C.I. LEWIS' CONCEPTION OF THE GIVEN AND THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

C.I. Lewis often spoke of his monumental epistemological works as mere preludes to the important work to be done in developing an ethical theory which would inform us about right behaving. In what follows, in the spirit of Lewis' own quest for foundations, I have sought to present a prelude to some cardinal notions in Lewis' epistemological thinking. What were the insights of earlier philosophical generations often become the targets of critiques by professional offsprings. The idea that there is some given element in our experiential commerce with the world and that this given may also serve as the foundation of an epistemological reconstruction of our empirical knowledge has not fared well in the present century. This may be explained perhaps by the too frequent identification of advocacy of a given with endorsement of a sense-data conception of perceptual knowledge. It is possible that postures critical of the given attempted to convert a philosophically local dispute into grounds for denying any credibility to a view which had global import. Recent criticisms have assumed two directions. On the one hand, we find an endorsement of a scheme of epistemic justification which countenances coherence as opposed to linear justification. On the other hand, there is a move away from according sense-data, or sense-data like entities an important explanatory (not justificatory) role in accounting for features of our experience of ourselves and of the world.

I think that Lewis' concerns are first and foremost epistemological, not ontological, not metaphysical but epistemological. This is not to

say that Lewis did not speak to issues of the ontological and metaphysical sort. Epistemology carries the austere connotation of some canons of rigor which may not be found in speculations about what exists and the way things are. Lewis' endorsement of the reflective method as a means of discerning philosophical insights was surely not intended as a license for individual and collective abuse of some intuitive canons of proper method or reasoning. Philosophical claims may not stand up to justificatory challenges in the same way as empirical ones do, but this does not mean that they are incapable of standing up to some form of challenge. I make these remarks in order to legitimize the kind of question I explicitly put to Lewis' conception of the given in the first chapter. This question recurs as a theme throughout much of the rest that follows. It is often easier to see what a philosopher does with a particular concept once he has it than to come to an appreciation (either in his terms or in your own) of how he arrived at the concept to begin with.

In chapter one I attempt to understand sympathetically Lewis' conception of the given. I avoid the frequent identifications of the given with a sense-data conception of perceptual knowledge. Lewis himself provides grounds for refusing to make such an identification. At the same time, without compromising the terms in which Lewis couches his characterizations of the given, I attempt to relate them to the basic realist sympathies which underlie a view of verification in terms of future experiences. I successively attend to Lewis' conceptions of 'experience', 'reality' and 'abstraction' with a view to understanding the sense in which the given may or may not be actually ingredient in the world. His realism, more implicit in Mind and the World Order, prevents a ready identification of the given as something actually in the world.

Consequently, I examine the possibility of construing Lewis as advocating a view akin to the adverbial theory of sensing. Close attention is also paid to Lewis' own positive characterizations of the given as involving sensuous quality and unalterability. Finally, in unpacking the structure of the given as presentations and qualia, I come to examine Lewis' contention that qualia are intrinsically recognizable.

Chapter two turns to an examination of the linguistic dimension which Lewis appends to his account of the given in his second major epistemological work, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. This later work clearly endorses realism; consequently the statements which constitute the analysans of objective judgments must be understood to have a referent distinct from the objective realities which the objective judgments speak about. By turning to a consideration of some of Lewis' remarks in Book III of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, I attempt to shed light on a problem which arose in chapter one. That problem is the attempt to fix on a signification for the descriptive terms which appear in "looks like" locutions.

Having elaborated the views of the given presented by Lewis in his two major epistemological works, in my third chapter, I turn to a consideration of the manner in which the given is implicated in justifying our empirical knowledge. By considering some of Lewis' comments on Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, an attempt is made to reveal concern with justification which becomes paramount in according credibility to our empirical beliefs. Underlying Lewis' view that there is a difference between a real property and the quale which one apprehends in a moment of sensory experience is the view that there is some trans-temporal stability behind the appearances. Consequently, our ascription of a concept to a presentation is in the nature of a hypothesis and

and may fail of confirmation. I examine this notion of transtemporal stabilities and the thesis of temporal spread, the view that there is much more to an object than can be apprehended by an individual in the course of a single experience of that object, and that the object has infinite consequences throughout time, and that it is these consequences which underpin the possibility of verifying the correctness of an earlier conceptual classification. An examination of Lewis' limited view of memory is undertaken, both in an attempt to see its relation to the thesis of temporal spread and to see the roots of his later conception of the prima facie credibility of memory reports in the context of avoiding an infinite regress of justification. Memories are implicated in the making of conceptual classifications and in the apprehension of future experiences as verificatory of earlier classifications; consequently, they bear a heavy responsibility in Lewis' scheme of justification.

Chapter four concentrates on the conception of knowledge as justified true belief. The distinction between objective, non-terminating and terminating judgments are considered, and their bearing on the realism, phenomenalism controversy is indicated and the relation of the latter to Lewis' espousal of foundationalism is examined. As in chapter three, I turn to the more developed account of memory which is now strongly related to the issue of justification. An attempt is made to understand the sense in which a deliverance of memory can be understood to be prima facie credible. In connection with this, Roderick Chisholm's attempt to assimilate the prima facie credibility of memory to his own construal of the given as involving a kind of perceptual taking is considered.

Chapter five undertakes an examination of some contemporary responses to the issues of givenness and justification. Even though Lewis

is not always the explicit target of contemporary commentators an effort is made throughout to relate the contemporary perspectives to my earlier remarks on Lewis. I turn first to a recent article of James Cornman's in which he canvasses possible uses for the idea of givenness. I do this with a view to placing Lewis' own account in the perspective of current understanding of the term. Wilfrid Sellars' sustained attack on the given is the next focus of attention. I attempt to see the degree to which Lewis can escape the thrust of Sellars' argument. At the same time it is suggested that there are problems in Sellars' development of his own counter-myth, especially in the idea of 'evidence'. The last part of chapter six is perhaps most properly concerned with the epistemological dimension of the given. I examine a dispute between Roderick Firth and Wilfrid Sellars on the proper construal of givenness as involving a coherence theory of epistemic justification. An attempt is made to understand the epistemological apprehensions of the given in terms of the notion of 'self-presenting character' of which Sellars speaks.

In my concluding remarks, using some of Gilbert Harman's recent remarks on representation in his book Thought, I attempt to reconstrue Lewis' remarks about the given as consonant with the sensory-core interpretation of the view of givenness.

CHAPTER: II

THE STRUCTURE OF THE GIVEN IN MIND AND THE WORLD ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Often, in order to assess the success of a philosopher's views it is essential to place pressure on one of the key notions of his philosophical scaffolding. In the present chapter I intend to examine Lewis' conception of the given as presented in the first of his two major epistemological works, Mind and the World Order. I have two major objectives: 1) To place Lewis' support of the idea of givenness in the context of his opposition to traditional epistemological positions such as the 'immediacy' views of the American New Realists and Rationalism as represented by Descartes. 2) To answer the questions "How did Lewis conceive of the given?" and "Where did he intend to locate it - in the mind or in the world - given his epistemological objectives?" Each of these issues raise particular questions of their own and these shall be considered under appropriate sections. In order to deal with these two issues it will be necessary to enter into an exposition of some of Lewis' detailed comments regarding the given. These comments occur at numerous points and in varied contexts in Mind and the World Order.

After examining Lewis' account of the need for an adequate account of error in an epistemology, I shall turn to a consideration of Lewis' contention that the given is an abstraction. I focus on this point as I believe it gives us important insights into the kinds of

erroneous views which may surround ontological speculation about where to locate the given. I attempt in the context of this discussion to urge as an understanding of Lewis' remarks a view akin to the adverbial theory of sensing. This is partially informative as regards the self-authenticating nature which is often ascribed to apprehensions of the given. The remainder of the chapter seeks to elaborate Lewis' basic criteria of givenness and the relations which may exist between the internal structure of the given, that is, between the presentation, quale and the property of which the quale may be a sign. I give special attention to the idea that qualia are intrinsically recognizable, for while Lewis employs this criterion in order to distinguish qualia from objective properties, it seems to stand at the core of what Lewis wants us to understand by noninferential knowledge.

TRUTH and ERROR

Lewis evidently does not expect his readers to be surprised by the inclusion within his philosophical system of two elements the recognition of which "is one of the oldest and most universal of philosophic insights."[1] He labels these two elements as: "the immediate data, such as those of sense, which are presented or given to the mind, and a form, construction, or interpretation, which represents the activity of thought."[2] Were it not for these two elements there would be no possibility of attaining "empirical truth, or knowledge of the objective." Sounding a famed Kantian note - though in his own terms - Lewis says, "if there be no datum given to the mind, then knowledge must be contentless and arbitrary; there would be nothing which it must be true to. And if there be no interpretation or construction which the mind itself imposes, then thought is rendered superfluous,

the possibility of error becomes inexplicable, and the distinction of true and false is in danger of becoming meaningless."[3] These few quotes already reveal the particular focus of Lewis' interest. While the objectives of both Mind and the World Order and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation are continuous - the reconstruction of knowledge on the basis of sense-certainties - the emphasis in the earlier work is free from the concerns of the logical positivists to which Lewis became attuned, and which his concern with meaning in the latter work strongly reveals.

The advocacy of the given as analogous to sense-data may prompt one to view Lewis' earlier effort as attempts to deal with the nature of perceptual knowledge. This view is warranted to some extent given Lewis' concern with the justification of knowledge claims. It receives added warrant in light of the fact that Lewis' earliest depictions of the idea of givenness rely heavily on those qualities of objects which are phenomenally presentable. However, Lewis does not intend that his distinction between the given and conceptual elements in experience be restricted solely to perceptual experience; consequently, to pursue the initial development of his view as though it were would be to betray his foremost concern, that of 'truth'.

'Experience', 'reality', 'truth', 'the given' and 'justification' are notions which for Lewis are strongly interrelated though he does not always succeed in retaining a univocal sense for them, thereby adding to the difficulty of exposition. The confusion may be compounded when we consider one of his characterizations of the given. Apprehensions of the given, while certain, are not knowledge for they do not countenance the possibility of error. This last comment should not be seen as effecting an unbroachable gap between knowledge and certainty. Our movement

through Lewis' views must be made with constant attention to the sense of his terms.

Lewis' concern with truth is revealed in his initial distinction between logic and mathematics on the one hand and the empirical pursuits represented by the sciences on the other. Mathematics offers us the dominant conception of truth and certitude. That a proposition in mathematics is deducible from premises which are known to be true affords that proposition unimpeachable credentials. But once it is realized that the premises are analytic, the issue of the proposition's informativeness about the empirical world must arise. Deductive validity cannot guarantee empirical truth "which is the object of natural science and the content of our possible knowledge of nature."[4] It might be urged against Lewis that the establishment of a real world to which our knowledge claims must be true is itself a philosophical task of major dimensions, and that to ask a question which seems to presuppose a solution is an inauspicious starting point for an epistemological treatise. While Lewis did join the dispute between the competing strands of idealism, realism and phenomenalism,his belief in the existence of an independent reality recurs as an unquestioned premise of his procedure. In an important late paper we find a strong reaffirmation of the view. "Independent reality is not something to be proved but an original acknowledgement which all men make confronting the facts of life."[5]

The acknowledgement of an independent reality naturally raises the spectre of a substantival dualism and with it the corresponding problem of mind's commerce with a world seemingly alien to its nature. The extension of 'reality' or 'the real' is not a useful guide to Lewis' conception of 'truth'. His metaphysics countenances a very liberal reading of 'real'. As experiences, non-veridical apprehensions are as

real as veridical ones. Nevertheless the distinction between veridical and non-veridical apprehensions bespeaks an epistemological distinction which must connect with the idea of 'truth' at some point. If there is a single error which unifies Lewis' opposition to empiricism, rationalism, forms of idealism and phenomenalism, and what he refers to as the copy-theory of knowledge it is that these views do not account satisfactorily for the possibility of error; that which is metaphysically real in Lewis' view becomes, in their views, objective as well.

At the outset of the chapter in which he describes the given element in experience, Lewis notes that conflicts usually arise over the emphasis given either to mind or that which it apprehends. On the one hand he cites Bergson and the American new-realists as advocates of the immediate apprehension of what is given. On the other hand, idealists "seem to include the content as well as the form of knowledge in what the activity of thought creates."[6] He dismisses the Bergsonian advocacy of immediacy as stemming from a metaphysical preoccupation with the exemplary character of a certain mode of experiencing. "The reason why Bergson identifies the truest knowledge with 'intuition' is similarly rooted in metaphysical theory and not in any divergent reading of our ordinary experience."[7] The exclusive emphasis on the given element is most characteristic of the American new-realists. "Here the activity of thought (or attention) is represented as selective only; it may determine what is included in or excluded from perception, but it does not supplement or modify the given data."[8]

It is premature to attempt to characterize Lewis' position solely on the basis of his advocacy of an objective reality and his opposition to forms of realism, especially direct realism, the view that we are directly aware of the real constituents of an objective world in our acts of perception. Nevertheless, it is important to

diagnose the kind of error committed by - among others - the new realists in an attempt to understand Lewis' position without at the same time attempting a full exposition of the views they adhered to. Both the new realists and the critical realists who succeeded them were in fundamental opposition to the idealistic strain characteristic of much of late 19th century English philosophizing. It becomes evident from considering the New Realists that advocacy of an independent reality did not necessarily involve substantival dualism, as, I noted above, it may lead some people to believe. The efforts of the New Realists were directed at explaining the facts of perceptual consciousness which acknowledged an independent reality, but which at the same time acknowledged the knowledge seeking aspect of the human mind. The New Realists sought to counter the subjectivist trend of Idealism in order to secure the belief in an independent objective reality. They were thus attempting to ward off the solipsistic account of experiences viewed in terms of appearances unique to the individual which the Idealist position seemed to trade on. In seeking to avoid the subjectivistic dimension of Idealism the New Realists succeeded in generating an unwanted consequence, reifying the appearances of non-veridical experiences until they were on a par with the objects of our experience which were truly known.

The divorce of perceptual activity from either physiological or psychological processes is apparently the omission which allows for reification of appearances which I mentioned. On the New Realist view, the mental content, or the content of knowledge is identical with the thing known. From this it seems evident that whatever one takes to be before one's mind is by dint of that fact assured a status as real. From Lewis' rejoinder to the problem it is evident that he views the

elements of givenness and conceptual interpretation as jointly exhaustive of the machinery required for the proper epistemological account of experience. In criticizing both Holt's elevation of contradictories and incompatibles to the status of objective reality and Montague's identification of brain-states with perceptions, Lewis repeatedly notes that both views cannot "escape the admission of an element of interpretation in cognition."[9]

His criticism of Montague is instructive, for in tying up his point to a conception of Berkeley's, he reveals to us how the 'explanation' of the possibility of error relates to what might be termed his thesis of 'transcendence', namely, the view that the content of an ascription of a quality to a particular is not and cannot be exhausted in the single perceptual encounter with the object. If, as Montague suggests, a particular brain state may have a plurality of causes, then, on the New Realist assumption that what lies before the mind is numerically identical with the thing known, we are forced to say either that we know each of the things which may be a cause for the particular brain state which we have or that we know only that which is identical in the plurality of the causes of the brain state. "If a single-brain-state, or modification of perceptive consciousness, is taken as meaning one thing when its veridical significance is of another, then some interpretation which goes beyond the content of this given state itself is the only conceivable basis of the error."[10] Without entering into a discussion here of Lewis' account of concepts it would seem that his use of the term 'interpretation' is not different from the general meaning he ascribes to it throughout the work. Effecting an interpretation is classifying some given experience, or some appearance. It is precisely an interpretation, as opposed to an immediate apprehension of the given,

which introduces the element of error in Lewis' general epistemological account. The involvement of interpretation in generating error is driven home even more strongly in Lewis' account of illusory experiences in the context of a discussion on the relativity of knowledge to which we shall have occasion to return.

Lewis often speaks of the "insidious fallacies" of the copy theory of knowledge. He views Descartes as a prime exponent of this view which insists on a qualitative identity between the object putatively known in cognition and the content of one's mind. It is at this point that the Berkeleyan insistence on the non-comparability of ideas and objects in the world serves as useful antidote to the problems posed by the representationalism espoused by Locke. The most obvious shortcoming of the copy theory of knowledge is the replacement of objective physical things or properties by the qualitative aspects of one's sense contents (which may be a causal resultant of our perception of the objective physical realities). One is forced either into admitting the immediate apprehension of the qualitative congruence between one's idea and the objective reality, or else one needs to postulate a hierarchy of ideas, each of which represents what a successful or accurate congruence of idea and object would be like. Not only does Lewis inveigh against some of the views thus far noted, he is also concerned to vindicate the possibility of objective empirical knowledge of an objective reality against the threats posed by the subjectivist retreat intimated in the Idealist conception that all knowledge is relative to the perceiving mind. I cannot enter into the intricacies of his response to the problem without at first examining the genesis and nature of his conception of the given element in experience. Thus, my first objective as noted on page 6 must await fulfillment of the second purpose of this chapter.

WHERE to LOOK for the GIVEN

While I have sought to indicate that much of Lewis' epistemological motivation for introducing the element of givenness and conceptual interpretation stems from his desire to explain the possibility of error in our perceptual experience it is equally important to understand his efforts as an attempt to reconstruct empirical knowledge on a sensory base in such fashion that our more complex claims can be seen to rest on a base of certain apprehensions of sense. In light of Lewis' repeated claims about the integralness of our experience as had by us we must come to understand how he arrives at the postanalytic ideas of 'givenness' and 'concept'. (This would be analogous to asking Aristotle how he arrived at the ideas of 'matter' and 'form' given the fact that we never encounter unformed matter.)

In calling our attention to the distinction between the given and conceptual element, Lewis notes that to suppress the distinction "would be to betray obvious and fundamental characteristics of experience."[11] Occasionally, the two elements are casually spoken of as "in experience." At first blush either of the above two phrases might prompt one to believe that Lewis views both the given and the concept as directly present in our experience in much the same fashion as objects and qualities, which are perceivable, are. But that is far from Lewis' intent, for neither the given, nor the concept is on a par with the middle sized objects (objects wich can be directly present to our sense), whose qualities we report on in our perceptual judgments. We shall see, however, that it is middle sized objects which are among the kinds of things which can be said to be given (but not only middle sized objects are given; memory, for example, is too, as are relations and features of experience which we may be more prone to associate with the having of certain sensations), in an

experience of them, and that it is to these very same objects that our concepts come to be applied.

While the notion of experience, especially 'possible experience', plays an important role in Lewis' account of meaning and verification, I want, at this point, to engage in only a minor bit of elaboration of his intent in Mind and the World Order when he uses the expression 'in experience'.

Lewis' emphasis on the method of reflection as the method of metaphysics heightens the importance of his notion of 'experience'. Experience provides the data for metaphysics, for metaphysics seeks to refer experiences correctly to their proper categories. "Experience", as used by Lewis, is not intended to signify the product of the reception of the panorama of events and objects which may pass before a passive mind. At times, Lewis speaks as if that experience in which the given and conceptual elements are to be discerned is, itself, very much a product of the application of conceptual material to the given. "The world of experience is not given in experience: it is constructed by thought from the data of sense."[12] Reflection is meant to turn its beacon on this 'constructed' experience. "The datum of our philosophic study is not the 'buzzing, blooming confusion' on which the infant first opens his eyes, not the thin experience of immediate sensation, but the thick experience of every-day life."[13]

As I have noted, Lewis' opposition to the immediacy views of the American New Realists should not necessarily be seen as a retreat to epistemological dualism; nevertheless, as further analysis shall reveal, he is concerned to draw a distinction between the immediate contents of one's sensory experiences and the real objects in the world of which the apprehended appearances are taken to be signs. In light of this we must

understand 'reality' and 'experience' to signify different things for Lewis. On the one hand, characterizing what he terms the reflective method, he says that it "is empirical ... in that it recognizes experience in general as the datum of philosophy. But it is not empirical in the sense of taking this experience to coincide with data of sense which are merely given to the mind."[14] While experience is the grist for philosophy's mill, "Philosophy cannot be merely a verbally more precise rendering of common-sense, nor a direct generalization from actual practice. Though it rises from what is implicit in experience, its procedure must be critical, not descriptive. So far as it is to be of use, it must assume the function of sharpening and correcting an interpretation which has already entered into the fabric of that experience which is its datum."[15] Reality represents our experience categorized, but we can only discover the categorial principles of our interpretations put on experience by examining not pure data of sense but by reflecting on the content of the reality which our interpretations have constructed. "Any particular experience is a whole within which that part or aspect which represents the legislative or categorial activity of mind and that which is given content, independent of the mind's interpretation, are separable only by analysis." [16]

Lewis does seem to suggest that givenness and conceptual interpretation are embedded in any experience which we might have; however, he does not explicitly contend that the notions of 'givenness' and 'concept' are themselves categorial principles of interpretation. Both notions may be extracted from reflection on the nature of experience as had by us, but surely neither notion is conceptually necessary for the having of the experience. Lewis claims that "whatever is denominated 'real' must be something discriminated in experience by criteria which

are antecedently determined."[17] We shall discover that both the element of givenness in an experience as well as the conceptual element involved in the apprehension of the experience are real in the sense that they can be interpreted along the lines of sense-data and mental acts respectively. Nevertheless, neither notion seems to enjoy the kind of reality which Lewis' remark seems to suggest. Neither 'the given' nor 'the concept' are things discriminated in experience on the basis of "criteria which are antecedently determined."

It is useful to view the meanings of 'experience' as analogous to the meanings of the term 'knowledge'. We often designate the entire body of transmitted and continuously produced intellectual products of man by the term 'knowledge'. Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from speaking of the knowledge possessed by individuals which need not be equivalent to the all encompassing notion, nor does it prevent us from referring to an individual's exercise of a capacity as an instance of knowing, nor does it prevent us from referring to the result of that exercise as a piece of knowledge. The reading of 'experience' most analogous to the first reading of 'knowledge' (above) is often understood to be synonymous with 'reality'. In non-solipsistic views of reality, a person never experiences everything which may possibly be real or 'in reality'. (A person's experience in such non-solipsistic views does not exhaust the content of the term 'reality'; there are countless things which are experienceable but which are unexperienced by the individual.

Experiences are related to actual occasions of experiencing. We don't, of course, say that it is 'knowledge' which is known. We don't say: "He knows knowledge." We give an instance of what the person in question is taken to know. A person knows facts, knows skills, and in an extended sense can be said to know other individuals. Similarly, we don't say that

someone experiences experience(s). We speak of undergoing certain experiences, but we rarely use the verb "to experience"; it is a catch-all for a variety of terms (verbs) some of which are passive and some of which are active, but which all implicate an agent, as either the giver or the recipient of the action. There may be those who would insist that I must be conscious of, or be aware of experiencings, that if I were to undergo an operation at the hand of a skilled surgeon then I would not experience it.

These comments are preliminary to an understanding of Lewis' account of the given. They are prompted by Lewis' repeated contention that the given is an abstraction and that "The given is <u>in</u>, not before, experience."[18] Given Lewis' account of experience and its relation to reality what sense can be made of a claim such as the foregoing, especially in the light of his contention that the given is ineffable? (Naturally we must distinguish between 'the given' as an analytic tool in the examination of experience and the particular instances of given-ness discernable in discrete experiences. "The given" is a generic for all of the various instances of givenness which occur in our varied experiences. In raising the questions I have for the past few pages I have not sought to establish a denotation of"the Given" in experience, but rather I have been concerned to understand how a notion such as "the Given" could arise at all. Lewis does not suggest that it is a notion arrived at inductively from the having of many experiences (in the same fashion as an Aristotelian universal might arise.) In light of Lewis' claim, quoted at the start of this paragraph, it is perhaps tempting to begin to unpack his account of the given so that it shares some features with the adverbial theory of sensing. Ultimately however, the value of such an approach can only be assessed against the role which

the given serves serves as the epistemologically basic element in the hierarchy of justification.

What it shall be necessary to square in our subsequent exposition is the contention that the given is both an abstraction and yet in experience. Each characterization tends to incline one towards different construals of Lewis' intent. On the one hand, speaking of the given as an abstraction leads one to think of the given as heavily caught up in conceptual skills; this view is apparently at odds with the independence of the given from concepts which Lewis repeatedly asserts. On the other hand, reference to the given as in experience is supported by Lewis' frequent accounts of the given in a particular experience in terms of phenomenally presentable qualities. The difficulty with the latter approach, however, is the difficulty in understanding what Lewis may mean by the ineffability of the given, despite a heavy investment in the phenomenal dimension of the qualia which are the contents of the presentations of our experiences.

