a militarized dispute.⁷¹ Finally, one can measure the time in between outbreaks of militarized disputes (*interlude*).

⁷¹ Due to the fact I am not using both the hostility and severity indicators in my analysis, their discussion is necessarily brief. For a detailed discussion cf. Bremer, Jones and Singer 1996. For a typical application of the MID data, cf. Senese 1997.

Table 2: Coding of hostility levels (in DYMID 2.0)

Highact = highest level of hostile action taken 23 point scale	Hihost = highest level of hostility reached 5 point scale
1= None	1= No militarized action
2= Threat to use force	2= Threat of force
3= Threat to blockade	
4= Threat to occupy territory	
5= Threat to declare war	
6= Threat to use nuclear weapons	
7= Show of troops	3= Display of force
8= Show of ships	
9= Show of planes	
10= Alert	
11= Nuclear Alert	
12= Mobilization	
13= Fortify border	
14= Border violation	4= Use of force
15= Blockade	
16= Occupation of territory	
17= Seizure	
18= Clash	
19= Raid	
20= Declaration of war	
21= Use of CBR weapons	5= War
22= Interstate war	

Table 3: Coding of fatality levels (in DYMID 2.0)

Level of fatality	Notes
>999	Interstate war
501 to 999	MIDs crossing the use of force threshold (<i>hihost</i> ≥ 4)
251 to 500	
101 to 250	
26 to 100	
1 to 25	
0	MIDs without the use of force (<i>hihost</i> <4)

To illustrate the difference between the measures, consider a generic example in which state X engages state Y in a show of force using ground troops (*highact*=7) at time t-1 and a general alert of the armed forces (*highact*=9) at time t. If I were to use hostility levels, state X would be considered to be engaged in rivalry maintenance since the corresponding highest level of hostility remained at the show of force (*hihost*=3) in both time periods. However, the time between period of conflict outbreaks, between t and t-1, can yield useful information even if the hostility levels remain the same.⁷² Take as an example, a case where state X and Y had an interval of one year between time t and t-1 in the first case but an interval of ten years in the second case. The longer interval in the second case compared to the first case tell us useful information; it is suggestive of rival de-escalation. If rival state X is trying to deescalate a rivalry, the rivalry as a whole would

⁷² The point, which has been applied to hostility levels, is equally true for fatality levels.

have had less opportunity to engage in a conflict and hence the duration between dispute episodes in the rivalry should, all other things being equal, increase.

This use of time intervals to reveal information that might be otherwise missed if the conflict hostility or severity were used is the primary reason why I choose to use indicators of duration (rather than indicators of hostility or severity).

To capture information on this interlude between disputes, I generate a continuous variable *interlude*, which captures within a rivalry, the time difference between MIDs. This time unit can be thought of as years in-between MIDs.⁷³ This *interlude* is an interval variable with 3749 observations and ranges from 0 to 161. There are two reasons for the high variance in this variable. First, coding errors in the enduring rivalry dataset may have been imported into my data during dataset construction. Second, there are anomalous cases in the data. For example, the Franco-Spanish rivalry is coded as having a first MID that occurred in 1823 and a second MID that occurred in 1984. Thus that rivalry has an interlude value of 161 years ($1984-1823=161$).⁷⁴ The obvious concern is that this may stretch the conventional understanding of a rivalry. For these reasons (coding errors and anomalous cases), I count only observations that have a value below 20 in my analysis. This captures 99% of the data or 3716 out of a total of 3749 observations.⁷⁵

⁷³ Although the MID dataset does have information on months and dates of MIDs, the information is generally understood to be more accurate for MID between 1993 to present than for MIDs prior to 1993. In other words, it is more conservative to use yearly information (which the MID project team does know about with fair degree of accuracy) than it is to use monthly or daily information (both of which have questionable accuracy the further we go backwards in time).

⁷⁴ The rivalry scholarship (Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006: 337-8) codes some disputes as part of the same rivalry even if the temporal proximity criteria is violated.

⁷⁵ Only 33 observations or 1% of the variance is affected by this cutoff.

I also generate a lagged version of the *interlude* variable *laginterlude*, that is, the *interlude* variable lagged one time period back. This is meant to capture information about the effects of baseline trends over time. By including this lagged variable in my regression analysis, I account for the possibility that the rivalry was already deescalating anyway regardless of the democratization.

4.1 The Independent Variables

This section elaborates on the operationalization of the independent variables, i) monadic democracy, ii) dyadic democracy, and iii) change in dyadic regime status.⁷⁶ For data on regime characteristics, I rely on the Polity project (Marshall and Jaggers 2006).

The current version, Polity IV, codes for each state, each year, institutionalized authority scores along five attributes: i) the competitiveness of political participation, ii) the regulation of political participation, iii) the competitiveness of executive recruitment, iv) the openness of executive recruitment and v) the constraints on the chief executive. These scores can be added to generate a summary democracy score, *democ*, and a summary autocracy score, *autoc*. Both summary indicators range from 0-10. These two scores can be furthered combined into a composite regime index, *Polity*, by subtracting the *autoc* score from the *democ* score. This creates a 21 point scale ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). Researchers who use Polity IV typically impose cutoffs points along the *Polity* variable. One common demarcation standard suggested by the physical investigators themselves (Jaggers and Gurr 1995: 474) is to classify states as

⁷⁶ All three can be thought of as measuring different aspect of regime-type, especially democracy as a regime type.

autocracies if their *Polity* score is -7 or less, as democracies if their *Polity* Score is +6 or more, and as anocracies (an intermediate regime category) if their *Polity* score is between -6 and +6. All three indicators, *democ*, *autoc* and *polity* are ordinal variables.

To measure the regime type of a country, I transform the Polity IV's *Polity*⁷⁷ variable, which ranges between -10 to +10 to generate a variable, *demaut* that ranges between 0 and 100. The transformation consists of the following steps. First, I add 10 to the *Polity* variable, which itself is a subtraction of each state's institutionalized autocracy, *autoc*, score from its institutionalized democracy, *democ* score, to remove nonnegative values. Second, I divide that resultant value by 20 which generate a range from 0 to 1. Third, I multiply that resultant value by 100 to generate a variable that ranges from 0 to 100. By convention, a state is considered democratic if it's *Polity* score is above 6. Transferring that cutoff point to my *demaut* variable, a state is considered a democracy if it has a score of 80 or more and non-democratic otherwise. The cutoff point can be varied to as a check of robustness. I create two alternative cutoff points. The first alternative cutoff point for democracy is a *Polity* score of 7 or more, in which case, the *demaut* equivalent is a score of 85 or more. The second alternative cutoff is more restrictive. It considers a state as a democracy only if it's *Polity* score is at 10 (the maximum value); in which case, the *demaut* equivalent is a score of 100. I generate the *demaut* variable twice, once for state X (*demaut1*) and once for state Y (*demaut2*).

⁷⁷ Specifically, I am using the *Polity2* variable which smoothes and effectively remove a lot of the polity transition indicators (-66, -77, -88) which were hard to interpret.

I use the monadic indicators, *demaut1* and *demaut2*, as building blocks for their dyadic equivalents. I generate two sets of indicators, one dichotomous (*dd6*, *mix6*, *autocrats6*) and one trichotomous (*dyadtype*).

To identify democratic dyads, I generate the dichotomous variable *dd6*, that has a value of 1 if both states in a dyad are democratic (*demaut* value is at least 80 or above); and a value of 0 otherwise.

To identify mixed dyads, I generate the dichotomous variable *mix6*, that has a value of 1 if one state in a dyad is a democracy (*demaut* value is at least 80 or above) and the other is not a democracy (*demaut* value is below 80); otherwise it has a value of 0.

Additionally, I create lagged variable of mixed dyads, *lagmix6*, that has a value 1 if the dyad was a mixed dyad (*mix6*=1) one time period before and a value of 0 otherwise. Lagged versions of independent variables are typically used in regression analysis to remove effects of time. In this case however, I am using it to refine the range of observations to those that are pertinent for a test of my theory.⁷⁸

To identify autocratic dyads, I generate the dichotomous variable *auto6*, that has a value of 1 if both states in a dyad are autocratic (*demaut* value is below 80); and a value of 0 otherwise.

To generate a trichotomous measure of dyadic regime type, *dyadtype*, that has a value of 3 if the dyad is democratic (*dd6*=1), a value of 1 if the dyad is autocratic (*auto6*=1) and value of 2 otherwise (*mix6*=1).

⁷⁸ This specific lagged variable is used as an identifier (similarly to the rivalry identifier *var96*) to refine the domain on which I test the theory.

To facilitate checks for robustness, I also generate alternative definitions of democracies. Thus while *dd6* use the Polity score of 6 as the threshold of democracy, the alternative specification, *dd7* uses a Polity score of 7 as the threshold and the alternative specification, *dd10* uses a polity score of 10 as the threshold. Similar thresholds, 7 and 10, were used for the alternative specification of *mix6*, creating *mix7* and *mix10* respectively.

4.2 Measuring change in regime type

My theory postulates dyadic regime change as a cause of change in conflict behavior, therefore I need a dyadic measure of regime change.

To captures changes from mixed to democratic rivalry, I generate within each rivalry, a dichotomous variable *changestate*, which has a value of 1 if a mixed rivalry becomes democratic and a value of 0 otherwise.⁷⁹ This is my key independent variable.

4.3 Interaction Term

The theory contends that the power parity in a rivalry changes the effects of democratization. Such a postulation requires an interaction between relative power and dyadic regime change. Table 4 summarizes the interaction between the two variables.

⁷⁹ This variable is also used as an identifier (similarly to the rivalry identifier *var96*) to refine the domain on which I test the theory.

Table 4: Interaction effect between relative power and dyadic regime change.

Value of <i>dualchange</i> given :		Dyadic regime change (<i>changestate</i>)	
		Regime Change	No regime change
Relative power (<i>unequalpower</i>)	Power disparity	1	0
	Power parity	0	0

To capture information on the interaction effect between relative power and dyadic regime change, I generate a dichotomous variable, *dualchange*, that has a value of 1 if a mixed rivalry becomes democratic and the relative power between the rivals is greater than three is to one; and a value of 0 otherwise.

5.1 The role of control variables


This section deals with the concept of a control variable and the operationalization of two specific control variables, relative power (5.2) and physical contiguity (5.3). I address the conceptualization of control variables because there is disagreement about their use and I wish to situate my work within a particular school of thought.

There are two views on the use of control variables within democratic peace research. Broadly speaking, one camp (Ray 2003; Achen 2002) argues for methodological simplicity and use of only a few control variables in multivariate models

of international conflict while the other camp (Oneal and Russett 2004) disagrees.⁸⁰ I will highlight two main arguments of the first camp.

First, Ray (2003) suggested five guidelines on the use of control variables. Of pertinence is his third guideline that control variables should not be added merely because they have an impact on the dependent variable. A control variable should be theoretically related to (or ‘causing’) *both* the independent variable and the dependent variable. The fact that the control variable also causes the dependent variable is a necessary but not sufficient condition for its inclusion. Visually (see Figure 1 below), it is not enough that there is a relationship, justified by the theory, linking control variable C with outcome B; there must also be a relationship, again justified by theory, linking C with the independent variable A.

Figure 1: The role of control variables.



Second, Achen (2002) argued in what he terms the “Rule of Three” that the list of control variables should not be large. In the absence of a formal theory, “a statistical

⁸⁰ One epidemiological analogy used in the literature (cf. Oneal and Russett 2004) may help. When investigating the effect of smoking on cancer, one side argues it is important to have a complete model on the causes of cancer whereas the other side argues it is not strictly necessary to do so.

specification with more than three explanatory variables is meaningless” (Achen 2002: 446). Ray took Achen’s rule and went a step further; in his formulation, the Rule of Three should apply even if the theory in question is not *formal*. In his words:

But in the absence of a theory that stipulates clearly that the variables in a model are the complete set of factors necessary to explain the outcome phenomenon, then I would recommend that all analysts abide by the rule of three... (Ray 2003: 19).

The implication for my research is that I should reduce my list of control variables to those that I can theoretically demonstrate (by reference to the literature) to have had a causal relationship to both democracy/dyadic regime change on the side of the independent variable and conflict behavior and dyadic outcomes on the side of the dependent variable.

This removes several candidate control variables. For example, a common control variable for conflict outcome is some measure of trade interdependence (Russett and Oneal 2001). Consider this variable in my situation. Trade interdependence is more likely to be a result of democracy (democracies trade often more with each other) than the other way round. Additionally if trade interdependence is likely to make a particular rival state more willing to compromise, it should also make its opponent rival more demanding and hence less willing to compromise (Morrow 1999). Thus, trade interdependence does not have a clear theoretical relationship to both the independent and dependent variables that allows me to infer causality to both variables. Therefore I do not include trade interdependence as a control variable.

Another common candidate variable is membership in international organizations (IOs). One common formulation is that IOs promote peace (Russett and Oneal 2001). Whilst plausible, it also requires me to infer that IOs shape the regime types of the rival

states. An assumption that is farfetched once we consider that we are dealing rivalries, which by definition involve states with the institutional capacity to sustain conflict with an opponent for state long periods of time; and thus are likely to be resistant to international pressure from IOs. Another consideration is that rival states are unlikely to be in the same IOs. If IOs reflect shared preferences amongst states, then rivalry states by definition have disparate preferences and are thus especially unlikely to be members of the same IOs. Including membership in IOs as a control variable has the additional disadvantage of reducing the universe of potential rivals. For these reasons, I do not include membership in IOs as a control variable.

In standard dyadic analyses of international conflict, it is also common to encounter controls for the opportunity or the willingness to fight (Most and Star 1989). This can take the form of proxy indicators such as major power status or politically relevant dyads. However, given that I use rivalry, which by definition, are pairs of states that already has both the opportunity and willingness to engage in conflict, controlling for both the opportunity and the willingness to fight is redundant.

5.2 Relative power

To conduct a critical test, I need a measure of relative power between the rival states. A commonly used indicator is the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) index from the COW project. It measures the weighted average of a state's share of the total system population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military personnel and military expenditures (Singer 1987).

Since I am comparing relative power between two states, I need a standard to identify scenarios of power disparity. I consider military preponderance to exist when there is a three-to-one ratio at any point in the history of the rivalry.⁸¹ This standard is conventional in the military literature (for a discussion, see Mearsheimer 1983).

To capture information on power parity, I generate the dichotomous variable, *equalpower*, that has a value of 1 when the CINC index of the stronger rival state is *not* more than three times that of the weaker rival state; and a value of 0 if the stronger rival state has a CINC index at least three times *more* than that of the weaker rival state.

To capture information on power disparity, I generate the dichotomous variable, *unequalpower*, which has a value of 1 when the CINC index of the stronger rival state is more than three times that of the weaker rival state; and a value of 0 otherwise. *Unequalpower* and *equalpower* are the converse of each other. I generate two measures of relative power to facilitate interpretation of the results.

5.3 Contiguity

Contiguity or the physical distance between states is one of the most consistent predictor of conflict. States tend to fight their neighbors (Gleditsch 1995).⁸² As a result, it has been considered a staple of many studies of interstate conflict (see discussion in Ray 2003).

⁸¹ One issue is whether the relative power changes during the history of a rivalry. Most rival states do not change their relative military balance enough to cross the three-to-one ratio (Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006: 340).

⁸² For this dissertation I treat contiguity as simply physical distance. For more sophisticated treatments, see Starr and Thomas 2005.

Applied to my research context, contiguity facilitates conflict between rival states and should thus promote escalatory conflict policies. It also affects regime type of the rivals because a) democracies tend to be geographically proximate to each other (Buono de Mesquita, Koch and Siverson 2004: 261); and because b) democratization is more likely to succeed in an environment dominated by fellow democracies (the “snowball” effect of democratization, Gleditsch 1995; Crescenzi and Enterline 1999).

To capture information on physical distance, I generate the dichotomous variable, *contiguous*, that has value of 1 when the two rivals state are share a land border or are separated by no more than 150 miles of water, and a value of 0 if otherwise.⁸³

The inclusion of contiguity as a control variable has the effect of reducing the number of cases used in my analyses. This is partly because some states were conquered or were amalgamated into larger states (such the unification of Germany and of Italy) would be coded as missing values under the coding rules for the *contiguous* variable. Auxiliary analyses showed that the exclusion of those missing cases bias the evidence *against* my hypotheses and hence is not otherwise a problem for my analyses.⁸⁴

6. Discussion on the hypotheses

The theory generates expectations about the conflict behavior of rivalry under conditions of regime change. Its independent variables revolve around regime-type status, such as dyadic regime type (*dyadtype*, *dd6*, *mix6*, *auto6*) and the change in dyadic regime

⁸³ The DCD v3.1 dataset (Stinnett et al. 2003) has five categories of physical distance, the convention amongst researchers who use contiguity as a control variable is to use separation by 150 miles of water as the cutoff point (see as an example, Gartzke 2007: 176).

⁸⁴ The missing cases would have been an issue if they bias the results in favor of my hypotheses (which is not the case here).

type, from mixed to democratic rivalry (*changestate*). It uses relative power (*equalpower*) and contiguity (contiguous) as controls variables. Its main dependent variables are rivalry termination (*terminate*) and the time period between MIDs (*interlude*). The relationships between the hypotheses and the dependent variables are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5: Summary of the hypotheses to be tested.

Hypotheses regarding	Predicted relationships in equations to be tested.	
	<i>terminate</i>	<i>interlude</i>
H1: DD terminate more often than non-DD	+ve	NA
H2: Given DA to DD, DD terminate often more than non-DD	+ve	NA
H3: DA to DD, change to deescalation	NA	+ve
H4a: Structural version DA to DD with power disparity, change to escalation	NA	-ve
H4b: Normative version DA to DD with power disparity, change to deescalation	NA	+ve

Notations used:

DD: democratic rivalry dyad

DA: mixed rivalry dyad

Non-DD: non-democratic dyad

NA: Not applicable (not tested in the model)

+ve: In statistical tests, the estimated coefficient should be greater than zero.

-ve: In statistical tests, the estimated coefficient should be greater than zero.

The first hypothesis, **H1** states that democratic rivalries tend to terminate more than their non-democratic counterparts. This helps to explain why democratic rivalry is rare compared to their non-democratic rivalry dyads. Due to the dichotomous and categorical nature of my dependent variable *terminate*, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate. This is because the error term does not conform to the underlying assumptions of OLS models (Long 1997). In the field, many researchers rely on logit and probit models, which employ maximum likelihood methods of estimation. The logit and probit models have distributions that differ in the extreme ends (or the “tails”). Otherwise, for most purposes, they are the functionally similar. Therefore, I use the logit model to determine the effects of dyadic regime type (democratic dyad or not) on rivalry termination. To test the hypothesis, I specify three models. The first model has the regime-type variable as the baseline. I add relative power as a control variable in the second model. In the third model, I include contiguity as a control variable. The results of the models give estimates of the direction and the significance of the hypothesized relationships. Due to the nonlinear nature of the logit model, however, the results can be difficult to interpret. Therefore, I also discuss the impact of change in the values of given variables on the predicted probabilities of specific conflict outcomes holding all other variables constant. This has the advantage of being easier to interpret.

The second hypothesis **H2**, asserts that rivalry termination is more likely when a mixed rivalry becomes democratic. The relationship between change in regime type (*changestate*) and rivalry termination (*terminate*) should be in a positive direction. Unlike **H1** which is focused on dyadic regime type (*dd6*), **H2** is focused on dyadic regime change (*changestate*). Due to the dichotomous and categorical nature of my dependent

variable, *terminate*, the use of a logit model is appropriate. As is the case for **H1**, I specify three models. The first model has only the regime change variable. The second model adds to it, relative power. The third and final model includes contiguity. Due to the nonlinear nature of logit models, I also present the results in predicted probabilities which have the advantage of being easier to interpret.

The third hypothesis **H3**, asserts that democratization should deescalate a rivalry. Operationally, the length of time in-between MIDs should increase as a result of a change from mixed to democratic rivalry. The expectation therefore, is that the coefficient for dyadic regime change (*changestate*) should be positively correlated with *interlude*. Given that *interlude* is an interval variable, linear regression (OLS) model is appropriate. I specify four models. The first model has only the regime-type variable, the second model adds to it, relative power and the third model includes contiguity. In the fourth model, I add in the lagged dependent variable, *laginterlude*. Adding lagged variables for deescalation to the right hand side (RHS) of the equation accounts for the baseline trends that were already occurring prior to dyadic regime change. For example, if a rivalry was already deescalating anyway before dyadic regime change occurs, adding in a lagged variable removes this prior baseline trend. In that sense, adding in lagged variables removes the effect of time (it removes the trend that was pre-existing at time t-1). In all four models, I refine my domain for testing by adding two conditions to the regression equation. First, I restrict the pool of dyads to only those that changed from a mixed to democratic rivalry. There are 618 cases of such dyadic regime change. They constitute the pool of cases that my theory is directed at. Second, of the 618 cases, I consider only those with an *interlude* score below 20. Recall that the *interlude* variable measures *years*

between militarized disputes (MIDs) within a rivalry. It is a conceptual stretch to consider MIDs that are more than 20 years apart to be part of the *same* rivalry sequence. The majority of the cases, 615 of 618 have an *interlude* of 20 and below. Hence I consider the remaining three cases to be outliers. Linear regression models are relatively simple to interpret and hence coefficients can be directly reported.

The last set of hypotheses **H4a** and **H4b** focus the effects of democratization under power disparity. The structural hypothesis, **H4a** expects the stronger democratic rival to escalate against its weaker rival after a mixed rivalry becomes democratic. Since the weaker rival has to respond accordingly to an attack by its stronger rival, the overall conflict trend is towards escalation. By contrast, the normative hypothesis **H4b**, predicts de-escalation as it expects the stronger rival to choose not to exploit its military superiority over its weaker democratic rival. Since the weaker rival also exhibit democratic norms, the overall conflict trend is towards de-escalation.

The theoretical logic in these hypotheses utilizes interaction effects (regime change in interaction with relative power). As such, the appropriate tool to use is a multiplicative interaction model (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). Given the interval nature of the *interlude* variable, linear regression is used. I specify three models. For the baseline model (Model 1), I follow the advice of Brambor et al. (2006: 66) and include both the interaction term, *dualchange* and the constituent terms *unequalpower* and *changestate*. I include physical proximity in the second model and add the lagged variable, *laginterlude*, for the third model. As is with the case for hypothesis 3, I focus the domain on transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry and excluded three outlier-cases. Three pieces of information are especially pertinent when interpreting the results;

they are the direction of the marginal effects of regime change, the statistical significance of those effects, and the magnitude of the effects of regime change.

The first consideration is over the direction of the marginal effects of democratization. If the institutional hypothesis holds, the marginal effect of dyadic regime change on *interlude* should be negative under power disparity. Conversely, if the normative hypothesis holds, the marginal effect of dyadic regime change on *interlude* should be positive under power disparity.

The second consideration is over the statistical significance of the marginal effects. This is the critical test. I want to determine whether the sum of coefficients of the constituent terms (*equalpower* and *changestate*) and the interaction term (*equalpower*changestate*) is statistically significantly different from zero.⁸⁵ If it is statistically significantly different from zero, the institutional hypothesis is supported. If it is not, the normative hypothesis is supported. This information is conveyed by the F-statistic.

The third consideration is over the magnitude of the effects of democratization. If the normative hypothesis holds, the *overall* effect (note, not the marginal effect) of democratization on *interlude* should be similar regardless of the relative power between rivals. By contrast, if the institutional hypothesis holds, the *overall* effect of democratization on *interlude* should be lower under power disparity compared with power parity.

⁸⁵ Note that variable for relative power here is *equalpower* rather than *unequalpower*.

7 Results and Discussion

The results for **H1** summarized in table 6, strongly supports the hypothesis. Compared with non-democratic dyads, democratic dyads are more likely to end their rivalries. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level under all three models. This relationship holds under alternative and more restrictive definitions of democracy.⁸⁶ Therefore, the relationship is fairly robust. In the full model, the coefficients of both control variables, *equalpower* and *contiguous*, are statistically significant at the .01 level. Both coefficients have a negative direction, which means that being adjacent to the opponent rival or having an equally powerful rival decrease the likelihood of rivalry termination.

⁸⁶ For the definition relying on the threshold of +7 on the POLITY score (*dd7*), the relationship is significant at the 0.015 level. At the highest threshold (*dd10*), the relationship returns to be significant at the .002 level.

Table 6: The effects of democratic dyads on the likelihood of rivalry termination (H1)

Models explaining termination			
Logit regression	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
dd6	.91** (.20)	1.00** (.20)	.77** (.28)
equalpower		-.60** (.08)	-.47** (.12)
contiguous			-.75** (.20)
constant	-1.21** (.04)	-1.02** (.04)	-.82** (.20)
N	4022	4019	2184
Prob>chi2	0	0	0

* Significant at .05 level, two tailed
 ** Significant at .01 level, two tailed
 () standard errors⁸⁷

Since the coefficients of the logit models are hard to interpret, it is more substantively meaningful to present the result in terms of predicted probability. Here, the theoretical focus is on dyadic regime types or whether the dyad in question is democratic or not. I hold the other controls variables at their fixed values (at 0 or 1) when generating the predicted probabilities of rivalry termination. Given two control variables, there are therefore four permutations, summarized in Table 7 below. Given distant rivals with power disparity (*equalpower*=0 and *contiguous*=0), democratic dyads have a 48.8 % probability of rivalry termination. By contrast, non-democratic dyads have only a 30.5% probability of rivalry termination. At the other extreme, given adjacent rivals that are

⁸⁷ I did not give the odds ratios as I am presenting predicted probabilities instead.

equally powerful (*equalpower*=1 and *contiguous*=1), democratic dyads have a 22.0 % probability of rivalry termination, whereas the equivalent percentage for non-democratic dyads is only 11.5%. Table 7 shows that democratic dyads have higher probabilities of rivalry termination across all four permutations.

Table 7: Predicted Probabilities for rivalry termination, stratified by dyad type (H1).

Probability of rivalry termination given :	Power disparity & non-contiguity	Power parity & non-contiguity	Power disparity & contiguity	Power parity & contiguity
	Equalpower=0 Contiguous=0	Equalpower=1 Contiguous=0	Equalpower=0 Contiguous=1	Equalpower=1 Contiguous=1
Democratic dyad (dd6=1)	48.8%	37.4%	31.1%	22.0%
Non-democratic dyad (dd6=0)	30.5%	21.6%	17.2%	11.5%

The results for **H2** are summarized in table 8. It strongly supports the hypothesis. A dyadic regime change from mixed to democratic rivalry tends to result in rivalry termination. This positive relationship between this regime change (*changestate*) and rivalry termination (*terminate*) is statistically significant at the 0.01 level under all three model specifications. It still holds when the model is re-run under alternative and more restrictive definitions of democracy. Therefore, the posited relationship is robust.

The control variable of power parity (*equalpower*) is also statistically correlated with rivalry termination. The direction of its coefficient is negative, which means that rivalry termination is less likely under situations of power parity. This dovetails with the balance of power view of rivalry, that rivalry continuation requires both sides to approximate each other in power, without which one rival will overwhelm the other

resulting in rivalry termination. The second control variable, contiguity is also statistically significant at the .05 level. Rivals who are near each other have more opportunities to engage in conflict and thus lower likelihood of rivalry termination.

Table 8: The effects of democratization on the likelihood of rivalry termination (H2)

Models explaining termination			
Logit regression	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
changestate	2.26** (.28)	2.19** (.28)	1.60** (.53)
equalpower		-.49** (.19)	-1.40 ** (.40)
contiguous			-1.08* (.54)
constant	-1.88** (.09)	-1.71** (.11)	-.91 (.55)
N	1097	1095	481
Prob>chi2	0	0	0

* Significant at .05 level, two tailed
 ** Significant at .01 level, two tailed
 () standard errors⁸⁸

It is often more substantively meaningful to present the results of logit models in terms of predicted probability. Here, the theoretical concern is with the effects on rivalry termination of a change from mixed to democratic rivalry. I hold the other two controls at their fixed values (at 0 or at 1). The four permutations of the two controls variables are summarized in Table 9 below. Given rivals state who are unequal in power and are not neighbors (*equalpower*=0 and *contiguous*=0), when a mixed rivalry becomes democratic (*changestate* from 0 to 1), the probability of rivalry termination increases by 37.9%.

⁸⁸ I did not give the odds ratios as I am presenting predicted probabilities instead.

