# A Ghetto State of Ghettos:

# Palestinians under Israeli Citizenship

by

Mary Boger

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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Abstract

A GHETTO STATE OF GHETTOS:

PALESTINIANS UNDER ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP

By

Mary Boger

Advisor: Professor Stanley Aronowitz

Since the establishment of the State of Israel a body of literature has amassed that deals with the question of the *Arabs in Israel*. Most researchers start from the empirical reality that Palestinians and Jews in Israel are residentially segregated from each other. Many write of the "culture of separation" that characterizes Israeli society. When treating of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship various social scientists have coined terms such as "entrapped minority" (Gorenberg) or "trapped minority" (Rabinowitz). The anthropologist, Henry Rosenfeld, has referred to the Palestinian enclaves in Israel as "worker dormitories". And some have used the term "ghetto" to describe the Palestinian locales. Most speak of the "isolation", "fragmentation", "separation", "segmentation" of the Palestinians in Israeli society and the state whether in regard to residence, labor markets, civil society or political society.

This dissertation is the first to theorize and empirically study the given segregation and separation characteristic of Israeli society as a case study in the production of social space (Lefebvre) as a process of ghettoization. The specific social practices and relations of production of the Zionist nation building project have produced a ghetto state composed of ghettos. The ghettoization of the Palestinians under Israeli

citizenship is situated within the Zionist nation building project which is an on-going process, an unfinished and contentious process of social formation (Gramsci) of a colonial settler society within capitalist development. This story is not yet finished. Since borders remain unresolved Israeli leaders are able to set the conditions de facto for Israel to expand territorially by illegally occupying and annexing more Palestinian land, removing native Palestinians from these lands, settling Jewish Israeli citizen-settlers on these lands, and proletarianizing and ghettoizing those Palestinians within the areas under their control. The Palestinian enclaves in Israel and the expansion of segregated locales in the occupied territories are a contemporary example of ghettoization of a subordinated people-class (Leon). The ghettoization of this population is integral to an understanding of the construction of the Israeli state and society within its specific ethno-national colonialist and capitalist formation within the global capitalist economy (Nitzan and Bichler).

# Acknowledgments

This dissertation is the product of several years of rigorous research, fieldwork and drafting of the first chapters only to be interrupted by a long hiatus during which time little progress was made, which was finally followed by a few more years of intense work, leading to its completion. Therefore, I am deeply grateful to my committee members, Professors Stanley Aronowitz, Lindsey Churchill and William Kornblum, who had every reason to give up on me but stayed with me through to the end. I am also greatly indebted to them for their critical engagement with the dissertation, the classes I took with them and their scholarly contributions to the field of sociology from which I have greatly benefited. I am also grateful to the Institute for International Education which awarded me the Fulbright Grant for Dissertation Study Abroad, 1990-91, Haifa University which provided me with a desk and use of their facilities while a Fulbright recipient, and my university, The Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York, which awarded me the Andrew Silk Dissertation Fellowship, 1991-92. This support gave me the ability to carry out an in-depth review of Israeli literature on the *Arabs in Israel* and to conduct extensive and intensive fieldwork in Israel.

Many thanks are due to my first readers: Yerah Gover, the late Dr. Vicki Shiran, Michael Brown, Elizabeth Mestres, Richard Levins and the late Dr. Annette T. Rubinstein. Their early support and encouragement to continue as I was going helped sustain me through the difficult task of producing a dissertation. This work is particularly indebted to Yerah Gover's published dissertation, *Zionism: The Limits of Moral Discourse in Israeli Hebrew Fiction*, also undertaken at the Graduate School and University Center, CUNY. This book more than any other clarified for me what I was witnessing and experiencing in the field and what I was reading in the literature. Gover's analysis and his critical engagement with the dissertation as a work in progress gave me the confidence to take head on what my research and analysis of the data and experience were telling me. Much thanks to him.

In the course of doing the research I was assisted by many many people, far more than I can begin to thank individually. I also made use of the services and resources of many agencies and institutions with the help of their staff. Here, I can only mention a few, those to whom I turned most frequently or whose assistance was most crucial. Ora Meir at the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics in Tel Aviv; Gad Neery and others at the Land Authority in Tel Aviv; Muhammad Abu Salamah, an activist and founder of Abna al-Balad, who took me on a tour throughout Umm al-Fahim; Saleem al-Saad, Director of the Health Department, Municipality of Umm al-Fahim; Adel Aghbariyah, Director of the Social Welfare Department of the Municipality of Umm al-Fahim; Professor Michael Saltzman at the University of Haifa who generously shared his office with me while I was a Fulbright recipient; Shlomo Swirski and Barbara Swirski whose research was crucial in this work and with whom I consulted while in Israel; Mirfat Aghbariyah, an unemployed sociologist, and Randa Mahajinah who assisted me in interviewing women in Umm al-Fahim; social studies teachers, Kamal Ahmad Rushdie and Yusuf Abd al-Latif, who assisted me in conducting a survey questionnaire in Umm al-Fahim and all their high school students who participated; Jamil Salem, a high school principal in Umm

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And I am indebted to all the people in Umm al-Fahim who allowed me into their places of work and homes and opened their hearts and minds to me in innumerable ways. In many ways this dissertation is owed to them, their lives, their struggles, their endurance, their generosity, their resilience and so great thanks is due them and in some ways this dissertation is dedicated to them.

Personally, my families on both sides of the ocean, worlds apart, sustained me throughout. My in-laws, Fawzi and Ifat Aghbariyah or Abu Ghassan and Umm Ghassan, were my daily sustenance while living in Umm al-Fahim for five years. My extended family embraced me, helped me with the dissertation and dealing with the concerns of every day life, and even helped my husband and I make it through difficult financial times. I have a most generous and remarkable family to whom I owe much and love deeply. Upon returning to the United States and during the years of struggle to finish the task here, I owe much to my family on this side of the ocean. At times they fed and sheltered me and helped me out financially and kept my spirits up when things seemed overwhelming and impossible. I especially thank my sister Kitty Drake and her significant other, Phillip Pratt, and my siblings Susan, Rebecca and John.

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knowledge and experience, currency with the literature in three languages, daily reading of the Israeli, Palestinian and Arab press, sharp intellect, critical distance to the question, and dislike of any exaggeration for whatever purpose assisted me at all stages of the work. He never doubted I would finish, no matter how long it took and at what the sacrifice.

# Dedication

To my three spirits

Ifat Aghbariyah, mart ommi, my mother-in-law, who is in her 70s and Muslim; Katherine Coombs Boger, my mother, who is in her 80s and Christian; and the late Dr. Annette T. Rubinstein, my friend, teacher and mentor, who died at 97 and is Jewish.

Without their nourishment in body and soul this work would never have been accomplished.

They are the salt of the earth and their lives prove the possibility of creating societies where each individual is cherished and people of all persuasions can live with dignity and appreciation of one another, in true human accord. May one day we see such people as these the chosen leaders of our civilizations.

amaar*

*amaar is an Arabic expression used when quests have finished eating. Literally it means construction, building, civilization. It is said at the end of a meal by quests since the partaking and sharing of food is the replenishment of life, the reproduction of civilization.

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**The Road of Death**
*By Manal Aghbariyah, a 10th grader*
*From Suwaysah, a sister village or neighborhood of Umm al-Fahim in Wadi 'Ara*

This is me.
Who are you?
And who is me?
I am the one who was attracted to craziness.
And the past didn't end with him.
And the seas throw him out.
Who are you?
I am the one lost in the lost
and was embraced by the ways of forgetfulness
and walked without a human feeling.
I am from the people of the road.
Are you?
Where do you live?
Which place do you travel to?
He answered: on the road of death
where there is life and beauty and loss.
I travelled to many places
and it doesn't travel to me.
Are you still in dispute
despite that we didn't sit long together?
And now it is returning time.
Why do you like to return?
Stay with me.
Did you forget me?
I am the madness.
Let the sky be my cover
and the ground my bed
and the road of death my shelter.
But do you know me?
I feel I am you
and you are me
while I don't know who you are
and who is me
But I know the fate.

# Introduction:

## Israel: A Terrain of Ghettos, A Ghetto of Ghettos

> **settle** verb [settled (-ld], settling] **1** To cause to become fixed; place firmly in a position; adjust for a time in a place; fix by agreement; appoint, as a time. **2** To determine in the mind, as a purpose or belief; come to a decision or conclusion; resolve. **3** To place in permanent relations or in fixed conditions; put in order; establish; as, to settle a pastor. **4** To free or cease from agitation or disturbance; still; calm; quiet. **5** To free from turbidity; clarify or become clarified, as a liquid; also, to precipitate, as dregs. **6** To render or become firm and passable, as a road. **7** [Law] To make over as a right or property by legal act; to ascertain, as a balance due; adjust differences; to pay; satisfy; to determine the form or language of; as, to settle a bill of exceptions. **8** To plant with inhabitants, as a new country; people; colonize. **9** To come to rest; alight as from flying. **10** To sink gradually, or cause to sink; subside. **11** To fix one's home or abode; enter upon a fixed habitation, domestic relations, or business. **12** [Pop.] To reduce to good behavior; subdue.
>
> **terrain** noun **1** Battle ground, or a region suited for defense, fortification, etc. **2** A piece or plot of ground; a region or territory viewed with regard to its fitness for some special purpose. **3** A terrane.
>
> *New Practical Standard Dictionary of the English Language*
> Funk & Wagnalls, 1948 Edition

Funk & Wagnalls' definitions of settle and terrain quite efficiently lay out the significant parameters of the present task at hand which is twofold; one, to settle the terrain of this study and to specify the most significant theoretical and research means and methods applied to the task; and, two, to lay out the basic outlines of the means and methods applied by the Zionist Movement[1] in the settling of their colonial settler state's

[1] More accurately, what is recognized as *the* Zionist Movement today was originally a particular branch within the Zionist Movement (including Ben-Gurion and others) that for years was a minority of the Movement, and even rejected by many. They became the founders of the State of Israel and quickly became the hegemonic force within Zionism and the main builders of the State of Israel. Political, Military, Cultural, Religious, Labor, Revisionist were some of the ideological and organizational forms that Zionism took. The indigenous Jews of Palestine for the most part were anti-Zionist for religious or political (as part of the Palestinian national anti-colonial movement) reasons. Throughout this work more detailed historical background is given and reference material cited from various perspectives when it is relevant for purposes of the specific material being dealt with. When I refer to the Zionist Movement or Zionist project or Zionism I am usually referring to that branch of the Zionist movement which became hegemonic with the establishment of the State of Israel. From that point on Zionism, as realized in the State of Israel, became identified with Zionism as a whole and Israel as its expression. With the development of a critical sociology, the Post-Zionists are now breaking the stronghold of this hegemonic Zionist discourse within

terrain *viewed with regard to its…special purpose*, the establishment of a state as a homeland for the Jewish people.[2]

For the leaders of the Zionist Movement to accomplish such a project at a time when the territories of the world were already divided up into independent states, or were territories controlled by imperial states, meant that they had to settle at least three pre-conditions in order for their project to succeed: namely, 1) gain support from an imperial power that had control of and jurisdiction over a territory;[3] 2) convince Jews to go to said territory and arrange to bring them; and 3) manage the relationship with the local

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Israel. See for instance Uri Ram, *Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology: Theory, Ideology, and Identity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995) and *The Time of the 'Post' Nationalism and the Politics of Knowledge in Israel* (Tel-Aviv: RESLING Publishing, 2006) [Hebrew].

[2] "This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign state…ACCORDINGLY WE, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JEWSIH COMMUNITY OF ERETZ-ISRAEL AND THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, ARE HERE ASSEMBLED ON THE DAY OF THE TERMINATION OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OVER ERETZ-ISRAEL AND, BY VIRTUE OF OUR NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHT AND ON THE STRENGTH OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HEREBY DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL." *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*, May 14, 1948. Israel's state Zionism defines the Jewish people as a nation and this grounds Israeli law on nationality and citizenship. I introduce this aspect of Israeli society here and discuss it more thoroughly in chapter 3, "*other than us and unable to be us*: Nation, Nationality and Citizenship."

[3] Leon Pinsker and Theodor Herzl were among those who understood the need for gaining support from a colonial power and advocated for this in the Zionist Movement and congresses. Since the Jews were a people without a land/state they realized that only such a power could grant the Zionists territory and support for building a Jewish national home somewhere in the world. Pinsker and Herzl, who were not religious, were not tied to Palestine as the only possible place for establishing the Jewish state. Herzl tried to get a charter from the Sultan of Turkey (when the Ottoman Empire ruled Palestine) for the establishment of a Jewish homeland; and in 1898 he met with the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, in Istanbul and Palestine for the same purpose. He negotiated with the British regarding the possibility of settling Jews on the island of Cyprus, the Sinai Peninsula, the El Arish region and Uganda. In 1903 British cabinet members suggested the Uganda Program which would give land in Uganda for a Jewish state but, although the Sixth Zionist Congress agreed to investigate the proposal it did not have general support within the Zionist Movement. In *Der Judenstaat* Herzl argued for a Jewish state in either Palestine or Argentina, "one of the most fertile countries in the world." After 1917, with the Balfour Declaration and British colonial support for establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine, the Jewish Territorialist Organization led by Israel Zangwill, who attempted to establish a Jewish homeland wherever possible (with the support of whatever colonial power would grant land and support) went into decline and dissolved in 1925. After 1917, with British support for Jewish immigration to Palestine and for the building of Jewish institutions and a state in waiting, Palestine became the realistic site for the Zionist project.

population to attain their acceptance of such importation, either by negotiation, law or force. Of course the creation of a *Jewish* state—conceived of as exclusively Jewish or at least home to a substantial majority of Jews[4]—would require the implantation of people from other regions of the earth to some specified territory which would obviously already be inhabited, which would in turn require the appropriation of already owned land--through legal means such as purchase or war or confiscation--and either the removal of an existing population or some combination of removal and accommodation. As is known, Palestine became the territorial realization of the Zionist Jewish national homeland and settlers began to arrive while Palestine was still under the Ottomans in the later part of the nineteenth century.

Establishment of settlements in Palestine, acquisition of land, the building of pre-state state institutions, and the creation of a military apparatus seriously began after the British adoption of the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Written during World War I, on the eve of the occupation of Palestine by the British, five years later the League of Nations drafted the Balfour Declaration into the Mandate for Palestine in 1922. After World War I the European colonial powers carved the region into states and under the auspices of the League of Nations placed these newly established entities under colonial Mandatory Governments who were to prepare the populations for self-rule. The residents of

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[4] The "demographic problem" or "demographic crisis", depending on the particular moment, is a central Jewish Israeli concern, since a core ideological justification for Israel's right to be a Jewish State which subordinates the native Palestinian population is the right to majority rule. The formula adopted by Ben-Gurion for the sufficient conditions to establish a state was the acquisition of at least eighty percent of Mandatory Palestine and that no more than twenty percent of the state's population be Palestinian. This is still the rule of thumb within the Jewish Israeli imagination. Therefore, the imagined threat that the Arabs may overrun their majority position is seen as a security threat to the existence of the Jewish State. Whenever the Palestinian population approaches or exceeds twenty percent Jewish society goes into a crisis mode and the "demographic problem" becomes a "demographic crisis", a major governmental and public "security" concern.

Palestine, on the other hand, were placed under the British Mandate Government whose main task was to "be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people…" Colonial support for a Jewish national homeland in Palestine was now in place even though Zionists were few in number and by no means represented world Jewry. To accomplish the task—"the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people"—as in known, a combination of removal and accommodation of the indigenous Palestinian population became the option available to the Zionist project. This is demonstrated in Appendix F which lists the destroyed villages within the domain of Umm al-Fahim, the ethnographic site for this dissertation, and describes what became of them.

Funk and Wagnalls' definition states that a terrain is *a piece or plot of ground; a region or territory viewed with regard to its fitness for some special purpose*. Palestine became in the end the territory most *fit* to serve the Zionist Movement's *special purpose*, aided first by the interests of British colonialism in the region[5] and subsequently those of

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[5] The British Mandate Government off and on permitted massive waves of Jewish immigration into Palestine in support of the Zionist nation-building project. It is now well documented that England had no intention of granting the native Arab population in Palestine sovereignty. Lord Arthur Balfour, author of the Balfour Declaration (the legal basis for Zionist colonization of Palestine) made it clear in a private letter he wrote to Lord Rothchild that Britain never intended to prepare the people of Palestine, that is the indigenous Arab population, for independence: "in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination." Under the League of Nations' de-colonization of the region, originally Palestine was to be included in the independent state of Syria but the British wanted Palestine separated out and under their jurisdiction, most importantly because Palestine's ports were key to their trade route to India and they wanted no other European power to have control of this route. The Zionists found in England the imperial power whose colonial interest in Palestine made them "natural" allies and this alliance provided the Zionists with a solution to meeting the first and to a certain extent the second condition mentioned in the text above. At times the Zionists were in conflict with the British colonial government, especially over Jewish immigration, since the British could not completely ignore the concerns of the indigenous population, but British interest, as clearly stated in the Balfour Declaration, was firmly in support of the Zionist project which as they planned would have divided the country into two

the United States;[6] and this *plot of ground* also most adequately provided the ideological justification for displacing an indigenous population because of the religious and historical ties this region has to the Jewish faith and people. Certainly this terrain has been and remains a *battleground* and *a region suited for defense* and *fortification* as we

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once they were to leave Palestine as the colonial authority, thereby insuring that no independent indigenous Palestine would be forthcoming. In adopting as government policy what was a letter, written in the form of a declaration, from an individual government official, Sir Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, to another individual, Lord Rothchild, Arnold Toynbee said: "We were taking it upon ourselves to give away something that was not ours to give. We were promising rights of some kind in the Palestinian Arabs' country to a third party." And the well-known Jewish writer, Arthur Koestler, summed up the Balfour Declaration in this way: "one nation promised a second the country of a third." Edwin Montagu, the only Jew in the British cabinet when the Balfour Declaration was issued was opposed to it on the grounds, among other things, that it was a capitulation to anti-Semitic bigotry because it suggested that Palestine was the natural place for Jews to be. It is interesting to note that in the Balfour Declaration not once is the word Arab or Palestinian used. Ninety-two percent of the population of Palestine at the time, 1917, was Palestinian and yet Balfour refers to the population as Jews (who are only seven percent and not all of these were Zionists) and non-Jews. Even in 1947, when the United Nations drew up the Partition Plan for Palestine, Jews were approximately one-third of the population, yet the Partition Plan granted them 56 percent of the land (at the time Jews owned only 5.6% of the land in Palestine). In the area designated for the Jewish state about half the population was Palestinian, but by the time the United Nations Partition Plan took effect, May 15, 1948, Zionist military forces had already "ethnically cleansed" this part of Palestine of non-Jews. By the end of the war the Zionists held 78% of the land of Palestine, had destroyed over 500 Palestinian towns and villages, appropriated the businesses and households of innumerable Palestinian owners, turned 750,000-900,000 Palestinians into refugees, and housed a remaining 160,000 Palestinians within the territory under their control. All this is well documented by scholars across all political and ideological perspectives. On "ethnic cleansing" see Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006); Benny Morris' two books on the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-1949* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Walid Khalidi, *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).

[6] Support from the United States first began in 1949 "on the eve of the election" in the form of a $100 million loan guarantee to Ben-Gurion's party, MAPAI, to help counter Mapam's influence (see Shindler 2008, 67). Ben-Gurion successfully marginalized the socialists and communists at that time by forming a coalition government with the United Religious Front which included religious, bourgeois progressive liberals and Sephardim. Today Israel is the single largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid nearly one-third of the total direct bi-lateral aid, roughly six billion dollars a year. US aid is both economic and military and also involves technological transfers. The November, 2006 assessment of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces designates five main areas of consideration (or scenarios—all of which position Israel in a belligerent stance towards its Arab neighbors and prescribe preparation for war in 2007). The fifth, "Advanced Western equipment in armies of the region" states: "the United States will try to preserve the principle of 'quality advantage' in favor of the IDF, by making available the most advanced systems to Israel, while delivering to (currently) moderate states systems lacking the more sophisticated upgrades." Amir Oren, "IDF girds for possibility of war with Syria, Hezbollah in 2007," *haaretz*, November 6, 2006.The Israelis dropped over a million US cluster bombs on Lebanon during the 2006 hostilities between Israel and Hizb-allah.

witness Israel's construction of a very thick and formidable concrete wall, the Separation Fence as it is called, which closes in Israel's population within the boundaries of Israel defined by the Green Line and Israel's settler-citizens in the West Bank while closing out the Palestinian population.[7]

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[7] A Separation Fence is being build which separates the Jewish settlements in the West Bank from their Palestinian neighbors and serves to extend the borders of Israel, as they have been defined by the Green line since 1967, to include over fifty percent of the land of the West Bank. It is serving de facto as a new enlarged border for the State of Israel, especially since the Jewish settlers are already Israeli citizens. By building the Wall and settling the terrain with Israeli Jewish citizens the preconditions for the illegal annexation of this part of the West Bank have been put in place as a fact on the ground. Henry Kissinger has stated this intent explicitly in his article "In Israel's Fence, an Opening to Accord," *Washington Post*, Dec. 22, 2003. If Israel is able to do this the State would acquire more territory but few, if any, additional undesirable others so their position as a majority would be maintained. Many who support this Separation Plan are willing to give up the idea of acquiring all of Eretz-Israel and some among these supporters would even agree on the basis of this annexation to establish international borders. The Separation policy is also seen as an answer to the "demographic threat" to a Jewish majority posed by the presence of Arabs, especially those who are citizens. Land cited for annexation needs to be cleared of Palestinians to insure the Jewish majority. The building of the Wall began while Sharon was Prime Minister in 2001. "On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister. 'That same night I got a call from Sharon's people asking me to meet him as soon as possible,' says Prof. Arnon Sofer, 'and they asked me to bring the maps.' The map of the wall, as published in 'Yediot Aharonot' can be found here: www.gush-shalom.org/thewall. The maps that Sharon's people asked for were the maps that Prof. Sofer, a geographer at Haifa University and the prophet of 'the Arab demographic danger,' presented in a lecture at the Herzliya Conference a few months earlier. Borders should be set immediately for the State of Israel, Sofer said at the time, otherwise the Arabs will inundate us and there will be no Jewish entity here anymore. The West Bank, he explained, must be split into three parts, three cantons, basically three sausages. One sausage from Jenin to Ramallah, a second sausage from Bethlehem to Hebron and a third tiny sausage around the city of Jericho. An electric fence must be put up around these three Palestinian sausages, which extend on less than half the West Bank, and finish the business… Something strange has been happening in recent months to the separation fence. What began thanks to a campaign of the Israeli Left and Center under Barak-style slogans of 'we are here, they are there,' it has become the baby of the Sharon government. The same Sharon who during the unity government opposed building the fence [for fear this would make it impossible to acquire all of Eretz-Israel] and was dragged into it almost against his will, on any given day has 500 bulldozers at work, paving and building one of the largest projects in the history of the country, perhaps the largest. The Bar Lev line, built after the Six-Day War on the banks of the Suez Canal, pales beside the first 150 kilometers of the separation fence, which is to be completed in two months. It certainly pales beside the next 500 kilometers left to complete the project… The settlers, who feared that the fence would be made on the Green Line and leave them outside the camp, can be pleased. Judging by the work already done and the Defense Ministry's maps, for a long time now the fence has not been along the Green Line but is a system of fences that will imprison hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in barbed wire-enclosed enclaves. The first stage of the fence already threatens to make extinct the livelihood of tens of thousands of Palestinians, after the fence swallowed up their land. Behind the separation fence are thousands of personal tragedies, which are entirely invisible to the Israeli public. Who here cares about farmers like Nimr Ahmed, who in one day lost access to his lands, which he and his fathers had worked for generations. Who cares about a shepherd like Naji Yousef who was forced to sell his sheep because the fence blocked access to pasture. Who is upset that the principal of a high school like Mohammed Shahin of Ras a-Tira, was forced to use donkeys to bring textbooks from Kalkilya since all the roads were blocked by the fence. Who cares about a doctor from Tulkarm who drives five hours every morning from his house to his job in Kalkilya, a distance of 15 kilometers, because he is forced to! go by way of Jenin, Nablus, the Jordan Valley, Ramallah and the trans-

Funk & Wagnalls' definition of settle contains key elements pertinent to the task of any settler project, and as such is helpful in regard to a study of Israel's colonial settling of its terrain both in relation to the settling of Jewish people and in relation to settling the matter of the undesired indigenous population of non-Jews. The Zionist task in constructing *a new country* was *to plant* [the terrain] *with* [Jewish] *inhabitants, to people, to colonize*. This implantation needs to be *place*[d] *in permanent relations or in fixed conditions; put in order* so that settlers can *enter upon a fixed habitation, domestic relations, or business*. Such matters must be settled amongst the Jewish settlers and between them and the native non-Jewish residents. So, first, the natural conditions of a suitable place for people to inhabit had to be settled and then the task of planting people had and continues to be settled. For the individuals who take on the task of importing themselves they must settle the matter, *determine in the mind, as a purpose or belief* such an undertaking and *come to a decision* to carry this out. Both the physical ground and the mental and ideological ground have got to be settled. Once done, this settled terrain requires the law *to make over as a right of property by legal act* and *to determine the language of* such settlement and if it suits the purpose to *ascertain* legally what *to pay as a balance due* or *to adjust differences* as the terrain is settled.[8] The task of establishing a state, of *putting it in order, to free* [it] *from turbidity,* a condition natural to such a task of colonization, also requires means *to subdue* the colonized; in our case, that means to

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Samaria road. This kind of occupation perhaps doesn't kill. Not right away, anyway. But it does destroy the soul." From Meron Rappaport, "A Wall in their Heart," *Yedioth Aharonoth,* May 23, 2003, M16; brackets mine.

[8] To "validate" the expropriation of Palestinian land during the war and after the establishment of the State, in 1953 the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law was passed. See David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 58-59.

*cause* the unwelcome Arabs who are "Our Arabs" *to sink; to come to rest; to subside* as "Good Arabs,"[9] *to reduce* [them] *to good behavior* by *plac*[ing them] *in permanent relations or in fixed conditions; to put* [them] *in order*. In the course of my research I came to understand that ghettoization was and is the key means of putting this undesired population *in order* and of insuring the maintenance of the separateness—also a form of ghettoization--of those areas that have been and are being *colonize*[d]; *plant*[ed] *with* [Jewish] *inhabitants*. By reading the dictionary definition of *settle*, the *terrain* of this dissertation was in a most helpful way *settled*.

Thus this dissertation concerns the construction of a modern ghetto-state composed of ghettos. Its particular focus is on the construction of the ghettos of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship.[10] The ghettoization of Palestinians is the flipside of the ghettoization of the Jews of Israel as this process has been defined by and carried out under the leadership of the hegemonic Zionist architects of the Jewish nationalist, state-building project. The ghettoization of these two peoples within one state is an intimately entwined process, interdependent and mutually defining, though, of course, the Palestinians are subordinated to and excluded as partners in what is a Jews only national project.[11]

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[9] The expressions "Our Arabs" and "Good Arabs" are commonly used in Israeli discourse and are considered non-pejorative terms by Jewish Israelis.

[10] I have borrowed this expression "Palestinians under Israeli citizenship" from an unpublished paper by Ghassan Fawzi. I use Mr. Fawzi's term rather than "Palestinian citizens of Israel" or "Israeli Palestinians" since it more accurately captures the relationship Palestinians have to the state and the territory of Israel than do the other expressions.

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[11] See footnote 2 which excerpts from *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*.

Ghettoization is a geo-political economic construction of social space. As Henri Lefebvre clarified "space is neither a 'subject' nor an 'object' but rather a social reality—that is to say, a set of relations and forms" and a history of space "must account for both representational space and representations of space, but above all for their interrelationships and their links with social practice" (Lefebvre 1991, 116). Quite simply, human beings are spatial and can only actualize themselves in their social practice spatially—"it is at once a precondition and a result of social superstructures" (Lefebvre 1991 85). "[S]ocial relations of production have a social existence to the extent that they have a spatial existence; they project themselves into space, becoming inscribed there, and in the process producing that space itself." (Lefebvre 1991, 129). But equally humans are and act temporally within history, so that a concept of space as "a specific space produced by forces (i.e. productive forces) deployed within a (social and determined/determining) spatial practice" (Lefebvre 1991, 171) is needed. Lefebvre further insists that although "Ideologies dictate the locations of particular activities… ideologies do not produce space; rather they are in space, and of it. It is forces of production and the relations of production that produce social space" (Lefebvre 1991, 210).

Combining Lefebvre's conception of space with Gramsci's notion of social formation as a process that unfolds through social practice over time, rather than as an "event" in history or a set structure within which individuals act, form the key theoretical cornerstones of this dissertation. Israel's social formation is a continuing process of nation building, an ongoing work of producing space *by productive forces deployed within a social determined/determining spatial practice* producing a ghetto-nation of

ghettos. A third key theoretical stance is exemplified by Nitzan and Bichler's study of Israeli capitalist formation by returning to "political economy" since "economic" development is at once "political" development and control of economic resources concomitantly constitutes who has political power within society and the state.

Ghettoization is a specific space that restricts communities who are demarcated within a society's political, social, economic and cultural formations, the main outlines of which are determined within the objectives of the hegemonic social classes and centers of power within a society. Chapter 1 of this dissertation, "The Ghetto," interrogates the conceptualizations developed within the literature on urban sociology that deals with segregated locales as a sociological object and situates the applicability of theorizing the Palestinian locales as the production of ghettoized space within the process of social formation of the Israeli nation-state. Chapter 2 describes how this process unfolded during the first two decades of Israeli state building when the Palestinian population was restricted to "security zones" under military rule as an "enemy within". Chapter 3 deals with the legal construction of separation, especially in regard to nationality and citizenship. Chapter 4 specifically interrogates the representations of space within the dominant academic and popular discourse concerning Palestinians under Israeli citizenship, most evident in the notion of the ghetto as "village" and the Palestinian as "villager". And chapter 5 introduces the reader to the inner everyday life of the ghetto inhabitants of Umm al-Fahim, the second largest Palestinian town in Israel. This is complimented by the interviews of inhabitants that are recorded in Appendices D and E.

Before I could accomplish this task I had to explicate and make sense of social practices and constructs--like the separation of nationality from citizenship, such that no

citizen in Israel, whether Jewish or Palestinian, is an "Israeli" national legally (the subject of chapter 3)--in order to derive the conceptual apparatus needed to understand the content of the social relations and processes that were underlying what I was witnessing on the ground and in the literature on *Arabs in Israel*. I had to interrogate and analyze the terrain of Israel, its historical formation and what I was experiencing and what I was reading about concerning Israeli social processes. I did this while living in Israel in a Palestinian ghetto, Umm al-Fahim, for almost five years as a housewife and then a sociology graduate student and housewife. During this time I experienced the daily life of Palestinians as a resident and family member while I also traveled back and forth between the two spatially separated peoples, Jews and Palestinians. My position as both an insider and an outsider proved most beneficial once I took on my research task. As an insider I was part of and privy to all aspects of daily life and as an outsider I had to learn the inner workings of daily life between and among people in the ghetto and our relation to the outside world, not as something that I simply took for granted—this is the way the world works--but as something I had to learn and learn to understand. Therefore, both out of necessity and then also as a researcher, I was both a participating observer and an observing participant. My lived experience in Israel, particularly within a Palestinian ghetto, and my work in the field was determinant in my thinking as I made my way analytically through the data and the literature on *Arabs in Israel*. The empirical data and my lived experience along with the historical evidence led me to the conceptualization of Israel as a colonial settler state within capitalist development constituted as a ghetto nation-state composed of ghettos; and that this process of state formation, nation-building, was an ongoing process involving the colonization of the terrain and

capitalization of the forces of production. But, to come to this assessment required that I historicize the apparent since what I was seeing and experiencing in the immediate was also itself the product or result of preceding processes. As Harvey E. Goldberg and Hagar Salamon point out:

> It is now apparent that the study of complex society requires simultaneous attention to several interconnected fields….Bourdieu (1990) has utilized the term 'field' to refer to a culturally structured domain of interests and action. In doing so, Bourdieu has insisted upon the historically constituted nature of such fields. Thus, in addition to following social links to wider political and economic contexts, social theory is challenged to find ways of incorporating 'the past' into the purview of ongoing social and cultural processes of coalescence and conflict (Goldberg and Salamon 2002, 128).[12]

In Appendix A, where I elaborate those theoretical and methodological influences most important to this work, I also discuss the historical method applied so that I could historicize the subject of this dissertation without turning it into a history of the Zionist Movement or of the Israeli state and society. How I undertook to do this owes a great deal to Gramsci's understanding of social formation and hegemony. Appendices B and C deal with my research methods and areas of inquiry and myself as a participating observer and observing participant respectively.

Throughout Israeli literature on *Arabs in Israel* the separation of Jews and Arabs (whom I shall refer to as Palestinians in this dissertation except when I am speaking from the standpoint of the typical Jewish Israeli citizen or scholar) is the point of departure for analysis, whatever the writer's ideological or political orientation may be or scholarly discipline. Quite simply, Jews and Palestinians are physically, linguistically, religiously, nationally, and culturally demarcated as separate and distinct in real terms, in social practice and in the minds of people. But, Palestinians, as the subordinated within the

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[12] See also P. Bourdieu, *In Other Words. Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) and A. Gupta and J. Ferguson, eds., *Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

whole of society, speak Hebrew, watch Israeli TV, work in the Jewish centers for Jewish bosses, are subject to the same laws as Jews while certain laws and policies pertain only to them and others from which they are excluded only to Jews, form political alliances with Jews, are members of the Histadrut (the national trade union), have Jewish friends, are just as likely to be hit by missiles during war as Jewish Israelis, vote for Zionist parties, and some even work for security and voluntarily join the army. Though their lives are entwined and both are citizens of the same state they are not so in mutually reciprocal and equal ways.

What distinguishes mainstream scholarship on *Arabs in Israel* from those doing critical explorations and analyses into Israel's culture of separation is that the former take separation as naturally given, a distinctness that is culturally rooted and historically given to Israel, as morally grounded in the right of the Jewish people for exclusive "national" self-determination, and as a general feature of modern societies which are conceptualized as consisting of "majorities" and "minorities", while the critical schools of scholarship see separateness as a socially constructed phenomena rooted in the specific exclusionary policies of the Jewish nationalist, Zionist state-building project. For the most part both sides of the discourse, except for an ever growing emerging few, begin with separation and exclusion as analytically given, and therefore proceed on the basis that there are two realities requiring separate fields of study, though their social and political assessment of these realities within Israel diverge.

Therefore, research and analysis based on separation as the conceptual starting point has led to the construction of two separate fields of study—the study of Israel proper, i.e. Jewish society, and the study of the Arabs of Israel. These two fields of

research and analysis have their own lexicon of notions, concepts, methods, premises and style, typically based, on the one hand, on the established separation of the study of the modern us—sociology, and the pre-modern or traditional them—anthropology. On the other hand, within each academic discipline separate studies are conducted in regard to the two different populations based on the premise that their circumstances and predispositions are fundamentally different. Chapter 4, "Settling the Cultural Terrain of Nation-State Building: Social Science & the State as Brokers of Culture," dissects the lexicon of Israel's culture of separation and its manifestation in popular and academic discourse. Such presuppositions are finally breaking down as more and more scholars analyze the place of Palestinians within Israeli society as just that, a part of Israeli society whose place is integral to the study of that society and explained within in it just as Jews, non-Jewish Russian immigrants, non-citizen Palestinians and foreign guest workers, whose lives are mediated within that society's social relations of production which is itself mediated within the world at large, also make up the complex of what is the totality of Israeli society.

I am not the first to refer to Israel itself as a ghetto-nation or to characterize the Palestinian locales within Israel's Green Line and the Occupied Territories as ghettos, but this appellation has been descriptive rather than sociologically explanatory. In fact, a variety of terms have been used to capture the socio-spatial culture of separation and exclusion characteristic of Israeli society. Gil Eyal in his book, *The Disenchantment of the Orient*, writes:

> It was typically the case that after the cities were occupied by the IDF the Palestinians who remained behind were forcibly concentrated in one place, a sort of Arab ghetto. Next to them now sprouted concentrations of impoverished Jewish families, typically immigrants from Arab countries. In Haifa, for example, the Palestinians were moved to the Wadi Nisnas neighborhood, and within a few months an immigrant slum, mainly inhabited by North African Jews, sprang up

> in the adjacent Wadi Salib neighborhood. Similar slums emerged in Jerusalem along the no-man's-land separating the Israeli and Jordanian halves of the city, as well as in Jaffa and Lod next to the Palestinian ghetto (Eyal 2006, 139).

Gershom Gorenberg uses the term "entrapped minority". Dan Rabinowitz characterizes the Palestinian citizens as a "trapped minority, trapped between a host but hostile state which reluctantly offers them citizenship and an absent, scattered mother nation with little political and economic weight" and this he calls a form of "neo-colonial domination."[13] Leila Farsakh "prefers" the use of "Bantustans" since "The term 'Bantustanization'…emphasizes the economic dimension of Palestinian 'cantonization,' especially the role of regulating labor flows in shaping the nature of the Palestinian entity" (Farsakh 2002, 15). She is looking at the situation of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but what she describes has already taken place for Palestinians under Israeli citizenship. Meron Benvenisti refers to the Palestinian enclaves in the Occupied Territories as "bedroom cities" and in an article entitled "All They Wanted was a Dip in the Sea" he writes: "It now emerges that the 'separation' slogan is not some sort of political strategy but rather an entire social philosophy and a guideline for planners: We are over here, in our national parks – and they are over there, in their native reservations." On their website, *Mid-East Realities* also refers to the Palestinian enclaves in the Occupied Territories as "reservations" writing: "But the reality of what the Israelis are doing is putting the Palestinians on confined and controlled reservations, carefully and intensely restricting them from being able to even visit the great bulk of what just a few years ago was their country." (8/11/00) Earlier in a February, 1997 editorial the editors wrote concerning Jerusalem that "The Palestinians…are simply to be penned up in their

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[13] Dan Rabinowitz, "The Palestinian citizens of Israel, the concept of trapped minority and the discourse of transnationalism in anthropology," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24, no. 1 (January 2001): 64-85.

few remaining enclaves—a kind of shrinking, isolated, economically deprived Arab ghetto within an expanding Jewish Jerusalem." In April of the same year they write another editorial entitled "The Ghettos of Palestine" including now not only Jerusalem but Gaza, Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah and others as it becomes "more and more difficult for Palestinians in the occupied territories even to travel between cities. In fact well over 90% of the Palestinian population is prohibited from even visiting Jerusalem [since 1993], and it is actually illegal for those few who do to stay overnight in the city." The Israeli anthropologist Henry Rosenfeld has called the Palestinian villages and towns inside the Green Line "worker dormitories". Ian Lustick wrote of "segmentation", "isolation" and "fragmentation" in his book, *Arabs in the Jewish State*. Officially and in the literature Palestinian villages and towns are still at times referred to as "security zones". David Grossman uses the legal term "present absentees" to describe the Palestinian citizens of Israel.[14] Others refer to the Palestinian enclaves as "rurban" spaces where proletarianization without urbanization has taken place such that these locales remain "rural" but without an agricultural base. And still others refer to Israel as an apartheid state.

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[14] "Present absentees" is a legal category referring to Palestinians who were present in Israel when their property was deemed "absentees' property" and therefore confiscated by the State. This applied to around 75,000 persons most of whom did not have their property returned to them. See David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 57. The term "present absentee" is used by some Israelis as a synonym for Palestinians in Israel. Since there are over 100 Palestinian villages and towns in Israel that are "unrecognized" by the government with an estimated population of as much as 70,000 people, the notion of "present absentees" has real meaning. The government does not provide road access to these villages, electricity, sewage, plumbing, running water. In a review of David Grossman's book *Present Absentees*, critic Hillel Halkin writes, "…we in this country know far more about the recent wave of immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union, even though we have been host to them for only a short time, than we do about the Palestinians who have been living in our midst for nearly 45 years. The later are indeed, in the words of Grossman's title, 'present absentees'…" Hillel Halkin, "The Silent Minority" in *The Jerusalem Report*, May 21, 1992. The unconscious absorption of Zionist culture and thinking down to every detail is even evident in this review. Zionist mythologizing about the eternal Jewish relationship to Eretz Israel as residents is operative when Halkin writes "we have been *host* to" *the Palestinians* who "have been living *in our midst* for 45 years" when what is really the case in regard to the native Palestinian population is the reverse. [Italics mine]

James Ron uses the concept "ghetto" in the title of his 2003 book *Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel*. He does not apply the ghetto concept analytically in this study, but rather uses it descriptively: "Ghettos…are ethnic or national enclaves securely trapped within the dominant state." Palestinians are, as he correctly states, "securely trapped within Israel's embrace." Ghettos for Ron are arenas where "ethnic policing" rather than "ethnic cleansing" takes place (Ron 2003, 194, 197). This work is a powerful description of the situations he discusses and his assessments must be taken seriously, but he does not explain how and why such situations arise historically and what historical social process or processes they represent. In the end, what one sees from his work is the breakdown of a state's internal and external institutional boundaries that turns into a battle over borders played out in the arena of frontiers. It is nationalism gone wild, in which a dominant *majority* (which in itself is not homogeneous ideologically or economically, a point that Ron does not make in his book) sets out to subordinate an *other* which is a numerical *minority* or reduced to one which it then segregates or, in the worse case scenario, attempts to ethnically cleanse completely from the map. What Ron describes is all too real and becoming more and more a common feature of today's geo-political landscape but the historical specificities that underlie the dynamic and explain the "necessity" of this process are not what he has set out to do, a task which also needs to be done.

The various spatialized conceptualizations pertaining to the situation of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship have as their complement conceptualizations which aim to define the type of state formation that Israel has developed into. The government decrees that Israel is a "Jewish and democratic" state and has written this into law.

Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, the founding father of the hegemonic sociological paradigm of Israeli society, coined the term "democratic pluralism" which is still the main paradigm applied today. This conceptualization was constructed in relation to Israeli society "proper" which simply ignored the Palestinian presence altogether—relegating their study to a different field with different methods of analysis. Others modify or challenge, particularly the post-Zionists who have emerged during the last two decades, this established dogma and have analytically derived alternative notions to define the Israeli state such as "ethnocracy" (Yiftachel), "ethnic democracy" (Smooha), "ethnic republic" (Peled), "internal colonialism" (Zuriek). Dan Rabinowitz analyzes Palestinians in Israel as "occupying a border area" by which means he "attempts to dislodge their case from traditional state vs. minority idioms and to examine it in the theoretical light of transnationalism." This approach leads him to conclude, in his study of Palestinian toddlers in the Upper Nazareth nursery school system, that "rather than cultural hybridization, creolisation and the gradual collapse of essentialist partitions between the dominant Israeli state and a subordinate Palestinian culture, the formal education system which the state imposes on the border in fact enhances a pluralist, liberal regime of neo-colonial domination" (Rabinowitz 1998, 144). All agree that the Arab or Palestinian citizens are in a "special" position vis-à-vis the "majority society" though, of course, there are nuances and differences regarding their analytic systems and assessments about the society's capacity to transform and transcend its current form, as well as what needs to be changed.

In Israel it is not uncommon to hear ordinary Jewish residents of the mixed towns and cities, like Haifa or Lydda, call the Palestinian quarters, the ghetto. Actually it is a

misnomer to call these towns "mixed" since in these towns Jews and Palestinians are not "mixed" but live in separate quarters. Smadar Sharon in "Planners, the State, and the Shaping of National Space in the 1950s" records from the documents of the period that

> The places where it was impossible to ignore the Palestinians, as early as 1949, were the mixed cities. During the period of military rule in these cities, the authorities invested efforts to separate the Jewish population and the Arab one. The Arabs were moved into a defined area which was called "ghetto" in the documents of the period…This is what emerges for instance from a document written by Michael Qon, a man of the Planning Department after a tour that he made to Majdal (Ashkelon) in July 1949 in order to collect information 'on the possibilities of the immediate settling and development.': 'City Zones: About 2,600 Arabs are enclosed in the old dense quarter. In the south side of the city-A modern quarter whose houses are good, of 'European' type (henceforth the former area will be referred to as the Arab area and the latter the Jewish area)…In the proximity of the Arab area there are close to 200 empty houses which are suitable to house the Arabs who are pressed into the 'Ghetto'. Some of the houses are fit to house Jews.' This is from A"M, H56, G-2705, file 6. In 1950 the Arabs who remained in Majdal were expelled. A different dynamic developed at Lud (Lydda). Ben Noriely (2005) describes in his article the relationship between Arabs and Jewish Arabs who lived together in the Arab 'Ghetto' of Lydda in the fifties, and the persistent attempts of the state to separate the two populations (Sharon 2006, 44-45).

One could say that the Jewish and the Palestinian ghettos in the "mixed" locales exist side by side, and often the Oriental Jews live in slums adjacent to the Palestinian ghettos, but of course, for the most part, jobs, governmental offices, hospitals, philharmonic and theaters, cinemas, universities and colleges are all located in the Jewish quarters of these towns. Although this usage of "ghetto" by Jewish residents is slang, they have captured correctly the social structure present and they have done so directly, rather than inventing new terms, no matter how descriptive such terms may be. In the vernacular they make use of the analytical concept that adequately applies to the study of these locales and the population that resides within them. During the first years of the state, as Sharon demonstrates above, "ghetto" was used by Israeli authorities to refer to the Palestinian areas which were set apart as "closed zones" or security zones". These militarized areas were established to administer and govern the "enemy within" even as this "fifth column" was granted citizenship. The military had exclusive rule over these

people who were not subject to the protection of civilian law but the Emergency Regulations, since these people were considered a "security" matter. The military government worked directly with Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister. For two decades Palestinians under Israeli citizenship were restricted to these residential locales and Jews were restricted from entering these areas. Such separation put in place the permanency of the ghetto structure and the general culture of separation which characterizes Israeli society and state to this day. This historical background is the subject of chapter 2.

Building on the various critical endeavors that address the separation and exclusion of the Palestinian citizenry within the Jewish state, the task of this dissertation was to discover the unifying theoretical underpinnings that could bring the mediated totality of social processes together in order to explain the underlying complex of social relations and practices seen on the surface of Israeli society and in the activities of everyday life. Although, as I stated above, I am not the first to characterize the Palestinian enclaves as ghettos, to my knowledge, I am the first to theorize the social process of Israeli society's formation as a modern expression of ghettoization as it is carried out in the ongoing story of Israel's nation-building endeavor as a colonial settler society within capitalist development. This story is not yet finished. That such is the case is seen even after "a process of partial decolonization has been launched by the Oslo Accords of 1993. A clear indication that the colonial drive has not spent itself yet is the doubling of the Israeli settler population in the OT since 1993" (Shafir and Peled 2002, 336). Since borders remain unresolved Israeli leaders are able (and the international comity of nations continues to allow) to set the conditions de facto for Israel to expand territorially by illegally annexing more Palestinian land, removing native Palestinians

from these lands, settling Jewish Israeli citizen-settlers on these lands, and ghettoizing those Palestinians remaining within the areas under their control. The Palestinian enclaves in Israel are a contemporary example of ghettoization, borrowing from Abram Leon, of a subordinated people-class and the ghettoization of this population is integral to an understanding of the construction of the Israeli state and society within its specific historical formation.

During the course of producing this dissertation I amassed a great deal of ethnographic material dealing with the inner life of the ghetto of Umm al Fahim and the ways that the dominant institutions contribute to organizing this social space as well as how the inhabitants through their self-activity reproduce themselves within the ghetto. Much of this material could not be presented in this dissertation given the limitations of space. Broadly speaking the "raw material" for this work has been a combination of "ideological representations, knowledge already acquired, the specificity of the concrete situations studied" (Castells 1997, 3). I had to decide what aspects of the production of ghetto space were most essential to elaborating this thesis in what is a first approximation to the question. Throughout the work I draw on the ethnographic material and most particularly in chapter 5, "Ahlan wa Sahlan: Welcome to Umm al-Fahim," where a Palestinian ghetto is directly the subject. I agree with Loïc J.D. Wacquant that

> the analyst must explicate and display in some detail the concrete mode of structuring social relations and representations operative within the ghetto—the work of *collective self-production*—whereby its residents endow their world with form, meaning and purpose, rather than simply report that this mode differs from those that hold sway in other sectors of society. It also entails showing how the *activities of dominant institutions*, public bureaucracies and welfare offices, schools and hospital, which are so conspicuously absent from the normal social science of the 'inner city', contribute powerfully to organizing the social space of the ghetto in particular and particularly destabilizing ways. It therefore involves recognizing, and specifying, the institutional bases and limits of the situated agency of ghetto residents, so that their practices and life forms emerge not as mere derivations of constraints that can be 'read off' structural conditions but as product of their active engagement with the external and internal social forces that crosscut and mould their world (Wacquant 1997, 347).

Much more work along these lines is needed and I could only indicate such things as "the work of *collective self-production*" that Wacquant speaks of. Interviews with residents of Umm al-Fahim recorded in Appendices D and E help remedy this to some extent. Nor have I been able to in all instances absorb the density, dimensionality and fullness of Henri Lefebvre's notion of produced space, but again, the elements are indicated and beg for further research and exploration. But, as Manuel Castells says: "The main thing is not so much to prove a point from the outset as to give rise to a dynamic that gradually opens up a new field of research that responds to the questions that are now being put to us by increasingly explosive urban contradictions" (Castells 1979, ix). The contradictions presented to the people of Israel/Palestine and humanity are indeed "explosive". So, along with Castells I say that this dissertation

> offers only the beginnings of a theoretical transformation of empirical raw material, the necessary minimum to indicate the direction the work might take…The only possible point of the effort expended is to reveal, through a diversity of themes and situations, the emergence of the same problematic throughout its articulation (Castells 1979, 3)..

And, although one might

> see here the concrete illustration of a theoretical system, complete and offered as a model…the production of knowledge does not proceed from the establishment of a system, but through the creation of a series of theoretical tools that are never validated by their coherence, but by their fruitfulness in the analysis of concrete situations (Castells 1979, 3).

# Chapter 1

## The Ghetto

> As an 'island' culture, a minority embedded in and subordinate to a majority group, the shtetl [Palestinian ghetto] functions always within a conditioning element. In certain areas and in certain situations it is absolutely influenced by the 'ocean' culture, as an island is coast-carved, storm-tossed and occasionally inundated by the surrounding waters. At any time its general climate is affected by them. Yet to a large extent it leads a life of its own.
>
> The two groups, minority and majority, recognize different values, follow different customs, and to some extent have been subject to different laws. In Eastern Europe [Israel] there have always been special decrees aimed specifically at the Jews [Palestinians], to enforce certain observances or more often to restrict movement or residence and to prohibit certain activities...Where they might live, where they might go, what they might do for a living have been stringently limited, with major and much-discussed effects on their habits, behavior and attitudes, and on the stereotypes generally held about them. That legal edict has on occasion been compounded by officially condoned massacre has intensified the traits of the 'island' culture...
>
> You try anything, but anything must be within the area available. The limitations on means of earning a livelihood have edicts...sometimes strenuously enforced, sometimes temporarily disregarded, their joint effect has been to prohibit the Jews of Eastern Europe [Palestinians of Israel] from owning and operating the sources of raw materials, from travel and from residence in large cities or on land.
>
> Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog,
> *Life Is With People: The Culture of the Shtetl*[1]

The precise history of the word "ghetto" is not known. Originally the ghetto pertained to segregated areas inhabited by Jews. Apparently it entered the English language either from the Italian "getto", foundry, or a shortened diminutive version of the Italian word "borghetto" which means a "settlement outside city walls." The possibility that it originates in "getto" comes from the fact that "the first ghetto [Jewish] founded in Venice in 1516 was on the site of a foundry."[2] Its first appearance in the English language, cited by *The Compact Oxford English Dictionary*, occurs in 1611 by Coryat in *Crudities*: "The place where the fraternity of the Jews dwelleth together, which is called

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[1] Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog, *Life is With People: Culture of the Shtetl* (New York: Schocken Books, 1952), 214-15, 242; brackets mine.

[2] *The Compact Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (1991), s.v. "ghetto."; also confirmed by John Ayto, *Dictionary of Word Origins* (New York: Arcade Publishing, Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 254.

the Ghetto."

According to the *Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary*, a ghetto is "any section of a city in which many members of some national or racial group lives, or to which they are restricted."[3] Ghetto (and ghettoize) is also a transitive verb: "to restrict to a ghetto" or "to cause to become a ghetto." The various dictionaries emphasize that it is an activity of "putting", "keeping", or "restricting" people to a locale. "To put or keep (people) in a ghetto" is the definition given in *The Compact Oxford English Dictionary*. In this dictionary the noun is defined as "A quarter in a city, esp. a thickly populated slum area, inhabited by a minority group or groups, usu. as a result of economic or social pressures; an area, etc., occupied by an isolated group; an isolated or segregated group, community, or area." In the *Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language*, a ghetto pertains to "some minority group" and they are restricted to a section of the city "by economic pressure or social discrimination."[4]

Fusfeld and Bates, in *The Political Economy of the Urban Ghetto*, maintain that the ghetto has three chief characteristics. "Its people are clearly recognizable as racial or national minorities. It is poor. And there are cultural differences." In a longer passage that opens their chapter on "The Economic Dynamics of the Ghetto" they write:

> The urban ghetto is a depressed and underdeveloped enclave within a prosperous and progressive economy. It produces little that can be sold outside the ghetto other than low-wage labor. Underdevelopment is preserved by a continuous drain of income and resources that keeps the ghetto poor. The pool of low-wage labor is preserved by barriers that make exit difficult outside the ghetto. These flows of income, resources, and people interact with conditions of poverty and underdevelopment in a system of circular causation that maintains the ghetto as a characteristic feature of the national economy (Fusfeld and Bates 1984, 2, 136).

Louis Wirth addresses, in his discussion of "The Ghetto" in *On Cities and Social*

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[3] *Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (1983), s.v. "ghetto."

[4] *Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language*, 2nd ed. (1970), s.v. "ghetto."

*Life*, what he terms the "natural history" of the Jewish ghetto from the point of view that such study will "throw light on a number of related phenomena, such as the origin of segregated areas and the development of local communities in general." He states that "From the standpoint of the sociologist the ghetto as an institution is of interest first of all because it represents a prolonged case study in isolation. It may be regarded as a form of accommodation through which a minority has effectually been subordinated to a dominant group" (Wirth 1964, 85). A main characteristic of the ghetto for Wirth is the residential concentration of a specific group or groups into segregated localized area(s). These, he states, exist throughout the world from the Little Sicilys to the Black Belts, from Chinatowns to the Gold Coasts.

These approaches, definitions and descriptions are all relevant to the present study. Palestinians under Israeli citizenship live in segregated locales and quarters within cities. They are a minority numerically, typically poor, and culturally differentiated from the hegemonic Israeli culture. For the first twenty years of statehood they were under military rule and restricted in their movement to and from the ghetto and, though the military government has been removed, they continue to be restricted by "economic pressure and social discrimination." The Palestinian areas are economically depressed in the midst of a "progressive economy" and produce little except low-wage labor. Shlomo Swirski's report, "Place of Residence and Wages in Israel," for 1997, shows that 47 percent of wage earners in Umm al-Fahim (the segregated locale which serves as the main ethnographic site of this dissertation) earn the minimum wage or less; this is well

over the national average for that year which was 33.7 percent.[5] Only two Palestinian localities out of seventy-one had less than the national average. The same trend, though not as severe, appears in the development towns, which are home to mostly non-European Jews, where only three of twenty-five were below the national average for wage earners earning the minimum wage or less. The report also shows that although Jewish and Palestinian men's average monthly wages start in the same range (3,683 for Jews and 3,660 for Palestinians), the average end point is dramatically different: namely, 15,675 for Jewish men and 6,568 for Palestinian men. The figures speak for themselves and, since poverty has only been increasing in Israel over the last decade, it could be safely assumed that the situation has only worsened.

Resources, income, and people flow from the ghetto to the center and a system of circular causation maintains the ghetto as a characteristic of the Israeli national economy. Swirski's report also shows that "There is a strong relationship in Israel between class and place of residence." If 47 percent of wage earners are making the minimum wage or less and the others are earning 41.9 percent what the majority of men are earning, than clearly the ghetto as a social space is a proletarian enclave and this is without figuring in the unemployed. Following the line of thinking presented by Wirth, the Palestinian ghettos are a form of accommodation which reproduces forms of domination and subordination; but what is being "accommodated" here, more fundamentally, are not ethnically or nationally differentiated people who are glossed as "minorities" and "majorities" due to numerical counts, but the various classes within Israeli society that

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[5] Shlomo Swirski, "Place of Residence and Wages in Israel: 1997 Average Wage by Locality and Gender Proportion of Minimum Wage Earners by Locality," in *ADVA Center Information on Equality and Social Justice in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Adva Center, April 2000).

are stratified and segregated along ethnic-religious lines. Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov summarize the results of studies on Palestinians in Israel in the following passage:

> Arabs, on the whole, are disadvantaged relative to Jews in every dimension of inequality, be it economic, social, or political. Their standard of living is lower and they receive less than their share of public funding and investment. Their earnings from work are lower, as is the social status attached to the jobs they hold. They are absent from the political arena and positions of authority in government. The Arab population is spatially segregated from the Jewish population and Arab communities do not have the infrastructure to support advanced industrial structures. Their development is dependent on and constrained by policies of the central government of Israel. The majority of Arabs are employed outside their communities of residence, mostly by Jewish employers in Jewish communities (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993, 6).

Although the various features of the ghetto pointed out thus far do identify some important characteristics associated with ghettos, they do not explain the specific social processes and practices that give rise to the ghetto phenomenon. As yet these definitions are too general and, on the other hand, simply descriptive. As Wacquant points out, the use of features to define the "ghetto"—for instance, as segregated areas that house poor people or people of color or some ethnicity; or as enclaves that have been derived through bureaucratic or administrative categories which usually only refer to urban settings and exclude rural or suburban areas[6]--only begs the question and are arbitrary and "asociological" (Wacquant 1997, 342). He considers such approaches "a dilution of the notion of ghetto…which obfuscates the racial basis and character of this poverty and divests the term of both historical meaning and sociological content" (Wacquant 1997, 343). As to the question of poverty, Wacquant states that "The fact that ghettos have

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[6] This is particularly important in the study of the Palestinian ghettos in Israel since for the most part they are neither rural (since there is not an agricultural base) nor urban (there is no industrial or post-industrial base). Perhaps, the notion "rurban" or "periurban" would more appropriately characterize the Palestinian ghettos. Interesting work is being done utilizing such concepts like Frank Perlin's "Proto-Industrialization and Pre-Colonial South Asia, "*Past and Present*, no. 98 (February 1983), 30-95; Creed and Ching, *Knowing Your Place: Rural identity and Cultural Hierarchies* (London: Routledge, 1997); Jonas Lindberg, *Education for all times of global transformations: Aspirations and opportunities of poor families in marginal areas of Sri Lanka* (Goteborg University, 2005).

historically been places of endemic and often acute material misery does not mean that a ghetto has to be poor, nor that it has to be uniformly deprived" (Wacquant 1997, 343).

The European Jewish ghettos and the object of this study, Palestinian ghettos in Israel, are two cases in point. The populations of these ghettos were and are stratified and differentiated economically though the majority were and are poor. The European Jewish shtetls,[7] for instance, often had complex class structures, including the wealthy; and such is the case, to varying degrees, within the Palestinian ghettos of Israel. Aziz Haider's "The Emergence of the Arab Bourgeoisie in Israel", for instance, documents the existence of wealthy and medium-rich strata within the Palestinian sector. But the rise in education and wealth has a curious ghetto expression within the Palestinian context in Israel, a mixed blessing. One medical article that I read on disease within the Palestinian population showed that contrary to the general trend in "modern" societies, the health of Palestinian men declined as their position rose. The authors attributed this phenomenon to the stresses peculiar to them because a rise in their circumstances did not lead to higher status, inclusion and power that is typically accorded such individuals within society at large. One of Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov's findings in their study of Arabs in the Israeli economy is that "adequate job opportunities for the better educated highly skilled Arabs are hard to come by." One consequence of this they say "is a growing mismatch between educational attainment and occupational awards" such that "It appears to be much harder for the highly educated Arab individuals to convert their educational assets into occupational status and commensurate income levels" (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993, 149).

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[7] Shtetls were small Jewish towns in Eastern Europe which in some cases had mixed populations.

In any case, definitions based on features do not explain the existence of the ghetto form of social space[8] and, furthermore, the features themselves are in need of explanation. The construction of typologies based on categorizing and cataloging features of a sociological object such as segregated locales, which then serve as *a priori* conceptual constructs and analytic tools, is typical of prevailing mainstream sociological approaches and Israeli social science is no exception. The underlying determinates rooted in specific social practices and the historical developments which give rise to such phenomena as the ghetto are for the most part ignored; instead, the characteristics of the conditions within the locale and the behaviors of the residents are studied abstracted from their social and historical precedents. Such approaches enable the social scientist to attribute the reproduced exclusion, restriction, constriction of the ghetto and the life of its residents from the benefits of society at large not to the dominant culture and society's exclusionary program and social practices, which are classist, discriminatory and racist, but instead to the ghetto enclave itself whose residents are presumed to embody detemporalized cultural characteristics. When separation as policy is acknowledged it is typically given a positive interpretation by the dominant who claim that they are respecting the ghetto residents' unique linguistic, cultural or religious heritages. Mainstream Israeli social science begins from such methodological approaches while incorporating Zionist nation-building constructs and definitions as assumptions into their conceptual apparatus. (This subject is returned to in chapter 4.)

What is needed instead is a theoretical starting point for analysis which can

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[8] I am using the notion "social space" along the lines delineated by Henri Lefebvre in his path breaking work, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991).

explain the historical specificity and inherent necessity of this spatial construct, the ghetto, to the society of which it is a part; and one which can explicate the social content and clarify the practical historical realities of the Palestinian ghettos in Israel. The prevalence of the contemporary or modern phenomenon of segregated locales, which has developed throughout the world concomitantly with "urbanization", has led many social scientists to treat the phenomena of segregated locales as a derivative of urban studies, though as a distinct object for study. An important early contributor to the development of this field, who was also particularly interested in the phenomena of the ghetto, was Louis Wirth, a significant member of the first “Chicago School” of social sciences. Subsequently a rich field employing ethnographic tools has developed within what is now called community studies. It is not my intent here to either provide a survey of or a critical review of this wide and diverse discipline embraced by “urban” or “community” studies. That would warrant a study in its own right. For the task at hand, it is important to identify certain conceptual developments within the study of “locales” that have been adapted or absorbed by Israeli social scientists in the construction of their social sciences as they built the intellectual and academic institutions of the newly established state and elaborated an approach to the study of Israeli society.

Louis Wirth's approach to the study of segregated locales is of particular interest since not only is his influence still present in urban studies, but more importantly, prevalent notions within mainstream Israeli social science paradigms mirror his conceptualizations about social development and the place of “minorities” within society; and he directly addresses the phenomena of the ghetto and not simply segregated locales which may or may not constitute ghettos. He refers to his methodology as "natural

history" or "human ecology" and is closely associated with "cultural anthropology". His emphasis on natural history, modernity, adaptation, forms of spatial organization as *modus vivendi* between and among groups within a society, toleration are all notions prevalent within Israeli social science conceptualizations about and approaches to what constitutes society and Israeli social development in particular. Therefore, although I do not agree with his overall methodology, a critical appreciation, though brief, of his work helps both to clarify an approach to the study of segregated locales and to situate some of the premises of Israeli academic discourse, a discourse, which as this dissertation demonstrates throughout, informs popular Israeli notions about their society and the place of the Palestinian other in relation to Israeli (Jewish) society and the state.[9]

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[9] Manuel Castells' summary and critique of Wirth's contribution in *The Urban Question* corresponds to my own assessment. "[T]he propositions of...Louis Wirth, are really an attempt to define the characteristic features of an urban culture and to explain its process of production on the basis of the content of the particular ecological form constituted by the city. In all probability, it is the most serious theoretical attempt ever made, within sociology, to establish a theoretical object (and, consequently, a domain of research) specific to urban sociology. Its echoes, thirty-three years later, still dominate discussion….For Wirth, the characteristic fact of modern times is a concentration of the human species in gigantic urban areas from which civilization radiates. Faced with the importance of the phenomenon, it is urgent that we establish a sociological theory of the city which, on the one hand, goes beyond simple geographical criteria and, on the other hand, does not reduce it to the expression of an economic process, for example, industrialization or capitalism. To say 'sociology', for Wirth, is equivalent to centering one's attention on human beings and on the characteristics of their relations. Given this, the whole problematic is based on a definition and a question. A sociological definition of the city: 'A permanent localization, relatively large and dense, of socially heterogeneous individuals.' A question: What are the new forms of social life that are produced by these three essential characteristics of *dimension*, *density* and *heterogeneity* of the human urban areas? It is these causal relations between urban characteristics and cultural forms that Wirth tries to stress...On the basis of the perspectives thus described, the city is given a specific cultural content and becomes the explicative variable of this content. And urban culture is offered as a way of life....[As part of the critique of this approach Castells states the following:] ...A detailed analysis of each of the features that characterize it would show without difficulty the causal link, at successive levels, between the structural matrix characteristic of the capitalist mode of production and the effect produced on this or that sphere of behaviour. For example, the celebrated 'fragmentation of roles', which is the foundation of 'urban' social complexity is directly determined by the status of the 'free worker', which Marx showed to be necessary to assuring maximum profitability in the use of labour force." Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach*, trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979), 77, 78, 81; brackets mine.

***a. a preliminary look at Louis Wirth on the ghetto and Israeli social science***

Wirth notes that many societies throughout the world have or have had residentially segregated locales where people of some common cultural traditions reside. The communities of Jews of Poland and Russia living in shtetls or African Americans in the slums in the cities of the United States, or Algerians in Paris all share certain commonalities. They constitute racial, national, religious communities who are numerically a minority within their respective national (i.e., state) entities. They live in separate areas and tend to occupy similar economic occupations. Special laws or treatments regarding their rights and duties to the state and society, especially if they are immigrants, whether legal or illegal, are operative in varying degrees. They constitute an *other* in relation to the majority (or dominant as the case was in South Africa) population and may be either protected or discriminated against, usually the latter, by the society at large, whether through legal instruments, institutionalized social controls, custom, prejudicial behavior, and any of a wide variety of informal practices within civil society.

The ghetto according to Wirth "represents a form of toleration through which a *modus vivendi* is established between groups that are in conflict with each other on fundamental issues." While defining the socio-spatial structure effectuating the form of domination and subordination the ghetto also "indicates the ways in which cultural groups give expression to their heritages when transplanted to a strange habitat." Wirth continues to say in this passage that the ghetto

> evidences the constant sifting and resifting that goes on in a population, the factors that are operative in assigning locations to each section, and the forces through which the community maintains its integrity and continuity. Finally, it demonstrates the subtle ways in which this cultural community is transformed by degrees until it blends with the larger community about it, meanwhile reappearing in various altered guises of its old and unmistakable atmosphere (Wirth 1964, 85).

In regard to the first notion, segregation as a form of toleration, Israeli social scientists mirror Wirth's thinking. The Israeli culture of separation between the Jews and non-Jews, meaning the native Palestinian population, is seen in just these terms and publicly addressed in this way. Segregation purportedly allows for a *modus vivendi* between two groups which enables them to live in the territory of the same state in spite of the fact that they are in "conflict with each other on fundamental issues."[10] Israeli discourse often refers to the "tolerant" attitude the "majority" has towards the alien other[11] who they allow to carry on their distinct cultural practices thereby rendering segregation as an expression of their enlightened attitude towards and respect for the cultural integrity of the other. In regard to the second notion, in the case of Israel it is Jewish immigrants and not Palestinians who are being "transplanted to a strange habitat", yet it is the Palestinians that are restricted to their locales within the nation-state, though one could say that the new circumstances presented to them by the establishment of the state certainly transformed their habitat into a strange and alien place. In regard to the third notion, since the Palestinians under Israeli citizenship are residentially stationary and do not "blend with the larger community", what Wirth describes here again, more appropriately, pertains to the immigrant Jewish population which does evidence "the constant sifting and resifting that goes on in a population" as new waves of Jewish immigrants arrive and are settled and adapt to their new habitat. These populations also

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[10] How this notion is expressed in the debate concerning the "legitimate" subordination of the Palestinian citizen to the majority's (Jewish) rule is discussed in chapter 3.

[11] As will be clarified in chapter 3, although Palestinians have citizenship they are not legally constituted as members of the nation which is defined as the Jewish people nor are they members of another nation since they are defined as not being a people-nation.

evidence “the factors that are operative in assigning locations to each section” since Israeli settlement policy has assigned spatial and social locations to its immigrant populations according to country of origin and time of immigration, such that Jewish society is characterized by various ethnic-racialized Jewish ghettos--although they are not identified within Israeli academic discourse as ghettos--which have been reproduced over generations.[12] Wirthian thinking is better reflected in Israeli discourse and social practice in regard to its non-European Jewish population than the divide between the Jews and non-Jews. Like Wirth, regarding the non-European Jews it was also hypothesized that over time these people would adapt to European ways and assimilate to Israel’s urban western society.[13]

Wirth also maintains that ghetto inhabitants tend to be of the same occupational groups and that Jews in particular formed a "separate vocational class". The extent to

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[12] I hold that the ghetto concept also applies to Israel as a national entity. The Zionists who gained political hegemony with the establishment of the state argued that only a national territory exclusively inhabited by Jews could be a solution to the Jewish problem. This position was in basic accordance with the Western anti-Semitic position that Jews were different and could not and even should not be assimilated or integrated into the societies they were inhabitants of. Israel, in this sense, is, by definition, a ghetto of Jews within the totality of existing nation states. Furthermore, Israel is comprised of segregated areas of Oriental and non-European Jews and Palestinians, which means essentially the Ashkenazim are also segregated though this is due to their dominant class position and political power within Israeli society. Israeli housing policy, under the MAPAI (which became the Labor Party), established segregation of the Jewish population along ethnic-national lines.

[13] The early Israeli sociologists like Eisenstadt put forward a version of this culturalist hypothesis regarding the assimilation of the non-European Jews, their *Israelization*. Later this model was developed by disciples of Eisenstadt like Sammy Smooha to include the so-called pre-modern Palestinians who argue that a process of *Israelization* also applies to the Arabs in Israel. In chapter 1, “Approaches to the Study of Arabs in Israel,” in *The Arab Minority in Israel’s Economy* Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov critically review the various schools of thought on ethnicity and Arabs in Israel. They identify three major paradigms, namely, 1) culturalist; 2) pluralist; and class (economic). In this dissertation I am mainly concerned with the dominant ideological discourse concerning the nature of Israeli society and the place of “minorities” within this social process and not the marginal yet important (and growing) critical literature that over the years has been analyzing this development. Three examples of early critical work include the internal colonialism thesis developed by Elia T. Zureik; Henry Rosenfeld's analysis of Palestinian locales as dormitories for workers; and Najwa Makhoul's work on the role of Palestinians in the formation of the Israeli working class and capitalist development which considers the two distinct national groups within Israeli society within one class structure.

which this is true concerning Jews in general is debatable and erroneous if applied across all societies and historical times.[14] But, in relation to the shtetls and Jewish ghettos of modern times, and in their articulation with the larger societies of which they were a part, class and occupational stratification did exist though not in simple and categorically mutually exclusive ways. Palestinians under Israeli citizenship likewise form a "separate vocational class" as do the non-European Jewish immigrants.

Along these lines of analysis, whereby a group of people plays some specific role or roles within a society's economic activity, Abram Leon developed the concept "people-class" in *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation*.[15] Although Leon confines his concept of people-class to the analysis of European Jewish history, its relevance to not

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[14] Rodinson points out in *Cult, Ghetto, and State*, basing his analysis, to a great extent, on the work of historian B. Blumenkranz (Juits et Chretiens dans le monde occidental (430-1006), (Paris: The Hague, 1960)), that Jews were not always restricted to special functions throughout their history in the West. "For this period [430-1006], too, any explanation based on the functional specialization of the Jews must be rejected. At the conclusion of an exhaustive investigation of the condition of the Jews in the Latin world before the Crusades, B. Blumenkranz sums up the results on this point as follows: 'The Jews were subject to the same laws as the Christians, and nothing else distinguished them either. Speaking the same language, dressing in the same manner, engaging in the same professions, they intermingled in the same houses, just as they all came together under arms to defend the common homeland.'" Maxime Rodinson, *Cult, Ghetto, and State: The Persistence of the Jewish Question*, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983), 94-95.

[15] Abram Leon, *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation*, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970). I agree with Rodinson's critique concerning the inapplicability of Leon's concept of people-class as an historically-general category valid throughout Jewish history. Rodinson bases his critique on evidence such as that presented in footnote 14 above. But, regarding its validity as a historically-specific category of analysis we also agree with Rodinson's evaluation that it does have merit for the "Christian world of the West, from the time of the Crusades onward." Later he says: "The theory of the Jews as a people-class thus has some validity from the lower Middle Ages onwards in Western Europe. Once again--and this bears repeating--this does not mean Jews were the only ones to engage in money-lending, nor that all Jews were moneylenders. In fact, there were serious class divisions within the Jewish communities. But it is fair to say that throughout a region of particular importance in the world, these communities revolved around those of their members who practiced this profession, and that poor Jews shared in the profits of the bankers through mendicancy, patronage, and so on." Rodinson's last comment here does not contradict Leon's thesis and I would argue it is, in fact, essential to Leon's analysis. Leon argues that Jews were fundamentally allocated to specific functions within society. This does not mean that there weren't a variety of other activities in which Jews engaged. In fact, for Leon such is the case and because of this, Zionism is the ideology of a particular class within the Jewish community, namely the bourgeoisie. It is not an ideology which represents all Jews nor is it based upon the class interests of all Jews, even if as a religious and practical community there exists a certain cohesiveness. Rodinson, *Cult*, 79, 107.

only Palestinians in Israel but also perhaps racial-ethnic-national peoples who are largely "restricted" to a particular socio-economic class position within a nation, such as African Americans in the United States, may emerge from the exploration of its applicability in this study of Palestinians in Israel. This work demonstrates the theoretical relevance of the concept people-class (Leon) as applied to the functions Palestinians serve as a "separate vocational class" (Wirth) within the "national economy" (Fusfeld and Bates) of Israeli society and the state as a territorial-political-administrative-economic entity.

What has emerged thus far are the following features or functions of the ghetto: 1) residential segregation of a particular group; 2) a spatially defined form of toleration, a *modus vivendi* between different groups; 3) a means of subordinating a minority to a dominant group; 4) a cultural entity--a *mode of life*[16] and; 5) a residential concentration of a particular economic class (or a restriction to certain economic positions or occupations) who share some common cultural characteristics. Furthermore, as Wirth also points out, the ghetto form of segregated space is reproduced over time, which is not the case of all segregated areas which may shift locale and resident population composition.

Since the ghetto concept is central to this analysis and to the critique of the literature on Palestinians in Israel, clarification is needed as to how the approach taken here is distinguished from mainstream approaches as represented by Wirth and "cultural

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[16] One study which beautifully and vividly shows how ghetto communities maintain their "integrity and continuity," demonstrating this dimension of Wirth's approach, though predating his by twelve years, is found in *Life Is With People: The Culture of the Shtetl* by Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog. These authors show the particular way that shtetl inhabitants related to the national society while developing their own internal economic, social, cultural and judicial activities. Many of the realities they bring to life, which resonate with several of Wirth's insights, pertain, though in quite a different setting, to this study of a Palestinian ghetto in Israel. Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog, *Life is With People: Culture of the Shtetl* (New York: Schocken Books, 1952).

anthropology" or "urban studies" as they have been absorbed within and adapted by Israeli social scientists.

***b. the question of historical specificity***

Although I agree with Wirth that the ghetto concept can be legitimately applied to the analysis of a range of communities that exist in various parts of the world and at various times in history nonetheless it should not be reduced definitionally, for purposes of analysis, to its most general and common feature of being a segregated residential area comprised of a people sharing some common cultural characteristic or class or caste position. Instead it is necessary, as Castells says in *The Urban Question*, "to study the production of spatial forms on the basis of the underlying social structure" which is always historically specific and specific to the social relations of production prevalent at any historical moment.

> To explain the social process that underlies the organization of space is not simply a matter of situating the urban phenomenon in its context. A sociological problematic of urbanization must regard it as a process of organization and development and, consequently, set out from the relation between productive forces, social classes and cultural forms (including space) (Castells 1979, 8).

In his chapter, "The Historical Process of Urbanization," Castells demonstrates how the application of a methodology that bases itself on a typology of features, such as density, size, rural/urban dichotomy, to the study of the city obscures the different social contents manifested in the variety of spatial forms present to the city, if only because similar features can be expressions of very different social forces and practices. If one looks beyond the apparent similarity of empirical categories pertaining to spatial concentrations of populations, one finds that the various city-forms and segregated areas are the socio-spatial manifestations of historically-specific modes of production. "[E]ach historical conjuncture specifies the forms of urbanization and segregation in space" (Castells 1979,

176). As such they are tied to the totality of social relations and processes rooted in particular organizations of material production and reproduction of specific class and property relations. The respective populations of each city form and city locales are also subject to different mechanisms of control, administration, and violence dependent upon their respective social positions within the social relations of (re)production, positioning them within specific produced social spaces which are integral to these relations and the practices they give rise to.[17]

Therefore, the empirical fact of segregated locales in different historical moments and places should not be superficially viewed as an expression of some general propensity for human beings, who are "naturally" constituted in groups, to prefer to reside together with their group members and choose to act upon this propensity. If this were the case, one would have to explain why these same groups choose (and this group process is never a complete representation of the aspirations of all the members of the group; there are usually contending interests within the group) to act on this propensity at certain historical moments and at other moments not to. Something beyond this propensity would need to be uncovered to explain when it does and when it does not function within and between or among human communities. Such exceptions to the rule invalidate it as an analytic supposition. Approaches that consider "space as a physical given and not as a certain historically-constituted social relation" (Lefebvre 1991, vii) tied to specific social practices are not methodologically adequate or scientifically sound.

The entry of the word ghetto into English written usage in the early 1600s is not the manifestation of some "group" inclination to collect together residentially and restrict

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[17] See Henri Lefebvre's discussion of Venice and Florence in *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 73-79, 119.

themselves to a quarter in a city or isolate themselves in a small town of their own. It is the expression of real activities of individuals in their interactions within society as they create and change their social material existence. Such transformative activity impacts developments and changes in language, spatial use of land, environs and habitats, and all areas of productive and ideological activity. As human beings transform their activities and the products of their activities (and more broadly speaking their culture) additional meanings and senses emerge in language. The transformations within language are developed within the historically specific context of human intercourse and eventually make their way into what are called dictionaries.

> Every sign, as we know, is a construct between socially organized persons in the process of their interaction. Therefore, the forms of signs are conditioned above all by the social organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction. When these forms change, so does sign...Every ideological sign--the verbal sign included--in coming about through the process of social intercourse, is defined by the social purview of the given time period and the given social group (Volosinov 1973, 21).

In regard to the use of the word ghetto what needs to be explained is why it is in Venice in the early sixteenth century that residents use this word to signify the residential quarter of their Jewish co-inhabitants, a quarter to which they were now "restricted". Certainly a crucial part of such an explanation lies in the fact that the during this period dramatic and world-historic social transformations were taking place in Venice which was one of the most developed bourgeois societies at that time, a commercial and banking center including an incipient proletariat engaged in factory production. New conflicts and social classes were emerging as social relations among the population and the position of Jews within this process were undergoing fundamental transformations. As city-states and nation-states congealed into formalized socio-spatial entities the leading social forces, most particularly the incipient bourgeoisie, began to distinguish among the population as

to who were nationals and those considered beyond the pale.

When Wirth states that the ghetto "indicates the ways in which cultural groups give expression to their heritages when transplanted to a strange habitat" what needs to be explained is how and why the “transplantation” to a strange habitat occurs, especially when the “transplantation” occurs within the same geographical location, as is now the case for Palestinians in Israel and for the Jews in Venice in the sixteenth century. “Transplantation” in these cases was and is not due to immigration nor was or is it an expression of a "naturally evolving" cultural *modus vivendi* between groups for preservation of their respective heritages, though this may also take place. Instead, it was and is the expression of contending social interests regarding economic resources, played out in civil society and expressed in power relations within political society (and the state). Only in this sense are socio-spatial allocations of people as groups “naturally” evolved, their "naturalness" being necessitated by these social dynamics.

All class and caste societies have had various forms of segregation by class or caste position and in the ordinary sense of the word one could say that all the various classes are ghettoized.[18] If one, for example, is analyzing the question of the alienation of the individual from his/her species being and other human beings, along the lines, for instance, of Bertell Ollman's *Alienation,*[19] specifying such a notion of ghettoization may be of interest. But the fact, for example, that pre-capitalist Middle Eastern *communal*

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[18] Archaeologist know, for instance, that when they see raised areas on the ground within a site this probably indicates some degree of productive capacity such that a surplus product could be appropriated by a strata of the community and used for religious or other privileged purposes. The living quarters of these individuals and ceremonial or administrative spaces were often built on higher ground indicating their status in the community.

[19] Bertell Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

cities were comprised of residentially separate quarters based on class and to a lesser though significant degree religious affiliation does not in itself mean that these quarters constituted ghettos. If such were the case, one would have to claim that Christians, Jews and Muslims were all ghettoized. If all these variations of residential exclusivity across time and space are conceptually linked because of their most rudimentary commonality then the concept would have little if any analytic value.[20] This applies not only to forms of socio-spatial organization, but, as Castells points out, the various forms of human behavior, which of course, are always spatially situated. "[F]ormal similarities in behavior have meaning only when related to the social structure to which they belong. For to reason otherwise would lead us to the logical conclusion that all societies are one because everyone eats or sleeps more or less regularly" (Castells 1991, 82).

Of course the various ethnic and religious communities within what was Palestine lived to a great extent in homogeneous residential settings before the establishment of the State of Israel, but such localities, typical throughout the world in various historical periods, are not sociologically ghettos simply because people residing in them share ethnic or religious commonalities. Many such locales were and are the result of quite different social dynamics relating to specific social relationships and processes within the societies they were or are embedded.[21] An interesting 1982 study, “On the Realities of

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[20] Marx's perception concerning "general concepts" is most relevant here. "Yet this *general* concept, or common aspect which has been brought to light by comparison, is itself a multifarious compound comprising divergent categories. Some elements are found in all epochs, others are common to a few epochs. The most modern period and the most ancient period will have [certain] categories in common...It is necessary to distinguish those definitions which apply to production in general, in order not to overlook the essential differences existing despite the unity that follows from the very fact that the subject, mankind, and the object, nature, are the same." Karl Marx, "Introduction," in “Appendices,” in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 190. Brackets in text not mine.

[21] “Before the modern epoch, however, societies of the national type—those that prefigured modern nations, extending beyond the earlier tribal structure, whatever they may be called—were characterized by

the *Millet* System: Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century," by Amnon Cohen, is based on primary source documents and records of Jerusalem from the sixteenth century when Palestine was under Ottoman rule. Cohen's study of this material reveals that "Jerusalem did not include a Christian or a Jewish quarter. This is at least what emerges from the Ottoman *tahrir* registers. In fact there were both Christians and Jews in various quarters. Still, among themselves they tended to live in close proximity to one another" (Cohen 1982, 9). That they "lived in close proximity to one another," the author states, is "for reasons of religious practice." Christians and Jews affiliated with the same church or synagogue tended to gather around each other and not because they were required to by law. They were not restricted to segregated communities. The author tells us that the data also reveal that "contrary to certain prevailing prejudices, which this writer shared prior to the present study…there were no 'minority' professions as such" (11) and that the members of the "minority" confessions were not restricted in their economic activity. This was so much so that the Ottomans even had a form of what he calls "equal opportunity" in that, for instance, in one case, when forty shops were put up for rent the renters were divided equally among the three confessions granting the extra one to a

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extreme internal partitioning, which seems to me related quite simply to the insufficient force of the unifying factors. The mercantile economy, large-scale international trade, and the relative power of state structures had finally succeeded in piercing the barriers between tribes or village communities, in imposing unification on a more or less broad scale. But the state still commanded limited means of action. Sub-administration, as it would be called today, was the rule and not the exception. This impelled leaders to administrate through the intermediary of multifarious bodies, sorts of sub-states that were also quasi-states. The pre-nation was a conglomerate of largely autonomous communities, which administered themselves and from which minimal allegiance to the state was demanded. The essential symbol of this allegiance was taxes, to which the sovereign bodies quite naturally assigned top priority. In many cases a military contribution was also required. Public order had to be respected. Apart from that, these communities lived their own lives. For their members, they represented the general society to which they owed their allegiance most of all, of which they felt themselves an integral part, and at the level of which they conceived their interests and aspirations, as is the rule in the structures that predate the age of modern individualism, in which people feel linked (at most) only to the state that dominates and controls them from above." Maxime Rodinson, *Cult, Ghetto, and State: The Persistence of the Jewish Question*, trans. Jon Rothschild (Thetford: The Thetford Press Ltd, 1983), 80-81.

Muslim who was obviously from the majority population which was well over a third of the population. And, as he writes:

> Last but not least in importance, they [the Jews and Christians] were economically linked with, and perhaps even interwoven in the whole system. They owned properties to be sold or bought as they wished; they were an important element in trade, industry, and agriculture; they served in various noncommunal, governmental positions and were even engaged in what we might call the liberal professions (medicine for example). (Cohen 1982, 15; brackets mine)

It is of interest to note that Umm al-Fahim's population only became entirely Muslim after 1948. Before the establishment of Israel, Christians with family and economic ties to other locales were living in Umm al-Fahim where they owned businesses and land. During the war they either left to be with relatives or secure their major businesses which were located in other towns and cities or they fled, or became refugees. Their properties were confiscated as absentee properties. This tendency towards societal integration in Umm al-Fahim was stopped with the establishment of Israel and the ghettoization of the Palestinian communities.

***c. the ghetto as produced space***

A ghetto can only exist in relation to a society of which it is a part. It is not self-sustaining or reproducing. The residents cannot independently maintain themselves except in articulation with the national economy. The ghetto population is subordinated politically, socially and culturally to the dominant society. The ghetto is a social construct and ghettoization is a social process involving, as Wirth notes, dominant and subordinate social relationships which are always cultural, economic and political. But, unlike Wirth, the ghetto does not arise as the "natural" expression of cultural or religious or linguistic "minorities" to cohabit a physical space within, yet outside, a dominant socio-spatial entity; nor does it represent a "naturally evolved adaptation, a *modus vivendi*, so that a

"majority" and "minority" may tolerably coexist. Essentially for Wirth, the domination of one group and the subordination of another is simply the result of the fact that the one constitutes a numerical majority and the other a numerical minority.[22] Such vague, glossed conceptualizations as the starting point for analysis of a society—like the identification of majority versus minority populations--typifies Israeli social science and grounds the argument for claiming that Israeli society is at once democratic and exclusively Jewish, an issue that is discussed more fully in chapter 3. Such an approach also, as Loïc J.D. Wacquant stressed, *deemphasized class and euphemized ethno-racial domination*. For Wirth the ghetto allows for co-existence rather than what is really ethnic exclusion and seclusion and in its more extreme form, ethnic-cleansing, a phenomenon we have been witnessing with the contemporary breakdown and (re)construction of nation-states.

That the ghetto is a cultural entity, as Wirth says, is not being disputed here. It could not be otherwise because it is (re)produced through social practice and it is composed of people who cannot but act culturally. But, as Paulo Freire says in *Politics of Education*, just as men and women as actors "transform the world and create their own world," it is equally true that "This world, created by the transformation of another world they did not create and that now restrains them, is the cultured world that stretches out into the world of history" (Freire 1985, 8).[23] Social constructs and their attendant features

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[22] See chapter 4 for a discussion of the majority/minority social science paradigm of Israel.

[23] The theory of history elaborated by Marx and Engels, in *The German Ideology*, which is a direct source for Freire's own approach, is a good starting point. "The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite *mode of life* on their part. What they are, therefore, coincides with

are delineated and transformed within historically specific human productive and reproductive activity, whether of the past or present, though they appear to be simply present to people as givens, which is how individuals experience and immediately perceive their world. Because of this, Freire continues,

> Praxis is involved in the concrete situations that are codified for critical analysis. To analyze the codification in its deep structure is...to reconstruct the former praxis....The relationship between the theoretical context, in which codified representations of objective facts are analyzed, and the concrete context, where these facts occur, has to be made real....It implies a movement from the concrete context, which provides facts, to the theoretical context, where these facts are analyzed in depth, and back to the concrete context (Freire 1985, 54).[24]

Thus, in distinction to Wirth's "culturalist" methodology, the task is to uncover through analysis the constitutive and defining relationships between the human actors, or as Freire puts it: "The only authentic points of departure for the scientific knowledge of reality are the dialectical relationships between men [and women] and the world, and the critical comprehension of how these relationships are evolved and how they in turn condition men's [and women's] perception of concrete reality" (Freire 1985, 86; brackets mine), rather than to simply identify, describe, classify and typologize the features of a sociological object. To take the appearance of majorities and minorities and cultural affinities within populations as the conceptual starting point for theorizing about social

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their production, both with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production." Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), 31-32. From here they elaborate the elements of what constitutes this *mode of life*. Forms of consciousness and ideology, division of labor, family, the state, institutions, etc., are inseparable elements of the organically constituted totality and must, from the standpoint of the researcher, be comprehended in their mutually complementary relations to this totality, i.e. *mode of life*.

[24]Also, "The only authentic points of departure for the scientific knowledge of reality are the dialectical relationships between men [and women] and the world, and the critical comprehension of how these relationships are evolved and how they in turn condition men's [and women's] perception of concrete reality" (Freire 1985, 86). Freire's approach here is also closely related to, actually a development from Marx (following Hegel). See Marx, "The Method of Political Economy," in "Appendices," in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political economy*, pages 205-07, where he describes his method as the movement from the imaginary concrete to the abstract concrete back to the real concrete.

processes as if these categories explain the phenomena serves only to *deemphasize class and euphemize ethno-racial domination*. Such notions are themselves social constructs and products of social processes in need of deconstruction and historical analysis.

Although Wacquant, in his critical essay, "Three Pernicious Premises in the Study of the American Ghetto," is studying the ghetto construct located in the inner cities of an advanced capitalist country, he has abstracted out definitionally what is specific to a ghetto setting in general while distinguishing this from any spatial setting that may for a longer or shorter time be a residential locale for a particular ethno-racial or religious group. In the following passage, as he critiques the work of mainstream sociologists, he articulates the dimensions of what he considers to be constitutive of a ghetto, which he describes as "involuntary, permanent, and total residential separation premised on caste as basis for the development of a parallel (and inferior) social structure." He writes:

> To say that they are ghettos because they are poor is to reverse social and historical causation: it is *because they were and are ghettos* that joblessness and misery are unusually acute and persistent in them—not the other way around. To call an area exhibiting a high rate or concentration of poverty a ghetto…robs the term of its historical meaning and obliterates its sociological import, thereby thwarting investigation of the criteria and processes whereby exclusion effectively operates in it…a ghetto is not simply a topographic entity or an aggregation of poor families and individuals but an *institutional form*, a historically determinate, spatially-based concatenation of mechanisms of *ethnoracial closure and control* (Wacquant, 1991). In ideal-typical terms, a ghetto may be characterized as a bounded, racially and/or culturally uniform socio-spatial formation based on (1) the forcible relegation of (2) a 'negatively typed' population (Weber, 1978: 385-7),..to (3) a reserved, 'frontier territory' (Hogan, 1980) in which this population (4) develops under duress a set of parallel institutions that serve both as a functional substitute for, and as a protective buffer against, the dominant institutions of the encompassing society (Spear, 1968; Meier and Rudwick, 1976: 232-70) but (5) duplicate the later only at an incomplete and inferior level while (6) maintaining those who rely on them in a state of structural dependency (Weaver, 1948: Fusfeld and Bates, 1984; Logan and Molotch, 1987). Put differently, the ghetto is an ethnoracial formation that combines and inscribes in the objectivity of space and group-specific institutions all four major 'elementary forms' of racial domination, namely, categorization, discrimination, segregation and exclusionary violence (Wacquant 1997, 343; brackets mine).

The residential socio-spatial enclaves of Palestinian citizens in Israel are "spatially-based concatenations of mechanisms of ethnoracial closure and control". They are *historically* rooted in the colonization of Palestine by the Zionist Movement and in its

exclusionary policy towards the remaining native non-Jewish population within the territory under the control of the State of Israel after the 1948 war. Exclusion, racism, categorization, discrimination, segregation, policing, control, administration, exclusionary violence are institutionalized and take *institutional forms* within the Palestinian ghetto and the society at large (and much of Wacquant's definition applies to the non-European Jews of Israel as well). Wacquant's "institutionalist (i.e. relational) conception" applied to the study of the ghetto

> foregrounds and interrogates variables that more nominalistic or gradational approaches tend to treat as background conditions requiring no further investigation, such as racial division, whose structural effects may vary over time even when rates remain unchanged, the weak presence and functional inefficacy of those public service institutions that are standard organizational fixtures of other urban neighborhoods, the protrusive role of police and penal institutions, and the absence of 'an indigenous exchange value engine' (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 131; Davis, 1991: 304-9). In particular, it problematizes that which a linear, 'demographic' perspective takes for granted: the bases and mechanisms of triage that determine relegation within the penalized space of the ghetto. And instead of situating the latter along *continuous* linear distributions of income, housing, segregation, or neighborhood poverty, an institutionalist approach seeks to locate *underlying breaks* in the urban fabric and to trace the (re)drawing of the dividing lines of which the ghetto is the physical manifestation.
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> Accordingly, the boundaries, form, internal makeup, external linkages and structural supports of the territory of exclusion considered all become central questions that have to be answered by empirical analysis, rather than dissolved by definitional fiat. And each of the traits that compose the ideal type of the ghetto sketched above—constraint, stigma, territorial separation and boundedness, institutional differentiation and parallelism, functional duplication and dependency—can be turned into a variable subjected to precise measurement, as can their degree of mutual 'meshing' (Wacquant 1997, 344).

This dissertation "foregrounds and interrogates" some of the range of variables and arenas mentioned by Wacquant above and demonstrates that ghettoization, like the Zionist paradigm itself, is an all-encompassing social practice and cultural narrative/discourse within Israeli society. It is premised on a culture of separation which is ideologically substantiated by the modernity narrative which posits the east/west dichotomies as essential truths about civilization, that is, ours versus theirs. This is necessarily so since the premises of the founders and leaders of the State of Israel have succeeded in establishing and maintaining an exclusionary form of a colonial settler

society within capitalist development, processes which are returned to later in this chapter.

Wacquant further argues that the ghetto, rather than being "disorganized", as it is typically conceived, is "*organized according to different principles, in response to a unique set of structural and strategic constraints*." These "constraints" include:

> (1) the unrelenting press of economic necessity and widespread material deprivation caused by the withering away of the wage-labor economy, translating into outright deproletarianization for growing segments of the urban poor; (2) pervasive physical and social insecurity, fueled by the glaring failings of public institutions and the correlative debilitation of local organization, fostering in turn irregular socio-cultural patterns; (3) virulent racial antipathy conjoined with acute class prejudice resulting in a severe and systemic truncation of life chances and conduits of opportunity; (4) symbolic taint and territorial stigmatization, contaminating every area of social endeavor, from friendship and housing to schooling and jobs, reinforced by (5) bureaucratic apathy and administrative ineptness made possible by the electoral expendability of the black [Palestinian] poor in a political field thoroughly dominated by corporate [Zionist] lobbies and moneyed interests (Wacquant 1997, 346-47).

These features, and the underlying dynamics identified by Wacquant, are all operative within the ghettos of Israel, but unlike the residents of the inner cities of advanced capitalist societies, like the African Americans of the United States he is studying, where exclusion is operating out of the laws of the capitalist market and needs of capitalist accumulation, in Israel the program of exclusion is organized, planned, legally constituted and definitionally ingrained into the basic founding documents of the State. Therefore, we see the proletarianization and deproletarianization, class differentiation, the relationship with the external economy and the ghetto's dependency on it, a general indifference to and even "blaming the victim" mentality about the realities of the residents of the ghetto, etc., as Wacquant explains, but we also see the older feudal/early bourgeois types of exclusionary laws and discriminatory programs typical of Europe before the political emancipation of the Jews. Both dynamics are at work in relation to the Palestinians of Israel. These dynamics will be further clarified below in

relationship to the colonization of the territory, a major strategic objective the Zionist leaders adopted for the realization of their nation-building project.

Ghetto inhabitants, whatever common heritages, languages, or religions they share, are fundamentally situated as subordinates vis-à-vis the dominant class and political powers. That they develop their own internal everyday life processes based on common "traditions"[25] to solve problems and maintain their "integrity and dignity," as Wirth points out and as Zborowski and Herzog beautifully describe, does not mean that they exist as a ghetto people from choice in order to maintain their cultural commonality with their fellow subordinates. The ghetto forms the socio-spatial/territorial parameter within which the dialectically related complex activities (internal and external to the ghetto) of a subordinated people take place. Although it must always be "envisaged as a pre-condition of comprehension" that people create themselves and their history, this aspect of human activity must not be abstracted from its opposite but complementary polarity, i.e. that people create themselves within historically given conditions not of their own choosing, conditions which appear, immediately to consciousness, as the “natural”

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[25] As Raymond Williams elaborates these "traditions" are not a carry-over of an ossified past but recreated within the realities of the lived present. "What we have to see is not just 'a tradition' but a selective tradition: an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped present, which is then powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural definition and identification...From a whole possible area of past and present, in particular culture, certain meanings and practices are selected for emphasis and certain other meanings and practices are neglected or excluded. Yet, within a particular hegemony, and as one of its decisive processes, this selection is presented and usually successfully passed off as 'the tradition', 'significant past'. What has then to be said about any tradition is that it is in this sense an aspect of *contemporary* social and cultural organization, in the present. What it offers in practice is a sense of predisposed continuity...It is a version of the past which is intended to connect with and ratify the present. What it offers in practice is a sense of *predisposed continuity*...It is a very powerful process, since it is tied to many practical continuities--families, places, institutions, a language--which are indeed directly experienced" (Williams 1977, 115-16). The importance of this passage will be seen in its relevance to our analyses of forms of ghetto consciousness and practices in Umm al-Fahim. It is also relevant to the Zionist narrative which has selectively rewritten Jewish history as an all encompassing historical narrative that culminates in the contemporary “home-coming” and the establishment of the Jewish State, Israel. Williams comment is also an implicit critique of Louis Wirth's approach.

circumstances of their lives. It is important to keep in mind that, as Freire points out, the self-activity of the human subject in itself does not give to the human actor consciousness of him/herself as a subject, a creator of culture and maker of history; and this is especially problematic when the created culture is a culture of domination and subordination. For Palestinians, although the reality of Israeli domination is simply expressed in different forms within the world of the ghetto and the world outside, the ghetto is the "haven" of an apparent security and genuine familiarity. In the ghetto you are among your peers. Wirth reminds us that "every community is a society, but not every society is a community."[26]

***d. ghettoization on the ground – the first stages***

The Israeli policy of maintaining as distinct and separate the two peoples who cohabit the same region has succeeded. The empirical reasons for this success--the on the ground facts--is that the ghettoization of Palestinians encompasses the totality of everyday social existence. As a social construct it is a geographical, political, economic, legal, ideological, and an everyday life construct. Therefore, as Castells emphasized, analysis must center on "the articulation of the 'urban [ghetto] question' with political processes... relative to the state apparatus and the class struggle" (Castells 1979, 6). The ghetto does not represent a "naturally evolved" form of resolution between the dominant and subordinated populations so that they might co-exist in toleration and maintain their distinct heritages or "modes of life" as Wirth would have us believe (along with the

[26] Quoted by Wirth in *On Cities* from Robert E. Park and E.W. Burgess' *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*.

majority of Israeli social scientists regarding their Palestinian population).[27] Dominant and subordinate are produced social relations and can only be actualized as produced social space. Furthermore, as Castells says,

> society is not the pure expression of cultures as such, but a more or less contradictory articulation of interests and therefore of social agents, which never present themselves simply as themselves but always, at the same time, in relation to something else. Nor is residential space a page on which the imprint of social values is laid. It is, on the one hand, historically constituted, and on the other, articulated within the social structure as a whole - and not only with the ideological instance (Castells 1979, 110-11).

The contemporary ghettoization of the Palestinian population has its beginnings in the pre-state period during which time those Zionists who envisioned an exclusive Jewish State (and these forces later became hegemonic within the state), pursued their nation-building endeavors in Palestine by employing such means as: 1) acquiring the support of an imperial power for constructing a Jewish national homeland; 2) pressuring the British Mandate Government to allow massive Jewish immigration towards building a Jewish majority presence in Palestine; 3) establishing Jewish only settlements and enterprises; 4) acquiring land that once owned became the sole property in perpetuity of the Jewish people; 5) insisting that Jewish businesses and enterprises hire Hebrew labor only; 6) constructing separate residential enclaves; 7) creating Jewish only social institutions and organizations; and 8) establishing Zionist state-in-waiting institutions and military units. These early Zionists, intent on establishing a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel, saw as their task the acquisition of land, generation of a Jewish majority, the construction of Jewish only institutions and social and economic life, along with the building of institutions that would serve as the basis for the state apparatus once statehood was achieved. They

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[27] Haifa is a case in point. The Palestinian residents who lived throughout Haifa's neighborhoods were forcibly removed from their homes and relocated to a separate Palestinian quarter-ghetto during the 1948 War and were confined to this "closed zone" during the military rule after the state was established.

consciously saw themselves as step by step building a State for Jews within the territory of Palestine and some even included, like Ben-Gurion, South Lebanon and Transjordan, which were mentioned as part of Eretz-Israel in the *Bible*.

In these endeavors the Zionists were aided by the British Mandate Government. For one, the British, as occupiers of Palestine after WWI and before the establishment of the Mandate Government, gave Pinhas Rutenberg (he participated in the establishment of the Haganah which became the nucleus of the Israel Defense Forces and served as President of the Jewish National Council) exclusive concession for the production and distribution of electricity in Palestine over the protests of the resident Palestinian population. Rutenberg formed the Palestine Electric Company which was completed in 1930. This later became the Israel Electric Company after the State was established.

The policy of the British Mandate Government towards the Jewish settler community versus the native Palestinian population is highlighted in these two contrasting actions of the Palestine Railroad which was under the control of the British. David Tirosh reports in his monograph *Rakevit ha-Emiq* (*Railroad of the Valley*) that there was "cooperation between the administration of the Palestine Railroad and the farms of the Zionist Labor settlements of the valley." The valley he is reporting on is the Jizreel Valley which is adjacent to the Jenin District and Umm al-Fahim, even overlapping. Tirosh discovered in the Railroad Museum an internal memorandum between the Railroad General Administrator to the Chief Engineer, written June 24, 1924, that reports that the "Hamshbir Hamirkazi", a retail chain for the agricultural labor settlements, sent a letter expressing their gratitude for "the Railroad Administration's rescheduling of the train table to an earlier hour that fits the needs of the milk shipment of

the farms of the valley." Hamshbir Hamirkazi also requested in their letter that "because of the hot summer nights a fan be activated by the wheels of the milk carrying train in order to blow air over the wet blankets that cover the milk jars." Tirosh writes that "It is worth noting that according to the dates of the letters, the matter was solved in less than four days!" (Tirosh 1988, 55).[28]

On the other hand, in an appendix to Dr. Fayiz al-Hamad's *The First Book on Arrabah* entitled, "News on Arrabah in the Palestinian Newspapers before 1948," he includes a news item about the British Mandate Government's intention to close the Afulah-Saudia line of the Hijaz Railroad in 1932 which they did. This was the only line in the Jenin area and was important to the residents of Umm al-Fahim and the Wadi 'Ara area. There were three stations—Jenin, Arrabah and al-Silah.

> These stations are used by people to ship their crops to sell and to bring merchandise they need. Now, after the closing of this line, we wonder what the inhabitants of ninety villages are going to do and how they will transfer their shipments. Will they use camels and animals and be chased by the Society for the Protection of Animals or use cars that charge exorbitant fees and lack no prefixed schedules?
>
> Unlike shipping by train, the owners of the crops will have to accompany their merchandise whenever they use cars. We are puzzled, by God, by the state of this Government, although, we know it has deaf ears, what should the people do and what vehicle will they use to transfer their crops?
>
> Why do we see this Government multiply the means of relief to the inhabitants of the Jewish settlements while we see it simultaneously deny a whole district a bi-weekly train line? The closing of this line will have a negative impact on the whole district because people use it intensively to transfer goods and because of their great need for commodities and construction materials. Thus we demand the Government keep this line active and not diminish the people in the name of savings.[29]

It appears that in order to keep their Balfour Declaration commitment (which was incorporated into the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine) to build a Jewish national homeland in Palestine the British colonial powers decided that the development of Jewish

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[28] Translated from the Hebrew by Ghassan Fawzi.

[29] All translations from the Arabic of Fayiz al-Hamad's book are by Ghassan Fawzi.

immigrant society necessitated the devolution of the indigenous Palestinian society. This is also evidenced, not only in regard to industry as indicated above, but with regard to political society as well. The British recognized and assisted the administrative and governing bodies of the Zionist Movement in Palestine, organizations of an immigrant population who were a tiny fraction of the country's population. While the British worked with political and civil organizations of the Jewish community they ignored such organizations of the Palestinians, who were over ninety percent of the population and native, like the Palestine Arab Congress, and preferred, as Walid Khalidi has pointed out, to work with the elites who they often simply appointed to various positions. Rather than recognizing indigenous Palestinian bodies they also often established alternative Palestinian bodies, like the Supreme Muslim Council, which were given limited powers while also causing inter-Palestinian conflicts since they appointed someone from this or that family or party; by creating the Supreme Muslim Council, for instance, the British gave authority to one family in the administration of religious endowments and the appointment of religious judges and local mufti rather than leaving this in the hands of the government bureaucracy as was done during Ottoman rule.

Most revealing is the "Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations of the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1938." Under the section "Arab Affairs" almost all points have to do with changes to military organization and military regulations and the deportation of Palestinians who were involved in the 1936-39 Arab Revolt. My mother-in-law's father, Sharif al-Qasim, was a leader during the Arab Revolt and his family, including my mother-in-law, had to escape to Beirut and

Damascus during that time. A few other points deal with repairs to mosques in various towns and cities. The first three points under "Jewish Affairs" have to do with issues and conflicts within the Jewish community and among the Zionist organizations. All the rest, which are reproduced below, have to do with the advancement of various political and economic developments within the Jewish community.

> 51. Negotiations were still in progress at the end of the year for the amalgamation of the committee of the local Jewish community of Tel Aviv established under the Religious Communities (Organization) Ordinance with the Municipal Council of Tel Aviv. Amalgamation of the corresponding bodies was completed in the case of the newly established Municipal Council of Petah Tiqva.
>
> New local councils were elected in Rishon le Tsiyon, Hertseliya, Ramat Gan and Raanana.
>
> Local town planning commissions were established in the Jewish settlements of Ramat Gan and Bnei Beraq.
>
> 52. The establishment of a temporary landing ground for aeroplanes was authorized in September on Government land north of the River Auja, adjoining Tel Aviv. A passenger and mail service plying daily between Tel Aviv and Haifa and Beirut was inaugurated by Palestine Airways.
>
> 53. Negotiations were continued for combining all Jewish citrus co-operatives under a single organization, with a view to centralizing arrangements for the disposal of the citrus crop and eliminating uncontrolled exports of citrus fruits but no agreement was reached for the 1938-9 citrus season. The negotiations were still in progress at the end of the year.
>
> 54. The Jewish Agency carried out a census of Jewish wholesale and retail distribution trades. 7,103 retail and 423 wholesales stores were enumerated, representing a capital investment of £P.7, 780,000 and affording employment to 19,910 persons.
>
> 55. Since the opening of Tel Aviv Lighter Harbour, increased interest has been shown by the Jewish public in the possibility of maritime developments, and a school of navigation and marine engineering was opened at the Hebrew Technical Institute at Haifa at which 41 students are attending.
>
> A local Jewish shipping company which is carrying out coastal trade in the eastern Mediterranean in two small cargo vessels manned by Jewish crews is expanding its activities.

While local and municipal councils are established, an airport landing ground created, combining of Jewish citrus co-operatives undertaken, a navigation and maritime school opened for the Jewish settlements the Arabs are deported and some of their mosques repaired. At other times their local councils are even dissolved. And, as a number of writers have pointed out, the profound repression of the Palestinian community after the

1936-39 Arab Rebellion--the imprisonment and deportation of the leadership, destruction of associations, application of Emergency Regulations against the Palestinian population, censorship, etc.--insured that the Palestinian people were without leadership and organization when the Zionist forces began in 1947 their War of Independence, not against a foreign colonizer but the local population.

Still, during the British Mandate the colonized Palestinian population managed to push through various developments, even in Umm al-Fahim. I discovered one such development while probing my in-laws for stories so I could learn about my family. On one occasion I found out something which I did not expect. I knew that, after persistent pressure from residents, Israel had finally agreed to open a high school with all grades included in 1971. Before then, only children whose parents could afford to send them to another town with a high school had a high school education and when parents could do so they sent sons. So, it was not until 1975 that Umm al-Fahim had her first high school graduates, including the first female graduates. I mistakenly assumed there was never a high school in Umm al-Fahim and that females in general, prior to the establishment of Israel, did not have high school educations.

What I didn't know is that prior to 1948 the forward-looking Palestinian intelligencia of Umm al-Fahim had already put in place high school education for their daughters. The father of my mother-in-law was one of these “enlightened moderns”. British Mandate authorities periodically made the rounds of the Arab villages and towns and on one of these occasions a group of fathers prepared for their visit and with typical Arab hospitality sat them down to a feast while presenting their request for a public high school for girls. As a young girl my mother-in-law was asked to present an opening

greeting to the British authorities and to ask at this time for a high school for girls. Her father helped her prepare for this speech. These families had already on their own and at their own expense set up a class for their daughters and hired a private tutor, but they felt it was about time that there be public education for their female children in Umm al-Fahim. Thus, my mother-in-law became a graduate of a public high school, thanks to the fact that the British agreed. The remains of the building can still be seen at the top of the hill overlooking where I presently live. One of the newspaper articles from *filastin*, dated February 22, 1942, included in Fayiz al-Hamad's book mentioned above, reports that "a girl's school was opened in Umm al-Fahim and studies will be started there." It must be the same school. I also learned from al-Hamad in another *filastin* article of January 12, 1940 that Umm al-Fahim's elementary school was raised to "Degree E" which meant that the Department of Education considered it to be a "complete elementary city school" and so its principle's salary was duly raised. Such developments came to an end in 1949 and Umm al-Fahim was left to stagnate until the people could learn to struggle within their new ghetto terrain.

The process of ghettoization of Palestinians that more immediately led to the present situation began during the war years (1948-49) within the areas of Palestine controlled by the Zionist forces through their practices of *ethnic cleansing* and *Judaization*.[30] A word should be said here regarding the question of ethnic cleansing.

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[30] See Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006); Benny Morris, *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-49* and *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*; and Ismail Zayid, "Palestine: A Story of Ethnic Cleansing and Dispossession," Lecture given at McGill University, in Montreal, September 26, 2002. For a good review of the *new historians* and Benny Morris in particular see Joel Beinin, "Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits of the New Israeli History," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 34, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 6-23. See also Walid Khalidi, ed., *All that remains: the Palestinian villages occupied and depopulated by Israel in 1948* research and text, Sharif S. Elmusa and Muhammad Ali (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992). Since the second Palestinian Intifada, which began in September 2000, and the show of support from Palestinian citizens of Israel in

The practice of *ethnic cleansing* employed during the 1947-49 War can no longer be disputed, especially since the recent publication of Ilan Pappe's book, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine,* in which he documents the history of the plan (Plan Dalet or Plan D), who was responsible for devising it and how it was implemented during 1948 and 1949. The facts are known and well-documented; within a six-month period, as Pappe reports correctly: "more than half of Palestine's native population, close to 800,000 people, had been uprooted, 531 villages had been destroyed, and eleven urban neighborhoods emptied of their inhabitants." The question till now has been how global and planned the policy was. Benny Morris, one of the *new historians,* has in his books, *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-49* and *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited,* reported in great detail the massacres, expulsions and flight of Palestinians during the war. He argues that even though *ethnic cleansing* was one of the tactics employed by military operations during the war it was more a matter of war-time exigency than plan. Pappe's work puts that argument to rest. He refutes Morris' position that *ethnic cleansing* was a consequence and not an objective of the war and proves, on the basis of original source documentation, that the conscious and planned

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October of that year who protested the government's policies, a shift towards a more exclusionary politic has grown among Jewish Israelis as is indicated by a variety of polls. Attitudes such as those espoused by Benny Morris towards the Palestinians both inside and outside the Green Line are now embraced by a large majority of Jewish Israelis across ethnic and religious lines. This is especially expressed in the discourse regarding the demographic threat and the security of Israel. Data from polls concerning the transfer of Palestinian citizens of Israel, transfer of Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories and whether the Palestinian citizens are a danger to the state, show in all cases that the percentages of Jewish Israelis who hold these views—all well over 50%--has risen and most remarkably a large majority of the respondents from a variety of pollsters consider that their Arab co-citizens are a danger to the state. This majority has consistently grown with each subsequent poll. See, for instance, Nadim N. Rouhana and Nimer Sultany, "Redrawing the Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 5-22.

purpose of the war was to cleanse as much as possible the territory of the new state of Palestinian inhabitants.[31]

The success of the ethnic cleansing was announced as a "miracle" of the war, yet, in spite of the success of such a miracle, some Palestinians remained within the territory occupied by the Israeli state. What was required now was the completion of their ghettoization in anticipation of their future removal from the Jewish state. Ghettoization, within the borders of Israel established by the armistice agreements following the war, was completed during the first years of the newly established state by placing Palestinians in "closed zones" under military rule.[32] In the first issue of *The New East*,

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[31] The question has now turned to what one's moral stance is towards the question of ethnic cleansing and if it can ever be justified. Morris thinks that Ben-Gurion should have completely removed the Palestinian population rather than only partially and he believes, as do many other Jewish Israelis, that if Ben-Gurion had used his better judgment and done so the existing contemporary conflict could have been avoided. In an interview reported in *haaretz* January 9, 2004 just before the publication of his second book on the Palestinian refugee problem he said this about the Zionists who expelled and massacred Palestinians: "I definitely understand them. I understand their motives. I don't think they felt any pangs of conscience, and in their place I wouldn't have felt any pangs of conscience. Without that act, they would not have won the war and the state would not have come into being." He is certainly right about the fact that the originators of this plan, who were also responsible for its implementation, had "any pangs of conscience" as can be seen in these words of its main strategist, Ben-Gurion, who said the following in a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive (the Jewish Agency served as the government in formation of the Zionist Movement in Palestine) as early as 1938: "I am for compulsory transfer; I do not see anything immoral in it." Yitshak Pundak, an assistant to the Commander of the Givati Brigade, Shimon Avidan, who was responsible for cleansing the southern region of Palestine, (there were twelve regional brigades in all), said as recently as 2004 in a *haaretz* interview: "There were two hundred villages [in the front] and these are gone. We had to destroy them…otherwise we would have had Arabs here as we have in Galilee. We would have had another million Palestinians." Cited in Pappe, *Ethnic Cleansing*, 6.

[32] A similar process is actively taking place in the West Bank today, which has also been under military occupation, as intensification of the *Judaization* of the West Bank continues and is being cemented by the Separation Fence. The Wall, or Separation Fence as it is officially called, whose construction began when Sharon was Prime Minister with slogans like "we are here, they are there", is continuing to be built today under Prime Minister Olmert. In November, 2006 Olmert swore in the outspoken racist Avigdor Lieberman as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Strategic Affairs. Lieberman is a member of the extreme right-wing party Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel is our Home), which now has eleven seats in the Knesset. He publicly advocates the transfer of Israel's Palestinian citizens to either Arab countries or some territorial area designated as a Palestinian state and he supports complete separation and the Separation Fence. Though the Separation Fence is deemed illegal by the International Court of Justice, the High Court of Israel (HCI) has legalized its construction by interpreting international law in such a way as to give rights to the occupier in the name of security. (See Michael Lynk, "Down by Law: The Israeli High Court, International Law, and the Wall," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 35, no. 1 (Autumn 2005): 6-24.) More than half the West Bank is

the quarterly journal of the Israeli Oriental Society, M. Assaf, who apparently was not an advocate of transfer, nonetheless writes in 1949 that "where the count of the integration" of the Arabs begins, is not with the acceptance of the Arabs of the new Jewish State, many of whom he acknowledges raised the white flag during the war, but "from the actions [the state took] against the possibility of having a fifth column and dangerous elements." What he describes as the "first phase" in the integration of the Arabs entailed the following: "The Arabs who remained in the state were divided into several parts: Arabs in villages, which were not moved from their places, especially the Duruz, Arab villages that were transferred to secure locations, young persons who were sent to prison camps, Arabs in cities who were put in special quarters."[33] The stage for the current situation was now set.

***e. some delineations of space***

In his chapter, "The Urban Sub-cultures," Castells summarizes and critiques a categorization of "localized types" developed by Ledrut which include *the village*, *the neighbourhood*, *the small town*, *the quarter*, and *the city*. Castells reminds us that these

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now secured behind this wall for the Jewish settlers while the native Palestinian population is fragmented into ghetto hamlets and towns without viable road systems connecting them to each other and the Israeli economy upon which they are dependent. (See Graham Usher, "Unmaking Palestine: On Israel, The Palestinians, and the Wall," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 35, no. 1 (Autumn 2005): 25-43 and Peter Lagerquist, "Fencing the Last Sky: Israel's 'Separation Wall'," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 5-35.)The ground is being *firmly fixed* so that at least the Jewish settlements confined within the Separation Fence, whose residents are citizens of Israel, can be annexed to Israel without attaining any undesired non-Jewish population while Israel maintains control of most of the natural resources of the West Bank, most importantly water. At the same time a ghettoized population is readily available with little cost to the Israeli state, since the administration of this population is the responsibility of the Palestine Authority, to serve as a reserve army of labor for Israeli capital and as a guaranteed market for Israeli production. But, as one population is ghettoized, kept separate from us, so too, conversely, the we ghettoizes itself, so that Israel is a ghetto country within the international community composed internally of ghettos.

[33] M. Assaf, "The Integration of the Arabs in Israel: An Attempt at a First Summary," *The New East* 1, no. 1 (October 1949): 3. Translation from the Hebrew by Ghassan Fawzi.

categories are not simply "objective" definitions, but represent spatial contexts which are linked to specific social practices. Israeli social scientists, ideologues and state employees make use of various categorizations of space depending on the particular social issue concerned. The classification of particular areas and not others as development areas, agricultural or industrial sites, security zones; the division of the territory controlled by Israel into regions, districts and sub-districts; the determination of residential (called localities) boundaries or required width of streets and depth between houses and streets within a locality; the laying of road-ways and determination of public transportation routes are just a few examples where classification and use of space in Israel are linked to specific social practices which are differentially negotiated depending upon geographical location and whether the population is Jewish or non-Jewish (Palestinian).

David A. Wesley's book, *State Practices and Zionist Images: Shaping Economic Development in Arab Towns in Israel*, demonstrates through ethnographic study just how precise and detailed such spatial social construction is, which in the case of Israel insures a culture of separation on the one hand, and economic underdevelopment of the Palestinian population, on the other.[34] He describes, for instance, how classification of land types and assignment of territorial jurisdiction to a local or regional council lead to economic polarization between Jews and Palestinians even when the planners explicitly apply a "growth-pole approach" which they say is intended to "trickle down" economic benefits to the Palestinian population and gradually reduce "the gap" between Jews and Palestinians. Instead, as all studies show, "the gap", even if "growth" occurs, widens. The very "pole" approach predicts the outcome since separation and not genuine integration,

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[34] David A. Wesley, *State Practices and Zionist Images: Shaping Economic Development in Arab Towns in Israel* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006).

even in particular projects where the locales are adjacent, is built into the outcome from the premises as a given. The urban centers to which Palestinians must go to for work, social services, and shopping remain "outside" and to the extent there are "development" projects in the Palestinian locales these are directed towards funding workshops and tourism. The dual program is one which brings large regional industrial areas into the Jewish sectors and small local manufactories and handicrafts into the Palestinian towns. Such planning, Wesley concludes, "contributes to the objectification of the Arab/Jewish distinction" (Wesley 2006, 159).

The development of urban centers in areas where there are high concentrations of Palestinians, like in the Galilee, is planned with the intent "to strengthen Jewish hold on the region." As Palestinians have become more confident as advocates for their needs and rights planners have had "to provide for the needs of the Arab population—residence, employment, and services—otherwise there will be problems." But, as Wesley points out,

> [T]he sense is that for the Arabs, it doesn't matter where the latter two functions [and so the separation of where one lives and where one works is typical for Palestinian workers] are located so long as they are available, whereas it does matter, and very much so, for the Jews. The Jewish towns are to develop into vibrant urban centers, and to that end, Arab employment needs and needs for commercial and professional services are appropriated for that development (Wesley 2006, 154; brackets mine).

He tells us that the Accelerated Urban Development in Galilee's (AUDG) two-pronged program of the 1990s resulted in the development of fourteen large regional industrial areas totaling about 22,000 dunam compared with fourteen local areas in Palestinian towns totaling 750 dunam; and this is in a region where in 1995 Palestinians were forty-eight percent of the population. He also shows how the government's programs create "differential access to employment opportunities," increase "the gap in urban vigor," and appropriate "the need for services on the part of the inhabitants of the Arab towns to serve the development potential of the new Jewish localities"--all components of classic

ghettoization.[35] And the story doesn't end here. "The Galilee Development Authority's proposal for projects through the year 2020…speaks of industrial development geared toward both Jewish and Arab employees," but, as Wesley informs us, the plan is to build "'one thousand vacation huts in small resorts and bed-and-breakfast facilities throughout the Arab sector…aimed at tourists looking for a different type of cultural experience… [these] would not compete with conventional tourist accommodations' (Shmoul 2000)" (Wesley 2006, 177; brackets mine). At times Jewish settlements are created, like Karmiel, simply to put "a brake on what Arnon Soffer had called the metropolitanization of the Arab towns" (Wesley 2006, 162). Wesley concludes: "[T]he effect of including the Arab towns in the two-pronged program has been to exclude them from the main thrust of Galilee development" (Wesley 2006, 160).

Another delineation of space pertains to the road system. The nation-state builders understood early on that control of and structuring of the road system was key to establishing on the ground the separation of Jews from Palestinians and Palestinians from each other. They also knew and know, as can be seen in the West Bank, that the control of roads, no matter what proportion of a population a dominant group may be, to a great extent gives them control of the territory and intercourse within it. During the 1948 War access roads to Palestinian towns and villages were blown up just as is being done today in the West Bank. Both inside the Green Line and the Occupied Territories, roads are laid in such a way that Jewish settlements are connected to each other and Palestinian

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[35] Wesley has an interesting discussion about how the notion of "periphery" is used by Israeli planners and geographers as a "natural" expression of the state of the Palestinian locales. He quotes one geographer who said at a public forum that the location of the Arab towns in Israel's periphery is "a matter of God-given geography." He tells us that the sociologist, Aziz Haidar, commented that: "It is geography that is God-given; periphery is not" (Wesley 2006, 164-65).

settlements can only connect to Jewish areas and other Palestinian settlements via these roads. In 1992 the bypass road being proposed to run from Jerusalem to Gush Etzion would "not be cheap. The terrain is hilly, and if the road is to appreciably cut travel time, reduce traffic hazards and circumvent Arab communities, it will require tunnels."[36] Now there are bypass-bypass roads, what Uri Avnery calls "an invention of the occupation", but, in actuality, this is simply an elaboration of what has already been done inside Israel in relation to the Palestinian locales. He describes one case where

> First, they built the cross-Samaria road, from Kfar-Kassem to Ariel and beyond, so as to bypass the Palestinian villages. But the Palestinian village of Bidia, which, on Saturdays, has become a shopping mall for Israelis, slowly crept up to the road….Benjamin Nethanyahu and Ehud Barak (each in his turn) decided on an even more sterile, bypass-the-bypass. Again great stretches of Palestinian land were expropriated.[37]

In another piece, Gila Svirsky writes:

> The Israeli army carries out numerous 'acts of occupation' against Palestinians, from humiliations at border crossing to curfews to exploding the homes, fields and orchards of families whose sons engaged in violence. Yesterday, however, a new form of punishment was inaugurated. The Israeli army bulldozed and destroyed all access roads to Palestinian towns and villages in the occupied territories. And after the roads were destroyed—the torn asphalt a jumble beside the trenches—the army set in place heavy concrete slabs to ensure that no vehicles could pass. This constitutes the complete isolation of Palestinian towns and villages—cutting off access to medical care, jobs, schools, family, normalcy.[38]

She is, of course, correct on all points but one; bulldozing of access roads is not a new form of punishment. The nation-builders did the same during the 1948 War. All that she describes as currently taking place in the West Bank was in some form carried out during and after the 1948 war in relation to the ghettoization of the Palestinian population under Zionist control and still goes on now. As recently as November 14, 2007, a *haaretz* article

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[36] "Good and bad decisions," *The Jerusalem Post*, August 25, 1992, 6.

[37] Uri Avnery, "Olives, Stones and Bullets," *haaretz*, November 22, 2000.

[38] Gila Svirsky, "Open Letter to Friends from Israel," portsideMod@netscape.net, November 29, 2000.

describes the demolition of the access road to one of the *unrecognized* Palestinian villages in the Wadi ʻAra area where Umm al-Fahim is located. The article also informs us that their houses are slated for demolition.[39]

The tactics currently reported concerning the West Bank have all been already well-documented and recorded by the actors themselves who planned and implemented them within the Green Line first. For instance, the same language of "security zones" dominates these earlier discussions and programs. What we have been witnessing is the continuation of the project forged by Ben-Gurion and his colleagues extended into the West Bank. The 58% of the West Bank that many in Israel would like to see annexed to Israel would leave ten percent of Mandatory Palestine for a State of Palestine should that occur and ninety percent of the same for Israel; that's ten per cent more of Mandatory Palestine than Ben-Gurion had settled for, at least initially (Ben-Gurion's minimalist program was eighty percent of Mandatory Palestine and not more than twenty percent of the native population, both of which were accomplished[40]). The Palestinian towns and villages remaining have become separated and isolated; they have been turned into ghettos. And, although the Israeli army no longer maintains street control inside these enclaves—that is now the task of the Palestine Authority--the Israeli army controls entrance and exit, and borders, underscoring what I said earlier about the importance of the road system to the construction of the exclusivity of the nation-state project.

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[39] See Yoav Stern, "Residents of unrecognized Wadi Ara village repave razed road," *haaretz*, November 14, 2007.

[40] "Ben-Gurion found he had to hold back the more extremist Zionist members, and he told them [leaders of the Zionist Movement at a meeting in Paris in 1946 after the Biltmore Plan was proposed] that eighty to ninety per cent of Mandatory Palestine was enough to create a viable state, provided they were able to ensure Jewish predominance. Neither the concept not the percentages would change over the next sixty years." Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 26; brackets mine.

A deconstruction of the Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) geographical and population definitions demonstrate other delineations of space that insure the exclusion, subordination, marginalization, segregation of Palestinians. An example of how the state's apparently objective classifications of geo-physical space are actually social constructions of space is the CBS's definition of *natural regions* as "continuous areas, as far as possible homogeneous in their physical structure, climate, soil, and in the demographic, economic and cultural characteristics of their population." Any map of Israel reveals how such a definition results in the formation of not so natural *natural regions* which must skirt around non-Jewish localities so that the "naturalness" of the region can be maintained. Such definitions do not simply serve ideological purposes of keeping the two people separated from each other, but also very practical ones since social investment in infrastructure and services of all sorts are implemented according to these definitions and other geo-social divisions. Each classification carries with it certain policy standards concerning budgets, allocation of resources, infrastructural needs, public health requirements, schools, and so forth.

Furthermore, localities which are "[P]ermanently inhabited place(s)...inhabited by 20 or more permanent residents...are divided into Jewish and non-Jewish, according to the majority in the population of the locality...There are nine localities [as of 1991], defined as 'mixed', with a large majority of Jews, but with a considerable minority of non-Jews."[41] Historically the state has classified Palestinian "settlements" as villages and rural localities rather than urban localities or towns.[42] Palestinian towns are often not

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[41] Central Bureau of Statistics. *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1992*, no. 33 (Jerusalem: Keter Press, 1992), 19-20.

[42] Ideologically, classification of Palestinian areas as villages and rural officially and in academic and

granted municipality status even when the population sizes well exceed the official numbers established for the larger municipal classification. In Israeli standards Umm al-Fahim, which had a population well over two thousand (the official number set for distinguishing a village from a town) since 1948 (just over 5000 in 1948), is a large town, but it was not until 1985, when the population was well over twenty thousand, that the government finally gave municipality status to Umm al-Fahim; and this was only after years of protracted struggle on the part of her inhabitants and pressure from the National Committee of Chairman of Arab Local Authorities. This did not result in any substantial changes in budgetary or resource allocation to Umm al-Fahim in accordance with state guidelines which are applied to Jewish settlements.

One way the state legitimized relegating Palestinian localities to village and rural

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popular discourse maintains the notion of Palestinians as culturally backward and traditional, in spite of the fact that virtually no "traditional" means of survival are present. During my Fulbright tenure (1990-91) I was affiliated with the University of Haifa which provided me a desk in the Anthropology and Sociology Department. Upon my numerous visits to the university I was repeated asked by professors "How's the village doing?" even after I had informed them that Umm al-Fahim is not really a village; that some 25,000 people live there and they do not farm. None of them had ever stepped foot in Umm al-Fahim to know if in fact it were a village, which by any standard it is not. The notion of Palestinians as villagers, tied to the spatial construct, the village, is connected to the urban-rural/modern-traditional dichotomies which inform the everyday practical ideology of Jewish Israelis legitimized by the social science paradigms based on these dichotomies. Such an ideological construct maintains an attitude of cultural superiority over the Palestinian population on the part of the Jewish population, who are characterized as modern and urban. The Palestinians as villagers attaches false cultural attributes to the "Arab" character and disregards the actual living circumstances of the "really existing" Palestinians under Israeli citizenship. The titles of two studies tell the story directly: *The Modernization of Traditional Agricultural Villages: Minority Villages* (1972) and *Geographical Changes in the Traditional Arab Villages in Northern Israel* (1981). In *Modernization* the authors state that their analysis of the *Arab minority* reveals that there is "a definite lateral order among the typologies: departure from extended family patterns precedes involvement with public institutions, and both of these precede the transformation of the occupational structure. In other words, it appears that the traditional bonds have to be broken before new ties can be forged, and these new ties have to become institutionalized before a modern, organic pattern of division of labor can develop" (p. 56). The authors of *Geographical Changes* explain the differences between Palestinian villages on the bases of "settlement size, population composition [meaning religious composition, Christians being more modern or less traditional than Muslims] and the geographical location of the settlement [that is, proximity to modern Jewish settlements]." (p. 43). Emmanuel Yalan, Chaim Finkel, Louis Guttman and Chanoch Jacobsen, *The Modernization of Traditional Agricultural Villages: Minority Villages* (Rehovot: Settlement Study Center, Publications on Problems of Regional Development, n. 11, 1972); Yoram Bar-Gal and Arnon Soffer, *Geographical Changes in the Traditional Arab Villages in Northern Israel* (Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, 1981).

status was simply to define rural and urban differently for the Jewish and non-Jewish populations. A Jewish locality with a population over 2,000 was classified as urban whereas a non-Jewish locality had to have at least 5,000 people. It was left to the discretion of the state to determine if non-Jewish localities with populations between 2,000 -10,000 were considered urban or rural, though even those with over 10,000 inhabitants did and do not, automatically receive urban (or municipal) status. Furthermore, the rural classification was broken down such that all Palestinian non-urban localities were defined as "villages" or Bedouin tribes. Therefore, officially in Israel, except in a few towns, Palestinians were "villagers" and are still considered to be so in popular conception even though the state revised its categories and definitions in 1983 (implemented in the 1988 census). There are also over one hundred Palestinian villages which are "unrecognized" by the state to this day and therefore do not receive any public expenditure or services including such necessities as hot and cold running water, electricity, telephone lines, transport, sanitation.

### *f. underlying social relations of production and the state*

Following Castells' thesis, an analysis of a social space must articulate it "in relation to the state apparatus and class struggle." In order to do so for the Palestinian ghettos in Israel, the essential character of the Israeli state and society must be identified. This requires an appropriate method of analysis applied to such phenomena. In the following passage from Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*, relationships between economic foundations, civil society and political society (the State) are not conceived of as simple and uni-directional processes but as a complex totality of mediated and contested

domains within societal formation.

> The historical unity of the ruling classes is realised in the State, and their history is essentially the history of States and of groups of States. But it would be wrong to think that this unity is simply juridical and political (though such forms of unity do have their importance too, and not in a purely formal sense); the fundamental historical unity, concretely, results from the organic relations between State or political society and 'civil society'...What, anyway, would a scientific recognition that the economic structure has changed, and that economic behaviour must conform to the new structure, mean? It would have the significance of a political stimulus, nothing more. Between the economic structure and the State with its legislation and its coercion stands civil society and the latter must be radically transformed, in a concrete sense and not simply on the statute-book or in scientific books. The State is the instrument for conforming civil society to the economic structure, but it is necessary for the State to 'be willing' to do this; i.e. for the representatives of the change that has taken place in the economic structure to be in control of the State (Gramsci 1971, 52, 208-09).[43]

This passage is particularly relevant to the Israeli nation building project. The State has been "an instrument for conforming civil society to the economic structure", a process which has required that the "representatives" of the change in the economic structure "be in control of the State" (see Nitzan and Bichler 2002). Gramsci further elaborates how the economic, political and social relations and activities which constitute the ideological and material production and reproduction of individuals within society, are subject to continuous transformation and struggle among the members of society, as these individuals act upon and change their circumstances and relations to one another and nature, effecting also, of particular importance for this study, the use and structural definition of their environment. Altogether these processes are none other than the production of social space.[44]

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[43] See Gramsci's *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, especially pages 12-13, for a particularly succinct elaboration of his methodology, one which I am attempting to apply in this study. In that passage Gramsci is analyzing the formations and role of "intellectuals" within the process of social formation, a process involving all the levels and mediations referred to in the passage quoted in the text referred to by this footnote.

[44] "[T]he essential fact is to perceive the close link between the urban [or really any human] processes and the social structure and to break with the ideological schema of a dualistic rural/urban, agricultural/industrial, traditional/modern society. For, if this schema corresponds to a certain social reality in its forms of relation and in cultural expressions, this reality is quite simply the reflection of a single structure, in which the effects at one pole are produced by the particular and determined mode of

Accordingly, the links between the socio-spatial form of the ghetto to the economic structure, civil society and political society and the State needs to be articulated. Since Israel is self-defined as a Jewish State the first task is to analyze the scientific validity of the notion "Jewish" as a category which provides definitional content to the state. This is particularly important because the state of Israel is legally constituted as the homeland for the Jewish people of the world. Jew/non-Jew frames official and academic discourse about Israel as a society. Population census data are recorded thusly. Statistics on car ownership are broken down by Jew and non-Jew by the government's Central Bureau of Statistics. Even the major tour guide book, *This is Israel*, let's you know as you travel from town to town, which towns have been totally "liberated", meaning that no Palestinians reside there, which towns are “Arab”, and if mixed what the percentages of Jews to non-Jews there are.[45]

### *f.1. a Jewish state?*

Phenomena are conceptualized and classified within Israel and about Israel along the Jew/non-Jew dichotomy. This conceptual dichotomy forms the basis of most analyses of Israeli society which proceed on the basis of majority-minority and modern-traditional

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articulation with the other pole...So far I have spoken of urbanization in a capitalist society, be it in the dominant or in the dependent countries. This characterization does not derive from an ideological option. It is the consequence of a theoretical point of departure: the hypothesis that the relations between society and space (for that is what urbanization is) is a function of the specific organization of modes of production that coexist historically (with a predominance of one over the others) in a concrete social formation, and of the internal structure of each of these modes of production. On this basis, designating a society as capitalist, then specifying the precise conjuncture and stage of capitalism that is revealed in it, enables me to organize my analysis theoretically." Specifically in regard to relations of dependency, “T]he whole of the productive system is reorganized according to the interests of the dominant society. It is logical that, under these conditions, the internal economic system should be 'inarticulated' or deformed. But this 'incoherence' is only the result of a perfectly coherent economic network, if one examines the social structure as a whole (dominant society and dependent society)." Castells, *The Urban Question*, 47, 64.

[45] See Sylvia Mann, *This is Israel: Pictorial Guide & Souvenir* (Herzlia: Palphot Ltd, 1990).

conceptualizations. These in turn inform the general public's knowledge of the two populations as distinct and provide part of the rationalization for the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict. The task here, conversely, like Marx's in "On the Jewish Question," is to establish the secular content of the *Jewishness* of the state and civil society in contra-distinction to the *Arabness* of the non-Jew. It is not the *Jewishness* or *Arabness* of our actors that is the "secret" to explaining the realities of Israel's segregation alone.

The *Jewish* and *Arab* aspects of Israeli society have to be explained and such explanation lies in revealing the nature of the actual secular activities of Jews and Arabs in their communities and the larger society of which they are a part. This activity and these relationships occur among the members (and groups) of society within specific relations to economic and political resources and institutions. The contending interests are made socially cohesive, though not necessarily stable, through the assertion of specific class(es) hegemony.

> Hegemony is always an active process, but this does not mean that it is simply a complex of dominant features and elements. On the contrary, it is always a more or less adequate organization and interconnection of otherwise separated and even disparate meanings, values, and practices, which it specifically incorporates in a significant culture and an effective social order. These are themselves living resolutions--in the broadest sense, political resolutions--of specific economic realities (William 1977, 115).

Furthermore, as Gramsci, Marx and Engels clarified the state apparatus corresponds, fundamentally, with the interests of the dominant class or classes (which are rooted in their secular relations to wealth, control over nature, and power) who are able to establish their hegemony. They do so in the name of all members of society and appear as the guardians of the interest of all. "[E]very class which is struggling for mastery...must first conquer for itself political power in order to represent its interest in turn as the general interest" (Marx and Engels 1996, 54). If such hegemony cannot be achieved or

maintained, then the State will not function as a unifying force at the societal level and a struggle involving all the various interests in civil society to gain hegemony or at least to further their control of the State apparatus would necessarily ensue.

It is significant to note that within Israeli society the question as to who is a Jew and what constitutes Jewish practice (which impacts social practice directly, such as marriage and divorce laws, when movie houses can be open—sometimes resulting in bitter legal and street fighting between secular and religious Jews within Israel) are among a variety of concerns regarding the *Jewishness* of Israel. At times the issue as to who is a Jew is hotly contested and no agreed upon definition among Jewish people in general actually exists. As discussed in chapter 3 laws exist which establish legal specifications for affiliation, though these do not go unchallenged and have been subject to change, to solve this problem at the practical level.