I propose, for expository purposes, to assert that Lewis endorses a particular view. I shall construe him to be referring to occasions of actual experiencings when he makes claims such as "The given is <u>in</u>, not before, experience."[19] When he speaks of the given and conceptual elements as fundamental characteristics of experience or as in experience, we should not take him to mean that they can be discriminated in experience in the sense in which particulars such as lumps of clay, kitchen plates and individual roses, are; they are not the objects of acts of perception. (For example, Ryle contends that we don't observe sensations; they are not the proper sensibles of perceptual attitudes.) I am trying to retain a reading of Lewis here which brings out his emphasis on the phenomenal dimension of the given (as initially conceived by him). It is a dimension

which emphasizes the perceivability of qualities, which are normally attributed to the real object (which we believe to exist behind the sensible appearances).

The adverbial theory of sensing is an attempt to short circuit the reification of appearances which the sense-datum theories are driven to. In an attempt to explain the apparent phenomenal characteristics which a sensory experience has, it is suggested that the predicate describing the experience which we take ourselves to be having be construed along the lines of an adverb. As an adverb (in its traditional grammatical role) is understood to modify a verb rather than a substantive, we explain the apparent quality of our experience by modifying the act of sensing rather than saying for example that we are perceiving a red sense-datum, or a red appearance. Lewis' opening characterizations of the given do not prevent us from heading in the direction of the adverbial theory of sensing. We can construe his claim that the given is in experience in either of two ways. On the one hand, we can view it as a claim which merely notes that unless we reflect critically on experience as it occurs to us we shall not uncover these two elements, givenness and conceptual interpretation. On the other hand, we can impose a more stringent claim on Lewis' remark. The given exists only in our experience and is contemporaneous with an occasion of experiencing. The alternatives diverge from this point. If we do not countenance the possibility of sensibile or unsensed sense-data, then there is no reason to suggest that Lewis cannot be construed as favoring a sense-data construal of the given in experience. But for Lewis it is equally true that illusions and hallucinations are as suffused with givenness as are veridical perceptions. All adequate accounts of perceptual experience have had to come to terms with these bugbears. The non-existence of the putative objects of one's

perceptual experience in such cases is a strong factor in inclining one towards the adverbial theory. We can then explain the apparent occurrence of a qualitatively determinate experience in terms of modifications of one's perceptual consciousness without introducting sense-data which may be parts of non-existent entities. In committing Lewis to one or the other position we must look beyond the accuracy with which the competing accounts explain perceptual experience. The adverbial theory may, in having removed one of the elements of mediated perception, sense-data, have a stronger kinship to the kinds of direct realism against which Lewis stood in opposition. Lewis' unsympathetic stance towards the naive realists stems from their conflating the object known with the mental content through which we come to know the object. While all experience must be characterized by givenness in Lewis' view, that which is the given for Lewis, namely the quale, is itself not the object of our experience. Consequently, he has retained some mediating machinery. The reasons, however, for the retention stem from epistemological insights rather than phenomenological ones as we shall come to see.

That the given is in experience is, by itself, a none too informative characterization. Are we to understand the agent implicated in the process of experiencing? Is he necessarily aware at the time of the occurrence of the experience? We have one guideline to an answer. All experiences, other than those of pure esthesis or pure apprehension of the sensuous given, are, for Lewis, conceptual experiences. But this is itself an ambiguous response. The sensuous given is the clue to the classifications or ascriptions of properties to objects. However, the given itself is apprehended, and even though it is, in principle, ineffable, we do characterize the given when we apprehend it. The mere fact that the qualia are intrinsically recognizable (and are in that sense analogous to universals)

does not entail that the recognition of them does not entail the existence of conceptual abilities. Each experience (in the Lewisian sense) in which a classification of some sensory content has been made cannot be free from its own conceptual ingredient. The question before us, however, is whether the apprehension of the quale is itself necessarily conceptual.

In Lewis' view every experience (which is to be denominated 'real') is to reveal the twofold dimension of givenness and conceptual interpretation. At the same time, it is intimated that both givenness and the conceptual element in experience are to be revealed with the very experiences which presuppose the distinction. How are we to uncover or become aware of either of the two dimensions of every experience? The given element in an experience is independent of the conceptual element in an experience. Are we to understand our search as one directed towards uncovering the denotation of each term of the distinction? How are we to separate the interpretation which might be brought to the experiencing (discovery) of one of the elements which comprise the distinction? If givenness and conceptual interpretation are features of all experience which are uncovered by the reflective method, precisely what features of experience is this reflective method directing itself towards?

Reflection immerses itself into the thick experience of the world of things, not into the thin given of immediacy. "We do not see ·hes of color, but trees and houses; we hear, not indescribable sound, ·.t voices and violins."[20] If we are to uncover that which the terms of the distinction designate, might it not be through attending to the manner in which we undergo the thick experience of the world of things that shall reveal them to us? But may it not be misleading to speak of revelation as that notion implies that the features which may be designated by 'concept' and 'given' are always present but require the application of

an acute mode of attention in order that they be revealed to us? In order to decide whether these questions are warranted we must turn directly to Lewis' account of the given as an abstraction.

The GIVEN as an ABSTRACTION

With a view to clarifying his conception of the given Lewis refers to it as an "abstraction".[21] But this is hardly satisfactory. For one thing, the general objective of a foundationalist program is to establish as non-inferentially known a certain proposition or type of entity; the attempt to justify the employment of such an entity (in this case, the given itself) seems oddly counter-intuitive. If the given is to form the basis of a hierarchy of knowledge, and is itself presumed to be non-inferentially known, then how are we to understand Lewis' maneuvers to make us see what he has in mind when he speaks of some experience as being given? The second problem, and it is specific to his particular formulation of the given as an abstraction, is that we must distinguish the sense of 'abstraction' in which it signifies the act of the mind from the sense in which it is taken to signify the product of an act of abstraction. It is easier to speak of certain results of man's intellectual endeavors as products of his abstractive capacity (for example, theories, musical compositions and the like) than it is to speak of distinct and identifiable acts of abstraction.[22]

Because of Lewis' claim that the given is an abstraction, our initial impulse may be to think of the given as a mental content, but obviously, to do so would be to violate an implicit characteristic of the given marked by the distinction between the given and the conceptual element. Lewis notes that the given element in experience is independent of the activity of mind; such independence, however, does not entail that that which is uncovered is, of necessity, an element in that mind,) nor

does it entail that the expression employed to designate that experience which we take to be given may not be a mental element, in the sense in which a word when thought of or entertained is something mental. There may be an initial tendency towards confusion if we view Lewis as endorsing an intimate relationship between the tokens employed to speak of things and their existence as mental contents. His claim that "Nothing that thought can ever comprise is other than some abstraction which cannot exist in isolation," and that "everything mentionable is an abstraction," may unwittingly foster such a reading.[23]

He may be claiming that thought occurs in words, that words are general and serve to designate or refer to universals, but that unlike a Platonic realism, those universals cannot be understood to have an existence independent of actual cases either of their instantiation in particulars or of their conception by minds. The weakest reading that can be given to his claim that "everything mentionable is an abstraction" is that he is referring in an oblique way to words and not necessarily to what words say, and that the very existence of words, and the very function which they serve represents the active intervention by a conscious agency. Words, unlike certain wild plants which have been found to be nourishing, were not found when man appeared on earth, they are products of his creative spark. We do, of course, use words to mention things; their use is best instanced when we speak of things which are not immediately present. Although everything mentionable may, in order to be mentioned, require the employment of words, that does not entail that the very things which we take ourselves to be mentioning through the use of the words are abstractions and not concrete and in the world.

We must exercise care in speaking of the abstraction-concrete distinction. Not only may the entities named by the use of words be

concrete in the physical sense, but the words themselves can be seen to be concrete in the inscriptional sense. In using words to designate things we understand that the primary denotata of the words are not the words themselves. Consequently, while it may be true that everything mentionable is an abstraction, it is not true because words are abstractions and words must necessarily be used in mentioning something. Clearly, words are mentionable, and they have names; the names of words are the quoted inscriptions of the words themselves. Are we to say that becasue they are mentionable, words are abstractions? We have no indication that Lewis inclines in this direction. Even though the given is to be understood to be an abstraction, the denotation of a term which purports to designate the given cannot be understood to be the mental act of abstracting or of entertaining (mentally) the word which names the abstraction (or the given).

Lewis seems to block this move outright by equating one of the senses of the term 'concept' with "the psychological state of mind when one uses a word or phrase to designate some individual thing or class of objects."[24] Even though concepts are not always paired with words, in light of the independence between concepts and the given which Lewis urges,[25] we are impelled to claim that the psychological state of mind, while perhaps a necessary condition of performing an act of abstraction, cannot be identified with the product of that act of abstraction. In other words, the psychological state of mind is not the denotation of the abstracted element which Lewis identifies as the given.[26]

Can we further clarify what Lewis has in mind by speaking of the given as an abstraction? Certainly Lewis does not mean to exhaust the notion of abstraction by identifying the given with abstractions. Things other than the given in experience can also be understood to be

abstractions. Our initial questions regarding the status of abstractions were prompted by Lewis' comment that "the only important question is whether this abstracted element, the 'given,' is genuinely to be discovered in experience."[27] The indications are that Lewis is asking a question which phenomenological investigation of experience may answer. But there is another perspective from which we can understand his remarks.

"But the condemnation of abstractions is the condemnation of thought itself."[28] Denying the possibility of generating abstractions is to foreclose the possibility of engaging in the type of epistemological analysis Lewis is doing. The distinction between the given and conceptual elements in an experience is not preanalytic data with which we approach our experiences; they are "recovered" from experience as we encounter it.[29] Lewis endows thought with only two capabilities: "It can separate, by analysis, entities which in their temporal or spatial existence are not separated, and it can conjoin, by synthesis, entities which in their existence are disjoined."[30] The implication that both the given and conceptual elements in our experience are entities does not aid the understanding of Lewis' view. The suggestion that the given and the concept are abstractions and that abstractions are products of the activity of thought seems inevitably to lead to the conclusion that the given and the concept are entities. Though in what sense either could be entities is not clear.

We must not neglect Lewis' desire to offset the subjectivist strain in Idealism. The pure apprehension of sense advocated by proponents of an immediacy view is as unacceptable as the "Post-Kantian ...identification of knowledge with what the activity of thought alone produces."[31] Consequently, to speak of the given as if it somehow divulged itself in experience to a purely passive consciousness would be a "figment

of the metaphysical imagination, satisfactory only to those who are willing to substitute a dubious hypothesis for the analysis of knowledge as we find it."[32] It becomes increasingly evident that Lewis is going to have to reconcile his claim that the given is an abstraction with his emphasis on the reality and independence of that which is taken to be given. He notes that the idealist, because of his emphasis on the existence in mind of given data, "may fail to admit, or even to recognize explicitly, that there are given data of experience which, ...the activity of thought can neither create nor alter."[33] The supporters of immediacy views as well as idealists fail because of their inability to account for error. How does Lewis avoid a similar charge considering his suggestion that the given is an abstraction? After all, insofar as an abstraction is not a judgment, it too seems incapable of falsifying the putative experience one may be having. On the one hand, Lewis endorses the techniques of analysis and abstraction as necessary for the pursuit of thought; on the other hand, he must be careful not to substitute a method of analysis which does not advance the cause of our knowledge because it may fail to allow for the possibility of error.

It may be felt that I have become embroiled in a peripheral issue. In taking Lewis' claim that the given is an abstraction seriously, I have focused too strongly perhaps on the idea that whatever is given must share the characteristics which we take to be hallmarks of an abstraction. Consequently, if we press the analogy too strongly we are led to the view that the given (in experience) is akin to an abstraction which may be nothing more than some entertained mental content. Hence, the given is also understood as being some mental content or the aspect of some mental content which occurs simultaneously with the having of an experience. Such an identification naturally does violence to Lewis'

intent. What is even more damaging is the implication that qua mental content, the given is error free because it is the product of mind, or at least present in mind. There seems to be no sense in which an abstraction can falsify. On the other hand, assuming the intent to represent, on the part of someone who does represent something, we may, with some accuracy, say of the representation that it is inaccurate or untrue to that which it is a representation of. Neither the mental act of abstraction nor that which is abstracted can be false to that which it is abstracted from. In light of Lewis' realist sympathies and his epistemological objective of setting the hierarchy of justified knowledge on a base of sense-certainties, it seems that his suggestion that the given is an abstraction did not rest easily in his mind and perhaps fostered the difficulties inherent in his account of the ineffability of the given.

THE BASIC CRITERIA of GIVENNESS

Having asserted that the given is an abstraction, Lewis remarks that "the only important question is whether this abstracted element, the 'given,' is genuinely to be discovered in experience."[34] Without prejudging the issue of whether or not the given exists, let me turn to the two basic criteria which Lewis offers for assessing whether an element in experience is given. Until now we have found Lewis to be concerned with whether or not the idea or notion of givenness was itself a tenable one for epistemological analysis. His concern now turns to an examination of whether or not in the case of a particular experience some element can be discerned which can be understood to be the denotation of the term 'given' as applied to the particular experience.

At this point it will repay us to consider, in detail, a quote

in which Lewis describes an encounter with a physical object. "There is, in all experience, that element which we are aware that we do not create by thinking and cannot in general, displace or alter. As a first approximation, we may designate it as 'the sensuous'."[35] The question of the connotation of 'experience' arises anew here. Here again the initial impulse may be to identify the given, in its guise as the sensuous,as in some way, intimately related to the actual occasion of experiencing, for we are apt to think of the sensuous as earmarked in some dispositional sense as that which can affect us through our sensory modalities. If the impulse is followed, Lewis may be thought to be restricting 'experience' to those kinds of occurrences during which we are conscious of, or during which we are affected (by an object) sensuously. Contracting the interpretation even further, we might take this to mean that it is our standard sensory organs which are affected. If we adopt the Aristotelian view on sensing, we are apt to distinguish between the proper and common sensibles; the former are those aspects of things which can act only on a single sensory modality, which in turn can only be affected by qualities of a particular type. The latter, on the other hand, can affect any of the sensory modalities indifferently. While Lewis gives us no clear indication of whether he would want to correlate the given in this fashion, or whether he would want to limit the sensuous aspect of the given in a particular experience to either the common or proper sensible, it would be plausible to contend, in light of his strong realism and in light of the fact that the Aristotelian distinction foreshadows the primary-secondary quality distinction, that the sensuous aspects of an experience, if construed as given, are best tied up with the proper sensibles. The identification of the sensuous given with qualities which accord well with primary qualities

does not obviate the difficulties of Lockean representationalism. In Locke's view we are perceiving ideas in our minds, be they ideas of primary or secondary qualities. The former, however, lead us to infer to the existence of objects outside of ourselves. Hence, in terms of the vindication of realism, we are no better off by inspecting the mental contents which may be the ideas of givenness in the mind. The identification of the sensuous with secondary qualities does not even carry with it the implication of transcendence, the idea that the qualities represent aspects of things which exist independently of acts of conception.

The most acute question confronting us in regards to the criterion quoted on page 29 is that of the phenomenological evidence in support of the claim. How could we become aware of the fact that "the sensuous" is neither created by thinking, nor displaced or altered by it? Two questions are possible here: 1) What means are available for ever becoming aware of such a fact? (It is at once a strange and difficult fact, one which would seem to test the wits of even the keenest introspective psychologist.) The other question is free from the suggestion that there may be a special mode of cognition appropriate to the discovery of such facts. It replaces that question with another one. 2) What kind of factors, or reasons, would incline us to believe that certain elements in experience (while experienced) were not created or displaced or altered by our thinking? Lewis' claim does not seem to leave room for the possibility that thinking does infect the sensuous, and that we are unaware of its doing so; he adamantly claims that its separation from the sensuous is something which we can be aware of. How can this be so? We are related to the given through acts of direct awareness; however, the direct awareness, while not itself

knowledge in the sense of being justified, does constitute the core of the certainty which accrues to apprehensions of the given. Lewis, however, is hinting at a different kind of awareness in speaking of the noncreated and unalterable character of the given. It will become evident that Lewis is suggesting that we must look to those marks of our experience which might serve as indicators of the fact that through an act of thinking a certain content of our experience can neither be created, altered nor displaced. But before we can seek to resolve the question I pose at the bottom of page 30, we must embark on an examination of the detailed structure of the given, for we shall then have a basis for looking at the descriptive practice of interpretation or classification, which may be the aspect of experience to which Lewis looks in seeking criteria of givenness.

THE DETAILED STRUCTURE of the GIVEN

In order to help us understand exactly where Lewis would like to situate the given (whether in the external world, or in the mind) we must look at the detailed structure of the given, for it is in removing some of the ambiguities which language fosters that Lewis gives us a less equivocal, if no less problematic, view than that provided by his two basic criteria of sensuous quality or feel and unalterability by thought.

The following discussion will also reveal the heavy emphasis Lewis places on the model of perceptual knowledge which he used in developing his account of the given. Despite Lewis' unwillingness to affirm a straightforward identification of the given with sense-data as traditionally conceived, his reader might be inclined to view the given very much along the lines of sense-data, and understand the given

as like sense-data, serving as some mediating entity between the object in experience and the perceptual consciousness we take ourselves to have of the object. Lewis is sufficiently aware of this possibility for he "never makes the mistake ...of treating sense experience as though it were the object of perception and not just a necessary condition of perception."[36] However, Lewis' refusal to equate the given with sense-data stems more from the fear that the idea of givenness will be tainted by the confusions which frequently infect the idea of sense-data than from any desire to imply that the given does not serve the mediating function in perception which sense-data are understood to serve. If 'sense-data' is meant to signify correlation with "processes in the afferent nerves" then the identification is to be avoided on methodological grounds. More importantly, (and this point may be raised as an objection to the earlier suggestion that the given may be correlated with the proper sensibles of Aristotle), 'sense-datum' may connote relation to particular sense-organs, and hence mark a division where none can be drawn by direct inspection. Also other qualities than the strictly sensory may be as truly given; "the pleasantness or fearfulness of a thing may be as un-get-overable as its brightness or loudness - that question, at least, must not be prejudiced."[37] The view that the given is ineffable stems in part from the fact that advocates of the sense-datum theory often reify the appearances which convey the qualitative aspects of real objects and merely endow the reified appearances with the very same qualities which they take themselves to be perceiving in the real object. They therefore, not infrequently, abolish the distinction which their theory is meant to explain but import an element of interpretation into the characterizations of the sense-data which they wish to describe, thereby failing to avoid the conceptual dimension which the given, as

conceived by Lewis, is set out to avoid.

The temptation to read the given as somehow simultaneous with the actual occasion of experiencing is strongly reinforced by Lewis when he distinguishes between the real object in experience, which is given, and the content of experience, which is the given.

> There is also another and different kind of ambiguity which must be avoided. Obviously, we must distinguish the given from the object which is given. The given is presentation of something real, in the normal case at least; what is given (given in part) is this real object. But the whatness of this object involves its categorial interpretation; the real object, as known, is a construction put upon this experience of it, and includes much which is not, at the moment, given in the presentation.[38]

Lewis does not mean to imply that the real object is a fiction (that it is a logical construction out of presentations, in the sense in which traditional sense-datum theorists suggested that physical objects might be logical constructions out of sense-data,) and that it is nothing more than a series of presentations or akin to sense-data. In this respect he is not analogous to certain advocates of phenomenalism who seek to analyze (or reduce) material object statements into statements about sets of sense-data. On the other hand, he does espouse a more sophisticated variant of phenomenalism, for he does suggest that the cash value of knowledge claims about physical objects must ultimately be analyzed into statements about actual and possible experiences. Lewis believes that the real physical objects which our knowledge claims presume to speak about, while given in experience, are never given in their totality. This claim cuts two ways. 1) Our knowledge of the object obviously cannot be exhausted by a single perceptual encounter with the object. The supposition behind this claim is that there are qualities which the thing has which are not manifest in acts of perception but which represent deep-seated dispositions. 2) The other point is that

ascribing a particular classification to a presentation is not exhausted by the particular presentation. The meaning of the term ascribed is not the particular constellation of sensible qualities currently being presented to us; consequently, the application of a concept to the object represents a hypothesis which can only be verified by repeated encounters with the object.

Before further elaborating the immediately preceding quote we must look at the special senses which Lewis reserves for terms such as 'presentation':

> Our interest is, rather, in the element of givenness in what we may, for usual and commonplace reasons, mark off as "an experience" or "an object." This given element in a single experience of an object is what will be meant by "a presentation." Such a presentation is, obviously, an event and historically unique. But for most of the purposes of analyzing knowledge one presentation of a half-dollar held at right angles to the line of vision, etc., will be as good as another. If, then, I speak of "the presentation" of this or that, it will be on the supposition that the reader can provide his own illustration. No identification of the event itself with the repeatable content of it is intended. 39

Lewis has no intention of restricting the term "presentation" to perceptual encounters with objects; he intends that it be suitable to cover all manner of experiences. There is some degree of ambiguity, however, in what Lewis claims. On the one hand, he speaks of 'a presentation' as the given element in an experience, and yet he also equates the presentation with a particular, an historically unique event. The first gloss only implicates an experiencing by speaking of a presentation as that element which is the content of a particular experiencing (and which undoubtedly is understood to conform to the two criteria noted in the preceding section). But we can puzzle over what we are to understand by speaking of 'a presentation' as an event.

It is evident that a presentation in the sense of a constellation of qualities is not analogous to what we take to be common-sense instances

of events. We might want to reconstruct our ontology and speak of objects as events in the fashion of Whitehead, or we might even speak of a special class of event, the instancing of qualities by material particulars, but these senses are somewhat distant from the more ordinary sense in which automobile accidents, revolutions and blinks of the eye are events. It is possible to reassess what Lewis says by thinking of actual occasions of experiencings, looking at objects, noting that one has a headache, seeming to see pink rats. Each of these occasions are historically unique and occur within a finite amount of time within a specifiable physical locus. It is possible that each of these occasions is, while historically unique, nevertheless, an instance of a recurrent type of occasion. After all, individuals scrutinize objects, are aware of headaches and, when inebriated, see oddly colored fauna. It is possible that 'a presentation' is correlated with the occurrence of the kind of event which we should call an 'experiencing'. The difficulty with construing 'presentation' itself, as an event, as an experiencing, is that we are then hard-pressed to explain what the contents of these experiencings are. Lewis calls them the quale, qualia in the plural. There is a temptation to fall back on an intentional construction for the verbs which report the occasions of experiencing, but Lewis does not suggest that quale or qualia can be the direct object(s), the intentional object(s), of certain psychological and perceptual verbs.

That Lewis wants to enforce a strict distinction between the actual presentation and its content is evidenced by the last sentence in the quoted passage on page 34. If there is a virtue in the intentional construal, stemming from his talk of a presentation as an event, it is that the distinction between the event which is the experiencing and the content, (or the object of the experiencing) is at least reinforced grammatically. There is no suggestion that the presentation may not be

something beyond the actual quale, which is taken to be the content of the act of experiencing. (If there is such a suggestion, it comes in the distinction between the two as being particulars and universals, respectively.) Were we to revert to an adverbial analysis of the experiencing,then it would be difficult to effect a distinction between an occasion of experiencing and the contents of such an experiencing. The quale, or qualia, on the adverbial view, would themselves (even though qualia are presumably nameless) become the adverbs which characterize the manner in which the experience is had: for example, "He saw redly", "He heard loudly", etc. The upshot of this approach would be valuable in one respect, at least as regards the issue of the incorrigibility accorded reports of sensations, for we would have moved from describing a putative object to characterizing a sensation; the entire process would be brought behind the scenes, so to speak.

In contrast to the presentation in which the quale or qualia are given and which is a unique historical event, and thus a particular, the quale or qualia are analogous to logical universals. There are a number of characteristics which Lewis employs to pin down what he wants us to understand by qualia. These are: 1)their intrinsic recognizability, 2) their functioning as clues to the presence of objectively real qualities, 3) their not being the denotata of concepts, 4) their not being objects of acts of immediate awareness, 5) their not being restricted to sensory qualities, 6) their not being identical with sense-data, when those are construed as the processes in the afferent nerves, and most important, 7) their being necessary for the understanding of anything in experience; no illusion or knowledge without the factuality of the content of the given is possible. These theses are tied up with other epistemological points of Lewis', for example, numbers 2 and 3 are related to the thesis

of temporal spread which encapsulates Lewis' realism.

At first I want to attend to some terminological problems: Lewis identifies the content of a presentation with a specific quale or with something which is analyzable into a complex of such. As an example of the former, he suggests "the immediacy of redness or loudness". In what sense is the 'immediacy' of the quality of an experience the content of an experience, or the presentation which we have in the experiencing? It is obvious that it is not 'red' and 'round' which are given, for these are the concepts which designate the qualities 'redness' and'roundness'. "Immediacy" in such epistemological contexts is most often and most plausibly glossed as meaning "involving no inference". But there might be a temptation to gloss 'immediacy' (along lines suggested by the traditional empiricists) as analogous to "vivacity", in which case it would be more evident that the quality, rather than the occasion which is the having of it, is the subject of the characterization. "Immediacy" is meant to characterize the manner in which the experience, regardless of its particular content, comes to be had. "Redness" and not "immediacy of redness" should be understood to name the quale which is the content of the presentation.

