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THE LIMITS OF MEMORY AND MODERNITY:
The cultural politics and political cultures of
three generations of Andalusians

by

Yvonne M. Lassalle

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York.

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Abstract

THE LIMITS OF MEMORY AND MODERNITY:

The cultural politics and political cultures of
three generations of Andalusians

My dissertation is about the work of hegemonies in the constitution of cultural and political silences. It is also about the diverse if subtle ways that collective memory, as an ensemble of practices and as a discursive foil, is used both to secure and to place limits on this work. Based on ethnographic research, this work is an account of how people of different generations in Cordoba (Andalusia, Spain) *re-membered* "the past" – not only how they reflected upon it but more importantly, how they integrated it within the discourses of various public spheres after Spain's transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The transition was negotiated between social sectors that had been dominant during the Franco dictatorship and the new groups emerging into leadership after Franco's death. I argue that the emphasis political "consensus" to guarantee peace among the different factions effectively excluded the large sectors of society from taking part in the negotiations, and silenced many incipient debates that remain "unspoken" to this day. This resulted in a massive political demobilization of the population, known as "the disenchantment." Those who continued to insist on re-membering denied aspects of their personal and political "past" were marginalized, as were others who, not having experienced what they choose to re-membered, nevertheless found it meaningful and relevant to their present. The maneuvering of collective memory became crucial in the

production of identity -- in terms of class, political affiliation, and regional or national belonging -- and thus shaped the strategies and tactics chosen by different individuals and groups in their efforts to maintain or expose unjust political, economic or social realities.

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Finally, I wish to dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Flor and my father, Miguel, who is now deceased. He also loved Spain, for reasons similar and different from my own.

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Chapter I. Introduction

"A man who remembers what others have forgotten is like a man who sees what others do not see"

Maurice Halbwachs

My dissertation is about the work of hegemonies in the constitution of cultural and political silences. It is also about the diverse if subtle ways that collective memory, as an ensemble of practices and as a discursive foil, is used both to secure and to place limits on this work. Although it incorporates other literature and genres, this research is above all an ethnographic account of how people of different generations in Cordoba (Andalusia, Spain) *re-membered* "the past" -- not only how they reflected upon it but more importantly, how they integrated it within the discourses of various public spheres after Spain's transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This transition was negotiated between social sectors that had been dominant during the Franco dictatorship and the new groups emerging into leadership after Franco's death. The negotiations resulted in a hegemonic configuration which effectively excluded large parts of society and silenced many incipient debates that remain "unspoken" to this day. In this dissertation I tell stories of people who continue to hear sounds within those silences: of the political and social marginalization of those who insist on re-membering denied aspects of their personal and political "past," and of others who, not having experienced what they choose to re-member, nevertheless find it meaningful and relevant to their present. The maneuvering of collective memory will be seen as part of larger strategies and tactics for defining cultural reality in collective ways, used by different individuals and groups in their efforts to maintain or expose those silences.

This project has unfolded as a result of my growing interest in two distinct groups I came to know during my fieldwork in Cordoba, Spain. One, the Yama'a Islamica de Al-Andalus/Liga Morisca, was part of a larger social movement that centered around conversions to Islam in Andalusia. The second, the Kasa Okupa/Kórdoba, was one of the many squatter communities set up by young people throughout the Spanish state. Although small in size and relatively marginal to the everyday life of the city, both groups were nevertheless highly visible. Their members were more or less easily identifiable by people outside and inside the group by their particular lifestyle choices and distinctive aesthetics. Furthermore, both groups were similarly influenced by the ages and political cultures of their members, by and large very homogeneous within each group.

When I first began to give serious consideration to these groups in relation to each other, I was struck by obvious differences in terms of age, political experience, world view and understanding of commitment. These differences translated into distinct choices about "the pasts" they claimed and recuperated, in other words, re-membered.

Originally, my intention was to focus exclusively on the Yama'a Islamica de Al-Andalus/Liga Morisca. Founded by a group of Andalusian converts to Islam, the Yama'a had "communities" in five other cities and towns in Andalusia, as well as one in Murcia. Other groups of converts to Islam, from other regions of Spain and Europe, had settled in Andalusia and had formed Muslim communities beginning in the early 1980's. But the Yama'a seemed particularly interesting as it was an almost exclusively Andalusian phenomenon, clearly tied to a renewed interest in Islamic history and culture among Andalusian nationalists and others interested in distancing Andalusia from previous

stereotyped representations, widely popular throughout the Spanish state. What commanded my attention at that time was the opportunity to investigate two related but distinct phenomena through these Islamic conversions. On the one hand, there was how Islam, as "Other" to the "Western" self, has increasingly assumed the role of critique to late 20th Century western civilization, in both "East" and "West." Thus, like many of their generation, the converts searched for a more holistic, "integrative" way of life, a righteous path which articulated and gave coherence to thought, emotions and actions. They believe to have found what they search for in Islam. On the other hand, and at the same time, conversion was tied to a broader cultural movement which revolved around the exaltation of the historical role that Islam in Andalusia. Proponents claimed that under Islamic rule Andalusia had reached its greatest social, political and economic development. Furthermore, Islam had left an indelible mark in Andalusia, and defined in crucial ways the culture and character of its people. Many Muslims saw conversion as part of pursuing such arguments to their logical conclusion. As such, conversion was seen as opening spaces in which to redress silences -- political, historical and mythical -- about Andalusia and Spain's role in perpetuating its subordinated position. In this endeavor, collective memory came to be used as a foil, a body of proofs and truths that justified the assumption that Islam as faith and identity is a marker of "recognition" of one's true being as Andalusian. Andalusians, Christians, Atheists and Re-newed Muslims alike, called attention to their "nations' " glorious past, its unworthy subjection in the present, and launched a project for constructing a future.

The converts for the most part belonged to the "1968" generation, those people who were in their teens and early twenties during the 1970's when the transition to democracy was taking place in Spain. Like many of their generation, the majority of the converts were involved in the "lucha antifranquista" and

militancy in the "left" had clearly been a crucial aspect of their lives prior to conversion. Having risen through the ranks of neighborhood associations or radical youth organizations, they knew first hand of people who had direct encounters with the repressive apparatuses of the Franco state; others had run-ins with the police and secret services themselves. All had great expectations for the society they would build once the dictatorship was abrogated. However, the end was not what they had envisioned: the dictator died in power, and many of the political leaders of the opposition, driven by raw pragmatism, seemed only too willing to compromise with the powers-which-had-been (for all intents and purposes, power-that-still-were) in order to keep political and social change under control. Thus, a generation saw their dreams of change, justice and retribution rapidly turn sour; as early as 1978, many had given up any hope that their projects and proposals for change would ever be enacted. Faced with the betrayal of their leaders, and tired of fighting against a "programmed disenchantment",¹ they too lost faith in party politics. Most of all they distrusted the complicity of the mayor political parties' -- Alianza Popular (AP); Union Centro Democratico (UCD), which later became Coalición Democratica Socialista (CDS); Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE); as well as the Partido Comunista Español (PCE) -- in creating silences in the name of "reconciliation."

In Andalusia, many channeled their energies into the consolidation of a growing self-consciousness of themselves as a "reality" different² from other

¹Ortí, Alfonso (1989) "Transición post-franquista a la monarquía parlamentaria y relaciones de clase: del desencanto programado a la socialtecnocracia transaccional" *Politica y Sociedad* (Invierno): 7-19

²Spanish ethnonationalists and social sciences together have coined the phrase *hecho diferencial*, to refer to ethnic groups sense of "peoplehood." The process of translating this phrase into English made me aware of the double assertion being made in this phrase. In other words, Andalusians as a people are 1) a "reality" and 2) they are different from Catalans. However, a more literal translation of *diferencial*, would be that which differentiates something from something else, other. In this sense, it also implies that the reality that makes Andalusian peoplehood a fact, *un hecho*, is different from the realities of other peoples in the Spanish state. This different reality is what differentiates Andalusians from others.

peoples within the Spanish State³. The Spanish state itself was embroiled in the difficult task of defining itself in a way that acknowledged the very complex "national" or "ethnic" reality within its frontiers, without threatening its cohesiveness or angering sectors hostile to such projects⁴. Similar to what was happening throughout the entire Spanish state, and partly fueled by these events, this "coming into consciousness" led to a politicization of Andalusian identity. This politicization became an important aspect of political culture that had flourished during the transition, and crystallized in a manifestation in which over a million Andalusians marched on the streets of every mayor Andalusian city (Barcelona included, of course). The demonstrators claimed recognition as a people and protested their subordinate position -- in economic and political terms -- within the Spanish state. These claims were made through a discourse that demanded levels of self-government equal to those being negotiated for the Basque and Catalan peoples. These events transcended the regional scale, influencing national affairs, to the point of precipitating the downfall of the reigning political party⁵. And yet, not quite 20 years later, precious few choose to re-member this episode.

The events were unprecedented in magnitude even if not entirely without historical precedent⁶. Although still highly debated and controversial, some

³ De la Cuadra and Gallego-Díaz (1981), argue that the disenchantment was staved off in Andalusia because of all the activity surrounding the passage of the autonomy statute.

⁴Ídem, pp. 127. See also De Blas Guerrero, Andres (1989) "El problema nacional-regional en la transición" in Tezanos, Cortado and De Blas (eds). *La Transición Democrática Española*. Madrid: Editorial Sistema

⁵ De la Cuadra y Gallego Díaz (1981) p. 216 The ambivalence of the Union Centro Democrático (UCD), the party of the then prime minister Adolfo Suarez, in dealing with the referendum for Andalusian Autonomy, cost them not only the general elections, but also discredited them before the electorate, and this eventually lead to their disappearance as a viable political alternative.

⁶While the Basque and Catalan regions might be the best known cases of peripheral nationalism, the fact is that many regions in Spain have also had regionalist and nationalist movements. In fact, it is possible to speak of regionalist and nationalist effervescences or periods, in which separatist or autonomist ideas spread throughout the entire Peninsula. The first such period coincided with the emergence of the First Republic; the second such period began slightly after World War I and lasted until the triumph of Franco; the third such period began in the late 1950's

scholars have pointed out that both attempts at the founding of Republican governments floundered precisely on their inability to manage both the demands for autonomous government of regions such as Catalonia and the Basque country, and the fears of those who saw these demands as threatening the integrity of the Spanish nation. But the events in the seventies are not exclusively related to these dynamics. This flourishing of national and ethnic demands and the "crisis of commitment" also resonated with a general cultural trend in the developed west towards greater personal introspection, a "search" or quest for the "self" that led to the exploration of new arenas of political and personal involvement. Thus, the 70's also witnessed a growing interest in alternative lifestyles – communes, artisan collectives, etc. – or alternative politics. The rise of "ethnonationalisms" in Europe is in part related to the hope of finding a new movements with revolutionary potential. The 1968 generation's search for its "signs of identity" (Goytisolo 1966), and its renewed interest in history as a solution to the exhaustion of utopia⁷ certainly offered a great impetus to the emerging "identity" politics within the Spanish state in general, and Andalusia was not an exception.

I was struck by the fact that most of those who are converting today seemed to be of the same generation of those who converted more than ten years ago, and shared very similar life experiences, even political histories. It is not an exaggeration to say that the movements growth, or reproduction, is maintained

and with ebbs and flows has perhaps lasted to this day. For more details about the Andalusian case, see Isidoro Moreno's work in the *Enciclopedia de la Historia de Andalucia*. Volume VIII, pages 233-351.

⁷This concept, taken from Sharon Zukin, refers to the disenchantment with ideologies of revolution that projected an idealized world of justice and peace somewhere in the future. Meanwhile, awaiting for its realization, room had to be made for errors and sacrifices. That the errors were at times monumental and unforgivable, and that postponement of gratification lost appeal in face of the promise of instant fulfillment through consumption are some of the reasons for this shift towards history. Zukin discusses this process in relation to urban development and planning in the U.S.: Zukin(1992) "Postmodern Urban Landscapes: mapping culture and power" in Lash and Friedman (eds.) *Modernity and Identity*. London and Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell.

by incorporating people of the same age cohort, not by spreading to wider sectors of society. What was happening? Why was the younger generation -- those who are now in their early to late twenties -- not being "conscripted"? While I was getting to know the converts better, I had also become increasingly involved with young people, mostly for social reasons. In searching for answers to my questions, many of these youths and their friends would become my "guides" through the labyrinthine quest for answers.

And thus began my work -- ethnographic, political and educational -- with radical and progressive youth, including the young squatters who "occupied" a building and created the Kasa Okupa/Kordoba. At first glance, this generational difference appears as a simple reflection of worldwide cultural and political trends. The generational break is in fact deeply connected to global processes; the "Post-transition" generation in Andalusia is clearly more globally aware, articulate and articulated than their predecessors; this is precisely what defines it. But in spite of the homogenizing effect of globalization, this generational break takes specific forms, shaped by the memory and political cultures of previous generations.

The differences between the two generations seemed absolute. First, there were radical differences in their political cultures. If the transition created a rupture, it was precisely at this level -- from a society mobilized, poised for change, quite radical in fact, to a complacent social body concerned with conserving the hard won gains -- and it cannot be emphasized enough. The squatters were much too young to participate in the counter cultural movement and the political struggle against the dictatorship that had defined the previous generation, to which the converts, as a rule, belonged. The squatters, coming of age in the mid to late 1980's, grew up in a society that was built around "agreed-upon silences", content to finally enjoy civil liberties and patterns of

consumption equal to those of others in Europe. Its political concerns had shifted in the direction of those of other advanced industrial nations at the end of the century: for example, ecology, unequal distribution of wealth *between* (as opposed to within) *nations*, and identity politics. The reality of forced economic migration and dislocation that their parents endured is far removed from their daily lives, at most experienced as conflicting allegiances to birthplace and culture. Furthermore, industrial restructuration, deindustrialization and growing unemployment has narrowed these young peoples' expectations for the future and cut them out from traditional networks of political socialization in the workplace⁸. Another critical difference was the waning role of the Catholic church both as a symbol to oppose and as haven for oppositional politics. This generation grew up taking for granted an extraordinary phenomenon: the diminishing importance of organized religion in the sphere of civil society and politics.

Silences are of course not only restricted to the past, as can be witnessed in the older generation's apparent bewilderment when they deal with this younger generation. The pervasive image of youth in much of Western Europe, and for that matter, the United States -- from the youthful child murderers of Birmingham to the German Neo-Nazis to New York and Los Angeles gang

⁸Paul Willis, in his now famous work *Learning to Labor: How working class kids get working class jobs* (New York: Morningside Press, 1982) has argued convincingly for the role of the school system, and students resistance to its organizational and ideological forms, in the socialization of youths. In Andalusia; due to the peculiarities of the political and economic situation in Spain, and to the rural character of the region, schooling, until the late seventies, was abandoned early on in favor of entry into the workplace. For the older generations, more important foci of socialization seem to have been the neighborhood associations and the youth wings of the Communist Party and the progressive Catholic groups, but even more so the labor unions and organizations. Strictly controlled or even outlawed, labor groups were the primary sites of politicization, and were central in obtaining basic rights for workers during the dictatorship, and during the Transition. The bureaucratization and demobilization of the labor movement has been one of the unintended consequences of democracy that is most mourned, or reviled, by the former anti-Franco activists. However, the younger generation, the first one to be schooled "democratically" in 40 years, came to age in a world very different from Willis' "lads".

members -- is of unexplainable and senselessly violent humans. Although lurking in the background, has not fully taken hold in Spain. Instead, the media, the powers-that-be, even critical sectors of society, are constantly remarking about the lack of concern, the self-absorption, and the apolitical attitudes of the young. The hegemonic mirror reflects an image of young people as a "new leisure class," spending most of their money on clothes or entertainment, and engaging in leisure activities likened to self-destructive rites of escapism: weekend-long binges of alcohol, drugs and dance. Even when young people do engage in political action-- for example, the student strikes against tuition hikes - - their claims did not seem to others all that revolutionary; rather, they seemed conservative. When they vote, if they vote at all, they tend to prefer conservative candidates. It would seem in fact that it is precisely the conservative youth that are emerging as the dominant group within their generation, thus defining it.

However, the picture is somewhat more complex. While in fact young people today are clearly less politically active than the generation that preceded them, they are not necessarily less politically aware. There is, moreover, a considerable diversity in political activity and commitment among them. The recent student strikes, movements in solidarity with peoples of the third world, the conscientious objectors movement, the squatters movement itself, are examples of youth political involvement that span the political spectrum, even if they are not easily classified within a traditional schema of left and right. An Andalusian with a long history of involvement in political and economic struggles told me, "What we see is that finally these children [sic] are assuming their proper ideological position in accordance to their class". The issue is obviously more complicated, but the insight remains: the struggle against Franco brought together the political energies and imaginations of a whole generation. Today's youth are not confronted with a political agenda capable of mobilizing

them into a similarly unified front. Furthermore, they have grown in the shadows of their elders' disenchantment, and are not prone to be taken in by organized political movements and promises of utopias. This inherited disenchantment they share with many other youths worldwide; the form this disenchantment takes is what cannot be generalized into global terms.

Thus, when we confront this generation's fascination with countercultural "objects" -- fashions, literature, icons -- we must keep in mind that although highly aesthetized, the retro/nostalgia mode is a form of historical periodization. That it is mass-mediated is obvious and unremarkable; that the youths are seeing past the "commodity phantoms" and becoming interested in other cultural objects associated with it-- literature, art, music and political icons-- cannot be explained away only in terms of "market forces." Specifically, "punk" culture, politicized by its local connection with Basque radical pro-independence youth's active search for marginality and highly antagonistic attitude towards the powers that be -- church, state and capitalists-- provides a constant interpolation of history and collective memory. Punk discourse, though international, does in fact hearken back in specific ways to the discourse of their immediate generational predecessors in Spain, as well as to others prior. Talk about the repressive and authoritarian state, about the parasitic clergy and military may seem anachronistic and out of place in democratic Spain, but to these youth they are still "real" and relevant⁹. Granted, these themes' ensemble might take the form of pastiche or collage; and yet it is disingenuous to argue that behind such forms there is simply a random collection of free-floating signs. In ways similar to the art forms they are said to resemble, the selection and positioning of images and meanings denotes an organizing principle, a field structured by ideological

⁹Particularly in face of the recent scandals within the Spanish government having to do precisely with the continued use of Franco counterinsurgency commandos -- the so called GAL -- in the fight against ETA

discourse. What pop-culture might intend to appropriate and trivialize can (and frequently does) betray it. In the end, even if the young Andalusian squatters consider themselves anarchists largely due to the influence of pop-culture trends -- Sid Vicious and other vernacular ones-- and are unwilling (or unable) to refer to other anarchists and other struggles which are geographically, if not life-experientially, close to "home", they are creating spaces in which political silences can be addressed. When they see Fascists everywhere, lurking in the very fiber of everyday life -- the police, military and clergy, but also bus drivers, store owners, even leftist politicians, nobody is above suspicion -- they are in fact re-membering, in so far as they introduce into public discourse symbols and experiences that resonate with other prior memories collected within the social that have been silenced and forgone. Whether they reflect on them or not is another issue altogether, and must be addressed later.

The Past Re-membered and Re-present-ed

In exploring these differences, and attempting to understand them, I became aware of their intricate connection to broader "politics of memory" in the Andalusia and the Spanish State. The increasing importance acquired by the rhetorics and politics of memory in the mobilization of social groups and movements has made scholars increasingly interested in memory as a subject of study (Alonso 1992; Boyarin 1992, 1994; Crapanzano 1992; Connerton 1989; Fischer 1986; Koontz 1990; Lowenthal et al 1990; Nora 1989; Rappaport 1990). Most authors have commented on the intimate and intricate connection between such bodies of practices and knowledges about past and present -- that which we call memories -- and the legitimization of the nation-state and the reproduction of the hegemonic configuration operationalizing the State's apparatuses. This is the primary emphasis in the work of Alonso (1992), Connerton (1989), Nora (1989).

Nora (1989) has focused on what he has called "places of memory," that is, memorials and monuments, and the essential paradox which positions them so powerfully: despite their supposed fixity and immortality as landscapes, they are intrinsically unstable as signifiers. "Landmarks...exude a sense of timelessness, even as they shift to meet new cultural and political demands on memory" (Koonz 1990: 260). Connerton (1989) has also focused on the performative aspects of memory, such as commemorative ceremonies, but also on the everyday performances of what Domínguez (1989) describes as "scripts," namely patterned reactions and interactions, both consciously controlled and unconsciously triggered. Others have chosen to stress precisely how subordinate(d) groups can make use of the inherent instability of memory to present challenges to the State through processes of historical revision (Boyarín et al. 1994; Fischer 1986; Rappaport 1990). It is to these works that my own is most proximate.

Brackette Williams (1991) has discussed how in a "transformative hegemony," the desired homogeneity is attained by incorporating heterogeneous elements, yet at the same time denying the origins of those elements that do not conform to the specific objectification that is sought. To claim a reevaluation of this objectification, or the ownership of such "denied" elements, brings with it the risk of being denied or marginalized as well. These insights are clearly borne out in my fieldwork. Within the larger society, both Muslims and Anarchists have been constituted as absolute "others," the traitors and heretics of the national orthopraxis. On the one hand, the Muslims challenged the current strategic uses of symbols and myths of Al-Andalus (Moorish Andalusia) by claiming their relevance to the present, in ways that directly contradicted and complicated the State's uses of these symbols and myths as an exoticizing factor to encourage tourism, or a strategic element in the jockeying for position within the European Union. On the other hand, the young Anarchist squatters hold up as heroic what

the powers-that-be want to portray as proto-terrorist behavior. Both groups engage consciously in practices that make their marginality spectacularly conspicuous. What makes their tactics of "hearing" and "voicing" culture so very different is the radically different definitions of "reality" -- and the past these realities presupposed -- under which they are operating.

In short, I will argue that what might seem as disparate and contradictory understandings of the past converge as critiques of the hegemonic constructions of "reality" in post-Franco Spain insofar as this "reality" casts shadows and silences unto "the past" in order to mute and obscure contradictions in its present. The lack of mutual intelligibility among people from different generations stems from the radical break in "collective memory," that reproduces a divergence in the interpolation of history within discourses of legitimation used by the hegemonic configurations during and after Franco. The dictatorship had to constantly represent (in the sense of making it present again) the past in order to justify its practices. Through its nationalistic ideology, it legitimized itself on the basis of keeping the demons of Spanish history-- religious strife, class conflicts, regional demands-- at bay, and preventing the demise of the "the Nation" as it had been hegemonically defined. I will argue that this has had an enormous influence in defining the overly historical politics of the Muslims, the vastness of their memories. The contrast with the legitimation strategies that the next generation encountered is quite stark. The new regime strategically and ideologically assumed "modernity" -- through its liberalization of the market as well as its discourse on democracy and Europeaness -- to claim to have finally transcended "the past," and in overcoming it, to have made it largely inoffensive and ineffectual, if not outright irrelevant. Thus the creation of a "dismemoried" youth.

My thoughts on collective memory are also deeply indebted to Maurice Halbwachs' book *On Collective Memory* (1992). Following Halbwachs' logic, I argue that it is as members of a group or collective that individuals remember. Since we know that individuals belong to many different groups, and experience conflicting loyalties to them, it follows that they must have memories which if not altogether different would potentially present conflicting elaborations on a same theme. Thus, memories within the family could be different from memories discussed in school and other state institutions, just as they could conflict with memories pertaining to the work situation, etc. These would be hierarchically placed according to axes of legitimation, loyalty, and affinity, among other possible ones. And yet, none of these memories need be events "lived through" by the group member. This second kind of memories, those personally experienced, can further complicate the collectivization of memories. For even if it would seem that those who "were there" and witnessed events first hand would hold the key to "historical truths," it is obvious that after time, later events and memories of others can destabilize our recollections and make "the past" seem different than what was experienced at that time. This is the case with memories of the Third Reich in Germany (see Koonz, 1994), and certainly the case with memories of Fascism and the Franco dictatorship years.

Thus, it seems necessary to qualify Halbwachs when he argues that memory ends where history begins. There is certainly a hierarchized distinction between the knowledge which gets called history and that which becomes memory. However, I would argue that just as memories, histories are always under challenge, and it is precisely by resorting to their memories and "pooling them" together that groups can attempt to successfully challenge histories they find objectionable. The relationship thus is a complex and dynamic one, of constant return and departure: history is continuously returning to collective

memory for its knowledge, but it does not eradicate the memory it feeds on, even if it devalues it. And it has become increasingly more common for people to turn to histories in order to recuperate their memories. Thus, issues of change, as well as continuity and transmission, become central to any discussion of collective memory.

Throughout this work, I will highlight three fundamental changes which I believe have been crucial in creating breaks in collecting memory, thus leading to this generational unintelligibility: changes in the discursive legitimation of the state, in the secularization of official discourse, and in the role and place of Andalusian identity in struggles for social, political and economic justice in Andalusia. As I began to discuss above, when the central state redefined itself, its discursive practices of representation, implicated in the project of finding legitimation, changed. To comprehend why someone would take converting to Islam as the "ultimate heresy," as the absolute rejection of Spain -- the "ungrateful step-mother"¹⁰ -- one would first have to have a critical understanding of the role of State and religion in the construction of Spanishness, and the role that National-Catholicism played in Franco's Spain. Recall how the pro-Franco forces, the *nacionales*, used the term crusade to justify the Civil War, and equated communists with "infidels." Remember that one of the most bitter and protracted debates within 20th century Spanish historiography revolved precisely around the place that Islam should be afforded in the constitution of the essence of "Spanishness." In the modern, European Spain that emerged after Franco's death, such debates are deemed to be arcane and irrelevant. State and Church are clearly separated. Modernity is a defeat of "the past", and Spanishness reaches its greatest moments through -- perhaps is even superseded by -- Europeanness. There is no room for quibbling over the uncomfortable self --

¹⁰Juan Goytisolo, *La reivindicación del Conde Don Julian*, Madrid: Ediciones Catedra

Europe's South, Africa's North -- if one wishes to be on the triumphant side of the new world order.

This raises the second issue, related but distinct: the changing importance of organized religion in people's everyday life. For all who grew up during the Dictatorship, the Catholic Church (whether as a progressive or collusive institution) occupied a highly visible space within everyday life. The rejection of the Catholic church's complicity, articulated with a long history of anti-clericalism and the undermining of traditional religious values by alternative ones promoted by market and other forces, resulted in the Church's losing much of its influence and legitimation. The "1968" generation's interest in non-western religions as related to the "search for (or loosing of) oneself", combined with an opening up of ecumenical communication within the Catholic Church itself, made the exploration of other faiths and world views less problematic than in the past. However, once these emergent possibilities for practice and experience within the religious sphere became accepted practice by the dominant groups, much of the drama of conversion dissipated. Furthermore, a general critique of commitment to institutions and/or large hierarchical organizations (parties, unions and churches) combined with an increasing (and not very welcomed) immigration of Muslims into Spain and a recrudescence of anti-Islamic discourse (under the guise of critiques of Muslim fundamentalism) to make the act of assuming Islam less comprehensible.

Another instance of unintelligibility are discourses vindicating Andalusia. The populism of the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party) followed the practices of the previous regime in promoting Andalusian identity as a folkloric spectacle. Aspects associated with popular festivals and religious practice, were, in particular, emptied of their conflictual contents.¹¹ Even more violent silences

¹¹This testifies to the limits of this break with the past. For if in fact, at a state level, the

erased the experience of oppression of Andalusia's rural population, the vast majority of whom experienced grinding misery until very recently. Take, for example, the experiences of migration and dislocation suffered by two million Andalusians, precipitated by the development strategies of the central state. Visions and representations of the negative effects of the Dictatorship's policies have been monopolized by the discourses of the conservative sectors (dominant today) of the most important ethnonationalist movements in Spain – Catalonia and the Basque Country. Andalusian immigrants to Catalonia, however, find themselves stigmatized if they criticize some of the culturally nationalist policies that discriminate against them. The irony of this situation is that while one cannot deny the terrible repression of Basque and Catalan cultures, and the aggressions against many of those who defended these cultures politically¹², it was precisely these regions which benefited economically from the unequal development practices of the nation-state. Andalusian and other youths of democracy have grown up in a "reality" where the memories of oppression have been hierarchized in a scale that clearly favors cultural "wrongs" over economic ones. Should it surprise us then that, once the memories of the Andalusian struggles had been erased, the notion of an Andalusian Autonomous Community would seem hollow, artificial? How can Andalusia be seen as a historic nationality if its nationalist movement has traditionally been weak, its "language" only distinct as it is seen as an uncultured, vulgar "dialect" of the State language, and much of its culture is associated with Franco aesthetics?

ideological legitimation for the form of government has indeed changed, at the local level, the use of Andalusian cultural products as representation for the Spanish whole continues, and one can only expect it will be exacerbated by increased reliance on tourism's revenues.

¹² Here is where the differences between the Basque and Catalan struggles are most obvious. For the former, the political defense of their culture was for a significant number inseparable from the right to self-determination; for the later, only a minority saw the need to take such steps.

However, youth culture is not only defined by lacks. The politics of the youth are built around a "reality" that threatens to saturate their daily experience. In their demands, radical youth, of which the squatters are part, refer to contradictions of the "democratic" premises on which the post-Franco state is founded. Their courting and open acceptance of aggression, points to the limits of peaceful solutions and the repression necessary for the system to function. In their suspicion about collective behavior one can also see a suspicion about economic (the market) and political (populist) practices of creating mass publics. Even more clearly articulated is their "pragmatic" reading of the possibilities of collective action in the face of the dismantling of the welfare state. When the citizen is left to his and/or her own devices, he or she must rely on cunning and savvy to eke out a living, and the blueprint for survival is found in the small scale entrepreneur. I see these some of critiques crystallize in the squatters' choice of identifying with the Anarchists -- who, in recent orthodox "left" accounts are seen as the Republic's true nemesis -- instead of with the traditional heroes, the Republicans. (Can one be truly surprised when, after all was said and done, most of those who had declared themselves staunch republicans became avid defenders of the parliamentary monarchy soon enough?).

Furthermore, a lukewarm or openly hostile attitude towards Andalusian culture and identity is often a rejection of the authoritarian and repressive aspects that have been made hegemonic by populist propaganda, coming from both the left and the right. In fact, youth do offer their own versions of identity. An example of this is when they recuperate symbols of recent radical struggles. A hunger strike in the village of Marinaleda -- carried out by destitute farmworkers demanding land reform instead of the rural welfare system then in operation -- which became a symbol for the Andalusian Power movement in the 1980's, is re-membered through the chant: "All of Andalusia like Marinaleda!

[*Andalucía entera, como Marinaleda*]"¹³ Within the music scene, in what is known as Andalusian rock, but specially in punk and heavy, there have been and continue to be attempts to recuperate precisely through the Anarchist identity a connection with Andalusia.

Finally, even as I am willing to admit that the historical recuperations of the younger generation pale in comparison to the depth and scope of their elders' projects, I will argue that these apparently different recuperations of the past nevertheless carry out a similar operation with respect to time. It cannot be forgotten that discourses of past, present and future are cultural reconstructions of time and space (Alonso 1992; Boyarin 1994). By considering the multiple slippages involved in the positioning of time, we can also explore other paradoxes inherent in the "politics of memory." As processes of recuperation, remembering both stretch and collapse "historical time." Each of the groups I studied lived the past they re-membered as part of their present, seeing it as immediate (unmediated). At the same time, the ways they approached and re-presented these pasts rendered them mythical, thus time-less, removing their immediacy and relevancy. In this respect, the mythmaking that surrounds historical figures associated with the Anarchist movement in the early decades of the 20th century and the anti-Franco struggles, in fact severs the very direct connections that might still be found in the present, not only of those dead but of those alive then and still alive today. The facile use of the term fascist also effects contradictory results. In the same way, Andalusian forays into early medieval history in order to reconstitute Andalusian peoplehood – of which the converts are but a radical example – are problematical for the way they render this past as a static essence, and distorts their perceptions of present-day Islamic countries

¹³The whole of Andalusia as Marinaleda was! For first hand accounts of the events that took place in this small village, read *Marinaleda, Huelga de Hambre* and *Marinaleda, Andaluces levantaos* Granada: Aljibe, 1980

from which they "borrow" much of what they see as traditionally Andalusian today. This example and others which will arise in the discussion should serve as an admonition: memory should be never seen as unproblematic recuperation, but as interested re-presentation. As a social axis in which to access power, it has potential for liberation just as for domination.

Passing and Past(e)ing Memories: Generations

It is diagnostic of the national hegemonic operation that those who would have claimed to defend the right of self-government for the Andalusian region squandered this potential to the benefit of the central government. Take for instance the managing of the "agrarian problem." Land reform, the hope of innumerable generations, was "cashed" into a system of "agrarian relief" that demobilized and demoralized the agrarian population and reinforced patron client relations. However, this present historical conjuncture gets projected into the past through the mass media, and through constantly parroted discourses that barely update old stereotypes of the ignorant, carefree, lazy Andalusian, creating the image of a credulous, docile and coopted electorate, bought off by the central government. This, in combination with other high-visibility infrastructural improvements of dubious import to the region¹⁴, has led citizens in other regions (ironically, most always Catalonia) to claim that Andalusia has received preferential treatment, sequestering into oblivion centuries of oppression and of highly creative and unrelenting, if rarely successful, popular protest. Thus, in the kingdom of the dismemoried, the newcomer is king, and young people in Andalusia actively re-member Basque anarchists and ETA heroes while "their ancestors" remain neglected and forgotten.

¹⁴ Such as the World Fair in Seville, and to a lesser degree, the AVE, the high velocity train that makes it faster to travel from Córdoba to Madrid (over 500 km.) than from Córdoba to Granada (barely 300 km.,)

My question became the following: up to what point was this solution taken up by the population? When does identity become relevant in the struggle to voice spaces where the arbitrariness of Andalusian reality can be revealed? What are the other idioms that have replaced the discourse on identity as vindication? In approaching these questions, I found that it was indispensable to begin with an analysis of contemporary Andalusian political culture. In fact, this perspective offers us several advantages: in the first place, it allows us to observe the political development of identity from the perspective of some of its main political agents; second, it allows us to observe with greater clarity how the critical moments of identity formation articulate with wider social and political processes; third, it allows us to consider axes of tension with other ideologies and identities. By dealing with the multiple and contradictory ways in which the great transformations of the last 25 years were experienced and narrated, the importance of memory and "re-membering" in processes of politicization became evident. This, in turn, pointed to the importance of specifying generational variations and changes in such narratives and experiences.

And thus I¹⁵ became interested in "political generations," defined as a social grouping, roughly coinciding with an age cohort, if not with a generation in the biological sense, that forms itself politically -- politically "comes of age" -- during a particular historical conjunction, and has a bearing on the subsequent construction and delimitation of discursive practices, spaces and representations. Each generation is marked even as it marks the events and the experiences lived in and through its members. Attention to political generations is not meant to predict the trajectory of processes of a generational "changing of guards". Rather,

¹⁵My thoughts on these issues were first developed in collaboration with Prof. Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán and Rafael Morales. In their initial form they appeared in a joint paper entitled "Ante un espejo resquebrajado: una interpretación de la trayectoria de politización de la identidad andaluza, 1968-1993". It was presented at the Symposium for Collective Identities (Bilbao [Spain] December 14-18, 1993) sponsored by the International Sociological Association.

it is a technique to detect "changes in presence", those barely perceptible shifts in understanding of those mixed, ambivalent experiences of everyday lives, that do not immediately challenge the orthodoxy/hegemony, but from which challenges can eventually emerge. It would seem that generational changes would provide a privileged position from which to survey these changes, as Raymond Williams has recognized: "Methodologically, structure of feeling is a cultural hypothesis, actually derived from attempts to understand such elements and their connections in a generation or period, and needing always to be returned, interactively, to such evidence" (R. Williams 1997:133)

Even though there is a sizable (and growing) literature on generations in the social sciences, the path breaking work of Karl Mannheim continues to be the most lucid explication of the problematics of the "non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous" within social formations: how in the same chronological time, social groups that have been marked and shaped by different historical conjunctures can coexist. For Mannheim, as for Williams writing some time after him,¹⁶ the generational phenomenon is of central importance in understanding the structure of social movements and the transformation of phenomena in the immediate present. Such inquiries dynamize investigations of the social, overcoming the biases built in by static approaches:

"If until now formal sociology had almost always investigated the existence of human groups exclusively from a static perspective, this problem seems to belong to a set of questions that have made evident precisely the causal forces that ground the dynamism of social occurrences as well as the ordering of the efficiency of its own dynamic components. In this way, we would have here precisely the point of transition from a purely static formal sociology to a dynamic formal sociology and from this to a applied historical sociology: we would be in the point of confluence ...[from which] to build the entire field of sociological investigation" (Mannheim 1994 [1929]:p. 204)

Mannheim sets out by rejecting outright biological notions of reproductive intervals as a means of delimitation and measure for change. In

¹⁶The coincidences with Raymond Williams' positions are quite extensive, and yet Mannheim does not appear cited in Williams book.

their place, he introduces the notion of eruptions of "new contemporaneities". For even if the generational connection is based on biological rhythms of life and death, this does not imply it can be deduced or be contained within this reality. What becomes critical is the "being with other" of the individuals included within a generational unit. This "generational adhesion" does not in itself lead to the formation of concrete social groupings. In fact, "one can approach the generational connection precisely as a mere connection, counterpoised to the development of concrete social groupings" (Mannheim 1994 [1929]: 206).

In order to explicate his point, Mannheim compares the category "generation" with that of "class": one cannot shed affiliation from class, for it is not exclusively voluntary in nature, but rather determined in part by the relations of production. Both class and generations are to be dealt with as "positions" (*Lagerung*), that are similar in that they limit individuals to a determinate "field of action" within the larger field of possibilities of potential occurrences and as such "...they suggest a specific modality of thought and living experience, a specific modality of fitting in the historical processes" (Mannheim 1994 [1929]; 209). Positions are also seen as effecting positive influences: they have tendencies inherent to them, determined within each position. This is the sense in which we can speak of generations shaping at the same time that they are shaped by the specific historical conjunctures in which they arise: they are "modalities of access" to the social sphere.

Being influenced by such an understanding of generations had important methodological implications for my research. As it happened, in the midst of attempting to create an understanding of the phenomena of conversions to Islam, it became obvious that I would have to pursue not only the converts but also those who were coming from the same position, were shaped by the same historical conjuncture – in other words, were of the same generation – but did

not choose to convert. In the case of the youth, it was even more crucial: in order to understand the dynamics of this generation – to an important degree still in formation – and the place of the squatters within it, I would have to expand my research outside the group. Two problems loomed in my horizon: first, how to find and/or create an adequate field of comparison; second, how to go about obtaining information.

First I sought to create a sample or "control group" of sorts through which to contextualize the converts. After long debate and some trial and error, I decided that the most adequate group for comparison would be people more or less within the age groups of the converts who had been engaged in political activities during the late 60's and early 70's. I had already begun interviewing activists who were currently and formerly of the converts' acquaintance, in order to discern social networks and gain insight into the converts' lives. At the same time, these interviews offered me a general sense of the "culture" in which the converts moved. There were a number of other reasons why this seemed an appropriate group. Political activists were those most likely to share an articulated understanding of many of the social and political issues raised by the converts as motives for conversion. Last but not least, since my interest was quite specifically political culture and political generations, it could be said that it was precisely those who were politically active in the late sixties and early seventies that gave this generation its image.

While the choice of activists as cohorts was quite justified in the case of the converts, it was more difficult in the case of the younger generation. After all, it appears that this generation's generalized lack of social commitment would require that I focus on youth who were not active in politics as well. And yet even my research among the "non-committal" continuously exposed me to situations which challenged this perception. I began to understand the break as

emerging from complexly divergent understandings of politics and the potential for involvement, rather simply apathy and indifference. I also sought out contacts with young activists outside the squatter movement, in order to explore the different cultures of activism that were present. By this time, I realized that in order to understand the uniqueness of the transition to democracy and its impact on the reproduction of political cultures, I would have to interview those whose politics were shaped by the period before, those activists who the "68ers" referred to as elders.

As I mentioned earlier, I had already begun some formal and informal interviews with activists and acquaintances of both squatters and converts. But I decided that the best way to systematize the task of eliciting information was to convene a series of informal discussion groups with people from different generations. The discussion groups were formed by 4 or 5 participants, all previous acquaintances and at times "accomplices" in their political activism. Each group was asked the same questions: When and why did you become active in politics? Are you still active and has the motivation and or form of activism changed? Did Andalusia figure as a referent in your political activities? In what way? The discussion group proved to be a method particularly well suited to the task. The presence and words of friends and former comrades served as "mnemonic" devices to prod discussions and debates that had been long since laid to rest. However, and perhaps more importantly, they also served as challenges to the narratives that had since been developed about these past events and experiences.

I used the words and images through which the members defined themselves in the moments of consensus as definitions of belonging to one generation or another. Thus, when I speak of the "1968 Generation" I am referring to an identity my informants ascribed to themselves and others whose

politics they believed were also shaped by the events of May 1968 in Paris. The same is true for the "generation" that came before them. In the discussion groups as in the individual interviews I conducted with them, they frequently used the words "post-war" to describe their political experiences, which spanned the entire dictatorship, rather than just its later years.

The youngest generation presents a different case. Certainly, as I have begun to suggest and will continue to develop in later chapters, there is great interest in defining the young from outside. However, as with other generations before them, they are resisting those imposed representations, even if articulate and self-conscious definitions are rare. The reasons for this are two fold (at least). On the one hand, it is a generation still in formation. On the other hand, it has had to develop in what are clearly hard times for oppositional politics. At the same time, the moments of fracture and debate gave a window into the issues that while being laid to rest were not yet at peace. A fascinating pattern emerged. Most of the moments of fracture and most of the unresolved issues had to do with the role of the Andalusian referent in political activity.

It was precisely the generational differences and the similarities in political culture and experience that alerted me to problematize the position of "the past" and of identity in discourses of memory and nationhood in post-transition Andalusia. I intend to discuss how events which became so crucial to the subsequent unfolding of the Spanish and Andalusian contemporary situation have been erased from everyday reflection. I will be presenting this process as a result of strategies for the creation and maintenance of a favorable situation for the hegemonic configuration which emerged after Franco's death. I will also offer a framework in which to understand the highly complex role that the confrontation amongst "received" memories and between "received" and "experienced" ones, as this relates to the creation of generational unintelligibility,

or generational "gaps," in political culture. I will argue that this is so because collective memories are stratified according to their role as structuring elements of identity; but identity defined socially (thus politically). This is why I turn my quest for answers to historical differences in objects of commitments (the nation, God, the family, the political party, a clique of friends) and practice of commitment between generations rather than to cognitive explanations¹⁷. In the following chapters, I will be discussing how the different images of "the past", the different elements of the collective memory of Andalusians, engaged and commanded engagement from different generations.

And yet, whether collective memory is used as a foil in a process of conscious re-membering, or the interpolation is unconscious and the re-membering more often than not accidental (or promoted by Capital), the pasts that these groups evoke and how they do so are part of an active attempt to reconstruct the present. The point is not whether these movements have the potential for achieving broad social acceptance – hegemonic status at this time seems out of the question – or that their actions can be seen as liberatory in an unproblematic way, but that from their position of apparent marginality they are addressing unresolved issues that define the reality for a larger social whole.

The Mirror of Identity

In undertaking the ethnographic task of attempting to grasp how Andalusians addressed the "past" – personal, historical and mythical – and went about re-membering it in ways that challenged hegemonic understandings of their present, identity defined in national terms did not always seem to be the most useful focus. It was not an important element of the everyday cultural

¹⁷See Robert Wuthnow (1987) *Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis* for a discussion of the importance and applicability of the concept of commitment in the study of "the social"

debate of many Andalusians I spoke to, and there seemed to be no major social movements animating this cause¹⁸. In fact, at first glance national or ethnic identity appeared to acquire significance only in a negative sense: as an instance of a "fuzzy", "undeveloped" or fragmented collectivity, when compared to other more visible "nationalities"¹⁹ within the Spanish state. Such statements become self-fulfilling prophecies: in the instances when Andalusians mobilized around issues of identity, their effort was dismissed as a mere "affront or injury in comparison" (*agravio comparativo*), some kind of "primal reflex" motivated by resentment or jealousy over the gains of others. For some, a separate identity would seem not to exist except in the completely reactive sense: Andalusian was not any different than Spanish. And yet, I continued to find hints and intuitions of its presence. The colors of the Andalusian flag, green and white²⁰, were used in many different circumstances: advertising, street decorations, sport teams, ceramics and home decorations. Furthermore, commoditized forms of Andalusian cultural products – songs, music, dance, costumes – were extremely popular and quite cherished, even when the associations with local culture had been muted and or distorted by the process of commoditization. There were also the unique forms that collective celebrations of popular religiosity take in Andalusia – forms that command, perhaps with greater force than before, the

¹⁸That is of course, discounting the nationalist party. However, the bureaucratic nature of this organization, the internal strife that was rendering it assunder, and the lack luster results in recent elections seem to suggest that, at least in the recent past and immediate future, this party cannot be considered a dynamizing element within Andalusian politics.

¹⁹Spanish nationalist and social scientific discourse commonly distinguishes between "nationalities" [*nacionalidades*], that is, ethnonational or regional collectivities, and the "nation-state," namely Spain. A discussion about these terms is undertaken in Chapter II.

²⁰ The current Andalusian flag is a creation of Blas Infante, widely regarded as the most sophisticated theoretician of Andalusian nationalism and the father of the Andalusian nation. It is not matter of coincidence that the colors are the same as those associated with Islam and islamic movements. Infante purposefully chose to emphasize and memorialize what he argued was Andalusia's Islamic heritage, in fact, character, while offering local referents for these colors. The green is meant to refer to the vegetation, and the white to the color of Andalusian homes and buildings.

participation of a large part of the Andalusian population. And of course, the most obvious (if highly ironic) evidence: the fact that political parties at the regional level all claimed, in more or less explicit ways, to be *Andalucistas*.

My curiosity was further piqued when I realized that even if a majority of Andalusians were not quite clear about these issues, foreigners seemed to have no trouble in describing Andalusians. The 19th century travel literature, written mostly by foreign travelers, produced very specific and vivid images which continue to inform popular stereotypes about the region and its people to this day. Works of a more explicitly fictional nature also contribute to the formation of an image of the Andalusian, as is the case with Washington Irving's *Legends of the Alhambra*. But this image has also persisted among Spaniards from other regions, who even when claiming to denounce its proliferation merely displaced it to "their" South. This in fact reaffirmed its use as a mark of distinction between northern Spaniards and their southern neighbors. Some of Spain's most famous men of letters -- such as Pío Baroja, Azorín, Valle Inclán, and most notoriously, Ortega y Gasset -- have at one time or the other written about Andalusia and the 'character' of its people.

But even more important clues were given by Andalusians themselves, who, throughout the last century, have tried, in one form or another, to address this slippery issue. Time and again, we find attempts to grapple with what it is that makes Andalusians so distinct and yet so seemingly unconscious of this fact. And the relation of Andalusia to its past -- mythical, historical and political -- seemed an issue of contention that resurfaces continuously. There was also a debate on how to build a nation in the present, an Andalusia that was not only free but fair, in political, socio-economic and cultural terms. Many Andalusians are struggling to keep the Andalusian referent from becoming institutional and normalized, something to re-member once a year, under the assumption that its

"fundamental meaning" has been forgotten, that it is not lived, and that it is the government's task to "make us make memory," *hacernos hacer memoria*²¹. They are aware of how such operations make difficult the political instrumentalization of an Andalusian identity that could lead to a nationalist movement. They are busy working against the solution that has been given by the leading political sectors, on which we will dwell further in a later part of this work. Thus, in the end, identity seemed to offer a very useful vantage point from which to understand many issues in contemporary Andalusian culture. Discourse on national identity, by definition, deals with place and time, permanence and change, and transmission, for identities concern the ways we position ourselves in the narratives of the past.

In Andalusia, an important feature of discussions about identity as a people centered on the discussion of "feelings." A common distinction was made between "others" who indeed were "conscious" of their identity, and the speaker, whose Andalusianness was "felt." And yet these "feelings", rather than being expressive of primordial essences, were frequently downplayed or even dismissed as being simply "perceptions." Another discourse on Andalusian identity denigrates its emergence as an instance of *agravio comparativo* -- a wrong or injury by "comparison," reminiscent the concept of "relative deprivation." In this discourse, Andalusian identity is seen as derivative, not truly original or and primordial. This devaluation of "feeling," counterintuitive to many of us who have made nationalist discourses our purview, nevertheless raises quite interesting questions at the level of theorizing about identity.

It seemed almost logical to turn to Raymond Williams' notions of "structures of feelings" in order to explore this issue in more detail. Indeed,

²¹ Taken from a speech by Manuel Chaves, president of the Andalusian Autonomous Community, August 10, 1993, as appeared in *El País*.

Raymond Williams' concept resonated quite well with Andalusian discourse. Both refer to "characteristic elements of impulse, restraint and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought; practical consciousness of a present kind, living in an interrelating continuity" (Williams 1977: 132) This he contrasts to processes which already have been identified and described, in other words objectified. What this objectification does, according to Williams, is transform a "continuous, interrelated process" into a finalized product, fixed in time. And yet, while Williams would seem to have ascribed a highly positive value to the processual character of "structures of feelings," the Andalusians experienced this lack of objectification as inferiority -- and "others" were quick to confirm this understanding.

It was through Michel de Certeau's work, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1982), that I began to understand the procedures by which this experience of inferiority could be constructed. His discussion of the rise of scientific theory and the aesthetization of everyday practices that resulted contributed greatly to my attempt to unravel the complex and tightly articulated series of ambivalences that Andalusians demonstrate when speaking about their identity. For de Certeau goes one step further than Williams in describing the operations involved in objectivization. He explains how

"...what is left behind ethnological colonization acquires the status of a 'private' activity, is charged with symbolic investments concerning everyday activity, and functions under the sign of collective and individual particulars; it becomes in short the legendary..." (de Certeau 1982:66"

The effect of this privatization is a demotion into the realm of the idiosyncratic, or the fantastic and only partially real, what de Certeau refers to as the legendary. This is because the loss of an anchor within the collective, the common-to-many, also means a loss of moorings within the real. This discursive

operation results in a dynamic I witnessed time and again in discussions of Andalusian identity, which de Certeau describes as follows:

"Detached from its procedures, this knowledge may pass as a kind of 'taste' or 'tact', or even 'genius'. Its is accorded the characteristics of intuition that is alternatively artistic or automatic. It is supposed to be a knowledge unaware of itself... This cognitive operation is not supposed to be accompanied by that self consciousness that would give it mastery through a reduplication or internal 'reflection'. Between practice and theory, it occupies a 'third' position, no longer discursive but primitive." (de Certeau 1982:70)

It did not escape my attention that the purportedly "primitive" way in which Andalusians deal with their identity, which would presumably preclude its politicization and vindication, conveniently coincides with other discourses on their "primitive" behavior: for example, the Andalusian preference for leisure over work, in Ortega y Gasset's words, their "paradisiacal ideal;" or the "millenarianism" of the Andalusian masses, so conscientiously expounded by Hobsbawm (1959) in his work Primitive Rebels . I intend to point to the various ways such theories articulated with each other, spinning a web of negations that entrapped and silenced the continuous and multiple popular responses to everyday realities of social, political and economic oppression.

The Private and its Publics

Understandings about the public and private spheres -- their articulation, their plurality, even their negations -- are central to many bodies of work within the social sciences. The literature on the subject is immense, and constantly growing. I had not intended to approach the issue explicitly in my work, but immediately found out that many of my arguments hinged on unarticulated assumptions about these spheres as arenas for political action. Furthermore, the ethnographic material I would be presenting would implicitly interpolate or be interpolated by contemporary debates on the centrality and transcendence for the larger social whole of agency and activity -- moral or religious (Casanova

1994), economic (Portes, Castells, etc), or political (debate on resistance, every day life work) – that take places in realms usually considered private.

In the work of both R. Williams and de Certeau I found an opening through which to engage these issues. By critiquing individualist ideologies and insisting on the social nature of most of human behavior, both theorists deal with how the devaluing of the agency of certain actors is tied precisely to operations which "sequester" it into the sphere of the "private." This problematization of the private and public parallel feminist critiques, which point to the effects of the gendering of different spheres of action. Following their lead, particularly that of Frazer (1989), I will argue that the "social" must be conceived as a plurality of spheres of action with fairly permeable boundaries, which frequently crisscross and overlap with each other. Their divisions into public and private is a judgment on the agency and activity that takes place within a given sphere and on their potential to impact other spheres. I hope to demonstrate through my ethnographic examples that whether intentionally or not, these interpretations frequently aid the work of transformative hegemonies by creating spaces of action which, a priori, are considered to be inconsequential to the workings of the larger social productive and reproductive forces. All this to make a strong case against the use of such terms as public or private, for their meanings are heavily value laden, and intrude upon our understandings of the dynamics of power in a capitalist system.

Thus in the section entitled "Identity," I will deal with how, in Franco's Spain, the clandestine emerged as a sphere that was not precisely private – in that it was constituted by a complex and often labyrinthine web of relations, which were nevertheless fully embedded in larger social networks – but clearly hidden and protected from the public eye of the state and its enforcement agencies. This space, far from lying suspended between spheres or bridging

gaps, was profoundly enmeshed within all spheres of action -- political, economic, familial and personal. The distinction between "public" and "private" will also be challenged in the discussion about the "feeling of identity." In this I will follow Naomi Scheman's (1993) critique, laid out through her work on emotions. In this work she lays the basis for a critique of the individualist assumption in psychology, arguing that it is a work of ideology which helps reproduce patriarchal gender distinctions. Instead of understanding emotions as if they attached to us "singly (no matter how socially we may acquire them)" (Scheman 1993: 38), we must move towards addressing emotions as "complex psychological objects." They must be distinguished from more amorphous and undifferentiated "twinges, pangs and so on" which can be maintained to be "particular events" (ibid: 40). The transformation of this "twinge" into an emotion is a social act. Applied to my work on identity, this would imply a critique of essentialist notions about the process of identity formation and reproduction -- as feelings toward or expressive of "identifiable things" within individuals, rather than as social constructions or complexes -- which are, alas, quite commonsensical in everyday discourse and are repeated constantly by the media and government, pointing to the power inequalities these operations reproduce.

In dealing with memory, the issue of "public" and "private" was also raised insofar as one deals with the differing roles and legitimacy given to memories defined as "personal," those more unique and *idiosyncratic*, versus those deemed to be more "collective" or even "official". The relation between emotion and memory is profound; each is deeply implicated in the construction of the other. Finally, as forms of access, generations also present interesting challenges to theories of the public sphere, especially as they impinge on the configuration/reproduction of the social whole. The most serious challenge (and for Mannheim, promise) is posed by the maintenance or erasure of accumulation

of the social (as "history", "past" and as "memory"). In contrast to processes of forgetting -- which Mannheim seems to view as inherent in the process of generational change -- processes of remembering are fraught with challenges and contradictions that have to be overcome.

Chapter Outline

Thus far, I have described how it was that I came to be interested in processes of re-membering and forgetting in Andalusia after the transition to democracy. I have also sketched out a theoretical framework which evolved from my trying to come to terms with the material I was gathering through participant observation, discussion groups and interviews. In what follows, organized in a loosely-chronological fashion, I will go directly into the material -- overwhelmingly ethnographic, but drawn also from history, literature, and the media -- which is the basis of my work.

The dissertation is composed of an introduction, a conclusion, and eight chapters grouped into three sections. From the introduction follows the section entitled Identity, in which I introduce a historical perspective on the Andalusian region. Chapter II, "Constituting Andalusia: nationhood, nationality and autonomy in the Spanish transition to democracy", discusses the complex and contradictory history of discourses about the Nation-State, "historic" nationalities and autonomous regions in Spain. This complexity is highlighted in order to put forth one of my main arguments: how was it that the Spanish constitution of 1978 enshrined the "national form" (Balibar 1991) as the model through which all manner of demands to the State would be expressed. Given that any discussion of "nationhood" in Spain would be incomplete without addressing the role of religion in its definition, I will pay attention to how this relation has been theorized, and particularly to the long and complex

relationship of Islam and things Islamic to the discourse, history, and imagination of Spain and Andalusia.

In Chapter III, "The Feeling of Being Andalusian: Identity, Emotion and the Naturalization of Subordination" I reflect on the way Andalusians speak about their identity, that is, in terms of "feelings of identity." I explore the relation between consciousness and feeling as ways of knowing in relation to identity by pointing out how discourses that foreground "emotivity" have been used by "outsiders" and Andalusians alike to define Andalusians and are fully implicated in the construction of their subordinate position within the Spanish state.

In the second section, *Generations*, I deal with the political cultures that have marked Andalusian politics from roughly the early 1960's to this day. In Chapter IV "Shattering the Mirror: the politicization of Andalusian identity, 1960 - 1980" I turn to the stories Andalusian political activists told me. Constructing an ethnographic account of the emergence of a public sphere of political action during the last years of the Franco dictatorship and its consolidation during the transition to democracy, I also consider the place of regionalist and nationalist discourse within it. The focus will be on the political and religious "cultures" of Andalusia during that time. I explore the Andalusians' deep seated ambivalence in embracing 'nationalist' projects, and how this situation came to be. Chapter V "Silences within the Big Bang: modernity, memory and the production of a generation gap" will continue where Chapter IV left off, offering an analysis of the decline of the "Andalusian Power movement" and the variety of factors that affected this result: generalized disenchantment with politics; the use of nationalist-populist discourse as an electoral tool by centrist parties; a crisis in leadership; and finally, the crisis of its model of and for nationalism. The intent is to contextualize the conversions to Islam in contemporary Spain and the

development of the Yama'a Islamica/Liga Morisca as a political community of converts. Finally, in Chapter VI, "Subjects in the Kingdom of the Dismemoried: youth culture and identity in the 1990's", I present, through the words of my informants, the changes in perceptions that have taken place in Andalusian political cultures: in terms of ethnicity, gender, religion, commitment and memory. A contrast will be developed between political generations: those who experienced political struggle before and during "the transition" and those whose political experience was shaped in the years immediately after. The many identities I witnessed among Andalusian youth are related to the changes in the dominant political culture of Andalusia in order to explore emerging cultures in the political sphere.

The third section, *Memory*, provides further ethnographic detail about political cultures and generations in Andalusia, this time focusing specifically on issues of memory as dissent. Chapter VII "Politics as the Performance of Life: Andalusian Muslims" will deal with the rhetoric and practice of conversions to Islam in Andalusia. I begin by addressing the challenges that the conversion narratives pose to the literature on conversions, in so far as Andalusian converts emphasized continuity, coherence and the political dimensions of transcendence instead of the themes of rupture, transformation and otherworldly orientation which are regularly stressed in the literature. I will analyze what I call (instead of "conversion") *narratives of recognition*, examining their understandings of religion but also history and memory as they define Andalusian, Spanish, Mediterranean and wider European identities and politics. How these definitions are put into practice at different times is crucial to understanding how the converts stake or justify claims on society: national recognition for Andalusia and religious recognition for their group. I will follow with a description of the Yama'a's internal structure and hierarchy; the diversity of the people it attracts;

those who actually convert; the role that previous religious values and political ideas play in the conversion; who remains in the movement and who leaves, and whether they remain Muslims after they depart. How gender and sexuality shape the conversion process and trajectory within the group will be highlighted as central to understanding issues of religiosity, interpretation and representation.

In Chapter VIII, "The Squatters", I will discuss briefly the origins and trajectory of the squatters movement in Spain. Then I move to describe how there came to be a squatters tenement in Cordoba: how the idea was conceived, the context in which it was developed, the people who became involved as well as its detractors, the selection of the site, and the actual process of occupation. I will recount the early days of the settlement, peoples hopes and expectations and the commitments extracted. I will follow through with the subsequent developments: relationships with the municipal government; changes in the composition of the squatters; struggle over leadership within the movement; changes in activities and uses of the house; perception and reception by the Cordoba community at-large. Throughout this description I will be including the life histories of major actors within the events recounted, focusing particularly on their previous political activities, their relationships to their families and the identities they choose to assume.

The final Section, (In)conclusion(s), offers a series of suggestions or guidelines for understanding the cultural and political dynamics that shape collective memories. First I will address the "option for marginality" that was made by my informants as part of their tactics for contesting hegemonic renderings of reality. I will argue that studies of marginality, rather than simply focusing on deviance or eccentricity, can in fact illuminate very central aspects of a society's culture, and thus be crucial to our understanding of the workings of

processes of homogenization and the creation of transformative hegemonies. This will lead me into a discussion of the collectivization of memories, both as a process of homogenization and as a struggle against such processes of hegemony creation. Finally, I will end with some thoughts on how the social sciences, through the ways in which they have traditionally theorized the social, have “privatized” certain social practices and unwittingly reproduced the gendered hierarchization of public spheres.

Chapter II. Constituting Andalusia: nationhood, nationalities and autonomy in the Spanish transition to democracy

"Autonomy in this regard is less an individual achievement than a socially recognized right, and, as such, people with social power tend to have more of it"

Naomi Scheman (1993)

On December 4, 1977, over a million Andalusians, wearing the Andalusian colors, white and green, and their pride clearly manifest, took to the streets. They organized coordinated actions throughout the Spanish state calling for levels of self-government equal to those being offered to Catalans and Basques. This massive demonstration helped popularize a grass-roots movement, known as "Andalusian Power," that demanded social and economic justice for Andalusians in clear nationalistic tones. However, the promise the movement held failed to crystallize. While the state formally granted Andalusians the autonomous government they demanded, this did not translate into real social change. In 1992, when I went to do fieldwork in Andalusia, precious few remembered this outstanding event. Furthermore, the possibility of mobilizing Andalusians on the basis of their "identity" as such was seen as almost non-existent. This in spite of the fact that Andalusia continues to be one of the poorest regions in Spain and Europe, and most of the issues that the movement raised remain un-addressed.

I have become fascinated by this event and the politics that surrounded it. In the following sections I will approach it through three different lenses. First, I will present a brief history of the political economy of the Andalusian region in order to highlight the importance that relations of production have had in shaping the Andalusian self-concept in terms of "haves vs. have nots." In the second section, I go on to explore how the economic exploitation

covered up -- often intentionally -- by the position occupied by Andalusia and its cultural products within the collective imaginary and in national representations of the Spanish State. The third section approaches the subject by examining how the hegemonic understanding of the "national form" (Balibar 1991, B. Williams 1993) precluded the crystallization of an Andalusian "nation" in the imagination of Andalusians and other peoples within this state.

