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IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
AMONG SECOND-GENERATION KOREAN AMERICANS IN NEW YORK

by

Dae Young Kim

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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
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
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

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Abstract

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY AMONG
SECOND-GENERATION KOREAN AMERICANS IN NEW YORK

by

Dae Young Kim

Adviser: Philip Kasinitz

This dissertation examines the educational and labor market outcomes and intergenerational mobility of second-generation Korean Americans in metropolitan New York. Based on a phone survey of 200 hundred second-generation Korean Americans and 40 in-depth interviews (a subsample of children of entrepreneurs and professionals from the phone survey), the study explores the diverse mobility paths of the second generation and the factors behind their trajectories. Given the concentration of Korean immigrants in small business, the dissertation investigates the role of immigrant small business on the educational and labor market outcomes of their children. At a time when economic restructuring is consolidating an "hour-glass" economy that requires post-secondary education for upward mobility, the key question was whether immigrant small business in conjunction with a vibrant ethnic economy serve as a springboard for mobility into mainstream educational and occupational establishments for the second generation. The primary finding is that parents' class background plays far more important role than entrepreneurship, unlike the prevailing image of Asian American

entrepreneurial success story. Nevertheless, the ethnic economy still provides a safety net for the less-successful children of Korean immigrants, and the effect of immigrant strategies of mobility has been the rapid assimilation of the second generation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation journey has its roots with my own immigration experience. My parents had immigrated to Paraguay and I had grown up as a 1.5er Korean Paraguayan. Then I left for the US to begin my undergraduate studies at the State University of New York-Binghamton. My parents later joined me in New York, becoming twice migrants, starting the immigration process all over again. My interest in immigration and the adaptation of immigrants and their children was sparked then. In graduate school, I had the good fortune and guidance to undertake a project to study immigrant communities in New York City. This hands-on research, initiated by Professors John Mollenkopf and Philip Kasinitz, funded by the CUNY Chancellor's office, gave me the opportunity to study the relationship between Korean immigrant entrepreneurs and their expanding Latino labor force. Not only did I get my feet "wet" through the research but also the relationship I formed with the project directors changed the direction of my graduate studies. I would like to thank John Mollenkopf and Philip Kasinitz for helping me grow, both as a researcher and student of immigration, who have been pivotal in my research and intellectual development. Their subsequent pilot study of the second generation (with Mary Waters) and my involvement with the project served as a backdrop to my successful completion of this dissertation. Mathew Lindholm, a colleague at CUNY GC, opened the doors to work with John Mollenkopf at the Center for Urban Research. Although life histories seem somewhat random events, looking back you realize that certain key people or crucial moments help define the direction you take, solidifying the research issues that had been latent all through the detours and excursions you take along

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CHAPTER 1: ETHNICITY, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY

INTRODUCTION

The idea that making it on one's own is the quickest road to upward mobility is firmly entrenched in the American psyche. From the "self-made" industrialists and entrepreneurs of the 19th and 20th century to the entrepreneurial success stories of Jews, Italians, Greeks, Japanese, and Chinese, to the success stories of post-1960s immigrants such as Cubans and Koreans today, entrepreneurship is regarded as a time-tested formula for upward mobility. In a 1985 edition of Time magazine, Asians were proclaimed the new immigrant heroes, whose entrepreneurial resourcefulness and drive were claimed to be central to their economic success: "Like previous generations of immigrants many Asians seek to realize their personal American dream not just by finding a good job but by starting their own business, the ultimate statement of independence" (Doerner 1985: 43-44).

This seemingly tried and true formula for upward mobility has, however, been on the decline for natives. First, as entrepreneurial capitalism of the 19th century gave way to industrial and corporate capitalism during the 20th century, Americans sought jobs that were comparable to or better than entrepreneurship and with far less risk. Second, early social observers felt that self-employment was going to further decline as society became increasingly bureaucratized and the corporate economy drove the small competitors away, making small-scale production obsolete (Waldinger 1986). Thus, contrary to the ideology of rugged individualism and the entrepreneurial pursuit, natives are shunning this sector.

Instead, entrepreneurship is heavily pursued by immigrants. Immigrants of today and the past have shown consistently high rates of self-employment, pointing to the racial and ethnic segmentation of the labor market. Faced with language, cultural, and credential barriers that restrict immigrants to secondary labor markets or simply unemployment, entrepreneurship provides one of the "best" (or one of the few) means of overcoming these obstacles (Light and Gold 2000). Furthermore, the fact that some groups have sought the entrepreneurial route more than other groups suggests that there may be specific factors particular to the group that leads them to undertake entrepreneurship over other forms of employment. Is entrepreneurship a strategy to offset disadvantages in the economy? Will immigrants seek other forms of employment when proper adjustments have been made in the host society? Is entrepreneurship a short-term strategy by immigrants to offset disadvantage? Will it cease to be important for subsequent generations, the offspring of immigrants and their children? As the 1.5 and 2nd generations overcome the language, cultural, and credential barriers, will they seek employment in the mainstream instead of in the risky businesses of their immigrant parents?

The exceptional self-employment rates of Korean immigrants, for instance, like Jews in the past, are frequently construed as evidence of Korean immigrants' rapid economic success. In a context where many first-generation Korean immigrants have taken the ethnic economy path, especially the small business route, what are the labor market trajectories of the second generation¹? Are 1.5 and second-generation Korean

¹ The term second generation includes the 1.5ers unless stated otherwise. By second generation, I refer to those who were born in the US with at least one parent who was born in Korea. By 1.5, I refer to those who were born in Korea (or elsewhere) and came to the US by 12 or younger with at least one Korean-born

Americans abandoning the ethnic strategies of mobility of their parents (the ethnic enclave and its cultural traits) in favor of mainstream channels of mobility in the primary labor markets? Considering the claim that the ethnic economy has been a viable alternative for the first generation (Portes et al. 1985, 1991), what function does it provide for the second generation? Does it serve as a springboard to intergenerational "mobility" for second-generation Korean Americans as has been the case for Jews earlier (Steinberg 1981)? Or is it a safety net for the 1.5 and second generations who have difficulty penetrating the mainstream? In what circumstances does the ethnic economy turn into a "mobility trap"?

Furthermore, given the widespread image of Asian youth as "overachievers", what are the costs of failure in a "model minority"? What happens to the less-successful children of Korean immigrants? How does discrimination in the mainstream economy (i.e. the "glass ceiling") impact on the identities of 1.5 and second generations? How do the trajectories of children of small business owners compare to the offspring of professionals and workers? In light of the increasing social acceptance of Asian Americans, how are 1.5 and second-generation Korean Americans received in the US? How will this impact the future of ethnicity?

This dissertation addresses these questions by examining the educational and labor market patterns of the 1.5 and second-generation Korean Americans in New York. This study represents one of the first attempts to address the role that immigrant

parent. I chose 12 because that age reflects a substantial upbringing in the US and also because I wanted to be comparable to the second-generation household survey by Mollenkopf et al (1997) who have operationalized the definition of the 1.5 using the same criteria. Rumbaut (1994) distinguishes between second, 1.75, 1.5, and 1.25. Won Moo Hurh has also written about the 1.5 generation Korean Americans. In my sample, 70% of the respondents were 1.5ers and 30% were truly second generation.

entrepreneurship and class plays in the outcomes of the new second generation. To date, not only has there been very little research² on the new second generation but also most of it has been speculative and/or has focused on the experiences of second-generation children and teenagers, primarily of Caribbean Black and Latino immigrants and Vietnamese refugees. By examining the experience of second-generation Korean Americans in metropolitan New York, the offspring of middle-class immigrants, I hope to specify the variation in second-generation outcomes as a result of the varied economic incorporation of the first generation into US society. For underneath the question of intergenerational mobility lies a theoretical and policy concern regarding the capacity of the US to incorporate post-1960s immigrants and their offspring. On the one hand, the restructuring of the American economy raises doubts about the capability of the US to incorporate millions of immigrants. On the other, natives fear that the new immigration from the Third World, a radically different stream of migration (different race, language, culture, customs) from previous migrant streams, is invading and altering the make up of US society. While some of these questions can be addressed by the experience of the first generation, the long-term effects of 35 years of continued immigration since the 1960s, including the costs and benefits of immigration and questions of nationhood, cannot be properly answered by the immigrant generation. These questions can only be answered by the offspring of immigrants and their children, the 1.5 and second

² Min and R. Kim (1999)'s edited volume presents narratives of adult second-generation Asian Americans, which examines questions of ethnic identity (See also E. Kim and Yu, 1996). Nazli Kibria (1997, 1998) examines the formation of panethnicity among second-generation Korean American and Chinese American college students.

generations who are coming of age and entering the educational and labor market institutions of US society. Intergenerational mobility, or the lack thereof and the pace of that mobility will determine how the US fares as a nation, shaping future patterns of ethnic and racial relations as well what kind of nation that will emerge from the multiplicity of ethnic and racial groups.

ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND IMMIGRATION IN NEW YORK CITY

The restructuring of the American economy, from a manufacturing base to a post-industrial, service economy, is captured best by no other city than New York. As the immigrant city par excellence, although Los Angeles now surpasses New York in sheer number of immigrants, New York is the most ethnically and racially diverse city in the world. This diversity, furthermore, encompasses and reflects New York's quintessential European immigrant past as well as its present non-European immigration (Waldinger 1996).

Immigrants of past and present have played and continue to perform key roles in the New York economy, and in many ways contributed to the restructuring process. During its heyday as a manufacturing center, immigrants in New York provided the much needed labor for its core industries- from apparel goods, printing and publishing to financial and insurance services (Torres 1995: 34). As small firm production was replaced by mechanized and mass factory production, New York lost its former advantages to lower cost, non-unionized regions in the west and the southwest. The culmination of this transformation, followed by a drastic reduction of New York's population, did not arrive until the fiscal crisis of the 1970s, when white ethnics relocated

to greener pastures or simply exited from the New York labor market as they reached retirement age. Had it not been for the new immigration, New York's population would have been significantly reduced (Muller 1993).

Yet, the transformation of the US economy from industries to corporate services was well suited to bring New York back to its global financial city status, as it was well positioned to take advantage of its prior experience in the financial and service industries. These new arrangements also remade the population and labor force in New York, as the influx of post-1960s immigrants along with ethnic/racial succession reorganized the city's occupational and racial composition (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991). In addition, the polarization of the US economy into low-wage service industries and high-wage corporate services was deepened by the entry of post-1960s immigrants who revived the remaining small manufacturers either on the way out or on the brink of elimination. In a twist of the tendency for production to be centralized and mechanized, the effect has been the return to old methods of production such as simple production techniques, piecework, substandard pay, and in some case return to homework (part of flexible production and labor) (Torres 1995: 30). Consequently, today, as in New York's past, New York's labor market is segmented by race, ethnicity, and gender (Waldinger 1996). The incorporation of immigrants and their children in the US offers a glimpse to how today's New York labor market is being altered and impacted by immigration, race, and a service economy.

KOREAN IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR OFFSPRING

Although Korean immigrants are not the largest Asian group in the US, their numbers have grown tremendously over the years, especially during the decade of the

1980s. New York has the second largest Korean community after Los Angeles, but Korean communities are flourishing in other major urban centers. Without a doubt, what has captured the attention of scholars and the media has been the disproportionate involvement of Korean immigrants in small business (I. Kim 1981; Light and Bonacich 1988; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Min 1996; Light and Rosenstein 1995; Min 1998; Light and Gold 2000). Indeed, Korean immigrant businesses, from the corner grocery store to drycleaners, have become ubiquitous urban fixtures. Moreover, just like their Jewish counterparts in the past, Korean immigrant entrepreneurs have captured niches as middleman minorities, servicing minority (African American and Latino) communities. Not only are they praised for their "relentless" entrepreneurial spirit, but also their high visibility in small business has thrust upon them the designation of "model minorities".

Yet, for their role as middleman minorities, Korean immigrants have also been caught in the racial crossfire in such incidents as the 1990 Brooklyn boycotts and the 1992 Los Angeles "riots". Nonetheless, in spite of the conflicts and difficulties that immigrant entrepreneurship may give rise to, the hardships and sacrifices of the Korean small business owners become legitimated, even celebrated as a rite of passage, by the successful entry of their US-born/raised children into the elite colleges and the primary sectors in the mainstream economy. Consequently, the successes of the subsequent generation further perpetuate the "model minority" image of Asian Americans, obscuring factors that may play a more crucial role in the mobility of the second generation. Given the theoretical underpinnings about the crucial role of the ethnic economy on the economic integration of the first generation, the outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans provide an important empirical test to segmented assimilation theory. Thus,

the viability and impact of the ethnic economy beyond the first generation will be put to a critical examination with the experience of the 1.5 and second-generation Korean immigrants in New York.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

While ethnographic studies and surveys of teenagers do provide information about their job prospects, they do not capture the actual labor market experience of the second generation that is just coming of age. Furthermore, because these studies covered mostly Caribbean blacks, Latinos and poor Asians, there is a paucity of data regarding the offspring of middle-class immigrants. Bearing these critical issues in mind and to best capture the impact of the ethnic economy on labor market trajectories of second-generation Korean Americans in New York, I adopted a methodological approach combining survey data and qualitative data.

Sampling Issues

The largest study to date on the adult offspring of post-1960s immigrants in metropolitan New York is the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York conducted by the Center for Urban Research of the CUNY Graduate Center and Harvard University [Mollenkopf, Kasinitz, Waters] (in the final stages as of this writing). The project began with a pilot survey (the Second-Generation Pilot Survey- hereafter SGPP) conducted from 1995 to 1997 (in-person screening in high and low concentration areas and any crossovers) to assess the costs of doing a full household survey. After several months in the field, the SGPP reached the conclusion that a random digit dialing (RDD)

of metropolitan New York would yield the best random sample despite a bias toward households with telephones³. Because of the smaller population of Koreans than the other four major immigrant groups, resulting in low hit rates using the RDD methodology, the SGPP decided to drop Koreans and Haitians from the full household survey considering the high costs involved in finding them.

Given the theoretically important question about the role of the ethnic economy on the prospects of the second generation and my interest and familiarity with Korean immigration to the US and New York, I took up the challenge of finding an alternative methodology to make up for the omission of second-generation Korean Americans from the large-scale study. Since there were no comparable studies of the adult second generation in other cities, a study of the adult Korean-American second generation in New York was warranted. The formidable task, just as it had been for the Second-Generation Project, was how to locate a representative sample of second-generation Korean Americans in a cost-effective way. Initially, I conceived of drawing second-generation samples from workplaces, on the basis of where second-generation Korean Americans may be seeking employment and the reasons for selecting these occupations. However, this strategy would draw the sample from the dependent variable, incorrectly attributing cause and effect. Another possibility was to draw samples from college and church directories. However, the sample would be limited to those of the second generation who were involved in churches or had gone to college, making it hard to decipher what the role of the ethnic economy would be on second-generation Korean

³ Initially the SGPP started with 6 immigrant groups (Dominicans, West Indians, Haitians, South Americans, Chinese, and Koreans) and 3 comparison groups (blacks, whites, Puerto Ricans) in New York.

Americans. A third scenario was to sample Korean immigrant businesses in Flushing, a vibrant enclave in Queens, New York, and investigate how the children of these immigrant entrepreneurs fared in the labor market. While this methodology would clearly reveal how small business impacts the outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans, without comparison samples in other ethnic economy businesses (middleman minorities and majority-oriented businesses) as well as a sample that included the children of workers and professionals, it would be difficult to assess what the impact of small business is on the educational and labor market trajectories of the second generation. Furthermore, operationalizing the ethnic economy entailed other difficulties, making the surname methodology, sampling on the basis of Korean surnames, an attractive alternative.

Surname Sample

Among many groups, Koreans have one of the more unique set of surnames. According to Rosenwaike (1994), 10 Korean surnames account for fully 65% of the Korean population. In fact, the surname "Kim" accounts for 22% of the Korean population (Shin and Yu 1984) and this distribution, Shin and Yu found, remains fairly comparable in the US. Since surname research has been used with Hispanic-origin surnames (Rosenwaike 1994) and Jewish surnames (Himmelfarb et al. 1983), indicating its feasibility, Korean surnames, because of greater population homogeneity, were even better suited for surname research than other ethnic surnames (Shin and Yu 1984). Consequently, with an exhaustive master list of Korean surnames, such a sample would

cover a large percentage of the Korean American population, providing a representative sample. Also not only was this method cost effective but also was most up-to-date and able to locate a population that exhibits high residential mobility and geographic dispersal. In short, among nonprobability methods of sampling such as using alumni directories and organization membership lists, the surname telephone sample, as previous research demonstrated, would yield a far more unbiased sample.

In spite of these advantages, there were a few considerations to take into account. Since the screening process involved reliance on phone screens, telephone subscription rates for Koreans needed to be verified. However, telephone coverage was not a serious problem for Koreans. As Shin and Yu (1984) argue, Koreans have high telephone subscription rates, approximately at 98% telephone coverage. Unlisted phone numbers, nationally at 16-20%, can be a problem; for Koreans, nonetheless, Shin and Yu put them at 3-5% after comparing (matching) telephone directories with the Korean Association Directory and seven Korean church directories in Atlanta, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. Thus, unlisted numbers do not pose a major problem. The single biggest concern in using Korean surnames, however, was locating inter-married first-generation Korean women and Korean adoptees who adopt non-Korean surnames. Because of the nature of the location of military bases and adoption patterns, metropolitan New York has fewer numbers of Korean women married to US servicemen and adoptees than elsewhere. Another possible omission was some of the intermarried second-generation Korean women with non-Korean surnames. One solution that addressed this potential exclusion was to include an item in the screens inquiring for children who lived outside/away from their parents. Although some parents were reluctant to give out their

children's contact numbers, many were accommodating, allowing us to contact their second-generation children for interviews. This greatly increased the overall hit rate of eligible second-generation respondents and at the same time helped reduce the number of intermarried second-generation Korean women with non-Korean surnames missed by the survey. In fact, because many second-generation Korean Americans were living on their own, this scheme helped locate second-generation adults who were living outside the New York metropolitan area.

DATA SOURCES

The primary data are based on a close-ended telephone survey (the 1998 NY Second-Generation Korean American Survey- NYSGKAS- by the author) with 200 23-35 year old second-generation Korean Americans in metropolitan New York [See Appendix A and D for response rates and specifics about how the sample was drawn]. Korean surnames have been based on the 1998 published telephone directories in metropolitan New York (New York and New Jersey counties). Published phone directories listing all residential households in the US are available in electronic format. Using area codes 718, 212, 516, 914, 201, 973, and 908 as proxies for metropolitan New York (and New Jersey) I searched for all households in these area codes with unique Korean surnames. Out of approximately 90 Korean surnames, 16 were selected. My criterion for selection was that these surnames had to add up to at least 200 households for the metropolitan New York area. The ones that did not meet this criterion were dropped. Also surnames that overlapped with Chinese and American surnames (i.e. Lee) were dropped from the sample to minimize screening for non-Korean households. The

procedure, the sum of 7 area codes and 16 prominent Korean surnames (See Appendix D for which surnames have been utilized), produced a total sample of 24,500 potential Korean households. Through the aid of a statistical package (SPSS), I was able to generate a random sample of 3500 households to commence the telephone screening for eligible second-generation Korean Americans. After an exhaustive screening process, 200 eligible second-generation Korean American respondents were successfully interviewed over the phone from June 1998 through November 1998. The telephone interviews took an average of 30 minutes to complete.

Although numerous studies have investigated the experience of the Korean immigrant and small business populations, very few studies have focused on the burgeoning adult second generation. Most of these have been case studies of second-generation Korean American college or high school students. This survey data represent one of the first efforts to present a broad portrait on the state of the adult Korean American second generation in metropolitan New York. While survey data do provide valuable demographic and life history information, the close-ended nature of the data do not capture very well the specific reasons and circumstances behind their educational and labor market choices. Thus, 40 follow-up, in-person, in-depth interviews were also conducted within the same time frame with the offspring of Korean small business owners and professionals from the survey⁴ to address these limitations. The personal, open-ended (tape-recorded) interviews lasted approximately an hour and a half and probed second-generation experiences with schooling, neighborhoods, jobs, the glass

⁴ Equal number of men and women as well as children of entrepreneurs and professionals

ceiling as well as identity concerns, social networks, religion, politics, language and marital preferences, to name a few. The qualitative data provide a rich and nuanced understanding of the dynamics of the second generation's transition from childhood, adolescence, and education to the labor market.

Finally, to provide a background to Korean immigration, a short questionnaire that probed education, occupation, and religion was administered to screened Korean households that did not meet the second-generation eligibility criteria. This *first-generation Korean immigrant* data (N=405), which I call the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants⁵, along with information about *parents of the second generation*, which I call the "1960-70s" Korean immigrants, provide a quick glimpse on the state of the first-generation Korean immigrants in metropolitan New York.

SCOPE OF DISSERTATION

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical background and review of the literature. Chapter 3 provides a statistical profile of second-generation Korean Americans. In addition, the chapter compares the second generation, their immigrant parents, and other Korean immigrants on several dimensions. Chapter 4 then examines the educational outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans and attempts to explain the factors that lead to their excellent educational credentials. Given the importance of education in today's

⁵ There are three phases of Korean immigration to the US: the early period, from 1903 to 1944; the intermediate period, from 1945 to 1964; and the recent period, from 1965 to the present (Yoon, 1997). The "1960-1970s" and "1980-1990s" Korean immigrants all came during the recent period although some parents of the second generation immigrated during the intermediary period. I use "1960-1970" and "1980-1990" designations to distinguish the parents of the second generation from other first-generation Korean immigrants.

information economy, Chapter 5 investigates how these educational qualifications, by the attainment of professional occupations, aid in the mainstreaming of second-generation Korean Americans. Since entrepreneurship is seen to have been an important variable in the economic integration of the first generation, Chapter 6 compares the outcomes between children of professionals and entrepreneurs to ascertain what role small business plays in intergenerational mobility. Chapter 7 investigates several variables- identity, language, intermarriage, and transnationalism- to measure how rapid assimilation is taking place with second-generation Korean Americans. It concludes with a discussion of what this means for the future of ethnicity and assimilation in America.

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF IMMIGRANT AND SECOND-GENERATION INCORPORATION

Assimilation conjures up a negative image of groups being forced to lose their distinctiveness. The Anglo-conformity view of assimilation in particular has met with strong resistance and criticism from racial minorities who maintain that following the dominant group's normative prescriptions is not a guarantee of their acceptance. When the Chicago School of Sociology first utilized the term, it was capturing the experience of *turn-of-the-century European immigrants*. What the Chicago school theorists observed were the initial difficulties faced by immigrants such as the large gap and difficulties with language, culture and their poor economic situation in ghettos/enclaves. Gradually, immigrants got better at language, adjusted to the new culture, and their hard work paved the way for the next generation. Robert Park, the preeminent Chicago sociologist, saw assimilation as a process that takes many generations to complete, with group differences narrowing over time. According to Park, "The race relations cycle which takes the form, to state it abstractly, of contacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation, is apparently progressive and irreversible" (Park 1926/1950: 150).

STRAIGHT-LINE ASSIMILATION

The "straight-line" assimilation model, describing the experience of *turn-of-the-century European immigrants*, posited that ethnic differences would erode with succeeding generations, with upward mobility serving as reward for assimilation. Thus, while the immigrant generation may face residential and occupational segregation and poverty, by the second generation, residential, occupational and identity integration

would become possible, allowing subsequent generations to attain upward mobility (Warner and Srole 1945). According to Warner and Srole (1945: 72):

Each consecutive ethnic generation pushes progressively farther out of the bottom level and into each of the successive layers above. That the class index of an ethnic group is related to the length of its settlement in the city is a manifestation of the continuous advance achieved in the hierarchy of each new generation.

This portrayal of assimilation assumed the shedding of ethnic cultures and languages, a prerequisite for upward mobility. The attainment of cultural assimilation (adopting language, customs, food habits, and values of the host society) and economic gains that go along with it presumed a zero-sum loss of the cultural traditions of their immigrant parents. The outcome was psychological tolls and costs. According to Warner and Srole (1945), the children of immigrants run into emotional conflicts because they are pulled by the parents' culture at home on the one hand and by the mainstream societal norms in schools, peers, and mass media on the other. Faced with what is considered "modern" American practices that have higher social status rewards in opposition to "traditional" ethnic practices that are seen as inferior and anachronistic, the American-born/raised children of immigrants who participate in both feel pressured to opt for one over the other (Warner and Srole 1945). To this tension is added a reversal of roles since the second generation become spokespersons for parents as they absorb the values and practices of the mainstream faster than their immigrant parents who are not as adept in learning American ways as their children.

As is obvious, not all white ethnic groups attained assimilation at the same pace. For many full assimilation in the form of primary assimilation (social interactions with members of the dominant group through common social institutions, social organizations,

and friendship networks) took at least three or four generations (Gordon 1964). Some groups such as the Eastern European Jews attained mobility much faster than Italians, which researchers attribute to their class/urban background, literacy, prior occupations, and the role of small business in catapulting their children's education (Steinberg 1981; Gold 1996). Other white ethnic newcomers starting out at the bottom encountered considerable discrimination. For example, the ethnic and religious differences that characterized the Irish newcomers put them in a severe disadvantage, to the extent that they were deemed a racial group and subject to discrimination. Furthermore, in its most virulent form, assimilation, even for white ethnics, entailed a fierce Americanization project to mold the foreign stock, discouraging ethnic assertion and strictly imposing assimilation. This was a nativist response to the influx of immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe (both groups were considered to possess inferior cultures and religions) during the First World War (Cornell and Hartmann 1998). As a result, German language schools were discouraged, and many reluctantly changed their foreign-sounding last names to American ones. In addition, the war hysteria during the First World War and the Second World War found the loyalties of ethnic groups suspect, questioning their patriotism. With the Great Depression, the nativist political movements succeeded in virtually ending immigration until the end of World War II.

Nevertheless, after several generations, white ethnics assimilated into the mainstream and overcame rigid ethnic boundaries (Hollinger 1995). Even for Jews, the perpetual outsider, as they left the ghettos of their parents and moved to the suburbs, as they attained economic mobility into professional occupations through education, their Jewish identity became less salient, and earlier efforts to retain Jewish identity gave way

to assimilation. In consequence, ethnicity began to lose its salience for most European ethnics as shown by intermarriage, residence, income, education and other indicators (Alba 1995). For white ethnics, ethnicity increasingly became symbolic (Gans 1992), and could be worn and disposed of without costs, what Waters (1990) calls the optional side of their identities.

Reactions against Assimilation

The first reactions to the Anglo-conformity model of assimilation came from two alternative models of assimilation. Against a program of Americanization or Anglo-conformity, Israel Zangwill saw in America a potential for forging a new American identity out of the many ethnicities (this vision did not include nonwhites however), which he put forward as the "melting pot". Others like Horace Kallen, on the other hand, advocated ethnic pluralism (for white ethnics again), the right to retain their ethnic cultures and practices, stressing the undemocratic nature of melting pot and Anglo-conformity.

While these two competing models of assimilation attempted to influence the meaning of American, in practice, Anglo-conformity remained the dominant model of assimilation. Although white ethnics eventually achieved assimilation, despite efforts to apply assimilation to racial minorities, minority groups realized that cultural assimilation did not lead to structural assimilation. Racial walls have been simply too impervious for racial minorities, remaining as persistent and powerful in determining their lives. In the wake of the civil rights movement during the 1960s and 1970s and with the influx of non-European immigration in the 1960s, new theories of immigrant adaptation surfaced,

challenging the traditional straight-line model (Greely 1976; Yancey 1977; Gans 1982; Waters 1990; Omi and Winant 1994). Blauner's (1972) internal colonialism (colonized minorities) described the historical role played by racial minorities in the development of the American economy and this literature pointed to the insurmountable barriers against nonwhites in the US.

In reaction to the radicalization of the civil rights movement, what Omi and Winant (1994) call the conservatism of the ethnicity paradigm (Steinberg 1981), the ethnicity paradigm shifted its attention to the resilience and acceptance of ethnicity in American life (Greely 1976; Yancey 1977). Theorists from the primordialist camp saw this as the persistence of ethnicity among white ethnics in contrast to the circumstantialist camp that saw the assertion of ethnicity as an instrument of specific interests. Nonetheless, the challenges brought forward against assimilation paved the way for theories of segmented class structure and split or dual labor markets (Bonacich 1972; Gordon et al. 1982). Hence, whereas the ethnicity paradigm had been the dominant theory, with the influx of new immigrants from Latin America and Asia and the globalization of the US economy, the salience of ethnic and racial boundaries gave rise to a new emphasis on multiculturalism and identity politics (Min 1997, 1993).

RACE, ETHNICITY, AND LABOR MARKETS

In light of the salience of race, various explanations have been advanced to explain the obstacles racial minorities face in US society. Historically racial minorities, notwithstanding educational qualifications, confronted substantial barriers to the more desirable jobs. In the neoclassical economic view, entry into the labor market would

simply be a matter of the fit between levels of human capital and the supply of and demand for labor (Torres 1995). Human capital theory, therefore, simply attributes the situation of racial minorities to lack of education and skills. Yet, the persistent overrepresentation of African Americans at the bottom of the labor market hierarchy and their difficulties in structural assimilation suggested that more factors were at work than simply market forces that distribute workers based on fluctuations of the economy and skill levels (Waldinger 1996).

Skills mismatch theory expands on this and attributes the inequalities of African Americans to the misfit between a changing economy that is becoming increasingly polarized and the levels of education and skills required in the hourglass economy (Kasarda 1989; Wilson 1980, 1987). For example, the US economy, especially in the nation's major urban centers, underwent a restructuring from manufacturing to services, resulting in increased inequality between the rich and the poor (Levy 1987; Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 1988; Sassen 1988). As multinationals fled for low-wage, non-union regions in the US and abroad, blacks and Latinos who lived in central cities were affected the most by economic restructuring (Waters and Eschbach 1995). Paradoxically, New York and Los Angeles, major urban centers that were deeply affected by restructuring which had a huge impact on African Americans, also received the largest number of immigrants. In light of this, Waldinger argues that the skills mismatch theory does not explain why, in spite of educational upgrades, African Americans have not been able to break into the primary sector. Others point to employer preferences for immigrants that block racial minority employment from the remaining manufacturing and service sector jobs (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1994).

