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SOCIAL CONTROL IN JAMAICA:
CAUSES, METHODS AND CONSEQUENCES

by

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PAYDAY

The burly black man strode down the street shirtless
My friend's dead-end street where his house stands at the end
And I stood on its second story verandah looking down at him
Machete at his side
A determined figure of retribution.
The dogs came out to greet him.
Barking and charging at him
Hoping to nettle him and then perhaps bite him
But he didn't flinch.
He only walked straight as a man could walk
Streaming sweat in the nearly noon sun.
"Someone to see you," called out my friend's wife
And he went downstairs to talk with the baleful figure.

He came back upstairs putting his wallet back in his pocket
As the man left, the dogs nipping at his heels.
He was the gardener. He had been paid.
I remembered that morning that woman with the vacuum cleaner
Who didn't see me.
I remembered reading in the paper
That Parliament was considering a \$20 a week minimum wage.
I remembered the thin black boy with the tattered shirt
That climbed the coconut tree next door
To harvest the neighbor's coconuts.
I remembered.....I forgot
As my friend said, "Come let's have a drink."
As he rolled out the tinkling tray
Of whisky bottles, mixers, glasses and ice
And why not?
It was hot, hot, hot!

Social Control in Jamaica:
Causes, Methods and Consequences

The two methods of social control examined herein are the Gun Court Law (1974) and the Declaration of a State of Emergency (1976). The latter empowers the police to conduct searches and arrests without warrants. The former prescribes indefinite detention for gun possession. In Part II we will look at each in depth. What follows is a brief glimpse at the main features of the Gun Court Law.

Remarks of the Prime Minister

My patience has come to an end now, we must do something and even if we have to change the laws, but we cannot allow people to come out on bail and kill four or five people even before they face trial. This country has a group of armed men trying to destroy it....It is a war to the death, and whatever it costs, Jamaica is going into that war. The people with whom we are fighting are not sufferers. We are fighting a small highly armed group of people who are not interested in anything except shooting or stealing. They are scavengers trying to prey on the society. We have one determination (however long it takes, and it may take us a long time and it will call for a lot of cooperation from you, the public) and that determination is to break organized crime in Jamaica, and break the connection between political gunmen and crime.¹

For a terse summary of the Gun Court Law and related legislation we turn to George Eaton's Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica where we find the following.

1. The Suppression of Crime Act - enables the Government to declare any area of Jamaica a special area for purposes of the Act for a period of up to thirty days subject to extension by affirmative resolution of the House of Representatives. Within the special area the police have full authority to search any person, enter any building, arrest and detain any person on reasonable suspicion that he or she is committing or about to commit a crime, and set up road blocks;
2. Amendment to the Juveniles Act - makes persons above fourteen subject to the same punishment as adults. The Act also will give power to wardens who must guard juvenile offenders, as is available to warders of the general prisons in the island. The major consideration here was that much of the gun crime was being committed by juveniles;
3. The Gun Court Act which provides that a person apprehended on a charge of illegal possession of a firearm will be placed on trial within seven days. There are no preliminary inquiries and cases are heard by a single magistrate appointed for this purpose. If an accused is guilty of other

offenses, that person must first answer the charge of illegal possession of a firearm. Conviction carries a mandatory requirement of indefinite detention. One appeal by a convicted person is allowed to the Court of Appeals of Jamaica and no bail is available at any stage. The public is debarred from entering the Gun Court — but accounts of what took place are made available to the press and media. A Review Board alone will be empowered to advise whether a detainee may be released;

4. Accused persons and detainees under the Gun Court Act are kept in a special prison in the same locale as the Gun Court.²

PREFACE

I am an American born of expatriate Jamaican parents. During my first visit to the island in the summer of 1974, I was intrigued by the then new Gun Court Law. It prescribed indefinite detention for illegal gun possession. I was eager to learn if it would serve to curb the rising tide of violent crime on the island. I wondered if such a law would work here in America. In the next two years, I made three more trips to Jamaica spending a total of twelve weeks there, during which time I gathered the data for this endeavor.

METHOD

My methodology is an eclectic one incorporating several types of data collection. I perused the statistics on crime and the economy found in the Statistical Abstracts of Jamaica furnished me by the Jamaica Institute in downtown Kingston. I found further information in this regard in the detailed month-by-month crime data supplied me by the Police Department.

I interviewed several lower echelon government officials and had scores of informal conversations with Jamaicans from all walks of life on the topics of crime and politics. These people were not only my friends and acquaintances, but cabdrivers, policemen, teachers and others who I had encountered during my time on the island.

At the Daily Gleaner head office I was allowed to roam freely through the back issues of this, the island's largest and oldest, newspaper. On its pages I found the Parliamentary and public debate that attended the passage of the Gun Court Law and the Declaration of the State of Emergency. From the Government Printing Office I obtained copies of the Gun Court Law, the Fire-arms Act and the Emergency Powers Act. In order to structure and interpret my observations, I turned to the literatures on development and penology.

Due to the turmoil and the attendant paranoia of the island, I was not able to ask many of the questions and to visit many of the places I would have liked to, so as not to draw too much attention to myself. I may not have drawn a highly reliable picture of the problem of social control on the island, but I feel that through this eclectic method I have nonetheless gained a valid idea of the interconnection between crime and politics in Jamaica in the mid-nineteen seventies.

INTRODUCTION

Crime develops with a society. It assumes new forms, proportions and directions as does the society over time. This work examines the problem of crime in the developing world and the authorities' responses to it. The island of Jamaica in the 1970s furnishes us with an intriguing case study.

In Jamaica the authorities are confronted with dire poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and the other manifestations of a stagnated economic development. Also, they face rising rates of violent crime, a new nemesis for this once tranquil isle. To cure the former Prime Minister Manely and the People's National Party have attempted a broad reform program under the aegis of "democratic socialism." To contend with the latter they have instituted the Draconian Gun Court Law which prescribes life imprisonment for gun possession. Both steps have failed.

The reforms have proven ineffectual because the authorities are unable and/or unwilling to take control of private wealth and to redistribute property and equalize opportunity.

The Gun Court Law has failed because its target, the gun, is not the real cause of the crime wave. It is merely the tool of the criminals.

I have come to see that underdevelopment and crime are not two separate problems. The former produces the latter. In Jamaica, since the underlying problem of inequality has not been confronted, the surface problem of violent crime has worsened.

The Gun Court Law, though, did have an initial dramatic effect on the rate of shootings and murders. In time, however, seemingly as the novelty of the law wore off, these and other types of violent crime returned to, and indeed surpassed, their former levels.

The Manley regime responded by declaring a State of Emergency. This has given the police and the army broad powers of search and seizure. So we see that the Jamaican government, precluded from meaningful reform by its powerlessness in the face of the wealth of the entrenched Jamaican bourgeoisie and foreign corporate interests, has attacked crime the symptom, rather than inequality the cause. It has substituted social control for social reform.

In the meantime, Jamaica may have gained a respite from crime, but she has become more of a police state and less of a democracy in the process.

In Part I we will examine the dynamics of the development process. I will show how attempts at modernization, with the "help" and under the direction of the Metropolitan countries, usually ends in the irony of increasing dependence, worsening underdevelopment. Jamaica as a consequence undergoes a process of "ghettoization" exhibiting on a national scale the characteristics of local urban black ghettos in America. She enters the world community not as a thriving partner, but as a stunted, underprivileged member.

Just as in the American ghettos where we see the police playing a crucial role, in Jamaica the police and the army have become essential to the polity in their role of maintaining social control. We will see that this is a common third world trend.

In Part II we review the provisions of the Gun Court Law, examine the nature, source and results of challenges to its constitutionality, and review as well the declaration of a state of Emergency. In Part III two questions are explored. Why did the Gun Court fail? What is the primary cause(s) of violent crime in Jamaica. I also compare the Gun Court's results with those of another "harsh" law, the New York State 1973 Drug Law.

Part IV links the changes in urban conditions on the island with changes in types of crime and weapons used in their commission. Part V contains an outline of parliamentary debate on Amendments to the Gun Court Law and related issues. Also, I present some of the opinions expressed to me by Jamaican citizens about the reasons for the current turmoil on the island.

CONCLUSIONS

Three principle conclusions emerge from the analysis:

1) the Gun Court has failed, 2) there is a "popular thesis" as to why, 3) appearances to the contrary we are not now witnessing real class struggle in Jamaica.

1. The Gun Court has failed in two senses. First, although it had some initial success by the end of the first year of

its operation the rate of shootings had re-escalated to their former levels, and soon after this it was suspended for a year due to a successful judicial challenge as to the law's constitutionality. Second, the law has failed in a deeper sense in that even when it was curbing shootings, murders continued at the same level.

2. The popular thesis for the Gun Court's failure is that it was opposed by vocal, determined opposition which emboldened the criminals to "come back on the scene with guns blazing." The judicial victory of the Gun Court's detractors was seen as having stripped the society of its best defense against the gunmen. I label this the popular thesis because this is the one subscribed to by most citizens and by the ruling People's National Party which continues to point out that the opposition Jamaica Labour Party opposed the measure and aided those who sought its repeal.

Whether or not there is any merit in this popular thesis, it is certain that in any "free" society such a hue and cry would be raised to such a law, such is the nature of democracy. It is useless to complain that "if only they had kept quiet we would still have the Gun Court and crime would be down." Many of those who hold the popular thesis appear to want to "have their cake and eat it too." They would like the authorities to have a free hand with

alleged lawbreakers, and not have them criticized, meanwhile they would like to keep enjoying the benefits of democracy.

3. There is no class struggle in Jamaica. The PNP and the JLP, although their rhetoric is much harsher and the skirmishing more serious as of late, are still managing to maintain a consensual monopoly over the sentiments of the Jamaican people. This sharper rhetoric and fiercer skirmishing only mirrors the sharper, fiercer struggle for survival by the Jamaican poor as the economy deteriorates. All of the recent rioting on the island has been along party lines and not the poor against the state.

There is no substantial band of disaffected outside of the two party rubric. The Rastafarians, the leftists and the very poor are tending to drift towards the PNP, the rich and the private sector towards the JLP. The middle class lying in both camps. The cleavage between the two parties is stretching to encompass the cleavage in the society. Will the cleavage become a rupture? So far there has been no revolution in Jamaica....

PART I: CAUSES

The Development of Underdevelopment,
The Jamaican Case,
The Ghettoization of Jamaica,
and
Mechanisms of Social Control

The Development of Underdevelopment

The term "underdevelopment" suggests a relatively primitive state of economic and political affairs. It suggests that there is a single line of national development, a succession of stages of growth in which nations pass through a relatively fixed sequence of experiences. From this point of view, underdeveloped nations are seen as lagging behind, and their underdevelopment as amenable to mechanisms operating to maintain the structures of, industrial societies.

Rigorously applied, this has been taken to mean that underdeveloped nations must "repeat the stages of economic growth passed through by modern developed societies"³ — feudal, precapitalist and classically capitalist periods. On the other hand, few economists and policy-makers have adopted that rigor. Instead, the prevailing view is that underdevelopment is overcome under the auspices of foreign investment and corporate rather than democratic politics.

The social costs of this approach are not considered part of the index of underdevelopment so that it appears that foreign investment and internal control not only develop nations; but that the extent of that investment and control is the extent of development itself. If, however, the social costs of this form of development are taken into account as dysfunctions, (and this seems to be what Frank, Baran and others have in mind in their

criticisms of this view),* then developing the underdeveloped nations is really to bring them more firmly into the orbit of the world economy.

There are three main reasons why the developing countries cannot really develop by following Rostow's "stages of economic growth." First, we have the time factor. The developed countries passed through these stages over a period of hundreds of years. Needless to say, those now developing cannot wait that long. Second, the exploitation of colonies served as a primary source of what Rostow labels social overhead capital⁴ in the early stages of economic growth. Therefore, if the third world is to develop what can it substitute as a source of overhead capital? Who can these excolonies exploit?

Perhaps the more developed countries of the third world can exploit the less endowed of their fellows, but as for the latter how can they in turn gather the needed capital? (In this regard, note that many of the developing countries have assailed the OPEC cartel for retarding their economic progress by siphoning off much of their national savings in payments for oil increases.)

Third, not only has colonial exploitation served the West by providing social overhead capital in its earlier development, but neo-colonial exploitation is serving an analogous function today. So we come to see that the development of any of the third

*This is the theme of A.G. Frank's Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America.

countries will (and did in the case of the OPEC cartel), hurt or undermine the development of the poorer countries of the third world and also retard the future growth of the already developed world as well.

In the light of the above, it appears manifestly unwise for the third world to plot its development under the direction of the Metropolitan countries. (It is analagous to "the fox teaching the hare to hunt.") Nonetheless, this is precisely what is happening.

In the following I will outline the counterproductive nature of most third world developmental strategies. In most of these countries, bourgeoisie political leaders are leading the quest for development often through the establishment of "mixed" economies. These are economies that attempt to be simultaneously capitalist and socialist. In such instances the "mixed enterprise" is seen as a principal developmental tool. Before examining the nature and consequences of these endeavors, let me point out that exploitation does not only occur between countries, but within them as well. In addition to the exploitation of the third world by the Metropolitan powers, we also witness the formation of a pyramid of exploitation in each underdeveloped country.

Pyramids of Exploitation

Exploitation on a national scale goes beyond the drain of resources and surplus to the molding of the economic structure of the society as well. It involves "the impregnation of the satellites' domestic economy with the same capitalist structure and fundamental contradictions."⁵ Within the satellite there develops the exploitation of regions, classes and parts of classes of other regions' classes and parts of classes who in their turn may be exploiting others also in a duplication or extension of the metropolis-satellite exploitation pattern.

In Chile we find foreign and national exporters and importers as well as large merchants and financiers exercising control over, and appropriating capital from, relatively smaller merchants in the national and regional capitals. These in turn do the same to other merchants and producers as well as to consumers.

In the agricultural sphere we find that the hired worker is connected to the tenant farmer, who is connected to the landowner and merchant, who are connected to the provincial metropolis wholesalers, who are connected to financiers and traders in the national metropolis who are in turn connected to the world metropolitan center — and so the most "isolated toe bone is connected to the world capitalist head bone."⁶ Although it is true that some of the surplus is appropriated on each of these levels, the bulk of it gravitates up to the world metropolitan center.

Beware the Bourgeoisie

The politics of third world nations are heavily infused with colonial divisions of power, with divisions which are post-colonial but essentially continuous with the colonial situation. The situation of socialists is paradoxical. On the one hand they are faced with bourgeoisie rule; on the other hand they are faced with a world economy that requires dependent development as the price of survival. The natural temptation is to form alliances with the progressive elements of the bourgeoisie.

A.G. Frank, though, cautions the socialists of the third world not to engage in alliances with the bourgeoisie, "not even with the weaker elements of that class," for two reasons. First, these national bourgeoisie are dependent on the structure of exploitation, and hence cannot be expected to reform the system.⁷ Second, alliances with the bourgeoisie involve the tacit assumption that third world countries are in a backward, precapitalist state, and the cooperation of the bourgeoisie is hence seen as a necessary condition for growth and modernization.

If, however, this assumption is incorrect as Frank, Baran et al., assert, and third world countries are underdeveloped precisely as a consequence of the development of world capital, the problem of growth, therefore, is construed not as a move toward internal capitalism, but rather as one away from it.

Whereas the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan countries were in revolt during the 17th and 18th centuries, (and in the process,

freeing their national economies from the feudal limitations on production and trade), the bourgeoisie of the third world today in this epoch of monopoly and finance capital are operating within the status quo to the detriment of their national economies.⁸

Many bourgeoisie leaders of third world have attempted to create mixed economies. However, this has resulted in a combination of the worst features of both capitalism and socialism. On the one hand the development of economic incentives and the free functioning of the price system have been impaired. This has produced price distortions and inefficient administrative controls. At the same time, true socialism has been hampered because of the capitalistic nature of the economic institutions. Mixed economies "fall between two stools combining weak economic incentives with bureaucratic socialism."⁹

Countries who embark on the attempt at establishing mixed economies and third world countries on a whole usually rely on foreign aid from the metropolitan countries. This "aid" turns out to be more of a hindrance than a help for the following reasons.

The level of assistance provided by the developed countries is only a fraction of what is really needed. Also, what little aid is given comes with so many strings attached and irritating debt problems "that they sap the initiative and freedom of action of the developing world." It would be more worthwhile to forego foreign aid and concentrate instead on "creating a different

economic and social order based on egalitarianism and second-best standard of living."¹⁰

The third world will never develop so long as it keeps its eyes focused on the Western style of life, and accepts its theories of development along with its foreign aid. China with its reliance on labor intensive industries and full employment is a prime example of a country that developed itself autonomously.

"Employment is the most powerful means of redistributing incomes in a poor society."¹¹ Even if it means temporarily lowering the average productivity of labor and slowing the rate of growth, full employment is preferable to the situation in most developing countries where a small part of the labor force enjoys high productivity and high salaries, but the mass of workers is either unemployed or underemployed and making disproportionately low wages.

To try and catch up with the Western living standards is a quixotic quest on which most of the third world is engaged. The developing countries should turn inward instead and create a different style of life, as did China, one which employs pots and pans and bicycles instead of cars and luxury appliances. Needless to say, this will require radical changes, "...a liquidation of the privileged groups...a redistribution of political and economic power which may only be achieved through revolutions rather than through evolutionary change (i.e., reform)."¹²

The Brazilian Model of Development

Brazil's development is following a course diametrically opposite to that of China and tends to be a model for many Latin American governments. According to the New York Times of March 20, 1977: "The continent is largely dominated by military governments that have looked upon the thirteen year-old Brazilian armed forces' regime as an important economic and political model."

Despite the fact that she possesses a number of large industrial cities, Brazil remains, for the bulk of the population, undeveloped. A large majority of her people are barely surviving at a subsistence level. There is increasing underemployment and a great disparity in productivity between city and country. The regime has fostered and steered the process of income concentration to benefit the consumers of durable goods, that is the minority of the population with patterns of consumption similar to those of the rich countries.

These durable goods are often imported from the West which affects Brazil's balance of trade unfavorably. More and more of these consumers' goods are being produced at home in her budding industries. However, this very process of income concentration creates a sluggish demand for these items (since only a small minority can afford them). The government has therefore subsidized the export of manufactured goods.¹³

In Brazil the mass of the people is excluded from the benefits of progress and the ruling junta suppresses all forms of

protest. Horowitz and others have noted that the large armies of most third world nations, the generals of whom are usually educated in the West, are seldom used for international conflict, but for intranational policing. They enforce these countries' conservative "development" programs and, as in Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria and Zaire, they often topple elected governments that stray too far leftward.

The large armies that we find in these countries, and the development programs that they enforce, are both financed by loans from the developed world. These loans, as we shall presently see, do not promote development but instead deepen third world dependence.

Underdevelopment: the Structure of Finance

Before looking in depth at the multinational corporations and the multinational banks and the international lending agencies that penetrate the economies of the underdeveloped world, I will make some general observations about the structure of finance within which reform programs are funded and ultimately controlled.

Most third world countries in adopting the Brazilian model of development and its attempt to reach the Gross National Product of the developed world face a number of financial problems. The technology that they employ in their industrialization processes is very expensive. At the same time there is a scarcity of local savings for investment. This is true not only because of the low level of income in these countries, but also because foreign firms repatriate their profits and much local savings is itself invested in these foreign firms.

Even when loans are procured, interest and costs over and beyond repayment tend to drain the economy as fast as it can grow. As a result, "the poor countries of the world are now ironically helping to finance the rich countries."¹⁴ Really, though, this is not ironic for this has always been their function. This was certainly the case in the colonial period, and now as we are seeing it is also the case in what many view as the neo-colonial era.

This problem is compounded by the fact that local financial institutions are, as are all businesses, interested in profit-maximization and risk-minimization. As a result; they tend to be

biased toward Multi-National Corporations rather than towards indigenous businesses in their lending patterns. In addition, Multi-National Banks (MNBs) which often control over 50% of the private deposits of some third-world states, work in tandem with the MNCs that they finance to the detriment of the local economy.

It is a well-established fact that the world-wide networks of banks and corporations are not two distinct entities separated at 'arms length' by a competitive market in which one is a seller and the other is a buyer. Instead there are interlocking interests of common ownership, management and technical personnel in the groups that control banks and corporations. Furthermore, whatever the consequences of these interlocking interests may be, there is a second well-established fact of a near perfect correlation between the worldwide expansion of MNCs and the commensurate expansion by multinational banks.¹⁵

The importance of these MNCs and MNBs lies in their social and political as well as their economic effects on the host country.

The Multinationals

The single industrial firm or financial house of old has been replaced by the nationally-based but world-embracing monopoly corporation of today. It is a multi-industry, mass assembly-line producer of standardized products and even new technology. It also functions as its own worldwide purchasing agent, "salesman, financier, and often defacto government in many satellite countries and increasingly in many metropolitan ones as well."¹⁶

One method employed by many third world countries in attempting to control multinational corporations is the device of the mixed enterprise. In this arrangement 51% of the shares of a given

foreign enterprise are owned by the public and private sectors of the particular third world country in which the enterprise is operating.¹⁷ However, the MNC is not handicapped in the least by this proviso because:

"Frequently the foreign corporation arrives with little or no capital of its own and raises its share locally by banking on its international reputation and creditworthiness."¹⁸

Obviously, the credit extended to the multinational by banking institutions in the particular country lessens the amount available for borrowing by the local entrepreneurs. Below is a chart portraying the percentages of U.S. based firms' investments in Latin America that are financed by local versus foreign savings according to type of endeavor.¹⁹

Müller MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THIRD WORLD

Percentage of U.S. MNC Gross Investments in Latin America Financed from Local versus Foreign Savings

Area and Sector	Origin of Finance Capital 1957-1965			
	(A) USA	(B) Reinvested Earnings and Depreciation	(C) Local, Host Country*	(D) Total Local (B+C)
Latin America, total	17	59	24	83
Mining and Smelting	8	78	14	92
Petroleum	13	79	8	87
Manufacturing	22	38	40	78

*The original source labels "Local, Host Country" as "Local and Third Countries." Since the participation of third countries is such a small part, we have omitted the designation to avoid misleading labels.

Source: Fernando Fajnzylber, Estrategia Industrial y Empresas Internacionales: Posicion Relativa de America y Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Naciones Unidas, CEPAL, November 1971).

Other reasons why the multinational is unaffected in its operations by the device of the mixed enterprise are:

1. The conglomerate's investment is only a tiny part of its overall assets. As a result, its ability to threaten withdrawal gives it power over the enterprise to a degree disproportionate with its legal ownership.
2. Where the enterprise is large, government support (to purchase 51% of its shares) channels possible funds away from helping smaller, local businesses and industries, thereby, enhancing the relative economic power of the multinational company.
3. Its standing as an excellent credit-risk with the world and local financial communities gives the multinational an even greater hold over the local economy.
4. Control over stock does not necessarily limit reinvestment of profits to the host country or to any particular segment of that country.
5. The MNC although it possesses a slight minority of stock possesses the vast majority of technical expertise and management control.

Multinational Banks and The International Money Market

In order to finance "development" projects such as mixed enterprises, third world countries often resort to loans on the international money market through a multinational bank or international lending agency. According to the United Nations Economic Report for 1964, political considerations carry much weight in deciding on the requests for loans, or even in encouraging the initial requests of the borrowers. After reviewing some of the decisions on investment by the Export-Import Bank, this same report came to the conclusion that "the Export-Import Bank must be considered as a basic instrument of the foreign policy of the United States."²⁰

It appears as if the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also, although seeming to aid the third world's development instead, increases its dependence and maintains underdevelopment. The statement by Alphonso Inoustrouza (appearing below), a finance official in Chile on the eve of Allende's ouster, illustrates the reactionary role of the World Bank. Recent developments in Zaire, Nigeria and Mexico serve to highlight the crippling effects of reliance on the International Monetary Fund.

In all these examples we will see the continued funding from these sources is predicated on the borrowers "strengthening their economies" through tight money policies. These policies retard these economies by increasing, inflation, unemployment and through worsening their already negative trades balances.

In an impassioned plea before the United Nations, Chile's Finance Minister declared:

This situation (balance of payments) has been aggravated by the decision of various foreign sources, which have traditionally granted financial assistance to Chile, to close their operations with our country.....The present attitude of the (World) Bank's management not only affects Chile but foreshadows a dangerous negative trend that to a greater or lesser extent, may affect a large number of developing countries...The origin of this behavior is the situation resulting from the decision of the Government of Chile to nationalize five private U.S. firms which were exploiting our principle copper deposits, as senior representatives of the Bank have informed the authorities of my country, including myself....it is not a function of the World Bank to be the universal judge for interpreting or pronouncing upon situations that are governed by the domestic legislation of each country and by the principles of international law contained in the resolutions of the United Nations.

If no fresh credits are granted to us, the time will soon come when Chile's debt service payments to the Bank exceeds the sums which it receives from it. The paradox would then come to pass of Chile becoming a net exporter of capital to the World Bank instead of the Bank assisting Chile...²¹

The International Monetary Fund, like the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank, does not seek to promote real development. Frank declares that the IMF "has been forcing tight money policies on dozens of Latin American governments." The justification is given in terms of "classical international trade and monetary theory to becloud the issue."²²

This is precisely what Mobutu in Zaire faces now that his copper industry and ambitious development program has foundered. Meanwhile across the border in Tanzania, Lofchie and others tell

us that since Ujamaa, Nyrere's cooperatives, are faltering he will be getting more loans and renegotiations of those already outstanding, but with certain strings attached. Mexico also, with the recent departure of Echeverria as Prime Minister and the installation of Portillo (ex-Finance Minister) and the sluggish growth of the economy, is facing "austerity measures" in exchange for further IMF loans.

Some of the effects of these foreign enforced tight money policies to "strengthen" the borrowing country's economy has been the creation of simultaneous inflation and unemployment as well as the aggravation of balance of payments deficits. The resulting situation occasions further loan requests which usually are granted but with the proviso that the borrowing country take another "dose of the IMF medicine (more tight money measures) in an unending vicious spiral."²³ This spiraling of third world debt is reflected in the following.

In the period 1951-56 Latin America devoted 5% of its foreign exchange earnings to service its foreign debt. The percentage rose to 11% in '56-60 and to 60% in '61-'63.²⁴ Now since the creation of the Alliance for Progress her debt service today is undoubtedly higher and ever increasing. As early as 1965 the Associated Press News Service reported that "the Ex-Im Bank is taking out 100 million dollars more a year than it is lending to Latin America."²⁵


Mixed Enterprises and Foreign Financing

Above I have outlined the detrimental effects of establishing mixed enterprises and the danger of relying on foreign financing by the developing world. Just as we earlier saw that the MNCs and MNBs work in tandem to preserve underdevelopment, the creation of mixed enterprises and the reliance on foreign financing work in conjunction to the same end. Below is a graphic presentation of the interrelated problems of mixed enterprises and borrowing on the international money market (some of what is borrowed being spent on financing government shares in mixed enterprises among other "development" projects).

MIXED ENTERPRISES AND FOREIGN FINANCING

Mixed Enterprises

51% of shares of foreign ventures
owned locally by government and private sector



As a result, the government is driven deeper and deeper into debt with metropolitan financing institutions for this and other borrowings. The multinationals, meanwhile, maintain management control of the enterprise, and the local bourgeoisie makes a profit and maintains its pre-eminence in the economy. We are now in a position to trace out the compounding factors of exploitation in the third world.

COMPOUNDING FACTORS OF EXPLOITATION


1. Metropolitan Exploitation of third world labor and resources
2. Mixed Enterprises
3. Borrowing on the International Money Market

Thus, in addition to the traditional metropolitan exploitation of the third world, there is as well that which comes with the creation of mixed enterprises as well as the detrimental side-effects of borrowing on the international money market.

The Destabilizing Effects of Multinationals

The MNCs do not only control production in the third world, they also determine consumption patterns as well. The mass media of these countries which are usually sponsored by the MNCs serve to generate a consumption ideology. They accomplish this through their commercials, advertising a wide range of expensive consumer items, and also through the content of their programming which often portrays middle class life in the Metropole. At the same time though, these countries possess by virtue of these very same MNCs' exploitation an inadequate consumption capacity. Needless to say, this inadequate consumption capacity generates frustration and unrest.²⁶ "A motor car owned by a worker in one country can be a symbol of revolt for people deprived of even the necessities of life."²⁷

The Interlocking Cycles of Frustration



This frustration and unrest tends to produce, on the one hand, crime, disorder and even rebellion, and on the other, it discourages industrial expansion by either foreigners or the indigenous bourgeoisie. This curtailment of industrial expansion in turn produces an even more inadequate consumption capacity which in turn increases frustration and unrest.

Thus we have two interlocking cycles of frustration which inexorably generate ever increasing rates of property crime, disorder and rebellion. In time, the specter of revolution looms larger and larger.

Muller has found three types of governmental responses to the MNCs and the frustration, unrest they generate in Latin America. He sees Brazil and Mexico as continuing their reliance on them and employing "the expedient of political repression." Cuba (and at that time Chile also) was seen as disengaging themselves from them whereas Peru, "seems to be in the midst of deciding to

what extent it desires, let alone is able, to minimize and/or modify the role of MNCs in order to pursue a new form of national development.

Jamaica in the period '62-'72 when it was under the aegis of the JLP behaved similar to the first instance or type, that of Brazil and Mexico with regard to her MNCs. She utilized repression to subdue dissent and maintain a favorable investment climate. Currently she is adopting the Peruvian stance. Like Muller we doubt how successful such an approach can be in attempting to limit their influence.

In Part I we have identified the counterproductive consequences of following metropolitan methods and direction in attempting development. Indigenous bourgeoisie leaders pilot third world economies and political institutions. In maintaining their wealth and position they have sacrificed real development for their countries.

The establishment of mixed economies often combines the worst features of capitalism and socialism. Development loans from the West come with large interest charges, and economy retarding conditions. Furthermore, mixed enterprises, cooperatives and other "development" strategies when conducted under metropolitan auspices are usually failures.

