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WHAT WORKS FOR ME?
ARREST DECISIONS AS ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR
BY
EDITH LINN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

2004

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
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
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Abstract**WHAT WORKS FOR ME?****ARREST DECISIONS AS ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR****by Edith Linn**

Adviser: Dr. Warren Benton

This study explores a factor rarely considered in the research on arrest discretion: arrest processing itself. It posits that when arrest-making procedures affect officers' personal lives, they will adapt their arrest-making behavior to accommodate their needs. A survey was administered to a representative sample of 506 officers who regularly performed routine patrol in New York, the city with possibly the longest arrest processing in the nation. Variables examined included arrest overtime need, post-work commitments, antipathy toward arrest-processing, tactics (adaptations) to control arrest-making, relative importance of personal versus situational variables, intentions preceding arrest decisions, attitudes toward arrest, and efforts by management to control adaptive behavior. Among the confirmed hypotheses were that officers with a higher need for arrest overtime made more frequent use of arrest overtime-seeking tactics; that officers who had more frequent post-work commitments had a more frequent need to end their tour on time, which corresponded with more frequent use of arrest-avoidance tactics; that officers who were more concerned about processing's administrative or prisoner-handling difficulties were more often "turned off" to arrest-making, which also corresponded with more frequent use of arrest-avoidance tactics; that officers making elective arrests or declining arrests began their tour intending such outcomes and patrolled in a style to assure such outcomes; that officers who held more cynical attitudes

toward arrests used both overtime-seeking and arrest-avoidance adaptations more often; and that managerial efforts to control adaptive arrest behavior through close supervision, reassignment of late-in-tour arrests, and sanctions for high overtime or low arrests, were generally ineffective. Other significant findings emerged through comparisons of high-arrest and low-arrest officers, males and females, and officers from slower-processing and quicker-processing city boroughs. The research is concluded with an examination of arrest-processing in other large cities, and suggestions for improving the NYPD's procedures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In seeing this project through, I must first thank my advisor, Ned Benton, who was encouraging, accessible, and (usually) willing to let me do it my way. Other vital help came from Jennifer Groscup, who scrutinized my stats and made them look cool, Barry Spunt and Jacob Marini, who clued me in to grant-writing, and Lisa Williams, who treated my data as if they were her own. Then there's my "ABDs Anonymous" crowd – Masood, Anita, Jo-Anne, Kim, Dana, Ronnie, Nelson, Heath, Tom, and others, who kept me going in my "darkest days."

Thanks also are owed to the New York City Police Department for permission to conduct the survey on company time, and to the National Science Foundation for the funds to bribe the troops with bagels, OJ, and chocolate chip cookies (lots).

Detective Elliot Miller, my patient husband and subject-in-residence, came through for me many, many times. He gave me faith in myself.

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*People do not exist just for organizations.
They track in all kinds of mud from the rest of their lives.*

Charles Perrow

I

INTRODUCTION

Our culture has had a long fascination with police officers. Their armed presence evokes a strange mix of comfort and fear. Their actions on behalf of “the State” are layered with meaning and fraught with controversy. Their persona is inflated by ballads, books, melodramas, news accounts, and their own media-savvy agencies. Whether viewed as heroes, rogues, buffoons, or tormented souls, police officers are always worthy of attention - never “just like everybody else.”

Scholars who would explain officer behavior are no less affected by this police mystique. Examining arrest, they dwell upon motives that seem unique or “subcultural”, while disregarding personal incentives common to all workers. They highlight distinctive sociological, psychological, and organizational dimensions, while ignoring the benefits and burdens of arrest-making itself.

Yet the *process* of arrest-making, with its personal consequences for the officer, may be one of the most critical arrest determinants of all. Consider the 38,000-uniform member New York City Police Department, where the author has observed fellow officers for twenty-one years. In the NYPD, post-arrest procedures may involve prolonged paperwork and contact with prisoners, and officers must extend their tour in proportion to the lateness of their arrests. This situation generates powerful private motives to make or avoid an arrest at any given time. The most common benefit afforded by arrest is overtime, calculated at time-and-a-half rates, taken in cash or compensatory

time. Arrest also offers an escape to the station house from a dull or unpleasant assignment. The major personal costs of arrest processing are also two-fold. It is an intrusion upon officer's lives as private individuals, and it poses inherent risks and discomforts. Controlling the timing and type of arrests is thus a way for officers in the NYPD to control their incomes, personal schedules, and working conditions.

New York City patrol officers seem to absorb the skills and rationales of arrest-control from their first station house roll call. There, many officers speak freely of their need for arrest overtime to pay for a car, a vacation, or their children's braces. One discusses a desire for arrest "comp time" to make up for days deducted as punishment. Another vows to arrest "any dirtbag that comes along," to get off his foot post. Some officers mention how they were up all night with a heavy date or a sick baby and are thus in no condition to stay late with an arrest. Others talk about a class, a second job, or a party after work that would preclude their making an arrest. One officer, itching from contact with a lice-infested prisoner, declares that he will never again arrest a derelict. Those car-pooling together coordinate their arrest plans to accommodate their transportation needs going home. Officers poll one another as to who that day would offer or take an unwanted arrest.

When these arrest-sharing arrangements fall neatly into place, they have little impact on the arrest decisions. But sometimes officers who have arranged to pass off their arrest find the "catchers" tied up with other patrol incidents. Occasionally, those officers most willing to take arrests are "capped out," forbidden by management to make any more cash overtime. On Super Bowl Sunday or on holidays, officers may not find a single volunteer to take their arrest. At other periods, like the pre-Christmas shopping

season, nearly every officer is out scrambling for arrest overtime. Thus peer cooperation cannot guarantee that on a given day an officer will be able to make or avoid an arrest.

Some officers therefore feel a need to modify their patrol style to enhance their “arrest control.” On a no-arrest day they may keep themselves busy with summonses and service calls, drive slowly and noisily to crimes in progress, avoid blocks where arrests “fall into your lap,” and forego proactive measures like license plate checks and stop-and-frisks. They may avoid the types of people and the kinds of arguments that get them “pissed off.” They may construe incidents as non-crimes, or ignore them entirely. And on an arrest day, they may do exactly the opposite – rush to incidents, initiate interventions, provoke disputants, and pat down “known criminals” – particularly late in the tour, when arrests mean overtime.

Of-often-repeated maxims endorse officer self-interest as a rationale for adaptive arrest behavior. “Your job is to get home safe at the end of eight hours” and “Your family comes first” remind fellow officers not to be too self-sacrificing. “Make the Job work for you” celebrates the officer’s ability to control the timing and type of arrest, to garner perks usually reserved for non-patrol assignments - more money, timely sign-out, or less unpleasantness. Other expressions justify adaptive arrest behavior by alluding to the “revolving door” nature of arrests. The failure to arrest a suspect is rationalized with “He’ll get locked up next time he does something,” while an arrest made on shaky legal grounds is excused with “This makes up for all the things this guy’s done that he never got caught for.” Capturing the broad disillusionment with the entire “System” is the common refrain, “The Job’s not on the level.”

Supervisors struggle to keep officers content and arrests honest. They may

occasionally indulge subordinates who ask for an arrest-prone or arrest-proof assignment, and may give a disproportionate number of non-arrest posts to women officers with young children. They may ask officers “looking for a collar” to identify themselves for the benefit of those hoping not to get stuck. They may help negotiated arrest-processing responsibilities, or assign an end-of-tour arrest to an officer on straight time. But even the most diligent sergeants are unable to oversee every potential arrest scene, and would incur great resentment if they tried. Moreover, sergeants sometimes feel they must barter for the cooperation of subordinates, even if it means “hanging back” from problematic arrest situations or accepting questionable arrest decisions.

Commanding officers are less familiar with their officers’ motives. They must focus on the “heavy hitters” who run up department overtime, and to a lesser extent, on the “empty suits” who “get paid for doing nothing” - often with perverse results. The most opportunistic officers may escape notice by balancing arrests and avoidance. The most conscientious crime-fighters may be penalized by being denied scheduled overtime tours, or being reassigned to posts with few arrest opportunities. The least-active officers may escape scrutiny by occasionally “picking-up” a shoplifter or other ready-made arrest, or by the arresting a hapless violator for a summonsable offense.

These observations are at odds with the prevailing paradigm of arrest discretion, wherein officers randomly respond to situations, discover an offense, and then weigh a host of factors that broadly may be termed incident-related. Here, personal concerns predisposed officers to make or avoid arrest, affecting which situations they handled and how they handled them.

Adaptive arrest behaviors appeared to be affected by officers’ finances, post-work

commitments, and arrest-related aversions. They sometimes seemed planned well in advance of patrol encounters. They were encouraged by verbal endorsements of self-interested and cynical arrest attitudes. Finally, these activities were little restricted by management. The present research empirically examines the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of those preliminary observations.

II.

REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

WHAT IS ADAPTIVE ARREST BEHAVIOR?

How does a researcher classify adaptive arrest behavior. Is it merely a manifestation of the officer's broad discretion, which is now commonly recognized? Is it a subtle form of corruption? Or, is it a normal employee reaction to peculiar organizational incentives?

Scholars disagree as to how broadly to define police discretion. Kleinig (1996) argues that the term should refer to only those options consonant with normative professional standards. Dworkin (1977) refers to discretion as the "hole in the donut," the freedom to act in situations not covered by existing laws or regulations. Skolnick (1967) bifurcates his definition, referring to discretion explicitly granted by rules or statutes as *delegated*, and that which is not explicitly granted as *unauthorized*. Similarly expansive, Davis (1969) includes in his definition any choice of action or inaction (presumably even an unfair one) made by officers, given the effective limits to their power.

Yet despite these varied definitions, the literature on police discretion does not actually examine all of the officer's possible considerations, but only those options informed by the officer's personal notion of "how to get the job done." Though such discretionary factors objectively may be biased or abusive, they are invoked by the officer as the proper way to do police work. In contrast, considerations of self-interest call forth a personal concept of the proper way to live one's life, to balance conflicting duties and competing selves. Kleinig (1997:74) is rare among police observers in speaking of this dilemma:

Does our chief loyalty lie to our partner, our department, the commissioner, our family, or to the professional standards that are implicit in the kind of work we do? These are not easy questions...and sometimes they will involve “defining decisions,” in which we decide what sort of person we will be.

Both discretion and self-interested decisions may compromise equal treatment, due process, and deterrence (Kleinig, 1996; Brook, 1993). But discretion, being rooted in a professional norm, can also serve some greater good, such as individualizing justice, preserving patrol resources, or being responsive to neighborhood priorities (Brook, 1997). Self-interested arrest considerations, on the other hand, further no public interest. Whatever their benefits – safety, income, self-fulfillment, family cohesion, and so forth - they are confined to the private sphere of the officer.

An adaptive arrest decision might be classified as a form of misconduct. It seemingly fits Sherman’s definition of police corruption, “the illegal use of organizational power for personal gain” (Sherman, 1978, p.30), especially if the self-interest blatantly overrides all normative considerations in an arrest. Moreover, the behavior appears to be “taught” to officers in the same way other professions convey deviant practices to their members, that is, by early and extensive exposure to specific means, motives, and rationalizations (Sutherland, 1949; Klockars, 1983). Our condemnation is tempered, however, by three considerations. First, the “personal gain” in adaptive arrest decisions may entail laudable objectives. Who can entirely fault officers for wanting to better support their families, or spend time with them? Second, this benefit is rarely the entire motive, prompting a clearly false arrest or dereliction of duty. Rather, self-interest is weighed with other factors of varying appropriateness.

Third, unlike a bribe or gratuity, the personal gains in seeking or evading arrests are unavoidably attached to that arrest decision, regardless of motive.

The most fruitful alternative may be to view adaptive arrest behavior as a “normal” response to organizational and personal imperatives. It is to that literature that we now turn.

SELF-INTERESTED ARREST DECISIONS AS ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Modern police departments are bureaucratic organizations (Fogelson, 1977; Brown, 1988; Wilson, 1989). Police officers may wield more power and attract more attention than other low-tier employees, but their relationship within their organization follows familiar patterns.

Because bureaucratic organizations involve and regulate only a limited segment of their members' selves and roles, sociologists classify them as secondary or segmental groups. These are contrasted with primary groups, which involve and regulate the sentiments and behaviors of members in almost all their selves and roles (Merton, 1957; Coser, 1956; Downs, 1967). Much literature on the police organization portrays it as a primary group, enveloping officers in its ethos. This author's observations of non-police commitments suggest that for the majority of officers, the police agency is decidedly a secondary group.

Organizations can only “partially include” the entire person (Allport, 1933). Yet, it is the entire person who comes to work. Philip Selznik (1948:26-27) wrote of this dilemma:

From the standpoint of organization as a formal system, persons are viewed functionally, in respect to their roles, as participants in assigned segments of the cooperative system. But in fact individuals

have a propensity to resist depersonalization, to spill over the boundaries of their segmentary roles, to participate as wholes. The formal systems...cannot take account of the deviations thus introduced and consequently break down as instruments of control when relied upon alone. The whole individual raises new problems for the organization, partly because of the needs of his own personality, partly because he brings with him a set of established habits as well, perhaps, as commitments to special groups outside the organization.

In his book, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Anthony Downs (1967) draws on these earlier theorists to develop propositions concerning organizations which mirror this author's observations of the NYPD. Downs begins with the hypothesis that members of organizations are significantly motivated by their own self-interest, even when acting in a purely official capacity. They chose, among possible acts, those whose results yield the highest personal "utility rating." Downs notes two reasons the private motive and social function of work can never coincide: First, the private motive serves the interests of workers themselves, while the social function serves the interests of others. Second, workers' roles outside their primary employment generate desires, attitudes, and behaviors which inevitably influence their actions in their role as employee.

Downs anticipates the imperfect symbiosis of a few officers seeking many arrests and many officers seeking few arrests. He states that in any organization with formal job descriptions, the particular abilities and personality of the individual assigned to each job will never mesh perfectly with the tasks he is supposed to carry out. As a result, tasks formally assigned to one person are in fact performed by one or more others.

The manipulation of patrol tactics that stems from self-interest also has parallels in all organizations, according to Downs. Depending on whether assigned duties favor or

oppose their own interests, subordinates will “zealously expedite some orders, carry out others with only mild enthusiasm, drag their feet seriously on still others, and completely ignore a few” (77-78). Where official regulations are ambiguous, officials will select the “proper” administrative rules to apply in specific situations.

Police officers are not alone in resisting supervisory incursions into their discretionary domain. Control of members in bureaucratic organizations is universally difficult, writes Downs, and the greater the effort made to control subordinate officials, the greater will be their effort to evade or counteract such control. Like police sergeants, most first-line supervisors in organizations find they must bend rules in exchange for work output. And, like police commanders, most executives must home in on performance indicators which either create strong feedback from external agents and/or significantly deviate from standard performance targets. As a result, top officials overlook important information on subordinates’ performance that falls outside these criteria.

Other authors have identified universal features of public organizations that lead employees to turn away from organizational goals in favor of self-interested ones. Goal displacement, first described by Merton (1940), is an oft-cited problem. Wilson (1989) observed that in government bureaus the trappings of “productivity” - records, reports, statistical sheets, and so forth. - substitute for truer but less tangible gauges of effectiveness. Kerr (1985) describes agencies that “reward A while hoping for B” – orphanages that block adoptions because their budgets rise with the number of residents, or job placement programs that send unqualified applicants to unsustainable jobs when their funding is tied to the number of referrals. News articles (e.g. Goodnough, 1999;

NYT, 1995) report that teachers and principals whose career prospects depend on student test scores have helped students to cheat on exams.

Wilson (1989) has written extensively about worker disenchantment and self-serving behaviors in public organizations. The problem is particularly acute in “coping organizations” like police departments, where outputs and outcomes are not readily observable. In such organizations, official goals (such as “educating children” or “arresting criminals”) are too vague or ambitious to become a ready basis for task definition. As a result, tasks come to be shaped by the incentives valued by the members. To add to the problem, executives in coping agencies are diverted from careful task definition by their need to cultivate those outside constituencies who influence their careers. When such constituencies complain, executives ostentatiously reassign responsibilities or replace “unsatisfactory” performers, thus appearing not to “back up” their subordinates.

Another discouragement for workers explored by Wilson is the constraints on raises and other incentives. Like police departments, other public agencies cannot lawfully retain any surplus profits for their members. Moreover, they find it difficult to define or demonstrate the attainment of the objective for which a reward is merited. Thirdly, their accomplishments cannot be evaluated without making political, and therefore conflict-ridden, judgments.

The belief that “politics” undermines a fair, standardized system of advancement reflects a cynicism common not only among police officers. Civil servants often suspect that management schemes to promote on “merit” are simply a covert way to advance the lucky few who have the patronage of a high official or outside “rabbi” (an expression not

confined to the police). Merton (1957) writes that workers in bureaucracies favor a standardized promotion method because it reduces in-group competition and bolsters esprit de corp. Such bureaucratic procedures attain a moral legitimacy, or even a “sanctification.”

The foregoing is not a complete discussion of all organizational writings which anticipate the self-interested arrest behavior of police officers. But the selections do connect observations of the NYPD to traits common in bureaucratic institutions, particularly those run by government. And, more broadly, they show that police behavior need not be viewed as peculiar to their occupation.

SUPPORT FROM OTHER POLICE RESEARCH

THE SCHOLARLY AFTERTHOUGHT

The importance of personal concerns in arrest-making decisions has been noted, but rarely probed, by scholars. For instance, James Q. Wilson (1968:83-84) writes:

The patrolman’s decision whether and how to intervene in a situation depend on his evaluation of the costs and benefits of various kinds of action. Though the substantive criminal law seems to imply a mandate... in fact for most officers there are considerations of utility that equal or exceed in importance those of duty or morality, especially for the more common and less serious laws.

Wilson’s observation, however, is buried in *Varieties of Police Behavior*, a work famous for its exploration of *department-wide* arrest tendencies. Similarly, in *The Ambivalent Force* (1985:171), Blumberg and Niederhoffer’s collection of prominent writings on police, this pragmatic side of arrest decisions was noted only in a chapter introduction to the subject:

Does each officer have to meet an arrest quota for that month? What time of day does an incident take place? Is it near the end of a shift or the beginning of a tour? Will the police officer have to spend hours after duty in processing an arrest? Will this interfere with a social or family engagement? Does the department pay overtime for additional hours of work? Does the officer need the additional compensation? Although rarely taken into account, these seemingly prosaic factors loom as controlling and compelling determinants of action.

ARREST OVERTIME

In the sparse literature relating personal interests to arrest, overtime money or “collars for dollars,” has received the most frequently mention. Van Maanen (1983) reported officers seeking overtime by “engineering” their arrests at end-of-tour and striving for transfer into high-overtime units. Mastrofski, Ritti, and Snipes (1994), in a study of driving-under-the-influence (DUI) arrests in Pennsylvania, found that a “rate-busting” cadre claimed to enjoy “sticking it” to management with high arrest overtime costs. The majority of officers in the study criticized the rate-busters as bounty hunters, yet reported that they themselves would increase their DUI arrests if more overtime funding were available. Foley (2000) reported that officers were more likely to lie concerning their grounds for arrest when they need overtime money.

One news article especially dramatizes the allure of overtime lucre. Three officers with DUI arrests in Texas were fired, and their DUI cases dismissed, when it was shown that they had targeted people who were sober, and therefore likely to fight their arrests in court. These officers usually made DUI arrests on evening and night shifts, so that their daytime court appearance was at time-and-a-half pay. The three not only had

falsely arrested people, but had conspired to include each other's name in arrest reports so that all would be called to testify (Murphy, 1996).

Only one study was found which empirically correlated arrest with overtime needs. Walsh (1986), comparing officers who made high, medium, low, and no felony arrests in a New York City precinct, found that the high-arrest group was distinguished by a greater dependency on overtime income. Some from this group, which comprised ten percent of all officers but made over half the felony arrests, even characterized themselves as "bounty hunters."

Overtime available as compensatory time can also be an arrest incentive, particularly if an officer has exhausted his reserve of leave time. Yet in searching the literature on arrest overtime, the only mention of comp time was in a nation-wide survey by the National Institute of Justice (Bayley and Worden, 1998). This report discussed comp time in terms of its cost-effectiveness (i.e., its loss of man-hours), not its influence on arrest decisions. It also found that many police departments do not even monitor overtime expenses taken in time rather than money.

TIME CONFLICTS

The time burden of arrest processing has been noted by a few authors. Wilson (1968) mentioned extended tours as a possible discouragement to arrest. Forbell (1973) found that officers who face long commutes home make fewer arrests than those who do not, though they were just as active in their other police duties. Vila and Taiji (1999) stated that officers' academic pursuits create a time conflict with arrest processing. Walsh's study of a New York precinct (1986) deemed arrest processing length a factor in the forty percent of NYPD officers who, though sometimes assisting in apprehensions, never processed any felony arrests. This group of officers had the greatest proportion of

individuals with off-duty employment and the largest share of wives employed full-time Walsh reasoned that these officers not only had less need for overtime money (arrest processing averaged four hours), but also had greater need to get off work on time, to get to either their second job or their children.

OFF-DUTY EMPLOYMENT

Off-duty employment is way of life for many police officers (Acuri, Gunn, and Lester, 1987). Police officials recognize that while moonlighting relieves pressure on their organization to raise salaries, it also saps officers' energy and focus (Kroes, 1985; Violanti and Aron, 1995; Vila and Taiji, 1999). Ninety-six percent of departments with 100 or more officers have policies limiting moonlighting (Reaves and Smith, 1995). The NYPD forbids outside employment which exceeds twenty hours per week or extends within three hours of the officer's start-of-tour (NYPD, 1999), yet it sets no limit on how soon after tour's end the officer may report to a second job. Clearly, even a job beginning three hours after sign-out time would discourage arrests in the latter half of an officer's tours. Yet no studies were found which addressed this.

PHYSICAL STRESSORS

The physical costs of a decision to arrest have received only a small amount of scholarly attention. A study of drunk-driving arrests by Canadian officers found that such physical burdens as the travel distance for a breath test, the time consumed and the difficulties in controlling intoxicated persons discouraged arrest-making. (Vingilis et. al. 1986). Similarly, Pennsylvania officers based DUI arrest decisions on such arrest "costs" as effort and unpleasantness (Mastrofski and Ritti, 1992). Conlon's personal account of life as a Housing Police officer described his ejecting but not arresting trespassers who "stank to high heaven" (2004, p.7).

Yet abundant research, without focusing on arrest, has shown that officers are quite concerned over various physical stressors. These include physical injury, infection, exhaustion, and excessive paperwork (Eisenberg, 1975; Sykes, Fox, and Clark, 1976; Kroes, 1985; O'Neill and Cushing, 1991; Violanti and Aron, 1995; Barker, 1999; Bayley and Worden, 1996; Blumberg, 1997 Vila and Taiji, 1999). Officer fatigue is further exacerbated by outside employment and college attendance (Kroes, 1985; Violanti and Aron, 1995; Vila and Taiji, 1999).

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESSORS

This same pattern is seen in research on officers' psychological concerns. Only a few police studies associated them with arrest decisions. Mastrofski, Ritti & Snipes (1994) found that a significant factor in DUI arrest decisions in Pennsylvania was whether the officer had the training and experience to feel at ease with the work such an arrest entails. Brown (1988) wrote that officers in his California study weighed their fear of making a mistake in their arrest decisions. Hernandez (1981) and Brown (1988) both observed that on slow tours, officers make more proactive arrests for minor offenses, to alleviate their boredom or release anger generated in private life. Yet there is no dearth of research that examined psychological stressors without addressing their influence on arrest-making. These stressors include anxieties over physical danger, disciplinary action, civilian complaints, adverse scheduling and strained personal relationships (Eisenberg, 1975; Kroes, 1985; O'Neill and Cushing, 1991; Violanti and Aron, 1995; Barker, 1999; Bayley and Worden, 1996).

CONFLICT BETWEEN POLICE AND CIVILIAN ROLES

The benefits and costs of arrests are tied to identities outside the police role, such as parent, breadwinner, student, as well as "ordinary mortal." Role conflict between

work and non-work identities is well-recognized in organizational literature (e.g., Selznick, 1948; Merton, 1957; Downs, 1967; Kahn et al., 1964). But in police literature “role conflict” almost always refers to discordant *policing* roles, such as crime fighter, social worker, and peace keeper (e.g., Wilson, 1963; Skonick, 1966; Brown, 1988; Walker, 1993; Manning, 1997).

Yet it is the role conflicts between officer and civilian identities that may pose the greater threat to the officers’ emotional equilibrium. In a study by Kroes, Margolis and Hurrell (1974), most officers complained that their work interfered with their home life, caused them to lose non-police friends, and made dating difficult to schedule. Maynard and Maynard (1982) and Barker (1999) each report that over half of married officers in their studies were divorced within their first five years in policing. Territo and Vetter (1981) found that work during evenings, weekends, and holidays resulted in extensive disruption of home life and prohibited the planning of family activities. Clearly, officers hoping to sustain the important personal relationships in their lives would be strongly motivated to exercise “arrest-control.”

Walsh’s study (1986), comparing high- versus low-arrest officers, all male, found a stark difference in their identification with their police and non-police roles. The zero- and low-arrest groups, which comprised 78% of the precinct, were drawn away from their “police selves” by second jobs and child care responsibilities left by working wives. Moreover, almost 62% of the zero-arrest officers - the largest category - expressed a desire to retire from the NYPD as soon as they were able, and only 29% expressed a desire to advance within the department. This contrasted with the high-arrest category, which had the highest proportion married but had no wives working full time. Every

officer in this group sought career advancement within the department and no one was interested in retirement. Walsh found that all groups but high-arrest reported that they make fewer felony arrests than they could, and consider their own preference, not the complainant's, in their arrest decision. This study stands alone in relating family concerns to arrest activity. No research was found which correlated arrest with other outside pursuits like school or an active social life.

Research on the arrest decision has also neglected the officer's most basic identity as a comfort-seeking, pain-avoiding mortal. As shown above, only a handful of studies have actually connected arrest decisions to boredom, or fear of getting hurt or looking foolish, and none were found linking the arrest decision to protracted fatigue or fear of being accused of misconduct by an arrestee or a superior.

COWORKER SUPPORT

The author initially described how officers developed arrangements with their coworkers to control arrest-making, but with only limited success. Officers' work behavior is highly influence by peer opinions (Wilson, 1967). They "learn the job" primarily from colleagues in the field (Van Maanen and Manning, 1978; Rubinstein, 1973), and are taught to value teamwork above individual motivation (Skolnick, 1966; Van Maanen, 1976).

Walsh (1986) found such teamwork in the New York City officers he studied. The no- and low-arrest officers, comprising 78% of the command's patrol strength, were frequently able to give away their arrests to "active" officers - either partners or a "back-up" team. The arrangement kept the squad's arrest average at a satisfactory level, and allowed officers to control their occupational environment so as to pursue their personal priorities. Yet because the precinct's felony rate was so high, these accommodations

were inadequate. A third of the no-arrest and low-arrest groups (who made under nine arrests per year) admitted to avoiding arrest, and many were thought to have “talked their way out of” them. Active officers complained to their supervisors of colleagues refusing to take their fair share of arrests.

Other studies found that high-arrest officers may also breed resentment, if their arrests are perceived as creating more rather than less work for colleagues. For instance, officers who made a lot of drunk-driving arrests were viewed as shirking their share of the workload to get overtime out of “minor offenses” (Mastrofski et. al., 1993; Vingilis et. al., 1986). This seems to be the case in the NYPD as well: a minor arrest made early in the tour, on a day when there were barely enough officers to answer calls for service, was viewed with annoyance by the colleagues (and supervisors) who now had to cover patrol for the arresting officer.

Walsh (1986) also found that some officers avoided arrests on holidays. This confirmed the author’s observations that certain events in the calendar inspire such widespread arrest-seeking or avoidance that little cooperation among officers is likely. NYPD arrest statistics do in fact show a marked increase in arrests before Christmas and most precipitous decreases on Mother’s Day and Super Bowl Sunday - changes which cannot be explained by crime rates alone.

No study was found that directly examined how the balance of arrest-seekers and arrest-avoiders affects arrest outcomes. It would seem that the difficulty each group has in accommodating the other would directly relate to their perceived need to control arrest-making through patrol tactics.

ARREST-CONTROL TECHNIQUES

In the NYPD, it was apparent that officers adapted their patrol tactics to conform to personal arrest preferences. The techniques officers devise to avoid arrest-making have also been described in a number of writings. Officers can pre-arrange to pass unavoidable arrests to those who want to take them (Conlon, 2004). They can drive around with tunnel vision (Brown, 1981), and delay getting to the scene (Walker, 1993, Manning, 1996; Barker, 1999). They can notify the radio dispatcher of their arrival time before or after actual arrival (Manning, 1996), in order to cover a delay or wait for the “catching” sector car. They can spend an inordinate amount of time at service-related assignments (Barker, 1999). In subtle and not-so-subtle ways, they can convince complainants not to press charges (Bayley and Garofalo, 1989; Walker 1993). They can determine that no crime has occurred, and direct complainants to other agencies (Black, 1980; Manning, 1998). They can take a report but never file it, or simply not respond to a call (Manning, 1998; Barker, 1999).

The literature also describes ways in which officers can “scrounge up” an arrest. They can focus on “vice-prone” locales that lend themselves to “proactive enforcement” (Sherman, 1980; Hernandez, 1981; Brown, 1988). They can postpone informing the dispatcher when their assignment is complete, to make time to pursue a favorite violation (Van Maanen, 1983; Brown, 1988). They can provoke complainants or rile suspects (Walker 1993; Bayley and Garofalo, 1989).

No research was discovered which compared the importance of self-interest to other arrest factors, or observed how they may interact. However, a study by Lundman (1979) on another dominant incentive, a monthly summons quota, might be informative. Lundman found that in the latter half of each month, when summoning pressures began

to mount, officers issued more citations to male, Black, lower class, and argumentative motorists. It is plausible that officers under a self-imposed “arrest quota” also might turn to such biased factors in their haste to identify a “perpetrator.”

PEER VALUES AND CULTURE

The “maxims” quoted in the beginning portrait suggest that officers rationalize adaptive arrest behavior by both loyalty to outside commitments and disaffection with organizational goals. Many authors have commented on the importance of peer values to police officers (e.g., Wilson, 1968; Van Maanen, 1978; Lundman, 1979; Bahn, 1984; Manning, 1988). These values are often captured in exchanged “words of wisdom”, and serve as the verbal link between ethos and action (Reuss-Ianni, 1983, Kappler et. al., 1994).

Admonitions to “Put your family first” and “Make the job work for you” suggest that the police officer culture endorses “holding back” some part of one’s commitment to “The Job” to affirm one’s non-police identity. This tendency of private identities and goals to assert themselves in the workplace has been recognized in organizational writings (e.g. Seznick 1948; Merton 1957; Downs 1967), discussed above. Police research, however, mainly explores the opposite vector of influence, that is, the rigors of the occupation producing a personality and world view which carries over into the private sphere. Officers are generalized as feeling isolated, suspicious, and resentful toward larger society, preferring the company of fellow officers even when off-duty (Banton, 1964; Skolnick, 1966, Wilson, 1968, Westley, 1970, Van Maanen, 1978, Sherman, 1982).

This picture of occupationally-based insularity is not only one-sided but increasingly out-of-date. As early as 1984, Bahn noted that the trend toward diversity

among officers is inevitably leading to less internal cohesion and greater external identification. There are now more racial and ethnic minorities, more women, and more gay officers, each claiming a distinct “culture.” Increasingly, male officers with working wives, as well as female officers, make child-care duties a high priority. Older recruits bring wider life experience. Entry-level college requirements expand the rookie’s perspective, and encourage further schooling or alternative employment. Steady tours and pension eligibility after only five years employment do likewise. Police residency “sprawl,” to suburbs ever more remote from the city, limit peer socializing to work hours (Bahn, 1984; Martin, 1993; Reuss-Ianni and Ianni; BJS, 1999). A recent study by Paoline (2001) found that officer attitudes varied widely according to shift and area of assignment. Also contributing to this cultural dispersion are current trends in the broader workplace. In the strong job market of the 1990s, employees had many options. Moreover they felt less organizational loyalty and more skepticism toward organizational claims of serving some higher purpose (Flynn, 2000; Lewis, 2000). All these factors weaken police solidarity and foster non-police identities and priorities.

While insularity may be on the wane, cynicism still seems to thrive. The often-heard refrain among officers that “the Job’s not on the level” suggests that the officer’s turning outward is accompanied by disillusionment. In 1967, officer-turned-scholar Arthur Niederhoffer suggested that police work engenders cynicism toward both fellow citizens and the job itself, allowing officers to rationalize illegitimate activities (Niederhoffer, 1967). Recent writings confirm this observation, and note that one common response to this disillusionment is to focus on an activity outside the job (Barker, 1999; Rigoli, Crank and Rivera, 1990).

Part of the cynicism toward humanity comes with the discovery that arrests can be intrinsically unsatisfying. Complainants may have ulterior motives for pressing charges (Wilson, 1968; Karmen, 1997). Some offenders may not “deserve” arrest because their crimes stem from economic desperation (Pollack, 1997). Repeated arrests of the same individuals may lend an air of absurdity to the whole enterprise (Walker, 1993). Arrests come to be seen not as righteous blow against crime, but as just “one of several outcomes” (Manning, 1996).

An added source of disillusionment is the occupational “politics” that infect the arrest process. Many officers are convinced that “connections,” not arrests, are the most reliable route to good assignments (Van Maanen, 1975; McDonald, 1998). Officers see that even an exemplary arrest record cannot save a career that high officials one day deem a political liability (Van Maanen, 1975; Wilson, 1989; Guyot, 1991). They cynically note how City Hall announces a “crackdown” to counter negative headlines (Wilson, 1989); how police higher-ups manipulate arrest statistics to augment their careers or budgets (Skolnick, 1966; Rubinstein, 1973, Wilson, 1974, 1989; Manning, 1996); how prosecutors plea-bargain to assure easy conviction. (Arcuri, 1977; Walker, 1993); and how judges hand down lenient sentences to clear court congestion or placate the courtroom “work group” (Arcuri, 1977, Narduli, 1978; Walker, 1993). When officers witness how arrests are subordinated to the self-interest of others, they can easily rationalize manipulating arrests to suit their own priorities.

MANAGEMENT LIMITATIONS

In the author’s field observations, arrest motives could be fairly apparent to precinct insiders. Nevertheless, officers were relatively unconstrained by police management in adapting arrest behavior to personal needs. This was largely due to the

awkward realities of first-line supervision, that are well-documented in business literature (Kahn et al., 1964) as well as police studies. It is physically impossible for sergeants to be present at every patrol situation (Banton, 1964; Manning, 1996). Moreover, officers are overtly hostile to being “snoopervised” and second-guessed, which makes sergeants reluctant to respond to too many calls (Iannone, 1970; Rubenstein, 1973; Van Maanen, 1983; Brown, 1988; Manning, 1996). Sergeants are psychologically caught between roles as bureaucrat and colleague, and consequently barter favors for work output. These favors include overt assistance to the officers, such as authorizing time off, and more subtle help, such as “not seeing” how certain results are achieved (Van Maanen, 1983; Brown, 1988). The pressure on sergeants to produce “numbers” reinforces this tendency to focus on ends rather than means (Rubenstein, 1973, Van Maanen, 1983). Finally, supervisors need to conserve patrol strength to answer radio assignments. Thus they may actually discourage officers from making less-serious arrests until nearing the end of tour (Brooks, 1993). And, while departments like the NYPD may direct late-in-tour arrests to be reassigned to an officer on the incoming tour (NYPD, 1995), supervisors may be unable to comply because of the original officer’s direct involvement, or because the incoming tour is itself too short-staffed.

Other problems of control lie with the commanding officer. Police commanders rely on numerical indicators to reveal qualitative information about subordinates (Mastrofski, 1981; Wilson, 1989), even though an unremarkable arrest-making record may merely reflect the “balancing out” of undesirable arrest-generating and arrest-avoiding activities. Mastrofski (1981) has suggested that police administrators emphasize statistical records both as a cover for their lack of street-level control of their

subordinates, and to avoid interference with the officers' actual work in the field, where discretionary latitude is a political and economic necessity. Commanders also respond to the reality that arrest overtime is of concern to their agency only as a budget-buster, and not as a "hidden persuader." As noted earlier, the 1998 N.I.J. survey of nationwide overtime practices dwelt entirely upon issues of cost-effectiveness (Bayley and Worden, 1998).

WRITINGS ON ARREST DISCRETION

Over a hundred factors have been linked to arrest discretion since its "discovery" by scholars in the 1960s (Smith, 1983; Walker, 1993). To understand the arrest decision, we must recognize that self-interest may interact with many of these factors.

Writings from the 1960s viewed police officers either as (1) agents of larger socioeconomic struggles, using their discretion to "hold the lid on" societal ills, (2) special "personality types" whose choices are molded by occupational pressures, or (3) semi-obedient bureaucrats, responding to organizational imperatives. Research has followed this pattern by grouping arrest factors as related to the situation, to the officer, or to the organization. All three paradigms excluded outside identities and influences.

POLICE AS PROTECTORS OF THE PECKING ORDER

The sociological perspective of police discretion gained attention through a pioneering field study of criminal justice officials at work began by the American Bar Association in 1956 (A.B.A., 1955; Walker, 1993). Among its revelations, wrote research team member Wayne LaFave (1965), was that officers, virtually without legal or administrative restraint, used arrest to address non-criminal problems such as vagrancy, indebtedness, and mental illness. These observations were reinforced by sociologists,

particularly conflict theorists who posited that arrests served to impose the social norms of powerful groups upon powerless ones (Turk, 1966; Vold, 1979), and labeling theorists who viewed arrest as part of a ritualized stigmatization which creates a criminal class (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1967). Ethnographic studies of police lent credence to the view that officers perpetuate the socioeconomic status quo through their discretionary choices (Banton, 1964; Skolnick, 1966; Bittner, 1967; Westley, 1970; Rubinstein, 1973).

This perspective was also supported by quantitative research on arrest from the 1960s and '70s that focused on situational factors tied to power and status, such as the level of offense, the demeanor, race, class, and relationship of suspect and victim, the method of intervention, and the type of neighborhood (Piliavin and Briar, 1964; Wertman and Piliavin, 1967; Black and Reiss, 1967; Black, 1971; Reiss, 1971; Freidrich, 1977; Sykes, 1972; Sykes, Fox, and Clark, 1976; Lundman, Sykes, and Clark, 1978). Many of these variables were integrated by Black (1976) into a theory that the quantity of law (i.e., government control) varies with the level of defiance of social norms. Thus arrest is most likely for offenses committed against strangers or higher status individuals, or in communities lacking informal social control mechanisms.

However, when these variables were subsequently reexamined, often using more sophisticated methodologies, the results were far more mixed (Riksheim and Chermak, 1993). For instance, the positive relationship between arrest and seriousness of offense has been one of the most consistent findings in the literature (Wilson, 1968, Ericson; 1982; Black, 1971, Piliavin and Briar, 1964; Sherman, 1980; Smith and Visser, 1981; Moyer, 1981; Visser, 1983; Smith and Klein, 1983; Smith, 1984; Brooks, 1986). Yet, in some later studies, where seriousness was operationalized not by level of charge, but as

injuries-versus-no-injuries or weapons-versus-no-weapons, the effects on arrest rates were absent (Berke and Loeske, 1980-1981; Smith and Klein, 1984; Worden and Politz, 1984:110; Bell, 1985; Smith:1987; Visher, 1983). Where the criterion for seriousness was violent-versus-property offenses, it did not increase arrest rates for women suspects (Visher, 1983) or within “service” style police departments (Smith, 1984).

Similarly, most research examining complainant preference for or against arrest has found this to be a significant factor (Black and Reiss, 1970; Black, 1971; Freidrich, 1977; Lundman, Sykes, and Clark, 1878; Berk and Loeske, 1980-1981; Lafree, 1981; Smith and Visher, 1981; Visher, 1983; Smith and Klein, 1983, 1984; Brooks, 1986; Smith, 1987; Worden, 1989; Kerstetter, 1990, Brooks, 1997). However, studies analyzing multiple variables suggest a number of contradictory interactions. Preference had less effect when complainants were Black or lower class (Lafree, 1981; Smith and Klein, 1984), but greater effect in lower status and homogenous neighborhoods (Smith and Klein, 1984). The wishes of female complainants carried more weight in one study (Visher, 1983), and less in another (Smith and Klein, 1984). In “militaristic” agencies complainant preference had no impact, while in “service” and “fraternal” agencies preference for arrest was usually honored, but not preference for leniency (Smith and Klein, 1983).