Debates about what constituted "nationhood," "nationality," "region" and "autonomy," specifically those that surfaced immediately before and during the transition to democracy, provide an interesting standpoint from which to follow and interpret the fault lines along which the discourse on the national form became articulated. Thus, in this chapter I will focus on how Andalusia's condition as a border zone onto which many of the foundational alterities of so called "western civilization" -- East vs. West, Semite and Pagan vs. Christian, Developed vs. Underdeveloped -- are projected and embodied, shaped the limits of its reality as a nation at different historical conjunctures. Limits or boundaries of the possible/the real will be described by interspersing "historical" or "received" narratives -- published academic and popular non-fiction works -- with the "experienced" memories of Andalusian political activists as they were told to me. From this account will emerge several lines of inquiry and suggestions for exploring further how the related yet distinct phenomena that will be discussed in the three sections of this chapter combined to define the current discourse on Andalusian identity today. My interest, far from simply academic, is driven by the conviction that in contemporary Spain, at least, the inability to assume a "national form" continues to place a people at a distinct disadvantage when making claims or demands at state levels.

Andalusia: Spaces , Places and Economies

The Autonomous Community of Andalusia extends for 87.268 km² – 17.3% of the Spanish territory holding as well 17.3% of the State's population – in the southernmost part of the Iberian peninsula. The Sierra Morena mountain range, the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea are stark geographic and ecological boundaries that have demarcated the region to the north and south, shaping its history, politics and economy for many centuries. Its other borders are more difficult to discern. To the west, the Guadiana river has served as an administrative frontier with Portugal since the latter separated from the Spanish crown; and to the north and east, boundaries with neighboring regions – now the autonomous communities of Murcia, Valencia and Castilla-La Mancha – are of much more recent consolidation.

The region endured successive waves of colonization – by Romans, Goths, Muslims, and finally northern Christians. Most of the time the conquerors moved in and occupied the spaces of government and administration of those they had defeated, without greatly transforming the social and political structures. What seems to have attracted these successive waves of invasion was the region's richness in natural resources – primarily metals and minerals – and its location, which gave it a prominent role in Mediterranean commerce. But it was the fertility of its soils, despite the aridity of the climate, that became Andalusia's long-standing trademark. As Isidoro Moreno has pointed out, the relationship with the land –*la tierra* – has been perhaps the preeminent structuring element for Andalusian identity (Moreno Navarro 1986)¹.

However, the preponderance of agriculture within the Andalusian economy, and its central role in singularizing the region are by no means a

¹ In fact, it means much more than land; *tierra* means also earth, ground and soil, and can mean also territory and region.

"natural" phenomena. Agrarian Andalusia is in fact the result of a series of historical conjunctures in which local and state level bourgeoisies responded to economic and political crises by disregarding many other of the previously and potentially active sectors of the economy in favor of the agricultural option. My goal in the discussion that follows is two-fold: first, to offer, albeit very briefly and superficially, an account of the "underdeveloping" of Andalusia; and second, to point to dynamics of the mode and relations of production implicated in this process.

The latifundio system² became the primary form of agricultural exploitation and land tenancy. As an institution, the latifundio can be traced as far back as the Roman occupation of the peninsula. However, historical research indicates that its overwhelming preponderance is much more recent. There is evidence for the existence of small and medium sized holdings side by side these large concentrations of land throughout the Roman period, and even more clearly during the period of Muslim rule³. And yet, although the basis for the latifundio system as we know it was laid during the period known as "The Reconquest," with the establishment of the *señoríos*, it was not until the 17th century that the latifundio fully developed and only in the 19th Century did it acquire its modern form (Sevilla Guzmán 1986).

Land concentration, which had begun with the land grants from the Catholic Kings to their loyal nobles as well as to monastic orders, was facilitated by a series of demographic and agricultural crises which left the

² The literature on the latifundio, its development and significance in Andalusia is quite extensive. Some of the classical works are M. Bernal (1974) *La propiedad de la tierra y las luchas agrarias andaluzas*. Barcelona: Ariel; M. Bernal (1988) *Economía e historia de los latifundios*. Madrid: Instituto de España, Espasa-Calpe; M. Bernal, M. Artola and J. Contreras (1978) *El Latifundio. Propiedad y Explotación. Siglos XVIII-XX*. Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura.; J. Martínez Alier (1971) *Laborers and Landowners in Southern Spain*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littleford

³ This is attested by the documents produced during the "repartimientos" of Muslim lands to Christian conquerors during the XIII and XIV centuries

countryside poor and depopulated. The first step towards the commodification of the land was the dissolution of these *señoríos* and the establishment of land as private property. Accumulation within the latifundio system depended on the availability and inexpensiveness of lands, the high price of agricultural products and the starvation wages paid to the workforce (Bernal 1988). Equally important to accumulation were matrimonial alliances among the elites. The stark differences between eastern and western Andalusia, and the provincial ones within these, begin to recede in the face of this extensive network of family and economic connections. Andalusia became defined within and without by its agrarian bourgeoisie and its trademarks: a land of *señoritos*, *caciques*, fighting bulls, and starving peasants (Domínguez Ortiz 1983).

The modern latifundio – consolidated in the 19th century – became characterized by the intense concentration of land ownership and extensive cultivation of lands, alongside scattered minifundia that are insufficient to provide subsistence for the domestic unit, and large agrotowns which house vast numbers of landless farmworkers. The severe un- and under-employment and pauperization in the countryside has to be understood in terms of the dynamic of the triangle created by the articulation of these three relations to land: latifundia, minifundia and landless laborer. In this context, the residential compound known as the *cortijo* became the center of the social relations of production in that it institutionalized the form of labor use. The *cortijo* was located within the estate, and in it lived the landowner, "el señorito" – or in his absence, his manager or overseer – and a force of tenant farmers and peasants with small holdings tied in quasi-feudal relations to the landowner, the *señorito*. Those outside el *cortijo*, the *braseros* o *jornaleros*, constituted a reserve army of labor dependent on seasonal and itinerant work in the land holdings, but perhaps less subjected to the landowner's authority. The *braseros* lived in

villages and agrotowns that emerged at the borders of these large estates. In contrast to the markedly urban character of the agrotowns, where there was significant concentration of population (Gilmore 1981), life at the *cortijo* was definitely rural.

This is not to say the townfolk were any freer: politically, they were disenfranchised through the system of *caciquismo*. The *cacique* was the "big man" in town, who exercised power in ways which were often arbitrary and corrupt. Frigolé (1981) and Gilmore (1977) have argued that the emergence of this form of politics is tied to the dissolution of the seigniorial regime and the difficult transition to a political and economic order based on capitalist relations of production. While its consolidation coincided with the extension of universal suffrage, its reproduction is directly tied to the politics of the period lasting from 1869 to 1923, in which liberals and conservatives agreed to take turns holding power (Carr 1982). The *cacique* became a crucial figure guaranteeing the results so that the "peaceful turnover" (as it was called) would not be threatened. Elections were rigged either through electoral fraud or violent intimidation of voters. In the conditions prevalent in the countryside -- abject poverty, illiteracy and overt domination -- it should not be surprising that this system was rapidly consolidated. As I will discuss in later chapters, such images continue to characterize images of Andalusian political culture and behavior continue to circulate within the Spanish State⁴.

The misery of both small tenants and landless workers was absolute. In the face of widespread hunger, malnutrition, and precarious employment, the fallow lands of the *latifundio* seemed an insult and a provocation to the Andalusian masses. Very few communal lands remained, and the *señorito* (or

⁴For example, contemporary characterizations of politics in the region that portray a passive, gullible electorate whose political wills are easily manipulated by the party bosses can be, in my opinion, traced to these prior stereotypes.

his overseers) exercised rigid control of his lands. However, the population continuously posed political responses to this situation. In fact, the popular forms of protest and rebellion against the social relations imposed by the latifundio system have also been crucial in defining representations of Andalusians at home and abroad. Classics such as those of Díaz del Moral's *Historia de las agitaciones campesinas andaluzas* (1983 [1928]) brilliantly capture the spirit of the times, in which the peasants and other rural workers involved themselves in struggles against their oppressors, seeking not only economic improvement but justice⁵. More recent works by anthropologists and social historians, such as those of Hobsbawm (1959), Gilmore (1977), Mintz (1984) and Maddox (1993) have continued to explore these issues, in ways that point to the continuous and creative, if not always strategically effective, ways in which the peasants and landless population responded to being subjected by the upper classes. Most of the literature coincides in pointing to the strong consciousness of oppression, in class terms, that the Andalusian rural population had.

The predominance and stability of the latifundio (Martínez Alier 1971) – not only as a form of appropriation, first feudal and later capitalistic, but also as construction within the popular imaginary – alongside dramatic and at times radical social and political unrest, has contributed to an image of Andalusia that emphasizes rurality and backwardness. The fact was that the region the romantic travelers described as a somewhat fantastic and dangerous backwater, had been the Peninsula's economic center of gravity. Commerce and trade with the Indies made Andalusia the most prosperous region in Spain during the 16th and 17th centuries, even if the social cleavages within the region were very

⁵Mintz (1984) critiques both Díaz del Moral and de Quirós for their overly romantic treatment of peasant resistance, and links it to their analogies between religious faith and anarchist belief. While Mintz' critique is certainly valid, I suggest that the romanticism of both Díaz del Moral and de Quirós is also tied to more secular issues, such as the nationalist and regionalist ideas circulating at the time. See for example Díaz del Moral (1983[1928]:127, 133)

profound. In fact, at the moment of the industrial take off in the peninsula, Andalusia was experiencing an economic rebirth, and was probably the best equipped region to industrialize (Sevilla Guzmán 1986).

Far from automatic, the consolidation of Andalusian underdevelopment was largely due to a very conscious decision by agrarian elites to continue within the agrarian model, encouraged by the 1868 disentailment known as "*la desamortización de Mendilazabal*". Lands became once again readily available, and elites fell under the lure of directing their investments toward the purchase of land rather than the incipient Andalusian industry. Mining became an exception. This was not necessarily a deluded position: the Andalusian elites, which up to that point had been progressive – anticlerical, liberal and educated – turned conservative as they were forced to face the fact that their most dangerous enemies were not the Church and the nobility, but rather the peasantry and the working classes (Sevilla Guzmán 1986). In the end, a complex articulation of disparate events and economic developments – a phyloxera plague of the 1890's that decimated the Andalusian vineyards, creating a crisis in agricultural exportation; the channeling of Andalusian capital into speculative activities and the purchase of lands "freed" from the Church; and the concentration of mining enterprises in the hands of foreign capital, due in part to the local bourgeoisie's disinterest in such endeavors – would configure Andalusia as a zone of expansion for foreign capitalism and also as an internal colony for Spanish capitalism.

During the process of economic development that lasted from approximately 1875 to 1920, the State, in a conscious effort to spur national industry and protect its products, raised tariffs on both agricultural and industrial imports. It also directed substantial capital investment toward the industrial sectors, particularly ship-building and metallurgy (Carr 1982). These

policies had the effect of bringing the state, the industrial bourgeoisie and the rural landed elites into an even closer alliance. The strength of this alliance meant that not even the Republicans could enforce the land reform program. Remaining untouched and untouchable, the "agrarian problem" steadily worsened. Franco's policies of development during the 1950's and 1960's only furthered the decay. Centralized programs favored certain regions through fiscal policies that channeled much of the national savings into development projects targeted just for them. While some attempts were made at creating "poles of industrialization" within Andalusia -- coinciding with the end of the autarkic period and the beginning of intense foreign investment in Spain-- given the weak industrial infrastructure of the region and the dependent nature of the industries that were established,⁶ they were mostly unsuccessful.⁷ By the 1970's Andalusia contributed only 12% to the overall industrial production of the State. This meant a per capita income of 71% of the national average (Carr and Fusi 1979).

More than ever before, migration became the primary outlet for the Andalusian population.⁸ Like many rural populations throughout Spain, it had long constituted a reserve labor force. Previously the relevance of latifundio in large parts of the Andalusian region had in fact constrained out-migration, for landless peasants found it basically impossible to raise the capital with which

⁶ The weak and dependent implantation of industry in Andalusia has meant that with the opening of other markets in Eastern Europe and Asia, there have been massive factory closings and lay-offs, which began in the early 1990's.

⁷ With the exception of environmentally hazardous chemical industries in the province of Huelva.

⁸ While not as important as in other regions of Spain, such as Galicia, migration did play an important role as a escape and safety valve for social unrest. Already in 1919, the Nationalist Manifesto in Córdoba would proclaim: "Andalusians, do not emigrate, fight back. The land of Andalusia is yours. Recuperate it". But in fact, Andalusia had also been a place of immigration, if only temporary, of workers from Portugal and other regions of Spain brought in by landowners and middlemen to undercut the extensive networks of organized labor in the countryside (Bernal 1988).

to finance the venture. During the 1950's and 1960's the situation changed. The need of the expanding Northern European economies became combined with policies that facilitated the migration process by both the Spanish and the receptor states (especially in the case of Germany). The lure of better paid jobs and better working conditions led to a massive out-migration: over 1.5 million Andalusians had left the region by mid 1970's, headed first for Northern Spanish cities, and eventually to Germany. Emigration became a characteristic of late 20th century Andalusian society, as had been the case for other Southern European regions almost a century earlier.

However, Martín (1992) cautions against overly emphasizing the so-called "push factors" in the migration process.

This approach implicitly assumes that the migrants come from a disorganized, impoverished world that can no longer support them in its midst. In opposition, Catalonia is presented as a structured and homogeneous reality, with the means to receive and house those for whom their own homeland no longer has room. It would seem then necessary to be grateful to Catalonia, obviating consciously or unconsciously the benefits that Catalonia received from this immigration"(Martín 1992: 43)

In fact, the Catalonia encountered by those first migrants of the late 1950, far from being structured, was severely ill prepared to deal with the influx of population that arrived. Migrants poured into the working class suburbs; to this day, names such as Barberá del Vallés, Santa Coloma d'Llobregat and Sabadell evoke immediate association with Andalusia. But those who managed to obtain housing were the lucky ones; for even when their labor was desperately needed, they found themselves unwelcome, and forced to live in conditions of extreme precariousness and marginality. Often unskilled and ill-

connected to Catalan society, these migrants would depend on networks of family and former neighbors to procure such things as employment and housing – sometimes built by themselves. While the networks and relations forged in these neighborhoods – pre-existing neighborhoods as well as those rapidly and shoddily built by the government and those that emerged from migrant built shanties – might have appeared to replicate the towns of origin, they were in fact quite different (Esteva 1984). Far from being self sufficient conglomerations with their own legal and social structures, these towns were both utterly dependent on and at the same time marginal to the larger city (Siguán 1985). Even so, the migrants, aided by the generalized politicization of the times, came together and organized themselves to improve their living and working conditions (Martín 1992).

Given the discrimination against Andalusians in Catalonia, even those who arrived with professional preparation and skills encountered subtle and not so subtle forms of it that alerted them to the situation in which they found themselves. One of my informants, Antonio Guzmán, put it in these terms:

At the University -- I went here in Córdoba -- you became a technician and when you finished you chose which way to direct your career and you began to practice. Well, back then I had barely been working for two years for a mining company of some importance when the multinational corporation that bought it decided to close down the plant and leave. You see, the industrial fabric was very poor here, and this happened often. So I decided that I would be better off leaving for Catalonia. And I did find a good job there, but working wasn't easy. I was Andalusian, you see, and they weren't happy to have us there. They saw us as coming to take their jobs, when there weren't enough Catalans to

do all the work that had to be done. They resented that we didn't speak Catalan, but would only laugh at our attempts to learn it. When you criticized them, they immediately called you a Lerrouxian.⁹ You were not welcome, and they did not try to pretend otherwise. Of course, it was often the politician who set the tone.

Perhaps my informant was making reference to comments such as these made by Jordi Pujol in his book La immigració, problema i esperança de Catalunya (1966), when he spoke about "the Andalusian man":

He is, generally speaking, a man that is unfinished [*poco fet*]. He is a man that for hundreds of years has been enduring hunger and who has lived in a state of cultural ignorance and misery. He is a rootless man, incapable of having a feeling of community that is the least bit comprehensive [*sentit una mica ampli de comunitat*]. Often he gives signs of possessing the stuff from which excellent human beings are made of... but he constitutes the least worthy sample of social and spiritual values in Spain. I have said it before: *he is a destroyed and anarchic man* [emphasis in original]. If by the force of numbers he ever were to rule without having previously overcome his own perplexity, Catalonia would be destroyed. And this would introduce his own mentality, anarchic and very deficient, that is to say, his lack of mentality" (Pujol as cited in Martín 1988: translation mine)¹⁰

⁹ "Lerrouxista" refers to the followers of Andalusian politician, Lerroux, who, during the early 20th Century, was accused of having used inflammatory rhetoric to rouse the non-Catalan working classes against the Catalanists, as a way to undermine the budding nationalist movement.

¹⁰ This paragraph, terribly disturbing, fascinates me for the way it psychologizes underdevelopment. It invites comparison with literatures such as "culture of poverty" or even the "underclass" debates; however, this lay outside the scope of my discussion.

The book is clearly a political manifesto, and the language Pujol uses is that of a pamphleteer. But the fact is that many Catalans like him were already on the defensive about their identity and saw in the large masses of immigrants an invasion that threatened the survival of their imperiled language and culture, their jobs and the well-being of their cities and towns. Furthermore, cultural and political manifestations of Andalusianness were often associated with the activities of small sectors of Franco's bureaucrats and military men, who had in the past instrumentalized the meanings of their gatherings and celebrations as a political tool to counter Catalan nationalism. But other Catalans, usually those involved in unions and worker syndicates, were sensitive to the plight of the Andalusian immigrants and became willing political allies in struggles based on neighborhood needs or workforce demands. At the national level, Catalans such as Antonio Carlos Comín and Juan Goytisolo¹¹ created awareness of the severe plight of the Andalusians through their writings and political activities. Coming in contact with politicized Catalans in friendly contexts – as well as in more hostile ones – meant that Andalusians, who already possessed a distinctive consciousness of discrimination within the larger Spanish state, began to speak of this discrimination in a language of identity and nationalism. In this respect, migration became crucial in the politicization of identity.

Meanwhile, land – *la tierra* – while still an important trope in defining what it meant to be Andalusian, began to be integrated into discourses of purposeful underdevelopment and internal colonialism. The relevance of these

¹¹Indeed, as can be expected, the ties between Catalan and Andalusian leftists were often extensive. Another example is the case of the anarchist Soledad Gustavo, alias Teresa Mañé, who travelled through Andalusia and became involved in the campaign for amnesty for those jailed in the judicial process known as *Mano Negra* in the 1860's. Her daughter, Federica Montseny, would herself visit Andalusia and write about its plight in the mayor anarchist publications of the 1930's.

discourses in the incipient nationalism of the late 20th century will be discussed in the following chapter. In what follows, I will move to show the dramatic contrast between the political and economic realities – poverty, marginality, discrimination – of the Andalusians, and the preeminent role they occupied within the Spanish social imaginary.

The Space of Difference: Andalusia as border and as Nation

Andalusia, more than any other region, set the tone for popular literature... García Lorca, as I have the opportunity to witness... believed that those who were not too moved by the beauty of many of these themes were not legitimate Spaniards. This is an opinion that is licit for an Andalusian such as himself, as much as for an Englishman or a Scandinavian, but it does not have to be subscribed to by someone who has lived more in the north than in the south of the Peninsula (Julio Caro Baroja 1981: 191)

At first glance, these words from Caro Baroja appear commonsensical enough: an intellectual complains about the conceit, or cultural “vanity” if you prefer, of a compatriot who insists that in order to be a real member of their country the said intellectual must identify with the latter’s region of birth. And yet, these off-hand, almost colloquial remarks neatly encapsulate the crux of the problematics with nationhood and identity in Spain, and the central role played by Andalusian culture in them. For if Andalusian social reality and the cultural products shaped by it have provided the main tropes for much of what was understood as popular culture throughout the Spanish state, even to this day, the conflation between Spain and Andalusia is perhaps even stronger outside of its borders.

One basis for this conflation has been Andalusia's condition as frontier or borderland. The episode known as "The Reconquest," in which the last of the Muslims kingdoms was taken over by the Catholic Kings, became the foundational episode in the construction of the Spanish nation-state. The newly empowered state moved swiftly and violently to eradicate all traces of a history prior to its triumph, claiming to have expelled the "culture" of Al-Andalus along with its population, its language and its religion. This "total expulsion" would have created an empty space in which Spain could have recreated itself without contamination. Though recent historical and literary studies have seriously challenged these State myths (Asín Palacios 1990 [1931]; García Arenal and Ledoy 1990; López Baralt 1985, 1991, 1994; Navarez 1988; see also Ollague 1977), these claims seemed to be borne out in the intense religious fervor exhibited by the Andalusian people. This fervor warranted for Andalusia the epithet of *la tierra de María Santísima*, the land of the most faithful, the most Spanish. However, it continued to be seen as a treacherous land – after all, had the infidels not only been welcomed but even allowed to flourish? – where bandits, beggars, gypsies and other outlaw, racialized peoples roamed freely outside the control of the civilizing state. Even the drama of religious devotion became suspect due precisely to the passion of the performances.

The ideological justification of the Reconquest, that it was both a religious crusade and an epic struggle against the enemies of civilization played an crucial role in creating an image of Al-Andalus as radically different from the rest of the Christian world at the time. Furthermore, in creating an exalted sense of historical mission, the Reconquest also fostered a self perception of Spain as a distinctive historical entity, one that was not governed by universal laws of history. The need to integrate Andalusia into the Kingdom of Spain while keeping alive the memory of Al-Andalus as a source of dynastic

legitimacy led to a widespread association, even if problematic and uneasy, between Spain, Andalusia and Difference.

However, if what today is considered stereotypically Andalusian seems to resemble what Maravall (1986) described as the Spanish mass culture that emerged during the 17th century, it is because the various elements became conflated in the 19th century. In what follows, I will describe the role Andalusia played as a space both at the center and at the margins of Spanish self-definitions. We will see both how Andalusian cultural products were ascribed or appropriated for Statewide representations, and how in attempting modern and progressive images of Spain, different groups displaced that which they considered archaic and regressive unto Andalusia.

Crucial in the shaping of representations of both Spain and Andalusia was the “orientalist” gaze of English and French romantic travelers. In their travels they witnessed the dire situation of the majority of the Andalusian population: the unemployment, the poverty, the disease. But in their writings, the poverty was transformed into rural charm, the unemployment into laziness or simply a healthy love of leisure, and the jarring laments of the popular *cantes* were transformed into song and dance (López Ontiveros 1991). The emphasis on the religiosity of the population reinforced an image of passivity. Any evidence of class conflict was described as banditry and thievery, in other words, criminalized. A healthy dose of racism often led to sweeping statements about national character that deemphasized power relations and class distinctions. Furthermore, in contrast to this present, many of these authors constructed and promoted a vision of a “past” when moors and mooresses treaded lightly over fertile soils and indulged in tantalizing exotic delights. The extravagant contrast between a past of splendor and prosperity and the reduced circumstances of the present would become an Andalusian trademark. It gave

enormous popularity to this genre of literature, making its partial and distorted portrayal the most recognized image of Spain outside its borders.

Even Gerald Brenan, who perceptively described the complex political, religious and social background to the Spanish Civil War in his book The Spanish Labyrinth (1971 [1962]), was not immune to the seduction of images. In another, later book, South of Granada, he writes:

... I take for granted that no one will find in Spain a model country like Sweden or Switzerland, conditioned by the rhythm of its machines. Instead, they will find a country that to this day has insisted in preserving a certain degree of anarchy and rebelliousness. I find it impossible to say for how much longer this situation will last. But it is certainly true that south of the Pyrenees lives a society that still places the deepest needs of the human spirit over the technical organization necessary to attain a higher standard of living (Brenan 1982: 11)

Brenan knew quite well the difference between industrial, cosmopolitan cities like Barcelona and Madrid, and rural Andalusia, where he chose to live.¹² And yet he glosses over differences, to emphasize *Difference*. This is the Andalusian antinomy: the most radically "Other" is at the same time the metonym for "the Nation." These images continue to exert enormous influence to this day. For example, contemporary alternative and anti-Spanish definitions of Andalusia are often inspired by them, relying as they do on the portrayals of the northern conquerors as savage zealots, contrasting starkly with the Muslims who are seen as enlightened, cosmopolitan and tolerant. However, the

¹²He had in fact had high praise for the political commitment and strategic efficiency of the Catalan anarcho-syndicalist. The Andalusian rural anarchists did not fare as well, even if he chose to live among them.

powers that be are not above recuperating such positive images of Islamic civilization and exploiting them for purposes of tourism.

This conflation of Spain and Andalusia had many detractors. Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset was prominent among them. He saw the situation as tied to Andalusia's historical preponderance within the Spanish state:

During the entire 19th Century, Spain has lived under the hegemonic influence of Andalusia. That century begins with the *Cadiz Cortes*; it ends with the assassination of Canovas del Castillo, from Malaga, and the exaltation of Sevela, also from Malaga. The dominant ideas have an Andalusian accent. People paint Andalusia... Meridional writers are read... The entirety of Spain finds justification by the honor of including within its boundaries the Andalusian piece of the planet. But around 1900, as with many other things, this also changes. The north incorporates itself (Ortega y Gasset 1984 [1929]: 231-2).

Ortega is certainly correct when he notes the role that Andalusian elites and their culture play in the representation of this region. And yet, I believe that it was the relations between classes that shaped Andalusian representations, both locally and beyond. For the elites' life of leisure and luxury was made possible by their control of not only enormous extensions of land and cattle but also, in alliance with Church and State, a vast population left landless and pauperized. Moreover, this disenfranchised population was equally if not more prominent in representations of Andalusia. As is the case with many other oppressed peoples, their behavior was the source of constant

commentary and critique, by Ortega as well as by others.¹³ Like with the narratives of the romantic travelers, what characterizes these representations of both elites and working classes is an aesthetization of power, oppression and as well as of the tactics of the oppressed to counter them.

In fact, Ortega was typical of those intellectuals who belong to what is known as the 1898 Generation, the "Generation of the Disaster." This generation takes its name from the historical conjuncture which defined it: the loss of Spain's last overseas colonies, which came to be seen as proof of Spain's "decline." When confronted with the political and economic crisis of the Spanish state at the turn of the century, these intellectuals proposed a moral and spiritual renovation of the "Nation." This moral and spiritual renovation was clearly secular, and as such focused on the individual as the vehicle for wider social renovation. After the "disaster" of 1898, and faced with a present, and perhaps future, of reduced importance the intellectuals searched for explanations of Spain's decline in the character traits and "customs" of Spaniards. This led them to a critique of the past. In angst-ridden, desperate tones (Prado 1975), they focused on the phenomenon of *casticismo*. In this they followed the steps of the 18th Century *ilustrados*, the enlightened who in attempting to bring rationality and modernity to Spain had also targeted this phenomenon. *Casticismo* was characterized by an exaggerated, chauvinistic, and often outright extravagant imitation by the upper classes of the fashions and

¹³ For example, the 19th century also saw the emergence of the ideology of Regenerationism – precursor to the political and cultural nationalisms of the 20th Century – that challenged both the place assigned to the these stereotypes of Andalusia within "Spanishness" as a category of cultural identity and the dominant hegemonic configuration of Church, Monarchy, Military, and sectors of the Madrid-centered bourgeoisie. Articulated by sectors of the regional bourgeoisies in response to what they saw as a stagnating, decaying state, it argued that the reconstruction of Spain had to be accomplished through initiatives coming from the country's regions and their elites. Spain had to be "regenerated" from its peripheries and not from its center, for the source of most of Spain's woes was its unwieldy, dysfunctional and overly powerful central government (Moreno Navarro 1982)

mores of the urban lower classes, who were seen as embodying the true spirit of Spanishness. While both *illustrados* and *noventaiochistas* bemoaned the "process of conquest of the upper classes by manners of the boisterous rabble [*modales chulescos*]" (Ortega y Gasset in Prado 1975: 133), many thinkers of the 1898 Generation nevertheless still conceived the *castizo* as that which was most purely Spanish. In order to resolve the contradiction, they redefined the content of the *castizo* so that it becomes the opposite of what it had been. Some, such as Unamuno, wanted to see it in universal terms, as that which is fully human. Others, like Ortega y Gasset, in his work *Meditaciones del Quijote*, gave it clear national grounding: "From the traditional rubble we must urgently salvage the first essence of the race, the Hispanic module, that simple Spanish tremor in face of chaos. What is usually called Spain is not that, but precisely the failure of that." (cited in Prado 1975: 134).¹⁴

Part and parcel of this project was a redefinition of Andalusia. Ortega y Gasset presents us with rather illuminating examples of this discursive ploy in his *Theory of Andalusia*, an essay that remains to this day the most comprehensive and articulate collection of stereotypes about Andalusianess. For Ortega, Andalusians are defined by four salient characteristics: first, collective narcissism, the tendency to "imitate oneself" and "give oneself as a spectacle to foreigners"; second, a millenarian profile, in that Andalusians were "the oldest people/nation [*pueblo*] in Europe," precursor to even the Egyptians; third, a peasant dimension, not as economic activity but as symbiosis with

¹⁴ Brackette Williams (1993) has written on how the requirements and precepts of nationalist projects impact on the concept of culture. Referring to the propensity of nationalists to imagine a highly idealized and aggrandized future for their people (often derived from equally distorted perceptions of the past) she writes:

"Where the relations of force permit, it is this glorious destiny that is to be institutionalized and naturalized (imagined as a "new race") and represented as the nation/the people (the nationalization of Self). The Self becomes the particular embodiment not merely of nationality but of universal humanity that has vanished into a racio-national configuration" (Williams 1993:153)

nature, that makes them in turn passive before the warriors and invaders, who would pose a threat if confronted; and finally a vegetative or paradisiacal ideal, a laziness or tendency towards engaging in the least effort possible that comes in part from the idyllic climate of the region.

This synthesis neatly obviates any need to comment on structural and power inequalities, choosing instead to "psychologize" or "personalize" certain stereotypical behaviors which are seen as problematic. However, much more damaging was the way in which it both trivialized and naturalized the Andalusian social structure and the power relations on which it was based. Furthermore, I would argue that one must not mistake Ortega's belief in an extreme self-consciousness on the part of the Andalusians about their identity and their culture for political vindication of or even aesthetic attachment to Andalusia. When Ortega states that narcissism and self-imitation are only available to those who are "accustomed to contemplate themselves and delight in doing this," that millenarianism makes Andalusia the region of Spain with a culture most radically its own, and that Andalusia's idyllic climate makes them feel like a "privileged people," I suspect he is attempting to sequester problematic representations of the "Nation" into an "Other"'s domain.

What I would like to point out here is that the discourse critical of what came to be called *casticismo popular* is astoundingly resonant with discourses which criticized the State's version of Andalusian culture. In fact, what is called *castizo* is often indistinguishable from what is considered Andalusian: *flamenguismo*, *gitanería* and *toros* have been ascribed to both.¹⁵ For example, just take another one of Ortega's, again in reference to Andalusia: the appeal of tropes such as the "flamenco and *cante*, the bandit or the free-spirited Andalusian" had permanently diminished. All that "meridional junk" seems to

¹⁵One possible exception would be *majismo*, strongly identified with Madrid.

only "disturb and annoy" (Ortega 1984 [1927]: 134) the free thinkers. And yet, the literature on these phenomena seems to ignore their interrelatedness as parts of a larger complex. At this stage I would like to suggest that the Generation of 1898, with its redefinition of what was *castizo* fed very well into the State nationalist ideology, of National Catholicism. Furthermore, it found in "the Andalusian" the perfect "other" unto which it could impose the elements that had become undesirable.

Nonetheless, time and again, governments and regimes resorted to the idea that "Spain is Different" when for populist or propagandistic reasons they felt forced to call upon the "Nation," or to sell the "Nation" abroad. As happened in the 18th and 19th centuries, the ruling social sectors of the early 20th century – the Church, the Military, the Monarchy, the agrarian bourgeoisie and sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie which valued protectionism – cultivated the association of Spain with the idea of Difference when confronted with philosophies and politics that challenged their privileges. It was in this context that National Catholicism emerged as an ideology consolidating a hegemonic bloc within the Spanish state.

Universal Spain, Popular Andalusia: the National Catholic imagination

The relationship between the rise of National Catholicism and the modern stereotype of the "Andalusian" is a complex one. In a country of intense localisms, faced with a reality of economic, historic and linguistic diversity¹⁶,

¹⁶While by the end of the fifteenth century, Spain had become a single and powerful political unit with considerable international power, this power was exercised over a loose number of political units whose respective degrees of autonomy varied considerably. The Catalans, while hypothetically on par with Castille, were kept from engaging in overseas trade until late in the 16th Century; Andalusians were governed as a conquered territory. Salvador Giner (198?) has drawn interesting parallels between the Hapsburg formula in Eastern Europe and that followed by the Spanish monarchy. He argues that the attempts of the Bourbons to modernize did not manage to overcome the previous weak state apparatus that perpetuated patterns of regional privilege and inequality.

Catholicism was proclaimed time and again to be the one belief most Spaniards had in common, and the Church had become the only institution common to the entire peninsula (Christian 1971; Carr and Fusi 1979; Sánchez 1985). The Church had managed to gain this enormous power during the Reconquest; it consolidated and reproduced it through the institution of the Holy Inquisition. The Inquisition served the double purpose of imposing not only a religious regime but a political and economic one as well: in a land where religious affiliations were intrinsically connected to political ones, the forced conversions and confessions of heretics, Muslims and Jews meant renouncing allegiance to other centers of power, specifically the Southern Kings, and pledging loyalty to the Northern fiefdoms now united under a single Monarch and a Christian orthodoxy. It was perhaps the most effective instrument deployed by Ferdinand and Isabella in their quest for creating a solid peninsular base -- to call it national would be premature -- from which to launch an empire.

National Catholicism -- the belief that the grandiose manifest destiny of the Spanish nation is based on a symbiotic relation between culture and creed -- took form as a coherently articulated ideology only in the late 19th Century. It was largely a reaction to the crisis brought about by the confrontation of the many contradictions festering within the state in country's transition to industrial capitalism: rural vs. urban life; agricultural vs. industrial production; local vs. cosmopolitan lifestyles; monarchical vs. republican political views; clericalist vs. anticlericalist sympathies; centralism vs. separatist aspirations.¹⁷

¹⁷ Many authors have made maniquean interpretations of this split, creating the myth of the "two Spains." For example, in his book Las Dos Españas, Fidelino Figueredo writes "In Spain, 'right' and 'left' are not limited to the concept of State, to its relationship with its citizens and to the paths of government, to all that is part of the art of politics; they respond more rigorously to two opposing attitudes in the appreciation of national history and to the meaning of the future, restorative or creative" (Figueredo 1936: 72) This is too simple a picture, given the ways these antinomies combined in multiple and at times unexpected ways, making it impossible to draw

At its core lay a positive reappraisal of old themes, such as the empire being a legitimate political-economic form, the elevation of the teachings of the Catholic church to a national moral norm, and promotion of monastic scholasticism as model for cultural and intellectual achievement. As a "solution," it was conservative from its inception.

National Catholicism also re-membered the discourse of religious crusade. Turning around the arguments of its detractors – the Regenerationists, but also Anarchists, Communists, Socialists and Republicans – who laid the blame for Spain's decline at its feet (Pérez Agote 1986), the Church advocated that a return to its teachings was the only hope that Spain had if it wished to reverse its decline and maintain its unity. Through the control it exerted over schools, the Church managed to impose Tridentine Catholicism as the cultural norm of the Spanish state, and its catechism as the ethical standard (Sanchez 1985). Once disseminated, National Catholicism succeeded admirably in instilling the notion that the Catholic faith was so insolubly connected to national sentiment that it was nearly impossible to be or imagine being Spanish without first being Catholic. It was difficult to challenge the Church's position within the national myth without needing a reappraisal of the entire narrative of foundation; overall, even those opposed to the Church's continued involvement in affairs that were understood to be secular were extremely ambivalent in their relationship with it. The ideology's success in achieving the utter permeation of one category by the other can be seen in Miguel de Unamuno's statement: "Here in Spain we are all Catholics, even the Atheists."

National Catholicism was shaped by different social movements and sectors at different moments in Spanish history.¹⁸ But only with Franco – whose

a map of these two mythically opposed halves.

¹⁸The Carlists were the first to bring together its tenets – its strident anti-liberalism, and the intrinsic connection between Spanishness, Catholicism and the Empire, embodied in the

particular weaving of nationalist, imperialist and religious discourses provided a definitive blueprint for putting the ideology into practice -- did National-Catholicism come into its own as an ideology capable of providing the legitimation needed to carry out a program of reaction. Any attack against it, real or imagined, was construed as a direct attack on the most profound values and the integrity of "the Nation" and "the Race."

After the Nationalist victory over the Republicans in 1939, National Catholicism became indispensable. It provided all those who opposed the Republicans -- Carlists, Phalangists, Monarchists, the Military, the Church and certain sectors of the bourgeoisie -- with a coherent justification for overthrowing a government they saw as ruled by politicians whose petty political infighting and taste for "foreign ideologies" was leading to the disintegration of "the Nation." They argued thus: in a truly unified Spain there could only be one center of power (Madrid), one political party (the Government), one ideology (National Catholicism) and one Church (Catholic). Franco and his ideologues conceived the state as an instrument of this "Culture" that would redeem the "Nation," thus creating a new empire which would perpetuate the glorious past it inherited: the elegance and artistry of the Gilded Century, the architectural prowess and beauty of the Escorial, the

Monarchy -- as articulating principles for a political platform. However, the monarchical bent of this movement and its messianic rhetoric made their appeal limited to the less industrialized regions of the North, specifically Navarre. It was in these districts that the Church allied with the peasants against the selling of common lands, which for the peasants meant a threat to their domestic economy, and to the Church a premonition of future forced dispossessions. The *Falange* -- *Falange Española de Trabajadores/ Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista* -- offered a national-patriotic option that rejected Nazi paganism while endorsing an authoritarian catholic "Nacional-sindicalist State" (Payne 1984; Carr and Fusi 1979) that would be capable of finally bringing the fatherland to its "unity of destiny" (Brenan 1971). This option, with its populist and working class overtones, seemed particularly attractive to many students and younger members of the military, including some of its officers. However, after early successes in recruitment and mobilization, it quickly became coopted by the other forces within the Nationalist coalition. Franco and his closest allies had no desire to conscript the working classes; rather, they wished to use the Falange and the nationalist state to keep the workers in their place (Carr and Fusi 1979).

spirituality of the Spanish mystics – all attributes regionally embodied in Castille.¹⁹ Spanish historiography also reflected this bent. Research focused mostly on the XVI and XVII centuries, but also the central role of the absolutist kings, the Spanish Reconquest and the American conquest, with Castille figuring as the most prominent of all regions at all periods. When dealing with the period prior to the Reconquest, it was the hispano-roman and visigoth cultural production which received emphasis, and all possible cross-fertilization between the Islamic and Christian kingdoms was vehemently denied.²⁰

And yet, even while the regime deployed National Catholicism as legitimation, it also relied heavily on populist elements alien and frequently contrary to such ideology. To this end, the dictatorship became very involved from early on in the promotion of a “mass” culture, packaged for internal propaganda but also external tourist consumption. Whether promoted directly by state activity or private commercial interests encouraged by the state, this mass culture drew on already existing traditions which relied heavily on Andalusian cultural products, tropes and stereotypes. The image of the Spanish “people” (the masses, not the elites) it projected was quite self-serving to the

¹⁹Maravall (1986) in his study of the Baroque has referred to the essentially “conflictive” nature of 17th century society, and how Baroque culture was essentially a conservative reaction to a sense of crisis. With this in mind, the resurrection of the Guilded Century as a model and standard for culture in postwar Spain would seem quite appropriate and congruent with Franco’s reactionary cultural and political project.

²⁰Early on, intellectuals like Américo de Castro (1971, 1984), by reinterpreting the foundations of the Spanish nation, and Julio Caro Baroja (1962, 1978, 1992), by exploring the history of the “forgotten” Iberian peoples – the Moors, Jews, Basques, heretics and witches – would challenge the homogenizing vision created by National Catholicism’s reverence for Castille. In official historical narratives, the presence of these peoples was treated as either as an interruption – in the case of Moors and Jews – or as negligible – in the case of the Basques, the witches and other heretics – to the essential thread of Catholic and Castilian history and tradition which had constituted what was Spanish. Intellectuals such as these and others, even when focusing on Medieval and early Modern history, were addressing themselves to contemporary issues of representation and legitimation in ways that even if problematic could, nevertheless, be considered “safe.”

regime. In contrast to "high" culture – neoclassical, heroic, mannered, moralistic and "Castilian" – the culture packaged for "popular" and foreign consumption was visceral, festive, picaresque, melodramatic or outright comedic: in other words, stereotypically Andalusian. Music and cinema became the two favored vehicles for the dissemination of this dual cultural structure. While the elites entertained themselves with opera and cinema revolving around heroic, imperial or literary themes, the masses swooned to the voices of popular songstresses turned movie idols. These idols, who later would be called "the folklorics", had their most glorious years during the decades of the 1940's and 1950's, becoming exponents of an industry in the service of the dictatorship, destined to bring comic relief to the lives of the long suffering Spaniards and Andalusians. In this "cinematic ceremony of confusion... a cinema of bullfighters, maidens, love, *cortijos* and happy endings, a solemnly bad cinema, ...Andalusian or not, all the women dress as flamencas" (Delgado 1991). Even in the few and very isolated instances when the scripts were based on literary works, this cinema (and the music on which it was inspired and which it helped promote) can be characterized by the following:

...the absence of even minimal socio-political stances, the presentation of characters that are confronted with exclusively sentimental or emotional conflicts, the posing of the [heterosexual] couple as an initial confrontation that devolves into the subjection of the woman by the man, the repetition as quotidian fact of exceptional professions such as bullfighter, dancer or singer, the falsifying of the ambiance in real decor, the mystification of the clothes, the language and the way of life of the characters, the high incidence of goodness in the representatives of money and power, the frequent presence of

merry and friendly priests who even sing (at the same time that they ignore the problems that surround them), the presentation of the poor or the ethnic minorities (gypsies) in picturesque if not humiliating ways, the inevitable happy ending that undermines and resolves any problem posed, no matter how small. (Delgado 1991: 42)

The scope and magnitude of the influence of cinema on popular the popular imaginary cannot be overestimated: in 1947, Spain was second only to the United States in the number of movie theaters per inhabitant (Carr and Fusi 1979: 267).

The aftermath of World War II brought enormous changes to Spain. It could no longer remain viable if it continued its autarkic policies as isolationism and xenophobia stymied the economic and political dynamism industrialization demanded. Thus, the Spanish state was forced to abandon its protectionist stances to avoid smothering the industrial takeoff – relative as it might have been – that had begun to take place. Spain opened up to Europe through tourism and by not only allowing but actively seeking foreign investment in industry and finance.

As Spain moved back into the world economy, many within the regime realized that the old language of economic nationalism no longer sufficed. It exposed the Nationalist coalition's greatest weakness: they were united by "negation", that is, by what they did not like or did not want, by their like of what had been, rather than by what they envisioned for the future (Carr y Fusi 1979). All in all, these common ideals and values were not enough to overcome their contradictions or the impossibility of their goals, for the circumstances that had led to that past could not be reproduced in the future. That the vast majority of Spanish intellectuals opposed the Nationalists only exacerbated this

ideological void. Figures of the caliber of Ortega y Gasset and Unamuno, who might have been somewhat ambivalent at first, were in the end repelled by Franco's ideological conservatism. And they were by no means alone. Individuals whose politics spanned the ideological spectrum found a common ground in their distaste for the dictatorship, as was the case with historian Claudio Sánchez Albornoz. Even though his writings were embraced and even promoted by the regime, which found in them legitimation for its xenophobic and autarkic visions of Spanish history, he chose to live out his days in exile in Mexico. Furthermore, the repression that the dictatorship so freely used in order to maintain Spain "unified" only exacerbated the schisms within it -- particularly those between classes and regions.

In the process of moving Spain into the mainstream of the world economy, the inner circle of generals and bureaucrats who had collaborated with the brutal installation of the regime were increasingly relegated to the status of a reserve means of repression for emergency situations. Their place was taken up by new elites of civil servants and entrepreneurial managers (Ortí 1989). These new elites began to downplay the regime's more stridently nostalgic and traditionalist rhetoric, and move towards propagating a "technocratic" ideology that attempted to justify the economic changes by privileging "rationalization" over "tradition" even while conceding that they should -- somehow -- be harmonized (Carr and Fusi 1979). The fact that this discourse never fully replaced old Nationalist Catholicism but stood parallel to it introduced a degree ideological ambiguity within the regime; and yet it was precisely its contradictory nature and malleability that proved to be effective.

These changes also affected the regime's cultural production. In the sixties the popularity of "folklorist" films declined, leading the way to a more modernized version, in which the characters, previously expressing their

culture, now begin to consciously perform it for the sake of entertainment. In contrast to the "natives" who in acting, singing, and dancing simply expressed their "selves", these modern "performers" packaged their artistic expression to cater to the changed tastes of the Spanish population, increasingly more urban and exposed to other cultures; and even more importantly, to the tourists themselves (Delgado 1991). However, the decline of the "folkloric" films has to be seen as tied not only to changes in tastes and consumption but also to a change in social perception and customs. For the migration that had begun in the late 1950's brought the Andalusian "natives" to the doors (literally) of many of those urban movie goers. The Andalusian world these films portrayed could no longer be maintained, not even at the distance afforded by the make believe world of film. In the popular imaginary, the Andalusian went from being a songstress, bullfighter or poor and cheerful peasant to becoming a "social problem:" the displaced laborer, the uneducated, nostalgic migrant, and later the beggar, the petty thief or the delinquent, stripped of any redemption by "native charm."

In the new genres that came after the "folklore" films, Andalusia ceases to figure as prominently (Delgado 1991). And yet, behind this decline in visibility lay hidden a process whereby these folklorized elements of Andalusian culture were appropriated by the official culture of the State: what was Andalusian was taken out of the Andalusian context into a nameless, slightly "up-dated" or "modernized" one where it became generically Spanish. The arrival of television only reinforced this trend, by re-broadcasting these products and in fact keeping them alive. And through television, other forms of identification would be created: the prominent broadcasting of sports events that would be given highly nationalistic overtones, eventually fostering a strong state-nationalist identification (Carr and Fusi 1979).

To summarize: while in the North, industry and finance were targeted for incentives and investments, the Andalusian economy was not able to support its own people. But at the same time, while other forms of regional cultural expression were forcefully suppressed because of their perceived threat to the "national" unity, Andalusian cultural products were appropriated to provide a national "mass" culture, and made to represent the "Other" that the regime had to suppress and control. The culturalist discourse, which appeared to exalt Andalusia, in fact disguised the economic neglect that afflicted the region. Nevertheless this discourse created the means by which to promote a strong identification on the part of Andalusians with this portrayal of Spain.

From Nation to nationalities: Andalusia in the Autonomy Process

Salvador Giner, among other prominent scholars, has argued that Franco's legitimization was drawn largely from his capacity to "...suppress and extirpate all forms of autonomism or minority ethnic separatism" (Giner 1989: 84). Thus, in the Spanish state that emerged from the "democratic transition" after 40 years of severe political repression, the visibility of the peripheral nationalist struggles of the Northern and Northeastern regions made them a standard for valiant anti-dictatorship opposition. But the politicians who had fanned the nationalist fires only as a means to challenge the dictatorship had to find a safe way to then defuse these separatist energies. To this end they came up with the "proceso autonómico," a calculated maneuver to assuage the nationalist demands without seriously challenging the State's centrality. However, this was much easier said than done, given that the consensus had to be reached from positions which had long been entrenched and at great political distance from each other. The politicians soon found themselves scrambling in order to come up with a constitutional formula that would please

at least the more moderate factions of the peripheral nationalism. Not only did they have to win them over to the cause of drafting a constitution for the State; they had to do so without alienating those on the far Right, who also posed a clear threat. The compromise was written into the second article of the Spanish constitution of 1978:

The constitution is founded upon the *insoluble unity* of the *Spanish Nation*, the fatherland that is *indivisible and common* to all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right of autonomy to the *nationalities and regions that comprise it* and the solidarity among all of them.

The wording of this article produced some of the most acrid debates on record during the constitutional convention of 1978. More than any other event, these debates threatened to undermine the consensus on which the Constitution was being built (De la Cuadra y Gallego-Díaz 1981; Solé Turá 1985). While no one involved in the writing of the article claimed that the term nationalities was problem free, the most vehement protestations of its usage and meaning came from those on the Right. Even if their objections were entirely predictable, their arguments nevertheless highlighted precisely what those on the Left hoped and desperately needed to keep vague for the sake of political expediency: the relationship between the Nation and its nationalities, not only in political but also in cultural terms. Julián Mariás, disciple of none other than Ortega y Gasset himself, put in this way:

Nationality is not the name of any social or political unit, but rather an abstract name, that signifies a property, affection or condition...With this word, the intent is to designate something like a "subnation;" but this word has never meant such a thing in our language... (in Sánchez Goyanés 1983: 215)

Jordi Solé Turá, who until recently headed the Ministry of Culture under the socialist government, wrote in 1985 what I consider to be an excellent example of the political discourse – with all its necessary paradoxes and ambiguities – about "nation and nationality" that emerged during the transition and was used by center and left sectors of the hegemonic configuration:

From my point of view, *both terms* [nations and nationalities] *are equivalent* and designate the same reality. Therefore, I see no contradistinction between the two. However, I believe in terms of exposition it is useful to make a certain *terminological distinction*.... because both terms make reference to a same reality that, as we will see, is always intimately connected with political power... When I speak of "*nation*" I will make reference then to the type of *social formation* that has as its *sphere of action* a *State* and when I speak of "*nationality*" I will refer to that reality that has as *its sphere* other form of political power, such as an Autonomous Community in the case of Spain...

In this case, the *counterpoising* of "*Spanish nation*" to "*Catalan nation*" or "*Basque nation*," for example, is a *political distinction* that *disavows* Spain's current constitutional framework. However, if one *accept* the political framework of the 1978 Constitution one is accepting that the Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalities are integrated in a broader ensemble from which no separation is intended. In this case the *distinction between nationality and nation* should not be problematic and have the functional character I wish to give them. Having said this, I insist that the term "nation" and the

term "nationality" refer to the same social reality and pose the same problems (Solé Turá 1985: 23; emphasis added)²¹

In the end, while many willingly admitted that the formulation of Article II was "awkward" and "rhetorical," it met "an indispensable need" within the new Constitution: "...to make all Spaniards feel united and committed to a common, collective project of the Spanish nation" (De la Cuadra y Gallego-Díaz 1981: 47) -- if for "nation" one reads State.

Those who wished to impose this compromise had no qualms about invoking the mantle of the constitution, thus of democracy, to legitimize their position. Salvador Giner (1986: 88-89) has pointed out how this legitimation was accessible through the previous conflation in popular political discourse between "democratization" and "autonomy." In this view, this equation of terms stemmed from the fact that it was in the regions with strong nationalist movements -- the most economically and industrially developed -- that the anti-dictatorship struggle flourished. He argues that the dominant role that activists from these regions played in defining the discourse about democracy meant that slowly but surely the notion of "political autonomy for all communities" crept into the consciousness of many of those who were organizing and acting against the dictatorship. In other words, the democracy was not just about individual freedoms, rights and responsibilities, but also about the freedoms of distinct communities, with respect to the state. What the hegemonic discourse did was to conflate two different conceptions: that of

²¹ Further proof of the inherent contradictions in this position is that in the same book, though much later, Solé Turá admits that in the final text of Article 2 "one can find, in a disorderly fashion the two great conceptions of Spain that are in conflict not only in the domain of ideas but also in that of the voting booth: that of Spain as a unique and indivisible nation, and that of Spain as an articulated ensemble of historically formulated nationalities and of regions." (Solé Turá 1985: 25)

autonomy as democratization, and that of autonomy as the earned right of certain groups.

And thus emerged the "Spain of the Autonomies," which made diversity its unifying principle. However, what had begun as an attempt to control the secessionist tendencies of the two most wealthy and developed regions within the Spanish state rapidly spun out of the politicians' control. Much to their surprise and alarm, other regions whose "Spanishness" had never been questioned enthusiastically embraced the idea of "difference" in ethnic terms. The threat this problem posed to the constitutional parliamentarians cannot be overestimated when it comes to the constitutional process. Martín (1992) argues that neither can the role Andalusia played in making this threat very concretely real.

We cannot deny that what has come to be known as "The State of the Autonomies" was in part propitiated by the governing political elites as a way of defusing the nationalist programs of certain peoples, the Catalan among them. However, it would be a huge simplification to then say that this policy responded exclusively to those interests. If it was enacted at all it was because at that time there were some "people/nations" [*pueblos*] ready to claim for themselves at least the same rights that the State was considering granting to some of the others that existed within its territorial boundaries. The Andalusian case and the events that took place with respect to the different legislative articles through which a given territory could accede to autonomy is a very important example of our arguments (Martín 1992:70).

The parliamentarians confronted two kinds of potential threat to the integrity of the State. On the one hand there were the so-called *nacionalidades*

históricas [historic nationalities], those with a "proven" history of autonomist claims and which had been granted some form of autonomy during the II Republic -- Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia. On the other, there were the regions that did not have a history of autonomist movements or whose movements and claims had previously not been formalized or recognized, and were now demanding recognition, such as Andalusia. This potential threat was resolved by instituting a process of "rationalization," or two-speed autonomy process. First, the constitution granted Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, as "historic nationalities," autonomy in the managing of many of their internal affairs -- namely health, social assistance, transportation internal to the community, ports, agriculture, sports and cultural affairs, to name a few. At the same time, their singularity -- and menace -- was neutralized by extending levels of self-government to other regions as well. However, while other communities would have to submit to a lengthy process of Statute development and a referendum in order to accede to the Autonomic regime -- complicated built-in hurdles made this process far from straight forward (García Ferrando 1982) -- the "historic nationalities" were exempted and were awarded the most extensive jurisdiction over their internal affairs allowed by the constitution.

In other words, all regions outside of those deemed "historic" had two options if they wished to pursue autonomy. The first form and/or trajectory was laid out in Article 143 of the constitution, and it was the one preferred by those intent on rationalizing the autonomy process. It established that "...bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, island territories and provinces with historic regional status..." could take the initiative towards creating an autonomous community. This initiative should come from the Provincial government or from at least two-

thirds of the municipalities within the limits of the purported Autonomous Community, and must be completed within six months of the opening of the procedure. If the initiative did not prosper within that time, it could not be presented to the Courts until five years had elapsed. Autonomous Communities formed under the aegis of Article 143 could assume all the competencies attributed to them in Article 148: organizational functions; economic administration and promotion; matters of social welfare; and cultural programs. The matters over which the State retained jurisdiction were stipulated in Article 149. Any or all matters not expressly addressed by article 149 but not included in Article 148 could be ceded over to the Administration of the Autonomous Community after a period of 5 years, during which they would be administered by the state. Article 150 provided that the State could, when it deemed convenient, delegate to the Administration of Autonomous Communities matters which initially pertained to it.

The second "form" of autonomy is that established by Article 151. This article was created as a refutation:

The political reason behind this special modality is to make possible for other nationalities and regions, different from Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, to achieve the levels of autonomy that these can reach...With this possibility one can refute the thesis of autonomies with higher levels of jurisdiction being exceptions [to the general rule] and opens the possibility for others to attain those same ceilings, even if their autonomic will is not historically validated. (Sánchez Goyanes 1983: 214)

Thus Article 151 was seen as a more desirable form of Autonomy, given that it granted the highest attainable levels of self -government to any region interested in the most expeditious fashion. A "community" could request

Autonomy through this article if it had the endorsement of three-fourths of all provincial or municipal entities within the limits of the projected Community. The government then would convene a Parliamentary Assembly composed by elected officials from the proposed Community. This Assembly was entrusted with writing a proposal for the Autonomic Statute. This bill was then presented to the Constitutional Commission of Congress for its final elaboration no later than two months after its introduction. After it was elaborated and deemed constitutional by the Commission, it was then to be submitted for referendum to the electorate of the proposed Autonomous Community, in accordance to the Organic Law governing referenda. However, given that this organic law was passed after the constitution had been approved, in a procedure widely regarded as hasty (De la Cuadra y Gallego-Díaz 1981; García Ferrando 1982; Tamames 1985), and that it created exceedingly high standards for passing referenda (an affirmative vote of over 50% of the *registered electorate*, not of the votes cast), it cast a shadow on the government's claims that it was acting in good faith when granting levels of self-government to communities other than the "historic" ones.

Andalusia became the test of the effectiveness of this strategy as a deterrent (Del la Cuadra y Gallego-Díaz 1981). Still reeling from the impact of the December 4, 1977 demonstration, the political elites were at odds about what to do with the demands for self-government so vehemently expressed by the Andalusian population. During early 1978, government and parties began to waver in their support for Andalusian autonomy, perhaps concerned with the political consequences of further encouraging popular expectations. However, the assembly of Andalusian parliamentarians -- composed by politicians elected to Parliament in the general elections of 1978 -- went ahead and drafted the project for Autonomy. In 1979, it decided to initiate official

proceedings. The date was set: on February 28, 1980, Andalusians would vote on whether or not they wished to form an Autonomous Community.

Continued ambivalence by the parties marked the approach of the plebiscite. Events took a turn towards the bizarre when the UCD [Centrist Democratic Union], the party backing the government coalition at the time, after having called for the referendum decided to carry out a campaign to get the electorate to abstain. The president of the Andalusian pre-autonomic government, socialist Rafael Escuredo, staged a hunger strike in protest of this and other continued problems with the organization and publicity of the referendum.²² Unlike the votes which had taken place in other Communities, access to the media was limited, and general campaign funds were extremely meager; furthermore, migrants in Catalonia found it practically impossible to cast absentee ballots (García Ferrando 1982: 129). In the end, all attempts to temper the momentum failed and activity became feverish days before referendum: popular artists along with poets laureate performed in impromptu meetings; high level UCD officials went against their party lines and campaigned for the referendum; and many others public figures joined rallies, marches and motorcades promoting the "yes" vote.

The results only complicated matters further. In seven of the eight Andalusian provinces over 50% voted for it; the exception, Almería, reached 43%. Given that over 55% of the registered electorate in all of Andalusia voted in favor of the establishment of the Autonomous Community, the government found itself face to face with a serious political crisis. The Junta asked the

²² In this action he was not supported by the general directive of the PSOE, and it would later cost him his job and his preeminence within the party. Although some question Escuredo's political motives, seeing him as an opportunist whose strategy of playing up his party's *andalucismo* backfired, to a vast majority of Andalusians Escuredo is seen as an honest and committed fighter for Andalusian autonomy who fell victim to the PSOE's internal fighting and hypocrisy in governing the Andalusian Autonomous Community. They held the absolute majority in the Andalusian Parliament until 1994.

government to come up with a solution. The majority party, UCD, was inclined to decree autonomy by invoking Article 144, which gave the government power to create an Autonomous Community if it was in the State's interest. The Andalusian nationalist party, Partido Socialista Andaluz, was inclined to accept; however, the matter was taken out of their hands when the PSOE allied itself with the Andalusian Communists and voted to reject this solution.²³ Instead, they demanded the modification of the Organic Law of Referendum as the only adequate instrument to make possible the continuance of the autonomy process under Article 151. In the end, they prevailed and Andalusians were granted autonomy which was supposed to be commensurate with that of the "historic regions."

And the fact that up to 1992 Andalusia remained the exception -- the one "non-historic" nationality to have, at least on paper, the same potential for self government as the "historic" ones -- points to another operation of "rationalization," more subtle and insidious. This was a discursive sleight of hand which gave "history" a prominent position when conferring autonomic jurisdictions and privileges, to the detriment of another possible rationale for autonomy: the "strengthening and deepening of democracy, the limiting of power and the participation of the citizens in this process" (Tamames 1985: 174). This in turn can be traced to two possible interpretations of "community": on the one hand, community as a socially constructed process articulated around dynamic axes of power; on the other, community as an "organic" whole, a harmonious and homogenous collectivity defined by an ensemble of static elements or attributes, whose emergence is either immemorial or fixed at a moment in "the ancient past." It could in fact be argued that the "essentialist"

²³The vote was taken on September 27, 1980. Many commentators distrust the "andalucismo" of the PSOE, and see this as a move to secure its hegemonic hold in Andalusia, which would be threatened by a successful alliance between the PSA and the UCD.

understanding of community served to temper the political potential of the other understanding, of community as a dynamic polity, a body politic; to have openly recognized this would have been a risky proposition indeed. This is because "to see ourselves as constituting others is to acknowledge our having more power than we wish to have or be comfortable having. To see ourselves as constituting ourselves is to leave the door open for calling into question the arguments we ourselves frequently use for claiming the 'fact' and, thus, legitimacy of our collective identity" (Dominguez 1991: 191).

I believe that this attempt at the "rationalization" of claims for self-government enshrined the "national form" as the blueprint for making all manner of claims to the state: political, economic, social, and cultural. This "national form", in its hegemonic understanding, was defined through the articulation of several key concepts: community, but also culture and authenticity. In order to unravel the complexity of their definition, we must go beyond the commonsensical understandings of these terms. Raymond Williams (1983) reflects on the transformation of the meaning of the term "culture" that took place during the 19th Century. While prior to this time it was understood as a process, and in fact was used as a synonym for cultivation, during the early 19th Century it became a thing in itself, an absolute. In contrast to civilization, which was tied to material prosperity and therefore to all the potential for corruption that this entailed, "it offered a different and superior order." And this order was clearly class based and specific.²⁴ In short, R. Williams sees this innovative use of the term "culture" as tied directly to the social, economic and political upheavals brought about by industrialization. It is essentially a

²⁴ A particularly important source of preoccupation became the effects of industrial occupations, specifically those most mechanized, on the thinking of the working class. "Against materialism, the amassing of fortunes, and the proposition of utility as the source of value, it offered a different and a superior order" (R. Williams 1978:40)

conservative understanding of culture, that is meant to protect certain values and behaviours – that defined and preserved specific social, economic and political privileges – against change.

Virginia Domínguez, in her study of the contemporary meaning of the term in contemporary Israel concludes that "[t]he clear, unheralded message seems to be that reference to *tarbut* [culture] is at one and the same time reference to the hierarchical placement of individuals and groups in society and to attempts to affirm or create a hierarchical order by which individuals and groups would, then, be judged" (Domínguez 1991: 120). Furthermore, she finds that "culturalist" discourse is "embedded within social political and economic inequality." Even policies that appear to be egalitarian to in fact uphold a hierarchical valuation of these "diverse" cultures. Much of this hierarchization is supported by a definition of authenticity that suggests simultaneously a sense of rootedness, truthfulness, history, culture and essence. Such understanding also suggests and/or assumes that in everyday life there is an excess of "impurity" at the same time that a regard for "the past" and a clarity in people's sense of themselves are seriously lacking (Domínguez 1991: 132 ff.)