What is problematic is whether Lewis allows for the possibility of giving any names to the qualia; they are, after all, parts of the given which he deems ineffable. He claims that "what any concept denotes - or any adjective such as 'red' or 'round' - is something more complex than an identifiable sense-quale."[40] I shall draw the distinction between a quale and a property shortly. Lewis has complicated the issue by distinguishing between them. When confronted by an object, we are affected in a certain manner so that we seem to apprehend certain qualities (qualities which we most probably ascribe to the object by which we are

presented in the belief that the object actually has those qualities.) Lewis' point is, that in ascribing a property (or quality) to a presented object, we are going beyond what is sensibly presented to us in the discrete occasions of our experiencing of the object. Were we to use the word 'red', thinking that we were describing the sensible quality which we take ourselves to apprehend, we would, Lewis insists, be in error. How are we to understand this error? There are a number of alternative possibilities, though not of equal credibility. 1) The simplest conceivable error is to have used the wrong word: this itself could be diagnosed as resulting from a) a verbal slip, or b) as indicating a failure to have perceived the content of the experience properly, or c) as not knowing the proper use of the word 'red'.

These are not the kinds of errors with which Lewis would be concerned. We should not lose sight of the fact that Lewis speaks of the quale or of the qualia as intrinsically recognizable from one to another experience. Even though he draws a close parallel between qualia and logical universals, the kind of recognizability he wishes to attribute to them is tied in with the presentation of certain sensible qualities. In the article "Realism or Phenomenalism?" Lewis speaks of qualia as "abstract in the sense of being literally abstracted from its given context by attention, and in the sense of having more than one instance, but not abstract in the sense of triangularity, whose instances may be immediately discriminable, as different shapes without respect to context."[41] The shortcoming of universals such as triangularity, apart from precipitating 'the nominalistic objection to acknowledgment of their factuality' is that "they cannot be at once precisely and adequately imaged. Anything we can imagine precisely is a quale or some complexus of such."[42] It is clear that imaging is something different from being presented with sensible

qualities, for we can do the former without the latter's occurring at the same time. However, it is possible that in order to do the former, the latter must in some way be implicated. The very contents of mind which are employed when one engages in imaging are contents the presence of which can only be accounted for by adverting to actual instances of earlier occasions when one may have been "presented with sensible qualities."

There are repeated allusions to the distinction between the sensibly manifest or presentable aspects of things which Lewis terms qualia and the actual properties of objectively real entities and between the many-one relationship which characterizes qualia in relation to the objective properties of which they are taken to be signs. We are reminded here of W.E. Johnson's distinction between 'determinables' and 'determinates'; the former are terms such as colour and shape, the latter, one the other hand are actual instances of color and shape such as red and square. The parallel is not exact, but the objective property which an object has is analogous to a determinable; the manifestations of the property in the various presentations which we have of the object are analogous to the determinates. The parallel cannot go much farther and be informative; Johnson drew the distinction in order to characterize adjectives applicable to substantives. We are looking for a more full-blooded construal of the denotata of terms which designate properties and qualia.

QUALIA and PROPERTIES

Lewis distinguishes between qualia and properties as though he were distinguishing between ontologically distinct entities; the former are universals, the latter are particulars. Yet he seeks to effect what purports to be a logical distinction on the basis of psychological feature of ours, the ability to recognize repeated instances of some quality. "There <u>are</u> recognizable qualitative characters of the given,

which may be repeated in different experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these 'qualia'."[43] The real property which an objective entity possesses is mediated to us through countless presentations of the object which provide us with glimpses. The glimpses however, are not of the property but are rather of the recognizable qualitative aspects which we term qualia. Consequently, it is the quale as such and not the property of the actual thing which is related to an act of perceiving on our parts. "The real roundness of the real penny is seen as all degrees of elliptical appearance; the blueness of the blotter may be seen as any one of a whole range of color-qualia, depending on the illumination."[44] As an occurrence of the presentation during which we catch a glimpse of the real property of the object "deposits" with us something as real as the actual property of the object, but something which is nevertheless subjective. "There certainly is such a thing as the shape of a penny or the color of a card which can exist unnoticed while I am looking at it - or when I am not. This is because the shape of the penny has the same kind of enduring reality as the penny, and a quite different kind of reality from the intermittent presentation of the penny in my consciousness."[45]

Before turning to the epistemological function which this distinction between qualia and objective properties serves to underpin, it is important to look at the firmest expression of the distinction in Lewis' paper "Realism or Phenomenalism?". Doing so, however, will clarify the notion of property more than it shall the notion of quale. Lewis' distinction between quale and properties of objects stems from an attempt to consider, in its new guise, an issue which has exercised idealists, realists and phenomenalists, the question of the existence of some objective reality. Historically the issue has generated discussions about the nature of substance; however, the "residue of it is found in the

question whether an object is merely a bundle of attributes."[46] Lewis urges a Whiteheadian identification of an object with an event; the recognition of the object is made possible by the "persistence of some character". "One must find in the object something which persists unaltered, or one must penetrate to some lawlike or predictable mode of such alteration, characteristic of the kind of thing the object in question is recognized to be." "And some properties or propensities of behavior, simple or complex, must be discernible as persisting as long as this object endures and is recognizable."[47] This nomological conception of the object is at the heart of his distinction between qualia and properties.[48] As a consequence of this identification of an object with an event, Lewis concludes that in actually ascribing a property to an object, the denotata of those properties is never identical with the characteristic which we take ourselves to be sensuously presented with. They are, rather, "'ways of behaving' or propensities exhibited."[49] Properties of objects are universals; nevertheless, they are also propensities to create certain affects, they are dispositional properties of objects. Objective properties and presentational qualia belong to different orders of being. "The immediate presentational quale, with due reference to apprehended circumstances, is simply one manifestation of the objective color-property attributable to the objective existent, and one means of confirming that objective property."[50] Lewis does not intend that his distinction apply solely to the traditional secondary qualities. "When we know the objective shape which a thing has, what we know is such reliability, attributable to the nature of it, of the various ways in which it will manifest itself, either by direct effect upon experience or by observable effects on other objects..."[51] The insistence on a distinction between objective properties actually possessed by objects

in the world and the presentational qualia through which the objects come to be mediated to us may not sit easily with those philosophers who would argue that in ascriptions of qualities to aspects of our experience we presuppose the existence of the qualities in the very place our judgment seems to indicate. Most obviously on such a view color must not be identified with either a physical disposition in the object or a propensity on the mind's part to respond to excitations of a certain wavelength. The color must truly be understood to be in the physical object, and to be there not in the metaphorical sense in which the disposition which creates the perception of color is housed in the inner recesses of the object. In light of this possible rebuttal, Lewis must yield an analysis of the fact that in using a color word such as 'blue' to ascribe the property of blueness to an object we are possibly doing something different than when we use a token of the same word to characterize the quale, which, for us, is a clue to the presence of the objectively real property of blueness.

It is essential to come to an understanding of what Lewis may mean by a notion such as 'intrinsic recognizability' when it is applied to the presentational quale. It is also important to see what his thesis of the given's ineffability rests on. He musters a number of points which seem to relate to one another but none too clearly. The thesis of temporal spread seems to underpin the distinction between what can be apprehended in a single presentation and what cannot. This distinction in turn seems to argue for the plausibility of the distinction between objective properties and qualia. That latter distinction is, in its turn, related to the view that concepts do not have qualia as their primary denotata and consequently that the given is ineffable. Let me examine the interplay of these various points.

We have already noted the intimate relation which Lewis' account of properties has to his identification of objects with events. Insofar as the primary cognitive relation one can be in is that of knowing about some object, knowing about its properties, one would expect that the sketchiest view of Lewis' account of knowing would reveal that connection. This connection is borne out in the essay "Realism or Phenomenalism?" "What we may know, when we say that we know an object, is some property or properties of it. ...What may become known to us of the nature of objects is reliable dispositional traits of them so manifested. We could have no practical interest in any other conceivable manner of knowing them..."[52] While this is not offered as an analysis of knowledge, it does nevertheless provide an element of constraint in any possible account. If, in perception, one is acquainted with a presentational quale, and if a presentational quale is but a manifestation of, and not identical with the objective property of which it may serve as a sign, then, insofar as one is not directly acquainted with the objective property of the entity under consideration, one does not have knowledge of the object. It is, of course, a separate question whether or not some knowledge is presupposed in being acquainted with a particular presentational quale, or whether that acquaintance is non-inferential and is self-certifying in the mere having of it. In other words, is the person, when experiencing the presentational quale, absolutely certain about its qualitative aspect without necessarily knowing anything further either about the object for which the presentational quale functions as a sign or about the circumstances in which the quale is presented?

Lewis is led, as a consequence of his distinction between properties and their presentational aspects in the qualia, to make claims which lead us to interpret his views on the given as but another

form of the mediation suggested by advocates of the sense-datum theory. He, in effect, dematerializes the notion of a material object and relates its 'objectivity' to the possibility of verificatory experiences; these experiences, however, are nothing other than sequences of presentational qualia which we relate to the same object, which we inferred putatively to exist as the cause of the quale with which we were initially presented.

The neglect of transcendence - the view that knowledge must extend beyond the boundaries of the immediately given - is explained by Lewis as the consequence of a certain view which draws some of its support from language. "The notion that there is a simple sort of knowledge, gained by direct apprehension alone" stems from the supposition that "there are some concepts at least which denote 'simple qualities' - something which can be directly exhibited in a single experience."[53] To assume, as some do, that there may be knowledge through the immediate apprehension of certain sense-qualia is to ignore the essential role which concepts play in the development of our knowledge. On the assumption, which Lewis makes, that concepts are necessary for knowledge, he wants us to infer that knowledge by immediate apprehension is not possible, as that which a concept denotes or encompasses is never captured in a single perceptual encounter with an object. "There are no 'simple qualities' which are named by any name."[54] On the further assumption that concepts must be articulable, in other words have names, Lewis would have us conclude that there are no simple qualities because anything that can be named must either be the quoted name of the concept or else an instance of the class of the concept's denotata. Though having a name may signify that the name, when entertained, is a mental content, that in itself is not sufficient to claim that that which the name designates is also a mental content. (Furthermore, it would seem to make little sense to

distinguish between a concept and its denotation if every member of the class of its denotata were mental contents in the same fashion as the name of the concept itself may be a mental content; the only sense we could ascribe to the distinction in such a case would be that each discrete occasion on which the name is entertained is an entity denoted by the name of the concept.)

That there are no simple qualities named by any name does not entail that there are no simple qualities. But we need not incline in the direction indicated in the last paragraph, a direction which entertains the notion that naming alone is a means of enriching our ontology. Lewis inclines in the other direction, in the direction of reality without nameability, of an ineffable reality. The quale or qualia, are for Lewis, the very paradigm of simple qualities, and, as they are immediate and are had in a single perceptual encounter with an object, are not nameable by any concept. "The confusion of the quale and the objective property has doubtless come about through a short-cut in the use of language which is characteristic of common-sense."[55]

> A thing is said to "look round" when it presents the quale which a really round object does when held at right angles to the line of vision; and a thing is said to "look blue" when it looks the way a really blue thing does under usual or standard illumination. In general, the name of the property is also assigned to the appearance of it under certain optimum conditions. The round penny looks round when held at that angle at which judgment of actual shape from visual appearance is safest. An an object looks that color that it is under that illumination which is conducive to accurate color discrimination.[56]

In saying that "the name of the property is also assigned to the appearance", Lewis may be implying that the use of the property name for characterizing the appearance is a derivative use. But if that were the case, it would imply that we may be able to acquire the meaning of the concepts which name certain properties without necessarily encountering instances of the quality which the property name denotes. But we need not assume this

derivative status if Lewis, by saying that qualia are directly intuited and intrinsically recognizable, intends to say that we can also recognize the property for which the particular quale which we apprehend is taken by us to be a sign.

The quote on the preceding page is not without rather obvious difficulties. What might be meant by expressions such as: "usual or standard illumination", "optimum conditions", "angle at which judgment of actual shape ...is safest", "that illumination which is conducive to accurate color discrimination"? Surely, Lewis is not suggesting that this battery of conditions is something which can be established a priori for every type of case of visual perception imaginable. The establishment of such conditions involves the kind of experimental, long term verification which Lewis views as essential for the vindication of the classification of a presentation. The natural objection is that the establishment of these conditions involves the use of one's perceptual apparatus, and consequently is fraught with the same uncertainties when reports of appearances are made, as the conditions are set up to guard against. (A potential answer to this problem arises in the context of Lewis' discussion of objective value in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation where he distinguishes between the objective meaning of value predications and the meaning of property ascriptions to objects. "With respect to value-terms their objective meaning is derivative from and rule by their expressive meaning; whereas for other terms, their expressive meaning is at least likely to be subordinated to their objective meaning."[59] All of the characterizations noted in the quote from Mind and the World Order are attempts to settle on what - in the language of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation - Lewis calls the expressive meaning of certain 'looks' expressions. But, "the most nearly decisive confirmation of the thing's being really round will not

be experiences of 'looking round' or 'feeling round' but the results determined with precision instruments."[58] This is not an entirely satisfactory answer. Lewis notes that the objective meanings of terms (those which arise by the application of certain technical means) are ultimately derivative from the expressive significations of terms. "With respect to 'hard' and 'round' and names of other properties, we have at some point thrown overboard such tests as those of feeling hard and looking round, as comparatively unsure corroborations of the objective character which engages our interest."[59] Lewis, in the extended quote on page 45 above, is expressing thoughts similar to those noted by Roderick Chisholm in his book Perceiving. Chisholm distinguishes between the various senses in which we can employ appear words: 'appear', 'seems' and 'looks'. If we say that "the bus appears to be moving", we are expressing a tentative conclusion about some state of affairs, a conclusion, nevertheless, which may entitle another person, hearing my statement, to infer that I believe that the bus is moving. This epistemic use of the 'appears' locution is meant to contrast with two non-epistemic uses of the locution.

Chisholm distinguishes between the comparative and non-comparative employments of appears words. The salient difference between the two stems from the fact that in using 'appears' or 'looks' in 'the tracks look convergent' one intends to compare what one presently observes to the way two tracks which actually do converge would appear, whereas in the non-comparative use no such comparison is meant or intended. The essence of the comparative sense of appears locutions is that they presuppose actual knowledge about how the things which appear to be so and so are in reality. "When we use appear words comparatively, the locution 'x appears to S to be...' and its variants may be interpreted as comparing x with those things which have the characteristic that x is said to appear to have."[60]

Chisholm adds a logical fillip to his point.

> Any sentence containing an expression that describes the way in which something appears, in the comparative sense of 'appear,' must be capable of translation into another sentence with that expression used to describe a property or characteristic of some physical thing. ... Hence we cannot know how to apply 'appears so-and-so,' in this sense, until we know how to apply 'so-and-so.' And therefore, if we are not familiar with things that are so-and-so, we may be quite uncertain, on any given occasion, whether anything is appearing so-and so.[61]

In saying of a mountainside for example, that it looks red, if one is using 'looks red' in its comparative sense then the original statement entails a statement to the effect that 'the mountainside looks the way red things look in daylight.' Such a statement however is analytic. On the other hand, if one were to make the same claim, however, using 'looks red' in its non-comparative use, then no such statement is entailed; furthermore, the statement "things which are red look red in daylight" is synthetic - an "empirical generalization."[62]

How do these distinctions relate to Lewis' point regarding the use of property names to describe the quale which we take to be signs for the existence of the actual properties? It is clear that the appearance of a property name in an appears locution is, for Lewis, an indication of the comparative use of the appears locution. A thing is said to appear to have a certain property when the property which it appears to present us with is the one which an object which actually does have the property would present us with. On the other hand, Lewis' repeated emphasis on the intrinsic recognizability of the quale seems to indicate that as regards the use of tokens of property names to name them in appears locutions the predicates are being used non-comparatively, for there is no entailment, claiming that the appearance, or the quale looks the way such things normally appear in standard conditions of observation. Such non-comparative use is consonant with Lewis' contention that the quale is subjective and

more important, with his view that apprehensions of qualia are indubitable. If there is an added reason to adopt such a reading of Lewis (in light of Chisholm's distinction) it is that Chisholm also argues for a dispositional construal of properties. ("The predicate 'red', as it is used in locutions such as 'The mountainside looks the way red things look in daylight', and 'things which are red look red in daylight' should be taken in its 'physical' sense, as referring to the capacity of things to reflect light waves of a certain sort."[63] If the primary denotation of a property name is the actual reflective capacity of the object to which we ascribe the property, then it is rather clear that Lewis does not want us to postulate a class of such reflective properties which parallel the ones in actual physical objects yet which are somehow present in the quale.

THE INEFFABILITY of the GIVEN

One of the most unsettling claims to empirically-minded philosophers is Lewis' view that the given is ineffable. The intimate relationship which exists between interpretation through concepts and the transcendence of concepts receives a strongly linguistic turn from Lewis, especially as he tries to reinforce the distinction between properties and qualia. Consequently, there may be a tendency to regard his claim about the given's ineffability as one supported by linguistic considerations. We have already noted Lewis' claim that there are no simple qualities which are named by name. At the same time, we have also noted that there are simple qualities. We have already seen that Lewis would claim that were any putative simple quality to have a name, the inscription purporting to name the quality would be masquerading as a name. In light of Lewis' emphasis on the transcendence of a concept beyond that which is immediately given and his contention that apprehensions of the given (which is ineffable) are indubitable it will be important to examine the epistemological impact

of the connection of these two points on the type of foundationalism which Lewis espouses. We can begin to shed some light on that connection if we examine Lewis' intent in referring to the given as ineffable.

Upon examining the contexts in which Lewis speaks of the given's ineffability, one is apt to feel that it is the subjective nature of the experiences (which we identify as the quale or qualia) which constitutes their ineffability; there seems to be a strong connection, in Lewis' mind, between ineffability and privacy. The concepts which we employ in our empirical judgments reflect a community of interest; this community of interest exists despite the differences in the qualitative experience each of us may have in apprehending the particular sensory aspect of an experience.

> we are "like creatures" and capable of understanding one another if, regardless of the sense-quality of what we intuit, we make the major discriminations and relations concerned by the adjustment of behavior to environment in comparable ways.
>
> The "common reality" projected by such understanding...triumphs over a good deal of verifiable difference in the power of individuals to discriminate and relate in the presence of the same situation.... the importance of those concepts which are framed in terms of distinctions and relations which <u>are</u> common, is enhanced, and of those which should be in terms of what some only can discriminate, is diminished. If these distinctions which only some can make directly in the content of their experience, do not concern what is important for behavior, then very likely no socially correct concept will be framed in terms of them. There will be no language to describe these personal and peculiar phases of experience.
>
> We can have no language for discussing what no language or behavior could discriminate. And a difference which no language or behavior could convey is, for purposes of communication, as good as non-existent.[64]

At one point Lewis explicitly identifies the ineffability of qualia with the notions of incommunicability and non-comparability of qualia possessed by different individuals. "Qualia...are ineffable, since they might be different in two minds with no possibility of discovering that fact and no necessary inconvenience to our knowledge of objects or their properties. ...An immediate quale apart from some relational context which 'locates'

it in experience is intrinsically and absolutely inarticulate. It is inarticulate not only in the sense that it cannot be expressed to another; it would be impossible for it to be abstracted and envisaged as an object of our own thought."[65]

Though one of the senses in which Lewis seems to think of the given's ineffability is the sense in which it is not describable, I shall defer discussion of that view until I return to our account of the basic criteria of givenness. In that context the relation of our descriptive practice to givenness will be more evident. We are left then with the two other senses, the incommunicability and non-comparability of the given. I have already noted that Lewis claims that qualia are purely subjective; however, such a claim does not settle our initial question regarding the locus of qualia in the world. All that Lewis may want us to understand by his claim is that the quale or qualia which we do receive in the course of a presentation are directly related to our personal acts of sensing. There is, as yet, no indication that Lewis did not reify qualia in the same fashion that sense-data were reified by sense-datum theorists. Yet Lewis was, as we have noted, perturbed by the possibility of unsensed sense-data. "The main objection to the sensum-theory is that it leaves at once the ground of the analysis of experience and plunges into metaphysics. It would explain the immediate and indubitable by something intrinsically unverifiable and highly dubious."[66] At the same time he wishes to leave open the possibility of the given's existing outside of the mind. "We need not say that what is given is a 'mental state' or even 'in the mind' in any more explicit sense than is itself implied in such givenness. Nor should it be presumed that what is thus in mind is exclusively mental."[67] We can begin to understand Lewis' contention that the given is incommunicable if we affirm

that qualia and sensations are related, if not identical. However, Lewis refuses to identify the given with sense-data because of the latter's connotation of processes in the afferent nerves. Assuming however, that the latter refusal is not sufficient grounds for not identifying qualia with sensations, it is possible to offer an explanation of Lewis' view that ineffability is, among other things, incommunicability.

Lewis, in his discussion of the use of property names to designate qualia, seems to take as paradigmatic the names of qualities which are perceptually manifest and which may be said to be representative. In maintaining that there is an unbridgeable gap between the properties which are the primary denotata of certain quality names and the qualia which we attempt to designate by employing tokens of those same quality names, Lewis may be suggesting that in cases where we don't have names which designate the properties of sensations and certain other bodily feelings, we cannot even begin to make the mistake on which the former attempt rests. Lewis has not demonstrated that there are no names which can apply to simple qualities. Instead, he seems to have taken the most favorable case, the case of color predicates, and argued that even in the most favorable case the attempt to use the same predicate to designate the content of a presentation is mistaken because the primary designation of the predicate is the objective and long term property which the object actually has. Even if names were available for other aspects of our experience, including sensations and bodily feelings, on the assumption that the primary designation of any property name is the property and not the momentarily presented quale, to attempt to name those momentarily presented aspects of our experience would be to fall into the same error fostered

by the common sense use of language.

There are in Lewis traces of a view somewhat akin to Wittgenstein's opposition to a private language. Lewis, however, is less concerned to show the incoherence of the idea of a private language than he is to indicate that the terms used to designate quale or qualia have publicly observable objects as their primary denotata. Consequently, there is no guarantee that qualia may not in fact be sensations. All we can conclude is that our reference to them by the use of terms does not signify the report of a private occurrence. From the claim that an expression is not used to designate a private entity, such as a sensation, and that the use of the expression in public contexts is not meaningless, we cannot infer to the conclusion that that entity which we purport to identify by the expression does not exist, even if the idea of a private language is incoherent. The private language argument is a thesis about conditions of intelligible discourse and not a thesis about the reality of certain types of entities:

> An immediate quale apart from some relational context which "locates" it in experience is intrinsically and absolutely inarticulate. It is inarticulate not only in the sense that it cannot be expressed to another; it would be impossible for it to be envisaged as an object of our own thought. Imagine a man to suffer all his life from toothache, but in such wise that no pressure on the jaw, no change of temperature or of the heart-beat, no behavior of himself or difference of surroundings would ever alter it. Not only would a person so afflicted be unaware that he suffered toothache - it would not in fact <u>be a toothache</u>; he could not even become conscious of the <u>ache</u> as a distinct fact of his experience....it would never become for him an explicit object of thought. Such an all-pervasive ingredient of experience could never become articulate, because it would lack the ground of any possible discrimination and relation. No language could express it; there would be no possibility of bounding it or eliciting it as a separate fact.
>
> There are no concepts of immediate qualia as such - not because the word "concept" as here used has any unnecessary connotation of the verbal, but because articulation is the setting of bounds and establishing of connections; because what does not affect discrimination and relation has no handle by which the mind can take hold of it.[68]

The meaning of a term which a person may use to designate a private sensation has no cognitive significance apart from some context which transcends the occasion in which the sensation is received or felt.