Multinational corporations project through the mass media a consumption ideology in third world countries. However, as a result of their own exploitation, the desires of these populaces to consume cannot be fulfilled. This generates crime and even rebellion. Repression is often employed to quell the unrest.

In the next section we will examine the process of Jamaican development and conclude that it fits the above model. It has a bourgeoisie-piloted development program. It too has rising frustration and it also is responding with repressive laws.

The Jamaican Case

Two uprooted populations, the one adapting its own culture to a new environment and the other subjected to pressures designed to obliterate all cultural recollection confronted each other in Jamaica and provided through their common experience a unique variant on the colonial theme.

Jamaica is currently in the 14th year of its independence after more than 300 years of the longest colonial administration in British history.

When in 1492 Columbus representing the Spanish monarchy discovered the New World, he set in train the long and bitter international rivalry over colonial possession for which after 4½ centuries no solution has yet been found.²⁸

One-hundred sixty-three years later, in 1655, the British seized Jamaica from the Spanish. The next 150 years saw the challenge of English industrialism, the fiery campaign of the Abolitionist movement, the absence among the planters of capital for the technical development of production and exchange, lack of credit, rebellions, etc., the "old palmy days of the plantocracy ended."²⁹

Sugar, although not as profitable as before, remained important to the Jamaican economy but not exclusively so. Following Emancipation in 1837 many of the ex-slaves fled to the hills and in their small rugged holdings began to cultivate banana.

Meanwhile East Indians, permitted by the Crown to immigrate to Jamaica took the places of the ex-slaves on the plantation.

By the end of the 19th century the migrations began; to Cuba to work in the sugar industry, to Panama to work on the Canal and elsewhere in Latin America as well as to England, America and Canada. The world-wide Depression of the thirties stopped the flow of migration and forced many to return. These returning emigres had been exposed to Garveyism and race consciousness, trade unionism, liberal democracy, Republicanism as well as revolutionary ideology and politics.

Eaton has called migration Jamaica's "social safety valve" and when it was closed in the thirties the resultant agitations, spearheaded by the returning emigres, occasioned radical changes for Jamaica — universal adult suffrage, internal administration and a timetable for political independence.³⁰

Meanwhile, on the economic front, coconut had joined sugar as did banana in forming the basis of the Jamaican economy. In the shade of the long-stemmed thickly fronded coconut groves were set the endless rows of green banana. All of these crops found their way onto foreign markets. As of late with the further development of trade within industrial markets, bauxite became, and remains, the most important Jamaican export. It is her biggest industry as well as a major source of revenue for the government. In 1970 Bauxite provided over 30% of the government's revenue and represented 14% of the island's Gross Domestic Product.³¹

Physically, Jamaica is not well-developed in its interior regions. Most roads point towards Kingston (which has the seventh best natural harbor in the world) on the south coast of the island. Other roads circle the island connecting the North Coast tourist resorts with each other and with the airports at Kingston and Montego Bay. These same roads also service the bauxite mines in the north and north central regions. The road system reflects the requirements of an export economy that is essentially exploited by the nations with which Jamaica trades. The one-sided development of its road system (for export as opposed to internal needs) is just one index of this exploitation and of the quasi-colonial character of Jamaica development. Another is the underdevelopment of agriculture.

Although Jamaica is a tropical country with fertile soil and although agriculture is her biggest industry, she imports much of her food nonetheless. Flour is imported from as far away as West Germany.³² Jamaica has few well-run large scale farms. As we shall see she is starting a number of state-run farm co-operatives. Most Jamaican farmers have tiny plots used mainly for their own subsistence. Also, large tracts are in the hands of speculators who keep them idle until sold to other speculators who in turn continue the process. The land, meanwhile, is never cultivated. It remains, simply, real property.

The value of land for tourism and the possible development of export industries marks the increasing incorporation of the Jamaican economy into the economy of trade and externally-

controlled exploitation. Prime Minister Manley once boasted that Jamaica exports 43% of the world's bauxite,³³ but he neglected to mention that America which is the homebase for most of the multinational bauxite companies on Jamaican soil, had huge reserves of the vital ore that she appears to be saving untapped until she has denuded Jamaica and other third world countries such as Guyana and Malaysia of their supplies.³⁴

A good indicator of a country's position with respect to the world economy is her trade balance. Jamaica has a negative balance of trade that grew tenfold in the eight year period from 1966 to 1973, from 25 to 250 million dollars.

The high visibility of the urban poor is part of Jamaica's one-sided and constricted development. Squatters' shanties populate tiny strips of vacant land providing a backdrop of misery to what might otherwise look like a thriving and productive nation. The continuing growth of this impoverished mass has given impetus to a kind of authoritarian welfare policy, the consequences of which will be discussed later.*

* 5% of the people own 90% of Jamaica's wealth. The rate of inflation over the past fifteen years is almost 150%, with the greatest increase occurring as a result of the international rise in oil prices in 1973. Unemployment is over 15% of the work force, though estimates are much higher for young people. As of 1970, only 12% of Jamaican dwellings had a private water source, 33% had only one room and 75% had no more than three rooms. (From the Statistical Abstract of Jamaica, 1976. Published by the Government Printing Office in conjunction with the Statistics Department.)

Manley's Proposed Reforms

Jamaican economic policy from 1945-1972 tended to increase the maldistribution of wealth. The current Prime Minister claims that those then in power utilized the Puerto Rican experience as a model for development. This involved, primarily, the use of incentives to attract foreign capital. In the extreme case of the bauxite industry, total foreign ownership was compensated for by high wages and special taxes.

In favored industries, such as bauxite, increasing salaries and wages produced something on the order of an aristocracy in labor. On the other hand, agriculture remained relatively unproductive and its workers poor and unorganized. This two-tiered economy reflects a capital-intensive industrial bias. Socially, one consequence of disassociating a large portion of the populace from the developing sectors of the economy is to remove their condition from the domains of economic and political decision-making. Manley observed that this is a situation fraught with tension and the potential for civil strife.³⁵

He argues that the Jamaican economy and society must be reformed through the mechanisms of democratic socialism.³⁶ This, however, involves precisely those perils of class collaboration warned against by Baran and Frank. In particular, the substitution of a program of social control for genuine social reform, and the possibility that even social control will not be accomplished.

Practically, Manley advocates (1) working with the national bourgeoisie in forming mixed enterprises to bring foreign corporations under domestic control,³⁷ and (2) establishing Multiracialism as the principle of an orderly and just policy.³⁸ These two general reforms would, presumably provide a basis for specific political, social and economic changes including cooperative farming and distribution, universal free education, mobilizing all the people in the running of the nation and the continuance of the two-party system.

On the strength of his proposals, Manley has, so far, successfully enlisted most of the left in his struggle to retain political power against the opposition of the Jamaica Labour Party.

His proposal for the adoption of Multiracialism recognizes that the problem of race is perhaps as fundamental to the Jamaican predicament as is the problem of economy with which it is intertwined. But Manley's proposal seems designed to maintain rather than limit racial division as a basis for national inequality.

Is Multiracialism a Valid Conception?

In the Prime Minister's words:

While superficially accepting the notion of a Multiracial society, Jamaica is not yet at peace with blackness or comfortable with its African heritage....People with light complexions enjoy a psychological advantage and, consciously or unconsciously, have assumed additional weight in the society.

Today there are two million people on the island of which approximately 25% live in Kingston. There are practically no unmixed survivors of the former white slave-owning planters. Similarly, most blacks are mixed with at least one other racial strain, however slightly. A convenient approximation of the percentages of the various ethnic groups in Jamaica is: black 78%, white and near-white (including foreigners) 1%, colored 18%, Chinese 1%, East Indian 2% and Jews and Syrians less than 1%. Listing these groups by status, we see the following order:

1. Near whites and foreigners — control the bauxite industry, the large estates, the finance and shipping activity.
2. Colored (mixed) — the professions, dominate the Civil Service and the government, some retail activity.
3. Jews — business, civil service.
4. Syrians and Chinese — business, mainly retail activity.
5. East Indians and Blacks — manual labor.³⁹

Since Jamaica is over 80% black, multiracialism, which reserves power for non-black groups, would perpetuate the domination of the many by the few. If wealth, opportunity, and power were equalized the society would not be seen as being multi-racial but as essentially black. Evidently the foremost advocates of multiracialism are the non-blacks and the privileged, while many

of those in the lower classes with race consciousness do not approve of this policy.* (Table 1)

TABLE 1

SKIN COLOR AND ACCEPTANCE OF MULTIRACIALISM**

<u>White Collar</u>	<u>Percent Accepting Multiracialism</u>
Brown	65
Black	<u>60</u>
% Difference	5
<u>Blue Collar</u>	
Brown	60
Black	<u>50</u>
% Difference	10

These are the percentages of black and brown, white and blue collar workers who display support for the concept of multiracialism. (Multiracialism is the notion that Jamaica is a multi-racial society as opposed to say the contrary notion that Jamaica is a black society. Jamaica is 80% black and 20% assorted races and mixtures of races.)

* "Particular symbols of national unity are utilized by the ruling group to maximize mass support (this in reference to general case).....(in reference to the Jamaican case). There is a self-conscious accommodation of external dependence, and white and foreign domination of the local economy through the projection of an ideology of cosmopolitan nationalism that reflects multiracialism and racial harmony rather than the distinctive attributes and features of the African racial group that makes up the vast majority of the population." (Carl Stone, Race, Class and Political Behavior in Jamaica.)⁴⁰

** From Carl Stone's Race Class and Political Behavior in Urban Jamaica.

The White Collar Class exhibits a larger percentage favoring the ideology of multiracialism than does the Blue Collar class. In each of these two classes though the Brown-skinned group has a larger percentage favoring the idea than does the Black-skinned group. Also, White Collar Blacks and Blue Collar Browns both exhibit 60% accepting this concept of multiracialism.

What emerges is a picture of occupational strata and skin color both being indicators of the likelihood of an individual favoring the concept multiracialism. There appears to be a continuum on this question with the Black-skinned Blue Collar workers being the least likely and the Brown-skinned White Collar workers being the most likely to accept multiracialism.

This can perhaps be explained by pointing to the fact that if one accepts the notion of M.R. one sees Jamaica as being a plural society and one tends to disregard the fact of the huge black predominance. The fact of the, not even equal but, severe underrepresentation of Blacks in the higher strata of the society is ignored.

The correlation between blackness and poverty and ignorance is unnoticed by the supporters of M.R., but it is very visible to those who oppose it. Being Brown makes one more likely to accept the ideology of the status quo, multiracialism, since it rationalizes your privileged position in the society. Also, white collar workers, being that they are more privileged, tend to be uncaring of those who are not. Vice versa for the Blacks and the blue collared. The Blacks being the very ones who are in the inferior,

exploited position tend to object or at least to not support multiracialism. Blue collar workers being more deprived than white collar workers tend to be more sensitive to inequality.

How Workable are Cooperatives?

Manley's proposal that Jamaica embark on a course of co-operativization is less obviously a compromise with the bourgeois class, but it is one nonetheless. Its problem has, primarily, to do with the difficulty of maintaining cooperatives within a society still dominated by private interest and dependent upon foreign lending agencies that would prefer a privatized to a socialized economy.*

Rene Dumont points to a myriad of problems that cooperatives encountered in Cuba. On the one hand, the internal pressure for increased productivity made it likely that estimates of performance would be exaggerated and unreliable. On the other hand, equal pay for unequal contributions tended to create resentment on the part of the most productive workers which resulted in a leveling off of performance at a standard set by those who were the least productive.⁴¹

Lofchie points to similar problems with the Ujamaa program in Tanzania, problems compounded by the attempts of middle farmers and moderately wealthy "kulaks to, through the use of political and economic power, retard the progress of cooperatives. As a result, Tanzania has been unable to raise enough food to feed its

* Since there is widespread dissatisfaction in the Jamaican business community over the socialist policies of the Prime Minister, many businessmen fearing an eventual government "takeover of the economy " are refusing to expand their businesses and to even reinvest profits. Many are even cutting back production and, despite the risk of prosecution, trying to liquidate their assets and ship them abroad.

people, and has had to renegotiate payments on her old loans from Multinational Banks and international lending agencies, as well as seek new ones from these same sources. In return they are demanding that the Tanzanian government "Let the kulaks run!" — give them more freedom of operation to expand their private agricultural holdings and urban business enterprises.⁴²

Still, Jamaica under Manley is heading for wide-scale cooperativization, not only in farming but in business as well. Her farm co-ops are to be modelled after those in Tanzania. Like Tanzania, Jamaica still has "wealthy kulaks" and depends on large foreign loans.

Privilege and Power

Manley recognizes that the success of any reform depends on the capacity to develop "strategies which may quietly dismantle the apparatus of privilege and replace it with a dynamic social organization designed to provide the channels of opportunity."⁴³

The problem is that the policy within which strategies must be generated is not autonomous of the structures of privilege and power in Jamaican society. As Manley has said: "There is perhaps no aspect of new policies which is provoking greater hostility to less purpose than government participation in the economy."⁴⁴

Multiracialism is a class compromise, but cooperativization at least in principle goes further. It challenges private interest and the privileges predicated upon a political economy that substantiates private interest. In the remainder of this

dissertation I will try to show how the political and economic realities of Jamaica's domestic society and its relations with the instrumentalities of the world economy make reforms of the sort suggested by Manley impossible. I will also illustrate how the consequent frustration of the ambition for a peaceful and even-handed development of the nation, provides a background for repression and for a political system that more and more is dis-associated from the needs, aspirations, and collective experiences of the mass of Jamaica's population.

World Capitalism as Jamaica's Metropolitan
Domain: Jamaica as a Quasi-Colony

The formation of a mixed economy has led to a combination of the worst, not the best features of its two component parts: capitalism and socialism. It has meant an economy with incentives and a mammoth bureaucracy. This is especially true in the under-developed areas of production where the government is taking a very active role, particularly agriculture. Here, young people are leaving for cities and the hope of a better life. If wages on the cooperatives are raised high enough to keep the young workers on the land, these labor costs would make these enterprises unprofitable.

The work force in the countryside, as a result, is becoming increasingly middle-aged as its size decreases. The PNP government is supposedly a democratic socialism. Since she is socialist she proposes and forms cooperative farms, but since she is

democratic as well she cannot force people to stay on the land and work it.

There is a large public works program employing tens of thousands, and there is an immense bureaucracy overseeing the cooperative program as well as myriad other development projects. At present one third of the Jamaican work force is directly employed by the state.⁴⁵ In addition to the enlargement of the administrative functions of the state, Jamaica still maintains a parliamentary government with the necessary agencies to deal with her continued membership in the British Commonwealth.

Thus, a mixed economy, one that is both capitalist and socialist, designed to mediate the relationships between the world and the local economy, provides the basis for the development of a bureaucratic state with its compatibility with the needs of the foreign financial community and its increasing irrelevance to the interests of the majority of Jamaicans.

**Multinational Corporations and Banks:
Their Penetration of the Jamaican Economy**

Besides the half-dozen or so aluminum companies that both own and lease large tracts of Jamaican land, which they are rapidly denuding of foliage and topsoil, there are scores of skyscraper-sized hotels representing all the international hotel chains from the Hilton and the Hyatt to the Sheraton and the Playboy in Montego Bay, Kingston and along the North Coast.

Foreign-owned and operated utility companies, banks and insurance companies occupy most of the new large buildings in Kingston. In order to counter the influence of these companies on the local economy, Manley has proposed a form of ownership in which 51% of the shares of local operations of every foreign venture are to be owned by Jamaicans.⁴⁶ However, as Manley himself acknowledges, "Jamaicanisation" has had a limited success. This is due largely to the fact that decision making still takes place in "foreign boardrooms." Moreover, the purchasing of shares puts substantial pressure on Jamaica's balance of payments, thereby directly influencing fiscal policy.* But even where it succeeds, it perpetuates domestic inequality since only the wealthy minority can afford to purchase shares.⁴⁷

Manley is a member of what Frank calls the "nationalizing bourgeoisie." Yet, given the fact that his attempts at socialization have no genuine popular and revolutionary base, he is relatively impotent in the face of the power and influence of the more dominant "export-import bourgeoisie" and their allies in "the

* This 51% of the shares that is in Jamaican hands is bought either by private citizens or by the Jamaican government. The government's shares are paid for by loans financed within the world market through multinational banks and/or international lending agencies. Her national debt is thereby increased (and unlike the American National Debt, this debt is owned to foreigners, not citizens) putting additional pressure on the Jamaican political economy. Since 1972 when the PNP came to power, the Jamaican national debt rose from 290 to 827 million dollars and yearly service charges were up from 28 to 105 million dollars.

imperialist metropolis."⁴⁸ This is a familiar scenario in the third world. Santo Domingo and Chile are recent examples of its consequences.*

In order to deal with the consequences of this penetration of the Jamaican economy — i.e., the riots during the sixties and the proliferation during that time of subversive literature and organizations — the government of that period adopted repressive "Brazilian" measures.⁴⁹

The Gun Court Act although passed by the current liberal reform-minded regime is too essentially a repressive measure. It portends Jamaica's swinging once more to the right. The Manley regime has adopted what has been called "a carrot and stick" approach to social inequality and its concomittant, social unrest. The carrot, that is social reform, is still in the pygmy stages, however. The stick, the Gun Court and the recently declared State of Emergency, though, is already being wielded.

* Because of this heavy indebtedness to international lenders, Jamaican internal policy may prove amenable to foreign pressures for "austerity measures under the threat of a cutoff of further loans." This is the situation Egypt was confronted with earlier in 1977. In January there was rioting in Cairo and Alexandria when the price supports, subsidies, by the government was halted. The price increases had been urged upon President Sadat by the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. Government, American private banks that are his creditors and the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, on which he depends financially...Last spring I.M.F. negotiators obtained from Cairo a promise that it would scale down its huge annual subsidies for basic food and would start adjusting the unrealistically high rate of the Egyptian pound in exchange for a loan from the fund. And that, in turn, would have signalled to Western investors that Egypt could now be trusted. The Egyptian food riots soon ended when Sadat reinstated the price supports, only after his Arab backers promised him more loans. In the Jamaican case we note that Manley also keeps the price of food low through government subsidy.

Meaningful reform requires state control of private property in order to facilitate land and wealth redistribution. The government does not control private property. On the other hand, social control merely requires a monopoly of the means of coercion. The Jamaican government possesses this. George Eaton, a prominent Jamaican political scientist decried this imbalance in government policy.

The anti-crime measures must be viewed, however, as a diversion from the main task of national reconstruction. The intensification of crime and violence is but symptoms and a reflection of problems which are endemic to the structure of the Jamaican economy and society...

- Population pressure and mass unemployment of close to 25%, concentrated among the youth who are likely to remain inexperienced and unemployed.
- Serious underemployment....in 1971, 44% of the persons who made contributions to (the Jamaican equivalent of Social Security) worked for 13 weeks or less during the year.
- Uneven distribution of wealth and wealth-earning opportunities.
- Mal-utilization and under-utilization of resources human and otherwise.⁵⁰

In the above we have seen that Jamaica like most third world countries is snarled in the quagmire of a stagnated development. Although the Jamaican people were freed from slavery in 1838, and the Jamaican state given its independence in 1962, the Jamaican economy has still to be liberated from its quasi-colonial status.

Jamaican agriculture is undeveloped and largely of an export nature, her mineral wealth is exploited by multinational corporations, her "development" financed by multinational banks and she is used as a playground by the upper middle class of North America.

Manley's institution of a "mixed economy," one that is both capitalist and socialist, has proven inefficient, while his "Jamaicanization" of foreign firms has proven counterproductive. Jamaica's failure to come to grips with its economic difficulties has generated intractable social problems: poverty, overpopulation, unemployment, etc. This has resulted in social unrest which has been met with attempts at social control: The Gun Court Law and the Declaration of a State of Emergency.


Jamaica is not the only "developing" country with these problems and she is not the only developing country to have turned to these solutions. In the next section we will examine the social consequences of a stagnated development for the third world in general and Jamaica in particular.

The Ghettoization of Jamaica

Overpopulation is a general trend encompassing Latin America and the whole third world. Birth control is slowing the growth of these populations, but only in respect to births. Death rates keep decreasing dramatically so there is still an overall increase. If the present trend continues, and there is little reason to feel that it won't, it is projected that by 1980 Mexico City will have 14,000,000 people and by the year 2000, 32 million. (See Diagram A, The Latin American Urban Explosion.) In Sao Paulo (1980 - 12 million, by 2000 - 25,000,000) we read that ...the city houses them (rural migrants) for three days, free of charge. If at the end of that time they have not found

jobs, "they must either accept free bus tickets back to their hometowns or strike out on their own in Sao Paulo."⁵¹

Is there any wonder then that living in such cities is becoming mean and fearful as existence becomes simply a struggle for survival. Affluent Paulistas used to assert that they would never live elsewhere. They enjoyed the best selection of night-clubs and restaurants in South America. But as of late this has not been the case. A recent Gallup poll indicated that over half the population would abandon the city if it was economically feasible.⁵²



The New York Times/Nov. 4, 1976

Rural Brazilians gather at a migration center in São Paulo, where the city houses them for three days, free of charge. If at the end of the three days the migrants have not found jobs, they must either accept free bus tickets back to their hometowns or strike out on their own in São Paulo.

Diagram A

The dramatic growth of Kingston since the forties is charted in Figure 1. The slope of this curve and those of population, unemployment and inflation, have the same skyrocketing shape, while that of migration is dropping (see Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). This is producing the Ghettoization of Jamaica as Orlando Patterson calls it.

....the remnants of Afro-Caribbean culture are giving way to the culture of poverty with all its deadening sameness. The family collapses, the personal dignity of the peasant disappears and is replaced by the fatalism and aggression of the urban masses. The hustler replaces the shrewd farmer, unemployment becomes a way of life; crime and delinquency run rampant. It is Harlem and Roxbury and Newark all over again; only here the trend is a national one and the setting a tropical paradise (Orlando Patterson in Towards a Reflection that has No Past: Reflections on the Fate of Blacks in the Americas.)⁵³

This Ghettoization process is a Caribbean and indeed a third world trend. But what in turn is responsible for this process.

The New York Times of May 10, 1976 informs us that

Most urban experts agree that the main causes of city growth (in Latin America) have been the inability of the countryside to sustain its population economically, the rise in urban industrial and service jobs, and the transportation and communications breakthroughs that have linked the cities to the interior.⁵⁴

(text continues on p. 54)

KINGSTON'S
POPULATION
1943-1975





Figure 1.

KINGSTON'S POPULATION

1943 - 1975

This is the curve of Kingston's population over the last 22 years. It has more than tripled in this time period. Like the previous high graph on Jamaica's overall population, it appears to be accelerating at an accelerating rate. This particular graph, however, indicates, or reflects, more than just population growth, but population concentration as well.



44

Figure 2

JAMAICA'S POPULATION

1840 - 1970

This is the curve of Jamaica's population over the last 130 years. It dramatically portrays the breakneck rate of growth of the Jamaican nation. Despite waves of migrations since the late 1800s to Central America, other Caribbean Island, Canada, England and the United States, the Jamaican population has maintained an astronomical rate of increase.

It can be expected to begin growing even faster now that migrations have largely been halted by the traditional host countries due to the continuing world-wide economic downturn.

Manley and others have referred to immigration as Jamaica's traditional "social safety valve." This valve has now been closed. The Gun Court and the Declaration of a State of Emergency can be seen as responses to the resulting social unrest.

JAMAICA'S POPULATION AND
BIRTH RATES 1960-1973




Figure 3

JAMAICA'S POPULATION AND BIRTH RATES

1960 - 1973

In this figure we have superimposed the island's rate of birth per 1000 on top of its population figures for the years 1960-73. It dramatically portrays how, despite a dramatic birth control battle, she is nonetheless losing the war against overpopulation. One can only imagine how steep the population curve would have been without the birth control program.

The small drop in population in the period 1968-70 represents the last massive wave of Jamaican migration. These individuals mainly migrated to America and to Canada.

UNEMPLOYMENT
(1960-1970)

% UNEMPLOYED




Figure 4

UNEMPLOYMENT

1960 - 1970

This graph portrays Jamaica's unemployment rates in the years 1960-1970. During this period the number of jobless Jamaicans tripled.

These figures do not include the underemployed, that is, those who are forced to work part-time, or who have stopped looking for work, or who are making an inadequate salary.

In any case, Jamaica faces overpopulation, inflation increased unemployment and a halt to her migration. This is certainly a dangerous brew for the continued health of the Jamaican society.

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
1958-1973





Figure 5

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

1960 - 1973

This graph charts the upward spiral of inflation that Jamaica has experienced in the thirteen year period of 1960-1973. In this period consumer prices rose over 150%! So we see that in addition to overpopulation the island is saddled with rampant inflation as well.



MIGRATION
1957-1975

Figure 6

MIGRATION

1957 - 1975

Here we have represented the apparently erratic pattern of migration from Jamaica in the past eighteen years. On close inspection, though, it becomes obvious that since the outset of the sixties the number of migrants from the island has been dropping precipitously. Four times as many people left Jamaica in 1957 as in 1975. However, during the same period the Jamaican population has increased significantly. Migration has been called Jamaica's "social safety valve." As of late, though, this valve has been virtually closed. This has only served to worsen the population and employment problems on the island.

This 1976 analysis can be more than adequately supplemented by looking at some ideas of Karl Marx penned well over a hundred years ago. He saw overpopulation as not only a cause of poverty but as a result of it as well.

Jamaica: A Base for a Unit of the Reserve Army of the Unemployed

...not only the number of births and deaths, but the absolute size of families stands in inverse proportion to the height of wages, and therefore to the amount of the means of subsistence of which the different categories of laborers dispose....It calls to mind the boundless reproduction of animals⁵⁵ individually weak and constantly hunted down.

Are not these words of Marx still true today, even in America where we witness the irony of the poorest and hence the least able to provide having the largest families? The not so poor have less children and the middle and upper classes the least. Jamaica and other third world countries, having an overwhelming predominance of poor people, concomitantly have a large average family size, and hence zooming population growth. The root of this problem lies in the "boom and bust" cyclical nature of capital. Overpopulation supplies masses of workers who remain on standby until the particular economy enjoys a "boom" period. They are the insurance that capital will never suffer because of a shortage of workers.⁵⁶

Also, improvements in machinery requiring less and less labor power help in this regard. In any case Marx concludes that:

The whole form of the movements of modern industry depends therefore upon the constant transformation of a part of the labouring population into unemployed or

half-employed hands. This is a law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of production; and in fact every special historic mode of production has its own special laws of population, historically valid within its limits alone.⁵⁷

For Marx, then, overpopulation is seen as a problem peculiar to capitalism. A problem, furthermore, that afflicts the poor, "the reserve army of the unemployed," and not the better off. Today the better-off metropolitan countries are not afflicted with overpopulation except in their poorer regions, their pockets of poverty. Today capital is a world system and as such the reserve army of unemployed is located in the third world and in the ghettos of the Metropole. The Metropolitan countries are the home of most of world capital's bourgeoisie, and petty bourgeoisie. (The mass in this region has become a vast lower middle class.)

As noted in the Introduction, since Jamaica had once been a plantation island manned by slave labor, after emancipation she was ideally suited to assume the role of a breeding ground for capital. We have seen how great numbers of Jamaicans have migrated to other parts of the world, the Jamaican economy having never been on a footing to support its population adequately. Certainly it did not do so in slave times, and as evidenced by migration rates and per capita income levels, it has not done so since.

In speaking of the industrialization of England, Marx noted that when workers were unable to find work "part of them emigrated, following in fact capital that has emigrated."⁵⁸ A similar situation has occurred in Jamaica with workers emigrating to find the capital that was never in Jamaica to begin with. Hence, I have

labelled her a base for a unit of the Reserve Army of the Unemployed. However, the latest "bust" or near-"bust" in the worldwide capitalist system has occasioned the shutting off of the immigration "social safety-valve" for Jamaica.

Marx also observed that the reserve army of the unemployed needs to be large, because as he notes, the length of one's life varies directly with the amount of one's wealth. "In order to conform to these circumstances, the absolute increase of this section of the proletariat must take place under conditions that shall swell their numbers, although the individual elements are used up rapidly."⁵⁹

In today's world advances in medicine and sanitation serve to mitigate this process somewhat occasioning therefore, the formation of a very great "reserve army." (Table 2)

A factor which helps account for the extreme build-up of population in Kingston and other third world cities is the migration from country to city that one witnesses in capital. "As soon as capitalist production takes possession of agriculture, and in proportion to the extent of which it does so, the demand for an agricultural laboring population falls absolutely."

TABLE 2POPULATION, BIRTH AND DEATH RATES
1960 THROUGH 1973

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population End of December</u>	<u>Birth Rate Per 1,000</u>	<u>Death Rate Per 1,000</u>	<u>Rate of Natural Increase</u>	<u>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)</u>
1960	1,639,000	42.0	8.8	33.2	51.5
1965	1,811,000	39.0	7.9	31.1	37.4
1966	1,859,000	38.9	7.8	31.1	35.4
1967	1,893,000	35.9	7.1	28.8	30.5
1968	1,923,000	34.3	7.6	26.6	34.4
1969	1,863,700	35.1	7.6	27.4	33.4
1970	1,890,700	34.4	7.7	26.8	32.2
1971	1,911,900	34.9			
1972	1,953,500	34.3	7.2	27.0	30.9
1973	1,997,908	31.3	7.2		36.2

POPULATION, BIRTH AND DEATH RATES

1960 - 1973

These are the Jamaican population, birth and death rates from 1960 to 1973. Column 2 informs us that the rate of birth on the island has decreased some 25%. However, despite this drop, the population has increased about 20% in the same period according to column 1. This anomaly is explained in column 3 where we see that Jamaica's death rate is only a fraction of her birth rate and it is dropping over time.

In other words despite a fairly successful Birth Control Program (Birth Control devices are advertised on television and in the newspapers, and Kingston is literally dotted with Birth Control clinics) as evidenced by her sharply dropping birth rate, the comparatively low death rate insures continued yearly increases.