Similar assumptions played a crucial role in the "cultural politics" of the Spanish transition. Notions of "community" and "nation" were interpreted primarily in terms of "culture" understood as a static absolute. In this context, consciousness became awareness of the cultural markers that made a "national community" into a differentiated reality [*hecho diferencial*]. This absolute difference became the basis on which to justify claims of nationhood, and therefore for self-government. The markers privileged to define such different realities were not only a distinct language and territory but also a distinct history, understood as a chronology of injuries and accomplishments that became "embodied" as differences in ethnic origin. Brackette Williams,

approaching the concept of culture "through the politics of struggle over meaning as power"(1993:152), points to how the positive value of "difference" is predicated on whether or not such differences are presumed to be homogeneously distributed within a purported unit, namely the people/nation. Authenticity of the "culture" of the present and the legitimacy of innovations on "traditions" this implies are prerogatives of the powerful in so far as they can write their histories calling upon hegemonies that homogenize the unit they are defining, i.e. their people/nation. The transformation of primordial allegiances into naturalized, "authentic"-ated civil ties to the nation is said to be guaranteed by this homogeneity, in so far as it breeds security, as security encourages cooperation, and as cooperation engenders progress (1983:148)

In the Spain of the "transition," the possibility of being able to "trace" a people's or a region's "identity" – a trajectory of legitimate and authentic innovations on traditions – through "history" became a zealously guarded form of symbolic capital. The fight against Franco's authoritarian regime included such a critique, in which the "Spanish Nation" was defined as inauthentic, in fact, invented by an authoritarian State that forcibly suppressed authentic "national differences." "Difference (within a unity)" validated through "history" became exchangeable for political leverage and economic privilege. The State's highly publicized wrongdoings in terms of cultural repression were privileged over other injuries, which were both contained and hidden within this culturalist discourse. This created, as Brackette Williams (1989) showed for Guyana, a hierarchy of legitimacy in terms of political and social claims to suffering within the State. Within this framing of reality, historic nationalities were pitted against regions, "non historic" by implication. What made this nationalities "historic" and deserving of self-government was not that they had

a history of political/nationalist struggles, although this was what was claimed, but that this "history" was redeemable. In other words, they were peoples having unique connections to a static absolute as measure of value, i.e. to a "culture" as it came to be understood. The challenging of other bases for the claim to nationhood was part and parcel of protecting these privileges.

The fact that the image of Franco that emerged from the transition period was one of a political and cultural tyrant yet a successful economic developer only exacerbated matters. As we have mentioned earlier, Spain as a whole seemed to have achieved levels of financial well being not known in any other period of recent history; and even if regional differences became intensified, it was certainly true that standards of living increased across the board. Thus to challenge the role of the dictatorship on economic grounds was somewhat complicated. Furthermore, the way the transition to democracy was transacted, as a negotiated consensus between elites – the industrial and financial bourgeoisies deeply implicated in the workings of the dictatorship, and the newly emergent sectors of young professionals who felt constrained by the political and social limitations imposed by the regime (Ortí 1989) -- imposed limits on political economic critiques. In contrast, a critique of the cultural and political repression was more easily incorporated within liberal ideas and standards. This critical legitimacy was enhanced by the reality of the specific forms of repression exercised over those geographic regions where nationalist activity had flourished during the Second Republic, namely Catalonia and the Basque Country. And yet to meet the demands made by these regions would have meant singling them out, which would have destabilized the tenuous pacts being reached.

In the context of the cultural politics I have described, the re-membling of the events of December 4, 1977 appears as somewhat less surprising. The

grassroots movement that made that day possible articulated its discourse around visible axes of social power, namely the economy – class and development – and politics. But this understanding did not fit easily within a hegemonic discourse articulated in "cultural" terms. What else could Andalusia invoke that would mark it as "different"? How else could it counter the use of its cultural representation and production as a metonym for the "Spanish nation" and be able to become a "nationality" among many? How could it avoid being signified as "Difference," highly undesirable in the context of post-Franco Spain, where democracy, modernity but above all Europeanness, where inextricably tied? In the following chapters, we will explore how different generations have answered these questions at different times.

Part IV Conclusions

Jonathan Boyarin suggests that "a claim to priority includes a claim of authochthony, of an origin inseparable from that very territory and free of dependence from any other group" (Boyarin 1994:17) and quotes Vidal-Nacquet's definition of authochthony as "not having been instructed by anyone else; the theme is fundamental" (Vidal-Nacquet in Boyarin 1994:17). The question is of course, not whether any group, let alone a more complex and dynamic collective such as a nation could, ever meet these requirements, but which nations are capable of defining and describing themselves as such. Andalusia is not among them.

Andalusia has served as a space within the Spanish national imaginary unto which many of the contradictions inherent in Spanish history and identity got projected, recreated and only occasionally resolved. This dynamic is inextricably linked to the nation-state's management of Andalusia as a border zone. Historically, by objectifying its border's products and linking them to itself as a center, the Spanish state effectively extended its control over a problematic social space, while justifying

its isolationist and xenophobic practices. Foreigners who engaged in these dynamics did so for different reasons, but the end result was the same: to bring to the very center of the Spanish nation-state the contradictions and confrontations that took place within the border, and having objectified them and frozen them in time, to render them unresolvable. It perpetuated a paradox as its definition, a paradox which at different moments in time found different resolutions. The "Transition to Democracy" constitutes an example of such a crisis, when challenges to an authoritarian State, were articulated as challenges to the representation of the "Nation" associated with it. The resolution was to give the appearance of democratizing the State resources by de-centering the Nation into nationalities. However, as Dominguez (1991) has pointed out in the case of Israel, the legitimation of cultural diversity merely promoted an *illusion* of equality, that masked new forms of subordination. Thus, consistent with Dominguez, what I have objected to is not the existence of diversity, but rather the grounds on which it was claimed, grounds that have perpetuated underlying hierarchies. Andalusians, in most desperate need of democratization and redistribution of resources, were not able to articulate themselves as a nationality under the definition imposed and thus lost access to leverage within the new hegemonic configuration of the state. I believe this case illustrates how it is certainly important to understand and critique the oppressiveness of nationalist ideologies as homogenizing and hegemonic apparatuses. At the same time, it is not enough to criticize the evils of nationalism while ignoring the crucial role that "nations" have in structuring contemporary political economy and cultural politics.



Figure 1. Folkloric dancers performing at the official celebration in commemoration of the passage of the referendum for Andalusian autonomy in February 20, 1980.

(Cordoba, 1993)




Figure 2. Another kind of commemoration: graffitti remembering the social, political and economic struggles that gave rise to demands for autonomy during the late 1970s.

(Cordoba 1993)

Chapter III. The feeling of being Andalusian: identity, emotion and the naturalization of subordination

*"Andalucía era para mí algo muy
cariñoso, una identidad cariñosa
..."*

– Omar Checa, 1993

In the summer of 1992, I arrived in Córdoba, a rather small city of around 200,000 people in the Autonomous Community of Andalusia, which occupies the southernmost part of the Spanish State – holding about a fifth of its territory and its population. I was to stay for two years, although I did not know it at the time, in order to conduct research on how the transition to democracy had shaped generational politics and political cultures. I had visited Córdoba before, in 1990, and became enchanted with the city. My enthusiasm only grew when I began to meet the people who lived there. I was puzzled, however, by the fact that often many of the people who befriended me – and I will always be thankful to how many there were – insisted that Cordovans were different from other Andalusians. People in Córdoba widely believed that Andalusians were “typically” festive, gregarious and open. In contrast, Cordovans described themselves as thoughtful, somber, undemonstrative and even austere. Sometimes, particularly people who were not from Córdoba, offered the city’s proximity to Castille as an explanation, which seemed to me uncomfortably reminiscent of the National Catholic ideal of a Castille of Christian ascetics and warrior martyrs. However, Cordovans were just as likely to attribute this difference to the influence of Séneca upon their character. While the philosopher had indeed been born in the city, he was sprinted off to Rome at the age of ten to continue his education. Amused, I used to ask them: “Would it not then be more appropriate to speak about Córdoba’s influence on him?”

These local fine tunings rarely became reflected in popular or more erudite representations of national character. Outside Andalusian borders, Cordovans, as Andalusians, were widely held to be open, friendly, festive and, above all, highly emotional people. In the social sciences, attempts at a more “nuanced” portrayal have often resulted in authors pointing out that Andalusians only appear to be open, but are in fact quite reserved and untrusting; that beneath the oft-noted and quoted strong bonds of friendship lurk deep seeds of hatred; that generosity is often thinly veiled greed, and that it quickly ensnares the object of attention into deeper and deeper webs of reciprocity; and so forth (see for example Gilmore1987). All told, Andalusians, either simply or in complex (and threatening) ways, were seen as peoples of extremes.

I believe that the disclaimers Cordovans made about themselves, especially when they came from such friendly and generous people, signal to their discomfort, not necessarily fully conscious but as such no less significant, with such stereotyped representations. In this chapter, I will explore what I see as a relation that underlies these images: that of emotion and Andalusianness. I will argue that this relation is created by conflating lack of control over one’s own body and actions, that is, the limitations placed on one’s agency, with lack of control over one’s bodily functions, including thoughts and emotions. It is an ideological relation in that matters of political choice or imposition -- that is, social, economic, cultural, and other forms of subordination -- become “naturalized” as matters of fact, unchangeable.

That a relation between emotionality and subordination is established is not in itself remarkable. Indeed, it comes with an outstanding pedigree, having been used to disempower and legitimate the disempowerment of all kinds of subordinated groups, whether categorized in terms of age, class, gender,

ethnicity and race, as the work of a growing number of authors has shown (Amin 1989; Fanon 1965; Lutz 1992; Min-ha 1989; Nandy 1989; Scheman 1993; Said 1979; B. Williams 1996; Yanakisako and Delaney 1994.) That it has proven to be so resilient, withstanding all manner of criticism and refutation, is further proof of its profound connection to broader forms of social control and to the discourses through which they are articulated, such as reason, civilization, and manliness.

Although I would like nothing more than to lay a lethal blow to such obfuscating and prejudicial stereotypes, my aim is actually much humbler. I would simply like to point out how the association between Andalusia and emotion has permeated the discourse on national identity in Andalusia. Andalusians are said to feel their identity, rather than be conscious of it, and Andalusians themselves make use of this term in such contexts. It is not the case that Andalusians do not distinguish between consciousness and feeling, for I heard many of them proclaim their *consciousness* of their identity as workers. Thus, I will be exploring what I believe are the complexly articulated reasons for this distinction, and its implications for everyday Andalusians who live in contemporary Spain, where identity, as a marker of "cultural difference," has become privileged as the site for making and staking claims on the State, and where feeling is seen as subordinate to consciousness. Andalusians have seen their demands and claims on the State consistently trivialized, delegitimized and silenced. In other words, I would like to rethink the way in which Andalusians were produced and referenced as subjects in Spanish and broader Western discourses and, specifically, how they were defined simultaneously as subordinate but also needing subordination (Said 1979).

Emotion as Identity: Andalusia in the Anthropological Paradigm

James Fernandez (1983), in a review article on Anthropological scholarship about Andalusia, commented on how the representations of North and South often assumed bodily metaphors: while the North was tied to the head and thus to thought, creation and production, people of the south were tied to the visceral organs, and with consumption, reproduction and, of course, lower passions.¹ In Spain, such stereotypes are very prevalent and popular through out all strata of the population. (Philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset was among their avid promoters). However, while the local tradition is quite extensive, in many ways it was utterly dependent on the orientalist (and oriental-izing) writings of European Romantic travelers during the 19th Century. In the 20th century, and especially since the 1950's, discourse within the British and American social sciences, and particularly Anthropology and Sociology, has contributed to preserving the vigor of these images.

Recently, folklorist Timothy Mitchell, in a book aptly entitled *Passional Culture* (1990) has argued most forcefully and explicitly that Andalusians are inherently emotional people. Extrapolating from Andalusians' behavior during the Holy Week commemorations (festivities that vary widely not only in tenor but also in importance across the region)² he purports to show "how the particular kind of emotionality that Andalusian society *breeds* is intense enough to constitute a belief system" that "can take so called secular culture and twist it into a patently religious direction" (Mitchell 1990: 5). This "twisted"

¹Dominguez (1987) has analyzed similar processes of subordination – though on different grounds – by the Ashkenazi, who "laid claim to a 'culture,' or a 'way of life,'" while ascribing a "mentality" to Sephardic Jews, that is, Jews of Mediterranean descent. "She points out how some Sephardim believe that this distinction "... was not a mere play on words, but a reflection on the way European Jews looked down on their Oriental compatriots"(p. 104)

²I found that the growing interest in and elaboration of Holy Week celebrations was actually a recent phenomena. People I spoke to in Córdoba and in other Andalusian towns suggest that outside Seville, and to a much lesser extent Malaga and Granada, Holy Week celebrations were actually disappearing by the end of the Franco dictatorship. However, tourism and populist politics have fueled a revival of these activities. Maddox (1993) draws similar conclusions in his book about the town of Aracena.

culture is said to foster "the growth of an idiosyncratic taste for spectacles of strong emotion with victimization as a central motif" (ibid: 2). Such is the threat posed by Andalusian emotivity. Not only is it bred, that is, reproduced by birth, it is also "thoroughly contagious" and has the power to desecrate secular culture by making it degenerate into less "rational," "religious" forms.

Even a cursory acquaintance with Andalusian history, such as the one I offered in the previous chapter, puts in evidence how obfuscating and obscene such statements can be. But Mitchell, either utterly unaware of history or simply ignoring it, turns centuries of oppression into "taste," in the last instance irrational. This "taste" is further explained away by connecting its emergence to other "naturalized" phenomena, that of Andalusian emotivity. However, the innateness of this emotivity does not relieve Andalusians of responsibility. Although the complex webs of subordination in which their dependency is embedded are neither acknowledged nor taken into account, and the stifling of autonomy and the fostering of dependency (Mitchell 1990: 5) are objectified and turned into essential, transhistorical, Andalusian "things," they should nevertheless be changed. But Mitchell neatly erases any social causality by "naturalizing" social, economic and cultural process, thus collapsing any spaces for change in his argument. This leaves Andalusians with the equivalent of an "original" sin, that perhaps only abandonment of Andalusianness can erase, if this is even possible.

This paradox is embedded within the webs of discourse that surround Western understandings of emotion. "On the one hand, emotion is conceptualized as something based in a physical reaction much like a sneeze or a burp; it cannot be controlled by thought which, being immaterial, is seen as operating in a separate realm of existence. Alternatively, we sometimes speak as if emotion can be reasoned away" (Lutz 1988: 63). For, as with burps and

sneezes, "social etiquette" and "good manners," the hallmarks of civilization, demand that such physical reactions be disciplined or properly disguised, and their release be confined to specific spaces where they can be endured. Furthermore, as Scheman (1993) suggests, who gets to invoke, or is subjected to, one standard of bodily discipline or another, and in what circumstances, raises once again issues of social power and control.

Mitchell is not alone in his interest in what he describes as an idiosyncratically Andalusian "character" trait. Indeed, the study of the role of emotion in Mediterranean societies, and Andalusia as one prominent example, has an extensive pedigree. In concepts such as amoral familism (Banfield 1958) and the honor and shame complex (Campbell 1968, Davis 1977, Peristiany 1965, and Pitt-Rivers 1961, 1965) Andalusians, as a specific variant or example of wider Mediterranean behavior, have been often described as lacking in control, particularly over emotions. This situation is seen as having significant negative repercussions for sociality and social order. Schultz (1988: 77) has suggested that morality is a particular way of being human in the world; it seems that different moralities confer different degrees of humanness. The vision of Mediterranean morality presented in these literatures, so different from the ideals of abstract and individualist morality of law and right which prevail the Northern researchers' home societies, further reinforced the perception of the deviance and inferiority of these Mediterranean peoples.

Citation practices within the literature work so that authors, in spite of a steady stream of critiques (Herzfeld 1983, 1987; and Moreno Navarro 1991 among others), can continue to write and innovate on well worn tropes largely ignoring the critics. To these critiques one could add the many works that have identified and challenged the common set of stereotyped masculinities used in descriptions of subordinated groups, be they classes, ethnicities or races, in

which these subordinated men's purported lack of control over their "lower passions" figures prominently (e.g. Fanon 1965, Mosse 1985, Said 1979, B. Williams forthcoming). And yet, in spite of it all, David Gilmore (1987: 126) still writes in these terms about Andalusian, and Mediterranean, men: "... defensiveness and manly pride is coupled with an intensely aggressive effort at sexual expression and, as everyone knows, a Mediterranean flamboyance in matters romantic. The Andalusian feels himself to be and wishes to be known as highly sexed. To be a man is to be a macho -- the terms are synonymous."

The issue is not that some Andalusians identify with this portrayal of themselves but, rather, that like my Cordovan friends, many have come to resent it, question it and reject it. Very important to this process was the growing politicization of Andalusian identity that took place during the 1960's and 1970's. This politicization eventually crystallized into a movement that challenged the basis for such representations by placing them within a broader context of social, economic and political subordination. Their argument, that this subordination had been concealed by the Spanish state's appropriation of cultural products and stereotyped representations for the creation of a mass culture in the service of internal political propaganda, and the promotion of tourism, is presented in the next chapter, Chapter IV.

The struggle to create an awareness of the subordinate position of the Andalusian people, and of how this was connected with stereotypes and images of Andalusians, was complicated by the conflation between Andalusian and Spanish identities which, as I have discussed in Chapter II, mirrored Spain's conflation with the Orient in 19th century Romantic and Orientalist literature. Moreover, the prominent role that ethnonationalist movements, specifically those in the Northern provinces, had played in organizing anti-dictatorship activity translated into an association between democracy and the de-

centralization of the State after Franco's death. Complex cultural dynamics conspired to privilege cultural difference as the grounds for claiming self-government within the State. A distinct, politicized national identity became crucial in validating claims of entitlement to regional autonomy. While Andalusians mobilized themselves and managed, in a long, protracted legal and political struggle with the government to attain the same level of autonomy as other regions, time and again their claims were trivialized, devalued or ignored.

Identity as Emotion: the Feeling of Andalusianness

This emphatic attention paid to "emotivity" as lack of control, presented uncritically and devoid of an analysis of the power relations that configure it, is deeply implicated in the dismissive treatment that claims about the existence of a consciousness of Andalusian identity receive. Take, for example, the literature on Andalusian nationalism, where there seems to be an agreement in describing it as "eminently emotive" (Jerez Mir 1985: 203). Another author, García Ferrando, chooses to defend the politicization of Andalusian identity against those who dismiss it as a product of the political opportunism by stating "*Andalucismo* was a *feeling* prior to the autonomic fervor of the political parties"(1982: 130). However, even a cursory interpolation of this discourse of identity as feeling leads one to suspect that these claims should not be taken at face value.

One would have to ask why it is worth insisting that Andalusians "feel" their identity. The idea that national identities have an emotional basis is after all not new (Connor 1983). However, the fact is that Andalusians do make reference to emotion in ways that appear, at least to me, significantly different from other peoples' usage of language. Statements such as "...the feeling of

identity as Andalusians came to be felt in the working class...;" "I would not speak of a consciousness, but rather a feeling..." were not at all uncommon in my interviews. I suggest that behind Andalusians' talk about "feelings" of identity lies a very precise and hierarchized understanding of terms, in which "feelings" were seen as a lesser form of awareness. Given the circumstances of the transition to democracy in Spain and the associated identity politics as described in the previous chapter, I became fascinated by what this had to say about Andalusians' discourse about themselves.

I found an excellent example of the use of this term in an argument that developed in one of the two informal discussion groups I held with communist and labor activists of the 1960's. I had asked them to participate in a discussion about politics during the 1960's: the main tendencies, the organizing strategies, the sources or inspiration for commitment. These particular men (in this group they were all men) had all been close associates, even friends, during those years, but life had taken them in different directions. While some continued to have close association, others had not met for years. For most of the discussion, the atmosphere was one of friendly reverie, sometimes rueful, sometimes fond, and yes, painful as well. It all changed when the topic of Andalusian identity was introduced. I posed a question to the group: What role, if any, had Andalusia played as point of reference in their political commitment. In what follows I reproduce the dialogue. The participants are, in order of appearance, Rafael Sarazá, sixty something in age, a labor lawyer and militant Communist; Manuel Molina, late fifties, former supervisor and labor shop steward, now heading an institute for labor studies; Filomeno Aparicio, late forties, labor lawyer; and Idelfonso Jiménez, construction worker and well respected labor and Communist leader during the 1960's.

Rafael: I have had more contacts with the labor movement, with the intellectual movement. With Andalusia as a point of reference, none. And well, I am being honest. Concretely, I have had more contacts at the professional level, in labor, with the Basque Country, with Catalonia, than with Andalusia. I have had an eminently localist, a provincial outlook, but also had connections at the State level, because you came in touch with other people, other movements. It wasn't 'till 68, in those workshops on regionalism organized at the University that I begin to take cognizance [*tomar consciencia*] of what regionalization and nationalization was all about. Because, for example, and *this ties in a bit with what's Andalusian, no, with power and that sort of stuff*, I remember once I was defending a kid who had been caught, that he was asked by the prosecutor: "And you, when the Civil Guard arrived, why did you know they were coming for you, if you hadn't done anything?" And he answered: "*Because in the cortijo there was only two of us, el señorito and myself, and I knew they weren't coming for el señorito, so they had to be coming for me.*" This anecdote is rigorously historical, I can tell you. Therefore, its clear that *people here knew there were "the others," those who nobody touched, and if the Civil Guard arrived it was for them [the people] even if they had done nothing.* "What had you done" the prosecutor asked again. "Nothing." And the majority had done nothing.

[Pause]³

³After Rafael's statements a long, dense silence came upon the group. Nobody seemed sure of what to say next. Just as I was readying myself to prod the group into reentering the discussion, Manuel Molina intervened.

Manuel: When I leave for Catalonia to work for a couple of years, besides making contacts with the labor movement, there were other political movements. There were *Catalanista* movements, the radicals and those who wanted to conscript, to bring others into the movement. And I had many political discussions with them. *I made them see that they were making a mistake. They presented the Andalusians as retards, and the managing positions were reserved for the Catalans, when the better professionals were Andalusians*, this had to be recognized and they recognized this. They moved in closed circles, I would tell them they had to open up, they had to *open the Catalan language to the Andalusians, because we were the new Catalans*. And they began to teach Catalan to me and a few other Andalusians, so we could go to their gatherings and meetings. Because it could be said that *we Andalusians felt Spanish but we also wanted to feel Catalan*. It was then when I became aware of the importance that the regional stuff had. Of course when I come back here, the regional issue, or the identity of the Andalusians, has become part of me. Aside from the fact that *Andalusians have always felt like second class citizens when it comes to development in Spain*. Because history has demonstrated that everything was for the Basque Country, Madrid and Catalonia. And there was even the joke by Mingote: "If the money of Andalusia goes to Madrid⁴ and the workers, the men of Andalusia go to Catalonia, what stays in Andalusia?" *That is why the feeling of*

⁴This refers to the historical situation of the Andalusian Savings and Loan Institutions, which invested heavily in businesses and development projects outside of Andalusia during the dictatorship, which meant that Andalusians were effectively subsidizing through their savings the development of other regions. Most of these savings and loan institutions are tied to the Catholic Church.

our identity as Andalusians already appears in the workers movement,
 Take Eduardo Saborido⁵. He is the expression of *Andalucismo* in all
 its generosity and magnitude. He was open and generous, a
 typical Andalusian.

Filomeno: I was involved in meetings at Comisiones⁶ where documents
 had been created with a markedly Andalucista bent, this did not
 take place until much latter, in the mid 1970's, just before Franco's
 death.

Manuel: (defensive) *I am talking about feelings.*⁷

Filomeno: Oh, all right.

Idelfonso: Yes, I see.

Rafael:...as a reaction.

[Pause]

Manuel:⁸ I remember how the Communist Party brought to task the
 labor movement that was the most wayward [*el más díscolo*] to
 insist that they support the most centralist option for Andalusia.

At this moment the consensus breaks down permanently. Voices are
 raised in the defense of the Party, as was to be expected; they are refuted; the
 Party is defended again. Then the historical veracity of Manuel's memories
 comes into question: it is said it was the Party that mobilized most effectively
 in favor of the Article 151; Manuel says that the Party's reaction was belated,
 after it saw itself forced by circumstances. In the midst of the heated discussion,
 Manuel's voice was heard above the din:

⁵ Prominent labor leader in Andalusia, both a communist and actively identified with nationalist politics.

⁶Comisiones Obreras (CCOO), one of the two major labor unions in Spain, and that most closely affiliated to the Communist Party during the transition.

⁷The tone of the debate, which had become somewhat tense, suddenly deflated. Consensus was reached once again.

⁸He is not pleased.

Manuel: I am referring that Benito Rufo *de las santas vírgenes*, ah, who was responsible for the Party, that this thing had its, its...

Idelfonso: [interrupting] Look, Benito Rufo was left standing by himself, standing almost by himself in more than one occasion.

Manuel: [excited] Precisely!

But then conversation broke down once again. After things calmed down somewhat, the men clearly were not willing to begin the discussion again. They quickly excused themselves, and tried to take leave in good terms with each other.

This episode was especially compelling for the subtlety and nuances contained within seemingly straightforward statements made by the participants. First, there was the equation between class and regional identities. What transcends the local and parochial, what is generally Andalusian, are the stark and brutal relations of production that subject a helpless working class to the arbitrary exercise of power from its upper classes. In the identity as workers they see no ambiguity, no possibility of hegemonic transformation or recuperation. In this particular rendering, not only are Andalusians first and foremost workers, but furthermore he or she who is not a worker is not Andalusian. Other discourses explicitly exclude the elites from the "national community" by claiming that the elites' are the descendants of the northerners that invaded the South five hundred years ago, or of the few Southern notables who allied themselves with them. Such an analysis can of course only be tenable at a mythical and metaphorical level, given that the elites are indeed Andalusian and, as Andalusians, were clearly implicated in the construction and the oppression of Andalusia.

The centrality of class as an axis of identity, and the contradictions this posed for those not of the working classes, have been present in the nationalist

movement since its inception, as I discussed in the previous chapter. Since the early 1900's nationalist writers and ideologues tended to consider the economic and political subordination of the nation as a defining characteristic, even when pointing to its contributions and accomplishments. During the 1960's the situation became even more pronounced. José Aumente, perhaps the foremost ideologue of the movement today, couched the issue in these terms:

Our nationalism was from the very beginning much more than cultural,⁹ but in fact political and social, in the sense that it considered Andalusia to be an underdeveloped zone that needed its own political force and with its own self-government. We looked for solutions and back then, I mean, when you read what was current everything was about 'dependency of.' We believed that it was easily applicable to Andalusia.

Such discourse, and the label it was given by its promoters, "class nationalism" – associated specifically with the working classes, and in contrast to other nationalisms which purported to be classless – signaled clearly the economic basis for this politicization of culture and identity.

Memory was also called into question. While the local communist intellectual, Rafael, claims to be "uninfluenced" by Andalusia, both Manuel, the migrant, and Filomeno, the youngest one in the group, clearly acknowledge the change in ideas and commitments. Nevertheless, this moment is downplayed, relegated and silenced by all except Manuel. The situation is brought out in stark relief in the exchange between Rafael, Filomeno and

⁹The reference is a veiled put down and attempt at differentiating their project from other nationalist projects articulated mostly in cultural terms. I suspect the reference is mostly directed at the Catalan nationalists, with whom Andalusians have the most conflicted relationship. It is also a recognition of the limits of the cultural nationalist project. This issues will be discussed further in Chapter IV and in the conclusion.

Manuel. When Manuel's reverie is interrupted to point out that he is probably remembering incorrectly or out of time -- more importantly, out of place, in a public space -- he defends his memories by reminding those who have upbraided him that he is *talking about feelings*. In what follows, I will explore the limits of such a defense.

The politics of feeling

I believe that most Andalusians experience cultural or national identity as a non-rationalized life experience, that emerges from the practice of everyday life, deeply connected to elements that are at the same time intimate but related to many; mutable, at times even vacillating, but continuously reproduced. It falls in the category of what the social sciences tends to dismiss as "the imponderabilia of daily life." Raymond Williams (1977) has argued that such experiences constitute a *structure of feeling*. Echoing Williams, I am "talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not of feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought; practical conscience of present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity" (Williams 1977: 132). In approaching the study of Andalusian identity, many scholars have realized that they are not dealing with a detailed, precise, coherent discourse, as we could find in certain social sectors with respect to other collective identities: class, gender, race, even sexuality. However, what has not been problematized enough in these theoretical and political discussions, is that these objectifications (class, gender, race, etc.) are only possible when the processes of differentiation have been completed, or when we arbitrarily take a sample and fix that moment in time. This maneuver, for all its theoretical or political expedience, results in the loss of fluidity of the concept, making opaque precisely what we wish to perceive.

If our interest lies in the understanding of processes that are occluded in everyday life, then we must engage those "mixed experiences" that defy facile classification to find the specific historical moments, whose formation is not predictable, when they make the transition from being experienced as private to being recognized as "public," or *social* – and social not only in the narrow sense, as that which is institutional and formal, but as that which is shaped collectively by everyday experiences of the "real." Addressing these experiences need not be a utopian task. The inseparability of thought from feeling does not make these processes irrational, disorganized, or even "unconscious."¹⁰ Much to the contrary, we find in these processes a structure:

a set, with specific internal relations, at once interlocking and in tension...a social experience which is still in process, often indeed not yet recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even isolating, but which in analysis (though rarely otherwise) has its emergent, connecting and dominant characteristics, indeed its specific hierarchies (Williams 1977: 132).

By problematizing the relation of the private with the public, and the social, I hope to avoid the often made mistake of denying the social character of emergent processes. Rather, I consider that which is most alive, most present, in fact, much of the *personal*, to be not only political but also collective, or non-individualistic. In the case of Andalusia, individualist and synchronic biases have led to a fixation on the lack of – or search for – objectified and hegemonic discourses on identity. The methodological implications taking this alternative approach are that:

¹⁰Radically dichotomous (and rigid) understandings such as rational/irrational, objective/subjective, and even private/public, although they might be heuristically useful, rarely help to clarify social processes. Take instead a more reflexive, liminal stance.

... specific qualitative changes are not *assumed* to be epiphenomena... they are from the beginning taken as *social* experience, rather than as personal experience or as the merely superficial or incidental "small change" of society... although they are emergent or pre-emergent, they do not have to await definition, classification, or rationalization before they exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on experience and on action (Williams 1977: 131)

Williams, in using the term feeling over that of experience – with its connotations of past tense – emphasizes the temporal discontinuity implicit in the process of objectification. Experiences/feelings always and already exercise effects and pressures prior to theoretical identification and classification. At the same time, Williams posits the disconnection between experience/feeling and theory as recognized almost exclusively through what rendered it assunder in the first place, theory itself. The paradox is only apparent. What we see here is an argument for understanding feelings as socially constructed and articulated.

Turning again to Naomi Scheman (1993) we see that emotions and feelings are frequently talked about as if they had existed all along, merely awaiting discovery and naming to emerge. This assumption underlies what she calls "the privileged access theory," the notion that each individual is the ultimate authority on his or her own emotions. In this sense, feelings would seem a particularly unfalsifiable category, in that no one but oneself can contradict the interpretation we make of ourselves. In the dialogue reproduced above, Manuel clearly operates under this assumption, when he attempts to quell all challenges to his narrative about identity by invoking the privilege of *his* "feelings." And yet this does prove to be sufficient. For even if each individual is said to "own" the ultimate privilege, it becomes immediately

palpable that this privilege is unevenly distributed socially. Given the element of judgment involved, dependency and other degrees of power inequalities -- involved in categories such as gender, age, race and class -- will clearly interfere in the final analysis.

Scheman finds that the "privileged access theory" and other such commonsensical¹¹ notions are "...typical of the workings of an ideology: matters of political choice come to seem matters of unchangeable fact."¹² Instead she proposes that

We can, I think, maintain that our twinges, pangs, and so on are particular events no matter what our social situation, but it does not follow that the same is true for more complex psychological objects, such as emotions, beliefs, motives and capacities. What we need to know in order to identify them is how to group together introspective states and behavior and how to interpret it all (Scheman 1993: 40)

Thus, the discovery of a feeling ceases to be the unveiling of an essence; rather, a "...change [in] the sorts of patterned situations that are seen as significant"(Scheman 1993: 40), in other words, a political, thus social, act. This is precisely what Andalusians began to do during the 1960's, and continued to do well into the 1980's. However, as a people linked to the State's power structure in relations of dependency, their attempt to do so was undermined. Open acknowledgment that national identities are socially constructed would

¹¹In Bourdieu's (1977) sense of doxic.

¹² Scheman would seem to connect the emergence of this understanding of emotions to the emergence of capitalism: "The individualism that characterizes this view of the mind and emotions is historically not accidental. It fits with the essentially atomistic view of persons underlying liberal economic and political structures, of agents entering the marketplace freely and with already formed motivations and desires. We treat each other as psychologically detachable units and regard ourselves as owners of ourselves. We are both legal and epistemic authorities" (Scheman 1983:27)

threaten not only those who claimed a privileged relation to "national identity" but the very foundations of the hegemonic bloc upon which democracy had been created.

Michel de Certeau (1981)¹³ details the historic and discursive process by which the unequal privilege of understanding and "owning" feelings became institutionalized. He links these processes to the parcelization of distinct disciplines of knowledge during the 19th century, and the particular form in which scientific discourse within them came to be elaborated.

Ever since scientific work [*scientificté*] has given itself its own proper and appropriable places through rational projects capable of determining their procedures, with formal objects and specified conditions under which they are falsifiable, ever since it was founded as a plurality of limited and distinct fields, in short, ever since it stopped being theological, it has constituted the *whole* as its *remainder*; this remainder has become what we call culture.

This cultural cleavage organizes modernity. (de Certeau 1981: 6)

de Certeau argues that Western social theory attempted to claim superiority on the basis of its "scientific truth," setting apart practices that were articulated through discourse from those that were not yet articulate. This mirrored the segregation of the social into separate spheres: public, articulated discourses, and private/personal, innarticulated ones. Science referred to

¹³ The most crucial difference between Williams and de Certeau lies in their understanding of the social organization of power. Raymond Williams' use of the concept of hegemony allows for the possibilities of social transformations in ways that de Certeau's work does not. Williams, by theorizing events and discourses in terms of their place and practice in hegemonic and emergent counterhegemonic activity, turns the social sphere effectively into a field of forces that are in constant activity, which only from a very abstracted point of view could be separated into discrete currents. Surprisingly, de Certeau, who is interested precisely in tactics of resistance, presents us with a (for once un-Foucaultian) power/non-power divide as an eternal category, effectively constituting an a priori (and politically, an extremely conservative) dictum about the expectations for social change, which is in fact not always borne out in history.

"operational languages whose grammar and syntax form constructable, regulated and thus writable systems," while everyday practices fell into the category of "arts": know-hows and their techniques (how-to-dos) that "await" to be illuminated, enlightened, by scientific knowledge. Along with other sciences, whether "human" or "natural", ethnology, *as the science of culture*, participated in the project of separating everyday arts/culture from its techniques. By separating the know-how from technique, the how-to-do's, they reified culture. "Know-hows," as arts of everyday life, got passed on within a community or culture, even as their how-to-do's – their techniques – are taken from them by scientific study, becoming "geometrized and mathematized," objects of study. The end result is that those unsystematizable or yet to be systematized know-hows, everyday "arts," are rendered intuitive or reflex activity, with an almost invisible and unrecognizable status. In the productive sphere, what is detached from human performance becomes perfected by machines; in the social sciences, this process is carried out by theory-as-tool to understand reality.

What results from the dynamics of alienating a know-how from its techniques is a process which he calls "aestheticization". De Certeau states:

Detached from its procedures, this knowledge may pass for a kind of "taste," "tact," or even "genius." It is accorded the characteristics of an intuition that is alternatively artistic or automatic...This "cognitive operation" is supposed not to be accompanied by that self-consciousness that would give it mastery through a reduplication or internal "reflection." (de Certeau 1981: 70)

Thus, if we follow de Certeau's arguments we find that feelings, as tastes and tact, become not only detached but also treated as inferior to the geometrized knowledge of procedures. The above speaks directly to the

operations of the various "theories" on Andalusia which were constructed during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from Ortega y Gasset's millenarian, passive and merry Andalusians to the Mediterranean honor and shame complex Of Pitt Rivers and Peristiany. But for now let us return once again to Manuel's caveat cum apology "I am talking about feelings." Now his claims about feelings might seem more ambivalent, paradoxical in fact. For even as he is claiming privilege, he seems to be acknowledging his subject(ed) position within the discourse, and how this affects his earlier pronouncements, relativizing them. While this acknowledgment is accepted by Filomeno, it is not quite sufficient for Rafael. He seems to need to further qualify Manuel's statements, and does so by adding the phrase "in reaction." As I have pointed out, the qualifications of the committed Communist unwittingly support hegemonic distinctions of privilege.

At this stage I should state again that I neither argue nor believe that emotion is antithetical to identity and nationalism. However, as the large and continuously growing literature on nationalism and nationalist ideologies increasingly indicates, nationalists are not primarily "feelers" or "imagers" but rather "builders." It is work in and on nature, the harnessing and controlling of the national "essence" and "character" to the political and economic advantage of their "people," which is the purpose and goal of nationalists. The operations of these assumptions can be seen in Elie Kedourie's (1970) dismissal of "eastern nationalisms" as imitative. Western nationalisms, claims Kedourie, based their claims on their contributions and achievements towards "Civilization"; Eastern peoples have made no such contributions, and therefore base their claims on what are considered lesser, indeed, weaker grounds, those of morality and the spirit. The builders of true nations must be true men and, as Brackette Williams states, "manliness without a distinctive

history of accomplishments... comes to be judged effeminate (now read: lacking in originality and self-imposed controls), accused of aping the prowess of 'true men'" (B. Williams 1996: 6-7).

Kedourie's ideas are an example of Western beliefs about the difficult and contradictory relationship between moral awareness and emotion. Lutz (1988: 87) ties this to positivism's influence, which segregates emotion from critical understanding. And yet, one has reasons to suspect that the relationship between emotion and consciousness is more complex. At least in the Andalusian case, it becomes important to make the distinction between the actual expression of emotion and simply the discourse about the existence of feeling. For while Manuel clearly expressed emotion (several, in fact) in speaking about the fact that he was speaking of them, most often the talk about "feelings of identity" was not an expressive one. The argument then turns into one of emotions as contemplation, or even intuition, versus emotions as action. Indeed, many other peoples in Spain who are widely regarded as "nationalistic" and fully conscious of their identities – Catalans, Basques, even Españolistas – often expressed much more emotion than Andalusians did about their identity and, furthermore, used the term "feeling" to describe it. And there are, of course, circumstances when it becomes eminently "reasonable" to express emotion. The question then becomes contextual: one of appropriateness, as we will see below.

Emotion and Identity Aggravated: the relativization of protest and dissent

It is impossible to miss the continuous reference to class in most debates about Andalusian identity. There often is a clear animosity toward and in fact denial of any identity other than class based. It may seem that this is a local playing -out of long-standing debates within Marxist theory itself. However, if

we carefully analyze some of the discursive ploys by which regional or national identity was devalued, we soon discover that much more than recalcitrant internationalism is involved. We find instead the operations of a transformist hegemony at work in creating a complex and highly articulate argument that Andalusians do not have a "developed" consciousness of their identity as a people.¹⁴ That this argument seems to be supported by several distinct and clearly contradictory ideologies – the internationalist one, the State-nationalist one, and the post-transitional ideology of "nationalities" – is but proof of its strength and its political significance.

Michael Herzfeld has observed that "[w]hen the powerful call the shots, collective self-defense... becomes the groveling *defensiveness* ('inferiority complexes') of despised weaklings" (Herzfel 1987: 66). This situation is evidenced by the discursive ploy of *agravio comparativo*, [literally injury in comparison]. Reminiscent of the concept of relative depravation, it was widely used as short hand to refer to the process by which Andalusians came to understand the reality created by unequal development within the Spanish state as an essentially unjust one. Just a brief review of the literature will make obvious the widespread acceptance of the discourse about *agravio comparativo*. Some statements show clear sympathy for the Andalusian situation:

Andalucismo was ... fruit of the *agravio comparativo* and the search for a social perspective. (García Ferrando 1982: 130) [emphasis added]

A recurring theme in *Andalucismo* is what is called *agravio comparativo*, [a feeling that] if [it is] not of being 'anti' [other

¹⁴I would like to remind you of the statements by Jordi Pujol quoted in Chapter II, where he describes Andalusians as "underdeveloped people."

nationalisms, at least it is] of "not being less than"(Jerez Mir 1985: 233) [emphasis added]

The more recent appearance of other 'nationalisms' (like the Andalusian and Galician ones), even though it is based on a self-consciousness of their differences, it is due fundamentally to a *demonstration effect* mechanism (Connor 1977:29), that leads [these new nationalisms] to align themselves with the projects of the other "historic nationalities."The conceptualizaiton of these two cases would fall under the framework of the *theory of marginality*, because of the social malaise produced by their *relative underdevelopment* [emphasis mine] in relation to other zones of the State (Pujadas 1993: 32)

As a concept, *agravio comparativo* is deceptive in its commonsensical appeal, and heavily laden with negative connotations. In order to fully comprehend how deeply implicated it becomes with dominant ideologies of nationhood and entitlement, it must be carefully unpacked. We can begin by separating it into its two basic components. The first word, *agravio*, is a factual, or empirical, if you like, category, referring to the actual injuries afflicted. It could seem to imply a generalized agreement that, indeed, Andalusia had been wronged by the unequal practices of industrialization and economic development. However, the word *comparativo*, used as a modifier, brings ambiguity to the phrase. In the first instance, it could be said that this "relativity" merely acknowledges difference, or a relation to other subjects and objects. It might even make reference to exile and emigration, suggesting context for this coming to consciousness. I believe, however, that what it does is in fact *relativize* the injury and question its fundamental veracity. Its becomes

not an injury made obvious by comparison but an injury *only in comparison*, not *in and of its self*.

Naomi Scheman's (1993) insights about the determination of genuineness or authenticity in "feelings" prove quite illuminating in this discussion. Scheman urges us:

...rather than considering what *must* be the case to satisfy certain conception of a scientific or realist theory of mind, we will do better to consider the sorts of constraints we are actually inclined to put on acceptable explanations. What I want to suggest is that these are irreducibly social and irreducibly involve notions of appropriateness (Scheman 1993:17)

By exploring the understanding of *appropriateness* – preeminently socially constructed – we are able to suggest several plausible interpretations. One would point out that Andalusia was not alone in its misery; there were other very poor regions within Spain. However, no other such people articulated their identity around issues of the economic inequality of region and of class. It might seem quite appropriate, in fact necessary to ask what quality Andalusian misery had that made it so particularly unbearable. But the discourse on *agravio* takes this one step further, by challenging the appropriateness of their actions as a response to the grievance. I strongly believe that this is because economic grievances are not seen as appropriate organizers for cultural identity. As a result Andalusians instead of being seen as politically aware are seen as greedy, or parasitic and dependent, asking not for an equal but for a privileged treatment within the state. This further delegitimizes political claims by explaining them in terms that would seem to imply a psychological complex producing feelings of inferiority and paranoia.

Emotional Natures as Subordinate Identities: some final reflections

I have argued that there has been extensive theorization and elaboration of an association between Andalusia (and for that matter, other regions included within the "Mediterranean culture area") and strong emotivity. That behind both these popular and academic theories – the intentionality of its proponents is in the end irrelevant – lies an ideological operation that conflates lack of control as political subordination with lack of control as personal indulgence of irrational dispositions and appetites. Finally, that this behavior is deemed antisocial. Stereotypes based on this conflation are either treated with ambivalence and only partially incorporated into self-representations, or rejected outright by the Andalusian population.

Here lies the inherent ambiguity of the Andalusian discourse about the "feeling of identity." On the one hand, it often expresses a recognition that Andalusians do not meet with the requirements, hegemonically defined, of having a consciousness of their identity. They are fully aware of having been subordinated to the identity of the State, their culture having been coopted for propagandistic purposes. They are also aware of a broader subordination, of an otherness, as can be seen in the discourse of "second class citizenship." On the other hand, the use of "feeling" remains an attempt to insure the claims to identity against challenge.

Chapter IV. Shattering the Mirror: the politicization of Andalusian identity, 1960 - 1980

"Andaluces, levantaos, pedid tierra y libertad... Que sea por una Andalucía Libre, por España y la Humanidad"
Andalusian anthem (exerpt)

"País sí; región no"
Chant, December 4,
1977

This second section of my dissertation, *Generations*, addresses the changes in political culture and commitment that have occurred in the last 30 years in Spain, focusing specifically on Andalusian identity. I construct an ethnographic account of the shifts in the trajectory of politicization of Andalusian identity during the transition to and consolidation of a parliamentary democracy in Spain. I aim to present changes in the expectations and formulas for political renovation as each successive generation developed discourses to critique and undermine the strategies of legitimization employed by the Spanish state, which were radically transformed during this period. Continuing the focus on cultural politics, I follow political activity regarding Andalusian culture and identity as it was shaped by four distinct political "moments." First, I discuss its emergence in clandestine networks during the latter years of the Franco regime. I then deal with its effervescence during the mid to late 1970's within the spaces for political action that began to "open up" during this time. The "third" moment was characterized by disenchantment with cultural politics and perhaps politics in general, as activists came face to face with the limitations of "freedom" of speech and action in a "public sphere" in the context of a liberal democracy. The fourth moment deals with the subsumption of cultural politics within other movements. The conversions to Islam, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VII, are briefly introduced as an example of such

subsumption. Their repercussions in terms of the reproduction of politics and political culture are illustrated through a discussion about youth culture and politics in Spain.

In this Chapter, I wish to focus on the discourses and events that took place from around 1968 to the early 1980's, the time of "transition" broadly defined (Morán 1989). In order to place this period in its proper context, I begin with the emergence of politicized discourses about identity in the context of the clandestine or underground spheres of political action during the Franco dictatorship. After describing the context for politics in general, and those related to identity in particular, I then discuss the opening up and tacit recognition of political action in the later half of the 1970's, and its later consolidation in more openly "public" spheres. If in Chapter II I suggested that there have been various competing discourses on identity in Andalusia, and focused mostly on those associated closely with the State-nationalist project, in this chapter I focus on those of different groups of Andalusians who have attempted to subvert such a project. Specifically, I will point to some of the discursive strategies that are used in the struggle for asserting one vision over the other.

The emergence of activist networks: the clandestine sphere

During the 1950's and 1960's, industrialization in Spain created social mobility but also a greater sense of economic inequality and injustice. These changes in the "economic market" brought with them changes in the "political market," especially in the working class and the University (Maravall 1980). Popular discontent began to spread from the late 1950's onwards, beginning in areas of heavy industry but including agricultural and rural areas where political organizations prior to the Civil War had left an enduring mark, or

where new organizations had begun to emerge (Maravall and Santamaría 1989). Adding to these tensions was the persistence of regional and ethnic diversity (Giner 1989). The State's policies of industrialization and development only added to the already existing differences by concentrating industrialization in the wealthier and already most industrialized regions. This created a situation in where the central and northeastern regions became exporters of goods, while others, primarily in the south and southwest became exporters of people. That the wealthiest regions had also had the strongest ethnonationalist movements made the sphere of culture a constant source of anger and anxiety in the *Franquista* hegemonic configuration. The regime's attack on local customs and practices only fueled ethnonationalist flames and became the fighting cry around which much of anti-dictatorship struggle was articulated (see Verdery 1991 for a comparison with the Eastern European situation). In the end, the Nationalist vision of a "dictatorship of progress" proved to be incompatible with the conservative vision of society and culture which the regime espoused (Carr y Fusi 1979).

In Andalusia, these cultural politics did not play a crucial role in structuring the anti-dictatorship struggle during this time. And yet this in no way reflects passivity or political apathy. Andalusians who had been active during the 1960's offered me stories of continuous and creative confrontation with authority, that even when unable to alter the balance of power or change the political direction of the larger social whole, explicitly exemplified disagreement and increased critical consciousness directed against the regime, its ideology and its policies. Furthermore, the stories marked the actions and the debates as collective: they were remembered in the presence of fellow accomplices or friends; they often were jointly told; and most important, they testified to the existence of social spaces, carefully crafted and protected, that

permitted their occurrence even as they defined them. This sphere of action was clearly political yet at the same time closely tied to and carefully cloaked by more intimate spheres of action, usually deemed to be part of the domain of the "private," such as friendships, religious practice, club and other limited associational activity, and even at times the domestic sphere.

Those who became involved in these types of underground politics lived a unitary moment when, joined in the struggle against the dictatorship, the enemy common to all, there was a coming together of social forces that otherwise would have been clearly antagonistic. In Córdoba, politics in the 1960's were organized around two central axis: "progressive" Catholicism and communist syndicalism. Each strand retained its integrity; but a complementarity of purpose helped keep the alliance, which at times became quite contradictory, from unraveling. Both ideologies, functioning as guiding threads, created networks of action that frequently became intertwined. Together they made an informal -- only episodic in the moments of worst repression -- but nevertheless powerful and resourceful social basis for resistance. These networks integrated people from all walks and trades of life, thrown together by circumstances that heavily penalized but at the same time bred political discontent and activity.

Passing information from mouth to mouth, the underground information network provided names and places of key people to whom anyone could resort in case of emergency, even without previous personal knowledge. The regime itself "aided" the functioning of the network by identifying, making noticeable and persecuting those it suspected to be the "leaders." Of course, its structure and informal character allowed for errors in the valorization of the level of commitment of some individuals; but it generally functioned in a very efficient manner. Such is the case of this episode

in which these three good friends, Francisco, Idelfonso and Rafael were all brought together in trying to help a group of people who had been arrested.

Idelfonso: It so happens that a group of kids get caught [*caen*] in Posadas¹. And since I was the best known Communist, they all come running to me to see what I can do. I was a worker, not a lawyer, and it occurs to me to go to this one here to see what I can do"

Rafael: "What happened in Posadas was glorious, what happened in Posadas was one of those things... And, well, they are still here and some of them continue. And it is truly marvelous, since it was a group of 40 people, of which only 3 knew what they wanted, and were of the Communist Party, the other 37... well, those they had gathered. And then they began to hand out, on Good Friday, while the *via crucis* was carried out, they just covered the town with leaflets, I mean, pamphlets. They grabbed all 40 of them, and this one sitting there comes to tell me, and then I, since I didn't have the clout to get them out of jail, I sent him to see this other guy I knew, who was quite devout and sanctimonious, and the other son of a b... he said he would pray for them... Well, time passed and we had to go to Madrid for the trial. There stood to be tried 40 militants of the autochthonous Communist Party of Posadas. And we defended them between three of us. And of those 40, there were 2 or 3 who really knew what they were, they were of a party; the rest, I meeean... Our defense was that they had gotten confused, that they had said that they were of the CP, Communist Party, when they really were of the PC, the "parochial

¹ A small town, inhabited mainly by farmworkers [*jornaleros*] about 30 Km south of Córdoba.

club." The priest of Posadas, Francisco, gave out the damn 40 I.D. cards. This now, of course, seems absurd, but hey, the truth is that we presented ourselves in Madrid with our parochial club I.D.'s, you know. And we won."

The priest, Francisco "Paco" Perea, rose within the ranks of the progressive Catholic movement that attracted a significant numbers of younger or newer members of the Catholic clergy. While his politics, and those of many other priests like him, were deeply influenced by the winds of change within the Catholic doctrine under the papacy of John XXIII, their final commitment was shaped by their experience in the working class and rural parishes to which they were assigned. Having to deal with the dismal living and working conditions of their parishioners, and frustrated by the lack of responsiveness of those within the higher echelons of the Church to this situation, they often took matters into their own hands and became actively involved in local politics and organizing.

For the working class and rural people, these activist priests provided a politically acceptable language in which to articulate their discontent and sometimes outright anger at the living and working conditions they were forced to endure. At the same time, the organizations they founded together, cloaked by the protective mantel of the Church, offered one of the few avenues for political activity in local contexts. However, perhaps the most immediate source of politicization was the family or work unit, through which discourses and practices of protest got transmitted. The dictatorship did not manage to erase long-standing traditions of political involvements within families, and memories of the dead at the hands of one side or the other were common in domestic discussions. Members of families particularly identified with one option or the other were often expected to take positions of leadership, and

sometimes found themselves doing so involuntarily. Idelfonso Jiménez grew up in such a family.

For Rafael Sarazá, as for many others who belonged to the middle classes, politicization came via different venues: contacts with Catalan and Basque professionals through business and/or professional associations, and through affiliations with the progressive sectors of the Church. Of course, frequently one set of experiences served to validate or to further along incipient political activity. While professional organizations served as outlets and as cloaks for these initial political preoccupations at the level of the State, at a local level activities were much more difficult to conceive of and carry out. Since the state forbade most forms of association which were not under its strictest control, any informal group, even of friends or professionals, who frequently came together for motives other than those that were strictly social could easily become noticeable and suspect. It is at this moment that the Church frequently stepped in to provide legitimacy and a quasi-public outlet for activities that would have otherwise had to remain clandestine.

These episodic alliances slowly developed into an extremely complex and tightly woven social fabric of resistance. It was quite common for those having taken part in this clandestine sphere of activity to single it out as a rather outstanding phenomenon in Spain. Groups closely affiliated with the Communist Party and progressive Catholic collectives worked alongside those who identified with the anarchist tradition of the CNT as well as more independent labor organizations such as the construction workers' guild and even the neighborhood and citizen associations. It was because this network of social resistance crisscrossed through such a wide variety of segments within the city's population that it managed to create an "impressive organization" which would incorporate even those social sectors considered most inaccessible

due to their marginal articulation. As I was proudly told by one of the activists I interviewed: "We had spies, even the woman who cleaned the Civil Guard headquarters. She would tell another woman 'look, they're cleaning the dungeons, there's going to be a raid [*caída* ²]' and that one would come running and tell us." This informal communication and information gathering gave time to those within the network to get people out of the way and to find them shelter. Often it was within the Church, as Rafael pointed out when he said, "well, the priests protected."

Any association or organization with sympathies for those opposing the regime would become a cover for clandestine political activity. One of the most important of such organizations in Córdoba – and the whole of Andalusia – was the *Círculo Cultural Juan XXIII*.³ It was founded in 1963 by a group of progressive Catholics as a cultural and intellectual meeting place for those who, up to that moment, only had vague political preoccupations about civil liberties. And yet, its markedly Christian identification allowed it to offer "asylum," and function as a center for leftist socialization. In the words of Jaime Loring, Jesuit priest and professor of economics at the local Catholic University, and its president during the late 1970's:

I began to frequent *El Juan*, I liked it... I liked the way of speaking, the way of thinking, the way democracy was defended and exercised. How liberty and equal rights were defended. There we questioned social, economic or religious taboos, and I felt really at ease, and not only at ease. I think that all that, in the Juan XXIII, I think I learned everything and that was by being in a group that was collectively of the left, probably for the first time

² The term literally means "fall."

³ The group was named in honor of the Roman Catholic pontiff responsible for convoking the Vatican II Council.

El Juan, as it came to be known, thus became a cover for the activities of very noted members of Córdoba's political underground: around its structure adhered all oppositional social actors and forces in Cordoba during the 1960's and early 1970's. *El Juan* was a place for "conspiring" at the local level, where alliances – such as the ones I described earlier – were forged. It was also space for intellectual discussions and for meeting and action for those most noted, committed and involved in the struggles against the dictatorship. Many of those who became symbols of the struggle, and many who survived to become national political leaders today, visited or gave conferences at one time or other: Alfonso Carlos Comín, a very well-known Catalan syndicalist and journalist; Nicolás Sartorius, today a leader of one of the factions within United Left party [*Izquierda Unida*]; Alfonso Guerra, vice-secretary of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]; and Felipe González himself, who gave a conference just before the 1974 PSOE congress where he would be elected Secretary General of the Party. It was in the very same clandestine networks facilitated by *El Juan* that the first nuclei of politicization of the Andalusian identity began to form. However, these nuclei and the discourse they developed remained at this time somewhat marginal to the process, if not noticeably discordant.

Part II Identity Underground: Andalucismo in the 1960's

In Andalusia, Franco and his flag were explicitly associated with fascism. Rafael Arjona remembered an incident when feelings of animosity actually came to the surface.

I was studying at the Labor College, and every Saturday a political science teacher, a Phalangist as all political science teachers had to be back then, led us through the pledge of

allegiance ceremonies, with songs and military marches. At the end of each exercise, the Phalangists would end by saying '¡España!' and we had to answer '¡España una, España grande, España libre'⁴ Well, it must have been around the year 1964, when to the first call of 'España' somebody decided to answer 'Tus muertos'⁵, and then again, 'España,' '¡Tus muertos!' and then the voice was quiet. But little by little in the course of a week, that cry spread, and to the call 'España' one would hear the loud and clear reply '¡TUS MUERTOS!' Not all of us took part, but it was such a large mass of people that the pledge of allegiance was dropped and the marches ended.

And yet, the rejection of fascism and its symbols did not always lead to an identification with Andalusia. A key factor in the process of identification was the migratory experience: not only the shock of having to adapt to a radically new environment, language and culture, but also the bitterness of having to leave in the first place. Pope Godoy, tireless cultural organizer and activist, explained to me how people began to ask themselves the reasons why they had to emigrate. The answer seemed straight forward: there was no work in Andalusia, or very little and of a very precarious nature. The better paid, more secure jobs were in Catalonia or even further afield, in France and Germany. "But then there was" said Pope, "the nagging question: 'But why? And why us?'" The realization of who made up this "us" radicalized many, "because it wasn't just anybody, it was mostly the poor." The consciousness of class oppression and regional marginalization came together, and the question

⁴ "Spain One, Spain Great, Spain Free"

⁵An expression which is meant to damn or demean the ancestors of the person to whom it is directed.

became, as Pope remembered: "Why is it that we, the Andalusians, are the poor? Why can't we stay in our land and develop what is there?"

Just as important, especially for those who stayed in Andalusia, were contacts with individuals and collectives involved in the anti-dictatorship struggle outside of Andalusia, specifically the Basque Country, Catalonia and Valencia. Although in Andalusia, the struggle was articulated largely through a discourse of economic and political empowerment and justice, primarily defined in terms of class and regional inequalities, in these other regions the sphere of cultural practice and expression also became a battlefield where authoritarian practices were resisted. José Aumente, one of the most noted theorists of *Andalucismo*, described his own experience in these words:

Following some articles that had quite a repercussion at the national level, a group of people invite me to give a series of conferences in the University of Valencia and the University of Barcelona. This put me in contact not only with people from the Communist Party but also with people from what came to be known as the Popular Liberation Front [*Frente de Liberación Popular*, or *FELIPE*]. Nicolás Sartorius and Alfonso Carlos Comín were very involved, as were a lot of others. I then began to have contacts with other groups in Seville and I also gave a conference in the Boca Circle and even in some parishes. In these circles, the Andalusian theme was clearly postulated, the regional theme, and I felt pulled by that which represented my land's best interests, Andalusia's best interests. I became convinced that Andalusia represented an entity as a people.

The work of progressive Christians with poor and marginal communities was also a source of politicization of identity. In attempting to

organize these communities in order to best meet their needs, "even if minimally" as I was often told, priests, but also committed lay people, were at first struck by the lack of "Culture" [*la falta de cultura*] of the populations they worked and lived with. They were referring to illiteracy, innumeracy, and want of general historical and political knowledge that afflicted the working classes in Spain during this time. However, these concerns often quickly translated into a more specific interest in and preoccupation with the local forms of culture which were described to me time and again as "ingenious," "inspiring," "powerful," and "combative." This interest often led to nationalist inclinations and identification.

Yet although popular culture often became a refuge for protest at the local level (Moreno Navarro 1983, 1986), the dynamics at the level of the State were radically different, as I have shown in previous chapters. For while other regional cultural expressions were forcefully suppressed because of their perceived threat to the unity of the Spanish "nation," many Andalusian cultural products were appropriated to provide a national "mass" culture that perhaps was not explicitly tied to fascist aesthetics. After all, as I have shown earlier, it was tied to stereotypes that had a long history within Spain, and had been popular under many different regimes, including the Second Republic itself. (A glaring exception to this was the carnival, explicitly associated with political and social satire (Mintz 1997). Therefore it should not be surprising that Andalusians themselves were the ones to most strongly identify with this portrayal of Spain.

I witnessed a rather illuminating example of the complexity and perhaps even ambivalence of this identification when conversing with a souvenir vendor in Torremolinos. I picked out a postcard of a particularly beautiful landscape. Trying to strike up a conversation, I commented on how it must

have been a best-seller. “¡Qué va!” he said, pointing towards a section full of postcards about bulls, guitars, flamenco dancers, and other stereotypes. Somewhat disappointed, I made a comment about tourists expecting every Spaniard to moonlight as a bullfighter or a *cantaor* (*cante jondo* performer). At first, my comment thoroughly perplexed him. But after a moment, he reacted defensively. “I mean, yes, this image is used for the whole of Spain,” but he denied that the Andalusian was “responsible” for this. “The Andalusian acts as what he is, but yes, this image gets to be used for the whole of Spain. The Andalusian does not decide it, it just happens that way...” When I asked if it bothered him, he was even more taken aback, and then became suspicious. “Why?” he answered back. I answered that because it was too easy, too simple an image of Andalusia. Was Andalusia in fact not much more than all that? Had he ever thought of being a bullfighter? This time he gave me a broad smile and said that no, but that as a child he had wanted to be a *bailaor* (flamenco dancer).

After sharing a good laugh, I asked him what had given him that idea. Did he know any bailaroes? “I don’t know,” was his response “maybe it made me feel necessary, and important... I was but a child, but I too had to, wanted to resemble what others said was an Andalusian. And in the movies you saw that was the way Andalusians were, and in the *coplas* on the radio, and in the books you read, that was the way the Andalusians were. And you begin to take this image as yours. And so it becomes. And it is, I mean.”

Beginning in the “...ninety sixty something, shortly before 1968...,” in reaction to what they saw as an impoverishment of popular culture and aesthetics, many intellectuals began to question the validity of these representations that celebrated “spectacular” or “exotic” aspects of Andalusian culture, while ignoring the people’s economic and political oppression. These concerned individuals feared that the popularization had reached a point in

which it threatened to overwhelm all other forms of local but perhaps less "marketable" cultural expression.

Salvador Távora, one of the premier theater directors of Spain and a critical figure in contemporary Andalusian culture and politics, re-called some of the concerns he felt that led him to embrace culture as a specific and important arena for struggle in the Andalusian context.