We have yet to examine the notion of intrinsic recognizability. What has happened thus far, and how does this last question relate to what has come before? Lewis has urged that apprehensions of the given are indubitable, furthermore that they are subjective. On the other hand he has deployed an argument against the possibility of giving a private designation to a subjective qualitative experience and has used that point to substantiate the claim that simple qualities have no names. At the same time he contends that qualia "have no names in ordinary discourse but are indicated by some circumlocution such as 'looks like'."[69] If, as we suggested, that last claim can be understood as an endorsement of the noncomparative use of 'appears' locutions as marked by Chisholm, we are left with the question of what the intrinsic recognizability of qualia consists of. It is assumed here that Lewis allows, though only grudgingly, that we can attempt to describe our subjective experiences in terms of predicates which have as their primary case of employment material particulars. As Chisholm points out, much of traditional empiricism adheres to the view that "appears so-and-so" is learned prior to "is so-and-so"; consequently, the primary referents of our descriptive predicates are sensations or appearances. The question confronting us then is whether a predicate which purports to say something true about some private entity, a quale, can, in light of the fact that the predicate must have as the paradigm case of its employment some publicly verifiable context, say something true about that private experience, and if not, then what sense is there to speaking of apprehensions of the given as certain because intrinsically recog-

nizable? Before turning to this most important issue, I want to return to a more detailed characterization of Lewis' basic criteria of givenness in light of his account of a certain example, which, he felt, elicited the criteria.

OUR DESCRIPTIVE PRACTICE

Earlier, I raised two questions: 1) What means are available for becoming aware of the fact of givenness, assuming that such a fact is an essential constituent in any experience that we may have? and 2) What kind of factors, or reasons would incline us to believe that certain elements in experience (while experienced) were not created or displaced or altered by our thinking? With a view to answering these questions let us consider a lengthy quote in which Lewis describes the example:

> At the moment, I have a fountain pen in my hand. When I so describe this item of my present experience, I make use of terms whose meaning I have learned. Correlatively I abstract this item from the total field of my present consciousness and relate it to what is not just now present in ways which I have learned and which reflect modes of action which I have acquired. It might happen that I remember my first experience of such a thing. If so, I should find that this sort of presentation did not then mean "fountain pen" to me. I bring to the present moment something which I did not then bring; a relation of this to other actual and possible experiences, and a classification of what is here presented with things which I did not then include in the same group. This present classification depends on that learned relation of this experience to other possible experience and to my action, which the shape, size, etc., of this object was not then a sign of.[70]

Lewis' claim does not seem to leave room for the possibility that thinking does infect the sensuous, and that we are unaware of its doing so; he adamantly claims that its separation from the sensuous is something of which we can be aware. How can this be so? Both the given as an abstraction and the terms employed to designate it as words, are constituents of a mind, are entertained in a mind, are

occasions of thinking, and yet Lewis suggests that within this very thought (which comprises among other things the experiencing of the presentation of a particular object) there is an added strand of selective attention which can observe the experiencing of the primary content of the experience while somehow sorting out and recording those aspects of that experience which are definitely contributed by mind alone and those which come to mind solely from experience. But if Lewis' account is to be exhaustive, as it is clear he wants it to be, then this second order experience is itself comprised of given and conceptual elements,,and the supposition that it can serve as an objective observer of the content of the primary experience presupposes that we can assuredly distinguish the given and conceptual elements in the secondary experience so that there is no danger that its recording of the given and conceptual elements in the first experience is not tainted. But if the presupposition of its objectivity is that we can distinguish the very elements which this particular act of observation is postulated to accomplish, then why introduce this act? If, on the other hand, we cannot thoroughly rely on its account of the primary experience because of the possibility that its account will be tainted by conceptual materials, then a third order observation is required. Either we don't require this act of observation for it presupposes that the very distinction it has been brought in to establish is already established satisfactorily in its own case, or else we are required to postulate an infinite set of these acts of observation, in which case there is no possibility of ever establishing the distinction. Consequently, when Lewis says that there is in all experience that element that we are aware that we do not create, we should not place too much emphasis on the notion of awareness. We should turn instead to other

factors which might incline us to regard certain aspects of our experience as revealing both the given and conceptual elements.

In the quote on page 55, Lewis suggests that description and abstraction are mutually related activities; there is no suggestion that either of the activities precedes the other temporally or logically. In fact, it is entirely possible that abstraction is accomplished through description. By speaking in this way, Lewis minimizes the notion of abstraction as selective attention. Clearly, among the things done in description, apart from perhaps looking at, or in some way being experientially related to, the item being described, one is employing a word which is essentially general. This means that it is potentially ascribable to a wide range of entities (though ones of qualitatively similar type). To abstract in the sense intended by Lewis doesn't entail making that which is abstracted less concrete merely because a token of a word has been applied. The words which we use to describe things are not intrinsically abstract or concrete (though as inscriptional tokens they are, of course, concrete), it is their assumed referents which tell us whether the terms denote an abstract or a concrete entity. But nevertheless, by the use of a word, in an act of description, we easily succeed in abstracting some element presented in our experience. The ascription of a term to a presented object involves an act of attention to an object, and even when the object is not physically present, the use of a term to describe it in its absence may involve the imaging of the object, or some other particular act of mental attention. However, I would not want to argue that all acts of attention to, or thinking about objects which are not present necessitate some form of mental imagery. We might be prompted to recruit these behind-the-scenes acts of attention if we wanted to insure that the description was

meaningful and not merely the casual production of an inscription of one of the description tokens. The relating of the abstracted item may either be a conscious relating or an implicit relating. If abstraction is thought of as distinct from the description in words of the presented content, then the relating occurs as a result of recollections of earlier experiencings of similar items. On the assumption that the use of a word represents a conceptual skill, it is possible to employ the terms without necessarily having learned the term ostensively, but what is implied in the possession of a conceptual skill is that the term may be used on like occasions to describe similar items of experience. In this sense the use of the term 'fountain pen' to designate that item now before me is to relate it to other experiences of other fountain pens, though not necessarily to ones antecedently experienced.

It is important that a distinction be retained between the 1) meaning of the presentation in which the qualitative aspect of the experience is presented to us, 2) the description made through the use of a designating expression, and 3) the abstraction; it is evident that none of these three are identical with the given element in the experience. We might wish to equate the meaning of the presentation with that feature of the objective reality which it portends to us. The description can be correlated with the intension of the name of the token which we use to describe the content of the presentation. The abstraction is not the token of the word used to describe the content of the presentation. We don't want to designate mental acts of abstraction by terms which purportedly serve to designate the quale. If we allow that abstraction can be accomplished through designation or description or classification, then it should be evident that a different

designating expression signifies a different abstraction (but this is entirely consistent with the way in which I wanted abstraction, through the use of words, to be understood) for one has served to put oneself and others on notice by the choice of a particular word that the presented experience is caught up in a web of earlier experiences and meanings of a rather specific sort, those associated with 'fountain pen' and not those associated with 'rubber tire', for example. But even though a different designating expression signifies a different abstraction, that obviously does not entail that the qualitative contents of the actual presented experience are any different; the point is that when construed as signs, the qualitative contents serve to signify different connections of experience to different people. Their acting as signs is contingent on the earlier occurrence of experiences of similar items as well as the current existence of associated interests or purposes which relate the object named or designated in a certain way as an instrumentality with respect to those interests and purposes in future experiences.

Lewis is ambiguous about the qualitative aspect of the given element in an experience; consequently, it is easy to misinterpret what he says about the constancy of the given. Referring to the pen of our example he says, "There is, to be sure, something in the character of this thing as merely presented colligation of sense-qualities which is for me the clue to this classification or meaning; but that just this complex of qualities should be due to a 'pen' character of the object is something which has been acquired."[71] It is evident that one of the ways in which Lewis wants us to understand the given is that it is a complex of some phenomenally present qualities of the experience ('qualities' being used in a rather guarded sense at this point, not wishing to compromise Lewis' distinction between qualia and properties.) These qualities are not

essentially related to any particular designation; there is no such thing as a complex of phenomenally presentable qualities which can be uniquely associated with pens or pen-like objects, though this particular pen now before me has certain qualities which make it identifiable over a period of time, and some of these qualities are the kind which we might think of as phenomenally manifest ones. Though not even these qualities are constant in the sense that if we were to alter the conditions under which the pen is observed and consequently described, the phenomenal qualities which we took to be present might be reported as being very different from an earlier experience of the very same pen (naturally this is part of the basis for distinguishing between the presented qualia of an object and its objective properties.) The fact that under altered conditions the phenomenal qualities might be reported to be very different from the way in which they first appeared does not alter the substance of Lewis' claim that in this new experiencing of the object there is also an element of givenness. To this extent his claim that the given in a particular experience is "qualitatively no different than it would be if I were an infant or an ignorant savage" [72] must be qualified lest it be wrongly construed.

Consider Lewis' further remarks on the example in question, when he speaks of altering the designation appended to the presentation in order to reflect altered interests or purposes:

> Again, suppose my present interest to be slightly altered. I might then describe this object which is in my hand as "a cylinder" or "hard rubber" or a "poor buy." In each case the thing is somewhat differently related in my mind, and the connoted modes of my possible behavior toward it, and my further experience of it, are different. Something called "given" remains <u>constant</u>, but its character as sign, its classification, and its relation to other things and to action are differently taken. 73

What sense are we to make of the underscored in the above quote? We have

a few possible cases: A secretary in a stenographic pool, an infant and a savage from New Guinea may all be shown the fountain pen (of our original case) under the same conditions of illumination and from the same standpoint. Imagine their heads being successively placed in a contraption somewhat like the stanchion used for cows while they are being milked. In this way the gaze of each of the three participants must fall on the intended object. If each participant can issue protocols about what he is seeing (is taking himself to see), Lewis' point is that the secretary will describe the presented object as a fountain pen both because of antecedent experience in which the meaning of similar presentations was associated with certain qualitative features, and because her current interests are such that a pen has a certain instrumental value to her. The infant may make sounds, and even respond with words such as 'rattle'; this would indicate that the child had no previous experiences in which he had learned the meaning of 'fountain pen' and that his current interests in the object were not dictated by that particular designation. The native might or might not be prompted to utter anything at all. But it is possible that he might have an exceptional memory and have been shown the identical make pen by an anthropologist who also told the native the word 'fountain pen', which the native now utters; it would be difficult to understand exactly what purpose or interest the native would reveal by employing the correct designation for the object. Despite the varying abilities to describe the phenomenal qualities of the presentation of the pen, it would be correct to say that (within bounds of different visual acuities, etc.) the phenomenal qualities presented by the object to our three percipients were fairly close. On the other hand, if I were to alter the viewing conditions of the object before presenting it a second time to our three subjects, it seems safe to say that the physical object would remain as

it was, but that the phenomenal qualities which sentient observers would take it to be presenting differ and such differences be reflected in both their reports of those qualities and in the altered designations which reveal the changed interests and purposes. (It might be worth noting a possible problem here. As the person who executes the experiment there is no excluding my experience from the Lewisian distinction between quale and concept; consequently, I might be confronted with the question as to how I know that the object has remained the same even though the viewing conditions for the three subjects of our experiment has changed?)

From Lewis' formulation (at the end of the quoted paragraph above) it is not clear what we are to understand by "classification" of the given. At later points he urges that it is the real properties of objects which are given in experience and not the particular qualia which act as clues on the basis of which we infer the presence of the objective qualities. He is suggesting that a single given (presumed) unchanged can have a different sign function. This is entirely true for different individuals who are presented with the same object under the same observational conditions. The secretary on second viewing, may fail to notice the metal clip used to secure the pen in a shirt pocket; there may not be ample signs in order for her to classify the object as a fountain pen, and she may also be ignorant of the altered conditions under which she is viewing the object. If she were being presented with the same given (had it remained constant) then there would be no reason for her not to offer the most correct designating expression. All this is true and we can still retain Lewis' contention that her designation of it as a 'cylinder' reflects previous experiences and present interests. It does not, however, allow us to say that it is the same given which she is being presented with on the second occasion. As a general understanding

of the given, it is erroneous to conceive of it along lines analogous to substance, as something which remains unchanged between occasions of observation or attention to the object. (This is borne out further along when Lewis suggests that the same real property of an object may present itself through a variety of qualia, and it is on the basis of qualia that we classify objects.) If the hallmark of the given is that it is independent of mental activity, it is difficult to understand the sense in which its character as sign can differ. The most plausible account would be that the same phenomenal quality may vary in accordance with present interests, as for example, "redness" needn't always be strictly correlated with the presence of applies, even though it often is taken as a sign of their presence. "Redness" may also signify blood and fire engines. The same phenomenal quality taken differently is clearly a sign of altered interest or purpose. It is also difficult to understand the sense in which the given is constant if the given is presented in the occasion of experiencing. While we attend to an object which presents us with certain phenomenal appearances, it seems entirely conceivable that the lighting conditions could change, in which case it would seem that the phenomenal qualities would also change and yet it is these phenomenal qualities which are most likely what we are referring to in speaking of the given. Perhaps Lewis should be understood to mean that on any occasion of experiencing there is some presented phenomenal content, but not that the phenomenal content itself may undergo alteration, an alteration which, if it were to occur, would, in part, be captured by our application of differing designating expressions.

Lewis continues to refer to the constancy of the given:

The distinction between this element of interpretation and the

> given is emphasized by the fact that the latter is what remains unaltered, no matter what our interests, no matter how we think or conceive. I can apprehend this thing as a pen or rubber or cylinder, but I cannot by taking thought, discover it as paper or soft or cubical....in a sense the given is ineffable, always. It is that which remains untouched and unaltered, however it is construed by thought. Yet no one but a philosopher could for a moment deny this immediate presence in consciousness of that which no activity of thought can create or alter.[74]

The question of how we are to become aware of the given element naturally recurs here. There is an account available for how we become aware of the given element, but an account which is less than adequate if we try to apply it to the presumed constancy of the given. Even though we do not attend to our practice of employing designating expressions, we are aware of the fact that there are words in our language which serve such a function, and occasionally we can catch ourselves in the act of making just such a description, especially if we are asked to describe an object or a person to someone else. We also notice that our designating expressions accord well with observed or remembered features of things; we do not see everything to be the same nor do we describe everything with the same word or set of words. If the employment of a word signalizes (as I suggested above that it could) the occurrence of an act of abstraction (even though that act may be nothing over and above the employment of a word, with the intent of describing something) then we can say that the use of a word differing from one used earlier represents the occurrence of a different act of abstraction. It seems in part that it is this kind of evidence which Lewis wants to use in claiming that the given is unaffected by thinking. But surely Lewis' thesis is not simply that the utterance of a word (considered as a kind of mental act) cannot alter the phenomenal qualities of the object or occasion which we are presented with. Lewis cannot cogently argue from the

occurrence of different designating expressions to the existence of some element in experience which remains constant throughout the altered designations offered for the presented qualities.

On the one hand, Lewis takes the occurrence of different designations as an indication of altered interests or purposes. He relies on behavioral evidence for the occurrence of something mental: both the presence of an change in interests. It is not clear why he must explain the occurrence of different designating expressions as resulting from the 'taking' of the constant given in different ways. In his view of experience, designating expressions are meant to capture and to record as constant (though not in the sense of unchanging through time) an object or ingredient in experience which may become manipulated and the experiential consequence of which may serve to verify an earlier classification. A designation, even if correctly applicable to an object, is a useless token, unless that object is a real item in our experience at some future time, even thought it may not be currently. There is a link between the ascription of a designation to an object and the presumption that the object can phenomenally present itself to us at some time.

How cogent is the claim "that I can apprehend this (presented) thing as pen or rubber or cylinder, but I *cannot*, taking thought, discover it as paper or soft or cubical"? Ordinarily, we can apprehend things in ways in which they really aren't, this is true if "apprehend" means a sensory apprehension, an object may look red without necessarily being red. On the other hand, we often reserve the term "discovery" for that kind of fact which is objectively true. It is on a par with "explanation"; an explanation which has been superseded was never really a true explanation of the phenomenon in question. We

can "see" or "observe" that the stick appears bent in water (such a bent appearance is phenomenally present to us,) but we cannot discover that the stick is actually bent, for it is not bent. In what sense is Lewis using the modal term "cannot"? There is a simple sense in which I cannot discover the real fountain pen is hard, cylindrical and made of some plastic to be either paper or soft or cubical; that sense is simply the one in which the fountain pen could never manifest those qualities to me as it is, objectively speaking, not actually any of those things. Care is essential here. For, in explicating Lewis, I myself have employed a modal term. Lewis claims that "the real roundness of the real penny is seen as all degrees of elliptical appearance; the blueness of the blotter may be seen as any one of a whole range of color-qualia, depending on the illumination."[75] Lewis, without becoming embroiled in the causal theory of perception, seems to be suggesting that there is some kind of nomic relationship between the actual properties which a thing has and the way that thing can maniest itself to us in presentational qualia. Goodman, describing Lewis' view says that "he holds that to ascribe a certain property to an object is in effect to describe the complete pattern of qualia (of the kind in question) exhibited under all sorts of conditions."[76] In light of Lewis' dispositional conception of objective properties we might argue that we can never be affected in such a way as to attribute a certain property to an object, because the object does not have the capacity to affect us in the appropriate manner.

The failure to discover the object as having characteristics which it doesn't have is not an indication of the weakness of our conceptual repertoire. On the other hand, there is no reason to preclude the possibility of the fountain pen's appearing to us as though it had

certain qualities which in fact it didn't have but which nevertheless we were inclined to believe that it did have, in part because of the way in which it appeared to us. In light of the relation between interests and purposes and the use of certain designating expressions, there is the added sense in which we could not discover the fountain pen to have certain characteristics; that is the sense in which a particular individual does not have in his conceptual repertoire certain of those designating expressions. But surely, this is not the sense in which Lewis wants us to take his remark. It seems that he is arguing from a construal of cannot, in which it would be logically contradictory for one to ascribe designating expressions to an object which manifestly could not possess any of the characteristics which the designating expression might suggest. There is no reason to suppose that an individual presented with the pen might not have an interest or purpose and even earlier experience which would incline him to designate the given aspect of the particular presentation as paper, soft, or cubical. The point which Lewis wants to make is that any such ascription would, in the long run, come to be seen as having been mistaken.

But even this conflicts with Lewis' view that the report of the given as experienced is infallible; part of the import of that claim is that at the time of making the claim, there was no other claim about which we were or could have been more certain. If this is extended to include the claim that we can never be shown to be incorrect in the ascription of the initial designating expression, then we could never discover the fact that our initial designation was in some fashion erroneous. Lewis, on the one hand, discounts any essential connection between the constellation of presented qualities and the designation employed to name this constellation, while, on the other hand, he main-

tains that it is "something in the character of this thing as a merely presented colligation of sense-qualities which is for me the clue to this classification or meaning."[77] What I make of this suggestion is that the appearance of a certain quality has a certain mnemonic effect and leads us to recollect earlier experiences of qualitatively similar objects. This creates the impression that certain qualities are necessarily bound up with certain physical objects, but we know this not to be the case. Apprehending is equivalent to conscious awareness of the content of the experience. As I noted much earlier, it is not clear whether Lewis wants to restrict experience to that kind of occurrence in which we are fully aware of the presence of the object which we are attempting to classify. Obviously, description as a performance would not be forthcoming unless we were aware of the fact that we were affected in some way by the presented object or by the thought of a non-present one.

Lewis hasn't said much if he means that we cannot describe an experience with words which name concepts, but ones which we don't know how to use. Nor does the fact that we may not have particular words represent an inability on our parts to alter the presumed content of the given; at best, it signifies a conceptual discrepancy, but to argue from the inability to engage in a descriptive performance to the existence of a certain constant qualitative core on the basis of which we can apply the designating expressions which we do have at our disposal, seems to invert the issue. The attempt to isolate an element "in experience" which, while non-describable, does underpin our descriptive practice seems oddly counterintuitive. There is not the slightest suggestion that our descriptive practice necessitates such an element. There is an ample dispute over the status of universals and their role in the function of communication which we ascribe to language to suggest that

Lewis' concern with designating expressions may be but a variant of that dispute. Lewis has noted the fact that our recognition of an entity entails earlier experiences of the same or similar entities. Such recognition presupposes some view of universals. It is particularly unfortunate that the account of unalterability is weak as it is that characteristic as opposed to merely sensuous character, to which Lewis accords a definitive status.

THE INTRINSIC RECOGNIZABILITY of QUALIA

With the understanding that the hierarchy of justifying our knowledge claims returns ultimately to the apprehensions of the qualia, we shall be in a better position to understand how Lewis conceives of the given and where precisely he locates it if we come to a coherent view of the given's epistemological role as a foundation. The conception of intrinsic recognizability is at the core of the idea that apprehensions of the given are immediate, indubitable and non-inferential.

I have noted the distinction which Lewis imposes between presentations, qualia and objective properties. The former, presentations, are the "given element in a single experience of an object."[78] Presentations are best understood as the actual experiential encounter with the object with which one is presented or about which one wishes to learn something. Lewis makes a number of claims about the nature of the quale, which, while not necessarily conflicting, lead to a difficulty in interpretation. The given has as one of its characteristics sensuous quality; there is no doubt but that Lewis endows the quale with this sensuous dimension. "In any presentation, this content is either a specific quale (such as the immediacy of redness or loudness) or something analyzable into a complex of such."[79] These quale or qualia, as we have noted, are, unlike the presentations of which they are the

contents, akin to universals in that they are repeatable whereas the presentations are historically unique events, particular occasions. Despite the aspect of repeatability Lewis refuses to identify the qualia with universals, in the sense in which universals are the element or elements common to diverse experiences and which entitle us to say of these experiences that they share some common characteristic. His chief objective in blocking any outright identification is that a universal should be understood as perhaps that kind of thing which is denoted by concepts (which are our true instruments of knowledge in that it is through them that we effect classifications.) Quale, or qualia, unlike the objects to which concepts come to be applied, do not have a temporal spread. Their significance is exhausted in the occasion of the experiencing of the object.

Venturing further we uncover other characteristics of the given. The given has a structure; its two elements are the presentation and the quale. This latter, Lewis identifies with "recognizable qualitative characters.""The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective."[80] Given the contrast between the qualia and objective properties of things which are ascribed in judgments, one is forced to conclude that apprehensions of the given are not judgmental. This non-judgmental feature of apprehensions serves in part to explicate what Lewis has in mind in speaking of apprehensions as immune from error. Awareness of the presented content is a requisite for immediate recognition, but such awareness does not entail the occurrence of a judgment. The divergence between the quale and the concepts through which we classify objects can be accepted as a legislative preference of Lewis'. Nevertheless, Lewis urges that the recognition of the qualia is a necessary condition for the naming or understanding or

knowing anything presented in experience.[81] This statement is acceptable in the context of a foundationalist epistemology where the regress of justification leads one back to incorrigible claims about one's personal experiences. As a claim purporting to capture the essence of the genesis of our conceptual skills it is confusing. The image one has is of an atomistic world in which one comes to recognize exemplars of qualities without necessarily connecting up in one's own mind the qualities exemplified with the things which they are qualities of. Surely, Lewis is not disposed to suggest that there are independently existent universals which we must come to identify before immersing ourselves into the thick of experience so that once immersed we can begin to navigate.

In responding to a possible objection to the view that apprehensions of qualia are not judgmental, Lewis appears to be reinforcing his conclusion, but only succeeds in doing so at the cost of circularity. If there is room for viewing apprehensions of the given as judgments it stems from the belief that there is necessarily an element of comparison involved in any qualitative recognition. "It may be said that the recognition of the quale is a judgment of the type, "This is the same ineffable "yellow" that I saw yesterday.'" ..."If what is meant by predicating sameness of the quale today and yesterday should be the immediate comparison of the given with a memory image, then certainly there is such comparison and it may be called 'judgment' if one choose; all I would point out is that, like the awareness of a single presented quale, such comparison is immediate and indubitable; verification would have no meaning with respect to it."[82] (In An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Lewis transforms these notions of immediacy and indubitability into the prima facie credibility of memory.) There is nevertheless an ontological obstacle to the easy identification of apprehensions of the given and judgments of

qualitative identity. The possibility of verification necessitates the existence of an objective reality which could provide us with confirmatory presentations. "If anyone should suppose that such direct comparison is what is generally meant by judgments of qualitative identity between something experienced yesterday and something presented now, then obviously he would have a very poor notion of the complexity of memory as a means of knowledge. He might be advised to try buying a spool of thread to match something left at home. The usual statement, 'This is the same yellow I saw yesterday,' truly represents a judgment because at least one of the things compared is an objective reality - a temporally continuing entity which retains its identify and character."[83] Qualia unlike real properties of objectively real entities do not provide us with - in Mill's terms - "permanent possibilities of sensation." Properties are dispositional, qualia are occurrent. "This meaning is something which could be verified, under conditions which are conducive to the permanence of color, by going back to the object seen yesterday, or in some other, and perhaps indirect, fashion. The judgment is about an objective property of a thing. To suppose that a quale itself is such an enduring entity is to work confusion between what is immediate and something else which, from the point of view of knowledge, is an intellectual construction of a highly complex sort."[84] Confronted with the possibility the apprehensions of qualia may be judgmental, Lewis rebuts the suggestion by offering yet another level at which immediate apprehensions prevail rather than offering an independent account of the nature of immediate apprehension.