Twentieth Century technology has recently produced the Pill and other methods of Birth Control, however methods of Death Control have long been employed: DDT, penicillin, vaccinations, swamp drainage, water purification, etc...

It is worth noting that Birth Control takes the patient cooperation of virtually the entire society whereas a few engineers can accomplish many Death Control measures by themselves in an afternoon.

Jamaica, like most third world countries, has a burgeoning population that is consuming what little national savings she manages to put aside in day-to-day necessities like food and shelter. These countries often go into debt not for development, but simply to maintain their swelling populations. In these societies the poverty of the masses and the wealth of the propertied minority breeds crime and social unrest.

Crime and unrest in the third world is usually combatted through the institution of totalitarian regimes. Jamaica has long proved an exception to this trend, but the recent Gun Court Law and the declaration of a State of Emergency indicate she may not long remain so.

This excess agricultural population heads for the cities joining the ranks of the urban or manufacturing proletariat.

In Jamaica there are still many small hillside farmers. The mechanization of agriculture is confined to the coastal plains regions. However, another factor which serves to swell the country-city migration in Jamaica is the "bright lights" attraction to

the city of the young who come in the hope of finding the sort of life they have seen projected at them on television and in the movies. Needless to say most are disillusioned. People also come to Kingston in order to apply for their visas so that they can go abroad. These visas are long in coming, and in today's lasting world-wide recession they may never come for most applicants.

Some Observations of Aldous Huxley

The population explosion appears to be centered mainly in the poor and undeveloped third world, and not in the more affluent first and second worlds. Faced with such a nemesis how can these countries ever develop for as Huxley observes:

As large and increasing numbers press more heavily upon available resources, the economic possibilities of the society undergoing this ordeal becomes ever more precarious...At the end of each year there is almost no capital available for creating the industrial and agricultural plant, by means of which the people's needs might be satisfied.⁶¹

This is certainly the case in Jamaica where we find the government borrowing heavily on the international money market to the point of flirting with bankruptcy not for development but to maintain expenses. The following observation seems made with Jamaica and her Gun Court and State of Emergency in mind.

Overpopulation leads to economic insecurity and social unrest. Unrest and insecurity lead to more control by central governments and an increase in their power. In the absence of a constitutional tradition, this increased power will probably be exercised in

a dictatorial fashion...Permanent crisis justifies permanent control of everybody and everything by the agencies of the central government.⁶²

I feel that it was the result of overpopulation and its concomitants (unemployment, inflation, etc.) that the Gun Court had to be created, to fight or try to stem the resultant social instability. At best it is a stop-gap measure, but with Jamaica unable to invest in real developmental-job creating projects the prognosis looks dire. In the above quote Huxley employs the qualifier "in the absence of a constitutional tradition." However, Jamaica has a constitutional tradition; still though it may ultimately go the way of dictatorship. Her Westminster tradition may only serve to delay this inevitability.

"It is a pretty safe bet that 20 years from now, all the world's overpopulated and underdeveloped countries will be under some form of total rule — probably by the Communist Party," prophesied Huxley in 1957.⁶³ He was wrong only in the nature of dictatorship. In today's world right wing, fascist-leaning oligarchies seem to be the third world vogue. In Jamaica the Gun Court Legislation, the State of Emergency and the worsening of the population-price-unemployment-migration situation forebode that she will be joining that trend.

In the following we will first examine some current sociological theories on the role of the military's impact on development in third world countries. Using this as a framework, we will proceed to examine the Jamaican Social Defense Forces' role in her own modernization process.

**Mechanisms of Social Control:
The Military in the Third World**

In more formal terms than Huxley's (p. 60), Harold Lasswell had earlier predicted that "a concatenation of social pressures and technological developments were leading toward a world-wide domination of politics by elites specialized in the management of violence."⁶⁴ Current events have proven Lasswell and Huxley to be correct, however, turning to other academic sources we find the following corroborations.

Welch and Smith in their volume Military Role and Rule conclude that the "garrison state hypothesis" has proven accurate. They note that world defense expenditures have risen from 132 to 224 billion from 1962-72. By 1973, one-third of the countries in the world were ruled outright by military officers, not to mention those in which they have considerable influence and those to which they have real power, civilian rulers being their puppets.

They define their rule not as a stabilizing interregnum to the discordant civilian political processes of their countries, but as an open-ended necessity if national development and order are to be realized. Praetorianism in its various forms is a pervasive aspect of world politics at the outset of the seventies.⁶⁵

Samuel Huntington defined a "praetorian society" as one that is highly politicized and where:

Social forces confront each other nakedly, no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict...

The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike. The techniques of military intervention are simply more dramatic and effective than the others because, as Hobbes puts it, when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps.⁶⁶

Horowitz in his Three Worlds of Development notes that the military in the third world faces a dilemma. In acting as "an instrument of national redemption," it opposes the wealthy and established classes. However, their use in riot control and secret police action aligns "the military against the popular class forces it is ostensibly serving."⁶⁷

Which horn it chooses in this dilemma is crucial for a particular developing country because the military's control over "organized coercive resources" makes it the "critical swing group" in most major policy decisions, especially those relating to the termination and formation of governments.⁶⁸ Welch underlines the notion that coup d'etats are usually not "military vs. civilians," but cases of the armed forces joining with one civilian group against another.

More often than not, the military solves its dilemma by siding with the more conservative forces in the particular society. "In concert with the urban middle classes the military seeks orderly economic growth within a social order that changes only slowly, insulated as much as possible from new and potentially disruptive political techniques and ideologies."⁶⁹ The military is usually stalemated beyond the anti-colonial and nationalist phase of the revolution that is they may aid in the decolonization process but

thereafter they serve to retard any future political evolution, that is, they hamper the fruition of the revolution. The military's basic conservatism is in large part accounted for by the metropolitan education and training of the officers. Also, the officers are usually drawn from the privileged, conservative classes.

The order of priorities of most military establishments in the third world is: first, promoting policies that serve their narrow interests (e.g., higher pay...); maintaining public order; "lastly (if at all) promoting policies designed to bring about fundamental social and economic reform." (Horowitz, p. 216)

The military in the third world is usually directed "inward rather than outward." In the praetorian role they are usually pitted against dissident groups be they students, political factions or alienated ethnic minorities. Rarely do they engage in international struggles. They are in reality well-armed auxiliaries of the police forces. Their only combat is of an intranational nature; their main function being to serve as agents of social control.

THE MILITARY IN JAMAICA

The police function of the third world military is aptly illustrated in the Jamaican case where joint police-military patrols regularly police certain ghetto areas in Kingston and where both Police and Soldiers are used in force to quell riots and halt party feuding in these same districts and elsewhere on the island.

In Jamaica we also note that since the beginning of the recent crime wave and subsequent passage of the anti-crime legislation (the Gun Court Law and the continuing State of Emergency), the size of the defense forces is being expanded. This is in keeping with the world-wide trend. (Tables 3 and 4) The Jamaican defense establishment though is still a pygmy.

One reason for the relatively small size of the Jamaican military is that Jamaica is an island and hence easy to defend. However, as we have noted, third world militaries are in any case usually not formed for international struggles, but for internal deployment for social control. A more important reason for the Jamaican military's small size is the traditionally stable nature of the Jamaican policy. Huntington classifies Jamaica as a stable nation. (Huntington, 257) Davis, in his article "Fear in Paradise" appearing in the New York Times of May 18, 1976 reports that:

"Jamaica was the only country independent since World War II to have an orderly change of government by free election and have it stick."⁷⁰

THE JAMAICAN POLICE

The Jamaican police are organized in a Constabulary system. The main difference between a regular police force and a Constabulary system is that the latter do not work a mere 40 hours a week. Constables are on duty around the clock, and they reside in a barracks located in the area in which they work. (The State Police Forces in the U.S. operate similarly.)

TABLE 3

THE JAMAICA CONSTABULARY FORCE

Officers	93
Sub-Officers and Men	3,873

There are two Regiments of about 1,500 men each in the Jamaican Army. There are also police auxiliaries called special Constables and there is a force of Reserve Soldiers who work one or two days a week. I doubt if the entire defense establishment numbers more than ten thousand.

TABLE 4

SOCIAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

SOCIAL DEFENSE (Crime and Justice)		MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (Armed Forces)	
71/72	- \$17,000,000.	70/71	- \$4,600,000.
72/73	- 20,000,000.	71/72	- 5,300,000.
73/74	- 28,000,000.	72/73	- 5,800,000.
74/75	- 35,000,000.	73/74	- 8,300,000.
75/76	- 48,000,000.		

Note that after 73/74 no further figures were published on the expenditures for the department of defense. Also, as Welch points out the true figures on third world military expenditure are obstructed by donations of material and training from the metropolitan powers.

Horowitz sees the military as serving as a counterweight to the party on the one hand and the bureaucracy on the other. It acts to ensure a partnership between the two for the good of the nation. Being stable Jamaica presumably has not had this problem and hence has not had this particular need for a strong military.

"The strength of the military often reflects the absence of strength on the part of the middle or working class." (Horowitz, p. 218). In Jamaica, the two parties are supported by two strong working class unions. These parties are piloted and the bureaucracy run, by members of the middle class.⁷¹ Manley in his The Politics of Change gives historical reasons for the peaceful nature of Jamaican politics.

...all the institutions through which the newly freed slave, and indeed the entire society, began to attain social coherence, were designed in the shadow of the Westminster model of democracy. (As a result, we find that) there is no question that the natural sociological tendency of the Jamaican people is individualistic, disputatious almost to the point of destructiveness, but rooted in a great historically acquired strength: the ability to accept that the vote is the natural end product of dispute and that a majority decision is conclusive of an issue.⁷²

However, this is not to say that the situation in Jamaica will forever remain stable. Today there is increasing crime and party-inspired feuding. There are cries for law and order, and there are new laws — the Gun Court Law and the Declaration of the State of Emergency. Furthermore, the Defense Forces are being expanded. There is a danger that as a result, or as a concomitant of the above, Jamaica will develop into a praetorian society. So far we have already witnessed:

1. student and lower class riots in the sixties
2. recent party-motivated fighting and arson attacks
3. high police officials making charges of political interference
4. violent clashes between police and soldiers
5. the two political parties vying for the favor of the Defense Forces
6. the establishment of a Home Guard, a people's militia to aid the Defense Forces

These developments bode ill for Jamaica's continued stability. In the following we will examine each of the above developments.

1. Riots and
and
2. Political Violence. It appears as though the recent party-inspired fighting in West Kingston has served to supplant the more status-quo threatening rioting along class lines in the sixties. (See appendix.)

3. Police Charges of Political Interference. (Some local politicians) with their own armed militia are promoting gun crimes and interfering with the police in the performance of their duties...Policemen are now afraid of which bird to touch and which not to touch...We are heading for chaos and frustration with this situation...The police are getting afraid. For God's sake will someone tell the politicians to get off the backs of the policemen? Will someone tell them to stop interfering with the policemen in the performance of their duties? We are capable. There is no need for any armed militia to protect any one man; we can provide security for everyone in this country. It is time for the politicians to examine themselves and realize the dangers of this practice if it is allowed to continue.⁷³

The Jamaican Attorney General afterwards asserted that the government did not provide any protection for any lawbreakers, and he urged the police to speak out on this issue so that it could be corrected. "You must shout it out," he said. He said there was no excuse for any judge or any policeman to bow down to a politician. "They can't touch him if he does his job properly and well."⁷⁴ The Prime Minister agreed and urged the Police Federation to submit their facts to the Director of Public Prosecutions. (Jamaica Daily Gleaner, June 6, 1975, p. 14.)

However, soon after the Public Prosecutor complained that he had not received any reports on the matter. The Jamaica Daily Gleaner in this connection reported that:

According to a spokesman for the Commissioner's Office, Mr. Robinson (the Attorney General) advised the Federation that it would not be right to make a statement now since the allegations were under investigation...When contacted yesterday, Det. Edman, secretary of the Federation, would not comment on the planned release or any matter pertaining to the affair. Inspector Smart was not available for comment.⁷⁵

The next day, we read that "round-the-clock police protection is being provided for Inspector Rainford Smart and his family as a result of threats he has been receiving."⁷⁶

Little more is seen in the papers regarding this matter in the succeeding weeks and months. However, we do read that the Jamaica Council of Churches is drawing up a resolution to submit to both Parties urging them to disavow political violence and disown those politicians among them who practice it. In other words, the issue of political violence had returned into the realm of the general and unspecific. Meanwhile though the average citizen maintains a grim cynicism of all politicians.

4. Clashes Between Police and Soldiers

In August of 1975 an argument between soldiers on leave with on-duty policemen lead to a riot involving as many as a hundred participants wielding sticks and clubs.⁷⁷

In October of the following year the "accidental" shooting of a soldier by a policeman was followed by the ambush and serious wounding of two policemen and to an attack on a police station. "...four men dressed in soldier's uniforms walked into the Vinyard Town station compound and raked the station and barracks rooms with gunfire. No one was injured."⁷⁸

Does this portend a schism in the Defense establishment?

In the past the police and soldiers, the defense forces, were not that active nor were they as numerous as they are now. In the future, we expect that they will be more active and know that they

will be even more numerous, thereby increasing the chances of friction and the seriousness of its results. Note that the first incident described above took place during 1975 and involved the use of clubs. The later incidents took place during the current State of Emergency when police and army activities are much greater, and they involved shooting. Turning to some remarks passed in Parliament we hear evidence of friction in the upper levels of the police force as well.

One JLP Senator declared that forces were at work to demoralize the force. He also claimed that many "genuine promotions" were not being made. He declared that some top officers were not talking to each other unless absolutely necessary, and some had been transferred or forced out. He had heard about a deputy commissioner resigning recently, and he had asked the Minister of Security to tell him confidentially or otherwise, what compensation had been given him, because if what he had heard was true there would be serious trouble.⁷⁹

5. The Political Parties Vying for the Support of the Police
The above statement appeared in the context of a Parliamentary debate in which one of the topics was which party had done more for the police over the years. The following are some of the other comments made at that time. Keep in mind, however, that although the small Jamaican constabulary is currently being expanded, but even at its present size the party who has the sentiment of the defense forces has an undeniable advantage in any possible future confrontation.

Shearer (JLP) an ex-Jamaican Prime Minister referred to a news clipping in which an Assistant Commissioner of Police expressed the view that the current rate of crime could be eradicated by the security forces if they were given motivation, professional skill and the will to work hard along with the full support of the public. (He also claimed that there was a shortage of police vehicles at some stations saying that their "overloaded jeeps" could not match the fast cars now used by criminals.)

Ross (JLP) said that in the current crisis the security forces had the answer, but their hands were tied. He claimed that disaffection was rampant in the Police Force and gave as example the call for the resignation of the Commissioner, and another being a case where a high officer gave evidence on behalf of a politician against a colleague. There was also, he said, evidence of a man giving a statement to the Security Forces about a killer, and days after the identified man was seen driving about with "special" friends. Making the point that unless there were relationships within the security forces they would not perform to the best of their ability, he said that only last week the police commissioner said there were forces at work to demoralize the force.

Charles (JLP) said the law before them was not going to stop the shooting. When policemen are prevented by politicians from going into certain areas, how are they going to catch the gunmen, he asked.

Munn, Minister of Justice (PNP) declared that there had been continuous patrolling, searching going on in virtually every area that had been mentioned. He wished to point out that the question of where raids and cordons were carried out was the prerogative entirely of the security forces.

I don't ask them where they are putting them; all that I do when they come to me and say, "We are going to do such a cordon or search, there is the paper," I sign it.

Once he'd satisfied himself that the Security Forces had a good reason he would allow them to proceed. As far as salary and equipment was concerned, he declared that the present government had done much more for the Security Forces than the previous administration. As far as morale goes, he admitted there might be some problems, but he claimed there was a better spirit in the force today than for many years.

We are going to be in a position over the next months to be having a heavy recruitment of persons whom we will recruit specifically to deal with crime on the street not just in the Corporate Area but in the country as a whole.⁸⁰

6. The Home Guard

The PNP has announced its intention to create a Jamaican militia force to assist the defense forces. These Home Guard members are to be given thorough security checks and fingerprinted. They would be trained in the use of firearms, and while on patrol they would be under "the control

of a policeman with a long gun or a soldier with a machinegun. They would be given sidearms at the beginning of each patrol, and they would be required to turn them in at the end of the patrol. (Jamaica Daily Gleaner, May 14, 1976)⁸¹

The Opposition has roundly criticized this proposal. They have pointed out that many of those who would be joining would have a political attitude. They wondered if they would be able to keep their politics from interfering with their performance. Doubts were raised as to the wisdom of distributing guns to the populace. They said that the idea of a Home Guard would tend to undermine the public's confidence in the police. It was also stated that poorly trained Home Guard members would perhaps be more of a liability than an asset to the police in danger situations. (Jamaica Daily Gleaner, June 10, 1976)⁸²

In this section I have attempted to show that Jamaica's Gun Court Law and declaration of a State of Emergency have been accompanied with increases in the size of the police force and the army. This is a phenomenon common in the third world. These countries are today facing a dilemma; "governments of force which will open the way to fascism, or popular revolutionary governments that open the way to socialism. Intermediate solutions have proved to be, in such a contradictory reality, empty and utopian." (Theontos dosSantos "The Structure of Dependence," The Political Economy of Development p. 117.)

Jamaica is a prime example of this situation. The Manley government has been proclaiming itself as a reformist democratic socialism. However, she had had to pass "repressive laws" and increase the size of her security forces. As we have seen she is also in the process of creating police auxiliaries, Home Guards. This has become a political bone of contention between the two parties as has the issue of which party has done more for the police.

There have been accusations of political interference with the conduct of police work, and there have been clashes between police and soldiers. This is happening because as social control becomes more important to the Jamaican policy, the mechanisms of social control (the police and the army) are increasing in power and importance. Let us turn now to a parallel consideration, the evolution of the methods of social control, that is, the laws the police and the army are charged with enforcing.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Text of the Prime Minister's Address," The Jamaica Daily Gleaner (March 20, 1974) p. 10.
2. Eaton, George. Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica. (Kingston, 1975) pp. 255-56.
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PART II: METHODS

The Gun Court Law an Experiment in Punishment,
The Gun Court Prison, The Attack on the Gun
Court, The Decision of the Privy Council,
Amendments to the Gun Court Law, Declaration of
a State of Emergency

In Part II we will examine the text of the Gun Court Law, investigate its dual nature, that is, how it embodies both progressive and regressive innovations, chronicle the attack on it by the Jamaican Bar Association, review the decision of the English Privy Council, discuss the subsequent amendments to the Gun Court Law and examine the main provisions of the declaration of the State of Emergency.

The Jamaican Bar Association and the Opposition Political Party spearheaded a drive to have the Gun Court Law repealed. Their appeal wended its way through the Jamaican courts to the Privy Council in London where certain provisions of the Law were declared unconstitutional.

For a time the measure was suspended while the Manley regime fashioned new legislation. A year later these amendments to the Gun Court Law were instituted. However, the violent crime rate did not prove amenable to the reinstated legislation. Something more was needed, and it was provided with the Declaration of a State of Emergency.

The Gun Court Law

In ushering in the new anti-crime legislation, the Jamaican Prime Minister declared:

My patience has come to an end now, and even if we have to change the laws, but we cannot allow people to come out on bail and kill four or five people before they even face trial....

This country has a group of armed men trying to destroy it....It is a war to the death, and whatever it costs, Jamaica is going into that war. The people with whom we are fighting that war are not sufferers. We are fighting a small highly armed group of people who are not interested in anything except shooting and stealing. They are scavengers trying to prey on the society....We have one determination, however long it takes, and it may take us a long time and it will call for a lot of cooperation from you, the public, and that determination is to break organized crime in Jamaica, and break the connection between political gunmen and crime. (Jamaica Daily Gleaner, March 20, 1974 p. 1)

The Key Provisions:

1. Designation of special "Gun Court" courts
2. Establishes that if accused is charged with other offenses, he must answer gun charges first
3. Provides for a speedy trial and no bail
4. One appeal only
5. Public and press are barred from the proceedings
6. Mandatory sentence of indefinite detention
7. A special "Gun Court" prison
8. A "Review Board" to decide when a convict is to be released

9. Anyone 14 or older found to have or have had possession of a gun or any ammunition or to be or have been in the company of another at the time that they did will be tried under this law.

Date of Passage: March 19, 1974

I. The Gun Court

An act to provide for the establishment of a court to deal specifically with firearms offenses and for purposes incidental thereto or connected therewith.

II. The Accused Must Answer Gun Charges First

6-(1) Any court before which any case involving a firearm is brought shall forthwith transfer such case for trial by the Court and the record shall be endorsed accordingly.

III. No Bail and Speedy Trial

8-(1) Where any person charged with a firearm offense appears before the Court, the hearing shall ordinarily be commenced within seven days.

IV. One Appeal Only

14-(3) Except from a decree given by a Circuit Court Division of the Court, the decision of the Court of Appeal on any appeal under subsection (2) shall be final and conclusive.

V. The Public and the Press are Excluded

13-(1) In the interest of public safety, public order or the protection of the private lives of persons concerned in the proceedings, no person shall be present at any sitting of the Court except —

- (a) Members and officers of the Court and any constable or security personnel required by the Court;
- (b) Parties to the case before the Court, their attorneys, witnesses and other persons directly concerned with the case....

VI. & The Gun Court Prison and Indefinite Detention

VII.

8-(2)upon summary conviction, the accused shall thereof be sentenced, pursuant to this act, to be detained at hard labor during the Governor General's pleasure.*

VIII. Establishment of a Review Board to Determine an Inmate's Release

22-(2) There shall be established a Review Board which shall consist of five members appointed by the Governor-General as follows:

- (a) A person who is or was a judge of the Court of Appeal or a Supreme Court Judge, nominated by the Chief Justice and who shall be the Chairman of the Board;
- (b) The Director of Prisons or his nominee;

*Those "detained at hard labor" have been kept at a special prison at the same locale as the Gun Court. Also, "during the Governor-General's pleasure" is a euphemism for "indefinite detention."

- (c) The Chief Medical Officer or his nominee;
- (d) The nominee of the Jamaica Council of Churches or any-body recognized by the Governor-General as replacing such Council;
- (e) A person nominated by the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition as being qualified in psychiatry.¹

The Gun Court Law: A Multi-Faceted Experiment in Punishment

In this section we will see how the provisions of the Gun Court Law encompass several innovations recommended in the current American penology literature. Before doing so, I would like to point out two basic differences between the American and Jamaican systems of punishment. First, there is no parole in Jamaica. A convict must serve the full length of his sentence. Second, Jamaica still has capital punishment.

These two facts are important because they indicate that the Jamaican penal system is much harsher than its American counterpart. This may help to explain her adoption of such a stern, categorical punishment as the Gun Court. They also indicate why two of the three experimental provisions are "regressive" or custodial in nature and why only one is "progressive" or rehabilitational in nature. The provisions are the ones pertaining to:

1. Harsh punishment for serious offenders that are high-risk,
2. Swift punishment, and
3. The establishment of what is, in effect, a mixed sentence tribunal.

1. Harsh Punishment for High-Risk Offenders: Martinson and others suggest decarceration of low-risk offenders and keeping high-risk offenders in prisons that are nothing more than custodial institutions for periods longer than they are now. They reason that people like the man who

kills his adulterous wife are low-risk offenders, in that there is little likelihood of a repeat performance. On the other hand, they see armed robbers as being highly likely to strike again.²

The more strident advocates of this sort of punishment would agree to preventive detention as was recently discussed on Capitol Hill in the form of a bill called S-90. This bill pointed out that most armed robbers were from the ghetto and that they often began in their teens and did not "retire" until their forties. Therefore, it questioned the wisdom of placing them in a revolving door between prison and society where they are prone to perhaps kill an innocent victim. The proposed solution was a 20-year sentence of an individual's first armed robbery.

The Gun Court, in a sense, attempts to do this. Gun criminals (high-risk offenders) are given indefinite detention "detained at hard labor during the Governor-General's pleasure." During this time, little or no attempt is made at rehabilitation.

2. **Swift Punishment:** Meninger asserts, "If society were able to catch most offenders, and then were willing to punish them promptly without any discrimination, inflicting the penalties fairly but ruthlessly, as it were, most crime could be prevented." Note that Meninger is not a

"hardliner." He is not of the custodial but of the rehabilitational school of thought. He offers this suggestion only rhetorically, for he maintains that it is impossible for society to do this, and hence, it is mistaken in its belief that crime can be deterred through punishment. Hence, his solution therapeutic rehabilitation.³

It appears as if the Gun Court is an attempt to do just that. Jamaican society is attempting to do what Meninger thought impossible. True, the Gun Court does not help in apprehending offenders, but it does punish promptly, indiscriminately and ruthlessly. There is no bail and "trial shall ordinarily be commenced within seven days of the date of his first appearance before the court on such charge..."

3. Mixed Sentence Tribunal: In Criminal Sentences, Frankel endorses the ideas of Professor Sheldon Glueck in the latter's Crime in Justice, "...sentencing is too important to be left to judges alone...sentences should be assessed by a panel of three: the judge, a psychiatrist or psychologist, and a sociologist or educator."⁴

When is the "indefinite detention" that the law prescribes to be ended? "...at the discretion of the Governor-General, who shall act in that behalf on and in accordance with the advice of the Review Board established under the following provisions..."

As seen in a previous section, there are to be five members: 1) a nominee of the Chief Justice and he is to be the chairman, 2) the Director of Prisons or his nominee, 3) the Chief Medical Officer or his nominee, 4) a nominee of the Jamaica Council of Churches, 5) a psychiatrist agreeable to both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition Party.

The Gun Court Prison

About a mile away from downtown Kingston is a sprawling army base. On the grounds of the base is located the gun court prison. It is surrounded by a high wire fence and is about a quarter of a square mile. The fence is painted red and at each corner there is a roofed turret where sits a soldier cradling a submachine gun. Above the main gate in huge black letters on a white background is written starkly, "GUN COURT."

The grim-looking stockade is the brainchild of a group of Jamaican psychologists, psychiatrists and sociologists. It is supposed to convey the message that crime does not pay...

Inside the partially open gate, two constables in their gray, pin-striped shirts and black caps and pants each sashed with big blue stripes, lounge in chairs. Another stands in a nearby booth. Behind them are the cells laid out in rows of one story each and covered with sloping roofs. Beyond, away from the road, is the exercise area. The following are questions put to the Minister of Justice by a member of the Opposition in Parliament soon after the prison was built. After each question is the Minister's answer.

What are the lengths and widths of the cells?

There are 13 cells in the detention compound, each of which are 7 feet high: four are 7 ft. long by 4 ft. 9 in wide, three are 7 ft. long and 6 ft. wide, three are 6 ft. long

by 6 ft. 9 in. wide, one is 8'6" by 5 ft. wide, one is 5'6" by 5'6", and one is 5'6" by 6'.

What furnishings and equipment are in each cell?

One mattress, one slop pail with cover, toilet paper, one blanket, one plastic water pitcher, one drinking mug.

Reading materials are provided. There are two exercise periods, one in the morning and one in the afternoon lasting from 30 minutes to an hour.⁵

AGES OF GUN COURT PRISONERS

Between the ages of 14 - 16	9
Between the ages of 16 - 21	89
Between the ages of 21 - 25	34
Between the ages of 25 - 30	36
Age of 30+	14
	<hr/>
TOTAL	= 182

The above were figures supplied by a judge in the Gun Court Ian Forte in 1975. At the time, he said the capacity of the prison was only 161.⁶

The Attack on the Gun Court

The successful judicial challenge to the Gun Court Law was sponsored by the Jamaica Bar Association. They challenged it on some seven grounds. Rather than elaborating on all their objections, I will instead present the main ones in the context of a series of comments made by their lawyers in arguing against the law.

1. The Gun Court is Unconstitutional:

We are not before the Court arguing for the mere purpose of trying to upset convictions; we are arguing in an endeavor that the Constitution of this country not be tampered with and that it should remain the supreme and fundamental Law of the Land...

We do not say that the circumstances which faced the legislature might not have warranted strong measures, but that whatever measures are taken be within the confines of the Constitution.⁷

They felt that it violated "important principles in the administration justice" in that it provided for the establishment of a separate court, trial in secret, no preliminary hearing, mandatory sentence of indefinite detention, no bail and the special Gun Court Prison.⁸

2. Objections to No Bail and the Gun Court Prison

Section 6 of the Gun Court Act was "most obnoxious" as it required that someone who appeared before the lawfully and constitutionally established courts of the land, should be transferred to that crimson monstrosity, if they were charged with offenses which came within the ambit of the Gun Court Act.

3. The Law Represents Legislative Interference with the Judiciary

The act sets up a court in competition with the constitutionally established Supreme Court and thereby reduces the scope and extent of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction...

The power of the Minister of Justice to create and control a Review Board was an executive infringement on a judicial function.⁹

4. Gun Court Punishment is Cruel and Inhuman

The mandatory sentence of indefinite detention under the Act was inhuman because punishment must bear some relationship to the nature of the offense...A sportsman breaking the terms of his license by having 501 rounds of shotgun ammunition instead of 500 was liable to receive the same sentence as someone found in possession of a prohibited weapon which included artillery.¹⁰

The Decision of the Privy Council

The Privy Council in England upheld the Gun Court Act, but for two of its key provisions. The Resident Magistrate's Division of the Gun Court, and the sentence of indefinite detention to be terminated by the Governor-General upon recommendation of a Review Board were found unconstitutional.