The situation of Andalusian culture, the consideration that is given to Andalusian culture, in the postwar period, affects me. To all of us Andalusians who had a conscience, a minimal conscience, *some sort of working class dignity* – as I was a worker – this was very troublesome. It troubled us that we were considered a happy people, *un señor o señora de la postal* ["postcard" people]. Then, as I get to know the songs and dances of my land, because I am born in the midst of them, I start questioning the situation. I am 18, 20 years⁶ old when I begin to ask myself why does Andalusian art not reflect our social reality, why is it equivocating? It is then I begin my search for the true identity of the Andalusian people, that has nothing to do with the postcard image. I begin because I am affected by this situation. Because when I leave Andalusia *I am considered a second-class Spanish citizen everywhere I go*, because I am considered a happy and funny being, when I am neither happy nor funny. And because I am assigned a cliché and a set of manners, but above all because I have the *pain of knowing that my fellow Andalusians are responding to this cliché* because it is put forth to them, and *they resemble it more and more*. It is then a *double struggle*. That is why I become interested in the search for the

⁶During the late 1950's.

Andalusian identity that has nothing to do with that which is projected. Not out of caprice, but because it affects me.

While in Córdoba, for example, politics were largely shaped by the dual hegemonic influence of the Communist Party and progressive Catholicism, both sharing more or less strict internationalist world views, Seville provided a much more fertile ground for the development of a more consciously and purposefully Andalusian politics. Not only was it the quintessential Andalusian city, it was also much larger and cosmopolitan, allowing for greater degrees of freedom, both of action and thought. Different groups and meeting places generated different intellectual and political milieus. A bar named "La Cuadra"⁷ emerged as one of those spots. Located on Santo Domingo street, it became known as the place where the literati and the political intelligentsia habitually got together. The police contributed to its fame by signaling it out for raids and other forms of harassment. Salvador Távora described it as "the meeting place for painters, sculptors, *cante*⁸ singers and guitarist, people from all walks of life that had a preoccupation for what was happening." Although it eventually it became a place of much importance, it started in an informal manner, without previous organization, "just people starting to know each other, that start stopping by. And then you began to see movements develop. Several trends developed in literature, theater, in the *cante*... In a short time there started to be a movement that one way or another began to connect there. And a strong nucleus formed, which in time acquired some weight. During the last years of the dictatorship, it had whole lot of weight."

However, even if this movement and its cultural politics had a clearly intellectual slant, perhaps for the first time in the history of the region it began

⁷ The Stable

⁸ Andalusian Gypsy deep song. For a discussion of the role of flamenco in political dissent during franquismo, see Washabaugh (1996).

to transcend class boundaries and political commitments, becoming a truly popular and collective movement. As I began to discuss in an earlier chapter, crucial to this process was the experience of the over 2 million Andalusian workers who left their region. But just as important as migration, and the physical separation from their native communities, and the contact with politicized "others" it entailed, was the awareness of their reality as workers. Referring back to Salvador Távora's words, we see how consciousness of what it "truthfully" means to be Andalusian is tied to both "a working-class dignity" and to the discriminatory treatment received by other Spaniards. However, economic exploitation and political oppression figured much more prominently than ethnic *discrimination* – for it was rarely yet articulated as oppression – in political motivations and actions. They defined the politicization of identity in Andalusia during the sixties, even while they were clearly antagonistic to its development at times.

Part III. The Generation of 1968: Transition in politics and culture

As I have extensively pointed out, the clandestine political networks and the groups through which they operated were crucial in the political education and mobilization of individuals during most of the 1960's. Their smallness and the limits placed on the scope of their activities must lead us to believe that they were marginal to mainstream culture. Their strength is proven by their continued survival in spite of the rapid and arbitrary changes in the political climate, dictated by the level of tolerance that the government felt inclined to indulge. Thus, while there was clearly an opening of the regime's policies with respect to certain social and cultural issues, this overall trend was punctuated by relapses and crackdowns.

But perhaps an even better measure of their established position, even if constantly threatened, was their success in politicizing the younger sectors of the population. It would be the youth of this generation that would take up the banner of nationalism and identity in the late 1970's to mid 1980's. And from this generation, the Muslim converts would emerge. In what follows of this section, I will present a general overview of the politics and views of this generation. They will serve to contextualize the life stories of the converts which will appear in Chapter V.

Even though a large majority of Spaniards continued to shun politics out of fear and mistrust, the democratic struggles begin to expand their basis of support, particularly among the young. Youth, sometimes barely into their teens, were already becoming politically aware through their involvement in neighborhood associations, clandestine political parties and groups and progressive catholic organizations, many of them with sections specifically designed to bring youth into their ranks. Alongside already existing groups such as the Christian Working-class Youth [*Juventudes Obreras Católicas*, JOC] there emerged the Worker's Commission Youth [*Comisiones Obreras Juveniles*], the Communist Youth [*Juventudes Comunistas*], and other more informal collectives within larger political bodies. Those entering politics after 1968 still had to go through many of the same forms of harassment and dangers that their elders had confronted. Nevertheless, the winds of change swept over the sphere of political action, in spite of the dictatorship, which remained in full force, and the beginning of a series of so-called "states of exception," government decreed states of emergency in which the few civil liberties guaranteed by the regime were suspended. There was a new sense of purpose, and new spheres of action began to be explored.

Part of this is a generational self-consciousness, an awareness of the commonalities shared by those who by chance of birth had been spared much of what their parents had lived, and had grown different for these same reasons.

I am the son of a worker, politics comes to me as a matter of tradition. My father was jailed many times during the dictatorship, so I guess by birth. I could be nothing else but a fighter. But my militancy in the Communist Party begins in May 1968, the French May, when I was, I believe, 12 or 13 years old. Back then there was this very important thing in Córdoba, it was the Comisiones Obreras Juveniles. We had a nuclei of young people, workers in the construction sector that began to pose ourselves questions about the specificity of being young

Not only do people become involved in politics younger, but youth emerge as a social sector intensely conscious of the implications of their involvement in political activity. This had several important repercussions in the political sphere. One is that while attention continues to be centered in the struggle against the dictatorship, there began to be a preoccupation with changes beyond the moment of dictator's deposition. In other words, the political, economic and cultural circumstances had changed so dramatically that there was a serious need to rethink old stances, allowing for new possibilities of government and social organization that had previously not been feasible or conceivable. These possibilities were not only imagined, they also began to be realized. The 1970's in Spain was marked by a moment of intense political activity and utopian thinking. "It was a veritable fair of illusions" a former activist said to me. "The things we said, so certain, so convinced, and we believed all of them, the craziest, the most utopian, most radically beautiful things. But then it was all over, and as in every good fair, we had to get up,

hangover and all, and get on with our ordinary lives, our daily struggles. But the bitter taste that hangover left lasted for years.”

Youth comes to be seen as a political standpoint in and of itself. Its preoccupations and interests are posed and gain strength and momentum. In this process, the events of May 1968 should not be ignored. Aside from any direct influence on Spanish political culture at the time, the strong similarities between the two movements cannot be underestimated. In Spain, just as in France (Tourraine 1971) young people were moved to reject, protest or criticize uncontrolled modernization, which they experienced as domination and exploitation. Their critique extended both to the old guard of the Franco regime and to the new technocrats who were responsible for unleashing policies of modernization that were left unchecked. At the same time, this critique extended beyond the sphere of economics to encompass society in its entirety precisely because the hegemonic configuration was seen as exercising its control through a vast array of institutions: not only the Church, and the repressive organs of the State, the military, the police and the censored media, but also through the school and the family. Every aspect of social interaction was questioned.

To the older generations, the events of that May might have appeared distant and confused. But to the youth they became very present, despite censorship and other impediments to the free movement of information. Emboldened by the legitimation that the May movement offered, liberty ceased to be seen as a matter of civil rights. It became imperative that the struggle transcend commonsensical divisions between “public” and “private” if the social transformation that was sought was to be achieved. In what follows, I present several excerpts of conversations that took place in discussion groups with activists of the Generation of 68, to show how countercultural themes

were central to their experience, even if there are not explicit connections made to the influence of the May movement. These excerpts are largely taken from the activists' responses to two questions I posed: Why did you become involved in politics? How would you describe politics and activism in those days?

One of the crucial contributions of the May movement was the popularizing of new ideas about morality and sexual freedom, greatly influenced by feminist critiques of traditional gender and sexual relations. In the Spain of Franco, particularly in smaller, more provincial towns like Córdoba, strict moral codes were enforced by Church and State, often to the point of absurdity⁹. Rafael Arjona, activist and member of the anarchist syndicate CNT [National Council of Workers] remembers being inspired to act against such constraints.

Beginning in 1968, but really during 1970 to 1973, there was in Córdoba an impressive movement, a youth movement, and became absolutely political, even if many of us involved in it barely knew it. The older generation in some way or other helped us along, even though I felt quite autonomous at the time. I began to move around this stuff as many others of my generation, by excess, overburdening of repression, and above all, sexual repression most concretely. The tremendous taboo that there was about sex, and the tremendous oppression, above all religious, that surrounded the sexual. The truth is that I, as others of my generation, had a really rough time until you began to question things.

⁹Take for example the case of the movie *Mogambo*, where Grace Kelly plays the role of a married woman willingly seeking an extramarital affair. When the movie was dubbed into Spanish, in order to avoid the scandal of having a married woman commit adultery, the censors, through translation, transformed a marriage into a brother and sister relation, having the woman commit incest instead.

In fact, not only was the political direction of elders somewhat subsumed by the spirit of the times and the contact with other youth, the youth, as I have just shown, often led the way to novel forms of and arenas for political action. Many different kinds of ideas seemed to be in the air, some clear and others quite vague. Aurora Hernández remembered how the mood was quite confusing and yet also quite compelling. The environment where activism was developed, the extension of ties to other activists, or at times, a chance encounter with a text, would take young people in one direction or the other. "With 16 or 17 years, you didn't have your ideas very structured. At that moment, anyone could have ended up in anyone of these organizations, I mean, non-traditional communist parties, the CNT, because, in the end, they all were very similar to each other."

There seemed to be an overall sense of the need to experience and experiment with ideas, aesthetics, politics and even one's body. It was often this understanding of experimentation as an exercise of personal freedom that fostered other aspects of the sixties counterculture: the use of drugs both as political protest, as exercise of personal liberty and as escape. Take for example the words of Pablo Blanco:

They were years in which people were stirred up, ideas kept coming up that sounded strange to me, others attractive, like the theme of drugs as something against the system. And there is also, in some fashion, the anarchist ideal, that idea about a more equal society where we could all be freer, there was less society of consumption. That kind of idea starts to float around, in student and high school groups. This is the beginning, later would come more personal elements, the need to feel surrounded by people

who think like you do, with the notion of transforming the world,
even if we weren't to sure which one we wanted.

Drugs, anti-consumerist notions, and anarchy; everything tied together by the overpowering drive to achieve a freer and more just society. Ideas and texts get passed from hand to hand; soon, cliques of friends are either abandoned for or transformed into study groups that slowly transform vague preoccupations into lucid concepts and political agendas. And while the political identity and trajectory of families and historical memory of commitment continue to weigh heavily in the social imaginary as well as in the political choices of individuals, this generation began to trespass on those ideological fields that had been demarcated in blood.¹⁰

As the foci of resistance became more extended and formalized, acquiring greater strength, we see old alliances shatter. Thus, the secular left acquired greater strength at the expense of the progressive Catholic sectors. But the "traditional" model of the left also comes into question. Maravall and Morodo (1989) have argued that the coexistence of class conflict with nationalist activity was greatly responsible for the fragmentation of political parties and organizations, in spite of restrictions imposed by the electoral law. In Andalusia, parties and organizations of what was called the "radical left" had great acceptance in the more rural areas of Andalusia, but also represented in other sectors. In fact, everything – the University, the workers' syndicate, the neighborhood association – became a fertile ground for these organizations. They were highly mutable and unstable, appearing on the scene at one moment and disappearing at the next, fusing with some groups at some moments or

¹⁰The regime proved to be the one with the longest memory, and often youths with connections to radical families were chosen by the authorities to make examples of its willingness to exact punishment for threatening its mandate.

disappearing altogether only to emerge at other moments under different names.

We can easily observe how this growing tendency towards plurality was reflected in the political culture of the time by following what was happening in the *Juan XXIII*. There is a radical change in the collectives that gather around the circle, and a change in their relation to one another. As the left became more plural, and other groups to the left and right of the communist party began to appear, the progressive Christians lose ground. This is in part due to the dynamics of clandestine and underground activity. *El Juan* was marked as a safe haven for the disaffected from the regime, but it also marked it as a "dangerous" place for the more reformist elements. Furthermore, some groups become more established, and as visibility became their protection, they were able to become independent from *El Juan* and others moved to occupy the spaces opened. Thus in the 1970's the issues that were in the forefront of the *Juan's* agenda were not only those of the traditional left and Christian groups with aspirations to influence local or even state politics, but include also those of the so called "non-parliamentary left," whose aims were at once broader and yet more personal. Lola, frequent visitor to *El Juan* described her initiation into politics.

I begin at sixteen, because there is a very constant political activity surrounding that which Franco represented, *the struggle against all those things that were unjust*. All relationships had to be perfect, everything had to be coherent, because we were building a perfect world. Activism weighed as life itself, it was like saying: "here's my life," it was like marriage, for the rest of one's days. You didn't think of changing ideas. You would say to yourself: "I think I can live my life with these"

Jorge Barragán summed up the generational spirit in these words:

All of us who belong to that second generation that in one way or another found its way in the struggle against Franco, well, there is something that marks us profoundly and that is that we developed as people in a society in crisis. We came from all different sectors -- labor, teachers, students, neighbors, and the like -- but anybody who had even a minimal sensibility tried, not only to develop themselves, which was important, but also to give a little push to this thing [the struggle against the dictatorship].

As we can clearly see, there had been a radical change in the discourse and practices of this younger generation. What struck me was that it was not significantly foreshadowed in the discourse of their elders. If anything, the preoccupation with the self, with personal growth and realization may seem similar in some respects to that of some progressive Christian groups talk about reflection and consciousness raising. But there is a strong emphasis on individuality and personhood which clearly breaks with earlier discourse. Furthermore, the world of that generation was much broader than that of their elders: in fact, their politics were truly global in scope. And the possibilities seemed endless, if only the limiting historical moment could be overcome.

Another critical change was in the sphere of religion. Montero (1986) argues that the developmentalist policies of the Dictatorship propelled Spain within two decades into a situation that had taken other Western countries close to a century. They had amongst their many consequences an accelerated process of secularization. The cumulative effects of the gigantic structural changes taking place in industry, work, income, class structure (Pereda and Prado 1987; Sanchez and Urbina 1987) and urban and rural spaces led to the diffusion of a "modern mentality" and to the crystallization of new social values

and behaviors. Although sociological surveys of the time could not, due to political repression and censorship, reflect the real changes in Spaniards' attitudes towards religion, as well as their religious beliefs and behaviors, within one or two years of the death of the dictator church attendance was already dropping dramatically, so much so that by 1982, 71% of the population rarely, if ever, attended Mass. And yet, the strong secular equation between faith and identity remained surprisingly strong: while in 1982, barely 50% of the population believed in God as the creator of the World, or in the divinity of Christ, more than three-fourths of the population identified themselves as Catholic (Montero 1986).

This by no means implied an adherence to all tenets of National Catholicism. In fact, the potential of National Catholicism as a unifying ideology had become exhausted by the 1970's, when even the Catholic Church disavowed most of its ties to it. The Church became aware of an increasing estrangement and disaffection in the part of its followers, for whom its support for the regime was no longer bearable, and the conflation between the Church and the political right unavoidable. The disaffection was taking place within the hierarchy of the Church, as well. Clergy throughout all of Spain were being given stiff prison sentences for engaging in subversive activities. The clergy became even more involved in organizing and mobilizing working classes (Pereda and Prada 1986). While certainly not as outspoken or notorious as the Basque clergy's defense of the Basque language and culture, many religious people in Andalusia also embraced a leftist political nationalist stance.

If the acts of defiance had remained constrained to the lower clergy, with ties to the popular classes, the regime might have been able to defuse the dissent and control the damage to its image. However, the problems with the Catholic church transcended national politics. With John XXIII the liberalizing

forces which had been gathering power in the Church became firmly consolidated. The Church's new emphasis on human rights, freedoms of speech and association, ecumenism, and an increasing preoccupation with the fate of the poor and downtrodden certainly was not simpatico with Franco's vision of Catholicism. If Franco's technocrats and their developmentalist ideology propitiated a climate of rampant materialism and consumerism, the Vatican II Council and its move from a church of belligerent fervor to a church of reconciliation sealed the Church's fate. Its decrees on the separation of church and state presented a direct challenge to the fundamental tenets of national Catholicism, that spurred, for the first time in Spanish history, an aggressive anti-clericalism of the right.

Julio Caro Baroja (1980), in his excellent appraisal of the history of anticlericalism in Spain, has very useful insights into this process. He argues that prior to the 18th century, anti-clericalism was taken up by believers who were dissatisfied with the operations of the Catholic clergy. During the 18th and 19th centuries, and up to the middle of the 20th century, as we have seen, anti-clericalism was characteristic of unbelievers, mostly from the bourgeois and plebeian classes. However, in the 1970's, anticlericalism was shared by believers and non-believers alike, whether of right, center or leftist political leanings. It would appear that the reforms of Vatican II managed to alienate the Church from its traditional reformers without endearing it to those who had historically opposed it. And yet this point should not be exaggerated. Most research and studies show that there was a deep-seated connection between religion and ideology, in that there was a significantly higher number of atheist or disaffected among the ranks of the left (Montero 1986, Díaz Salazar 1990; González Blasco and González Anleo 1992).

In Chapter V, we will see how this embracing of utopian revolutionary project, the seriousness and intensity of political commitment, coupled with a rejection of Catholicism and the Spanish state, is clearly present in the conversion narratives of the new Muslims.

Part IV. From perception to vindication: the politicization of Identity

Pope Godoy remembers how it was like in the early days.

When we carried the Andalusian flags to the first demonstrations, those on the traditional left would tear them away from us and rip them apart. Yes, trying to convince the left that a nationalist argument was not simply a way of fooling the working classes and diverting them from internationalist proletarianism was our challenge. Outside a few, mostly of the group called ASA, and some in the more radical left, people were very unaware. Who would have known it would change, and so quickly!

In the 1970's, Andalusian identity becomes politicized as an integral part of the process of redefinition of the parameters of struggle. In attempting to explain the continued existence and vigor of Franco's regime, the new generation on the left was tackling the issue of its reproduction and looking for explanations that went beyond the traditional left's understandings of politics and repression. Thus, their critique went beyond the political and economic aspects of the regime and incorporated a critique of "Franco's society" as a whole. In this process, culture was not only recognized as an arena of struggle but played an integral role in opposing the dictatorship. It was clear to many in 1970 that Spain was a country in crisis; but while the crisis in the Franco's regime could be addressed by political and economic reforms, the generalized

social crisis required the cultivation of a new society and a new culture, which would replace the old and decaying one. And needless to say, the debates over possible social models were just as intense, if not more, than those over the political model. These debates are crucial to the processes I will be discussing in Chapter V, when I talk about how in the early 1980's identity, would lose its close articulation to labor and expand to other arenas – nation, gender, sexuality, political affiliation, aesthetic preference, etc. – just as was happening in many other countries in Europe and in the Americas.

Exile also played a crucial role in shaping the politics of this generation. Indeed, there was an important international dimension to the anti-Franco struggle. It fostered strong ties with progressive sectors of host countries, such as France, England, Mexico, Colombia, and as well as with other countries which were also seen as struggling against or successfully overcoming repressive governments. Particularly strong connections and identifications were developed with former colonized countries who had recently become independent and those belonging to the so called "non-aligned block." Cuba, but also Algeria, Libya, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Polisario movement in the former Spanish Sahara and even the Iranian revolution in its early days served not only as inspiration but also as concrete models for society. Anti-imperialist politics but particularly anti-American rhetoric made these peoples' struggles very attractive to much of the Spanish left.

While the political debates surrounding Andalusianess, shaped by the dynamics which I described above, maintained a degree of continuity with the earlier discourses, there were also important points of departure. Many detailed analysis of these debates exist.¹¹ For the purposes of this discussion, I

¹¹The literature on Andalusian nationalism tends to fall on two extremes: that of "hagiographic" studies of its leaders, or dismissive critiques by its detractors. Yet some outstanding work on the subject has been done by Isidoro Moreno, Juan A. Lacomba, and Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán. See

have identified two critical axes on which most of debates hinged. One axis, political-economic, pointed to the precarious situation of Andalusia and its people. While linking class and oppression, it was innovative in connecting this situation to the uneven industrialization of the Spanish State, and thus focused mostly on the capitalist period. The other axis, historical-ontological, problematized "official" historical narratives and made an argument that did not limit itself to the last two centuries. The way in which these two preoccupations articulated within the population led to two distinct but overlapping discourses on identity.

On the one hand, there was the discourse of many within the intellectual and the professional classes, who developed and posited their commitment as a historical interest in the cultural and economic reality of the Andalusian people, conceived as those living within the geographic boundaries of the region. Activists from this sector would be responsible for developing a discourse of dependency for Andalusia, which made the concept of "colony" a household world for many Andalusians during that time (see Acosta Sánchez 1977, 1980; Aumente, 1976, 1979; etc.). While this discourse was critical in popularizing a systemic understanding of the effects of State policies of unequal development, not only did it fail to address the role of the Andalusian bourgeoisie in supporting and facilitating those policies, it actually worked to include these bourgeoisie in the categories of "victims" or "oppressed" by the system. To the extent that it neatly avoided pointing to the elites' responsibility in the creation of Andalusian underdevelopment and softened some of the lines of conflict between classes, it can be said to have promoted a "nationalist vision," even if we might vehemently disagree with the parameters by which the nation was drawn. However, in its emphasis on underdevelopment, it actually served to stigmatize Andalusian culture further. In insisting on the

deleterious effects of the long history of Andalusian poverty, dependence and subordination, they came uncomfortably close to those who saw Andalusian culture as a culture of poverty.¹²

On the other hand, there were groups within the radical left, who embraced and perfected the concept of "class nationalism," defining the Andalusian "people" as those of the working classes – both industrial and agricultural workers whether they were employed or not. Thus, Andalusian history and culture was the struggle of the oppressed masses against their oppressors. In turn, dependency and colonialism took on very different meanings. First, they aligned Andalusia squarely with the "Third World." Economically, they were seen as having suffered a similar exploitation of their natural resources as raw materials and of their people as cheap labor. Historically, they claimed a brotherhood with the former Latin American colonies on the grounds of sharing a common variant of the Spanish language and a common history of conquest by the Spanish kings, and with North African countries, on the basis of the legacies of Al-Andalus. In this sense, they tapped into a widely but vaguely held popular notion about the ethnic connections with North Africa. Furthermore, their critique of the colonial relation transcended the scope of the Spanish state in conceiving it as part and parcel of the wider capitalist system.

¹² Anthropologists played an important and distinguished role in this process. Maddox (1993) finds this involvement problematic. He argues that "ethnographic strategies devised by anthropologists to foster a sense of distinctive Andalusian identity" run the risk "of devaluing the contemporary significance and diminishing the force of cultural differences in the very act of delineating, celebrating and comprehending them." This risk is "paradoxical and to some degree unavoidable". While agreeing with Maddox in the challenging and in fact downright messy nature of engaging in these politics, I believe it is disingenuous to expect anthropologists not to have participated in these debates. Furthermore, such statements seem to ignore the role that foreign scholars, and quite a few anthropologists among them, have had in shaping the image of Andalusia prior to the nationalist effervescence in the transition.

Thus, even to the extent that these two tendencies had distinct trajectories of growth, they all were deeply influenced – made possible only – by the regionalist and nationalist preoccupations that emerged in the early 1960's, which we discussed earlier. Out of these informal associations and discussion groups [*grupos de tertulia*] emerged the Socialist Alliance of Andalusia [*Alianza Socialista de Andalucía*], which integrated for the first time (and perhaps for the last) all major groups and individuals who had as a common interest the vindication of the struggle for the political, economic and social justice for Andalusia. It was conceived exclusively as an interim organization to meet the specific political needs of the years immediately before Franco's death. In its foundational manifesto, this is clearly stated: the "political commitment groups" that constitute it are "born with the dictatorship and will die with it."

When the "lid" was taken off, at the death of the dictator, and the public sphere was re-claimed, many would be shocked to find out that those they had considered comrades actually shared very little in common with each other. Statements such as this by José Castillo were very common.

Franko brought us all together. Then, when the moment of transition finally arrived, what happens is that each one finally takes his place, where he was really at all along, and everything emerges, it becomes clear. For example, we thought everybody belonged to the Communist Party, and to our surprise, many began to identify themselves as socialists, or more properly Christian... These times left one feeling perplexed, a little betrayed and honestly, preoccupied and apprehensive about the future.

And it is after the death of the dictator, in the transition from a loosely structured broad based political and cultural movement into a political party,

that the differences in opinions and projects become irresolvable tensions.¹³ Jerez Mir (1985) in a thorough and thoughtful article chronicles the evolution of ASA into PSA (Socialist Party of Andalusia) and later into PA, *Partido Andalucista*. What we find is a history of complicated and largely counterproductive alliances with other political parties, driven by electoral aspirations rather than by a vision of movement building. Another crucial factor in the subsequent development of the PA since the transition has been having to contend with a particularly hostile reception from the media and formal organs of public opinion, shaped by campaigns from political parties both of the center, moderate left and right, all fearful that the PSA, later PA, would encroach on their perceived electoral bases. (At one point the PA was accused at the same time of accepting support from the party in government, the Union Cristiana Demócrata, UCD, and from Libya). Finally, and most importantly, the party has undergone an accelerated gentrification. In its first congress, the then PSA espoused "class" nationalism, and Marxism as a tool for intellectual critique and model for social justice. In its second congress, just two years later, in the midst of much debate Marxism was disavowed, and Socialist was dropped from the name. The move away from issues of economic justice, at least as phrased in class terms, coincided with a move to solidify the historical ties with previous nationalist movements and symbols. The new name adopted, Partido Andalucista, had been the name of the political party founded by Blas Infante. Their claims as heirs to other nationalist struggles in the past was further solidified by the successful recruiting of well-known nationalists active prior to Franco's coup d'état. While this might have

¹³Hindsight leads us to the sad conclusion that once again we are confronted with a situation where the people attempted to take the lead and yet the politicians refused to follow. In years to come, Andalusians would continue to debate the true nature of the demands made on that day. Were they based on class or nationhood? If based on nation, were they driven by "national consciousness" or by feelings of *agravio comparativo* or *revanchismo* (desire to get even)?

strengthened its historical legitimation, it weakened its more radical social and economic programs.

In spite of all their contradictions and equivocations, early on they obtained a string of dramatic and unprecedented successes: three representatives elected to the Catalan parliament and five representatives elected to the Spanish Parliament in 1979, which led to the formation of a parliamentary group, and victories in several municipal elections. Both these groups, but particularly the SOC which continues to exist, were crucial in the popularization of the "Andalusian Power" movement. And yet, its ill-conceived and precipitous political maneuvers and back-room deals drove away many of the more radical and committed elements of the party. They soon made their home in newly emerging groups within the extra-parliamentary left, claiming for themselves the title of "class nationalists," which intellectuals within the PA had coined but were quite ill-suited to bear.

The parties the disaffected joined usually came out of radical left organizations that began to appear around the mid 1970's, sometimes as a critique to the more "bourgeois" nationalisms of the North. And, yet, their rhetoric articulated quite well with the concerns of the "class nationalists" and would lead many who became involved in these groups for reasons altogether different toward a nationalist path. So it was "Andalusia itself," as it was often put to me, that filled these groups' demands and programs of action with specifically Andalusian content. And they flourished. Some of the more important ones were *Movimiento Comunista – Andalucía* (MCA) and *Partido de Trabajadores de Andalucía* (PTA). However, even while their platforms addressed specific Andalusian issues, and they incorporated the letter "A" into their initials, the relationship these organizations had to issues of identity was often forced and ephemeral. Nevertheless, the impact of their rhetoric on grassroots

activists was stronger and enduring. It is around the mid-70's, the same time as Franco's death, that several autochthonous movements arose. Some of the more important ones were United People of Andalusia [*Pueblo Andaluz Unido* ,PAU], which later allied itself with the PTA to form PTA-PAU and the Andalusian Liberation Front [*Frente de Liberacion Andaluz* , FLA].

Their influence extended far beyond their immediate members. These groups proved central in the formation of the Andalusian Workers Syndicate [*Sindicato Andaluz* , SA], a nationalist labor union, and in the "nationalist" turn of the Agricultural Workers Syndicate [*Sindicato de Obreros del Campo*, SOC]. The latter, as we will see in the next section, the became protagonists in the early 1980's of a series of events that would become central in the politicization of Andalusian identity and propel the plight of the Andalusian poor to the center of national and European consciousness during that time. For Maria Teresa Calderón it had to do with making the crucial connection between abstract revolutionary critiques and the immediate, concrete reality of your daily life. "You lived an economic, political, and social reality of oppression, of course, but you experienced it in an environment also, in the circumstances of a region, that has its own history, tradition, its culture... it has its feelings, its way of seeing life and living it." To ignore the way this oppression was knit into the fabric of daily life was "to blind oneself" to the full complexity of its operations. In this statement lay the importance of making Andalusia a fundamental part of a person's political commitment.

However, the emphasis on local particularities did not detract from an internationalist understanding of political action. "The struggle was against the capitalist system" argued Carmen Rodríguez. "Franco was a secondary idea, a stage in a much broader framework." Indeed, there was a much more romantic idea, that of the total social transformation of Andalusia. "We were fighting for

a radical rupture in politics, economy and ideas, that would lead us into a revolutionary struggle. When we had political discussions, when we formed ourselves politically, what we imagined and aimed for was a free and socialist Andalusia”

It is important to note that these strands – the historical/intellectual and the radical/class nationalist – are not inherently incompatible, and that they frequently articulated with one another. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the effect the critiques and the rethinking of history had in the reappraisal of the Andalusian past, and its implications for present day politics. Thus, while some would explore in mythical Tartessus the roots of the Andalusian essence and spirit, others would focus on the kingdoms of Al-Andalus. In claiming Tartessian heritage, Andalusians could also claim a foundational role in the creation of classical civilization, and thus in the history of Europe and the in fact, the world. However, historical knowledge about this period is virtually non-existent and highly controversial. Much more information was available about the Islamic period, and yet it too was problematic, for it usually fell into two categories: either wild romantic fantasies by European orientalist scholars and travelers,¹⁴ or the vengeful chronicles of northern Christians, and the Spanish historiographical literature they inspired. The romanticized vision was obviously more suited to anti-Spanish and anti-State purposes. Emphasis was placed on the contrast between the contemporary and Islamic Andalusia: while Christian Andalusia was associated with poverty, ignorance, and repression, Islamic Andalusia was said to have been economically prosperous; unparalleled in its scientific, intellectual and aesthetic production; and perhaps most importantly, exceptionally tolerant in matters of politics and religion.

¹⁴British historian Nigel Towsend in his book *The Black Legend* discusses how the exaltation of the Islamic kingdoms served very well British desire to discredit its southern rival.

In contrast to the "historic nationalities" of the North, who claimed difference on ethnic or linguistic terms, and the right to self-government citing centuries old-treaties with the Spanish state, Andalusia had been conquered and its surrender treaties betrayed. This meant that the newly victorious state had moved to impose its language, culture and political system unto the population. That, according to the State-national founding myth, this population saw this as a liberation, only reinforced the erasure. But Andalusians in 1975 could draw on historical precedents that told of a different story. Andalusia had also counted with its own regionalist and nationalist movements during the First and Second Republics, the periods of most intense nationalist activity in the Spanish State before the 1960's. In fact, Andalusian nationalists were fond of pointing out that an Andalusian referendum for Autonomy was ready to be voted on when Franco took over in 1936.

However, the fact remains that its historic precedents for separation from the state were "tainted." For Andalusia's moment of independence and preponderance within the Spanish peninsula, and the ancient world, happened during the period of Islamic rule. Time and again, intellectuals and politicians felt compelled to vindicate Al-Andalus as the founding moment for the nation. One of the first Andalucistas, Antonio Machado y Nuñez, would say in as early as 1868 that to call the wars between the North and South a "reconquest" was erroneous, for after 700 years "the invaders [the moors] and invaded [the southern Christians] had become brothers". Blas Infante, hailed as "the father of the Andalusian fatherland", was fascinated by the history and culture of this period. In the year that preceded his death at the hands of pro-Franco militia, he had begun to write extensively about them, and is even said to have converted to Islam. However, we will never be able to know how his thought might have progressed.

Claiming Al-Andalus was radically anti regime. Franco had freely made use of "crusade" metaphors in his speeches and slogans; communists were equated with infidels and apostates. But it was in some ways also anti-Spanish.¹⁵ Certainly, it meant rejecting much of what contemporary Andalusians would recognizably identify with: language, popular religiosity, feasts and festivals, music, etc. Furthermore, to associate oneself with the Islam and just as Spain was struggling to consolidate its place within European political and economic sphere was complicated at best. Thus, while Al-Andalus stood as symbol of defiance against National Catholicism, its perception as radically "un-European" limited its use. But even more important, as a symbol, Al-Andalus acknowledged transformation and change in a context where radical breaks were not acceptable. Many nationalists argued that precisely what defined the Islamic period was the flourishing of culture thanks to diversity and tolerance of differences. Nationalist ideology stressed Andalusia's uniqueness as forged out of the multiplicity of cultures and peoples who have inhabited its space. In the words of one of my informants:

They have accused us of not acting like Andalusians, but these things have to be dealt with carefully. The Andalusian case, different from the Basque or the Catalan case, has to be distinguished because Andalusia has been a people [*pueblo*] that has opened its arms to all nationalities. It is a people that has been in constant contact with other peoples. Civilization has arrived here in many forms. I am telling you, all that we know today as graphic worlds, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, all have come in contact with us, have become brothers in fact, and became identified with the Andalusian pueblo. We did not have a consciousness

¹⁵ However, as we will see in Chapter V, in many ways it was an intensely Spanish act as well, in the sense that it was still caught up within the reality and the politics shaped by National Catholicism and Franco.

of independence because we have never seen ourselves as independent. What happens is that with the coming of the State of the Autonomies we have had to reconsider our participation within the state, since nowadays every time someone declares themselves autonomous the state showers it with tax moneys.

Furthermore, as I have already emphasized, the Andalusian discourse on peoplehood was articulated around differences other than cultural ones. Differences between oppressors and oppressed are inherent to its self-conception. Certainly, with nationalist application of dependency theory to the Andalusian situation this oppression becomes tied to notions of regional belonging and discrimination within the larger State. Virginia Dominguez, in her excellent study of Israeli peoplehood and nationhood has asked: "Can a *people* really exist without a *culture* by which they can be identified and distinguished? Can a *people* really be culturally pluralistic?" Be the case as it may, it is certain that the luxury of not conceiving itself as a homogeneous entity, carefully bounded and "identical" through, time was no longer available to Andalusia after the transition. To define itself in terms of its internal "differences" was to once again be equated with Spain. Which seemed the same as saying that as a "nation," both Spain and Andalusia exist only insofar as they are connected to the State. In the case of Spain, the state dissolves into nationalities; in the case of Andalusia, were it not for the State of the Autonomies, Andalusians would never have defined themselves in such terms.

Part VI. The axis of politics and identity: culture and class (in) conflict

What becomes immediately apparent is the complex and often contradictory role that class demands played in the process of politicizing identity in Andalusia. From early on, class had been singled out as a basis for

national identity. Blas Infante shows throughout his writings a marked inclination towards economic explanations of the Andalusian situation. An eclectic thinker, influenced by very diverse currents of thought at very different moments in time – liberalism, socialism, even the anarchism of the peasants he so admired and whose demands he often assumed as those of the entire nation - he combined both a clear-sighted view of oppression of large segments of the Andalusian population with an overly romanticized and somewhat essentialized vision of Andalusian history. As I have shown earlier in this chapter, this contradiction was perhaps his most enduring legacy to the nationalist movement.

What is impossible to miss in most debates about Andalusian identity is not that identity continuously refers to class, but that there often is a clear animosity and in fact denial of any identity other than class based. This in itself is not remarkable: what we are seeing is a local playing-out of long-standing debates within Marxist theory itself. However, if we carefully analyze some of the discursive ploys by which regional or national identity was devalued, we soon discover that much more than recalcitrant internationalism is involved. What I find, as I discussed in the previous chapter, is the operations of a transformist hegemony at work in creating a complex and highly articulate argument legitimizing the belief that Andalusians do not have a "developed" consciousness of their identity as a people. That this argument seems to be supported by several distinct and clearly contradictory ideologies – the internationalist one, the State-nationalist one, and the post-transitional ideology of "nationalities" – is but proof of its strength and its political significance.

To review my major arguments: I expect to have shown that those involved in politics immediately prior to the transition had their attention

placed in other arenas: the anti-dictatorship struggle, articulated around a discourse of class interests, as was used by the labor movement or the Christian "base" communities. For many, the concept of Andalusia as a region or even nation was barely taking shape; others would take even longer, until the years immediately after Franco's death. As many of my informants pointed out, the radical segmentation of the Andalusian social structure, with its insurmountable separation between owners and the dispossessed, delimited a reality in which there was no space for imagining other forms of community. Add to this the fact that Andalusian identity appeared in no way to be threatened, but to the contrary, promoted. At the local level, this meant that it was precisely popular culture and celebrations¹⁶ that provided one of the few forms of public association sanctioned by the regime.

The moment of the transition is crucial for understanding the dynamics of development and collectivization in contemporary Andalusian identity. I believe Antonio Gramsci has alluded to similar processes through his metaphor of "passive revolution." The dynamics of "consensus" -- the political negotiations and strategies that arise at the moment of the creation of a new hegemonic configuration satisfactory to the leading political forces -- are captured quite vividly in this concept which involves a transformation of the state that neutralizes opponents, making former antagonists into friends, bringing together diametrically opposed factions from the previous and emerging hegemonic configurations. This dynamic revolves around a system of government only partially reorganized, with strong economic limitations on reform. Everything is weighed to provide the minimal amount of inclusion necessary to win the support of the popular sectors of the population, but at the

¹⁶ Of course, it is important to note that it was not all forms of popular culture that were freely celebrated. Carnival, particularly that in Cadiz, with its satirical and confrontational attitude, even if ritualized, was expressly forbidden throughout the dictatorship.

same time taking care to keep them at the margins of any real participation. Chatterjee (1986) posits that this historical process generally coincides with a "revolution of Capital." In the Spanish case, however, the "revolution of Capital" precedes changes in civil society due to the existence of an authoritarian regime that on the one hand promotes intense industrialization while on the other hand exercising control over the public spheres, even if at great cost and eventually jeopardizing the reproduction of the system itself.

The discursive practices and representations produced and reproduced by the hegemonic configuration that kept Franco in control until the moment of his death were so constituted as to appear to be "mirror" that "reflected" reality. Due to internal and external contradictions (of Capital, of class, of ideology, of discourse) this mirror slowly began to crack but never shattered completely. However, the cracks were sufficiently wide to make the image that was being "reflected" different, even distorted. From those interstices new visions emerged. This is the moment in the transition when Spaniards "proclaimed radical Manifestos and fell hopelessly in love with the most provocative of heterodoxies" (Fortes 1990:20). But this "liminal" moment is rapidly lost because the rupture was after all only partial, carefully negotiated and managed.

This is precisely what happened in Andalusia. Traditionally, Andalusia had been defined by the predominance of the rural sector in most spheres of life. But the dramatic changes of the 1960's and 70's, along with the migration of large sectors of the population, meant that much of what was taken for granted had to be thought or cultivated. Neighborhood networks had to be recreated, festivals had to be fought for and adapted. With the major changes in the political sphere, the division between the censored and the unthinkable, which had already become obvious, could finally be addressed. This "opening"

precipitated a moment of "heterodoxia," in which the Andalusians were confronted with a veritable tumult of possibilities in which to reconstruct, recompose an image, for and by themselves, that they could recognize as their own. In combination with other processes of politicization (for land and labor), it made "feeling Andalusian" a public and collective life-experience. It was in this context that the "Andalucista," and more properly nationalist, projects moved towards the mainstream of public debate; identity itself became part of the everyday "cultural debate."

But this situation did not last for long, for it clearly jeopardized the negotiated order and the new configuration that was precariously imposing itself. The recently inaugurated "mirror" of representations and practices was supposed to reflect a decentralized, "modern" European state, concerned with the civil liberties and economic welfare of its citizens. However, the fact remained that the State relinquished few real powers to the newly "autonomous" regions, while the economic reforms followed a neoliberal rather than welfare-state program.

Examples abound, and they will be addressed in the following chapter.



Figure 3. Plaque in honor of the last Muslim mayor of the town of Casarabonela, just outside Malaga.

(Casarabonela, 1993)

Chapter V. Silences within the Big Bang: politics of memory at the margins of modernity, 1982-1994

Modernity
... not only entails a ruthless break with
any or all preceding historical
conditions, but is characterized by a
series of never ending internal ruptures
and fragmentations
David Harvey, *The Condition of
Postmodernity*

Some readers might disagree with my choice of the word silence as a defining concept for the public sphere in Post-Franco Spain. Silence, as an acquaintance argued, perhaps should be reserved for the censorship and authoritarianism that suffocated public life for 40 years prior; to do otherwise would be to trivialize the repression. For many who are familiar with or lived through the 1980's and early 1990's in Spain, noise -- loud, often strident, conflicting sounds that merged into a self-conscious and dynamic cacophony -- might be a more accurate trope for that period.

Obviously, it is not my intention to trivialize the 40 years of censorship and repression. On the contrary, in using the word silence I hope to expose precisely what I see by and large as an erasure of Franco's legacy from most discourses and spheres of debate. In this I am following the path blazed by other Spanish scholars, such as Morán (1991) and Ortí (1989), among others. In previous chapters I argued that discourses about nationhood and the perceived "nature" of people's identification with the nation were used to structure and solidify silences about political, economic and social realities that challenged the delicate balance of power brokered during the transition, in such a way that culture became a privileged site for making and staking claims (for similar dynamics in Eastern European transitions, see Verdery 1991). In this chapter, I

will be developing another aspect of my argument, focusing on how the complex of ideas, discourses and practices we call "modernity" was used by the emergent sectors within the hegemonic configuration to provide for a positive and alternative framing of reality that would cloak the silences.

Modernity as a trope appealed to people in post-Franco Spain by offering "adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation" (Berman 1982:15) through concrete objects, ideas and practices in which it was seen embodied. I argue that the discourse on modernity worked powerfully to promote the sublimation and transcendence of potentially conflictive social and political expectations. By embracing and consuming modern ideas like "democracy" and "culture" -- in both "traditional" ethnic and "contemporary" transnational forms -- and the commodities that embodied each, a "new" Spain was constituted. However, while Modern Spain and the discourse that created it did appeal to broad sectors of the population, for others the particular themes on which modernity was conceived became thoroughly problematic. This chapter focuses on this discontent and disillusionment, for it defined political culture in definitive ways.

Within oppositional discourses, memory emerged as a particularly contested terrain. The emphasis on memory and personal narratives was tied not only to how the past was silenced and censored during the Franco regime, but more importantly to the purposeful forgetting of the past by a new democratic government fearful of what a rehashing of history and memories could unleash. For many political activists, this discarding of the past only heightened the sense of dislocation and the need to reestablish contact and communication with it by making "the past" once again present. However, while "personal" experience was often claimed as the ultimate source of truth, it was also acknowledged that memory was notoriously treacherous, or

idiosyncratic at best. How could the collective events be accessed, extricated even, from within the personal experiences that were its mnemonic devices? What spaces were available for re-memorizing the past in a society that considered it politically and socially “embarrassing” and was intent on transcending it through an unquestioned assumption of “modernity”?

Questions such as these lead us to a discussion of another contentious issue within the political domain: the relationship between freedom and what liberal democracy defines as the public and private spheres. For it was not just that one could not speak of a “public sphere,” at least not in any of the senses that it has been defined in the literature (Habermas 1979; Fraser 1983, 1993; Landes 1988; Negt and Kluge 1993). Repression also severely curtailed the possibility of a sphere of “personal” and “familial” discourse outside government regulation. These dynamics defined the existence of the “clandestine” as an interstitial space within censorship and public fear, as I discussed in Chapter IV. However, the recent literature on the “public sphere” also points to how in a liberal democratic regime, the openness and public nature of discussion and activity does not translate into fairness or even equity in influence. The ability of Capital and the hegemonic configuration of power to intervene and shape debate through the mass media and government policy severely limits the autonomy and plurality of discursive praxis within civil society. This is why in 1980’s Spain, many oppositional voices, seeing their access to society and the citizenry at large mediated and often outright controlled by institutions invested in maintaining the status quo, responded by seeking spaces of action on the edge and in the interstices of the institutions and of totalizing discourses about modernity.

Both critiques came together in social movements that, like other such movements through out the world, centered upon the construction, defense and

public performance of identity, the critiques of personal life and the attempt to create an utopian vision of community (Epstein 1990). The communities these movements envisioned often did not foresee or desire the State as an ultimate audience or interlocutor, opting for other publics and arenas. As Touraine (1971, 1981) and others have pointed out, these movements represented conflicts over historicity, "people's very models of knowledge, accumulation and culture that shape people's fundamental relation to their world" (Kling 1993). The recognition that much of the hierarchical asymmetries they were facing were created within rather than in spite of standards of modernity and humanism (Fraser 1983, 1993; Landes 1988; Negt and Kluge 1993; Tsing 1993) led activists in Spain to attempt to challenge and/or reconfigure categories such as "private" and "public" by promoting the marginal as an alternative space (Urla 1995). In the upcoming chapters I will be discussing whether they were successful in constructing the marginal not only as the excluded but as the insubordinate.

In this chapter I begin to discuss the conversions to Islam, which offer an excellent example of the complexities involved in this form of political praxis. I understand the conversions as an attempt to bring disparate and often contradictory critiques of tradition and of modernity into a cohesive, if not always coherent, discourse and practice. Acknowledging the relevance of the political, social and cultural dynamic should enrich our understanding of the search for spiritual dimensions to everyday life. The conversions are neither "opportunistic," as Rocher and Cheraqui (1987) would have them be, nor are they esoteric escapism. They are, among other things, a complex social phenomenon that allows us a privileged vantage point into the fault lines crisscrossing the religious, cultural, social, political and economic foundations of "modernity" and oppositional politics of marginality in post-Franco Spain.

The Big Bang: memory and hegemony under the PSOE

To many, Franco's death symbolized the end of Spain's distance – temporal and spatial – from the rest of Europe and the "developed" world. According to this line of reasoning, Franco had modernized the economy but refused to modernize himself, and therefore the State; his death put an end to the anachronism in which Spain had been caught. This discourse resonated well within the general population, who had often been told that the root of Spain's problems lay in its truncated modernizing process, for whom the Church, the monarchy and the military were responsible. It also appealed to those whose improved standards of living had exceeded the possibilities for consumption offered by the dictatorship. The "peacefulness" of the transition was proof of this fact: Spain had been kept "non-modern" by force.

There seems to be a consensus among writers that the victory of the PSOE in the general elections of 1982 marked the end of the "transition" in Spain. Not only was the UCD, the leading party up to that point, defeated but this defeat precipitated its dissolution and replacement by a party in which the ideological component of the former regime was nil for all intents and purposes. Furthermore, the threat of military subversion, constant if unrealized through the transition, had become minimal after the defeat of the attempted coup d'état in February 1981 (Tussell 1992). However, although the political transition had come to an end, the economic and social transitions had barely begun. Indeed, the PSOE inaugurated its tenure in office under less than auspicious conditions. While on the political front matters seemed to be settled, the economy was in the throes of a deep crisis.

The global economic crises precipitated by the rise in oil prices in the early 70's and again in the early 1980's hit Spain particularly hard, destroying

more than 20% of its industrial capacity¹ (García and Segura 1989). Matters did not improve during the transition, and the economy reached dramatic lows in 1977. Deindustrialization, aggravated by the return of migrants (no longer welcome in host countries also beset by economic crisis) and by the youthfulness of the Spanish workforce, translated into skyrocketing unemployment. And while some initial action was taken, the political leaders demonstrated a concerted weariness in tackling any serious structural problems that might jeopardize the smoothness of the political process. Increases in government services and spending, combined with a significant decrease in productivity, drove up inflation rates and the public deficit (Martínez Cortiña 1990.)

However, those who voted the PSOE into power had enormous hope and confidence that the young politicians they had chosen to govern their country -- debonair, modern, progressive, intellectually inclined "beautiful people" (de Miguel 1980) -- would come up with solutions to this crisis. By the mid-1980's their hopes seemed to have come reality, as Spain experienced an unprecedented if short lived economic growth spurt. The PSOE, whose leaders just a few years earlier had bristled at the epithet "Social Democrats," embarked on a neo-liberal program of economic reform (Ortí 1989). Along with an industrial reconversion came the liberalization of the economy. Taking advantage of an international boom, the government promoted the influx of foreign investment and finance capital by inflating the price of currency and offering interest rates double those of most other European markets. This policy was crucial in correcting a negative balance of payments, promoting alliances between local and international capital (many of which turned sour in

¹ Spain's industrial infrastructure was particularly vulnerable since 85% of the industries were small to medium size operations.

the 1990's and led to some notorious public scandals). Government intervention, in the creation of jobs through the service sector and through infrastructural improvements, was also crucial during this period. About this time, what was then still the Common Market became an important source of economic incentives and aid. The Socialists, bolstered by these "successes," reigned with an absolute majority throughout the decade, despite two fairly successful general strikes and a highly contested challenge to its referendum to join NATO. Given the rapid pace and the apparent effortlessness with which these radical changes in economic and foreign policy were instituted, many began to believe that anything was possible.

Similar changes took place in the cultural spheres. Important among the catalysts for these changes were the dynamics of identity politics in Spain during the 1980's. As we mentioned in Chapter II, history and identity became much desired and cultivated credentials in a market of State "favors" which included goods, services and jurisdictions. Novelist and social critic Juan Goytisolo has argued that the "itch" or urge to identify oneself had become the central dynamic of cultural politics in the "new" Spain. "The search for what sadly has become the celebrated 'signs (or marks) of identity'," wrote Goytisolo in 1985 "... at a state, national or autonomic scale... has turned the new democratic Spain into a kind of club whose primary end consists in the fond contemplation by each of its members of his or her own singular and irreducible identity." Cultural producers now enjoyed wider audiences and outlets for their work: resources were available at all levels – State, Autonomous Community, Province and locality – for the promotion of arts of "universal" but also "national" appeal. Indeed, as we discussed in Chapter II, culture emerged from the transition as a privileged space for action and redress, and its preeminent position in daily life was reflected in the successful

way in which culture "sold" during this time. The outspoken support that many intellectuals manifested for the PSOE contributed to this association between democracy and cultural production, while offering important legitimacy to the regime.

In Chapter IV, I discussed how the movement of resistance and politicization in the world of the arts that arose towards the end of Franco's life was not only tied to ethnonationalist fervor but to a broader critique of the cultural impact of Franquismo in the arts and in daily life in general. Those same individuals and groups continued to play an important role in the aesthetic fields after the transition. Some authors (Tussell 1993, Acosta 1990) have suggested that the prevalence of these figures and movements is tied in no small measure to certain commercial circuits and small-scale infrastructures that developed in the early 1970's. This phenomena is also tied to the recuperation of figures who had been silenced or abandoned during the dictatorship. This nostalgic revival was not always fortuitous, as Morán (1990) describes with acuity. Many of the authors were past their intellectual prime, and their production reflected the toll that age, exile and isolation had created. Moran suggests that the revival, at best naive and at worse thoroughly cynical, was handled as if it could, by itself would right the wrongs that 40 years of censorship had wrought upon culture and civil society. Within the reigning triumphalism of the transition, there was no space to admit certain defeats, much less to assign and assume responsibilities to create new foundations from which to build in cultural matters.

In fact, one of the greatest ironies of this time was the dramatic decrease in the radicalism of critiques against the dictatorship shortly after the dictator's death. While references to Franco and the past in general remained constant, the preferred vehicle for them became the comedy of manners or farce, and the

medium, film (Amell and García 1988). Framing critiques through humor served to create a (false) sense of separation and distance from Franco and his world, thus asserting a rupture that was far from being consolidated, masking the ties that continued to exist, and obfuscating the paths towards real social and cultural transformation. Parody also led to a nostalgia, even at times to a thinly veiled romanticism of the “good ol’ times” of social control and predictability. Franquismo increasingly came to be seen as a thing of the past, and receded into time with every renewed claim about Spain's modernity and Europeanness.

Just as noticeable as this humorous and nostalgic turn was an exaggerated, and often uncritical, insistence on transgression and experimentation which seemed to have no limits, increasing exponentially as each new fad became normalized. Although the existence of self-deprecating nostalgia alongside a rampant vanguardism might seem paradoxical, these developments were in fact related to the sense of having left the past behind, of it having become irrelevant. At the level of popular culture, this exaggerated celebration was manifested by the phenomenon known as *el destape*, in which many popular entertainers (especially women) bared themselves to their audiences, most often, again, in farces and comedies of dubious taste or artistic value. Some of these attitudes can also be found in the *madrileño* artistic and social scene known as *la movida*, and its best known exponent, Pedro Almodovar.

It is tempting to see this florescence of transgression and experimentation in the arts as a displacement of energies from the sphere of formal politics to the “aesthetic” spheres. For it coincided with the significant decline in popular mobilization and political participation known as *el desencanto* [the disenchantment]. Some writers downplay the significance of this

disenchantment, arguing that Spaniards have "traditionally" demonstrated conservative political behavior, and thus it was the effervescence of the 1970's which was exceptional. Others subscribe to the view that as a rule civilians simply become exhausted from the rigors of continuous and intense participation in politics, and will choose to retire into their daily routines as soon as they see their responsibilities fulfilled by voicing their opinions, demonstrating or voting. Finally, there are those who see the retreat as a result of the political praxis of parties during the transition, which continuously engaged in private negotiations instead of public debates in parliament or through the organs of public opinion, excluding the vast majority of the population.

Judging by the people I interviewed, the demobilization was a very traumatic experience. Statements like these were quite common:

There was no change of guard in *Franquismo*. They made it up and the deal worked out fabulously. At the beginning you saw a corroded system, and thought, "no problem, we'll tear this down. But then the mirage disappeared and you saw a machine coming directly at you functioning thanks to the support of those who had once been in the opposition. Everything began to tumble...

Looking back at the 1980's today, people no longer speak of miracles or booms but instead of what they call *cultura del pelotazo*, meaning "culture of the Big Bang,"² characterized by individualism, a cynical attitude towards social morality and ethics, the quest for financial security through rapid gain, and ostentation through conspicuous consumption. Although shared by many

²*Pelotazo*, literally translated, refers to hard or loud hitting of a ball. Thus grand slam might also be an appropriate translation. Others might prefer "Big Time" because of its referents in American popular culture, as in Peter Gabriel's song and the Hollywood movie with the same title.

Spaniards across the board, these values were most clearly tied to an emerging class of newly rich. Drawn from the ranks of the professional or entrepreneurial classes – the same strata that produced many of the new generation politicians of the PSOE (Ortí 1989) – these new elites were able to amass considerable fortunes in a short time thanks to a favorable climate in world financial markets and their ability to capitalize on the investments pouring into the country. The rise of these newly rich and empowered into positions of social preeminence contributed to the spotlighting of practices of conspicuous consumption. These practices were embraced by Spanish consumers across the board, eager to invest their newly acquired discretionary incomes in icons of modernity. Whether because of their inherent conservatism, a sense of having fulfilled their civic duty by electing democratic leaders, or the realization of their estrangement from the mechanisms of power, the population retreated into the daily pleasures of this new Spain, and left the responsibility of government to those they had elected.

Andalucismo in the new Spain: the populist turn

The causes for the populist turn taken by Andalusian politics are extremely complex. The rising influence and power of the middle classes within *Andalucista* politics in particular, and the sphere of cultural production in general, was seen by many informants as crucial to this turn. Although historically *Andalucista* politics had drawn heavily from the intellectual, professional and managerial sectors of the middle classes, during the 1980's a series of factors combined to make their weight in the cultural sphere even greater. While the politicization of identity that began in the late 1970's was certainly influential perhaps even more important was the greater disposable incomes. This created, on the one hand, a consuming public defined by the nostalgia of migrants away from or returning to their land, and on the other, a

generalized desire for what was seen as “continuity and tradition” in the midst of the rapid and continual shifts in the “modernity” that was being lived. My informants also pointed to how the uncritical, populist elements were further reinforced by the “tastes” of middle and upper classes which saw themselves favorably represented in much of those popular images and icons. It is important to note as well that these populist images drew heavily from *Sevillano* customs and mores. While this dynamic is clearly related to Seville’s historical preponderance in Andalusian politics and economy, it was only reinforced by the city’s designation as capital of the autonomous community, and by the fact that much of Andalusia’s political leadership – with perhaps the exception of the Communist Party – was drawn from the ranks of the *Sevillano* middle and upper classes.

Another important factor was the electoral strategies of those political parties whose aspirations were primarily toward the State and not local government. In order to court a voting population increasingly more sensitized to regional issues of inequality, without furthering autonomic trends that could hurt their chances at the level of the State, these parties turned to the most recognizable icons of Andalusianness, even if many were precisely the ones that had been brought into question by the cultural resurgence of the 1970’s. According to Fernando Martín, member of the PSA,

If you listen to political speeches, today as much as then, the majority of politicians who claim to be concerned with Andalusian issues are, and have always been, populists. The case in point is the PSOE who got a lot of mileage from that folkloric version of Andalusianness, both here in Andalusia and in Madrid. It was a matter of expediency, the easiest way to get a strong base

of support. People recognized these images immediately, even if they were fundamentally deformed and degrading.

For Salvador Távora, the problems go much deeper than simply rational choice. He believes that what he called the *petit-bourgeois* politicians never understood the significance of the aesthetic and cultural elements in the process of political education and transformation. The potential of the movement of cultural politics and criticism was squandered in reducing national politics to economic development.

Some of the former, and current, radical nationalist activists saw a more sinister process at work. Fernando Calderón contended that the consolidation of a hegemonic bloc, within both Andalusia and the central state, required "putting the brakes" on the political impetus of economic reform and social transformation. According to this theory, the landowners continued to be a formidable force to reckon with in Andalusia, and any party or group with aspirations to power had to contend and negotiate with them. Land and labor reforms, central themes of the Andalusian Power movement, were clearly not palatable. Once the radical politics were defused, I was repeatedly told, the cultural politics which they fueled rapidly lost momentum.

Thus, while the proliferation of treatises on the historical precursors to contemporary *Andalucismo* continued, its impact became more and more limited. This form of intellectual production itself lost its critical edge and became "hagiographic readings,"³ failing to transcend the limitations of the previous theoreticians and politicians. In their task of creating a popular awareness of the historic roots of Andalusian nationalism they reproduced the same mistakes as their historical predecessors (Sevilla Guzmán 1989).

³Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán, personal communication. Outstanding exceptions are the work of Juan Antonio Lacomba and Isidoro Moreno, which I have cited elsewhere.

I suggest we understand the promotion and support of this culture of the Big Time, and the related dynamics that took place during the 1980's, as illustrative of a process of orthodoxy-creation and hegemony. This consolidation of a new hegemonic configuration lead by the PSOE had very specific consequences for Andalusia, affecting the trajectory of the Andalusian movement for social and economic justice which we discussed in Chapters II and IV, and in fact the political mobilization of the population in general. As I was told time and again by my informants, and is documented in the work of Gallego-Díaz (1981), Morán (1991) and Ortí (1989), the PSOE's consolidation of its power was carried out by a series of carefully orchestrated campaigns which discredited the political competition in the left and in the nationalist camps. It also involved the political "management" of Andalusia in order to have a guaranteed basis of support in order to secure their centralist strategy of government.

Indeed, while many political parties -- PSOE, AP/PP, UCD/CDS and to a lesser extent PSA/PA⁴ -- purported to support the Andalusian pro-autonomy project and claimed to be the true bearers of Andalusian interests, they distorted the incipient processes of consciousness-raising by reinscribing the search for identity under populist and folklorist discourse, progressively undermining the elements of self-government in the Andalusian "autonomous community," and privileging the interests of the State over those of the region. The PSOE in particular carried out truly demagogic campaigns against its opponents, delegitimizing the PA as a party of *señoritos* (a critique that if not totally without foundation could also describe, even if to a lesser extent, the PSOE itself), and accusing the PC, and later IU-CA of all forms of anti-

⁴The Communist Party, and later Convocatoria por Andalusia, although eschewing populist rhetoric, nevertheless also privilege the central government over regional interests and leadership.

democratic and anti-constitutional behavior. In the case of the parties of the left, these statements coincided with rhetoric voiced by the organs of public opinion which portrayed leftists leaders as "authoritarian," "zealots," and constantly raised questions about the financial and political connections of their parties to what was then the Soviet Union. These dynamics reinforced the PSOE's power base in Andalusia, which was rapidly becoming the community with the largest number of voters, and used this voting base to secure its control of the State government.

The contradiction between claiming Andalusianness and aspiring to the State government was only apparent, as we have seen in Chapter II. Andalusian cultural products had for many years been used to represent the overall culture of Spain. However, the Andalusianness which had begun to emerge during the transition was very different from its previous form. The newly emerging identity politics, in so far as it challenged the conflation between Andalusia and Spain, also challenge the use of Andalusia as a mere springboard to State control, and thus was threatening to any political party with State aspirations. Furthermore, there had been a long tradition by which many heads of state were drawn from Andalusia. That this historic reality had in no way resulted in benefits to the region did nothing to damage an idea that became increasingly popular during the 1980's: that Andalusians did not need to be concerned with issues of "self-government" since it was "their own" who were running the State, and they were doing so to the benefit of the whole of Andalusia. The idea that the PSOE somehow favored Andalusia was further promoted by politicians from other autonomous communities who argued that Andalusia was receiving too much money and attention from the State.

Another form of silencing was how the State was portrayed as "already decentralized" through its new administrative form of "Autonomous

Communities." This meant that the Central state was no longer associated with nationalism. Indeed, the nationalist phenomenon was – and continues to be -- linked to the Basques, "violent" and "uncontrolled," and to the Catalans, "greedy", "insolidary", "overly capitalistic."⁵ Since late 1992, nationalism has increasingly become associated with the war in the former Yugoslavia.⁶ All this implies a lapse in the re-membering of the progressive and oppositional role played by ethnic nationalisms during the Franco years, as well as the pernicious results of a strong state nationalism and the overall obscuring of the historical reality of the dictatorship in a mirage of success stories, emphasizing material wealth and personal liberties.