Another prominent theory that underscored the persistence of inequalities on the basis of race (and ethnicity) has been the dual or segmented labor market theory. Notwithstanding the acquisition of human capital, racial minorities struggled to improve their economic situation because, according to this perspective, they were stuck in and unable to move beyond the less desirable segments of the labor market (Torres 1995; Waldinger 1996). From the dual economy perspective, technological change and transformations in the production process in the US produced a twofold system of employers: large corporations and peripheral firms (Gordon et al. 1982; Torres 1995). Core industries such as large corporations, oil and automobile companies, in return for labor stability, agreed to a labor-capital accord, giving the protected unionized sectors guaranteed stable employment and wage increases (Torres 1995: 25). Job stability, high wages, good working conditions, and mobility opportunities characterized the primary labor market established from this labor-capital deal. Due to their market strength and clout in the economy, core industries, in exchange for skilled workers and labor stability, are able to provide greater material rewards and incentives. In peripheral industries where firms lack market clout, they encounter more competition, are more cost-conscious, and are not covered by collective bargaining. The corresponding secondary labor market is distinguished by low wages, bad working conditions, few or no mobility opportunities, and high turnover (Wilson and Portes 1982; Torres 1995).

The labor-capital agreement, while protecting its organized constituency, hardly made a dent in the established racial division of labor (and stratification), preserving past patterns of inequality. Notwithstanding the transformations of the economy and the postwar boom, workers were sorted into different labor market segments on the basis of

race and ethnicity (also class, gender, and nativity) (Waldinger 1996). Whereas among white ethnics structural assimilation allowed formerly excluded groups to cross into primary labor markets, racial minorities such as blacks, Latinos, and Asians, because of discrimination, levels of education, and other factors, were still restricted to secondary sectors. As Waldinger (1996) notes in his theory of ethnic queuing, white ethnics who set up beachheads were able to establish ethnic niches, which effectively prevented newer groups (outsiders) from penetrating. Blacks and Puerto Ricans in NY, for example, made their way into some of the less desirable sectors only when white ethnics retired or moved out to "greener" sectors with the expansion of the economy (ethnic succession, intergenerational mobility). The efforts of the civil rights movement during the 1960s that gave rise to Affirmative Action policies, in conjunction with ethnic succession and economic expansion, allowed African Americans to challenge the white establishment and open up the more desirable segments of the labor market that had been inaccessible to blacks. The main segment that has been amenable to African American presence, nonetheless, has been the public sector, which now has become, in Waldinger's view, a quintessential African American niche (1996).

Immigrants and the Labor Market

The renewal of immigration since the 1960s changed the contours of the labor market as new immigrants made inroads into a reconfigured labor market. Due to the enormous racial, ethnic, and class diversity of post-1960s immigrants and a revamped, postindustrial, "hour-glass" US economy, the incorporation of contemporary immigrants ranges from workers (Mexicans) to professionals (Indians, Filipinos, and Taiwanese to

name a few) to entrepreneurs (Koreans and Cubans). Initially the occupational preference system of the 1965 immigration laws spurred the flow of skilled immigrants into the primary sectors, especially doctors and nurses in state and city hospitals (I. Kim 1981). However, as family reunification replaced the occupational preference system as the main mode of access for immigrants, class diversity (varying levels of human capital) channeled immigrants into the secondary labor market and other segments of the labor market.

Yet, because of past labor market configurations, specifically niche consolidation and closure by established ethnic and racial groups, post-1960s immigrants met not only obstacles in the primary sectors but also considerable competition even in the secondary sectors. According to Torres (1995) and Waldinger (1996), immigrants were able to break into some segments of the secondary labor market because the secondary sectors experienced labor shortages with the retirement and/or advance of large numbers of blacks and Puerto Ricans into the more attractive positions in the public sectors and expanding industries. Furthermore, as secondary sectors became attached with stigma and low status, racial minorities have shunned this sector, further stimulating their exodus, opening it up for immigrant workers who are less affected by stigma and status, since immigrants are less familiar with host status concerns (Piore 1979; Waldinger 1996: 318). Another reason is that with the continuous flow of immigrants ready to take the bottom-tier jobs, low-status ethnic niche occupations/sectors do not extend to subsequent generations (rather a one-generation phenomenon), preventing the reproduction of the ethnic niche, allowing access for newer immigrants (Waldinger 1996).

Although one of the strengths of the dual labor market theory is its neat division of group incorporation into bimodal sectors, that also becomes its main weakness, as it fails to capture the full range of labor market experiences of immigrants. In addition to the theory being too rigid, the formulation, according to Mahler (1995: 9), has offered very few insights into how particular groups of immigrants integrate into local economies. Finally, what Waldinger (1996) sees as key in sustaining continued immigration- the role of immigrant networks and immigrant enterprises- has not been adequately addressed by segmented labor market theory (Wilson and Portes 1982).

ALTERNATIVE LABOR MARKETS: INFORMAL ECONOMY AND ETHNIC ECONOMY

To address these shortcomings, concepts such as informal economies and ethnic economies have been introduced to explain other channels of immigrant economic incorporation. The concept of the informal economy was first applied in developing countries to capture the apparently "unemployed" or "underemployed" individuals who still generated income and supported families in spite of massive unemployment. Castells and Portes (1989) characterize the informal economy as activities that generate income outside the purview of the regulatory mechanisms of society's institutions. Lomnitz (1978) adds that informal economic exchange, thriving in the interstices, perhaps plays an axiomatic role by making up for the deficiencies of the system.

Applying the informal economy model to the inner cities of advanced industrial countries, Sassen (1988, 1991), among others, has drawn attention to the increasingly sweatshoplike conditions in the garment industry as well as the resurgence of home work and the widespread phenomenon of low-wage labor in the service sectors. According to

Sassen (1991), the escalation of low-wage personal service work such as domestic work, nannies, and housecleaning that services the needs of the privileged in high-wage service industries such as investment banking, finance, insurance, and law is the direct result of deindustrialization and the restructuring into a postindustrial service economy. This increase in the informalization of the economy is a response from workers and firms responding to the demands of the formal economy when other employment channels are not available or have been eliminated (Sassen 1991; Sanjek 1998).

Immigrant Entrepreneurship

One of the areas where immigrants not only react to the labor demands of the economy but also create and exploit their own niches, generating their own mobility is entrepreneurship. As a matter of fact, immigrants consistently show higher rates of self-employment than natives (Waldinger 1986; Portes and Bach 1985; Min 1988; Waldinger, Aldrich, and Ward 1990; Portes and Zhou 1992; Light and Roach 1996; Min 1996; Yoon 1997; Light and Gold 2000), stirring the admiration of journalists and scholars alike. Indeed, many studies have noted the particularly positive aspects of immigrant entrepreneurship, especially those that attribute rapid economic "success" and integration into American society as the result of immigrant enterprise. The high self-employment rates of Korean immigrants, like Jews in the past, are perceived as an indication of Korean immigrants' rapid economic mobility. Portes and Rumbaut (1990: 83) point out that the two principal ways by which immigrants "make it" in the US are the professional/managerial route and the independent entrepreneurship route.

Yet, aside from the mobility potential of self-employment, striking on one's own may be engendered by the disadvantages that immigrants face in their new environment. For example, a high proportion of Korean immigrants resort to self-employment in the US because of their difficulties with English, strict licensing requirements, and discrimination in the mainstream labor market (I. Kim 1981; Min 1995; Min 1996; Light and Roach 1996). Min argues that Korean immigrants, unable to find jobs commensurate to their middle-class, white-collar backgrounds in the mainstream economy, choose entrepreneurship to offset their status gap/inconsistency (1988: 28). Hence, the relationship between self-employment and the creation of ethnic economies derives from the scant opportunities for mobility in the secondary sector and also the fact that even these jobs were scarce.

Although language and labor market disadvantage as well as loss of status are primary explanations for seeking self-employment, how immigrants obtain and exploit business niches is crucial for understanding the "opportunity structures" involved in gaining entry into a particular sector of the economy or industry. Notwithstanding deindustrialization, immigrants locate and exploit niches in the general economy. In Waldinger's view several factors explain the immigrant penetration of ethnic niches. Most significantly, mass production and distribution techniques fail to cover all sectors of the economy and leave open nonethnic niches such as 1) underserved or abandoned markets, 2) markets with low economies of scale, 3) markets characterized by instability and uncertainty, and 4) markets for exotic goods (Waldinger, Aldrich, and Ward 1990; Waldinger 1994). "Opportunity structures" from these niches come about to immigrants when 1) vacant businesses with few natives after them show up, and 2) when government

policies favor or hinder business ownership. Subsequently, how immigrants enter into these niches depends on the mechanism of ethnic succession and establishing beachheads (Waldinger 1996).

Ethnic Economy

In the face of less promising alternatives or barriers, immigrant entrepreneurs, relying on ethnic solidary ties, started small businesses, establishing an ethnic economy and absorbing in this way much of the coethnic labor force. Due to competition, niche closure, opportunity structures, and resources immigrant entrepreneurs in the US have been able to establish businesses mostly in the immigrant community (ethnic enclaves) and native minority communities (middleman minorities) underserved or abandoned by native firms. The ethnic economy is the overarching theoretical formulation that includes two influential concepts prominent in the immigrant entrepreneurship literature: ethnic enclaves and middlemen minorities (Light et al. 1993). According to Light and Bonacich (1988: x), ethnic economies refer to "the ethnic self-employed and unpaid family helpers, ethnic employers, and their coethnic⁶ employees." They point out that the ethnic economy is ethnic because the business owners are ethnic and usually their employees are coethnics (1988: xi).

⁶ By coethnic I mean other members of the same ethnic group.

Middleman Minorities

Middleman minorities originally described minority-majority relations in colonial and peasant societies. In its current usage, it depicts the self-employed immigrants who serve minority groups, playing the intermediary role between poor minorities (in the US) and the mainstream economy (Light 1972; Bonacich 1973; Bonacich and Modell 1980; Zenner 1980; Light and Bonacich 1988; Min 1996; Yoon 1997). Middleman minorities have captured a lot of attention for the hostility that they have received in their host society. Typical of the blaming of the victim, the hostility that they have been subject to has been attributed to their 'clannish' and tight solidary ties that middleman minorities exhibit. Instead, the characteristics ascribed to middleman minorities are articulations of stereotypes crystallized and reinforced by their adjustment to a hostile environment (Bonacich and Modell 1980; Min 1996; Yoon 1997). As Bonacich and Modell (1980) note, the tight ethnic solidarity displayed by middleman minorities stems from their economic endeavors in small business. Yet, when the next generation is able to move away from their parents' economic activities as circumstances change and integrate into mainstream labor markets, the solidary ties that have been viewed as persistent also fade away and their resistance to assimilation subsides (Bonacich and Modell 1980; Min 1996).

Enclave Economy

Enclaves, on the other hand, have historically formed when immigrants congregate together to facilitate their transition in a new environment. However, enclaves have also come into being because of outside discrimination forcing immigrants

to geographical concentrations (Chinatowns). In the current usage, ethnic enclaves emerge when immigrant entrepreneurs provide goods and services and also jobs for coethnics. Wilson and Portes (1980) Portes and Bach (1985: 203) define ethnic enclaves as the "spatial concentration of immigrants who organize a variety of enterprises to serve their own ethnic market and the general population." Enclaves differ from immigrant neighborhoods that accommodate an array of businesses that provide ethnic merchandise, comestibles, and goods catered to coethnics. By catering to the needs of the ethnic or the immigrant community (Mollenkopf et al. 1997), ethnic businesses generate a natural ethnic market, a protected market that relies upon ethnic solidary ties and fosters an ethnic identity (Light 1972). The ethnic enclave economy, as an extension of ethnic businesses, adds the geographic dimension to the locational cluster of ethnic firms, vertically integrated from coethnic manufacturers, coethnic workers, and coethnic consumers. In addition, Zhou (1992: 4) defines the enclave as "a segmented sector of the larger economy, a partially autonomous enclave economic structure constituting a distinct labor market." Portes and his associates (Wilson and Portes 1980; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Manning 1991) have been the primary proponents of the idea that the ethnic enclave economy confers benefits on new immigrants and is an alternative to the secondary labor market and perhaps, even the primary labor market. As Wilson and Portes (1980) and Portes and Bach (1985) put it, an ethnic enclave comprises a "network of small enterprises that offers employment comparable to those of the mainstream economy to recent immigrants and to those who speak little English."

Returns on Human Capital

One of the controversies with employment in the ethnic economy, principally the ethnic enclave, has been the rate of returns on human capital for workers. Portes's claim that the ethnic enclave economy can circumvent traditional models of assimilation has sparked a debate regarding returns on human capital for enclave participants (Sanders and Nee 1987; Zhou and Logan 1989; Zhou 1992). Portes's discussion of the benefits of the enclave hinges upon the possibility of entrepreneurship for workers, or in case entrepreneurship is not an attainable goal, advancement possibilities to managerial positions. Returns on human capital for immigrant entrepreneurs are generally agreed upon. What has been the spring of controversy is whether workers receive comparable returns on their human capital or the enclave is rather a disguised form of ethnic exploitation with almost no opportunities for mobility, much like the secondary sector. Using statistical analysis of census data comparing earnings based on human capital within the enclave vs. earnings with comparable human capital outside the enclave, Sanders and Nee (1988) have challenged Portes's claim. They support Portes's claim that enclaves provide higher returns on their human capital for enclave entrepreneurs. But they contend that the returns on human capital are not as considerable for workers. Zhou and Logan (1989) joined the debate by operationalizing the enclave as a place of residence, of work, and of industry. They find positive returns for human capital for workers inside and outside the enclave when using place of residence. However, they found no human capital effects for women workers within the enclave. Gilbertson (1995) finds that Dominican women working in Hispanic-owned or managed firms are not better off than women working in non-Hispanic firms. However, Dominican and Colombian

men working in ethnic firms received greater returns on their human capital than Dominican women working in coethnic businesses (Gilbertson and Gurak 1992).

Min Zhou's (1992) and Peter Kwong's (1987) studies of Chinatown reveal the two faces of the enclave (Liu 1998). For Zhou, notwithstanding the exploitation and internal problems in Chinatown, there has been a lot of dynamism and growth in Chinatown, to the degree that it now has expanded from an initial Manhattan enclave/geographic concentration within a few blocks into satellite Chinatowns in Sunset Park and Flushing. In other words, a tour of duty in the worst jobs, by delaying immediate gratification, will lead to training benefits, managerial positions, and eventually a business of one's own (Wilson and Portes 1982; Bailey and Waldinger 1991). Peter Kwong's study, on the other hand, reveals the class polarization within Chinatown. Kwong contends that the revival and expansion of Chinatown was due to the fortuitous incorporation of low-wage Chinese workers in the declining garment industry in New York, at whose expense the enclave gained much of its growth. Consequently, a large share of the benefits of the ethnic economy has instead assembled inside the employers' coffers. In response, working-class Chinese immigrants have organized themselves to fight conditions of exploitation against big Chinese employers in restaurants and garment industries, pointing out that ethnic solidarity serves employers but not workers.

Light and Gold (2000) note that while the exploitative nature of ethnic labor markets is a fact, "bad" jobs are better than no jobs, considering that many immigrant entrepreneurs are sole proprietors. In other words, the kind of ethnic exploitation may be true for those large ethnic businesses whereas many self-employed ethnic businesses

employ fewer workers. In the face of unemployment, immigrant business offers a modicum of economic well being.

Limits of Ethnic Solidarity

Even though the ethnic enclave economy model illustrated the importance of an established ethnic economy for Cubans in Miami, as Kasinitz and Rosenberg (1996) note, there is a danger in seeing ethnic enclaves everywhere, and the concept has received more attention and debate than was called for, skewing the terms of the debate and sometimes getting lost over the problematics of definition (Sanders and Nee 1987; Zhou and Logan 1989; Zhou 1992; Light et al. 1994). Recent research indicates that the ethnic solidarity fundamental to immigrant enterprise in ethnic enclaves or in middlemen minorities has its limits. Nicaraguans in Miami are employed in the Cuban enclave (Portes and Stepick 1993) while increasing number of Latinos, primarily Mexicans and Ecuadorians, are finding employment in both Greek and Korean-owned businesses in New York (Smith 1994; D. Kim 1999). The counterpart to ethnic solidarity, which is reciprocity in ethnic preference in hiring and support for coethnic economic ventures, crumbles in the face of labor shortages. Wilson and Portes (1982) have noted that if the enclave economy is to remain viable, the enclave labor force has to be renewed with continued immigration. As a result of high self-employment rates and business co-sponsorships, declining coethnic labor has rendered ethnic solidarity loose and opened up hiring networks to non-coethnics (Gold 1994; D. Kim 1999). The integration of non-coethnics in the enclave complicates the ethnic solidarity ties based on ethnic reciprocity. Mexicans, for their part, have gained a foothold in the labor market niche (Smith 1994)

by utilizing their extensive social networks, and avoiding or inserting themselves into a non-black and non-Puerto Rican racialization within the black-white US racial structure. In addition, Mexicans have benefited from the immigrant analogy/ideology that puts them closer to Korean employers for whom their undocumented and immigrant status places them above the native-born (Americanized) blacks and Puerto Ricans (in terms of vulnerability and malleability). While wages and job conditions are substandard, in spite of their undocumented status and English difficulties that have prevented them from obtaining jobs in the general labor market, Mexicans are able to obtain larger returns on their human capital⁷.

Consequently, the ethnic economy needs to be redefined to include the employment of non-coethnics. Also a debate about returns on human capital in the enclave economy can be generalized as a general debate about returns on human capital between employment within the ethnic economy or outside of it. The basic thrust for coethnic employers and coethnic workers is that ethnic solidarity, generated on a symbiotic relationship of mutual co-dependence, gives a protected market. What the literature does not address is whether economic mobility is due to the internal strength of the ethnic economy or because of the niches the ethnic economy has been able to gain a foothold in to compete vis-à-vis mainstream firms, as well as creating and expanding into new niches (Torres 1995). In other words, the viability and continued resurgence of the Chinatown economy is due to the internal attributes of the community, which by no means are not important, but how and which ethnic niches are commanded by the ethnic

⁷ Recent unionization efforts have placed Korean small business owners in a tight spot as employer-employee conflict is becoming a major source of strain.

economy. The Cuban enclave reveals similar inroads into the garment industry and the construction industry, which are very much non-coethnic markets, that has multiplier effects in the enclave.

The other question is to what extent the enclave economy can support new businesses before competition dooms many to failure and would-be entrepreneurs revert back to worker status. Another important dimension missing in the literature is the experience of immigrant women and their role in the ethnic economy. Grasmuck and Pessar (1991) and Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) have particularly drawn attention to the growing literature on the gendering of migration and settlement. Finally, we can question the viability and impact of the ethnic economy for the 1.5 and second-generation children of immigrants. The next section addresses these concerns.

CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS

"Second-Generation Decline"

Much of the literature on the new second generation forecasts a pessimistic view on their prospects. In drastic contrast from the period of industrialization at the turn of the century, children of post-1960s immigrants face an hour-glass economy characterized by high-wage financial and investment service jobs at the top, low-wage service jobs in the bottom, and very few well-paying blue-collar jobs in the middle (Portes and Zhou 1993, Gans 1992). Gans's "second-generation decline" hypothesis posits that children of

immigrants, born and/or raised in the US, without the dual frame of reference that distinguishes their immigrant parents, immersed in the culture of their poor surroundings and incessant consumerism, are not willing to take the low-wage jobs that their parents have been involved with (1992). In addition, a restructured American economy may not offer better jobs to those with low skills and very little education.

First, transformations in the US economy have raised the stakes of education towards securing upward mobility. In today's fast-paced, knowledge-based, information economy, post-secondary education has become a basic requirement for the demands of an "hour-glass" economy (Portes and Zhou 1993, 1994; Gans 1992; Zhou and Bankston 1998). The upper tier jobs in the hour-glass economy demand college education, sophisticated job and interpersonal skills, and information knowledge. Those who meet such requirements can command high salaries and favorable working conditions as well as career stability and opportunities for promotions (Zhou and Bankston 1998: 3). Those who fail to acquire the requirements of a polarized economy, on the other hand, are relegated to low-skilled, labor-intensive service jobs that offer low wages, poor working conditions, and fewer chances for promotion (3; Bourgois 1996). The children of post-1960s immigrants, according to Zhou and Bankston (1998), find themselves in such a predicament because a big proportion do not possess the requisite education, and a restructured economy offers very few mobility opportunities at the lower end of the spectrum.

Consequently, the mismatch between second-generation job standards and expectations and their levels of education and skills in the context of an "hour glass" economy can produce either a "second generation decline" (Gans 1992) or "second

generation revolt" (Perlmann and Waldinger 1997). For Gans, poor immigrant children, especially the "dark-skinned" ones, who face discrimination, do not have access to an ethnic niche, and abandon their immigrant parents' culture and jobs as they assimilate into the cultural mainstream, will face downward mobility. In contrast, those who remain anchored with their immigrant parents' community and values because of viable ethnic niches may acculturate less but end up doing better. Hence, in one scenario, children of high human-capital immigrants attain high levels of education and fare superbly in the economy. On the other, children of low human-capital immigrants, acquiring low levels of education and facing inadequate ethnic niches, will fall even further behind the economic standing of their immigrant parents. In sum, Gans suggests a bumpy-line model of assimilation where children of poor immigrants may be swapping Americanization for a bleak economic future and vice-versa, less acculturation for a brighter outlook.

Segmented Assimilation

Despite some of its flaws and normative assumptions, the new assimilation theorists (Alba and Nee 1997) posit that the process that has characterized white ethnic incorporation into mainstream America is still very relevant for some of the post-1960s immigrant groups and their offspring. Portes and Zhou (1993) add that assimilation is still a very powerful force, but for the offspring of immigrants the process is much more complex since the US racial stratification patterns can channel them to take on the values and outlooks of marginal, segregated communities as well as those of middle-class communities. Expanding the paths of assimilation, Portes and Zhou delineate three likely

trajectories for children of immigrants: 1) the white middle-class route to upward mobility, 2) the black underclass route to downward mobility, and 3) the ethnic route of selective assimilation to upward mobility. Class and gender mediate in this immersion into the culture of the mainstream, the marginalized, and/or the ethnic community. For instance, children of middle-class immigrants can embrace the identities of middle-class white America or assimilate selectively by retaining elements of their ethnicity with the values and outlook of the mainstream.

Building on the enclave economy premise, Portes extends his formulation to the second generation. He contends that even if economic mobility does not occur for the first generation, at least their sacrifice and hard work will pave the way for mobility in the second generation. This third route is predicated on the strength of the ethnic community (social networks, values, jobs) to anchor the children of immigrants, who may lack the class resources that mediate and facilitate overcoming the various obstacles of racialization, and prevent the development of an adversarial stance. Just as the ethnic economy may provide alternative paths of assimilation to immigrants (Portes et al. 1985, 1991), Portes and Zhou (1994) and Zhou and Bankston (1998) argue that ethnicity, especially for children of poor immigrant groups, in the face of class disadvantage and bleak mobility opportunities of their surroundings, can serve as shields against the forces of "negative" Americanization (oppositional or adversarial identities), forestalling or delaying downward mobility.

For Portes and Zhou (1992, 1993) this third route is especially critical because the availability of a viable ethnic economy draws the attention of the second generation. Why? Because firmly established ethnic economies carry with them vibrant cultural and

social capital, which translates into tangible benefits such as ethnic jobs, networks, and values. Lured by the social networks and social capital of the ethnic economy, the second generation is drawn closer to the ethnic community and its norms, whereby adherence makes possible their mobility, or at the very least it prevents them from falling into downward mobility. The second-generation Vietnamese in Louisiana is a case in point. According to Zhou and Bankston (1994, 1998), despite the poverty and class disadvantage that characterizes the Vietnamese community there, the community is able to exert its influence over the second generation to retain a strong Vietnamese ethnicity, keeping them from dropping out of high school and obtaining an education. The outcome of this kind of community intervention is the retardation of assimilation processes of the Vietnamese second generation into the culture of their poor surroundings.

However, how effectively this intervention works depends upon whether the immigrant generation forms "linear ethnicity" or "reactive ethnicity" (Portes and Zhou 1993). Immigrants who come to the US with strong ethnic networks, access to capital, and with fewer ties to native minorities develop "linear ethnicity" while those who are close to native minorities and as a consequence, face intense discrimination develop "reactive ethnicity." How these are passed on to their children and what identities the new second generation embrace will determine, according to Portes and Zhou, their mobility chances. Children of immigrant groups with linear ethnicity, because they have more advantageous links with the immigrant community in the form of social and cultural capital, may resist acculturation (Waters and Eschbach 1995). In other words, children of middle-class immigrants, as they face less discrimination and view positively

their opportunities, are likely to follow a linear trajectory, adopting mainstream (white) values and attaining good education to enter the primary sectors. Those with reactive ethnicity, on the other hand, may join the ranks of poor native minorities as they develop an adversarial stance, or what John Ogbu (1990) calls oppositional identities, towards white society and its associated institutions. Children of immigrants who are ascribed racial minority status and receive stigmatization, as they adopt and acquiesce into peer norms of their poor surroundings (schools and neighborhoods), may develop an oppositional stance to white institutions.

While the absence of a vigorous ethnic economy may affect the mobility chances of poor immigrants and their children, by the same token, the presence of marginalized ethnic communities, if they fail to function as a springboard, may also hinder mobility (Portes and Zhou 1995). In other words, unless the ethnic community can offer tangible benefits, either its presence or absence can be less than (Portes and Zhou 1995) productive, being a barrier instead of a source of mobility or safety net. In the case of Jews, anti-Semitism forced the second-generation professionals to rely upon the ethnic enclave for employment. In this respect, the ethnic community played an important role as a safety net. However, with other groups, the lack of such employment alternatives within the community as well as the overall poverty of the community generally meant that one's struggle for mobility required a rejection of or exit from the ethnic community. As the accounts of Puerto Rican or Mexican barrios attest, mobility becomes possible only when subsequent generations leave these ethnic working-class barrios or ghettos (Waldinger 1996). Similarly, for Italian youth as well as youth in the barrios, mobility meant going against the norms of the community- doing well in school, losing ethnic

distinctiveness like language, adopting middle-class values in contrast to working-class values.

Yet, post-1960s immigrant communities have not had the time to crystallize into barrios or mobility barriers, and Portes and Zhou's third route to mobility is premised on the viability of the ethnic economy. In addition, because the intensity and degree of discrimination has changed compared to how racial minorities were treated earlier (Tuan 1998) (the victory of the civil rights movement and multiculturalism as well US global standing to address its domestic stratification), post-1960s immigrants and their children face a different set of circumstances with differential outcomes. Moreover, as research has shown, the longer one's length in the US the greater the assimilation into the individualistic and consumer US culture and consequently, the greater the fall in grades and health conditions (Rumbaut 1994). The current anti-intellectual ideology and individualistic consumer culture that pervades US society is now operating globally as the US media infiltrates world markets (Zhou and Bankston 1998). Conceivably, rather than the particular ideology in place, the question may be what assurance the youth get that abiding by the rules of the game is going to result in tangible rewards. Trust in the system is conditional on the class standing of the person and the safety net that a vigorous immigrant community is able to arrange. Clearly other intervening variables (peers, ideologies) play important roles, such as to what extent peer groups and the dominant group are able to enforce a belief system (sell out, acting white) (Fordham 1996). However, unless these are met with concrete opportunities or alternatives, whatever trust and positive outlook that has been developed can quickly disappear.

Therefore, the second-generation children of poor immigrants are faced with adapting to and adopting the values and identities of the marginalized community, whereas immigrants with resources may take on the values of the white middle class or their ethnic communities (Portes and Zhou 1993). For Perlmann and Waldinger (1997), in the face of diminished economic opportunities, we may see a "second-generation revolt" similar to the ones displayed by earlier white immigrant working-class groups. The immigrant second generation, like the earlier second-generation children of European immigrants, are responding to the lack of advancement opportunities in their neighborhoods with an oppositional stance and contempt toward the illusory promises of middle-class America. In many ways, crime has been an important medium for working-class immigrant groups, and still continues to hold much attraction (and maybe the only opportunity) with racial minorities (Steinberg 1981).

It seems that all three scenarios are possible for any second generation. This may explain why within the same population some are following a downward mobility trajectory whereas others are on the upward mobility route. As Gibson (1997) stressed, it is not necessary that the oppositional identities of racial minorities lead to downward mobility, and by the same token, immersion within the ethnic community and identification with the white majority result in upward mobility. Furthermore, as Perlmann and Waldinger (1997; 1998) point out, the pessimistic outlook for the second generation arises because of the disproportionate composition of Mexicans in the immigrant equation. As the largest immigrant group that is poor, once the Mexican factor is controlled for, Perlmann and Waldinger argue, the prospects for the second generation are not as gloomy as researchers speculate it to be.

CHAPTER 3: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 1.5 AND SECOND-GENERATION KOREAN AMERICANS

This chapter provides key demographic characteristics of second-generation Korean Americans. The first part discusses the background attributes of parents of the second generation. As it will become clear, what is salient about the parents of the second generation is their middle-class selectivity. Although the role of the ethnic economy and entrepreneurship will be discussed in later chapters, the superior class background of the parents remains the single most important predictor of the second generation's life chances in terms of their superb educational and labor market outcomes. The second part of this chapter provides a statistical portrait of second-generation Korean Americans.