Resident Magistrates Courts

The Gun Court Act empowered certain courts dubbed "Gun Courts" to hear all firearms cases. Some of these Courts were merely Resident Magistrates or "lower" Courts. Under the G.C. Law, they were now

...to try all crimes, however serious, short of capital offenses committed by any person who has also violated the Firearms Law...the jurisdiction conferred upon a court consisting of three resident magistrates (a lower court) thus extends to all non-capital offenses which were previously triable only on indictment before a Superior Court judge....The distinction between the two is that the former is given a greater degree of security of tenure: a) their offices cannot be abolished, b) their salaries cannot be reduced, c) they cannot be forcibly retired before they are 65.¹¹

The Privy Council felt that it was wrong to have lower court judges who were potentially amenable to political pressure presiding over trials that the Jamaican Constitution required Supreme Court judges to preside over.¹²

Sentence of Indefinite Detention

A government based on the Westminster Model may prescribe a fixed punishment or it may provide a range to be interpreted and applied to the particular case by the judge but it may not transfer from the judiciary to any executive body (whose members are not in the judiciary) a discretion to determine the severity of the punishment to be inflicted upon an individual member of a class of offenders.¹³

In other words, the Privy Council is objecting to the establishment of a Review Board to determine the length of a convict's sentence. This Review Board in their opinion is exercising a right that belongs only to members of a country's judiciary. Therefore, the Privy Council nullified the Gun Court Law's proviso of indefinite detention because of the manner in which it is administered, and not because, as the Jamaica Bar Association contended, it constitutes "cruel and inhuman punishment." However, it is a nullification of the proviso nonetheless. In the following we will review the subsequent charges in the Gun Court Law occasioned by the Privy Council decision.

Amendments to the Gun Court Law

In June 1976 the PNP submitted and subsequently had passed in Parliament several amendments to the Gun Court Law. This in response to the verdict of the English Privy Council that declared certain provisions of the measure unconstitutional. The amendments were: to change the penalty of indefinite detention to one of life imprisonment, the abolition of the resident magistrates division of the Gun Court and the imposition of jury-less trials.

1. From Indefinite Detention to Life Imprisonment

As seen in the Privy Council decision, the objection to the provision of Indefinite Detention was not based on the severe nature of the penalty, but rather on the fact that authority over the length of sentence was to be delegated to a Review Board with at least four of its five members being non-judges. In order to maintain the categorial nature of the Gun Court punishment and yet still satisfy the Privy Council ruling, the sentence of indefinite detention with its concomittant Review Board was dropped and a mandatory life sentence put in its place.¹⁴

2. Abolition of Resident Magistrates Division of the Gun Court

The Privy Council objected to "lower courts" handling such serious offenses as gun crimes; therefore, the use of such courts in the Gun Court judiciary was halted and the number

of higher court (called Supreme Court) judges was expanded to replace them.

3. Trial without Jury

This amendment had nothing to do with the Privy Council decision. It was proposed because of the alleged threatening of jurors by the friends of defendants in Gun Court cases. It was felt that some jurors were "delivering verdicts against their better judgements." Henceforth, judges are to hear and decide on all Gun Court cases, the option of trial by jury being removed.¹⁵

In May of 1976, when it became apparent to the authorities that more than the Gun Court Law was needed to halt the violent crime wave, a State of Emergency was declared. In the following are the Prime Minister's reasons for making the declaration as well as an outline of the nature and scope of this measure.

Declaration of a State of Emergency

In declaring the State of Emergency, our first target is the gunman and the new breed of terrorist. Our second objective is to create a breathing space, a pause, in which the nation may take a deep breath and begin to shake off the pall of confusion and return to the path of common sense. Our fourth objective is to create an atmosphere of security in which the economy can start to function effectively again. Our fifth and most important objective is that the citizen, the men and women and children of Jamaica, should be able to sit on their verandas and porches, to walk the streets peacefully, once again....

There is no question that there have been persons in the field of political activity working with others with influence in the economy who have not been prepared to act within the normal rules of our democracy, but who have tried to act outside of those rules. It must be the duty of everyone of us who cares for this country to unite against this threat.... (Daily Gleaner, June 20, 1976 p. 2)

These are some of the words of the Prime Minister in declaring a State of Emergency on June 19, 1976. When the Emergency Powers Act is invoked, the police have the power to:

1. Block roads and set up cordons
2. Requisition any article
3. Require information
4. Restrict publication of undesirable matter
5. Prohibit assemblies
6. Prohibit carrying weapons
7. Curfew
8. Restrict access to any area

9. Search premises
10. Stop and search vehicles
11. Ask questions
12. Search persons
13. Confine individuals to place of residence
14. Issue detention orders

Under the current State of Emergency, those detained are being held at special detention centers. Below is the text of an announcement played periodically over Jamaican radio and television during this emergency.

Under a State of Emergency, the Government suspends some of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. This is for a limited time and is to allow the forces of law and order to come to grips with any situation which threatens the life and safety of the nation.

Remember that a State of Emergency is a temporary and drastic measure to deal with an immediate and drastic threat to peace, security and survival of the nation and its citizens, most of whom are decent law-abiding people.

The freedom of a few is being restricted so that the freedom of the many may be protected.¹⁶

FOOTNOTES

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2. Martinson, "Prison Reform: What Works" in Public Interest (Spring, 1974).
3. Meninger, Carl. The Crime of Punishment. (New York, 1972) p. 38.
4. Frankel, Marvin. Criminal Sentences. (New York, 1972) p. 74.
5. "All At Gun Court Appeal," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (February 22, 1975) p. 8.
6. "Gun Court Judge Speaks Out," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (December 9, 1975) p. 10.
7. "Gun Court on Trial," Jamaica Daily News (June 26, 1975) pp. 34-35.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
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11. "Privy Council Decision on the Gun Court," Jamaica Daily News (November 13, 1975) pp. 51-52.
12. Ibid.
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14. "House Passes Gun Court Amendment Act," Jamaica Daily News (June 10, 1976) p. 14.
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PART III: EFFECTIVENESS

Why Did the Gun Court Law Fail?

What is the Cause of Violent Crime on the Island?

Political Violence, The New York Drug Law

In Part III I will attempt to gauge the effectiveness of the Gun Court Law through an examination of the rates of violent crime. We will come to see that the law had only a temporary novelty effect on the rates of shooting and murder. It will become apparent that the target of the law, the gun and its proliferation, is not the cause of the Jamaican crime problem. I will show that all violent crimes not simply gun-related offenses have been on the rise as of late. Hence, it appears as though gun proliferation is but a symptom and not the stimulus for the lawlessness on the island. A more logical stimulus or cause is the increasing urban poverty in Jamaica.

I will go on to focus on the issue of political violence. It has a special relationship with the gun problem. I postulate that the authorities are especially interested in gun proliferation not so much for the manifest reason that "it is the cause of violent crime," but more so for the latent one that political thugs armed with guns are much more dangerous than if they were armed with merely sticks and knives.

Lastly I will compare the effectiveness of the Jamaican Gun Court Law of 1974 with the New York Drug Law of 1973. Both prescribed stringent unequivocal punishments for their targeted offenses and both had a temporary dramatic effect (the Novelty Effect) on these same.

In Jamaica it appears that the failure of the Gun Court Law has occasioned the Declaration of a State of Emergency. It is too soon to say if its dramatic effect on the rates of violent crime will too prove short-lived.

Two Important Questions

The Gun Court Law was not successful in curbing the upsurge in violent crime in Jamaica. Its failure was made manifest by the declaration of a State of Emergency two years after it was passed. Why did the Gun Court fail? Was it unsuccessful simply because of the vocal opposition it encountered? Or, was it unsuccessful because of a deeper reason; that it failed to address itself to the cause(s) of violent crime on the island?

We are confronted with two interrelated questions. What is the cause of violent crime in Jamaica? Why did the Gun Court fail? In answering the latter question we will examine the source and the nature of the opposition that the measure encountered.

Those who favored the Gun Court Law claim that the measure faltered because the criminals, in witnessing the debate over its constitutionality, felt it was soon to be repealed and that the society was not serious in its resolve to sternly punish them. Those who opposed the measure have another theory about why it proved ineffective. They claim that the only reason that the measure had even an initial effect on shootings and murders was because of its novel nature. This novelty effect, they claim, naturally subsided as the newness of the law wore off.

In considering the question of the cause(s) of violent crime in Jamaica, I will turn to organized crime and the drug trade, political maneuvering and poverty as possibilities. All

told, each of these has an influence on crimes of shooting and murder, but it appears as if the increasing impoverishment of the mass of urban Jamaicans, what I call the Ghettoization of the island, is the main factor. Before turning to this question of the cause(s) of violent crime on the island we will inquire as to why did the Gun Court fail?

Why Did the Gun Court Fail?

The Jamaica Bar Association and the Jamaica Labor Party have been harsh critics of the Gun Court legislation. The former launched a series of appeals that culminated with the law being declared unconstitutional in certain of its provisions by the Privy Council in England.

The PNP, and much of Jamaican society, have come to see the JLP and JBA objections as unwarranted interference in the fight against crime. The Minister of Justice reports that in the year prior to the passage of the Gun Court, there were 124 murders committed with the gun, and in the year after only 70; shootings had also fallen from 879 to 566. He concluded that the Gun Court did have some effect during its year of operation.¹

The JLP counters with what I have labelled the novelty effect, claiming that the law had an effect at first because it was a novelty, but as the newness of the measure naturally began to wear off, so did its efficacy as a crime deterrent. They cite the case of the anti-strike law in Trinidad that also appeared to have a temporary dramatic effect. Also, they argue that the most important concern should be to protect the basic democratic freedoms of all Jamaicans, provided by their constitution. This law, they feel, infringes on these democratic rights.²

Looking at a 4-year curve on shootings with intent, (Figure 7) we do witness a sharp drop followed by a sharp reincrease. This phenomena can be adequately explained by either of the above theories. Meanwhile, the two parties and the larger society are rent by bitter acrimony over the reason(s) for the failure of the Gun Court and the legitimacy of its provisions. We cannot resolve the dispute, but we can perhaps shed some light on the nature and the dynamics of the disagreement.




Figure 7

SHOOTINGS
(1972-1975)

These are the rates of shooting in the years 1972/73 to 1975/76. The number of shootings increased in 73/74 over 100% of what it had been the year before. In 74/75, however, this figure dropped back virtually to the 72/73 level. In 75/76 the number of shootings rose once again, but did not reach the high point of two years earlier.

These sharp rises and drops can perhaps be explained by the initial effect of the Gun Court Law. The law was passed in March 1974. (The Jamaican statistical year begins in April.) During this year we note the dramatic decrease, but by the following year the effectiveness of the Gun Court may have worn off as indicated by the steep rise in the shooting curve in the following year.

The Dialectic of Rhetoric

It appears safe to say that whatever "harsh" legislation is ever proposed, the Jamaica Labor Party will seek to block and/or modify it in Parliament; and whatever "harsh" anticrime legislation is ever passed, the Jamaican Bar Association will seek to have it, wholly or in part, declared unconstitutional. At the same time, whatever failures they encounter in attempting passage, or in maintaining anti-crime legislation, the People's National Party is certain to blame the "vocal opposition" for any upward fluctuations in the crime rates (by having "emboldened" the criminals).

Furthermore, the JLP's and JBA's opposition will cause further modifications of the original legislation by the PNP which, in themselves, will elicit more opposition from the JLP and JBA in a vicious never-ending circle of cause and effect, charge and counter-charge. The PNP accusing the JLP-JBA of sabotage, and they, in turn, accusing the PNP of increasing repression, police state tactics and attempting to stifle the Loyal Opposition.³

However, the PNP must remember that it is truly a democratic right to voice opposition. At the same time, the JLP must realize that opposition, even "loyal opposition" can at times weaken the force of laws aimed at repressing crime, though, they are right in noting that repression in one area has a tendency to spill over into others. Will men, honest men, given broad powers under the State of Emergency, be able to use them

wisely over the long run? Will they willingly surrender them? "Power Corrupts" is an old adage. A recent modification by Aldous Huxley is, "If power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely."

What this all suggests is that perhaps in a democratic society, or one that aspires to be democratic, laws such as the Gun Court cannot exist. True, they may be powerful deterrents to crime in their harsh and absolute nature, but these same features engender opposition framed in the potent argument of their tendency to infringe on democratic rights. And the right to object itself being a democratic right....

It may be, though, that if the problem that inspired repression (in this case, the problem of crime) is serious enough, the nature of the society will be forced to undergo radical change from being a democracy to becoming a police state.

The Murder Rate

True, as Rattray has pointed out, the Gun Court, while in effect, did have a dramatic effect on the rate of shootings, and on the rate of murders caused by shooting. However, according to his own figures, it had little effect on the rate of murders per se, a drop from 232 to 207 per year. In Figure 8 (Shootings and Murders 1972-1975), we observe that the rate of shootings, although dropping sharply, was accompanied by only a small dip in the murder rate. We must conclude that there was merely a change in the nature of the weapon of murder even when the Gun Court was at the height of its "effectiveness." Looking at the long-range picture in Figure 9 (Murders in Jamaica from 1953-1975), it is apparent that even though murders took a small dip during the Gun Court's year of operation, they still remained way above the level of even just a few years ago. The best the Gun Court legislation ever did was to temporarily stabilize the rate of murders. So we see that the failure of the Gun Control cannot be completely explained by pointing to the vocal opposition of its opponents. Perhaps the problem was that it failed to deal with the source of the violent crime problem on the island.

It is time we confronted the question, "What, if any one thing, is the cause of violent crime in Jamaica?"




Figure 8

SHOOTINGS AND MURDERS

1972-1975

Here we have the rates of shootings and the rates of murder in Jamaica for the years '72-75. The murder rate peaks and troughs at the same points as does the shooting rate. However, its highs and lows are very shallow in comparison to those of the shootings curve.

We can conclude that while the number of shootings was increasing and decreasing dramatically, the murder rate remained basically constant. Therefore, the Gun Court Law although sharply affecting the volume of shootings (albeit temporarily) did little to curb the underlying problem of murder in the society.

It appears as if would-be murderers only changed their weapons from guns to knives or other substitutes, but were not deterred from their crimes.




Figure 9

RATES OF MURDER
(1953-1974)

These are the rates of murder in Jamaica from the year 1953 to 1974.

Despite occasional drops in the rate of murder it appears to have been on a steady increase over the course of these 21 years. This figure and the one before lends credence to the notion that the Gun Court had, at best, a temporary dramatic effect on the rate of shooting and miniscule impact on the rate of murders.

It appears to me that the rate of murders is a better index of the security of the average Jamaican citizen than is the rate of shootings. However, the Gun Court Law had not even a temporary effect on it.

Possible Cause(s) of Crime

In the paper so far, we have encountered three possible reasons for the recent dramatic increases in violent crime in Jamaica: organized crime, the machinations of politicians, or poverty. We will begin our inquiry by examining the role of organized crime on the island. We will use the rates of arrest for drug trafficking as an indication of the volume of organized crime's drug trade.

In Figure 10 (Murders and Drug Arrests from 1966 to 1973) we notice a steady increase in drug arrests. It roughly parallels the rises in murders and shootings (though not hardly as steep as the latter). Can we then infer that it is organized crime that is fueling the rapidly rising shooting and murder rates. Is there, as has been stated, "...an insidious corrupt network linking organized crime, drugs and violence?"

Before jumping to that conclusion, let us look at the rates of two crimes that have little or no connection with drugs or murder. Using them as controls, we can postulate that if they have not also been increasing parallel to the rises in murder, shooting and the drug trade, then we are safe in assuming some intimate connection between murder, shooting and the drug trade. However, if they too have been rising sharply, such an assumption would be unwarranted.




Figure 10.

ARRESTS FOR DRUG TRAFFICKING AND MURDERS

(1966 - 1974)

These are the Arrest Rates for Drug Trafficking and the Murder Rates in the years 1966 to 1974 on the island of Jamaica. The two curves although not exactly parallel do exhibit the same general upward slope over the course of these seven years.

Could it be that organized crime, the main force in Caribbean drug trafficking, has been responsible for the recent rise in shootings and murders?

In Figure 11 (Rape and Breaking and Entering), we see that these two crimes have also been on the rise. It is hard to imagine how the purchase of marijuana by American organized crime elements could have engendered these increases in rape and burglary. Therefore, one is led to conclude that the rise in drug trafficking is largely a result of the same force(s) that have increased murders and shootings rather than the cause of these two.

Could the force be political violence? True, there may be some political murders and shootings, but I doubt that the entire (or most of) the increase in violent crimes (including rape and burglary) can be attributed to politics. Rather, I feel that the changing nature and magnitude of crime in the society has affected the subset of political violence as it has all types of crime and violence in Jamaica as of late. Still, the question remains though what has caused the changing nature and magnitude of violent crime?

I feel the answer is simply the Ghettoization process discussed in Part I. The worsening poverty and struggle for existence in the slums of Kingston and Montego Bay is generating increasing violent crime.

Indices of this process as we saw were rising unemployment, spiralling inflation, soaring population growth and sharply decreasing migration. As we will learn in Part V, many Jamaicans cynically point to the politicians and their key supporters as the ones behind the crime wave. The politicians, on the other hand, point to organized crime as the culprits behind the current terror.

(Text continues on p. 114.)




Figure 11

* Note the Burglary rate is ten times as large as pictured here.

RAPE AND BURGLARY

1966 - 1973

On the previous page are the rates of Rape and Burglary on the island from 1966-73. Perhaps an examination of these curves can shed some light on the question raised by the discussion of the previous figure, that is, whether or not Organized Crime, the main protagonist in Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean was not also responsible for the rise in shootings and murders, presumably through the sale of guns to Jamaicans.

In the previous graph we noted that Arrests for Drug Trafficking and the rate of Murder possessed the same modest upward slope over the course of the period 1966 to 1973. Herein we note that Rape and Burglary, as well, during the same period also exhibit a moderate upward slope.

I doubt that Organized Crime can be blamed for the increase in burglaries, and I hardly believe it could be responsible for the rise in rapes. Therefore, one is led to suspect that the idea that Organized Crime is responsible for the rise in murders and shootings cannot be concluded simply because it has a similar slope to the curve of murders. True, Organized Crime elements may have brought guns onto the island, but they cannot be said to have caused the wave of violent crime.

I reject both hypotheses and turn instead to the deteriorating social conditions of the urban poor as the key variable. Political violence and organized criminal activity I feel are simply the results of these conditions as are other crimes.

Organized crime traditionally provides those services and commodities desired by the citizens of a society, but forbidden them by the authorities. For example, in America it provides pornography, gambling, loan sharking, etc. In Jamaica they provide the gun.

Some bored middle class Americans want pornography, prostitutes and gambling. Some poor, urban Jamaicans, on the other hand, want guns to aid them in their struggle for existence. In both cases organized crime merely supplies the goods to meet the demand. It does not generate demand. As for the role of political violence in Jamaica, let us take some time to investigate its sources, occurrence and direction.

Returning to Political Violence

Although I am not of the opinion that political reasons are the motive force behind the Jamaican turmoil, political violence does occur on the island. It, like all violent crime, I feel, is a result of the worsening urban poverty.

By comparing the rate of murders and the rate of murders solved over a 48-month period (two years before and two years after the passage of the Gun Court Law), perhaps we can get a picture of the frequency and intensity of politically motivated violence. Unsolved murders quite often are of an organized crime or political nature. The murderers having no acquaintance with their victims and the sophistication involved in their execution makes it difficult for the police to find the culprits.

In Figure 12 (Murders and Murders Solved in a 48-Month Period), we witness two distinct patterns before and after the passage of the Gun Court Law. Before the passage of the law, the percentage of murders that were solved remained relatively constant. I make this inference based on the fact that the curve of solved murders seems to meander in parallel fashion beneath the curve of total murders.

After passage though, the two curves are no longer roughly parallel, their relationship to each other is more erratic. On closer inspection of the right half of the graph, we note that immediately after passage, for the next three months, virtually all the murders committed were solved. However, in the months that follow, we note wide discrepancies.

— MURDERS PER/MONTH
 - - - MURDERS SOLVED PER/MONTH
 (April '72 - March '76)




Figure 12

Some months most are solved, others hardly any. I feel that these months with a small percentage of murders solved indicate periods of increased political violence.

The logical question is, could not these unsolved murders be organized crime killings and not political ones? I am assuming that organized crime murders occur at a steady rate and do not rise and fall at particular periods, therefore some of these murders may have been committed by organized crime, but this factor cannot explain the sharp fluctuations.

Unlike organized criminal violence, political violence in Jamaica appears to be centered around certain specific events and/or time periods. As an illustration of the latter, we can take January, 1975 which was a period of attacks on the political offices of the two parties. In early January after the JLP office in Kingston was attacked by 40 men on 20 motorcycles (see Appendix), the Prime Minister asserted in Parliament that, "This ugly monster political violence has once again reared its head."⁴

He went on to deplore the attack, but asserted that there had been provocation, listing recent attacks on PNP members. A few days later, the Leader of the Opposition listed twelve recent attacks on JLP members. In the weeks that followed, the violence continued. On our chart during month #34 (January, 1975), these events are mirrored in the small percentage of solved murders.

Turning to the period of the International Monetary Fund Conference in January of 1976, we witness a comparable

phenomenon.⁵ Out of 20 murders committed that month, only three were solved! During this time, three policemen were shot and there were riots between opposing political factions in the slums of West Kingston (see Appendix). Once again, the obviously political nature of the turmoil is evidenced by the small percentage of solved murders.

A few months after these upheavals our chart ends, but we know a State of Emergency was soon declared. This is evidence that the Gun Court was a response to crime seen largely as being caused by social factors, the State of Emergency a response to crime seen largely as being caused by political ones. However, we must add that this apparent politically motivated crime, too, has its roots in social factors, namely the worsening poverty of the urban Jamaican. These ideas will be further developed in Part V.

We began this section with two questions. Why did the Gun Court fail? What are the cause(s) of increasing violent crime? The Gun Court probably failed because of a combination of the reasons suggested. There probably was a novelty effect operating in its initial success, and the "vocal opposition" did too have its part in weakening the measure, and such opposition will be expressed in any democratic society.

A deeper reason for the failure of the Gun Court is that it was not attacking the cause(s) of crime. This brings us to our second question: what is the cause of increasing violent crime? It is not political violence, nor is it the presence of

organized crime. Both are only symptoms in Jamaica's general trend towards lawlessness. This lawlessness is powered by the increasing inequities and absolute hardships of life for the masses, especially in Kingston (increasing unemployment, inflation and population coupled with decreasing migration), that is the Ghettoization Process.

One question still remains. We have come to see that the Gun Court, even in the "heyday" of its effectiveness, its first year of operation, was only serving to cut down on shootings and did little to ease the real problem, the murder rate. In a sense, the question of why did the Gun Court fail is really a moot one since it really never worked. One must ask why and how the politicians and the populace became obsessed with stopping the gun which is only a tool of violence. What accounts for this collective displacement with regards to fighting crime?

Despite the fact that many politicians may be involved, at least indirectly, in the turmoil, they probably seized on the gun issue as a sensational means of quieting the people. (It is just as important for politicians to seem effective as it is to be effective.)

It has been asserted that there are three types of political gunmen: the henchman, the bodyguard and the overzealous political supporter. Whichever one(s) of these an individual Jamaican politician may have in his employ, as a group, as the government, the politicians must control the rise in crime in order to preserve that same government, the very thing they are fighting to be a part of or to control.

The following is another reason for the furor over the gun in Jamaica. The gun, in and of itself, poses a potentially serious threat to order (as it is currently a threat to law) that the knife does not. Individual gunmen can band together and turn against the state. If they were armed only with knives, they'd prove hardly a threat in this respect. So, irrespective of the murder rate, the gun is dangerous in that it can be used in rebellion, whereas knives are virtually useless against the gun-toting police and soldiers of the state. (Also, certain crimes such as bank robberies are easier to commit with guns.)

In this regard, we can perceive a reason for the paranoia of the populace, particularly the middle and upper classes, over guns. To employ the knife, one must come up close to his victim, but with the gun one can stay a great distance away and bring it into play. Therefore, people in the middle class, by staying out of certain areas and away from "certain-looking" people, can somewhat stay out of the range of a knife. This is not quite possible when a potential lawbreaker is armed with a gun.

Knives, because of their limited range, are more likely to be used, or are more likely to be felt by the middle class as being more used, among associates and, therefore, in ghetto neighborhoods, rather than in the middle class areas and on the residents therein.

The New York Drug Law and the Gun Court Law: A Comparison

It would appear at this point that "harsh" laws do not work from an examination of the results of the Gun Court Law. However, would we be safe in making a generalization based on this one instance?

Let us look at another "harsh" law passed one year before the Gun Court, the New York State 1973 Drug Law. In the following we will look at its provisions, compare common elements in the New York and Jamaican crime problems, gauge the effectiveness of each measure and look at subsequent modifications in each instance.

We will see that the laws have much in common, not the least of which being that both produced what I call a Novelty Effect. Each served in the short run to cut down the incidence of their respective offenses, but in the long run fails as significant crime deterrents.

Following are excerpts from Governor Rockefeller's 1973 state of the State message before the Albany Legislature.

This is a time for brutal honesty regarding narcotics addiction....We have allocated over one billion dollars to every form of education against drugs and treatment of the addict through commitment, therapy and rehabilitation....But let's be frank - let's tell it like it is. We have achieved very little permanent rehabilitation and have found no cure....The crime, the muggings, the robberies, the murders associated with addiction continue to spread a reign of terror. Whole neighborhoods have been as effectively destroyed by addicts as by an invading army. We face the risk of undermining our will as a people - and the ultimate destruction of our society as a whole. This has to stop. This...is...going...to...stop. Frankly, all the laws we now have on the

books won't work to deter the pusher of drugs. We have this choice: either we can go on as we have been, with little real hope of changing the present trend; or we must take those stern measures, that I have been convinced, common sense demands.⁶

The proposed, and subsequently adopted, legislation, prescribes various penalties for minimum amounts of various illicit drugs. Below are presented the penalties for the polar cases of heroin and marijuana.

220.21 Crime possession of a controlled substance
in the first degree

A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of an aggregate weight of 2 ounces or more containing a narcotic drug.

Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree is a class A-1 felony. (Mandatory life imprisonment)

220.06 Criminal possession of a controlled substance
in the sixth degree

A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the sixth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses....one or more preparations or substances of an aggregate weight of 1/2 ounce or more containing marijuana or hashish.

Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the sixth degree is a Class D felony.⁷ (One year minimum)

Compare the above remarks of the New York State Governor and the excerpts from the New York Drug Law with the remarks of the Jamaican Prime Minister and the summary of the Gun Court Law. (See page 134) Before proceeding to compare crime rates,

oppositions to the laws, and subsequent modifications, we must first address ourselves to a methodological issue. Can one compare a drug law and a gun law?

Can One Compare a Drug Law with a Gun Law?

Life imprisonment for the possession of certain drugs vs. indefinite detention for possession of a firearm. The most "repressive" law in New York and its opposite number in Jamaica. The apparently greatest fear in each society: drugs in New York, guns in Jamaica. The greatest threat to each society's stability, integration.

Another similarity is that both threats pertain to the property possession equilibrium, the cornerstone of any capitalist society.


The reaction against drugs in New York is apparently aimed in large part at the profusion of hard drugs to all strata of the young, but it is also aimed in large part at arresting the steep rise in robberies and burglaries undertaken by addicts to satisfy their urges, and the resultant disruption of property relations. Similarly in Jamaica, the reaction against guns is aimed in large part at the danger to individual life and limb, but also in large part at cutting down armed robberies and the resultant disruption of property relations.

We see property relations being disrupted in both contexts in two ways: 1) through the loss of property and its appropriation by gunmen (and burglars in New York), 2) through the fear of such loss and the fear of harm that disconcerts and inhibits the owners of property.

The Jamaican Crime Circuit

The New York Crime Circuit

The Crucial Role of Organized Crime



In Jamaica guns are used to commit crimes, especially armed robbery. These guns are, in turn, often obtained by trading ganja (marijuana) for them. Organized crime supplies the guns as payment for ganja.

One of the most worrisome aspects of the drug traffic was the tendency to use arms as payment for drugs because currency was no longer trusted by the producers who believed that it may be forged. (From the 1975 Conference for the Collaboration in Crime Prevention in the Caribbean)⁸

The New York circuit is more complex. Many armed robbers are non-addicts (dotted line). However, many addicts pay for their drugs through armed robbery (solid line from drugs to guns to crime) or through burglary (solid line from drugs to crime).

Organized crime plays a crucial role in both contexts. In Jamaica, it purchases ganja with guns. In New York, it sells heroin, paid through property crime. Mr. Matalon, the Defense Minister of Jamaica asserts that the sophisticated equipment - planes and ships - indicates the involvement of organized crime. He claims:

The police know the insidious and corrupt network that has been established linking Colombia, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Jamaica and the U.S.⁹

Although there are no hard facts to prove it, one would tend to think that the same criminal syndicates are importing ganja from Jamaica, cocaine from Bolivia and heroin from Turkey.

In the above, I have sought to illustrate the common factors in both contexts, and how they interact in different patterns, circuits. The crucial link in the Jamaican circuit is seen as the gun, in the New York circuit drugs are perceived as the key. This accounts for the different targets of these two "most repressive laws."

Despite the differing targets of the laws, each was formulated to deal with each society's greatest threat to its stability, integration. Therein lies the essential similarity. Can one compare a drug law and a gun law? Yes.

How Have the Laws Affected the Crime Rates?

The crucial question is how effective were these laws in curbing their respective offenses, the possession of drugs in New York and that of guns in Jamaica? After the passage of the Gun Court Law, there was a marked decrease in crimes involving guns. Other Caribbean nations began to consider instituting similar measures. However, the respite proved to be ephemeral.¹⁰

In Jamaica - Eli Matalon, the Jamaican Minister of Security, on July 10, 1974 reported to Parliament the following statistics:¹¹ (This is a detailed breakdown of the yearly rates seen earlier.) Fig. 13 (December, '73-June, '74)

In the three months prior to the Gun Court Law, there were:

<u>Shootings</u>	<u>Murders</u>
188	29

In the three months after:

69	8
----	---

Apparently the Gun Court Law was having a dramatic effect on the crime rate. Before jumping to conclusions, let's turn to a somewhat longer time frame.¹²

Fig. 14 Violent Crimes Reported to the Police
in Jamaica per 100,000 Population

<u>73/74</u>	
<u>Shootings</u>	<u>Murders</u>
44	12
<u>74/75</u>	
29	11

The dramatic effect seems to have been wearing off.