Despite the close tie between judgment and verification in Lewis' view his response to the objection just noted is not merely trading on a verbal stipulation. He is, after all, concerned to establish a certain class of experiences, apprehensions of the given, as self-warranting.

Furthermore, his opposition to the identification of immediate apprehension with judgment may be understood as motivated by his foundationalist strategy. The suggestion that qualitative identifications involve comparison and the recognition of similarity is open to the charge of leading to an infinite regress. For what is entailed by judgments of comparison is that there is recognition of the relationship of similarity which the end terms of the relationship presumably exemplify. It may be then that Lewis seeks to avoid the pitfalls of such a regress. It may be objected however, that Lewis does not escape the objection to the postulation of universals as necessary for the recognition of qualities. This objection points up the kind of double life which the qualia sometimes appear to lead. Lewis' solution to the objection initially posed - the identification of apprehensions with judgments - relies on suggesting that comparisons are immediate and non-judgmental. However, he also maintains that there is a distinction between qualia and properties. The objection based on the possibility of a regress is marshalled against the universals which may be the denotata of property predicates and not against the qualitative aspect which Lewis' qualia may have. Consequently, unless Lewis makes good his distinction between qualia and objective properties, then he too is subject to the argument against universals. In most instances - as in the example of the fountain pen - Lewis views the occurrence of a classification by a concept as necessitating earlier experiences of a similar object in order that the concept be applicable on the present occasion. ("This present classification depends on that learned relation of this experience to other possible experience...."[85])

There is a point of contact between the views of Lewis and those of a firm critic of the notion of givenness such as Wilfrid Sellars. Sellars does not speak specifically to Lewis' formulation of the given but presents

a schematic account of the commitment of sense-datum theorists. In an attempt to explicate the intuition that "the point of the epistemological category of the given is, presumably to explicate the idea that empirical knowledge rests on a 'foundation' of non-inferential knowledge of matter of fiact", Sellars contends that sense-datum theorists "insist both that sensing is a knowing and that it is particulars which are sensed."[86] Diverging here from Lewis, Sellars claims that the "non-inferential knowing on which our world picture rests is the knowing that certain items, e.g. red sense contents, are of a certain character, e.g. red."[87] In light of this claim and other stipulations noted by Sellars the sense-datum theorist is found to hold that "it is logically necessary that if a sense content be sensed, it be sensed as being of a certain character, and that if it be sensed as being of a certain character, the fact that it is of this character be non-inferentially known."[88] There is no point to point correspondence between Sellars' outline of a sense-datum view and Lewis' particular account of givenness; nevertheless in the foregoing reconstruction of the sense-datum position we are given a feature which we have found in Lewis' view, namely that a sense content, if sensed, is sensed as being of a certain character. It is clear from repeated remarks by Lewis that he withholds the title of 'knowledge' from apprehensions of the given, even though apprehensions of the given connect up well with the qualitative specificity which Lewis accords the given.

There is another feature of the traditional sense-datum theorists as described by Sellars which bears directly on our problem of explicating intrinsic recognizability. Speaking of the sense-datum theorists, Sellars says that "they have taken givenness to be a fact which presupposes no learning, no formation of associations, no setting up of stimulus-response

connections. In short, they have tended to equate sensing sense contents with being conscious."[89] Lewis does not discount the element of awareness in immediate apprehensions of the given; however, such awareness by itself does not suffice to explicate what Sellars would term the unacquired ability to sense sense contents as being of a certain nature. Lewis is not unequivocal however as to the role of awareness. The question I am trying to resolve is whether apprehension of the given, though not judgmental, may nevertheless be conceptual in a sense which respects Lewis' own distinction between the given and its conceptual interpretation through the application of concepts in acts of classification? The given is ineffable; the given can be obliquely referred through a locution such as 'looks like'; the given is interpretation free, and yet the qualia, which are the qualitatively specific contents of the presentations which we have of the objects, are intrinsically recognizable. What does this mean?

"There is, in the knowledge of presented objects and of objective properties, a distinguishable element of awareness which is indispensable to this knowledge but which, by itself, cannot be knowledge in the meaning here assigned. It is this awareness of immediate and recognizable qualia which may be supposed to be expressed by 'This looks round,' etc."[90] But, (and this serves as partial ground for ascribing to Lewis a version of the sensory-core interpretation of the sense-datum theory) the apprehension afforded by awareness is not a distinct and psychologically discernible state which precedes the interpretation effected through the application of a concept. "It has also been pointed out that such immediate awareness is an element in knowledge rather than a state of mind occurring by itself or preceding conceptual interpretation."[91] (From this we cannot conclude anything about the separation of the quale from the act which

is awareness of it.) If Lewis refuses to distinguish the awareness which accompanies apprehension of the qualia from the conceptual interpretation which we make of the ostensibly presented perceptual situation then it may be claimed that the issue of explicating the nature of intrinsic recognizability does not arise. For, it may be claimed, even though there is no proper name available for designating the quale (which is the content of a certain presentation) in the act of applying a concept to the presentation complex, we exercise a conceptual skill which is either broad enough to encompass the quale itself or else we can take the quale as a sign (presupposing a recognition of it in some sense) and consequently apply a concept (which has a designation extending beyond the immediate perceptual context.) The other alternative, and it appears to be the one towards which Lewis inclines, is that intrinsic recognizability is a basic and unanalyzable feature of our experience, similar to Chisholm's 'takings', and that the attempt to interject the problems which, we noted, apply to predicates, is illegitimate.[92]

SUMMARY

In developing this chapter, I felt it was important to consider Lewis' scattered remarks on the nature of the given against the backdrop of his concern with the possibility of accounting for error in our empirical knowledge. But even his earliest remarks levelled at advocates of diverse views reveals the intimate connection which Lewis felt existed between issues of truth and veridical apprehension. Truth, for him, is not the semantically laden notion which it has become for us. Even though there is an implicit appeal to correspondence, the weight of the metaphysically oriented term 'reality' is evident in the early

position.

Apart from remarks to the effect that the given is essential in order that there be knowledge there are no indications that the given is headed for a critical function in the justification of empirical knowledge claims. The given, with the benefit of hindsight, should perhaps be understood as a first thrust at vindicating metaphysical realism. This is not to identify the given with some independently existent reality; the object is to divorce the objects of our speculation from our own conceptual apparatus. The chapter sees us grappling with the claim that the given is an abstraction, a claim which creates difficulties of interpretation precisely because of the implied connection with a mental faculty, thereby compromising the alleged independence of the given. It is noted that undue pressure musn't be placed on the idea that the given is an abstraction for that claim is meant to refer to the idea of givenness as a tool of conceptual analysis and is not intended to cloud the issue of a possible referent for the term 'given'.

Lewis does offer characteristics of the given which are mostly drawn from phenomenological reflection. But this itself would seem to imply that the given has in some way been discerned and is unequivocally established as some element in our experience. Lewis' emphasis on these phenomenological criteria leads to an examination of our descriptive practice in trying to designate the actual denotatum of the given in a single case. It is suggested that our descriptive practice cannot serve as an adequate reason to postulate a given element in experience.

The most light is shed on the given when Lewis retreats from the phenomenological account and begins to offer an account of the structure of the given in terms of presentations, qualia and properties. The distinction between presentations as particulars and qualia as

universal-like draws the given into the realm of ontology, and is itself made more perspicuous by the discussion of the primary uses to which our descriptive predicates are put. However, this does not free Lewis from the difficulty of accounting for the intrinsic recognizability of qualia and of grappling with the problem of resemblance between universals. Intrinsic recognizability is an attractive notion as it may be at the core of our idea that experiences of the given are self-certifying and are thus ideal candidates for the justificatory purpose for which Lewis employs them. But at the same time, the problem of the independence of the given arises anew when it is urged that the recognition of the qualia necessitates a conceptual skill, one which presupposes earlier experiences of like particulars. This general difficulty with the given recurs in chapter six, both in the discussion of Sellars' views and in the dispute between Sellars and Firth about the primacy of material object predicates. Though, in that dispute, the issue arises in the midst of a broader controversy, which is itself generated in response to Lewis' opposition to the coherence theory of justification. We must turn however, to the account of the given in Lewis' second major epistemological work.

Footnotes to Chapter II

[1]Clarence Irving Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1956), p. 38.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., p. viii.

[5]Clarence Irving Lewis, "Realism or Phenomenalism?", Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis, ed. John D. Goheen and John L. Mothershead Jr. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 339.

[6]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 39.

[7]Ibid., p. 41.

[8]Ibid., p. 42.

[9]Ibid., p. 43.

[10]Ibid., pp. 43-44. There is an interesting earlier occurrence of this view at the point where Lewis is laying out the method of his metaphysics. "The clues to the categorial interpretation - the correct understanding - of any presentation of sense must be empirical clues. If they are not contained within that segment of experience which constitutes the phenomenon itself, then they must be discoverable in its relation to other empirical fact. If the dream or illusion is not betrayed by internal evidence, then its true nature must be disclosed by the conjunction with what precedes or follows." (Lewis, Mind and the World Order, pp. 12-13.) Apart from its obvious bearing on the point immediately under discussion, the above comment is noteworthy as it hints at the importance of future verificatory confirmation of an ascription of some characteristic to an experience in yet some further experience. We, of course, recognize the dream as a problem with which Descartes wrestled in The Meditations. Lewis reinforces his initial contention by drawing on Berkeley's view that "the real cannot be distinguished from the unreal by any relation between the idea in the mind and an independent object, but only by some relation within experience itself." (Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 28.)

[11]Ibid., p. 38.

[12]Ibid., p. 29.

[13]Ibid., p. 30.

[14]Ibid., p. 33.

[15]Ibid., p. 19. It is this kind of approach which Wilfrid Sellars seems to be criticizing in his account of the Jonesean development of

inner episodes and the reporting use of the language describing such episodes. "Envisaging the general lines of that framework, even sketching some of its regions, he [Jones] has taught himself to play with it (in his study) as a report language. Unfortunately, he mislocates the truth of these conceptions, and,...confuses his own creative enrichment of the framework of empirical knowledge, with an analysis of knowledge as it was. He construes as data the particulars which he has come to be able to observe, and believes them to be antecedent objects of knowledge which have somehow been in the framework from the beginning." ("Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), I, 327-328.)

[16]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, pp. 25-26.

[17]Ibid., p. x.

[18]Ibid., p. 55.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid., p. 54.

[21]Ibid., p. 55.

[22]In one important philosophical sense, abstraction has come to signify the kind of activity hinted at by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, where he accounts for the development of the universal in the mind. But even there the account is non-committal, suggesting only that abstraction is the occurrence of acts of selective attention to particular features of individuals.

[23]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 55.

[24]Ibid., p. 67.

[25]Ibid., p. 37.

[26]We have no reason to ascribe to Lewis a view which claims that all mental acts are verbal. Sellars seems to be a prime advocate of such a view, especially in conjunction with his development of the Jonesean myth. Conceptual experiences, in his view, involve the occurrence of internal episodes, specifically, the utterance of Mentalese sentences. Richard Rorty provides us with a summary statement of the essentials of the Jonesean myth. "On his [Sellars'] 'mythical' account, thoughts were originally theoretical entities, postulated as 'inner' states that explained certain sorts of behavior. But they were not merely Rylean dispositions nor Armstrongian 'states apt...'; for they had certain intrinsic features. For example, they were true or false, and were about things, in the way in which sentences are. They shared, in other words, the 'semantical' features of sentences - the features sentences possessed not qua physical objects (inscriptions) but qua types (as opposed to tokens) - but had no other features. Sensations, in turn, were also originally theoretical entities - 'inner' states postulated to explain the occurrence of certain thoughts....They too had certain intrinsic

features, but, again, features not shared by any physical objects qua physical objects....When originally proposed as theoretical entities (by Jones, the man who, in Sellars's myth, invented the concept of mind) sensations and thoughts were not conceived of as immediate experiences - they were not the objects of noninferential introspective reports, much less of incorrigible reports. Instead, they were inferred entities - known to exist in the way in which positrons are known to exist, by inference from the behavior they cause. It is only after Jones has instructed others in his theory and subjected them to a prolonged training process that it turns out they can make noninferential reports of their own inner states." ("Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental," The Journal of Philosophy, LXVII (June 25, 1970), 411-412.)

[27]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 55.

[28]Ibid.

[29]"Such initial data of object and fact set the problem in philosophy and are, in a measure, the criteria of its solution, since any philosophic theory will rightfully be rejected as inaccurate or inadequate if it does not measure up to, or account for, experience in this broad sense." (Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 54.)

[30]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 55.

[31]Ibid., p. 45.

[32]Ibid., p. 66.

[33]Ibid., p. 47.

[34]Ibid., p. 55.

[35]Ibid., p. 49.

[36]Roderick Firth, "Lewis on the Given," The Philosophy of C.I. Lewis, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle, Illinois, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1968), p. 331.

[37]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 57.

[38]Ibid., pp. 57-58.

[39]Ibid., pp. 59-60.

[40]Ibid., p. 60

[41]Lewis, "Realism or Phenomenalism?", p. 343.

[42]Ibid.,

[43]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 121.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid., p. 63.

[46]Lewis, "Realism or Phenomenalism?", p. 341.

[47]Ibid.,

[48]It is not surprising to find Lewis urging a criterion of identity for an object in terms of "lawlike or predictable modes of alteration" given his emphasis on 'real connections' in the account of terminating judgments in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.

[49]Lewis, "Realism or Phenomenalism?", p. 342.

[50]Ibid., p. 344.

[51]Ibid., p. 345.

[52]Ibid., pp. 345-346.

[53]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 120.

[54]Ibid., p. 121.

[55]Ibid., p. 122.

[56]Ibid., pp. 122-123.

[57]Clarence Irving Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Illinois, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1962), p. 381.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid., p. 382.

[60]Roderick Milton Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 45.

[61]Ibid., pp. 48-49.

[62]Ibid., p. 51.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, pp. 111-112.

[65]Ibid., pp. 126-127.

[66]Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[67]Ibid., p. 65.

[68]Ibid., pp. 126-128.

[69]Ibid., p. 124

[70]Ibid., p. 49.

[71]Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[72]Ibid., p. 50.

[73]Ibid.

[74]Ibid., pp. 52-53.

[75]Ibid., p. 121.

[76]Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appearance (2nd ed.; Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), p. 131.

[77]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 49.

[78]Ibid., p. 59.

[79]Ibid., p. 60.

[80]Ibid., p. 121.

[81]Ibid., p. 123.

[82]Ibid., p. 125.

[83]Ibid., p. 126.

[84]Ibid., p. 126.

[85]Ibid., p. 49.

[86]Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," pp. 255-56.

[87]Ibid., p. 256.

[88]Ibid.

[89]Ibid., p. 258.

[90]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 276.

[91]Ibid.

[92]There are, however, indications within Mind and the World Order which incline me to believe that Lewis, while not attempting an explication, would not be satisfied with letting the issue drop, relying merely on the claim that intrinsic recognizability is a simple and unanalyzable notion. Consider what he says about color: "Color also illustrates another common method of achieving simplicity; that is, by dividing a whole field of qualia into classes by the use of names with a qualitative range of denotation. 'Red' or 'blue' represents no single quale, but instead a considerable variety of such. That the mind could hardly make a beginning of bringing order into given experience without this device, should be

evident. It is made use of wherever it is the case that no imaginable instance can completely contain or illustrate the essential denotation of the concept - as there can be no image of triangle in general or dog in general. This assignment to a name of a range of denotation should be sharply distinguished from that abstraction of the essential and ignoring of other characters which is represented by many theories as the universal basis of general names." (Italics mine.) And, in a footnote on the same page, Lewis speaks to the issue of similarity as the basis of classification. "Similarity is of two types, partial identity and resemblance proper. A spatial or temporal whole, like a contour or a melody, may be divisible into parts some of which may be qualitatively identical. But similar color-qualities are an instance of the other type."(Mind and the World Order, p. 364.) What Lewis is saying in the underscored above is that there can be no idea of a determinable without the idea being of a particular determinate form of a determinable. In light of the apparently unbridgeable gap between properties and sense-presentable qualia, one is entitled to ask whether objective properties are ever directly perceived? Lewis would say no. Consequently, we get impressions or ideas of qualia but not of objective properties. There are indications in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation that Lewis subscribes to a conceptualist view of concepts which are ascribed in predication; the entire machinery of sense-meaning is undoubtedly meant to serve the purpose of reconciling tokens of concepts with the requisite imagery which confirms the applicability of the concept to the object in question. However, in light of the distinction between qualia and properties (and what concepts designate) it is possible that Lewis has no desire to offer a comparable account for the sense presentable aspects of qualia. Furthermore, it is wholly unclear what such a solution would be like. In An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Lewis describes sense meaning as a "prescribed routine and an imagined result of it which will determine applicability of the expression in question....We cannot imagine triangle in general but we easily imagine following the periphery of a figure with the eye or a finger and discovering it to be a closed figure with three angles." (p. 134.) Very clearly, on this view, the meaning of 'triangle' is the mental image of a procedure or technique and not the image of a mental particular, the idea or image of a triangle. 'Triangle' or any shape for that matter is a favorable example for Lewis' purposes. What I question is whether color is equally amenable to comparable treatment? The only answer Lewis offers in Mind and the World Order discounts the element of imagery found in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation and relates the issue of meaning to verification. On the assumption that 'blue' and 'round' can be taken to be 'simple ideas', the least concepts that there are, "we find that what such concepts embrace is not an immediate quale as such but some stable pattern of relations....To verify a color, we change the conditions of illumination or alter the angle so as to get rid of the sheen, or we bring the thing into juxtaposition with some object whose color has previously been tested or is accepted as a standard of comparison. When we thus manipulate the object or behave toward it, we must know what we expect if it really is round or blue..." (Mind and the World Order, pp. 128-29.)

CHAPTER: III

THE STRUCTURE OF THE GIVEN IN

AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND VALUATION

INTRODUCTION

If we seek to uncover an elaborate account of the given element in experience in Lewis' second major epistemological treatise, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, we shall almost certainly be disappointed. For in that work Lewis does not engage in a sustained treatment of the given, does not offer definitive criteria and does not offer an unequivocal account of the given's ontological status. None of this is to say, however, that in shifting to the linguistic standpoint Lewis has so submerged the given that it no longer plays a significant role - if not the dominant role - in the epistemological reconstruction of empirical knowledge. Whereas in Mind and the World Order I was able to examine Lewis' conception of the given by looking at substantial quotes, in the present chapter I shall have to engage in significantly more extrapolation of scattered remarks, remarks which come in manifold contexts: verification, sense-meaning, justification, the prima-facie credibility of memory, and the account of value offered in Book III. Perhaps the most important question which can be put to Lewis, that of whether or not he has demonstrated either a logical or an ontological need for postulating a given element in experience, cannot be answered in this chapter but must await a presentation of his views in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation and comparison of these views with those of Mind and the World Order. There will however be one significant development

in this chapter which was little mentioned in the preceding one; the connection and emphasis which Lewis' places on the certainty of our apprehensions of the given will become more apparent as his conception of the justificatory structure implicit in empirical knowledge is elaborated.

THE GIVEN in AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND VALUATION

It is against the backdrop of Lewis' claim that "if anything is to be probable, then something must be certain", that I turn to an examination of his account of the given.[1] The most straightforward account of the given comes in discussing two examples. The examples are introduced in order to develop the distinctions between the kinds of statements involved in the description of an empirical situation:

> I am descending the steps of Emerson Hall, and using my eyes to guide my feet. This is a habitual and ordinarily automatic action. But for this occasion, and in order that it may clearly constitute an instance of perceptual cognition instead of unconsidered behavior, I put enough attention on the process to bring the major features of it to clear consciousness. There is a certain visual pattern presented to me, a feeling of pressure on the soles of my feet, and certain muscle-sensations and feelings of balance and motion. And these items mentioned are fused together with others in one moving whole of presentation, with which they can be genuinely elicited but in which they do not exist as separate. Much of this presented content, I should find it difficult to put in words. [2]

There are three salient characteristics of the content of the perceptual cognition which are analogous to the account of the given in Mind and the World Order: there is the implication that selective attention is necessary to lift the distinct given elements out of the context in which they are embedded. There is, furthermore, the suggestion that the context in which they are embedded is analogous to the thick of experience rather than to the thinness of the given. And, as in Mind and the World Order, we find the difficulty of explicit formulation of or use of a language

uniquely suited to the reporting of the contents of acts of selective attention. It is interesting to note that Lewis pulls together elements which some epistemologists might want to retain as distinct. The visual pattern is most analogous to the impressions of the empiricists; feelings of pressure and sensations, on the other hand, are of course internal occurrences and are grouped under the general category of sensations. Lewis has not indicated at all that the elements lifted out of the embedding context are abstractions in the sense which they are in Mind and the World Order; if he did seek such an identification, it would only be possible for the impressions which may constitute the visual pattern which we take to be before us; these impressions are not manifestly internal as sensations. Though, as I have indicated, Lewis might be willing to suggest that they are in fact on a par with internal sensations. Certainly such a view enjoys some prima facie plausibility in light of the fact that internal sensations are most closely allied to a position which sees us as having incorrigible knowledge of their occurrence, and such incorrigibility is a necessary feature of Lewis' account of the given.

The attempt to formulate, in tenable locutions, the contents of our presentations finds Lewis returning to the basic tack of Mind and the World Order:

> Ordinarily I have no occasion to express empirical content of this sort: it performs its office of guiding my behavior and thereupon lapses from consciousness. But if I attempt to express it, I might say: "I see what looks likfe a flight of granite steps, fifteen inches wide and seven inches deep, in front of me." The locution 'looks like' represents my attempt to signalize the fact that I do not mean to assert that the steps are granite, or have the dimensions mentioned, or even that in point of absolutely certain fact there are any steps at all. Language is largely pre-empted to the assertion of objective realities and events. If I wish, as I now do, to confine it to expression of a presented content, my best recourse is, very likely, to express what I take to be the objective facts this presentation signalizes and use locutions such as 'looks like', 'feels like', or some other contextual cue, to mark the intention on this occasion to restrict what I say to

> the fact or presentation itself as contrasted with the objective state of affairs more usually signified by the rest of my statement.[3]

We shall come to see how the element of 'tentativeness' implicit in the 'looks like' and similar locutions is tied up with Lewis' notion that the cash value of an objective statement lies in the potentially infinite chains of discrete verifications. But, viewed apart from the context, it is difficult to understand how a particular set of locutions come to serve the purpose Lewis claims they can serve. If the meaning of a statement which is made with the intent of referring to some objective state of affairs is intensionally equivalent to the meanings of statements expressing the potential verifications of sets of experience, it is difficult to see how Lewis can claim that "language is large preempted to the assertion of objective realities and events." It is equally difficult to understand his claim that these same locutions can be used to accomplish different ends on different occasions of their use, particularly "to mark the intention to restrict what I say to the fact of presentation itself as contrasted with the objective state of affairs more usually signified by the rest of my statement." It would seem that implicit in the ability to distinguish these two uses is the idea that there are contexts in which the two uses could have arisen independently or that the 'looks like' use is parasitic on the 'is' use where that latter could develop without falling back on the 'looks like' use or some analogous locution at some point in the genetic development of an individual in whom both can be instanced. The obvious question which must be put to Lewis' account is why anyone necessarily thinks that a presentation (presumably described in one of the chosen locutions) serves to signalize an objective fact or reality, as Lewis thinks it must.

Upon turning to the second of Lewis' examples, we find a significant

addition, one not evident in the earlier example nor in the parallel discussion in Mind and the World Order:

> I believe there is a piece of white paper now before me. The reason that I believe this is that I see it: a certain visual presentation is given. But my belief includes the expectation that so long as I continue to look in the same direction, this presentation, with its qualitative character essentially unchanged, will persist.[4]

Hitherto, the presentation was understood as a clue to the existence of an objective reality 'behind' the presentation. Now, while it is true that it perhaps makes no sense for something to be a 'clue' independent of its being related to an individual's mind, we are given an indication of how something does serve as a clue. The occurrence of a presentation occasions a belief, in an individual, that there is, in fact, a continued presence of the source of the presentation. But there is an important asymmetry here: The presentation occasions, is ground for, belief in the continued presence of a presentation. However, there is no analogous ground for the belief in the presentation (even though the presentation is an objective reality in the sense that it is something about which we cannot be mistaken when we are the subject of it.) One doesn't believe that there is a white rectangular presentation before one now, whereas one does believe that there is a piece of white paper before one now. Presentations, or more properly speaking, their contents, are not the kinds of things which are the objects of states of belief, whereas the existence of material particulars are. This seems to indicate that there is no element of mental assent in the occurrence of presentations, even though the description of them in a certain fashion may lead one to suggest that there is, insofar as the concepts brought to the presentation represent conscious and conceptual mediation. In part, Lewis hints that reception

of a presentation does not represent a cognitive achievement. Of the three types of apprehension which he mentions in Chapter 2 of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Lewis does not accord the status 'knowledge' to apprehensions of directly given data of sense.[5] He refuses to do so because in the case of the given there is no contrast with corresponding kinds of error (discounting here verbal slips, etc.) as there is in the case of real empirical knowledge. But error for Lewis takes on a special complexion as well; error arises in the projection or prediction of a terminating judgment implied by and implicit in an objective judgment. The salient point is that in the case of the given there are no further verificatory experiences which could confirm or disconfirm the fact of occurrence of the particular given experience. "If any of these predictions should, upon trial, be disproved, I should abandon my present belief in a real piece of paper before me, in favor of belief in some extraordinary after-image or some puzzling reflection or some disconcerting hallucination."[6] Notice that what is relinquished is a belief in the objective reality which the presentation portends. It is further noteworthy that what Lewis envisages as a substitute is precisely the kind of momentary occurrence which normally characterizes the given itself, viz., after-images or hallucinations.