The correlation of arrest and citizen demeanor has been another fairly consistent finding. Citizens who were “antagonistic” or “disrespectful” were more likely to be arrested, and less likely to be accommodated as complainants, than their “civil” or “cooperative” counterparts (Piliavin and Briar, 1964; Black and Reiss, 1970; Black, 1971; Petersen, 1972; Lundman, 1974, Sykes, Fox, and Clark, 1976; Friedrich, 1977;

and Lundman, Sykes, and Clark, 1978; Smith and Visser, 1981; Moyer, 1981; Erikson, 1982; Smith and Klein, 1983, 1984; Worden and Pollitz, 1984; Smith, 1986; Smith 1987; Worden, 1989). Ironically, very deferential suspect behavior was also more likely to result in arrest (Black and Reiss, 1970; Lundman, Sykes, and Clark, 1978; Friedrich, 1977). However, many of these studies have subsequently been criticized for confusing suspect demeanor with conduct that is itself illegal and/or conduct that is subsequent to the moment of arrest (Klinger, 1994). This led to two more restrictively defined analyses of the data sets, one finding a lesser effect (Lundman, 1994) and the other upholding earlier findings (Worden and Shepard, 1996).

Two other variables have demonstrated consistent significance. Lower class suspects were more likely to be arrested (Black and Reiss, 1967; Black, 1971; Reiss, 1971; Friedrich, 1977; Black, 1980), as were suspects encountered in proactive interventions (Black 1971; Friedrich, 1977; Lundman, 1974). However neither factor has been cross-analyzed with other variables in any later study (Riksheim and Chermak, 1993).

The effect of many other variables stand unresolved because study results have been contradictory. Race, the focus of much research attention, exemplifies this. Debate surrounding the Black-Reiss data (Black, 1970) focused on whether the higher likelihood of arrests for Blacks is the result of demeanor or complainant preference rather than race per se (Black and Reiss, 1970; Black, 1971; Lundman, 1974; Lundman, Sykes, and Clark, 1978). Most post-1980 studies, examining a variety of circumstances, concluded that race itself had no effect on police arrest decisions (Smith et. al., 1984; Smith 1986; Berk and Loeske, 1980-81; Moyer, 1981; 1982; Worden and Politz, 1984; Smith and

Klein, 1984; Smith and Klein, 1983; Smith, 1984; Hollinger, 1984). Yet more recent findings show that being Black does increase the likelihood of arrest (Brooks, 1986; Powell, 1990); that White combatants are more likely to be arrested than Black (Smith, 1986), and that the race of Black female suspects increases the probability of arrest (Smith and Visher, 1981; Visher, 1983).

Studies of neighborhood characteristics also produced discrepant results. Various economic indicators were associated with both higher and lower arrest rates (Liksa and Chamlin, 1984; Smith, 1984; Smith, 1986; Slovak, 1986; Crank, 1990). Community heterogeneity likewise had mixed effects (Liksa and Chamlin, 1984; Crank, 1990), as did the polity of jurisdictions (Langworthy, 1985; Slovak, 1986; Crank, 1990). Other variables that produce mixed findings are suspect age (Freidrich, 1977; Bogomolny, 1976; Smith and Visher, 1981; Visher, 1983; Smith, 1984); suspect gender (Sykes and Brent, 1983; Krohn et al. 1983; Smith and Klein, 1984; Smith et al., 1984; Smith, 1986; Smith and Visher, 1981; Moyer, 1981, 1982; Visher, 1983; Willbanks, 1986; Steffenmeier and Allan, 1988), relational distance between suspect and victim (Black, 1970; Smith and Visher, 1981; Smith et al., 1984; Smith and Klein, 1983; Lafree, 1981; Visher, 1983; Berk and Loeske, 1980-1981; Worden and Politz, 1984; Smith and Klein, 1984; Smith, 1987), and public visibility (Lundman, 1974; Friedrich, 1977; Worden and Politz, 1984; Smith, 1987).

To summarize findings concerning the social control paradigm, we observe, first, that the contradictory mélange of empirical results weakens its persuasiveness. Even the most consistently significant arrest variables of offense level, complainant preference,

demeanor, class, and proactive entry, vary enough in study results to allow the possibility of officer self-interest as a highly significant co-factor.

Second, the preeminence of offense seriousness as an arrest variable need not be related to social control. While offense level is indeed a gauge of the determination of lawmakers to suppress a particular behavior (Becker, 1963), it is also related to the officer's personal feelings of moral outrage and resolve. Moreover, a "good felony collar" brings recognition from the officer's peers and superiors. Under such circumstances, even outsiders such as spouses and professors are more forgiving of broken commitments

Third, even when arrest factors support the social control model overall, they can be manipulated on a case-by-case basis to further self-interest. As mentioned, charges can be trumped up or downplayed. A lower-class suspect can be targeted because he is more plausibly "crime-prone." Both complainant preference, a reflection of societal punitiveness toward offenders, and citizen demeanor, a sign of submission to police authority (Friedrich, 1977; Brooks, 1997), can be "adjusted" by an officer's well-chosen words. Proactive, unsolicited interventions, which are said to make citizens more antagonistic and arrest-prone (Reiss, 1971), are tactics *chosen* by officers who are *seeking* arrest. Researchers locked into the social control paradigm are likely to miss such machinations.

POLICE AS PERSONALITY TYPES

A smaller body of writing has approached police discretion through traits of the police officer. Some scholars posited that the police experience creates an "occupational personality" with a shared rationale for arrest. Others suggested that certain major personality dimensions interact to create several officer "types," some more arrest-prone

than others. A third series of studies empirically relates specific officer characteristics with inclination to arrest.

Among the literature offering a single prototype is Skolnick's (1966) description of the officer's "working personality." Molded by danger and authority, it is manifested in preemptive actions toward anyone whose appearance or demeanor matches that of a "symbolic assailant." Niederhoffer (1967), in contrast, saw cynicism as the dominant mindset, eroding the officer's responsiveness to the wishes of the citizenry. Wilson (1968) contended that the officer's moral judgments of the victim and suspect form the basis of most arrest decisions, while Ericson (1982) asserted that the officer's need to "reproduce order" determined whether and how to intervene. Such generalized portraits help explain overall arrest behavior, but not its wide variation among individual officers. Other authors have classified officers into several personality types based on select dimensions which relate to arrest discretion. For instance, White (1972) classified officers by whether, in patrol situations, they attend to immediate events or final outcomes, and whether they treat citizens as individuals or as stereotypes. Brown (1981) developed a four-category typology based on officers' selectiveness and aggressiveness in enforcement. A more abstract system by Muir (1977) distinguished officers by whether they were comfortable or conflicted about the use of force, and whether they had a compassionate or cynical view of the human condition. Still another typology, by Broderick (1977), grouped officers along the dimensions of commitment to constitutional rights and commitment to statutory enforcement. Chatterton (1983) divided officers between those committed to strict legal and moral standards for arrest and those zealously preoccupied with arrest in disregard of such standards. More

recently, Gerber (2001) reported that between police partners, those with higher status (because of seniority or male gender) display instrumentally-oriented, dominating traits while those with lower status display accommodating, expressive traits. While such typologies better reflected the diversity among officers than did the singular prototypes, they too gave little recognition to predispositions arising outside the police identity.

Empirical studies relating individual officer traits to arrest behavior have yielded generally weak or unresolved results (Sherman, 1980; Riksheim and Chermak, 1993). Higher education, a key element of police professionalism, seems to have no measurable effect in most studies comparing individual officers (Worden, 1989, 1990; Smith and Klein, 1983; Crank, 1993). Individual police experience sometimes was accompanied by fewer but better arrests (Forst, Lucianovic, and Cox, 1977; Friedrich, 1977; Sherman 1980; Crank, 1993), sometimes by more arrests (Sykes and Brent, 1983; Meyers et al. 1989), and sometimes by no connection (Smith and Klein, 1983; Worden, 1989). In recent findings officer race had no effect on arrest behavior (Worden, 1989; Smith and Klein, 1983), though in an earlier study both Black and White officers were more likely to arrest suspects of their own race (Friedrich, 1977). Gender also has shown no influence on arrest in more current research (Worden, 1989), although in earlier studies women on patrol, rare at the time, were found to make fewer arrests than male officers (Sherman, 1980). Studies of officer height (Hoobler and McQueen, 1973), and age (Sherman, 1980) found no relationship to arrest. Finally, having a non-working wife was correlated with more arrest-making, while secondary employment was associated with less, in Walsh's aforementioned study (1986), only one found that related arrests to outside roles.

Some quantitative research related officer attitudes to arrest. Friedrich (1977) associated a positive attitude toward police work with more arrests. Other research suggested that education, experience, and gender may affect attitudes, which in turn may affect arrest behavior (Hayeslip and Cordner, 1987; Canter and Martinsen, 1990; Brooks, Piquero, and Cronin, 1993). However, as shown, these three attitude-related traits had a weak influence overall on arrests. And, more generally, the effect of attitudes upon behavior could not be demonstrated in a clear majority of studies (Wicker, 1969; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Wilson, 1989; Brooks, 1997). Wilson (1989) suggested that this is because attitudes cannot compete with more powerful positive and negative incentives inherent in the work environment.

It is clear from the foregoing that research relating arrest decisions to personality has neglected the officer's full identity. What leads one officer to earn extra income through arrest overtime, and another officer to earn that income through moonlighting in a completely unrelated occupation? Why does one officer seek career advancement by amassing an impressive arrest record, and another by studying for promotion or attending law school? Traits such as comfort with the use of force, and commitment to legality, certainly may come into play, but so too do more general characteristics relating to ability and temperament.

POLICE AS SEMI-OBEDIENT BUREAUCRATS

A third perspective on police discretion portrays officers as products of their organizational environment. Their discretionary tendencies are said to be influenced by such department-wide variables as bureaucratization, professionalism, closeness of supervision, stability of assignment, overall "mission," and strategic approaches to that

mission. Since these characteristics reflect rational managerial decisions tempered by broader political considerations, this view of policing has been termed the “Constrained Rational Model” (Wilson, 1967; Mastrofski, Ritti, and Hoffmaster, 1987).

This organizational approach, like social control and personality models, emerged in the 1960s. Banton’s study (1964) comparing British and American police departments noted that large, vertically differentiated agencies have more promotional opportunities that can be used as incentives for certain types of work behavior. Such agencies, Banton noted, also place emphasis on impersonal, quantifiable performance measures, such as numbers of arrest. Skolnick (1966), in his research in two American cities, suggested that the more a police department conforms to a “military model” which stressed obedience to rules, the more it would emphasize crime-control behavior, including arrest.

The most influential and in-depth research exploring organizational effects was James Q. Wilson’s *Varieties of Police Behavior* (1968). He described three police department prototypes, differentiated by their response to varied political and managerial expectations. “Watchman-style” departments like that of Albany, New York ignored minor violations, particularly among groups and neighborhoods deemed “naturally lawless,” and reserve arrest for serious crimes. “Legalistic” agencies, such as the Oakland, California Police Department, were most likely to strictly adhere to substantive and procedural law, making frequent arrests across socioeconomic strata for both crime and disorder. “Service” agencies, operating in homogeneous communities like suburban Nassau County, were responsive to both crime and order-maintenance problems but prefer informal resolution to arrest.

Research testing specific organizational variables invoked by Wilson has been inconclusive (Ricksheim and Chermak, 1993). Bureaucratization, often characterized in police agencies by tall rank structure, and an emphasis on efficiency, discipline, and productivity (Bittner, 1970; Manning, 1977), was associated with greater arrest rates in some studies (Smith and Klein, 1983; Crank, 1990), and had no effect in others (Smith and Klein, 1984; Smith et al. 1984). Professionalism in a police agency, generally indicated by a service focus attained through educational requirements, training, and specialized community-oriented units (Goldstein, 1977; Smith and Klein, 1984), had yet a more mixed effect. In one analysis it decreased arrests (Smith and Klein, 1983), in another it had no effect (Smith and Klein, 1984), and in still another it decreased arrests in urban departments while increasing them in rural ones (Crank, 1990). The effects of bureaucratization and professionalism are further confused by the literature's inconsistent and overlapping definitions of the terms (Smith, 1984; Walker, 1983; Brooks, 1997). Smith and Klein (1983, 1984) combined features of both in operationalizing legalistic departments, finding, as did Wilson, that this style of policing correlates with more arrest-making.

Department size, a variable associated with bureaucratization, also had unclear effects on arrest. Brown (1981) suggested that larger agencies are more autonomous, deriving legitimacy by enforcing laws uniformly, and thus they make more arrests than smaller departments that must depend upon community support. Yet subsequent research has shown either that size has no effect (Liksa and Chamlin, 1984) or that it has an inverse relation to arrest (Slovak, 1986; Mastrofski et al., 1987). Similarly, the span of control, that is, the ratio of officers to sergeant, has shown mixed effects on arrest. A

larger span had no effect in urban areas but increased arrests in rural agencies (Crank, 1990), and in urban departments it was correlated with more arrests for violent crimes but had no effect on property crimes (Slovak, 1986). However, the span of control is but a crude indicator of how frequently patrol sergeants are actually present at potential arrest situations. Reiss (1971) found that close supervision gave officers less of an opportunity to violate department rules, and this presumably would suppress the urge to improperly make or avoid arrests due to personal factors.

The work schedule, or “duty chart” may have a great influence on arrest behavior, and begs further research. One police agency instituted a duty chart with four ten-hour shifts, three days off, and considerable shift overlap for in-service training, community-oriented projects, and other “off-the-radio” tasks. These innovations resulted in more consistent supervision, reduced overtime pay and sick leave, and greater ability for officers to manage off-duty employment (Moore, 1995). Another police department, that adopted a three-tour “work week” of twelve hours on / twelve hours off followed by a “weekend” of three or four days off, also experienced reduced overtime through fewer late arrests and off-duty court appearances. This change also reduced officers’ commuting times and provided blocks of time to spend in family and recreational pursuits (Vila and Taiji, 1999). These findings imply that such compressed schedules could suppress the influence of personal factors in arrest decisions.

Another managerial variable is the frequency with which departments rotate personnel among different shifts, units, and neighborhoods. Researchers have suggested that consistency increases officers’ sense of closeness to the community, reducing the inclination to arrest (Brown, 1981; Murphy and Pate, 1977; Mastrofski, 1981). Yet

working a consistent shift also could decrease arrest-making in a way that has been overlooked, that is, by enabling the officer to schedule regular outside commitments.

Close neighborhood ties are a central theme of the community policing movement popularized in the mid-1980s (Brooks, 1993). According to its advocates, self-directed community police officers develop imaginative problem-solving methods that undercut the need to make arrests, and prioritize arrest-making to reflect neighborhood concerns (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). In practice, however, this approach to arrest, like other community policing ideas, made little headway against entrenched practices. Management was reluctant to cede autonomy to the CSOs. And with their token of autonomy, self-scheduling, CSOs adjusted their tours not to meet community enforcement needs but to accommodate their own private lives (Silverman, 1999).

When upper management does throw its weight behind an arrest campaign, however, it becomes the most potent of organizational forces (Sherman, 1990). In a typical “crackdown,” orders from the upper echelons are translated almost overnight into street-level arrest quotas. Crackdowns are often short-lived reactions to a particular negative news story, as when, for example, a vicious assault by a stranger on a New York City street prompted a campaign to arrest homeless persons (Bumiller, 1999). At other times, the increased arrests, accompanied by a tougher stance by legislators and judges, stem from more fundamental changes in public attitudes. For instance, heightened concern for domestic violence and drunk driving has led many police jurisdictions, including the NYPD, to adopt mandatory arrest procedures (Sherman, 1992; NYPD Patrol Guide, 2000). Crackdowns may even originate from academic quarters, as when James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling’s *Atlantic Monthly* article, “Broken Windows”

(March, 1982) argued that arrests for “minor” misconduct can dispel the lawless, fearful atmosphere that leads to serious crime. Many departments, including the NYPD, adopted the “Broken Windows” approach (Rosen, 1999; Silverman, 1999). In New York the philosophy transmuted into a “Zero Tolerance” policy of escalating low-level arrests, despite flagging statistical justification and community support (Rosen, 1999; Barstow, 2000).

To summarize, findings on organizational arrest influences did indicate that there were agency-wide patterns of arrest. However, the effects of specific organizational characteristics, such as size, bureaucratization, professionalism, span of control, and consistency of patrol “clientele,” remained unclear. Studies of longer tours with larger blocks of off-duty time suggested that this type of schedule may offset the influences of personal arrest factors, but much further research is needed. Finally, recent events proved that the hierarchically imposed crackdown can still mobilize arrest-making, even on a massive scale. Regardless of a department’s overall enforcement style, however, individual officers will evidently make personal adjustments.

This overview of research on arrest discretion demonstrates that despite its volume and variety, nearly all the factors examined pertain only to the officer’s work-related roles. We will now turn to writings on officer motivation, and will see that they limit themselves in the same manner.

WRITINGS ON MOTIVATION AND JOB DESIGN

Theories of worker motivation have influenced reform-minded police administrators since the early twentieth century (Fogelson, 1977). Each theoretical trend from scientific management forward has successively made its way into police

management texts (e.g. Vollmer, 1931; Smith, 1940; Wilson, 1950; Leonard and More, 1951; Iannone, 1970; Munro, 1974; Whisenand, 1981; Swanson et.al., 1988; Gaines et.al., 1991; More and Wegner, 1992; Holden, 1994; Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997). And though these theories are arrayed as a progression toward broadened humanistic understanding of the worker, none fully recognized the influence of private, extra-occupational concerns.

Still, many motivational theories appearing in police texts offer insight into self-interested arrest adaptations, even without making this connection. For instance, these texts present such classic management theorists as Taylor (1916), Fayol (1949), and Weber (1946), who viewed economic incentives as the worker's prime motivator. The classic perspective anticipates the officer who would seek end-of-tour arrests that maximize overtime. Yet if police administration literature mentions overtime at all, it is in regard to fiscal management, not motivation.

Discussions of police motivation, like overviews of worker motivation generally, have tended to downplay financial motives in their enthusiasm for more humanistic outlooks. Most begin by describing the famous Hawthorne experiments which gave rise to the "Human Relations" movement (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). These studies were considered the first "scientific" evidence that workers respond to social incentives, particularly from researchers and coworkers. The Hawthorne employees, organized in teams, controlled production rates through cooperation between more and less skilled workers, and held common agreement to not be a rate-buster, a slacker, or a "squealer." Such peer cooperation has been observed in many police ethnographies, and plays a

critical part in arrest-control. Yet police management texts never associate the “universal” attributes of Hawthorne workers and the “subculture” of officers.

From the human relations approach evolved “content” theories of motivation, which related productivity to the fulfillment of human needs. Best known, in both organizational literature and police texts, is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Maslow, 1943). Maslow proposed that individuals, in their many endeavors, must satisfy basic physiological needs, such as sleep, sex, and security, before striving to fulfill higher-order goals such as esteem, personal growth, and self-actualization. His theory would seemingly predict that officers working a double shift, or anticipating a “hot” date, or faced with foreclosure, would make arrest decisions responsive to these “lower” needs. The theory would also predict that officers whose higher needs are more readily satisfied off-duty would make arrest decisions that ease access to these loftier satisfactions. Yet discussions of Maslow in police texts often downplay policing’s physical demands, or assume that physiological and security needs are satisfied by a reliable paycheck and pension. Such texts rightfully urge supervisors to address officers’ higher order needs, but they never acknowledge that officers with higher-level post-work interests may prefer, or even arrange, a dull, uneventful tour.

Unlike Maslow’s model, other content theories presented in police management literature mostly restrict themselves to the occupational environment. For instance, Argyris’ Maturity-Immaturity Theory (1957) charged bureaucratic organizations with alienating its members by encouraging such child-like traits like passivity, short perspective, and narrow interests and abilities. Police texts, in presenting Argyris’ quest for maturity, disregard outside avenues of growth.

Along similar lines, McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y (McGregor, 1960) held that the worker is molded by management assumptions either to become an "X" who resists innovation and challenge, or a "Y" who seeks them out. Policing texts duly recognize that the typical police agency takes a Theory X approach, eliciting minimal, routine work through punitive discipline. They fail to note that this X environment can inspire officers to display Y-style resourcefulness, not only in pursuing their private aims, but in manipulating their patrol behaviors to accommodate these aims.

Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene Theory (Herzberg, 1968) also is specifically aimed at workers. It classifies their concerns as either "hygiene factors" that control worker dissatisfaction, such as salary, job security and working conditions, or "motivators" that provide job satisfaction, such as growth, recognition, and advancement. Though Herzberg's theory is widely cited in organizational and police texts, some have noted its lack of empirical support. Specifically, studies have consistently challenged the connection of satisfaction and performance, or have found that a given factor (e.g., working overtime) may satisfy one employee and dissatisfy another, or satisfy and dissatisfy the same employee at different times (Munro, 1974; Wilson, 1989).

Alderfer's (1972) variation on Maslow's theory consolidated human needs into three levels, Existence, Relatedness, and Growth. These motivate the individual interactively, so that a neediness at a higher level would lead to striving both at that level and the one below. Thus, according to one police management text, officers stymied in their pursuit of higher aims could channel their efforts toward lower-level gains (More and Wegener, 1992). The text missed the implication that this ability of officers to redirect their focus could also lead them to outside pursuits.

Individual motivational differences, so evident in arrest behaviors, are central to McClelland's Acquired Needs Theory. McClelland (1961) posited that each person is driven by needs for achievement, affiliation, and power, with one of the three needs predominant. Policing texts urge supervisors to attend to these differences in their officers so as to fit them to appropriate assignments. In practice, of course, a sergeant turning out ten assorted officers in patrol cars cannot make such distinctions. Some officers will meet their dominant need by emphasizing various patrol tasks, some by working their way into more fulfilling positions, and some by pursuing outside satisfactions. But again, police management texts fail to recognize external need-fulfillment.

Another approach to motivation within the human relations school emphasizes not its content, but its process, that is, the cognitive dialog preceding it. Best known is Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964), which appears in a number of policing texts. It proposes a formula whose elements are based solely on the worker's perceptions: Motivation is the product of the expectancy that one possesses both the ability and opportunity to perform an act, the instrumentality of the act in achieving a reward proffered by management, and the valence, or negative or positive value of each particular outcome. Vroom's model has been applied only to work-related variables, but theoretically it can include outside factors as well.

Only one study, concerning drunk drivers, has applied Vroom's formula to arrest decisions (Mastrofski, Ritti, and Snipes, 1994). It found that officers' ability factors accounted for 10% of variation in arrest rates, and opportunity factors accounted for 7%; instrumentality accounted for only 3% of arrest variance (though a statistical adjustment

for different departments may account for this). All organizational “rewards” had a negative effect on arrest except “overtime funding.” Overall the expectancy model accounted for about 26% of arrest variance, and organizational variables accounted for about another 13%.

Some researchers have applied only some elements of Expectancy Theory to police behavior. Van Maanen (1975) measured the perception among recruits that “working especially hard” would lead to rewards from the organization. He found that as this expectancy dimmed over thirty months, their motivation to work decrease significantly, to a level approaching that of a control group of veteran police officers. In a study by Guyot (1991), officers reported that only such intrinsic rewards as pride in their work motivated them, since organizational recognition and reprimand were both rare. Brown (1988) reported that officers mentally balance the intrinsic reward of good police work with the fear of getting a reprimand. These findings, like the DUI arrest study, demonstrated the weak link between officer performance and expectation of organizational reward.

Police management books conclude from Expectancy Theory that supervisors should clarify goals and how to achieve them, link the achievement to organizational rewards, minimize conflicting expectations, and determine which organizational rewards are important to which individuals. This advice, typically, ignores outside expectations and goals, even though they may be key to understanding and controlling subordinates.

Equity Theory (Adams, 1965) is another process model that has been applied to police officers. It posits that workers compare their own job inputs (e.g., skill, experience, training, personal characteristics) and job outcomes (e.g., pay, benefits,

recognition, or promotion) to similarly situated coworkers. They will be uncomfortable when they perceived inequities, and react by changing either their inputs, their evaluations of input and outcome, their target of comparison, that target's input, or (by leaving the job) their entire situation. Police management books offer the example of patrol officers who, to compensate for the superior salaries or perquisites of officers in details, will either work harder to get a special assignment, or, more frequently, will reduce input through absenteeism and diminished effort. No text reviewed noted that bottom-rung patrol officers also may strive for equity through arrest-control techniques that confer extra pay, desirable schedules, and better working conditions.

Reflecting humanist theories, police management texts cite a number of studies indicating that traditional policing falls short of satisfying officers' upper-level needs (e.g. Lefkowitz (1973, 1974; Cacioppe and Mock, 1985; Angell, 1971; Guyot, 1991). Some studies cited suggest that officers with higher education especially suffer from a perceived lack of autonomy and accomplishment under policings's mechanistic structures (Mottaz, 1983; Griffin, Dunbar, and McGill, 1978). Police texts advance various ideas from managerial literature on job redesign, including job enlargement (including different of tasks of similar difficulty), job enrichment (including related tasks of greater skill), and job rotation (moving the worker among different assignments). These approaches are incorporated in Hackman and Oldham's widely-discussed Job Characteristics Model (1975), which identifies five dimensions of psychologically motivating work: skill variety, task identity (completion of a whole piece of work from beginning to end), task significance, autonomy, and feedback.

Policing texts also draw upon Systems Theory (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Thompson, 1967) in advocating openness to the community and responsiveness to other criminal justice agencies. Texts apply Contingency Theory (Hackman, Porter and Lawler, 1975; Luthans, 1976) in recommending adaptive organizational structures to accommodate either stability-seeking or growth-seeking workers. But these texts fail to note an important implication of these theories as well. That is, for police departments to be open, adaptive systems, they must respond to a changed economic environment. For instance, with the advent of the two-income police household, each partner must share domestic responsibilities. When there is a “hot” job market, officer might do better financially in a number of other occupations. Police agencies that limit officers’ earnings, make their private lives unmanageable, or impose negative working conditions risk losing their employees to the private sector (Butterfield, 2001).

Most police management authors concede that actual attempts to make fundamental changes in police work have often been disappointing. In the mid-1970s, Team Policing was introduced in a number of departments. Officer teams with expanded investigatory and community affairs tasks were assigned to steady patrol areas under mid-level supervision. However, few departments sustained these innovations. New York City introduced Neighborhood Police Teams in 1971, but the local precincts alternately absorbed and resisted them (Walker, 1983; Silverman, 1999). The Community Policing movement, popularized in the late 1980s, similarly featured organizational decentralization and flexibility as a way to engage the community in crime prevention (Trojanowicz and Buquerox, 1990). It promised officers variety, autonomy, task identity, and other “job characteristics” said to make police work fulfilling. The

Community Policing movement also embraced the Open-systems/Contingency tenet of responsiveness to community concerns. Yet as with Team Policing, this initiative suffered from management's reluctance to cede the necessary authority to the community "beat cop" (Rosen, 1999). Police agencies also failed to adhere to Contingency Theory's principle of fitting organizational style to worker, unrealistically expecting traditionally-minded officers to transmute into creative problem-solvers with a personable, "democratic" style (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997). In New York City, community policing also was undermined by the Department's zero-tolerance approach to minor offenses, producing diminished crime reductions and eroded citizen support (Rosen, 1999; Barstow, 2000). In sum, police work has yet to be restyled as a path to self-fulfillment, leaving officers to pursue this quest outside the Department.

WHY ADAPTIVE ARREST BEHAVIOR HAS BEEN OVERLOOKED

Since most research on worker motivation is confined to the workplace, it is no surprise that police applications of this research also are restricted to job-related variables. But how is it that studies which directly observe arrest behavior also fail to note the influences of the officer's personal life? Given the volume of such studies, this question must be addressed.

One can look to the researcher's larger culture, where the dramatic image of arrest obscures its quotidian realities. This unique authority to use "non-negotiable force" against fellow citizens is central to our visceral reaction to the officer (Bittner, 1967). Arrests "keep a lid on" society's problems, making the officer a "Rorschach in uniform" for projected grievances (Niederhoffer, 1967; Walker, 1993). Arrests are the "battle statistics" touted by police agencies to rally public support (Smith, 1982;

Manning, 1977). Arrests also provide climactic moments in TV and movie entertainment. (Holden, 1994; Kroes, 1985). All this takes its toll on objectivity.

In addition, arrest presents tantalizing paradoxes to those of a philosophical bent. It is an unparalleled authority, but it is delegated to modestly-educated, entry-level civil servants. It is among democracy's most profound intrusions upon its citizen, yet it is a routine event. It reins in the evildoer, but may stigmatize the innocent. It expresses universal morality, or indulges private peeves. It furthers justice, or perpetuates inequity. Scholars who by nature are drawn to profound issues would have difficulty seeing arrest as determined by a desire to buy a new television or attend a Knicks game.

Perhaps an even stronger factor is the political climate 1960s and early '70s, when most arrest-related studies were done. Many common police practices were declared unconstitutional by the Warren Court in those years. Police abuse of Black citizens was officially cited as the spark for race riots in many cities. Radical leaders demonized police and equated the soaring crime rate with political resistance. Officers clashed regularly with student activists, who brazenly broke laws to draw attention to social issues (Walker, 1983). College-based scholars were in the thick of this ferment - decoding police subculture, advising crime commissions, developing "radical criminology." They were highly unlikely, in these circumstances, to develop a "cop-as-everyman" perspective.

Officers, like their agencies, make little effort to demystify themselves. They resist the deflating truth that they mostly perform service tasks (Reiss, 1971, Brown, 1988; Manning, 1999). Write Skolnick and Woodworth (1967:129), "When a policeman can engage in real police work - act out the symbolic rites of search, chase, and capture -

his self image is affirmed and morale enhanced.” According to Goffman (1959), most professions highlight their dramatic attributes and conceal activities and motives incompatible with an idealized image. Their “stage” selves present cohesive performances and hide colleagues’ errors, while their “backstage” selves play out other social realities. Police officers (and well as surgeons, prizefighters, and violinists) have an advantage in displaying their dramatic attributes and concealing what is “out of character,” since many of their core work tasks are “wonderfully adapted” to such showmanship.

This self-promotion must be kept in mind when we consider that the majority of arrest studies originated with ride-along observers who wishfully believed officer performances were “real.” Undoubtedly, the officers had presented their interpretation of normative police behavior (i.e., “what it takes to get the job done”), and concealed incompatible, extra-occupational concerns. Any discussions of hot dates, family gatherings, and car payments were no doubt conducted “backstage” and out of earshot.

Even if some discussion of adaptive arrest behavior were heard, it literally would not have registered. This is because the major ride-along studies, by Black and Reiss, Sykes and Clark, PSS, Piliavin and Briar, and Erickson, used survey instruments that focused on the situational dynamics at each encounter, in keeping with the social control paradigm. The questionnaires included some personal traits thought relevant to this model, such as officer race, education, or experience, but not such extra-occupational attributes as financial need, post-work plans, or personal aversions.

These omissions were replicated as these data sets were analyzed and reanalyzed in subsequent research. The original Black-Reiss data collected in 1966 were mined for

findings by Black and Reiss (1970), Black, (1971), Reiss (1971), and Freidrich (1977, 1989). The initial Sykes-Clark ("Midwest City") data gathered in 1970 were used by Lundman (1974, 1979) Lundman et al. (1978) and Sykes et al. (1976). The Police Services Study data collected in 1977 were analyzed by Smith (1984, 1986, 1987), Smith and Klein (1983, 1984), Smith and Visher (1981); Smith, Visher, and Davidson (1984), Visher (1983), Worden and Pollitz (1984), and Worden (1989, 1995).

Thus a confluence of factors blinded the researcher to the full dimensions of the arrest decision: the culture at large, scholarly attraction to "big" explanations, political climate, participants who were skilled dissemblers, and research methods that first foreclosed alternative explanations and then fed off the circumscribed data.

III. ARREST PROCESSING IN THE NYPD

PRECINCT PROCEDURES

The average arrest made in New York City in 2001 took 9.57 hours to process, and cost \$174.68 in overtime. Nearly 95% of adult arrests made in New York are “on-line” cases, that is, prisoners held in police custody for about twenty-two hours awaiting arraignment before a judge. The rest are mostly Desk Appearance Ticket (D.A.T.) cases, wherein select low-level offenders are issued a future court date and then released on their own recognizance. Under typical conditions, patrol officers take the arrestee to the station house in the precinct where the offense occurred. (Sometimes they first must take the prisoner to a facility for blood-alcohol testing, or to a hospital for medical treatment or psychiatric evaluation.) Officers report to the Desk Supervisor, who logs in the prisoner’s pedigree information, physical condition, and personal property or evidence confiscated. They next fill out an On-line Booking Sheet and Precinct Complaint Report (a “61”), each of which has over one-hundred captions. Much of the same arrest information is then written on additional forms such as a Property Voucher, Supporting Deposition, Medical Treatment of Prisoner, Stop and Frisk Report, Request for Lab Analysis, and Aided Card. Lest some document be forgotten, officers may also prepare an Arrest Documentation Checklist (the “Form Form”).

The majority of officers cannot input their own arrest data into the On-Line-Arrest System. Designed almost two decades ago, OLBS is so idiosyncratic that only very regular users know all its “tricks.” The system lacks the most basic word-processing features, and many entries cannot be changed without re-typing entire sections. “Error” messages regularly flash on screen, without offering a clue as to what is wrong. Thus

the typical officer must find a staff member willing and able to input their reports and provide the serial numbers.

With these numbers, officers now can electronically fingerprint and photograph the prisoner. Paperwork must be completed within about three hours, and faxed or hand-delivered to the District Attorney's Intake Office. The officer then must confer with an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) or a surrogate officer-deponent, who draws up the primary arraignment document, the Complaint Affidavit.

With on-line cases, each of six processing stages is tracked in the On-Line-Prisoner Arraignment system. Introduced to locate specific processing delays (inevitable in so convoluted a system), the OLPA system has become yet another management tool to determine or deflect blame. And while OLPA helps keep detainees from getting "lost in the system," its logging procedures add to the length and expense of processing.

REQUIREMENTS OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES

Though the NYPD's Criminal Justice Bureau oversees arrest processing city-wide, each borough prepares complaint affidavits through widely varying procedures established its own district attorney and administrative judge. Their offices set policies regarding whether to impose additional arrest forms, whether officers will be interviewed in person, by video, by phone, or by interactive computer, and who among the arresting officers, ADAs or officer-proxies will operate the complaint-writing software. These offices also control how many Intake ADAs and arraignment judges will be working, and until what hour. These decisions, combined with differences in staffing, equipment, and prisoner volume, create inter-borough disparities in arrest-processing speed and difficulty. At the extremes, we find that the mean arrest-to-complaint-sworn time (when

the arresting officer has completed the final arrest processing task) was 8.10 hours in Queens, but 11.35 hours in Staten Island (C.J.B., 12/2001). An overview of on-line arrest volume and arrest-to-complaint-sworn times is as follows:

Table III-1

***On-line Arrests and Average Arrest to-Complaint-Sworn Times
in each Borough and City-Wide in 2001***

<i>Borough</i>	<i># of On-line Arrests</i>	<i>Arrest-to-Complaint-Sworn Time</i>
<i>Manhattan</i>	91,393	10.48 hrs.
<i>Brooklyn</i>	82,300	8.28 hrs.
<i>Bronx</i>	50,082	10.68 hrs.
<i>Queens</i>	49,527	8.10 hrs.
<i>Staten Island</i>	8,406	11.35 hrs.
<i>City-Wide</i>	289,708	9.57 hrs.

To further complicate matters, these arrest processing policies have a different impact depending on the tour. Arresting officers on the 4-to-12 shift who don't finish their paperwork before the D.A.'s Intake Office closes for the night will be rescheduled to finish processing on the day tour. Most officers dislike being rescheduled, because it disrupts their sleep patterns and personal schedules while affording no overtime. But if they make an arrest just before their regular day off, and are rescheduled, they must be paid a sizable amount of overtime. Moreover, if the officers have plans for the following evening, being rescheduled can jibe perfectly. So we find, for instance, that every Saturday night before the yearly Super Bowl, there is an increase in arrests and subsequent reschedules, allowing the arresting officers to finish processing well before Sunday's big game.

In contrast to those on the 4-to-12 shift, officers on midnights end their tour as the DA's Intake Office opens, and are never rescheduled. Their arrests have the highest potential for overtime, and in the past, the "heavy hitters" who made the most arrests

gravitated to these hours. Whether this is still the case is explored in this study. Presently many officers appear to seek the midnight tour because, aside from paying ten percent higher salaries, it allows them to work a day job or to get their children off to school in the morning. The arrest overtime may be less of an incentive, since, during the study, officers were frequently assigned overtime tours in the Department's separately funded "CONDOR" enforcement initiative, or in details stemming from the 9/11/01 attack on the World Trade Center.

IMPACT OF OPERATION CONDOR AND THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACK

CONDOR, begun in 1999, had flooded precinct commanders with overtime, but also has pressed them for impressive enforcement numbers. Officers complained of being repeatedly scheduled for extra tours, under specific orders to produce summonses or low-level arrests for targeted offenses. These directed operations afforded few of the "arrest control" avenues normally available to officers. At the same time, these overtime activities may well have decreased the pressure to make arrests while doing routine patrol, and may have made officers that much more eager to get off work whenever they could.

The World Trade Center attack had a far broader effect on patrol officers' arrest habits. On the morning of September 11, 2001, virtually every member of the N.Y.P.D. commenced working twelve-hour tours for as many as seven days a week. Some officers continued to work overtime details at Ground Zero, bridges and tunnels, city landmarks, and other "sensitive locations," through the time of the study (April through June, 2002). Officers' paychecks swelled, and their desire for routine arrest overtime was replaced by the desire to simply go home. Moreover, this period was marked by lower crime rates, as even habitual offenders were shocked into behaving.

IV. METHOD

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The foregoing “field study” and supporting literature suggest that arrest processing decisions are heavily influenced by officer needs that originate outside their police identity. The present research aimed to describe and quantify the elements of this phenomenon, through an anonymous survey of officers themselves. The survey addressed the following issues: What personal concerns give rise to arrest-related needs for overtime money, schedule-control, or avoidance of arrest-processing difficulties, and how strong are these concerns? How, and how often, do officers actually go about seeking or avoiding arrests? How are arrest-related personal needs linked to arrest-seeking and arrest-avoiding behaviors? Do these adaptive behaviors vary with gender, tour, and arrest processing duration? How do the personal concerns of officers rank in importance compared with other, well-studied arrest factors? Are instances of arrest-making or avoidance planned in advance, and then engineered through the style of patrol and the type of intervention? What arrest-related attitudes accompany adaptive behaviors? Finally, how are adaptive arrest behaviors influenced by management?

SURVEY STRUCTURE AND DERIVED VARIABLES

The survey developed for this study appears in Appendix A. It had 84 items, some of which presented a series of related questions. Most of the items offered scalar selections – either integers from zero to ten, percentages at 10% increments, or ordinal selections such as “Never” through “Always.” Other items offered categorical choices, or solicited word or numerical fill-ins. The variables explored were as follows:

Items 1 through 22 gathered data on the participants' **work situation**. The first two questions concerned time as an officer and time in present command, two measures of patrol experience. Item 3 asked officers to rate the level of crime in the area they patrol, a possible indicator of how participants may view the importance of arrest-making. Item 4 solicits participants' regular tour, which may differentially affect both on- and off-duty activities. Item 5 asked the frequency of assignment to patrol, revealing which officers regularly work the streets and which are "House Mice" who rarely leave the police station. Item 6 had participants write the assignments comprising a typical work week, to further clarify each officer's duties and degree of arrest-making autonomy. Item 7 asked how many days per week they work with the same partner, since a steady partner would presumably facilitate a participant's "arrest-control." Item 8 asked participants to rate their level of difficulty in finding an arrest; to see if this is a factor in actual arrest-making. Item 9 established the most recent month when participants worked on full duty for fifteen or more tours, as a reference period for the two next questions. Item 10 solicited the number of arrests made that month, a key variable used often in the analysis to examine differences between arrest-seekers and arrest-avoiders. Item 11 asked participants the number of arrests their partners made that month, to determine if these figures tended to be disparate or similar to those of the participants. Items 12, 13 and 14 requested the specific amount of overtime hours earned from arrest and non-arrest sources, as earnings of the latter type may relate to earnings from the former. Items 15 and 16 asked participants about their arrest rates and overtime earnings relative to coworkers, to see the extent to which officers acknowledge deviating from the "norm" set by their peers. Item 17 sought officers' percentage of overtime

taken in time, as opposed to cash. Items 18 and 19 examined overtime as an end-of-tour arrest incentive by asking the proportion of arrests made in the second half of the tour, and arrests made in the last hour of the tour.