Given that the initial probability of rivalry termination in such a scenario is 28.7%, this represents a 132.1% increase over the baseline probability. At the other end of spectrum, the effect of dyadic regime is even starker. Given rivals state who near each other and are relatively equal in power (*equalpower=1* and *contiguous=1*), democratization (*changestate* from 0 to 1) increases the probability of rivalry termination by 11.0%. Whilst this may seem a modest, it is not when the baseline probability is considered. The initial probability of rivalry termination in such a scenario is only 3.3%, while the increase over the baseline probability is 333.3%. In each permutation, a change from mixed to democratic rivalry increases the probability of rivalry termination (even if the initial baseline probability is low).

Table 9: Predicted Probabilities for rivalry termination given dyadic regime change (H2)

Change from mixed to democratic rivalry given the following conditions:	Initial probability	Post-change Probability	Change in probability ⁸⁹	% change in Probability
power disparity & non-contiguity Changestate 0 to 1 Equalpower=0 Contiguous=0	28.7	66.6	+37.9	+132.1
Power parity & non-contiguity Changestate 0 to 1 Equalpower=1 Contiguous=0	9.0	32.9	+23.9	+265.6
Power disparity & contiguity Changestate 0 to 1 Equalpower=0 Contiguous=1	12.0	40.4	+28.3	+235.8
Power parity & contiguity Changestate 0 to 1 Equalpower=1 Contiguous=1	3.3	14.3	+11.0	+333.3

The next three hypotheses, **H3**, **H4a** and **H4b**, rely on linear regression models. Before presenting and analyzing their results, a discussion of the premises underpinning such analyses is warranted. Here, I rely on the arguments of Ray (2003), whose position was previously discussed in section 5.1. He noted there are two general views on the multivariate models. The first argues that a model should include all independent variables when explaining the dependent variable. The aim in this view is to build a

⁸⁹ Note the percentage change values can be off by up to 1% due to rounding errors as I round the figures to 1 decimal place. For discrepancies, I take the Stata values generated by the “mfx” command to be accurate.

comprehensive model of the dependent variable. In contrast to this, Ray notes that the trend is moving towards a second view. He asserts:

In recent decades, this kind of multivariate model appears less frequently in important books and journals in international politics, and even perhaps in political science in general. Certainly in research on the causes of war, general models aimed at the best fit for the model as a whole seem to have given way almost entirely to models whose basic purpose is to evaluate the impact of one key factor. Variables beyond that one key factor are added almost entirely for the purpose of providing a more sophisticated, thorough, and rigorous evaluation of a key hypothesis in question than would be possible with bivariate analyses. Most specifically, explicitly or implicitly, control variables are added to multivariate models in order to see whether the relationship of special interests persists. The implicit argument or assumption is that if a key relationship cannot survive the addition to the model of control variables, then that relationship is exposed as less interesting. (emphasis added) (Ray 2003: 5)

The point is crucial and bears emphasis. In my situation, I am seeking to establish the nature of the relationship between dyadic regime change and deescalation for **H3** and the relationship between the interaction effect and deescalation for **H4a** and **H4b**. Extraneous control variables and their ability to account for variation in the dependent variable, by themselves, is no great theoretical concern to my research questions.⁹⁰ With this caveat in mind, I return to the examination of the evidence of the main claim of the theory of rivalry change, **H3**.

The result of the linear regression models, summarized in Table 10, supports **H3**. Democratization from a mixed to democratic rivalry deescalates a rivalry. This positive relationship between regime change (*changestate*) and rivalry deescalation (*interlude*) is statistically significant at the 0.01 level for all four models. In the full model, model 4, a unit increase in *changestate* is associated with a 1.62 unit increase in *interlude*, holding

⁹⁰ An medical analogy may help. A researcher who is interested in the impact of smoking on cancer may add in other variables, genetic predisposition, regular exercise, and so that are associated with cancer. Those additional variables do not address the primary research question which remains the impact of smoking on cancer.

all other variables at their constant. In substantive terms, when a mixed rivalry becomes democratic, the average length in-between militarized disputes increases by around 1.6 years.⁹¹

Table 10: The effects of democratization on interlude between MIDs (H3)

Models explaining interlude				
Linear regression	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
changestate	.835** (.298)	.803** (.299)	1.66** (.497)	1.62** (.458)
equalpower		-.226 (.149)	-.046 (.218)	-.137 (.210)
contiguous			-.161 (.402)	.247 (.400)
laginterlude				.096** (.022)
constant	1.73** (.074)	1.82** (.094)	1.91** (.402)	1.24** (.406)
N	1337	1335	615	547
R2	.006	.008	.019	.062
Prob>F	.005	.007	.010	.000

* Significant at .05 level, two tailed

** Significant at .01 level, two tailed

() standard errors

Re-running model under alternative and more restrictive definitions of democracy reveals that the relationship between *changestate* and *interlude* is no longer statistically significant. Before dismissing the relationship as not robust, it is useful to consider the

⁹¹ The *interlude* variable is measured in years (cf section 4.1).

situation theoretically. At higher thresholds of democracy, one expects that the effect of dyadic democracy to be magnified upon conflict behavior. One manifestation of this impact could be in rivalry termination which we already know from the results presented in Tables 8 and 10 is a strong and robust relationship. If rivalries terminates after they become democratic, this would logically *prevent* a corresponding increase in the time in-between militarized disputes. Without a rivalry, there would have been no interlude between MIDs to measure! Thus, whilst the relationship posited by **H3** is not robust under more restrictive definitions of democracy, the hypothesis is not necessarily undermined by this.

Except for the control variable, *laginterlude*, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, all the other control variables in the four models have coefficients that are not statistically significant. As argued previously, this lack of statistical significance by itself is not a serious concern given a research focus on the relationship between *changestate* and *interlude*. Given that nature of *laginterlude* as a lagged variable, it is natural for it to be significant predictor of *interlude* (what Y is at time period t, is most likely of what Y was at time period t-1).

The overall fit of the models, R-squared, is low, although the p-values of the four models showed that the results of the models are unlikely to have occurred by random chance alone (Prob>F is less than an alpha of 0.01). Less than 10 % of the variance of the dependent variable is explained by the variables collectively. This is a normal situation in

conflict studies.⁹² This is in part due to the sense that interstate conflict behavior is inherently stochastic (Gartzke 1999). As a result, the pragmatic approach adopted by some in the field is to identify necessary conditions for the occurrence of certain types of conflict with the understanding that such conditions by themselves are not sufficient conditions.

The results for the linear multiplicative interaction model, summarized in table 11, support **H4a** and falsify **H4b**. Democratization still deescalates a rivalry but the magnitude of deescalation is *greater* between equally powerful rivals than is the case for unequally powerful rivalry pairs. This negative relationship is statistically significant at least the 0.05 level (one tailed), for all three models. In the full model, model 3, a unit increase in *dualchange* is associated with a 1.65 unit *decrease* in *interlude*.⁹³

The overall fit of the models (R-squared) is low. In the final model, only 6% of the variance of interlude is explained by the group of independent variables collectively. As explained previously, this is normal in such studies of international conflict. The p-values of the three models showed that the results of the models are unlikely to have occurred by chance alone (Prob>F is less than an alpha of 0.01).

⁹² As an illustration, consider an early work (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979) on the war-joining behavior of states, in which the authors seek to determine whether states band-wagon or balance when they join an ongoing wars. The fact that most of the time, most states do not join wars, around 98 % of all cases meant that only 2% of the variance of state behavior is explained. The point is that explaining even only 2% of state war-joining behavior is considered a legitimate exercise in the field (at least, legitimate enough to be published).

⁹³ Because this is an interaction model, this should not be interpreted as the average effect of *dualchange* upon *interlude*. The proper interpretation is to focus on marginal effects (which I do in later paragraphs). Similarly, because the statistic of interest is the F-statistic of the critical test and not the statistical significance of the *dualchange* variable, a robustness check should be directed at the former and not the latter. A robustness check of the latter indicates that *dualchange* retain its statistical significance at the *dd7* threshold but not at the *dd10* threshold.

The critical test, to remind the reader, is that the *sum* of coefficients of the interaction and constituent terms are significantly different from zero. After running the full model (model 3), the critical test showed that the probability that the sum of coefficients is significantly different from zero is 0.0518, just above an alpha of 0.05, the conventional threshold of statistical significance. Rerunning the critical test under alternative, and more restrictive specifications of democracy, yields similar results. Under the *dd7* threshold, the probability was 0.7401 and under the *dd10* threshold the probability was 0.9540. These results suggest a rejection of the normative hypothesis **H4b** in favor of the structural hypothesis, **H4a**.

Since we are using an interaction model, the substantive interpretation should focus on the marginal effects.⁹⁴ The marginal effect of *changestate* upon *interlude* given power disparity is 1.167. By contrast, the marginal effect of *changestate* upon *interlude* given power parity is a higher 2.584. That is, the magnitude of the marginal effect of *changestate* upon *interlude* is *smaller* under conditions of power disparity. This set of results is more consistent with the structural perspective than with the normative perspective. It supports therefore, **H4a** and not **H4b**.

⁹⁴ Given that changes in relative power are rare, I assume the variation originates from dyadic regime change (*changestate* from 0 to 1), so that *dualchange* changes from 0 to 1.

Table 11: The impact of democratization under power disparity (H4a & H4b).

Models for explaining interlude <i>given power disparity</i>			
Linear regression	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
dualchange	-1.859 †† (.680)	-2.218 † (1.001)	-1.646 † (.933)
changestate	2.180** (.585)	2.941** (.762)	2.584** (.713)
unequalpower	.322* (.152)	.156 (.223)	.229 (.216)
contiguous		-.169 (.400)	.236 (.399)
laginterlude			.088** (.022)
constant	1.534** (.119)	1.817** (.402)	1.084** (.403)
N	1337	615	547
R2	.013	.027	.067
Prob> F	.001	.003	.000

* Significant at .05 level, two tailed

** Significant at .01 level, two tailed

† Significant at .05 level, one tailed

†† Significant at .01 level, one tailed

() standard errors

8. Conclusion

The overall results are summarized in Table 11. The evidence provides strong support for **H1** and **H2**; both of which are robust under more rigorous definitions of democracy. In a sense, this is to be expected given that both hypotheses replicate what is already known in the existing literature. The innovation here is to extend that replication

onto the domain of enduring rivalry. The results suggest that when a mixed rivalry becomes democratic, rivalry termination is especially likely. This is in part due to the tendency for democratic dyads to end their rivalries. It suggests a possible way to account for the rarity of democratic rivalries, an issue I take up in the concluding chapter.

The evidence supports hypothesis **H3**. A change from mixed to democratic rivalry deescalates a rivalry. However, this relationship between dyadic regime change and rivalry deescalation appears to disappear under more restrictive definitions of democracy. Before we conclude that the relationship is not robust, consider the implications of prior hypotheses. If democratic dyads terminate their rivalry (inferred from **H1**) and change to democratic dyads terminates rivalry (inferred from **H2**), the selection effect of democracy, that is the tendency of democracy to not be rivals, would override the variation in the *interlude* variable. At higher levels of democracy, I would expect this selection effect to be stronger. Hence, there is a theoretical reason why the relationship posited by **H3** might not hold under higher levels of democracy.

Table 12: Summary of test results for Hypotheses 1 to 4b.

Hypothesis	Overall conclusion	Robustness check
H1: DD terminate more often than non-DD	Strongly supported	Yes
H2: Given DA to DD, DD terminate often more than non-DD	Strongly supported	Yes
H3: DA to DD, change to deescalation	Supported	No (but accounted for by selection effect)
H4a: Structural version DA to DD with power disparity, change to escalation	Supported	Yes
H4b: Normative version DA to DD with power disparity, change to deescalation	Rejected	Yes

The evidence shows that democratization under power disparity results in a shorter interlude compared to democratization under power parity. This supports **H4a**, and rejects **H4b**.

Although these results support my theory, it is worth recalling that focus has democratization, or the transition from mixed to democratic rivalry. Even if we know that democratization de-escalate a rivalry, a legitimate question is to compare its effects with other types of regime transitions. Are democratization especially pacifying compared to autocratization? I address such questions in the next chapter.

Chapter Four:

1. Introduction

In this chapter I conduct a quantitative test comparing the effects of democratization with other types of regime transitions. I concentrate in particular on hypothesis H5a to H8. I start by discussing dataset construction and give an overview of survival analysis in section 2. I follow by discussing the operationalization of the dependent variables, of the independent variables and of the control variables in sections 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Next, I discuss survival analysis in section 6. I present the findings in section 7 and draw conclusions in section 8. As is the case for the previous chapter, all the operational names of the variables will be in italics for the sake of clear exposition.

2. Data

The hypotheses focus on the conflict behavior of transitioning dyads. For the domain of rivalry, I adopt the rivalry conception by Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006), widely used in the rivalry literature. They operationalize a rivalry as a pair of states that has fought a minimum of three militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) over the whole 1816-2001 period.⁹⁵ Because their dataset represents a work in progress, I fill in parts of the missing data on the MIDs with the dyadic version of the MID dataset (Maoz 2005).⁹⁶ To estimate regime characteristics, I use the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2006). Finally, I add data on the relative power of states drawn from the National Material

⁹⁵ Those dyads with only 1 to 2 MIDs are treated as isolated conflicts. These are dropped from analysis because they do not represent the long term persistent conflict relationships that are of interest.

⁹⁶ The dyadic information for the MID 3.1 dataset (Bremer, Jones, and Singer 1996) only covers MIDs between 1993 to 2001. As a result, for dyadic information prior to 1993, Maoz's version is more appropriate.

Capabilities dataset (Singer 1987) and information on geographic contiguity from the Direct Contiguity Dataset (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002).

The resultant dataset has 1083 militarized disputes spread between 248 enduring rivalries from 1816 to 2001. Each “row” in the dataset represents a single militarized dispute between two rival states. Therefore, the unit of analysis is a conflict episode.⁹⁷ Since an enduring rivalry is composed of several MIDs, each MID is by definition, “nested” within a rivalry. Following Bueno de Mesquita (et al. 2004: 259), I separate multilateral MIDs into a series of bilateral MIDs, each with its own row in the dataset.

3. Dependent Variable: Interlude between militarized disputes

My dependent variable is the conflict behavior of states during their rivalry (and not rivalry termination). To operationalize this, I focus in particular on the duration of peace in between outbreaks of fighting within rivalry. To measure this peace-spell, I generate a continuous variable *interlude*, which captures within a rivalry, the time difference in years between outbreaks of MIDs. Additionally, I recode *interlude* with values of 0 as missing data because the covariates of interest is by design, yearly data.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ I do not use the rivalry-dyad-year format (example in Cornwell and Colaresi 2002; Prins and Daxecker 2007) as the focus is on the peace-spell in between outbreaks of fighting rather than the duration of rivalry.

⁹⁸ Our existing measure of the timing of regime transitions (in Polity IV) is not precise enough for us to use them in a date format instead of the more general year format. Thus my covariates of interest, regime change, can only vary from year to year. There were however, seven cases where the MID initiated before the regime transition ended. Those were excluded from my analysis as my theoretical focus is on how regime change affect conflict behavior (rather than the other way round).

4. Independent Variables: Regime Transitions

The independent variables measures different types of dyadic regime transitions. I start by drawing information on regime characteristics from the Polity series, (specifically Polity IV, Marshall and Jaggers 2006).

For monadic measures of regime type, I transform Polity IV aggregate regime score, *polity2*, which is a state's democracy characteristics minus its autocracy characteristics and which ranges from -10 to +10, to generate the variable *demaui*, that ranges from 0 to 100. First, I add 10 to *polity2*, in order to remove negative values. Then I divide the results by 20 and multiply that by 100 to generate a variable that ranges from 0 to 100. Following the conventions suggested by Gurr and Jaggers (1995), a state is considered a democracy if its *polity2* score is at least six and an autocracy if its *polity2* score is below negative six. This translates into a *demaui* score of at least 80 for democracies and score of 15 and below for autocracies. States with values in between the two are considered anocracies or mixed regimes.

To measure democratic dyads, I generate the variable *dd6*, which has a value of 1 if both states in the dyad are democratic, and a value of 0 otherwise. To measure mixed dyads, I generate the variable *mix6*, which has a value of 1 if one state in a dyad is a democracy and the other is not a democracy; otherwise it has a value of 0. To measure autocratic dyads, I generate the variable *aa6*, which has a value of 1 if both states in a dyad are autocratic; otherwise it has a value of 0.

I code regime changes by comparing the dyadic regime type at the time of dispute, *t* with its dyadic regime type at the time of the previous dispute, *t-1*. Given three types of dyadic rivalry, democratic, mixed and autocratic, six directions of regime change

are possible. The variable *minor democratization* measures a transition from an autocratic to mixed rivalry. The variable *major democratization* measures a transition from mixed to democratic rivalry. The variable *complete democratization* measures a transition from autocratic to democratic rivalry. The variable *major autocratization* measures a transition from a mixed to autocratic rivalry. The variable *minor autocratization* measures a transition from a democratic to mixed rivalry. The variable *complete autocratization* measures a transition from a democratic to autocratic rivalry. All six regime transitions are dummy variables and have a value of 1 when the specific regime change occurs and a value of 0 otherwise. To capture information on regime change in general, I generate the variable, *regimechange* that has a value of 1 when any of the six specific regime transitions occurred in the rivalry and a value of 0 otherwise. To address the issue of multicollinearity, I also create a second measure, *non-democratic transitions*, that captures information on all regime transitions except the transition from mixed to democratic rivalry (except *major democratization*). This variable effectively measures all non-democratic transitions.

There are a total of 33 regime transitions in the data. Of those, 13 were transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry, 12 were transitions from mixed to autocratic rivalry, 5 were transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry and 3 were transitions from autocratic to mixed rivalry.⁹⁹ There were no cases of transitions from autocratic to democratic

⁹⁹ Some may be concerned about the small number of transitions. It is worth recalling that the posited relationship between democratization and interlude was found to be robust. Such a finding can be substantively meaningful, especially from a policy-making perspective, even if it only applies to a subset of the population of conflict dyads.

rivalry and from democratic to autocratic rivalry. Summary information on the regime transitions is provided in table 1.

Table 1: Summary of different regime transitions, 1816-2001.

Variable Name	Type of regime change	Absolute number
<i>minor democratization</i>	From an autocratic to mixed rivalry	3
<i>major democratization</i>	From a mixed to democratic rivalry	13
<i>complete democratization</i>	From an autocratic to democratic rivalry	0
<i>minor autocratization</i>	From a democratic to mixed rivalry	5
<i>major autocratization</i>	From a mixed to autocratic rivalry	12
<i>complete autocratization</i>	From a democratic to autocratic rivalry	0
<i>non-democratic transition</i>	All regime transitions except <i>major democratization</i>	20
<i>regimechange</i>	Any regime change	33
Total observations in the data		1083

To give a sense of the transitions involved, I list the specific cases in Table 2 and provide two illustrations. The US-Ecuador rivalry illustrates the impact of a transition from a mixed to a democratic rivalry. The rivalry revolved around the fishing rights of US vessels off the Ecuadorian coast. The “tuna wars” intensified under the military government of Velasco (1967-72) when US vessels were seized and the US in turn, withdrew military and economic aid to Ecuador. It was after the democratization of Ecuador in 1979, when the Ecuadorian President Febres Cordero aligned its policies with the US under President Ronald Regan that the rivalry started to deescalate.

The Peru-Ecuador rivalry illustrates the impact of a transition in the opposite direction, from a democratic to a mixed rivalry. In that rivalry, the issue is a long running

border dispute in the upper Amazon. Tensions over the contested border outposts were contained in the 1991 Pachacútec Incident when both rivals were democratic. After the 1992 autogople (a self coup), Peru under President Alberto Fujimori became autocratic. The same border tensions that were previously contained escalated into the 1995 Cenepa war, during a period of mixed rivalry. This was the most severe conflict between the two rivals since their 1941 war. While it is true that the rivals managed to conclude a comprehensive peace treaty (the Brasilia Accords) in 1998, it should be noted this was *after* the 1995 conflict.

Table 2: List of all regime transitions with specific dates.

Transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry					
No	Rivalry dyad	Country transition	under	Transition end date	MID start date
1	Ecuador-USA	Ecuador		30/04/1979	25/10/1980
2	Russia-USA	Russia		01/11/2000	26/03/2000
3	Russia-Canada	Russia		01/11/2000	26/03/2000
4	Honduras-El Salvador	El Salvador		02/06/1984	23/05/1989
5	Russia-Norway	Russia		26/03/2000	14/02/2001
6	Russia-Turkey	Russia		26/03/2000	18/06/2000
7	Syria-Israel	Syria		26/02/1954	28/02/1954
8	South Korea-Japan	South Korea		26/02/1988	13/02/1996
9	India-Pakistan	Pakistan		17/11/1988	11/02/1990
10	India-Bangladesh	Bangladesh		26/09/1991	25/06/1996
11	Honduras-Nicaragua	Nicaragua		27/02/1990	02/02/1991
12	Venezuela-Guyana	Guyana		06/10/1992	03/10/1999
13	Russia-Japan	Russia		26/03/2000	21/04/2000
Transitions from mixed to autocratic rivalry					
No	Rivalry dyad	Country transition	under	Transition end date	MID start date
1	Chile-Argentina	Chile		12/09/1973	14/07/1977
2	France-Russia	France		03/11/1852	13/06/1853
3	Greece-Bulgaria	Greece		05/08/1936	11/10/1940
4	Cameroon-Nigeria	Nigeria		01/01/1984	02/05/1987
5	Uganda-Kenya	Uganda		20/12/1969	13/02/1973
6	Kenya-Somalia	Somalia		22/10/1969	23/06/1977
7	Somalia-Ethiopia	Somalia		22/10/1969	01/04/1973
8	Ethiopia-Sudan	Sudan		13/10/1971	01/03/1975
9	China-Burma	Burma		01/07/1963	01/01/1969
10	France-Germany	France		03/11/1852	06/06/1859
11	Germany-Italy	Germany		15/07/1933	25/07/1934
12	Uganda-Sudan	Sudan		13/10/1971	15/12/1971
Transitions from autocratic to mixed rivalry					
No	Rivalry dyad	Country transition	under	Transition end date	MID start date
1	Ethiopia-Sudan	Sudan		02/04/1986	05/12/1986
2	Syria-Jordan	Syria		26/02/1954	13/04/1957
3	China-Philippines	Philippines		03/02/1987	01/01/1995
Transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry					
No	Rivalry dyad	Country transition	under	Transition end date	MID start date
1	Ecuador-Peru	Peru		01/01/1992	09/01/1995
2	Belgium-Germany	Germany		15/07/1933	07/03/1936
3	Greece-Turkey	Turkey		13/09/1980	21/03/1981
4	Russia-Ukraine	Russia		16/10/1993	08/04/1994
5	France-Germany	Germany		15/07/1933	07/03/1936

5. Control variables: contiguity, relative power and conflict history

When using control variables, I follow the injunctions of Ray (2003) and Achen (2002) to limit the number of controls variables to the minimum necessary to avoid the omitted variable bias with a view for the substantive interpretation of the results. Including more controls merely to improve the fit of the model can hurt the interpretation of the results. I focus on relative power and on geographical proximity, both of which have been established in the conflict literature as stable predictors of the probability of conflict (Bremer 1992).

Realist theories place a premium on relative power as a determinant of interstate conflict. Traditional balance of power theory, such as that articulated by Morgenthau (1956), argues that states need a preponderance of power before they initiate a particular round of conflict. Thus, an interpretation is that power parity between rivals discourages the initiation of militarized disputes in the rivalry (Cornwell and Colaresi 2002: 335). For measures of relative power, I use the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) index from the COW project which measures the weighted average of a state's share of the total system population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military personnel and military expenditures (Singer 1987). I apply Ray and Singer (1972) measure of the concentration of power to the dyadic context. I take the ratio of the capability of a state over the summed capabilities of the pair, subtract .5 from it, and take its absolute value. This generates a continuous variable that ranges from 0 to .5 where higher values indicate greater power disparity.

Geographically proximate states have more opportunities for militarized disputes. Vasquez (1993) notes that contiguity helps to predict rivalry and Bueno de Mesquita,

Koch and Siverson (2004: 261) note that democracies tend to be proximate to each other. To capture information on physical contiguity (Stinnett et al. 2002), I generate the variable *contiguous* which has a value of 1 when the two rival states share a land border or are separated by no more than 150 miles of water, and a value of 0 otherwise.

Unlike the case for regime changes which are treated as time-varying covariates, I consider both controls to be time-independent covariates (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).¹⁰⁰ There is precedence for this view (see Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006: 340 for relative power and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 99 for contiguity). Going beyond precedence, it is worth thinking about the theoretical relevance of the conditions where the control variables are time-variant. The decolonization of the European powers can change both the geographical proximity and the relative power between rivals. However, the focus here is on hostile relationships (rivalry) and not colonial ties.

Within the conflict-begets-conflict literature, there is an argument that a prior history of conflict influences the likelihood of subsequent conflict (Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin 1978). Applied to the data, rivalries with a disputatious history have a greater likelihood of experiencing a subsequent dispute *independent* of the condition of rivalry. To use a smoking analogy, consider two smokers with different smoking histories who stop smoking at the same time t . The first smoker smokes one pack of cigarettes a day for 20 years and has a 20 pack-year smoking history. The second smoker smokes two packs of cigarettes a day for 20 years and has a 40 pack-year smoking history. The second smoker has a higher probability of experiencing the symptoms of lung cancer compared

¹⁰⁰ Treating the control variables as time-varying covariates did not substantively alter the results.

to the first smoker even if both stopped smoking at the same time. Similarly, a prior history of disputes (the smoking history) influences the likelihood of subsequent militarized disputes independent of the condition of rivalry (the smoking habit). Thus the Ecuador-US rivalry which has low disputatiousness has a lower likelihood of future conflict compared to the Israeli-Syria rivalry, with a high disputatiousness rate, even if both rivalries were to undergo regime change at the same point in time. To capture this notion of a prior history of conflict, I generate the variable, *eventseq* to indicate the serial sequence of militarized disputes within a rivalry.

6. Survival Analysis

The resultant dataset contains information on the conflict behavior of transitioning rivalry dyads. The issue is the appropriate conceptualization of the changes in conflict behavior and the role regime transitions play into it.¹⁰¹ I use the smoking analogy to suggest one such conceptualization.

Smoking causes lung cancer (National Cancer Institute 2007). The primary way to prevent lung cancer is the cessation of smoking itself. Due to the additive nature of cigarette smoking, cessation is frequently not practiced until after the onset of cancer, by which time, alternative treatment methods (for example, surgery or chemotherapy) may be necessary. Due to the fact that lung cancer, like all cancers can reemerge even after remission, it is more precise to state that both smoking-cessation and the medical

¹⁰¹ In the previous chapter I identified three indicators of conflict behavior (hostility, severity and duration) and explained why duration is the appropriate choice (cf. Chapter Four, section 3.2).

treatments reduce the risk of experiencing the symptoms of lung cancer (for example, chronic cough or persistent bronchitis) rather than reducing the risk of lung cancer itself.

Applied to my research context, the prosecution of a rivalry is the equivalent of keeping the smoking habit while the resolution of the issues underlying a rivalry is the equivalent of kicking the smoking habit. Analogously, the different types of regime changes represent alternative treatment methods while outbreaks of interstate violence (MIDs) represent symptoms of the underlying lung cancer. Like the case of medical treatments for cancer, regime changes affect the risk of experiencing the *next* outbreak of conflict within the rivalry.

As the smoking analogy illustrates, while the cessation of smoking amongst the populace is ideal, sometimes treatment is what the physician has to work with. Similarly, while the resolution of rivalry amongst states is ideal, sometimes democratization is all that the policy-maker has to work with. In that sense, I posit regime changes as treatments that increase or decrease the risk of the next outbreak of conflict (MIDs). If the treatment is successful, the time interval to the next militarized dispute should increase. Conversely, the same time interval should decrease if the treatment is unsuccessful. Couched in this manner, the appropriate method is survival analysis (Cleves et al. 2010).¹⁰² This is because survival models *directly estimate* both the duration in between the outbreaks of conflict as well as the independent variables (termed the covariates), such as regime change, which vary over time. Survival models are less frequently used in democratic peace research but are the norm in rivalry research.

¹⁰² There is as yet, no consensus on the notation used in survival analysis (also known as duration, event history or hazard analysis). For this article, I rely on the notation of Cleves (et al. 2010).

In survival analysis, the dependent variable is the hazard rate, or the instantaneous rate at which a failure event will occur in a given interval (the analysis time) given that the subject have already survived until time t (see also, Bennett 1997a: 380; Cleves et al. 2010: 7-8). Applied to the data, the subject is the rivalry dyad and the failure event is an occurrence of a militarized dispute. Given that a rivalry is not at risk of experiencing the next militarized dispute while it is already in a current dispute (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 99), the analysis time, therefore, is the time *in between* militarized disputes. It may help to think of survival analysis as simply modeling the instantaneous rate at which a given rivalry dyad transition from non-violence to violence as a function of a set of covariates (which the literature posits to be the different types of regime transitions).