In our first table the Minister of Security gave us the statistics on murder and on shooting for the three months prior and the three months following passage of the Gun Court Law. Let us now begin with the fourth month after, July, the month he made the address, and provide a monthly breakdown on shooting incidents.¹³

Figure 15

SHOOTINGS

July '74 - December '75

July	21
August	50
September	48
October	42
November	78
December	75

Now let us combine our first and third tables and look at shooting incidents over the course of a year, from three months prior to the legislation until nine months after.

Figure 16

SHOOTINGS

Quarterly - Dec. '73-Dec. '74

3 months prior	188
3 months after	69
The next 3 months	119
The next 3 months	195

So we see that the deterrent effect of the Gun Court Law has proven to be non-existent. Since the start of 1975, the rate of shootings has continued to rise. In January, 1976 it had reached a new threshold. Five policemen and several times as many civilians were killed in a month. Also, there were numerous woundings and innumerable shootings.¹⁴

In New York - There was an initial period in which drug sales appeared to have dwindled. The Times conducted a survey of pushers and addicts and claims to have found that the chief result of the new law was to have driven dealings underground, "from out in the open to dark streets, in apartments or abandoned buildings..." The respondents felt that the law would lead to more shootouts between police and pushers. It was also widely speculated that pushers would flee to New Jersey where the penalties were not as severe.¹⁵

Three Months after Passage - Many law enforcement and drug treatment officials agreed that Governor Rockefeller's prediction that the law would drive addicts and pushers from the streets, had not been borne out.¹⁶ They said that heroin and cocaine dealers were once again very much on the streets after maintaining a low profile for some weeks, and there is little evidence of a decline in marijuana use or "pill popping."¹⁷

Assistant Manhattan District Attorney D. F. Roberts said, "I believe the laws' increased penalties have convinced some private adventurers and college kids to get away from drugs; but the addict-pushers and bigtime dealers have not gotten out."¹⁸

Also there had been no exodus to Connecticut and New Jersey by dealers and no increase in desperate shootouts between pushers and the police.

Rates in a 28-Month Period - Below we have a comparison of the rates of felony drug arrests in the 14-month preceding passage of the Drug Law and in the 14 months following:¹⁹

Figure 17

Rates of Felony Drug Arrests
in New York November '72 to February '75

14 months prior	17,453
14 months after	18,409

Apparently, this stringent law has failed to halt the epidemic of drug addiction, just as in Jamaica, the Gun Court law failed to decrease gun crimes.

So we see that both measures enjoyed only a short-lived, novelty effect on the rates of crime. We shall also see that both, too, encountered stiff, vocal, established opposition and both were subsequently modified. Turning to the issue of opposition first, we note the following.

Opposition to the Laws:

In New York: The American Civil Liberties Union claims "There is a broad and unexplored ground between the present tendency of some law enforcement officials to impose excessively lenient sentences on narcotics traffickers and the Governor's

wild demand for mandatory life imprisonment for petty dealing in soft drugs." (New York Times, November 9, 1974)

The Legal Action Center, a group of lawyers who handle criminal cases of the poor, has concretized opposition to the law in the form of several test cases. In one such case, their brief contains the following:

The 1973 drug law both on its face and as applied to petitioners and members of their class violates the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in that the harsh mandatory minimums, mandatory life maximums, and lifetime parole surveillance with no possibility of discharge are so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings, are arbitrarily inflicted on a small group of persons, are unacceptable to contemporary society, are disproportionate and excessive, are more severe than the punishment accorded any other convicted felon in New York State, including murderers, rapists and arsonists, and preclude adequate consideration of the individual background of the offender or circumstances of the offense without rational connection to any legitimate state interest;...

In Jamaica, a magistrate on the Gun Court declares:

Are we also by our attitudes contributing to the crime in our nation? We cannot stand by and see so many of our young Jamaican boys find an outlet for their anger at a society that seemingly has deserted them and their economic situations...We need to convince them that there are other ways to solve problems than "solving it" with a gun. There must be something wrong with a society in which most of the violent crimes are committed by its young men.²⁰

He goes on to point out that the average age of those tried, convicted and detained in the Gun Court Rehabilitation Center is 18.

The most devastating attack against the Gun Court was launched by the Jamaican Bar Association which is seeking to have it repealed or amended. In this connection, Attorney R. N. Henriques is conducting the appeals of the first four men convicted under the Gun Court Law. He argues that a special court outside the judiciary is unconstitutional as is the sentence of indefinite detention.²¹

Subsequent Modifications

In Jamaica - In October, 1975 Arthur Mackenzie, a prominent businessman, became the first inmate ever released on bail from the Gun Court. In November, the first Gun Court conviction was set aside.²²

As we previously saw, in early December, the Jamaican Bar Association succeeded in having the Gun Court rules unconstitutional.²³ The Prime Minister and his advisers reworded the legislation to have it conform with the Jamaican constitution. Indefinite detention was replaced with life imprisonment.

In New York - The Legal Action Center has had limited success in combatting the Drug Law. In People v. Carter, they were able to have the Law's provisions dealing with methadone modified.²⁴

"...Methadone related crimes are now considered on a pure weight basis, and the categories have been rearranged to give judges flexibility to deal with all but the most serious offenders on an individual basis. The new law was made retroactive, and thus, provides for the re-sentencing of persons previously sentenced for methadone crimes under the '73 drug law.

However, in People v. Donigan, their attack on the law's life sentences and life-time paroles met a different fate.²⁵

...they left untouched such aspects of the law as its mandatory provisions for imposition of the life sentence and life parole without possibility of discharge for a wide range of drug offenses, including many that are truly marginal.

Summary of Comparisons

We have seen that one can compare the drug law with the gun law because each is aimed at the greatest threat to the respective society's stability, integration: drugs in New York and guns in Jamaica.

Although Jamaica and New York State may not be exactly parallel political entities, for the purpose of the analysis, they both display common salient characteristics. These are the fact that both make their own criminal laws and punish their own criminals. Also, both are enmeshed in the exploitative processes of financial capital.*

In both contexts we witnessed liberal opposition to the laws and to the nature of punishment.

Apparently the laws had a short effect on the crime rates, but in time, the rates returned to and even surpassed the old levels.

We noted that in Jamaica, the Gun Court was suspended and then reinstated. In New York, the methadone provisions of the drug law have been made more flexible.

In closing we would like to emphasize the fact that these harsh repressive laws just do not seem to work. Our section on rates offers ample proof. It would appear that the main force behind crime in capitalist society is unequal distribution of property. Crime is but a manifestation of unorganized individual attempts to redistribute property. Crime

* Both Jamaica and New York are nearly bankrupt and dependent on loans from Multi-national Banks for continued fiscal solvency.

is the forerunner of revolution, an organized social attempt to redistribute property through the seizing of state power.

However, the authorities in both contexts seem unaware of this and continue to rely on heavy prison sentences to contain crime.

Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica, when the Gun Court was declared unconstitutional, refashioned the legislation, changing indefinite detention to the stiffer penalty of life imprisonment. Furthermore, in June of 1976, with violent crime still soaring, the PNP government declared a State of Emergency which borders on a declaration of martial law.

In Part III we have seen that the Gun Court failed because it was aimed not at the source or causes of violent crime, but at the tool of its implementation. It confused effect with cause. The real "cause" of crime, I have shown, is the Ghettoization of Jamaica, the increasing impoverishment of its growing cities. Political violence although widespread is like organized crime's presence, merely a manifestation of this Ghettoization Process and not a fundamental cause of violent crime. (This notion is further developed in the Appendix.)

The New York Drug Law is similar to the Gun Court Law in its stern, categorical nature, its attack on the symptom rather than the cause of crime and its failure to have a long term effect. In Part IV we will see how this Ghettoization Process has changed the nature of crime on the island. I will show that crime, criminals and weapons in Jamaica have undergone radical transformations in the last ten years.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Senate Debates Gun Court Act," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (June 18, 1976) p. 9.
2. Ibid.
3. These charges and countercharges are discussed in the Appendix in the section entitled "Trading Accusations of Political Violence."
4. "Prime Minister Addresses Parliament," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (January 12, 1975) p. 3.
5. "Bad Fortnight for Mr. Munn," Keble Munn was the Jamaican Minister of Security and Justice. Soon after the violence of January, 1975, he was stripped of his title Minister of Justice. He has since been only Minister of Security. Carl Rattray was appointed Minister of Justice. Jamaica Daily Gleaner (January 20, 1976) p. 24.
6. "Text of the Governor's Address," the New York Times (January 4, 1973) p. 16.
7. "Revisions of the New York Drug Law," McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York (New York, 1967) p. 6.
8. "Summary of Conference for the Collaboration in Crime Prevention in the Commonwealth Caribbean," sponsored by the United Nations (January 5-11, 1974) p. 9.
9. "Defense Minister Addresses Parliament," the Jamaica Daily Gleaner (July 15, 1974) p. 18.
10. "Summary of Conference for the Collaboration in Crime Prevention in the Commonwealth Caribbean," p. 6.
11. Wint, Carl. "Focus on 14 Years of Violence," the Jamaica Daily Gleaner (July 15, 1974) pp. 16-17.
12. Jamaican Police Statistics supplied me by the Corrections Department in January, 1976.
13. "Increase in Gun Crimes," Jamaica Daily News (January 11, 1975) p. 1.
14. This information was culled from various newspaper reports that I read while in Jamaica from January 10-31, 1976.
15. "Survey of Drug Addicts and Dealers in the South Bronx," New York Times (October 7, 1973) p. 1.

16. "Effects of the Drug Law," New York Times (December 2, 1974)
p. 4.
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20. "Gun Court Judge Speaks," the Jamaica Daily Gleaner
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21. "Stalag in Kingston," Newsweek (September 23, 1974) p. 35.
22. "Gun Court One Year Old Today," Jamaica Daily Gleaner
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23. Ibid.
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PART IV: RAMIFICATIONS

Perspective on Violence, The Development of Social Crime
The Development of Political Crime, The Gun Court vs. The
State of Emergency, The Changing Nature of Crime

Introduction

Earlier I spoke of the Ghettoization Process in Jamaica. It is engendered by population concentration, overpopulation, rising prices, unemployment and the other strictures of life in depressed urban areas. Herein I will attempt to flesh out the process of Ghettoization and thereby gain a perspective on violence on the island. In so doing we will see that the development of shanty towns is a key element.

The residents of these areas, in struggling for survival, often turn to crime. Politicians often employ these individuals as bodyguards or as henchmen to terrorize their own and neighboring communities into supporting the particular politician in Parliamentary elections (see Appendix on lumpenproletariat).

Political independence and attempts at modernization have succeeded in changing the Caribbean. The islands have, however, not been made into modern, thriving, industrial nations, but into modern, depressed "ghetto" islands.

The analogy to the American ghetto is apt because the poor as in North American cities have become "homogenized and proletarianized." Cultural differences between the islands are vanishing and being replaced with "the culture of poverty with all its deadening sameness." Harlem, although it has half a million people, is lost in the 200 million that is the American nation. On the other hand, when we realize that much of Western Kingston and large sections of Montego Bay are slums, we cannot say that these hundreds of thousands are swallowed up

in the 2,000,000 that is the Jamaican nation. They are the Jamaican nation. Hence, we can say Jamaica has become Ghettoized.

Perspective on Violence

Political independence and attempts at modernization have certainly changed the Caribbean, but far from improving conditions, they have succeeded only in urbanizing and proletarianizing the population - the same processes are unfolding as in the U.S. The urban poor of the shanties are becoming increasingly homogenized and atomized...the insular differences in the slums of the different islands are breaking down... The family collapses, the personal dignity of the peasant disappears and is replaced by the fatalism and aggression of the urban masses. The hustler replaces the shrewd farmer, unemployment becomes a way of life. Crime and delinquency run rampant. It is Harlem and Roxbury and Newark all over again; only here the trend is a national one and the setting a tropical paradise. (Orlando Patterson, "Towards a Reflection That Has No Past: Reflections on the Fate of Blacks in the Americas")¹

Jim Whetton in "A Perspective on Violence" expands on this theme. "The working class Jamaican faces conditions similar to those of the Negro in Harlem, in that conventional means of attaining his goals, as are recommended by society, are obscure and unconvincing." He concludes that violence is often the only available means of attaining status and self-respect, whether for the gang member or the member of a persecuted minority group. In Jamaican working class culture, things are finely balanced to avoid violence as far as possible. The following are methods of channeling aggression in the island's crowded urban environments: Aggressive displays, curses, taking chances--the truck driver hurtling corners, the motorcyclist

darting in and out of traffic, coconut vendors swinging their cutlasses within a hair's breath of their fingers, etc. Sometimes, though, the balance is upset and because of the availability of weapons, violence results. Factors that might tip the balance include the sensitivity or the lack of artistry by one of the participants in a cussing match, or the influence of the audience in such an encounter.

However, in view of the overcrowded housing, unavailability of work, the frequency of irritating interpersonal situations, the very restrictive conditions of working class life generally, it is worth asking why actual violence does not result more?²

Ken Maxwell in "Gunning for the Poor" adds the political dimension to the above enunciated social one in accounting for violence. Some politicians, especially in urban areas for the past fifteen years or so, have been using gangs of hooligans to break up the meetings of their rivals. In time, it went from fist fights to knives and now to guns. When police would arrest the gangs, they would often find the men soon released "on orders from higher up." Both political parties made pious statements abjuring political violence, but still it continued as some "candidates of each party continued to villify their opponents in the vilest terms and, by their speeches and behavior, set examples of irresponsibility and violence; violence in opinion and intention, if not violence in fact."

On the other hand, he also adds to the list of social reasons for crime. As people left the land and came to the

cities, their old rural based traditions were eroded and they found little work and less decent housing. New developments cut the residents off from the sea, their traditional bathing and fishing area.

With services such as piped water, less and less adequate to meet the growing population, being deprived of a sea bath was a major event, and it does not take much imagination to see that for a man coming home from work, tired and sweaty, to a houseful of noisy kids, a wife who probably either was at work or is pregnant, with the sound systems blaring and the heat beating down, a sea bath could mean a difference between a peaceful, soothing interlude and an irritating, possibly violent evening.³

The duality in Maxwell's article is a common one among writers, politicians and even the Jamaican "man in the street" in any explanation they might give of the causes of crime. We can label the two elements of this duality as the SOCIAL and the POLITICAL factors in crime. As we will come to see, they are not wholly distinct categories, but rather overlapping perspectives of the essentially same process.

Below we will trace out the development of shanty towns, look at the writings of two prominent academicians and the speeches of the Minister of Justice in order to present the logical dichotomy in violent crime: the social and the political.

The Development of Social Crime

In the September 15, 1962 edition of the Jamaica Daily Gleaner, we read in an article entitled, "Java Training Ground" that a beach near Kingston used to be "a quiet spot for lovers,

but now at Java, teenage boys and girls form the nucleus of the gangster group"...guided by older robbers in learning house-breaking and pickpocketing. In October, 1963 in "Vice Rings Flourish in West Endlease Lands," we read that "vast acreages of bushland are inhabited by low income families. Crime has become an accepted part of the daily lives of the people." Shanty towns are erected with no sanitation or running water. At the entrances to these places, robberies are committed and, "Victims will not risk chasing anyone in these places...At that dangerous curve in the road, they fear neither God nor man when they smoke ganja and are a violent lot - Most of them are on the police wanted lists. At the approach of the police, they clamber in all directions."⁴

May, 1966 - "New Menace of the Gullies"

(Gullies are streams that criss-cross the plain that is Kingston and carry the rainwater from the surrounding mountains out to sea.) The gullies have been paved and their banks reinforced, states the article, removing their danger. "...but a new danger arises as many of the people who come to settle near them are criminals." These people allegedly rob and use the gully-courses as "getaway avenues."⁵

June, 1966 - "New Kingston Hideout for Thieves"

New Kingston was a, then new, hotel-office building complex near downtown Kingston. The article complains of purse snatchings, vandalism, terrorizing residents and tourists. "...thieves are infesting the area and hiding out in the shrubbery of the undeveloped area."⁶

In April, 1976 the Jamaican Minister of Justice made a speech on crime. Two of the social factors which he identified as influencing the crime situation were: first, the migrations of thousands of Jamaicans to Britain in the fifties and sixties; second, the movement of the population from country to city.

In the migrations he asserts that for the first time a large number of women also took part, leaving their children in the care of grandparents or on their own. This widespread breakup of the family unit "produced a generation of Jamaicans without any authority and direction."⁷ On the matter of the population shift, he proclaimed:

If large numbers of people continue to drift from the country to the city, the pressure on available housing in the city increases to an intolerable level, congestion grows, the pressure on the employment opportunities available builds up as well, human frustration develops and right away, we have in one explosive brew, all the necessary ingredients for crime.

This, then, is an outline of the development of "social" crime on the island. Let us turn to its concomitant, or rather, its resultant, namely "political" crime.⁸

Political Crime

Below we will see how in the shanty towns of squatters, formed in the mid-sixties, the ordinary criminal activity of these areas begins taking on political overtones. The following three articles were written in 1966, an election year.

"Bulldozers Smash Camp of Terror"

It began as an ordinary criminal gang of "rudies" being trained to pick handbags and the like or to "lasso" a victim to rob him; but certain other strongarm

members of the Rastafarian cult, with the connivance of politicians and their henchmen, directed their attention to terrorism in the squatter area for political reasons for which they are paid large sums of money. The gang is called the Young Vikings.... People were forced to pledge allegiance to the gang during rituals held at the gang base.... At the base, bombs and ammunition and guns were distributed to the members by politicians or their henchmen.... At one meeting, it was decided to "clear out" squatters who were known to be supporters of an opposition political party. Terror reigned all over the compound at nights when the gang members went on the rampage flogging out opposing factions.⁹

"Denham Town Violence Vietnam Style" reports that warring political factions have marked off sections of the troubled area. Regent Street is the dividing line or DMZ. South of it is called South Vietnam and is controlled by the PNP. North of it is North Vietnam and is controlled by the JLP. Party organization buildings in the area are guarded by men on shifts.¹⁰

"Political Gang Terror in West Kingston"

Political gang violence believed to involve the Young Vikings gang spread terror yesterday afternoon and night in Western Kingston. Throughout the day in the whole area there were reports of violence... The most sustained burst of violence since political disturbances started in West Kingston following the banning on Wednesday of meetings and marches in the Corporate Area (by the Minister of Housing Affairs for one month).¹¹

Let us now return to the April, 1976 speech of the Minister of Justice on the topic of crime. Previously, we discussed the social factors he delineated. The following are the political ones. He claims that simply providing decent homes for poor people does not remove crime and violence. In fact, he sees the distribution of new homes as a primary cause of political violence.

The mass clearance of slums which took place in the sixties resulted in the bulldozing of hundreds of families and the creation of thousands of nomadic Jamaicans living one step ahead of the bulldozer.... The crimes today being committed by many of these rootless young people is the price we pay for the callous governmental behavior of those days. (Note this is putting the onus on the previous administration.) When the houses were built in the areas cleared, they became inhabited not by those who have been cleared from these areas, but instead by favored political adherents.... We must learn soon that if we continue to house people on the basis of political adherence rather than on the basis of need, we create tribal situations such as we now have in Tivoli Gardens and Arnett Gardens with the warring factions poised for attacking each other across a troubled no-man's land.¹²

Referring to the Jamaican political scientists, George Eaton and Carl Stone, we learn the following in this, the political side of their explications of urban violence. Eaton outlines the nature of Jamaican political unionism: each political party is identified with a national union. As a result, the "Spoils System of Jobs (and as we've just seen, housing also) extends to the broad base of the population." As a result, "attention is not focused on national priorities and remedial measures, but on the rationing of limited employment opportunities and the dispensing of rewards."¹³

Stone suggests that in Jamaica, class struggle is muted by polarizing the poor classes into two political parties. The lumpenproletariat in Kingston, instead of fighting for class interests, is organized into warring factions by the two political parties, and are repaid with political patronage. So we see that, say what they may about the undesirability of political violence, the parties have a vested interest in its continuation.

If it were to stop, the class struggle would burst to the fore and a revolution from below might become a distinct possibility.¹⁴

There has always been party rivalry over the distribution of jobs, but with the worsening economic situation, the conflict becomes more serious as jobs decrease and population increases. With the migration from country to city, housing itself becomes a political plum as well. Furthermore, the unrest in Kingston over these two items is hardly a local matter for two reasons. First, Kingston represents nearly 30% of the population and secondly, the Parliamentary nature of the Jamaican government.

In Jamaica members of the cabinet, including the Prime Minister as well as the leader of the opposition, must by law be members of Parliament with a constituency. These powerful figures invariably have Kingston constituencies and they appear determined to remain in government and, hence, to win their local elections, even if it means employing violence, so that they can continue to play national roles.

The Gun Court vs. the State of Emergency

In a sense the Gun Court legislation can be viewed as a response to violent crime conceived of as being a social problem, and the later declaration of a State of Emergency as a response predicated on a conception of crime as being a political problem.

Furthermore, perhaps it is safe to say that the former social view of crime and its attendant Gun Court remedy are inspired by a functional view of Jamaican development; and the latter political view of crime and its attendant declaration of a State of Emergency is inspired by a conflictual or dialectical perspective of Jamaican development.

In the former, violent crime was seen as a problem amenable to legislation aimed at the individual lower-class perpetrators. It seized on the tool of their trade, the gun, and mechanically attempted to eliminate it from Jamaican society as if that in itself would eliminate violent crime. In this view crime was seen simply as a drain on the resources of a modernizing Jamaica.

In the latter view, violent crime is perceived as a problem that is exacerbated by elements in both political parties using violence to gain, or maintain, political office. Also, upper-class groups and wealthy individuals are seen as being instrumental in promoting unrest with the aid of outside forces in an attempt to topple the current administration. (See Appendix.)

So we see that the declaration of the State of Emergency is aimed at "enemies" of the government in the bottom as well as in the top levels of society. It does not merely set up a special Court and Prison and give certain judges more powers, as does the Gun Court Law, instead, it gives every soldier and policeman emergency powers. It keeps them mobilized, vigilant and ever-searching.

It doesn't merely disrupt the lives of certain apprehended individuals as does the Gun Court Law, but it dislocates the entire society for an indefinite period while the "enemies" of the state, not mere criminals, are being rooted out. In this view crime is seen as a political assault on the PNP government and its "socialist" method of development. In any case we see the same dualities present in responses to crime, the nature of crime and in the very methodology of Jamaican Development.

	<u>STRUCTURAL</u> Approach	<u>DIALECTICAL</u> Approach
CRIME:	Property Offenses	Political Violence
ITS CAUSES:	Social Factors (mainly)	Political Factors (mainly)
REMEDY:	Gun Court Law	State of Emergency
JA. DVLPMT.:	Functional (conservative)	Conflictual (radical)

So we see that the Gun Court and the State of Emergency are more than just simply two pieces of legislation. They reflect differences in the nature of crime as perceived by the authorities. Around the time of the passage of the Gun Court Law, crime was seen as being mainly social in nature. By the

time of the declaration of a State of Emergency, though, it was seen as a political problem.

A PNP member of Parliament suggested the following as a method of classifying gunmen. He identified the free entrepreneur gunman, the political gunman, the political gunman who free-lances part-time and lastly, the middle class "braggadocio bully."

A TYPOLOGY OF GUN CRIMINALS

1	2	3	4
Free Entrepreneur	Combination Political and Free Entrepreneur	Political	Middle Class Bully

Apparently type 1 was seen as the main threat by the authorities before the passage of the Gun Court Law, but types 2 and 3 seem to be occupying their attention since the Declaration of the State of Emergency.

Long before the apparent shift in the perception of the nature, causes and remedies for crime; there has been a subtle shifting in the types of predominant violent crimes and the weapons used in committing them.

The Changing Nature of Crime

With the passage of the Gun Court Law, the gun, the hand gun, was seen as the culprit behind the wave of violence. (This is similar to the way in which the "Saturday Night Special" is seen in America as being the culprit behind much of our violence.) It was felt that if it could be eliminated, if its possession was sternly punished, then violent crime would diminish. This thesis proved invalid.

The hand gun was only the modal weapon or tool of violent crime in the early seventies. Placing it in historical perspective, we see that it was preceded by the ratchet knife which in turn had been preceded by the machete. The gun itself has been, in a sense, superseded by automatic rifles and molotov cocktails. This evolution in weaponry took place over the course of some scant ten years. Is it possible that the same teenage "Rude Boys" who wielded their ratchet knives grew up to become armed robbers and later became political thugs?

In any case, we will see below that the gun was merely the third stage in the four stages of crime in Jamaica in the last ten years. The Gun Court Law was drafted to deal with this threat. The State of Emergency was later declared to deal with the fourth and most dangerous stage. What stages and what laws lay in Jamaica's future?

The Changing Nature of Crime

Long before the apparent shift in the perception of the nature, causes, and remedies for crime, there has been a subtle shifting in types of predominant crimes and the weapons used in their implementation. The changes of weaponry correspond to the worsening struggle for existence by the mass of urban Jamaicans.

Changing Nature of Crime

Occasional machete massacre of fatal lovers' quarrel	Increase in robberies and stabbings	Increase in murders and shootings	Urban factional strife
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Changing Weapons of Crime

Machete	Ratchet Knife	Hand Guns	Sophisticated rifles
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Time Span

Early 60's and before	Mid 60's	Early 70's	Mid 70's
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The MACHETE

Up until she received her independence in 1962, Jamaica was a sleepy tourist spot in the Caribbean. Her population was overwhelmingly rural, her industries and cities pygmies compared to their present sizes. The biggest crime news would be an occasional fatal lover's quarrel or an infrequent "machete massacre."¹⁵

The machete or cutlass is the primary tool of the Jamaican farmer. He uses it for harvesting, cutting through thick vines and underbrush and even for cutting patches of grass. Every laboring man in the countryside has a machete and carries it about with him during the day. Rarely is it used as a weapon. However, men have been known to go berserk and begin "chopping away" at whoever comes in sight. Needless to say, whenever this would happen, it made great copy.

The Ratchet Knife

In the mid-60's the crime rate began a noticeable increase. The urban criminals came to be wielding what was called a "young cutlass," a ratchet knife, a cheap switchblade. On June 16, 1966 the Jamaica Star carried an article entitled "Ban the Ratchet Knife." "Lately many people have been remarking on the way crime and lawlessness have become widely prevalent in the island. A study of cases coming to the courts and an examination of the newspapers reveals that the weapons most used in woundings is the ratchet knife." Soon after we come across another article in the same paper on this topic, "These Knives Should Be Seized:"

Who are the ratchet-wielders? They can be found on most corners where young men meet. Their ages range from boys of ten and eleven to men in their forties. Women of the rougher type carry them, too, though you won't know unless they tell you or snap out the blade somewhere near your heart. The men generally carry them in their waists or in their back pockets with only the rings protruding. This, it is said, makes for a speedier draw.¹⁶

Hand Guns

By the end of the 60's, armed robberies increased sharply and the robbers came to be armed with guns instead of knives. Jamaica is an island and does not manufacture any firearms. The question, where did so many illegal guns come from, can be reduced to the question of who imported them, how and why? The most popular theory is that they were supplied by organized crime elements from America as payment for ganja (marijuana).

One of the most worrisome aspects of the drug problem was the tendency to use arms as payment for drugs because currency was no longer trusted by the producers who believed that it may be forged. (From the 1975 Conference for the Collaboration in Crime Prevention in the Caribbean)¹⁷

In combatting the ganja trade, several planes and ships have been seized. The Jamaica Minister of Justice has asserted that the use of such sophisticated equipment indicates the involvement of organized crime. "The police know the insidious and corrupt network that has been established, linking Colombia, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Jamaica, and the U.S."¹⁸ (For more details, see Part III)

The Jamaican Crime Circuit

Organized Crime ← Ganja ← Guns → Crime
 ↑

Automatic Rifles

Another later theory has it that the American CIA is supplying a certain faction (presumably the opposition party)

with arms to use in a destabilization effort. There are no hard facts but the recent waves of calculated arson in which bands of well armed men, using Molotov cocktails, set fire to entire neighborhoods in Kingston (which occasioned the Declaration of the State of Emergency) were some sort of well-planned political undertakings.¹⁹ It has also recently come to light that "the American ambassador solicited funds from the Aluminum Company of America (which has substantial bauxite investments in Jamaica), apparently for Jamaican officials and political parties."²⁰

One would think though that little of this money (reportedly 14 million) went to the ruling PNP because of its leftist-leaning policies and its friendship with Castro. Rather, it is rumored to have gone to the JLP and other elements in the country unfriendly to the Manley regime. During the unrest of the 1966 election period, the following story was widely reported in the press.

The Star has definitely learned that the bulk of illegal firearms being used in the current wave of shootings and murders in Denham Town and other sections of West Kingston were stored at the Foreshore Road, Shanty Town after they were smuggled in by so-called fishermen from visiting U.S. Naval and other ships docking at the port of Kingston.²¹

Recently in the Daily Gleaner, an article entitled, "95 Shotguns Disappear from Freighter," reported that:

...the disappearance of 95 shotguns from the cargo vessel Atahualpa while it lay anchored a mile off Port Royal.... The guns were part of a consignment of several hundred firearms destined for Lima, Peru, from the United States.²²

The notion of destabilization does not contradict the notion of subversion as a byproduct of organized criminal activity. In a sense, destabilization is seen as a new wrinkle in the old problem.

A pattern of events, including the upsurge of violence and industrial unrest, was described by Prime Minister Michael Manley on Wednesday, May 12, as an attempt to destabilize the Jamaican society...

....(there) was an attempt by the Mafia to establish Jamaica as a major trans-shipment center for hard drugs.

....the Mafia attempt was smashed in an operation that earned the Order of Jamaica for the Hon. Eli Matalon former Minister of National Security said the Prime Minister.²³

However, the Jamaica Labor Party has hinted that the recent urban strife was engendered not by the JLP with American assistance, but by the PNP with Cuban help. I investigate both possibilities in the Appendix. Suffice it to say, at this point, that the emergence of sophisticated weapons has apparently coincided with a change in the magnitude and in the nature of Jamaica's violence.