The next four items concerned **financial situation and arrest overtime need**. Items 20 through 22 presented scaled rating for financial aspiration, percent of income from non-police sources, and overtime opportunities outside of arrests made on patrol. These were examined in relationship to Item 23, need for overtime money from arrests made on routine patrol.

Items 24 through 31 concerned **officer time constraints and the need to leave work at end-of-tour**. The degree of time-demand was measured by the general frequency and three-hour-post-work frequency of six types of constraints: family commitments, school needs, second jobs, social engagements, other appointments, and commuting concerns. Item 29 explored the specific nature of the commuting concerns. Item 31 asked the overall frequency of the officer's need to end work on time, in order to gauge how often participants felt this need and determine which types of time constraints most contributed to it.

The next three items probed **elements of arrest processing perceived as unpleasant or risky**. Items 32 and 33 listed, respectively, eight negative aspects of arrest's administrative procedures and eight negative aspects of handling prisoners, asking how often each was a concern for the officer. The two items also solicited "other" administrative and prisoner-handling concerns. Item 34 measured overall arrest-processing aversion by asking how often the participant was "turned off" to making an arrest because of its actual or potential discomforts and risks.

The next two items examined **arrest-seeking adaptations aimed at making overtime**. Item 35 presented thirteen arrest-seeking methods, asking how frequently the officer engaged in each. The Item also requested descriptions of “other methods” of arrest-seeking for overtime. Item 36 sought the overall frequency of using arrest-seeking method for overtime.

Items 37 through 39 considered **arrest-avoidance adaptations stemming from sign-out need and processing aversions**. Item 37 was structured like Item 35, only it asked the frequency of use for each of twelve arrest-avoidance methods. Items 38 and 39 asked, respectively, for the overall frequency of adaptations for sign-out need and the overall frequency of adaptations for processing aversions.

Item 40 examined **personal need factors relative to other arrest determinants**. Thirty possible arrest considerations were presented. Thirteen related to officers’ personal needs, while four more reflect the officer’s concern for cooperative interaction with peers. The remaining thirteen were either situational factors or organizational factors that in previous studies had appeared to play a role in arrest discretion. “Other” arrest-making determinants were also requested. Participants were asked how often each factor was important in their arrest decisions.

The next section dealt with **arrest-making and pre-incident arrest proclivity** – the question of whether arrests are sometimes planned, orchestrated events. Items 41 requested the time elapsed since the most recent arrest, to select only those participants whose recollections were reasonably fresh. Items 42, 43, and 44 asked the offense involved, whether the supervisor initially responded, and whether the arrest was unavoidable, factors suggestive of the officer’s freedom of choice in the situation. Three

indicators of arrest proclivity then followed. Items 45 and 46 had participants rate, respectively, the start-of-tour desire for an arrest and the effort to make an arrest while on patrol. Item 48 measured the proactiveness of intervention, asking participants to select from among seven ways they may have initiated their last arrest (or to describe an “Other” method.) The seven interventions ranged from those completely proactive and self-initiated to those completely reactive and unavoidable. Finally, Item 48 asked officers to rate twelve major personal, situational, and organizational factors that may have weighed in the arrest decision.

Items 49 through 55 concerned **declined arrest and pre-incident arrest proclivity**, addressing the question of whether arrest-avoidance also is sometimes engineered by officers. The section used the same variables as those in the preceding section on arrest-making and prior arrest proclivity.

Item 55 examined officers’ **attitudes toward arrests**, as these may factor into adaptive arrest behavior. Participants were asked to select their level of agreement with 15 statements, eight expressing cynical or self-interested attitudes, and seven expressing positive, “professional” views.

In the next four sections the survey delved into management’s influence on adaptive arrest behaviors. Four Items explored the **patrol supervisors’ immediate effect on subordinates’ adaptive patrol behaviors**. Respectively, 57 and 58 asked the percentage of time patrol supervisors are present when arrests are made and percentage of time patrol supervisors are present arrests are declined. Items 59 and 60 asked the percentage of the time supervisors overrule participants’ wishes to make an arrest and the

percentage of the time supervisors overrule participants' wishes to decline an arrest arrests.

Examined next were **management initiatives to limit processing time for individual arrests.** Items 61 had officers write how much time participants are allowed to process their arrests, and 62 and 63 ask them to rate the adequacy of the time allotment and the strictness of enforcing the time limit. Items 64 through 66 presented frequency scales for supervisors reassigning participants' late arrests to other officers, supervisors reassigning other officers' late arrests to the participants, and participants having problems with the ordered turned-over arrests, which participants were then asked to describe. For comparison, Items 67 through 69 then presented similar scales for participants' arranging to give another officer their arrest, arranging to take another officer's arrest, and having problems with arrests they voluntarily took from other officers, which they are asked to describe.

The next six items concerned **management suppression of "extremes" in adaptive arrest rates.** Items 70 asked how many months out of the last twelve participants reached their overtime "cap." Item 71 had participants identify from a list of sanctions their own consequences of being capped, and select from a list of possible reactions their own responses to management sanctions against high overtime. Items 72 and 73 followed a similar question pattern for low arrests.

The last section explored the **personal characteristics and family life of the officers.** Its ten Items collected data on gender, race/ethnicity, age, education, household structure, and special family-related needs. Finally, Item 84 asked officers to comment on their approach to arrest-making or any other aspect of the study.

HYPOTHESES AND RATIONALES

Below are the hypotheses that were tested in this study. After every variable is the survey item(s) by which it is operationalized. Each hypothesis is then followed by a brief review of its underlying rationale.

1. **Personal Traits and Arrest-Related Needs:**

Hypothesis 1.1:

Officers who report upward economic aspirations (# 20), few outside sources of income (# 21), and few structured opportunities for overtime (# 22) will also report a high need for overtime money (# 23).

Rationale:

The author's field observations, as well as the literature (e.g., Kroes, 1985; Acuri et al., 1987; Barker, 1999) suggest that many officers' basic salaries cannot match their rising middle-class aspirations. Personal observations also suggest that officers who have regular access to non-arrest overtime, or overtime from arrest details (coordinated arrest "sweeps" by teams of officers, aimed at a specific type of offense) are less inclined to pursue arrest overtime on patrol. Similarly, officers with second jobs seem less interested in arrest overtime. Walsh (1986) found in the precinct he studied that the group of officers who made the fewest felony arrests had the greatest proportion of individuals with off-duty employment and the largest share of wives employed full-time, suggesting that arrest overtime was less of a priority for these officers.

Hypothesis 1.2:

Officers who report frequent commitments related to dependent family members (# 24) school (# 25), second jobs (# 26), social engagements (# 27), other personal business (#28), and commuting (# 30), will also report a frequent need to end their tour on time.

Rationale:

On numerous occasions, officers with whom the author worked expressed a desire to avoid “getting stuck” at the end of their tour for each of the above reasons. Other studies of officers report time conflicts stemming from family commitments (Walsh, 1986), educational pursuits (Vila & Tiaji, 1999), secondary employment (Kroes, 1985; Violanti & Aron, 1985), social engagements (Blumberg and Niederhoffer, 1985) and carpools (Forbell, 1973).

Hypothesis 1.3:

Officers who report greater and more numerous concerns over unpleasant or risky aspects of administrative arrest procedures (# 32) and/or prisoner contact (# 33), will also report a greater aversion to arrest processing (# 44).

Rationale:

Police officers are famously reluctant to reveal their fears and insecurities to outsiders (Goffman, 1959; Manning, 1999). Yet the author’s lengthy observations suggest that they are as eager as other mortals to avoid exhaustion, embarrassment, and danger - all prospects in the arrest-making process. Unexpected human or technical problems may extend processing into the following day. Complexities of the arrest may expose officers’ weak procedural knowledge or poor writing ability. Prisoners may pose a range of physical, emotional, disciplinary, and legal risks. These concerns have also been noted by other observers (e.g., Sykes, Fox & Clark, 1976; Kroes, 1985; Vinglis et. al., 1986; Mastrofski & Ritti, 1992; Vila & Tiaji, 1999).

2. Personal Needs and Adaptive Arrest Behaviors:

Hypothesis 2.1:

Officers who report a greater need for arrest overtime money (# 23) will also report more frequent use of arrest-seeking adaptations aimed at making overtime (# 36).

Rationale:

The officers observed by the author used a variety of techniques - at roll call, while cruising on patrol, at the scene of incidents, and even after hauling in the suspect – to control arrest-making and processing. The diverse ways officers generate and avoid arrests also have been described by Sherman (1980), Hernandez (1981), Brown (1988), Bayley and Garofalo (1989), Walker (1993), Manning (1996), and Barker (1999).

Arrest overtime was an ongoing quest for officers and worry for management throughout the author's employment with the NYPD. Specific connections between arrest-seeking behaviors and the desire for arrest overtime income have been noted by Van Maanen (1983), Walsh (1986), Mastrofski, Ritti, and Snipes, (1994), Murphy (1996), and Foley (2000).

Hypothesis 2.2:

Officers who report a greater need to end their tour on time (# 31) will also report more frequent use of arrest-avoiding adaptations aimed at timely sign-out (# 38).

Rationale:

Many officers with whom the author had contact eschewed arrest-making because of post-work commitments. The link between officers' outside commitments and arrest-avoiding adaptations has been suggested by Wilson (1968), Blumberg & Niederhoffer (1985), Walsh (1986), and Forbell (1973).

Hypothesis 2.3:

Officers who report a greater aversion to processing arrests (# 34) will also report more frequent use of arrest-avoidance adaptations to avoid arrest-processing burdens (# 39).

Rationale:

The author found that officer feelings of fatigue, fear, or diffidence, though less openly discussed than post-work commitments, clearly led to arrest-avoidance in some instances. Studies by Vingilis et. al. (1986), Brown (1988) and Mastrofski and Ritti, (1992) have also connected such personal discomforts to arrest decisions.

3. Personal Needs relative to Situational and Organizational Arrest FactorsHypothesis 3:

Officers will report that in potential arrest situations, they assign as much importance to major personal concerns of arrest overtime need (# 40 k), sign-out need (# 40 n-r), and arrest-processing aversion (# 40 x & y) as they do to the most consistently significant situational variables of offense level (# 40 a), suspect demeanor (# 40 d), or complainant preference (# 40 h).

Rationale:

The prominence of personal arrest factors noted by the author stands in stark contrast to the situational and organizational focus of previous research. In a list compiled by Riksheim and Chermak (1993) of over one hundred arrest factors already investigated, only one (having a working wife) related to officers' personal lives. Yet Riksheim and Chermak also note that the more sophisticated methodologies of recent studies have revealed that many variables have far weaker effects than were earlier reported. Thus it is plausible that even the most consistently significant factors of offense

level, complainant preference, and suspect demeanor might be less of an arrest determinant than the most salient personal concerns of overtime money, sign-out time, and processing problems.

4. Arrest Decisions and Pre-Incident Arrest Proclivity

Hypothesis 4.1:

Most officers will report that their most recent decisions to arrest, if freely made, were preceded by an initial intent to arrest (# 45), arrest-seeking behaviors (# 46), and proactive intervention (# 47).

Hypothesis 4.2:

Officers will report that their most recent decisions to decline arrest, if freely made, were preceded by an initial intent to not arrest (# 52), arrest-avoiding behaviors (# 53), and reactive intervention (# 54).

Rationale:

This author's experience suggests that on any given day, officers begin with a predisposition to either make or avoid arrest, which influences how they plan to patrol, which situations they handle, and what outcomes will ensue. Similarly, Conlon (2004) reported that early in their tour, New York City Housing police officers would ask each other who was looking for an arrest that day. Although this conflicts with the traditional, incident-focused view of arrest decisions, the research on police behavior can well support this alternative model. Studies describe the tactics officers devise to increase or avoid arrest-making (Sherman, 1980; Black, 1980; Brown, 1981, 1988; Hernandez, 1981; Van Maanen, 1983, Bayley and Garofalo, 1989; Walker, 1993, Manning, 1998; Barker, 1999). They consistently find that proactive interventions are more likely to lead

to arrest (Black 1971; Friedrich, 1977; Lundman, 1974; Riksheim and Chermak, 1993). They widely recognize that officers have great discretion in many potential arrest situations (Wilson, 1968; Davis, 1969; Blumberg and Niederhoffer, 1985; Walsh; 1986; Manning, 1996).

5. Adaptive Arrest Behaviors and Attitudes toward Arrests.

Hypothesis 5.1:

Officers who report agreement with cynical or self-serving attitudes toward arrests (# 56 c, d, f, h, i, k, l, & m) will also report more adaptive arrest behavior (# 36, 38, & 39).

Hypothesis 5.2:

Officers who report more disagreement with professional attitudes toward arrest (# 56 a, b, e, g, j, n & o), will also report more adaptive arrest behavior.

Rationale:

The author often heard expressions of disillusionment with arrest used to rationalize self-interested arrest behavior, and such comments were in keeping with the findings of other observers. Cynicism toward both fellow human beings and the job itself allows officers to rationalize illegitimate activities (Niederhoffer, 1967). Officers find that arrests can be intrinsically unsatisfying (Wilson, 1968; Karmen, 1997; Pollack, 1997; Walker, 1993; Manning, 1996). They are also disillusioned by the role of “politics” in the arrest process. (Skolnick, 1966; Rubinstein, 1973; Van Maanen, 1975; Arcuri, 1977; Wilson, 1974, 1989; Guyot, 1991; Walker, 1993; Manning, 1996). If disillusionment with arrest does serve to justify adaptive arrest behaviors, it may correlate with higher frequency of such behaviors.

6. Adaptive Arrest Behavior and Gender

Hypothesis 6.1:

Female officers (# 74) will report less frequent assignment to patrol (# 5) than male officers.

Hypothesis 6.2:

Female officers (# 74) will report more frequent family commitments (# 24) than male officers.

Hypothesis 6.3:

Female officers (# 74) will report a more frequent need to end their tour on time than male officers (# 31).

Hypothesis 6.4:

Female officers (# 74) will report fewer overtime-generating adaptations (# 36) than male officers.

Hypothesis 6.5:

Female officers (# 74) will report more arrest-avoiding adaptations aimed at timely sign-out (# 38) than male officers.

Rationale:

The author's observations of female officers suggest that despite choosing a "masculine" occupation, many were as torn between career and family as other working women (Machionis, 2001, Schwartz, 1989). They seemed more likely to have sole custody of children, more preoccupied by family matters, more eager to get home on time, more likely to have inside assignments, and more inclined to pass on their arrests than are their male counterparts. Conversely, the female officers who made frequent

arrests rarely seemed to be primary caretakers of young children. Research from the 1980's indicated that gender had no effect on arrest behavior (Worden, 1989), but these studies may have looked only at behavior in the field, not at avoidance of arrest-prone assignments or the passing off of arrests to other officers. Martin (1993) speculates that female officers' lower arrest rates may reflect a tendency to mediate rather than escalate confrontations, or to allow male partners to take credit for arrests. These explanations easily coexist with the thesis that women officers' parenting role leads to arrest-suppressing adaptations such as calming combatants and passing arrests to fellow officers.

7. Adaptive Arrest Behaviors and Tour

Hypothesis 7.1:

Officers on the midnight tour (# 4) will report more arrest-seeking adaptive arrest behaviors (# 36) than officers on the day or evening tour.

Hypothesis 7.2:

Officers on the midnight tour (# 4) will report more arrest-avoiding adaptive arrest behaviors (# 38 & # 39) than officers on the day or evening tour.

Rationale:

Midnight shift has been described as “the petri dish of police misconduct” (Baker, 2001). The hours isolate officers from civilian contacts, and inspire a conspiratorial closeness with coworkers. Fewer superiors are looking over their shoulders. Places catering to illicit desires bustle with activity. The streets are empty except for those too marginalized to credibly complain of police abuse. Such anomic, vice-ridden surroundings are said to attract rogue officers and corrupt decent ones (Lundman, 1980).

Thus we might find that officers on midnights more brazenly display adaptive arrest behaviors than officers on other tours.

8. Adaptive Arrest Behaviors and Borough Processing Duration

Hypothesis 8.1:

Officers from the Bronx, the major borough that affords the highest arrest overtime, will report more arrest overtime-seeking adaptations (# 36) than officers from Queens, the borough where arrest processing affords the lowest overtime.

Hypothesis 8.2:

Officers from the Bronx, the major borough where arrest processing is most arduous and disruptive to personal life, will report more arrest-avoiding adaptations (# 38 & # 39) than officers from Queens, the borough where arrests are least arduous and disruptive.

Rationale:

Of all five city boroughs, Queens has the shortest arrest-to-complaint-sworn time, 8.1 hours, while the Bronx has second longest, 10.7 hours (next to the atypical, three-precinct borough of Staten Island, where arrest-to-complaint-sworn time was 11.1 hours). Queens arrests average \$91.68 in overtime, while the Bronx averages \$124.37 (in 2001). This suggests that officers in the Bronx can anticipate two-and-one-half hours more overtime money, disruption to their personal life, and processing adversity than their Queens counterparts. Therefore, the Bronx officers may manifest more adaptive arrest behaviors.

9. Adaptive Arrest Behaviors and Managerial Response.

Hypothesis 9.1:

Officers will report that the patrol supervisor is usually not present before an arrest is made (# 57) or at any time when an arrest is declined (# 58).

Hypothesis 9.2:

Officers will report that patrol supervisors very rarely reverse officers' decisions either to arrest (# 59) or to not arrest (# 60).

Rationale:

The author, like other patrol supervisors, found it impossible to respond to every radio-dispatched assignments that had “arrest potential.” Thus when arrests were declined by officers, she was unlikely to learn of it. When arrests were made and reported on radio as required, she often arrived at the scene after the first critical moments, to find a suspect in handcuffs and hear the officer’s account of what transpired. To challenge this *fait accompli*, especially in front of onlookers, was to invite problems. Many other observers recount police supervisors’ difficulties in monitoring scattered patrol units (Banton, 1964; Manning, 1996) and countermanding subordinates’ decisions (Rubenstein, 1973; Van Maanen, 1983; Brown, 1988). In other organizations as well, first-line supervisors faced with pressures to show “productivity” find that they must make compromises with subordinates in return for their cooperation (Downs, 1967; Wilson, 1989).

Hypothesis 9.3

Officers will report that their last-hour arrests were rarely reassigned (# 64), and were sometimes processed and prosecuted less effectively when reassigned (# 66).

Rationale:

In 1995, the New York City Police Department tried to save overtime costs by issuing “Guidelines for ‘Turn-over Arrests’” (1995). It directed the supervisor to reassign late-in-tour arrests to an officer on the incoming tour in select instances, often where the original officer had no critical involvement in the actual incident. Anecdotal evidence suggests this policy’s limitations. In many precincts the incoming tour would be too short-staffed to spare an officer to process the earlier arrest. Also, when an arrest was turned over, the new officer would later prove unfamiliar with details of the case, hindering processing and prosecution of the arrest.

Hypothesis 9.4:

Officers will report that when sanctioned for having high arrest overtime, they were more likely to react in ways management did not intend than in ways management intended.

Hypothesis 9.5:

Officers will report that when sanctioned for making few arrests, they were more likely to react in ways management did not intend (# 71-3 , -6, -7, -8) than in ways management intended (#-71-2 , -5).

Rationale:

The author routinely witnessed resistance toward higher management’s attempts to control arrest behavior. High-arrest officers who were barred from scheduled overtime opportunities vowed to make up the money by “milking” as much arrest overtime as possible. Those denied arrest-making assignments because of overtime declared their intention to reduce all types of productivity. Officers pressured to make arrests often responded by making a single minor or ready-made arrest (e.g., store security holding a

shoplifter), or would arrest in lieu of issuing a summons. This management focus on workers whose “numbers” draw negative attention is common in organizations (Wilson, 1989). Also typical are the workers’ reactions - stealing time, “foot-dragging,” and token compliance (Van Maanen, 1983). The greater the effort made to control subordinate officials, the greater their effort to evade or counteract such control (Downs, 1967).

SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE AND SUBGROUPS

With the Department’s permission (see Appendix B) the surveys were administered during In-Service Tactical (IN-TAC) Training, a mandatory two-day course that everyone of police officer and detective ranks attends once a year. Time for the survey was set aside on the second IN-TAC day, when the training schedule was lighter. Since each patrol command is proportionally allotted a set number of IN-TAC seats to fill each weekday, and selects from among officers scheduled to work until everyone has attended, those at IN-TAC may be considered an unbiased sample.

All seven of the IN-TAC sites designated for Patrol Bureau and Housing Patrol Bureau officers were included in the study. These sites served the eight N.Y.P.D. Patrol Boroughs, as follows:

Table IV -1
Survey Sites

<i>Location</i>	<i>Patrol Borough Served</i>
New York State Armory, 2366 5 th Ave	Manhattan North
Police Academy, 235 E. 20 th St.	Manhattan South
PSA #3, Flushing & Central Ave.	Brooklyn North
69 th Pct., 9720 Foster Ave.	Brooklyn South
D.O.T. Bldg., 92-33 168 th St.	Queens North & Queens South
49 th Pct., 2121 Eastchester Rd.	Bronx
Petrides School, 715 Ocean Terrace.	Staten Island

The surveys were administered on twenty-seven dates between April 12, 2002 and June 21, 2002, usually at two sites per day. The class sizes ranged from six to thirty-four officers. In selecting dates to visit each site, an attempt was made to make regular rounds, maintaining proportions of participants from each Patrol Borough similar to those found in the Department as a whole. The schedule was then adjusted on the day before an intended visit, because personnel shortages at officers' commands sometimes forced IN-TAC instructors to cancel the session or hold class with as few as five officers. When possible, the author avoided surveying very small groups, as they were inefficient and diminished the participants' sense of anonymity. Ultimately, as shown in Table IV-2, geographic representation came within three percentage points of each borough's combined Patrol Bureau and Housing Bureau figures (NYPD, 3/3/03):

Table IV-2
*Borough Distribution of Officers in Full Sample
and in NYPD Patrol and Housing Bureaus*

	<i>Sample N</i>	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>Patrol Bureau N</i>	<i>Patrol Bureau %</i>
Manhattan	205	31.3%	4,586	28.2%
Brooklyn	196	29.9%	4,926	30.3%
Queens	123	18.8%	3,067	18.8%
Bronx	110	16.8%	3,031	18.6%
Staten Island	21	3.2%	666	4.1%
<i>TOTAL</i>	655	100%	16,276	100%

It could be ascertained from the Sign-in Logs maintained at each IN-TAC site that 42 of the total 716 officers who attended were from non-patrol units such as Organized Crime, the Police Academy, the Court Section, and Support Services. Though some of these 42 chose to complete questionnaires, none were included in the study. This left 674

attendees eligible to participate in the survey: 617 from the Patrol Bureau and 57 from Housing Patrol Bureau. Of these 674, 655 officers, or 97.2%, filled out questionnaires. This sample represents about 4% of the approximately 16,000 officers assigned to the Patrol and Housing Patrol Bureaus (NYPD, 4/11/03). These 655 survey-takers are referred to as the *Full Sample*, abbreviated as *FS*.

Among the 655 in this Full Sample were two overlapping groups of officers who were outside the central focus of this study. First, there were the House Mice, those officers assigned to non-patrol positions such as community affairs, crime analysis, captain's clerical, and other administrative tasks. These 95 officers were separated based on Questionnaire Item 5, wherein they reported going on patrol twice a week or less. The second group eliminated comprised officers who were not in a position to make autonomous arrest decisions because they worked as part of a team, under direct supervision of a sergeant. These 74 "Team Players" were separated if they reported in Questionnaire Item 6 that in a typical week they were assigned at least once to Anti-Crime, Street Narcotics Enforcement, Razor, Tracer, or a Field Training. Thirty officers fell into both the House Mice and Team Player groups, so that a total of 139 officers were removed for separate consideration.

What remained was a *Core Sample*, or *CS*, of 506 participants: officers who performed regular uniformed patrol, alone or with a partner, with relative autonomy, at least three out of five days a week. They are the focus of most of the analyses in this study, as they make the vast majority of arrest decisions. From the Core Sample, several subgroups were also identified by arrest rate, gender, tour, and borough. Table IV-3 summarizes the selection criteria for the groups analyzed in this study.

Table IV-3
Derivation of Full Sample, Core Sample, and Subgroups

<i>Group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Selection Criteria</i>	<i>Item</i>
Full Sample (FS)	655	IN-TAC attendees from patrol commands who prepared surveys	# 5, 6
Core Sample (CS)	506	FS officers who patrol alone or with partner, 3 or more times/ wk.	# 5, 6
No-Arrest	151	CS officers who made no arrests in the previous month	# 10
High-Arrest	95	CS officers who made 3 or more arrests in the previous month	
Males	379	CS officers who are male	# 74
Females	68	CS officers who are female	
Midnights	88	CS officers from CS working 1 st Platoon, 11:05 pm-7:40 am.	
Days	173	CS officers working 2 nd Platoon, 7:05 am- 3:40 pm.	# 4
Evenings	171	CS officers working 3 rd Platoon, 3:05 pm-11:40 am .	
Bronx	79	CS officers from slowest-processing major borough, the Bronx.	top ^a
Queens	103	CS officers quickest-processing major borough, Queens.	

^a Borough of assignment was written in after questionnaires were collected.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE SURVEY

Because officers traditionally greet inquiries about their methods with a “blue wall of silence,” special efforts were made to secure participants’ cooperation. First, the IN-TAC instructor at each site introduced the researcher in his or her own words. Then the researcher, dressed in civilian clothes, personally distributed the surveys and read aloud the written introduction, “Information for Participants in this Study” (see Appendix A).

The introduction provided a consistent presentation that served several functions. It assured participants that the questionnaire, while appearing long, required only about thirty-five minutes to complete. It tied the survey to the widely-studied subject of police discretion, implying that such research was common and not a threat to participants. It gave advanced notice that the officers would be asked personal information. It pointed out several safeguards to their anonymity, including the absence of specific identifiers among the survey items and the procedure to return completed surveys, in sealed envelopes and in random order. The introduction emphasized that the study was not sponsored by the Police Department, but rather, was affiliated with John Jay College of Criminal Justice, a local institution generally regarded as sympathetic to officers. Finally, it offered several ways for officers to directly contact the researcher.

The participants were also told to help themselves at any time to refreshments (coffee, juice, bagels with cream cheese, fruit, cookies, and donuts) set up on a table in the classroom. These items were jokingly referred to as “the bribe,” and they indeed seemed to buy the officers’ good will.

After the survey was introduced, participants were allowed up to one hour to complete its 84 items. Officers reached the end of their 16-page questionnaire at a rate of better than 90%, despite being asked over 250 items of personal information.

HOW THE FINDINGS ARE PRESENTED

Officer responses yielded three types of information: descriptive data, tests of hypotheses, and additional inferential findings. These three kinds of results are discussed in the order from which they logically emerge from specific sections of the survey, with hypotheses distinguished by boxed italicized subheadings. Afterward, the results are

summarized according to the participant groups and subgroups to which they relate.

Because of missing answers, there were fewer responses for many items than the totals shown in Table IV-3. In presenting findings, the upper-case N denotes the number of officers in the Full Sample or Core Sample who provided answers to the item(s) under discussion. The lower-case n refers to the number of subgroup participants (drawn from the Full or Core Samples) who answered the item(s).

V.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FAMILY LIFE*(SURVEY ITEMS 74-83)*

As noted earlier, questions about officers' personal traits and home life were placed at the end of the survey, so that participants would better understand why such information was relevant to the study. Table IV-1 summarizes this data.

Table V-1***Personal and Family Characteristics of Core Sample****(N=506)*

<u>Age</u>				
	<u>N</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
	420	21-55	31.9	5.6
<u>Gender</u>				
			<u>N</u>	<u>Valid %</u>
	Males		379	84.8%
	Females		68	15.2%
	Total		447	100%
<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>				
			<u>N</u>	<u>Valid %</u>
	White		247	63.0%
	Black		39	9.9%
	Hispanic		94	24.0%
	Asian/Indian		8	2.0%
	Other		4	1.0%
	Total		392	100%

Personal and Family Characteristics of Core Sample (cont.)

Education

	<u><i>N</i></u>	<u><i>Valid %</i></u>
HS Diploma	48	10.7%
Some college, no degree	158	35.1%
Associate Degree	102	22.7%
B.A./B.S.	127	28.2%
Some grad school, no degree	10	2.2%
M.A./M.S.	5	1.1%
J.D./PhD.	0	0.0%
Total	450	100%

Living with Parents

	<u><i>N</i></u>	<u><i>Valid %</i></u>
Yes	91	20.0%
No	363	80.0%
Total	454	100%

Living with Spouse/ Partner

	<u><i>N</i></u>	<u><i>Valid %</i></u>
Yes	252	56.0%
No	198	44.0%
Total	450	100%

Living with Children

	<u><i>N</i></u>	<u><i>Valid %</i></u>
Yes	182	40.2%
No	271	59.8%
Total	453	100%

Personal and Family Characteristics of Core Sample (cont.)

Number & Ages of Children in Households with Children

	<u>N</u>	<u>Valid %</u>
1 child	67	38.1%
2 children	66	37.5%
3 children	36	20.5%
> 4 children	7	4.0%
Total	176	100%

Mean #	1.9	
SD	.93	
Mean Age	6.6	
SD	4.7	

Living with Special-Needs Adult

	<u>N</u>	<u>Valid %</u>
Yes	13	3.1%
No	401	96.9%
Total	414	100%

Living with another Adult Caregiver

	<u>N</u>	<u>Valid %</u>
Yes	28	6.8%
No	381	93.2%
Total	409	100%

Several personal and family characteristics have potential ramifications for arrest behavior. For example, a sizable group of Core participants did not have the 60 college credits that would be required for promotion to sergeant. In order to rise in rank, these

officers would need to attend college, and would have to control their work schedule to accommodate their classes.

About 43% of participants' households included children and/or dependent adults. Their needs may well conflict with the demands of police work, particularly among the 10.5% of such households where there is no spouse or live-in partner .

Under seven percent of those with children at home said they lived with another adult caregiver, such as a home attendant, nanny, or other relative. Asked to elaborate, 14 of 16 respondents described childcare arrangements that involved extended family. It may be that modest salaries or difficult hours limit the "professional" child care options available to most officers.

Household composition differed by gender, as shown in Table V-2. Most striking was the finding that only 4.8% of male officers were raising children without a partner, while 32.3% of female officers were facing this challenge.

Table V-2

Household Composition of Male and Female Officers in Core Sample

<i>"Yes" Responses</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>X²</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>p</i>
Living with Spouse/ Partner	248 (56.4%)	218 (58.3%)	30 (45.5%)	1	3.76	.092	.053
Living with Children	178 (40.2%)	147 (39.0%)	31 (47.0%)	1	1.49	.058	.223
Living with Spouse/ Partner & Children	160 (90.4%)	139 (95.2%)	21 (67.7%)	1	22.21	.354	<.001

From this demographic portrait, it appears that a substantial proportion of officers may experience conflict between arrest-making and the demands of their personal lives.

VI.

WORK CHARACTERISTICS

(SURVEY ITEMS 1–20)

Since basic patrol is the starting position in the typical twenty-year police career, it was no surprise that the Core Sample officers surveyed had a mean career length of 6.1 years ($SD = 4.97$, $N = 500$). The newest officer had ten months with the Department, and the most senior had close to 21 years. The mean time that participants had been at their present commands was 4.9 years ($SD = 4.11$, $N = 497$). Forty-eight officers, or 9.7%, had been at their present commands for their entire career. Participants generally viewed their command's crime level as being moderately high, rating them on a zero-to-ten scale at 6.2 ($SD = 2.17$, $N = 503$).

Most officers were assigned to one of the three basic platoons (sometimes referred to as Midnights, Days, and Evenings) as indicated in Table VI-1.

Table VI-1

*Usual Tours of Core Sample**(N = 506)*

<i>Tour</i>	<i>Hours</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
1 st Platoon (Midnights)	11:05 p.m. to 7:40 a.m.	88	17.6%
2 nd Platoon (Days)	3:05 p.m. to 11:40 p.m.	173	34.7%
3 rd Platoon (Evenings)	11:05 p.m. to 7:40 a.m.	171	34.3%
Other	various	67	13.4%
Total		499	100%

All 506 participants, in qualifying for the Core group, reported three or more patrol assignments per week; 423, or 83.6%, reported going on patrol every day.

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HYPOTHESIS 6.1: GENDER AND PATROL FREQUENCY

Female officers will report less frequent assignment to patrol than male officers.

Table VI-2 compares the assignments of male and female officers in the Full Sample. These 655 officers include the House Mice who patrol less than three times per week, and Team Players whose patrol activities are directed by their sergeant.

Table VI-2
Gender and Frequency of Assignment to Patrol for Full Sample
(N = 655)

Frequency & Valid Percent within Gender							
	<i>Rarely/ Never</i>	<i>1x/ mo-/ 1x-wk</i>	<i>2x/ Week</i>	<i>3x/ Week</i>	<i>4x/ Week</i>	<i>≥5x/ Week</i>	<i>Total^a</i>
Male	12 (2.6%)	20 (4.3%)	16 (3.5%)	28 (6.0%)	37 (8.0%)	350 (75.6%)	463 (100%)
Female	7 (6.5%)	15 (14.0%)	9 (8.4%)	10 (9.3%)	7 (6.5%)	59 (55.1%)	107 (100%)
Total	19 (3.3%)	35 (61%)	25 (4.4%)	38 (6.7%)	44 (7.7%)	409 (71.8%)	570 (100%)

Note. $X^2(5) = 28.973$, $V = .225$, $p < .001$.

^a Includes full sample of 655 officers, comprising Core & Non-Core Groups. Percentages may not equal total due to rounding.

There are clearly different rates of assignment to patrol for male and female officers, with the disparities most pronounced at the extremes. For instance, 6.9% of males versus 20.5% of females reported that they go on patrol once a week or less, while 75.6% of males and 55.1% of females reported patrolling five times per week or more. Cumulatively, only 71.1% percent of female officers from the Full Sample met the Core

Sample criterion of three or more patrol days per week, as compared to 89.6% of men. Pearson Chi-Square and Cramer's V values confirm that female officers' patrol frequency was significantly less than that of their male counterparts.

These differences might reflect a real or assumed superiority of women officers' office skills, so that supervisors routed them to in-house assignments. The survey could not determine whether female participants were better at certain desk-bound tasks than males, but it did reveal that the females did *not* have more education. The disproportion of women officers in non-patrol assignments did not seem to stem from their having children at home either, as their proportion of households with children was similar to that of the women who regularly patrol. The author suspects that some supervisors *and* some female officers may be complicit in gender stereotyping.

.....

Core participants were also asked to list their assignments in a typical five-day week. Table VI-3 first presents the Core Sample's seven most commonly named assignments, which accounted for 87.6% of responses. Included in "Other Posts" were over 40 additional positions, each under 2% of the total.

All seven posts entailed patrol. The mobile, two-officer Sector Car, comprising two-thirds of assignments, may be the most "arrest-prone" unit because it is usually the first to be assigned to crimes in progress, and is ultimately responsible for taking any unavoidable, unwanted arrest in its geographic sector. Other named assignments offer varying odds for arrest-making. The solo Foot Posts rarely are first on the scene, but they are sometimes assigned to take low-level arrests in order to keep the sector cars rolling. The Conditions Auto, like the Sector Car, responds to 911 calls, but does not have primary responsibility in any particular sector. The SP10 Car officers mostly respond to

Table VI-3
Core Sample Assignments Over 5-day Period
 (N = 506)

<i>Assignment</i>	<i>Times assigned over 5-Day Period</i>	<i>% of all Responses</i>
Sector Car	1683	66.5%
Patrol	74	2.9%
Foot/Summons	204	8.1%
Conditions Auto	66	2.6%
Sgt./Lt. Operator	58	2.3%
SP 10 Car	55	2.2%
Car/ RMP	52	2.1%
Other Posts	313	12.4%
Total	2530^a	100%^b

^a All 506 participants reported 5 days of assignments; 506 x 5 = 2530.
^b Sum of individual assignment percentages may not equal percentage total due to rounding.

past or non-emergency incidents. The Sergeant's or Lieutenant's Operator is expected to drive the supervisor for the entire tour.


Arrest-making may be easier for officers to control when they have a steady partner with compatible arrest-making inclinations. Of Core participants, 73.2% reported working with a regular partner at least three times a week, 62.2% has the same partner at least four times, and 52.8% had the same partner for five days a week (N = 500).

Officers may have two approaches to "partnering up." They might choose coworkers who are like themselves in arrest-making style. By doing so, laid-back partners would guarantee each another an uneventful tour, while aggressive partners

would take turns reaping arrest overtime. The second approach would be for officers to choose their opposites, so that when an arrest is made, it would be handled by the partner hungry for overtime and not by the partner eager to sign out or avoid the processing ordeal. To determine which approach is more common, participants were asked the number of arrests in the previous month made by partners.

Figure VI-1 shows the distribution of differences when partners' arrests were subtracted from participant's arrests. Most often the pairs matched each other in number of arrests. Only 10.5% of officers reported an arrest-making disparity greater than two. This suggests that officers choose partners who are similar in inclination to make or

Figure VI-1
***Differences between Arrests per Month
of Participants and their Partners***
(N = 487)




avoid arrests, not those who are compatibly opposite.

Though the vast majority of daily assignments offered arrest opportunities, Core participants reported a mean of only 1.6 arrests in their last full month worked ($SD = 1.9$). The distribution was quite skewed, as depicted in Figure IV-2. Specifically, 30.2%, or 151 officers (the No-Arrest group) reported zero arrests, and another 29.8 %, or 149 officers, reported one arrest. Only 94 officers, or 18.8%, made three or more arrests (the High-Arrest group), but they were responsible for about 54% of all arrests.

Figure VI-2

Number of Arrests Made in Last Full Month Worked
($N = 500$)



Male and female Core participants, who patrol regularly, reported statistically equal arrest rates. Only in the Full Sample did women average 1.2 arrests ($SD = 1.2$) as opposed to the male average of 1.6 ($SD = 1.9$), a significant difference: $t(233.17) =$

2.938, $p = .004$ This is apparently because the Full Sample includes the House Mice who patrol under three times per week, a group that is 39.2% female (as compared to the Core Sample, which is 15.2% female). Thus the disparity in arrest rates between females and males among officers in general appear to be the result of different rates of assignment to patrol, not different patrol behaviors.

Among the 86.6% of the Core group who worked the midnight, day, and evening tours, there were no significant differences in arrest rates. However, among the different boroughs of the city (Table VI-5), arrest rates varied significantly; $F(4, 495) = 2.914$, $MSe = 3.488$, $p = .021$. The highest arrests per month, 2.1, was in the Bronx, the borough most associated with high crime and poverty. The lowest arrest rate, 1.1, was in Staten Island, the borough that is most suburban in character. Significant differences were found between arrest rates in Manhattan and Queens, the Bronx and Brooklyn, and

Table VI-4
***Arrests per Officer in Last Full Month Worked
in the Five New York City Boroughs***
($N = 506$)

<i>Borough</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Bronx	79	2.1 ^a	2.0
Manhattan	154	1.7 ^{ac}	2.3
Brooklyn	152	1.5 ^{bc}	1.7
Queens	103	1.2 ^b	1.2
Staten Island	12	1.1 ^{abc}	1.1
Total	500	1.6	1.9

Note. Post-hoc testing for differences between boroughs with Fisher's LSD indicated with superscript next to means, Shared letters indicate no difference and different letters indicate significant differences at $p < .05$.

the Bronx and Queens. Staten Island showed no statistical difference from the other boroughs, probably due to its small number of survey participants.