PARENTS OF SECOND-GENERATION KOREAN AMERICANS: SELECTIVE MIGRATION

The Korean community today in New York and elsewhere in the US is much more heterogeneous than it was when Korean immigrants began to arrive in large numbers during the 1960s. Like other Asian immigrant groups that could not benefit from family reunification, Korean immigration also began with the professional migrant stream⁸ since occupational preference system limited entry to those with professional occupations. The medical professional immigration programs came along with "student-abroad-turned immigrant population" which meant that the highly educated and

⁸ In conjunction with this professional stream, some came as students or branch representatives and obtained permanent residency thereafter (I. Kim 1981). An earlier stream consisted of Korean immigrant women married to US servicemen.

professional sectors- the upper and the middle classes- of the Korean population could emigrate (Abelmann and Lie 1995). According to Illsoo Kim (1981: 147-148), between 1965 and 1975, more than 13,000 Korean physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and dentists entered the US. During the same period, approximately 75,000 foreign-trained doctors entered the US (Kim 1981; Steinberg 1981: 274; Sanjek 1998: 81). As soon as this professional, middle-class migrant stream established residence in the US and became naturalized, family reunification became possible and family members were sponsored. Until the peak of Korean immigration during the 1980s, most Korean immigrants came from middle-class, urban backgrounds (Steinberg 1981: 273; Yoon 1997: 94-96). However, as soon as family reunification replaced the selective occupational preference system as the principal mechanism of entry to the US, this middle-class uniformity shifted to a more heterogeneous class composition (Abelmann and Lie 1995; Park et al. 1990; Yoon 1997).

Table 1: Social and Economic Characteristics of Korean Immigrants

Characteristics	Year of Entry to the US			
	Before 1965 (N=865)	1965-74 (N=4208)	1975-84 (N=8614)	1985-90 (N=4911)
Education				
Some High School or Less	17%	17%	18%	17%
High School Graduates	18%	19%	28%	29%
Some College	22%	22%	23%	17%
4 Year College Graduates	21%	26%	22%	23%
Graduate School Graduates	22%	15%	10%	14%
Occupation				
Professional Workers	24%	18%	11%	13%
Managerial Workers	16%	14%	12%	11%
Service Workers	11%	14%	15%	19%
Operators and Laborers	10%	13%	14%	15%
Income				
Mean Personal Income	\$30,909	\$27,907	\$18,894	\$10,313
Mean Family Income	\$64,852	\$63,425	\$46,084	\$30,679
Percent below Poverty Level	8%	6%	10%	25%

Source: Adapted from In-Jin Yoon (1997:94)- US Bureau of the Census, 5 percent PUMS of the 1990 Census; Korean adult immigrants are between the ages of 25-65.

In conjunction with this shift from the occupational preference system to family reunification, economic improvement in South Korea was a major factor behind the diversity of Korean immigrants' class backgrounds (Yoon 1997). Middle-class and upper-class Koreans, for instance, had less desire to immigrate as their standing improved with Korea's economic development and as they became aware of the limited nature of opportunities for Korean immigrants in the US. On the other hand, working-class Koreans, according to Yoon (1997: 93), as they experienced greater relative deprivation vis-à-vis the middle class and the upper class, sought migration to offset the growing economic gap.

My survey data corroborates Yoon's observations of the changing makeup of Korean immigration to the US. When parents of the second generation are compared with the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants, there are considerable differences. First,

whereas about 80% of the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants came to the US during the 1980s and 1990s⁹, close to 76% of the parents of the second generation¹⁰, in contrast, immigrated during the 1960s and 1970s. We can collapse the two data together and compare the demographic characteristics on the basis of the time of arrival (decade). Actually, by limiting the comparison to "1980-90s" Korean immigrants who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s with parents of the second generation who arrived in the 1960s and 1970s, the time of arrival clearly sets the parents of the second generation apart from other Korean immigrants.

Second, this selectivity translates into considerable educational differences between parents of the second generation and "1980-90s" Korean immigrants. Although Korean immigrants possess overall high levels of education, parents of the second generation reveal higher levels of education than "1980-90s" Korean immigrants. For example, 14% of fathers of the second generation completed a Master's degree, another 18% obtained professional degrees (MD, DDS, JD, etc.), and 10% had a Ph.D. (42% of fathers possessed a graduate degree). By contrast, only about 20% of the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants had graduate degrees¹¹.

I have recoded the education data according to Fernandez and Kim's (1998) 3 categories: noncollege graduates (HS or lower), native-college graduates (BA/BS from

⁹ Close to half (47%, N=391) of the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants in the sample came to the US during the decade of 1980s.

¹⁰ Only 24% (N= 392) of the parents of the second generation came to the US during the 1980s.

¹¹ Fifteen percent of "1980-90s" Korean immigrants obtained a Master's degree, and rates of professional degrees and doctorates pale in comparison to fathers of the second generation.

Korea), and postcollege graduates (MA/MS or higher in the US). The recodes reveal that close to half (42%) of the fathers are post-college graduates, twice the rate of the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants (21%).

Table 2: Educational Attainment

Educational Attainment	"1980-90s" Koreans		R's Father	
	N	Pct	N	Pct
Noncollege (HS or Lower)	101	33%	38	19%
Native-college (BA/BS in Korea)	125	47%	74	38%
Postcollege (MA/MS or Higher-US)	44	21%	81	42%
Total	270	100%	193	100%

Chi-Square (62.411 a); df 4; Asymp. Sig (2-sided) 0; *Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

Finally, much research has documented the high propensity of Korean immigrants to turn to entrepreneurship (I. Kim 1981; Hurh and Kim 1984; Min 1996; Bonacich and Light 1988; Light and Roach 1996; Yoon 1997). For instance, Min's 1988 survey of married Korean women in New York City (1996) found a self-employment rate of 61% for husbands and 49% for wives. The 1990 PUMS data (US Census Public Use Microdata Sample) indicates that 38 % of Korean immigrant women and 41% of Korean men were in the retail industry in New York City. Overall, the self-employment rate for Koreans is estimated around 35% (Min 1996: 52; Light and Roach 1996). Validating much research on self-employment rates of Korean immigrants, my 1998 NYSGKA survey reveals that 42% (N=278) of the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants are self-employed. Similarly, 32% (N=165) of mothers and 43% (N=198) of fathers of the second generation are self-employed. The data substantiates that self-employment plays a major role in the economic adaptation of all first-generation Korean immigrants. In fact, for "1980-90s" Korean immigrants¹² the ethnic economy is pivotal: three fourths (22%

¹² For married 1980-90s Korean immigrants, information was asked about their spouse's jobs and education. Spouses (N= 254, 33%) have somewhat lower self-employment rates than the head of household. Korean immigrant businesses heavily rely on the labor of wives, unlike the trend in Korea where middle-class women have been homemakers. This is a change that women undergo as a result of

find employment in Korean immigrant businesses¹³) depend on the ethnic economy for employment.

Table 3: Type of Work

Type of Work	"1980-90s" Koreans		1980-90s's Spouse		R's Father		R's Mother	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Self-Employed (Including Fam Bus)	125	45%	132	52%	104	53%	87	53%
Korean Immigrant Business Employee	61	22%	62	24%	8	4%	16	9%
South Korean Subsidiary Employee	8	3%	11	4%	7	4%	0	0%
Mainstream Firm Employee	84	30%	49	19%	79	40%	62	38%
Total	278	100%	254	100%	198	100%	165	100%

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

However, what clearly distinguishes the mothers (38%) and the fathers (40%) of the second generation from the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants (30%) is their higher participation in non-Korean (mainstream) firms: 38%, 40%, and 30% respectively. And unlike the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants (22%), very few parents of the second generation are employed in Korean immigrant businesses: 10% for mothers and 4% for fathers. As a result, whereas more than a fifth of the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants can be described as employees¹⁴, workers make only a small percentage among the parents'

where middle-class women have been homemakers. This is a change that women undergo as a result of immigration (Park 1997: 115-117; Min 1997). Participation in a business or sharing the burden of earning an income creates conflicts in families about the role of women in the family. (See Park 1997 for a discussion on this). Even among women the self-employment rate is extremely high, indicating that self-employment is a major source of economic adaptation for all Korean immigrants.

¹³ As recent immigrants who have not had the time to adjust, it is conceivable that after a period of working in the ethnic economy they may seek self-employment. Still the changing class characteristic of Korean immigrants in recent years is creating a more heterogeneous community.

¹⁴ Korean immigrant businesses are generally smaller in size and therefore, offer fewer opportunities for advancement than South Korean multinational subsidiaries or primary sector firms. Because most Korean immigrant businesses are small-scale, labor-intensive, and retail-oriented, with the exception of

wave. Hence, parents of the second generation are either small business owners or professionals.

1.5 AND SECOND-GENERATION KOREAN AMERICANS

Place of Birth and Age to the US

More than two-thirds (70%, N=205) of the second-generation respondents were born in Korea (the 1.5ers) and only about a third (30%) are truly second generation: those born in the US. The 1.5ers still outnumber the second in this age category. Probably children of Korean immigrants who entered the US in 1980s and 1990s will be more evenly distributed.

For the 1.5ers, 11% came to the US when they were 8 years old or earlier. Another 11% came when they were six. The rest came at different ages. The mean and median age to the US are 6.34 and 6 respectively. A critical age that separates those who are more "Koreanized" from those who are more "Americanized" seems to be 10. Those who arrived before 10, although there are slight individual differences, are much more comfortable in English than those who came after the age of 10.

wholesalers/import and export businesses and manufacturers, there are limited slots for managerial positions. Employment in mainstream, government, or non-profit sectors assumes that these jobs are more professional although there are certainly blue-collar or lower-end administrative positions in these sectors.

Place of Residence

More than half (53%, N=205) of the second-generation respondents grew up in New York (during 6 through 18 years old) and 18% grew up in New Jersey. The rest had grown up elsewhere in the US, as far as Alaska, but in many different parts of the US (West Coast, Midwest, East Coast, and the South). Currently, close to three fourths (69%) live in New York and almost a quarter (23%) in New Jersey. Respondents currently living outside the metro New York area had immediate family members who were living in New York/New Jersey (whose households were screened and contact numbers about eligible respondents were obtained. We then contacted these respondents for interviews). Among those who reside in metropolitan New York, slightly over a third (34%) of the second-generation households are concentrated in Manhattan, more than three times the rate of "1980-90s" Korean households (10%). As young adults, many are drawn to Manhattan for work, entertainment, and culture. However, a good proportion of second-generation Korean Americans (23%), like their first-generation counterparts who are concentrated in area code 718 (predominantly in Queens¹⁵), also reside in the 718 area code. Another 16% live in area code 201 (NJ).

Gender and Age

Slightly more women (52%, N=205) participated in the survey than men (48%). Whether the ratio of women to men is greater in the overall second-generation population

¹⁵ The area code 718 also includes Brooklyn, Staten Island, and the Bronx. Most Korean immigrants, however, are concentrated in Queens.

is less certain. Among the "1980-90s" Korean households 54% of the head of households (HHs) were women and 46% were men.

The mean age for second-generation Korean Americans is 27.49. The median age is 27. The mean age of the fathers is 60.2 and their median age is 60. The mean age of the mothers is 56.4 and their median age is 55. The mean age¹⁶ for the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants is 46.79 (N =414) in 1999. The median age is 44 in 1999. Whereas the parents¹⁷ of the second generation are in their mid 50s and early 60s, the mothers and fathers respectively, the "1980-90s" Korean households are in their 40s. Furthermore, compared to the 23 through 35 year old second-generation Korean Americans, in the "1980-90s" Korean sample only 18% (N=414) were in that age group. 69% were between the ages of 36 and 60 and only 9% of the "1980-90s" Koreans were made up of the elderly.

Marital Status

Only a quarter (25%, N=205) of second-generation Korean Americans were married, while the rest were single. This is still a young population and they are making the transition from school to work to forming families. In contrast to the second

¹⁶ The "1980-90s" Koreans' ages have been computed using year of birth since these more accurately reflect the ages of the respondents in different years. The respondent's age, especially for the first generation, is tricky because the age at the time of the interview takes into account whether respondents recently had their birthdays or not. Also the first generation is apt to give "Korean" ages as opposed to "American" ages, which counts an extra year.

¹⁷ The parents' information was obtained through the second-generation respondents (their N=205). Their demographic information and data on education and employment serve as a backdrop to compare the outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans vis-à-vis their immigrant parents.

generation, more than three fourths (79%, N=416) of the 1980-90s Korean immigrants were married and only 14% were single or never married.

Religion

Previous studies have shown that the vast majority of Korean immigrants attended Korean immigrant churches regularly. My survey in New York supports this finding for the first generation. Among the 1980-90s Korean immigrants, 58% (N=405) were Protestants, 16% were Catholics, 4% were Buddhists, and 23% had no religious affiliation¹⁸. Religious affiliation, prior to immigration, shows a lower rate than current affiliation. Still the figures are very high, highlighting the selective pattern of immigration among Christians instead of Buddhists (according to Hurh 1998, in Korea 28% are Buddhists, 19% are Christians, 6% are Catholics, and 1% are Confucian). For instance, 42% (N=405) were Protestants, 12% were Catholics, 6% were Buddhists, and 37% had no religion in Korea. The data show that religious affiliation, as a result of immigration, increased for Protestants and Catholics while the rates for Buddhists and no religion decreased. As others have shown, there has been much conversion of Korean immigrants to Christianity in the US (Min 1992; Hurh 1998).

¹⁸ It should be noted that "No Religion" for the first generation may mean no religious affiliation and not atheism since some of them practice ancestor worship. "No Religion" for second-generation Korean Americans, on the other hand, refers to atheism and not religious affiliation.

Table 4: "1980-90s" Korean Immigrants' Religion

Religion	In Korea		Currently (1998)	
	N	Pct	N	Pct
Protestantism	221	45%	300	58%
Catholicism	60	12%	83	16%
Buddhism	35	7%	15	3%
Other Religions	12	3%	4	1%
No Religion	162	33%	113	22%
Total	490	100%	515	100%

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

Not deviating too far from the trends of the first generation, 54% (N=200) of second-generation Korean Americans were Protestants, 12% were Catholics, 2% were Buddhists, and 30% were not affiliated with a religion. Christians make up close to 65% (N=202) and those who do not have a religion is 32%. Whereas the parents converted from no religion and Buddhism to Christianity in the US, the second generation's Catholic rate went down while the no religion rate went up. Whether this is a secular trend among second-generation Korean Americans or the function of immigrant churches (for the parents) is another matter but nonetheless interesting.

Table 5: 1.5 and Second-Generation Korean's Religion¹⁹

Religion	Religion during Childhood		Religion at the Time of the Interview		Church Affiliation at the Time of Interview	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Protestantism	118	58%	109	54%	72	36%
Catholicism	37	19%	23	11%	11	5%
Buddhism	4	2%	4	2%	1	
Other Religions	2	1%	2	1%	0	
No Religion	40	20%	64	32%	0	
Total	201	100%	202	100%	84	100%

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

An important qualification to this data is that there is a discrepancy between those who profess a religion and actually participate in a church. If we restrict to those who profess a religion and participate in a church, the rate of Protestantism/Catholicism goes down in their current religion. With the first generation, there is less discrepancy in regards to current religion and church participation. But for second-generation Korean Americans, who may have grown up with a parent's religion and attended a church in their childhood, the rate for current religion drops. Many still profess a Christian religion because they grew up in that religion (which shows quite high rates).

Politics

Among second-generation Korean Americans 65% (N=202) are registered to vote. That is among citizens, 79% (N=166) are registered to vote while 21% have not

¹⁹ Note that those who profess Protestantism as a current religion are 54%. This rate includes those who don't participate in a church. If we restrict to those who participate in a church and profess Protestantism the rate drops to 36% (72), which demonstrates that the church leaders' worries are not unfounded. For instance, 84 respondents do belong to a church while 56 do not. 36 respondents who profess Protestantism do not belong to a church whereas 12 who profess Catholicism do not belong to a church.

registered to vote. In-depth interviews indicate many second-generation Korean Americans consider voting an important civic duty. However, whether they actually vote is another matter. Out of those who are registered to vote, 24% (N=131) reported being registered as Republican, 47% as Democrat, and 18% as Independent. What accounts for the political affiliation is less clear but from in-depth interviews, respondents attributed to party platform and their political orientation (conservative, liberal) as major reasons. Although some have voted in the presidential and mayoral elections, many reported not having done so. In addition, most in-depth respondents showed more interest in national events than in local politics. A respondent suggested that this is probably due to the fact that many second-generation Korean Americans live in Manhattan, are single, and do not have children. Married couples who have children and live in the suburbs have to deal with property taxes and education, a general concern for local issues among most suburbanites.

CHAPTER 4: THE EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES OF SECOND-GENERATION KOREAN AMERICANS

The impressive academic performance of Asian Americans has captured the attention and awe of national weeklies like *Time* (Brand 1987) and *US News and World Report* (Success Story 1966). From their soaring rates in Ivy League colleges to becoming finalists of the prestigious Westinghouse competitions, children of these new Asian immigrants have been dubbed the "Asian whiz kids" or "overachievers." Researchers find that Asian American students score higher on GPAs and standardized math tests relative to other groups (Portes and Rumbaut 1990). Several studies also found that controlling for other independent variables, being Asian stood out as one of the most significant factors behind academic performance (Steinberg 1996). Precisely when researchers and policy makers fret at what they perceive as the decline of academic performance of American students vis-a-vis their counterparts in other advanced industrialized nations, the strong academic performance of Asian American students brings out a dint of hope and intrigue. Why do Asian American students perform so well in school? Is there an Asian American exceptionalism that accounts for their superb academic outcomes? Or is it simply a myth perpetuated by the media and neoconservatives to pit Asian Americans against other racial minorities?

This chapter addresses some of these questions by examining the educational outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans in New York. Second-generation Korean Americans show outstanding educational outcomes. While the media and neoconservatives highlight family values and a strong work ethic, I argue that parental class resources play a greater role in the superb outcomes of the second generation.

LEVELS OF EDUCATION

Gans (1992) anticipated many second-generation Korean Americans would rely upon education to achieve upward mobility. Confirming Gan's speculation, second-generation Korean Americans have achieved outstanding levels of education, demonstrated by almost universal high school graduation rates (99%) and impressive college graduation rates. Fifty-five percent report BA/BS as their highest degree. Women are attending college in slightly higher numbers than men, corroborating a pattern of increasing educational attainment for women of all races (See Lopez 1999).

Table 6: R's Education by Sex

Education	Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
HS or Less	2	2%	1	1%	3	2%
Some College (AA)	15	15%	6	6%	21	10%
College (BA/BS)	47	48%	66	62%	113	55%
Some Graduate School	8	8%	7	7%	15	7%
Graduate Degree or More	26	27%	27	25%	53	26%
Total	98	100%	107	100%	205	100%

Chi-Square 7.089; df 4; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .131

[Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.]

This is far above the average rates of educational attainment than the general US population. A third (26%) have a graduate degree, slightly lower than their fathers but still notably high. However, they do not surpass the strikingly high educational attainments of their fathers. Only 19% (N=200) reported Master's as their highest education completed and the rates are lower for professional degrees or doctorates. Men and women are also comparable in regards to graduate degrees.

A majority (80%, N=205) attended public high schools and 19% went to a private or parochial school, a pattern that does not diverge much by gender. Most of the public high schools were suburban high schools or specialized NYC public schools (Stuyvesant, Bronx Science, and Brooklyn Tech). Over half (51%, N=203) attended high schools in New York compared to 19% who attended high schools in New Jersey.

College Selectivity

The figures on college selectivity are even more remarkable. About half (51%) of the second generation attended National Tier 1 schools²⁰ (National Universities Tier 1 [top 50 colleges] and National Liberal Arts Tier 1 [Top 40 Liberal Arts colleges] combined).

Table 7: College Selectivity by Sex

College Ranking	Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
National Tier 1 (NUT1+NLT1)	45	48%	52	53%	97	51%
National Tier 2 (NUT2+NLT2)	27	29%	23	24%	50	26%
Regional and Other	19	20%	10	10%	29	15%
Fine Arts	3	3%	13	13%	16	8%
Total	94	100%	98	100%	192	100%

Chi-Square 9.789(a); df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.02

Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.

Not only are second-generation Korean Americans graduating from college in high numbers but also a large proportion is doing so from the most selective schools. In addition, a slightly higher percent of women are attending selective colleges than men

²⁰ A noticeable rate is the 8% who went to Fine Arts Colleges (13% of women, 3% of men). About half of the colleges (50%, N=199) were in New York. Very few (6%) attended a university in New Jersey while a slightly higher proportion (10%) chose schools in Massachusetts.

and this cross tabulation is statistically significant (0.02). A higher percentage of women are also attending fine arts colleges.

When these figures are compared to the national rates they are even more striking. For example, in "Who goes to America's Highly Ranked 'National' Universities?" a 1998 report by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) of the US Department of Education, the authors found that Asian high school graduates were twice as likely as Hispanics, blacks, or whites to enter top national universities (Owings et al. 1998). The figures for Asians are 27% for National Universities (NU) Tier 1, 12% for Hispanics, 7% for blacks, and 10% for whites. Asians comprised only 6% of the total enrolled in higher education in 1995. Second-generation Korean Americans in my sample were almost twice (40%) as likely as Asians to have attended NU Tier 1²¹. Because my sample consists of mostly middle-class respondents, this exceptionalism may be overemphasized. What needs to be controlled for is the class background of the students to verify whether ethnicity still remains significant. Obviously the Asian American population is smaller and immigrant parents who have experienced status loss are more likely to push their children. This may explain the greater rate of Asian Americans in NU Tier 1 schools.

²¹ Although the N is too small to draw any reliable conclusions, a larger number of the second generation in the sample chose graduate schools selectively too. More than half (54% N=61) attended NU Tier 1 and a quarter (25%) attended NU Tier 2-4.

High School Average

According to a report by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) of the US Department of Education, among many factors, GPA is one of the more significant variables that determines whether high school students attend a top national university or not. Research indicates that Asian Americans receive higher GPAs, score higher on standardized tests, and go to top national universities (Rumbaut 1995; Owings et al. 1998). In my survey, close to three-fourths (70%, N=205) of the second-generation Korean Americans had a grade point average of at least A-/B+. Less than a fifth had a B average. Again, women are receiving somewhat higher GPAs than men although most second-generation Korean Americans were doing well in school. This gender difference is statistically significant.

Table 8: High School GPA By Sex

High School GPA	Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
A (93-100)	29	32%	42	40%	71	36%
A-/B+ (89-92)	29	32%	44	42%	73	37%
B (83-88)	23	25%	12	12%	35	18%
B-/C+ (79-82)	7	8%	4	4%	11	6%
C (73-78)	3	3%	2	2%	5	3%
Total	91	100%	104	100%	195	100%

Chi-Square 9.112(a); df 4; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.058

Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.

Clearly, there is a correlation between high GPAs and entry into top national universities. Logistic regression analysis predicting the likelihood of attending top national universities corroborates that GPA is the most statistically significant independent variable [See chapter 6]. Second-generation Korean Americans did

extremely well in high school, as reflected by their GPA, affecting their chances of attending top universities.

EXPLAINING EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES OF SECOND-GENERATION KOREAN AMERICANS: CLASS RESOURCES AND COMMUNITY AND PARENTAL PRESSURES

Cultural explanations of Korea-American educational success would argue that second-generation Korean Americans are doing well academically because their Asian cultural background (Confucian work ethic and family values) promotes learning and education (S. Lee 1996: 53). S. Lee (1996) found that the teachers at the high school where she conducted her ethnography saw Asian culture to be behind the academic success of Asian Americans. Other researchers argue that Asian culture is compatible with middle-class American culture, which they contend is conducive to academic achievement (Kitano 1969; Caplan, Choy, and Whitmore 1991). Asian values, beliefs, and practices of compliance and respect for authority in these formulations fit with the educational requirements of the host society (Sue and Okasaki 1990). Others point to the family-centered nature of Asian families (Sung 1987), whereby children are taught to work hard in school to please their parents (Pang 1990). In short, the Confucian work ethic and family values, deduced to be at the root of the East Asian "miracle", operate behind the academic success of Asian Americans.

While cultural explanations may account for why there is strong Asian academic achievement, they fail to account for intra-group differences in achievement, in particular explaining low achievement (S. Lee 1996). In other words, in the countries of origin (in Asia) where culture is likely to be strongest, achievement varies significantly (Steinberg

1981; Siu 1992). Steinberg (1981: 275) aptly writes, "After all, no such claims are made about the Asian youth who inhabit the slums of Manila, Hong Kong, and Bombay, or, for that matter, San Francisco and New York." In addition, cultural explanations are circular in that "values are not measured independently, but inferred from success, and then posited as the cause of success" (Steinberg 1981: 272).

Selectivity of Korean Immigration

Structuralists, on the other hand, view social class (father's education, father's occupation, family income) as the primary factor behind academic success (Blau and Duncan 1967; Coleman 1960). From this perspective, the stratified nature of American society is underscored, whereby resources and rewards are distributed inequitably. The primary role of education in a capitalist society is the reproduction of extant class relations: class advantage and disadvantage. For Bowles and Gintis (1976), educational institutions, through a set of overt and covert mechanisms, channel youths into different positions in society, replicating inequality of outcomes. Research reveals that economic situation as well as family structure (whether the household is single parent or two parent) affects school performance (Zhou and Bankston 1998: 142). Dropouts, for instance, come from large families or single-parent households (Wagenaar 1987). Stable and cohesive families, on the other hand, provide role models and value orientations. Hodges Persell points out that studies consistently have found that children of low-income families performed less favorably than children of affluent families (1977: 1). In short, for Steinberg (1981: 275), "what is inherited is not genes, and not culture, but class advantage and disadvantage."

As noted in Chapter 3, the selectivity of Korean immigration has significant consequences for the educational outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans. The parents of the second generation are roughly split between highly-educated entrepreneurs and professionals. In contrast to the simplistic, stereotypical view of Korean immigrants as small business owners, the cohort the parents of the second generation belong to highlight a substantial professional composition. The fact that close to half of the parents of the second-generation respondents are professionals and the other half are entrepreneurs draws attention to the variety of resources at the disposal of middle-class immigrants. As the case of Asian Indian and Taiwanese immigrants attests, professionals have one of the highest educational attainments and incomes and their children are predicted to do very well (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Bacon 1996). Family socioeconomic status (SES) (combined with race/ethnicity), Zhou and Bankston (1998) note, affect everything from the choice of neighborhoods, to the type of schools and peers, to other formal and informal networks associated with SES that are far less readily available to children of working-class immigrants, which influences the mobility prospects of the second generation. It is within this context that parents can guide the trajectories of their children in spite of the external pressures (anti-intellectualism, peer pressures, etc.) that may undermine the actions of the parents. Therefore, I argue that the strong academic performance of the Korean American second generation stems from their parents' class selectivity and not Korean culture, if that means a static characterization of culture.

Relative Functionalism

In conjunction with class selectivity, relative functionalism is an important variable that interacts with the middle-class background of Korean immigration in explaining the strong academic performance of second-generation Korean Americans (Abelmann and Lie 1995). Historically, Asian Americans have been excluded from various social institutions, including labor unions. In response to barriers, they have sought alternatives especially in education, which according to Suzuki (1980: 173), has "reaffirmed this faith by rewarding compliance, good behavior, perseverance and docility of Asian children." Similarly, when immigrant parents face "blocked mobility" in the mainstream economy or status gap/inconsistency (Min 1984), Sue and Okazaki (1990) argue, parents turn to their children to fulfill their dreams by placing greater emphasis on their children's education and occupation (Zhou and Bankston 1998: 148; Min 1998). While this may inform the pressures that some Asian American youth encounter, S. Lee points out that the theory does not explain the dissimilar responses by African Americans and other racial minorities who consistently faced discrimination and blocked mobility (Zhou and Bankston 148). Also the theory does not address low achievement (S. Lee 1996).

Nonetheless, as some studies have noted, Korean immigrant entrepreneurship often signifies downward mobility (underemployment) (Gold 1994; Abelmann and Lie 1995). In spite of their professional and urban backgrounds, Korean immigrants have been restricted to small business because of their difficulties with English, licensing requirements, and experience with discrimination in the labor market. In fact, according to Min (1984) and recently Fernandez and Kim (1998), one of the principal reasons why

college-educated Korean immigrants seek self-employment is to relieve their status gap/inconsistency. Fernandez and Kim (1998) show that Korean native-college graduates (BA/BS from Korea) seek self-employment at higher rates than noncollege graduates (HS or lower) or postcollege graduates (MA/MS in the US). Native-college graduates were the most likely to seek entrepreneurship to offset their blocked mobility because their professional qualifications from Korea do not translate into professional occupations in the US. For noncollege graduates, on the other hand, the lack of capital and class resources generally relegate them to ethnic labor markets or secondary labor markets. Mobility for non-college graduates is often achieved through the use of ethnic resources (training and sponsorship), which still allow for mobility into self-employment. For postcollege graduates, having obtained an MA/MS or professional degrees in the US, English and licensing requirements do not pose as severe a barrier as it does for native-college graduates and they are able to obtain professional occupations (although these may not be in the most competitive sectors²²). Thus, the higher overall self-employment rates of Koreans reflect the concentration of native-college graduates within the Korean immigrant stream²³. As a result of the status gap/inconsistency, these parents wish to fulfill their dreams of professional, high-income, high-status occupations through their children (Abelmann and Lie 1995).

²² In fact, the status gap/inconsistency also applies to professionals. Even the highly educated professionals are restricted to lower-status professional occupations (for example, the concentration of Korean doctors in city and state hospitals as well as less desirable specialties). This is one of the reasons for the active participation of successful businessmen and professionals in Korean churches (as elders) and business organizations, which provide an important outlet to regain their status.

²³ This migration pattern has shifted toward noncollege graduates since the 1980s as occupational preference system became replaced by family reunification.

Thus, Korean parents' emphasis on education stems less from the Korean culture that values education than from a class-based response to opportunities in Korea and the US. In South Korea, Abelman and Lie (1995: 72) point out, educational credentials are crucial since they serve to maintain and legitimate the class position of the South Korean elite. In the US, facing obstacles in the labor market because of language barriers and their inability to translate Korean educational and professional experience, college-educated Korean immigrants emphasize education and top schools to their children. The protagonist of Marie G. Lee's novel Finding My Voice, a high school student, illustrates the frustration of her father and his insistence on why she has to attend Harvard. "Many of my classmates have gone on to become big people in ...Korea. Yet over here, all people cared about was that my degree was not American...So now...you and your sister can do more than I or your mother ever could: you will graduate with degree from Harvard, and nobody can say anything to you, because everyone knows Harvard." Quoted from Abelman and Lie (1995: 125). The first generation strategically chose entrepreneurship to bypass downward mobility, the successes translating into a financial stability that provided advantageous class resources to the second generation. This way mobility is deferred to the second generation.