One advantage of survival analysis is in the way it models censored data. In the dataset, the issue is right censoring,¹⁰³ which occurs when a rivalry did not terminate by the year 2001, the year the available data ends. Such cases could have experienced militarized disputes after the time of observation. Survival analysis accounts for this by treating such cases as having duration at least as long as the analysis time (Cleves et al. 2010: 30-1).

I use *both* the Weibull and the Cox regression models to investigate the relationship between the covariates of interests and conflict behavior. The Weibull model is used when there are theoretical expectations about the distribution of the baseline hazard. By contrast, the Cox model is used when the researcher wish to be agnostic with

¹⁰³ Left-censoring is not an issue in the data because starting point for observations is the year 1816, which is also the starting year for the MID dataset.

regards to the distribution of the baseline hazard. As there are arguments for the use of either model, I use both models as a robustness check. Ideally, the regime change of interest, democratization, should exhibit the same relationship with conflict behavior under both models.

The case for the use of the Weibull model is theoretical. Bennett's account (1997) suggests that the interlude in-between militarized disputes could shorten after democratization, thereby implying an increasing hazard. Conversely in Prins and Daxecker (2007), democratizing states gain signaling credibility which increases the interlude in-between militarized disputes, thereby implying a decreasing hazard. Furthermore, a preliminary examination of the data using Kaplan-Meier survival curves shows a decreasing hazard. Since the Weibull model allows the distribution of the baseline hazard to be monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing or flat with respect to time, both theoretical accounts can be represented by the same model.

The case for the use of the Cox model is methodological. Most theories in political science do not specify the distribution of the hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001:974; also Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn, 2003). Since the Cox model does not require a specification of the baseline hazard, its use has been consequently widespread. Applied to my data, it is worth considering the risk process (by which the failure event is generated) itself. We know that democracy exhibit a strong selection effect on rivalry and that one way by which this is achieved is that transitions to democracy ends rivalry. What is unclear, and this is a key purpose of this study, is how such rivalry termination is achieved. After regime-change, two rivals can fight with greater frequency resulting in the settlement of the rivalry on the victor's terms.

Alternatively, the same two rivals could reduce their disputatiousness, allowing the rivalry to peter itself out. In the former process, interlude between militarized disputes is shortened, in the latter, the interlude is lengthened. Because rivalry termination is an equifinal outcome which can occur as the result of two distinct risk processes and we do not know which of the two baseline hazard is correct, the use of the Cox model is appropriate.

I estimate two general equations. The first general equation tests for the effects of directional regime change (Hypothesis 5 to 7) while the second general equation tests for the effects of regime change in general (Hypothesis 5b and 8). For each general equation, I run three models. The basic model considers only the covariates for regime change. In the second model adds to it, the controls for relative power and contiguity. The full model includes information on the prior conflict history. In all models, the results were obtained using robust standard errors and reported as hazard ratios. I also account for the possibility each rivalry has its own unique baseline hazard, as opposed to a single baseline hazard for all rivalries, by re-running each model twice, using the cluster routine in Stata 12.0.¹⁰⁴

7. Findings

The first general equation focuses on the effects of specific regime transitions. Two types of regime change, complete democratization and complete autocratization had

¹⁰⁴ A set of replication files for the results reported in this chapter can be downloaded at this site: <http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/rbins/fellowships/tan.html> . As the files were uploaded in 2011, there will be minor differences between the file therein and the tables reported in this chapter. For a 2012 version of the files, see <http://silo.hunter.cuny.edu/AUymsX7D> . The files were uploaded on 15/12/12.

zero cases and hence no estimation of their effects was possible. This is why there were only four types of regime changes in the output tables 3 to 6.

Table 3 reports the Weibull regression results for specific regime transitions using a generic baseline hazard (with the non-clustered option enabled). All four directional regime transitions have statistically significant relationships with the risk of conflict outbreak. With the exception of *minor autocratization*, all transition relationships are robust across all three models, with p-values that is at least .05 and below. I use the full model to make substantive interpretations that demonstrate that the impact of the three transition types is not equal. A major autocratization reduces the risk of outbreak of conflict by 55.3%, holding all other variables constant. By contrast, *minor democratization* and *major democratization* reduces the risk of outbreak of conflict by 47.4 % and 61.5% respectively, holding all other variables constant. In the full model, all three controls, relative power, contiguity and prior conflict history, have hazard ratios above 1, which means they *increase* the risk of outbreaks of conflict. The p-value for relative power ($p < .769$) indicates that its relationship is not statistically significant. While both contiguity ($p < .036$) and a prior conflict history ($p < .000$) are statistically significant, their substantive impact is weaker compared to the effects of regime change. For example, a prior MID in the rivalry (representing a prior history of conflict) increases the risk of subsequent MID by a mere 4.3 %, holding all other variables constant. In terms of substantive impact, it is clear that *major democratization* or transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry, has the greatest effect on the reduction of risks.

Table 3: The effects of specific regime transitions on the interlude in between militarized disputes using the Weibull regression model, non-clustered.

Weibull	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value
Regime transition from:									
mixed to democratic	.449	.148	.015	.427	.143	.011	.385	.133	.006
autocratic to mixed	.477	.143	.014	.494	.125	.005	.526	.139	.015
mixed to autocratic	.442	.068	.000	.417	.065	.000	.447	.071	.000
democratic to mixed	.545	.175	.059	.501	.162	.033	.455	.170	.035
Controls									
Relative power				.892	.238	.669	1.086	.304	.769
Contiguity				1.248	.115	.016	1.224	.118	.036
Prior conflict history							1.043	.009	.000
Observations		1083			1083			1083	
Prob>chi2		.000			.000			.000	

As Table 4 demonstrates, using the Cox model reveals a similar pattern of result.¹⁰⁵ The extent of reduction in risks is generally lower here. Except for *minor autocratization*, all transition relationships are statistically significant ($p < .05$) across all

¹⁰⁵ I tested for the proportional hazards assumption (PHA) in the Cox regression using Schoenfeld residuals. The assumption of proportionality holds for all covariates in all Cox regression models.

three models. *Major autocratization* reduces the risk of outbreak of conflict by 46.6%, holding all other variables constant. By contrast, *minor democratization* and *major democratization* reduce the risk of outbreak of conflict by 39.4 % and 53 % respectively, holding all other variables constant. Two of three controls variables, contiguity and prior conflict history, increase the risk of outbreaks of conflict although the magnitude of the increase is not large. In particular, a prior conflict history increases the risk of subsequent MID by a mere 1.2%, holding all other variables constant.

Table 4: The effects of specific regime transitions on the interlude in between militarized disputes using the Cox regression model, non-clustered.

Cox	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value
Regime transition from:									
mixed to democratic	.511	.136	.012	.496	.132	.008	.470	.129	.006
autocratic to mixed	.571	.140	.022	.583	.119	.008	.606	.131	.020
mixed to autocratic	.532	.072	.000	.508	.069	.000	.534	.074	.000
democratic to mixed	.630	.162	.073	.595	.154	.045	.565	.168	.055
Controls									
Relative power				.857	.158	.400	0.998	.190	.991
Contiguity				1.157	.071	.018	1.138	.071	.040
Prior conflict history							1.029	.006	.000
Observations		1083			1083			1083	
Prob>chi2		.000			.000			.000	

The forgoing models in table 3 and 4 were conducted with a single baseline hazard for all rivalries. The next set of models in tables 5 and 6 were conducted using unique baseline hazard for each rivalry. By doing so, I control for dynamics that are idiosyncratic to specific rivalries rather than to rivalry as a whole. Table 5 reports the regression results using the Weibull model with the cluster option enabled. The same set of covariates, *major democratization*, *minor democratization*, *major autocratization*, contiguity and prior conflict history, are statistically significant. Substantively, *major autocratization* reduces the risk of outbreak of conflict by 55.3% whereas *minor democratization* and *major democratization* reduce the same risk by 47.7% and 61.5 % respectively. While statistically significant, the magnitude of the effects of contiguity and of prior conflict history on the risk of outbreaks of conflict is smaller compared to the effects of regime change. For example, a conflict history increases the risk of a subsequent MID by a mere 4.3%, holding all other variables constant. A comparison of its output with the Weibull model used in table 3 (with the cluster option disabled) reveals similar results. In fact, the coefficients for several of the covariates were identical. This suggests that the relationships of interest are robust and that the use of unique rivalry baseline hazards does not affect the results.

Table 5: The effects of specific regime transitions on the interlude in between militarized disputes using the Weibull regression model, clustered.

Weibull	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value
Regime transition from:									
mixed to democratic	.449	.146	.014	.427	.141	.001	.385	.131	.005
autocratic to mixed	.477	.142	.013	.494	.124	.005	.523	.138	.014
mixed to autocratic	.442	.070	.000	.417	.069	.000	.447	.074	.000
democratic to mixed	.545	.175	.058	.501	.161	.031	.455	.165	.030
Controls									
Relative power				.892	.331	.758	1.086	.326	.784
Contiguity				1.248	.144	.054	1.224	.119	.038
Prior conflict history							1.043	.007	.000
Observations		1083			1083			1083	
Prob>chi2		.000			.000			.000	

(standard errors adjusted for 247 clusters)

A similar outcome obtains in table 6 when the Cox model is used. In the full model, *major autocratization* reduces the risk of outbreaks of conflict by 46.6% whereas *minor democratization* and *major democratization* reduce the same risk by 47.7 and 61.5 % respectively. Of the control variables, only a prior conflict history has a statistically significant relationship. Having a prior MID in the rivalry increases the risk of a

subsequent MID by 2.9%. A comparison of the results of the Cox model with (Table 4) and without (Table 6) the cluster option reveals almost identical results. This implies that the relationships of interest are robust and that the use of unique rivalry baseline hazards does not affect the results.

Table 6: The effects of specific regime transitions on the interlude in between militarized disputes using the Cox regression model, clustered.

Cox	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value
Regime transition from:									
mixed to democratic	.511	.135	.011	.496	.131	.008	.470	.128	.006
autocratic to mixed	.571	.138	.021	.583	.118	.008	.606	.129	.019
mixed to autocratic	.532	.074	.000	.508	.071	.000	.534	.076	.000
democratic to mixed	.630	.162	.073	.595	.154	.044	.565	.166	.052
Controls									
Relative power				.857	.229	.562	.998	.215	.992
Contiguity				1.157	.095	.074	1.138	.078	.058
Prior conflict history							1.029	.004	.000
Observations		1083			1083			1095	
Prob>chi2		.000			.000			.000	

(standard errors adjusted for 247 clusters)

Both *major democratization*, *minor democratization*, as well as *major autocratization* reduce the risk of outbreaks of conflict. The relationships of interest are

robust across the models reported in tables 3 to 6. The finding that *major autocratization* reduces the risk of conflict outbreaks falsifies the dangerous autocratization hypothesis (H6). The finding that *minor democratization* reduces the risk of conflict outbreaks falsifies the political dissimilarity thesis (H7). By contrast, the finding that *major democratization* reduces the risk of outbreaks of conflict supports the pacific democratization thesis (H5b). These findings suggest a focus on *major democratization* or the transition from mixed to democratic rivalry. The follow-up question is whether this reduction in risk is due to democratization in particular or due to regime change in general. I address this with the second general equation.

Preliminary analysis of the data using all regime transitions and democratization as the covariates of interests revealed that multicollinearity is an issue. To partly account for multicollinearity, I use the measure of regime transitions that specifically excludes major democratization.¹⁰⁶ Table 7 summarizes the results using Weibull regression.¹⁰⁷ Both democratic (that is, major democratization) and non-democratic transitions reduce the risk of outbreaks of conflict and are statistically significant ($p < .05$) throughout all models. Although the difference in the reduction of risk between the two transitions types, democratic versus non-democratic, is not statistically significant, it is worth remembering we are dealing with population rather than a sample in this situation. Substantively, in the full model, a transition from mixed to democratic rivalry reduces the risk of outbreaks of conflict by 61.5%. By contrast, non-democratic transitions reduce the

¹⁰⁶ Tests using alternative specifications of non-democratic transitions reveal that both democratic and non-democratic transitions were consistently significant.

¹⁰⁷ There is little substantive difference if the models were run without the cluster option enabled. To conserve space, I only report the regression results with unique baseline hazards for both the Weibull and the Cox model.

risk of outbreaks of conflict by 54.0%. Democratic transitions offer a 13.89 % greater reduction in risk of conflict outbreaks compared to non-democratic transitions.

Table 7: The effects of generic regime transitions on the interlude in between militarized disputes using the Weibull regression model, clustered.

Weibull	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value
Regime transition from mixed to democratic	.449	.146	.014	.427	.141	.010	.385	.131	.005
All other regime transitions.	.471	.065	.000	.448	.062	.000	.460	.069	.000
Controls									
Relative power				.896	.331	.766	1.088	.325	.778
Contiguity				1.249	.144	.054	1.224	.119	.038
Prior conflict history							1.042	.007	.000
Observations		1083			1083			1083	
Prob>chi2		.000			.000			.000	

(standard errors adjusted for 247 clusters)

I repeat the analysis using Cox regression, with unique baseline hazard for each rivalry and present the results in table 8. Both democratic and non-democratic transitions reduce risk of outbreaks of conflict and are statistically significant ($p < .05$) throughout all models. Similar to the case for the Weibull regression, it is the substantive impact of democratization that is of concern. Substantively, in the full model, *major democratization* reduces the risk of outbreaks of conflict by 53%. By contrast, *non-democratic transitions* reduce the risk of outbreaks of conflict by 44.8%. Democratic

transitions offer a 18.3% greater reduction in risk of conflict outbreaks compared to non-democratic transitions.

Table 8: The effects of generic regime transitions on the interlude in between militarized disputes using the Cox regression model, clustered.

Cox	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	p-value
Regime transition from mixed to democratic	.511	.135	.011	.495	.131	.008	.470	.128	.006
All other regime transitions.	.561	.064	.000	.540	.061	.000	.552	.067	.000
Controls									
Relative power				.860	.230	.570	1.000	.214	1.000
Contiguity				1.157	.094	.073	1.138	.077	.058
Prior conflict history							1.029	.004	.000
Constant									
Observations		1083			1083			1083	
Prob>chi2		.000			.000			.000	

(standard errors adjusted for 247 clusters)

8. Conclusion

The classical liberals, it would seem, were right. In this chapter, I conducted a test of five perspectives on the democratization-conflict linkage on a domain of enduring rivalry. Three types of regime transitions, *major democratization*, *minor democratization*, and *major autocratization*, were found to reduce the risk of outbreaks of militarized violence within rivalry. Of these, only the finding that transitions from mixed to

democratic rivalry supports the pacific democratization thesis. The substantive reduction in risk for such transitions is also larger compared to reductions from non-democratic transitions. This challenges the conventional wisdom that democratization is destabilizing. To be sure, democratization can still have other undesirable consequences. For example, Ratner (2009) found that democratization tends to lead to a foreign policy realignment against the United States if the US intervened in the democratization process. Such costs of democratization are legitimate trade-offs which policy-makers should be aware of. However, the results presented here suggest that the exacerbation of an ongoing rivalry is not one of them.

This paper used interlude as a way of measuring pacification without rivalry termination. The finding that democratization of a rivalry increases the interlude has implications for the process of rivalry termination. What do democratic rivalries do when they are not terminating? This study suggests that democratization end rivalry with a whimper, by making the outbreaks of conflict more sporadic over time. This is a step beyond asserting the selection effect of democracy on rivalry to unpack the process of rivalry termination itself.

Thus far, the evidence presented used statistics to establish nomothetic covering laws (Hempel 1965). In the next two chapters I take the alternative idiographic approach. I use the rivalry between Ecuador and Peru as a case study to examine the consequences of democratization (chapter five) and of autocratization (chapter six) on conflict behavior

Chapter Five

1. Overview of the case-study.

In this chapter I use the Ecuador-Peru rivalry, over a disputed land border in the Upper Amazon, as a case study. I divide the rivalry from the years 1979 to 2000 into two distinct periods based on the type of dyadic regime change. Within each period, I focus on the conflict behavior of both rivals during and across two conflict episodes. The aim is to verify if the actual conflict behavior during those episodes matches or falsifies the theoretical predictions. Therefore, for the 1979 to 1991 period, which represents a transition from a mixed to democratic rivalry, I focus on the conflict behavior around the 1981 Paquisha incident and the 1991 Pachacútec incident. Similarly, for the 1980 to 2000 period, which represents a transition from a democratic to mixed rivalry, I focus on the conflict behavior around the 1995 Cenepa War and the 1998 Brasilia Accords.

Overall, I find that transitions into joint democracy deescalates a rivalry and I found more support for the institutional account compared to the normative account.

I proceed in the following manner. First, I summarize the theoretical expectations and discuss the issues encountered when applying them to the case study (1). Next, I conduct a review of rivalry with three emphasizing i) its significance, ii) the key events and iii) the relevant literature (2). With both the theoretical and historical framework laid out, I examine the evidence (3) for the 1979 to 1991 period in this chapter. I address the 1980 to 2000 period in the following chapter.

1.1 Theoretical framework.

My theory applies the explanatory logics (normative and institutional) of the democratic peace onto conflict behavior in rivalry. Unlike the case for autocratic and mixed dyads, democratic dyads offer the best prospects for the normative and institutional mechanisms to ameliorate conflict. Therefore, the prediction is that transitions into joint democracy should deescalate an ongoing rivalry. Furthermore, the institutional explanation predicts a lower level of deescalation between two democratic rivals with power disparity. This is because the institutional explanation, unlike the normative one, is power sensitive. These are the main theoretical claims of interest.¹⁰⁸

Before applying them to the case study, I need a way to classify the regime-types of the rivals. I use data from Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2006).¹⁰⁹ Specifically, I use the composite regime indicator (*polity2*) which measures each state's democracy score minus its autocracy score for each year.¹¹⁰ By convention, a score of +6 denotes a democracy and a score below +6 denotes a non-democracy. Since my analytic distinction is between democracy and non-democracy, I refer to the latter category which includes autocracy and anocracy, collectively as 'autocracy'. I summarize the dyadic regime types in Table 1.

¹⁰⁸ This is a smaller set of the hypotheses (H1 to H8) that were tested in chapter 3 and 4. Specifically, only hypotheses 3, 4a, and 4b and to a lesser extent, hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 7 were tested. The rationale are that some of the hypotheses were i) on domains that did not apply to the case study (example H1, H2, H6) or ii) were couched in such a manner (example the language of interlude and of risk) that makes them suitable for quantitative, rather than qualitative testing. As I explain in the later part of this section, I modify the theoretical claims to account for a change from democratic to mixed rivalry.

¹⁰⁹ Given that I use Polity IV in chapter 3 and 4, it is internally consistent to retain its use for this chapter. To reassure readers that this does not misrepresent the Latin America context, I refer to the works of Hagopian and Mainwaring (2005) who compared Polity IV with three alternative datasets and found a high level of correlation amongst them.

¹¹⁰ I elaborated on the composition of the composite index in chapter 3, section 4.1.

Table 1: Dyadic Regime-type of the Ecuador-Peru rivalry from 1933-2008.

Number	Time period	Regime type of Ecuador	Regime type of Peru	Dyadic regime type
1	1933-1978	Autocracy	Autocracy	Autocratic
2	1979	Democracy	Autocracy	Mixed
3	1980-1991	Democracy	Democracy	Democratic
4	1992-2000	Democracy	Autocracy	Mixed
5	2001-2006	Democracy	Democracy	Democratic
6	2007-2008	Autocracy	Democracy	Mixed

Key:

Democracy: scores of +6 and above

Autocracy (autocracy and anocracy): +5 and below.

From Table 1, there are two occasions where the dyadic regime change is in the required direction, from mixed to democratic rivalry. These are from 1979 to 1991 and from 1992 to 2006. The problem with the later dyadic regime change is that the Ecuador-Peru rivalry is understood to have ended by 1998, which means there were no conflict events during the 2001 to 2006 period.¹¹¹ Since my concern is to explain conflict behavior *within* the rivalry, the dyadic regime change from 1992 to 2006 is not as relevant.

The transition during the 1979-1991 period is problematic because the period of mixed rivalry lasted only for the year of 1979. It takes some time for a new regime to consolidate itself. One year is too brief for regime dynamics to credibly influence foreign policy decisions. On a related note, a conflict episode should not be so far removed in

¹¹¹ This is also why I do not consider more contemporary periods in Ecuador-Peru relations when the rivalry has effectively ended.

time from democratization that it has no linkage with the regime-change (Mansfield and Snyder 2002: 314). Within the democratic peace literature, the convention is to include a time lag of around three years before a new polity is considered a democracy. An explanation of this otherwise implicit convention is offered by Russett (1993: 16):

Theoretical precision, however, requires one further qualification: some rather minimal stability or longevity. Huntington (1991, 11) emphasizes stability or institutionalization as “a central dimension in the analysis of any political system.” To count a war as one waged by a democracy Doyle (1983a) requires that representative government be in existence for at least three years prior to the war. Perhaps that is a bit too long, yet some period must have elapsed during which democratic processes and institutions could have become established, so that both citizens of the “democratic” state and its adversary could regard it as one governed by democratic principles. Most of the doubtful cases arise within a single year of the establishment of democratic government.

Although the 1979 to 1991 period is not ideal, it is still useful theoretically. This is because the regime-stability requirement applies more to the stage after transition (democratic rivalry) and not to the stage before transition (mixed rivalry). The fact that the stage before transition was short (1 year) matter less because the prior dyadic regime type was autocratic, which means the overall direction of dyadic regime change, once we concentrate on the theoretical distinction between democracy and non-democracy is still in the correct direction (from non-democratic rivalry towards democratic rivalry). The alternative of ruling out this period from consideration would also mean there no cases in this rivalry that fulfills the theoretical requirements.

The classification of regime type presented in table 1 largely dovetails with area-specialists’ assessment. A potential disagreement lies with the classification Peru’s regime type from 1992-2000, due to the 1992 *autogople*, a presidential self coup, by Fujimori. While Mares and Palmer (2001) considers Peru to be democratic for that period, the majority of scholarship (Petras and Vieux 1994; Crabtree 2001; Tanaka 2005;

Conaghan 2005; McClintock 2006) placed Peru within the authoritarian camp. Instead of treating Fujimori's Peru as a kind of delegative democracy (O'Donnell 1994), the literature treats it as an example of electoral authoritarianism/competitive authoritarianism (see discussion in Kay 1996). In addition to the academic sources, it is noteworthy that the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)¹¹², an august and respected institution tasked with factfinding after Fujimori ouster, also reached a similar conclusion about the nature of Fujimori regime. It notes:

The TRC distinguishes the years between 1980 and 1992, a period of civilian, democratically-elected regimes, from the final period of our mandate (1992 – 2000), following the coup-d'etat of April 5, 1992. This change of regime has a direct effect on the responsibilities of the State's highest authorities with respect to violations of human rights since the centralization of power forges, in principle, a more direct link between the President of the Republic and the groups who operate under the cover of power to perpetrate violations.¹¹³

Armed with a classification of regime-types, I turn to the selection of appropriate conflict episode. The ideal episode meets the following requirements:

- i) the direction of dyadic regime change is from mixed to democratic rivalry;
- ii) the state that democratize is also the stronger of the rivalry pair;
- iii) the direction of dyadic regime change meets the regime-stability requirement; and
- iv) there is enough information on both the regime characteristics and the conflict behavior for the respective episodes.

¹¹² TRC is its English acronym, the Spanish version is *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* or CVR. The following is an English excerpt from the final report and is available at the following site: The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru ,

<http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/Peru/TRC.FinalReport.eng.pdf> , Last accessed 7th July 2010. The full report in Spanish is available at the following site <http://www.cverdad.org.pe/final> .

¹¹³ This from the English excerpt pp. 331 in the English version of the report, <http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/Peru/TRC.FinalReport.eng.pdf> (Last accessed 7th July 2010).

I term the first condition as the “democratization requirement”, the second condition as the “power disparity requirement”, the third condition as the “regime-stability requirement” and the fourth condition as the “sufficient information requirement.” I examine each episode against the theoretical requirements.¹¹⁴

The 1941 episode is mostly irrelevant.¹¹⁵ The 1941 war¹¹⁶ was conducted during a period when both rivals were non-democracies. Both rivals were also stable regimes. There was no change in their regime scores from 1933 to 1947 (cf. table 1). Collectively, they rule this episode out since i) there was no regime change and ii) the conflict behavior of autocratic rivalry is not an emphasis of my theory.

The 1981 Paquisha Incident occurred during a democratic rivalry. It meets both the democratization and power disparity requirements. The problem lies with the regime stability requirement. Both rivals are new democracies. The incident occurred two years after the democratization of Peru (1980) and three years after the democratization of Ecuador (1979). In lieu of rejecting this episode outright, I cope by extrapolating the

¹¹⁴ In focusing on the five episodes (1941, 1981, 1991, 1995, 1998), I am guided by the need to select cases where there is substantial literature on both regime characteristics and conflict behavior. This narrowing of the focus is not unusual in the literature. Mares for example, in a paper on deterrence in the Ecuador-Peru rivalry, concentrated on the latter conflict episodes (1981 and 1995) despite noting that rivalry has at least 34 militarized disputes (Mares 1996/1997: 99). In his later work on militarized bargaining in Latin America where he again noted the 32 MIDs (two seemed to have treated as full mobilizations, Mares 2001: 161), he made the same editorial move. Similarly, Rousseau (2005:66-79) who examined the rivalry from the perspective of the democratic peace, also focused on the 1981 and 1995 episodes.

¹¹⁵ When the Peruvian military received orders to remain defensively oriented in June 1941 (the war started in July 1941), the then Peruvian commander in chief General Elroy G. Ureta threatened the President Manuel Prado with a military revolt if the army was not allowed to initiate an invasion of Ecuador (Masteron 1991: 71, cited in Marcella 1995: 6). This event suggests a lack of civilian control over the military and fits the notion that autocracies are less constrained compared with democracies.

¹¹⁶ The qualitative literature treats the conflict episodes in 1941 and in 1995 as wars (for example, Herz and Nogueira 2002: 33, 47). To be considered an interstate war, Correlates of War (COW) requires i) at least two participants be members of the interstate system, and ii) at least 1000 battle related casualties amongst the participants in total. Going by COW criteria, the episodes are militarized disputes not wars. For the sake of narrative consistency, I follow the convention set in the qualitative literature.

logic of both accounts onto a democratization context. As newly democratic regimes, I expect the institutional and normative constraints of both Peru and Ecuador to be weak, precisely because they are newly established.

The 1991 Pachacútec Incident occurred during a democratic rivalry. It meets all theoretical requirements except the one on sufficient information. This is because most analysts glanced over this episode to focus on the more dramatic events in the 1995 Cenepa War.¹¹⁷ I cope by supplementing the incident with information on the diplomatic initiatives undertaken by both rivals, culminating in the so-called ‘gentleman’s agreement’.

The 1995 Cenepa war and its aftermath, the peace process leading to the 1998 Brasilia Accord, occurred during a period of *mixed* rivalry. As a result, it does not meet the democratization requirement.

A summary of the theoretical requirements met by each episode is presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Summary of the theoretical requirements met for each episode.

Theoretical requirement (Y/N)	1941	1981	1991	1995	1998
1. democratization	N*	Y	Y	N*	N*
2. power disparity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. regime stability	Y	N	Y	N*	Y
4. sufficient information	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

Y= the requirement was met.

N= the requirement was not met and I adopted measures that allowed for the use of the episode.

N* = the requirement was not met and I dropped the episode from analysis.

¹¹⁷ As an example, Mares (2001: 167-8, 171) made passing references to that episode, mostly to explain the Ecuadorian rationale for the 1995 conflict.

For the purposes of testing for a mixed to democratic transition, only the 1981 and 1991 episodes are relevant. For each episode, I examine the relationship between domestic politics and conflict behavior of both rivals using the normative and institutional accounts. This gives me eight observations points with which to test the theoretical expectations.

The next step in building a theoretical framework is to operationalize the dependent variable, conflict behavior. I do it in three ways. I operationalize conflict behavior in terms of i) the overall conflict trend; and in terms of the expected behavior using the ii) normative and the iii) institutional logics. For part i) I am asking if the overall trend is towards escalation or deescalation, and am explicitly comparing *across* conflict episodes. For part ii) and iii), I am asking if the conflict and diplomatic behavior of the rivals dovetails with what we expect from the normative and institutional logics; and it is comparing in a sense, *within* conflict episodes.