If Israeli law makers have not been able to solve the question as to who is a Jew, what possibly could be the answer to what would constitute a Jewish state? Is it a particular form of productive activity which defines property relations and access to natural and social wealth? Does it tell individuals in a society how to produce, distribute and consume the material wealth of society? Can these activities, essential to constituting and reproducing any society, be organized in a particular *Jewish* way that would then relate to a definite form of a *Jewish* state? This can only be answered in the negative for the obvious reason that *Jewish* does not define the content of what individual Jews and groups of Jews do in their various activities to actualize their concrete material existence, certainly not at this historical juncture (and probably never), since Jewish individuals do just about every kind of human activity, are represented in a wide variety of occupations,

and are members of every social class. Could perhaps “Jewishness” as an analytic concept be applied during the period when the Tribes of Israel, 1250-1050 B.C.E., consolidated into a confederation? Norman K. Gottwald, in his exceptional and rigorous study, *The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of Liberated Israel, 1250-1050 B.C.E.*, uses such concepts as "feudalized peasants", "tribally organized farmers", "transhumant pastoralists", etc. and not “Jewish” to explain the content of the individual and social activities of the Hebrews at that time. Therefore, it would seem, that if one designates Israel as a Jewish state, then the only substantive content one could attach to the adjective "Jewish", which would depict the character of the state, is that Israel is a colonial-settler state being settled by Jews; that is, it is a state whose population is being constituted on the importation of foreigners who settle a particular place and establish control over that territory. In the case of Israel, the particular people who are the colonizers are Jews from around the world, rather than a people from a particular nation-state, such as France or England or Germany. Only in this sense can it be said that Israel is a Jewish state; stated more accurately it is a state *for* Jews and not a Jewish state.

Regardless of what the actual conditions of economic and civil and political life may be, the conception of Israel as a Jewish State is the prevailing notion in all circles. At the ideological level, such conceptualization divorces the issue of the state from its social and class content insuring hegemony of the current social order. It also maintains the attitude of the Jewish population to the Palestinians as outsiders. These ideological constructs present barriers to Jewish Israeli workers, discriminated sectors, women, and

others towards advancing their own democratic or class interests. [46] In addition, the maintenance of the "security" issue as a top priority creates an atmosphere that relegates democratic and class issues to a subordinate position. Some segments within Israeli society claim that these struggles undermine Israel's main task of survival against the Arab enemy within and without and therefore constitute a form of sabotage, if only because they present to the world a picture that Jews in Israel are discordant. Many Israeli Jews internalize this ideology which further impedes their critical engagement within their own national circumstances. In spite of these ideological barriers contentions and antagonisms between Israeli Jews exist in civil society, as well as conditions that suggest possible alliances between Jewish and Palestinian workers and women, seen for instance in the development of the Ahoti (Sisters) movement which is a coalition of many women's organizations including all ethnicities.[47]

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[46] Dan Rabinowitz analyzes "homogeneity" stating that "the segment of the Israeli society most attracted to unilateral separation, namely the Zionist Left, is the one historically identified with the bifurcated ideology of cohesive core as robust borders. Forming the backbone of the Zionist and later Israeli project since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Zionist left, and in particular the Labour movement, has always been deeply invested in the ethos of a composite, idealized Israeli identity. Typical of young states and nations, this vision came with a series of assumptions regarding desirability and feasibility of universal values that underscore cultural homogeneity and solidarity. Such an ideology has an important role on the internal front: smoothing over socio-economic inequalities and disparities in access to resources, thus helping buttress a hegemonic order which ostensibly serves the good of all." Dan Rabinowitz, "Borders and their Discontents: Israel's Green Line, Arabness and Unilateral Separation," *European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics* 19 (2003): 229. In chapter 3 this question is returned to within the discussion of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

[47] Maxime Rodinson's optimistic comments of 1968 are worth excerpting here. Perhaps, in spite of the not too promising situation for genuine peace, his remarks may inspire us to look at the present with fresh eyes uncovering possible sources for progressive change. "Besides, nations have no eternal, unchanging essence. Their existence is in a state of constant flux. As has been said, powerful factors, however, could just as well drive her in an opposite direction. A different Israel is not an impossibility. If the threat from outside were to disappear for any length of time, the process which has each time begun during periods of respite could acquire very much greater impetus. The reactionary and expansionist parties would find most of their trump cards had disappeared. The internal social struggle could continue on a much healthier basis. The Left-wing parties, no longer suspect of weakening the defenses of the fort, would stand a better chance in the political struggle. With the decline of anti-Semitism in Europe and America, Jewish immigrants into Israel could be reduced to more modest proportions. Jewish emigration from Israel would grow. Zionism would thus lose much of its force through sheer pressure of circumstances.

The use of "Jew" as an explanatory category in the West has been for the most part tied to anti-Semitic ideologies and movements. It has been used as a pseudo-scientific category to justify nationalist anti-Jewish activities and governmental policies. The fact that most Israelis identify the State of Israel as a Jewish State does not make it a legitimate and valid scientific concept. Here too it is rooted in ideology and does not help to understand or explain the specific development of Israeli social formation. Arguing along the lines of Marx, Leon and Rodinson, just as the "secret" to explaining the persistence of the Jewish question must be sought in the history of real Jews in society and not in their religion or culture or some unique essence, so too must the explanation of the ghettoization of the Palestinians be sought in the relations of real Jews and real Palestinians in their economic and social relations as Israel has developed its specific form of class society and political state within world geo-political developments. Substituting "ethnicity-nationality" or "a people" for religion, and "Palestinian" or "Arab" for "Judaism", the task here is the one Marx outlines in "On the Jewish Question" where he states: "The contradiction between the state and a *particular religion*, for instance *Judaism*, is given by us a human form as the contradiction between the state and *particular secular* elements; the contradiction between the state and *religion in general* as

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"Israel would, from that moment, be a Levantine State, like any other, and no more a bridgehead of the West, forced by her situation to bear the brunt of the Arab world's hostility and to seek imperialist support. The continual temptation to embark on preventive aggression would likewise be removed. The state ideology would gradually tend to adapt to the new conditions. The privileges granted to the Jews as such would tend to disappear. Laws with racist or clerical overtones would fall into disuse and eventually be abolished. A considerable proportion of the refugees would be able to return without acting as a Fifth Column. The end-result would be a bi-national state like that dreamed about by the more open-minded and advanced spirits in Mandatory Palestine.

"A state of this sort would easily be accepted by the Middle East and could enter on harmonious relations with the neighbouring Arab countries, who would benefit form Israel's technical know-how and aid. This was the dream of King Feisal, and of some courageous Jews in the Palestinian Yishuv. One is inclined to prefer it to the grandiose visions of Herzl and Ben-Gurion, and to encourage all men, Israelis and Arabs alike, with the cry first set up by the Viennese journalist [Herzl]: 'If you really desire it, it need no longer be a dream!'" Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs*, 234-35.

the contradiction between the state and its presuppositions in general" (Marx 1975, 151).

Since according to established Zionist precepts the Jewish people constitute a nation, it was only logical that the Zionist Movement saw as a necessary requisite for the realization and actualization of nationhood the establishment of a nation-state. Obviously, accomplishment of such a task would require the acquisition and the ownership of physical territory, first by the Zionist Movement then by a Zionist State, as a prerequisite for establishing a national homeland exclusively for the Jewish people. Following this logic, Israel is conceptualized legally and within academia and popular consciousness as a Jewish State. Instead, I have been arguing here that Israel is a specific example of a colonial settler society within capitalist development informed by a particularistic religio-national agenda; and that *Jewish* is not an explanatory term that defines the substantive content of the Israeli state. *Jewish* obviously relates to the settlement of people within the territory controlled by the state of Israel and to how the state legally and institutionally administers and juridicates among the members residing within the boundaries of its territory of control; but *Jewish* or *Jewishness* as such, which is a religious, cultural and/or blood affiliation, does not and can not constitute the content of a state; such is based on the underlying secular social relations of production and the property relations upon which these relations are rooted.[48]

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[48] This is just as true in regard to Islamic or Christian or any other religious or ethnic category. States which define themselves in such a way may have discriminatory legal systems regarding their populations or may be influenced in a cultural way by a dominant religious or ethnic constituent within the state's population, but even this dominant sector is relating amongst itself not on the basis of religion but on the secular content of the real existing social relations of production and in this regard are divided ideologically and materially and in fact do not share as a homogeneous grouping even the same notions in relation to their shared religion or nationality or ethnicity.

Saying this though does not imply that constructing a state and a state apparatus as a homeland intended exclusively for the Jewish people does not affect the legal, juridical, administrative, political and military form of the state apparatus. But what is at issue here is the identification of the defining social relationships that form the substance of the state as such. If we place in brackets the non-Jewish citizens of Israel for a moment, it becomes clear that the Jewish citizens of Israel are legally relating to one another in specific social forms of property and organization of production which are the most fundamental constitutive elements of the legal, juridical, administrative apparatuses of the state. The body of literature, tradition, customs and rules handed down through Jewish history and codified as Jewish thought, ethics and principles may influence this or that law, and even such important ones as the *Law of Return*, but do not dictate or establish or provide a blueprint for how individuals within society are organized so that material life is constituted and reproduced. Individuals relate as legal, productive and juridical agents in their society (and state) and reproduce these relationships on the basis of the real existing forms of property and organization of productive activity—that which makes material life and culture possible.[49]

### *f.2. further situating the ghetto question theoretically*

The manifold and apparently disparate empirical phenomenon which are present to the observer within a network of complex interrelations and interactions, all of which make up the manifested totality of a particular society, are subsumed conceptually under

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[49] If this argument is not self-evident, let it be remembered that what constitutes *Jewishness* and Jewish conduct is contested terrain throughout all domains of Jewish Israeli society, including marriage, divorce, who is a Jew, observance of Sabbath and how these are dealt with in the public domain; some Orthodox sects do not even recognize the state.

the dominance of a historically determinate and specific form of human productive/reproductive activity. Uncovering what Freire calls the "deep structure" enables comprehension and explanation of the complexity of social phenomena.[50] To identify the specific dominant and determinate relations of human beings in their historically-situated mode of production[51] as space, and thusly as a temporalized unity of form and content--the cultural and the economic, etc.--is, as Castells explains,

> not derive[d] from an ideological option. It is the consequence of a theoretical point of departure: the hypothesis that the relations between society and space is a function of the specific organization of modes of production...On this basis, designating a society as capitalist [or whatever mode of production is dominant], then specifying the precise conjuncture and stage of capitalism that is revealed in it, enables me to organize my analysis theoretically (Castells 1979, 64; brackets mine).[52]

Wirth's "human ecology", "natural history", "cultural" approach, which typifies the

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[50] See "Appendix A" for further clarification on the historical methodology applied in this analysis of Israeli society.

[51] Conceived of as a process in Gramsci's sense as discussed in "Appendix A."

[52] The capitalist mode of production is premised on the generalization of commodity production, and most importantly the commodification of the capacity to labor so that the two factors brought together within the production process are wage-labor and capital (means of production) which are, as commodities, owned by workers and capitalists respectively. Landowners comprise the third of what Marx calls the three great classes of the capitalist mode of production. Such a social organization of human life is premised on the private ownership of the conditions of production, specifically the means of production and land, and the separation of the producing classes as owners from these conditions of production. Workers own their specific commodity which is the capacity to labor which they sell individually to an individual capitalist (or capitalist corporation) to be consumed by this capitalist for a certain period time within the production process of a commodity. Furthermore, like any society, capital must organize the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, including the production of means of production, in order that human existence can be reproduced. But how it does so is specific to the needs of capitalist reproduction which spatially and temporally separates the production, distribution and consumption processes as well as the productive consumption of the capitalist from the individual consumption of individuals and their families. Therefore, particular spatial organization emerges out of the complex of social organization required for capitalist reproduction. This becomes more complex and differentiated when we take into account the division of labor, mobility of labor and capital and the ever changing conditions of production as capital reconfigures space in the constant pursuit of opening new markets, expanding capitalist production and revolutionizing the labor process in pursuit of maximizing profit. What are of particular importance to this study of ghettoization are the spatial differentiation of the classes and the fragmentation of the working class such that certain segments of the population are segregated into restricted locales both because of the natural workings of the market and specific social practice. See Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), especially "Appendices."

majority of sociological and anthropological research, cannot and does not intend to uncover these fundamental, historically-situated and specific forms of social relations between the "real" individuals and producers in society.

> [T]he mere description of the process does not inform us as to the technico-social complex (for example, the productive forces and the relations of production) at work in the transformation. There is, therefore, a simultaneous and concomitant production of social forms and cultural dimensions. One may pose the problem of their interaction, but one cannot set out from the proposition that one of the forms produces the other. The theses on urban culture were developed in an empiricist perspective, according to which the context of social production was taken to be its source (Castells 1979, 83).

Therefore, as Marx states, a "pre-condition of comprehension" is the conceptual recognition of the dialectical interplay and unity of two fundamental aspects of the totality (as process); that is, on the one hand, the *real* actors, who engage with one another and are the creators of social existence, and, on the other hand, the definite historically-present (i.e., already produced) forms of human activity and products (natural and social) which situate and define the activity of these actors. Conceptual comprehension of this dialectical unity must be an analytic point of departure. The "features" brought to light by social scientists, such as Wirth, should be understood as manifestations of this interplay in need of analysis, and not, as in their case, the point of departure for analysis of the subject. As with any social space, Castells demonstrates that "A detailed analysis of each of the features that characterize it would show without difficulty the causal link, at successive levels, between the structural matrix characteristic of the capitalist mode of production and the effect produced on this or that sphere of behaviour."[53]

In distinction to Wirth, Castells further relates in his discussion of segregated

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[53] "For example, the celebrated 'fragmentation of roles', which is the foundation of 'urban' social complexity is directly determined by the status of the 'free worker', which Marx showed to be necessary to assuring maximum profitability in the use of labour force" (Castells 1979, 81).

areas, that segregation is "a specific phenomenon, and not simply...a reflection of general social stratification" (Castells 1979, 176). Also, for Castells, it is essential to recognize the underlying laws of capitalist accumulation as they are played out through the mechanisms of the market (especially for labor and housing) which give rise to a variety of forms of inner city segregated areas as well as a variety of means by which the state controls and administers the resident populations of these areas. The social operations at play forming the inner city ghettos of the United States, which Castells studies, have significant differences from our study of Palestinian ghettos in Israel. In Israel, while all the capitalist market forces are at play along with the capitalist division of labor and segmentation of the working class, the Palestinian ghettos were created by the State upon its establishment and correspond to the particular and consciously determined objectives of the hegemonic Zionist interests. This has generated a “fixedness” in place and composition of the ghettos over time in Israel rather than the more fluid shifting of place and composition of locales, such as neighborhoods, which may also often be “mixed”, which is more typical of advanced capitalist societies. New waves of immigrants replace older populations, elements of the ghettoized population become upwardly mobile leaving the ghetto, and changes in capitalist production and class relations and composition generate changes in the functions and composition of space.[54] Many segregated areas within capitalist societies are locales of “the poor” or marginal segments of the working class or home to the permanently unemployed or new immigrants and may or may not be fixed over time in place and composition, though such segregated spaces remain a necessary feature of any capitalist society where unemployment and the

[54] Harlem, New York is now in the process of being gentrified and real estate prices are rising. People of color are being forced out as whites are moving in.

capital and labor movement are permanent needs and results of the ever changing terrain of capitalist production and accumulation. As Wacquant stresses--and I am in agreement with his insistence that the definition of a ghetto cannot be simply reduced to enclaves of poverty--to the extent that segregated spaces become fixed and restricted and reproduced spatially over time and in composition, then such spaces are appropriately termed ghettos. In the United States such realities are most exemplified by the African American experience, whose segregated locales have been home not only to the poor but middle and bourgeois classes as well. Such a phenomenon is what I call the classical ghetto. The Palestinian experience encompasses the classical ghetto, and elements of the Jewish shtetl and Native American reservation experiences.

Though elements of the process of formation of various forms of ghettos and segregated areas may differ and derive from differing social practices, the results of ghettoization as well as a number of the ghetto's key socio-economic and political realities internal and external (within the larger society) to it are the same. For one, "the social milieu that such a concentration gives rise to, the sub-culture it develops," includes "the reaction of hostility that are set up between this community and the state apparatuses" (Castells 1979, 176). A "reaction of hostility" was immediately set up by the State which declared the Palestinians to be a threat to Israel's security, an *enemy within*. The initial phase of Palestinian ghettoization occurred during the 1948 War and was completed after the establishment of the State by restricting Palestinians to "closed areas" or "security zones" under military rule. This lasted for two decades. The belief that Arabs were inherently anti-Semitic and that they constituted an *enemy within* as well as an *enemy without* combined to create a powerful state sponsored global ideology that served,

and still serves, as a basis for the persistence of a policy of control and subordination towards the Palestinians under Israeli citizenship.[55]

The perception that the Jewish population is constantly under threat and therefore Israel must be in a constant state of emergency has militarized the society and to a great extent collapsed civil society into the State. The all-encompassing necessity for *bitachon* or *security* informs the basic stance taken towards the Palestinian population. As Ilan Pappe describes it: "*Bitachon* was then and remains until today a meta-term used by Zionist and, later, Israeli leaders to cover a wide range of issues and justify numerous core policies, from arms purchases abroad, internal struggle with other political parties, preparations for the future state, and the policy adopted against the local Palestinian population" (Pappe 2006, 27). Zionist leaders have consistently drawn on these two fears, the supposed innate Arab anti-Semitism and the existence of a *fifth column* within society, since the Palestinian co-citizens are claimed to identify with the Arab countries; both the Arabs and the Palestinians are portrayed as wishing the destruction of Israel. Through concerted and continuous use of rhetoric, propaganda, and educational curricula[56] these beliefs have been kept alive throughout the society's development,

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[55] In the *Jerusalem Post* on March 27, 1992 on page 11A a Professor of Education at Ben-Gurion University, Walter Ackerman, wrote the editors concerned about the speech MK Rafael Eitan gave to students at Tichon Gimmel in Beersheba. Eitan said to the young students that "all Arabs, including those who live in Israel and are citizens of the state, are 'enemies'" Ackerman thought Eitan's comments were fascistic in character and was concerned that such speeches were affecting "Israel's high school students…[of whom] a disturbing percentage…doubt the wisdom of a democratic form of government." He was also concerned that "pupils who might have argued that there must be some 'good Arabs'…probably found themselves in an uncomfortable position." So here even the term "our good Arabs" ran into trouble. Public leaders commonly are guest speakers in high schools and other public places and speeches such as Eitan's are not uncommon though people do voice their disapproval at times.

[56] See Uri Ram's discussion of Israel's education guidelines in *The Time of the 'Post' Nationalism and the Politics of Knowledge in Israel* (Tel-Aviv: RESLING Publishing, 2006). (Hebrew) and the development of sociology in *Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology: Theory, Ideology, and Identity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).

helping to maintain a hegemonic Zionist agenda vis-à-vis the Palestinian population. This dimension of Israeli society has become a concern for some psychologists who fear that such attitudes threaten the overall well being of the society.[57]

Besides the security threat the Palestinian citizens are purported to pose, they are also perceived to represent an internal threat since they threaten the boundaries demarcating us from them and the Jewishness of the State. Therefore, constant vigilance in all spheres, and particularly at the very basic human everyday level, is required to insure Israel remains secure as a Jewish State. After analyzing the processes which give rise to a variety of segregated areas and their control and administration by the state apparatuses and within the society at large, Castells stresses that "The result, on the ideological plane, is the reinforcement of the ethnic sub-culture; at the level of the class struggle, we are witnessing attempts on the part of the state to disperse or to limit the ghetto and also the consolidation of these zones as a place for organizing revolt among the...ethnic minorities" (Castells 1979, 183). Regarding Palestinians in Israel, two examples will suffice for now--a separate department exists to deal with Arab Affairs and the Sheen Bet (Israeli Security) oversees the hiring of teachers and principals in the separate Palestinian schools. Unlike Wirth's hypothesis we are not witnessing simply a "cultural" construct which allows the segregated population to maintain a "mode of life" while enabling a *modus vivendi* of "toleration" to exist between different peoples. The ghettoization of Palestinian Israelis is not simply a question of segregating a people residentially, but interconnects a variety of legal, ideological, political, military and economic processes--land appropriation, military rule, special laws, ideological

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[57] See Daniel Bar-Tal, *Living with the conflict: Socio-psychological analysis of the Israeli-Jewish society*. Jerusalem: Carmel, 2007. (Hebrew)

constructs, surveillance, violence--bringing "into play the complex totality of determinations that characterize each social formation" (Castells 1979, 183). All these are linked to the basic social form of production upon which the nation building project has been implemented. It is interesting to note that one of the results of Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov's empirical study of *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy* shows, based on 1983 data, that the majority of "Jews who enter the subordinate market…occupy administrative and supervisory positions in which they perform control functions for both employers and the state" (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993, 143).

### *f.3. Zionist nation building: a colonial settler state within capitalist development*

#### *f.3.a. a colonial settler state*[58]

Mainstream studies of Israeli society consistently exclude the colonial character of Israel's nation-building process; instead, the importation of foreigners is termed an "in-gathering", a "homecoming". Certainly, settling in Israel for many Jewish individuals is perceived as such, but such perceptions should not invalidate or supersede sociological concepts regarding human/social practices. In order to "return" Jews have participated in conquering and colonizing what was formally Palestine and have dispossessed and displaced a vast portion of the native population. This is simply fact.

Although the colonial character of Israeli society is generally not acknowledged the settler aspect is. The settler aspect of Israeli society is unquestioned since by definition Israel has been created as a homeland for Jews who mainly come from the Diaspora. All towns, cities and villages in Israel are officially classified as "settlements".

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[58] An early but still worthwhile book that addresses this issue is Maxime Rodinson's *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?*, trans. David Thorstad, (New York: Monad Press, 1973).

Furthermore, the Israeli/Zionist social science paradigm begins with the establishment of the Israeli State; the facts on the ground created by the state form the starting point for the study of society. Produced facts, like the Palestinian ghettos, termed "Arab villages", appear as natural and present to the researcher as objectively given empirical data, and thus serve as the point of departure for analysis. In their studies of these segregated locales, mainstream sociologists and anthropologists make no analytic or historical reference to colonialism, ethnic cleansing or even exclusionary policy (since Palestinians are perceived to constitute an "enemy within", their status is seen as a security matter); instead Palestinian ghettos are conceptualized as "Arab villages" wherein these villagers act according to their cultural traditions. By defining all locales as "settlements", Jewish and non-Jewish alike, the "naturalness" of the circumstances present, and "national" separateness, are given further ideational legitimacy. History begins with the present Israeli national construct.

The State has been the main coordinator of the colonization of the terrain while simultaneously building the nation, both in terms of populating the terrain and creating a nation-state entity and culture and all that that involves. Most importantly the leaders of the society through the state apparatus have (and continue to) put into place specific forms of ownership of productive resources and property and the class formation specific to these forms of property. Capitalization of the society has not occurred all at once but over time as the society and its economy were being produced. As Nitzan and Bichler point out

> In its early years, the Israeli state, while on the surface apparently subjugating capital to its own ends, was in fact the initial 'cocoon' within which capitalist institutions and organizations were allowed to develop [and in the end] Israel capital has not only outgrown the initial state structure from which it emerged, but also altered the very nature of that structure. Indeed, capital seems to have increasingly encapsulated the state, turning more and more of its public features into integral

> facets of private accumulation (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, 17; brackets mine).

They also make the important point that this process is not exceptional in regard to Israel, but is similar to the consolidation of European capitalism as well as characterizing the emergence of capitalism in colonial societies. What is specific to Israel, as they say, "is in the speed of its transition."

Now, if we bracket for the moment Israel's Palestinian population, the population of this nation has been and continues being constructed, for the most part, by importing people from other parts of the world, dispersing this population within the State's borders and the territories under its control. While settling the population the State generates the dominant forms of economic and productive activity upon which the lives of these individuals depend (and all this is the production of space). The State, which initially had legitimacy under the leadership of Ben-Gurion, has been the means for establishing on-the-ground control over territory, resources and people, and the concrete and specific forms of social relations of production. Through the State civil society has been constructed into a national entity--population, economy, culture, language, institutions. Under these particular historical circumstances the State (along with the military arm) was the only apparatus (its representatives are the real constituents of this apparatus) capable of unifying the disparate population and providing the administrative mechanisms necessary on a societal level for importation and incorporation of the more or less continuous flow of foreigners into Israeli society. This situation, with the consensus of the population, gave the State the ability, at least during the first decades given Ben-Gurion's capacity to lead and popular support,[59] to more or less dictate the

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[59] Actually, Ben-Gurion insured his leadership and Mapai's control of the state at a time when Mapam held a large position within the society and the military through shrewd political manipulations such as

character (in some arenas only tendentially) of Israeli social relations of production and determine who among society's members would have access to economic resources and political power within civil society, economic society and the State (and military).

But, as Williams elaborates, following Marx and Gramsci, the hegemony process is not generally actualized through a one-sided act of domination; instead the dominant class must incorporate various interests within civil society into political society. Accordingly, in Israel, the State, organized along the British form of proportional representation, first under the hegemony of MAPAI (which eventually became the Labor Party), incorporated into its apparatuses various movements, such as the Kibbutz and Religious, which were sanctioned by law, given positions in the government and thus had access to a proportion of the State's budget as well as natural resources. For the most part, except in formal terms, Palestinian citizens have been excluded from access to economic resources and limited in their capacity to be active agents within civil and political societies. Although various liberalizations over the years have taken place vis-à-vis the Palestinian population—granting of citizenship, formation of local councils, and removal of direct military rule—the status of this population still remains unresolved and contested, nor are they considered to be a part of the nation proper which is defined as exclusively Jewish. Within the present political context, the position that Palestinians are essentially a temporary guest who exist "amongst us" until circumstances present themselves such that their “removal” can be negotiated is on the rise. This is seen in the

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using the Transition Law of 1949, which as Colin Shindler writes “Helped to define the electoral system in that people voted for the party and not the candidate” such that the “largest party would therefore be called upon to form the government.” Schindler goes on to say that “Ben-Gurion utilized this law to ensure that the President would not be elected by the voters and that it would be a purely symbolic position. Real power would reside with the Primes Minister. Ben-Gurion thus engineered the marginalization of Chaim Weizman, the first President of Israel” (Colin Shindler, A History of Modern Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 2008), 65-66.

reemergence of the “transfer option” within civil society, political society and the state.[60]

The consistent policy of neglect of the Palestinian locales and their subordination within political society is reminiscent of the argument made by Marx in "On the Jewish Question" in his debate against those who opposed extending political rights to Jews in European countries.

> Society behaves just as exclusively as the state, only in a more polite form; it does not throw you out, but it makes it so uncomfortable for you that you go out of your own will. In substance the state does not behave otherwise, for it does not expel anybody who is satisfied with *its* demands and orders and *its* development. [In Israeli parlance, the *Good Arab* or the *Positive Arab* is one who accepts his/her subordination to and exclusion from the nation as legitimate.] In its *perfection* it even closes its eyes and declares *real* contradictions to be *non-political* contradictions which do not disturb it. [The Jewish right to self-determination as a people-nation is considered to be on a higher moral standing than the subordination, even ethnic cleansing, of the Palestinians can be considered an injustice.] Besides, Absolute Criticism itself has argued that the state excludes Jews only because and insofar as the Jews exclude the state and hence exclude *themselves* from the state [It is popularly perceived that the Palestinians want the destruction of Israel, the Jewish State.] (Marx and Engels 1956, 129; brackets mine).

One form exclusionary "behaviour" has taken in Israel can be expressly seen in the State's (and society's) program of social neglect, which has been explicitly carried out by Israeli policymakers in hopes that Palestinians, demoralized and discouraged, will "exclude themselves from the state” by voluntarily immigrating. Along with social neglect the web of ordinary everyday repression and surveillance of Palestinians has taken its toll. To a certain extent such policy has been successful since Palestinians have been "excluding themselves”, particularly in the former Occupied Territories, since immigration by Palestinians in greater or lesser degrees is constantly taking place.

The policy of Israeli leaders and the organic intellectuals of the nation towards the Palestinian Question/Problem and Arab states follows, in its essential content, the

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[60] Of course, in the end, whether or not such a situation comes to pass depends on geo-political developments, struggles within Israeli civil society and the State, and the actions of Palestinians.

strategy formulated and implemented by Ben-Gurion, a master of the realpolitik.[61] The outlines of this strategy are--As history presents a situation or series of situations which enable further extension over the appropriation of Palestinian land while allowing for the further removal of the native population,[62] Israel is to establish herself as a fortress nation, in a state of emergency, with universal (Jewish) conscription. Armistice agreements and treaties are not to establish permanent borders in hopes that future circumstances will provide the opportunity to extend the territory under Israeli control and their eventual annexation. Since borders are not legally established by international law or bi-national agreements with neighboring states on all sides, and land and people are unresolved, overall military superiority in the region must be maintained. In this way,

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[61] "And indeed, upon his promotion to the Jewish Agency Executive, statesman Ben-Gurion began contemplating broader, cosmological theories. One of these was the 'theory of political time'. 'In this game of historical forces', he observed, 'there sometimes arises a big historical chance…one big moment in a year when the skies open up and you can get what you wish…A [political] movement has to have the sense to capture this moment…' (cited in Tevet 1987: 9,12). 'They [the Arabs]', he continued, 'ignore the internal and external obstacles and the time factor…Alas and alack if we don't know how to exploit this time in order to grow and fortify…' (cited in Aronson 1994-95: Vol. I, p. 22). In other words, high politics, like modern business, was a matter of 'timing', the ability to seize the moment and beat the competitors in the historical bourse. This ability, or 'vision', was what differentiated a real statesman from an ordinary politician. The only problem was that, much like in business, the historical cycles kept getting shorter and trickier, the competitors were forever breathing down your neck, and unless you constantly came up with 'new and improved' visions, you in turn became history. And so, during the 1920s, the key was to quickly amalgamate the 'working class' parties in order to capture the labour market and the Jewish Agency before the competitors had a chance to organize. Then, in the 1930s and the 1940s, it was necessary to unite the 'Jewish world' in order to bring in enough immigrants, before Arab nationalists got their act together and stopped the Jewish colonial project dead in its tracks. In the 1950s it was crucial to have 'Jewish genius' develop nuclear weapons to keep the Arabs states at bay. And in the 1970s and 1980s the call of the day was to import Russian immigrants for the settlements before the end of the Cold War caused Israel to lose its historical tempo. Unfortunately, as the statesman got older, the race looked more and more like a treadmill, with the epochal jackpot becoming increasingly elusive, and the public, as always, totally oblivious to the grandeur of historical timing" (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, 107-08).

[62] "With regard to the refugees, we are determined to be adamant while the war lasts. Once the return tide starts, it will be impossible to stem it, and it will prove our undoing. As for the future, we are equally determined—without, for the time being, formally closing the door to any eventuality—to explore all possibilities of getting rid, once and for all, of the huge Arab minority which originally threatened us. What can be achieved in this period of storm and stress will be quite unattainable once conditions get stabilized. A group of people from among our senior officials has already started working on the study of resettlement possibilities in other lands and of the finances necessary." Moshe Sharett, Letter to Chaim Weizman 22 August 1948 Israel State Archives. Quoted in Colin Shindler, *A Modern History of Israel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 50.

step by step, the hegemonic Zionist objectives in regard to land and people, it is hoped, will eventually be realized by creating the facts on the ground--military control of territory, Jewish settlements on the land and removal of the indigenous population--creating *faits accomplis*. Israel enters into pragmatic agreements with neighbors (that do not establish definite borders if it is believed to be possible to acquire more territory later); engage in war when necessary or expedient (which must necessarily occur since land and people issues are unresolved); insure the docility of the resident Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories (or Palestine Authority) and inside the Green Line; prevent the establishment of a viable social life which would create the context for permanent residence by Palestinians (do not allow the development of economic, civil and political society to take root)--are all part of the policies which have been and continue to be enacted by the Israeli state necessary for the fulfillment of the hegemonic Zionist project. Simply put this translates into--the construction of *Jewish* facts on the ground and de-construction of *Palestinian* facts.

Just a few examples of the construction and deconstruction process will have to suffice for now. The Palestinian port city of Jaffa is a dramatic but not exceptional example. Like all the mixed urban towns Jaffa was targeted for "ethnic cleansing" and on May 13, 1948, five thousand Irgun and Haganah troops attacked the city. The Palestinians resisted for three weeks but in the end as Ilan Pappe tells us: "The Greater Jaffa area included twenty-four villages and seventeen mosques; today one mosque survives, but not one of the villages is left standing." The entire population of fifty thousand was expelled. "With the fall of Jaffa, the occupying Jewish forces had emptied and depopulated all the major cities and towns of Palestine. [And this is before May 15$^{th}$

the date the British announced that they would be leaving Palestine.] The vast majority of their inhabitants—of all classes, denominations and occupations—never saw their cities again…" After successfully occupying and depopulating the Palestinian towns and villages Pappe also documents the abuses that took place "under the cover of curfews and closures." One of the common crimes was looting, the ransacking of homes and businesses.

> Jaffa was also a particular victim of house robberies that took place in broad daylight. The looters took furniture, clothes and anything useful for the Jewish immigrants that were streaming into the country. UN observers were convinced that the plundering was also a means of preventing Palestinian refugees from returning….the scope of both the official confiscation and private looting all over urban Palestine was so widespread that local commanders were unable to control it (Pappe 2006, 204-06).

I was unexpectedly shocked when in the early 1990s I went with my husband to the secondhand shop district located in part of Old Jaffa to discover shop after shop filled to the brim and overflowing with the personal items that had been looted from Palestinian homes—furniture, dishes, clothes, jewelry, pottery, art works. And this was already over four decades after the original looting took place, yet these shops were still overflowing with merchandise to buy. According to Tom Segev:

> [T]ens of thousands of Israelis, soldiers and civilians, helped themselves to the spoils. One took an armchair, another a rug, a third took a sewing machine and a fourth—a combine; one took an apartment and another took a vineyard. Very quickly and easily a whole class—albeit a small one—of newly prosperous people appeared on the scene: merchants, speculators, contractors, agents of all sorts, industrialists and farmers. Some stole what property they could, others received theirs legally. A good many of the transactions fell into that grey area between what the law permitted and what was considered illegal, between outright robbery and official expropriation (Segev 1986, 79).[63]

The antique and secondhand shops in Jaffa were also booty. They had formerly been

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[63] Segev also reports in the book, *1949 The First Israelis*, what the soldiers did: "Soldiers who entered abandoned houses in the towns and villages they occupied grabbed whatever they could. Some took the stuff for themselves, others 'for the boys' or the kibbutz. They stole household effects, cash, heavy equipment, trucks and whole flocks of cattle. Behor Shitrit told his colleagues of the Ministerial Committee for Abandoned Property that he had visited some of the occupied areas and saw the looting with his own eyes. 'From Lydda alone,' he said, 'the army took out 1,800 truck-loads of property'" (Segev 1986, 69).

Palestinian places of business and homes and underneath all the objects and clutter one can still see the remnants of a former glory in the mosaic tiles of the floors. The owners of these shops were busy insuring me of the Arab authenticity of the items in hopes of making a sale. In Jaffa what remains of the Palestinian population and the quarters they live in are in decline. These areas resemble the shanty towns one sees throughout the Third World, but unlike their relatives the makeshift housing is the attempt of the Palestinian residents who remain to survive in an inhospitable environment rather than the dispossessed going to the cities and establishing shanty towns for another kind of survival. The one is a process of de-population the other population growth. Along the road leading to the entrance into the Old City of Jaffa, which has been turned into a tourist site, a former Mosque has been made into a discotheque called Aladdin.

One last example of deconstruction pertains to parks and forestation. Many of the over 400 abandoned and destroyed villages have been turned into parks and were targeted for the Plant a Tree campaign presented as an ecological program and not as a policy of creating new facts. Even Muslim cemeteries have been turned into parks. I am personally familiar with two in Jerusalem, where tombstones are used as benches to sit on.

Maintaining the British Mandate Emergency Regulations and various Ottoman and Egyptian Laws has facilitated the policy of control over the Palestinians and created a sense of "temporary residence", whether inside the Green Line or the Occupied Territories. Laws pertaining to association, publication, and censorship impede and at times prevent the establishment of permanent organizations and an oppositional or dissenting discourse within civil and political society. The following examples are just a few instances of such practices applied to the Palestinian citizenry.

During the military government in the early 1960s, the Cultural Movement for Sports and Education for Arab youth was banned and later in the sixties the nationalist organization Al Ard was also banned on the bases that it would be a threat to Israel's security. In the 1980s, after military rule was already revoked, the Congress for the Arabs of Israel was banned as well as the Committee for Coordination between the National [Arab] and Leftist Jewish Groups. In 1967 the State banned a march to Jerusalem requested by the Committee of the Heads of the Arab Local Councils and the Committee for the Defense of Lands against the continuation of Palestinian land expropriation. Since this was banned the organizers decided to hold local demonstrations. The army was sent to the various towns, resulting in violence and the army killed six Palestinians. This event has been marked in the minds of Palestinians and has become known as Land Day. And of course it has been illegal for any individual or organization to have any form of communication or relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization until the Oslo Agreement. Contrary to popular opinion the Islamic Movement has been permitted to organize and publish continuously.[64] Until 1994 no group in Israel has been permitted to

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[64] The development of the Islamic Movement in Israel owes much to the Israeli and Jordanian governments who collaborated to establish an Islamic University in al-Khalil (Hebron), headed by Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Ja'bari a prominent anti-PLO leader who served as minister in Jordan and in the internal circle of kings Abd-allah and Husayn, who are known to have befriended the Israeli occupation. A decade before the peace accord with Egypt, the Israelis brought Shaykh Abd al-Sami', an Egyptian scholar, or 'alim and graduate of al-Azhar, the oldest and most prestigious Islamic university, to Israel. Shaykh Abd al-Sami' preached anti-national ideology, along with anti-Jewish rhetoric, but was free to travel throughout all Palestinian Israeli towns and to be involved directly in organizing youth to his doctrines. Young people from the Shaykh's organization and graduates of Al-Khalil Islamic University were the founders of the Islamic Movement in Israel. He lived in Umm al-Fahim for a time, as he did in other towns, and was very successful in organizing a group around his teachings. Umm al-Fahim became the headquarters for the Islamic Movement. During this time the attacks against progressive Palestinians, like Abna al-Balad and Communist Party members and supporters, began. The Communist Community Club was burned, a filming crew of Antonia Caccia was attacked and its vehicle was burnt; and women and volunteers who came from Europe to help the community were regularly harassed. The Camp of Voluntary Work, which brought together Palestinians from Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Jewish Israelis, and international volunteers, was attacked in many ways. Umm al-Fahim's electrical power was shut down by the zealous and volunteers who tried to turn it on were shot at. During the same period the Palestinian Red Cross offices

use the word "Palestine" in their name. The first to do so is the Palestine Women's Organization which was only granted permission to do so after the higher court ruled against the lower court.

The Emergency Regulations, which were adopted by the State from British colonial rule in Palestine, allow the State to arrest and detain without cause.[65] Exercise of these regulations is quite an ordinary practice, at least as it is applied to Palestinian citizens. During my first year living in Israel I witnessed its use first hand. Two weeks before the beginning of the Gulf War in 1991 the authorities had come to our home with a search warrant. They were looking for illegal materials as a pretext to arrest my husband who has been an activist for Palestinian rights in Israel. They went through all our possessions including my books and files confiscating various materials including my copy of Franz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*. The authorities returned again with a search warrant for the cooperatively owned print shop that my husband manages. Here they found a receipt and master copy for a print job that was done for the Democratic

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and library were burnt out in Gaza by Fundamentalists. In the 1980s they were defending the Afghan Mujahidin. Throughout the Israeli government never felt the need to use its apparatus to inquire, stop, or arrest any of the perpetrators. What is evident is that there has been, at least since the introduction of Shaykh Abd al-Sami', an alliance between the Islamic Movement and the Israeli powers-that-be particularly against the secular democratic Palestinian forces. This occurs is spite of the rhetoric of the Islamic Movement that publicly writes and speaks about pushing all the Jews into the sea. It is not uncommon, and it is known by Palestinians, for members of the Islamic Movement or families of these members to work for the Israeli government as policemen, collaborators, and even for the notorious Border Police. The father of the former mayor, Shaykh Ra'id, was a policeman and after the 1967 occupation of the territories he was appointed as an assistant to the officer responsible for the Jenin area. Two of his brothers and cousins serve in the police in Wadi 'Ara. When the Islamic Movement gained the local council in 1989, for the first time in decades Israeli government officials felt comfortable to enter Umm al-Fahim and they came to celebrate the new Islamic Movement mayor. The Minister of Interior (this Ministry, up until recently, has been held by the National Religious Party) and the new mayor embraced on a public platform and immediately, to the joy of both these parties, the mayor decreed the separation of girls and boys in Umm al-Fahim's public schools. Many residents, both students and parents, protested this action and circulated a petition.

[65] Prior to the establishment of the State, Zionists opposed these same regulations, but once in power they instituted them for control over the Palestinian population.

Front (a legal list in Israel sponsored by the Communist Party which has seats in the Knesset). The print shop had printed a leaflet which criticized the United States, Israel and Iraq. It called for people to remain calm and did not announce any public action. My husband is neither a member of the Democratic Front nor did he help draft the leaflet, nor, since the print shop is a cooperative, was he solely responsible for the printing of the leaflet which was a paid job. The police arrested him, put his arms behind his back and handcuffed him, and he was immediately taken to prison in Ara, the station responsible for the Wadi Ara area (called Iron in Hebrew). Arrest without cause is legal in Israel and is repeatedly used against Palestinian citizens. I accompanied my husband to the station and kept insisting that they tell me why he was being arrested but of course to no avail. In order to shut me up I was told "This is not America." Fortunately, he was released two days later, but only because the authorities had made the mistake of arresting him two days before the Sabbath. It is required by law that a detainee be taken before a judge within forty-eight hours which meant my husband's court appearance occurred on the Sabbath. This meant that only courts in the Palestinian areas were open. Fortunately, the judge, being able to read Arabic, realized the leaflet was harmless and ordered his release in spite of the police authorities' insistence that he be kept in jail for at least two more weeks so that they could continue their investigation while he was safely behind bars and a threat to no one. The judge overruled and said they did not have sufficient reason to keep him and ordered that they let him get back to work.[66] He concluded that releasing

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[66] Besides interrupting work activity the police confiscated a month's worth of receipt books from the print shop which had a serious disruptive effect. These were never returned even after many attempts involving numerous trips to the police station and lawyer intervention. The materials confiscated from our home two weeks earlier were returned after several months but only because the American Embassy intervened on my behalf.

my husband would not jeopardize their further investigation.

According to Israeli law a case remains on the record for a year. During this time the authorities can continue their investigation, build a case, and bring it to the court. If they do not do so within the year the case is closed. Since, in this case, the authorities only wanted to keep possible organizers behind bars during the war against Iraq they only wanted to detain these people, including my husband, during that time. Two other people from Umm al-Fahim, members of the Democratic Front, were also arrested during this period. The authorities did not get what they wanted from the judge, extension of my husband's confinement, and he was not harassed any more while his case was pending.

There are many other formal and informal means besides those briefly mentioned here which contribute to maintaining the "alien" and "temporary" position of Palestinian citizens inside Israel and the Occupied Territories; some of these will be turned to throughout this dissertation. As Lefebvre pointed out violence is inherent to the production of space and all the more so when the social practices integral to it are premised on exclusion and subordination, which are further accentuated by the colonial endeavor. In the extreme case the legal use of torture and collective punishment, which are quite common practices, terrorize the Palestinian population and attempt to discourage any form of social action by Palestinians. Use of quasi-state private institutions organized to provide services and funding for Jewish people only provides a basis for public expenditure to exclude Palestinians contributing to their economic and social conditions of poverty and neglect.

The Zionist colonization of Palestine exists within the historical development of geo-political interests and realities dominated by the capitalist world market. Israel is

both a subject and an object within these processes. In Nitzan and Bichler's excellent study, *The Global Political Economy of Israel*, of capitalist development in Israel they elaborate the various phases of this development beginning with the pre-state settler period. Palestinian ghettos are articulated social spaces established through the ongoing resolution of these national and international forces, where resolution often takes the form of irresolution. Wirth pointed out that a community not only exists within a society, but a society exists within national and international relations--and these are all "poles [towards] which every social group tends" (Wirth 1964, 167). It is not simply an ideological bias to state that Israel has been and continues to be a client state of the United States receiving the largest amount of economic and military aid of any country[67] or that Political Zionism, a nationalist ideology, was conceptualized and organized into a movement by European Jews in the late 1800s and that this movement realized its objectives by allying with the colonialist interests and transformed itself first under the leadership of Ben-Gurion, reinforced under Begin, into Military Zionism.[68] The realities of Western anti-Semitism cannot be used to disavow analysis of the actions of members of a state and society that is the result of the interests of some Jewish people or because it is called a Jewish State. Furthermore, as has already been argued, the fundamental forms of property, ownership, the organization of how material reproduction takes place and its distribution and consumption which define the institutional and legal basis of Israeli society are not explained by some notion or definition of what it means to be Jewish. This is unscientific and can only lead to either anti-Semitic or legitimizing ideologies. What is

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[67] See Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israeli Connection* (Pantheon Books, New York, 1987).

[68] See Eran Kaplan, "A Rebel with a Cause: Hillel Kook, Begin and Jabotinsky's Ideological Legacy," *Israel Studies* 10, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 87-103.

at issue is the analysis of the content of social practice. Rodinson's sound methodological clarifications quoted here speak directly to the point: namely,

> As far as socio-historical study is concerned, those who adopt these concepts [historical materialist] begin with a basic methodological stance. They are unwilling to accord any scientific privileges to the various Jewish entities of the past and present. The Jews have indeed constituted specific groups and categories, perhaps even exceptional ones in the sense that a set of laws and conjunctures gave rise to types of formations and evolution not encountered elsewhere. But they are not exceptional in the sense that the general laws that govern the history of human groups do not apply to them.
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> Methodologically, then, we must refrain from postulating the action of any historical dynamic that is not founded on some substratum of forces the operation of which can be analysed as a function of factors that are also at work elsewhere, throughout the history of human societies.
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> Now, here as elsewhere--and this is another methodological premise, that of Marxist sociology, derived from generalizations about historical experience as well as reflexive deductions--no substratum of empirical forces can be discovered to account for the action of any 'spirit', or immutable 'essence' characteristic of a people or civilization regardless of the situations in which they find themselves. There is no such thing as an independent 'Western spirit' or 'Chinese spirit', although a set of relatively constant empirical factors may at least bring about some degree of permanence of the ideal phenomena that accompany them...It does not seem to me that they have shown that certain unvarying features of the Jewish religion (which is the only constant element of Jewish history)--whether its historic character or something else--have been able to produce a tendency to conserve Jewish existence in extremely diversified forms, to replace one formation with another ceaselessly through their effect alone. Still less can we consider this the result of a 'spirit of Judaism' situated somewhere between heaven and earth, acting through unknown and intangible mechanisms, and escaping any serious influence of the usual factors of human history.
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> Marx's statement that Judaism survived not despite history but through it is not a mystical or philosophical axiom of untestable origin. It is simply a methodological requisite of any scientific history. Jewish history must be explained by the usual historical factors, as even religious minds can admit if they accept the idea, asserted for millennia by the great universalist religions, that God acts through secondary causes. However that may be, even though here as elsewhere complete explanations can be expected only asymptotically, through the permanent, continuous, and cooperative efforts of historians and sociologists, and although one cannot hope to do more than narrow the margins of uncertainties and illuminate obscure areas little by little, at least it can be affirmed that there is nothing in Jewish history that imperiously compels recourse to the effects of any mystical forces standing outside the usual mechanisms of the social history of humanity (Rodinson 1983, 75-77).

### *f.3.b. capitalist development*

Though Israeli society has been to a certain extent a conglomerate of several interacting modes of production—capitalist (corporations and monopolies, state-owned, and petty bourgeois and family-run enterprises), cooperativist, communal, collectivist--all these have tendentially and hegemonically been subsumed within the capitalist system. In

his article, "From State-Led Growth to Globalization: The Evolution of Israeli Capitalism," Adam Hanieh concludes that

> The fact that Israel's economy was state-controlled and directed for decades by the Labor Zionist movement was not a reflection of socialist ideology but an outgrowth of the context in which it developed: during the colonization period, the absence of a strong, indigenous Jewish capitalist class led the state (or proto-state) to control investment, but this control was not antagonistic to private capital. To the contrary, from 1948 on the state pursued policies aimed at nurturing a capitalist class by encouraging a few key families to undertake joint projects and investment with state and quasi-state enterprises. The turning point in this state-led class formation was the 1985 Economic Stabilization Plan (ESP), which led to the emergence of private capital as a class independent from the state. [69]

Nitzan and Bichler argue much along the same lines though their historical and empirical research leads them to the conclusion that what has gradually emerged is "capital as state."

> On the one hand, the Israeli state was created and subsequently sustained by foreign capital flows. These flows, extended by both private investors and foreign governments, enabled their owners to act as partners, and often as the real boss, in crucial local and regional matters, including economic policy, war, and peace. On the other hand, domestic capital was born from within this context. Initially weak and sheltered by the state, it eventually grew to transcend it, locally by taking over and controlling more and more state functions, as well as globally by integrating into the transnational structure of capitalism (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, 14).

Though various scholars argue when capitalization of Jewish life in Palestine/Israel began, all concur, at this point, that the capitalization of the political economy of Israel

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[69] Hanieh also raises the important question as to whether Israel's full-scale entry into a globalized economy "has the potential of undermining the stability of Zionist hegemony" since "[T]he hegemonic position of Zionist ideology within the Israeli polity was largely based upon the economic privilege guaranteed to the majority of its citizens—particularly Ashkenazis employed by the five dominant conglomerates…Hence the neoliberal reforms have led to a massive income gap—the second largest gap between the lowest and highest deciles in the industrialized world [2002]. The child poverty rate is second only to Mexico among developed countries. Moreover, these aggregate figures hide the extreme differences between strata within Israeli society. In 1999, the salary of an Ashkenazi employee averaged 1.5 times that of a Mizrahi employee and twice that of an Arab employee" (2003, 17). While on the campaign trail, Shimon Peres, former leader of the Labor Party who served for thirty years as vice-president of the Socialist International, openly admitted to students from Ramat Gan College that "the Labor Party never wanted to be called socialist or social democratic." The so-called secularist even went on to say, "We have no need for Lenin, Marx or Engels. Our positions are taken from the Torah: The Ten Commandments are the most important things to human civilization and they represent our moral base. The Prophet Amos is our social ideology and the Prophet Isaiah is the base for our political vision: 'nation shall not lift up sword against nation." Quoted in Lilach Weissman, "Labor irate over Peres' claim party never aimed to be socialist," *haaretz*, March 14, 2006.

has occurred. In the *Basic Guidelines of the 30th Government of Israel*, issued February 2003, the following is stated under section five, "Economy and Society":

> 5.4 The Israeli economy is small and dependent on foreign trade. Successful expansion of the economy depends on the country's expertise in areas where it enjoys a relative advantage, thus enabling it to manufacture and export high-quality products and services at competitive prices. This approach necessitates exposure to the international market and the removal of administrative and other obstacles in order to enhance the competitive strength of the country's economy.
>
> 5.5 The Government will continue to expand the policy of exposure and liberalization of the money market, capital market, and labor market.
>
> 5.6 The Government will maintain a low level of inflation by reducing government expenses, reducing its budget overdraft, creating conditions for increased productivity, and setting appropriate monetary policies.
>
> 5.7 The Government will adopt a policy of privatization and will transfer control of businesses (including authorities, according to legal and banking regulations) to the public and to private enterprises.
>
> 5.8 The Government will strive to the best of its ability to build confidence in the capital market and to encourage all sectors of the public to increase savings.
>
> 5.9 The Government views the business sector as an essential tool in promoting economic growth and creating jobs, and will, as such, work to encourage this sector.
>
> 5.10 The Government will work to increase economic competition while limiting monopolies, removing obstacles, and reducing economic centralization, and it will also work towards integration in the world economy. The Government will encourage and promote knowledge-intensive industry and high-tech companies. The Government will encourage investment in these industries and the establishment of new businesses, especially in development towns.[70]

Clearly, we are studying the specific realities of a particular colonial settler society within capitalist development. In this regard, Abram Leon's genius in analyzing the class content of the Zionist Movement in *The Jewish Question* as he did has been proven from hindsight.[71] Most particularly, he understood that the leadership of the

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[70] Acquired from the Israeli Government's website, www.knesset.gov.il.

[71] See especially pages 245-49 in Abram Leon's *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation*. The errors that exist in Leon's historical analysis, due mostly to the lack of information available to him at the time he was writing, I do not believe refute his basic analysis of the roots and character of the Zionist movement. In fact, I would argue the events--the actual development of the State of Israel--have confirmed his analysis of the class content of Zionism as it is hegemonically expressed and help explain the social problematics that exist today. See Maxime Rodinson's critique of Leon in *Cult, Ghetto, and State*, especially pages 110- 116.

Movement represented the national bourgeoisie who aspired to enter the historic scene as full members. To do so meant establishing a Jewish controlled nation-state upon which these aspirations could be materialized. Leon also understood that to accomplish this colonialist project the Zionist Movement would require the support of at least one of the major imperialist world powers since the territories of the world were already divided up and settled by people.[72] By the time the Zionist Movement fully organized itself into a settler movement it was known that to achieve the aims as set forth would require the appropriation of land and the expropriation of some *other* people. Once the terrain of Palestine was settled upon and the support of a major world power, Britain, had been drafted, the European based Jewish religio-ethno-nationalist colonial settler project could begin the difficult task of settling its terrain. The task of settling the terrain so that capitalist development could gain hegemony took some time, but by 1985, the last stages were accomplished when the State under the Economic Stabilization Plan privatized all but a few enterprises.

This process enfolded regardless of the fact that Israel has been built out of diverse Zionist ideological currents involving different class perspectives each constructing their particular social projects on the ground as ways of organizing productive activity and social relationships. The existence of these diverse ideological projects also supports the thesis argued here that *Jewishness* is not an explanatory category that defines the content of the Israeli state. In regard to these diverse currents within the Zionist Movement it is not their *Jewishness* that explains their specific

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[72] See Stephen Green's *Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel*. In this book he documents the little known yet very significant relations the US had with the Zionist Movement in the pre-state period and subsequently. Stephen Green, *Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984).

character vis-à-vis each other but their secular class content (and, it should be remembered that the ideological currents within the early Zionist Movement, which were in contestation with one another, were particular expressions of what was going on more generally within Western and Eastern Europe, Russia and the United States when the Zionist Movement was being formed in the 19th and early 20th centuries). These various ideological formations were in competition once the state was formed regarding what form of development Israeli society would take; each sought political space, social resources and funding for their particular projects and ways of organizing social reproduction. The use of the state apparatus to insure the social demarcation between an *us and them*, as well as the exclusivity of these projects as Jewish enterprises is an expression of the colonial character of this society and state defined within a particular historical context and a particularistic religio-ethno-national movement; still, the Zionist agenda laid out thus far, and those aspects of the nation-building project outlined above, do not as yet sufficiently situate the ghettoization of Palestinians as an essential part of these developments. For that we need to further clarify their position within the social formation; particularly the formation of Israel's working class and the place of Palestinians within this formation. The formation of the working class was a key task of the Zionist leaders, and necessary for the successful construction of the nation-state. This task was ideologically expressed by the early Zionist leaders as the redemption of the "old Jew" through the control of land and labor in a state of their own. Creation of a working class underpins the specific production of this national space in all its dimensions and situates the ghettoization of Palestinians within that social space.

### *f.4. Palestinians as a reserve army of labor*

Contemporary ghetto residents constitute a segment of a capitalist society's labor power, namely, the reserve army of labor. As explicated by Marx, this segment of the proletariat is necessary to, and the result of the laws of, capitalist accumulation. (They serve as a readily available source of additional labor when needed by capital as well as keeping a lid on the value of labor power.) Manuel Castells recognizes this relationship to capital as the fundamental defining social relationship of the ghetto population to the national society and as an essential social content effectuating the formation of segregated areas characteristic of "modernity" (i.e. capitalism). While Castells establishes this as a central starting point for analysis, he does so non-reductionisticly. "Social segregation in space is, therefore, the specific expression of processes aimed at the simple reproduction of labor power, but these processes are always inseparably articulated with all instances of the social structure" (Castells 1979, 183). The task is to comprehend that the defining social relationships embedded within the social formation, which are expressed in social practice, are only manifested through a network of mediations at all levels of societal processes and these can only be actualized as forms of social space. These mediations (which involve all the aspects of human activity including counter-hegemonic impulses and forms of resistance of the subaltern) can give rise to many and different forms of socio-spatial and cultural formations even when rooted within the same dominant social relations of production because they are always rooted in concrete, particular, temporal, contingent social practice.

A fundamental defining social relation relevant to the explanation of the ghettoization of Palestinian Israelis has thus been identified (and will be returned to in

subsequent chapters): namely, their position within Israel as a reserve army of labor for Israeli capital. "The complex totality of determinations" though, in any specific ghetto experience will have certain determinations that are specific to it which articulate with this fundamental underpinning. The other determinant processes must also be uncovered and it must be made evident how they are "inseparably articulated with all instances of the social structure" if one is to, through the analysis, give back “the complex totality of determinations” of the ghetto in all its concreteness. In regard to this study of ghettoization in Israel, while demonstrating the general dynamics underpinning residential segregation in contemporary capitalist societies and the importance of the reproduction of labor power to that segregation, the ghetto formation must be appreciated as it is defined by the particularities of the nation-state building project within which ghettoization is taking place. To do so requires seeing how the Palestinian ghetto is also tied to the strategic objectives of the hegemonic Zionist project in regard to land, labor, and people. Although these strategic objectives inform the policies and actions of the State they are acted upon within the actual historically limited circumstances present to the actors as they attempt to realize their objectives. Of specific significance in this regard are the “incomplete” process of colonization of land controlled by Israel; the unfinished territorial definition of the State which leaves Israel without legally and internationally recognized borders; and the continued unresolved presence and status of indigenous non-Jews, that is, Palestinians, who reside in territory under Israeli control whether within the Green Line or the Occupied Territories (Palestine Authority). Since this dynamic is a *living resolution* in process, Palestinians in Israel are at once a definite *permanent* presence and yet also a *temporary* presence that could be transferred or

relocated outside the boundaries of the Israeli State at some point. How this process will be resolved is yet unknown.

That Palestinians have been incorporated into the societal reproduction process of Israel as a reserve army of labor is simply a fact. However, this process of incorporation has been carried out within an overall Zionist objective of exclusion. The early leaders preferred option, Ben-Gurion in particular, was for the transfer of this population out of the Jewish State since their objective was the creation of a Jewish state based on Jewish business and "Hebrew labor".[73] It must be kept in mind that it is the dominant or hegemonic Zionist program that is of immediate analytic concern and not the many contending viewpoints which are both to the left and the right of the hegemonic agenda. The hegemonic program is carried out through the fact that the interests which this strategy represents have major access to the State apparatus, are leaders of political parties and hold key positions within the institutions and organizations of civil society, and are therefore also in a position to determine the predominant course of economic life (both as private entrepreneurs in civil society and through control of state policy and expenditure), intercourse within civil society, as well as foreign policy. All of these activities involve a strategy towards Israel's Palestinian citizenry, the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the Palestine Authority, and the Diaspora (the refugees).

Palestinians are incorporated into society only to the extent the historical

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[73] It is well documented that early on Ben-Gurion was in opposition to the Jewish socialists and communists who represented a large portion of the Jewish settler community in both Palestine and then Israel. "Ben-Gurion's dislike of Jewish Communists and fellow travelers stretched all the way back to the split in Poale Zion, the predecessor of Mapai, in 1920 into pro-Soviet and Palestine-centered wings. Then, he argued against those who preferred class solidarity between Jewish and Arab workers over the establishment of a 'centre of Jewish labour in Palestine'" (Shindler 2008, 70). Shindler goes on to say "Since 1948, he had been conducting an effective purge of Mapam sympathizers in the army and their replacement by Mapai adherents. Neither was Ben-Gurion pleased with Mapam's approach towards the Palestinian Arabs since his aim was to achieve security through settlement based on expanded Israel borders" (Shindler 2008, 71).

circumstances necessitate and to the extent new social forces emerge or mature that push against the established borders. These forces may involve actors such as Palestinian activists; reform, Post or anti-Zionists; neo-liberal bourgeois--any of whom may seek minimally a further "normalization" of Israel's market society. These circumstances and the arena for maneuvering and advancing strategic objectives pertain most particularly to the State's internal and external borders, since the solution to the internal borders--Israel's *Palestinian Question* with respect to her alien citizens--is tied to the solution of the external *Palestinian Question*, whose solution is to a great extent dependent on Israeli acceptance of definite internationally set external borders (which in turn situates the Palestinians in some way vis-à-vis this territorial formation). The maximal Zionist program envisions the complete exclusion of the Palestinian population from the social totality of the nation state whether accomplished through force, war or some kind of "voluntary transfer".[74] But the exigencies of realpolitik demand adjustment to the existence of a Palestinian population within Israel and the Occupied Territories. "Toleration" of this population in "our midst" is acceptable as long as they constitute a manageable numerical minority insuring their political subordination while allocating to them as little social space and expenditure as possible.

These two positions—removal and presence--can co-exist within the overall strategic plan of the hegemonic Zionist interests, which was formulated by Ben-Gurion and constitutes the dominant strategy to this day. This orientation unifies both the long term objective and the short term realities and envisions that the overall objective is to be realized through stages. At each stage, when circumstances are conducive, Israel will

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[74] See Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).

further advance towards her overall Zionist objectives. As I stated earlier, this strategy necessitates that Israel maintain a superior military apparatus in the region, continue campaigns to bring Jews from various parts of the world to settle unpopulated areas or when labor supplies are needed, agree only to demarcation lines and not official state borders so that further territorial extension can occur when possible, exist within continued conflict and partial resolutions of the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict while acquiring when possible territorial expansion and attrition of the Palestinian population within those areas the State controls. That expulsion of the Palestinian population has been an objective of the leadership of the state with Ben-Gurion as the main strategist, especially during the formative years leading to the war and the establishment of the state, has been substantiated by numerous researchers, including Zionists. As mentioned earlier, Ilan Pappe has settled this question based on original source documents produced by the individuals who commanded the military struggle and formed the leading core of the state. These documents clearly reveal the planning for and implementation of such a policy and are referenced in his book, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*.

Thus, the Palestinian ghetto is also the particular socio-spatial resolution of the unfinished process of this Zionist social formation within the lands controlled by the State of Israel in regard to its resident Palestinian population which is deemed undesirable whether religious or secular reasons are advocated. The ghetto structure allows for a relatively inexpensive means of surveillance, administration and control of the ghetto population; concentrates the reserve army of labor into defined residential areas which can readily be drawn into the national economy as needed and can fall back

upon itself for survival when not[75]; disarticulates the Palestinian population from each other and the Jewish population; prevents ordinary everyday interpersonal interaction between Jews and Palestinians; maintains an apparent non-commonality of culture, religion, language between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis; and insures that Palestinians perceive themselves as alien and subordinate residents within the nation-state. Little social resources are allocated to the ghettos; the public transportation system passes by the Palestinian towns and, for the most part, does not enter them; administrative offices, social services and hospitals are located outside the ghetto. Virtually no economic and infrastructural investment occurs in these areas. It is public information and at times contested in the Knesset that Palestinian towns are allocated one third the budget of comparable Jewish towns. Since Jewish settlements are built with an infrastructure and modern facilities, the disparity is even greater. Palestinians for the most part have to, if they can, acquire such things as a sewage system through their own initiatives. Given these realities some social scientists have emerged who provide a critical analysis of the situation of Palestinians in Israel. Elia Zureik refers to the domination of Palestinians in Israel as "internal colonialism". Anthropologist Henry Rosenfeld has called the Palestinian towns "workers dormitories".[76]

The ghetto form of maintaining the Palestinian population guarantees the

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[75] This helps explain why even the public transportation system does not enter Palestinian towns, which at first glance seems to be even against the interest of the Israeli economy since daily Palestinians commute to Jewish locales to work for Jewish-owned businesses. Transport to and from work is left up to the Palestinian proletariat to figure out.

[76] Elia T. Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); Henry Rosenfeld, "The Origins of the Process of Proletarianisation and Urbanisation of Arab Peasants in Palestine," in *City and Peasant: A Study In Socio-Cultural Dynamics*, eds. La Ruffa, Freed, Saunders, Hansen, Benet (New York: The New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 220, art. 6 of the Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 1974).

subordination of these people; ghettoization allows the incorporation of them into the life of the society marginally when capital accumulation necessitates their use, as for instance, when Palestinian labor is called upon to construct housing for the new immigrants. What is described here also pertains, for the most part, to all such marginal populations which exist throughout the capitalist world. But, in this case, "marginality" and poverty not only reflect workings of capitalist development which necessitates the formation of a reserve army of labor and stratification within the working class, giving rise to residential segregation and all the realities of marginality and poverty that this calls forth in everyday life, but also Israeli Zionist policy attempts to maintain Palestinians as a non-essential part of the social reproduction process and therefore also non-essential to society proper. If geo-political circumstances permitted, this population could be dispensed with both as a pool of labor and as a market for Israeli products. New waves of Jewish immigration or foreign guest workers can and do provide other sources to meet these economic needs, though some Israeli politicians argue that their Arab workers are needed since they have acquired skills and return to their homes (ghettos) after work rather than the streets of the cities like the disenfranchised immigrant workers.[77] Nonetheless, the increasing use of disenfranchised unprotected foreign guest

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[77] Palestinians from the Occupied Territories form the lowest strata of the Israeli work force and are crucial to Israeli production. They are mostly employed in agriculture and construction. When the government prohibits Arab workers from the Occupied Territories from entering Israel cheap foreign labor must be imported to take their place in these necessary menial jobs (in the Israeli vernacular dirty menial jobs are called "Arab work"). This is in spite of the fact that some 102,000 (1995) Jewish Israelis are unemployed. Israeli Jews refuse to take these jobs. The August 14, 1995 *New York Times* article entitled, "Foreign Workers Replacing Arabs on Israeli Farms," quotes Ora Namir, Labor and Social Affairs Minister, who is personally opposed to the importation of foreign labor, as saying that one reason she is in favor of Arab labor is that "they go home at night." The foreigners, on the other hand, hang out in the streets and bars, spend "their free time drinking beer outside the old Jerusalem city walls" and in general give rise to "social problems." According to this *New York Times* article approximately 72,000 (1995) foreign workers currently reside in Israel.

workers over recent years is a case in point. This class of workers competes with the marginalized Palestinian workers and could replace the Palestinian workers altogether should some "transfer" of populations occur down the road. In fact, the Palestinian workers though subordinate, as citizens they partake to some extent in the benefits of the welfare state. The guest workers do not.

The Palestinians' status of being unwelcome guests who are envisioned as only temporarily residing in the land of Israel serves both practical and ideological purposes for the established Zionist interests. The constitution of the Palestinian ghettos enables the practical possibility of the "extraction" of this population from the nation, which could adjust its internal economic intercourse with more or less ease. Ghettoization—segregated space—also insures the ghetto people's ideological exclusion in the minds of the majority of the Jewish Israeli populace since they for all practical purposes literally do not see the Palestinians. Meanwhile, the needs of capital accumulation for politically marginalized and unprotected workers at lower wages than the "primary Jewish workers" are met. War, terrorism, or some other context could result in deportation, transfer, expulsion and treaties that further remove this unwelcome presence from our midst. And on hand are guest workers, more of whom can always be recruited.[78]

It should not go unnoted that Israeli politicians and entrepreneurs have no particular problem developing Israel into a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. The

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[78] Zeev Rosenhek's work is most interesting and I believe supports the argument I am making here though he doesn't address the transfer question. He ties Zionism, colonialism and capitalist development together and begins from the totality of the social relations absorbed within the state and its reproduction. The titles of these three articles inform the content of his contribution. "The Political Dynamics of a Segmented Labour Market: Palestinian Citizens, Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and Migrant Workers in Israel," *Acta Sociologia* 46, no. 3 (2003): 231-49; "Policy paradigms and the dynamics of the welfare state: The Israeli welfare state and the Zionist colonial project," *The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 188, nos. 2-4 (1998): 157-203; "The Exclusionary Logic of the Welfare State: Palestinian Citizens in the Israeli Welfare State," *International Sociology* 14, no. 2 (June 1999): 195-215.

large non-Jewish immigrant population like the Russians and the importation of guest workers from a variety of countries, as well as the adoption off and on of non-Jewish refugees, makes this clear. These non-Jews are an ever growing proportion of Israeli society though they do not represent a direct threat to the Jewish position of numerical majority status. What these politicians and businessmen seek, and it is often quoted within Israeli discourse, is a Jewish state like England is an English state. What this means in actual terms is that Jewish capital be firmly established as hegemonic within society and that the dominant customs, symbols, language, holidays be of a Jewish character around which other cultural symbols and customs are subordinated. In the end, in real terms, this is what is meant by the Jewishness of the Jewish state as a "normal" society. (This is further discussed in chapter 3.) But, if the presence of the non-Jew as such is not a threat, they are even invited, why the obsession about the presence of the Palestinian citizens? I think the answer to this lies in the realities of Israel as a colonial settler state within the Middle East. These people represent a moral blemish to the self-construed justness of the exclusive nation-building project--which all Jewish Israelis know has been at the expense of the Palestinians whether they acknowledge this or not--and a threat to the pettiness of the petty-bourgeois character of the nation-building agenda.[79] If one is to stand before these individuals as peers and see oneself reflected in their eyes as equals, one's moral center would be threatened. I believe this is why Jewish racism against Arabs is so prevalent and aggressive. All that which is Arab and indigenous to the place must be erased--witness the physical destruction of Arab architecture, villages, mosques and the construction of Jewish facts on the ground; what

[79] Abram Leon's influence on my thinking is clearly seen here, but this is not an a priori absorption of his analysis, rather an assessment based on empirical evidence and ethnographic research.

is absorbed is redefined as “Israeli” not Arab or Palestinian; and the history of the region has been rewritten as an expression of Zionist history with Arab Palestine viewed as simply a temporary detour from the authentic history and content of the place as the homeland of the Jewish people.

The Palestinian presence, unlike the other non-Jews who are imported to Israel, constitutes an inherent and ever-present threat to the legitimacy of the Zionist construct as a national entity based on a particular people to the exclusion of others which continues to be built by the displacement of a native population. And since Zionist ideology attempts to present itself as grounded upon democratic, secular and morally universal premises, the Palestinian blemish persistently reminds the "nation" of its faulty premises. Zionist particularism limits the extension of generally applicable standards regarding legislative, juridical, administrative, cultural, symbolic, and moral discourse within Israel. If particularism is to be maintained along with the blemish, then the only solution is to blame the situation on the blemish and so the Palestinians are officially and in popular Jewish Israeli discourse depicted as the transgressor of morality and democracy who must be contained and from whom the "nation" must be protected.[80]

In this way, both in class terms, as discussed above, and ideologically, the Palestinian ghettos are different from other segregated areas typical of capitalist market societies in general. Such societies necessitate stratification between the classes and within the working class and the permanent existence of these stratifications within social relations (super-structure), concomitantly giving rise to various segregated socio-spatial

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[80] See Yerach Gover's excellent book which deconstructs the contradictions within Zionist morality through Israeli literature. *Zionism: The Limits of Moral Discourse in Israeli Hebrew Fiction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

residential formations which are reproduced over time. This is also true among the Jewish Israeli population, which Swirski's work mentioned above well documents, and is especially evidenced in Israel's *development towns* which were constructed for non-European Jewish immigrants. In relationship to Israel's Palestinian population we witness the same process, but as it also articulates with particularistic colonial interests which envision the Palestinian presence as temporary and undesirable; therefore, the ghetto-form also serves to contain and control and is thus a *living irresolution* to this Zionist objective.

Zionist colonization and Israel's capitalization of what was formerly Palestine is an ongoing incomplete process. These processes operate concomitantly and are unfinished. Although I argue that the Palestinian presence is structured by the Zionist agenda as a temporary construct, its presence within Israeli society is a concrete reality and a continued part of the reproduction of this society. As such it is neither analytically or materially peripheral to Israel as a society. In this regard Palestinians are a necessary part of Israeli society and the social scientists, if they are to practice "good" science, must incorporate this population and its place within Israel at least within their field of reference. But even more than this, especially as capitalist relations become more generalized, and as Israel's economy is globalized, I believe the ability to maintain a strict Zionist agenda becomes more difficult and this puts pressure to reform Israel's particularistic laws and exclusively based social programs. This process has already been going on and most recently there have been changes in draft laws such that non-Jews, i.e. the Palestinians, may voluntarily join national service. While this represents a fracture in Zionist policy and is creating some controversy in Israel, it is not an actual integration of

the nation's military, but the ghettoization of Palestinians within the military apparatus who are relegated to civil duties. It is too early to see all the consequences of these developments, but, clearly, Palestinians as workers and consumers within Israel's capitalist markets are, as Najwa Makhoul argues in her PhD dissertation, "The Proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel: A Study of Development and Class Formation," essential to Israel as it exists presently from the standpoint of the society as a whole.[81] Notwithstanding, how these dynamics will play themselves out within society is not yet clear; one thing that is clear, is that the subaltern status for Palestinians will remain; perhaps, as is the case for African Americas, certain bourgeois strata within the Palestinian community will have more social mobility and recognition and even positions within the cabinet and the such. If these processes continue as they are and a population transfer does not take place, what I think is most likely to happen is that the Palestinian reality will begin to look more like the African American experience than the shtetl, while maintaining the already existing physical construction of the separate ghetto Palestinian locales.

Lastly, it should be noted that Israel's internal ghettos are not only confined to the Palestinian population, but exist among the various Jewish ethnic, racial, religious and country of origin subgroups within the Jewish population. These spatially separated Jewish ghettos can be partly explained by State and settler movement policies which were directed at correcting what was considered to be the "abnormal" life of Jews in the Diaspora by supporting socio-economic programs intended to invert the *inverted pyramid*

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[81] See additionally Najwa Makhoul, "Capital Sectarianism and Working Class Internationalism: Greater Israel in Twenty Years," *Ayyar*, June 9, 1988. (Arabic) and "Changes in the Employment Structure of Arabs in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 11, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 77-102.

espoused by Ber Borochov, attaching labor to land. In his writings in the early 1900s Borochov argued that in the Diaspora, due to the hostility and competition of Gentiles, Jews became an "abnormal" people with a class structure that resembled an "inverted pyramid." Jews were forced to take on professional, intellectual and commercial occupations rather than the "normal" predominance of peasant and proletarian occupations which typified "normal" society at large and were thusly overrepresented as an urban petty bourgeois. He argued that this distorted Jewish life and only subjected Jews to further anti-Semitism. Because of this he believed the Jewish people could only correct this "abnormal" development by inverting the pyramid within a state of their own.[82] Although this vision of a *normal* society was conceptualized by the socialist Ber Borochov, who is considered by many to be a Marxist Zionist, it was ideologically adopted during the first few decades of the state and served to support a particular vision based on capitalist development and its attendant class divisions within society as the normal order.[83] For the socialist Borochov, creating a large Jewish working class, which

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[82] Ber Borochov, *The National Question and the Class Struggle: Selected Essays in Marxist Zionism* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transition Books, 1984). Borochov's ideas were embraced by the Poalei Tziyon movement and in particular by the socialist Hashomer Hatzair which later became MAPAM, the United Workers Party of Israel. In a similar vein A.D. Gordon proposed establishing a society of Jewish peasants. The ideas of Borochov and Gordon and others like them motivated the establishment of the first Jewish collective settlement—kibbutz—Deganiah, to be followed by many others.

[83] Israelis typically pride themselves on creating a "normal" society that mirrors other western countries, particularly the United States, including all the ills that go along with capitalist development. This is reflected in newspaper and magazine articles and popular discourse which for instance romanticize and glorify individual entrepreneurs who have made their fortunes even in marketing and trafficking women from the former Soviet Union—"the submissiveness of the East and the whiteness of the West" is one way they advertise the buying and selling of these women in mainstream tourist guides. Of course many people are concerned about the direction that Israeli society is taking and David Grossman sums this up in his speech on the occasion of the anniversary of Rabin's assassination on November 4, 2006 saying: "And these [100 years of conflict and war and other circumstances he identifies as typifying Israel life] are partly the cause of Israel's quick descent into the heartless, essentially brutal treatment of its poor and suffering. This indifference to the fate of the hungry, the elderly, the sick and the disabled, all those who are weak, this equanimity of the State of Israel in the face of human trafficking or the appalling employment conditions of our foreign workers, which border on slavery, to the deeply ingrained institutionalized racism

would right the inverted pyramid, was seen as a necessary precondition for the Jewish people to accomplish on their road to building socialism within a state of their own;[84] but its practical application and realization was to provide the ideological underpinnings for a generally uncritical acceptance within Israeli society of the policies of Israel's leaders as they have progressively extended and *caused to become fixed* capitalist class relations and forms of property as the expression of a *normal* society.[85]

Although the early pioneers were European, and Zionism is a product of European Jews, it has been for the most part on the backs of the Oriental (from Arab countries) and other non-European Jews that the Zionist leaders have constructed their normal pyramid. The *othering* that is so essential to the hegemonic Zionist nationalist construction is also an expression of the class formation taking place within the nation-

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against the Arab minority. When this takes place so naturally, without shock, without protest, as though it were obvious, that we would never be able to get the wheel back on track, when all this takes place, I begin to fear that if peace were to arrive tomorrow, and even if we ever regained some normalcy, we may have lost our chance for full recovery." David Grossman's speech at the Rabin memorial printed in *haaretz*, November 5, 2006. Even during the early pre-state period, many individuals within the Zionist Movement, like Ahad Ha'am, were critical of the adventure capitalist schemes of many of the early immigrants to Palestine, including Rothschild's vineyards, and saw these efforts at establishing profit-making businesses as self-aggrandizing and antithetical to creating a thriving Jewish cultural center. Many Zionists were also very critical of the prevalent anti-Arab sentiment that often typified and at times was quite abusive and clearly racist, that existed among many of the immigrant settlers.

[84] In the following excerpt Jason Schulman summarizes Borochov's ideas succinctly: "What was needed to 'normalize' the Jews—and avoid their destruction—was the founding of a Jewish state where Jewish capitalists and workers would wage class struggle. Migration to Palestine specifically 'was ideal because it would be, in Borochov's view, the only land available to the Jews. It lacked advanced political and cultural development, and would be a land in which big capital would find no possibility while Jewish petty and middle capital would.' Palestine would then develop along capitalist lines and the Jewish proletariat—in solidarity with the world proletariat—would fight for socialism." Jason Schulman, "The Life and Death of Socialist Zionism," *New Politics* 9, no. 35 (Summer 2003): 127.

[85] Given that there were many different and vying ideological movements within Zionism, and most particularly labor, socialist and communist currents, this can be partly explained by the overriding belief, whether real or ideologically fostered, that nation-building and security, which have been equated to the state's very survival, take precedence over all other concerns. This has weakened the expression of real differences over the direction of the society and real social differences amongst Jews within Israel. Ben-Gurion set the "security" precedent which has been repeated with each change in leadership.

building project. In the following excerpt Shlomo Swirski discusses the socio-economic circumstances leading to the class subordination of the Mizrahim (the Orientals).

> While the period of mass immigration is a critical one for understanding inequality in Israel today, the explanation is not to be found in the socio-economic characteristics of the Oriental Jews in their countries of origin, nor in the insufficient economic means that were at the disposal of the young state of Israel. Rather, the key is in the role played by the Orientals in the developmental processes that took place in Israel after their arrival.
>
> To begin with, the contention that Orientals emigrated from backward societies to a modern one reflects a gross and stereotypical generalization regarding all of North Africa and the Middle East, especially with regard to the role of the Jews in the economies of their countries of origin. But, most important, this contention constitutes a gross exaggeration of the state of the Israeli economy at the time of independence....
>
> The rapid development of Israel after 1948 was made possible by various factors: the formation of an independent state apparatus that could, as the leading entrepreneur, set its own goals for development: the appropriation of the real estate and enterprises of the Arab refugees; the flow of capital from abroad - from Jewish donations, German reparations, and U.S. government loans; and the flow of new immigrants, which, on the one hand, made for the expansion of the home market and, on the other, provided the labour power necessary for large-scale economic development. In this process, the Oriental immigrants constituted, in the main, a relatively cheap, mobile, and manipulable labour force.
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> ... [This chapter deals] with the process by which Orientals became the industrial and white-collar Jewish proletariat of Israel, a process that involved the simultaneous transformation of Ashkenazim into the governing, managerial, and commanding class. The emphasis in this analysis is on the meaning of class affiliation within present-day Israeli social structure. A related point, which will not be dealt with here, has to do with changes in class standing caused by immigration to Israel. Lacking a thorough and comparative study on the subject, all that can be said is that while for many Orientals, especially villagers and urban proletariat, immigration brought an improvement in the standard of living, for a substantial stratum, especially those who had been engaged in commerce, administration, and the professions, immigration brought a change for the worse, at least for the first generation; the motif of *declassement* is a very salient one in Israeli Oriental literature" (S. Swirski 1989, 7-8).

A primary task for any colonial settler society in the process of formation with the aim of *putting in place* its national economy, is the construction of a sufficiently large and segmented labor force so that capital accumulation can take place. The sought after immigration of Jews from the Arab countries in the early years of the state mirrors the process of constructing the reserve army of labor in the 1800s of another colonial settler society in a process of capitalist formation: namely, the United States. Just as agents of US capital went abroad to recruit individuals and whole communities to immigrate to the land of promise, so too did (and still do) Zionist agencies seek Jewish immigrants from abroad in order to swell the ranks of the working class inside Israel. In keeping with what

the hegemonic leaders of the Zionist Movement saw as the task of the Jewish nation, these leaders, through the government and private Zionist organizations, ghettoized their non-European Jewish immigrants into Development Towns, separating them from the centers of Jewish Israeli life politically, physically and economically. Usually these towns, besides being located on Israel's borders with the Arab countries, were often located next to one or two major industrial sites so that these captive Jews could be cheap fuel for helping set fire to Israeli capital development.[86] And so they did, along with the captive Palestinian populations, which included, firstly, those within the Green Line and then also, after 1967, those in the Occupied Territories. And thus the nation-builders have produced a ghetto country of ghettos. One of Borokov's aims has certainly been fulfilled in that a majority of Jewish Israelis are now members of a working class, but his dream of a socialist Jewish state is not, at least as yet, to be seen on the horizon. Instead, many of these working class Jews are ghettoized in the slums of Israel's cities or are isolated from the centers of Israeli society (Ashkenazi dominated), residing on the borders or in areas designated for *Judaization* in underdeveloped Development Towns. [87]

***g. summation***

Ghettoization of the Palestinians within Israeli society and the state has insured

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[86] See, for instance, Adam Hanieh, "From State-Led Growth to Globalization: The Evolution of Israeli Capitalism," *Journal Of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003): especially 6; Shlomo Swirski *Israel: The Oriental Majority*, trans. Barbara Swirski (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1989); and Tom Segev, *1949 - The First Israelis* (New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1986).

[87] The Ethiopian immigrants are particularly discriminated on a clearly racial basis. In a Reuters News Service Feature the story of one 1984 immigrant is told: "[W]hen his group arrived in Israel in 1984, the government sent the newcomers to live in economic backwaters and the religious establishment said they would have to undergo conversions to make sure they were real Jews." Elisabeth Eaves, "Israel: Feature – Ethiopian Jews Struggle to Adapt in Israel," *Reuters News Service*, 30 August, 1998.

their status as a subordinated other. Such incorporation of a population within a society's life precludes the ghettoized population from being peer members within a shared society that belongs to all members as a national entity and heritage. The Zionist leadership has definitionally and legally separated "nationality" from citizenship and this separation underwrites the separation of Jew and non-Jew and the ghettoization of these respective populations within in all spheres of the society's life activities. No universal notion applies to these two populations within the nation-state's totality as a societal we.

Physical separation is especially significant since it affects everyday life experience making ordinary daily intercourse between the two populations impossible. Residential ghettoization has insured that Palestinians are virtually unseen within daily life for the Jewish population except as a subaltern—menial laborers who clean their offices, pave their streets, repair their cars; though the flip side is not the case since Palestinian survival is dependent upon daily engagement, most especially for working males, with the powers that be. Palestinians must go to the Jewish ghettos to work, to shop, to go to the hospital, to go to government agencies; while Jews, for the most part, need never enter a Palestinian ghetto.

In regard to economic life, ghettoization of the Palestinians has insured a readily available supply of cheap labor to be called into action within Israel's productive activity when needed and restricted to the ghetto when not. Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov consider segregation to be one of the practices crucial to maintaining Palestinians as a source of cheap labor and write:

> [I]n order to provide 'cheap labor' for individual employers, the state turns to boundary-maintaining measures in order to control the subordinate minority. Practices such as geographic segregation, legal closure of employment opportunities, discriminatory labor exchanges, or other

> forms of discrimination, make it necessary for the subordinate ethnic group to supply its labor at low cost as the only means of competing in the labor market (Lewin-Epstein 1993, 10). [88]

The Palestinian populations in the West Bank and Gaza have also played this role. Dr. Makhoul has shown in her work how acquisition of the Occupied Territories in 1967 spurred on capital accumulation in Israel by creating virtually over night a reserve army of labor. Nitzan and Bichler also confirm this and they show how at that time even as the

> [Jewish] demographic growth in Israel itself continued to decelerate, the shortfall was more than compensated for by the economic annexation of over 900,000 Palestinians who lived in the newly occupied territories. The 'merging' of this population was tantamount to a massive injection of breath, equivalent to one-third of the overall market. Moreover, the social reorganization mandated by merger, the proletarianization of the agrarian Palestinians, and the rapid incorporation of their cheap labour into Israel's small economy—up to 140,000 workers, or 14 per cent of the overall labour force—helped kindle productivity (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, 124; brackets mine).

And this captive population, whether inside or outside what is called Israel proper, whether more or less disenfranchised as citizens or not, who are legally and militarily restricted in their capacity to organize in their own interests, take on the task of carrying out the least desirable jobs, and in all their areas of employment at low wages enabling higher profit margins for their employers than would otherwise be possible.

> But according to the Histadrut's Economic and Social Research Institute, as late as 1992 the average wage of Palestinians working in Israel was 38 percent of Israeli wages. The explanation provided for the persistence of such a wide gap, that "the distribution of occupations among the workers from the Territories shows concentration in occupations characterized by low wages", is nothing but tautological. The reason for this lopsided concentration is hardly the absence of a stratum of educated Palestinians. While 30 percent of the West Bank labor force was employed in white-collar occupations, only 5 percent of the Palestinians employed in Israel were so employed, and most of them, probably, were working in East Jerusalem. The Ben-Shahar report explicitly admits that "the employees in Israel represent a lower crosssection of the educational and skill continuum that those residents of the Territories that in the past were employed in the Gulf states". The real reason for the wage gap is that under Israeli rule a rigidly stratified ethnic labor market was established, pushing educated Palestinians to leave (Shafir and Peled 2002, 187-88).

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[88] In their empirical study of the Israeli economy Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov also show that not only are profits increased but also maintaining the Arab population as a source of cheap labor reduces Jewish wages as one goes down the occupational ladder. They indicate that this does not lead to alliances between Jewish and Palestinians workers since Jewish workers are still economically advantaged vis-à-vis the Palestinian population and also wedded to a culture of separation.

Palestinians, whether citizens or not, have satisfied for Jewish capitalists the need, as Emanuel Farjoun pointed out, "for a cheap, mobile labour force, with no social rights; a free labour force in classical meaning of the term."[89] They are also a ready made market for Israeli production. Ghettoization makes administration and control of this "free labour force" efficient and readily manageable, while insuring that social expenditure to their enclaves is as limited as possible.

The ghetto as an isolated cultural space constricts narrows and thwarts the cultural life of its inhabitants, forcing a particular form of underdevelopment which in turn appears and is explained by the powers that be to be inherent to the character of the inhabitants themselves. "Traditional", "backward", "provincial", "dirty", "slippery", "untrustworthy", "narrow-minded", "primitive" and all the other attributions Europeans typically bestowed upon the Jews of their ghettos are now given a new "Arabist" twist by Jewish Israelis in regard to the Palestinians housed in their ghettos.

Furthermore, ghettoization is a form of spatial organization which leaves open how this population is treated in any future resolution to Israel's Palestinian Question. Depending upon which social force or forces gain hegemony the fact that Palestinians are ghettoized makes available a variety of options for Israel's rulers regarding this population and any additional Arab populations Israel might acquire should Israel occupy or annex additional Arab territories by, for instance, occupation of South Lebanon, resettlement of Gaza, further settlement or annexation of the West Bank. The experience of implementing and maintaining a ghettoized population provides Israel with a ready to hand policy and facts on the ground that can facilitate future agendas which could include

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[89] Nitzan and Bichler (2002, 120) quote this passage from Emmanuel Farjoun, "The Palestinian Workers in Israel—An Economic Reserve Army." Hebrew. *Red Papers* (5).

the transfer of land and/or people, creation of a new wave of refugees, ghettoization of newly acquired populations; and this is the case whether the scenario resolves into the actualization of a Palestinian State; permanent border agreements between neighboring Arab states; occupation and settlement of newly acquired territories; or some new accommodation of Palestinians within Israeli society.[90]

In this chapter I have been concerned with identifying the essential logic of the process underpinning ghettoization within Israeli development so that the various objective and subjective phenomena pertaining to the construction of social space occurring within societal formation can be explained. In order to properly contextualize the Palestinian ghetto we have needed to establish the developmental contours and substance of Israeli society so that the everyday life processes are understood as situated realities. The "Israeli experiment" is an unfinished process whose future is unclear both for the Jews and the Palestinians and the world. Borders and control over territory and natural resources, as well as people, are all unresolved issues between the inhabitants of what was formerly called Palestine.

Ghettoization is the social spatial resolution to Israel's *Palestinian Problem* as that problem has been formulated, produced and managed through the social practice of those Zionist forces which have been hegemonic in the nation building process. It is tied into all levels of social existence and reproduction of a continuing colonial settler project within capitalist development. It informs Israel's legal, political, economic, social,

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[90] At a time when third-world states are being actively pulled apart through programs of ethnic cleansing, invasion, religio-ethnic nationalist struggles, and the US led War against terrorism, Israel's systemic treatment of its internal other, who constitute twenty per-cent of its population, provides a model of control and subordination as one of the ways to create *living resolutions* to these human dramas. This is a far cry from what the early bourgeoisie heralded as a new age of universalism and enlightenment. Perhaps now the king has no clothes.

cultural, linguistic, religious, class, ideological, moral, administrative, and military order relative not only to its Palestinian population but through this lens its own socio-economic, moral and political character. The leaders of Israel have actively and quickly constructed a country of ghettos through the policies of the state--assignation of peoples to separate geographical settings, enactment of preferential laws, and construction of ideological and moral narratives that instruct public education and give *scientific* legitimacy to the construction of mainstream social science paradigms premised on exclusivity. Ghettoization is an all-encompassing construct of Israel's *lebenswelt*. As such, ghettoization is the concrete converse of the totalizing hegemonic Zionist narrative that presents the State of Israel as the culmination of all of Jewish history.

As stated in the "Introduction" it is only possible in this dissertation to begin establishing the contours of a complex process of producing social space within the development of the nation building process of Israeli society. I have attempted here to provide an overview of significant aspects of this process as it applies to the ghettoization of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship. Subsequent chapters selectively help provide a fuller story of the settling of Israel's terrain vis-à-vis her *nokhahim nifkadim*, present absentees.[91] To understand the underpinnings of this process, Israel's peculiar definitions

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91 "Present absentees" is a legal category referring to Palestinians who were present in Israel when their property was deemed "absentees' property" and thereby confiscated by the State. This applied to around 75,000 persons most of whom did not have their property returned to them. See David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 57. The term "present absentee" is used by some Israelis as a synonym for Palestinians in Israel. Since there are over 100 Palestinian villages and towns in Israel that are "unrecognized" by the government with an estimated population of as much as 70,000 people, the notion of "present absentees" has real meaning. The government does not provide road access to these villages, electricity, sewage, plumbing, running water. In a review of David Grossman's book *Present Absentees*, critic Hillel Halkin writes, "…we in this country know far more about the recent wave of immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union, even though we have been host to them for only a short time, than we do about the Palestinians who have been living in our midst for nearly 45 years. The later are indeed, in the words of Grossman's title, 'present absentees'…" Hillel Halkin, "The Silent Minority" in *The Jerusalem Report,* May 21, 1992, 56. The unconscious absorption of Zionist culture and thinking down

of nation and nationality must be unraveled. These definitions ground Israeli laws concerning nationhood, citizenship and immigration, the subject of chapter 3. They serve as the legal basis for setting in motion a perpetual dilemma in a messy terrain of an *us* and *them*, where the *us* is insecure in its capacity to perpetually dominate and secure its majority status over a *them*; and the *them* is insecure in their title as present yet absent, not knowing for how long the present "secured" enclave will remain home to them, wondering if the contradiction between the first and second half of their entitlement may resolve itself such that their *nokhahim* (they are present) will be engulfed by their *nifkadim* (they are absent). But before going there, something of the story describing how Palestinian towns and villages were changed into ghettos in Israel needs to be told.

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to every detail is even evident in this review. Zionist mythologizing about the eternal Jewish relationship as residents of Eretz-Israel is operative when Halkin writes "we have been *host* to" the immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union and that *the Palestinians* (who are expressed here and typically not as individuals but as a reified group) "have been living *in our midst* for 45 years" when what is really the case in regard to the native Palestinian population is the reverse. [Italics mine]

## Chapter 2

## Umm al-Fahim, The Mother of Charcoal: Military Rule, The First Decades

> Although Israel had essentially completed the ethnic cleansing of Palestine by now, the hardships did not end for the Palestinians. About 8,000 spent the whole of 1949 in the prison camps, others suffered physical abuse in the towns, and large numbers of Palestinians were harassed in numerous ways under the military rule that Israel now exerted over them. Their houses continued to be looted, their fields confiscated, their holy places desecrated, and Israel violated such basic rights as their freedom of movement and expression, and of equality before the law.
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> Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*[1]

> [The military government] interferes in the life of the Arab citizen from the day of his birth to the day of his death. It has the final say in all matters concerning workers, peasants, professional men, merchants, and educated men, with schooling and social services. It interferes in the registration of births, deaths, and even marriages, in questions of land and in the appointment and dismissal of teachers and civil servants. Often, too, it arbitrarily interferes in the affairs of political parties, in political and social activities, and in local and municipal councils.
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> A military governor Sabri Jiryis quotes in *The Arabs in Israel*[2]

In Arthur Ransome's children's book, *Swallows and Amazons*, his character Young Billy, a charcoal producer, tells his hiking visitors that "We want ours to burn good and slow. If he burns fast he leaves nowt but ash. The slower the fire the better the charcoal."[3] Billy knows that the burning of the wood must be good and slow for it to turn into a charcoal that will also burn good and slow. According to Wikipedia's charcoal entry "The operation is so delicate that it was generally left to professional charcoal burners." The invention of charcoal has an honorary place in the story of human development and its uses are far ranging—from medicinal and cosmetic to warfare, hunting, tattooing and drawing; it's used in water purifiers and is even used as a filter in

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[1] Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 200.

[2] Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 40; brackets mine.

[3] Arthur Ransome, *Swallows and Amazons* (Boston: D.R. Godine, 1985), 141.

gas masks, such as those distributed during the first Gulf War to Jewish Israelis and, only after much protest from Palestinians under Israeli citizenship, to residents in Umm al-Fahim and the other Palestinian ghettos in Israel. Most importantly, without its discovery the Iron Age would not have come about since charcoal enabled people to smelt and work metals. A noteworthy result of this invention was not only the famous Damascus sword but also the acclaimed perfumes of the Middle East. Today we take it with us as an essential item when we go picnicking.

Before 1948, such "professionals" were among the residents of Umm al-Fahim. They were experts at this good and slow burning and thus Umm al-Fahim became a major charcoal producer for the region; and so their town was named the *Mother of Charcoal*. Umm al-Fahim was not the only town in Wadi 'Ara that produced charcoal: Dir al-Hatab, *The Monastery of Wood*, and Fahmah, *A Piece of Charcoal*, are two other neighboring towns as you travel towards Jenin that also produced charcoal or provided the raw material for charcoal production. These two towns still exist; since they are located in the West Bank beyond the Little Triangle they were not attacked by Zionist forces during the 1948 War and therefore were not earmarked for ethnic cleansing.

Today one can still see the remnants of charcoal pits, called *mafhamah*, on the outskirts of Umm al-Fahim—radiating out in each direction from the center of town, there were two or three pits near the orchards in former days. Charcoal production was seasonal, occurring after the olive harvest in the Fall. Branches from wild trees like the bushy oak and old almond and olive trees were banded together with other organic matter and put in the pits and covered with earth. Tree prunings provided the major raw material for producing charcoal while also insuring the continued productivity of the trees. In

addition to the permanent *mafhamah*, which were manned by the professional charcoal producers, there were temporary pits made by harvesters while in their fields. In the center of the Jewish settlement of Mi'ami, which adjoins Umm al-Fahim and was built on lands of Umm al-Fahim and other neighboring Palestinian villages in the 1960s, confiscated when these towns and villages were under military rule, there is a natural reserve which is home to ancient wild trees. Formerly, Umm al-Fahim charcoal producers gathered raw material from this forest. All such places became forbidden zones to their former owners and all such activities were put an end to with the establishment of the State of Israel and the occupation of Umm al-Fahim by the Israeli military. Business was shut down and charcoal production came to an end as did just about everything else. Thus began a good and slow, slow only from the standpoint of continuous, burning of one of Israel's Palestinian ghettos.

In this chapter something of the story of the initial burning of this town is briefly told. The war period is touched upon and in somewhat more detail I describe the first two decades of the State of Israel when most Palestinians within the Green Line, and all of Umm al-Fahim's residents, were restricted to their ghettos and administered and governed by the Military. This is the formative period that defined Israeli society not only for the Palestinians under Israeli citizenship but for all Israelis. Instead of a slow kindling process Umm al-Fahim's initial burning was rapid and thorough, virtually overnight; a burning that transformed a rather large agricultural village, whose residents were sprawled out over an extensive tract of land including numerous hamlets which were economically, commercially and personally tied to the region's towns and cities, into a ghetto. Perhaps this first burning burnt too fast and left nowt but ash, but out of the ashes

a bustling over crowded ghetto of over forty thousand souls now keeps the numerous hills of Umm al-Fahim burning with life good and slow six decades later. The ashes from this initial burning carry within them much history, many stories of survival and redefinition as individuals and families and the community struggled to exist and find their place in a world no longer familiar. Some have prospered, all reproduced. Many are jobless or underemployed; others have taken to drugs and crime. Some hold university degrees; others are illiterate; others are high school dropouts. Secularists and Islamists co-exist and all argue politics and life. For years their restricted ghetto-world was shut off to the outside world; they were unwanted by the newest rulers of a state who defined them as strangers in their ancestral homeland; and not only were they defined as strangers to their homeland but they were also told that they are an enemy to this homeland, a homeland now claimed as the exclusive property of the Jewish people-nation.

Since there is no authoritative written history of Umm al-Fahim, in order to tell something of this story, I have had to gather information from a variety of sources. One does find references to Umm al-Fahim and its more important sister town, Lajun, scattered throughout the historical record in Ottoman, British Mandate and UN documents and in the literature about Palestine. But, such detailed and fastidious historical research was beyond the scope of this dissertation and is the task of a different research agenda. I do make use of such resources but I have also drawn on a variety of other sources to create some sense of the history that has given rise to the community as a whole within its Israeli context. Fortunately, legends and tales circulate through the memories of the elders who tell their children and they tell theirs, and even as this oral tradition is giving way to the realities of contemporary market society, I was still able to

hear stories about the settling of Umm al-Fahim, the war years and what it was like during the first years of military occupation.

For the war period and its aftermath I have turned to various authors who base their research on primary source material including among others, Morris (1987, 1993, 1994, 2004), Pappe (2006), Jiryis (1976), Hadawi (1959. 1967, 1990), and Aharon Cohen (1970). The works of Pappe and Morris give detailed reports that describe the war events and the creation of the Palestinian refugees as these events took place and most importantly for our purposes they include information pertaining to the Wadi ‘Ara, Jezreel Valley and areas surrounding and including Umm al Fahim. I am also indebted to Antonia Caccia, Ghassan Fawzi and Uri Davis for making their research material, photos and interviews available to me. Their research was conducted in the 1970s in preparation for Ms Caccia’s documentary film about Umm al-Fahim, *On Our Land*. When I make use of their work I indicate this by (C,F,D). I also interviewed individuals in the 1990s and these interviews, along with those conducted for Ms Caccia, are included in Appendices D and E. I was delightfully surprised to find a correspondence between the historians’ written material and the oral histories told by participants.

The residents of Umm al-Fahim were for centuries living in a region of Greater Syria called Palestine. According to oral histories, Umm al-Fahim was settled some four to five hundred years ago, though Lajun, her sister town composed of many of the same families, goes back to at least Roman times. Before 1948, although Umm al-Fahim was not a major town she was a substantial agricultural village of some 5,000 people. Umm al-Fahim lies within the Samarian mountain chain in the Wadi ‘Ara area and is situated on the edge of the Jezreel Valley. Atop a cluster of hills, Umm al-Fahim, the oldest

village in Wadi ‘Ara, overlooks the Wadi ‘Ara Valley and in previous times controlled the important Wadi ‘Ara Highway (now the main road linking Hadera and Afula—Route 65) which was a section of the ancient trade route which connected the Mediterranean, Mesopotamia and the Far East, the Royal Highway or King’s Highway. Up until the 1948 War peoples’ lives were tied to 1) Wadi ‘Ara and the agriculturally rich Jezreel Valley in which farmers and landlords owned land; 2) the large Triangle of Nablus, Tulkharm and Haifa (and the smaller Triangle of Nablus, Tulkharm and Jenin) that linked the communities and families of this region through trade, commerce, administration and marriage; 3) the Arab societies at large through commerce, marriage, education, language, religion and culture; and, 4) through these relationships to the rest of the world.

When part of Palestine, the town of Umm al-Fahim was primarily residential, where people had their homes and private gardens and orchards. Farming land and pastures were located in the plains and valleys and hills surrounding the town. The residents of Umm al-Fahim sold their agricultural products in the centers of both the larger and smaller of the two Triangles mentioned above and they engaged in other social, commercial and business activities in these places. I have been told by residents in Umm al Fahim who worked in Haifa before 1948 that as many as five hundred people from Umm al Fahim worked as proletarians in British, Palestinian and Zionist factories and workshops in Haifa; Umm al-Fahim merchants had shops there; workers and merchants rented rooms and apartments for living quarters and shops for business. One area in Haifa was nicknamed Umm al-Fahim. All this came to an end.

The commercial centers in the Triangle also housed governmental, administrative, educational and medical services and institutions which were used by Umm al-Fahim’s

inhabitants up until 1948. During the preceding decades, Umm al-Fahim and her sister town Lajun were growing in population and commercial importance. Although there was no suq (central market place) in Umm al-Fahim there were manufactories for making flour and olive oil and there was an open area in the town for selling produce; people came from the surrounding towns with their donkeys and horses carrying their wares to sell. By 1942 there were two grain manufactories. Lajun already had a school, administrative offices, post office (since Roman times), a clinic and a suq.[4] Lajun was destroyed as were all these social developments within Umm al-Fahim and in her relations to the world.

Although Umm al-Fahim had not been conquered by the Zionist forces during the 1948 War and was not located in the area designated to be the Jewish State by the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan, nonetheless, subsequent to the ceasefire, while under Transjordan's protection, Umm al-Fahim, along with all the other surviving villages and towns within what is henceforth called the Little Triangle (many villages in this area were destroyed; these are listed in Appendix F), without any consultation with the inhabitants, was transferred to Israel. Now, in 1949, the misnomer "Green Line"[5], a foreboding barbed wire fence, separates these people from friends and relatives, commerce and business on the other side and another invisible border separates them from those by whom they will soon be attributed the status of co-citizens within Israel.

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[4] See Appendix F for a listing of destroyed villages including Lajun and chapter 5 for more on the history of Lajun, which was first built by the Romans and called Legio (Legion).

[5] "The 'Green Line' which was finally delineated in 1949 as an armistice line between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon was actually a cease fire line agreed upon in Rhodes, and approved by military representatives of all partners who participated in the 1948 war, with the mediation of U.N. observers" (Efrat 2006, 50).

This piece of land, along with its surviving residents, its natural resources, and the remainders left from those who fled or were ethnically cleansed, including homes, personal affects, and productive infrastructure, was essentially "given" to the new state by King Abdullah of Transjordan; and as a vassal state of England, therefore, by England with the consent of the other colonial powers. It is now well documented that Zionist leaders had entered into an agreement in the 1940s with King Abdullah that involved sharing Palestine between them. Israel would take the portion up to the West Bank and Transjordan would extend its territory east with the West Bank, which included the Triangle. This agreement also explains why the Arab Legion, which was under Jordanian command and the strongest Arab military force, was so little involved in fighting the Zionist occupation and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.[6] But, during the armistice negotiations the victorious Zionists insisted on having the Little Triangle (at first without people) and threatened military action if Transjordan did not comply.[7] "In the secret

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[6] On "ethnic cleansing" see Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006).

[7] A similar story holds true for the armistice agreement with Syria. Shlomo Ben-Ami summarizes the story in *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace*, thusly:
"The Syrian story was indeed extraordinary. Husni Zaim, a man on horseback, staged a *coup d'etat* on 30 March 1949 and immediately came forward with a breathtaking peace initiative. His proposals included a separate peace with Israel, full economic co-operation and even a common Israeli-Syrian army that would allow the new allies to become the masters of the Middle East. And, if this were not enough, the strong man from Damascus would later propose to absorb in Syria 300,000 Palestinian refugees provided the US would finance their resettlement and make available to Syria additional economic aid.

"Israel's response was initially formalistic—Ben-Gurion's instructions were not to proceed to any peace negotiations before Syria had agreed to Israel's terms for an armistice, that is, her withdrawal to the international borders—and then practically dismissive. Ben-Gurion even thought of resuming the military offensive in order to drive back Syrians east of the border. This was exactly the pattern of gunboat, coercive diplomacy he had used with the Jordanians through Operation Uvdah (Operation Fait Accompli) that expelled the Jordanians from the southern Negev, while the armistice talks were still being conducted, and forced Abdullah under threat of an ultimatum to relinquish the Wadi Ara area.

"Nonetheless, once Ben-Gurion had his way and the armistice agreement was signed on 20 July 1949, Israel was ready to resume the contacts for a peace settlement with the Syrian regime. However, Israel's peace strategy remained unchanged. The instructions given to the Israeli negotiators not by the hawkish Ben-Gurion but by his supposedly dovish Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, were as strict as ever: 'Not even hint should be given to the Syrians of the possibility of border modifications along the Jordanian River or in the Lakes. On the contrary, it needs to be made clear to them that no such modification can be

negotiations with King Abdullah and his emissaries, Israel had demanded that the Arabs cede territory to widen Israel's vulnerable Coastal Plain 'waist' and almost openly threatened action if Transjordan and Iraq did not cede" (Morris 1987, 247-48). The refugee problem was so immense that Transjordan's bargaining chip was that if they took the land they had to take the people and so the deal was struck. Upon making this deal Transjordan expanded its territory by acquiring the West Bank establishing a territorial unity between the east and west banks of the Jordan River and henceforth became recognized as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.[8] Among Israel's acquisitions was the stretch of land that, as I have already mentioned, is called the Little Triangle, a designation adapted from the fact that this area had been part of what was called in Palestine the Triangle. With the signing of all the armistice agreements, Ben-Gurion accomplished his goal of acquiring eighty percent of Mandatory Palestine and no more than twenty percent of the native population,[9] while insuring the possibility of acquiring

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contemplated.' It is inconceivable that Zaim could have agreed to a settlement on such a basis; it offered him no legitimacy whatever for a separate deal with the Zionist enemy" (Ben-Ami 2006, 64).

[8] "The War of Independence not only assured the birth and immediate survival of Israel but also produced a host of effects that left a deep imprint on the future of the Jewish state. The most obvious of these effects was the far-reaching modification of the original United Nations partition plan. The Arab state envisaged by that plan failed to emerge, and the territory allocated to it was divided by the armistice agreements between Israel, Transjordan, and Egypt. Israel got the largest share, some 2,500 square miles, which it formally annexed to the 5,600 square miles allotted to it by the partition plan. Transjordan acquired 2,200 square miles, which it formally annexed as well, transforming itself into the state of Jordan. Egypt retained control of the Gaza Strip, some 135 square miles, which it held in the status of Egyptian-administered territory...Jerusalem, intended by the partition plan to be under an international regime, was divided between Israel and Jordan" (Safran, 1981, 60). Shlomo Ben-Ami in *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* writes that this armistice agreement, which was signed while Ben-Gurion's "pattern of gunboat, coercive diplomacy" was being played out "through Operation Uvdah (Operation Fait Accompli) that expelled the Jordanians from the southern Negev…and forced Abdullah under the threat of an ultimatum to relinquish the Wadi Ara area", was also one of the key factors that "for all practical purposes [was] tantamount to a death sentence for the idea of a Palestinian independent state" (Ben-Ami 2006, 64).

[9] "…Ben-Gurion found he had to hold back the more extremist Zionist members, and he told them [leaders of the Zionist movement at a meeting in Paris in 1946 after the Biltmore plan was proposed] that eighty to ninety per cent of Mandatory Palestine was enough to create a viable state, provided they were able to

more land by leaving the question of final treaties and final borders unresolved—and so the story continues to be unresolved to this day.[10]

Thus, the contemporary destiny of the people of Umm al-Fahim was set on April 3, 1949, on the island of Rhodes by Israel and Transjordan under the guardianship of the United Nations. The previous secret land agreements between Israel and Transjordan (Ben-Gurion and King Abdullah) were formalized and made public, blessed by the Anglo-European colonial powers, particularly the United States and England. This agreement became known as the Rhodes Armistice Agreement or the Israeli-Jordanian General Armistice Agreement. This is how Aharon Cohen depicts what took place:

> The armistice agreement between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan was signed at Rhodes on April 3, 1949. (It was officially signed at Rhodes, but the actual negotiations proceeded in the Shunah Palace in Transjordan with King Abdullah himself.) The cease-fire line in Jerusalem was agreed on as the border; in the Dead Sea-Eilat area, the Mandatory frontier was retained; Israel agreed that Jordanian forces would replace the Iraqis stationed between the Yarmuk and Rosh-Haayin (the Iraqis decided to withdraw their troops from Palestine without signing an armistice agreement with Israel.) In return for Israel's acceptance of this arrangement (which meant the extension of Abdullah's rule in the western and southern foothills of the Hebron mountains),* Jordan ceded to Israel the Wadi-Ara strip [which included Umm al-Fahim], sections along the Hadera-Afula road [where Umm al-Fahim is specifically located], and several villages in the Sharon plain and Jerusalem area. ....
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> When the agreement with the Kingdom of Jordan was reported to the Knesset the next day, it evoked considerable opposition from both the left and right, because the Knesset had not been consulted before signing; because the agreement implied recognition by Israel of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its control of areas west of the Jordan, before this had been done by an international agency...

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ensure Jewish predominance. Neither the concept nor the percentages would change over the next sixty years" (Pappe 2006, 26; brackets mine).

[10] This process can be seen in the changing Israeli definitions of the "Green Line". "The 'Green Line' as a border between Israel and Jordan was established after Israel's War of Independence in 1949, and separated Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip from the rest of Israel's territory. The line was thickened in the past by the establishment of the so-called Nahal settlements along it, populated by army units who combined security and military training with agricultural work. Only a few hundred miles of the line have been supported by new development regions that were established along it, such as Lakhish, Besor, and Ta'anach, mainly for the purpose of reinforcing border strips of land. The 'Green Line' was very dominant as a border line between the two countries during the years 1948-67, till the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967, which changed the region politically and territorially. Israel then unilaterally recognized the Jordan River as its eastern border, unilaterally converted the armistice line in the Golan Heights into a security border, and created a de facto border between Israel and Lebanon in the form of a narrow security zone, north of the 1923 international borderline" (Efrat 2006, 49).

> The critics' consensus was that the agreement was not a purely "military accord," as Ben-Gurion presented it, but a far-reaching political act. Reasons and attitudes varied widely. The left opposition, Mapam, stressed that the agreement perpetuated the country's partition, precluded an alliance between Israel and an independent democratic Arab state that might lead to reunification of Palestine--since Abdullah's was no more than a vassal state. The right-wing Herut party contended that by acknowledging the presence of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on both sides of the Jordan, "the Israeli government had relinquished to the satellite-king an enormous area of the western part of the homeland, and actually ceded it not to him but to his British masters." Even the moderate General Zionist representative in the Knesset wondered "whether this did not mean renouncing all possibilities of an independent Arab state in that part of Palestine," while "from the point of view of our national and political future it is very important that an independent Arab state should be established." Tewfik Toubi, the Communist member, noted that the agreement in effect recognized the rule of a British colony over that part of the country in which an independent state was to have risen. The policy of making an alliance with a Jordanian vassal instead of helping to establish an independent Arab state in Palestine was the 'crowning glory' of the policy consistently adopted by Ben-Gurion to prevent the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine. After a stormy debate in the Knesset, the opposition motions were defeated, and the government statement was confirmed (Aharon Cohen 1970, 447-49; brackets mine).

This first act that set the contemporary stage for the lives of the people in this area was accomplished without the consultation of the residents. Soon to follow in 1952, a second act, again without consultation and in clear violation of the armistice agreement, reinforced the stage setting when those residents of Umm al-Fahim and the rest of the Little Triangle who met the residency requirements--along with those in the occupied territories of the Galilee and the Negev--were declared citizens of the State of Israel though not members of the "nation" as will be clarified in the next chapter. Most of their lands became state or Jewish Agency owned, to be held *in perpetuity* as belonging to the Jewish people. Henceforward, the residents of these towns are to celebrate May 14th as Independence Day.[11]

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[11] Actually Independence Day is not celebrated on May 14th each year. The Government uses the Hebrew calendar so the anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel is celebrated on 5 lyar which will be plus or minus a day or two around May 14th. May 15th was the day set by the British to leave Palestine as mandated by the United Nations Partition Plan (The UN had given the British until August and the British declared May 15th as their departure date). The Zionists saw May 15th as the basis for the establishment of the State of Israel, and on May 14th the founding fathers wrote the *Declaration of Independence*. By then the Zionist forces were already in control of more territory than granted them by the Partition Plan, so I suspect that setting May 14th rather than May 15th, a moment when the founding fathers were feeling in control of the situation, was their way of saying we took independence rather than we were given it. But why the choice of the Hebrew calendar as the basis of setting the date, a choice made under secular hegemony? I can only draw out from my study of Ben-Gurion and the Zionist movement in Palestine, that

It is important to note that according to the Rhodes Agreements with Transjordan and the other Arab states bordering Israel the areas occupied by the Zionist forces militarily during the war were declared "demilitarized zones". These "occupied territories", as they were called, were to be administered by Israel but not annexed; they were to remain autonomous until a permanent solution to their status would be settled since this region was not designated as part of Israel by the United Nations Partition Plan. The Israeli government in these occupied areas of Palestine--the Galilee, the Negev, and the Little Triangle--was not to interfere in the lives of the people in these areas; therefore, the granting of citizenship and the annexation of these territories were in clear violation of the armistice agreements. The granting of citizenship provided the Israeli State with a mechanism to annex these territories since this meant that Israeli laws would apply to them and therefore de facto these territories would be part of the State. And this is exactly what happened.[12] Israel's acceptance into the United Nations required granting Palestinian residents citizenship, but this would have applied only to those Palestinians living in the areas designated as Israel by the UN Partition Plan[13] and not the areas under

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this was the best way to establish ideological hegemony for the establishment of an exclusive Jewish society, one which through all means would alienate the Palestinian residents from any way of entering into this national day or any other as an expression of their affiliation to the nation, society and state where they, unwanted, reside.

[12] I owe this insight to Ghassan Fawzi who is working on a study of this period. It should also be underscored that the armistice agreements reached between Israel and the various Arab countries on her borders in Rhodes under United Nations supervision and mediation were each cease fire agreements and not peace treaties; none of them established internationally recognized borders. This was the case since Israel had forcibly taken the Galilee and Negev during the war; these areas were to be part of the Palestinian State under the United Nations Partition Plan. Since the new Israeli State was under no circumstance going to give up control of these territories, and even intended to illegally annex them, which they did, there was no way her Arab neighbors could sign peace agreements that accepted such terms or borders. The territories occupied by Israel were, as explicated in the text, to remain autonomous until their status was agreed upon by all parties in a permanent settlement.

[13] Already in 1947 Zionist military forces had begun consolidating their control of the areas designated as Israel by the UN Partition Plan and cleansing this area of Palestinian inhabitants. By the time the war was

Israeli control defined by the Rhodes Agreements. By granting citizenship and applying Israeli law to this occupied population these territories were de facto annexed to Israel[14] and in doing so "the issue of Arab citizens [was turned] into an internal Israeli problem, thus neutralizing any international involvement in it."[15]

It should be further noted that Israeli policy, crystallized during the 1948 War, has since then proceeded strategically with the objective of enlarging its territorial domain so that acquisition of Eretz Israel or Greater Israel,[16] which is designated by the *Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel* (*Declaration*) as the Jewish homeland, which in turn is considered to be the real domain of the Jewish State, is also at stake.[17] And this is

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concluded almost all Palestinians living in this part of the territory controlled by the Zionist forces were removed, perhaps a couple of thousand remained living in the area designated as Israel. Clearly, the illegal granting of citizenship was tied to annexing the physical terrain.

[14] One of the few references to the illegality of the annexation of the occupied territories I have come across in my readings is this passage by Ilan Pappe: "The Zionist leadership seemed most pressured to determine the status of the lands it had occupied but were legally within the UN-designated Arab state. In August [1948], Ben-Gurion still referred to these territories as 'administered areas', not part of the state as yet but governed by a military judicial system. The Israeli government wanted to obfuscate the legal status of these areas, which had originally been granted to the Palestinians, because of its apprehension that the UN would demand an explanation for their occupation, an apprehension that proved totally unfounded Inexplicably, the issue of Israel's legal (read: 'illegal') status in UN-designated Arab Palestine was never raised during the momentary interest the international community briefly displayed in the fate of post-mandatory Palestine and that of its indigenous population. Until Israel was accepted as a full member of the UN, in May 1949, the designation of these areas alternated between 'administered' and 'occupied'. In May 1949, all distinctions disappeared, along with the villages, the fields and the houses—all 'dissolved' into the Jewish State of Israel" Pappe 2006, 175).

[15] Jamal Zahalqa, "The First Conclusion of the October Uprising in Israel: 'Drink International Water'," 2000.

[16] Eretz Israel means Land of Israel and is typically considered to correspond to the area of mandated Palestine. Greater Israel refers to the Land of Israel as defined in the Bible and implies the political notion of the return to the "promised land" which has not as yet been realized, since the area embraced by the State does not include all the area bestowed by God to the Jewish people according to the Bible. The *Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel* uses the Eretz Israel concept. Of course both concepts encompass areas greater than the United Nations Partition Plan.

[17] That such policy has been strategically operative can be seen in Begin's role in the Camp David talks regarding the 1967 territories occupied by Israel. Ilan Peleg writes: "The Camp David 'concessions' must be seen as merely the opening shot in a massive campaign on the part of the Begin government designed to guarantee eventual control over the territories taken during the 1967 War. While Camp David precluded an

so not only for minority right-wing religious and settlement parties but, more importantly, for ruling class politicians motivated by secular not religious interests. The *Declaration* was published on May 14, 1948, the eve of the implementation of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine. Zionists forces began their military operations in 1947 when the UN announced the Partition Plan and by May 14th, 1948, the day before England had scheduled its withdrawal from Palestine, they already had control of a greater territory than granted to them by the Partition Plan. During the drafting of the *Declaration* it was discussed whether or not to define (and include in the *Declaration*) the territory of the Israeli State. The drafters decided against setting any boundaries. For one, they did not want to lose areas they had already conquered that went beyond what the UN plan gave them knowing that if they included these areas as part of the new State, there would be international criticism. Furthermore, the Zionist leaders had correctly assessed that England, scheduled to withdraw the next day, would not intercede after that date so the possibility of acquiring even more land was seen as highly likely.[18] Ben-Gurion was the strongest and clearest advocate of leaving the issue of definite borders unresolved not

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immediate, de jure annexation, it gave the Neo-Revisionists precious time needed to carry out policies that could have affected the long-term disposition to the territories. The first sign that Begin did not intend to leave the territories was his proposal for West Bank autonomy. He envisioned an administrative body of 11 members, giving services to the local population but acting under the authority of Israel's military governor. Moreover, Begin's autonomy would not curtail Israeli settlement activities, including land purchasing, in the territories." Ilan Peleg, "The Zionist Right and Constructivist Realism: Ideological Persistence and Tactical Readjustment," *Israel Studies* 10, no 3 (Fall 2005), 139.

[18] Instead of protecting Palestinians England assisted in removing refugees in truckloads, busloads and boatloads and on foot, especially from the mixed towns and cities. See Morris (1987, 2004) and Pappe (2006).

only at the time of writing the *Declaration* but throughout the armistice negotiations and on. To this day Israel does not have on all its borders recognized boundaries.[19]

> For Ben-Gurion, meanwhile, there was little question about how best to achieve Israel's goal of maximum territorial expansion. The options were clear - and so were their drawbacks. Accepting the partition plan meant giving up western Galilee. Accepting the Bernadotte proposals meant giving up the Negev and repatriating the refugees. Making peace with the Arabs would entail a still greater price; even if the UN were to accept Israel's demands for border rectifications (based on battle victories), the Arabs would not. Thus, in Ben-Gurion's view, the military option, if the most risky, was also the most promising...On these fundamental objectives [the elimination of the Palestinian factor and the winning of maximum territory for the Jewish state, both by way of military *faits accomplis*] there was no difference of opinion within the Zionist leadership, only division of labor. Ben-Gurion concentrated on the acquisition and production of arms, the building of a modern and well-organized army, and planning of military operations. Sharett was responsible for foreign affairs and the judicial, political, strategic, and moral justification for Israeli policy among the great powers and within the UN (Flapan 1987, 47-48, 51).[20]

Ben-Gurion put it simply and directly when he said: "To maintain the status quo will not do. We have set up a dynamic state, bent upon creation and reform, building and expansion" (Ben-Gurion 1954, 419).[21] The new Israeli government made sure that the question of borders was left open in all the armistice agreements.

> All these agreements explicitly stated that 'the Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary' (for example, Article V, &2 of the agreement between Israel and Egypt), and that they were concluded without any commitments as to the rights, claims and positions of the parties 'as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question' (*ibidem*). Similar formulations are to be found in the armistice agreements concluded between Israel and Lebanon (e.g. Article II, &2). Jordan (Article II, &2) and Syria (Article V, &1). This last agreement was particularly categorical since it specified that the line of demarcation and the

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[19] Benny Morris argues in *birth* that this land policy (and removal of Palestinians) was more the result of war circumstances than a preconceived objective. In later writings it appears he has come to the conclusion that land expansion and Palestinian displacement were strategically wed to the Zionist project and as such he believes, as a committed Zionist, that these were appropriate strategies and tactics.

[20] All brackets are the author's. On the topic of Israeli expansionism see R. Garaudy, *The Case of Israel: A Study of Political Zionism* (London: Shorouk International, 1983), especially section II of Part Two entitled "Israel's Foreign Policy: Expansionism." Garaudy documents the policy of expansion throughout Israel's formation and shows that it is not the policy of one leader or governmental regime but central to Zionist politics whether Labor or Likud.

[21] Tom Segev, in *1949*, documents Ben-Gurion's position on peace with the Arab countries and borders. He discusses Ben-Gurion's plans continuing after the 1948 War to annex South Lebanon and all of Greater Israel. Although Ben-Gurion didn't fully achieve the objectives he certainly laid the strategic basis to do so. By 1982 South Lebanon had been brought under Israeli control though they were unable to keep it and the Oslo Agreement was an attempt at legitimizing Israel control over parts of the West Bank.

> establishment of demilitarized zones 'are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements' (Article V, &1) (Weinstock 1989, 240).

Benny Morris documents in detail the events leading to the signing of the Rhodes Agreements. In an almost day-to-day account of the 1947-49 period, he details Zionist military operations which first concentrated on the areas of Palestine designated as the Jewish State by the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan and then later, through implementation of Plan Dalet, known as Plan D, the border areas in the north, south and the east where Umm al-Fahim is located.[22] It is in this plan that the precise objectives and detailed tactics of ethnic cleansing were laid out.[23] The border towns along the cease fire line separating the new Jewish State and the areas held by Transjordan and the Iraqi forces, including the Wadi ‘Ara area of Umm al-Fahim in the Triangle, had for the most part already been evacuated and the empty villages had been either destroyed or demolished by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) or occupied by Jewish settlers. In the following passage Yosef Weitz, the head of the Transfer Committee, is overseeing sites that have been captured and cleansed of Palestinians as a result of the implementation of

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[22] It is now known that Zionist strategic plans for the political and military struggle to settle and colonize Palestine were being worked out over many years, so, as the date for implementation of the United Nations Partition Plan neared, the Haganah and other Zionist military forces were coordinated and prepared with strategic and tactical plans upon which to work. The Zionist movement also considered itself to be a government in waiting so that prior to the actual establishment of the state governmental and administrative bodies, especially the military apparatus, were already in place. It should be noted that the British Mandate Government was well aware of all these developments and even helped put them in place, including the training of Jewish military units, which they also made use of as, for instance, in putting down the 1936-1939 Arab Rebellion.

[23] It is not known if the British knew of this plan but it is interesting to note, as Pappe points out, that after the Plan was adopted the “British announced that they were no longer responsible for law and order in the areas where their troops were still stationed, and limited their activities to protecting these troops. This meant that Haifa and Jaffa and the whole coastal region between them were now open space where the Zionist leadership could implement Plan Dalet without fear of being thwarted or even confronted by the British army” (Pappe 2006, 124-25).

Plan D by the Golani Brigade responsible for occupying and cleansing Palestinian towns and villages in the region which includes Umm al-Fahim.

> On 13 June [1948], Weitz traveled north to the Beit Shean and Jezreel valleys [Umm al-Fahim lies partly within this area], where he saw 'our people…reaping in the fields of [the Arab village of] Zir'in'. In Kibbutz Beit Hashita, Weitz met Goldenburg, David Baum from Kfar Yehezkeel, and the commander of the IDF's (Golani Brigade) [the brigade assigned to ethnically cleanse the Wadi 'Ara and Jezreel Valley] battalion in the Jezreel, Avraham Yoffe. "From the start of our talk", Weitz recorded, "it became clear that there is an agreement among us on the question of the abandoned villages: Destruction, renovation and settlement." Another participant in the meeting, representing Kibbutz Nir David, urged the immediate settlement of Zir'in, Sandala and Faqqu'a and barring a return of the refugees to the Beit Shean Valley "so long as no peace treaty was signed". Weitz concluded: "There is a consensus everywhere: 'No' to return of Arabs, on no account. They must be prevented from returning and at the same time the 'vacuum' must be filled" (Morris 1994, 122-23; brackets mine).

In the following excerpt Morris relays a report written by Asher Bobritzky, a settlement official of the Transfer Committee, regarding the destruction of Palestinian villages in Beit Shean and the Jezreel Valley which includes villages within Umm al-Fahim's domain:

> Bobritzky, who submitted a progress report on his activities on 21 June [1948] to Weitz and the other relevant Jewish authorities (the Agricultural Centre and the Jewish Agency Settlement Department), named both Berger and Barazani as being "charged with destroying the Arab villages". Bobritzky lists 20 villages which he thought were of no use for Jewish settlement and could be destroyed—including Qannir, Kafr Qari, Bureika, Khirbet as Sarkas, Wadi Ara, the dwellings places of Arab al Foqara and of ad Dumeira, near Hadera, and Umm Khalid…near Netanya [All these villages except the last are part of Umm al-Fahim's extended domain. All were destroyed except Kafr Qari.]
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> He listed seven village sites as suitable for Jewish settlement—including Fajja, which he found already being destroyed and where he asked that "10-11 rooms" be left intact for Jewish settlers, Tantura, Khirbet Beit Lid, An Nusseirat, Sabbarin [part of Umm al-Fahim], and two smaller sites….
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> In his concluding remarks, Bobritzky thought it worth mentioning that Berger and Barazani "had orders" to speed up the destruction of the villages and that the IDF district OCs…concurred with this approach. Bobritzky, for his part, asked the two officials and the district OCs to hold off on the destruction of sites he regarded as appropriate for Jewish settlement (Morris 1994, 124-25; brackets mine).

Many of the border villages Morris is writing about in these passages were located on what were the extensive lands of the residents of Umm al-Fahim and her sister villages. Morris describes how the villagers and refugees during 1947-48 were pushed eastward along the frontier by raids, blowing up of houses, expulsions, confiscation of flocks and

herds, patrols and sniping. According to Morris, just in the Triangle of Nablus-Tulkarm-Jenin of which Umm al-Fahim was a part there were 100,000 to 120,000 refugees by June of 1948. He reports that “Most lived in the open, under trees, in caves, and in unfurnished houses; few had blankets and there was insufficient food.” According to the mayor of the area at that time “at least three refugees were dying each day in the immediate vicinity of Nablus” (Morris 1994, 300, 314).

Morris also writes about the “second series of evictions and expulsions [that] took place at the start of 1949.” He says: "Along the frontier, IDF units continuously harassed Arab cultivators and infiltrators; there was no telling who was a spy or potential saboteur and who a genuine civilian. The IDF played it 'safe'" (Morris 1987, 247).[24] The Palestinian “infiltrators” that he speaks of were Palestinian refugees who had been expelled or “fled”. They were “illegally” trying to return to reunite with their families or to return to their original home or an emptied or another still inhabited village. The Zionist forces did not want these “infiltrators” since as Morris tells us they were “assuring a permanent increase of the country’s population [and] some neighbouring Jewish settlements wanted the lands of the semi-abandoned villages.” So these too were cleansed and the refugee population grew. In the area of Umm al-Fahim Morris tells us that “The remaining inhabitants of Farradiya and Kafr I’nan, both Muslim villages, were evicted in February 1949, about half going to other villages in Israel and the rest across

[24] As more and more information is made public, it appears to me that such harassment of Palestinians was a tactic used by the Zionist forces to terrorize the civilian population, and the overwhelming majority of Palestinians were civilians, and to frighten them into fleeing, which is what repeatedly happened, rather than Morris’s claim that such incidents occurred because “there was no telling who was a spy”. As Morris himself documents over and over again the Zionist forces knew full well that they were massacring and forcing the expulsion of unarmed civilians and destroying or settling the abandoned villages of these same civilians. Now that Ilan Pappe’s book has appeared, such can no longer be disputed—ethnic cleansing was the military objective, not simply the acquisition of land. See Ilan Pappe, *Ethnic Cleansing*.

the border into the Triangle." Thus, not only during the war period but also following the cessation of the fighting evictions were taking place producing more and more refugees who were steadily being pushed eastward to Transjordan. As Joseph Schechla points out in the following passage Umm al-Fahim was one of their destinations.

> Most of the internally displaced became absorbed into the remaining Palestinian Arab villages such as Furaydis, Kafr Qasim, al-Rama, al-Tayba, and many others. The village of Umm al-Fahm, for example, with a population of approximately 3,000 in 1947, burgeoned to four times its size the next year with the influx from undefended villages nearby. Because Umm al-Fahm was initially under Jordanian control in the West Bank portion of the 'Arab State in Palestine,' the status of its residents changed from 'refugee' to 'internally displaced' in 1949 when the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement conveyed the refugee-swollen village of Umm al-Fahm in the Wadi 'Ara to Israeli jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, the State of Israel confiscated 124,000 of the village's dunams of land.[25]

In the Little Triangle some areas had not been sites of battle during the war and others had been successfully defended by Arab volunteer forces and residents, and still others were occupied and destroyed. There were, according to Ilan Pappe's research, five Zionist operations against the Wadi 'Ara area during the war, all of which failed, though that did not mean that numerous towns and villages in the area were not occupied and or destroyed (see Appendix F). Lajun and Kfar Qara were occupied and Lajun subsequently destroyed and its lands taken over by the Kibbutz Megiddo. Because Umm al-Fahim's domain extended north towards Haifa, into the Jezreel Valley, as well as into the West Bank, previously, when Palestine was under the Ottomans and then the British Mandate Government, some parts of Umm al-Fahim's lands were administratively included in the District of Haifa (Wadi 'Ara) and others in the District of Jenin (Jezreel Valley and West Bank). Given the extensiveness of the area involved different fronts of the Zionist military operations pertained to different parts of Umm al-Fahim's domain and in these

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[25] Joseph Schechla, "The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel's 'Internally Displaced' and the 'Unrecognized Villages'," *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXXI, no. 1 (Autumn 2001), 11.

operations numerous towns and villages were occupied and or destroyed. Iraqi soldiers, part of the Arab League, were stationed in Umm al-Fahim and the town was successfully defended, and from what I am told actual fighting never took place in Umm al-Fahim. Rather, Umm al-Fahim was used more as a point from which battles took place in the region, like Kfar Qara and even as far as Haifa. After the Rhodes Armistice Agreement in 1949 the Iraqi soldiers went home. None of them remained and established homes in Umm al-Fahim. Many of the villages mentioned in this passage by Pappe were part of Umm al-Fahim's extended lands.

> It was in and around Haifa that the ethnic cleansing operation gathered momentum, its deadly pace heralding the destruction to come. Fifteen villages—some of them small, that is with less than 300 people, some of them huge, with around 5000—were expelled in quick succession. Abu Shusha, Abu Zurayq, Arab al-Fugara, Arab al-Nufay'at, Arab Zahrat al-Dumayri, Balad Al-Shaykh, Damun, Khirbat al-Kasayir, Khirbat al-Manshiyya, Rihaniya, Khirbit al-Sarkas, Khirbat Sa'sa, Wa'rat al-Sarris and Yajur were wiped off Palestine's map within a sub-district full of British soldiers, UN emissaries and foreign reporters (Pappe 2006, 109).

Umm al-Fahim at the end of the war lay on the Transjordanian side of the cease-fire line. According to residents, about 2,000 refugees lived out in the open under the trees and in caves in the foothills of Umm al-Fahim and were fed by the United Nations Welfare and Relief Association (UNMRA). Expulsions of Palestinians and destruction of villages in the area continued after the war and will be discussed a bit more later in this chapter. Those expelled were added to the refugee ranks and some, as mentioned already, ended in the foothills of Umm al-Fahim. According to my mother-in-law, Ifat, who was fifteen at the time, "They [the refugees] followed the food lines. When UNRWA went further east after the Rhodes Agreement the refugees followed. Where the food went they went." Those dispossessed Palestinian refugees who remained in Umm al-Fahim were expelled when Israel took over control. Mahmud Husari Aghbariyah, secretary of the Communist Party, Rakah, in Umm al-Fahim, told me:

> According to the 1947 UN partition plan, Umm al-Fahim would have been in the Arab State but after the Rhodes Armistice Agreement it was apportioned to Israel. In 1949 the Iraqi Brigade, who had formed four groups of popular militia, left with the Iraqi Army. The Israeli Army destroyed many local villages: Lajun, Buwayshat, Muawiya, Mansi, Kafrayn and Um al-Zinat. Lajun was the central village of the area and would have developed into a town if it had not been destroyed. The regional police station was Lajun. There was also a medical clinic and a bus company. Umm al-Fahim had none of these. Many of the people from these destroyed villages came to Umm al-Fahim seeking refuge.

Morris describes the process as follows:

> Few Arab villages were left on the Israeli side of the cease-fire lines separating the new Jewish State and the areas held by Transjordan and the Iraqi forces[26] in the Triangle when the major hostilities ended in eastern Palestine in mid-1948. The empty villages were demolished by the IDF to render the sites less attractive to would-be returnees. Along the frontier, IDF units continuously harassed Arab cultivators and infiltrators…
>
> The activities of the Palmah's 4th Battalion (Harel Brigade) in November 1948 were fairly representative of the period between the end of hostilities and the signing, on 3 April 1949, of the Israeli-Jordanian General Armistice Agreement. The battalion held positions along the southern flank of the Jerusalem corridor, opposite the Arab Legion. On 5 November, B Company raided the area south of Beit Nattif and the border village of Al Jaba. At Khirbet Umm al Lauz, one platoon encountered dozens of refugees with flocks moving westwards. "The platoon...ordered them to get out [of Israeli-held territory]" and confiscated a flock of 65 goats, a camel and an ass. The following day, a platoon sent to "expel refugees" found some 150 at Khirbet Umm Burj, south of Beit Nattif. The unit expelled about 100, apparently injuring some of them. A raid on Al Jaba on the night of 5/6 November, in which some 15 houses were blown up, led to a temporary evacuation of the village.
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> Initially, 4th Battalion reported, the refugees were unresponsive to threats and refused to move eastwards. Some even asked 'to live under "Shertok's [sic] rule." But the raids ultimately proved persuasive, and the refugees encamped along the frontier south of Beit Nattif eventually moved off. Similar raiding patrols and occasional sniping pushed eastwards refugees and local cultivators all along the line (Morris 1987, 247; brackets mine).

Altogether sixteen villages in the Little Triangle survived the war. This meant that Israel also acquired 12,000-15,000 Palestinians. Some of these villages are among the 123 unrecognized Palestinian villages. One way of "legitimately" categorizing villages as unrecognized, even as the state gave the residents citizenship, was through the National Planning and Building Law of 1965 which retroactively re-zoned the lands of many Palestinian villages as "non-residential". This law legalized the non-official status of these villages and thus exempted the government from providing services to these

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[26] It should be kept in mind that the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) and the Iraqi forces were composed of irregular troops of volunteers who were organized by the Arab League and were under the command of King Abdullah of Transjordan who was simultaneously and secretly making arrangements and agreements with the Zionist forces, which, as discussed in the text, led to his acquisition of the West Bank. The Iraqi forces mentioned by Morris are not independent forces but acting under King Abdullah's command.

villages such as running water, access roads, electricity, telephone lines, schools, sanitation, as well as denying them the right to build homes and other public buildings. Since the establishment of the state, the government and military have tried to rid themselves of these villages by demolishing "illegally" built homes, confiscating land, denying basic services and the like.