So we have seen that in traditional Jamaican society, the farmer's machete was the typical implement of the little violent crime that did occur. In the mid-60's with the growth of Kingston and its poorer class, the Rude Boys wielding their ratchet knives came onto the scene and there was an increase in "mugging-type" crimes. In the early 70's hand guns became the vogue and murders soared as organized crime began bartering guns for ganja. Finally, by the mid-70's, political reasons

seemed to be the motive force behind much of the violence which now included warring neighborhoods in Western Kingston.

In Part IV I have attempted to show that despite the perception of crime as being a political problem, the underlying "cause" of crime is social in nature. The increasing urban poverty, the ghettoizing of Jamaica is the real problem. The inability of Jamaica to develop a sound economy, erase poverty has had political ramifications. The two parties have made crime a political issue accusing each other of being responsible for political violence and denigrating each other's theories of development.

In Part V we will look at an outline of Parliamentary Debate on the Gun Court Law and Related Issues as well as examine some opinions of typical Jamaicans about the reasons for the current violence.

FOOTNOTES

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2. Whetton, Jim. "A Perspective on Violence," Jamaica Journal (March, 1968).
3. Maxwell, Ken. "Gunning for the Poor," Jamaica Journal (June, 1975).
4. "Java Training Ground," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (September 19, 1962) p. 14.
5. "New Kingston Hideout for Thieves," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (June, 1966) p. 33.
6. "New Menace of the Gullies," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (May 15, 1966) p. 30.
7. "Rattray: Poor Housing to Blame," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (April 4, 1976) p. 5.
8. Ibid.
9. "Bulldozers Smash Camp of Terror," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (October 8, 1966) p. 13.
10. "Denham Town Violence..." Jamaica Daily Gleaner (December 3, 1966) p. 9.
11. "Political Gang Terror in Wikon," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (December 5, 1966) p. 6.
12. "Rattray: Housing to Blame," p. 5.
13. Ibid.
14. Stone, Carl. Race Class and Political Behavior in Urban Jamaica. (Kingston, 1972) p. 153.
15. "Lover's Quarrel Ends in Death." This is a typical example. Here we read that a spurned suitor stabbed himself to death after killing his ex-girlfriend. Jamaica Daily Gleaner (September 5, 1956) p. 14.
16. "Bar the Ratchet Knife," Jamaica Star (June 17, 1966)
17. "Summary of Conference for the Collaboration in Crime Prevention in the Commonwealth Caribbean," sponsored by the United Nations, (January 5-11, 1974)

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18. Ibid.
 19. See Appendix: Trading Accusation of Political Violence.
 20. Editorial, Jamaica Daily News (February 3, 1976) p. 32.
 21. "Ship Gunrunning by Shanty Town," Jamaica Star (August 8, 1960) p. 15.
 22. "95 Shotguns Disappear from Freighter," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (May 20, 1976) p. 3.
 23. "Destabilization At Work," Jamaica Daily Gleaner (June 1, 1976) p. 28.

PART V: OPINIONS

Parliamentary Debate on Amendments to the Gun Court Law and
Related Issues

Perceived Reasons for the Current Violence in Jamaica

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
ON AMENDMENTS TO THE GUN COURT LAW
AND RELATED ISSUES

JLP

The Gun Court had some initial success because it was a novelty. In time, this effect wore off.

Mandatory sentences are unjust and ineffective.

It is strange that you should propose mandatory sentences for gun crimes when you opposed them for murder and possession of ganja when you were the opposition.

The jury system has existed for centuries and should not be abandoned in Jamaica today in the heat of the moment.

Don't panic.

It is easy to be framed under the Gun Court Law.

The basis of the island's troubles was the loss of consensus about what a man should do in gaining power.

PNP

The Gun Court's effectiveness was eroded by the vocal and determined opposition it encountered.

Judges vary too much in giving sentences.

It is strange that you should oppose mandatory sentences for gun crimes when you proposed them for murder and possession of ganja when you were the government.

Jurors were being threatened and, as a result, sometimes gave verdicts against their better judgement.

You are out of touch with the mood of the country.

In cases of reasonable doubt, as always, the benefit of the doubt is given to the accused.

Both parties must simultaneously weed out their gunmen.

JLP

You have tied the hands of the police and are causing them to become demoralized.

Politicians shouldn't join the Home Guard. They will only get in the way when "the action starts." The very idea of a Home Guard shows a lack of confidence in the police.

Victimization occurred mainly since 1972. Victimization in housing and jobs is currently widespread.

Today's gunmen were being given sophisticated training.

The leftists, not the rightists, are responsible for the current turmoil.

You are trying to silence the JLP.

PNP

The police are given a free hand and we have done more for them than the previous administration.

We regret that the Home Guard is being made into a political football. Home Guard members are to receive training and will patrol only their own neighborhoods.

Victimization occurred mainly in the ten years prior to 1972. Victimization in housing is being corrected.

What we are seeing today in the streets is not traditional party rivalry.

The communist bogey is false. The rightists don't want change.

Politicians should watch their rhetoric and not incite others.*

* This outline of Parliamentary debate was constructed from innumerable articles in the island's newspapers, on legislative debate concerning passage of the Gun Court Law and the Declaration of a State of Emergency. A particularly seminal article, in this regard was "Senate Passes Gun Court Amendments," Daily Gleaner, June 18, 1976.

PERCEIVED REASONS
FOR THE PROBLEM
IN JAMAICA

Over the course of my four recent trips to the island, I would invariably ask those whom I would encounter, "What is the cause of the problem in Jamaica?" I received a wide array of answers. The politicalness of the responses though can be seen as a common feature. Most were either one of the following:

1. Non-Political
2. Anti-Political
3. Apolitical
4. Political Per Se

Non-Political

These replies centered on the problems in governing backward people. Within this sphere there is both the cynical and educational positions. The cynical is mirrored by a middle-aged female social worker who asserted that Jamaica was always a peaceful place when it was run by the English, but that now the blacks rule or attempt to rule, there is chaos.

The educational position is illustrated by the young female, middle class schoolteacher who points to the high illiteracy rate among Jamaicans. She sees them, hence, as being open to rumor and

manipulation by powerful or power-seeking individuals. She asserts that the common man is too often non-verbal and unable to grasp complex ideas; therefore, he is ready to accept what a political authority figure says to be the truth.

She scores the poor state of education in Jamaica today despite recent progress. In rural areas, she teaches in the country, children are often late for school due to the long distances they must travel on foot if they cannot hitch a ride. By the time they arrive in class they often drop off to sleep.

Anti-Political

This attitude points to a certain hypocrisy in the official crackdown on crime. A young, male Kingston factory worker crystallizes this position. First, though, let's hear his description of the turmoil in early summer, 1976.

They fight in the night. Old busses blockade the streets. They stay up all night armed with sticks and machetes, and are fed by the local merchants for protecting their businesses. Passwords are sometimes used to cross certain areas.

This individual did not live in the slums where the fighting was taking place, but in a lower-middle class area. He had to cross the troubled areas, though, on his way to work. He says that the women on the job told him that the password for the area through which he had to cross and in which some of them lived was, "I man under heavy manners."

All in the morning on my way to work, someone may yell out, "Who's that?" I just say, "Manners!", and keep on going.

In any case, this same individual asserts that:

The main cause of the problem in Jamaica is money. People not working. Crime is directed by the rich people. The police never curfew and search the rich areas. The little Notty Dreads (Rasta types) they catch in town are little men, but they are afraid to curfew the rich areas. Why? Because they are afraid they may offend someone. You see in order to get on the police or into the army, you have to have a sponsor. Perhaps if they were to go into the rich areas, they'd offend their (benefactors)...

Someone with money finances the gun or gives them the knowledge of how to make guns... Take all even a bank robbery. The common man isn't (sophisticated) enough to plan the robbery and spend the money without being caught. Often (It's an inside job) perhaps even the bank manager is involved. The man who commits the robbery is just a pawn.

Apolitical

This view expresses the fears of the middle class in the changing Jamaican situation. The middle aged, suburban housewife provides an example with her response to the question, "What is the problem in Jamaica?"

Jamaica used to be such a nice place. I used to go to the Carib (moviehouse) all the time, but now there is a different class of people there. I'm afraid to go...I hear there are Rastas in the field (referring to an unused piece of open land near her house. She is saying that Rastafarians are squatting there). You know that Rastas are not

that bad though. Sometimes they come up to the back fence and ask to borrow salt. They are very polite. I remember the time I was on a crowded bus and a Rasta kept telling me to watch out for the opening and closing door. Everytime the bus would stop, he'd hold me so I wouldn't be hit or fall out. You know, not in any sort of "fresh" way. I remember the time another Rasta helped me with my packages in the supermarket and wouldn't take any money for it...

Political Per Se

This category contains the bulk of my responses. Those who gave another response also often gave a political response as well. This category includes those who blame one or both of the political parties for the current turmoil.

1. The PNP is to blame.
2. The JLP is to blame.
3. Both parties are responsible.

The PNP is to Blame!

A black college student and a well-to-do, mulatto, elderly gentleman provide examples of the perspective that pillories the PNP for the current turmoil.

(Elderly man) ... The JLP needs to come back because now the majority rules and they give no one else (presumably the better-off) a chance. Whereas, there wasn't all this trouble when the JLP was in power... (Earlier he had described how his home was firebombed two years ago.)

(College student)... the JLP was developing the country along sound lines. They had great plans for further development, but Michael (the Prime Minister) discarded them when he came to power in 1972, and look at the economy now. Take the sugar industry for example; in 1972 the JLP was moving to mechanize the industry so that it could be competitive on the world market. But Michael stopped that and said we had to employ the unemployed on the estates. Now look at the sugar industry. The whole thing 'mash up,' and Jamaica is way behind the other producing countries. Look at (Leader of Opposition). He was Finance Minister in the sixties. He will put the country back on its feet, and end the turmoil caused by joblessness when/if he is elected.

The JLP is to Blame!

Those who are pro-PNP and anti-JLP see the Opposition as the cause of the current conflict. Their cause is cogently stated by a black graduate student and a black bureaucrat.

(Graduate student)... The JLP and the PNP have historically employed the class antagonisms in Jamaica. However, today the PNP has currently come to encompass the progressive forces in the society including the Communist party. The JLP, as a result, is destabilizing the country because they see most of the people, perhaps a permanent majority, moving into the ranks of the PNP.

(Bureaucrat, upper-middle class)... I think this (Leader of the Opposition) has gotten together with each of the big boys and said, "Look, this is the way things are going and your only hope is to back me, and see if we can't turn this situation around." He's a whiz at finance, you know. And I believe he's behind most of this dirty business.

Both Parties are to Blame!

Many of those quizzed, at least half, felt that both parties are to blame for Jamaica's problems. They felt that politics was the cause of the problems. Cabdrivers, factory workers, farmers, etc., all expressed this position. Also, many people who had voiced other reasons for the current situation also included this one.

For examples unlike the other positions, I will not provide the words of a respondent to my open-ended, informal survey. Rather, I will provide the comments contained in two letters to the Editor of the Jamaica Daily Gleaner and the observations of a columnist.

(First letter)... Violence in Jamaica will remain with us like a cancer gnawing in the core of our body politic so long as politicians continue to maintain their own private armies to achieve political ends.

The Gun Court does not deter these individuals because they are above the law, and are protected by certain law enforcing agencies. Newspapers and other media for public information cannot investigate the facts, and are effectively silenced by our antiquated laws of libel. The democracy which National Heroes fought to achieve is now a jungle where bullets and not ballots are the determining factors. Our politicians must learn that once a pact is made with the devil, this monstrous association cannot be shunned, for the denizens of the underworld know too many dark and sinister secrets. (Daily Gleaner, April 12, 1976.)

(Second letter)... It is really interesting when one starts asking questions. How is it that the excessive criminal activity of the past few

months was so subdued during this period (referring to the Commonwealth heads of Government meeting in Jamaica in May, 1975)? Are professional criminals so politically aware that they would attempt to control themselves during this ten-day period when the world has its eyes on us? Were they concerned about embarrassing the government?

It is apparent that certain politicians do control the criminal activists, but conveniently, and in fact, many of their violent activities are not only political but outright criminal. It is obvious that criminal elements are attached to the political parties in Jamaica. But the key question is, which side is now in control? (Daily Gleaner, May 25, 1975)

(Editorial by a columnist)... Where groups of people move around in an organized manner, it should be easy for the police to apprehend them. Individual operators can, to some extent, move around with ease, but not so dozens of people (as in the Orange Street Massacre and the attack on the Political Office, for example). The police force is apparently helpless in handling what seems to be a comparatively easy operation...It baffles me that a gang of bandits can move and do their dirty work, and then disappear into thin air... It is time for both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition to put some meaning to the many vocal expressions of their sincerity to end politically organized violence, by exposing members of their respective parties who are organizing these bandits and murderers. (Daily Gleaner, June 20, 1976.)

CONCLUSION

A few weeks before this writing on December 15, 1976, the government of Michael Manley and the People's National Party won another five year term at the polls. They won an overwhelming majority of the seats in Parliament (45 out of 60). It is being said that the people of Jamaica have spoken, and as if with one voice they are proclaiming support for the PNP and its democratic socialism. Many observers feel that Jamaica's socio-politico-economic ills are now on their way to being solved as a result. I think not.

In these pages we have seen a long list of pseudo-solutions to Jamaica's problems. We have recounted many supposed "turning points" in the course of Jamaican History. They included:

Abolition of Slavery	1838
Internal self-rule	1944
Independence	1962
Manley's First Victory	1972
The Gun Court Law	1974
Decl. of a State of Emergency	1976
(and now) Manley's 2nd Victory	1976

After each there has been great euphoria and rejoicing which evaporated soon after. We note that as of late the "solutions" have been coming fast and furious.

We have examined one of the above in-depth in this paper, namely the Gun Court Law. It is a curious experiment in punishment

being that it embodies the custodial innovation of swift and universal punishment for a particular crime that of firearms possession; while also containing the rehabilitational innovation of a Review Board (in effect a Commission on Sentencing) to determine the length of punishment.

We have noted that the Gun Court, even at the height of its effectiveness, only served to cut down on the amount of shooting crimes but had no effect on the underlying murder rate. In this connection it was observed that the gun as opposed to the knife has some special qualities besides its lethal nature. For one thing its possession by large numbers of lower class, lumpen individuals poses a potential threat to State power. Also, it is more feared by middle class people because of its longer range.

We considered political motives as a root cause of the current turmoil and noted that political machinations and skirmishing between local bands of respective party "goons" may be responsible for some of the shooting. However, it appears that political violence, which always existed in Jamaica, may itself be changing with the changing nature of crime and society over time. The real cause of crime, we felt, was the increasing urban poverty (unemployment, inflation, overpopulation and decreasing migration were good indicators of this), the Ghettoization Process

Poverty and crime in New York is not a national problem for America. However, poverty and crime in Kingston is such a problem for the Jamaican nation. The reason being that New York

despite its prodigious size is swallowed up in the huge mass that is America. Not so Kingston with respect to Jamaica, since it contains about a third of Jamaica's population. The rise in crime in Western Kingston bodes ill for the island as a whole. I say this because Kingston is the only real metropolitan and cultural center on the island and unsafe streets in Kingston mean unsafe streets in Jamaica. There is also the fact that the poor, the dispossessed and the violent in Kingston are residing in the capital, the seat of power, and thus threaten the established order.

In any case, as far as the possibility of having a Gun Court-type of law in America is concerned, I think it would meet the same fate it met in Jamaica, failure. (This is what has happened to the N.Y. Drug Law.) America also being a "democracy" the critics of such a measure could not be silenced. Wishing them away would not work, nor could they be stopped in the courts. Opposition to the measure would even be stiffer in America than it was in Jamaica. The latter's penal system was more stern to begin with. There is no parole on the island and capital punishment is still practiced.

The law would succeed in America, however, if the mood of the country shifted, as far as personal rights or crime is concerned. This could be occasioned by a depression-induced crime wave of mammoth proportions. In such a case, personal rights would go by the wayside in the mad rush to protect the lives and the property of the well-to-do, and to preserve "respect for law

and order". Many of the impoverished themselves would no doubt be found in the forefront of this effort. All of this would put America into an analagous situation to the one Jamaica is in today.

She is wracked by poverty. The mild recession we are feeling in America is hitting her, as it does most third-world countries (and the pockets of poverty in America) with the sledgehammer blows of a depression. As a result, when the first Gun Court Law was opposed by the Jamaica Labour Party and the Jamaican Bar Association, a second even harsher one was drawn up to replace it. A State of Emergency was declared. The JLP was defeated at the polls, and the critics of the Gun Court and the State of Emergency were swept aside, unheeded.

I agree with the minister quoted in the Opinions Section who declared, "There is a situation of static emergency developing in Jamaica." At first there was one detention center and a thirty-day declaration of a State of Emergency. Now there are several detention centers, and there have been several extensions of the State of Emergency. (It has so far been over 300 days that it has been in effect.)

Even the best of men succumb to the allure of power. The Minister of Justice has declared that he does not politically interfere with the police. "When they want to do a cordon or a search, and they bring me the warrant, I sign it." (Daily Gleaner, June 18, 1976.) Is that necessarily the best policy? Already there have been reports of police and soldiers having shootouts,

over ostensibly petty arguments. Perhaps they are showing the after-effects of the heady drink of power. Have they become raucous in their dominance? There are other reports of the defense forces abusing the poorer citizens in the ghettos.

Returning to the larger picture, we note that despite their harshening rhetoric the JLP-PNP still dominate the society. Yes, there have been riots and arson attacks, but always it is the poor against the poor for the sake of the hierarchy of the two parties. The class riots of the sixties have become the party struggles of the seventies. The lumpen have been dissuaded from fighting for the poor and seduced with favors and money to war on each other and control the poor for the parties (See Appendix).

But what will happen now? Now that the election is over can the lumpen gangs beat their pistols into plowshares or lunch pails? There is no work in any case. Jamaica's crucial problem, as we have herein seen time and time again, is not the super-structural, political one but the underlying, substructural economic one. The PNP has been spending to maintain the poor, but she can no longer. The international lending institutions and the metropolitan banks are demanding "austerity measures" for further loans or the refinancing of the old ones, and she must comply.

Meanwhile, the "political wars" being over for the time being each party must "demobilize" its gun-toting adherents, but what will these individuals do then. I suggest that they

will do full-time what they were previously doing on a part-time basis; namely, sticking up the citizenry.

This will bring us back full circle to the point where the Gun Court "solution" was introduced, rampant violent crime. There will no doubt be another "solution" introduced to go along with the Gun Court and the State of Emergency, and Jamaica will have gone another step towards becoming a police state, keeping in step with the current fashion of fascism in the third world.

APPENDIX

Jamaica's Future: The Paths of Violence, Millenarianism,
Revolution From Above by the Left,
Revolution From Above by the Right,
Revolution From Below

Miscellaneous: Censorship, Raid on a Movie Theatre

PATHS OF VIOLENCE

Revolution From Above	Revolution From Below	Millenarianism
<p>From the left - A Castro-backed PNP declaration of a dictatorship with nationalization of foreign holdings and seizure of all idle land.</p> <p>From the Right - an American (CIA)-backed JLP and Jamaican bourgeoisie seizure of power with a resulting right-wing dictatorship.</p>	<p>Can/Will be precipitated by the elimination of featherbedding and "austere" economic measures, and/or a concerted official attack aimed at eliminating youthful lumpen gang members in the cities.</p>	<p>A retreat into passive acceptance of economic hardships will occur if there is a resurgence of Rastafarian-like cults that seek redress of grievances in the next world or by Repatriation to Africa.</p>

Jamaica in the near future will be traveling along one of these paths unless she is able to create a healthy economy, redistribute the wealth and end the political bickering. If she can do all this, she will also be a model of third world development. However, it is unlikely that she will escape the modernization process unscathed. In this section we will flesh out the above possibilities and provide the ingredients for and the likelihood of each.

1. Revolution from above by the left.
2. Revolution from above by the right.
3. Revolution from below.
4. Millenarianism

BLACK LIBERATION
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
THE ELUSIVE GOAL

UNITED STATES	JAMAICA	AFRICA
- Slavery (1600's)	- Slavery (1600's)	- Colonization (1800's)
- Abolition (1865)	- Abolition (1838)	- Independence (1950's)
- Constitutional Amendments and Civil Rights Laws (1870-1968)	- Internal Rule (1938) - Independence (1962)	
- Agitation to End Racism (1964+)	- Agitation to overthrow the "neo-colon." regime (1959+)	- Agitation to overthrow "neo-colonial" regimes
- Eventual Revolution?	- Eventual Revolution?	-Eventual Revolution?

The above is an attempt to place political moves in Jamaica in a world-wide perspective. Note that the category Independence in Jamaica actually had three parts: first, agitation against British rule from 1938-43; second, the granting of internal self-government in 1944; and finally Independence in 1962. (Even today though Jamaica is still a member of the Commonwealth.)

1. "Rasta, 'rude boy' and Black Power advocate each represented at different points in the troublous days of the sixties active responses to a milieu of social and economic disinheritance." These are the three main protagonists who have been agitating for change in Jamaica since the sixties. I will now describe the first of these Rastafarianism, and the millenarianism that they embody.

The following discussion will center around four major objectives:

1. To enumerate the principle Rastafarian beliefs and to illustrate how they lead the Rastas into conflict with the wider Jamaican society.
2. A presentation of data on their numbers, location and material conditions.
3. To show that the Rastafarians are but the latest in a long standing Jamaican religio-political tradition of Deliverers.
4. To show that the Rasta movement as a political (as opposed to a cultural) force flourished and died in the decade of the sixties.

MILLENARIANISM

Rastafarian Precepts

The main Rastafarian precepts are the belief in African Redemption, the divinity of Hailie Selassie, the idea that black is good, and white is wicked; also they hold Marcus Garvey to be a prophet. The cornerstone of the Rasta faith is that Jamaica is not their true home; Africa is, specifically Ethiopia.

They believe that the Emperor of Ethiopia, Hailie Selassie, was the personification of God despite his denials. They even believed him to be immortal, and had a difficult time rationalizing his death. Now it is believed that he is alive in heaven. All of this may seem ridiculous, but many religions have parallel notions including Christianity.

The reason for the prominence of Ethiopia and the pre-eminence of Sellasie (Ras Tafari being the title of the uncrowned king of the Ethiopian line which is what Selassie was in the thirties) is that the original Rastas were ex-Garveyites, and Garvey had preached that the Black man must return to Africa. At the time the Ethiopians were fighting to maintain their independence from the Italian encroachment. They were the only country in Africa never to be colonized and their kings claim direct descent from King David of Israel. (The wild hair style of the Rastafarians called "dread locks" is an imitation of the coiffure of the ancient Ethiopian warriors.)

They reverse the typical antipathy for things black in Western society by asserting that black is good and white is

bad. However, as Nettleford in Mirror, Mirror: Race Class and Identity in Jamaica notes, this belief is tempered by the strongly Judeo-Christian antecedents of the movement which at least leaves room for dialogue. Even the most militant of them are thus able to enter into accommodations with the society they challenge. However, these precepts, as we can see below, do in some ways clearly clash with those held by the wider society.

Contrasting Perspectives: The Rastafarians vs. the Status Quo

1. The Rasta view of Ethiopia as home vs. Jamaican nationalism.
2. The allied notion that Jamaica is a functionally black society vs. the official perspective of multi-racialism.
3. Repatriation as the remedy for the Rastas vs. a 1960 University of the West Indies Report that rehabilitation is what the Rastas need.
4. The emphasis on individual rights vs. the wider society's stressing of law and order.

As examples of the last point, note that the Rasta view ganja as a sacrament, and believe that a man should never comb his hair, but that he should keep it matted with wax and growing wildly. The former is an outright violation of the criminal law of Jamaica, the latter a gross violation of etiquette.

5. Their belief that to work in "Babylon" is oppressing for the "true Israelites" vs. the wider society's puritanical ideal of work for work's sake.¹

It is quite likely, though, that this belief is merely a rationalization of the chronically high unemployment rate in Kingston which is where they are heavily concentrated. Many feel that if the employment picture in Kingston were to change significantly, not only would most of them welcome the opportunity to work, but that much of the appeal of the Rastafarian movement itself would vanish.²

Their Numbers, Location and Condition

The 1960 University of the West Indies study found that the slum belts in West Kingston had a good percentage of Rastas and their sympathizers (15-70,000 Rastas in 1960). Many had inadequate shelter, no electricity, no sewage and little water. At the time, there was hardly any government assistance to these areas.³

Since then, a government survey in Trench Town, one of the better-off shanty areas, discovered "the facilities available... leave a great deal to be desired, judging by any standard of civilized living." There was 29% unemployment among heads of households and 13% of those who worked, worked six months or less the previous year.⁴ The following is an excerpt from the essay, "Peace and Love," by Heather Royes. The excerpt is from a passage in which Rastafarian tells of his childhood and how he and his brothers and sisters had to fend for themselves, even having to find food on their own.

Seven of us to feed and couldn't stop. As she get up, she gone (the mother who worked as a housekeeper). Understand that we had to roam the Trench Pen and shoot bird in a grave. Yes.. you just take your slingshot and bop down a dove and take him and pick him. You don't have a condensed pan with oil, you know. You wash out the first one you see and put him in there to fry in his own fat. You know what with? A piece of paper... Sometimes we work miracles with hot stones and make the paper to light. We don't have any matches, you hear...⁵

Rex Nettleford feels that the Rastafarian movement is not such a strange white elephant as it may appear on first glance. He points to Jamaica's "strong tradition of religiosity": missionaries before and after slavery, the Great Revival of the 1960's, the Pocomonia cult, Spiritualists like Alexander Bedward, secular counterparts of the prophets such as Garvey, J.A.G. Smith, Bustamante, etc., "The Jamaican environment of want had always thrown up the cry for deliverers... and the Rastas could be seen as yet another variant of the recurring phenomenon in Jamaican life."⁶

Turning to Eaton and his work, Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica, we can gain a perspective on Bustamante, and see how this particular political deliverer's approach contrasted with some of the other "saviors" mentioned above. Unlike Bedward and Garvey, who promised Salvation for their followers in the next life, Bustamante "translated his concern for the oppressed and black populace into mundane and practical action which would improve their material and spiritual well-being here and now." He encouraged workers to unite and strike for higher pay and better working conditions.⁷

During the political agitation of the thirties and forties, Bustamante and Norman Manley (father of the current Prime Minister) were working as a team; the former handling the union side of the movement, the latter the political side. In time the two men split over the issue of who would wield supreme power, and they went on to form two distinct party-union blocs that have endured until the present.

This consequently watered down the effectiveness of the drive for Jamaican independence. In time (1962) complete political independence was gained. However, it soon proved of little benefit to the masses without its concomittant economic independence. As a result:

Ever since the Rastafarian rumblings of the late fifties, the country is standing with a lighted match over a powder keg and the dynamic interplay between those who hold political power and the deprived Rastas who question the legitimacy and use of that power, resulted from the knowledge that all was far from well in the society at large. "Rasta, Rude Boy, and Black Power advocate each represented at different points in the troublous days of the sixties, active responses to a milieu of social and economic disinheritance."⁸

In other words, the upward progress of Jamaican nationalism was stalled after Independence with the achievement of political hegemony. From then on it became apparent to many in the masses (notably the Rastas) that the two party system had organized squabbling blocs of black workers about largely brown party hierarchies. The middle class entrepreneurs, politicians and civil servants were reaping the benefits of Independence,

political independence, and what galled many of the little people at the bottom is that they failed to gain anything in an economic sense.⁹

Nettleford sees the Rastafarian movement as a reassertion of the "Black Essence" that had originally powered the struggle for independence in the thirties. He sees the Rastas are a barometer of the social and economic pressures of the lower class. "The masses threw up the Rastas who reinforce their "moral" position by a strongly religious dynamic, giving their movement a momentum and force which was easily conceived as a threat to the society it sought to change."¹⁰

Turning to the Chart, "Focus on Black Liberation in Jamaica" at the beginning of this section, we see that the Rastafarians, and others, in the sixties, challenged the power structure that they and the rest of the masses brought to power in the thirties, but which now to many appears unsatisfactory, to say the least.

The Repatriation Issue

As we have pointed out, the Rastafarians vocalized the growing disillusionment of the mass of blacks in Jamaica with the Jamaican nationalist movement. The granting of independence in 1962 did not allay their apprehensions. According to a Rastafarian self-styled the "Interpreter" who made the following remarks soon after Independence:

Jamaica is independent. Yet English customs and laws and instructions still lead us. The white queen still rules (Jamaica remained in the Commonwealth). The Black Governor-General

is but her representative. How much voice do we have in saying what laws will pass at Gordon House (site of the Jamaican Parliament)? As far as I am concerned, politics was not the black man's lot, but the white man's plot.¹¹

The Rastafarians wanted no part of the "Jamaican nation". What they sought was Repatriation to Ethiopia the "black man's vine and fig tree." They root their Redemption dynamic in the Scattering, the Exile, the Return as recorded and prophesied in the Bible's Old Testament. They see themselves as one of the lost tribes of Israel and Jamaica as their Babylon, Ethiopia their Zion.

The visit of the Emperor Hailie Selassie of Ethiopia to Jamaica in 1966 pointed up the weakness of Jamaican nationalism. Tens of thousands of Jamaicans greeted this alien leader in a more spontaneous, sincere and heartwarming manner than they had ever greeted any Jamaican leader.¹²

The Daily Gleaner "in its role as formulator and articulator of the formidable Jamaican middle class opinion" criticized the Rastafarians for being unpatriotic and not wanting to stay and build a better Jamaica. Apparently, the Gleaner sees black nationalism as being bad for Jamaican nationalism, but can the Rastas really be called unpatriotic for wanting to migrate.¹³

As we have seen, throughout Jamaican history there has been a continual process of migration, as a response to poverty and intolerable living conditions at home, to more lucrative sources of employment in the world of capital. Even the Rasta's destination, Africa, is not new. There are thousands of Jamaicans, mainly professionals and missionaries, in West Africa.