The low rate of arrest does not appear to be related to a lack of arrest opportunities. Asked to rate the difficulty of finding an arrest, from 0 (*usually very easy*) to 10 (*usually very hard*), respondents produced a mean rating of 4.1 ($SD = 2.4$), suggesting that they found it somewhat easy. Figure VI-6 presents the distribution of scores, indicating that 48.1% of the officers gave “easy” ratings of 4 or lower, while only 25.3% gave “difficult” ratings of 6 or higher. Not even the No-Arrest group reported arrest-finding to be hard, rating the mean difficulty level at 4.9 ($SD = 2.6, n = 147$).

Figure VI-3

Ease or Difficulty Finding an Arrest

($N = 501$)

8. How easy or hard is it to find an arrest while patrolling in your command?



However, the High-Arrest group rated arrest-finding almost two points easier, at 3.1 ($SD = 2.3$, $n = 95$). This difference was significant; $t(240) = 5.389$, $p < .001$.

A need for overtime money would logically be an incentive for patrol officers to make arrests. Yet as discussed earlier, officers at the time of the survey had considerable overtime opportunities from other sources, such as the special enforcement initiative CONDOR and the many post-9/11 security details. Table VI-5 compares these various overtime sources, indicating that routine arrest-making was an inferior source of overtime in terms of both the percentage of officers involved and their average monthly earnings.

Table VI-5
Sources of Overtime

<i>Source</i>	<i>n responding</i>	<i>n getting OT from source</i>	<i>% getting OT from source</i>	<i>Mean OT hrs/month for those getting OT from source</i>	<i>SD</i>
Routine Arrest-Making	497	264	53.1%	10.9 hrs.	11.1
Other Sources (a + b):	484	321	66.6%	22.5 hrs.	25.5
a) Special Enforcement	491	159	31.8%	15.9 hrs.	11.5
b) Security / Special Events	489	275	56.0%	18.8 hrs.	24.7

Note. Participants may report more than one overtime source.


The Core Sample showed a strong inclination to take their time-and-a-half overtime in money rather than time. Asked to select to the nearest 10% the *time* portion of their overtime, participants averaged 18.9% of overtime in time instead cash ($SD = 25.6$, $N = 503$). This preference, illustrated by Figure VI-7, may reflect not only a need for cash but an abundance of vacation time (at least twenty-five days) afforded to NYPD officers.

Figure VI-4

Percent of Overtime taken in Time rather than Cash

(N = 503)

17. About what percent of overtime, if any, do you usually take in time rather than cash?



One obvious way to increase overtime is to make arrests close to the end of tour. If officers ignored this reality, they would make arrests at an even pace throughout their workday. As Table VI-8 indicates, participants reported that within the second half of their workday they made 50.8% of their arrests, not significantly greater than the 50% that would be expected. However, in the last hour, they reported making 25.1% of their arrests, more than double the 12.5% that would be anticipated in one out of eight hours of patrol. The arrest-making was even more accelerated among the High-Arrest group, who estimated making 27.5% of arrests in the final hour ($n = 92$. $SD = 26.3$). The No-Arrest group also preferred final-hour arrests, but to a significantly lesser degree, making 20.4%

Table VI-6
Percent of Arrests Made in 2nd Half and Final Hour of Tour

2nd Half						
<i>18. About what proportion of your arrests are made in the <u>second half</u> of your tour?</i>						
<i>N</i>	<i>Mean % in 2nd Half</i>	<i>Expected Mean %</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Sig.(2- tailed)</i>
495	50.8%	50%	25.6	.66	494	>.05
Last Hour						
<i>19. About what proportion of your arrests are made in the <u>last hour</u> of your tour?</i>						
<i>N</i>	<i>Mean % in 2nd Half</i>	<i>Expected Mean %</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Sig.(2- tailed)</i>
499	25.1%	12.5	25.3	11.15	498	<.001

of their arrests at that time ($n = 150$, $SD = 23.5$); $t(176.58) = -2.11$, $p = .036$. This suggests that the desire for overtime may influence last-hour arrest-making, particularly among those who make a lot of arrests.


VII.
FINANCIAL TRAITS
(SURVEY ITEMS 20-23)

At the time of the survey, NYPD officers were bitter about their salaries. The city had enjoyed rising prosperity and famously low crime rates during the 1990s, but its pay to police officers had stagnated, and lagged far behind police salaries in surrounding suburbs. It was not surprising therefore that when officers were asked to rate their ability

Figure VII -1

Attitude toward Present Finances
(N = 500)

20. *How do you feel about your present ability to afford the things you want?*




to afford the things they want (Figure VII-1), from 0 (*very able right now*) to 10 (*very eager to do better*), the respondents' mean rating was 7.7 ($SD = 3.0$), with 43.0% choosing the extreme score of 10. No-Arrest and High-Arrest officers expressed no significant difference along this scale.

Another element of officers' financial situation is the extent to which they have other sources of household income, such as a second job, spouse's salary, military service,

Figure VII-2

Percent of Household Income from Non-PD Sources
($N = 500$)

21. *What percent of your total household income come from sources other than your police salary, like a spouse's salary, second job, rental income, government subsidy, military service, rich parents, etc.?*




service, rental income, parental assistance, and so forth. The Core Sample's mean for such outside sources was 29.4% of total income ($SD = 28.1$). No-Arrest and High-Arrest officers displayed no statistical differences in mean percentage of outside income. As Figure VII-2 shows, for 34.4% of households the police salary was the *sole* source of income. Thus for the typical officer, the police paycheck appears to be a critical determinant of financial well-being.

Officers' perceived need for arrest overtime may also be related to the adequacy of non-arrest overtime. As had been shown in Table VI-5, about two-thirds of officers earned overtime from sources outside routine arrest-making, averaging about 23 overtime

Figure VII-3
Adequacy of Non-Arrest Overtime
($N = 501$)

22. How would you describe your present opportunities to earn overtime by means **other than** through arrest-making on routine patrol?



hours per month, as compared to only about half that number of officers earning routine arrest overtime and averaging just 16 hours per month. Yet, when asked to rate the sufficiency of these alternative OT opportunities, from 0 (*Never Enough*) to 10 (*Always Enough*), participants expressed their discontent with a mean score of 3.2 ($SD = 2.6$). Figure VII-3 shows that the most frequent response, from 17.8% of respondents, was 0, or “Never Enough.” Statistically similar scores were reported by No-Arrest and High-Arrests groups.


Having reported overall dissatisfaction with their police income, critical dependence on that income, and inadequacy of overtime sources outside routine arrest, officers were asked a final financial question, about their need for overtime money from arrests made on routine patrol. In a range from 0 (*Never any real need*) to 10 (*Always a great need*), the mean response was a slightly needy 5.4 ($SD = 3.3$). Figure VII-4 shows a bimodal pattern of answers, with 17.9% of officers selecting a noncommittal midpoint of 5 and 16.9% selecting the extreme score of 10.

The No-Arrest officers congregated on the low-need side of the scale, with a mean score of 4.5 ($n = 148$, $SD = 3.3$), while the High-Arrest officers were a full two points higher, at 6.5. ($n = 93$, $SD = 2.8$). This disparity was significant; $t(220.642) = -5.02$, $p < .001$. Thus we see that No- and High-Arrest officers differ in their perceived need for routine arrest overtime even though they are alike in financial satisfaction, outside income, and opportunities for non-arrest overtime.

Figure VII-4

Need for Overtime from Arrests on Routine Patrol
(N = 498)

23. To what extent do you ***need overtime money*** from arrests on routine patrol?



HYPOTHESES 1.1: FINANCIAL TRAITS AND NEED FOR ARREST OVERTIME MONEY

Officers who report (a) greater dissatisfaction with present finances, (b) lower income from outside sources, and (c) fewer structured opportunities for overtime, will also report a higher need for overtime money.

A correlation matrix (Table VII-1) indicates that Core participants who were more dissatisfied with their present finances (i.e. more *eager to do better*) experienced a greater

need for arrest overtime. Officers who felt their overtime sources from other than routine arrest-making were less adequate also expressed a greater need for overtime through routine arrest-making. Officers' outside income, however, was unrelated to arrest overtime need. Thus parts (a) and (c) of the hypothesis are supported, but part (b) is not.

Table VII-1

Correlation of Financial Dissatisfaction, Non-PD Sources of Income, Adequacy of Non-Routine-Arrest OT, and OT Need from Arrests on Routine Patrol
(N = 506)

		<i>Non-PD Sources of Income</i>	<i>Non-Routine- Arrest OT</i>	<i>OT Need from Arrests on Routine Patrol</i>
<i>Dissatisfaction with Present Finances</i>	<i>r</i>	-.09*	-.18**	.26**
	<i>n</i>	494	497	494
<i>Non-PD Sources of Income</i>	<i>r</i>		.01	.07
	<i>n</i>		497	494
<i>Non- Routine- Arrest OT</i>	<i>r</i>			-.29**
	<i>n</i>			497

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$

Table VII-5 also indicates small but significant negative relationships between financial dissatisfaction and outside income and between financial dissatisfaction and adequacy of overtime from non-arrest OT sources.

VIII.
TIME CONSTRAINTS
(SURVEY ITEMS 24-31)

Personal commitments, such as family, school, second job, social events, and other appointments, may have the *general* effect of requiring the officer's time *whenever that time can be spared*, thus broadly discouraging any extension of the workday with an arrest. These same commitments, along with commuting difficulties, may also have the *specific* effect of demanding the officer's time *right after a given tour*, so as to directly induce the officer to avoid a delayed sign-out. Officers were asked how often these various personal concerns created a general and a specific time constraint. They were then asked how frequently these concerns, taken together, made them feel obligated to end their tour on time.

Table VIII-1, concerning general time constraints, and Table VIII-2, concerning specific time constraints, compare the Core Sample's monthly or weekly frequency of each concern. In the last column is a *Time Constraint Index* for the specific activity, derived by first assigning a point value to each frequency level (*Rarely/Never* = 0, *1-4x/month* = .5, *1x/week* = 1, *2x/week* = 2, etc.). That point value is then multiplied by the percentage of officers engaged in the activity at the respective frequency level, and the products are added across the row. Thus the maximum possible Index score for each activity, if 100% of officers selected the *5x/week* category, would be 500. Activities are listed in the table from highest to lowest Index scores.

Table VIII-1 suggests that care of children and family makes the greatest general demand on officers' time. Fully one-quarter of officers are care-givers for five or more

days per week. Dates or social engagements and other appointments were closely rated in second and third place. Much lower scores were given to the general time constraints of a second job and school.

Table VIII-1

Personal Commitments and Need to Leave Work in General

(N = 506)

24-30. About how often do you [attend to your commitment] in general?

A. Rarely/Never B. 1- 4 days /month C. 1 day /week D. 2 days /week
E. 3 days /week F. 4 days /week G. 5 or more days/week

<i>Commitment</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Number & Percent of Officers Engaged in Activity in General</i>							<i>General Time Constraint Index^a</i>
		<i>Rarely/ Never</i>	<i>1-4x / month</i>	<i>1x / week</i>	<i>2x / week</i>	<i>3x / week</i>	<i>4x / week</i>	<i>5x / week</i>	
Care for Children/ Family Members	504	214 (42.5%)	58 (11.5)	14 (2.8)	33 (6.5%)	47 (9.3%)	11 (2.2%)	127 (25.2%)	184
Dates/Social Engagements	504	53 (10.5%)	168 (33.3%)	66 (13.0)	97 (19.2%)	75 (14.9%)	27 (5.4%)	18 (3.6%)	152
Other Appointments	502	57 (11.4%)	195 (38.8%)	71 (14.1%)	87 (17.3%)	49 (9.8%)	15 (3.0%)	28 (5.6%)	138
Second Job	499	332 (66.5%)	55 (11.0)	16 (3.2%)	36 (7.2%)	29 (5.8%)	10 (2.0%)	21 (4.2%)	70
School/School Assignments	501	428 (85.4%)	13 (2.6%)	14 (2.8%)	18 (3.6%)	14 (2.8%)	5 (1.0%)	9 (1.8%)	33

^a Row sum of (Percent of Officers Engaged in Activity) x (Times per Week). Rarely/Never scored as 0, 1x/wk scored as 1, 2x/wk scored as 2, etc. Maximum possible General Time Constraint Index score is 500.

Table VII-2 compares those activities most likely to take place *within three hours after the end of tour*, and to thereby create a “must leave” mindset. Here, the Post-Tour Time Constraint Index reveals that concerns over commuting home far outweigh all others. Caring for children or dependent family members follows as an important post-tour time constraint, while appointments, social engagements, second jobs and school are substantially less important.

Table VIII-2

Personal Commitments and Need to Leave Work within Three Hours after Tour

(N = 506)

24-30. About how often do you [attend to your commitment] within 3 hours after your tour?

- A. Rarely/Never B. 1- 4 days /month C. 1 day /week D. 2 days /week
 E. 3 days /week F. 4 days /week G. 5 or more days/week

Commitment	n	Number & Percent of Officers Engaged in Activity 3 Hours Post-Tour							General Time Constraint Index^a
		Rarely/ Never	1-4x / month	1x / week	2x / week	3x / week	4x / week	5x / week	
Commuting Concerns	504	208 (41.3%)	38 (7.5%)	18 (3.6%)	27 (5.4%)	37 (7.3%)	25 (5.0%)	151 (30.0%)	210
Care for Children/ Family Members	494	268 (54.3%)	43 (8.7%)	18 (3.6%)	17 (3.4%)	34 (6.9%)	9 (1.8%)	105 (21.3%)	149
Other Appointments	487	167 (34.3%)	138 (28.3%)	65 (13.3%)	53 (10.9%)	41 (8.4%)	7 (1.4%)	16 (3.3%)	97
Dates / Social Engagements	489	180 (36.8%)	130 (26.6%)	62 (12.7%)	56 (11.5%)	40 (8.2%)	10 (2.0%)	11 (2.2%)	93
Second Job	479	389 (81.2%)	20 (4.2%)	10 (2.1%)	21 (4.4%)	21 (4.4%)	7 (1.5%)	11 (2.3%)	44
School / School Assignments	484	431 (89.0%)	13 (2.7%)	8 (1.7%)	12 (2.5%)	8 (1.7%)	5 (1.0%)	7 (1.4%)	24

^a Row sum of (Percent of Officers Engaged in Activity) x (Times per Week). Rarely/Never scored as 0, 1x /wk scored as 1, 2x /wk scored as 2, etc. Maximum possible Post-Tour Time Constraint Index score is 500.

The widespread concern over commuting home from work was probed in a separate question, summarized in Table VIII-3. There we see that of 314 reported time-related commuting concerns, 278 dealt with the woes of traveling by car, while only 49 concerned public transportation. Ten officers cited post-work commitments as a commuting concern.

participants felt they could not extend their tour on one or more days per week. Over one-fourth felt they could *never* extend their tour.

As might be expected, officers who made no arrests felt the need to leave work on time significantly more often than officers who made three or more arrests, as shown in Table VIII-5.

Table VIII-5

Overall Need to End Tour on Time of No-Arrest and High-Arrest Officers

31. Overall, how often do you feel you must end your tour on time because of any of the above commitments or concerns ?

Group	<i>Never/ Rarely</i>	<i>1-4x/ month</i>	<i>1x/ week</i>	<i>2x/ week</i>	<i>3x/ week</i>	<i>4x/ week</i>	<i>5x/ week</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>No-Arrest</i>	34 (22.5%)	19 (12.6%)	7 (4.6%)	8 (5.3%)	22 (14.6%)	16 (10.6%)	45 (29.8%)	151 (100%)
<i>High-Arrest</i>	22 (23.4%)	22 (23.4%)	5 (5.3%)	11 (11.7%)	13 (13.8%)	7 (7.4%)	14 (14.9%)	94 (100%)

$\chi^2 (6) = 13.174, V = .232, p = .040$

HYPOTHESIS 1.2: PERSONAL TIME CONSTRAINTS & NEED FOR TIMELY END-OF-TOUR

Officers who report frequent time constraints related to (a) dependent family members, (b) school, (c) second jobs, (d) social engagements, (e) other personal business, and (f) commuting, will also report a frequent need to end their tour on time.

Table VIII-6 shows significant positive correlations between Core officers' personal commitments and their desire to end their tour without delay. Not surprisingly,

Table VIII-6
Correlation between Officer Commitments and Need for Timely End of Tour

<i>Commitment</i>		<i>Need for Timely EOT</i>	
		<i>r_s</i>	<i>n</i>
Commuting Concerns	...within 3 hours of end-of-tour	.44***	502
	... generally	.30**	503
Care for Children / Family Members	...within 3 hours of end-of-tour	.35***	493
	... generally	.25***	501
Other Appointments	...within 3 hours of end-of-tour	.30***	486
	... generally	.18***	503
Dates/Social Engagements	...within 3 hours of end-of-tour	.23***	488
	... generally	.12**	498
Second Job	...within 3 hours of end-of-tour	.21***	478
	... generally	.078	500
School / School Assignments	...within 3 hours of end-of-tour	.09*	483
	... generally		

* Correlation is significant to .05 level (2-tailed).
 ** Correlation is significant to .01 level (2-tailed).
 *** Correlation is significant to .001 level (2-tailed).

activities scheduled for within three hours after tour were always more closely associated with the desire to leave work than the same activities engaged in generally.

Commuting, the most common of the post-work time concern (see Table VIII-2), was also the issue most highly correlated with need for timely end-of-tour. Commuting problems thus may have a broad, chronic, arrest-suppressing effect, given the facts that (1) dense traffic and road construction are endemic to New York City, and (2) officers are allowed by long-standing NYPD policy to reside in remote counties.

The correlation between care of dependent family members and sign-out need was second-highest, both in general and within three hours of end-of-tour. This too has broad implications for arrest-making, given the extent of childcare obligations (see Tables V-1 & V-2). The next highest correlation, both generally and three hours post-tour, was between other appointments and sign-out need. These non-social appointments, such as going to the dentist, may have less of an impact on arrest-making, since they are relatively infrequent (Tables V-1 & V-2). Slightly lower still were the correlations of post-tour dates or social events, and post-tour second jobs, with sign-out need. Here too, their low general and post-work frequencies (Tables V-1 & V-2) may help explain their decreased correlation with sign-out need. Involvement in college bore the smallest relationship to sign-out need, and was significant only when within three hours post-tour.

To summarize, all hypothesized correlations were significant except the general time constraints of school with sign-out need.

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HYPOTHESIS 6.2: GENDER AND FAMILY COMMITMENTS

Female officers will report having more frequent family commitments than male officers.

Earlier, Table V-2 revealed that proportionally more female officers than male officers lived with children, and that these females living with children were far less likely to have a spouse or partner at home than were the males living with children. This supports the prediction that female officers will more frequently need to take care of children or dependent family members, both in general and within three hours post-tour.

Table VII-7 bears out this hypothesis. The cross-tabulations show, for instance, that generally, 20.1% of male officers versus 47.1% of female officers provide five-day-a-week care for family members. Within three hours post-tour, 16.3% of men as opposed to 45.5% of women provide this daily care. Values for Chi-square and Cramer's V demonstrate significant gender differences in family-related commitments, particularly when post-tour.

Table VIII-7

Gender and Family Commitments

24. How often do you have to take care of children or dependent family members...

(a) ...in general (b) ... within 3 hours after your tour

<i>In-General</i> Number & Valid Percent within Gender (N = 447)								
	<i>Rarely/ Never</i>	<i>1x-4x/ Month</i>	<i>1x/ Week</i>	<i>2x/ Week</i>	<i>3x/ Week</i>	<i>4x/ Week</i>	<i>≥5x/ Week</i>	<i>Total^a</i>
Male	171 (45.1%)	45 (11.9%)	12 (3.2%)	26 (6.9%)	40 (10.6%)	9 (2.4%)	76 (20.1%)	379 (100%)
Female	21 (30.9%)	7 (10.3%)	1 (1.5%)	4 (5.9%)	2 (2.9%)	1 (1.5%)	32 (47.1%)	68 (100%)
<i>Post-Tour</i> Number & Percent within Gender (N = 440)								
	<i>Rarely/ Never</i>	<i>1x-4x/ Month</i>	<i>1x/ Week</i>	<i>2x/ Week</i>	<i>3x/ Week</i>	<i>4x/ Week</i>	<i>≥5x/ Week</i>	<i>Total^a</i>
Male	211 (56.4%)	36 (9.6%)	15 (4.0%)	11 (2.9%)	33 (8.8%)	7 (1.9%)	61 (16.3%)	374 (100%)
Female	28 (42.2%)	4 (6.1%)	0 (0%)	2 (.3%)	1 (1.5%)	1 (1.5%)	30 (45.5%)	66 (100%)

Note. For General Commitments, $X^2(6) = 24.67$, $V = .24$, $p < .001$. For Post-Tour Commitments, $X^2(6) = 32.41$, $V = .27$, $p < .001$.

HYPOTHESIS 6.3: GENDER NEED FOR TIMELY END OF TOUR

Female officers will report a more frequent need to end their tour on time than male officers.

As was previously shown, family-related commitments received high ratings for both their frequencies (Tables VIII-1 and VIII-2) and correlations with sign-out need (Table VIII-5). It also was revealed that women officers have more pressing family commitments than men (Table VIII-7). Nevertheless, when asked about their overall need to sign out on time, males and females responded similarly, as shown in Table VIII-8.

Table VIII-8

Gender and Need to for Timely End of Tour

(*N* = 446)

31. Overall, how often do you feel you must end your tour on time because any of the above commitments of concerns ?

<i>Number & Percent within Gender</i>								
	<i>Rarely/ Never</i>	<i>1x-4x/ Month</i>	<i>1x/ Week</i>	<i>2x/ Week</i>	<i>3x/ Week</i>	<i>4x/ Week</i>	<i>≥5x/ Week</i>	<i>Total^a</i>
<i>Male</i>	81 (21.4%)	61 (16.1%)	18 (4.7%)	36 (9.5%)	56 (14.8%)	38 (10.0%)	89 (23.5%)	379 (100%)
<i>Female</i>	16 (23.9%)	10 (14.9%)	2 (3.0%)	4 (6.0%)	7 (10.4%)	6 (9.0%)	22 (32.8%)	67 (100%)

Note. $X^2(6) = 4.22, V = .10, p > .05.$

That the hypothesis was not confirmed may be due to the number of more “gender-neutral” time constraints that contributed to the need for timely end-of-tour. Commuting concerns in particular may have diluted the gender-differentiated impact of family commitments, since commuting concerns were ranked highest both in post-tour frequency and correlation with sign-out need.

IX.

ARREST PROCESSING RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS

(ITEMS 32-34)

In the next section of the survey, participants were asked to rate various unpleasant aspects of arrest processing according to how frequently each one concerned them. They are then asked how often these discomforts and risks discouraged them from making an arrest.

As described earlier, these arrest-processing concerns were of two types: those relating to administrative procedures and those relating to the handling of prisoners. The magnitude of each concern was compared through its *Concern Index* score, derived, like the previous Indexes, by multiplying each concern rating (0 = *Never*, 1 = *Rarely*, etc.) by the percentage of officers in each rating category, and then adding the products. The maximum achievable Concern Index Score is 400, that is, 4 (*Always*), x 100%.

Table IX-1 displays Core Sample ratings for Administrative Concerns, ordered by their Index scores. The list reveals that the number-one fear among respondents was the “need to write lengthy or difficult narrative.” For 61.4% of officers, this was often or always a concern. This may reflect the weak writing skill of many officers, or the time it takes to compose a cohesive account. Either problem may lead to criticism from supervisors or prosecutors who review arrest paperwork.

The second greatest worry was testifying in court, with 59.9% calling it often or always a concern. This is perhaps because it involves spending hours in a seedy waiting area, and *then* submitting to scrutiny on the witness stand.

Fear of humiliation may also explain the third highest concern, that the officer

may make a mistake, look bad, or be reprimanded. This was often or always on the minds of fully 60.8% of officers.

Table IX-1

Concerns over Administrative Procedures

32. Below are aspects of the arrest-making's administrative procedures that may be unpleasant or risky. Please indicate the degree to which each item is a concern for you.

<i>Administrative Processing Problem</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Number and Valid Percent of Officers reporting...</i>					<i>Administrative Concern Index^a</i>
		<i>Never a Concern</i>	<i>Rarely a Concern</i>	<i>Sometimes a Concern</i>	<i>Often a Concern</i>	<i>Always a Concern</i>	
May need to write lengthy or difficult narrative	503	24 (4.8%)	31 (6.2%)	139 (27.6%)	175 (34.8%)	134 (26.6%)	272
May need to testify.	504	43 (8.5%)	39 (7.7%)	120 (23.8%)	162 (32.1%)	140 (27.8%)	263
May make mistake/ look bad /be reprimanded	502	49 (9.8%)	39 (7.7%)	109 (21.7%)	185 (36.9%)	120 (23.9%)	257
Procedures may be complex or confusing.	503	29 (5.8%)	64 (12.7%)	154 (30.6%)	154 (30.6%)	102 (20.3%)	247
May be disciplined for taking too long	502	74 (14.7%)	66 (13.1%)	115 (22.9%)	131 (26.1%)	116 (23.1%)	230
Arrest forms are boring and repetitious	503	90 (17.9%)	87 (17.3%)	110 (21.9%)	118 (23.5%)	98 (19.5%)	210
May need to go to different locations, e.g. DWI.	503	89 (17.7%)	74 (14.7%)	145 (28.8%)	134 (26.6%)	61 (12.1%)	201
Procedures are tiring, especially after working 8 hours.	503	65 (12.9%)	88 (17.5%)	189 (37.5%)	102 (20.3%)	59 (11.7%)	200
Staff with computer/ equipment skills may be unavailable.	502	172 (34.3%)	147 (29.3%)	102 (20.3%)	46 (9.2%)	35 (7.0%)	126
Computer /other processing equipment may be down	503	171 (34.0%)	154 (30.6%)	119 (23.7%)	36 (7.2%)	23 (4.6%)	118

^a Row sum of (Percent of Officers each Frequency Category) x (Frequency of Concern). Frequency of Concern scored from 0 (*Never*) to 4 (*Always*). Maximum possible Administrative Concern Index score is 400.

The next item, complex or confusing arrest procedures, was often or always a concern to 60.8% of officers. This may be a reaction to how frequently such procedures are amended by commanders, higher police executives, and ranking members of the prosecutor's office.

Being disciplined for taking too long followed on the list, often or always reported by 49.2% of officers. This issue was explored in later survey items 62, 63 and 64, wherein most officers stated that they are allowed from two to three hours for arrest processing (prisoner photos, fingerprints, medical screening, rap-sheet retrieval, and numerous arrest forms). They further reported that they usually have enough time to complete the procedures, but when they exceed time limits and incur extra overtime, they were likely to be disciplined.

The next biggest complaint was that arrest forms are boring and repetitious, with 43.0% of responses in the often or always category. As described in Chapter III, the basic Arrest Report Worksheet has over 100 captions. Officers must hand-write the same information on the arrest report, complaint report, medical treatment report, and often, property vouchers, requests for lab analysis, supporting depositions, and whatever additional forms the prosecutor's office requires.

Often or always, 38.7% of officers were troubled by the prospect of having to go to several locations. This arises when prisoners must be taken to the hospital, answer outstanding warrants from other city boroughs, or be tested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) at an outside facility. Officers face many extra hours of processing, and sometimes the additional discomfort of unfamiliar locations and procedures.

Nearly the same Index score was given to concern over fatigue. Thirty-two percent of officers reported that procedures are often or always tiring, especially after working eight hours. However, as discussed earlier, participants admitted making one-quarter of their arrests in the last hour of their tour (Table VI-6). Thus they themselves bear some responsibility for their late-tour fatigue, and cannot blame only the arduous arrest procedures.

The last two concerns were that staff with computer or equipment skills may be unavailable, and computers or other processing equipment may be down. Officers often depend on civilians or in-house arrest processing officers to input arrest data and take digital photo and fingerprints. In part this is because, as shown in Figure VI-2, many officers make less than one arrest per month, so that their skills grow rusty. This dependency is also due to computer programs so antiquated and cumbersome that only a regular user can master them. Thus when a staff member critical to arrest-processing is backlogged, out sick, on meal, or “has an attitude,” processing may be seriously delayed. To these personnel variables are added frequent mechanical problems, such as a faulty phone line, broken fax machine, shortage of toner, or downed computer link to central records. However, these human and technological delays are often or always of concern to only 16.2% and 11.8% of participants, respectively. Perhaps this is because such problems augment officers’ arrest overtime without subjecting them to blame.

Officers were also asked to describe any other administrative problems, and 140 of the 506 participants responded. Table IX-2 quotes some typical responses.

Table IX-2

Other Concerns Regarding Administrative Procedures: Typical Comments

Related to Listed Concerns
<p><i>Nobody knows what to do when asking something.</i></p> <p><i>Too many forms compared to other agencies.</i></p> <p><i>Working in different boroughs – everything is different.</i></p> <p><i>Reprimanded for mistakes with vouchers and property.</i></p> <p><i>Arrest processing officer never working.</i></p> <p><i>Some civilian employees are surly and obnoxious.</i></p> <p><i>Equipment outdated and inoperable.</i></p> <p><i>Paperwork not available, no film for camera, etc.</i></p>
Critical of Supervisors
<p><i>Being rushed to avoid OT.</i></p> <p><i>Overtime [requests] are scrutinized and kicked back for BS reasons.</i></p> <p><i>Stress of not getting treated fair from upper ranks.</i></p> <p><i>Supervisors who don't know what the hell they're doing.</i></p>
Critical of Assistant District Attorneys
<p><i>Everyone with a law degree wants their own form.</i></p> <p><i>Having to change affidavit.</i></p> <p><i>ADA dropping charge.</i></p> <p><i>ADAs don't answer phone for hours.</i></p> <p><i>Making an arrest around 2300 when the [ADAs go off-duty] and being told to do a day tour the next day.</i></p>
Other Issues
<p><i>Dirty work areas.</i></p> <p><i>Lack of training.</i></p> <p><i>Can't bring prisoner to Central Booking until prints clear; sometimes it takes 3-3.5 hrs</i></p> <p><i>Feel like your wasting time away from family – perps are usually let go in a few hours.</i></p> <p><i>There shouldn't be quotas. Arrests should be made when they are in front of you, not for the needs of the department.</i></p> <p><i>The [commanding officer] likes to change charges to improve numbers so he won't look bad at COMPSTAT and won't get yelled at by chief.</i></p>
Summary Comments
<p><i>Arrest processing is horrendous.</i></p> <p><i>The whole system sucks.</i></p>

Item 33 asked officers about prisoner-related problems in arrest processing. Like Table IX-1, Table IX-3 orders Core Sample responses by Index score, calculated in the same manner as were administrative problems. The maximum possible score is 400.

Table IX-3

Concerns over Prisoner-Related Problems

33. Below are aspects of *handling arrested persons* that may be unpleasant or risky. Please indicate the degree to which each item is a concern for you.

<i>Prisoner-Related Problem</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Number & Valid % of Officers reporting ..</i>					<i>Prisoner Concern Index^a</i>
		<i>Never a Concern</i>	<i>Rarely a Concern</i>	<i>Sometimes a Concern</i>	<i>Often a Concern</i>	<i>Always a Concern</i>	
Prisoner may be verbally abusive.	505	30 (5.9%)	54 (10.7%)	132 (26.1%)	159 (31.5%)	130 (25.7%)	260
Prisoner may make allegations (CCRB, IAB, etc.)	503	104 (20.7%)	61 (12.1%)	112 (22.3%)	137 (27.2%)	89 (17.7%)	209
Prisoner may be EDP/Drunk.	504	43 (8.5%)	85 (16.9%)	228 (45.2%)	109 (21.6%)	39 (7.7%)	203
Prisoner may be violent.	505	86 (16.9%)	69 (13.7%)	232 (45.9%)	81 (16.0%)	37 (7.3%)	183
Prisoner may try to escape.	503	158 (31.4%)	48 (9.3%)	90 (17.9%)	145 (28.8%)	62 (12.3%)	181
Prisoner may need to go to hospital.	503	87 (17.3%)	113 (22.5%)	197 (39.2%)	80 (15.9%)	26 (5.2%)	169
Prisoner may be filthy, have foul odor.	502	116 (23.1%)	151 (30.1%)	158 (31.5%)	57 (11.4%)	20 (4.0%)	143
Prisoner may be infectious (AIDS, TB, lice, etc.)	505	231 (45.7%)	117 (23.2%)	122 (24.2%)	24 (4.8%)	11 (2.2%)	94

^a Row sum of (Percent of Officers each Frequency Category) x (Frequency of Concern). Frequency of Concern scored from 0 (*Never*) to 4 (*Always*). Maximum possible Index score is 400.

Defying their thick-skinned public image, officers rated verbal abuse by prisoners as their most common concern. This might be explained by the fact that prisoners cannot

be left unattended, and sometimes berate officers relentlessly through every step of processing. Often, their requests for a phone call, a bathroom, a cigarette, or a dose of methadone – if not granted immediately - are followed by a stream of epithets. This behavior often or always bothered as much as 57.2% of officers.

The second most frequent worry was that the prisoner may make allegations to the Internal Affairs Bureau or the Civilian Complaint Review Board. For 44.9% of participants, there was often or always a possibility that a prisoner accuse them of stealing their property, or abusing them physically or verbally. The high rating reflects the potential career damage inflicted by such accusations. Under Department policy, supervisors must report all allegations to IAB and/or CCRB, or put their own jobs in jeopardy.

Nearly as great a concern were prisoners who may be drunk or emotionally disturbed. For 29.3% of respondents, this was often” or always” a concern. This may reflect the high proportion of arrestees who are agitated or ill from substance abuse, or who are mentally ill and have perhaps not taken their prescribed medications. The officer must move such prisoners through arrest processing using minimal force, though they may be incoherent, uncooperative, or combative.

A related fear was that the prisoner may be violent. Some 23.3% of participants often or always felt endangered by their prisoners. Many arrest procedures require the unarmed officer to be in close physical contact with the uncuffed detainee. But officer injury is not only negative consequence of a violent outburst. If the prisoner is hurt, he or she must be taken to the hospital. Moreover, IAB. and CCRB. must be notified, and may conduct an investigation.

The chance that the prisoner may try to escape is often or always a concern of 41.1% of respondents. This is higher than might be expected, given the rarity of escapes compared to the other listed prisoner-related concerns. The explanation may be that these incidents often receive embarrassing media attention, and are punished more severely than most other infractions.

Taking a prisoner to the hospital was often or always a concern for 21.1% of officers. Such trips are common among arrestees for a host of reasons: Injuries received during their crime or arrest, detoxification from alcohol or drugs, psychiatric examination, treatment of previous ailments like AIDS or gangrene, replacement doses of routine medication, or sometimes fabricated complaints. Officers must wait with their prisoners in non-secured emergency rooms, often for many hours, before returning to their commands to resume processing.

Prisoners who may be filthy or have a foul odor were often or always a concern to 15.4% of respondents. Such prisoners are usually homeless, and in an enclosed patrol car or arrest processing room, their physical condition may actually nauseate the officer. The probable reason officers ranked this as a lower concern is that they do not arrest these individuals unless they feel they have no choice.

Least often a worry was the possibility that the prisoner may have an infectious disease, with only 7.0% of officers often or always considering this danger. This may indicate an increased understanding of how HIV and AIDS are transmitted, as well as a wider availability of protective gloves and masks.

Forty-five officers described other prisoner-related concerns. Some typical comments are quoted in Table IX-4.

Table IX-4

Other Concerns Regarding the Handling of Prisoner: Typical Comments

Related to listed concerns

Accusations of racial profiling.
CCRB makes it possible for lawbreakers to retaliate against cops.
Prisoner suing officer.
Possibility of getting hurt.
EDPs at psycho ward; hospital connections should take them off our hands.
Arresting officer so busy with paperwork that it is impossible to watch prisoner.
Homeless prisoner using cell as bathroom.
Prisoner injured, handicapped, filthy.
Prisoner spitting at you, trying to bite.

Other Prisoner Issues

May have fingers not conducive to fingerprint machine.
Prisoners uncooperative - refuse info / prints.
Speaks foreign language only.
Prisoner who knows people on the Job.
Deception.
Prisoner has to pee every 5 minutes.

Critical of Shortages

Improper cells (lack of) for males/females.
Not enough cell area for prisoners.
Lack of in-house equipment (non-lethal-straps/tasers).

Critical of Supervisors

Boss angry at you for bringing in a skell [derelict] even when you have no choice.
Supervisors afraid to use [non-lethal] devices for fear of liability.
Supervisors may be intimidated by complaining prisoner and order voided arrest.

Fear of Mishap and its Disciplinary Consequences

What would happen if prisoner hung himself while A/O was busy with paperwork?
Razor blade hidden under tongue of shoe, found at Central Booking.
Property and prisoners - Best way to get jammed up.

.....

HYPOTHESIS 1.3: ARREST-PROCESSING CONCERNS & AVERSION TO MAKING ARREST

Officers who report more frequent and numerous concerns over unpleasant or risky aspects of administrative arrest procedures and/or prisoner contact will also report a greater aversion to making an arrest.

Tables IX-5 and IX-6 respectively list administrative and prisoner-handling problems, ordered by their degree of correlation to arrest aversion, or being “turned off” to arrest. They show significant relationships ($p < .001$) between aversion and both types of concerns, confirming the hypothesis.

Table IX-5
***Correlation between Administrative Processing Concerns
and Aversion to Arrest-Making***

<i>Administrative Processing Problem</i>	<i>r_s</i>	<i>n</i>
Procedures are tiring, especially after working 8 hrs.	.50***	501
Arrest forms are boring and repetitious	.44***	500
May be disciplined for taking too long	.41***	500
Procedures may be complex or confusing.	.39***	501
Staff w. computer/equipment skills may be unavailable.	.38***	500
May make mistake/ look bad / be reprimanded	.38***	500
May need to testify.	.35***	502
May need to write lengthy or difficult narrative	.35***	501
May need to go to different locations, e.g. DWI.	.35***	501
Computer/other processing equipment may be down	.31***	501
All Administrative Processing Problems ^a	.58***	491

^a Sum of participants' ratings for each administrative problem, correlated with arrest-making aversion.
***Correlation is significant to .001 level (2-tailed).

Table IX-6
***Correlation between Prisoner-Handling Problems and
 Aversion to Arrest-Making***

<i>Prisoner-Related Problem</i>	<i>r_s</i>	<i>n</i>
Prisoner may make allegations (CCRB, IAB, etc.)	.32***	501
Prisoner may need to go to hospital.	.31***	501
Prisoner may be filthy, have foul odor.	.29***	501
Prisoner may be EDP/Drunk.	.26***	503
Prisoner may be violent.	.24***	503
Prisoner may be verbally abusive.	.18***	503
Prisoner may be infectious (AIDS, TB, lice, etc.)	.18***	503
Prisoner may try to escape.	.15***	501
All Prisoner-Related Problems ^a	.33***	497

^a Sum of participants' ratings for each prisoner problem, correlated with arrest-making aversion.
 ***Correlation is significant to .001 level (2-tailed).

The last row of each table correlates, respectively, each participant's total ratings for administrative and prisoner concerns with his or her score for arrest aversion. They show that overall, administrative concerns are more highly associated with arrest aversion ($r_s = .58$) than are prisoner concerns ($r_s = .33$). Moreover, every administrative problem except equipment breakdowns is more closely linked to arrest "turn-off" than *any* unpleasant aspect of handling prisoners. This conforms to findings in the literature that police management is a major source of stress and resentment (Wilson, 1968; Niederhoffer, 1969; Kroes, 1985; Reuss-Ianni & Ianni, 1988; Manning, 1996).

It is also notable that the concerns that best predict arrest-avoidance are not necessarily the ones deemed most common (see Tables IX-1 & IX-3). For instance,

writing a lengthy or difficult narrative was rated the most frequent administrative concern, but the fatigue associated with lengthy procedures was the factor most related to arrest aversion. Similarly, verbal abuse was deemed the most common prisoner-handling concern, but prisoner allegations was rated highest as an arrest-deterrent.