But, at the time of the signing of the armistice agreement with Transjordan, the United States, England and Transjordan, based on past experience, suspected that the residents of all these villages, at the hands of the Zionists, would become refugees. There were already far too many for the international community to handle, so they insisted that an Article protecting the inhabitants be incorporated into the armistice agreement. Morris writes:

> The Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement of 3 April 1949 provided for minor frontier changes, with a few small areas (in the Beisan Valley and southwest of the Hebron Hills) going to Jordan, and some larger areas around and south of Baqa al Gharbiya and in Wadi 'Ara being ceded to Israel. In the secret negotiations with Abdullah and his emissaries, Israel had demanded that the Arabs cede territory to widen Israel's vulnerable Coastal Plain 'waist' and almost openly threatened military action if Transjordan and Iraq did not cede. ..Abdullah and the British feared that the cession, which involved handing over to Israeli rule 15-16 villages, would precipitate a new wave of refugees, 12,000-15,000 strong. It was to guard against this that Article VI, clause 6 of the armistice agreement explicitly protected the villagers against expulsion and confiscations.
>
> But the Americans, British and Transjordanians suspected that Israel, following the Arab withdrawal from the ceded areas in June, would engineer the departure of the villagers. The British Consul-General in Jerusalem Sir Hugh, for instance, thought that the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugee "would do well to prepare for a further 20,000 [refugees]...[they] will almost certainly be driven out on some pretext or other." Secretary of State Dean Acheson instructed McDonald to propose to the Israeli government to issue public reassurances to the villagers that they would be well-treated. At the same time, the Transjordanians took steps to allay the villagers' fears. Brigadier Ahmad Bey al Halil, the Transjordanian Military Governor of the Triangle, pleaded with Israeli representatives that Tel Aviv broadcast assurances "by wireless that [the civilians] would come to no harm should they remain in Israel...He...begged that no incidents occur that would discourage Arabs...to remain in Israel." IDF intelligence reported from mid-April that the Arabs "live in great fear of our 'barbarity' and it would take little inducement to persuade them to abandon their lands."
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> The Israelis reassured the United States that nothing would happen to the villagers. They did not want to jeopardize the implementation of the cession or damage relations with Washington. Eytan told McDonald that Tel Aviv was "keenly anxious" for the villagers to stay put as Israel did not wish to further aggravate the refugee situation and that if these villagers were to stay, it would serve as proof "to the world that mass exodus [from] other [previously] captured areas was more fault hysterical Arabs...than occupying forces." Eytan said that the troops who would take over the area were being thoroughly briefed about how to behave towards the

> inhabitants. A fortnight later, McDonald conveyed Acheson's and Truman's concern directly to Sharett. The Ambassador asked that Israel reassure the inhabitants; harm to them might jeopardize the continuing Israeli-Jordanian peace negotiations. Sharett reassured McDonald that all would be well. But Sharett's thinking in fact took another tack altogether: "We have inherited a number of important villages in the Sharon and Shomron and I imagine that the intention will be to be rid of them, as these sites are on the border. Security interest[s] dictate to be rid of them. [But] the matter [in light of the American diplomatic warnings] is very complicated."
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> The cession in May passed smoothly. There was no expulsion and no IDF pressures on the locals. Political considerations - generated by the specific and repeated American warnings against the backdrop of the deadlocked Lausanne Conference - prevailed over the military's desire for Arab--less borders. There was apparently no "clean" way to pressure the Arabs into leaving. The inhabitants of Baqa al Gharbiya, At Taiyiba, Qaqun, Qalansuwa, Karff Qasim, At Tira and the Wadi 'Ara villages stayed put. As Sharett put it on 28 July: "This time...the Arabs learned the lesson; they are not running away. It is not possible in every place to arrange what some of our boys engineered in Faluja [where] they chased away the Arabs after we signed an...international commitment...[There were] at least 25-30,000...whom we could not uproot."
>
> An exception was made of 1,200-1,500 refugees from elsewhere living in and around Baqa al Gharbiya. On the night of 27 June, they were "forcefully and brutally" (in Sharett's phrase) evicted and pushed across the border into the Triangle. …The Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, chaired by the United Nations, investigated the incident during the following two months. Israel argued that the armistice agreement protected only local inhabitants, not refugees temporarily resident in the ceded areas...In September, the Commission - meaning its United Nations chairman - ruled in favour of Israel's interpretation (save for the case of 36 of the expellees, permanent inhabitants who had been driven out 'illegally') (Morris 1987, 247-49).

Thusly, in the summer of 1949, residents of the Little Triangle found themselves located inside the Green Line,[27] which is now a very thick concrete wall, the Separation Fence, running along Israel's eastern border including within it parts of the West Bank. This imposing wall runs directly aside Umm al-Fahim. During military rule barbed wire fences marked out much of the Green Line. This line was not to be crossed and soldiers

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27 "Regarding the Arab population that resides along both sides of the 'Green Line' it should be indicated, that at the time when the line was marked, there lived along it in Judea and Samaria about 60,000 people, while today the Arab population which lives within 1.25-2 miles (2-3 km) east of the line numbers about 200,000. Within the same distance of the west side of the line, but in Israel's territory, there live about 230,000 Arabs who have direct interrelationships with the Arab people in Judea and Samaria, and by that actually blur its character.

"The Jewish population which resides adjacent to the 'Green Line' in Israel's territory opposite to Judea and Samaria, within the same distance of 1.25-2 miles (2-2 km) west of it, numbers about 130,000 people, while that on the other side of the line in Judea and Samaria numbers about 100,000 settlers. It seems that the Jewish population along both sides of the 'Green Line' made a big gap among the Arabs. The basic deficiencies of the 'Green Line', intended to safeguard Israel from terrorism ["infiltrators" and "smugglers"] in its sovereign territory, were thereby demonstrated. As mentioned, the line was not properly delineated, it remained physically broken because of the twisted topography, it was impossible to close it hermetically, it has a large Arab population on both sides of it, and lacks a substantial Jewish population which might block the access of infiltrators or terrorists to Israel" (Efrat 2006, 50; brackets mine). Perhaps the Separation Fence now being constructed as the latest version of the "Green Line" will solve such problems and "hermetically" close Israel into its own Jewish ghetto-state.

were even ordered at times to shot to kill individuals who trespassed. "Infiltrators" and "smugglers" were the main targets of the state. These people were for the most part refugees trying to return to their homes or relatives trying to "smuggle" money or necessities—labeled contraband--to relatives on one side or the other of this forbidden border. Of course, residents of Umm al-Fahim participated in these "criminal" activities, given that their town is what is called an Arab Border Village. Since this time Umm al-Fahim has been characterized as especially deviant and dangerous by Israeli officials and therefore Jewish society at large. These individuals were treated as criminals and enemies of the state—a threat to the state's existence. From the standpoint of the residents they were doing what they had to do to ensure their and their families' survival under harsh and economically desperate conditions; when even basic foods were scare or nonexistent. To many residents such acts were seen as a form of resistance. Many of Umm al-Fahim's criminals and prisoners in those first years were such people—refugees and relatives. The border areas such as the Little Triangle were also targeted for *Judaization* in order to secure the borders from Israel's Arab neighbors and to prevent refugees from "infiltrating" back to their homes; and to counter the predominant Palestinian presence in these areas.[28]

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[28] Attempts to *Judaize* the border area of Wadi 'Ara (which includes Umm al-Fahim) are still going on. Wadi 'Ara is situated along the West Bank and its population is predominantly Palestinian. Thus far, all attempts at reversing the *demographic problem* or *demographic crisis*, as it is called, have failed. The aim of the "Axis of the Hills" plan, developed in the 1990s and still being implemented through stages, is:

> "…to create an irreversible border on the map representing new demographic, economic, and political realities along the 'Green Line'. The government has been trying also to settle people more densely along the 'Green Line' and 'Judaize' the area. Both objectives were included in an original plan named "Axis of the Hills' settlement plan.
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> "The plan focused on a narrow strip of land, 50 miles (80 km) long, at the edge of the 'Green Line'. It was wedged between the West Bank and the eastern Coastal Plain. The area, including the Arab town of Um Al-Fahm and surrounding villages, is inhabited by 150,000 Arabs and 40,000 Jews, and a decision was made by the Israeli government to settle 350,000 Jews in this area by the year 2005….

Of the towns and villages in the Wadi ‘Ara area Umm al-Fahim was the largest and the units of land owned and cultivated by residents were amongst the largest in Palestine. Umm al-Fahim’s land extended thirteen kilometers to the east, where inhabitants owned extensive tracts of land in the Esdraelon Valley, eight kilometers to the north (approaching Haifa), six kilometers to the west, and one kilometer to the south (C,F,D). Confiscation of these vast agricultural lands was among the first order of business of the day. Besides widening her waist Israel gained the rest of the rich and fertile Jezreel Valley and Wadi ‘Ara. These lands have always been important agriculturally, as they are to this day. All the most fertile land was expropriated and is used for Israeli agricultural production; other confiscated land of Umm al-Fahim is used for military purposes and for such things as roadways, like Route 65 which connects Hadera and Afula, while separating Palestinian ghettos from each other and Palestinians from Jewish towns and settlements.

Like all the other militarized Palestinian ghettos, Umm al-Fahim’s boundaries were reduced to the residential core. David A. Wesley relays that one of his sources

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> “According to the plan the ‘Judaization’ of the area had to occur in three stages, with the final stage reached in another few years, when it will have reversed the demographic composition from the present 82 percent Arabs and 18 percent Jews to 36 percent Arabs and 64 percent Jews; it will strive to settle the Jewish population between Kafar Qasem in the south to Um Al-Fahm in the north….
>
> “The plan also envisaged the building of four large centers which will offer the settlers commercial and industrial job opportunities, health services, cultural services, and a system of communications with the rural settlements to be built around them [Jewish only]….Rural settlements built around each of the four urban centers will have between 1,000 and 4,000 residential units and will be connected by a network of roads. The planned network of roads will cut through lad and the administrative jurisdiction of Arab villages.
>
> “The plan, aimed at settling 350,000 Jews in the strip on the border of the West Bank, is being implemented. Three steps were being undertaken by the Ministry of Housing. First, the most recent and apparently final, routing of the north-south highway has been determined and building is in process. The second was the founding of the town of Qazir-Harish. The last was the decision to re-establish in regional council consisting of seven Arab villages which lack any municipal representation such as a local council. The planned council was unanimously opposed by the residents of the seven Arab villages, who believe that it might restrict their independence” (Efrat 2006, 52-3).

conversant with the Ministry of Interior told him: "The boundaries of jurisdiction in Arab localities were set in a confining manner—according to the historical nucleus of the village plus a certain addition—not much…This was different from the approach to setting the boundaries of the Jewish towns" (Wesley, 2006, 129). A number of mechanisms were put in place to render expropriation legal and justifiable. In the case of Umm al-Fahim, even though her inhabitants had not left their homes during the war and therefore were not really "absentees" the government manipulated the definition of "absent" by considering the fact that Umm al-Fahim's inhabitants were under Jordanian jurisdiction at the time of the armistice agreement and had been separated during this time from their lands, even though they hadn't left their homes. Therefore her inhabitants were considered "absent" from their lands, enabling the state to legally appropriate their property as "absentee property". Besides the use of the abandoned property laws, the 1948 Cultivation of Waste Land Regulations enabled further land expropriation; by classifying land as waste land the state could then appropriate it. Rezoning of tracts was another means of acquiring land; for instance, the state could reduce the residential area of a Palestinian village or town by classifying areas as "non-residential". And of course, the Security Zone Regulations allowed massive amounts of land to be confiscated as necessary for military and security purposes. These mechanisms and others resulted in the State of Israel acquiring over ninety percent of Palestinian owned land and almost all of Umm al-Fahim's. Vast amounts of Umm al-Fahim land were expropriated for military purposes. This is still going on today.

**Part of the extensive lands of Umm al-Fahim confiscated for military purposes.**

Umm al-Fahim's transformation from a village in the world to a ghetto in Israel occurred overnight. With the signing of the armistice agreement the military occupied Umm al-Fahim, closed the area, set up the military government, and issued identity cards. The home of my father-in-law was appropriated by the military governor as his headquarters. His family's home was located in the center of Umm al-Fahim's cluster of hills atop a prominent hill which gave a good view of the town and so was coveted by the military.[29] A couple of years later, the Israeli government granted those who "qualified" citizenship. While legally citizens they were physically and otherwise restricted to the confines of their ghetto existence dependent on the military governors for just about everything.

> In general, with many of the still-inhabited Arab villages…close to the front lines [armistice borders], Arabs were barred by the IDF and security forces from cultivating their fields….the Arabs who stayed put were placed under Military Government, and their freedom to move freely outside their village was severely curtailed. The daily movement of villagers back and forth from village to fields (sometimes involving relatively great distances) was regarded by the authorities as a security risk or, at least, problem. The country was still at war with Arabs; the Israeli Arab minority was seen as a bed of potential saboteurs, spies, and fifth columnists. Hence in most areas of the country, the Military Government and local IDF units found it simplest to forbid *in toto* Arab cultivation of fields. At the same time, Jewish settlements began to cultivate fields of Arabs who had remained in the State (Morris 1994, 253; brackets mine).

Inhabitants could not leave their town without the military governor's permission whether to go to work, to the hospital, to their own orchards on the outskirts of the

[29] The house was returned to the family once the military government was dissolved.

residential part of the town, or to visit relatives in a neighboring town. Within the ghetto productive life had been shut down. Manufactories of wheat flour and olive oil were closed. Charcoal professionals put out of work. All the most fertile agricultural land and pastures owned by the inhabitants of Umm al-Fahim were confiscated by the State, leaving only the residential core and some surrounding orchards. For the most part, farming as a means of livelihood came to an end and all the subsidiary businesses and activities associated with agriculture. Government policy, in general, restricted Palestinian engagement with the land whether as owners or agricultural workers. Ben-Gurion, in particular, envisioned as part of the construction of the Jewish State the creation of a Jewish economy through "Hebrew labor" only (and he hoped that at some point the Palestinian population would be transferred out). Fixing in place "the ideas of self-labor and national ownership" were seen as tasks of the State.[30] Nonetheless, the military governors did issue permits for residents to build and work on agricultural kibbutzim on what were parts of their previously owned lands since these Jewish enterprises demanded their labor.

The events of the war and its aftermath were dramatic, traumatic and determinant; they deserve a fuller study than can be undertaken here. The inhabitants had no say in matters that would affect their lives ever after. Their experience of alienation from land, employment, society, the state, the law, civil society, history, travel, ordinary human intercourse in trade and commerce and communication—everything that makes up an integral cultural life--has often left the older members of the Palestinian ghetto communities demoralized, embittered and insecure about the future of their children. It is

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[30] This quote is from "The Rebirth of a Nation" in David Ben-Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1971), 39.

not uncommon for individuals to express the belief that if some Palestinian territorial solution should come about, for which they have sympathy, they would become refugees once again. That this is not an unfounded fear is seen as recently as January 2006 when geographers from Bar Ilan University proposed at a conference to transfer some of the Arab towns of the Little Triangle, including Umm al-Fahim, to a Palestinian state in return for Gush Etzion, Upper Modi'in and Elkana settlement under a final-status peace agreement.[31]

Sami Hadawi informs us in his book, *Bitter Harvest*, that

> The first legislative act of the Israeli authorities was the enactment of the *Law of Administrative Ordinance* which empowered the Minister of Defense to issue *Emergency Regulations* that would restrict movement of the Arab minority and control all their other human liberties. Under these *Emergency Regulations*, the Minister of Defense was empowered to establish 'defense areas' within which he could designate 'security zones' and delegate his authority within these 'areas' and 'zones' to military officers of certain ranks (Hadawi 1967, 195).

The reality of what it means to be under military governance is hard to fully appreciate. I found it difficult to draw out concrete specific remarks from individuals who were old enough to remember their experience living under military rule. Comments were general and not particularly interesting. I suspect the reason for this is that the *Nakba*, the *Catastrophe*, particularly exemplified by the humiliation and degradation suffered under military rule—a profoundly traumatizing experience—has to a great extent been emotionally buried with the details as well. Aharon Cohen summarizes the experience briefly yet succinctly in *Israel and the Arab World* in this way:

> At the end of the first decade [of the establishment of the state] and even later, nearly 85 per cent of Israeli Arabs lived under military government. Within its bounds, the laws of the state did not in fact apply, and in their place was the rule of the military governor and his henchman. Arabs were tried in military courts for offenses for which Jews would be tried in civilian courts. The military governor was authorized to prevent anyone from entering certain areas, to place people under police supervision, to exile them from their permanent residence, to impose administrative arrests, and to clamp down a curfew on whole towns or villages. Anyone leaving a town or village within

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[31] Yoav Stern, "Geographers propose transfer of Israeli Arab towns to PA," *haaretz*, January 23, 2006.

> the bounds of military government needed a special permit, which determined for how long he was entitled to stay in his place of destination and by which route he would travel, without stopping at interim points. Offenses against these restrictions were punished by fine, by arrest, or by both. This situation was eased only in July 1959. The supervision of matters vital to those living within the borders of the military government (such as employment, supplies, marketing, credit, taxation, representation, etc.) was in practice handed over to various Arab 'notables,' who, in return for supporting the actions of the military governor's representative, received benefits for themselves and their associates (Aharon Cohen 1970, 493-94; brackets mine).

Cohen mentions in a footnote to this passage that

> The legal basis for the military government was contained in the emergency regulations enacted by the British regime in Palestine in 1945 for the purpose of suppressing the Jewish community's movement of insurrection [and Arab even more to the point, especially after the 1936-39 Arab Rebellion against British colonialism]. At that time, these same regulations were severely condemned by the leaders of the entire Jewish public, and first and foremost by those same members of the judiciary who were later to become ministers of justice in the state of Israel (brackets mine).

The territories occupied by Israel at the time of the signing of the armistice, as stated earlier, were defined as "demilitarized zones". The outer boundaries of these zones did not constitute state borders since the armistice lines were cease-fire lines between belligerent parties and not state boundaries agreed upon by parties at peace. Not only was the status of these "occupied territories" to be determined once peace was permanently established through treaties between the belligerent parties under the supervision of the United Nations but also such conditions were deemed necessary for the final resolution of Israel's internationally recognized borders. Israel and all the Arab states involved were signees to the various armistices agreements which set definite conditions upon these states pertaining to the territories they held jurisdiction over. Israel violated most if not all these conditions and although complaints were repeatedly voiced by the Arab states, who complied with the armistices agreements, the United Nations never did anything to prevent or make Israeli authorities abide by the terms that they themselves were party to. At times UN officials complained about Israel's intransigence and blatant disregard of the agreements, but no actions were ever taken to prevent or undo Israel's flagrant

violations.[32] I have already mentioned that the annexation of "occupied territories"--the Galilee, the Negev and the Little Triangle--and the unilateral granting of citizenship to their residents were in clear violation of the armistice agreements. In the following I briefly list several other violations. I have chosen those that are most pertinent to this discussion of the ghettoization of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship.

Firstly, the occupying parties were mandated to keep the demilitarized zones in tact. Instead, Israel occupied these territories, annexed them wholesale and confiscated land and property, destroyed villages, and looted Palestinian possessions. Secondly, the occupying parties were mandated to protect the life, property, livelihood and the integrity of the people living within the demilitarized zones under their jurisdiction—that is, to restore normal civilian life. Instead, Israel confiscated or shut down productive facilities, restricted movement, set curfews, prevented farmers from accessing those fields and pastures which had not been confiscated, and for border towns, like Umm al-Fahim, prevented people who had property on the other side of the armistice lines from accessing their residences, land and businesses in clear violation of the armistice agreement. If the Israelis had fulfilled their armistice obligations there would probably have been few if any "infiltrators" or "smugglers". Thirdly, the states involved were responsible to bring into being a local civil administration and police force and they were explicitly forbidden to militarily enter the demilitarized areas. Instead, in flagrant violation of this part of the armistice agreement, Israel militarily occupied the territories and put military governors

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[32] See, for instance, Lt.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1963). From August 1954 until November 1956 he was Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. He then became commander of the United Nations Emergency Force until the spring of 1957 "when the Force took up its position along the Gaza Strip Demarcation Line and the International Frontier in the Sinai." In this book he records his experiences while in service for the United Nations during this time.

in charge and established military courts, all of which was ultimately controlled by one individual, the Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion. Fourthly, the responsible state was not to interfere in any way in the political life of the people whose status was pending international agreement. Instead, Israel unilaterally granted citizenship to Palestinians in the "demilitarized zones" of the "occupied territories" they were responsible for. They deemed illegal any indigenous association under the Emergency Regulations on the pretext of national security and created through the ruling party, MAPAI, Arab lists for the Israeli elections. Fifthly, signees to the agreements were to insure the safe return of refugees who desired to return to their homes. Instead, Israel rejected the right of return and created laws to prevent the return of the refugees and to confiscate their property and to destroy or resettle their towns and villages with Jewish immigrants. The story continues, but the basic outlines of the situation and its illegality are encapsulated in these historical realities and provide the back drop for the rest of this chapter's discussion.[33]

The policy of imposing military rule over occupied Palestinians was already being formulated by Ben-Gurion during the 1948 War, even before the *Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel* was proclaimed, as pointed out by Tom Segev in *1949: The First Israelis*. Along with a series of questions as to what to do with Arab property, Arab captives and other such matters, Ben-Gurion wrote in his Diaries: "It is now necessary to lay down the law for an occupied town or village. Who governs: the local commander or an appointed governor? On whose behalf?" Segev tells us that a "few days after the atrocities committed during the seizure of Ramlah and Lydda, and before

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[33] See Sami Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest: Palestine Between 1914-1967* (New York: New York Press, 1967), 116-55, for an excellent discussion of the armistice and Israel's complete disregard for its terms and conditions as a signee.

the conquest of Nazareth…Ben-Gurion summoned Elimelih Zelikowitz, 'Zelig' Avner, and ordered him to impose martial rule in all occupied territories." Although at first military rule was uncoordinated and poorly implemented "within a few months the military government became institutionalized and expanded. By the end of 1949 it employed over 1,000 people." Ben-Gurion himself defined its responsibilities and soon ordered that the "Military Governor be the sole representative for all government ministries among the Arab population" (Segev 1986, 48-49). Also in 1949, Ben-Gurion dissolved what was considered a liberal orientated ministry, The Ministry of Minorities, and replaced it with the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs. Now, matters concerning the Arabs were directly under Ben-Gurion's scrutiny, the population under martial rule, and matters pertaining to them were parceled out between the Defense Ministry, the army, the Custodian of Abandoned Property under the Ministry of Justice and Finance, and the Ministries of Religions, Agriculture, Education, and Labor.

As pointed out in chapter 1, the nation-state building project, as first projected under Ben-Gurion's leadership, has required from its beginning the militarization of Israeli society, premised as it is on expansion of territory and cultural separation as absolutes. Although there was controversy over policy regarding Israel's borders, militarization and the treatment of the Palestinian citizens—there were even individuals who espoused construction of a constitution based on secular democratic governance and assimilation or integration of Palestinians into society—given Ben-Gurion's capacity to assert hegemony within the society as the leader of MAPAI and the State, a militaristic and separatist hegemony took root and became the operative principle still guiding Israel's leaders to this day. Primacy is accorded to "security" in regard to the "enemy

within"—the Palestinians within the state boundaries--and the "enemy without"—the surrounding Arab states. Thus, the Israeli state and society have been collapsed into one another more so than most societies that are typically classified as "western democracies" and this reality has had an overriding effect not only on Palestinians but the nature of Jewish society.

Returning to the question of Israel's borders, as stated earlier, the leaders of the newly established state, particularly Ben-Gurion, decided, even before cessation of the war, not to settle the question of borders. This meant that armistice lines, truce agreements between Israel and her surrounding Arab countries agreed upon within a condition of war, served to demarcate the territory under Israeli control. This situation was what Ben-Gurion wanted, operating as he was on the belief that through further conflict Israel would gain more territory as has happened. Military Zionism is still the working thesis of Israel's leaders and it is interesting to note that many of Israel's Prime Ministers have been military men, often Generals, like Barak, Begin, Sharon, Rabin. Professor of history and former Knesset member Shlomo Ben-Ami adds that a constant state of conflict and war also served the nation-building project. In his book, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace*, he writes:

> Israel's War of Independence was not for a moment seen by the leaders of the new state as heralding an era of peace. That a 'second round' was inevitable was almost public knowledge, let alone that such was the working premise of most of the leaders, first and foremost of Ben-Gurion. To him, as he said when presenting to the Knesset a new 'Security Law' on 19 August 1952, Israel was living in a state of 'armed peace,' and he warned against the illusion and the danger of a 'false peace' with the Arab world. The new nation made out of immigrants from all corners of the world had to be shaped and galvanised as a nation in arms, a people in uniform, a fully mobilized society. The army, Ben-Gurion taught, should be the vital agent of nation building. When initiating military reprisals against neighbouring Arab states, he would frequently consider not only the need to inspire and motivate the army, but also to boost the morale of the new immigrants through exploits of their army. The notion of a nation living on a razor's edge between war and a precarious truce became a collective state of mind, a philosophy of life. 'Security' was definitely elevated to the status of the sacred cow of the young Jewish state (Ben-Ami 2006, 72).

For the Palestinians, the merging of state and society was unadulterated since they were ghettoized into "security zones" which were broken down into small enclosed enclaves, "closed areas", governed and administered directly by the military for twenty years. Access to what would be called civil society, for such things as work or healthcare, which for the most part were only available in the Jewish world outside their ghetto-zones, could only be acquired through the military governor and usually only on a daily basis. It is during this time that the "hamula" and "village" were constructed "on the ground" as institutionalized structures that organized life within the ghettos and as cultural conceptions about *Israel's Arabs*. (In chapter 4 these constructs are analyzed more fully.) Eyal says in regard to the ideological process of separation that

> [T]he discourse on the 'Arab village' that developed within the framework of the military government imposed on the Palestinians from 1948 to 1966 purifies the Israeli Arab hybrid by separating what is 'internal' to the village and hence 'traditional' and 'Arab' from what is 'external' and hence due to the dynamic effect of the 'modern' and 'Western' Israeli society. In this way, modernization discourse—with its binary oppositions of modern versus traditional, West versus East—was inscribed upon the physical landscape of the state of Israel and has become part of the taken-for-granted spatial knowledge of all Israelis (Eyal 2006, 14).[34]

Actually the *village* discourse had already begun well before the establishment of the state, though it could only become a fully "national" discourse, in the way Eyal is addressing the question, with the actual establishment of the state. The hegemonic ethno-nationalist Zionist vision of an exclusively Jewish state could only be actualized through colonial settlement and a war which would enable the Zionists to expropriate the indigenous population—two key prongs of Ben-Gurion's strategy for building the Jewish

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[34] As long as it is understood that notions about what are "internal" to the "Arab village" are also recognized as socially constructed notions rooted in the society's social relations of reproduction Eyal's statement presented here is not in need of qualification, but, since he raises "purification" and not the production of space rooted in social practice to an, if not the, explanatory level of analysis of Israeli social process this comment needs to be added. He tends to raise a form of "discourse" rather than the actual social relations of a society's form of reproduction as the positing factor of social existence.

state. Such a project, like any colonial project, *organically* gave rise to a *modernity* discourse which distanced the colonizers from the colonized. Such a discourse was already well-established before 1948 and Palestinians were already typically portrayed as pre-modern, traditional, clan-based villagers. This discourse was reflected in the title given to the data collected on the Palestinian locales and their inhabitants, the "village files", which have been brought to light by Ilan Pappe in his book, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*. The "village files" began to be compiled for the Jewish National Fund well before the establishment of the state and were used by the military forces to carry out the Zionist colonial objectives of territorial expansion and ethnic cleansing during the 1948 War.

> By the late 1930s, this 'archive' was almost complete. Precise details were recorded about the topographic location of each village, its access roads, quality of land, water springs, main sources of income, its socio-political composition, religious affiliations, names of muhktars, its relationship with other villages, the age of individual men (sixteen to fifty) and many more (Pappe 2006, 19).

When Ben-Gurion and his close associates "realized by the end of 1946 that the British were on their way out" (Pappe 2006, 28) they began revising Plans A and B of their war strategy. These were fused into Plan C in which they added that "all data required for the performance of these actions could be found in the village files: lists of leaders, activists, 'potential human targets', the precise layout of villages, and so on" (Pappe 2006, 28). Plan C was aimed at preparing "the military forces of the Jewish community in Palestine for the offensive campaigns they would be engaged in against rural and urban Palestine the moment the British were gone." Pappe enumerates what "these actions" consisted of, which included:

> Killing the Palestinian political leadership.
> Killing Palestinian inciters and their financial supporters.
> Killing Palestinians who acted against Jews.
> Killing senior Palestinian officers and officials [in the Mandatory system].

> Damaging Palestinian transportation.
> Damaging the sources of Palestinian livelihoods: water wells, mills, etc.
> Attacking nearby Palestinian villages likely to assist in future attacks.
> Attacking Palestinian clubs, coffee houses, meeting places, etc. (Pappe 2006, 28).

Just a few months after this plan was put into place, Plan D (Dalet) was drawn up. This plan "called for their [Palestinian] systematic and total expulsion from their homeland." Plan D, under Ben-Gurion, as Minister of Defense, was put into effect on March 10, 1948, before the writing of the *Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*, and the "village files" were given out to the twelve brigades that were organized to carry out the ethnic cleansing in twelve designated regions of Palestine. Over a number of years, preceding the establishment of the state, the generation of these files, which included every Palestinian village, involved typographers, photographers, informants and information gatherers. Out of this endeavor came Israel's Arab experts, the *Orientalists*. These individuals served in the Military Government, Ben-Gurion's Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, the Sheen Bet, and became the original academic *Arabists*. *Bitachon*, security--the securing of an exclusive or at least majority Jewish presence in the state—remained, and still remains, a major organizing principle regarding the remaining Palestinian population.

Dominated by the perceived need for "security" everyday life for all Israelis has been subordinated to the task of fortress building vis-à-vis the *enemy within* and the *enemy without*. The policies put in place in the first years of the state continue to inform the national prerogatives to this day. On Independence Day, *yom ha'atzmaut*, 1992, the *Jerusalem Post* ran an article entitled, "Border Police spend holiday on patrol," which described how the Border Police Inspector Nissan Lahat spent his holiday in his Jeep raising "storms of dust as he drove the back roads of the Triangle in the Sharon district,"

an area inside the Green Line where a concentration of Palestinian citizens live. The article reports that "Lahat and his 30 officers performed their holiday routine of patrolling the invisible line separating Jewish and Arab villages" while "tens of thousands of Israelis loaded their cars with easy chairs and portable barbeques, and drove to parks and recreation sites." Lahat is quoted as saying: "'This is Israel's Wild West,'…as he drove the Jeep along the dirt road separating Moshav Tenavot from the Arab village of Kalansuwa."[35] All that remains of this day's efforts to secure the *nation* from "Israel's Wild West" is the simple remark he entered into the platoon's log: "Nothing unusual to report."

In regard to the *external enemy*, the *Jerusalem Post* reports in June, 1992, after the first Gulf War, that Homefront Command Major-General Ze'ev Livne has released a new regulation ordered by the Israel Defense Forces, requiring a "sealed room in all homes" that must be "complete with a gas-proof, blast-proof door and window." Thanks to the innovative spirit of Israeli capitalists there are a whole array of "brand-new concepts in protection [that] have replaced the traditional basement or neighborhood shelters" for new housing and there are upgrades for existing apartments and homes as well. Among the new innovations are "the 'apartmental protected area' ('mamad' in Hebrew shorthand) and the 'building-floor protected area' ('mamak')." As the article states, "every new structure is legally required to have one or the other, at the discretion of the architect and contractor." All these and much more were on display at a six-day exhibition, which took place after the IDF order was released, entitled, "Protection,

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[35] Michael Rotem, "Border Police spend holiday on patrol," *Jerusalem Post*, May 8, 1992, 2.

Shelter and Rescue" at the Israel Building Center in Tel Aviv. [36] *Bitachon, bitachon*—security—perhaps the most commonly spoken word in Hebrew, is the primary business of the state and civil society; and, after first serving to justify the ghettoization of Palestinians under Israeli administration, it has become quite a profitable business.

Cloaked in the language of security and concretely actualized in a militarized social space the nation was produced. A main objective of military rule was to isolate the Jewish and Palestinian populations from each other. Spatial demarcation isolated the Palestinians from the national civil government and civil society. When Palestinians appealed to the civilian government to help them the government's response was to send the Palestinian complaints to the military governors and to insure that the military governors and not officials from the civilian government responded to these complaints. Tom Segev points out that

> Isolation of the Arab population from the political, administrative and social system was part of the intention to guarantee the political supervision over it. The political aims of the martial rule in the early years of its existence were summed up in the following words, contained in a top secret memorandum: 'The government's policy…has sought to divide the Arab population into diverse communities and regions….The municipal status of the Arab villages, and the competitive spirit of local elections, deepened the divisions inside the villages themselves. The communal policy and the clan divisions in the villages prevented Arab unity….Martial law has ruled all this time with complete and total authority.'….In the eyes of the dazed, divided and frightened population, the memorandum went on to explain, martial rule represented the 'new triumphant power,'….It served as the sole and central channel for all the extensions of the state authority which functioned in the Arab sector, 'so that each and every Arab felt his daily dependence upon the military governor who was in charge of his area' (Segev 1986, 65).

Making use of existing and appointed mukhtars, sheiks and heads of clans in their dealings with the Palestinian population, the military governors were enabled, as the memorandum goes on to say, "to rule over a whole community through a handful of people" (Segev 1986, 66). Every aspect of Palestinian life was dealt with either directly

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[36] See Martha Meisels' two articles, "IDF calls for sealed rooms in all homes," *Jerusalem Post*, June 9, 1992 and "Sealed With the IDF's Kiss," *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, June 19, 1992.

through the military government and courts or through separate governmental departments and ministries—education, labor, religious, etc.--which were coordinated through the military governors. Alina Korn points out in her article, "Military government, political control and crime: The case of Israeli Arabs," that this led to "the introduction of double standards and the institutionalization of discrimination against the Arab citizens" (Korn 2000, 171).

Under Article 125 of the military regulations the military governor was granted "the power to proclaim any area or place a forbidden (closed) area…which no one can enter or leave without a permit…a written permit from the military commander or his deputy…failing which he is considered to have committed a crime." This also meant that Jews could not enter these closed Palestinian areas which further insured the separation of these two peoples. All the Palestinian villages and towns in the Negev, the Galilee and the Little Triangle were divided into small pockets of "closed areas". Military courts were set up for each of these three areas; the military court for Umm al-Fahim was in Kfar Yonah. The military government was granted immunity and a Supreme Court ruling validated any action taken for "security reasons". By controlling travel, so crucial to everyday life and survival, the military government had at its hands an easy system of control, co-optation and manipulation through a system of rewards and punishment. Besides refusing travel permits, they could refuse licenses, building permits, leasing of land to anyone deemed politically incorrect or out of favor. When the General Security Services (Shabak) wanted to recruit an agent all the military governor had to do was deny exit or work permits to force individuals to collaborate or become informants. This was a routine practice and in clear violation of the armistice agreements. All such practices also

generated conflict among the ghetto residents, between and even within families as some were granted certain privileges and others denied, some became collaborators and others resisted. Although it appears that Gil Eyal in his book, *The Disenchantment of the Orient*, adopts the "village" attribution as an objective spatial categorization of Palestinian locales, while critiquing its corruption in its Israeli form, nonetheless, his remarks pertaining to the spatial definitions which restricted the boundaries of the Palestinian enclaves and separated them from the society are well placed. Such restriction and separation, he says "were supplemented by the sociopolitical effects of the Arabists' art of government" which were intended

> to cultivate internal *hamula* struggle within the villages and to block all forms of cross-village or national political organization. Like land confiscation and spatial segregation, this government strategy folded the Arab village back upon itself and produced the appearance of a traditional social structure hopelessly stultified by its own divisions and conflicts (Eyal 2006, 158).

The seclusion of Palestinians within the confines of their ghetto town corresponded to their general proletarianization and entry into Israel's *modernity* process. The borders of towns were drastically redefined and basically reduced to living quarters or "workers dormitories" as the anthropologist Henry Rosenfeld depicts them. In Umm al-Fahim some residents still owned orchards located on the outskirts of the residential area. To get access to these lands required permits from the military governors. The constriction, imposed isolation, and de-development of economic and social life were the real foundation for the construction of what is called the contemporary Israeli Palestinian *village*. Furthermore, the confiscation of "hinterland surrounding Palestinian villages was…to block their tendency to spread outward until they approached one another to form a single territorial block or even a city. In order to drive a wedge between them, Jewish settlements were planted on the confiscated lands" (Eyal 2006, 157). The military

government was responsible to assist in establishing and maintaining these Jewish settlements. This process insured the narrowing, both physically and culturally, of the boundaries of the Palestinian locales and their separation and segregation from the national life of society thus furthering Israel's construction of the Palestinian ghettos, the so-called "traditional village". As Gil Eyal writes, "The spatial structure of the village was fixed, frozen, and folded back upon itself mainly through the confiscation of Palestinian lands" (Eyal 2006, 157).

As mentioned earlier, Umm al-Fahim suffered one of the greatest land losses of the Palestinian population. It is estimated that half of the land expropriated from the Palestinians once belonged to the population of this area. In 1945 Umm al-Fahim and her sister offshoots of Mu'awiya, Musmus, Al Mshirfa and Ein Ibrahim possessed 68,311 dunams and in 1962 12,006 dunams. 34,600 dunams alone were expropriated during 1953-54.[37] Overnight, people who mainly made a living based on agriculture found themselves without a livelihood, jobless and landless. This process reduced the population to a dependent community whose every need would have to be met through the intervention of the military government and the state. Expropriation continues today—to build Jewish settlements, to build roads, for military purposes or to build the Separation Fence. So much land has been confiscated from Umm al-Fahim residents because, as stated earlier, Umm al-Fahim is located in one of the most fertile areas in Israel; because Umm al-Fahim is located

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[37] For 1945, see *Village Statistics 1945, A Classification of Land and Area Ownership in Palestine*, with explanatory notes by Sami Hadawi (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1970); for 1962, see *Israel Government Yearbook* 5724 (1963/64). In footnote 5 of "Appendix: Tables" in Sabri Jiryis' *The Arabs in Israel*, 311-12, he says: "The land was expropriated according to the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law S713-1953. The total for 1945 includes 351,657 dunams classified as No. 16, which is quasi-agricultural land that is not taxed. Such land is considered national property, although compensation is paid to any Arab willing to relinquish his rights to it."

along the armistice line the government wants to be certain the town is contained; and, because the Little Triangle is predominantly Palestinian, the government still has plans for its *Judaization*.

Given the immensity of land confiscation it is curious that Israeli literature on Palestinian agriculture for the most part discusses what is considered to be the backwardness of Palestinian agricultural methods and their refusal to modernize and embrace entrepreneurship. These social scientists ignore the actual circumstances facing Palestinians and curiously denigrate their traditional forms of agriculture which combined private family based production within communal land rotation and shared infrastructures for common processes such as harvesting and threshing. They criticize the Palestinians for lacking private entrepreneurial incentive, while Israeli agriculture has from the beginning been largely based on the communal production of the kibbutzim movement and cooperative production of the moshavim and has always been heavily subsidized and regulated by the government.

And, of course, the historical and social development of Palestine was much more complex than simply a collection of villages and peasants, whether backward or not. In the 18$^{th}$ century, for instance, Zahir al-Umar initiated a unification process which included all social, religious and ethnic groups in Palestine involving extensive social reform. Zahir's activities contributed to integrating Bedouins, peasants, urban groups, Moslems, Christians, Jews, and foreigners into one functioning system characterized by expanded use of land, growing of crops, a prosperous domestic and international trade, building of cities like Haifa, forts, roads, enhancing security, and the welcoming of growing numbers of emigrants. Already in the 1770s relations of trade existed from the

French to the Russians. In 1825 Acre and Tyre exported much more than they imported and Sidon and Jaffa were also well established in world trade.[38] By the 19th century Jaffa had become the major port for importing and exporting goods for central and southern Palestine and railroads had been laid. Palestine, during all this period, had at one time or other exported cotton, silk, olive oil, wheat and barley, sesame and many other goods.

Turning to more recent times, Gad G. Gilbar discusses "Palestine's integration into the world economic system during the last decades of Ottoman rule," from 1870-1914, a time which had, he says, "a major impact on the socio-economic development of several urban communities in the country" (Gilbar 1998, 281). His study pertains to the Nablus area, "a commercial center that marketed agricultural produce from the surrounding area" which also affected the Triangle region including Umm al-Fahim. Gilbar reports that a shift from subsistence crops to cash crops during this period, due to international developments in the world market, "enlarged the population of the rural labor forces employed in primary industrial work both in absolute and relative terms" (Gilbar 1998, 284). Commerce and manufacturing rose significantly in the domestic product along with "the intensification of the monetization process in the rural area" (Gilbar 1998, 284). Nablus, according to Gilbar, became the largest producer of soap in the Fertile Crescent by the turn of the century. So, certainly by 1948, not all Palestinians were villagers. But, returning to Israeli historiography regarding the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the most blatant omission from their discussion regarding the backwardness of

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[38] See Thomas Philipp, *Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, 1730-1831* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) and, concerning Nablus see also Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Philipp states that the region of Acre was the "first region in the Arab East to be inextricably linked to the modern European economy…[Acre became] from 1730-1831, the third largest center of trade and political power on the Syrian coast and the third largest city in geographic Syria…[and] during the last quarter of the eighteenth century Acre also began to play a role in international politics" (Philipp 2001, 3).

the Palestinian farmers is that the Israeli government confiscated all the most fertile land for their own production.

The largest amount of land confiscations took place from 1948 to 1953 through the efforts of the Supreme Expropriations Committee (SEC), upon which the military governors and the advisor on Arab Affairs sat. The SEC coordinated the confiscation drive and the military government carried it out. Given these realities, there was simply no longer a material basis for Palestinians to engage in any meaningful agricultural production, whether communal or entrepreneurial, nor were they, for the most part, permitted to during military rule, except when work permits were issued to Palestinians to work on Jewish agricultural settlements. Nonetheless, some Palestinian farmers have done their best to make something of the marginal, rocky, less fertile lands still available to them. It is interesting to note that, as Alina Korn informs us, "An analysis of all criminal records of Israeli Arabs in the police data bank indicates that 23.2% of all convictions for property offenses between 1948 and 1967 were for criminal trespassing on agricultural land (articles 286 and 385 of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936)" (Korn 2000, 172).

The land that remains to the residents of Umm al-Fahim has been greatly needed to build homes for the ever growing population which is restricted into the narrow confines of the town's boundaries as defined by the Israeli government. David A. Wesley depicts the situation in the 1960s while Palestinians were still under military rule thusly:

> Part of the sense of siege and dispossession ensues from the manner in which Arab town jurisdictional boundaries have been determined. By separating the domains of municipal jurisdiction, on the one hand, and ownership, use, and the possibility of future development on the other, Ministry of Interior practices of the 1960s were able to set the village boundaries that had been recorded in the Mandate Survey of Palestine, leaving land…without municipal status (Wesley 2006, 192).

The housing problem is only aggravated by the fact that the government often does not issue building permits for homes by making use of a variety of legal and administrative mechanisms, such as defining land as non-residential. Umm al-Fahim has one of the highest, if not highest, population densities in Israel and due to the historical lack of a Master Plan and budgetary neglect, along with the zoning policies of the State, building in Umm al-Fahim is chaotic and crowded in upon itself (as can be seen in the photos in chapter 5) and streets became cesspools breeding disease. Necessity forces families to build illegally and take their chances that the government will pass them by and not demolish their homes (which are built on land they own). But, all too often the bulldozers arrive early in the morning with no warning leaving only enough time for the family to get out of their home to stand by, impotent and helpless, while they watch everything they own being destroyed. Although Umm al-Fahim is no longer under martial rule I have witnessed this several times while living there. And this is not the Occupied Territories but a policy applied to Palestinians under Israeli citizenship.

Thus, the military government insured that Palestinians were separated from their lands and agricultural production and through their control of the issuance of work permits limited their employment on agricultural lands now owned by Jewish settlements—an attempt to realize Ben-Gurion's ambition of creating Jewish only businesses and Jewish only labor in all areas of production. In the end full implementation of the Zionist program to keep Palestinians from any attachment to the land including as workers was too difficult to enforce since the settlers on the agricultural kibbutzim and moshavim were themselves demanding such labor. Requiring work and

travel permits served to regulate the flow of Palestinian workers into the Jewish labor market based on the needs of the Jewish economy.

> The military government received instructions from the Ministry of Labor regarding the number of Arab workers needed in the different sectors and reported on the numbers of permits issued. During the summer months and other periods when there was a reduced demand for labor, the military government was required to block departure of the Arab workers to the Jewish sector. The military government introduced a type of 'queue' system and supplied permits for two or three weeks in a month (Korn 2000, 165).

The work permit system prevented the Palestinians from direct access to the labor market and insured that they did not compete with Jewish workers. Until 1953 the military governors were responsible for determining the wages of Palestinian laborers. In 1953 Palestinians were allowed to join some of the trade unions attached to the Histadrut and to benefit from some of its services, such as health insurance; though they were still excluded from membership to the Histadrut. In the 1950s employment offices were set up in some of the Palestinian towns including Umm al-Fahim. This required that the military governors relax somewhat their travel restrictions and more readily grant travel permits to those Palestinians who could prove they had jobs to go to. By first making Palestinians propertyless and unemployed and restricting them to their ghettos, the military governors, and later with the Histadrut, could then serve to regulate the flow and price of Israel's reserve army of labor.

During military rule zoning laws restricted building; licensing laws prevented residents from engaging in business or commerce; almost all forms of association were illegal including social and even at times sports clubs. There is an interesting news item in *filastin* of June 6, 1940 recorded in Fayiz al-Hamad's book *The First Book on Arrabah*. The article reports on of the Annual Games Festival which included the schools of Jenin, Yabad, Arrabah, Umm al-Fahim, Qabatyah, and al-Yamun.

> Present at the festival were the Assistant Governor of the district, the Chief District Administrator, the Justice of Peace, the Education Inspector with his assistant and several army officers. Throughout the festival army music was played, closing the schools for the summer break. The extra support teachers will remain without jobs and salaries because the government does not pay them during the summer vacation.[39]

These relationships and activities came to an end and were banned by the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian towns. To this day many of the military regulations still apply and are incorporated into Israeli law and policy which are implemented in specific ways in regard to the Palestinian citizenry.

Control of movement, as already mentioned, was a major function of the military government. Alina Korn describes the situation in this way:

> Up to the end of the fifties, no fundamental changes were introduced in the system of control over the movements of the Arab citizens: the obligation of carrying a permit with the exact date and duration and the places where the person is allowed to stay. For example, at the end of December 1957, doctors from Nazareth were still being given a permit valid for six months with a specific list of places where they were allowed to visit. In 1958, a permit was granted, at any given time, to only one in three Arabs living within the areas under the jurisdiction of the military government, and only half of those permits were granted for 'extended periods'….However, a significant easement on travel restrictions was introduced from August 1959. In the wake of recommendations made by the ministerial committee that investigated the actions of the military government, most of the Arab inhabitants in the north and in the Triangle, were permitted to leave their villages and remain in the local centers and cities during daylight hours (Korn 2000, 165-66).

But the permit system did much more than what has been mentioned thus far. As Eyal points out in the following passage the permit system

> effectively fixed the residence of Palestinian villages, since the area under the jurisdiction of the military government was divided and subdivided into smaller and smaller zones, residence in which was the basis upon which the military governor issued employment permits and marriage certificates, dispensed food and clothing coupons, and allowed the delivery of mail and the procurement of organized transportation. Movement between these zones, and thus effectively between villages, required special permits and these were doled out gingerly. Thus, the Palestinian population was kept rural and fixed to villages. The usual pattern of migration from villages to the cities was interrupted. This also led to a dramatic reduction in the number of intervillage marriages. It was the first necessary step in the constitution of the Arab village as object (Eyal, 2006, 156).

No matter what the circumstances a violation of one's travel permit in any manner made one subject to punishment, imprisonment, detention and payment of a fine. "Any

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[39] Translated from the Arabic by Ghassan Fawzi.

person entering a security zone without a military permit could be removed and was also subject, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding 500 pounds, or to both these penalties" (Hadawi 1967, 196). Matters were further complicated for Palestinians because of the way military districts and sub-districts were arbitrarily defined causing at times a village to be included within the boundaries of one district while lands were included in another district whose administrative offices were often far from one's home. Still, violation of travel restrictions no matter what the causes criminalized the person involved. According to Korn, "between the years 1948 and 1967 some 33% of all convictions of Arab citizens were for violations of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, by means of which their movements were restricted." As she reports only a small part of offences committed were actually for criminal reasons, yet all violations of the Emergency Regulations were criminalized. According to the records, Korn states that 95% of all convictions "were for administrative offenses whereby Arab citizens failed to carry the proper permits and licenses, or exceeded travel restrictions imposed by the military government" (Korn 2000, 157).

Although the Israeli government was mandated under the armistice agreements to permit access to residences, businesses and land on the other side of the armistice lines all ties with family, friends, and business on the other sides were severed and any crossing of these lines to go to such places were illegal. Benny Morris acknowledges the impact of just what it meant to the Palestinians in the Little Triangle and the West Bank to be split apart from each other and their lands and businesses, although he mistakenly blames this on the armistice agreement between Israel and Transjordan and not Israeli violation of the agreement, in this passage from his book, *Israel's Border Wars 1949-1956*:

> The second major problem stemming from the border demarcations in the Israeli-Arab armistice agreements was rooted in the cessation by Jordan in the summer of 1949 of the strip of land extending from Wadi 'Ara southwards, to the west of Tulkarm and Qalilya, down to Kafr Qasim. The territory ceded, on pain of an Israeli threat to renew hostilities (which the far weaker Jordanians feared), encompassed fifteen or sixteen Arab villages, including Umm al Fahm, Baqa al Gharbiya, Qalansuwa, At Taiyiba, At Tira, and Kafr Qasim, whose inhabitants would have preferred to remain under Arab rule. Far worse, the strip included tracts of arable land belonging to several dozen villages on the eastern—i.e. Jordanian—side of the line. Thousands of West Bank villagers thus lost much of their cultivated land—and a greater or lesser part of their livelihood. Infiltration by these fellahin to cultivate 'their' lands and reap 'their' crops was almost inevitable….
>
> A British report from 1952 asserted that about one quarter of the West Bank's non-refugee population of more than 400,000 was 'slowly starving, and a further substantial proportion are not far above the same level and may soon sink below it.' The 'wholly destitute', according to the report, consisted of '47,000' (of '76,000') border villagers, '20,00' who had migrated inland from the frontier villages, '19,000' East Jerusalem slumdwellers, and '34,000' 'others'. Some 17,000 of the 'wholly destitute' border villagers received 'half-rations' from UNRWA (while the remaining '30,000', 'equally in need', did not)…
>
> The problem of the disposed West Bank villagers meshed with that of the far more numerous Palestinian refugees from the 1948 fighting. There had been, all told, between 1.2 and 1.3 million Palestinian Arabs in the lands west of the Jordan River before 1948 (Morris 1997, 3-4).

Physically Umm al-Fahim's inhabitants were now cut off from all the surrounding Palestinian villages and towns with which they had had regular and everyday relations, as well as the Jewish and mixed towns, like Haifa, which previously were common places to go for shopping, recreation, social visits, and employment; and of course, intercourse with the surrounding Arab countries to which they had cultural, linguistic, political, educational, familial, commercial and religious ties for centuries ceased. According to Korn rarely were permits even granted to visit family within the Green Line. "Permits for family and social visits were rarely granted. From data published in the government yearbook of 1954, it appears that 1953/54, some 80% of the permits were issued for purposes of employment and the remainder was for medical treatments, court appearances or consultations with lawyers, or dealings with government agencies" (Korn 2000, 179).

Interviewees in Appendix D mention the Kafr Kassim massacre that took place on October 29, 1956 in the Triangle region of Umm al-Fahim. It is important to take note of

this incident. Massacres of Palestinian villagers inside the Green Line were the application of a tactic developed during the war by the Zionist forces that was used as a means to terrorize the population of entire villages and towns into fleeing in masse. This tactic was a most successful part of the ethnic cleansing operation discussed earlier. On the eve of the war a curfew was placed on Palestinians under Israeli citizenship resulting in the massacre of Kafr Kassim residents—fifty-one men (22), women (12) and children (17) were murdered and thirteen wounded. The curfew was timed to prevent any Palestinian response to Israel's intervention and to provoke fear in the Palestinian population at large as Israel entered a war of aggression against Egypt. The small border village of Kafr Kassim in the Little Triangle became a site for a massacre. Since violation of curfews was a criminal offense and tensions were running high, orders were given to the soldiers at Kfar Kassim to shot to kill those that violated the curfew.

> The Israeli daily, *Kol Haam*, on Wednesday, December 19, 1956, on its front page under the title, 'This Way Were the forty-nine Inhabitants of Kafr Kassim Slaughtered.' On October 29, 1956, the day that Israeli Frontier Guards started at 4 p.m. what they called a tour of the Triangle Villages. They informed the Mukhtars and the rural councils that the curfew in those villages was from that day onwards to be observed from 5 p.m. instead of 6 a.m., and that the inhabitants were required to stay at home as from that instant. One of the villages was Kafr Kassim, a small village situated near the Israeli settlement of Betah Tekfa. The villages there received the alert at 4:45 p.m., only 15 minutes before the new curfew time. The Mukhtar tried to convince the officer that the villagers whose work took them outside the village would not be able to receive the warning in time. The officer told him that his soldiers would take care of that. The villagers who were home complied. Meanwhile the officers posted themselves at the village gates. Before long the first batch of villagers, home-bound on bicycles, came into sight unaware of the curfew. They were met by the soldiers who shot them at a close range. Others, unaware of the danger awaiting them, started to reach the village entrance. They were met with the same fate. When the massacre finished, officers moved around to finish off whoever still had a pulse beating. According to their soldiers, 'There will be no wounded.' The blood bath was not restricted to the entrance or outskirts, but was carried right into the village itself. The next day, 31 October, a curfew was imposed and during the curfew, the Israeli police brought over some villagers from the neighboring Galgoulia and ordered them to bury the corpses, which included fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters. 'With two or three exceptions, the press has been party to a conspiracy of silence, throwing a veil over the 'incident'.' It wrote of condemned men instead of killers; instead of a killing in Kafr Kassim, it wrote of a 'mistake' and a 'misfortune' and a 'regrettable incident.'

> When it mentioned the victims of the calamity, it was difficult to tell whom it meant, the dead or the killers.[40]

It must be asked why such a brutal policy was applied against Israel's ghettoized Palestinians at that time. Military rule was in effect; Palestinians were segregated into small militarized zones with no freedom of movement; few towns and villages had electricity and televisions were almost nonexistent and radios rare; Palestinians in Israel were shut off from each other and knew next to nothing about what was happening in the world at large; there were no independent newspapers in Arabic in the closed areas; formation of most forms of Palestinian association was illegal; the Palestinian population was unarmed; they were demoralized and humiliated; food and supplies were scarce and searching for necessities occupied most families' time; and as my husband says "We didn't even know we were Palestinians until after 1966 when military rule was removed and the PLO entered into the world arena." In fact, under the armistice agreements, Israel technically and legally was not permitted to militarily enter or interfere in the life of Kfar Kassim since it was within the border area whose status was to be decided once peace treaties and borders were finally agreed upon. Why then, given these circumstances, did the Regimental Commander (the person the government claimed gave the order to shoot to kill) of the Military Government, which was under the supervision of Ben-Gurion, reemploy such a brutal tactic when for all practical purposes it was unnecessary? The first to be killed were workers returning home on bicycles.

I don't propose to answer this fully, but I do think that part of the answer is to be found in the particular form of colonialism practiced by the Zionist leaders. They were

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[40] *Ner*, August-October 1959, *Baaz Evron*; and *Ha'aretz*, 18 Nov. 1959 - quoted in by Sami Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1990), 155-157.

about to invade Egypt who was under the leadership of a most popular Arab leader, Abdel Nasser. This act of aggression had to be justified as an act of survival for the state and popular support had to be aroused against the Arab enemy within and without. A war of aggression needed to be mobilized for and what better way to stir up the juices and prepare for the brutalities of a war than to begin against that part of the enemy at home? Such policies are characteristic of all colonial ventures and Israel's master politician and virtual dictator, Ben-Gurion, was well-versed in such means and methods. The environment that made such atrocities socially possible I believe is to be found in what Shlomo Ben-Ami calls in *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* the "psychosis" of security. This psychosis of security, as he says, had been created as a "collective state of mind, a philosophy of life" under the leadership of Ben-Gurion and the others surrounding him and henceforth.[41] Such a global social mentality among the Jewish population allowed such massacres to occur and be considered justifiable even necessary; and allows the continued dehumanization of the Palestinians as more land is expropriated, houses demolished, families separated, while hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees remain homeless, stateless and disenfranchised for decades. In any case, for whatever reasons this massacre took place, for the immediate purposes of this chapter, this tale reveals the environment that Palestinians lived within during military rule, whose legacy

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41 "According to an item of news which appeared in the Hebrew weekly, *Haolem Hazeh* of Tel Aviv, the editors are reported to have 'talked to hundreds of Jewish children, boys and girls, of different social classes and of ages varying from 6-13 years, about the Arabs of Israel and what they thought should be done with them. Of these children 95% said that they should be murdered. A small percentage were a little compassionate and human. They opined that the Arabs should be detained in concentration camps or else deported to the Negev.'" From Hadawi, *Modern History*, 156.

still informs the context, conditions, and personal insecurity within which Palestinians live under Israeli citizenship.[42]

Since the affects of military rule were profound and lasting more must be said about life under military rule. What I am describing pertains to all the closed areas though I sight for the most part only examples from the experience of residents of Umm al-Fahim and the Little Triangle. Regarding control, Article 124 of the military regulations, which pertains to curfews, was employed for fourteen years in all Palestinian towns and villages in the Little Triangle. "On entering the Triangle after the armistice agreement with Jordan in 1949, the Israeli forces 'imposed a curfew on all roads and thoroughfares from sunset to sunrise and inside the villages from 8 P.M. until 5 A.M. Then in January [1953]…the curfew on all roads, thoroughfares, and villages was reduced to the hours between 10 P.M. and 4 A.M'" (Jiryis 1976, 30). The curfew on these towns and villages was not lifted until February 1962.

Pinhas Yorman in his book, *Medinah be-Tirunut* (*A State in Bootcamp*),[43] shows how the first census, conducted in 1948 before the war was over, constructs population data and registration (used in identity cards) that is based on ethnic separation; these are the same procedures that are carried on to this day. The first Israeli census took place in November, 1948 after the Zionist forces had already taken control (and ethnically cleansed) the area designated to be the State of Israel as well as major areas that were to be part of the Palestinian State, including Jaffa, Ramlah, Lyyd, Jerusalem, Nazareth and

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[42] For a most interesting portrayal of the sense of insecurity and disenfranchisement that Palestinians under Israeli citizenship experience regarding their fate see Sayed Kashua's novel *Let it be Morning*, trans. Miriam Shlesinger (New York: Black Cat, 2006).

[43] All passages from this book were translated from the Hebrew by Ghassan Fawzi for this dissertation.

Safad and other areas in the Galilee. At this point in the war, the Zionists had not yet acquired the Little Triangle and sporadic exchange of fire was still going on in this area. Three reasons were announced for taking the census: namely, "Preparing the identification index of everyone, preparing the voter registrar, and presenting a clear updated report of the extension of the population and its ethnic composition" (Yorman 2007, 56). Eleven thousand clerks with three thousand backup and supporting staff were mobilized to survey about one million people. A total curfew was put into effect on November 8, 1948 from 5:00 PM to midnight to carry this out. It was announced that everyone fifteen and over had to present two photos. The surveyors had to prepare two copies of the results, one for the Ministry of Interior and the other for the Bureau of Statistics. The army, the police and the civil guard secured the situation. It is interesting to note that the Palestinians in Haifa were "enthusiasts for registration" while members of Netore Karta refused to register since they did not recognize the State. I suspect the Palestinians felt that registration would give them some security and insure that they would be able to remain.

Included among the questions were two that pertained to religion and nationality. These were required to be answered. This angered some Jews who questioned why these were asked.

> On October 31 the Minister of Interior [Yitzhak Gruenbaum] complained in a press conference that "registration of the inhabitants suddenly turns to be a question of a war of opinions! Nobody imagined," Gruenbaum pointed out, "that this necessary project to produce the voter registrar will cause a storm because of two questions included in the questionnaire—nationality and religion"…The Minister also pointed out that the two questions were inserted into the questionnaire "for statistical needs only," and because in Israel there are people from different religions and nationalities, the Minister declared that "there wasn't any way to think that these questions are directed towards the internal problems of the Yishuv" (Yorman 2007, 59; brackets mine).

The results were announced to the population on November 19, 1948. The first count of the survey showed that "On November 8, 1948 the State of Israel counts for 782,000 people—713,000 Jews and 69,000 non-Jews [including foreigners and diplomats besides Palestinians]. In the official statement it was pointed out that the registration included the inhabitants in the State of Israel and 'in the Israel Defense Force held Territories'" (Yorman 2007, 67; brackets mine). Already the decision to annex these "occupied territories" and to incorporate them into the State is indicated by including the residents in the census.

Now we come to the question of the divisions according to localities (the Jews and Palestinians have been physically separated into distinct locales) and how this information was treated, along with the number of conscripts. Yorman writes, quoting from the official statement:

> "Numbers about the divisions of the population according to localities cannot be published yet." Certain specific information regarding the number of inhabitants in cities and settlements, which appeared in some papers, is not official and in some cases they are "absolutely not correct." Regarding the sensitive demographic subject—especially at this time—the concept "yet" was given a flexible interpretation and the full information regarding the split of the population according to locality was kept secret for many years. Detailed information was given on November 18, 1948 to members of the Provisional State Council in their regular weekly meeting in Tel Aviv. Those there were privileged to hear a well kept secret: the estimated number of conscripts on the day of the survey was 96,500 people out of 713,000 Jews (Yorman 2007, 67).

Since the war was not over and the objectives of acquiring more land while removing more Palestinians were still being implemented, keeping the information regarding the number of conscripts and the numbers of Palestinians secret from the public (and the international community) would have been a priority. Some of the surveyed Palestinian localities were still destined for ethnic cleansing. Ben-Gurion, who was hopeful that most if not all Palestinians could be *motivated to leave* or *transferred out*, certainly would not have wanted these figures public information. (Interestingly, Yorman tell us that Ben-

Gurion, after he had already resigned from the Government which was in 1963, divulged the exact data gathered on November 8, 1948 on the number of conscripts and the split of the population according to localities in his 1969 *The Renewed State of Israel*.) In any case, with this first census, a culture of separation was further institutionalized. Data for the Ministry of Interior, responsible for issuance of identity cards and many other important functions, and data for the Bureau of Statistics, crucial for planning and development, based on this culture were put in place.

Military governance was not only about keeping the populations separate and controlling the undesired Palestinian population but also played, as I have already indicated, a crucial role in land confiscation. In conjunction with various laws created for the "redeeming" of land, such as the Absentee Property Law, 5710-1950, a variety of emergency laws were used by the military government to expropriate Palestinian land, including Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Ordinance 5709-1949; Law for the Requisitioning of Property in Times of Emergency, 5710-1949; Emergency (Security Zones) Regulations, 5709-1949; Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945; Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law, 5713-1953. These laws were used by the military government to confiscate land and to create closed areas and security zones. Sabri Jiryis in his book, *The Arabs in Israel*, documents some of the expulsions and land confiscations that took place in the Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev during the 1950s while the Palestinian ghettos were under military rule. "At the beginning of February 1951, the inhabitants of thirteen small Arab villages in Wadi 'Ara in the Triangle were sent over the border. And on November 17, 1951, a military detachment surrounded the village of Khirbet Buweishat (near Umm al-Fahm in the Triangle),

expelled the inhabitants, and dynamited their homes" (Jiryis 1976, 82). In 1959, the military declared the area near Baqa al Gharbiya in the Little Triangle closed and appropriated it for army maneuvers.[44] As Korn points out, to this day

> [Palestinian] demography and their connections to the land are still handled by the security services, the law enforcement agencies, experts in Arab affairs, and spokesmen on 'security matters' in the media….Even today, many years after the end of the military government, the Arab population in Israel has remained under strict social control: the Border Guard patrol Arab towns and villages, there is an increased police presence…and above all, the possibility to activate the Emergency Defense regulations has remained unchanged (Korn 2000, 177).

Jiryis points out that "for some reason the Israeli army favors certain populated Arab districts for its maneuvers" (Jiryis 1976, 155). Land confiscated by the Israeli military was of course previously cultivated or used as pasture land by the former Palestinian owners. This land is often located near the owners' homes so people desire to tend to their orchards or shepherd their herds and children play in the fields. Since the army now holds maneuvers on these lands numerous grenades and explosives have been buried throughout the area. Nothing was done to protect the Palestinian residents or inform them of these dangers and hundreds of causalities resulted. For the most part the Israeli authorities did nothing and blamed these occurrences on explosives that they claim were planted there during the 1948 War and were probably put there by Arabs. But the fact is that these deaths and causalities only began happening eight years after they had supposedly been planted and only after these lands were confiscated for military training. After repeated protests by Palestinians in the 1960s, the authorities announced that they would transfer operations to uninhabited parts of the Negev, only to later proclaim in

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[44] Much has been written on Palestinian land alienation; Sabri Jiryis, for one, has a good section on the development of Israeli laws for the purposes of expropriating Palestinian land in his book *The Arabs in Israel* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976). See also Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., *The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1987).

1971 that this would be impossible and instead of limiting the areas used by the army they actually extended them. “During the months of May and June 1971, the minister of defense issued orders that an area near the village of Tayba [in the Triangle], totaling some three thousand dunums, be reserved for maneuvers” (Jiryis 1976, 156; brackets mine).

Besides casualties from such army explosives, the 1950s saw a wave of bomb scares in public places in Palestinian towns and villages, reportedly placed by “persons unknown”. According to Jiryis, from 1956 through 1958

> bombs were found near schools in Tayba, Nazareth, the villages of Ein Mahil and Jish, Baqa al Gharbiya, Kfar Kassim, Ramle, and Tur’an, near a church at Ahafa Amr, in a children’s playground in Baqa al Gharbiya, and in the village of Sandaleh. A bomb exploded in August 1957 in Umm al Fahm, wounding four children, and in 1956 a bomb exploded in Sandaleh, causing the deaths of fourteen schoolchildren who had found it and were playing with it (Jiryis 1976, 155).

The Israeli authorities responded in their usual way: these bombs were placed there during the 1948 War and were put there by the Arab armies. Bikhur Shitrit, Minister of Police, said in his reply to the questioning in the Knesset that “in 1956 the police handled 648 incidents of this kind and in the first eleven months of 1957, 295 additional cases were recorded.” Jiryis replies: “But the minister failed to explain why the schoolchildren did not find these bombs until eight years after they had been planted and why more than nine hundred bombs had suddenly been found within this two-year period—and those only in areas inhabited by Arabs” (Jiryis 1976, 155).

All aspects and each minute detail of everyday life were controlled by and supervised under the military governors. Sabri Jiryis relates that eventually “The harshness and pettiness with which restrictions were enforced drew criticism from every political party except the dominant Mapai [Ben-Gurion’s Party of the Workers of the Land of Israel], which had used the military system to obtain its political objectives

among the Arabs" (Jiryis 1976, 31; brackets mine). Military governance guaranteed that social and political formations within these closed areas would be established according to the Mapai government's objectives, particularly so at times of elections. Tom Segev points out that the ruling party, Mapai,

> created lists for the general elections, placing at their heads individuals from the traditional Arab leadership, whose main business was to mediate between the authorities and the Arab populace. 'In this way,' [quoting from the memorandum mentioned above] the party could avoid having to form a particular ideology for its Arab voters, and also ensured that those lists would not consolidate into an independent Arab bloc (Segev 1986, 66; brackets mine).

To the extent local councils were formed[45] the military governors appointed the members and assigned roles to particular residents who would act on their behalf. If things weren't working out the way Mapai wanted the military governor was there to insure that they did.

> In the summer of 1956, the military governor in the Triangle ordered the banishment of two members of the Tira local council to prevent them voting in the election of the chairman, thus guaranteeing a majority for his own candidate. In 1957 there was a sharp conflict between the military governor in the Triangle and Israel Bar-Yehuda (then Minister of the Interior and a member of Achdut Haavoda) over influence in some of the local councils. The dispute eventually had to be settled at the national level. In another instance, after the 1959 elections, the legal advisor to the government demanded that the military prosecutor take measures against Emanuel Shababo, the military governor's representative in Umm al-Fahim, whom he accused of 'using threats and acting in excess of his powers' to induce Arab voters in his district to vote in favor of the list attached to Mapai (Jiryis 1976, 248).[46]

Alexander Scholch writes that

> The first attempt of the ruling party, Mapai, into the direction [a clear policy towards the Arabs] dated from the years 1952/3. There were, to be sure, activities in the Arab sector already for the Knesset elections of 1949 and 1951, especially by Mapai and Mapam. These activities, however, were uncoordinated and dictated by short-term interests. The main aim was to mobilize the Arab clan structure in order to utilize the Arab electoral potential for the different, hastily established Arab lists. Mapai had no explicit programme for the Arab minority, and the Mapai-dominated

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[45] Jiryis thinks that one of the reasons the government was reluctant to establish local councils was that this meant that, besides giving Palestinians some kind of local authority, the state would have to establish the town's jurisdiction regarding land. Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, trans. Inea Bushnaq (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).

[46] Jiryis cites Emil Habibi in *Knesset Debates*, 29 Nov. 1955, 411, and *Judgments of the Supreme Court* 30: 103, Appeal 56/136, Iraqi et al. v. the Military Governor in the Central Region et al.

> government also preferred to leave matters of importance to the military administrators in the Arab sector (Scholch 1983, 35-36).[47]

In coordination with the special duties department of the Israeli Police, the Border Police and the Internal Security Service, the Mossad, the military governor had agents at all levels of Palestinian society; local agents, called "collaborators" by the Palestinians, were recruited from the ghetto populations by means of bribes, privileges and threats, so much so that people said that "no Arab family was without some representation in the military government." Besides appointing a local mukhtar to serve as the "governor's eyes and ears in the village," to whom all residents were required to assist in fulfilling his duties, the governors appointed regional representatives of the military government who worked closely with the mukhtars and kept an eye on them. According to Eyal, "They kept a 'record of sins' in which were noted the names and addresses of offenders and their punishments." In 1963 when military rule was again being reconsidered, Ben-Gurion responded to his critics in a speech where he stated:

> Three regions, Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev, are hotbeds of hate and conspiracy, and therefore always a potential danger. Acting openly or under cover of communism, there are elements in these areas who could instigate disturbances among the Arabs themselves, or between Arabs and Jews, in any moment of tension…The military government, with its power under the defense regulations to arrest, imprison, and banish such people, acts as a deterrent.

This is in spite of the fact that, as Korn points out: "The rate of convictions for purely political (or security) offences was low during the entire period of the military government, never exceeding one third percent of all convictions of Israeli Arabs" (Korn 2000, 172). It took another three years before the opposition to Ben-Gurion could bring this form of Palestinian subordination to a close.

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[47] In this book Scholch has also written a good summary of what he considers to be the four main approaches taken towards the Arabs in Israel in his *Introduction*, namely, 1) modernization (Landau, Stendel; 2) system of control (Lustick); exclusionary domination (Smooha); internal colonialism (Zureik). Perhaps a fifth needs to be added, proletarianization (Rosenfeld, Makhoul).

All activities within the ghetto could be monitored and repressed when necessary and the governor could legally take any action deemed necessary for the purposes of security. Community activists were regularly arrested, banished and detained sometimes for the most petty of so-called crimes, like arguing with the governor over some mundane matter. Publishing and organizing of associations, even clubs were illegal.

Does all this mean that that the Palestinians were simply passive inert objects of their oppression? That their hands and quite literally their feet were bound there is no question, but people are resourceful and find ways, whether always appropriate or effective or not, to resist and to change their position of subordination and Palestinians throughout their ghettos did and do. Umm al-Fahim in fact has been considered by the Israeli government to be among the most militant of the ghetto populations and I suspect that is why they were particularly helpful in bringing the right-wing anti-communist Egyptian religious leader, Shaykh Abd al-Sami', who is discussed in more detail in chapter 5, to Umm al-Fahim in the 1970s. The occasion of Israel's 10th Anniversary in 1958, a time planned by the Israeli authorities as a demonstration of the achievements of the state, including the *progress* enjoyed by *their Arabs,* was used by Palestinians as a moment to express their anger and disapproval of the military government. Quite fierce clashes broke out in Nazareth and Umm al-Fahim; many were wounded and hundreds arrested. This experience led to the formation of the Arab Popular Front. By 1961 the Jewish-Arab Committee for the Abolition of Military Government was formed; so, by no means were Israel's Palestinians simply docile subjects of Israeli rule but the parameters within which they could articulate their injustices and aspirations and act upon them were severely restricted and it often required tedious and painstaking efforts to engage in the

simplest forms of dissent or even to voice a complaint which could be taken as an act of sedition by the military governor. Elia T. Zureik describes the 1961 events in this passage from his book, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism*:

> Protest movements which sprung up in 1961, on the eve of elections for the Fifth Knesset, such as the Movement of Intellectuals for the Defense of Democracy, the Movement of Workers and Farmers against the Rising Prices and for a Rise in Salaries, the Movement of Arab Farmers against the Robbery of Land, and so on, signaled the election results for 1961, whereby Rakah [the Communist Party] increased its vote by 122 per cent compared to 1959 (Zureik 1979, 89; brackets mine).

An in-depth study of Palestinian resistance within everyday life, especially during military governance, is a much needed research project which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this dissertation; but let us consider two Israeli criminal classifications: namely, "infiltrators" and "smugglers", as a case in point. These two categories of despised criminals in Israel are typical to the *Arab border villagers* and particularly Umm al-Fahim whose eastern border was defined by the armistice line separating Israel proper from the West Bank. During military rule this line separated Israel from land controlled by Jordan; it split Umm al-Fahim such that some people found themselves east of and others west of this impassable line. It was illegal to cross this line and such acts were even punishable by death. Individuals classed as infiltrators and smugglers who crossed this line were shot and at times killed. But this line separated loved ones and relatives, husbands from wives and parents from children; and this line separated people from lands that they cultivated and businesses that they owned—all things the Israeli government was mandated to safeguard under the armistice agreements. Often these so-called infiltrators and smugglers were relatives bearing subsistence goods to one another or parents and children and husbands and wives stealing a moment to see one another or farmers seeking to till their land or harvest their orchard. To do so they were engaging in

a criminal act and risking their lives. This is a form of resistance even if no grand program or movement emerges out of such daring and defiant acts. While waving their arms to mark the forbidden line that in crossing over one risked his or her life, residents proudly showed me the spot atop Jabal Iskander, Umm al-Fahim's highest peak, through which the Green Line runs, where many so-named infiltrators and smugglers met.

The criminalization of what would be considered ordinary activities of citizens in most countries during peace time turned many Palestinians into criminals subjecting them to prison, detention, killings, beatings, fines and humiliation. Violation of a curfew, found without a travel permit or identification card, for instance, were crimes against the state. Forming an association, building a home without a permit, harvesting one's olives—all were criminal acts subject to repression. Often enough Palestinians born in Palestine were denied citizenship under the special regulations pertaining to the naturalization laws which applied to them (immigrant Jews on the other hand were and are immediately given citizenship whereas Palestinians had to be naturalized even though they were born there). Refugees seeking to go home—a right they held by international law and Israel had agreed to abide by by signing the armistice agreements--were criminalized as "infiltrators", enemies of the state. The phenomenon of infiltration was quite massive as indicated by this passage from Zureik's work:

> The restrictions imposed on the return of the Arab refugees were the direct cause of the infiltration phenomenon and the numerous offences that were connected to the civil status of the Arab inhabitants. By means of various laws (such as the Nationality Law, the Entry into Israel Law, the Prevention of Infiltration Law) that defined who would be considered a citizen or a legal resident, thousands of refugees that had left the country or were expelled, were turned into infiltrators, criminals and trespassers, including Arabs resident within the boundaries of the state who were not permitted to return to their pre-war homes and property. Each year between 1949 and 1956, thousands of Palestinians illegally crossed the border into Israel, from the West Bank of Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula controlled by Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. The statistics indicate that there were about 10,000-15,000 cases of infiltration each year, and the numbers decreased to about 4,500 cases per year in 1955 and 1956. Of course, many infiltrations were not recorded (Zureik 1979, 163-64).

One of the functions of the Military Government was to insure that such "infiltrators" were not harbored within the Palestinian ghettos. In 1953 the police estimated that there were 745 infiltrators hidden in the homes of local Palestinians. Concealing infiltrators--who were actually refugees, entitled by international law to their homes and property in what was now Israel--was, of course, also deemed illegal, creating another stratum of "criminals". Most ordinary activities of everyday life—activities Israel was to protect and insure as the occupier—were criminalized. As Korn puts it "The restrictions imposed by Israel… converted resistance to the 'new order' into criminal behavior" (Korn 2000, 159). Because of this program, the Palestinian crime rates were exceedingly high which generated the image of the Palestinian as deviant and dangerous; this perception continues to inform the Israeli public to this day. According to Korn:

> The Arab average for all serious offences between 1951 and 1966 was 29%. Their percentage contribution was about three times their population ratio. Up to the end of the sixties, Arabs constituted 10% of the population. A similar trend emerges when comparing rates of offenders, Jews and Arabs, per each 1,000 of the relevant population. Between the years 1955 and 1966 the Arab rate of convicted criminals per 1,000 was 4-5 times greater that the Jewish rate (Korn 2000, 159-60).

David Reifen points out in his 1964 book, *Patterns and Motivations of Juvenile Delinquency among Israeli Arabs*, that during the period of military rule he studied half of the cases pertaining to Jewish juveniles were dropped, whereas for Arab juveniles only one-fifth of their cases were dropped. In addition, he reports that probation officers were more likely to request out-of-court administration arrangements for the Jewish juveniles. Thusly, the ghetto locales were criminalized zones.

Eventually, after two decades, military rule was rescinded, but as Aharon Cohen remarks in his book, *Israel and the Arab World*, removal of the Military Government was by no means the end of the story since, for one, as he says, "the actual military

government regulations remained in force" and the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs had the power to enforce them at any time. Though I have by no means comprehensively treated the period of military rule in this brief overview, I believe, the key elements of the production of ghetto space, for which the Military Government served as the prime organizer under Ben-Gurion's supervision, have been sufficiently outlined for the task at hand. [48] It has been shown that the ghettoization of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship involves not only physical space but this also implicitly integrates force and violence, control, governance, administration and most importantly the social construction of the Palestinian population as a reserve army of labor for Israeli production. The period of military rule established the spatially ghettoized population as a permanent feature of the Israeli landscape and culture and as Cohen says in the following passage, its legacy is far from over, not only in 1970 when he wrote this, but to today:

> Even though the military government has hardly been felt recently in daily life, the public struggle to abolish this instrument, which makes possible the demotion of Arabs to the status of second-class citizens, is not yet over. Even when it is eventually abolished (along with the legal basis on which it was founded), the military government will have left behind it an inheritance whose effects will not be quickly eliminated (Aharon Cohen 1970, 495).

Therefore, it is important, before closing this chapter, to take at least a cursory look at how the changeover from military to civilian governance occurred, a process which insured the continued ghettoization of Israel's Palestinian population.

As already pointed out the emergency regulations stayed in effect and can be called upon (and consistently are) at anytime and override civilian legislation. The police

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[48] More research covering the period of military rule and its legacy is still needed, though more and more interesting work is being undertaking, like Yair Bauml, "The Military Government and the Process of its Revocation, 1958-1968" [H] and Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, "The Military Government as an Apparatus of Control of the Arab Citizens in Israel: The First Decade, 1948-1958 [H], besides those that I have sited in the text.

apparatus was restructured and made even more efficient with respect to the surveillance and monitoring of the Palestinian population. Furthermore, the restrictions on Palestinians were now imposed uniformly throughout the country, including areas that had not been classified as closed areas, such as the ghettos in the *mixed towns*. No longer were Palestinians subject to the individual tyranny of this or that governor and his retinue, who may be more or less brutal or idiosyncratic, but now each and every Palestinian was subject to systematic state-coordinated and bureaucratically administered governmental and security-military policy. Edwin Samuel, a supporter of Ben-Gurion, writes in 1969, "Now, military governors have been abolished and the issue of passes to Arabs handed over to the regular police forces." He also boasts that "The total number of Arabs on the blacklist, from whom passes are withheld, is said not to exceed 500" (Samuel 1969, 103). He does not mention that in fact military rule was not removed for all Palestinians; some border areas like in the Triangle, areas being developed and destroyed villages inside Israel remained "closed zones" under the military. Destroyed villages were kept closed to prevent their villagers from returning. David A. Wesley in looking at development of Arab towns in Israel concludes in the following passage from *State Practices and Zionist Images* that the change over from military to civilian rule did not in fact remove arbitrariness from Israeli policy but changed the form:

> In general, local authorities in Israel—Arab or Jewish—find themselves dependent on the national government for budgets and approvals. But the special dependence of the Arab local authorities was not particularly alleviated with the dismantling of the military government in 1966. The contacts of the Arab councils with the various ministries and national agencies were channeled through the 'minorities departments' or the officers of the Arab affairs of each body. One former Ministry of Interior official described to me the discretionary and filtering power of these officials, exercised outside regular procedures of the government administration (Interviews). The effect would certainly have been to curtail the ability of the Arab local authorities to initiate development projects; it would have also exacerbated dependence and manipulation (Wesley 2006, 46).

There was no need to modify or repeal any laws to remove the military government since it was based on military regulations specific to the military. Regional military commands were placed in charge of the three areas under military rule, the Galilee, the Little Triangle and the Negev, and, although they were no longer responsible for such things as issuing travel permits once the civilian police took over, military commanders had the power to enforce the emergency regulations. "Each commander had the assistance of an advisory officer, who formed the link to the Internal Security Service and the civilian police, who were now in charge of carrying out the provisions of these laws" (Jiryis 1976, 63). Jiryis discusses how after the elimination of the military government not only the emergency regulations remained in effect, but also restrictions now pertained to all Palestinians everywhere in the country.

> [A] new body was created with the power to enforce them [emergency regulations] at any moment—a special duties department of the Israeli police in charge of counterespionage, aliens, and the Arab population. Its methods were extremely vicious and highly effective. In addition the entire police apparatus, from municipal police to frontier guard, lends its services. Although military rule in the past imposed restrictions only on extreme 'instigators' among the Arab political activists—writers, poets, lawyers, and intellectuals who openly criticized government policy in their writings and work—the special duties department restricts laborers, peasants, and the 'general' population….Furthermore, restrictions can now be imposed on Arabs anywhere in the country, even in cities with mixed populations; this rarely happened under the military government because only the areas under its control were affected (Jiryis 1976, 64-65).

And, already in place, for many years were elaborate and detailed files, based on the "village files", enabling surveillance of each and every Palestinian village and town, documenting specifics pertaining to individuals and families as well. Perhaps this tiny country can claim to have the most advanced surveillance system in the world for a population that would fit into a section of New York City. Elimination of the military government did nothing to change this reality and perhaps even, as Jiryis argues, intensified the situation though through the use of civilian apparatuses rather than direct

martial rule. Eyal sums up his assessment of the transition in this passage from *The Disenchantment of the Orient*:

> More importantly, by no means did the 'abolition' of the military government mark the end of spatial segregation or the cultivation of *hamula* struggle. The permits regime remained in force for at least two more years. The designation of Palestinian-dominated areas along the border [like Umm al-Fahim] as special security zones was only revoked in 1972. As the military government was disbanded, a special Committee for Population Dispersion was formed, composed of the general managers of relevant government ministries and led by the former chief of the GSS [General Security Services (Shabak)], to deal with the 'increased possibilities for mobility of the minority population.' At the same time, the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs coordinated the activities of the newly formed regional security committees, composed of army officers, police officers, GSS operatives, and functionaries of relevant government ministries. These committees were established in order to maintain close supervision and 'custodianship' over state lands, as the military government had done earlier, and they too saw their charge as protecting and maintaining spatial segregation. For their part, the police and GSS too took over the networks of informers and collaborators in the villages and continued to use them to supervise the Palestinian population and cultivate *hamula* struggle. The Arab departments of the various ministries remained in place, and the Advisor's Office continued to coordinate their activities, which included the blacklisting of any Palestinian suspected of nationalist tendencies. Finally, the Labor Party (Mapai's successor) continued to organize local *hamula* lists to run in municipal elections and relied on *hamula* leaders as part of its electoral machine (Eyal 2006, 163-64; brackets mine).

Before closing this chapter the question as to why the military government was abolished should be addressed. There are several reasons given. The most common pertain to 1) the infamous corruption that the military personnel were claimed to be involved in finally led to the government's disbanding of their rule over the Palestinian population; 2) the ongoing opposition to the military rule for political and human reasons finally gained enough weight to bring the military government to an end; and 3) the assessment that the military government was no longer effective in carrying out its objectives of control over the Palestinian population and was in fact now counterproductive and generating dissent in both the Jewish and Palestinian communities.

Certainly all the above were aspects weighing in on the decision to abolish direct military rule, but I do not believe any of them identify the underlying historical dynamic that had matured sufficiently to make the military government obsolete. During these first two decades the military government was crucial in the process of developing the Israeli

economy through several means. The military governors, under the direction of the Minister of Labor and then also the Histadrut, regulated the flow and prices of the Palestinian work force into the Israeli economy and set their wages. The confiscation of Palestinian land and property significantly advanced a process of primitive accumulation allowing for the Israeli economy and capitalists to quite rapidly, relative to other underdeveloped countries, construct their national economy, which in the first decades combined state-owned industry, privately owned businesses, and communal and cooperative modes of production. All areas of economic and domestic life were underwritten by confiscated Palestinian property, including even the toys of Palestinian children left in the homes they were expelled from or from which they fled. The military government was responsible to establish new settlements and insure their survival on confiscated Palestinian land which was also part of the nation-building and national economy building task put forward by the Zionist leaders. By 1966, the development of the national economy and its capitalization had matured significantly and the markets for capital and labor had taken on a life of their own and could function through the regulatory processes of the market directly. Israel was on the verge of expanded capital accumulation and needed to relax the rigidity of the control of prices and flow of labor supplies for that accumulation to take off. This became even more evident when in 1967 the state gained the captive population of Palestinians in the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank, at which point Israel's economy took on new and expanded dimensions. The military government had done its job and now it was up to the "invisible hand" of the market to take over while a new captive reserve army in the Occupied Territories helped insure profits for all. The military government had helped put in place

a dual labor market that would insure competitive and stratified prices for labor and separation and antagonism between Jewish and Palestinian workers, so much so that to this day, in spite of the fact that many Palestinians are members of the common trade union, Histadrut, no real alliances socially or politically exist between Jewish and Arab workers.

Though military rule was terminated its legacy persists. The legacy does not simply belong to Israel's Palestinians but equally to the Jews of Israel who in creating and applying such a social policy produced the institutions and character of their own society regarding all that constitutes a society's life activities. Typically it is argued that military rule and closed zones were necessary to insure the survival of the new state against the *enemy within* but Alexander Scholch points out that support for the military government had more to do with building the Jewish economy and absorbing Jewish immigrants.

> The debates of Mapai [Ben-Gurion's ruling party] in the years 1952/53 prove that the decision to upkeep institutional segregation stems less from security considerations…than from the commitment to utilize the Zionist structure of Israel for the absorption of the huge immigration influx of the early fifties. The employment policy of the government and the internal discussions about it provided ample evidence.

Even though there were founding leaders who did not agree with Ben-Gurion regarding the unarmed civilian population of Palestinians as representing an *enemy within* and therefore they did not consider them to present a vital security problem, their interest in minimizing any expenditure on this undesired population led them to support the idea of creating closed Palestinian areas to be administered by the military—a simple, manageable and relatively inexpensive way to deal with *their Arabs*. Many argued that they had no other choice given the influx of Jewish immigration, but I would argue that this is simply a rationalization to support a certain objective. The leaders could have

chosen to construct a different social dynamic and there were many present who disagreed and even opposed Ben-Gurion, such as Jabotinsky who argued for a democratic secular bourgeois society and other Political Zionists, like the American born, Hillel Kook, who sought to incorporate Arabs as peers within society and the state and some even advocated immigration policies that would put restrictions on Jews entering the country, developing immigration laws more along the lines of other modern nation-states.

Israeli literature repeatedly tells of the great deed that the new State did for the Palestinians. Under the benevolent and enlightened tutelage of the modern State of Israel, class distinctions among Palestinians, it is claimed, were equalized. The imbalance of a many poor and a few wealthy landlords has been corrected. It is certainly true that the vast majority of Palestinians were made propertyless thereby reducing or equalizing most Palestinians to the common status of impoverished proletarians. The high became low and the low remained low and to an extent it can be claimed that former exploiters were expropriated, but in this case not by the exploited, but by conquerors. For those Palestinians who were impoverished prior to 1948 it could be argued that their material circumstances improved over time with the establishment of the Zionist State, at least to the extent that Palestinian labor is more or less consistently demanded thereby enabling these families to have regular incomes. The flip side of settling the Zionist terrain by Jewish immigration has been the equalization of *their Arabs* as a mass of proletariats for Israeli production and consumption.

If, as Israeli scholars argue, Israel's contribution to turning the Palestinian pyramid right side up by equalizing the living standards of the masses of Palestinians and thereby introducing modern democracy into the life of these backward people, then

should not such a model of social development, at least the results of such, hold also for the Jewish population? Here we see quite a different paradigm espoused by Israeli intellectuals and social scientists. The great accomplishment of the Zionist State has been to create, as they say, a *normal* society; the Jewish pyramid had also to be inverted and thereby corrected but in quite a different manner. The great Israeli accomplishment has been to create a stratified *Jewish* society with masses of Jewish proletariats at the bottom of the pyramid then relatively fewer and fewer, as one climbs up the pyramid's social ladder, middle class, professionals, shop keepers, tailors, managers, scientists, petty bourgeois, intellectuals—until you reach the pinnacle of the pyramid where only a handful of owners of capital sit at the top. From such heights only these owners are in a position to see the whole and therefore provide direction for the society as such. Stratified capitalist society is the great inversion that Zionism has created for the Jews in their homeland. Now Israel can boast that under its roof it houses some of the world's poorest and richest people, as evidenced by UN statistics.

The dream of the bourgeois nationalists, the class Abram Leon identified as the founders of the European Zionist movement, have been realized and their social class content informs the historical underpinnings of the development of Israeli society. It is only in this sense that Jewish nationalism pertains, that is, the Israeli bourgeoisie is Jewish while the proletariat is international. The Israeli proletariat is not only Jewish and Palestinian but it is also comprised of people from around the world, from the Far East to the Balkans, as guest workers. Guest workers, migrant workers and undocumented migrant workers altogether have now reached the two hundred thousand mark; and the non-Jewish Russian immigrants are well over two hundred thousand. In 1988 Najwa

Makhoul wrote in an article entitled, "Capital Sectarianism and Working Class Internationalism: Greater Israel in Twenty Years," in an the independent newspaper *Ayyar* (May): "What comes out of the sectarianism of the state is the sectarianism of capital, not the sectarianism of the working class and this is contrary to the Hebrew only work ideology."[49]

As Palestinians were forcibly equalitarianized into a dispossessed and propertyless class they were striped of the complex developments that are characteristic of all societies with any degree of development in cultural and intellectual life. For twenty years while under military rule they lost freedom of movement which is essential for cultural and intellectual development; they had to turn inward for marriage partners, depend mainly on family for economic support and moral sustenance and not other sources, such as associational, occupational, special interest or political institutions, organizations or movements. By separating the Jewish and Palestinian populations into distinct locales, by reducing the areas of the Palestinian towns and villages to their residential cores, by turning them into a captive reserve army of labor, by first de-developing and then under-developing their ghettos, by originally appointing local heads and MAPAI lists and generating local divisions over spoils whose legacy still persists to this day, the Israeli regime could then, through its Arab experts, the organic intellectuals of the hegemonic Zionist enterprise, present to the outside world *their Arabs* as backward, undeveloped, pre-modern, traditional, clan-based and rural people. These are

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[49] Najwa Makhoul, "Capital Sectarianism and Working Class Internationalism: Greater Israel in Twenty Years," *Ayyar*, June 9, 1988, 1-2. This was a short lived independent left newspaper whose editors were Najwa Makhoul from the Galilee and Ghassan Fawzi from Umm al-Fahim; Marwan Darweish of Umm al-Fahim acquired a permit for its publication. Translated by Ghassan Fawzi.

all symptoms of ghetto life and especially one that was so completely and quickly thrust upon a community. Albert Einstein's words describing a past echo here in the present:

> A century ago our forefathers, with few exceptions, lived in the ghetto. They were poor, without political rights, separated from the Gentiles by a barrier of religious traditions, habits of life, and legal restrictions (Einstein 1954, 181).

At times in Europe Jews were locked in their ghettos at night; Palestinians were restricted twenty-four hours to their ghettos under military rule and curfews are still imposed when the authorities deem that the ghetto residents pose a "security" threat. Jews were in some places given a legal standing unto themselves, *servi camera*, as property of the local or emperial ruler[50]; Palestinians were essentially the property of their local Military Governor and still are legally not included as part of the "nation". Life for Palestinians under Israeli citizenship is embraced within the confines defined by the produced ghetto/shtetl space with its concomitant stratification of wealth and power within the ghetto and its overall subordination within society at large.

Most people living in Israel now have refrigerators, running water, electricity; by law women have equal rights; education is mandatory until sixteen for boys and girls--and much of this now affects Palestinians as well—but even these simple pieces of *modernity* in such a tiny country as Israel are in practice played out very differently between Jewish Israelis and their compatriots, the Palestinians under Israeli citizenship, as will be further explored in subsequent chapters. A different kind of *modernization* took place and is taking place from the one depicted in the standard literature of Palestinians in Israel, one that claims to be, in spite of Palestinian recalcitrance, a great accomplishment of the State of Israel; an accomplishment for *our Arabs* that only Israel has undertaken,

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[50] See Johann Heinrich Kurtz, *Church History*, trans. Rev. Jon Macpherson, M.A. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1894) and Heinrich Graetz, *History of the Jews* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America 1891-1898).

even though it is not really *our task* since these people belong in the Arab countries and not in *our Jewish homeland*. Certainly a form of modernization has taken place for Palestinians under Israeli citizenship, and the inhabitants of Umm al-Fahim in particular, one that has incorporated them into very specific locations within the Israeli economy and society; one that transformed a village in the world into a ghetto in Israel.

# Chapter 3

## other than us and unable to be us:[1]
## Nation, Nationality and Citizenship

> In our eternal, ancient homeland, citizenship rights of other nations among us cannot supersede Jewish national rights, thus threatening Jewish heritage, identity, security. We cannot 'democratically' abandon our heritage to the votes of others. This is not democracy's purpose, nor is it discrimination. Discrimination against former Palestinian Arabs is in Arab states denying them equality and citizenship.
>
> Lisa Levitin of Tel Aviv, Letters to the editors, *Jerusalem Post*[2]

> On a bus tour through Galilee several years ago, the guide commented that the government was having difficulty preventing Arabs from encroaching on the land through which we were passing. I asked why Arabs were being kept off this land and he replied that it was national land. I told him I didn't understand what 'national land' meant if it has to be secured against Arabs. 'Aren't Arabs citizens of Israel?'
>
> "Of course they are," he replied, "but it's much more complicated here than in the United States and difficult to explain." That ended our brief exchange, for he turned abruptly away.
>
> Roselle Tekiner,
>
> *Israel's Two-Tiered Citizenship Law Bars Non-Jews From 93 Percent of Its Lands*[3]

Lisa Levitin's remark to the editors of the *Jerusalem Post* is typical of Jewish Israeli discourse, except perhaps the designation of Arab as a "nation" and that Israel houses within it "other nations". According to Israeli law, which is based on a definition of *nation* developed by the Zionist founders of the State of Israel, only the Jewish people in Israel constitute a *nation* [le'om]. When *nationality* is being discussed, what is usually being addressed is not the modern political notion of *nationality*, which refers to the nation-state to which an individual belongs as a citizen, but more fittingly *ethnicity*, which, according to dictionary definitions and common usage, pertains to those

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[1] Taken from Yerach Gover, *Zionism: The Limits of Moral Discourse in Israeli Hebrew Fiction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 29.

[2] Liza Levitin of Tel Aviv in Letters to the editors in the *Jerusalem Post*, July 28, 1992, 6.

[3] Roselle Tekiner, "Israel's Two-Tiered Citizenship Law Bars Non-Jews From 93 Percent of Its Lands," Special Report, *Washington Report*, January 1990, 20.

characteristics which distinguish heterogeneous populations within a nation by customs, language, country of origin, common history and so forth.[4]

In the Israeli context the preceding sentence should actually read "those characteristics which distinguish heterogeneous populations within a *state*" rather than *nation* since Israeli law asserts that Israel is not a nation but a state. This definitional separation of nation from state grounds the legal basis for the separation of nationhood and nationality from citizenship. This hegemonic Zionist construct[5] is fundamental to an understanding of the legal, ideological, moral, cultural and spatial ghettoization of Palestinian citizens within political society and civil society and on the ground. Moral

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[4] Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov also prefer to use "ethnicity". They write: "Arabs in Israel have been alternately, or in combination, considered as a religious, cultural, linguistic, or national minority. In this study we prefer to use the term 'ethnicity' to distinguish Jews and Arabs." They use "ethnicity" "in a generic sense, which refers to '…groups defined socially as sharing a common ancestry in which membership is therefore inherited or ascribed' (Bonacich 1972:548). Ethnic groups are typically culturally distinguished and, as we argue, ethnic groups have the inherent potential to become national groups. Hence, defining Arabs in Israel as an ethnic minority neither distorts their situation nor does it entail any loss of generality" (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993, 13). For purposes of simplicity I will generally use "ethnicity" in a very broad sense throughout this work to refer to the range of characteristics, such as those mentioned above in the text, that exist among individuals and groups within civil society. I am using it as shorthand to identify in general characteristics that individuals hold that are seen within society as constitutive of difference or are held by individuals and groups as identities and affiliations. Such differences are usually associated with forms of discrimination within political and civil societies but not necessarily so. When referring to Israeli "nationality" registration, the use of "nationality" is restricted to those classifications that have been established by Israeli law as the "nationality" (which is actually closer to the meaning of ethnicity) belonging to each citizen. Hopefully this will not lead to confusion in the reader; the context should make the matter clear and I have tried to be explicit whenever the circumstance being discussed required further specification. This is made more difficult because "ethnicity" and "nationality" are historically specific appellations that individuals and groups create within specific lived circumstances and is endowed with more or less meaning by individuals within these circumstances so there are no general definitional boundaries that can be established that will be universally acceptable or meaningful for all times and situations.

[5] I want to make it very clear from the start that this hegemonic construct established by the Zionist founders and written into law was not an expression of world Jewry but a particular and marginal movement that gained colonial support for their establishment of the State of Israel. What is quite remarkable, but certainly explainable, is that this marginal position came to represent the Jewish people in general and became ensconced as the only or at least prevailing expression of the aspirations of world Jewry.

society should be added here, since this definition also constitutes who is and who is not a moral subject within the *national* project of the Zionist state and society.

This chapter lays out the socio-political significance of these foundational constructs of Israeli law and policy with regard to all the citizens of the State and their practical expression in official, academic and everyday activities that substantiate the demarcation of an us and them. Also touched on is an important discussion/debate going on within Israel that reemerged in the 1990s pertaining to the self-assertion of the Israeli politic, which is written into law, that Israel is a Jewish and a democratic state. This debate also relates to the unresolved constitutional question and whether or not Israel should draft a constitution.[6] It is entered into in this chapter for purposes of clarifying the character of the existing social context--the socio-economic, ideological and political character of Israeli society and the state and its relevance to the ghettoization of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship.[7]

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[6] Under the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine the Jewish State was mandated to write a constitution but Ben-Gurion opposed this and each subsequent push to do so has been defeated. Instead, *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel* and a body of *Basic Laws* are given a quasi-constitutional status.

[7] This discourse, which is also taking place within an informal international forum, centers on a deconstruction of the notions and actually existing forms of the modern secular political state--theoretically, conceptually and normatively—its ideal, its claims, its limits. Participants in this debate focus for the most part on the question of "divided societies" whose populations are composed of various ethnic-national-religious groups as majorities and minorities who contest their rights (or lack of) and claims to political power and self-determination within the territorial borders of states. Participants attempt to define what minimal requirements are necessary for a regime to be considered a democracy and to compare existing regimes to ideal regime types and forms of governance and evaluate claims made by existing states regarding their democratic character. This discussion places the question of democracy squarely on the table and challenges the boundaries of established or taken-for-granted thinking about what forms of governance are desirable, possible and probable given existing divisions and inequalities within civil societies and what constitute sufficient principles upon which political society and the state need to be based to insure democratic rights to all citizens. Obviously this debate has great significance to Israelis and is relevant well beyond Israel as humanity confronts the disintegration of nation-states and ethnic-national civil wars.

The confidence with which Ms. Levitin asserts her position is well-founded. It is based in Israeli law and not simply a national myth or ideology. Israeli law makes use of two Hebrew words, *ezrahut* which means citizenship and *le'om* which means nation. Both Jews and non-Jews are citizens [*ezrahim*] of the State of Israel but only Jews are members of a *nation*, have nationality and are nationals [from *le'om*].[8] The non-Jews of Israel like Jews have ethnicity.[9] The fact that the Population Registry calls their classifications "nationalities" does not change the legal underpinnings described above. In Israel *nationality* [*le'om*] may be attributed to non-Jews, as Ms. Levitin does, but from a legal standpoint such designation could only be applicable in regard to an individual and not to an individual as a member of a *national* collectivity.

Labeling these classifications as *nationalities* does not attribute "national" status to the bearers of these labels. Instead, these classifications are part of the institutionalization of separateness in an attempt to prevent non-Jews, on the one hand, from acquiring either a Palestinian identity (which is not recognized as one of the official *nationalities*) or a cohesive Arab identity (since the Palestinian population has been rendered into separate and distinct identities amongst themselves—they are conceptualized as a minority composed of minorities); and, on the other hand, to fix, at

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[8] Unfortunately the Hebrew word *ezrahut* is typically mistranslated as *nationality* instead of *citizenship*--I suppose this is the result of the misapplication of the generally accepted linkage of nationality and citizenship--so that, for instance, Israel's Citizenship [ezrahut] Law is mistranslated as Nationality Law. This body of law is strictly dealing with the terms that establish who can and cannot acquire citizenship to the State of Israel. On the other hand, *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel* makes use of *le'om*, nation, which strictly pertains to the Jewish people and to the State of Israel as the Jewish national homeland. This mistranslation only adds to the confusion and results in even intelligent writers drawing erroneous conclusions about Israeli state, law and society.

[9] Ethnic categorization is a major feature of Israeli social science—most social science models of society are based on ethnicity—and ethnic categorization applies to all of Israel's citizenry. For the most part these models follow the categories developed by the Israel Bureau of Statistics.

least in law, that there is no common Israeli national identity between Jews and non-Jews. This is done in such a way that the law appears to only make official what is given as fact--the reality of distinctness itself—*other than us and unable to be us*. This fact is presumed as a precondition or presupposition upon which the State is grounded. Although Jews are also attributed a variety of ethnic and other classifications—Ashkenazi or Sephardic, religious or non-religious, Sabra or Israeli born and new immigrant, and many more—and are studied along these lines, only the Jewish individual, legally and socially, is at once an individual with *a nationality* and a member of a *national* collectivity, which in both cases is Jewish. Jews are conceptually united as a nation-people, while the native non-Jews, who do not constitute a people or a nation, are disunited within themselves as members of numerous confessions and distinct in relation to their Jewish co-citizens. As touched on in the previous chapters and more fully in the next, within academic and popular discourse the affiliations that are considered to characterize Palestinians and their behaviors are the *hamula* (patrilineal clan) and the *village*. Palestinian individuals are seen as belonging to a *hamula* and a *village* and these constructs are claimed to be self-identities that the Israeli Arab experts have supposedly surmised from empirical reality. They are key elements of the Israeli world view regarding Palestinians under Israeli citizenship and are used as the analytic bases to explain, both in academia and popular discourse, the political, economic and cultural behavior of *Israel's Arabs*, as Palestinians are termed within Israeli academic and popular discourse.

Such conceptualizations and especially the above mentioned categorizations of the Palestinian population in Israel have been developed by Israel's social scientists and

Arab experts.[10] They are definitional constructs without historical reference or more precisely they are constructs based on notions of trans-historical essentialisms. The Duruz, Circassians, Samaritans, Christians, Moslems, Bedouins, who have lived together along with Jews for centuries within their common homeland sharing linguistic, cultural, political, and economic histories, are treated as disconnected groupings who even amongst themselves are *essentially* disunited as members of different villages and within a village, as members of different clans, *hamulas*. The individual Arab, it is claimed, only experiences a sense of belonging and an identity within his or her village and *hamula*. The non-Jewish indigenous population has been dissected, classified, and categorized into separate distinct groups broken down along religious, village and familial lines. The Israeli Arab experts not only do not attribute any national or other unifying identity to these people, but have also claimed that such identities are antithetical to the Arab character. On the other hand, Jewish residents, who did not share a common national-territorial history and have come to Israel from all kinds of different national, regional, cultural, racial, class, linguistic, ethnic and even ideological and religious backgrounds, are attributed an overriding national identity. The non-European Jews though, similar to the Palestinians, have been absorbed within Jewish society, through immigration and development policies, into distinct class and residential locations as outlined in chapter 1.

The *ethnicity* qua *nationality* of each individual citizen in Israel is registered with the Population Registry and there are now some 137 officially recognized *nationalities.*

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[10] For a discussion of the development of Israel's Arab experts and their conceptualizations see for instance Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient: Expertise in Arab Affairs and the Israeli State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) and on Israeli anthropology see Dan Rabinowitz, "Oriental Othering and National Identity: A Review of Early Israeli Anthropological Studies of Palestinians," *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 9, no. 3 (2002): 305-25.

*Jewish*, *Arab*, *Duruz* are the three major *nationalities* of concern to the state and society but a non-Jewish Russian immigrant may be registered as *Georgian* or a Jewish individual may register him/herself as *Hebrew* to cite just two examples. These characteristics of individuals which the Population Registry records for every Israeli citizen are referred to as nationalities rather than ethnicities which, as I said, makes the matter more confusing for non-Israelis who are used to using the general notion of nationality to signify the country to which an individual belongs as a citizen or national rather than the characteristics an individual has as a member of an ethnic, religious or country of origin group in civil society. In most states nation, national, nationality and citizenship are definitionally related and nationality and citizenship are legally equivalent. The laws within such nation-states, at least in principle, usually apply equally to all citizens irrespective of ethnicity.[11]

What our tour guide describes above in the excerpt from Roselle Tekiner's *Special Report* as "complicated" is really quite simple.[12] The Zionist founding fathers

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[11] Of course there are countries, like Canada, that attribute "national" status to various peoples within the state's borders, like people of French origin and the Native Americans. Some countries are bi- or multi-national in character and special laws exist to safeguard the rights of "national" minorities and preserve their "national" identity within the state. Canada is a bi-lingual country by law. In the case of Canada, even though it does not have a republican form of government like the United States or France, but a federal state, the Federal Dominion of Canada, (which grew out of the original Confederation of 1867 which brought into association the provinces and territories of Canada), nonetheless, all citizens are members of the same federal nation-state, Canada, and are as such Canadian citizens.

[12] "Generations of Israeli and pro-Israeli scholars, very much like their state's diplomats, have hidden behind the cloak of complexity in order to fend off any criticism of their quite obviously brutal treatment of Palestinians in 1948 and since…The Zionist narrative is as simple a story as the history of the conflict itself;" a "simple story…of dispossession, of colonization, of occupation." Professor Ilan Pappe on Norman Finkelstein's *Beyond Chutzpah*, "Occupation Hazard: Norman Finkelstein Challenges the Conventional Line on Israel," *Bookforum*, Feb/March 2006.

defined the Jewish people as a *nation*.[13] The authors of *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel* (*Declaration*) put down in writing that the "State of Israel" is established for "the Jewish people to rebuild its national home." Private Zionist organizations, most importantly the Jewish National Fund (JNF), took on the task of *redeeming the land* in Eretz-Israel for the Jewish people before and after the establishment of the State. Land *redeemed* by the JNF becomes *in perpetuity* the unalienable property of the *Jewish nation* and as such are *national* lands. These *national lands* belong exclusively to Jews--those resident in Israel and those in the Diaspora--and are to be used exclusively by and for Jews. The JNF continued its redemption process in the name of the Jewish nation after the establishment of the State and the government took on the important task of consolidating and expanding the lands under its jurisdiction by creating various laws.[14]

In 1960 the *lands of Israel*, including those owned by the JNF, were brought under governmental administration by setting up the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) as required by the Lands Administration Law. There are three types of land in Israel that are administered by the State: namely, 1) land owned by the JNF (exclusively for the Jewish nation), 2) land owned by the State (lands that were formerly national lands under the British Mandate and Palestinian lands expropriated or confiscated for military,

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[13] For a different approach, and there are many others, see Abram Leon who defined the Jewish people as a people-class in his book, *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970).

[14] On various laws regarding land appropriation see for instance David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

security[15] or other State purposes), and 3) lands belonging to the government's Development Authority (Palestinian owned land acquired by the State under the Absentees' Property Law). [16] The JNF owns 13.1 percent and the Israeli Government 80.4 percent so 93.5 percent of the land is administered by the Israel Lands Administration.[17] The latter two can be leased to Arab citizens. 6.5 percent of land is either privately owned by Palestinian Israeli citizens (2.5 percent),[18] land that was not confiscated or purchased by the State or the JNF, or by Jewish individuals who purchased land before the establishment of the State or has been sold to them by the state or JNF. It

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[15] In 1992 the government illegally handed over two Arab houses that had been confiscated for "security" purposes—to be used either as a police or border police outpost--to the Ateret Cohanim yeshiva. Then Police Minister Moshe Shahal took the property back stating before the Knesset in response to the motions submitted by parties supporting the yeshiva that "army or police units alone, and no others, are authorized to hold on to property after it has been confiscated." Dan Izenberg, *Jerusalem Post*, August 5, 1992, 1.

[16] None of this land, "the lands of Israel", is allowed to be transferred by sale or in any other manner, as established by Basic Law. Lands are leased with longer or shorter terms thus remaining in perpetuity *nationa*l; but in practice the lessees are in all intents and purposes acting as private owners buying and selling their leases, so that in effect the lease functions as their private property on the real estate market similarly to the real estate market in any other capitalist society. Still the lessee does not privately own their leased property. In 2005 however, under Sharon's Prime Ministry, "revolutionizing" changes were made that have begun to move Israel into a more directly capitalist direction regarding real estate. Under Sharon, with the support of Netanyahu as Minister of Finance and Olmert as Minister of Trade and Commerce, a process of privatizing "national" land began through reforms to the Israel Land Authority which now enables individuals to directly own their apartments for instance. Also, since 1997, large tracts of land are being awarded to individuals (Jews) by the Ministry of Agriculture, the ILA, and the Jewish Agency, for instance, in the Galilee and the Negev, where the owners build private ranches. This is done "in direct contravention of national and district outline plans, and in many cases, without regard for statutory approval….[The reason, though not officially stated,]…is the view that it constitutes a barrier to Bedouin and Arab expansion in the Negev and in Galilee" Wesley 2006, 39; brackets mine). Clearly, just as in 1985 most state owned businesses were privatized, with this 2005 initiative, real estate is now being privatized. "According to Olmert, the main task that the Israel Land Authority (ILA) faces today is the marketing of land. According to his statement an improvement in capabilities and outcomes of marketing will have a decisive effect over real estate, state income and the whole Israeli economy. Olmert pointed out that the ILA will concentrate its activities in three major fields: registration of land, guarding of land, and mainly marketing of land." See "Sharon Approves the Reform in the Israel Land Authority," www.ynet.co.il, May 16, 2005; translated from the Hebrew by Ghassan Fawzi.

[17] These figures are from the Government Press Office of Israel, May 22, 1997.

[18] On this 2.5 percent of Israel's land twenty percent of Israel's citizenry live. Palestinian ghettos have the highest housing and population densities in Israel.

should also be mentioned that some hundreds of Palestinian towns and villages are "unrecognized" which means the inhabitants, even though they are citizens, do not receive budgets or services including such things as roads, schools, electricity, sewage systems, and running water; [19] and thousands of Palestinian Israeli homes are considered illegal because they were built without licenses and are at risk of demolition at any time even though they are built on land owned by the builder. On the other hand, Joseph Schechla reports that "there are presently 155 Jewish villages built without recognition in the statutory plans. Though theoretically illegal, these small settlements enjoy all the necessary services that come with the privileged civil status of their inhabitants as 'Jewish nationals'" (Schechla 2001).

Following the passing of the Lands Administration Law the Israel Lands Administration entered into a covenant with the JNF that stipulates that the ILA will administer JNF lands in accordance with the memorandum of the JNF.[20] This covenant

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[19] In 1998 Palestinian NGOs took the case of the unrecognized villages to the United Nations' Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The CESCR concluded, besides finding that Israel's "national" (WZO/JA) organizations and legislation discriminate against Palestinian Arab citizens, that there are specific forms of discrimination in housing and land and that residents of the unrecognized villages "face demolition orders, lack of basic services and removal into concentrated 'townships.'" "The CESCR formally notified Israel that, in order to meet its minimum requirements under the Covenant [UN], the state would have to 'ensure the equality of treatment of all Israeli citizens.'" Under UN pressure, the Israeli government did increase "first-time national water carrier connections in unrecognized villages …from 60 to 260 [during 1999-2001]." See Joseph Schechla, "The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel's 'Internally Displaced' and the 'Unrecognized Villages'," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001): 20-31.

[20] The JNF and Jewish Agency are all arms of the World Zionist Organization which is registered as a private philanthropic tax exempt organization in the United States. So, not only is this covenant between the Israeli State and a private organization, but a foreign-based one. "Under the 1971 rearrangement, the WZO was separated in terms of its functions, but not its leadership, from the Jewish Agency. This was necessary because of the restrictive provision of the United States tax code pertaining to contributions and gifts. Those of its activities that were "political" or otherwise questionable from a tax-exemption standpoint had to be grouped separately and placed under the WZO. The organization was directed to "continue as the organ of the Zionist movement for the fulfillment of Zionist programs and ideals," but its operations were to be confined mainly to the Diaspora. Among the main functions of the WZO after 1971 were Jewish education, Zionist organizational work, information and cultural programs, youth work, external relations, rural development, and the activities of the Jewish National Fund. For the most part, these functions were financed by funds funneled through the Jewish Agency, which continued to serve as the main financial arm

between the State and a private institution has taken precedent over the State's laws which require that bodies of the State not discriminate between citizens on the basis of their religion or national origins.[21] Here, the State claims it is following the mandates of democracy by not interfering in the rights of private institutions in civil society. But, by bringing a private institution into the state's administration and working together on social policies pertaining to land allocation and use, the government has established the JNF as a state or at least quasi-state institution. By manipulating a democratic principle, the state claims its hands are clean of any preferential treatment to citizens within the purview of its domain of responsibility and thus it becomes legitimate for state administered programs to discriminate between citizens on the basis of religion or national origins.[22] Since there is no constitution Palestinian citizens have little recourse and more often than not loose in court when they attempt remediation.

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of the WZO. However, because of United States tax law stipulations, funds allocated for the WZO by the Jewish Agency were required to come from those collected by Keren HaYesod (Israel Foundation Fund), the agency's financial arm in countries other than the United States." Library of Congress Country Studies website, Data as of December, 1988.

[21] See for instance David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), especially chapter 4, "Control of Land." See pages 93-94 for information on the covenants between the Government and the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. These covenants among other things pertain to Jewish only immigration and land settlement.

[22] This is a quite common practice. For instance the Industry, Trade and Labor Ministry offered special loans for small businesses in the Galilee after the war with Lebanon in August, 2006. These loans were offered only to Jews (even though the Galilee has a large Palestinian population and Palestinians were around half the casualties) because as the State said the project was funded by a private organization. Another recent example where the State acting alone discriminated between Jew and Arab pertains to its list of "confrontation line" communities, those communities that are located near war zones. This list includes only a few Palestinian towns even though areas along the borders are predominantly home to Palestinians. Within this list of frontline communities no Palestinian towns are included among those whose residents can receive full compensation due to war damages. The list is constructed and the policies pertaining to it clearly along discriminatory lines. Jewish towns farther away from the borders than Palestinian towns for instance are included on the list while the Palestinian towns are not and so on and so forth. At least four petitions have been presented to the High Court by Palestinian citizens as of August 21, 2006. See Aryeh Dayan, "Second-class compensation," *haaretz*, August 21, 2006.

Furthermore, the State implements *Judaization* programs on state lands (and in coordination with the JNF on JNF owned land) which often involves confiscating more Palestinian owned land--particularly in areas like the Galilee where high concentrations of Palestinians live and currently in the Negev where the government is negotiating the removal and resettlement of the Bedouin population.[23] Legal means, like the Abandoned Areas Ordinance (1949), Absentees' Property Law (1950), Land Acquisition Law (1953) exist that enable the State to confiscate Palestinian owned lands, but besides such laws State officials and legislators can at any time confiscate land for military and security purposes, road building, and the like. So, whether the land belongs to the JNF, which is

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[23] The *Judaization* of the Galilee has been a major concern for many years and various projects for developing the Galilee (that is, break the Palestinian numerical majority and physical concentration within the region) have been attempted but without the desired effects fully accomplished. As David A. Wesley points out the strategy has been two-pronged, namely to acquire numerical superiority through creating urban Jewish centers and to acquire jurisdiction over territory by introducing Jewish rural settlements which break up the Arab settlements' contiguity. "From the mid 1970s, the Jewish Agency entered the scene as the driving force behind a push to establish Jewish rural settlements in Galilee. The two major studies of this settlement drive (Soffer and Finkel n.d.; Carmon et al. 1990) both show how Arab illegal building and incursion into state lands and the concomitant image of threatened territory figured in the planning discourse that gave rise to the settlements. Indeed, these settlements became known as 'outlook posts' (*mitzpim*), an illusion to the expectation that the settlers would monitor and somehow deter the perceived land takeover…Later in their evaluation of the *mitzpim* project, Soffer and Finkel (n.d.: 35-36) describe the deployment of the new Jewish settlement as the driving wedges (a concept with military implications) between emerging blocs of Arab settlement in the Galilee. They refer to this as a process of 'deterritorialization' of the Arab population in Galilee, calling this an implicit aim of the project, and one of its accomplishments." So, it should be of no surprise that our tour guide feels the way he does. Such development projects have of course led to continual confiscation of Palestinian owned land and land held by Palestinian towns (by redefining the town's area of jurisdiction) and arrests of Palestinian home builders, and shepherds and farmers who use land for grazing and farming that the state or the Jewish Agency define to be "national." Such land expropriation of course has not simply been passively accepted by Palestinian citizens but resisted, protested, contested in the courts and led to formation of organizations in defense of the land. The 1976 expropriations of land in the Galilee led to organized demonstration during which the police killed six demonstrators. This has become an annual point for protest and struggle and is known as Land Day. Obviously, the story did not end in the 1970s but continues to this day. "In 1990, the National Board for Planning and Building (NBPB) decided to initiate the preparation of a development plan for the Galilee that would be framed and processed as an amendment (no. 9) to the Northern District Outline Plan. [ The NBPB asked the planners to address eleven problems that it saw as relevant to planning for the Galilee. The first three, in order, were (a) a marked Jewish minority in many parts of Galilee, (b) the territorial contiguity of Arab towns, and (c) the takeover of state land and illegal building (by implication, by the Arabs)…[t]he Arab presence in Galilee provided the top three problems that the NBPB put to the planners (Shefer et al. 1992: 3-4)" Wesley 2006, 30-1, 37).

exclusively leased to Jews, or the State, which can rule that Palestinian land is necessary to the national interest, consistent preferential land policy and discrimination is implemented by the State and legally upheld. Government officials claim they are not acting preferentially in regard to land policy since, as stated above, JNF land is not owned by the State, and the rest is done in the national interest. In the end it really makes no difference what argument is used since the *Declaration* clearly establishes the task of the State, the ingathering of the Jewish nation in a state in Eretz-Israel as the realization of the Jewish nation's sovereign right to exclusive self-determination.

The consequences of these laws and policies on particular citizens and the subordination of the Palestinian qua citizen rarely enters into the equation because the law establishes, as Gover clarified, the Palestinian as a juridical citizen only, not a member of the *nation*. Thus, from the standpoint of the Jewish Israeli tour guide, the Arabs, whether they are citizens or not, are "encroaching on the land." "Of course," as he says, these Arabs are citizens, but what he doesn't say is that just because they are citizens of Israel does not make them a part of the *nation* and therefore a beneficiary of *national* lands.

Matters could have been made even clearer to Ms. Tekiner if our tour guide had explained the simple fact that Israeli law prescribes, as mentioned earlier, that Israel does not constitute a *nation* so Israeli does not constitute a "nationality". Arab and Jew categorically cannot belong to the same *nation* though they can both be citizens of the same state, but as citizens of the same state, Israel, they cannot be registered with the same nationality as Israeli. In 2003 a group of thirty-eight people (including both Jews and Palestinians) petitioned the High Court of Justice, after being denied by the Tel Aviv

District Court, to order the Interior Ministry to register their "nationality" as Israeli. The same rationale was applied to the case by the High Court as that of the District Court as expressed by Judge Yitzhak Shilo: "I can fully declare that there is no Israeli nation that exists separately from a Jewish nation." The High Court's denial upheld the 1972 High Court decision that denied non-Jews nationality rights stating that there is no Israeli nation separate from the Jewish people.[24] Nonetheless, of course most individuals call themselves Israeli. It only makes practical sense, but the attribution has no legal meaning within Israel.[25] Inscribing the Zionist construct into law, constituting it as an historical fact, and raising it to a universal moral principle enables the continuation of the belief—though often uncomfortably held and "laden with…a deeply guarded bad faith" (Gover 1994, 26) as may be indicated by the tour guide abruptly turning away--that there is no contradiction in a state's responsibilities towards all its citizens and the exclusion of certain citizens from the *nation* and such things as *national* lands. In fact, this legal separation of nationhood from citizenship within the laws of political society and the practical policies of exclusion and separation within civil society is proclaimed to be democracy at work, as Ms. Levitin insists. For the tour guide and Ms. Levitin, as is typical of most Jewish Israelis, and more importantly it is inscribed into law, Yerach

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[24] See Moshe Gorali's article, "So this Jew, Arab, Georgian and Samaritan go to court…" in *haaretz*, December 28, 2003.

[25] Moshe Gorali tells this funny story in the *haaretz* article cited above—though not funny for the individual involved—"Another petitioner [see footnote 26 above for reference] is Druze businessman Carmel Wahaba. In 1990 he and his French partners wished to set up an import-export company in France. The company's registration required a notarized translation of his birth certificate. When the French clerk saw the translated documents, he scolded Wahaba: 'What's a Druze nationality? I know of no Druze state. Do you want to tell me that there is a Druze state within the State of Israel?' Wahaba, who was suspected of trying to trick the French authorities, tried to explain but the clerk would have none of it, demanding authorization from the embassy that the translation was accurate and that Wahaba was indeed an Israeli whose nationality was Druze." In "So this Jew, Arab, Georgian and Samaritan go to court…," *haaretz*, December 12, 2003.

Gover's maxim explicated in his book, *Zionism: The Limits of Moral Discourse in Israeli Hebrew Fiction*, holds true: "[The Palestinian] exists only in the formlessness of a nonsubject assimilated to the generally negative category of the *other than us* and its concomitant moralistic evaluation--*unable to be us*." The Palestinian citizen simply has no moral, legal or practical rights to these—*our*--lands; nor can they readily turn to political society—or a constitution since Israel does not have a constitution--as citizens and demand that political society protect them against exclusionary and discriminatory social policy and laws based on one's ethnic characteristics within civil society.[26]

The tour guide's remarks and his response to questioning are not idiosyncratic; Israeli law is their underpinning, since, as Yerach Gover says, "When this other is nevertheless acknowledged as a subject [as our tour guide does since he acknowledges that Arabs are citizens], the relation is that of the moral citizen of the living utopia to the merely juridical citizen of the state." As a juridical citizen, the Arab must abide by the laws of Israel. These laws and the principles upon which they stand are given to them as moral and just in regard 1) to the right of the Jewish nation to self-determination and its realization within its national homeland and 2) the laws and governing bodies have been democratically generated on the basis of majority vote and as such are the democratic expression of the majority will. Even if these laws were initially established exclusively by Jewish people without the consent or even participation of these others in the decision making process as citizens of the same state (putting aside the fact that they were already inhabitants and citizens of said territory well before *we* arrived), these laws are

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[26] Palestinian citizens do challenge these discriminatory laws and policies and have been doing so since the establishment of the State and even at times win in the courts, though very often nothing is done. Especially during the last decade the High Court has been more or less consistently, at least in principle, upholding Basic Law and the principle of non-discrimination within state policy.

maintained and stand as the democratic expression of the democratically established right of the Jewish people to express their right to self-determination exclusive of any other ethnic or national group.

Human Rights Professor at the Hebrew University and Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Israel Democracy Institute, Ruth Gavison,[27] recognizes that such a situation necessarily results in the subordination of the Palestinian citizen within Israel, but this subordination is simply the result of a just principle that was set down in the *Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*, the right to self-determination of the Jewish nation.[28] "This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign state."[29] For the human rights professor, Gavison, and the ordinary citizen, Ms. Levitin, discrimination by the majority which is repeatedly reconstituted by majority vote in the State established in the "eternal,

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[27] Ruth Gavison is a participant in the debate concerning Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. I particularly choose to discuss Professor Gavison's position within this debate here because she is an intelligent and genuinely concerned person, and open to discussion of this problematic within all of Israeli society. Furthermore her position represents the most liberal expression of the hegemonic Zionist principles. She argues for the furthest extension of democratic principles available within the Zionist paradigm of exclusion and therefore demonstrates the outermost limits possible to the Palestinian citizen within Israeli political society and civil society as now constituted. See Ruth Gavison, "Jewish and Democratic? A Rejoinder to the 'Ethnic Democracy' Debate," *Israel Studies* 4, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 44-72 and "Constitutions and Political Reconstruction? Israel's Quest for a Constitution," *International Sociology* 18, no. 1 (March 2003): 53-70.

[28] Professor Gavison further asserts that this is justified morally and politically--and is confirmed and established as doctrine by *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*--because the United Nations decision of 1947 recognized the right of the Jewish people to self-determination within a part of Palestine. She erroneously raises secular self-interested political decisions of political elites (and specifically the interests of colonial states) into universal moral positions which substitute for historically specific human concerns. Relevant text from *Declaration* reads: "ACCORDINGLY WE, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JEWSIH COMMUNITY OF ERETZ-ISRAEL AND THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, ARE HERE ASSEMBLED ON THE DAY OF THE TERMINATION OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OVER ERETZ-ISRAEL AND, BY VIRTUE OF OUR NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHT AND ON THE STRENGTH OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HEREBY DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL."

[29] *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*, May 14, 1948.

ancient homeland" of the Jewish nation, is democracy at work. Professor Gavison recognizes that

> This is not perfect justice to Palestinians, because it does not restore to them their exclusive right of self-determination in the whole of Palestine.[30] It is not even second-best justice to them, because it means that they will continue to live as citizens in a state which in a sense is not fully theirs. And the arrangement is 'imposed' on them, because of the fact that they happen to live in a political unit in which they are a minority, and the state is the indispensable tool for achieving legitimate goals of the majority.[31]

The Palestinian situation in Israel described by Ruth Gavison above is presented as the unfortunate result of a higher moral principle, one that can in practice only be realized at any one time in any one place by establishing within a sovereign state the right to self-determination for one people and the repression of the same right to any others who are co-inhabitants within the same territory of the state. The right to self-determination goes to the victor in this human contest as ethnic-national peoples each

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[30] According to Gavison "The Palestinians had the correlative right to try and prevent Jews from settling in their midst." Therefore, it logically follows for her that the Palestinian right to self-determination must be democratically repressed so that the majority's right is not violated, requiring the institutionalization of laws and policies to insure that Palestinian as a national identity and resistance to their subordination does not emerge within the population. Just to mention a few over the years: place the Palestinians under military rule and monitor any forms of association, disallow the use of Palestine in the name of an association or in educational materials (this was modified after the first Intifada), do not classify Palestinian as a nationality, require a license to form any civil organization, require allegiance to the State as democratic and Jewish in order to be able to run for the Knesset, etc., etc.

[31] Gavison reduces the 1947-49 War to the contestation of two peoples' struggles for self-determination within the same territory. The Zionists were victors and the Palestinians were defeated. Both struggles were just but one party would, in the end, have had to be defeated, a tragedy from the standpoint of the defeated, in this case the Palestinians. Gavison reduces the Zionist nationalist colonial project to the longing of Jews to go home and justification is claimed as a moral principle on the one hand and a natural right on the other, the right to self-determination. "The Jewish settlement in Palestine was not just another colonialist enterprise…it was going home." As mentioned in footnote 28 above Gavison uses the UN Partition Plan as proof of the correctness of this position, but the Plan did not include most of the Galilee, the Negev and the Triangle which were militarily taken by the Zionist forces during the war and subsequently annexed (rather than administered only in accordance with the Armistice agreements) to the State after the war. Even if one could claim that the establishment of a Jewish (only) State in the part of Palestine accorded by the UN's Partition Plan was morally correct and therefore exempt from being understood as a colonial project, regarding the rest of the territory taken by the Zionist forces and illegally annexed to the State one would be hard put to objectively deconstruct this process into something other than colonialist expansion. Since the Zionists established Jews as the eternal historical subject of the territory of the State (and all of Eretz-Israel) the Palestinian inhabitants in these areas found themselves to be *newly constructed* residents living amongst the *original and authentic* inhabitants.

struggle to fulfill their natural right to be "masters…in their own sovereign state." Ethnic cleansing, which is now considered to be a crime against humanity, as well as the violation of international law pertaining to the right of return of refugees to their homes, are either simply not discussed or become legitimate means of a people in their struggle for self-determination as they attempt to create a majority on the ground so that they can become "masters" over what they take as "their sovereign state."[32] Gavison speaks only of a struggle between two peoples for self-determination in the same territory. For Gavison it is a contest of each against each and the spoils of war go to the victor. The victor takes all, but hopefully, as Professor Gavison wishes,[33] they will establish normative democratic practices sufficient enough to ameliorate the worst abuses of majority tyranny and allow the other(s) to engage in the life of the society and state and express their national, linguistic and cultural heritages. To this effect she proposes reforms to Israeli law that would lessen some of the discriminatory practices which she feels weaken Israeli democracy and threaten to further entrench divisions within an already problematic ethnic and religiously divided society. But, full justice and equality for the loser she claims is impossible. The Jewish people's right to self-determination in a sovereign state of their own is their universal right won through hard work and war. For the defeated Palestinian citizen on the other hand this situation, though it "is not even second-best justice to them, because it means that they will continue to live as citizens in a state which in a sense is not fully theirs," is simply the nature of the "moral universe".

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[32] I already discussed "ethnic cleansing" in chapter 1. See Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006).

[33] "I want to live in a country that is just. I think democracy is the best regime for achieving justice and stability, especially in divided societies." Ruth Gavison, op. cit.

The human rights lawyer rests her case. She calls upon Jewish Israelis to become more tolerant (amongst themselves and with the Arab citizens) and she calls upon Israeli Arabs to abide by the laws of Israel because this government is not "unjust to an extent justifying" either "the use of force to change it" or "delegitimation of Israel's political institutions, as distinct from criticizing them for particular decisions they make or legitimate."[34] Along with most other Jewish Israelis she implicitly agrees that the only *Good Arab* is what Jewish Israelis typically call the "Good Arab", those who not only in practical terms acquiesce humbly to their subordination, but also embrace the moral correctness of their subjugation.[35] As Gover points out "The authentic moral citizen's

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[34] In 2002 *Amendment No. 35* to *Basic Law: The Knesset, section 7A* was passed. This amendment makes it possible to prohibit individuals and political parties from running for the Knesset if they dispute the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, virtually closing off criticism and critical participation around these issues within the government. This especially concerns Palestinian citizens but is equally an undemocratic constriction of the rights of Jewish individuals as well. In January, 2006 a proposed bill which would have extended the application of this amendment was rejected by a large majority of the Knesset. If this bill had passed citizens would have been required to make a signed declaration recognizing Israel as a Jewish and democratic state as a precondition to vote. See Gideon Alon, "A bill that makes it obligatory to declare faithfulness to the state," *haaretz*, October 19, 2006. Nadim N. Rouhana and Nimer Sultany see the 2002 amendment as part of a new consensus in Israel, which they call the New Zionist Hegemony in their article "Redrawing the Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony." In this article they outline changes to law, policy, budgets and discourse and site data from polls which demonstrate a shift towards a more exclusionary politic among Jewish Israelis. They argue that this new hegemony emerged after the second Palestinian Intifada began in September 2000 and the demonstrations of Palestinian citizens of Israel in October of that year, during which thirteen Palestinian Israelis were killed, who protested the government's policies. Nadim Rouhana and Nimer Sultany, "Redrawing the Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 5-22.

[35] Apparently the Israeli designation of their Arabs as "good" or "bad" has its roots in the 1947-49 war when the Zionist Arab experts "claimed expertise…in distinguishing between different types of Arabs—those who were 'bad' and must be expelled versus those who were 'good' and should be allowed to stay." See Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient: Expertise in Arab Affairs and the Israeli State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 106. See Yerach Gover's *Zionism* for an excellent discussion of how the ideological notion of the "good Arab" is expressed in Israeli Hebrew literature and serves to reproduce the Palestinian as other and thereby re-invent the Zionist paradigm. There is an interesting footnote (144) to chapter 2 of Susan Slyomovics' book, *The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village*, in which she is discussing Israeli policy to separate the Duruz from the other Arabs as the "good" Duruz versus the "bad" Arab. "Many Druze in Israel dispute the official government view [that they are not Arab]; certainly the Syrian Druze of the Golan Heights living under Israeli jurisdiction since 1967, consider themselves Arab. The process by which ethnic categories and distinctions are developed and used as instruments of social control in colonial society (the 'good' Druze versus the 'bad' Muslim Arab) is not

relation to the living utopia is not available to the juridical subject as such, for whom society is a practical but never a moral community." Those Arab citizens who have for generations lived on and made a living from the lands now called Israel are citizen-aliens, not of the *nation*. They lost the war in this human contest. Our tour guide is correct in saying that the Arabs are "encroaching" on land that is outside their rights. They are legally established as alien to the *nation* proper.

Although Ms. Levitin may have made a slip of the pen in attributing nationhood to Israel's Arabs she does so in accordance with the prevailing logic of the hegemonic Zionist scripture on nationhood and citizenship. Palestinians under Israeli citizenship, upon whom she bestows the appellation of "former Palestinian Arabs" (not Palestinian or Arab *Israelis*, thereby removing this question altogether[36]) belong to one of the *other nations*—they are *other than us* and *unable to be us*. By labeling these non-Jews of the Jewish state as "former Palestinian Arabs" it is self-evident to her that, belonging as they do to the Arab nation, their discrimination can only have meaning if it takes place within an Arab state. Categorically for her and typically for Jewish Israelis, discriminatory policies pertaining to the *nation*, and its realization within a Jewish State, can only be an issue pertaining to Jews and not policies relative to non-Jewish citizens living *amongst us*

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unique to Israel. In fact, every colonizer does it: for example, compare the case of the colonizing French in Algeria who invented the 'good' Kabyle or Berber to contrast with the 'bad' Arab, in Patricia Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995)." Brackets mine. Susan Slyomovics, *The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 237. Jewish Israelis do not consider "our Arabs" to be a pejorative designation and is used publicly, but such derogatory terms as *Arabush*, *Indianem* and *Shehorim* are commonly used in private conversations, the last two pejorative appellations have as their referentials Native Americans and Blacks. These last two are interesting in that Jewish Israelis take off on US racism for depicting *their* Arabs.

36 Actually Ms Levitin does not even attribute "Arab" to her non-Jewish indigenous co-citizens, since the they are considered by her to have been "Palestinian Arabs" only "former" to the establishment of the Jewish State. For Ms. Levitin apparently they are simply *other than us*.

in the Jewish homeland.[37] Although Ruth Gavison, unlike Ms. Levitin, acknowledges discrimination as a fact, albeit an inevitable result of a just state of affairs, neither entertains, as a proposition or ideal, any notion of a societal we; separation is the norm and the normal condition; secular universalism does not enter into the discussion even as an option to be ruled out.[38] Meanwhile, as Gavison seeks an "improved *status quo*," Ehud Olmert's Government implements its "Separation Plan" with almost unanimous Jewish Israeli support. The premises and conclusions of this plan are that two mutually exclusive populations residing within the land under the control of the Israeli State must

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[37] I have heard it argued numerous times in conversations with Jewish Israelis who are living in the United States (while maintaining dual citizenship as Israeli citizens—one of the exceptions to US nationality law that in general does not allow for dual citizenship) that they expect to be treated without discrimination in the United States and that this is their right. They will also argue that this should be equally the case for Palestinians in the US; at the same time they argue that this cannot and should not be the case in Israel. The argument made usually comes down to the assertion that "Israel is special". In the US they are willing to engage the Palestinian at least in principle as an equal citizen vis-à-vis the state. In one conversation with an Israeli-US citizen I learned that he had gone to court because he believed he had been discriminated against as an immigrant and he was quite adamant about his right to do so. He was as equally adamant about the absolute justice of discriminating against Palestinians, his co-citizens in Israel, insisting that Israel is *different*.

[38] The general acceptance of a culture of separation also represents the success of the hegemonic Zionist forces who saw themselves as building institutions for a Jewish only state within Palestine during the British Mandate. These Zionists did not support the Arab population's repeated attempts to establish a secular representative government during this time, especially since they were a small portion of the population in Palestine. Since Palestine was designated as a Class A mandate by the League of Nations it can be argued that the British Mandate Government was to establish a national government with legislative and administrative structures towards granting Palestine full independence. Instead the British put in place the Balfour Declaration in 1917 which supported a Jewish homeland in Palestine and gave assistance to massive Jewish immigration to Palestine, while suppressing the indigenous Arab initiatives for independence. Although the Zionists were at times in bitter struggle with the Mandate Government in attempts to fulfill their objectives, they were against creating an independent secular Palestine at that time, since as David Eder, acting chair of the Zionist Commission, aptly said in testimony before the Haycraft Commission (established to investigate a riot that started in Jaffe between leftists and centrist Zionist groups that quickly involved Arab Palestinians concerning massive Jewish immigration in 1920-21) "…there can only be one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as soon as the numbers of that race are sufficiently increased." In the 1920s sufficient ground had not yet been laid for a Jewish State to establish itself in Palestine and the Zionists were well aware that an independent Palestine would foreclose their chances of gaining a majority of the population so they worked with the British Mandate to suppress the Palestinian national movement's aspirations. This above incident is related in R. N. Verdery, "Arab 'Disturbances' and the Commissions of Inquiry," in *Transformation of Palestine*, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1987), 275-303, and Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. Aruri, *Palestine and the Palestinians: A Social and Political History* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2006), 84-5.

be separated as much as possible by building a Separation Fence between us and them[39]-- a modern version of the Enclosure Acts of earlier centuries. Gavison's *status quo* is not only maintained, and as thought by most Jewish Israelis *improved* upon, but also extended.

In the State that has emerged out of a difficult struggle to acquire what are considered to be venerated ancient lands, Israel as a nation-state loses significance in the modern political sense. Instead, the state references two distinct terrains. As a territory it is simply conceived of as an empty neutral framework or space in which people reside under Israel's jurisdiction as citizens of the state. On the other hand it is the physical realization (as territory and government) of an exclusive project of and for the Jewish people, a project which is still in the process of being fully realized within the territory under the jurisdiction of the State, both within the Green Line and all of Eretz-Israel. Within either part of the project's territorial domain, the *nation* proper confronts a native non-Jewish other. The breaking apart of nationality from citizenship, the nation from the state, is a necessary dichotomy which provides a mechanism for Jewish Israelis to claim, even if with a *guarded bad faith* as Yerach Gover suggests, that they have constructed a democracy within that part of the State's jurisdiction that is considered to be Israel proper. Here, implicitly the state is referenced as a neutral space occupied by its equal citizen-inhabitants. When referencing the state's project the terrain shifts as well as

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[39] This Separation Fence encloses the Jewish settlements in the West Bank who occupy over fifty percent of the land. These settlers are Israeli citizens. By building the Wall and settling the terrain with Israeli Jewish citizens the preconditions for the illegal annexation of this part of the West Bank have been put in place as a fact on the ground. If Israel is able to do this the State would acquire more territory but few if any undesirable others so their position as a majority would be maintained. Many who support this Separation Plan are willing to give up the idea of acquiring all of Eretz-Israel and some among these supporters would even agree on the basis of this annexation to establish international borders. Of course, a future war could make it possible, even with such established borders, to *redeem* this other land at a later date. These are possible scenarios but what *living resolution* will emerge is yet to be seen.

democracy's premises. Democracy now definitionally claims to itself its own negation. For democracy to express itself it must function undemocratically. The democratic right to privilege one group out of civil society in political society within a multi-group society demands, depends upon for its democratic realization, the privileged group's democratic undemocratic restriction of the rights of all others within civil and political societies and to establish itself as the exclusive representative of the nation proper upon which the state is premised. With such premises it is no wonder that all too often one witnesses the Israeli veneration of the *lands of Israel* only when Arab citizens encroach.