For the first operationalization, consider the claim that democratization deescalates rivalry. Since my argument is on the change in conflict behavior *after* democratization, the relevant comparison is between two episodes (the minimum necessary to establish a conflict trend) *after* the requisite regime change.¹¹⁸ For the 1979-1991 period, the conflict trend is derived by comparing between the 1981 and 1991 episodes. The comparison is also couched in terms of relative change, towards more escalation or more deescalation.

¹¹⁸ I could compare between episodes in different dyadic regime types so that the trend is both before and after the regime change. This brings with it, its own set of problems. First, for the 1979-1991 period where a mixed to democratic transition occurred, there are no significant events during the year 1979 (the period of mixed rivalry).

By escalation, I am referring to conflict policies by Peru/Ecuador to i) to remove the contested outposts and its attendant garrison troops by force, ii) to reject the diplomatic intervention of third parties,¹¹⁹ or iii) to mobilize the armed forces or reinforce contested outposts in preparation for more conflict. By deescalation, I am referring to conflict policies by Peru/Ecuador to i) seek the removal of contested outposts (or to defend them as the status quo) by diplomatic rather than by military means or to ii) accept the diplomatic intervention of third parties.¹²⁰ The distinction here is whether the rejection or the defense of the status quo (the contested outposts) is done through military or diplomatic means.

The second operationalization of the dependent variable is derived from the normative account. Under it, norms of political bargaining differ by regime type. Elites are socialized in democratic norms (favor compromise-seeking and non-violence) are assume to externalize those same norms in interstate disputes. It is the interaction of those norms in dyadic context that determines the prospects for a peaceful outcome. There are two operational contexts for this account. The first is over the use of force. The second is over the bargaining positions (maximalist or not) adopted in diplomatic negotiations. By deescalation, I am referring to policy decisions by Peru/Ecuador i) to use diplomatic rather than military means to challenge or defend the status quo; and ii) to be willing to compromise from a maximalist bargaining position. By escalation, I am referring to policy decisions by Peru/Ecuador i) to use military rather than diplomatic means to

¹¹⁹ In this case, it usually refers the mediation of the four guarantor countries.

¹²⁰ In this operationalization, decisions not to mobilize or to reinforce a region are non-events and harder to interpret. They are not necessary indicators of deescalation.

challenge/defend the status quo; and ii) to be unwilling to compromise and stick to a maximalist bargaining position.

The third operationalization of the dependent variable is derived from the institutional account.¹²¹ Under it, a democratic chief executive is prevented from the escalation of a dispute into war from above, by the relative military balance, or from below, by different institutional actors (such as the parliament, public, military). One can think of relative military (military advantage or not) and institutional constraints (favor leader's preference or not) as a two by two table, presented in table 3 below. When there are both military advantage and institutional actors share the executive preferences, escalation is likely. Conversely, where there are both military disadvantage and institutional actors oppose the executive, deescalation is more likely. When the institutional actors share the preference of the executive for escalation but military weakness precludes escalation, the account predicts deescalation. This is because unsuccessful military adventures are still politically costly for the executive. Such leaders are likely to play a double game, to lie to the electorate while negotiating a compromise with the rival state. An example is the policy of Ecuadorian President Durán-Ballén during the Cenepa War to preach nationalism domestically but practice conciliation internationally. When the institutional actors do not share the preference of the executive for escalation but the military balance allow for escalation, the account predicts escalation. This is because the leader can escalate in the hopes that a successful attack

¹²¹ There are different variants of the institutional account, I am relying on a synthesis of the selectorate version of the institutional account (as articulated in chapter 2) as well as the institutional constraint model as articulated in Rousseau (2005).

will reduce the political costs of a military advantage, in effect presenting his domestic critics with a fait accompli.

Table 3: Interaction between the relative military balance and institutional constrains

		Relative Power	
		Military disadvantage	Military advantage
Preferences of Institutional actors	Against the executive	Deescalation	Escalation
	With the executive	Deescalation	Escalation

The considerations, therefore, are i) the use of force itself, and ii) the distribution of power between the chief executive and the other institutional actors (the parliament, military, and the public). The former is relatively clear-cut, the use of military force to challenge/defend the status quo constitutes escalation and its non-use constitutes deescalation. The latter focus on whether the executive attempted to work with or conversely, subvert preferences of the other institutional actors. Furthermore, the circumstances specific to the case study allow for two additional extensions of the institutional logics. First, Ecuador can be weaker than Peru at the strategic level but may enjoy localized military superiority in specific theatres of conflict. This can affect the calculation of both rivals during the 1981 and the 1991 conflict episodes. Second, the institutional logic assumes that the executive has a different preference from the other institutional actors. This assumption is relaxed for some observations where idiosyncratic

variables may dominate. For example, the major institutional actors tend to agree with the chief executive on the conduct on the rivalry in Ecuadorian politics.

The overall assessment of each operationalization (overall, normative and institutional) is summarized in table 4. The assessment specific to the mixed to democratic transition are summarized in table 5. Collectively, table 4 and 5, constitutes the theoretical framework with which I access the case-study.

Table 4: Overall Framework to assess the dependent variable (conflict behavior)

	Overall conflict trend	Normative account	Institutional Account		
Escalation	i) Use force to challenge/defend status quo ii) reject third party mediation iii) mobilization of army.	i) use force instead of diplomacy to challenge/defend status quo ii) adopt maximalist bargaining position	Consideration 1	Constraints from above	Relative military balance
Deescalation	i) Non-Use of force to challenge status quo ii) accept third-party mediation	i) use diplomacy instead of force to challenge/defend status quo ii) compromise from a maximalist bargaining position	Consideration 2	Constraints from below	Distribution of power between executive and institutional actors
Additional considerations idiosyncratic to case study	Not applicable		-overall military balance vs local military balance -Preferences of the institutional actors		

Table 5: Framework for the transition from a mixed to democratic rivalry, 1979-1991.

1981 and 1991 episodes.	Overall conflict trend	Normative account	Institutional account
Prediction	Deescalation	Deescalation	Escalation
Supporting Evidence	Use of diplomacy	i) Use diplomacy ii) Seek compromise	i) Use of force by democratic Peru ii) Use of diplomacy by democratic Ecuador
Non-supporting Evidence	Use of force	i) Use force ii) Adopt maximalist position	i) Use of diplomacy by democratic Peru ii) Use of force by democratic Ecuador

2. Literature review and historical overview.


The previous section (1.1) provided a theoretical framework. In this section, I provide a historical overview. I start with the significance of the rivalry, review the literature and conclude by addressing the major events, in that order.

The rivalry between Ecuador and Peru revolves around a disputed border in the Amazonian headwaters, specifically the Cordillera del Cóndor region which lies on the Cenepa river basin (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Map of the disputed Ecuador-Peru focusing on the Cenepa river basin.¹²²

¹²² Source of map: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/2/2c/Cenepa_river_basin.jpg . The image is from this site: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cenepa_War . Note the map obscures the names of Rio Cenepa and Rio Marañon. Also, Bruce St John has a series of clear maps in his article available at the following site: http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/publications/full/bsb6-4_john.pdf For maps of the recent DMZ, as well as on Operation Safe Border, see http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jq019610.pdf. There are also several high quality maps in the articles by Bruce St John (1994 ; 1996; 1998-9).

PERU-ECUADOR: Area of Boundary Dispute



The rivalry is one of longest dispute in the Western Hemisphere (Palmer 1997: 109). It attracted scholarly attention focusing on the international legal mediation dimension (Simmons 1999; Einaudi 1999; Herz and Nogueira 2002), the military dimension (Marcella 1995, Mares 1996/1997); and on the impact-on-democracy dimension (O'Donnell, Schmitter et al. 1986; Malloy and Seligson 1987; Fitch 1998; Mora and Hey 2003; Conaghan 2005; Smith 2005). For these scholarship, the significance of the rivalry lies in its potential to i) illustrate effectiveness of multilateral peacemaking, to ii) escalate into a major war, to iii) trigger an regional arms race in Latin America, to iv) to reduce the quality of democracy in both states.

What is more theoretically pertinent is the literature that looks at this case from the perspective of democratic peace theory (Hensel 1994; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Mares 2001; Herz and Nogueira 2002; Parish 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Rousseau 2005).¹²³ A selected summary of the literature is provided in table 6. Several perspectives can be distinguished in this literature. One distinctive perspective considers this case to exemplify the limits of democratic peace theory. To make that argument, they have to consider the major conflicts in this case-study to have occurred during periods of joint democracy (Mares 2001; Palmer 2001)¹²⁴ or as a case of incomplete democratization (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2001). The opposing perspective is

¹²³ The works in this group gave unequal emphasis to this rivalry. For some, the rivalry is just a data-point in a large-N study or a tangential part of a larger work.

¹²⁴ Mares and Palmer are two area-specialists who considered Peru to have been democratic or at least having “experienced civilian elected rule” in Palmer’s term (2001: 31). Palmer notes (2001: 31, footnote 9) that Mares and he have since collaborated on a manuscript entitled “Democratic War and Peace: Peru and Ecuador in the Amazon” that is as of now (December, 2010) unpublished.

provided by Rosseau (2001) who used this rivalry as to test the institutional and normative logic from democratic peace theory. He argued the 1995 episode was not a suitable test of the democratic peace because Peru should be classified as an autocracy after 1992. While conceding that the 1981 episode occurred during a period of joint democracy, he concludes that the episode cannot refute the probabilistic claims of the democratic peace. The two contrasting perspectives share one methodological flaw, they neglected the condition of the rivalry. By doing so, they did not account for the fact that the case they selected may already have a higher than average conflict propensity. A third perspective which does consider both regime dynamics and the condition of rivalry is represented by the work of Herz and Nogueira (2002). The authors observed that i) political instability, especially in Ecuador from 1996 to 1998, need not undermine peace-building and that ii) the international mediators were influenced by democratic norms of conflict resolution. In terms of the democratization-conflict linkage, Herz and Nogueira are implicitly engaging with the political instability thesis (as explained in chapter 4). There are two issues with this perspective. First, the authors were reluctant to theoretically engage with the democratic peace theory. In fact they explicitly stated that their “research is not aimed at discussing the validity of the democratic peace argument” (ibid: 14). Second, given the focus of their work is on the multilateral peacemaking, the authors emphasized the later conflict episodes, 1995 and 1998 at the expense of the coverage of the earlier episodes.¹²⁵

¹²⁵ For example, their reference to the 1981 episode was only a couple sentences long (pp. 37).

Table 6: Selected review of the pertinent literature (considering both regime type *and* conflict behavior)

Address the issue of :	Regime-change	Correct classification Peru regime-type (1992-2000)	Rivalry	Events covered (1981, 1991, 1995, 1998)
Herz & Nogueira (2002)	Yes (1)	Yes	Yes	1991, 1995, 1998
Snyder and Mansfield (1995; 2005)	Yes	No	Yes (2)	1995
Mares (1996/7; 2001)	Yes	No	No	1981, 1991, 1995, 1998
Marcella (1995)	Yes	No (3)	No	1995
Palmer (1997; 2001)	No	No	No	1991, 1995, 1998
Simmons (1999)	No	No (4)	No	1995, 1998
Rousseau (2005)	No	Yes	No	1981, 1995
My case study	Yes	Yes	Yes	1981, 1991, 1995, 1998

(1)- They explicitly avoided addressing the democratic peace theory (pp. 14) and the dangerous democratization thesis but they do consider the effects of political instability in Ecuador post-1995.

(2) -They considered the impact of rivalry only quantitatively in their 2005 work.

(3) – Marcella relied on Mansfield and Snyder classification (p. 10).

(4) – Simmons relied on Mansfield and Snyder and classification (p. 19, also in her footnote 72).

The origins of the rivalry can be traced back to the mechanics of Spanish colonial rule (Mares 1996/1997; Palmer 1997; Simmons 1999; Herz and Nogueira 2002). Spain used multiple administrative divisions in its colonies which created overlapping jurisdictions; in this case, between the Viceroyalty of Peru and the audiencia of Quito (Mares 1996/7: 100). Whilst under the Spanish Crown, demarcation of the remote Amazonian interior that separates Peru and Ecuador was not necessary. This became an issue after the independence of both countries, Peru in 1824, Ecuador in 1830. Repeated attempts from the 1830 to 1930s (for an timeline, see appendix 1) to demarcate the border

between the two rivals were stymied by the differing legal interpretations of the boundaries. Ecuador relied on the legal doctrine of *uti possedetis de jure* to argue that the boundaries should follow the administrative boundaries of Viceroyalty of New Granada,¹²⁶ which would have included a large part of what is currently northeastern Peru. Peru by contrast relied on the alternative doctrine of *uti possedetis de facto* to argue for a demarcation based on the actual occupation of the territory. Since the geography of the area favor colonization by Peru (Amazonian tributaries on the Ecuadorian side are not navigable, Herz and Nogueira 2002: 57), an *de facto* interpretation would have awarded much of the contested land to Peru.

The first serious modern conflict was the 1941 war, initiated by Peru. Herz and Nogueira (2002: 33) suggested that an *de facto* interpretation of the boundary created an incentive to use force since military occupation is a way to demonstrate effective occupation. Internationally, the fact that the attention of the major powers were centered on Europe following the outbreak of WWII allowing Peru a chance to consolidate its gains in the disputed border (ibid: 32). The Peruvian armed forces which was becoming more professionalized (Mares 2001: 162-3) also saw an opportunity to avenge a history of defeat.¹²⁷ Peruvian expectations proved right as Peru won a decisive victory. The Peruvian force of 15000 had around 80 to 100 casualties while the Ecuadorian force of 3000 had 500 to 600 casualties (Rousseau 2005: 68). It ended when external powers intervened diplomatically. The external powers, especially the United States and Brazil, were more concerned with fostering inter-American unity against the Axis threat.

¹²⁶ The Audiencia of Quito is part of that viceroyalty.

¹²⁷ Peru lost three prior wars, two against Chile and the one against Colombia.

The resultant treaty, signed in 1942, known as the Rio Protocol,¹²⁸ was to shape the parameters of rivalry. Under its terms, the status quo on the ground¹²⁹ was legitimized. Ecuador lost territory and with it, access to the Marañón and Amazon River. Furthermore, four countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States, were accorded “Guarantor” status, with both the right to observe and execute the treaty. Due to this status, external diplomatic intervention was conducted through the auspices of the guarantors. This is why the Organization of American States (OAS), did not have a mediation role to play in this rivalry.

As part of the implementation of the Rio Protocol, border demarcation conducted under Brazilian auspices proceeded without major incident for 95 % of the length of the border. Aerial photography conducted in 1946 however, revealed that the Cenepa River watershed was more extensive than was originally envisioned.¹³⁰ Ecuador used this information to halt the demarcation in 1948 and to claim the nullification of the treaty (known in the literature as the “nullity thesis”) in 1960.

Ecuador’s position that Rio Protocol was formulated under duress and that cartographic error made fulfilling the letter of the protocol impossible (known in the literature as the “inexecutability thesis”).¹³¹ Peru’s position was to maintain the validity of the protocol, demarcation problems notwithstanding. International law and the position

¹²⁸ An informal text of terms of treaty can be found at the following site : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rio_Protocol

¹²⁹ This is known as “the Status Quo line of 1936” and originates with the 1936 Lima act.

¹³⁰ Ecuador argued that the discovery of the extent of the Cenepa river watershed, which runs between Zamora and the Cenepa Rivers, meant that the original boundary line envisioned under the Protocol, the watershed between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers, could not be fulfilled.

¹³¹ Ecuador advanced two related arguments. The “nullity thesis” is the claim that Rio Protocol is nullified because it is imposed by force. The “inexecutability thesis” is the claim the Rio Protocol cannot be enforced due to geographical anomalies. This distinction is important as it gave Ecuador a face-saving way to accept the Rio Protocol.

of the four guarantors generally favor Peru's position. Given their respective legal positions, *Ecuador was the revisionist power while Peru was the status-quo power*. In the majority of the subsequent disputes, Ecuador was challenging the status quo while Peru was defending it.

Since Ecuador was militarily weaker than Peru, direct military confrontation was not viable. Instead, it opted for progressive encroachment in the disputed region coupled with periodic low-key border skirmishes "to keep the issue alive and to make it in the interests of the international community to pressure Peru" (Mares 1996/1997: 107). Ecuador preferred *modus operandi* was to place small outposts on the eastern side, that is, on the Peruvian side, of the Condor mountain range in effect, challenging the Peruvians to evict them. This was the strategy carried out during the next major conflict, the 1981 Paquisha Incident.

The 1981 Paquisha Incident was precipitated by the discovery of Ecuadorian frontier outposts by Peru on the eastern side (that is, on Peru's side) of the Cordillera de Condor (a mountain range). Casualties in this episode were light. According to Rousseau (Rousseau 2005: 69), Peru suffered 1 casualty and Ecuador suffered 8. However, both sides took the conflict seriously enough to order mobilizations and declare states of emergency. The Ecuadorian initiation of this conflict was motivated by three international considerations. First, Ecuadorian diplomatic attempts to link progress on regional integration, such as the Andean Pact, with a settlement on the disputed border was rebuffed by Peru. This implies a need for other (military) means. Second, the US characterized Peru's position as intransigent (Mares 1996/7: 113). This gave Ecuador hope that international community might favor its view. Third, Peru reaction to incidents

with Chile (Peru's traditional rival) in 1976-77 and to Ecuador in 1977-78 were moderate (Mares 1996/7: 112). Ecuador assumed Peru's reaction this time round would be just as mild.

Ecuador miscalculated. Within days of their discovery, the outposts were attacked and occupied by the better armed and better prepared Peruvian military (Rossueau 2005: 68-70). Peru threatened to invade Ecuador proper in a replay of the 1941 war (Mares 2001: 167). Ecuador appealed to the OAS to intervene and broker a ceasefire in an attempt to neutralize the Rio Protocol. Peru circumvented this by appealing to the four guarantors and agreeing to a ceasefire under their auspices. While Ecuador can claim to have won a diplomatic victory by replacing references to the 'guarantors' with 'four friendly nations', the fact remain that Peru still had possession of the disputed region and the guarantors were still the arbitrators as envisioned in the Rio Protocol.

The next round of conflict in 1991 is over a Peruvian outpost, Pachacútec, which Ecuador interpreted as located on its side of the border. Ecuador responded by placing its own troops and outposts near the region which Peru in turn, interpreted as an infiltration. Conflict was averted because of the good offices of the four guarantor countries, especially by Brazil. Under their mediation, both sides reached a gentlemen's agreement (*pacto de caballeros*). Under the agreement, both sides were supposed to withdraw their troops, a boundary marker 19 (*hito 19*) was to be repatriated, the Pachacútec outpost was to be removed. The agreement was not implemented. In Herz and Nogueira's interpretation, the negotiations leading to the agreement was conducted in good faith, as part of general rethinking of foreign policy by both sides after the end of the Cold War (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 39-43). In Mares' interpretation, the agreement failed because

the Ecuadorian side was not sincere. Mares argued Ecuador has been preparing for conflict since their defeat of 1981 and that it was ready to use force but needed Peru to initiate the fighting (Mares 1996/7: 117).

The next challenge by Ecuador resulted in the 1995 Cenepa war. Fighting centered on the three Ecuadorian outposts¹³² in the disputed region. In two months when the bulk of the fighting took place, Peru deployed 6 divisions to the region and Ecuador deployed 4 brigades (Simons 1999: 12). According to Marcella, of the 3000 troops Ecuador deployed, it suffered 27 combatant casualties; and of the 2000 troops, Peru deployed, it suffered 46 combatant as well as 300 non-combatant casualties. The cost of the conflict was estimated at one billion dollars (Marcella 1995: pp. 1, 12, 21).

Ecuador had prepared extensively for the conflict (Mares 1996/7: 117; Marcella 1995: 16) and was rewarded with a tactical victory over Peru. Before the skirmish could escalate into a full-scale war, Ecuador formally asked for mediation by the guarantor countries. By doing so, they reversed their diplomatic stance, taken since the 1960s, of rejecting the Rio Protocol altogether.

Intervention by the guarantor countries led to an immediate cease fire formalized by the Declaration of Itamaraty. This is followed shortly (within the same year 1995) by the Declaration of Montevideo which authorize the deployment of military observers, the Military Observation Mission Ecuador Peru (MOMEPE) to the region. In the first stage of peacemaking, the guarantors monitored a cease-fire, physically separated the two sides, and established a demilitarized zone in the disputed region. In the next three years (1995-

¹³² They are Tiwintza, Base Sur, and Coangos. They were placed during the 1991 crisis

1998), the four guarantor countries made concerted effort at multilateral mediation with the aim of an eventual comprehensive peace settlement. Four commissions were set up to deal with the issues of i) navigation and commerce, ii) economic integration of the region, iii) border demarcation and in iv) confidence building. Each commission met in one of the four guarantor capitals under the respective auspices of their respective guarantor special envoy (Einaudi 1999: 414). The outstanding issue of territory was resolved after both sides agreed to submit to binding arbitration by the guarantors.

The result was the comprehensive peace agreement, the Brasilia Accords of 1998.¹³³ Under it, the principles of the Rio Protocol was upheld. Provisions were also made for trade, regional integration, navigation, economic development, demilitarization (ecological parks were created in the Upper Cenepa region). Ecuador was given quasi-sovereign access to the Amazon and through it, access to the Atlantic. Ecuador was given perpetual access to Tiwintza, one of the outposts contested during the 1995 conflict. The final settlement gave Peru the bulk of the region but gave enough concessions to Ecuador to fulfill its identity as an “Amazonian country”.¹³⁴

3. Evidence.

The preceding sections laid out both the theoretical and historical framework. In this section, I examine the evidence using the theoretical and historical framework laid out in the preceding sections (especially in table 4 and 5). One clarification is necessary, I

¹³³ I use the Brasilia Accords to denote the several treaties involved. There is the Act of Brasilia (1998) was signed by all the participants (the two rivals and the four guarantors) and six bilateral accords on various aspects such as trade, confidence building.

¹³⁴ The view that the agreement favored Peru is widely held. Palmer (2001: 41) noted that “it was clear that the party that gained most of what it had been seeking was Peru.”

am not interested in explaining democratization/autocratization as those are not my dependent variables. This means that an account of the democratization of Peru since 1978 and conversely, the autocratization of Peru after 1992 are theoretically irrelevant. The exception to this rule is if democratization constrains the decision-making process of the chief executives of both rivals. I am also less interested in the events or the motivation of the actors per se than in how the normative and institutional mechanisms constrain or fail to constrain the conflict behavior of the rivals.

3.1 The 1981 Paquisha incident.

The 1981 Paquisha incident and its immediate aftermath represent a case of the use of force by two democratic rivals. Ecuador initiated the conflict episode but Peru was the side which escalated in response to Ecuador's challenge. The cease-fire was obtained after mediation by the four guarantor countries.

3.1.1 Normative account, Ecuador (Prediction: Deescalation; Outcome: Rejected)

The normative account expects democratic Ecuador to engage with democratic Peru using diplomacy instead of military force. Ecuador initiation of this round of the conflict with a border encroachment (a use of force) constitutes evidence which do not support this account.

However, we should note that Ecuador considered only a limited use of force and only after the diplomatic options were tried and deemed to have failed. Ecuador had limited options given its diplomatic stance. Since 1960, it rejected the Rio Protocol. Its position pits Ecuador against the principle of the sanctity of treaties, endorsed by the

international community. Consequently, Ecuadorian attempts to get international support to challenge the status quo in the UN and the OAS were deemed to have “failed completely” (Mares 2001: 166). Ecuador tried to get interested parties to negotiate outside the framework of the Rio Protocol, for example, the Brazilian initiative for Amazonian cooperation (Mares 2001: 166) and the 1977 US initiative under President Carter (St John 1996: 81). Both were rebuffed by Peru they were outside the Rio Protocol. Similarly, Ecuadorian attempts to link the border dispute with progress on the regional economic integration (the Andean Pact) were rejected by Peru. Since Ecuador wants to challenge the status quo and its diplomatic means were unsuccessful, it resorted to the use military force. Its aim it argued was to get the international community to pressure to Peru into negotiations (Mares 1996/7: 107). If so, there is a contradiction in the Ecuadorian grand strategy, as Bustamante (1992: 207) notes:

...the military confrontations have placed Ecuador in the position of seeing itself continually having to meet a numerically superior military force by itself; without the hope of any major regional powers might intervene on its behalf –given the fact that they serve as guarantors of the very Protocol which Ecuador has chosen to challenge.

Although Ecuador conducted only a limited probe, it is still considered a use of force and thus its conflict behavior does not support the normative account.

3.1.2 Institutional account, Ecuador (Prediction: Deescalation; Outcome: Rejected)

The institutional account emphasizes two types of constrains on the chief executive, from below (from other institutional actors) and from above (from relative military balance). To the extent that the chief executive is constrained from above but not from below, the account predicts deescalation (see table 4). A weaker military power,

Ecuador should not risk confronting a stronger Peru even if the populace supports the executive. The encroachment of outposts by Ecuador constitutes evidence that do not support the prediction.

With regard to constraints from below, we are examining the preferences of the major actors. In Ecuadorian politics, the chief executive is constrained on most economic issues but not on the issue of appropriate conflict behavior in the rivalry (Rousseau 2005: 75). When the Ecuadorian military withdrew from politics (the process known as *el retorno constitucional*, 1978-79), it extracted several concessions,¹³⁵ one of which was the proscription of Assad Bucaram as the presidential candidate of the Concentration of Popular Forces (Concentración de Fuerzas or CFP). The CFP was forced to field instead the alternative candidate, Jamie Roldós. Roldós was meant to be a stand-in candidate for Bucaram since he is the nephew in law of Bucaram. Unfortunately for Bucaram, Roldós proved to be politically independent and conflict emerged between the two men. Bucaram, who is president of Congress and dominant within the CFP (which was nominally the president's party), used his position to block the initiatives of Roldos, who is the elected president of Ecuador. Roldos eventually formed his own party, the People, Change and Democracy (Pueblo, Cambio, y Democracia or PCD). From the institutional perspective, this is clear evidence of severe executive-legislative conflict which constrains the executive (Conaghan 1987). This constrain does not however apply to the foreign policy domain because all major actors support the prosecution of the rivalry. As Rousseau (2005: 75) noted:

¹³⁵ They include 1) ability to name board of directors of major state corporations, 2) a say in selection of defense minister, 3) veto over human rights abuses that occurred during military rule (Rousseau 2005: 72).

Ecuadorian governments, whether democratic or autocratic, have rejected the status quo that was imposed on them after a military defeat in 1941. Successive governments have socialized the public through school texts and political speeches to demand territorial changes. No political party or significant political actor advocated giving up the claims; no political platform explicitly denounced the use of force to change the status quo.

In the Ecuadorian psyche, the culture of irredentism is strong. Ecuadorians are taught their national territory was reduced by two thirds as the result of the 1941 war (Marcella 1995). Until recently, the official motto was “Ecuador is an Amazonian country and always will be.” (*El Ecuador ha sido, es y será País Amazónico*). Echoing a similar point, Simmons (Simmons 1999: 17) noted that the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry conducted a public opinion poll after the 1981 incident and found public support for both the policy of nullification and for the policy of seeking sovereign access to the Amazon.

Given that a policy of confrontation against Peru was domestically popular, the constraint on escalation has to be from above. The relative military balance favored Peru. The Peruvian military was more professional than its Ecuadorian counterparts (Mares 1996/7: 112). Moreover, Ecuador was not ready for a serious confrontation against Peru. For example, the Ecuadorian outposts had no anti-aircraft defenses, a significant absence since they were attacked by Peruvian aircraft (Mares 1996/7: 113). It is also telling that the Ecuadorian outposts were overrun by Peruvian attacks within days of their discovery (Rousseau 2005: 69-70).

Ecuador attempted a limited probe which backfired when Peru reacted with force. The use of force (limited probes) by Ecuador and the initiation of this round of conflict by Ecuador fail to support the institutional account.

3.1.3 Normative account, Peru (Prediction: Deescalation; Outcome: Rejected)

The normative account expects democratic Peru to i) be willing to compromise in diplomatic negotiations with democratic Ecuador before the outbreak of hostilities; and ii) to use diplomatic (rather than military) means to remove the contested outposts after their discovery by Peru.¹³⁶ The negotiating stance of Peru, to i) stick to the framework of the Rio Protocol and the decision to ii) use force to remove the contested outposts constitute evidence that that do not support the prediction.