In addition to parents' class resources, ethnic resources from the Korean community are invaluable (Light and Gold 2000). The Korean community is extremely obsessed with the reputation of schools, both high schools and elite US colleges. This goes back to middle-class Korean immigrants' desire to regain their status through their children. The Korean-language media in New York is an ethnic resource that actively

covers (and promotes) a range of educational concerns of the Korean community, from Korean high school valedictorians²⁴ to information about school rankings and school districts to famous Koreans with superb educational backgrounds. For instance, the credentials of doctors, dentists, and lawyers, particularly the name of the college and medical/law school, are prominently featured in newspaper advertisements, which confers a level of prestige and expertise. Many second-generation Korean Americans will quickly point out which secondary and post-secondary schools their parents and the Korean community emphasize and are enamored with. Connie's response illustrates the extreme pressures that second-generation Korean Americans confront. A 24 year old working in the fashion industry, Connie (a pseudonym²⁵) points out that she went to the Bronx High School of Science because of her parents. *"That's where Korean parents force you. It was between that and Stuyvesant and I didn't make it to Stuyvesant,"* she expressed.

In addition to the Korean-language media, church social networks as well as alumni and other networks (Waldinger 1996; Min 1998) play an important role in the diffusion of the status of schools and concrete information about how to go about finding them. The church is such a site where much interaction among Korean parents takes place, allowing them to compare how their children stand vis-à-vis their congregationists'

²⁴ Because of the national obsession for elite colleges in Korea, high school students in Korea have to undergo an excruciating amount of time preparing for college examinations. As a result of the tremendous competition, making it into a four-year university in Seoul is considered an achievement. Because of this rigid structure, South Koreans spend an enormous amount of their monthly budget on private education to supplement public education. By private education, I mean after school tutoring, academies (Hakwons), ranging from piano lessons to English to math to computers, etc.

²⁵ All names are pseudonyms. They have been altered to maintain the confidentiality of the respondent.

children in regards to specialized high schools or elite colleges. Parents then go back to their children and repeat the information they heard from church members or friends, either in frustration that their children are not living up to the model of other commendable youth, or in the hopes of putting pressures on their already irritated children (the fact that parents are making unfair comparisons and scolding them for not doing better or as well as their siblings and friends). Joseph explains, "*Back then, especially through church influence, everyone said 'Your son has to go to one of those schools [specialized high schools].'*"

Pressures to Attend Selective Colleges

As a result of the status considerations, the educational bar has been raised for second-generation Korean Americans. For Korean parents, because they are far more concerned with the reputation of schools, graduating from high school and going to college is hardly regarded an achievement but a taken-for-granted educational trajectory that second-generation Korean youth are expected to follow. Hyun, a 27 year old woman working for a non-profit arbitration organization, agreed that skipping college "*wasn't even a choice.*" Jeeun, a 29 year old woman in the hotel industry, adds, "*we had to go to college*". In other words, to disregard attending college was hardly an option and both never contemplated not going to college.

Instead, much of the pressure that second-generation Korean Americans face revolves around the prospects of making it into an elite university. Sungsoo's parents were seldom explicit about their preference for colleges. However, he implicitly knew

that his parents "*wanted [him] to go to Ivy.*" Sungsoo, a 23 year old man working as an analyst with a consulting firm, remarked, "*They only know Ivy.*" Jonathan's parents, on the other hand, were adamant about their preference for top colleges for their children. Not surprisingly, his parents could not hide their displeasure that Jonathan chose to attend Rutgers. "*Even my brother he went to Penn, and they wanted him to apply to Harvard and Cornell. He didn't apply to either one of them because he didn't want to go there. But I remember my dad didn't really like that. They are like enamored by Harvard,*" clarified Jonathan, a 27 year old working for an accounting firm.

Hence, one of the consequences of intense pressures to attend selective colleges was to rationalize the choice of colleges on the basis of costs. This was the case of Junghoon, a 24 year old male loan officer at a Korean bank. Since he recognized that he did not have the grades to make it into an Ivy League school, cost considerations became the primary criteria behind his choice of schools. Junghoon explained, "*I knew if I wasn't going to Ivy League like Harvard or whatever, mediocre college or state college, they are all the same. Might as well save some money.*"

Suburban Residence

Recognizing that placing emphasis on tops schools is not enough, Korean parents make good use of their middle-class resources by proactively seeking residence in the suburbs in order to send their children to schools with a prominent reputation (Abelmann and Lie 1995: 106). Certainly, suburban residence is not simply for the sake of their children but also to showcase their achievement of the "American dream". Initially many Korean immigrants resided in the New York City boroughs. As soon as they adjusted to

their new environment and learned of good school districts, they sought out districts with well-known schools on Long Island, Westchester or New Jersey. Now, many newcomers settle directly in the suburbs (for the well off and those with good social networks) with excellent schools (Min 1998). Jeeun's parents had indeed moved to a better neighborhood solely to send their children to a school known for its name. "*We were at the edge of Beverly Hills, barely in Beverly Hills, just so that we could go to that school,*" concurred Jeeun, a 29 year old woman in the hotel industry.

Some parents even relocated to a different state to facilitate their children's career trajectory. Hanna's parents, in order to make her pianist career possible, moved to New York from Indiana after junior high school so that Hanna could attend a high school in New York and increase her admission chances to Juilliard. Hanna replied, "being Korean" parents (laughter), "*we moved to New York to go to study with someone from Juilliard.*" Recognized as a premier music school, her parents wanted Hanna to attend the best music school in the country.

In immigrant families, because of the faster acculturation of the children vis-à-vis their immigrant parents, often these young children are thrust into adult decision-making roles (Warner and Srole 1945). The decision-making process became reversed in the case of Heesoo, a 32 year old woman in real estate development, who played an active role in persuading her parents to purchase a house in a neighborhood known for its schools, especially its high school. Not particularly fond of the junior high school she was in, Heesoo handed her father a short list of 2 or 3 high schools. This list was the result of assessing high schools on the basis of the ratio of teachers with Ph.D.'s as well

as distribution of national merit scholars. Heesoo declared, "*We bought a house in the neighborhood where I wanted to go to school.*"

Thus, although most second-generation Korean Americans attended public high schools, these were in middle-class suburban neighborhoods. Ilene highlights the degree of variation that exists among public high schools. "*It was a public high school but even the teachers they would say this is like a private country club,*" she said. In addition, Joonshik reminds us that most of the students that attend these suburban high schools were "*Middle class, upper middle class, white. I think there were two black kids in the whole school and three or four Korean kids.*"

Hakwon: Private Academies (After-School Programs)

"Hakwons" are a carryover from South Korea that have now become a prominent institution within the Korean community in New York. Promising entry into specialized schools and Ivy League colleges, these ethnic firms aid second-generation Korean Americans by preparing for college entrance exams such as PSAT and SAT. But Hakwons²⁶ also offer students after school programs ranging from English, Math, computers, homework, etc. to supplement public education. Because many of the respondents in the survey had grown up in the suburbs at a time when few Koreans lived there, most do not have experience with Hakwons. But the younger respondents as well as those who grew up in ethnic neighborhoods in New York City have had experience

²⁶ *Hakwons* play another role for the immigrant community. Because many self-employed parents work long hours, *Hakwons* serve as caretakers of youth, which ironically becomes a place for Korean youth to meet other coethnics.

with Hakwons. While older respondents may have not had experience with Hakwons, their younger siblings have attended these cram schools. Others who had not attended Hakwons growing up, however, came across Hakwons as instructors. Most simply were not familiar with them. As an ethnic enclave business that caters towards Korean immigrants, the Hakwons have come to play a more prominent role today than has been the case in the early 1970s. Joseph's parents intervened early as they sent him to a Hakwon to prepare for the specialized schools' entrance exams. As Joseph recalled, "*My parents decided basically, for me. I went to Hakwon to pick these schools. Take the tests and everything.*"

Doing Homework, GPA, and Teachers' Expectations

Among the factors that determine entry into selective colleges are high school GPAs. According to Steinberg (1995), Asian students are not instinctively smarter (Asian whiz kids) or culturally inclined to perform better in schools. Rather, it is the pattern of Asian American students' conformity to devoting more time to homework and school work that helps them perform better in schools. Portes and Rumbaut (1990) also find that the amount of time spent doing homework was one of the best predictors of high GPAs, which is a primary measure of academic performance. For Joonshik, he thinks he got an A average because of the amount of time he put into homework. "*I did my homework. I studied for tests. I guess that's why. Doing homework,*" he reasoned.

Horace agrees that doing homework is determinant of GPA. The question was why he initially complied with this and later did not. Obviously the pressure came from his parents to do homework every evening. For Horace, the habit of doing homework

had been "programmed" early on by his mother in Korea. However, with assimilation the feelings of guilt and the practice of doing homework soon lessened. *"I felt guilty not doing my homework but I realized that because slowly it [the guilt] went away and a few years into schooling here, I didn't do homework...Now, looking back on it, I only did it cause of the guilt. It was something I never questioned. You had to do it before you go to sleep... And the guilt association is because the person who programmed me was my mother so that's where the guilt comes in,"* explained Horace. As other studies have shown, the longer a child has been in the US and goes through a process of acculturation, the worse his/her academic performance (Rumbaut 1994). In fact, research indicates the foreign-born generally outperform the native-born [bilingual children perform best]. This has been a consistent finding that assimilation into the cultural mainstream, especially the anti-intellectualism and consumer culture common among youth, may not be beneficial to children of immigrants (Portes and Zhou 1995; Zhou and Bankston 1998). One explanation is that subsequent generations, whose frame of reference is the US, are more dissatisfied with the lack of progress and therefore, less optimistic about their outlook in contrast to recent immigrants (Steinberg 1996: 98). Another is that children of immigrants assimilate to American standards through a process of normative socialization (Steinberg 1996: 99) into the anti-intellectualism prevailing among the youth in the US (Zhou and Bankston 1998).

For others, how the teachers perceived Asian American students mattered as much as the time put into their homework. Teachers look upon Asian American students as model students, as "well behaved and academically competent" (S. Lee 1995). Suzuki (1980) observes that Asian students are favored by teachers because of their conformity

to the goals of the teacher and the educational system- obedience and respect for authority. When Dongchul was in junior high school his grades faltered. However, once he entered senior high school he started doing well. He remembers an incident when one of the teachers made an approving comment about the Choi's- his older brother and sister who had excelled in high school and expected the same from him. Nancy corroborates that she received good grades sometimes because she worked hard for them but also because her teachers saw her in a positive light.

Peer Groups, Socializing, and Academic Performance

Peers play a big role in academic performance because they are one of the primary agents of socialization. Whether the concern is with being popular, forming identities, having friends, dating, partying, becoming sexually active, these peer pressures play a greater role in the socialization of the youth. Because of discrimination and the way schools are segregated along ethnic/racial and class lines, (in coethnic/racial schools divisions will be along other dimensions), not all youth have equal access to status peer groups. In fact, Asian and minority students have fewer access to status peer groups (such as the populars, jocks, partyers) and only a very select gain acceptance into the status peer group. For Steinberg (1996), this is precisely the key factor that prevents Asian American students from doing poorly in schools. Rejected from peer groups that favor being popular, partying, and underemphasizing schooling, Asian American students socialize with fellow Asians who believe in education and work hard.

Even though this observation may explain why Asian American students show far more engagement in schools, Steinberg assumes that all Asian American peers equally

stress education and doing well in school. As S. Lee's study (1996) shows, there were varied levels of engagement and academic performance depending on the type of identities these Asian American students held. There is also variability within the same group. In addition, the particular status peer group may vary from school to school. For example, in schools where the status groups are dominated by the most academically competent, barriers to entry into the status group may undermine the academic performance of outsiders. As she underscores, Asian American students are not a monolithic group and fellow Asian American peers do not guarantee an academic track. In fact, "new wavers" (working-class Chinese and Southeast Asian students) emphasize getting by in schools, and belonging to this peer group may lead to poor academic performance (S. Lee 1996).

Heesoo could not agree more. For her, "good" schools usually are surrounded by academically inclined students more so than "bad" schools. *"I think that's very very important that you hang out with the right crowd. I think this is where my sisters went wrong. Cause all my friends went to Yale and Harvard and Princeton and Stanford and UC and University of Chicago. My sister's friends went to community college and look where she is. If all your friends are applying to Ivy League schools and all your friends have 4.0s what are you gonna do? Be the slacker,"* Heesoo argued. Karen concurs. While parents and self-motivation are important, she recognizes that the type of peers matters tremendously. *"I wanted to do well and I always knew I was going to go to college. I didn't know what kind of college but it's also all my friends. 99% of our graduating class went to college, whether it was in the Philippines or in Europe or in the U.S. So it was kind of expected. We all worked really hard and there was a lot of*

competition too because our parents all knew each other and we all kind of knew each other too," elaborates Karen.

Similarly, Annie's parents emphasized and pushed Annie to befriend only those peers that were academically inclined. According to Annie, *"The only thing they kind of strayed me away from was friends, if they weren't making good grades or if they weren't going into a major that my parents approved of. Then they'd say, 'you better make new friends'...So I think I lost a friend that way because she felt that my parents didn't approve of her. She wasn't a bad kid but her grades were kind of shaky. But she was still a smart kid, respectful and everything like that."*

On the other hand, Joseph's academic performance fell when he started attending a high school with a large number of Asians and socializing actively. Joseph wanted to go to Bronx Science because there were more Asians there than his junior high school where it had been predominantly white. However, attending Bronx Science did not turn out as his parents had planned. Instead because Joseph was surrounded with more Asians (the "wrong" crowd like the new wavers) and became more social, his academic life suffered to the point where he barely graduated from high school. *"I'm thinking had I gone to a normal school I would have done a lot better and maybe not hung out as much. In junior high school I did have my friends but I wasn't very social so I would study more, and it's a hard balance between a social life and academics,"* Joseph reflected.

Connie also did poorly in high school, receiving a C average. She was hardly engaged with school work and instead cut classes to go to a friend's house, the movies, or go shoot pool. Also instead of doing homework she went to parties and clubs. What is interesting in her account is that her parents were not aware of the extent of her academic

troubles. Not only would she resort to making fake report cards, passing them as real to her parents, but also she would intercept phone calls from schools or come up with an excuse if got caught. *"I was really horrible in HS,"* said Connie. Had her parents known the severity of the problem she would have gotten into trouble. *"But they never knew to what extent,"* Connie noted. Ironically, she was also attending Bronx Science, which shows to indicate that simply going to a good high school is not a guarantee of academic success.

Others like Eugene also did not do so well in high school because he hardly spent time doing homework. He feels that he was in a high school that did not push the academic side that strongly. According to Eugene, the teachers were laid back, none of the students made it to Harvard, and the impetus was simply to pass a class not to fail. He also spent much of his time socializing, playing pool, bowling, going out drinking, and checking out the club scene.

Among those who had struck the social scene more than the academic side, a few were also involved with gangs, affecting their academic performance even more. Bill ended up graduating from a high school in Greece because of the severity of his involvement with gangs. He had to leave the country to avoid going to court and going to jail. His parents, feeling the best way was to pull him away from his friends and set him in an academic course, decided to uproot him from those peers that imposed far more authority than they did. In retrospect, Bills feels that this last resort decision was justified since had he stayed in NY he would have gone to jail without the possibility of parole. His friends are currently in jail for having "done too many things" (crime). Thus, peers, especially gangs, can strongly determine the academic performance of students. While

many Korean parents saw these specialized high schools as academic havens, outcomes varied according to peer influences and the amount of time spent doing homework, or socializing.

Finally, difficulties with family, especially emotional breakdowns as a result of divorce and other traumatic events, affect academic performance. This was the case of Andrew who suffered an emotional lapse during 11th grade and his grades began to fall abruptly. *"I never had to devote that much time to work in high school but I made it easier for myself because in the middle of my eleventh grade year, I stopped doing work altogether. My GPA dropped from an A average to a low C average and I guess something happened to me psychologically. Not consciously but I just decided that the work in high school wasn't worth doing anymore...I think that I wanted to disengage myself from being a high school student altogether... I wasn't conscious of my parents having trouble. I think by that time my parents were separated. That might have affected me psychologically. I was not conscious of that being an influence. I was listening to a lot of music and devoted most of my energy to that. I don't know. I wasn't suffering from any sort of psychological breakdown. I just decided that I didn't have to do it anymore."* Andrew elaborated.

EDUCATIONAL OUTCOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHILDREN OF ENTREPRENEURS AND PROFESSIONALS

While parents and the community can put equal pressure on their children to do well academically, educational outcomes do vary between children of entrepreneurs and professionals. In levels of education for second-generation Korean Americans, little

difference emerges between the two groups although children of professionals show higher rates of graduate degree (41%).

Table 9: Respondent's Education by Father's Work Type

Education	Father's Work Type					
	Self-Employed (or in Family Bus)		Professionals		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
HS or Less	2	2%	1	1%	3	2%
Some College (AA)	16	15%	3	4%	19	10%
College (BA/BS)	65	63%	39	45%	104	55%
Some Graduate School	6	6%	8	9%	14	7%
Graduate Degree or More	15	14%	35	41%	50	26%
Total	104	100%	86	100%	190	100%

Chi-Square: Value 22.511; df 4; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) at .000

Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.

But a major and substantial difference between the two is that 64% of children of professionals have graduated from NU Tier 1 schools in comparison to 41% of children of small business owners.

Table 10: College Ranking by Father's Work Type

College Ranking	Father's Work Type						All Second Generation	
	Self-Employed (or in Family Bus)		Professionals		Total Column			
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
National Tier 1 (NUT1+NLT1)	40	41%	53	64%	93	52%	97	51%
National Tier 2 (NUT2+NLT2)	28	29%	19	23%	47	26%	50	26%
Regional and Other	16	17%	10	12%	26	14%	29	15%
Fine Arts	13	13%	1	1%	14	8%	16	8%
Total	97	100%	83	100%	180	100%	192	100%

Chi-Square: Value 14.208; df 3; Asymp. Sig. at .003

[Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off. There are slight differences between "Total Column" percentages and "All Second Generation" percentages. This is because a small percentage of parents of the second generation are workers.]

This difference clearly speaks to the impact of professionals on the overall educational outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans, an impact commonly

overlooked in the media portrayals of the Asian "whiz kids" phenomenon. Certainly, the fact that close to half (41%) of children of entrepreneurs have also made it to NU Tier 1 schools point to the springboard effect of small business (to be discussed in the next chapter).

Education and Salary

To examine the consequences of education on the economic well-being of second-generation Korean Americans, I carried out Anova tabulations for years of education (college or less vs. postcollege) by salary and selectivity of colleges (National Tier 1 vs. non-Tier 1) by salary.

Table 11: Total Salary- Current Job and First Job by R's Levels of Education

Education	Salary- Current Job			Salary- First Job		
	Mean	N	Median	Mean	N	Median
College or Less	\$42,681.90	126	\$31,200	\$27,262.11	115	\$22,000
MA/MS or Higher	\$71,380.95	42	\$56,500	\$35,781.92	39	\$28,000
Total	\$49,856.67	168	\$35,500	\$29,419.73	154	\$23,700
College Ranking						
National Tier 1	\$57,624.66	79	\$42,000	\$29,550.55	75	\$24,000
Non-Tier 1	\$42,491.51	81	\$31,200	\$29,250.24	73	\$25,000
Total	\$49,963.50	160	\$36,000	\$29,402.42	148	\$24,250

As Table 11 shows, postcollege graduates earned higher mean and median salaries in their current and first jobs: a difference of \$25,300 for median salary and \$28,699.05 for mean salary in their current jobs, and \$6000 for median salary and \$8519.81 for mean salary in their first jobs. The salaries also show an increase from their first jobs to their current jobs for both levels of education: a difference of \$15,419.79 for mean salary and \$9200 for median salary for those with college or less; and a difference of \$35,599.03 for mean salary and \$28,500 for median salary for postcollege graduates. Postcollege

graduates registered higher salary (mean and median) differences in their current jobs (about \$25K) than in their first jobs (only about \$6K) compared to those with college or less. Although those with college or less still registered significant salary increases from their first job to current job (about \$9K), postcollege graduates registered higher salary increases in their transition from first jobs to their current jobs (about \$29K). Anova tables indicate that these salary differences are statistically significant, but because the number of postcollege graduates are much smaller (N=42 for current job), the salary differences should be interpreted with caution.

The salary difference between graduates of National Tier 1 schools vs. graduates of non-Tier 1 schools is large. Although salary differences are very small in their first jobs, attending National Tier 1 makes a difference in their current job: Tier 1 graduates received a mean salary of \$57,625 (median salary of \$42,000) compared to a mean salary of \$42,492 (median salary of \$31,200) for non-Tier 1 graduates, a difference of \$15,133 for mean salary and \$9800 for median salary. Anova tables reveal that salary differences by selectivity of college are statistically significant. Thus, the results seem to point to greater salary differences by postcollege graduates vs. college or high school graduates than between graduates of selective colleges and less selective colleges. Because the sample is too small, it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions about the former. However, there are certainly other factors involved in the salary differences (occupation, industry, gender, number of hours worked, etc.) besides levels of education and college selectivity and multiple regression analysis (chapter 6) will be able to distinguish which variables make a greater difference in salary outcomes.

Educational Outcome Differences by Father's Education

Because Korean immigrants in general and fathers of the second generation in particular have high educational attainment rates, there is an overlap between their education and type of work. Fernandez and Kim (1998) found that Korean *native-college graduates* (BA/BS from Korea) seek self-employment at higher rates than *noncollege graduates* (HS or lower) or *postcollege graduates* (MA/MS in the US). This finding substantiates what Min (1984) found about blocked mobility or status gap/inconsistency of middle-class Korean immigrants. Postcollege graduates, having obtained their master's or professional degrees in the US, have a greater ease with English and licensing requirements than native-college graduates or noncollege graduates.

My sample corroborates and reflects the patterns described by Kim and Fernandez. Therefore, this calls for an analysis of industry, occupation, and salary by the father's education. Children of postcollege graduates show greater participation in National Tier 1 schools (66%) than children of native-college graduates (47%) or noncollege graduates (23%).

Table 12: College Ranking by Father's Education

College Ranking	Father's Education							
	Noncollege graduates		Native-college graduates		Postcollege graduates		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
National Tier 1	8	23%	35	47%	52	66%	95	50%
National Tier 2	13	37%	17	23%	19	24%	49	26%
Regional and Other	10	29%	13	17%	6	8%	29	15%
Fine Arts	4	11%	10	13%	2	3%	16	9%
Total	35	100%	75	100%	79	100%	189	100%

Chi-square: Value 24.365; df 6; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .000

[Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.]

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the educational outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans. Not only are they graduating from college in high numbers but also they are doing so from the most selective colleges. I have argued that what explains the academic success of second-generation Korean Americans are the class resources and relative functionalism rather than culture. The media accounts of Asian American academic success fail to mention or gloss over the superb educational backgrounds (professionals) of Korean and Asian immigrants, emphasizing instead individual work ethic, family values, and positive attitudes. Statistical analysis of educational outcome differences between children of entrepreneurs and professionals show that outcome differences are rather due to father's education and not occupation, underscoring the highly-educated professional backgrounds of Korean immigrants. Furthermore, in-depth interviews reveal that peers groups, socializing, and not doing homework impact academic performance and that these outcomes do vary among the second generation.

One of the main consequence of a "model minority" is that high-achieving students in S. Lee's study usually felt even greater pressure to live up to the standards of

a model minority. In fact, "any grade lower than an A was a failing grade" for these students, raising the bar so high that the excessive pressures to succeed create failures and psychological burdens (S. Lee 1996: 59). Because of the model minority image and pressures to remain faithful to the image, one particular student whom S. Lee thought fit a high achieving profile- quiet and studious, hanging out with other Asian students- turned out to be a low-achieving student (60). In fact, other students had no clue he was a low achiever. Fearful of revealing his problems, the low-achieving student was not only embarrassed to reveal his poor academic standing, but also avoided seeking help to remedy his academic difficulties (61). By the same token, second-generation Korean Americans face huge pressures to succeed, which raises the bar so high that attempts to fulfill them also generate failures and psychological tolls. A major negative consequence of the "success" story of children of professionals and entrepreneurs may be that those who are falling through the cracks are overlooked and extreme pressure is put on them. The gang phenomena, juvenile delinquency as well as the academic problems and extreme parental pressures Korean youth face tend to be silenced or hardly addressed until these make headlines. In this scenario, only extreme forms of failures are deemed receptive to attention, and the difficulties and pressures that many face are played down, let alone taken care of. Praising the academic achievements of Asian Americans as models for other immigrant second generation (model minority) may conceal serious costs involved in attaining "success", particularly trivializing the difficulties and discrimination Asian Americans face.

The next chapters on labor market outcomes and self-employment examine how these educational outcomes translate into labor market trajectories, which in turn determine the mobility patterns of second-generation Korean Americans.

CHAPTER 5: LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

Segmented assimilation theory and recent research on the new second generation generally focuses on the educational prospects of high school students and teenagers and less on labor market outcomes. How and whether these educational attainments actually translate into labor market trajectories has been less examined. Addressing the labor market experiences of young adults has the advantage of capturing both the educational outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans and their specific labor market experiences.

LABOR MARKET TRAJECTORIES

The 1.5 and second-generation Korean Americans, unlike their immigrant parents, are not bound by the same obstacles and have various employment options. In today's post-industrial economy, employment choices range from working for a firm domestically or journeying abroad to tackle the S. Korean labor market. Moreover, multiculturalism and diversity initiatives have also expanded the role of ethnic mediators/brokers to tap into minority/Korean community markets. In addition, second-generation Korean Americans can turn to the Korean immigrant "ethnic enclave" firms which offer various professional employment opportunities, including self-employed professional work²⁷ (insurance, accounting, law, medicine, dental, etc.). Lastly, the

²⁷ "Middleman minority" businesses serve minority populations whereas "ethnic enclave" businesses cater to coethnics. Firms in the "ethnic enclave" offer managerial and professional opportunities (accounting, law, medicine, insurance, etc.) for the second generation whereas "middleman minority" businesses usually entail low level managerial work or inheriting the business from their parents.

second generation may choose to follow the path of their self-employed parents, and inherit their parents' business or start their own.

Exit from the Ethnic Economy in One Generation

Given the prominence of self-employment in the economic adaptation of Korean immigrants, are second-generation Korean Americans following their parents into self-employment? Goldscheider and Kobrin (1980: 262-275) found that successive generations of Jews in Providence, Rhode Island showed a decrease in self-employment. Still second-generation Jews typically followed the direction of their parents, albeit abandoning retail for more lucrative business sectors such as distribution, wholesale, or manufacturing. The small business experience for Korean immigrants, however, seems to be a one-generation phenomenon. Light and Roach (1996) note that the 1990 Census shows a drastic drop of self-employment among second-generation Korean Americans in California, as even compared to whites. A recent article in the Korea Times New York reported that about 50% of second-generation Korean Americans were moving into professional jobs contrary to the self-employment route of the first generation. My 1998 NYSKGA survey corroborates this observation.

Table 13: 1.5 and Second Generation's Current Job by Sex

Work Type	Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Self-Employed (including Family Bus)	18	19%	15	14%	33	16%
Korean Immigrant Business Employee	3	3%	5	5%	8	4%
S. Korea/Subsidiary Employee	3	3%	5	5%	8	4%
Mainstream Firm Employee	72	75%	81	76%	153	76%
Total	96	100%	106	100%	202	100%

Chi-Square 1.310(a); df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.727

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

As the Table 13 reveals, self-employment rates drop markedly by the second generation: to 11%²⁸ (N=202) [This figure excludes those working in a family business]. Close to two-thirds (64%) are employees of private firms, and figures for employment in the mainstream economy reach a little above three fourths²⁹. Clearly, second-generation Korean Americans are abandoning small business in droves for employment in the mainstream economy.

Unlike their parents, second-generation Korean Americans are leaving the retail trade industries of their parents for professional and related service industries (41% for the second generation as opposed to 28% for fathers and 21% for "1980-90s" Korean immigrants).

²⁸ Among the self-employed only a few were involved in quote unquote stereotypical Korean immigrant businesses such as groceries/fruit and vegetable stores. Some were owners of boutiques, an industry that follows the tradition of moving from fashion designer to one's own design label.

²⁹ Among second-generation Korean Americans, three fourths (76%) were working while 24% currently did not work. 69% (N=182) held their current or most recent jobs in New York, 13% in New Jersey. In their first jobs, 60% (N=169) held jobs in New York whereas 10% held jobs in New Jersey.

Table 14: R's Current Job- Industry by Sex

Industry	Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Construction	1	1%			1	1%
Manufacturing	9	9%	19	18%	28	14%
Transportation, Communications, and Utilities	2	2%	5	5%	7	3%
Wholesale	3	3%	1	1%	4	2%
Retail	15	16%	5	5%	20	10%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	15	16%	14	13%	29	14%
Business/Personal Services	11	11%	15	14%	26	13%
Professional and Related Services	38	39%	45	43%	83	41%
Government/Public Administration	3	3%	2	2%	5	3%
Total	97	100%	106	100%	203	100%

Chi-Square 12.924(a); df 8; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.114

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

Many are securing a variety of professional occupations, but undeniably the 1990s financial boom in New York has created a huge demand for a host of jobs as consultants, analysts, and investment bankers that second-generation Korean Americans have come to occupy (67% in managerial and professional specialty occupations compared to 51% for fathers). For second-generation Korean American women, in addition to FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) industries, designer occupations have been another route of entry into the primary sector.

Table 15: R's Current Occupation by Sex

Occupation	Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Managerial and Professional Specialty	63	66%	70	68%	133	67%
Technical, Sales, and Administrative Support	25	26%	28	27%	53	27%
Service	5	5%	4	4%	9	5%
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair	1	1%	1	1%	2	1%
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers	1	1%			1	1%
Total	95	100%	103	100%	198	100%

Chi-Square 1.328(a); df 4; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.857

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

Other occupations that seem to work as initial entry points into the professions are paralegal occupations. According to Sarah, although the job requires long hours and college education, it is a position that pays relatively well for a starting job and can act as a springboard to other corporate sectors like finance. The race of coworkers also indicates that these occupations are in mainstream firms and are not ethnic niches.