The encroachment of Arab Israeli citizens on *national lands* brings to mind the situation of the Moselle peasants Marx wrote about in his "Preface" to *The Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. As a young lawyer he found himself up against a situation in the courts which he did not at first understand. Moselle peasants were being taken to court for forest theft by landowners. The peasants didn't understand why they were being taken to court either. In their minds they were simply engaging in practices that they had done for generations--collecting wood from what were common lands which according to feudal law they had usufruct rights to. The young lawyer, on the other hand, perceived that something had changed in the legal terms that reflected a fundamental social change (investigation into this social problem led Marx to study political economy). He came to realize that the new *modern* laws were constituted on new forms of property. The original thieves were the landowners who had appropriated the common lands through the enclosure acts as their private property and the laws now represented their *rights of man* in the courts to said property in perpetuity. Like the Moselle peasants, those Palestinians of the Galilee, who should happen to think that they

have some right to the use of land that they and their families have made a living from or built their homes on for generations or perhaps even own or have owned outright--land now off limits to them through the present day Jewish only enclosure acts--will find themselves under arrest, facing a judge in the courts.[40]

The definitional separation of nationhood from citizenship, as we have seen, is the legal basis in practice for the tour guide's complaint concerning Arab encroachment on national lands. This social and very concrete spatial construction underwrites, as explained earlier, the fact that *Israeli* is not recognized as one of the legal nationalities (ethnicities) that an Israeli citizen can be registered as with the Population Registry. Such a policy insures that Jews and Arabs cannot, even as civil subjects one to the other, share a commonality at the level of the state and certainly not, as already discussed, within the national-society.[41] Legislation thus far consistently enforces the ruling that Jews and Arabs are inextricably not members of the same nation and nationality. Since Israel does not constitute a nation *Israeli* subsequently does not constitute a nationality or ethnicity.

In practice, this social construction affects all aspects of life. It determines how private and governmental policies and programs are written and how they are implemented. It affects where you live, what job you hold, who you can marry, what you

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[40] This was particularly true during the 1950s when repeatedly Palestinians were arrested for "encroaching" on "national" lands. Reminiscent of the Moselle peasants, many of these Palestinian criminals were shepherds who were simply, from their standpoint, taking their sheep out to pasture as they had done for years.

[41] The court system is also constructed such that marriages and other personal and family matters are under the purview of the Religious Courts so that civil marriages are excluded between Jews and Arabs, unless one of the parties to the marriage converts and that is also a difficult matter. I suppose one could argue that getting rid of the "modern" idea of civil courts and replacing them with religious courts is a Zionist contribution to a "new kind of modernity," like getting rid of secular democracy and replacing it with "ethnic democracy" is claimed to be a "new kind of democracy," but to my mind it is more like a feudal throwback.

call yourself, what transportation is available to you, if your child's school has a piano or not. "The education system of the Palestinian citizens of Israel," for example, "is sponsored and controlled by the state of Israel in a separate, clearly bound bureaucratic sub-system [and this] formal education system which the state imposes on the border in fact enhances a pluralist, liberal regime of neo-colonial cultural domination" (Rabinowitz 1998, 143-44). The 2006 government plan to make additional investments in the education system in "areas of national priority" included approximately 500 Jewish communities and only four small Arab towns (and all the schools in all the Arab ghettos are already well under-budgeted and known to be so by everyone). This plan was challenged by the Israeli Arab Monitoring Committee and Adalah, a non-governmental legal center. The High Court did rule in their favor in support of Basic Law that requires the State not to give preferential treatment.

Although the High Court has been in recent years more or less consistently upholding the notion of "equality" there is as yet no mechanism for enforcement and numerous loopholes exist which enable the State and private organizations to continue to act preferentially so few of these rulings actually result in any remediation or change in policy.[42] This was seen in the "Katzir" case which began in 2000. A Palestinian Israeli

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[42] For example, almost none of the recommendations made by the Report, published in September 2004, by the State Commission of Inquiry into the Events of October 2000 (during which thirteen Arab Israeli citizens were killed), known as the Or Commission, (after Justice Theodor Or who chaired the Commission) have been implemented, though the establishment of police stations in Umm al-Fahim for instance, is one of the exceptions. The Or Commission is held up as a landmark in regard to the State's position concerning its Arab citizens and is used by scholars and such to demonstrate Israel's openness to the concerns of its Arab citizens. Elie Rekhess, one of Israel's Zionist Arab experts, considers the Report "a turning point in minority-majority relationships in Israel" while he concludes his introductory remarks by saying: "The implementation of the commission's recommendations is a separate issue. I will only add that since the Shiloah Institute and, more recently, the Dayan Center showed interest in the topic of Arabs of Israel, the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation, in its previous forms, has steadfastly dedicated itself to addressing the issue of equality between Jews and Arabs, using tools of our trade, to expand academic research on this topic, as befits our academic institute, while avoiding alienation from the

couple wanted to buy land in the communal settlement of Katzir and build their home there. They were refused. They petitioned. The High Court ruled in their favor stating that the Israel Lands Authority could not continue allocating land to bodies such as the Jewish Agency which build settlements for Jews only. The Jewish Agency was required to accept the couple's application but were able to control the procedure in such a way that the couple was disqualified because "from the material in our possession it develops that the family, and especially the wife [she is a school teacher], are not suited to live in the settlements and that their social integration will prove unsuccessful."[43] For now the case is closed and for Dov Sanderov, chairman of the Katzir local council and former head of the residents association, "We met all the demands set us by the High Court of Justice. We discussed their application and we reached a decision…Kaadan [the couples'

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community [which community?], and, rather, attempt to make a pragmatic contribution as well." Bravo! More studies about what is already known and nothing is done about! See Judge (Ret.) Theodor Or, "State Commission of Inquiry into the Events of October 2000: A Retrospective," Introduced by Elie Rekhess, *Israel Studies*, vol. II, no. 2, Summer 2006, 23-53. Brackets not mine.

[43] In a similar vein Jewish families can also be refused admittance into the Israel Lands Administration's "expansion neighborhoods". Although this is a plan under the Israel Lands Administration members of the cooperative association of the moshav or kibbutz serve as the admissions committees and are responsible for screening candidates. Most of the new neighborhoods of these moshavim and kibbutzim are located in prestigious and wealthy suburbs and the members (usually Ashkenazi) screen along class and status lines. Palestinian Israelis are excluded from applying since "compulsory service with the Israel Defense Forces is a mandatory prerequisite for admission" and most Palestinians are not called to serve. In 2004 a couple, the Ben-Hamos, was rejected by the Tel Adashim moshav because they did not meet the clause entitled "Suitability for life in a communal setting" much like the Kaadans. In this case too, the admissions committee considered the wife, who was pregnant at the time and "was exempted from the diagnostic session", to be the guilty party. "[T]he majority of the couples found to be suited for these new neighborhoods are secular Jews (for the most part, Ashkenazi) who are also members of the upper-middle class and who are high-profile professionals (doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.), college professors or hold senior positions in the defense establishment. The Ben-Hamos do not meet these criteria." Aryeh Dayan, "Grounds for rejection," *haaretz*, March 8, 2004. So much for the "inverted pyramid" and the "normal society".

family name] was not the issue; it was the Jewish character of Katzir and of the State of Israel."[44]

But the State of Israel exists, something that Israelis commemorate and the nation-states of the world recognize. If Russian immigrants from Georgia are registered as Georgian, why can't a citizen of Israel be registered as Israeli? Israel is officially recognized as a state within the comity of nations and like Georgia it is a territorial entity to which individuals feel they belong. This rigid policy seems to go against some of the State's own logic especially since the Registry's classifications do not express nationhood but rather ethnic, cultural, religious, ancestral or previous territorial affiliation—so the notion that Israel does not constitute a nation could be still legally maintained while designating Israeli as one of these Registry classifications. Why couldn't Israeli, since Israel is a territorial entity at least on a par with Georgia, and Georgian is a permissible classification, be at least accorded the status of "nationality" for Registry purposes?

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[44] The Kaadans plan to legally challenge the Local Council's decision. See Aryeh Dayan, "Reasons to discriminate, part three," *haaretz*, September 17, 2003. To date, no Palestinian Israelis have achieved success in the courts when they have tried to acquire membership to a kibbutz or other Jewish collectivity. This is the first case that I know of where the High Court ruled in favor of the Palestinian citizen on this kind of matter. Non-Jewish immigrants who are not Arabs, but Vietnamese, Russian, Christian Americans and Europeans, etc. can acquire membership. And even though Israel claims that the Duruz and Circassians, for instance, are separate "nationalities" distinct from the Arab "nationality", and use this classification for registry purposes, when it comes to such policies as membership to a kibbutz or some other "national" project, they are treated not just as non-Jewish, like the Vietnamese and others, but as Arab and they are excluded just like all the other non-Jewish indigenous people of what was formerly Palestine. This is also the case when it comes to permitting civil marriages between non-Jews and Jews. Why the Duruz and Circassians and the other governmentally classified non-Arab native peoples cannot be granted civil marriages or membership into a kibbutz, while other non-Jews can, cannot be argued on security grounds, because these people are drafted into the military and security forces. It is simply and purely a racist anti-Arab policy that violates their own official designations. I suspect the virulence of this anti-Arab sentiment, and the return to the categorization of the Duruz and others as Arabs when it comes to the policies mentioned, is the reality that all these people are part of the colonized; they are not living amongst us as part of our colonizing project as colonizers, which is the case for the non-Jewish immigrants.

Periodically individuals and groups of individuals have made this request and even taken it to court as seen in the petition mentioned earlier. But so far Israeli courts have ruled against such a classification so that at least for now, Jews and Palestinians living in their common homeland and citizens of the same state are not members of the same nation nor can they legally share in a common Israeli identity qua citizen. To some this may not seem so very important but one's "nationality" on one's Identification Card has very practical meaning for Israel's Palestinian population and serves as a simple everyday tool for insuring the subordination of those *other than us*. That such is the case is reflected by the renowned Palestinian poet, Mahmud Darwish, in his poem entitled "Identity Card" which begins:

> Write down
> I am an Arab
> & my I.D. card number is 50,000
> & my children are eight in number
> & the ninth
> arrives next summer.
> Does this bother you?[45]

Because of its practical, ordinary, everyday place in the subordination of Palestinians, a closer look at registration policy and the uses of the identification card is warranted.

The Ministry of Interior maintains records on every citizen and is responsible for administering identification cards, which all citizens over the age of sixteen are required to carry. With only a few interruptions the Ministry of Interior has been headed by the National Religious Party (NRP) since the establishment of the government irrespective of which party, Labor or Likud, has led the coalition government.[46] William Frankel in

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[45] Mahmud Darwish, *Selected Poems*, trans. Ian Wedde and Fawwaz Tuqan (Chatham: Carcanet Press, 1973), 24.

[46] The National Religious Party (NRP) lost the Ministry of Interior and gained control of the Ministry of Housing with the 1999 election of Barak. The NRP's predecessor party was the Mizrachi.

*Israel Observed: an Anatomy of the State* describes the role of the Religious Party in Israeli government and society.

> When the State of Israel was formed, the Mizrachi Zionist party combined with the Aguda groups to present a United Religious List for the first elections in 1949 and joined the first coalition government. Soon afterwards, however, the Aguda left both the United Religious List and the Government, while Mizrachi (later the NRP) stayed to become an almost permanent member of the Government....Until 1977, Labour led all the coalitions and the religious parties were its most constant partner, the NRP being in the Government since the State was created except for only two short periods. The first was in 1958-59 when the NRP left the Government on the 'Who is a Jew' issue, and the second, about six months in 1976-77, when they were excluded by Rabin for having abstained on a no-confidence motion in the Knesset. They came back as members of the Begin coalition in 1977 (Frankel 1980, 68-70).

The alliance with the religious parties and their incorporation into the State apparatus was and is a secular policy.[47] The Ministry of Interior has been assigned to the NRP by both the major secular parties, Labor and Likud. One or the other of these parties has been in control of the government apparatus since the establishment of the State and represent the overwhelming majority of Israeli Jewish citizens who are secular. It is usually argued that since neither major party has had enough votes to head the government on their own they have, therefore, had to ally with the religious parties. They could have as easily allied with the left and Palestinian constituencies which would have meant making concessions of a more secular and democratic character.[48]

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[47] "The composition of Ben-Gurion's first administration set the pattern for future governments. He had abandoned a core coalition of Mapai and Mapam which would forge a socialist future for the new state. Instead a working relationship with small parties and an agreement with the religious on the basis of no change and no interference in religious affairs became the foundation for the moulding of the new society…The religious Zionists proved to be Mapai's long-term coalition partner, balanced by the secular [bourgeois] Progressives. With troublesome, larger ideological parties excluded from the government, Mapai, the dominant party, would now carry out its program of state building. Moreover, it always held the crucial ministries—foreign affairs, defense and finance…Not only were ideological rivals outside both Mapai and the government, but prominent ideologues within Mapai such as Berl Katznelson and Dov Hoz were long dead. Alone and at the head of government, Ben-Gurion basked in the glow of the achievement of the state without the danger of anyone of standing presenting a challenge to his views" (Shindler 2008, 77).

[48] Hillel Kook, an important Political Zionist and colleague of Jabotinsky from the United States who later moved to Israel, said "Israel because of Ben-Gurion and also because of Begin is the world's only

The Ministry of Interior "maintains the registers of nationality, religious and marital status. Administratively, orthodox control of this Ministry has ensured that no person is registered Jew unless he is recorded as such by the orthodox controllers" (Frankel 1980, 72). Registering the "nation" of a person and guaranteeing its accuracy is one of the important mechanisms for "securing" the distinction between Jew and non-Jew. But this function is by no means the only one controlled by the religious party.

> The Ministry [of Interior] also controls the finances of local government and has been able to influence the use of these funds for religious and religious party purposes. The Ministry of Religious Affairs controls the rabbinical establishment and provides subsidies to religious institutions. NRP's gain of the Ministry of Education [along with the Ministry of Police in the 1977 Begin (Likud) led coalition Government] was a great achievement for the party because of its intense religious involvement in education. Apart from the substantive advantages of achieving the implementation of party policies, control of a Ministry places in the hands of the party the gift of jobs, patronage and subsidies (Frankel 1980, 73; brackets mine).

These Ministries play an essential role in 1) the control and administration of the Palestinian ghettos; 2) the form that development, or perhaps more accurately underdevelopment, takes in these ghettos, and 3) the maintenance of the Palestinians as different, backward, subordinate, and "temporary guests".

The identification card is used extensively to differentiate (and discriminate and intimidate) Palestinians from Jews in every day intercourse--at bus stops, check points at road intersections, air port entrances, governmental agencies and social services. Ilan

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theocracy that was founded by secularists." In Eran Kaplan, *A Rebel with a Cause: Hillel Kook, Begin and Jabotinsky's Ideological Legacy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 98. It is interesting to note that the Political Zionists like Kook and Jabotinsky advocated for a secular democratic society with a constitution as a homeland for Jews who wanted to live there and that Arabs would have full rights as citizens. For Kook, Jews do not constitute a nation, so all individuals living in Israel would be the same as citizens. But Jabotinsky, like Ben-Gurion, was anti-communist. The last article he wrote was titled "Communism is Poison to Zionism," so clearly he would not have wanted to ally with the left in government, but he certainly wouldn't have approved of Ben-Gurion's and all subsequent leaders' alliances with the religious parties. In an interview with Carmit Gai, who wrote a book about growing up on a Communist Kibbutz, Kibbutz Yad Hanna, she says about Ben-Gurion, "[He] was determined to run the country without Herut and Maki, without what we today know as the Likud and the Communists. He made both of these groups into lepers." *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, July 24, 1992, 16. She describes Ben-Gurion's anti-communist policies which ranged from beatings to withholding of funds and even the withholding of necessary provisions and supplies during the 1948 war.

Pappe discusses its early use in 1948 and 1949, during which period it was granted selectively and used as a means to intimidate the Palestinian population. "But the granting of such an ID card, which allowed people limited freedom of movement in the area where they lived, itself became a means of intimidation: only people vetted and approved by the Israeli Secret Service were given such a card" (Pappe 2006, 201). One example of its use today is the registration of Palestinians at bus terminals by the police. This occurs every day and all day long. Most Palestinian Israeli men[49] have been registered hundreds of times throughout their lives. If a police-person happens to stop a non-Arab (really we should say non-Palestinian since almost half of Israel's Jewish population are Arab, having as their country of origin a North African or Arab country) he/she will apologize and let him pass; but if you are Palestinian, and I am referring to citizens not only Palestinians from the Occupied Territories, the police officer will question you, ask you to show your identification card, and possibly demand to see papers to prove what you are doing at this location at this time, and will register your name on the ledger.

For quite a while I was under the impression, unfamiliar as I was with registration, that a great deal of petty theft occurs in Israel. Since I frequently used the bus system I regularly saw the police stop and check people at the stations. One day when I was accompanied by my husband, Ghassan, I asked him what was going on as a registration was taking place, believing that I was witnessing another police intervention in an attempted theft or some other petty crime. He simply replied that the police were

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[49] Usually the police only stop males. It is mostly males who commute to and from the Jewish areas for work and then home to the ghetto. It must be kept in mind that I am speaking about Israeli citizens and not only Palestinians from the Occupied Territories.

registering this man as if I should know what that meant. After some probing he explained the registration policy to me and, if nothing else, I learned that I didn't have to be any more cautious about my possessions in Israel than anywhere else. The man we were observing that day happened to be from Umm al-Fahim, a worker returning home at the end of the day, and an acquaintance of my husband. Ghassan knew that he could not write so he would have to place a mark by his name on the registration ledger. My husband has been registered hundreds of times at bus stations, taxi stands, and the slave-markets. The latter are places where Palestinian (citizens, not only Palestinians from the Occupied Territories) workers daily gather in hopes of acquiring employment and have become known as such. All the major cities and towns have slave-markets.

Jewish Israelis witness the registration of their co-citizens every day but usually think nothing of it; though, I have heard stories about how, once in a while, a Jewish Israeli, who is mistakenly stopped by the police and subsequently released, will protest such discrimination against the Palestinian population by demanding to sign the registration ledger *like an Arab*. But no public action against such an evident discriminatory policy has yet taken place. From my five-year experience in Israel I learned that most Israeli Jews, including leftists, have almost no experiential knowledge of everyday life for Palestinians. Ordinary activities, involving the postal service, police, bus transport and so on, are experienced by Palestinians in an entirely different way. Mediating between these two worlds I had to figure out how to function and determine what was expected of me within each of these worlds respectively in order to facilitate the accomplishment of various routine tasks. In so doing I became quite familiar with the

existential and very material "great divide" between Israeli society proper and Israel's other.[50]

David Kretzmer raises the question as to why there is registration. Periodically some Knesset members have tried to abolish registration along with its companion, the identification card but, thus far, such attempts have always been defeated.[51] After reviewing the various legal, social and political issues involved he comes to the conclusion that

> Registration of 'nation' in the Population Registry is one of the mechanisms for maintaining the distinction between citizens of the state who belong to the Jewish people and those that do not. Registration of 'nation' is irrelevant in determining the rights and obligations of citizens, but it strengthens the dichotomy between the state as the political framework of all its citizens, and the state as the particularistic nation-state of the Jewish people (Kretzmer 1990, 44).

Although he correctly identifies the main intent of registration, I believe, he underestimates the practical importance of the registration process and use of the identification card in everyday affairs as a means for the concrete realization of the very dichotomy he identifies. Registration of "nation" is the administrative practice that formalizes a legal system that underpins official policy that is not "irrelevant in

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[50] For instance, I repeatedly and frustratingly attempted to get mail sent to me to Umm al-Fahim from the United States on a timely basis. Paying for express mail and special delivery accomplished nothing since Haifa would simply ignore this and hold it there for weeks at a time since it was destined for Umm al-Fahim. Sometimes the post office manager would release a package, after taking it apart, without requiring me to pay an exorbitant fee. Often I had to send packages back because the article was not worth what I would have to pay to get it released. Any mail going to a Palestinian ghetto is monitored. To avoid these problems I finally had whatever I needed sent to a Tel Aviv friend. I found it was much quicker, though inconvenient, to make the trip to pick it up there. Sending packages, books and mail to Tel Aviv (in the name of a Jewish Israeli) would not go through inspection so if a gift or good were sent to me I would be able to receive it. Once I sent her a postal money order from Umm al-Fahim which she had to pick up at her neighborhood post office. She told me the clerk gave her a rather difficult time, wanting to know all the details about why and from whom she was receiving this mail from Umm al-Fahim. Similarly, if she sent mail to me in Umm al-Fahim, she would be drilled. It was most uncomfortable for her and after a few such encounters she did not care to repeat the experience so I was on my own again. Undemocratic treatment towards the Palestinians clearly also imposes undemocratic practices upon Jewish Israelis.

[51] Because of repeated protest the Ministry of Interior has recently stopped putting "nationality" on the Identification Card but this does not change the practices or legal definitions of "nationality" and data on individuals in the files records "nationality" and religion.

determining the rights and obligations of citizens" as can be seen in the Law of Return, conscription and the all to simple but real and humiliating practice of daily stopping Palestinian citizens as they go about their ordinary business, to interrogate them and make them sign on the dotted line.[52] When identity cards were first introduced soon after the establishment of the state in 1948 Ilan Pappe writes that

> The worst offense was not being in possession of one of the newly-issued identity cards, which could result in a prison term for as long as a year and a half and immediate transfer to one of the pens to join other 'unauthorised' and 'suspicious' Arabs found in now Jewish-occupied areas….

He continues to say that during this time the Israelis

> introduced a novel feature, also well known among present-day Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories: roadblocks, where they carried out surprise checks to catch those who did not have the new ID card (Pappe 2006, 201).

This is still a "well known" practice applied to present-day Palestinians inside the Green Line and is extensively carried out at "checkpoints" throughout the country, particularly at bus stations, taxi stands, intersections, and the airport.

A recent story reported in *haaretz* tells of a busload of youth who were touring sites together as part of a "Face to Face/Faith to Faith" program for Jewish and Arab youth sponsored by the Interreligious Coordinating Council in Israel (ICCI). At a checkpoint the Border Police stopped them and demanded to see all the Identification Cards of the Arab youth. One of the tour leaders cried out: "They have been studying and

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[52] One very practical use that has manifest affects is the use of military service as criteria for granting of credits that generate higher scores for Jews than Palestinians in their applications for all kinds of benefits. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) credits are added to such things as college entrance scores and to applications for numerous things like student dormitory housing, distribution of plots of land by the Israel Lands Authority, financial loans. Since the state does not call most Palestinians to serve in the military they cannot acquire these credits, which have nothing to do with merit, need or credentials, and so are always put at a disadvantage in relation to Jewish applicants. A landmark case in the Haifa District Court ruled that Haifa University's use of IDF credits on student applications for dormitory housing was discriminatory. Hopefully, this will set a precedent and other universities will follow and perhaps this is the beginning of the end of this blatantly racist discriminatory policy. For now this ruling only applies to Haifa University. Tamara Traubmann, "Court rules Haifa University must halt housing advantages for IDF veterans," *haaretz*, August 20, 2006.

having fun together for an entire year. I will not agree to you separating them in this way. It will destroy everything that we have built." After consulting the officer the Border Policeman was ordered to collect all the identity cards but for some reason they were all the same color instead of blue for the Israelis and orange for the Palestinians so eventually they gave up and allowed the bus to go on its way. According to the reporter the "Palestinian youngsters felt humiliated and their Jewish cohorts felt ashamed." An interesting backdrop of the article relates to the different perceptions between the two groups and the noticeable "lack of comprehension of some basic facts, on the part of the young participants." The young participants the writer is referring to are the Jewish youth who did not know, for instance, that "Palestinian residents of Jerusalem all carry blue identity cards [and] they are not citizens of Israel." They did not know, when they stopped in Abu Dis, that spouses are divided by the separation fence; and they did not

> understand that a decision was made to leave Palestinian residents of the Shu'afat refugee camp beyond the [separation] fence but to include Palestinian residents of the adjoining Shu'afat neighborhood inside the fence. They repeatedly referred to Pisgat Ze'ev [a Jewish settlement in the West Bank] as 'Israel' and Shu'afat as 'Palestine.' It was clear that they were not at all aware that Pisgat Ze'ev lies beyond the Green Line.[53]

Such activities are ordinary and regular and by being so they guarantee the reproduction of the national dichotomy.

Since the above situation involves Palestinians from the Occupied Territories, even though they are children, perhaps the Israeli military officers have reason to be security conscious, but the ID card is also as relevant today for Palestinians under Israeli citizenship as the following *haaretz* article indicates. On February 15, 2007 four law students at the Netanya College were denied entry to the Sharon Mall "because the

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[53] Aryeh Dayan, "'Collect ID cards from all of them—the Jews, too'," *haaretz*, April 17, 2006.

security guards identified them as being non-Jewish." How the guards knew these four young men where non-Jewish I don't know--and it always surprises me when I am in Israel how security personnel and just about everybody in Israel can distinguish between who is a Jew and who is not--but the Mall guards did and they stopped them in the parking lot to inspect their car and check their identification cards. One poor student, a resident of Haifa, had forgotten to carry his card and so they were all refused entry, ordered to leave and it is reported that one of the guards sarcastically told them: "Now you have something to do your clerkship about." But here's the clincher, an example of Gavison's democracy at work, when the Mall security guard, Meir Twito, was asked to explain he said that "because they are members of 'minorities' they had to show an identity card."[54]

But the times are changing and more and more Palestinians are protesting their treatment and taking their objections to court. For one, at least at the airport, as reported in *haaretz* on February, 28, 2007, the Sheen Bet (security forces) is introducing a new system that will ease checks of Arabs at the airport. This is a result of protests by Palestinian citizens regarding their treatment, most notably a suit brought by Salim Kayat, a 74 year old business man who arrived at the airport with his wife and elderly mother who is wheelchair ridden. They underwent the grueling, humiliating and time consuming inspection and interrogation awarded all Palestinian citizens. This time Mr. Kayat decided he had had enough and made his voice heard.[55]

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[54] Fadi Eyadat, "Arab law student denied entry to Sharon Mall" *haaretz*, February 15, 2007.

[55] See Aryeh Dayan, "Come with me, please," *haaretz*, February 20, 2007 and Yoav Stern, "Shin Bet: New system will ease checks of Arabs at airport," *haaretz*, February 28, 2007.

Still, through official mechanisms and interpersonal intercourse the otherness of the Palestinian is continuously reinvented and reestablished. Membership in or outside society proper is stamped into fact since each person must register their "nationality"--Jew, Arab or Duruz being the three main classifications. A person may only register as their nationality one that Israeli law recognizes.

> Under the Population Registry Law, 1965 all residents of the state must be registered in the Population Register. The law stipulates the details that must be registered. Among the details listed in the law are 'Nation' and religion. The law requires all residents over the age of sixteen to carry identity cards which contain some of the information included in the Population Registry. According to regulations promulgated by the Minister of Interior pursuant to his authority under the statute, the identity card includes the 'nation,' but not the religion, of the bearer. The Population Registry Law does not include a definition of the term 'nation,' nor does it define any of the various recognized 'nations.' The only definition is that of the term 'Jew,' added by an amendment to the law passed in 1970 (Kretzmer 1990, 41).

David Kretzmer has an interesting discussion of the laws concerning registration of nationality in a sub-section of chapter 3, "Registration in the Population Register," in his work cited above. The excerpt here refers specifically to the question of how a person may choose to be registered and, in particular, that a person cannot register their "nationality" as Israeli.

> Whether people may choose how to be registered, or even whether information about their 'nation' or 'religion' be registered at all, are questions that have arisen in a number of cases. These cases have related to registration of Jews, but the principles laid down would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, in the case of non-Jews as well...
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> A…question arises when a person demands a specific form of registration under the heading of 'religion' or 'nation.' As the term 'Jew' is now defined in the law, a person may not demand to be registered as a Jew unless he or she meets the statuary definition. The Supreme Court has also refused to allow those who object to the statutory definition to use alternative epithets, such as 'Hebrew.'
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> The principles laid down in cases dealing with registration of Jews may have implications as far as Arab residents are concerned in a number of contexts. First, the policy of the government has always been to register members of the Druse community as part of a separate nation. The question arises whether members of the Druse community who so desire may be registered as 'Arabs.' A further question is whether an Arab resident may register his or her children as 'Palestinians,' rather than as 'Arabs.'
>
> ...The Supreme Court decided [in the *Shalit* case] that…an individual may not force the registrar to recognize a 'nation' merely by his subjective declaration that he regards himself as a member of the nation. If the nation is not recognized by the registrar the onus is on the individual to prove that such a distinct nation exists. There are a number of elements that characterize a nation. When the argument is that a group that had been a part of one nation has evolved into a separate nation, it must be shown that an appreciable number of people belonging to the former nation no longer identify with the nation, whose members may be scattered all over the world, and

> have no sense of mutual inter-dependency and common destiny with them. On the strength of this last test the court dismissed the argument that a separate 'nation' of Israelis, who were no longer part of the Jewish nation, had evolved (Kretzmer 1990, 41-43; brackets mine).

Clearly, if an Israeli Jew has no right to be registered as a national of Israel, since the Israel as a nation does not exist then, *mutatis mutandis*, neither can a Palestinian citizen of Israel. Therefore Jews and Palestinians are not and cannot be members of the same nation (though they can be citizens of the same state as clarified earlier) according to the definition derived by Israel's founders and law makers.

Even though the Duruz have never constituted a nation-state and are nationally or ethnically Arab (or Palestinian in Israel/Palestine),[56] Duruz being their religion, Israel has classified this religious group into a distinct nation. Although the government treats the Duruz somewhat differently from the other Palestinians, such as being subject to the draft, in most respects they live much the same in their ghettos as all the other Palestinians in Israel. Their "special" treatment corresponds more to an attempt by the government to fragment the Palestinian population by confession. Palestinians, who are officially labeled “Arabs” (the rationale is that since Palestine does not constitute a nation there is no such thing as a Palestinian nationality) are conceptualized as a minority of minorities. This is both a legal definition and is used by the Bureau of Statistics for instance, as well as a conceptual premise held by mainstream social scientists. The minority discourse is one that obscures via a neutral language the real social content that

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[56] The Duruz are members of a sect which was formed in the eleventh century in Egypt. They are a split-off from Shi’ah Islam and their doctrine is partially derived from neo-Platonic philosophy. Today the Duruz live in parts of Israel, Lebanon and Syria. According to the Statistical Abstract of Israel 1992 (which includes the populations of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in the census) some 83,700 Duruz citizens resided in Israel in 1991. Historically their nationality would depend upon which nation-state they lived in. Duruz in Syria, for instance, consider themselves to be national Syrians whose religion is Duruz; in fact, the Duruz are known for their ability to accommodate to the national context within which they live.

grounds a culture of separation and its corresponding social agenda and practice. The following quote is taken from what was a top secret government memorandum, entitled "Recommendations for Dealing with the Arab Minority in Israel," dated September 1959. Tom Segev refers to this memorandum in his book, *1949-The First Israelis*. This memorandum summarizes the government's previous policy towards the Arabs and explicitly states one of the reasons for the government's policy of division. In it the following is stated:

> In this way, the party [MAPAI] could avoid having to form a particular ideology for its Arab voters, and also ensured that those lists would not consolidate into an independent Arab bloc...The policy of communal division bore fruit, and...succeeded in creating barriers, albeit sometimes artificial ones, between certain parts of the Arab community, as in the case of the mistrust between the Duruz and the other Arab communities (Segev 1986, 66; brackets mine).

The principles, definitions, guidelines and laws outlined thus far contribute to establishing what legal and illegal behavior within Israeli society is. If one directly explains them there is nothing particularly complicated about them. What is "complicated" and "difficult" is not their explanation or the explanation of their application legally on the ground but the discomfort one experiences when asked to explain. Apparently for our tour guide some anxiety exists regarding the split between citizen and nation, and even though he is on firm ground legally, rather than pursue the discussion he brings it to an abrupt end. Lisa Levitin on the other hand has no such qualms. Since the State of Israel is decreed by law to be both a Jewish state and a democratic state, there is no contradiction in her mind. Equating exclusivity and democracy, at least for the Jewish people in Israel, is self-evident. Like Gavison, she can assert with "moral rectitude" the appropriateness of the subordination of the non-Jew who, from her standpoint, happens to live among us and should actually live elsewhere—in an Arab country. The subordination of the other juridical non-subject citizen is not

discrimination. As Gover insightfully pointed out "This [morally reducing the other to a nonsubject] has its abstract political aspect in the attempt to assert a moral universe as a condition of claiming a territorial realization of Jewish history." Thus, Ms. Levitin can quite confidently assert that "In our, ancient homeland…We cannot 'democratically' abandon our heritage to the votes of others." And so, "the questions surrounding conquest are resolved by asserting a polity that can stand for the moral universe itself…one based on the identification of exclusion with moral rectitude" (Gover 1994, 29). [57]

In this way, whether one asserts providence, Jewish exceptionalism in history, or the United Nations Partition Plan, one can assert "the identification of exclusion with moral rectitude." Yet, as Yerach Gover also poignantly unveils in his work on Hebrew literature, no genuine resolution to this individual and social dilemma is possible as long as "the morally deceptive key relations of the Jewish person as a moral citizen to the non-Jewish person as juridical citizen" are maintained. The contradictions continue to persist in the hearts and minds of Jewish Israelis and in the daily realities of what happens on the ground. Israeli culture is a battle ground where the ideologies, politics, discourses and resistances of Israel's divided members struggle and fight for space in this combative combustible terrain. The persistent moral contradictions embedded in law which are based on privileged particularism may be alleviated by ideological salves and by the

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[57] Gavison and others who argue along her lines ignore their own historical record. Many of the early Zionists, like Ahad Ha-Am, argued against colonizing Palestine recognizing that there would be grave consequences morally and objectively, if they were to do so. See for instance a collection edited by Adam Shatz entitled *Prophets Outcast: A Century of Dissident Jewish Writing about Zionism and Israel* (New York: Nation Books, 2004). For study on American Jews against Zionism see Thomas A. Kolsky, *Jews Against Zionism: The American Council for Judaism, 1942-1948* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). Even among the Zionist founders there were major differences on objectives and directions, on strategy and tactics. By treating the matter legalistically, emphasizing the normative, and ignoring the actual history and genuine differences concerning the Zionist project, Gavison and others proceed from the given state of affairs (and all the ideological constructs as facts attached inherently to the given) as the only point of departure upon which a discourse can take place.

material benefits one receives within society but they do not disappear. Morality, if it has any relevance, is based on universal standards of validity and applicability for all human beings. No one can escape this ultimate bottom line in one's consciousness. To maintain psychically and on the ground the particularistic principles of the hegemonic Zionist positions requires constant reinforcement and ever more rigid entrenchment. If such a position is to be maintained by a state invariably it will have to be vigilant, in a constant state of national emergency and military preparedness. Security for and the perceived demographic threat against the majority are necessarily *national* obsessions and among the State's main concerns and obligations in respect to its moral (*national*) citizens versus its purely juridical citizens.

Lisa Levitin states the case simply and directly. Democracy for her is not based on citizenship rights but on the national rights of the Jewish nation. "[C]itizenship rights of other nations among us cannot supersede Jewish national rights." It seems for her at least the question of whether or not the Jews constitute a majority does not matter.[58] But for those that want to legally ground the national rights of the Jewish people to a sovereign state of their own as democratic, the demographic question is of the essence. Ruth Gavison, as a liberal representative of the prevailing Zionist discourse, conceptually reduces the notion of democracy to such normative practices as the holding of free elections open to all of a state's citizenry and concludes on this basis, at least within a "thin" definition of democracy, Israel is a democracy. Using the same normative

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[58] Perhaps the 2002 law that enables the government to restrict the participation of individuals and political parties in the Knesset who do not affirm that Israel is both a Jewish and democratic state could be interpreted as a safeguard against such a situation—Jews as a minority in the State of Israel--though the immediate purpose was to exclude certain Palestinians such as Azmi Bashara from running who are calling for a "state for all its citizens."

argumentation--"Hebrew is its language; its holidays, religious as well as national, are those that belong to the Jewish calendar."--she concludes that Israel is a Jewish State. For Gavison, whether the existent essentially democratic *status quo* is to be maintained or *improved* upon, which she would prefer, depends upon the democratic expression of the majority will through the vote. Therefore, the state must insure that Jews remain a majority of the citizenry and in this way, and here she and Ms. Levitin are in agreement, "the purpose of democracy"—the exclusive privileging of the Jewish nation within the state as established by Israel's founding *Declaration*--can remain in tact, as fact and morally justifiable.

In accordance with these presumptions, this acclaimed human rights lawyer supported the High Court's amendment to the Nationality Law of 2005 which restricts the reunification of the families of Palestinian Israeli citizens and residents, including residents of East Jerusalem, and Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories. This is a blatant violation of international human rights standards on the matter of family reunification but the secular Zionist need to maintain a Jewish majority requires that limits be placed on additions to the ranks of the native non-Jewish citizenry and this need takes precedent over their human rights. Ours is of a higher moral order. Thus, "the questions surrounding conquest," like the right of return for the Palestinian refugees, family reunification, illegal settlement and land acquisition, ethnic cleansing, "are resolved by asserting a polity that can stand for the moral universe itself." Clearly, as has already been seen in regard to land use (whether for homes, business or agriculture), the separation of the nation from the state has very practical meaning to the lives and livelihoods of concrete individuals and their families and the maintenance of the

ghettoization of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship relative to all that constitutes a society's *lebenswelt*.

Thus, maintaining a majority Jewish presence is part of the "national agenda". Because of the particular way in which the Zionists have constructed their democracy which gave citizenship[59] and the right to vote to native non-Jews[60] the demographic question is a constant source of insecurity. Since Jews from the Diaspora have not flocked in mass to what is claimed to be their ancestral homeland, the State's population composition is a major social and political concern and is often referred to as a national obsession. It is a security matter. The separation of nationhood from state, leads to another dichotomy with regard to how the population concerns of the State are conceptualized and implemented—within the Jewish nation there is a "demographic crisis" and with respect to the non-nationals there is a "demographic threat".[61] As long as

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[59] See chapter 2 on the granting of Palestinians citizenship and the illegal annexation of the "occupied territories" by Israel in violation of the armistice agreements following the 1948 War.

[60] The process of acquiring citizenship was not a simple process for those Palestinians remaining in the territories controlled by Israel; many did not acquire citizenship and many were deported. Strict residency requirements had to be met. Palestinians had to meet these requirements in order to be able to stay in Israel and to acquire citizenship. These requirements included the war period during which time many people had to flee their towns and villages and so they could not meet the residency requirements making them ineligible for citizenship. Also hundreds of Palestinian towns and villages were destroyed. None of the residents of these towns, who became refugees, were allowed to return so obviously they did not receive citizenship. For the history of Israeli citizenship law see David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel*.

[61] In 2002 the "demographic problem" once again became a central concern and the government revived the National Demographic Council which was mandated "to encourage Jewish households to have more children, using incentives such as housing benefits and other government grants." The government also decided to establish 20 community settlements and two new cities "to Judaize the Galilee and create a contiguous Jewish presence to contain the natural growth of Israeli Arabs and the 'leakage' of Palestinians from the territories into the Green Line; and the no less urgent need to settle the Negev, to stop the 'uncontrolled Bedouin takeover' of state lands." Avirama Golan, "Stockade and tower and destruction," *haaretz*, June 8, 2002. Concerning the National Demographic Council Uri Avnery writes: "This is an institution that is supposed to deal with what many Israelis consider the state's most important problem--more important than the war with the Palestinians, Saddam's weapons of annihilation, growing unemployment and the economic crisis." Uri Avnery, "Israel: the Jewish Demographic State," *CounterPunch*, October 11, 2002.

the majority of voting citizens is Jewish (and these individuals hold to the hegemonic Zionist paradigm) then *democracy* as constituted is not threatened since the Zionist prerogative will be "democratically" selected by a majority vote.

But the native non-Jewish presence not only persists but keeps growing relative to the Jewish population within the Green Line. Therefore, Ruth Gavison's agreement with the ruling to restrict the family reunification of Israeli Palestinian citizens was a reflection quite simply of a practical matter. It is claimed that the majority as a majority has every right to circumvent international law when the majority's interest is seen as undermined. To grant the non-Jewish spouses of these non-Jewish citizens citizenship would mean that these spouses and the children of these couples would have to be added to the numbers of legitimate voters and future voters. The government and its advocates justified placing restrictions on the rights of some of its citizens on the basis of security needs and this is so, not because these spouses threaten the lives of Israeli citizens as terrorists but because they threaten the *nation's* security, the majority as majority, which is seen as constantly under threat from within and from without by these ever demanding alien bodies that press against us, live amongst us and surround us. Thousands of such families have submitted their requests for reunification and have been patiently waiting their turn; but now there is no need to wait anymore. Ilan Pappe tells of this recent incident where

> In the dead of night on 24 January 2006, an elite unit of Israel's border police seized the Israeli Palestinian village of Jaljulya. The troops burst into houses, dragging out thirty-six women and eventually deporting eight of them. The eight women were ordered to go back to their old homes in the West Bank. Some of them had been married for years to Palestinian men from Jaljulya, some were pregnant, many had children. They were abruptly cut off from their husbands and children (Pappe 2006, 248).

This action was backed by the government when the police came under criticism. Separation is the order of the day and as many Jewish Israelis feel and say "They can go live in Jordan." Or as Justice Mishael Cheshin stated in February, 2006 before the High Court in his argument against a petition calling for the cancellation of the discriminatory amendment to the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law: "No one is preventing them from building a family but they should live in Jenin instead of Umm al-Fahim [a Palestinian ghetto in Israel from which data is drawn for this dissertation]."[62]

If one takes into account all of the territory under Israeli control, the demographic threat becomes even greater. Although the State has been continuously *Judaizing* land within the Green Line and establishing settlements within the Occupied Territories the demographic threat does not disappear. Should all the territory under Israeli control, the lands of Eretz-Israel, be annexed to the State, along with all its occupants, the entire project collapses. Because of this reality every regime since the establishment of the State has left the matter of borders unresolved. *A land without people to a people without land* may have been at one time a rallying call but no one can argue this now. Nor is the Diaspora knocking at the door to be let in.

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62 Yuval Yoaz, "Judge: Israeli citizens who marry Palestinians can go live in Jenin," *haaretz*, February 2, 2006. See also Jonathan Cook, "Israel's 'Demographic Demon' in Court," *Middle East Report Online*, June 1, 2006. After the High Court decided to uphold the constitutionality of the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law in May 2006 (which restricts the reunification of Palestinian families in Israel) by a six-five vote in favor, "…Justice Minister Ramon…ordered his department to prepare Israel's first immigration bill 'based on international law.' He added: 'The time has come for Israel to have clear immigration legislation that will give priority to Jews returning to their homeland but will allow the possibility to naturalize on the basis of universal principles.' All the indications are, however, that Ramon is playing fast and loose with the concept of 'universal,' if only to satisfy the discomfited among Israel's senior judiciary. Certainly, Palestinians and inhabitants of most other Arab states are not expected to be included among those entitled to residency in Israel. Ramon hinted as much when he stated: 'The State of Israel, which designates itself a Jewish and democratic state, is authorized to limit entry via its borders…The state has an absolute right to prevent citizens of hostile states from becoming citizens of the state.'…Other non-Jewish spouses, the committee argued, should face age and income requirements and be expected to affirm a loyalty oath—not to Israel, but to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. In keeping with current policy, non-Jews are unlikely to receive citizenship, but may be eligible for residency rights."

Establishing a state based on the presuppositions presented thus far has resulted in creating a societal environment for the Jewish population, at the level of the individual, the nation and the state, wherein one feels constantly at risk and under attack from the ever present enemy within and without. Though much of the fear is ideologically produced and promoted for political interests, nonetheless, the fact is, obstacles to the security of Israel as it is presently constituted are profound. How to secure and maintain a ghetto-people state in today's constantly changing terrain, based on a colonizing project *in land with people* is no easy and secure task. But Israel's ruling elites have been most patient and they are masters of the real politick. Step by step more and more parts of the overall objective have been realized, most often first through war then law. Palestinian land here then there is confiscated and cleared of people, then settled illegally by Jewish immigrants who automatically receive Israeli citizenship. Then these lands with their all-Jewish settler-citizens are enclosed within a real or imaginary Separation Fence or demarcation line. Next comes annexation, if and when the military and political circumstances permit. Within Israel it is now acceptable, though debated, to publicly propose the transfer option—of Palestinian citizens of Israel--as another piece of the solution to the Jewish Question and the Palestinian Problem within Eretz-Israel, a proposal implicit in Ms. Levitin's remark to the *Jerusalem Post*, argued for by MK's Effi Eitam and Avigdor Lieberman, and supported by such renowned personages as Henry Kissinger.[63] Armed with such a step by step strategy, whether openly acknowledged as such (as Kissinger does) or not, makes irresolution--to such matters as writing a

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[63] In the "Statement of the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Before the House Committee on International Relations" on Thursday, February 10, 2005 Kissinger proposed the transfer of territories within the Green Line (which in particular refer to the Little Triangle where Umm al-Fahim is located) to a Palestinian state as part of the plan to create Israeli borders within which most if not all inhabitants would be Jewish.

constitution, establishing permanent internationally recognized borders, securing peoples residency and citizenship—not an accident of fate or history but a choice made by Israel's leaders. It is their *living resolution* to the Palestinian-Jewish Question within the given circumstances as they pursue their objectives.

The State's quest for the preservation of a Jewish majority within Eretz-Israel (or at least some part of it) keeps a level of social anxiety alive, and maintains the perception that the Palestinian citizens are not only a Fifth Column in political and military terms who threaten the nation's security (another result of the separation of nation from state), but an encroaching population who threatens our very presence in our "eternal, ancient homeland." The "demographic threat" turns every Palestinian, regardless of ideology or political persuasion, including even those who serve in the military, into an offense against us simply because they exist in the *lands of Israel*.

Although to a great extent Jews in the Diaspora support the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish State this does not translate directly into constant arrivals of new immigrants that can counter over time the "demographic threat" and solve the "demographic crisis".[64] This causes the society to be ever seeking means of inflating the Jewish presence—where to find new pools of immigrants and organize their ingathering; how to encourage Jewish couples to have large families without enlarging Arab families; how to implement policies that encourage by discouragement Palestinian Israelis to leave; how to improve development projects that will succeed at *Judaizing* the Arab

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[64] Much of this support comes from the very real felt need to insure that Jews have a safe haven against anti-Semitism. This felt need though has not resulted in Jews in the Diaspora immigrating to Israel in mass or even in continuous flows, in fact, there has been a regular and consistent immigration of Israelis out of Israel going on as well. Therefore, private Jewish organizations and the State work to locate Jewish populations and convince them to make Aliyah and of course, they are there to assist and relocate when real social or political circumstances place a particular Jewish community at risk.

dominated areas within the Green Line; what means are best to confiscate lands in the Occupied Territories and to settle them with Jews; how to revise laws pertaining to who is a Jew.

Like nationality laws and policies, Israel has its own peculiar population laws and policies. In most countries laws and programs pertaining to population control are created in regard to the society's general population needs and concerns with respect to the nation's social and economic development and prospects as a whole and not in relation to the ethnic composition of its citizenry. Population laws and programs in Israel on the other hand are rooted in the separation of *nation* from state and are constructed and implemented along the Jew/non-Jew axis. Laws and policies are framed and implemented in such ways as to insure as much as possible that the proper outcome be realized for those of the *nation* relative to those outside the *nation* but within the state; and in such a way that, at least in appearance, the State can assert that its public legislation and programs meet the requirements of impartiality and treat citizens equally and non-discriminatorily. For instance, the legislation that put into effect family subsidies to encourage larger Jewish families resulted in proportionally more subsidies going to Palestinian families so the law was changed. The revision set a max so that when this number of births is reached within a family additional child subsidies are stopped. The particular max number that was chosen took into account average Jewish family size and was set higher than this average in order to encourage Jewish parents to go the next step higher. With this policy the legislators hoped that average Jewish family size would increase and at the same time there would be no impact on Arab family size. Since the government could not outright legislate a Jewish only child subsidy program, this

revision also attempts to insure that no more than the necessary (necessary for the purpose of enlarging the size of Jewish families) social funds are allocated to Palestinian families.

Summing up thus far, it should now be evident that what appears to be a simple matter of the definition of nation, which then informs the definition of nationality and qualifies the notion of citizenship, has very real practical meaning in the State of Israel. National land does not refer to land that is held by the state in the interest of all citizens as their shared heritage, but to the Jewish people who may or may not even live in Israel. Palestinians under Israeli citizenship may not share in the use and ownership of this "national" land to build homes, set up businesses or kibbutzim or farm. National laws such as those pertaining to immigration and family reunification, which are usually uniformly applied to a state's population, are in Israel, applied differentially depending upon whether you are Jewish or Palestinian; and population planning is formed on the basis of the *nation's* growth while containment is applied to the *non-national* citizens' presence on the *nation's* lands. And, as the nation is made secure against its insecurity the Palestinians are made insecure as the objects of security. Cutting Palestinians out of the *nation* within the State has placed every Palestinian under the watchful eye of the police, intelligence and the separate Arab Affairs department of the Prime Minister's office. To today, education in the "Arab sector" is overseen by the Sheen Bet who has authorization to veto the hiring of any teacher, principal or supervisor—any candidate for an educational position--without explanation.[65]

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[65] As recently as November, 2005, when the general director of the Education Ministry, Ronit Tirosh, was challenged by questions at a briefing with editors of local Arab newspapers on education in the Arab sector, she responded, unlike her predecessors and other senior officials who in the past have skirted the issue and even the fact that the Sheen Bet supervises every appointment, by openly confirming the Sheen Bet's role

How Israeli leaders have constructed the concepts of nation, nationality and citizenship, legalized these notions into laws and formed a regime constitutes for the Israeli sociologist Sammy Smooha a model of a "new kind of democracy." This model is premised on conceptualizing societies as divided along ethnic lines each seeking to assert their self-determination within the state. Since all can't win in this war for dominance of the national ethos, the majority, if democracy is at work, takes all and hopefully creates a stable enough *status quo* that enables the dominated to have certain political rights and ethnic self-expression while abiding by the constraints set by the majority; or where possible each distinct ethnicity should be enclosed within a territorial entity where it can be secured to express its right to self-determination as a sovereign people without the presence of any others. This last option is seen as preferable but since it is not usually possible Israel's "new kind of democracy" is presented as the more realistic alternative to the *divided society* syndrome.[66]

But here is the rub. How is stability to be maintained if the ethnic proportions change over time? And why is such a model of ethnic purity as the presupposition for the composition of a state assumed as preferable to a completely secularized mixed society? If there is any truth to Jared Diamond's fascinating book, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies*, then human development has rested to a great extent on contact between peoples and their mixing. Certainly, contemporary Israeli cuisine and art reflects

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and that neither she nor Education Minister Limor Livnat had any intention of working to change it. See Aryeh Dayan, "Teacher's pests," *haaretz*, November 3, 2005.

66 Smooha's model contributed to initiating the current debate taking place within Israel concerning Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. See Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype," Israel Studies 2, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 198-241 and "The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State," *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 4 (October 2002): 475-503.

the contact of Western immigrant peoples with the Middle Eastern landscape, including its native population, language, architecture, vegetation, cuisine, color, shape—all that makes up the natural and human ecology of a place. In any case, in Israel the non-Jews keep staying and reproducing and pose a threat to the majority. The acquisition of more of Eretz-Israel also poses a threat to the Jewish majority since the annexation of land that contains non-Jews would potentially require, sooner or later, granting them citizenship and the right to vote under any morally recognizable precepts held by the international community. All predictions, as stated earlier, indicate that the Palestinian presence will only continue to grow proportionally.

In the struggle for the completion of the "national" project—acquisition of some or all of Eretz-Israel as the exclusive homeland for the Jewish people with established borders—the majority is constantly 1) in need of ingathering of Jews from the Diaspora, 2) battling amongst themselves over the legal definition of who is a Jew in attempts by some to swell the ranks by recognizing previously categorized non-Jews as Jews, 3) when available, settling the terrain with new Jewish settlers (both in the areas within the Green Line that that are predominantly or substantially inhabited by Palestinians in the Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev, as well as in the Occupied Territories), 4) trying to find means of removing Palestinians from these areas through social discouragement, confiscation and physical removal or resettlement (like the Bedouins in the Negev), 5) fencing in the Jewish only ghettos within the West Bank that form contiguous territorial mass with Israel of the Green Line, and 6) obsessed with security, maintaining a state of national emergency, military preparedness, and engaging in repeated wars.

The consistent policy of not establishing permanent borders is tied to the unfinished "national" construction and the "demographic crisis". Sallai Meridor, Chairman of the Jewish Agency, made this very clear at a conference convened in 2002 by the Institute for Jewish People Policy Planning (although this conference was put on by a private organization which is part of the Jewish Agency, it received government founding). At this conference, which was convened to deal with the "demographic crisis", Meridor stated that the "demographic threat" from Palestinians inside Israel and the occupied territories "must certainly influence our borders policy."[67] Although it is a desire of many Jewish Israelis that the national project be completed in regard to what they see as their historic mission and national right: namely, redeeming all of Eretz-Israel for the Jewish people, this is as yet an impossibility since, besides the obstacles due to international law, so many non-Jews are present.[68] Until or unless this so-called

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67 Quoted in Will Youmans, "Understanding the Existential Threat: Israel's Demographic Obsession," *counterpunch*, December 7, 2002. See also Arnon Soffer, "From Demography to Disengagement," in *Israel on Israel*, eds. Michel Korinman and John Laughland (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008), 155-163. Soffer was a participant at the conference and is a proponent of the Separation Fence as a means "for maintaining the Jewish majority in Israel." He thinks "the subject of demography constitutes one of the central considerations in Israel's formulation of policy."

68 See Gershom Gorenberg, *The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., Times Books, 2006). Aryeh Dayan reviews this book in *haaretz*, March 9, 2006 and writes: "Gorenberg chose to start the story of the settlements on June 19, 1967, the last day of the Six-Day War. On that Saturday night, three days after the battles in Jerusalem had died down and only hours after they had ended in the Golan Heights, Israel destroyed without a government decision, without an orderly procedure, not according to law and without being able to determine exactly who made the decision. Like many of the activities that would follow, the destruction of the Mughrabi Quarter stemmed from the emotional tendencies of the state's leaders to determine facts that would affect the permanent status created on the ground. Further on, Gorenberg describes how the first settlements in the Golan Heights (July 1967), Gush Etzion (September, 1967), the Jordan Valley (late 1967) and Hebron (April 1968) were established in a similar fashion. 'They knew perfectly well that they were doing things opposed to international law,' he says of the state's then leaders. Some realized that their actions in the territories would create a colonialist and binational reality from which Israel would have a hard time extricating itself. 'They were always aware of this problem. Levi Eshkol, for example, constantly talked about how much he wanted the bride, i.e. the territories, but how he didn't want the dowry that came with her, i.e. the Palestinians in the territories.' Why then did Eshkol (and like him, Allon, Yisrael Galil, Golda Meir, Dayan, Peres and others) do what they did?...they began to determine settlement facts on the ground as if they were back in the days of the Mandate, as if they were acting against the British Mandate

demographic threat can be solved there is no possibility of Israel as presently constituted fully absorbing the Occupied Territories as part of Israel proper. On the other hand, giving up the territories in total is not an option either, since for one thing the settler movement is now quite strong and as citizens they vote and are part of the government. Furthermore, there are important resources, especially water, that the State has no intention of giving up. So *irresolution* to borders is the form of *living resolution* that the leaders of Israel have consistently chosen since Ben-Gurion.

Whether Israel will achieve annexing more territory is yet to be seen, but there are those within Israeli society who are ready to negotiate some kind of land (which includes those areas of the West Bank that have been illegally settled by Jewish Israeli citizens) for peace in hopes that within the boundaries of Israel Jews are a majority and can remain a majority. This has led to the reassertion into Israeli politics, as mentioned above, the question of transfer. Clearly, a one state solution is not on the horizon and a two-state solution at present is tenuous, though not impossible, at least from the standpoint of Israel, though for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, how to be a state within a

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government…' All the government ministers, without exception, felt obliged to support settlement somewhere in the territories…All these processes of course had political roots. A major component in the ruling Labor movement, Ahdut Ha'avoda and the United Kibbutz Movement, of which Galili and Allon were leaders, continued in 1967 to believe, just like on the eve of the establishment of the state, in the idea of the Greater Land of Israel. Another major component of Labor—Rafi, under the leadership of Dayan and Peres—also supported continued Israeli control over all the territories and even threatened, both before and after the Yom Kippur War, to quit the Labor government, join the Likud and bring Begin to power…Gorenberg describes the settlement dreams that the Labor Party leaders entertained between the Six-Day and the Yom Kippur War. Yitzhak Tebenkin, the ideologist of the United Kibbutz Movement, spoke of establishing 'hundreds of new kibbutzim' in the West Bank; Yigal Allon spoke of the settlement of 100,000 Israelis in the Jordan Valley; the settlement division of the Jewish Agency made plans to settle 50,000 Jews in the Golan Heights, and Ariel Sharon, the CO Southern Command, spoke of the establishment of the dozens of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, which would be separated from the Sanai desert by dozens of Jewish settlements that would be established in the Rafah Salient." All their dreams at the time may not have been realized but slowly and surely the facts on the ground have continued in the Occupied Territories to mirror what the Zionists leaders did during and after (when Palestinians under Israeli citizenship were restricted to "security zones" under military rule unable to leave their "zones" without military permits) the establishment of the State of Israel in regard to the land and the native inhabitants within what is called Israel proper.

terrain that has been constructed by Israeli occupation is almost certainly a practical impossibility. At best it could become a so-called autonomous region with some kind of limited self-rule and policing itself within its fragmented, disconnected enclaves of towns and villages whose inhabitants for the most part would be there to serve the needs of the Israeli economy. This may be a solution Israelis could live with but what about the Palestinians? For one, the Palestinian part is not even contiguous and Israel has taken control over most of the water resources. A viable self-sustaining environment for a people to govern and reproduce themselves within is in practical terms not very realistic. What living resolution will emerge next within this contentious reality I do not think is predictable at this time though various scenarios are certainly possible and some more probable than others.

It may appear that what I have been laying out in this chapter contradicts the argument made in chapter 1, that Israel is not a Jewish state. Quite the contrary. The presuppositions of the state are based on the real relations of property and class between and among the real Jews and Palestinians that compose Israeli society. The political leaders have insured the legal basis and structural apparatus for maintaining these presuppositions within civil society while carrying out its colonial settler project. As was argued in chapter 1, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Christianity as religious or cultural or ethnic affiliations or as ethical systems and traditions do not constitute the basis upon which or the historically specific forms within which real individuals 1) own, possess, appropriate and control the resources—the conditions for life—and wealth of society, 2) practically and legally relate to one another and nature, and 3) relate to one another within social production, distribution, and consumption through which the manifold

aspects of material and cultural life of individuals within society are reconstituted and reproduced. Traditions and affiliations survive through, adapt to and are transformed by individuals who are acting within changing secular and temporally specific relations to each other, wealth, conditions of life, labor, the products of labor, and so forth. As Lefebvre argued "ideologies do not produce space…they are in space…It is forces of production and the relations of production that produce social space." As individuals make and transform themselves and their relationships to each other and nature within their more or less stable, more or less contested, ever-changing societal terrains, they transform their own religious, traditional and cultural selves in the process. The *Bible* was retranslated under King James in England and today in Israel who is a Jew is getting redefined; both are expressions of new secular interests pushing against older established religious traditional boundaries (themselves *living resolutions* of earlier secular interests expressed within historically specific religious forms) within their respective changing secular circumstances.

Typically Israeli scholars and ordinary people declare the state to be Jewish in much the same way that the lawyer Ruth Gavison does in the following passage:

> For a state to be Jewish, on the conceptual level, it needs to have either a Jewish majority or some form of Jewish particular identity. Israel is clearly a Jewish state, on all these spectra. It has a large Jewish majority (about 80 percent). It is a nation-state that maintains strong control over the symbolic and material aspects of the state. Hebrew is its language; its holidays, religious as well as national, are those that belong to the Jewish calendar. Jewish religion is very present in public life, and matters of personal status are controlled by Orthodox religious law.[69]

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[69] Gavison's reduction of the notion of the state to stand for the embodiment of practices particular to its majority population, and her assertion that this speaks to the question "on the conceptual level" is one which ignores a long standing and extensive body of literature dealing with the historical, theoretical and political issues pertaining to the formation, boundaries, forms and content of the state. At best it is simplistic or just a statement of ignorance, at worst it is a vulgar expression of ideological interest asserted as conceptually sound. I suppose this is an example of democracy at work—everyone has the right to assert their opinion as fact or truth, or construct their own "conceptual level" and expect it to be treated as equally valid and authoritative as the next simply because they thought it, said it or wrote it.

The fact that Jewish traditions and customs are given expression within the society's life activities and recognition within the state by way of legislation, like making the Sabbath a legal day of rest, forms the basis for her to postulate, "on the conceptual level," that these features of Israeli society are the substantive elements that define what constitutes the state. If she had presented these facts to demonstrate on the practical rather than conceptual level the *Jewishness* of the state and society she would have been on firmer ground. The very things that Gavison lists do speak to the *Jewishness* of Israeli society culturally, linguistically and so forth. If one's claim is limited to this reality, then to say Israel is Jewish like England is English, as the argument is often made, has some meaning. But this is not what is being claimed. The argument pertains to the definition and substance of what a state is and leads directly to the conclusion that it is justifiable within a democracy to privilege one group of citizens within civil society and political society over any others.

To claim "on the conceptual level" that Israel is a Jewish state just like the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is an English state is a conceptual absurdity. I don't know of any English individuals who would make such a claim for themselves unless they were right-wing, anti-immigrant, racist or anti-Semitic bigots. England has a parliamentary form of government and its state presupposes the right to private property in the means of production and land and social reproduction occurs within the capitalist market. As a citizen of England, you are as equally English and a member of the English nation regardless of your religion, ideology or ethnicity.[70] Yes, it

[70] I once heard a story about Winston Churchill that related how Churchill refused to take some action against an English citizen, as requested by the Americans during WWII, because he was a Communist. Churchill retorted that he would do no such thing stating that the gentleman in question was a "good Englishman."

has an English character to its form of government and cultural life due to its particular history, customs, language, etc. This is true of any country. But these characteristics change and adapt over the years to the changing social relations that constitute the society and the state.

In the case of England, whose modern history has been fraught with revolution and counter-revolution as new and old social forces--the bourgeoisie, the landed aristocracy, peasants, independent farmers and the proletariat—have battled to insert or maintain their interests within civil society and the state, we see that there have been various changes to the regime form, legislation and property relations. These changes have been shaped by the economic and political (and at times military) strength of the social forces present. Under Queen Elizabeth maximum wage laws were put in place as a means to insure the survival and growth of the newly developing capitalist class and capitalists were penalized if they paid anything higher than the maximum allowed. Now in England as is true for the advanced capitalist states the workers have won minimum wage laws. To say England is an English State is simple-minded and has no real meaning "on the conceptual level." Neither does labeling Israel a Jewish State or the United States a Christian State because a majority of the populations within these states identify themselves as Jews or Christians and national symbols have Jewish or Christian significance whether explicitly or implicitly and Saturday or Sunday is legislated as a day of rest (though in the market society par excellence, the US, many people never get a day of rest since most everything is open for business on weekends and holidays).[71]

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[71] In Israeli discourse the fact that Saturday is the official day of rest is held up by some as proof that the state is a Jewish state and, the fact that it is the only state in the world to do so somehow proves it is an expression of modernity and democracy. During the French revolution a debate took place within the

Again, as explicated in chapter 1, it is not what is specifically Jewish or Christian or Islamic or the such that defines the state within which these ideologies and identities have survived over the centuries, but the secular content of real individuals that compose society and the historically specific forms that the social relations of reproduction have taken by these individuals. That religious and ethnic affiliations, as well as gender, color, sexual orientation, etc., are played out in the human drama is no doubt the case and these influence the character of a society and even more importantly how the fundamental relations of class and privilege within civil and political societies will take shape (women, for instance, up until recent history in most European states and the United States, epitomes of the modern secular political state, could not own property or vote); but these identities and affiliations are situated within historically specific social forms of reproduction within which religions, customs, traditions, legal concepts, gender relations and such evolve, adapt and are transformed.

As an example, within Christian feudal Europe land could not be bought or sold (though it could be given as gifts) and the serf could not be alienated from the land (if land was given the serfs went with it). Nor could Christians deal in money lending. It was to the interest of feudal property to restrict as much as possible the penetration of a money economy, which presupposes the alienation of property in exchange, within the feudal order. During this time the *Bible* was translated (in accordance with the original Hebrew) and interpreted in such a way that making a profit and charging interest were

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French Chamber concerning what day should be established as a day of rest. Sunday was suggested which provoked the debate. The secular revolutionaries insisted that establishing Sunday privileged one group (a majority) within civil society and therefore in principle had to be ruled out. For these secular revolutionaries one of the tasks of political society and the state was to insure the rights of all men (and therefore protect the rights of minorities) against majority tyranny even regarding such mundane matters as holidays.

ruled immoral. Matters changed and just as Shylock had to be castigated so that the emerging bourgeois Christians could in the end take over monetary functions--which no longer existed within the pores of society but were becoming the very rationale for intercourse within society--so too did the *Bible* get a kind of castigation in its being retranslated and reinterpreted in such a way that the original Hebrew words for "profit" and "interest" were turned into "unjust profit" and "usury". By qualifying these words the good Christian burgher readers of the scriptures could with clear conscience carry on their gainful business of gainful enrichment off the back's of others with the *Bible* placed comfortably under their arms.[72]

In Israel the concern over who is a Jew has arisen again and is now being contested. Many Jewish Israelis are advocating for legally changing the laws to fit to what they understand to be new circumstances that require redefining what has been a centuries' old code. For example, it is argued that the children of non-Jewish women and Jewish fathers should be classified as Jewish.[73] It is also argued that non-Jewish women

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[72] Various Liberation Theologians who are steeped in the history of the *Bible* have studied how the *Bible* has been retranslated in different historical periods. The King James Version is particularly interesting in regard to the question of profit and interest. In the original Biblical Hebrew text profit or gain (besa' which derives from incision, extraction by cutting with a knife) is condemned in all its forms, including interest (neshek), since it is considered a gain made from exploiting someone's hardship and need. During classical feudalism in Europe this translation strictly applied. Later, the Hebrew words for "profit" and "interest" were re-translated as "unjust profit" and "usury" so that the reader is left with the idea that profit and interest as such are legitimate. In the original text they are outrightly condemned regardless of the amount or rate. Jose Miranda calls these mistranslations "the conspiracy of the ideologues of the establishment." By the time King James commissioned a retranslation of the *Bible* into English the burgher class was well established in England and obviously, given that they were good Christians and the society a good Christian society, the authentic meaning of the words of God expressed by *besa'* and *neshek* could only have meant "unjust profit" and "usury". The King James Version of the *Bible* became the main translation for generations. See Jose Miranda, *Communism in the Bible* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1981), especially 48-56 "Reprobation of Profit."

[73] See for instance an online posting by jonathan, "The Head Heeb: Ezra, Shalit and Intermarriage," January 6, 2003 and Mark J. Altschul, "Israel's Law of Return and the Debate of Altering, Repealing, or Maintaining Its Present Language," *University of Illinois Law Review* 2002, no. 5 (2002): 1345-1372.

and men (this does not hold for Palestinians; it applies only to non-Jewish immigrants brought to Israel by Jewish organizations and the government), even if they do not convert, who identify with Israel and feel themselves to be part of Jewish society should be registered as Jewish and be counted as part of Jewish society and the nation proper.[74] This is not a theological matter though of course religious individuals and parties are a part of the dispute. A very practical secular need, based on the present Zionist agenda of maintaining a Jewish majority, is pushing against the religious and traditional law that define who is a Jew in order to adjust these rules to secular demands.[75] It has nothing to do with the "actual" Jewishness of individuals but the reclassification of secular individuals (whether they are Jewish or not) within secular society so that particular individuals be accorded Jewish status in order to combat a secular need to maintain a privileged position of a particular caste of the population within the State.

To see just how this is the case, I quote here extensively from an article written by Asher Cohen in which he describes the ongoing changes to official classifications regarding who is classified as Jewish by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) especially regarding the non-Jewish non-Palestinian population—who he calls the non-Jewish Jews. Most of these individuals are Russian immigrants. His story reads like a parody but it is not. He implies that since these individuals and their families are in reality treated as part

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[74] There are over 300,000 non-Jewish, non-Arab immigrants now living in Israel. This is a substantial number of people who potentially could be counted as Jewish (and their offspring) which makes the question of their status as Jews a serious matter. In practical terms they are incorporated into Jewish society but they are excluded from certain privileges that are available to Jews only, like where one is buried. Because these individuals do not count as Jews, even those that adhere to Zionism and Israel as a Jewish State, there is an element of prejudice and social exclusion that is felt by the non-Jewish immigrants.

[75] As discussed above and a bit more later, this is based not in religious matters, though some use the *Torah* to get support for their argument, citing for instance the story of Ruth, but on the need to combat the "demographic threat" posed by the Palestinian presence in the Jewish nation.

of Jewish society proper, unlike *our Arabs*, they should be included in the census as Jews. The real secular dispute is about demographics and maintaining a Jewish majority to justify the "minority's" subordination. He writes:

> September, 1998, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) published the following: 'In the beginning of the Hebrew Year [1999], the population in the State of Israel is estimated to be 6,037,000 souls. Of these 4,783,000 are Jewish (79.2%) and about 1,254,000 are sons of other religions (20.8%). Of these 901,000 are Moslem, 129,000 Christian, 99,000 Druze and 125,000 citizens whose religion was not classified in the census.' The statement does not give any hint as to the possible connection between the Jews and the 125,000 whose religion is not classified. In reality most of them are new immigrants who live in families with Jews. Not only is it that there is no mention that these olim arrived according to the laws of return, a valid point in itself [to grant them Jewish status], it is also that this group is placed in the population list under the heading 'sons of other religions'….
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> The same statement was repeated in September, 1999. An important change took place in the CBS that was reported in the press in December, 1999. The [CBS] statement opens as the previous one: 'In the beginning of the Year….' The big new thing appeared in the continuation of the statement: 'The 'extended Jewish population' (which also includes olim and their descendants who are not registered as Jewish in the census) amounts to about 5,100,000 (81.5%) of the population of the State and the Arab population amounts to 1,100,000.' It looks like this is the first time that an official party in the State of Israel makes use of the term 'extended Jewish population' which is accepted among demographers of the Jewish world to describe the core Jewish population and non-Jews who are part of their families. While in the Jewish world this term relates only to non-Jews living in a family structure shared with Jews, in the Israeli context it includes also families that have no Jews at all. In any case, this construct, 'extended Jewish population,' fits much more the reality in which the non-Jewish olim lives within Jewish society…
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> The terms keep changing. A few months later [May 2000] they didn't use the 'extended Jewish population' but when they calculated the portion of Jews of the whole population they added the olim in this calculation. You have to notice an interesting point in the demographic information which we will explain subsequently: whenever the Jews were presented separately from the non-Jewish olim there was an obvious process of consistent reduction in the proportional weight of the Jewish majority which gradually went below the 80% mark. Adding the olim to the Jewish majority increased the proportional weight of the extended Jewish majority above the 80% mark.
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> In September, 2000, a new term appears in the CBS statement: 'In the beginning of the Year of 2000 the population of the State of Israel amounts to 6,300,000. Of them 5,150,000 Jewish and others (82%) and 1,150,000 Arabs (18%). […] The population 'Jews and others' includes those registered in the census as Jews (4,950,000) and olim and their families who are not Jews (most of them are not registered in the census according to their religion and some of them are Christians (200,000 total, of them 20,000 Christian)).'
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> Firstly, the CBS office presents the term 'others' as a supposed neutral solution to describe a group which it isn't clear how to deal with. Secondly, the 'others' were stuck to the Jews in a clear fashion in contrast to the Arab population. And finally, the Christian olim who just shortly before were stuck to the Arab Christians were separated from them and entered into the heading 'Jews and others.' Sticking the 'others' to Jews more truly fits the reality, but it now raises a new question: To which extent is it possible to include people, like those who are authentically Christian only, under the heading 'others' which is connected to the Jewish population?
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> In December, 2000, the process of the administrative statistical conversion which is carried out by the CBS continues and deepens: 'In the beginning….6.4 million total. The Jewish population (which includes 225,000 non-Jewish olim) amounts to 5.2 million (81.4%) and the Arab population 1.2 million.' The term 'Jewish and others' disappeared and the others were included under the much more unifying term 'Jewish population.'…The climax of the

> administrative conversion process was realized in May, 2003. In the CBS statement, which was unusual and only made once, it was simply said: 'The Jewish population counts today for about 5.4 million souls and makes up 81% of the total population and is similar to its proportion in 1948.' Those who read only the text of the statement and didn't pay attention to the footnotes were not able to know about the existence of the non-Jewish olim…
>
> In the next Hebrew Year [2004] they return to use the term 'Jews and others (non-Jewish olim)'…Till the end of 2004 this term, 'Jews and others,' becomes a constant policy in describing the different populations. In the beginning of 2005 a withdrawal from the policy of giving statements to the press that connects the Jews and others to one group, so that the policy of separating the Jews and the others appears once again: '76% of the residents of Israel are Jews, 20% are Arabs, 4% are others.' This separation, as we indicated above, doesn't fit the reality where most of the olim go through the process of sociological conversion. On the evening of the 58th Independence Day anniversary, Jews and others were stuck together as a group again, while indicating the fact that together they constitute 80% of the population. Next to this statistic was presented the more detailed internal division: '76% Jewish and 4% others.'[76]

What is most interesting here is the openness of the government officials on this matter, even though there is within civil society some opposition to incorporating "non-Jewish olim" into "Jews". This opposition comes mostly from religious Jews and I suspect pressure from them is why the CBS keeps changing the calculation. The combining of "Jews" and "non-Jewish olim" into the official category "Jews" is of course simply a way of inflating the demographic numbers. But it does mean more than this—it is a secularization of what it means to be Jewish within the "Jewish State". Such a redefinition of Jewishness changes the "traditional" rules for identification of who is a Jew. Since "non-Jewish olim" are treated within civil and political societies and vis-à-vis the State more or less like "Jews" Cohen is absolutely right to see this as their "natural" category for registration. Non-Jewish olim others are not *othered* except for not being officially registered as "Jews" which means certain things are not available to them, but in most practical ways they are and perhaps more importantly they are considered to be part of "Israeli" society proper.

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[76] Asher Cohen, "Non-Jewish Jews in Israel," in *Judaism and Israel*, ed. Avi Sagi and Yeddia Z. Stern (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House Ltd., 2006.), 88-91. Brackets mine. Translated by Ghassan Fawzi.

Now, if non-Jews, who neither have maternal Jewish lineage nor religious affiliation with Judaism, the two main rules for claiming Jewishness, can be given "Jewish" status, then why can't Palestinians be classified as Jews if they are also law abiding citizens? And if non-Jews and Jews can be recognized by the State as the same category of people, then what meaning does Jewish have except to distinguish some part of the citizenry from the Palestinian citizenry? If affiliation is secularized so that non-Jews, even those who are purely Christian like some of the Russian immigrants, can be classified as Jewish why not simply classify everyone as Jewish, or even forget about this altogether and become a "modern" "democratic" fully secularized state, which you already claim to be, by letting everyone equally be "Israeli"? Make Israeli everyone's nationality. If this is not possible, and the "Jew" and "Arab" classifications must be maintained, then one can only conclude that the interests of colonialism are mandating the State's practice and not some sacred right of the Jewish people-nation to their "national" right to self-determination as a people. Israeli nation-building and not the Jewish people's project is not yet finished. The expropriation of Palestinians from their homeland has not as yet been completed; otherwise there is no reason to maintain such a distinction. Israel's leaders could continue completing the capitalization of the Israeli economy and continue incorporating the Palestinians as their reserve army of labor while maintaining segregation, just like other Western capitalist countries, without needing a complete culture of separation. Palestinian ghettos could remain, but their form would take the more general capitalist form as seen in the United States, France and England. This agenda is not yet on the horizon, but the dilution of official terminology may indicate that such social forces exist and they are pushing Israel to move in this direction.

Meanwhile, twenty per cent of Israel's citizens who are Palestinians are classified as "non-Jews" by the Israeli government and their "nationality"[77] as Arab.[78] The attribution of Palestinian is an arena of contention and to date, as already discussed, Palestinian does not legally constitute a "nationality" according to the State's definition and although Arab is referred to as a "nationality" it is done so only in regard to the individual not as a group. Palestinians, or in Israeli parlance Arabs,[79] are considered a minority, who are a collection of minorities classified according to religious affiliation, Muslim and Christian being the two major groups.[80] Duruz have been separated out as a separate "nationality" even though they are Arab (and they are known to proudly claim themselves to be the "pure" Arab) and a religious split-off from Islam and have never had a territorial state of their own. Jews on the other hand are categorized in popular

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[77] Here the problem mentioned in the beginning of this chapter becomes evident. We are not strictly speaking dealing with "nationality" here since Arab or Palestinian does not constitute nationhood and therefore is not a nationality. Ethnicity may be a better word but to call "Hebrew" an ethnicity is not quite kosher either. These concepts are peculiar to Israeli definitions and legal classifications and do not correspond to the concepts of nationality and ethnicity in general use. I will use nationality in quotes to qualify what is called nationality but is more closely a kind of ethnicity construct.

[78] As discussed earlier there are also certain breakdowns within the Arab population such as Duruz and Samaritan.

[79] Rhoda Kanaaneh received the following email from a "prominent Israeli academic" in response to asking for his suggestions regarding her "research on Palestinians serving in the Israeli armed forces." He replied: "I don't know what…you're talking [about]. Except [for] about a dozen volunteers no Palestinians serv[e] in the Israeli military. Druze and Circassians are drafted and several hundreds of Bedouins (and perhaps some Arab Christians) serv[e] as volunteers. However [to the best of my] knowledge none of them perceived themselves as 'Palestinian.' If you're searching for ARABS in the Israeli military, this is another issue." Kanaaneh's brackets. "Embattled Identities: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 8-9.

[80] The dissection of the non-Jewish indigenous population into groups and sub-groups was a conscious strategy of "divide and conquer", which became formalized during the 1947-49 War, and took on new meaning and forms after the State was established. Part of the strategy's objective was to gain loyalty from some groups, like the Duruz, Bedouins and even Christians, by granting them favorable treatment. See for instance Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*; Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, 1947-49; and Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient: Expertise in Arab Affairs and the Israeli State*.

conception, scholarly work, and legally along a variety of lines including Ashkenazi, Oriental, religious/non-religious, country of origin, ethnicity, and time of immigration. Harvey E. Goldberg and Hagar Salamon argue that "a reduction of the complexity of the social dynamic in Israel" is shown "by the reliance upon and the politics of the categories delineated by the Central Bureau of Statistics [in regard to the Jewish population] to classify country of origin."[81]

Nonetheless, making classifications of "ethnicity" more empirically correct and less blatantly racist, sexist, ethnocentric, does not really address the fundamental issue. I have heard it often said by non-religious Jews that "I have more in common with secular Arabs than I do with religious Jews." But attachment to the hegemonic Zionist paradigm, which constructs an identity of exclusive national belonging and is supported by the objective reality that all Jews share in the product of their social, economic and political privilege, has not lead to creating any meaningful associations that are based on the real secular relationships that individuals share within their common society, except at the peripheries and within the pores of social discourse and space. Some Jews and Palestinians are exploited by the same Jewish bosses; and the working class at large, which is obviously Jewish and Palestinian, is not socially unified and therefore members are not able to take on labor struggles in a genuine united front.[82] Non-religious Jews do

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[81] Harvey E. Goldberg and Hagar Salamon, "From Laboratory to Field: Notes on Studying Diversity in Israeli Society," *HAGAR: International Social Science Review* 3, no. 1 (2002): 125. They go on to say "The categories reflect an arbitrary division of continents and the little attention paid to differences among countries or regions within countries. The division into two groups, Europe-America and Asia-Africa, creates false dichotomies of East and West, along with their well-known orientalist hierarchies. Another error of simplification is the practice of defining 'country of origin' with reference to fathers only, a further indication of the inability to relate to complex social fields, in this case, the increasingly hybridized ethnic identities in Israel that are essential to understanding the dynamics of Israeli ethnic diversity."

[82] The Israeli working class is also divided along "ethnic" lines among Jews and between Jews and Palestinians. Palestinians are situated in distinct locations within the work force and often Jews and

not as a rule cross the *national* line and unite with the secular Palestinians in publicly meaningful ways. The national ethos evaporates all these substantive concrete unities of lived realities shared by Jewish and Palestinian individuals within civil society into thin air. At times of course the line is crossed, like on the issue of nationality registration discussed earlier. But generally, at best, what one sees are Jewish associations that sponsor "understanding" between Jews and Arabs which hold special programs where, for instance, children meet and discuss their stereotypes of the other; while the scouts remain separated into Hebrew and Arab only scouts with virtually no funding for the latter and a wonderfully elaborate infrastructure for the other.[83]

Yerach Gover, who is expressly interested in the "dilemmas arising from how subjects are thought to be related to the Law, those that bear on the subjective aspect of Israeli civil society," analyzes the expression of these dilemmas in Israeli Hebrew

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Palestinians do not work in the same work places and usually not in the same job categories. Palestinian citizens are excluded from working in certain enterprises and certain occupations, usually for "security" reasons. Some of the reasons given for job distinctions verge on the bizarre, and are simply racist. For instance, in restaurants Palestinians work as chefs and dishwashers but not waiters. I was told by Jewish friends that Jewish Israelis don't want to see Palestinians when they are dining or recreating so they are not hired as waiters on the floor; instead they do the work behind the scenes in the kitchen. Secondly, it is commonly believed, and it has been said to me, that as waiters Palestinians might poison the food. But chefs are in an even better position to do that and most chefs in Israeli restaurants are Palestinian. Separation within the work force though is not universal, since Palestinians are hired as bus drivers, nurses, and other occupations where they work together alongside Jews. The Histadrut (General Federation of Labor), the major and largest trade union in Israel, was Jewish only until 1959 when Arab Israelis were allowed to become members but without the right to participate in elections which was granted in 1965. Still, leadership and policy within the Histadrut is clearly discriminatory towards its Palestinian membership.

[83] My observations of co-existence programs in Israel were confirmed by what Dan Rabinowitz states about the political agenda of these programs: "Conceptualising the project as an effort by hegemonic 'First' Israel [Ashkenazim members of the Labor Party] to stem unwanted tides within the younger echelons of 'Second' Israel [Mizrahim] thus puts into perspective the peculiarly passive role designed in it for representative of 'Third' Israel—the Palestinian citizens. The Palestinians, particularly those taking active part in structured meetings in the classroom, were there to serve as living illustrations in an ideological and political battle that is of great importance to Jews in Israel but of limited direct relevance for Palestinians." Dan Rabinowitz, "Natives with jackets and degrees. Othering, objectification and the role of Palestinians in the co-existence field in Israel," *Social Anthropology* 9, no. 1 (2001): 78. Brackets mine.

literature and gives us a most important insight which pertains to all layers of Israeli societal activity in the following passage:

> Whereas interpersonal relations ignore their own moral problems for individual actors, I am interested in that level of moral thought that constitutes rather than merely manifests the normative order, such as it may be. Thus, the civil subject precedes the interpersonally responsive subject, in Israeli culture as in many others, though in Israeli culture the division between civil and juridical subjects is particularly fraught with alterity, and hence laden with opportunities for a deeply guarded bad faith. Thus, the issue of historical 'value,' difference, is immediately presented within Israeli moral/political discourse and unavoidable from the standpoint of all parties to that discourse. Relations of civil subject to civil subject are relations that individuals manifest in general, as representatives. Therefore, they carry the weight of an exclusion as well as inclusion. The other, in a sense, the object of the civil subject, and the latter expresses the subjectivity beyond what an individual can claim on her or his own. It follows that the overriding relation that presents itself as one of *Subject* to *Subject* changes when one term refers to an *other* beyond moral society. When this other is nevertheless acknowledged as a subject, the relation is that of the moral citizen of the living utopia to the merely juridical citizen of the state. The former appears as an authentic subject, whereas the latter is, as it were, a merely practical subject who is always an instance of a category, never an authentic representative. The authentic moral citizen's relation to the living utopia is not available to the juridical subject as such, for whom society is a practical but never a moral community (Gover 1994, 25-26).

Such a national/tribalist basis for membership within society which relegates citizen-persons to specific juridical and moral positions within civil and political societies cannot be fully democratic with respect to each inhabitant-citizen regardless of the stated intentions of upholding "the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, sex" (from the *Declaration*). The premises of Zionist particularism and democratic universalism simply contradict one another and cannot be resolved by linguistic or legal manipulations or, as Gover insightfully states, "by virtue of its elevation of Law to the status of a moral and practical imperative, as a virtuous 'republic'" (Gover 1994, 27). Impediments to universal democratic principles were explicitly expressed in the 1989 High Courts decision concerning the right of the Progressive List for Peace (PLP) to run in the elections. Yerach Gover again succinctly captures the significance of this case stating:

> The challenge was rejected, three to two, on narrow grounds, based on the claim that it had not been definitively proven that the PLP was calling for equal rights for Arab citizens of Israel. But the position of Justice Menahem Elon, that 'it is necessary to prevent a Jew or Arab

> who calls for equality of rights for Arabs from sitting in the Knesset [Parliament] or being elected to it,' appears to have been upheld by a four-to-one majority. The charge that the PLP program calls for full equality between Jewish and Arab citizens, and, furthermore, that the party intends 'to act to realize equality in all aspects of life,' was not considered to have been proven. But the majority appears to have agreed with Justice Dov Levin that such commitments (which he thought *had* been proven) would suffice to bar the party from the political system. As Justice Dov put it, the PLP members 'completely deny that the State of Israel is the State of the Jewish people,' so, although they have the right to express their opinions, if these opinions 'conflict with the Basic Law of the Knesset' by calling for equal rights, the party is barred from participation in the political system--or would be barred according to the Court majority, if those transgressions had been fully proven (Gover 1994, 28; brackets mine).

Kretzmer concludes his discussion of the PLP case by saying that the

> wider implications, which were articulated in the most radical fashion by the dissenting justices in the PLP case, are that on the decidedly fundamental level of identification and belonging there cannot be total equality between Arab and Jew in Israel. The state is the state of the Jews, both those presently resident in the country as well as those residents abroad. Even if the Arabs have equal rights on all other levels the implication is abundantly clear: Israel is not *their* state (Kretzmer 1990, 31).

Through the repeated observation of the petty (and not so petty) harassment and penalization to which Palestinians under Israeli citizenship are regularly subjected I began to realize that what I was witnessing is not about protecting or securing the lives of Jewish Israelis; instead, it is about insuring the subordination of this other people. Furthermore, these people must be made to understand themselves as a subordinated people who are *other than us* and *unable to be us*. These assaults against ordinary manners of civility between individuals within society, and who are if nothing else co-citizens within the same state, which are presumably based on mutual respect and the recognition of the other as subject, simply does not pertain to the affairs between Jews and non-Jews. Through these experiences in Israel, I believe I also came to experientially understand, what I already knew intellectually, about racism in the United States and what it means to be black in “white” America. But one fundamental ideological difference exists between the United States and Israel on the national ideological level. Universalist, vis-à-vis the citizen, democratic secularism (though of a bourgeois form) is

the principle of the republican form of the state of the United States;[84] whereas in Israel, a particularistic and exclusionary principle grounds the political and moral basis upon which Israeli society and the State is constructed; Zionist nationalism is the medium through which Israel's particularistic form of democratic secularism germinates. This necessitates, along with the class structure of Israeli society (a common reality to both Israel and the United States which also necessitates limitations to the really existing content and practice of democracy in both these countries), Palestinian subordination and provides its moral justification. The Arab is not only to accept his/her subordination in practical terms but also in principle, he/she is to accept a subordinated position as morally correct.

That Jewish Israelis typically, including those identified as progressive or leftist, prescribe to this particularistic code in its essentials became clear to me by numerous experiences such as the one I now describe. One day I accompanied a friend from Umm al Fahim to Tel Aviv for a meeting with a progressive cinema professor from the University of Tel Aviv.[85] This professor had helped set up special boarding schools for teenage Oriental Jewish students, especially from the Development towns, featuring an intensive film-education program. He hoped that such programs would help remediate the inequality between Ashkenazi and Oriental Israelis by providing Oriental Jews the means

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[84] We are not here addressing the specific form of United States' democratic secularism and its limitations both in principle and in practice, nor the historical realities that in fact legally excluded peoples who have and do reside within the State, such as Native Americans, slaves and the descendants of slaves, women, immigrants; but the philosophical premises and principles of the State. On these Israel and the United States differ fundamentally.

[85] "Progressive" in the Israeli context usually means that the individual recognizes the Palestinian as a national entity and therefore they have a right to national self-determination and a state of their own. It usually does not imply secularizing of Israeli society—the us and them is maintained and therefore the solution to the conflict is a two-state one.

of self-representation through film. He knew that Palestinian youth had little if any film equipment or training in their schools or public or private projects to make such available. Since he recognized the importance of media and access to media for representation within society he wanted to see if he could assist in starting a similar film project within the Palestinian community, the most disadvantaged and least represented sector in Israel. He asked a friend of his, who was both involved with film and active with Palestinians, to arrange a meeting between himself and a Palestinian to discuss the project. And so one day my friend and I were on our way to meet this gentleman at a Tel Aviv café and explore what might be possible.

After the mutual friend made the proper introductions, the professor explained that he didn't know Arabic and felt uncomfortable speaking Hebrew with an Arab, the language of the dominant majority population, and so he insisted that they speak in English, a supposedly third and neutral language which all of them also knew. And so English was spoken, which was excellent for me, since I wouldn't miss any of the discussion.

After completing this initial point of business, the professor added that before proceeding there was a second point in order that had to be clarified. Before a conversation with this particular Palestinian concerning a film education program for young Palestinians in Israel could take place, the professor had to be assured that this person across the table from him did not question Israel's right to exist and did not espouse such a position. If he did, the professor made it clear that there was really no basis to continue their discussion about a much needed film project for Palestinian youth,

at least not with this particular Palestinian. His tone was mannerly and polite, yet stern, as if he were seeking a common truth.

I was not really a part of this meeting, just a friendly observer, and still relatively new to Israeli society and the totalizing culture of Palestinian objectification within Israeli life. I was present as a "participating observer" and so was able to closely watch the subtleties of the interactions taking place before me. I was witnessing what I later realized was a typical relation between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis regardless of political persuasion; that is, a Palestinian must first be subjected to a political-moral cross examination to establish their credibility and thereby the legitimacy of some kind of engagement with them. One side of this see-saw engagement has access to the resources of society and the means to insure this access and the other does not.

Although this sensitive professor did not want to speak in the language of the dominating *majority* population with this member of the subordinated *minority*, he nonetheless insisted upon his clearance as a “positive Arab”. There was no question in my mind as to the genuineness of his desire to give support, but it became equally clear to me that it was up to the Arab to make it possible for him to do so.[86] To make his generosity possible, all the subordinated had to do was swallow his pride, insure that the person across the table did not have to fully contend with him as a subject, but as an object for his generosity. Consequently, my friend turned his head slightly down and to the side, averting the other’s eyes, until he regained his composure. Momentarily he

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[86] Later, upon reflection, I recognized that what was taking place here was similar to the process that had occurred during the civil rights movement in the sixties in the United States. African Americans were privately and publicly required by whites (this is, of course, still going on today) to disavow other African Americans and the use of "any means necessary" for the achievement of their civil rights. These whites, from their position of power, so very much wanted to help these others gain equality if only they, the disenfranchised, would make it possible for them to do so.

figured out how to respond in such a way as to satisfy the professor, maintain his own sense of dignity, and to guarantee the conversation's continuation. He found a way to accomplish all the above, simply and brilliantly. Slightly lifting his head and directing his eyes back to the professor he stated that, “Of course, this is not an issue for me. Israel does exist.” making it clear that there was nothing further to be debated on this subject. In this way he neither lied to the professor nor to himself, because, by stating the issue in this way he confirms a fact--Israel’s very definite existence, one he knows all too well in all its concreteness--while not claiming his allegiance to the political and ideological structure of the state as it is presently constituted, one in which by definition he can never be an authentic subject within. He was able to satisfy the professor, not violate his own personal dignity (which the professor is not even aware he has affronted) and successfully bring the conversation back to the real question at hand. As a participant observer I experience little difference in substance between this “friendly” interrogation by a progressive and the not-so-friendly interrogation by the police.

I have not yet come to the end of this story. It has only begun. After fixing the "politically correct" language of discourse, after establishing the "political correctness" of the other, I discover that there is yet another issue before us, a matter of principle that must be addressed and agreed upon concerning the requirements of the program. The professor considers that these program principles will be problematic for the Arab community and if the project is to be pursued for the Palestinian sector some way must be found to overcome Arab resistance to these program principles: namely, that it be a boarding school and one composed of fifty per cent boys and fifty per cent girls. A priori, this format is considered to be in principle the only correct one and is therefore to be

implemented in practice, independent of the specific and concrete social realities of the people involved. The professor stresses that any objections to the project's format can only represent backward attitudes which must be overcome. To strengthen his position he points to successful endeavors with regard to the Oriental Jewish population (Jews who come from Arab countries). He makes it clear that he considers Oriental Jews and Palestinians to share similar cultural attitudes, particularly regarding women, so it is to be understood that the Arabs must find a way to meet these requirements as did the Oriental Jews. He insists that if the Orientals can Palestinians can.

My friend is not asked to help conceive and develop a film-education project for Palestinian youth that takes into account their needs and situation but is presented a blueprint and then asked if there are people who can make this happen. The professor has probably never been to a Palestinian ghetto. He does not consult my friend to learn about the actual attitudes people hold nor the circumstances in which these attitudes are embedded so that some kind of realizable film-education project can be derived that would advance the social dimensions he projects as part of the purpose of the program. He lumps the experience of the discriminated Oriental Jews, as Arabs, with the Palestinians forgetting that cultural similarities do not equalize the vast social and political differences between these particular Jews and the other non-Jews. Ghettoization, subordination, poverty, repression, lack of public transportation to and from the ghettos, lack of family cars, exclusion from the military, separation of cultural institutions including public schools, the almost complete lack of resources within the ghettos—virtually no cinemas, no public libraries, no museums, no parks, no gardens, no playgrounds, no pianos, musical instruments or classes in the schools, and on and on, the

list is endless--yet these realities are not seen as relevant to the discussion and relevant to the complex issue of family and gender attitudes. Instead, the assumption is that we are simply dealing with the sexist and macho, *honor and shame* "Arab" culture.

My friend is again placed in a defensive position and made into an object of the professor's agenda. Unbeknownst to the professor, he has consistently and repeatedly transformed the person across the table from him into the object of his monologue and good will. He has dictated the language of speech, English (which, unlike our university educated professor, has been learned in the streets so in fact my friend could much more masterfully communicate in Hebrew, which is really a first language for him); he has set the terms of the discussion both in the abstract, that is adherence to the "essential" moral and political correctness of Zionism, and in the concrete, by dictating how and in what form Palestinians must be organized for their cultural uplifting which can only be realized through his financial and material support, which of course can also be withheld.

Again my friend has to swallow his pride and not directly confront our carrier of moral superiority and progressive social behavior if the conversation is to continue. He must find some way to enable the person on the power side of the see-saw to deal with the realities of the situation, adjust to them and not withhold at least some resources. He knows that from the outside one cannot just come in with a formula and apply it in principle to the Palestinian community, or any community for that matter, irrespective of their everyday realities. But these principles are most important to the professor who knows that because of *Arab ways* it will be difficult to implement such a project. Nonetheless, he insists that this format must be approximated without conceding too

much or, he makes it clear, the possibility of funding a film project in the Palestinian sector could be at risk.

I simply listen and observe as my friend once again molds his words as he explains that most parents would have difficulty sending any of their children away from home, whether boys or girls, but of course this was particularly true for girls, especially to a mixed environment. He tried to explain that one simply could not change this attitude overnight and that there are also some genuine reasons for this resistance, financial and in terms of needing the children at home to help. So he inquired if it weren't possible for the program to be modified in some ways to take into account the realities and needs of everyday life for Palestinians, perhaps by establishing a day component to the program and transportation so that the youth could get to and from the school.[87] Couldn't they explore, he suggested, other ways to bring film-education and equipment to Palestinian youth based on their circumstances while, of course, attempting to involve as many girls as possible and boys and girls together?

Never in the discussion does the professor ask my friend, "an actually existing Palestinian" who grew up in and lives in a Palestinian ghetto of Israel, what is needed and how it could be done. He never asks to see the situation, though when this is suggested to him he gives a nod and offers the possibility of sending someone on his behalf; nor does he inquire about meeting and talking with the youth to find out what's on their minds and what concerns they have. Instead, he outlines what the project is to be and how he might

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[87] Public transportation to and from and within the ghettos is greatly lacking making life quite difficult. Private cars are also relatively scarce and when a family does have a car it is usually needed by the male head of the house, who can be away working for days, weeks and even months. Nor are the internal road systems in the ghettos developed to satisfactorily accommodate the cars already in use or for easy internal movement.

be able to get certain moneys and equipment. His main concern at this point is whether people in the Palestinian sector are available and of like mind to do what he has described. How can my friend respond? At this point he can't be sure if a project amenable to the professor can be worked out. It seems it is more important that the format—a boarding school with 50 percent boys and 50 percent girls—be realized than finding some way to bring film training to the Palestinian communities. Furthermore, there are few Palestinian film professionals available to teach and no community organizations to speak of that have developed the capacity to do the kind of work and organizing the professor is requesting unlike the Jewish sector. Where are the human and material resources to be found and how are cultural attitudes to be changed to fit the professor's conditions, attitudes that have a basis in practical realities?

At this point in the conversation I can see that my friend is doing his best to simply prevent the doors from being shut altogether. He would like the professor to keep his mind open while he explores who is available and what might be possible. I have already come to the conclusion that what the professor has so generously offered has been handed out in such a way that it will be next to impossible for anything to come of it and unfortunately my suspicions in the end where confirmed by fact. As far as I know nothing did come of the offer, at least as of this writing, and I believe, though I have not verified this, that our friend whether consciously or not, believes this to be due to Palestinian social backwardness. The professor was there available to do his part, but the Palestinians, sitting on the lop-sided see-saw, were not able to carry their own weight.

These stories from everyday life in Israel are intended, for one, to provide a glimpse into what it means to be a juridical and not a moral citizen in the ongoing

practical, political and social activities of society. Even in the current atmosphere where there is more openness to such things as hiring Palestinians in certain positions, like doctors at major hospitals who service both Jewish and Palestinian patients and are respected by all, the *other than us* still asserts itself. In a *haaretz* article, "A respected doctor—and a suspicious Arab," the director of the emergency department of the Afula hospital, Dr. Aziz Darawshe, is interviewed. He tells the reporter how this "integrated unit has been the leader in consumer satisfaction polls" and that "more than 40 percent of the patients and a significant percentage of the staff there are Arab." (Afula is the Jewish town neighboring the Little Triangle which serves as an administration center for residents of the Little Triangle, including Umm al-Fahim.) Nonetheless, Dr. Darawshe tells the reporter: "But take me out of the area and I become a suspicious object. An hour's drive away from here, at the Haifa Mall, for example, the world turns 180 degrees."[88]

Thus, when one studies Israel's population one immediately comes up against "national" social constructs which spatially situate persons. These constructs ground legal and institutional norms which concretely affect the lives of real individuals who comprise the state and society and their relations to each other. Different sets of rights and duties vis-à-vis the state and society based on Zionist principles consequently apply to these people who are *other than us* and therefore categorically defined as distinct and separate. The consecration of religious rather than civil courts helps insure that within daily life and civil society the us and them remain as separate and distinct as possible.

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88 Ruth Sinai, "A respected doctor—and a suspicious Arab," *haaretz*, October 10, 2006.

Israel's officially established definitions of nation and nationality and the separation of nation and citizenship was and still is a contested arena within Zionist discourse and is evidenced in writings by Jews both in the Diaspora[89] and in Israel who are critical of Israeli policies, along with a growing number of Jewish Israeli voices who do not identify themselves as Zionist. Israeli law on these matters, as it has been constituted, is the *living resolution* of a contested social terrain under the hegemony of particular social forces within the Zionist Movement who were and are key leaders in the establishment of the State. The late, Hillel Kook argued the position, as Eran Kaplan points out in his book, *A Rebel with a Cause: Hillel Kook, Begin and Jabotinsky's Ideological Legacy*, that the separation of nation and citizenship was a continuation of the Jewish ghetto mentality that defined a community by a common religion and tradition and not by a common national identity and national institutions. By defining Jews as a nation and Israel as a state of the Jews for redeeming the homeland, "national" institutions in Israel are also by definition exclusively Jewish. Kook considered that this separation and definition of Israeli society by the religious community "not only prevents Israel from becoming a normal nation-state, but also perpetuates the tensions between the Jewish state and the Arab world." [90]

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89 See, for instance, Tony Kushner and Alisa Solomon, eds., *Wrestling with Zion: Progressive Jewish-American Responses to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (New York: Grove Press, 2003).

90 Quoted in Eran Kaplan, "A Rebel with a Cause: Hillel Kook, Begin and Jabotinsky's Ideological Legacy," *Israel Studies* 10, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 97. Ilan Peleg summarizes Jabotinsky's position towards the Arabs in this way: "He saw the Arab-Jewish conflict as historically inevitable. At the same time, as a European liberal, he wanted the Arabs to have full rights in the future Jewish state. He even wrote that Palestine ought to be viewed as joint property of the Jewish state (by having a Jewish majority) that would be at the same time also a state of all its citizens. It is particularly important to note that Jabotinsky believed that the Arabs should be entitled not only to personal rights, but also to national rights; that is: broad autonomy." Ilan Peleg, "The Zionist Right and Constructivist Realism: Ideological Persistence and Tactical Readjustment," *Israel Studies* 10, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 128.

A very interesting article written by journalist Shulamit Tna regarding a research project that surveyed the attitudes of Israeli youth towards other groups was printed in the newspaper *Yediot Ahronot*, Israel's most widely distributed paper. It was published on Rosh Ha Shonah, the Jewish New Year, September 5, 1994, and is entitled "Youth of the Jewish New Year."[91] The sub-title in bold says "Kibbutznicks About Orientals: They are wimps. The Orientals About Kibbutznicks: they are Ashkenazi. The Jews About Arabs: They are dirty." The journalist begins the article saying

> 'Kibbutz Galuiot' [ingathering of Diaspora Jews in Israel], 'melting pot,' 'unified Israeli society' these are all beautiful phrases. Israeli youth, according to the research which was done this year, are full of prejudice, hostility and even hate towards other youth groups that look to them characteristically different than their own. The research indicates the canyon of alienation that separates youth groups who are polarized and distanced, like kibbutznicks, students from the development towns, north and south Tel Aviv high school students (brackets mine).

This research project was conducted by the staff of Kashev (Listening) Corporation which is owned by the Kibbutz Barur Hayal (Distinguished Soldier). This kibbutz specializes in the different implications of computer networking. The study's data is based on interactive correspondence among students at sixty schools located throughout Israel and include Ashkenazi, Oriental and Palestinian students. The research hypothesized that by using the computer word processing system during the students' computer class time they could capture the "real" content of the students' thinking about themselves and others because they would not be afraid to express what they really think via the computer. The study was interactive. One day students from one school would write to the others who could then write back and so on. The study's population included kibbutzim, Russian immigrant, Moroccan, homosexual and Palestinian youth. These students resided in kibbutzim (Ashkenazi), the development towns in the south

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[91] Translated from the Hebrew by Ghassan Fawzi.

(Sephardim or Orientals), and Tira and Nazareth (Palestinians). The findings were announced in the article whose subtitle, quoted above, indicates that Ashkenazim dislike the Sephardim, the Sephardim dislike the Ashkenazim, and they both dislike the Arabs. Dislike for Arabs placed first among the Jewish Israelis except for the Russian immigrants for whom it ranked second.[92]

The kibbutz students say the Sephardic are “wimps". They have an Oriental accent. Their dress is “mitsoatsaa” (gaudy). Their females loose. They are full of garbage music. They only read *Mariv Noaar* (*For Youth*) which they consider silly. Most of them are driver-sick and they are only interested in money. The kibbutz students identify the Sephardic as right wing and identical to Kahane and transfer people. They dress in the style of what is derogatorily called the Central Bus Station. They are full of drug users, criminals and obsessed with gold jewelry. They have never heard of the Beatles or Pink Floyd. They take a knife out over any small argument. They don’t know what physical work is. They are ambitious and try to succeed at any cost.

The Sephardic call the kibbutznicks Ashkenazi and don’t think much of them either. They characterize a kibbutznick as a “tembel,” a hat wearer, someone who milks cows. They are “Ashkenazi, snobs, leftists, elitists, feel themselves to be superior." In their houses they listen to popular dance music and don’t know what rock means. They take heavy drugs from the age of fourteen. They get “protection” while in the army which

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[92] The little story depicted here tells something about how new immigrants are brought into the general attitude of disdain for Arabs. A friend of my husband told me that when one stops to get gas at gas stations, though the attendants are suppose to clean the windshield, typically the attendants do not do so if the customer is Palestinian. The new Russian immigrants, not yet fully acclimated to these Israeli manners, do not at first distinguish Palestinian from Jew and so wash the windshields of Palestinian owned cars. One day this happened to him and he saw that the immigrant was scolded by his co-worker. My husband’s friend told me, "He [the new Russian immigrant] will soon fall in line. They always do."

means easy jobs and promotions. They are square, intellectuals. They are satisfied with little things (this could be a compliment). They live in garbage. They sleep together and they start acting out sexuality when they are very young. One Mizrahi girl from Shdarout wrote: “The kibbutznicks appear to be racist themselves.” She added “I am a proud Moroccan.” But wait: “and for your knowledge, which is very narrow about us, I and the majority of my friends don’t listen to Mizrahim music. Our political opinions are close to yours. I personally wear jewelry only made of silver and in my home we very much listen to Pink Floyd.”

Both Jewish sectors say the Arabs are dirty. A Sephardic Jewish student from a poor town, Shdarout, in the south, said “Arabs are thieves, agitators, provocative, dirty, ignorant, lack credibility.” Of course there are always exceptions and one Jerusalem student said “I have no stereotypes. They are human beings, human beings, human beings.”

The researchers said they were surprised by the Arab perceptions about Jews and report that their comments “exposed a perception full of negativity towards Jews." The Arab youth used “unexpected” words like “exploiters”, “occupiers”, and “killers”.

Do not these responses speak for themselves? It is almost too easy, too mechanical a reflection of class and power within Israel. The expressions of dislike between the Ashkenazi and Mizrahi are actually more intense and concrete then that felt by the Jewish youth towards the Arabs. But this is understandable. The Arab is more an abstraction then a living person with whom one personally engages and in reality has no everyday power over you. There is no ordinary and daily involvement between Jewish and Arab youth in Israel, not even in the scouts. (In his 1950 article, “Changes in the Life

of Israel's Arabs," Y. Washitz writes that he found among the younger Arabs who are "fighting for their rights in Israel" that "all have strong aspirations to meet and cooperate with Jewish youth. Even the Arab Scouts desired to unify with the Hebrew Scouts" (Washitz 1950, 164). This was not to be.)

But unlike our researchers, I do not find the remarks made by the Arab students surprising or "unexpected". Jews are present for these youth also as abstractions, but abstractions which are real forces felt in their daily lives, not as persons, but as subjects who have power over them. These remarks could only be surprising to one who denies or refuses to recognize the objective relations of colonization, domination and subordination. Yerach Gover's insight quoted earlier is most relevant here: "What cannot occur is the recognition of a moral other in whose gaze the Jew would find him- or herself suddenly objectified as Jew, made an essence." And so, these researchers are "suddenly" caught off guard by the "unexpected" which they simply recall but do not reflect upon.

What should be cause for surprise or at least a moment for reflection is expressed in the title of the article and its opening paragraphs. This study is supposedly all-inclusive and presumably Arabs are equally subjects, not objects, of the study. But the title is "Youth: The Jewish New Year" and the opening summary does not mention Arab youth as a part of the research population. What the authors are concerned about is the discrepancy between the "ideal utopia"--the in-gathering of Jews for the common task of national revival--and its practical manifestation--hatred and prejudice among Jews. Although the study portends to be about all of Israel's population, it is really only about *our society* presented for *our* review on *our* New Year. Comments by the Palestinians

may be cause for a passing discomfort, but equilibrium readily returns. If the Palestinian students were truly seen as subjects then their statements would be cause for self-reflection, critical self-consciousness, but since they are not a moral subject, these researchers and journalists (and the Jewish Israeli readers) may listen but they are not required to hear.

In this instance, these Palestinian students, as subjects of their subordination (that is, self-consciously expressing themselves vis-à-vis the dominant--the Israeli Jew, to whom, and about whom, they have been asked to address their thoughts) associate moral characteristics of a dominator. For Israeli Jews to allow themselves to see themselves through the eyes of the other as a moral subject is a virtual impossibility. In Israel, as Gover affirms, "People learn to think politically and morally simultaneously, in regard to referents, images, and conceptions that are deeply and persistently moralized" (Gover 1994, 5). The most deeply held definitions of morality which substantiate the person and his/her affiliation to "community" and "society" cannot permit a truly self-critical and self-reflective understanding of oneself. Such self-understanding can only occur, and this is true of anyone, not specific to Israeli Jews, when one can see oneself through the other, but the other as subject like oneself. To maintain one's identity within the totalizing lens of Zionism, which is a totalizing ideology, rules this kind of self-consciousness out. It should not be at all "unexpected" if we were to discover that to many Jewish Israelis these statements by Arab youth will confirm the moral flaw, not of themselves, but the Arabs. As I was informed by an elderly respectable woman in Haifa, that besides being "primitive", "They hate us." As the writers point out in the article the Palestinian youth “exposed a perception full of negativity towards Jews,” but these negativities are

perceptions based on negative, objectifying relationships by Jews towards them as their "exploiters," "occupiers," "killers." These are not projections of demeaning attributes of a subjective character like those made between the Ashkenazi and Sephardic youth but social relationships which express their actual and felt subordination with respect to those they speak of.

The remarks about Palestinians quoted above could perhaps be reduced in their significance because after all teenagers have not yet reached maturity and are not yet fully self-reflective. It may be argued that this is a time in their lives when peer group pressure and need for acceptance have a great influence, so who is in and who is out dominates their consciousness. Be that as it may, I would nonetheless suggest that the volume of unsolicited remarks made to me about Oriental Jews, Arabs and Palestinians during my various encounters with a wide variety of Jewish Israeli adults must lead one to the conclusion that teenagers and adults share the same stereotypes. In the case of Israel, I believe such pervasive and inter-generational cultural attitudes reflects the hegemony of the Zionist ideological construct which has successfully penetrated the hearts and minds of Jewish Israelis creating a mono-cultural, mono-logical world view. This does not mean that social discourse is not fraught with tension and contention; quite the contrary, I would argue, it must be so since society is not homogeneous and the dominant world view is just that, dominant not universal; and, perhaps more importantly, held attitudes and ideologies often stand in contradiction to the real practical life relationships and circumstances the holders of these attitudes and ideologies

experience.[93] The statements about Oriental Jews, disclosed by the story I am about to tell, were not made by children but by adults at the Tel Aviv Land Authority office, who felt quite comfortable and even responsible to inform me about the Oriental character. They were a bit embarrassed about this *reality* of the Oriental within Israel but not self-critical about stereotyping ethnic and cultural groups. They mirror the same prejudices and assumptions as those made by the teenagers in the study discussed above.

The story goes: One day I found myself in the middle of a rather heated discussion among the staff at the Land Authority's Tel Aviv office concerning the development towns which are almost entirely inhabited by Jews from North African and Arab countries. Before giving the details of this conversation I must provide some background information about this trip since it demonstrates how the Palestinians and Orientals are both on the flip side of the same coin, at least regarding their subordination to the Ashkenazi power elite.

I had gone to the Land Authority to learn how "Master Plans" come into being and are developed. Particularly, I wanted to hear their side of the story as to why Umm

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[93] On Zionism as a totalizing ideology which mediates all cultural discourse in each particular, Yerach Gover writes that Israeli literature is not simply cultural because it is literary but "that the instances of it are features of a greater public discourse" which is "colonized" by Zionism. "Ideology refers to a repetitive discourse that unself-critically, expresses a particular interest in such a way that it mediates other discourses, particularly those whose concerns are primarily moral or political. As a practical matter, such a discourse aims to refamiliarize its audiences with what they have already received as incorrigible knowledge, and to do so monologically, in a way that places it beyond the challenges of different points of view and different, dialogical, means of knowing and claims to know....The success of any ideology, the extent to which it colonizes other discourses, depends in large part on its capacity to constitute and synthesize formations of meaning and feeling, integrated elements of legitimation and motivation....Zionism constitutes just such a synthesis; [and Gover shows] how it conforms to the model of ideology as a countergenerative, repetitive, thematically discursive unit; how it serves as a basis for predication within the discourses that it informs; and in what way it can be seen as pervasive to or unavoidable within Israeli culture....Jewish Israeli society is grounded in its culture, and if that culture is mediated by Zionist ideology [as he argues it does and thus effectuates] political decisions, attitudes toward other groups, patterns of authority and obligation, and the limits of political and moral dialogue" (Gover 1994, 3-4; brackets mine).

al-Fahim, whose residents have been trying for over twenty years to get a Master Plan approved by the government, did not as yet have one. I began the interview by asking how a Master Plan comes into being and how a town gets one approved. The architect meeting with me informed me that "all" towns have Master Plans. He further said that since the great majority of towns have been created by the state they began with Master Plans so their approval is simply part of their construction. When I responded by saying, "Oh, but the town I'm studying, Umm al-Fahim, doesn't have a Master Plan" he became a bit embarrassed and informed me that this is a different matter. Again, for my architect-host almost twenty per cent of Israel's population is simply invisible and not even considered within ordinary or official conceptions of what constitutes society.

After our initial discussion concerning master plans, during which I learned little about the actual circumstances concerning pursuit for one by the residents of Umm al-Fahim and the obstacles in their way, other than that governmental policy is discriminatory (and my host was clearly uncomfortable and I believe a bit critical about this discrimination) we moved into a discussion of the development towns. Since Palestinian areas are economically undeveloped, technically they should be considered as areas designated for development. I knew that the State for the most part does not include them but I wanted to understand, from the Land Authority's position, how such designation occurs. "Undeveloped" generally refers to areas that are not substantially inhabited by Jews, such as in the Galilee where there is a substantial Palestinian population, or along the borders of Israel and therefore considered to be in need of fortification. They are predominantly inhabited by immigrants from North African and Arab countries. When we entered into discussion about these areas the entire office got

involved in a heated interchange as they explained to me the special circumstances pertaining to the residents of these towns and why they are underdeveloped. I learned that these residents are "backward", "ignorant", "uneducated", "superstitious", and have "unclean personal habits", all because they come from backward countries. It should be noted that the Orientals among the staff were as vehement about this, perhaps even more so than the Ashkenazim staff, reminiscent of our girl student above who while claiming her Moroccan pride also asserts her conformity to Ashkenazi standards.

I find little to differentiate these "mature" exclamations from those of Israel's Jewish youth. The antagonism between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim has ideological, political, and economic roots and their polarization was concretized through government (controlled by the Ashkenazim) absorption and settlement policies. David Kretzmer summarizes in the following passage the ongoing task of Zionism which involves people and land.

> [E]stablishment of a Jewish state in Palestine could not have been achieved without a Jewish majority and land for Jewish settlement. Thus it was that the efforts of the Zionist movement during the pre-state years were directed at ensuring a flow of Jewish immigration and acquiring land...[And accordingly] the first legislative act passed by the Provisional Council of State [Section 13 of the Law and Government Ordinance, 1948] after independence, retroactively revoked the legislative arrangements adopted to enforce the limits on Jewish immigration and place restrictions on purchase of land by Jews (Kretzmer 1990, 35; brackets mine).

These fundamental issues of land and people for the realization of the Zionist project as envisioned by the Ashkenazim not only excluded the Palestinians but included the non-European Jews by excluding and marginalizing them from the center of Israeli society. Particularistic laws with regard to immigration, citizenship and land ownership (its settlement, purchase and sale) guarantee the Palestinian as Israel's other, while designation of location of settlement--the development towns--and work location within the labor market guarantee the marginalization of the Orientals.

The reduction of the concept of democracy to ethnic-religious or "national" majority rule, which is grounded on the social construction of produced minority space which denigrates the rights of minorities and legally gives preferential treatment to the ethnic-religious majority, is a *reductio ad absurdum* today in a world in which countries are composed of ethnically, religiously and nationally mixed populations. And Israel is no exception. "Ethnic" and "national" groups are composed of individuals whose ideologies, beliefs, class positions, etc. are not only different but can also be mutually exclusive and individuals between and among the differing "ethnic-national" groups within society may often have more in common substantively with each other than they do with many within their own "ethnicity". Conceptualizing "ethnicity" and "nationality" as the building blocks of what constitutes society serves a very useful political purpose. Such social constructs, which separate between and homogenize within, serve very particular secular interests. The homogeneity of the Zionist national paradigm subsumes the highly differentiated Jewish citizens, who are divided by class, culture, language, ethnicity, ideology and religious orientation, into a unitary national ethos which in Israel, to speak a bit like Hegel, has become conscious in the minds of most Jewish Israelis. The colonial aspect of the "national" project serves to ideologically homogenize Jewish Israelis into a "national" unity when in fact they actually exist within relations of real disunity. For instance, the 2005 report of Israel's National Insurance Institute shows that one out of every third child is poor. The number of poor families in Israel is the highest in the West while the number of millionaires and billionaires is among the highest in the world. According to the World Wealth Report 2005, the number of Israeli millionaires

per capita is twice the world average. Nine Israeli billionaires are among the list of the 500 richest people in the world.

The liberal sociologist, Sammy Smooha, has raised such a *reductio ad absurdum* to an ideal type which he labels *ethnic democracy* and claims that Israel's *ethnic democracy* represents a "new kind of democracy." [94] His claim is endorsed by such individuals as the already mentioned Ruth Gavison. She argues along with Smooha that Israel cannot give "full equality to citizens who are not members of the preferred nation."[95] For both Gavison and Smooha, the inclusion of the non-Jew territorially, that is as citizens within the state, while excluding them as subjects of the "nation" resolves itself into a more or less stable "status quo" which insures the legitimate "democratic" right of the ethno-religious majority to rule while limiting the most egregious discrimination of the minority and so a sufficient exercise of "democracy" prevails. Gavison even states that she believes "an improved *status quo* between Jews and Arabs is more stable than the *status quo* in the inter-Jewish rift. If I am right, the Jewish-Arab *status quo* in Israel is stable despite the fact that it is, as I have suggested, unjustified in many ways."

The *status quo* of Israeli society and state, whether improved upon or not, is elevated to new heights by Smooha, who argues that Israel's "new kind of democracy" may be a model for other "divided societies". Both Gavison and Smooha see the Israeli

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[94] See Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype." *Israel Studies* 2, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 198-241 and "The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State," *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 4 (October 2002): 475-503.

[95] Ruth Gavison, "Implications of Seeing Israel as a Jewish (and Democratic) State," Discussion Paper no. 383 (Jerusalem: Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, February 2005), 18. [H] and "Jewish and Democratic? A Rejoinder to the 'Ethnic Democracy' Debate." *Israel Studies* 4, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 44-72.

form of democracy as a continuation of the process begun with the Enlightenment, perhaps even its further extension within modern societies. They assert this in contradistinction to the founders of the State who explicitly were critical of the Enlightenment since they either opposed the idea of assimilation or integration of Jews into their respective societies which they saw as the end of Judaism and the Jewish people or because they did not believe that anti-Semitism, which they portrayed as an eternal condition of the Jews, could be solved by political emancipation. Nonetheless, these writers consider themselves to be both the disciples of their founding fathers and the Enlightenment. To my mind, the State of Israel is not, as is presented by Zionist ideologues, either a logical conclusion of the *rights of man* and the *modern political state* or *modernity* nor the further extension of the aspirations of the Enlightenment but more accurately an adaptation of old feudal forms of privilege given new life within the contemporary circumstances of a moribund though powerful capitalist world order. The historical record leads me to the conclusion that the hegemonic Zionist paradigm has, as Abram Leon analyzed, its roots in the European Jewish bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. Those leaders, who gained hegemony within the movement and more importantly, the State, saw as their solution to the European Jewish Question the removal of the ghetto, which in its positive aspect preserved the Jews within a Jewish community, out of Europe and its reconstitution as a ghetto nation in a state of their own where they could realize their national development (led by a Jewish national bourgeoisie) in the name of one people-nation. The following passage by Marx from "On the Jewish Question" is relevant to the debate concerning the character of the Israeli state:

> What is the character of the old society? It can be described in one word—*feudalism*. The character of the old civil society was *directly political*, that is to say, the elements of civil life, for example property, or the family, or the mode of labour, were raised to the level of elements of

> political life in the form of seigniory, estates, and corporations [kibbutzim, Jewish National Fund and such]. In this form they determined the relation of the individual to the *state as a whole*, i.e., his *political* relation, that is, his relation of separation and exclusion from the other components of society. For that organization of national life did not raise property or labour to the level of social elements; on the contrary, it completed their *separation* from the state as a whole and constituted them as *discrete* societies within society. Thus, the vital functions and conditions of life of civil society remained nevertheless political, although political in the feudal sense, that is to say, they secluded the individual from the state as a whole and they converted the *particular* relation of his corporation to the state as a whole into his general relation to the life of the nation, just as they converted his particular civil activity and situation into his general activity and situation. As a result of this organization, the unity of the state, and also the consciousness, will and activity of this unity, the general power of the state, are likewise bound to appear as the *particular* affair of a ruler [Zionism incarnated] isolated from the people, and of his servants.[96]

I am not implying by citing this quote that Israel is a feudal society; it is a colonial settler state within world capitalist development; but regime forms, just as relations within civil society and political society, can incorporate or adapt "old" forms or social relations within the regime and within civil society. Perhaps the pressures from civil society for further secularization of the state that we see taking place within Israel—I believe these are the result of the capitalization of Israeli society and its incorporation into global capitalism which is becoming ever more complete (even "national" lands are beginning to be sold off to private individuals)--may lead Israelis to rid themselves more and more from these "feudal" forms. Whatever the case, equating the tyranny of a majority to democracy at work, even the term "ethnic democracy", no matter how it is presented, stands in stark contrast to the ideals of the original advocates of the modern political state, who fought to break the tyranny of feudal privilege by constructing nation-states wherein individuals as citizens were, at least in principle, equals to one another before the state and free to engage actively within civil society.[97]

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[96] Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works, Volume 3, Marx and Engels: 1843-44 (International Publishers: New York, 1975), 165-66; brackets mine.

[97] See Nadim Rouhana, "'Jewish and Democratic'? The Price of a National Self-Deception," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 35, no. 2 (Winter 2006): 64-74. Because majority rule is equated with democracy Rouhana argues that this is why the demographic threat looms so big in the minds of Jewish Israelis. He

After living in Israel for almost five years in a Palestinian ghetto and after conducting extensive field work and review of the literature, the facts on the ground led me to the conclusion that most Israeli social scientists proceed from a priori concepts that then subsume empirical reality into these concepts instead of deriving concepts from the reality itself. Mainstream Israeli social science subsumes within its conceptual apparatus as "fact" that Israel, as a state and a society, is Jewish and democratic. These conceptual constructs are treated as analytic preconditions or presuppositions inherent to the social science object of study, and as such they are the building blocks upon which the hegemonic Zionist social science models of Israeli society have been constructed and developed. This model, by basing itself on the definition of the State of Israel as the Jewish homeland, equated Israeli society to Jewish society and the establishment of the State as the territorial realization of Jewish history.[98] Within such a model of society,

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also argues that the concern about the Jewish identity of the society is not dependent on whether or not Jews constitute a majority of the population so that the demographic problem is more about insuring and maintaining the privileges that Jews in general receive relative to the Palestinian citizenry. He thinks this is what explains the almost unanimous acceptance of the definition of Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state even within what is called the Israeli left.

[98] An example of the reduction of Jewish history to the state of Israel is seen in an article that defends the Jewish national symbols, particularly the flag and the anthem, as expressions of "The past and the future [as] our joint Jewish memory." The author argues that "'The land of Zion and Jerusalem,' in whose presence a Jewish soul still yearns and is stirred, reminds us that the State of Israel is not a 'normal' state like all other states…but rather a state whose 'vitality is in the present, which has a right in the present but for which everything stems from the past' (as Dr. Yaakov Herzog defined it)." Nadav Shragai, "Perhaps we'll cancel the flag?" *haaretz*, April 25, 2007. In Uri Ram's recent book, which critically reviews the history of social science in Israel, he shows that soon after the establishment of the state, in the 1950s, the adoption of Jewish history to the Zionist narrative was completed and that by this time, what was a marginal movement within Zionism became *the* Zionist movement. On the reduction of Jewish history to the hegemonic Zionist paradigm he writes: "The policy of adopting Jewish history to the Zionist narrative is explained explicitly in the educational encyclopedia: 'In its core teaching education should be the learning of national history and the central core of it should be the people and the land. Maximum space will be designated here for the eras wherein the people [Jewish] lived in their country [Eretz-Israel]. The various Diasporas (slavery in Egypt, slavery in Babylon and other kingdoms) will be explained only as 'episodes' in the life of the people, as a transition period, and in these eras the main thing to be emphasized is the aspiration of the people to return to their country.' (p. 257) This is stated clearly. Not only that the real history was turned into episodes and the imagined history to a real one, but also all the varieties of Jewish community life were condensed into one essence and in it the majority of the time [historical] and

tensions between Israel's *majority* (Ashkenazi) and *minorities* (non-European Jews) are theorized as the natural working out of pluralism and democracy, as ethnically diverse minorities resist, adapt to, are assimilated within their new culture--an Israeli culturalist approach which echoes Wirth. Smooha extends this standard Israeli model to include the Arab minority and comes up with the assessment that the *status quo* appears to be more or less *stable* both within Jewish society and between the Arabs and Jews, an assessment which simply mirrors his presuppositions and conceptualizations about what constitutes society and expresses his own Zionist position within the debate regarding the character of the Israeli state.[99]

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the majority of the Jews (in the Diaspora) are presented as the negating pole—as the inferior—to the minority of time and the minority of Jews (in the country) [Eretz-Israel]. Accordingly they took the following path: 'Teaching each Diaspora separately will not emphasize the general spirit of one unity. This matter makes it obligatory to deal with the Diaspora as one whole.' (p.268)…The examination of the whole of Jewish history from the point of view of Zionist historiography is new and partial, and this is in contrast to the way it presents itself as ancient and absolute…This nationalism [hegemonic Zionism], being a fruit of a late invention of a small ideological movement, and for many decades even a rejected movement, was suppressed in the collective memory, instead it was replaced with the concept of the 'concrete and essential,' of eternal Jewish nationalism which, as they claim, always aspires for national goals." Uri Ram, *The Time of the 'Post' Nationalism and the Politics of Knowledge in Israel* (Tel-Aviv: RESLING Publishing, 2006): 49-50, 53-54. [H] Translated from the Hebrew by Ghassan Fawzi.

[99] Smooha, for instance, stays within the superficial categories of the functionalist model developed by Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt that analytically privilege majority-minority ethnic categories as they appear on the surface of society. He treats these apparent categories (which are actually in need of deeper sociological analysis) as the given facts at hand. His work concentrates on the attributes of and attitudes held by the various ethnic groups and he collects his sociological data on these ethnic populations by periodically undertaking survey questionnaires. On the other hand, the works of individuals who came out of the Jewish Israeli experience such as Yerach Gover, op. cit., Ella Shohat, *Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989) and Sholmo Swirski, *Israel: The Oriental Majority*, trans. Barbara Swirski (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1989) were among the first to break the Zionist ideological hold and introduced approaches into the analysis of Israeli society that, while appreciating Israel's ethnic diversity, situated the deeper underlying realities of Zionist exclusivity within the class (Swirski) and colonial (Gover, Shohat) character of Israel's national, social and cultural development. Smooha's "new kind of democracy" was an important catalyst for the current debate around Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This debate concerns the conceptual and political legitimacy of these presuppositions (Jewish and democratic) as they pertain to the analysis of Israel society and its state and in relationship to the "kind" of democracy, if it can be labeled as such, is at work within Israel, especially in regard to the Zionist self-referential definition of nation and how this grounds Israeli laws and policies regarding nationality and citizenship. That such a debate is taking place reflects the growing importance of the new waves of critical--post-Zionist, anti-Zionist--sociological work and Palestinian insertion into Israeli discourse that are now able to claim space within academic and public discourse. Nonetheless, the ruling

*Majority*, *minority* and *pluralist* are concepts that can effectively generate a picture of the whole of society as it is immediately presented to and perceived by the observer. Sociological models that construct such pictures serve to gloss over complex determinant social content and treat the given as a self-contained laboratory removed from its historical context. Harvey Goldberg and Hagar Salomon sum up this approach as it is implemented within Israeli social sciences in the following way:

> One way of summing up these tendencies is by reference to the image of Israel as a 'laboratory', an image shared by researchers of different orientations, including anthropologists bemoaning the fact that field research was not able to take full advantage of the cultural diversity of the early 1950s (Deshen, 1979). At times, the notion was explicitly mentioned (e.g. Matras, 1965; Horowitz and Lissak 1990) or hinted at by use of terms like 'test case' (Talmon, 1972). The laboratory image encapsulates the features already mentioned: disconnection from history and the surroundings, and the isolation of empirical phenomena as if analytic distinctions were coterminous with social reality 'on the ground.' Also entailed in the laboratory metaphor is the assumption of 'control'. This resonated with the focus on social planning within Israeli social science, and the putative affinities between social science work and centers of policy and decision-making.[100]

When history is treated within mainstream models of Israeli society it is done so self-referentially, that is relative to its presently constituted terrain—the facts on the ground created by the establishment of the State--and usually concerns such matters as when and from where Jewish immigrants came to Israel, how and where they were absorbed, and what social tensions have arisen along with their absorption. More importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, by leaving out of their picture the history (and its legacy) and the continuing reality of colonialism and ghettoization these models fundamentally erase the Palestinian as a moral and social subject. The Zionist paradigm, which is a totalizing national-cultural discourse, necessitates that the Palestinian

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ideas within Israel remain to be the ideas of the ruling class and the society as a whole has moved in a right-wing separatist direction. What influence these critical voices will have is yet to be seen.

[100] Goldberg, Harvey E. and Hagar Salomon, "From Laboratory to Field: Notes on Studying Diversity in Israeli Sociology," *Hagar, International Social Science Review* 3, no. 1 (2002): 126.

> exists only in the formlessness of a nonsubject assimilated to the generally negative category of the *other than us* and its concomitant moralistic evaluation--*unable to be us*. This has its abstract political aspect in the attempt to assert a moral universe as a condition of claiming a territorial realization of Jewish history. In this way, the questions surrounding conquest are resolved by asserting a polity that can stand for the moral universe itself, therefore one based on the identification of exclusion with moral rectitude (Gover 1994, 29).

The *living resolution* of such a moral universe is actualized not only in the subordination and degradation of the humanity of the *other* but also inescapably carries with it the "bad faith" such a particularistic ethic demands, a moral uneasiness burdens, whether consciously or unconsciously, each Jewish Israeli.

Mark J. Altschul, in the *University of Illinois Law Review*, confronts this moral/legal dilemma from a non-religious point of view. On the basis of his assessment that anti-Semitism still exists within the world and that Israel is surrounded by hostile Arab states, he concludes that at least for now an ethnocentric Jewish state and it's necessarily attendant undemocratic features vis-à-vis its non-Jewish citizens must be maintained. He supports the continuation of the *Law of Return* and the *Judaization* of the land, which he acknowledges are discriminatory and do not treat all citizens as equal within the State, but he believes they are required to insure that a Jewish majority is maintained, so that Israel can legally remain a state for the Jewish people. (That citizens of a country, whether Jews are a majority or not, could mandate that their state incorporate into law a principle which insures the state be a safe haven for Jews of the world, is not considered.) Altschul argues for reform of the conversion rules so that individuals from the former Soviet Union, who are not considered Jewish under existing law, would be as he states "accepted as part of Israeli society" by being considered legally Jewish. It is curious that he says here "Israeli society." What he means, of course, is Jewish Israeli society, because otherwise there would be no meaning to his statement.

As citizens these Russian immigrants are part of Israeli society, as are the Palestinian citizens, so why is there a need to enable them to be Israeli? Actually, what I just wrote is not precisely accurate. Palestinians are conceived of as part of the Israeli state, as citizens, but not as part of Israeli society which is exclusively Jewish. In this regard what Altschul states in accurate. The issue regarding the Russian immigrants therefore is to fully *Judaize* them, that is, make them part of the "nation", "Israeli society", and not simply *Israelize* them with regard to the state, since this simply leaves them with the status of a juridical citizen of the state much like the Palestinians. By *Judaizing* the Russian immigrants they would be counted as part of us and thereby inflate the Jewish composition and so help combat the so-called "demographic threat" posed by the presence of the native, non-immigrant Palestinian citizens.[101] By equating Jewish with Israeli he has excluded twenty percent of Israel's citizenry from membership in society as such. He has, as Yerach Gover points out, internalized the Palestinian "in the formlessness of a nonsubject assimilated to the generally negative category of the *other than us* and its concomitant moralistic evaluation--*unable to be us*."

All colonizers create a world view that legitimizes their right to supersede and subordinate an existing native population; the colonizer necessarily reduces the colonized to a position of nonsubject. Much literature has been written on this question, such as

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[101] Mark J. Altschul, "Israel's Law of Return and the Debate of Altering, Repealing, or Maintaining its Present Language," *University of Illinois Law Review* 2002, no. 5 (2002): 1345-1372. In contradistinction to Altschul's argument I found two pieces in the May/June 2006 issue of *Outlook: Canada's Progressive Jewish Magazine*, that explicitly argue for separation of religion and state in Israel and full equality among all citizens as the only guarantee for Israel's security in the Middle East, for a thriving Jewish culture within a multicultural world whether it constitutes a majority of the population or not, and democracy for all citizens which under the current circumstances also circumscribes the civil rights of Jewish individuals. I would add that democratization of Israel would not only help insure the above, but there is no reason that Israel/Palestine, and I know of Palestinians who agree, could not be internationally secured as a homeland for Jewish individuals who seek residence—and this could be established independently of whether there is a majority of Jewish residents or not--as long as international laws are applied to Palestinian refugees also.

work by Franz Fanon, Albert Memmi and Edward Said, and although this literature has been an important influence, its critical review is not the purpose of this dissertation. Relevant here is the recognition that colonialist ideology can serve as a monolithic worldview in spite of the real secular differences that exist among and between the colonizers because, as Albert Memmi so clearly pointed out, they are all beneficiaries of the colonial project.[102] Therefore colonizers, generally, even those individuals who are critical, partake of the hegemonic ideology and vision since objectively each benefits from the domination and exploitation of the colonized.[103]

In regard to the particularism of the Zionist colonial project, this common colonizing ideology took on a specific expression since the colonizer was not attached to a secularized colonial nation-state, like a France or Britain, but an ethnic-religious people's movement whose members were citizens or residents of existing states who were (and are) living throughout the world. Therefore, the common colonial position vis-à-vis the colonized has a specific Zionist form of moral justification which Yerach Gover has succinctly captured in the passage quoted above. And, whether one draws upon a secular or religious justification, one can assert "the identification of exclusion with moral rectitude," since "the morally deceptive key relations of the Jewish person as a moral citizen to the non-Jewish person as juridical citizen" enables the continued

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[102] See Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991).

[103] One need only remind one's self that the vast infrastructures, which include hot and cold running water, electricity, telephones, transportation systems, and on and on, which exist in the United States and any advanced capitalist country, and are taken for granted as a given, is not only the result of the national product but the exploitation of the wealth of the colonized world, its people and its resources. We occupants of these states, whether members of the possessing or disposed classes are all beneficiaries of this domination and so we witness the rather historically consistent, though not unchallenged, collaboration of the working classes with their national bourgeoisies in their colonial and imperialist exploits.

concrete ghettoization of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship institutionally, legally and within everyday life to be settled in one's mind and conscience.

Clearly, the hegemonic Zionist notion of nation which leads to the legal ruling that Israeli does not constitute a nationality, is one notion among others that could have been adopted by the state. People born in France, regardless of country of origin, ethnicity, religion are French nationals. In France nationality is defined politically and territorially, the nation-state to which one is affiliated as a citizen. Germany on the other hand has quite a different definition, one more closely related to the Israeli one.[104] Until 2000 immigrants and their offspring, even those who had been residing in Germany and contributing productively to German society for generations, could not acquire citizenship since their patrimony was not German.[105] On the other hand, individuals who have been residing outside of Germany for generations who can demonstrate German paternal lineage can claim German citizenship under the "Right of Return". In Germany today there are those that advocate for a more political form of citizenship, closer to the French, and over time there have been reforms to citizenship laws though the main definition is still operative.

In the case of Israel, as mentioned above, there have also been contending voices since the establishment of the State advocating different definitions for nationality and citizenship. At times Israeli Jews and Palestinians contest these definitions. As a society

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[104] See Christian Joppke and Zeev Rosenhek, "Contesting ethnic immigration: Germany and Israel compared," *European Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 3 (December 2002): 301-35. See also Hannah Arendt's interesting essay in which she discusses the German sources of Zionist nationalism, "Zionism Reconsidered," *Menorah Journal* 33 (August 1945): 162-96.

[105] In 2000 Germany revised its citizenship laws such that children born of immigrant parents in Germany may now acquire citizenship if they meet certain conditions. The law is moving from a strictly *jus sanguins*, "right of blood" to a *jus soli*, "right of soil" definition.

changes and new social relationships emerge within a society and in its relations to the rest of the world, pressures upon the existing forms of social intercourse and governance assert themselves. Old claims and injuries often reinsert themselves into public discourses and new social agents, movements and struggles emerge within the changing social and political landscape. After the first Intifada in the Occupied Territories, for the first time in Israel's history a court ruled that it was permissible for "Palestinian" to be used in the name of a Palestinian Israeli organization. Clearly, the definitions of nation, nationhood, citizenship are socially constructed and come into being within competing and contending social interests. From just these brief references regarding the concepts of nation, nationality and citizenship it is evident that such definitions are not cast in stone, but take on quite specific meanings with very real concrete consequences depending on the particular human drama at play.

In summing up, I have repeatedly used the word construct and I intentionally do so since the explicit purpose of the Zionist project has been to construct a state, as the territorial basis for nation building of a Jewish homeland—a process that can only be actualized as a production of space in all its dimensions.[106] This has been a conscious project and the Zionists in constructing *their* State have had to deal with a remaining indigenous population who is not conceived of as part of *their* nation and nation-building project. The hegemonic orientation towards this population is structured such that they are, as Yerach Gover states, *other than us* and *unable to be us*. They remain an *enemy within*, a *fifth column*. This *other than us* must be administered, legislated, juridicated,

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106 The ingathering of the nation and the construction of a Jewish state or a Jewish cultural center in Palestine were also seen as the construction of the new Jewish or Hebrew man, as well as a revival of Jewish culture, at least for the early Zionists, and was widely written about and argued over by such personages as Jabotinsky, Ahad Ha-Am, Herzl and many many others.

monitored and population size watched while always treated as externally antagonistic to us and our morally legitimate agenda—the construction of a Jewish State of and for the Jewish people in at least some part if not all of Eretz-Israel.