Let me turn to the use to which Lewis puts these two examples in delineating his distinction between expressive and objective language. If we limit our attention merely to the presented content of an experiencing, we lose sight of what Lewis terms the "cognitive significance" of the presentations; this cognitive significance comes out in terms of the predictions which are based on the occurrence of the presentation. However, we are not prevented from attending to the context of the experiencing itself; in fact, such attention is important for it reveals an important

distinction between the kinds of language employed in describing the situation. That the presentation in the first case served as a clue to predictions does not lighten the burden of describing, in equally certain terms, the procedure of the prediction. "If we are to describe this cognitive situation truly, all three of these elements - the presentation, the envisaged action, and the expected consequence - must be described in language which will denote immediately presented or directly presentable contents of experience. We attempted to make clear this intent of the language used by locutions such as 'looks like', 'feels like'; thus restricting it to what would fall completely within the passage of experience in question and what this passage of experience could completely and directly determine as true."[7] There are two important and problematic notions in the above quote: It is important to put pressure on the dispositional element suggested by Lewis' phrase "directly presentable contents of experience." What could such contents be? In addition to being given, they echo that characteristic which may be the true hallmark of all givenness and which we associate with occasions of experiencing. It would seem that the kinds of things which are directly presentable are the phenomenal characteristics which we take physical objects to have and which can in some way causally affect various of our sense modalities. But that this is a very limited construal of what can be given is evident from Lewis' desire to speak of certain psychological occurrences and memories as themselves given in the same sense.

The second important point is that the occurrence of an experience which has some presentation as its content is itself sufficient ground for the belief or assertion that the content of the experience was of a certain nature. This suggests perhaps that there is some analytic connection

between the occurrence of these experiencings and their report and the truth of these reports. Another way to express the same point would be to say that the occurrences of experiencings of the given are self-authenticating, or that the experiencings stand in a truth-certifying relationship to the description of the contents of the experiencings. A similar point is made by Lewis when he claims that "unless there should be some statements, or rather something apprehensible and statable, whose truth is determined by given experience and is not determinable in any other way, there would be no non-analytic affirmation whose truth could be determined at all, and no such thing as empirical knowledge."[8] These remarks are important for they serve as an antidote to charges such as Scheffler's against Lewis' earlier construal of the given as certain. Scheffler claims, and rightly, that it is essentially a category mistake to speak of either experiencings or the phenomenal contents of them as the type of things which can be certain or uncertain: these characterizations are terms of epistemic appraisal and as such should be applied to the expression of states of belief.[9]

When language is employed in order to "formulate a directly presented content of experience" it is given an expressive use. This is understood to contrast with "the more common intent of language" as exemplified in its objective use. "The distinctive character of expressive language, or the expressive use of language is that such language signifies <u>appearances</u>. And in thus referring to appearances, or affirming what appears, such expressive language <u>neither asserts any objective reality of what appears nor denies any</u>. It is confined to description of the content of presentation itself."[10] There are a number of difficulties here as well. There surely is a difference between two languages and the various uses to which a language is put. In the passage where Lewis

introduced the 'looks like' locution, he suggested that the very same language enjoyed at least two markedly different employments. Here he is suggesting that language which we call expressive has a distinctive character as well; whether this character is anything over and above the use to which it may be put is left unclear. Similarly it is unclear exactly how, if the language is in fact the same, but is being used differently, context serves to distinguish between the intent with which an utterance is being made and its ordinary use. It would seem natural that the primary function of our language is to make reference to present objects of our environment. For Lewis these items are more restricted in intent than the ordinary physical objects which are the primary constituents in our common sense world; the items are the contents of presentations. But we cannot turn to the putative objects to which we refer in order to make explicit the use we are making of our language. The content per se does not disambiguate; we mark the difference solely by the use of the 'looks like' locution. The use of it serves notice on our hearer that he is to understand us as referring to a (perhaps private) content of our experiencing of a public object. The remaining problem is whether Lewis wants us to conceive of the contents of these presentations as themselves the objects of acts of sensing, and hence to view them as being on a par with the sense-data of traditional theories of perceptual experience, or whether he wants us to construe them as private impressions which are the concomitants of objectless sensings. Unfortunately the fact that the contents of presentations are what the expressive use of language succeed in referring to, does not quite answer the question nor does it give us a guide as to which position Lewis would be more willing to endorse. In using the term 'appearance', we are inclined to view Lewis as opting for something akin to the sense-datum view, for the suggestion is that an

may be, in appearing to us, presenting us with appearances of itself. Nevertheless such appearances can easily be construed as the concomitants of occasions of experiencing, occasions on which we are appeared to. The traditional ploy when the objectless sensing view is adopted, is to suggest that the qualities which would ordinarily be ascribed to the independent sense-datum can be internalized and taken to be adverbial characterizations of the manner in which we are appeared to, for example: "appeared to redly' as opposed to 'saw a red appearance'.

Despite the difficulties of formulating the contents of presentations in expressive language, unless we acknowledge a class of experiences which are the kind describable in an optimal expressive language if such could be developed, there would be no empirical knowledge whatsoever. Consequently, attempts to undermine his foundationalist reconstruction of knowledge must look beyond the deficiencies which it may be felt inhabit his account of expressive language. It is frequently maintained that an ineffable given cannot serve as the basis of knowledge either because it is ineffable and thus incoherent, or else because it encourages a solipsism of personal experience and consequently makes the idea of knowledge incoherent.

Only at one point does Lewis offer a characterization of the given element of experience which sounds reminiscent of the account in Mind and the World Order:

> ...there is such a thing as experience, the content of which we do not invent and cannot have as we will but merely find. And that this given is an element in perception but not the whole of perceptual cognition. Subtract, in what we say that we see, or hear, or otherwise learn from direct experience, all that conceivably could be mistaken; the remainder is the given content of the experience inducing this belief. If there were no such hard kernel in experience - e.g., what we see when we think we see a deer but there is no deer - then the word 'experience' would have nothing to refer to. [11]

As is evident in the above, the given is to remain untouched by the

activity of mind. However, the mode of discovery hinted at is different than that found in the earlier account of Mind and the World Order. What Lewis understands by the underscored in the above is the conceptual or classificatory material brought to the presentation by us; this material is susceptible to error, but in the sense that its ascription to a presentation is in the nature of a hypothesis and subsequent experience may serve to disconfirm it.

I shall examine the nature of objective statements and terminating judgments when the epistemological problem of justification arises; suffice it to say that objective statements unlike expressive statements do not explicitly refer to a present state of affairs, but do make a claim on reality in the sense that the content of a presentation is envisaged as being a cue to a long term object or event of which the presence and characters can, by our undertaking certain appropriate activities, be verified. I had noted earlier that the presentation was, for Lewis, the occasion of belief in an objective state of affairs but I left unexplicated the status of these presentations vis-a-vis the state of affairs for which they may be signs. Lewis offers only a sketchy account in a footnote:

> It is still possible, in terms of the conception here presented, to affirm that the content of presentation is an authentic part or aspect or perspective which is ingredient in the objective reality known. Such language is figurative, when measured against the ordinary meaning of 'part' or the ordinary meaning of 'ingredients' of objective things. But the view thus figuratively expressed may be consistently and literally correct - provided one is prepared to accept the implications that an elliptical appearance may be a genuine ingredient of a real round penny, the bent stick in the water an ingredient of the really straight stick, and one's nightmare an ingredient of mince pie for supper. The hiatus implied, in the view here presented, between immediate sense presentation and objective reality thus evidenced, is not the denial that the content of presentation may be 'numerically identical' with a part or aspect of the objective reality, but the denial that it is ever the whole of the objective reality believed in, or that it is ever unambiguously decisive of the statement of an objective

property or existence of a specific objective thing or event.[12] On the very same page, Lewis suggests that "what is given is a certain complex of sensa or qualia." From the examples Lewis gives of what can be an ingredient it is evident that there is a continuum which progressively diverges from those characteristics of things which are purely phenomenal. The elliptical appearance may be the facing surface of a penny which we see from a particular perspective. The appearance of a bent stick was literally 'physically liberated' from the actual stick in water by the argument from illusion; we perhaps think of our belief that the stick is bent as being caused, in some fashion, by the way the actual stick appears to us through the intervening medium of the liquid. Mince pies do not ordinarily have as their aspects nightmares; these are most clearly causal consequences of the ingestion of mince pies. If we are to understand a sensum as akin to some intermediate entity between physical objects and our own mental contents, then it seems that Lewis' claim that presentations are complexes of qualia coupled with his claim in Mind and the World Order that qualia are like universals, in that they are intrinsically recognizable, would suggest that appearances themselves possess phenomenal properties. In addition to speaking of the redness of the physical object we would also speak of the redness of the appearance. The upshot of this, however, is to vitiate the adverbial view of objectless sensings hinted at earlier in this chapter.

VALUE ASCRIPTIONS

The reification of appearances is one of the threats against which nominalistic opponents of sense-data analyses have argued. While we have no clear idea of whether Lewis does in fact reify appearances, we still must look at his comments about the status of properties, those

things which we take ourselves to be predicating of objective reality. In Book III of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Lewis provides an account of valuational judgment consonant with his proposals in the earlier sections so that value ascriptions would be seen to be on a par with the predication of objective properties. The main thrust of this parallel is that value ascriptions like objective property ascriptions are seen to be in the nature of hypotheses and as such, implicit claims on the course of future experience. Despite this gross similarity of purpose, Lewis contends that there is a genuine difference between predications of value to objects and predications of other properties. "We might seek to mark this peculiarity of judgments of objective value by saying that with respect to value-terms their objective meaning is derivative from and ruled by their expressive meaning; whereas for other terms, their expressive meaning is at least likely to be subordinated to their objective meaning."[13] The utterance of 'looks round' is both a clue to and an occasion for the belief in an objectively round entity before us.[14] The occurrence of this experiencing itself is a partial confirmation of the objectivity of the entity. But we cannot settle on the real signification of 'round' as predicate by appeal solely to the contents of our presentations as reported in 'looks' expressions. "The most nearly decisive confirmation of the thing's being really round will not be experiences of 'looking round' or 'feeling round' but the results determined with precision instruments."[15] In the case of a value predication, however, the immediate import of and final authority as to the objectivity of the experience is the manner in which a thing appears and not what it is determined to be by certain tests. "Objective value is at bottom derivative from direct appreciation."[16] This thesis is not striking; it seems that an essential part of what we understand by something's value is its instrumental

quality for our subsequent experience. "Because it is by reference to the fact that relation to some possible realization of goodness in experience is constitutive of any genuine value which is to be found in objects, that explanation..." of the difference between ascription of value and other properties can be understood.[17]

> If an object is 'really round', we should, indeed, suppose it capable of being seen as round and felt as round, under certain conditions; we should suppose it could be experienced, with that quality which represents the expressive meaning of 'round'. But we should hardly say that the genuineness of this possibility is what makes it round: we should be more likely to locate the criterion of objective roundness in some measurement with precision instruments, and repudiate as not really round what should look round but not satisfy these more precise tests. Similarly we should expect that what is objectively hard will feel hard under normal conditions. But it is not this relation to experienced hardness which constitutes the objective property ascribed. ...In like manner, the possibility of presenting the quality of apparent redness - 'red' in its expressive meaning - would be attributed to any really red thing.
>
> In the case of value, however, it is such relation to possible experience of positive value-quality which constitutes the objective property meant by calling a thing good or valuable.[18]

It is true as noted in the quote of page ninety-one above that the contents of a presentation should be directly presentable, should be capable of being received or recorded in some fashion. It is also true that only certain qualities may have the characteristics which render them directly presentable, but there is no basis for identifying what may be a twofold disposition, the objects affecting us in a certain fashion and our being affected in that manner, with the objective property which is so presented, and to which we take ourselves to be referring by the use of certain locutions of expressive language. But what is not clear on Lewis' account is how the ordinary observer is led to the identification of a particular set of operations as the meaning of a qualitative presentation which may occur to him. According to Mind and the World Order, many qualia may be associated with any particular objective property; this means that each quale of a round object can be and is taken to be a clue

for the presence of an objectively real and round existent. But our so taking a red presentation or a round presentation as the sign of a red or round object is already indication of the fact that we have had similar experiences in the past which we also took to be referring to objectively red or round existents. We have been able to arrive at a functionally correct and useful sense of the term 'red' as a sign for an objectively red existent without ever settling on the real meaning of the property red. Now it is clear that Lewis wants to distinguish between the redness or roundness of the entity which really has these properties and the redness and roundness of the appearances which are taken to serve as signs for the real existence of the objective entities, but it is not clear that there is some conceptually real mental content which represents generic redness and which allows us to subsume any qualitatively different presentation under the same general label. Nor does he contend that there are concepts corresponding to each of the potentially directly presentable reds which we might encounter in the course of our experience and on the basis of which we can come to describe any particular appearance as 'red'.

One more claim is examined with a view to clarifying Lewis' commitment as regards the nature of properties:

> A property of a thing is called <u>objective</u> if it is genuinely a property of that object, and not apparent only, or merely relative to incidental relation to a subject; as the redness of a 'really red' object is an objective property, but the redness of one which merely 'looks red' to a particular person or under special conditions, is not objective. [19]

Clearly, while Lewis shifts his conception of 'objectivity' in moving from <u>Mind and the World Order</u> to <u>An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation</u>, the sense in which properties are objective is consonant with the view expressed in the latter. There 'objective' is taken to signify that which relates to an existent entity or to a property of such an entity independent

of an occasion of experiencing by any particular individual. The suggestion is that the real properties of objects are intrinsic parts of the objects which have long term duration. But this still leaves us somewhat confused about the status of appearances which do not coincide exactly with the real property of the object. An occasion may arise in which the appearance does coincide; does this mean that the appearance is numerically identical with the real property of the object, but that in all other cases there are unique entities called appearances, which while serving as clues to the existence of the real property, have an independent existent? It would indeed be puzzling to explain why a particular experience should be singled out as being identical with the actual property while all other appearances are wholly independent.

The suggestion that apprehended value or qualities of objects are subjective is only dangerous in Lewis' view if 'subjective' is understood to carry the pejorative sense of private and non-veridical. All experience, in that it involves some receptive human, is subjective. All experience is experience of someone, and represents the passage of some occurrence in an individual. Even though the contents of presentations are themselves not recorded by means of judgment, they too represent experiences. Again it seems that Lewis is able to avoid coming down firmly about where the appearances or the qualia are to be situated. "Value as immediately found, like any other character as directly disclosed, is subjective in the sense that it has the status of the apparent. Its <u>esse</u> is <u>percipi</u>."[20] Lewis is concerned to offset the suggestion that the contents of sense presentations which afford the certain basis on which knowledge can come to be justified is not related to an object (or more accurately, to further experiences) for which it is presently taken as a sign. He distinguishes, therefore, between the reception of an

an appearance and its causal conditions, refusing to identify the two. "Value as immediate is precisely like any appearance or mode of appearance in this respect: like what I see as against the objective thing present to be seen; like what I hear as against the objective airwaves affecting my tympanum, and the cause of them." [21] There is never the suggestion that we might fall into the error of saying that it is sound waves, or reflective capacities, or even firings or certain neurons which are given , as opposed to the effects such as causal conditions seem to produce. "When the content of appearance is considered as such - as appearance - it is more appropriately recognized as neither subjective nor objective, or as both without distinction. Subjectivity and objectivity, in any distinctive sense, are a 'later' classification of apprehended content."[22] The ultimate test of the value of these designations comes only when understood in conjunction with the possibilities of future verificatory experiences. It is the confirmation of a projection (as represented by a classification) in future experience which constitutes the objectivity of the original experience so classified; similarly, it is the disconfirmation in the course of subsequent experience which renders the experience as illusory, and subjective in the negative sense. But regardless of whether an experience is subjective or objective in the two senses just noted, "there is the absolute factuality of the given content of presentation itself: without that kind of fact there could be neither illusion nor knowledge; neither subjectivity nor objectivity. Formulation of this given content of presentation as such is thus a kind of truth antecedent to and essential for either veracity or falsity of any objective judgment." [23]

A dominant theme throughout much of Mind and the World Order is reiterated in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation and bears on the

point currently under discussion. In the earlier work, Lewis inveighs against a naive empiricism, one which, in giving prima facie status as knowledge to the contents of perceptions, subverts the distinction between error and falsehood. This same point is raised against the copy-theory of knowledge. But while Lewis chides the advocates of that position, he does not further our understanding of where we are able to locate the properties of objects. "We must not fall into the fallacies of the copy-theory of knowledge and suppose we can distinguish objective elements in our apprehension as those which 'are in the object as in our perception of it'; subjective ones as those which are due to the object but do not resemble that character of it which causes them....We must be content to admit as objective any datum which has the character of a normal and common human apprehension in the presence of the object in question, and to regard as subjective only those which deviate from this by reason of something which is a personal or a temporary characteristic of the individual subject."[24]

Thus far I have been unsettled as to whether or not to commit Lewis to a conception of the contents of presentations as mental or, as in some fashion - to use his phrase - ingredient in the objects themselves. It would be unfair to charge that the question doesn't arise for him; it is evident from his distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value that he countenanced the possibility of qualities inhering in an experience and in a sense somewhat different from that in which qualities may inhere in objects:

> It may be a part of the difficulty surrounding this distinction between the intrinsic value in the experience itself and the extrinsic value resident in the object experienced, that it does not appear what 'substance' it is of which the values immediately found are to be predicated. As suggested, the subject of such predication of intrinsic value is the occasion of experience itself, or the phenomenal content of this occasion. It does us

> no particular good to predicate experienced content, as distinct from the objective properties of physical things presented, to a mind-substance, after the fashion of traditional dualism. What is more in point is to recognize that occasions of experience are real in their own right and with their own particular kind of reality....Strictly, such phenomenal content of an experiential occasion is never simply identifiable with any character attributable to an object: the corresponding property of the object presented is something else in any case; although where the experience is cognitively veridical, there is a highly important connection of the two. This distinction must be maintained between the value-quality in the content of experience itself and an objective property of value in a thing, for the same reason that we must distinguish between apparent hardness or squareness and the objective property of being hard or square....For clarity, however, the most important point is simply that inherent value is an objective property of the thing to which it is attributable, even though this property consists in the potentiality for conducing to experience of a certain kind - as, indeed, other objective properties, like hardness or squareness, could also be construed.[25]

The sense in which value can be predicated of an occasion of experiencing as opposed to the phenomenal content of the experience is not entirely clear. Traditionally Lewis wants to speak of the phenomenal content (of an experiencing) as that which is given and about which one cannot be in error when one perceives the situation. It is not clear what the occasion of experiencing involves apart from the reception of certain phenomenal characteristics. It is true that insofar as the experiencing may involve bodily position and other physical occurrences within the subject himself, the sensations which are the concomitants of these movements may be as forcefully presented to the subject as the redness of an object in physical space. If occasions of experiencing are understood to involve such bodily sensations and these sensations can be seen to have a givenness in the sense of their being immediate to the person undergoing them, it is difficult to understand the sense in which "this experienced content" is not to be predicated of a 'mind-substance'. Perhaps the rejoinder to this is the claim that sensations are often recorded as occurring in a locus other than where

the brain is known to be, and consequently while a sensation is within a body it is not necessarily within the brain, even though the existence of a brain may be a standing causal condition for the possibility of such a sensation's being recorded as having occurred anywhere within the body. But Lewis wants to avoid identifying the phenomenal content of an experiential occasion with "any character attributable to an object"; surely then there is no reason to exclude the physical body from the class of objects he is referring to. The primary reason for his retaining the distinction is that what we take to be the experiential content of an occasion of experience may not really be the true character of that occasion of experiencing, and conceptual room must be left for the real objective properties of occasions of experiencing independent of how those occasions are felt or seen by us. The problem which arises when we seek to explicate the sense of this independence is the general one of trying to characterize a disposition when the disposition is not necessarily being actualized. There is a close fit between actualizations of the disposition to create the appearance of intrinsic value and our experiencing such occasions. The predication of value implies that there will be further such actualizations of the disposition in which the predication of the value on this particular occasion shall become vindicated.

SUMMARY

Thus far I have only sought to provide an accurate account of Lewis' conception of the given. It is difficult to assess his conception of the given without attending to the critical role which such an epistemologically basic element may serve in the reconstruction of knowledge. There has been one dominant motive in my characterization;

I have sought to interpret Lewis' view in a manner which avoids reifying the given so that it is analogous to sense-data or independently existing appearances. However, the success of such an explication can only be measured against the ultimate purpose served by the given. I have not as yet considered the sense in which things can be said to be given. Statements such as 'the given is incorrigible' or 'the given is self-authenticating' are wholly uninformative unless we attend to the scheme of justification which Lewis finds essential for knowledge claims, and until we come to understand how this scheme of justification requires a non-inferential base if it is to offset the threat of an infinite regress of justification.

Footnotes to Chapter III

[1]Clarence Irving Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1962), p. 186.

[2]Ibid., pp. 172-73.

[3]Ibid., p. 173.

[4]Ibid., p. 174.

[5]Ibid., pp. 29-31.

[6]Ibid., p. 174.

[7]Ibid., p. 179.

[8]Ibid., pp. 171-72.

[9]Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1967).

[10]Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 179.

[11]Ibid., pp. 182-83.

[12]Ibid., pp. 187-88.

[13]Ibid., p. 381.

[14]This is an oversimplification in that 'looks elliptical' may in fact be a clue to 'is round'. Consequently, the many-one relation which exists between qualia and objective properties is apt to lead to some confusion in the specification of the optimal clues to the presence of particular properties.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., p. 388.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., p. 392.

[20]Ibid., p. 407.

[21]Ibid., p. 408.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., p. 420.

[25]Ibid., pp. 433-34.

CHAPTER: IV

THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION IN MIND AND THE WORLD ORDER

INTRODUCTION

By examining Lewis' review of Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, I seek to bring out the emphasis which Lewis places on the justificatory aspect of our cognitive endeavors. Consideration of this view is important for another reason; we begin to see intimations of the metaphysical realism which is an important adjunct to the epistemological foundationalism developed in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. In the second section of the chapter, following the opening account of the idea of transtemporal stabilities, I turn to Lewis' attempts to characterize the certainty which, he feels, apprehensions of the given enjoy. I attempt to understand the relevant senses of certainty in terms of his thesis of temporal spread and the applicability of concepts to qualia. It is necessary in this connection to discuss Lewis' view regarding the 'objectivity' of an experience.

In light of the distinction between the degrees of certainty which accrue to apprehensions of the given and to ordinary empirical claims, I turn to an examination of the sense in which the possibility of error in those empirical claims relates to the thesis of temporal spread. The discussion of error leads to a brief excursus into the importance of memory both as a potential source of error and as a necessary component of the justificatory process, as that notion comes to be developed in Lewis' account of memory in Chapter XI of

An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. An attempt is made to construe a memory, as itself the extended effect of some perceptual encounter; the incoherencies of such a view are indicated. This early account of the role of memory as a source of knowledge is related to Alvin Goldman's views on a causal theory of knowledge.

As a prelude to the probabalistic view of empirical knowledge and the role of appearances as the foundation of our hierarchy of knowledge, it is essential to see the role that Lewis accords the a priori in developing our tools of conceptual classification. His image of empirical knowledge as a diagnosis of appearances is considered as is the conception of a generalization which is implicit in the application of a concept to an experience.

LEWIS'S REVIEW OF DEWEY'S THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY

In order to offset the charge that I have placed undue emphasis on the given, I now propose to compare Mind and the World Order and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation with respect to how their accounts of the given mesh with the accounts of the justification of empirical knowledge claims found in each.