X**ARREST-SEEKING AND ARREST-AVOIDING ADAPTATIONS***(ITEMS 35 – 39)*

The findings on officer finances, time constraints, and arrest-processing burdens suggest that officers have personal motives that lead them to seek and avoid arrests. Next to be explored were the *means* that may be used to control arrest-making.

ARREST-SEEKING ADAPTATIONS

Item 35 presented a list of 14 strategies to increase arrest overtime, asking how frequently each one was used. The Core Sample responses are listed in Table X-1, ordered by scores in the *Arrest-Seeking Index*. These are derived like previous index scores, by multiplying each rating (0 = *Never*, 1 = *Rarely*, etc.) by the percentage of officers in each rating category, and then adding the products. The maximum possible Index score is 400.

Table X-1 shows that participants used every overtime-seeking adaptation presented. Yet few officers – between 2.0% and 13.4% - applied any one overtime-seeking technique often or always. The low percentages in these categories probably reflect the generally low arrest rate among participants, and the array of arrest-seeking strategies available.

The responses suggest that officers patrol differently in the second half of their tour, when they are “looking” (i.e. arrest-seeking). Conversely, when officers are early in their tour and *not* looking, they perhaps are not at their crime-fighting best. They *do not* necessarily rush to crimes scenes, patrol on easy-arrest blocks, perform license-plate checks or investigatory stops, and try hard to find suspects, or engage in other self-directed activities.

Table X-1

Methods of Arrest-Seeking for Overtime

35. Below are methods officers might use to increase their arrest overtime. Please indicate the extent to which you may have used each method for the purpose of increasing arrest overtime.

<i>Method</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Number & Valid Percent of Officers who report using method...</i>					<i>Arrest-Seeking Index^a</i>
		<i>Never</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Always</i>	
Tried to arrive faster at crimes in progress in 2 nd half of tour	500	167 (33.4%)	143 (28.6%)	123 (24.6%)	53 (10.6%)	14 (2.8%)	121
Patrolled in areas known for easy arrests in 2 nd half of tour	502	178 (35.5%)	121 (24.1%)	148 (29.5%)	41 (8.2%)	14 (2.8%)	119
Tried hard to find suspects who left scene in 2 nd half of tour	500	184 (36.8%)	132 (26.4%)	132 (26.4%)	45 (9.0%)	7 (1.4%)	112
Made more MDT checks and/or car stops in 2 nd half of tour	501	183 (36.5%)	148 (29.5%)	116 (23.3%)	41 (8.2%)	13 (2.6%)	111
Asked officers for their unwanted arrests	502	191 (38.0%)	152 (30.3%)	127 (25.3%)	24 (4.8%)	8 (1.6%)	102
Tried to take domestic incident jobs in 2 nd half of tour	500	202 (40.4%)	156 (31.2%)	104 (20.8%)	32 (6.4%)	6 (1.2%)	97
Switched to assignment with good arrest opportunities	501	229 (45.7%)	148 (29.5%)	88 (17.6%)	26 (5.2%)	10 (2.0%)	88
Tried harder to get complainants to prosecute in 2 nd half of tour	497	244 (49.1%)	162 (32.6%)	64 (12.8%)	20 (4.0%)	7 (1.4%)	76
Looked for any minor violation In 2 nd half of tour	502	251 (50.0%)	159 (31.7%)	70 (13.9%)	14 (2.8%)	8 (1.6%)	74
Made more Stop/Question/Frisks in 2 nd half of tour	502	252 (50.2%)	168 (33.5%)	61 (12.2%)	19 (3.8%)	2 (.4%)	71
Followed up on every pick-up complaint in 2 nd half of tour	502	256 (51.0%)	164 (32.7%)	67 (13.3%)	13 (2.6%)	2 (.4%)	69
Tried to handle jobs before telling dispatcher in 2 nd half of tour	496	277 (55.8%)	162 (32.7%)	42 (8.5%)	11 (2.2%)	4 (.8%)	60
Issued a DAT instead of a summons in 2 nd half of tour	501	350 (69.9%)	112 (22.4%)	29 (5.8%)	5 (1.0%)	5 (1.0%)	41
Focused more on minority individuals who might be perps	500	384 (76.8%)	88 (17.6%)	18 (3.6%)	5 (1.0%)	5 (1.0%)	32

^a Row sum of (Percent of Officers in each frequency category) x (Frequency of Use). Frequency of use categories scored from 0 (*Never*) to 4 (*Always*). Maximum Index Score is 400.

The most questionable arrest-seeking tactics were the least common. Sometimes, often, or always, 11.5% of officers tried to handle jobs before alerting the dispatcher, allowing them to turn an incident into an arrest situation before a supervisor or other officers could influence the outcome. At least sometimes, 7.8% of officers issued a Desk Appearance Ticket instead of a summons, so that at a minor offender who ordinarily would be briefly detained at the scene would instead be arrested and held for six or more hours. And, at least sometimes, 5.6% focused more on minority individuals who might be perps, a practice akin to racial profiling.

The survey then asked how often per month or week officers used *any* overtime-seeking arrest techniques. As Table X-2 shows, 17.9% of participants stated they deploy such measures out of overtime need at least once per week. This somewhat infrequent use jibes with the infrequent arrest-making previously reported.

Table X-2

Overall Use of Arrest-Seeking Measures for Overtime

36. *How often overall do you take measures like those above to make arrests because you need overtime money?*"

<i>Number & Valid Percent of Officers</i>							
<i>Never/ Rarely</i>	<i>1-4x/ month</i>	<i>1x/ week</i>	<i>2x/ week</i>	<i>3x/ week</i>	<i>4x/ week</i>	<i>5x/ week</i>	<i>Total</i>
307 (61.9 %)	100 (20.2 %)	34 (6.9 %)	30 (6.0 %)	16 (3.2 %)	4 (.8 %)	5 (1.0 %)	496 (100%)

However, those in the No-Arrest Group use arrest OT-seeking tactics significantly less, and those in the High-Arrest Group use such tactics considerably more, as Table X-3 illustrates. For instance, 10.8% of No-Arrest officers as compared to 34.4% of High-Arrest officers use these measures at least once a week.

Table X-3

**Overall Frequency of Arrest-Seeking Measures aimed at
Increasing Overtime for No-Arrest and High-Arrest Offices**

(n = 238)

36. *How often overall do you take measures like those above to make arrests because you need overtime money?"*

	<i>Number & Valid Percent within No-Arrest & High-Arrest Groups</i>						<i>Total</i>
	<i>Rarely/ Never</i>	<i>1x-4x/ month</i>	<i>1x/ Week</i>	<i>2x/ Week</i>	<i>3x/ Week</i>	<i>4x-5x/ Week</i>	
<i>No-Arrest</i>	113 (76.4%)	19 (12.8%)	8 (5.4%)	4 (2.7%)	3 (2.0%)	1 (.7%)	148 (100%)
<i>High-Arrest</i>	40 (44.4%)	19 (21.1%)	10 (11.1%)	11 (12.2%)	6 (6.7%)	4 (4.4%)	90 (100%)

Note. $\chi^2(5) = 28.45, V = .346, p < .001.$

HYPOTHESIS 2.1: NEED FOR ARREST OVERTIME AND ARREST-SEEKING FOR OVERTIME

Officers who report a greater need for arrest overtime money will also report more frequent use of arrest-seeking adaptations aimed at making overtime.

Earlier, Figure VII-4 displayed a bimodal distribution of reported need for arrest overtime. These responses proved to have a significant correlation with overall overtime-seeking behaviors, as displayed in Table X-2: $r_s = .39, p < .001, N = 489.$ Thus Hypothesis 2.1 is confirmed.

HYPOTHESIS 6.4: GENDER AND ARREST-SEEKING FOR OVERTIME

Female officers will report fewer arrest-seeking adaptations aimed at overtime than male officers.

It was thought that women officers may be more directly involved with their families, and thus less interested in arrest-generating activities, than men. Table X-4 refutes this hypothesis, showing males and females using arrest overtime-seeking measures at statistically similar rates. This conforms to the earlier findings that Core Sample women were similar to men in both their rates of arrest and overall sign-out need.

Table X-4
Overall Frequency of Arrest-Seeking Measures aimed at Increasing Overtime for Male and Female Officers

(N = 442)

36. How often overall do you take measures like those above to make arrests because you need overtime money?

<i>Frequency & Percent within Gender</i>					
Officer Group	Rarely/Never	1x-4x / month	1x /Week	2x-5x/Week	Total
Males	220 (58.8%)	81 (21.7%)	24 (6.4%)	49 (13.1%)	374 (100%)
Females	47 (69.1%)	13 (19.1%)	5 (7.4%)	3 (4.4%)	68 (100%)

Note. $X^2(3) = 4.95, V = .106, p > .05.$

HYPOTHESIS 7.1: TOUR AND ARREST-SEEKING FOR OVERTIME

Officers on the midnight tour will report more arrest-seeking adaptive behaviors than officers on the day or evening tours.

Table X-5 indicates that there were no significant differences in rates of arrest-seeking adaptations among midnight, day, and evening tours. This is counter to the

expectation that officers on midnights would be more likely to engage in questionable arrest-seeking methods because they are less likely to be observed by either supervisors or law-abiding citizens. The result, however, does follow from the earlier finding that the arrest rates of the three tours are statistically equal.

Table X-5

Overall Frequency of Arrest-Seeking Measures aimed at Increasing Overtime for Officers on Midnight, Day, and Evening Tours

(N = 424)

36. *How often overall do you take measures like those above to make arrests because you need overtime money?"*

<i>Officer Group</i>	<i>Frequency & Percent within Tour</i>					<i>Total</i>
	<i>Rarely / Never</i>	<i>1-4 x / Month</i>	<i>1x / Week</i>	<i>2x / Week</i>	<i>3x-5x / Week</i>	
Midnights	50 (56.8%)	22 (25.0%)	7 (8.0%)	4 (4.5%)	5 (5.7%)	88 (100%)
Days	110 (65.5%)	31 (18.5%)	9 (5.4%)	9 (5.4%)	9 (5.4%)	168 (100%)
Evenings	106 (63.1%)	36 (21.4%)	11 (6.5%)	7 (4.2%)	8 (4.8%)	168 (100%)

Note. $X^2 (8) = 2.90, V = .58, p > .05.$

HYPOTHESIS 8.1: BOROUGH AND ARREST-SEEKING FOR OVERTIME

Officers from the Bronx, the major borough that affords the highest arrest overtime, will report more arrest overtime-seeking adaptations than officers from Queens, the borough where arrests processing affords the lowest overtime.

According to an NYPD arrest-tracking report (see Table III-1), arrest processing

takes more than 2½ hours longer in the Bronx than in Queens. It was predicted that this potential this overtime “advantage” will encourage Bronx officers to engage in more seeking behavior. Table X-5 displays this pattern. For instance, 22.1% of Bronx officers, as opposed to 18.5% of Queens officers, reported taking measures to increase arrest overtime at least once per week. The borough disparities were statistically significant, confirming the hypothesis.

Table X-6

Overall Frequency of Arrest-Seeking Measures aimed at Increasing Overtime for Officers from the Bronx and Queens

(*n* = 180)

36. *How often overall do you take measures like those above to make arrests because you need overtime money?*

<i>Frequency & Valid Percent within Borough</i>						
<i>Officer Group</i>	<i>Rarely / Never</i>	<i>1-4 x / Month</i>	<i>1x / Week</i>	<i>2x / Week</i>	<i>3x-5x / Week</i>	<i>Total</i>
Bronx	42 (54.5%)	18 (23.4%)	3 (3.9%)	10 (13.0%)	4 (5.2%)	77 (100%)
Queens	65 (63.1%)	19 (18.4%)	11 (10.7%)	2 (1.9%)	6 (5.8%)	103 (100%)

Note. $X^2(4) = 11.77$, $V = .26$, $p = .019$.

Earlier, the survey found that the Bronx officers had the highest number of monthly arrests per officer, 2.1, while Queens had the second lowest, 1.2. Moreover, the Bronx far exceeds Queens in its crime rates (NYPD CompStat Unit, 2002). Thus the arrest overtime-seeking behaviors of Bronx officers may be attributable not only to the lucrative length of arrest processing but to a higher arrest-making “norm” in the toughest borough.

ARREST-AVOIDANCE ADAPTATIONS

The survey next presented a list of 12 arrest-avoidance strategies aimed at leaving work on time and/or escaping the burdens of arrest processing, asking the extent to which each one was used. Table X-7 lists each method, ordered by scores in the *Arrest-Avoidance Index*. As with arrest seeking, the Index scores are derived by multiplying each rating (0 = *Never*, 1 = *Rarely*, etc.) by the percentage of officers in each rating category, and then adding the products. The maximum possible Index score is 400.

Officers used all of the listed arrest-avoidance methods. The most popular strategies involved refraining from such self-initiated actions as conducting stop-and-frisks, patrolling easy-arrest blocks, confronting “quality-of-life” offenders, or investigating motorists. Less frequently applied were the more questionable tactics, such as trying to arrive at a crime scene *after* the suspect has fled, ignoring a tip from a “concerned citizen,” and dissuading a victim from pressing charges.

Table X-7

Methods of Avoiding Arrest

37. Below are methods officers might use to avoid making arrests. Please indicate the extent to which you may have used each method in order to get off work on time, and/or avoid the discomforts and risks of arrest processing.

<i>Method</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Number & Valid Percent of Officers who report using method...</i>					<i>Arrest Avoidance Index^a</i>
		<i>Never</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Always</i>	
Conducted few or no Stop / Question / Frisks	498	124 (24.9%)	119 (23.9%)	120 (24.1%)	77 (15.5%)	58 (11.6%)	165
Made few or no RMP computer checks / car stops	499	112 (22.4%)	123 (24.6%)	154 (30.9%)	75 (15.0%)	35 (7.0%)	159
Ignored minor violations (eg, drinking/urinating/smoking weed)	501	153 (30.5%)	136 (27.1%)	136 (27.1%)	53 (10.6%)	23 (4.6%)	135
Avoided patrol areas where arrests "fall into your lap"	495	163 (32.9%)	122 (24.6%)	112 (22.6%)	72 (14.3%)	27 (5.6%)	135
Asked fellow officers to take any arrest you may get stuck with	499	136 (27.3%)	137 (27.5%)	164 (32.9%)	48 (9.6%)	14 (2.8%)	133
Arranged to get assignment having little or no chance to arrest	498	175 (35.1%)	133 (26.7%)	131 (26.3%)	45 (9.0%)	14 (2.8%)	118
Issued a summons instead of making an arrest	500	175 (35.0%)	145 (29.4%)	133 (26.6%)	32 (6.4%)	13 (2.6%)	112
Drove slowly or conspicuously (lights, sirens) to crimes in progress	500	235 (47.0%)	130 (26.0%)	76 (15.2%)	36 (7.2%)	23 (4.6%)	96
Ignored pick-up complaints from non-involved parties	499	221 (44.3%)	152 (30.5%)	82 (16.4%)	28 (5.6%)	16 (3.2%)	93
Tried to discourage complainants from pressing charges	500	263 (52.6%)	124 (24.8%)	85 (17.0%)	19 (3.8%)	9 (1.8%)	77
Avoided assignments to domestic incidents	499	260 (52.1%)	139 (27.9%)	67 (13.4%)	21 (4.2%)	12 (2.4%)	77
Tried to dispose of jobs without alerting dispatcher/supervisor	496	281 (56.7%)	119 (24.0%)	67 (13.5%)	15 (3.0%)	14 (2.8%)	71

^a Row sum of (Percent of Officers in each frequency category) x (Frequency of Use).

Frequency of use categories scored from 0 (*Never*) to 4 (*Always*). Maximum possible Index Score is 400.

The next two survey items asked how often per month or week officers used arrest-avoidance techniques, either to get off work on time, or to avoid the burdens of arrest processing. Table X-8 indicates that as a reason to avoid arrest, sign-out need outweighed processing concerns. For instance, at least once a week, 33.9% were influenced by the need for timely sign-out, and 25.3% were influenced by the burdens of processing.

Table X-8
Overall Use of Arrest-Avoiding Measures

38-39. How often *overall* do you take measures to avoid arrests like those above ...
...because you need to get off work on time?
...because of risks/discomforts of administrative procedures or handling prisoners?

<i>Reason for Avoiding Arrest</i>	<i>Number and Valid Percent of Officers</i>							<i>Total</i>
	<i>Never/Rarely</i>	<i>1-4x/month</i>	<i>1x/week</i>	<i>2x/week</i>	<i>3x/week</i>	<i>4x/week</i>	<i>5x/week</i>	
Get Off Work on Time	226 (45.3 %)	104 (20.8 %)	33 (6.6 %)	38 (7.6 %)	37 (7.4 %)	21 (4.2 %)	40 (8.0 %)	449 (100%)
Processing Risks/Discomforts	283 (56.8 %)	89 (17.9 %)	17 (3.4 %)	32 (6.4 %)	20 (4.0 %)	21 (4.2 %)	36 (7.2 %)	448 (100%)

Of course, both time pressures and processing burdens may simultaneously discourage officers from making arrests. The two factors proved to be highly correlated:
 $r_s = .67, p < .001, N = 498.$

The No-Arrest Group used arrest-avoidance techniques significantly more often than the High-Arrest Group, as seen in Table X-9. For instance, in order to sign out on time, 40.3% of No-Arrest officers versus 21.6% of the High-Arrest officers utilized avoidance measures at least once per week. Because of arrest processing concerns, 28.9% of No-Arrest officers compared to 9.7% of High-Arrest officers used avoidance measures within this time frame.

Table X-9
**Overall Frequency of Arrest-Avoidance Measures
for No-Arrest and High-Arrest Officers**
(*n* = 242)

<i>38. How often overall do you take measures like those above to avoid arrests because you need to get off work on time?</i>					
Officer Group	Number & Valid Percent Avoiding Arrest for Timely Sign-out				Total
	Rarely / Never	1x-4 x / Month	1x-2x / Week	3x-5x / Week	
No-Arrest	67 (45.0%)	22 (14.8%)	17 (11.4%)	43 (28.9%)	149 (100%)
High-Arrest	46 (49.5%)	26 (28.0%)	20 (21.5%)	1 (1.1%)	93 (100%)

<i>39. How often overall do you take measures like those above to avoid arrests because of the risks / discomforts of administrative procedures or handling prisoners?</i>					
Officer Group	Number & Valid Percent Avoiding Arrest for Processing Concerns				Total
	Rarely / Never	1x-4 x / Month	1x-2x / Week	3x-5x / Week	
No-Arrest	84 (56.4%)	22 (14.8%)	8 (5.4%)	35 (23.5%)	149 (100%)
High-Arrest	65 (69.9%)	19 (20.4%)	7 (7.5%)	2 (2.2%)	93 (100%)

Note For timely sign-out, $\chi^2 (3) = 33.40, V = .37, p < .001$. For processing concerns, $\chi^2 (3) = 20.27, V = .29, p < .001$.

The values for Cramer's V, shown in the last row of Table X-9, also suggest that the need to leave work on time is a greater source of disparity between No-Arrest and High-Arrest officers than the burdens of arrest processing.

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HYPOTHESIS 2.2: NEED FOR TIMELY SIGN-OUT AND

ARREST-AVOIDANCE ADAPTATIONS AIMED AT TIMELY SIGN-OUT

Officers who report more frequent need to end their tour on time due to outside commitments and concerns will also report more frequent use of arrest-avoidance adaptations aimed at timely end-of-tour.

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Earlier, Table VIII-4 had displayed officers' need to end their tours on time because of outside commitments and concerns. This need to leave work proved to be significantly related with officers' use of arrest-avoidance adaptations aimed at timely sign-out, shown in Table X-8: $r_s = .30$, $p < .001$, $N = 499$. Hypothesis 2.2 is therefore confirmed.

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HYPOTHESIS 2.3: ARREST PROCESSING AVERSION AND ARREST-AVOIDANCE

ADAPTATIONS AIMED AT AVOIDING PROCESSING BURDENS

Officers who report a greater aversion to processing arrests will also report more frequent use of arrest-avoidance adaptations to avoid processing burdens.

Previously, Figure IX-1 displayed how often participants were "turned off" to arrest-making due to administrative or prisoner-handling burdens. These sentiments were

significantly correlated with the use of arrest-avoidance measures stemming from processing concerns, shown earlier in Table X-8: $r_s = .56$, $p < .001$, $N = 498$. Hypothesis 2.3 is also confirmed.

HYPOTHESIS 6.5: GENDER AND ARREST-AVOIDANCE ADAPTATIONS FOR TIMELY SIGN-OUT
Female officers will report more arrest-avoiding adaptations aimed at timely sign-out than male officers.

It was predicted that because women officers may shoulder more family-related responsibilities, they would be more likely than male officers to use arrest-avoidance methods to assure a timely end of tour. Table X-10 rebuts this hypothesis, showing statistically similar rates in the use of arrest avoidance adaptations for sign-out between males and females. This conforms to the earlier findings that Core Sample women were comparable to men in both their rates of arrest and overall sign-out need.

Table X-10

Overall Frequency of Arrest-Avoiding Measures aimed at Timely Sign-Out for Male and Female Officers

($N = 447$)

38. *How often overall do you take measures like those above to make arrests because you need to get off work on time?*

<i>Officer Group</i>	<i>Number & Valid Percent within Gender</i>							<i>Total</i>
	<i>Rarely/ Never</i>	<i>1x-4x/ month</i>	<i>1x/ week</i>	<i>2x/ week</i>	<i>3x/ week</i>	<i>4x/ week</i>	<i>5x/ week</i>	
Males	158 (41.7%)	82 (21.6%)	27 (7.1%)	33 (8.7)	31 (8.2%)	20 (5.3%)	28 (7.4%)	379 (100%)
Females	38 (55.9%)	15 (22.1%)	4 (5.9%)	1 (1.5%)	4 (5.9%)	0 (%)	6 (8.8%)	68 (100%)

Note. $\chi^2 (6) = 10.89$, $V = .16$, $p > .05$.

HYPOTHESIS 7.2: TOUR AND ARREST-AVOIDANCE ADAPTATIONS

Officers on the midnight tour will report more arrest-avoiding adaptations for timely sign-out and aversion to processing than officers on the day or evening tour.

Table X-11 indicates that among midnight, day, and evening tour officers there were no significant differences in rates of arrest-avoiding measures, for either timely sign-

Table X-11

Overall Frequency of Arrest-Avoiding Measures on Midnight, Day, & Evening Tours

38. How often overall do you take measures like those above to avoid arrests because you need to get off work on time?

Officer Group	Number & Valid Percent within Tour							Total
	Rarely/ Never	1-4 x/ Month	1x/ Week	2x/ Week	3x/ Week	4x/ Week	5x/ Week	
Midnights	33 (37.9%)	19 (21.8%)	8 (9.2%)	9 (10.3%)	6 (6.9%)	2 (2.3%)	10 (11.5%)	87 (100%)
Days	69 (40.8%)	38 (33.5%)	9 (5.3%)	16 (9.5%)	15 (8.9%)	7 (4.1%)	15 (8.9%)	169 (100%)
Evenings	86 (50.9%)	34 (20.1%)	12 (7.1%)	8 (4.7%)	11 (6.5%)	9 (5.3%)	9 (5.3%)	169 (100%)

39. How often overall do you take measures like those above to avoid arrests because of the risks / discomforts of administrative procedures or handling prisoners?

Officer Group	Number & Valid Percent within Tour							Total
	Rarely/ Never	1-4 x/ Month	1x/ Week	2x/ Week	3x-5x/ Week	2x/ Week	2x/ Week	
Midnights	47 (54.0%)	21 (24.1%)	1 (1.1%)	4 (4.6%)	2 (2.3%)	6 (6.9%)	6 (6.9%)	87 (100%)
Days	87 (51.8%)	30 (17.9%)	4 (2.4%)	16 (9.5%)	8 (4.8%)	6 (3.6%)	17 (10.1%)	168 (100%)
Evenings	103 (60.9%)	29 (17.2%)	7 (4.1%)	6 (3.6%)	8 (4.7%)	8 (4.7%)	8 (4.7%)	169 (100%)

Note For timely sign-out, $X^2(425.12) = 12.75$, $V = .17$, $p > .05$. For processing concerns, $X^2(424.12) = 15.99$, $V = .14$, $p > .05$.

sign-out or processing aversion. Thus, as with arrest-seeking (Table X-5), the expected “anomie” of late tours was not in evidence. This result also may reflect the similar arrest rates among the three tours.

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***HYPOTHESIS 8.2: BOROUGH ARREST-PROCESSING DURATION AND
ARREST-AVOIDANCE ADAPTATIONS***

Officers from the Bronx, the major borough where arrest processing is most arduous and disruptive to personal life, will report more arrest-avoiding adaptations than officers from Queens, the borough where arrests are least arduous and disruptive.

As described earlier, the NYPD reported that arrest processing took about 10.7 hours in the Bronx as compared to about 8.1 hours in Queens. Bronx officers might therefore be expected to employ more arrest-avoiding measures than Queens officers because of the greater time conflicts and processing difficulties they faced. However, as shown in Table X-12, Bronx and Queens officers were statistically similar in their use of arrest-avoidance measures, both for timely sign-out and processing aversion. Hypothesis 8.2 is thus rejected.

This result contrasts with the earlier finding (Table X-6) that Bronx officers employ more arrest overtime-seeking tactics than Queens officers. Possibly, the markedly higher crime rates in the Bronx create a basic arrest-making mindset, leading to the higher rate of arrest-making and consequent focus on maximizing overtime. This may offset the seemingly higher incentives to avoid arrests in the Bronx.

RELATIONSHIP OF ARREST-SEEKING AND ARREST-AVOIDANCE

Table X-13 matches up comparable seeking and avoiding methods and their respective Index scores. While not amenable to statistical testing, the scores were greater for arrest avoidance in ten of the twelve pairings. The exceptions were officers' reaction

Table X-12

Comparison of Index Scores for Arrest-Seeking & Arrest-Avoiding Measures

<i>Method</i>	<i>Seeking/Avoidance Index</i>
Made more Stop-Question-Frisks in 2 nd half of tour	71
<i>Conducted few or no Stop-Question-Frisks</i>	<i>165</i>
Made more MDT checks and/or car stops in 2 nd half of tour	111
<i>Made few or no RMP computer checks / car stops</i>	<i>159</i>
Looked for any minor violation In 2 nd half of tour	74
<i>Ignored minor violations (eg. drinking/urinating/smoking weed)</i>	<i>135</i>
Patrolled in areas known for easy arrests in 2 nd half of tour	119
<i>Avoided patrol areas where arrests "fall into your lap"</i>	<i>135</i>
Asked officers for their unwanted arrests	102
<i>Asked fellow officers to take any arrest you may get stuck with</i>	<i>133</i>
Switched to assignment with good arrest opportunities	88
<i>Arranged to get assignment having little or no chance to arrest</i>	<i>118</i>
Issued a DAT instead of a summons in 2 nd half of tour	41
<i>Issued a summons instead of making an arrest</i>	<i>112</i>
Tried to arrive faster at crimes in progress in 2 nd half of tour	121
<i>Drove slowly or conspicuously (lights, sirens) to crimes in progress</i>	<i>96</i>
Followed up on every pick-up complaint in 2 nd half of tour	69
<i>Ignored pick-up complaints from non-involved parties</i>	<i>93</i>
Tried harder to get complainants to prosecute in 2 nd half of tour	76
<i>Tried to discourage complainants from pressing charges</i>	<i>77</i>
Tried to take domestic incident jobs in 2 nd half of tour	97
<i>Avoided assignments to domestic incidents</i>	<i>77</i>
Tried to handle jobs before telling dispatcher in 2 nd half of tour	60
<i>Tried to dispose of jobs without alerting dispatcher/supervisor</i>	<i>71</i>
<i>Note. Arrest-avoidance methods and their index scores are in italicized print. Maximum possible Index score is 400.</i>	

to crimes in progress and to domestic incidents, where arrest-seeking measures prevailed.

Arrest-avoidance also surpassed arrest-seeking when comparing overall ratings (Tables X-2 and X-8). At least once a week, for instance, 17.9% of participants used arrest-seeking methods aimed at overtime, while 33.8% used avoidance tactics aimed at timely sign-out and 25.2 used avoidance tactics because of processing burdens.

Interestingly, officers who made greater use of arrest-seeking methods for overtime did not necessarily make less use of arrest-avoiding methods for timely sign-out or processing aversion. Table XII-4, a correlation matrix of overall usage for the three adaptive behaviors, shows all associations to be significant and *positive*. Besides the expected high relationship between the two avoidance variables, there is a small correlation between Arrest-Seeking for Overtime and Arrest-Avoidance for Sign-out, and a smaller correlation between Arrest-Seeking and Avoiding for Processing Aversion.

Table X-13

***Correlation of Arrest-Seeking for Overtime,
Arrest-Avoidance for Sign-out, and Arrest-Avoidance for Processing Aversion
(N=506)***

		<i>Arrest-Avoidance for Timely Sign-Out</i>	<i>Arrest-Avoidance for Processing Aversion</i>
<i>Arrest-Seeking for Overtime</i>	<i>r_s</i>	.15**	.10*
	<i>n</i>	493	492
<i>Arrest-Avoidance for Timely Sign-Out</i>	<i>r_s</i>		.67***
	<i>n</i>		498

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

XI
PERSONAL NEEDS IN COMPARISON TO
OTHER ARREST DETERMINANTS

(ITEM 40)

The survey's next section presented a list of arrest factors that interspersed 15 personal considerations with 17 situational and organizational variables, mostly drawn from Riksheim and Chermak's 1993 summary of previously-studied arrest determinants. Participants rated how often, in a possible arrest situation, each factor was important in their decision to arrest or not arrest. By comparing *Importance Index* scores for the 33 items (calculated as were the previous indexes, with a maximum possible score of 400), the relative decision-making "weight" of each variable could be gauged. However, it must be noted that Index scores are not amenable to statistical tests for significance.

Table XI-1 indicates that all 31 variables carry weight in the arrest decision, suggesting its true complexity. The situational variables of offense seriousness, suspect demeanor, and complainant cooperation and attitude were the most salient determinants, echoing many previous studies. But ranked just below these factors were the participants' need to get off work for a social commitment (# 5), and their reluctance to deal with a difficult, dangerous, filthy, or sick prisoner (# 6). The next factor, number of sectors running, stems from concern that an arrest will take the officer off patrol for the entire tour, sometimes overburdening coworkers. Also high on the list (# 8) was the need to make overtime money.

In the middle-third of the rankings were seven more personal variables. A request to accommodate the arrest-making needs of a coworker (# 12) led this group. Next was

Table XI-1
Arrest Factors Listed in Order of Importance Index Scores
 (N = 506)

40 Below are factors officers may weigh while on routine patrol when faced with a possible arrest situation. Please indicate how often these factors are important in your own decision to arrest or not arrest while on routine patrol.

<i>Factor</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Some- times</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Always</i>	<i>Import- ance Index^a</i>
1. Level/seriousness of the offense	492	10%	10%	22%	22%	35%	260
2. Willingness of complainant to prosecute	489	11%	15%	41%	25%	16%	210
3. Attitude/demeanor of the suspect	492	14%	16%	43%	19%	8%	191
4. Attitude/demeanor of complainant/victim	490	15%	22%	44%	14%	5%	172
5. Need to get off work on time for social commitment	493	18%	21%	40%	14%	7%	171
6. Difficult / dangerous / filthy / sick prisoner	491	20%	21%	40%	11%	8%	167
7. Manpower / number of sectors running	490	22%	22%	35%	14%	7%	162
8. Need to make overtime money	489	23%	25%	33%	10%	10%	161
9. Pressure from supervisor / CO to make arrest	489	27%	24%	28%	13%	8%	151
10. Presence of supervisor	491	26%	32%	30%	7%	6%	137
11. Presence of bystanders / personal safety	487	24%	31%	33%	7%	4%	134
12. Request to take coworker's arrest/give away your arrest	492	26%	29%	40%	3%	3%	130
13. Long/complicated paperwork or processing	492	33%	29%	25%	6%	7%	125
14. Likelihood of being rescheduled to see ADA/go to court	492	35%	28%	24%	7%	7%	125
15. Need to get off work on time for child-related activity	492	45%	14%	23%	8%	9%	120
16.. Desires/expectations of community	490	38%	30%	24%	7%	2%	113
17. Lack of another officer to take your arrest	492	33%	35%	28%	3%	2%	108
18. Desire to go into station house / take break from patrol	490	38%	27%	29%	5%	2%	108
19. Need to make comp time	487	39%	30%	23%	5%	4%	107
20. Class / type of suspect (derelict, blue-collar, VIP, etc)	493	40%	27%	25%	7%	2%	105
21. Pressure to limit overtime	487	44%	26%	18%	6%	6%	104
22. Class of complainant (homeless, blue-collar, VIP, etc.)	493	40%	25%	28%	4%	2%	101
23. Judgment /opinions of other officers	488	38%	32%	24%	4%	2%	100
24. Desire for career advancement / plainclothes assignment	489	47%	23%	21%	5%	6%	100
25. Need to carpool / beat rush hour / catch train, / etc.	491	51%	17%	19%	8%	5%	99
26. Bad weather	490	43%	27%	25%	3%	1%	90
27. Boredom	490	46%	30%	20%	2%	1%	80
28. Pedigree of suspect (race, sex, age, etc.)	492	52%	29%	14%	3%	2%	74
29. Need to get off work on time for second job	491	65%	12%	14%	6%	4%	74
30. Pedigree of complainant (race, sex, age, etc.)	488	53%	27%	16%	3%	1%	72
31. Need to get off work on time for college-related activity	488	75%	11%	10%	3%	2%	48

Note. Boldface items indicate personal or self-interested factors.

^aRow sum of (Percent of Officers each Frequency Category) x (Frequency of Importance Level). Frequency of Importance scored from 0 (*Never*) to 4 (*Always*). Maximum possible Index score is 400. Order of equal scores is arbitrarily assigned.

the likelihood of complex or protracted arrest processing, and of equal importance was the prospect of a tour change to accommodate the ADA or judge (often reverting to straight-time pay). This factor was directly followed by to the need to get off work on time for a child-related activity. Also in this middle grouping is the lack of a coworker to take the officer's arrest, so that the participant's intervention would inevitably mean "getting stuck." This is matched in importance by the desire to go onto the station house or take a break from patrol. Just a point lower is the need to earn overtime in time.

In the bottom third of the list were the remaining five personal variables, respectively commuting concerns, bad weather, boredom, and sign-out need for a second job or college. That the commuting factor was ranked relatively low (#26) suggests that it has a more limited impact on arrest decisions than would be expected from earlier findings on its frequency as a post-work concern (Table VIII-2). In contrast, the rankings for need to go to a second job or college are more in line with the low concern index scores found previously.

Also noteworthy is that some of the most-studied situational variables were surpassed in importance by personal ones. Of the 31 arrest factors, suspect class or type was ranked # 20, complainant class or type was # 22, suspect race, sex, or age was # 28 (after boredom and bad weather), and complainant race, sex, or age was # 30.g

Separate Index scores for No-Arrest and High-Arrest officers are also calculated and ranked, to see if the two groups accord different weights to the 31 arrest factors. Table XI-2 indicates that was indeed the case. For instance, the most important personal variable for No-Arrest participants was prisoner difficulties, while for High-Arrest participants it was the need for overtime. Non-arresters gave far higher index scores and

Table XI-2
Importance Index Scores & Rankings for Arrest Factors of No-Arrest & High-Arrest Officers

<i>Factor</i>	<i>No-Arrest Group (n = 151)</i>		<i>High-Arrest Group (n = 94)</i>	
	<i>Importance Index Score</i>	<i>Importance Rank</i>	<i>Importance Index Score</i>	<i>Importance Rank</i>
1. Level/seriousness of the offense	263	1 st	271	1 st
2. Willingness of complainant to prosecute	203	3 rd	207	3 rd
3. Attitude/demeanor of the suspect	187	4 th	195	4 th
4. Attitude/demeanor of complainant/victim	155	8 th	182	5 th
5. Need to get off work on time for social commitment	180	6th	162	6th
6. Difficult / dangerous / filthy / sick prisoner	185	5th	143	9th
7. Manpower / number of sectors running	160	7 th	162	7 th
8. Need to make overtime money	132	14th	212	2nd
9. Pressure from supervisor / CO to make arrest	214	2 nd	139	10 th
10. Presence of supervisor	148	11 th	119	14 th
11. Presence of bystanders / personal safety	149	10 th	130	11 th
12. Request to take coworker's arrest/give away your arrest	137	13th	126	12th
14. Long/complicated paperwork or processing	152	9th	80	26th
13. Likelihood of being rescheduled to see ADA/go to court	127	15 th	113	15 th
15. Need to get off work on time for child-related activity	143	12 th	101	20 th
16. Desires/expectations of community	112	18 th	92	23 rd
17. Lack of another officer to take your arrest	113	17th	97	21st
18. Desire to go into station house / take break from patrol	98	21st	109	16th
19. Need to make comp time	94	24th	121	13th
20. Class / type of suspect (derelict, blue-collar, VIP, etc)	115	16 th	76	27 th
21. Pressure to limit overtime	108	19 th	109	17 th
22. Class of complainant (homeless, blue-collar, VIP, etc.)	108	20 th	90	25 th
23. Judgment /opinions of other officers	97	22 nd	97	22 nd
24. Desire for career advancement / plainclothes assignment	67	30 th	147	8 th
25. Need to carpool / beat rush hour / catch train / etc.	97	23rd	91	24th
26. Bad weather	81	27th	108	18th
27. Boredom	80	28th	101	19th
28. Pedigree of suspect (race, sex, age, etc.)	86	25 th	58	29 th
29. Need to get off work on time for second job	71	29th	57	30th
30. Pedigree of complainant (race, sex, age, etc.)	84	26 th	62	28 th
31. Need to get off work on time for college-related activity	42	31st	53	31st

Note. Boldface items indicate personal or self-interested factors. Maximum possible Index score is 400.

rankings for the arrest-suppressing considerations of paperwork and child-care. They also rated the arrest-making pressures from superiors as far more influential. High-arrest officers, on the other hand, rated the desire for career advancement or plainclothes assignment as an important arrest-making factor, while the non-arresters barely considered it.

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HYPOTHESIS 3: MAJOR PERSONAL FACTORS RELATIVE TO MAJOR SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Officers will report that in potential arrest situations, they assign as much importance to major personal concerns of (a) arrest overtime need, (b) sign-out needs, and (c) arrest-processing aversion as to the most consistently significant situational variables of offense seriousness, suspect demeanor, and complainant willingness to prosecute.

Table XI-1 shows that the Core Sample ranked the need for overtime as its ninth most important consideration, while it ranked offense seriousness, complainant willingness to prosecute, and suspect demeanor respectively in first, second, and third place. Thus part (a) of the hypothesis was not confirmed. However, Table XI-2 indicates that for the High-Arrest group, overtime ranked second, surpassing complainant cooperation and suspect demeanor.

Sign-out needs carried widely disparate weights. Sign-out for social commitments scored fifth in Table XI-1, just two ranks below the three major situational variables. Child-related activities, commuting concerns, second jobs and college were ranked, respectively, in 16th, 29th, and 31st place. Therefore part (b) of the hypothesis is also unsubstantiated.

The two arrest aversion factors ranked beneath the major situational factors as well, refuting part (c). Prisoner-related problems held a relatively high 6th place, while paperwork and other administrative problems held 15th place.

In sum, while index score comparisons could not be tested for significance, they suggest that the three most established situational variables of crime seriousness, complainant cooperation, and suspect demeanor had the greatest influence on participants' arrest decisions. However, some personal arrest variables (most notably social commitments, prisoner issues, and overtime) carried considerable weight.

XII

ARREST-MAKING AND PRE-INCIDENT ARREST PROCLIVITY

(ITEMS 41-55)

The next section of the survey sought to measure the extent to which arrest-making decisions are planned and orchestrated by officers. The section had two parts, the first focused on the participants' most recent arrest, and the second focused on their most recent rejection of an arrest opportunity. Each part first presented questions to assure that the arrest outcomes to be examined were recent and freely chosen. It then examined the officers' pre-incident intent, using three criteria: start-of-tour desire for an arrest, effort while on patrol to make an arrest, and the proactiveness of the intervention.