Yet these alien people live within the territorial boundaries of the State and were granted citizenship. Therefore, the concepts developed that ground the legal forms adopted by the State make the distinction between the nation to which a person belongs and citizenship to the state. Jews belong to the Jewish nation and therefore constitute a nationality; belonging to Israel, which is not a nation, does not establish one's nationality as Israeli. In this way Palestinian citizens are by definition not a part of the social we. This construction of the Jewish homeland, which is still unfinished both within Israel proper and within all of Eretz-Israel, is a very concrete and physical process. It involves bringing Jewish people from abroad, constructing settlements, laying roads; while, concomitantly physically, legally and culturally constructing native non-Jews residing in the "homeland" as physically separate and culturally distinct from us. Separation, using a manifold array of means and methods--military rule, a separate governmental Office for Arab Affairs, laws, customs, policies, national symbols, language, social science constructs and most importantly by physically separating daily life and ordinary human intercourse via ghettoization--is the rule of the terrain.

The hegemonic national-capitalist and colonialist Zionist agenda was grounded upon a particular definition of Jewish nationalism which set specific geo-political objectives as requirements for its realization. These grounding principles and *national* objectives have consistently served to inform the strategies and tactics of Israel's leaders and governing bodies though not without controversy and bitter contention over how best

to overcome obstacles and advance the national project. As the state has matured, cleavages within and breaks from the monolithic hold of the ruling Zionist paradigm and agenda have generated a growing critical body of work, like that of the "post-Zionists". Nonetheless, the Zionist agenda continues to hold ideological, political, moral and cultural hegemony; it is, at least in its basic outlines, supported by a majority of Israel's Jewish citizens; and Israel's leaders continue to practically maneuver as they confront obstacles along their way towards the completion of their Jewish-Israeli nation-building agenda in a messy and un-empty terrain.

We have seen in this chapter how citizenship has been constructed (and contested) within Israel in such a way as to insure that the boundaries that separate the us and the them are maintained and secured as much as possible. This is a fundamental underpinning, established in law and applied to social policy, of the ghettoization of the Palestinians residing within the state and serves equally to maintain the Jews of Israel as a ghetto-nation. Ghettoization is the major means and method of settling this unsettling terrain and has been and is expressed and experienced in all the layers and levels of Israeli discourse and life activities. Therefore, ghettoization, in all its forms and applications, must be integrally—not as an exogenous or external factor--subsumed within any analysis of Israeli society.

# Chapter 4

## Settling the Cultural Terrain of Nation-State Building: Social Science & the State as Brokers of Culture

> There is no doubt that the [Palestinian] peasants, who the Arabs found present there [Eretz-Israel] in the seventh century, are descended from the rural 'Yishuv'.
>
> David Ben-Gurion, *Eretz-Israel in the Past and in the Present*[1]

> Ben-Gurion's rule: Good government was not democratic but paternalist. It vested authority in a single strong father figure—first, the military governor, then Palmon himself [the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs], and finally the supreme governor, Ben-Gurion.
>
> Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient*[2]

The above two statements pertaining to David Ben-Gurion, a founding father of the State of Israel, its first Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and perhaps the most important architect of its nation-state building project, appear to represent a shift in his attitude and stance towards and thoughts about the native population in Palestine, or as he denotes, in Eretz-Israel. A closer examination though reveals that this apparent disjunction in attitude is related to the different concerns occupying Ben-Gurion in advancing his version of the nation-building project at different moments in the historical unfolding of that project. An analysis of these statements serves well as entry into a discussion of the main conceptualizations pertaining to the *Arabs of Israel* within Israeli academic and popular discourse.

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[1] David Ben-Gurion, "The Origin of the Fallahim," in *Eretz Israel in the Past and in the Present*, David Ben-Gurion and Izhak Ben Zvi, trans. from the Yiddish, D. Niv (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 1979), 196. [H] Translated from the Hebrew by Ghassan Fawzi.

[2] Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient: Expertise in Arab Affairs and the Israeli State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 128.

In 1918, when he wrote "The Origin of the Fallahin," Ben-Gurion and the Zionist pioneer settlers were concerned about creating the "New Jew" or "New Hebrew" as distinct from the Diaspora Jew of Europe in the *eternal homeland*.[3] But this homeland had not been a place of residence for most Jews and certainly not the locale of a Jewish state for centuries, so what basis did the nation-builders have to claim this site for their exclusive national project as a social and moral imperative, knowing full well, as Ben-Gurion certainly did, that others inhabited this locale and called it home for generations? In 1918, he and a comrade, Yitzhak Ben Zvi, an ethnologist and Israel's first President, put forward an argument in their co-authored book, *Eretz-Israel in the Past and in the Present*, that was meant to substantiate the Jewish people's right to Palestine (in their view Eretz-Israel) in order to convince Diaspora Jews, especially North Americans, to support and join the Zionist redemption of the homeland.

They claimed that the Palestinian peasants, the *fallahin*, presently tilling the land were descendants of the ancient Hebrews. Proof of this, they alleged, was seen in such things as the methods and tools of agriculture they used, their dress, certain customs and traditions, aspects of their language and place-names, all of which, they postulated, had their origins in the practices of the original Hebrew inhabitants of Eretz-Israel. Since, as they presumed, remnants of these original Hebrew practices and traditions survived in the practices of the existing Palestinian peasantry, it was only logical that, for this to be so, these people had to be the descendants of the original Hebrews native to this land. Though these individuals were now for the most part Moslem or Christian and spoke

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[3] "Zionism represented a revolt against the feminine image of the 'ghetto Jew.' It was an attempt to create a Jew, virile Hebrew man who thrives outside the walls of the Yeshiva and the synagogue." Eran Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and its Ideological Legacy* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 133.

Arabic and not Hebrew, to their minds, such phenomena only represented surface changes due to historical circumstances that hid their authentic core. The hidden core of these people was to be found in their blood lineage which, they speculated, could be traced back to the ancient Hebrew tribes who, in turn, were proclaimed to be the original settlers of this part of the world. The present Palestinian peasants were thus, in actuality, descendants of the original Jews. As such, their present existence in the land of Eretz-Israel stood as proof of an unbroken continuity with a Jewish past. The authentic Hebrew core, though hidden by outward appearances, was still traceable, preserved through the unbroken reproduction of the Palestinian peasantry who had never lost their connection to the land, the homeland of the Jewish people since ancient times. In other words, the Jews had never left Eretz-Israel.[4] The present national movement, although a product of the European Jewish Diaspora community, was, therefore, simply the contemporary expression of the eternal longing of the entire *Jewish nation* to return to their homeland, a place from which they had never really left, redeem their land and rebuild their state.[5] Thus, the contemporary Arab appearance of the place and people was seen as a

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[4] "It is worth noting that even those who followed these theories concerning antiquity described the ancient Hebrews as believers in monotheism—not pagans. This version of the past aims at firmly establishing a historical approach and historical ideology which cites continuous Israelite residence in Palestine from the dawn of time…." Yaacov Shavit, *The New Hebrew Nation: A Study in Israeli Heresy and Fantasy* (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 89.

[5] The conception of Jewish history within which Ben-Gurion and Ben Zvi made their argument about the Palestinian peasants was developed during the pre-state period, and is characteristic of the Israeli nation-building discourse adopted once the state was formed. This narrative reduces all of Jewish history into one unified nation-building narrative. Of course this particular hypothesis was eventually dropped from the discourse since, on the one hand, there was no scientific basis for their claim and, on the other hand, in the end it did not serve the interests of their version of state-building, which based itself on the separation of Jews and Arabs as distinct cultural entities.

superficial shell, the result of accidents of history; the authentic core was Hebrew.[6] Eyal Naveh relates how according to that narrative,

> the creation of the state of Israel was both a renewal of a glorious past and the necessary stage toward a messianic vision…Indeed, after the establishment of the state, Ben-Gurion jettisoned the history of the diaspora and ignored the fact that Zionism had developed in Europe as a modern secular movement. His messianic vision focused on the formation of a consciousness of place, a yearning for a long-familiar place to which return was the beginning of redemption; hence the shortcut linking the distant past with the present, and emphasizing Zionism's direct connection with the holy territory of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel) (Naveh 2006, 250-51).[7]

The terrain shifts fundamentally in 1949. The State of Israel has been established and Ben-Gurion is Prime Minister. Although the majority of native Palestinians have been expelled or fled or killed there still remains a substantial number, twelve percent of the population, within the armistice lines agreed upon after the war. Ben-Gurion, as has been well documented by many writers, favored transfer of the remaining Palestinian population out of territory controlled by Israel and hoped that future circumstances would allow such to happen.[8] Meanwhile, the nation-builders were confronted with this

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[6] See, for instance, Shavit, *Hebrew Nation*, especially chapter 5 and Shabati Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), especially 30-31.

[7] Naveh also emphasizes that part of this narrative of a "redemptive future" realized through a "returning from exile to sovereignty" required construction of a new Jewish identity. "Israeli culture had to re-create a particular imagined community" and this "imagined community" following Ben-Gurion's vision, saw the Jew as always pitted against an enemy surrounding them, an enemy, whose particularities may change over time, but nonetheless potentially always existent. With the establishment of the state that enemy became the Arab within and without. In regard to the educational approach, he says: "The first history core curriculum of 1954 was trapped in ethnocentricity. Nevertheless…they sought to integrate Zionism and Jewish nationalism into universal values and existential views. Thus, both the core curriculum and textbooks presented the establishment of the Jewish state as a fulfillment of the Western vision of enlightenment. The alleged duality of the national-Jewish element and the universal element was portrayed as a problem linked to the anomaly of the diaspora, a problem that was eliminated by the establishment of the nation-state and the disposition of the Jewish people within the family of nations" (Naveh 2006, 253).

[8] Many writers, on the basis of primary source materials, have substantiated *transfer* as Ben-Gurion's favored position as the solution to *Palestinian Question*. Gil Eyal is among these writers. In his book, *The Disenchantment of the Orient: Expertise in Arab Affairs and the Israeli State*, he discusses the various positions argued regarding the Palestinian population and transfer in particular. In his summary of this discussion in the early years of the State he writes: "There were four suggestions on how to overcome the ambiguity of the internal boundary between Jews and Arabs. Two of these sought to eliminate the boundary altogether, either through population exchange [Ben-Gurion] or through assimilation [Alexander Dotan]. The other two sought to preserve the boundary but immobilize all movement across it, either through the

undesired population in their midst. Ben-Gurion was able to assert himself as a virtual dictator of the new state by claiming, for one, that *bitachon* (security) from within and without required centralized power be vested in one man. Ilan Pappe lends support to my argument in his recent book, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, and sites 1946 as the crucial turning point in Ben-Gurion's position. In 1946 the 22nd Zionist Congress gave him "total control over security issues of the Jewish community in Palestine" and from this point on he functioned as defense minister and prime minister (the Jewish Agency served as a state-in-waiting) which were formalized once the state was established.[9] He made *bitachon* into the national priority which, as Pappe tells us, he "nourished so carefully and successfully that it came to overshadow all other social and political issues on the agenda of the Jewish community in Palestine and later, of course, in Israel" (Pappe 2006, 27).

In regard to the Palestinians, Ben-Gurion established military rule over what he and his allies declared to be an *enemy within* and henceforth Palestinians were

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granting of substantial religious and cultural autonomy or through direct control and supervision of the minority." He discusses how transfer was the preferred option of the military elite including such people as Dayan, Palmon and Ben-Gurion. He goes on to say: "Although they kept hoping that a new war would permit them to solve this problem once and for all, they were not idle in the mean time. As late as October 1950, they were still transferring out of the state the populations of towns and villages that were close to the border." Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient: Expertise in Arab Affairs and the Israeli State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 120-22; brackets mine.

[9] Perhaps, one of the most important revelations of Ilan Pappe's book, besides substantiating ethnic cleansing as an objective of the war, is his uncovering of the group of men surrounding Ben-Gurion, what Pappe calls the "consultancy" who worked together in secret and planned, designed and implemented their version of the nation-building project. They were "a combination of security figures and specialists on 'Arab affairs', a formula that was to serve as the core for most of the bodies entrusted with advising future governments of Israel throughout the years on issues of state security, strategies and policy planning towards the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular" (Pappe 2006, 38). All these men where key actors in the military and civil government. It is also important to note, as he demonstrates, the disjuncture between the consultancy's actual agendas, programs and methods and their public positions, whether to the international community or the Jews in the Diaspora or their co-patriots in Palestine/Israel.

unqualifiedly conceived of as *alien* to the *nation*.[10] He formed the office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs so that he had direct supervision over these matters and ordered the Palestinians remaining within Israeli territorial jurisdiction to be segregated and restricted to "closed zones". It should be noted that Ben-Gurion explicitly explained that securing the Palestinians in "closed zones" under military rule was more a matter of "security" for the Jewish people and their rights to Eretz-Israel than any security threat the decimated, powerless, unarmed, frightened Palestinian population could have posed.[11] In the Knesset Ben-Gurion, at least this once, put it directly: "[T]he military regime exists for the defense of the right of Jewish settlement everywhere" (Zureik 1979, 120). These closed areas were militarized holding grounds in hopes that some kind of *population exchange* or *transfer* would come into effect in the not too distant future.

On the other hand, *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*, of which Ben-Gurion was a draftee, stated that all non-Jewish residents would be accorded rights equally and impartially within the state. At that time Israel's leaders were mandated to carry out their nation-building within certain guidelines established by the

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[10] Regarding Ben-Gurion on the Arabs, Avi Shlaim writes this: "[Ben-Gurion's] basic image of Arabs was that of a primitive, fierce, and fanatical enemy that understood only the language of force. In his monumentally prolix speeches he repeatedly stressed the alienation and the gulf between 'us' and 'them.' 'We live in the twentieth century, they—in the fifteenth,' he said in one speech. He took pride in the fact that 'we created a proper society…amid the world of the Middle Ages.' Ben-Gurion could not conceive of a multi-ethnic society, embracing Jews and Arabs. He often compared Israel to a boat and the Arabs to a cruel sea and ruled out the possibility of harmony between them." Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 96.

[11] "In 1959 the Arab Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister maintained that in 1949 the Arab population was 'in shock, separated, fragmented, and scared.'" From a memo of September, 1959, "A recommendation on how to treat the Arab Minority in Israel," Israel State Archives, 18-1959-926-2, 12, cited in Yair Bauml, "The Military Government and the Process of its Revocation," *Jewish-Arab Relations in Eretz Israel/Palestine*, ed. Haim Gerber and Elie Podeh, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2002), 133. [H] Translated by Ghassan Fawzi.

United Nations; they had entered into armistice agreements with bordering states; and the massive Palestinian refugee problem was an international concern. Under these circumstances the solution chosen for these undesirables was formal citizenship while ghettoizing them within militarized "closed zones".[12]

The second lead-in quote refers to Ben-Gurion's attitude towards the Palestinians under Israeli control as the state was being formed and the *place* of these *Arabs* within it was being settled. No longer do these contemporary "villagers" represent an authentic presence of the Jewish nation in Eretz Israel since ancient times; instead they now stand in opposition to our presence as the modern owners and rulers in the present redemption of Eretz Israel. Their village attributes are no longer put forward to demonstrate the continuous presence of the original Hebrews but are now in fundamental antagonism to our western modern civilizing presence. Ben-Gurion now proclaims the *native Arabs* to be a security threat, an *enemy within*, whose culture and interests are seen as diametrically opposite to the Jewish nation-builders. And most importantly, delimiting the boundaries of the Palestinian towns and villages--reducing the area of confinement and a town's jurisdiction as much as possible to the core residential center--and restricting movement to and from these circumscribed ghettos secured the State's

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[12] Once the leaders of the state realized that they were not going to be able to transfer out the entire Palestinian population, but instead were faced with housing a more or less permanent undesired non-Jewish population, settling their status as citizens while maintaining they were a threat to security, an "enemy within," who, they asserted, could at anytime lash out against us, also had its benefits for the nation-state builders. Eyal writes "One must recognize that from the point of view of the state elites there was a great deal of utility in preserving the status of the Palestinian citizens of Israel as hybrids, between citizens and enemies, between the village and the city, between modernity and tradition. In this way it was possible to use them, for example, as itinerant and commuting laborers from whom it was possible to squeeze surplus value without the danger of provoking class conflict; or it was possible to use them as an organized group of voters that nonetheless forever remained disconnected from the centers of influence; or it was possible to use them as risky citizens, as a 'dangerous population,' with respect to which it was possible to embed mechanisms of surveillance and control into the very fabric of legal discourse (as in the case of the Emergency Security Regulations)" (Eyal 2006, 171).

ambition of acquiring as much as possible of the land owned and used by this non-Jewish population while limiting their productive engagement in the economic life of the society. A Jewish state based on Hebrew labor was Ben-Gurion's ambition.

Let us now look more closely at the apparent difference in attitude expressed by Ben-Gurion in these two stances taken towards the native Palestinian population. Though there appears to be a commonality expressed between *us* and *them* in the first, whereas no such commonality is present in the second, nonetheless both are expressions of an *us* and *them*. More importantly, both are looking at the "native" as an object of interest only in so far as this object relates to the exclusive nation-building project of the Jewish people. The stance, whether favorable or not, depends upon the perceived requirements of the national movement at a particular historical moment. In both cases, the Palestinian is seen as an *object* of *our* discourse (and practices) and not as a subject in their own right. They have meaning and significance (or concern us) in relation to our distinct nation-building endeavor. Furthermore, both statements view the native-object as pre-modern. The Palestinians who are of interest to Ben-Gurion in 1918 are the peasants and villagers who use ancient tools and apply ancient methods of agriculture, not urban Palestinians.[13] In the first quote the pre-modern designation is directly expressed. In the second it is expressed in the insistence that only *paternalistic rule* makes sense in regard to these people. Ben-Gurion and his followers asserted that paternalistic governance was necessitated because it provided the appropriate mechanisms required to control and administer this population whose members are "primitive" and familial bound, upon

[13] According to Teveth, at this time Ben-Gurion considered "the urban, Christian Arab population as the bitterest foe of Zionism" (Teveth 1985, 31).

whom "democracy is wasted."[14] In justifying military governance in a 1956 article, the close associate of Ben-Gurion, Edwin Samuel writes: "Most Arab areas are still under military government, although one of the reasons for this is that Arab peasantry have always been accustomed to paternalistic rule."[15] And the Arab experts were there to provide the language that supported their assertions. As Eyal says the "Arabists not only would provide the rhetoric (e.g., the claim that the Palestinians 'don't really miss democracy') but more importantly would organize a system of segregation, control, and co-optation to secure the consent of the ruled on the basis of a knowledge of their mentality" (Eyal 2006, 128). (Such thinking has given rise to a body of Orientalist literature that studies the "Arab mind" and the "Arab mentality".) The leaders projected, and most accepted, even those who were reluctant, that a dictatorial father, which is how Ben-Gurion characterized it and how he chose to act in the ghettos through the Military Governors, was the only rule these Arabs knew and the only form of governance they would respond to.[16] Such projections simply ignored historical reality and the events and

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[14] Palmon, the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Atab Affairs, was even more explicit in the following quote where he expresses his opposition to allowing Arab communities to elect their own local councils: "Democratic elections will only augment family feuds and are not in keeping with the existing conditions in the Arab community. The establishment of local councils is also bound to lead to bloodshed. In the Arab community, one must choose a 'middle road' of not-too-much democracy." Cited by Eyal (2006) and Segev (1986).

[15] Edwin Samuel, C.M.G., "Israel and the Arab World," *The Political Quarterly* 27, no 4 (October 1956): 409. Samuel was a British Viscount and he was a member of the Palestine Civil Service 1920-48. Ben-Gurion and Samuel were in the Jewish Legion together, which was the name for five battalions of Jewish volunteers established as part of the British Army's 38th through 42nd (Service) Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers in Palestine. They assisted the British in World War I and later in repressing Palestinian protests, especially during the 1936-39 Arab Revolt and its aftermath.

[16] On the question of governance in general, in all fairness to Ben-Gurion's legacy, perhaps it should be said that in regard to paternalistic rule, he more or less applied this standard universally though obviously, in regard to the Jewish population, in different forms and for quite different purposes. Since he portrayed the situation of the new State to be one of "national emergency", making "security" the top priority, he insisted that under such military circumstances, one-man rule was necessary and democracy threatening to the success of the national agenda. He ruthlessly and effectively attacked and marginalized opposition to

processes taking place in Palestine prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. The people Ben-Gurion and the Zionists leaders and Arab experts give the appellation "villager" and to whom they attribute their cultural notions were already, under the Ottomans, organized into districts and administrative centers; residents of urban centers and not only villages; members of trade unions; electors of representatives who were active in the central government; and, as more and more villages and towns acquired status and local councils were established, voters at the local level.

The apparent difference towards the *natives* expressed in Ben-Gurion's statements is interestingly reminiscent of the change in appellation given the Native Americans by the European colonists in North America and their treatment towards them before and after the establishment of the United States. The original colonists called themselves just that, colonists, and they distinguished amongst themselves according to their home countries. For instance, they were New Englanders or New Netherlanders, Swiss, Finns, etc. The natives, on the other hand, were known as the Americans. In the Israeli context, though some of the European settlers still identify with the country from which they immigrated—some English Jews live in what is called the English colony and as custom has it they still partake of high tea; just as some of the German Jews live in what's called

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his positions, especially in regard to the communists. He tried to block the formation, for instance, of the Knesset, and although ultimately unsuccessful, he was able to, at least for the first years, impede its formation, restrict its powers and more or less subordinate it to his objectives. To what degree his position was actually based on a perceived threat from the Arab states surrounding Israel and the *enemy within* rather than the desire to impose his particular Zionist vision for Eretz-Israel, which, among other things, included leaving the matter of borders unresolved while continuing colonial expansion in order to be able to acquire all of Eretz-Israel and the transfer of as much of the Palestinian population as possible out of Israeli controlled territories, is debated though it appears to me it is becoming less and less debatable, since primary source material more and more supports the latter assessment. See for instance on the matter of the Knesset Giora Goldberg, *Ben-Gurion against the Knesset*, trans. Chaya Naor, (London: Frank Cass, 2003) and Netanel Lorch, ed., *Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981* (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1993), especially volumes 1 and 2 entitled "People's Council and Provisional Council of the State 1948-1949" and "The Constituent Assembly—First Knesset 1949-1951."

the German colony—and the census bureau collects data on country of origin, more important than identification with any particular European country is the identification with Europe and the West. Most Jewish Israelis see Israel not as a part of the Middle East but of Europe. Herzl, for instance, envisioned a national project that would bring European civilization to the Orient.

Looking back again to the American colonial situation, in the first centuries of colonial settlement, to a great extent, the colonists and the Americans were involved in a web of mutually beneficial activities including an extensive fur trade and numerous business contracts were made between various Americans and colonists as well as alliances against other competing European settlers and Native American communities. And, of course, there were conflicts and reprisals made between the Americans and the colonists.[17] Similarly, Jewish pioneers in Palestine, who, unfamiliar with the terrain and unaccustomed to agricultural work, turned to the Palestinians for help, though, of course, the Palestinians, unlike the Native Americans, were already ensconced in modern market relations through commerce and trade. But, once the ambition of creating an independent nation-state took shape among the colonial-settlers in America, and most particularly after creating the nation-state, a national narrative emerged which redefined the terms. The immigrant-settlers (of course many of these had been born in the colonies) became the authentic Americans (and English the hegemonic language and culture) and the Native Americans were referred to as the Indians, the designation mistakenly given them by original explorers who thought they were finding a passage through to India. Indian

[17] For a vivid and detailed picture of the early colonies, most particularly Dutch Manhattan, and the relations between the Americans and the colonists see Russell Shorto's *The Island in the Center of the World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005).

became associated with the notion of wild and savage. “Wild Indians” appeared in the title of numerous books and articles and was used extensively by ethnologists. And now, the Native Americans were legally constituted as “aliens”, foreigners within *our* country. Henceforth they were dealt with through the military and civilian government and treaties were established between the various “tribes” and the US government. We see a similar pattern in the case of Israel and this is reflected in Ben-Gurion’s statements. Once Israel was established as a state, Palestine and Palestinian was erased from the national discourse (in 1918 Ben-Gurion still uses these terms) and their usage is even made illegal. Reference to “Arabs” as native to the land is dropped from the discourse and instead they are redefined as Israel’s non-Jewish minority and they are “alien” to the “nation”. *Hamula* (clans) like “tribes” are considered their organizational principle. The United States established the Bureau of Indian (not American or even Native American) Affairs to deal with its *alien* population[18] and Ben-Gurion creates in 1949 the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs (after disbanding the original Minorities Ministry while keeping both conceptualizations in usage to today) to deal with Israel’s alien *enemy within*. “Indians” are placed in reservations and “Arabs” in “closed areas” or “security zones” under a Military Government.

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[18] In the opening paragraph to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) website it is stated that BIA’s “responsibility is the administration and management of 55.7 million acres of land held in trust by the United States for American Indians, Indian tribes, and Alaskan Natives.” This is a long cry from the early colonial settlers who understood that these people were the original Americans. “American Indians” is like the appellation “Israeli Arabs.” They belong to us. The paragraph states that “there are 561 federal recognized tribal governments in the United States.” In practical terms it would be interesting to compare the “Indian Reservations” to the “Palestinian Ghettos.” Like the various Israeli Arab Departments one sees on the BIA’s website the listing of the agencies for *the Indians* such as the Indian Health Services, Office of Indian Education Programs, Indian Child Welfare Agency, Indian Gaming, Indian Reservation Roads Program, just as in most Israeli government offices there is a separate Arab department. www.doi.gov/bureau-indian-affairs.html.

Dan Rabinowitz, in his essay, "Oriental Othering and National Identity: A Review of Early Israeli Anthropological Studies of Palestinians," draws on Arjun Appadurai's notion of "culturalism" and reveals how Israel's early anthropologists were integral to the emergence of this state's hegemony as a politically motivated broker of culture. Within the Israeli context, he shows how the formal and informal agencies (of state hegemonies) play an active part in "the construction and manipulations of notions of culture for strengthening solidarity and mobilizing support" (Rabinowitz 2002, 306). Ben-Gurion's two positions demonstrate how "the construction and manipulations of notions of culture" are related to "strengthening solidarity and mobilizing support", in this case to advance what Ben-Gurion saw as the needs of nation-building at different historical moments. Present in both of Ben-Gurion's claims about the Palestinians are the core notions of the *cultural* narrative of the nation-building project. He subsumes within his discourse, as does the Israeli national narrative, the *diametric oppositions* of the modern versus the traditional and primitive, the West versus the East. Construction of a national narrative is not peculiar to Israel's development; it is a crucial aspect necessary to any nation-state construction. But, each national project will have its specific cultural representation based on its national imperatives and projections.

> Zionist discourse, like other national narratives, promotes a particular bundle of cultural traits as an exclusive representation of the national project. A central tenet of Israeli culturalism is the binary opposition between Jew and Arab, which stands for a series of 'Us versus Them' dichotomies: European versus Other, modern versus primitive, progressive versus stagnant. In such a context, the quest for the border, the need for psychological differentiation and the desire for a coherent Israeli identity emerge as different aspects of one, ostensibly uniform and coherent national project (Rabinowitz 2003, 5).

Such oppositions were and still are simply taken-for-granted as self-evident by both academicians and the general public.

With the establishment of the State, the reality of Palestinians, now a *present alien other*, of course, underwent a drastic transformation. This change is reflected in the difference between the two attitudes taken by Ben-Gurion. Under the rubric of the State's territory of control was an unwanted Palestinian population subordinated to the state's authority. On the eve of the implementation of the United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine in 1948 the leaders of the Zionist Movement had already written and adopted as their founding document, *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*, which declared Israel to be the exclusive homeland of the Jewish people. Nation-building and the place of the native Palestinian population within this process would now be concretized spatially, ideologically, legally and practically. The solution--spatial segregation, military rule, and formal citizenship.

Within this context, predictably the Zionist project, once it acquired state form, eventually generated a body of literature and academic work of a "scientific" character about its own social process, that is sociology, and the study of *others*: namely, anthropology and area studies like the Middle East; academicians would carry to these fields of study the assumptions inherent to their national construction. Such phenomena are characteristic of all societies. Since the Palestinians remaining in Israel stood as an *alien presence* within the nation-building perimeters not only the territorial borders demarcating them from us had to be constructed—the ghettos—but also the cultural demarcation in such a way that, as Rabinowitz says, "[the] traits Israeli writers single out as defining Arab culture are often diametric oppositions of features many Israelis see as typical of their own identity" (Rabinowitz 2002, 307). These "diametric oppositions" organically inform the researchers' orientation towards the object of their study.

A discourse that included the *diametric opposition of features* was already embedded, well before statehood, within the conceptions of the European Zionist settler movement whose members for the most part saw themselves as *European* even as they were creating the *New Jew*, as distinct from the Diaspora Jew, within a non-European setting.[19] Much literature now exists which in great detail, making use of primary resource materials, documents the early years of European Zionist colonization of Palestine, their complex relations to the Arab culture and people and their equally complex relation to the Diaspora Jews. Nonetheless, in the end, in spite of these complexities the *orientalism* of the dominant and hegemonic ideology, which informed state policy towards the indigenous Palestinians remaining within the state's territorial jurisdiction, the neighboring Arab peoples and states, and the immigrant Arab Jews, as Eyal pointed out "serves to confirm the cultural chasm between Israelis and their neighbors" both within and without the boundaries of the state. This was especially true since the political leaders of the state were for the most part also *sabras*, early pioneers, who considered themselves to be the inheritors of the Zionist project that developed out of the European Jewish nationalist movement. The national agenda they projected included the need to bring a disparate Jewish population into a unified nation-building project that required the state to be a fortress against a hostile surrounding Arab world while containing within an enemy who by definition was not part of the *nation*. This

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[19] In "Borders and Their Discontents: Israel's Green Line, Arabness and Unilateral Separation" Rabinowitz looks at "the central role that the proximity of the essentialized category 'Arabs'—as individuals, as a culture and as a political entity—still plays in the formation and consolidation of an idealized Israeli identity. This identity owes much to the European origins of the Zionist project, and to the fact that for many Zionists the demarcation line between themselves and Palestinians, which runs through the territory in which they live, is tantamount to the border between 'Europe' and 'Asia', civilization and barbarism, good and evil. Physical, symbolic and metaphoric points of contact with and separation from Arabs, in particular Palestinians, are sites in which Israeli identity and solidarity have been acted out and reified for well over a century" (Rabinowitz, 2003, 4).

required the construction of a unifying conception of the cultural borders between the Jewish builders of the Jewish nation-state and the hostile others surrounding us and living within our midst. At one level, the architects of the state had no need to invent a new ideology, since the east/west or occidental/oriental clash of civilizations was already well ensconced in their consciousness as obvious and fact. It was simply adapted and applied as a matter of course. Dan Rabinowitz puts the case very well in this summary of Israeli culturalism:

> Israeli culturalism was defined by the attempt of Zionism and, later, of the state, to fabricate a new, essentially secular and highly modernized identity (Zrubavel, 1995: 22-35). The aim was to pluck Jewish immigrants originating in a variety of histories, territories, cultural milieus, and socio-economic backgrounds from their previous coordinates, and mobilize them into a new space whereby the Nation was rapidly being engraved into the land (Dolev-Gandelman 1987; Ben-David 1988), society (Eisenstadt 1985), and the state. This effort, which produced a rich inventory of positive 'Israeli' cultural signifiers (Katriel 1986, 1987, 1988-1989), was largely premised on the dual negation of the Jewish diaspora (cf., Raz-Krakotzkin 1993; Boyarin and Boyarin 1994) and of anything and everything remotely associated with the Arab East (Rabinowitz 2002, 306-07).[20]

Most importantly for this discussion of the dominant conceptualizations about the Palestinian population in Israel, Rabinowitz poignantly concludes in his article, "Borders and Their Discontents: Israel's Green Line, Arabness and Unilateral Separation," that

> The mainstay of Zionist ideology was thus confined to a consistent—and on the whole successful—attempt to prop a new identity against a negated ultimate Arab Other. The representations of the east so rife in formative Zionist musings about the East are thus politically and historically significant: they isolate rural Palestine, incarcerating it in a time capsule with rudimentary technology and marginal economy, and make it into a prototype Arabness at large. By doing so, they repeatedly obscure contemporary Arab and Palestinian urban culture, Arab contributions to western thought and learning, and many other aspects of Arab culture and society

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[20] I agree with Rabinowitz that "Israeli culturalism" is not exceptional to Israel, but a particular expression of a general dynamic pertaining to nation-state construction and colonialism as it is expressed in the specific circumstances of Israel's development. Rabinowitz writes: "This ethno-territorial self assertion, so often couched in culturalist jargon, becomes particularly stressed in the political spaces that lie between states and indigenous or immigrant minorities within it. The concepts of culture selected to signify, reify, and glorify the State are easily manipulated, and can be stretched to include some groups and shrunk to exclude others almost as will. The flexibility and inherent ambiguity of these concepts enables the powers that be to promote inherently exclusive mental spaces such as lingua franca (normally the one used by the dominant groups), canons of high culture, and, at times, religion to buttress domination, control political arenas, and legitimize unequal resource allocation… [In Israel] The construction and reification of an effigy of Arabs generally and Palestinians in particular is a case in point" (Rabinowitz 2002, 306-7; brackets mine).

> which signify modernity and progress. The reification of the old dichotomy between 'Us" and 'Them" was successfully achieved (Rabinowitz 2003, 11).

Already in Ben-Gurion's 1918 statement we see how rural Palestine was isolated out and incarcerated "in a time capsule with rudimentary technology and marginal economy."

The grand east/west, modern/traditional narrative discussed thus far was given local expression in the notions of culture that are applied to the study of the Palestinian population. The key cultural markers attributed to these people are pre-modern: namely, the *village* and *hamula* (patralineal clan). Such cultural markers are explicit in Ben-Gurion's attitudes towards the Palestinians—they are rural villagers familial bound who only know paternalistic relations--and these markers have been established as analytic presuppositions about *our Arabs*. By objectifying physical space in the form of the *village* and personal space in kinship via the *hamula* as quintessentially and distinctly "Arab" features, the social sciences provide the conceptual means whereby separation is constructed as natural, even respectful of cultural difference. The *village discourse* reaffirms and thus reproduces the grand modern/traditional narrative within academia and in the popular imagination. This discourse is so ingrained within everyday life that such notions easily and effectively serve to culturally and *in our minds* demarcate *us* from *them*, allowing the *arena of culture* and social practices to support the actual objective demarcations of spatial segregation and social separation. Thus, the ghettoization of the Palestinian citizenry which is the result of a restrictive, undemocratic, racist policy of the state and its exclusive national project vis-à-vis this population, can be assimilated into one's moral discourse as the appropriate and manifest expression of the Arab personality.

Through such discourse, ethno-particular nation-building remains morally untarnished as an exclusive project of the Jewish people; the state's hegemony continues

to serve as an effective broker of culture to insure the legitimacy of exclusion; and, in Gil Eyal's language, this discourse allows the society to continually "purify" any "hybrids," like the Oriental Jews, that may undermine the culture of separation upon which the interests and institutions of society are based. Since all agree "security" is the "top priority" and separation is a natural and political given, differences amongst the protagonists—especially all those who make a living as "Arabists" in one or other arena within society and the state—over policy towards the Palestinian citizens, as Eyal points out, are more a matter of "techniques" than fundamental political direction or program.[21]

The development of Israel's *cultural* discourse on the *Arab* has its constitutive basis in the network of institutions that stretch across all of Israeli society and its state apparatus. Government ministries and agencies have separate departments for dealing with the "Arab sector"; the study of the *Arabs of Israel* is treated as a separate object from the study of Israeli society proper which is defined as Jewish; cultural institutions and the public school system are separated along the Jewish/Arab nexus; Central Bureau of Statistics records its data distinguishing between the Jews and non-Jews; and as I've pointed out before, even the scouts are organized separately as the Hebrew Scouts and

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[21] "It is common to depict the struggle over the management of the Palestinian minority as taking place between a hawkish, security-oriented approach and a dovish, liberal one. Occasionally it was construed as a jurisdictional struggle between ministries. But this is a very partial view. In fact, the opposition between hawks and doves does not adequately differentiate between the various participants of this debate, because, first, security ranked high on everybody's agenda, and, second, nobody's 'liberalism' went so far as to espouse a significant form of political autonomy for the minority. The range of options on this dimension was simply too narrow to provide for much contrast. Instead, I would like to suggest that the main difference between the protagonists was in the techniques they offered to manage the internal boundary between Jews and Arabs and to purify the Israeli-Arab hybrid. The interministerial struggle, for its part, while it was real and significant, is also not satisfactory as an explanation. To take it to be a sufficient explanation is to depict the conflict as purely instrumental and to treat how the protagonists positioned themselves with respect to one another as purely random. Instead, I would argue that position within the field of orientalist expertise (which includes institutional affiliation) provides a much better principle of explanation for how the protagonists positioned themselves and how they formed alliances" (Eyal 2006, 120).

Arab Scouts. Government resources are dedicated to the management and control of this separate-from-us entity.

Through the ingrainedness of these *notions of culture*, ghettoization comes full circle as its own self-perpetuating discourse, expressed not as ghettoization but as national and cultural distinctness in such a way that separation is proclaimed a natural and not a social construct.[22] We are modern and urban, whereas the Arab is traditional and rural—a villager. In academic literature, mirrored in popular discourse, the appellation *village* is assigned to these segregated zones. The *village* assignation glosses the reality that Palestinian locales are restrictive domains in which Palestinian individuals and families and communities must negotiate their lives, subordinated within a surrounding hostile society that sees them as alien. By such glossing the historical, contextual, specific social formation and construction of the Palestinian locales as ghettos are erased. They become their own de-temporalized, de-situated explanations of themselves.

The local discourse about Palestinians needs to be further situated within the nation-state building narrative which has cultural hegemony within Israeli Jewish society and the state. To do this it is important to see the formation of Israel within the more general historical process of nation-state building. Nation-building, a characteristic of

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[22] Now that a substantial mass of critical writers has emerged within Israeli discourse a challenge to this unitary narrative is now taking place. Nonetheless the national Zionist narrative and the culture of separation remain firmly in place. Perhaps, because of this critical voice from within Israeli society and Palestinian resistance, support for the culture of separation based on the perception that the Palestinian citizens represent a threat has actually grown among the Jewish population. A polarization is taking place within Israeli national discourse. It is too early to predict the outcome of this cleavage within Israeli society, but clearly the Separation Wall is continuing to be built and the ground has been laid to annex a large portion of the West Bank, part of which has been almost completely removed of its Palestinian inhabitants and settled by Israeli settler-citizens.

*modernity* world wide, continues to be a significant and defining feature of Israel's ongoing development.

Dan Rabinowitz's summary in "Oriental Othering" of Corrigan and Sayer's discussion of the growth of the English state and Kearney's discussion on borders is pertinent to this discussion of nation-building:

> [Corrigan and Sayer] identify modern capitalism and the cultural revolution that came with it as the main catalysts fueling the emergence of the nation state. At the same time, however, they recognize another element contributing to the ascendance of the state, namely the ever-present tension with aliens at the frontier. Kearney's discussion of borders in the colonial context likewise points out the predication of modern empires on a distinct spatial separation between them and their colonies: 'a structural feature […] which provides the basis for the cognitive distinction between the colonizer and the colonized' (1991: 53). Capitalism, in other words, creates a spatial differentiation between developed, underdeveloped, and de-developed regions. Within this context, the modern nation state emerges as a supreme unit of order, 'a social, cultural and political form which, as Anderson shows, is distinctive in having absolute geopolitical and social boundaries inscribed on territory and on persons, demarcating space and those who are members from those who are not' (Kearney 1991: 54) (Rabinowitz 2002, 309-10; brackets mine).[23]

All nation-building processes, if they are to succeed, must forge a national identity, that is, perform a "cultural revolution". This requires such things as a national language, national holidays, and a unified notion of a national heritage and history. The Italians, for example, chose the dialect of Florence as the basis for establishing a national Italian language even though this was a minority dialect within the territory of Italy, which was comprised of many different people who spoke different dialects and languages. Most if not all nation-states have selectively generated a national ethos out of what in reality is complex and culturally, ethnically and linguistically mixed. In Italy, as Al Sayyad and Castells inform us, Florentino was decided upon to "set the standard for Italian…although it was not truly Italian…because of its great Renaissance history."

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[23] Rabinowitz is referring to Corrigan, P. and D. Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution* (Oxford, New York: B. Blackwell, 1985); Michael Kearney "Boundaries of state and self at the end of empire," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1991 4 (1): 52-74.; and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).

They use this Italian construction, among other examples, to demonstrate what "lies at the heart of national identity discourse" (Al Sayyad and Castells 2002, 3). Their analysis confirms what Rabinowitz regards as a general phenomenon--that most nation-states are built around an "exclusionary ethno-territorial nuclei." He writes:

> [A]n analysis of the dynamics of culturalism highlights the ethno-national contradictions inherent to so many modern states, including those that see themselves as liberal and benevolent to all constituents, most states, including those of the West, are built around exclusionary ethno-territorial nuclei: dominant groups purporting ancient linkages to the territory and the symbolic capital engendered by their primordial role as guardians of the 'authentic' nationally defined cultural core. The implications of this entitlement on the marginalization of non-affiliates should be clear, but often remain obscure (Rabinowitz 2002, 306).

This is just what Ben-Gurion is trying to establish in the minds of Jews in the Diaspora regarding Jewish nation-building in Palestine in 1918.

Any process of social formation (and here we are particularly addressing nation-state building) requires generating the material conditions which are necessary for the production and reproduction of life (such as definite forms of ownership and control of productive resources and the corresponding forms of class relations, i.e. social relations of production and forces of production); political structures and arenas (including a given state form along with its specific bureaucratic, administrative and juridical apparatuses, as well as the military and policing apparatus); and ideological/cultural institutions, national ethos and discourses (pertaining to such things as the public school system with educational guidelines and established curriculum, national holidays, symbols and language). Just as objects of social study are not empirically or conceptually strictly "cultural" or "economic" or "political" or "physical", being as they are mediated aspects of a dynamic complex of human activity actualized within a specific temporal terrain, neither is the terrain of social formation set and closed, but contentious and transformative, while being nonetheless subject to definite social forces and interests, out

of which certain of these assert hegemony. Within a colonial-settler nation-building process-in-formation all these social activities are intensified as the actors attempt *to settle* the construction of the national project--*to cause* [it] *to become fixed; place* [it] *firmly in a position; adjust* [it] *for a time in a place; fix* [it] *by agreement*. Although insoluble sediment may settle to the bottom for a while, when the borders are *unsettled and unsettling*, both within and around the boundaries of the nation-building terrain, any fixedness, firmness of position, adjustment for a time in a place, as well as all apparently settled agreements, are repeatedly subject to being disturbed. Sediment rises muddying the boundaries, threatening the fixed "geopolitical and social boundaries inscribed on territory and on persons," jeopardizing the "demarcating [of] space and those who are members from those who are not." This is especially the case when the actual territorial borders are unsettled, expanding or contracting within specific political contexts. In Israel such unsettling boundaries are seen, for instance, in the discussion as to whether Palestinian citizens have or have not, or should or should not be *Israelized*; and in the debate over whether to give-back land occupied (and settled by Jewish Israeli citizens) as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority. In such circumstances vigilant clarification regarding boundaries and borders over "territory and persons" is required if the interests of separation, ethno-particularism, are to be maintained as the organizing principle of social space.

As I have been emphasizing ghettoization is a spatial process that is not limited to land (territory) or physical locales—restriction to designated residential areas. Such territorial and physical restriction is bound up with all that is cultural, linguistic, ideological, political, symbolic, economic—as Lefebvre encapsulated in his notion of

social space. Production of space is a dynamic process that is continually being constructed and reconstructed, adapted and reinvented within the specific developments and social contestations going on in society, as evidenced in Ben-Gurion's apparent shift in attitude towards the "natives". Social forces within Jewish society and the state (in its capacity as a unifying force and director of societal development, as well as an apparatus of control and legislator and implementer of social policy), have been able to consistently reaffirm the hegemonic nation-building narrative within changing circumstances, thereby *securing* a culture of separation as the basis upon which the nation-building project, and its concomitant production of space, continues to be carried out. This grand narrative remains intact as the dominant social and political unifying force within Jewish Israeli society. Subsequently, transformations which have and continue to take place within Israeli discourse at all levels, even in matters pertaining to territorial compromise (Israeli willingness to give up some of the Occupied Territories) or lessening of discriminatory policies towards "Israel's Arabs", are predominantly informed within a common spatial (physical, psychological, symbolic, cultural) range that adjusts itself to this dominant orientation about Jewish exclusive national rights to their exclusive state.[24]

The Zionist nation-building project predicated on a culture of separation has been the "unit of order" as a "social, cultural and political form" and has actively inscribed

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[24] Signs that the *fixedness* of this national discourse is also contested within the public domain is indicated by this recent article quoted below from *haaretz*. The writer, Uzi Benziman, ends his article by calling for a public discussion involving all of "Israel's citizens, Jews and Arabs alike…." In the article he also says that the "shameful" treatment of and "blatant discrimination against Arab citizens" cannot simply be corrected through practical policies, budgets, etc., but requires changes to the "conceptual and psychological." He writes: "What is needed is genuine, large-scale action, in order to instill Israel's Arabs with a feeling that the state is shaking off the inertia of the past and redefining its relationship with them, with the goal of seeing them as citizens with equal rights. This vital change must occur, first and foremost, at the conceptual and psychological level—namely, by getting rid of the view that the Arab minority is a fifth column and by accepting it as a community with its own national, organizational and cultural needs." Uzi Benziman, "A la Intifada comme a la intifada," *haaretz*, February 18, 2007.

(and extended over time its inscription of) its geopolitical and social boundaries, as does any colonial or nation-building project, "on territory and persons, demarcating space and those who are members and those who are not." In the previous chapter it was seen how this was the case in regard to the legal and ideological territories and boundaries of nationhood and citizenship. The conceptualizations and practices of Israel's Arab experts, which form part of the cultural terrain, inform the larger society and state agencies and institutions about the character, practices, behaviors, mentality, and culture of their object of study and expertise. As scientists and practitioners with credentials within their respective fields of expertise, they make their claims about "the Arabs" on the basis of supposed empirical data which is claimed to be "objective" and "verifiable" gathered through scientifically accepted criteria and tools of study and analysis. Along with the state, as a broker of culture within civil society, social scientists reinforce what "everyone knows" to be correct—our national right to the land and an exclusively Jewish state or one that, if it must house a non-Jewish population within it, has the right to subordinate the non-Jewish population to our national rights. Through their "objective" studies of the *Arab* the national ethos is confirmed by reaffirming as fact the cultural lines that demarcate *us* from *them* thus alleviating, at least for a time, any threats that may morally or practically blur the borders that separates us. The *othering* of the *Arab* is thus constituted as a given, as natural to the object of study.

The *village* notion, for instance, is an "absolute geopolitical and social boundary" which directly inscribes the Palestinian territorially and personally but it is presented to the members of society as a naturally given fact. It is presumed to be an objective feature of the object of study and therefore a "scientific" starting point from which the

anthropologist or sociologist frames his or her research and analyses of the object of study, the *Arabs in Israel*. As a notion of culture, it is a construct which presupposes the nation-building narrative (and the spatial form that this social project has taken on the ground) within it and therefore the work that flows from such a construct will, whether intentionally or not, reflect back to society proof of the *other* as culturally distinct from *us*, thus reproducing the exclusivity of the national narrative. The *Arabists*, as brokers of culture, are particularly suited to the task, since as expert practitioners and scientists within society, they have the ability to flex the tools of their trade, and are even expected to do so as part of the research endeavor, if only because their work involves the ever-changing circumstances of life within society. Challenges to the national narrative due to changing realities within the society can be accommodated by "the construction and manipulations of notions of culture" and when the nation-building narrative is simply subsumed within the social scientists' world view as a given, and therefore unanalyzed, their work can easily and directly, without necessarily requiring any forethought or intention on the part of the social scientist, translate into a means "for strengthening solidarity and mobilizing support" for the exclusivity of the national project by demonstrating the distinctness of the *Arab*.[25]

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[25] I am in basic agreement with Rabinowitz that "early Israeli anthropology" and the social sciences more generally, did not work "as a concerted conscious effort, with unified intent or an agreed agenda. Rather," their work reflects "how the political climate that prevailed when early Israeli anthropology was consolidated shaped what ethnographers were interested in, where they looked for it, and how they tried to prove it" (Rabinowitz 2002, 307). Nonetheless, there were among these academics individuals who were important participants in constructing and implementing the agenda of nation-building as an exclusively Jewish endeavor. This can not be simply relegated to the ordinary workings of norms within a society. The implementation of this project required the dispossession and removal of the Palestinian population. Such a project was consciously and actively created and implemented and some of these early Arab experts were key actors in this process and in policy towards the Palestinians once the state was established. The Arabists were crucial in producing the "village files" discussed in chapter 2 which served in the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians during the war and in the construction and administration of the ghettos after the war.

It must be held in mind that the cultural boundaries and demarcations spoken of here do not simply exist in some amorphous ideological domain where individuals invent identities which they attach to themselves and others because of some propensity to create cultural demarcation and *otherness*. Such ideations are rooted in real material processes within social formations. Ghettoization of the Palestinians in Israel is a definite spatial organization which positions the Palestinians within the class formation of Israel and its political society. These social relations and the social content of everyday life can only be expressed or actualized spatially, thus produced space. As Rabinowitz points out in the quote above, along with capitalist development, comes the "spatial differentiation between developed, underdeveloped, and de-developed." Colonizing societies add to this general process of capitalist development demarcations separating the colonizer from the colonized.

As I have said, these are general dynamics, which, of course, can only be concretely played out in particular realities that have their own history, circumstances and actors. In the case of Israel, broadly speaking, its spatial differentiation represents simultaneously its capitalist and colonial character. Schematically, the three areas specified--developed, underdeveloped, and de-developed—are empirically associated with the three major stratums within Israeli society: namely, the Ashkenazim, the Mizrahim (Oriental Jews), and the Palestinians respectively. In broad terms, these breakdowns also correspond to the hierarchy of social class and political and social power within society and the state. They express in general terms the organization of

social-economic-political space and power within Israel.[26]

Because the task of nation-building is still a process-in-formation, the construction of society and the state is an on-going process--the continuous in-gathering of foreigners, their settlement on land and their absorption into the society; the continued presence of the unresolved location of the *other* in relation to the "nation"; and the continuing unresolved delineation of internationally recognized borders. To continue to execute the Zionist ethno-exclusionary colonial program requires the continued confiscation and settlement of Palestinian land. This necessitates the constant application of security measures--emergency regulations, preemptive strikes, collective punishments, road blocks and check points, state of military preparedness, universal Jewish conscription, nuclear arms, prisons and continuous wars.[27] These measures are given to the Jewish population as necessary to the success of the national project and its survival; and given the hegemonic Zionist national agenda they are required to *defend us* against 1) our *external enemies*, that is, our hostile Arab neighbors, 2) the Palestinian resistance

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[26] On the Oriental Jews see, for instance, Tom Segev, *1949 - The First Israelis* (New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1986 and Shlomo Swirski, *Israel: The Oriental Majority*, trans. Barbara Swirski (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1989).

[27] Professor of history and former Knesset member Shlomo Ben-Ami discusses how a constant state of conflict and war also served the nation building process. He writes: "Israel's War of Independence was not for a moment seen by the leaders of the new state as heralding an era of peace. That a 'second round' was inevitable was almost public knowledge, let alone that such was the working premise of most of the leaders, first and foremost of Ben-Gurion. To him, as he said when presenting to the Knesset a new 'Security Law' on 19 August 1952, Israel was living in a state of 'armed peace,' and he warned against the illusion and the danger of a 'false peace' with the Arab world. The new nation made out of immigrants from all corners of the world had to be shaped and galvanised as a nation in arms, a people in uniform, a fully mobilized society. The army, Ben-Gurion taught, should be the vital agent of nation building. When initiating military reprisals against neighbouring Arab states, he would frequently consider not only the need to inspire and motivate the army, but also to boost the morale of the new immigrants through exploits of their army. The notion of a nation living on a razor's edge between war and a precarious truce became a collective state of mind, a philosophy of life. 'Security' was definitely elevated to the status of the sacred cow of the young Jewish state." Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2006), 72.

(which include the Palestinians residing in what is *our* homeland in the occupied territories who struggle against the occupation, as well as refugee *infiltrators* who are attempting to return to their homes and families from the neighboring Arab states, and Palestinian *saboteurs* acting against Israel who are based in neighboring Arab states); and 3) our perceived *internal enemy*, the Palestinians under Israeli citizenship who demographically threaten us and who are perceived to ally with our external enemies. These practices have, to a great extent, as I argued in previous chapters, collapsed civil society and the state into one another, requiring, as they do, the militarization of the society-at-large and a general state-of-emergency which maintains "security" as a top priority.[28]

Militarization of society affects all of the society's formation and is part of the social practice that engenders Israel's specific production of social space--how and where roads are laid, architectural forms and architectural styles, fashion and design, representation, imagination, myths, films, national icons and heroes, music and radio, media, psychological and emotional states[29]—hate, fear, insecurity, an ordinary encounter with an Arab is felt as a threat. The IDF, civil-military law, mandatory draft, a national ethos of fear and suspicion, continual war requiring security of the state and the individual homeowner, a private war industry, intelligence gathering, policing of the borders, surveillance—are all part and parcel of everyday life. *Bitachon*, security,

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[28] See "Special Issue: 'An Army That Has a State?" *Israel Studies* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2007). "What has emerged from this inquiry is a very complex and fluid reality that is under constant change, but at the same time manifests certain continuity, such as in the continuous non-separation and overlapping of civilian and military realms." Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak, "Introduction" op. cit., VI.

[29] See D. Bar-Tal and Y Teichman, *Stereotypes and prejudice in conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Daniel Bar-Tal, *Living with the conflict: Socio-psychological analysis of the Israeli-Jewish society* (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2007). (Hebrew)

circumscribes and infiltrates the *lebenswelt* of everyone in Israel whether Jew or non-Jew, though logically speaking in inverse relation or perhaps conversely, since Jews and non-Jews are each the transposition of the subject and predicate of the other. For the Palestinian citizens, the merging of state and society was unadulterated since they were ghettoized into "security zones" which were broken down into small enclosed enclaves, "closed areas", governed and administered directly by the military for twenty years. And that legacy is far from over.

That Israel's leaders are involved with the task of defining external borders is not a peculiarity of Israel; such is necessary in constructing any nation-state. The emerging nation-states of Europe were confronted with "the ever-present tension with aliens at the border." As early as the sixteenth century, while the European powers were consolidating their heterogeneous populations into national entities and establishing defensible borders, they were also busy securing their contested borders in regard to their colonies abroad both in relation to the indigenous populations and competing European states. The Zionist Movement as a nation-state building movement, which since 1948 is expressed through the Israeli State, while similarly engaged, has also been and still continues populating the territory under its jurisdiction from the outside, via immigration, by a particular ethno-religious people as its way of constructing a nation-state. Unlike England or France, whose colonizing projects grew out of the socio-economic interests present within their societies upon which their nation-states were being constructed whose interests turned them outward, Israel's society and state has populated itself and built itself through colonization of in-gathering, which is still an unfinished project. Therefore, since Israel's nation-building process is simultaneously a colonizing project which is

taking place within as well as outside legally recognized territorial borders,[30] the question of "ever-present tensions with aliens at the borders" is not only the question of defining the alien-others along its perimeters, its outer boundaries, but its inner borders with respect to the remnants of the colonized population who reside within the territories under Israel's control (as citizens in Israel and as occupied people under its jurisdiction as Occupier).

A particular feature of Israeli nation-building that pertains to how the state has ideologically and legally resolved its ever-present tensions with aliens at its internal borders was to separate definitionally the "nation" from citizenship, as clarified in chapter 3, such that non-Jews can live in our midst territorially as citizens of the state but can never be part of the "nation" and therefore society proper, which is exclusively Jewish. Nationhood is established as ethno-religious on the one hand and de-territorialized on the other, since the *nation* includes all the Jewish people in the world, who can claim Israeli citizenship if they so desire. In this sense, it is difficult to argue that Israel is really modeled on a "modern" and "secular" conception of the nation-state. In the *Pledge of Allegiance* of the United States, citizens pledge themselves to the "one Nation" of the Republic of the United States of America. The "one Nation" is secularly defined and includes all citizens regardless of religion, race, ethnicity, country of origin, etc. All citizens are members of one and the same nation; they have the same

[30] It should be kept in mind that the unsettled border question is by choice, since, as discussed in the previous chapters, all ruling parties have repeatedly worked from the position that Ben-Gurion first articulated, that is, leave the matter of borders unresolved in hopes that later, when favorable circumstances present themselves, most probably through future wars, Israel will be able to acquire more land and eventually annex most, if not all, of Eretz-Israel. And such has been the case.

nationality.[31] In Israel, the individual pledges loyalty to the State (and its laws) and the state is defined as the homeland of the Jewish nation. A non-Jew can be a citizen of the State but is not by this fact necessarily a member of the nation. Therefore one pledges allegiance to the State. The recent additions, discussed in chapter 3, requiring allegiance to the State as democratic and not just Jewish, in an attempt to confirm the right to ethnic-religious privileging as democratic, further distances Israel's *national* construct from what is typically considered the modern secular nation-state. Perhaps that is why the sociologist Sammy Smooha speaks of the Israeli state as a *new* kind of democracy. Perhaps this is Smooha's "desperate attempt" to affirm Israel's identity as Western by inventing a new kind of rationalization for an old kind of subordination.[32] Regardless, as long as this non-national remains present within our borders—and now Palestinians constitute twenty percent of Israel's citizenry—premising nationhood in such a way insures that *we* remain ever insecure requiring vigilant monitoring of the ever-present tensions at our internal borders—culturally, legally, militarily, demographically.

Another ideological construction that defines the territoriality of the nation-building narrative relates to the definition of the State as the homeland of the Jewish people based on the religio-mythical Israel. To date, the State has territorially, if not legally, occupied through military and colonial expansion, a great deal of what is considered to be biblical Eretz-Israel. Most official maps of Israel include all of Eretz-

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[31] The original secular content of the US *Pledge of Allegiance* was compromised in 1954 when President Eisenhower ratified an amendment to the *Pledge* which changed "one Nation indivisible" to "one Nation under God, indivisible." I believe this occurred within the fierce anti-communist political climate of the time. Communists were portrayed as godless atheists. It is interesting to note that included among the original patriots of the American Revolution were notable atheists like Tom Paine, who, for one, has been more or less removed from US history books.

[32] Taken from Gil Eyal's discussion of the "invention of Hebrew" as "a desperate attempt to affirm a separate Western identity" (Eyal 2006, 2).

Israel, or to be more precise, a particular version since there is debate among Biblical scholars as to what constitute the biblical borders of Eretz-Israel. Regardless of this, what is seen on Israeli maps is actually an historical compromise that has been established by the hegemonic Zionist forces, since, for instance, it is stated in the *Bible* that Eretz-Israel extends to the Euphrates, so the territory of Jordan should be included in the maps of Eretz-Israel. (In the 1930s Ben-Gurion included Jordan in his plans for the Jewish State.)[33] But, at least for now, Israel's leaders are not demanding the Jordanians handover their land nor are they preparing to militarily *redeem* it. On this matter, they have compromised. Still, even to my surprise, as recently as December 11, 2007, an ex-Minister of Defense, Moshe Arens, writes in a *haaretz* article, "the new post-Zionists," that Jews have a right to "settlement on the land" including "what is today the Kingdom of Jordan." For support, he refers back to a 1920 League of Nations mandate. And the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Salai Meridor, made the comment in a public broadcast that it is a great sacrifice for many Jewish people to relinquish their right to any of the land given to them by God. He made this statement during a panel discussion with

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[33] Originally Ben-Gurion included Tranjordan as seen in this excerpt from a 1930s's conversation with George Antonious, an Arab historian quoted in Amos Elon, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 182.

"What is the territory?" Antonius asked.

"The territory is *Eretz Israel*," I [Ben-Gurion] answered.

"What are the borders of *Eretz Israel*?" Antonius asked.

"The borders of *Eretz Israel* are known from history," I answered.

"Borders are artificial things," Antonius remarked. "They are here today and there tomorrow…." He asked again what the territory was.

I answered: "It is the country between the Mediterranean in the west, and the desert in the east, between Sinai in the south and the source of the Jordan in the north."

"You are including Transjordan?" Antonius asked with more surprise.

"Of course," I answered. "Is the Jordan river the border of *Eretz Israel*? It is an *Eretz Israel* river…."

"Well," said Antonius, "you suggest that what England has not granted you, you will get from us? This is an Arab country and we have a right to full sovereignty."

"In Syria, yes, " I said. "in *Eretz Israel* we have been before you. We return to our country."

the PLO Mission's Ambassador to the United States, Afif Safieh, in December, 2007, soon after the Annapolis talks.

On the other hand, the matter is quite different when it comes to the area defined by the pre-1967 Green Line (which at present represents most closely what could be considered legal internationally recognized borders) and the occupied West Bank. When the Minister of Education, Yuli Tamir, proposed in December, 2006, to include the pre-1967 boundary, that is, the Green Line, in maps in school textbooks, *haaretz* reported that she was "sharply criticized" by many MKs, along with leaders of various political parties and even the former Director-General of the Education Ministry, now a Knesset Member for Kadima, Ronit Tirosh. An organization of right-wing rabbis "issued a Halakhic decree forbidding students from using schoolbooks featuring maps of Israel which include the pre-1967 Green Line border." Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, although he saw "nothing wrong with marking the Green Line," was also quoted as saying: "There is an obligation to emphasize that the government's position and public consensus rule out returning to the 1967 lines."[34]

In 2004, Dr. Nurit Peled-Elhan of Hebrew University researched "six study books that had been published after the Oslo agreement." Dr. Peled-Elhanan's research found

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[34] The controversy over the Green Line concerns what territory is considered to be Israel whether legally established or not and is reflected in the ever changing uses of what is considered to be Israel, as seen by Olmert's response to the question. "The 'Green Line' as a border between Israel and Jordan was established after Israel's War of Independence in 1949, and separated Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip from the rest of Israel's territory. The line was thickened in the past by the establishment of the so-called Nahal settlements along it, populated by army units who combined security and military training with agricultural work. Only a few hundred miles of the line have been supported by new development regions [mostly by the government by Oriental Jews] that were established along it, such as Lakhish, Besor, and Ta'anach, mainly for the purpose of reinforcing border strips of land. The 'Green Line' was very dominant as a border line between the two countries during the years 1948-67, till the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967, which changed the region politically and territorially. Israel then unilaterally recognized the Jordan River as its eastern border, unilaterally converted the armistice line in the Golan Heights into a security border, and created a de facto border between Israel and Lebanon in the form of a narrow security zone, north of the 1923 international borderline" (Efrat 1988, 49; brackets mine).

that the "Green Line and Arab cities" had disappeared from the maps in these books and what appeared were their "presentation of sites and settlements in 'Judea and Samaria,' rather than in the 'West Bank,' as an integral part of Israel." Some of these books, as the *haaretz* article indicates, were approved by the Education Ministry and apparently many teachers used these books "even without the ministry's approval."[35] Tamir's defense in the above dispute over including the Green Line in school textbooks was that it was a matter of education and not politics, since "We teach, for instance, about United Nations Resolution 242, but we don't show students the Green Line. We cannot deny that there used to be a border that is still being debated today." But, facts are not the issue. Within the national narrative such simple facts as those presented by Tamir are attacked as biased politics, while biased politics is presented as fact as witnessed in the maps and textbooks.

As to the native non-Jewish population housed within the territory of Eretz-Israel under the control of the state, they are simply alien to the *national* project. Some of this population has citizenship, those within the Green Line who are known by *us* as the *Arabs of Israel*; the others are in the Occupied Territories and are known as *Palestinians*. Therefore, the borders demarcating *us* from *them* and what designation we attribute to them are internal features of the different stages in the colonization of Eretz-Israel. In this regard, Elia Zureik's definition of "internal colonialism" is quite apt.[36] It applies both to

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[35] See Akiva Eldar, "PM Olmert backs Tamir proposal to add Green Line to textbooks," *haaretz*, December 5, 2006.

[36] Elia T. Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). Zureik identifies nine elements that are constitutive of internal colonialism: 1) racial domination; 2) settler colonies; 3) imperialist relation between capitalist and non-capitalist economies within one nation-state; 4) use of subordinate population as a source of cheap labor; 5) specific mobility

territory and persons. And just as the Israeli state has been the *unit of order* inside the Green Line, differentiating space between developed, underdeveloped, and de-developed, it serves as the *supreme unit of order*, a social, cultural and political form, inscribing "absolute geopolitical and social boundaries…on territory and on persons, demarcating space and those who are members from those who are not," not only within the Green Line but all of the territory it has under its control and has earmarked for annexation.

Thus, the *unit of order as a social, cultural and political form*, upon which the construction of this nation-state was established by the leaders of the hegemonic Zionist Movement, is one that requires the continuous mediation of not only physical borders but population borders. As we investigate the *cultural* discourse about the *Arabs of Israel* the empirical fact of separation—ghettoization—is what substantiates the discourse and gives it its taken-for-grantedness and not the other way around. Although I do not agree with Eyal that "new forms of knowledge …could only come into being on the newly void cognitive terrain created by separation" since this terrain and this project of separation were not without historical foresight and planning and not simply the result of an "abrupt and violent act of separation", nonetheless, he does identify the important role that the institutionalization of a culture of separation serves once it is in place within social space in reproducing the culture of separation in the following passage.

> [T]hose discourses that today serve to explain and justify cultural separatism themselves owe their existence and justification to the abrupt and violent act of separation—the expulsions, the prohibition against the return of refugees, the military government, the emigration of the Arab Jews and their settlement on the periphery—and to the struggles that followed in its wake. The new forms of knowledge—the realpolitick rationality of the network of intelligence expertise, the cultural rationality of modernization discourse—could only come into being on the newly void cognitive terrain created by separation and the dissolution of the Orient. Therefore, they cannot explain separation; on the contrary, the secret of their own existence is held by the structures of separatism… Moreover, the problem is not the result of some essential antinomy between religion

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(and lack of for the subordinate population) patterns; 7) dependency; 8) race relations in settler society; and 9) a system of incorporation of the subordinate population through co-optation.

> and rationality, tradition and modernity, but arises from purely social causes, from the fact that the distinction between the various spheres has by now been institutionalized and that countless social actors now possess vested interests in its continuation and in the purification of the hybrids that disrupt its neat divisions. The multiplication and mutual reinforcement of these interests function as a lock-in mechanism (Eyal 2006, 238-39).

As Israelis continues to colonize the region, ghettoization, viewed from one side as a form of internal colonialism, is extended to the Palestinian population within the territories occupied by Israel. But, once this is accomplished, the actually existing segregated locales substantiate in consciousness the correctness of separation and its discourse which appears in one's mind to be validated by the facts on the grounds as objectively given. The state's central and unifying role in the nation building process, especially in the first decades, along with the rise of the organic intellectuals of the Zionist project who are situated throughout the institutions of society, enables it to act hegemonically as a central broker of culture demonstrating the significance of Marx and Engels' straight forward claim that the ruling ideas of a society are the ideas of the ruling class—"i.e., the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force" (Marx and Engels, 1996, 64). Anyone who wants to challenge this discourse, which is, as Eyal says, "locked into" society through the "multiplication and mutual reinforcement" of the interests of cultural separation, will, as he points out,

> have to reckon with the fact that the sum total of all these interests—in other words, the mechanism of lock-in against which they speak—is immediately connected, in the last instance, to the way in which the effect of the state is produced. This is why whoever wishes to speak differently will be perceived as threatening the state—its borders, its character, its justification or its very existence. It is much easier, therefore, to continue on the course already established, to build walls of real separation along imaginary internal and external boundaries (Eyal 2006, 242).

Even Yuli Tamir's modest proposal to include the Green Line on the maps of Israel in school textbooks marks her as a *national* threat requiring the Likud faction within the Knesset to introduce a no-confidence motion charging her with "introducing politically-motivated changes to the national curriculum in line with what they called her extreme

leftist ideology. They added that the proposal ignores Israeli law, including Jerusalem Law and Golan Heights Law." And the good laws they mention are those enacted by the colonial occupiers in order to illegally annex territory they acquired as the spoils of war.

All nation-states construct national narratives. National narratives are integral to the process of producing nation-states; they are inseparable from the construction of a nation's social space and the rise to hegemony of specific social forces within the borders of the state. Without the successful production of such narratives external borders would be unstable as well as internal cohesion since no hegemonic social class would have consolidated its unifying legitimacy to rule in the name of all. Colonial projects of nation-states additionally require narratives that justify taking possession of the land and the means of livelihood of indigenous inhabitants and the subjugation of native populations to the interests of the colonizing people. Typical of colonial narratives are the notions that the colonizer brings a superior culture or superior know-how to an otherwise backward people who do not have the means to advance themselves, or simply that God is on our side for one reason or another. Similarly, the hegemonic Zionist world view mirrors these typical colonial narratives, but most particularly, the biblical notion that God has given this land to the Jews for perpetuity enables a conception, whether one is secular or religious, that defines the Jewish colonization as simply a returning home. Ben-Gurion's hypothesis about the Palestinian peasants as descendants of the original Hebrews and his idea of the Jewish redemption of the land and national redemption through Hebrew labor is a secular version of the religious narrative.

Maintaining a Zionist national narrative has been more or less easily managed since the prevailing hegemonic Israeli-Zionist world view has acquired common sense

status throughout most of society--Palestinian individuals living in *our midst* are seen as not having any real historical connection or legitimate claim, or at least not equal to that of the Jews, to the place as their homeland and this is directly expressed in how Zionists have defined "nation" as discussed in chapter 3. This orientation informs the Jewish population at large and not only the extreme religious Zionists. The *village-hamula* discourse supports the perpetuation of this rationale since it precludes these *Arabs* from having identification with anything but their familial-village place within the world. Nationhood is declared, therefore, to be a form of affiliation alien to these Arabs. Within the cultural arena this has been, perhaps, one of the key aspects of the village discourse, a secular and pseudo-scientific discourse, which allows Israelis to feel morally justified in colonizing and dispossessing Palestinians of their homes and subsequently excluding Palestinians as co-nationals. Holding to such ideations about the Palestinians one can assert with "moral rectitude" that in fulfilling our national project we have not displaced or dispossessed "a people" from their national homeland. Even the programs of "ethnic cleansing" carried out during the war and the "transfer" option which is still being actively advocated for today can be seen as morally justifiable. This is the position of the notable historian Benny Morris[37] and it was, after all, the revered national leader Ben-Gurion who formulated and implemented these policies. In the end, supported by such discourse, Palestinians are to *us*, in fact, *present absentees*[38] and many Israelis would like

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[37] See footnote 31 in chapter 1.

[38] Regarding the definition of "absentee" see footnote 85 of chapter 1. It is interesting to note that as the Annapolis talks are underway with the objective of realizing a Palestinian State, the *haaretz* reports that "Israel has reached new heights of racism." According to a report by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel there has been a 26 percent rise in anti-Arab incidents and the number of Jews who express hatred towards the Arabs has doubled in the last year. The article also reports that according to the June 2007 Democracy Index of the Israel Democracy Institute, "only half the public believes that Jews and Arabs

them all to become presently absent within our borders. The arguments amongst Jewish Israelis about the Palestinian citizenry may differ in emphasis, but in practical terms their conclusions more or less arrive at the same place.

But, a shift in emphasis within the national discourse regarding the Palestinian population occurred once the leaders of the state realized they were faced more or less permanently with this population. Although the depiction of the native Palestinians as an *enemy within* remained an essential part of the discourse, the more sanitized *minority* discourse became dominant within academic and official parlance. Yair Bauml in his book, *A Blue and White Shadow: The Israeli Establishment's Policy and Actions among its Arab citizens: The Formative Years: 1958-1968*, considers 1958 to be the turning point and he provides solid and detailed evidence that shows that it is during the 1958-1968 period that a systematic plan towards the Arab minority is developed.[39] By 1958, even though Ben-Gurion and Dayan were still advocating the transfer option (and the absolute necessity of military rule over the Palestinian population) transfer had not taken place and other leaders, like Moshe Sharett,[40] were pushing for changes in the military

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must have equal rights…55 percent support the idea that the state should encourage Arab emigration from Israel and 78 percent oppose the inclusion of Arab political parties in the government…74 percent of Jewish youths in Israel think that Arabs are 'unclean'." From Yuval Yoaz and Jack Khoury, "Civil rights group: Israel has reached new heights of racism," *haaretz*, December 9, 2007.

[39] Yair Bauml, *A Blue and White Shadow : The Israeli Establishment's Policy and Actions among its Arab citizens: The Formative Years: 1958-1968* (Haifa: Pardes Publishing House, 2007). This book is in Hebrew but includes a twenty page summary of each chapter in English.

[40] "Sharett became Prime Minister following David Ben-Gurion's retirement in January 1954. Considered to be a moderate, he advocated diplomacy with neighboring states, but was unable to implement his policies due to lack of support from hardliners in his government who continued to consult Ben-Gurion, now retired to Kibbutz Sde Boker, bypassing Sharett's authority. In February 1955 Ben-Gurion returned to serve as Minister of Defence under Sharett, replacing Pinhas Lavon who had resigned following a failed Israeli covert operation in Egypt known as the Lavon Affair. Ben-Gurion soon regained a prominent position in Mapai party, displacing Sharett as Prime Minister in November 1955. Moshe Sharett served as Foreign Minister (1956), and then became Chairman of the Jewish Agency from 1961 until his death. He

order. In 1958 Palestinian local councils become part of Israel's Center of Local Authorities; in 1959 Palestinians can become members of the Histadrut; MAPAI sets up committees for Arabs within the party; the Military Governors lessen the restrictions on passes so that Palestinians can more readily work in the Jewish economy and the Histadrut works with the Military Government to recruit workers; and it is during this time that the "minority" discourse becomes more dominant and results in the dissection of the Arabs into distinct groupings. It is at this time, as Bauml points out, that, for instance, the Druze are categorized as a distinct nationality. Henceforth, the non-Jewish native population is portrayed as a minority (vis-à-vis the Jewish majority) composed of competing religious and ethnic minorities who as individuals are affiliated to their villages and patrilineal blood-clans. This depiction of the *Arab minority* is part of the larger mainstream sociological-political paradigm, which conceives society at large as a more or less cohesive--more or less since it is only natural that tensions exist among and between different ethnic and religious communities--collection of minorities (obviously with some grouping constituting a majority whether this be numerical or because they are culturally and politically hegemonic). This model of society became the dominant *modus operandi* of the Israeli social science enterprise as well as the nation's (i.e. Jewish) conception of itself. It is also during this period, 1959, that the anthropologist Abner Cohen writes the landmark book, *Arab Border-Villages in Israel: A Study of Continuity and Change in Social Organization.*

Although a detailed and comprehensive review of the historical and conceptual development of Israeli social sciences is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is

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also continued to serve, until his death, as a member of the Knesset." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moshe_Sharett.

important to identify the major contours of this aspect of the cultural terrain.[41] The cultural terrain is inextricably a part of the process of social formation and integral to the social construction and reproduction of ghettoization within Israel. By examining the dominant features of the social science establishment as part of the cultural terrain, it is seen how this work is informed by and informs the national narrative and supports the reproduction of social space. Therefore, for the present purposes, a summary review of the major conceptualizations of the disciplines of sociology and anthropology is presented in order to demonstrate how these conceptualizations were constructed within the framework of nation building and the hegemonic national discourse regarding the form and content of Israel as a society and state, especially during the formative years of state-building under Ben-Gurion's leadership.

The *minority* discourse was given systematic formulation by the renowned sociologist, Schmuel Noah Eisenstadt. Under his tutelage sociology was framed within a structural-functionalist model via modernity theory which defined Israeli society as a western, democratic, pluralist society composed of various majority-minority Jewish ethnic communities.[42] He, along with his colleague Carl Frankenstein, a psychologist, treated the study of Israeli society proper as the study of Jewish society independent of the Palestinian population, who at the time were twelve percent of the state's citizenry. Clearly, society, as such, is conceptualized in terms of the Jewish nation's nation-

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[41] For an excellent review of Israeli sociology see Uri Ram, *The Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology: Theory, Ideology and Identity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995) and for anthropology see Dan Rabinowitz, "Oriental Othering and National Identity: A Review of Early Israeli Anthropological Studies of Palestinians," *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 9 (2002).

[42] Schmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1967). Eisenstadt was a close associate of Talcott Parsons and a major contributor to the structural-functionalist school of sociology in the 1950s and 60s.

building project—and the State of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. These two co-thinkers academically formalized the notion that the Yishuv, the pre-state European Jews who settled in Palestine, who were considered to be the founders of the state, constituted the core of society. Accordingly, it was conceptualized, that it is to this European-based Jewish society and state that the other non-European Jews immigrate; they are absorbed into Israeli society (Ashkenazi) as ethnic minorities, albeit Jewish.

Within this Wirthian type paradigm, social problems within Jewish society are understood to be the result of tensions and stresses due to the difficulties non-European immigrants have in adjusting or assimilating to Israel's western, democratic culture and modern social organization. The native Sephardic Jews were also considered part of the "problem of ethnic differences" and Eisenstadt included them "among the oriental Jews as evincing similar signs of backwardness, lack of differentiation, and resulting social disengagement: 'symptoms of the lack of integration and tension specific to immigrants…unstable social relations and deviant tendencies…juvenile delinquency, criminality, instability of family life, etc.'" (Eisenstadt 1955, 90-92). Like Wirth, they postulated that overtime as these immigrants and the native Arab Jews adapted to their new realities and were socialized and absorbed into modern Israeli culture and life these tensions would lessen.[43]

The use of the *majority-minority* social paradigm is seen as the natural result of the fact that society contains various ethnic, national and religious groupings that numerically constitute minorities. Extending Eisenstadt's social model to include the Palestinians, as the sociologist Sammy Smooha does, is therefore simply an amplification

[43] Their methodology, as is most mainstream sociology, is based on what Antonio Gramsci correctly identifies as "evolutionary positivism" in "Historical Materialism and Sociology."

of what is considered a valid social model. Minority status appears to be naturally given to society and not the result of specific social practices that situate a population spatially within society. Ideologically, the spatially segregated population is then turned into the social category "minority". Their treatment as a population in specific socio-political and economic ways and their "behaviors" within their social spaces are correspondingly seen to be results inherent to their being a sociological "minority". Such "minority" positioning, and its reproduction over time, has in itself nothing to do with numerical quantities. Numbers alone do not account for particular social policies and practices and political programs towards a group in society. Their place within the social relations of society does. Minorities are produced social spaces. But, mainstream Israeli social science takes as its starting point for social analysis conceptualizations of features established by the national construction of the Jewish State. Whether it be the *othering* of the Palestinians or the non-European Jews is henceforth seen as natural to the circumstances of *our* society and as such is the expression of any modern democratic state that houses within it numerical minorities.

With such a social model the "Arabs" are portrayed and studied as Israel's particular minority relative to the Jewish majority and therefore, like anywhere else marginal to society proper. In general, the culture of separation is simply another fact. All the policies of ghettoization and marginalization, which had to be actively decided upon, put in place, and continuously monitored, reinforced and adjusted--all necessary to creating the given situation--have had little if any empirical or conceptual meaning when it comes to the study of the Palestinian as object of the social scientist. Constructing the state as the national project belonging to the Jewish people, as discussed in the previous

chapters, which is perceived as a moral right, establishes in the mind the correctness of discriminatory policies and constructions that subordinate the other to the broader narrative of nation-state building. And, by glossing Palestinian realities into such vague and apparently non-ideological conceptualizations like "minority" the effect is to remove *our* responsibility in constituting Palestinian "marginality" and enables their "marginal" situation to be seen as coming from the "minority" disposition.

Although Eisenstadt's view of the Oriental Jews mirrors the notions put forward by the Arab specialists regarding the Palestinian citizens, unlike the native Arab, the Arab Jew can be *resocialized* since they have the Jewish, that is Ashkenazi, family of Jews to whom they are affiliated at their deepest level. For instance, according to Moshe Shokeid and Shlomo Deshen, although the Middle Eastern Jews come from Arab countries and have been influenced by the Arab and Muslim cultures, they can be re-conditioned because they have as a "traditional cultural ideal…the ideal of all-inclusive mutual responsibility" which comes "from Jewish society," as opposed to the "traditional cultural ideal from Arab culture—the ideology of kinship" (Shokeid and Deshen 1982, 3). How such a view meshes with the concrete reality that "19 families…hold the keys to the state economy" and have a total income of "NIS 298 billion, while the state's income from taxes comes to NIS 191 billion" and that according to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor in 2007 "businesses in Israel donated…NIS 1.1 billion—a fraction of 1 percent of their profits" would need to be explained. Yossi Sarid, who wrote the *haaretz* article (3/6/2008), "Our march of pennies," in which he reports this information, concludes that "the idea of social responsibility has yet to penetrate the awareness of most businesses." Nitzan and Bichler describe in some detail in a sub-section of a chapter

on the history of Israel's power structure entitled "The Dynasties" how "Over the years, the business, political and ideological affinity among the elites was fortified by intricate kinship ties" (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, 108). But, putting these matters aside, Shokeid and Deshen continue to explain that under the modernizing influence of Euro-Israel, the non-European backward immigrants, though faced with "questions of identity," can in time, be acculturated, that is *Israelized*. "The particularistic symbolic heritages in Israel thus do not remain embedded with the specific ethnic groups that nurtured them. Rather there are indications of cultural diffusion" (Shokeid and Deshen 1982, 3).

On the other hand, the native Arabs, who, as they simply assert as a truism, have no such all-inclusive ideal or community, are left to their own distinct and "primitive" devices, the *village* and the *hamula*, and so can only dig themselves deeper into their traditional social structures and mentality even as they adjust, adapt, react to their minority status next to (typically not rendered "within" but "next to" or "neighboring") a modern society. (It is also typically claimed that these traditional kinship bound people resist modern western society even when it would be to their benefit.) Gil Eyal makes the point that the proponents of the discourse on the Oriental Jews cite the Arab experts to substantiate their claims about the Mizrahim, though not vice versa. He argues that this is because

> [T]hese two discourses perform different roles: the discourse about *mizrahi* Jews needs the discourse about the Arab village in order to constitute its subject as Arab-Jewish hybrids, while the discourse about 'Israeli Arabs' does not require such assistance. It is premised on the objectivity of the Arab village, which is guaranteed by the mechanisms that control and monitor the internal boundary. Thus, it is possible to say that the Arab village, the development town, and the immigrant *moshav* complemented each other as parallel and mutually supportive arms of the Israeli border regime (Eyal 2006, 177).

The contribution Eisenstadt's early work made to establishing the purview of sociology I do not think can be overestimated. His work provided a systematic orientation

to the discipline based on the *othering* of the Arab, both in regard to the Oriental Jews and the native Palestinians; it provided an authoritative structure to and methodology for the study of society as an academic discipline grounded on respected scholarly traditions (Talcott Parsons in particular) within the national institutions while reflecting the tasks of state-building as conceived of by the political elites; and it provided, based on its conceptualizations, a blueprint for policy-making which corresponded to the requirements of the state-building project, particularly in regard to the in-gathering of Diaspora Jews necessary for the actual material production and peopling of the society, which corresponded to the absorption and assimilation programs designed by the founders of the state. These programs, as they applied to the non-European Jewish immigrants, served to de-class, or rather proletarianize, these immigrants for purposes of building the national economy; while also placing them on the borders of society, literarily at the borders, as well as at the margins of the cities in the slums, and in undeveloped areas designated for *Judaization*. As Eyal says, "Eisenstadt performed, in the field of expertise, the same exclusion that Ben-Gurion instituted in the political field" (Eyal 2006, 145).

To underscore this summary's influence of Eisenstadt's work, I turn to the landmark 1949 study concerning social problems pertaining to the absorption of immigrants, which Eisenstadt conducted under the auspices of the Department for Middle Eastern Jewry of the Jewish Agency in collaboration with Carl Frankenstein. In their study they distinguish immigrants according to their country of origins and the cultural environments from which they came. Eyal correctly points out that they were concerned with "defining the general form to which they [the immigrants] should conform. They

both understood this form to be differentiation, a differentiated personality and a differentiated role structure," differentiation being considered a defining feature of modernity, an integral part of Wirth's typology of modernity. In Eyal's analysis of their notion of the "general form" he writes:

> One starts with the norm as an unmarked universality, defined in exceedingly abstract terms—Israeliness, modernity, stable social relations, normal mental development, the capacity for abstract thought, differentiation. It is impossible to define this norm in substantive terms, unless by fact that it is identified with the Ashkenazi public or a portion thereof. This means that the norm is defined negatively, through identifying the 'others' who are not part of the Ashkenazi public and who are thereby defined as a problem from the point of view of integration and also absorption into this norm. For example, the immigrant children from Arab countries are defined as a social problem because their grades at school are typically lower than those of European children. They are not less intelligent, explained Frankenstein, but they lack 'powers of abstract critical thought,' which are characteristic of Western-modern differentiated thought processes and therefore are prerequisites for integration in 'our society.' This failure is caused by a certain cultural pattern, the 'oriental mentality' of the society in which they were raised, but it can be overcome with the correct application of scientific psychological principles to education work. Difference, therefore [that is in relation to the Arab Jews], is marked not as something irreducible but as something to be overcome. The Yemenite will become 'a Jew who forgets whence he came' (Eyal 2006, 144-45; brackets mine).[44]

Frankenstein put it this way in his "On the Concept of the Primitive" which is concerned with the non-European immigrant Jews, not the native Palestinians: "the adaptation of the primitive person to a society at a higher level of differentiation depends on whether he can exist within a framework of life that is familiar to him…like the small community, work in a personalized economic setting, etc."[45] Tom Segev, in his book, *1949: The First Israelis*, gives an excellent account of the attitudes of the Zionist leaders, writers and intellectuals, including Ben-Gurion, Eisenstadt and Frankenstein, towards the non-European immigrants. In the early years of the State, as Segev relates, academics were recruited to deal with this problem of immigration, especially since the number of

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[44] Eyal is quoting from Carl Frankenstein, "On the Concept of Primitive," 353-55; Carl Frankenstein and Gina Orther, "A Method to Improve the Powers of Abstraction in Children of Immigrants from Oriental Countries," *Megamot* 2 (October 1951): 261-76 [H].

[45] Eyal quotes this passage from Frankenstein in *Disenchantment* on p. 147.

immigrants from Arab countries began to exceed those from Europe. What is seen is not only the denigration of the *Oriental* but its complement, the centrality of the European Jews to Judaism and its historical culmination in Zionism, largely a movement of Western Jews. Thus, the external *othering* of the indigenous population is also an internal *othering* of the non-European Jew, distanced from the European modern us, who are considered the center and norm of Israeli society. This still pertains even though the Mizrahi constitute half, if not more, of the Israeli Jewish population.[46]

Thusly, the analytic *othering* and separation of "the Arab" attained scientific legitimacy within the social sciences and notions, such as "primitive", were made not only acceptable but given scientific validity. To this day such stereotypes are quite commonly held as truths about Arabs. While living in Israel it was not an exceptional occurrence for me to be informed of the "primitive" ways that *our Arabs* think and behave. That such notions about Palestinians are current is seen in this incident at Haifa University that was reported in *haaretz* in 2005. Meron Rapoport reported that a respected Professor, Dr. David Bukay, was charged by an Arab student for teaching racism against Arabs in his classes.[47] Dr. Bukay, on the other hand, considers his thoughts about Arabs to simply be fact and scientifically proven though he has no problem if you disagree with him because, as he says, that's the nature of science. He makes use of the tribal-clan notion and characterizes "Arab" mentality as primitive, irrational, pre-science, much the same as Frankenstein. In a course outline entitled,

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[46] See Shlomo Swirski, *Israel: The Oriental Majority*, trans. Barbara Swirski (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1989).

[47] Dr. Bukay counter-charged the Arab student for disrupting the class. I don't know the outcome of this conflict but the last I knew the student was up for suspension and the professor was not reprimanded though under investigation.

"Surveys in Arab-Islamic Culture," which he distributed to his students at the University of Haifa for his class "The Inter-Arab System and the Palestine Issue," he states:

> Both the Arabs, due to their tribal-clan structure, and the Islamic religion, which holds that Allah is the center of all and rejects human centrality, are characterized by the rejection of the opinion of people as individuals. Their views and concepts are not taken into account at all, only the opinion of the generality…This leads to tribal-communal conceptual conformity and perpetuates the pointlessness of the scientific polls and surveys. Therefore, anthropologists state, when an Arab or a Muslim opens his remarks with the expression wallahi, he is apparently intending to lie.[48]

Since the Palestinians are assumed to constitute a pre-modern *other*, and given the historical formation of the various social science disciplines established within *modern western civilization*, their study has for the most part fallen to the anthropologist. The *anthropologizing of the Palestinian* and the *sociologizing of us* is another aspect of the national academic enterprise based on the culture of separation.[49] This distinction between the disciplines is itself a product of European capitalist colonial development

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[48] "wallahi" literally means "I swear on God" but has come to mean in common usage "indeed."

[49] With the growth of a critical body of literature over the last decade, most notably the post-Zionists, this disciplinary separation is beginning to break down, though it still remains hegemonic. And, of course these delineations have been and are more and more being contested and even within mainstream sociology there are scholars who include the Palestinian population, as the Arab minority, into their studies, like Sammy Smooha, a disciple of Eisenstadt. Nonetheless, the dominant paradigm holds sway and inclusion usually means a separate chapter in a book or collection on the Arabs since their case is special or different from society proper. A 1989 example, "The Structure and Dilemmas of Israeli Pluralism," by the sociologist Judith T. Shuval, is a good representative of a revised version of Eisenstadt's methodology. The title itself reflects Eisenstadt's methodological premises. What is interesting here is that the author identifies "three principle dimensions" in terms of which "Israel is differentiated" and which "define its pluralistic structure: ethnicity, defined in the Jewish population in terms of country of origin of an individual or his parents and grandparents; religion [she means only within Jewish society]; and the Arab-Jewish dimension." Clearly she is a disciple of Eisenstadt, expanding the field of study by granting the Israeli Arabs a position within society at large and including them as part of Israel's pluralism; but, she conceptualizes the Palestinian population not as subjects within Israeli society, but as an abstraction of something she terms "the Arab-Jewish dimension," that is, as a particular expression of the Israel-Arab conflict (and the conflict in the Occupied Territories) and devotes to this "dimension" of Israel's pluralism in her study about two-thirds of a page of a nineteen page article. She concludes, after providing no research material or analytic substantiation—just that hostility exists between Jews and Arabs--that a culture of separation, as regards this third dimension, is required to sustain the "legitimacy of coexistence." Mirroring Louis Wirth's earlier work she states: "Physical and social separatism have made this [coexistence] more or less tenable….A separatist structure has made a modicum of coexistence possible." Judith T. Shuval, "The Structure and Dilemmas of Israeli Pluralism," in *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers* ed., Baruch Kimmerling, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 129. Brackets mine.

which placed the West in the position of asserting cultural hegemony through its real domination on the ground resulting in the western postulation of the diametric opposition of the modern we and the pre-modern other (the colonized). Since the colonized non-western (meaning also pre-capitalist—rural) *other* resides internal to the state but external to Israel's national (i.e. Jewish) borders, the general east/west dichotomy is distinguished within in Israel as having both internal territorial borders demarcating us from them spatially and, within the ideological-cultural terrain, borders between us and them are expressed in academia as different fields and areas of expertise. The study of *our Arabs* and the study of *our society* are two distinct enterprises.[50] The Oriental Jews, who stand between, require special expertise and social policy. Although I would argue that it is not "purification of hybrids" that is central to the tasks of the experts, nor does this phenomena to the extent that it can be claimed to operate explain the demarcation process[51]--since the ideological zones that separate the Ashkenazi (Yishuv/sabra) from the Oriental Jews (Sephardic/Mizrahi) and the Palestinian citizens reflect the actually existing social practices of interested parties that produce physical, class, power, political and cultural delineations of produced social space--nonetheless, Eyal captures an important aspect of the ideological delineations which occur within Israeli social structures and expertise in this passage:

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[50] In Israel the study of Arabs in the Arab states is a separate field of study so that there are differing frameworks for the study of *Israel's* or *our Arabs* and Middle Eastern Arabs.

[51] It appears to me that Eyal thinks that the culture of separation just happened out of the process of the 1948 War and the establishment of the State. He argues that it was not inherent to pre-state Zionism and not "inevitable". This position seems either naïve or uninformed. Certainly there were differing ideological positions within the Zionist Movement, but the leading forces were consistently organizing and putting in place a state-in-waiting and the apparatuses and institutions of a state with a plan for implementing a Jewish only state. The historical record is there and has been made public by numerous writers like Ilan Pappe (2206).

> By 1953, the field of orientalist expertise had been completely transformed…Four different jurisdictions were differentiated—intelligence, government, *hasbara* [propaganda-education], and the absorption of immigrants—each controlled by a different group with a different form of expertise, and each organized around the purification of one of the hybrids. The expertise necessary to speak about Arabs outside the state was separated from the expertise necessary to speak about the Arabs inside the state, and both were separated from the expertise necessary to deal with the Arab-Jews. Thus passed away the liminal territory of the Orient, where the transmutation of identities could be performed, and its place was taken by the buffer zones of separatism (Eyal 2006, 151; brackets mine).

As I have been arguing, such zones are premised on Israel's specific, produced social space, actualizing concretely the social practice of power, and political and economic relations and resulting in the production of the national entity as a society of ghettos. The "village" discourse reproduces in the mind the rightness of what is actually produced ghetto space.

The established conceptual apparatus, which spatially fixes, in all its social dimensions, the Palestinian population as a minority vis-à-vis the Jewish majority,[52] had its origins in the social practices of the Military Government, as did the dissection of this "minority" into distinct minorities who are classified along *village*, *hamula* and religious lines. It was systematized within the field of anthropology as part of the dominant academic discourse by the Arab specialists, many of whom first worked in the Arab ghettos with the Military Government before entering academia, like Abner Cohen and Emanuel Marx.

Since Abner Cohen was particularly germinal in structuring the conceptual parameters for the study of the *Arabs of Israel* an assessment of his work helps to further situate the cultural terrain. Cohen successfully established the apparent objectivity of the

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[52] The concept *minority*, which is in such popular usage today, is, to my mind, one of those glossed terms that treats a phenomenon as a *natural* consequence of *modernity*, another glossing concept. Glossed constructs like "minorities" are seen as the *natural* result of modern settings which are understood in technical terms—size, density, differentiation, etc.--and not historically specific constructs produced as a consequence of specific social practice.

*village* and *hamula* as the units of analysis for the distinct study of the *Arabs in Israel*. In his 1959 book, *Arab Border-Villages in Israel: A Study of Continuity and Change in Social Organization*, he establishes this discourse with the weight of scientific rigor. One way he accomplished this was by providing what appears to take into account the "changed circumstances" the Arabs find themselves in: namely, a "traditional" population who were previously a "majority" who are now a "minority" within "a modern society" who are also subject to a military government. But, as he develops his analysis it is seen that these "changed circumstances" are only the present stage props for the expression of inherent Arab cultural traits. Their "minority" status is simply treated as a fact, though often credited to be a difficult one for *the Arabs*. The newly constituted facts on the ground as they pertain to the Palestinian citizens in Israel are treated in the end as exogenous factors that form the medium in which the Arabs express themselves as individuals, families and communities--behaviors which are prescribed by their specifically *Arab* embedded *village-hamula* tradition-bound cultural traits. The spatial fact of produced ghettoization is portrayed not as produced space but as the normal, albeit under military rule, village mode of life. Therefore, what one witnesses going on in the Arab locales, as explicated by Cohen, are the Arabs *adapting* their character to "changed circumstances" by means of their own self-regulatory processes. What appears to be an appreciation of historical specificity is in actuality a de-temporalizing and essentializing of cultural traits. Nonetheless, the language within which he presents his research data and conclusions, a language which speaks an appreciation for historical change (the subtitle begins *A Study in Continuity and Change*), lends historical authenticity to his text. His study of the border villages in the Little Triangle (where I conducted most of my

ethnographic work)--where he had worked as a school inspector for the Military Government before becoming an academic[53]--provided, I believe more than any other academic work, the means to establish the dominance of the *hamula* and *village* discourse within the discipline and society. He grounded the use of these *notions of culture* on what appeared to be a legitimate and authoritative scientific basis. These concepts became firmly established as the central units of analysis for the study of *Israel's Arabs*.

Since Cohen's object of study was designated a pre-modern, non-western other, their study was only naturally situated within the pre-modern discourse of anthropology. The categories of analysis required to study such an object were already firmly established by the discipline (and the Manchester school of anthropology he was trained in in England). Affiliations based on blood lineage within village life were the tools of the trade. Putting aside the fact that the *hamula* was not and is not a true form of a purely blood-related kinship-clan, nonetheless, Cohen conscientiously and systematically applied the tools of analysis he was trained in to his research in the field and gave back in the form of fact, a reality circumscribed by these anthropological categories. Taking this into account, along with his de-temporalized concept of "changed circumstances", the major conclusion of his research--that it is the villagers themselves who resurrect traditional social structures and behaviors within their changed circumstances—had the weight of scientific objectivity, even as he acknowledged that prior to the establishment of the State of Israel affiliation to the *hamula*, for instance, was loosing significance within everyday life.

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[53] As someone who worked in the Palestinian areas and who was supervised by the Military Government, Abner Cohen had to have been familiar with the well-entrenched *hamula-village* and *minority* language used by the Military Government during that time before entering the University of Manchester to study anthropology.

In the end A. Cohen substantiates the national discourse of separateness. His work, whether he intended it or not, gave this narrative, to my mind, more than any other academic work, the semblance of objectivity and scientific validity. It is one in which we can all partake and believe that we are grounded in fact and truth. The *village*, as understood via the constructs of Cohen and the other Arab specialists, gives the discipline and members of society, a notion of culture that is seen as authentic, authoritative and factual. He accomplished for the national discourse what Gil Eyal considers to be accomplished by the village discourse in general in this passage from *Disenchantment*:

> [T]here are two discursive features—the analysis of the space of the village as composed of a traditional 'core' and a more modern 'periphery' and the analysis of the social structure of the village as divided into warring *hamulas*—that served to demarcate the Arab village as a *sui generic* social and spatial entity from all that surrounded it and permitted the participants in the discourse to believe that they were all talking about the 'same thing' (Eyal 2006, 152).

And, as is so typical of Israeli society, this discourse fits into, conforms with, informs the general discourse and becomes part of the general public's common sense knowledge about the Palestinian other. Thus it serves to insure that the boundaries between *us* and *them* are maintained. As Eyal's says: "the more significant effects of this discourse have to do not with the villages themselves as with the internal boundary between Jews and Arabs" (Eyal 2006, 153).

Drawing on Johannes Fabian's analysis of time and ethnographic writing, Rabinowitz identifies "how lexicon, syntax, and style employed by the ethnographer 'temporalizes' the objects of anthropological inquiry." He points out that "these three discursive means tend to isolate the objects of inquiry in temporal, moral and political universes which the reader is led to assume must be radically different from the Euro-center." The use of kinship as a unit of analysis is particularly conducive to such "temporalization" and differentiation of the reader (and the ethnographer) from the object

of study because, for one, it appears as an objective and empirical fact about the individuals and communities being studied. Rabinowitz also notes that it "is a technical and universal tool of the ethnographic trade, denoting how groups living today are linked to their primordial pasts." He adds that when one's analysis of this kinship lexicology is "augmented with an appraisal of the syntax and style of prose that go with it" what is revealed is that "kinship studies often produce powerful demarcation lines between those whose kinship web is being studied and the modern world" (Rabinowitz 2002, 314). (Ben-Gurion curiously used kinship to substantiate the Palestinian fallahin's supposed Jewish lineage.) Furthermore, as Lefebvre, Castells and Wacquant each point out in their respective critiques of *modernity* regarding urban space, along with the notion of a particular setting comes a set of cultural characteristics and behaviors attributable to that setting—the urban urbanite, the village villager. And so, the Palestinian qua villager, living in his/her village, is endowed with a set of cultural traits and, as Dan Rabinowitz points out, these traits are seen as diametric oppositions of features Jewish Israelis see as typical of their own identity. Such demarcations are evident throughout the work of Israeli anthropologists.

Aiding the effect of the lexicon, syntax, and style employed by the ethnographer, the "three discursive means" which "tend to isolate the objects of inquiry in temporal, moral and political universes", are the choice of research topic. Typically the areas that hold interest to the Israeli researcher regarding the "Arab minority" are such topics as endogamy, cousin marriages, adolescent deviance, honor and shame killings, kinship and politics. The conclusion one draws from such anthropological work is the sense that the "objective" marginality of this "minority" population is in the end the result of their own

culture. For instance, Erik Cohen in his study of "urban" Palestinian youth chooses as his subject matter certain *Arab practices*--drug abuse, sex with tourists and marriages with Jewish Israeli women.[54] Although he places these practices within the circumstances of their "marginality" within Israeli society proper, that is Jewish society, he does so in such a way that "marginalization" appears as an appropriate characterization of this "minority's" situation relative to "proper society". *Their* "marginality" within Israeli society is, therefore, their proper place vis-à-vis *our* culture. This is reinforced by the fact that he, like most others, makes "marginal" practices such as drug abuse and sex with tourists central to his studies. By doing so he effectively makes "marginal" behaviors within the Palestinian community appear as representative of the community at large, an analytic prejudice Wacquant critiques in his "Three Pernicious Premises in the Study of the Ghetto." And E. Cohen is not exceptional but typical. All this reinforces in the mind the correctness of the culture of separation upon which *we* are constructing *our* national project. But, of course, these notions can only be sustained because they are based in the prevailing social practice and the production of social space premised on a culture of separation and physical ghettoization that in turn produces and reproduces these cultural artifacts and notions. Ghettoization is produced space and ghettoization produces and reproduces social space and everyday life within the ghetto and society at large.

As I stated previously, a thorough critique of Israeli social science cannot be undertaken here, but even this brief overview I believe can serve as a lens into the construction of Israeli social space, and particularly in regard to ghettoization as it is expressed within the intellectual domain, a key aspect of a society's national cultural

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[54] See, for example, Erik Cohen, "Arab boys and tourist girls in a mixed Jewish Arab community," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 12, no. 4 (1971): 217-33.

terrain. In order to somewhat round out this brief overview, I turn to Dan Rabinowitz, who summarizes the main features of Israeli anthropology in the following passage from "Oriental Othering." Rabinowitz wrote this review based on his study of fifteen works on Palestinians written by seven member's of Israel's first generation of anthropologists over a span of some twenty-five years. Having studied these same anthropologists and having reached the same conclusions, I let Rabinowitz's succinct words tell the story.

> An interesting feature of this corpus of research emerges when we take representations of Arab culture featured in it and invert them. [Emmanuel] Marx highlights the extent to which the Negev Bedouin are geographically marginal and politically dependent—the opposite of being metropolitan and self-reliant. Erik Cohen characterizes Palestinian youths as escapist and easily uprooted—the reverse of being resilient, industrious, and rationally committed to pragmatic politics. The ascriptive and unequal kinship system described by Rosenfeld can be contrasted with depictions of "modern" families, where personal choice and autonomy reign. A. Cohen's characterization of a society dominated by traditionalism and primordial structures is the opposite of a society that emphasizes transactionalism, meritocracy, free will, and individual preference. Kressel's emphasis on traditional stability and resistance to change is the opposite of dynamic social innovation. Shokeid's account of the culture of honor and shame contrasts with depictions of elected representatives as servants of their voters. Ginat's focus on differentiated treatment of offenders according to their social standings is the opposite of absolute equality before the law; his allusion to the preference of rhetoric over factuality is the antithesis of the notion of ideal fit between theory and practice (Rabinowitz 2002, 317-18; brackets mine).

The conceptualizations used by the disciplines within the social sciences came into being out of the apparent objectivity of the work of Israeli social scientists, Eisenstadt (sociology), Frankenstein (psychology), and A. Cohen (anthropology) being three of the major architects. Their areas of study and the conceptualizations they developed complemented one another and served to reinforce a totalizing world view within which the nation-building project as exclusively Jewish and its corollary, the ghettoization of the native non-Jewish population and subordination of the Oriental Jews within society proper, appeared not as particular political and economic agendas, but as the only social option, as one rooted in "natural" cultural demarcations inherent to the character of the peoples involved. "Social problems" henceforth were identified as "social problems of differentiation." The non-European others, whether they are the

Oriental Jews or the non-Jewish natives, the Arabs (Palestinians was never used), are both *minorities* who differ from the Israeli-Ashkenazi norm, which Eisenstadt and Frankenstein predicated on a "higher level" of society. But, the Oriental Jew can be acculturated, *Israelized*, while the native other, since they have only their Arab codes to fall back upon are inherently distinct; as Yerach Gover puts it, they are *other than us* and *unable to be us*.

How profoundly the sociological categories are instilled into the ordinary thinking and workings of the society can be seen throughout all levels of Israeli social practice and activities. Just as an example, on their website ELEM (Youth in Distress) describe themselves as "a non profit organization for runaway, homeless and neglected Israeli and Arab youth in distress." Not only do they distinguish the Arab from the Israeli, attributing membership to Israeli society only to the Jews, but they also use the dominant classifications that distinguish the Arab from the Druze. In the description of their work they refer to their activities in "Arab society" in distinction to their work in "Druze society," both of which are distinguished from "Israeli society."[55]

Turning to state policy, the practical importance of the classification of the Palestinian population as a minority composed of minorities to their ghettoization is shown in this passage from David A. Wesley's excellent book, *State Practices & Zionist Images: Shaping Economic Development in Arab Towns in Israel*. In this excerpt he connects the *minority of minorities* narrative to state practices and Zionist images in shaping economic development in Arab towns, particularly in the Galilee:

> Now even a cursory glance at the data published by the CBS reveals that the distinction between Jew and Arab is the linchpin of the bureau's population statistics, inevitably present as

[55] Their English language website is www.elem.org/index.php.

> the chief organizing element in the endless permutations of data. The language employed adopts a certain deliberate indirection: the data speak of religion, the main ones among the Arab population being Muslim, Christian, and Druze. Until 1995, CBS publications would sum up the members of these categories as 'non-Jews,' that is, as distinguished from Jews. The benefit of this language in terms of control is clear. Focusing attention on sectarian divisions among the Arab population facilitates myriad comparisons between them on such topics as education, fertility, natural increase, and so forth; it avoids having to refer to the Arabs in national terms, such as the 'Palestinian citizens of Israel.' Indeed, these classifications enable the regime to refer to the Arab populations as 'the minorities [sic!]—a common locution in the official lexicon of Israel.
>
> One anthropological approach to official record keeping concerns itself with the way in which that activity essentializes, hammers human material into regime-inspired categories, and brings the subjects of the state into being (cf. Appadurai 1996; see also Anderson 1991). These effects are all present in the official statistical undertaking in Israel, and although they are not the main concern of the present study, they inspire caution against allowing oneself to be seduced into thinking of statistical categories as a priori givens.
>
> The statistics I present on Jewish/Arab populations, and later on natural increase, are cited by virtue of their connection to the Zionist imagination, and through it, to the struggle for territorial control as that struggle is constructed in the Zionist discourse. Striving for Jewish demographic superiority in the Galilee, or at least for checking Arab numerical domination there, has been a main theme in Israeli policy in the north of the country. It should perhaps be pointed out that the numerical relation of majority and minority, a key trope in the Zionist discourse, is a function of power, of being able to set oneself up as majority and draw the social or geographical boundaries required to make the definition hold (cf. Soffer 1983b) (Wesley 2006, 23-26).

Wesley also identifies another key component of the process, that is, how the definitions of districts, sub-districts, regions, and, though not mentioned in this passage, the territorial jurisdiction of the council, whether local or regional, are manipulated for demographic purposes and "effective spatial control." Regarding the territorial jurisdiction of Jewish local or regional councils, these will generally be defined up to the boundaries of Palestinian settlements "thus helping to freeze Arab spatial sprawl to the boundaries of their municipalities."

> As a statistical aside, one may note that in the case of Galilee, the deliberate demographic homogeneity of the natural regions is countered by the manner of their aggregation into subdistricts. Three of the four Galilee subdistricts each take over a chunk of the Arab-dominated (numerically) heartland, attaching it to an area of Jewish numerical superiority…Curiously, these subdistricts are themselves little more than statistical creatures, at least as far as the Ministry of the Interior is concerned (cf. Newman 1984: 145). That ministry, one of the few government or government-affiliated units to declare its adherence to the official division of the Northern District into subdistricts, maintains no administrative apparatus or functions at the subdistrict level.
>
> One might also note that the 1995 Census divided what had until then been the Western Lower Galilee Natural Region into two: the Shefar'am Region and the Karmi'el Region. The Arabs constitute 79.7 percent of the population of these two regions taken together, but their separation enables showing an area (the Karmi'el Region) in the very center of the Arab heartland in which Arabs are only 53.8 percent of the population (at the cost of having Shefar'am Region

> with a population that was 95.4 Arab). Of the 34.0 thousand Jews in the Karmi'el Region, 33.1 thousand live in the city of Karmi'el (Wesley 2006, 26-28).[56]

In summary, Israel's dominant notions of culture are integral to the emergence of this state's hegemony as a politically motivated broker of culture and inform how the formal and informal agencies (of the state's hegemony) play an active part both in "the construction and manipulations of notions of culture for strengthening solidarity and mobilizing support" (Rabinowitz 2002, 306) and in the implementation of social policy which produces social space and most particularly segregated social space.

The notions and the narrative pertaining to the Jewish people's national project are embedded in the orientation of the social scientists and are, therefore, expressed in their local concepts about Israel's Arabs, in the categories they use for their analysis, and in the subject matter they choose to research regarding this population. The notion of the *village* and the Arab person as a *villager*, in spatial terms, situates the "Arab" objectively while its accompanying notion, the *hamula*, situates the individual subjectively as a member of a blood-clan. These two together define what are considered to be specific to and definitionally essential for an understanding of how the "Arab" thinks and behaves and claim to explain just about everything about this population--identity, affiliation, cultural characteristics, familial ties, mentality, morality, marriage, birth rates, crime, deviant behavior, voting patterns, even such things as the ability to think abstractly. The village discourse subsumes spatial separation as a natural given and by so doing removes it from a social policy and practice of exclusion and restriction to a spatial cultural expression of the Arabness of the objectified other and not what it is--ghettoization.

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[56] In chapter 5 I describe in some detail how manipulation of the definitions of districts and divisions and sub-divisions of districts and regions are applied in the case of Umm al-Fahim as well as the assignment of the town to one or another ministry for policy purposes.

Within this discourse, the Palestinian citizens are seen as a people who are living in our midst, with no authentic historical or national roots to the place and nation; they are simply occupants who live in villages—to which they do identify—that happen to exist within the territory of *our* state. As the anthropologist Ori Shtendel puts it: "Their home is the village, and to the village they return…carrying with them influences they have absorbed in the city, which they radiate onto the whole of the Arab rural population" (Shtendel 1973). The two notions together complement and reinforce the other. Both notions are part of a culturalist methodology which abstracts from historical specificity. The historically specific circumstances within which the object of study is situated are, accordingly, explained by the cultural traits attributed to the object, in this case the essentialized pre-modern Arab villager. Since the *village* and the *hamula* are Arab traits constituted as empirical facts they stand as ahistorical facts, or de-temporalized facts. They are presented as ingrained traits acting much like genetic codes upon the Arab person and thus span across historical time. For instance, the title of one of Moshe Shokeid's monographs is "Ethnicity and the cultural code among Arabs in a mixed town: women's modesty and men's honor." In his research he finds that these "codes" "order" Arab behavior and that Arabs have "a continuing commitment to a traditional code of behavior" (Shokeid and Deshen 1982, 8). These so-called empirically grounded traits as notions of culture are the localized building blocks pertaining to the Arab population which situates them inside the state but outside of the larger discourse of the nation-building project.

The works of the *Arabists* have and continue to inform the civilian government and the military, as well as popular consciousness. The extent to which these notions

permeate the most ordinary and everyday is something I learned after living in Israel for five years and in one of Israel's largest Palestinian ghettos as a family member and, once my research agenda had been established, as a sociological participant-observer. For such an infiltration into the pores of a society at all levels of thinking and experience to take place requires the generalization of a national discourse that is not only hegemonic but also one whose precepts and conclusions appear unquestionable to the holders (and pronouncers) of this discourse as natural, truthful, authoritative, legitimate and self-evident.[57] The discourse of the *othering of the Arab* within the national discourse is accomplished by *essentializing* features such as *hamula* (clan) and the *village* that work, as I stated earlier, to repeatedly reconstitute in *our* minds the Palestinian as *other than us* thus securing the state's hegemonic practice of physical, legal and cultural separation—ghettoization.

Some ordinary examples will suffice to demonstrate the pervasiveness and authoritativeness of this discourse within society. In the 2005 novel *Dancing Arabs*, Sayed Kashua targets the village discourse and writes: "The Hebrew textbooks still speak of the small village. One of the questions goes like this: 'What do the people in your village do for a living?' and the right answer is still: 'They're farmers.'" Now, it is interesting to note that Kashua, a journalist and novelist, a citizen of Israel, comes from the Palestinian town of Tira whose twenty some thousand residents do not make a living from agriculture. By official Israeli classifications, Tira is a city. It is neither a village nor rural. Yet, on the book cover to his second novel, *Let It Be Morning*, it is stated that

[57] Such hegemony is common to all societies but I never experienced this kind of societal ingrainedness of a national discourse before living in Israel. Because of this I think Israel can serve the social scientist as a laboratory for the study of this problematic in general.

Kashua's "hometown" is "an Arab village within Israel." On the Wikipedia website Tira is described as "an Arab village close to Kfar Saba, a larger Jewish city." Why it is necessary to reference "a larger Jewish city" I can only imagine, but we see here once again the diametric opposition of traits which are not based in fact yet presented as fact, between the village and the city, the Arab versus the Jew.

In a recent newspaper article from the *haaretz*, January 21, 2006 entitled, "Hundreds gather for funeral of Israeli Arab man killed by police" the journalist repeatedly and without exception refers to the place of the incident and demonstration as "village"—"northern village of Arara", the "Wadi Ara village". Locations within the "village" are given the assignation "village" such as "village mosque" where the body was taken; and individuals are ascribed "village" as in "village leaders" with whom a senior police officer met. No matter the size of the towns, and regardless of the fact that probably none of the inhabitants of the towns in the Little Triangle, where the shooting and subsequent demonstrations took place, make a living from agriculture, their towns and inhabitants are referred to as villages and villagers. Such assignation is universal and goes undisputed. Newspapers, journals, popular magazines, government materials for the public and state officials, scholarly articles all use "village" and "hamula" as descriptive and explanatory labels and categories regarding such matters as Israeli Arab votes, dress, customs, affiliations, marriage patterns, behavior, deviance—everyone in Israel, including the "Arabs," since it might just as well have been branded into their flesh--have been schooled in this ideation of the Palestinian as fact.

This is so much so, that even teenagers—and I spoke with numerous Jewish teenagers while living in Israel--who have never been to a Palestinian ghetto or had an

interpersonal encounter or a relationship or friendship with *an Arab*, speak authoritatively about *Arab* behavior, familial ties and the such. At times their comments were quite humorous to me, as for instance, and this happened more than once, in learning that I was living in an Arab town (often they had not even heard of Umm al-Fahim) he or she would express sympathy, knowing how difficult it must be for me there given the primitive ways of the Arabs. Adult friends would express this same sympathy by letting me know I was always welcome to stay with them when I needed to escape. Such comments were always well intended and the pronouncers never realized that at times it was quite hurtful to me referencing as they were people I loved and honored like my husband and in-laws. What one *speaks*, what one *pronounces*, what one *utters* regarding these people are simply matters of fact, common knowledge and they are often uttered, as I said, with no ill intended. These pronouncements are spoken with the weight of authority, the authority of a unified national narrative that informs the speaker and provides her/him with an *authoritative* and *truthful* language that corresponds to the *natural* conditions of *their* world.[58] This holds as true today in general in spite of the emergence of a critical literature that has historically, empirically and ideologically unsettled the conceptual legitimacy of this body of expert literature and thinking. One experiential reason for its

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[58] "Anybody who wishes to speak 'seriously' about the conflict, the refugees, the Palestinians or the *mizrahi* Jews, and also to be heard, cannot afford to ignore the existence of the network of intelligence expertise, the discourse about the Arab village, or the sociology of 'the problem of ethnic differences.' This is because they offer speakers ready-made subject positions, ready-made discursive positions, that with little effort provide them with the gravity, authority, and weight of one who speaks 'the truth' and is 'in the know.' Even before opening one's mouth to speak, one is already supplied with discursive resources, linkages to other arguments, to proofs, to 'well-known facts,' and to other authoritative speakers. Moreover, even before opening one's mouth, one is already positioned within a Western, modern Israeli society that observes the Middle East, or the Arab village, or the 'traditional' culture of *mizrahi* Jews, from without" (Eyal 2002, 241-42).

endurance is the all too real and everydayness of the ghettoization of social space in all its dimensions.

Segregation is so pervasive that in every day life there is little interpersonal ordinary intercourse between Jews and Palestinians. In reviewing Daniel Bar-Tal and Yona Teichman's *Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli-Jewish Society*, which is "a detailed review of studies that discussed the representations of Arabs in public discourse, in school textbooks, in literature, drama, and films, along three general historical periods: the pre-State period, 1948-1973, and the recent three decades," Dan Bar-On writes that "One of the frightening results of this survey is the systematically diminishing number of Israeli Jews who ever personally encountered an Arab." He also tells us that the survey shows that to the extent Israeli Jews "encounter" Arabs it is more and more "not through work relationships or through the military, but as occupiers."[59] (The results of this survey lend support to my assessment of the responses of the Palestinian youth in the Kashev study discussed in chapter 3.)

One point of clarification is necessary: I am not trying to prove that Israeli social scientists and Arab experts conspired to create a Zionist world view based on Jewish national exclusivity that would be given "scientific" validity and therefore have legitimacy as representative of the truth about Arabs or that they set out consciously in advance, whether individually or collectively, to establish such a body of work that would inform public knowledge about Arabs and assist official policy towards the Arabs in Israel in order to advance the nation-building project constituted on a culture of

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[59] From Dan Bar-On's book review of *Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli-Jewish Society*," *Israel Studies* 11, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 77.

separation. I agree with Dan Rabinowitz's following assessment regarding Israeli anthropologists and would include the Arab specialists of other fields and within other institutions as well:

> As anthropologists, they were 'professionally empathetic' towards the Palestinians they wrote about, staying clear from scholarly traditions that sought to merge Arabness with backwardness and malice. Like most Israelis of their generation and their sociopolitical rank, their Zionism was mostly taken for granted, as was their willingness to reproduce its rationalizations almost unquestionably. Most of them thus did not have to be consciously in touch with formal ideology. The two emancipatory movements in which they were involved—Jewish ethno-territorialism and academic research of the ultimate other—incarcerated Palestinians as perpetual candidates for corrective reform. Based on deep convictions and unencumbered by critical inquiry—which at the time was only budding within anthropology—the project they were part of allowed Israel to preserve a clean self-image of progress. Their contribution to the construction of a new 'theodeological space,' where theory and ideology fuse, was as tacit as it was effective (Rabinowitz 2002, 320).[60]

What is important is that a body of discourse and "scientific" work, which does just these things, did emerge, not because of some preconceived plan of the Arab experts and social scientists, but organically because these actors imbibed the Zionist national colonial project. They were informed by the definitions of this project as it developed and identified with its tasks, and took responsibility for fulfilling these tasks within the territories (both physical and cultural) which the state had occupied. Such nation-building processes are not peculiar to Israel, or its colonial expansion. Such processes are endemic to nation building and colonialism where demarcation of territory and people between an us and them are jurisdictionally and culturally established. And, in the case of Israel nation-building and colonization coincide spatially.

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[60] On this subject Gil Eyal writes: "Although it was a smoothly functioning apparatus of discourse and practice whose various parts were well coordinated, there was no arch planner and no intentional and conscious conspiracy to construct it. This strategy is better understood as a series of tactical moves between which strategic correspondence was gradually established by virtue of the fact that they were undertaken by actors who had a similar set pf predispositions and who gradually taught each other to speak the same language, the language of the discourse about the 'Arab village.' Additionally, the strategic correspondence between the various tactical moves was established because they were all undertaken within the preexisting jurisdiction of government over the Israeli Arab hybrid, the boundaries and parameters of which were already well established and clearly defined" (Eyal 2002, 164).

Nevertheless, several writers, like Gil Eyal and Dan Rabinowitz, have pointed out that a good number of academic specialists who study the *Arabs of Israel* had their beginnings as Arab specialists working in some capacity for the Military Government, like gathering intelligence in the field, that is, in the Palestinian ghettos. For most, their civilian-military alliance as "security" workers would not have been seen as cause for concern over the validity of their work or their attitudes towards the non-Jewish native population since their activities and the government's objectives were understood to be a part of the society's and the state's necessary tasks in securing the survival of the Jewish State. As individuals they simply embraced the national narrative as their own. Eyal concludes, in his study of the Arab experts and expertise, that the "emergence of an academic discourse about the Arab village" as the dominant discourse about the Arabs coincided with the abolition of the military government over the Palestinian population and the relocation of the Arab experts into the universities. He further says that although this transition in the discourse was "not accidental" it was "unplanned".

What is seen here is the particular development of a society's complex of infrastructural and superstructural institutions, including knowledge-making, expertise, and all the apparatuses required to constitute the society at large. These are all quite simply *organically* interconnected and their main and dominant form is defined by the hegemonic forces within which the social formation as a whole is being created. Viewed in Gramscian terms, these experts and specialists are the organic intellectuals of the hegemonic forces within society who are the architects of the dominant form that the national-building process takes. Such intellectuals and specialists quite naturally arise out of the social division of labor, the institutions of society and the activities that comprise a

society's life without conscious conspiratorial requirements. And, as Eyal demonstrates, although the Arab experts are often in competition with each other--since they are affiliated with different institutions within the social division of labor--contention amongst them concerns who best represents, or who has the best policy for advancing, the common national, that is Jewish, project. Their differences, as stated earlier, pertain more to "techniques" rather than any programmatic political position that would fundamentally affect the way the state is constituted. Institutions throughout all of society and the state have been constructed on the basis of a culture of separation so that Jewish citizens in general, including the Arab experts and social scientists, who already imbibe the national narrative as their own, also have a vested interest in the continuation of this *way of life*.

Having said this, it is still important to acknowledge that this culture of separation is a result of a planned program ruthlessly carried out under Ben-Gurion's leadership to establish a state as free of the native non-Jewish population as possible as discussed in previous chapters. Intensive training of Arab experts began before the establishment of the state. These experts gathered intelligence information, compiled the "village files" described in chapter 2, and recruited informants and collaborators in preparation for the inevitable war that Ben-Gurion and others considered necessary for the establishment of a Jewish State (with a war plan that included expansion of the state's territory beyond the UN Partition Plan and the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians). In *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, Ilan Pappe describes the 1944 "special training base" called Shefeya

> where special units in the service of the village files project [headed by Danin] received their training and it was from here that they went out on their reconnaissance missions. Shefeya looked very much like a spy village in the Cold War: Jews walking around speaking Arabic and trying to

> emulate what they believed were the customary ways of life and behaviour of rural Palestinians (Pappe 2006, 21; brackets mine).[61]

This body of trained Arab experts and the information they produced were instrumental in carrying out Plans C and then D during the Zionist offensives in 1948 and 1949 and were the original basis of the present-day intelligence system. This system is as active today as ever in the daily life of Palestinians as can be seen by this *haaretz* article of October 25, 2000, "Border Police go undercover in Israeli Arab Umm al Fahm during unrest." The writer of the article, Sharon Gal, is obviously not aware that this has been going on since before the establishment of the state (the intelligence gathering that produced the "village files" began in the 1930s) as can be seen in this excerpt: "For the first time, Israel has deployed Arab look-alike undercover men to infiltrate Arab communities within its Green Line borders."

Once the state was well established and the culture of separation firmly institutionalized, the Israeli way of life was locked-in, as Eyal puts it. It was during the first two decades, while Palestinians were under military rule, that the notions of culture, such as the *minority*, the *village*, the *hamula*, were constructed as facts on the ground and conceptual artifacts. The lock-in mechanism of the culture of separation that Eyal speaks of was well in place so that even when the Military Government was finally abolished (1966-67), important as this was to providing some normalization to everyday life for Palestinians, in substance, it only represented a change in the administrative form and not in the reality of subordination and separation. The transition from military to civilian rule, though, required changes in the language of separation and it is this requirement which

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[61] See Ilan Pappe's discussion on the compilation of the "village files" and the Arab experts role in intelligence gathering, and the creation of informants and collaborators in each of the Palestinian villages during the pre-state period and the war in *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006).

gave predominance to the *village-hamula* notions of culture over the *enemy within* or the *fifth column* which had previously dominated the discourse on the Arabs since maintaining military rule was justified on the basis that these people, as an *enemy within*, represented a security threat to the Jewish people and their state.[62] That did not mean that the notion of "enemy within" was discarded; quite the contrary, since *bitachon*, security, in relation to the *Arab other*, both external and internal, remains as the first priority of Israeli discourse and policy. But it did mean that the Arab experts and academics shifted their emphasis to the study of and language of the "village" and the "hamula".

Besides the shift in language, as the *Palestinian Question* of Israel was moved out from under direct military rule, there also came a shift in the institutionalization of the culture of separation. Now, throughout the agencies of the state, the military and the cultural institutions within civil society, like the universities, people were needed who had the appropriate credentials to do the work of dealing with the Arab sector. Ready at hand were those individuals who had had their training in the field as Israel's *Arabists* during military rule. The transition from military to civilian governance was therefore accompanied by a transition of experts from the military apparatus into the apparatuses of civil society, most particularly academia as well as offices and departments within the civilian government dealing with the "Arab" or "minority" sector. Of course, the military wing of the state was also involved through, for instance, the regular police, the Border Police, the Sheen Bet (security forces), Mosaad (intelligence agency). Various

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[62] I do not mean to suggest that this transition in language meant the end of the idea of the Palestinians as the *enemy within*, only that its relative weight within the dominant discourse shifted at a specific moment. A range of cultural notions pertaining to the Palestinians are present in the discourse at all times, and any one or other is held to be more important by this or that individual or ideological grouping. Furthermore, at certain moments within the dominant national discourse one or other of these notions about the Palestinians becomes more dominant within society in general.

departments within the civilian government were directly tied to branches of the military like the Ministry of Education's department for the Arab sector which worked and still works directly with the Sheen Bet.

The nation-state building narrative based on a culture of separation provided the lexicology, prose and style that informed the scientific endeavor, official agencies and popular discourse about *our* society and *our Arabs.* In the case of Israel, one sees reflected in the national discourse and social science categories the premises of the nation-building project as forged by the founders of the State, demonstrating with little mediation Marx and Engels' maxim quoted earlier: namely, "the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force." Israeli social scientists, as organic intellectuals of the hegemonic social forces within Jewish society and the state, imbibe the hegemonic premises of the nation-building project and are formulators of their society's intellectual-ideological discourse. They have done this by treating Palestinians as a distinct object of study separate from Jewish society proper. They have established units of analysis pertaining to this object of study based on cultural traits that are seen as distinct from those that characterize their own identity. They have reduced Palestinian reality to one defined within a "rural Palestine and its rudimentary technology and marginal economy as the epitome of Arabness" and have reductionistically analyzed "Arab" behavior through the kinship prism.

While social scientists were constructing their respective areas of expertise state officials were taking an inventory of the expropriated Palestinian resources--housing, plant and equipment, fertile land, factories, mills, furniture--confiscating as much of these as possible and using them as a basis for development of their own infrastructure and

settlement of new immigrants. The looting began during the war as villages and towns were occupied, destroyed, and abandoned. Eventually what remained of stolen Palestinian property was placed under the Custodian of Abandoned Property and goods were placed in their warehouses. Tom Segev tells the story of the huge task that Dov Shafir, as the Custodian, confronted in 1949. Years later Shafir said that he had to act fast and firm "if we were to take control over the territory and the vast amount of property spread over hundreds of towns and villages." To do this, Segev writes,

> [H]e had to dispatch men to go from house to house, from shop to shop, from warehouse to warehouse, from plant to plant, from quarry to quarry, from field to field, from orchard to orchard, and also from bank to bank, and safe to safe—to count, measure, evaluate, estimate, replace locks on doors and transfer all moveable property to well-guarded warehouses, while maintaining a correct inventory of the property and its location. It included a total of 45,000 homes and apartments, about 7,000 shops and other places of business, some 500 workshops and industrial plants, and more than 1,000 warehouses. At the same time, it was necessary to continue harvesting the crops and picking olives, gathering tobacco and the fruit in the orchards—a total of over 800,000 acres. It was also necessary to take care of livestock—goats, sheep, hens—as well as market the produce, collect the profits and deposit them in the Treasury (Segev 1986, 69).

But then there was the question as to who gets the property held by the Custodian. (It should be remembered that this property only represents a portion of what was stolen. During the war and its aftermath looting in mass by individuals, soldiers, kibbutzim, moshavim took place and included just about everything from land to homes to businesses and household and personal affects.) Concerning the confiscated property held by the Custodian Segev tells us:

> To begin with, Shafir later reported, goods, materials and equipment were turned over to army, directly from the stores in the occupied towns. Merchandise which the army did not want was put up for sale. The sale was conducted by special departments instituted for the purpose, staffed, as much as war conditions allowed, by personnel trained in the principle branches of commerce. Other merchandise was sold through negotiation with merchants and industrialists, depending on the type of materials.' The army had the first choice of any goods and materials it might require,' Shafir said. 'Next were the government offices, the war disabled, the Jewish Agency, the local authorities and public bodies, such as Hadassah.' The army also needed most of the workshop equipment such as cabinet-making shops, locksmiths-works, turneries, iron-works, tin-works and the like. Industrial plants which could be operated on their existing sites were leased out by contract, 'whenever possible,' according to Shafir. Plants which no one wanted to lease were sold to the highest bidder.

> The sale of furniture, Shafir said, 'was an especially complex and difficult business and took a long time.' The army had removed from the houses and obtained from the warehouses furniture worth tens of thousands of pounds for its offices, homes and clubs. A ministerial committee resolved to have the remaining furniture…sold to a variety buyers (Segev 1986, 72-73).

Apparently, the so-called backward natives had some things of value to the modern technologically sophisticated new Israelis--things worth keeping and using for their homes, businesses, government departments, military apparatus, industry, offices and shops, besides the land. The expropriation of the not so "primitive" property of the Arabs laid the basis for the real "primitive" accumulation of Israel's economy.

It is also interesting to note that not only were the "objective" and natural forms of wealth appropriated, but so too, as Y. Washitz reports in 1950 in a sub-section of an article about "Changes in the Life of Israel's Arabs" entitled "Aspirations for Equality," were "subjective" forms of wealth like the skills embodied in Palestinian laborers and professionals. In his discussion regarding Arab individuals' aspiration to be citizens with equality, concerning such matters as "equal right to work, equality in wages and prices of production, serving in the state agencies and engaging their services" he says that the Arabs aspire to equality in income without understanding that with rights comes duties so he argues that education is needed to develop their consciousness to the fact that they must take on the "burdens" of the state as well. But then, in a curios twist, he goes on to say that they are already involved in taking on some of these "duties" since they are

> carrying this burden, like the mitzvoth of absorbing the aliyah: not few are the work places where they work together with newcomers and teach them the trade: in railroads and roads, in the Jaffa port, in factories and workshops of ceramics and fishing in Acre. (Understandably it is annoying that very often the wage of the Jewish apprentice is higher than the Arab master.)[63]

There were, of course, many villages in Palestine prior to the establishment of Israel. But these villages were tied into an entire society through trade, marriage and all

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63 Y. Washitz, "Changes in the Life of Israel's Arabs," *The New East* 1, no. 4 (July 1950): 263-64. Translated from the Hebrew by Ghassan Fawzi.

the activities that constitute life where both pre-capitalist and capitalist social relations of production are present. There were urban centers, like Acre and Jaffa, and villages were tied to these centers as well as those in the Arab countries and the world. I have indicated some of this historical development in previous chapters as well as the long standing relationship with European societies through trade and political struggle. In more contemporary times, for instance, my father-in-law, in the 1940s worked for British Petroleum in Haifa and had plans to study at a university in Baghdad until the war began. In the photos shown below, taken in the mid-1940s, he is spending a day with a friend in Haifa or Jaffa, no one is certain any more exactly which city and now that he has passed away I cannot ask him. A look at these photos in light of John Berger's classic essay, "The Suit and the Photograph," raises interesting questions about Israeli cultural notions about *their Arab villagers*.

In Berger's essay he compares a 1914 photograph of French peasants dressed in their Sunday best on their way to a dance with a 1931 photograph of urban Protestant missionaries attired in their suits posing for a group picture. Berger points out how in the former photo the men appear "physically mis-shapen" in their suits, even "deformed". He makes the point that it is not a question of the suits looking mis-shapen but the bodies of the peasants, unaccustomed as they are to wearing the urbane bourgeois "suit". The wearing of the suit has not as yet become a fashion that they are at home in. The Protestant missionaries, on the other hand, are quite at home in their suits. As he says, in their case "the suits actually confirm and enhance the physical presence of those wearing them" because "Suits, experience, social formation and function coincide."[64] Now, look

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64 John Berger, "The Suit and the Photograph," *About Looking* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 27-36.

at my father-in-law and his friend in the following pictures taken in the 1940s before the State of Israel was established. Both are wearing tailored suits. Do these two men appear physically mis-shapen, out of place, artificial, uncomfortable, deformed by putting on an attire that coincides in "experience, social formation and function" with that which is modern, secular, and urbane? According to Israeli social scientists, these two men are Arab villagers, residing as they do in an Arab border village, one which is located in the proximity of Abner Cohen's study. They are rural; their world is the village; they affiliate themselves with their blood-clans, their predominant concern is with the honor of their women folk. Shouldn't they be mis-shapened by their suits—uncomfortable? And shouldn't they look clumsy, awkward, not at home in this city-world of Jaffa or Haifa which is outside their village and therefore holds no authentic meaning to them in which they can experience their sense of self-identity? Instead, they appear relaxed, handsome, debonair, at ease and not only at home in their suits but in their surroundings, a city café. Do not their suits "actually confirm and enhance the physical presence of those wearing them" thereby signifying that "Suits, experience, social formation and function coincide."

**Fawzi al Saa'd (on the right in both pictures) with a friend in Jaffa or Haifa in the mid-1940s.**

Such regular and normal trips to the city, like the one depicted in these photos, whether for pleasure, shopping, visiting or work, ended for my father-in-law in 1948

when he found that he could not only not go to Haifa or Jaffa but across the main road which separated him from the Ein Ibrahim quarter of Umm al-Fahim to visit relatives or friends. From then on, under the MAPAI's leadership with Ben-Gurion at the helm, the state was to be based on a culture of separation with the Palestinians constituted as an *enemy within*. My father-in-law, along with all the *Palestinian others*, became what Israelis pronounce them to be, *our Arab villagers* whose places of confinement are *villages*. Restricted within closed security zones and placed under military rule, with no viable internal economies and ties to the outside world severed, the context was set during these first decades that would insure that a culture of separation could survive and adapt to whatever changing circumstances and developments Israeli society confronted. As Eyal puts it, a lock-in mechanism was put in place that insured that the physical and cultural borders of separation could be constantly reproduced, managed, adjusted and reaffirmed. Let us now visit Umm al-Fahim, one of the largest Palestinian ghettos inside Israel's Green Line.

# Chapter 5

## Ahlan wa Sahlan: Welcome to Umm al-Fahim

> 'Bakerwoman,' he said, 'give me two loaves of bread for the cobbler, and the cobbler will give me some shoes, and the shoes are for the plowman, and the plowman will plow under the tree, and the tree will give me a branch, and the branch is for the ewe, and the ewe will give me some milk, and the milk is for the old woman, and the old woman will then sew my tail back on.'
>
> 'Bring me a bucketful of manure from that pile over there,' said the bakerwoman.
>
> So, bringing a bucket full of manure, the cat gave it to the bakerwoman, and she gave him two loaves of bread. Taking the bread, he gave it to the cobbler, and the cobbler gave him the shoes, which he gave to the plowman, who plowed under the tree. The tree then gave him a branch, which he gave to the ewe, who gave him the milk. Taking the milk with him, he went running to the old woman.
>
> 'Meow! Meow!' he cried. 'Why don't you sew my tail back on?'
>
> The old woman took the milk and sewed the cat's tail back on, and they became friends again.
>
> The bird of this tale has flown, are you ready for the next one?"
>
> From "The Old Woman and Her Cat" in
> *Speak, Bird, Speak Again: Palestinian Arab Folktales*[1]

The bird of the above tale may have flown, but our present story-bearer has taken new flight, not with recourse to her own wings but those of an immense steel bird, to the Land of Promise[2], where the old woman and her cat quarreled and made amends.

For this storyteller some piece of the world is available in an instant, not only through books and the reports of travelers, but by way of such things as CNN broadcasting or an airplane. At any moment I choose, by a flick of a remote control, I can bring the four corners of the earth into my living room; participate two-dimensionally in

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[1] From "The Old Woman and Her Cat," in *Speak, Bird, Speak Again: Palestinian Arab Folktales*, by Ibrahim Muhawi and Sharif Kanaana (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 284-85.

[2] Interestingly, when I looked up "Promised Land" in my 1948 edition of Funk & Wagnalls' *New Practical Standard Dictionary*, to see if "Promised Land" territorially corresponded to what is known as Palestine/Israel, the entry said "See Land of Promise" which in turn reads "Palestine; by extension, heaven, or any longed-for place of happiness." Could there be an inclusive resolution to the current "quarrel" which is taking place on the same piece of earth as the one relayed to us in this Palestinian tale? Is this place a land promised exclusively to someone or some people or is it a land promising happiness for all those who happen to inhabit it?

the joys and sufferings of individuals and peoples from all parts of the world; and I can even be transposed into the universe via a televised spaceship in orbit. If I choose to be bodily rather than virtually transported, I can board a jetliner (of course, only after handing over the requisite cash) and be somewhere else in a moment.

Having decided to do just that, I am now landing at the Tel Aviv airport. During this twelve-hour journey from New York, I have traversed oceans and continents--natural history's handiwork of momentous geological developments and formations. I have soared above glaciers and fjords, volcanoes, the black forest and dessert--the theater sets for manifold civilizations of the past, present and expectant futures. How offhandedly we twentieth (now twenty-first) century transients move across different visible horizons. By land, air or sea we readily erupt out of one limited view of the earth's surface to position ourselves within quite another; and likewise, the limited vision fixed by the boundaries of our experience and culture are jolted out of focus and we must adjust our eyes to discover the appropriate angle of vision for proper sight. It is said that travel broadens our horizon, but is vision simply a matter of changing one's point of contact with the earth's surface, shifting the line at which the earth and sky appear to meet? This present transmigration of my being occurs in an instant, twelve hours, a mere instant in which to span the millenniums of natural and social history compressed in this distance traversed from New York to Tel Aviv.

In this age of cybernetics and electronic information, digital super-highways and skyways, nature's unfolding in time, and the pace and rhythm of human intercourse within this movement, have lost, for the most part, any special or practical meaning to us. To the extent that such sentiments exist, are they not typically perceived as romantic

remnants leftover in our memories of some distant quaint past, like that suggested by the folktale quoted above; replaced now by concepts and feelings, exemplified by our modern notion of time as exactly quantifiable consecutive repetitions of equal and discrete instants, appropriate to an age where consumption defines character and instant gratification happiness?