It might be said that Lewis' elaboration of the given in the latter work reveals an emphasis on the prospective feature of empirical investigation; terminating judgements are, after all, expressions of expected predictive consequences. These consequences are understood to be implied by a statement of objective fact. That Lewis' concern is not wholly with the prospective but involves the retrospective feature implicit in justification comes out quite strongly in his review of John Dewey's The Quest for Certainty. The review appeared in 1930, shortly after the publication of Mind and the World Order. While the full-blown account of "if-then" terminating judgments had not been developed in

Mind and the World Order, nevertheless it placed great emphasis on the existence of continuing realities of objects and experience which entitle us to speak of occasions of potential verification. After noting the main thrusts of Dewey's view, the continuity of knowing and acting, the function of empirical concepts as prescription of operations to be performed, the significance of knowing as prediction of a future into which our action enters, Lewis remarks that "it is nevertheless possible to feel that something has been left unsaid which is important."[1] The shortcoming of Dewey's instrumentalist approach has tended to give short shrift to the "question of the ground, basis, validity of knowledge." [2] The emphasis has fallen on the future, predicted consequences of a hypothesis erected on the basis of current concern. While the future is pregnant with the confirmations of current predictions it is also open to an unsettling degree; we cannot wait until the entire future is in until our current statements will be able to serve as instruments of investigation.

In pressing this critque of Dewey, Lewis reveals two elements, both of which are given fuller development in the two epistemological works. While it is true that knowledge is hypothetical (even in Lewis' view), attention must be paid to the ambiguity hidden in the word 'hypothetical':

> If what is meant is that the content of knowledge is a hypothetical proposition - "If I should do thus and so, the results woud be such and such" - then it is to be observed that it is not the hypothesis of this proposition which wants assurance: it is the judgment as a whole, and particularly the prediction contained in its consequent clause, whose ground and validity are in question. The only sense of "hypothetical" which is pertinent to the present issue is that of "tentative" or "probable." But if what is meant by empirical knowledge is probable, then the question merely recurs in another form: "What makes it probable? What justifies the judgment as a knowledge of probabilities?[3]

It is evident that Lewis feels that Dewey's crusade against dualism or groundless bifurcations has been excessive when applied to an analysis of

the cognitive situation. The emphasis on the guiding function of a hypothesis with respect to its role of incrementing our knowledge neither necessitates nor justifies losing sight of the difference between 'the ground of knowledge' and 'the content of knowledge'. The employment of a hypothesis presupposes that it is accorded some status; it is viewed as knowledge in its own right or at least as probable. The purpose of the experiment, for which the hypothesis may serve as guide, can be seen as the adding to of the credibility with which the hypothesis is held prior to the running of the experiment. Only if we adopt that standpoint can the experiment be understood to stand in some evidential relationship to the original hypothesis. Our willingness to employ the hypothesis implies that we accord a certain plausibility to the hypothesis and that plausibility is given a measure in the probability which we ascribe to the hypothesis. However, the measure which is the probability itself represents an item of knowledge; consequently the issue arises as to why we are justified in accepting a probability as itself warranting belief in a certain hypothesis. The final resolution involves reference to our past inductive policies; the degrees to which our past generalizations have survived repeated tests is a mark of our confidence in their current application.

The warrent with which a belief is held necessarily implicates the past; the hypothesis of a past, while itself perhaps a tenuous belief, is a necessary condition of the cohesion of our justifications.

> ...if we grant that a practical belief has a just ground only in the light of what is past, we then make connection with traditional issues in their traditional form. Warranted beliefs, hypotheses justifiably held, are possible only if something learned from the past is pertinent to the future.[4]

There are two theses here. A belief must necessarily be justified, or justifiable if it is to be rationally held, and if it is to be used in

furthering knowledge. At some point, the statement used in order to justify a currently entertained belief must be shown to be a statement which derives its own credibility from some past occurrence or sets of occurrences. The justifying statement is not necessarily about a past statement, nor is it about the past in any obvious sense, though it would seem that either its meaningfulness or truth depends on the factuality of certain past experiences. There is no full-blown theory here about who may be offering the justification, or about whose past experiences may be involved; consequently, there is no assumption that a person's memory must accurately record and invariably deliver recollections of past occurrences when justifications are in the offing.

While there are intimations of realism in some of Lewis' comments, the specific entity hinted at as real is ambiguous.

> The possibility of knowledge argues some continuing stability which extends through past and future both. It is such transtemporal stabilities, or the basis of them in reality, which constitute the object of the traditional quest for certainty... But in some terms or other, some such background, in the more-than-particular, will be required for empirical beliefs if the problem of their validity is to be solved.[5]

If the locus of justification is the individual himself, and the stock of statements on which he draws are nothing but reports of psychological occurrences which he has undergone, the only transtemporal stabilities which may be presupposed in the scheme of knowledge are those which we refer to as 'his body' and 'his mind', Little in Lewis' early thought suggests that he is concerned with more than the lawlike regularities which may sustain between chains of sensations or appearances. Even verification of the consequent of a conditional statement entails nothing more than the possibility of a person's experiencing a particular appearance or sensation.

That "something to be learned from the past" is ambiguous: an

individual may learn from the past, where the past may involve experiences other than those in whch he himself may have been participant, and an individual may learn from his own past experience. It seems that the first optiondoes not absolutely require memory on the part of the individual involved but only requires that what is 'learned' is seen to be about the past in some way, as having some mark of pastness. Now it may be that it is entirely implausible to expect a person to understand what it is for an experience, or the statement of some occurrence, to appear to be about the past unless that individual has a memory, or that he is able to employ locutions which have other than present tense grammatical elements; naturally, one could only learn about the past if one had memory, but not because what had happened in the past had happened to oneself and it was the occurrence of its happening that one was remembering in the ostensible occasion of learning. The second option most definitely bespeaks the existence of a memory. What is involved in the second case is the recollection of an experience which had occurred in one's own past. But it is then difficult to understand the sense in which one is said to "learn about the past"or to have "learned from the past". Lewis does not suggest some Platonic theory of <u>anamnesis</u> as the necessary component of any theory of knowledge. If the cognitive integrity and survival of each of us depended on learning strictly from our own pasts in such a way that what we learned was relevant for the prosecution of the future course of our lives then we surely would be extinct. There is a sense in which it is appropriate to speak of 'learning from the past' where 'past' signifies stretches of experience not necessarily either coterminus with or even overlapping our own.

It is erroneous to identify that which may be learned from the past with continuing transtemporal stabilities. Lewis does not conceive

of these stabilities as timeless propositions which may be entertained on discrete occasions when some justificatory challenge is to be met. Nor does it seem as if the stability he is arguing for is the continued possibility of the human being's having experiences in a uniform fashion, tantamount to a stability of human nature. Such stability of human nature is clearly presupposed in Lewis' account of verification and of the relevance of future evidence to present belief.

The manner in which the past becomes relevant as an instrument for the course of future experience is through explicity formulated generalizations. The appearance of some sensory quality, though capable of being apprehended in a purely non-conceptual fashion, only comes to serve as a sign of expected experience, only serves as a guideline for the anticipated verificatory experience when its application to the present situation is based upon a generalization. The capacity of an appearance to function as a sign presupposes antecedent generalizations. The appearance as "ground of our prediction must reflect some generalization - that on such occasions as this, a particular act will result thus and so - and the only possible basis of this generalization is something prior."[6] Generalizations are the formal instruments through which investigation may proceed. But generalizations represent a logical encapsulation of features within experience; they represent recurrent features of real things. Unless we construe them in such a manner there would be no basis for our generalizing to them or for our using them as we do. The notion of "evidence" is a relational one and conceptually requires relata which in some fashion come to represent our intuition that there are natural classes of things which are erected on the basis of similarity of behavior or of properties. In his paper "Realism or Phenomenalism?" Lewis ascribes the regularities which our generalizaitons report to dispositional traits

possessed by real objects. He is comfortable with his analysis of terminating judgments in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, despite the counterfactual element in such claims because of the existence of 'real connections'. Having thus revealed to some extent the degree to which Lewis is concerned with the problem of the validity of probable empirical knowledge, I turn now to a detailed examination of how the problems of justification arise within his two epistemological works and how the analyses of the given offered in both relate to his view that the given(s) is the terminal point(s) in the scheme of justification.

THE FOUNDATIONALISM of MIND and the WORLD ORDER

Despite the emphasis on the given element in experience and mention of problems about the applicability of concepts to objects, there is but slight indication that Lewis conceives of knowledge in a hierarchical fashion with statements about the contents of sense lying at the bottom and justifying those which stand above them. In fact, the paradigm knowledge claim for Lewis is that made in a judgment; a judgment ascribes a name to an object, even though the object is presented to us through the sensory appearances which it may produce. Far greater stress is placed on the nature of verification and the thesis of temporal spread; the latter claims that the import of any ascription of a predicate made in a judgment necessarily transcends the sensory or presentational content of the occasion in which the predication or classification is made. Lewis maintains an important difference between the verification of a hypothesis and the justification of belief. The two are not unrelated insofar as the confirmation of a hypothesis adds to the antecedent probability with which the hypothesis is entertained on the next occasion of its employment. I shall return to the development of this relation when I come to examine the account of justification in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.

In Chapter II, I concentrated on the formal criteria of the given and on its detailed internal structure; little attention was paid to the relation between apprehensions of the given and those judgments to which Lewis accords the status of empirical knowledge. I turn to that now.

At the very outset of his account of the given Lewis criticized those theorists who, he felt, placed undue emphasis on either the aspect of immediacy or on the element of interpretation in seeking to arrive at an accurate conception of knowledge. He already argued against the identification of knowledge with some pure state of immediacy. If knowledge consisted in "the mere presence of data to the mind," then "every cognitive experience must be veracious."[7] Similarly, in criticizing the "New Realists", he points out that their view leads to abolishing the distinction between truth and falsehood. While this viewpoint is reiterated frequently, Lewis adds another which looms equally large in the development of his view of empirical knowledge. "In immediacy, there is no separation of subject and object. The givenness of immediate data is, thus, <u>not</u> the givenness of <u>reality</u>, and is not knowledge."[8] The importance of this latter thesis comes out in Lewis' conception of empirical knowledge as probable. If what we come to 'know' about an object in a momentary presentation of it is but a small part of the object's temporal span, then we never know the object with complete certainty. The point is also tied in with the cognitive significance of concepts."The object of the concept must always have a timespan which extends beyond the specious present."[9] The concept thus stands in significant contrast to the quale (or qualia) which is (are) the content of the presentation of some object. Whereas the object does have temporal spread, the quale, while repeatable in the sense of being instantiable on different occasions, has no temporal spread. This last feature of it is essential as far as the property of self-authentication

goes. There are no possible chains of future experiences which may serve to confirm or disconfirm the content of, or the nature of a particular presentation as apprehended by us at the actual time of experiencing.

Apart from the two characteristics of the given brought out in Chapter II, viz., sensory feel or quality, and unalterability by thought, there is a further aspect of it when it becomes related to us through an act of attention on our parts. Apprehensions of the qualia are indubitable. "The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective."[10] But Lewis has already weakened the quoted remark long before he asserts it. "Now it is indeed obvious that I may make erroneous report of the given, because I can make no report at all except by the use of language, which imports concepts which are not given.... All those difficulties which the psychologist encounters in dealing with reports of introspection may be sources of error in any report of the given."[11] Despite this qualification, it is perhaps possible to distinguish the mere experiencing of the object (by means of the presentation which we have of it) and the attempt to report the content of the experiencing. Undoubtedly it is some such distinction which Lewis must have in mind. His suggestion is perhaps analogous to the claim of those who contend that the vocalizing is a superfluous activity in the reception of the meaning of a written word. In the course of reading a text, uttering the printed word (if construed as an act of conceptualization) does not enhance or facilitate the apprehension or reception of the meaning of the word. The reason obviously is that our learning has made it possible to bypass the utterance of the word before we can recognize its meaning. The visual form or shape of the inscription is sufficient as a cue to its meaning; presumably that is why we can identify countless different inscriptional tokens of the same type.

Lewis' claim that the quale as directly intuited is meant to capture a similar feature of non-conceptualization involved in the reception of sensory qualities in the world. But obviously the parallel is not complete. We did, at some point in time, come to recognize the physical written inscription of words; such recognition was part of our learning how to read. If Lewis' claim about qualia is to be strictly parallel we must identify a similar set of experiences which constitute the internalization of canons of recognition. But that Lewis would be willing to relativize his conception of intuitively known qualia by suggesting a class of experiences which we may have forgotten about is not entirely clear. Lewis bases the difference between the certainty of apprehensions and the error ascribable to reports of their contents on whether or not language is employed. Where language is not employed there is assurance; where language is employed an element of uncertainty is introduced, however. Lewis has not demonstrated that language does not covertly enter into the intuitive apprehension of the given even if no attempt is made to report on the content of an apprehension.

If there is a distinction in the degrees of certainty attaching to apprehensions of sense and to reports of such apprehensions, it is not to be taken as marking out a comparable one between two types of knowing or knowledge. "There is no knowledge merely by acquaintance; that knowledge <u>always</u> transcends the given."[12] Lewis attributes the view that there is knowledge by direct acquaintance to two major sources: "In the first place it is falsely supposed that there are some concepts at least which denote 'simple qualities' - something which can be directly exhibited in a single experience. And second, the word 'knowledge' is sometimes used for that enjoyment or contemplation which projects no purposes but is completely absorbed in the given as an esthetic object."[13] As Lewis places greater

emphasis on the first point we must look at the grounds of his opposition to it. He unequivocally insists that there is intuitively direct apprehension of the quale in a presentation. His opposition is to identifying the immediate apprehension with "knowledge". In support of this opposition, he reiterates a corollary of the thesis of temporal spread. "There are no 'simple qualities' which are named by any name; there is no concept the denotation of which does not extend beyond the immediately given, and beyond what could be immediately given. And without concepts, there is no knowledge."[4] Though the quale is taken by an observer to be the sign of a property, the property is ascribed to an objectively real existent in a judgment; consequently, the possibility of error exists. But what Lewis does not make clear is precisely why the possibility of error exists. He has already suggested that insofar as concepts are employed in reporting the contents of presentations, an element of error is imported into the report. Now clearly that error is possible in the making of a judgment does not entail that the experience reported in the judgment should necessarily be the type of experience which is verifiable; it is entirely unclear what a verifiable experience is. The use of the concept in the report of the experience is fraught with the possibility of error, and yet the concept has as its primary reference an objective property of an object. Lewis confuses us somewhat by speaking of the "objectivity" of an experience. In the strict sense an experience can make contact with reality, but with only a very limited portion of it, whereas the objectivity of a property, which is ascribed to an object on the basis of a momentary presentation, is that which is understood to endure in the real object and which is verified in the course of subsequent experience.

We have already noted that Lewis may base differences in the degrees of certainty of sensory apprehensions and conceptual interpretations

on whether or not the involvement of concepts in the having of the experience can be demonstrated. But I have suggested that such grounds are not exceedingly strong. There is another problem peculiar to his opposition between quale and concept. "Qualia are universals, and they are universals such that without the recognition of them by the individual nothing presented in experience could be named or understood or known at all."[15] What basis does Lewis have for suggesting that qualia are intrinsically recognizable? Only two are evident to me. On the one hand, they are intrinsically recognizable because their apprehension does not involve the employment of concepts; were concepts employed in the recognition of qualia then we might be led to assume that the qualia were the denotata of the concepts. On the other hand qualia as opposed to concepts have no temporal spread. This may be understood to mean that insofar as there is no verification involved in the ascription of a concept to them, in fact there is no ascription of a concept to them at all, and recognition of them is instantaneous. It certainly seems that Lewis could employ both of these suggestions as grounds for taking the apprehension of quale or qualia as certain. We could be led to construe 'certain' for Lewis as 1) not requiring the use of concepts, and 2) the absence of a verificatory procedure in assuring oneself that the experience one had undergone was of the qualitative character that one had taken it to be. But while both these points may represent adequate construals of 'certain' for Lewis they do not seem satisfactory. For one thing the role of the thesis of temporal spread in Lewis' claims about quale, verification and the objectivity of properties is very unclear. It is not clear precisely how one thesis serves to or is intended to sustain another thesis.

The nub of the thesis of temporal spread seems to be that Lewis argues from an analysis of the common sense features of a simple perceptual

experience to the requirements involved in the verification of the ascription of a property of an object. From the obvious fact that our encounter with an object may be of limited duration and that we may therefore fail to uncover or note all of the manifest (visually presentable) qualities and probably most of the non-manifest ones, Lewis goes on to contend that the full cognitive worth of any predicate can only be assessed in terms of the course of future experience. "The predication of a property on the basis of momentarily presented experience, is in the nature of an hypothesis, which predicts something definitely specifiable in further possible experience, and something which such experience may corroborate or falsify."[16] Lewis employs the thesis of temporal spread to substantiate his claim that the objects of which we predicate qualities are real. "For the object presented to be real, there must be more to it than could be given in any single experience. The objectivity of the experience implies this 'more'."[17] One motivation for the suggestion that the reality of an object involves more than could be given in any single experience is thedesire to scotch the inference that the reality of the object may consist wholly in the act of experiencing. Lewis has already sought to block such a suggestion by his claim that "the nature of that interpretation or construction by which we come to know objects suggests that the given must be, in some sense or other, a constituent of objective reality as well."[18] The "objectivity" of the experience, however, is not to be taken as signifying one of the transtemporal stabilities Lewis speaks about in the review of Dewey. The objectivity of the experience consists in the possibility of future verificatory experience. There must be standing conditions for the possibility of such future verificatory experience. Among such standing conditions we would include the presence of the percipient in the vicinity of the object of which a presentation

may be received, the capacity to receive a presentation, and the capacity of the object to affect the percipient repeatedly. "But what does it signify that there should be verifiably more to any object than is given in the single experience of it? It can mean nothing else than the possibility of other experiences, of a predictable sort, related to this experience in predictable ways."[19]

It is evident from what Lewis has said about the distinction between quale and concepts applicable to objects in judgment and the accompanying distinction between the indubitable reception of the former and the potentially erroneous judgment about the latter that the true referent of predications in Mind and the World Order, or what Lewis terms objective judgments in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, are real states of affairs which extend beyond the occasion of our perceptual or cognitive encounters with them. This is the thesis of temporal spread in its epistemological cloak. Lewis, however, has not denied that in some fashion we are able to come to refer to objective states of affairs even though the real import of those states of affairs potentially transcends all possible experience which we may ever have of them. This lack of a denial may imply that Lewis countenances the possibility of our identifying objective states of affairs even though not all the potentially verificatory experiences relevant to the ascription of a certain predicate to the state of affairs are in. Lewis intends that a similar account holds for the knowledge of objects as holds for the knowledge of properties."...even that minimum of cognition which consists in naming is an interpretation which implicitly asserts certain relations between the given and further experience. The ascription of a substantive or an adjective is the hypothesis of some sequence in possible experience or a multiplicity of such sequences. The verifiability of such is essential to the nature ascribed to the object

in recognition, or even to the acceptance of this experience of it as presentation of the real."[20] In view of this, it seems that naming involves the justified ascription of objective properties to our experience. There is little question but that we do confirm the presence of a property a particular place when we seem to experience it there , even if we only report it by the use of "looks like" locutions.

But an obvious consequence of Lewis' claim that real objects, about which we take ourselves to be making claims in judgments, have temporal spread is that we, as observers of those objects could never have experienced all of their parts or facets. This impossibility does not hinge on the distinction between manifest and non-manifest properties. The notion of the objects' objectivity entails that there be experiences or future encounters with the objects which, ex hypothesi, we could not as yet have undergone or experienced. If Lewis were to claim that the identification of an objective property necessitated the exhaustive experiencing of all the possible aspects or consequences or parts of a temporally spread object, then it would be impossible that we could have ever experienced or identified such a property. This seems counterintuitive and conflicts with a conception of learning which maintains that there may be a temporal difference in the acquisition of concepts such as 'is red' vs. 'looks red'. If we opt for the other position it is evident that we must allow for the possibility of the identification of properties on the basis of encounter with but a few of the complete parts or aspects of the empirical object. But if such incomplete encounter is sufficient for the identification of objective properties, that bespeaks the fact that those properties may be the more salient properties of the complex comprised of the indefinitely extended aspects or parts. Furthermore, if identification portends something on the order of an achievement, albeit a cognitive one, it is possible

that appropriate to the sets of properties by which we are able to identify an objective state of affairs, there is a corresponding mode of verification, one which is more relevant to the possibility of an identification than another might be.

I have left unexplicated the sense in which an object may have an infinite number of consequences. One very important sense, critical to Lewis' account of the verification of a classification, is that of the object's repeated ability to affect a percipient in ways similar to those of earlier occasions in which the object was encountered. The repeated encounters with objects spawn generalizations (recall Aristotle's image of the route of an army in the Posterior Analytics). Lewis has equated the 'objectivity' of an object with the recurrent possibilities of verification. He has de-materialized the concept of an object and has recast its epistemological status in the manner of Mill's "permanent possibilities of sensation."

THE NATURE of ERROR

In an effort to gain an understanding of Lewis' conception of why knowledge is probable it pays to examine his conception of error and falsehood as they may arise in the perceptual situation. In Chapter II I noted Lewis' emphasis on a non-interpreted given element in experience independent of mind's activity. The emphasis on the former by advocates of "immediacy" theories of perception is one of the causes of the abolition of the distinction between truth and falsehood or the elimination of the difference between veridical and illusory perception. Insofar as the conceptual element restores the balance, it is not unreasonable to suppose that that element brings with it the possibility of error and falsehood. As has been noted, Lewis analyzes the objectivity of an experience in terms of the possible future verificatory experiences. We must look to the

class of future verificatory experiences if we are to ascertain whether an experience of ours is either veridical or illusory. Insofar as the experiencing of the given is immediate and therefore not possibly mistaken, exclusive attention to the content of such a presentation can never assure us that an experience is veridical. The return on such an investment in the phenomenalist analysis of the properties of objects comes when we are able to forego the dilemmas which confront a Cartesian copy-theory of knowledge which analyzes veridicalness in terms of correspondence of what is presented with some mental content.

I noted in an earlier chapter that the apprehension of a given quality may be seen as the occasion for the formation of a belief about some underlying reality which is related to the qualitative aspect of the experience which we apprehend. Lewis may confuse us when he suggests that "wrong understanding may be due to ... the nature of the given."[21] What he does not intend is that the reception of the given may itself be mistaken; we have already noted that when reception is free of the intrusion of language there is no possibility of error. What Lewis must mean then is that the given as apprehended by us occasions an erroneous belief. However, the belief cannot be seen to be erroneous until some future experiences have occurred which at the time of the original experience were implicitly understood as evidentially relevant for the confirmation of the predication made in the original belief. If the given, when apprehended, is infallible, in what sense can it induce us to make an erroneous inference? We can never be mistaken about the way something appears when we are experiencing it; even if the thing undergoes qualitative change during our observation of it, what we take ourselves to be observing also undergoes change. Lewis lays the blame for error on the conceptualizing activity engaged in by mind. "In fact they [the errors] are due <u>directly</u>

to the conceptual interpretation and only indirectly to the given experience."[22] The appearance of given is a clue in the sense that it implicitly reveals the expectancies which we entertain as regards the course of future experience. But interpretations are not de nuovo classifications which arise on each occasion of experiencing; they all involve a residue of past experience. The possibility of being in error, of deception, lies not in the qualitative nature of the given but rather in what that qualitative nature portends for future experience in terms of what we have come to expect on the basis of antecedent experience. What remains unsettling in this view is that our experiencing of the given is not similarly tainted and therefore not infallibly apprehended.