Andalusian cultural production was deeply influenced by this general trend. There was enormous promotion from both governmental and private institutions of Andalusian popular arts such as the *copla*, the *flamenco*, the *cante jondo*, carnival and of course, the more commercially-oriented *feria* and bullfights. However, these expressions lost their specificity and oppositional character, being assimilated once more to the populist rhetoric of those in power at the State and the autonomic levels. Once again Andalusia became the representation of Spain, and this had devastating effects for the processes of politicization that had begun to take place during the transition. Once again, as it had been during the 1950's and 60's, the "folklorics" gained enormous popularity, becoming highly visible public figures and enjoying the fame and fortune that come with stardom.

⁵ These words were commonly linked to those ethnic groups in conversations about the dangers of nationalism in Spain and abroad, not only in informal conversations with people in Córdoba, particularly the youth, but also in media (newspapers, magazines, TV) editorials.

⁶ It was very interesting and terribly disturbing to hear a high level functionary during the dictatorship defend Franco's *coup d'état* against the democratically elected Republican government by saying: "If Franco had not taken over the government then, we would be like they are now in Yugoslavia." (!) He spoke as if the Civil War had not happened, and had not led to the violence and carnage it did.

Modern politics: disenchantment and new social movements

In the rank and file of political parties, the demands and hardships of shifting from loosely organized structures to powerful bureaucracies capable of enduring the *real politic* of electoral struggles were taking their toll. Maria Teresa, a former activist, ruefully remembered how unprepared many activists had been for this dramatic change in political climate: "In the 1970's, we were all very aware of the limits of liberal, or constitutional if you prefer, democracy, and we were very critical. But somewhere along the way, at some point we got caught up in it all. And then when it was here, when it was real, then we said, well yes, we knew that this wasn't what we wanted. And yet maybe it was all we were going to have..." Many of these activists experienced what Sharon Zukin (1992) has called the *exhaustion of utopia*. This term refers to the disenchantment with ideologies of revolution that projected an idealized world of justice and peace somewhere in the future. Meanwhile, awaiting for its realization, room had to be made for errors and sacrifices. Given that the errors were at times monumental and unforgivable, the postponement of gratification lost its appeal in face of the promise of instant fulfillment through consumption.

The discrediting of nationalism in general and Andalucismo in particular can be seen in the conversation that took place in 1993, as part of a discussion group I organized⁷ with political activists of the 1968 Generation. These were people who had been very active in the Communist party during the transition, but shortly after 1982, most of them had left the party, either for reasons of ideological discrepancy or simply from disinterest. In the midst of the

⁷ Prof. Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán led the discussion.

discussion, Mari Carmen made reference to Andalusia, and the moderator took the opportunity to stir the group toward this subject.

M(oderator): There was a moment when there was a specificity about being Andalusian in your politics. In all your political trajectories...

Mari Carmen: (emphatically) No. Andalusia, no.

Antonio: Yes, yes.

Mari Carmen: Nationalist feeling?

Julián: Yes.

Mari Carmen: Nationalist? I don't see that so clearly...

M: Of identity.

Antonio: Yes, there was a moment, when we still hadn't gotten to... But yes there is a moment when the political map of Spain is still being configured, back when the UCD was still in power, when there were certain expectations that what we can consider the sociological left would say "Well, let's try to politically configure this region, our people." Then you could easily find greater Andalucista political participation, greater presence of the labor unions, let's say a greater social activity in general. And the manifest proof, even if it was a problematic strategy for a region or nation, was the conquest of the autonomy through the *vía* 151. Up to that point it existed...

Mari Carmen: Yes, yes!

Julián: I remember that in an election campaign for the Andalusian parliament Mari Carmen wrote a statement [for a party congress] that seemed very interesting to me at the time, that went something like this: "We should be aware of

nationalism, and attempt to capitalize on its potential, for in the end we are the ones who are taking care of the Andalusians...”

Mari Carmen: *I* said that?[!]

Julián: Yea, you did...

[Laughter]

Mari Carmen: ¡*Qué cosa* !

Julián: And there were some people who got mad at you for that but I thought that was a very positive step.

The above discussion was prompted, as I mentioned earlier, by Mari Carmen’s own reference to Andalusia, specifically, to the social and political problems of *nuestra*, “our” Andalusia. And while at first she denied emphatically being influenced by the politics of identity, let alone having any nationalistic motivation, shortly thereafter she excitedly agrees with the narration of her friend. Her forgetting is even more interesting given that according to her other friend, she had in fact argued for the incorporation of Andalucista politics within her party, and she had been criticized for it. What this discussion suggests is how thoroughly discredited nationalist politics in Andalusia have become, and furthermore, how fully implicated were most of the political parties with centralist expectations.

However, there were those who were willing to move on and fight in other arenas, for other goals. An environmental activist who in his terms “defected” from the Communist Youth organization in 1984, phrased it in this way:

The public sphere was overrun [*copada*] by the powers that be and the mass media, most of it uncritical or openly in their service. The PSOE took over; maybe the PA complained about something, and the communists opposed something else, but nothing was

getting done. Politics had become this involuted game, with politicians totally caught up in how to get on top, and in the process they left the grassroots behind. So many of us began to rethink our priorities. And getting involved in politics as they were being carried out here was not one of them. I, and many like me, became convinced that what we needed was a broader understanding of politics, that went beyond the narrow electoral politics that were destroying the democratic process. We needed to counter the idea that all that was being taken care of at the top, because it wasn't, that was clear. So we sought out issues that people would identify with. Not new ideologies, but real issues of life and subsistence.

Another activist put it in these terms: "We finally had democracy, but we realized democracy was not enough. The most crucial issues exceeded the national scope: environmental devastation, nuclear proliferation, ethnic conflicts, the oppression of women... Political leaders were not up to facing these challenges. Before, we always had thought that those issues could wait, there were more immediate things to take care of. But then we began to realize that the time might never come, that we were running out of time." This shift away from focusing exclusively at the level of the state and towards a simultaneous global and local perspective, is characteristic of what have been called new social movements. These movements have put an indelible mark on the political cultures of the left. However, Andalusians were very ambivalent about how to gauge their impact on the political scene. It is certain that these dynamics contributed to the promotion of the rights of women, gays and lesbians. Changes in el Juan XXIII – the organization that had served as the center of clandestine political activity during the dictatorship, as discussed in

Chapters II and IV – illustrate the extent to which it moved into the spaces historically occupied by the “traditional” left. By 1981, el Juan housed, more or less officially, over seven different political groups or associations, whose concerns ranged from feminism to gay and lesbian rights to “green” collectives and solidarity groups. Indeed, el Juan became an important forum for the socialization of the values promoted by these new social movements.

The increased awareness and open criticism of structural inequalities and undemocratic practices reproduced by most political organizations within the “old” left was threatening to those who continued to support it. The “new left’s” rejection of electoral politics, and its search for spaces outside what it regarded was the tightly controlled apparatus of the liberal democratic State was not what the “old” left conceived as “serious” politics. A dear friend of mine called the new social movements the “folkloric” left, trivializing this trend by comparing it to the frivolousness of popular songstresses. Many of my friends who were members of the Communist Party argued that the trend towards smaller, more flexible organizations contributed to the depoliticization of the population, by weakening the party structure and presenting a plethora of causes with no clear organizing principle. Indeed, their arguments parallel José Casanova’s (1992, 1994) interpretation of the division between public and private religions. For the left, this was clearly a self-serving explanation, for as we have seen in previous chapters and in this one as well, the dynamics of depoliticization and disenchantment were extremely complex.

An excellent example of these subtle changes in politics can be seen in the farmworkers syndicate’s [SOC] experience from 1980 to 1986. In 1980, it had organized a hunger strike in order to call the State’s attention to the plight of its members the Andalusian town of Marinaleda. The struggle was couched in

terms of class and was also deeply influenced by the discursive forms of anti-colonial national liberation movements. Amply covered by the press nationally and internationally, it proved to be a great embarrassment to both the UCD and the Socialists, who were seen as largely ineffectual or worse, actively obstructionist in meeting the farmworkers' demands. However, the outcome of the strike was very mixed. While the State was able to come up with income subsidies, most of the strikers' demands, including for agrarian reform, were ignored. The cry "Andalusia entera, como Marinaleda!" [the whole of Andalusia following on Marinaleda's footsteps], which had become an emblem of the Andalusian power movement, became reduced to testimonial remembrances. Furthermore, a concerted effort was carried out by the leading political parties and by the organs of public opinion to discredit the political actions of the farmworkers and their radical implications. The farmworkers soon became portrayed as lazy free loaders, or as coopted docile voters at the mercy of those who controlled their subsidies. Realizing that the institutional channels were not responsive to their claims, and that they were being actively excluded from political participation, the farmworkers shifted their strategies to seek alliances with other groups and collectives that were active on issues that overlapped their own, such as the ecologists. As I will discuss shortly, by 1984, they traveled to Frankfurt and in 1986, to Libya.

However, as we suggested earlier, the fruits of such attempts are not immediately apparent. In the case of the "green movement" and the SOC internationalist discourses matched those of the traditional left in Andalusia, but the roots of "greens" were in politics with a radically different understanding of the arenas for struggle. This has limited the potential of such cross-fertilization. Indeed, Paco Casero eventually became distanced from the SOC. He argues that its political agenda was "stagnant" [*estancada*], still geared

towards the State and its subsidies, and that this orientation would not change because of the dual, if at times contradictory, influences of the PC and the PA. Many, of course, are also critical of Casero, who they see as having abandoned "class politics" for other – the implication is less radical – venues and struggles. (What he clearly has not abandoned is politics, for he is constantly organizing some new political group or platform). The hard times of the SOC during the 1980's (and until quite recently), and the debates over how to interpret its causes, was paralleled by the political potential (or lack thereof) of the conversions to Islam.

Memories against modernity: The renewed interest in the Islamic past

One enduring aspect of the historical revisionism that took place in the 1970's and early 1980's was the emergence of a discourse vindicating Andalusia's Islamic past. It was, to a large extent, based on the recuperation of the ideas Blas Infante articulated during the last days of his life, but it connected with other visions, popular and erudite, of a millenarian Andalusia that traced its continuity, sometimes racially but more often historically and culturally, to the mythical communities of Tartessus (for historical precedents see Maddox 1994; Moreno Navarro 1981, 1986; Sevilla Guzmán 1987).

Indeed, this interest in the Islamic past tapped into a the popular ideas and images that many Andalusians have about Islam. Many of them are negative, as Driessen (1994) points out, tied not so much to the distant past as to the behavior of the Rifian soldiers who were brought in by Franco to fight against the pro-republican militias. However, there are also positive beliefs and lore about "those who came before," as a woman who farmed a small piece of land near a Moorish fortification referred to the people in Islamic Spain. Towns in the Alpujarra Mountains, just south of Granada, have continued to

celebrate mock battles between Christians and Moors for centuries, in which the Moors are often perceived as positive, indeed, tragic figures (Driessen 1985).

While looking at trinkets in a Córdoba flea market, I overheard a discussion between three men, identified by a friend as being gypsies, about the origin of a surname. One of the men's last name was Heredia, and one of them was suggesting it did not sound *Christian* at all. The man answered that gypsies came from Egypt,⁸ so maybe it was from there. A third person intervened by saying that all that Egypt stuff was nonsense. Many people called gypsies were actually left over moors, who disguised themselves in order to be able to stay around.⁹ Another good example of this was my conversation with Manolo, a gardener for the city, who was with one of my colleagues on the May first labor parade in 1993. He introduced himself by name and also gave his party and union affiliation, including the section, and added: "just so you know who you are speaking with." After such a presentation, I was left feeling very inadequate, but managed to mumble "Yvonne, from Puerto Rico, student of anthropology." Without asking precisely what I studied, he began a discussion of the differences there were among Andalusians; specifically, how those in the plains and the coast were much merrier than those in Córdoba. This idea I heard expressed often by people of all ages with whom I spoke in the city, and it was immediately connected to the legacy of Séneca, as I mentioned in Chapter III. However, Manolo had a very idiosyncratic explanation. He believed that this was because the Moors, who were severe and taciturn but also more "thoughtful" (*meditabundos*),¹⁰ influenced Córdoba more than any other city. "The Moors, were good, upstanding people [*gente seria*] who worked very hard.

⁸ The term *gitano* is said to come from *egipciano*, an archaic form of toponymic Egyptian.

⁹ See Mitchell (1994) for a synopsis of various theories about the origin of the gypsies of Southern Spain.

¹⁰ It is interesting that in Manolo's rendition, the Moors are vaguely reminiscent of the National Catholic ideal of ascetic mysticism, discussed in Chapter II.

In Seville they have more wit, more charm [*gracia*], but here we set ourselves to work, we are not afraid of it. That's because of the Moors, you see."

During the early 1980's was that vague notions such as these became politicized in ways no one could have predicted. The incorporation of this historical vision into the discourse of the radical left was crucial for both its initial notoriety and rapid spread, and for its eventual discrediting. Several groups attempted to create a political platform out of this interpretation of history. At the moment when these syntheses were taking place, the struggles of the Polisario against Spanish and later Moroccan control were considered heroic, the Iranian revolution still seemed like an anti-imperialist struggle directed against the United States, and the memories of the Algerian revolution were still fresh. There was a progressive turn to more specifically Islamic content with each successive political platform. Thus, the Liberation Front of Andalusia (FLA) was modeled on the Basque model of Herri Batasuna, although it never devolved into terrorism. It was followed by the Andalusian Liberation Front (FAL). As I mentioned in Chapter IV, the FAL first appeared as a political organization for a brief time in the late 1970's. It was meant to be a radical alternative to the PSA, with a strong commitment to Infante's version of Andalusian history. It was re-founded in 1989, this time by the Muslim converts and their non-Muslim sympathizers. In the early 1990's it was succeeded by Andalusian Liberation (LA), which now advocated for an Islamic Andalusia. All these attempts failed. "The people were not ready for our message" was the most common lament of the converts. For activists outside the movement, their value was "testimonial." "In the beginning, the research and investigation into the Islamic past seemed promising to us," I was told by an activist who had come in contact with the early FAL, "but the religious turn soured its potential. And then, the immigration of North Africans into Spain and the racism it

unleashed finally made it clear to me that a movement based on such claims had no future."

Conspiracy theories linking nationalist politics to Libyan, Iranian or even Saudi Arabian subversive activities became popular during this time. For example, as I mentioned in Chapter IV, the PA was accused of accepting money from the Libyans to meet the costs of its second party congress. I discounted such tales as absurd paranoias. The transition provided especially fertile ground for these tales, fed as they were by the secrecy that surrounded most political negotiation. They were somewhat amusing to the extent that they unwittingly parodied the broader Cold War genre of conspiracies. Such tales also seem tied to a reaction against the general trend of historical revisitation and interest in Islamic Andalusia and to the increased presence of fabulously wealthy Arabs in the Costa del Sol.

However, I found out soon enough that collectives of Andalusians with connections to that radical left did indeed cultivate ties with groups from North African countries. Such was the case with over 200 Andalusian members of the farmworkers union (SOC), the same that had organized the hunger strike in 1980. They traveled to Libya in 1986, unfortunately coinciding with the American bombardment of Tripoli (although none were hurt). The invitation to visit was extended in 1984 at a congress of ecological groups in Frankfurt. The farmworkers union and some ecological groups working closely with it had taken part in discussions about desertification, a theme particularly dear to many Andalusians, given the aridity of their climate and a series of droughts that affected the region during the 1970's, 80's and 90's. "We were obsessed about solidarity in the struggle against desertification," Paco Casero, one of the founders of the farmworkers union, the SOC, told me. "Members of a Libyan NGO were impressed by our commitment, and invited us to visit. We weren't

able to do it immediately, because of lack of funds, but we kept in touch." And thus, in 1986, after some saving and fundraising, the group of men, women and children left for Libya. They thoroughly enjoyed their visit, although it was cut short by the bombing. "From where we were, in the countryside, we thought they were putting on fireworks, and we asked what were they celebrating," said one of the woman on the trip. "The next day, on the way to the airport, I was shocked, but also embarrassed." She commented how she had felt right at home until that moment: "They are socialist, like we would want to be. Andalusians and people from Libya are like brothers, I mean, we were all once the same people." To her friend, being "... a friend of the Muslims is to be a friend of the poor; to be friends with the Germans [perhaps a reference to Maastricht] is to have the rich as your friend."

It is possible to argue that the Libyan farmers with whom they met were indeed wooing the farmworkers, even if simply by attempting to improve their country's public relations image¹¹. And yet, as the above quotations indicate, they were preaching to the converted. The Libyans were above all farmworkers, socialists and anti-American.¹²

It is clear that the impetus to recuperate the Moorish or Andalusí past was by no means limited to marginal political activity. Popular music offers an excellent example of its importance at the level of popular culture. A series of highly innovative and successful movements emerged and transcended each other in rapid succession. This meant all of them were very short lived, and did not leave a lasting impression on the musical scene or popular culture. People I spoke to offered different interpretations for this situation. For some, it was

¹¹ No mention was ever made by the farmworkers of any official contact with the government and I doubt it was due to willful deceit on their part.

¹² This was the year of the highly contested and unpopular referendum about whether Spain should join the NATO, which won a favorable vote but by an extremely narrow margin.

typical of all cultural production during the transition: vibrant, dynamic but ephemeral. For others, it was directly related to the influence of the mass media and of international trends, which overwhelmed much of the local production. However, I tend to agree with those who tie the demise to the dynamics and the fate of the nationalist movements. Indeed, I believe the attempts toward rekindling the Moorish past suffered from much of the same contradictions and paradoxes that the nationalist movement did.

The earliest proponents of this trend in popular music were folk musicians who drew inspiration not only from the nationalist movement but also from the music of folk singers like Peter, Paul and Mary, Joan Baez and Arlo Guthrie, who turned to local musical traditions as a form of protest. Most representative of this movement seems to have been Carlos Cano, who continues to perform, and a now defunct group, *Jarchas*. The popularity of this musical group extended well beyond Andalusian borders. One of their songs "Libertad, Libertad, Libertad" was often described to me as "the soundtrack for the transition." The conscious attempt at recuperating and engaging with Andalusian musical traditions can be seen in their choice for a name: *Jarchas* is the Andalusí term for a soulful, mournful ballad, which some have argued were direct predecessors to the *cante jondo* (see Mitchell 1995). The same can be said for Carlos Cano, who revived traditional song genres through his original compositions. Indeed, if the *Jarchas* were the soundtrack for the transition, Carlos Cano was and continues to be an important aspect of the sounds of the nationalist movement.

On the heels of the triumphs of Andalusian folk music genre came Andalusian rock. These musicians rejected the folk movement's cultivation of the traditional, in favor of electric sounds. As I was told by one of their fans, "Back then electric sounds meant progress, liberalization, modernity. We had

to avoid sounding like Manolo Escobar or Lola Flores (prominent exponents of the commercialized versions of Andalusian music, whom I mentioned in Chapter II) at all costs." But the cultivation of a distinctively Andalusian style remained an important preoccupation. Thus they electrified the very "roots" of Andalusian music by connecting the flamenco guitar and percussion box to amplifiers, and wedding rock rhythms with North African riffs. Three groups emerged as the primary exponents: *Triana* (named after one of the most historic neighborhoods in Seville, associated with both Gypsies and Moriscos), *Alameda* and *Mezquita*.¹³ One woman, Sonia, who had been a staunch follower of these groups recalled the frenzied chanting of the audience during one Triana concert: "Moors! We are all Moors!" This dramatic embracing of Otherness did not appeal to all, and many were turned off by what one described as the movement's "conservative" nationalism.

The tragic deaths, in rapid succession, of the foremost musicians within Andalusian rock slowed down the movement's momentum, and severely limited its influence within the popular music scene. In the more "classical" music genres of flamenco and *cante jondo* this trend fared no better. Musicians such as Paco de Lucía and Antonio "El Lebrijano" experimented with fusing, although some would argue simply emphasizing, the Andalusí influences within Flamenco music led to what became known as "Flamenco Árabe." These artists were explicit about the influence that nationalist writings about Flamenco music. Their references included the early works of Blas Infante as well as later exegesis and works those writings inspired, had on their musical

¹³In inquiring about the name of this group I happened upon yet another paradoxical commentary on the self/other relation between Islam, North Africa and Andalusia. The word *mezquita* means mosque in Spanish. The group is from Córdoba, and when I asked friends if they knew why they had chosen this name they usually referred to the group's early start as a "hometown" band, and that the name probably related to their wish to identify themselves with Córdoba. But others felt the selection reflected the groups desire for an *exotic* name.

themes (for a more detailed discussion, see Manuel 1989). Flamenco Arabe itself was a short lived phenomenon, though the interest in Andalusí music can still be felt in the work of some of its proponents.

The Conversions to Islam: memory of identity and critique of modernity

The question of when did the first conversions to Islam in contemporary Spain take place is a difficult one to answer with precision. First, the answer is woven deeply into the foundational myths of the various communities of converts that emerged during the 1980's. Thus, while one community of converts holds that the first conversions to Islam happened "the same day that Franco died," at Sheik Abdelkadder's Islamic community in England, others are just as likely to answer that Islam never died. Making constant reference to *taquiyya* (the Islamic practice of hiding one's religious beliefs, of "passing," in moments when anti-Islamic hostilities can threaten the believers life and existence) they argue that its rituals continued to be practiced and its doctrine, far from being forgotten, had been incorporated into popular folklore and beliefs. Thus, several converts described having heard of families -- in one case, their own -- that had a secret room with an Arabic book. Only adult men entered (the above mentioned case was an exception in that it claimed that adult women also participated) and lay themselves before the text. Furthermore, I was told, Andalusians had been rediscovering such practices throughout the 20th Century, the most notorious example being that of Blas Infante, which we discussed earlier. Indeed, for the latter group of converts, the term conversion does not apply at all.

However, after piecing together various accounts, one can conclude that at least the first *communities* of Islamic converts began to appear around 1980. The first ones were created in Córdoba, one of them founded by those converts

who followed Sheik Abdelkadder. There are, of course, several versions of the founding of this particular group, some more flattering than others. The version of the few within the group who would speak to me and those most sympathetic to it told the story of how Abdelkadder, a Scotsman widely believed to have been a former manager of the Beatles – although his followers refuse to address the issue – traveled extensively throughout North Africa during the early 1970's. Upon arriving in Meknes, he converted to Islam under the auspices of a local Sufi teacher of some renown, Ibn Habib de Tarkauii. Abdelkadder created a colony in Norfolk shortly thereafter, and many young Spaniards, either studying abroad or traveling as hippies, found their way to the colony and converted. Once the community took shape, although Sufism provided the original impetus and continued to be an important source of spiritual inspiration, the influence of the puritanical and anti-western rhetoric of the new Shi'ia Islamic revival, headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, steadily grew.

According to Mohammed, one of the earliest followers, it seems that Abdelkadder's teacher instructed him to "go to Spain and spread Islam." Córdoba was chosen as the site for the new commune, although most accounts suggest that its members were originally from Castilla-La Mancha, and quite a few from one particular town, Puertollano. According to Ali Kattani, a Moroccan scientist who became involved with the movement early on and has offered much support ever since, the choice of Córdoba was due to "the preeminent place that Córdoba occupies in the psyche of most Muslims and Spaniards." The sheik and his followers moved into a building in the historic section known (ironically) as *la judería* ¹⁴ [the Jewry, the place of the Jews] and

¹⁴ The judería gets its contemporary name from the few remains of a small, private synagogue, part of a large residential compound, that is located in el barrio. Even in its present condition it is one of the few buildings of this type that still survive in Spain. However, the placement of

attempted to settle in. But living conditions were difficult for these new Muslims. Believing that society was *kafir*¹⁵ and thus to be avoided, these people retreated to a large extent from society and their former existence, although rarely to the point of forsaking prior friends or family. Kattani claimed that they eked out a daily ration through the importing and selling of crafts from Morocco, a profession deemed appropriate by the Sheik. The Sheik tended to exercise rigid control over the community, influencing or outright assigning leadership positions, jobs and even marriage partners. As more converts were recruited, matters got increasingly tense between the converts and the Sheik and among the converts themselves.

Saleh, a member a of community of Muslims in Seville, remembers his first encounter with this group. "I had wanted to travel down South for some time, and a friend of mine suggested we visit some mutual acquaintances who had moved back from London and resettled in Córdoba. You cannot imagine our surprise when we saw our woman friend come out covered by a veil!" They were welcomed by the community and stayed for some days, in which his companion ranted and raved to his friends about the absurdity of their actions. Saleh laughed gleefully as he remembered his friends continuous refrain: "This is the CIA's doing, I know it! It's all a plot to demobilize us, to brainwash those in the opposition. Nobody will believe this, they'll call me paranoid, but you just have to see it to believe it!" Saleh reaction was quite different. Far from being appalled, he was intrigued. He felt uncomfortable with the veiling, and was in fact critical of it ("They were playing at being Moors, it wasn't the behavior of serious people [*aquello no era serio*]"). However, other aspects of the

el barrio, immediately surrounding what was then the mosque, led many of those I spoke to – tour guides, local history buffs and the converts themselves – to speculate or affirm that el barrio would have been occupied primarily by Muslims.

¹⁵ To be *kafir* is to be a non-believer, an infidel. Using this term for society was meant to point out its evil nature and non-Islamic character.

community, such as its communal living practices, its simple lifestyle and constant critique of consumerist values, its rejection of Catholicism, as well as the attraction of the Islamic doctrine made perfect sense to him. He returned to his home in the Basque country, but within two years was back in Andalusia and had converted.

Apparently unbeknownst to the followers of Sheik Abdelkadder, another Islamic group had been formed in Córdoba during the same period. Two of its founders were born Muslim and had more or less extensive ties to North Africa: Ali Kattani, who was Moroccan, and José Sellán, who was Spanish of Moroccan descent. According once again to Kattani, the main impetus behind participation in this group, called Asociación Musulmana de Córdoba y Provincia, was a fascination with "the reality of the Andalusí Diaspora" and the deep seated conviction that "Islam could not be dead in Andalusia." He told me of how in the 1970's he read in a Moroccan newspaper that Franco -- again, shortly before his death -- had begun to consider moving the Cathedral to another, newer location, and restoring the Mosque to the Islamic cult. He began to research the issue, he said, and found other news items which seemed to indicate to him that negotiations were proceeding and that the Municipal government had requested UNESCO's aid in achieving this task. He believed matters to have reached King Faisal, who approved of a joint venture, before the whole enterprise was derailed by the intervention of the Church.

Ali Kattani, and a few converts, all pointed to a time when relations with the Church were not so strained. Around 1980-81, the community obtained permission from the Bishop to celebrate the feast of the Prophet in the Cathedral-Mosque of Córdoba, complete with the slaughtering of the lamb¹⁶. Those who were somewhat involved firmly believed that the Bishop had

¹⁶This event is also mentioned in Rocher and Cheraqui (1987).

become interested in the championing of relations between Catholics and Muslims. I was told how he invited Muslim scholars and other important religious figures to visit Cordoba throughout the 1970's. "He was leaning toward allowing the Friday prayer at the Mosque" I was told by Ibn Guzmán, a native from Córdoba who converted in the late 1970's and was also crucial to the foundation of the Asociación Musulmana. According to Ali Kattani himself, "He wanted to make the Cathedral Mosque a center of ecumenism, and Córdoba the center for the three traditions [Christianity, Islam and Judaism.]" Whether this was the case or not I was never able to confirm, for the Bishop never granted me an interview on this subject. In any case, he seems to have quickly changed his mind when the potential threat of the communities became apparent.

Indeed, if the Church ever appeared to be softening its stance towards Islam in Andalusia, it is clear that by 1983 its position was once again openly antagonist. In a report to Pope John Paul II, the writers had the following to say about the Islamic conversions:

In respect to... the Muslim religion, Andalusia finds itself in a favorable conjuncture for its expansion. To the historical nostalgia that our region awakens for the Islamic world, is joined a wave of romanticism that has contaminated politicians and intellectuals through their pondering about the Muslim epoch in Andalusia. Politicians, some motivated by the optical illusion of "petrodollars" and others by a radical nationalism, are favoring the installation and development of the Muslim religion in Andalusia, entering in conflict even with the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Such was the case in Córdoba that galvanized public

opinion to condemn the attitude of certain local authorities.

(Gorraiz et al. 1983: 392)

The events to which the above quotation makes oblique reference pitted the Bishop in Córdoba, Monsignor Infante Florido, against the newly elected Communist mayor, Julio Anguita. They centered around the attempt to cede to the *Asociación Musulmana* a crumbling building which had last been used as a convent, but which as with many Catholic churches and monasteries throughout the South, had previously been a mosque. Such requests and behests were not unprecedented. City Hall donation to the Sheik's followers of a small mosque that had been built by Franco for his Moroccan troops during the Civil War did not inspire anything like the furor unleashed the plans to "desacralize" the Santa Clara convent, vacant and in ruins for as long as most adults could remember. The Church became deeply invested in this battle and carried an effective public relations campaign through the local newspaper, *El Diario Córdoba* (which was published by a company in which the Church conveniently had controlling interests), not only to stop the donation but to personally discredit the newly elected mayor. Indeed, the mayor and the Bishop carried some of their most memorable exchanges in print.

In the end, even while the communists governed in majority through an alliance with the PSOE and the then still PSA, when time came to vote for the ceding of the convent, the PSOE sided with the minority alliance of the UCD and the AP, and the deal fell through. The event marked the mayor in permanent if not seriously damaging ways. He acquired the nickname "The Red Caliph," an appellation that he seems to relish and that has stuck with him throughout his rapid political ascent to the presidency of the Spanish Communist Party and the leftist coalition known as United Left. And townspeople, who still overwhelmingly remember his mandate as excellent,

have immortalized a phrase in which he reminds the Bishop of his proper place by stating: "Remember, Mr. Infante Florido, that I am your Major, but you are not my Bishop." This incident also had more serious repercussions for the nationalists, who lost all their seats in the next municipal elections. When I asked a neighborhood activist member of the PA why had his party supported the deal, he responded:

It became a battle of wills between Anguita and Florido. Our coalition was with Anguita, and at the time it seemed that our loyalties and best interest lay with him... It was a complex issue, and an unpopular one, but we felt strongly that the Church was acting irrationally. After all, the building was Moorish, it was built for use within an Islamic context, not a Christian one. The Church had seized it in war, we could return it in peace. Mind you, I am not a maurophile, I am Catholic, I belong to a *cofradía*,¹⁷ that [his emphasis] is our culture; I don't want to go back in time. But things are the way they are. The building should have gone to the cultural association. By God, they were harmless. But the Church, there's no reasoning with the Church.

The level of acrimony and hostility against Muslims that remained after the incident brought about the dissolution of the Asociación Musulmana. It also proved to be the final straw for the Sheik and his followers. They moved to Seville where they followed the same pattern as in Córdoba, selling crafts and living communally. However, their stay in Seville appears to have been even shorter than that in Córdoba, for they left soon after some of their followers got into trouble with the authorities. Although this time the reasons are less

¹⁷*Cofradías* are religious brotherhoods dedicated to the promotion and devotion of particular saints or avocations of Jesus and the Virgin Mary. They have been studied extensively by Moreno (1981, 1986)

clear, the conflict apparently involved incidents that arose during their leafleting of the Holy Week celebrations with anti-catholic and anti-clerical propaganda. The next move was to the Huelva countryside, where the community acquired some land.

Mariam, a convert now living in a town in the outskirts of Granada, first encountered the community there. She too had friends among the converts whom she visited during her vacations from her job as a civil servant in Barcelona -- she herself was Catalan. She described a summer spent gardening, making crafts, swimming in the pool, meeting people from very different parts of the world. As she was fluent in several languages, she was able to communicate with many. "As the vacation time was coming to an end," she told me, "I began to ask myself where do I go from here? What do I do? I realized then and there I was not going to be able to go back to my old life in Barcelona." Indeed, she was married to a man who had joined the commune at more or less the same time, and shortly thereafter left for Granada along with the rest of the converts, who once again were on the move.

By this time, the Sheik had begun to relax some of his rules about dress and behavior. Women were not required to be fully veiled in the presence of unrelated men, and men did not need to wear robes or other such garments. Furthermore, converts were encouraged to begin their own business ventures, and many did, becoming skilled carpenters, plumbers, or opening small tea houses in the old section of Granada, known as el Albaicín. This was the barrio in which the community chose to settle, founding "The Society for the Return of Islam to Spain." Popularly they were known as *Los Morabitunes* [The Morabitors], because of Sheik Abdelkadder's name for his original community. However, things continued to be volatile among the converts, and relations with the outside community difficult. Indeed, after a year or so of apparent

calm, rumors of conspiracies began to appear in the press. Granada's local newspaper, *El Ideal*, regularly ran editorials or articles, sometimes outright slanderous, about the community and its activities. Of course, the community's self-righteousness and fundamentalist intolerance did not help matters. Mohammed, who now leads another Sufi *tariqqa*, recounted how he was upbraided and harassed for helping his pregnant wife climb the steep hills of the Albaicín. "They were not good Muslims, just rude and intolerant people. Could they have actually thought that the Prophet would have put the prohibition of public contact between the sexes before the well being of my wife and my unborn child?"

As Mohammed's words indicate, not all within the community saw eye to eye with the Sheik; dissent, defection and the formation of new communities were fairly common occurrences. Mariam, who shortly after arriving in Granada had left to study in the Middle East on a scholarship, told of her return in 1986 to find the community in the throes of *fitna*. "Those were dark difficult times... the umma fought amongst themselves, arguing and publicly shaming the faith. Eventually matters calmed down, but much damage was done, and it has only has begun to be repaired recently." But contrary to the impression one might get from Mariam's words, the community had been beset by dissension and fission from the very beginning. In the move from Córdoba to Seville there were already some expulsions and voluntary defections. These people regrouped themselves in Seville under the name of *Asociación Musulmana de Sevilla y Provincia*. But they were not the only ones, for as other people were expelled or left, they also formed new groups. The Seville community would prove to be particularly important in the trajectory of Islamic conversions in Andalusia; from it would emerge the second tendency, and the one that

concerns me more in this dissertation: that of the nationalist conversions to Islam.

It is possible to trace the emergence of the nationalist tendency earlier, to the *Asociación Musulmana* of Kattani and Sellán, and their belief that "Islam must not be dead" in Andalusia. Kattani himself was very involved in Seville community as patron and religious authority. He told me of how the community began to attract people from radical left nationalist groups, who were disheartened by the turn that nationalist political mobilization had taken in the early 1980's. Many of them were in their early 20's, the oldest one in his early 30's; they were students or already working in the liberal professions, and had been deeply influenced by the trend of thought that posited Andalusia's Islamic past as a challenge to its widely promoted collusion with the Franco regime and culture. As I was told by the group's leader, Abderahman Medina:

I had been involved in all kinds of politics, both institutional and "extraparlamentarian" for over 10 years. I saw everything I believed in be betrayed again and again by those who claimed to be anti-fascist, to be democrats. But what democracy was there to be had if the Fragas, along with their unholy host of priests, continued to control everything? It was a particularly dynamic moment for me, I had made an important decision about my life that I knew would change its course. Then in some of the circles I moved I heard of this man Kattani and how he had founded a community of Muslims. *Que barbaridad!* Kattani did not found anything; he, as I, came together at a moment where there was a preoccupation with life, and with what came after it. In the community in Seville I found like-minded souls, a safe haven

were I could be at peace with my whole self, and take my intellectual search for my identity to its logical conclusion.

Medina, as he was known within the movement, was named Antonio at birth, and he had been a prominent figure in leftist politics in Andalusia. He had worked closely with the Communist Party and with the SOC, but also the FLA, the FAL, and since then, most other nationalist parties. Paco Casero remembered with shock and amusement the reaction of Abderahman's friends to his conversion. "Antonio had always been very intense, a visionary, but a very hard worker, truly committed. He left his heart and soul in every fight. He was also completely enamored with Andalusian culture and history. During those days, a friend had told me Antonio was hanging out with a strange cult, but I dismissed it. Then he came to a SOC meeting and announced that from now on we should call him Abderahman. *La que se formó* [What a scene!] ... I respect his decision, but I believe it distanced him from the rank and file. They didn't understand what it was all about, just that it was strange."

Medina described the early days of his conversion as filled with concord, peace and spiritual growth. He describes the first Ramadan, where evening after evening they would gather for spiritual instruction, prayer and discussion. However, according to Ali Kattani, those days did not last for long. Some of the earlier converts took exception to Medina's explicitly political approach to Islam. They felt that he was just using Islam for his latest political platform, that he was not sincere in his faith. To Medina and others who agreed with him, the other converts were chasing after esoteric experiences, and had no profound understanding of commitment or community. According to Ali Kattani, fighting forced him to intervene and he suggested the group separate. Islam was a diverse community, which could accommodate many tendencies, he argued, and it was better to separate than to give the Umma a bad name. The

communities did separate, but not before a lawsuit was filed over who had rights to use of the name Comunidad Islámica. In the end, the Seville group kept the name, and the building.

This was all taking place around 1985. By this time, Medina's conversion had become well known, and others who knew him from nationalist circles began to show interest in his new endeavor. Two new communities that had opened in Málaga and in Algeciras "defected" with Medina and formed the *Yama'a Islamica de Al-Andalus*, which translates as the Islamic Community of Andalusia. In 1987, the community in Córdoba was founded, and the central offices of the movement were located there. In Córdoba, Abderahman would meet and collaborate with Roger Garaudí, former president of the French Communist Party who had converted to Islam in the 1970's. Garaudí saw in the history of the city proof of the peaceful coexistence of disparate religious traditions, and became intent in creating a center that would celebrate the contributions of "the three cultures" of Al-Andalus: Christianity, Judaism and Islam. They petitioned the municipal government and were granted use of an ancient tower, *la Torre de la Calahorra*, that stood directly across the Guadalquivir river from the Cathedral Mosque. Together, they conceived and helped implement a project that turned the tower into an interactive museum in which the history of Al-Andalus is celebrated, which opened in 1991.

The movement was growing fast, and gaining credibility. This helped attract to its ranks well known activists as well as professionals -- lawyers, doctors, university professors -- who previously had not been actively involved in politics but whose allegiances were clearly to the left. In addition, the *cafetines* [tea houses] that many of the communities had established, as a means of revenue as well as meeting space, began to attract a younger but equally disaffected group of Andalusians who came as much for the group's aesthetics

as for its politics. Part and parcel of the attraction was scholarships, arranged by Ali Kattani, to study Arabic in various Universities in North Africa and the Middle East. According to Kattani, governments in these countries were more than happy to sponsor young Muslim converts from Andalusia. Kattani contended, as have others, that Al-Andalus continues to figure prominently in the collective imaginary of Muslims in North Africa and the Middle East. The Yama'a capitalized very well on these popular sentiments, and cultivated extensive ties with Islamic groups in North Africa, and later on in Turkey.

Almansur Castillo spoke of this time as one of great excitement and promise. "1989 was an important year. The Andalucistas seemed to have recovered from their slumber and were back in the streets, organizing and being seen. Furthermore, people were beginning to see that things had not improved much for Andalusia under el PSOE. There were also those who were still smarting from the loss in the NATO referendum. It looked like people might be starting to stir up again." He was making reference to the Autonomic elections, in which the group ran candidates under the reconstituted *Frente Andaluz de Liberación*. None of their candidates was elected, but the group had not expected otherwise. As Abderahman Hassaui pointed out: "It was a matter of getting known, of being taken seriously. We may not have won, but we were noticed and we made important inroads in terms of alliances and recruitment."

However, there seemed to be bigger and better plans. In 1990, the group held the first Andalusí Congress, which Medina described as "the first official gathering of the Andalusí Diaspora since its expulsion beginning in 1492." Scholars, religious leaders and interested laymen from North Africa, the Middle East, but also as far as Mexico and Malaysia came to present their research on Medieval and Muslim Spain and to establish contacts and alliances. The congress, which lasted five days, was in fact much more than a scholarly

gathering: it was the platform to launch an international organization-cum-movement dedicated to servicing the interests of the Andalusí Diaspora. Aside from establishing an organizational structure, the congress endorsed a series of demands which included the ceding of State control over monumental constructions dating to Al-Andalus – such as the Cathedral Mosque – to UNESCO, and the granting of Spanish citizenship to all those members of the Andalusí Diaspora, as was being done to the Sephardim.

Once again, the Yama'a was in the news, and coverage was overwhelmingly favorable. Indeed when I arrived to do preliminary fieldwork in 1990, the movement seemed at a high point. They had begun to publish a journal, *L'amalif*, that covered a variety of topics: religious, political, historical, cultural, and so forth. The communities I visited seemed to be thriving. The leadership was full of projects, expectations and hopes: a second congress was being called for 1991, and there was talk of a new political party, *Liberación Andaluza*, running once again but this time in the municipal elections. However, 1990 proved to be a disastrous year for the community. A fight over the expenses and revenues of the Andalusí congress led the group from Algeciras to defect. Furthermore, Garaudí, concerned with the impact that Medina's political activities could have on the viability of the center, decided to ask Medina to step down from his official duties within the project. For Medina, this became yet another defeat. In 1991, *Liberación Andaluza* did run candidates in the municipal elections as planned but with absolutely disastrous results. And many of the young people who had been attracted to the movement began to drop out, either losing interest or being driven away by what one described as "authoritarian politics and constant infighting."

While this was happening with the Yama'a, the followers of Abdelkadder had continued to grow in numbers and to splinter into subgroups.

By 1990, there were five different Muslim groups in Granada. The number of tea houses along Calderería Vieja street had also multiplied. One group had established a pottery collective, while others had established a bookstore and a coffeehouse on Elvira Street. However, Granada was becoming too small for such dissension, and converts increasingly began to leave the city and settle in other towns. A group of physicians established a natural medicine practice in the coastal town of Mojácar. Followers of Mohammed, whom I spoke of earlier, moved to a small town just outside of Granada known as Quéntar. Some even moved to Córdoba, and got permission from the municipal government to use a small mosque that Franco had built during the Civil War for his Moroccan reinforcements.

In 1992, when I returned, the movement seemed to be at a particularly low point. And yet, by the time I left, in 1994, I was convinced that, although no longer growing as before, it had reached a stable plateau, and was in fact consolidating. Indeed, in 1995, the Yama'a opened an Islamic university and sponsored an international conference on fundamentalism. That same year, permission was finally granted to the *Morabitunes* to break ground for what would be the first mosque in the Albaicín in over 500 years. The movement is clearly not fading away anytime soon, as I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter VI.

Summary

At first glance, both the frenzied embracing of modernity and the search for margins from which to critique and challenge this totalizing discourse, may appear as derivative of Western European trends, just a catching up after an enforced "time lag." And yet this would be a crass oversimplification that

would obscure the very powerful role that memories of the dictatorship have continued to play in the lives of many Spaniards. For if in dominant discourses Franco was portrayed as an obsolete anachronism of the past – the only obstacle in Spain's path to modernity – and the ignoring of the legacies of the dictatorship was conflated with overcoming them, for many Spaniards and Andalusians the Franquista past continued to shape and exercise social and political pressure from beyond the grave.

My interest in memory and its use in political contestation has led me to foreground the role that anomie and political apathy, i.e. "disenchantment" [*desencanto*] played in shaping political discourse and action during the 1980's. I have pointed to how this complex phenomena has been understood, explained and judged in various ways. I argue that the retreat from formal, organized party politics, although by no means absolute or permanent, marked the political culture of the 1980's in Andalusia. While quite a few who became disillusioned with the political outcome of the transition moved away from political activity altogether, others, after coming to terms with their frustrated expectations and rethinking their politics, chose to move into other arenas where they continued their old activities, and even created new ones.

This rethinking of politics and interests meant that although some new areas of activism came to the fore, and some older issues became incorporated into the new agendas, others causes became reduced to specific redoubts. This was the case for national identity, which became circumscribed to a small sector of the intellectuals, for the environmentalist movement, and for other social movements, such as the conversion to Islam. Not only were most forms of activist politics marginalized; those which were notoriously tied to the disappointments of the transition were the most delegitimized of all. At the same time, marginality came to be valued as a privileged space for conducting

politics and political life. Marginality, at first simply a result of the exclusion from public life and debate, eventually came to be seen as a valuable political strategy and an option in and of itself. This option was tied to the exploration of areas of activity not yet incorporated into the mainstream, thereby believed to offer greater freedom, as well as to the choice of culture as an arena of activity and struggle.

It is in this context that I have discussed the emergence of a conversion movement. In this chapter, I have limited myself to presenting in broad strokes the dynamics of fusion and fission which have characterized the movement, as well as briefly contextualizing its emergence within the politics of the time. Chapter VII recounts the convert's stories as told to me as well as their everyday lives as I saw them from 1992 to 1994. So far, I pointed towards two main tendencies within the movement: one clearly political and nationalist, and another more inclined towards spirituality and a critique of morality. In separating these two tendencies, I am merely pointing to differences in emphasis and orientation. However, as we will be seeing in more detail in Chapter VII, the conversion movement has as many commonalities as it has differences.



Figure 4. Young women, dressed for carnival, entering the cafeteria run by the Yama'a Islamica de Al-Andalus, in Cordoba.

(Cordoba, 1994)

Chapter VI. Subjects in the Kingdom of the Dismemored: youth culture and identity in the 1990's

And it happens that there is a generation, that is, our generation, people of our age that questioned things, had feelings of solidarity, of justice, of changing things, of modifying a political discourse and practice that existed in our country and that we disagreed with. And that there was a sector that came before us that was much smaller, they were our elders, and they suffered tremendous amounts of repression under the dictatorship. There were a lot of people who were persecuted in Andalusia, mostly in the Anarchist movement and in the Communist Party, which were the two groups that were most visible during this time. But they were important for they gave us hope and cheered us along. And then there is a generation after us that when you study it, you deal with it, it is but a group of apathetic people, *pasotas*,¹ who know nothing. Everything has been done, or rather the PSOE gave them everything, and destroyed everything.

These are the words of Mari Carmen, a former Communist militant and current labor organizer in Córdoba. Every time I read them, I am startled and deeply moved by how they neatly yet powerfully they convey the

¹I believe this word is equivalent to the English term "slacker," although it is an ascribed not self imposed term. Pasotas are seen as somewhat more careless than carefree, more passive aggressive than apathetic, also nihilistic and antisocial. I could not determine when the term gained currency, but Maddox (1993) reports the term "pasotos" was used in the early 1980's in Aracena, a small city north of Seville. So one could suspect the term gained currency in the mid-to late 70's, and was standardized somewhat later. Just as with the term "Generation X," the term pasotas or a variant thereof was probably used to refer to those of the Generation of 1968 before it was used to refer to the current generation. In other words, those who got labeled pasotas once are returning the "favor" to the next generation.

commonsensical understanding of generational politics and realities in Spain. Indeed, this short story of Spanish political culture during the late 20th Century was told to me over and over again, with little variation.

Its importance to the arguments I was putting forth is such that I debated constantly where the quote should be placed. At first I attempted to organize my introduction as a dialogue with this text, but the dialogue constantly exceeded the scope of an introduction. Then I debated letting it stand by itself, as an introduction to the section on generations, but concluded that my reasoning might be too oblique for the reader to fathom. Briefly I toyed with the idea placing it at the start of my concluding remarks, but once again I felt it would only be confusing. In the end, I have chosen to place it here, in this chapter on the political cultures of youth, because I felt it would make most explicit the voice of my interlocutors to my readers. Indeed, this chapter is not written for an audience of young people, not even for those who so generously and willingly offered information about their lives as well as lasting friendship. Much of what I say here might sound redundant to them.

This chapter focuses on the political cultures and the cultural politics of young Andalusians. Contrary to the images promoted by most organs of public opinion, youth culture in Andalusia and throughout Spain is vibrant and dynamic and defined precisely by its enormous diversity. Because a thorough description and analysis of this diversity is beyond the scope of this chapter, I can not pretend to fully refute the image of the "apathetic, nihilistic youth" but rather will explore the complex discourses and practices that have been operative in its construction and promotion. And while I will on occasion refer to the voices of interlocutors such as Mari Carmen, I will rely on the stories and voices of the youth themselves to present some of the multiple ways in which youth confront and creatively respond to these images. I organize my discussion in

three sections, that focus on very specific aspects of the youth cultures I became aware of, observed and participated in during my stay in Córdoba. The first section deals with the sociality of youths and the spaces it in which it takes place. I consider the ways young people chose to define and represent their everyday lives, ideas and activities to their peers and to the society at large and how these ways were connected to their understanding of issues such as class, gender, and the economy. In the second section, I will focus more specifically on the form and content of political activity among youth: the struggles they most identify with as well as the form their political action takes. These two discussions lead into the third section, the politics of memory and history, in which I focus on the cultural and political practice of the anarchist squatters. I will conclude by reflecting on the politics of generations and generational memories.

Space, place and the public performance of identity

I learned about youth while hanging out in the plaza of the local archeological museum, known as *la plaza del Museo* or simply as *el Museo*. Youths from various parts of Córdoba would gather in the plaza all year round, but on Spring afternoons and summer evenings it would be particularly crowded. Young people would come to "el Museo" just before or right after lunch and dinner, to meet with friends. They would bring their bicycles and motorcycles, their musical instruments and their favorite pets, but most importantly their liters of beer -- which they bought at nearby candy stores -- and change to buy hash. With all "necessities" at their reach, they would sit with their "gente" -- their "people", their clique -- or talk to other friends and acquaintances for hours in the many bleachers-like steps and benches which the park provided. They would talk about their lives, share jokes, make plans for the coming evening or

for the future -- plans, for example, to take a bicycle ride to the countryside, a camping trip, set up a band or open a small business.

El Museo was associated with the leisure habits of unemployed and underemployed working class youth. Unemployment was at over 30%, and even higher among youths. And yet people from all social sectors and political persuasions continued to be fairly unanimous in their condemnation of youth leisure practices. In the conservative sectors of the population, the discourse was predictable: today's youth are lazy, they do not want to work, drugs have destroyed their minds. However, I found much of the same moralistic discourse in many who considered themselves progressives, and had been deeply involved in the youth scene of the late 1970's and 1980's. The plaza was seen as the crystallization of everything that had gone wrong, the personification of the evils of democracy as it had been consolidated. The youth, hanging out for hours on end, smoking and drinking, were continuously described to me as careless [*despreocupados*] or even unaware, lacking consciousness [*inconcientes*]. In their elders eyes, democracy had been a hard fought victory, and these young people were squandering it. Of course there were no job, no future perspectives, but what were these young people doing about it? Nothing, I was continually told. They were just "dead weight," or else "drift wood being carried back and forth by the tides." Nothing good was to come from my association with them. I was wasting my time with people who were completely uninteresting.

I also was concerned with these young people's use of their leisure time for, like all stereotypes, there was some truth in the "outsider's" perception of the plaza's denizens. There was indeed an oppressiveness to the plaza atmosphere, a sense of social deviance and defeat. On Sunday mornings, when *El Museo* was deserted except for the oldest, poorest and most marginalized individuals, the sense of social defeat was painfully evident. However, outsiders were refusing to

acknowledge that much of this leisure time was enforced, created in fact by dismal employment opportunities and an educational system that seemed severely out of step with the needs and wants of these young people. Furthermore, youths were using this time in creative ways, interpreting and acting upon the meager circumstances and prospects their situation offered. Few of those who came to the plaza were able to draw continuous and unambiguous satisfaction from the daily routine of lazy days hopelessly repeating themselves over and over again, sunny day after sunny day. Most of these young people had other plans for their lives, and they were conscious that none would ever be realized while hanging out. Moreover, they were not impervious to social expectations which require that they become independent, establish a household and even help in the support of their parents, all of which required some more or less formalized source of employment. Although the combined effects of alcohol and hash² did subdue these young people and make them more impervious to the immediate reality and its dismal prospects, it was only momentarily.

These young people were actively and creatively seeking forms of employment and remuneration, even if time and time again most of their job searches and money making schemes fell flat. Furthermore, as they grew older, people went to the plaza less and less, and sought out more established, agreeable and respectable places to hang out. All in all, the image of the Museo as a "dead end" street is an oversimplification, if not the product of outright incomprehension that pervades common stereotypes about youth and el Museo. In the pages that follow, I will describe the many ways in which young people attempted to use the leisure time enforced upon them creatively. I will describe how they used their time in spaces like el Museo as well as outside of it: going to

²There was experimentation with harder, more powerful drugs, but it was confined largely to mayor occasions such as the summer fair and Christmas time reveling.

school, working, looking for formal work or making a living outside the formal labor market. I believe, however, that it is spaces such as el Museo that define, at the same time that they are defined by, the social position, values and worldview of those who use them. In other words, spaces such as el Museo are integral to how young people see themselves and how they portray others from whom they wish to distinguish themselves or with whom they wish to associate. The activities that take place within them are also central in social and media representations of youth's everyday life.

El Museo

The "Museo" had been a hangout for young people for well over ten years. They shared it with a smaller group of older men, usually addicts or other petty criminals, who came to the plaza to hang around with the youths, either to sell them drugs or to vicariously enjoy the "vidilla" -- the life, the excitement -- that young people brought to the park. And although the plaza had an eerie sense of timelessness, it had seen dramatic transformations during the last decade. Young people were fond of remembering the time when la plaza del Museo was a very charming, typically Andalusian garden with a beautiful small spring rising slightly above the ground, whose water would flow through channels in four directions. Barely landscaped shrubs and trees made the park a cozy and welcoming place. Back then the historic district where la plaza del Museo is located had been abandoned, and most of the buildings that surrounded it were dilapidated. There were many bars and taverns frequented by poor and working class, to socialize, eat, drink and, according to my friends, listen to flamenco. Youths in the late 1970's and early 1980's were attracted to this seamier side of life, and also became avid patrons. With democracy came public funds and a local government which set out to rescue the historic district from

what it saw as its ruin. The gentrification process that was unleashed meant that the neighborhood became one of the most expensive real estate locations within the city. Many wealthy professionals and merchants moved into the area, and changed the character of "*el barrio* ."³

The houses surrounding the plaza were sold and renovated and the archeological museum was refurbished and reopened. But its plaza remained a preoccupation to authorities, which saw it as a foci of delinquency. So, as with many other spaces in Córdoba and throughout Andalusia, it fell victim to the clutches of post-modern design. The small, cool, and charming garden my friends described was turned into an open space of gray granite, roughly divided into two sections. To the south, there was a open area, slightly sunken in, surrounded by bleacher-like steps.⁴ As the ground rose, the steps blended into ramps and eventually evening the terrain. This led to a more clearly defined square, where large individual trees (and struggling saplings) stood as islands of nature amid the sea of granite. At the center of this square, enclosed by a circular marble ledge, stood three fountains of different sizes and heights, whose waters would flow into each other. Overturned, broken columns and pieces of rough-cut stone, such as those that could be found in a collapsed roman or Greek ruin, served as benches, hot in the summer and cold in the winter. The overall impression was of a fluid if somewhat alien landscape. The place seems to be designed to be admired from afar, certainly not to welcome human use and interaction. It is to the young people's credit that they transformed such a sterile and inhospitable place into a home of sorts.

There was a time when el Museo attracted a heterogeneous crowd, but it always seemed divided into zones clearly marked by the practices of their

³ *Barrio* is the name people in Córdoba used to refer to a neighborhood within the city. *Barriada* referred to a poor *barrio*.

⁴Perhaps it was intended to remind the viewer of roman or Greek theaters.

"regulars." When I first knew "el Museo" it was divided into two "user areas." The largest was the area occupied by the youths and those who hung around with them. This area itself was loosely subdivided into smaller sections in which different groups of friends regularly congregated. This was not a matter of territoriality so much as custom, and people would often congregate in different spaces, for various reasons: inclement weather, time of arrival, desire to speak to or avoid another group or person, the cleanliness of the plaza that particular day, etc. The second "user area" was a small section had been carved out by a local bar using plastic chairs and tables. This attracted a slightly older, more established clientele of thirty-something couples often with their children, as well as tourists seeking out the shade of some of its large, shady trees.

The interaction between users of these two areas was limited. Bar customers would wander over to greet and chat with friends hanging out around el Museo and perhaps buy some hash, and sometimes, when the young people had come into some money and could afford to buy -- and treat others -- to beer and drinks, they would sit not on the chairs but on the granite benches or overturned columns close to the bar and consume. The reasons for this separation were various. First, there was a degree of self-imposed segregation. While the young people derided the atmosphere of family life and stability that the bar's terrace provided, the patrons looked down upon the marginality of many of the plaza's denizens. Moreover, the bar owners were not shy -- they could not be -- about making it clear that unseemly people and those that were not non-consuming from their establishment were unwelcome in their area. Another factor was that many youth could ill afford its prices, though they were extremely reasonable. To go out *de tapeo* ⁵ meant incurring expenses that could

⁵ In Spain, most consumption of beer and wine in a commercial establishment also involves sampling some *tapas*, appetizers and finger foods for which Spanish cuisine is very well known. In fact, in cities like Granada, it is common for beer to be served with a complimentary *tapa*.

easily be avoided: food was something you ate at home: all outside expenses revolved around drink, cigarettes and drugs. Thus, after el Museo, the activity would move on to bars around the area which catered to their tastes in music and atmosphere.

La gente de mi peña: the organization of friendship and sociality

Early on in my fieldwork, I became close friends with a *peña*, a close group of friends who frequented el Museo. As has been described for other regions of Spain (Hansen 1974, Kasmir 1994)⁶, social relations among young people tend to be organized into small, tightly knit nuclei or cliques. These cliques are often formed in the neighborhood, but can be consolidated much later, such as in junior high or high school. People in these *peñas* will choose to hang around with each other constantly and, while friendships and relations can be established outside of the group, those within the group tend to take precedence. Often, in a *peña* there are best friend pairs, but these can in fact be broken and reconstituted with other members. Members refer to those within the *peña* as *mi gente*, or *la gente*, although *la gente* can also refer more generally to "people" as in the phrase, "*allí es donde va la gente*" (that is where people go.) It was my experience that *peña* might be somewhat flexible, but that there is a strong sense of in-group solidarity which might often make newcomers feel very much like hangers on.

The *gente* of the *peña* with whom I became fairly good friends were in their early twenties, though they interacted quite closely with some people in

⁶Uhl (1991) speaks of female friendship in Andalusia as needing to be veiled and being seen socially as less legitimate than male friendship. In doing fieldwork in Córdoba, I found that this was clearly not the case. Mothers frequently went out with their friends and there were numerous women's organizations that promoted this kind of socialization among housewives. Among the young women, I found that the ideal for relationships was that of friendship, and they often described having or wanting a friendship with their mothers, their boyfriends and lovers. Perhaps this situation is a measure of the enormous social changes that took place in Andalusia since the 1980's, when Uhl conducted her research.

their early thirties.⁷ The group shared important similarities in family backgrounds, most of them coming from upwardly mobile working class homes.⁸ Internally, the group separated itself into *las niñas*, the girls, and *los niños*, the boys or the guys. The girls themselves had belonged to a *peña* in their neighborhood. I became friends with several of them: Pilar, Puri, Carmen (these three were sisters), Rafi, Anabel, María the Tall and María the Short (the former was, at 5'10, just an inch taller than the latter).⁹ All except Anabel lived quite close to each other in a neighborhood for working and middle class families which had been built in the 1960s. Several of them chose to attend an experimental high school which combined technical training with the standard curriculum offered in high schools tracked for college preparation.¹⁰ The school was well-regarded for its training in visual and performing arts. Its innovative curricula and strong artistic emphasis attracted many young teachers who had become quite politicized during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The young women's description evoked a "bohemian" scene: a cult to "artistic creation and creativity;" a turn to drugs as protest and source of inspiration; and a fair amount of political debate and awareness. Indeed, the most memorable political intervention for these

⁷It is possible to think of these older members as "honorary," in that sometimes a slight distinction was drawn between the actual members of the group and those who were closely affiliated with it.

⁸In six of nine families, one or both parents had migrated to Catalonia during the early stages of their work life but had returned to Andalusia to marry and start families. (One of the "peña" had been born outside of Andalusia, and a couple of others had lived in other areas of Spain as children, but none claimed to be influenced by this). During this time the parents had acquired training and other expertise which had facilitated their economic takeoff upon return. Three of the fathers were working or had retired as workers for the railroad company; one was working in construction as a master carpenter; three of them were involved in sales or other white collar, private sector service job, and two otherwise supplemented their income with small businesses; one had died many years ago. Some of the mothers worked sporadically as cleaning women at various peoples homes. Only in one family had both parents completed post-graduate education, and they worked as art instructors at the high school where the *peña* had met.

⁹In Andalusia, nicknames are often quite ironic. Thus, someone who is very slow might get called *motorito* (little motor) or someone who is quite thin might be called *gordo* (fatso).

¹⁰Several important works have focused on the role of intermediate and high schools in creating cliques and social networks among youth (see Mc Cleod 1993; Willis 1983, 1990).

young women was the high school students strike' in support of the general strike of 1988.

Here they met the other "half" of the group, "the boys." While some of the boys had also been neighborhood friends, as was the case with Manolo and Sancho, others began to hang out while at school. This was the case of Dani, who after having a falling out with his previous *peña*, a much rougher and tougher crowd, began to seek out this new clique. Here the group also began to hang out with two brothers, Manolo and Paco Marco, and also with Yupi. The *peña* became consolidated when a couple of the boys become attracted to a couple of the girls, and sought them out. Shortly after, as the two couples started spending more time together, a wider group formed, which included some of the neighborhood girls who had not gone to this high school. The *peña* had seen several tempestuous relationships and break ups, one of which was a long term homosexual relationship between two of the women, and numerous other inter group flirtations.¹¹ Towards the end of my stay, the strains of growing up, the departure of some members for reasons of work and of school, and unresolved tensions between group members had many of them lamenting that "*la gente está muy perdía*," meaning our people are don't hang out, don't socialize together anymore.

I was introduced to this *peña* by a friend whose sister's boyfriend belonged to it. At that time, the group in fact preferred to hang out at the Círculo Cultural Juan XIII, whose importance in the politics and culture of Córdoba I discussed in Chapters IV and V. The *peña* liked to imagine themselves as "bohemians," artists, musicians and writers who pursued their craft in marginal

¹¹I found that it is quite common for members of such groups to behave rather "endogamically" in their early stages, although it becomes more and more frequent to seek partners outside of the group as its members grow older. This is also a source for separation from and disintegration of the group, as we shall see later.

settings and in alternative ways. The Juan XXIII was particularly well suited for all these activities. It appealed to this young crowd who associated the space with difference and to a certain degree exclusivity -- even if it was political and not social. Furthermore, it was centrally located in a beautiful old house in an old neighborhood known as San Francisco, just as historic but less gentrified than the area around el Museo. To enter one had to go through very large and thick wooden doors, and an elegant wrought iron gate. This led one to a shaded indoor patio, kept cool in traditional Andalusian style by a small fountain whose water spilled into four channels. Crossing the patio one entered a two story house whose ground floor was occupied by a bar and a large, open room with tables and, in the winter, a wood burning stove.