Yet, now, more than ever, our inter-dependency upon each other and nature, materially and culturally, is pan-global and pertains to all the ordinary and necessary details of our everyday lives and our survival. For the most part we have lost sight of, and deem as unimportant to our individuality or actions, the network of social and material relations which are so evident and essential to our host of characters in the Palestinian folktale cited above. The old woman who cares for the cat needs milk; the cat who depends on the old woman for his well-being drank up her milk, lost his precious tail to her anger, and now must replenish her supply; but, the ewe who gives milk needs a branch from a tree; while the plowman who tills under the tree must have shoes; the cobbler makes shoes but needs bread; and the bakerwoman who makes bread requires manure to fuel her oven. Rubbing up against and bumping into each other, together they make up an engaging, frictional, interactive, contentious, and noisy society. Man and beast are here depicted as interdependent upon one another and nature, simultaneously forming for each other the object and the condition of their individual and mutual survival, reproduction and culture, which encompasses all the ways--plowing and baking, and means--plows and ovens, and emotions and values-- anger (the old woman) and making things right (the cat)--attached to the doing of life's activities.

Nowadays adherents claim virtual reality and technology bridge what before were

considered to be unbridgeable; digital super-highways and skyways apparently surmount all barriers to time and space. TV commercials, academics, and Presidents of the United States tell us we are residents of the *global village*. And this must be so, since, voila, here I am, in tact in body and soul, conveyed in a contemporary time-space machine to Tel Aviv. And so too, to all on this earth comes the same latest news, the same newest hits, and the same display of new and revolutionary items for sale and, even if we cannot all partake from this world of commodities to the same degree, their "immense collection"[3] forms our common estate. *Virtually* all differences are obliterated. We are all interdependent upon one another for our needs to be met--I don't produce the food I eat or provide the services which enable me to acquire it for my consumption; neither am I am involved in the construction of this plane which has just borne me to Israel nor can I pilot it. We earthlings from the most disparate of places and distances are interconnected, down to the minutest details of our existences, through our labor via the global market place of things and electronic impulses.

And yet, once I land in Tel Aviv, I learn how quickly, how easily, the *same* people are separated into unbridgeable others, into apparently irreconcilable antagonistic opposites within their *shared* society. A *virtual* drama is being played out on their all too substantial common stage set, with consequences that are all too real for the actual people situated on this particular, limited and all so material portion of the earth's surface. From their privileged position the inhabitants of this spot, whether Jewish or Palestinian, should, theoretically at least, draw the same line which determines for them where the

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[3] This is taken from the first sentence of Volume 1 of Karl Marx's, *Capital*. "The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an 'immense collection of commodities'; the individual commodity appears as its elementary form."

earth appears to meet the sky and the circle bounding that part of the earth's surface revealed to them, their "visible" or "sensible" horizon, that is, the horizon which is visible to them if there are no “irregularities or obstructions” present to interfere with their view.[4] What are the "irregularities", the "obstructions" present that perhaps distort their view upon their own particular exposed circle of the earth's surface, the one which should be made "sensible" and "visible" to them simply because they occupy it? Within the boundary-line of their common stage set these actors have presented a most successful dramatic conflict but as yet no visible or sensible resolution. And yet, do they not also share the same “obstructions” to their view of their shared horizon?

This flight in September, 1990, from New York to Tel Aviv, is the first leg in my journey to Umm al-Fahim. I am already prepared for the fact that at passport inspection, once my name is entered into the computer, I will be ordered to step to the side and await the attention of security. This will involve at least another two hours of interrogation and inspection of all my belongings. I am on this honorary list, not due to any illegal action on my part; I have no criminal record, or due to any action that has been deemed contrary to the interests of the State of Israel, except for one. I have married an Israeli citizen whose identity card indicates he is "Arab". This has placed me along with other notorieties as suspect and a security risk.

On this occasion, due to the fortunate circumstance that I have a friend who

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[4] The definition of horizon in the *Oxford English Dictionary* reads: "1. The boundary-line of that part of the earth's surface visible from a given point of view; the line at which the earth and sky appear to meet. In strict use, the circle bounding that part of the earth's surface which would be visible if no irregularities or obstructions were present (called the apparent, natural, sensible, physical, or visible horizon.)...b. transf. The part of the earth’s surface bounded by this line; the region visible from any point. 2. fig. a. A boundary, the frontier or dividing line between two regions of being. b. The boundary or limit of any ‘circle’ or ‘sphere’ of view, thought, action, etc. (often with direct reference to sense 1); that which bounds one’s mental vision or perception; limit or range of one’s knowledge, experience, or interest; formerly, sometimes = the region so bounded."

knows a top official of the airline company I am traveling with, to have had my economy ticket upgraded to first class. When I arrive at the Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv mid-afternoon, while still on board, unexpectedly I hear my name announced over the loud speaker. I am told to see the stewardess before disembarking. Unbeknownst to me my friend's friend had arranged for me to be personally escorted from the plane to the terminal and then to a special line for dignitaries and airplane personnel. How nice! My attendant expects me to simply pass through passport inspection and becomes confused and quite apologetic when I am singled out by security. Puzzled, he studies my first class ticket and turns from it to me several times asking me each time if in fact I had traveled first class. Having assured himself of my travel status he assumes I am a member of the upper class and therefore, my first-class interests are naturally the same as those of the hegemonic ruling class rooted in the social status quo. Consequently he proceeds to reassure me that this embarrassing mistake will be cleared up shortly. I hold my peace for I already know there has been no mistake. I have been through this before. I decide to let him and his associates find this out for themselves. Although I know I am about to enter upon a most aggravating and lengthy ordeal, at least for the moment, I am absorbed by the curious situation I am in. My apologetic escort continues to reassure me that this entirely embarrassing situation will be set right. Trying to set him at ease, through a slight nod of my head and shrug of my shoulders, I silently assure him that I quite understand how these things can happen, while I hold counsel with myself, reflecting upon, among other things, how deep class assumptions are concerning commonalty of interest, at least for those on top.

But the inevitable must take place. Security--*bitachon*--of the state comes before

all else. All is subordinated to this overriding concern to which the needs and rights of the individual are subject. Most certainly, from their "given point of view" there exists a "boundary-line" separating out my person from being included within "the circle bounding [their] part of the earth's surface." [5] "The boundary or limit of [their] 'circle' or 'sphere' of view, thought, action...which bounds [their] mental vision" makes it all so "apparent" that I pose a threat to the security of this state of the "Promised Land". This is only "sensible" since I have married one of *their Arab* citizens. A very physical horizon has been drawn, establishing a most tangible though invisible "frontier or dividing line between two regions of being." All precautions must be taken to insure that, at least for the moment, I do not endanger the security of this state; or more precisely, all measures must be taken to fortify and make visible to me the limits of my sensible horizon. The task of the present twenty-some year old security personnel is to impress upon my mental vision that a definite line demarcates the "region of my being"--having made my particular love choice--from being *welcome within our midst*, before I am permitted access to the gates of the "Land of Promise".

Besides a lengthy interrogation involving innumerable questions concerning my personal life, work life, previous trips to Israel and so on, photocopies are made of my address and date books as well as literature I am carrying. All my personal possessions are inspected down to the toothpaste tube which, along with several other articles, is taken to a back room for further examination. In the end I am handed back a mess of clothes, gifts, personal supplies and items, unfolded and unwrapped. All I or anyone else (which is every Palestinian man, women, and child, whether citizen of Israel or resident

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[5] See footnote 4 for the definition of horizon.

of the “Occupied Territories”) can do in this situation is stuff everything back into their luggage, cram it shut, and hope nothing is damaged by the time you get to your destination.

During the elaborate inspection of all my belongings, the interrogation continues. I am asked many questions about my husband and the security personnel assigned to me are quite upset because of his last name. They are not satisfied with the one I have given them and insist that he must have another family name. They cannot place him by the one I provide. But then why should they? There are well over a million Palestinian citizens of Israel, over twenty per cent of the country’s total population. How could any one security officer at the airport know all of the, perhaps hundreds upon hundreds, of family names belonging to these people? I repeatedly assure them that this is the surname I know him by, the name recorded on our marriage license, and the only one I can furnish to them. They are insistent. There must be another name. Before I am set free I am ordered to fetch him from outside and bring him to them for questioning. What's all this rigmarole about anyway? He isn't going anywhere. He lives here. He has only come to the airport to meet his wife. Why such a fuss about his last name? What difference does it make? Who cares? But I want to get this ordeal over with as quickly as possible and I have learned from previous experience that it is best to ask no questions, make no trouble; so I dutifully go get my husband. After a short interval security inspection begins again, this round with another player.

Eventually, after completing our rites of passage, Ghassan and I are awarded freedom to the outside world where an uncle has been patiently waiting for us. It is in his van that we will be conveyed to our destination, Umm al-Fahim, about a two hour drive

from here. Darkness has long descended upon us by the time we become free agents. During our night journey from the airport I learn the reason for security's consternation and clear displeasure concerning my husband's last name.

The tale concerning the names of Palestinian folk in Israel goes like this. After the establishment of the State, all Palestinians, who were allowed to remain and acquire citizenship, had to be registered, as do all citizens. What is interesting here is that the leaders of the State implemented bloc naming for *their Arabs* by registering Palestinians by their *hamula* (clan of affiliation) name even though this is not an individual's family name. As these ghettos qua *villages* were constructed, Palestinian residents were classified as belonging to one or the other of the various *hamula* blocs that existed in their *village*. These blocs were claimed to be the patrilineal family-clan to which individuals were related by blood. Through my field work in Umm al-Fahim I discovered that this construction often disregarded actually existing families and attributed patrilineal blood relations along *hamula* lines to blocs of families whether or not they were actually blood-related. In 1949, when the territory (along with most of her inhabitants) of the Little Triangle, which includes Umm al-Fahim, was handed over to Israel as a part of the armistice agreement with Transjordan, four major *hamula* formations existed in Umm al-Fahim—Aghbariyah, Jabareen, Mahajinah, Mahamid. Each and every living soul--and one can be certain that the authorities allowed no stuffing of the registers with immaterial beings as Gogol's Chichikov tried--was assigned one of these four *hamula* names. Given this situation, our security officers at the airport, even if one should happen to be somewhat dimwitted, certainly could know the last names, four in toto, of all Umm al-Fahim's 30,000 residents at that time. Fawzi, the name I gave the security personnel, one

of my husband's actual family names, is not one of these four officially sanctioned *hamula* family names. Responding with such a last name to the inquiries of these officers of the State, and security officers at that, certainly was cause for their disapproval, requiring their further investigation in fulfillment of their duties as guarantors of the *bitachon* of this State.

The *hamula* is a socio-political alliance among families who often, though not necessarily, have blood ties. In the past, once such alliances were established members often claimed common ancestry which served to strengthen group cohesion and loyalty. But these alliances, like any social or political alliances anywhere, are subject to the stresses and strains between and among those that comprise them, relations to other groupings and alliances, as well as changed circumstances, and so groups combine, break apart, and regroup over time depending on socio-economic and political developments and intra and inter-group interests and conflicts, much the way, though on a larger scale, modern states do today.

More specifically, in relation to Palestinian experience, these alliances really only acquired, and, to the extent to which people currently make use of these forms of social engagement acquire, concrete meaning when they were/are needed by people to solve problems involving this level of social interaction; for instance, in the event that the community as a whole must raise money for a school, or engage in battle, or a dispute arises between or among members that requires intervention at the *hamula* level for its resolution. In practical terms, to make decisions or settle disputes might mean assembling the *council of elders*, or gathering together all the *heads* of the member families or even all the adult male *hamula* members and, at times, all the women, who are involved in

decision-making and problem solving though through more informal channels. Depending on the substance of the matter at hand, the concerned parties may simply apply to the wisdom or judgment of a person who is respected or experienced in handling the type of issue that has arisen and this person may be a woman or a man. People would go to the *diwan* (salon) of such a person, regardless of *hamula* affiliation, and put their case before him or her for consideration. Women could also have a *diwan* and hold such status, as, for instance, was the case of the paternal grandmother of one of my brothers-in-law (who, by the way, is a Mahajinah married to an Aghbariyah—what does that make their children—to which *hamula* do they belong? Obviously, even if the couple joins the paternal *hamula*, in one case the family joins one *hamula* and in another case the family joins one of the others, depending on who is the wife and who is the husband, so, in the end, the *hamulas* are mixed with each other in terms of familial links). In fact, when the woman is a strong character the family will even become known by her name. My brother-in-law's grandmother was especially known for being able to make alliances between *hamulas* during military rule when the policy of the military government was to divide and conquer on the basis of *hamula* affiliation. In all these situations, depending upon the scope and content of the issue, the boundaries of who constitutes the problem solving group is open and varies according to the needs of the occasion. Non-*hamula* neighbors, people from other villages, friends and relatives may be consulted, brought in to arbitrate, called to a meeting, and so forth. Thus, characterization of the so-called traditional *hamula* as a kinship form of a socio-political body based on blood lineage, with delineated boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, each competing with each other for resources, privileges and access to power, is simply not true to life.

Variations of this form of alliance were and are still found throughout the Middle East, Africa and the Mediterranean. For that matter, I believe, one could argue that various alliances between and among families in parts of Europe were likewise formed to solve problems and settle matters involving individuals, families or allied families or groups regarding such things as marriages, conflicts, debts, infringements of obligations, exchanges of property, mergers of estates and businesses, as well as community-wide issues such as wars or natural calamities in much the same spirit and form as the Palestinian *hamula* system historically was called upon to do. The author, Marina Belozerskaya, writes that "marriages of leading families were political alliances" in Italy and she describes how during the fifteenth century the Medici's gained power "By arranging marriages with prestigious Florentine families and creating a circle 'of friends'—clients who linked themselves to the Medici in return for their support" and in this way "the family formed an unofficial party" (Belozerskaya 2006, 97, 88-9). And in contemporary Israeli terms Nitzan and Bichler point out in their co-authored book, *The Global Political Economy of Israel*, that

> The genealogy of Israel's ruling class rests on a surprisingly small number of family trees—primarily Hacohen, Ruppin, Shertok (later Sharet) and Elyashar—whose think trunks and multiple branches are intimately interlaced with one another, as well as with many other dominant families. The resulting octopus-like structures makes the spheres of government, business, military, culture and opinion-making so entangled, that 'state' and 'capital' can no longer be clearly separated (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, 108).

Originally, one of the practical uses residents made of the *hamula* names, a vestige of whatever the earlier significance of the *hamula* formation in Umm al-Fahim may have been, was to assign each of the four residential quarters a *hamula* name. Within these quarters are numerous neighborhoods. There are various renditions about how these quarters got these names, which I learned through oral histories, that relate to the original families that settled in Umm al-Fahim at various times, but no one is any longer certain

as to who these people really were and what exactly took place. Within the community people also use the names of these quarters to identify individuals, so, for instance, if you live in the Mahajinah quarter you will be called a Mahajinah; but this does not mean you are actually a member of the Mahajinah *hamula*. If you were to move to the Aghbariyah quarter you would then be called an Aghbariyah. Ein Ibrihim, a sister town to Umm al Fahim located across the main Hadera-Afula road was originally a quarter within Umm al-Fahim proper and the families belonged to Aghbariyah and so Ein Ibrihim became known as the Aghbariyah quarter of Umm al-Fahim. But the quarter substantially grew over time and is now home to families from all the *hamulas* as well as people from other locales who have bought land and made their homes in Ein Ibrihim. Yet, still the area is called Aghbariyah today by many people. After the Municipality of Umm al-Fahim won a raffle and built the Shikun--a Hebrew word meaning public home for senior citizens--in an undeveloped section of the hills of Umm al-Fahim, this area became open for housing and very quickly grew into a densely populated neighborhood, which now has an intermediate school, two mosques, an elementary school, a pharmacy, Histadrut offices, as well as the home for senior citizens. This neighborhood is called by the residents of Umm al-Fahim, Shikun.

Names of quarters and neighborhoods emerge out of the lived experiences of the name givers and over time the original meanings and references embedded in the names are often lost to later generations. Such naming of neighborhoods occurs everywhere in the world and is not a manifestation of some unique Arab mentality. In the case of Umm al-Fahim *hamula* names identify locations amongst the inhabitants and are not, even if originally they may have been, representative of familial or social or political ties. As a

quarter, perhaps, residents may cohere if developments should occur within a quarter that require the attention of those residents as a group in that quarter, as happens any where in the world. The Israeli government substituted a simple naming of neighborhoods within the town for a branding system of family names.

During the 1948 War Umm al-Fahim was a locus for settlement for some of the internally dislocated refugee Palestinian population. These people are often known by the name of the destroyed or confiscated town they came from such as the Kafraini who were displaced from Kafrain. So there are, besides the descendents of the original settlers of the four *hamulas*, others who came from elsewhere and made Umm al-Fahim their home. Another such group of people are the Masarwah, the Egyptians. They came to Palestine along with Muhammad 'Ali's military forces during his rule of Egypt from 1805-48. Muhammad 'Ali, a Turk from Macedonia and a hero to most Arabs, had been sent to Egypt as part of the Ottoman forces to fight against the French. The French had invaded Egypt in 1798 and occupied the country for three years. Muhammad 'Ali was able to establish himself as governor and to impose his control over the administration and tax-collection of Egypt. He attempted to unify the Sudan, Arabia, and Syria, which included Palestine. He was eventually forced to withdraw by the Europeans and Ottomans, neither of whom wanted an independent Egyptian state. Some of the Masarwah decided to stay rather than return to Egypt, were integrated into the community and given this appellation by the locals. Their family names were disregarded by the Israeli State. They were assigned one or the other of the four *hamula* pseudo-family names apparently according to which *hamula*-named quarter of the town they happened to be living in at the time the military government registered them. So, although most people’s last names are

registered today as one of these four pseudo-*hamula* family names there are in actuality hundreds, possibly thousands, of family names still used daily by this population of some 40,000 individuals. Officially, according to the State, there are only four.[6]

To the claim that the Israeli State has brought *their villagers* into the blessings of the *modern* world, it can be added that this State has provided *their villagers* with a nomenclature which registers their deepest and truest ties of affiliation and identity, one which corresponds to their authentic Arab character. The Arab experts allege, as explicated in chapter 4, that Arab *hamula* affiliation runs deeper than blood or nationhood, even if unrecognized as such by the name carriers themselves.[7] Perhaps the Zionist ideologues did not know that during the decades preceding the establishment of Israel, national, secular and democratic impulses, movements and affiliations had taken root in Palestine; there is a vast literature that details and records these historical developments, including the role the Zionist Movement and British colonial rule played in repressing these developments. Jamil Hilal relates the process thusly:

> The confrontation with Zionist colonization and British colonialism generated a secular, or nationalist, dimension to a Palestinian identity in the form of a *national* individuality transcending that of religion, sect and locality. The new identity 'imagined' Palestine as forming a national community and not simply an administrative unit or a holy space. The highly secular discourse of Turkish nationalism 'accelerated a decline in the saliency of religious identification in the Empire before and during the War [WW I].'…Still, more important was the holding of regular national congresses during the period 1919-1928. Some seven congresses were held during this period and all were consciously organized on non-sectarian terms…After 1928, the Palestinian political field witnessed the consolidation of political parties. By 1936, seven such parties existed…The

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[6] I often wonder whether Palestinians in Israel, as they become more confident as actors in the larger society, will demand the government rid them of this racist nomenclature.

[7] As discussed in chapter 4, the dominant Israeli social science conception regarding Arab identity is based on the *hamula*/clan affiliation as the most authentic and deepest felt identity which overrides, in the Arab mentality, any notion of belonging to a people or nation. Such ideological constructs have been prevalent in the literature of colonizers, and most particularly in relation to the Arab World. Such a conceptual construction took on general significance within the Zionist literature, vital to its rationalization that settling Palestine did not impinge on an indigenous people-nation. Besides the use of the *hamula*, Palestinians are separated out as distinct groupings along confessional or ethnic lines, the Duruz, Christians, etc.

> Palestinian national movement was clearly interested in emphasizing its non-sectarian nature i.e. in defining Palestinian identity in national terms. Thus, when in autumn of 1921 a Palestinian Moslem-Christian delegation went to London to relate their cause before British authorities, it took care to include in its demands not only the nullification of the Balfour Declaration, halting Jewish immigration and ending any transfer of Arab or state land to Jewish control, but also the creation of a 'national government' with a parliament to be democratically elected by the country's Muslims, Christians and Jews (Hilal 2002, 106-07; brackets mine).

With the establishment of the Israeli State it could now be said, as is typically claimed by Israelis, that the journey *of these villagers* into *modernity* had actually begun. By means of a program that organized Palestinians along Israeli defined *hamula* lines, those that structured the Israeli State have, for the first time in Palestinian history, bridged the gap between essence and appearance. By recognizing *their Arabs'* truest sense of affiliation and self-definition and raising it to its proper status as an individual's family name, these people are now socially marked with their *authentic* identity, as *hamula* affiliates. Family names such as Boger, the one I possess as a direct descendant of George Boger and Katherine Coombs Boger (Coombs being my mother's maiden name) do not apply to these people;[8] nor are these *villagers* Palestinian, since they do not, according to Israeli figuring, constitute a nation or people. Therefore, since according to the Zionist colonizers neither direct familial relations nor peoplehood reflect the essence of these individuals in their social settings, a special registration policy for surnames had to be invented and any public designation referring to Palestine or Palestinian, up until

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[8] Of course, some individuals in the West are now taking their mothers' maiden names as their surnames; women, like myself, often keep their patrilineal family name when they marry; others hyphenate their children's surnames using both parents' names, etc. But family names are still mostly acquired in the West through one's patrimony. On this issue, Palestinians may be more advanced, since women often still maintain their own family identity after they enter upon marriage, so that their direct family names are still attached to them and their patrimony still maintain obligations to them after their marriage. As far as naming themselves within their own communities in everyday life, unofficially, Palestinians in Israel still use their patrilineal family names, in much the same way as we acquire our last names in the West, because as we will see shortly, *hamula* surnames are really meaningless, except vis-à-vis the state and social institutions. On the question of nationality in Israel see chapter 3.

the First Intifada,[9] had to be banned.

The *hamula* pseudo-family bloc served as an important means to administer, bestow access to resources and privileges, and maintain law and order over the newly militarized population.[10] When managing a population via blocs of people, the authorities do not need to concern themselves with the particulars of this or that person. Working via their anointed *hamula heads* so many work permits could be issued for so many Aghbariyahs, Mahajinahs, Jabarins and Mahamids. And, if these people did not relate to themselves and each other in this way before, they certainly would now, since the military governor tallied out essential resources, like jobs, on this basis. It must be kept in mind that after the 1948 War and conclusion of the various armistice agreements, the new Israeli government was left with a relatively small (160,000) but very material undesired population of non-Jews. The registration policy being described provided the authorities with a simple and readily implementable mechanism for control over and management of this population.

The officially constructed *hamula*-family socio-political blocs were now constituted as empirical facts on the ground. It could be asserted that the Ministry of Interior's statistics and census data on this population simply reflect objectively and

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[9] One outcome of the1987-1991 Intifada and the Peace Accords is that for the first time in Israel's history the use of "Palestine" in an association's was legally allowed. See chapter 3 on this issue.

[10] It must be kept in mind that Palestinians in Israel, in spite of the official bestowal of citizenship, were excluded from civil and political societies and were directly administered, policed, legislated and juridicated by a military government, which was responsible for the containment and administration of this ghettoized population for almost two decades. The method of administration and control being discussed could be effectuated to a great extent because Palestinians were immediately and thoroughly ghettoized into and movement restricted to separate and distinct physical locales by the Zionist military forces during the 1947-48 War, a process which was completed upon establishment of the State. In the case of the few remaining mixed cities, like Haifa, where some Palestinian residents remained after the war, Palestinians were forced to relocate into an Arab quarter-the ghetto.

empirically the real state of affairs of these subordinated people, for surely facts and figures in ink do not discriminate between people. Ideologically, the establishment of such facts on the ground served to legitimize the military government's operations and form of rule over the Palestinian communities within the overall Zionist project. Could it not be claimed, as it was and is, in all good faith, that the hands of the authorities were tied; what else could be done for these *villagers* upon whom "democracy is wasted", since one had to respect their Arab ways (and is not the *hamula* the *traditional* and authentic self-constituted expression of their affiliation and identity), even as one attempted, for their own good, to bring them the benefits of modernity? And aren't these "facts on the ground", reflected in government records, the authentic expression of traditional Arab village familial lineage and social and political organization? Along with such ideological justification for their methods of control and domination, the *hamula*-family identity also made it easy for the authorities to record and file information on these people, a convenient filing system for a people who were considered to be only temporarily housed within one's midst (when this was instituted Ben-Gurion still hoped for transfer of the population). If the authorities needed information concerning a specific individual the unique registration number served to mark that person and still does; and there are the extensive *village files* (discussed in chapter 2) to turn to.

Since the annexation of the Little Triangle to Israel in 1949 officially there are and should forever remain only four family names in Umm al-Fahim. Consequently, our security officers at the airport could know the last names of all her residents. Fawzi, one of my husband's actual patrilineal family names, is not one of these four officially imposed *hamula* family names so it was meaningless to them and either incorrect or

worse a form of sabotage that I should give as my family name "Fawzi". But for my husband, unlike his *hamula* affiliation Aghbariyah, Fawzi is a meaningful surname. It identifies who Ghassan specifically is to others. Aghbariyah tells one little if next to nothing, since, Ghassan--or say Muhammad or Faisel, more common first names--Aghbariyah could refer to hundreds of individuals. A speaker referring to Ghassan in a conversation in his absence would have to provide additional information, like an actual family name, such as Fawzi, so that the listener would know that it is this Ghassan or that Muhammad of such and such a family who is being spoken of.

The same thing is done in the United States or any where else for that matter when surnames are used to specify the specific person being spoken about to avoid any misunderstanding as to the exact person being referenced. Just imagine how many Lailas, Duads, Yusefs, Samirahs there are in Umm al-Fahim all with the same last names; and how absurd it would be if in a town in the United States of say 40,000 people, comparable in size to Umm al-Fahim, all the Lindas, Davids, Josephs, and Susans shared one of the same four last names because of the quarter in the town they happened to live in. No matter what the literature may say about Palestinians in Israel, such a nomenclature is just as absurd for these people, though it is their official reality. But, in everyday life people are more intelligent than what is written about them in books or in government documents, so among themselves, in their ghettos, use of a person's *hamula* name may never be mentioned in a conversation.

Although during this ride from the Tel Aviv airport to our home in Umm al-Fahim my husband explains the reason behind security's concern about his last name, and I learn that the people in Umm al-Fahim are all registered under one of four names, I did

not fully appreciate what such a policy would mean for the people who are relegated to such slate naming until I decided to undertake a study of the first names Umm al-Fahim parents have given their children. Tracing from pre-1948 times up through the 1991 Gulf War, I wanted to see if any patterns in naming emerged which might indicate such things as religious or secular influences, or the impact of historical or contemporary events, and if different attitudes in the naming of girl and boy children were evidenced. I didn't finish this study but in the course of pouring through sheets of government generated voter registration lists and the lists of pupils in public schools, I began, first visually, to recognize the absurdity that was implicit in attributing four surnames to a population of nearly 40,000 people. The registrars consist of pages and pages of nothing but Aghbariyahs, Jabarins, Mahajinahs, and Mahamids--with a smattering of miscellaneous last names trailing behind.

Although such slate naming may be convenient for the authorities, for the Palestinian residents the contrary is true. For instance, the Umm al-Fahim telephone book is almost useless. Imagine how many Muhammad Aghbariyahs and Ahmad Jabarins there are and with no addresses since Umm al-Fahim, without a Master Plan, has no street names. One has to regularly make several telephone calls before one hits upon the particular person one wants to speak to. Imagine how confusing voting would be if it were not for the universally required, uniquely issued identification number. Voting booths in Umm al-Fahim are set up alphabetically by first name within each of the four *hamula* assigned family names. So, for instance, individuals with first names beginning with say A through F within Aghbariyah are assigned to report to one location, G through P to another, and so on. Likewise for Jabarin, Mahajinah and Mahamid. But, heaven help

us! how many individuals have the name Mahmud Mahamid, just to site one instance! But, thank God, or rather the State, for the ID number. Like one's fingerprint it is unique so the clerks at the voting booths can altogether forget about names. Lump them altogether, divvy out the goods and manage out their affairs in blocs, and when you need to know or recognize this particular *one* out of the rest, don't worry that can always be done; the security files are filled with detailed records on each and every one of these individuals, including my own person.

So, my husband, in his thirties, after carrying this burdensome government imposed nomenclature upon his person for so long, rejected the colonizer's designation and registered instead his father's first name, Fawzi. (One convenient unexpected side effect for him, since there are not many people with non-*hamula* family names in Umm al-Fahim, he does not have to stand in long lines to vote. All the individuals with miscellaneous surnames or people with problems are assigned to a distinct voting booth.) Fawzi is the name that I knew him by while I was being interrogated by the airport security. The Israeli authorities know him as, and only want him, and me, to use his *hamula* name of Aghbariyah. Fawzi is my husband's family name, a meaningful surname, the one he registered under when we were married in New York City, the one he is now imposing officially and legitimately upon the State of Israel to which he is a citizen.

One recalls how in Europe, during the transition from feudal to bourgeois property and the concomitant development of centralized and bureaucratized state systems, individuals were required to register themselves with surnames. As social intercourse progressively became constituted upon and mediated through contractual relationships--buying and selling, trade, commerce, lending, inheritance, etc.—the

individual, as a property holder and contractual party, was consecrated legally and ideologically (Bentham, Locke, Hume, Hobbes among others). An interpersonal system of rights and duties, carried out through verbal agreements and handshakes, taking one another in trust based on mutual reciprocity and honor, could no longer serve to guarantee the generalized workings of modern commerce and trade and insure the legitimacy of and fulfillment of mutually entered upon obligations. Surnames became required in order to carry out the practical ordinary matters of civil society and daily life. But it took a while before this took firm root. For instance, the playwright, Christopher Marlowe's father, John Marlowe, was actually known in his time, "in that lackadaisical way Elizabethans had with spelling in general and surnames in particular," as Marloe, or Marley, or Marlyn.[11]

So, as individuals became legally constituted entities registration of individuals with surnames began. This procedure often required the payment of fees. For the poor and propertyless such fees often put them at the mercy of unsympathetic and mean-spirited registrars, who could bestow upon these hapless individuals whatever denigrating and insulting name came into their heads, brandishing upon their person their social marking. If you happened to be Jewish and poor, well, any nomenclature may fall to your lot, and so it happened Jews were assigned names having to do with money like Goldstein, Moneta (coinage), and derogatory names like Dreyfuss (three foot), Ferkelfudder (pig's food) or Ferkelfuss (pig's foot). It was not uncommon for Jews to be assigned the names of animals. Many of these derogatory names no longer exist, since, as could be expected, when circumstances permitted, the offspring of these unfortunate

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[11] See Rodney Bolt, History Play: The Lives and Afterlife of Christopher Marlowe (New York: Bloomsbury, 2005), 4.

people, to whom such epitaphs fell, removed these markings from their persons.

Likewise, my husband disencumbered his body of a burdensome marking, though, in the case of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship, his naming was not left up to a registrar's imaginative spitefulness. Israel's naming policy is more reminiscent of the bloc naming of Jews in Europe during the same period referred to above, when, for instance, such as in Spain, Jews where given surnames according to their place of residence.[12] All Jewish individuals from the same town or village were accorded the same last name; a policy which has no regard for the individuals and families involved. Or in more contemporary times, one is reminded of the Nazi policy in Germany which required Jews to have only Jewish first names. If a person kept an Aryan name, it was decreed that he or she had to add a Jewish middle name such as Israel or Sara. These names were stamped on their identification cards along with their nationality, "Jew".[13] Up until recently in Israel "Arab" has been stamped on the ID cards of Palestinian citizens, along with one of the easily recognizable pseudo-*hamula*-family names.

Even with such a simple procedure for registration, sometimes different registrars transliterate the *hamula*-family name differently, clearly a sign of disregard and indifference to these individuals and people. Only four names need be memorized for the

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[12] The Spanish government, on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the Inquisition and the deportation of Jews from Spain, granted citizenship to those Jews that could verify their Spanish ancestry (actually Arabs and Jews were expelled, but the law only included Jews). This was easy for those Jews whose ancestors had been given group names based on locales of residency. Assigning surnames based on such things as place were not applied only to Jews and were not always derogatory. Occupations were also used. Spanish colonialists were known to assign group first names in parts of South America by holding group baptismal ceremonies during which all the native females, for instance, were christened Maria and the males Jesus. One has to research the historical circumstances and meanings of names in their context to determine if the name has embedded social and class prejudices attached to it.

[13] See Jorg Wollenberg, ed. *The German Public and the Persecution of the Jews, 1933-1945*, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996), xv. A decree of July 25, 1938 required all Jews to carry a special identification card, followed by a decree of August 17, 1938 which required the use of a Jewish name.

residents of Umm al-Fahim, not a difficult task. One would think a standardized transliteration of these four names would be established and instituted; but apparently this is not the case. You will find, for instance, on every page of the Ministry of Interior's voter registration book for Umm al-Fahim, both Jibereen and Jabarin, as Hebrew spellings for Jabarin. But, the registrars know these mistakes do not matter. The different renditions of the same official last names do not create any problems since the voter registration lists are arranged numerically, according to the unique identity number assigned to each individual. Names, at least for Arab citizens, in the end, are immaterial.

Although, by law, Arabic is an officially recognized language, and "All ordinances, official notices and official forms of the government and all official notices of local authorities and municipalities in areas to be prescribed...shall be published in Arabic and Hebrew," Palestinians under Israeli citizenship are registered in Hebrew.[14] Therefore, staff at the Ministry of Interior have to transliterate Arabic names into Hebrew and the Hebrew transliteration is treated as the original name from which, when needed, Arabic names are derived. Every page of the voter registration is fraught with mistakes and absurdities. Arab names are truncated; ends are simply dropped, like "Abd al S" or simply "Abd al". At other times it appears that little care was taken in the transliteration, when, for instance, a slight change has occurred which has changed a name into an Arabic word, that has an actual meaning but would never be used as a person's name. A common Arabic name, *Jamal*, which means beauty, is transliterated into Hebrew as camels. No Arab parents would give the plural version of the word camel to a child.

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[14] Israeli law is based on Article 82 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922, which is cited above. And, although, pursuant to Article 82, "laws and regulations must be translated into Arabic," Kretzmer acknowledges "there is a fair gap in this matter between the legal situation and reality" See David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 165-66, 172.

Examples of this sort appear to be the result of carelessness or worse an insulting gesture on the part of the registrar.

The bird of this tale of Palestinian names in Israel is not yet ready to take flight. There is another embellishment to this story. Although the Ministry of Interior gathers and records the information on individuals for the voter registration lists in Hebrew, the Arab Local Authorities need this information in Arabic. So, staff at the Ministry of Interior, transliterate the Hebraized Arab names back into Arabic. The Arabic transliteration is placed in small type underneath the original Hebrew transliteration. Many names do not even have the honor of being transliterated into Arabic, if even vulgarized. Now we witness the turning of tragedy into comedy, as insult is added to injury. For example, the name *Tagreed* appears repeatedly in the Hebrew as a transliteration of an Arabic name, probably *Taghreed*, which means the singing or chirping of birds. But then, the registrar transliterates back from the Hebrew rendition of the Arabic name and comes up with *Tajreed*. The first transliteration to *Tagreed* corresponds to neither an Arabic name nor word, but the transliteration back into Arabic, *Tajreed*, has a very definite meaning: namely, "peeling, paring; disrobement, stripping; denudation; disarmament; dispatching (of troops); freeing; isolation; abstraction."[15]

At other times one doesn't know if the Hebrew transliteration or the transliterated Arabic is right, since there are cases where the Hebrew transliteration of some Arabic name could represent more than one Arabic name. For instance, a transliterated Arabic name in Hebrew could be an actual Arabic female name, like *Eman*, which means belief, or the male name, *Aman*, which means peacefulness. So, what is the name and gender of

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[15] J. Milton Cowan, ed., *The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, Inc., 1976), 119.

this person, *Eman* or *Aman*? Did his or her parents want their child to hearken feelings of belief and truth or peace and tranquility? A correct Hebrew transliteration, like *Riyad*, is given back incorrectly, ending the Arabic with a soft "d" sound instead of the Arabic dahl sound, a sound which does not exist in Hebrew. This error occurs because the alphabets don't correspond.

Repeatedly, transliterated Arabic names are wrong, vowels are added, letters incorrect, resulting in nonexistent Arabic names in Arabic--*Omayma* is *Oomayma*; *Ferdaus* is *Ferdaaus*; *Osamah* is *Oosamah*, *Lamyah* is *Laamyah*. The Hebrew may be fine but the Arabic meaningless. Even newspapers incorrectly spell the names of Arab dignitaries, including Arab Knesset members. Many of these mistakes are simply the result of inherent problems of transliteration. The alphabets to not correspond and several sound-letters in the Arabic are not present in Hebrew. The state uses Hebrew transliterated Arab names as the original name, in spite of Arabic being, *de jure*, an official language. And for the vast majority of those born after the establishment of the State, these names have been fixed upon their person since birth and follow them throughout their lives.[16] But this does not explain all the various errors. Apparently at least some of the registrars care little about how the names of their Arab compatriots are entered and make little effort to transliterate correctly from Arabic to Hebrew and back.

As we drive along on to Umm al-Fahim this September night from the Tel Aviv

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[16] Almost everyone in Israel is born in a hospital and registered at that time. Besides eliminating community midwifery, if one is not born in a hospital one is not eligible for certain benefits, so it is to everyone's interest to get to a hospital to give birth. Since the vast majority of Umm al-Fahim residents were born after the establishment of the State, most, if not all, the mistakes I have indicated above have occurred during hospital registration. For Palestinians, hospital registration would in all likelihood exaggerate the problems discussed because hospitals do not generally have Arab administrators who would be more likely to take care to transliterate correctly, and in any case would be fluent in both languages.

airport, new stories unfold from Ghassan's explanation for the airport security's quandary about his name. He tells me the circumstances that led to his realization, as an adolescent, that he was living under a "false identity". Since Umm al-Fahim did not house a high school, at thirteen his parents boarded him in Nazareth so that he could acquire a high school education. In the school rolls he was registered by the authorities under his *hamula* affiliation and so teachers, school administrators and staff called him Ghassan Aghbariyah. Until this time he, his family and friends had known him to be Ghassan Fawzi Abd al Wahab of the al Saa'd extended family. When the teacher took attendance by reading out the roll call he didn't respond. Now, in a high school away from home, for the first time in his life, he learned his *true* and *legitimate* identity. He also discovered that through this nomenclature he had supposed relatives whom he had never met or heard of, children who lived in towns other than his home town, like Kamal from Musmus and Khalid from Mushairfa, whose *hamula*-slated last names were also Aghbariyah like his own. Thus, at the ripe age of thirteen Ghassan began to understand what he was expected to appreciate about himself and his community; that he was essentially an *Arab villager*--modernity or no modernity, land or no land--and that his *hamula* ties set the "limit of [his] sphere of view, thought, action...bound [his] mental vision and perception...limit the range of his knowledge, experience, or interest." He came to know of the "physical horizon" which had been set for him given his position on the earth's surface. This official appellation should therefore be ever imprinted upon his being, since, as is claimed by the State and the Arab experts, this appellation corresponds in language to his genuine identity. And the security personnel at the airport would accept no other.

On the other hand, al Saa'd is the name his father was registered under during the British Mandate. Palestine is clearly stamped in his 1946 passport issued by the Mandate Government, which he still possesses and exhibits, whenever an occasion for such a display arises, proudly pointing out that Palestine is indicated as his country of residence. I have family members who do not live in Israel and therefore are not subjected to this artificial nomenclature. One of my mother-in-law's brothers, who was in Umm al-Fahim in 1948 and stayed in Israel, has Aghbariyah as his last name, just as she does. But one of her father's brothers, who happened to be in Syria, is known as al Qasim. Two of my husband's brothers studied in Europe and presently live there. One brother disencumbered himself of his branding and took al Saa'd as his surname.

Ghassan's father and mother, both members of the same *hamula*, though they do not share direct blood relation, at least not for five generations, share the same official family name, Aghbariyah. Her patrilineal lineage is actually Sharif, al Qasim, Muhammad, Yusef, Saa'd within the extended family al Saa'd; whereas her husband traces his lineage Abd al Wahab, Sulieman, Isa'id, Hasan, Saa'd also within the extended family of al Saa'd. Fawzi and Ifat, my father and mother-in-law respectively, are from different offshoots or branches of a family that had common parentage five generations ago.[17] If we add the matrilineal lineages the complex of families involved becomes even more diverse and varied; any direct blood ties become even further removed. Their story

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[17] Part of my study involved tracing lineages of one family within each of the four *hamula* formations. The results of my fieldwork on my own immediate family where confirmed by a study I recently discovered which is part of a series on *Destroyed Palestinian Villages* undertaken by Beir Zeit University's Center of Documents and Research, published by the Islamic Organization for Education, Science and Culture in 1988. *Al Lajun*, by Dr. Sharif Kanaana and Omar Mahameed, is no. 6 in this series. Kanaana and Mahameed trace the family lineages of Lajun residents and present the same information as I acquired through oral interviews.

is not unique to them or an anomaly within Palestinian culture.

I also discovered that in my family marriage partners came from a number of different villages, towns and cities, including at least, besides Umm al-Fahim, Jenin, Jerusalem, Nazareth, Sili, Birkine, Acre, Musmus, and Lajun, covering a large territorial stretch within Palestine. But, since 1948, and particularly during the first twenty years when Umm al-Fahim was under military rule, marriages were necessarily restricted to the town, just as was movement. Today, it seems that in Umm al-Fahim, if one goes by name tags, almost everyone intermarries, Aghbariyahs with Aghbariyahs, Jabarins with Jabarins and so on, and for the most part exclusively within the *village*. With only four last names, what else can appear to be the case but lots of inbreeding, proving how these *village Arabs* prefer cousin marriages. And, to a certain extent, there is some truth to this prejudice. How could it be otherwise when the *marriage market* along with every other aspect of one's existence was physically restricted within claustrophobic bounds, so characteristic of "incestuous", externally imposed ghetto life? Assigning *hamula* names and working through *hamula* groups to distribute resources also gave impulse to the residents to marry within their *hamula* group in order to insure that families held on to what economic resources they had and that any resources granted to them through the Military Governor would benefit the family.[18]

Even the British Mandate colonial government did not resort to such bloc naming of their Palestinian subjects; nor do other Arab countries use *hamula* affiliation as a person's family name, simply because it is not the immediate family to which a person belongs. Israeli registration of Palestinians by *hamula* affiliation was an original creation

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[18] A thorough study of the affects of Israel's use of the *hamula*, especially during military governance, is a much needed research project.

of the new state as they set about to construct a new position within *their* society for this "undesirable" population of “non-Jews” as they are officially titled by the government. Historically, Arab patrilineal families, such as al Saa’d, which are composed of many branches and offshoots, have also served as social groupings much like the *hamula* though on a narrower basis. Problems and conflicts whose importance are restricted within the boundaries of the extended family, such as the killing of a family member by someone within the extended family, marriage problems within and between families, debts, property exchanges, any and all such familial-based issues or disputes would call upon the intervention of the extended family but not the *hamula*.

Sons and daughters like everywhere marry and break off and set up households and have children who do the same and so do their children. The separation and negation integral to the generational re-construction of families is an ever open and unending process. Branches and offshoots of families within a family inevitably occur and blood ties become more and more removed and distant, not to speak of marriages between foreigners who come peacefully as merchants and not no peacefully as conquerors and tax collectors. My husband, Ghassan, has several surnames which identify to which paternity he belongs, referring to closer or more distant paternity or to closer or more extended family lineage. For instance, he is known to many, especially his peers, by his father's first name, Fawzi. This is the family name he chose to register with the Ministry of Interior in his thirties. But others within the community, especially those of his father's generation, would refer to Abd al Wahab, his father's father's first name, as his family name.

But then again, others would prefer to identify Ghassan's patronage by Abu al

Ajaar, which can also serve to identify the family to which he belongs. This name, which means the father of unripe figs, was the nickname of his father's father. The story goes that one evening as a youth, Ghassan's grandfather was sitting chatting with his friends late into the night. The young men began to spar with each other and dared one another to go out into the dark all the way to a distant orchard. Ghassan's grandfather took up the bet and in order to prove that he had accomplished the feat he brought back figs from the trees. But in the dark he had gathered unripe figs and so in honorary jest he became known as Abu al Ajaar, the father of unripe figs. But this nickname stuck to his person and to the persons of his male offspring and the generations to follow from his loins. And so Ghassan is also known by this family name. In fact Fawzi, Abd al Wahab, and Abu al Ajaar all better and more accurately identify the specific patrilineal branch of the larger extended family, al Saa'd, to which he and his siblings belong. Aghbariyah, my husband's *hamula* affiliation, which is comprised of numerous families and extended families, tells no one the specific family to which he belongs, whether the extended or the direct patrilineal family. Probably, if the Israeli State had not instituted the *hamula* names as registered family names, its usage would have disappeared as a meaningful expression of inter-personal and inter-group affinity along with the *hamula heads* which is, as I have been arguing, in its present form, a product of the Israeli experience.

The language of objects, relationships and processes travels the path of their usage in human intercourse, which endows them with shared meaning for people in their everyday life. Just as in our living activities--whether consciously or not, whether or not legislated or through design--we create, embellish, modify, combine, transform, negate the world of relations and things, likewise we do the same to our word-signifiers,

recreating our language-communicators within the manifold activities of our ever engendering reproduction. It is interesting to note that in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which traces the history of words as they are used in the written English language, the word, *surname*, only begins to take on a significant presence beginning in the 1500s, coinciding with the breakdown of feudal relations as the developing bourgeois activities--commerce and trade, urban life, contracts and exchange, legal establishment of private property in land, enterprises and goods--take on more general significance. Throughout history and across societies people have had to find ways through naming that identify specific individuals. Occupations were also used and even such names as my mother's maiden name, Coombs, we are given to understand originally meant small valley. Throughout the world naming by occupation, place of residence, geography of place, son or daughter of father's birth name, etc. have been common ways of identifying exactly who an individual is. My mother's mother's maiden name is MacLeod, which means son of Leo, which originally referred obviously to sons only, but later became the surname for all offspring of that paternity over generations. And names like my mother's maiden name, Coombs, related to place. We are given to believe that my father's surname, Boger, of German origins, relates to occupation, perhaps archer. Arab naming fits the general rules; it is not exceptional; the only difference from the West today is that in Arab names one can still see the connections to the origins of names more directly.

As objects in use and relationships change or even disappear, as new and different ways of doing things are implemented, as new social relationships and systems of power take hold of people's practical existence, the significance and cultural meaning of words as they have been handed down by each generation, pertaining to and indexing former

ways of doing things and expressing relationships, begin to dissolve or are redesigned and new words are also created. So too the previously given stories and truths which made sense out of life and events, along with the customs, manners, and rituals which bound individuals and groups together, dissolve and change. As human activities and cultural artifices are transformed so too are their meanings and purposes for people even when cloaked by the same words. Life as it is, as it presents itself to us, has to be gotten on with. It is this living process of real activities that forms the substance of, gives content to, written and sounded words, enabling them to continue as meaningful indices, useful communicators between and among people; those words, which are historically continuous, like *hamula*, very often index quite different relationships and meanings which are not directly visible to the outside observer and are taken for granted by the users themselves.

1948 began a process for Palestinians that was not simply an expression of the ever-evolving story of human development but a totalizing restructuring of all of known existence. This experience is dramatically captured by the word Palestinians use to signify that reality, *nakba*, the Catastrophe. Three quarters of a million people or more began their refugee journey literally on foot, while the approximately 160,000 Palestinians remaining inside the Green Line,[19] now designated as Israel's non-Jewish minority, their "fifth column", their "enemy within", started on their separate, stationary,

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19 "The 'Green Line' which was delineated in 1949 as an armistice line between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon was actually a cease fire line agreed upon in Rhodes, and approved by military representatives of all partners who participated in the 1948 War, with the mediation of U.N. observers." Elisha Efrat, *The West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Geography of occupation and disengagement* (Routledge: New York, 2006), 50.

though entwined journey.[20]

For those Palestinians that, so to speak, stayed put, life as it is, as it presents itself, had to be gotten on with within their particular circumstances. What occurs within the confines of the Palestinian ghetto, typically, presents itself to the outside observer and to the resident, as the "Arab" way of doing things, as normative Arab behavior within village life.[21] In Umm al-Fahim residents speak Arabic, go to their neighborhood mosques, eat lebenah (thick yoghourt) and zatar and olive oil, want male offspring, marry first cousins, have large families, use their *hamula* names, and seek out their *hamula heads*. Are not all these activities typical of "traditional" Arab ways? The experts on *Israel's Arabs* tell us that such is the case and, for that matter, most ghetto residents concur.

For the younger generation of Palestinians, who experientially know themselves within the boundaries established by the Zionist state, the prevailing *hamula* system with

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[20] Over the years there has been a dispute concerning the number of Palestinian refugees resulting from the 1948 War. Janet L. Abu-Lughod discusses this issue and explains how the figures are determined in her article "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine" in *The Transformation of Palestine*, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1987). Benny Morris discusses the dispute in *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 297-98. The figures range from a low of 520,000-530,000, the official Israeli figure, to a high of slightly over 900,000, an estimate of the United Nations Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near east (UNRWA). Generally, somewhere between 600,000 to 760,000 is quoted as the number of refugees from the 1948 War. Around 80 percent of the indigenous Palestinian population became refugees. In Benny Morris' discussion regarding the numbers, he quotes from a private letter that Eytan, the Director General of the Israel Foreign Ministry, wrote in late 1950, where he refers to the 1949 figure UNRWA registered "of 726,000 as 'meticulous' and thought that 'the real number was close to 800,000.'" Morris then writes "but officially, Israel stuck to the low figure of 520,000-530,000. The reason was simple: 'if people...became accustomed to the large figure and we are eventually obliged to accept the return of the refugees, we may find it difficult, when faced with hordes of claimants, to convince the world that not all of these formerly lived in Israeli territory...It would, in any event, seem desirable to minimize the numbers...than otherwise.'" ISA FM2564/22, Arthur Louise to Eytan, 11 August 1948. Chaim Weitzman, the first president of the State of Israel, at that time, proclaimed the Palestinian evacuation to have been "a miraculous clearing of the land: the miraculous simplification of Israel's task." Estimates regarding how many Palestinians were in Israel in 1949 also vary, apparently some where between 130,000 and 160,000.

[21] See chapter 4 regarding the Palestinian ghettos as *villages* within popular and academic Israeli consciousness.

its concomitant ordering of *hamula heads*, along with the extant construction of *hamula*-family names apparently expresses something of traditional Arab ways. Furthermore these social forms apply only in their ghettos lending authenticity to the *Arabness* of their substance which is further substantiated by "experts" who write and publish articles and books about *Israel's Arabs* for the general public, academia, the government, as well as journalists and political analysts who discuss Arab matters on television and in the press. Like all colonial settler projects, the Zionist movement has not only colonized Palestine, a particular piece of the earth's surface, but the minds and souls of the Palestinians who remained and generated progeny on this surface, setting limits to both their visible and cultural horizons.[22]

When, for instance, my husband goes to a bank in Umm al-Fahim to submit a form or application, the bank clerks, all who know him, and know him as Ghassan Fawzi, or one of his other family names, will automatically submit his forms using Aghbariyah. They submit Aghbariyah instead of Fawzi even though Ghassan changed his name officially with the Ministry of Interior many years ago. Just as the security officers at the airport would not be satisfied until Ghassan had given them the name Aghbariyah, so too, the workers at the bank in Umm al-Fahim know that Fawzi may not be officially

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[22] See, for instance, the Palestinian writer, Subhi Abu Ghosh. He asserts that *hamulas* are "groupings based on blood relationships" in "Communism in an Arab Village in Israel," in *Texts and Responses*, ed. Michael A. Fishbane and Paul R. Flohr. E.J. Brill: Leiden, 1975. Abu Ghosh is an example of the internalization of Israeli categories by Palestinians. Many authors have shed light on the subject of oppressed consciousness: Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 1968) and *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markman (New York: Grove Press, 1982); Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (New York: Orion Press, 1965); and Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Seabury Press, 1970) are just a few. Another fruitful source of material on this subject is fiction of which African and Middle Eastern literature abounds. Just a few are mentioned here, such as the contemporary Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o's novel *Petals of Blood* (London: Penguin Books, 1977); the late Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani's stories in *All That's Left To You* (Austin: The University of Texas, 1990); one could also include Bertolt Brecht's plays, such as *Mother* and *Mother Courage*.

approved. And even if Fawzi should pass through, the State's policies have so dominated these ghettoized peoples' lives that they automatically produce what they think is expected of them. The State imposed *hamula* names are the ones acknowledged by this Zionist state and society. Their Arabs are expected to function under these names when in contact with their state and their society. So the Palestinian individual may do what he or she wills, but *the boundary-line dividing two regions of being* has been firmly established and *limits the sphere of view, thought, action* which a Palestinians under Israeli citizenship may take.

Yet, actual everyday relationships also have a way of asserting themselves, at least within the ghetto, as seen by a letter my husband and I received from one of our nieces. She wrote this letter to us when she was nine years old. She proudly tells us that she has been elected class monitor and writes, "The sender, Reem Muhammad Salameh Abu Raad, wants you to know that I am in the Fourth Grade section A. I began to learn English and I'll write my name [in English] on the envelop. I am the class monitor and I won by getting 31 votes out of 35." In identifying herself she makes no mention of her *hamula* name at all, instead her actual patrilineal names are all referred to--her father's first name, Muhammad, her grandfather's first name, Salameh, and her extended family name, Abu Raad. Only on the envelop, in English as she promised, as part of the return address, does she use her *hamula* name, Mahajinah, which is her official, state-established, bloc surname. This is the name she must use for the state-run post office.

In the case of my husband, in 1963, while attending high school away from home, he began his journey to self-knowledge--awareness of his essential nature, of his embedded Arab character, of his innermost feelings of affinity and identity which he is to

understand form his deepest bonds of personal loyalty. Away from home he acquired knowledge of what he should have recognized as his appropriate appellation. Like the Indian tale of the monkey-king, he had to be separated from his every day connections to acquire self-knowledge. Through his direct lived experience, among his family and community, he was unable to identify, out of his various ties and relationships, the most profound of all his attachments, his *hamula*, an attachment so obvious to the State and scholars on "the Arabs". Later, as an adult, he came to learn in contradistinction to his lived experience, through the prevailing and ever-present network of popular, governmental, and academic Israeli-Zionist cultural and ideological constructions and practices, that his *village* affiliation as an *Arab villager*, another *established* fact, runs deeper in his psyche than any other attachment and overrides any commitment to his community as a whole, and makes any class alliance, as well as genuine secular politics, unnatural to him as an "Arab."[23] Not only can he never belong to us, our *Jewish* state and society, but he is told that he does not even truly identify with his own immediate "ethnic" or "national" community, since, as the Arab experts have made apparent, his

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[23] The literature on Arabs by Israeli social scientists and Arab experts, and not just on Israel's Arabs, abounds with these kinds of discussions on identity. But how is the experience of a variety of affiliations, a reality which everyone every where in the world shares, be defined as so uniquely unapplicable to Arabs, while affiliations applicable to Arabs are considered so foreign from our own? For instance, I live in a neighborhood in Chelsea, subscribe to my community newspaper and can belong to a variety of Chelsea based organizations if I choose. I am a resident of New York City and as such lobby for funding to New York City and if so inclined I would root for my city's sports teams. I'm a New York State resident, and just as I do as a New Yorker, I compete for resources as a resident of this state. How many insider jokes are there between New Yorkers and New Jerseyites? As a citizen of the United States I might root for US teams in the Olympics if I were so inclined. I haven't even gotten into political affiliation, gender, occupation, religion, class, ethnic or national origins, etc. which are also identities and affiliations I can hold. No one questions or makes it an issue or suspects that I could identify with family, a small community, belong to a confession, have national loyalties, be secular and religious within a national identity at the same time, and form alliances across a variety of sectors from all these groupings depending on the issue or interest at hand. How is it that it has become taken for granted that such attitudes are not natural to, in fact are considered inherently antagonistic to, people in the so-called "Arab World", a concept which is itself a meta-conceptual construct?

loyalties are fundamentally limited to the circle bounded by his clan affiliation within his *village*. Perhaps it is true that the subaltern can not speak of or for themselves, but only through those that subordinate them.

Thus the tale is spun, elaborated and nuanced by Israeli social scientists, narrators of *their Arabs'* story. As their tale unfolds, just as Ghassan's loyalties are considered to be bound by the circle defined by his *hamula* affiliation within his ghetto *village*, so too, our narrators relate that his *village* affiliation, defined as a self-enclosed world, establishes dividing lines between him and all the other villagers from other *villages* whose lives are positioned within the confines of their *village*. And still the story continues, since, as a member of a confession Ghassan is considered just as readily incapable of truly, authentically identifying with others of different confessions. These people are Christians or Muslims and sects within these denominations, and Duruz, each a distinct affinity. *Our Arabs* belong to tribes, villages, and sects and these form the boundaries of their personal and group loyalties. Neither objectively nor subjectively are these people considered identifiable as an authentic people as such, and certainly not a people-nation no matter what historical circumstances they find themselves acting within, whether as Palestinians under British colonization or as non-national alien citizens living in what is now called a Jewish State, Israel. Palestinian is decried a meaningless nomenclature and Israel cannot be called home to Palestinians since no such people exist; instead Israel houses an Arab minority. And even as an "Arab minority" the only identity these people cum people hold in common in Israel is their classification as non-Jews since as Arabs they are composed of distinct ethnic and religious and village affiliations. Ghassan left home at thirteen and not only began his high school education, but also

learned a most valuable lesson, one that informs and affects all aspects of his existence. He was not simply the person he thought himself to be, at least not in the eyes of the *state* and *society*. He came to comprehend that he had two appellatives, two personages; one vis-à-vis the state (*and its society*) and the other, though not disarticulated from that state and society, but separated out from it and specific to his ghetto community. With this, the narration of this tale of names, though it has many more renditions and ramifications, comes to its end.

Prior to the trip I am now undertaking I had only visited Israel on three occasions and Umm al-Fahim twice. My longest previous stay in Umm al-Fahim was after my marriage in 1988 for about two weeks. I am now coming to stay more or less permanently for at least the next four years. Before ever visiting a Palestinian ghetto inside Israel I had traveled to the West Bank and Gaza. Of course, there, the overwhelming reality of occupation was ever present--check points, Israeli military and military installations, prisons, destitute refugee camps, curfews, inhabitants barricaded and surveilled by Israeli military police twenty-four hours a day. Israeli policy was clearly evident. These Palestinians are refugees, aliens who do not belong here. Their stay is to be temporary and so, to the extent possible, no structures or institutions that would create on-the-ground facts of permanent residency and civil society were permitted to be established.

At the time of my visits to the Occupied Territories in the late 1980s, the effects of a policy of temporariness was especially evident in Gaza, which had become essentially a huge densely populated beach camp. For twenty some years, efforts by her population to construct any permanent infrastructure and civil society had been thwarted,

out rightly prevented or deemed illegal. A women's group was not allowed to organize doctors to make house visits to teach women about hygiene. Dirt roadways and tin structures dominate the scenery. I learned that construction of a hospital had been on hold for years because the Israeli occupying authorities would not permit the money which had already been raised to enter the Strip. So, at the time I was visiting, the money was sitting in an outside account ready to put in place the long awaiting drafted plans for a hospital. Predominantly people in Gaza lived in make shift homes with dirt floors. Public sewage and sanitation systems were virtually non-existent. Hot and cold running water a luxury few had. Telephones and electricity were not something to be taken for granted. Yet, in spite of the hardships and repression, one experienced the hustle and bustle of life and activity as people engaged with one another, solved everyday problems of survival and surveillance.[24]

Living in such conditions of temporariness, I was amazed how clean peoples' homes were—dirt floors that looked polished--and I was astonished by the whiteness of the women's *hattah*, head scarves, and their full length dresses even as these scratched the dirt roads as they walked; everything was spic-and-span; and the children remarkably clean. When I met the famous and much respected Doctor Haidar (who became a member of the original negotiating team for the peace talks in 1991 begun in Madrid) I shared this impression. Having first grown up in rural Pennsylvania then upstate New York in poverty stricken Tughill Plateau, moving on to Buffalo and then New York City

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[24] Under Israeli control Gaza was turned into a disaster area and in the end became an economic burden to Israel so that granting autonomy to the Palestinians was to the interest of the hegemonic Zionist leaders. These leaders, I believe, were more interested in moving Jewish settlers into the Galilee which has a large Palestinian population and of course, most importantly, settling the West Bank, much of which has to all intents and purposes been annexed to Israel. That is one of the functions of building the Separation Fence in the West Bank.

as an adult, I am quite familiar with both rural and urban poverty in the United States, which, besides all the inconveniences of poverty, carries with it demoralization and alienation.[25] I told Doctor Haidar I had rarely seen poverty unaccompanied by degradation and its accompanying symptoms. He remarked that not once has a parent brought a dirty child to him and I believe him. But, of course, this outer dignity did not prevent a variety of parasites to wreak havoc upon the internal organs of the inhabitants of this Strip, especially the children.

In the West Bank of the 1980s I was particularly struck by not only the variety of economic activities going on but particularly how engaged and aware people were in relationship to the outside world in spite of occupation. Israel has occupied this territory rather than annexed it as is the case with the Little Triangle of which Umm al-Fahim is a part. Therefore, the Israeli leaders were obliged, at least formally, to abide by International Law as expressed particularly in the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, since the 1949 Rhodes Agreement between Israel and Jordan and up to 1967, these Palestinians were under Jordanian authority. During this time a variety of social activities and institutions had been established. Palestinians worked, paid by the Jordanian government, as teachers, administrators, merchants, and owned or worked in workshops. Jordanian passports were issued and so on. Even after Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 the "Jordanian factor" was not completely removed. Palestinians continued to work for the Jordanian government, passports continued to be issued by Jordan, as well as a variety of administrative activities. Occupation, rather than annexation, had allowed for not only the ongoing struggle for self determination but a certain degree of social,

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[25] Mark Twain once said that everywhere in the world poverty is an inconvenience but only in the United States is it a sin; a blaming the victim mentality which is internalized leading to degradation and alienation.

commercial and economic activity. On my visits to the West Bank I saw quite a lot of Palestinian-based housing and road construction as well as factory and agricultural production. Many people have lived abroad, worked and sent money home, and consequentially ideas and activities of all sorts abound. Many people, including women, have been educated abroad and at home. Palestinians in the West Bank had not been completely cut off from the outside world and international developments; and inhabitants found ways to build organizations and institutions within their society, even while they contended with repression and the realities of occupation.[26]

These trips to the Occupied Territories did not prepare me for my trip to Umm al-Fahim, a Palestinian ghetto of Israel. I was certain I would be entering a town, though her inhabitants, for the most part, would be poor and socially discriminated, nonetheless, because they are among the "privileged", that is citizens of Israel, I believed I would see, in general, better conditions where life would be easier. I knew I was going to a town, a municipality, not a village, but a town of 28,000 people when I first visited in 1988.[27] Umm al-Fahim is the second largest Palestinian town in Israel and in Israeli terms it is a large settlement whether Jewish or Arab. To my utter amazement I was completely taken aback. I had entered a complete world, shut off and shut out. History had stopped, not stopped but been twisted down a peculiar path and though ever changing was frozen and

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[26] To a great extent, since the Peace Accords and the establishment of the Palestine Authority, the West Bank is looking more and more like Israel proper which is being accomplished by massive Israeli settlement of the West Bank, the building of the Separation Fence, enclosure of Palestinian towns and villages, road building that links the Jewish settlements but shuts out and isolates the Palestinian towns and villages, etc. Presently, as Palestinians under Israeli citizenship are beginning to break their isolation and Palestinians in the West Bank are being ghettoized their situations appear to be reversing. I believe this is the result of Israel's policy for the annexation of the West Bank—to insure as few as possible, if any, Palestinians will be living in the annexed areas, a replay of what happened inside the Green Line.

[27] The population of Umm al-Fahim in 1990 was 28,000; in 2004 it was 39,500. It is now over 40,000. *Israel Statistical Abstract*, Central Bureau of Statistics.

static at the same time. Another kind of occupation had taken place here, different from what was occurring at that time in the Occupied Territories. The occupation of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship was of a different order. Umm al-Fahim was an encapsulated, separated space; a confined and restricted insular world—a ghetto.

Poverty, sewage in the dirt streets, streets without means for water drainage, crumbling buildings, classrooms empty of basic supplies and schools with music or gym facilities practically nonexistent, unfinished cheap cement structures housing extended families who are too poor to complete the building of their homes. Dust, dirt, garbage in the midst of swarming and engaging people. A world turned inward, struggling to deal with everyday matters and survival and cope with the growing unfamiliar problems presented to them--absentee fathers who work outside town and who, if lucky, leave town early in the morning to return home late at night the same day, and if not so lucky they may get to see their families on the weekend or perhaps once a month or worse yet, only on holidays;[28] local businesses and households whose daily routines are interrupted by water shortages and electrical breakdowns; high truancy among the youth; illiteracy; drugs; police surveillance; robbery and murder; arrests; no way to accommodate their growing population within the confines of the space allocated them and building permits jealously handed out to residents by the authorities.

I simply was not prepared for all this ghetto "messiness" by my prior visits to the Occupied Territories. At least there international law in some way pertained and people could wage a struggle for their self-respect before the world, a world they knew and were

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[28] See Henry Rosenfeld emphasizes the dormitory character of Palestinian villages since the male proletarian bread winners must commute outside their places of residence, only returning to their homes to sleep. See also Sami Farah Geraisy, "Arab Youth in Jewish Urban Centers: A Study of Youth From Umm al-Fahim Working in the Tel Aviv Metropolitan Area," (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 1971).

part of; as yet, they had not been so completely fragmented into ghettoized enclaves separated from each other so economic and social activity was going on all around, particularly in the West Bank. But Palestinians living in Israel had been cut off, carved out, shut out of the world around them and at large—a world encapsulated, enclosed, insular, absorbed with and turned in upon itself, an island caught in a time capsule. I felt as if I were a time traveler and that I had gone back to some previous epoch before things like hot and cold running water, paved roads, knowledge that the earth was round and that whole worlds existed outside one's immediate surroundings were known to man. This was accentuated by the actual physical, spatial separateness of the town—a bounded space of internal combustion, of living activity which appeared to move by its own self-generated, self-propelled, inward turned energy.

On one side, the residents of Umm al-Fahim were severed from relatives, from land, homes and businesses they had formerly owned, from places were they had formerly worked, shopped and sold their goods. These people and places until 1967 lay on the other side of the armistice line which defined the eastern frontier of Israel's control. They had lost their social and economic place within what had once been an integrated region in Palestine and the world. From the hills of Umm al-Fahim facing east, you looked upon the forbidden zone; just an afternoon's stroll from where you are standing relatives and friends are engaging in their everyday activities. But these people, after 1949, were residents of an area that was off limits to you and its people were considered to be enemies of the State that you now found yourself living under but set apart from, yet you are to give allegiance to. Then in 1967 the lines are redrawn and this forbidden zone you can travel to, visit, shop. Then the doors close again as new lines are

drawn and now a concrete Separation Fence marks you off from the other side rather than the barbed wire put up in 1949. On the other side of Umm al-Fahim another boundary line within Israel has drawn the *physical horizon* which circumscribes the boundaries of the field of thought and action allowed to these Palestinians. They have been carved out, relegated to special segregated locales and "regions of being" within Israeli social, political, economic, cultural and geographic terrain. And now this story is being repeated in the Occupied Territories.[29]

After almost six decades of ghettoization, quarantined under military rule during the first two, the soul of the community has been undermined while preservation and survival have dominated the inner life of the ghetto. How appropriately her forebears had, unbeknownst in terms of today, named their village, Umm al-Fahim, Mother of Charcoal. Irving Howe's poignant and difficult description about life in the shtetl of Eastern Europe in *World of Our Fathers* was forced into my consciousness as I came to grips with existence in my new home:

> The life of the east European Jews was anything but an idyl. Given the pressures from without and a slow stagnation within, this world was bound to contain large portions of the ignorant, provincial, and even corrupt...Locked into a backward economy, the Jews of eastern Europe continued to act and think primarily in premodern, prebourgeois terms. The struggle for livelihood, unending and rarely successful, occupied much time--it had to...The *shtetl* was not a village...[it] was a town...it sometimes had cobbled streets; it occasionally had imposing structures; it rarely was picturesque...Because the *shtetl* lived in constant expectation of external attack, all the inner tendencies making for disintegration were kept in check. The outer world, the world of the gentiles and the worldlings, meant hostility, sacrilege, brute force...This condition of permanent precariousness gave the east European Jews a conscious sense of being at a distance from history, from history as such and history as a conception of the Western world...It was the word that counted most [It was] a culture of speech (Howe 1976, 8, 10-11; brackets mine).

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[29] "The public in Israel [and the world] does not seem to be sufficiently aware of the economic, social, demographic, and physical implications of the occupation. Over the decades, while the Israelis have engaged in ideological disputes for and against a Greater Israel, a civil occupation has been taking shape, under the auspices of the military administration, with the aim of turning the occupied territories into an inseparable part of Israel. These activities have been going on, slowly but steadily, with the sanction of all Israeli governments, left and right, and with the co-operation of all authorities, military and civil." Elisha Efrat, *The West Bank and Gaza: A Geography of Occupation and Disengagement* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2. Brackets mine.

The Palestinians also have *a culture of speech*. Every night people come together and intimately discuss and argue the meaning of Allah's words in the *Quran*, was life better under British rule or the Israelis, and complicated linguistic problems within the Arabic language.

Although Umm al-Fahim is called a "village" by Jewish Israelis she is anything but a village. She is a town like the East European shtetls were towns, "locked in a backward economy" where the "struggle for livelihood" occupies much time because "it [has] to." The world of words revolves to a great extent around the mundane, issues of everyday necessities--where it is best to buy apples; whose vegetables are better, a neighboring kibbutz or a West Bank farmer near Jenin; at such and such kibbutz one can buy discarded chickens at reduced prices. (According to Kosher law an animal that has lost a limb cannot be eaten. Palestinians are a ready-at-hand customer for these meats.) Almost nightly relatives and friends visit one another in their homes and inevitably conversations come up about such things so I first became proficient at Arabic words that related to these matters. Sometimes these discussions led to a comparison of life under their previous occupier, the British and their present Zionist colonizer. Some elders even refer back to the Turks. When a question like "Did we eat more meat under the British than we do now under the Jews?" emerges during an evening's conversation, people sometimes reminisce about former days or, just as readily, enter into a heated disagreement.

During some of these almost nightly visits the smell of burning charcoal is mixed with the deliciously buttery sweet smell of *kenafah*, a scrumptious Middle Eastern sweet, as it is made over a tin box which is used as an indoor fireplace. Charcoal was an

important if not main source of fuel and is still used in many homes in a rectangular tin firebox called a *kanun* during the cold rainy season. There is no central heating (or air conditioning) in any of the buildings including the newest constructions. A window must always be kept open since the fumes from charcoal are deadly. Everyday during the winter, coffee is brewed over the coals while people hover around the *kanun* to keep warm. When people are in a celebratory mood, the Arab specialty *kenafah*, made of butter, shredded pastry, and cheese smothered in a sweet lemony sauce, is baked over the coals.

"In constant expectation of external attack" all of Umm al-Fahim's "inner tendencies making for disintegration [are] kept in check." When the 1991 Gulf War occurred Umm al-Fahim, instead of being protected--a scud missile could just as easily fall on Umm al-Fahim as any where else--was put under twenty-four hour surveillance. Gas masks were not provided as they were to all Jewish citizens except after much protest; warnings were not broadcast--residents did there own broadcasting through the speaker systems of the mosques; nor were shelters provided. The same was true during the 2006 Lebanon War during which at least half the Israeli causalities were Palestinians living in Galilee. During the first Gulf War, placed as we were under twenty-four hour surveillance, no one could leave or enter Umm al-Fahim without going through a police check point. The Border Police occupied the Palestinian-owned gas station located at the town's entrance and used it as their headquarters. The police set up camp across the main road on top of a hill to better view Umm al-Fahim. Ghassan, my husband, and three other Umm al-Fahim residents were arrested and detained in advance of the Gulf War as a preemptive action. They had not committed any illegal act. But, since they were known

as civil rights activists the authorities wanted them in prison while the war took place. Since Israeli law does not require cause to arrest someone they were under lock and key when the war began.

On the same day my husband was arrested an off-duty Jewish soldier had shot into an open field (adjacent to the main Hadera-Afula thruway) where Palestinian children from Kufr Qara (a neighboring town to Umm al-Fahim also located in the Wadi ‘Ara area) were playing. He shot one of the children in the back. He was arrested and should have been taken to the Ara police station which services crimes committed in this area, but since it is not considered proper for a Jewish Israeli to be detained among Palestinian co-citizens he was taken to Afula some thirty kilometers away. He had to be taken to court the same day as my husband and also to Nazareth. (By Israeli law an arrested person must be taken before a judge within 48 hours. Since their court day fell on the Jewish Sabbath they had to be taken to court in an Arab town.) After my husband was picked up they went to get this man in Afula and then on to Nazareth. Ghassan was handcuffed until his release by the judge. After enduring a barrage of insults and provocations while in the police wagon, Ghassan finally tried to calm the policemen by explaining to them in Hebrew that he had not done anything wrong. This only fueled their fire. They ordered him to shut his mouth; they did not want to hear a “filthy Arab” use their language. When he attempted to speak in Arabic he was again ordered to shut up. This time because they did not want to hear that "filthy language" spoken. The other man, who had recently shot the Palestinian child, came out of the Afula police headquarters laughing and joking with the police officers unhandcuffed and remained so throughout the day.

During the day's ordeal Ghassan was continuously provoked by one or the other of the police officers responsible to guard him while he was at all times handcuffed. One policeman became furious with him after his repeated efforts failed to get Ghassan to say that he hated Jews. The straw that broke the camels back occurred when Ghassan responded that the war (which was into its third day) was difficult for everyone and that he did not wish anyone harm. The policeman went into a rage. He called Ghassan a liar and asserted that he was a better man because, at least, he was honest in saying that he hoped a bomb would fall on Ghassan's house and kill all his family and even destroy his town. But, perhaps, in all fairness, he really is not as hateful towards the Arabs as these comments make him appear, because, as he had made clear to Ghassan while they were driving to Nazareth, he considered Ghassan a "terrorist against the State" and as such, he deserved to be "exterminated."

Regularly one trembles under the flight of, and shudders from the sound caused by, military jets as they wing themselves at terrifying speed above the rooftops of Umm al-Fahim. I could never get used to this experience and one day asked about it and discovered that the residents of Umm al-Fahim are as humbled by it as I, but feel there is nothing they can do about it. I don't know if such is the case, but typically residents expressed their belief that this is an intentional action on the part of the government, to make them feel insecure and unwelcome. The planes fly very low. Intentional or not, unquestionably this is the effect and it adds to the sense that they are living "in constant expectation of external attack."

A maze of narrow streets and alley ways are filled in between with homes on top of homes, people on top of people. Homes are very important, especially to the younger

generation of women, who more and more desire their own independent households separate from in-laws. So, both out of desire and necessity, when possible, houses are built every which way in whatever vacant spot is available to a family. Since Umm al-Fahim was neither an administrative or market center the town lacks the colorful and lively activity of the suq, a central market place for which the Arab countries are so famous. Formerly, residents took their goods to the centers of the Triangle as well as Nazareth and Haifa. To this day Umm al-Fahim still does not have a suq in spite of its size. Instead, innumerable small groceries, attached to homes and often run by the women of the household, reminiscent of the Jewish shtetls, are scattered throughout every neighborhood.

Atop the flat roofed cement homes a tapestry of colorful laundry paints the skyscape of Umm al-Fahim. Daily the women of the household hang bed mats, rugs and blankets out the windows and over the roofs. This is especially important during the rainy season when one must take advantage of every sunny day to open all the closets and hang bedding and clothes out to dry in an attempt to undo the damage caused by the inescapable dampness. Bronchial illnesses, upper respiratory problems, runny noses afflict almost everyone during the cold damp season. Most homes are cheaply built and cannot adequately cope with this climate. Mildew and mold rapidly grows through the

porous whitewashed plaster walls and penetrates the closets, renewing itself even as you wash it away.

Umm al-Fahim is one of the most densely populated Palestinian towns in Israel (or for that matter any town in Israel since Palestinian ghettos have the highest per capita density). Tin structures, dirt roads, sewage in streets, congestion, and general economic underdevelopment and physical decay marks the landscape. Because of the lack of adequate public sanitation, up until recently, the people of Umm al-Fahim, like Gaza, have been plagued with intestinal parasites. So much so that gastroenteritis is called the Umm al-Fahim disease by doctors and health workers in Afula and Hadera where Umm al-Fahim residents must go for health care service. Over the years this disease has claimed hundreds of lives in Umm al-Fahim, especially children, all due to the lack of budgets for the development of public health and sanitation systems.

**Streets in Umm al-Fahim in the 1970s, Conditions still persisting in the 1990s**
**Photos courtesy of Antonia Caccia**

Limits to where housing construction can legally take place are imposed on residents. Structures house as many as five generations and often several young families (the families of sons of the paternal head of household). During my first visit to



**Views of Umm al-Fahim in the 1990s.**

Umm al- Fahim I witnessed the demolition of one home on the outskirts of town deemed illegal by the government. Early in the morning we were woken by several men pounding at our door, calling for my husband to hurry and get dressed and come to one of the homes where the bulldozers were converging. But there was nothing that could be done. By the time we arrived, about 7:30 in the morning, the family had already been ordered out of their home, given just enough time to get themselves up, still in their night clothes, and out. The military personnel with their bulldozers had long since gone. I am told that this is how demolition takes place. Early in the morning, without prior notice, the police simply arrive and order the household to vacate their home. A fait accompli. This family lost everything. The bulldozers tore to pieces their house and destroyed everything within its walls. Afterwards the family members and neighbors tried to salvage whatever they

could out of the ruins, a pot, a pan, whatever small item was still intact and usable. Since I am a foreigner, the group of people who were gathered at the site, pleaded with me to tell the outside world what is happening to them, but at that time, I only felt impotent.

This event hardly warranted any coverage in the press, but I did read a short article in the *Jerusalem Post* of July 5, 1988. The demolition I saw was one of five which took place in the Wadi ʻAra area of Umm al-Fahim during that time. According to this article "the operation was carried out under the supervision of 750 regular and border policemen. It brought to 12 the number of illegal buildings that have been demolished throughout the country in the past month." It was reported that "people feel that the government is starting to use its 'iron fist policy' against Israeli Arabs."[30] Illegal building by Palestinians occurs on plots of land they own, but for one reason or other, by means of zoning rules and land categorization, the state will not grant permission for residents to build, in spite of the fact that the populations within the ghettos are expanding and land is scarce. Majid Al-Haj and Henry Rosenfeld report the following in their co-authored book, *Arab Local Government in Israel*, concerning "illegal" building in Umm al-Fahim:

> 'Illegal' building is a by-product of the absence of zoning plans and local planning committees. Today thousands of homes in the Arab sector are defined as 'illegal structures' built without permit….
>
> An illustration of illegal building in Arab settlements, and the reasons behind it, is the case of Umm al-Fahm, with a population of about 23,000 [1990]. Although the housing situation in Umm al-Fahm is more serious that that in any other Arab settlement, the factors behind illegal building are common to other settlements. The approved building area of the town covers about 1100dunams, and about 2850 families reside within it at an average density of 2.6 families per gross dunam. This area was determined arbitrarily and unilaterally by the planning authorities in the last year of military government, in 1965-1966, without any discretion being granted to local inhabitants or leadership. 'The extent of building outside the approved area, which in 1979 constituted 17 percent of the total structures in the settlement, rose to about 30 percent of the total structures existing in 1986. Over the past seven years, construction outside the approved area has amounted to more than two-thirds of the total construction in the settlement… Building without

[30] The "Iron Fist" was a policy developed by Rabin which instructed soldiers during the Intifada not to kill but to break bones. Hundreds of Palestinians, especially young people, have been permanently crippled by implementation of this policy.

> permit is an expression of the housing needs of a large population which cannot be fulfilled through the framework and processes of the Planning and Building Law in its present form' (see Chernobroda *Al Hamishmar*, 8 May 1986) (Al-Haj and Rosenfeld 1990, 49-50).

In the case of Umm al-Fahim, building on the outskirts of town is particularly restricted. The government has plans for the *Judaization* of the Little Triangle whose population is predominantly Palestinian. According to another *Jerusalem Post* article of February 13, 1992, there are about 140,000 Arabs and 40,000 Jews in this area. The Housing Ministry's *Seven Stars Plan* "originally called for building seven new Jewish communities along the Green Line between Rosh Ha'ayin and Umm al-Fahim, but has since been expanded." A newspaper article covering a press conference held in Jerusalem, to mark the publication of the Nitzotz/a-Sharara Publishing House report entitled, "The Seven Stars: A new settlement plan which aims to Judaize the Arab Triangle and eradicate the Green Line," stated that according to this report "by 1995, 90,000 more Jews will have settled in the new communities in the Triangle, and by the year 2005 there will be 555,000 residents in the area, 393,000 Jews, and 162,000 Arabs." The head of the Kafr Kasim local council, Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur, is reported to have said: "How are we supposed to feel when all around us high-quality 'stars' are being built and our villages are still flooded during the winter, when we lack proper roads, sewage, and even classrooms?" Knesset member, Hashem Mahamid, from Umm al-Fahim, went on to say: "Come to our towns and villages so you can witness the depth of our distress. We lack housing, public buildings and ...We explain time and again that we are not opposed to aliya. Yet, we do not accept the policy of turning it into a tool to evict us from our lands." I suppose it is because such "hardline" statements come out of the mouths of *these Israeli Arabs*, which lead to "violent" strikes, that 750 regular and Border

Policemen were needed to supervise the demolition of five Palestinian homes.[31]

During my stay in Umm al-Fahim I witnessed the first stage of implementation of the "Seven Stars Plan" before the actual construction of new Jewish settlements took place in the area. During that phase, Umm al-Fahim's boundaries were narrowed to accommodate widening of the main road which runs from Hadera to Afula, a necessary step for the creation of new settlements and an increased population in the area. So, obviously, the government could not tolerate "illegal" construction by Umm al-Fahim residents on land these same residents owned on the outskirts of town. All these Jewish settlements will, of course, be connected to each other and the main Jewish centers through a network of paved roads, while Palestinian areas will become further restricted and carved out of discourse with each other and Jewish life.

Homes, small shops and groceries, usually first floor extensions or rooms of homes, and workshops--auto repair, dress-making, butcher--nestle around the main hills and many peaks of Umm al-Fahim and down into her valley. An unkempt cemetery lies on one of her highest peaks. I am again reminded of one of Howe's citations, taken from a portraitist, who described the shtetl as

> a jumble of wooden houses clustered higgledy-piggledy about a market-place..as crowded as a slum...The streets...are as tortuous as a Talmudic argument. They are bent into question marks and folded into parentheses. They run into culs-de-sac like a theory arrested by a fact; they ooze off into lanes, alleys, back yards...[At the center is] the market place, with its shops, booths, tables, stands, butchers' blocks (Howe 1967, 10).

Umm al-Fahim's houses are made of cement rather than wood but otherwise the description fits. There are many local centers. The town is a maze of mazes with twisting streets and alleys radiating out in every direction, "bent into question marks and folded

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[31] All passages in quotes in these paragraphs are from *The Jerusalem Post* of July 5, 1988, p. 2 and February 13, 1992, p. 3.

into parentheses." It was many months before I was able to find my way around, with no street names to help me, and especially in the early days when I knew no Arabic I was often trapped in a cul-de-sac not knowing which way to turn with no way to communicate. Although people tried to help I usually found that their suggestions only led me from one cul-de-sac to another driving me, at times, to just this side of desperation. Whatever remains of her original "picturesque" traditional Arab village structure has been sacrificed to necessity and she is now far from anything that one could call "picturesque". Her population has expanded five hold in less than that many decades while she has been confined within narrow and still narrowing official boundaries. She has no Master Plan so there is no real possibility of implementing some kind of rational and socially-minded use of space. A local committee organized by Abna al-Balad and the Communist Party cooperated with the Municipality during 1979-1984 and devised a plan for street names and house numbers but this was not carried through, though one can still see numbers on some of the houses.[32]

In this maze of streets and alleys traffic jams are typical and this is in spite of the fact that per capita Palestinians own relatively few cars. It was reported in an article in the newspaper *Yediot Ahronot* on October 8, 1994 that Umm al-Fahim had the lowest rate of cars for each 1,000 persons in Israel. In the *haaretz* on August 15, 1999 it was reported by Ahmad Abu-Husein, a resident of Umm al-Fahim, that Palestinians pay higher insurance rates than Jews. The majority of working men commute daily, weekly or monthly to work outside the ghetto. For most Palestinians, unlike their Jewish co-

[32] Master Plans are vital for any municipal planning of space and the efficient use of space to meet the needs of the residents. For decades Umm al-Fahim's residents have been attempting to get a plan approved by the government but among other issues which are blocking approval are the definition of boundaries. The government is insisting on further restrictions while her population and its needs continue to grow.

citizens, their place of residence and place of work do not coincide. Furthermore, most governmental offices and social services do not exist in Umm al-Fahim. Her inhabitants must travel to various Jewish settlements for almost everything. Hospitals, health services, governmental agencies, etc., etc., etc. are outside the ghetto. A broken arm cannot be treated in this municipality of some 30,000 people (1990, now over 40,000);[33] transportation must be found for expectant mothers when her time comes so she can make it to the hospital some thirty minutes away (and babies are legally required to be born in a hospital for purposes of registration). The municipality cannot even deal with identification cards, a necessity in Israel, and inhabitants must travel to Afula, some fifteen kilometers away.[34] The population most in need of public and private transportation has the least. Cars are too expensive for many working families; but everyone who can scrape the money together to purchase a car will do so. Without one life is only that much more difficult. But poor Umm al-Fahim cannot efficiently accommodate these moving devices within her already overtaxed walls and regularly at a busy moment in the *maydan* (piazza or center of town where shops are concentrated, though now shops and businesses also run down along the newly constructed main road into the town), car and passengers are locked into a "cul-de-sac".

Just as the "streets are as tortuous as a Talmudic argument" the cacophony of sounds kept me awake for days before I learned to filter them out. These are not the

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[33] Around 2000 the Histadrut opened a primary care health clinic in the Aghbariyah quarter (in a rented space) which has some basic equipment and a doctor on staff that sees patients and can prescribe medication but the clinic's main purpose is to screen patients and the resident doctor refers them to specialists or for testing in Afula when necessary.

[34] Recently the Local Council hired a person, a woman, to collect the Identification Cards of residents who have issues with their cards and she makes the trip and waits while the staff of the Ministry of Interior's office in Afula processes the cards.

typical sounds of the farms I knew as a youngster growing up in rural America, nor are they the sounds of an urban setting, such as I have heard in New York City for the last twenty years. No, I come to learn instead that these are the sounds of the typical shtetl-ghetto. A woman pounding the dust and dirt out of rugs leaning out a window or over a rooftop; a rooster crowing; a car's exhaust backfiring; a merchant with his donkey shouldering rugs crying out the name of his goods; a vendor luring children to come get his cotton candy and mothers his tasty cakes and sugary sweets; neighbors shouting to each other; a wagon announcing her wares through her clanging pots and pans; the harsh voice of a roving loudspeaker drumming into the citizens' heads when and where some candidate is speaking; the wooden wheels of a cart crackling against the gravelly road, with its cart bouncing along somehow without cracking the eggs that are for sale; a roving fruit and vegetable vendor with a megaphone repeatedly imploring housewives to come and see for themselves; a truck revving up; an explosion; a car honking as it enters a bend in the road; children crying; boys yelling and fighting at soccer; grown men arguing; a donkey baying; a Muadhdhin calling people to prayer; a wedding parade of singing and dancing as the young bride is carried to her new home; a radio blasting; hours of sparring between the bride and the bridegroom's representative each competing to prove that their offering to the marriage bed is the better half of the merger; jackals

fighting each other for refuse in the streets in the middle of the night; wild dogs howling; cats hissing; pigeons cooing endlessly; and who knows what the Jinns are up to.

Each sound, mixed in with multitudinous others, is individual and specific; the composition and variety of this *great noise experience* changes as the day progresses and the night advances, but, noise, yes noise without silences, continues uninterrupted. The new day is signaled at daybreak, when as the sun rises the Muadhdhin beckons you to prayer and the day officially comes to a close at sun down by the same token. Each sound is concrete and particular signaling that someone is doing this or that or that some event is taking place. Irregular, unexpected, spontaneous--these noises, flowing out of the *mess*

Boys playing soccer

Street Venders

Wedding Parade

of personal and interpersonal activities of, what I call, the "incestuous" (that is, turned in on itself) ghetto life, cannot simply be tuned out like most of the busy, regular and

mechanical noises of the city. Although initially I am kept awake throughout the night, until my body learns to adapt to the language of this environment and perceives its world of noise as natural and the given, I also do not want to sleep. The day's symphonic cacophony is followed by an equally mysterious and unmelodious orchestra at night and I don't want to miss a note.

We must not forget that I and my companions have not as yet reached Umm al-Fahim from the Ben-Gurion Airport. We have just passed Hadera and will shortly enter the Wadi ʻAra Valley part of the Little Triangle which is composed almost entirely of Palestinian ghettos. But before we arrive here Ghassan lets me in on how I can determine which settlements are Jewish and which are Palestinian as one passes them from the highway at night as we are now doing. He tells me to look out the window as we approach a couple of settlements nestled in the hills off the side of the road beyond Hadera. I see the outlines of circular-layered streets systematically lined with lights, creating the appearance of a flickering ball. I am told that these are Jewish settlements. Now we see a number of settlements which have only a smattering of lights, some are almost without any illumination. The people of these villages and towns, Palestinians, are nestled in their assignated hills of the same Wadi ʻAra Valley in the dark.

As we drive along I see fruit groves, which are run by kibbutzim, along the sides of the highway. Prior to 1948 this area was part of the extended network of Umm al-Fahim's settlements and agricultural lands. At that time the Palestinian inhabitants were almost entirely, in one way or the other, tied to the land and agricultural production for their livelihoods--as land owners, landlords, small independent farmers, tenant farmers, agricultural proletarians, peasants tied into the musha system (communal lands); or as

middlemen, merchants, peddlers, and traders; and, of course, as artisans of all kinds who manufactured olive oil, baked bread and pastries, made yoghurt and labnah, tailored clothing, wove baskets and rugs, made the traditional Arabic mattresses filled with sheep's wool, and the town's namesakers who made charcoal--all tied into a network of mutually interdependent activities, much like the characters in the Palestinian tale introducing this chapter.

Today almost no one in Umm al-Fahim makes a living from agriculture. Once land has been purchased by the state or acquired by the Jewish National Fund (JNF)[35] it becomes Jewish owned *in perpetuity*, as established by law, and cannot be sold to non-Jews. (This policy is more and more being challenged by Palestinians in the courts and some victories have been made, especially regarding the State lands.) Zionist policy, both state and pre-state, has been to sever Palestinians, as much as possible, from physical

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35 The official name of the Jewish National Fund is Keren Kayemet le'Yisrael which means "the Perpetual Fund for Israel." One of its founding principles is that all property of the fund becomes "the perpetual property of the Jewish people." Under the 1953 Jewish National Fund Law, the memorandum and articles of the JNF (now constituted as a new Israeli company), including this one, were approved by the government. The JNF maintains its status as an independent organization of the Jewish people, but the government established in 1960, the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) whose task is to administer the "Israel lands" referred to by the special legislation passed that year, namely "The Basic Law: Israel Lands states that the ownership in 'Israel lands,' namely lands in Israel of the state, the Development Authority of the JNF, shall not be transferred by sale or in any other manner." By 1950, the state had sold "two million dunams of rural land [acquired through a combination of expropriation and land transfers] that had belonged to Arabs, some of whom were still resident in the state as 'present absentees,' " and these lands "were placed in the hands of an institution whose declared policy was that its land should not be made available to non-Jews...By the late 1950's over 90 per cent of the land in Israel was Israel land." By this time the function of the JNF was no longer land acquisition but land reclamation. With the 1960 statute: "In return for agreeing that its land would be administered by a government body, control over rural land development and afforestation was placed in the hands of a special JNF body, the Land Development Authority." After the 1960 legislation was enacted a formal covenant was signed by the JNF and the government which fixes as policy, that both the administration and development of state lands must be pursued "in accordance with the memorandum and articles of the JNF." Approximately 19 per cent of Israel lands are JNF owed so under the auspices of a governmental agency, the ILA, none of these lands can be leased, at least on a long-term basis, to non-Jews. The remaining state owed lands of Israel lands can be leased to Arabs and although, at times, land is leased to Arabs, a variety of "institutional constraints of the land-lease system restrict the extent of land leased to Arabs." For more details see David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of Arabs in Israel* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), specifically the chapter entitled "Control of Land."

connection to the land whether as owner-farmers, as discussed in chapter 2, or as agricultural proletarians.[36] Generally such a policy is more or less strictly enforced depending on socio-economic exigencies and in the end has not been too successful because, when it comes to making money or doing the dirty work, owners of businesses, workshops and agricultural kibbutzim members have often preferred to hire cheap Palestinian labor over employing Jewish workers or doing the work themselves. Neither through the public or state encouragement of such policies, nor legal enactment, have many kibbutzim, for instance, been persuaded from the hiring of Palestinian labor to build their farms and work their fields.

Initially, after the Little Triangle's annexation to Israel, the government rigorously restricted inhabitants to their towns and villages; most residents became propertyless and without work, at times serving as day-laborers for Israeli kibbutzim, Jewish owned workshops and the construction industry. Eventually a system was developed whereby the Military Governor would authorize permits to sub-contractors so that truck loads of men, women and children of the Little Triangle could build and work kibbutz farms, which are located on the lands once owned by the families of these Palestinian agricultural workers. In the 1979 photo below Umm al-Fahim workers, whose families are from the destroyed village of Ghabiyya al-Tahta, are seen working at Kibbutz Mishmar ha-Emeq, which is built on the ruins of their former homes. In our drive from the airport we have just passed the road that leads to one such kibbutz farm, the Mezer Kibbutz, as we continue en route to Umm al-Fahim after entering the Little Triangle.

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[36] The class structure of Israeli society along with the stratified composition of its working class, which are features characteristic of all capitalist societies, has added to these ordinary distinctions, prohibition of Palestinian citizens from certain occupations, positions in the government, and industries, especially in what are considered sensitive security areas.



**Workers whose families lived in Ghabiyya al-Tahta, one of the destroyed villages, working at Kibbutz Ha-Emek.**

My husband, Ghassan, during the school summer breaks, began joining these trucks in 1960 at the age of ten when military rule was still in place to harvest chick peas. A few Palestinian residents made some money out of this, since the Jewish bosses paid the sub-contractors, who assembled and transported the work crews, in one payment. It was up to the sub-contractor to divide the wages among all the workers and take a portion for himself. At times, heads of families asked these sub-contractors to give the wages of their family members, especially women and children, directly to them, so some workers saw more or less from their efforts. In any case, given the overall scarcity of resources of every kind, each family member's wages, from whatever source, went into a common household fund.

Historically, in this part of the world, villages were established on hillsides for protection, adjacent to arable land and water. The amalgam of hills to which Umm al-Fahim's present boundaries are limited lies in the western extremity of the center fold of the three-fold Samarian mountain range, known as Samirah in Arabic. This part of the Samarian hills is called Iron in Hebrew, just as the Wadi 'Ara Valley (named by its Arabic inhabitants after the 'Ara stream which flows through this valley), is called the Iron Valley. We have been presently passing through here on our way to Umm al-Fahim,

once we passed Hadera. Umm al-Fahim's pre-state network of settlements and agricultural lands is situated where four geographical areas converge--the Wadi 'Ara Valley to the west; the edge of the Samirah hills, where the original town was built, to the southeast; the Jezreel Valley, called Marj ibn Amir in Arabic, to the northeast; and the Carmel Mountains to the northwest. The area defined by Haifa to the north, what are now Afula and Hadera to the east and west, and Jenin in the West Bank to the south were all linked to what was a part of Umm al-Fahim's domain.[37]

According to the research conducted by Caccia, Fawzi and Davis in preparation for Ms Caccia's documentary film about Umm al-Fahim, *On Our Land*:

> It is likely that the region had become largely depopulated in the centuries preceding the Arab settlement, for the units of land owned and cultivated by the villagers of Wadi 'Ara were among the largest in Palestine. Umm al-Fahim controlled a larger area of land than any other Wadi 'Ara village: it extended its control and ownership of land 13 km to the east, where it owned extensive tracts of land in the Esdraelon Valley, 8 km to the north, 6 km to the west, and 1 km to the south. Umm al-Fahim was the largest and oldest village in the Wadi 'Ara region. It is spread over three main hilltops overlooking the Wadi 'Ara Valley and historically controlled the Wadi 'Ara highway which is now the Hadera-Afula road. This highway served as the main link for transport and trade connecting the Mediterranean and Mesopotamia and the Far East until the opening of the Suez Canal and was called since ancient times the Royal Highway.[38]

Apparently Umm al-Fahim was mentioned in 1265 by the Muslim historian El-Makrizi, but I did not verify this.

Since Umm al-Fahim was primarily residential with agricultural land surrounding the residential core, as was typical of Middle Eastern villages and towns, before 1949 Umm al-Fahim did not have a suq, governmental offices, cultural centers, or headquarters

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[37] The government has converted all regions and place names to what is projected back to be their authentic Biblical Hebrew names. Obviously, this has meant that all the existing Arabic names had to be changed to Hebrew; and the names of the Arab localities have been Hebraized, like Shefar-A'm, which in the Arabic is Shifaamr.

[38] Antonia Caccia, Ghassan Fawzi and Uri Davis, who I refer to as C,F,D, have generously made their research materials, photos and interviews available for use in this dissertation. These materials are extensively used in the Appendices. Some of the pictures in this chapter were taken by Ms Caccia.

for political parties.[39] Lajun was the center of productive and social life of Umm al-Fahim's residents. Families had some orchards and gardens but Lajun, located not in the mountains but in the fertile plain of the Jezreel Valley, is where people had their main residences, businesses, commercial agricultural lands, schools, mosques, factories, post office, etc. Lajun's lands were confiscated and the town was destroyed. The town was annexed to the Megiddo Kibbutz. The homes of Lajun were blown up in 1949 to prevent the possible return of her inhabitants but the major buildings were left standing so that they could be used by the Megiddo Kibbutz; the mosque became a carpentry shop, the clinic and landlord homes became warehouses. Since Lajun was destroyed residents of Umm al-Fahim were particularly reduced to poverty and left without basic facilities.

People believe Umm al-Fahim was settled some 400 years ago. According to two Israeli authors, Efraim Orni and Elisha Efrat, "Most of the Arab villages are of ancient origin. The continuity of settlement through the ages is shown by the fact that Arabic names of present-day hill villages differ but little from the Hebrew names known from the Bible or the Talmud."[40] The *Hebrew Bible*, though, is derived from reconstructions of Hebrew from ancient and more recent transliterations from other languages, as well as reconstructions or transliterations of ancient Hebrew texts when Hebrew was no longer a spoken language, so that the *Hebrew Bible* which has come down to us has absorbed

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[39] Since Shefar-A'm, a Palestinian town in the Galilee, was already a municipality before Israel was established the Haifa University sociologist, Majid Al-Haj, was able to make use of his town's existing historical records and documents in the writing of, *Social Change and Family Processes: Arab Communities in Shefar-A'm* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

[40] Efraim Orni and Elisha Efrat, *Geography of Israel* (Jerusalem: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1971), 286. A part of the Zionist nation building narrative has been to claim historical territorial continuity of the Jewish nation with the land. This was seen in the thesis put forward by Ben-Gurion and a comrade, Yitzhak Ben Zvi, an ethnologist and Israel's first President, in 1918 in their co-authored book, *Eretz-Israel in the Past and in the Present*, that was meant to substantiate the Jewish people's right to Palestine (in their view Eretz-Israel) as discussed in chapter 3.

within it the influences of such Semitic languages as Aramaic and Arabic and others.[41] Therefore, it is difficult to authoritatively say which language is influencing or expressing the other. But, as Orni and Efrat say, Hebrew and Arabic place names in this part of the world do often differ little, which does demonstrate that these peoples, whether Hebrew or Arabic speaking, have shared a common piece of the earth and linguistic history.

Legend has it that two brothers, Mahmoud and Jabar, probably from Hebron, as well as two other unrelated men possibly from Shifaamr, came to Umm al-Fahim and settled there, bringing whatever family and belongings they had. It is believed that the first names of these four men are the origins of the four *hamula*s. Another story similar to this one is told by family elders from Kufr Qara, which is a neighboring town to Umm al-Fahim and is recorded by Michael Gorkin in his book, *Days of Honey, Days of Onion: The story of a Palestinian Family in Israel*. Typically, and not only in the Middle East but much of the world, parts of families or groups of families, as a community grew too large to be supported by the resources available, would split off and settle elsewhere, near a water source with agricultural and pasture land. Situated in a fertile and irrigated area, with the mountains as protection, Umm al-Fahim prospered and grew, both by natural increase and migration of families into her villages. Families split off and formed neighboring villages or expanded into existing ones such as Lajun which became even larger and more developed than her parent. At least here in this rich fertile valley Israel did not have to turn a desert into a paradise, the paradise was already present. The fertility of the land, abundant water sources, central location, proximity to the Occupied

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41 See "Biblical Literature" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* for an historical account of the texts of the *Bible* or Kamal Salibi's interesting and curious book, *Bible Came From Arabia* (London: J. Cape, 1985) in which he discusses how the *Bible* was written and the difficulties involved in interpreting it as an historical geographer.

Territories, alongside the roadway that links the region—these are among the factors hat account for the severity of the land expropriation that Umm al-Fahim suffered and still continues to endure.

The following photos were taken in Umm al-Fahim on Land Day in 1990. 1976 expropriations of land in the Galilee led to an organized demonstration during which the police killed six demonstrators. This has become an annual point for protest and struggle and is known as Land Day.

With most of Umm al-Fahim's land confiscated and pre-1948 Palestinian civil society destroyed, virtually overnight residents were turned into a captive reserve army of labor for Jewish production. At any time, by way of a permit, the military governors could make however many workers were needed active and likewise, when not needed latent or floating; others became part of a permanent surplus population and others still were overtime lumpenized, becoming petty criminals, and after removal of military governance drug dealers and addicts.[42] As I discussed in chapter 1, ghettoization makes it easy to

[42] Umm al-Fahim, since1967, when the military government was removed, has in some ways slowly begun to look more like the African-American ghettos. For instance, drugs and crime are now a part of everyday life and affecting many families and the police are often hand in glove with the traffickers. Drugs have become a good replacement for military controls and serves well to keep the ghetto population in a

systematically call forth portions of a population into active duty as laborers for *our* society when needed discharging them back into the restricted boundaries of their ghettos when done with them; and during dry spells of employment the confines of the ghetto secures *us* from *them* and keeps them out of *our* society.

Although it is not possible for most people to make a living from agriculture, today, wherever possible, families maintain fruit trees and plant flowers around their homes and some people still have small orchards of olive trees located down on the hills surrounding the residential area of the town. Around our home we have grape vines, orange, lemon, grapefruit, and plum trees, and a sweet bright orangey fruit called iskidinya, something like a juicy apricot but sweeter, a fruit I have only seen in this part of the world. Sabir, which means patience, a large spindly cactus, grows haphazardly all around and bears a prickly but succulent sweet fruit, which I have recently seen on fruit stands in New York City, bearing the name prickly pear.

A native herb, zatar, a form of thyme, is a Palestinian favorite which inhabitants get by picking it in the wild. The government has declared this plant a protected species. Off and on the government decides to crack down on Palestinian residents who pick zatar. In an *Yidiot Ahronot* article of March 22, 1996, entitled "One Ton of Illegal Zatar was Destroyed," it reads:

> The supervisors of the government agency Preservation of Nature captured three tons of zatar that

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*fixed place* and *to cause them to sink; to subside*. "The social mechanisms now deployed to manage the large numbers of marginalized people in [the United States] possess a spatial component which has been relatively effective. First, the sheer scope of segregation in the cities and in the suburbs, means that the most disadvantaged groups are also the most isolated…The lack of contact between separate social groups makes it easier for the state to manage discontent by spatially and selectively deploying its agents and institutional mechanisms of social control. Through the neglect of root causes, social pathology in these areas turns inward, and murder, drug addiction, and family problems become characteristic of life in economically deprived areas, as studies on the emotional impact of unemployment now show." M. Gottdiener, *The Social Production of Urban Space* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 278-79.

> were cut illegally by six women from the Triangle villages in the area of North Sharon Valley. Zatar is a protected spice plant. It was confiscated and destroyed. A complaint was initiated by the police against the women and the man who operated with them. In the last two weeks about thirty complaints were initiated against zatar collectors in the area of North Sharon.

Why zatar is considered an endangered species in need of protection is curious. It grows in abundance and has been part of the region's vegetation for millenniums, never threatened by extinction because inhabitants consume it as part of their regular diet. Nor do Palestinians presently pick it from the roots, but cut the tops off which grow back like a weed. It appears to have more to do with a policy intended to alienate Palestinians from any relationship to the land and their culture, as well as to insure that this population is completely dependent for its consumption on Israeli production. An Israeli version of zatar is produced. It reminds me of the Spanish colonists in the Americas who destroyed the articles and utensils of everyday life of the indigenous population, in an attempt to *tajreed*, to disrobe, denude, disarm them of their cultural and historical identity. Since through the artifacts and utensils people use they express their culture and beliefs in the activities of their everyday lives, the Spanish colonizers knew that the way to subordinate the indigenous people to the colonial power was to remove all artifacts and signifiers of their culture, beliefs and history. They also unburdened them of their names, by assigning them Christian names, often in bloc baptismal naming ceremonies, attaching, for instance, to all males, Jose, and to all females, Maria.

Some of the foods that made up the Palestinian cuisine are no longer available. Some of these foods are not marketed nor can Palestinians produce them since they are now for the most part without land and without access to the vegetation in the world around them. Many young people have never tasted various local vegetables and herbs nor do they know the names of a great deal of their indigenous vegetation. I had the treat

of participating in a family expedition, organized by a relative who has made it his business to know about the indigenous vegetation. We spent a day in abandoned fields, in the hills, along streams searching for and picking a wide variety of plants. Through the help of older women, who still know what can be eaten as vegetables, herbs and salad ingredients, we tasted, and took home to cook, a variety of succulent and tasty morsels. Fortunately for us, on that day, we did not come across any of the Preservation of Nature personnel or we may all have been put in jail. The first two of the following pictures are of a family gathering at one of my sister-in-laws in Kfar Qara during which we are grinding the dried zatar that had been picked in the fields surrounding a sister-in-law's home. In the first picture I have the honors of grinding and a bowl filled with ground zatar can be seen in the second photo. In the last picture you see my mother-in-law making a special bread, called *manaqish*, stuffed with zatar; you can also see how in cooking she makes use of Western and Middle Eastern methods and appliances as is now typical throughout the kitchens of Umm al-Fahim and other Palestinian ghettos.

Although the government has the resources to insure the "preservation" of zatar, which grows like a weed, preservation of cultural and historical artifacts, if they should be located in Palestinian areas, do not deserve protection. Governmental programs to preserve the structure of the traditional towns and villages, historic landmarks or architecture are not incorporated into their projects. I have seen how historical remains in Acre and Jisryisi, for instance, are simply left to decay. Umm al-Fahim is not rich in such

artifacts, but many other Palestinian ghettos are, including such things as the remains of Roman and Phoenician structures and aqueducts. Ghetto inhabitants, besides being overwhelmed by innumerable everyday matters and problems, are simply without funds to preserve such artifacts. Furthermore, the lack of master plans makes it next to impossible to organize any historical or social-minded planning. Palestinian ghettos are already bursting at their seams, unable to suitably accommodate their growing populations, their cars and their needs. The three most pressing issues residents raised to me that they wanted to see something done about were public sanitation (the sewage problem in particular), roads and internal transportation, and, upon which all these depend, the government's approval of a Master Plan.

The Israeli government took some time in granting Um al-Fahim a local council, but in 1960, during military rule, a local council was appointed for a five-year period. Like the establishment of *hamula heads*, this five-year period of direct control *placed* the local council *firmly in a position* and therefore shaped the character, structure and functioning of the town's local government which has had lasting affects on overall social and political developments in Umm al-Fahim. After years of petitioning the government, Umm al-Fahim was finally granted municipality status, though efforts to acquire a fully developed Master Plan have as yet failed.[43] Even though initially Umm al-Fahim was not a cultural or political center important political formations have emerged within this ghetto. During military occupation Umm al-Fahim residents acquired the reputation for being deviant since at times residents clashed with the Military Governor. Since 1949 Umm al-Fahim has been a

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[43] See David A. Wesley, *State Practices and Zionist Images: Shaping Economic Development in Arab Towns in Israel*, for an excellent description of the many means and methods that the government employs to delay and thwart the development of a Master Plan and its implementation for an Arab locale. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), especially 34-37.

stronghold of the Communist Party.[44] Umm al-Fahim became the locus of both a secular national movement, Abna al-Balad (Sons of the Village), an activist organization which developed a secular program and analysis of Israel and Palestinians in Israel, and an intellectual center for the Islamic Movement, where the college Adaawa (Preaching College or the Principles of Religion College) was founded in 1988-89. In the 1990s a group of democrats consisting of the former Rakah (Communist Party), Abna al-Balad, Progressive List, and some Islamists regrouped to form a new Arab List, the Democratic National Alliance. In 1996 they held an important convention in Umm al-Fahim where, among other issues and tasks, they consolidated plans to run with the Democratic Front in the 1996 elections. This alliance has allowed the Palestinian secular democratic movement to gain seats in the Knesset.

In 1989 the fundamentalist Islamic Movement swept the local mayoral elections in Umm al-Fahim after twelve years of secular leadership under the Communist Party led Democratic Front. This reflected a growing religious revival, dissatisfaction with the Democratic Front's performance during its twelve years in office, and perhaps most importantly the Islamic Movement's ability to ally pro-government forces (police, collaborators, officially recognized religious leaders) and those social forces that represent the deeper underlying socio-economic changes as Umm al-Fahim becomes ever more a part of the general capitalist development even as she remains a ghetto.

The development of the Islamic Movement in Israel owes much to the Israeli and Jordanian governments, who collaborated to establish an Islamic University in al-Khalil (Hebron), headed by Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Ja'bari a prominent Palestinian anti-PLO

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[44] The Communist Party is legal in Israel and has Knesset members; it's members are both Jewish and Palestinian.

leader who served as a minister in the Jordanian government. After the 1948 War he favored annexation of the West Bank to Jordan and actively fought against the development of independent Palestinian governance in Gaza and the West Bank. He was a known friend of Israel. On the other side of the Green Line inside Israel, a decade before the peace accord with Egypt, the Israelis brought Shaykh Abd al-Sami', an Egyptian religious scholar ('alim) and graduate of al-Azhar, the oldest and most prestigious Islamic university, to Israel. Shaykh Abd al-Sami' preached anti-national ideology, along with anti-Jewish rhetoric, but was free to travel throughout all Palestinian Israeli towns and to be involved directly in organizing youth to his doctrines. Young people from the Shaykh's organization and graduates of Al-Khalil Islamic University were the founders of the Islamic Movement in Israel. He lived in Umm al-Fahim for a time, as he did in other Palestinian ghettos, and was very successful in organizing a group around his teachings. Umm al-Fahim became the headquarters for the Islamic Movement.

During this time attacks began against progressive secular Palestinians, like Abna al-Balad and Communist Party members and supporters. The Communist Community Club was burned; a filming crew of Antonia Caccia was attacked and its vehicle was burnt; women and volunteers who came from Europe to help the community were regularly harassed. The Camp of Voluntary Work, which brought together Palestinians from Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Jewish Israelis, and international volunteers, was repeatedly attacked. Umm al-Fahim's electrical power was shut down by the zealous and volunteers who tried to turn it on were shot at. During the same period the Palestinian Red Cross offices and library were burnt in Gaza by Fundamentalists. In the 1980s they

were defending the Afghan Mujahidin. Throughout the Israeli government never felt the need to use its apparatus to inquire, stop, or arrest any of the perpetrators.

What is evident is that there has been, particularly with the introduction of Shaykh Abd al-Sami', an alliance between the Islamic Movement and the Israeli powers-that-be against the secular democratic Palestinian forces. This has occurred in spite of the rhetoric of the Islamic Movement that publicly writes and speaks about pushing all the Jews into the sea. It is not uncommon, and it is known by Palestinians, for members of the Islamic Movement or families of these members to work for the Israeli government as policemen, collaborators, and even for the notorious Border Police. The father of the 1989 newly elected mayor, Shaykh Ra'id, was a policeman and after the 1967 occupation of the territories he was appointed as an assistant to the officer responsible for the Jenin area. Two of his brothers and cousins serve in the police in Wadi 'Ara. When the Islamic Movement gained the local council, for the first time in decades Israeli government officials felt comfortable to enter Umm al-Fahim and they came to celebrate the election of the new Islamic Movement mayor. The Minister of Interior (this Ministry, up until recently, has been held by the National Religious Party) and the new mayor embraced on a public platform and immediately, to the joy of both these parties, the mayor decreed the separation of girls and boys in Umm al-Fahim's public schools. Many residents, both students and parents, protested this action and circulated a petition.

We will soon be nearing the cluster of hills which makes up Umm al-Fahim. Her entrance road is off to the right of the main highway, Route 65, which directly connects Hadera to Afula. At the time we are taking this trip in the 1990s there are no road signs indicating along the way in what direction Umm al-Fahim is located or how many

kilometers until you come to her. The only sign is immediately by her entrance written in Hebrew, Arabic and English.[45] The State maintains strict planning of the road system, which, besides being a system for the transport of humans and goods, is of utmost strategic importance. It also serves as an easy mechanism to divide Palestinian localities from each other and Palestinians from Jewish residents. Roads connect Jewish settlements with each other and the major cities, skirting around Palestinian ghettos, which are not connected to other towns. Sometimes Palestinian towns and villages are split to build roads, further dividing families and inhabitants, while providing no readily available means to travel between these residential areas. The road system as it has been constructed separates Umm al-Fahim from all her surrounding neighboring Palestinian villages and towns and the "unrecognized" villages do not even have paved roads. In general, roads leading into the ghettos are poorly constructed, often dirt, and inadequately lit. If the conditions of the entrance roads are poor, what precedes one into town is usually even worse.

From certain positions within Umm al-Fahim's cluster of hills one can see a water tank atop the locally famous neighboring mountain, Jabal Iskander (Mount Alexander). This tank supplies water to some parts of Umm al-Fahim. Some residents say Alexander the Great stopped here to rest along his travels on the Royal Highway. The Royal Highway, referred to by Orin and Efrat in *Geography of Israel* as Via Maris which means Sea Road, was the forerunner of this main Hadera-Afula artery of Israel, a segment of the important ancient trade route between the Mediterranean and Mesopotamia and the Far

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[45] Recently a road sign on the main road has been placed indicating Umm al-Fahim. Still most road signs are in Hebrew and English, even though Israel is legally required to use both Hebrew and Arabic; more and more though signs and advertisements, etc. are being written in Arabic, alongside the Hebrew and English.

East mentioned above. While some inhabitants believe that Alexander the Great stood upon this mountain while in Palestine, others believe a Saint Alexander took refuge upon her heights where he meditated. He is apparently mentioned in the *Quran* and referred to as having two horns. It is said that either Alexander came to this mountain or that he went to China and his soul came to this mountain. The legends vary. According to Umm al-Fahim's Sufi people, Saint Alexander has the capacity to heal, help people in need, take revenge upon one's enemy and bring rain. When it did not rain for a long time in the winter, I am told, people used to go to Iskander's tomb, located at the top of this mountain, and chant "Lord Iskander/ we beg you/ that the rain will fall upon you." Now that agriculture plays almost no role in people's everyday life, praying for rain does not have much meaning any more. There are still some locals who make pilgrimages to his tomb upon which they paint henna, burn candles, and pray. The *Quran* is placed on an altar inside the tomb for worshippers to use. For many years one Sufi, a Sheik Hailel, lived atop this mountain and cared for the tomb. He was said to have known the language of the Jinns (spirits of the other world) and could therefore converse with them. He cultivated the land, where ancient carob trees still grow, repaired the tomb and generally serviced the place. This was very difficult after the transfer of the Little Triangle to Israel since Jabal Iskander falls along the border between the West Bank and Israel and was therefore placed off limits and under surveillance by the Border Police. The Border Police are a specially trained unit initially established to police the borders, particularly to deal with "infiltrators", typically Palestinian refugees who were trying to return to their homes, and Palestinian "smugglers", typically individuals who brought provisions to their families and relatives on the other side of the Green Line. Gradually the Border Police

have been used more and more to deal with internal security, criminal and political matters and often used in relation to Palestinian citizens, like in the demolition of homes discussed above. In spite of the Border Police, not only did our Darweish, as he was called, continue to serve Iskander's tomb, but locals met “smugglers” here to exchange much needed goods and money and discuss family matters between relatives of the Little Triangle area and the West Bank.

During the 1936-39 Arab Rebellion against British colonialism, the British wanted to set up camp atop Jabal Iskander, an ideal location for military surveillance of the entire region. It is said that the British army could not drive their vehicles up to the mountain's top so they first set up camps in the foothills, where now a print shop, a school and the Kupat Hoalim (Health Clinic) in the Mahamid quarter are located; camels and donkeys carried their things up to the peak. Palestinian anti-colonialists were hidden in the surrounding hills and mountains; a battle between the rebels and the British took place. My mother-in-law’s mother’s father, Abu Dura, from Sili near Jenin in what is now the West Bank, was one of the leaders. The British won that battle as well as the overall colonialist war. While occupying Jabal Iskander the British are said to have desecrated the holy tomb enraging Iskander who, in his anger, contorted their faces and bodies and turned their cooking pots and tents upside-down. Whatever the truth of these stories about Iskander may be, the battle between the British and the Palestinian rebels did take place, the British military did occupy it, the tomb does exist, and this mountain and its peak is significant in the hearts and memories of her native residents and caretakers.

In the winter of 1992, Iskander's residence once again became the center of

excitement, when it was covered in snow for a couple of days. The last snow storm was in 1950 so the majority of residents, being under forty years of age, had never seen snow.[46] Every one took to the streets and ascended the hills to Jabal Iskander's peak in sandals and slippers. Without alcohol people were drunk with joy, it was a festivity of festivities. Cars completely blocked the streets as you approached Jabal Iskander. The town below became a ghost town. Arabic snowmen were everywhere--sphinxes sat atop cars and pashas greeted you as you entered a friend's yard. Recently the Municipality has turned Jabal Iskander's plateau into a park, so Saint Alexander finds his tomb, along with

the water tank, embraced within a park. Though this park is not in the center of town and not readily accessible, at least now, Umm al-Fahim can boast that she has a park.

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[46] I was told by a geographer friend that after a war, because bombing pollutes the immediate environment of the atmosphere above the region affected and thereby lowers the temperature, it is typical to have climatic changes for a few years after such an event. This is the first winter after the Gulf War, and so, as this geographer informs me, given the colder skies, it is not at all strange that snow should fall. The last time it snowed in Umm al-Fahim was in 1950, the first winter after the 1948 War which ended in 1949.

In Israeli standards Umm al-Fahim is a large town and was finally, as mentioned earlier, granted municipality status in 1985, "after a protracted struggle and considerable pressuring by the National Committee of Arab Local Authorities" (Al-Haj and Rosenfeld 1990, 34). Such status is supposedly determined by quite clearly defined objective criteria, mainly population size, but such criteria are never clear when a Palestinian population is at issue. Eget buses, which are owned by the Histadrut, run all day and evening just about everywhere, traveling into each tiny Jewish hamlet throughout Israel. Besides cars, buses are the main mode of transportation within and between locales. But bus lines do not take you to or from Umm al-Fahim's center, the *maydan*, so one must take private transportation or hitch hike to get to the main road to get a bus and from the main road to get into town. No public internal transportation exists either. There are privately owned taxis that run throughout the day going to and from Tel Aviv, Hadera and Afula; and taxis can be hired to get around town but this is quite costly. After years of struggle the Eget bus company finally agreed to supply a bus in town at 6:30 AM on work days to take workers to Tel Aviv and to return them home in the evening.

Even those among my Israeli friends who are socially aware don't realize most of the realities that Palestinians deal with in their daily lives. They often express astonishment when they learn that no buses go into Umm al-Fahim, or that I am required to go to some special location in the middle of nowhere to receive a package sent to me in the post, and will have to pay its original cost and a percentage over this if I am to take it home (because of this I sometimes had to send things back). In the Arabic paper, *Fasl al-Maqal*, January 7, 1998, there was an article about a wholesale coffee maker from Shifaarm who did not receive his delivery of coffee. Neither the Israeli government's

postal service nor UPS would deliver my parcels to Umm al-Fahim for security reasons. The policy of separate and distinct lives for Jews and non-Jews has been so effective that for the most part Jewish Israelis assume that what they take for granted is more or less available to Palestinians as well.

During my Fulbright tenure, 1990-91, I made regular trips to and from Haifa via the bus. I had chosen Haifa University as my affiliate school while a recipient of a Fulbright Grant for dissertation study abroad, so besides having desk space, I had access to the university's spectacular library. By car this is about a 30 to 40 minute drive from Umm al-Fahim, but by bus it can take as much as 3 1/2 hours. In the course of this trip you will travel through one small Jewish hamlet after another. Every day these buses take long detours off and on the main road to pick up and drop off people. Sometimes they make this trip for only one or two people. David Wesley aptly describes the situation in the Galilee in the following passage. What he describes is also true of the Little Triangle though the number of Jewish towns and villages are not as numerous here.

> Between 1975 and 1987, forty-four Jewish rural settlements were established [as part of the Judaization of the Galilee planned by the Jewish Agency] in the area delineated by Muvhar's [an official of the Jewish Agency] line, thirty-one of them in the four-year period from 1979 to 1982. The settlements are dispersed throughout the area, with most falling into four major clusters.
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> Twenty-three of the forty-four settlements had a population of under two hundred in 1995. Three of these were down to zero population at that time, while the average population of the next twenty was 139 (CBS 1998b). Though dispersed and small, the settlements are connected to the power, water, and telephone grids; they have good access roads, and their children are regularly bussed to school (Wesley 2006, 31).

Busses run into all these tiny hamlets, but when I finally reach the Umm al-Fahim stop I am dropped off at her foothills along the side of the road. Over 40,000 people live in this cluster of hills known as Umm al-Fahim, but they do not warrant even one bus stop in town. When coming to or going from Umm al-Fahim you must make your way up or down the main road. To make your ascent into her bosom, to the *maydan*, entails at least

a forty minute walk. At night it is pitch dark. If it’s raining the streets are slippery and muddy. And besides it's uphill all the way with no stairways like Haifa.

The lack of transportation services only contributes to the ghetto's isolation and separation from Israeli society at large. It makes interpersonal relations, even for those that desire to break down the separation, extremely difficult, and so perpetuates Jews and Palestinians as separate and distinct communities. To visit a friend in a Palestinian town demands a day’s outing, a car, or a lengthy and not very pleasant trip on public transportation involving usually at least two buses and a taxi and possibly hitch hiking. Many buses pass by Umm al-Fahim throughout the day and evening, but only a few of these are scheduled to pick up or drop people off. If you miss the last bus to or from Umm al-Fahim you must hitch hike. When returning from Haifa, I tried my best to avoid such situations; this meant leaving the university mid-afternoon. If I missed one connection I would be in trouble and sometimes I needed to make as many as five connections depending on the time of day I actually headed for home. Once or twice a soldier or bus terminal attendant would intervene for me if I happened to miss the last bus from Afula that was scheduled to stop at Umm al-Fahim's entrance road. They would request the driver of a bus, which would pass by Umm al-Fahim’s entrance road, to make an exception for me and let me off. I knew from experience that this was only possible because I am an American, and it only happened when I was the only passenger going to Umm al-Fahim, unaccompanied by any Palestinians, who had also missed the last bus home. And so at these times disaster was diverted.

Many times when returning home from Haifa, I was able to get to the Megiddo junction. At this junction there is a bus stop, so, if all goes well, either a taxi or bus will

go by, en route from Afula to Hadera, and thus enable me to get a ride home. On one occasion a Palestinian construction worker, on his way home to Musmus from a day's work in Afula, was also looking for a ride at this same junction. From where we were standing you arrive at Musmus shortly before you reach Umm al-Fahim. Musmus, though a small village, is famous because it is the birth place of one of Palestine's renowned contemporary poets, Rashid Husain, who died in New York City in 1977.[47] The two of us are standing in the foothills of the remains of the walled city-state of Megiddo, built on a hill plateau which provides a panorama view of the beautiful and fertile Jezreel Valley (in Arabic, Marj Ibn Amir, The Plain of the Son of Amir, a Islamic leader who is believed to have been the first to come to Palestine and introduce Islam to the native population). Megiddo was a site of many battles and much bloodshed in ancient times. This is the same Megiddo, or Armageddon, where, according to *Revelations* the final conflict between good and evil will take place. Here I find myself, along with my accidental traveling companion from Musmus, standing directly opposite a prison housing many Intifada fighters. The prison on the Megiddo site was first constructed by the British during the Arab uprisings of the 1930s and was taken over by the Israeli military to house Palestinian "enemies of the state". The site became another battle ground in 2005, this time between the Israel Prison Service and the Israel Antiquities Authority (IAA), after it was discovered that the prisoners are housed on an early Roman fortress and army camp

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47 "[Rashid Husain (1936-1977)] first worked as a schoolteacher, but was dismissed by the Israelis for his political beliefs. An organizer of the Al-Ard party in Israel, which was founded in 1958 and later banned, he spent many years in Israeli prisons. He became editor of the Arab journal *Al-Fafr* (*The Dawn*), which was banned in 1962. He translated selections from Hayyim Bialek's poetry from Hebrew into Arabic and translated Palestinian folk songs into Hebrew. After the June 1967 war, he chose exile and lived in poverty in New York City, dying in a fire in his apartment. Husain has three collections, the last of which, *I Am the Land, Don't Deprive Me of Rain*, is his best known. His poetry is mainly concerned with the predicament of the Palestinians under siege both in Israel and in the Diaspora." Salma Khadra Jayyusi, ed., *Modern Arabic Poetry: An Anthology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 269.

that held within its premises, among many other artifacts, a Christian prayer hall with a mosaic floor from the third century CE. The IAA won and the site was excavated. The archeologists confirm the importance of this site to antiquity and history since it "is situated at the meeting point of three main landscape units: the Samarian Hills to the south and the southwest, the Jezreel Valley in the southeast and the Menashe Heights to the west and northwest. This topographic constellation contributed to the centrality of the site throughout history." We are standing waiting for a ride on the contemporary version of the ancient King or Royal Highway or the Via Maris. The archeologists say that El Lajjun was once a

> fortified capital of a district on the main road from Damascus to Cairo and was referred to as a city in the tenth-century-CE sources… Crusader sources of the eleventh and twelfth centuries CE mentioned the building of a church at the site and an estate garrisoned by a small Crusader force…During the Mamluk period El Lajjun once again served as a border city between the districts of Safed and Gaza, and one of the largest khans in Palestine was built there. The khan remained in use during the Ottoman period, alongside an official station of the horse-driven postal service.

They end by saying that "The place kept its name up until the mid-twentieth century, and with it the memory of the Roman legion, which had been stationed there." Curious, it was in mid-twentieth century, in 1948 to be exact, that the town was destroyed by the Israeli army and in 1949 the Kibbutz Megiddo built over its remnants. The writers mention Kibbutz Megiddo of course and remember the ancient presence of the Romans but not the contemporary presence of Palestinians not only in El Lajjun and Megiddo but the region they are discussing. This is even more curious because one of their "important" findings is that this geographical area in which Umm al-Fahim is located, is one in which "Soldiers and civilians, Jews and Samaritans, Christians and pagans lived together, each group with its common, as well as distinguishing attributes. This co-existence in a location that is both geographically and historically well-defined highlights the

evolvement of neighborly relations and most likely, mutual cultural influences as well."[48]

Well, perhaps some driver will presently feel "neighborly" in the context of today's not so friendly co-existence and stop and give me and my fellow traveler a ride to our respective homes. Our homes are situated off the main road in a ghetto-zone sandwiched between Jewish Afula and Hadera. Although there is no doubt that the groups living in this area with their "distinguishing attributes" have had "mutual cultural influences" on one another, it is difficult to argue, as was the case in former times, that an "evolvement of neighborly relations" has emerged. While we wage our own small battle to get to our homes, we stand only a few kilometers from the line which separates the natural and human environments of the Occupied Territories from those of Israel. Our struggle to get home marks out another border, one which is internal to Israel, one which demarcates us from them.

My Musmus companion is hitchhiking so I hope to get a ride with him. Soon a car, with a man wearing military fatigues in the passenger seat, pulls over to our side of the road, apparently to give my stranded companion a lift. Leaning in front of the soldier, the driver asks him where he is going, but when he replies, "Musmus," revealing that he is Palestinian, the driver refuses to give him a ride. But then, standing there also is blond and blue-eyed me, who also needs a ride and so they ask me where I am going. To their consternation they discover that I want to go to Umm al-Fahim and, after a moment's hesitation, I hear the driver rev the car and take off. During that moment of hesitation, how rapidly the driver sized up the situation.

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[48] Yotam Tepper and Leah Di Segni with contribution by Guy Stiebel, *A Christian Prayer Hall of the Third Century CE at Kefar 'Othnay (Legio): Excavations at the Megiddo Prison 2005*, ed. Tamar Winter (Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority, 2006), 7, 10, 16. On this controversy see Aryeh Dayan, "A latter-day Gog and Magog?" *haaretz*, November 18, 2005.

How many computations took place within his brain for him to come to a moral and practical decision? If he accepts the woman isn't he somehow morally bound to take the other guy whose destination is even closer than hers? She is obviously not Palestinian, one of us, but she is also going to a forbidden zone--perhaps she's a traitor or an Arab-lover. If I had been alone, in spite of the fact that I wanted to go to enemy territory, if only out of curiosity, the driver probably would have given me a ride or at least asked me why I was going to such a place. But under the circumstances, what with the presence of that other guy, and my traitorous affirmation of his existence by desiring to go to an even more treacherous place than his small Musmus, there simply was only one choice to be made. Through whatever inner calculations he silently processed his dilemma, he summed up the situation and concluded it was best to just forget the whole thing and he left in a huff. His soldier passenger, resting his arm in the open window, shrugged his shoulder at me—what can he do--while the car wheels spit up loose dirt from the shoulder of the road as they make their abrupt exit. The man from Musmus and I exchange a glance and hope someone more friendly will be coming along shortly. This Palestinian man from Musmus is good enough to build the other man's home and clean his office and streets, but not good enough to be given a lift after a hard day's work. And a lift, what would it have meant? We two hitchhikers would have been let out on the side of the road. The driver would never have entered a Palestinian town, but simply dropped us off the main road for each of us to make our own way up into the hills.

Given the transportation system it is next to impossible for ordinary human intercourse to occur between the ghetto and the outside world. Most working men commute to work and if the family has a car it is used for this purpose. Women in general

are tied to the ghetto, especially if they have children. It is difficult for them even to visit each other within Umm al-Fahim, except neighbors. The streets and alley ways, many of which until recently were dirt (and some still are) are steep and without steps. When it rains they are additionally slippery and muddy. Mothers with young children and babies have little option but to stay home and visit their relatives (mostly on their husband's side of the family), who usually live nearby, and neighbors. Baby strollers are useless and if anything dangerous in these circumstances. There are no side walks, except along the new main entrance road but this area is not residential. Most homes are situated in the cluster of numerous hills which make up Umm al-Fahim and not along the entrance road which is strewn with shops.

More importantly, there are no road-side steps which are really needed if inhabitants are to easily get around, especially with children. Many women told me that since completing high school they have not seen their high school friends, especially after they married and moved out of their parental homes and childhood neighborhoods. Umm al-Fahim, like Haifa, is situated on hills, but, unlike Haifa, there is no system of steps or internal bus system and the roads are of extremely poor quality and steep. There is virtually no illumination at night. Notwithstanding, people walk just about everywhere when they have to and, of course, children run around like kids do everywhere. In answer to an open survey question "What would you like to see develop in Umm al-Fahim?" women, spontaneously and independently, repeatedly included among their responses, a wish for an internal and affordable public transportation system so they could get around town. More and more families are acquiring cars and women are learning to drive so their mobility is improving over time, though this is a mixed blessing since the cars are

causing overcrowding and problems of their own.

I was pleasantly surprised to come across an article in the *haaretz* as I was putting the finishing touches to this chapter. In a survey conducted by Kayan, an advocacy group for Arab women, it was found that "85 percent of Israeli Arab women said they would use public transit within their towns if it existed." The reporter, Yoav Stern, writes that "only 30 percent of Arab women aged between 25-44 participate in the Israeli workforce, far lower than the 80 percent rate among Jewish women in the same age range." This is because there is no public transit in Israeli Arab towns. Kayan conducted their survey of the public transit system in 11 Arab communities after they realized that "several women were unable to attend Kayan meetings because of the difficulty of traveling." Their report indicated that residents need cars to get around. I was particularly gratified with this statement because, besides confirming what I have been writing, it has now finally become a public issue.

> For instance, there is no public transit at all in Umm al-Fahm, which has a population of 40,000 and is spread over a large, mountainous area. Other Arab towns are served only by buses that travel on the main road that connects them to the large Jewish communities in the same area. Most Arab families in these areas have one car, which the main breadwinners—the men—use to go to their places of work. The women also have a hard time reaching the main road by foot because the towns have expanded so much, leaving them virtually unable to get not only to workplaces, but also to health clinics, educational institutions and other locations.

In another *haaretz* article by Yoav Stern the topic concerns the hours it takes for Palestinian students to get to the university because of the transportation system and the segregation of their towns; and he raises the problem that because Palestinians do not get military service credits they usually cannot get campus housing. The Stern article even goes so far as to call for government subsidy for public transit in Israeli Arab towns.[49]

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[49] Yoav Stern, "Report: Government should subsidize public transport in Arab communities / No buses means Arab women can't work," *haaretz*, February 4, 2007 and Aryeh Dayan, "A drive to university should not take two hours," *haaretz*, September 6, 2006.

There was even a court decision in January, 2007, that the Ministry of Labor record women from Aksal (a Palestinian town near Nazareth) as unemployed who cannot get to the employment office, which is located in another city, to register because there is no public transportation to get them to the office or to work outside their town. Since almost all government agencies, social services, hospitals, universities, and jobs are located outside the ghetto, no matter how large the population, the lack of public transportation makes many details of everyday life a burdensome ordeal.

Because of my dependence on public and private transportation to and from Umm al-Fahim, I learned much about the inner workings of daily life for Palestinians, especially details which reveal much about the political economy of transportation and racism. I collected much material for what would be a wonderful monograph. For instance, my husband, Ghassan, along with many other men, told me that when he has to hitch hike say from Hadera, he will go to Gan Schmuel, a kibbutz just outside Hadera, whose entrance is off the main road, the same road we have been traveling on to get to my new home from the Tel Aviv airport. He tells me he stands here because drivers will think he is Jewish and pick him up. He will get in the car and close the door before he answers the question as to where he wants to go. Since he knows that almost all the towns and villages in the stretch of the highway between Hadera and Afula are Palestinian the driver will most likely be going past Umm al-Fahim, but he also knows that if he tells the driver before he is in the car that he is going to one of these Palestinian towns, it is most likely the driver will not give him a ride, as happened to my Musmus friend and I. So he could stand out on the roadside for hours.

I later discovered that it is not uncommon for liberal Jewish Israelis to remark that

they pick up Palestinian hitchhikers, as proof of their open-mindedness and lack of racist attitudes toward *their Arabs*. It reminds me of how liberal whites in the United States would drop the phrase that they had Negro or Black friends. I have often been asked by African and African American friends and colleagues to flag a taxi for them in the streets of New York City. Racism has no national boundaries. In Israel hitchhiking is a national phenomenon. Picking up hitchhikers is encouraged and promoted, especially in regard to soldiers. Most Jewish Israelis are required to serve and since they must travel throughout the country and do not receive a travel stipend, picking up hitchhikers is put forward as a civic duty, except regarding Palestinians.[50]

But our three travelers--a bride, her husband, and uncle escort--do not face such difficulties on this occasion. Thanks to my uncle's van we do not have to depend on public transportation or hitchhiking. Comfortably seated, every moment we get closer to our destination. We are now almost home. I am still too unfamiliar with the environment to recognize any visual landmarks as signs alerting me to the fact that we are approaching Umm al-Fahim. Visual signs won't help too much at this time anyway, since we have been driving at night. But unbeknownst to me, that so ignored yet vital of senses, smell, by way of which we unconsciously take in our world, alerts me to the fact that we are approaching Umm al-Fahim. A hidden odorous memory of stench impels me to ask my companions if we are nearing Umm al-Fahim. I am told yes and asked how did I know? My simple and direct answer being the good blunt American that I am is "Because it stinks."

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[50] Enforcing this policy has progressively become more difficult, since Jewish hitchhikers, even soldiers, have at times committed crimes against those who pick them up, including rape. So it is becoming less and less desirable and not as easily promoted as in the past, though it is still a typical practice in Israel.

The smell of sewage is the welcoming signal that one is approaching Umm al-Fahim from the west, which is the direction from which we have been driving. I had stored this in my memory bank from my previous visits though unknown to me until this trip where sight was of no assistance. The reactions of my companions to my explicit comment were, on the one hand, an offended husband, how could I say this about his home and now mine; and on the other, an uncle who simply acknowledged it as fact. Later I had a somewhat similar experience when two women came to visit me in Umm al-Fahim from Tel Aviv. One of the women is a friend of mine. She is an Oriental Jew, Mizrahi, whose family came from Egypt, a feminist and is politically active in her community and on women's issues. She is accompanied by a friend of hers, an Ashkenazi woman who is a journalist, who has come to interview me, an American in Israel, for the Histadrut's newspaper *Davar*. When the journalist made the disparaging comment that Umm al-Fahim stinks, implying that the residents were responsible, my friend immediately and sharply responded by saying that she should blame her government for the problem and not the people. And she's right. The reason is simple. The Israeli government has not decided where the sewage is to be drained, so it flows down into the valley that surrounds Umm al-Fahim's western side. Two kibbutzim in two different districts claim rights over Umm al-Fahim's sewage which they want to use as fertilizer.

Districts in Israel are defined differently by the different governmental ministries. Most Palestinian ghettos, no matter how large, are linked into other Jewish towns for social services and administrative functions. Umm al-Fahim, for instance, does not have a hospital or an office of the Ministry of Interior, which among other things, deals with registration and the all important issuance of identification cards (possession of which is

required by law). Depending on where your ghetto is located vis-à-vis Jewish settlements, Palestinian inhabitants are linked into one or other district. In the case of Umm al-Fahim, inhabitants must go to Afula for Ministry of Interior affairs, but to Haifa for matters pertaining to the Ministry of Finance. Previously, for health matters, Umm al-Fahim was assigned to Hadera but when Hadera decided her hospital could no longer accommodate Umm al-Fahim residents, Umm al-Fahim was reassigned to Afula.

Although Jewish settlements may not desire to accommodate their Palestinian neighbors' health needs they do desire their sewage and so an argument over whose jurisdiction this territory falls within has been going on for sometime. Meanwhile the inhabitants of Umm al-Fahim are left living in the stench. They have no authority in this matter regardless of the fact that their all too material soul count is a hundred-fold, thousand-fold, more than either of these kibbutzim. But, then, they can assert their civil rights and complain as they have innumerable times.[51] Fortunately, the smell doesn't penetrate the ghetto except when the wind blows from the west.