Table 16: Race of Coworker (Current Job) by Sex

Race	Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
White	62	67%	82	80%	144	74%
Asian	12	13%	13	13%	25	13%
Hispanic/Latino	6	7%	1	1%	7	4%
Black	2	2%			2	1%
Other	10	11%	7	7%	17	9%
Total	92	100%	103	100%	195	100%

Chi-Square 8.325; df 4; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .080

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

EXPLAINING CAREER TRAJECTORIES: CLASS AND COMMUNITY AND PARENTAL EXPECTATIONS ABOUT OCCUPATION

In the same manner that Korean parents put tremendous pressures on second-generation Korean Americans to enter top schools, they also place utmost emphasis on high-status professional occupations (Abelmann and Lie 1995: 127; E. Kim 1995). Both the parents and the Korean community favor professional occupations, especially medical doctors and lawyers. The fact that close to half of the parents are professionals themselves is a good predictor of professional careers for their children (Abelmann and Lie 1995). In this context both the concern for social status as well as the pragmatism of professional jobs seem to be decisive factors. Given the first generation's difficulties in

the primary sectors, they believe professional occupations (law, medicine, engineering, accounting, and sciences) will better shield second-generation Korean Americans from discrimination, providing a solid entry into the middle class. Abelmann and Lie (1995: 127) note, "Personal experiences of discrimination goad many Korean immigrants to urge their children to pursue technical careers- fields in which subjective criteria are minimized."

Furthermore, in the event that the second generation face difficulties in the primary sectors and seek alternatives, just like the early Jewish professionals who were forced to rely on the ethnic economy due to anti-Semitism, these skills come in handy in the ethnic economy and elsewhere. Peter, a 28 year old working as a research assistant at a hospital, responded on the affirmative that his parents had pressured him to become a doctor, "*Ever since I was a little child, they ingrained in my brain I was going to be a doctor.*" The same was true for Paul, a 32 year old working as chief resident at a university hospital, who had for some time been bent on becoming a physician. This was not unexpected since his father is also a physician. Paul noted that "*the kids get steered toward that direction*". Being the only child among his siblings to actually fulfill his parents' expectation, Paul feels he readily internalized his parents' wishes. He is quick to point out that it was not so much an obligation because "*it's not only for them, because it's a good job...It's not like suffering.*"

If some parents find their children are not pursuing the profession they had emphasized, parents will advocate the next status occupation in the prestige ladder. For instance, when Heesoo's mother realized Heesoo was not pursuing the pre-med route, her mom pushed her toward law. "*Korean parents really know only 3 careers: law,*

medicine, and engineering...She was astonished that there was work outside of that. And they have no idea what I do," Heesoo declared. Now her dad is happy because she works at a big firm and he can brag about it to his friends. Eunjung, a 28 year old woman, working as a chiropractic assistant for a Korean chiropractor, indicated that her mother stressed nursing or computer jobs but, to her surprise, not law or medicine. She concedes, *"maybe she wanted us to marry one"*. For women, even though most parents equally expected professional occupations from their daughters, others saw marriage as the ultimate aim, since many parents felt getting their daughters married was their "final" responsibility. Eunjung suspected that her father *"wanted us to get married and be taken care of. I think he just wanted us to go to college, meet a nice man, get married."*

As the quotes reveal, not many parents realize the extent of occupational diversity that exists in the corporate world. This is not too surprising since many of the parents did not have the level of experience in the corporate world to advise their children to pursue promising careers beyond conventional professional careers.

PARENTAL AND SECOND-GENERATION REJECTION OF SMALL BUSINESS

Self-employed parents, understanding that small business takes hard work and long hours to survive, as well as the difficulties associated with interethnic/racial conflicts that entrepreneurs encounter with minority customers in minority-clientele businesses, are reluctant to push their children to follow in their footsteps. Having established themselves in small business because their labor market options were limited, Korean merchants, as Min's 1982 survey in Atlanta found, did not want their children to

continue in small business and rather, expected their children to obtain professional jobs³⁰ (1988; See Waldinger 1989a, 1996 too). Abelman and Lie (1995: 129) write:

The decision to start a small business represents a calculated intergenerational mobility strategy—the strategic adaptation of the dreams of modernity and mobility. Like many petite bourgeoisie in contemporary capitalist societies, the stratum of small business people is transitional, not hereditary. Many Korean American shopkeepers balk at the prospect of their children's succeeding them in their businesses or opening small retail stores of their own: the first generation's desire for the second generation is for them to achieve prestigious and remunerative careers.

Sharon perceptively recognizes that language barriers and limited employment opportunities are what push the first generation to pursue a small business in the US. Sharon's parents, as first-generation immigrants, had very few options whereas she is not in the same boat. *"It [motel business] was a very hard, manual labor job that they would not want for us, nor would we want it for ourselves...There are certainly better ways of making money. They didn't have the opportunity unfortunately, but we do,"* Sharon stressed. Similarly Heesoo's parents had told her to move beyond the occupational limitations of the first generation, *"We don't want you to follow in our footsteps. That's why we came here so you wouldn't have to do this. So don't do this!"* Likewise, Joseph never even considered taking over his parents' business and his parents had no such expectations. *"They thought I was just too smart to be doing something like that. They don't want me to do what they do,"* interjected Joseph. Thus, Abelman and Lie (1995:

³⁰ According to Waldinger, ethnic succession among Jews occurred because coethnics were retiring and the second and third generations were reluctant to take over the family business. Waldinger found similar responses from Korean business owners he had surveyed in New York.

137) write, "The whole rationale of the enterprise is for the second generation to achieve mainstream success and therefore upward mobility."

The American-born/raised children, products of American upbringing and socialized in the mindset of the host society, are unlikely to follow the low-status jobs of their immigrant parents (Zhou and Bankston 1998; Portes and Zhou 1993). Min (1988) notes that children of Korean immigrants were unlikely to tolerate the long hours necessary for survival in small business. Indeed, second-generation Korean Americans are unwilling to carry on with the labor-intensive, mom and pop type of businesses Korean immigrants are generally involved in. Having witnessed what her parents went through- working 7 days a week, dealing with the stress and the financial ups and downs of business- Connie is not willing to put up with the same instabilities characteristic of small businesses. Joonshik also does not want to put himself or his family through the same uncertainties as his dad had inflicted on the family. *"I've seen my father and our family suffer when things were bad,"* Joonshik reminded.

A few reiterated they felt unfit for their parents' businesses. Some wanted to forge their own trails. *"First of all, I don't think I am very well suited for running a store. This is fitting in. Most of your peers are working in businesses or starting their own companies, and to take over an established business it kind of seems like a cop out,"* Jonathan explained. Jonathan's parents would have liked for one of their sons to take over the family business. But knowing that all of them had professional careers, Jonathan's parents recognized that their children were not going to drop their careers to run a store. On the other hand, some like Junghoon rejected the idea of taking over his

parents' business after he figured there was no way he would reach his financial goal of \$10 million net worth through a small retail business.

Often parents attempted to assess whom among their children were most fit to take over the family business. Indeed, Connie's parents had asked Connie to take over the business but quickly realized she was never going to and that was the end of the discussion. Sarah's parents also wisely chose not to pass along the drycleaners to her since they came to the realization that Sarah had no desires to become a storeowner. With her younger brother however, recognizing he was not headed toward the primary sector occupations and had no clear career goals, Sarah's parents felt the need to intervene and set him up with a small business. Sarah, on the other hand, her parents figured, would not be interested in small business because of her professional occupational trajectory.

Self-Employment Prospects

Although children of small business owners, as their low self-employment rates attest, are unwilling to take over their parents' businesses, self-employment in the future was not completely out of the picture. Small businesses vary considerably in size and profitability. While second-generation Korean Americans shun labor-intensive, retail businesses, especially middleman minority types that their parents and other Korean immigrants have been heavily involved in, they are not averse to taking over businesses that may offer attractive opportunities. A few of the respondents spoke about the difficulties in the mainstream labor markets and had plans of becoming self-employed in

the near future. Also the appeal of financial independence is a big draw for these young adults.

The financial lure of her parents' drycleaners was very appealing for Martha, a 29-year-old high school teacher. Had it not been for her teaching job, Martha would have taken over her parents' drycleaners. Her parents had never pushed her to take over the business, but she thinks they were not opposed to it since the money was tempting. Had she been solely interested in the financial gains she would have gone into business because of the good cash flow. She even considered hiring a manager to work the morning shifts while Martha would take over the evening shifts. *"I felt tempted. But I realized money is not everything so I gave up that dream,"* Martha said. Martha felt her older sister should have taken over the business. In fact, she tried to convince her sister and her husband to take over the business, arguing that entrepreneurship is the quickest and surest way to achieve economic security, considering her brother-in-law's difficulties with English. *"They didn't listen to me,"* Martha sighed. Martha plans to have her own business in the future, not in dry-cleaning, but in the computer field.

Similarly, for those who have seen how quickly their parents attained financial security through business in spite of language and cultural limitations, the appeal of small business and financial independence made them reconsider the option of going into small business. Because Alex already set his feet in the primary sector, even though the thought of taking over the family business was attractive, it was *"not serious enough to quit my job and try it out."* Joseph, who has not made any strides in the primary sector, on the other hand, is willing to consider any opportunities that may emerge:

Of course they want me to do something better but then it goes back to having opportunity. If a particular store is very profitable and where I could be my own boss, I would grab that. I don't have to be a white-collar worker. I would be a blue collar because I've tasted both of them. So I could do one or the other just as easily.

Others were willing to consider self-employment if and only if they could reduce the risks that plague businesses in general. Joonshik, who is planning to go for an MBA, thinks the knowledge will help him lower the risks. However, for now, striking on his own is a remote possibility. In addition, as Joonshik reminds, second-generation Korean Americans would only consider areas they are already familiar with. *"I don't think I could open up a high-tech firm,"* responded Joonshik. Instead, having worked as a financial analyst, he would look into a *"consulting or a brokerage firm."* Yet, if he could form a partnership with someone in the high-tech area, which he has explored some, it could be possible. *"A friend of mine is in information systems so that might be a possibility,"* Joonshik pointed out.

Some like Sungsoo hold the idea that becoming their own bosses in the future was the best way to make it in the US. Sungsoo claimed that his aim was not simply for monetary gain but to *"make more of a difference."* *"You are a CEO of a company, you can have more say in the Korean community as well,"* he stressed. However, most agree that the ideology of being their own boss, to be able to decide their own fate, is what the American Dream is all about. Especially with the explosion of dot.coms, the lure of fortunes made by young entrepreneurs and intuitively the possibility of greater financial reward and control as an independent entrepreneur as opposed to a corporate worker is a big incentive for venturing out on their own. As Jonathan put it, *"But at some point I would want to start my own business."* Yet, Sungsoo and others, in spite of their firmness in becoming their own bosses, had no clear idea what that business would look like and

how they would go about establishing themselves. For now, like Junghoon, most are garnering experience, meeting key people in their respective industries in the hopes of landing something lucrative in the future.

There were those who were simply afraid to venture on their own having witnessed the high rate of turnovers and failures. Sarah explained, "*You hear about all the failed businesses. I think I would be a little scared*". For James, having experience in managing cafés he understands the level of stress involved, especially dealing with customers. "*I would like to avoid it because it's too much headache dealing with people,*" James stressed.

In sum, given their young age and limited experience in the labor market, it is still unclear if second-generation Korean Americans will turn to self-employment in the near future. Because the self-employment rate is a function of age (Min 1996, 1998) and many are still in the early stages of their careers, possible barriers in promotions and/or the glass ceiling may push the second generation to consider alternatives. For instance, the tremendous explosion of high-tech, internet-based venture firms (dot.coms) is luring young people attuned to the possibility of striking the next gold mine in IPOs (Initial public offerings). Another is self-employment as independent contractors or consultants that provide professional services to corporations. Thus, the labor-intensive retail businesses Korean immigrants have been known for seem to be a one-generation phenomenon as second-generation Korean Americans unanimously are defecting in favor of primary sector jobs.

JOBS IN THE ETHNIC ECONOMY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO MAINSTREAM LABOR MARKETS?

While second-generation Korean Americans reject self-employment and opt for professional occupations in the mainstream economy, given the employment opportunities in South Korean subsidiaries and "ethnic enclave" firms, why is the second generation eschewing employment there, as illustrated by their low rates (4%)? Notwithstanding discrimination in the mainstream, the relative ease of entry and comfort factors (language and culture) in South Korean multinational subsidiaries or ethnic enclave firms, second-generation Korean Americans unanimously prefer the primary sectors. Not only are benefits, pay, and promotions inferior in Korean firms but also, especially for women, sexual harassment and unequal treatment have left them with a "bad taste."

The few who were working in the ethnic economy, especially for South Korean firms (Samsung, Hyundai, etc.), worked there because of language facilities, easier access, comfort level with the culture, and discrimination. As Jonathan sees it, it is simply easier to obtain jobs in South Korean firms. Jonathan believes Korean firms are not as competitive in their hiring process. He thinks these companies do not take into account high GPA's or previous experience. *"I don't want to malign them, but I don't think their standards are as high as American firms in terms of taking really good qualified people,"* Jonathan elaborated. He adds that Korean firms have very high turnover rates.

For Junhoon, one of the few respondents who worked for a South Korean bank, the main reason was language comfort. This cultural and language advantage (or

preference) is especially relevant for 1.5ers (if not fully bilingual) who came to the US by the age of 10 or older and are more adept in Korean than English. Conversely, language difficulty and cultural distance is what deters highly assimilated second-generation Korean Americans from seeking employment there. Howard is not interested in joining a Korean firm because he is less able to communicate as effectively in a Korean company as he can in an American firm. Howard feels that his chances of promotions will be impaired.

Thus, despite ease of entry and language and cultural familiarity, many pointed out the inferior working conditions there (salary, benefits, promotions, etc.) and did not see much future in moving up the hierarchy or remaining in the firm (J. Kim 2000). The disadvantage with Korean companies, Junghoon recognized, is that they do not pay well and generally have longer work hours. A 25 year old woman working for a Korean clothing company, Kyunghee agrees with her parents that it is better to work for an American firm. *"Everybody knows that it's better (health) insurance wise,"* Kyunghee stated, *because Koreans underreport their taxes and underpay payroll. "Korean people, it's all talk. You can't trust them,"* she expanded. Her brother-in-law, who works at Ernest and Young, a major accounting firm, in contrast, gets all the major benefits. Kyunghee is willing to stay with her current company for a couple of years but she is planning to leave afterwards.

Some raised objections to the hierarchical nature of Korean firms and their work customs. For example, Howard would prefer to hire someone competent who can finish a given task in 3 hours rather than 6 hours, but in Korean companies he feels everyone has to stay the same long hours regardless. Jonathan's objection is directed toward the

lack of competitiveness and variable reward structure within Korean firms. Although the job may be stable, Jonathan feels the work may not be as fulfilling and there will be less opportunity to learn. [Now with the financial crisis, more is expected for less pay and jobs are less secure]. *"A lot of Korean firms, they are not managed very well. It's good if you are an employee because they do not like to do layoffs, but they are not very competitive"*, he argued. This is a major reason why he thinks there is so much turnover with Korean firms. *"I've seen people go to Hanjin (parent company of Korean Air) and Daewoo. Some stay but a lot of them, after 2 years, they are itching to get out and move on"*, remarked Jonathan.

In addition, some respondents objected to the South Korean subsidiaries' policy of bringing top managers from Korea. Martha had worked on a part-time basis for 6 months with a Korean company while she was pursuing her Master's in the seminary. Although the job paid for her tuition in addition to a decent salary, she did not like the job. Martha felt the practice of passing over Korean Americans for higher-level managerial positions was discriminatory. *"They would always have Korean people from Korea in higher positions. Local people, they are as much competent as anyone else, but they would get paid less, less privileges. I didn't think that was fair,"* Martha explained. According to J. Kim (2000), this is a practice that South Korean firms continue to reproduce, maintaining a Korean organizational structure and culture in the US.

Moreover, for women, gender inequality and sexual harassment are unacceptable. Kyunghye's sister interjected [present during the interview] that she caught her *"boss looking at porno, and they think it's OK."* She feels this is a frequent incident in Korean companies because sexual harassment is not taken seriously and hardly brought out in the

open. When Kyunghee's sister confronted her boss that talking about porn over lunch constituted sexual harassment, and that she would sue the company, her boss quickly dismissed it as a joke, telling her to lighten up. On top of this, Kyunghee feels Korean men are able to get away with office chores that Korean women are rather looked upon to fulfill. For example, Kyunghee's sister noticed that men generally usually do less work than she does and still get away with it. *"They think women are not that important. Even simple things they would ask me to do it,"* she fumed. Although Kyunghee's sister objects to the practice and tells the men she is not willing to go beyond the tasks required by her position, she keeps hearing the same remarks like *"can you make some coffee?"* She sighed, *"no matter how many times you say it, it doesn't go through their head. I don't know if that's a Korean mentality but I feel very uncomfortable."* Whether white women would receive similar treatment, she exclaimed, *"That's what I am saying!"*

Sarah also recalls a similar incident with a friend who had interviewed for a Korean company in New Jersey. Her friend had arrived an hour early for the interview, but the firm kept her waiting for over an hour and that *"just left a bad taste in her mouth"*. Moreover, when her friend went to the women's restroom, she found an assortment of dishes in the sink. Her friend did not know whether the dishes were there because the women had left them after eating or because it was expected of the women to wash them as part of their work. In this way, ethnicity, gender, and generation intersect and compound in reproducing the structures of male domination in the workplace, giving an ethnic twist to these labor-gender practices from South Korea (J. Kim 2000).

Not surprisingly, the overwhelming consensus was that primary sector jobs were better. Still, for some it provided a safety net that served as a transition to the mainstream

economy. One explanation for the initial receptivity but an unanimous rejection of the ethnic economy jobs as captured in the survey could be that many of these South Korean firms initially held much promise and hoopla as the Asian economies were doing well and expanding abroad in the 1980s and early 1990s. During that time, according to a respondent, many second-generation Korean Americans were not only interested in working for Korean firms (as a way to experience Korean culture, gain language, visit Korea, etc.) but also their Korean ethnicity served to obtain jobs at a time when primary sector jobs were a lot more competitive. After their stint (either summer internships or full-time positions) there, however, the second generation were disillusioned with the inferior pay and working conditions, prompting a quick exit from these firms. For second-generation Korean Americans who do seek employment there, ease of entry and comfort levels may determine whether they choose South Korean firms over mainstream jobs. Whether a stint there serves as a springboard to obtain the necessary experience to later move on to a more lucrative position elsewhere in the mainstream economy or instead becomes a trap remains to be seen.

Little Desire to Work in the Korean Community

Unless they felt fluent in the language and comfortable with the Korean culture, highly assimilated second-generation Korean Americans did not feel at ease in such an environment. In fact, they felt much more at ease in an American setting. Joseph explains that his parents did not emphasize working for a Korean firm or in the Korean community in part because his father had no special connections with the ethnic economy to begin with. In consequence, his ethnicity organized very little of his life. The same

was true for Sharon who, because she grew up outside of an ethnic enclave like L.A. Koreatown and in the suburbs, does not feel particularly attached to the Korean community. In fact, this issue never came up with her parents since they themselves were very detached from the Korean community and its networks. *"I don't think we grew up in enough of a Korean community to feel that way. I don't think that ever came up. They don't even know any Korean people who could even...it's not like they had a friend who had a job for us,"* Sharon pointed out. Had she grown up in a place like L.A. Koreatown, things would have been very different, meaning various networks could possibly have channeled her into the Korean community.

While the literature on immigrant incorporation underscores the benefits of ethnic solidarity, research has also delineated the burdens or limits of ethnic solidarity (Gold 1994; D. Kim 1999). Joseph's apprehensiveness in dealing with other Koreans arises out of the obligations that envelop ethnic solidarity. As a result, he would prefer not to deal with other Koreans and if possible avoid working in the Korean community, which is a feeling that many second-generation Korean Americans express. *"I've had experiences where working with the Korean community is not profitable. Not profitable but it's more of a headache because you're Korean, they expect you to give them a break here and break there, give me special attention. And you can't do a business like that. So no, I would try to stay away from them as well, unless it was a business which was strictly geared for Koreans. I don't know. If it arises, I would prefer not to work in the Korean community,"* Joseph elaborated.

Sometimes it was less about the second generation not wanting to get involved with the Korean community but being chastised by other first-generation Korean

immigrants or even by 1.5ers for not speaking Korean or adhering to Korean cultural practices. Sally was the most adamant about Korean firms discriminating against her. Her particular experience with other Koreans expressing these views have particularly turned off her desire to associate with the Korean community or Korean firms. *"I would if they [Korean community/firm] didn't discriminate against me,"* Sally expressed. In other words, *"I guess what I mean is that sometimes the Koreans I've been around say very nasty things to me, 'You're an idiot if you're a Korean and you don't speak Korean,'"* Sally clarified. Sally stated she would want to be treated as a *"professional instead of an idiot."* In situations like the above she simply walks away and avoids dealing with those type of people.

Consequently, many of the highly assimilated second-generation Korean Americans would not target a Korean firm simply because of their feelings of ethnic attachment. Her coethnicity is not what would draw Sharon to a Korean firm but whether the job fit her needs. *"Sure, if the job was right...It wouldn't be because it was Korean. It would be judged on the same basis as any other job,"* Sharon stressed. The same was true for Gina who had been encouraged by her father to consider import/export businesses because her Korean/Jewish connections would come handy. *"Because I'm half Korean and half American, I have some kind of sensibility that maybe most people doing import/export with Asian communities don't have. So you would know the demand better than the average American,"* Gina explained. However, Gina showed very little interest in the import/export business and for her, choosing an industry or firm had to be based on whether the work fit with her needs and wants. *"Sure. Why not? I'd consider*

anything. It would have to provide something that I needed and wanted. I wouldn't just do it because it was Korean," Gina responded.

Thus, although I had expected to see a significant number of the 1.5ers enter the professional sectors of the ethnic economy playing broker roles between the community and the mainstream society, in fact, this was not the case. Most of the lawyers, doctors, accountants in the sample were working in the mainstream economy. This had to do with their level of knowledge of the Korean community and their experience with other Korean Americans as well as the level of opportunities in the mainstream economy. Having grown up in a white suburban environment, their ethnic attachment was not strong enough to seek employment there or offer services to the community (although this may change for some). Professional employment in the ethnic economy is more true of 1.5ers who are fully bilingual and therefore, can act as go-between the immigrant generation and the mainstream society. The fully bilinguals can also find employment in both labor markets and their preference is predicated upon a different set of circumstances and reasons.

Yet, a minority of the highly-educated professionals do return to the Korean community (and Asian communities), playing broker roles between the community and the larger society, working primarily in the non-profit sectors (community-based or city/state-based) that provide services to the community. Espiritu's (1992) pan-Asian ethnicity highlights this pattern among second-generation Asian Americans. In Los Angeles, the power has slowly transferred to the 1.5ers and the second generation, in part through the prominence of the 1.5ers and the second generation after the Los Angeles riots (Min 1996). Mark was among the few who has been working in the community for

a considerable length and still continues to work in the community. Because his father is a minister serving the Korean community, for Mark, being involved with the Korean community came somewhat naturally and also as a duty. *"I guess because my parents were working in the Korean community they kind of always said to me to engage in what's going on with the Korean community,"* Mark explained.

OBSTACLES IN THE MAINSTREAM

Promotions

The question of promotions and obstacles such as the glass ceiling will affect how second-generation Korean Americans view their current labor market situation and whether they seek alternatives in the future. Connie feels promotions are *"another huge problem"*. She knows a coworker who has not been promoted even though that person has been in the firm for 4 years. Connie heard from her coworkers that it takes 4 to 6 years in that firm, which is a big reason she is leaving the firm. Had she stayed, she would probably want to move up to a public relations manager. Connie thinks it is possible. Regarding the glass ceiling, Connie agrees that it is not imagined. However, the particular industry she is in (fashion), in conjunction with her being a woman and Asian there, has advantages. The garment industry has been particularly open to women at all levels of the industry and Asian Americans show much visibility. Thus, she was pointing to a niche phenomenon (ethnic control even at higher levels) that seems to be amenable to Asian American women.

Mark asks, "*If someone gets promoted, gets a raise, and you were in line for promotion, you can't help think 'Oh, what's the difference? You know, I was here longer'.*" Mark illustrates the case of his friend who works as a federal agent and who felt unfair about how promotions took place within the bureau. Some of the agents, over whom his friend had seniority, had been promoted ahead of his friend despite his very good track record and good arrest records. For Mark this was a clear example of biases that still permeated the agency. As he argued:

All the Asian agents, [in] the FBI, the Justice Department, anyone who was Asian seems to work on Asian crimes but they don't get to deal with other cases. It's understandable that the bureau might want to put Asian agents to work on Asian crimes because they have that kind of perspective. But then I'm sure a lot of those agents can work on other things as well. So do you make all Italian agents work on Mafia crimes or Jewish agents work on these crimes? Do you know what I'm saying?

The Glass Ceiling

The prospect of promotions is implicated with whether the glass ceiling is likely to be an obstacle in their career trajectory. Regarding their current situation in the corporate world, some have a firm belief about their possibilities in the corporate sector, a conviction in one's individual abilities (meritocracy) as the limit to fulfilling their goals. Many second-generation Korean Americans feel their class attributes will overcome racial boundaries. Having had success this far, there is much optimism and confidence in their abilities as some make inroads within the corporate hierarchy. This is how Howard feels regarding the glass ceiling. Within a 7 year span, Howard has been promoted 4 times, starting from a supervisory level, then moving up to manager's to senior manager, and finally being promoted to assistant directorship. His goal now is none other than to become a CEO. For example, Howard tells his supervisor, whose credentials are similar

to his, to not worry about his job but his boss's job (CEO). When asked how far he would actually be able to move up, confidently Howard replied, *"Sky's the limit. If they like what you are doing, and you do your job and you are creative and young and talented, I would say the only stopping point is the final stop cause you got to the board of directors."* Although he admits that it is very hierarchical in the corporate world because there are no women or minorities, he was more than optimistic, *"But I say I will be the first."*

Others, because they accept the premise of meritocracy and see their current position in terms of their own individual choice, are not convinced that the glass ceiling may be a factor for minorities and women. Heesoo reckons that she may not be able to obtain a top position because there is only one woman in the higher echelons in her company and she happens to be married to the boss. Yet, she does not interpret this as a glass ceiling and rather rationalizes that she is simply not interested in moving to a top position. For Heesoo, she likes where she is, at a level she is able to competently meet her job responsibilities and expectations. In fact, in order not to run the risk of doing a mediocre job, she does not want to have more responsibilities than she can fulfill capably. *"If I want more responsibility I can take it. I think it's definitely a meritocracy but the higher up you go the more they expect from you,"* Heesoo contended. Heesoo clings to the idea of meritocracy and explains that it is out of her own volition that she chooses not to move up the corporate ladder. On the one hand, because she has seen how her parents had suffered through small business, sacrificing their lives for economic stability, Heesoo does not want to give up family and leisure for monetary compensation. Not only are her salary and work hours more than comfortable but the level of responsibility that her job

demands is ideal for Heesoo. She is able to balance work and leisure at a sane level that a higher position will not likely allow.

Some, on the other hand, simply saw the glass ceiling as irrational to the profit goals of the firm. As Jonathan asserts, firms will not pursue policies that will hinder profits since that is their chief motive. Jonathan argued:

If you are profitable and bring in business, it's really stupid of the firm not to hire you or to promote you. Because they know if you hit a ceiling then you are gonna leave and take all that money with them. America's goal is to make money. Maybe in some firms, where it is solid white or Jewish establishments, but in most cases I don't really worry about it as much as all these ethnic minorities and women say there is.

Others, aware that multiculturalism and diversity initiatives in the corporate world have expanded opportunities for minorities and women, are a lot more optimistic about their chances. Sungsoo grants that *"in the past, you could see that it's all set, that everybody's Caucasian at the top level."* Mark concedes that a glass ceiling exists but nonetheless he feels much progress has been made over the past 20 years. As Sungsoo maintained, *"now the trend is, because everybody sees that, they know there is something wrong. Especially in [a major consulting firm], they changed their views on who should be hired, how many minorities should be hired, and diversity on the group. That's what they are concentrating on and opportunities will rise up."* Mark points out how 20 years ago there were no black CEOs in corporate America. *"You see those now. Even though that's not big fortune 500, you still see. You notice a lot of women CEOs around the country, even in power seats. So that's surprising. We wouldn't have seen that 20 years ago. I think there's a lot of changes being made in a progressive sense. That's encouraging,"* Mark elaborated. Whether Sungsoo will make it to the top, he replied: *"I*

don't really think about 'what if I don't get the position?' For me that's my goal and I will work hard no matter what position I am at. Even if they keep me as an analyst for the next 10 years, I am going to work hard. I will probably leave (laughter)."

Thus, on the one hand, having had some initial success, there is much optimism and confidence in their abilities to make inroads within the corporate hierarchy. If the glass ceiling has been a problem in the past, they do not see it as an obstacle in the future as they recognize expanded opportunities as a result of diversity initiatives. Furthermore, we should note that many of the respondents are fairly young (mean age is 27) and have yet to face much of the glass ceiling in the corporate world. Whether second-generation Korean Americans will retain its current views 10 or 20 years down the road when the glass ceiling becomes more salient in their climb up the corporate ladder is unclear. On the one hand, their presence and continued efforts to break the corporate glass ceiling may reduce it. On the other, the present structure may retain some as tokens but frustrate the ambitions of many as insiders maintain a vigilant stance. However, others were less sanguine about the mobility possibilities and pointed to current institutional arrangements that remain fixed and static. Not only are the higher positions occupied but also once these are locked in, the top persons are unlikely to relinquish them. Hyun feels people at the top will not be bumped out, which means openings will not occur unless they make a decision to leave (Waldinger's protection of ethnic niches by insiders). Whether she feels there will be discrimination due to her gender and race, *"I think that's relevant to a certain extent in any organization. The top person in our office is a white male,"* Hyun clarified. When Hyun was working at a shelter (a non-profit organization) the top person was also a white man. In the bottom, the lower level supervisors were women and

minorities. *"When you look at the top, it's always a white male who's in charge,"* she added. Peter agrees he can foresee a glass ceiling. He feels it is real although he has not experienced himself. From what his uncle has told him, the reason some choose to start their own business is because they get stuck in the corporate ladder.