Peruvian diplomatic behavior demonstrated limited flexibility. Peru was willing to negotiate, but only within the framework of the Rio Protocol; which Ecuador would not accept. Peru's legal position, to uphold the sanctity of international treaties was considered "relatively defensible" (St John 1996: 81). By contrast, Ecuador position garnered little international support despite repeated efforts by Ecuador. This implies that under international law, the Peruvian position was more reasonable.

Peruvian conflict behavior demonstrated restraint. After skirmishing in the contested border, the Peruvian government rejected calls by its military hardliners to invade Ecuador proper (Rousseau 2005: 70). It opted instead for the diplomatic intervention of the guarantor countries. Additionally, Peruvian post-conflict diplomacy also demonstrated flexibility. Peru agreed to an OAS-led intervention that referred to the four guarantor countries as "four friendly nations" so long as the guarantors were recognized as arbiters of the dispute (ibid). Peru did not have to make that concession. After all, prior to the 1981 conflict, Peru's position hitherto was to reject all attempts to

¹³⁶ That is, after Ecuador initiated the conflict.

negotiate outside the Rio framework (this was the same position that the US criticized as “intransigent” Mares 1996/7: 113). With this move, Peru gave Ecuador a face-saving way to back down.

Although Peru made minor diplomatic concessions, it did use force to expel Ecuador from the contested outposts. Thus, its behavior fails to support the normative account.

3.1.4 Institutional account, Peru (Prediction: Escalate, Outcome: Supported)

The institutional account expects Peru, which was constrained from below (institutional opposition) but not from above (Peru has the military advantage) to opt for escalation (see table 3). Peru’s reaction to the encroachment by outposts with military force of its own supports the institutional account.

Peru has both the overall strategic advantage and had the more professional army. Ecuador had 38,800 military personnel, 120 tanks, and 55 combat aircraft while Peru had 130,000 military personnel, 620 tanks, and 115 combat aircraft (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1981).¹³⁷ In terms of professionalization of the armed forces, the Peruvian military was more professional than their Ecuadorian counterparts (Mares 1996/7: 112). Internal conflict, in the shape of two insurgencies, by the Shining Path and by the MRTA (*Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru*), had yet to become a factor in

¹³⁷ Cited in Rousseau 2005: 99, footnote 69.

1981.¹³⁸ Peru's military advantage was significant because it attacked and occupied the offending outposts within days (Rousseau 2005: 70).

Domestically, the chief executive, faced more institutional constraints from military autonomy and from the parliament. Peru had just democratized in 1980 after the military decided to withdraw from politics. The military however, extracted several concessions from the new civilian government as the price of its exit from politics. One key concession was an absolute autonomy of the military in its internal affairs and a say for the military in key national security issues (Abugattas 1987: 139). The government under Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde did not challenge this autonomy. Furthermore, the president's party, Popular Action controlled only 43% of the seats in the Senate and 54% of the seats in Chamber of Deputies (Rousseau 2005:74).

The use of force by Peru in response to Ecuadorian encroachment supports the institutional account. The specific institutional constraints in this case however differs slightly from that anticipated the theory. President Belaunde was less constrained by an institutionalized parliamentary opposition (his party was to perform badly in the 1983 elections) than by an autonomous military. In this event, the difference in the source of opposition did not matter much because the Peruvian military advantage was such that the political cost of escalation was minimal for President Belaunde.

¹³⁸ Both groups were in their infancy in 1981. MRTA started attacks from 1982 onwards (after the 1981 episode). While the Shining Path did start its attacks in 1981, it was an insignificant organization back then.

3.2 The 1991 Pachacútec Incident.

The 1991 Pachacútec Incident represents a crisis between democratic rivals that was contained with diplomacy. Although there are disagreements,¹³⁹ Ecuador is generally understood to be the initiator of the conflict (St John 1996; Mares 1996/7). Although the agreement obtained through the mediation of the guarantor countries (Brazil) was not subsequently implemented (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 40-1), the point remains that immediate conflict was averted with diplomacy.

3.2.1 Normative account, Ecuador (Prediction: Deescalation, Outcome: Supported)

The normative account expects democratic Ecuador to engage with democratic Peru using diplomacy instead of military force. While Ecuador did initiate this round of the conflict with a border encroachment, its subsequent attempt at diplomacy (from 1991 to 1992) constitutes evidence which support the account.

Under President Rodrigo Borja and his Foreign Minister, Diego Cordovez, Ecuador's foreign policy emphasized participation in multilateral forums and international cooperation in general (Bustamante 1992). As part of this new orientation, Ecuador started to suggest ideas for a peaceful resolution of the territorial dispute. For example, the Foreign Minister Diego Cordovez suggested that Ecuador may have to settle for lesser gains such as free access to the Amazon and preferential treatment in the area

¹³⁹ Herz and Nogueira (2002: 40) blamed Peru for installation of the Pachacútec outpost which triggered the Ecuador reaction to build its own outposts. St John and Mares disagrees with this assessment. St John argued that the Pachacútec outpost was within Peruvian territory based on 1945 Braz Diaz de Aguiar Arbitral Award (for maps, see St John 1996: 82, figure 3) and thus its installation was not provocative. Mares argued that the Ecuadorian side knew about the outpost in 1987 and waited until 1991 to make an issue of it (Mares 1996/7: 117), implying the offending outpost is just a pretext. Given that Ecuador is also the revisionist state, I am inclined towards the view that Ecuador initiated this round of conflict.

instead of the more ambitious aim of full sovereignty over the region (ibid : 208-09). The fact that such suggestions, which would have been considered heretical in the past, are entertained reflects a change in the public mood in Ecuador towards compromise. When the 1991 incident broke out, not only did Ecuador agree to the gentleman's agreement which resolved temporarily the potential for militarized conflict, Borja also made two proposals for third party mediation to resolve the dispute. The first proposal called for Vatican arbitration, the second for Chilean or Brazilian arbitration. The language of the proposals was sufficiently ambiguous to allow for mediation over the demarcation of the disputed border using a means *not* originally envisioned by Rio Protocol (Bustamante 1992: 210-211). While the intention of those proposals is might have been aimed at the subversion of the Rio Protocol (St John 1996: 82), the counter-argument is that if the proposal had led to a resolution of the dispute, the issue of observing the Rio Protocol would have been moot. Bustamante observed that:

... the whole question of whether the Rio Protocol is (or should be) considered nullified would end up by becoming totally irrelevant, and Ecuador would be able to end up by respecting it without outwardly appearing to do so (Bustamante 1992: 211)

For the purposes of accessing the normative account, the fact i) 1991 incident did not escalate into armed conflict and ii) that Ecuador pursued diplomatic means (through its two proposals) supports the account.

3.2.2 Institutional account, Ecuador (Prediction: Deescalation, Outcome:Supported)

The institutional account predicts escalation due to a combination of i) relative military disadvantage and the ii) lack of institutional opposition to the executive. Given that i) the 1991 Pachacútec incident did not escalate into armed conflict and that ii) the

post- 1991 diplomatic efforts by Ecuador, the institutional account is supported. This case also has two idiosyncratic factors, specifically, i) the localized military advantage Ecuador may have had, and ii) the preferences of the institutional actors for peaceful resolution.

In terms of relative military balance, the overall military advantage remains with Peru. The issue is that Ecuador may have achieved a *localized* military advantage in the Cenepa river basin by 1991. Given that the Ecuador military had preparing for a military conflict since their defeat in 1981, the inference is Ecuador might have had the military advantage by 1991. Mares observed that the Ecuadorian military was aware of the existence of the Peruvian Pachacútec outpost in 1987 but waited until 1991 to make an issue of it. He suggested that “Ecuador was ready to militarily contest Peru by 1991, but needed Peru to initiate the fighting” (Mares 1996/7: 117). Although the Ecuadorian military expenditure as a share of GNP has been decreasing, its capability has been increasing (Mares 1996/7: 120).¹⁴⁰ By contrast, the Peruvian military capability has been weakened by economic crisis. Mauceri (1991: 100) noted that the salary, based on 1991 prices, of a Peruvian general is only \$210 a month while that of his Ecuadorian counterpart is \$558. Collectively these (the capability increase, and the higher pay) suggest Ecuador may have a localized advantage.

How should one evaluate the status of this localized military advantage in the light of the institutional account? The first consideration is to recognize we are dealing with a counterfactual scenario, that Ecuador could have won a localized conflict in 1991.

¹⁴⁰ Mares cites data on United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) data on Ecuadorian spending which showed that i) the military share of the GNP “declined dramatically under democracy” (ibid, p. 120); and ii) from 1987 to 1993, the military expenditure was declining (ibid, p. 120, footnote 76).

Unlike the case for 1995 where Ecuador did fight and win, all we know in 1991 is that both sides choose not to fight. The second consideration is that the advantage is merely localized, and not a strategic level advantage, which remained in Peru's favor. Based these considerations, I conclude the military balance in 1991 was in Peru's favor.

The second issue refers to the preferences of the institutional actors, in this case, Ecuadorian public opinion and its executive President Rodrigo Borja. Ecuadorian public opinion has been changing towards qualified moderation. Bustamante for example, attributes this to an awareness in the Ecuadorian public that a maximalist irredentism approach is not working and that settling for lesser gains may be necessary (Bustamante 1992: 208-9). An opinion poll conducted in 1992, supports this view. Most Ecuadorians (55% of respondents) wanted free trade with Peru although many (49 % of respondents) still consider Peru to be an enemy country (Mares 1996/7: 102).

Several initiatives support the view that the executive, President Borja, was also in favor of deescalation. First, during the 1991 crisis when armed conflict appeared possible, the Borja administration invited the four guarantors in October 1991 to mediate (Bustamante 1992: 209). If Ecuador had wanted the Peruvian side to initiate conflict as Mares suggested, inviting mediators would be self-defeating since it risks exposing Ecuadorian ploy to outside scrutiny. It also could be that Ecuadorian military wanted escalation but President Borja did not. In that event, Borja's action supports the view that he preferred conciliation. Second and more significantly, it was Ecuador and not Peru that started the new diplomatic initiatives (for example by proposing Vatican mediation Bustamante 1992: 209-10). As part of those initiatives, it suggested the idea that Ecuador

might have to make do with lesser gains such as functional access to the region rather than full sovereignty (ibid, p. 209).

In Ecuador, the major institutional actors shared the same preferences with the chief executive for deescalation. This congruence of preferences is also strengthened by the overall military balance, which I argue was against Ecuador.

In sum, the various diplomatic initiatives of Borja government, i) to seek the mediation of the four guarantor during the 1991 crisis, ii) to propose the mediation by the Vatican in 1991-1992, and iii) to moderate the aims from full sovereignty to merely functional access, support the institutional prediction of deescalation.

3.2.3 Normative account, Peru (Prediction: Deescalation, Outcome: Supported)

The normative account expects democratic Peru to engage with democratic Ecuador using diplomacy instead of military force. While Peru can be considered an autocracy in 1992 (after Fujimori launched his autogolpe), Peru was democratic in 1991. Therefore, the conflict that occurred in 1991 should be judged according to the expectations for a mixed to democratic transition. The diplomatic initiatives launched under the Fujimori administration support the normative account.

When elected in 1990, Fujimori inherited a Peru with chronic economic and security problems.¹⁴¹ His foreign policy was directed towards resolving foreign disputes (with Ecuador and with Chile) in order to concentrate on the domestic problems. Towards Ecuador, Fujimori launched several initiatives. First, he defused (for a while) the 1991

¹⁴¹ These are addressed in greater detail in the following sub-section 3.2.4.

crisis by signing the gentleman's agreement. Second, Fujimori initiated his own diplomatic proposals. He visited the capital of Ecuador, Quito. This was an unprecedented trip as he was the first Peruvian president to visit Ecuador (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 42). He offered both a) economic cooperation, namely a treaty of commerce and access to port facilities for Ecuador, and made a counter-proposal to the Ecuadorean proposal of Papal arbitration. The Peruvian counterproposal was to appoint a Vatican representative as a technical expert to assist in the demarcation of the boundary as envisioned in the Rio Protocol. Couched in these terms, Peru sees the Vatican as an additional source of legitimacy in addition to the four guarantors instead of replacing them (Bustamante 1992: 212). Nevertheless, the effect of its decisions is to accept the good offices of the Holy See, as Bustamante observed:

... Peru has accepted, at least in spirit, Ecuador's –eg., resolving the problem of determining borderlines can be carried out *via* mechanisms not envisioned by the Rio Protocol. ... It [Ecuador] has maintained that even partial acceptance by Peru is the equivalent, in fact, to full acceptance since it [Ecuador] believes that the moral force and credibility of a Vatican-supported expert is such that it would be impossible for Peru to exempt itself from following his recommendations. (Bustamante 1992: 212)

This concession demonstrates Fujimori's willingness to compromise in negotiations.

A more serious critique is the Ecuadorean allegation¹⁴² that Peru was not sincere when making its proposals. Fujimori himself declared publicly in 1995 that his earlier conciliatory policies were designed to deceive. The context of that comment is important; it was made during the election of 1995 after the Cenepa war. During the election, Fujimori faced criticism from the opposition candidate, Javier Pérez de Cuellar (the

¹⁴² Herz and Nogueira (2002: 43) conducted confidential interviews with Ecuadorean military officers who made those allegations.

former UN secretary general), that he did not do enough to defend Peru interests. Set against this context, Mares concludes that Fujimori's comment is just "defensive campaign rhetoric" (Mares 1996/7: 118, footnote 70). It should therefore not be treated as an attempt of Peruvian deception. Furthermore, Fujimori's offer of economic cooperation in exchange for border demarcation are a) similar to those he offered Chile and b) consistent with his repeated interventions during the 1995-8 period towards a resolution of the dispute. This consistency is why the negotiations of 1991-2 represented "genuine attempts at negotiations that had been absent at least since the years of the Washington Conference" (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 40).

It is true that both the gentlemen's agreement and the counterproposals subsequently failed. The *means* of conflict resolution, diplomatic or military, should in theory, be differentiated from the *outcome*. The fact that Peru adopted diplomatic means in the 1991 incident and its immediate aftermath supports the normative account.

3.2.4 Institutional Account, Peru (Prediction: Deescalation, Outcome: Supported)

Although Peru has an overall military advantage over Ecuador, it had both a socio-economic crisis and a domestic security crisis to contend with. Furthermore, President Fujimori faced opposition from both the Congress and the military. The institutional account, based on a combination of these two factors of severe domestic crises and institutionalized opposition, predicts deescalation. The diplomatic initiatives under the Fujimori administration support the account.

Peru in the early 1990s faced a multitude of problems. The government of Alan Garcia, Fujimori's predecessor, mismanaged the economy. Garcia left Peru with i)

hyperinflation, ii) a decrease in real income, iii) high budget deficits as well as a default on foreign debt (Berriós 2003: 213). In 1990, Peru also experienced a cholera epidemic. With around 320,000 people infected, this was the worst outbreak of cholera in Latin America for a century (Hunefeldt 2004: 258). On top of this, the country faced two domestic security problems, drug-trafficking and insurgency from two groups, the Shining Path and the MRTA. Faced with these problems, Fujimori's priority was to first implement neoliberal economic reforms, win popular support with state-backed executive philanthropy and to conduct counterinsurgency. Kay (1996) characterized this distinctive mix of neoliberal reforms and populism as "Fujipopulism".

Given Fujimori's agenda, conflict with Ecuador is an unnecessary distraction. After all, the Ecuadorian threat is confined to incursions in remote parts of Peru. By contrast, the Shining Path at its peak of influence, "controlled one third of the country" (Hunefeldt 2004: 252). Comparisons of the fatalities incurred in the two conflicts reveal a similar picture. The rivalry with Ecuador as measured in terms of casualties incurred in five conflict episodes from 1941 to 1995 was around 1082, most of which were combatants. By contrast, the casualties count incurred during the insurgency was estimated by the Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) to be around 69,000, most of which were civilians. Resolving the border dispute with Ecuador would allow Fujimori to concentrate projects that were more important to him.

Fujimori's preference for deescalation ran into institutionalized opposition from two sources, Congress and the military. Here, it is important to distinguish between the early and late stages of Fujimori's leadership tenure. While the four institutional bases

underpinning Fujipopulism (Kay 1996)¹⁴³ were entrenched during his later tenure (1992-2000), none of them were well-developed during his early tenure (1990-2).

The first institutional base deals with the Peruvian party-system. Fujimori did not dominate the Peruvian Congress. Rather the party-system was dominated by four large parties that dates from the post 1979 era. They were the Democratic Front (Frente Democrático; FREMDO), the American popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), the United Left (Izquierda Unida or IU), the Socialist Left (Izquierda Socialista or IS). Collectively, the four parties controls 182 out of a total 242 seats in the two chambers, or 75.2 % of the total seats in Congress. By contrast, Fujimori party's Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría (meaning "Change [19]90-New Majority") held only 46 out of a total of 242 (Tanaka 2005: 271). While the parties were unable to deal with the socio-economic crisis Peru was in, they were capable of blocking Fujimori's initiatives. Congress criticized Fujimori for not dealing harshly with Ecuador in the aftermath of the 1991 crisis (Mares 1996/7: 119). In fact, one of the main reasons why Fujimori launched an autogolpe in 1992 was to neutralize Congress as a source of opposition to his rule.

Although Fujimori enjoyed popular support after the 1992 coup, he was unpopular during the 1990-1991 period. Fujimori had campaigned in the 1990 election against neoliberal reforms and economic austerity. In power, he proceeded to implement the same reforms he had campaigned against. The opposition within Congress mobilized the public against Fujimori's economic adjustment policies. Protests were intense in 1991

¹⁴³ I elaborate on the four bases in the subsection on the 1995 Cenepa war in the next chapter.

(Tanaka 2005: 271-2). Although the reforms worked in the long run, in the short run, his popularity plummeted (Kay 1996: 62).¹⁴⁴

In a similar vein, although Fujimori enjoyed a cosy relationship with the Peruvian military after the 1992 coup, the politicalization of the army was only beginning in 1990-1991. Back then, the army was split between an ‘institutionalist’ faction that favored the neutrality of the army and opposing ‘politicized’ faction that favored participation in politics. It is *only* in the late 1991 when the politicized faction, led by army General Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos, acquired control over all three branches of the military (Kay 1996: 75). Consequently, although Fujimori wanted to deescalate the rivalry with Ecuador and focus on counterinsurgency, the military did not just go along with his wishes. Instead of deploying for a counterinsurgency, the bulk of the military equipment and personnel were deployed on the borders against Ecuador and against Chile (Mauceri 1991: 104).

The chief executive, President Fujimori, was under multiple constraints in 1991. Elected as an outsider, he lacked the support of a traditional party. His own party, Cambio 90 was little more than a political front. He was unpopular in 1991 and faced institutionalized opposition from both Congress and the military. Fujimori was able to an agreement (the gentleman agreement) to avert immediate conflict, make a visit to Quito and to offer proposals to resolve the border issue. He was unable to get the nation to follow-up on the negotiations. Thus, Peru did not (neither did Ecuador for that matter)

¹⁴⁴ Additionally, Tanaka (2005: 261-288) provides informative graphs of President Fujimori approval ratings and the public approval of his public policies from July 1990 to Jul 2000 in Figure 9.2, 9.3 (pp. 272, 273). Both showed a initial dip in ratings for Fujimori as he implemented his painful but unnecessary reforms in 1991. He recovered from them with his popular autogople, in part because the Peruvian public is more disgusted with both Congress and the Judiciary.

fulfill the terms of the gentlemen's agreement. Peru refused to remove its Pachacútec outpost unless Ecuador also removed its Teniente Ortiz Base. Ecuador refused arguing that the base was on its side of the demarcation line. (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 41). Both sides did not implement the common security zone (they did not withdraw their respective troops) as required by the agreement. The fact the diplomatic initiatives were ultimately unsuccessful did not negate their nature as diplomatic rather than military means. As such, the behavior of Peru to opt for diplomacy supports the institutional account.

4. Conclusion.

We have enough information on the conflict behavior of the rivals in the two conflict episodes to make an assessment. Table 7 below summarizes the finding for this case. The theory expects a transition from mixed to democratic rivalry to be deescalatory. In the 1981 Paquisha Incident, both sides resorted to the use of force. Ecuador launched a limited probe and Peru retaliated by attacking the contested outposts. In the 1991 Pachacútec Incident, both sides averted the use of force with diplomacy. Although the diplomatic initiatives subsequently failed, the theoretical point remained that non-military means were adopted. Thus the trend in overall conflict from 1981 to 1991 is deescalatory and it matches the theoretical expectation.

Conducting a critical test here is more involved. Recall that a critical test requires the normative and institutional account to make different predictions for conflict behavior. This condition does not for the 1991 episode, as both accounts make the same predictions. This is due to idiosyncratic factors specific to that episode. Ecuador may

have achieved a local military advantage but choose not to escalate the crisis further. Peru has the overall military advantage but it also has severe socio-economic and security crises that demanded the attention of its government.

The only critical test for this regime transition is over the behavior of Peru in the 1981 episode. The institutional account predicts escalation (since Peru was militarily stronger) while the normative account predicts de-escalation (since both rivals were democracies). Peru responded to Ecuadorian encroachment by directly attacking and occupying the offending outposts. This behavior supports the institutional rather than the normative account.

In conclusion, this chapter discussed the methodology behind the theoretical framework used to assess the rivalry. After a historical overview, I divided the rivalry into two separate regime transitions. I focus on the 1979 to 1991 period where there was a transition from mixed to democratic rivalry. I examined the normative and institutional accounts of both rivals behavior during the 1981 Paquisha Incident and the 1991 Pachacútec Incident. The evidence supports the theoretical expectation of i) an overall trend towards de-escalation as well as ii) the institutional account over the normative one.

Table 7: Summary of results for 1979-1991 (mixed to democratic transition).

	Expected conflict behavior	Verdict
1981		
Normative account		
Ecuador	Deescalate	Reject
Peru	Deescalate	Reject
Institutional account		
Ecuador	Deescalate	Reject
Peru	Escalate	Support
1991		
Normative account		
Ecuador	Deescalate	Support
Peru	Deescalate	Support
Institutional account		
Ecuador	Deescalate	Support
Peru	Deescalate	Support
Overall conflict trend	Deescalate	Support
Critical test (1981 episode, Peru only)	Normative : Deescalate Institutional: Escalate	Institutional account supported

Chapter Six

1. Overview.

In this chapter, I use the Ecuador-Peru rivalry from 1980 to 2000 as a case study of the effects of a transition from a democratic to a mixed rivalry. I focus on conflict and diplomatic behavior around the 1995 Cenepa War and 1998 Brasilia Accords. Overall I find that such transitions can be deescalatory, which is not anticipated by the theory. In a critical test over the behavior of Ecuador, I find more support for the institutional account. Additionally, I discuss several alternative explanations for the rivalry.

I proceed in the following manner. I start by discussing the theoretical framework to evaluate this transition (1). I use it to examine evidence (2). I discuss alternative explanations of the rivalry (3). Finally, I summarize the conclusions for the case study (4).

1.1 Theoretical framework

The theory argues that transitions from a mixed to a democratic rivalry or *democratization* deescalates a rivalry. Judging by this argument, both the 1995 and 1998 episodes are theoretically irrelevant since they occurred during a period of mixed rivalry (1992-200) and the prior dyadic regime type was democratic (1980-1991). Removing these two episodes would remove a lot of valuable information, since the Cenepa war was a major escalation while the peace process represents a major deescalation. Therefore in the Lakatosian spirit of seeking explanations with excess empirical content, I project using the logic of my theory, to cover transitions from democratic to mixed

rivalry or *autocratization*.¹⁴⁵ The simplest extension of the logic is treat democratization and autocratization as symmetrical. If democratization deescalates, it implies that its reverse, autocratization escalates (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Direction of dyadic regime and expected conflict behavior

Given that:	Mixed to democratic rivalry (democratization)	deescalation
I infer therefore:	Democratic to mixed rivalry (autocratization)	escalation

This is not without theoretical foundation. In chapter 4, I discussed five perspectives on how regime change can affect conflict behavior. The political dissimilarity thesis is based on the argument that political similar regimes have less rationale for conflict (Werner 2000; Peceny Beer, Sanchez-Terry 2002). Transitions into mixed dyads should increase the chance of conflict (this is represented by hypothesis 7 in chapter 4). It follows therefore that a transition from a democratic to a mixed rivalry of two dissimilar regimes should escalate the rivalry.

Recall that for democratization, the critical test is between a normative account which predicts deescalation and an institutional account which predicts escalation. Can one still conduct a critical test when focusing on a transition from democratic to mixed rivalry? In reversing the direction of transition, the expectations vary for the two rivals. Peru as the newly autocratic regime who has the overall military advantage, both the normative and institutional account makes the same prediction of escalation. Ecuador as the democratic state with overall military inferiority but has localized military advantage, the normative account predicts escalation due to norm-switching. The institutional

¹⁴⁵ For the sake of narration in this chapter only, I use the term *democratization* to refer to transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry and *autocratization* to denote the reverse.

prediction, however, is for deescalation if the overall military advantage is emphasized and for escalation if the localized military advantage is emphasized. There is thus, a potentially a critical test, over the conflict behavior of Ecuador.

For the purposes of evaluating the effects of autocratization, only the 1995 and 1998 episodes are relevant.¹⁴⁶ For each episode, I examine the relationship between domestic politics and conflict behavior of both rivals using the normative and institutional accounts. This gives me eight observations points.

As is the case with the previous chapter, I operationalize the dependent variable in terms of i) the overall conflict trend and in terms of the expected behavior using the ii) normative and the iii) institutional logics.

Since my argument focus on the conflict behavior *after* autocratization, the relevant comparison is between two episodes (the minimum necessary to establish a conflict trend) *after* the requisite regime change. The overall trend can either escalate or deescalate. By escalation, I am referring to conflict policies by Peru/Ecuador to i) to remove or defend the contested outposts (and its attendant garrison troops) by force, ii) to reject the diplomatic intervention of third parties (the four guarantors), or iii) to mobilize the armed forces or reinforce contested outposts in preparation for more conflict. By deescalation, I am referring to conflict policies by Peru/Ecuador to i) seek the removal of the contested outposts (or to defend as the status quo) by diplomatic rather than by

¹⁴⁶ I could compare between episodes in different dyadic regime types so that the overall conflict trend is before and after the requisite regime change. The problem with that alternative is that it is not clear what the pertinent comparison for the 1980-2000 period should be. Comparing between the 1991 and the 1995 episodes result in a finding of escalation. By contrast, comparing between 1991 and the 1998 episodes result in a finding of deescalation. Using the former comparison (1991, 1995) ignores the peace-making (the Brasilia peace process) that came after and using the later comparison (1991, 1998) ignores the intervening Cenepa war.

military means, or to ii) accept the diplomatic intervention of third parties. The distinction here is whether the rejection or the defense of the status quo (the contested outposts) is done through military or diplomatic means.

The second operationalization is derived from the normative account. Under it, norms of political bargaining differ by regime type. Elites are socialized in democratic norms (that favor compromise-seeking and non-violence) and are assumed to externalize those same norms in interstate disputes. It is the interaction of those norms in dyadic context that determines the prospects for a peaceful outcome. With autocratization, the normative account predicts escalation as democratic Ecuador switches to the norms of the newly autocratic Peru. In this transition, escalation refers to policy decisions by Peru/Ecuador to i) use military means to challenge/defend the status quo; and ii) to stick to a maximalist bargaining position. Conversely, deescalation refers to policy decisions by Peru/Ecuador to i) use diplomatic means to challenge/defend the status quo; and ii) to be willing to compromise and retreat from maximalist bargaining positions. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the 1995 and 1998 episodes allow for additional extensions of the explanatory logics.¹⁴⁷ For 1995 episode, I expect Ecuador to be especially mistrustful of the intentions of Peru. For the 1998 episode, where one issue is inclusiveness of the peace-building process, I expect democratic Ecuador to be more inclusive, compared to autocratic Peru, when building support for the peace deal.

The third operationalization is derived from the institutional account. There are two factors, the relative power between the rivals and extent to which other institutional

¹⁴⁷ I treat these extensions as auxiliary claims because they are derived from circumstances idiosyncratic to the 1995 and 1998 episodes and not part of the main claims of the theory (as articulated in chapter 2).

actors share the preferences of the executive. The interaction of the two factors, summarized in table 1 below, helps to predict the expected behavior of the rivals.