We have finally reached the turnoff to Umm al-Fahim and now proceed to drive up an unilluminated, poorly paved, pothole ridden entrance road, barely wide enough for two cars.[52] In the daylight one can see garbage strewn along the hillsides of this road and down into its ditches and soon one sees off to the left a dump area carved into the hill. High up on a hill to the right sits a public high school. This school and another one sitting atop another hill at an opposite extremity are located on land confiscated by the State and

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[51] Recently, after the research for this dissertation was completed, a solution to this problem was found. It turns out a decision was finally made and Kibbutz Ein Sheena was granted rights to Umm al-Fahim's sewage and work has recently begun to funnel her waste to this kibbutz under a contract with a Haifa based contractor.

[52] A new and wider road has been subsequently built that is lined with shops and workshops.

then, by an agreement reached in court, leased back to Umm al-Fahim in the 1970's, so that these two schools could be built.

I am terrified—not as yet accustomed to this experience--as we ascend into town along a poorly lit narrow, twisting road that appears to me to be vertical most of the time. At one point the road becomes almost perpendicular and then swings to the left then back to the right only to veer to the left again and always at what seem to be 90 degree angles. I am certain gravity will pull us tumbling down the hills of Umm al-Fahim as I hang on to the dash board. Somehow we get to the center of town, the *maydan*, without roller-coastering off the cliffs. The street of the *maydan* runs parallel to the main Afula-Hadera road, which is now far down below us, joined only by an imaginary perpendicular line formed by Umm al-Fahim's vertically sloping hills. While we drive through the *maydan* I don't know what keeps the van to the road, which feels to be almost turned on its side.

We pass through the *maydan* quickly, which is really nothing more than a taxi stand lined with coffee shops, a bank, a money changer, and various shops and offices—a place where men, who are retired, unemployed, on a break, or waiting for transportation pass the time playing backgammon, eating sweets and drinking coffee while they discuss local, national and international events, along with their own problems or those of others. Offices are housed behind and above these coffee shops. During the day women and children are also found here waiting for transportation to go shopping in Hadera or to visit someone in the hospital in Afula. We pass through the *maydan* in a few seconds and now turn straight up a vertical hill for a short distance before abruptly coming to a dead-end which splits into two. We go left onto a dirt road that barely fits one car, but at least this street is flat. My uncle honks the horn as he rounds each corner so that other drivers

and pedestrians know we are approaching and can clear out of the way.

Momentarily we are in front of our home which is located within a hillside high up in the hills of Umm al-Fahim. We live in a three story cement structure. A garment factory, rented and run by my uncle escort, a subcontractor for a Jewish businessman, takes up the first floor. Sewing is one of the major sources of local employment for women and many young women work in these sweatshops, especially before marriage.

**Entrance to my and my in-laws home**

**Garment factory on first floor**

My in-laws and their unmarried children live on the next floor; I and Ghassan,[53] the first born male, live above his parents. Thanks to the support and warmth of my in-laws this traditional Palestinian custom is one I later learn I am greatly indebted to.

We live in the Aghbariyah quarter, one of the six main quarters which are composed of numerous neighborhoods, bearing just as many names. We are home and a house full of relatives--parents, sisters, brothers, nieces and nephews, uncles and aunts--have been awaiting our arrival. A kiss to each side of the mouth and one again. Ahlan wa sahlan, welcome to Umm al-Fahim.

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[53] In Arabic the pronoun I is placed before the other subjects unlike English; I chose to use this construction here, in this way also the clause modifying Ghassan wouldn't interrupt the overall subject.

## In Closing

A Jewish colony could turn into a ghetto inside a ghetto with all the prejudices of the ghetto ... and it will be small and narrow-minded, conservative and not liberal, and will push away the non-Jews.

Lord Nathaniel Rothschild to Theodor Herzl, August 18th, 1902.[1]

That is the way to becoming, sooner or later, a closed religious cult, hated and isolated. And even inside that ghetto hostilities will still rage between secular and religious, Oriental and Western, 'real Jews' and Russians who are buried outside the cemetery wall.

Boaz Evron, "Demography as the enemy of democracy," 2002.[2]

[The Jews] made their impact [on the Middle East], then [late 19th-early 20th century], not as indigenous inhabitants of Palestine, for the most part, but as Zionists, nineteenth-century products of unemancipated, unassimilated Jewish communities of Central and Eastern Europe. The Zionist movement was a reaction to solutions of the Jewish problem which looked to civic emancipation alone, a rejection of the hopes of Jewish disciples of the Enlightenment, and a reaffirmation of the continuity of traditional conceptions of the nature and goal of Jewish history.

D. Edward Knox, *The Making of a New Eastern Question*, 1981.[3]

No. I do not think Israel is at the centre of the world. But I do believe that Israel holds a special place in the world and is different from other countries in the world. Its very birth—a historical revival after 2,000 years; the way it was built by the hands of pioneers; the Holocaust that struck at the Jewish people; the five wars it underwent; its ability to make the desert bloom and develop industries; a country whose language has no brother and whose blood has no sister and its history no neighbor. What was created is unprecedented in history and cannot be compared to anything similar in modern times.

Shimon Peres, "An Interview with Shimon Peres," 2008.[4]

The thing that worries me most now, the real basis of my worry, is that the Arabs don't want two states. And this has to be prevented. We came here, Jews from Yemen, from Vilna, from France, from America, we gathered the remnant of the Jewish people after the Holocaust, we came here to live with ourselves, to see if we can live with ourselves. We don't need to enter into a symbiosis with the Arabs, just as we don't need to enter into a symbiosis with the Ukrainians or the Americans.

A.B. Yehoshua, "Hard Talk," 2008.[5]

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[1] Theodor Herzl, *Die Judensache, Diaries 1885-1904*, Vol. 3, ed. Michael Heyman and Josef Wenkert. Published by Bayalik Institute. Translated from the Hebrew by Ghassan Fawzi.

[2] Boaz Evron, "Demography as the enemy of democracy," *haaretz*, September 11, 2002.

[3] D. Edward Knox, *The Making of a New Eastern Question: British Palestine Policy and the Origins of Israel 1917-1925* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 5.

[4] Michel Korinman and John Laughland, eds., *Israel on Israel* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008), 11.

[5] Gidi Weitz and Dror Mishani, "Hard Talk," *haaretz*, 2/15/2008. This is an interview with A. B. Yehoshua.

The main thesis of Abram Leon's analysis of the Zionist Movement in *The Jewish Question*, I believe, has been proven from hindsight by the actual development of the State of Israel.[6] His analysis of the class content of the movement led him to conclude that the Jewish bourgeoisie in their aspiration to enter the historic scene as full members required the establishment of a Jewish national state upon which these aspirations could be materialized--"The Jewish bourgeoisie is compelled to create a national state, to assure

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6 Abram Leon, *The Jewish Question*, see especially pp. 245-49. Leon, originally a member of the Zionist socialist youth movement, *Hashomer Hatzair*, lived in Palestine with his family who immigrated from Poland when he was a boy in the 1920s. Later, through his studies of Jewish history and the current crisis, he became an astute critic of Zionism. He stayed in Europe working in the underground against fascism, in hiding. In 1944, as the war was nearing an end, Leon was arrested by the police, taken by the Gestapo and sent to Aushwitz. He became ill and was sent, along with the others deemed sick by the medical inspectors, to the gas chambers. I agree with Maxime Rodinson that "Leon is right about the factors that were at the root of these tendencies [the preservation of Judaism by modern anti-Semitism and its flip side political Zionism]." Concerning Leon's conclusion that "Zionism is the product of the imperialist era" and is therefore not a solution to the "Jewish problem" but its continuation, Rodinson pointed out that the European Zionist Movement has successfully exported the Jewish Question to the Middle East: "Zionism achieved its principal objective, the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, by exploiting a situation brought about by European and American imperialist powers, and by relying directly on one or another of these powers on various occasions. As Leon among others pointed out, this has not at all resolved the 'Jewish problem', but has even aggravated it seriously. As many people had predicted, Jews and non-Jews alike, not only revolutionaries and Marxists, but also bourgeois liberals, it has in the first place created an intractable problem in the relations between the Jewish colony of Palestine and the Arab people whose elementary right to master in its own territory was violated by this colony....As was inevitable, the Palestinian problem, created by Zionism and compounded by its local triumph, has spread hatred of the Jews into Arab countries, where anti-Semitism was previously virtually unknown. The Zionists have actively aided this with their incessant propaganda designed to persuade people that Zionism, Judaism, and Jewishness are equivalent concepts. An important part of the world Jewish population, the Israeli Jewish colony, thus finds itself committed to a dead-end course, driven to a policy of preventive aggression abroad and discriminatory legislation at home, the entire situation encouraging racist and chauvinist mentality that impels society down the road of social regression...In the increasingly serious struggles under way both within each group of countries (capitalist world, socialist world, and Third World) and between these categories, the Jews are driven by the process set in motion by Zionism towards options that are reactionary in the full sense of the word. All of us, Jews and non-Jews alike, must do all we can to arrest this evolution, the consequences of which could be terrible...But the Zionist option brought about this ingathering under the worst possible conditions. Its consequences led almost inevitably to placing it in a reactionary context...In the recent [Rodinson wrote this in 1968] conditions of exacerbated struggle between the hungry masses of the Third World and the capitalist imperialist powers, of pressure by the masses of the Communist world for democratic socialism, and of international and intranational tensions in the capitalist world, it is imperative to prevent the 'Jewish problem' from being used to aid the manoeuvres of the most reactionary forces." Maxime Rodinson, *Cult, Ghetto, and State: The Persistence of the Jewish Question*, trans., Jon Rothschild (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983), 110, 111-12, 114, 115, 116. I believe it can be argued, given the present realities, that now solution to the Jewish Question has become solution to the Palestinian Question and solution to the Palestinian Question is the solution to the Jewish Question.

itself of the objective framework for the development of its productive forces" (Leon 1970, 149). According to UN statistics Israel is now home to ten of the world's richest people and some of the world's worst poverty. Yossi Sarid reports in *haaretz* in March, 2008 that "19 families in effect hold the keys to the state economy" and that the "income of the 19 families totals NIS 298 billion, while the state's income from taxes comes to NIS 191 billion." He goes on to say that "It is not the people who are making a golden calf for themselves…but their leaders who are sitting down to eat and drink and make sport on the occasion of the sale of the controlling interest, another privatization in the country of unlimited privatization."

Leon also understood, as did the original Zionist founders, that to accomplish this project would require the support of at least one of the major imperialist world powers especially since the territories of the world were already divided up. By the time the Zionist Movement fully organized itself as a settlement movement it was known that to achieve the aims as set forth by the hegemonic Zionist forces would require the appropriation of land and the expropriation of some other people. Once the terrain of Palestine was settled upon and the support of a major world power, Britain, had been drafted, the European based Jewish ethno-nationalist colonial settler project could begin the difficult task of settling its terrain. Once the state was established, Israel soon became the largest recipient of US economic and military aid and has been for decades now. This insured the continuation of the state in its present form. Without the support of such imperialist powers the Zionist project probably would have withered away which could have opened the doors for local and immigrant Jews and the Palestinians to challenge

British colonialism together and create an independent state. Instead, as the acclaimed Israeli novelist, A. B. Yehoshua, says in a 2008 interview:

> A group [Zionists] that was just half a percent of the entire Jewish people established everything that we now have here. It's incredible. And they did it outside the Jewish people. If the Zionist party had run in an election in the early 20th century, it would have received only 6 or 7 percent of the Jewish people's vote. A majority of the Jewish people was against this thing. They went ahead and made this project. There was something sort of omnipotent then that is still with us today (brackets mine).

But, there is nothing "incredible" in this story. It is "incredible" only if one abstracts it from the international geo-political economic developments in the region. As Maxime Rodinson says:

> Marx's statement that Judaism survived not despite history but through it is not a mystical or philosophical axiom of untestable origin. It is simply a methodological requisite of any scientific history. Jewish history must be explained by the usual historical factors (Rodinson 1983, 76).

That "half a percent of the entire Jewish people" could establish "everything that we now have here" was possible because their small movement at a particular moment in the colonial development in the Middle East found a powerful ally and continued to do so once the state was established. The Zionist pioneers did not make a desert bloom as Peres says. The deserts in Palestine before 1948 are still deserts in Israel and the ones who had actually made the desert bloom, the Bedouins, have been to a great extent evicted or settled in marginal communities. And, on the basis of the confiscation of the fertile land, homes, businesses, plant and equipment, the infrastructure of the pre-1948 Palestine and Palestinians the economy of Israel was built.

Nor, as I have stated throughout the dissertation, are the colonial practices and capitalist forms of development carried out by the settlers and leaders of the state peculiar or unique to Israeli nation-building. Israel's development is simply a particular case of colonialism within capitalist development, though, perhaps, as Nitzan and Bichler suggest, it is unique in the rapidity with which this development has occurred. But even

this rapidity is quite explainable. Given the consistent external political and economic support from major powers, as well as from contributions from Jews from around the world, and, as stated above, the vast appropriation of existing Palestinian natural, personal and economic resources and infrastructure, generating the Israeli state and economy could be undertaken and quite rapidly.

Even regarding Israeli colonial and expansionary practices, there is nothing that is particularly new or exceptional, except that it continues to unfold as I write these words, so that what I have analyzed in this dissertation is a contemporary process rather than simply a legacy of a previous historical phase. Off and on in this work I have related Israeli developments to other times and places and, perhaps, in these closing remarks it is important to once again underscore that the process brought to light in these pages is not an expression of Israel exceptionalism, but a particular case of nation-building within the general development of modern capitalist history. This can be clearly seen by referencing the experience of another nation-building project of a colonial settler state, the United States. For example, the historian David Williams records, that "[i]n the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, colonial legislatures throughout British North America passed a series of laws designed to…divide and conquer" the black and white underclasses by "[c]reating a social distance between poor whites and blacks, assigning whites the superior social position" most particularly by treating the blacks as "an alien race" (David Williams 205, 24). So too did the founding fathers of Israel divide and conquer the masses of Jews and Palestinians attributing, as I discussed in chapters 3 and 4, "nationhood" to Jews only while designating the Palestinians as a resident alien, an *enemy within* the Jewish homeland, outside the nation and society proper.

Williams also points out that among the punishable offenses of slaves in the United States were "being off the plantation without written permission [and] talking back to—'sassing'—a white person" (David Williams 2005, 20) much like the experience of Palestinians under Israeli citizenship during the period of military rule as I discussed chapter 2. Even the naming of slave children was often the prerogative of the slaveholders who "usually reserved that right for themselves" (David Williams 2005, 21); again, not dissimilar to the prerogative of the Israeli leaders who took on the "right" to brand Palestinians with bloc surnames based on supposed *hamula* affiliation as discussed in chapter 5. In the Dred Scott case of 1857, the Supreme Court ruled that slaves were the personal property of their slave-holders and to "maintain their subordination" Williams records that "the definition of 'moderate correction'," which was "a right similar to that which exists in the father over his children…was left entirely to the slaveholder" (David William 2005, 20); not very different from leaving the matter of reward and punishment for two decades to the Military Governors in the Palestinian ghettos where "paternalistic rule" through a "strong father figure" was openly declared to be the only form of rule appropriate to these backward people for whom military law and the Emergency Regulations, which overrode civil governance, was required so that "their subordination" could be maintained as discussed in chapter 2.

Turning to US expansionism, Williams describes what can only be called the "ethnic cleansing" of Native Americans.

> But the early nineteenth century was also the era of Indian removal. In 1827 Georgia forced out its few remaining Creeks. Nine years later Alabama did the same. The 1830s saw the Choctaws and Chickasaws driven out of Mississippi. And Georgia annexed Cherokee land following the 1829 discovery of gold there…In 1842 Florida's Seminoles became the last of the southern nations to be violently relocated to land that they were promised would be theirs for 'as long as grass grows or water runs.' At the time it was called Indian Territory. Today it is called Oklahoma (David Williams 2005, 25-26).

And the process of removal didn't end there. Later, during the Civil War, in order to gain more territory and remove the native population, even those like the Cheyenne and Arapaho in Colorado who were supporting the Union,

> Western commanders used the war as an excuse to define all Indians as threats to national security regardless of their posture toward the whites. In 1864, Cheyenne and Arapaho under Black Kettle negotiated peace, accepting settlement on the arid wastes of Sand Creek in eastern Colorado. But at dawn on November 29, soldiers led by militia colonel and Methodist minister John Chivington attacked the Sand Creek settlement, killing every Indian they could find, about 150 in all. Over half the dead were women and children. Black Kettle had tried to stop the massacre by tying a U.S. flag and a white flag of truce to a lodge pole, telling his people to gather around it. Those who did were cut down under the banners. It was but a single instance of many in which Indians found themselves set upon regardless of their actions or alliances. Simply being Indian was enough to invite attack (David Williams 2005, 10).

Change the dates, names and places and the story becomes a Palestinian one. Perhaps, again, the only difference that is unique to Israel, is the speed with which the Zionist leaders accomplished the removal of the native Palestinians, creating in a matter of months rather than years a Trail of Tears as hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, like the Cherokees in Georgia in the 1830s before them, made there forced march on foot away from their homeland. Yet, until recently, Israeli history has been treated as a special case, unique in history and is still considered so by Simon Peres who says in the introductory quote above, "Israel…is different from other countries in the world…What was created is unprecedented in history and cannot be compared to anything in modern times." Israel exceptionalism dominated the discourse, scholarship and the political debate, much like the literature on US history did. But now, within Israeli scholarship, just as happened within the US, a critical discourse has emerged, rooted in the historical evidence, which is assessing this exceptionalism, and seriously revising the hegemonic "national" narrative, though it is far from unseating this narrative nor the social practice upon which it is based.

That such is the case is seen in Peres' desire to remain, like A. B. Yehoshua, a

ghetto resident of a ghetto-state. Peres takes this aspiration to new literary heights in his proud cry that Israel is "a country whose language has no brother and whose blood has no sister and its history no neighbor." Both Hebrew and Arabic are derivatives of the same patterned language and so are they not figuratively "brother" languages?; and as the late Stephen Jay Gould pointed out in the pages of "Natural History Magazine", scientists are now hypothesizing that all human languages spring from the same origin and if this be the case then all human languages are brothers and sisters to each other. Are not Ismail and Isaac brothers whose blood flows from the same source and are not the daughters of such fathers related or do females not count? And has not the United States been a good neighbor and more close to home, King Abdullah of Transjordan, a vassal of England, another good neighbor, with whom Ben-Gurion entered into pre-war negotiations to share parts of Palestine which they settled in the Rhodes Armistice Agreement after the 1948 War?

Israel, as presently constituted, has no means to financially and economically exist independently without fundamentally restructuring itself. Means of life are to a great extent based on imports from abroad. Some durable goods are produced, high-tech electronic equipment, agricultural products, clothing, polishing of diamonds from South Africa, development of computer soft wares and of course a significant military industry exists--but the computers and tractors are imported and much investment is based on foreign capital and as Nitzan and Bichler show Israeli capitalists are intimately integrated into the global capitalist economy; many are what Nitzan and Bichler call "absentee owners" based on foreign capital flows both into and out of Israel.

The relatively high standard of living of Jewish Israelis has been subsidized by

transfer of funds from the outside and does not only rest on an internally developed and independent infrastructure. Given the intense and ruthless privatization of the Israeli economy and its dependence on the global economy even this relative “privilege” has for most individuals burst. Should the "special" relation with the United States change the system as it is would become unviable. Israel would be reduced to what it really is--a dependent and relatively undeveloped society. A ghetto composed of ghettos. Should significant interests within the United States decide that this state no longer serves its purposes, and perhaps even hinders their interests in the region, or should popular sentiment in the United States become critical of the tremendous economic support given to Israel and fatigued by the constant engagement in wars while their own conditions deteriorate, Israel’s “special place in the world”, which Peres asserts “cannot be compared to anything similar in modern times,” would collapse and that Israel is quite similar and comparable to many other places in the world would become self-evident.

The Zionist project of colonizing Palestine proceeded systematically as Jewish settlers acquired land and sought to dominate the domestic market, replace Palestinian labor by Jewish labor, and eventually, upon statehood, subordinate the remaining indigenous population turning them into unwelcome guests in their own homeland and a reserve army of labor for Jewish industry. The task of settling the terrain so that capitalist development could gain full hegemony took some time, but by 1985, the last stages were accomplished when the state under the Economic Stabilization Plan privatized all but a few enterprises. For now the terrain has been settled.

In the “Hard Talk” interview with Gidi Weitz and Dror Mishani, Yehoshua makes the distinction between the “partial Jew” of the Diaspora and the “total Jew” of Israel.

Implicit in this distinction is a prescription that indirectly confirms Leon's analysis of the class content of the Zionist national project. Yehoshua says:

> The Jew of the diaspora is essentially a free Jew, he's free from another Jew, while here we are ruled by Jews. Jews can send us to prison, and Jews send us to war, impose taxes on us, Jews evict us from our homes…You are partial Jews on this level in which I contend with the totality of the reality and I am in a binding relationship among Jews, while you—no Jew can touch, no Jew can impose anything on you, can compel you to do anything. It's basically up to you. That's the point.

Yehoshua is wedded to a state that realizes the aspirations of the national Jewish bourgeoisie in a state of their own ruling over other Jews. What this turns out to mean in social terms is that now "NEARLY 35% OF ALL ISREALI CHILDREN LIVE BELOW THE POVERTY LINE AND OVER 75% of our orphans and students require some type of financial assistance" in a country with some of the richest men in the world. Boys Town Jerusalem has recently put out a world call: "Buy a Hungry Israeli Boy Lunch For Just $5!" (from the *haaretz* website, marketing@haartez.com). And on such a basis Yehoshua wants his ghetto state to continue and he believes "A binational state is recipe for the annihilation of the Israeli state." For Yehoshua only in a ghetto-state of Jews where he is "in a binding relationship among Jews" can he, as he says in the interview, celebrate Yom Kippur (as a secularist). To do so, as he makes explicit in the interview, it is fundamental to him that no Palestinians live in the same apartment building as himself. The American, Henry Morgenthau, felt differently in 1921. In the journal *World's Work* he wrote: "We [Jews] in America refuse to set ourselves apart in a voluntary ghetto for the sake of old traditional observances." Morgenthau, a US Ambassador to Turkey, an advocate of Armenian rights, President of the liberal Free Synagogue of New York for over a decade when he split with Rabbi Stephen Wise in 1919 over the issue of Zionism, an officer of the B'nai B'rith Jewish Masonic Lodge, considered "Zionism is a surrender,

not a solution…Zionism is the most stupendous fallacy in Jewish history." And the argument amongst Jews in Israel and the world continues today.

Does Israel represent a new proto-state?; one which, as some argue, resolves ethnic or national differences within a particularistic state formation that legitimizes the domination of a *majority* over a *minority* as the expression of democracy at work? Sammy Smooha, a sociologist, and Ruth Gavison, a human rights lawyer, as I discussed in chapter 3, believe so. Israel, they claim, is a "new kind of democracy". Is such a paradigm a recipe for some kind of "brave new Wirthian world" in which a *modus vivendi* allows for *toleration* and therefore co-existence of people with *different heritages*? Sayed Kashua, a Palestinian journalist and novelist from Tira, Israel, has his doubts which are expressed in the following passage from his novel, *Let it be Morning*. He wrote this novel after the October, 2000 events during which thirteen Palestinian Israeli citizens were shot dead by the Israeli police in what were planned as peaceful demonstrations in protest of the Israeli occupation and in solidarity with the Second Palestinian Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza. The government sent in the Border Police and gave instructions to shot to kill.

> I can recall the day when I was sent to cover the Arab demonstrations in Wadi Ara after the cabinet members put in an appearance at the Al-Aqsa Mosque…I saw the injured being taken to the local infirmary, the masses of people huddling at the entrance to the small clinic, to see if their loved ones had been brought there, find out whether they were alive, whether they'd been injured…I was there, and I knew that nobody had expected the police to react so harshly, so relentlessly. Like me, the demonstrators had always thought of themselves as citizens of Israel, and never imagined they would be shot at for demonstrating or for blocking an intersection…Two days and more than a dozen causalities later, the riots were over. I went from funeral to funeral, from mourner to mourner, interviewing parents as they wept and assigned blame and expressed their horror. Then things calmed down…Two days of demonstrations had been enough for the state to delegitimize its Arab population, to repudiate their citizenship…These two days had changed my life. Suddenly my life as an outsider, which had had its advantages, began to get in my way…The report I submitted about these two days of demonstrations was the first to be changed beyond recognition…For the first time I was accused of having an axe to grind. 'Next thing we know, you'll be blocking the entrance to our offices and expecting us to applaud you,' the editor said, laughing to put me at ease. That was when I realized I was in the process of losing my job…I learned the rules soon enough, to steer clear of what people were saying and to focus on dry descriptions, sticking to the assignment, as I was told. I adopted the

> lingo of the military reporters: terrorists, attacks, terrorism, criminal acts. Some of the journalists in the Hebrew press—non-Zionist left-wingers—allowed themselves to lash out against the occupation and against the restrictions imposed on the Palestinian inhabitants, but I no longer dared. The privilege of criticizing government policy was an exclusively Jewish prerogative. I was liable to be seen as a journalist calling for the annihilation of the Zionist state, a fifth column biting the hand that was feeding it and dreaming each night of destroying the Jewish people (Sayed Kashua, 2004, 18-20).

Kashua's uneasiness is confirmed more recently when Effi Eitam, a National Union Knesset Member, exclaimed to the Arab MKs during the March 6, 2008 Knesset discussion concerning the rally that took place in Umm al-Fahim in protest of Israel's actions in Gaza, that "one day we will expel you from this house, and from the national home of the Jewish people."

At least for now Palestinians remain within the boundaries controlled by Israel and under the dominance of Israeli production and market relations. This "coexistence" has two sides to it. Palestinian livelihoods are dependent on Israeli demand for their labor. But this also means that Israeli social reproduction incorporates the Palestinians. In spite of the fact that the majority of Jews in the Diaspora support the existence of a "Jewish" state in what was formerly Palestine they are not choosing to leave their actual "home" countries to live there. The majority of Jews live in the Diaspora by choice. When confronted with a labor shortage (which often occurs when Palestinian labor is boycotted) Israeli leaders allow the importation of cheap foreign non-Jewish labor since Diaspora Jews are not readily forthcoming. Meanwhile Palestinian refugee camps serve as home to hundreds of thousands of men, women and children who live in sub-standard conditions, without citizenship and no civil or political rights.

Perhaps, given the on-the-ground reality that the two peoples share the same space and are intertwined in a given reproduction process, though unequally, they could move towards creating some form of democratic secular union or confederation based on

what is already a constituted and concrete reality. Such a possibility would demand that Jewish particularism vis-à-vis "Palestine" would have to be overcome.[7] How likely this prospect is cannot be predicted and if Shimon Peres and A. B. Yehoshua are any indication it seems more improbable than probable. Both Peres and Yehoshua are secular and considered liberal within Israeli discourse. But, as I have indicated in the text of the dissertation, there are challenges to the status quo from within Zionism, like Avraham Burg, a former Knesset speaker and former head of the Jewish Agency who argues that "to define Israel as a Jewish state is key to its end" and instead he is calling for a return to Ahad Aham's ideas about creating a Jewish cultural center. Israel's entry into global capital also pushes against the particularist foundations of Zionism. And now there are the post-Zionists within the Jewish community and, of course, the Palestinians under Israeli citizenship who are twenty percent of the population. They continue to protest

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7 "Besides, nations have no eternal, unchanging essence. Their existence is in a state of constant flux. As has been said, powerful factors, however, could just as well drive her in an opposite direction. A different Israel is not an impossibility. If the threat from outside were to disappear for any length of time, the process which has each time begun during periods of respite could acquire very much greater impetus. The reactionary and expansionist parties would find most of their trump cards had disappeared. The internal social struggle could continue on a much healthier basis. The Left-wing parties, no longer suspect of weakening the defenses of the fort, would stand a better chance in the political struggle. With the decline of anti-Semitism in Europe and America, Jewish immigrants into Israel could be reduced to more modest proportions. Jewish emigration from Israel would grow. Zionism would thus lose much of its force through sheer pressure of circumstances.

"Israel would, from that moment, be a Levantine State, like any other, and no more a bridgehead of the West, forced by her situation to bear the brunt of the Arab world's hostility and to seek imperialist support. The continual temptation to embark on preventive aggression would likewise be removed. The state ideology would gradually tend to adapt to the new conditions. The privileges granted to the Jews as such would tend to disappear. Laws with racist or clerical overtones would fall into disuse and eventually be abolished. A considerable proportion of the refugees would be able to return without acting as a Fifth Column. The end-result would be a bi-national state like that dreaded about by the more open-minded and advanced spirits in Mandatory Palestine.

"A state of this sort would easily be accepted by the Middle East and could enter on harmonious relations with the neighbouring Arab countries, who would benefit from Israel's technical know-how and aid. This was the dream of King Feisal, and of some courageous Jews in the Palestinian Yishuv. One is inclined to prefer it to the grandiose visions of Herzl and Ben Gurion, and to encourage all men, Israelis and Arabs alike, with the cry first set up by the Viennese journalist [Herzl]: 'If you really desire it, it need no longer be a dream!'" Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs*, trans., Michael Perl (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1970), 234-35.

their subordination within society and have been chipping away at the legal and social restrictions that have been set upon them. And while the Israeli bourgeoisie has been predominantly Jewish the working class is international and includes not only Jews and Palestinians (citizens and from the Occupied Territories) but also non-Jewish immigrants and guest workers. Perhaps the time has come to reconsider Abram Leon's remark, written in the early 1940s, concerning what he envisioned could eventually result from the Zionist colonization of Palestine.

> And tomorrow, when national barriers and prejudices begin to disappear in Palestine, who can doubt that a fruitful reconciliation will take place between the Arab and the Jewish workers, the result of which will be their partial or total fusion?...Historically, all existing nations are products of various fusions of races and peoples. It is not excluded that new nations, formed by the fusion or even the dispersion of nations now existing, will be created (Leon 1970, 264-65).

But such a prognosis is to be seen. It is too early to make definite predictions and the circumstances are too volatile. One problematic, which Yerach Gover confronts head-on in his path-breaking book, *Zionism: The Limits of Moral Discourse in Israeli Hebrew Fiction*, needs to be dealt with if any genuine resolution can come about. The backbone of the Zionist project, which is a totalizing world view held by most Jewish Israelis, is encapsulated in Gover's analysis by his phrase "other than us and unable to be us." I use this phrase in the title of chapter 3. This insight into the Zionist narrative enables Gover to identify an important ideological axis upon which the social world of Israeli society and its state revolves which makes the possibility of resolution and a break from a ghetto society for the Jews and Palestinians of Israel profoundly difficult.

Gover's insight leads him to another clarification that informs Israeli discourse and more importantly social practice: namely, the Jewish individual as a moral subject and the reduction of the Palestinian to a purely juridical one, exemplified by the human rights lawyer Ruth Gavison, sociologist Sammy Smooha, and the novelist Yehoshua, as

seen above. (In chapter 3 this problematic was discussed in some detail.) My dear friend, the late Israeli political scientist and Mizrahi activist and feminist, Vicki Shiran, once said to me there can be no genuine resolution to the conflict until Jewish Israelis go to the tables with Palestinians as equals. She felt that this could only happen when Israelis could acknowledge that they have done an injustice to the Palestinians. In other words, Jewish Israelis would have to see the Palestinians as equal moral subjects and to see, as Gover says, themselves as a moral subject through the lens of the Palestinians as moral subjects. A. B. Yehoshua, like the anthropologists Shokeid and Deshen before him, makes it clear that such is impossible, at least for him—"We have our moral codes and they have their moral codes." If Israelis can break out of their ghetto mentality is to be seen. To do so, I believe, requires a negation of what Gover identifies as underlying the Zionist nationalist narrative—exclusion as a moral principle. Negating such a moral stance is a question of social practice and interest and it is to be seen if either the Jewish working class and/or the Jewish bourgeoisie will see it in their interest to break down the ghettoization of the Palestinians and thereby their own and if the Palestinians under Israeli citizenship can forge alliances with Jewish Israelis to break out of their restricted social space. Gover has helped situate a key part of the problematic. It is now up to the actors to determine what kind of humanity, what kind of society they want to be a part of.

My contribution in this dissertation is neither to provide a blueprint for the resolution of the social drama underway in Israel nor to predict the outcome of the current conflicts within Israeli society and Israel's relations in the world. That is a matter of social practice and determinate upon many circumstances and developments both within Israeli society and its relation to the rest of the world. My contribution has been to

reframe the problematic of Palestinian "separation" within Israeli society as a process of ghettoization. This is not a static process, but a process that takes concrete form within specific social practices and the changing circumstances of the objects of ghettoization (both Jewish and Palestinian) on the one hand, and, on the other, as the subjects of ghettoization actively in their practice of survival and resistance change their circumstances and do the work of "collective self-reproduction."

Such reframing of Israel's culture of separation can assist in explicating the totality of social relations within the Palestinian locales and their relation to and within the larger society as one unified process of the ongoing construction of a colonial settler state as it develops into a mature capitalist society doing so as a ghetto state composed of ghettos. Furthermore, I believe, this places the discussion correctly within the actual constitutive social processes which are at once social relations pertaining to the economic, political, cultural, ideological, legal and all that constitutes the social production of space within a national construction. This dissertation, as I said in the "Introduction," can only be a first approximation and as such only begins the theorization and empirical study of a specific production of social space. Regarding the social issues such space raises and their resolution, Castells remark concerning the urban question equally pertains to the national question which is also the production of space: "there is no purely theoretical possibility of resolving (or superseding) the contradictions that are at the base of the urban question: this supersession can come only from social practice, that is to say, from political practice." At the same time "in order for such practice to be correct and not blind, it is necessary to make explicit theoretically the questions thus approached" (Castells 1979, 6).

A closing remark. It has been drawn to my attention, through comments made to me by readers of this dissertation as a work in progress, that I have characterized Ben-Gurion's role in the nation-building project with new clarity by identifying his contribution to the nation-building project as a "dictator". This was not a hypothesis that I set out to demonstrate or prove, but a result of the investigation into the history of the establishment of the State of Israel and Ben-Gurion's leadership position within this process which enabled him, as a "virtual dictator", to impose his objectives and strategies and tactics to the situation and determine the course that that project would take. He was a master of the realpolitik, and although he was one of many within a movement that encompassed a variety of ideologies and orientations, he was able to "impose" his agenda ruthlessly and consistently, often in secret and unilaterally, and impede opposition to what he felt had to be done, even in regard to the establishment of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, during the first years of the state. He was the architect of the basic structures and objectives that ground and guide the rationale of Israeli society and state to this day.

I came to this conclusion on the basis of the historical evidence and not from an a priori presumption or as I said a working hypothesis. Although I do call him a "virtual dictator" in this work, I do so with this qualification. He did not seek power for his own self aggrandizement in order to rule a people or accrue wealth (though as Nitzan and Bichler point out his position enabled him to place family members in key positions which enabled them to own and control important businesses) but because he believed his plan for the Jewish people in a state of their own was the "only" possible one. I believe he felt there was no other choice but what he himself saw fit to put in place, therefore, opposition to his goals had to be quite literally put down or at least put in their place and

marginalized. I believe his legacy has "entrapped" the Jewish Israelis into a ghetto state with a ghetto mentality that is not only imprisoning the Palestinians but themselves and is reflected in this remark by A. B. Yehoshua: "I was the old Yishuv, I was the absorber, not the one who was absorbed. I absorbed the Ashkenazim, we absorbed Ben-Gurion. My father did." And for him, like Ben-Gurion, Ashkenazi defines what is *Israeli* and is equivalent to "Western culture", that is, western capitalist culture. For Yehoshua the "Ashkenazim [are Jews who] came from Christian lands…as opposed to Jews who came from Islamic lands" and, like Ben-Gurion, the Ashkenazi, the Western, are superior and in fundamental contradiction with the Arabs. "We have our moral codes…and they have their moral codes." Separation is the premise because as Yehoshua says, "these are two completely different people."

And so the conflict continues. But perhaps, "the old Yishuv" will be transcended by the new generation, the inheritors of their past and the makers of the future. Some inhabitants of this small piece of earth are native to it and others come from around the world. All now find themselves "in a binding relationship" to each other. Perhaps this patch of land, known as the "Promised Land", can become a multi-cultural haven, and fulfill what has only been dreamt of and reflected only in its name, the Land of Promise, and truly become a "longed-for place of happiness". Perhaps tomorrow, as Leon hoped, national barriers and prejudices will disappear in Israel/Palestine and a fruitful reconciliation will take place between the Arab and the Jewish workers, resulting in their partial or total fusion creating a new nation, formed by this fusion.

# Appendix A

## General Theoretical and Methodological Influences and Orientation

Major influences affecting this dissertation are discussed here in relation to the tasks of the research project. In this Appendix I first discuss the most general theoretical and methodological concerns and influences on this work; second, those theoretical influences more directly related to carrying out the specific research tasks of this dissertation as an example of produced space; and third, those key works that helped me make conceptual sense out of what I was researching and experiencing, as well as giving me the confidence to draw the necessary analytic conclusions that the research material--the literature on *Arabs in Israel*, the empirical data, the historical record, and my lived experience in Israel and in a Palestinian ghetto in Israel--was pressing upon me.

Since this dissertation is not a history of the Zionist Movement or of the Israeli state and society, nor a sociological analysis of Israeli society as a whole, nor a history and analysis of Israeli social science as such, while all of these are the defining context in which the ghettoization of Palestinians takes place, a major task in developing and carrying out this dissertation was to determine how to appropriately treat and incorporate these subject matters; and this pertained to all stages of the dissertation process. Zionism, the Israeli state and society, and the constructs of the social scientists and the Arab experts are all intertwined in the social formation of Israeli society and this is the terrain in which the Palestinian ghettos have been constructed and reproduced. Since Jewish nationalism, the structures of the state and jurisprudence, civil society and forms of economic development and class formation, culture and ideology all are called upon to

fulfill the nation-building task as it has been designed (primarily by Ben-Gurion and his associates) and carried out--and these envelop and give structure and meaning to how things "are done" and how life is perceived and mediated throughout Israeli society--a major task for undertaking this work at all stages of its process was to methodologically, analytically, and empirically determine how to successfully incorporate yet limit these key aspects of the social formation of Israel so that this dissertation would remain focused on revealing the ghettoization process and be of a manageable length.

The scholarly influences discussed in this Appendix represent those that were most key and essential in helping me gain the clarity and precision that I needed to accomplish my aims and to insure that I did not collapse the work into a history of Zionism, Israel or Israeli social sciences while also insuring that I be as historically rigorous and accurate as possible while treating this necessary subject matter which could easily be rendered too simplistically, schematically or superficially. The task regarding these matters was to do what Frederick Engels explains in his review of Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* in *Das Volk*, 1859 concerning their method: namely, to uncover the logic of the historical process and not to render historical development simply as a story of the historical sequence of events.

There are two methodological issues directly related to the critical concept of society which grounds the analytic work of this dissertation: namely, society as *a construction of contention within hegemony*. Certain clarifications about this approach need to be brought to light before continuing further. The first clarification is that although all societies, as a produced *construction*, must engage in productive activity but they do so in different ways. It is this difference--how this or that society reproduces

itself and is structured to do so--that needs to be explained. Therefore, a general category of production or labor, for instance, though useful for understanding human activity in general and a necessary orientation for comparison of different societies, is not in itself sufficient for the explanation of a particular society. Marx's comment concerning "general concepts" is most relevant here.

> Yet this *general* concept, or common aspect which has been brought to light by comparison, is itself a multifarious compound comprising divergent categories. Some elements are found in all epochs, others are common to a few epochs. The most modern period and the most ancient period will have [certain] categories in common...It is necessary to distinguish those definitions which apply to production in general, in order not to overlook the essential differences existing despite the unity that follows from the very fact that the subject, mankind, and the object, nature, are the same (Marx, 1970, 190; brackets mine).

What Marx discusses in the above passage relating to different historical periods he also explicates in regard to processes which occur within a society as, for instance, in his clarification that although there are general laws pertaining to crisis within the capitalist mode of production, each crisis must be studied within its own historical specificity. This problematic pertains also to such matters as the nation-building process within capitalist development and colonialism. The establishment and development of Israel is a specific example of processes and dynamics within these general social formations; but social formations are actualized in particular circumstances, within specific historical conjunctures and are carried out by particular social forces and interests. Thus, while Israel is not “exceptional” or outside the general laws of colonial settler states and capitalist development it is also its own specific expression of these more general social processes.

The second clarification regarding society as *a construction of contention within hegemony* is the relation of the dominant mode of production as determinate. For one, as Marx, Lefebvre and Castells point out, it must be recognized that any particular society

contains within it expressions of and relations of production of "formerly existing social formations." In Marx's conception these former relations do not simply exist as independent structures in relation to others but are generally subjugated to the dominant (in this case bourgeois, capitalist) organization of production and are absorbed within its reproduction process though this may be contradictory and more or less mediated. Concerning the "structure and the relations of production of all formerly existing social formations the ruins and component elements of which were used in the creation of bourgeois society" Marx writes:

> Some of these unassimilated remains are still carried on within bourgeois society, others, however, which previously existed only in rudimentary form, have been further developed and have attained their full significance, etc....Since bourgeois society is, moreover, only a contradictory form of development, it contains relations of earlier societies often merely in very stunted form or even in the form of travesties, e.g., communal ownership. Thus, although it is true that the categories of bourgeois economy are valid for all other social formations, this has to be taken *cum grano salis*, for they may contain them in an advanced, stunted, caricatured, etc., form that is always with substantial differences (Marx 1970, 211).

As the new relations of production become dominant and hegemonic, as Castells puts it,

> [T]he whole of the productive system is reorganized according to the interests of the dominant society. It is logical that, under these conditions, the internal economic system should be 'inarticulated' or deformed. But this 'incoherence' is only the result of a perfectly coherent economic network, if one examines the social structure as a whole (dominant society and dependent society) (Castells 1979, 47, 64).

It should also be mentioned that depending on the stage of development of a society these various subordinated modes of production within society, representing various interests, contend in varying degrees of forcefulness for economic and political space. The relevance of these two initial analytic points to Israeli society are most evident in my analysis of the determinant or dominant interests defining the hegemonic social forces historically present as the Israeli state and society has been developing over time and is seen most particularly in my analysis of Ben-Gurion’s role and the social forces he

represents in providing hegemony regarding the particular form that the nation building project would take.

In this work I have tried to follow Marx's prescription that in studying society the starting point of analysis is the existence of concrete individuals within society and for the analysis to be authentic and scientifically grounded it is essential to proceed from these individuals and not from a priori typologies or features or categories that are themselves constructs in need of analysis. One must also guard oneself from reifying history or culture as such, explaining reality as the working out of inherent historical dynamics or cultural essences or for that matter sociological *a priories*, a reifying tendency as equally adopted by social theorists of the left and the right political spectrum. It is important to keep in mind that "History does nothing; it 'possesses no immense wealth', it 'wages no battles'. It is man, real, living man who does all that, who possesses and fights…history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims" (Marx, *The Holy Family*).

Yet, these actors who do, act, feel, think, destroy—i.e. make their own histories do so in "circumstances not of their own choosing;" or, as Paulo Freire puts it in *Politics of Education*, they do so within the dead congealed accumulated culture of the past that stands before the history-makers of the present, and for us contemporary actors, we do so within our *cultures of domination* since we are dealing with class differentiated societies. For Freire, these history-makers, "as actors transform the world with their work and create their own world. This world, created by the transformation of another world they did not create and that now restrains them, is the cultured world that stretches out into the world of history." Thus, the task--in distinction to those purely subjective schools within sociology

and anthropology that treat reality as purely a process that is being constructed through the action of the actors in each contemporaneous present--is at once to situate not only the context or situation as historically developed (an already actualized history having been made and present in the now as a congealed past[1]), and to do so in regard to the hegemonic processes at work, to situate the actors as at once the legacy and makers of history.

The scholars that I have mentioned thus far are those who have been at the most general level of theorizing most present in my thinking in this work though there have been many more influences across various disciplines. In discussing their influence and in those that follow I can only highlight certain of the main analytic aspects of their work that have been present to me, but their work is profound and their influence much more than what is indicated here. Since this dissertation is not a critique of each of these thinkers contributions nor sociological theorizing in general, for our purposes I only draw upon what I consider to be the most influential elements of their thinking that have been brought to bear on this work. In doing so there is the risk of oversimplifying and I am certain I have done so, but hopefully the spirit of the methodology in some of its richness is also conveyed.

In the text of this dissertation I have referred to Gramsci at various times. Of particular importance is his understanding of social formation as process. This orientation is particularly relevant to Israel since the nation building process is an on going one, not

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[1] Friere's conception of culture presented here is directly linked to Marx's analysis of the means of production in *Capital Volume 1*. There Marx defines the means of production as congealed dead labor embodied in already produced goods; they were newly produced by living labor of a past period. They form part of the accumulation of wealth of the present owned by capitalists and are the means for the continuation of the exploitation of living labor in the present. See Paulo Freire, *Politics of Education: Culture, Power, and Liberation, trans. Donaldo Macedo* (Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1985).

yet resolved and still involving the settling of the terrain regarding people and territory. Because of the importance of his theoretical contribution to this analysis I attempt to summarize his approach here and hopefully in doing so I have not too brutally reduced his non-reductionist thinking. Building upon Marx and Engels, Gramsci developed a dialectical, non-reductionistic and non-mechanistic method of analysis, which enables the layers of intertwined social phenomena to be uncovered as what they are, a complexly interrelated process of social formation which embodies all the interests within civil society (which is itself based on definite economic foundations) and the state. The contending interests of the members of society are played out in their struggles for access to economic resources, ideological hegemony, and political power. Ideologically these various interests are expressed in all levels of society giving rise to the various strata of *organic* intellectuals attached to the institutions and classes embedded within economic life (such as constitutive property relations, division of labor, branches of industry, separation of mental and manual labor, science as production--what Marx terms the forces of production), civil society (such as media, schools, newspapers, universities, religion, chambers of commerce, trade unions, arts and sciences) and political society (such as political parties, blocs, elections, and the State). Through the state the hegemonic class or classes constitute a unifying structure (administration) for society, establish the terms of rule (through the legislative, judiciary, executive branches of government), and maintain order through their control of the police and military.

Society or the social formation is an evolving and organically constituted totality rooted in the practices of all the contending interests of real individuals in civil society, expressed in the discourse of intellectuals, and played out in the political sphere. The

activities within civil society and the state give rise to their respective ideological manifestations. Gramsci refers to these ideological manifestations as the superstructures of civil society and the state. All of these levels of society are fundamentally rooted in the economic foundations of society, not directly but through layers of mediation. Gramsci develops more fully Marx' and Engels' method of historical materialism, which comprehends society conceptually, at its most abstract level, as the dialectical interplay/interdependence of the infrastructure, also referred to as the base, and superstructure. Clearly, the importance of Gramsci's formulations discussed here to a study of Israeli social formation has been foremost in helping articulate both the contentious and the determinate aspects of Israeli formation. Furthermore, how Gramsci develops concepts that are at once distinct yet organically connected was crucial in helping to make sense of the specificities of Israeli formation. This social formation, as I argue in the text, has more than most "modern" societies, given the totalizing hegemonic character of the nation-building project defined within a uni-nationalist Zionist narrative and program, collapsed civil society, political society, the state and the military apparatus into one another.

Gramsci is also the person who developed the concept of hegemony that has influenced many other scholars and most importantly for this dissertation, Raymond Williams. Williams has been particularly drawn on in this study for demystifying tradition and helping me focus the task of study on how real people in their real relations to each other, their resources, circumstances and societal contexts rewrite, reinvent tradition. This influence can be seen in the discussions of the *hamula*. Together Paulo Freire and Raymond Williams discussions of culture and tradition provide a rich

approach that is at once historical and structural while forcing one, as Marx would say to go to the root of the matter, which is man him/herself.

Also, certain passing comments by Marx have had a significant influence on the methodological orientation of this work, such as his remark in the "Preface to the Second Edition" of Volume I of *Capital* where he says that his task was, when discussing his dialectical method in relation to Hegel, to "discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell;" or in "On the Jewish Question" in *The Holy Family* where he insists that the task is to find the secular content of the religious or mystical form; and again as in the *8th Thesis* in his "Thesis on Feuerbach" which says: "All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice." The task here, unlike Weber, who *comprehends* society as a typology of discrete divisions of human activity that function within their definite spheres and somehow coexist and cohere as parts within a whole, is to see how all human practice--mundane, economic, ideological, religious, traditional, secular, spiritual--is made out of and consists in the real and everyday activities of human beings acting within historically specific circumstances. Additionally, any approach that privileges religion, tradition, custom, culture or the such--that does not attempt to explain the ideas and actions and beliefs of people in their lived relations of reproducing themselves within specific historically determinant social relations of production/reproduction--is, to my mind, unscientific and leads, in its worst application to the study of the human subject, to "special" laws pertaining to "special" peoples and retrograde thinking such as Samuel P.

Huntington's *clash of civilizations*.[2] The task is to find the secular content of the mystical or mystifying forms and this pertains to all expressions of human activity since any particular is a manifestation of many mediated instances of the totality; thus, the task is to discover the inherent interconnections that are at play in the social forces at work, which are at once expressions of particular human practice and expressions of general human development. These influences are most evident in my discussion pertaining to Israel's nation building process and colonial settlement as well as its settling of the cultural terrain discussed in chapter 4 of the text.

It needs to be noted that Gramsci, and Marx before him, felt compelled to explain that concepts, analytically derived, exist in the consciousness of the social scientist and the subject, society, exists independently of this consciousness. The concepts and ideas already developed within and about society (the entire ideological apparatuses of and forms of consciousness within society) are also parts of the phenomena of the subject under analysis as I have already discussed. For Gramsci and Marx, the only valid scientific concepts are those that develop through an appreciation of the real subject of study: namely, real individuals in their actual intercourse with each other within society. "Individuals producing in a society, and hence the socially determined production of individuals, is of course the point of departure" (Marx 1970, 188). These real individuals in society form the starting point of the analysis and "must be envisaged...as the pre-

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[2] Since the Middle East is where *civilization* arose--where the domestication of plants and animals first took place, where the first cities were settled, the first writing; and it is the Arabs who saved the Greeks whom the West now claim as the foundations of their own democracies; and of course mathematics, our number system, our alphabet, the all important zero, empirical medicine, the three monotheisms--just to mention a few--all come from this part of the world so the whole idea of the clash of civilizations is an absurdity. It's a clash for US world domination by private capitalist interests of today over the rest of humanity.

condition of comprehension even when the theoretical method is employed" (Marx 1970, 207). It is the "speculative stance" or "theoretical attitude" of the social scientist though, which enables the mind, through a process of abstraction, to develop concepts which allow the complex totality, society, to be comprehended as a dialectically interrelated process. The concepts thus derived enable the various aspects of this interdependent whole to be grasped, first, in their distinctness, then, as dialectically interrelated aspects of "a totality comprising many determinations and relations" (Marx 1970, 206). If successful, the subject is now comprehended in consciousness as a whole, but not a whole composed of discrete parts or structures or facts that are simply contemporaneously co-existing and therefore in relationship to each other, but as aspects definitionally related to and mutually dependent upon each other and the whole. The subject must always be "presupposed both in reality and in the mind, and ...therefore categories express forms of existence and conditions of existence--and sometimes merely separate aspects--of this particular society, the subject..." (Marx 1970, 212).

I emphasis this aspect of the historical materialist method because social scientists, including Marxists, too often substitute their concepts about reality for the reality and construct concepts which fragment the subject being analyzed into aspects, and then conceive the subject as a whole, both in their minds and in fact--in reality--as the sum of these conceptual parts. As Marx put it: "philosophical consciousness [for our purposes sociological consciousness]... regards the comprehending mind as the real man, and hence the comprehended world as such as the only real world" (Marx 1970, 206-07; brackets mine). Such thinking about Palestinians in Israel dominants the intellectual discussion in Israeli social sciences and is seen in the application of culturalist and

essentialist concepts such as the *hamula* and *village* which I discuss in chapter 4. Mainstream culturalist and urbanist studies proceed along this same line of essentialist reasoning as I discuss most particularly in chapter 1, “The Ghetto.” Within the Israeli context, social spaces, the Palestinian locales, which are in fact constructed ghettos, are attributed to essentialized Arab cultural traits and given the nomenclature “village”.

The application of the method of analysis--historical materialism--created by Marx and Engels, and developed further by Gramsci, which is being discussed here, makes the researcher's task more difficult but leads the research endeavor towards an explanation and not simply a sociological description of some event. The major difficulty, which goes against the dominant mainstream intellectual method of our time--empiricism--is that all categories about society are dialectically conceived. Each concept is, at once, defined as a distinct aspect of the totality, such as Gramsci's concept the “State”, and at the same time, it is analytically and definitionally related to all the other aspects which comprise a unity within the whole. That is why Marx and Gramsci both explain that the concepts, such as base and superstructure, are just that—concepts--abstractions from elements of the totality that make possible the comprehension of crucial dynamics within societal formation. The subject, which exists outside and independently of the comprehending mind while being "envisaged...as the pre-condition of comprehension...when the theoretical method is employed," is not the expression of or representation of these concepts in reality. These abstractions reflect in consciousness dynamics within society and make possible their comprehension but are not the reality. "...reality produces a wealth of the most bizarre combinations. It is up to the theoretician to unravel these in order to discover fresh proof of his theory, to 'translate' into theoretical

language the elements of historical life. It is not reality which should be expected to conform to the abstract schema" (Gramsci 1971, 200).[3]

Therefore, one will find that the same phenomenon or fact presented to consciousness for both Marx and Gramsci will be absorbed, at one moment of the analysis, within a particular abstraction-concept, only, to be absorbed, at another moment, by an apparently mutually-exclusive but complementary concept, depending on what process within reality they are trying to comprehend and explain. "Political parties" for Gramsci may be discussed as part of "civil society" at one moment and as part of the "State" at another. For both these thinkers, scientific activity will be defined, at once, as a force of production and again, as a part of the social relations of production; or in one instance as a part of the base and at another as a part of the super-structure of society.[4] Gramsci develops the concepts of civil society and political society (the State) as distinct spheres of activity only to turn around and stress that "in concrete reality, civil society and State are one and the same." On the other hand, when theoreticians fail to distinguish the state from civil society, so that differentiated process within society cannot be brought to light, Gramsci will criticize their short-sightedness.

While still discussing general theoretical influences, mention must also be made of Lenin and Lukacs who stand high among those thinkers who have drawn our attention to the need to develop a keen awareness and sensitivity to mediation, since what one

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[3] I would argue that Gramsci along with Marx and Engels are the real *empiricists* since reality in its immediacy, conceptually unmediated form, is the starting point of the analysis; concepts are derivative.

[4] In the *Appendices* to *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy* Marx analyzes production, distribution and consumption as necessary and distinct activities of any society and then proceeds to demonstrate that production is consumption, consumption production and so forth. Such an analysis is simply mind-boggling to mainstream sociologists and economists. Unfortunately empiricism has penetrated much of what is considered Marxist writing as well.

empirically perceives is the expression of many mediations which are lost to one's perception except through analysis. They address this concern theoretically and through their analyses they demonstrate how to apply such thinking. The attention to mediation along with Freire's emphasis on developing the methodological and analytical conceptual tools required to identify the deep structures that are both the constituted past as present and the being-made-in-present work together to form a coherent theoretical and methodological orientation.

I was particularly impressed by Lenin's *State and Revolution* which I reread after many years for a Political Science class while a gradate student. I quite expected to find it naïve, but to my surprise, I realized I had never fully appreciated the richness of Lenin's method applied in this work. I am not here discussing the historical events that have subsequently taken place since his writing of this book that may prove or disprove any of his predictions or the correctness of any one aspect of his analysis; what is important here is his method of analysis and understanding of social developments, in particular, the awareness that any given action transforms the given reality and sets into motion other dynamics that then shift the forces at work and create new contradictions and pressures and contentions and actions that lead then to other centers, vectors and directions generating new social forces and processes, while at the same time the fundamental dynamics of the system as such and its inherent logic are reproduced yet always on ever changing structures and circumstances constituted by the actors themselves.

So, we turn full circle here back to Marx, Engels and Gramsci, to a method of analyzing society as at once formed and structured and evolving and being remade. Unfortunately, in English, we don't have, at least not now, words that immediately grasp

such process as being and becoming, formed and evolving, so one is forced clumsily (of course those more literate than I may be more successful) to construct such concepts by hyphenating and compounding words or stringing words together in an attempt to give back to our words a sense of movement and an inner dynamism for the purpose of rendering an analytic approach that is neither static nor reductionist. As Marx says, the only way we have to apprehend the world is through our consciousness and we do this through developing our concepts. How we develop these concepts is also rooted in how we live and all that that encompasses—our relationships to each other, nature, property, possession, means of production. Our concepts can help us get to the *root of the matter which is man himself*, or can gloss, mystify, disclose, hide, make static, reify the real movement of people as individuals in their life process. So, the influences I mention here and the many others that I draw on aid me in developing for myself concepts, sensitivities, insights, objectivity, to the complexity and non-teleological (and therefore often quite unpredictable) yet systemic character of our world from its most micro to macro levels. Perhaps, as chaos theory becomes more developed and cohesive we will have at our disposal a logical system that enables us to hold in our minds as common sense that human development is at once ordered and not predictable, at least not in the long run;[5] and that we can develop social scientific means and methods of analyzes that take into account that small changes can make for greatly different outcomes in a world that is inherently, definitionally, or perhaps better, ontologically interconnected and

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[5] In a public talk I heard Richard Lewontin, the internationally renown Marxist Harvard biologist, respond to a question that the late Stephen Jay Gould posed to him concerning what period of time either in the past or the future he would like to witness. Lewontin said, fifty years in the future. This surprised the paleontologist who desired to go back to the time of the dinosaurs. Lewontin's reason was that perhaps if he knew what happens in fifty years from now he could make some difference in his present actions on the future, stating that any longer period of time would be meaningless for such purposes

contradictory; and that existence is non-teleological and complex yet systemic and determinant--always keeping in mind that we can understand ourselves and our societies, because as Vico so simply yet elegantly told us, we make our history.[6] What I am discussing here has informed all the work whether it be analytical or ethnographic.

Thus far I have mentioned those influences that are most basic to my theoretical approach to sociological study. But once stated the concrete analysis of a concrete situation calls forth the need for further methodological and research tools so I now turn to the second task of this Appendix and discuss those influences more directly related to carrying out the research tasks of this dissertation. In this regard there have been numerous influences appropriated from a wide variety of disciplines and genres from the natural sciences, natural history, fiction, nonfiction, literary criticism, anthropology, urban studies, political science, ancient history, ethnography, and of course, sociology and branches within sociology, most particularly, ethnomethodology. Although I do not refer explicitly to all these and other influences on me in this study, these influences affect how I see, feel, look at, appropriate, speak about, write about, create a coherent (at least hopefully so) whole out of this dissertation's laboratory. In regard to these influences I would have to mention at least four additional sources.

First, work pertaining to social space and most particularly, Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* and Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question, A Marxist Approach*.

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[6] Marx was deeply interested in the new developments in the mathematics of his day, particularly the concept of the derivative. He thought that the derivative formed the starting point for the development of a mathematization of dialectical logic. When I learned of fractal geometry and chaos theory I had a similar reaction and still think that these developments are moving in the direction of generating logical systems that are at once dynamic, complex, dialectical, historical, non-linear and empirical. And I am not alone in thinking this as can be seen in Oliver Sacks' 1990 edition of his *Awakenings* which includes in the "Appendices" a piece entitled "Chaos and Awakening" He discusses the possibility of chaos theory providing such a logical mathematical system. So perhaps Marx was right after all, since without the derivative there would be no chaos theory.

Lefebvre's influence is discussed in the "Introduction" and is evidenced throughout the analysis and Castells is discussed extensively in chapter 1, "The Ghetto," so further attention is not required here, except to say that Lefebvre provided the conceptual and theoretical framework that enabled me to fully grasp what I was experiencing and what the research material and data was forcing upon my consciousness: namely, that ghettoization is temporalized produced social space. Castells on the other hand was more helpful analytically at getting at some of the particulars of the process of producing space within the specific historically determinate circumstances given to the study.

Second, influence comes from my study of ethnomethodology as a graduate student. This branch of sociology focuses one's attention to the phenomenology of living in the world. For myself, what I have taken from ethnomethodology is what I call a sense of the phenomenological gestalt by which I mean apprehending an event as an interaction between and among individuals within each situated experience as a complete gesture, whether successful or not the event stands as a gestalt of some sort. When engaged in participant observation, when out in the field, when conducting qualitative ethnography it is most important to pay close attention to how human beings interact with each other in their shared situated contexts, as they engage in a continual process of initiation, mediation, negotiation, and eventually some form of resolution or closure; and as they do so they create, recreate and reproduce the situated context and their relationships within the context at hand. Acquiring an appreciation for ethnomethodology's attention to the *how* of people actively constructing their positions in their momentary worlds, in their interaction within their particular settings whether an institution, the market place, a court room, or a simple conversation between two people was indispensable for carrying out

my research agenda and is seen in a variety of examples and stories I include in this dissertation as supporting evidence along side the more traditional sociological analysis.

Ethnomethodology sensitized me, complemented by anthropologists like Clifford Gertz, James Clifford, Vincent Crapanzano and Eleanor Leacock, to the subtle processes at work as individuals interact in their circumstances and create their dynamics and realities individually and together. Again, it must always be held in mind, as I stated earlier, that individuals are creating reality within already constituted social givens and the task is not to loose sight of the objective while paying close attention to the subjective or vice versa. Individuals are relating to one another at their work places, in the universities, in social welfare institutions, in schools, in families within historically constructed forms of how these institutions and activities are organized and reproduced and in their active present interrelations they are dynamically adjusting, figuring out, challenging, pressing the limits of or passively accepting these defined circumstances and the established hierarchical and power relations and these relations clearly constrain how their negotiated reconstructions are played out. The analyst has to, to the best of their ability, perceive the complex phenomenological mediations present and how the *deep structures* are present and expressed in the given relations as the active subjectivities interact and create within their given circumstances.

Third, anthropological and sociological readings on working in the field and ethnographic studies have been indispensable; of particular assistance were writings on participant observation such as Danny L. Jorgensen's *Participant Observation: A Methodology for Human Studies*; *In the Field: Readings on the Field Work Experience* edited by Carolyn D. Smith and William Kornblum; Vincent Crapanzano's *Waiting: The*

*Whites of South Africa*, *Tuhami: A Portrait of a Moroccan* and *The Hamadsha: An Essay in Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry*; David M. Fettermen's *Ethnography: Step By Step*; James P. Spradley's excellent how-to book, *The Ethnographic Interview*; Paul Rabinow's *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco*: and David M. Fetterman's *Ethnography: Step By Step*, along with many others. I also had the good fortune of discovering a wonderful book in Haifa University's magnificent library on learning a language in the field, Robbins Burling's *Learning a Field Language*, while under the auspices of a Fulbright Scholarship for Dissertation Study Abroad.

A word regarding Vincent Crapanzano's *Waiting: The Whites of South Africa* is warranted since this book was especially relevant to the work of this dissertation. The realities of Black South Africans during apartheid and Palestinians in Israel have had much in common—homelands/ghettos, separateness, essentialism of culture to justify differences and subordination, fear of the oppressor, no real recognition of the subordinated other, the issue of intermarriage—and of course these commonalities have their basis in the historical fact that both South Africa and Israel are colonial settler societies developing within the world capitalist market. Additionally, Dr. Crapanzano's wonderful writing, which combines interviews with his comments and analysis, and his insightfulness, demonstrated how to combine the objective and subjective, the researcher and the researched; and showed me the validity of incorporating into the dissertation the experience of being an American living in Israel going between the two cultures.

Lastly, regarding influences within sociological case studies, Frederick Engels' *The Condition of the Working Class in England* still stands as a model of social analysis based on field work. This important book published in 1845 was the first work to my

knowledge that incorporated sociological field work and still stands as an exemplary model. Engels writes in the *Preface to the First German Edition of 1845*:

> Since social distress in our day reaches its climax in the condition of the working classes it is obvious that the topics with which I am concerned in this book must form the basis of any effective approach to the examination of modern social movements…It is essential to have adequate knowledge of the way of life of the proletariat if one is to form a sound judgment on the merits of socialist theories…I had the opportunity, during a stay of twenty-one months in England, of seeing for myself how the proletariat lives. I have met many workers and I have had long talks with them. Through personal contact with the English workers I have learned something of their hopes and fears, their joys and sorrows. My own observations have been supplemented by studying authentic printed sources of information concerning the conditions of the proletariat. This book is based upon what I have seen and heard for myself and also upon what I have read.

Besides being the first sociological ethnographer, Engels was the first to do a concrete study on the working class and "to deal with all the various types of English workers." It was through Engels that I first learned, reinforced by the teacher and literary critic, Dr. Annette T. Rubinstein, the importance and usefulness of fiction, as a source of historical and social data. He demonstrated the applicability of such data to serious social analysis in such work as *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State*. This is underscored by this remark by the late Dr. Annette T. Rubinstein.

> These examples [from literature] are significant not only because they disabuse us of the idea of any pure content without material form, but also because they show how, by attending closely to the formal properties of literature, its historical and political qualities resonate as well. The ability to see in the received categories of daily life a more comprehensive account of the workings of society is very much in keeping with Marx's approach."[7]

I join Engels in saying: *I have learned more [from my readings of literature] than from all the professed historians, economists and statisticians of the period together*. The reading of literature generally and Israeli, Arab and Palestinian in particular, has been crucial to this work.

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[7] Annette T. Rubinstein, "Fundamental Problems in Marxist Literary Criticism: Form, History and Ideology," *Socialism and Democracy* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 1-23.

In regards to the third task of this Appendix, those key to helping me make sense out of the particulars of Israeli society, three books must be mentioned: namely, Yerach Gover's *Zionism: The Limits of Moral Discourse in Israeli Hebrew Fiction*, Susan Slyomovics' *The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village* and Ella Shohat's *Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation*. Yerach Gover's penetrating insights helped me make conscious my own perceptions and I am profoundly indebted to him. In some ways this dissertation was possible because of his path breaking work, particularly his identification of the difference between the juridical and moral subject. This work more than any other gave me the confidence to say what I felt had to be said. Gover's importance to this work is evident throughout, most particularly in chapter 3, the title of which is taken from his book. I mention Susan Slymovics' work, not because she has influenced me in the writing of this dissertation (I had already finished most of the writing before discovering *The Object of Memory*), but because she has written a book which I feel is a sister to this dissertation in orientation and approach and her research confirms much of what I am writing here. She helped me keep my focus as I went into the last stages of writing this dissertation. Ella Shohat, like Yerach Gover, has directly confronted the hegemonic nation-building Zionist particularism and helped me gain insight into the process of ideological construction within Israeli society and the general east/west dichotomy within the complexity of Israeli social formation, Jewish and Palestinian. Two other significant works are Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog's *Life is With People: Culture of the Shtetl* and Eva Hoffman's *Shtetl: The Life and Death of a Small Town and the World of Polish Jews*.[8]

[8] See also Nancy Sinkoff, *Out of the Shtetl: Making Jews Modern in the Polish Borderlands (*Providence:

Their stories of the European shtetl were informative in helping me understand in living everyday terms the meaning of a community's life, especially one defined by ghettoization, and had direct relevance to the realities of Palestinians in Israel.

With all these theoretical, conceptual and empirical moments in mind, and particularly Lefebvre's concept of social space, which absorbs within it the complexity of all that is constitutive of social practice, we see that the study of any particular space, like ghettoization, is expressive of the totality of social practices and a culmination of a history of social practice embedded within the present manifested space. Therefore, to fully treat the subject would involve much more than possible for one volume to take into account, so I had to limit the scope of what to present in this dissertation while attempting to express or at least indicate the dimensions of the historical and social complexity manifested in the production of Israel's ghetto social space. For purposes of the dissertation, I came to the conclusion that besides articulating the problematic of the ghetto (chapter 1) and specifying the key historical backdrop to the settling of such a terrain (chapter 2, Appendix F), the specific legal (chapter 3) and cultural dimensions of the nation building project (chapter 4)—the institutionalization, legally and ideologically, of a culture of separation—were also necessary ingredients to this first approximation of the question at hand. But this is a story of real individuals and so I decided that something of the life of the people involved, something of the concrete situation of the ghetto, and some of their voices telling their history, concerns and daily life were essential to this first approximation (chapter 5, Appendices D and E). I had to leave out much ethnographic work (which will hopefully be the basis for further study and elaboration) and other important pieces of the fuller picture but an entry into the story is begun.

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Brown Judaic Studies, 2004).

In closing I pay homage to Abram Leon and Maxime Rodinson who have been my mentors as theorists and practitioners of historical materialism and as analysts of Zionism, Israel and the Middle East. Their humanity and integrity as scientists and individuals, their uncompromising commitment to science, drawing whatever conclusions necessarily followed from their explorations no matter where that led them—these I keep before me as a constant reminder to myself as I struggle to make sense out of what often appears to be a senseless world. I cherish their lives and their lives' works.

# Appendix B

## Research Modes and Methods
## And Discussion of Selected Research Areas

The research methods employed have had to be just as interdisciplinary and diverse as the theoretical influences I discussed in Appendix A. Research involved the use of historical and statistical methods; open and closed sociological survey questionnaires and interviews; anthropological methods applied to tracing family histories, lineage, marriage patterns and the naming of offspring; and participant observation. Oral histories and in-depth interviews were essential tools in the gathering of data for a narrative of one of Israel's Palestinian ghetto communities.

Besides an in-depth review of the literature on Arabs in Israel along with a study of the history of the Zionist Movement and the establishment and development of the State of Israel, a great deal of fieldwork was undertaken to make this dissertation possible. Although much of the ethnographic material is not recorded in the pages of this dissertation, it was this on-the-ground work, of being in everyday life in the ghetto, from which my theoretical conclusions were drawn. For one, the analysis of the realities of everyday life was key to an assessment of the literature on the Arabs of Israel. Living in Israel's second largest Palestinian ghetto for over four years provided me with a living laboratory to test the assumptions, conceptualizations and statements about Palestinians under Israeli citizenship. This was most important because this dissertation analyzes the process of constructing a social other, a people within a given society who are seen by the dominant culture and state as an *other living in our midst*. Witnessing everyday life within a Palestinian locale and its articulation with the dominant society was fundamental

to determining what avenues of theoretical and empirical work needed to be undertaken if only because I was faced with the task of making sense of this experience—what I eventually understood to be a particular production of space—the ghetto.

Research tasks were accomplished by conducting fieldwork in Umm al-Fahim and by gathering the required statistical and historical information from a variety of sources in Israel, including national and municipal government statistics and reports and interviews with national and municipal government agency officials and staff. I reviewed political documents and institutional archives. I made extensive use of Israeli government statistics, census reports, land, population and housing policy documents, and income, occupation and employment data. These were available through the City Council of Umm al-Fahim, Israel Ministry of Interior, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, Department of Arab Affairs, Knesset, Histadrut, political parties, journals, newspapers, and various institutional archives. Other data gathered concerned social backgrounds, household division of labor, education, housing density, election results, political affiliation, religious attitudes, self-identity; and other demographic data on age, birth rates, infant mortality, and causes of death, family size, and health. Interviewees included residents of different generations, gender, occupation, class, and status.

I also researched public institutions and the developments of social welfare, education, and public health facilities and the actual conditions of school buildings, classrooms and supplies for education, clinics, garbage dumps and health facilities; and by means of personal narrative and interviews with teachers, doctors, nurses, housewives, young people, municipal workers, social workers, and industrial, service and agricultural workers I learned about the problems, concerns and frustrations facing individuals in

these activities within social life. By reviewing municipal and government statistics along with interviews, surveys, and my own experience I learned of the separate and conjoined lives of men and women in the ghetto, the ghetto economy and its articulation with the Israeli economy, the political economy of transportation, drugs and truancy, and the various political and social responses that have emerged within the community as its inhabitants struggle to deal with their problems and living conditions.

It is important to note that in May, 1988 I married a resident of Umm al-Fahim. I had traveled to Israel a couple of times in the mid-1980s and in October, 1988 I went to live with my husband as a housewife in Umm al-Fahim after completing all the requirements for the doctorate except the dissertation. I hoped to decide upon my dissertation topic while living there. During the next year I shared the ordinary problems and concerns of everyday life with my family and the rest of the community. During this period I formulated my dissertation topic, actually, people in Umm al-Fahim decided it for me. Friends and family knew I was trying to figure out what I wanted to work on and they knew I was planning to return to New York to settle this with my university when the 1989 academic year began. One day while talking about this with friends someone perked up and said why not write about us. "The world doesn't know about us. We don't exist. They know about Israel but they don't know about us." Well, that settled the terrain of the dissertation for me. I also came to realize how true this statement is. I have found it to be quite common for people in the United States and Canada (I have family in Canada and visit there quite often) not to know that Palestinians live in Israel and that they are citizens. Even after clarifying about whom I am speaking, I often have to reiterate that I am not talking about Palestinians in the Occupied Territories or refugee camps but citizens of Israel. Israel is equated in the minds of

many people to be a Jewish State consisting of Jews only. Israeli is synonymous with Jewish. This is all the more remarkable since percentage wise Palestinians constitute a larger portion of the Israeli citizenry than do African Americans in the United States.

While living in Umm al-Fahim, first as a housewife then as housewife-researcher, I continuously studied Arabic on my own with the help of family members as well as taking classes at the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Jerusalem and at home in Umm al-Fahim where I participated in an after school program for illiterate adult women. Such experiences also formed part of the research data and gave me further entry into life in the ghetto. Once I was actively involved in the research and not just living in Umm al-Fahim I established liaisons with various residents, community institutions and official offices in Umm al-Fahim. I kept a diary of events in Umm al-Fahim, observations of everyday life, details of conversations, rumors, gossip, social discussions and opinions.

To the extent possible I involved members of the community in the research project. Listed here are some of the projects undertaken with residents: 1) With the help of social studies high school teachers, students conducted a survey questionnaire interviewing from the same pool of male residents that Sami Geraisy, in *Arab Village Youth in Jewish Urban Centers: A Study of Youth From Um El Fahm Working in the Tel Aviv Metropolitan Area*, surveyed twenty years before my own research began. His dissertation pertained to young men in Umm al-Fahim who commuted to work outside the ghetto and although I was not able to identify the particular young men he surveyed I drew my sample from the same age group twenty years later. 2) I took walking tours with residents who described Umm al-Fahim today and as they remembered it. 3) Applying Israeli social categories, I worked with family members from each of what are

considered the four independently related *hamulas* to trace their family names and parentage going back six generations to see if this data was consistent with Israeli presuppositions and concepts. 4) Under my supervision housewives conducted interviews and surveys with other women residents. 5) Residents also assisted me in translating to and from written and spoken Hebrew and Arabic, interpretation, and in gaining access to diverse segments of the population and accompanied me on interviews when necessary. I discuss some of these areas in more detail when I review five research themes later in this Appendix.

Such community cooperation was important and necessary. Learning language, etiquette, the meaning of gestures, and the complex web of interpersonal relationships so varied among the peoples of the world is no easy task so support from the community was essential. That I am married to a respected resident of Umm al-Fahim, had already lived in Umm al-Fahim as a housewife before returning to the community as a researcher and was familiar with colloquial Arabic helped me gain unique access to the community and made available unusual avenues of research.

In the “Introduction” to the excellent collection of readings about the difficulties and awards of ethnography, *In the Field,* William Kornblum tells of some of the issues the participant observer must deal with and Part I of the book treats the question of “Gaining Trust.” For any researcher of a subordinated population the issue of trust and its relevance to the reliability of data is important. There are special circumstances affecting this in the Israeli setting. Due to historical circumstances Palestinians are in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the hegemonic Jewish society and state. They are generally viewed by the Jewish population, at both the official and personal levels, as the "enemy within" who is not to be

trusted. This in turn instills insecurity and mistrust into the Palestinian community, who were also subject to military governance until 1966 and to police surveillance ever since the establishment of the state. My relationship to the community as both an "insider" and an "outsider" gave me unique access to the activities, concerns and attitudes of its residents. In this regard my marriage to a respected member of the community and the fact that I had already established myself within the community as a housewife, undoubtedly gave me access to the realities of everyday life as well as the trust of the residents, which would not have been available to me otherwise. Without the help of all the individuals who assisted me in doing this work, and without the openness of the community to allowing me into their homes, lives, concerns and opinions, I could never have written this work; and I would not have written this work if I felt that I could not with some genuine degree of authenticity narrate their story.

Besides the question of trust there is also the problematic inherent to the question/answer format since it is known that the interviewee generally wants to give the answer that he or she thinks the interviewer is looking for. Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson in their book *Ethnography: Principles in Practice* speak of the “reactivity” of the interviewee to the interviewer and discuss how to minimize the influence of the interviewer on the interviewed and thus, hopefully insure the validity of the interview data. When the subject is a subaltern, the researcher confronts an even more difficult task, particularly in relation to a subject who knows he/she is seen as an *enemy within* the society of which he/she is a part. Words can be dangerous and held against you. This is a specifically Israeli expression of a more general aspect of the colonial experience. In the Israeli context it has profound significance since ideologically and in practical terms the

Zionist nation building construct is based on what is conceived of as a moral right to exclude from *our society* the native non-Jewish *other* as a social equal since they are not a part of the moral-social we.

As Freire has shown, cultures of domination are internalized by the subjugated and many mediations have to be made conscious to comprehend what is really going on in the heart and mind of the subject, a process which may or may not be conscious to the subject. Such insight makes the researcher's task even more difficult, especially when interviews or surveys are used as a source of data. The manifold mediations between lived experiences and self-consciousness within cultures of domination which have been "interiorized" by the actors demands that all such materials not be treated at face value. Instead they require layers of analysis to uncover the various mediations at work that result in the responses given by the interviewed. Residents in Umm al-Fahim, for instance, may not only be speaking to the interviewer, but experience the presence of the authorities as they speak. This also requires sensitivity on the part of the researcher to the context of subordination. The researcher must take into account the respondent's perception of the researcher which informs the kind of response that the person will give, whether this is conscious on his/her part or not. The researcher must also be sensitive to the complex psychological processes at work that enable the individual to move in and out of their subordinate position within the society at large and at home in the ghetto among peers, while maintaining a sense of him/herself as a "person" with at least a modicum of integrity and dignity.

It is typical in Israeli scholarship, which almost universally ignores or glosses the historical background and reality of subordination of Palestinians in their society, to

conduct surveys questioning *their Arabs* to determine their self-identity, attachments, their Israelization, etc. After living in Israel and studying this literature, I realized how superficial most of these studies were and that answers to such questions as: Should the State of Israel exist?; Can you live in a Zionist state?; Do you identify yourselves as a Palestinian or Israeli?; If a Palestinian State is established do you want to live there? etc., etc. were misleading and the questions themselves were often unknowingly insensitive and elitist. The conclusions drawn from the data acquired from such surveys, in my estimate, are to be put in brackets since the meanings of the answers given may not be what they appear to be and can therefore lead to misguided conclusions about what one is attempting to understand.

Troubled by this approach, one day I asked my husband about how he would answer such questions and what difficulties if any he experienced in answering such questions. I share one of his responses since it helps explicate the complexity about which I am speaking and confirmed my own sense that such questions were not always appropriate and that a different format or analytic approach was required. In response to the question: "If a Palestinian State is established do you want to live there?" he replied: "If an Israeli asks me this question I feel there is a doubt about my existence here. The interviewer expects me to leave so I quickly respond to tell him I want to stay here, to let it be known that they can't get rid of me. The assumption is that a Palestinian State would be my normal place and Israel is not my normal place. On the other hand, by answering this way it makes me sound like I am not sincere about wanting a Palestinian State. Also, I want to remove suspicion that I am that kind of Palestinian who doesn't accept Israel. On the other hand the question makes me uncomfortable because it implies that I want a

Palestinian State but I don't want to live there, therefore it is assumed I think a Palestinian State is a negative thing, that Israel is better than a Palestinian State."

All this man wants is to live where he and his family were born and be considered an individual and peer by the society as a whole. But how, within this culture of domination and separation can he answer just this one question and explain all that he feels and believes; especially when one answer is sought and will be interpreted a certain way? I had to develop a different approach. In developing my own interviews I was aided by James P. Spradley's discussion in his book *The Ethnographic Interview* in which he emphasizes how to let the interviewee speak and communicate in their own language and terms and how the interviewer can unravel his/her meanings and cultural assumptions, relations, meanings, definitions, etc., over time through a process of developing the ongoing interview process, analysis of interviews and notes. Also, fortunately, my own situation, as I clarify more in Appendix C, helped me greatly in entering more authentically into the lives of a Palestinian community. In Appendices D and E the reader can hear the voices of individuals from Umm al-Fahim speak for themselves.

My research stages more or less proceeded along the following course. During the 1990-1991 academic year I was recipient of a Fulbright Grant for Graduate Study Abroad in Israel. I was told that I was the first Fulbright dissertation awardee for research pertaining to Israel's Arab population. I was affiliated with the University of Haifa and had access to the University's facilities. The University of Haifa houses a magnificent library which contains an extensive collection of literature pertaining to the Arab population in Israel. During this period my dissertation efforts concentrated on an extensive study of this literature (which continued throughout the research and writing phases of the dissertation),

learning colloquial spoken Arabic, gathering historical and statistical data, and preparing the next stage of work, competent fieldwork in Umm al-Fahim. Actually, once I settled the dissertation topic I began fieldwork, by first keeping daily notes of my experiences and observations living in Umm al-Fahim and mediating between the two worlds, going as I did back and forth between the two cultures, the two separate worlds of Israeli society, Jewish and Palestinian.

During the 1991-92 academic year I received the Andrew Silk Dissertation Fellowship from my university, The Graduate School of the City University of New York. This Fellowship gave me the ability to continue with my research and conduct fieldwork in Umm al-Fahim which was being threatened to come to an end. At the time my husband and I were facing severe financial difficulties, with no employment opportunities for me in Israel and the threat that I may have to return to New York simply to work. Thanks to this Fellowship I was able to conduct fieldwork in Umm al-Fahim while I also gathered information and documentation from official Israeli sources. Interviews with many people of different generations and occupations including commuting workers, shopkeepers, sub-contractors, small producers, women garment workers, housewives, unemployed youth, professionals (school teachers, lawyers, accountants, doctors), high school students, municipal employees, trade unionists, self-employed small business people, imams, officers and lay members of religious and political parties were conducted. Data concerning social backgrounds, family histories, division of labor within the home, occupations, educational status, political affiliation, religious attitudes, self-identity; and other demographic data on age, births, deaths, family size, housing density, health were gathered. Developments of the local government, election campaigns and results, social welfare, health and education

services were researched. Israeli government statistics, census reports, past and present government plans for land use, population and housing policy documents, and income, occupation and employment data were studied.

There is no written history of Umm al-Fahim. Stories circulate through the memories of the old who tell their children and they tell theirs. But gradually this oral tradition is giving way. Umm al-Fahim was not an important center like Nablus, which was a major market and urban center located in the original pre-1948 trading Triangle. Nor was Umm al-Fahim a municipality like Shifaamr in the Galilee. (Because of this the Hebrew University sociologist Majid Al-Haj, who grew up in Shifaamr, had available a wealth of documentation and was able to write *Social Change and Family Processes: Arab Communities in Shefar-A'm.* Shefar-A'm is the Hebraization of the Arabic Shifaamr.) Therefore, there are few statistical, legal or historical documents readily available concerning Umm al-Fahim's history. There is, of course, a great deal of raw data that could be gathered since the Ottomans and the British kept extensive records dealing with property, deeds, registration, inheritances, legal disputes, imports and exports, production, births, etc. But such research was outside the scope of this dissertation. Although I make use of some of this historical material, I have drawn on a variety of other sources and resources to create some sense of this history and the context surrounding the events leading up to the present, the major ones of which I now mention.

In the 1970s the British documentary filmmaker Antonia Caccia and her film consultant, Ghassan Fawzi, with the assistance of Uri Davis, produced a research manuscript that was the basis for her film, *On Our Land*, about Palestinians in Israel based on Umm al-Fahim. This unpublished manuscript, of which I have access,

documents in pictures and interviews some of the story of Umm al-Fahim. They have generously allowed me to reprint photos and excerpts from this work.

Benny Morris, one of Israel's *New Historians*, has written, what is now covered in three volumes, a history of the 1947-49 war years up through 1956. His first volume concentrates on the circumstances that gave rise to the Palestinian refugee problem and he then goes on to document the border wars through 1956. He wrote these important works after the Israeli government declassified and made public state and private documents and political papers of the 1947-1949 period. Based on this material, in his book, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-48*, he details, at times giving a day-to-day accounting, the events that took place during this time. Luckily, for our purposes, there exists information concerning some of the events that took place in the Little Triangle and Jezreel Valley of which Umm al-Fahim is a part. Without this detailed and conscientious historical work I would not have been able to reconstruct the story as objectively as I have since I would not have been able to check the oral histories for their accuracy. Furthermore, Ilan Pappe's recent book, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine,* based on original source documents, not only substantiated my own assessment of the war but clearly settles any ambiguity that surrounds the question regarding the Zionist objective of gaining at least eighty percent of Mandatory Palestine and removing as many of the native Palestinians from the territory under their control (Ben-Gurion settled on an 80-20 percent ratio, that is 80 percent of Mandate Palestine and no more than 20 percent of the native Palestinian population as sufficient for the establishment of the state. This was accomplished by the war and this ratio has been the working territorial and demographic principle of all Israeli regimes since that time.). The work of many other

authors have been crucial to understanding the historical background to the present situation and I mention here just a few—Sami Hadawi, Tom Segev, Shlomo Swirski, Shlomo Ben-Ami, Walid Khalidi, Sabri Jiryis, Pinhas Yorman, Beshara Doumani, Albert Hourani, David Kretzmer, Majid al-Haj, Henry Rosenfeld, Elia Zuriek, Aharon Cohen.

Combining resources drawn from Ms Caccia's and my interviews and field work a story of Umm al-Fahim took shape. The perceptions and memories of the residents were, as stated, compared when possible to the details provided by Morris and others. I was surprised to discover how well in these instances the *perceptions* fit the *facts*. Since I am not only interested in reconstructing the *objective facts* of Umm al-Fahim's history, but also disclosing the meaning of the events that comprise this history to the people who either lived them or are living out their consequences--events, both dramatic and traumatic, resulting in a rupture from and transformation of their entire mode of life prior to 1948--I was not *a priori* concerned that the *facts* and the *perceptions* may differ but I was delighted when I discovered congruence.

In closing, five research areas have been chosen for a brief but more detailed discussion. Though the research areas outlined here do not constitute separate chapters the research undertaken in these areas proved extremely valuable and helped inform the analysis and writing of the dissertation; and most importantly allowed me to entire into the more intimate complexities that make up individuals and communities which are not directly evident to the outsider nor necessarily conscious to the individuals concerned since much of everyday life is simply lived, second nature and taken for granted. In these cases, the carrying out of the research and not just the data gathered was important to the work, since I worked through institutions in the community and with groups of people as well as

individuals in carrying out the research. These projects not only widened my experience in and knowledge of the community but also became a part of the research material that had to be analyzed. Furthermore these experiences proved invaluable for a critical reading of the literature on Arabs in Israel. I turn now to these five research areas.

1) As mentioned earlier, Dr. Sami Farah Geraisy conducted a survey questionnaire during 1969-1970 on working male youth from Umm al-Fahim for his doctoral dissertation in social work entitled *Arab Village Youth in Jewish Urban Centers: A Study of Youth From Um El Fahm Working in the Tel Aviv Metropolitan Area*, which he completed in 1971. He researched the living and working conditions of these young men. I wrote a follow-up survey to be conducted on a sample from this same population in hopes of generating a longitudinal study on this Palestinian population in Israel. Additional questions were asked to trace their work and family histories, and to explore their attitudes to the Zionist project, concerns about conditions in Umm al-Fahim, attitudes to women, politics, and religion. With the help of social studies teachers in Umm al-Fahim's public high school, students worked with me and conducted the interviews. In the end I did not consider that I had sufficient control of the circumstances to be assured that the data throughout was statistically valid, though the information was certainly of use. But the experience itself became research material as I stated above. Furthermore, in drawing up the list of people to be surveyed, current residents who formerly were the pool for Dr. Geraisy's sample, I had to turn to the voter registration list. Through this work I discovered the Israeli government's *hamula*-based registration policy of their Palestinian population, which is elaborated in chapter 5.

2) Once I came to understand the hegemonic Israeli social science paradigm regarding the Palestinian population in Israel, exemplified by the assignment of *hamula* names as an individual's family name, I set out to trace back as many generations as possible the histories of what are considered to be the four independent families in Umm al-Fahim; I worked with family members from each of the four *hamulas* who trace their ancestry back to the original native settlers. I was particularly interested in marriage partners and where they were from and if they were relatives. I also collected the birth names of all the husbands and wives and all their offspring. At times a man had more than one wife so these also had to be included. These first names were used as data in the third research area that is discussed next. The period traced covers the end of Ottoman rule, the British Mandate, and the establishment of the state of Israel. Each of these periods has left their mark on the Palestinian community. This research was important evidence that clearly indicated that the *hamula* as a determinant social science construct was questionable since among other things the choice of marriage partners over time and within different periods varied by residence and family and *hamula* membership; this research gave evidence that choice of marriage partners within Umm al-Fahim had been reduced to the local setting with the establishment of the Israeli state. This information along with other research material I analyzed helped me come to the conclusions I express in this dissertation about the significance of the *hamula* within everyday life.

3) A study of the naming of children born during certain important periods in the history of Palestinians and the Arab world in general was of lesser importance, but is nonetheless of interest. Curiously, while conducting this research and studying anthropological work about the significance of such research, I discovered that Israel had

conducted a poll on the most popular names given to male children by Jewish and Palestinian parents in Israel. The poll was conducted in the early 1990s. Surprise: David and Mohammad! In regard to Palestinians this is an interesting project because Arab names have meanings and are either religious or secular in origin. By tracing the naming patterns one may be able to get an insight into identity and responsiveness of Palestinian Israelis to their Arab heritage, affiliation, historical and political events, and secular and religious influences. For instance, just as an example, my husband's parents' first born son's name is Ghassan, born 1950; this is a secular name. Ghassan was a famous pre-Islamic Arab tribe originally from Yemen who immigrated to Syria (Golan Heights and Palestine) and established a kingdom. They were known for their courage and support of the arts. They were originally Christian, 250 BC, and converted to Islam in the 7th century. Their second son's name is Suleiman, born 1954; he is named after the *Old Testament's* Jewish King Solomon who Arabs consider to be a prophet and is known as *Suleiman, The Wise*. Their next son's name is Mahmoud, born 1956, a derivation of the Prophet Mohammad's name; he is followed by Abd el-Nasser in 1960; his name I need not explain. The last two sons, like Mahmoud, all have variations of the name of the prophet, Mohammad and Ahmad. The daughters' names have been chosen for the sound and beauty of the name and were more typically chosen by the mother. An interesting article I read on naming in Arab societies suggests that Arab female names are more varied than male names because of the historical subordination of women and their removal from public life which gave parents the freedom to name their daughters as they pleased. If this is so, I suspect one would find similar naming patterns in patriarchal pre-capitalist class societies more generally. In any event, I believe, one can ascertain, and I think the example given is a case in point, that analysis of

naming can give insight into the significance and meaning of events, both of the past and present, to people and suggests that naming is important in mediating an individual's and family's sense of pride and dignity, especially for the subaltern. It is interesting to see how in the present within existing circumstances individual's relearn and draw upon their history, their culture and traditions and out of the raw clay dug up from their earth's past, sometimes from the farthest past, they constitute themselves anew within what can be a most pressing upon them present. A proper analysis using naming would I think have to absorb Margaret Mead's thoughts concerning the significance of bringing psychological insight into anthropological and social science studies and analyses. For the naming of their sons my in-laws have first turned to a pre-Islamic secular, of Christian origins, Arab hero, then a Jewish wise man of the *Old Testament*, then their own prophet and then a contemporary secular Arab hero; and only, perhaps after defeat has fully sunk into their bones, do they return exclusively to their prophet, though throughout they were never more or less, better or worse Muslims.

4) In-depth interviews with women of diverse ages and backgrounds were conducted, including high school students, elderly women, college graduates, illiterate women, religious and secular women, housewives, politically active women, women working outside the home. Almost all the women I interviewed spoke openly and forthrightly. They spoke about their activities, attitudes, problems, ambitions, concerns as women, as residents of Umm al-Fahim and as Palestinians in Israel. It seemed to me that they were glad to say what they thought and have it heard. They described in detail their daily activities; their relationships to family members--husbands, siblings, in-laws, children; their relationships to friends or the lack thereof; engagements, if any, they have outside of

Umm al-Fahim; how they saw Jewish society and their relationship to it; what changes they would like to see in their community; and what they thought about the Palestinian social movements and political organizations within Umm al-Fahim and Israel more generally. I was assisted in this work by an unemployed (which didn't mean she wasn't busy, but did mean she had some spare time) married woman who had graduated from college and was happy to assist me in carrying out these interviews. She spoke English and had studied the social sciences so I was able to establish a "professional" working relationship with her since she understood the requirements of the work and the methods to be employed and the importance for accuracy in gathering the data; and I was able to review the work with her. My Arabic by this time was good enough for me also to conduct certain kinds of interviews on my own, especially if the interviewee had some working use of English. We could go back and forth between the two languages to assure each other what we each meant. But, to have her assisting me meant I could undertake many more interviews, could check there accuracy, and could have assistance on those I conducted to insure their adequacy.

5) I studied the history and present realities of the conditions of, facilities available, and services provided by the health, social welfare, and education systems. I supplemented this study with field work by making on-site visits to clinics, doctors offices, schools; observed programs such as one organized for the wives whose husbands are mentally ill; and interviewed social service and welfare staff and doctors and nurses and patients. This research informed all aspects of the dissertation since it helped provide me with an overall and detailed picture of life in the ghetto and ghetto-residents' relationship to Israeli society and the government since so much of these areas of people's everyday life are tied into the town's municipality and the Israeli government. Though much of this research was not able

to be directly incorporated into the text, given the limited scope of this dissertation, it was crucial material for the analysis of the political, economic, and social relations of the ghetto to the dominant society. This research also drew to my attention areas in need of further research; one that stands out is the affect of the drug trade and use in the Palestinian ghettos. I know from my own family's experience, and my study into the health and welfare of Umm al-Fahim, the devastating affects of the drug trade and their use. The use of drugs, especially among male youth, has become one of the most important concerns within the community, impacting virtually every family. Analyses of the political economy of drug trafficking and studies of the affects of substance abuse on individuals, families and the community is sorely needed and would clarify the ghetto's particular relation to the dominant Israeli society as well as the changed internal conditions within the community vis-à-vis the family, criminality, alienation, poverty, and unemployment. In recent years the struggle to fight drug abuse and cope with its affects has led to some forms of self-activity within the community but the affects of substance abuse are overwhelming the abilities of families to cope and the community's resources. On this issue much more research is needed and is needed now.

# Appendix C

## On Myself as Participating Observer and Observing Participant

I went to live in Umm al-Fahim, as I mentioned in Appendix B, to be with my husband after our marriage in 1988. This had followed three short visits to Israel in the 1980s. I had completed my course work for my graduate studies but had not as yet finalized my dissertation topic. I lived as a wife in my husband's town. I did not know Arabic or Hebrew. Since I did not come with an income, my husband was struggling financially to establish a print shop, and we did not own a car I lived within the ghetto, at least in terms of my circumstances, like most other people. I had to use the existing transportation systems to get around, deal with the same public services, healthcare institutions, post office, plumbing system, electricity, running water, sewage and all the rest that makes up daily life in the same ways as the rest of the residents without any privileged assess to resources. Sometimes my lack of financial resources was joked about, because as everyone knows all Americans are wealthy tycoons so why didn't I at least come with a car, an item we could really have benefited from. We would also turn the stereotype around and joke about my unfavorable marriage partner since where were my husband's oil fields. I have learned that as I travel abroad more that many people don't realize that working class and poor people exist in the United States who are without savings and all the other luxuries they see on television.

I didn't know at the time that my unfortunate financial situation, an unemployed graduate student, would work out to my benefit once I took on the dissertation project. I didn't know then that my experiences during this first year of living as a wife would be a

very good preparing ground for the dissertation. But this ordinary lived experience, living as a Palestinian in an Israeli ghetto without being a Palestinian or an Israeli, gave me access to and insight about the community's life that I could not have acquired in any other way.

I did not go to Umm al-Fahim initially as an anthropologist, living in a suburb of Tel Aviv and commuting for a day now and then to engage in fieldwork via an informant, only to get back into my car and drive home to the comforts of a "normal"--that is from my own culture's point of view—life; nor was I in Umm al-Fahim for some three or six months or possibly a year as a participant observer, *going native*. By saying this I in no way mean to denigrate such studies. As Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson point out in their book, *Ethnography: Principles in Practice*, all sources of information are "social phenomena occurring in, shaped by, particular contexts" and therefore should not be treated as valid in their own terms; all data are sources of information but what is at issue is their interpretation and what inferences are drawn from them. Therefore, in regard to myself, I am only saying that I am aware, having lived my experience, that I would have written a very different dissertation if I had followed the standard way of doing anthropology or ethnography or sociology when studying another culture or society. This drew home to me that all works in the social sciences are stories--narrations by a teller (and each in their own way are legitimate and valid as such); even when purely quantitative methods are used to acquire data with all the objectivity that such data presumes, the finished product is a construct of a reality which is being told by someone. Therefore, I have written this dissertation in a personal narrative form and illustrate through case studies the more general, ideological and theoretical discussions presented

in each of the chapters portraying the social, political, legal, and economic transitions that led to the ghettoization of the Palestinian communities within the state of Israel and their affect on the everyday life of the residents of Umm al-Fahim.

It should also be stated that simply because I lived in Umm al-Fahim as a resident and am married to a Palestinian and therefore participate as a family member and social actor within the culture and community, I am not now a Palestinian, either in regard to myself or to the residents of Umm al-Fahim, to whom I am always also an American, an outsider. For the study I believe this fact privileged me as well, since, on the one hand, I lived as a Palestinian and on the other hand as an outsider both to the Palestinian culture and Israeli society. I had to learn the culture; I had to figure out consciously the assumptions, the presumptions and the rules so that I could effectively negotiate myself through social space. A close friend, the late Dr. Vicki Shiran, a political scientist and Oriental Jewish activist in Israel who studied at John Jay School of Criminal Justice while I was at the CUNY Graduate Center, said to me after reading the first three chapters I had drafted, "You are a Palestinian without the assumptions of Israel."

Because of my position living-in this society, or more appropriately societies, I had to learn how to act, do, get around, behave, both in Umm al-Fahim and in Israel at large; and I had to do so as an adult without any of the taken-for-grantedness of the way things are done for both Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. This was now my *lebensraum* and one whose phenomenological taken-for-granted mechanisms had to be made evident to me if I was to be able to successfully be an adult in this my new *lebenswelt*. What is given as first or second nature--this is the way the world works-- was not the case for me, and I had to figure these things out in order to live in some appropriate way within these

circumstances. I discovered that my position proved to be particularly important in understanding the dominant-subordinate position between Israeli Jews and Palestinians and how this is constructed in everyday life. My lived experience therefore also forms part of the data of this dissertation. At times I will draw upon this lived experience to bring into sharp focus the issue being discussed. This dissertation therefore attempts to be rigorously objective and thoroughly subjective

My experience living-in Umm al-Fahim also affected my research methods and how these methods developed over time. Because of my circumstances, even during my initial stay in Umm al-Fahim as simply a married woman, I was forced out of necessity to be a participating observer and an observing participant. I had had no previous encounter living within Arab culture, its etiquette and manners or with Israeli society. And of course I had no language. I was reduced to infancy learning how to eat appropriately and politely with my hands sitting cross legged on the floor. There is a graceful etiquette involved in serving, eating and drinking, and the taking of shared food at a common meal whether at the family dining table (which may be the floor, a low table or a western type table), being a host in one's home or a guest in someone else's home.

Culturally specific forms of behavior between the young and old, guest and host, men and women, children and adults--all the stuff that makes up everyday life of which all cultures imbibe but each in their own way--were not givens to me and even at times I found myself doing things that felt like violations to my nature. You don't say one general hello to everyone as you enter a room, but to each person and you shake their hands; you don't put a bowl of fruit and a platter of cookies on a table and say help yourself and expect people to serve themselves. In the beginning I often felt foolish, even

ridiculous, as I would go through the motions of doing what was expected even though I consciously knew if I were to do what felt *natural* to me would be experienced as impolite and would reflect badly on me, my husband and family. Nonetheless the power of my own culture made me feel ridiculous; to do what I was doing back in my other home would seem silly, overly polite, and perhaps even pretentious.

I found myself an adult with inner speech and language and my American way of doing these very same ordinary human interactions yet I could not function as an adult, not the adult as I knew her. I was stripped of the taken-for-grantedness of everyday life; a loss of self that was at times very painful. In my head I would be formulating thoughts that when spoken were reduced to gibberish and so, speaking like a child as I was, with no ill intent on the part of my companions, I was treated as a child. And even as I learned the language, often what I would say didn't feel real to me, since one is not simply using words to index some dead thing but transmit one's feeling for or relationship to the world that the word or words refer to. Language references an entire culture. So, even when I was speaking and communicating appropriately, my soul, so to speak, still felt starved. For example, in Arabic possession is indicated by placing an *i* sound at the end of the noun, not by using a possessive pronoun like *my* in English. So, one would say *ummi* for *my mother*. I eventually became more or less proficient at using this form, but when I felt the need to really say this is mine putting the *i* sound on the end of the word just didn't do it for me. I had to say *my*, like a child insisting he/she wants MY mommy. So, although I gained skills in communication, I did not experience that I was in fact communicating what I really intended to transmit to the other. For a long time I did not *feel* what I said; and this is very painful.

Of course, the process I am describing is what most if not all people who have this experience go through, but when one is going through it, it can be devastating; your personhood is gone. But, slowly, one negotiates oneself though this morass. I was most fortunate because my husband's immediate family, most particularly my in-laws, is a most remarkable group of people and I was welcomed into their family. My husband and I lived directly above my in-laws in one of the floors in a shared four storey family home and they were available to me everyday. My mother-in-law from whom I have learned a great deal, and who suffered my tedious and boring struggle to acquire some Arabic, was my living fluid. I don't know if I could have stayed through that first year if it had not been she who was *my mart ommi*. Eventually these ordinary matters became natural to me and I discovered that what one considers to be one's self is more fluid and expandable and capable of redefinition than one might expect as the painful cultural journey is traveled; in the end one's subjective world becomes richer and deeper.

This living daily in the ghetto—the home life, the street life, the moving within and without of the ghetto--dependent upon only the resources that everyone else uses, and dealing with the daily encounters and problems and concerns of her residents, without question privileged my research endeavor. I had to learn the culture on its terms from within as an adult. To do this one has to unlearn one's own culture which is actually a learning of one's culture, in much the same way that linguists tell us that you learn your own language by studying another; this is because as one acquires his/her own culture and language these become second nature, taken-for-granted, unconscious and simply given. So I had to unlearn and learn; be stripped of personhood and so to speak be reborn. As Tony Larry Whitehead and Mary Ellen Conaway describe in *Self, Sex, and Gender in*

*Cross-Cultural Fieldwork* the researcher comes to the field (in my case the field and my new everyday life were one and the same) with prefield biases; contact with the host community initiates a process of breakdown and resolution which requires facing the prefield biases. In order to understand the host community the researcher must understand the self brought to the field. This is a very painful process, but, as the process continues and the social and personal relationships become more usual and take on a make-senseness about them, slowly who you are transformed. I will not say that I became a Palestinian. That would be too simplistic. But I became someone who feels at home, and that is the best word I can come up with to describe the sense of what happens, as a Palestinian. And it must not be forgotten that living as a Palestinian in Israel is equally a living in Israel. In my case this was particularly so since on the one hand I went back and forth between the two cultures, as do all Palestinians, and on the other hand because of my real ties to and friendships within Jewish society. Israel slowly also became my home. Again, what is important in terms of this study, I came to this place not as a Palestinian or Israeli. I had to actively and consciously learn what that means.

# Appendix D

## Stories From the Ashes

> In November and December [1948], Israeli troops attacked Wadi Ara again, but the presence of volunteers, Iraqi units and local villagers both deterred and in several cases defeated this plan yet again. Villages that are familiar names to Israelis traveling on the busy Route 65 that connects Afula and Hadera succeeded in protecting themselves against a far superior military force: Mushayrifa, Musmus, Mu'awiya, Arara, Barta'a, Shuweika and many others. The largest of these villages has grown into the town we know today as UMM al-Fahm. There, with some training from the Iraqi soldiers, the villagers themselves had organized a force that they called the 'Army of Honour'. This fifth Israeli attempt to occupy these villages was called 'Hidush Yameinu ke-Kedem', that is 'Restoring our Glorious Past', possibly in the hope that such a charged codename would imbue the attacking forces with particular zeal, but it was destined to fail once again.
>
> Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, 194-195.

> I suggest that the collapse of a viable Israeli peace camp…and the limited impact of the new history on Israeli public culture are related phenomena rooted in an inability to hear Palestinian voices or give credibility to Palestinian historical evidence.
>
> Joel Beinin, "Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits of the New Israeli History"

## A View of Umm al-Fahim's Story told by Residents

In the following interviews residents of Umm al-Fahim and her sister villages tell stories regarding the settlement and development of Umm al-Fahim and what are considered important events in their lives, like the 1936-39 Arab Revolt. Information about each individual pertains to the time when the interview occurred. These interviews and the accompanying pictures were conducted and taken by Antonia Caccia and Ghassan Fawzi (C&F) in the late 1970s in preparation for Ms Caccia's documentary film about Umm al-Fahim, *On Our Land*. Mr. Fawzi translated from the original Arabic. Information in brackets and notes are mine.

### The Interviews

#### Anisa Mahmud Sheikh Mahmud

She is 60 years old and has four children. One son is a sub-contractor and works in plastering and one daughter is married.

"My husband, Ahmad al-Azzam, was a strong man and a good man. The owners of land would come to him in the harvest season and ask him to work for them. He was an agricultural laborer, but he also cut trees in the woods for charcoal production. He cleared 4 dunam of land in the woods. This became his property and he planted it with vines. At the time of the 1936 revolution he dropped everything and even sold his own flour to buy a gun. He was a friend of Ahmad al-Faris who was a young man in 1936, but

he was appointed military commander of the region. He was a native of Umm al-Fahim and he had his regional Headquarters here. Once the British arrested Ahmad al-Faris and released him on conditions that he work with them and arrange for the people to hand in their weapons. He came to my husband and asked him to give up his gun so that he could prove to the British his efficiency as a collaborator. My husband was reluctant, but finally agreed. The people began to suspect Ahmad al-Faris but the truth seems to be that he had long term plans against the British, but suspicion and social pressure forced him to act hastily. He invited the British soldiers to his house for dinner and then wanted to blow up the house with the soldiers inside. But his family prevented him because they were afraid of British revenge. The group with Ahmad al-Faris continued to fight the British long after most of the village had stopped. When Ahmad al-Faris was killed by the British in Kafr Qara' the whole population of Umm al-Fahim was in mourning. His death marked the end of the resistance in the area of the Wadi ʻAra.

"During the revolution my husband had three guns, two of them he had taken off the British soldiers he had killed. Fighters would return home from battles with their weapons in the open. Popular support was very strong and there was no need to hide weapons in secret cases.

"When the two British soldiers were killed at Ein al-Nabi, the British cut down the trees around the wells, they blew up some houses and killed an old woman and a camel. It was the traitors who ruined the revolution.

"In the same place where the Jews killed my husband, there he had previously engaged the British in battle, and from there he had carried his wounded comrade 7km to his family on the West Bank.

"After the 1948 occupation the people were without work and the problems of permits and travel began. They [Military governors] only gave permits to collaborators and because of my husband's role in the 1936 revolution he had a black mark against him. He was forced to seek work without a permit.

"In 1950, as he was coming back from work, he was stopped by an army patrol at the entrance to the village. He had no permit. They tied his hands and legs and shot him. It happened at dawn and many peasants and farmers witnessed the event. They saw his arrest and heard the shooting. When he was killed my husband had on him pens and copybooks and bread and sweet biscuits for the children.

"It was only the second time he had gone to Tel Aviv to work. The first time he came back after a fortnight with his wages. I remember everybody coming to the house to see his money. They had never seen Israeli notes and coins before. It was when he came back the second time from the Jewish City that he was killed.

"After his death I worked in Ruha [a neighboring town] as an agricultural laborer. At night I worked as a water carrier for the richer families in the village. For four years I went barefoot in order to have money to feed my children. My soul was devoted to my son and I did not allow my daughter to go to school because I needed her to take care of the boy. When she was nine years old she was detained by the Israeli army. She had gone to the water container some thirty metres from our home to fetch some water. There was a curfew and we were only given two hours per day in which to get food and water supplies. Because she was small she was pushed in the queue and she was delayed near the container beyond the curfew deadline. She was detained for a few hours and fined 40IL, which in those days was a lot of money.

"I tell my grandchildren the stories of my life and of the life of their grandfather, and I strengthen their hearts and hands. My older grandson is now eight years old and I encourage him to become a doctor. My younger grandson is about seven years old and him I encourage to take a different course in life.....One day I told him he must be careful lest he be run over by a car in the street and he answered "Oh Granny, I can't get run over. Yasser Arafat will be very upset!"

**Anisa Mahmud Sheikh Mahmud holding pictures of her two brother, Ali Faris on the left and Ahmad Faris on the right.**



**The grave of Ahmad Faris in Umm al Fahim**

**Ahmad Faris**

**<u>Mahmud Husari Aghbariyah</u>**,
He is Secretary of the Communist Party (Rakah) in Umm al-Fahim. He is the son of a doctor. He died of a heart attack at the age of sixty.

"Before 1948 Umm al-Fahim was an agricultural village with a population of approximately 5000 residents. They owned approximately 145,000 dunams. But because much of the land was far from the village many satellite villages were created. Most of the villagers were peasants and Umm al-Fahim became a major source of agricultural produce for the cities in the area. During the spring and summer months herdsmen from

Gaza and Hebron would bring their herds to graze on the lands of Umm al-Fahim. Before 1948 nobody in Umm al-Fahim had sold land to the Zionists. But in 1948 the local population of the Jezreel Valley, where the best land is, were expelled and dispossessed of their lands. According to the 1947 UN partition plan, Umm al-Fahim would have been in the Arab state but after the Rhodes Armistice Agreement it was apportioned to Israel. In 1949 the Iraqi Army formed four groups of popular militia left with the Iraqi Army. The Israeli Army destroyed many local villages: Lajun, Buwayshat, Muawiya, Mansi, Kafrayn and Um al-Zinat. Lajun was the central village of the area and would have developed into a town if it had not been destroyed. The regional police station was Lajun. There was also a medical clinic and a bus company. Umm al-Fahim had none of these. Many of the people from these destroyed villages came to Umm al-Fahim seeking refuge.

"When the Israeli Army occupied Umm al-Fahim they immediately imposed a curfew and told the people to hand in their weapons. The order was to submit weapons with the muzzle turned down. The Israeli soldiers were not satisfied with the number of weapons submitted and on the following day they produced a list of people who were on the list but had no weapons. These people crossed the border to Jordan to fetch weapons so that they could submit them to the Israeli Army.

"Many pressures were put on people to encourage them to leave the country. There were land closures, local mills were closed, the harvest at Lajun was destroyed, and of the 145,000 dunams which belonged to Umm al-Fahim, 120,000 had been confiscated by 1950. Many people were denied permits to work outside Umm al-Fahim and people were even forbidden to cross the main road (Hadera-Afula) without a permit from the military governor. In 1951 a boy who went to sell flowers on the main road without a permit was shot by the army. The people organized a demonstration against the military regime. The soldier who shot the boy was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, but I myself saw him four months after his trial in Tel Aviv.

"Families were reduced to selling their furniture, gold, and essential belongings for food. The poorest families were forced by these conditions to seek employment in the Jewish cities without permit. Dozens and hundreds were detained daily and sentenced to fines and imprisonment. Some were shot by the police and the army.

"All these pressures were effective and out of the original population of 5000 residents about 2000 fled the village.

"During the first period of occupation the village suffered from acute food shortages. This caused the first demonstration under Israeli rule. All the people in the village participated in the demonstration, including women and children. We congregated outside the Military Governor's Headquarters. Three of the people who tried to negotiate with the Governor were promptly arrested. I was one of the three. Three others were deported to the isolated village of Barta'a. However, following the demonstration rations were increased from 4 kg to 8 kg of flour per person a month and the first permits for people to go and work in the Jewish cities were issued.

"In 1952 demands were made for the establishment of a local municipal council. The local military governor rejected the petitions. It wasn't until 1960 that the first Local Municipal Council came into being. But all the members were appointed, not elected. They were representatives of the large hamulas or known to be leading collaborators. The fact that for the first 15 years of the existence of the State of Israel there was not a democratically elected local municipal council in Umm al-Fahim is one of the cardinal

reasons for the backwardness of the place. In 1956, after the massacre at Kafr Kassim [see chapter 2], a day of protest was organized. It was organized nationally and demonstrations were held in every Arab village. The day before the protest I and two others from Umm al-Fahim were exiled to the Duruz village of Beit Jann. They sent us to a Druze village deliberately. The Israeli authorities had spread that rumor that it was Duruz soldiers who committed the massacre at Kafr Kassim. When they took us to the Duruz village they told the villagers that we were communists and anti-Duruz and that it was people like us who claimed that the massacre had been committed by the Duruz. But their slander was not successful: the people of Beit Jann were very generous and supported us after we had explained the real issues to them.

"Following our stay in Beit Jann the people signed a petition demanding a local municipal council and they approached radical lawyers to help them defend their lands from confiscation. We had to report daily to the police station at Tarshiha which was 40 km away and as we had to walk it took all day. We held a sit-in demonstration in protest and were then told that we could report three times daily to the Mukhtar of Beit Jann instead.

"In 1958, just before the 1st of May, the government banned all public meetings in Arab villages. We had planned a meeting to be held on May 1st and we decided to go ahead with it as scheduled. The village was full of police and soldiers. A running battle broke out between the people of Umm al-Fahim and the soldiers. One of the people in the crowd beat Shababo, who was military governor at the time. Shababo identified himself, "I am Shababo, the military governor." The man answered, "Yes, you are the man I am looking for." And then he beat the hell out of him. Other officers were also beaten, Seltzer, the District Commander, and Ben Aharon, who was an officer at the Padres Hannah police station at the time. 300 people were arrested. Of those 60 were detained and subsequently sentenced from two months to three years. I got 18 months."

Muhammad Ali who was present at the time of the interview joins in. "I was a young man at the time and not political. I came to the meeting late and was immediately arrested. I was beaten while being marched to the place where all the detainees were held and as I approached I witnessed a terrifying situation. There were two rows of soldiers leading to the police van and as each person was forced to walk between the two rows of soldiers they were beaten until they fell to the ground. Then they were packed on top of each other and covered with blood. It was in prison that I became a communist."

**Mahmud Aghbariyah all the way right with his father all the way the left.**



**Mahmud Aghbariyah with his wife and son.**

"Before the 1967 War there was large scale unemployment in the country. Because the State had stopped building houses for new Jewish immigrants many people in Um El Fahim, who were employed as construction workers, became unemployed. There was a demonstration in Um El Fahim of about 5000 people and a delegation of thirty went to the Knesset to protest. The government decided to create jobs in Um El Fahim. They paid people to plant Jewish National Fund trees on lands that had been confiscated from the village. People were only allowed to work 12 days per month and were paid 12 IL per day. The average wage for a worker in Tel Aviv at the time was 30-50 IL per day."

**Rafiq Yusuf Abdallah Mahamid (Yusuf)**

He is 52 years old and has 14 children. He lives in the village of Muawiya, a sister village to Umm al-Fahim.

"The Israeli Army entered the village of Muawiya on May 20th, 1949. The residents were ordered to leave the village for a few hours, and told to go to Umm al-Fahim. We were ordered to leave out furniture and all our belongings in our houses. This was after the occupation of Umm al-Fahim and we had already handed in our weapons there. The army told us that they only wanted to stay in the village as a military exercise. We left the village, we were about 500 residents at that time, and when we were about 2 km away, we began to hear the sound of explosives blowing up one home after another. Some of the younger men returned to the village to see what was happening. They saw the Israeli Army methodically blowing up the whole village, with explosives and bulldozers. The destruction was total. They destroyed everything including the school and mosque. We were left without shelter and had to live under trees with our children.

"We went to the Military Governor in Umm al-Fahim and after some time he agreed to see us. He said that the destruction of Muawiya was illegal and that we should return. He said the area was not his jurisdiction and that we should see the Military Governor in the village of ‘Ara. We were sent from one Military Governor to another in the area, but we never gave up and we continued to press them."

Mr. Abdal-Rahman, a friend of Yusuf, who is visiting while the interview is going on, intercedes at this time. He was on the delegation that went to see the Military Governors and adds: "At that time we didn't know anything about this new State. When one of the Military Governors told me that he was going to bring the matter before the Knesset, I went outside and told the people that he intended to speak to the most important person in the State about our problems. They kept promising us that we would be able to return. Once, on one of these delegations, they served us coffee and peppermint sweets. I whispered to my friend that these peppermint sweets are the price they are prepared to pay for our land. But we refused to leave the area and we continued to live under the trees and in the middle of 1950 we were finally permitted to return and rebuild our village. We received no compensation and none of the officers responsible for the destruction of our village were ever brought to trial. During this period, when the Israeli Army was busy destroying our houses, the authorities confiscated thousands of dunams belonging to the village. Today we only have between 200 and 300 dunams. Recently

they set the boundaries of the village. It encircles the existing densely built area and it is now illegal to build beyond it."

Yusuf Rafiq then picks up again: "I used to own 48 dunam, but 41 were confiscated and now I only have seven. From the time our village was occupied until today, military maneuvers have threatened the welfare of our residents.* Three have been killed and 13 injured and crippled. Last year a baby was injured. Currently we have 2500 residents in Muawiya, but we have no electricity, no Kupat Holim and no children's clinic. Most residents have to commute to Tel Aviv to work; some of the old men and women raise sheep, goats and cattle."

* Part of Umm al-Fahim land was confiscated for use by the Israeli military where daily maneuvers are undertaken. These lands are covered with land mines and numerous children and adults have been killed or disabled because of these mines, whether at play or at work tending their orchards.

## Mustafa Ahmad Mahmid

He is 29 years old and has five children. He works in a marble cutting factory in Ramat Gan. He lives in Zalafa.

"Both my father and my grandfather were farmers in Lajun. In 1948 they were forced to escape and their land was confiscated. Today we live in Zalafa where we have 40 dunam of land planted with olives and almonds. We also have four dunam in Durayhima which we succeeded in saving from the Jewish National Fund. We also had lands in the area of al-Saqi. They were confiscated in 1949 and the orange groves of Kibbutz Giv'at Oz are now on our land."



**Mustafa Mahamid**

## Anis Hammad Mahamid

He is 70 years old.

"The people of Umm al-Fahim owned 45,000 dunam of land at Lajun. The land was divided into four blocks one for each of the hour hamulas. The land was musha'a which

means that nobody had freehold ownership on any part of the land. The land was redistributed annually. Similar procedures applied to water distribution. People had rights to a particular number of dunam, let us say for example, ten dunam, but which ten dunam that person would cultivate was determined by rotation, and other traditional criteria of redistribution.

"In Lajun there were more owner-peasants than peasants who leased land from feudal land owners. The land owners received three-quarters of the produce and the tenants only received one quarter of the produce. Before the produce was divided between the land-owner and the tenant one tenth of the produce was taken in taxes by the government.

"In 1946 the British Mandate Authorities wanted to update the land registry of the area and asked all owners and claimants of land in Lajun to hand in their documents so that they could be updated. The documents were never returned by the British, and they subsequently fell into the hands of the Israeli authorities. When the Israeli government issued confiscation orders in the area, the owner peasants could not document their counter claims.

"Before 1948 no one in Umm al-Fahim sold any land to the Jews. People were forced to leave Lajun. The Jews attacked the village.

"Even today there are still closed areas around Umm al-Fahim and peasants can only go to their lands with special permission. Peasants who cultivate their lands in these closed areas, with or without permission, are always in danger of being injured by Israeli army maneuvers. They set fire to the crops in Ruha [an area in which many villages were destroyed] and pulled up olive trees.

"I was an owner of land and I still till today. Today I collected sumsum [lentil] in Durayhima, near what was Lajun. The authorities tried to plant trees* there four years ago. We called together about 100 people to try and stop them. In the end they took some of the land for afforestation and left some for farming and cultivation. I feel I am a victim of injustice and I am not reconciled to what has happened. Today the situation is difficult, for example, all my children are workers, and what remains of our land is not sufficient to live on. There is an obvious connection between the land confiscation on the one hand and the attitudes of the people on the other. The bad situation began with the confiscation of the land and the transformation of the people into wage laborers. The criminals are those who confiscated the land. I have no power to do anything but if anyone took positive action I would hasten to join them. I tell my children never to sell their land, even if the government swallows it. Perhaps a day will come, and justice will return to those from whom justice was robbed."

* The afforestation program in Israel for the most part is used to cover over the Palestinian areas that have been destroyed in an attempt to visually erase traces of Palestinian history and presence in the country. This program is a very sensitive one for the Palestinians and another denial of their *Nakba*, catastrophe, an erasing of their presence and history in their homeland.

**Anis Mahamid interviewed by Ghassan Fawzi.**

**Anis Mahamid**

## More Interviews

The following interviews are with residents of Umm al-Fahim who are from the destroyed village of Buwayshat on the land of Ruha, a neighboring town of Umm al-Fahim. These interviews were also undertaken by Antonia Caccia and Ghassan Fawzi in the late 1970s. This village was destroyed in 1948. Part of Ruha's land was confiscated but most of the land was declared closed for the purpose of military maneuvers. Further confiscations took place in the 1960s. People were afraid that they would lose all their lands and because of the deepening political consciousness of the people they began to enter the closed areas and cultivate the land. A few years ago the lands at Ruha were only accessible by foot or donkey. The farmers themselves have now built a road about four kilometers long and they hired bulldozers to clear their land. They planted new olive groves, and also fields of vegetables (tomatoes, cucumbers, beans, sumsum, etc.). There are two wells at Ruha. One well which was restored by the farmers in the 1960s was then destroyed by the army. One can also see the remains of the houses that were destroyed in 1948. Since the farmers returned to their lands the army has intensified its maneuvers. Tanks and armored cars move over the reclaimed land and the soldiers deliberately pull up the newly planted olive seedlings. They have destroyed newly built terraces as well as homes built by the peasants on the land. Yet the peasants replant their fields again and again and rebuild their destroyed houses. Many peasants have been injured and some killed by the exploded bombshells left in the fields by the army. Ms. Caccia and Mr. Fawzi met Mr. Mahmud at Ruha under a carob tree in the late 1970s. There are bullets lodged in the tree.

### Mahmud Awad Salih Mahamid

He is 61 years old.

"I was hiding from the army under the tree during recent maneuvers. You can see where the bullets hit the tree while I was lying flat on my belly.

"During the Ottoman rule I lived in Ju'ara with my family but most of the villagers died during the plague [around World War I]. I then moved to Umm al-Fahim and worked in Lajun as a tenant peasant. I only got a quarter of the crop for my work. I then began to work as a vendor traveling by donkey to nearby villages and to the West

bank. In 1948 the Israeli military authorities did not give me permission to travel and I was forced to seek work in the Jewish settlement of Zichron Yaakov. I was an agricultural worker and worked in the vine groves. I was often detained and fined because I had to travel without a permit. Once when I was on my way home with my wages, I was detained and fined. It took all my wages to pay the fine and so it was pointless for me to go home. I went straight back to work - without a permit of course. Later I worked for five years as a dustman in Tayyiba. Four years ago I began with others to cultivate the land here in Ruha. I cultivate my wife's land and daily I have to face the threats and harassment of the army and the dangers caused by stray bullets and explosives."

## Tahqla Faris

She is a sister of Ahmad Faris, one of the famous leaders of the 1936-39 Arab Revolt against British colonialism. She is 65 years old, has 8 children and 44 grandchildren. She owned 250 dunams in Ruha but most of it was confiscated and has only a few dunam left.

"In 1936 my two brothers, Ahmad and Ali, were employed in Haifa as guards for a local bus company. I lived with them and was responsible for their household. My elder sister was married and also lived in Haifa. Our house was next to the mosque of Hajj Abdullah in the quarter of Jisr Rusmiyya. One summer day I was sitting with my elder sister in our house when suddenly Ahmad, who was then about 17 years old, came in and said: 'Come and see what your brother is about to do.' He turned round, picked up his stick, which I had decorated with carvings for him, and went out into the street. It was the hottest part of the day. The sun was so fierce that it even dazzled the birds' eyes, and the street was empty except for one British soldier who was patrolling the street. We saw Ahmad following the soldier and just at the right moment, he pulled out his stick and hit the soldier right under the ear. The soldier fell to the ground and Ahmad stole his gun and rushed back into the house and hid it in the toilet. He immediately left again and went to join the crowd of people which was gathering around the unconscious British soldier. Two days later he came back to the house, collected his gun and bade us farewell. We asked him where he was going and he replied 'To the mountains.' We began to cry and said: 'Why are you going to the mountains? You have no land, no figs or olives of your own to defend.' We cried and pleaded with him and he stayed with us for two days to console us but he left without telling us. Later we learned that he had gone to Umm al-Fahim and organized a group of fighters.

"About two years later, my other brother, Ali, left his job in Haifa and went to work in Zikhron Yaakov. He worked for a Jewish farmer and ploughed his land with a mule. The Jew gave him a Sten gun. He worked there for about a month and then took the mule and Sten gun and took to the mountains. After he took to the mountains, my family came to Haifa to take me back to the village because they feared for my safety. We learned that Ali had also organized a group of fighters and joined the revolution. Later we learned that he had been detained in Transjordan by the Amir Abdullah. When he was released he came back to Umm al-Fahim and told us what had happened to him in Transjordan.

“After his capture his interrogators had striped him naked and put him inside a barrel which had nails welded onto the inside. They closed the barrel and then rolled it down a hill. When the barrel was opened at the bottom of the hill, he was taken out and dogs were set on him.

"Ahmad specialized in raids and ambushes. He used to enter the cities in different disguises. He once entered the clinic of Dr. Hamza in Haifa dressed as a woman. The doctor took him in and asked him to undress. Instead Ahmad took out his gun and pointed it at the doctor's temple. The doctor was terrified and pleaded for his life. Ahmad told him to treat any wounded person brought to the clinic without question and without fees. Dr. Hamza hastened to agree.

"Once, someone informed the British that Ahmad Faris was in Umm al-Fahim. The British forces surrounded the village and imposed a curfew. They ordered the woman to gather in the square. They searched the houses and interrogated the people. I was in the mosque with the other women. To my amazement I heard Ahmad's voice. He was there disguised as a woman. He told me to be quiet and told me if he was caught he would hang. But he got away without being caught.

"Ahmad always brought weapons to the house when he came home and I and my cousins were trained by him. He trained me to shoot from the shoulder and from the hip. But we did not participate in the fighting. But on the day of the battle at Khallat al-Himara someone shouted: "Get water for the revolutionaries!" All the women rushed to the well to fetch water for the fighters. Bullets were flying all over the place, but we weren't afraid and went about our work as we were supposed to. The fighting continued and the British sent in an aeroplane.

"One day I was on my way to the well, with a water jar on my head. I was in high spirits and was singing revolutionary songs. On thee way to the well there was a carob tree. Near the tree I was met by a woman who began to shout "Your brother Ahmad al-Faris has been killed!" I dropped my water jar and rushed back home. On the way I met my mother, who had heard the news and had gone out to look for his body. She took me back home. The house was full of people. Ahmad was killed by the British during a battle at Kuftqari'. It was towards the end of 1939. About the same time another hero of the revolution Yusuf Hamdan was killed. His tombstone is still standing in the desecrated cemetery of Lajun. My brother's grave is in the cemetery in Umm al-Fahim.

"With the death of Ahmad Faris and Yusuf Hamdan the fighting was over and the revolution was suppressed in the entire district of Umm al-Fahim.

"Ali survived the fighting and lived to fight again in 1948. He was wounded in Lajun and was taken for treatment to Jenin. He left the country with the Iraqi and Jordanian forces on the eve of the transfer of Umm al-Fahim to Israel."

## **Yusuf Hasan Jabarin**

He is 70 years old and has 5 children.

"In 1938 I was a volunteer in the revolution under the leadership of Yusuf Hamdan. The British entered Umm al-Fahim and told everyone to hand in their weapons. I did not hand in my gun but they must have suspected me because I was detained and

tortured. I was beaten and stripped naked and left for dead in a deserted shack. I still suffer and the after effects of this and have scars all over my body.

"There were about 100 volunteers from Umm al-Fahim. In Umm al-Fahim the British concentrated in three positions and the popular militias fought many battles against them. In one battle two British soldiers were killed next to the spring (Ayn al-Nabi[1]). The British then destroyed two houses and forced people to clear the entire area of trees and cacti.

"The revolution had the support of the population and relatives gave money to the younger men who were fighting so that they could buy weapons. My father was one of the Mukhtars of the village and he hid militia soldiers in his home. I remember only one collaborator with the British and he was an outsider, an Arab from another village. He was ambushed and injured and he left the village.

"Our aim was to achieve independence, a Palestinian state. This was nothing new. The people had been fighting for this since the announcement of the Balfour Declaration. The British had deceived the people with false promises. Leaflets were distributed by the British from airplanes urging the people to maintain the peace and containing political commitments that the British had no intention of fulfilling. The revolution continues up to this very day.

"In 1948 fighting began between the Israeli army and the villages of Ayn Ghazal, Ayn Hud, Tira and 'Ijzim. The people in these villages were able to cut the supply lines between Haifa and Tel Aviv and the Jewish settlements in the area under siege. British navel ships bombarded the villages and forced the village militias to withdraw. The Israeli forces followed and expelled all the residents of the area. The villages were destroyed and the villagers became refugees. The Israelis then shelled other villages. The reports of shelling spread quickly and terrorized the population. This was one of the things that caused the evacuation of Lajun.

"Before 1948 I owned 1,000 dunam of land in Lajun and in Ruha and al-Butaymat and Jadhr al-Balad. Today I own 200 dunam of rocky mountainous land around the village. I was a peasant until my land was confiscated. Today my time is divided between cultivating the remainder of my land and the courts where I challenge the confiscations.

"Five years ago 50 dunam of my land was confiscated at al-Qurus. I appealed to the Supreme Court but lost my case. At the same time another fifty dunam of my land was confiscated on the claim that it was rocky uncultivated land. In the court I protested to the judge: 'You sell us stone for building at the price of thousands of pounds and yet when God gave us land with rocks and stones on it you want to take our land and the stones as well.'

"Two years ago 70 more dunam of the little land that was left to me in the area of Zahrat Mahmus was confiscated. I was a peasant all my life and I cultivated the land all my life and I did not neglect the land a single day throughout my life. The land that was recently confiscated is registered in my name. I have Ottoman registration papers and Mandate registration papers and even in the heyday of the military regime when one could not move a single step without a permit I obtained permits to go cultivate this land.

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[1] Ayn al-Nabi is in a hill on the way to the top of Jabal Iskander (Mount Alexander), which is the highest point of Umm al-Fahim from which one can oversee the entire Wadi 'Ara, Samarian foothills, Jezreel Valley, Jenin, both east and west, and so was used by many historically as a military point for operations.

"In addition to this problem of land confiscation there is now the added problem of government taxes. The government is now demanding 160,000 IL tax on the lands that remained in my possession. The taxes are completely out of proportion to my income from the land and are imposed so that I will be forced to sell my land. For instance Mustafa Said was forced to sell his land in order to pay the taxes."

**Muhammad Ibrahim Salih Jabarin (Abu Awni)**

He is 29 years old. He has five children and they live in one room. He works in construction and earns 8,000 IL per month. Now he is a shop owner in Umm al-Fahim.

"My father owned about 300 dunam in the area of Kafrain. It was confiscated after it had been declared a closed military zone. For some years we did not accept the compensation but in the mid 50s my father signed and sold the land. I left school when I was 14. I worked in restaurants and as a gardener but since I was 18 I have been working in construction.

"I began to feel oppressed and discriminated against when I was a child. The police used to come regularly to arrest my father. They used to come at night during the time of the military government.

"I felt it even more when I began to work in Tel-Aviv. I saw the Jewish boss ordering the Jewish foreman to fetch Arab workers to do the heavy work on site. Any job that is not properly done they call 'Arab job.' Whenever there is an economic crisis the first to be dismissed are the Arab workers. I did not join Rakah because it is more Israeli than Palestinian and it makes too many concessions to Zionism. I believe that Abna el-Balad will become the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians inside Israel because its programme expresses the interests of the Palestinian people and because it does not make concessions on the question of the Palestinian identity. It proposes a just, democratic and socialist solution to the problem of both the Jewish and Arab Palestinians."

**Ali Muhammad Mahamid**

He is 53 years old. He has nine children and works in a marble cutting factory in Ramat Gan.

"Our land was confiscated in Lajun. We had 60 dunam. The land was taken and out village was destroyed. I and my brothers were farmers. Today the land belongs to Kibbutz Megiddo. After we fled from Lajun my family and others lived in the open under the trees for two to three years. We were hoping to return to our land. When we lost hope we bought some land in Zalafa and built a house there. Before taking this job I worked as a farm hand in Nahlat Yitzhaq where I was employed in the cowsheds.

"From 1954 to 1965 I had many problems with travel permits. They would only give me a permit which had to be renewed every 20 days and then it would take them about two months to renew it. So I had to go to work without a permit. I was caught twice. Once I was Fined 2 IL and the other time 10 IL. In those days our daily wage was 3 Israeli pounds.

"I have worked and lived here on the premises of this factory for 19 1/2 years. I go home once a week. Once when I went home I took my younger son out to play and he got scared and began to cry, 'I want my Daddy.' He didn't realize I was his father. During the days of the Military Government the police would visit us often at night. Now they come three to four times a month.

"I am a Palestinian. I would never give any other answer even if they chop off my hand. The representative of the Palestinian people is Yasir Arafat. I feel I am a member of a despised and humiliated minority that is denied all its rights and freedoms. Freedom is not just the right to speak.

"I take my children to our lands. I show them and teach them what happened to our lands. I teach them that it is our land and that we are prevented from cultivating it. The youth and the next generation have no future without a state that will bring them all together. I do not believe that the land will be returned to us in the near future but the hope is ours and out strength is in unity. The Palestinian people are persecuted even in the Arab states. We are one people - we are all Palestinians."

**Tawfiq Salih Kiwan Mahamid**

He is 81 years old.

"In Lajun all the houses were destroyed by the Israelis during the ceasefire in 1948. They confiscated 155 dunam of my land in Lajun. They sent for me and asked me to accept a ridiculous sum of money. I refused it. We should never give our land away even if we are left with only water to drink.

"In 1960 22 more dunam of my land were confiscated. They wanted to confiscate another four dunam next to this house and to save them I had to give up other lands instead.

"In 1945 I and others went to Jenin to register the land of Durayhima in the name of Umm al-Fahim. The British Settlement Office had asked for registration papers and then they kept them there. In 1948 they fell into the hands of the Israeli authorities. A few years ago the Jewish national Fund wanted to plant pine trees on the lands of Durayhima. The farmers decided to collect money, about 19,000 IL so that the land could be reclaimed for cultivation. And indeed the reclamation of the land was completed. However in the end, the Jewish National fund got precisely that land which had been reclaimed. But the truth is that we did save 400 dunam of the land at Durayhima and the Jewish National fund only got 275. I am sure that without our struggle we would have lost all the lands.

His wife: "I protested and told the soldiers that we might be attacked by wild animals if we walked unprotected at night. They told me not to worry because the army would go in front of us. I said 'that's no comfort at all. From the animals we can run, but who can escape from the army.'"

"I was detained with my son for one day and then released. We had to stay in Umm al-Fahim for about three months. We sent one of our relatives to live secretly in our house at Kiwan Hamlet to keep eye on the place. But he was also arrested.

"When the harvest season came we began to go back to our homes. But for the next two years we were harassed almost daily by the army. But we refused to leave. They

used to come late at night and scare us by screaming and shouting. They would assemble us outside our houses and shoot over out heads. They stabbed our doors with bayonets and once they broke into our house and threatened us. They stole our chickens and anything else they could lay their hands on. Sometimes they forced us to feed them.

His wife: "They even threatened our relatives and others who came to visit us so that they would not come again."

"A few days ago the representative of the Custodian for Absentee Properties visited me and asked me to substitute my land here for land in Umm al-Fahim where I would be able to get a building permit. They refused to give me a building permit here. I told him that I will be buried here. We will not only live here, we will die here.

"The government is now trying new methods to remove people from the land. Before it was through confiscation, now it is through taxation. This year I have been told to pay 250,000 IL in taxes on my land. Last year I paid 6,800 IL. They have reclassified the land from agricultural to building land, but only for the purpose of taxation. We are still not given permission to build here. If the State continues to exist no Arab will have a single inch of land."

# Appendix E

## Interviews from the Ground

The first group of interviews presented in Section 1 is courtesy of Antonia Caccia and Ghassan Fawzi. They were conducted in the 1970s in preparation for Ms. Caccia's documentary film, *On Our Land*. Mr. Fawzi interpreted for Ms. Caccia and translated into English from the original Arabic. The second group of interviews was undertaken by me in the early 1990s, also with the assistance of Mr. Fawzi. Some of these were conducted in English and others were interpreted and translated into English by Mr. Fawzi. During this time I was able to speak a rudimentary colloquial Arabic, understanding more than I could speak. In the first section, interviews for Ms. Caccia, I have italicized all material that is not a direct quote from the interviewees. For the interviews I conducted, which are presented in Section 2, my questions are italicized, as well as any material which is not a quote from the interviewees. In Section 1 the interviews are listed alphabetically by first name. Interviewees in Section 1 are from three different settlements in the Wadi 'Ara area of the Little Triangle which are extensions of Umm al-Fahim. All are located on what were the extensive lands of Umm al-Fahim before 1948. I have ordered the interviews in Section 2 by subject matter that connects some of the interviewees together. Two of the interviewees, Muhammad Yusuf Da'ud Mahamid and Raslan Khalid Mahajinah, were interviewed in the earlier period. Changes in the political and social climate are clearly evidenced in the differences in their thinking and concerns expressed twenty year later.

## Section 1 – Interviews from the 1970s

### From Umm al-Fahim

### Ghassan Fawzi Aghbariyah

*Secretary of Abna al-Balad Umm al-Fahim. Born December 29th, 1950.*

I went to primary school in Umm al-Fahim and secondary school in Nazareth.
In November 1967, while I was at secondary school in Nazareth, I was charged with having given food, shelter and directions to a Fateh group which had blown up a Dodge car factory which produced both military and civilian cars. This was one of the first military operations that Fateh carried out inside Israel. One of the members of this Fateh group had been at school with me and had gone to Jordan for military training. None of the members of the group were caught during this operation. When I was arrested I claimed that the guerrillas had threatened me with death if I told the police of their presence. I was sentenced by a military court to one year imprisonment and six months suspended for three years.

In prison I was confronted by the authorities, the jailors and the police on a daily basis. I had to face their racism directly. I lost all desire to become a doctor, architect, or engineer and became convinced that this was only the beginning of my political struggle. I was aware and conscious of the history and circumstances of the Palestinian people, of their dispossession and dispersion. Although I did not have much political and historical education I knew that the 1936 rebellion was right and I had heard stories from my parents and relatives about the Israeli occupation of Umm al-Fahim and the area. It was clear to me that our situation could only be corrected through struggle. I saw other people who left the struggle because of hardship or imprisonment, and I saw the damage this caused to the struggle. After my imprisonment I was determined not to resign, but I did not have a clear conception in which way to pursue my struggle.