Here they would smoke hash and drink beer or wine, discuss the latest book they had been sharing and reading -- Henry Miller and Paul Bowles were popular authors -- carry out impromptu jam sessions or work on an on-going collaborative writing project. This project consisted of a series of notebooks in which people wrote short stories, poems essays, jokes, veiled and open critiques of each other and general information pieces. The notebooks were illustrated with original artwork as well as with cut outs from magazines and books. It was not a *fanzine*,¹² for it circulated exclusively among the group itself, and it was not reproduced. The oldest member of the group, who fancied himself somewhat of a teacher or patron, would take it upon himself to maintain some degree of coherence or style to different sections or notebooks, and also continuously prodded the young people to keep participating in the project. However, just as often my friends chose to hang around joking and playing cards and dominoes.

¹² Fanzine was the name given to underground "magazines" which were published by informal collectives of young people. Fanzines dealt with a wide variety of issues of interest to young people, though individual publications usually tended to focus on a specific subject: squatter settlements, specific variants of punk music, role playing games, and so forth.

While the boys did consume significant amounts of hash and beer, the girls sipped *pacharán* (a blackberry liqueur) and anise, occasionally asking for a puff. The exception to this was Anabel, who was capable of smoking and drinking any of the boys under the table.

Gender played an important role in more than just organizing primary sociality within the group. Indeed, there were crucial differences in educational achievement, wage-earning expectations and strategies, as well as in general attitudes about work. The primary nucleus of the group consisted of seven women and five men. Two of the young women had received scholarships to study fine arts and another one theater at highly competitive schools in Seville; other three studied Special Education in Córdoba; the remaining one studied voice over and dubbing in Madrid but was also accredited as a radiotherapy technician. The contrast with the young men was startling. Of the five, only three had finished high school and of those only one had passed the college preparatory course, going off to study Fine Arts in Seville with his two women friends. Shortly before I returned to the United States, two of the other young men had begun to study at a local private music conservatory.

As a group, they embraced the identity that in youth culture was known as "bohemian." They considered themselves to be artists, intellectuals, clearly superior to others of their peers who had lesser minds and talents. They resembled, and conspicuously borrowed from, the style of the 1960's counterculture, particularly what in the United States became called "the beats."¹³ Most of their clothes, instruments and books were second hand, bought in flea markets and second hand stores. This was not was not purely a matter of aesthetics; it is difficult to imagine how they could have afforded otherwise. Yet

¹³ For more information on the American countercultural movement, see Rozack 1970. For Europe, see Tourraine 1971.

they consistently chose to downplay any element of necessity, and emphasize their lifestyle as one of choice. However, they defined themselves most clearly by pointing to what they were not. Indeed, theirs was an identity largely defined in opposition to a constellation of possible lifestyles and worldviews. One group the bohemians took great pains to distinguish themselves from were those whom they called *hipis*. This was of great interest to me, since many young *hipis*. I met seemed to share tastes in clothes similar to those of the bohemians, and many were also quite interested in music and the performing arts. However, according to my friends and many others I spoke to, the *hipis* were the unkempt and uncouth. They often accompanied the term *hipi* with the adjective *asqueroso*, filthy. This was partly because many people they identified as *hipis* lived on the streets, and were indeed unbathed.

Hipi was also the name given to those who sold cheap crafts and trinkets in the streets and markets. Many of these itinerant vendors were in their late thirties and early forties, and had become small scale entrepreneurs, making profits which seemed considerable in the eyes of many youths. This did not endear them any more to my friends, who, although liking some of these, resented the profits made at their expense. Alternatively, they would scoff at the *hipis* arguing that this form of engagement with the market was beneath them. They defined themselves as strictly “mental” laborers, and fondly if humorously accepted my epithet of “street philosophers.” However, I think just as important in their rejection was the fact that *hipis*, by and large similar in same age and class backgrounds, were a reminder of how dire employment perspectives were, and how precarious their positions were. Indeed, I heard people, only half-jokingly, despair: “*Aquí hay que dedicarse a hipis*” (here we have to become *hipis* to survive.) Not surprisingly, they were also seen as somewhat dangerous and untrustworthy, always hoping to scam an unsuspecting victim: how could

someone so desperate be trusted? Furthermore, *hipis* often slept and earned a living performing or begging in the spaces that my friends and others chose for leisure and relaxation. Not only did my friends and others have to compete for space with these *hipis*, this also meant that outsiders would lump all users of el Museo together.

For these same reasons they also looked down upon many of their peers who had settled in steady job. "*Currante*" and "*currito*"¹⁴ were some of the labels they bestowed on those of their age who held steady working class jobs, and who, more importantly, were perceived as being driven by the work ethic. In strong contrast to the "bohemians," these youths were said to be quite content with becoming "good workers." Manolo, for example, described himself to me once as existentially unemployed [*parado existencial*], though he was working 40 hours a week.¹⁵ He pointed out to me how Andalusians these days had lost the sense of enjoying leisure which had characterized them in the past.¹⁶ "You see," he told me as we were sitting in "el Museo" on a Tuesday afternoon, shortly before he had to return to work, "a *currante* would not be sitting here in the middle of the day sipping a *tinto de verano* (wine with ginger ale). He'd be at work, or eating at home with his parents, or worse, his wife, and then running back to work." For this bohemian, people made a living from work, but work should not become a person's life. Work should not define a person and much less should they identify with it. For Manolo, just as working class as the hypothetical "worker" he described, what was deplorable was how the "worker"

¹⁴ In Andalusian, and more broadly Spanish, slang work is called "curro." "Curro" can also be the nickname for those called Francisco, as was the case with a famous bandit, Curro Jiménez. Ironically, or perhaps perversely, the mascot of the Seville World Expo in 1992 – a rather bizarre looking animal, somewhat of bird with a multi colored, conical beak and a separate, smiling mouth – was also called "Curro."

¹⁵ [Parado means unemployed, but also and perhaps more importantly in this context, idle.

¹⁶ Representations of Andalusians as poor and happily idle people were discussed in Chapter II. I found very interesting that young Andalusians most often made references to the past when speaking of Franco, language and unemployment, as I discuss later.

allowed his job, his labor, to regulate his life: this regulation was the source of drudgery and alienation.

El Museo was also known for attracting *okupas*, a group of squatters who had taken over a building not far away from *El Museo*. These were the youths whose aesthetics were perhaps the most openly anti-establishment. They actively cultivated an aggressive, anti-social aesthetic, that was drawn partly from the British punk scene but more specifically from the particular interpretation this music and aesthetic received in Northern Spain. They were very critical of the current state of politics in Spain, which they saw as repressive and oppressive, economically and politically. They considered themselves anarchists, and believed in communitarian living, enforced by minimal local governance driven by consensus politics, not elections. They openly displayed anarchist symbols and icons in their clothes and on their bodies and made constant reference to the anarchist resistance during and immediately after the Civil War. They even organized their squatter settlement to resemble the "atheneums"¹⁷ that anarchist organized during the period immediately before the Civil War. Aside from offering free housing to whomever needed it, the settlement also served as an open space for young people to gather, socialize, and learn a wide variety of crafts and skills. Workshops ranged from puppeteering and other "circus arts," as they called them, to how to work on leather, how to speak English or how to play guitar, electric bass or drums. These skills were meant to provide the means of support for young people somewhat autonomous from the capitalist market economy, which the *okupas*, strongly opposed.

¹⁷ Athenaeum comes from the Greek, and refers to the temple of Athena, the goddess of wisdom. In the Roman Empire, atheneums were schools for the study of the arts. Today it refers to a scientific or literary association, and to the building where the association houses its library: books, periodicals and newspapers.

My friends, the “bohemians” from *el Museo*, had a very uneasy relationship to the *okupas*. They saw them as too aggressive and violent. I was often told that you never knew when “one of those *punkis*” (as the *okupas* were also called) was going to pick a fight or go off in a destructive frenzy. Indeed, my friends saw the *okupa*’s anti-establishment rhetoric as no more than a justification for their violent and destructive behavior. They did not share the *okupas* interest in history nor their passion about politics. However, they also had radically different outlooks about work and leisure. While both refused to define themselves by the labor they performed, the *punkis* did not share the “bohemian” distaste for manual labor, just the rejection of the conditions under it usually took place: in a factory, or for an independent contractor. For the *punkis* and the *okupas*, work was acceptable, though not necessarily enjoyable, as long as it was done under your own terms, and it did not contribute to sustain and legitimate the oppressive State nor the Capitalist system. Indeed, the strong interest and attraction the circus had for the *okupas* could be partially explained by this desire to find a space that would challenge the standard separations between work and leisure, and thus prove that work need not be drudgery.

There were other plazas and spaces to hang out. People from *el Museo* also frequented bars ran by young people belonging theater and performance collectives, which were also located in the town’s center. And for daytime get-togethers another very popular spot was *La Corredera*, a monumental edifice that resembled in style, if not size, Madrid’s *Plaza Mayor*. It was the location for one of the largest flea market and fish market in the city, housing, as well, a variety of second hand and “five and dime” stores. On the west side of the plaza was a bar where an eclectic crowd of young and middle aged people gathered for *tapas* and conversation during the morning and early afternoon hours. Next to *el Museo*, in fact, directly behind the archeological museum, was another popular

spot. It was known as la *plaza del Séneca* or simply *el Séneca* because of the headless statue of the philosopher that occupied a pedestal over the plaza.¹⁸ It was located on a steep incline just at the edge of the historic section. *El Séneca* was made up of three open squares joined by steps and flanked by benches and hedges at either side. It was considerably smaller than *el Museo*, and used almost exclusively at night, as a place where the clientele from a nearby bar, called *Plateros*,¹⁹ would spill over. Despite their proximity the atmosphere was markedly different at each plaza. For one, *el Séneca* was rarely used during the day. When I asked people in the *Museo* about this, they proposed that *el Museo* was more hospitable than *el Séneca* : its was bigger, had more trees and fountains. I believe that equally important was the fact that *el Museo* was further away from the street. But there were other differences: in terms of class, work, politics, and worldview.

Indeed, people who frequented other plazas not always agreed with the boundaries drawn by the "bohemians" of *el Museo* . For example, people who willingly hung out at *el Séneca* viewed *el Museo* mostly with distaste. To them, it was dirty, dark and there were too many *tiraos*. -- outcasts, marginalized people, people who were unkempt, not properly dressed. Among others, *hipis* fell under the categories of *tiraos*, as did the drug peddlers and their coterie. The "bohemians," whom many of *el Séneca* knew and indeed had friendships with, were not included in this category. However, there was an implicit question about the judgment of those who would choose to socialize with these "outcasts," even if at a distance. Those who frequented *el Séneca* might, although by no

¹⁸Vandals in Córdoba had decapitated several statutes and it was joked that they had switched their heads around, so that any one of the many statues of illustrious men that where scattered through out the city could be wearing another's head.

¹⁹There were many bars with the appellation "Asociación de Plateros" throughout Córdoba. It was explained to me that while most were privately owned, all claimed a nominal affiliation with the silversmiths guild for tax purposes.

means always, have been willing to purchase drugs from the outcasts, but wanted to uphold boundaries of class, values and morals .

Those of *el Museo* did not have any specific label for the people of *el Séneca*,²⁰ and did on occasion spend time there. When I asked them about their preference of *el Museo* they would say that *el Séneca* was too crowded, and that those who went there were "*más pijos*." To be *pijo* meant to be wealthy, to be children of good families, very much "*niños (as) de papi y mami* ", that is, daddy's and mommy's little girls or boys. In fact, the crowd at *el Séneca* was not a wealthy crowd, but working and middle class young people who were slightly more conformist with social norms and did not identify with the quest for marginality that many of the youth's who hung out *el Museo* embraced. The label "*más pijo*" is not so much a comment about their economic situation as it is about their class allegiance. The true *pijos* preferred the terraces and the club scene near their neighborhoods, which was at some distance from this area.

My friends also spoke of another identity which was very distinct in their minds, that of *modernos*, or modern. This was an identity clearly tied to the change from dictatorship to liberal democracy, in that much of what was indispensable to their definition only became available after Franco's death: not only things such as expensive, imported cars, the latest fashions in clothing, and an abundance of designer drugs, but also the freedom to purchase and the spaces to use them, such as malls, discos, etc. While the "bohemian" emphasis on contemplation demanded an aesthetic of disinterest and passivity, the *modernos*

²⁰I was once told that they were "*normalitos*," that is, average kids, nothing distinctive or special about them. It is interesting, however, that in the vocabulary of young people "normal" doesn't necessarily have the positive connotations that the term has in English. For example, the response to someone complaining about an unfortunate event having to do with a bureaucratic snafu, a run in with the police or a boss, or even a particularly long traffic jam, would be "Normal," in other words, is "not exceptional"; the assumption is that trouble or inconvenience is a matter of course. Furthermore, when something or someone has gone beyond the pale, has trespassed the bounds of the tolerable, my friends would say "*Eso no es ni normal*," meaning "That isn't even normal."

were described as constantly engaging in frenzied activity. *Modernos* lived a very fast lifestyle, dedicated to late night partying, and weekend long marathons, of intense dancing, drinking, drugs and revelry. If one is to take seriously the youths' equation of modernity with the lifestyle of this group, then modernity for them implies immediate gratification, conspicuous consumption, stark individualism and most obviously, an enormous importance placed on appearance.

The *modernos* spent considerable amounts of money, whether of their own income or that of their parents, on clothes and leisure.²¹ Thus, there was some debate among my friends about the class background of the *modernos*. *Modernos*, some argued, were not always *pijos*, in the sense of being born wealthy. Many held nine to five jobs, but in their consumption habits they appeared as people who had no worries about money. Furthermore, there were plenty of *pijos* who were *horteras* (tacky). But there was no denying that the *moderno* lifestyle was very expensive. *Modernos* seemed to do most of their socializing in clubs, where drinks were considerably more costly than *terrazas*. Furthermore, they often took part in the coastal club scene -- weekend-long binges of drugs and alcohol,²² in which young people incurred in significant expenses.²³ Considering that some

²¹It is widely held, and supported by statistical evidence, that youth in Spain spend over 2/3 of their resources in clothes and leisure activities. However, among the groups of young people I frequented this was certainly not the case. They were avid shoppers, but of the second hand stores and mercadillos, and had highly developed standards for what was expensive and what was not. Of course, my friends were working class, and furthermore, at the time of my study, Córdoba was one of the cities with highest unemployment rates in all of Spain. Nevertheless, in my experience these statistics were skewed towards middle and upper class consumption habits.

²²There was considerable debate and discrepancy about the amount of alcohol consumed. While some argued that the designer drugs preferred by this crowd -- such as ecstasy -- did not interact well with alcohol and thus were avoided, others I asked, including those who were deeply involved in this scene, argued that it was just mixed drinks that spoiled the effects. As one acquaintance pointed out, "Jack Daniels neat goes down like water, so I drink it like water, and it doesn't spoil a thing!" I should point out that Jack Daniels is a much desired commodity in Spain.

²³In two separate occasions I accompanied some young people in these weekend sojourns. On one of such weekends, the average amount of money spent by the young men was in the ballpark of \$200 dollars, which included \$50 for accommodations and about \$10 in gas. The rest was spent

did this once or twice a month, it became clear to me that the *modernos* possessed either considerable disposable incomes or disposed of their incomes exclusively on their selves.

Buscandose la vida: wage earning strategies

This observation points to a defining feature of Spanish youth culture. While in other countries in Europe, much of what has been called “subcultural innovation” (Hebdige 1979) relied financially on individual wages or on the support of the welfare state, in Córdoba few youths were fully independent economically or able to live off state assistance.²⁴ The few who did were able to do so by declaring themselves insane and receiving what they called *carnet de loco* - - an identification card that certified them as mentally ill – through which they could garner not only support for themselves but also for their family.²⁵ Others also gained sporadic support through a series of one year programs that were designed to jump start young households, but were often used simply as another form of unemployment benefits. On the whole, state aid was overall difficult to come by.

in food and beer, though they only ate one full meal a day, and it was never over \$5. Clubs sometimes had door fees, but most did not. Thus, they spent close to \$100 in drinks and drugs in two and a half days. Women spent somewhat less, for they were treated more often.

²⁴A study conducted by the Andalusian department of Social Services in the early 1990's suggested that only 21% of Andalusian youth could fully support themselves, while 45.5% reported no income whatsoever. The situation is worse for those living in large urban center than for those living in less populated urban areas, where irregular employment in agriculture can supplement an otherwise meager income. See Escuela Pública de Animación Socio-Cultural (nd.:135)

²⁵ I found that this strategy often backfired because of the sorry state of the Andalusian healthcare system, related to the way healthcare has been turned over to individual autonomous communities. While in some instances, such as Catalonia, the decentralization has resulted in improved health care, Andalusians are at the mercy of a chronically underfunded system – largely because the Spanish state owes the Andalusian Autonomous Community a significant amount of revenue in public health transfers – that ill serves the population. Mental health is an area particularly affected by what amounts to a crisis. Not one of the informants I knew who had sought treatment was given any form of therapy, and was instead treated chemically. Psychologists, those who tended to rely less on chemical treatments, were not covered by the public health plan.

Among my friends, the “girls” were more active about participating in the job market, and willing to accept a variety of jobs in order to procure an income for themselves.²⁶ Most of the time this involved participating in the underground economy that included sporadic work cleaning private homes, piece-work in the jewelry industry, secretarial and other office work, and part-time positions at campgrounds during the summer.²⁷ However, not one was able to find fully regulated and compensated employment. The “boys” did not fare much better. Of the ones who had not finished high school, one worked selling ceramic flutes at the entrance to the Cathedral mosque. The local manufacturer for whom he did this gave him a small percentage only after he sold a specified number. Needless to say, his earnings were highly irregular, and a crackdown by the police on itinerant vendors further hurt his business. His friend who also had not finished high school sometimes sold flutes for him, but was basically dependent on his parents. He had on occasion supplemented his income by arranging through the employment office work as a migrant farmworker in the apple picking season in France, as did two other of the “boys.”

Indeed, the government, through the State employment office and local programs, was looked at as the primary source of employment. Both my female and male friends relied on the temporary employment lotteries, known as *bolsas de trabajo*, which the municipal and provincials governments periodically held to distribute some unskilled clerical and menial jobs such as gardeners, nurse aids and work in sanitation and public works.²⁸ Unfortunately, the chances of

²⁶ Young men are more affected by unemployment than young women See Escuela Pública de Animación Socio-Cultural (nd.: 120)

²⁷ In Andalusia, waitressing is considered a skilled job, and most restaurant service personnel are men. They earn a salary and tips are minimal. At sea side resorts there are more opportunities, but they are usually taken up by locals and carefully protected. I did meet some young women who worked as bartenders at pubs, but everybody agreed that this was very hard work (often more than 12 hours a day, given how long pubs and clubs are open) and not very remunerative.

²⁸ There were also skilled positions available in such lotteries, but none for which the young men qualified.

obtaining employment in such lotteries was often very slim, as the applications enormously exceeded the positions available. In a case that made news throughout the Spanish state, a recruitment drive by a multinational supermarket chain opening a store in Córdoba turned out over 8,000 people for just 240 clerical and stockroom positions: 40 times as many applicants as there were openings. People lined up for three days straight waiting each day for over 6 hours just to obtain an application. In the end, the supermarket interviewed slightly over 600 hundred candidates and ended up hiring close to 300 hundred people.

And yet, even if one was not successful, having registered for a government sponsored lottery might result in being called for a paid worker re-education program. Young people were very ambivalent about such programs. Although participants received a minimal salary and the possibility of being hired by a local company, the instructors were often considered incompetent and intolerably boring. Moreover, although technically a person could indicate which programs he or she was interested in, the reality was that people were assigned to courses through another lottery system. My friends and many of their friends saw these programs more as a punishment than as leading to potential wage earning opportunities. Many people I spoke to agreed that the worker retraining programs sponsored by the Unions were consistently better, but those were much more difficult to gain access to. Not only did Union members have precedence, but the spaces that remained open were often given to children or friends of Union members.

Parental neighborhood or workforce networks provided an important source of employment information and opportunities for young people. Neighbors who knew of friends with unemployed children often came knocking at the family's door with news about possible jobs or the latest deadline for

employment lotteries. I saw this network at work on several occasions. I was told of a case of a young woman whose came looking for her at the neighborhood bar where she knew we were where having coffee. A friend of her neighbor had just seen a "Help Wanted" sign at a local boutique. She insisted my friend change and present herself immediately. My friend, though grudgingly, followed her mother, and through a glowing recommendation of another neighbor who knew the owner, got the job. It lasted only for five months, for her predecessor returned. This situation was not uncommon. These jobs invariably were either short term or very poorly remunerated, and young people saw them as less appetizing than the possibility of landing a full term government job, which until quite recently came with tenure guarantees.

Of the entire group, only one of the "boys" had work that was on the books and thus enjoyed full work benefits. He worked as a radio dispatcher at the headquarters of a tow truck company. However, his hours, from 12:00 A. M. to 8:00 P.M. were highly undesirable. Furthermore, his job was some distance outside the city and he often found himself having to walk there or spend money hiring a taxi. He had been hired through a government program whose stated purpose was to provide opportunities for on the job training for youths. Such programs usually amounted to a government subsidy for private enterprise, and a cheap source of service and clerical personnel for the government. This was made amply clear with the *contratos de aprendizaje*, the apprenticeship contracts instituted in 1994, as part of an agreement between the government and the private sector. The contract stipulated that the government, in the name of job creation, would allow businesses to pay people from the ages of 16 to 25 less than the minimum wage, and would reimburse the businesses for half the wages of every employee hired under this program. In common parlance, these jobs were called *contratos basura*, junk contracts.

Given the dire prospects for employment, my friends and their peers came up with a variety of strategies to supplement parental support. A very prevalent one, as I mentioned earlier, was the selling of crafts. The “girls” experimented with this strategy one winter. They were at a particularly low point financially and, while talking one day, had decided to sell jewelry made out of beads, which was becoming fashionable among young women. So they pooled their resources, set out to Seville and purchased all the necessary equipment. Those among them who were more creatively inclined also made some of their own beads out of papier maché. They spent almost all fall making earrings, bracelets, and necklaces. As the time grew nearer, they began to disagree on some issues. First there was the issue of price. While some argued that prices should be calculated by adding an agreed upon percentage to the cost of the materials, others felt that it should be calculated on the basis of labor. A very interesting debate emerged about what would be “fair” earnings, and what was a “reasonable wage.” Those who opposed the idea of calculating a wage argued that it would be difficult to estimate what they should have been paid per hour; and furthermore, there were some of them who were much more productive and skilled than others. Should they then be paid more? But even when the option of a set percentage of earnings was adopted, it was the cause of much discussion. What were to be seen as fair earnings? And how were they to be distributed?

With all these questions unsettled, the time came to set up their stand at the arts and crafts fair sponsored by the city in one of its main pedestrian malls. From the very first day, disappointment set in. Although interest was high, sales were meager. Furthermore, the young women discovered that in another such fair similar jewelry was being sold but for a much lower price. But competition and consumer conservatism were not the only problems. The stand was not officially authorized, for the cost of renting out a space was way beyond their

means. Nevertheless, they expected that other stall vendors would not complain. Not only did they not mind the presence of the “girls,” they had been quite friendly and helpful in setting up and willingly watched the stall when the young women took breaks. The problem turned out to be the owners of stores in the area, who complained bitterly that the arts and crafts fairs were hurting their business. Indeed, a local weekly publication ran an article which argued that Córdoba was beginning to resemble a third world city because of all the street vendors. Police vigilance in the market area increased, and quite often their goods were confiscated, although they were not made to pay any fines. But even without the fine, the damage was done: a day of selling was missed.

The last day of the market I stopped by to offer moral support and warm beverages. But I could not find the young women. Fearing the worse, ran to the police precinct, but seeing that they were not there, I called one of their homes. I found them there, and they informed me they had decided not to try one more time and set up the stalls. When I saw them later that day, they said it had been too hard, and it wasn’t worth it. They were barely making ends meet, and had started fighting amongst themselves. Furthermore, one had been grounded because her parents found out what she was doing. Apparently, a neighbor had seen her selling the jewelry at the stalls and gossiped within her mother’s reach that the girl was headed to no good. What kind of a person goes to sell junk at a stall? “Gypsies, Moors, good for nothings.”²⁹ The lady ended her tirade by saying that what that girl needed was a job. But that was precisely what they had wanted in the first place.

They were also tired of being mercilessly teased by the “boys” for their endeavors. Indeed, for their male friends, this kind of economic activity was

²⁹Gypsies and North Africans, popularly known as *moros* are targets of prejudice and in cities like Barcelona, racist violence.

problematic at best. Part of their derision seemed to have to do with issues of respectability. For example, when I suggested that as a group they all get together and perform in the streets for money, this was rejected out hand. As had happened to my women friends, chances were too high you would be seen by a neighbor or acquaintance and that person would then "forever look down upon you."

Given the meager prospects for employment, young people depended on their parents for support. This meant that they often remained for a long period of time under their parents roof, and left when ready to marry and set up an independent household. Since most families I became acquainted with in my study were quite large by contemporary Spanish standards (the average size was 6, but they ranged from 5 to 9 individuals per household) I became aware of the burden this posed. In some instance the continued residence of grown offspring was a strategy on the parents' part, who expected and often received some support from their working children. But this was by no means always the case. As one can expect, the greatest expectation and pressure for contributing to the general household income was in the working classes. In one particularly large household, there was enormous pressure on the eldest son, who was partners with this father in the family business, and the eldest daughter, who had recently completed University with flying colors and was heading towards a well paid teaching position, to delay their marriages. In the case of the son, marriage meant he would either have to have a raise, or bring at least one more member into the household -- both options which the household could not support. In the case of the daughter, it was argued by the father that after being put through school she had to repay the debts incurred by helping educate her younger siblings.

Nevertheless I found that just as many working class parents were not comfortable receiving help for household expenses from their unmarried

children who remained in the household. One parent told me of his working daughter's continued insistence in contributing to general household expenses "It just makes me angry. It is my responsibility to support this family. When I am old, decrepit, or dead, that will be something else then." Older siblings complained of just the opposite, of how their younger siblings, now in their twenties, were spoiled and not pulling their weight in the family. Interestingly enough, many parents behaved in a much more lenient fashion with their sons than with their daughters. Time and again, many of my women acquaintances complained about how their brothers did not contribute as much or at all to family subsistence. It seems that the traditional social expectation that women will be more involved in household activities has translated into a greater pressure to contribute to the family coffers. And yet, when parents I asked if they would take measures to force the non-contributing offspring out of the household, they seemed absolutely appalled or horrified. Furthermore, there seemed to be a keen awareness on the part of the parents of the difficult economic situation their children are facing.

At first glance, it often seemed to me that young people were not much in a hurry to leave their parents' homes. A research study conducted by the Department of Social Services of the Junta of Andalusia found that 80% of youths live with their parents, and that 55% of those does not plan to leave the parental household in the near future (Escuela Pública de Animación Socio-Cultural, nd.: 65). The fact was that home life provided enormous advantages, and parents, though often quite vocal about their opinions, generally respected those of their children. The study mentioned above suggests that a profound transformation has taken place in kinship relations. While "traditionally" family was characterized by strongly hierarchical relations dominated by strong father figure, increasingly one finds relations characterized by tolerance and respect

(Escuela Pública de Animación Socio-Cultural, nd.: 81). I found young people enjoyed considerable leeway in their everyday home life, and found in their mothers enormous emotional and financial support. Many of my young women friends reported having "friendships" with their mothers, and often relied on their mother's complicity when engaging in activities that the father might not approve of, such as extended vacations, new clothing, even late nights out. Young men also relied on their mothers' support, though they were much less subject to family strictures. Indeed, young men were quite often left to their own devices altogether. And yet, the fact of the matter was that even in the most lenient of families, privacy was rare, and young people deeply resented this. It was the search for a space of their own which they could share with lovers and friends that drove many to seek separate living quarters. For those few who managed to realize this wish, this did not always imply financial independence from parents, however. I noticed how some of the *okupas* and other young people would return to their parents home for meals and even an occasional overnight stay.

There were two principal reasons for moving out of the parental residence. One was going to college. This move was not always permanent, for after graduation the young person would more than likely move in, that is, unless he or she was ready to set up their own independent household with a person they were romantically involved with. The latter was the principal and most permanent form of independence. In this situation, most people waited until the chosen residence, invariably an apartment, had been totally furnished before moving in. Setting up a household together did not necessarily involve marriage, although it often did. If the young couple was purchasing the apartment, they often took over a year furnishing it before marrying and/or setting up residence. Otherwise, all the necessary equipment and furnishing

would be purchased and then an apartment would be sought out to rent. Needless to say, parents' participation was crucial to meeting these costs.

The inability to procure one's own housing and private spaces for interaction was what made the plazas and open spaces so crucial for interaction. Youths claimed these spaces as theirs, and engaged in practices that would perhaps in other contexts be carried out in more private spaces. However, the powers that be -- the State, local government, the mass media, neighbors, and even parents -- often conspired to control even such spaces. In late 1993, a new local tax on terraces made the owners of the bar in the *plaza del Museo* decide to close down its open air tables, and it marked a dramatic change in the plazas' ambiance. The young people took over most of the entire space, but in doing so made it a much less central part of neighborhood life. Toward the end of my stay in Córdoba, the summer of 1994, there were constant police raids in an attempt to crack down on the sale of hash in the neighborhood. This made *el Museo* undesirable, not only because it was "criminalized" as a space, but because criminal activity had to move elsewhere. It was no longer possible to purchase hash there; one had to go either to the *barrio* where the hash distribution originated or search out the dealers in their new hangouts, which were far from established. As fewer and fewer young people hung around *el Museo*, it became more and more marginalized, to the point where it in fact became an undesirable place to visit.

Politically Discrete: commitment and activism

In my frequent discussions with Andalusian political activists, both former and still current, some were willing to grant that youth culture was more complex than it was often held to be. But the idea that there might be something political about it was often dismissed out of hand. Indeed, while many of my

peers spoke of highly of young people who they saw as exceptions to these rules, these young people were often involved in the traditional left within Córdoba. Most activist define what constitutes “apolitical” through the activities of young people.

An excellent example of these dynamics is the story of how the “gente” I befriended stopped visiting *el Juan*. As I mentioned in Chapter IV and V, *el Círculo Cultural Juan XXIII* had seen a steady and significant decline in membership and activity since the late 1970s. As political activity moved into the public sphere, the importance of *el Juan* as a place for organizing and conspiring declined. While in the 1960s and 1970s it had been the center of clandestine political activity, in the 1980s it became a meeting place for those loosely organized around identity politics and issues of third world solidarity. However, as we discussed in Chapter V, the very “cultures” of these groups contributed to further sideline *el Juan* as a political space. By the time I came in contact with *el Juan* it was in crisis. While many were nostalgic for its days of greatness, few were regular visitors. The steering committee was trying its best to rouse some interest, but few people attended their activities. The glaring exception to this situation was their parties, when hundreds of people would crowd into the building to celebrate and meet with friends and former comrades.

Indeed, by 1990, with most political activity taking place elsewhere, *el Juan* had become a social club for people who could be loosely described as progressives. Yet in a city where the left became the mainstream, at least in politics, those who continued to visit *el Juan* were progressives outside the mainstream, what I would come close to describing as social misfits. This sealed the fate of *el Juan* in the eyes of many former members. My young friends became emblematic of *el Juan*’s decay. Invariably, people dismissed their project and activities. They were seen as “deadbeats” who came to *el Juan* because it

allowed people to smoke hash freely, not because they had any real interest in politics or in cultural production. Furthermore, some argued people were being turned away by their presence. The situation escalated to the point that the older crowd began a concerted effort to discourage the younger crowd from coming.

At first they began by instituting a policy that no hash could be consumed in the premises. Although a recent law had forbidden the consumption of hash on public places, many of *el Juan* had strongly and vocally opposed it, making a point of insisting that its consumption be allowed in the premises. They could after all claim that *l Juan* was not a public space, but a private club. However, since many of the older crowd were also avid consumers of hash, this new rule could hardly be enforced. The older crowd refused to stop smoking, and the younger crowd was rightfully indignant at the blatant discrimination. After several highly tense incidents which resulted in some, though minimal, violence -- none of them, ironically, involving the younger crowd -- the leadership decided to change their tactics and claim that only members who paid dues could enter the building. Two of the young people joined, and several others claimed to have as well. Furthermore, during this period, the person in charge of enforcing these rules was a young woman who ran the bar, and her best customers were the young crowd. While neither tactic was successful, the group of friends began to show up less and less, just to avoid the aggravation. Sometime later *el Juan* would have to move out of the building because the landlord claimed he wanted to refurbish it so that a relative could occupy it. In its new location, a warehouse space, *el Juan* lost its social function and became a meeting space for several small political organizations.

This incident clearly encapsulates the tensions that existed between generations. In interviews with former activists of the 1968 generation, some of which I recounted in Chapter IV, it becomes clear that much of what these young

people are doing now is very similar in form to what was being carried out by their elders. What differs dramatically is the content, and the implications that each group draws from their activities. The fact is that the younger crowd does not believe that progressive organized or rather institutionalized politics is at all possible. In this they are following many of those of the earlier generation who frequented *el Juan*: being tired of the bureaucracies which political parties had become, they had abandoned this style of politics for an alternative, movement-based one. However, the extreme fragmentation of the groups they formed, while allowing for more internal freedom, also limited the scope of their visibility, and as the literature of social movements has shown, also their impact. In other words, these bohemians came of age when much of the prior political scene was being disparaged and yet no new options were being promoted. If *el Juan* had been a more political space to begin with, the young people would have either picked up on its ideas and activities, or stopped visiting it.

Furthermore, there was no attempt made by the older generation to interact with the newcomers, perhaps stimulating in them the kind of thought and discussion that had made *el Juan* so well known. On the contrary, as I mentioned early, there was a strong tendency in those who are affiliated, however loosely, with the "Generation of 68" to project their social, political and personal frustrations unto the younger generation, rather than facing and critiquing the limits of their politics as they have practiced and defined them. In this sense, the youths became "scapegoats."

It is undeniable that in most public spheres there was a rupture in social and political memory, occasioned by the political demobilization and social conformity, the disenchantment and the hegemonic "recuperation" of many activists of the generation of '68 into the ranks of the PSOE. The new generation that was emerging found itself without a path to follow and with little help in

finding it. The meticulous care and cultivation of young militants that had been promoted by parties and syndicates was interrupted. A few groups still involved in the active recruitment and organizing of youth were Catholic, either progressive, as in the JOC, or ultra-conservatives, such as the Opus Dei. Learning rapidly from their elders, most youths began to see democratic party politics either as the purview of the unscrupulous and cynical or as an excellent career opportunity. This situation was particularly shocking to anti-Franquista activists who continued to practice some form of militancy. Such was the case of Maria Teresa, a high school teacher from Córdoba, who had been an active member of several radical left parties during the 1970s and early 1980s. "These youngsters" she complained, dismay punctuating every word

are absolutely clueless, they just don't get it. And what is worse, those who are somewhat more informed, and are active in party organizations, frequently have a very professional attitude about militancy. I mean, they see politics as a job, a vocational option, not a life commitment, not like my generation, who lived, sweat and bled politics. They say to me "I don't like politics." It's not that we liked politics, but how could we avoid them? They learned strategy from the ostrich: they just bury their heads in the sand.

High school and the university are no longer the centers of organized political mobilization that they once were, although some political activity continues to take place in them. An example of the important differences in the political culture of high school and universities were the student strikes of 1993-4. Overwhelmingly, the media and political organizations of the left characterized the discourse around which the students mobilized as utilitarian and not very solidary. Indeed, while the rising cost of tuition was an important issue, at times it appeared that what the students most feared were the changing

of academic standards involved in the process of integration with the European Community. Even discounting the critique of the mass media which chided the movement for not being more like 1968 – as if such a movement would have been received any better – the fact is that the University students' concerns were not radical, in the sense that they did not address the fundamental issues at stake in the process of reorganizing the University: the role that Spain and Spanish workers are meant to play within the European community, and, consequently, what kind of University system would be best geared to meet these demands.

This was recognized in a conversation with a high-ranking member of the University System of the Autonomous Community of Extremadura. According to this official, the problem with unemployment and education in Spain was that people were trained for careers they would never be able to work in, for there were no jobs. He offered engineering as what he thought was a particularly good example. There were engineering schools in almost every Autonomous Community, and yet there were increasingly fewer jobs in the field. Furthermore, with the opening of the borders and the free flow of workers within member countries, the highly technical and skilled jobs would probably go to those with better training. How could a Spanish graduate compete with a graduate from a German university, he argued? In his view, Spain was better off concentrating educational resources in training workers for service sector jobs in tourism, in which lay Spain's future. There would always be fellowships for exceptionally talented students to study abroad; Spain however could become the training hub for jobs in tourism and other service sector industries. Machiavellian and draconian as such a discourse may sound, it is clear that these are among the big issues at stake. Tellingly, Spanish University students concentrated their efforts not in challenging such a scenario but simply arguing the details.

There is among the Andalusian youth whom I met and befriended what I would call a crisis in commitment. While their sympathies lay clearly on the side of progressive movements and politics, they are deeply suspicious of those who take part in such movements and the demands that the movements make on them. This is because politics have become utterly discredited. This should not be surprising, given the plurality of negative and critical discourses which surround it: on the one hand is the critique of institutional politics promoted by the "disenchanted," which articulates with the empirical evidence of most political leaders who pursue power as an end in itself and the rampant corruption at all levels of government. On the other hand, there is the rhetoric of those in power who insist on portraying the left as embracing "millenarian," "authoritarian," and "prehistoric" attitudes and programs.

The following illustrative incident occurred during the general elections of 1994. It was a particularly warm afternoon, given that summer was still some time away, and my gang of friends had chosen to hang around the museum fountain to cool off. One of them pulled out of his pocket something that was bothering him, and it turned out to be a leaflet for a party known as Liberal Independent Group [*Grupo Independiente Liberal, GIL*]. This party was known to be a blatant attempt at self-promotion by the megalomaniac, millionaire mayor of Marbella, Ernesto Gil. The man was greatly despised and discredited because of his authoritarian and corrupt practices, but within his hometown he had, in the purest of tradition of *caciquismo*, managed to maintain significant support.

Once we became aware of the contents of the offending piece of paper, jokes began to circulate. "What a pest this guy is!" said Carlos, who had found the paper in his pocket. "He just sneaks up on you without you noticing!" "*Hasta en la sopa, tío* (You'll find him even in the soup)" said Dani. Jesús, who had recently begun to hang out with the group, commented that he had been offered

a job handing out propaganda for the party, but his sense of ethics had prevailed and he refused. This comment led to a moment of silence, until Manolo noted how Gil had no shame, naming his party so that its initials spelled out his last name: "There is no question about whom one is voting for, is there?" Carlos intervened once again saying that the same could be said about José Aznar, president of the Popular Party. The initials of the party are PP, and Pepe is the most common nickname for José. This led to another round of laughter. "Vote for *el Pepe*! Vote for *el Pepe*!" joked Pilar. Sancho, who had just walked up and joined the group, mentioned the similarities between Aznar and a popular cartoon character, *Martínez el Facha* (the fascist); to María la Larga, he resembled Franco himself, but somewhat skinnier. Yupi chimed in "But have you seen Anguita on TV? He's flipped out [*Que flipe tiene*]."

In retrospect, I notice that Yupi's comments about Anguita provided somewhat of a turning point. The conversation began to turn serious. Manolo, still joking, suggests: "There is not going to be work for us. Here we have to become *hipis* in order to survive." Puri, laughing, shouted: "*Ea, paraos* ³⁰ like the grandfathers." Some laughed, but María la Corta rebelled. "We can't stay *paraos*. We have to move, do something." Salvador, who had been quiet until this time, intervened. "The revolution that Anguita wants is not coming and its never going to happen." Rafi, coming out in María's defense, countered: "But if everyone chips in a little..." The mood of the group sobered a bit, and at that moment Paco took the stage. In a parodic rendition of self-righteous criticism, he pronounced: "[The trouble] is that we are all [a bunch of] indolent[s]." With this intervention, which elicited the loudest and rowdiest of laughs in the conversation, the mood lightened once again. But after a collective recovering of breath, Carlos asked an

³⁰ The reference to grandfathers reflects an awareness of how prevalent unemployment was just two generations ago.

open question: who were they thinking of voting for?. Dani, in a show of bravado, forcefully declared that he planned to crumple [*estrujar*] his vote. Sancho, drawing a thinly veiled parallel between Franco's and Felipe González's long tenures in office, joked that in Spain voting didn't matter, people only left power when they died. Jesús argued that politics wasn't all that bad, but politicians "reeked." María la Corta responded immediately, "well, tell me who you walk with and I'll tell you who you are...", that is, if politicians were awful and liked politics it must be because politics was also awful. Salvador commented on the dramatic change [*cambiao*] that Felipe González had undergone. He said he had a couple of pictures of *el Felipe* dating back to 1982, in which he looked like "a valiant revolutionary, and dressed in the latest of fashions," but now his pictures were taken in an office, wearing a "tacky" suit. Once again, every one laughed. Some one piped up "Aznar looks like a cretin" and Paco, once again in his sarcastic mockery of erudition and self-satisfaction, concluded: " [The problem] is that we are witnessing a social involution."

What caught my attention about this discussion was not only the vast array of opinions expressed, but how the group constantly wavered in its collective if tacit endorsement of one position or the other. This was particularly clear in the discussion about what solutions to take, as in the discussion about voting. The preoccupation with events at the state level is explicit, as is the connection between incompetent – and corrupt – political leadership and the limited economic expectations of the population, exemplified in Manolo's comments about the unavailability of work. I believe the dialogue illuminates how the root of these young people's political apathy, or perhaps more accurately, their trivialization of politics, lies in their sense that there are no solutions within the current political framework, but neither are there alternatives. When Manolo jokes "we'll have to become *hipis*" he is arguing that

in order to survive, people have no other choice than to start hustling, "*buscarse la vida*," find their livelihood as they say, in any way they can. The *hipi* as the ultimate hustler becomes the picaresque hero of yesteryear, both hated and admired for his cunning and resourcefulness. Indeed, the *hipi* is as much part of the "social involution" as the corrupt or inept politicians that Paco was referring to.

The connotations that the term *hipi* has for these youths might have already caught the attention of some readers. As I was able to observe, there is not much about world renunciation involved in their images of the *hipi*. The *hipi* was always "trying to get one over you," "peddle some piece of junk," or get you to give him money *por la cara*, just because of his pretty face. Indeed, the *hipis* were sometimes seen as blatantly aggressive, though clearly not as much as *punkis* or *skines*. skin heads. That could largely be due to the fact that the *hipis* they meet these days have aged, the love and peace turned a bit sour, and their economic activity is no longer novel, but indeed seen as too close to home.

This anecdote also illustrates another point I had made earlier, that my young friends, both spontaneously and purposefully, most clearly identified themselves as Andalusians when they spoke about unemployment. In Puri's statement "*Paraos como los abuelos*" lies a wealth of history and collective memory about the misery that has been the lot, in fact a defining reality, of many Andalusians. Another phenomena that was strongly associated with identity was language. One example of this was a slight altercation I had with Dani when I first began to spend time with the gang in el Juan. At first, I had quite a hard time making out the meaning of the words they used, and the particular intonation they cultivated often made matters worse. I had to constantly inquire about what was being said, and what was meant by it. Yupi, knowing I was a Spanish speaker and completely fluent in the language, got somewhat suspicious of my

difficulties, and one night responded to my question rather testily: "Start getting used to this, because we speak Andalusian here!" Shocked, I informed him that my problem was not with Andalusian pronunciation, but with youth slang! Caught by surprise, he laughed, excused himself saying that I was probably right, but that he often forgot that he didn't speak like everyone else. Manolo, who knew of my project, teased Yupi: "There you go, a nationalist!," which Yupi denied, laughing.

However, I also witnessed just the opposite reaction while at a state-wide feminist conference. While having lunch with some young friends, I noticed that the banner announcing the conference was covered from top to bottom with letters. This was because the title of the conference appeared written in five different languages: Spanish, Catalan, Basque, Galician, and Bable, spoken in the North. When I jokingly commented that we should all stand up and demand that a couple more bolts of fabric be added to the banner to accommodate the Andalusian and the Canary "languages," one of the young women I was with strongly disagreed. The proper Andalusian language, she claimed, was the "mozarab, the Arabian-Andalusian." This was the language that should be spoken in Andalusia, but it had been lost. What got called Andalusian today was nothing but a variant of "Castillian." I responded that the same could be said for Bable; for that matter, French, Catalan and Spanish were merely variants of Latin. At this point my interlocutor became somewhat defensive. Shrugging her shoulders, she said that she did not care about those things; those were debates for those who needed to "feel different." Andalusians were what they were in spite of their language.

The above discussion is marked by an intense ambivalence about identity and its markers. One can interpret the young woman's rejection of the idea of including Andalusian being a language as a refusal to demarcate herself as

"different" from the Spanish. She does claim that there once was a Andalusian language, but that could be understood as suggesting that its difference was now superseded. And yet, it seems more likely that difference was erased, silenced. Her specific knowledge of the terms used to refer to the language spoken in Andalusia during and shortly after Muslim rule, and her willingness to declare it "typical" or "native" to Andalusia makes me inclined to explain her reaction as the unconscious internalization of the discourse that would see Andalusia's claims to "difference" and its non-identity with Spain as tainted or in fact illegitimate. Strongest proof for this understanding I find in her claims that "Andalusians are Andalusians" despite any debates about their language, that is despite having lost what she believed was their "own" and proper language, and being reduced to speaking a variant of another.

This brings me to discuss the politics of gender among youth. I found that among young women, there was an unquestioned assumption about their equality with men. Differences in social position, economic opportunities and political participation were due to a social system that had discriminated against women to the men's benefit. However, they also assumed that "society," which included civil society and the government, had changed, and that discrimination was no longer systematic. When I would ask them about their male friends' attitudes towards them, a matter of much concern and constant complaint, they would point to the fact that the "family" had not changed, so that some individuals continued to have "retrograde" attitudes. I found this distinction quite interesting insofar as it paralleled rather nicely discourses I discussed in Chapter V, about the coming of democracy and the modernity of Spain. These young women assumed that the institutional, or perhaps more precisely the legal, changes of recent years had changed civil society, and any exceptions, of which there were many, were a matter of individual "time lag." There seemed to

be no recognition of the crucial role that the feminist movement in Spain had played during the 1970 and 80. Gender equality was just another feature of democracy.

Yet another example of young peoples' assumptions about social change and modernity is exemplified by another incident, this time involving Dani. I was sitting out in the steps of the Cathedral Mosque while Dani sold his whistles. We were joined by a friendly bus driver who worked for a tour company and was bringing tourists to Córdoba. As the three of us sat down making jokes about tourists, two priests walked by talking about their plans to go to the Pilgrimage of el Rocío, a religious devotion to the Virgin Mary which has acquired enormous religious and to some extent nationalistic significance since the late 1970's.³⁰ Dani's reaction was immediate. "El Rocío is asinine [*es una gilipollez*]; it's disgusting, tía!" If the priests heard anything, they thought better of commenting, and continued on their way, ignoring our group. I was so astounded by this unexpected and robust reaction that I found myself coming to the defense of the celebration, arguing that although I had never been present myself, everything I had heard so far made it sound like a lot of fun. But Dani did not relent in his criticism: "They are destroying the *marisma*³¹, tía! They leave garbage everywhere, and on top of everything, every year a bigger group of people shows up, stepping over everything as if they owned the place. They leave the whole area in shambles. And to top it off, they pretend that they are very religious, but then end up getting skunk drunk with wine... It's just that they are such hypocrites!" The bus driver from Madrid had other reasons to dismiss the event: "Those are rituals, nationalist stuff." Dani looked at him for a

³¹The shrine of el Rocío is located in a wetland area that has recently acquired notoriety for its ecological importance to the region. Moreno (1986) has also pointed to its mythical significance, dating to pre-roman times. Indeed, although the devotion is supposed to date to the 10th century when the statue was found in the marshes, it is thought to be tied to a broader phenomena of Mediterranean fertility cults.

moment with a questioning glance, but decided to ignore the comment. He concluded by saying to me: "You want to go to el Rocío because of your work and stuff, then go when there's nobody there.³² Its a beautiful place, and even the shrine is supposed to be kind of nice. But don't go to the pilgrimage."

There are several issues that this event highlights. On the one hand, it is interesting that the mention of nationalism came from the person from Madrid, not from Dani. And from Dani's reaction to the event, I would argue that he did not associate it with nationalism at all. For Dani, it was a matter of religious tradition, which he associated with hypocrisy. In fact, Dani's favorite description for anybody associated with the Church, be they priest, nun or lay person, was that they were drunkards and -- perhaps therefore -- hypocrites. It was precisely for this reason that he had earlier discredited Holy Week celebrations. Dani was of course mistaken in assuming that revelry was anathema to a religious celebration. However, he was operating from the models imposed during the dictatorship, which he either experienced or drew from popular stereotypes. In this anti-religious discourse -- which went beyond anti-clericalism -- he was unwittingly supporting the church's leaders' understanding of proper religious practice.

Dani was not alone in his rejection of religion. Overwhelmingly, most surveys about youth religiosity demonstrate that youth participation in religion is below 40%, and decreasing (FOESA 1992). This follows from the general crisis in commitment I have been discussing. However, his opinions about popular religious celebrations were minoritarian. Just as attendance at mass continues to

³² Dani *knew* that my work involved speaking to people. In fact, I was often teased by them about how I had it made, how they should have had anthropology as a topic in high school and then they would all have gone to college. However, others were sophisticated enough to bring up the issue of "privacy," representation and friendship. They questioned my ability to be able to separate personal exchanges from academic discussions. Thus I find this lapse reflective of his own ideological approach to nature and to politics.

decrease, participation in popular religious festivities has increased significantly. One specific instance in which this has become obvious is in the Holy Week celebrations. While it is certain that an increase in the numbers and the elaborate nature of the celebrations responds to governmental and institutional promotion intended to increase tourism, it is also true that Andalusians themselves have become to identify these celebrations as cornerstones of their "culture and traditions." (Maddox 1994) However, contrary to the arguments of anthropologists such as Mitchell (1990), these celebrations, as most other manifestations of popular religiosity in Andalusia, have had a marked secular and even political tenor. With their growth in popularity, and their mainstreaming as recognized and celebrated markers of identity, much of their oppositional content has been toned down. This can also be tied to the dynamics of nationalism, which tends to homogenize difference in its attempts to define the nation. In any case, while people in Córdoba remember that in the 1970's brotherhoods had to pay porters to carry their statutes through the Holy Week celebrations, today young men not only sign up voluntarily to carry these statues, they pay for what has become the privilege of carrying them.

Laboring on the spaces and identities of youths at leisure: some final thoughts

I have attempted to offer a picture – more of a snapshot really – of how young people in Córdoba have interpreted and acted upon the reality that shaped their everyday lives. I found that the ways young people used space to define boundaries of friendship and to create identities for themselves and others offered a running commentary on their values, their life expectations, their views on work and even their class identities. I discussed how these definitions of friendship, space, and identity were shaped by an implicit debate about the proper relations between work and leisure. These definitions were not always

fixed or precise, but they helped locate a person or group within a broader constellation of hierarchical relations. How young people went about creating friendships, using public spaces, being at leisure, looking for work, and cultivating specific tastes and styles all pointed to the limits of their acceptance of prevailing definitions of reality in Spanish society. These practices also highlighted the ways in which young people challenged and conceived of alternatives to the limits of this reality, socially defined, imposed on their everyday practices and their expectations for the future. In other words, I argued that although the various aspects of youth culture I discussed might appear to be superficial and restricted to issues of "lifestyle" or "pure aesthetics," they reflect instead an incipient critique of the political, social and economic situation of Spanish society. I hope my arguments have served to undermine stereotypes while enriching the general understanding of youth culture in Spain.

VII. Memory as the performance of everyday life: conversions to Islam in Andalusia

"The most incomprehensible stranger is the *garib*¹ that inhabits within us, buried in the innermost recesses of our being. Everything else ceases to be enigmatic when compared to this strangeness."

—Fatima Mernissi, *El Miedo a la modernidad*

In writing the master narrative of modernity, scholars such as Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim foresaw a society where rationality would determine production and social organization as well as individual thought and actions. While at pains to classify the horrors of the two world wars and the subsequent threat of nuclear Armageddon as rational, many social scientists have argued that there has been a steady decline in the significance of organized religion and of religious belief in the everyday life of people in industrialized societies. This process of secularization, and the theories that emerged to explain it, became measure and proof of modernity, and as such this theory became promoted. In the words of Ernest Gellner, while scholars might disagree about "the extent, homogeneity, or irreversibility of this trend... it would seem *reasonable* to say that it [secularization] is *real* ." The "one *very real*, dramatic and conspicuous exception to this" is Islam (Gellner 1992: 9; emphasis added).

It is interesting to note that at the same time that theories of secularization were being perfected by scholars such as Luckmann (1967) and Bellah (1972), religious institutions and beliefs were mobilizing significant

¹Mernissi (1992) offers a fascinating reflection on the dual meanings of the Arabic word *garib* , which can mean both foreigner, "stranger" and "the West."

segments of society, as was the case with the Civil Rights movements in the United States (Turner 1969). Indeed, by the early 1970s several books had been published concerning themselves precisely with what appeared to be a religious revival, that included not only institutional religions but also a more diffuse interest in so called "new" religions: eastern philosophies and turn of the century occultist practices (see Berger 1970; Tiryakian 1971). What began as a trickle turned into a tidal wave from the late 1970s onwards (Bellah 1978). Scholars within history and the social sciences became increasingly concerned with what has been called the "worldwide religious resurgence," the growing importance of religion in everyday life and particularly within the public spheres, including but not limited to that of politics (see Robbins 1988 for an excellent and thorough review of the literature to that date; see also Casanova 1994; Sacks 1991; Wuthnow 1992, 1994). Implicitly or explicitly, the studies were driven by an attempt to understand a phenomenon that seemed to offer a devastating blow not only to theories of secularization but to the very foundations of modernity (Bellah 1976).

In spite of the complexity of the phenomena, and indeed the controversies that surrounded its interpretation, studies can be grouped roughly into two separate concerns. On the one hand were those scholars who focused on revivals within the major world religious traditions, such as the Evangelical movement within Protestantism and the new Islamic movements. These were studied under the rubric of fundamentalism. There was also considerable attention given to Liberation Theology, although not always acknowledging its connections to the broader religious revival. This literature tended to highlight the politicization of religious discourse, often portrayed as an encroachment and a threat to the well being of civil society (Casanova 1994). On the other hand, there was an astonishing proliferation of literature on so-

called "new religious movements," or NRM's. Secularist and Judeo-Christian biases, combined with a focus on groups with strong totalitarian tendencies, contributed to emphasize the disfunctionality and pathology of the groups and those who belonged to them. Furthermore, much was made of the fact that in their asceticism and world renouncing tendencies, they did not contradict but rather support theories about the privatization of religion. Debates about modernity and postmodernism have also been brought to bear in explanations and interpretations of this phenomena. (Robbins 1988; Turner 1994)

In this chapter I continue to focus on a religious phenomenon that defies the neat distinction between public and private religions as made by Jorge Casanova (1992, 1994). I am referring to the movement of conversions to Islam, which I began to discuss in Chapter V. These groups exist in spite of conflict with local and state officials, who are often openly hostile to their activities, and anti-Arab and anti-Islamic sentiments being expressed by the Spanish population as a whole. The converts "treason," as Juan Goytisolo might put it, does not lie in their insistence on the historical connections between Andalusia and North Africa. Local governments, and even the Spanish state have been known to claim such connections to promote tourism but also to stake out spheres of influence and further Spain's position within Europe and the world. Their problematic status lies in their claiming that there are still current vital connections -- at the level of collective memory, imaginary and everyday practice -- constantly being produced and reproduced through thoroughly modern processes, and that these connections at times supersede commonalities with Europe, and with northern Spain as part of it. By focusing on how the converts put into action their understandings of history, religion and race in the definition of Andalusian, Spanish, Mediterranean and wider European

identities, I hope to illuminate the ways that memory works both to reinforce and to contradict hegemonic notions about identity and modernity.

The analytical problem presented in this chapter is similar to the work of Bowen (1993), in that I focus on how everyday practices get "couched" in Islamic terms, though my interest is in exploring how such discourse is used to legitimize such practices and beliefs. Thus, I am interested both in "the overall cultural style" and in the "din" that emerges from these practices. The chapter is divided into several parts. The first section discusses the impetus and interest behind the embracing of an Islamic faith and identity. I argue that converts had very different understandings of the process whereby they acquired not only the Islamic faith but also identity. On the one hand were those whose experience resembled most closely what the literature has called "conversion;" on the other, those who reject such a categorization off hand, arguing that theirs was a recognition or an acceptance of a reality that was already (and for some, not only already but always) there. What I choose to call "narratives of recognition" generally make a greater and more explicit argument regarding the political implications of transcendence. By this I do not mean to imply that those who narrate their identification with Islam using the conversion formula are necessarily de-politicized or apolitical, but rather that their discourse is more deeply cloaked with references to actions, moods and motivations more commonly associated with the so-called "private sphere." I will argue that references to issues considered a matter of personal choice, even of individual freedom, are not innocent – that they in fact disguise, to outsiders and to themselves, the political implications of their understandings and actions. This manipulation of the "public/private" divide as part of a larger critique of modernity and liberal politics points not only to the limits of such dualistic classificatory schemes, but also to the converts' implicit and explicit challenges

to the grounds on which the democratic Spanish state, and more broadly, contemporary capitalist societies, seeks legitimation. I will also deal with variations in such narratives along gender lines, which, although subtle, are important in understanding the intricate complexities of the conversion process as a production of identity.

The section that follows presents three different types of communities that converts formed. It is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis or exhaustive typology of all types of Islamic communities that exist in Andalusia today, but rather an impressionistic presentation of the diversity of forms that the communities of converts can take. I will offer a brief discussion of the Yama'a communities of Córdoba and Almería, and compare these to a community of Sufis in Quéntar, a small town in the outskirts of Granada. This section discusses how converts' search for coherence between their public and private life is manifested in the communities they create. Despite the fact that the search for coherence is "usually grounded in a connection to the past, the meaning abstracted from that past," coherence by necessity also requires "an ethic workable for the future" (Fischer 1986: 196). For this reason, we shall see how these communities function not only as religious, but also social and economic units. This leads into a discussion of how gender and sexuality shape the experience of converts within these different communities. I will present how converts negotiated within and outside their communities European stereotypes and biases about Islam as I explore the degree that Islam constituted a radical reshaping of these people's expectations, but also how in fact religious discourse is used to legitimate practices, moods and motivations that predated conversion.

The fourth section contains a discussion of the ways in which arguments about collective memory and history are used to legitimize the conversion

experience, and the ways in which, without being made explicit, assumptions are made about the special, perhaps primordial relation between Islam and Andalusia. The importance of memory in claiming and shaping identity will then be followed with respect to debates about the proper Islamic understanding regarding gender relations and sexuality, which are constantly debated within the community. I conclude with a brief discussion about the implications of this embracing of Islamic identity in a context when Europeanness and modernity are increasingly powerful social axes.

Becoming or recognizing one's being: narratives of new Muslims

I found that most people, when hearing I was doing research on Spanish Muslims, assumed that I was doing a historical analysis. When I indicated that I was actually interested in 20th Century conversions, I was often confronted with utter disbelief. "But just how many people are we talking about here?" I believed what seemed incredible, and somewhat unsettling, was not just the idea of a modern day "westerner" embracing a religion so commonly associated with intolerance, fanaticism, and thus frequently reviled in public opinion. What was particularly disconcerting was that a Spaniard would do so. Outside Spain, some academics seemed more attuned to the potential political implications of such an act, and explicitly made reference to how such conversion seemed to challenge the fundamental assumptions of the Franco Regime and its ideology of National Catholicism.²

Indeed, I found that converts, particularly those in their late thirties and older, were no strangers to political action. Although in retrospect some were critical of their motivations, most converts had been acutely aware of the

² This "perceptiveness" could be based on stereotyped ideas about the role of Catholicism in Spain that contemporary Spaniards do not experience as their reality.

"spectacular" character of their actions and believed them to be a "valid" – that is, effective and/or expedient – form of social commentary and protest. The new Muslims' acute awareness and constant reference to social, political and economic issues led French authors Lizbeth Rocher and Fatima Cheraqui (1986) to dismiss these "conversions" on the grounds that they were "politically motivated." However, not many writers share these authors' preoccupation with the "contamination" of religious practice by secular or even utilitarian motivations. Moreno Navarro (1983, 1985) argues explicitly that popular religiosity is intimately connected with political action, in that religious language often offers a cloak of respectability to social and political protest. This is also the case in the American literature on new religious movements, where there is often mention of the political trajectories of converts and recruits prior to their involvement with sects and cults, and ample recognition of the role that prior political activity plays in the embracing of faith (see Robbins 1988). However, most authors portray the moment of conversion as a process of "depoliticization" (Casanova 1992, 1994; Robbins 1988).³ As we saw in Chapter V, this view is also shared by many Spaniards, activists and academics alike.

Opportunistic ideologues or deluded mystics? Both representations greatly simplify what are complex and, yes, often contradictory discursive practices. And nowhere is this complexity more obvious than in the new Muslims' narrations of how they came to redefine their life and worldview in accordance to their interpretation of Islam. While the emphasis varied from story to story, in all their accounts I found that spirituality, faith, commitment

³Robbins (1988) sees this bias, as expressed in the American literature, as related to the context in which the first such new religious movements were studied – the Bay Area in the 1970's (Bellah 1976). See also Danforth (1989) for a very cogent discussion about the specific countercultural themes which many of these new religions elaborate upon.

and community, as well as social and cultural concerns were woven together, although not always seamlessly or coherently. In fact, I came to suspect that the emphasis was also determined by the narrative form chosen to formulate the experience, even if the choice of form was also a conscious decision.

On the one hand there were converts who chose to emphasize mysticism and individual spiritual cultivation, or, alternatively, chose to de-emphasize the earthly dimensions of their religious practice. These converts most often described the process of becoming Islamic according to a conversion "formula:" a dramatic, life transforming event that created a permanent divide between life before and after "conversion." These new Muslims experienced the moment of "conversion" as a rite of passage or an epiphany more often than not predetermined by the will of the transcendent deity (Robbins 1988, Cucchiari 1986). A typical example of this rhetoric was used by a convert whom I shall call Uthman.⁴ He was born in Northern Spain, who had converted to Islam sometime in the early 1980's. Sometime before his conversion, Uthman had decided to leave his native city and "turn to the south," looking for "less civilized lands." After some wandering, he arrived in Granada. At the time, the city was buzzing with news about the newly arrived converts. Wild rumors were constantly being spread, and each seemed to outdo the next. First it was Saudi monetary incentives for conversions, then it was imported wives who soon were said to be housed in large harems, and eventually talk of Libyan infiltrators and Iranian spy networks.⁵ In spite all the absurdity surrounding the community, he recalls being continuously and mysteriously compelled to

⁴ While most converts I interviewed did not seem concerned with being mentioned by name in the dissertation, some converts were visibly uncomfortable, or explicitly asked for their names not to be used. In most instances, I have just elided their names; however, in others, I have used pseudonyms for sake of clarity. I will make note of such instances.