MOST RECENT ELECTIVE ARREST

Only arrests made within 90 days of completing the survey were examined, so that officers' memories would be reasonably accurate. The arrests to be considered also had to be freely decided, rather than forced on the officer by a supervisor, a must-arrest policy, or another inescapable circumstance. Thus of the 424 arrests made within the time frame, only 264 (62.3%) had no supervisor at the scene from the outset. Of these, only 89 arrests (33.7%) were not procedurally mandated or otherwise unavoidable. This final sample of 89 *elective arrests* therefore represented 21.0% of arrests made in the last 90 days.

The 89 arrests were made, on average, 24.3 days earlier ($SD = 18.2$). The offenses involved, as written out by the participants, appear in Table XII-1. Fifteen of the arrests were for felonies, 49 were for misdemeanors or violations, and 25 could be either for misdemeanors or felonies.

Table XII-1
Offenses Reported in Elective Arrests
 (n = 89)

Assault	13	Attempted Kidnapping	1
Driving without License	12	Public Lewdness	1
Petty Larceny	7	Crim. Possession. of Forged Instrument	1
Trespass/Crim. Trespass	7	Unlicensed Vendor	1
Assault 2 nd Degree	4	Trademark Counterfeiting	1
Crim. Possession of Controlled Substance	4	Window-Washing	1
Burglary	4	Outstanding Warrant	1
Disorderly Conduct	4	Misdemeanor	1
Robbery	3	Criminal Contempt	1
Menacing	3	Auto Theft	1
Driving While Intoxicated	3	Unauthorized Use of Vehicle	1
Criminal. Mischief	3	Harassment	1
Assault 3 rd Degree	3	Assault-Family Offense	1
Rape	2	Larceny – Family Offense	1
Criminal Possession. of Weapon	2	Unspecified	1

Note. If participant reported more than one offense, the first one listed is shown.

HYPOTHESIS 4.1: ELECTIVE ARRESTS AND PRIOR ARREST PROCLIVITY

Most officers will report that their most recent decisions to arrest, if freely made, were preceded by (a) an initial intent to arrest, (b) arrest-seeking behaviors, and (c) proactive intervention.

To address part (a) of the hypothesis, participants were asked to rate their pre-tour arrest intentions, from 0 (*strongly didn't want an arrest*) to 10 (*strongly wanted an arrest*). The distribution of pre-tour preference scores is illustrated in Figure XII-1. It shows that at the beginning of their arrest-making tour, 14 officers (15.7%), did not want an arrest, 48 (53.9%) had no preference, and 27 (30.3%) wanted an arrest. It also reveals


a ten-officer group (11.2%) who selected the highest arrest-preference score. The mean pre-tour arrest preference score was 5.6 ($SD = 2.3$), a small but significant elevation over the mean of 5 that would be expected if the officers had no pre-tour preference; $t(88) = 2.517, p = .014$. In other words, when officers made elective arrests, they had tended to start their workday in favor of that decision. Part (a) of Hypothesis 4.1 is confirmed.

Figure XII-1

Pre-Tour Arrest Preference on Day of Elective Arrest

($N = 89$)

45. At the beginning of your tour, to what extent did you want to make an arrest?




Hypothesis 4.1 (a) is also supported by a comparison of the pre-tour preference scores of the elective arrest group with those of 329 officers who made arrests with the supervisor present, or under procedurally mandated or otherwise unavoidable circumstances. This “non-elective” arrest group averaged a significantly lower preference for arrest, at 4.6 ($SD = 2.6$); $t(416) = 3.49$, $p = .001$. In other words, at the start of their tours the non-elective arresting officers had vaguely *not* wanted an arrest, and the elective arresting officers, scoring 5.6, had vaguely *wanted* one.

Hypothesis 4.1, part (b) proposes that prior to elective arrests, officers consciously patrol in an arrest-seeking mode. Participants were asked to describe their pre-arrest patrol activities, from 0 (*trying hard to avoid an arrest*) to 10 (*trying hard to make an arrest*).

Figure XII-2 shows that before the incident, 7 officers (7.9%) were trying to avoid an arrest, while 20 (22.4%) were trying to make one. A large majority of 62 officers (69.7%), were neutral in their patrol orientation. The mean score was 5.4 ($SD = 1.7$), again a slight but significant increase over the expected mean of 5, were officers not trying to engineer a specific patrol outcome; $t(88) = 2.34$, $p = .022$. This confirms part (b) of the hypothesis. However, the mean patrol-seeking orientation of the elective arrest group was only 0.2 points higher than that of the non-elective arrest group’s mean of 5.2 ($SD = 1.6$). This difference was not significant: $t(414) = -1.02$, $p = .308$.

Figure XII-2
Patrol Style before Elective Arrest
 (n = 89)

46. Before the possible arrest situation arose, how would you describe your patrol activities?



The final part of Hypothesis 4.1 predicts that officers making elective arrests will tend to become involved in the incident on their own initiative. Participants were presented with seven intervention methods, ordered to offer a range from more active to more passive approaches. They were also given an opportunity to write down other ways they began their encounter.

Table XII-2 supports part (c) of the hypothesis in some respects. The most common mode of intervention, resulting in 31.5% of arrests, was to initiate an investigative

Table XII-2

Initiation of Elective Arrests

47. How did you get involved in the arrest situation?

<i>Method of Intervention</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
a. Pursuant to self-initiated investigative/enforcement activity (car stop, stop/question/ frisk, etc)	28	31.5%
b. The primary unit didn't want the arrest and you offered to take it	5	5.6%
c. Dispatcher announced job and you/your partner offered to take it	13	14.6%
d. Pick-up job – approached by non-involved witness	2	2.2%
e. Pick-up job – approached by complainant	7	7.9%
f. Dispatcher / TS assigned you the job	26	29.2%
g. Supervisor made you take arrest	2	2.2%
h. Other		
(b) and (c)	1	1.1%
(e) and (g)	1	1.1%
Knew of possible gang fight	1	1.1%
Pick-up (auto stripping)	1	1.1%
Quality of life – on beat (disorderly conduct)	1	1.1%
Walked in McDonald's, viewed activities of customer (narcotics)	1	1.1%
Total	89	100%

or enforcement activity. However, the second highest proportion of arrests, 29.2%, were commenced reactively through direct radio assignments. The high proportion of radio-initiated arrests may reflect the prioritized dispatching system, wherein the more serious, arrest-worthy calls to 911 are the first to be announced and assigned.

The third most common approach was to offer to take an assignment announced by the radio dispatcher, rather than wait to be assigned. Including the dual response listed under “other,” this self-initiated intervention accounted for 15.7% arrests. Still, it must be recognized that when patrol coverage is thin, even reluctant officers feel obligated to take an announced assignment without being directly asked.

Pick-up jobs accounted for 14.6% arrests: seven through complainants, two through witnesses, and four through officer observation, as described under “other.”

Pick-ups often express a desire to get involved, since without a 911 call-in, the officers alone are aware of the situation.

Finally, in five incidents (or six if the dual answer is included), officers got their arrests from a willing donor. This reached a total of 60 out of 89 elective arrests (67.5%) wherein officers took an affirmative step to intervene. Yet, given the varied interpretations of the different interventions, as well as the small sample size, Hypothesis 4.1 part (c) cannot be confirmed.

MOST RECENT DECLINED ARREST

The survey next queried officers about their most recent, freely declined arrests. Of 205 incidents ending without arrest in the previous 90 days, 140, or 68.3%, had no supervisor at the scene. For this final sample, the arrests were declined, on average, 15.0 days earlier ($SD = 17.6$).

Shown in Table XII-3 are the offenses involved in the 140 declined arrests, as

Table XII-3
Offenses Reported in Declined Arrests
($n = 140$)

Assault	33	Minor Violation	2
Driving without License	17	Security Holding	2
Trespass/Criminal Trespass	9	Crim. Possession of Controlled Substance	1
Larceny	8	Burglary	1
Criminal Mischief	7	Disorderly Conduct	1
Domestic (unspecified)	7	Public Lewdness	1
Harassment/Agg. Harassment	6	Crim. Possession. of Forged Instrument	1
Criminal Possession of Marijuana	4	Unlicensed Vendor	1
Driving While Intoxicated	4	Counterfeit CDs	1
Drinking in Public/Open Container	4	Criminal Contempt	1
Menacing	3	Auto Theft	1
Public Urination	3	Unnamed/Missing	13
Warrant	3		

Note. If participant reported more than one offense, the first one listed is shown.

described by the officers. Three of the incidents (burglary, auto theft and possession of a forged instrument) were felonies, 75 concerned misdemeanors or violations, 49 could be either felonies or misdemeanors, and 13 were not described. Only 2.1% of the avoidance incidents (3 out of 140) clearly involved felonies, in contrast to 16.9% of arrest-bound incidents (15 out of 89) that clearly involved felonies. On the other hand, many of the same reported misdemeanors and violations that had led to arrest (Table XII-1) also appear in the current table.

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
HYPOTHESIS 4.2: DECLINED ARRESTS AND PRIOR ARREST PROCLIVITY

Most officers will report that their most recent decisions to decline arrest, if freely made, were preceded by (a) an initial intent to not arrest, (b) arrest-avoiding behaviors, and (c) reactive intervention.

For part (a) of Hypothesis 4.2, participants were asked to recall their pre-tour arrest intentions on the most recent day they declined an arrest. The distribution of pre-tour preference scores, in Figure XII-3, shows that at the start of their tour, 67 officers (47.9%) did not want an arrest while 12 (8.6%) wanted one. Thirty-two officers (22.9%) selected the extreme avoidance score of 0, creating a bimodal distribution with the 61 “no preference” officers (43.6%). The mean pre-tour arrest preference score was 3.4 ($SD = 2.6$) marked decrease from the mean of 5 that would be expected if the officers had no prior inclination; $t(139) = -7.43, p = .001$. Thus, as predicted by part (a), when officers declined an arrest opportunity, they tended to begin their workday disfavoring arrest.

Figure XII-4
Patrol Activities before Declining Arrest
 (n = 139)

53. Before the possible arrest situation arose, how would you describe your *patrol activities*?



Part (c) of Hypothesis 4.2 states that officers who decline arrests will tend to get involved in the situation without a self-initiating act. Participants were offered a choice of six possible interventions, and also given the opportunity to write in other methods.

Table XII-4 shows that the highest proportion of officers, 24.3%, offered to take assignments as they were announced by the radio dispatcher. These acts may be seen as

elective, rebutting the hypothesis. However, as discussed earlier, they may simply be an inevitable response to the common situation of being the only patrol unit available for assignment.

Table XII-4

Initiation of Incidents ending in Declined Arrests

54. How did you get involved in the situation in which you ultimately declined the arrest?

<i>Method of Intervention</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
a. Pursuant to self-initiated investigative/enforcement activity (car stop, stop/question/ frisk, etc)	29	20.7%
b. Dispatcher announced job and you/your partner offered to take it	34	24.3%
c. Pick-up job – approached by non-involved witness	6	4.3%
d. Pick-up job – approached by complainant	13	9.3%
e. Dispatcher / TS assigned you to back up the job	27	19.3%
f. Supervisor directed you to back up the job	2	1.4%
h. Other		
Assigned by Dispatcher/TS as primary unit.	7	5.0%
Pick-up – Personal Observation	5	3.6%
Backed up other sector	5	3.6%
(b) & (c)	1	0.7%
Checkpoint	1	0.7%
Unspecified	9	6.4%
<i>Total</i>	140	100%

There is yet another interpretation for the frequency of “volunteering.” As mentioned previously, the dispatcher will immediately assign potentially urgent, arrest-worthy calls, but will casually announce the less pressing, less serious ones. Since the declinations mostly concern lesser offenses, they are usually initiated by an *offer*, not an *order*, from the dispatcher.

The second most prevalent mode of involvement was through self-initiated investigative or enforcement activity. As the instigator of 20.7% of incidents, this approach was certainly more common than anticipated by the hypothesis. On the other hand, self-initiated investigative or enforcement activity was far less common here than

as a prelude to arrest (Table XII-2), where it had ranked first and had accounted for 31.5% of interventions.

The third most frequent initiation, for 19.3%, of declinations, was via as an assigned back-up unit. A back-up is usually assigned to in-progress incidents that appear to pose some risk. The back-up takes a routine arrest only if it is declined by the primary unit assigned.. Thus, in line with prediction, the assigned back-ups were a “passive” intervention likely to end in a declined arrest.

The fourth most common lead-up to declined arrests was the various types of pick-up jobs. As described previously, these are largely elective involvements with discretionary outcomes. Pick-ups accounted for a total of 17.1% of declinations, as compared with 14.6% of arrests (Table XII-2).

In only 5% of declinations did the dispatcher order the officer to the scene as primary responder. This contrasts sharply with the 29.2% of arrests initiated in this manner. Again, the difference may be explained in part by the diminished need to directly assign less serious calls. Also, the percentage of initiations as a primary unit might have been higher had this choice been one of the listed options.

As with pre-arrest interventions, the sample of pre-declination interventions was small, and proved harder to interpret than anticipated. Therefore Hypothesis 4.2 (c), which is based on a hierarchical range of active to passive initiations, could not be confirmed. What is clear is that the patterns of intervention preceding elective arrests differed from the patterns of intervention preceding arrest declinations.

In sum, when officers freely chose to make or decline arrests, their decisions were not merely influenced by on-the-scene variables. They tended to have favored the

eventual arrest outcome from the start of their tour, and to have patrolled in a manner that ensured such an outcome.

XIII ATTITUDES TOWARD ARREST

(ITEM 56)

As described by Reuss-Ianni (1983) and Kappler et. al. (1994), officers convey cynical attitudes toward work through oft-repeated “maxims.” When the author was among fellow officers, they seemed to rationalize self-interested arrest behavior by exchanging such maxims. These were either cynical comments about arrest, or admonitions to put self and family first. Eight of such statements were presented in the survey’s next section, interspersed with seven “professional” statements endorsing arrest-making as an important duty. Participants rated their level of agreement from 0 (*strongly disagree*) to 10 (*strongly agree*).

Table XIII-1 arranges these 15 statements from highest to lowest mean agreement scores. Officers agreed overall with seven out of eight cynical items and four out of seven professional items. The three most strongly endorsed statements (all scoring over 7) contended that officers’ arrests are misused to further the reputations of, respectively, prosecutors, commanding officers, and politicians. At the other extreme, three of the four rejected statements (scoring below 5) claimed that arrests fulfilled valid civic objectives. More positive was the finding of *least* agreement with the attitude that legally questionable arrests are acceptable for offenders who have “beaten the system” in the past.

The mean agreement level for all cynical statements was 6.1 ($SD = 1.6$), and for all professional statements was 5.2 ($SD = 1.5$). The mean agreement levels for the two groups of statements displayed a correlation of $-.13$ ($N = 497, p = .003$). In other words, officers who held stronger cynical or self-serving attitudes were slightly inclined to hold weaker professional attitudes.

Table XIII-1
Attitudes toward Arrests
(N = 506)

56. Below are 15 statements. Each is followed by an opinion scale, wherein "0" indicates the strongest **disagreement**, "5" indicates a **neutral** position, and "10" indicates the strongest **agreement**. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement along its scale.

<i>Cynical (C) or Professional (P) Statement</i>	<i>C/P</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Level of Agreement</i>	<i>SD</i>
"ADAs will plea bargain a felony to a violation if it means an easy conviction."	C	489	7.8	4.3
"Arrests statistics are manipulated by the C.O. or higher brass to make themselves look good."	C	489	7.7	2.5
"Arrest policies depend more on 'politics' than on concepts of sound crime-fighting."	C	486	7.2	2.4
"No arrest is worth risking serious injury."	C	488	6.9	3.1
"A person who takes the oath of a police officer should be prepared to make sacrifices."	P	490	6.7	2.7
"Judges will accept almost any plea bargain just to clear their calendars."	C	488	6.2	2.6
"Arrests represent the way Society enforces basic standards of right and wrong."	P	488	5.9	2.3
"Arrests for "quality of life" offenses prevent more serious crime problems."	P	489	5.7	2.5
"It's no big deal if a perp gets away, as he'll get caught sooner or later doing something else."	C	489	5.5	3.0
"Making arrests isn't worth it if they really disrupt your home life."	C	488	5.4	3.0
"Making good arrests is a way for officers to advance in their career."	P	491	5.2	3.0
"Arrests show that the police are doing what the public expects of them."	P	490	4.9	2.5
"A good police officer should regularly make arrests."	P	490	4.6	2.8
"Arrests deter offenders from repeating their criminal behavior."	P	490	3.6	2.8
"Arresting on shaky legal grounds is o.k. if you figure that the perp got away with many other crimes."	C	486	2.2	2.7

Table XIII-2 compares the attitudes of officers in the No-Arrest and High-Arrest groups. For 13 out of 15 statements, agreement levels were essentially the same. Only the professional principles that good officers make arrests, and that minor arrests can

Table XIII-2

Attitudes toward Arrest of No-Arrest and High-Arrest Officers

<i>Cynical (C) or Professional (P) Statement</i>	<i>C/P</i>	<i>No-Arrest Group</i> <i>(n = 151)</i>			<i>High-Arrest Group</i> <i>(n = 95)</i>			<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
		<i>n</i>	<i>Level of Agreement</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Level of Agreement</i>	<i>SD</i>			
"ADAs will plea bargain a felony to a violation if it means an easy conviction."	C	146	7.7	2.3	88	7.7	2.6	.25	232	.805
"Arrests statistics are manipulated by the C.O. or higher brass to make themselves look good."	C	147	7.8	2.7	88	7.7	2.5	.43	233	.670
"Arrest policies depend more on 'politics' than on concepts of sound crime-fighting."	C	145	7.3	2.6	87	6.9	2.5	1.18	230	.240
"No arrest is worth risking serious injury."	C	145	6.8	3.4	91	6.7	3.1	.29	234	.771
"A person who takes the oath of a police officer should be prepared to make sacrifices."	P	145	6.8	2.7	91	6.7	2.4	.45	211.0	.653
"Judges will accept almost any plea bargain just to clear their calendars."	C	147	6.1	2.8	88	6.5	2.5	-1.21	233	.227
"Arrests represent the way Society enforces basic standards of right and wrong."	P	146	6.0	2.5	88	5.9	2.3	.33	232	.738
"Arrests for 'quality of life' offenses prevent more serious crime problems."	P	146	5.4	2.7	88	6.4	2.5	-2.78	232	.006
"It's no big deal if a perp gets away, as he'll get caught sooner or later doing something else."	C	144	5.6	3.2	91	5.4	2.9	.61	206.8	.546
"Making arrests isn't worth it if they really disrupt your home life."	C	147	5.6	3.2	88	5.3	2.7	.702	203.9	.484
"Making good arrests is a way for officers to advance in their career."	P	148	5.0	3.1	88	5.4	2.9	-1.06	234	.292
"Arrests show that the police are doing what the public expects of them."	P	144	4.7	2.6	91	4.8	2.6	-.302	233	.763
"A good police officer should regularly make arrests."	P	147	3.8	2.5	88	5.7	2.5	-5.36	233	<.001
"Arrests deter offenders from repeating their criminal behavior."	P	147	3.4	2.9	88	3.7	2.9	-.65	233	.516
"Arresting on shaky legal grounds is ok if you figure that the perp got away with many other crimes."	C	146	2.1	2.7	88	1.8	2.4	.81	232	.421

Note. Boldface rows denote statements for which the agreement levels of No-Arrest and High-Arrest groups are significantly different.

prevent more serious crimes, garnered significantly more support from High-Arrest officers. The mean scores for all cynical statements were 6.1 ($SD = 1.8, n = 148$) for the Non-Arresters, and 6.0 ($SD = 1.4, n = 92$) for the High-Arresters, a statistical match: $t(222.8) = .74, p > .05$. However, the average for all professional statements was 5.0 ($SD = 1.5, n = 148$) for the No-Arrest group, significantly lower than the 5.4 ($SD = 1.5, n = 93$) for the High-Arrest group: $t(239) = -2.03, p = .044$.

Overall, then, the No-Arrest and High-Arrest officers were in common agreement over all of the cynical statements, but not all of the professional ones. The High-Arrest group alone felt that regular arrest-making was essential to good police work, and it had greater faith that arrest-making could deter crime. Thus, overtime motives aside, the High-Arrest officers seemed driven to arrest by a higher sense of purpose.

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HYPOTHESIS 5.1: CYNICAL ARREST ATTITUDES AND ADAPTIVE ARREST BEHAVIOR

Officers who report more agreement with cynical or self-serving attitudes toward arrests will also report more adaptive arrest behavior.

As discussed in Chapter X, adaptive arrest behaviors can take the form of arrest-seeking measures aimed at overtime, and arrest-avoidance measures aimed at timely sign-out or avoiding processing difficulties. If adaptive arrest behaviors are rationalized and encouraged by the exchange of cynical or self-centered maxims, then the more the officers actually believe these statements, the more they will use these adaptive measures.

TableXIII-3 displays the Spearman correlations of officers' mean level of agreement with cynical statements with the three forms of adaptive behavior. All are

Table XIII-3
Correlations of Cynical Arrest Attitudes and Adaptive Arrest Behaviors
 (N = 506)

<i>Adaptive Behavior</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>r_s</i>	<i>p</i>
Arrest-Seeking for Overtime	491	.13	.004
Arrest-Avoidance for Timely Sign-out	495	.36	<.001
Arrest-Avoidance for Processing Burdens	494	.37	<.001

significant and positive, confirming the hypothesis. The r_s values indicate that negative arrest attitudes have greater association with arrest-avoidance than with arrest-seeking behaviors, probably because the eight cynical arrest statements argue far more forcefully *against* making arrests.

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HYPOTHESIS 5.2: PROFESSIONAL ARREST ATTITUDES AND ADAPTIVE ARREST BEHAVIOR

Officers who report more disagreement with professional attitudes toward arrest will also report more adaptive arrest behavior.

Although Hypothesis 5.1 proposed that adaptive arrest behavior is positively associated with cynical arrest attitudes, Hypothesis 5.2 posits that it is negatively associated with professional arrest attitudes.

Table XIII-4 indicates that arrest overtime-seeking adaptations were not significantly related to professional attitudes, partially refuting the hypothesis. However, conforming to prediction, both types of arrest avoidance adaptations displayed significant negative correlations with professional attitudes. In other words, the less the officers subscribed to the professional maxims, the more they used avoidance measures.

Table XIII-4
Correlations of Professional Arrest Attitudes and Adaptive Arrest Behaviors
 (N = 506)

<i>Adaptive Behavior</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>r_s</i>	<i>p</i>
Arrest-Seeking for Overtime	491	.01	.782
Arrest-Avoidance for Timely Sign-out	495	-.22	<.001
Arrest-Avoidance for Processing Burdens	494	-.24	<.001

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The results in Table XIII-4 may reflect the influence of High-Arrest officers, who tended to subscribe more to professional attitudes (Table XII-2), but also tended to use more overtime-seeking methods (Table X-3). By raising the overall professionalism score of the entire Core Sample, the high-arresting officers erased the predicted negative correlation between professional beliefs and OT-seeking.

XIV
MANAGEMENT EFFECTS ON ADAPTIVE ARREST BEHAVIORS
(ITEMS 61-73)

Based on the literature and her own observations, the author has suggested several factors that make it hard for police management to curb self-serving arrest behavior. These are (1) the absence of supervisors at the scene of potential arrests, (2) the reluctance of supervisors to reverse subordinates' arrest decisions, (3) the difficulties in reassigning arrests to the incoming tour, (4) the ineffectiveness of sanctions to limit high overtime, and (5) the ineffectiveness of sanctions to encourage arrest-making. Hypotheses 9.1 through 9.5 predicts that participants will report the presence of these conditions in the majority of instances.

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
HYPOTHESIS 9.1: PATROL SUPERVISOR PRESENCE AT ARREST SITUATIONS

Officers will report that the patrol supervisor is usually not present (a) before an arrest is made or (b) at any time when an arrest is declined.

For part (a), participants were asked what percent of the time their supervisor was present *before* they placed an individual under arrest. The scores, displayed in Figure XIV-1, had a mean 32.7% ($SD = 26.4$); that is, a supervisor was present at the start of the arrest for less than a third of the time. Previously, Chapter XII had reported that in regard to the 424 arrests made within the last 90 days, the supervisor was on the scene at 37.7 % of occasions. The two findings support part (a)'s contention that most arrests are made without supervisory input.

Figure XIV-1
Percent of Time Patrol Supervisor was Present prior to Making Arrest
 (N = 433)


57. About what percent of the time (if at all) has the patrol supervisor arrived at an arrest incident before you placed the individual under arrest?



For part (b), officers were asked how often their supervisor was present when they declined (“shitcanned”) a legitimate arrest. Their responses, displayed in Figure XIV-2, had a mean score of 24.8% ($SD = 22.8$), showing that a supervisor attended about a quarter of the declinations. In Chapter XII’s examination of declined arrests made the previous 90 days, a supervisor was present at 31.7% of the incidents. Both results uphold part (b) of the hypothesis, as they indicate that supervisors were not usually around when arrests were declined.

Figure XIV-2
Percent of Time Patrol Supervisor was Present at Declined Arrest
 (N = 322)

58. About what percent of the time (if at all) is the patrol supervisor at the scene when you have not made an arrest that you could have made?



It also may be noted that supervisors were more likely to be present when an arrest was made than when it was “shitcanned.” This common expression itself implies a swift and surreptitious disposal.

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HYPOTHESIS 9.2 PATROL SUPERVISOR REVERSAL OF ARREST DECISIONS

Officers will report that patrol supervisors very rarely reverse officers' decisions

either (a) to arrest or (b) to not arrest.


For Hypothesis 9.2, part (a), officers were asked how often their decisions to make an arrest were countermanded by their supervisor. As Figure XIV-3 illustrates, the mean frequency for supervisory reversals was only 6.8% of the time ($SD = 13.1$), with

Figure XIV-3

**Percent of Time Patrol Supervisor
Overruled Officers' Decision to Arrest**

($N = 459$)

59. About what percent of the time (if at all) has a patrol supervisor at an incident told you not to make an arrest you wanted to make?




64.9% of officers reporting that their arrest decisions had *never* been overruled. Part (a) is thus confirmed.

For part (b) of Hypothesis 9.2, officers were asked how often their decisions *not* to make an arrest were countermanded by their supervisor. As Figure XIV-4 indicates, the mean frequency for supervisory reversals in favor of arrest was 21.0% of the time ($SD = 23.7$), with 30.3% of officers reporting that this had never occurred. Part (b) is thus confirmed.

Figure XIV-4

***Percent of Time Patrol Supervisor
Overruled Officers' Decision to Decline Arrest
(N = 459)***

60. About what percent of the time (if at all) has a patrol supervisor at an incident order you to make an arrest that you did not want to make?



It is also apparent that supervisors were more likely to order an arrest than to quash one, a result in keeping with previous indications of officers' overall tendency toward arrest-avoidance.

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HYPOTHESIS 9.3: REASSIGNMENT OF ARRESTS

Officers will report that their last-hour arrests were (a) rarely reassigned, and (b) were sometimes processed and prosecuted less effectively when reassigned.

Hypothesis 9.3 relates to NYPD guidelines to curb arrest overtime, wherein supervisors are urged to reassign the processing of late-in-tour arrests to officers on the incoming tour in select cases. Among such instances are arrests for an outstanding warrant, a violation of an Order of Protection, or an offense eligible for a Desk Appearance Ticket. In the author's experience as a supervisor, these reassignment opportunities were rare, because either the arrest did not meet the Department's criteria, or the incoming tour was too short-staffed to take over the processing. When arrests were turned over to new officers, they sometimes complained that they were inadequately briefed about the prisoner or the crime.

To confirm these observations, the survey first had officers rate, on a scale from 0 (*never*) to 10 (*very often*), how frequently a supervisor reassigned their late-in-tour arrest to the incoming tour, and then had them rate how often a supervisor had reassigned an arrest from the outgoing tour to them.

Figures XIV-5 reveals that 49.3% of participants never had to turn over their arrest, and the mean on the 0-to-10 frequency scale was 2.0 ($SD = 2.7$).

Figure XIV-5
**Supervisor Reassignment of
 Officers' Arrests to Incoming Tour**
 (N = 483)

64. How often, if ever, has a supervisor reassigned an arrest that you made late in your tour to another officer?





Figure XIV-6 reveals that 59.5% never had to *take* a turned-over arrest; their mean was even more infrequent at 1.3% ($SD = 2.1$). Hypothesis 9.3, part (a) is thus confirmed.

Figure XIV-6

Reassignment of Prior Tour's' Arrests to Officer

(N = 482)


65. How often, if ever, has a supervisor reassigned a late-in-tour arrest made by another office to you?



For part (b), officers were asked how often on a 0-to-10 scale they had problems processing an arrest because it was initially made by another officer. Figure XIV-7 shows that contrary to the hypothesis, 53.1% of participants had no problems, and the mean score was 2.1 ($SD = 2.9$). Apparently the author, while acting as supervisor, only noticed the problematic cases, and not the vast majority of reassignments that proceeded smoothly.

Figure XIV-7
Frequency of Processing Difficulties caused by
Reassignment of Arrests
 (N = 469)

66. How often, if ever, has a supervisor's reassignment of another officer's arrest to you caused you a problem in preparing paperwork, answering the ADA's questions, testifying, etc.?



HYPOTHESIS 9.4: OFFICER REACTIONS TO SANCTIONS FOR HIGH OVERTIME


Officers will report that when sanctioned for having high arrest overtime, they were more likely to react in ways management did not intend than in ways management intended.

Commanding officers are held strictly accountable for overtime spending, and pass this pressure on to subordinates. To gauge how patrol officers are affected, participants were first asked how often they exceeded management's monthly overtime

Figure XIV-8

Times in Past Year that Officers Earned More Overtime than Management Would Like
(N = 481)

70. In the past 12 months, how many times, if at all, did you earn more overtime than management would like?



caps. Figure XIV-8 shows that 53.2% (256 officers) had never run afoul of these limits. A small, distinct group composing 6.9% (33 officers) were over quota every month. The mean for all Core officers was just 2.6 times in 12 months ($SD = 3.6$), in keeping with participants' low overall arrest rates. For the 225 officers who went over the limit at least once, the mean was 5.5 times ($SD = 3.4$).

Those who had earned overtime after being “capped out” were then asked to chose which if any sanction(s) they experienced, from a list of possible consequences. Table XIV- presents these results, ordered from the most to the least common sanction.

Table XIV-1
Sanctions Imposed on Officers Exceeding Overtime Limit
(*n* = 225)

<i>Sanction</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
Was pressured to take overtime in compensation time rather than cash	77	61.6%
No consequences for making a lot of overtime	66	29.3%
Was admonished by Integrity Control Officer or other superior	64	28.4%
Was threatened with reassignment / tour change / RDO change	50	22.2%
Was denied details or special assignments that offered overtime	47	20.9%
Was denied time off.	44	19.6%
Had arrests reassigned to another officer	40	17.8%
Was reassigned or given tour change/RDO change	38	16.9%
Was given lower evaluation	37	16.4%
Was threatened to not be able to work with steady partner.	35	15.6%
Was given fewer patrol assignments with arrest opportunities	34	27.2%
Was forbidden to work with steady partner	34	27.2%
Other : <i>Given other duties while processing arrest / Not paid enough</i>	2	0.9%
<i>Note. Participants were told to select as many choices as apply.</i>		

The table shows that despite labor regulations and contractual agreements, the most frequent managerial sanction for high overtime was to pressure officers to select payment in time. The next most frequent managerial response was to do nothing at all to the officer.

Hypothesis 9.4 proposes that sanctions by management for high overtime provokes unintended reactions from the officers on whom they are imposed. Thus after each consequence selected by participants, they were ask their own reaction(s) to that sanction, drawn from a list of possible responses including “Other,” which was open-ended. Officer reactions to each sanction appear in Table XIV-2, ordered from left to

Table XIV-2
Officer Reactions to Sanctions Imposed for Exceeding Overtime Limit
(N = 225)

Sanction Imposed	Responses to Imposed Sanctions (Frequency and % of Total for Sanction)								Multiple Responses (1 each unless indicated)	Total Responses
	a) Did Everything the Same	b) Made Fewer Arrests Generally	c) Got Union Involved / Filed Grievance	d) Took OT in Comp Time	e) Tried to make more Arrests	f) Tried to get transfer to Other Unit	g) Made Fewer Arrests at EOT	h) Took 2nd Job/ Worked more at 2nd Job		
Was pressured to take overtime in compensation time rather than cash	30 (33.0%)	11 (12.1%)	10 (11.0%)	22 (24.2%)	7 (7.7%)	4 (4.4%)	5 (5.5%)	2 (2.2%)	b-c, b-d (2), b-g, c-d (2), d-e, d-f, d-h, f-g, c-f-h, c-d-e-h	91
No consequences for making a lot of overtime	47 (70.1%)	6 (9.0%)	3 (4.5%)	4 (6.0%)	4 (6.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (4.5%)	0 (0.0%)	b-g, b-h	67
Was admonished by Integrity Control Officer or other superior	31 (44.9%)	11 (15.9%)	6 (8.7%)	7 (10.1%)	5 (7.2%)	1 (1.4%)	3 (4.3%)	5 (7.2%)	b-c, b-h, d-h, b-d-g, c-d-e-h	69
Was threatened with reassignment / tour change / RDO change	27 (50.9%)	5 (9.4%)	8 (15.1%)	3 (5.7%)	3 (5.7%)	3 (5.7%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (7.5%)	b-c, c-h, b-c-f, c-d-f	53
Was denied details or special assignments that offered overtime	21 (46.7%)	6 (13.3%)	4 (8.9%)	4 (8.9%)	4 (8.9%)	2 (4.4%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (8.9%)	b-h, c-d, d-h, e-h	45
Was denied time off.	21 (48.8%)	9 (20.9%)	10 (23.0%)	1 (2.3%)	1 (2.3%)	1 (2.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	b-c, c-d	43
Had arrests reassigned to another officer	27 (62.8%)	5 (11.6%)	2 (4.7%)	1 (2.3%)	1 (2.3%)	2 (4.7%)	5 (11.6%)	0 (0.0%)	b-c, f-g	43
Was reassigned or given tour change / RDO change	21 (52.5%)	4 (10.0%)	6 (15.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (10.0%)	2 (5.0%)	2 (5.0%)	1 (2.5%)	c-e, c-h, b-c-f	40
Was given lower evaluation	20 (43.5%)	10 (22.2%)	8 (17.4%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (4.7%)	4 (8.7%)	1 (2.2%)	1 (2.2%)	b-c, b-g, c-f, b-c-f, b-e-f, c-f-h	46
Was threatened to not be able to work with steady partner.	24 (60.0%)	9 (22.5%)	3 (7.5%)	1 (2.5%)	1 (2.5%)	2 (5.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	b-c, b-d, c-f-h	40
Was given fewer patrol assignments with arrest opportunities	25 (67.6%)	3 (8.1%)	4 (10.8%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (5.4%)	3 (8.1%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	b-c, e-f, c-f-h	37
Was forbidden to work with steady partner	20 (52.6%)	7 (18.4%)	6 (15.8%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (7.9%)	1 (2.6%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.6%)	b-c, b-c-f	38
Frequency of Reaction	313 (51.2%)	86 (14.1%)	70 (11.5%)	43 (7.0%)	37 (6.1%)	25 (4.1%)	19 (3.1%)	18 (2.9%)	--	611

Note. Participants were told to select as many responses as apply. Where multiple responses were reported, each response also was included in the row total for that response.

right by the overall frequencies of each reaction (bottom row). The Table shows that after every imposed sanction, the most frequent officer response was to do everything the same as before. This non-reaction accounted for over half of responses overall. Another quarter of officer responses were either to make fewer arrests generally, and/or to complain to the union. Finally, about 13% either defiantly aimed for more arrests, tried to leave their unit, or put in more time at a second job. Clearly these were not the effects for which the anti-overtime sanctions were striving.

Management did have some limited successes. When it directly pressured officers to opt for comp time instead of cash (the most common sanction), 24.2 % of responses complied. In the face of all anti-OT sanctions, 7.0% of reactions involved accepting time over money, and another 3.1% entailed decreasing arrest-making at end-of-tour. Thus, overall, only about a tenth of officer reactions achieved the goal of curtailing overtime costs.

In sum, the sanctions imposed to curb arrest overtime were most likely to be counterproductive. Hypothesis 9.4 is confirmed.

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HYPOTHESIS 9.5: OFFICER REACTIONS TO SANCTIONS FOR LOW ARRESTS

Officers will report that when sanctioned for making few arrests, they were more likely to react in ways unintended by management than in ways management intended.


Commanding officers are expected to ensure that each patrol officer performs at least some enforcement activity. Usually they are satisfied if the officer issues an adequate number of summonses, but occasionally they will demand an arrest.

To evaluate how arrest-making pressure affected the Core officers, they first were asked how often they were urged to make more arrests. Figure XIV-8 indicates that 39.6% (178 officers) were addressed by a supervisor for low arrest activity at least once in the past year. The Core Group's mean score was 1.9 times over 12 months ($SD = 3.1$). For the 178 participants who were criticized, the mean number of warnings was 4.8 ($SD = 3.4$).

Figure XIV-9

Times in Past Year Officers Were Told to Make More Arrests
($N = 449$)

72. *In the past 12 months, about how many times, if at all, has a supervisor told you or hinted to you that you should be making more arrests?*



Those who were urged to make more arrests were then asked which if any consequences they experienced, from a list of choices. Table XIV-3 orders these sanctions from the most to the least frequently chosen..

Table XIV-3
Sanctions Imposed on Officers making Too Few Arrests
(n = 178)

<i>Sanction</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Valid %</i>
Was threatened with reassignment / tour change / RDO change	64	36.0%
Was told to take a specific arrest (e.g., shoplifter, reassigned arrest).	62	34.8%
Was denied time off	54	30.3%
Was given undesirable posts.	53	29.8%
No consequences threatened or imposed	52	29.2%
Was given lower evaluation	49	27.5%
Was threatened to not be able to work with steady partner	47	26.4%
Was threatened with transfer	40	22.5%
Was reassigned / had tour changed / had RDO changed	38	21.3%
Was denied details or special assignments offering overtime	31	14.4%
Was threatened with loss of permission to work second job	27	15.2%
Was forbidden to work with steady partner	27	12.2%
Lost permission to work second job	26	14.6%
Was transferred	25	14.0%
Other (1 each):	7	3.9%
<i>Assigned to hospitalized prisoner every day for 2 months</i>		
<i>Walked solo foot post on midnights for 4 months</i>		
<i>Threatened with possible foot post</i>		
<i>Threatened with assigned arrest</i>		
<i>Was asked to try and make arrests</i>		
<i>Was told no OT if don't make arrest in quarter</i>		
<i>Had a late job 1 day & scumbag sergeant refused to sign OT slip</i>		

Note. Participants were told to select as many choices as apply.

To test the hypothesis that supervisory measures to increase arrest-making were generally ineffective, participants were then asked how they reacted to imposed sanctions, from a list of possible responses including an open-ended "Other." Table XIV-4, like Table XIV-2, shows that for every sanction, officers most often responded by to making no change in their behavior. Overall, 54.1% "did everything the same." The next most common reaction was making a single, routine arrest, pursuant to a direct order or to a threat of reassignment, tour change, or change in regular days off (RDO).