Table 1: Interaction between relative military balance and institutional constrains

		Relative Power	
		Military disadvantage	Military advantage
Preferences of Institutional actors	Against the executive	Deescalation	Escalation
	With the executive	Deescalation	Escalation

When there is both relative military advantage and preference congruence (major institutional actors agree on preferences), the account predicts escalation. It predicts the deescalation when both factors are absent. Where the factors are in opposing directions, the outcome is dependent on whether the military adventure is likely to successful. If the relative military advantage is enough to make a military success likely, it may nullify institutional opposition. Conversely, if a state does not have military advantage, the executive may opt for deescalation even if he has the public behind him as he would be paying the political price of a failed military adventure. Applied to the case, the institutional account focus on i) whether there was an actual use of force to defend or challenge the status quo; and ii) the distribution of political power between the chief executive and the other institutional actors (the parliament, military and the public). Additionally, circumstances specific to the case study should be considered when applying the institutional logic. First, Ecuador may enjoy a localized military advantage while being militarily inferior on a strategic level (this is pertinent during the 1995 episode). Second, the institutional logic tends to assume it is the executive that is

belligerent and who have to be contained by the other institutional actors (see a discussion on this assumption in Rousseau 2005: 80-2, Appendix 2.1). In the case of Peruvian politics, it is chief executive, President Fujimori, who prefers de-escalation compared to other institutional actors.

The overall assessment of each operationalization (overall, normative and institutional) is summarized in table 2. The assessment specific to the democratic to mixed transition are summarized in table 3. Collectively, table 2 and 3, constitutes the theoretical framework with which I evaluate the case-study.

Table 2: Overall Framework to assess the dependent variable (conflict behavior)

	Overall conflict trend	Normative account	Institutional Account		
Escalation	i) Use force to challenge/defend status quo ii) reject third party mediation iii) mobilization of army.	i) use force instead of diplomacy to challenge/defend status quo ii) adopt maximalist bargaining position	Consideration 1	Constraints from above	Relative military balance
Deescalation	i) Non-Use of force to challenge status quo ii) accept third-party mediation	i) use diplomacy instead of force to challenge/defend status quo ii) compromise from a maximalist bargaining position	Consideration 2	Constraints from below	Distribution of power between executive and institutional actors
Additional considerations idiosyncratic to case study	Not applicable	1995 –Norms switching by Ecuador. 1998- inclusiveness of peace-building process	-overall military balance vs local military balance -Preferences of the institutional actors		

Table 3: Framework to access the transition from a democratic to mixed rivalry, 1980-2000.

1995 and 1998 episodes.	Overall conflict trend	Normative account	Institutional account
Prediction	Escalation	Escalation	Escalation
Supporting Evidence	Use of force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) Use of force ii) adopt maximalist position iii) Ecuador switch norms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) Use of force by autocratic Peru ii) Use of diplomacy by democratic Ecuador (if strategic balance is emphasized) iii) Use of force by democratic Ecuador (if local balance is emphasized)
Non-supporting Evidence	Use of diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) Use of diplomacy ii) seek compromise iii) democratic Ecuador do not switch norms or autocratic Peru seek compromise 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) Use of diplomacy by autocratic Peru ii) Use of force by democratic Ecuador (if strategic balance is emphasized) iii) Use of diplomacy by democratic Ecuador (if local balance is emphasized)

2. Evidence

2.1 The 1995 Cenepa war

In April 1992, Fujimori conducted an autogople, transforming Peru into an autocracy. In so doing, the dyad transitioned from a democratic rivalry to a mixed rivalry. Unresolved tensions from the 1991 crisis broke into the 1995 Cenepa War. During the war, Ecuador won a tactical victory. The conflict ended when both sides sought the mediation of the four guarantors.

Conceptually, there are three stages in the conflict episode that be used for evaluation.¹⁴⁸ The *first stage* deals with the negotiations from 1992 to 1995 before the Cenepa War. The second stage deals with the initiation of conflict in 1995, where the rivals have to choose between the continued use of diplomacy or its alternative, the use of force. The *third stage* deals with the prospect of further escalation once the Cenepa War started, where the rivals have to decide if they want to escalate the border skirmishes into a general war. To use a metaphor from firefighting, each stage can be thought of as a ‘firebreak’ preventing further escalation. If so, the first, second and third stage constitutes the strongest, the intermediate, and the weakest firebreak respectively.

Since the *third stage* (‘firebreak’ for peaceful relations than the (conflict initiation),

Given the three stages in this episode, there is a theoretical division of labor. The normative account concentrates mainly on the evaluation of the first stage since it is judging the tenor of the negotiations. The institutional account concentrates on the evaluation of the second and third stage since it is affected both the military balance and the preferences of the major institutional actors.

2.1.1 Normative account, Ecuador (Prediction: Escalation, Outcome: Supported)

The normative account expects the democratic rival to adopt the norms of its autocratic rival because it fears exploitation if it were to retain its original democratic norms. It expects the negotiations from 1992 (after the coup in Peru) to 1995 to take a negative turn as Ecuador exhibits a mistrust of Peru. Therefore, it predicts escalation

¹⁴⁸ This multistage approach to evaluate the implications of a theory is similar to the framework proposed and utilized by Huth and Allee 2002, 2003.

during the *first stage* of the episode. The subsequent diplomatic behavior of Ecuador supports this account.

The negotiations initiated in 1991 started to stalemate after Peru became autocratic. President Sixto Durán-Ballén, whose tenure is from August 1992 to August 1996, had a weak foreign policy record before 1995. Amongst Durán-Ballén early foreign policy failures were the withdrawal of Ecuador from OPEC (where Ecuador was a founding member); and the fiasco over the OAS Secretary-General vote (Hey: 1996). To this list of failures, one may add his performance during the 1992-1994 negotiations (before the 1995 Cenepa war). Unlike his predecessor Rodrigo, who emphasized multilateral cooperation and sought lesser but tangible benefits in the negotiations with Peru, Durán-Ballén allowed that policy to lapse through apathy. Hey (1996: 294)¹⁴⁹ made a telling observation: “When asked what Durán Ballén’s foreign policy goals were, a high-ranking member of the Foreign Ministry answered that he had ‘none’.”

Durán-Ballén’s indifference is significant because it allowed the military to effectively dominate the negotiation process (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 76). The Ecuadorian military was inclined to interpret Peruvian signals negatively (ibid: 45). The Ecuadorian military questioned Peru’s sincerity in the post 1991 negotiations. This view appeared to be justified by the fact that i) Peru did not withdraw from the Pachacútec outpost as required under the gentlemen’s agreement of 1991; ii) and that the head of negotiations, the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Black Miller, was replaced by a military officer (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 75).

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Leonardo Carrion, Quito, 3 May 1994; cited in Hey 1996: 294.

The Ecuadorian military had a similar negative interpretation of Peruvian signals in the buildup to the 1995 Cenepa War. In December 1994, a Peruvian colonel threatened to use force if Ecuador did not remove its three outposts in the Upper Cenepa region (and Nogueira 2002: 44). When the skirmishing was just starting in early 1995, Ecuadorian defense minister José Gallardo made several attempts to contact Peruvian defense minister General Nicolás Hermoza (ibid: 46). Those attempts failed due to a lack of response on the Peruvian side. Both incidents, the alleged ultimatum and the diplomatic silence, were interpreted by the Ecuadorian military as signals of Peruvian belligerence, prompting an Ecuadorian preparation for war. The Ecuadorian interpretation fits the normative perspective that a democracy fears being taken advantage in negotiations with an autocracy and eventually resorts with a policy of tit-for-tat.

The Ecuadorian public around the year 1995 was also hostile towards Peru. Two opinions polls conducted during and just after the 1995 conflict in the capital city, Quito, showed that Ecuadorians expected conflict and are unwilling to compromise (Mares 2001: 176). In those two polls, 55% of respondents in Quito feel that Ecuador won the 1995 conflict. However, 80 % believe there will be future armed confrontations and only 39.5 % of Ecuadorian believed that Ecuador will win the next war. Yet when asked the question: “There are people who say that Ecuador should recover the territory which it lost in the 1941 war and that it should be done no matter the costs.”, 44.3% of respondents agreed.

In Ecuador, the chief executive appeared to be indifferent (or incompetent), the military was suspicious, and the public was pessimistic about the intentions of Peru. As a

result and in line with the theoretical expectations, the negotiations of 1992-1995 failed and Ecuador resorted to the use of force in the 1995 Cenepa war.

2.1.2 Institutional account, Ecuador (Prediction: Escalation, Outcome: Supported)

The institutional account expects an Ecuador, which was not constrained from above or from below to opt for escalation. Here, we should differentiate between the *second stage* (conflict initiation) and *third stage* (further escalation) of the episode. At the *second stage* of conflict initiation, the institutional account predicts escalation because Ecuador enjoys a localized military advantage and the major actors share the same preferences. At the *third stage* of further escalation, the institutional account predicts de-escalation because Ecuador still has a military disadvantage at the strategic level even though the major actors (President and the military) started to have divergent preferences. One minor concern could be over the different predictions for the account in the second stage and the third stage. This can be reconciled if we keep in mind that it is still relative military balance as the institutional constraints (as elaborated in section 1.1, Table 1). At the second stage of conflict initiation, localized military advantage was more pertinent to the calculations of the key actors. At the third stage where a general war is possible, strategic military advantage was more pertinent.

In the *second stage*, Ecuador underwent an extensive preparation for conflict against Peru. According to President Durán-Ballén on March 4th 1995 (that is, after the fighting), the victory by Ecuador was the result of 14 years of preparations (cited in Marcella 1995: 16). Ecuador learnt from the mistakes made during the 1981 Paquisha Incident. It assumed Peru will respond the way it did in the 1981 episode with a

combination of air attacks and ground attacks by paratroopers and adopted the appropriate countermeasures (Mares 2001: 174). These include anti-aircraft defenses and intelligence gathering systems. The preparation paid off. Ecuador was able to maintain local air superiority and to hold onto the contested outposts despite Peruvian attacks. It managed to inflict higher casualties on the Peruvian side and also shot down nine Peruvian aircraft (Marcella 1995: 1, 11-12). This outcome of a tactical victory for Ecuador demonstrates that the Ecuadorian assessment that it has a localized military advantage was credible.

Domestically, the distribution of power within the Ecuadorian political system constrained the chief executive, President Durán-Ballén. Both Congress and the military exercise significant leverage over the executive.

Legislation within Ecuador requires a coalition amongst the parties due to Ecuador's weak and fragmented party system. One consequence is that the President's party never controls Congress (Mares 2001: 181). Congress can and do censure cabinet ministers for both criminal and political reasons. Congress makes the appointments to the Supreme Court. This has the effect of making the judiciary dependent on the legislature rather than on the executive (ibid, pp. 182). Congress can also oust the President, which it demonstrates it could do when it ousted President Bucaram in 1997.

The military is by far, the most respected political institution in the country. It has formal autonomy, it can set defense policies, and has a guaranteed share of the revenue from petroleum exports. By tradition, the Minister of Defense is a retired military officer instead of a civilian (Fitch 1998: 79-81). Both the presidency and Congress lack civilian expertise on the military which renders oversight over defense policies and over military

budget difficult (Mares 2001: 182). The Ecuadorian military can oppose defense policies which it dislikes and force the president to back down. For example, in 1982, the minister of defense, a retired admiral was forced to resign after coming out in favor of the then President Hurtado's call for a national debate over the issue of ending the rivalry with Peru. After opposition from the army, President Hurtado dropped his proposal (Fitch 1998: 88). Fitch (1998), who has conducted a detailed analysis of civil-military relations in Latin America, notes that as an institution, the military do *not* want to return to military rule. It had for intervened for example, in 1987 to *put down* a coup attempt. This institutional distaste for direct rule differentiates the military from the opposition in Congress. The army is still influential however, as Ecuadorian actors may seek the support of the military (Mares 2001: 183) during times of crises.

At the beginning of the war, all the major institutional actors favor the prosecution of the conflict. This includes the President. Even with the institutional autonomy of the military, "the decision to move Ecuadorian troops into the disputed territory was at the very least known to the civilian leadership" (Mares 2001: 182). Given the localized military advantage, and the lack of institutional opposition, Ecuador opted for escalation in the 1995 crisis, as expected by the theory.

The *third stage* (further escalation) is theoretically interesting because this is when the preferences of the actors start to diverge. That event highlighted the adroit performance of President Durán-Ballén.

During the fighting, the President declared a state of emergency, mobilized the army and imposed new war taxes. To his countrymen, he advocated resistance, preaching the slogan "Not one step back" (Mares 1996/7: 118), while using the powers granted by

to deal with domestic unrest resulting from the war (Hey 1996: 304). This proved popular, his popularity rating which was languishing at below 10 % before the war surged to 93 % during the war (ibid, pp. 303-4). In an atmosphere of patriotism, critics of his administration are portrayed as “enemies of national unity” (ibid 304). Furthermore, Durán-Ballén op-opted the Congressional President Heinz Moeller by offering him a role in the diplomatic process, thereby reducing the opposition he faces (ibid, 305). All these made his usual critics, the trade unions and the opposition parties, reluctant to challenge Durán-Ballén.

Internationally, Durán-Ballén sought the mediation of the Organization of American States (OAS) unlike his Peruvian counterpart, who rejected OAS mediation on the grounds that only the four guarantor countries should mediate. Ecuador was also quick to accept a subsequent ceasefire offer from Fujimori (Hey 1996: 305). In an important diplomatic move, Durán-Ballén *accepted* the mediation of the guarantor countries, thereby recognizing the authority of the Rio Protocol (Palmer 1997: 121-122). This is significant because Ecuador is repudiating its policy of challenging the legitimacy of the Rio Protocol. Hereafter, Ecuador would only focus on technical issues in the implementation of the Rio Protocol. In addition to this major diplomatic concession, Durán-Ballén engaged in shuttle diplomacy. He flew to various South American capitals to reassure them and to emphasize Ecuador’s willing to compromise. All these actions put Ecuador in a favorable light as the party seeking mediation compared to Peru who, already isolated after the coup of 1992, now appeared to be intransigent. In essence, President Durán-Ballén was playing a double game, he was advocating nationalist resistance domestically but conciliation internationally (Hey 1996).

Why did Durán-Ballén opt for deescalation in the *third stage*? The Ecuadorian military had successfully defended the three contested outposts in the initial round of fighting. It was confident it could withstand an escalation of the conflict from a border skirmish into a general war. Durán-Ballén believed otherwise (Mares 1996/7: 120). A general war would have spread the fighting from remote jungle regions to the lowlands nearer the Pacific, where the Peruvian military maintained an overall military advantage (Herz and Nogueira 2005: 46). It risked being a replay of the 1941 war where Peru invaded southern Ecuador proper and threaten to take Guayaquil, Ecuador's largest city (Marcella 1995: 20). President Durán-Ballén opts for deescalation and sought mediation by the guarantors. The military was not consulted prior to this move but they did not oppose this (Mares 2001: 183). Neither did nationalist civilians oppose this. Mares speculated they recognized that the prior policy stance of seek full sovereignty not borne results and have instead concentrated on consolidating the gains made in January 1995 (Mares 1996/7: 120).

The institutional account predicts escalation by Ecuador in the *second stage* and deescalation in the *third stage*. At the second stage of conflict initiation, Ecuador achieved a localized military superiority and the major institutional actors agree on the aims. The subsequent escalation resulting in the 1995 Cenepa War, was the most severe since the 1941 war (Simmons1999: 12) constitutes evidence which supports the account. However at the third stage where further escalation is possible, Ecuador remained inferior to Peru at the strategic level. Furthermore, the preferences of main actors (President,

Congress and the military) started to diverge.¹⁵⁰ Thus Ecuador opted to negotiate, armed with a strong negotiating position since it still held the contested outposts. This attempt at deescalating the conflict also supports the institutional account. The institutional account is therefore supported by Ecuador's conflict behavior in this case.

2.1.3 Normative Account, Peru (Prediction: Escalation, Outcome: Supported)

The normative account expects autocratic Peru (after the coup by Fujimori) to adopt non-democratic norms, and become more intransigent in its negotiations with Ecuador. Therefore, it predicts escalation during the *first stage* of the episode. The subsequent diplomatic behavior of Peru supports this account.

The diplomatic stance of Peru hardened after the autogolpe of 1992 (Herz and Nogueira 2005: 78). Before the coup, President Fujimori visited Ecuador and offered joint economic development and a free port on the Amazon in exchange for resolution of the border issue. After the coup, the Fujimori made repeated his offer in 1992 and 1993 (Mares 2001: 187). However, offering economic inducements is one thing, making the compromises necessary to resolve the border issue is another. Fujimori did not offer to negotiate outside the framework of the Rio Protocol and Peru did not withdraw troops from the Pachacútec outpost, as required under the terms of the 1991 gentlemen agreement.

Although Peru's diplomatic behavior supports the normative account for the negotiation stage, the rationale for the change in behavior is worth exploring as it reveals

¹⁵⁰ Although President Durán-Ballén still had the upper hand and can impose his preference in the third stage.

the nature of Fujimori's regime. Peruvian public opinion, both towards the coup and towards Ecuador *does not* appear to be the reason. First, the Peruvian public supported the coup (Conaghan 2005: 33). The traditional parties and the judiciary discredited themselves with the public. The former by political infighting and governmental paralysis and the later by freeing convicted and suspected terrorists. In fact, resistance to the coup was stronger from the international arena compared to the domestic arena. Second, Peruvian public opinion was not especially hostile to Ecuador (unlike the case for Ecuador!). In a January 1994 poll, 63 % of Peruvians see Ecuador as a friendly country, compared to the 23 % who saw Ecuador as an enemy. In an April 1994 poll, 41% of Peruvians do not see a problem between the two countries because the Rio Protocol already resolved it. During the 1995 conflict when the poor military performance of Peru was blamed on Fujimori, polls still rate Fujimori as more popular at 59.2 % compared to his chief rival Javier Pérez de Cuellar 46.6 % (Mares 2001: 180). Fujimori had after all, won the 1995 election with 64 % of the vote (Conaghan 2005: 99). It was an electoral victory big enough to avoid a second round of voting.

If the public was dissatisfied with Fujimori personally or with his policy towards Ecuador, it was not severe enough to cost Fujimori his job. Rather, the change in diplomatic stance and the consequent deterioration in relations was the result of three factors. First, the diplomatic fallout of the autogolpe denied Peru opportunities to improve relations. Peru was temporarily ostracized in several multilateral forums, especially in the OAS. These include i) Peru's suspension from the Rio Group until April 1993, ii) the no-show by Fujimori during the Andean pact meeting, iii) and the cancellation of the Ibero-American Summit in Madrid by Fujimori (Herz and Nogueira

2005: 75). Second, the conciliatory offers by Fujimori were not reciprocated by Ecuador. We know from the rivalry literature that unreciprocated cooperation is hazardous for the leader making the concessions because it renders him vulnerable to criticisms from domestic hawks (Colaesi 2004a). Third, the military acquired more political influence over the negotiation process. From 1992 to 1995, Fujimori became increasingly reliant upon military support (Kay 1996: 74-8). The replacement of the head of negotiations with Ecuador, Foreign Minister Blacker Miller by a military officer reflects the growing influence the military had over the issue (Herz and Nogueira 2005: 75). Since the Peruvian military had a hard-line position towards Ecuador, the negotiation process was frozen. It is also indicative that the outbreak of fighting in the 1995 episode was abrupt. This is unusual because in prior episodes, outbreaks of fighting occurred only after a period of denouement by both sides. This lack of public criticisms by both sides before the outbreak of fighting suggests a marginalization of the diplomatic communities in both rivals and correspondingly, the greater influence of the military in decision-making on the ground (Palmer 1997: 119).

The diplomatic fallout of the *autogople*, the lack of Ecuadorian reciprocity and the increasing influence of the Peruvian military in negotiations with Ecuador lead to a deterioration of relations with Ecuador. The diplomatic behavior of Peru after the *autogople* thus matches the normative account.

2.1.4 Institutional Account, Peru (Prediction: Escalation, Outcome: Supported)

The institutional account expects an autocratic Peru, which was not constrained from above or from below to opt for escalation. Here, we should differentiate between the

second stage (conflict initiation) and *third stage* (further escalation) of the episode. At the *second stage* of conflict initiation, the institutional account predicts escalation because Peru has the strategic (but not the local) military advantage and the major institutional actors shared the same preference (thanks to the autogolpe). At the *third stage* of further escalation, the institutional account predicts escalation because Peru still has the strategic military advantage and the preference of the chief executive remained dominant.

It is clear that the outbreak of hostilities that the Ecuadorean military was more prepared than the Peruvian military. While it is reasonable to infer from their respective performance that Ecuador had the local military advantage, the fact remained that Peru have an overall military advantage (Mares 2001: 174; Simmons 1999: 12; Marcella 1995: 17). Despite its initial losses, including 9 expensive combat aircraft, the Peruvian military had the reserves from which it could draw on to continue the war. Those reserves, Fujimori revealed, were built-up from the 1970s in anticipation of a war against Chile.¹⁵¹ Had the conflict into a general war, Peru's military could have invaded southern Ecuador, using a route taken in the 1941 war (Marcella 1995: 20), and where Ecuador lacked the prepared defenses found in the Upper Cenepa region. Additionally, despite the domestic insurgency threat, the Peruvian military had nevertheless concentrated the majority of its resources on the border against its traditional rivals, Ecuador and Chile (Mauceri 1999: 104). Moreover, by 1995, the bulk of the Shining Path leadership was already captured or killed (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 45). For example, Abimael Guzman, the leader and founder of the Shining Path had already been under arrest for 2 years by 1995 (Conaghan

¹⁵¹ Chile Information Press (CHIPnews), "Peru was Preparing for a war with Chile, Reveals Fujimori," 3rd March 1995, cited in Mares 2001: 174.

2005:54). Collectively, these means while that the initial military setbacks Peru suffered were certainly painful, they do not constitute a constraint on its choice of viable military response. I interpret this to mean that Peru was not constrained from above in both the *second stage* and the *third stage*.

Domestically, President Fujimori has a much freer hand during 1992-1995, especially we compare with the 1991-1992 period. International pressure on Fujimori to return to democracy after the autogolpe was minimal. While the OAS did pressure Fujimori away one-man rule and towards elections, its subsequent electoral observation missions in the elections in 1992, 1993 and 1995 endorsed the same elections as legitimate (Congahan 2005). The United States pressured Fujimori on democratization but did not cut its foreign aid to Peru. The US under Clinton administration decided to prioritize the combating of nacro-trafficking over democracy promotion (Congahan 2005: 255; Tanaka 2005: 277). Both the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United States engaged in the rhetoric of democracy-promotion but did little in practice.

The autogolpe removed much of the domestic opposition to President Fujimori. The opposition in Congress was marginalized and the judiciary was made dependent upon the executive. Constitutional restraints upon the executive became politically irrelevant.¹⁵²

To use the language of the selectorate theory, Fujimori reshaped the winning coalition after the autogolpe. Two key individuals in Fujimori's winning coalition includes Vladimiro Montesinos, the head of the Peruvian National Intelligence (SIN),

¹⁵² Fujimori's willingness to break the constitutional rules when he needed to is demonstrated when he pass the infamous Law 26657 allowing him to run for a third term which was not allowed under the 1993 constitution, the same constitution he helped set up. (Mares 2001: 183-4).

who used the intelligence service to serve Fujimori's political needs,¹⁵³ and General Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos, the leader of the faction within the army who favored intervention into politics and who brought with him the support of the military.

Kay (1996) argued there were four institutional bases underpinning Fujipopulism; they are:

- i) a symbiotic pact between executive and the military in which the executive protects the military from prosecution for human rights abuses and drug trafficking in exchange for the military support;
- ii) the creation of new state institutions (for example, the National Development and Social Compensation Fund or FONCODES) controlled by the executive which allows the regime to fund public works and developmental projects;
- iii) the recentralization of political authority from the regional government back into central government which allows the regime to distribute resources to win support; and
- iv) the disintegration of the entire Peruvian party system which removes a source of opposition to the regime.¹⁵⁴

Except for the fourth base (collapse of the party system), the other three institutions can be thought of as constituting the proper winning coalition behind Fujimori's tenure. Fujimori used the resources gained from neoliberal economic reforms, distributed through pliant state apparatuses, to buy political support. He also shielded the army from prosecution for human rights abuses allowing it to concentrate on counterinsurgency. These two in conjunction lead to his main achievements in stabilizing the economy (reducing

¹⁵³ Montesinos has been described as a Rasputin-type character who engaged in troubleshooting, corruption and bribery on behalf of Fujimori. Under his directorship of Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional or SIN, state apparatus were used to spy on, bribe, intimidate, kidnap, and torture opponents of the regime (Conaghan 2005).

¹⁵⁴ After Congress was dissolved in 1992, the constituent assembly, the Democratic Constituent Congress (which wrote the new 1993 constitution) and the 1995 congress was controlled by Fujimori.

hyperinflation) and reducing the insurgency threat. It is for these achievements that ordinary Peruvians supported Fujimori.

Two indicators demonstrate how Fujimori had more leeway in the prosecution of the rivalry relative to the 1991-1992 period. First, Fujimori won the election, with 64 % of the votes, despite facing criticisms over the poor performance of the Peruvian military during the 1995 Cenepa War. Conaghan (2005: 94) noted that both oppositional presidential candidates, “Pérez de Cuéllar and Toledo roundly criticized Fujimori’s handling of the border war, but to no effect.” Herz and Nogueira (2005: 80) make a similar point noting that:

Fujimori’s grip over the media and his deployment of the intelligence apparatus to repress more critical antigovernment expressions insulated the debate about the border conflict from public opinion to a considerable degree (Herz and Nogueira 2005: 80).

Second, Fujimori was able to silence his military critics. After the 1995 election, three retired military officers who criticized Fujimori conduct of the war, General Walter Ledesma, General Carlos Mauricio, and navy Captain Luis Mellet Castillo, were charged with the crime of insulting the armed forces (Conaghan 2005: 104-5; Amnesty International May 1995).¹⁵⁵ The indictments were seen as a “sign that dissent in the armed forces, even if voiced by retirees, would not be tolerated” (ibid: p. 104).

Theoretically, the autogolpe aligned the preferences of the major institutional actors (the military, the judiciary and the public) with the chief executive. It also marginalized the influence of those institutional actors (in the Congress) that did not align

¹⁵⁵ The three officers were also supporters of the opposition and that may be the real reason why they were indicted. The amnesty report has more details on the specific charges while Conaghan’s account summarized the aftermath for the three officers.

themselves with the executive. Combined with overall military advantage, it is easy to see why Peru under Fujimori opted for escalation in the *second stage* of the 1995 Cenepa War. Peru responded to the contested outposts with the use of force.

This brings up the related question pertinent for assessing the *third stage* (further escalation) of the episode, if Fujimori faced little domestic opposition and had the overall strategic military advantage, why didn't he escalate the border conflict into a general war? In a direct quote by President Fujimori in 1995, when he was responding to criticisms of his conciliatory policy towards Ecuador, he argued:

For some time there was a *détente* at the border. This gave us some relief and a chance to fight terrorism. We have eliminated, or almost eliminated terrorism... Not just that. As there was a clear *détente* at our border with Chile and Ecuador, I was allowed to concentrate on fighting terrorism, without overlooking the borders, of course. I ask myself and ask you all: How different would it have been fighting terrorism, we would not have been able to deploy our troops because there would have been a debacle here in the interior.¹⁵⁶

The quote suggests Fujimori was more concerned about counterinsurgency than with the border issue. This dovetails with the interpretation that Fujimori's priorities (counterinsurgency and neoliberal economic reforms) are domestic oriented. Resolving the border issue helps the attainment of those goals. By contrast, invading Ecuador itself would have alienated the international community and thus jeopardized Peru access to international finance (which Fujimori needs to fund his economic reforms). Since Peru international standing is already bad, thanks to Fujimori's autogople, invading Ecuador would have compounded Peru's international isolation. It would also make Peru the aggressor, and not the defender of the Rio Protocol, a treaty which if implemented would

¹⁵⁶ "Fujimori Interviewed on Conflict with Ecuador," Lima Panamericana Television, March 13, 1995, FBIS-LA, February 14, 1995, p. 50; cited in Marcella 1995: 15

have given Peru most of its territorial claims and thus is in Peru's national interests to uphold.

For the *second stage*, Peru had the overall military advantage and could afford the initial setbacks. President Fujimori faced little opposition to his rule after consolidating power with the autogolpe. Peru's decision to fight thus matches the institutional expectations for the *second stage*. While the same conditions (and thus the same prediction) hold for the *third stage*, President Fujimori appeared to prefer deescalation in order to concentrate on his domestic concerns. Since he was a strong chief executive after restructuring his winning coalition, it is his preference to deescalate that was implemented. This unexpected behavior fails to support the institutional account. Since the *third stage* (further escalation) is conceptually a weaker 'firebreak' for peaceful relations than the *second stage* (conflict initiation), I conclude, on balance, the institutional account is supported.