⁵ See Rocher and Cheraqui (1988) for a more detailed discussion of the press reception of the new Muslims in Granada.

seek the converts out. But he resisted. He then told of beginning to have a recurrent dream which inevitably ended with him facing a white wall. He remembered being puzzled and somewhat disturbed by it, but attempted to ignore it. However, one day, while walking through the Albaicín and taking a route he had taken many times before, he said he lost his way and found himself facing what seemed to be the white wall that kept appearing as part of his dream. Feeling somewhat dazed and confused, he sat at the edge of the wall to gather his thoughts. It was there, he said, that an acquaintance who he had met some months before but whom he had not seen since found him. Uthman remembers the man listening carefully as he told his story. The man suggested that Uthman visit someone whom people described as an expert on such dreams. The following Wednesday, Uthman reported meeting the man at what turned out to be a Sufi gathering. Uthman remembers feeling alarmed at first, but becoming calmer as he realized that the converts were not the deadbeats [*estrafalarios*] everyone seemed to describe. There he was introduced to Sheik Abdelkadder, who was told of his concerns. The Sheik instructed him to write down his dream, and to remain for the prayer meeting. In the midst of the chanting, he had a vision involving parts of his dream. It was at this point that he became convinced that this was a Sufi saint who was calling him, and he converted shortly after. Uthman gave as further evidence of divine intervention that the acquaintance who found him that day left Granada shortly after and no one has ever heard of him again. (Uthman has since left the Morabitum and joined another Sufi order.)

Uthman seemed to find his life prior to his arrival in Granada to be largely irrelevant to his decision to become Muslim. When explicitly asked about his prior political and religious life, his response was a dismissive "oh, typical [*lo típico*]. Anti-dictatorship activity [*movida anti-franquista*], some third

world solidarity stuff, you know, like everybody else." He believed this activity led him to become "an atheist, a rabid anticlerical." Now he claimed to realize that all that was the center of his life for quite some time was nothing but "mirages, shadows that cloud your soul and alienate you from the real work to be done, that is, serving and loving Allah." As he described this activity, however, it became clear that part and parcel of serving and loving Allah in a world run according to heathen rules must of course involve opposition to cultural, economic and, yes, political trends. New Muslims are often highly critical of western economies, even though they are not adverse to trading and profit making. Many have a very elaborate argument against the use of paper money and against banking institutions, which has led them to mint their own coins out of gold bullion, and use them as currency. In the Albaicín, this is the currency of choice amongst most new Muslim businessmen, as well as among their North African colleagues. While they were open in this practice, and there is reason to believe the authorities were aware of the situation, no steps were taken to put an end to it, although it could be construed as a violation of State law. Uthman refused to consider this act as political, because, by definition, politics were secular, and his actions were sacred, were in the name of Allah. Thus we can see how political activity becomes cloaked, and some would argue limited, by the purpose which it must serve.

But for some other new Muslims, the road to Islam was not tied to politics, not even to politics whose purpose was sacred. Such was the case of Musa,⁶ also born outside Andalusia and an early recruit to Sheik Abdelkadder's community. (He, too, left the community after some years.) Musa came from a very wealthy family, and was brought up as a strict Catholic, and educated in Catholic Schools. While still in his early years of college, he felt compelled to

⁶A pseudonym

renounce all this privilege. He left college and his family to find himself, not through organized or activist politics but through religious exploration. During this time, he met his wife, Rashida,⁷ who had dropped out of high school. Together they began to travel through Spain, and reached Granada. He had immersed himself completely in the Spanish counterculture, and had begun to read voraciously about eastern philosophies and experiment with diverse religious practices. (Even in 1993, his countercultural aesthetics conspicuously dated him.) A friend told him about the new Muslims and their community, and Musa became immensely curious. He arranged to visit the mosque, and once there, began to meditate. Suddenly, he reported seeing a brilliant ray of light, and experiencing such peace and joy that he became completely overwhelmed. Recovering from the experience, he immediately asked to be accepted as a Muslim in the community, to which the members agreed, and thus he converted.

After hearing Musa's story, I turned to his wife and asked her about her process of conversion. Smiling mischievously, she reported no such earth shattering experience. To her, it was a slow process of learning, accepting and believing in this way of life as a truly enlightened one. While today she has no qualms about conversion, and finds deep inspiration and support in Islamic doctrine, law and practice, she admits that had her partner not converted, she probably would not have "found the righteous path." This was also the case for another couple, with whom I became very close friends. Al-Hakam, from Córdoba, and Farah, from a Castilian town close to the Andalusian border, had met and fallen in love as university students in Granada. Both were studying philosophy at the time, and had come in contact with the new Muslims there. However, neither of them took the conversions seriously at the time; they

⁷A pseudonym

believed the converts were hippies, dilettantes from the North who had come to Andalusia seeking primitivism and exoticism. Yet, upon returning to Córdoba without finishing his philosophy degree, Al-Hakem met Medina, who was just setting up the Córdoba community. He became enthralled by what he learned from Medina, and began to read extensively on the history and culture of Andalusia. He became a regular visitor to the Yama'a and shortly thereafter decided he wished to convert. By this time Farah had returned to stay with her family at her home town, though both were frequently in touch. Shortly after his conversion, Al-Hakem was offered a scholarship to study Arabic in Jordan. He asked Farah to come along with him, and while deeply ambivalent, she agreed. She also agreed to convert in order to receive a scholarship. Before leaving for Jordan, they were married in a Muslim ceremony.

They spent over two years in Jordan. Farah remembers this time with mixed feelings. Both excelled in their studies, but were under severe financial hardship, which only aggravated the tensions the couple was experiencing. That they were Western converts living in a Muslim country, even if Amman was in many ways quite cosmopolitan, only complicated matters. Both recall feeling continuously scrutinized by Jordanians and other Muslims, but this scrutiny affected each in drastically different ways. Al-Hakem immersed himself in local culture and custom. As his devotion and commitment to Islam grew and strengthened, so did his demands on his new wife, expecting her to dress and behave more according to the mores he saw around him. Farah, while modifying her dress code so as to avoid offending local sensitivities, nevertheless remained highly critical of many of the structural inequalities of Jordanian society, and refused to accept her husband's attempt to legitimate them as "Islamic." Her friends were mostly other cosmopolitan, european-educated Muslims, or foreigners living in Jordan. Another serious strain was

created by fact that the couple had to leave behind their son who was barely a year old at the time, because of the child's poor health and the financial hardship his presence represented. He was in the very good hands of Farah's family, but she missed him terribly, and often felt remorse at having left him behind. However, when all was said and done, Farah concluded she had loved much about Jordan and its people, and became increasingly fascinated with Arabic as a language.

Upon return to Spain, both Farah and her husband settled in Córdoba with their child, and began working as Arabic instructors in the Yama'a. Life in Córdoba also had its share of conflicts and dilemmas. Money continued to be tight, particularly with a child, and relationships with Al-Hakem's family, somewhat strained, were taking a long time to heal. Furthermore, Farah found herself with very few female friends, as very few women became involved in the everyday workings of the *comunidad*. And yet she, as had Rashida, also drew inspiration from the Islamic faith. This became clear during her attempt to obtain a teaching position at the high school level. In Spain, the hiring for most government jobs takes place through an open contest known as *oposiciones*, roughly equivalent to the civil service examination in the United States, which includes, among other things, a written test and/or an oral presentation. The presentation is judged by a tribunal. While postulants are given a list of possible subjects from which to prepare, the specific topic is assigned through a lottery system, and revealed only an hour before facing the tribunal. Farah did not expect to win a slot that year, but since obtaining a high score counted favorably in your records and was crucial to improving your competitiveness in later years, she decided to take the examination anyway.

After months of preparation and agonizing, finally came the day of her presentation. The public was allowed, so I went to offer moral support. I

entered and found her ready to address the tribunal. Turning toward a blackboard to write down the outline of what she was going to cover, she strained to reach the very top. I realized, in shock and, I must admit, concern, that she was writing, in Arabic, "there is no other god but Allah, and Mohammed is his messenger." The thought that one of the judges might take offense crossed my mind. My fear seemed to become reality when a stern-faced judge asked for a translation. She translated the phrase, adding that all Muslims, before commencing any task, must first commend themselves to Allah. The response surprised all, and the judge actually smiled. The presentation proceeded quite well, and she earned a respectable score.

Thus, while Farah's relationship with Islam was ridden with conflict, and she was highly critical at times, in her moment of greatest need she turned to Islam for comfort and hope. This situation is indeed common for many new Muslim women, although it is by no means the norm. As I discussed in Chapter V, there were quite a few women I came in contact with who became Muslim independently from partners or lovers. Furthermore, new Muslim women frequently referred to the rewards they found as Muslims, offering very concrete examples. Many cited, as did their male counterparts, an intensive cultivation of spirituality. This was particularly the case for those women in communities that followed Sufi teachings – where women had a strong and at times even majoritarian presence – and learned the various techniques for communicating with the transcendent being. Such was the case with Habiba. A widower with grown children but still raising the youngest, who had worked for over 12 years as a midwife, she was a well respected member of her community and enjoyed perhaps the highest status among women in that group. While certainly her profession, her age (late 40s), her financial independence and her widowhood were obviously important to her standing

within the community, what people seemed to comment on most was her intense thirst for religious knowledge and her intense spirituality. It was her thirst for a closer and more profound relation with the transcendent being that attracted her to Islam in the first place. She found the works of Sufi scholars the most inspiring. By the time I met her, she told me not being able to remember ever not being Muslim.

Indeed, for significant numbers of new Muslims, the concept of "conversion" seemed wholly inadequate to explain their process of becoming Islamic. Theirs were what I have called "narratives of recognition and acceptance," that is, a process of slow learning and exposure that leads to understanding and a final conviction about the truthfulness and divine inspiration of the Islamic doctrine. These men were invested in making broader claims about history, memory and identity; in Abderahman Medina's words, their "trajectory towards Islam" was guided by research and knowledge of the "sociological, political, economic, human and transcendent dimensions of Islam." For such new Muslims, "recognition" was the culmination of a life trajectory, not a rebirth. Conversion was after all the final step in a nationalist political trajectory driven by the interest, which some of them described as an "obsession," with the cultural history of their homeland, Andalusia. The predetermination of such interest, if any was discussed or acknowledged, could be described as "historical" and "cultural" but understood in a nationalistic sense, that is, as essences tied to the land and embodied in people, places and objects.

Such was the case of Ahmed. He began the interview by clarifying that his process of becoming Muslim was not a religious experience. Ahmed saw his trajectory towards Islam as starting from very early on in his life.

"There were many factors that predisposed me. For example, here, in Almeria. First, there was the name of the city, which is Arabic. Then, at least when I was growing up, the tallest building was the Alcazaba [a moorish fortification], which could be seen from any point in the city, before all these new buildings were built. The first thing you would see in the morning was the Alcazaba. It was a strong, intense presence, you could not avoid it. There was also my family that although from different political tendencies all were Republicans and thus I learned from very young that the authority claimed by the State and the Church is illegitimate. That in spite of being educated by priests. Of course, since there was no religious life behind their façade, they did not inspire me to question my thoughts. Then it was also the case that my family was anticlerical. Though my aunt who raised me prayed the rosary everyday, she never, absolutely ever took communion. She also believed that if she said the word "priest" [*cura*] with an empty stomach it would bring back luck, and she was quite fond of making jokes, really bad, raunchy ones, about priests. *Now I look back and I see those are things typical of new Christians* [emphasis added].

Thus, religion was not taken seriously at my home. However, I remember always having curiosity about religion. I remember reading in the Encyclopedia Alvarez, the encyclopedia of choice back then, a thick book containing everything from mathematics to history and religion, I remember reading about Islam. It said that Mohammed was a crazy man, that he used to have epileptic seizures or something like that, and that he

believed an angel appeared to him and he began to preach to these savage tribes in the desert and conquered an empire. The next entry was about Al-Andalus, and included the Mosque in Córdoba, the Alhambra of Granada, Abderahman III, Almanzor,⁸ Averroes ⁹ ... I began to think that if all these people who were so smart were fooled – because I didn't question that Mohammed was crazy, I mean, the book said so – how can I be certain that the priests and other Christians weren't mistaken too? After, angels also appeared to Joseph. They were pretty busy back then, it seems."

As a teenager, Ahmed began to read about other religions, such as Buddhism, but everyone seemed to require suspending disbelief. This was not the case with Islam, he claimed. In the early 70's he enrolled in the University of Barcelona (shortly before Franco's death), and under the dual influences of Marxism and emigration, his early attraction for Andalusia became politicized. It was during this period that he first recalls considering himself a Muslim, although he had not made it public yet. He began taking Arabic lessons -- available at all major universities as part of the requirements for a Degree in Spanish literature -- and was reading the Koran intently. He believed to have found in Islam a much more coherent and plausible story than that which the Christian doctrine provides.

In the late 1970s he came to the United States to pursue a career in education. Here he encountered the Black Muslims, who offered yet another source of inspiration. "The history of the Blacks in the United States seemed to parallel that of the Andalusians in Spain, [each confronted by a] genocidal

⁸Rulers of Al-Andalus.

⁹Muslim philosopher.

attempt to completely erase their historical memory as a people. The desire to reconnect with that past, of recovering an identity, that is your own identity and not that which other people ascribe to you, that also drove me." However, he was still a Muslim only in name, for he did not comply with Muslim law. He did not go to Friday prayer nor did he pray in his home and he drank alcohol and ate pork regularly, as any other Andalusian would. It was the attack on Libya, which took place while he was serving as a volunteer in the Polisario refugee camps in the Sahara, that led him to fully embrace Islam publicly and privately. This was not an easy step, for many of his friends were appalled by his choice. "Those are things of third world moors, followers of the Ayatollah" he reported being told constantly. He became one of the founding members of the Yama'a community in Almeria, and eventually many of his friends learned to respect his choice. One of his friends went so far as to convert along with his entire family.

For many young converts, nationalism came *after* joining the Yama'a. Such was the case with Almansur, one of the youngest members of the Córdoba group, who claimed that through Islam he had become an Andalusian nationalist. He came into contact with the group while he was still in college, finishing his degree in Agronomy, but did not convert until two years later, after unsuccessfully looking for a employment. At first the group provided him moral support and a sympathetic forum for discussing his plight. Not much later he came to believe in the truth of their way of life. Within a few months of his conversion he accepted a scholarship to study Islamic law and Arabic in Kuwait, and was hoping to return to continue his studies after the Gulf conflict was settled. Even though he was training to become an imam, when he "gave testimony" of his faith, his arguments were primarily historical and political, and only secondarily religious. To him, Christianity was the religion of the

oppressor. The Castellians and other Spaniards of the north had acted savagely against Andalusians, and continued to do so today. What was worse, Christianity itself had become another source of oppression. This is why he had converted, and become actively involved in nationalist politics. When I asked if there were any contradictions in working for the creation of a "kingdom of this earth" he responded that there were none. By joining the fight for a free Andalusia he was also fighting for the liberation of Islam in Spain, the first step towards its spread in Europe. And yet, he did not believe it was necessary to live under an Islamic state in order to live a fully Islamic life. In fact, most new Muslims rejected overwhelmingly such idea. For most, they were part of a broader project: either returning Islam to Andalusia or aiding in the spread of Islam throughout the world. We will discuss these different understandings of Islam later in the chapter. Now I turn to describe the different forms of community that the various groups of new Muslim prescribed and practiced.

Communities and communes: models for Islamic sociality

As I discussed in Chapter V, the first communities began to appear in the early 1980's in the cities of Córdoba and Granada, and during the first half of the decade they grew and spread throughout the region. After a period of decline in the early 1990's, the situation seems to have stabilized. Today, although estimates vary widely¹⁰ there seem to be close to 2,000 Spanish

¹⁰ Census figures are notoriously unreliable, because under the category of "Spanish-born Muslim" [*musulmanes españoles*] are included the Muslim inhabitants of the Spanish cities in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla. Furthermore, many converts do not recognize the authority of the State and are not interested in figuring among its subjects. Of the few authors who have written on the subject, Rocher and Cheraqui (1987) offer figures for other areas in Europe which seem largely exaggerated; however, their figure for Spain, 2,000 is actually slightly under that offered by the converts, who across the board tend to agree upon a figure of 3,000 for

Muslims in the region, with the numbers growing primarily not through recruitment but by birth: an increasing number of converts have started families and are raising Muslim children.

At the time of my research, the communities varied enormously in size, organization and religious orientation. Participants tended to organize in small groups, under the guidance of a self proclaimed leader cum-religious expert. These leadership styles varied from the model of a Sufi "teacher" to that of a Sunni or Shiite imam. However, their "official" religious affiliation notwithstanding, it was obvious that their beliefs were quite heterodox. Some were exclusive, but most interacted more or less freely with each other and with society at large. They were active participants in the economy of the localities in which they had chosen to live, usually through small businesses such as coffee shops and bookstores, or as skilled artisans and craftsmen. Others earned a living as professionals, in occupations as varied as medicine, law, architecture and academia.

I became most familiar with the Muslim group known as the Yama'a Islamica del Al-Andalus. The Yama'a had communities in Córdoba, Seville, Jerez, Málaga and Almería, and also in Murcia. The pattern of community formation seemed pretty homogeneous. As I briefly suggested in Chapter V, a group of people, either old friends or recent acquaintances, drawn together by their mutual interest in the history and culture of Andalusia, would at some stage come in contact or be told of the work of Abderahman Medina. Upon meeting him, they would establish a relationship in which Medina would begin imparting his ideas about the history and culture of Andalusia, as well as

Andalusia, and double that number for all of the Spanish State. Sanchez and Urbina (1987) offer a figure of 10,000 for Granada alone, which I assume must be a typographical error. I feel more comfortable with a figure of about 2,000 converts to Islam in Andalusia, the majority of which would be Andalusians, although there are also a significant number of other Spaniards and foreigners.

encouraging them to help organize public events that would serve as a forum for the promotion of these ideas. The embracing of the Islamic "faith" would take place significantly later, often up to four or five years after the initial contact. Medina strongly believed that embracing Islam was a matter of "recognizing" the true self of Andalusians. Since it was impossible to recognize what was not known, the historical, cultural and political education had to precede this moment.

I first came in contact with the Yama'a, and the Andalusian Muslim movements, outside the Cathedral/Mosque in Córdoba. Members of the Yama'a were leafleting tourists and passerbys about the deplorable conditions of the building. (They were not exaggerating by any means. Centuries of neglect have left the building with serious structural damage, and today repairs tend to become embroiled in struggles between Church and State over jurisdiction and financing.) Upon approaching the table, I was barraged with information about how the Church's purposeful and callous neglect of what they described as a "magnificent example of architectonic achievement, of universal value to humankind," was ample demonstration of its continued intolerance and "inquisitorial" behavior toward the Muslim legacy, and that this situation was threatening the very existence of the monument. The Spanish state, which they viewed as deeply embroiled and complicit with the Church's activities, could be not trusted either. Thus, to ensure the adequate repairs and maintenance the edifice required, it should be declared a "Patrimony of Humanity" and its administration left to the United Nation's agency, UNESCO.

My interest in their critiques and positions led to a lengthy discussion, which I was invited to continue at what they called *el cafetín* or *la comunidad*, namely the group's headquarters. They were located in a two story old house on a narrow side street of the historic center, just a couple of blocks away from

the cathedral/mosque. As one entered the old house, through old, thick wooden doors and a beautiful wrought iron gate, one faced a patio which divided the house into two sections. To the right were classrooms -- were both Arabic and Spanish were taught -- and offices. Above this area were a mosque, a large meeting place and a temporary dormitory for both members and visitors from outside Córdoba. Called *la comunidad*, this was the nerve center not only for the Córdoba community, but for all other Yama'a communities through out Andalusia. On the ground floor to the left was a cafe, specializing in vitamin enriched drinks and North African and Middle Eastern foods. This was known as *el cafetín*. Although there were no doors or gates barring passage, visitors to *el cafetín* were kept away from *la comunidad*, if by chance or mistake they might begin to wander in that direction. Indeed, there was limited interaction between the converts and the tea house patrons.

Upon arrival, I was invited to sit in the patio, and enjoined to drink some Moroccan mint tea. There I was introduced to several converts, men in their mid thirties to late forties. They seemed very excited about my project of studying Andalusian nationalism, and immediately launched into an animated lecture about the Islamic roots of Andalusian culture. When I returned the next day, I met a group of 6 or 7 people, none of them any older than 21, who had converted to Islam. In the following days I would get to know some of them and talk to them more. I was also introduced to the two young men who ran the tea house, Almansur and Ismail. In the days that followed, I learned more about the community, got to speak in some detail to the young people, and found out some of what attracted them to the movement. I almost immediately got a sense of the enormous influence, for better or for worse, that Medina exerted over the community.

However, it seemed to me at the time, at least from these young people's accounts, that there was not much of a hierarchy within the group. The young people were quick to point out that what attracted them to the *cafet  n* and later to the *comunidad* was not only the aesthetics of otherness which the group so openly embraced, but also its unstructured organization and the freedom it offered. One young woman, who had taken the name of F  tima, was quite specific about this:

What I like about *la comunidad* is that they leave you more or less alone to do your thing. No one is telling you 'you have to do this, you must wear that, you must not eat this...' Of course, there are rules, but they are intelligent about them. It is more as if rules were guidelines and not laws... I don't know. People are always saying all this bad stuff about Muslims on T.V., my mother is crying all the time because I'm Muslim now, but I think of it as being freer. I don't know how it is in other places, hopefully I'll get to go and find out.

What the young woman was referring to was one of the primary means of recruitment of young people to the community: the promise of scholarships to study abroad, at that time either in Jordan or Algeria, and later Pakistan. This is at least how my group of young friends, whom I spoke of in detail in Chapter VI, saw what they called the Yama'a's *modus operandi*. Mar  a la Corta told me how they used to hang out there after school. "It was a really nice space, and the drinks were great, even better than they are now. We liked the decor, the bean bags, the padded sofas, the soft cushions... you could go and stretch out and spend hours there, they wouldn't say a thing." For Rafi, "it was a different space, away from all the crowds, you could drink tea and listen to the nice music." But they stopped going because they didn't like what they saw

as their "tactics of cooptation." Rafi saw them as preying on "lost souls:" "They got those who were disoriented, confused [*despistados*] and they conscripted them." Pilar's criticism dealt more with what she saw was their dishonest or at the very least inconsistent approach to recruitment: "They told you they were going to send you here and there, and yes, you had to convert but that you didn't have to worry, because it was only a formality to get the grant... What's that all about? Are they Muslims or only smart alecks [*listillos*]?" For Sancho, conversion under any circumstances was suspect: "I mean, what is all that religious stuff anyway? Those people are crazy, flipped out [*colgaos*]. Allah, this, Allah that, who the hell goes around believing in God these days? They are walking and talking anachronisms."

The young Muslims whom I spoke with at the time did not see anything sinister or strange about it. One young man who was about to go to Pakistan said: "They put no pressure on me. They were quite explicit about what were the requirements, and I accepted. It's not like they brainwash you or anything. Nobody forced me to go to Pakistan. I want to go to Pakistan. I want to leave Córdoba badly." He was not alone in this, and I am certain the promise of such an opportunity worked as an incentive for many. However, as a strategy to build a community -- if it ever really was that -- it did not work. The everyday strains of being in a foreign country whose language was so different from their own; the penuries of life in a Third World country, which the young people were ill equipped to handle; and the rigors of studying on very tight budgets and in universities closely regimented according to Islamic rules, made the experience less than positive for many. Most young people returned after a very short stay, and others were forced to return by being expelled from their campuses. There were a few who did complete their studies successfully, but they were a minority, and even they did not always remain within the

community. When I returned in 1992 for an extended stay, most of the young people I had met had left the movement. Ismail and Almansur remained, and they had married Muslim women by birth – one Moroccan, the other the daughter of a Spanish man who had converted in the 1960s.¹¹ In the meantime, a young couple, Farah and Al-Hakem, had returned from Jordan and settled in as Arabic teachers. They would become dear friends and generous informants.

I contacted some of the young people I had before, as well as others whom I had not met but who had belonged to the community at one point or another. One of them was the young man who had just arrived from Pakistan. Although he chose to hang around *la comunidad* and *el cafetín*, most of the members were not too happy about it. He had gotten into trouble in Pakistan, they said, and was almost thrown out of the country. He had another version of the story: that once he was in Pakistan, he was left to fend for himself. With no guidance and little support, he had to look for his own patrons and his own funds. He acknowledged that not all of his patrons were of the liking of the Yama'a – though he would not clarify why – but that he had at least completed his coursework. At the time he told me he was arranging through contacts in Pakistan to attend University in the United States in order to obtain a degree in English. I also spoke to a young man in his late twenties who had been in Algeria at the time of my visit. He had since returned but had decided not to remain in the community. In his view, he had “outgrown” the need for such an “intensive” form of living. He also had become disenchanted with the political program of the Yama'a, because it did not seem willing to adapt itself to the reality of contemporary Andalusian life. About his faith, he pondered whether or not his withdrawal from the community was a reflection of the fact that its

¹¹ The young woman refused to grant me an interview. People in the community believed she was not at all interested in Islam.

spiritual life did not seem very active, and that he sought more, not less, out of his faith.

With the departure of the young crowd from the Córdoba community, it became largely male, and markedly older, that is, people in their late thirties and early forties instead of their late teens and early twenties. Their occupations and class background varied immensely, from physicians to academics, artisans, artists, businessmen and trade workers. In Córdoba, most men were divorced, or single, and those who did have wives rarely appeared with them in the community, for the wives usually remained unconverted. The women participants were the wives of the younger members, and the young Spanish women who converted to marry North African men whom they met at the community. One became central, in her role as Arabic teacher. Thus, while one could argue that gender segregation was not practiced actively -- and indeed, there was much talk about ways of opening the community to include women -- there was a culture of male sociality that inhibited the full participation of women. We will discuss issues of gender later in the chapter; for now, suffice it to say that this pattern of sociality were only reinforced by Islamic custom and law, and were rather firmly entrenched within local variations of broader patterns of exclusion and sexism.

The North African presence was crucial to the everyday functioning of the community, not only for their numbers and their commitment, but also for their religious knowledge. They served the function of muezzin [*muecín*] and informal religious specialists, consulting about minor details of ritual correctness and theological interpretation. They also contributed with their labor power. Many served as waiters and cooks in the *cafetín* but more important, they willingly contributed their time and effort to maintenance and repairs of the building. Furthermore, many made donations of money or

decorations – rugs, plates, textiles, posters – for the mosque and the common spaces of the *comunidad*. In return, Medina was constantly attempting to arrange paying work, shelter and ways of legalizing their stay, if necessary.

There were monthly meetings where members were encouraged to come, although most did not. In fact, the group functioned more as a association than as a “community.” What I mean is that although certain members did have close friendships with one another, which developed primarily out of conversion, most members led lives quite separate from the other converts. The community came together almost exclusively to commemorate important religious celebrations such as Ramadan and the feast of the Prophet. In these celebrations, the number of Spanish Muslims was doubled by those of North African origin and by friends and sympathizers who had not yet, or would not, convert. Conversation covered a variety of topics, but inevitably would revert to historical disquisitions on Andalusian history and identity couched in religious terms.

Such was the case during the communal meal held the first day of Ramadan in 1993. The meal had taken hours to prepare, and many people close to the Yama'a, including myself, had contributed in one way or another to its preparation. Shortly after the dusk prayers, members, mostly men, filed down from the mosque, and others arrived from their homes to celebrate and eat their first full meal of the day together. The atmosphere was quite festive. As people took their seats, much teasing and joking was heard about the experience of going without eating for a day. Few indulged in the courtesy of waiting for all others to be served, and began to eat immediately, which was cause of even greater merriment and chiding. At this stage, Medina attempted to bring some order to the crowd, mostly to take the opportunity to speak on the subject of Ramadan. At first, some resisted, and attempted to quiet Medina

by claiming that saying grace before meals was "Christian stuff." Medina, who never took such teasing lightly, insisted that open reflection and meditation was the central purpose of Ramadan, and addressing a group of North Africans, asked: "Isn't this so, brothers?" Not waiting for an answer he continued: "For Muslims, fasting is not a punishment. Fasting is just a 'technique' to inspire such reflection, and penitence the outcome of it. Those who do not understand this are the ones behaving like Christian devotees [*beatas*]." He then proceeded to thank all of those who had come and those who had contributed to making the meal, including the non-Muslim "brothers and sisters" who were sharing this joyous occasion, making it "a true homage to Allah and Mohammed, his messenger, who worked so hard to create peace, harmony and tolerance among all people." This he contrasted to the Catholics, who had "intolerant" and "inquisitorial" predispositions. This led him to a disquisition the religious freedom and tolerance that prevailed in Muslim Andalusia and how that all changed once it was conquered by the Northern "inquisitors." He concluded by urging all "brothers and sisters present, Andalusians from North and South" to come together and work, through word and example, in "awakening the consciousness" of those who still had not come to realize the righteousness of Islam and its rightful place in Andalusia.

The everyday interaction between North Africans and Andalusians did not exist in the Yama'a community in Almería. I first came in contact with this community during an event celebrating Morisco history and legacy in a town just 5 miles outside of Almería. The community had worked with the local officials in charge of culture and history to create a very successful event. The week long celebration began with the opening of a local archeological exhibition, and with a talk offered by Medina on the Islamic heritage of Andalusia. It was an astounding experience to witness how a crowd of over 100

townspeople sat down quietly and attentively listened to Medina rage against “myths of Spanish history” that not even 20 years earlier had been held as dogma. (I will return to this episode later in the chapter). In the reception that followed, I was introduced to the converts and some of their supporters.

I first visited the community in the fall of 1992. It was located on the second floor of a slightly run down building on a side street leading to one of the central plazas of town. Like the Córdoba community, it was also marked by a large sign in Spanish and Arabic. Inside were the offices, a meeting space and a mosque. The community had joined the Yama’a in 1988, though, as I discussed in Chapter V, they had existed as a nationalist and historical association since 1985. Back then they had been called Liga Morisca, and their interest had been primarily in exploring and promoting the legacy of Al-Andalus in Andalusia. Many of the members believed themselves to be descendants from Moriscos, and were constantly seeking out new sources of information that would help them legitimate their claims. It is in this quest that they had made contact with Medina, and as a group decided to convert. The community also had a small tea house run by youths. The ambiance of the coffee house reminded me quite strongly of what I had seen in 1990 in Córdoba: countercultural young people choosing the spot as a place where they could socialize and feel somewhat above the crowd that gathered in the pubs and plazas. During my short stay, I struck up an easy friendship with the two young women who ran the bar. However, I had very little opportunity to socialize with them, for shortly after my arrival twelve of the young converts left for Pakistan to study, and with this core of patrons gone, the young women found their revenue dwindling severely, and eventually closed the operation. They moved on to other activities, and I lost touch. When I sought them out some months later, I found

out that not only were they no longer affiliated with the group, but that the young people who had left for Pakistan were not either.

There were several versions of what happened. The elder converts' version was that these young people had taken the Yama'a for a ride. Instead of going to study Islam in Pakistan, what they had intended was to embark on a journey to India. The converts were livid: "Those youths were nothing more than hippies, spiritual voyeurs, not serious people at all." The version that I eventually heard from one of the young women who ran the tea house was that the youths found the conditions in Pakistan simply awful, and had decided to abandon the country. But since the Yama'a held their return tickets, they decided to travel to India where they were told they could get a cheap return ticket to London. It is not hard to imagine, however, that the trip to India might have been planned all along or at least became a temptation too big to resist. The young peoples' reported shock at the conditions they were expected to live in while in Pakistan is equally plausible. Nothing in their experience could have prepared them for what they would find. In the end, the youths returned to Pakistan and the Yama'a paid for their return flight for Spain anyway.

However, the fact was that the community did not fully attempt to integrate these young people, whose activities and interests remained somewhat marginal. The community's life and culture was dominated by a group of 10 to 12 men in their late 30s to early 40s, some with their wives and families. They had very diverse occupational and class backgrounds: there were lawyers, a teacher, a policeman, and several small business men. They were joined often by sympathizers, who declined to convert but were equally enthusiastic about Andalusian Islamic history. This core and some supporters got together regularly on Wednesdays and Fridays, sometimes for religious services but more importantly for informal discussions about Andalusian

history and politics. Because the families often came along it resembled a get-together between friends or neighbors more than a religious or intellectual discussion. In these moments, as the children ran around and played with each other, the women would sit together and in their words, "let the men discuss their things" while they chatted about themselves and their children, their daily lives, the news, or what ever other topic of conversation came up. Most of these men's wives had not converted, and I will discuss the implications of this gender dynamic later in the chapter. The men's discussion would end when the food, either ordered in or brought by those present, was served.

Indeed, the Almería community functioned very much like the *peñas* we spoke about in Chapter VI. The community was the primary locus of sociality, to the degree that it competed with other friendships and with family obligations. One of the women who had become a Muslim herself complained that *la comunidad* was consuming more and more of her husband's social time. She argued that until recently, she and her husband had a very close relationship with her sister, who was an important source of emotional support for her. However, in recent times visits had become more and more rare as her husband chose to come to the community instead or to socialize outside the community with other community members. Furthermore, she found that while her husband might have found soulmates within the community, she had not bonded in the same way with the other women. She was beginning to resent what she saw as her husband's withdrawal from relationships outside of those in the community.

A third type of "community" I found in Quéntar, a small town just outside the city of Granada. This community was perhaps the newest of all those I encountered. Almost all of its members had belonged to the Morabitum movement of Sheik Abdelkadder, but had left or been forced to leave because

of the ongoing tensions created by the demands of the hierarchy upon its members. They had been reconstituted as a Sufi community under the guidance of Mohammed, a German who was being schooled as a Sufi teacher by the Yerrahi,¹² a Sufi tariqa of Turkish origin. Wanting to leave what Mohammed described as the "negative atmosphere" created by the infighting and authoritarian practices of many converts in Granada, they had found this small town which had numerous empty houses that could be purchased and rebuilt. The fact that some of the male converts made a living out of construction work -- Mohammed himself was a master carpenter and a stained-glass craftsman -- made this renovation cost effective.

The community had grown to include 12 households. While households were spread throughout town, I noticed that Muslims and townspeople kept their distances. At first glance, it would seem the separation was enforced by the Muslims. They tended to socialize exclusively among themselves. Furthermore, both men and women dressed rather differently than townspeople. Women were the most noticeable. They wore bright scarves on their heads, and a long, loose fitting garments, most of them made in India: long cotton skirts or Punjabi pants with long and wide sleeved shirts. Men's garments were also loose fitting and often quite ethnically marked as well. Thus, while townspeople treated the Muslims politely, there was none of the familiarity in treatment that I had encountered elsewhere, particularly between store owners and regular clients. It seems that while the Muslims certainly preferred their own company, they also faced some rejection, perhaps even resentment among townspeople, who viewed them as encroaching foreigners. This situation was openly acknowledged by Mohammed, who recognized it as

¹²This tariqa, which can be translated as path or school, includes among its followers the group known as the "whirling dervishes."

a problem but one that was quickly diminishing. After all, population flight had also left the village without skilled plumbers, electricians and other such craftsman. The converts could both make a living and ingratiate themselves with the villagers who were in desperate need of their services.

Households varied in size varied from two (in both cases, widowed or divorced women with one child) to six members. About half the adults were Andalusian; the others being from Germany, Italy, Cuba, and Turkey, as well as other places within the Spanish State, such as Madrid and Barcelona. Of the non-Spaniards, only two were women. Indeed, there was a pattern in the community of foreign men marrying Spanish, and mostly Andalusian, women.¹³ All children had been born in Andalusia. Since four¹⁴ of those households were headed by women, there were actually more women in the community than there were men. The community as a whole made certain that these women were well taken care of and lacked nothing. One of these women lived in Granada and Mohammed was actively seeking out available housing in town so that the woman could move into the community. In another instance, where the woman was quite poor, the community acquired an empty building and was rehabilitating it for her, while providing her with extra income in the form of a housekeeping job for a widow in the community who worked full time. She suggested that the community might even become involved in finding her a husband, something she looked forward to.

¹³ This contrasts dramatically with the reports that appeared in the press, discussed by Rocher and Cheraqui (1987), that spoke of foreign, mostly European, women converting and marrying Spanish men, and then being paid the equivalent of 1,000 dollars for every child the couple had. More often than not, foreign women who married Spanish converts were North African.

¹⁴ There were four women with children whose former or current spouses were not part of the community. One woman, the oldest member was a widow. As we shall see in the discussion on gender, she was an authority figure in the community. She had generously offered temporary quarters to another woman, who was divorced and had recently converted. The community was busily arranging to rehabilitate a house for her. A third was also divorced, but in this case he was also a convert. Finally, there was one who was still officially married to her husband, though he had taken a second, much younger, Moroccan wife.

Women often arranged to do chores together, whether grocery shopping, sewing or cooking, and there was a fair amount of visiting. Trips to the city were communally arranged. This was quite important for those women with several young children, who otherwise would find it very hard to leave the small village and go into the city. The teacher, Mohammed, was always available for a talk or consultation outside of the official gatherings that took place on Wednesday and Friday evenings. At this time, all those affiliated with the Yerahi tariqa, whether or not they lived in Quéntar, would come to Mohammed's house, where the Mosque was located. Community meetings took place on Wednesdays. These were the times for people to gather and share informal conversation, tea, and smoke.¹⁵ Mohammed would discuss the latest news and talk about his thoughts and preoccupations regarding the community's spiritual well being in general, but also the behavior of particular individuals.

On Friday evenings the community came together for a prayer service. Services began slightly after dusk, but some participants arrived up to an hour earlier to share with the community and see friends who might be visiting just for the occasion. While people were allowed to enter the mosque earlier, most people waited outside, smoking or drinking tea. At Mohammed's invitation, people would begin to file in to the Mosque, men first. The mosque was a spacious room, handsomely decorated with North African and Turkish fabrics and artifacts. Instruments were carefully laid out at the far end, where men sat. The women's and children's section, larger than the men's, was partially

¹⁵The heavy consumption of cigarettes was made much more conspicuous by the ritual performed every time a cigarette was lighted. First, every time a member pulled a cigarette out of its package, he would offer cigarettes to others, by pointing the opening of the package to the gathered group. Then, before putting the cigarette in his or her mouth, he would turn the cigarette sideways, kiss it, lower his head and touch the cigarette to his or her forehead. Others would also turn to face Mohammed, lower their eyes, and make a gesture that I interpreted as seeking permission from the teacher to smoke.

separated by a divider made of wooden slats, and continued by a curtain of glass beads. However, because everyone sat facing Mecca, most men were not able to see the women as they sat, although the women had a fairly clear view of the men, and of their teacher. The service, which was led by musicians and singers from beginning to end, varied enormously in length, from 1 hour to 3 1/2 hours in one occasion.

While everyday sociality took place almost exclusively within the community, most members had extensive friendship networks with new Muslims in other communities: former Morabitums themselves, or people they had met while living in Granada. These friendships remained important sources of support, and while visiting was complicated by long distances, limited resources and, more importantly, the logistics of traveling with several young children, communication via letter or the phone seemed frequent. I also found that the families of many new Muslims played an important role in their lives as evidenced by their frequent references to travel undertaken to visit grandparents and other relatives. Some mentioned their parents' role in supplementing their meager incomes and in helping with expenses for their children. Friendships with people who remained Morabitums seemed very limited, in part because of this group's strict enforcement of in-group solidarity and loyalty to the Sheik. There were also very limited contacts with members of the Yama'a, as I pointed out earlier. Muslims in Quéntar knew of the Yama'a, but had little regard for them, mostly because of their openly political and nationalistic stances.

The children's world was somewhat different, since all went to public schools, a few at some distance from town, and thus were in constant interaction with people from outside the community. However, while some reported having close relationships in school, most friendships were

established with other Muslim children who lived in the town. The reasons for this were various. On the one hand, parents encouraged the friendships with other Muslim children. On the other, there were very few young children in town who were not Muslims, as most young people left before they were married and settled elsewhere when they married. However, there was also an element of mutual avoidance, perhaps simply adopted from their elders. The one exception to this was the case of a 15 year old girl whose father was not Muslim and whose mother had become Muslim fairly recently. Since most of the other youths were younger in age, and with very different interests, her real peer group was among non-Muslims in Granada. Yet the young women's behavior was not so exceptional in the context of the broader Muslim population. I had the opportunity to speak to five young women, ranging in age from 11 to 16, and all were either discretely or openly critical and resentful of what they called their parents "lifestyle" [*estilo de vida, forma de vivir, or ideas*]. However, only one of the five stated her complaint as specifically dealing with Islam. For three of the young women, it was the fact that their parents were religious at all that they resented, and they compared their situations with other girls of strict Catholic and Pentecostal families, whose parents also demanded from their daughters strict observance of religious and moral codes, and exercising strong controls over their behavior.

I found especially interesting a comment made by the 15 year old mentioned above. After a minor squabble with her mother about the mother's objections to her predilection for wearing tightly fitted clothes, the young woman complained: "Mom might say whatever she wants, but this business of wearing scarves is stuff that old fashioned elderly ladies do [*lo del pañuelo es cosa de marías, de viejas*]." The reference to the now almost obsolete custom among widows and some married women of wearing black and covering their heads

with scarves surprised me. I did not expect such a young person to be aware of this tradition, given that I myself, having visited Spain on several occasions since 1982, had not seen anyone dressed in this fashion except in photographs. While it is possible that, living in this small and until recently largely rural town she had seen elderly women who still clung to this old custom, I would have suspected she would have assumed them to be isolated and exceptional cases. What was I then to make of such a comparison? Clearly, she was attempting to establish her mother's views as backward, even "unenlightened," if you wish. But this particular metaphor locates her mother's beliefs among the relics of Franco's Spain, something I am certain would not only shock but repulse her mother and her peers. While I would not argue that the young woman had an explicit and politically articulate critique of her mothers behavior, it is quite possible that at an intuitive level she recognized how older patterns of sociality were being reinforced by some of her mothers beliefs. These patterns, despite what is stated or suggested in much of the literature on gender in the Mediterranean, are not exclusively related to Islamic influence on the region. As Ahmed (1991) has eloquently argued, they predate Islam and were found broadly among the so called "classical" cultures of Greece, Egypt and Rome. In what follows, I will discuss how distinctly and self-consciously "Western" discourses about gender difference are critiqued, debated and sometimes become "Islamized" in the everyday practices of these new Muslims.

What about the women?:" Gender and Sexuality in the conversion process

If for many, the idea that Spaniards, or any Westerner would willingly embrace Islam was strange enough, the idea that women who were once very politically involved in the struggle for justice and democracy would do so was

absolutely aberrant, even pathological. How could women, who considered themselves feminist barely 10, 15 years earlier, choose to embrace a religion which is so widely held to be discriminatory, some might argue brutally oppressive, to women? The women themselves were constantly confronted by the assumption that while men's "conversion" was certainly bizarre, their conversion was somehow more intrinsically inexplicable, or as one acquaintance put it, "pathologically aberrant." When writing about converts in Spain, Rocher and Cheraqui (1986) suggest that men who convert, consciously or unconsciously, ignore or explain away inequalities that do not affect them or, more problematically, embrace Islam precisely because it would seem to support their supremacy. Women are portrayed as gullible and deluded cult followers.

As a woman studying the converts, I was often met with scorn by women and men alike. They immediately assumed that I had come exclusively to interview women about veiling. The fact of the matter was that while I was very interested in the gender dynamics of these communities, veiling was the least of my concerns. Although many did wear scarves or hats covering their heads, the overwhelming majority of women were not "veiled." But on the occasion of a visit of some journalists intent upon writing a piece on the converts for a popular magazine I found out that the women converts had good reasons to mistrust outsiders. The journalist had contacted Medina and expressed interest in interviewing and in following the daily routine of a "family" so as to create an "accurate representation" of the community. The reporter felt compelled to add that it would be best if people wore "typical clothing" for portraits. Almansur joked: "The message is clear: dress up like moors [*a vestirse de moros*]!"

As the most active family within the community, the task of being "exhibit no. 1" fell upon Farah and Al-Hakem. But as it turned out -- as they had expected all along -- the reporter, a woman in her mid 40s, was really most interested in Farah. During the interviews, the reporter was continuously surprised by Farah's candor, her wit and her strong sense of self. Her reaction to finding out that Farah had completed a university education, and in philosophy, was outright comical. However, that was not the story the reporter wanted to write. The finished piece, part orientalist novel, part tabloid scandal, made many suggestive remarks about the "inner motivations" of a woman who had fallen under the exotic and titillating allure of the North Africa and Islam. Although Farah made a point of telling the reporter that she rarely, if ever, wore a caftan or covered her head, being as she was quite fond of keeping up with the latest fashion trends -- which at the time included miniskirts -- the reporter insisted in taking pictures of Farah in a caftan with a kerchief on her head. The one chosen for the cover was a picture of what was then their study, slightly redecorated by the photographer to bring out a more "Moorish" feel. In it the reporter's and photographer's fantasies of Islamic domesticity were played out. Farah appeared smiling serving tea to smiling Al-Hakem, who was seated on a low chair next to a brass Moroccan table. Their son, Ali, played at their feet. Never mind that Farah openly refused to make tea at all, claiming not to know how. Or that Ali, a bundle of energy, would never play quietly by himself and would more likely than not be watching television. Or that Farah would never serve Al-Hakem willingly, for as she always said, "he can do those things himself." As I said, it was not the story of the community, but of the reporter and photographer.

Thus, most converts were pleasantly surprised to find that I was well aware of the xenophobic and anti-Semitic biases that had driven much of the

discussion about gender in Islam (see Ahmed 1992, Alloulah 1986, Mernissi 1985, Said 1979), and thus alert in avoiding any facile biases or oversimplifications. I had correctly assumed the basic motivation for men and women to be similar: a rejection of the values and morals that were hegemonic in the West by embracing an identity that was widely believed to be its absolute opposite, *the Other*. Certainly, in order to espouse this particular critique, the women had made enormous compromises, which many might find unacceptable. And yet, I found time and again that many of these Muslim women believed they had not ceased in their "pursuit of goals of female autonomy and subjectivity" (Ahmed 1992). Rather, they were critical of the grounds in which these goals had been defined by the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s, a view that is shared by at least one respected feminist writer (Fox Genovese 1991).

I found that most new Muslim women I interviewed shared the argument that what they called "liberal feminism" had succeeded in promoting only the "civil" rights of women but had left capitalism and its work ethic largely untouched. "As women we are now able to accede to the exploitation of the workplace," was the running joke among many of them. Furthermore, they offered numerous examples of how "legal" equality rarely came with adequate compensation or redress for historical oppression and did not protect women against more insidious forms of male dominance and misogyny which could not be legislated against. They were also fully conversant in the by now classical Islamic critique of how capitalism promoted the sexual liberation of women – and men, they invariably added – in order to exploit for profit.

However, gender discourses and practices varied so greatly and significantly between groups that commonalities could only be found at a very general, and abstracted level. This is perhaps because gender practices were

seen as one of the most distinctive features of Muslim identity. The community of Quéntar again serves as a particularly good example. Women claimed that they found within these communities a network of solidarity and companionship that shielded them from the harsh realities of having to juggle home and jobs, for few households could survive on one income alone. Furthermore, single mothers could rely on the communal funds to supplement their incomes. Indeed, as I mentioned briefly, all sorts of household duties were shared among women, and they often found free time to engage in personal pursuits. Thus, while men often emphasized the naturalness of the women's relation to home, women chose to highlight what they saw as Islam's awareness of men's frailty, and its sensitivity to the burden this imposed on women. Women placed great value on the attention and praise they received for their role as mothers, which they felt was devalued in broader society in favor of an identity as workers.

While gender segregation was not absolute, there were explicit rules and implicit suggestions that led women and men within the community to socialize separately. Among women this was not seen as a point of contention. Many suggested this was precisely what they enjoyed the most about the community, and indeed there seemed to be a truly friendly atmosphere and great camaraderie. While I visited Quéntar, Habiba, a midwife by profession, was the only woman working away from home at that time, but I knew of other women who had run businesses and other money-making ventures. Overall, household income was provided either by their husbands and/or the community, or by independent sources of wealth. Women organized their everyday activities so that they took turns caring for children and other more burdensome household chores, thus providing opportunities for one another to leave the house and visit and run errands in Granada. This mostly involved

shopping which I was told was often collectively organized.¹⁶ It was widely believed among women in Quéntar that Northern European men willingly took part in household chores, and were also actively involved in child rearing, and thus were the preferred partners.

Women insistently remarked on how Islam had deepened and enriched their spiritual life beyond their wildest imaginations. It was common to hear them claim that Islam opened an entirely new facet to their lives, one which provided them with constant satisfaction yet continuous yearning for more. Indeed, in spite of the joy they claimed to experience in their close relationship with the divine – and I often witnessed expressions of this joy – internal strife and anguished deliberation figured much more prominently in the narratives of women than in those of their male counterparts. Of course, since everyday life as a new Muslim in many of these communities placed very specific and often burdensome demands on women of which men were spared, it stands to reason that devotion and dedication would be more difficult. New Muslim women often made veiled or explicit reference to those aspects which were more galling, as we shall see in the following sections. Mariam, whom I spoke of in Chapter V, described her relationship with "The Loved One" as a struggle, in which she constantly had to discipline herself. Sadiyya made frequent references to her "undisciplined mind," and saw herself as "inconstant."

Indeed, the most problematic aspect of gender segregation – and where it most clearly related to inequality and subordination – was tied to worship. The group held two meetings a week, one which was a forum for religious instruction, imparted by Mohammed, and on Fridays, a Sufi *mesh*, a religious

¹⁶Dietary rules were strictly observed in this community. Meat was rarely eaten, mostly because there were no halal meat markets in Granada, and thus a whole animal had to be purchased and the slaughter carried out in correct ritual was by a specialist or at least a knowledgeable butcher.

celebration which involves chanting and trance. While some women commanded a significant amount of respect and authority, particularly because of their studies and their devotion, most women were seen as less informed, and less spiritually developed than the men. In practice this translated into a situation in which most men were allowed to debate and challenge their teacher, Mohammed. It was interesting to see how often these questions often became battles of wits and exposed, often very clearly, some of the men's resentment over Mohammed's authority, both religious and secular, to shape their daily lives. In contrast, women were openly discouraged from engaging the teacher in debate. I soon realized that what appeared to be Mohammed's prodding a reluctant audience of quiescent women followers to ask questions was in fact a granting of permission but under carefully enforced limits. Mostly women simply asked their question and stood quietly while listening to the response. On one occasion when a woman was not satisfied with the answer offered by Mohammed, and insisted on challenging him, he reprimanded her forcefully for her lack of discipline and respect for the teacher. The woman, shocked by the harshness of his rebuff, turned to others only to find down-turned faces or reproachful looks. After the incident, she remained quiet for the rest of the evening and avoided Mohammed until he sought her out some days later.

However, the women who lived in closely-knit communities such as Quéntar were by no means the norm. Not all new Muslim women were willing to surrender their personal autonomy and allow their subjectivity to be shaped so strongly by a community, even if they believed in the inherent justice and righteousness of Islam.¹⁷ Many saw little or no change in their lives after

¹⁷Ahmed (1992) cites research in Egypt in which a majority of young Islamic women in university concurred in seeing Islam as inherently fair and right, and thus supported general social reforms which would include the imposition of the *shari'a*, the social code which is most

conversion. This was particularly the case for women in the Yama'a, whose domestic life resembled that of many other married Andalusian women of middle and lower middle class background. The same was the case for Farah, Al-Hakem, Almansur and Huriyya, who lived their lives like many other young couples, struggling to set up a household and find adequate means of support for their growing families. This situation extended to gender dynamics. If household responsibilities and husbands' expectations about them heavily impinged on female autonomy, this was the case for the vast majority of Andalusian women I met. While some men were not above invoking Islamic custom when confronted by their wives, such feeble attempts at justification only made women angrier and in fact were met with erudite rebuttals citing Koranic and other legal evidence to the contrary.

I am not arguing that I found in any of these communities, or in Islam more generally, an exemplary blueprint for gender relations. Rather, I wish to highlight how gender relations in these communities, although often attributed to Islam, were in fact complex critiques and negotiations of Western practices that merely assumed an Islamic form. Many readers will correctly point to how the same could be said of much of the debate on gender within the Islamic world, spurred by the struggle against Western cultural, political and economic domination (Ahmed 1992; Fischer and Abedi 1988; Mernissi 1984, 1993). Indeed, although few spoke, let alone could read, Arabic, new Muslims were very familiar, and even erudite, about contemporary and historic debates about Islamic doctrine, law and tradition. The enigmatic nature of the Koran, and the importance of dialogue and debate, though ideally under the guidance of knowledgeable individuals (Fischer and Abedi 1990; Mernissi 1992), was

restrictive to women. This included a surprising 52.7 percent whom the study identified as "feminist" because of their strong support for women's equality and rights both in and outside the domestic sphere.

constantly brought up as a justification for heterodox interpretation. And yet, however imbued in Islamic tradition, their discourse barely concealed a manipulation of European stereotypes about Islam and the East to provide authenticity and legitimation to their cultural innovation. Although some men, threatened by changes in popular and political culture which acknowledged women's autonomy and subjectivity, found comfort and validation in the more restrictive aspects of Islam, others – and not only Northern European ones – assumed a significant share of household tasks and responsibilities and became greatly invested in the domestic sphere, arguing that this was the "truly Islamic" family structure.

The "improvisations" on Western stereotypes about Islam and the Orient became most apparent in many of the male converts' discourse on sexuality. While the majority of new Muslims, both men and women, spoke of "sensuality" and "eroticism" when referring to North African and Middle Eastern "cultures," the Yama'a had developed a particularly elaborate discourse on the place of "sexuality" within Islam itself, that was most often brought up in conversation by the men. In the Yama'a's vision, the body was not a temple but neither was it the site of sin, decay or the antithesis of the spirit. Time and again I was told by new Muslims how Mohammed had spoken of the "naturalness" of erotic and sensual pleasure, and encouraged it over self-sacrifice and denial. When they discussed sexuality, their emphasis was not "on proper control and channeling," (Ahmed 1992; Combs-Schilling 1989) but rather on what could be called its "sanctity." Time and again I was informed that nothing was more repulsive to a Muslim than celibacy. Men and women had to find suitable partners in order to procreate, and sexuality was certainly part of such compatibility. Incompatible partners, either men or women, should be encouraged to seek divorce, though in the case of men, it was said, taking a

second wife might be preferable, "so not to abandon the first one to poverty and destitution."

Though acknowledging and promoting the centrality of procreation to Muslims, the converts' also stressed that sexuality and sexual activity was independent from it. The converts continuously contrasted what they claimed was Islam's open, accepting and encouraging stance toward sexuality, which they described as enlightened, even liberated, with "repressive Catholicism." However, this insistence on sexuality has very different implications for men and women. As Ahmed (1992) has so brilliantly discussed in the context of early Christianity in the Mediterranean, when women are considered essentially biological and sexual beings, and excluded, or "exempted" as the case may be, from having to develop their rationality and spirituality, this insistence on sexuality places women firmly on the side of nature, and furthers their subordination to the male, whose sexuality is seen as tempered by reason and spirituality. But new Muslims of the Yama'a did not believe that the rightfulness of finding sexual satisfaction was limited to heterosexual unions. They argued that homosexuality was sanctioned within Islam, so far as the duty to procreate had been met, and that this applied to both males and females. While I was not aware of any lesbian relationships among converts, in the communities of Córdoba and Seville there was constant discussion and rumors about the sexual preference of several of their male members. One of these men, Al-Mutamid, who in his own words had taken the name of "the homosexual caliph of Seville," told me in conversation that in the Koran, although he couldn't remember which shura, Mohammed had explicitly discussed and sanctioned the possibility.¹⁸

¹⁸ It should be noted that one of the gravest objections of fundamentalists to Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* was precisely that it implied that Muhammad had condoned sodomy (Fischer and Abedi 1988).

Memorial Politics: Al-Andalus as once and future glory

Thus, we can see how the discourse on things *Islamic* brings together several distinct social, economic and political critiques. Prominent among them is a discourse critical of modernity and progress, specifically regarding how secularism, individualism and the commodification of interpersonal relations shapes the experience of everyday life. Although having a wide variance of opinion as to what Islam meant to them, the converts did seem to be in agreement about it being a more holistic, integrative and tolerant way of life that the Western, in which soul, mind and body were all acknowledged, cultivated and cherished. Conversion was often referred to as a matter of coherence between beliefs and everyday life, a way in which to integrate intellectual critiques with lived experience. During my stay, the new Muslims became involved in activism that ranged from the preservation of Islamic monuments to grassroots organizing against anti-immigration laws being imposed upon Spain by the European Union. Converts were also actively solidary with illegal immigrants from North Africa and with Muslim refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In analyzing the narratives for political content, interest in the group could be placed within two broad categories: nationalist-political and universalistic-egalitarian. The universalists were particularly interested in the group's critique of Western forms of production and appropriation, and the alienation and social anomie inherent in the system. They cited repeatedly the "fairness" of Islam and its "holistic" essence, which allowed for the person to be tended fully, body and soul. The nationalists had similar preoccupations to the "universalists" but they focused specifically on the domination and exploitation of Andalusia, and emphasized the particular ties that Islam had with the

region's people and culture. Nevertheless, the rhetorical move of identifying Islam and Andalusia had deep-seated contradictions. I noticed that in many narratives, the rejection of Spain did not imply a rejection of Europe. Furthermore, the identification with North Africa or formerly colonized nations and states, if present, was contradictory or rhetorical at best. When I explicitly broached the subject, responses varied. Some answers were coherent within an universalist approach. Ethnicity and race were not significant since Islam, as a religion for the whole of humanity, had no frontiers, racial or otherwise. When asked about their own identification, they described themselves as Muslims. One informant, who described himself as a "reticent convert" saw the connection only in ideological terms, as a show of solidarity and support, and was distrustful of those within the group who insisted on its biological reality.

Other positions were more complex and contradictory. Ismail told me that if he were not a Muslim he would probably be a socialist. He hastened to add that Islam was much superior to socialism, in that it dealt with problems holistically, and did not encourage hatred among people. (I discerned he meant class antagonism). He also believed in the biological reality of the Ibero-African connection, and supported his belief by pointing to several of the Yama'a members whom he saw as examples of this legacy: dark hair and complexion, aquiline nose, short stature and stocky build. His own appearance -- fair, tall and lanky -- he attributed to the Germans who had settled his town. The pride he took in making these distinctions would be comical were it not so disturbing. Almansur, on the other hand, while granting the existence of some individuals of "pure" North African ancestry in Andalusia, argued that the mixing of "tribes and races" which took place in Al-Andalus made its people

unique. It gave the Andalusians their singular industriousness, their aesthetic sensibility and mystical capacity.

Magazines and pamphlets were important instruments in proselytizing. Most of the printed material was crudely reproduced and casually distributed, although increasingly groups were coming up with higher standards for their publications. Among this type of publication, I found the Yama'a's magazine, "Lamalif: Revista de Investigación y Pensamiento", surprisingly attractive and well executed. It aimed at providing a balance between intellectual debates, current issues and religious instruction. Articles covered a variety of topics in history, literature, art, anthropology and current affairs, mostly related to the connection between Islam and Andalusia, either past or present. A good example of its ideological and intellectual approach is the editorial for the first issue entitled "Islam in the Occidental Imagination". Borrowing from Americo de Castro, Said's critique of Orientalism and Gramsci's writings on the Southern Question, the editors claimed that the Spanish intellectual tradition which demeaned the Islamic legacy in the South was founded on racist principles. They then pointed to how the same stereotypes used to describe the Moors were also applied to Andalusians today. They countered the stereotypes by invoking the political economic circumstance in which they were circulated: underdevelopment, and political and cultural oppression. As an alternative to the system they argued for the inherent superiority of Islamic life. Private property, the editorial claimed, is a purely Western construct. In Islamic law, property must serve a "social function", and thus cannot be "used and abused" by either individuals or groups and certainly not the state. Islamic economy was said to be more equitable. The production and uncontrollable growth in consumption spawned by Western economic forms (i.e.. Capitalism) "the blind mechanisms of an economy which is an end in itself", are compared

unfavorably to notions of equilibrium, social harmony and the holistic development of mankind, which they deem to be Islamic.

Similar arguments are used in another editorial to argue against Andalusia's participation within the project of European Unification. The economic success and supremacy of "Europe" – an obvious incentive to support the project – is condemned as the product of "the premises of exceptionalism, free choice, racism and aggression" on which the European nation states were founded. Never before, argues the editorial, has a "civilization" espoused such a "cruel and inhuman" lack of solidarity. In contrast, Andalusians are defined, in the words of Blas Infante [founder of contemporary Andalusian Nationalism] as: "...Euroafricans, Euroasians, and we [the editors] would add, Euroamericans, in a radical common sense, universal and anticolonial". Therefore, the EC-- for the diversity it attempts to homogenize and the concentration of capital it will facilitate -- is even more colonialist than the nation-state and therefore inherently undesirable to Andalusians.

In a somewhat different tone, one article supported Andalusia's separateness from Europe through archeological and paleontologic evidence: the recent finding of the "Man of Orce," in Andalusia which they bill as "the most ancient human remains in all of Europe and Asia." The article emphasizes that he was found in an "authentically African" ecosystem, and that his morphological traits were similar to those of other hominids found in North Africa. Furthermore, it claims that the hominid's age makes him a direct relative of the other hominids found in the African continent. The article was accompanied by a field report produced by the investigators, full of jargon and details which only an expert could properly follow. Clearly the field report was published in order to offer legitimacy to the claims in the article, namely that the ontogeny of Ibero-African connections lay at the very origins of humankind

itself, bestowing racial primacy. In another volume, an article claimed to have found a Berber tribe which were direct descendants of the Al-Andalus Diaspora. Proof was found in their music and crafts.

The contrast between the editorials and the articles is interesting for the very different ways in which they situate Andalusia. The editorials position Andalusia in the interstices of cultural boundaries, which it simultaneously synthesizes and transcends. The "West," of which Christianity is but a part, is contrasted to Universal Islam, which is never explicitly associated with any culture or civilization: it is of itself. The cultural plurality by which Andalusia is defined, constructed in terms reminiscent of the "cosmic race" of Vasconcelos, makes Andalusia's positionality even more fluid. If there is any fixation, it is in time: the fluidity is clearly the convergence of the centuries of historical dynamics. The articles, on the other hand, attempted a conclusive grounding of Andalusianness in a particular mythical/physical place (Ibero-Africa). They also locate Andalusia in time; however, because this location coincides with the 'beginnings' of time, it effectively renders Andalusia always already present -- timeless, unfixed. This tension between the fixing in time as opposed to the fixing in place reoccurs throughout the magazine, and remains unresolved.