Table XIV-4
Officer Reactions to Sanctions Imposed for Insufficient Arrests
(N = 178)

Sanction Imposed	Responses to Imposed Sanctions (Frequency and % of Total for Sanction)								Multiple Responses (1 each unless indicated)	Total Responses
	a. Did Everything the Same	b. Made One Routine Arrest that Month	c. Made Enough Arrests to show average activity	d. Got Union Involved/ Filed Grievance	e. Tried to Milk Next Arrest to Make it Worth the Effort	f. Other Reactions	g. Made Arrest for r Offense Eligible for Summons	h. Tried to get steady inside assignment		
Was threatened with reassignment / tour change / RDO change	30 (43.5%)	15 (21.7%)	8 (11.6%)	3 (4.3%)	2 (2.9%)	6 (8.7%)	2 (2.9%)	3 (4.3%)	be(2), gc, g-h, h-f	69
Was told to take a specific arrest (eg. shoplifter, reassigned arrest).	27 (42.2%)	12 (18.8%)	8 (12.5%)	0 (0%)	11 (17.2%)	4 (6.3%)	2 (3.1%)	0 (0%)	b-e, b-c	64
Was denied time off	26 (44.8%)	5 (8.6%)	9 (15.5%)	8 (13.8%)	1 (1.7%)	4 (6.9%)	3 (5.2%)	2 (3.4%)	b-g, c-d, g-h, e-c	58
No consequences threatened/imposed	38 (66.7%)	7 (12.3%)	8 (14.0%)	2 (3.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.8%)	1 (1.8%)	0 (0%)	b-g, b-c (2), b-c-d	57
Was given undesirable posts.	29 (51.8%)	9 (16.1%)	4 (7.1%)	2 (3.6%)	6 (10.7%)	3 (5.4%)	2 (3.6%)	1 (1.8%)	b-g-e, b-e, c-g	56
Was given lower evaluation	26 (48.1%)	8 (14.8%)	9 (16.7%)	2 (3.7%)	3 (5.6%)	2 (3.7%)	3 (5.6%)	1 (1.9%)	b-e (2), b-g, g-e, g-c	54
Was threatened to not be able to work with steady partner	30 (62.5%)	7 (14.6%)	4 (8.3%)	3 (6.3%)	1 (2.1%)	2 (4.2%)	1 (2.1%)	0 (0%)	b-e	48
Was threatened with transfer	23 (57.5%)	4 (10.0%)	2 (5.0%)	6 (15.0%)	1 (2.5%)	1 (2.5%)	2 (5.0%)	1 (2.5%)	g-c, g-h, e-d	40
Was reassigned / had tour changed / had RDO changed	19 (47.5%)	9 (22.5%)	2 (5.0%)	3 (7.5%)	2 (5.0%)	3 (7.5%)	1 (2.5%)	1 (2.5%)	b-g-e	40
Was denied details or special assignments offering overtime	20 (64.5%)	3 (9.7%)	3 (9.7%)	2 (6.5%)	0 (0%)	3 (9.7%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	--	31
Was threatened with loss of permission to work second job	19 (65.5%)	4 (13.8%)	2 (6.9%)	0 (0%)	3 (10.3%)	1 (3.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	b-e, e-c	29
Was forbidden to work with steady partner	17 (60.7%)	4 (14.3%)	1 (3.6%)	4 (14.3%)	1 (3.6%)	1 (3.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	b-e	28
Lost permission to work 2 nd job	18 (72.0%)	1 (4.0%)	2 (8.0%)	2 (4.0%)	1 (4.0%)	1 (4.0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	--	25
Was transferred	16 (61.5%)	1 (3.8%)	1 (3.8%)	5 (19.2%)	1 (3.8%)	1 (3.8%)	0 (0%)	1 (3.8%)	b-e	26
Frequency of Reaction	338 (54.1%)	89 (14.2%)	63 (10.1%)	42 (6.7%)	33 (5.3%)	33 (5.3%)	17 (2.7%)	10 (1.6%)	--	625

Note. Participants were told to select as many responses as apply. Where multiple responses were reported, each response also was included in the row total for that response.

Overall, responses that entailed the increased arrest-making sought by management - either making one routine arrest or making an average number of arrest - represented only 24.3% of reactions.

Though 33 officers (5.3%) reported “other reactions,” only five specified what these were. Two of the participants seemed chastened in their comments : “Wanted to go back to patrol and not be threatened to lose your chart days and RDOs”; “Took it into consideration and started to look further.” Three were unrepentant: “Did less of everything”; “Gave no activity for several months”; and “Don’t care what they do – still will get paid no matter what assignment you get.”

Even without knowing the nature of all the “Other” responses, over three-quarters of officer reactions to arrest-making sanctions would be considered by management to be undesirable. Therefore Hypothesis 9.5 is confirmed.

The array of measures used by police supervisors to control adaptive arrest behaviors – being present at arrest situations, countermanding inappropriate arrest decisions, reassigning late-in-tour arrests, and sanctioning high overtime or low arrest-making – all appear to have little effect.

XV

REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

In the preceding ten chapters, survey findings were generally presented in the order that they emerged from the questionnaire. In the following review, the results most pertinent to adaptive arrest behavior are discussed according to their relevant group or subgroup: Core, Low- and High-Arrest, Male and Female, Midnight and Non-Midnight, and Bronx and Queens. The hypotheses are presented in boxed text within the relevant category.

Certain revelations presented in this study inevitably raise questions about the truthfulness of the participants. Following the review of the major findings, their potential “distortions” will be discussed.

THE CORE SAMPLE

Because this study concerned in how individual patrol officers make arrest decisions, most of it focused on the Core decision-makers: the 506 participants who patrolled solo or in two-officer cars, at least three times per week.

- 1. *Family situations presented potential conflicts with officers' jobs:*** 40.2% of participants lived with children of average age 6.6 years, and 10.5% of such officers had no spouse or partner. Under 7% of those with children had professional child-care assistance.
- 2. *Future educational needs may conflict with work:*** 45.8% of officers would be required to attend college in order to be eligible for promotion.
- 3. *Officers overall made relatively few arrests:*** In their most recent full month worked, 60.0% made zero or one arrest; the Core group average was 1.6.

4. Officers appeared to have had ample opportunity to make arrests: 83.6% went on patrol every workday. Participants rated their command's crime level as moderately high, and rated arrest-finding to be relatively easy.

5. Officers may have been better able to regulate their arrest-making by working with a steady, compatible partner: 72.2% usually worked with regular partners, and the partners' arrest rates were very similar to their own.

6. Overtime seemed to be an incentive to make arrests at the end of the tour: 25.1% of participants' arrests were made in the last hour, when arrest processing OT would be maximized. This was double what would be expected were arrests made at an even pace throughout the tour.

7. Overtime from routine arrests was less important than other OT sources after 9/11: Routine arrest-making provided 53.1% of participants with a mean OT of 10.9 hours per month, while security or enforcement details provided 66.6% of participants with 22.5 hours.

8. Officers were "very eager to do better" economically: After going years without a raise, they rated their financial dissatisfaction at 7.7 on a 0-to-10 scale.

9. The police paycheck appeared to be the key determinant of household finances: On average, 70.6% of officers' household income was derived from their NYPD employment. It was the sole source of income for 34.4% of officer households.

10. Officers felt their OT opportunities from sources other than routine arrests to be insufficient: On a scale from 0 (*Never Enough*) to 10 (*Always Enough*), their mean rating was 3.2.

11. While most officers had a moderate need for routine arrest overtime, a distinct segment of participants rated their need for arrest OT at the maximum level: The mean

was 5.4 on a 0-to-10 scale, with 17.9% scoring at midpoint, and 16.7% scoring at 10.

(H. 1.1) Officers who reported (a) upward economic aspiration, and (c) few structured opportunities for overtime also reported a high need for routine arrest overtime money. However, officers who reported (b) few outside sources of income did not have a higher (or lower) need for routine arrest OT.

Hypothesis 1.1 was partially substantiated: Officers' need for overtime from routine arrests was significantly correlated with financial dissatisfaction ($r = .26$) and adequacy of other overtime sources ($r = -.29$). However, arrest OT need was unrelated to the percentage of household income from non-police sources.

12. Because of personal commitments, officers often felt that they could not extend their tour, and implicitly, could not make an arrest: For instance, 62.7% of participants felt they could not stay late on one or more days per week; 26.4% felt they *never* could stay.

H. 1.2: Officers who reported frequent commitments related to (a) dependent family members school, (b) second jobs, (c) social engagements, (d) other personal business, and (e) commuting, also report a frequent need to end their tour on time.

Hypotheses 1.2 was confirmed for all five post-work constraints and three of the four general constraints. There were significant positive correlations between the need to get off work on time and 3-hour-post-work time commitments to: commuting ($r_s = .44$), family ($r_s = .35$), other appointments ($r_s = .30$), social engagements ($r_s = .23$), second jobs ($r_s = .21$), and school ($r_s = .09$). There also was significant but smaller

correlations between the need for timely sign-out and all general activities except college.

13. Officers' most frequent administrative processing concerns involved a fear of being humiliated. The three concerns ranked highest were having to write a narrative, having to testify in court, and making a mistake, looking bad, or being reprimanded.

14. Officers' most frequent prisoner-handling concerns involved what the prisoner might say, rather than physical danger: Being verbally abused, or the subject of a CCRB or IAB allegation, were ranked highest.

15. Because of arrest processing difficulties, officers were "turned off" to arrest processing nearly half the time: On a scale from 0 (*On no occasion*) to 10 (*On every occasion*), the mean score was 4.8.

(H. 1.3) Officers who reported more concern over unpleasant or risky aspects of administrative arrest procedures and/or prisoner contact also reported a greater aversion to arrest processing.

Hypothesis 1.3 was confirmed for all 18 arrest listed processing concerns. In descending order, the significant correlations between arrest-making aversion and the administrative problems were: officer fatigue ($r_s = .50$), boring, repetitious forms ($r_s = .44$), being disciplined for taking too long ($r_s = .41$), complex/confusing procedures ($r_s = .39$), no staff with computer/equipment skills ($r_s = .38$), making mistakes/looking bad/being reprimanded ($r_s = .38$), having to testify ($r_s = .35$), having to write a lengthy or difficult narrative ($r_s = .35$), having to go different locations ($r_s = .35$), and inoperable computers or equipment ($r_s = .31$). The prisoner-handling problems that correlated with arrest aversion were prisoner allegations ($r_s = .32$), taking prisoner to the hospital ($r_s =$

.31), prisoner filth or foul odor ($r_s = .29$), drunken or emotionally disturbed behavior ($r_s = .26$), verbal abuse ($r_s = .18$), infection ($r_s = .18$), and escape ($r_s = .15$).

16. Overall, arrest aversion was more highly associated with administrative processing problems than with prisoner-handling problems: The correlations were, respectively, .58 versus .33, concurring with the well-documented sentiment among officers that they “get more grief from bosses than from perps.”

17. Officers employed all listed tactics when arrest-seeking for overtime: From most commonly used to least, they were 1) driving faster to crimes in progress in 2nd half of tour, 2) patrolling in easy-arrest areas in the 2nd half of tour, 3) trying harder to find suspects who just left scene in the 2nd half of tour, 4) making more car stops in the 2nd half of tour, 5) asking officers for their unwanted arrests, 6) trying to take domestic incident jobs in 2nd half of tour, 7) switching to assignment with good arrest opportunities, 8) trying harder to get complainants to prosecute in 2nd half of tour, 9) looking for any minor violation in 2nd half of tour, 10) doing more stop/question/frisks in 2nd half of tour, 11) following up on pick-up complaints in 2nd half of tour, 12) trying to handle jobs before telling dispatcher in 2nd half of tour, 13) issuing a DAT instead of a summons in 2nd half of tour, and 14) focusing more on minority individuals who might be perps.

18. Overall, officers used arrest-seeking tactics fairly infrequently: For instance, only 17.9% used such tactics once or more per week.. This corresponds to participants’ low overall arrest rate.

19. The most ethically questionable overtime-seeking tactics were the least common:

The least frequent practice was focusing on minorities (“profiling”), followed by arresting someone for an offense normally meriting only a summons.

(H. 2.1) Officers who report a greater need for arrest overtime money also reported more frequent use of arrest-seeking adaptations aimed at making overtime.

Hypothesis 2.1 was confirmed. Participants’ need for arrest overtime money correlated significantly with their overall use of arrest overtime-enhancing patrol methods ($r_s = .39$).

20. Officers employed all listed tactics to avoiding arrest: From most to least common, they were 1) not conducting stop/questions/frisks, 2) not conducting car stops, 3) ignoring minor violations, 4) avoiding easy-arrest areas, 5) asking fellow officer to take unwanted arrest, 6) arranging assignments with little chance to arrest, 7) issuing summons instead of making arrest, 8) driving slowly or conspicuously to crimes in progress, 9) ignoring pick-up complaints from non-involved parties, and 10) trying to discourage complainants from pressing charges.

21. Overall, arrest-avoidance measures were more commonly used because of a need to sign-out than because of an aversion to processing: For instance, 33.9% of officers used avoidance tactics for sign-out, while 25.3% used them due to a distaste for processing, at least once a week.

23. Overall, arrest avoidance measures were used more often than arrest overtime-seeking measures: For example, at least once per week 17.9% of participants used arrest overtime-seeking methods, while 33.8% used avoidance methods for sign-out and 25.2

used them to escape processing burdens. This agrees with several findings: that officers have non-arrest sources of overtime, that most express only a moderate need for arrest overtime, that they have many opportunities for arrest than they do not follow up, that their post-work commitments are sabotaged by arrest-making, and that processing is risky and unpleasant.

(H. 2.2) Officers who reported a greater need to end their tour on time also reported more frequent use of arrest-avoiding adaptations aimed at timely sign-out.

Hypothesis 2.2 was confirmed. There was a significant positive correlation between participants' overall sign-out need and their use of arrest-avoidance tactics to achieve this end ($r_s = .30$).

(H. 2.3) Officers who reported a greater aversion to processing arrests also reported more frequent use of arrest-avoidance adaptations to avoid arrest-processing burdens.

Hypothesis 2.3 was confirmed. Participants' overall distaste for arrest processing's administrative and prisoner-handling elements were correlated with their use of arrest-avoidance tactics aimed at avoiding this ordeal ($r_s = .56$).

24. Overall, arrest-avoidance measures was more highly associated than sign-out need than with processing aversion: The correlations of avoidance tactics with sign out need and processing aversion were, respectively, .56 and .30.

25. Arrest decisions can be extremely complex: From a list of 31 arrest factors (16 situational or organizational, and 15 personal), every item carried weight in some participants' arrest decisions.

26. Offense seriousness, suspect demeanor, and victim cooperation and attitude were the four factors most commonly cited as important: Thus the participants' primary arrest determinants were similar to those found in previous studies.

27 Some personal factors ranked closely to the four major situational factors in importance: Post-work social commitments ranked # 5, offensive or dangerous prisoners # 6, and need for overtime money # 8.

28. Some of the most-studied situational variables were surpassed in importance by personal ones. For instance, suspect class or type (#20) was ranked below the personal factors of long, complicated arrest procedures (#13), likeliness of being rescheduled to see ADA/go to court (#14), need to attend to children (#15), desire to take a break from patrol (#18), and need for comp time (#19). Suspect race, sex, or age (# 28) followed bad weather (#26) and boredom (#27).

(H. 3) Officers did not report that in potential arrest situations, they assign as much importance to major personal concerns of arrest overtime need, sign-out need, and arrest-processing aversion as to the most consistently significant situational variables of offense level, suspect demeanor, and complainant preference.

Hypothesis 3, positing that major personal concerns will be weighed equally with the major situational concerns, was *not* substantiated. The most widely-documented arrest factors of crime seriousness, suspect demeanor, and complainant cooperation were also the participants' highest concerns. However, such personal variables as social commitments, prisoner problems, and overtime need followed closely on the list as major decisional factors.

(H. 4.1) Most officers reported that their most recent decisions to arrest, if freely made, were preceded by an (a) initial intent to arrest, and (b) arrest-seeking behaviors. Whether their decisions were preceded by (c) proactive intervention remained unclear.

Hypotheses 4.1, parts (a) and (b) were confirmed, but part (c) was not. For part (a), the 89 Core officers who had made recent elective arrests were asked to rate their pre-tour arrest desire from 0 (*strongly didn't want an arrest*) to 10 (*strongly wanted an arrest*). Their mean score was 5.6, a significant elevation over a neutral desire of 5, which indicated an initial preference in favor of arrest.

For Part (b), those with recent elective arrests rated their patrol style just prior to making the arrest, from 0 (*trying hard to avoid an arrest*) to 10 (*trying hard to make an arrest*). Participants' mean score was significantly above midpoint at 5.4, indicating that they were patrolling in "looking" mode.

Part (c), which predicts that officers making elective arrests will tend to become involved on their own initiative, could not be confirmed, because the proactive versus reactive nature of some of the methods of engagement proved ambiguous. One finding in support of part (c) was that the most common lead-in to an elective arrest was a self-initiated investigative or enforcement activity.

(H. 4.2) Most officers reported that their most recent decisions to decline arrest, if freely made, were preceded by an (a) initial intent to not arrest and (b) arrest-avoiding behaviors. Whether their decisions were preceded by (c) reactive intervention remained unclear.

Hypotheses 4.2, parts (a) and (b) were confirmed, but part (c) was not. For part (a), the 140 Core officers who had recently declined an arrest rated their pre-tour arrest desire in the “*strongly didn’t want an arrest*” direction at 3.4. This was a significant decrease from a non-committal mean of 5, confirming that when officers declined an arrest, they tended to plan this outcome at the start of their tours.

For part (b), participants rated their patrol style prior to declining an arrest in the “*trying hard to avoid an arrest*” direction at 4.1. This is a significant decrease from the scale’s midpoint, suggesting that officers who declined arrests used a patrol style aimed at this result.

Part (c), which proposes that officers who decline arrests will tend to get involved in the incident without a self-initiating act, could not be confirmed, again because the proactiveness or reactiveness of several interventions proved to be unclear. It is noteworthy though that while 31.5% of elective arrests began with a self-initiated enforcement activity, only 20.7% of declinations began that way.

29. Officers held both cynical and professional attitudes toward arrest, but more strongly endorsed cynical ones.

Rating eight cynical statements and seven positive statements about arrests from 0 (*strongly disagree*) to 10 (*strongly agree*), participants’ mean level of agreement with the cynical statements was 6.1. Participants’ mean level of agreement with the professional statements was 5.2.

30. Officers who held stronger cynical or self-serving attitudes were slightly inclined to hold weaker professional attitudes: The mean agreement levels for the two groups of statements displayed a correlation of -.13.

31. The most strongly endorsed statements contended that officers' arrests are manipulated to further the careers of prosecutors, commanding officers, and politicians: Agreement levels were, respectively, 7.8, 7.7, and 7.2.

32. Three of the four rejected statements claimed arrests served professional goals: Claims that arrests are the mark of a good police officer, fulfill public expectations, and deter offenders from repeating their crime, respectively scored 4.9, 4.6, and 3.6.

33. Officers most strongly disagreed with the statement that it is all right to arrest a suspect on shaky legal grounds: This rejection was indicated by a score of 2.2 .

(H. 5.1) Officers who reported agreement with cynical or self-serving attitudes toward arrests also reported more adaptive arrest behavior.

Hypothesis 5.1 was confirmed. Cynical arrest attitudes were significantly correlated with arrest-avoidance due to processing burdens ($r_s = .37$), arrest avoidance due to post-work commitments ($r_s = .36$), and arrest seeking for overtime ($r_s = .13$).

(H. 5.2) Officers who reported more disagreement with professional attitudes toward arrest also reported more adaptive arrest behavior.

Hypothesis 5.2 was partially confirmed. Professional sentiments displayed significant negative correlations with arrest avoidance due to post-work commitments ($r_s = -.22$) and arrest avoidance due to processing burdens ($r_s = -.24$). However, professional attitudes bore no relationship to arrest-seeking for overtime.

(H. 9.1) Officers reported that the patrol supervisor was usually not present before an arrest is made or at any time when an arrest is declined.

Hypothesis 9.1 was confirmed. A supervisor was present just before an arrest for 32.7% of the time, and to witness declined arrests for 24.8% of the time. Thus direct supervision was too infrequent to be an effective restraint upon Core officers' adaptive arrest behavior.

(H. 9.2) Officers reported that patrol supervisors very rarely reversed their decisions either to arrest or to not arrest.

Hypothesis 9.2 was also confirmed. Supervisors overruled Core officers' arrests only in 6.8% of instances, and overruled their declinations in 21.0% of instances. In practice, therefore, supervisory reversals occurred too rarely to curb adaptive arrest behavior.

(H. .9.3) Officers reported that their last-hour arrests were (a) rarely reassigned. However, these arrests were not (b) processed and prosecuted less effectively when reassigned.

Hypothesis 9.3, part (a) was confirmed, and part (b) was not. Supporting part (a), participants rated the frequency of having their arrests reassigned, on a scale from 0 (*never*) to 10 (*very often*), at 2.0, and they rated the frequency of *taking* a reassigned arrest even more rarely, at 1.3. However, refuting part (b), officers reported that reassigned arrests rarely gave them additional problems in processing or prosecution,

rating the frequency at 2.1. Thus the NYPD guidelines, urging that select late-in-tour arrests be reassigned to the incoming tour, were too rarely applied to have much effect on overtime abuse. On the other hand, the lack of problems in such reassigned arrests suggests that this approach could be expanded, by using not only other officers but other agencies. As the next chapter will describe, this is a common practice in other police departments.

(H. 9.4) Officers reported that when sanctioned for having high arrest overtime, they were more likely to react in ways management did not intend than in ways management intended.

Hypothesis 9.4 was confirmed. There were 255 officers (46.8%) who exceeded management's over limits at least once in the previous 12 months, and on average they went "over the cap" 5.5 times. The most common sanction for exceeding overtime limits, imposed on 61.6% of the over-cap officers, was supervisory pressure to take overtime in time. The second most common response from management, experienced by 29.3% of over-cap officers, was *no consequence*, that is, to do nothing to the officer. Other sanctions commonly imposed were to be admonished by the Integrity Control Lieutenant (28.4% affected), to be given fewer patrol assignments with arrest opportunities (27.2% affected), and to be forbidden to work with one's steady partner (27.2% affected).

Hypothesis 9.4 states that sanctions imposed by management for high overtime are likely to have mostly unintended consequences, and this was certainly the case. Of 611 reactions to sanctions, 51.2% entailed no change in behavior, 14.1% entailed fewer arrests generally, 11.5% involved complaints to the union, 6.1% were attempts to make

more arrests, and 2.9% were to put more time into second jobs. Only 10.1% of officer reactions to sanctions achieved the management goal of curtailing cash overtime: the 7.0% accepting comp time and 3.1% making fewer end-of-tour arrests.

(H. 9.5) Officers reported that when sanctioned for making few arrests, they were more likely to react in ways unintended by management than in ways management intended.

Hypothesis 9.5 was also confirmed. Making too few arrests brought supervisory admonishment over the previous 12 months to 178 officers (39.6%), who on average were warned 4.8 times. The most common sanction, experienced by 54.1%, was to be threatened with a change in assignment, tour, or regular days off. Next most common were to be ordered to take a specific arrest (38.4%), to be denied time off (30.3%), and to be given undesirable posts (29.8%). No consequences were threatened or imposed on 29.2% of low-arrest officers.

Hypothesis 9.5 predicted that Core officers would largely *not* respond by increasing their arrests, as management had intended. Of 625 reactions to sanctions, 54.1% entailed no change in behavior. Other undesirable reactions were to complain to the union (6.7%), to “milk” the next arrest for overtime (5.3%), to arrest someone who is eligible to just receive a summons (2.7%), and to try to get a non-patrol assignment (1.6%). Only 24.3% of reactions explicitly entailed increased arrest-making - either making one routine arrest (14.2%) or making just enough arrests to show “average” activity (10.1%).

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THE NO-ARREST AND HIGH-ARREST GROUPS

From the Core Sample, 151 participants or 30.2% had made no arrests in the last full month they worked, while 94 participants or 18.8% had made three or more arrests. When survey variables of the two groups were compared, many telling distinctions emerged.

1. Finding an arrest was easier for High-Arrest officers: On a scale from 0 (*very easy*) to 10 (*very hard*), the No-Arrest mean was 4.9, significantly higher than the High-Arrest mean of 3.1.

2. Last-hour arrest-making was more accelerated among the High-Arrest Officers:

The No-Arrest group made 20.4% of their arrests in the final hour of the tour, while the High-Arrest group made a significantly greater 27.5%, suggesting the High-Arrest group may be particularly influenced by overtime.

3. No-Arrest and High-Arrest officers were statistically alike in their desire to better themselves financially, in the proportion of their household income coming from non-policing sources, and in the sufficiency of alternative OT opportunities: These economic circumstances thus appear unrelated to arrest rates.

4. The need for overtime from routine arrests was greater for the High-Arrest officer: The No-Arrest need for routine arrest overtime was below midpoint at 4.5, while the High-Arrest need was significantly higher, at 6.5. Since the High-Arrest group seemed to have economic circumstances similar to the No-Arrest group, High-Arrest's perceived need for arrest overtime may stem from a dependency on their OT-enhanced paychecks, once they began making arrests on a regular basis.

5. The need to sign out on time because of outside commitments or concern was greater for the No-Arrest officers: For instance, 29.8% of the No-Arrest group versus

14.9% of the High-Arrest felt it could not stay late on any workday, a significant difference.

6. Administrative and prisoner-handling difficulties were more of a “turn-off” to arrest-making for the No-Arrest officers: From 0 (*On no occasion*) to 10 (*On every occasion*), the No-Arrest group rated arrest-processing aversion at 5.7, while the High-Arrest rated it significantly lower at 3.5.

7. Tactics to increase arrest overtime were used more by High-Arrest officers. As an example of their significant differences, 34.4% of the High-Arrest group versus 10.8% of the No-Arrest group and used such tactics at least once a week.

8. Tactics to avoid arrest, for both timely sign-out and processing aversion, were used more by No-Arrest officer: Illustrating their significant disparities, at the once-a-week-or-more level 40.3% of the No-Arrest group versus 1.1% of the High-Arrest group used arrest avoidance measures to secure timely sign-out; 28.9% of the No-Arrest group versus 9.7% of the High-Arrest group used such measures to avoid processing burdens.

9. The prospect of prisoner difficulties was the most important personal arrest variable for No-Arrest officers. It was ranked 5th by No-Arrest officers, and 9th by High-Arrest officers.

10. The prospect of overtime was the most important personal arrest variable for High-Arrest officers. It was ranked 2nd by High-Arrest officers, 14th by No-Arrest officers.

11. The prospect of long complicated processing procedures, and the need to attend to children, was given greater weight by No-Arrest officers. Respectively, for No-Arrest officers they ranked in 9th and 12th place; for High-Arrest officers they ranked in 26th and 20th place.

12. The prospect of career advancement or plainclothes assignment was only an arrest consideration for High-Arrest officers. The High-Arrest group ranked it 8th; the No-Arrest group ranked it 30th (second-to-last).

13. For all eight cynical arrest statements, and five of seven professional arrest statements, No-Arrest and High-Arrest officers were essentially in agreement.

The mean scores for cynical arrest attitudes were a statistical match. However, because the High-Arrest group gave stronger endorsements to two professional statements, their average for professional attitudes was 5.4, significantly higher than the 5.0 for the No-Arrest group.

14. The professional principles that good officers make arrests, and that minor arrests can prevent more serious crimes, garnered more support from High-Arrest officers.

For the first statement, the No-Arrest group's agreement level was 5.4, versus 6.4 for the High-Arrest group. For the second statement, the No-Arrest group's agreement level was 3.8, versus 5.7 for the High-Arrest group.

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MALE AND FEMALE OFFICERS

With the question on gender appearing near the end of the survey, only 447 of 506 officers responded. The 379 males and 68 females represented, respectively, 84.8% and 15.2% of the Core Sample.

Differences in the policing styles of men and women have been the subject of research since women began assuming full patrol duties in the early 1970s. This study sought to determine if there are gender differences in arrest behavior, and how these differences might be related to dissimilarities in personal needs and circumstances.

1. Core sample women were more likely to be raising children without a spouse or partner: 32.3% of female participants versus 4.2% of males were in this situation, a significant difference.

2. Core sample women and men made a statistically equivalent number of arrests.

(H. 6.1) Female officers reported less frequent assignment to patrol than male officers

Hypothesis 6.1 was confirmed. For instance, in the full sample of 605 participants, 20.5% of females versus 6.9% of males could be characterized as House Mice, going on patrol only once a week or less. Only 71.1% percent of female officers, as compared to 89.6% of men, met the Core Sample criterion of three or more patrol days per week. Neither differences in education level, children in the household, or overall need to end tour could explain these differences.

(H. 6.2) Female officers will report having more frequent family commitments than male officers.

Hypothesis 6.2 was confirmed for both non-time-specific and post-tour family commitments. One of the significant findings, for instance, was that for five or more days per week, 45.5% of women as opposed to 16.3% of men provide care for children or dependent adults within three hours post- tour.

(H. 6.3) Female officers did not report a more frequent need to end their tour on time than male officers.

Hypothesis 6.3 was not confirmed. Though women officers have more family-related time commitments, they have no greater overall need to get off work on time. This result may be due to the number of more “gender-neutral” time constraints, particularly the widespread commuting difficulties of both sexes, that contributed to the need for timely end-of-tour.

(H. 6.4) Female officers did not report fewer arrest-generating adaptations aimed at overtime than male officers.

Hypothesis 6.4 was not confirmed. Males and females used arrest overtime-seeking measures at statistically similar rates. This conforms to the earlier findings that Core Sample women were comparable to men in both their rates of arrest and overall sign-out need.

(H. 6.5) Female officers did not report more arrest-avoiding adaptations aimed at timely sign-out than male officers.

Hypothesis 6.5 was not confirmed. Though women officers may have shouldered more family-related responsibilities, they and their male counterparts had statistically similar rates in using arrest avoidance adaptations for sign-out.. This too was consistent with earlier findings that Core Sample women and men were similar in arrest rates and overall sign-out need.

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TOUR - MIDNIGHTS, DAYS, & EVENINGS

Of the Core Sample, 88 officers, or 17.6%, were assigned to Midnight tour, 173 or 34.7% to Days, and 171 or 34.3% to Evenings. Tour was thought to be a possible

factor in adaptive arrest behavior because of previous research suggesting that the anomie working conditions of Midnights were conducive to police misconduct.

1. There were no significant differences in arrest rates among the Midnight, Day, and Evening tours. This finding came as a surprise to the author, because the patrol duties of each tour have a distinct nature and pace.

(H. 7.1) Officers on the midnight tour did not report more arrest-seeking adaptive arrest behaviors than officers on the day or evening tour.

Hypothesis 7.1 was not confirmed. Officers on the three tours were statistically alike in how often they engaged in arrest-seeking tactics aimed at overtime .

(H. 7.2) Officers on the midnight tour did not report more arrest-avoiding adaptive arrest behaviors than officers on the day or evening tour.

Hypothesis 7.2 was not confirmed. There was no statistical difference in how often the three tours used arrest avoidance tactics aimed either at signing out or avoiding processing.

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BOROUGH PROCESSING DURATION – QUEENS AND THE BRONX

Of the five city boroughs that were proportionately represented in the Core sample, 123 officers, or 18.8%, worked in Queens and 110, or 16.8%, worked in the Bronx. While the two boroughs each handled about 50,000 arrests in 2001, Bronx processing took nearly three hours longer. Thus compared to Queens, the Bronx offered

officers more arrest overtime, more disruption to personal life, and more processing misery. It was thought that this might lead to more adaptive arrest behaviors.

1. Core officers from the Bronx made nearly twice as many arrests as those from Queen: In the last full month worked, Bronx officers average 2.1 arrests, while Queens officers averaged 1.2. This may reflect the much higher levels of crime found in the Bronx.

2.. Despite longer processing, Bronx officers were no more “turned off” to arrest processing than Queens officers: Between the two boroughs there were no significant differences in arrest aversion . Perhaps Bronx officers were more accepting of processing burdens as a necessary evil in fighting crime, or perhaps ten hours of processing is perceived as not that much worse than seven.

(H. 8.1) Officers from the Bronx, the major borough that affords the highest arrest overtime, reported using more arrest-seeking adaptations than officers from Queens, where arrest processing affords the lowest overtime.

Hypotheses 8.1 was confirmed. Among the statistically significant differences in adaptive behavior was the finding that 22.1% of Bronx officers, as opposed to 18.5% of Queens officers, used arrest overtime-seeking measures at least once a week. However, Bronx officers may be reacting to not only the financial rewards of protracted processing but to a “norm” of frequent arrest-making in precincts with serious crime.

(H. 8.2) Officers from the Bronx, the major borough where arrest processing is most arduous and disruptive to personal lives, did not report using more arrest-avoiding adaptations than officers from Queens, the borough where arrests are least arduous and disruptive.

Hypothesis 8.2 was not confirmed. Despite the difference in borough processing duration, Bronx and Queens officers were statistically similar in their use of arrest-avoidance measures, both for timely sign-out and processing aversion. This result is consistent with the finding that Bronx officers did not find processing to be more aversive than Queens officers.

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WERE THE RESPONSES HONEST?

As the individual who administered every survey, the author believes that she had successfully assured participants that their identities would remain secret, and that the research was intended not to disparage officers but to address their grievances. However, even when a questionnaire is anonymous and completed in good faith, participants are tempted to give socially desirable responses (Babbie, 1979). In this study, the officers may have distorted their answers to appear a bit more conscientious and unbiased, and a bit less swayed by personal interests, than they actually were. That said, the information they revealed should be taken seriously by anyone interested in the welfare of officers, the cost-effectiveness of police work, or the fairness of arrest decisions.

XVI

ARREST PROCESSING IN OTHER LARGE CITIES

I think arrest processing should be done like other big cities – you write a 61 and drop them off – resume patrol. You should have civilians do paperwork and Corrections do the transports from beginning to end! The P.D. can take their overtime because when my tour ends I want to be away from the precinct!

Participant # 251

Several survey comments expressed an awareness that some police departments have much quicker, easier ways to process arrests. How many other agencies experience delays and difficulties like those of NYPD? How many have streamlined their arrest processing, and thereby minimized its influence on arrest behavior? What can America's largest police department learn from them?

To address these issues, a brief survey of arrest processing practices (Appendix D) was addressed to 253 police departments in U.S. cities with over 100,000 population. Mailed in June, 2002, it elicited 130 responses, a 51.4% return rate.

For the question of how long it took their officers to process an arrest, the police agencies provided different types of responses, as displayed in Table XVI-1. The mean

Table XVI-1

Length of Arrest Processing in other Large U.S. Cities

(N = 130)

<i>Type of Response</i>	<i># of PDs</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Typical Length	57	30 min. – 5 hrs.	1.74 hrs.	1.09
Minimum Length	74	5 min. – 5 hrs.	1.15 hrs.	.83
Maximum Length	71	45 min.-12 hrs ^a	3.39 hrs.	2.26
Not known / It depends	5	-	-	-

^a Hilo, Hawaii's estimated maximum of 12 hours was offset by its minimum of 30 minutes.

lengths clearly indicate that processing can be done in a lot less time than New York's 9½ hours.

Because about half of the surveys were not returned, it is impossible to know how many larger cities have difficulties similar to those of the NYPD. However, it must be noted that the Los Angeles Police Department, the nation's second-largest, also seems to have a problem. Its spokesperson wrote that it is "unrealistic" for the LAPD to be expected to compile valid statistics on processing time, and that "since our Regional jail facilities accommodate other law enforcement agencies, a longer wait time is often generated." (This is reminiscent of the claims made by NYPD Central Booking personnel that "it's those other agencies coming here that slow us down.")

The survey also found that 112 of the departments, or 86.2%, used other personnel to assist the arresting officer in processing. Their roles are shown in Table XVI-2. Most telling is the finding that in 71.5% of these agencies, *all* booking procedures were performed by personnel other than the arresting officer.

Table XVI-2
Arrest Processing Assistance in other Large U.S. Cities
(N = 130)

<i>Type of Assistance</i>	<i># of PDs</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Fingerprinting	67	51.5%
Retrieving Criminal Records (Raps)	23	17.7%
Taking Photos	41	31.5%
Guarding Prisoner	8	6.2%
Transporting Prisoners	42	32.3%
Handling Prisoners in/awaiting Court	33	25.4%
Data Entry	41	31.5%
Every Procedure	93	71.5%

In light of the computer and equipment problems in NYPD arrest processing, the

survey asked other agencies about their use of technology. Table XVI-3 displays a variety of applications:

Table XVI-3
Use of Technology for Arrest Processing in other Large U.S. Cities
(N = 130)

<i>Type of Technology</i>	<i># of PDs</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Digital Photography	57	43.8%
Digital Fingerprinting	84	64.6%
Data entry of Arrest Information ^a		
- PO enters data into car computer	14	10.8%
- PO enters data into portable computer	14	10.8%
- PO enters data into station house/unspecified computer	14	10.8%
- PO may hand-write report or use computer	6	4.6%
Computer Transfer of Arrest Data ^a		
- to other arrest forms only	14	10.8%
- to other locations /agencies only	16	12.3%
- to other forms & other locations	6	4.6%

^aSome agencies reported more sophisticated technology to transfer arrest-related data, such as barcodes on officer IDs or prisoner wristbands, and integrated processing programs with access to mug shots, prints, rap sheets, arrest documents, etc.

What lessons do other police agencies offer the NYPD? First, processing duties can be readily performed by personnel other than the arresting officer. Second, arrest data can be transferred from officer to computer, from arrest form to arrest form, and from agency to agency, without additional paper or staff. Third and most important, a prisoner can be processed in about 90 minutes.

What lessons from the NYPD should be heeded by other police agencies? If their arrest processing takes only half as long as New York's, they still have the same problems to reckon with: overtime costs, loss of patrol strength to processing, arrest seeking for overtime, and arrest avoidance to sign out or steer clear of processing.

XVII

CONCLUSION

GENERAL COMMENTS

This study was prompted by my observations of how fellow officers make arrest decisions, and how this differed from depictions in both the popular media and the scholarly literature. In a survey of 504 officers who regularly perform foot or sector-car patrol, most of what I witnessed was confirmed.

The participants reported that their arrest decisions were indeed influenced by overtime concerns, post-work commitments, and arrest-processing burdens, all factors largely ignored in past research on arrest discretion. Officers indicated that they used an array of tactics to control their arrest making, even beyond those described in previous writings. They rated personal arrest factors as more important than such variables as race and class, which the literature had so often emphasized. They showed that some arrests outcomes were planned, orchestrated events and not situation-based decisions initiated by chance, as ride-along studies have suggested. Participants indicated that active arrest-making reflected a belief in the importance of arrest as a crime-fighting tool, and not merely the crass pursuit of “collar for dollars” as sometimes described in the media. Finally, the officers revealed that efforts to control their behavior through strong, attentive supervision, better allocation of manpower, and appropriate sanctions, held little promise of success, though these were the standard prescriptions of police management texts.

The survey responses also challenged the general characterizations of police officers as “different” from everyday folks. The participants were cynical about arrest-making, but they were not an insular subculture alienated from civilian life. Indeed, they

would much sooner have subordinated their jobs to their personal lives than their personal lives to their jobs. Moreover, the participants did not seem especially to hardened to affronts to their dignity, job security, or physical well-being. Generally they were not superheroes, but neither were they authoritarian protectors of an inequitable status quo.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

There remains much information to be mined from the survey data. The comparison groups can be analyzed along additional dimensions. For instance, the high-arrest and low-arrest groups might be can be examined for differences in age, education, and patrol experience. Male and female officers can be compared according to their financial perspective, arrest priorities, and attitudes toward arrest. The three tours can be analyzed to see how household structure may have affected their choice of shift. Bronx officers and Queens officers, with their contrasting arrest rates, can be compared for differences in their arrest priorities and attitudes. In addition, new comparison groups can be selected and analyzed along a multitude of variables.

A similar survey can be developed for police officers from other agencies that have lengthy processing procedures. The London Metropolitan Police might be particularly interesting: According to several members I interviewed, its four-plus hours of arrest processing lead to a variety of overtime-seeking and arrest-avoiding maneuvers.

Most importantly, research should be directed toward finding the “best practices” for arrest processing. A starting point may be to examine in depth the technology, procedures, and inter-agency relationships of more successful police departments. The goal must be a process that returns arresting officers to patrol within 90 minutes.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The survey of NYPD officers persuasively argues for the need to fix arrest processing. The survey of other police agencies demonstrates the feasibility of alternative practices. Without claiming technological expertise or exhaustive knowledge of possible alternatives, I believe that the following measures are worth considering:

1. Provide portable computers with self-explanatory form-preparation software.

As in other police agencies, NYPD officers should use laptops or computers fixed within autos to directly input arrest-related data. The software must be designed to remove the tedium and intimidation of arrest “paperwork.” To the extent possible, it must replace typing with check-off boxes. It must access and transfer text from the penal code and other legal references. It should be equipped with such common word processing capabilities as spell-check and cut-and-paste. It must be able to transfer duplicate information from arrest report to complaint report, property vouchers, requests for lab exam of evidence, medical treatment forms, supporting affidavits, and so forth. It must be capable of capturing signatures, and sending documents electronically to the station house and district attorney’s office. This technology would also encourage greater cooperation from complainants, who sometimes decline to prosecute because it entails waiting for hours at the police station house. Under the proposal, complainants could provide necessary information from their home or while seated in a patrol car.