I had working relations with the Communist Party in Umm al-Fahim, I attended open Matzpen meetings and established contacts with leading nationalists and members of the former group al-Ard. But none of these groups satisfied my political aspirations. During this period there was no clear Palestinian movement inside Israel. The CP insisted on identifying themselves as Israeli patriots, they did not regard the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, they backed UN Resolution 242 as the magic solution for peace in the Middle East, and they saw Palestinian resistance as a purely military phenomenon, not as a political phenomenon. The CP could not give a sound historical education to the Palestinian youth in Israel. They suppressed the fact that the USSR supported the establishment of a Jewish State and the fact that CP members had played a crucial role in mobilizing arms for Israel in 1948. Each year on the 15th of May Zu Haderech commemorates the memory of CP members who were killed "in defense of the liberation of the Galilee". I remember discovering that the leader of the Israeli CP, MP Meir Vilner, was a signatory to the Israeli Declaration of Independence. I had rented a room in Tel Aviv in an apartment belonging to a Jewish Family. It was Succot, and the family Succa was decorated with an enlarged facsimile of the Israeli Declaration of Independence. And there I saw Vilner's signature. When I told people in Umm al-Fahim nobody believed me. Even local members of the CP were convinced I was spreading malicious slander.

At Matzpen meetings I did not convince people who impressed me as truly revolutionary, and I was not convinced by their political strategy. It also became clear to me that the nationalist leadership of al-Ard were not interested in creating a popular mass organization. I felt the leadership was content with playing a role as nationalist martyrs and that they were incapable of establishing a really democratic relationship with the rank and file. They would never come close to being Vietnamese.

The only person I met who struck me as a genuine revolutionary was Udi Adiv, and it was he who taught me that I would not find my struggle in the left wing or nationalist salons and that I should direct all my efforts to the village.

After much discussion with friends and colleagues it became clear to us that the only viable option was for us to form a local organization that would relate to local, regional and international issues. An organization for which the developments in Umm al-Fahim

would be as relevant as the struggle for the liberation of Vietnam. We founded Abna al-Balad in Umm al-Fahim in 1969. Today, 10 years later, it is evident that our analysis was correct. We consistently avoided the temptation to limit ourselves to local municipal issues and Abna al-Balad has now become a national Palestinian movement.

Abna al-Balad has been translated in English as Sons of the Village. This is not correct. The correct translation is Sons of the Country and we are about to decide to use the term Abna al-Balad as a standard in all languages.

Udi Adiv, who had grown up on the neighboring Mapam Kibbutz Gan Shmuel, was at this time a member of Matzpen. Matzpen's position was that they could not collaborate with the PLO because they claimed that Fateh was a petit bourgeois organization, and that the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] was a chauvinist organization. They claimed that there was no truly internationalist organization within the PLO with which Matzpen could affiliate. When the PDFLP [Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, now DFLP] was founded in February 1969 it made a unique contribution to the Palestinian issue. They stated that Jewish society would be secured the right of national self determination within the framework of a secular democratic liberated Palestinian State. Udi Aviv was very influenced by this analysis and wanted to establish direct organizational ties between revolutionaries inside Israel and the resistance outside. Adiv felt that unless revolutionaries in Israel were prepared to shed their blood in a common struggle there was no way in which Palestinian refugees would be convinced of the viability of internationalism and the common Arab-Jewish struggle. He felt that the establishment of the PDFLP was a break-through and that Matzpen should support the PDFLP. But the other members of Matzpen took the position that unless the PDFLP publicly recognized the rights of Israeli Jews, not only to self-determination, but also to the right of a separate state if they should want it, i.e. "self determination up to separation", they would not be prepared to work with the PDFLP. Adiv, therefore, found himself completely isolated in left-wing circles and was compelled to leave Matzpen.

During this period I still maintained contacts with all the revolutionary left groups in the framework of my work for Abna al-Balad. The work of Abna al-Balad was at this time rudimentary. We began with political discussions and the recruitment of local youth. These discussions, the many individual contacts we made and the problems we had helping people to overcome the pressures they faced from their families, took up most of the time during this first year. We started the format of a workers' group and distributed leaflets. Intellectually I understood that my work should concentrate on the slow step by step building up of an organization within our village. But at the same time I was impatient. I supported the Palestinian resistance, and my people were being massacred in Amman, Gaza and Lebanon. This made me want to bring the revolution here in one big bang, even though I realized that the situation here was not ready. At the same time Adiv, with whom I still maintained a close relationship, had established the so-called 'Network' with Da’ud Turki. I decided to join the group. It gave one the prospect of participating in the Palestinian resistance, and of participating in the discussions and decisions made by the group. The leadership was not external and I could feel part of it. I would not be just a

passive soldier acting on orders. I rejected the exclusively military activity of the Palestinian resistance. I had been approached by Fateh, but I disagreed with their class analysis, and I rejected their approach to the Palestinian people inside as mere cannon fodder in a programme which would determine their fate, rather than seeing them as political partners in a planned protracted struggle.

Adiv, at this time, was generally following the PDFLP line with emphasis on the autonomy of local organizations which, in his view, had to be formed inside. Members of this new political organization would have to undergo thorough political education before the organization could develop and expand, arrangements had to be made for clandestine safe houses, an underground press prepared, and only after this would the organization start distributing propaganda which would prepare the Arab and Jewish masses for armed struggle against military targets and the strategic infrastructure of industry, transport, etc.

I joined the group in early 1972 and on December 5th, 1972, when the organization was still in its first stage of operations, it was exposed and about 75 people including myself were arrested. 33 of us were brought to trial. I had 14 separate charges brought against me. I was found guilty of all 14 charges. The main charges were membership of an illegal organization and contact with a foreign enemy agent. I was sentenced to six years imprisonment. I spent the 6 years in the Ramleh jail.

The "Network" trials were a show to both Jews and Arabs. The people arrested came from all walks of life and different religious backgrounds. They were Muslims, Jews, Christians, Druze, students, workers, villagers, peasants, city people and Bedouins.

The group had no history of clandestine work to speak of. None of us were experienced or had any training in this field. We were not taught or drilled not to confess at any cost. We were not even fully aware of the use the authorities could make of the confessions. I know it sounds incredible - but this is the truth. After my arrest, I did not, for instance, demand to see a lawyer. All of us signed statements and were found guilty and sentenced on the basis of our own statements. Sentences ranged from 17 years to a few months. I was not shocked by my imprisonment. I was determined to participate in the struggle of my people and I was prepared to face death or life imprisonment. But I was shocked at the timing of my imprisonment. I had not expected to be arrested before I did anything tangible or worthwhile. The crucial point comes when you realize that you have lost the chance of making any political impact on the people for 6 years. One has to resign oneself to the fact that during this period of imprisonment, daily contact with the people is lost and that one's efforts are restricted to inter-prison politics.

There are three choices in prison:
1. complete subservience;
2. opportunism; but successful opportunism is an option which is only available to the leadership. In return for their containment of political struggles in jail they get better cigarettes, extra visits, better cells, etc. And the third option is daily fighting and resistance.

One learns in prison that there is no binding law. Force operates directly and without the guise of democratic due process. It is possible for a prisoner, who asks for an increase in his food portion, because he is still hungry, to be beaten, injured and thrown into a punishment cell for days, and it is possible to commit 50 people to punishment cells for months because together they protested against the beating of another fellow prisoner.

Of the 6 years of my imprisonment I spent two years in punishment cells. I learned in prison to ruthlessly and accurately assess my inner capacities, as if standing naked before a mirror, so that I could face outside reality without entertaining any illusions.

They take away your copybooks and papers - you use cigarette papers, they take away your cigarette papers - you steal paper when you are taken for an interview with the prison director. You draw a chessboard of a blanket with a bar of soap and make the pieces out of break and olive stones.

In prison one learns that, relatively speaking, as long as one breathes one can struggle. Struggle has the deepest and most just unifying power and through the struggle one can see the future in concrete, tangible terms. The relationships between the prisoners in jails are a part of the struggle, and Israeli prisons today are a microcosm of the struggle for a democratic Palestine.

**Advocate Hussein Abu Hussein**
*Aged 26. Member of the National Progressive Movement and member of Umm al-Fahim Local Municipal Council.*

Umm al-Fahim is the worst victim of Zionist Colonization, and a clear demonstration of this is the confiscation of the majority of the lands of the village.

Ninety percent of Umm al-Fahim lands were confiscated and the majority of breadwinners in the village were transformed into a daily commuter wage labour force.

Also the poverty of the village is glaring, especially when compared to Jewish settlements – kibbutz or otherwise. The village suffers from a complete lack of public and cultural facilities like cultural clubs (even the official Histadrut Club has shut down), public gardens, playgrounds for kids, let alone adequate school buildings, water supplies, land for popular cheap apartments or a location of building zones to allow for the urgently needed expansion of the building area in the village. The Government obstructs the introduction of industrial areas in the village and aims to suppress any local industrial initiative. Every day 4,000 workers leave Umm al-Fahim early in the morning to all corners of the land for employment in the Jewish cities, and then return to the village in the evening for the night.

Our situation in Umm al-Fahim is typical of the situation of all Arab villages under Israeli rule since 1948. I wish, however, to emphasize that in the view of our Movement the position and national oppression of our people is an integral part of our problem as is

the economic and material impoverishment and under development. Our struggle aims to correct our situation in both these areas.

**Jamal Ahmad Mahajinah**
*Aged 22. Student at the Hebrew University. Studying biology and specializing in genetics.*

I completed my secondary education at a Jewish school because in 1971 there was no secondary school in Umm al-Fahim. At the Jewish school they celebrated Israel's Independence Day, the Memorial Day for fallen Israeli soldiers, and they had commemorations against Palestinian operations. This taught me a great deal. I wanted to go to university, but my father did not have the money to support me so I worked for one and a half years at a hotel in Elat and saved up money for my studies. Now I also receive a grant from the Arab Students Loan and Scholarship Fund. This is the only foundation that offers grants apart from the authorities. The Arab Department of the Histadrut and the Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs give small grants, but to select students and with the aim of making the students subservient to the authorities. The mere existence of the Arab Students Loan and the Scholarship Fund it vital because it encourages even the poorest families to send their children to university. They know that if their children qualify for a grant they won't have to pay for it with humiliation and shame. The grant, even though it is modest, frees the student from dependence on the authorities and from the pressures applied to them.

I was recently put under house arrest for three months with five other students from the university. The authorities considered me a danger to the public. The order was issued by the commander of the Northern commander, General Avigdor Ben Gal, the same criminal who recently stated that the Arabs in the Galilee are a cancer in the heart of the State. There were no specific charges and because of this they had to resort to the Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945. This followed the publication of a leaflet by the National Progressive Movement for the convention of the Palestinian National Council in Damascus. The leaflet expressed our views on the Middle East problem and the Palestine problem. The press wanted to incite people against us and claimed that we support the armed struggle and the annihilation of the State.

While under house arrest I was confined to my house from sunset to sunrise and I had to report to the police twice daily. Also the police used to come to the house every night, sometimes two or three times during the same night.

I am now organizing study groups for the secondary school students in Umm al-Fahim. These study groups take place in the Abna al-Balad club. Since 1974 our movement has helped pupils in many Arab secondary schools. We assist them with University entrance exams. We also organize assistance for Arab students during their first year at university.

As to my future in biology, the truth is that the problems have already begun, even though my average grade every year has been excellent. One of the lecturers refused to supervise my dissertation because of my political activities. I approached another lecturer

and he is now deliberating on whether to supervise me or not. It may be that I will be forced to change my subject and take dentistry instead.

But my house arrest failed in its main objective: namely, to frighten me away from political activity. I continue to participate in the defense of Arab students and the rights of my people. Our political activity and the struggle must continue although this will obviously increase the oppression against us by the authorities. There is an attack against the Palestinian people as a whole - in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel, and the attack against us is part of this general overall attack.

**Muhammad Yusuf Da'ud Mahamid**

*Aged 30. A construction worker. His family's land was confiscated in Lajun.*

When I was 13 years old I crossed the border to Jordan illegally. I did this because as an Arab living under this regime I could not open my eyes without seeing discrimination and racism all around me. I thought I would not be able to do anything useful here, and that it would be better for me to go to Jordan and be with other Arabs there. I gave Jordanian intelligence all the information I could about spies and collaborators in Umm al-Fahim, I felt this was my contribution to the struggle against Israel. But I was detained there for one month, tortured and then handed back to the Israeli authorities with a dossier full of all the information which I had given the Jordanian authorities. I learned that Jordan is reactionary, perhaps more so than Israel. In Israel I was detained for one month and then released on bail. A year later I was sentenced to two months imprisonment by a military court. I spent these two months in the store room of the Padres Hannah Police Station. I was not allowed any family visits, or even a walk in the courtyard. Food was handed to me from used the door and I was never allowed to have a shower. My toilet was a bucket that was emptied once a day. Police helmets, clubs and mattresses were kept in the storeroom. The mattresses were often stained with blood.

After I was released I went back to school for two years and then began to work. In 1966 when I was 17 years old I had been working in a battery factory for one year. The country was in recession. I was the only Arab worker in this factory and although there were some Jewish workers who had only been there for a few weeks, when the recession came I was the first to be fired.

At this time the PLO was forming and they were broadcasting on the radio and calling for Palestinian youth to join the liberation army. The call was not specifically to Palestinians living in Israel, it was directed to all Palestinian youth wherever they might live. I wanted to join and participate in the liberation struggle of my people. I attempted, with two other youths from Umm al-Fahim, to cross the border to Gaza. By mistake we got to the UN observation post on the border and they tried to convince us to return but we refused. In Gaza I was delivered to the fedayyin. At the time I was just anti-Jewish but the fedayyin insisted on distinguishing between Jews and Zionists. They repeatedly emphasized that their struggle was not against the Jews but against the Zionists. They also told me that it was my duty to return to Israel, because if all the Palestinian youth in Israel were to leave

like me the Zionists would find it easy to rule and take the remainder of our lands. I agreed to return and the fedayeen took me to the border. Because it was Friday evening I crossed the border easily. After I crossed I went to a bus station and had to wait there for over one and a half hours. Some members of a nearby kibbutz became suspicious of me and phoned the police. I was picked up by an army command car while I was still waiting for the bus. At this time I was with one other youth from Umm al-Fahim who also decided to return. We told the soldiers that we were looking for work but they didn't believe us.

They blindfolded us and told us to lie down on the floor of the command car. They covered us with a tarpaulin and then heaped sand on top of it. When the command car stopped we were thrown to the ground and the soldiers began to systematically beat us and curse us, I was put in solitary confinement for one month and tortured. But this is common and you can hear about it from others. I was sentenced to four years in the Beersheva District Court. (two and a half years imprisonment and one and a half years suspended sentence). After my release I was under travel restrictions for the one and a half years of my suspended sentence. I had to apply for a special permit every time I wanted to travel outside my home area. The police continued to harass me, mainly by coming to my house in the early hours of the morning (two or three a.m.). I also faced problems of discrimination at my various places of work.

In 1973 I started to work at the Herzl Printshop, the owner, who was about eighty years old, had been a member of the Knesset for the Hashomer Hatzair - Mapam. I was taken on to replace a worker who had to leave to do his military service. The first two weeks were a probationary period, but with the help of my fellow workers, I learned the job well, and at the end of the two weeks I went to register as a permanent worker with my boss. When I have him my identity card he became very excited. He threw it down and rushed off to see the owner of the press. When I had first arrived he had asked me my name and I had said "Mahamid", but he understood it to be Rahamin, now that he saw an Arab name 'Mahamid' on my identity card he recoiled. I was the first Arab worker to set foot in the press. I did, however, manage to work there for eight months and my relationship with the other workers was excellent - most of them were Arab Jews. Our good relationship developed through the political discussions we had on the shop floor. But when the owner of the press realized this he wanted to dismiss me. He called me to his office and told one of the workers to mess up my machine while I was out. When I got back to my machine I was accused of being irresponsible and immediately fired. I realized there was something funny going on and when I confronted the worker who I thought had messed up my machine he confessed that the boss had told him to do it. I freaked out. I pulled out all the money I had in my pockets, about 700IL, and tore it up and threw it on the floor. I started shouting at the owner that I didn't need him or his favors. The other workers began to shout at him. He ran out of the workshop, they were shouting after him "You see now why they hate us. You want to throw him out because he is an Arab!" and I shouted "Yes until now I always held my friends back from terrorist activity but now....!!" When he got outside the old man fainted. He as quite scared and when he came round he insisted on walking with me to my room in the Shanazi quarter. He was trying to persuade me to return to work. When he entered my room and saw all

the books I had he was astonished and asked me, "What's that you are reading?" I told him that all the Arab youth were reading a lot and he said, "Oh dear, oh dear, this is really bad!"

I am convinced that nothing will ever take place in this world without struggle and resistance. Everybody should know what they have to do. Struggle is the duty of every man everywhere. It is important for us to stay here and struggle here. I am glad that I returned from Gaza and remained in our land.
It is imperative that people organize and undertake political activity, publications, demonstrations, leaflets and public meetings to improve the education of the masses. Even my meeting with you is a political action.

**Mustafa Muhammad Hajj Da'ud Mahamid**
*Head of the Local Municipal Council - CP Democratic Front*

We lack everything: schools, playgrounds, a sewage system and houses for young couples and large families. It is the Ministry of the Interior that has the primary responsibility for the budgets of local municipal councils, and it is with this ministry that we have problems. However, we also have urgent problems with the ministries of Education, Finance and Agriculture. In truth there are urgent and sensitive problems with all Israeli Government Ministries. We began to formally demand the introduction of a sewage system in 1975. All we need is the agreement of the Ministry of the Interior to publish a tender. So far they have not agreed.

Government loans to municipal councils are given in proportion to the collection of local tax. In one month this year we collected 96% of the local municipal taxes but we have received only 10% of the credit loan which is due to us.

Experience has taught us that there is open discrimination against Arab local municipalities in all areas. Yigal Alon, when he was Minister of Education, promised to help us construct a secondary school with the assistance of the Jewish Agency. Yet the Jewish Agency withdrew its offer to support and so far we have failed to get any grants or loans, and up to this day only the foundations of the school have been constructed.

During the summer it is unusual to have regular water supplies for domestic consumption in Umm al-Fahim. In previous years the water supply was always cut off. But the council fought hard against this, and this year we have water.

The authorities want to impose a master plan on the village that will suffocate us and prevent any development to the village. They intend to prevent the hamlets affiliated to Umm al-Fahim from expanding. They want to future industrial zone of Umm al-Fahim to be on private property rather than of the ample government owned property inside the village and surrounding it.

In 1977 the government claimed all the remaining so called uncultivated lands of the village. There was a great outcry in the village and signs of strong resistance. The case went to court, and during the court case the government proposed a compromise: 1000 dunam would be registered under public village ownership and the village would have rights of long term lease on a further 1150 dunam. But because of our dispute over the master plan these 1000 dunam are not yet registered in the name of the village and neither are the lands proposed for long term lease.

Personally I have felt many difficulties. It was impossible for my son to get into medical school in this country because of the numerous clauses against Arabs in medical schools. They intend to force Arabs into regression and backwardness and into manual labour. I reject this policy. The government is pushing people to extremism and insurgency. But these days are no longer like the 1950's. The best indication of this is the Federation of Arab Local Municipal Councils.
Now that I am sixty years old no pressure or difficulty can affect me. The authorities label me as a communist or a nationalist. If a person who demands his rights is a communist or a nationalist - then I am a communist or a nationalist.

**Raslan Khalid Mahajinah**
*Aged 18. Attending last year of Secondary School in Umm al-Fahim.*

My family owned land in Lajun but it was confiscated. My grandfather was one of the Mukhtars of Lajun. My father works with a transport service in Tel Aviv and he had three lorries.

On the eve of March 26th, which was the day the final text of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty was signed in Washington, the Palestinian flag was raised over the secondary school in Umm al-Fahim. Also the walls of the school were covered with slogans against the Israeli authorities, and against Arab reaction as represented by Sadat, and against local reaction as represented by the Deputy Principal of the school. The slogans supported to PLO. On the same night an Egged bus was set on fire in the village.

Two days before the Israeli Day of Independence, the Israeli flag, which is usually raised over the secondary school, was torn to shreds and soaked with black paint and thrown to the ground. On the 29th April two more Egged buses were set on fire. Today Egged buses are no longer parked in the village over night. They are now parked next to the Ara police station. On May 20th I was arrested with three other friends from the secondary school. We were charged with having carried out all the above listed incidents. They came to arrest me at 2:05 a.m. There were about 20 police officers and Shine Bet people. They searched through the house and through my books. They confiscated a book which was in Hebrew. The name of the book was "towards a Socialist Republic of Palestine" by Uri Davis. They blindfolded and handcuffed me and put me in one of the Shin Bet cars. They began to interrogate me but I denied the charges. They beat my face. One of them took a knife and poked my ribs and then poked it under my eye. After a short time I was taken out of the car at the police station. I realized my friends were also in the courtyard. They

began to beat us about our faces and heads. I was then put back into the car. They pretended to be discussing the fate of my two comrades over the car radio. They made out that they had been handed over to the Haddad falangists and that one of them had been killed. They then said that I also would be handed over to Sa'd Haddad to be murdered. They then stopped the car and threw me out. They pretended they had taken me over the Lebanese border. When it became clear to them that I was still not prepared to confess I was taken to another police station. It was only two days later that I realized that it was the Petah Tiqwah police station. There I had to stand in front of a wall with my hands raised for the whole day. A dog was let loose in the courtyard. The only interruption was when I was called for interrogation. During my interrogation they threatened to extend my detention. Afterwards I was taken back into the courtyard, blindfolded, and again made to stand in front of the wall with my hands raised. On one occasion, I lowered my arm, and one of the police officers kicked me and slapped my face. One the second day they continued to interrogate me. They advised me to resign from Abna al-Balad and told me that the movement was playing with fire. They wanted me to confess that the person in charge of the youth section of Abna al-Balad had incited us to do these things. They wanted the names of members of the youth section and information about our meetings. They wanted me to collaborate with them. They said that in return they would see that I got to University and would pay for my studies. They said that if I refused my future would be ruined like the future of others. Still we all refused to confess so they tried a new trick. They took one of my friends and beat him badly. They then forced him, with a club stuck in his back, to plead with the rest of us to confess the charges, even if we had not committed them. He said that if we did not they would beat us also and detain us indefinitely. The first of us refused to talk to him, let alone confess. But the second agreed to confess to the charge of tearing the Israeli flag and he signed this confession. He was afraid because he had been in hospital one month before and had undergone two operations. Then they came to me and showed his confession and tried again to make me confess. I told them that my friend was a liar. The interrogator then got hold of my tongue and pulled it and then proceeded to beat me and threaten me.

After 48 hours we were taken to court. Our friends from Abna al-Balad were waiting for us there with nationalist lawyers. We felt the value and importance of our organization - we were not facing the authorities on our one. Our detention was extended for five days but we were then released with no charges.

Abna al-Balad is the only movement that is fighting and leading the Palestinian people in the right direction. It supports scientific socialism and it is a nationalist movement which considers us to be Palestinians and not Israelis like the C.P. Individual struggle will not bring victory, so we have to choose between the C.P. and Abna al-Balad and because I am a Palestinian I have joined Abna al-Balad. I hope that Abna al-Balad will help the Palestinians inside the 1948 borders and lead us to the fulfillment of our aims. I am not talking only about Arabs, but also about Jews who are today fighting against the authorities, also including Jewish political prisoners. So long as a Jew fights against Zionism and Zionist immigration and the settlements then he participates in the same struggle and I consider him a Palestinian.

**From the Village of Muawiya**

**Rafiq Yusuf Abdallah Mahamid**
*Aged 52. He has 14 children.*

The Israeli army entered the village of Muawiya on May 20th, 1949. The residents were ordered to leave the village for a few hours, and told to go to Umm al-Fahim. We were ordered to leave our furniture and all our belongings in our houses. This was after the occupation of Umm al-Fahim and we had already handed in our weapons these. The army told us that they only wanted to stay in the village as a military exercise. We left the village, we were about 500 residents at that time, and when we were about 2 km away, we began to hear the sound of explosives blowing up one home after another. Some of the younger men returned to the village to see what was happening. They saw the Israeli army methodically blowing up the whole village, with explosives and bulldozers. The destruction was total. They destroyed everything including the school and the mosque. We were left without shelter and had to live under the trees with our children.

We went to the Military Governor in Umm al-Fahim and after some time he agreed to see us. He said that the destruction of Muawiya was illegal and that we should return. He said the area was not under his jurisdiction and that we should see the Military Governor in the village or Ara. We were sent from one Military Governor to another in the area, but we never gave up and we continued to press them.

***Mr. Abdal-Rahman*** *was on the delegation that went to see the Military Governors, he adds:* At that time we didn't know anything about this new State. When one of the Military Governors told me that he was going to bring the matter before the Knesset, I went outside and told the people that he intended to speak to the most important person in the State about our problems. They kept promising us that we would be able to return. Once, on one of these delegations, they served us coffee and peppermint sweets. I whispered to my friends that these peppermint sweets are the price they are prepared to pay for our land. But we refused to leave the area and we continued to live under the trees and in the middle of 1950 we were finally permitted to return and rebuild our village. We received no compensation and none of the officers responsible for the destruction of our village were ever brought to trial. During this period, when the Israeli Army was busy destroying our houses, the authorities confiscated thousands of dunums belonging to the village. Today we only have between 200 and 300 dunams. Recently they set the boundaries of the village. It encircles the existing densely built area and it is now illegal to build beyond it.

***Mr. Rafiq*** *continues:* I used to own 48 dunam, but 41 were confiscated and now I only have seven. From the time our village was occupied until today, military manoeuvres have threatened the welfare of our residents. Three have been killed and 13 injured and crippled. Last year a baby was injured. Currently we have 2500 residents in Muawiya, but we have no electricity, no Kupat Holim and no children's clinic. Most residents have

to commute to Tel-Aviv to work, some of the old men and women raise sheep, goats and cattle.

**Muhammad Uthman Mahamid**
*Aged 53. He has seven children.*

I was shepherding my herd of sheep and goats and I sat down to eat some food. I leant on my elbow and a bomb exploded underneath me. I lost three fingers and one eye, the other eye is also almost blind. I still have over 100 splinters in my body. I received no compensation. Today I live on a grant from the National Security Service. I, my wife and seven children live on a monthly grant of 4,500 IL.

**From Sharaya**

**Mahmud Muhammad As'ad Aghbariyah** *Aged 42. He has 10 children. He used to own 200 dunam near Mei Ami - he now owns 90 dunam.*

Until 1964 12 families lived in the Sharaya Hamlet. We have owned and cultivated this land for hundreds of years. We lived off the land and cultivated wheat, barley, sumsum, summus, tobacco and vegetables. Our problems began in 1960 when bulldozers, protected by the Israeli Border Police, came and begun to plough our land by force. They ploughed the fields which we had sown with wheat and then resowed it with durra or maize. We complained to the police but they threw our complaints to the bottom of the waste bin. We began to answer their trespassing in kind. We reploughed the land they had ploughed and resowed it with sumsum. This situation continued for a few years until the land was finally given to the settlement of Mei Ami. Since Mei Ami was established we have been continually threatened and terrorized in order to persuade us to leave the land. The police raided regularly and confiscated our animals and arrested the shepherd. We would then be taken to court and released because the land is registered as Musha'a, and we have a resolution from the Supreme Court of Justice issues in 1962 saying that this land belongs to us. Yet Mei Ami had taken control of our lands and there is no one who can recover our lands and give them back to us.

The houses were blown up be explosives in 1966. So was the well. They confiscated the land and most of the families left Sharaya. They obtained token compensations.

My family refused to leave. But today we only have one cow and I work in the township of Migdel ha-Emeq in the garbage department, This year we succeeded, through the courts, in gaining back control over 60 dunam of our land and we began to plough this land.

***His wife*** *interjects:* "One night in 1968 a man passed through here and asked for some bread. The man was from the West Bank. I gave him bread. Two weeks later the police came in great force in the middle of the night and surrounded the house. They searched

the house on the pretext that we were giving shelter to men from Fateh and that we were harbouring weapons. They arrested my husband and his father for 32 days. My husband's father was 60 years old."

***Mahmud Muhammad As'ad*** *continues:* While we were detained they did not try to interrogate us, but the police put all their efforts into trying to persuade my father to sell his land. Finally my father consented and we were released. But after we were released he reversed his consent and rejected the offer.

After the well was destroyed I asked the Local Municipal Council to repair it but they refused and even today we drink water which is polluted with worms and snails. One of my small children died because he drank this polluted water.

Four months ago the police came and threatened to pull up the olive trees which I had planted on the 60 dunam I regained through the courts. But I became furious and stood my ground and they went away.

In addition to confiscating our lands, destroying the crops, requisitioning the herds of sheep and goats, and destroying the well, and arresting us and threatening us the settlers of Mei Ami have blocked the connecting road between Sharaya and Umm al-Fahim with gates and guard dogs and heaps of gravel and sand. The road has been there since the days of the Turks and it is drawn on all the maps of the area and the police have confirmed that it was a public highway – and yet even so the residents of Mei Ami blocked the road on January 22nd 1979. On February 2nd 1979 the Head of Mei Ami came with another man. They were armed with weapons and they began to threaten us with expulsion by force. But again I stood my ground and they left. But the same day they stopped a tractor, which was bringing us some goods, from coming to Sharaya.

I went to the Chief Police Inspector, who agreed with me that the road is a legal public highway and that it is my right to use it. But he did not do anything and instead began to talk about democracy. I told him that democracy exists from Hadera to the South and Afula to the North only, but that in the Arab villages here there is no democracy.

Today we use a dirt road, which is 4km to Umm al-Fahim. The other road was only 1½ km to Umm al-Fahim. This dirt road goes through the woods which belong to the Jewish National Fund, and I am convinced they will close this road in the future. When Sadat and later Carter came here I told the Chief Police Inspector that if they wish to make peace, they should come here and make peace with me. There is no peace unless I am also included in this peace.

## From Zaalafa

### Mustafa Ahmad Mahamid

*Aged 29. He has five children. He works in a marble factory in Ramat Gan.*

I have worked at this factory for nine years now. My wage is the highest in the factory; I get 9,000 IL. I work five days a week and on Thursday evenings I return to my village. During the week I sleep on the factory premises. It is impossible for a Muslim or indeed any Arab, whether he is Muslim or a non-Muslim, to rent a room or a flat in Tel Aviv. And anyway I would have to earn double the wage that I earn in order to afford it. I am a member of the Histadrut. Three years ago I asked them to help me find a flat. They told me I should have applied when the factory was first established. Sometimes officials from the Ministry of Health visit the factory. They demand improvements in the health and working conditions here. But nothing has been done. During the last nine years that I have worked here, the police have come regularly four or five times a month at night. All these years they have known that we sleep here but they still come. They provoke us and upset our belongings, and throw our things on the floor. If any worker dares to rebuke then they will beat him. I made a small shack on the premises. That is where I pray and keep the Koran and a prayer carpet. That is a holy place and when the police came I asked if I didn't they would take me to the police station and detain me. They searched my Koran and ordered me to translate the entry in my calendar. One of the other workers spoke to me in Arabic. They turned on him and, pointing their guns at him, told him not to talk in Arabic. Sometimes they detain workers.

I am a Palestinian; this is obvious and requires no question. The Palestinian people lived on this land before our father Ibrahim arrived. Then it was known by the name of Amalek. Today there is no question about the existence of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people are recognized throughout the world, they are recognized by the UN. Everybody knows the Palestinian people, and no Israeli denial or rejection is going to change this fact. They may try, but it is not going to help them. Five years ago they talked about territories and today they say Palestinians.

## Section 2 – Interviews from the Early 1990s

**Muhammad Yusef Da'ud Mahameed (Abu Nidal)**

*(This is the same Muhammad interviewed in the 1970s included in Section 1 above.)*
*He was an activist in Abna al-Balad. He helped build what is the Ansar Cultural Center. When a split occurred within Abna al-Balad he joined the split off group, Ansar. He is now married with three boys and a fourth on the way. His first sons name is Nidal and so now he is called Abu Nidal, the father of Nidal. They are hoping for a girl. He is a construction worker in the Tel Aviv area. He is a sub-contractor and has one assistant. He is a stone mason, a skilled job. This meant he opened a file as a business for taxation purposes. He used to work for a wage now he is self-employed.*

*He and his wife have returned from a wedding party and he tells me:*

All the people did was clap their hands. People are tired. Too many parties, always alike, too many worries, debts.

*I ask him what relationships he has with Jews.*

Two types of relationships--work and social. We agree not to talk about social and political issues because we will disagree. We used to talk and argue but it interfered with our work relationship so we agreed not to talk about such things. My experience from before taught me that you can loose your job or won't get hired.

*What is the difference between being a sub-contractor versus wage laborer?*

It's natural the more important you are the more respect you get and they think twice about treating you badly. If I was a regular worker they could immediately fire me. I worked in a place before where there were Russian workers and they didn't do a good job so they were fired but one of the managers told me to take the best one and work with him. When the boss saw this he told him to get rid of him. I work cheaper and better, all the Arabs do and when it comes to work the boss has a common interest with the work.

*What changes have you seen over time if any?*

They respect more at work because it is to their interest. But there is no reason people come to like each other more. Like the mayor of Bat Yam, saying after the killing of the girl that he doesn't want to see any Arabs from Israel and the Occupied Territories in his town. If anything I think the situation is worse. When it's just a question of work the relationship is judged according to interest. Many times when a Palestinian attacks, kills or stabs someone it is because the bosses exploit the situation. The bosses don't pay the workers, etc. then the Palestinians strike back. The bosses know the media will create the atmosphere so that it is seen as a national not a personal issue. This dehumanizes the Palestinians. But the boss also wants the workers. I was told by a Jewish person that three workers killed a boss because he didn't want to pay them.

*Do you have any social relationships with Jewish people?*

No contact. The Israelis have an expression: "I can't know who you are, what you are really thinking." About two months ago I had a problem with my car, needed oil. I was between Tel Aviv and I had to go towards Hadera where a gas station is located. A Palestinian from Umm al-Fahim, on his way from work, gave me a ride to the station. It was a Friday afternoon so it is only Jews who are travelling to Tel Aviv while Arabs are going in the opposite direction home. I must go back towards Tel Aviv where my car is. All the cars must go past Windgate on their way to Tel Aviv where my car is. No one will take me. I wait and wait but no one will take me. I really couldn't believe it. No one would pick me up. Most of the workers in the gas station were Russian and even they couldn't believe it. They haven't learned the racism yet. After waiting an hour and half I finally stopped someone. He said "Are you crazy? People will take you in their car with fuel in your hand?" So I said "Have things come to this?" He said yes, but because he said he knew Arab workers and I was strong he would give me a ride.

*Have things changed?*

The economic situation is better. The standard of living has improved. Palestinians from Israel go to Egypt and come back feeling Israel is better, of course not when they go to Europe. But on the other hand I am not ready to have a dispute with anyone, not even a regular person over some small thing. I feel insecure, threatened physically. Everyday the roads are blocked to stop Palestinians and check their ID cards. This is on the main road to Tel Aviv as the workers go to work, until about 6:30 AM. If by accident the police stop a Jew they let them go. Sometimes they stop the transport taxis and all the workers are checked, make them get out. You see this and it makes you feel bad. I'm speaking about Israeli Arabs, not from the Occupied Territories. People here know who is who. We know who is a Russian, the police know who is an Arab. They rarely stop a non-Arab.

*Are you engaged in any political activity now?*

Not active now. The political situation since the new world order has made the Arab situation worse. It used to be that you knew that any humanitarian institution, like the UN would listen to your cry, intervene, now no one will hear you. This prevents you from doing things. Also the economical situation is difficult. Most of the time people are running after their hubiz *(bread).*

*You were once very active in Abna al-Balad and now?*

Before Abna al-Balad was very good. The main reason for the collapse--the people who were the leaders or made themselves the leaders were a bad phenomena for Palestinians inside Israel. A Palestinian person has to talk and argue but also give. If you wait for things to be given to you, from America, Norway or Germany, it means things here are not dear to you. When Abna al-Balad was strong the movement of Aloni, Ratz, wasn't stronger than Abna al-Balad, now they are in the government and Abna al-Balad has disappeared. It is a failure of the leadership--personal and behavioral, their way of thinking and behaving. For example, if you want a kindergarten you must put some of your own money into it not just stick the children into a room. Abna al-Balad didn't publish a newspaper until it was too late, now someone like Tayser Khalid does his own thing. The trust of the people is important and they lost it. Behavior is very important like only working on national issues while you do nothing on the local problems for the town. If the Muslims do something good for the municipality I choose the Muslims. Somebody from Abna al-Balad talked to me about making a fund to help students. I said it had to be open to everybody. He asked me who I voted for. I said that was my business. So that was it. Didn't want to work with me. This way of working is not good. The people didn't go against Abna al-Balad. They got two seats and this was not on the basis of families. This was before the splits.

There used to be a committee for Voluntary Work, organized by the CP and Abna al-Balad. CP and DF *(Democratic Front)* had 33 people and Abna al-Balad 3. There were 7 sub-committees. We in Abna al-Balad asked that Abna al-Balad have one place in each committee. They refused. So vote after vote they controlled and all night they continued to vote. After they asked everyone to sign the protocol, the first and second member of Abna al-Balad signed. When it got to me I tore it up. They started shouting at me. “What are you doing? What kind of voting is this? You do what you want.” Three years later I met one of

the CP man. He insisted on giving me a ride. Now this man has joined the Islamic Movement and said how stupid it was before.

*What do you think of the current Municipality and the Islamic Movement?*

Why they took the local election is because of the situation. If I had to compare today with the last time I was interviewed, everything is ok, feel satisfied. A volunteer from Norway 2-3 years ago was just here again about 2 months ago. She lived with us before. We were walking around Umm al-Fahim and she said I don't support the Muslims politically but there is something concrete here. The streets are paved. We went to Swissi and there is a playground/park for the children now. She is against the Islamic Movement but couldn't ignore that they are giving answers to certain needs of the people.

There are differences politically. If somebody tells you there politics are wrong but the streets are clean and there is a place for the children to play, you have to deal with these questions. Also everyone has to admit the difference in the management of the Municipality. If I speak realistically, I know the Jews have more order and discipline than us. I shouldn't hide this fact. There are mistakes. The same with the Islamic Movement. But I know they are a political party and they are looking to gain benefits for themselves.

*What do you think are the main social issues?*

Housing, homes. I don't say the Palestinian question because we were put aside, by the PLO, international politics, developments.

*Do you think these improvements under the present Municipality have occurred because the government is more willing to give to a non-DF Local Council?*

Why would the government prefer the Islamic Movement to the DF? The DF doesn't endanger Israel. I think there is a change in government policy. They now recognize that they did an injustice to the Palestinians and so they are trying to improve the situation. They succeeded to exclude us from the Palestinian people and have to justify this by giving us a better situation so we don't make bigger demands. Israel released 800 prisoners. So people think this is a good thing and they forget that they were arrested for no reason. Same thing here--the fact that the government gives us something people forget the last 40 years. When the Islamic Movement came we knew the situation was bad. In the similarly bad situation Abna al-Balad was growing and had a critique and now because of the bad situation without Abna al-Balad the Islamic Movement is responding. People talk often about the two periods and make comparisons. The Islamic Movement is organized well. Before Hashim *(former DF mayor of Umm al-Fahim)* used to deal with every issue himself no matter how small. The Islamic Movement has many people who can deal with different things. Not just one strong person, many with responsibility. The bad local situation gives them power.
Not sure who I will vote for next election. Depends on the situation and what the Muslim Brotherhood does, if they are corrupt or not.

*What is the situation with the police in Umm al-Fahim?*

*Em Nidal, Abu Nidal's wife, interjects:*

They must have increased in Umm al-Fahim because there are more police cars in the streets, a moving Police station. *Ghassan adds:* instead of one headquarters they go around in police cars. *Abu Nidal joins in and says:* The Sheen Bet--no political confrontation now. The police have less work, lack of militant events, so I am sure they are not as busy. They are more concentrated on West Bank and Gaza.

*Abu Nidal tell this story about his father, Yusef:*

My father, Yusef, was a merchant. He had a store. Dead now. His grandfather was a farmer. His father would exchange goods from the farmers and trade in Haifa, etc. and bring the farmers other things. Before 1948 my father advanced jibni [cheese] and other goods to the farmers and would get his payment later after the harvest. But because of the war the farmers had to flee so he couldn't be paid. One of the farmers who went to the West Bank calculated how much the goods from Yusef were worth. When he was dying he told his sons that the sheep and their offspring belonged to Yusef Da'ud a merchant in Umm al-Fahim and if they should ever meet him they must return them to him. One day after 1967 the sons arrived to Yusef Da'ud's shop and asked if he were the same Yusef Da'ud. They told him they had sheep that belonged to him. He said you must be mistaken I have no sheep. They insisted and clarified the Yusef they wanted. "Sure enough I am the one and the same but I have no sheep." Back and forth. Then Yusef says "I am doing ok and don't need the sheep please keep them." They say the same thing and they go back and forth. Then one day they show up with 36 sheep in Umm al-Fahim.

**Nael Sharif Kaasim Sa'ad Agbaria (Abu Sharif)**
*Interviewed 9/18/92 in the afternoon at his home with Ghassan translating. Married with 7 children. His father tried to open a milk factory in Umm la-Fahim but couldn't get a license.*

*Could you describe your work history?*

After finishing high school in Afula in 1964 I worked and lived in Tel Aviv as a construction worker. Then in 1968 my grandfather died and I returned to Umm al-Fahim and began to work here. I and a partner from Umm al-Fahim founded a cleaning supplies, ammonia, bleach, factory in Umm al-Fahim. We buy the materials and make the products. We sell in the Arab sector In the Triangle and the Galilee in Israel and a little in the West bank. We still have the factory. There was no problem getting a license.

In 1973 my brothers and I got a license to open a sewing factory and rented the downstairs in Abu Ghassan's house. We had no difficulty getting a license. We are sub-contractors. The Jews don't want to do this work. They know the Arabs are cheap labor. We sub-contract for companies in Tel Aviv. They have the design and cut it. We sew it. Sometimes they give us the material to design and cut. The Tel Aviv company exports what we make. We sub-contract for several companies. The factory has grown larger, employees 55 unmarried women, no married women. One was married but only for a short time. She is the

forewoman. Total employees are 60. August/September is a slow time of year in the garment industry so not working at full capacity now.

In 1988 I founded another company with a Jewish friend for sewing for export directly. I thought it would be easier with a Jewish partner. We would design, cut, do the complete process and export ourselves. We did everything. We invested a lot of money but our facilities were not competitive with the Jewish sector. We went bankrupt. We didn't have enough capital or the support of the government and we didn't have direct contacts to the exporters. We made connections through a mediator.

*Why a Jewish partner?*

We knew each other through the work for years, Moshe. We came from the same field. I thought it might be helpful to have a Jewish partner. The Government gives loans and grants if the factory is located in a development area or a settlement in the Occupied Territories, but Umm al-Fahim is not considered a development town. Moshe tried to get loans and grants but couldn't. We couldn't compete, get orders and we went bankrupt. The mediator sent a shipment to the US without an official order. Then the US company was having financial difficulties and cancelled the order but the goods had already arrived. The mediators don't always wait for the official order, he took a risk, but we lost. And sometimes the mediators work with the exporter's interest in mind. We got a little money from the mediator, the goods were delivered and were sold in retail stores in the US but we lost a great deal. In 1989 we folded. Before this I had two factories running at the same time.

We *(the brothers)* founded a company that owns and rents buildings. There was no difficulty. To register a company takes a day. We owned the land so there was no difficulty getting a permit. We built one story without a permit but once the Master Plan is approved we will get a permit for this story.

*What about the Master Plan?*

If the people of Umm al-Fahim agree to a smaller area the government will sign the Master Plan. It means cancelling a number of small hamlets of Umm al-Fahim on the way to Hadera, Ein Ibrihim, Lybia, and others. There are other issues also. Umm al-Fahim people must build 100 meters from the road but this is not the case for most Jewish areas, like Tel Aviv or Kardur where it is only 25 meters. I don't think this issue of the Master Plan will be solved for a long time if at all.

*What is going on in your neighborhood?*

In 1982 my neighborhood, Jabal Kahowlsh, the people got together to plan its development. Most of the land is privately owned by members of my family and others too except for parts that the state owns, all of which is confiscated land under the Absentee Property Law. Iit includes land of an uncle of mine also. We spent $20,000 US dollars for an architect and planners to plan the neighborhood. We made a survey. The plan includes all the land, private and state. We didn't get any help from the Ministry of Housing or Transportation.

We want to develop the area, roads, a complex with supermarket, cinema and other faculties—a commercial center. The survey covers the buying patterns of people of Umm al-Fahim, etc. The plan includes 30 dunams, 30,000 sq. meters, for the commercial center. The regional Committee for Planning in Haifa and the local committee in Ara which is for the Arab towns has only approved 8,500 sq. meters for this center. We don't have money to start this project. There are many Jewish investors who are ready to participate in this project but they exploit our situation. Since the government won't give use support, grants, loans, etc. they can blackmail us. They want 80% of the profits and ownership. It's not like the building in the madan [center of town] where we took out a loan and from the rents we pay back the bank according the agreement. Here the investors want a 80/20 split and ownership of the project. The percentage depends on the situation and can be 50/50, etc. to encourage development. The first survey was completed in 1984 by the Histadrut consortium. Now we are doing another survey with the Arab/Jewish Development Association. They are paying for the survey. American/Kuwait money--$15,000. There are investors, all Jewish. The Arabs don't have any money. But these are the same ones who suggested the 80/20 split.

*What kinds of problems do you have?*

In 1974 I suggested to a Jewish friend to open a factory that would start from the beginning and complete the garment. We planned the project and he went to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Jerusalem. We thought it better if a Jewish person went. The Minister said why Umm al-Fahim and not Afula and didn't even want to discuss the project. We got no help. At the personal level I have good relations with Jewish people but institutionally and the state this is not so. Anything, you have to do yourself. You can find help on paper but not in reality. It is not a question of luck. You have to risk your money, your property, your nerves to be able to do something. *(Recently Abu Sharif was in the hospital and had to rest.)* There is no planning for the Arab towns. No expertise, no cadres. So you have to take the risk on any project. No planning. The government doesn't tell you what is needed, what can succeed. In Jewish towns they initiate the projects and do the planning. For example, in agriculture, Israeli farmers are given direction on when and what to plant, for instance cucumbers. They don't do this with the Palestinians. If a Jewish farmer wants to plant something and the government knows somebody else is already doing that they will suggest something else. The municipality has no role to play. There is no Master Plan. This is also not the case for Jewish towns. We don't even have roads completed.

*Are there problems among Palestinians?*

Because there is no planning if someone succeeds at something then others copy. Then they become competitors. This isn't good. There is no real difficulty working together if the projects are small, not big ones.

*What do you think of the Islamic Movement?*

The Islamic Movement tried to prevent women from working. First they attacked the women who work outside Umm al-Fahim in Afula, Hadera, Beit Sheean in the sewing

factories, food factories. Then they put social pressure on the women who work inside Umm al-Fahim. But this failed. The women continued to work for pay. They burnt the cars that transported the women to work. Now they try to get women to work for them. They found out that the money women earn is important for the family's income. And the women just didn't stop working. They still send women to instruct how they should dress, that women should stay home, but meanwhile they send their daughters to work.

***Notes***

*There were three sewing factories each employing about 50 people in Umm al-Fahim when these interviews were conducted in the early 1990s. There were about fifteen small workshops employing 10-20 people.*

*Abu Sharif was hospitalized in September, 1992 because of chest pains. It was not a heart problem, but the muscles in his chest caused sweating and other symptoms. The doctor said this was due to stress and insisted he must rest. As discussed in chapter 1 such health problems are typical of middle class Palestinians in contradistinction to the general health trend for such people in "modern" societies.*



**Abu Sharif in his office at the sewing factory in Umm al-Fahim**

**Interview with Hussain Abu Hussain, a lawyer, on selling alcohol in Umm al-Fahim in 1992.**

Four years ago the owner of the restaurant by the gas station on the main highway before entering Umm al-Fahim was selling beer without permission from the Municipality. The Municipality gave him an administrative order of closure. The man came to me and we wanted to take the case to court, an abuse of discretion on the basis of religious grounds. The man decided not to and instead signed a promise not to sell beer so that the Municipality would renew his license.

According to Israeli Law the Local Authority grants the right to sell alcohol, open cinema on the Sabbath, etc. Two years ago the Knesset ruled that the Local Authority has the right to use its discretion on religious grounds. This decision occurred after the Jerusalem Magistrate Court ruled that the Local Authority couldn't use religion as a basis to deny permission. Then members of Knesset joined to amend the Knesset law and they won. Now there is a case in the Supreme Court that deals with the Local Authority. In Tiabe the new mayor made a coalition with the religious and promised that the Local Authority would not renew permission to restaurants who sold alcohol. The opposition has issued a petition to the

Supreme Court. The decision will have general implications. The Local Authority gives permission to open a restaurant and permission to sell alcohol, two separate permissions.

In Umm al-Fahim when the man was issued an order of closure because he sold beer, this was before the Knesset Law was amended so I thought the man had a good chance of winning the case but he did not want to challenge the Muslim Brotherhood. Now there are no places in Umm al-Fahim that sell or serve alcohol. Currently under the amended law the Municipality has the right to deny permission on religious grounds.

This could not happen if Israel had a constitution. The Local Authority can make practical laws though they cannot change the basic laws.

**Saleem Allssad**
*Director of the Municipality's Department of Health. Interviewed on 9/20/92.*

*I met with Mr. Allsaad several times. We mostly discussed public health matters. Here I site comments he made in the course of an interview in his office on September 20, 1992 concerning economic activity in Umm al-Fahim. I began my interviews with him shortly after the new Islamic Movement municipal government had been voted in. He had not lost his job though he is secular, but he told me "many have switched sides to save their positions." Saleem has worked for the Municipality for 14 years. Since 1988 he has been the Director of the Health Department.*

There are 400 to 450 businesses in Umm al-Fahim, all small--carpentries, restaurants, sewing factories, stores, butchers, etc. There are about 380 retail shops, including groceries, boutiques, etc. Most of these are run by women. There are many one-person sewing shops.

There are problems for businesses because there is no zoning for industrial activities, no Master Plan, no industrial area in Umm al-Fahim. A project was presented for a tile factory and was refused permission. In another case they had to sign a commitment that they would move without compensation to the industrial site once it is approved. There is no serious industry in Umm al-Fahim. Two-three furniture factories that hire 20-25 people each. Most people work outside Umm al-Fahim. Why we can't find investment here is a question of government policy. What privileges can an investor get in Umm al-Fahim? There is no industrial area, no tax allowances. This is because of the government. Only the Jewish sector has these programs. When a project is approved by the government in the Arab sector it is designed for only a very small area which is immediately filled to full capacity. In the Arab sector there is no serious industry, even in Nazareth or Shifaamr. Businesses are small private family run. There are in all of Umm al-Fahim only 4 or 5 factories employing people. 95% of the working people work outside Umm al-Fahim.

We are planning two industrial zones. One in Ein Jarar 70 dunams on the western southern side of Umm al-Fahim and one in El Eyan 300 dunams on the eastern side. The first is for small factories--sewing, food, etc. that can't damage the environment. The other is for technological industry. I don't know what exactly; it's hard to image pharmaceuticals in

Umm al-Fahim, but something. I am not optimistic. In order to attract investment the government must announce that your town is a development town and must be class 1. This will give you cause to invest. The government doesn't include us as an integral part of this country. We are considered a part of the West Bank and Gaza; not a part of this country.

**Khalid Haj Mahmud Agbaria (Abu Muhammad)**
*Mukhtar from Musmus , a sister town to Umm al-Fahim*
*Interviewed in his son's home in Musmus; conducted with Ghassan Fawzi translating on the evening of 9/22/92. He is filled with stories and I hardly ask him a question.*

*Mr. Fawzi and I walk up the steep hill into Musmus off the main Hadera-Afula road. There are no street lights and the streets are extremely steep, narrow and winding, but the roads are paved. The houses fill up all the space and surrounding hills. People peer into each others' faces to determine with whom they are speaking. When it rains it is a disaster. His son's salon is large with the couches and chairs arranged typically around the walls in a rectangle. Plastic flowers and porcelain vases are everywhere. The typical wooden put-together-yourself shelf is in one of the corners. His grandson comes into the room periodically with each serving, ending with coffee. Abu Muhammad is wearing the traditional dress and headdress of a yellow color.*

*Musmus doesn't have local council status. A sheriff, Mukhtar, is appointed as well as an education director in villages like Musmus which don't have a local council but are recognized settlements. Abu Muhammad was appointed by the Minister of Interior to be the Mukhtar for Musmus in 1953 while under military rule and he still is. During military rule in 1962 he was appointed as trustee for three towns but he refused. He explains:*

I agreed only to do so for Musmus. Because of social reasons I accepted to be a trustee for Musmus only, my village, letting other permanent persons from the other villages to be the trustees of those villages.

I had the stamp of the Ministry of Interior. I used to give temporary IDs, like when you wanted to change your Id they gave you paper without a photo. I represented the community to the government in all offices. Both as a muktar and trustee I got symbolic money for my services which didn't cover expenses for entertainment of officials who come to my house or my travels to the different offices.

In 1963 I had a conflict with the military governor of Umm al-Fahim. The governor didn't like that somebody from the community had any authority. The fact that the son of my brother was Rashid Hussain, the poet, who was also involved in this conflict didn't help matters. The officials from the Ministry of Interior supported me and didn't like the fact that the governor provoked the poet who was not especially active. They made a conflict. They fabricated a case against my own son blaming him for entering a marshal area with the sheep and he was brought to court and fined. I dared to tell the governor that governors come and go and that I represent the people. My stamp was taken from me because of this

dispute between 1963-65. Other notable people from Musmus showed solidarity and didn't accept the stamp when they were appointed by the governor's maneuvers.

*What do you think about the idea of Musmus acquiring council status?*

I am against having a regional council. I hold this position not because I am the trustee but that this is the people's will and that there is no need for the council because it only means that people will have to pay taxes for their buildings, like taxes on their houses which people don't pay now. Musmus is in a solitary cell. Between the military maneuvers area there is land that is owned by people from Musmus and the Jewish National Fund. We have only the houses. And we shouldn't give to the government. The Arab Heads of Local Authorities are putting themselves in chains in front of the Knesset because they don't have budgets and the Druze Councils are on strike. Other Councils can't pay the teachers and staff of workers. Why then do we need all this? If they really want us to have a Council are they ready to give us the money we need instead of depending on the taxation we are going to pay? For me also having a council means having an administrative board which means money goes to this board and disputes will happen as to who will be there. I didn't give positions to my family members. Once we needed a girl who graduated from the 8th grade to assist in one of the schools. There were three girls including my daughter. I went to one of the girls who represents another branch of the family. She refused because she said people will say she's going to work because her father had died. So she said: 'If your daughter will work with me I will work.' Because of this I chose the third girl.

*How are social needs met without a local council?*

Musmus got a water system at the same time as Umm al-Fahim did, under the same project, paid into it. We built a Kupat Holim center, a school till the 9th grade. This money is from the government. We have a water cooperative that maintains the water lines and collects the fees. People work voluntarily in the water cooperative. We raised money and connected the town to the electricity line, as well as to build streets. We have a Mother-Child Clinic and nurseries and the Voluntary Work Association provided services for garbage collection, etc., for a few years. We bought a tractor and paid the man so the people paid nothing. After this collapsed the Islamic Voluntary group organized it. Now each family makes agreements with the garbage collector and pays money. The Voluntary work Association purchased computers for the school and they have also a public library.

The suggestion of having a regional council was raised in 1973 by the Ministry of Interior. All the trustees form the different towns refused. Now they have raised it again and suggested to have an office in Jerusalem or Afula. I don't know what their reasons are but rumors say that they want to find a job for one of their people from the area. The officials came to Musmus and met with different people from Musmus and we all refused the idea. The Deputy of the Ministry wants to come September 30th to raise the question again. Maybe they are moving now to suggest local committees in each town rather than forming a regional council. The trustee institution functions very well. *[He repeats this again and again, especially empathizing how well the education committee works, which is officially*

*appointed by the government.]* The quarters bring the money on time. We were able to build a school and to equip it and keep it in good shape. There is no reason for a council.

*What about the issue of a union with Umm al-Fahim, particularly regarding public health concerns, like garbage collection?*

The garbage system now is good. A private garbage collector from Umm al-Fahim takes it to an area in the military area that is assigned for Musmus. This is fine. But we shouldn't be part of the project to take garbage to Mei Ammi. This is not a good site. The location is bad, difficult to access and the smells will be all over the place. It's just a gathering place so there will be a smell. If they succeed Musmus will join and I don't believe it is a good solution.

[***Ghassan Fawzi*** *adds:* Earlier, Mei Ammi people didn't want the garbage there because it is land of Umm al-Fahim and they wanted it to be used for other purposes. They proposed in their Council not to use this land for garbage purposes but that it should go to the military. This land is also land confiscated from the people of Umm al-Fahim.]

I suggested to the Ministry of Interior that the new big road had to go through the military area and not divide the people of Musmus and this area. The main road now cuts Musmus in half and the bigger road means taking more of our land. Umm al-Fahim didn't do anything on this issue, always postponed it, were silent. Musmus wanted to put pipes under the new road to make sure that we won't have obstacles in the future when we want to build the sewage system between the two parts of Musmus. People told us this had to be a decision made by an engineer and that technically it is possible to dig beneath the road without disturbing the road, so that it shouldn't be a problem later.

[Ghassan *adds:* Also, there are accidents on the highway every year. No overpass has been built that connects the two parts of Musmus.]

The sewage system is now a cesspool and one of our next projects is to lay a sewage system, independently. I don't know where sewage will go. We are not doing it now so why join a union when it is not a problem now. For us the garbage problem is solved so why should we join something that will only mean we have to pay more money?
*[He is laughing.]* I have no interest in joining Umm al-Fahim, for practical reasons. We have not asked Umm al-Fahim to be a part of Umm al-Fahim. I have no interest in this direction. We have our own roots and there is nothing to gain.

*[Ghassan Fawzi comments when we leave that when the Mukhtar dies maybe Musmus will get a Local Council. He tells me, as I was also able to surmise, that he speaks as the sole representative of the people of Musmus, using I did this and that and we need this and that.]*

**Raslan Khalid Mahajinah**
*(This is the same Raslan who was interviewed in the 1970s in Section 1 above.)*
*Interviewed on the evening of 9/15/92 in his home in the presence of his wife with Ghassan Fawzi assisting in translation.*

*Raslan finished high school and afterwards went to a two-year school for accountancy in Tel Aviv. His father supported him through school. He worked for four years in Tel Aviv with his father's company until it went bankrupt. In 1968 he lived in Jenin with his wife and her parents. He opened an office there but he was placed under movement restriction for three months and had to return to Umm al-Fahim where he opened an office. He was not permitted to go to the Occupied Territories. In 1989 he started selling shoes. He buys merchandise from the West Bank and sells it in the zuks in Afula, Nazareth, and other towns and cities. In 1991 he was a sub-contractor with ten men working under him in Haifa. Presently he isn't in any organization but he has had a political relationship with Abna al-Balad and keeps relations with others.*

*In April, 1991 he was in Jenin in the West Bank. The police stopped him. He had on his possession a newspaper and leaflet from the Intafada. He was taken back to Israel, put in detention, and was under interrogation for 40 days while he was taken from one prison to the next--Afula, Tiberias, Jalami, and others. His lawyer got him released by the court and subsequently he was placed under house arrest. He was required to pay a guarantee of NIS 20,000 and sign for NIS 30,000 and register with the police twice a week. They took his passport. The police are now appealing his case to the Higher Court. They want continued punishment. He doesn't yet know what will happen. He was already sentenced, has paid NIS 15,000 and is now under three-year probation. If he does anything he will go to jail for one year--all this for having a leaflet that Israel considers illegal.*

*He was once a member of Abna al-Balad but is no longer. He says this is not because he has "principled differences" but "internal disagreements" and "the situation is different." He says: "I was hopeful before, not now. Now the Islamic Movement is strong. I hoped Abna al-Balad would grow and become a large movement. The ideas are good but the organization made mistakes and the situation changed. They didn't translate the ideas to the people."*

*How is the situation different?*

After Land Day in 1976 the people were enthusiastic. The PLO was strong and this influenced and encouraged the people. The events and the PLO radicalized the youth. When the Palestinians in the OT are strong people in Israel are stronger. In 1979-81 Abna al-Balad was strong but then the leaders had differences. Abna al-Balad emphasized Palestinian identity. This was like a flame and people were able to give more than they do now. Splits and disagreements inside Abna al-Balad have weakened the organization in Umm al-Fahim.

The people went to the main street. There was a fight between the police and the people. Thirty people from Abna al-Balad and twenty others were arrested. This demonstration was part of a National Strike Day organized by the Committee of Arab Heads of Local Authorities. I was arrested and put under Administrative Detention. There was not enough evidence to take it to court so they used martial law. Rabin, who was Defense Minister at the time, signed the order. I was in jail for four months. I wasn't beaten. Some were in jail for one year, others for one and a half years. There were many other demonstrations on this day in the Arab towns and many people were arrested.

*Did Jews participate in the demonstrations?*

As far as I know the Jewish left didn't demonstrate or participate. They helped as lawyers. Our lawyer was with the Association for Civil rights.

But this struggle didn't continue. That means there is no movement, no organization to continue the struggle. When twenty-five people were killed in Jerusalem there was another big demonstration in Umm al-Fahim. People were arrested. It lasted one, two days and then there was nothing. Things are lost for the '48 Palestinians.

*And now?*

The Muslim Brotherhood is strong. The political situation is missing. When Abna al-Balad was strong there were demonstrations, strikes, many joined and followed the organization's programs. Now it is small and can't begin anything. It means it didn't succeed. Activities now are more official, established parties rather than militant. They are not engaged in confrontation. They are only doing things around daily issues not national demands.

*How is life for the people now?*

Things are more difficult now. The economic situation is harder than before. Products are more expensive and wages and salaries are low, not sufficient. This is why people concentrate more on daily life and how to make a living. This is true for me personally especially after I got married. The PLO doesn't speak about the Palestinians in Israel. Why do anything? Why get arrested, have your house closed? No one cares. The person must feel really a part of the Palestinian people to struggle about this. Now people say: 'For what do we struggle?' Arab organizations are not doing anything. We lost a strong movement.

*What can be done?*

We can change many things. The Muslim Brotherhood is strong. Now the people have to engage in a social struggle in Umm al-Fahim. This is a new stage. This social struggle is the first step.

*Will things be different if there is a Palestinian state?*

I don't believe the state will open up to Palestinians in Israel. I don't believe something will really happen in the Occupied Territories. In the news the Palestinian negotiating team raised the question of civil rights in the Occupied Territories. The Israeli's said this is not their business; we are the rulers here. And the Palestinians didn't include the '48 Palestinians in the question of civil rights either. All the people are talking now because of the situation in the schools, segregating classes. This makes people talk about what girls wear, future of their children, change their ideas. This is the first step of the social struggle.

*What kind of relations do you have with Jews?*

When there are problems we work with Jews, like getting my wife's ID card. But now there is not much working together. The relationships are weaker than before. For two years now I have worked in the open markets. I see all the people and how the Jewish people hate Arabs, how they talk about Arabs, the expressions they use. I feel the hatred. Other merchants bother me but don't prevent me from selling and Jews buy from me. But if I am selling the same product for the same price they will buy from the Jew. It makes life difficult. The atmosphere is not good. There are the poor Jews, mostly Oriental. The Ashkenazi are rich and they don't come to the zuks [markets]. You hear talk all the time about Arabs--how they do this, are like this. There is much hatred."

*How does this made make you feel?*

What can you do? You have to accept.

*He shrugged his shoulders and was clearly uncomfortable and found it difficult to say anything. I described some of my experiences and said a bit about how it made me feel. He simply agreed and nervously said "Yes."*

*Is the Sheen Bet working in Umm al-Fahim?*

More people are working for the Sheen Bet now. Before people who worked for the Sheen Bet were under attack, criticized. Under the Muslim Brotherhood it has become a causal thing. They raise different questions, like is this Muslim or not. This is a weakness of the political movement. It makes it easy for people to work with the Sheen Bet. Also the Muslim Brotherhood cooperates with them. Also the difficulties of people's lives make them find an easy way to solve their problems and try to progress--deal with arresting orders, problems with police, financial problems, the daily problems. This is a good way to make people cooperate with them. There are many more nineteen to thirty year olds who work with the Sheen Bet. They gather information about the residents. But nothing is happening right now. This may be needed later. It's open territory now. They collect all information about your personal life, what you say, even arguments with your wife. The streets are lost now. The political situation is lost. People are afraid.

***Ghassan Fawzi*** *adds—"*Since Abna al-Balad lost its leadership, there are no plans, no program, no organization. Now Abna al-Balad works with other Arab organizations and speaks from two sides of the mouth--official and nationalist. They work with and turn to the official organizations like Dawarshe and on the other hand call them collaborationists with the Sheen Bet. They can't do anything." *Raslan and he speak together. Then Ghassan continues.* "Now people gaze on the collaborators with respect. Two new principles were appointed this year. The Ministry of Education has a committee for principles. They appoint who become principles. There are ways they control who gets selected. There is a special school for preparing managers of schools. Not everyone gets to go to this school. If you collaborate it is easier. A security person is the head of Personal." ***Raslan*** *adds*—"Aloni can't change anything." *They give an example*—"There is a good guy, active in Abna al-Balad whose wife is from the West Bank. He became friends with the Supervisor of Schools

in Umm al-Fahim who is in the Ministry of Education, a notorious person, a Sheen Bet man. He's not ashamed, accepts to work with the Sheen Bet. Now his wife has been promised a job." ***Randa**, Raslan's wife, joins the conversation*. "When I was desperate I thought about going to the Sheen Bet to ask them to help me. Maybe the guy is still a good guy." ***Ghassan** then explains how they work*—"They invite you to their home. Seems like a nice guy, you talk, laugh, drink coffee together. A process begins that separates you from the people. If people complain to you, you say, 'But he's a nice guy. Why do you speak like this?' The gap increases and then you find yourself in the camp of the Sheen Bet." ***Raslan** tells a story*-- "My father told me how the Sheen Bet helps people get arrested and then right before you are released the same guy who got you arrested is brought to the jail and the police tell you that this person helped to get you released while you were in prison." ***Ghassan** tells what happened to him in 1969*—"This was a local and general election year. Dayan was Prime Minister. A lot of people were arrested, sent to detention including me. A group of us were called to the officer and asked if we knew this man. It was Abu Jabir, a notorious collaborator. I said yes. The officer told me, 'It is because of this man I am going to release you. You must thank him.' Other people who were with me took fruits, etc. to his home to thank him." *Then Raslan and Ghassan speak together. They agree that Abna al-Balad has no answer to what is happening and what to do.* ***Ghassan** says:* "Abna al-Balad calls Dawarshe for help and on the other hand informally calls him a Sheen Bet man. They tell people to boycott the elections. They're against the Knesset because they say we will lose our Palestinian identity. Doesn't look principled to the people. They are losing their power among the people. They could be small and principled and to some people they would seem crazy but to others they would be a hope, an alternative. They are not a small group of cadre that has an analysis, an understanding that can address the current situation at the stage we are at." ***Raslan** gives another example*—"Someone was a nationalist, coordinating National Committee in the 1970's when Abna al-Balad and others tried to form a group. Now he is a judge. People in the movement have joined the establishment." *Raslan describes another arrest.* "In 1987 I was arrested for having a Palestinian flag during the Land Day demonstration in Umm al-Fahim. This was before I was under administrative detention. I was arrested and they beat me. They put me on a chair with three legs so it was unstable, with a sack on my head. Then they beat you and you fall to the floor and are made to get up but you can't see. And they keep doing this to you all day four to five hours, perhaps a ten minute break to eat something They did this three times in three days to me. I was arrested for fifteen days and released. Two others were also arrested."

**Randa Ahmad Assad Mahajni**

*Randa is twenty-eight years old. Her father is from Lajun (destroyed during the 1948 War). He went to Nablus in the West Bank. He lived there for thirteen years. Her mother is from Nablus. Raslan Mahajni and she have two boys, ages three and six. One is in school; the other in a nursery (Al Hadaf).*

*She tells me something about her background and where she comes from:*

I am from the West Bank, Nablus and Jenin. My family is from Nablus and my father worked in Jenin. When he wanted to build a house he decided to move to Jenin where he

worked. I went to Al Najah University in Nablus from 1982-87. I have a BA in Arabic. I lived in a rented room with a friend. This was ok with my family. I married Raslan in 1985. He is from Umm al-Fahim. He is the son of my father's brother. Raslan came to the university and we met. we spoke with each other and fell in love. I was still in the university when our first son, Khalid, was born in 1986 in Nazareth. My husband lived with my parents in Jenin and on Fridays I went with the child to Jenin to be with my husband. On Saturdays I returned to Nablus. There were no problems about this with my or my husband's families, only support. Raslan lived in Jenin for one year. In 1987 I moved to Umm al-Fahim and lived with my in-laws. This was very difficult. If I wanted to sleep, where I was going, why am I not cleaning and cooking with my mother-in-law all the time, etc. But then we moved to the first floor, two rooms of the home we now live in. Now we have our own separate house away from the parents. My husband's brothers and families live in the other apartments and others will live in apartments which are still under construction.

*What do you do?*

All the time the women in Umm al-Fahim must work in the home. The mother-in-laws are always asking why you are not working with me to clean the house and cook. It is not like this in Jenin and Nablus. Here it is a village. All the time cooking. In Nablus women work for pay. There are clubs, women's center. Women go outside the home.

**Randa and Raslan Mahajinah in their home.**

*Their house is modest. They have a refrigerator, stove, electricity, telephone. When they had enough money they built the upstairs and moved in. The entire house is still not complete. In 1989 the second son was born, Ahmad. Her husband, Raslan, is self-employed, a middleman. He buys shoes from West Bank and sells them in the zuks in Israel, Nazareth, Afula, etc. Now she tells me:*

We have no problems with relatives because we live separately. My biggest problem is that I want to work, teach, but can't get a job. Until recently Israel wouldn't give me an ID card which made it harder to get a job. I applied and continually requested an ID card but they simply refused. Witness for Peace took this issue up and presented my case. Then the Israeli

news got interested and I was interviewed. Soon after this I got my ID card, in August, 1992.

*After she got her ID card she went to the municipality about teaching but they refused her.*

I think it is because I am not religious and do not cover my hair, etc. There is no other work for me and this makes me very unhappy. I am only sitting at home. I read books. I don't like to visit women all the time. All the time the same thing, the same talking, drinking cola, coffee, speaking about this and this and then going. In Nablus it is not like this. There are many things to do. I can work in a children's school, teach, work in the Women's Center, clubs. Here there isn't anything. Sometimes I sit. I don't want to wash the floors. There is not enough money. If I work life would be better.

*Do you have any friends?*

I have a few. Only women from the West Bank. Three or four. That's enough. We get together. Go to Afula, Hadera, Jenin. I am with my family and they with theirs. We go outside to Hadera, have coffee. We go in the evening without our husbands.

*She and another woman know how to drive and the husband's' let them have the car. Their husbands and families do not complain about this. She has no close friends who are from Umm al-Fahim. When I ask her why, at first she doesn't want to answer. She is embarrassed. Then she says:*

If I visit my friend, say Mary, we talk, drink coffee, talk, after I leave. Then she goes to see Lubna and speaks about me. This is not good. It is not necessary for me to sit with her.

*Why is it like this?*

I think it is like this because there is nothing for the women to do in Umm al-Fahim, only speak about this and this.

*How are your children doing?*

The children are ok. The youngest, 3 years old, goes to a pre-kindergarten, Al Hadaf, and the oldest, 6 years old, goes to school. We send him to an elementary school in the Mahajinah quarter which is far, Al Hayam. He has to walk and I don't like this. I called the school but they will not send a car to get him. He goes to this school because it has the best results on the tests. The teachers are good. We *(she and her husband)* took him to a psychologist in Nazareth who said he doesn't know things a 6 year old should know and that he should stay back a grade. We didn't do this and he is one of the brightest in his class.

*Do you do things as a family? Do you go out of Umm al-Fahim?*

On Friday and Saturdays my husband doesn't work. The family does things together on these days. We visit my family in Jenin, go for pizza in Afula, picnic, go to the beach. We

visit friends in Maliya near Netanya, Christians. We visit my husband's family in Umm al-Fahim, stay home and play Atari with their children, help them with schoolwork, etc. We are doing well though money is a problem but we are doing ok.

*What do you hope for?*

I hope to teach. This I want the most. For my children I want them to be good children, good in school, in home, with friends. I don't care if they are doctors or lawyers, only that they each be a good person, that they don't go with bad people, drugs, this is a big problem in Umm al-Fahim, there are many people involved in such things. I hope, I only ask God, that they be good children. And I hope Raslan works well. And I want peace in Israel. Later I hope to have a girl. Not now, after I work.

*If you don't have a girl would you try again?*

No. Three is enough. Two is enough. Raslan agrees. Two is enough.

*What would you like to see happen for women in Umm al-Fahim?*

I would like to see them work outside the home, think independently, leave the house when they want without being asked where they are going. I want women's clubs, a women's center, women having relations with each other. In UEF the most important thing for the girl is to marry. If she is 20 and not married it is difficult for her. It is a problem.

*When I asked her about the existing Women's Center in UEF with the Dept. of Social Welfare she expressed no interest.*

**Lubna Aghbariyah Mahajinah**
*She married in 1979 and has three children.*

*She tells me some thing about her family life.*

I would like one more girl. My husband wants more children but this is not a big problem between us. Relations with my mother-in-law are ok. She doesn't interfere. We live in a separate house in part of the complex of my husband's family. I am an Aghbariyah and my husband is a Mahajinah. I more or less do want I want whether my mother-in-law [mart ommi] likes it or not. I can leave my children with my mart ommi when I want. My mart ommi likes that I work outside the home. In general my relations with my relatives are good. They don't mind that I work, though they will say how can you manage the house, care for the children? I have no real problems with my husband; we can talk about things with each other. I know how to drive, but we have one car which my husband must use for work. He has a bakery, for bread only. In the mornings he goes around Umm al-Fahim selling the bread from the car with a megaphone.

The children have no real problems. The youngest Reeme just began kindergarten. She is five. My husband works in Umm al-Fahim six days a week from 6:00 to 1:30. Friday he doesn't work and we do things together, picnics, go out of Umm al-Fahim. I usually don't leave Umm al-Fahim with friends or children without my husband. I don't want to.

*What do you do during an ordinary day?*

In an ordinary day I get up and get the children ready for school. Then prepare food for the day. Do a little housework. Then I go to the nursery and work there until 1:00. Back home, some housework, dishes, washing clothes, like this. The kids come home from school and we may study together and do their homework. When Abu Salami comes home we eat. In the evening we may go visit friends, in-laws, or just stay home and read the newspaper, watch TV, play computer games. I read the newspapers a lot but no time for books.

*Who are your friends?*

I have no friends from school. All my friends are new ones, the wives of friends of my husband or friends I have made from work, from the nursery.

*Why don't you have any friends from school?*

Maybe because after women marry they work in the house, have their children. I don't think it's because mother-in-laws don't want their daughter-in-laws going out visiting during the day. It's hard to maintain relations after school especially after you marry and move to another quarter or neighborhood. With my friends I can talk freely about problems, troubles with husband and such things.

*What kind of problems do you have?*

I have two jobs, the house and work. The house is too small--three children in one room.

The Kindergarten is open from 8:00-1:00. I earn NIS 600. It opened in 1985.
Some women formed an association, an independent association. We thought, we have children, we want something for our children why not start a nursery. We got money from the Welfare Association from Geneva. We met with nurses, doctors, nursery school teachers and talked about how to do a nursery school. The Association still exists but it is not active. All the work goes into the nursery. There are three teachers. It's not enough but there isn't any money. The only money is from the students. NIS 100 per month. We have a car that picks up the children. It's going ok but we need new things for the children. It's all from before and then there's maintenance, painting, etc. The Municipality this year opened two nurseries but there is no money from the Municipality for the existing ones like ours.

*Why isn't there any money for existing nurseries from the Municipality?*

*Laughing a bit sarcastically she says:* You must ask them why. But there is money to help pay for the tuition of the students from the government. Each student applies and then the government pays the nursery directly for this student.

*Do you go out of Umm al-Fahim much?*

I go to Hadera; to Afula to shop, Kupat Holim, Ministry of Interior, hospital; to picnic, the sea, etc. Because I work I don't go that often. If I didn't work I would go out more often.

*What I would like in Umm al-Fahim?*

Restaurants, coffee shops--like in Hadera, not just sweets. Places where women can go alone or with men. Playgrounds--all the time the children are in the streets.
The first is very difficult because if I go with Abu Salami, religion. Umm al-Fahim is only Muslim. If there were say Christians it would be easier, better. Always I and the sister of Abu Salami go to Hadera to go out instead of somewhere in Umm al-Fahim. The second could be easy if the Municipality supports it. There is land; they just have to make it happen.

*What would you like your children to do after school?*

I would like my children to go to the university but if they don't want to that's ok. If they want to go to work that's ok too. Reeme likes to study the best.

*Have things changed in Umm al-Fahim?*

Things are not much better, some things are better. All the leadership is still men in Umm al-Fahim, Rakah, Abna Al-Balad, Ansar--there aren't any women. Politically now there is only the Islamic Movement. This is not good, but things are not worse either, just not better.

*Do you work with any organizations?*

I am a member of the Progressive Arab Women's Organization now. There are eight women in Umm al-Fahim who belong. Presently I am not doing much with them but in the past year I was active in organizing an International Women's Day activity in Umm al-Fahim and I participated in a Children's Day activity in Haifa.

*Do you work with any Jewish organizations?*

There isn't any work going on with Jewish and Arab women at this time that I am involved with and I don't know of any.

*When you were young you worked with Abna Al-Balad. What about now?*

Their program is good but they speak from two sides of their mouth. They are now just a few men. It's not just because they are bad, but they originally were young men without experience, not professional. They are now married, have children. Before if they didn't

have any money it didn't matter but now it is important. Maybe there will be an organization again. I am hopeful, but it will have to be a completely new organization, new people. There must be women in all the positions [*she indicates with her hands all the levels*].

*What do you think about independent women's organizations?*

There must be such organizations if there isn't a good women and men's organization like the situation now. It would be better if such an organization existed but it must be one with women in all positions, on the top.

*When I mention that this problem also exists in US, she is a bit disbelieving or rather surprised, but then adds:*

It is different there. Women can work outside the home, go where they want, go to meetings, be where men are, etc.

*Do you think the ideas you believed in in the 1970s have any relevance today?*
(*Lubna was interviewed in the 1970s for Ms Caccia.*)

I still agree with the main political positions I stated in an earlier interview concerning women's liberation and the national question.

*How are social relations in Umm al-Fahim?*

Things are better for married women than girls. She must do what the brothers, fathers and mothers want. Basically the situation for girls has not changed except in certain ways--more go to high school, some work outside the house, in university. But they can't see boys and the Muslims are separating the classes.

*Do you think things could explode, that young people might rebel against their parents, or do things that are harmful as a way of protest?*

Two girls in the all girls school told me that the bathrooms in the girls school are covered with pictures of nude men and writing. They think the girls school is terrible and one of them told her parents.

*Why do usually only unmarried women in Umm al-Fahim work outside the home for pay?*

Only unmarried women work because the pay is too low. I would work in the sewing factory if they paid the same wage for half the time or I worked only half the day. A lot of women would work if the pay were better or the hours shorter. NIS 500/month. Its nothing.

**Lubna Aghbariyah as a young woman working in a sewing factory in Umm al-Fahim.**

*Are things better for Palestinians in Israel?*

Every year a little something is better but the situation is basically the same. The Jews don't want Palestinians here. Each year there are fewer in Acre, Haifa. There were more before. Now the two people are even more separate. I think--there are Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and there is Israel. Where am I?

**Mirfat Aghbariyah**
*Mirfat was born June 21, 1965. She married in August, 1988. She has two girls, 2 and 3 ½ years old. She is from Jaffa and moved to Umm al-Fahim in 1988 after she married.*

I was born in Jaffa in 1965. I went to the Terisanta School, then I worked for two years as a secretary.

*Who did you work for?*

First in an office for Jewish bosses for 1 1/2 years then 6 months in an Arab office. The relationships were good. I worked to save money so I could go to the university.

*Where are your parents from?*

My mother's family is originally from Jaffa, born 1945. My father's family is originally from a neighboring town to Haifa but during the 1948 War he went to Umm al-Fahim for two years and then to Jaffa.

In 1985 I went to the University of Haifa. I got a BA in Arabic literature and Middle East History in 1988.

*Why only 3 years?*

I just studied. I had no friends; I just worked in the university. I lived in the dormitory. The first two years I had a scholarship to help pay for the room. The last year I had to pay and it is very expensive. Since my parents had no money I had to finish quickly. I didn't have money and my parents couldn't help me so I had to finish as quickly as possible. There were

six girls, two in each room. My roommate was Arab but my neighbors were Jewish. The relations were good. We studied together; we were friends. There weren't any problems. In 1989 I attended the one year program for teachers so I also have a teacher's certificate. From Haifa also. By then I was living in Umm al-Fahim and pregnant. I got up a 6:00 AM and went to Haifa everyday. I had a 12:00 examination scheduled and my baby was born at 12:00. I took the exam two weeks later. My parents wanted me to go to the university. People in Jaffa usually go to Tel Aviv Univ. If they leave home they usually go to Jerusalem. It was something unusual to go to Haifa. I had to finish as quickly as possible because of money so I chose Haifa where I had no family or friends to distract me, just study, otherwise it would have been too difficult to finish.

*Were their other Palestinian students in your class?*

In my class one became a nurse, two went to teachers seminary and I know one boy who became a doctor but he went to Germany. Most girls get married but most women work outside the home for pay in Jaffa after they finish high school. My mother, my auntie's, my grandmother, my two sisters, me--we all worked and work. Many women work in Jaffa and Tel Aviv as secretaries, cleaning women, sewing, in kindergartens. The mothers take their children to kindergartens. They never sit at home all day and no one objects. It is not like here. Girls 16-21 are not at home all day cleaning like here. Parents, relatives, neighbors--I have been in Umm al-Fahim for five years without any job, sitting at home. If I am in Jaffa I can get a job. But I can't leave the girls. It's too hard.

My husband has a new garage. He never thinks to leave Umm al-Fahim. He can't. He owes the bank money, etc. It's too hard. I have a bad feeling. You work hard, you study, always working. I thought if I studied it would be easy to get a job, but there is nothing in Umm al-Fahim. The Muslim Brotherhood is in the Municipality and won't give me a job. I got a lawyer. I can't wait more. They put people in who are less qualified than me. I don't know what to do. Here in Umm al-Fahim you must have protection. If you are the son or daughter of a rich man, or have an uncle--all the people do this--you will get a job. How will I get a job? I have no father, uncle here to go to for protection *(in Arabic wasta)*. I know I will never get a job. That's why I got a lawyer.

*How did you meet your husband?*

My husband is from the same family—his mother is from the family of my father. We met but decided not to marry until after I finished the university. My husband helped me get through teachers college. He is a good man, he helps me, he feels with me, he tries to help me. He sees it is very hard for me to be in the home all the time. I want to work and not just for the money. I want to teach. I am a teacher.

We married, I finished university, and we built the house all at the same time. We moved into the house we are in now. *(We look out the window and she tells me that there were no houses there when they built their house and the view was very beautiful. Now there are many homes and she says, "Soon it will be filled.")*

*How are things with your in-laws?*

I have good relations with my mother-in-law and relatives. *(Speaks very well of her mother-in-law.)* I never lived with them. They support me if I want to work. The most important thing in life is what my husband thinks not my in-laws and they don't believe in interfering.

*What is the situation of women in Jaffa?*

They are freer. Women are independent. Here women are dependent on their fathers and then husbands. They can't decide anything. Not all women, some are strong, but in general it is like this. The man can go where he wants, do what he wants but the woman can't. I have a friend. She read about a job in the paper in Afula. She called and they were interested and told her to come. She's 20-21. When she told her parents they said no so she is still sitting at home and she will stay at home. If she gets engaged she can't go out with her fiancée. In Jaffa she can go out with him, go to the cinema, he gets to know her, she gets to know him, if its good they go on if not they end it and its ok. Not here. They can't go anyway. Only the girls suffer. After they marry, after children, only she suffers not the man. Her husband tells her she can't do this, can't go there. All her life goes on like this. There are parents that are open but most are like this. If her brother or father and then husband say no, it's no.

*What do you think about the Muslim Brotherhood?*

They are not ok for me. That's me. I can't get a job teaching because of them. But I don't think things are worse for the people because of them. They are not against girls learning and working. It's a separate problem. It's what the religion says. It's not good to have separate classes for boys and girls. They must study together. A boy will see a girl and be ashamed. It will be strange for him. They must be in the same class. A lot of people don't agree with the municipality.

*What are your children doing?*

Both my girls are in nursery school. There are no playgrounds or parks. I want to take them for a walk, but where? The streets are no good. In school they sing, play; it's better. There are no parks, gardens, playgrounds. Two years ago my husband sent me to learn to drive. Now I have a licensee. I take them out of Umm al-Fahim to Afula or Kfar Kara.

*Do you have any friends?*

I have no friends in Umm al-Fahim. All the time the women stay at home. They have no friends. They finish school, get married, cut relations with friends from high school because now she is married. Everyone is in their place. I don't know why it is like this here.

I have friends but they are from Jaffa, the university. I made friends and we still visit. I go see them; they come to Umm al-Fahim to see me. But in Umm al-Fahim I have no friends. I try to make friends during the day. I go to their house once twice. They don't visit me. It's difficult. I can't always go visit them. But they never come to visit me. It's good when the

women with their children get together. The children play and the women talk. But here the women all the time stay at home. Maybe they go visit their sister, their mother, sisters of their husbands. So I take the car in the day and go out of Umm al-Fahim with the girls.

*Do you have any Jewish friends, like from the university?*

No. In the university we only studied together.

*What do you do together as a family?*

Every Friday we do things together. We go to Jaffa to see my parents, to the sea, etc.

*Can you tell me something about your husband?*

He has some education. He went to Ben Gurion University in Beir Sheeva. He lived alone. He encourages me to study. Tomorrow I go to Afula. I am going to begin a program for teaching children with education problems. It begins in October and tomorrow I have a meeting. I have had jobs off and on. I filled in at Asmaa's *[my youngest sister-in-law who has down syndrome]* school for six months when the teacher left to have a baby and I have done some substitute teaching. My husband encouraged me to study. He said since you can't get work now study. He helps me to adjust to life here.

*What do you do in an ordinary day?*

Today, yesterday, the day before, tomorrow, it's the same to me. Stay at home. I read. I like reading. When I get money I buy books. I read Meari's booklet on women. I receive a good magazine about relationships between parents and children, psychology. Then there's cleaning, cooking, playing with the girls. I go for two hours with the girls to see their grandmother. Come home. Sometimes visit someone. My husband wants to buy a car just for me so I can go when I want. Now he must also use it for his work so it is not always available. *[She appears nervous, sad.]*

*Do you visit people?*

Now that my husband has a new job, he must work a lot and often he doesn't get home until 9-10 at night. We can't go out at night. But every two weeks or so we visit friends together. People here visit each other just at night, who the husband knows. People visit when a baby is born, someone is sick, etc. The women don't visit during the day. They have no time. I visit; I invite someone to see me. Not all the life is the baby and home. To clean, to cook it's not all the life. You must have friends. My mother is 45 and she still has friends from school.

*What do you think about family planning?*

We have two children, two girls. Grandparents want boys. We don't want anymore. I don't know, maybe 5-6 years from now I will want another, but I don't think so. I first want to work. My husband says "It's enough. They need money, good education."

*Do you think things are getting better for women?*

I think so. There are women who are working. There are courses --Histadrut, El Hadaf-- teaching the computer, writing, reading, in the afternoons. Many girls go to these classes.

*How is living in Umm al-Fahim?*

I don't like it here. I want to change it here. There are no parks. My husband says take the girls to Afula. Like today. It's a beautiful day. Why can't I take them to a park or playground, that's clean beautiful? Even walking on the streets is not beautiful, just houses one after the other; it's dirty and difficult to walk. Why must I go to Afula, take fruits and go there?

*Do you talk to other people about these things?*

Yes. They complain to but it seems it is not really important to them. They will complain or wish something was here but that's it. It is not something they seem to really care about. I don't know why. They don't think about. Children play in the streets. Part of the problem is that land is privately owned so there is a problem about getting public spaces like parks.

*How are you adjusting to life here?*

I begin to accept the life here. My husband will never leave. If I get a job my life will change from top to bottom. I will be doing something; I will give something to society. I really want to teach. I like it very much. But I accept the life here.
*[When she speaks about not working she is very emotional but controlled and self contained, but appears desperate and sad.]* Sometimes I feel like I am strangled, choking *[she buts her hands around her neck]*. Girls, women are dependent here. I don't know why Umm al-Fahim is like this. They stick to it. What their brothers, fathers and husbands say they do. If they say no, it's no. They can't make a decision on their own. They always first go to their fathers or husbands. It's like they can't think.
Of course not all the women are dependent--there are strong and independent women in Umm al-Fahim doing things, speaking out. There are good people.

*Note:*
*It does not strike me that she thinks she is better or above the people in Umm al-Fahim. She never speaks down about them. Instead she describes the situation and how it is a problem for her. She praises her mother-in-law and has obvious respect for her husband based, I think, greatly on the fact that he thinks and feels for her. I had verification of this. When he returned from work, after I had conducted the interview, besides the daughters clinging to him, especially the youngest, he had just been to see her lawyer and was telling her what the lawyer said. They discussed this. He informed her that the Municipality won't budge and they say they are right. They discussed the possibility of going to the Higher Court. They*

*know of 2-3 other people who are also doing the same thing. He works long hours, a hard and dirty job and takes care of her business too. She can't do these things herself in Umm al-Fahim.*

**Rodina Hamdan Agbariyah**

*Interviewed in my house during the afternoon of 9/9/1992. She was born in 1975 and is in the 12th grade, her last year of high school. She has four brothers. She is the fourth child. She attends the girls school, a choice she made.*

*How is school?*

I like school. I am mad at one teacher, I can't forget. Started when I was in the 4th grade. I was 10 years old. Because of him I will never succeed in math. All the time he was going after girls. Now I hate math. I don't understand it.

*Did you go to other teachers for help in math?*

No other teachers help but I pass.

*Are there school activities?*

There are no activities in school. Just study. That's all. Not even sports. Gym classes--it's silly. The teacher gives you a ball, you play with it. It has to be exciting. They don't teach us how to swim. Not one young woman knows how to swim or really knows any sports. In the 11th grade once a week we had gym. So far in the 12th there is nothing. In America they do a lot of things, go to parties, etc. We were only once outside for sports but that was because they couldn't unlock the door to the gym room. Girls play basketball, nothing else. There are three foot balls and those are only for the boys.

There is one video and a TV. The only time the TV was used was when the Gulf War began. The video has never been used. There are no music classes. The teacher lectures, students take notes, there's homework. This is very boring, to teach us like this.

*What facilities are in the classrooms?*

All classrooms have blackboards.

My classes include Arabic, Hebrew, English, history, religion, science, social studies. There is a library and students use it but if you want to take books home you have to pay NIS 10 a year. If you return the book late you have to pay. Otherwise you can only read the book in the library. Students don't read much. Parents don't encourage reading. People don't read books. The students mostly love stories when they do. I am not happy about school. It is boring. Teachers are ok. My only real problem is math.

***Note:***
*There are no public libraries in Umm al-Fahim, only in the public schools, which is what Rodina is describing. Al-Hadaf, a private organization has a library.*

*How are your relationships with other students?*

My relationships with other students are ok.

School hours are from 7:45 AM to 1:00 PM with lunch break from 10:15-10:45. Students stay in one room and the different teachers come to that room. Classes are 45 minutes.

*What happens at lunch?*

Kids eat at an outdoor stand in the parking lot. There is no lunch room. They eat in a classroom or outside. Last year a man and a wife ran a separate store for the girls school but this year it is closed, also outside. Now the girls go down to the one used by the boys and girls school or they stay up in the classroom. Some don't eat; they are too shy to go down."

*Does any one bring their lunches from home?*

Students don't like to bring their lunches to school. It means you are too poor to buy it.

*What do you think about the separate girls school?*

I chose to be in the girls school because when I was in elementary school [*she pauses, a little embarrassed, then continues]* I started my period and it would show and girls would say what's this Rodina? I was afraid this would happen. Three times this happened. Bothers me a lot. I'm afraid it will happen again. I was 11 when I started, earlier than most other girls.

*Are you glad you made this choice?*

No, it was not the right decision. There are a lot of problems in my school. Girls are left free, they run away from class if they want. If she doesn't like math she doesn't go to class. There's a lot of noise. During breaks, classes are not synchronized. The school is not serious, girls are not learning.

*Why not?*

There was one girl in my class for two years, she failed. She had money to buy drinks and sandwiches. She's pretty, nice, but she can't write her name in English. I asked her why she comes to school. She said to spend time. She doesn't want to be at home. Many girls aren't interested. Some come to school because their parents want them to. Their parents want them to learn but they don't want to.

*Are drugs a problem at school?*

No. There is no problem of drugs at the school. The boys smoke a lot, they start at 15 but not the girls. The boys and girls school is better. There are about 350-500 girls in the girls school, 13 classes with about 30 in each class. There are about 1000 in the boys and girls school.

*Do you work when you are not in school?*

After school I don't work. In the summer I only worked for a week in a sewing factory. Usually there isn't any work.

*What do you want to do after High School?*

I am preparing for the begrut exam. If I succeed maybe I will go to the university or I will work for two years, earn some money and then go. I think if I go to the university it is a waste of my time. I want to study but there are more important things to do--make my dream come true.

I want to ask you a question. Why go to school for 5 years, become a doctor, for the money?"

*I respond by saying that people go to university for many reasons, some for learning a skill to make money, or because they want to help people, or because they are very interested in a subject and want to know more about it.*

I want to be free. I want to go away from Umm al-Fahim. In Umm al-Fahim I am not free, because of religion...The dream I want may seem strange to you--I want to be bigger than Madonna. I believe I can. This is all that I have in my mind. People around me--family, friends, the society I am living in--are against me. I want to be a singer. I have talents. It started when I was 9 years old. My talents are getting better. I sing just when I am home alone, about twice a week. I sing with the radio. There are no singing teachers. My parents know I want this. I talked to them about it once when I was 11. They didn't accept it. My mom says to forget about it. Other places parents encourage kids to play the piano, take lessons, not here. Some parents don't allow their daughters to watch TV because of religion. Their daughters shouldn't have time for something like that. Just work at home and study. Many of my friends' parents are like this. My parents aren't like that. My parents would like me to go to the university. They would support me to go but I don't want to lean on them, I want to be free. They want me to forget about singing. I don't want to give it up. So I work alone. I wrote a letter to Shulamit Aloni asking her to have the same program in the Arab schools that is in the Jewish schools. I saw it on TV. Every year on TV students from the schools sing. It's a special activity. I told her to hurry before this year ends to I can participate. My mother says it's ok to send this letter because if it's in the schools it is alright with her. If somebody else thought I was good in singing my parents wouldn't be against it. But there are no music classes in school, no singing teachers, no music programs in Umm al-Fahim.

*Tell me about your singing.*

Only Arab men sing. There aren't any Arab women singers. The Jewish support their kids and in America but not the Arabs. For this reason I hate the Arabs. I hate Arab society. I am looking for a way to go from this society. I feel like I don't belong. I don't listen to Arab music, only Hebrew, English, other European languages.

*What about all the famous Arab women singers?*

I don't know them. If you tell me their names I won't know them. I don't listen to them. I have 350 cassettes in Hebrew and English. I use the money my parents give me to buy lunch to buy these. I don't dance or sing at wedding parties. I dance at home by myself, western dancing.

*Do you have any problems at home?*

It is difficult to deal with them, small things. Problems with brothers, yes, difficult to deal with society. I feel I don't belong They will blame me. They won't understand. If I was a boy maybe I would feel different. You can't stay out late. In our neighborhood at 10:00 PM the family is together, not going anywhere. In America people go out somewhere to club until 1:00, 2:00. By 8:00 PM I am sleeping with my grandmother. [that is her mother's mother; her mother's father is dead, her father's father lives nearby, and her father's mother is dead] I like the old and young. They are easy to deal with. I practice signing at my grandmother's at night. Sometimes she screams for me to shout up, threatens to tell my mom so I shut up. She wants me to stay with her. If I get angry I tell her I am going to the US, she gets upset. She wishes I won't go and says that she will tell my father so he won't allow me to go. I tell her I am going.

*Do you have friends?*

Two cousins are friends. We share secrets, not everything. They don't encourage me. I need encouragement. When I talk about my talents they say forget it. No one can understand me. I have one friend who understands me. A boy. I ask him to help me. He has helped me in small cases. If someone catches me doing something, the punishment could be death. Once I had a boyfriend. The boy asked me to get in the car. It was at school. When I got in he said, 'Isn't that your brother?' I said no but I really didn't look. If it was my brother I knew I would be in very big trouble when I got home. But nothing happened. So it wasn't my brother or he didn't see me. I was saved because of my friend.

*How did your friend save you? Everything went ok, so you didn't need a friend's help, did you?*

"Aren't you going to ask me who my friend is?"

*Only if you want to tell me.*

“Jesus is my friend. I am a believer, just like a Christian. I pray. No one knows. Mohammad is dead. Jesus is alive. I learned about Jesus from TV, Middle East program, 700 Club. I learned how Jesus helps people. I wrote to Jerusalem and they sent me books. Did you expect to find someone like me here who believes in Jesus? I am not just praying when I am crying about something, when he is good to me. I thank him. I want always to be close to him. I can feel his power.

*Do you ever go outside Umm al-Fahim for anything?*

Not much. When my father was working as a bus driver for Eget--he quit when the Intifada began as did a lot of drivers, Palestinian ones, because people from the Occupied Territories did things to the buses, now he works for Amisragas in Hadera--I went to summer camps, I and my brothers for one month, not an overnight camp, a day camp, Kfar Sabah. I swam. Jews were there too. I've been to Tel Aviv three times, Hadera a lot, not Afula. My family doesn't go out. We don't have a car.”

*Do you want to get married?*

“Do you think I can find someone from the Arab society who will respect me? I want someone to love, trust. I had a boyfriend. He got married. His daddy pushed him to marry, not because he wanted to. I met his brother. He looked sad. I said I heard that your father pushed your brother into getting married. He said oh that's women's talk, meaning it's silly. He said, ‘You love my brother don't you?' I said, ‘Yes.’ We talked. I told him something about me, freedom, the Arab girl. We think the same way. We belong together. The first brother was a bridge to the second. He is engaged now also.

*Have you talked to him again?*

“No. He lives far away so I don't see him. For a year now I have tried to call him but my heart starts to beat and I can't. If two persons love each other I think they should marry. You shouldn't stop them. I will fight to get him. He has something strange, a big secret. The same problem I’ve got. He doesn't know my telephone number. He doesn't know the way I feel. I tried to stop the first marriage. I told my boyfriend that I wanted to talk to his father and tell him that if two people love each other you shouldn't stop them from marrying. But he said that it wouldn't work, that his father was set, hard. I want to talk to the second son, tell him how I feel, see if he feels the same, fight for him. If you love someone you have to be willing to die for him. I got his picture from his cousin in a school album. No one knows. Now people marry without knowing each other, without trust. I don't want to get married until my dream comes true.

**Fatina Jabar**

*She is 17 years old in the boys and girls high school, now in the 12th grade. After high school she wants to go to the university and study psychology. She is preparing to do well on the begrut.*

*Last year she wrote an article for a sports paper,* El Masar--The Orbit, *when she was in the 11th grade. The paper only ran for about 6 months, late 1991- early 1992, a weekly. It is printed by Al-Ateed and published by a private group of people--two teachers, one student and others.*

*What happened that made you write an article?*

I got desperate. The editors censored my article and took out things I considered the most important. They don't care about the people. They just want to look like leaders, like important people. These papers are devoted only to soccer which is only for males. If this game didn't exist these papers wouldn't be published because they have nothing else to write about. I said this in my original article and they cut it out. The editor got angry.

Last year in the 11th grade there wasn't any gymnastics for the girls while the boys in the same class had two hours a week. The girls didn't have any gym because the gym teacher didn't work on the day set for class. We applied several times to the principal verbally but there was no response. Then we submitted a petition and still no response. This year an activity began in the beginning of the year. The girls get one hour per week while the boys get two. The first hour the teacher (for girls) was absent so we didn't do anything. In the 10th grade some of the girls played basketball and those who didn't learn the game in elementary school did nothing. For three months the teacher was absent because she had a baby and no one substituted for her. Usually in the beginning of the year there might be some gym exercises while the teacher is still enthusiastic, but later she looses her enthusiasm and then things are as I said earlier.

The Municipality also doesn't care. The sports area they built is only for soccer and that is only for the boys. The girls are ready to have a male teacher but the administration forbids this. The boys compete with other schools but the girls don't. Also the sports day organized at the school is only for boys.

***Note:***
***Something about Sports in Umm al-Fahim***

*Soccer*
*There are presently four soccer teams in Umm al-Fahim, which in Israel are organized by the various ideologically-based insurance companies, specific to Umm al-Fahim the 1) Hapoel, which belongs to the Histadrut and is the first and largest team, 2) Macaabi, 3) Shimshun which belongs to a right wing Jewish organization which means Samson, and 4) Bitar(formerly Ali) which belongs to the Likud. Each team is basically organized around a neighborhood. Hapoel is more general but Mahajinah, Macaabi Mahameed, Shim Jabareen, and Bitar Mahajinah. The Agbariyah quarter doesn't have a team.*

*Teams began independently on a neighborhood basis. There are no playgrounds and there was no institutional support for sports development. In the 1950's and early 60's the government banned sports clubs in the Palestinian settlements. The people involved tended to be pro-Communist Party. They formed independently for many years and even competed with other towns. Previously they had names from famous Egyptian sports clubs. They took over open areas and made these their playing fields. Team members were the main people involved in the struggle to get official fields in Umm al-Fahim. Through direct and indirect pressure put on the Histadrut, the Histadrut was eventually forced to do something. It was thirty years before they got any support from Hapoel which was tied to the government during this time. Management is now under the Histadrut. They control the process and can drop players, etc. Finally people were able to get the Histadrut to make an official field which was constructed on communal land transferred to the Histadrut under the authority of the Municipality. The new field in Jabal Kahowsh is an official field and is called "Sports Town." The budget for the field was promised to Umm al-Fahim eight years ago (1984) when Weizman was responsible for Arab Affairs. It still is not completed. This field serves all four teams. After the Hapoel team was formed, the creation of official teams tended to dissolve the others. But because of the interference of the Histadrut bureaucracy in the teams, such as selection of members, youngsters wanted new teams and so they affiliated with other teams. The affiliation is more symbolic then actual since little if any money is provided by the parent Israeli team for the teams in Umm al-Fahim. The teams raise money from the residents of Umm al-Fahim for the most part. Local managers raise money to pay local staff.*

*Boxing*

*A champion boxer, Tawfeek Agbaria known as Tuvia, is from Umm al-Fahim. He competes internationally and holds a championship in his weight. He plays for Macaabi. He is married to a Jewish woman and is believed to have converted when competing for championship. He now works in a vegetable and fruit store in Umm al-Fahim. He has tried to get support from Macaabi for a boxing school in Umm al-Fahim. He worked with the previous Municipality when there was a Center (co-directed by the Jewish Agency and the Municipality). The new Municipality (under the Islamic Movement) closed this Center so he has no support for a boxing team in Umm al-Fahim. He applied to Macaabi for support, then joined up with Matnas (with the Municipality) and the Center but this was closed so he lost the program. Now he is trying to arrange with Macaabi in Umm al-Fahim to use the rented space which is for the soccer team so there is a possibility teaching will begin again. But this is minimal support even if it comes through. He tells me he has good students.*

*Basketball*

*There is a Histadrut managed team (Hapoel) which competes.*

*Table Tennis*

*Boys and girls play table tennis in school.*

*Handball*

*The walls of schools are used to play handball.*

*Weight lifting*
*Weight lifting is under Matnas--Cultural Institution involving the Jewish Agency, the Municipality, and the Ministry of Education. Classes are held in a rented space.*

*Sports Center for Women*
*This is run by Al Hadaf. It had been used more actively, but not much now. It is located in rented space.*

*Karate*
*A man has a school which holds classes for men and ones for women and children. Several qualified people teach.*

*Omar Aghbariyah from Muawya works with the Islamic Karate Union. He has been working independently for years and now he is under their umbrella. They have provided him with facilities. He wants to print a book on Karate at Al Ateed.*
*There is a Karate school above the madan (center of town where taxis stand) and one can see children in their uniforms when passing through the madan.*

*Kids School of Soccer*
*This school is under Macaabi in Musmus. They have hundreds of boys who attend. The results are good. Three days a week and each Saturday games with kids from other towns are held. It costs NIS 150 per year. Children participate officially. These schools are all over Israel.*

**Omar Muhammad Aghbariyah on The Arab Scouts**
*He was interviewed by phone by Ghassan Fawzi on 9/25/1992 who asked questions drawn up by me. He is the Director of the Arab Schools Scouts Organization in the Wadi 'Ara area.*

*Could you please describe the area you are responsible for as the Director of Arab School Scouts in the Wadi "Ara area?*

This includes 28 schools, elementary and intermediate involving about 1800 scouts. In Umm al-Fahim there are about 450 scouts, including boys and girls. In certain schools girls don't participate because they lack female scout leaders. In the 28 schools there are 2 female scout leaders.

In Israel there is the general union of scouts. People used to be members of this directly. Now there is the Hebrew Scouts Organization which is independent and does not relate to schools at all. They have their own budgets and headquarters. The Arab Scouts are organized through the schools which prevents Arabs from having an independent organization and keeps Jews and Arabs separate. There are the Islamic, the Catholic and the Druze scouts. Islamic and Catholic Scouts were pre-48 organizations and they were excluded from the original general union of scouts. They worked as scouts but weren't recognized as part of the union so they didn't relate to the schools. These included adults

also in Nazareth, Jaffa, Shifaamr, and Haifa. These still exist as separate but now they are recognized.

Reorganization took place in 1969. In Umm al-Fahim they began in 1972. The scouts' leaders are teachers. For these teachers part of their job is to work certain hours for the scouts after school hours. In the elementary schools they have two hours per week and in the intermediate schools four hours. Voluntary organization and activities occur after school hours. The parents have to carry all the expenses. This is why when they have activity to go camping for 3-4 days only a third of the membership of the kids can come because of the expenses.

It's important to have the scouts because there are no extra-curricular activities in most of the schools. This gives the kids certain time away from their studies and adds to their development. There aren't any summer programs, only during the school year. Last year the scouts went to Iskandar and the year before that they went to Aroha Mountains in the military maneuver area. We make trips to places so the children learn about the area. This year we went camping in Tiberias for a couple of days. Usually we have drum and fife which are used especially on religious occasions as a form of celebration. A great many of the schools don't have these drums and fifes so the scouts who want to learn have to go to the other schools. There are no membership fees and no real budget at all. Parents pay expenses for activities and the Ministry of Education pays teachers. There is no thought of making the Arab Scouts independent from the schools like the Hebrew Scouts.

In the last 2-3 years there has been an attempt to make relations between Jewish and Arab scouts. They find it's a good place to talk about and teach for coexistence. The previous Deputy to the Head of the Scouts Israeli Union was an Israeli Arab--he died. He also functioned as the Superintendent of the Arab School Scouts, for all the Arabs. The new superintendent is from 'Ara. At the beginning of the school year they teach the children heads of the unit scouts. They train them and train the new teachers.

There is also a course called the Forest Title. They have a meeting in the Hazorea Forest. These two activities were with Jewish scouts.

**Mahmoud Jamil**

*Mahmoud Jamil, the Director of the Department of Education of the Municipality, gave me an overview of the education system and facilities in Umm al-Fahim. He was interviewed with staff in the afternoon of 8/6/92. The interview is conducted in English.*

*On Staff of the Department of Education*

There is a Director, an Assistant to Director, a woman, a secretary. There is one full-time psychologist and two part-time positions but there are no psychologists in any of the schools. Instead there is an office in the Municipality where the students come. When teachers notice a problem they go to the principal, the principal in turn goes to the parents. Parents have to agree. They sign a document. Students then go to psychologist's office.

There is one councilor in one of the Intermediate Schools and planning for one in the new Intermediate School. There are no social workers, etc. in any of the schools. There are four Truant Officers who deal with dropouts for children ages 14 to 17 and two for 5 to 14 year olds.

*On Facilities for Special Education*

*Deaf/Mute*
Presently 12 children go to school in Nazareth.

*Blind*
There's nothing for them.

*Mishan--Handicapped/Mentally Retarded*
There are 105 students.

*Vocational Training for Low IQ students*
There are 70 students.

*On School Buildings*

The condition of the High School is good, the Intermediate School ok, the Elementary School 50/50. The Kindergarten is terrible. There are 10 kindergartens with 685 children and all of these are in private rented rooms. Rented Classrooms include three for Special Education, the ten Kindergartens and one regular classroom.

Janitors are hired through a private company.

Equipment like computers and xerox machines are paid for by the Municipality and parents.

Since 1970 the Parents Committees have built forty classrooms. Volunteer worker brigades worked at night, after normal work until the middle of the night. Local Parents Committees are formed at each school. There are meetings of all the local committees.

*On After School Programs*

There is the Community School three days a week, from 3:00 to 6:00 in the evening. This is paid for by the Municipality and the Ministry of Education. There are three schools like this. Attendance is on a voluntary basis. There is drawing, singing, and tutoring.

*On the History of Schools in Umm al-Fahim*

In 1920 there was one elementary school with four classrooms. In 1962 two elementary schools and in 1965 another elementary school was added. In 1970 a High School was opened with classes up to 10th grade. In 1983 the first complete, all grades, High School

was opened. Before this students had to go outside Umm al-Fahim to complete High School. In 1990 a new Intermediate School was added and another in 1991.

By 1991 the total number of schools was seventeen: ten Elementary Schools with 5000 students, which includes 5 year olds; three Intermediate Schools with 2,000 students; one High School with 1,500 students. This school was built in 1983. There are also two Special Education classes under Mishan in rented rooms; a school for Vocational Training with 70 students; and a School for the Handicapped which has two programs, one for the mentally retarded which has 55 students and another for people with low IQs which has 50 students.

In 1992 there is to be a new High School and a new Intermediate School.

*On Transportation*

There is one bus for the High School, three mini-buses for the Intermediate--one for each school and a Special Education bus.

*On other Non-Municipal Education in Umm al-Fahim*

There are nineteen provide Kindergartens with 685 children and the Islamic College.

**Muhammad Mahajinah (Abu Salami)**

*Abu Salami is a parent on a Parents Committee. He was interviewed on 9/22/1992 in his home. Ghassan Fawzi is presented to interpret and translate when necessary.*

*What are your main concerns regarding education in Umm al-Fahim?*

The lack of classrooms and the facilities of the existing rooms is still a problem because although there are new buildings it is very crowded. There is no heating in winter and in summer it's very hot, no ventilation even in the new buildings. Many of the walls and rooms were built by volunteers from the Parents Committees and the community at large as well as the money to pay for this. For example, there are 1600 students in one building with no space and outside yard or playground. This makes school always noisy. Through struggles of the Parents Committees and political associations and the Local Authority improvements have happened.

While in the other basic questions, qualified personnel and the intervention of the Sheen Bet, things are still very bad. The Sheen Bet controls the whole process through the special officials of the Ministry of Education. Many of the principals and teachers don't have the begrut certificate and they simply are not qualified to teach. In the last few years there are more Palestinian supervisors of schools but they are appointed in the same way and without the support and the protection of the Sheen Bet or certain political parties there is no hope for this qualified person to be accepted to such positions. So we ended with a system where the whole personnel that is supposed to manage and to plan the practice of schools and to

take care of student development is all unqualified and corrupted. What makes it worse is the corrupted intervention of the Local Authority. As a member of the parents committee we raised money to buy computers, a TV and video for our children in 1988. The computers are not used, at least not systematically and they are getting old because the principal and the staff are not qualified to use them and because of corruption they won't look forward to bring a specialist to put them to use. In the same time they are proud that they have computers in their school. I myself had to physically bring the video from the house of the deputy principal and the TV from the main porter's house. They kept it there as they said because there is no insurance.

*What are the Parents Committees?*
The Parents Committees began to be formed in the 70s. By law they have the right to intervene in the curricula and the different activities of schools and to check the qualifications of the staff. But when such a thing happens they face a great hostility from the principal and the whole system. Basically the parents had to retreat because they can't keep the school in tension. Actually they have accepted to be used by the principal as a provider of services and equipment and maintenance of the school, like painting, repairing windows, etc. Again, all unofficial activities. Extra curricular activities are minimal and libraries don't exist in all the schools or are very neglected, as are the science laboratories. Once there was an extra curricular activity in my children's school. The school was supposed to provide the children with sandwiches. I found that the teacher who was responsible for taking care of this activity used to take a good part of the food and to invite his colleagues to have a meal at school. I almost was beaten physically by this teacher when I noticed this odd contribution to the activity.

There is a lack of medical and psychological treatment in schools and nurses do not exist in almost all the schools. Once when a child was hurt at school one of the principals refused to give a note that the child was hurt at school to take to the insurance--despite the fact that we pay for insurance. He says that the order is to give such a note only if the child has a permanent damage or if he died. If he acts so, it is clear that most of the parents will concentrate more on taking the child to receive care rather than despair trying to get a note and compensation from the insurance.

One of the teachers used to be absent because of his private business. He did this for years. This continuously caused great damage to the students. When he did go to class he was so tired he would have a nap. Year after year the Parents Committee worked to stop this and after three years they succeeded to reduce his job, but he continued to teach half time. Finally he was transferred to another school. Maybe it's a way to keep the Parents Committees busy.

In the last few years the government has reduced the budgets and hours of classes. What was reduced especially were sports, art, workshops, music. These are not professionally, seriously, treated anyway in Umm al-Fahim. Now Aloni has given back some hours and she has asked that some of these hours be given back to these subjects. Certain local voluntary associations sometimes have programs for the kids. This is not stable and doesn't cover the needs for the all-rounded development of the children which should include sports, cultural

subjects and activities, theater, music, painting. As mentioned before the extra-curricular activity at school is very poor if nonexistent. One of the schools has a basketball yard. They really consider it lucky. This was built voluntarily by the Committee for Volunteer Work.

There is no service for eye and hearing problems which is very important for the students' learning. You can imagine the suffering of the children who have even only a small physical problem. Many kids don't go to school in the mandatory age or leave school because of these problems and also because of the bad treatment by teachers. Very little is done by the Municipality about dropouts. They have figures about this and nothing is done by the Ministry of Education to implement the law. There are elementary school dropouts. The Local Authority, including the present one, doesn't face the problem and the reality, while they celebrate the opening a new school. The whole Palestinian society was shocked lately by the results of the tests in math and reading comprehension. About seventy percent failed. After the first exam they knew they did poorly so they began to only teach the students to prepare them for the next exam. The failing grade in the second exam was almost fifty percent. Statistically it shows progress but it is a false one as was declared by the head of the Knesset Education Committee, Mr. Abraham Burg, who stated that it was not the result of an all-round better education but only preparation for the exam.

After all the dropouts by the time the students arrive to high school, there are those that are preparing for the begrut, a further selection process, only twenty some percent passed. This was true for all the Palestinian public schools. Private Palestinian schools are an exception. There is a ninety-six percent success rate for all the students at the Haifa Orthodox School.

*What education is mandatory?*

Only up to 9th grade is obligatory.
Kindergartens located in the elementary schools don't have playgrounds and facilities. In the kindergartens they don't give something hot or milk. Schools have no shelters in the event of war.

Any improvements in the education system have happened only after a continuous fight by the population, including the good teachers and principals. We demonstrated and made sit-ins many times and distributed leaflets in town about these problems. In 1979 the Abna Al-Balad movement initiated a huge demonstration against the Sheen Bet intervention and against the corruption. We forced the local council to have an emergency meeting and to send a memorandum to the Ministry of Education about our demands. Certain unqualified teachers were removed from the newly founded high school. We also presented the Minister of Education, who visited Umm al-Fahim in 1971 or 72, with a leaflet. The hypocrisy evidenced in seeing the kids waving Israeli flags and singing for the Minister while they were suffering these conditions made some of the militants shout against the Minister. They were beaten by the police and put in jail for that including Ghassan. People who continuously raise these demands and issues are considered extremists and nationalist and hostile to the state of Israel. That means they are risking their whole social existence. The children dropped the flags after the militants started to shout and began crying after the police attacked. The women also began shouting against the police. It was a show. A lot of

people came because the Minister was here. The elementary school that the Minister came to open, even after four or five voluntary work camps, it still doesn't have a suitable playground.

## Appendix F

### Listing of Destroyed Villages in Umm al-Fahim's Pre-1948 Domain

> There are many reason the preferred choice was to demolish the villages rather than preserve them—Arabists and military commanders considered it a way of demonstrating to the refugees that nothing was left to return to; surrounding kibbutzim and moshavim wanted to take control of village lands and did not want immigrants to be settled there and compete with them; planners considered the hilltop location of many of these villages a unnecessarily cumbersome—but regardless of the reasons, the consequences for physical landscape were far-reaching. Not only were the traces of Palestinian presence erased as much as possible, but Jewish and Palestinian spaces were sharply demarcated and differentiated from one another. They could be adjacent and even touching and yet embody completely different principles of organizing space, heterotopias with respect to one another.
>
> Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient*

> South of Biriyya lies Ramat Menashe Park. It covers the ruins of Lajjun, Mansi, Kafrayn, Butaymat, Hubeiza, Daliyat al-Rawha, Sabbarin, Burayka, Sindiyana and Umm al-Zinat. At the very centre of the park lie the remains of the destroyed village of Daliyat al-Rawha, now covered by Kibbutz Ramat Menashe of the socialist movement Hashomer Ha-Tza'ir. The remnants of the blown-up houses of one of the villages, Kafrayn, are still visible. The JNF website highlights the admixture of nature and human habitat in the forest when it tells us that in its midst there are 'six villages'. The website uses the highly atypical Hebrew word for 'village', kfar. To refer to the kibbutzim in the park, and not the six villages underneath the park—a linguistic ploy that serves to reinforce the metaphysical palimpsest at work here: the erasure of the history of one people in order to write that of another people's over it.
>
> Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*

The data recorded below is greatly indebted to the research undertaken by Uri Davis in collaboration with Ghassan Fawzi and Antonia Caccia in preparation for Ms Caccia's documentary film on Umm al-Fahim, *On Our Land*. I supplemented their material with additional information from www.palestineremembered.com, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, and information gathered from various readings in the literature on the 1948 War period.

#### Destroyed Arab Villages and Jewish Settlements

(Population for Jewish settlement is for 1990 from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics)

#### Lajun

Kibbutz Megiddo (Mapam) (est. 1949) (pop. 380)

Destroyed May 30, 1948. Completely ethnically cleansed.

**Lajun** was 16 km northwest of Jenin. It was attacked and occupied by the Golani's Fourth Battalion as part of Operation Gideon. The town was defended by the Yarmuk

Battalion of the ALA of volunteers, some local Palestinian militia and the Iraqi Army. It is situated on the western flank of the Esdraelon Valley.

Named by the Romans Legio, Lajun was located next to Megiddo and what is now the archeological mound and excavations of the Megiddo site, which was called in Arabic, Tall al-Mutasallim, first excavated by German archaeologists in 1931. It was situated on both banks of Wadi (River) al-Lajun. The town's population in 1945 was 5,409. In 1948 the town was mostly made up of families from Umm al-Fahim, many who had gone there to escape repression after the 19936-39 Arab Revolt. Other inhabitants came from neighboring villages. Its inhabitants held 48,918 dunams of cultivatable land. Though mostly Muslim, Christians and even two Jews lived in Lajun before 1948. An elementary school for boys was founded in 1937 and in 1945 had eight-three students. Two famous scholars are from Lajun, 'Ali al-Shafi'I (d. 1310) and 'Ali inn al-Jalal.

**Kibbutz Megiddo** was established in 1949 by a nucleus of Polish Jewish immigrants, survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. It is affiliated to the Ha-Kibbutz ha-Artzi/ Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir Kibbutz Federation. It was first named 'Irgun Kaplan' (The Kaplan Organization), after Joseph Kaplan, a leading fighter in the Warsaw Ghetto rebellion. In the course of the years the Kibbutz absorbed new membership from Poland, Argentina and Israeli born Jews. The Kibbutz area is 3,700 dunam and in 1978 it numbered some 380 residents.

Almost everything was destroyed except for a few remnants: one of the two mosques (the other was destroyed) became a carpentry shop; homes became warehouses and one a chicken coop. "The health center and grain mill are deserted; the school is gone. The cemetery remains, but is in a neglected state. The tomb of Yusuf al-Hamdan, a prominent nationalist who fell in the 1936 revolt, is clearly visible. The surrounding lands are planted with almond trees, wheat, and barley; they also contain animal sheds, a fodder plant, and a pump installed on the springs of 'Ayn al-Hajja. The site is tightly fenced in and entry is blocked." (www.palestineremembered.com)

## **Al-Mansi**

Midrakh Oz (Moshav) (est. 1952) (pop. 436)

Destroyed April 12-13, 1948. Completely ethnically cleansed.

**Al-Mansi** was 30 km southeast of Haifa. It had six springs in its vicinity which supplied drinking water. The village had 7,950 dunam of cultivatable land. Its population was 1,200 with 1,180 Muslims and 20 Christians. It had an elementary school for boys which is still standing. "According to the Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi…'The remains of the school and the mosque are still standing in the midst of a thick undergrowth composed of vines and thorny bushes. The exposed foundations of the village buildings, surrounded by stone rubble, can be seen throughout the site.'" (www.palestineremembered) It was destroyed during the Battle for Mishmar Ha'emek. Local Palestinian militia and the ARA volunteers defended the village.

**Midrash Oz**, before becoming a Moshav it was a new immigrant transition camp (*maabarah*) named after the destroyed Arab village, al-Mansi. It is situated on the western flank of the Esdraelon Valley, some 4 km northwest of the Megiddo Junction.

## Abu Shusha, Ghabiyya al-Tahta and Ghabiyya al-Fawqa

Kibbutz Mishmar Ha-Emek (Mapam) (est. 1926) (pop. 795)

All three villages were destroyed April 9-10, 1948 and completely ethnically cleansed.

Many of the inhabitants of these three villages fled during the fighting and those that remained were ethnically cleansed soon after occupation.

These three villages were situated on the western flank of the Esdraelon Valley some 6 km north-west of Megiddo junction. They were taken over by Kibbutz Mishmar Ha-Emek after they were occupied and ethnically cleansed. They were occupied as a result of the Battle for Mishmar Ha-Emek. The Israeli attacking brigade was a combination of the First Battalion of the Palmah, Carmeli and Alexandroni Brigades. The villages were defended by ALA volunteers and local Palestinian militia.

**Abu Shusha** was 28 km southeast of Haifa located near many sources of water, including two nearby wadis and a spring. The Romans referred to Abu Shusha as Gaba Hippeon. It had 5,870 dunam of cultivatable land and a population of 720 in 1945. It had an elementary school for boys and a grain mill and a mosque. The site of Abu Shusha, near the archeological site of Tel Abu Shusha, indicates a long and rich cultural past. The village was completely destroyed before being absorbed by Kibbutz Mishmar Ha-Emek.

**Ghabiyya al-Tahta** was 28 km southeast of Haifa. It had a population of 1,130 in 1945 and 11,092 dunam of cultivatable land. For awhile it shared an elementary school founded in 1888 by the Ottomans with al-Ghubayya-al Fawqa and al-Naghnaghiya but was closed during the British Mandate. "The village had several Khirbats (including Tel Abu Shusha) which contained artifacts such as fragments of pottery, pieces of masonry, and an olive press." (www.palestineremembered)

**Ghabiyya al-Fawqa** was 28 km southeast of Haifa. It had 121,092 dunam of cultivatable land and a population of 1,130 (including al-Naghnaghiyya). During the battle for Mishmar Ha-Emek it changed hands several times with Fawzi al-Qawuqji. It had one mosque and a shrine for the Muslim sage, al-Shaykh Ahmad. An unexcavated archeological site, Tel al-Asmar, lay just southwest of the village borders. "The debris of the houses is visible among the vegetation. One can see a big heap of stones where the mosque once stood. The cemetery is covered with thorny plants and weeds." (www.palestineremembered.com)

**Kibbutz Mishmar Ha-Emek** is situated on the western flank of the Esdraelon Valley some 6 km northwest of Megiddo Junction. It is affiliated to the Ha-Kibbutz ha-Artzi/Ha-

Shomer ha-Tza'ir Kibbutz Federation. One of the Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir regional educational centers is located there. Prior to 1948 it served as one of the logistic bases for the Haqanah Storm Troops (Palmate). In the course of the 1948 war it was attacked by the Qawuqji Arab Liberation Army, which was repelled but with heavy losses for the Kibbutz. The Kibbutz area is 11,700 dunam and in 1978 it numbered 870 residents.

**Kibbutz Mishmar Ha-Emek**

**Ruins of Ghabiyya al-Tahta**

## Abu Zurayq

Kibbutz Hazore'a (Mapam) (est. 1936) (pop. 1,020)

Destroyed April 15, 1948; occupied April 12.

**Abu Zurayq** was situated 24 km southeast of Haifa and near Wadi Abu Zurayq. It had a nearby spring and a well. It had 6,493 dunam of cultivatable land and a population of 550 in 1945. It had an elementary school for boys and one mosque. Abu Zurayq contained Paleolithic stone tools and the remains of a Roman farmhouse.

The village was attacked by the Palmach 1st Battalion, Carmeli and Alexandroni Brigades. The ALA volunteers and some local Palestinian militia defended the village. Upon occupation 15 adult males and some 200 women and children were taken captive. The women and children were sent towards Jenin. After occupation the village was completely defaced.

**Kibbutz Hazore'a** is on the western flank of the Esdraelon Valley next to the Megiddo-Haifa road. It is affiliated to the Ha-Kibbutz ha-Artzi/Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir Kibbutz Federation. It was founded by a nucleus of members of Jewish youth movements from Germany. Prior to 1948 it served as a strategic base for the Haganah Storm Troops (Palmah). The Kibbutz area is 6,500 dunam. The Kibbutz supports the "Wilfred House," which is a museum for Middle East culture. In 1978 it numbered some 850 residents, mostly immigrants from Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, USA, Holland, various Middle East countries and Israeli born.

## Al Rihaniyya

Ein ha-Emeq (Moshav) (est. 1944) (pop. 408)

Destroyed mid April 1948 and was completely ethnically cleansed.

**Al Rihaniyya** was situated 25 km southeast of Haifa and 3 km from Wadi al-Mileh. It was conquered during the Battle for Mishmar Ha-Emek. The ALA led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji defended the village. The village had 1,834 dunam of cultivatable land and a population of 240 in 1945. It had an elementary school which opened in 188 under the Ottomans but was closed during the British Mandate. It had one mosque.

**Ein ha-Emeq** is situated some 4 km south-west of the Yogne'am junction. It was founded by a nucleus of Jewish immigrants from Kurdistan. Its area is 1,600 dunam and in 1978 it numbered some 320 residents.

## Ji'ara

Giv'at Noah: Ein ha-Shofet (Mapam) (est. 1937) (pop. 860)

No information of **Ji-ara** except that it was completely ethnically cleansed.

**Ein ha-Shofet** is affiliated to the Ha-Kibbutz ha-Artzi/Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir Kibbutz Federation and is situated some 7 km south of the Yogne'am junction. It was founded by Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir nuclei from the USA and Poland and named after the noted American Zionist leader, Justice Louis Brandeis. The founding Kibbutz nuclei first established residence in Ji'ara and subsequently moved to its present site. The Kibbutz area is 13,800 dunam. Ji'ara served as one of the strategic bases for the Haganah Storm Troops (Palmah) prior to 1948 and following the establishment of the State of Israel it became an official training base for the Israeli army infantry and para-military Gadna' youth organization. In 1978 it numbered some 680 residents.

## Daliyat al-Ruha

Daliyah (Mapam) (est. 1939) (892)

Ethnically cleansed in mid February 1948 and probably occupied on April 10, 1948. Mid-June 1948 the village was completely obliterated.

**Daliyat al-Ruha** was situated 24.5 km southeast of Haifa. It had 10,008 dunam of cultivatable land and a population of 600 (280 Arabs, 320 Jews) in 1945. It was attacked by some unknown troops from the Haganah during the Mishmar Ha-Emek Battle. A Khirba was located northwest of the village’s center. The walls of a stone house remains; the rest is rubble.

**Daliyah** is situated some 12 km north-east of Zikhron Yaakov and is affiliated to the Ha-Kibbutz ha-Artzi/Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir Kibbutz Federation. It was established by nuclei of Jewish immigrants from Rumania and from Israel and supplemented by nuclei from Hungary and Persia. Prior to 1948 it served as one of the strategic bases for the Haganah Storm Troops (Palmate). The Kibbutz area is 10,000 dunam; in 1978 it had 650 residents.

Ramot Menashe is also built on some of Daliyat al-Ruha's land.

## Sabbarin

Ramot Menashe (Mapam) (est. 1948) (pop. 601) and 'Ammiqam

Destroyed May 12-14, 1948. Ethnically cleansed.

**Sabbarin** was situated 28 km south of Haifa on the banks of Wadi al-Tin. It had numerous wadis and springs. It had 17,027 dunam of cultivatable land and its population was 1,700 (1,670 Muslims, 30 Christians) in 1945. It had a boy's elementary school. A large masonry shaft west of Sabbarin, identified as the head of the Caesarea High Level Roman aqueduct, drew water from the springs near Sabbarin.

Although the villages of Sabbarin, al-Sindiyana, and al-Fureidis were willing to surrender to the Haganah, they were mostly ethnically cleansed upon occupation. The Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) attacking units held captive close to 100 old people, women and children behind barbed wire; then they were pushed to Umm al-Fahim. (www.palestineremebered) The village was defended by local Palestinian militia and possibly the ALA volunteers.

**Ramot Menashe** is situated some 10 km north-east of Zikhron Yaakov and is affiliated to the Ha-Kibbutz ha-Artzi/ Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir Kibbutz Federation. It was founded by Jewish immigrants from Poland, survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. It has 12,000 dunam. The Kibbutz supports a regional archeological museum and has a memorial garden for Kibbutz members' parents who were exterminated in the Holocaust. There were approximately 550 residents in 1978.

## Sindivana

Avi'el (moshav) ('formerly: Yad ha-Arba' & Alonah) (est. 1949) (pop. 289)
and Amigam (Moshav) (est. 1950) (pop. 184)

Destroyed May 12-14, 1948. Ethnically cleansed.

**Sindiyana** was 29 km south of Haifa near numerous springs and wells which provided it with water for both domestic use and irrigation. It had 8,702 dunam of cultivatable land and a population of 1,250 in 1945. It had an elementary school for boys founded in 1942-43 and in 1945 had an enrollment of 200 students. Its original inhabitants came two centuries ago from Umm al-Fahim and 'Arraba. It contained building foundations, and pottery and tessere seen on its surface in a nearby Khirba. The village also had Khirbat Rusaysa, which contained mosaics, a rock-cut wine press, and columns suggesting that Sindiyana was inhabited during the Roman-Byzantine period. Walid Khalidi tells us: "The site is fenced in with barbed wire. Scattered piles of stones, the debris of destroyed houses, are visible among thorns, cactuses and fig, olive, and plum trees'" (www.palestineremembered.com)

Although the villages of Sabbarin, al-Sindiyana, and al-Fureidis were willing to surrender to the Haganah, they were mostly ethnically cleansed upon occupation. Al-Syndyana Mokhtar along with his family and 300 civilians raised a white flag upon occupation. They were expelled towards Jenin. They were attacked by units from the Haganah and Irgun gangs under either Operation Coastal Clearing or Operation Mishmar Ha-Emek.

**Avi'e**l is situated north-east of Binyaminah. It is affiliated to the Herut Movement. It is named after Israel Epstein, an Irgun emissary in Rome whose nom de guerre was "Aviel." It has an area of 3,000 dunam. Number of residents in 1978 was approximately 250.

**Amigam** is situated some 5 km east of Zikhron Yaakov. It is affiliated to the Herut Movement. Its area is 3,000 dunam. Number of residents in 1978 was approximately 130.

## Umm al-Shawf

Giv'at Nili (Moshav) (est. 1953) (pop. 251)

Destroyed May 12-14, 1948. Ethnically cleansed and completely obliterated.

**Umm al-Shawf** was 29.5 km south of Haifa situated on the sloping section of Wadi al-Marah. It had two springs in its north side which supplied it with drinking water. It had 6,284 dunam of cultivatable land and a population of 480 in 1945. It had a mosque. A shrine for a local sage, al-Shaykh ‘Abd Allah, is still standing.

Umm al-Shawf was probably attacked by units from Haganah and the Irgun gang. It was defended by local Palestinian militia and ALA volunteers. Soon after occupation, IZL gangs searched the Palestinian refugees and found a pistol. After unsuccessfully trying to find out who owner the pistol, they shot seven males.

**Giv'at Nili** is situated some 10 km east of Zikhron' Yaakov. It is affiliated to the Herut Movement. It was founded by Jewish immigrants from Turkey, Tunis and Iraq. It covers an area of 3,000 dunam. Number of residents in 1978 was approximately 200.

## Qanir

Regavim (Hameuhad) (est. 1948) (pop. 296)

Occupied and destroyed possibly on the 15th-20th of May 1948. Completely ethnically cleansed.

**Qanir** was 35 km south of Haifa. It had 6,270 dunam of cultivatable land and a population of 750 (mostly Muslim). It contained a number of Khirbats, where ruins of walls and cisterns were found; apparently the village was constructed over an earlier settlement.

Qanir was probably part of Operation Coastal Clearing. The ALA headed by Fawzi al-Qawuqji defended the village.

**Regavim** is situated 3 km east of Giv'at Ada. It was founded by nuclei of Jewish immigrants from North Africa, Italy, France and Israeli born. It has an area of 10,000 dunam. The Kibbutz supports a museum for North African Jewish folklore and a memorial site for the dead of Israel's wars. Number of residents in 1978 was approximately 420.

## Al-Butaymat

Gal'ed, formerly Even Yitzchaq (est. 1945) (pop. 343)

**Al-Butaymat** was 31 km southeast of Haifa and had 7,289 dunam of cultivable land. Its population in 1945 was 110. It had one mosque.

Most likely the village was attacked by the IZL terror gang as part of the Mishmar Ha-Emek Battle. Inhabitants fled soon after the Battle for Mishmar Ha-Emek and upon occupation it was completely ethnically cleansed. The village was completely obliterated. The site is fenced in. The Jewish settlement of Gal'ed acquired all or some of the village lands.

**Gal'ed** is situated some 4 km south of Kibbutz Daliyah. It is affiliated to the Ihud ha-Kevutzot ve-ha Kibbutzim Federation. First called "Even Yitczhaq" after Isaac Hochberg, leading South African Zionist with whose legacy the Jewish National Fund bought much land in the area. The area of the Kibbutz is 14,500 dunam. The Kibbutz supports an archeological museum and cultural center named after Giorah Josephtal. In 1978 the number of residents was approximately 300.

## Khubayaza

Gal'ed, formerly Even Yitzhaq (Ihud) (est. 1945) (pop. 343)

Destroyed May 12-14, 1948. Completely ethnically cleansed.

**Khubayaza** was 29.5 southeast of Haifa. Its population was 209 in 1945. Khirbat al-Kalba (probably named after the Bedouin tribe of Bani Kalb) lay north of the village; there appear traces of a human settlement.

Khubayaza was probably conquered as part of the Battle for Mishmar Ha-Emek; most likely by Irgun (IZL) units. The village was completely destroyed.

**Gal'ed** (see **Al-Butaymat** above).

## Al-Kafrain (Al-Kafrayri)

Lands divided between neighbouring Jewish settlements: Gal'ed, Regavim, Daliyah, Ein ha Shofet (see above for information)

Destroyed April 12-13, 1948. Completely ethnically cleansed.

**Al-Kafrain** was 29.5 km southeast of Haifa and 6 km north of Wadi 'Ara. The Crusaders referred to al-Kafrain as *Caforana*. It had 10,058 dunam of cultivatable land and a population of 920 in 1945. It had an elementary school for boys, founded by the Ottomans in 1888. There was one mosque. The village contained a number of ruins, such as foundations of buildings, columns and tombs.

The village was probably attacked by the Carmeli Brigade during the Battle for Mishmar Ha-Emek. Local Palestinian militia and the ALA volunteers defended the village.

## Wadi 'Ara

Barkai (Mapam) (est. 1947) (pop. 499)
Also 'En 'Iron and Ma'anit

**Wadi 'Ara** was occupied on February 27, 1948and partially ethnically cleansed. The ALA volunteers with some assistance from the Iraqi Army in Tulkharm defended the village. A few villagers managed to stay. At the time of the cease fire Wadi 'Ara was under Transjordan, but was ceded to Israel with the Rhodes Armistice Agreement on April 3, 1949. Then the village was completely ethnically cleansed.

Wadi 'Ara was 38.5 km south of Haifa overlooking the nearby Wadi 'Ara. It had 8,349 dunam of cultivable land and a population of 230 (mostly Muslim) in 1945. The village contained Tall al-'Asawir which contained burial caves dating from the fourth to the second millennium B.C. Walid Khalidi tells us: "Only two village houses remain, both on the eastern edge of the site. One of them has arched windows and a spiral staircase leading up to a room on the roof. The second has a large entrance that is used today as a gate for the kibbutz's swimming pool."

**Barkai** is situated at the entrance to Wadi 'Ara on the lands of the village of Wadi 'Ara. It is affiliated to the Ha-Kibbutz ha-Artzi/Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir Kibbutz Federation. It covers an area of 2,750 dunam. In 1978 the number of residents was approximately 500.

## Sarkas (Khirbat al-Sarkas)

Gan Shemuel (Mapam) (est. 1921) (1,070) and Talmey El'azar

Destroyed April 15, 1948. Completely ethnically cleansed.

**Sarkas** is 42 km south of Haifa. In 1931 there were 383 inhabitants (366 Arabs, 17 Jews). The village was founded by Circassians from Russia who had been cleansed from

their country by the Russian Czarist armies in the 19th century. (www.palestineremembered.com)

The occupation and ethnic cleansing of Sarkas was probably part of Operation Coastal Clearing. Many villagers were expelled to Tulkharm where many are still living and are known as el-Sharkas.

**Gan Shemuel** is situated at the entrance to Wadi 'Ara, some 3 km east of Hadera. It is affiliated to the Ha-Kibbutz ha-Artzi/Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir Kibbutz Federation. It is named after the Zionist leader, Rabbi Shemuel Mohliver and was founded by Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir nuclei from Poland and Beserbia, Czechoslovakia, Latin America and Israel. Located in Gan Shemuel are one of the Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir regional educational centers, an intensive Hebrew Ulpan for new immigrants, and the "Uri House" cultural center named after Uri Ilan, member of the Kibbutz who died in Syrian captivity. It covers an area of 6,000 dunam. In 1978 the number of residents was approximately 850.

## Dumeira (Dumayri)

Gan Shemuel (Mapam) (est. 1921) (pop. 1,070)

**Dumeira** was destroyed April 10, 1948. It was completely ethnically cleansed. The occupation and ethnic cleansing of Sarkas was probably part of Operation Coastal Clearing.

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