But perhaps most radical is the converts' reformulation of Andalusian cultural and political history, based on the work of a little known Jesuit priest by the name of Ignacio Ollagüe, who in 1974 published a magnum opus entitled *The Islamic Revolution in the West* [*La Revolución Islámica en Occidente*]. The book, completely out of print, and passed from hand to hand among new Muslims in what can best be described as clandestine fashion, challenges the officially accepted narrative about the spread of Islam to Spain. Instead of a small group of Berbers, led by a Christian traitor, overwhelming the Christian armies in 711, and within the space of three years, controlling the entire

southern half of the peninsula and forcing the population to convert to Islam, Ollagüe presents a complex narrative that sees Islamization as a result of political and economic competition between two centers of power, Imperial Byzantium and Papal Rome, with both manifested in the Iberian peninsula. According to this and related narratives, (Garaudy 1987, Thompson and Ur-Rahim 1988) the southern Christians were strongly allied to the Unitarian Christians, whose stronghold were in Byzantium, and Northern Africa, while the Northern Christians allied themselves with the Romans, who followed the Trinitarian variant of Christianity. This political alignment is said to reflect social cultural differences: the center and north of the peninsula was more closely tied to Indoeuropean culture and traditions, while the South was integrated into a Middle Eastern sphere of influence, because of its proximity and continuous relations with North Africa. (Economic differences tied to different subsistence strategies are also mentioned, but only in passing.) The tensions created by these cultural, political and economic differences became complicated and escalated through a conflict over succession among the Visigoth rulers of Spain that led to a civil war, in which the Southerners enlisted the help of Unitarian Christians' and Muslims from North Africa. Having successfully won the war, the Unitarian Christians dependence on North Africa grew, at the same time that Islam was becoming a hegemonic political, economic, cultural and religious presence in the region.

What is radical in Ollagüe's and the other authors arguments' is that the islamization of Spain thus occurred not as matter of conquest but as a slow and steady process of political, economic and cultural exchange. One the one hand, the authors argue that Islam's monotheism was closer to the Unitarian variant of Christianity than was the Trinitarian one. The authors offer as evidence for this fact the work of a Saint John of Damascus who considered Islam to be yet

another Christian heresy inspired in Arrianism, the most popular variant of Christian Unitarianism at the time.¹⁹ On the other hand, and perhaps most importantly, they argue that rulers and the general population alike would have found the beliefs and values of Islam quite compatible with local culture and practices. Rather than an invasion, they describe a process of "civilization" in which new and vibrant ideas were introduced into the Peninsula, interacting with local society and custom. This led to the creation of a "brilliant" civilization, centered in Córdoba, that was the "light of the European middle ages" (Garaudy 1988: 21; Ollagüe 1974: 14) and hegemonic throughout the Southern Mediterranean world. As proof for this they cite historical texts that would seem to indicate that not until 150 years after the supposed invasion of the Muslims and the imposition of Islam were Northern bishops aware of the presence of Islam in the peninsula (Garaudy 1988: 27; Ollagüe 1974: 143). All authors concur that this "historical reality" was silenced in favor of the official narrative because the latter favored both Christians and Arab Muslims. The Christians could explain away the massive apostasy of over two million of its southern population as a matter of military imposition, and the Arabs could feel proud of how their military prowess was highlighted, which to them underscored the righteousness and divine purpose of their mission.

The implications of this alternative narration of historical events is immediately obvious. Andalusia is firmly placed within the Mediterranean and "semitic" worlds, and removed from the ("Indo-")*European* sphere of influence. Furthermore, in rejecting an Arabization of Spain in favor of an Iberianization of North Africa. Islam's connection to Andalusian society and culture becomes one of profound affinity and acquires an intricacy that is difficult,

¹⁹Arrianism is the name given to the doctrines of Arrius, Bishop of Alexandria, who proselytized about the unity and indivisibility of God, thus presenting Jesus as a prophet. He and his followers were persecuted and expelled by the Roman Catholic church.

perhaps impossible, to unravel. In stories of Yama'a converts, such proximity translates into a complicity and protection once the northern Christians conquer the South and impose their faith. Thus, many popular practices that to others might seem examples of anticlericalism are seen as "things new Christians would do" [*cosas de Cristianos nuevos*], that is, customs of those who were forced to convert, or whose conversion is recent enough to be contaminated by previous heresies and infidelities. Even more dramatic examples were the various stories, or perhaps more accurately, the retellings of what is probably a single story or theme: the existence of "secret rooms" in houses where only adults were allowed and where objects, such as "a book written in Arabic," were revered. Houses with such rooms were usually said to be located in the mountainous towns of the Almeria province or the Alpujarras.²⁰

Most narrators claimed to have heard such stories from "highly credible sources," but a few claimed to have seen these places first hand. One of them, Omar, told of research he was conducting in this area, but declined to share the information until he published his findings. (No amount of coaxing would convince him otherwise, although as of December 1995 he had not published anything yet.) But perhaps most interesting was the story told to me by a new Muslim woman. She said she remembered how in her grandparents' house, in a mountainous, rural village in the province of Almeria, there was a room she was never allowed entrance to. It was a room that only adults could enter, and usually it was just men. On late afternoons on Fridays, her grandfather and some of his brothers would go into the room for a while, and not come out

²⁰These zones had been the last bastions of the Moriscos; however, they are also archetypical "hinterlands," and mythically charged places. Several Sufis I encountered in Granada cited as their reason for moving or seeking to move to the Alpujarras that the tallest mountain in the Iberian peninsula, the Mulhacén, was located there, and that they considered it a sacred place with considerable mystical powers.

until darkness had descended. She was always very intrigued by the room, but her parents and grandparents never allowed her in. Eventually, her grandparents moved in with her parents to a town much closer to the provincial capital, the city of Almeria. Her grandparents house remained abandoned, and eventually had to be torn down. She asked her father about that room and he dismissed it as "superstitions" [*supersticiones*]. Intrigued, she continued to inquire and sometime later he told her that his father had kept a room with an "old, beaten up" and roughly bound set of pages handwritten with strange letters. The woman recalls thinking "even then" (for she would not convert until several years later) that, based on her father's description, the writing might be Arabic.²¹ The woman recalls her father saying that his father and uncles would go and prostrate themselves before the book, and recite some strange words that he could not begin to understand. The converts' father, a good anarchist, remembers attending when he was young, but he stopped going fairly soon, completely disgusted with such comings and goings. "Just imagine what we could have learned if I had only been a little older!" marvelled the woman at the end of the story. "We cannot even begin to comprehend, to compensate for what has been lost" lamented her husband.

I would like to conclude this section with a brief comparison with the work of Juan Goytisolo, a mayor intellectual figure, social critic and writer in contemporary Spain. Goytisolo's discourse parallels in many ways that of the

²¹There are records of manuscripts written by Moriscos that have been discovered centuries later, hidden between walls of old houses and cottages. The manuscripts, known as *Aljamiados*, are written in Spanish but using the Arabic alphabet. Scholars who have studied them such as Lope Baralt (1989) have discovered that they can often be very political in tenor, and that they contain invaluable information about life among the Moriscos and Muslim conversos in the 16th and 17th Centuries, after the defeat of the Muslim kingdoms. However, these manuscripts are most commonly found in Northern Spain, where many of the Moriscos and conversos were sent as vassals and slaves to work for the Northern nobility and landowners. What the converts described is closer to the practices of "crypto-judaism," such is said to have survived in some areas of Southwestern United States and Northern Mexico.

converts. He too rejects the mythical and legitimizing interpretations of Spanish history, deeply influenced in his critique by the work of Americo Castro. He, like the converts, also made the unorthodox move of realigning his personal coordinates and choosing "the South." First he chose the Spanish south (Almería) over the north (Barcelona, his place of birth). It was in this south, he claims, that he experienced for the first time "a consciousness of belonging," which spurred his indignation over the social injustices and regional inequalities in the peninsula. The second instance of choosing the south came while in exile in Paris. Arriving at the height of the Franco-Algerian war, he lived the daily horrors of racial hatred and persecution against the Algerians. His solidarity with the victims, with whom he shared ideals and aspirations, was reaffirmed by, I quote: "... the physical beauty of the Arab immigrants", an unforeseen but determinant factor in his enthusiasm and fascination with their culture and landscape.

These loosely related perspectives – the rejection of the official discourses of Spanish historiography, the interest in another "human landscape" and the awakening to the horrors of European ethnocentrism – come together in Goytisolo's novel, *The defense of Count Julian*. This work is, among other things, a celebration and homage to the mythical figure, who, according to mainstream Spanish historiography, allowed the Berbers entry into Spain in 711. This act of treason was somehow so immense that almost 1,300 years after the fact, Spain has yet to fully recover from it. This playful handling of history and culture, although with shifting emphases, reappears in Goytisolo's subsequent work and criticism, such as in his novel *Makbara*, written to be read aloud in the tradition of Medieval Andalusí troubadours, whose counterparts continue to practice today in Marrakech.

The parallels – in project, orientation, sensibility – between Goytisolo and the Islamic converts are inescapable. However, Goytisolo, in and through his work, chose not to correct the “conflictive” character of Spanish historiography, but instead rereads and rewrites it imaginatively, openly appropriating the biases and inaccuracies for “mythopoetic” purposes, thus exposing and destroying these biases through their use. This possibility is open to Goytisolo and not to the converts because of the particular form politics take in Goytisolo's project and his own grounding of identity in the spaces of 'exile' and 'marginality' (cultural, political, sexual). There should be no doubt of its political content, which is individual and personal, precluding (and in fact rejecting) direct engagement in state politics.



Figure 5. Entrance to a mosque in the Albaicin section of Granada

(Granada, 1994)

Chapter VIII. The squatters: memory as myth and heterodoxy against the State

"60 years later, the struggle
continues "
-- okupa bulletin, Córdoba, 1996

"Our dreams are your worst
nightmares "
-- graffiti, Córdoba, 1994

It was the summer of 1993. My young friends and their friends seemed a bit more restive than usual. The weather was extremely hot and dry, and the intervening months until the fall seemed to stretch out endlessly before them. As in other years, few had found steady work for the summer. There was talk about going down to the Costa del Sol or Costa Brava resort areas in search of employment, or backpacking around "Europe" [*irse a rular por Europa*], but no serious plans had been made yet. Then, one day, I arrived at *el Museo* to find some of my friends speaking to a young man I had never met before. I hesitated, for there was clearly a conspiratorial air about them. When one of them waved in greeting, I approached. As was usual, they continued their conversation without further acknowledgment or introduction. I was alarmed to find that they were discussing different ways of breaking and entering without getting caught. My concern gave way to puzzlement and curiosity when the young man began to talk about how he had created a permanent entry and had "prepared" the locale for "others" who would be coming later. I knew I was not following the conversation when, to the question of how would they deal with the neighbors, the young man answered that they would send a letter or perhaps go door to door introducing themselves and explaining their plan. Unable to wait any longer, I asked what they were discussing. They were

talking about how some of the *punkis* were going to create a *kasa okupa*,¹ a squatter settlement in a house or locale.

In this chapter I will deal with the political culture of the *kasa okupa*, by focusing on *punkis*, and others who came over to *el okupa*. I will be exploring its many referents and influences: English (and American) punk aesthetics, Basque and Catalan alternative and political rock, Spanish anarchism, the conscientious objectors movement, green politics, and the search for alternative modes and strategies of subsistence, such as self-help [*autogestión*]. I will explicitly be avoiding the use of the term “subculture” when making reference to the *okupas* [the squatters]. Hebdige (1979), although critical of the intellectual history tied to the term subculture, justified its use in his discussion of popular culture among youth in Britain, as recognition of the social and political subordination of the working class youth he studied, and as a way of acknowledging the articulation of these practices to a broader consumer culture. Hebdige believed the problematic aspects of “subcultural” studies were related to the lack of analytical content in much of this work. It is my opinion that his work showed that the very use of the term obfuscates analysis. “Subculture” only makes sense if one assumes a “mainstream” or “mainline” culture. As is the case with any such orthodoxy, it can only be posited as an ideological abstraction. Furthermore, the *okupa* movement advocates *insubordination* to the orthodoxy that emerged in Democratic Spain. Thus I believe that the use of *subordinate* in reference to the aesthetic and political practices of the *okupa* movement is

¹ The verb *ocupar* can be translated as to occupy, and also is used when asking someone for a favor or for help, as in “voy a tener que ocupar a X”, I will have to bother or ask so and so for a favor, or as in “no te ocupes,” do not bother. The slang version, *okupar*, means to squat. *Okupa* refers both to the squatter and to the settlement. *Okupación* refers to the act of taking possession of a property, and should not be confused with *ocupación*, which means trade or job (although the *okupas* are fond of punning on the resemblance). The changing of the c for the k can be traced to punk usage but also, as Urla (n.d.) points out, to the linguistic practices of Basque militant youth.

counterproductive. A much more felicitous attempt at discerning the workings of transformative hegemonies of which these practices are part can be found in Raymond Williams' discussion of the residual, the emergent, and the dominant (Williams 1977). The *okupas* tap into and politicize certain residual elements of the contemporary hegemonic practice in Spain -- which I have argued can be found in the realm of memory.

In their words, although I believe that the *okupas* do "interfere" with hegemonic representations by violating "authorized codes through which the social world is organized and experienced" (Hebdige 1979) in post-Franco, democratic Spain, I would not reduce their intervention to "noise." Indeed, their voices, even though reaching at times what to some might be unbearable levels of stridency, are articulate attempts at communicating dissent. And it is on their voices -- written and oral -- and their practices that I will focus in this Chapter, rather than their clothes and poses. The first section will explore the roots of the *okupa* movement within popular culture, particularly the Basque punk rock scene, exploring its early use of Anarchist imagery and Civil War memories as mobilizing tools for youth. I will then move to discuss the emergence of the *okupa* movement itself, as was told to me by the *okupas* and other young people I interviewed. It is largely uncorroborated and complete, because there was very little information available in the Andalusian or national press, and I had limited contact with older squatters. The third section deals with the *okupación* : how it was planned, how it took place, and how the reality of life in a squat contrasted with young peoples' hopes and expectations. The fourth and final section will deal with the political culture of the *okupas* as compared to that of other young people who are also politically active.

Pisando fuerte: the popular culture roots of the okupa movement

I found that most *okupas* were not concerned with tracing the history or the evolution of their movement. When asked when did they first became aware of and/ or involved in the *okupaciones*, most *okupas* were quite vague. They either did not remember and/or did not bother to think about it. Frequent answer were "I have always been *anarka* [anarchist, rebel]" or "Well, I think I still was in *EGB* [Educación General Básica, grades k-9]." Since most of the *okupas* in Córdoba were first time squatters, I assume they were referring to when they first became attracted to the aesthetics and politics of the movement, which draws heavily from the Spanish and British punk scenes.

In their accounts, the Spanish punk scene appears to have been slowly emerging during "the transition." A former anarchist and punk from San Sebastián described it in the following manner: "It was a wild time. The streets reeked of pot, and everywhere people were doing all kinds of drugs, shooting up in all kinds of places. If you walked on the streets, you could get mugged by gypsies, by junkies, or by the police. The concerts were intense: mohawks, baldies, and me, with hair down my butt, getting it from both sides. Musicians would regularly injure themselves, because they were too high to stand up or because they got hit by the bottles thrown from the crowd." And yet precisely this violent marginality seems to have driven the enormous success that punk music had in Spain. In many ways, they gave voice to the chaotic experience of many youths in the transition, when the old parameters of behavior had been exploded but new ones not yet put in place. In Andalusia, the situation seems to have been much less chaotic and traumatic than in other places of Spain. And yet, the impact of this dynamic was still felt. Young Andalusian *punkis* often spoke of "a generation lost to heroin," making reference to those but 5-7 years older than themselves: indeed, people who would now be in their mid- to early thirties.

Although those within this age group remember listening to bootleg copies of the Rolling Stones and some ska and reggae as early as 1973, the emergence of private radio stations brought with it a generalized exposure to the latest in music trends from both United States and Britain. Within the politicized anti-dictatorship circles of Madrid, Barcelona and the Basque Country, it was punk that most caught their fancy. A friend who belonged to a Basque rock band in the early 1980s, remembers what attracted him to punk: "It was loud, it was angry, and we were angry and wanted to be loud about it. People here, the politicians, were splitting up the pie and leaving many of us out. In Euskadi, our hopes for freedom were being squashed by people who called themselves nationalists, in the name of peace and order. Well, if that is what was order was, we wanted disorder, chaos, anarchy!" At first, punk bands were rarely able to record, and publicized their music through live performances and amateur recordings. The first groups to emerge, around the late 1970's, I was told, were "exact copies" of the Sex Pistols: the music was loud, the spirit mean and angry, and the politics vague. Things seem to have changed significantly around the time of the first presidential elections in 1982. By this time, "punk had exploded into the scene."

Punk's violent lyrics and their openly aggressive stance toward authority, particularly that embodied by the Civil Guard, made them frequent targets of arrest and harassment by the State, which further increased their popularity. Many whom I spoke to also pointed to these groups' embracing of anarchy as a viable political option. Indeed, for many youths in Spain anarchist ideology and symbols were becoming increasingly attractive. There was a popular cult surrounding the anarchist heroes of the civil war, especially those of the CNT, and those known as *maquis*, who hid in the countryside throughout Spain and continued to attempt to overthrow the Nationalist forces. Of course,

the Anarchists and their political practices were also seen by many on the left as responsible for the defeat of the Republicans. And yet within youth culture even this stigma became a mark of distinction. An activist in the CNT explained: "I had always been told that the anarchists were largely responsible for the defeat, because they would not compromise, that what they wanted was not freedom but *libertinaje* [the behavior of libertines]. But when politicians began to betray freedom and justice in name of compromise and social order, I, and many others like me, began to suspect the anarchists had good reasons not to submit to the Socialists and the Communists!"

But perhaps what most furthered their association with alternative and oppositional politics was the campaign carried out by the Basque political party Herri Batasuna (HB) to recruit bands to the cause of amnesty towards ETA prisoners. This turned out to be a highly successful strategy for HB, as the party became immensely popular among youths throughout all of Spain. But it also guaranteed the success of the groups who signed on, some of which became superstars. Punk rock quickly became associated with Basque radical youth politics; Spanish punk came to be associated with for Basque identity, in spite of the fact that there were very successful and politically radical groups from many other regions, particularly Catalonia, Madrid and Galicia. This had important implications in terms of the dissemination and politicization of Basque political ideas and causes. For example, a good friend, Antonio, would explain: "You see, the thing with ETA is that although I'm not from ETA -- I mean, I am an anarchist, and nationalism is just another way of fooling people - well, when people start criticizing ETA, it just makes me mad, I can help it! They were hard core, they were tough once, and these people, they never like them, they are probably *fachas* (*fascists*)." When I asked the *okupas* who they felt were the most radical people, invariable the answer was "the Basques." Punk

was often described to me as *música de combate* [combat(ive) music], and one *okupa* went so far as to claim it was the “catechism for revolutionaries” in the 1980’s.

It is interesting to note that for some young Basques, it was precisely the moment in which Punk became intimately associated with nationalist politics that defined the end of the boom. I was told by an ardent supporter and knowledgeable fan that HB, “*fachas* as any others,” coopted the movement. Indeed, there was a deep seated contradiction within many of the bands: how could one be both anarchist and nationalist? However, this critique did not seem to take hold in much of Basque radical youth culture, and was certainly not exported to other areas of Spain where this radical youth culture became so influential. For example, during the mid 1980’s in Andalusia a moderately successful punk band was created, called “the Undesirables,” whose musical style and aesthetics drew heavily on the Basque scene. They often combined nationalist themes with anarchist slogans, as in the case of the song “Andalusia Entera (como Marinaleda),” which makes reference to the hunger strike carried out by farmworkers mentioned in Chapter V. I was also told that they were responsible for the slogan “*Andalusia: Anarquía y cerveza fría*” [anarchy and cold beer], that lampooned the incipient nationalist movement. However, perhaps because of the highly derivative nature of their music, they could never compete with their Basque cohort. Indeed, when I spoke of nationalism to the *punkis*, the *okupas*, and the anarchist, the most likely response I would get was “*cosa de fachas*”.

The scarcity of Andalusian punk bands during this time is related to some of the cultural and political dynamics we discussed in Chapter V. The Andalusian musical scene was overtaken by Andalusian rock, very different than the punk music coming out of the North. The marketing strategies and the

attempt to service emerging niches of "ethnicized" consumers meant that cultural production became geared toward specific commodities, identified as autochthonous and authentic, and those that fell outside established stereotypes failed to be promoted. Andalusian rock was one such product to be promoted, but the fact that it was not seen as political and oppositional had important implications for the reproduction of political culture and nationalist politics in Andalusia.

The apparent "conformity" or at the very least "undesirability" of Andalusian rock's message operated against any identification with Andalusia. This was made very clear by a friend, Ana, who claimed that she often felt embarrassed about saying she was Andalusian. Andalusians, she complained, were not political or militant people. "We are just subservient, quiet, and accept the situation as if it was normal." The Basques, on the other hand, were very active, radical, and politically committed. "The real stuff is going on there. That's where people are at the barricades." When I asked her what she thought were the causes, she answered that "it was in their blood, they've always been *anarkas*." I was so shocked and moved by her words, uttered so casually and matter of factly, that I immediately embarked in an ardent defense of Andalusian anarchists. I pointed out that for many people outside of Spain, anarchism is associated almost exclusively with Andalusia. Furthermore, I argued that historically the Basques had been great supporters of the Monarchy and the Catholic Church, and gave as examples the Carlist movement and Sabino Arana, one of the "forefathers" of Basque nationalism. "Get out of here" was her laughing response. Upon my insistence, she was silent for a moment, and then responded "Well, but you see, that was before. Now Andalusians, we all vote for el PSOE. The Basques are *still* [emphasis mine] fighting, you see.

They can be kind of crazy sometimes, but they are hard headed, tough people who stick to what they believe."

This conversation deeply impressed me, and made me come back to it again and again. Ana, who was one of the leaders of the squatters, and a very articulate and politically informed young woman, nevertheless included herself as one of those who is "subservient and quiet" insofar as she is an Andalusian. Following the dynamics we discussed in Chapter II and Chapter III, we see how Ana essentializes matters of history and politics into matters of "culture" and personality. Interesting also is how in praising the Basques, she resorted to popular stereotypes that were also used against them, as we saw in Chapter V. This crude inversion of value: bad is good, good is bad, is typical of the political message of punk.² However, what I found most interesting was Ana's rendering of history and of contemporary reality. I believe the *always* and the *still* refer to the Civil War, when indeed Basques, as Catalans, Valencianos and people from Madrid resisted valiantly against the Nationalist forces, while Andalusian cities³ fell in rapid succession. History prior to this point just did not seem relevant. But there was more. I suspect that what was taking place was a more subtle operation, one in which the Civil War became a metaphor for speaking of contemporary politics. I will be dealing with this shortly, but first, I would want to speak of the creation of the community in Córdoba.

Kórdoba Okupa: *the creation of identity and community among radical youth*

² Also prevalent was an emphasis on bodily functions, or more often, malfunctions – shit, menstruation, but also vomit, spitting, drooling, etc – perhaps a metaphor for the rottenness of the social body.

³ Young anarchists and *okupas* were always shocked, and disbelieving, when I mentioned that the northern regions of Andalusia, specially those closest to the Sierra Morena, failed to fall under Franco's nationalist control until after the Popular Front's surrender in 1939.

Although as Maddox (1993) points out, Basque rock groups were already attracting enormous crowds by 1980, most Andalusian young people I spoke to, whether they were *okupas* or not, remember the years between 1985 and 1989 as the heyday for Basque punk rock. It was also the time that many believed the *okupa* movement took off. In Bilbao, Begoña, who I was told was an *okupa* for over eight years, remembered: "It was shortly after the first elections, I think Felipe was in power already. At least his face was everywhere! In any case, many of us were real burned from those elections. So these kids, older than me but not much, moved into this house and began to run it like an open space for other kids to come and hang around. It was a way of doing politics outside the normal way, outside of elections, parliaments and other shit. It was later coopted, but at the beginning, it meant something."

Of course, there were those who argued that there had always been *okupaciones*. The Spanish legal system provided extensive squatter rights⁴, and individuals as well as families often "took over" dwellings. However, the *okupa* movement went beyond simple squatting. From its inception, the movement saw itself as a political statement about the need to create affordable housing for young people. "While there are people without roofs [over their heads] squatting is a right" chanted the *okupas* in more than one occasion. However, the idea was also to create a space for youth to meet and develop "cultural, political and leisure" activities. The need for this was stated over and over again by community, youth and even government organizations. And yet little was being done at the level of institutions to meet these needs. It was this latter goal which the *okupas* stressed most strongly, partly because it offered great legitimacy to their cause, and partly because they saw this as a mark of

⁴This is no longer the case. Reacting to the enormous popularity of the movement and a recent string of legal judgments favorable to the squatters, the State enacted new legislation criminalizing squatting.

distinction from other squatter settlements in Europe and the United States. These spaces are often called "libertarian houses" or "libertarian athenaeums," a name borrowed from similar organizations run by anarchist "communards" during the Second Republic and the Civil War.

There are currently over 40 such "libertarian houses" in the Spanish State, most of them in Castille, Catalonia and the Basque country, but there are also important ones in provincial cities such as Saragoza, Logroño, and Palma de Mallorca. It appears that the first *kasa okupa* in Andalusia was created in Granada. I was not able to contact any squatters from that settlement, though I was often pointed to people who were thought to have founded it. There was general agreement that it was located in the Albaicín – the same neighborhood that the Muslim converts were moving into – and that it had moved a lot, for it was always being closed down by the authorities. The next to oldest house was found in Seville, and was considerably more stable, since the squatters had managed to get the Mayor to donate the space on the condition it be used as a self-managed space for youth groups and cultural activities. However, it was closed down in 1995 ostensibly for reasons having to do with an illegal bar on the premises and noise, although political changes at the municipal level brought about by a new and more conservative administration also played a role.

Thus, it is possible that the Córdoba Okupa collective is the most active, and best known, squatter settlement in operation in Andalusia at this moment.⁵ As I said in the introduction to this chapter, the actual take over process was long and carefully planned. It began in early summer but was not carried out until mid October of that same year. In the process, the organizing group drew

⁵ I would not dare say it is the only one, for it seemed that squatter settlements were springing up everywhere. However, at the time of my stay, the okupas in Córdoba knew only of the one in Seville.

upon the resources and expertise of many political activists and progressive individuals within Córdoba. This extensive use of the progressive network did not necessarily translate into full support or even positive reception, however. As we shall see in the following paragraphs, the *okupas* had to overcome many stereotypes and prejudices of elders and youth alike before coming to be seen as a legitimate space and force. This did not come to pass until after I left, a long year and a half after the first squatter settlement was created.

The immediate impulse towards taking over a locale came from a group of young people who were resettling in Córdoba after a period of life outside the city. One had just returned from a sojourn in a ecological Buddhist commune in the Alpujarras. Another had returned from a stay in Navarre, severely injured but with a hefty settlement. They were joined by others in Córdoba who were ready to move out of their homes and live with their lovers, or who wished to see a self-run space for youth like they had seen in other cities and towns. While the core group of organizers consisted of long term friends and acquaintances, others were pulled into the process. The core group, and the others who became slowly incorporated, held no official planning meetings, but rather gathered informally, in spaces such as *El Museo* and other nearby plazas. Sometimes, actual meeting times were set up, but often planing and coordination began spontaneously. As one *okupa* pointed out to me, there was really no need to set a time and place [*quedar*], after all people from Córdoba were creatures of habit, and if one needed to find someone, it was easy enough to get a hold of him or her by looking in the usual hang outs. This almost total lack of structure meant that information was passed on through word of mouth. Given the way in which socialization takes place among youth, which I discussed in Chapter VI, this meant that the people

were integrated slowly into the core group of organizers, and that information was not leaked to people who were not trusted.

I was surprised to realize that in spite of its informality, the network was organized. Even without a formal network of accountability, tasks were completed in what at least appeared to be a fairly expedient fashion. In this way, the youths scouted out possible locations throughout the city. There seemed to already be a tacit agreement about the preferred location; however, since the process of entering and taking over a house was an extremely complicated and precarious one, alternate locations were needed. Throughout the summer, young people entered and surveyed at least five locations that I was aware of. They also had friends look into titles of ownership, discretely asking neighborhood people about the state of occupancy of a house, and spent enormous time watching comings and goings to determine whether indeed the locale was being used or guarded in any way by the owner. An important factor in the final selection also was the isolation of the building, for it was common for neighbors to warn owners if they saw or heard any untoward activity.

In the end, the group agreed to occupy that which had been their first choice: a seigniorial mansion that stood directly across from City Hall but was obscured by a large and unkempt passage-cum garden area. The mansion had once served as a public library but since they had been boarded up and abandoned. The only nearby tenants were an upholsterer, whose store was at the entrance of the alley but who only worked by day, and priests who lived in a monastery to the side. The squatters-to-be kept a discrete but intent watch on the building for several weeks, and finally two of them managed to break and enter in a discrete fashion, to explore the conditions of the building inside. The news was wildly optimistic. Though there was enormous amounts of garbage

and debris, partly left behind by other illegal occupants such as transients and junkies, the place seemed otherwise in good shape. After a couple more recognize visits to the site, the date was set for the occupation.

The process of occupation was the most delicate of moments. If the group did not firmly establish its position, it could easily be forced from the premises. It was decided that occupation would take place over a long weekend, so that the squatters would have time to stake out their claim before the police were alerted. Close to thirty squatters entered the building on the first day, and by the third day, when the police finally came, the number of occupants was close to fifty. Facing the significant numbers involved, the police raid was reduced to asking for identification cards. In the confusion, some were proffered, but immediately an anarchist lawyer who was on premises instructed the young people to refuse. While this could have led to automatic detention, in fact the police were in no mood to take on the squatters at that time, and eventually any left. (Ironically, the police would turn out to be one of the squatters' closest allies, even offering testimony in their favor in one of the trials they faced.)

Along with the police came the media. Not surprisingly, the first news reports were very negative. "Squatters move into crumbling building" read the headline of the story in the local newspaper. Even *El País* covered the occupation in its Andalusia edition. Though using more measured tones, it also relied heavily on the Junta de Andalusia's version of the events. The Junta, the executive branch of the Autonomous community's government, described the way the *okupas* had entered the premises as illegal⁶ and announced plans for the building, which suddenly was on the fast track to be renovated and turned into the new space for the *Delegación de Cultura*, the branch of government dedicated

⁶Before the law was changed in 1995, the burden for keeping people out of a property lay on the owner. The law allowed for people to enter places where there was no secure lock, but the *okupas* had used a crowbar.

to promoting the arts and Andalusian culture.⁷ The Junta of course realized that to have stressed the "ruinous" condition of the building would have legitimized the takeover, which the *okupas* defended on the basis that the building, which they argued had "significant architectural value," had been abandoned. The *okupación*, and the renovation work that would result from it was in service of the greater social good. Indeed, both the *okupas* as an organized collective, and their supporters, wrote to the media and gave interviews in which they characterized the *okupación* as a response to the government's failure to carry out its duty towards its citizens: not only providing for the material needs of its citizens in the form of adequate, affordable housing and employment, but also social, educational and cultural needs, such creating spaces for leisure and the preservation of landmarks of historical and cultural value.

The municipal administration was caught in an awkward position. There is no reason to believe that they were thrilled about having squatters move to the very center of town, in fact, directly across from the Mayor's office. The *okupas*, even at their most ingratiating, were far from being examples of the upstanding, responsible, urbane behavior that any government institution would endorse. However, the leading government coalition, headed by the Communist Party, could ill afford to come down too hard on the young squatters who, in spite of the many criticisms of their lifestyle and morality, were overwhelmingly perceived within the left as part of a truly progressive political force. In the end, the Municipal Administration, while never fully endorsing the settlement, did not actively participate in prosecuting the *okupas*.

⁷Part of the process of selecting a squatter settlement is to research, formally and informally – but always discretely, of course – the ownership and the status of the building. I was told by the *okupas* that nowhere in their investigations did they come up with any indication that there were plans for the building. In this process the squatters had help from members of the CNT.

The police looked the other way in so far as nuisance complaints against the squatters were concerned. Even the prosecutor put in charge of the case basically defended the *okupas* ' actions during the trial, and their case was dismissed by the local judge. (It was eventually lost on appeal around October 1995, but the *okupas* simply took over another building.)

While all these negotiations were taking place, the *okupas* were busy renovating the space that would become their home. The initial stage of renovation took about a month and a half, and many of the initial squatters did not survive the hardships of living on the floor in a humid, dusty and dark decaying building. A core of about twenty young people remained - - not surprisingly, those who had initially come up with the idea. They organized communal meals, to which everyone was invited, and those outside the house paid a suggested fee of 200 pesetas, although this was not enforced. The residents began to rehabilitate specific sections and create small "apartments" within the larger complex, which they took great care to make welcoming and comfortable. But even more work was put into the communal places. Aside from the creation of kitchens and workable bathrooms with running water, murals were painted, gardens created, and specific rooms set up for a variety of purposes: a *distribuidora*, where records, books, magazines and overall paraphernalia were sold or bartered; a meeting room where house meetings would take place,⁸ a ping-pong room, a small bar space and later, a tea house. Murals were painted on many walls and a garden was created.

In carrying out this work, the *okupas* continued to count on the support of a broad network of activists and organizations. Deeply involved were the members of the anarchist labor union CNT and people affiliated with what was

⁸The meetings -- too frequent, too unfocused, too drawn out -- became one of the main reasons why people decided to leave the house and/or leave the movement.

left of the leftist organization MCA [*Movimiento Comunista-Andalucia*]. But there were also other young people, such as my friends whom I spoke of in Chapter VI, and others involved in the conscientious objector and in the gay rights movement. People whose political commitment had been rather vague up to that time became politicized in the process. Such was the case of Isabel, a social work student, who as a class project came up with an analysis of the settlement's viability and its importance as a resource for young people. Previously, Isabel had been involved in activities involving solidarity with the Third World and in women's issues. She became involved through one of her friends, one of the core group of squatters, who had been crucial in developing and carrying out the plan. She had known of the process every step of the way, and decided that while she was not interested in squatting, she could help to build a case in favor of the settlement. "Before, it was all quite vague, almost theoretical. *El okupa* made things quite concrete for me. I may not agree with everything they do, and, in fact, they are quite exasperating, but they are doing something for themselves, in a way that many other people my age would never dare." Her report was circulated to the press and to community groups and used as evidence by the defense in the expulsion proceedings.

However, not everybody was as supportive. Many people, including those in the left, were openly critical of the settlement. To the general stereotypes applied to all youth were added rumors more specifically directed at *punkis*: anti-social behavior, rampant use of hard drugs and violence, and in terms of political acuity, limited or nil. These rumors were to no degree helped by the fact that one of the leaders, known as *el Fa*, was quite well known and despised in leftists circles in Córdoba for his erratic behavior and aggressive and overly critical stance toward leftist organizations in the city, many of which he had belong to when in his teens. The squatters were keenly aware of

this problem, and moved to invite different youth groups and collectives to use the space and organize activities. This was also seen as a source of revenue, which the settlement desperately needed. Thus, a theater group began to rehearse in one of the rooms; English, French and Arabic lessons, puppet, leather and massage workshops, and guitar classes were set up. It was also used by the most openly gay collective in the city. For about a month, the settlement was buzzing with activity.

However, the use of space by other groups whose connection to the squatters and their political culture was otherwise minimal or even antagonistic did not produce the desired effects. These individuals' relation to the settlement remained limited to the use of space, and did not lead to communal projects with the squatters. Many *okupas* felt that they were being taken advantage of. This misunderstanding resulted from a clash of expectations. The groups operated on the assumption that they had been invited to use space that was available, and in this manner contributed to its rehabilitation. They had no intention of extending their involvement any further, lacking both the time and the inclination. The *okupas'* sense of commitment to the settlement and the cause was much stronger. "*Es que esos no se pringan,*" was a common complaint: they do not get their hands dirty, they do not get involved. One after the other, the groups and individuals were asked to leave, and only the gay collective remained. But the unfortunate result was that the *kasa* became associated almost exclusively with its bar. The bar was an important networking tool, quite popular among a variety of young people for its cheap prices and its access to a large, shaded patio, and became a preferred performance space for amateur punk and heavy metal bands. However, once the *kasa* became associated exclusively with leisure, and specifically with forms considered "problematic" by many social sectors, it only created even more

negative gossip and hearsay about the settlement, "confirming" the stereotypes of the squatters as rude, hostile, politically inconsequential hooligans. But in the midst of this negative gossip and publicity, the settlement pushed on.

One of the main issues at stake in many of these conflicts with outsiders was the tension between the "public" and "private" functions of the *kasa*. The usage of the *kasa*, as bar, gathering place, performance space, and even temporary source of housing for transient youths – i.e. its "public" functions – began to conflict with the highly individualistic attitude of many of the house denizens, and their desire for a personal, autonomous space, their creation of domestic places, and the management of their everyday lives – its "private" functions. That is, though the squatters' ideology emphasized that everybody had a right to housing, and that decisions about it were taken in an assembly of residents and users, learned social conventions proved hard to overcome. For the twenty young people who lived there, the settlement became a "home" with all the assumptions that are tied to notions of the domestic: privacy, control and ownership. Tensions mounted over who exactly could aspire to be included in "public" decision-making processes; and over the "fairness" of recognizing and validating the work of those most involved and committed to the settlement versus the ultimate, more abstract fairness of including all. On more than one occasion the house was closed to outsiders for days at a time, and only those who were friends of people living in it could come enter and visit. While these "shut downs" never lasted for long, they were enough to become fodder of further rumors about the "hypocrisy" of those in the house, and side comments about the contradictions between claiming the title of "libertarian athenaeum," and closing the space at will. Another frequent complaint was: "They say they are anarchist, but look at them, charging money for a concert!" (the amount involved was 200 pesetas, the equivalent of 1 dollar and 50 cents.) Conflicts

over defining the *limits* of the settlement's "public"-ness, turned out to be irresolvable.⁹

There has been at least one successful political project carried out by the *kasa*. That was the establishment of a series of conferences in early 1994 related to the Zapatista insurrection in Chiapas, Mexico. The conferences brought in many older activists, who otherwise would not have come to the house, and broadened the political horizons of many *okupas*, who were introduced to the history of Andalusian anarchist and peasant movements perhaps for the first time. The first series of conferences was an enormous success, and a solidarity group with Chiapas was formed. This was crucial to the normalization of the house within the city's political scene and its endurance after its closure by the Junta. The logo of the Platform became "In Chiapas, land and liberty; in Córdoba, housing and liberty [*En Chiapas, tierra y libertad; en Córdoba, casa y libertad*]."

Another chapter of Blue Spain: history and ideology in the okupa movement

The presence of the past in everyday lives of young *okupas* and anarchists was continuously disorienting for me. *Fachas* were everywhere: the military, the police, the priest and the politicians were paramount among the culprits -- and guilty by definition -- but everybody was suspect. Anyone who sustained any kind of institutional relation with the State or with the economy was seen as participating in the maintenance and legitimation of its hegemony, and thus condemned.

⁹Some early squatter settlements have reverted exclusively to homes, and some former squatters even rent their spaces in the tenements. This situation has been increasingly common in many places of Europe, like Britain and Germany, but is still looked upon with shock and horror by most Spanish *okupas*. Many *okupa* settlements today are used exclusively as public spaces for social, cultural and political activities; squatting as a housing solution has been left up to individuals or small groups. This of course makes the housing option more vulnerable, since it does not have the legitimization that its cultural activities provided. But many feel it was the only viable solution to the constant conflicts arose that from the multiple uses of the spaces.

The idea behind squatting was to create a space outside the public sphere, "normalized" by the liberal democratic State where youth could imagine, discuss and organize political, cultural and social alternatives to the reigning orthodoxy or "mainstream." I found consistently that *okupas* were intensely aware, to a degree that some might describe as paranoid, of the State's influence (they would invariably have said "control") over public debate and discussion. *Okupas* in their slogans and everyday conversations were constantly admonishing vigilance against state manipulation and coercion. The mass media, particularly the music industry, is an important target of criticism. Whether it be large radio stations or record labels, *okupas* would go out of their way to avoid any kind of patronage or consumption of their products. Bootleg recordings, pirate radio stations, and the zines were the preferred venues of information. The spread of information was often coordinated through what they called *distribuidoras*, almost always *okupa* -run businesses which created catalogues and warehoused a sizable stock of commodities produced and/or promoted by those within the movement. Among the books I found classic and recent Anarchist texts and an extensive selection of radical left accounts of the Spanish Civil war, but also works by Michel Foucault, Karl Polanyi and even Spanish translations of "Our bodies, Our Selves." This aside from a dizzying selection of underground comic books, music, posters and other paraphernalia.

Part and parcel of operating outside of State control in ways that are seen to undermine the reproduction and stability of the State by breaking individual dependence on it are *estrategias de autogestión* [collective strategies of self-help]. "Promote self-help: make it your self [*Todos por la autogestión, háztelo tu mismo*]" was a very common slogan, written in graffiti in many of the settlements I had a chance to visit. The squatters' movement and the distribution centers are part of this larger goal of attaining an existence independent from the State and

parallel to the capitalist system. This independence from the State is necessary for two main reasons, intimately related.

As can be seen in the rationale for squatting that the *okupas* offered, the State was negligent in its duty. It was not actively taking measures to insure the well being of its citizens and in fact had abandoned its people to their own fates. And yet, at the same time, this state of affairs was inherent in the operation of the capitalist State, thus nothing different could be expected. It is interesting to note that this critique was also applied to the European Union, which was seen as a militaristic and capitalist machine. *Okupas* often spoke of government subsidies and aid, whether European or Spanish, as seen as yet another way which the State had to ensnare and enslave. Pinki believed that, "the State plays tricks with your brain, man. It gets you hooked on this stuff man [aid and income subsidies] like a drug, and you forget how to make a living [*buscarse la vida*]. And they only give it to you so you can spend more, so you can consume more, it's all about getting you to buy and buy and further the system, man. Me, I need very little to get along. These clothes, I bought in *mercadillos*, just plain, and fixed them up myself. I know how to make my own shoes if I need to, you know. I don't give a damn [*paso*] about that consumer stuff. Its all tacky, anyway."

In this context, *autogestión* was both a critique of and a solution for the reality of capitalist relations and liberal democratic States. Many *kasas* offer workshops on other self-help strategies: the making and dyeing of cloth, working with leather and clay, and the ever popular street performing skills such as juggling, mime, and even guitar and flute lessons. These workshops serve not only to provide subsistence and wage earning skills to the young people who participate, but indeed legitimize the settlements as stable and "serious" projects. This of course is very important, as I have shown, in dealing

with and gaining the support of neighbors and constraining the actions of the police and municipal governments. Barter is also integral to the self-help ideology, and is crucial for the distribution of materials and other resources within the *okupa* networks. Cash is obtained mostly by selling to *okupa* supporters, and those who come to make use of the squatter facilities. But most squatter tenements support themselves through illegal bars, which attract a wide variety of young people, thanks to the promise of leniency in drinking age but mostly in the use of hachis, and equally important, their very inexpensive prices.

For the *okupas*, the carving out of space outside the orthodoxy, the normalized or straightened, in Bourdieu's (1977) terms opinion and belief is a continuous struggle, in which the State continuously deployed more clever and devastating weapons. The use of force and violence was seen as integral to this struggle and the *okupas* were quite clear about the fact that weapons were to be used against the State and the other estates of which it was composed: Church, the Military, the Monarchy, the Capitalists and the "Political Class." Their critique and sarcasm about these groups was constant -- in chants, graffiti, t-shirts, buttons, etc. --in statements like "a good priest is a dead priest," "priests, soldiers, politicians are social parasites," or "Church, State, Nation: they all fool you."

Even if their rhetoric does border on the apocalyptic, theirs is not a world-renouncing or millenarian movement. Not for a moment do they consider fleeing from the State to an impenetrable hinterland. As I was told, "Eso es cosa de hippis," those are things hippies would do, but for the *okupa* the state is everywhere, can reach everything. Thus, they argue for tactical interventions, for urban guerrilla strategies of clandestine operations which lead to open confrontation with the State, and attempt to carve out spaces in the

midst of the domains of the State that nonetheless the State will not be able to reach. Indeed, there is an intense fascination with quasi military texts and how-to books on revolutionary activity. And yet, the fear of manipulation frequently becomes a fear of commitment, as I discussed in Chapter VI, so that they often parody their own interest in these strategies. Thus, for example, an excuse about why someone forgot to bring his guitar for a jam session can turn into a hilarious parodic riff on their own discourse about State surveillance and control. Pepe: "Man, you see, there was this guy looking at me while I was going to my house [*keli* ¹⁰]. He was up to no good, dude, reeked of *secreta* [undercover cop, secret police], man, and he got me all nervous. And then I looked out my window, and I swear I saw him again! He was some kind of undercover something man, I had to flee, and who could think of a guitar in those circumstances?."

What to make of the recovery of Civil War history and memories in such a personalized fashion? While many would resist taking this rhetoric too seriously, I can not bring myself to dismiss it as child's play. However, although I insist on the importance of their rhetoric in pointing to "silences" within political and historical discourse, I concede that the *okupas* are not entirely successful in giving this discourse voice. For in the end, the *okupas* concern with history is only insofar as it offers a commentary on the present. Their discourse mythologizes the Civil War more than it engages with it, making sacred that which became unmentionable or in fact outright embarrassing for a Spain that claimed to have achieved modernity and was ready for Europeaness. Instead of a sad spectacle of fanaticism and incivility, the Civil War becomes the most glorious moment of Spanish history, precisely

¹⁰ The name given to a house or an abode in *kaló* or *kalé*, a urban dialect associated with Gypsies.

because it symbolized Spanish people's commitment to liberty and justice. And in so far they do this they are indeed successful.

Juntos pero no revueltos:¹¹ *other youth politics, and their influence*

It is interesting at this stage to compare the political views of the okupas with other young people politically active in the conscientious objector movement, specifically the branch that advocates against military service and against community or bureaucratic work as alternative service. The *movimiento de insumisión* has become one of the most important political movements of young people today. The movement gained enormous momentum during the late 1980's and early 1990's, with over 4,000 young men in jail for refusing not only the military service but the substitute social service as well. Indeed, the movement's popularizing and galvanizing potential among youth has been recognized by politicians. After the recent general elections (March 1996) in which the conservative Partido Popular won over the PSOE but with an insufficient margin to form a government, the Catalan nationalists, by all measures a conservative party, raised as a condition for entering a ruling coalition the ending of obligatory military service.

In the arguments of the *insumisos* we begin to observe the young people making systemic connections between their movement and a broader goal of social change. Activists I interviewed seemed well versed not only on pacifist but also environmental and feminist critiques of the military and its role. However, what distinguishes this movement from other conscientious objection paradigms is a reflection on the role of the substitute social service. The very idea of *insumisión* is that social service is just another form of service to the State in its current unjust form. The movement points to the role that

¹¹ The phrase can be translated as "together, but not mixing/ bonding,"

substitute social services have in creating a pool of coerced, underpaid labor that allows the State to institute further cutbacks and layoffs. As I was told by one young man during a rally: "Many within the *movimiento de insumisión* believe they are attacking the root of the problem, that is the State in two of its strongest functions. We challenge the idea of 'welfare' by pointing out how programs such as the social service play a role in the maintenance of unjust social relations, and the military apparatus as the legitimized exercise of violence that attempts to deter through the threat or the actual exercise of force anyone challenging the unfair system." As I was recording, a young woman addressed the crowd by saying "*Insumisión* builds culture, makes civil society grow, allows it to get organized and allows it to impose itself over an authoritarian power."

Furthermore, the movement has been very successful in broadening its base of support to extend far beyond its immediate constituency, that of young men of military age, by exploiting some of the more improbable and untenable aspects of the law making *insumisión* a criminal act. The law states that the mere act of "inciting" a young man to refuse to serve is punishable to the same degree as the act of refusal itself. Thus, at every trial of an *insumiso*, four other people come forth and admit to having incited the young man to refuse military service. This is known in the movement as *estrategias de autoinculpamiento*, the strategic voluntary confession of "guilt." As I was told by Antonio Luna, the lawyer for most of the *insumisos* in Córdoba and one of the first to get a favorable judgment (though it was later overturned); "This strategy of *autoinculpamiento* goes beyond creating solidarity with other sectors of the population; it is also meant to create the grounds for a class action suit against discrimination and to bog the judicial system down so as to slow its processing of the *insumisos*."

In Córdoba, what struck me about the *insumisos* is how in their rhetorical style and political culture they reminded me so much of the preceding generation of activists. Indeed, they possess an earnestness that was lacking in most other youth I associated with. In fact, their untiring political activity and the zeal with which they carried it out drove some of my young women friends to label them pamphleteers [*pamfleteros*]. An example of their single-minded dedication to their cause was the entertainment they chose for a trip to a demonstration in Madrid. We spent close to 10 hours on the bus, and in that time they showed four films: one was about Irish political prisoners, the other about political repression in South Africa, the other about death squads in el Salvador and finally one about the Sahara question. Only one of them, the one on South Africa, was a feature film. The unrelenting seriousness of the topics and the consistency of the messages prompted a man, in his mid-forties, to draw parallels to popular stereotypes about the process of recruitment to cults. After the fourth film had ended, he turned to one of the MOC leaders and commanded urgently in a stage whisper: "Quick, bring the sweet cookies!" To the rest of the crowd, he said with a sinister smile: "Eat, eat my friends and repeat after me: MO-O-C...MOC...," leaving most of those traveling grateful for the comic relief.

The movement is not of course without its contradictions. It is strongest and most popular in the most ethno-nationalist regions of the State, namely Euskadi and Catalonia. There, hundreds of young men have been jailed in their refusal to serve "the Spanish State." In such cases, it is unclear the extent to which the young people are pacifists or just protesting the enforced service to a State they do not recognize as legitimate. One young man who was completing the social service in a rural town in Andalusia challenged: "If it was the Basque state calling, if it was ETA, they sure would be willing to serve and fight."

They're not pacifists, just anti-Spanish. And that's o.k., if you're honest about it." An older acquaintance in Catalonia told me of the Catalan objectors movement: "They may be nationalists, but what they are for sure is kids who don't want to do their military service, not for Felipe [González], not for Pepe [José Aznar, leader of the Partido Popular], not for Pujol [Jordi Pujol, president of the Catalan Autonomous Community], not for their saintly mothers..."

In the case of the *okupas*, it was clear that they were against the Military in so far as it was a monopoly of the State which secured its reproduction and also offered legitimacy. However, the *okupas* are not pacifists by any stretch of the imagination. I found many of the young men to be enamored of weapons and military technology, and quite adamant about the necessity of using them against the State. Given that very few had ever come in contact with any kind of weaponry outside of knives, clubs and chains, however, and fewer yet had used them (I can only speak of those in Córdoba), I often joked that they were better off serving in the military in order to learn how to use the instruments they so admired, or they risked shooting off a foot or spraining their thumb on the trigger. But they did not take to this joking lightly, and were quite adamant in their insistence that given the situation, they were willing and able to fight for liberty and equality. They would immediately come up with examples of when they had done so: against a gang of *ultras* [fascist football hooligans], or against a group of *skines* [skin heads].¹² Had they ever used a gun?, I would ask. No, but they knew they could.

Is this simply braggadocio? Certainly, male pride is at issue. However, it became clear to me that their mythologized relation to history was also involved. The *milicianos* had no training, I was often told. Others said that the

¹² There was very little activity on the part of fascist youths in Córdoba. Most encounters took place outside the city, either in Madrid or most likely Barcelona, where skin head violence has become an extremely common and a serious public safety hazard.

sight of a *facha* would improve their aim. To me, though, their fascination with weapons and with violence was more like ideology tied to their relatively superficial analysis of Spanish history, specifically that of the Civil War; it was not a real option for violence. Some might argue that this ideology might turn into practice given the opportunity, and offer the Basque case as an example. And my response would be that while that certainly became a legitimate option there, it was due to extremely complex circumstances which are not to be found in contemporary Andalusia.



Figure 6. Front entrance to Kasa Okupa Kordoba, after renovations were made by squatters

(Cordoba, 1993)

IX. (In) Conclusions

"Remembering, forgetting and recalling
belong to the historical constitution of
man and are... part of his history..."

—Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth
and Method*

In the preceding pages I have presented my account of the "limits and forms of *memory* " (Foucault 1991) in contemporary discourses about politics and identity in Andalusia. I focused on how the Spanish State attempted to homogenize memories through its transformative hegemony and how (in)subordinate groups countered these strategies by mobilizing silenced memories, and attempting to establish their *present* relevance for all members of society. This is what I have called *re-membering*: the struggle to raise discursive practices that had been defined as "not real" (or *realistic*) from the level of doxa (Bourdieu 1977), the taken for granted, and reintegrate them, have them be recognized as legitimate and valid alternatives to the orthodoxy promoted by the reigning hegemonic configuration of the State. In this process, these residual discourses, these "structures of feeling" (Williams 1979), acquire the potential of emerging as powerful challenges to the present hegemonic configuration. I argued (1) that the use of time and space in discourses about Andalusia was crucial in consolidating the region's position within Spanish political economy and cultural imaginary, a position that became central to various Spanish state legitimizing strategies; (2) that at different historical conjunctures-- the early 1960s, late 1960', early 1970s, and the 1980s -- changes in cultural politics led to the elaboration of alternative discourses about Andalusia's "past" and present "reality;" (3) that these discourses challenged, implicitly or explicitly, the legitimacy of the Spanish nation-state; and, (4) that these politics, and their broader ethical implications, were often coded in the language of identity.

In the first part of my dissertation I discussed how notions of memory were employed in various political and social movements since the late 1960s in Andalusia. Chapter II offered a discussion of different yet related discourses -- Orientalism, *Casticismo*, National Catholicism, as well as the discourse about the "New Spain" or the "Spain of the Autonomies" -- that helped define and construct representations of Andalusia, with profound effects on the constitution of an Andalusian identity. In Chapter III, I addressed explicitly how the temporalizing and spcilizing practices of these different, yet related, discourses "naturalized" -- made immutable, essentialized -- the social, political, economic and even cultural subordination of Andalusians. My intention was to show that memory and the "past," are not inert bodies of knowledge, lying in wait to be accessed through proper techniques or technologies. This is because I believe that a focus on memory as the transmission of events and ensembles of practices and statements, is incomplete without a nuanced understanding of the ways that memory is used as a discursive foil, consciously and unconsciously, in order to legitimate statements, performances, programs, and politics that support -- or challenge -- social "reality" as it is hegemonically defined in the present.

Thus, I argued that memory should be understood in terms similar to those used by Fischer (1986) when making reference to ethnicity: memory "... is not... simply passed on from generation to generation, taught and learned: it is...dynamic, often unsuccessfully repressed or avoided. It can be potent even when not consciously taught;...institutionalized teaching easily makes [it] chauvinist, sterile and superficial,...[it] emerges in full -- often liberating -- flower only through struggle" (Fischer 1986: 197). In Chapters IV through VII explored how generational dynamics shaped the political cultures of Andalusians, discussing how social changes in Spain -- and the world -- transformed the way of doing politics, even what was considered political. I

describe the enormous impact this has had on oppositional social and political movements, particularly in the ways they chose to challenge official, legitimized narrations of the past, as well as the hegemonic vision for the present and future of Andalusia, Spain, and even the world.

I have argued that these political, economic and social changes also led to shifts in the Spanish state's strategies of legitimation. Perelli (1994) has pointed out that in states that find themselves facing reduced political, economic and social circumstances, particularly when compared to a past marked by prominent accomplishments, this past, often in the form of memory, can be mythologized and used to unify citizens. This was and is the case for Spain, (and perhaps doubly so for Andalusia, once the richest and now the poorest region within Spain). However, because the most immediate memories related to the Civil War and the dictatorship -- events so unthinkable, so unspeakable, so antithetical to claims to civility and civilization -- they portrayed an inhumanity that threatened to taint not only past glories but future achievements. The emerging hegemonic configuration, locally and at the level of the State, could not contemplate allowing a full reflection on and about this past and its memories. It thus turned to the future, to modernity, to Europe, to create a narrative that would unify the population. (Indeed, following the logic of National Catholicism, in becoming Europe[an] Spain would have ceased to exist: the memories of the Spain that no longer existed were of course irrelevant).

The strategy of legitimation that emerged after the transition is reminiscent of those described by Connerton (1989) and Koontz (1994) in reference to the French Revolution and post-war Germany. However, there was never a revolution, a rupture, not even trials to mark the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in Spain. While the peacefulness of the transition was said to constitute ultimate proof that Spain had indeed overcome its past

and could look forward to a future of democracy and civility, this peace was only achieved at the price of forgiving and forgetting the immediate past. I described how as Franco and his *Franquismo* quickly receded into the mists of time, the former dictator become increasingly a mythological figure. In this process of temporal and special distancing, the figure of Franco lost not only immediacy but also its reality and its power. In discussing the effects of this "programmed disenchantment" (Ortí 1989), Chapters II and IV and V deal with how both in Andalusia and at the level of the State there was a concerted strategy of political demobilization, in order to curtail dissidence and better manage the "reconciliation" between long time opposing political factions.

Koontz, in describing similar dynamics has used the term "organized oblivion." She restricts its usage to "totalitarian states" that impose "a single narrative that vindicates the leaders and vilifies their enemies, but leaves the average citizens cynical and alienated" (Koontz 1994:258). However, as many have argued, while differing in scope and enforcement, similar processes are also at play in most liberal democracies. It is perhaps the hope and expectation offered by the concept of "democracy" that can keep some of the cynicism and alienation at bay. Democracy legitimizes the "public sphere" as an autonomous arena in which private citizens, as part of "the public," can participate not only through electoral politics but also through a multiplicity of mass media. But for how long? As Virginia Dominguez has pointed out, "the underlying assumptions" about the public are 1) that it exists and 2) that it is a "fact" that the government and the media must contend with. It is also the case that "a sense of the public is implicit in acts of censorship" (Dominguez 1987: 28). Recent studies of the public sphere, which I discussed in Chapter V, have gone so far as to suggest that any notion of the private is predicated on such mandatory silencing (Hansen 1993).

This is partly because the production of the public as a "positivity" both essential for but also unique to democracy creates a tautology that undercuts claims made from outside this "Public." Democracy perpetuates the myth of individual "freedom" by defining it as autonomy from social and political control and liberty of thought and action. This myth, as Althusser (1981) pointed out, obscures the systemic nature of knowledge and power. While democracy's imperfections are seen as part of "reality," the imperfections are not tied to the system ("democracy") but to the way it is practiced by *individuals*, - that is, "to human nature." Attempts to point to the limits of (liberal) democracy, to the glaring contradictions of electoral politics that stem in no small part from the metonymical relationship between the doxic or ideological category of "public" and the body politic which we discussed above, become by default "unrealistic" - - "there is nothing better," -- or worse, subject to "totalitarianism" -- that is, of not respecting the sacred rights of the "individual."

While the ability to mobilize political power might be a necessary condition for being addressed as part of the public, it is certainly not a sufficient one. Paraphrasing Orwell, we can say that "All publics are equal but some are more equal than others." This work has as its primary focus precisely those whose mobilization was not sufficient, those "publics" or "constituencies" who have been excluded from the government's and mass media's definition of the homogenized, hegemonic "Public." In other words, those who were "censored" although not by a dictator, those whose hopes were reduced to dreams - - why should they not become even more cynical and alienated? Chapter VI addressed these issues when dealing with the much vilified political (to some, apolitical) culture of Spanish youth. I argued that much of what is seen as a callousness, even nihilism, is directly related to having come of age at time of "political disenchantment" that followed the transition. Furthermore, I pointed out how

their ignorance and amnesia is intricately connected to changes in political culture, and the retreat of oppositional groups from the "public sphere".

A large number of Spaniards abandoned political activity altogether, a small number refocused their energies, this time around a politics that aimed for a broader ethical vision of justice and equality. Politicizing the "personal," they embarked on a variety of projects and programs that transcended the State in ways that previous forms of internationalism, with the notable exception of anarchism, had yet to do. Another aspect of challenging the categories of personal/private and political/public was to personalize the political, in the form of a politics couched and performed in the language of identity. This is the context for the "option of marginality" that was made by my informants as part of their tactics for contesting hegemonic renderings of reality, which I began to address in Chapter V. In Chapters VII and VIII, I discuss at length two such social and political movements, a movement of conversions to Islam, and the *Okupa* movement of anarchists and squatters. Both of these movements, and others alluded to in Chapter V, shared a critique of the institutional(ized), legitimized "public sphere" as an arena of control and intervention by the State and other powers that be (Capital, political parties, labor unions, even former class identities.) Instead, they sought to create open, "free" spaces for political praxis at the margins of hegemonically accepted/integrated discursive practices. The profound differences between these movements are seen as breaks in memory created by the "organized oblivion" of the democratic State that posed limits but also opened spaces to new critiques and politics.

In emphasizing the role of temporalizing and spacializing discourses emerging from the state, I do not wish to imply that memory is necessarily tied to a "traditional" politics whose ultimate goal is to obtain redress from the State in the form of aid or other interventions. This was certainly the tenor of

Andalusian nationalist politics during the transition, and the view of many Spanish citizens in general, who believed that the new liberal democratic regime was designed to represent their interests and was capable of doing so adequately. However, the "politics of memory" in Andalusia today are quite complex, and are just as likely, as is the case with the Muslim converts and the radical youth, to eschew any such direct intervention by a State that is seen as continuing to perpetuate the legacy of the dictatorship through its support of practices and institutions considered authoritarian, such as the police, the military and the Catholic church. However, given that the State remained as the ultimate source of legitimation, and as the most legitimate of all powers, any critique and attempt to change the power structure of society must necessarily address itself to the State at one level or another. The question of whether or not these tactics will change with the increasing interference of the European Union and other such supra-national bodies remains to be seen, although given the way their intervention is formulated and structured, it does seem that they are inclined to use the State as a buffer between the centers of decision making and the population. This is painfully clear in the rhetoric of the European Union, which would have the States remain in charge of "cultural" *and* (much more worrisome) "social" matters, while increasingly taking over governing the economy, foreign relations and currency.

All told, I have explored the dynamics of memory in Andalusia during this transition – how memories were created, collected, became collective and re-presented, and how different groups chose to re-present and re-collect different memories or the same ones differently. By focusing on the practices of groups who either by force or choice found themselves at the margins of hegemonic narrations of past, present and future realities, I hoped to demonstrate how studies of "marginality," rather than simply focusing on deviance or eccentricity,

can in fact illuminate very central aspects of a society's culture, and thus be crucial in our understanding of the workings of processes of homogenization and the creation of transformative hegemonies.

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