2. Offer recruit and in-service training that is specifically geared to writing police reports and testifying in court. An arrest involving a series of events may require the officer to prepare a cohesive written narrative, and then to articulate what had occurred in front of a judge. These prospects were a fraught with anxiety for survey participants, making them reluctant to arrest. However, classroom practice in writing and role-playing

may alleviate this problem.

3. Standardize computer software and procedures so that arresting officers know what to do regardless of borough of jurisdiction. Presently each of the five city boroughs imposes its own additional arrest forms, uses its own intake software and procedures, and keeps its own staffing hours for ADAs and arraignment judges. Standardization would both speed the exchange of documents and assuage the officer's apprehension upon entering a "foreign jurisdiction." This change would require New York City's elected district attorneys and chief administrative judges to treat their respective boroughs as components of a unified system, rather than as independent fiefdoms.

4. Have the arresting officer deliver the prisoner to the stationhouse and resume patrol, equipped with a cell phone to respond to any further questions regarding the arrest. In other police agencies it is a common practice for arresting officers to simply drop off their prisoners and go back out. Moreover, most NYPD officers already carry cell phones, and all are already required to provide the Department with a phone number.

5. Have ADAs and arraignment judges work through the night, so officers will not be tempted to alter their arrest-making behavior to avoid a tour change. This is already done in some jurisdictions.

6. Have the remainder of arrest processing tasks performed by personnel other than uniformed police officers. NYPD officers who had processed turn-over arrests from the previous tour reported that they were not hindered by their lack of initial involvement in the incident. Similarly, other police agencies had reported successful turn-over of processing to civilian police employees, county sheriff's deputies, correction

officers, court officers, and so forth. It would be most logical in New York for the city's Department of Corrections to take over prisoner transport, medical screening, escort to hospitals, fingerprinting, photos, and routine custodial care prior to arraignment, as this agency already performs most of these duties for post-arraignment detainees.

These six steps would go far to reduce adaptive arrest behavior, since arresting officers would look forward to a brief procedure that affords little profit and little pain. The saving in arrest overtime from the more than 300,000 arrests per year would easily pay for their initial costs, and leave enough money to give officers a long-overdue raise.

However, these changes alone would merely transfer other absurdly inefficient post-arrest practices to other personnel. A final reform is therefore suggested:


6. Provide adequate detention facilities for prisoners awaiting arraignment. At Brooklyn Central Booking, where I had supervised the midnight tour, the overcrowded, hazardous accommodations had both human and financial costs. Because there was only one single body-search station for arriving prisoners officers and their charges, they sometimes waited outdoors in the sally port for hours. (In the wake of 9/11 a state-of-the-art Body Orifice Search Station was installed, but since no one was instructed on how this strange-looking chair works, it remains unused.) Short-staffing or broken cell doors often forced three floors of detainees to squeeze into two floors. There was barely enough space in the large holding cells for everyone to sit or lie down, and bloody fights ensued when one prisoner inadvertently kicked another or tried to share a cardboard "mattress." Everywhere were mice and water bugs that would agitate prisoners to the point of near-riots. There was no freely-available drinking water, as the pipes were found to release toxins. The toilet bowls, serving up to 50 prisoners apiece, frequently backed

up or overflowed. The conditions led to disturbances, which led to injured prisoners and officers, as well as IAB investigations and law suits against the City.

This environment was such that some prisoners, for their own safety, had to remain at the station house and be guarded one-on-one by a uniformed officer. Those lodged at Central Booking for 12 hours or more often required a trip to the emergency room for chest pain, an asthma attack, or other stress-induced crisis. Even those needing routine medication eventually had to be taken to the hospital just to get a replacement dose (they could not bring in their own pharmacy-dispensed medicine). This meant that two uniformed officers from the precinct of arrest had to go off patrol, drive to Central Booking, and transport the patient.

What would be both humane and economical is a modern holding area that extends some the features of the city jail system. These include sanitary surroundings, mats and reasonable space to lie down in the course of a 16-hour stay, on-premises medical treatment for routine problems, and areas to separate infectious, vulnerable, or disturbed detainees.

The principal message of this study is that the NYPD's way of processing arrests is harmful to police officers and to the public, and must be changed. Because of its duration and duress, arrest processing thrusts an unwanted ethical choice upon any officer faced with a routine arrest: to be true to the professional values of policing, or true to one's own needs and those of one's family. Moreover, protracted processing is costly in terms of overtime dollars, and the loss of patrol coverage when officers go out-of-service with an arrest. Finally, the current methods lead to adaptive arrest behavior, and this compromises the arrest decision.

Appendix A - Survey of Patrol Officers**JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE**

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Information for Participants in this Study

My name is Edith Linn and I am a lieutenant in the Queens Court Section. Through John Jay College and the CUNY Graduate Center, I am working on a doctoral dissertation about personal factors in arrest discretion. Its aim is to increase our understanding of how concerns like financial need, time constraints, and feelings toward arrest processing may influence arrest decisions. Although the Department has granted me its permission, THIS STUDY IS NOT INITIATED OR CONTROLLED BY THE NYPD.

I have prepared the following voluntary, anonymous questionnaire for distribution to approximately 500 officers who routinely perform patrol. Though the survey appears long, it takes officers only about thirty-five minutes to finish. You may decline to answer a question or cease participation at any time, without penalty. But to achieve a valid result, I ask that you answer each item as accurately as possible, based on your own situation and perspective.

Some of the items may seem personal or sensitive. To assure your anonymity, the questions are structured so as to make it impossible to identify any specific officer. Moreover, you will be sealing the questionnaire in its envelope, and returning it in random order. If the results of the study are published, the anonymity of all participants will be maintained.

The ultimate goal of this research is to find ways to ease the conflicts between officers' professional duties and their personal lives. If you would like to learn the final results of the study, you can reach me at John Jay College Ph.D. Program in Criminal Justice, 899 Tenth Avenue #434, New York, NY 10019, (212) 237-8419, or through e-mail at edie188@aol.com. (You need not identify yourself when contacting me, unless you chose to.) Inquiries may also be directed to Dr. Ned Benton, Dissertation Advisor, at (212) 237-8070 or nbenton@faculty.jjay.cuny.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a participant in the study, you can contact Hilry Fisher, Sponsored Research, the Graduate Center, (212) 817-7523 or hfisher@gc.cuny.edu.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

(Patrol Borough)(Date)(Participant #)

1. How long have you been a police officer? (Write one number, for example, 02, per line) _____ years & _____ months
2. About how long have you been assigned to your present command? (Write one number per line) _____ years & _____ months
3. How would you describe the overall crime rate in the area you patrol? (Circle a number along scale.)
Very Low - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Very High
4. What is your usual tour? (Circle letter.)
A. 1st Platoon (12x8) B. 2nd Platoon (8x4) C. 3rd Platoon (4x12) D. Scooter Chart E. Other (Describe) _____
5. How often are you assigned to go out on patrol? (Circle letter.)
A. Never/Very Rarely B. 1-4 times per month C. 1 in 5 tours D. 2 in 5 tours E. 3 in 5 tours F. 4 in 5 tours G. Almost every tour
6. Please write in each space what assignments you might have in a typical five-day set (e.g. sector car, SP10, foot post, TS, etc):
day1 _____ day2 _____ day3 _____ day4 _____ day5 _____
7. In a typical week, how many tours do you work with the same partner? (Circle letter.)
A. 5 B. 4 C. 3 D. 2 E. fewer than 2
8. How hard or easy is it to find an arrest while patrolling in your command? (Circle a number along scale.)
usually very easy - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - usually very hard to find an arrest
9. What was the most recent month when you worked, full-duty, for at least 3 weeks or 15 tours?
(Write month.) _____
10. How many arrests, if any, did you make in that month? (Write one number per line.) _____
11. How many arrests, if any, did you assist a partner in making in that month? (Write one number per line.) _____
12. How many hours of overtime, if any, did you earn from arrests made on routine patrol in that month?
(Write one number per line.) _____
13. About how many hours of overtime, if any, did you earn in special enforcement assignments that may generate arrests of summonses (e.g. CONDOR, Red-light overtime) in that month? (Write one number per line.) _____
14. About how many hours of non-arrest / non-enforcement overtime (e.g. WTC/security posts/special events) did you earn in that month? (Write one number per line.) _____
15. How do your arrest numbers compare to officers with similar assignments in your unit? (Circle number on scale.) _____

Well below average - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Well above average
average

16. How does your arrest overtime compare to officers with similar assignments in you unit? ? (Circle number on scale.)

Well below average - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Well above average
average

17. About what percent of overtime, if any, do you usually take in time rather than cash? (Circle percentage.)

0%... .. 10%..... 20%..... 30%..... 40%..... 50%..... 60%..... 70%..... 80%..... 90%..... 100%

18. About what portion of your arrests, if any, are made in the second half of your tour? (Circle percentage.)

0%... .. 10%..... 20%..... 30%..... 40%..... 50%..... 60%..... 70%..... 80%..... 90%..... 100%

19. About what portion of your arrests, if any, are made in the last hour of your tour? (Circle percentage.)

0%... .. 10%..... 20%..... 30%..... 40%..... 50%..... 60%..... 70%..... 80%..... 90%..... 100%

20. How do you feel about your present ability to afford the things you want? (Circle number on scale.)

Very able right now - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 – Very eager to do better

21. What percent of your total household income comes from sources other than your police salary, like a spouse's salary, second job, rental income, government subsidy, military service, rich parents, etc.? (Circle percentage.)

0%..... 10%..... 20%..... 30%..... 40%..... 50%..... 60%..... 70%..... 80%..... 90%..... Over 90%

22. How would you describe your present opportunities to earn overtime by means other than through arrest-making on routine patrol (i.e. any other OT source – special events, CONDOR, WTC, etc.)? (Circle number on scale.)

Never enough – 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 – More than enough

23. To what extent do you need overtime money from arrests made on routine patrol? (Circle number on scale.)

Never any real need – 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 – Always a great need

24. About how often do you have to take care of children or dependent family members...

...in general? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

...within three hours after your tour? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

25. About how often do you attend school or prepare school assignments

...in general? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

...within three hours after your tour? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

26. About how often do you go to a second job (even “off-the-record”) ...

...in general? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

...within three hours after your tour? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

27. About how often do you have social commitments, such as sports teams, fraternal organizations, family gatherings, dates etc. ...

...in general? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

...within three hours after your tour? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

28. About how often do you have other personal commitments or appointments, aside from those above...

.....in general? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

...within three hours after your tour? (Circle letter.)

A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

29. Do you have any of the following commuting concerns when leaving work? (Circle letter or letters.)

A. a car pool B. beating rush hour C. catching train / bus / ferry D. other (describe) _____

30. About how often do you have commuting concerns when leaving work? (Circle letter.)

- A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

31. Overall, about how often do you feel you must end your tour on time because of one or more of the above commitments or concerns? (Circle letter.)

- A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 days/month C. 1 day/week D. 2 days/week E. 3 days/week F. 4 days/week G. 5 or more days/week

32. Below are aspects of the arrest-making's administrative procedures that may be unpleasant or risky. Please indicate the degree to which each item is a concern for you. (Place check in selected column.)

	Never a concern	Rarely a concern	Sometimes a concern	Often a concern	Always a concern
a. Procedures are tiring, especially after working 8 hours.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
b. Arrest forms are boring and repetitious.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
c. Procedures may be complex or confusing.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
d. May need to write lengthy or difficult narrative	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
e. May need to go to different locations, e.g. DWI.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
f. May need to testify.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
g. May make mistake/ look bad / be reprimanded.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
h. May be disciplined for taking too long.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
i. Computer / other processing equipment may be down	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
j. Staff with computer/equipment skills may be unavailable	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
k. Other administrative problems? (describe)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

33. Below are aspects of handling arrested persons that may be unpleasant or risky. Please indicate the degree to which each item is a concern for you. (Place check in selected column.)

	Never a concern	Rarely a concern	Sometimes a concern	Often a concern	Always a concern
a. Prisoner may be violent.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
b. Prisoner may be verbally abusive.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
c. Prisoner may be EDP/Drunk.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
d. Prisoner may be infectious (AIDS, TB, lice, etc.)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
e. Prisoner may be filthy, have foul odor.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
f. Prisoner may need to go to hospital.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
g. Prisoner may try to escape.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
h. Prisoner may make allegations (CCRB, IAB, etc.)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
i. Other prisoner problems? (describe)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

34. How often are you seriously "turned off" to making an arrest because of its actual or potential discomforts and risks (stemming from either administrative and/or prisoner-handling factors)? (Circle number on scale.)

On no occasion – 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 – On every occasion
half the time

35. Below are methods officers might use to increase their arrest overtime. Please indicate the extent to which you may have used each method for the purpose of increasing arrest overtime (*Place check in selected column*).

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
a. Switched to assignment with good arrest opportunities	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
b. Asked officers for their unwanted arrests	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
c. Made more MDT checks and/or car stops in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
d. Made more Stop/Question/Frisks in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
e. Patrolled in areas known for easy arrests in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
f. Tried to arrive faster at crimes in progress in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
g. Tried hard to find suspects who left scene in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
h. Tried to take domestic incident jobs in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
i. Tried harder to get complainants to prosecute in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
j. Tried to handle jobs before alerting dispatcher in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
k. Issued a DAT instead of a summons in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
l. Looked for any minor violation in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
m. Followed up on every pick-up complaint in 2 nd half of tour	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
n. Focused more on minority individuals who might be perps	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
o. Other methods you used (<i>describe</i>).	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

36. How often overall do you take measures like those above to make arrests because you need overtime money? (*Circle letter.*)

- A. Rarely /Never B. 1-4 times/month C. Once/week D. Twice/week E. 3 times /week F. 4 times/week G. every tour

37. Below are methods officers might use to avoid making arrests. Please indicate the extent to which you may have used each method in order to get off work on time, and/or avoid the discomforts and risks of arrest processing. (Place check in selected column.)

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
a. Arranged to get assignment having little or no chance to arrest	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
b. Asked fellow officers to take any arrest you may get stuck with	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
c. Made few or no RMP computer checks / car stops	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
d. Conducted few or no Stop/Question/Frisks	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
e. Avoided patrol areas where arrests "fall into your lap"	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
f. Drove slowly or conspicuously (lights, sirens) to crimes in progress	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
g. Avoided assignments to domestic incidents	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
h. Tried to discourage complainants from pressing charges	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
i. Tried to dispose of jobs without alerting dispatcher/supervisor	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
j. Issued a summons instead of making an arrest	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
k. Ignored minor violations (eg, drinking /urinating /smoking weed)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
l. Ignored pick-up complaints from non-involved parties	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
n. Other methods you used (describe).	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

38. About how often overall do you take measures to avoid arrests like those above because you need to get off work on time? (Circle letter.)

- A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 times/month C. Once/week D. Twice/week E. 3 times/week F. 4 times/week G. every tour

39. About how often overall do you take measures to avoid arrests like those above because of the risks / discomforts of administrative procedures or handling of prisoners? (Circle letter.)

- A. Rarely/Never B. 1-4 times/month C. Once/week D. Twice/week E. 3 times/week F. 4 times/week G. every tour

40. Below are factors officers may weigh while on routine patrol when faced with a possible arrest situation. Please indicate how often these factors are important in your own decisions to arrest or not arrest while on routine patrol. (Place check in selected column.)

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
a. level/seriousness of the offense.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
b. class/type of suspect (derelict, blue-collar, VIP, etc.).....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
c. pedigree of suspect (race, sex, age, etc.)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
d. attitude/demeanor of the suspect.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
e. class of complainant/victim (homeless, blue-collar, VIP, etc.)...	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
f. pedigree of complainant/victim (race, sex, age, etc.).....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
g. attitude/demeanor of complainant/victim.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
h. willingness of complainant to prosecute.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
i. desires/expectations of community.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
j. pressure from supervisor/C.O. to make arrest.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
k. need to make overtime money.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
l. need to make comp time.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
m. pressure to limit overtime.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
n. need to get off work on time for child-related activity.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
o. need to get off work on time for college-related activity.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
p. need to get off work on time for second job.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
q. need to get off work on time for social commitment.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
r. need to carpool/beat rush hour/catch train, etc.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
s. likeliness of being rescheduled to see ADA/go to court	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
t. desire for career advancement / plainclothes assignment.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
u. desire to go into station house / take a break from patrol...	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
v. bad weather.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
w. boredom	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
x. long/complicated paperwork or processing.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
y. difficult / dangerous / filthy / sick prisoner.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
z. request to take coworker's arrest / give away your arrest..	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
aa. lack of another officer to take your arrest.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
bb. manpower / number of sectors running.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
cc. judgment /opinions of other officers.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
dd. presence of supervisor.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
ee. presence of bystanders / personal safety.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
ff. other _____.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____.....	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

The next group of questions (49-55) concerns the **most recent time**, within the last **three months**, that you **DECLINED a possible arrest** while on routine patrol and **no other officer** took the arrest, i.e., it was "shitcanned." (Please write "N/A" - not applicable - if you have not been in this situation within the last 3 months.)

49. About how many days ago was this opportunity for an arrest? (Write one number per line) _____

50. What was the offense or offenses in question? _____

51. Was a supervisor present at the scene? (Circle.) Yes / No 52. At the beginning of your tour on the day this arrest was declined, to what extent did you want to make an arrest?

Strongly didn't want an arrest - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly wanted an arrest
no preference

53. Before the possible arrest situation arose, how would you describe your patrol activities?

Trying hard to avoid an arrest - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Trying hard to make an arrest
neither seeking or avoiding arrest

54. How did you get involved in the situation in which you ultimately declined the arrest? (Circle letter.)

- a. Pursuant to self-initiated investigative/enforcement activity (car stop, stop/question/frisk, etc)
- b. Dispatcher announced job and you/your partner offered to take it
- c. Pick-up job - approached by non-involved witness
- d. Pick-up job - approached by complainant
- e. Dispatcher/TS assigned you to back up the job
- f. Supervisor directed you to the job
- g. Other _____

55. To what extent did the following factors affected you in making **this particular decision to decline this arrest?**

(Place check in selected column):

	not a factor	minor factor	moderate factor	major factor
a. level of offense	_____	_____	_____	_____
b. suspect attitude/demeanor	_____	_____	_____	_____
c. other suspect trait (class, age, gender, race, etc.)	_____	_____	_____	_____
d. complainant cooperation/attitude	_____	_____	_____	_____
e. complaint trait (class, age, gender, race, etc.)	_____	_____	_____	_____
f. need for overtime cash/time.....	_____	_____	_____	_____
g. pressure to arrest from supervisor/C.O.	_____	_____	_____	_____
h. lousy day on patrol (boredom, bad weather, etc.)	_____	_____	_____	_____
i. opinion of fellow officers/lack of another available A/O	_____	_____	_____	_____
j. desires/expectations of community.....	_____	_____	_____	_____
k. presence of bystanders /personal safety.....	_____	_____	_____	_____
l. other (describe)	_____	_____	_____	_____

56. Below are 15 statements. Each is followed by an opinion scale, wherein "0" indicates the strongest disagreement, "5" indicates a neutral position, and "10" indicates the strongest agreement. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement along its scale. (Circle number.)

a. "Making good arrests is a way for officers to advance in their career."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

b. "Arrests deter offenders from repeating their criminal behavior."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

c. "Arrests statistics are manipulated by the C.O. or higher brass to make themselves look good."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

d. "Arrest policies depend more on 'politics' than on concepts of sound crime-fighting."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

e. "Arrests for "quality of life" offenses prevent more serious crime problems."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

f. "ADAs will plea bargain a felony to a violation if it means an easy conviction."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

g. "Arrests represent the way Society enforces basic standards of right and wrong."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

h. "Making arrests isn't worth it if they really disrupt your home life."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

i. "Arresting on shaky legal grounds is o.k. if you figure that the perp got away with many other crimes."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

j. "A good police officer should regularly make arrests."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

k. "Judges will accept almost any plea bargain just to clear their calendars."
Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

l. "No arrest is worth risking serious injury."

Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

m. "It's no big deal if a perp gets away, as he'll get caught sooner or later doing something else."

Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

n. "Arrests show that the police are doing what the what the public expects of them."

Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

o. "A person who takes the oath of a police officer should be prepared to make sacrifices."

Strongly disagree - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - Strongly agree
neutral

The next set of items concern supervisors' involvement in your arrest decisions. Please complete them based your own experience.

57. *(Skip this item if you made no arrests in the past three months.)*

About what percent of the time (if at all) has the patrol supervisor arrived at an arrest incident before you placed the individual under arrest? *(Circle percentage.)*

0%... .. 10%..... 20%..... 30%..... 40%..... 50%..... 60%..... 70%..... 80%..... 90%.....100%
never half the time every time

58. *(Skip this item if you have not declined an arrest in the past three months.)*

About what percent of the time (if at all) is the patrol supervisor at the scene when you have not made an arrest that you could have made? *(Circle percentage.)*

0%... .. 10%..... 20%..... 30%..... 40%..... 50%..... 60%..... 70%..... 80%..... 90%.....100%
never half the time every time

59. About what percent of the time (if at all) has a patrol supervisor at an incident told you not to make an arrest you wanted to make? *(Circle percentage.)*

0%... .. 10%..... 20%..... 30%..... 40%..... 50%..... 60%..... 70%..... 80%..... 90%.....100%
never half the time every time

60. About what percent of the time (if at all) has a patrol supervisor at an incident ordered you to make an arrest that you did not want to make? *(Circle percentage.)*

0%... .. 10%..... 20%..... 30%..... 40%..... 50%..... 60%..... 70%..... 80%..... 90%.....100%
never half the time every time

61. How much time are you allowed to complete arrest paperwork and get a "Police-Ready" time? _____ hours.

62. How adequate is the time allowed for you to complete arrest processing? *(Circle number on scale.)*

never enough - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - *always enough*

63. How strict is your command about going past arrest processing time limits and incurring extra overtime? *(Circle number on scale.)*

not at all strict,
any reason ok,
no penalty - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - very strict,
no excuses,
likely CD

64. How often, if ever, has a supervisor reassigned an arrest that you made late in your tour to another officer? *(Circle number on scale.)*

never - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - very often

65. How often, if ever, has a supervisor reassigned a late-in-tour arrest made by another officer to you? *(Circle number on scale.)*

never - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - very often

66. How often, if ever, has a supervisor's reassignment of another officer's arrest to you caused you a problem in preparing paperwork, answering the ADA's questions, testifying, etc.?

never - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - very often

Please describe any problem(s) you may have had:

67. How often, if ever, have you and another officer arranged to have the other officer take your arrest? *(Circle number on scale.)*

never - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - very often

68. How often, if ever, have you and another officer arranged to have you take the other officer's arrest? *(Circle number on scale.)*

never - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - very often

69. How often, if ever, has an arrangement with a fellow officer to take the other officer's arrest, caused you a problem in preparing paperwork, answering the ADA's questions, testifying, etc.?

never - 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10 - very often

Please describe any problem(s) you may have had:

70. In the past 12 months, about how many times, if at all, did you earn more overtime than management would like? (Circle.)

Never 1 time 2 times 3 times 4 times 5 times 6 times 7 times 8 times 9 times 10 times 12 times

(If in the last 12 months you never earned more overtime than management would like, write "N/A"- not applicable - over the rest of this page.)

71. The following is a list of consequences that police management may threaten, or actually impose, for making too much cash overtime. Below, to the right, is a list of ways officers may react to their bosses' actions.

In the first list, please indicate any consequence(s) you experienced. (Circle the letter.)

Then, from the list at the bottom, indicate your reaction(s) to each consequence you experienced. (Write the number of up to four different reactions for each consequence you circled in the blank lines that follow.)

Example: If you were pressured to take overtime in time, you would circle letter "D", and if in reaction you took the overtime in time and filed a grievance, you would write the numbers 4 and 6 after line D.)

CONSEQUENCE YOU EXPERIENCED

(Circle one or more letter.)

YOUR REACTION(S)

(Select one or more number from list below.)

- A. No consequences for making a lot of overtime ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- B. Had arrests reassigned to another officer. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- C. Was admonished by ICO or other superior. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- D. Was pressured to take overtime in compensation time rather than cash... ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- E. Was denied details or special assignments that offered overtime. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- F. Was given fewer patrol assignments with arrest opportunities. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- G. Was threatened with reassignment / tour change / RDO change. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- H. Was reassigned or given tour change/RDO change. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- I. Was threatened to not be able to work with steady partner. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- J. Was forbidden to work with steady partner. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- K. Was denied time off. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- L. Was given lower evaluation. ___ / ___ / ___ / ___
- M.. Other _____ ___ / ___ / ___ / ___

POSSIBLE OFFICER REACTIONS

1. Did everything the same.
2. Made fewer arrests close to the end of tour.
3. Made fewer arrests generally.
4. Took overtime in comp time.
5. Tried to make more arrest overtime to make up for lost income.
6. Got PBA delegate involved / filed grievance.
7. Tried to get transfer to other unit.
8. Took second job / worked more at second job.
9. Other _____

72. In the past 12 months, about how many times, if at all, has a supervisor told you or hinted to you that you should be making more arrests? (circle)

- Never 1 time 2 times 3 times 4 times 5 times 6 times 7 times 8 times 9 times 10 times 12 times

(If you never were urged by a supervisor to make more arrests, write "N/A" over the rest of this page.)

73. The following is a list of consequences that police management may threaten, or actually impose, for not making enough arrests. Below and to the right is a list of ways officers may react to their bosses' actions.

In the first list, please indicate any consequence(s) you experienced. (Circle the letter.)

Then, from the list at the bottom, indicate your reaction(s) to each consequence you experienced. (Write the number(s) of up to four different reactions for each consequence you circled in the blank lines that follow.)

Example: If you were threatened with loss of permission to work a second job, you would circle letter "D," and if you reacted by making one arrest and "milking it" for overtime, you would write the numbers 2 and 4.)

CONSEQUENCE YOU EXPERIENCED
(Circle one or more letter)

YOUR REACTION
(Select one or more number from list below)

- | | |
|---|-----------------------|
| A. No consequences threatened or imposed | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| B. Was given undesirable posts. | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| C. Was told to take a specific arrest (e.g. shoplifter, reassigned arrest)..... | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| D. Was threatened with loss of permission to work second job..... | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| E. Lost permission to work second job. | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| F. Was denied details or special assignments offering overtime..... | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| G. Was given lower evaluation. | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| H. Was threatened with reassignment / tour change / RDO change..... | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| I. Was reassigned / had tour changed / had RDO changed..... | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| I. Was threatened to not be able to work with steady partner..... | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| K. Was forbidden to work with steady partner..... | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| J. Was threatened with transfer. | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| Was transferred. | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| L. Was denied time off. | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |
| M. Other _____ ... | ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ |

POSSIBLE OFFICER REACTIONS

1. Did everything the same.
2. Made one routine arrest that month.
3. Made arrest for an offense that might otherwise get a summons.
4. Tried to "milk" the next arrest to make it worth the effort.
5. Made enough arrests to show "average" activity.
6. Tried to get steady "inside" assignment.
7. Got PBA delegate involved / filed grievance.
8. Other _____

Appendix C – New York City Police Department Authorization to Conduct Study

**POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY OF NEW YORK**

May 4, 2001

From: Lieutenant Edith Linn, Queens Court Section

To: Police Commissioner (through Channels)

**Subject: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT SURVEY OF NYPD
OFFICERS FOR DOCTORAL DISSERTATION**

1. The undersigned, presently assigned to the Queens Court Section, is a doctoral candidate in Criminal Justice at John Jay College. My proposed dissertation seeks to explore factors outside officers' police identity that may have a bearing on arrest decisions. To this end, I request permission to distribute an anonymous survey (attached) to a sample of approximately 300 patrol officers, during the second days of IN-TAC training at Brooklyn, Bronx, and Queens sites.

2. The project has the support of Doctoral Faculty Advisors Warren Benton, Gwendolyn Gerber, and Barry Spunit, as well as the Criminal Justice Ph.D. Program Director Mary Gibson. Its methodology conforms to the human subjects protections of the John Jay College and CUNY Institutional Review Boards: Officers will be told orally and in writing that their participation is completely voluntary. They will be informed outright of the origin of the survey, its purpose, and personal nature of some of its items. Subjects will be assured of sustained anonymity by the absence of identifying questions in the survey, and by procedures for returning the surveys in blank, sealed envelopes.

3. The study is designed to elicit candid responses to such questions as -

- To what extent do officers feel financially dependent on arrest overtime? Does a strong sense of dependency encourage frivolous, biased, or legally questionable arrest-making?

- To what extent do child care, second jobs, school, or carpool arrangement discourage arrest-making because it extends the officer's tour? Do these time constraints lead officers to patrol with blinders on, or decline legitimate arrests?

- To what extent are officers reluctant to undertake the administrative or prisoner handling burdens in arrest? Do processing discomforts and risks lead to passive patrol and arrest avoidance?

- To what extent are arrest decisions "predetermined" by a pre-tour preference for an arrest, and by proactive, arrest-seeking patrol? Conversely, to what extent are declined arrests preceded by a pre-tour preference not to arrest, and by avoidance of patrol intervention?

- How important are personal concerns like overtime need, time commitments, and arrest processing aversion relative to previously-studied arrest variables like crime seriousness, suspect demeanor?

- Are there aspects of the arrest-making process that contribute to cynicism and low moral? How are attitudes and actions related?

- What impact do management's efforts to curb arrest overtime, or increase arrest-making, have on officer behavior?

4. These issues are important to citizens and officers alike. Polls have shown that the public is not opposed to aggressive crime-suppressing measures, as long as they are applied reasonably and even-handedly. Thus it is incumbent on police management to minimize arrest factors that express personal rather than professional objectives. But at the same time, we must recognize that officers' "improper" arrest objectives stem from very real pressures - to support their families, sustain close relationships, avoid personal stagnation, and stay out of harm's way. In their struggle to balance professional and private duty, officers need ways to avoid compromises that leave them stressed and demoralized.

5. What makes this research particularly compelling is that concrete solutions are available. Alternative scheduling arrangements might discourage overtime-seeking and make officers' lives more manageable. Technologies to simplify arrest processing, such as the long awaited arrest "omniform," would reduce the influence of overtime, post-tour commitments, and processing aversion. Refresher training in computer operations, narrative-writing, prisoner handling, and other arrest-related skills could go far to alleviate arrest-processing anxiety. Some of these approaches have already proved successful in other police agencies. Thus this research holds the promise of both improving the arrest "product" and reducing the conflicts and pressures inherent in the officer's work.

6. This study will be an important addition to the existing research on arrest decision-making and police culture. Earlier scholarship emphasized sociological variables and promoted a highly class-conscious view of arrest behavior. It also portrayed officers as markedly alienated and hostile toward the civilian world. If this study's findings are as expected, it will render a more complete understanding of arrest-making, and a more "human," socially integrated portrait of the officer.

7. By my completing this project, the Department would also gain an in-house Ph.D. Newly-honed skills in sampling techniques, survey construction, and

statistical analyses would prepare me to do high-level research on issues the Department deems important. These analytical tools would also be an asset when the NYPD faces criticism based on scientifically flawed "research." By exposing the methodological weaknesses of such studies, the Department could mount a more effective defense.

8. In sum, this research will help officers, management, and the public find common ground in addressing important arrest-related issues. It will make a significant contribution to scholarship on police behavior. And, it will produce a staff member ready to provide advanced research skills to her Department. At a moment when the Department seeks to continue its proven arrest strategies, attract and retain good officers, and win back public confidence, these objectives could not be more critical.

9. If you need further information, I can be reached at the Queens Court Section during the 1st Platoon at (718) 268-4899, or at home at (718) 438-8685. The Doctoral Program Chair, Dr. Gibson, is at (212) 237-8818.

10. For your consideration.



Edith Linn
Lieutenant

QCS 122/01

1ST ENDORSEMENT

Commanding Officer, Queens Court Section to Commanding Officer, Criminal Justice Bureau. May 7, 2001, Contents noted.. Lieutenant Linn is a doctoral candidate in Criminal Justice at John Jay College. Enclosed is the proposed dissertation and survey. Recommend APPROVAL to conduct survey for doctoral dissertation.



James F. McLoone
Captain

JW:pr

REPORT UNDER
CJB # 085-2001-0003

100 36-01-0022

2nd ENDORSEMENT

Commanding Officer, Criminal Justice Bureau to First Deputy Commissioner.
June 1, 2001. **CONTENTS NOTED.** Recommend approval. It is requested that
the attached set of documents be forwarded to the Police Commissioner for
consideration.


PJD/JFD/jfd

D. J. Edward W. Hamilton
Patrick J. Devlin
Assistant Chief

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FIRST DEPUTY COMMISSIONER'S
OFFICE

THIRD ENDORSEMENT

First Deputy Commissioner to Deputy Commissioner, Policy and Planning and Deputy Commissioner Legal Matters, June 7, 2001. Contents noted. Forwarded for your comments and recommendations.



Joseph P. Dunne
FIRST DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

JPD/PJA/mh

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FOURTH ENDORSEMENT

Deputy Commissioner, Legal Matters to First Deputy Commissioner, June 25, 2001. Contents noted. Assuming that this survey will be completed by uniformed members of the service (UMOS) while on-duty, if Lt. Linn's request is approved, it will cost the Department roughly 175 paid police hours (i.e., 300 surveys @ 35 minutes per survey). Since you are not under a legal obligation to approve this request, I believe that you should approve it only if you are satisfied that this survey will benefit the Department, so as to justify the expenditure. Although, Lt. Linn has indicated her intent to share survey results with the Department, I recommend that this be made clearer in a signed writing. Of course, you may wish to consider possible alternatives that would include members of the service completing the survey on off-duty time or, if completed while on-duty, scaling back the length of the survey, thus reducing the time it takes to complete. Additionally, in some instances, the survey as presently constituted, calls for responses which could generate admissions of misconduct by UMOS. Lt. Linn's academic pursuits must not conflict with her duty to report misconduct if she becomes aware that an identified UMOS has engaged in such misconduct. For your information and consideration.



George A. Grasso
Deputy Commissioner,
Legal Matters

GAG/MGG:mgg
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1DC 36-01-0022
OMAP # 788
CAPPS # 255
MSU # 86
CJB #85-01-0003

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT

Deputy Commissioner, Policy and Planning to First Deputy Commissioner, July 27, 2001. Contents noted. This project may yield some worthwhile information for the Department. Having increased knowledge about officers' attitudes on arrest, school, child care, etc. may help the Department improve morale and may ultimately impact on efforts to increase efficiency (e.g., reduce overtime, increase arrest activity). It is, therefore, recommended that the request be approved with the following stipulations: (1) before conducting this research, all related approvals from the University's Human Subjects Committee be sent to the Office of Management, Analysis and Planning; and (2) once approved by the University, a copy of the approved prospectus as well as the completed dissertation must be sent to the Office of Management, Analysis and Planning with an Executive Summary of important points for the Police Department. Submitted for your consideration and approval.



Maureen E. Casey
Deputy Commissioner,
Policy and Planning

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FIRST DEPUTY COMMISSIONER'S
OFFICE

IDC 36-01-0022

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT


First Deputy Commissioner to Police Commissioner, July 16, 2001. Contents noted. Recommend Approval of attached request by Lt. Edith Linn, Queens Court Section to survey uniformed members of the service during IN-TAC training pursuant to doctoral studies concerning factors affecting arrest decisions. Results of said surveys will be provided to the Department. Forwarded for your consideration.

APPROVED

JUL 30 2001


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POLICE COMMISSIONER


Joseph P. Dunne
Joseph P. Dunne
FIRST DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT

Commanding Officer Police Commissioner's Office to First Deputy Commissioner, July 30, 2001. Please note the Police Commissioner's **APPROVAL** of the Fifth Endorsement and the request of Lt. Edith Linn, Queens Court Section to conduct a doctoral study relating to factors affecting arrest decisions. Lt. Linn is to be advised of, and comply with the caveats contained in the Fourth Endorsement as submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters. Forwarded for necessary attention.



Lowell Stahl
Assistant Chief

LS: file

1DC 36-01-0022

SEVENTH ENDORSEMENT

First Deputy Commissioner to Commanding Officer, Criminal Justice Bureau, July 31, 2001.
Contents noted. Forwarded for your necessary attention. Please note the Police Commissioner's
APPROVAL and signature. Please note additional stipulations required by Deputy
Commissioner, Policy and Planning under separate cover.



Joseph P. Dunne
FIRST DEPUTY COMMISSIONER


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REPORT UNDER
CJB #85-01-0003


EIGHTH ENDORSEMENT

Commanding Officer, Criminal Justice Bureau, to Commanding Officer, Queens Court Section. August 3, 2001. **CONTENTS NOTED.** Forwarded for your necessary attention. Please note stipulations required by both the Deputy Commissioner, Policy and Planning, under separate cover and the caveats contained in the Fourth Endorsement as submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters.

PJD/JFD/jfd


Patrick J. Devlin

Appendix D - Survey of Police Agencies in U.S. Cities of over 100,000 Population



JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The City University of New York
899 Tenth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019
(212) 237-8000

June [], 2002

Chief of Police
[City] Police Department
[Street Address]
[City, State, Zip Code]

Dear Sir or Madam:

My name is Edith Linn and I am a lieutenant in the New York City Police Department. I am presently doing doctoral research, authorized by the NYPD and under a grant from the National Science Foundation, concerning how personal factors in police officers' lives affect their arrest decisions.

In the NYPD, the processing of an arrest involves a great deal of paperwork and close prisoner contact, and can take seven or more hours to complete. Thus when officers consider making arrests, they weigh such concerns as potential overtime, processing burdens, and disruption to their personal lives. I am interested in how other police departments process arrests, and whether they may have shorter or simpler procedures that exert less influence on the officers' arrest decisions. I would greatly appreciate your taking a few minutes to answer the following questions (continuing your response on the back of the page if space is insufficient):

1. About how long, on average, does it take an arresting officer from the time he or she makes an arrest to the time he or she resumes patrol or ends the tour? _____

2. Are there other uniform or civilian members of your police agency that assist in processing an arrest, such as an arrest processing officer, fingerprint officer, civilian attendant, "paddy wagon" driver, or civilian clerical worker? Are there personnel from other agencies, such as correction officers, court officers, or members of the prosecutor's office, that assist in processing an arrest or handling the prisoner before arraignment? What are the titles, positions, and responsibilities of such individuals?

3. What is the work schedule of the typical patrol officer? For instance, how long are the tours? How many days off are there between sets of tours? Do Officers go around the clock or do they have steady tours? _____


4. Do arrests often cause officers to work past the end of their tours? Are they compensated in overtime time or money, and at what rate? Are they compensated or rewarded for making arrests in some other way? Please describe.

5. What technology does your department use in processing arrests? For instance, do you electronically scan or send fingerprints and/or photos from one site to another? How are criminal histories (rap sheets) provided? Do arresting officers enter arrest information directly into a computer, without a hand-written first draft? Are arresting officers generally handy with computers, or do they rely on other designated individuals to enter data, etc? Do arresting officers have portable computers to use in processing arrest paperwork? Can your computer system transfer arrest information onto several different types of forms, or send arrest data to other units or outside agencies? Please describe.

6. Do you have any other information of suggestions that may help the NYPD to make arrest processing easier, quicker, or less of a factor in officers' arrest decisions? _____

Please use the enclosed self-addresses envelope to return your response. I also welcome further communication through mail (c/o Ph. D. program in Criminal Justice, 899 Tenth Avenue #433T, New York, NY 10019), e-mail (edie188@aol.com), or calls (718-438-8686). If I may contact a representative of your agency with further questions, please tell me how: _____

Thank you very much for your help,



Edith Linn

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