As a consequence, some fret that the glass ceiling will prevent them from moving up into upper management positions, usually citing the absence of Koreans in the upper tiers of the corporate world. *"Oh yeah, I think it's definitely real. Of course, it's probably very rare that an Asian person will get that high in an American company. There are some instances where an Asian American will get to a point where he may be president of the company or CEO, but it's unheard of. It's not going to be something that you hear often,"* Ralph stated. No matter how good their credentials may be, Junghoon feels there is a ceiling they will reach, and that is why he thinks many qualified Korean Americans leave these American companies. *"When you are a foreigner...if you go into an American company, that glass ceiling...They give up. They face the reality,"* he said.

The glass ceiling is not the only obstacle Asian Americans face. Although affirmative action and diversity initiatives have opened up positions that were closed off for Asian Americans, in Mark's view, these tend to be lower-level positions that remain ghettoized, without much room for career mobility. As a result of the corporate expansion into ethnic and global markets, the need for ethnic mediators (cultural and linguistic expertise) provides more job opportunities for Asian Americans in the corporate sector. Certainly, expanded job opportunities in different sectors for previously excluded groups are to be commended. However, Mark notes, these positions confine Asian Americans to the ethnic market, circumscribing their promotions. For instance, the

Korean stockbrokers who get hired by large firms, Mark observes, ethnicity helped them to secure these jobs. Yet, it is clear that these employees were solely recruited for the purpose of handling Korean accounts. If they are not allowed to expand their customer base, Mark asks, how will they be able to get promoted and move up the career ladder.

Karen felt that the ethnicity card, especially being an Asian American woman, could work both ways. On the one hand, she knows that her being hired as a sophomore dean had much to do with her ethnicity to comply with affirmative action (diversity) initiatives. This certainly gave her an opportunity to pursue the sophomore dean's position. On the other, she is not sure how far she will be able to move up the ladder, considering that this diversity initiative represents mere tokenism. *"So that could work for me. But as far as how far they will let me get, I don't know. I really don't. So it could be a positive thing, depending on I guess if I'm docile...not docile enough but I play along with the system enough to get me there. Then maybe they'll go for it,"* Karen pointed out. Thus, not only was Karen faced with tokenism and possibly a glass ceiling but also to what extent conforming with persistent stereotypes of Asian American women as "docile" would work for her or against her. Especially in the corporate sector, Asian Americans (Feagin 1999; US Commission on Civil Rights) are deemed capable workers as technical or research personnel, but at the higher echelons they are passed over for managerial positions because they are deemed less aggressive ("docility"). Unlike their immigrant parents whose difficulties with English were used to deny promotions, language ability will not represent a major hurdle for the second generation³¹.

³¹ Min and Kim (1999) note that the primary difference between the first generation and the second is that, the immigrant generation cite the glass ceiling and discrimination as major obstacles in the corporate world.

In this regard, the stereotype of Asian Americans as "model minorities" upholds Asian Americans as a model to other minority groups, pitting Asian Americans against other racial minorities. Furthermore, Asian Americans are in a difficult position as they have to continuously battle generalizations made upon them. Mark, who does not have a stake in corporate America, critiques the treatment of Asians as model minorities:

It's kind of like that plantation system, too. This is what people used to call the 1980s. Here we are the successful Asian model group. Here we are kind of used as a thing to show off to everyone that you can be successful in America. You can find part of that goal if you work hard. So we are held up as a model for, to say to the Hispanics and blacks why can't you be like Koreans. So there's a backlash or resentment towards Asians and we've seen that mostly in L.A. riots, the problem in Brooklyn a few years ago, the boycott. So that's problematic. So we're kind of being placed in juxtaposition to other ethnic groups. Again it's that plantation type of mentality. Why can't you be like the good slave? But we are all still kind of slaves. I have discussion with friends of mine, and we get into heated arguments because they don't see it that way. I guess I see it that way because I don't place myself in corporate America. So I tend to have that kind of view. You are just a slave to white America and stuff like that. They go, "I have a nice office. I have a nice income. What do I have to complain about?"

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Children of entrepreneurs and professionals are rapidly entering the mainstream labor markets. In the process, the ethnic economy that served as the foundation for the first generation is becoming less important for second-generation Korean Americans, although the next chapter discusses the various roles that the ethnic economy continue to play for the second generation. With the departure of second-generation Korean Americans from the self-employment route of their parents into the mainstream economy, ethnic succession is in the not-too-distant future. Unless entrepreneurial parents (the parents of the second generation are approaching retirement age in contrast to the "1980-

By contrast, the primary concerns of the second generation dealt with questions of identity and their place in America.

90s" Korean immigrants whose median age is 44) find a replacement among coethnics³², then they have no choice but to sell their businesses to other immigrant groups. In many ways, this bears a resemblance to the dilemma that Jewish and Italian store owners faced as they were aging or as they or their children were moving into the upper levels of the retail and wholesale distribution or manufacturing. This is likely to break the pattern of intra-business exchanges, opening up niches for non-Korean immigrant groups in the future. Already Arab, Vietnamese, and other non-Korean merchants (99 cents stores) are competing against Korean-owned small businesses. It could well be that these new immigrants may drive some Koreans out of business, along their way absorbing some of the Korean businesses.

The glass ceiling, difficulties with promotion, and tokenism in the corporate world will decide whether the second-generation Korean Americans seek self-employment in the future. Nevertheless, for now ethnic channels of mobility are being replaced by mainstream channels of mobility. The outcome of this is a rapid integration of the second generation in the mainstream. In the next chapter, the role of immigrant small business on intergenerational mobility will be assessed.

³² Korean immigration has been decreasing over the years as a result of the economic boom in South Korea (Min, 2000:309). With the IMF financial crisis in 1997, however, the level of South Korean immigration is likely to rise again.

CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF SMALL BUSINESS: SPRINGBOARD, SAFETY NET, OR MOBILITY TRAP?

Literature on immigrant incorporation has given much significance and attention to the positive impact of immigrant entrepreneurship on the rapid integration of immigrants into American society. Korean immigrants' concentration in small business, like Jews in the past, is perceived as evidence of Korean immigrants' rapid economic success. Their swift economic ascent has conferred on Korean immigrants the title of "model minorities": *immigrants who have come to the US in search of a better life and who, through hard work and unwavering will, are attaining "the fruits of their labor"*. This epic story, a perennial immigrant tale that vindicates immigration and reinforces the image of the US as the "land of opportunity and mobility", then culminates with the accomplishments of their American-born/raised children. The hard work and sacrifice of the immigrant parents in the end pay off as their children fulfill the parents' dreams by gaining entrance to elite colleges and establishing themselves in the primary sectors in the mainstream economy.

Given the well-known prominence of Korean immigrants in small business, and much media and scholarly discussion attributing the success of Korean immigrants to their concentration in small business, what is the role of entrepreneurship on the outcomes of the second generation? Does the ethnic economy, a major waystation by which ethnicity continues to organize comprehensively the lives of the first generation, continue to provide similar functions for the second? Segmented assimilation theory posits the benefits of the ethnic economy for offspring of poor immigrants. What role does the ethnic economy serve for the offspring of middle-class immigrants? Is its role

one of a springboard, safety net, or mobility trap? As the chapter on labor market outcomes showed, second-generation Korean Americans are abandoning the small business route of their parents in favor of primary sector occupations. Employment in South Korean subsidiaries or ethnic enclave broker positions, and any prospects of working in the Korean community are firmly being rejected by the second-generation respondents.

In light of this, this chapter addresses the impact of their parents' economic incorporation on the educational and labor market trajectories of the second generation. The chapter examines what role the ethnic economy plays for second-generation Korean Americans by comparing the outcomes between children of professionals and entrepreneurs. My survey confirms the significance of entrepreneurship for Korean immigrants, as parents of the second-generation respondents were closely split between professional parents and entrepreneurial parents. Thus, a comparison of outcomes between children of professionals and children of entrepreneurs allows us to measure outcome differences between the two. Since very few parents of the second generation respondents were workers (basically the sample split between the two), I have taken them out of the analysis. Had their numbers been large enough, this 3 way comparison would have given us a clearer picture about the role of class and occupation. After the quantitative analysis, I provide some qualitative comparisons between the two groups, as the benefits/costs of entrepreneurship cannot be measured by statistics alone.

SELF-EMPLOYMENT, CLASS ADVANTAGE, AND SMALL BUSINESS SUCCESS

The chapter on demographics indicated that Korean immigrants seek self-employment because their language difficulties and their South Korean college education and professional experience do not transfer as readily in the US (Waldinger 1996; Min 1996). Abelman and Lie (1995: 128) summarize, "Self-employment is...an adaptive response to the credential and linguistic constraints that Korean Americans face. Small businesses offer a promise of financial success and an escape from manual work." In fact, had Korean immigrants other options they would have not sought business opportunities in a poor minority neighborhood. The Korean professionals turned entrepreneurs in the US would not have sought self-employment in Korea.

Entrepreneurship in the Korea of the 1950s and 1960s was not accorded high status. Rather, in part to the legacy of Confucianism, commercial pursuits were frowned upon since education provided the main route to status positions in the government. However, following the shift in the orientation of the economy to exports, initially with light manufacturing and the ascendance of the chaebols later, the image of the entrepreneur and commerce changed in Korea. The Korean immigrants leaving Korea in the 1960s and 1970s did not seek small business immediately in the US. Only when immigrant pioneers demonstrated the viability of small business did the community promote entrepreneurship as a suitable alternative, becoming a reputable endeavor in the face of blocked mobility (Waldinger 1996; Abelman and Lie 1995).

Thus, while entrepreneurship remains a form of underemployment for Korean immigrants it is still a better alternative to jobs in the secondary sectors and most importantly unemployment (Gold 1988: 418; Light and Gold 2000). Whereas

disadvantage explains the supply side of the equation, disadvantage alone cannot create entrepreneurs (Light and Rosenstein 1995: 152). The demand side of the equation, or the opportunity structure of the host society, has to be taken into consideration (Waldinger 1996). The opportunity structure in the US channeled Korean immigrants into establishments in retail or services that required low start-up capital, primarily in poor minority markets that were underserved by mainstream firms, and were opened up as a result of ethnic succession (I. Kim 1981).

Yet, it is one thing to enter into self-employment and another to succeed in it. Research shows that not all Korean immigrant businesses have been successful and in fact, many have encountered considerable turnovers and failures. Small businesses vary in size and profitability and many go through turnovers and failures. A recent Los Angeles Times survey's forecast (Lee 1999) for Korean businesses was rather grim because of their concentration in small-scale retail industries with low-profit margins and a poor, inner-city customer base. In contrast, Chinese firms had brighter prospects because they were taking advantage of the boom in high-tech, internet-based economies.

Most recently, Light and Gold (2000) and Bates (1997) have engaged in a debate about the entrepreneurial success of Korean immigrants. Bates (1997) argues that what makes Korean businesses more successful is their level of capital investment compared to other groups such as blacks. However, the rate of return for their investment pales to other groups. In-Jin Yoon (1997) argues that ethnic resources help during the initial stages of establishing small business, but in the long run, class resources are what determine the success of the business. Light and Gold contend that both class and ethnic resources matter.

Waldinger posits that entrepreneurial success relies on 3 factors: the premigration characteristics, the condition of migration, and postmigration effects (Waldinger and Aldrich 1995). Those Koreans who have success in small business do so because of the resources and skills they bring with them, especially their class and urban advantage. My survey corroborates the educational and middle-class advantage of the fathers of the second generation. I. Kim (1981) shows that in fact, some of the wealthy Koreans brought large sums of cash and bought businesses. In contrast, post-1980 Korean immigrants, according to Abelman and Lie (1995), because they tend to be poorer and less-educated than the post-1970s counterparts, have not fared as well in small business (129) as the former. In fact, the 1960s and 1970s Korean immigrants belong to the same elite segments in South Korea who have turned around the South Korean economy (the "Han River miracle") (144). Given this background, that these Korean immigrants have succeeded in the US (highly educated and motivated group) should not be surprising. Their mobility strategy entailed choosing small business because that was the best way to regain their lost status. This was possible in the immigration context. Had this group remained in South Korea, it would have been unimaginable for this segment of the population to seek entrepreneurship (Abelman and Lie 1995). Abelman and Lie explain, "For an SNU graduate to "make it" as a greengrocer or a dry cleaner in the United States is akin to an elite US university graduate's succeeding as a convenience store owner in opulent Japan" (1995: 123).

In conjunction with this class advantage, the condition of migration brings a group of self-selected immigrants who have greater motivation to succeed. Coming from a pre-modern context but with a mindset to achieve modernity, their meager returns on

self-employment do not discourage them since their dual framework compares their earnings to home wages (Piore 1979). Another is the orientation of the immigrant, whether to settle permanently or return home shortly. Permanent settlers immigrate as families and bring other family members; sojourners are temporary labor migrants who send remittances back (Kessner 1977; Piore 1979). Korean immigrants, as permanent settlers, could not only dedicate greater sums for small business investment, but also could utilize family and coethnic labor, a trustworthy, dependable labor that kept them competitive in particular niches (middleman minorities) they were able to enter, exploit, and protect (Waldinger 1996; Portes and Manning 1991; Min 1996; Park 1997). Furthermore, ethnic resources in the form of high density networks, transnational ties, vertical integration of manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, and credit rotating associations (kehs) provided the tools necessary for successful business operation (Kim 1987; Light 1972; Waldinger 1996; Yoon 1997; Light and Gold 2000).

COSTS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

If Korean immigrants achieved some level of economic "success" it has not been without a number of costs, including family problems, health issues, occupational risks, and hostility (Kim 1981; Light and Bonacich 1988), notably the 1990 Brooklyn Black boycotts and the 1992 Los Angeles riots and uprising (Lee 1993; Min 1996; Yoon 1997). Given the tendencies to simplify success in terms of individual attributes, it is critical to bear in mind the extent of costs involved and the contexts of reception that make success possible. Yet, in spite of all these qualifying observations, it is hard to deny the critical role entrepreneurship has played for Korean immigrants. Not surprisingly, the Korean

community has come to see it as the main avenue of economic adaptation for the first generation (as opposed to say jobs in the secondary labor markets or ethnic labor markets) (I. Kim 1987; D. Kim 1999).

OCCUPATIONAL AND SALARY OUTCOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHILDREN OF ENTREPRENEURS AND PROFESSIONALS

How do second-generation outcomes in the sample vary by the occupational backgrounds of the parents (professionals vs. entrepreneurs)? At a general level there seems to be very little variation between children of professionals and entrepreneurs. Both the offspring of professionals and entrepreneurs are leaving the self-employment route of their parents as indicated by their low self-employment rates although children of entrepreneurs display higher rates of employment in the ethnic economy (31%). However, the difference is not statistically significant.

Table 17: Respondent's Current Work by Father's Work Type

Type of Work	Father's Work Type						All Second Generation	
	Self-Employed (or in Fam Bus)		Professionals		Column Total			
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Self-Employed (Including Family Bus)	19	19%	9	11%	28	15%	33	16%
Korean Immigrant Business Employee	7	7%	1	1%	8	4%	8	4%
S. Korea/Subsidiary Employee	6	6%	2	2%	8	4%	5	4%
Mainstream Firm Employee	70	69%	74	86%	144	77%	153	76%
Total	102	100%	86	100%	188	100%	199	100%

Chi-Square: Value 2.312; df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .510

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

Moreover, the college ranking differences between the two (Chapter 4) reveal that children of professionals have higher participation rates in private firms (close 75%) than children of entrepreneurs (about 59%). Also 75% of children of professionals are in

managerial and professional specialty occupations compared to 62% of children of entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, both industry and occupational differences are not statistically significant.

Table 18: R's Current Job- Industry by Father's Work Type

Industry	Father's Work Type						All Second Generation	
	Self-Emp (or in Fam Bus)		Professionals		Total			
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Construction	1	1%	0	0%	1	1%	1	1%
Manufacturing	17	17%	9	11%	26	14%	28	14%
Transportation, Communications, Utilities	2	2%	3	4%	5	3%	7	3%
Wholesale	2	2%	2	2%	4	2%	4	2%
Retail	13	13%	4	5%	17	9%	20	10%
Finance, Insurance, Real estate	17	17%	12	14%	29	15%	29	14%
Business/Personal Services	14	14%	12	14%	26	14%	26	13%
Professional And Related Services	33	32%	43	50%	76	40%	83	41%
Government/Public Administration	4	4%	1	1%	5	3%	5	3%
Total	103	100%	86	100%	189	100%	203	100%

Chi-Square: Value 11.119; df 8; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .195

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

Table 19: R's Current Occupation by Father's Work Type

Occupation	Father's Work Type						All Second Generation	
	Self-Employed (or in Fam Bus)		Professionals		Column Total			
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Managerial and Professional Specialty	62	62%	64	75%	126	68%	133	67%
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support	27	27%	20	24%	47	25%	53	27%
Service	8	8%	1	1%	9	5%	9	5%
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair	2	2%	0	0%	2	1%	2	1%
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers	1	1%	0	0%	1	1%	1	1%
Total	100	100%	85	100%	185	100%	198	100%

Chi-Square: Value 8.357; df 4; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .079

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

Salary Differences

The main outcomes of occupational differences are reflected in their mean and median salary differences between the two. The mean salaries (first job and current job)

show important differences between the two groups. Children of professionals, in their current (or most recent) jobs, had a mean salary of \$53,473 (median salary was \$40,000) compared to \$47,912 (median salary of \$32,880) for children of entrepreneurs. The difference in mean salary for their first jobs was slightly lower than the difference in their current jobs: \$31,341 (median salary was \$25,000) for children of professionals and \$27,586 for children of entrepreneurs (median salary of \$23,000). The difference in current salary, however, was not statistically significant.

Table 20: Total Salary by Father's Work

Father's Work		Salary- Current Job	Salary- First Job
Self-Employed (or in Family Bus)	Mean	\$47,912	\$27,586
	N	92	83
	Median	\$32,880	\$23,000
Professionals	Mean	\$53,473	\$31,341
	N	69	64
	Median	\$40,000	\$25,000
Total	Mean	\$50,295	\$29,221
	N	161	147
	Median	\$36,000	\$24,000

Anova: Sig. 0.4

Occupational and Salary Outcome Differences by Father's Education

Earlier chapters have pointed out that there may be an overlap between father's type of work (entrepreneurs vs. professionals) and father's education. Second-generation educational outcome differences by father's occupation and father's education reveal a close correspondence that makes it necessary to carry out cross tabulations of respondents' industry, occupation, and salary by the father's education.

Cross tabulations indicate that the variation in mainstream employment is very small between children of postcollege graduates (85%) and native-college graduates

(75%). Children of noncollege graduates show a greater difference (59%) but their numbers are too small to draw reliable conclusions.

Table 21: R's Work Status by Father's Education

Type of Work	Father's Education							
	Noncollege graduates		Native-college graduates		Postcollege graduates		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Self-Employed (Including Family Bus)	13	33%	9	12%	11	13%	33	17%
Korean Immigrant Business Employee	1	3%	5	7%	1	1%	7	4%
S. Korea/Subsidiary Employee	2	5%	5	7%	1	1%	8	4%
Mainstream Firm Employee	23	59%	56	75%	71	85%	150	76%
Total	39	100%	75	100%	84	100%	198	100%

Chi-Square: Value 17.501; df 6; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .008

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

There is also some variation in respondents' professional and related services industries and managerial and professional specialty occupations but children of native-college graduates are not too far behind children of postcollege graduates.

Table 22: R's Current Job- Industry by Father's Education

Industry	Father's Education							
	Noncollege graduates		Native-college graduates		Postcollege graduates		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Construction			1	1%			1	1%
Manufacturing	5	13%	11	15%	12	14%	28	14%
Transportation, Communications, Utilities	1	3%	2	3%	3	4%	6	3%
Wholesale	1	3%	1	1%	2	2%	4	2%
Retail	7	18%	8	11%	4	5%	19	10%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	5	13%	12	16%	12	14%	29	15%
Business/Personal Services	7	18%	10	13%	9	11%	26	13%
Professional and Related Services	11	28%	28	37%	42	49%	81	41%
Government/Public Administration	2	5%	2	3%	1	1%	5	3%
Total	39	100%	75	100%	85	100%	199	100%

Chi-Square: Value 20.622; df 16; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .193

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

Table 23: R's Current Occupation by Father's Education

Occupation	Father's Education							
	Noncollege graduates		Native-college graduates		Postcollege graduates		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Managerial and Professional Specialty	16	42%	52	69%	62	77%	130	67%
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support	18	47%	16	21%	18	22%	52	27%
Service	3	8%	5	7%	1	1%	9	5%
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair	1	3%	1	1%			2	1%
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers			1	1%			1	1%
Total	38	100%	75	100%	81	100%	194	100%

Chi-Square: Value 19.133; df 8; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .014

*Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

Salary Differences by Father's Education

Respondents whose fathers were postcollege graduates had the highest mean (median) salaries in their current and first jobs: a mean salary of \$59,936 (median salary of \$45,000) in their current job compared to \$46,304 (median salary of \$34,000) for respondents whose fathers were native-college graduates and \$33,805 (median salary of \$29,000) for respondents whose fathers were noncollege graduates. Mean and median

salaries for respondents' first jobs follow similar pattern. In fact, second-generation salary differences between respondents' fathers by levels of education are more pronounced than by fathers' occupational types.

Table 24: Total Salary by Father's Education

Father's Education	Salary- Current Job			Salary- First Job		
	Mean	N	Median	Mean	N	Median
Noncollege (HS or Lower)	\$33,804.77	31	\$29,000	\$20,320.54	28	\$18,100
Native-College (BA/BS from Korea)	\$46,303.64	67	\$34,000	\$28,518.42	65	\$23,000
Postcollege (MA/MS or Higher)	\$59,935.71	68	\$45,000	\$34,796.03	59	\$26,000
Total	\$49,553.73	166	\$35,000	\$29,444.99	152	\$23,400

Anova: Sig. 0.01

Multiple Regression

Because of the close correspondence in second-generation outcomes in relation to father's education and father's occupation, I carried out statistical tests to determine which variable decided whether the difference in outcomes was statistically significant³³. Anova tables show that father's education, respondents' education, and type of college are all statistically significant. Father's occupation, on the other hand, is not statistically significant. In order to assess which variable (father's education or occupation) impacts salary and selective school outcomes, I have carried out multiple regression. I ran a linear regression (OLS), setting current job salary as the dependent variable and setting sex (0 = men, 1 = women), father's occupation (0 = professionals, 1 = entrepreneurs), father's education (0 = BA or lower, 1 = MA or higher), mother's education (0 = BA or lower, 1 = MA or higher), and college rank (0 = Tier 1, 1 = Non Tier 1) as independent

³³ The p is at .05

variables among others. The regression analysis allows us to measure the effect of father's occupation and father's education on respondents' salary. Not only is the R Square for father's occupation negligible (.004), indicating almost a non-existent effect, but also the difference is not statistically significant (.399).

Table 25: Regression- Father's Occupation on R's Salary

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	
1	(Constant)	53472.580	4971.976		10.755	.000		
	Father's work	-5560.928	6577.306	-.067	-.845	.399	1	1

a Dependent Variable: Total salary

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	R	Exp(B)
FAWRKTY3	.9232	.3078	8.9964	1	.0027	.1675	2.5174
Constant.	-.5691	.2285	6.2036	1	.0127		

FAWRKTY3 = Father's occupation (0 = professionals, 1 = entrepreneurs)

When father's education is entered with father's occupation, the R Square increases to .041, not much of an effect. However, father's education is statistically significant at .015 whereas father's occupation is not statistically significant (.468)

Table 26: Regression- Father's Occupation and Education on R's Salary

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	
1	(Constant)	38601.127	7587.715		5.087	.000		
	F's work	5683.086	7816.800	0.068	0.727	.468	0.698	1.433
	F's education	19294.628	7832.003	0.231	2.464	.015	0.698	1.433

A Dependent Variable: Total salary

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	R	Exp(B)
FAWRKTY3	.4975	.3562	1.9500	1	.1626	.0000	1.6445
FEDUCRC4	-.7980	.3581	4.9647	1	.0259	-.1097	.4502
Constant	.0101	.3391	.0009	1			

FAWRKTY3 = Father's occupation (0 = professionals, 1 = entrepreneurs)

FEDUCRC4 = Father's education (0 = BA or lower, 1 = MA or higher)

The results confirm that father's education has a greater indirect effect on the respondents' salary, although other independent variables may have a more direct effect.

Setting the dependent variable as the type of school second-generation Korean Americans graduated from (using dummy variables- 0 as National Tier 1 and 1 as Non-National Tier 1), I ran a logistic regression. The independent variables were occupations of parents (0 = entrepreneurs, 1 = professionals) and levels of education (0 = BA or lower, 1 = MA or higher), all set as dummy variables. Although father's occupation is statistically significant in the first table, in the second table when both variables (occupation and education) are regressed on college selectivity, occupation is not statistically significant.

Table 27: Logistic Regression- Father's Occupation, Education, Mother's Education, R's Sex and GPA on College Ranking

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
FAWRKTY3	.1784	.4075	.1915	1	.6616	.0000	1.1952
FEDUCRC4	-1.1058	.4267	6.7144	1	.0096	-.1417	.3310
MEDUCRC3	.1037	.5440	.0363	1	.8488	.0000	1.1093
Q1SEX2	.1393	.3697	.1419	1	.7064	.0000	1.1494
Q29HSGP3	2.2160	.4719	22.0489	1	.0000	.2922	9.1709
Constant	-.3742	.4410	.7203	1	.3961		

FAWRKTY3 = Father's occupation (0 = professionals, 1 = entrepreneurs)

FEDUCRC4 = Father's education (0 = BA or lower, 1 = MA or higher)

MEDUCRC3 = mother's education (0 = BA or lower, 1 = MA or higher)

Q1SEX2 = sex of the respondent (0 = men, 1 = women)

Q29HSGP3 = high school GPA (0 = A, 1 = B or lower)

When other independent variables (father's occupation, mother's education, gender, high school GPA) are entered with father's education, only father's education and high school GPA are statistically significant. GPA has a direct effect on college selectivity whereas

father's education has an indirect effect. We can interpret from this logistic regression that educational levels determine the type of occupations for parents, which impacts on patterns of occupations for first-generation Korean immigrants. This suggests, as Fernandez and Kim (1998) have shown, that native-college graduates turn to self-employment in greater numbers to bypass status gap and attain mobility. In so far as entrepreneurs have been able to successfully achieve economic mobility to the suburbs that offer excellent schools (or if not geographic mobility, then entry into specialized public high schools), the outcomes between children of entrepreneurs and professionals seem far similar in their trajectories. Yet, it is children of postcollege graduates who are far more likely to enter National Tier 1 schools. Fathers who are postcollege graduates are able to obtain professional jobs (doctors, engineers), that lead to stable economic conditions and thus, provide a favorable educational trajectory for their children.

Thus, at least in all three categories- education, occupation, and salary- children of professionals are faring better than children of entrepreneurs, but in close analysis the former is a spurious relationship. Instead children of postcollege graduates are faring best. In the context of an upbeat mood regarding immigrant enterprise and "model minority" status of Korean immigrants and their American-born/raised children, there is a danger of attributing the remarkable outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans to factors like entrepreneurship as if ethnic enterprise is an automatic route to success. What clearly comes out from the survey is that there is a substantial professional contingent in the parents' wave that needs to be taken into account. This clearly cautions against a simplistic assumption of a connection between Korean immigrant entrepreneurship and upward mobility. Explanations of the extraordinary educational

and occupational outcomes of second-generation Korean Americans have to take into account the superior trajectories of the children of highly-educated professionals whose impact has been evidently overlooked, which the Horatio Alger version of Korean immigrant entrepreneurship and upward mobility fails to capture the professional dimension within the Korean immigrant stream. Even so, the role of small business as a springboard to mobility is still clearly established as reflected by the roughly comparable educational, occupational, and salary outcomes of the children of entrepreneurs.

QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES

What distinguished children of entrepreneurs from the professionals, as far as the ethnic economy is concerned, is that these second-generation young adults with professional parents had no experience with the ethnic economy to begin with. Their parents were hardly involved with the ethnic economy. Usually the second generation's only connection to the Korean community was participation in a Korean church in their childhood. In large part, most grew up in the suburbs, usually as one of the few Koreans/Asians in the neighborhood, attending a predominantly white suburban school system. Children of doctors spoke about spending time with other Korean doctors' children. But most of their friends throughout their childhood to adulthood have been and continue to be non-Korean, primarily whites. Hence, one segment of the population, both professional parents and their second-generation children, has started off in the mainstream economy and continue to do so. Another difference is the amount of time and attention paid to their children by entrepreneurs, which has been one of the costs of entrepreneurship (Abelmann and Lie 1995: 145).

Thus, it is necessary to examine the role of the ethnic economy, specifically how its capacity as a safety net can turn into a springboard and in what circumstances it could also lead to mobility trap.

Small Business: Springboard, Safety Net, or Mobility Trap?

For Jews, small business has been an important medium by which the second generation obtained mobility to professional occupations (Steinberg 1981: 102). The Jewish ethnic economy was both a safety net and springboard that provided an alternative for those who did not take the professional route, by offering mobility into the distribution, wholesale, or manufacturing sectors. Even the second-generation Jewish professionals, when faced with barriers in the mainstream economy due to anti-Semitism, benefited from the safety net of the ethnic economy, which after WWII served as a springboard into the mainstream (Steinberg 1981).

In so far as Korean immigrant entrepreneurs have been able to successfully achieve economic and residential mobility, the outcomes between children of entrepreneurs and professionals resemble each other. As shown in the chapter, notwithstanding the better outcomes of children of professionals, children of entrepreneurs are faring well, supporting the springboard function.