2.2 The 1998 Brasilia Accords.

One of the results of the 1995 Cenepa War was an active mediation effort by the four guarantor countries. The mediation helped both rivals in a three year negotiation process that culminated in the 1998 Brasilia Accords. The comprehensive peace treaty that emerged is considered to have ended the rivalry. The nature of this episode, as a peace process means that the analytical focus is on diplomatic behavior rather than on conflict behavior. Additionally, in the Lakatosian spirit of seeking explanations with excess empirical content, I am interested in the impact of regime-type on the political mobilization for the comprehensive peace deal.

2.2.1 Normative account, Ecuador (Prediction: Escalation, Outcome: Rejected)

The normative account expects democratic Ecuador to adopt non-democratic norms and become more intransigent when negotiating with autocratic Peru. Therefore, it predicts escalation. The examination of norms in this case focuses on the opinion of the masses and of the elite.

The Ecuadorian public seemed to have incoherent attitudes towards the rivalry. In public opinion polls conducted after the 1995 conflict in the years 1995-6, majority of Ecuadorians are committed to regaining sovereign access to the Amazon but are pessimistic about the chances of future military victories with Peru (Mares 2001: 176). For example, in the capital city Quito, only 39.5 % thinks that Ecuador would win the next conflict with Peru (ibid). In another set of polls reported by Simmons (1999: 18), 71 % of Ecuadorians would accept a resolution of the rivalry provided both side made major concessions (Simmons 1999: 18). The results of isolated polls may be misleading, they need to set in the context of other policy concerns to determine their importance to the Ecuadorian electorate. In a 1996 polls on the presidential elections where two candidates, Bucaram and Nebot, had different policy stances on stances on the economy and on the border issue, Mares found that while the border issue was important, it was “not the defining issue in Ecuadorian politics”(Mares 2001:176). Although analysts like Simmons (1999: 18) have suggested attitudes of the Ecuadorian public have been ameriolating, I argue the polling evidence they evidence do not necessarily support that claim. Apparently, a majority of Ecuadorians expects future conflict and yet are willing to compromise; a majority are willing to fight pay any price to in future conflict but prioritize other non-security issues over them.

Given the incoherence of Ecuadorian public opinion, it is noteworthy that the Ecuadorian elites seemed willing to test the boundaries of public opinion. Two examples are illustrative, President Durán-Ballén played up nationalist sentiments during the conflict but that did not stop him from recognizing the authority Rio Protocol, a key diplomatic concession, to kick start international negotiations. The other example is the rationale behind President Bucaram ouster. In one view, Bucaram was simply too conciliatory towards Peru (Mares 2001: 177; Simmons 1999: 18). He was the first Ecuadorian president to officially visit Lima. In a speech to the Peruvian congress made during his visit, he called for “forgiveness.” This offended Ecuadorians who felt they had nothing to apologize for (Mares 2001: 177). Bucaram himself advocated this interpretation as the reason behind his ouster.¹⁵⁷ Then again, Bucaram would claim this because the alternative view is not as flattering. In the alternative view, Bucaram was ousted because i) he was corrupt as and has a reputation for erratic behavior in office,¹⁵⁸ ii) he was an anti-establishment politician; and iii) he implemented neoliberal reforms despite his populist campaign platform not to (Hey 2003: 190-1). That meant he provide his political enemies in Congress with a excuse to impeach him while his political support base, the poor, was alienated by his breach of campaign promises. The implication for this example therefore, is that going against public opinion was not main reason why he was ousted.

¹⁵⁷ Panama City TVN, in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 9th, 1997, as cited in Simmons 1999: 18, footnote 69.

¹⁵⁸ His political nickname was “El loco” or ‘the madman’. It was ironic because Congress ousted him on the grounds of “mental incapacity”.

In contrast to public opinion, Ecuadorian elites seem to exhibit a preference of conciliation. From 1995 to 1998, Ecuador had four presidents in quick succession. Yet, its policy towards Peru is consistently conciliatory. As Herz and Noguera noted, this policy continuity despite political instability is remarkable :

The important point, here, however, is the striking continuity of Ecuador's general disposition to come to terms with the problem and sign a definitive peace in a context ripe with opportunities to use the conflict with Peru for political purposes (Herz and Noguera 2005: 77).

The policy stance of Ecuador, to seek a genuine resolution to the border issue constitutes evidence that rejects the normative expectation of diplomatic intransigence by Ecuador.

2.2.2 Institutional account, Ecuador (Prediction: Deescalation, Outcome: Supported)

The institutional account expects a democratic Ecuador which is constrained from above (Ecuador is overall militarily weaker) but not from below (major actors agree with the chief executive) to opt for deescalation. Additionally, Ecuador experienced considerable domestic political instability but its leadership managed to build a consensus for the peace treaty. Both the diplomatic behavior of Ecuador and the inclusive nature of its peace process supports this account.

The overall military advantage remains with Peru. This creates an incentive for a peaceful resolution of the rivalry. Nevertheless, the border issue is such an integral part of the Ecuadorian identity that the leadership had no choice but to be inclusive in its search for political support for a peace.¹⁵⁹ This is especially so given the turnover in the chief

¹⁵⁹ Fujimori, unlike his Ecuadorian counterparts, do not need a broad base of support for the peace deal. That is why I place Peru's political mobilization process for the peace treaty under the normative account (where there is volition) and Ecuador's political mobilization process under the institutional account (where there is no volition).

executives during the period. There was therefore a conscious effort to include broad sections of society, when building political support for the peace deal (Palmer 2001: 41-2; Herz and Nogueira 2002: 78-9).

Actors which were consulted include the military, Congress, business sector, media, academia, the church, public intellectuals and nongovernmental organizations. The major actors have to be consulted due to their ability to block an eventual agreement. The Congress has to be included because the Ecuadorian political system ensures that the legislature is usually dominated by political parties that do not support the chief executive.

The Ecuadorian military also have to be consulted because it has a traditional autonomy over defense policy. Compared to Peru, Ecuador's civil-military favors the military. Its acquiescence is the result of two factors. First, the military's influence over the Ecuador relations with Peru was circumscribed by the structure of the negotiation process itself. The internationalization of the issue reduced the army scope for maneuver, as Herz and Nogueira notes:

Once Ecuador decided to accept that negotiations would be conducted under the aegis of the Rio Protocol, the degree of control by domestic players was substantially reduced (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 78).

By accepting the mediation of the four guarantors, the autonomy of the domestic actors such as the military is reduced.

The second factor promoting acquiescence deals with the professional pride of the army. The superior performance of the Ecuador military during the 1995 conflict satisfied nationalist pride. This in turn made the peace deal more politically palatable as Herz and Nogueira notes:

Another important consequences of the war was to “restore the country’s honor” following long decades of perceived humiliation after the defeat of 1941, in society at large but especially among the new generation of military officers who took part in the Cenepa War and among those who still remembered vividly the dramatic events of the past.

The war also generated –if not immediately, at least during the three years of process – a general feeling favorable to a definitive settlement (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 78). The military may have calculated that it is better to settle for a honorable peace now rather than risk a future round of conflict which the public does not think is winnable. According to opinion polls Mares (2001: 176) cites, only 39.5 % of Ecuadorians in Quito city think the next war will be won by Ecuador.

As a result of a inclusive consultation process, when the terms of the Brasilia Accords was announced, Ecuadorians accepted the agreement despite disappointment over the loss of their historic aspirations (Palmer 2001: 41). A national poll found that 80% of Ecuadorians supported the ratification of the treaty.¹⁶⁰

The normative account expects Ecuadorian intransigence in negotiations with Peru. Ecuador’s diplomatic behavior, to negotiate a comprehensive peace and to build a political consensus, constitutes evidence that fails to support the normative expectation.

2.2.3 Normative account, Peru (Prediction: Escalation, Outcome: Rejected)

The normative account expected autocratic Peru to use non-democratic norms in negotiations with Ecuador. First, due to the fact that autocratic norms are less prone to compromise, it expects Peru to be inflexible in its negotiations with Ecuador. Second, it expects Peru to use military force to gain bargaining leverage over Ecuador. Third, it expects the building of political support for the peace deal to be more excluisionary

¹⁶⁰ LARR, November 10, 1998: 6; cited in Hey 2003: 188.

(compared to democratic Ecuador). Thus, its overall prediction is for Peru to opt for escalation.

The traditional diplomatic stance of Peru is that the Rio Protocol settled the border dispute. With the arbitration of the subsequent 1945 Diaz de Aguiar Award,¹⁶¹ all that was left was the implementation of the treaty (Herz and Nogueira 2002: chp 4; St John 1998-9). Thus, Peru opposed any further mediation on the border issue (which would have reopened the terms of contract), especially by third parties (such as the Vatican) outside of the four guarantors. In the peace process, Peru made three concessions that demonstrate a will to compromise from this basic position.

First, during the 1996 negotiations about the procedures for mediation, Peru accepted a list of substantive differences (*impasses subsistentes*) in the Rio Protocol which still had to be addressed. This was a tacit admission from Peru that there are issues left unresolved in the Rio Protocol and was interpreted as a “change” by Luigi Einaudi, the guarantor representative for the US and a key player in the mediation process (Einaudi 1999: 423). Second, Peru accepted, again during the 1996 talks, the mediation of the four guarantors to work on those substantive differences (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 53). Although the recommendations of the four guarantors could still be rejected by Peru at this stage of the negotiations, the fact that Peru made those concessions demonstrated flexibility from its original legalistic stance.

The third concession by Peru is to agree, *in advance*, to formal and binding arbitration by the guarantors in a crucial stage during the 1998 talks. By that stage of

¹⁶¹ The Rio Protocol authorized technical arbitration lead by the Brazilian navy officer Braz Diaz de Aguiar, from whom the award acquired its name (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 35; Simmons 1999: 10).

negotiation, the mediators from the guarantors have resolved most of the easier issues. The demarcation of the contested region, the hardest issue, remains. Both Peruvian President Fujimori and Ecuadorian President Mahuad asked for arbitration to break the diplomatic deadlock (Palmer 2001: 41). The guarantors in turn wanted both countries to agree in advance to the arbitration agreement. Since the outcome of arbitration is not known in advance, they were being asked in effect to submit to binding arbitration. Both rivals agreed. Although both sides took the risk that the arbitration might not be in their favor, I argue this represents a concession from Peru as it had more to lose. Peru was *already* in possession of the disputed land and had international law (Rio Protocol) on its side. Compared with Ecuador, accepting binding arbitration risked losing what it had already possessed.¹⁶² The three diplomatic concessions demonstrate Peru was more flexible than theoretically expected.

The second theoretical expectation focuses on the use of force in negotiations to gain a bargaining advantage. During the negotiations, Ecuador underwent political instability which gave Peru opportunities for the use of force. For example, when Ecuadorian President Bucaram was ousted in 1997, Peru could have used force but choose not to.¹⁶³ There were minor incidents on the border such one in May 1997

¹⁶² Albeit, one could argue Peru had reasonable expectations that under international law the arbitration would probably go it's way.

¹⁶³ In defense of this example which admittedly is about what Peru did not do, Beth Simmons also refers to missed opportunities for hardliners on both sides to exploit the border issue as diversions (Simmons 1999: 16-17).

(Simmons 1999: 17, footnote 54) and in July 1988 (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 79) which were resolved without the use of force.¹⁶⁴

The third theoretical expectation focuses on the inclusiveness of the peace-building process. President Fujimori used his control over the media and the intelligence service (through his spy chief, Montesinos) to insulate himself from societal and oppositional criticism (Conaghan 2005). He did not engage nor inform the public during the negotiation process. As a result, when the peace deal was announced, Peruvians were shocked at the concessions made, especially over the outpost of Tiwintza. Protests broke out in Iquitos, a major city near the disputed border, and were violently put down by the government (Palmer 2001: 41-44).

Resistance from the military was more problematic for Fujimori since the military is part of his winning coalition since 1992. To cope, Fujimori used his control over the military promotions (Palmer 2001: 43). For times when that did not work, he silenced his military critics politically. For example, he ousted the influential head of armed forces, General Hermoza in 1998, when the later was too vocal in his opposition to the peace process.¹⁶⁵

To conclude, the first observation is that Peru was flexible in its diplomatic stance and make more concessions than theoretical ly expected. Second, Peru did not use force

¹⁶⁴ Although the non-use of force is a counterfactual which is hard to prove, it should noted that Simmons (1999: 16-17) also argued that the leadership did not exploit opportunities to derail negotiations.

¹⁶⁵ There are several accounts in the literature why the general Hermoza was ousted. In one set of accounts (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 81; Palmer 2001: 43) the reason is because the general was advocating the use of force in response to alleged Ecuadorian penetration in the demilitarized zone; which would have ended the peace process. In another set of account (Mares 2001: 187; Conaghan 2005: 165, footnote 5), the firing of Hermoza was because he took credit for the successful operation to release hostages in Japanese embassy hostage crises (1996-7), which challenged the official position that it is all to Fujimori's credit.

to gain bargaining leverage over Ecuador when it underwent domestic instability, again contrary to theoretical expectations. Third, its mobilization of the support for the peace deal is characterized by secrecy and exclusion, which matches the theoretical expectation. Since only the expectation on political mobilization is supported and it is an auxiliary point, the bulk of the evidence from Peru diplomatic behavior does not support the normative account.

2.2.4 Institutional account, Peru (Prediction: Escalation, Outcome: Rejected)

The institutional account expects an autocratic Peruvian chief executive who is not institutionally constrained and who has the military advantage to opt for escalation. President Fujimori was able to impose his preference for a resolution of the rivalry over the objections of the other major actors (especially the military). Since the overall military advantage remains with Peru, the analytic focus of this section is on the distribution of power between the chief executive and the other major institutional actors. Additionally, I discuss the role of autocratic leadership in peace-making.

From 1995-1998, President Fujimori was secure in his tenure. He had control over the media, the judiciary and the state apparatus. His spymaster Montesinos built an extensive network of corruption and bribery on Fujimori's behalf (Conaghan 2005). The opposition in Congress was effectively marginalized. It is illustrative of the lack of institutional opposition that Fujimori was able to pass in 1996, the "Law of Authentic Interpretation of the Constitution" (Law 26657). This law allowed him to seek a third presidential term, which was prohibited under the 1993 Constitution (Tanaka 2005: 278).

This distribution of power meant that any opposition is likely to originate from the military.

Unlike the case for Ecuador, the civilian leadership is more dominant in Peruvian civil-military relations. This is why despite the ambivalence of the Peruvian military about the peace process, President Fujimori was able to overrule it. The military had supported Fujimori during the 1992 autogole. The 1992-1995 period saw an expansion of the military's role into both counterinsurgency and direct participation in national politics, for example by using army personnel to campaign for Fujimori (Kay 1996). This expansion of roles beyond national defense extracted its own price, the Peruvian military became politicized (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 78). The politicization was also compounded by Montesinos (Fujimori's spymaster), who made the promotion of the officer corps dependent on loyalty to the regime. As a result, the Peruvian military became less professionalized and conversely more politicalized.¹⁶⁶ This organizational weakness gave Fujimori room for maneuver. For example, faced with criticisms by military officers over the poor preparation of the military during the 1995 Cenepa war, Fujimori used the military courts to silence the critics by charging them with either the crime of "insulting the nation" or the "crime of disloyalty" (Conaghan 2005: 104; Amnesty International Reports 1995). Later in the peace process, when the military wanted "revenge" (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 79) for their humiliating 1995 defeat during the July 1998 crisis, President Fujimori ousted the chief of armed forces, General Hermoza. Characteristically, after removing Hermoza, Montesinos made sure to put his

¹⁶⁶ Palmer (2001: 42) makes a similar point.

former military academy classmates into high command in the army (Conaghan 2005: 165).

The intervention of key personalities at several points in the negotiations to prevent the talks from breaking down was also decisive (Palmer 2001: 39-41; Herz and Nogueira 2002: 71-81). President Fujimori was personally committed to a resolution of the dispute. His Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela, for example, credits Fujimori strong support for the peace process.¹⁶⁷ Does this imply that autocratic leaders who are able to insulate themselves from political criticism make better peacemakers, compared to democratic leaders who cannot? Although Fujimori's preference was helpful in this case, I argue that regime-type variables are still relevant when comparing the consistency of policy positions between the rivals. From 1995-8, Ecuador had four presidents in rapid succession whereas Peru had none (Fujimori was in his second presidential term). One might have expected the political instability in Ecuador to lead to greater variance in its policy towards the peace process. A comparison of the composition of the respective negotiation teams and their policy stance reveals this is not the case (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 76-81). On Ecuador's side, President Durán-Ballén made the concession of recognizing the Rio Protocol that was needed to start the negotiations. His successor, President Bucaran kept the same negotiation team (and retained foreign minister Galo Leoro). After Bucaran was ousted, his successor, President Alarcon kept the same team and appointed, Jose Ayala as foreign minister.¹⁶⁸ Finally, President Mahuad maintained policy continuity as well as participating in direct negotiations with Fujimori. Thus,

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Dr. Francisco Tudela, Lima April 3, 2001; cited in Herz and Nogueira 2002: pp. 80.

¹⁶⁸ Ayala is committed to the peace process; therefore his appointment did not change Ecuador's approach.

Ecuador kept its negotiation team mostly intact maintaining policy consistency despite turnover in the heads of government (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 76-81). On Peru's side, Peru oscillated between policy stances, depending on the resistance Fujimori was facing domestically. When his foreign minister Tudela was kidnapped during the hostage crises, he was replaced by Eduardo Ferrero, who was more hawkish stance (compared to Tuleda). Ferrero would later resign because he opposed the 1998 Brasilia Accords (ibid pp. 80). Thus, the diplomatic stance of Peru was not consistent (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 79). I conclude therefore that for democratic Ecuador, political instability did not cause much policy variance. By contrast, in autocratic Peru, political stability did not prevent policy variance.¹⁶⁹

Under President Fujimori, Peru accepted the 1998 Brasilia Accords despite i) strategic level military superiority over Ecuador and despite ii) the lack of serious institutional opposition to the President. This contradicts the logic of the institutional account.

2.3 Overall Conflict Trend and Critical Test

We have enough information on the conflict behavior of the rivals in the two conflict episodes to make an assessment. Table 4 below summarizes the finding for this case. The theory expects autocratization to escalate a rivalry. In the 1995 Cenepa War, both sides resorted to the use of force. In the 1998 Brasilia Accords, both sides accepted a

¹⁶⁹ The policy variance is magnified if we consider Peru policy over the entire length of Fujimori entire tenure period.

comprehensive peace treaty. Thus the overall trend from 1995 to 1998 is deescalatory. This fails to support the theoretical expectation.

The conduct of a critical test is more involved. Recall a critical test requires the normative and institutional account to make different predictions for conflict behavior. For the 1995 episode, both accounts make the same prediction of escalation for both rivals. This reflects the localized military advantage that Ecuador managed to achieve and is idiosyncratic to the episode. Consequently, no critical test for the 1995 episode was possible. For the 1998 episode, the critical test is over the behavior of Ecuador. The institutional account predicts deescalation (since Ecuador was militarily weaker) while the normative account predicts escalation (since Ecuador should switch to non-democratic norms). Ecuador built an inclusive consensus for comprehensive peace despite facing considerable political instability. This behavior supports the institutional expectation rather than the normative expectation.

To summarize, I examine the evidence for the 1980 to 2000 period where there was a transition from democratic to mixed rivalry. I examined the normative and institutional accounts of both rivals behavior during the 1995 Cenepa war and the 1998 Brasilia Accords. The evidence does not support the expectation of an overall escalation and supports the institutional account over the normative one.

Table 4: Summary of results for 1980 to 2000 (democratic to mixed transition).

	Expected conflict behavior	Verdict
1995		
Normative account		
Ecuador	Escalate	Supported
Peru	Escalate	Supported
Institutional account		
Ecuador	Escalate	Supported
Peru	Escalate	Supported
1998		
Normative account		
Ecuador	Escalate	Rejected
Peru	Escalate	Rejected
Institutional account		
Ecuador	Deescalate	Supported
Peru	Escalate	Rejected
Overall conflict trend	Escalate	Rejected
Critical test (1998 episode, Ecuador only)	Normative : Escalate Institutional: Deescalate	Institutional account supported

3. Alternative Explanations.

In this section, I examine alternative accounts of the conflict trends in the rivalry. They are arguments based on the logic of diversionary wars (3.1) and on the logic of neoliberal reforms (3.2).¹⁷⁰ They are discussed in this subsection because their analytic focus, the cause of variation in conflict behavior, is over the entire course of the rivalry.

¹⁷⁰ One potential explanation that is excluded is the geopolitical value of the disputed border. The value of the disputed region did not change and hence cannot account for variation in conflict behavior. Additionally, analysts agree that the land is symbolically rather than materially important (Simmons 1999: 10, footnote 15; Hey 2003: 187).

3.1 The rivalry as a diversionary conflict

The diversionary war literature emphasizes the utility of a foreign conflict for incumbent elites as a distraction from domestic political troubles. Applied to the rivalry context, it argues that the conflict behavior of the rivals should be driven more by the diversionary value than by regime type or rivalry dynamics. This alternative argument is so common that five works on the rivalry felt a need to address it (Marcella 1995: 18; Mares 1996/7: 120; Simmons 1999: 17; Herz and Nogueira 2002: 76; Rousseau 2005: 76-7). All of them took the view that diversionary conflict is *not* a factor in this rivalry. I proceed to examine the diversionary war argument as applied to the 1981 and 1995 episodes,¹⁷¹ on the basis that these were the same cases that were discussed in the extant literature.

The allegation of seeking a diversionary conflict for the 1981 episode has been applied to the presidency of Ecuadorian President Roldós. It is based on the use of the conflict by the Roldós administration to pass through an austerity program, which was otherwise facing political resistance, with the argument that the program was necessary “in order to ensure the territorial integrity of Ecuador” (Rousseau 2005: 76). Three factors suggest this allegation is wrong (ibid: pp. 76-7). First, the contested outposts were constructed months before the outbreak of fighting in January 1981. Ecuadorians could not know in advance when the Peruvians would discover the outposts and respond. Lacking such crucial information as the timing of an anticipated conflict, it would have

¹⁷¹ Herz and Nogueira (2002: 43) discussed an allegation by Ecuadorian officers that the proposals by Fujimori made from 1991 to 1994 were diversions. I did not consider this to be an allegation serious enough to be included in the main text because a) Herz and Nogueira themselves argued against this allegation and because b) the logic in this allegation referred to not to diversionary conflict but rather to negotiations meant to buy time and hence they should be considered deceptions rather than diversions.

hard for the Ecuadorian side to capitalize on it as a political diversion. Second, the actual Ecuadorian military performance 1981 was poor. Presumably, the point of a diversionary conflict is to divert the attention of the public with a quick victory. A conflict that ends as a military defeat risks becoming a political liability for the leader that opted for conflict. While, it is possible that the Ecuadorian badly underestimated the Peruvian capabilities and resolve, the simpler explanation is that the Ecuadorian leadership was caught unprepared for actual conflict. This lack of preparation in turn suggests a lack of intent to divert attention. Third, the initial response of Roldós administration to the conflict was “subdued”, it became “vitriolic” only after Peru won the conflict (ibid, pp. 77). Presumably, a leader seeking diversion would adopt vitriolic rhetoric immediately if he had planned it all along. Rousseau concluded this episode by noting while Roldós administration may have profited from the rally-around-flag effect as a result of the conflict, it is a theoretically different claim to assert that President Roldós started the conflict as a diversion.

The second allegation of diversionary war is directed at President Fujimori over the 1995 Cenepa War. His Ecuadorian counterpart, President Durán-Ballén, was not due for reelection and therefore has no need to divert attention (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 76). By contrast, Fujimori had a presidential election in the April of 1995 and the bulk of the bulk of the fighting was conducted during the first two months of 1995. During the presidential campaign, Fujimori made a publicized visit to the outpost of Tiwintza (Mares 2001: 186) and claimed that his conciliatory offers to Ecuador from 1991 to 1994 were meant to deceive Ecuador (Mares 1996/7: 118, footnote 70). Two reasons suggest this allegation is wrong. First, the poor battlefield performance of the Peruvian military hurt

rather than help Fujimori's election prospect. As mentioned before, a diversionary conflict that results in a military defeat creates a political liability for the incumbent leader who ordered it (guess who the voters are going to blame?).

Second, Fujimori *did not need* the political diversion of a external conflict. Fujimori was popular with the electorate who credited him with success in both curbing hyperinflation and combating insurgencies. From 1992 to 1996, his administration approval ratings did not drop below 60 % and throughout 1995, it even surpassed 70 % (Tanaka 2005: 275). Fujimori was able to win the presidential election with a comfortable 64 % of the vote against two presidential opposition candidates who criticized him about the conduct of Cenepa war (Conaghan 2005: 94).

To summarize, the two cases where allegations of diversionary conflict were made were also case of military defeats for their respective leader. Since military defeats hurt the leader's tenure, the diversionary war argument is not a factor in this rivalry.

3.2 Neoliberal reforms require peace.

This alternative explanation is based on the political economy literature and it argues that the deescalation in the rivalry is driven more by a neoliberal economic logic rather than by rivalry or regime dynamics.

The 1980s were a lost decade for both Peru and Ecuador. The legacy of military rule and of import-substitution industrialization left both countries in dire economic straits with the usual characteristics, a bloated and inefficient public sector, hyperinflation, a debt crisis and concomitantly, stagnant economic growth. To get out of this economic malaise, new sources of capital are needed. Such capital can be found in i)

the international financial market, ii) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and iii) the United States. That is, the only realistic source of new capital is in international finance.

Since the international finance markets prefers both domestic reforms (read, austerity programs) and a peaceful international environment,¹⁷² elites who want access to foreign capital have to behave accordingly. Ending the rivalry was a means to get access to foreign capital (Herz and Nogueira 2002: 73-4). This argument is advanced mainly by Herz and Nogueira (2002: 71-81).¹⁷³ Even they noted that these economic imperatives did not preclude variation in both economic and conflict policies.

In the case of Ecuador, the same elites can adopt hostile attitudes towards neoliberal economics while pursuing deescalation in the rivalry and vice versa (Berríos 2003: *passim*). Thus, Ecuadorian behavior do not support this alternative account which would expect the attitude towards neoliberal economic reforms and towards the rivalry to work in tandem. President Roldos (1979-81) adopted centre-left economic policies and yet authorized the military encroachment (Fitch 1998: xiii) that triggered the 1981 Paquisha incident. His successor, Osvaldo Hurtado (1981-4), was pro-market but passive in foreign policy. The centre-right Febres Cordero (1984-8) was pro-market and against conciliation with Peru. The socialist Rodrigo Borja (1988-92) was against the neoliberal reforms but conciliatory towards Peru. His successor Durán-Ballén (1992-6) favored neoliberal economic reforms and was apathetic towards Peru until the 1995 Cenepa War where he advocated peace talks. The next president, Abdalá Bucaram (1996-7) engaged

¹⁷² This worldview of international finance reached its apotheosis in the Washington Consensus of the 1990s.

¹⁷³ Both Hey (2003) wrote on Ecuador's foreign policy and Berríos (2003) wrote on Peru's foreign policy. Because their analytic focus was country specific, their focus was on the respective countries policy towards international finance rather than in its relationship with rivalry.

in populist rhetoric but practiced (ineffectively) neoliberal reforms. His commitment towards reconciliation with Peru alienated his countrymen and allegedly contributed to his ouster. The interim president, Fabian Alarcón (1997-8) tried to satisfy both the poor and the international creditors but maintained the commitment to the peace process. The next president, Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000), had to deal with economic chaos (see Hey 2003: 191) but signed the 1998 Brasilia Peace Accords. The four guarantors also attached development assistance as rewards for accepting the Accords (Herz and Nogueira 2005: 78).

This alternative account proves a slightly better fit with the behavior of Peru under President Fujimori (1990-2000). Fujimori seemed to be motivated in part by the need to secure access to foreign capital, without which his economic reforms is unlikely to succeed. This however did not preclude considerable variation in the policy towards Ecuador. From 1990-1991, Fujimori had just embarked on his neoliberal economic reforms (the so-called “Fujishocks”) and he proposed economic concessions (access to Peruvian ports) to Ecuador in exchange for border demarcation. From 1992-1995, his economic reforms were bearing fruit, hyperinflation was curbed and economic growth resumed, yet the relationship with Ecuador deteriorated. After the 1995 Cenepa war, Fujimori was to again push for the peace process which culminated in the 1998 Brasilia Peace Accords. It is also noteworthy that from 1993 to 1998, Peru received more aid from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) than any other country in Latin America (Berriós 2003: 214).