The Rastas in the Sixties: From Militance to Acquiescence

When the Rastafarian movement first became widespread in the early sixties, there were, in addition to numerous minor confrontations, arrests and harrassment, mainly over the smoking or possession of ganja, three major incidents of violence.

Claudius Henry - self-styled "God's Anointed, Anointed Prophet and Repairer of the Breach," had issued thousands of tickets for a shilling a piece for a Return Trip to Africa that had been scheduled for October 15, 1959. He was arrested and given a suspended sentence.

Six months later, a police raid on his headquarters found detonators, a shotgun, 18 sticks of dynamite and a great quantity of two-edged machetes. He and 14 members of his congregation were charged and convicted of breaches of the fire-arms law and with treason felony (the first such charge issued in Jamaica in a hundred years, not since the Morant Bay slave rebellion). He received a ten-year sentence.

Red Hills Incident - On June 21, 1960, there was a violent confrontation between the police and some Rastas upon discovery of an arms cache in Red Hills near Kingston. Two soldiers were killed and five men hijacked a van and escaped. The Daily Gleaner "in a conciliatory mood" appealed to the "largely friendly... elements which comprise the large majority of cultists groups to show their oneness with the community at large and their disapproval of any philosophy of violence."

Two days later it was reported that a group of Black Americans, or Jamaicans long resident in the U.S., led by Claudius Henry's son had come to enlist the support of Rastas in "a definite plan to foment disorder."

On the 26th of the month, three Rastas were found dead in a grave and were believed to have been shot, either by or on orders of the Americans. This last point tended to feed the notion of their being a highly organized guerilla group. However, the four Americans were caught the following week. During the search for them, there had been numerous charges of police brutality by the Rastas.

Coral Gardens Incident - occurred on Holy Thursday 1963, and was the worst of the three incidents. A group of "bearded men" attacked a gas station at Coral Gardens ten miles from Montego Bay, killing the attendant, and advanced to a nearby motel, killing a guest and fleeing into the hills where they attacked an overseer's house. On the arrival of the police, a skirmish developed. In the end, eight persons were killed, including two policemen. Three cultists were held for murder, but soon, 150 Rastas were arrested in four parishes on a variety of charges.¹⁴

The expectation of the millenium was reinforced by the incidents of Claudius Henry, Red Hills and Coral Gardens and the reactions of the government and the police were endowed the eschatological significance." In other words, they have become a part of the Rastafarian tradition and have been interpreted in light of the Redemption.¹⁵

All of the above remain in the Rasta tradition in the very real sense that they typify past Rasta behavior, their earlier militance. Today, they are much more acquiescent. They are no longer known for their armed violence, but for their reggae music. How did the Rastas become "acceptable"?

Assimilation or Cooptation?

In 1960, the University of West Indies was commissioned by the Government to do a study on the Rastafarian Movement. The report received some criticism from the wider society for being too conciliatory. However, it exploded the popular myths that the Rastas were a group of lunatics and criminals, and also served as a palliative for the explosive situation at the time.¹⁶ In reality the Report helped to co-opt or conventionalize the Rasta Movement.

It recommended that the government explore the possibilities for Repatriation, but that the main effort should be put into rehabilitation: low rent houses, self-help cooperatives, and civic centers to be sponsored by welfare groups or service clubs. The Jamaica government did make a modest effort along these lines.

However, the report and its implementation in and of itself did not tame the Rastas. Another more important factor was the movement's essentially non-activist nature. Rastafarianism sharpened and heightened political alienation among the disaffected urban poor without offering any conception or strategy of local

political struggle. In keeping with the tradition of millenaral cults they assume a fundamentalist posture and allow every individual to claim divine inspiration. For them, there is no leader except the divine Hailie Sellasie (but he denied his divinity and took no active leadership role). "There are several Rasta organizations of one member each."¹⁷

As seen earlier in the Coral Gardens and Red Hills incidents individuals attempted to "cash in" on the movement's political potential by utilizing its ideology and appeals as a basis for mounting premature violent challenge against the established dominant groups."¹⁸ These premature attempts at rebellion only served to intensify coercion against them.

The government employed a "carrot and stick" approach towards the Rastafarians. There was a prolonged period of legal harrassment through arbitrary arrests, beatings and heavy prison sentences. At the same time in addition to a modest effort at housing reform, there were "attempts by the government to co-opt the movement by promoting dialogue between Ethiopia and the local movement, finally transforming the political direction in which the movement sought its survival."¹⁹

Subsequently, a strong chapter of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was set up in Jamaica. This signalled the Jamaicanization of the African thrust of the movement. The Church tended to absorb the energies of the Rastas in religious and cultural activities "the expansion of which required political accommodation rather than resistance towards the status quo." The Ethiopian Orthodox Church filled the movement's organizational void.


After the depoliticization of the Rastafarian movement, its art, music and other cultural symbols suddenly acquired legitimacy. However, "the price of attaining middle class respectability has been the emasculation of the political potential of the movement as a source of challenge to the dominant party coalitions."²⁰

If the percentage of Rastas were to increase dramatically, I would expect Jamaican society to become more passive. We would not expect violent protests by the disadvantaged. However, I feel the numbers of Rastafarians are not likely to increase. They have lost their appeal to the disaffected urban poor and have been replaced as spokesmen for this segment of the population by first the "Rude Boys" and then by the Black Power Advocates.

The Possibilities of a Revolution From Below

After the last section, one is likely to ask two questions. Why is it that the percentage of Rastas will probably not increase dramatically in Jamaican society? What is the difference between a "hard" and a "soft-core" Rasta? To begin our answer, we must turn once again to Stone's Race, Class and Political Behavior in Urban Jamaica. In Figure 18, Occupational Strata and Attitudes Towards Rastafarian Movement, we note that the Rastas have significant support within the working and lower classes. Stone feels though that "to the extent, however, that the movement continues to develop towards religious, cultural and apolitical emphasis, this mass support will have very little relevance to future patterns of mass political resistance beyond the movement's historical role in crystallizing racial attitudes."²¹ (underlining added)

FIGURE 18

OCCUPATIONAL STRATA AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS
RASTAFARIAN MOVEMENT

1 = Big Business; 2 = Professionals; 3 = Small Business; 4 = White Collar; 5 = Self-employed Artisans; 6 = Blue Collar; 7 = Lower Class

Above we have graphically portrayed the percentage of each occupational class exhibiting support for the Rastafarian movement. It appears as though the lower one's occupational strata the more likely one is to look favorably upon the Rastafarian movement.

We note a sharp increase in the percentage of supporters in moving from the propertied to the propertyless classes. Big Businessmen, Professionals and Small Businessmen have much less support for the "Brethern" than do the White Collar, Artisan and Blue Collar classes. The lower class which is not merely propertyless, but in a sense dispossessed, displays another quantum increase in support for the Rastas.

The Rastas have had a history of inspiring sympathizers, imitators of their beliefs and traditions. These people are what I would term "soft-core" Rastafarians. Just as the Rastas have been inspired by Garvey and others, they, in turn are inspiring the Rude Boys, the middle class Jamaican equivalent of the American hippies, and the Black Power advocates, as well as the violent lumpen youth of today. The reason I feel the Rastas are not likely to increase in number is that in a sense, they are anachronistic, having had their heyday in the early and middle sixties. Their "offspring" are currently the main characters on the stage of political conflict.

The Rude Boys

Were the first such "offspring." As we saw earlier, the ratchet knife was their tool, crime their trade. They made their appearance in the mid 1960's among the youth "from the lower 60% of the population that shares 19% of the national income." They employed violence against one another until they "acquired a higher consciousness." In the words of one of them:

It is not the suffering brother you should really stick-up. It's these big merchants that have all these twelve places and living into apartments... with the whole heap of different luxury facilities... We are no longer going to hold up our brothers and sisters because they haven't got what we really want. What we really want is this equal rights and justice. Every man have a good living condition, good schooling, and then I feel things will be much better as long as we get this right of equality.²²

Nettleford observes that the alienated youth tended to align themselves with the Rastas and viewed them as mentors:

...passing their time away in euphoric escape by the smoking of ganja and in bitter contemplation of the inherent injustice of social system which threatens to keep the Black Jamaican forever at the base of society... They shared Rasta beliefs and practices and meandered quite comfortably between the religious escapism of repatriation Rastas and the secular materialistic anarchy of the rudie youth.²³

Black Power

Black Power in Jamaica paralleled the rise and fall of its mentor in America. In a sense, one could say that the Jamaican Black Power adherents were also like the Rudies "soft-core" Rastas. However, their beliefs were more realistically conceived and articulated. Through the radical newspaper, Abeng, they helped to seriously advance the development of mass political awareness. In Figure 19 we see that like the Rastas, they had a significant following in the lower classes. In Table 3 Skin Color and Attitudes Towards Black Power and the Rastafarians,^{*} it becomes apparent that both these groups' support in the blue-collar class comes more heavily from the blacks than the browns and that even in the white-collar class, they have sizeable support among those who are black.

* See also Figure 19, Occupational Strata and Attitudes Towards Black Power.


TABLE 5SKIN COLOR AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS BLACK POWER
AND RASTAFARIANS

	Percent Antagonistic Black Power and Rastafari	Percent Supportive of Either Black Power or Rastafari	Percent Supporting Both Black Power and Rastafari
<u>White Collar</u>			
Brown	85	10	5
Black	<u>64</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>12</u>
% Difference	21	14	7
<u>Blue Collar</u>			
Brown	75	19	6
Black	<u>59</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>14</u>
% Difference	16	8	8

Above we have presented the percentages antagonistic towards Black Power and Rastafarianism, the percentages supportive of either of the two, and the percentages supportive of both according to class and skin color.

Focussing on the middle column, we conclude that there is slightly more support for either Black Power or Rastafarianism in the blue collar than in the white collar class. Also, in both classes the black-skinned group has a larger percentage than the brown-skinned group in favor of either Black Power or the Rastas. Lastly, the cleavage between brown and black on this issue is less pronounced in blue collar class as opposed to the white collar.

Therefore, it appears as though both color and class determine one's position on supporting either Black Power or Rastafarianism. Furthermore, it seems as though occupational class is a stronger determinant in this regard than is color.

FIGURE 19OCCUPATIONAL STRATA AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS
BLACK POWER

1 = Big Business; 2 = Professionals; 3 = Small Business; 4 = White Collar; 5 = Self-employed Artisans; 6 = Blue Collar; 7 = Lower Class

In the graph above we have the percentage of each occupational class who approve of the concept Black Power. We note a similar pattern as in the preceding case. The lower one's class the more likely one is to approve of Black Power just as

one is more likely to be supportive of the Rastafarian Movement (See Figure 18). However, there are two differences between the two graphs.

First, there is not the same huge incremental leap between the percentages of the propertied classes (Big Businessmen, Professionals and Small Businessmen) supporting Black Power and the percentages of the propertyless classes (White Collar, Artisans, and Blue Collar) doing the same. In the preceding case concerning support for the Rastas you will recall there was a huge gap between the propertied and the propertyless in their support.

In this graph we note instead a general pattern of tiny increments of support going up the occupational ladder. The two exceptions to this rule being the lower class and the Big Businessmen.

As in the previous instance the Lower Class (or dispossessed class) supports Black Power with a large quantum increase over the next higher class. However, Big Businessmen exhibit a 0% approving of Black Power, consequently, there is a huge gap in support between Big Businessmen and the other propertied classes on this issue. What can explain this?

The Rastafarians have cultural as well as economic goals. The Black Power advocates, however, are almost exclusively concerned with property relations their chief adversary, or bogeyman, being the propertied whites and near-whites specifically those in control of the economy. Hence, it is no surprise that we have this huge chasm between the Big Business class and the other classes with respect to support for Black Power, a phenomenon which is not present in the previous graph of Support for the Rastafarians.

Also, the higher the class the larger the percentage supporting the police. This pattern is interrupted in two instances: among the self-employed artisans and the small businessmen. These two cases interrupt the smooth downward slope of this curve. The obvious question is why? One possible answer is that both artisans and small businessmen are likely to have little shops that serve the public. They are vulnerable to stick-ups and shoplifting, therefore, they may see the police favorably because of their role as crime fighters. Note that small businessmen, artisans and professionals (likely to include a large number of doctors and lawyers with private practices, offices open to the public and targets of robberies) all exhibit the same 90% support for the police.

The Big Business class displays nearly 100% support obviously because the police are the guarantors of stability and the status quo. They insure the continuance of the present property relations, and therefore we would expect this class, the ruling class, to support them totally.

Membership in Black Power Movement.

Here we are speaking of not simply supporters but advocates, the Black Power "hard-core". They are comprised of four main types: traditional Africanists, that is old Garveyites, and Rastafarians, young and lower middle class persons recently evolved from urban or rural poverty, some in the more established middle class, exhibiting a "brown built," young intellectuals. This last group supplied the main contributors to the Abeng.

As do the Rastas, they turn to Garvey for "ideological strength and sustenance." They are acquainted with Marx and Marcuse and with the progress of Black Studies in America and "know the language of confrontation." Their intellectual critique of Jamaican society is in a sense an extension of the work of others like M.G. Smith and Elsa Goveia.²⁴

The Abeng was regarded as the official organ of the Black Power Movement in Jamaica. It didn't quite last two years, 1968-1970. It broke up because of "police harrassment, financial problems, weak organization, and sharp ideological differences." Its aim was to preach to "the already converted rather than effectively changing the reactionaries, the apathetic and the very power structure."²⁵

Their verbal offensive was concerned with the "big problems," mainly foreign, white, capitalist penetration and control of the economy of the island. However, the local big Jewish and Chinese entrepreneurs received their share of the flack. But the thorny, closer to hand problems that blacks would have to overcome

to emulate the success of the Jews and the Chinese were skirted, felt Nettleford. Problems such as curbing illegitimacy, seeking out non-white collar jobs, and dulling the memory of their proverbial castration by slavery.²⁶

The main thesis of Abeng and the Black Power movement, if not of all the protest movements in Jamaica, is that the nation has achieved political independence, but has yet to gain hegemony in its economic sphere.

Black Power's Critique of the Jamaican Economy

Their critique of Multi-racialism exhibits more coherence than that of the Rastas. They see not only the folly of a two-party system that pits black against black for brown leaders, but they go further and point out the weakness and divisiveness of the concomittant split trade union movement. They envision it as perpetrating the traditional confrontation of slave, now worker, with master, now capitalist, in a "tidy system of checks and balances."²⁷

This, they claim, increases wages through the game of Collective Bargaining. However, the blacks still do not control. They have no share in its ownership. Furthermore, for them, the very trade union gains produce extreme differences in the wage structure between unionized and non-union workers, breeding frustration and discontent (and violence). There is bitter rivalry between unionized and non-union workers and frequent violence. A recent attack on construction workers in the heart of Kingston in the middle of the day is typical:

The men say they are unionized workers who reported to the construction site for work Monday morning. Shortly after beginning work, they claimed they were attacked by a group of men who came armed with guns, machetes and knives. The men were reported to have chopped four workers and forced the others to flee for safety.²⁸

Manley and his government, as mentioned in the Introduction, are conscious of this division and refer to it as the two-tiered economy. They have proposed interesting workers in worker control and thereby weaning them away from further wage increases, but it doesn't appear, judging from the continuing rampant inflation, that they have had much success.

Black Power advocates criticize each element in the trinity of major Jamaican industries: bauxite, tourism and sugar. Bauxite: like sugar, has a deleterious effect on the producing country's economic, social and political structure, while also having the further disadvantages of depleting a precious resource and destroying the land.

Tourism: is relatively profitable, and is a means of building up precious foreign reserves, but blacks who participate as workers are put into a subordinate position reminiscent of slave times. (The movie, Smile Orange, portrays this in satiric fashion.)

The sugar industry remains relatively unprofitable, and still is mainly in the hands of foreigners. It has the stigma of slavery on it with the descendants of slaves working the fields and the descendants of the planters and the over-seers running and owning the plantations.²⁹

Black Power and Violence

Jamaica has long had a history of being a "stable" polity; Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies classifies it as moderately so. As of late, that image has been somewhat tarnished, but the political violence that has so far occurred has still been under the rubric of the two-party system, as serious as it may have been, and may yet become.

However, the Black Power movement as a force outside the two-party system, in the late sixties was perceived by the wider society as embodying the threat that the Rastas had a few years prior. As a result, it inherited the "wrath of a populace which still comprises thousands who remember the struggles and the sacrifices of nation-building less than a generation ago." Jamaicans have a commitment to the Westminster model of democracy and are quite conservative, especially in rural areas "peasant and planter class alike."³⁰

(If as many, including Wolfe and Moore, feel that the disgruntled peasant is the key to successful revolution, Jamaica is far from one. The countryside is quiet and if one turns to the city to look for the displaced peasant of the slums, one does find discordance, but it is in the name of the established party-union blocs. The average union worker meanwhile is well-paid, content, some would say co-opted.)

Due to the Jamaican conservative political tradition, violent language from vociferous militants is, hence, interpreted as action, and people are likely to be tried on their intentions rather than their deeds. Police harrassment, brutality against both Rastas and Black Power advocates and others who threaten the status quo, has been implicitly condoned by all sectors of the society. See Figure 20 Occupational Strata and Attitudes Towards the Police.

So the Black Power movement as such tended to fade from the limelight. Apart from factional, ideological differences, police harrassment and the knowledge of the virtual impossibility of mounting a viable third Party challenge against the firmly entrenched union-party bloc of the JLP-BITU and the PNP-NWU also led to its demise.

As in America, the term Black Power is no longer even in vogue. However, before writing off the movement completely, we must credit its doctrines like those of its forerunner, Rastafarianism with having a significant impact on an important urban stratum, namely the lumpenproletariat.

The Lumpen Stratum

Carl Stone speaks of the "rootlessness of men of no fixed address." He tells how they have been unemployed so long that even when, and if, they are ever offered work, they are unable to work. This because they have for so long survived through "petty and organized crime, gambling, prostitution, and trade in

FIGURE 20OCCUPATIONAL STRATA AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS
THE POLICE

1 = Big Business; 2 = Professional; 3 = Small Business; 4 = White Collar; 5 = Self-employed Artisans; 6 = Blue Collar; 7 = Lower Class

Above we see the percentages of each occupational class giving qualified or unqualified approval of the behavior of the Jamaican police. Evidently there is high support among all the occupational strata for the police. This is true of the propertied classes (Big Business, Professionals and Small Business) as well as of the propertyless classes (White Collar, Artisan and Blue Collar). Even the group which I have dubbed the dispossessed (Lower Class) exhibit a majority supporting the Police.

illegal commodities" like ganja and stolen goods.³¹ They subsist in an Underworld Economy. (See Organized Crime Network Part V.)

In severely depressed slum neighborhoods in Kingston and New York and elsewhere, all of these illegal activities dovetail into Underworld Economies and are buttressed by small scale legal retail establishments. As a result, the needs of everyone in the community are taken care of as best as possible and the area becomes somewhat of a self-contained unit.

Stone says the lumpen are not the lower class per se, or even the unemployed per se, but rather "that 10% of the population of Kingston and St. Andrew that is the one-third of the unemployed that has become inured to work." It is characterized by "very low deferment of gratification, unstable and disorganized family patterns, an obsession with sex and interpersonal violence as sources of individual prestige..."³² What about their political philosophy?

The political perspectives of the lumpen represent an eclectic assimilation of Black Power theories, diluted Rastafarian doctrines of racial consciousness, crude ideas of socialism, heightened class consciousness that is antagonistic to both upper and middle classes, and strong feelings of racial hostility towards white, brown, Chinese and other minorities. These radical perspectives are reflected in the lumpen's attitudes towards economic nationalism, whites, multi-racialism, party politics, voting and political violence.³³ See Table 4, Comparative Political Attitudes of the Lumpen-proletariat and Occupational Class and Support for Violence, Figure 21.

TABLE 5A

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF LUMPENPROLETARIAT

	<u>% Hostile to Multi-racialism</u>	<u>% Support- ing Nation- alization of Bauxite</u>	<u>% Hostile to Both Parties</u>	<u>% Hostile to Whites</u>	<u>% Support- ing Vio- lence by the Poor</u>
Lumpenprole- tariat	74	69	63	56	65
Blue Collar	44	42	11	10	11
Lower Class	57	43	21	18	24


N.B. The lumpenproletariat was defined to include all respondents who were not seeking work and had been unemployed indefinitely.

Above we have presented the percentage of the Lumpenproletariat, Blue Collar and Lower Classes Hostile to Multi-racialism, Hostile to the Political Parties and Hostile to Whites and Supporting Nationalization of Bauxite and Supporting Violence by the Poor. The lumpen class is far and away the most radical of these five issues.

Also, on each issue the Lower Class in turn is more radical or extreme than the Blue Collar Class. These findings are to be expected since the Lumpenproletariat is the most poor and the Blue Collar Class the least poor of these three.

FIGURE 21

OCCUPATIONAL CLASS AND SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE



1 = Big Business; 2 = Professionals; 3 = Small Business; 4 = White collar; 5 = Self-employed artisans; 6 = Blue collar; 7 = Lower class

Here is a graphic representation of the percentages of each occupational class supporting violence by the poor. There appears to be somewhat of a direct relationship between occupational class and support for violence to redress social grievances. The lower one's class the more likely he is to exhibit support for violence.

The Big Business and Professional Classes are united at the 0% point on this issue. The other six classes' percentages are found on an upward curve. Note the Lower Class is once again isolated a great distance above the rest.

This is all to be expected since violence threatens the status quo and the secure positions of the Big Businessmen and the Professionals. The closer we get to the bottom of society moving from the propertied to the propertyless classes and culminating in the dispossessed, the lower class, we see support for violence increasing steadily.

The recent proliferation of guns bodes ill for the future stability of the social order on the island. It is certain that many, if not most, of these firearms are in the hands of lumpen individuals. This, coupled with their manifest beliefs, is reason to give the authorities concern. Stone says that their militancy and radicalism is firmly rooted in the social experience of the "lumpen, the most self consciously dispossessed of the urban strata." Furthermore:

Unlike the organized working class which tends to defer to the political ideology and beliefs of the middle class political leadership, the lumpen has developed political ideas that explicitly challenge those of the dominant political groups... There are grass roots intellectuals who conduct fairly sophisticated social analyses of the ills and problems of the society from an extremely militant perspective. Much of the analysis emerges from the constant gatherings at street corners in the poorer sections of the city... The new pattern of urban crime...well-planned organized crime, youth gangs, the extensive use of firearms...frequent shootouts with the police and "lumpen" criminal elements. These factors reflect the emergence of a militant lumpen stratum which articulates many of the social antagonisms that exist in Jamaican society. This stratum has distinctly broken with the pattern of deference and respectful emulation of middle and upper class individuals which characterized the urban poor of the forties and fifties... The emergence of the criminal lumpen has coincided with the emergence of a heightened sense of black awareness and increasing political militancy among the youth, particularly in the poorer urban communities, and... there is some evidence of a connection between the two phenomenon...³⁴

This lumpen stratum with its unorthodox, violent behavior and militant beliefs, if well-armed, would certainly be a danger to the establishment. Besides the obvious fact of guns making

them better able to attack law-abiding citizens, there is the implicit danger of their forming into some sort of cohesive, organized political movement.

As men armed with machetes or sticks, such a threat held no real danger for the state with its gun-carrying police and army. However, with guns, the balance of power is somewhat equalized. As we saw earlier, this was perhaps a basic reason for the passage of the Gun Court Law.

The Road From Crime to Revolution

Individual criminals usually do not occupy themselves with questions of legitimacy of the social order; however, groups of people organized to subvert state power have as a unifying theme, "The authorities are illegitimate." Who does this organizing? Berger and Luckmann assert that: "Intellectual revolutionaries need people who believe in their counter-definitions of reality... There is a dialectic between ideas and change."³⁵

By the same token, the disadvantaged, the deprived, the lumpen or whatever you label these individuals, need intellectual revolutionaries to organize and lead them. Marx, in speaking of the lumpen, is reported to have said,

They are as capable of the most heroic deeds and the most exalted sacrifices as of the basest banditry and the dirtiest corruption.³⁶

The theory, ideology of black consciousness as embodied in Rastafarianism and Black Power may serve in time to halt the individual, isolated, self-aggrandizing criminal activity of the Jamaican lumpen, and galvanize them into potent revolutionary bands.

Three Riots

We will now turn to three violent expressions of the lumpen in the recent past that were riots. In the first one, it is interesting to note that the obstruction of the communication of revolutionary ideas ostensibly was the major issue.

The Rodney Riot occurred in 1968 over the banning of a Guyanese lecturer from the University of the West Indies (which is located in Jamaica). As in the two later disturbances, according to Stone, "The initiative in terms of leadership action and general crowd participation was dominated by individuals drawn from the lumpen stratum."³⁷

Rodney, the banned lecturer, the object so to speak of the 1968 riot, was a black power advocate. True, he was mainly an academic, rhetorician and probably never really organized violence or any real political activity by the lumpen or any other strata. However, the fact that they ostensibly rioted in his behalf, on behalf of being denied his oratory, points to a potential linking up of "intellectual revolutionaries" with a militant lumpen strata.

Three years earlier in 1965, the "Chinese" riot's precipitating factor was the shooting of a black laborer by a Chinese grocer and the 1970 Street Vendor Disturbance was precipitated

by a government attempt to ban street vendors from certain sections of downtown Kingston. All three riots involved several days of random looting of commercial establishments, vandalism and the disruption of bus service.³⁸ Stone feels that they employed merely "demonstrative" and not revolutionary violence.*³⁹

* Demonstrative violence he sees as not being an attempt to seize state power, but rather a method of demonstrating dissatisfaction over specific grievances that the rioters want to have corrected. As such, they can be likened to the Church and King riots outlined by Rude in the Crowd in History. They were largely commodity riots, they petitioned for largesse, food mainly. They had as theme: "If the King only knew (and oftentimes he did), he would put an end to these injustices, and as such, they were ultimately not subversive, although seeming so on the surface. Likewise, in Jamaica, the rioters had limited, specific grievances.

In addition to the above, there is another that perhaps prompts Stone to claim that the Jamaican disturbances were not revolutionary in nature. The reason is that during the riots the crowd would often attack bus crews, people who are part of the working class. This he sees as being alienating of potential sources of support. In fact, he earlier points to the fact that the lumpen tend to attack the poor in their criminal assaults even in "normal" non-rioting times, and also underlines the alienating non-revolutionary or anti-revolutionary potential of this behavior.

I don't doubt the truth of this assessment; however, I feel it would be helpful to note that it is the working class's moderate, perhaps even conservative, political attitudes that contribute to the attacks on them. The unionized working class is given relatively large crumbs, and the non-unionized simply crumbs from the table of capital. As mentioned before, some unionized labor receives several times larger wages than non-unionized labor for comparable work. The political voice of unionized and other labor is the strike that of the lumpen is demonstrative violence. Are the lumpen expected to differentiate between well-paid workers and capitalists in doling out their criminal and political assaults? The well-paid workers never work to get "larger crumbs" for the non-unionized or work for the unemployed.

This is not an attempt to point out who is the villain and who is not, but an attempt to demonstrate that apparently as long as capital has a largesse to distribute selectively, the working class will be divided. I objected to Stone's trying to isolate the target of lumpen attacks from the contributory factor of unionized labor's conservative political attitude.

(Continued)

Collective Behavior

All three incidents were directed against an "unjust" action of the authorities and portend in terms of a Turnerian analysis that this emergent norm(s) may blossom in time into a significant social movement if not a revolution. Stone, on the other hand, presents a more antiquated view of collective behavior. In his apparent denigration of demonstrative violence as being "situational and short-lived... not aimed at fundamental change, only at correcting specific grievances... It spends itself in the cathartic emotional outbursts that accompany the violence."⁴⁰

However, Brown and Goldin in Collective Behavior see episodes of collective behavior like the Jamaican riots in a different light. They see them as being atomistic in a dual sense. First, each episode consists of a number of nearby locations; second, over time, a number of nearby episodes may form a pattern and like their individual incidents, also be loosely related. In other words, an episode of collective behavior may appear only demonstrative, but may in reality be part of a pattern of emerging social protest culminating in rebellion, and ending in perhaps

* In Jamaica, as elsewhere the ranks of the "materially dispossessed" and, hence, the shock troops of any potential revolution and directly affected by the strength of capital for two important reasons. First, as capital is weakened or strengthened and as its largesse increases or decreases, the larger or smaller the crumbs for unionized labor and the larger or smaller the size of unionized labor as capital expands or contracts. Second, a committant of this process is obviously as the size and the paychecks of unionized labor vary, so will the size and the antagonism of the lumpen to the unionized.

successful revolution.⁴¹ It is a fact that most revolutions begin or have their roots in modest outbursts of collective violent protest.

The implication for Jamaica is that the incidents of 1965, 1968 and 1970 may have had some inherent connection although appearing totally unrelated. -

The Cooptation of Violence?

The obvious question is, "Have there been such outbursts since 1970, and if not, why not?" There has been much "rioting" since 1970, but of a different nature. Whereas the rioting of the sixties had been along class lines, the rioting of the seventies has been along party lines. There have been sporadic incidents in which PNP supporters have crossed into JLP areas and vice versa, and fought pitched battles and/or set fire to their opponents' homes. These incidents have become more frequent and more serious over time.

Could they be the result of an implicit understanding between the political parties to deflect political violence away from the class onto party lines, or is it the result of the buildup of poor people in Kingston, many of them squatters. In other words, is it simply the result of the congeries of overpopulation, unemployment, inflation, etc., that we spoke of earlier? Or is it both? Carl Stone asserts that:

...Certain "lumpen" youth gangs have developed a tradition of mercenary relationships to organized party politics. These "lumpen" youth gangs have attempted to provide defense and protection for contending political party groups, in exchange for certain patronage benefits. The relationship is not one of party allegiance but is based entirely on a marketing of services; but the effect is to further divide the lumpen into warring factions of antagonists who contend for control over territory...⁴²

This sheds some light on the problem, but the further question is how did this "tradition of mercenary relationships" develop? Gangs in depressed urban areas often organize themselves on a territorial basis, and also they often extort all manner of businesses therein using the rationale of protection from competing neighboring gangs.