However, the existence of a viable ethnic economy and family business plays a more indispensable role as a safety net particularly for the downwardly mobile who are unable to enter or face stiff competition in the primary sectors. Parents seem to make a realistic assessment of what avenues were available for their children who were not doing well academically. In situations like these, parents encourage the next best option,

whether to have their children work for them, set them up in a business of their own if the parents have the means to do so, or to land them a decent job through their social networks. Chulsoo's parents, as a condition for allowing their son to drop out of junior high school, made Chulsoo promise that he learn the work in the family business. Now Chulsoo, one of the few 33 year old fruit and vegetable store owners who took over the family business, believes he made the right choice in running a business since his friends who had graduated from high school and also college are bouncing from one job to another. He had even encountered a friend who was delivering newspapers after graduating from college. He often considers himself fortunate to have bypassed all those years of schooling directly into the labor market, quickly establishing himself when others his age are still struggling to establish themselves.

Sarah's parents, also realizing her brother was not following the professional occupation route that Sarah was taking, intervened and helped him to open up his own business. *"They know that's what my brother wanted so they helped him getting the store,"* Sarah replied. The reason why her brother wanted to have his own business, according to Sarah, was Sarah's brother realized he was not the type to dress up in a suit and tie and go to work everyday in the city for a company. Instead, he wanted to become his own boss. [Sarah's brother currently owns a stationary business.]

Helping Out

[From Patti Kim's A Cab Called Reliable]

Throwing a straw at me, he said, "Why don't you get out of there and help? It's not easy, you know." He massaged his ankle with his right hand, while the other searched for a cigarette. Curling up against the buns, I told him I was tired because I was studying the night before, and when I go through, I only slept for three hours because I was having horrible nightmares.

While the safety net function is unmistakable, small business involvement, in many instances, imposes far greater amounts of obligation on second-generation Korean Americans and increases their chances of being stuck in it. Early exposure to work in a family business and/or family circumstances (like a death of a parent) may force some to forfeit opportunities elsewhere, especially delaying their entry into the mainstream economy. While high parental expectations and general obligations are part of the second-generation experience (Confucian filial piety), some children of small business owners incurred extra obligations as the expediency of small business made family labor very valuable³⁴ (Song 1997; See Miri Song's (1999) study of children of Chinese take-outs). Not only have many helped out in the business when growing up but also felt obligated to do so. This difference marks the experience of children of entrepreneurs from children of professionals who did not face such obligations.

Just like the identity of being Chinese in Britain meant a family take-out and helping out in the family business (Song 1999), helping out was seen as part of their duty. As Martha notes about helping out at the store, *"You get that. It's an unspoken rule. Usually my oldest sister did the most but I did help out,"* she said. Sungsoo, whose parents owned a Tae Kwon Do dojang (Korean martial arts studio) and day care center, replied, *"of course, I think you underline being a very Korean family the sons have to help their dads in the store."* As Joseph summed it up, *"I was brought up thinking that I*

³⁴ Because Korean small businesses depend less on children's labor than the Chinese takeouts in Britain that Song studied, the labor market trajectories of children of entrepreneurs seem to have been less circumscribed. Still, as a result of the diversity of Korean businesses and levels of dependency, there were cases of personal (sibling) sacrifice that limited the primary sector employment of the second generation.

had to do this. It wasn't an option. To be a good son you have to help out in these situations, which I did."

The fact that some of their Korean friends were also contributing with their labor in their family business, Sharon and Andrew did not think twice about their roles.

Andrew did not think it was odd since his Korean friends were also very much involved in aiding their parents with their labor. Moreover, the fact his mom was on her own after his parents' divorce made it more critical that he lend a hand as often as he could.

Andrew elaborated, *"When I was in college, I went there every day...So after classes I would go there and work, and she would be able to get home. On weekends, on Saturdays I would go to help her buy the merchandise to restock the store."* Song (1999) explains the importance of child labor for the Chinese take-outs in Britain. Similarly, Sharon's parents initially depended on their children's labor to cut labor costs in the motel. *"Oh absolutely. Even when I was seven or eight, I used to help make the beds... It never occurred to me that I wouldn't do that. It wasn't spoken about, it was just, 'this is what we have to do. There's absolutely no money to go and hire people.' So we all did our part,"* Sharon replied. But unlike the Chinese takeouts in Britain that Song studied, the Korean-owned small businesses were less dependent on children's labor (although it varies by type and size) and most of their helping out consisted of coming out during busy holidays like Christmas, Back to School time, Easter, or weekends and summertime. As Jonathan described, *"We always came out to the store. They would ask us to come out. Or sometimes for summer jobs we would come out".*

Thus, a significant number did help out. Whether having to help out at the store felt like an obligation, it was often a tension between burden and guilt. For Sungsoo,

although helping out did not affect his and his brother's schooling, it limited their socializing, like playing sports or going out with friends during weekends. Sungsoo described his feelings: *"There's a lot of resentment too at the time. After junior high school ended, everyone was allowed to play except me and my brother. We have to go and help out in the dojang. Even in high school, I was in the basketball team and my dad made me quit because of dojang."* Sungsoo worked during weekends and weekdays after school. *"Many times it felt like an obligation, a lot of times we got into trouble because we were coming in late cause we tried to spend extra 5, 10 minutes just to hang out with our friends. There were basketball tournaments and so many activities that were going on during weekends, and we couldn't get involved in them. It was difficult,"* Sungsoo said. Nevertheless, *"My dad always stressed schoolwork at home after dojang. I think we did all right in junior high school,"* replied Sungsoo.

Hyun's parents worked at an indoor flea market selling jewelry. Her mother worked there full time. Hyun was expected to help out on the weekends. She replied, *"We hated it. It was more of an obligation"* (laughter). She acknowledged that it did not interfere with her personal life because she could skip out when needed and also could split up the duties with her sisters. Although Sharon knew helping out was part of her family life, it did provide certain contrasts between her and her "American" friends who had no such obligations. *"I can remember growing up, going to slumber parties and having to come home because I had to help at the motel, and I remember my friends sort of thinking, 'What are you doing? What do you mean you have to go home and help clean the motel?' But I don't remember that being a huge burden. I didn't mind it that much actually. Surprisingly they paid us too,"* Sharon explained. However, being the

youngest gave Sharon much more leeway than her oldest sibling who was given a lot more responsibilities. Song (1999) points out that this has to do also with who is likely to accept that role among the siblings.

These obligations reflect in part an immigrant family's strategy to make ends meet and the ethnic dimension of what it means to be a child of Korean immigrants. Despite feeling like an obligation, Jonathan tried to be more understanding about chipping in with his labor. Because he saw how hard his parents worked for their education, even if going to the store tended to be dull, they all helped out. As Jonathan rationalized, *"I didn't think otherwise. It's a family business. They are working. What they are doing is sending us to school...I figured this is our parents. If they do this 6 days a week, why can't I just go out every once in a while."* Jonathan also did not feel the store work interfered much with their schoolwork or their social life. *"It wasn't like we were such active with our social life, as if it was interfering with our plans. Sometimes it was just gyichaneo (tedious). You didn't want to go out,"* he.

Andrew also did not give too much thought about helping out because he saw this as part of the reality of being a child of an immigrant family. *"I didn't lose any friends over it but it got on my nerves because I had to do it but on the other hand, the other kids...most of my friends were Korean then, and still are, and when I was living in the neighborhoods that I was living in then, most of the other kids' parents had businesses too. So they had to do the same thing. So we were all in the same boat. Everybody understood. In terms of the amount of fun that I could have had, yes I suppose it was affected but not greatly,"* Andrew clarified. Yet, helping out did interfere with Andrew's school work because he had less free time to devote to schoolwork. However, he does

not think it was detrimental since he was able to do well in school. That did not mean, in spite of their understanding regarding their duties, that they did not harbor strong feelings against it. Andrew adds that helping out did feel like an obligation, "*Yes, begrudgingly but yes.*"

Because most parents are concerned with their children's academic performance, even if they were in dire need of family labor, they refrained from becoming fully dependent on them. As indicated above, depending on the economic situation of the family, most provided help on weekends or busy holidays during high school or during the summer time in college. In Connie's case, she did not help out until after college. During high school she was not asked to help out at the nail salon. After she graduated from college, however, because she wanted to travel to Europe for a few months and needed to earn money, Connie opted to help her mom for a year instead of seeking a job in the primary sector. Here the decision to work for her mother at the nail salon was predicated upon feeling obligated towards her mom. Connie admitted, "*My guilt, you know. It worked out well.*"

The real measure of the costs of helping out emerges when the second generation's decisions are constrained by their feelings of obligation to their parents. The stark difference between children of entrepreneurs and professionals is that while small business entails a springboard, it also becomes a big burden because the livelihood of the immigrant family is at stake. Certainly professional parents may lose jobs and the family's livelihood can be at risk. However, when the entire family's savings and labor are invested in these enterprises, it becomes that much harder to abandon or ignore the sacrifices made for the family well-being. Thus, James, a 28 year old artist, would face a

big dilemma if a situation came up where his mom needed help to run the store.

Although he was not willing to take over his mom's business, he would still have to temporarily halt his artist career to put the business back up. James specified, *"If it comes down to where she can't provide for herself and the business is there and if it's bringing decent income, I would have to do it...But living here to go to Seattle, as an artist it's not a good move. Hopefully I can tell my younger brother to do it."*

Joseph's situation is a little different. He is tied up now with work at the store and would be glad to see the store go. He feels his work at the store is what is stopping him from finishing his degree as he is unable to dedicate more hours to school work. At the same time, the reason why his parents, unlike other academic-minded parents, have not decreased the level of Joseph's involvement at the store, to allow him more time for his schoolwork, is that Joseph has not been in an academic route to professional occupations despite having graduated from the Bronx High School of Science. In fact, he barely graduated from high school and after a rough academic year at SUNY Buffalo, he entered a community college in New York because his grades had dropped so low for other four year colleges. Joseph concurs, *"My parents really want to sell the store. That would be great for me because I wouldn't have to work and maybe more towards next semester I might be looking for an internship...I want to have my weekends free and just work and go to school five days a week. Because I'm working at the store, that's somewhat of an excuse to not be able to work."*

If being a child of small business owners entailed these obligations, often times, being a daughter or the oldest sibling in small business meant they were stuck with far more responsibilities. As Sarah illustrates, to her consternation, her parents *"never made*

my brothers go in and help but I had to go and help." She thinks this was because she was the oldest sibling and female. According to her mom, *"She said that my brothers weren't good at taking the ticket and bagging so I always had to go in (drycleaning business)."* Although she felt it was unfair, it did not interfere with her schoolwork or personal life since this was only one or two years in high school and it was mostly during the summer. Sarah states, *"I didn't want to go. It was too hot. I am not a morning person...I would just go in early and I would be out early afternoon."* However, the time when Sarah had to cover for her mom in the store because of an illness did interfere with her academic performance in college.

Some older siblings, especially if they came to the US at an older age, took it to him/herself to help out in the business. In this sense, it involved a personal sacrifice from the oldest sibling to completely immerse in the business. For instance, Eugene mentioned that his oldest brother made a personal sacrifice to support the family. He thinks his older brother became like a parent, giving up on his own ambitions or dreams. Meanwhile, helping out her parents did not affect Martha personally but had repercussions on her brother and especially her older sister. *"She had to take a year off from school after my dad passed away [to work at the drycleaners],"* Martha noted. It was no surprise that unlike Martha, her sisters harbored especially strong feelings against small business. Martha explained:

My siblings never liked it. They always say 'I will never do drycleaners'. They have such an animosity. For me I don't know better.

Thus, in contrast to children of professionals, children of entrepreneurs, in addition to other pressures of growing up in America, incurred extra obligations due to

small business. While the safety net function of the ethnic economy is vital, for some the costs of helping out exacerbated their outcomes, especially circumscribing their career trajectories. Hence the ethnic economy holds various ambiguities and its role as a safety net role can not only turn into a springboard into the mainstream but also lead to a mobility trap.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Unlike the stereotypical image of the ubiquitous Korean green grocer whose hard labor paves the way for their children into the corridors of the Ivy League, a large proportion of second-generation Korean Americans comes from professional backgrounds whose parents have no connection with the ethnic economy. Korean immigrant professionals, like other middle-class post-1960s immigrants illustrative of that migrant stream (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Zhou and Bankston 1998; Bacon 1996), come equipped with an advantageous set of class resources that provide the impetus for their children to succeed in education and attain professional occupations (Abelmann and Lie 1995). This oversight of the professional elements within the Korean immigrant stream leads to the glamorization and idealization of immigrant entrepreneurship, extolling the virtues of Asian American culture and work ethic (Steinberg 1981; Abelmann and Lie 1995). Yet, entrepreneurship allows highly-educated, middle-class Korean immigrants to regain their lost status in addition to rapid economic integration in the US. Already urbanized and in their quest for modernity, these immigrant entrepreneurs succeed in small business in America because of their class advantage and other factors, and not on hard work and resilience alone (these may be important but does

not guarantee success). Coming from the middle class, the transition of second-generation Korean Americans to middle-class America is no surprise and does not entail mobility- if that is to mean bottom to up. Ironically, while the children become mainstreamed occupationally, this does not necessarily mean they are economically more successful than their self-employed parents. Some in fact experience downward mobility in terms of income. Yet, many are not willing to inherit their parents' businesses, unless they realize the profitability (and prestige issues) of the business. For now, as single men and women they are experimenting with various occupations and their outlook on small business may change as they form families and feel pressed to secure a larger income.

CHAPTER 7: IDENTITY, LANGUAGE, INTERMARRIAGE, TRANSNATIONALISM, AND THE FUTURE OF ETHNICITY

Previous chapters have demonstrated that second-generation Korean Americans are attaining educational, occupational, and residential assimilation, choosing mainstream channels of mobility and integration over the ethnic channels of mobility of their immigrant parents. This chapter examines the identities, language retention, rates of intermarriage, and transnationalism of second-generation Korean Americans. The question at hand is how the American-born/raised children coming of age will negotiate the identities imposed by the US racial classification scheme, and what role ethnicity will play in the lives of the second generation. As other identities compete in organizing the world of the second generation, what is the future of ethnicity?

FLUID IDENTITIES: GROWING UP AND NOW

Considering the relationship between the type of identifications (Waters 1994; S. Lee 1996; Portes 1996) and assimilation, the survey attempted to capture the second generations' identities during childhood and adulthood. Respondents were asked to choose from the four primary categories they identified with. As the Table 30 reveals, several identifications have undergone changes from childhood to adulthood. Whereas a quarter (N=199) of the second generation identified as "Korean" (immigrant), 49% as "Korean American" (hyphenated/ethnic American), 8% as "Asian-American" (pan-ethnic), and 11% as "American" (mainstream) growing up, currently 17% identified as Korean, 68% as Korean-American, 6% as Asian-American, and 4% as American (See

Min and Hong 1999 about ethnic attachments among second-generation Korea American high school students).

Table 28: Identity by Sex

Identifications	Identity Growing up						Identity Currently					
	Men		Women		Total		Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Korean	26	27%	24	23%	50	25%	19	20%	15	15%	34	17%
Korean American	43	45%	55	53%	98	49%	61	65%	73	71%	134	68%
Asian American	8	8%	8	8%	16	8%	6	6%	6	6%	12	6%
American	10	11%	12	12%	22	11%	5	5%	3	3%	8	4%
Other	8	8%	5	5%	13	7%	3	3%	6	6%	9	5%
Total	95	100%	104	100%	199	100%	91	100%	97	100%	197	100%

Chi-Square 2.021; df 4; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .732 (Growing up); Chi-Square 1.856; df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .603 (Current) [Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.]

Most of the second generation identify with the Korean American category, which also gained a substantial increase from childhood to adulthood. Women show slightly higher rates of identification with the Korean American category (53% vs. 45% for men growing up and 71% vs. 65% for men currently) although the differences are not statistically significant. Other identification categories show very little variation between men and women. The pan-ethnic Asian American identities represent a small minority among second-generation Korean Americans, pointing to a more homogenous, ethnic identification. The drop of “American” identity during adulthood may be in part due to the increased acceptance, even popularity, of ethnicity today. During childhood there was a heavy pressure and desire to be “American”, a desire to be part of the dominant group, and conversely, a rejection of their ethnicity and difference. Considering that many second-generation Korean Americans grew up in suburban neighborhoods as the only Asian children, going through a predominantly white school system and peers, the

strong desires of wanting and pressures to be white are understandable. *"I guess I really wanted to be white, wanting to fit in. I had dreams of being white,"* recalled Hanna.

When second-generation Korean Americans meet other Korean Americans and Asian Americans in college, a time for reevaluation of identities in general and ethnic identities in particular, they begin to assert their identities, contributing to a shift into a bicultural identification. Furthermore, the dissemination of multiculturalism, along with the diversity of ethnic groups and immigrants in New York City, promotes the transformation of identifications during adulthood.

In spite of the generalizable appeal of survey data that serves to delineate the types of identities held by second-generation Korean Americans, these figures have to be interpreted with caution. The close-ended nature of these questions does not take into account how the respondent interprets these categories. For instance, while the categories Korean and Korean American/Korean-American are distinguished to probe particular attachments- immigrant vs. bicultural/ethnic-, in-depth interviews indicate that many respondents do not make clear cut distinctions. When some reply "Korean" the meaning is not "immigrant". Rather, they are referring to mean "Korean American" or a bicultural (reflecting American upbringing and Korean heritage) identity. Eugene exclaimed, *"I am Korean so sure. What kind of question?"*

Others, however, did make a concerted effort to make these distinctions. Sally, for example, chose the "Korean American" category to specify the bicultural, hybrid nature of her identity. At the same time, she also identified with other identity categories to differentiate the context in which these identities are being invoked. When she is traveling, Sally emphasizes the Korean American to differentiate herself from being

identified as a South Korean traveler or Korean immigrant. Around other Asian Americans she basically drops the "American" part from the "Korean American" with the assumption that they recognize her bicultural component of her ethnic identity, therefore stating "Korean" simply to mean "Korean American". Yet, around non-Asians, understanding that ethnic distinctions are not generally made, she takes on a pan-ethnic identity. Only when people probe further will she state her Korean identity. *"In Europe I was saying I was Korean American because I didn't want...if I said I was Korean, then they would think I was from Korea so I always said Korean American,"* illustrated Sally. Therefore, although the survey data points to a shift of identities from childhood to adulthood, some are less pronounced than what the data seem to indicate.

LANGUAGE PREFERENCE

Language retention becomes ever more difficult as the subsequent generation is further removed from the parents' country of origin. Without a specific function involving translating for parents or speaking to grandparents or other uses for the language, language loss occurs very rapidly. The US is a graveyard of languages and English monolingualism is the general trend for roughly all children of immigrants, Koreans being no exception to this trend. In fact, while 35% (N=200) preferred to speak Korean at home growing up, only 22% currently prefer to do so. On the other, almost half (49%) preferred to speak English at home growing up, and this rate has soared to 64%, pointing to a substantial difference between those who prefer to speak Korean and those who prefer to speak English. The number of bilingual speakers has remained relatively the same but they constitute a very small percentage. Thus, the story is one of

rapid linguistic assimilation that is accelerated by suburban upbringing and school attendance, which exerts a powerful grip over children of middle-class immigrants.

Table 29: Language Preference at Home by Sex

Language	Language Growing Up						Language Currently					
	Men		Women		Total		Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
English	46	48%	52	50%	98	49%	61	63%	69	66%	130	64%
Korean	34	35%	36	34%	70	35%	26	27%	18	17%	44	22%
Both	15	16%	17	16%	32	16%	10	10%	18	17%	28	14%
Other	1	1%			1	1%						
Total	96	100%	105	100%	201	100%	97	100%	105	100%	202	100%

Chi-Square 1.149; df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .765 (Growing up); Chi-Square 3.922(a); df 2; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.141 (Currently); [Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.]

This trend confirms the findings of others (Portes and Rumbaut 1990, Rumbaut 1994) of the tendency toward English monolingualism among the immigrant second generation.

Language preference differences are not marked between second-generation men and women. Growing up there is very little variation between the sexes. However, men show greater preference to speaking Korean (27%) than women (17%) but more women (17%) are bilingual speakers than men (10%). Whether this is a sign of greater ethnic attachment among second-generation men is difficult to deduce from this data due to the size of the sample. Examining other differences will reveal to what extent men and women differ regarding ethnic attachments.

The flip side of second-generation Korean Americans' preference for speaking English is their level of competence with Korean. As the Table 32, 33 shows, there are clear differences in how well the second generation speak, read, and write Korean. Most could speak Korean better than they could read or write. Writing was indeed the most difficult for the second generation. While 39% (N=202) said they could speak Korean

well, 26% said they can read Korean well, and only 14% said they could write Korean as well. Those who said they could not speak Korean at all was 10% while reading was higher at 26% and writing at 31%. Both men and women could speak Korean better than they could read or write. Writing was the most difficult for both sexes although women (19%) responded that they could write Korean better compared to men (8%).

Table 30: Comparison of Korean Language Facility: Speaking and Reading

Level	Speaking Korean						Reading Korean					
	Men		Women		Total		Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Well	37	38%	42	40%	79	39%	29	30%	24	23%	53	26%
Some	19	20%	24	23%	43	21%	18	19%	27	26%	45	22%
A Little	30	31%	29	28%	59	29%	20	21%	32	31%	52	26%
Not at All	11	11%	10	10%	21	10%	30	31%	22	21%	52	26%
Total	97	100%	105	100%	202	100%	97	100%	105	100%	202	100%

Chi-Square .647(a); df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.886 (Speaking); Chi-Square 5.964(a); df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.113 (Reading); Chi-Square 4.992(a); df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.172 (Writing); [Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.]

Table 31: Korean Language Facility: Writing

Level	Writing Korean					
	Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Well	8	8%	20	19%	28	14%
Some	23	24%	23	22%	46	23%
A Little	33	34%	32	31%	65	32%
Not at All	33	34%	30	29%	63	31%
Total	97	100%	105	100%	202	100%

INTERMARRIAGE

Outmarriage probably symbolizes the ultimate litmus test of assimilation (Gordon 1964; Alba 1990, 1995). Intermarriages are far more frequent among white ethnics. It is true that religious boundaries still remain influential marriage barriers even among some

white ethnic groups (Catholics vs. Protestants). However, upward mobility and suburbanization have reduced the religious gap. Racial boundaries, especially interracial marriages on the other hand, have been more formidable to tear down. The “one-drop rule” preserved a rigid miscegenation rule that restricted white-black unions (Feagin 1999; Omi and Winant 1994). With Asian Americans, racial boundaries confined the Chinese bachelors to picture brides or single life, which was a major factor behind the gender imbalance that contributed in the decline of the Chinatowns until their renewal by post-1960s immigration. The liberalization of immigration since the 1960s and the victory of the civil rights movement have brought important changes to interracial marriages, in particular unions between whites and Asian American women. Many Asian women have entered the US as wives of US servicemen (Korea, Japan, Philippines). A recent Newsweek article (Pan 2000) contended that Asian-white marriages are on an upward trend, as not only Asian women but also Asian men have become more acceptable as marriage partners. Are second-generation Korean Americans marrying out? Will this signify the breakdown of racial barriers for Asian Americans?

Asian-white intermarriages are most pronounced among third- and fourth-generation Japanese Americans. For example, Japanese American women in California (1990 US Census) had the highest intermarriage rate (50%), compared to 48% for Chinese American women, 43% for Chinese American men, and 40% for Japanese American men (Shinagawa and Pang 1996). What is revealing about Asian American intermarriage patterns is that these outmarriage increases have been primarily interethnic ones rather than interracial ones. That is, except for Japanese American women, both

Chinese American men and women and Japanese American men marry other Asians in greater proportions than white spouses (1996).

My sample cohort is still very young (mean age of 27) and, as a result, only 25% of second-generation Korean Americans were currently married. Almost three fourths were not married, indicating a conscious choice in the part of the second generation to finish college and establish themselves in the labor market before getting married. The number of couples with children is very low, including the age they bear children, which diverges significantly from second-generation Latino and black groups, but paralleling the Chinese and white groups' age at fertility (The Immigrant Second Generation in New York Survey).

Because the marriage rates are very low, it is somewhat premature to speculate on Korean American intermarriage patterns. The crosstabulations for second-generation Korean Americans (numbers are too small to arrive at safe conclusions) reveal that the intermarriage rate still remains relatively low. Only 28% of second-generation Korean Americans marry out, less than a third of those who marry within (much lower than the pattern of Japanese and Chinese Americans).

Table 32: Race of Spouse/Partner by Marital Status

Race	Marital Status									
	Married		Separated		Divorced		Single/Never Married		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
White	7	14%	1	50%			10	36%	18	22%
Asian	6	12%					7	25%	13	16%
Korean	36	72%	1	50%	1	100%	9	32%	47	58%
Other (Hispanic/Latino)	1	2%					2	7%	3	4%
Total	50	100%	2	100%	1	100%	28	100%	81	100%

Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.

The data on race of the partner for single people, however, indicates that a higher rate of interracial dating is taking place than actual interracial marriages, which is not surprising since marriages involve parental and family approval. A word of caution is the fact that the number of respondents who had lived with a partner in the year they were interviewed stands at only 19%, which does not take into account living with partners the previous years. In spite of this qualification, it is revealing that only 32% had lived with a coethnic partner and the rest had lived with non-Korean partners. In addition, what is interesting about the choice of partners or spouses is that second-generation Korean Americans generally prefer white partners and spouses over Asian partners and spouses.

In light of this data, because of the young age of the respondents (mid 20s rather than mid 30s), and especially considering that second-generation Korean Americans delay getting married and forming families, it is hard to decipher the trends on future intermarriage patterns from this data. Probably the low rates of exogamy are due to the size of the sample and parental pressures to marry coethnics. We need to examine Census and marriage license data to get at the true rate of intermarriage. Another proxy to measure the likelihood for outmarriage, while imperfect, is their views on their preference regarding coethnic marriage partners. Certainly, these feelings may change over time and many are not likely to follow their preferences, making it extremely difficult to accurately forecast intermarriage patterns. Nonetheless, their responses reveal that second-generation Korean Americans are divided in regards to coethnic marriages. More than half (60%) felt it was important to marry other Koreans whereas less than half deemed ethnicity to be less of a factor than love. Although both men and women felt it was important to marry Koreans, men (32%) felt more strongly about endogamous

marriages than women (23%). The variations, however, are very slight and all second-generation Korean Americans seem to agree on the importance of coethnic spouses.

Table 33: Importance about Marrying Koreans by Sex

How R Feels	Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Very Important	29	32%	23	23%	52	27%
Somewhat Important	28	30%	36	36%	64	33%
Not Important	18	20%	20	20%	38	20%
Not at All Important	17	19%	22	22%	39	20%
Total	92	100%	101	100%	193	100%

Chi-Square 2.023; df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .568

[Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.]

This feeling in part reflects their sense of obligation to their parents, who were firm about their preference for Korean spouses. In highlighting this partiality for Korean spouses, the parents of the second generation also revealed strict racial hierarchies regarding the race and/or ethnicity of their children's spouses:

The best would be Korean. Next would be a Korean who doesn't speak Korean. And then it would be an Asian. There's a certain hierarchy there.

It wouldn't be that big of an issue, only if that person happened to be black, which my parents are kind of prejudiced unfortunately. That's the only race that they would have an objection to...If they were white, then maybe still a little bit but they would accept it and if it was Korean, obviously they would be satisfied.

They don't want us to marry blacks. Anything but blacks.

I must say if anybody brought home someone who was black, that would be the end of the world to them. You might as well kill yourself. It really would be. It's a shame but...

Given the limitations of this data, it is still too early to declare the breakdown of racial barriers for Asian Americans. While intermarriage is likely to increase in the future, the availability of eligible 1.5 and second-generation Korean Americans will also encourage endogamy, given the parental preference for coethnic spouses. Thus, the

growing social acceptance of Asian Americans, combined with the upward mobility of second-generation Korean Americans, means that intermarriage will increase in the future.

TRANSNATIONALISM: REMITTANCES AND VISITING KOREA

In a world that is becoming ever smaller as a result of communication and transportation advancements, complete assimilation may not be desirable nor possible for contemporary immigrants. From a transnationalist perspective, immigrants are becoming less confined to the nation-state (Basch et al 1994). The dynamics of globalization has rendered single national attachments outmoded as migrants entertain opportunities both at home and abroad. In their effort to maximize their outcomes, immigrants retain fluid identities, allegiances, and social networks.

These transformations, however, affect groups and generations differently. Whereas the immigrant generation participate materially and emotionally with their country of origin, the second generation, whose attachments generally lie with the host society, may not be as transnational as their immigrant parents. Unless parents make extraordinary efforts to maintain a transnational existence in the second generation, assimilation is more likely. To determine whether transnationalism is a one-generation phenomenon, the survey probed for various practices that gauge the degree of transnationalism among second-generation Korean Americans, particularly the frequency of remittances and visits to Korea.

Contrary to the practice of immigrants sending remittances back home, this activity drops drastically with second-generation Korean Americans: 93% never send any

money back to Korea. Whereas only a quarter of parents never send any remittances back home, second-generation Korean Americans have no obligation to send money back home, except for if their parents have relocated back to Korea. It should be noted that many second-generation respondents (47%) were not sure or did not know whether their parents sent remittances to Korea (probably parents did not disclose this information to their children). Not having surveyed parents, we may not know the exact extent of their involvement with remittances, which probably is higher than what the second generation have indicated. However, the point here is that second-generation Korean Americans are not involved with remittances because their direct family members are likely to be in the US. These figures lend support to the immigrant generation being more transnational because they have vested interests (families, relatives, politics, and nostalgia) in their country of origin. These material and emotional attachments or ties do not bind children of these immigrants. The comparison of second-generation men and women's remittance patterns further confirm that these transnational practices are of limited interest to the second generation.

Table 34: Frequency Parents and R Send Money to Korea

Frequency	Parents		Second Generation					
			Men		Women		Total	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
Never	50	25%	91	94%	97	92%	188	93%
Several Times a Year	50	25%	6	6%	7	7%	13	6%
Several Times a Month	6	3%			1	1%	1	1%
Several Times a Week	1	1%						
Not Sure/Don't Know/NA	94	47%						
Total	201	100%	97	100%	105	100%	202	100%

Chi-Square 2.211; df 3; Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) .530 (Second generation)

Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding off.