From the behavior of both states, we can see the considerable variation in rivalry behavior despite facing a common economic imperative towards neoliberal reforms. Herz and Nogueira themselves made a similar point:

It is important to stress, however, that the building of neoliberal consensus was not devoid of contradictions and imposed considerable social and political costs on these societies. Additionally, this consensus did not necessarily establish conditions conducive to the peaceful settlement of the conflict. In the final analysis, Peru and Ecuador were involved in processes of redefinition of interests and identities that reduced the relevance of the territorial issue that had driven their rivalry for decades, vis-à-vis the goal of integration with the global political economy (Herz and Nogueira 2005: 74).

This suggests while that the economic imperatives were part of the calculations of the elites on both sides, they were not the determinant of conflict outcomes. That said, when comparing the priorities of both countries elites, the Peruvian side, especially under Fujimori, seems to be more inclined towards a neoliberal logic.

4. Conclusion

In this section, I draw conclusions from the rivalry as a whole. It should be read as the continuation of the arguments raised in this and the previous chapter.¹⁷⁴ Additionally, I list five lessons learnt from the case study as a whole.

I grouped by conflict episodes by their respective direction of dyadic regime change. I proceed to analyze each episode through two democratic peace accounts for each rival. Two rivals with two accounts for each of the four episodes generate (2 x 2 x 4= 16) sixteen observation points. This is summarized in table 5.

¹⁷⁴ For the conclusion on only the period 1980-2000, see sub-section 2.3

Table 5: Summary of conclusions for both regime transitions (DA DD & DD DA)

	Expected conflict behavior	Verdict
1981		
Normative account Ecuador	Deescalate	Rejected
Peru	Deescalate	Rejected
Institutional account Ecuador	Deescalate	Rejected
Peru	Escalate	Supported
1991		
Normative account Ecuador	Deescalate	Supported
Peru	Deescalate	Supported
Institutional account Ecuador	Deescalate	Supported
Peru	Deescalate	Supported
1995		
Normative account Ecuador	Escalate	Supported
Peru	Escalate	Supported
Institutional account Ecuador	Escalate	Supported
Peru	Escalate	Supported
1998		
Normative account Ecuador	Escalate	Rejected
Peru	Escalate	Rejected
Institutional account Ecuador	Deescalate	Supported
Peru	Escalate	Rejected
Critical test (1981 episode, Peru)	Normative : Deescalate Institutional : Escalate	Institutional account supported
Critical test (1998 episode, Ecuador)	Normative : Escalate Institutional : Deescalate	Institutional account supported

It presents a complex picture. The evidence supports the overall claim that transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry deescalates a rivalry. Both sides resorted to the use of force in 1981 but averted its use in 1991. The evidence *does not* support the claim that

transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry escalate a rivalry. Both sides used force in 1995 but signed a comprehensive peace treaty in 1998. This finding deserves elaboration. Like much of democratic peace theory, my claims are probabilistic. Just as in democratic peace theory, a claim that democracies do not fight wars against each other is *not equivalent* with a claim that joint autocracies cannot be peaceful. That is, I treat joint democracy as a sufficient but not necessary condition for peace. Similarly, I am not claiming autocracy cannot opt for deescalation or that mixed dyads cannot end their rivalries. This case showed that mixed rivalries can also opt for deescalation.

The construction of a critical test for this case study proved to be problematic. The original idea behind the critical test was to leverage the sensitivity of the two accounts to relative power into two distinct predictions. This proved to be impractical for the case study due to two reasons.

First, the institutional account relies on institutional constraints on the chief executive to discourage escalation. This notion of institutional constraint presumes there are i) differences in the preferences in the key actors and ii) that the chief executive would have, in the absence of constraints, opt for escalation. The preferences of the key actors in the rivalry suggest otherwise. Within Ecuador, the major political actors, chief executive, congress, populace, and the military, tend to prefer the prosecution of the rivalry (that is, for escalation). As a result, Ecuadorian chief executives face less institutional opposition than the theory would expect. Within Peru, the chief executive, Fujimori was inclined towards a resolution of the rivalry. It was the Peruvian military that was belligerent. The situation in Ecuador represents a case where the main actors share the same preferences while the situation in Peru represents a case where the chief

executive himself prefers to deescalate; both of which were not anticipated in a typical institutional account.¹⁷⁵

Second, the notion of power parity relies on aggregate measures of power. These are strategic level variables that may not deter at the tactical level. In the 1995 Cenepa War, Ecuador proved to be willing to escalate despite strategic inferiority so long as it believed it had the tactical advantage in the Upper Cenepa valley (which it did indeed have).

As a result of these two factors, which are idiosyncratic to the case study, the number of critical test I was able to conduct is small, only two of the eight potential critical tests (out of the sixteen observation points) fit the theoretical requirements. The evidence supports the institutional over the normative account. In the transition from a mixed to democratic rivalry, the critical test is over the behavior of Peru in 1981. In it, Peru escalated as predicted by the institutional account. In the transition from a democratic to mixed rivalry, the critical test is over the behavior of Ecuador in 1998. In it, Ecuador deescalated as predicted by the institutional account. Both suggested institutions rather than norms matter. This is reassuring because another set of critical test conducted by Rousseau (2005) also drew the same conclusions. The variation in the pertinent variables in both critical tests is also noteworthy. The institutional account applies both to Peru, the stronger rival and to Ecuador, the weaker rival. The institutional account applies both to outcomes of escalation (in 1981) and deescalation (in 1998).

¹⁷⁵ It is noteworthy that Rousseau (2005: 80-2, Appendix 2.1) has an appendix where he speculated on the implications of relaxing the assumption that the chief executive is belligerent, for the democratic-peace.

There are also five lessons learnt from this case-study that were novel in the sense that they not anticipated for in the original research-design of this case–study.

First, within the democratic peace literature, there is the selectorate argument that democracies have a military advantage over autocracies because they ‘try harder’ in the prosecution of a conflict. This may come across as rather abstract; in what sense does a democracy have an advantage over an autocracy? The case study however lends support to this argument. For example, the Peruvian military was becoming less professional in Fujimori’s Peru. Crucially, the Ecuadorian side *was aware* of this as Mares noted:

Ecuador’s military command believed that the Peruvian military became demoralized and corrupted after a decade of fighting a civil war against both guerillas and the drug trade (during which the institution was heavily criticized for human right abuses and in which officers succumbed to narcodollars). Fujimori’s interference with the military chain of command in order to assure personal loyalty was also believed to have hurt Peru’s military. (Mares 2001:171)

I suggest that the *autocratization* of Peru is a factor here. Fujimori gave the Peruvian army carte blanche in the prosecution of counterinsurgency. He also politicalized the army officer corps by promoting only those who are loyal to his regime. As Fitch (1998) had shown, the military can acquire greater political influence (example in a military dictatorship) and yet weaken as a professional organization at the same time. As a result the military advantage Peru had over Ecuador started to decline to the point that democratic Ecuador was able to inflict a tactical defeat upon autocratic Peru in 1995.

Second, the direction of aggression was surprising. One would have thought that the stronger power is more likely to be revisionist as its odds of challenging the status quo is higher. Instead in this case study, Ecuador is usually the side that *initiated* conflict against its stronger rival. Prior military defeats in 1941, 1981 seemed to have only

spurred Ecuador to try harder in the next round of conflict. This suggests that commitment to the status-quo may be an important variable in itself.

Third, autocracies can have pacific preferences. President Fujimori consistently sought a resolution of the rivalry.¹⁷⁶ He did not seek this out of a sense of nobility. Initially, he sought international peace so as to concentrate on his domestic reform project, wherein he behaved in an authoritarian fashion. After the 1995 election, when Fujimori had achieved economic growth and the insurgency is winding down, there is a sense that Fujimori sought to remain in power, as an end-in-itself (Conaghan 2005). Thus, an autocrat can seek international peace if only to facilitate his internal repression. Whether that is palatable to policy-makers seeking to prevent war is for them to decide.

Fourth, the influence of Mansfield and Snyder (2005) is still dominant within the traditional peacemaking literature. Scholars still assert (as Mares and Palmer did) that democratization causes war; and by the extension of that logic democratization should exacerbate an existing territorial dispute. The conflict that emerges is then interpreted as a refutation of the democratic peace. I suggest what is missing from this view is a conception of the rivalry, that some of the conflict may be driven by rivalry dynamics rather than by regime dynamics. In this respect, Herz and Nogueira (2002: 15-17) work was distinctive because it explicitly discuss and used the concept of enduring rivalry. Even there, they did not explicitly compare democratic peace against enduring rivalry in their study. In fact, they explicitly states that their “research is not aimed at discussing the validity of the democratic peace argument” (ibid: 14). Against this context, my case-

¹⁷⁶ The only time he did not (in the 1992-5 negotiations) was because of domestic opposition.

study makes an original contribution. It explicitly compares and contrast both rivalry and regime dynamics in interaction with each other.

Fifth, sometimes losing a war helps rivalry termination. Given the intense nationalism a rivalry tend to generate, losing a war to the weaker side gives them a face saving way to back down, making deescalation and rivalry termination possible. Ecuador tactical victory over Peru in 1995 gave the Ecuadorian military the excuse/legitimacy it needed to seek a 'peace with dignity'. This helped Ecuador accept the 1998 Brasilia Accord, under which Ecuador lost almost all of its historic aspirations.

Chapter Seven

1. Overview:

In this chapter, I summarize the main conclusions from the research. I start by highlighting the central questions (2) and the main findings (3). Next, I suggest future avenues of inquiry (4). I conclude by discussing the implications of this research, focusing in particular on democratization (5).

2. Central Questions and Claims

This dissertation investigates the effects of regime type on interstate conflict behavior. In particular, I focus on the effects of democratization on conflict behavior within enduring rivalry. I apply the logic of the democratic peace to rivalry and claim that democratization should ameliorate an ongoing rivalry. In the course of the research, I also derive and pursue three auxiliary research questions. First, I examine how the institutional and normative explanatory accounts vary under different combinations of relative power. In so doing, I set up a critical test between the two accounts of the democratic peace. Second, I set democratization in the broader context of regime change and examine the effects of other types of regime transitions. In so doing, I assess the role of autocratization, political instability, and political dissimilarity as alternative candidates for the increased conflict. Third, I examine the effects of autocratization on conflict behavior. By testing if an autocratization escalates a rivalry, I am applying my argument to other phenomena besides democratization.

3. Central Findings

The main claim is that a democratic rivalry should deescalate after democratization. In Chapter Four, I used linear regression to analyze the conflict behavior of enduring rivalry that experienced regime change. I found that, all other things being equal, transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry increases the interlude in between militarized disputes by approximately 1.6 years (see Table 13 of Chapter Four). In Chapter Five, I used survival analysis to study the peace-spells between outbreaks of militarized violence. I found that regardless of choice of models (Weibull or Cox) and of controls (clustered or non-clustered), democratic transitions, compared to other type of transitions, always offer the greatest increase in the duration of peace. In Chapter Five, I examine the Ecuador-Peru rivalry from 1979 to 1991, when a transition from mixed to democratic rivalry occurred. I found that an overall deescalatory trend between the conflict episodes. Unlike the 1981 Paquisha incident, where both sides used force in an attempt to remove (for Peru) or defend (for Ecuador) the contested border outposts, the 1991 Pachacútec Incident was resolved without recourse to force by a ‘gentlemen agreement’ between the rivals. In other words, this central claim is substantiated in both the quantitative (in both linear and survival regressions) and qualitative (for the 1979-1991 period of the Ecuador-Peru rivalry) parts of the dissertation. On the basis of these varied tests, I infer that the central claim that democratization deescalates is robust.

One auxiliary research question concerns the critical test between the normative and institutional explanations. Does the distribution of relative power between rivals affect the conflict behavior of the rivals? The institutional account argues it should while the normative account argues it should not. In the critical test conducted in Chapter Four, all

three measures, the direction of marginal effect of democratization, the statistical significance of the marginal effects and the magnitude of the overall effect of democratization, support the institutional account over the normative account. In the case-study, the critical tests are over the behavior of Peru in the 1981 episode and the behavior of Ecuador in the 1998 episode. In the 1981 episode, the institutional explanation expects a militarily stronger Peru to escalate. In the 1998 episode, the institutional explanation expects a military weaker Ecuador to deescalate. In both episodes, the institutional expectations are supported. Thus, both the quantitative and qualitative tests support the institutional explanation rather than the normative one.

The second auxiliary research question concerns the effect of autocratization on conflict behavior. Extrapolating from my argument that democratization deescalates, I expected autocratization to have the opposite theoretical effect. I expect autocratization to *escalate* a rivalry. In Chapter Six, I examine the Ecuador-Peru rivalry from 1980 to 2000, when a transition from democratic to mixed rivalry occurred. Unlike the 1995 Cenepa War where a severe border conflict broke out, the 1998 Brasilia Accords was characterized by diplomatic compromise by both rivals. This deescalatory trend between the conflict episodes does not support the expectation of escalation. In Chapter Five, I use survival analysis to study the effects of two types of autocratization: minor autocratization or the transition from a democratic to a mixed rivalry and major autocratization or the transition from a mixed to autocratic rivalry.¹⁷⁷ The effect of minor autocratization on conflict behavior proved to be inconsistent. In each of the four survival

¹⁷⁷ There are no cases of the third type, complete autocratization, or the transition from democratic to autocratic rivalry (see table 2 in Chapter Five for the specific cases of the transitions).

models,¹⁷⁸ the statistical significance of minor autocratization varied substantively, above and below the threshold of statistical significance, when different control variables are used. By contrast, the effect of major autocratization was statistically significant in every model. The magnitude of its effect was however, smaller than the effect of transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry. That is, the duration of peace was longer under major democratization compared to under major autocratization. I conclude, therefore, that the evidence does not support the claim that autocratization escalates. It is worth nothing while my theoretical expectation on this type of transition was wrong, so was the extant literature which argued for the “dangerous autocratization” thesis.

4. Future Avenues of Research.

The dissertation studied the impact of democracy on conflict behavior within rivalry. There are four potential avenues for future research. They are 1) to test the arguments on new domain, 2) to use a different unit of analysis, 3) to refine the measure of regime change, 4) to build alternative critical tests and 5) to reverse the direction of regime change.

The dissertation relied on the enduring rivalry conception of rivalry. The alternative conception is strategic rivalry (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2008). If the central argument holds for enduring rivalry, we should also expect to see the same deescalatory effects of democratization on strategic rivalry. Other possible domains include the use of international crises (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). One research

¹⁷⁸ The permutations are the Weibull and Cox regressions, with and without unique baseline hazards. See table 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Chapter Four.

question using interstate crises would be to determine if rivalry use lower level of escalation after democratization in international crises.

This dissertation use states as a unit of analysis. Arguably, the explanatory logics of the democratic peace emphasize the leader or the elite rather than the state. For example, the normative account emphasizes the socialization of elites in the norms of bargaining dominant in their country's regime type (democratic or not). Similarly, the institutional account emphasizes the constraints on the leader's preferences created by the political system, which again varies due to regime type. Both suggest a focus on the leader rather than the state. Two possible candidates are the leader-year, used in the study of the selectorate theory (Buono de Mesquita, et al. 2003) and the leader-spell, used in studies of war termination (Goemans, et al. 2009).

I examined the effects of democratization vis-à-vis regime change in general in Chapter Five. While the impact of democratization is substantive and statistically significant even when generic-regime-change is included in the model,¹⁷⁹ parsing out the effects of democratization from generic-regime-change was problematic due to multicollinearity. The issue is that democratization is a component part of generic-regime-change. The workaround I adopted was to conceptualize generic-regime-change as all non-democratic transitions such that the two measures of regime change, democratic transitions and non-democratic transitions end up measuring different phenomena. Future work may seek to address the multicollinearity issue.

¹⁷⁹ This is in the auxiliary tests and not reported in Chapter Five.

The auxiliary finding of support for the institutional account addresses the issue of explanations of the democratic peace. The debate Rosato (2003) inspired is representative of a trend amongst skeptics of the democratic peace to challenge explanations of the phenomena rather than its empirical veracity. To meet such challenges, more critical tests that differentiate between predictions of the different explanatory accounts are needed. In this dissertation, I rely on the fact that institutional account is power-sensitive while the normative account is not to construct a critical test. While the institutional account receives more support, I also note that the F-test of the statistical significance of the marginal effects of democratization has a probability of 0.0518. This is just above the alpha of 0.05 and suggests the evidence is not beyond dispute. Alternative critical tests may be needed. By studying the conflict behavior of transitioning rivalry dyads, this dissertation is in effect holding the variable of relative power constant while varying the level of democracy. An alternative test is to hold the variable of relative power constant while varying the level of relative power. An early work by Schweller (1992) did something similar. He studied the impact of democracies on power transitions and found that democracies never wage preventive war.

Finally, one can focus on the effects of autocratic transitions. This dissertation found (in Chapter Five and Seven) that autocratization can be pacifying. This is surprising since neither my theory nor the extant literature anticipated this finding. My extrapolation is that if democratization deescalates, its converse, autocratization should escalate. Similarly, the extant literature argues that autocratization should increase conflict propensity (the dangerous autocratization thesis). The phenomenon of autocratization and its effects on conflict behavior deserves follow-up research. Studying

the conflict behavior of autocratizing regimes will help to address the tendency to treat autocracy as a residual category, as merely non-democracy. It has policy implications as well. After all, despite the best efforts otherwise, democratic backsliding does occur. Policy-makers need to know what to expect from their autocratizing rivals.

Studying autocratizing states is a complex issue because autocracy, unlike democracy, is a more heterogeneous concept. Peceny, Beer, Sanchez-Terry (2002) argue that personalist, military and single-party autocracies behave differently under the four mechanisms (institutional constraints, shared values, transparency, war fighting capabilities) linking regime type with war. The authors also pointed out that Polity data on autocracy is problematic because it frequently awards the same score on the autocracy scale to personalist, military and single-party regimes. For measures of autocracy, they preferred Geddes (1999) data on autocratic regimes. Future research may have to adopt a similar coding strategy, to use Polity for indicators of democracy but other sources for indicators of autocracy.

5. Implications of the findings.

Democratization deescalates, even within rivalry. This key finding furthers knowledge in two issue-areas, in the process of rivalry termination and in the international consequences of democratization.

First, by focusing on the conflict behavior of newly democratic rivalries, this study goes beyond the selection effects of democracy. We know that rivalry tends to end after transitions into joint democracy. What we do not know is the process by which such termination occurs. Do rivalries end with a bang or a whimper? That is, after

democratization, does rivalry termination occur as the result of the victory of one rival over the other? Conversely, does rivalry termination occur after democratization because both rivals fight with a decreasing frequency? My research, which shows that democratization increases the peace-spells in-between outbreaks of militarized violence, suggests that rivalries peter themselves out.

The same finding also speaks to the democratization-conflict literature. Contrary to the arguments of Mansfield and Snyder, democratization does not exacerbate existing international conflicts. It is worth emphasizing that the research was done on rivalry pairs. If democratization lengthens rather than shortens the duration of peace in dyads that are especially conflict prone, we increase our confidence in the democratic peace as a whole.

This dissertation claims that the exacerbation of an ongoing rivalry is unlikely after democratization. It does not claim that democratization has no undesirable international consequences. As Ratner (2009) demonstrates, democratization may bring about a foreign-policy- realignment against the United States. When reflecting on the concerns of Washington on the transition in Egypt, highlighted in the beginning of the dissertation, this potential realignment of Egyptian foreign policy against the United States may be the “risks of transition” that the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, warned about. Whether that is an acceptable political price to pay for democracy is something policy-makers (and their constituents) have to decide.

Appendix 1: Timeline of the Ecuador-Peru Rivalry

Sources: drawn through 1997 from Palmer 1997; with subsequent development drawn from Einaudi 1999. Domestic events drawn from Conaghan 2005

- 1542 Francisco de Orellana expedition to the Mouth of the Amazon from Cuzco and Muti via the Napo River.
- 1717 Separation of Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada (which included audiencia of Quito) from Viceroyalty of Peru (voided in 1723 and reestablished in 1739).
- 1802 Cédula of the king of Spain separating most of the trans-Andean territory from the Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada and the province of Quito and transfer it to the Viceroyalty of Peru.
- 1822 Battle of Pichincha through which Ecuador became independent from Gran Colombia.
- 1823 Joaquín Mosquera, commissioned by Simón Bolívar, concludes boundary treaty with Peru establishing borders on the basis of *uti possedetis* as of 1809, but not ratified by congress of Gran Colombia.
- 1824 Battle of Ayacucho through which Peru became independent.
- 1827 Peru requests United States mediation, whose belated response (1829) renders mediation attempt moot.
- 1829 Battle of Tarquí. Forces of Gran Colombia defeat Peru. Rights to Guayaquil reaffirmed.
Treaty of Guayaquil, establishing borders as “the same as the former Viceroyalties of Nueva Granada and Peru before their independence.” Not executed due to separation of Ecuador from Gran Colombia on May 13, 1830.
- 1830 Pedemonte-Mosquera Protocol, establishing the Marañón as the boundary between Ecuador and Peru, but never ratified by congresses.
- 1832 Pando-Noboa Treaty, recognizing present boundaries “until an agreement fixing the boundaries is concluded.” Ratified by both parties.
- 1859 Peru occupies Guayaquil in war with Ecuador.
- 1860 Treaty of Mapasingue, by which Ecuador recognizes territorial claims of Peru under the Cédula of 1802, but canceled by congresses of both countries in 1861.
- 1887 Bonifaz-Espinoza Treaty, by which Ecuador and Peru agree to submit their boundary dispute to the arbitration of the King of Spain, ultimately unsuccessful.
- 1890 García-Herrera Treaty, which reaches a compromise on the borders by drawing a boundary approximating territories traditionally under the jurisdiction of each country. Ratified by Ecuador, but not by Peru. Ecuador revoked it in 1894.
- 1904 Valverde-Cornejo Protocol, reviving Spanish king arbitration option, which produces recommendations provoking popular protests in both countries and shift from arbitration to mediation, and from Spain to the United States.
- 1910 United States mediation efforts, expanded to include Argentina and Brazil, ultimately propose Arbitration Tribunal at the Hague, which Peru accepts, but Ecuador does not.
- 1924 Ponce-Castro Oyanguren Protocol, by which parties to meet in Washington to negotiate, submitting remaining differences to the United States president for

- arbitration. Delayed, then accepted by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1934, and pursued beginning in 1936.
- 1936 Act of Lima, reaffirming commitment to the 1924 agreement, maintaining boundary status quo “without recognition of territorial rights” in the meantime.
- 1936-8 Inconclusive negotiations between parties in Washington, with good offices of the United States and efforts to expand to multilateral good offices by the Chaco War mediators.
- 1941 Ecuador-Peru war (July-September), resulting in a decisive defeat for Ecuador.
- 1941 Rio Protocol (January 29) treaty of “Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries,” signed by Peru and Ecuador, with the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signing also as “guarantor” countries, approved by congresses of Peru and Ecuador on February 26.
- 1942 Binational Ecuador-Peru demarcation Commission formed (June) and deployed to the field to place the border markers. Technical differences submitted to guarantors for resolution in 1944 and 1945. Western boundary differences resolved.
- 1944 President Carlos Arroyo del Rio was overthrown by the military.
- 1945 Braz Dias de Aguiar submits arbitral decision on eastern boundary differences.
- 1947 US Army Air Force, having completed aerial mapping survey, turns over maps to parties (February).
- 1948 Ecuador Foreign Ministry (September) orders its members on the Demarcation Commission to stop work in the Cordillera del Cóndor, “since the map showed that there was no single watershed...”
- 1960 Ecuadorean president José María Velasco Ibarra declares, “The Rio Treaty is null” (August).
- 1981 Outbreak of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru (January) in the disputed Cordillera del Cóndor area, mediated through the OAS by “friendly countries” (the guarantors).
- 1991 The Pachacútec Incident. New border incident, which produce the “gentleman’s agreement” between the foreign ministers of Ecuador and Peru, quickly disavowed by Peru.
- 1992 January. President Alberto Fujimori makes first official visit ever of a Peruvian head of state to Quito (January), followed by two more trips during that year.
- 1992 April. *Autogolpe* by Peruvian president Fujimori.
- 1995 Cenepa War. Major outbreak of hostilities in the disputed border area (January), producing a call by both parties for the good offices of the guarantor countries under the Rio Protocol.

Recent timeline (with emphasis on mediation and domestic events in both countries)

1995

- Jan 9,11 Exchange of fire between Peruvian and Ecuadorean military patrols.
- Jan 24 Ecuador recognizes Rio Protocol and asks the guarantors for assistance.
- Jan 26 Another round of hostilities ensues. Peru welcomes Ecuador’s declaration and also asks for aid of guarantors.

Jan 31	Guarantors meet in Brazil, invite Peru and Ecuador to participate, and both accepts.
Feb 5	Peru accepts guarantor cease-fire proposal, Ecuador does not.
Feb 13	Peru declares unilateral cease-fire, which Ecuador accepts.
Feb 17	Parties sign Peace Accord of Itamaraty along with guarantors, but fighting continues.
Feb 28	Hostilities formally end with acceptance of both parties of the Montevideo Declaration, reaffirming validity of Itamaraty Accord.
Mar 10	Agreement on procedures signed in Brasilia by guarantors and parties.
Mar 30	Separation of Peruvian and Ecuadorean forces begins.
Apr 30	Forces of both sides largely withdrawn from disputed area (90%).
Apr-May	Retired army generals Walter Ledesma Rebaza and Carlos Mauricio Agurto, retired navy captain charged with insulting the nation and disloyalty by the military court. The three had been critical of Fujimori administration during the 1995 war.
May 3-13	Withdrawal of all units from disputed area, with MOMEPA verification, except for designated concentration points.
July 25	Establishment of a demilitarized zone by MOMEPA, "without affecting the territorial rights of the parties to the conflict."
Aug 4	Entry into effect of a 528-square-kilometer demilitarized zone.
Oct 5-6	Meeting in Brasilia of guarantor country officials with vice ministers of foreign relations of Peru and Ecuador, expressing particular satisfaction with progress.
Nov 17	MOMEPA declaration noting satisfaction with progress in achieving a security accord for direct coordination between Peruvian and Ecuadorian military forces and with the absence of incidents.
Dec 27	A brief border incursion by Ecuadorean forces was protested by Peru.
1996	
Jan 2	Peru expresses opposition to Ecuador's plan to acquire planes from Israel (K-Firs), with approval by a guarantor country, the United States, because of US-made engines.
Jan 17-18	Lima meeting of Peru and Ecuador, with presence of guarantor representatives, to cover procedures for continuing search for a peaceful solution.
Feb 22-23	Quito meeting of Ecuador and Peru, with guarantors, to advance the process, including agreement to submit list of remaining substantive differences in achieving an accord.
Mar 6	Public release of the list of remaining differences. Peru wants final drawing of the boundary line; Ecuador continues to note the inapplicability of the protocol to one area and requests sovereign access to the Marañón-Amazon. Parties agree to continue discussions in the near future, under the auspices of the guarantors.
Jun 18-19	Buenos Aires meeting of Ecuador and Peru to continue procedural discussions, with the presence of guarantor representatives.

Oct 28-29 Santiago meeting of Ecuador and Peru to complete procedural discussions, with the presence of guarantor representatives. Plan to meet in Brazil to begin substantive talks on December 20, 1996 postponed – first, by the hostage crises in Lima in mid-December, and then by the replacement of Ecuador’s president by the congress on February 6, 1997.

1997

April 15 Official negotiating commissions designated by Ecuador and Peru meet with guarantor representatives in Brasilia to implement the Santiago Agreement of October 29 by beginning substantive discussions on remaining impasses.

Nov The guarantors propose talks on navigation, integration, and security as well as the border.

1998

Jan 19 Ecuador and Peru agree to seek a comprehensive settlement by May 30; positions on the border remain far apart.

Aug 10 Jamil Mahuad becomes president of Ecuador in the midst of renewed military tensions.

Oct 8 Mahuad and Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori ask the guarantor presidents to propose a border solution.

Oct 16 The Congresses of Ecuador and Peru voted to accept a guarantor finding.

Oct 23 The guarantor presidents declare that Peru is sovereign over the Cenepa but must grant Tiwinza to Ecuador as private property. Ecuador gains access to navigational access to the region but not sovereignty, which remains with Peru.

Oct 26 Comprehensive peace agreement between Ecuador and Peru, signed in Brasilia.

2000

Sept Videotape showing Fujimori intelligence advisor, Valdimiro Montesinos bribing a congressman.

Nov 19 Albert Fujimori resigns as president of Peru in the aftermath of the vote buying scandal.

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