Politicians in expanding or creating party machines in depressed areas of squatters may have been forced (extorted) into making arrangements with the existent gangs or used them to their own ends.

Barrington Moore in the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy muses that the only apparent reason for the existence of the Chinese warlords was to extract the surplus from the peasantry.⁴³ In fact he noted that most warlords were ex-bandits. I feel that "extracting the surplus" is a crucial function of all governments. All territorially based political units are basically organs for extortion. The usual rationale being the same, protection from neighboring, competing aggressors that gangs in depressed urban areas employ.

Mafia groups in the United States collect monthly payments from city businesses in their "turf" for protection. Even the United States government demands that one-half of each citizen's taxes (or more) goes to "defense." To refuse payment of this portion of one's taxes on the ground that one does not desire this protection, will merit one a jail term as many who protested the Viet Nam War in this manner found out.

In Jamaica due to the extremely factional nature of electoral politics, and the strength of youth gangs in the increasingly depressed urban environment, in much of Kingston politicians and youth gangs have apparently entered into a symbiotic relationship. Normally a national government would see the activities of petty gangsters as an unwanted infringement on their hegemony.* However, in Jamaica the traditional bitter feuding between the two parties and the danger that a serious attack on the youth gangs might cause them to coalesce into a united front has prevented this from happening.

* The following taxonomy may help explain this point.

The Four Dimensions of Power

1. Rivalry, conflict among factions of a territorial group.
2. Rivalry, conflict among parallel territorial groups.
3. Conflict between a given territorial unit and an encroaching or encompassing unit.
4. Time.

Examples of the Four Dimensions of Power

1. Factional conflict - in a street gang factions may vie for control of the group, factions in a unit of the Mafia may do the same. Elections in America are an example of peaceful rivalry in this connection, Jamaican elections are a somewhat violent example and the American Civil War a clearly violent case.
2. Parallel Conflicts - are exemplified by youth gang "rumbles", mob wars of organized crime and conflicts among nation-states.
3. Conflict with the Encroaching Group - conflicts between a Mafia group and parasitic street gangs, conflict with an encompassing group - conflict between the FBI and Mafic groups.
4. Time - over time the balances of power are altered.

The worse the struggle for survival in a given area, the more powerful the youth gangs become. In America we notice that ghetto gangs are usually more violence-prone than their suburban counterparts, that the worse the slum, the worse the gang. Now Jamaica (possessing as she does one huge, ever-growing, ever-deteriorating capital city) has youth gangs that are ever-growing in numbers and power.

These are the young lumpen and to oppose them frontally will perhaps drive them into renewed class conflict a la the sixties riots, only more serious this time. But to employ their violence in advancing local party goals, deflects them from revolutionary activity, and enlists them in conflicts that tie them to the status quo.

Muting the Class Struggle

The PNP, the "Party of Change," claims that it aims to out-organize and out-teach the Opposition and thereby mobilize the people in its cause. According to the election results of 1972 and the bi-election of 1975 she seems to be doing just that. How has she been able to gain and maintain such a large plurality? One feels it is more than just as a result of teaching and organization.

It has not been through the implementation of most of its socialist policies. These have been largely stymied due to Parliamentary and business community opposition. True, there has been much infrastructural development in the countryside (i.e.,

extending roads and power lines, erecting schools and some new housing schemes). However, there still remains huge idle latifunda and tens of thousands of unemployed in Kingston. To try and wrest control of these estates would meet determined opposition in Parliament, and to try to "mobilize" or force people to work on them would perhaps meet determined opposition in the streets, and surely would occasion a loss of support to the other party. The solution?

The PNP has solved the problem and at the same time increased its support through massive featherbedding, "make work" beautification programs in the capital, Kingston. Much of the funds coming from the previously mentioned "international lending agencies." Needless to say this is not advancing the progress of development, in fact it is retarding it, since it increases Jamaica's indebtedness and balance of payments deficit while she is merely "marking off the time" and not using the funds for true development. In this regard Scott notes in Comparative Political Corruption that:

The choice among development strategies and the manner of their execution may depend for the ruling party, less on criteria of growth or productivity than on the level and quality of inducements they place at the party's disposal. If economic success and political payoffs coincide so much the better. But a project judged a failure by economic standards may nevertheless have achieved precisely the political effects expected of it.⁴⁴

In addition to the featherbedding programs there is also in Jamaica the patronage extended to the lumpen youths. Below we see a chart of types of patronage.

TYPES OF JAMAICAN PATRONAGE

1	2	3	4
Trad. machine patronage for <u>"boys on top"</u>	Trad. Ja. patronage which includes jobs and housing for even the <u>small party-backer</u>	new <u>featherbedding</u> beautification scheme for Kingston	lumpenproletariat patronage bordering on if not actually outright <u>payoff</u>

What will happen if the international loans that supply this patronage were cut off? Scott said the following in reference to the defeat of the Detroit Republican machine in 1932, but it rings true now for Jamaica as well. "Latent class and policy issues that had remained dormant as long as the machine had ample material rewards to distribute had reappeared with decisiveness."⁴⁵

In this section we have seen how the Rastas, Rude Boys, Black Power advocates and the lumpen have successively offered challenges to the status quo from below and have each in turn been frustrated, so far. Now let us turn to an investigation of the possibilities of a revolution from above.

REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE

There are two possibilities in this connection and both center on the creation of a one-party policy. This through either a PNP Castro-backed takeover or one by the JLP in conjunction with say the CIA.

In the acrimonious debate on the island each side accuses the other of precisely this. The Manley government blames its troubles on overt destabilization by the Opposition through political violence and economic sabotage. The JLP on the other hand asserts that the PNP is planning a communist-style seizure of power and is currently bringing the economy to the brink of bankruptcy. This through massive spending programs not aimed at development (a valid economic goal) but at gaining voter support for the eventual seizure of power (an invalid political goal). Against her loyal supporters she asserts the PNP is employing political violence.

In this section we will ponder both points of view and afterwards provide an analysis. Manley and the PNP position is presented first.

Reasons for the Declaration of a State of Emergency

If one examines in depth the reasons and reasoning that the Manley government put forth for the declaration of a State of Emergency this summer, one derives a good picture of their perception of the nature and sources of "destabilization." Below is a list of these reasons and following that are arguments and "facts" supporting each one.

1. Well-planned urban terrorism
2. The communism scare
3. Economic sabotage
4. Internal media campaign
5. Outside sources of support

Urban Terrorism

The PM noted that recently violence and even "local" political violence took a new turn. Now there was organized arson and open confrontation with the Security Forces. This first occurred around the time of the International Monetary Fund Conference to embarrass Jamaica when the foreign press from all over the world was present in large numbers he said. A new wave was expected to coincide with the August '76 Carifesta, Caribbean celebrations to be held in Jamaica, and was apparently already starting (early July) and hence the decision to declare a State of Emergency.⁴⁶ Earlier in the year a "defector" from the JLP declared:

I have seen young men being trained and brainwashed to commit murders, to destroy property and personal effects of innocent and impoverished people who are singled out only because they are of a different persuasion... I know that as the election approaches it is planned that this violent pattern will escalate... violence will gain in momentum and ferocity. When the election is called, this country will witness almost civil disobedience. 47

Documents found in the possession of a JLP candidate for office, who also happened to be an ex-Army officer, allegedly included the following information:

St. Ann's area 22 trained men; 100 ideologically indoctrinated; 300 supporters...200 rifles; 100 sub-machine guns; 2 barrels of gun-powder; 50,000 anti-governmental pamphlets.⁴⁸

Also, the second ranking man in the JLP was allegedly found with tapes of police military operations. Both men were detained under the provision of the State of Emergency.

Communism Scare

Rumors and accusations by the Opposition were echoed in the island's press to the effect that the PNP intends to declare a one-party dictatorship, and to become a communist nation under Cuban and Russian domination.⁴⁹

Internal Media Campaign

The worst offender in this regard is said to be the oldest and largest newspaper, the one Stone called "the formulator of middle class opinion," The Daily Gleaner. It is seen as being biased against the PNP in its reporting of the news. Its editorials are said to be repeating and amplifying the "communism scare." It was also said to be in the habit of reprinting foreign news articles portraying a drying up of business activity, and with exaggerating of the magnitude of violent crime.

Adverse stories in the foreign press were seen as an "external media campaign." Furthermore, the internal press in repeating these stories was allegedly abetting its own internal media campaign against the Jamaican government. The

PNP referred to the synchronization of the foreign and internal press as being both suspicious and "ominous."⁵⁰

Economic Sabotage

The violence, the media magnification of the violence and the anti-communist hysteria are said to have badly damaged the economy in addition to the damage it received as a result of the poor world economic picture. Because it discouraged many skilled and propertied people who were genuinely frightened to leave the country and to remove their property legally or illegally. Also, the unpatriotic were determined as a matter of course to do this. Thereby reducing available capital and depleting precious foreign reserves of currency. Foreign investment and tourist trade were also casualties of the violence, its projection in the international press and the communist scare.

There is no question that there have been persons in the field of political activity working with others with influence in the economy who have not been prepared to act within the normal rules of our democracy, but who have tried to act outside of those rules. It must be the duty of everyone of us who cares about this country to unite against this threat.⁵¹

Outside Forces

This refers to the oft-repeated suspicion of the Manley government that the situation in Jamaica would seem to be progressing much like events in Chile prior to the fall of Allende. They continue in this view despite disclaimers of non-involvement

by American officials, in fact they point out that America claimed she was not involved in Chile until the facts were brought to light years after Allende's demise.

The situation is not helped by a recent rumor that the last American ambassador's (since recalled) contributed of fourteen million to the Jamaican political parties. Since America is somewhat displeased with the Manley regime, one would not think that his party received much of this sum.

The JLP's Perception of Destabilization

Turning to the other side of the aisle, the other side of the story, we identify the main points in the JLP's indictment of the PNP as being:

1. They embrace communism
2. Undermining the free press
3. Undermining free government
4. Destroying the economy

The PNP and Communism

The leaders of the JLP assert that Manley intends to "turn the country communist." An editorial in the Gleaner illustrates one of the arguments against the PNP's goal of socialism. It asserts that all other such attempts to establish a "classless society" have failed. The article then goes on to raise many of the arguments brought forth by Djilas in his work The New Class in which he argued that it was impossible to put

into practice the political theories of Karl Marx.⁵² The editorial asserts that in addition to the fact that in these classes have remained, also

basic human rights are denied the ordinary citizens...free speech, religious freedom, suppressions of the press, outlawing of political parties, discouragement of free enterprise and rigid state controls... There is every reason to believe that Cuba's technical and economic assistance to Jamaica is supported by Russia. Cuba's communist influence is affecting Jamaica in a very subtle way, and it is about time that Jamaicans everywhere showed some concern. We cannot afford to allow blind partisan loyalties and charismatic fidelity to obscure our critical examination of the policies that our politicians advocate and the commitments that they make in the name of Jamaica.

Naturally there could not have been a more opportune time for Cuba to impose communism in Jamaica than at this time when Jamaicans are ideologically divided between capitalism and democratic socialism... 53

Undermining the Free Press

This is seen as a mechanism to bring the two party system to an end in Jamaica. The Leader of the Opposition recently charged that the Daily Gleaner is to receive no more government advertising, Radio Jamaica is to have 51% of shares bought by government statutory bodies, and a party newspaper for the PNP is to be formed.

The result of these moves is the Jamaican people allow them to be implemented, is that the only news which will reach the public is news which the government wants the people to hear or read. Under such circumstances no one will ever know of failures, mismanagement, corruption, dictatorship or brutality which may occur in the country.⁵⁴

Undermining Free Government

In the same press release the Leader of the Opposition goes on to assert that since the PNP could not legally rid itself of the Westminster model of government, since it would take a two-thirds majority on a referendum (and Jamaican parties have never ever won more than a 57% plurality) -- "other strategies are being used to prevent the system of Parliamentary government from operating in the manner laid down in the constitution."⁵⁵

In line with this he asserts that at a recent meeting "concerning the expenditure of taxpayers' funds on special employment or 'Crash Programme' work," the Secretary of the PNP was present along with (the appropriately present) ministers and civil servants. He likened that to "communist countries where it is the political party which makes the decisions and rules the country, the government only being an arm of the Party."⁵⁶

Criticisms of the Handling of the Economy

The Leader of the Opposition, who happens to have been the Finance Minister in the last JLP government, chides the government for failing to spend the Capital Development Fund for its real purpose. Namely investment in capital and hence in long-term growth. Instead the government has increasingly used these funds to cover recurrent expenditures; either in its job program or in running the various enterprises that have fallen into its hands either by design (democratic socialism) or default (entrepreneurs selling out to government and leaving the island).

The jobs or Impact Program was largely felt in many quarters to be merely a means of satisfying the poor masses and hence keeping voters in the PNP camp.

The Opposition Leader called the Loan Programme "one of the most frightening features of the financial picture." From 1972 (when the JLP left office) the Jamaican National Debt was \$290 million but in 1976 it had risen to \$827 million. In 1972 debt charges or servicing the loan amounted to \$28 million which was 11% of revenue whereas in 1976 servicing amounted to \$105 million or 20% of revenue he charged. In 1972, he claimed there was a \$29 million dollar surplus whereas now there was a deficit of \$81 million.⁵⁷

The Accusations of a PNP "Defector"

In the previous section we read the words of a "JLP defector" so it is only fair that we now turn to those of a like person on the other side of the aisle.

The PNP expelled the Minister of Mining who was instrumental in gaining the quadrupling of Jamaica's bauxite revenues. He later claimed that several attempts had earlier been made to get him to resign because he opposed the policies of the PNP. One such attempt purportedly involved his being offered the post of Jamaican ambassador to the U.S. When he refused, he noticed that the most important topics had been removed from his minister's portfolio and given to other Ministries.⁵⁸

He criticized the "cult of Leader Worship" in the PNP which causes the emasculation of the cabinet, and warned of the "rising ascendancy of the party over the constitutional government

including Parliament itself... The present cabinet is no longer the real policy making body of government."⁵⁹

He charged that unelected Party officials wielded more weight in Government than those elected by the people and they were committed to the eventual goal of establishing the Cuban model of Socialism in Jamaica.

The Press was to be regimented, violence was becoming a tool for the suppression of resistance, criticism and dissent and all this was being built up to a crescendo for the visit of Prime Minister Castro of Cuba to Jamaica on Labour Day this year, trip has since been indefinitely postponed).⁶⁰

In Parliament soon after his dismissal from the PNP, he declared while sitting in the benches of the JLP that

We got a windfall (the greatly increased bauxite levy) at the psychological moment and we dissipated that windfall by callous and reckless mismanagement...We threw it away like a profligate... because of the slap-dash manner in which the affairs of this country has been run.⁶¹

He claimed that planning and policy formulation was only what the Prime Minister announced in his various declarations around the island. He warned that the

"country had been put in the hands of a set of apprentices and raw recruits. It was like handing the Concorde over to a set of motor mechanics."⁶²

So we see that each side has a battery of "evidence" to prove that the other is out to seize absolute power. Let us turn to a related issue, "Trading Accusations of Political Violence."

TRADING ACCUSATIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

In Jamaica there are frequent acts of political violence. Each of the two parties and everyone in the society will admit this. The difficulty arises when one attempts to determine which side is responsible. Each party and their supporters blames the other one and its adherents. Even if one isolates a particular incident, he will find two clashing interpretations. Below we will report on the following incidents:

1. Forcible evictions at a housing site
2. An attack on a JLP office
3. A funeral procession that became a riot
4. Disturbances during the International Monetary Fund Conference
5. Orange Street Massacre

Forcible Evictions

The number two man in the JLP asserted in May of 1975 that JLP supporters were being forced from their homes in Southwest St. Andrew, an area near the capital. The reason he said was so that the area would elect a PNP Member of Parliament in the next election.

Armed gangs of men who describe themselves as agents of the Ministry of Housing have been terrorizing citizens of Southwest St. Andrew... invading houses, destroying furniture, ransacking, robbing and shooting residents. One of whom was to appear in Court to give evidence against a Garrison Gang member (alleged PNP supporters)...Over 4,000 residents are involved in ejections from 110-124 Spanish Town Road.

Of these 1000 are on the Voter's List, the majority of whom are JLP supporters as shown by the last election results. No attempt has been made to house any JLP supporters being ejected in the many vacant new Government units at Majesty Pen, the adjoining locality. But the intention is clearly to evict them from the constituency, not just the locality, so as to cut down JLP voting strength drastically.⁶³

Attack on a JLP Headquarters

In January 1975, an office of the JLP was attacked by 40 men on 20 motorcycles. The building was ransacked and two employees beaten and stabbed.⁶⁴

The Prime Minister regretted the occurrence in an address to Parliament in which the Opposition staged a walkout. Unpreturbed he declared that he was putting the defense forces on alert to stop this "monster political violence that has once again reared its ugly head." This was eleven months after the passage of the Gun Court Act and it was becoming evident at this time that it was not the ultimate solution.

He warned both sides to desist. He admitted that this was a "reprehensible act," but stated that there was provocation, he went on to list several shootings and beating of lower-level PNP officials.⁶⁵

The Leader of the Opposition responded the next day with an assertion that the PNP intended to destroy the Opposition and have a one-party state. He listed and described a litany called the Dirty Dozen, of which recent acts of political violence committed against the JLP by an alleged group of PNP supporters, a motorcycle gang called the Garrison Gang.⁶⁶

A Violent Funeral

In the summer of 1975, the Prime Minister was a pall-bearer at a funeral of a Mr. Winston Blake also known as "Burry Boy." As the procession of thousands passed near a JLP area shots were fired at it. A riot ensued and the police had to respond in force (150) to end the uproar. It was widely reported in the press that Mr. Blake was a "PNP gunman" and that his fellow gunmen gave him a 21-gun salute at the graveside.⁶⁷

After he learned of the riot, the Leader of the Opposition asserted that the PNP and the police had planned the affair to discredit the JLP. Why else he claimed would they bring the procession so close to a volatile area of JLP supporters. Also, if they were determined to do this in good faith, why had they not posted more police in the area to prevent hostilities. Furthermore, once the fighting started, where had the 150 policemen suddenly materialized from. It appeared to him as if they were already in the area and laying in wait for the riot to occur so that they could use that as a pretense to raid the JLP area.⁶⁸

The Prime Minister issued a statement after the affair claiming that he heard no gunshots while at the cemetery and that the police informed him that there had been no shooting. He did say, however, that he did hear what sounded like explosions, but they sounded as if they were coming from outside the cemetery. He attributed the erroneous reports to biased "vindictive" reporters on the Daily Gleaner.

As to why he attended the funeral of an alleged gunman, he admitted that "Mr. Blake had a checkered career, but that as of late, he was making a sincere attempt to improve his position in the society and raise a family." He asserted that Mr. Blake was not wanted by the police for any offense at present. He went on to describe how Blake had risked his life on two occasions to save him and another time his wife, from JLP attacks while campaigning in 1972.

Responding to the charges of the Leader of the Opposition he said that Jamaica is a free country, and no political party can stop a group of peaceful people from proceeding on the public highways. As to the lack of police and their sudden appearance, he said he was told by the Police officer in charge of the march that 200 men were detailed to police the entire route of the march, and that the police had felt that that was sufficient for a march of that nature. Naturally, when the trouble started he said he was told that most of the police along the march route converged on the scene of the trouble, thereby explaining the sudden massing of the police.⁶⁹

The I.M.F. Conference Disturbances

During the IMF Conference in January, 1976, we had the first serious wave of "urban terrorism"; widespread arson, shooting at police and firemen, etc...⁷⁰ The number two man in the JLP said that the JLP was not behind the shooting of the three policemen, but that it had been done by "PNP gunmen." The incident he claimed was used for an excuse for the police to raid and disrupt the JLP sections of West Kingston.⁷¹

The PNP declared that the disturbances were an attempt by the JLP to embarrass the Jamaican government and erode confidence in it at a time when the eyes of the world were focussed on Kingston. As one result, the 1976 tourist season was badly hurt, and perhaps the fear engendered will harm future seasons.⁷²

Orange Street Massacre

In the midst of the second even worse wave of urban strife that began in May 1976, and which occasioned the Declaration of a State of Emergency, the Orange Street Massacre occurred in which eight children and two adults were burned to death. At the time, Manley declared that destabilization was obviously taking place, and that it was obvious that the PNP was not out to overthrow its own government.⁷³

A few weeks later the number two man in the JLP asserted with the help of recent voting results, that the voters on Orange Street had been predominantly JLP supporters.⁷⁴

Analysis

The preceding pages serve as an example of the rhetoric surrounding acts of political violence. As a result of the artful articulation of charge and countercharge. Jamaican politicians and partisans can "successfully" defend the one they support. Meanwhile, the "truth" is lost in a tangle of ultimately mutually cancelling statements.

The rhetoric of political violence like all rhetoric and argument is not uttered for the purpose of resolving conflict, but as a substitute for or a prelude to conflict, reminiscent of the barking of dogs or the enraged rantings of two motorists assessing blame following a minor accident.

Jamaica's Dialectic of Conflict

Each party insists that it is not out to seize power with the help of outside forces, but that the other one is. The PNP on the one hand, asserts that such charges by the JLP are causing grave damage to the economy because of the uncertainty and fear they engender in foreign and local investors. The JLP, on the other hand, asserts that these claims that she is destabilizing the economy through her charges is a smoke-screen for the PNP's plans to seize power.

So we see a strange dialectic developing wherein the PNP may eventually feel compelled to overcome its compunctions and seize power if only to silence the JLP and its apparently economically harmful criticisms and/or it genuinely fears a JLP-led right wing takeover. Meanwhile, the JLP may come to feel that the PNP is really out to seize power (and as we have seen it might do just that because of its fear of the JLP) and as a result it might do just what the PNP fears that it may do, namely, attempt a CIA-backed Allende style coup.

In any case the two parties, the two antagonists, are like two boxers in a ring squaring off and sizing each other up. Expecting blows at any moment if for no other reason than that

they would punch their opponent if they were in his position. In fact, they are in his position and perhaps they will punch if only to forestall his punch. "The best defense is a good offense."

The consensus being removed the two parties no longer mirror the type of mild diadic conflict represented by the Republicans and Democrats in America, but the hostile diadic conflict that we saw exemplified by America and Russia during the cold war before the appearance of the third antagonist China (who turned the situation into a triadic one, and thereby muted hostilities by introducing the necessity for diplomatic juggling for alliances).

Beyond the Dialectic of Conflict

On deeper analysis of the Jamaican situation one comes to feel that things are not as stark as portrayed above. I would now like to point to some mitigating factors.

The Jamaican two party system has traditionally functioned to supplant class conflict. However, with the recent worsening suffering, overcrowding and overpopulation of the lower class that we pointed to earlier, the PNP came to power in 1972 on a platform that proclaimed, "Better must come!" their wrinkle in the sameness of the two traditional alternatives was an appeal that offered democratic socialism, an ambiguous term to say the least.

In any case what we witness is the PNP government assuring that the wealthy and reluctant middle class Jamaicans, and

the conservative forces in the first world, that her socialism is not to be the socialism of Russia and China. Meanwhile she is telling Cuba, and the other third world radicals, that she totally supports, while making promises of vast "future" reforms to the poor at home. At present she is carrying out modest reforms: a massive literacy program, a jobs program, and some infrastructural improvements while expanding the scope of the public sector through design and default (businesses that are selling out to the government).

In the meantime, her slender monetary reserves are being strained to the breaking point. America views her actions with disapproval. She is engaged in a bitter debate with Opposition critics. The Bank of Jamaica and her creditors, the first world lending institutions, advise her to adapt a "sensible" spending policy, but she cannot for several reasons.

First, in order to carry out the modest socialist programs she has already begun; second, to maintain her widespread support among the populace at least until the next election; third, to prop up however precariously her limping economy or else face widespread malnutrition among the poor, especially those in the cities and in the suburban shantytowns. By doing all this, she is not only maintaining her position vis-a-vis the JLP, but she is protecting the position of both traditional parties by forestalling the development of subversive radical movements. (Currently the Communist Party and other fringe groups on the island are supporting the PNP, not to mention that as we've just seen, she and the JLP have the Lumpen tamed.)

CENSORSHIP

The Gun Court legislation was not the first attempt by the Jamaican government to halt the rise of gun-involved violence. Two years before in 1972 measures were taken to curb violence on the screen both in the movies and on the television network (Jamaica has only one television channel.)

The Prime Minister has announced the firm decision of government to place a check on the display of violence in the cinemas and on the television screen. It is a courageous decision, most politicians in most countries are afraid of being regarded as fuddy-duddy if they object to displays of violence...The PM recognized that the banning of violence cannot be indiscriminate. He is inviting cinema operators and film distributors to assist in framing suitable rules and regulations....⁷⁵

The Owner of the largest chain of movie theatres on the island objected, mirroring the sentiment of many disgruntled viewers.

People are deliberately looking away from the real causes of crime that separate our society ...All we are doing is treating symptoms, we are not treating causes and that's where violence starts.⁷⁶

During the summer of 1974, Jamaica staged its first film festival. The films were all made or acted in by blacks. However, this caused some embarrassment since as one Jamaica columnist observed:

Unhappily far too many black films fall under a violent heading with the additional suggestion in some of them that pimping and drug pushing are not too heinous offenses if they are done in rivalry with the already ensconced Mafia.⁷⁷

The actor Jim Brown who I had earlier met on my plane-flight from New York was a prominent figure in the awards and the televised festivities, however, not one of his many films were screened. Also, the Jamaican classic "The Harder They Come" was also blacklisted. "The Spook Who Sat by the Door" was "the only one of the seven films advertised by the festival and not yet passed by the censors." It was described as "a film on the violent overthrow of a government by revolutionary forces."

The writer of the book on which "Spook" is based protested that censorship, "...was the foremost characteristic of a frightened oligarchy." He went on to complain that, "I feel very disappointed and a bit surprised over the banning of my film... I did not expect this sort of behavior in Jamaica which is a black country."

He said the book had been banned in both Jamaica and Trinidad, but had sold many copies in other countries. It has been translated into German, Italian, Dutch and Japanese and he claimed that he planned to show the film in those countries. Subsequently, the film was allowed to open the festival, but it was not allowed to close it as had earlier been planned.⁷⁸ The reason given by the Cinematograph Authority being

In the light of numerous public objections it had decided that the film should not be passed for further viewing because of the content which included violence, the use of guns and the manufacture of bombs.⁷⁹

Ironically, when the banning was announced on closing night, irate patrons demanded their money back and soon erupted into disorder. The police had to be called to quell what soon became a riot.⁸⁰

Just as musical comedies became the mainstay of television, karate films became the movies' staple as a result of censorship in Jamaica. One witty journalist penned the following:

Jamaicans might yet see the rapid construction of yet another historic building as an ally to the Gun Court to help fight the kind of organized crime which is at present existing in the society. Those of society's prominent citizens who haven't yet lost their lives by the gun might in the future be wiped out by youthful karate experts who are now in the making.⁸¹

However, his prediction is not as far-fetched as it appears for soon after we read in a news dispatch from Guyana:

The admittance of children to karate films has been condemned by the Minister of Education, and steps are being taken to stop the admission of children to these films... The comment follows the death of a ten year old schoolboy after receiving a fatal blow from a colleague while playing karate during an interval of school classes. Karate and Judo have become popular in Guyana due to the frequent showing of these films at cinemas. In many cases school children freely practice during school intervals the "chops," "cuts" and "kicks" witnessed on the screen.⁸²

In reviewing Jamaican censorship three important ideas emerge. First, if one were to ban all violent and erotic films, only the bland and the boring would be left. (If one were to remove violence and sex from life, what would be left?) We are

reminded of another remark of the earlier-quoted movie chain owner, "The art form merely mirrors the society."

Second, if one removes the current instruments of violence that does not mean one has eradicated the urge, or need to, employ violence and the ability to improvise the means of destruction.

Third, so far Jamaica has constructed a Gun Court Prison to go along with the Gun Court Law. After having passed the State of Emergency, alongside the Gun Court prison was constructed its "ally" a Detention Centre. What laws and what prisons will follow?

RAID ON A MOVIE THEATRE

A couple of weeks after the Declaration of a State of Emergency, I arrived on the island to complete my research. One evening my cousin and I decided to go to the Carib movie theatre, the largest of the half dozen or so in Kingston. Being that it was crowded, we were forced to sit up front.

In the midst of the meandering plot line of the movie "Serpico," I noticed that the lights in the moviehouse began to flicker. Suddenly they blazed into life, and a man came running towards the front of the theatre waving a big gun. The crowd murmured loudly. I didn't know what was happening.

"Keep still! Don't anybody move!" he bellowed waving his submachinegun literally in front of our faces. I realized then that he was a soldier, but I didn't know if he was about to shoot or what.

At first I thought he had chased somebody inside in a running gun battle, next I thought he was arresting the entire movie house then I realized they (the soldiers) were up and down the aisles pulling suspects out of the audience to search; especially those with woolen caps covering their Rastafarian "dread locks."

I kept still waiting for a fire fight to erupt at any moment.

One poor fellow was searched four times by four different khaki-clad soldiers. Each one ordering him to stand, ripping off his cap and roughly running their fingers through his hair looking for ganja probably. When at last he objected, they began shoving him and called over an officer, he was nearly arrested.

An Indian-looking young man was pushed to the center aisle and ordered to the rear of the theatre (arrested?). Finally, a ten row section of the theatre was singled out, and all the men and boys therein ordered to stand against the wall and undergo thorough searches.

Afterwards the soldiers left.

The lights returned.

The film continued.

I wanted to go home after that. My cousin, though, advised against it, claiming that the soldiers were probably waiting outside to search and question anybody who suddenly should decide to leave. And so I settled down and tried to enjoy as best I could the make-believe cops and robbers on the screen.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nettleford, Rex. Identity, Race and Protest in Jamaica. (New York, 1972) p. 52.
2. Ibid., p. 91.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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