Visiting Korea

Another activity that may reveal the level of transnationalism among the second generation is the number of visits to their parents' country of origin and their desire to live there. The immigrant generation rely upon phone calls, letters, and frequent visits to maintain a foot on the society they have left. The question is whether the children of immigrants are likely to sustain these practices, when the intensity of material and emotional interests is likely to have declined. Survey and in-depth interviews show that many see Korea as a nice place to visit but have no intentions of living there. For instance, close to 80% of second-generation Korean Americans (N=202) have visited Korea at least once, either on a summer language program forced upon them by their parents or on their own during or after college. The number of those who have not been back to Korea is 20%. Even though close to half have visited Korea once or twice, many see it as a pleasant place to pay a visit but show no desire to live there permanently. Only a few of the respondents thought they could live in Korea and among them very few thought they could settle there permanently.

For instance, because Derek (half-white) had a fabulous time in Korea, he could see himself living in Korea even though he knew he could encounter some problems fitting in. *"First of all I am not Korean. I don't even look Korean. I am not going to totally fit in. But when I was there I had a blast. I made a lot of friends. It wouldn't be a problem to fit in,"* he said. Others like Eunjung expressed fears about living in Korea. Because Eunjung's husband is a Korean-Korean there is a strong possibility that she might have to move back to Korea. For Eunjung, she is less afraid about living in Korea than wondering if she will be happy there. Sungsoo also echoes the fear of living in a different place, but he is becoming more open to living in Korea. *"[In the] Beginning I couldn't, but the more I think about it I can,"* he replied.

Yet, the response was undivided. Most agreed they could not live in Korea permanently although a few could see themselves living there temporarily. Many had difficulties with the Korean language and were not familiar with the Korean social etiquette, distinct from what they had been used to in the US. Others were simply more used to the lifestyle in the US, especially the lifestyle of New York. In particular some were turned off by the density of Seoul. Women expressed strong disapproval of and ambivalence toward the way women were treated in Korea. If the treatment of women improved, a few could conceivably live there. Other aspects of the Korean society that second-generation Korean Americans disapproved of were the close mindedness of the culture and the impingement on the freedom of people to speak their mind. A few who had lived in Korea came to realize they were not quite Korean and that their work and purpose belonged in the US. These young adults recognized that they face a disadvantage because they were hardly embedded in the Korean society and had limited

social networks. These, in conjunction with the small size of the Korean labor market, created a competitive environment, restricting their opportunities as opposed to what they could possibly secure in the US. Thus, the process of assimilation had become clear to many as these visits revealed to second-generation Korean Americans that they had ceased to become Korean and have become Korean American.

Although transnationalism seems to be less applicable to the second generation in my sample, the increasing mobility of individuals across national boundaries is likely to generate increased transnational opportunities. In other words, transnationalization of individuals seems to be a reaction to or a form of protective device against increasing globalization that creates opportunities as well as constraints. The real difference today is that communication and transportation advancements have vastly reduced the constraints of time and space, making a transnational existence a reality. Thus, for contemporary immigrants, especially those with resources, assimilation can be extremely selective, one that incorporates the most useful elements of each society in their effort to maximize upward mobility. Children of these immigrants and the next generation are likely to be influenced by transnationalism, but unless these are supported by tangible benefits, local influences will strongly compete with transnational influences. To put it another way, parents will try to maximize the outcomes of their children, to reproduce advantage if parents came with class advantage, or to generate advantage if parents came without one. What transnationalism offers are expanded opportunities although not everyone will be able to equally enjoy these resources.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This dissertation examined what role immigrant entrepreneurship and class plays in the educational and labor market trajectories of 1.5 and second-generation Korean Americans. In contrast to ethnic strategies of mobility of the first generation (via the ethnic economy), second-generation Korean Americans are opting for mainstream channels of mobility as reflected by their low self-employment rates. Second-generation Korean Americans are following the straight-line model of assimilation, progressively attaining cultural and structural assimilation.

While ethnic collectivism served the first generation well to integrate economically, ethnic strategies of mobility have also kept them culturally and linguistically apart from mainstream society. However, the same success through ethnic collectivism is accelerating the assimilation in the second. What has been paramount for the first generation is becoming less so for the second as many of the prior obstacles of the immigrant generation are overcome in subsequent generations. Consequently, whereas the first generation were the most ethnic, ethnicity is becoming thinner for the second. Shown by language loss, transnationalism, and occupational assimilation, other identities, especially class interests, compete against ethnic identifications. In this context, what does the future hold for ethnicity? Will ethnicity begin to lose its salience?

The swift incorporation of second-generation Korean Americans raises critical questions as to how the American-born/raised children of immigrants will be grouped under the US racial classification scheme, and how the second generation tackle or come to terms with their ascriptions. Will class advantage of second-generation Korean

Americans overcome their racial disadvantage as Asian Americans? In other words, does the upward mobility of the second generation increase their social acceptance?

Against the historical treatment of Asian Americans as the "unassimilable foreigners," including the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and later the incarceration of Japanese Americans during the Second World War (Daniels 1975, 1988), middle-class Asian Americans today are received more favorably. The current shift in the reception of Asian Americans as "model minorities" or "honorary whites" from their historical treatment as "forever foreigners" complicates the black-white racial divide. Increasingly, Asian Americans have a set of options to assert their ethnic identities but they are not immune from racial ascriptions. This renders Asian ethnic groups in a tenuous spot between the white and black racial divide. Tuan's juxtaposition (1998) of a favorable reception of Asian Americans as "honorary whites" is the flip side of their rejection as "forever foreigners". The "forever foreigner" racialization of Asian ethnics, a characterization that has been compounded by the renewed immigration from Latin America and Asia as these communities became revitalized after a long immigration hiatus, captures the precarious state of their "honorary white status" (Tuan 1998). In any given moment, their "honorary white" or "model minority" status can be as promptly taken away from them as had been granted, just like anti-Semitism is a lingering reminder of the formidability of ethnic and racial boundaries³⁵.

In the case of Japanese Americans, the internment experience is a distressing reminder of racial assignment for subsequent generations, keeping them apprehensive

³⁵ Racial backlash and increasing nativism is on the rise, racial projects (Omi and Winant 1994) that strive to undermine the gains made by racial minorities.

about the promise of assimilation (Tuan 1998). Still, despite the "forever foreigner" status that looms large over and leaves the third and fourth-generation Japanese Americans cautious, in their daily lives, ethnicity has become very "thin" as class and other identities organize a bigger portion in their lives (Cornell and Hartmann 1998). Even the random reminders of their ascribed racial status do not paralyze them to reject assimilation as they maintain an optimism toward social mobility (Tuan 1998). But in their attempt to earn the "blessing" and "acceptance" from the dominant group (white America), their class identification as a means of overcoming racial assignment leads them to reject immigrants and other poor racial minorities (even their own ethnicities) (Tuan 1998).

Similarly, class advantage seems to have rendered racial disadvantage less striking for second-generation Korean Americans. Class advantage mediates or buffers the deleterious effects of racial ascription for Korean Americans. Arriving at a period when the gains of the Civil Rights movement were gradually being felt, Korean immigrants were able to achieve residential assimilation³⁶ as formal residential segregation was abolished. Through their rapid economic integration as professionals and small business owners, middle-class Korean immigrants attained economic and residential assimilation. The American-born/raised children of Korean immigrants gained from residential integration, growing up in middle-class white neighborhoods and attending excellent suburban schools. Raised in the suburbs, second-generation Korean Americans absorb the values, outlooks, customs, and tastes of middle-class whites. This

³⁶ Increasingly class divides seem to determine residence more than race (Abelmann and Lie 1995), even though, notwithstanding class advantage, middle-class blacks have yet to achieve comparable residential integration as other middle-class Asian immigrants.

class advantage facilitates the second generation to enter prestigious colleges, and then successfully make their entry into primary sector labor markets. The mainstreaming of second-generation Korean Americans occurs very rapidly as their educational credentials present very few obstacles in the current labor market.

In conjunction with the second generation's ease with language, superb educational credentials, and white middle-class familiarity (speech, mannerisms, values, tastes, etc.), multiculturalism and diversity initiatives have opened formerly closed off occupations to racial minorities, contributing to their rapid transition to corporate America. For instance, entry level and technical jobs are now open to racial outsiders because established white ethnic groups do not perceive newcomers as a threat (Waldinger 1996). Furthermore, the financial sector in New York has experienced unprecedented growth during the 1990s, which may have expanded job opportunities beyond ethnicity when there is a shortage of qualified personnel (Waldinger 1996). In short, the second-generation's success in the labor market may have as much to do with the opportunity structure of the financial sector in New York as their qualifications. Nevertheless, what is remarkable is the rapidity by which Korean Americans gained entry into the mainstream. What had taken several generations for European immigrants and two or three generations for Jews, middle-class Korean Americans are doing so in one generation.

Consequently, second-generation Korean Americans are very optimistic about their prospects in the corporate world. They believe that meritocracy (class factors) is going to determine their mobility chances in the corporate world. Having had success,

the second generation do not foresee much of a glass ceiling and are very confident that it will not be applicable to them. They believe racial ascription will not be an impediment and instead are extremely confident that they will make it in the corporate world.

In part, this optimism stems from the linear ethnicity that was passed on by their parents, especially a favorable view of their chances in America. In spite of their initial labor market difficulties, which turned highly-educated first-generation Korean immigrants into self-employment, Korean immigrants do not reject the "American Dream" and instead maintain a strong idealism. Their belief in the "American Dream" is unfazed because they attribute their barriers in the mainstream labor market to language and untransferable credentials. More importantly, their success in small business and a dual framework of mobility prospects³⁷ reinforce their belief in the "American Dream", which credits their upward mobility to individual work ethic and culture. Thus, parents trust that top American educational credentials and professions will transcend the sort of difficulties they experienced as immigrants, including any difficulties with racial boundaries (Abelmann and Lie 1995; S. Lee 1996). They also believe that professional occupations will help shield their children from racial discrimination. Undoubtedly, parents are also concerned about status and monetary considerations of these occupations, which increase the odds of attaining solid middle-class/upper-class lifestyles.

³⁷ Many Korean immigrants are realizing that their success in small business has been marginal as they have seen their classmates in South Korea attain huge economic and social gains. Instead of being critical about the myth of the "American Dream", which the Los Angeles riots dramatically exposed the precariousness of their situation, many still cling on to the possibilities of the "American Dream" for their children. In contrast to their difficulties with language and untransferable credentials, their children possess superb language skills and impeccable US educational credentials (a Harvard degree as opposed to a degree from Seoul National University). Thus, Korean immigrant parents do not pass on a reactive ethnicity to their children and rather communicate that merit and "model minority" status will earn the respect from the dominant group (S. Lee 1996; Abelmann and Lie 1995).

On the other, the young age and relatively limited experience of second-generation Korean Americans in mainstream firms, where the second generation are still making inroads into the upper echelons in the corporate occupational ladder, explain the confidence about their possibilities in the corporate world. Their successful attainment of elite educational credentials and in so far promising transition into mainstream occupations provide them with an optimism that almost make the racial boundaries disappear or render them inconsequential, to the degree that they also deny (Omi and Winant's immigrant analogy) the racial boundaries of poor immigrants and racial minorities. This parallels the reaction by middle-class Asian American students at Academic High who usually responded to racism with self-denial and shied away from confronting the perpetrators. Trumpeting their role as "model minorities" (achievers) and hoping to earn the respect of whites by proving their merit, Asian-identified and Korean-identified students in Academic High minimize the racism that minorities face and dismiss their experience as a random encounter (S. Lee 1996; Abelmann and Lie 1995). In the same manner, second-generation Korean Americans are wary of minority denouncements of racism, for their experience with racism as nonwhites had been less frequent. This does not mean that they have not been reminded of difference and experienced discrimination. However, as in-depth respondents confirm, they have not been victims of violent racism and many do not recall incidences with racism. In short, there is a strong faith in individual ability as the primary determinant of achievement.

On the upshot, this unbridled optimism may become a self-fulfilling prophecy for some as their determination to not let racial boundaries obstruct their aspirations or become a stumbling block allows them to reach the higher echelons. On the other, their

faith in merit as the criteria for rewards and promotions may change when these fail to overcome the wall of racial ascription. At the higher corporate management levels, Waldinger's insider-outsider niche protection (1996) may be operating much more forcefully than at entry level and technical jobs. Denying that a glass ceiling exists because they have seemingly moved beyond these obstacles could exact psychological tolls and an identity crisis when second-generation Korean Americans confront these barriers in the future (or serve as mere tokens). Thus, what remains to be seen is whether the second generation, after a lengthy exposure to the corporate world, come to realize that the glass ceiling is a lot more real in the higher echelons than they had anticipated and how they cope with this intransigent obstacle, as racial and (gender) boundaries continue to sort individuals. The future of race and ethnicity will remain contingent on the level of racial ascriptions and the ability of groups to assert their ethnic identities and the economic resources they are able to command.

As class and educational credentials steer the mobility fortunes of second-generation Korean Americans, ethnicity organizes their lives very thinly and becomes increasingly symbolic. Nevertheless, because we live in a period of ethnic and racial diversity, where these identities are far more prominent than what had been 30 years ago, ethnicity may continue to play an influential role. Multiculturalism and ethnic pride is transforming the racial climate, prompting some to explore their ethnic identities. In addition, immigration has added a diversity that cannot be captured by a rigid white-black dichotomy. New York, the capital of diversity, embodies this particular cosmopolitanism, which in the 1970s had not been quite as diverse as the New York of the millennium. The Flushing of today is a major Korean enclave. In the 1970s these

neighborhoods were still heavily white, but undergoing rapid ethnic succession with the influx of new immigrants. Since the explosive growth of Korean immigration in the 1960s, suburban enclaves have mushroomed throughout the metropolitan New York. My respondents were growing up in this white milieu where rapid acculturation took place. However, for those who grew up during heavy immigration and ethnic succession, ethnicity is a lot more prominent. For second-generation teenagers who are growing up in this ethnic and multicultural world, ethnicity is a lot thicker, with a different set of expectations, obligations, and identities. Finally, increasing transnationalization is keeping ethnic attachments alive and salient for the immigrant generation and perhaps for the second.

Yet, it is one thing to identify ethnically and another to actively pursue ethnicity. Ethnic identities may remain salient in a multicultural world, but the trend seems toward a symbolic ethnicity (Gans 1979). Intermarriages among many different groups will destabilize the racial order and lessen the comprehensiveness of ethnicity across generations. Furthermore, class disparities within the community complicate the intensity of ethnic attachments for second-generation Korean Americans. For children of middle-class Korean Americans, there is a growing social acceptance as indicated by their educational, occupational, and marital assimilation. The fact that second-generation Korean Americans are establishing themselves in mainstream America will result in greater economic power and influence, and consequently making sure their "honorary white" status and advantages are not stripped away. Although conditions outside the group (discrimination, the glass ceiling) will continue to dictate the level of ethnic

assertion and racial assignment, the offspring of middle-class Asian Americans commands class resources to contest and protect against ascription.

The children of working-class Korean Americans, on the other hand, faced with racial and class disadvantages, may remain ethnic and count on the ethnic economy to avoid downward mobility. My study demonstrated that very few children of working-class Korean Americans were found in the sample. Instead, the exceptional educational and labor market outcomes of the current second generation are a consequence of the selectivity of Korean immigration from the 1960s and 1970s, the children of highly-educated Korean professionals and entrepreneurs. The subsequent second generation, the teenagers who were excluded for the purpose of this study, however, have working class parents (a fifth) and their outcomes may be different from and less exceptional than the current second generation. This raises the question of whether the ethnic economy is able to extend its benefits to children of workers as has been the case for children of entrepreneurs. What remains to be seen is whether second-generation children of the "1980-90s" Korean immigrants will follow similar educational and occupational trajectories as the current second generation.

In explaining the speedy integration of Korean immigrants and the mobility of their American born/raised children, the media conveniently eschewed class explanations and endorsed cultural explanations of hard work, resilience, and rugged individualism. They incorrectly attributed success with immigrant entrepreneurship as if their mere presence in small business constituted a ticket to mobility. What is really behind the success of the immigrant generation and the rapid assimilation in the second is the selective background of Korean immigrants, the college-educated Korean doctors and

professionals, students, and businessmen that entered the US through the occupational preference system. These successful Korean businessmen came from privileged backgrounds, who turned to entrepreneurship because of language barriers, cultural unfamiliarity, and untransferability of credentials. Immigration set them back temporarily, but through their ethnic and class resources these middle-class immigrants, after a period of adjustment, were able to recoup their lost middle-class status. Until they learned to operate a business and establish critical niches, their economic success was forestalled. But possessed with ethnic and especially class resources, Korean immigrants were able to succeed. By no means, am I suggesting that immigrants had an easy time regaining their status.

If class resources have been vital for middle-class Korean immigrants, ethnic resources helped cushion class disadvantage for working-class Korean immigrants. If the immigrant group is heavily represented by the working class, the overall outcomes of that group will diverge from groups that are dominated by middle class members. Cuban and Korean immigrants consisted of elite and middle-class members that established a vibrant ethnic economy, incorporating coethnic labor into this sector. The outcome for coethnics, Portes et al argue, is an alternative to secondary labor markets and even primary sector employment. Working-class Koreans not only find employment in the ethnic economy but also have the potential to move into managerial positions, or even better, a business of their own. This is the premise behind the benefits of ethnic solidarity in the ethnic enclave economy. Even if mobility is delayed in the first generation, Portes and Zhou (1992) argue, the advantages of the ethnic economy will be extended to the second generation. Especially for poor immigrants, the ethnic community can play

crucial roles that buffer the harsh effects of class disadvantage. By contrast, the absence of such communities may heighten the class disadvantage, impacting the identities of the second generation and their immersion into the lifestyles and identities of the barrio or the ghetto. If a viable ethnic economy exists, however, then the second generation have the option to assimilate selectively.

Thus, the Korean small business success is not a Horatio Alger story and the rapid mainstreaming of their children is not accidental but a concerted effort from middle-class parents to restore lost status and reproduce their economic advantage in the second generation. Yet, despite evidence against it, the glorification of rugged individualism, entrepreneurship, and culture as the basis for the apparent success of Asian Americans in general and Korean Americans in particular continues in the public thinking. For Abelman and Lie (1995: 167), "The popularity of the model minority thesis is due in part to its demonstration of the openness of the US to minority advancement." If Korean Americans and their children are able to make it on their own, then the blame for the "failures" is placed on racial minorities, and any government intervention to alleviate the plight of the inner-cities is criticized (Abelman and Lie 1995: 176). By emphasizing culture and rugged individualism and ignoring the class dimensions of ethnicity (along with race and gender), the differential rates of mobility and integration of groups in the US are legitimated.

APPENDIX A: RESPONSE RATES

(NY Area Study 1990 model)

Total # tried	2631
Unable to reach household by phone	797 (30%)
Non-operating #	598
NIS (Not in service)	193
DIS (Disconnected)	189
NIS/DIS/Wrong #	63
Fax/computer	153
Business or Non-residential #	152
Health Deaf	15
Other	34
Defined as not in universe	1832 (70%)
Able to reach household by phone	1834 (70%)
NA after 20 (at least) callbacks	
Busy- always busy	
Could not reach	
Not possible to interview but apparently eligible	
Answering machine	
Never an adult at home	
Designated respondent never around	
Actual contact made (Reached HH)	1836
Did not screen (not eligible)	1213 (66%)
Refused screen	436
Koreans who refused screen	72
Unspecified ethnicity	363
Non Korean households	777
Chinese	83
American	15
Other	112
Non-Korean (Did not specify ethnicity)	566
Actual households that were screened	623 (34%)
Qualified LH	166 (27%)
Qualified LA	38 (6%)
Non-Qualified	418 (67%)
Q Incomplete/partial interview	1
Q Completed mail questionnaire	1
Refuse outright	
Impossible to arrange interview on time	
Partial interview	
Completed interview	
Not coded	

Response by Area Code

AREA CODE	N	PERCENT
201	604	23%
212	694	26%
516	239	9%
718	647	25%
908	64	2%
914	200	8%
973	159	6%
Other	20	1%
732	1	0%
Total	2628	100%

Able to reach household by phone or not

	N	PERCENT
Did not reach HH	797	30%
Reached HH	1834	70%
Total	2631	100%

Able to screen HH or Not

	N	PERCENT
Reached HH by phone but Did Not Screen (no ivw)	1213	66%
Screened (interviewed)	623	34%
Total	1836	100%

Result of screening and successful interview (HH that were reached and screened)

	N	PERCENT
Qualified LH	166	27%
Qualified LA	38	6%
Non-Qualified	418	67%
Incomplete	1	0%
Mail Questionnaire	1	0%
Total	624	100%

Disposition of Disqualified- HH unable to reach by phone (reasons)

	N	PERCENT
NIS	193	24%
DIS	189	24%
(NIS DIS Wrong#)	63	8%
Fax Computer	153	19%
Bus or Nonres #	152	19%
Health Deaf	15	2%
Other	34	4%
Total	799	100%

Reached HH by phone but unable to screen (reasons)

	N	PERCENT
Refused screen	436	36%
Non Korean	777	64%
Total	1213	100%

Ethnicity of Refused Screen- (Reached HH by phone but unable to screen)

	N	PERCENT
Korean	72	17%
Unspecified	363	83%
Total	435	100%

Type of non-Korean (unable to screen)

	N	PERCENT
Chinese	83	11%
American	15	2%
Other	112	14%
Non-Korean	566	73%
Total	776	100%

APPENDIX B: COVER LETTER (SENT OUT TO HOUSEHOLDS BEFORE PHONE SCREENING)

May 1998

Dear Sir or Madam:

Hi! My name is Dae Young Kim. I am a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology at the City University of New York, the Graduate School and University Center. I am myself a 1.5 generation Korean American and currently writing a dissertation entitled "In and Out of the Ethnic Economy: Labor Market Outcomes of Second-Generation Korean Americans in New York," under the supervision of Professors Philip Kasinitz, Pyong Gap Min, and Stephen Steinberg.

There have been very few studies about second-generation (and 1.5 generation) Korean Americans in New York. This important group that is just coming of age will define the future of the Korean community and the American society. This dissertation attempts to undertake a phone survey of second-generation Korean Americans to explore labor market outcomes of 1.5 and 2nd generation Korean Americans in New York. It examines the experience of growing up in New York City or elsewhere in the US to going through the educational system in the US, to forming identities and retaining Korean language, and to how they are changing the meaning of American and its institutions. I plan to publish major findings from the study in one of the Korean-language newspapers in New York.

I have obtained your address and phone number from published phone directories and have randomly selected your household for mailing. Within a few days, you or a member of your family will receive a phone call regarding this study to find out if you or any members of your family qualify for this important study. I would like to urge that qualified members (18-35 years old, either born in the US or have come to the US by the age of 12 with at least one Korean-born parent) of your household participate in this timely study and further our understanding on the state of second-generation Korean Americans.

If you have any questions about this study, please don't hesitate to contact me at 212-642-2829 at the Center for Urban Research, the City University of New York or at home at 718-428-0597.

Thank you very much for your cooperation!

Sincerely,

Dae Young Kim

Committee:

Professor Philip Kasinitz

Professor Pyong Gap Min

Professor Stephen Steinberg

APPENDIX C: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS (SELECTIVE)

Respondents (gender)

Age

Place of birth

US (second generation)

Korea/elsewhere (1.5er)

When came to the US/NY

Age

Current immigration status

Naturalized

Green card/permanent resident

Student visa

Marital status

Single (Partner)

Married

Race/ethnicity of spouse (Outmarriage)

Korean

White

Ethnicity

Asian

Ethnicity

Latino

Ethnicity

black

Ethnicity

Divorced

Children

Number

Siblings (brothers and sisters info)

Residence (current)

Live with parents or on your own

Rent

Own

Type of unit (single home, apartment, two family housing)

Neighborhood

Suburbia

Enclave/

On his/her own or share or partner

Rent

Own

Dorm

Type of unit (single home, apartment, two family housing)

Neighborhood

Suburbia
 Enclave/
 Residence (past)
 When born or first moved to US/NY
 Next residence till current

Education

- Elementary (list)
 - Name
 - Neighborhood
 - Borough (outside NY- get state or whether in Korea)
 - Length
- Junior High
- High School
 - Whether graduated
 - Regular
 - Regents
 - GED
 - Drop-out (Skip; GED?)
 - Type
 - Public
 - Regular
 - Specialized
 - Private

College

- Whether graduated (4 year) or still in college
- Degree
- Still in college
- Level (1st year, 2nd year...)
- Dropout
- Name
- Public vs. private
- Level of prestige: Elite vs. nonelite (code later)
- 2 year vs. 4 year
- Major (code later)
 - Humanities
 - Social Science
 - Science
- Professional
- Vocational school
- Cram school
- Current status
- In school (full-time)

Graduate School (professional school)

- Major
- Public vs. private

Job (full-time)

School/part-time job
 Job (full-time)/ part-time school
 No school/job (skip to
 Military service
 Occupational training

Job (current)

Name of company/industry (services)/self-employed (own or family)/Type of jobs
 (professional, code later)
 Ethnic economy
 Korean-owned
 Clientele
 South Korean corporation
 Mainstream
 Location (address)
 Job title
 Full-time vs. part-time
 Wages
 Length
 Promotion
 Benefits
 Off the books
 Job search (how found job)

Jobs

Number of full-time and part-time jobs
 Ethnic economy (family business)
 Mainstream
 HS/summer (part time)

First full time job

Job search
 Off the books

Parents' SES

Parents' place of birth

When to the US/NY

Reasons for immigration

Past/Current Immigration status

Naturalized
 Green card/permanent resident

Education

US
 Korea
 HS grad
 College grad

Occupation in Korea

Occupation in the US

Self-employed (type of store/industry- drycleaning, fish markets,)
 Professional
 Worker

Residence (if R lives on his/her own ask parents' residence)

Rent

Own

Type of unit (single home, apartment, two family housing)

Neighborhood

Suburbia

Enclave/

Crime/fear

Neighbors

Religion

English ability

Public assistance

Income

Savings club

Respondent

Savings club

Identity

Korean

Korean American, Korean-American

American

Asian American

Language facility (comfortable with)

English

Korean

Bilingual

Religion

Social networks

Political participation and views

Gender roles

Experience and perception of discrimination

Parental expectations

Transnationalism

Visits

Ethnic movies/soaps/music/newspapers

Aspirations

Education

Job

Marriage (partners- within or out)

Income

Personal

Household

APPENDIX D: SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHOD

Following sum of surnames (26 selected out of 90)

(Ahn, Cho, Choe, Choi, Chun, Chung, Ha, Han, Hong, Hwang, Jung, Kang, Kim, Ko, Kwon, Moon, Oh, Pak, Park, Shin, Song, Suh, Yi, Yoo, Yoon, Yun)

Following sum of area codes

718: 11,964 (48.49%)

212: 3795 (15.38%)

516: 1557 (6.31%)

914: 1275 (5.17%)

201: 4714 (19.12%)

908: 369 (1.5%)

973: 997 (4.04%)

Total: 24,671 households

Initial 1000 cases randomly drawn (using SPSS) out of 24,671 cases

Result:

718: 477 (47.7%)

212: 164 (16.4%)

516: 71 (7.1%)

914: 56 (5.6%)

201: 182 (18.2%)

908: 16 (1.6%)

973: 34 (3.4%)

Total: 1000

Equal random samples of 250 from following area codes for initial 1000 (3 drawings)

718: 250 (11,964)

212: 250 (3795)

201: 250 (4714)

Rest: 250 (4198) [Rest- sum of 516, 914, 908, 973]

Total 1000

APPENDIX E: CODING SCHEMES

- Mother/father deceased = 100
- Work hours:

When pay information was given by number of hours, annual salary was tabulated using 8 hours as number of hours per day, 5 days a week, 52 weeks per year. Part time jobs obviously do not follow this pattern but an averaging of working hours was required to compute annual salary. Despite these limitations, since annual salary is grouped in distributions, it may not be too far off from the true salary.
- Private practice for physicians is coded as self-employed
- Multiple jobs were coded with the main job (usually FT job instead of PT job)
- Unless specified, nurses were coded as registered nurses. The possibilities are licensed practitioner nurses (LPN) or registered nurses (RN)
- Hospitals, although some are public and unless specified, have been coded as private firm
- Due to inaccurate/missing/incomplete descriptions about job industry and title, some industries and occupations may not reflect accurate portraits. I have tried to code them as accurately as possible with the limited information. For instance, with large corporations, divisions reflect various industries. In such cases coding has followed the main industry that the corporation is generally identified with although in actuality the particular division may reflect a different industry from the main activities of the corporation. Especially with South Korean conglomerates, I have simply coded them as chaebols or conglomerates since their activities are wide-ranging. When certain industries do not fit the standard categories, I have created separate categories to accommodate these.
- Because many people generally move from one job to another, surveys reflect the particular time when the respondent was interviewed. This is inherently a limitation of surveys. The particular job information captured in the survey reflects current or most recent (or future) job description. Consequently the most current job information, by the time of this writing, may have changed. It should be noted that the current job information is the year 1998. With parents of the second generation, job information describes the main job during their childhood (from ages 6 to 18). Often respondents gave information about two or more jobs and sometimes current jobs. For parents with professional occupations, there are cases of those who had professional jobs earlier in their lives but later turned to small business, which is generally the trend among other Korean immigrants. I have coded their professional jobs here. For occupations as owners/managers, I have coded them as sole proprietors (retail and wholesale).
- Chaebols or South Korean conglomerates = 1000 (code)
- Individual tutoring is coded as self-employed unless tutoring is offered within a private establishment such as a Hakwon or private academies.
- Elementary and secondary schools are coded as public unless these are private schools, in which case they are coded separately.
- For full-time students, if they held a part-time job, these were coded as part-time job.

- Some respondents had only one current/recent job which is the same as first job.
- In the NQ data married women generally gave information about their husbands as head of households (HH)
- For religion, no religion for the first generation does not generally mean they are atheist. Rather it refers to nonaffiliation in a formal religion (organized religion) since some still practice ancestor worship and other rituals. For the second generation, however, no religion specifically refers to being atheist.
- Enclaves (ethnic-oriented) vs. middleman (minority-oriented) vs. general (majority-oriented)
- For the NQ, those who came after 1995 includes foreign students.
- For education, it is the highest degree completed or attended.
- US corporations: many fortune 500 companies
- Ranking of consultants and analysts: assistant, associate, senior, VP

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