There are two relevant senses in which the belief occasioned by an appearance may be erroneous. On the one hand, the anticipated consequences implicit in the original predication may fail to occur. On the other hand, the subsumption of the particular in question under the particular classification may be faulty because of the faulty recollection of the generalization; a failure of memory is implied in this case. [23] Lewis undermines the suggestion that memory may be a contributory cause in an erroneous judgment:

> Apprehension of the presented quale, being immediate, stands in no need of verification; it is impossible to be mistaken about it. Awareness of it is not judgment in any sense in which judgment may be verified; it is not knowledge in any sense in which "knowledge" connotes the opposite of error. It may be said that the recognition of the quale is a judgment of the type, "This is the same ineffable 'yellow' that I saw yesterday." ...If what is meant by predicating sameness of the quale today and yesterday should be the immediate comparison of the given with a memory image, then certainly there is such comparison and it may be called "judgment" if one choose; all I would point out is that, like the awareness of a single presented quale, such comparison is immediate and indubitable; verification would have no meaning with respect to it. If anyone should suppose that such direct comparison is what is generally meant by judgments of qualitative identity between something experienced yesterday and something presented now, then obviously he would have a very poor notion of the complexity of memory as a means of knowledge.[24]

This foreshadows the view which evolves in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation and which accords the deliverances of memory a prima facie credibility. The implication here is that the memory image employed to effect a comparison has features analogous to the phenomenal given which Lewis describes in his chapter on the given. Clearly the possibility of a comparison of this yellow patch with the memory image of the same yellow patch implies that the memory image retains, in some fashion, the yellowness of the original patch. This is not to say that there is necessarily some yellowish entity in the mind which is hauled up on each occasion when a comparison is made. It may be that the memory image may have a feature, analogous to that of the phenomenal given, of unalterability by thought. It would seem that part of what we might understand someone to mean if he claimed that a comparison of a currently existing patch of yellow to a memory image of one is "immediate and indubitable" is that a person is correct in claiming sameness or difference between the two things compared without having to transcend the context of the situation of comparison. Furthermore, there is an assurance involved to the effect that the item against which the comparison is made, viz., the memory image, is unchanged, is recognized to be unchanged and is intrinsically unchangeable. A memory is clearly not an abstraction in the sense in which Lewis conceives of the given as being an abstraction. Nor is a memory a universal in the sense in which a quale is a universal. The intimate connection which a memory image seems to enjoy with the occasion of which it is a memory qualifies it as very much the kind of thing a particular may be. The recognition involved in the recollection of a memory does not appear to be analogous to the recognition of a quale. Memories are intrinsically recognizable in the sense that when understood to be memories, they are seen to be about a past occasion. They are, however, intentional in that

the occurrence ostensibly reported as having occurred in a memory may never in fact have taken place.

As I pointed out in Chapter II, the fact that something is a mental content involves some conceptual activity. This statement was offered in support of a view of the given as possibly mental without at the same time doing violence to Lewis' contention that the given is unaffected by the activity of mind. Is a memory image mental in the first sense, i.e., unaffected by mental activity? Apart from such facile psychological claims that we do not remember that which we do not want to, the question is a difficult one to answer. Memory of an event entails that attention was paid to the event when it occurred; it is as if the attention was relevant to the existence of a memory of the past occurrence. One way in which attention may be relevant is that our conceptual categories are deployed in acts of attention. In one respect, memory is analogous to an abstraction, especially if abstraction involves, as Lewis suggests it does, the lifting of an embedded element of our experience out of the context in which it is embedded by means of concepts. This is not to say, however, that there are ready-made categories which stand ready for application to memories.

The occurrences which we remember are not apprehended in any unique manner at the time that we apprehended them which would qualify us to say at that moment of apprehension that the event shall be remembered on certain occasions. We can exert ourselves to remember facts and faces and events but we certainly do not remember everything which may have happened to us. Despite the fact that we can attend to an occurrence it does not seem accurate to say that there is a special mode of attention which qualifies that which is attended to as a potential memory. At no time during our experiencing of an event can we justifiably suggest that what is then occurring will be the content of some future act of recollection,

i.e., the content of some memory.

It would appear that calling something which is mental and which seems to report on or refer to an occasion earlier than the present a memory is the predication of a term to an experience. It has its full import in the future potentially verificatory experiences which are implied in the original predication. To refer to a mental occurrence which seems to be about the past as a memory is to accord the occurrence a certain status in the realm of statements entertained. The status seems to be short of knowledge in that we may possibly be in error in remembering, but not in error in the sense that we have performed a particular feat of remembering poorly, but rather that the specifics of the case as we happen to remember it may in fact not be the way things really were on the actual occasion of the initial experiencing.

Lewis seems to support the construal of memory as in some way analogous to the given. While he discusses little about the import of memory in general, he makes some relevant remarks about it in conjunction with his discussion of the possibility of verifiable knowledge of the past. He does not connect his conception of memory with features similar to those characteristic of his conception of the given, apart from suggesting that the presented experience must be unalterable:

> For a satisfactory account, it would be essential to reveal, by analysis of experience, those peculiar characteristics by which the pastness of a thing is presently identified;...But for present purposes it will be sufficient to remark that obviously <u>some</u> kind of identifiable marks in presented experience must mean the pastness of the thing presented, since otherwise the past event could not be distinguished from the present. Doubtless one item would be a certain kind of unalterability and unresponsiveness to desire and purpose in which respect what is present or future would not be thus unalterable....Whatever it is by means of which past fact is verified, it is something which is capable of present and future experience. The past is known through a correct interpretation of something given, including certain given characters which are the marks of pastness.[25]

It would seem that one of the ways through which the past could be verified, in one sense of 'to verify', is by the occurrence of a memory of the event along with memories of other occurrences contemporaneous with the original event. A memory is always with us, until forgotten, and in that sense is always accessible to present and future experience. What is less clear is the kind of occurrence which might occasion the recollection of a particular memory. The basic opposition to considering a memory as that which may serve to verify a past occurrence is that we should have to look to some relevant, though unrelated, and independent corroborating fact beyond the sphere of the individual's own experience. Reliance on sets of one's own memories spawns the problem of a coherence theory of justification; I defer examination of that problem until a later chapter.[26]

MEMORY and TEMPORAL SPREAD

Before closing this discussion of memory, I want to note the relationship between Lewis' conception of memory and his thesis of temporal spread. Lewis tries to tie up the verifiability of the past with the possibility of future verificatory experiences. In doing so he explicitly suggests that a past occurrence lives on long after its appointed time in the same way that a man's deeds live on long after his bones have been interred.

> The assumption that the past is intrinsically verifiable means that at any date after the happening of an event, there is always something, which at least is conceivably possible of experience, by means of which it can be known. Let us call these items its "effects." The totality of such effects quite obviously constitute all of the object that is knowable. To separate the effects from the object is, thus, to transform it into some incognizable ding an sich. We may then say, from a certain point of view, that the event is spread throughout all after time.[27]

This is not an ontological thesis about the nature and status of events

and past occurrences. Admittedly though, Lewis sometimes invites such a reading: "In so far as an event, or the existence of a thing at a certain date, is intrinsically verifiable, and is thus spread through all after time in its effects, what cognition of it apprehends as its presentation and what historical knowledge proceeds to verify, is a part of its nature."[28] I shall not try to give a sense to "a part of its nature". At most such a claim could only mean that the event, (the past event), cannot exist without the possibility of there being consequences of the original event. But that is not Lewis' intent (in light of the above (indented) quote). His thesis is clearly an epistemological one. The suggestion that an event can be identified with the totality of its effects seems counterintuitive for the simple reason that we drain from the original event its causally active nature, especially if we can infer that an effect, in so far as it is part of the event, may have as effects those kinds of things which are caused by the original event. Obviously this would suggest that the effect which is a part of the event could somehow cause itself.

To say that "the totality of such effects quite obviously constitute all of the object that is knowable," is not to equate the object with its effects but is rather to suggest that the effects serve as evidences for the fact of the event's occurrence. What is not clear is how strongly a piece of evidence must be related to that for which it is evidence. Lewis suggests that the original event is a causal condition for the existence of the class of experiences which are potential evidences for it. He construes the event's effects as analogous to the appearances or presentations which a physical object produces when observed. "What cognition of it apprehends as its presentation and what historical knowledge proceeds to verify,...is the "appearance"

of the event at the time of this verification, much as a presented surface may be the appearance of a solid object."[29] It does not appear unreasonable to contend that a memory or a memory image of an event is as much an effect of the original event as are the other types of effects which Lewis must have in mind as comprising the "totality... that is knowable." A causal theory of memory appears to be acceptable if all it claims is that for a memory to be potentially veridical (and a source of knowledge about the past) there must have been an event which the person claiming to have the memory was present at. I do not want to claim in addition that he must remember having been present before the content of the original memory claim can be thought to be a legitimate memory. Lewis does not distinguish between memorial and non-memorial effects; consequently, he may be willing to countenance memories as themselves effects of past events. If his claim were an ontological one then we would be faced with the difficulty of individuating the original event. Each newly acquired memory, resulting perhaps from confrontation with some temporally later consequence of the original event would constitute an addition to the original event. We would not say that the event never occurred if there had been no memorial residue; all we could say is that there is no evidence for the event having occurred. Despite lack of explicit commitment to the view that a memory may be a consequence or effect of an event, such suggestion seems to capture well the import of memory's <u>prima facie</u> credibility. If a memory is understood to be a causal consequence of the occurrence of the event which it is ostensibly about there seems little reason to deny that it may and should be taken to be evidence for the earlier occurrence of the event by the person whose memory it is.

There is an interesting parallel between Lewis' analysis of the

verifiability of the past and a recent analysis of the conditions for knowledge offered by Alvin Goldman in "A Causal Theory of Knowing." He suggests supplanting traditional analyses of knowing in order to avoid the range of counterexamples raised by Edmund Gettier's analysis of the deficiencies in the traditional model. In order to do this, Goldman proposes the following analysis of knowing: "S knows that p if and only if: The fact p is causally connected in an "appropriate" way with S's believing p. "Appropriate," knowledge-producing causal processes include the following: (1) perception (2) memory..."[30]

Goldman complicates the basic spirit of Lewis' analysis. He introduces the notion of beliefs and suggests that our current beliefs (which may have reference to the past) must be understood to have been caused by attention to past occurrences which we now remember. The causation needn't be direct, however. Examples which fail to take into account the causal connection between the fact that makes p true (or simply: the fact that p) and someone's belief of p, are deficient. In order to protect his claim against charges that he allows for a peculiar type of causation, in discussing memory or remembering, Goldman notes that "S remembers p at time t only if S's believing p at an earlier time is a cause of his believing p at t."[31] The occurrence of an earlier mental occurrence, a belief, is a necessary condition for the occurrence of a memory at a time later than that of the earlier occurrence. Goldman's analysis is superior to Lewis' in that he doesn't recruit any spurious conception of a temporally extended object or event. At worst, he may identify the object or event with the set of beliefs it may have occasioned at the time of its occurrence, but there is little indication that he does or that such a view is necessary to his analysis. Second, the occurrence of a memory image, or present belief

in a past event, seems less mysterious in that it is understood to be causally connected to a similar type of event at an earlier time, rather than being construed as the effect of an event without the interposition of an act of belief at the original time of occurrence. All that is required on Goldman's view is that the current belief in p be occasioned by p through some causal connection. There is no implication that the person believing p must also believe that his belief in p is occasioned by a causal connection commencing with p.[32]

If the person in Lewis' case who had a memory or a belief in the occurrence of some past event also had to know that the occurrence of his present belief had to be causally connected to the occurrence of the event at an earlier time, then naturally he could never know that his belief or memory was true. In order to have a true belief about a past occurrence he would have to know a more complex statement involving that same occurrence; consequently, we would find that our analysis foundered on an infinite regress. It would seem plausible that the realization of this possibility is what prompted Lewis to suggest that a memory must have a prima facie credibility. It is best to construe memories as themselves effects of earlier occurrences, even if they are not construed as parts of those earlier occurrences as Lewis urges. We construe the memory of a past event as evidence for the actual occurrence of that event. A memory cannot be construed as evidence for the occurrence of a past event unless there is some belief connecting such things as memories with the occurrence of earlier events in general. So, if Lewis' account of memories must stand or fall on whether we choose to reconstrue memories as evidences for the earlier occurrences of events, it seems that he founders on the shoal of our regress.

THE A PRIORI BASIS of CONCEPTUAL CLASSIFICATION

I turn now to an examination of the a priori basis of conceptual classification and of how the conception of an a priori represents Lewis' first thrust at the foundationalism which reaches fuller development in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. At the beginning of his account of the a priori, Lewis strikes a skeptical chord not in his emphasis on generalization from the past in the review of Dewey's book:

> There is no knowledge without interpretation. If interpretation, which represents an activity of the mind, is always subject to the check of further experience, how is knowledge possible at all? That the interpretation reflects the character of past experience, will not save its validity. For what experiences establishes, it may destroy; its evidence is never complete.[33]

It is strange that Lewis should raise the specter of skepticism against his own conception of the meaning of an empirical claim. Equally puzzling is his concern with the non-terminating nature of evidence in light of his emphasis, as we recently noted, on the infinite temporal extent of an object or occurrence which is intimately related to its effects through time. Some untoward disconfirmatory experience may belong to the class of experiences or effects which constitute the original object or occurrence, about which one had hoped to confirm a hypothesis expressed in a certain predication. Lewis believes that an inductive inference is frail. "An argument from past to future at best is probable only, and even this probability must rest upon principles which are themselves more than probable."[34] The claim that a past occurrence has consequences throughout the duration of time is less an empirical one than a transcendental because it is required to justify the possibility of verifying claims about past experience. Or should we understand Lewis' contention about infinite spread as itself

an empirical hypothesis and therefore only probable at best? If the thesis of temporal spread is to be taken as probable, on what principle might it rest which itself is more than probable? Any suggestion that there is a transtemporal stability underlying the thesis of temporal spread is itself subject to the charge of being merely probable; consequently, any positing of an entity the existence of which cannot be verified in a single or in a finite number of occasions cannot serve as the basis for the thesis of temporal spread.

The discussion of the a priori reveals that the categories which Lewis feels best represent the conceptually necessary interpretive schema for experience, and which are a priori in the pragmatic sense, are not empirical generalizations. On the other hand, Lewis opposes any tendency to think of the basic elements of knowledge as presuppositions, as logically necessary conditions. Yet his remarks both in the review of The Quest for Certainty and in the chapter on the a priori in Mind and the World Order hint at just such a view. "For the validity of knowledge, it requisite that experience in general shall be in some sense orderly - that the order implicit in conception may be imposed upon it. And for the validity of particular predications, it is necessary that a particular order may be ascribed to experience in advance. Thus if there is to be any knowledge at all, some knowledge must be a priori; there must be some propositions the truth of which is necessary and independent of the particular character of future experience."[35] It is not evident that when he speaks of "the validity of particular predications" that Lewis has in mind validity in the fact of a justificatory challenge, nor even that in the face of such a challenge the strongest justification would necessarily involve reference to the a priori basis of the conceptual classification exemplified in the predication. To the extent that Lewis

seems to identify the a priori with some knowledge, the contrast of the a priori and the given must come out in the fact that the latter allows for no possible error whereas the former must. But in laying out the sense and source of error, Lewis once again falls back on the Cartesian dynamic of error; error is something brought about through the misuse of a human faculty. In Descartes' case error belongs to the overextension of the will; Lewis, on the other hand, sees it as introduced by the mind.

The a priori, unlike the given, cannot compel acceptance of its own truth. The given does not allow for the possibility of error in its reception. Such immunity from error signifies the fact of mind's passive reception of the content of a presentation. The a priori, however, signifies an attitude of conceptual classification. "It represents an attitude in some sense freely taken."[36] Were there no possibility of error, as we find in the case of the given, the cognitive import of the a priori would be diminished if not lost. The a priori does not represent contraints on experience, nor does it impose itself on the mind, but rather it flows from the mind. The a priori represents our anticipations regarding the course of future experience; "it formulates an uncompelled initiative of mind, our categorial ways of acting."[37]

It is important to examine this view against a backdrop of Lewis' critique of the rationalist notion that the "a priori is distinguished by some psychological criterion such as the "natural light" or some peculiar mental origin such as innateness."[38] I feel that it is important to understand this view so that light may be shed on the kind of certainty and indubitability which characterizes apprehensions of the given. If Lewis wishes to sweep away all mental characterizations of incorrigibility, such

as may also be involved in the self-authenticating nature of an experience of some presentation, it is important to establish the scope of his opposition to these rationalist criteria. He seems to imply that the rationalist approach evolved out of an attempt to found knowledge on a certain and non-inductive base. Prior warrant is required for belief in universal propositions which are drawn from experience. "Knowledge which is certain can not be grounded in the particulars of experience if it is to apply to particular experiences in advance; it can only come from the possession of some universal by which the particular is implied."[39] Without speaking to the issue of the logical tenability of such a rationalist position, Lewis attacks the psychological base of their psychological criterion. "Psychological undeniability, even if it exist, would not be proof of truth....Moreover, if the criterion of the a priori were a certain impulsion of the mind, then there would be no difference amongst truths on this point. As Bosanquet has pointed out, all discovered truth lays upon the mind some impulsion to belief; this character belongs to all propositions once they are believed."[40] The observation of a particular mental state or attitude in us, by ourselves, is not sufficient testimony to the veracity of that which is indicated by the state of belief. On the other hand, if we are in possession of criteria other than psychological ones, relating to the truth of a proposition which we believe, then the observation of a psychological state of assent may be taken as further corroborating evidence for the truth of the belief, but it alone can never constitute the sufficient evidence in itself. It follows from this that when Lewis speaks of the certainty which attaches to apprehensions of the given, he does not mean to identify certainty with the truth of the proposition which may be entertained. One of his criteria for the fact that the apprehension of the given does not constitute knowledge

is that the propositions expressing the apprehensions cannot be spoken of as true or false.

In examining the suggestion that the basic premises upon which others may come to rest be construed as "presuppositions", Lewis affirms that he believes in necessary propositions without believing at the same time that they are inescapable, especially if inescapability means a psychological impulsion towards belief. "What is a priori is not true because the mind is so constituted that it finds such truth unavoidable; however fantastic or practically negligible any alternative supposition may be, there still are such alternatives, which may be self consistent."[41] The suggestion that the a priori may represent nothing more than an imposition on the mind is countered by Lewis on the grounds that it would then mean that the a priori has the brute-fact character which is the distinctive mark of the given. But the a priori is "recognized as not being given as the content of experience is given."[42] The rationalists, however, illegitimately move from this fact to another, namely that the a priori must be "absolute datum in some sense or other."[43] Furthermore, the a priori is construed by them not only as an absolute datum, but as one which is "a peculiar possession of the mind itself."[44] It is precisely the situation of the a priori in the mind which endows it with a self-certifying nature, one which inductions from empirical particulars cannot enjoy:

> This point of the relation of the a priori to the mind is really of prime importance, for upon it depends that assurance, superior to the assurance we can have of generalizations from experience, that nothing future experience can reveal will falsify it. What ever experience may bring, the mind will be there; whatever belongs to the mind itself is assured in advance. This is the one point upon which all conceptions which recognize an a priori have agreed.[45]

The a priori is legislative with respect to the possible content of reality but not with respect to the possible content of an experience which is to

be grist for our interpretation. In that the a priori is not normative with respect to the content of reality, the kind of certainty which attaches to it in light of its a priori status does not impinge on the degree of certainty or credibility which we can accord to the interpretations we make. Ourrassurance is that our experience will conform to some categorial feature with which we endow experience; however, we have no assurance regarding whether it will conform with any particular interpretation which we may happen to ascribe to its content. "An a priori principle of interpretation is not required to bring all experience within that category whose principle it is. Precisely what it expresses is the criteria of reality, of a certain type such as the physical.[46] The most significant indication of the fact that the a priori principle which 'confers' reality on the content of a presentation is Lewis' repeated contention that, unlike in the case of an empirical judgment, the hypothesis which the judgment represents is disconfirmed, or weakened by a recalcitrant experience. In the case of an a priori principle there is no such disconfirmation forthcoming from future experience.

Knowledge of a particular is a priori in the sense that the "particular can, and must be, subsumed under some universal of which knowledge is possible a priori."[47] However, construing the import of the question differently, we find that such knowledge is not possible in the sense in which "mind, confronted with a given content of experience, can with absolute certainty refer it to its proper category, and thus interpret what is now given in such wise that no further experience could invalidate that interpretation."[48] Any decision regarding the veridicalness of the original experience must await the eventual outcome of future experience and cannot be made on the basis of attention to the a priori principle. "The empirical object is always such that we are capable of being

deceived about its 'true nature'." [49] The conclusion to be drawn here is that the question of justification of empirical belief has a ready made solution in the a priori principles. Lewis, however, blocks the use of the a priori as such a solution. The applicability of the a priori is, in a sense, purely hypothetical. The suggestion seems to be that they stand ready in the eventual case that a sentient observer is confronted by experience. Their validity, however, does not flow from experience, and consequently does not owe its continued tenability to such experience. While the first half of the last statement is true the latter is most certainly not. "The principles of categorial interpretation are a priori valid of all possible experience because such principles express the criteria of the veridical and the real."[50] Should the question of the validity of the a priori principles arise, the justification to be offered is a pragmatic one regarding the utility of the categories as ordering principles for the experiences which we do have. The justification is not analogous to the justification expected when there is a question about the validity, tenability, or credibility of an empirical claim.

THE PROBABLE NATURE of EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

The judgments expressed in predications are fraught with the uncertainty which the future may bring. Yet, predication as the paradigm form for the expression of our knowledge cannot escape that uncertainty. "The use of predication is completely pre-empted to the conveying of the objective, and there is no language whatever, unless of primitive cries, which expresses awareness of the given as such."[51] Lewis redeploys the thesis of infinite temporal spread in order to substantiate his contention that knowledge of empirical reality is probable only. In the earlier discussion of the nature of concepts as compared with qualia, Lewis noted that the former were meant to apply to objects whose real natures could not be

established in the course of a single encounter. Furthermore, he claimed that the predication of a property is analogous to the annunciation of an hypothesis. In the context of discussing the nature of probable knowledge, he shifts from speaking of the nature of objects per se to speaking of the truth of the predications made of those objects. Nevertheless the image of a predication as an hypothesis carries over into the question of the truth of an interpretation. "By how much does the interpretation which characterizes our knowledge of objects transcend what is given? What is involved in its complete verification?"[52] Lewis shifts from considerations of the objectivity of an experience to the truth of the interpretation of an experience. The thesis of temporal spread is deeply implicated in both. In the chapter "The Knowledge of Objects" he notes that the objectivity of an experience means "the verifiability of a further possible experience which is attributed" by an interpretation. In this case his remark seems to be guided more by considerations of the nature of the transtemporal realities which make our predicative practice possible than with the element of evidence. The emphasis on this latter notion is revealed in a claim about the truth conditions for a predication. "Obviously in the statement 'This penny is round' I assert implicitly everything the failure of which would falsify the statement. The implicit prediction of all experience which is essential to its truth must be contained in the original judgment. Otherwise such experience would be irrelevant to it. "[53]

There are two implications of this last claim which may cause problems. There are difficulties with the notion of "implicit assertion" which are best left unexamined until we look at an analogous notion in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. It is difficult to understand the sense in which an individual who makes an empirical claim can be aware of

the kinds of experiences which, when they occurred, constituted confirmation of the prediction implicit in the initial predication. There is an element of generality in the future and in statements about it which seem to constitute a difficulty for Lewis if he attaches a great deal of specificity to the statements which are implicitly asserted in the making of an objective statement. Lewis does not distinguish between "all possible experience" and "all possible experience of which the person making the prediction is the subject." The thesis of infinite temporal spread would maintain that the consequences of an event or an occurrence extend throughout time, and are not bound by the lives of any particular individual or observer. It is obviously this fact which allows me to verify the occurrence of an event earlier than the one of my own birth. It would seem plausible to maintain that the same predication made by a different individual would involve the identical set of implicit assertions about future experience which may be potentially verificatory. Lewis' emphasis on the historical or memorial residue of an occurrence seems to indicate that the problem of justification of empirical knowledge claims, in his eyes, extends beyond the confines and interests of the person. The individual necessarily works within the boundaries of a relativized conception of the truth of an utterance or predication which he may make in the course of his experience. He must realize that the fullest possible confirmation of any predication which he may make will come only through the course of his own experiences and these are finite in number, and not each of them is particular to predication at hand. There would seem to be a pragmatic criterion which might serve to govern the acceptability of a hypothesis by an individual on the basis of the realization that the potential verificatory experiences of that hypothesis are finite. The individual is less interested in the future historical consequences which follow from

an occurrence and which extend beyond his own life; they are of no value in according credibility to a hypothesis which he may entertain. What is unsettling about Lewis' account is the feeling that the reader is left with that even though verification is never complete and can never be completed and hence that knowledge is always probable.

Lewis returns to the claim that there necessarily are a priori principles if any knowledge, even the probable knowledge of predications, is to be possible. However, the reiteration of the point reveals a distinction not made before. Not only is all that could possibly confirm a predication implicitly asserted in the making of the predication, but also implicit are certain a priori criteria:

> When we make the judgment, "This penny is round," the subject "penny" and the predicate "round" both express implicitly certain a priori criteria which are definitive of the meaning of these terms in application. Being a penny, or being round, means a hundred and one various sequences in further possible experience. That these sequences would actually accrue under suitable conditions is implicitly predicted in applying these concepts to the given presentation. To be really round, this presented object must alter in appearance in certain characteristic ways if handled; and if it be measured with precision instruments, the results must be thus and so....Such explication of what is implicit in the concept sets the criteria by which further experience will verify (or falsify) the present judgment. If this setting of criteria were not a priori and incapable of being overturned by the eventualities of experience, then such experience would not be a test of the truth of the predication, or even establish a probability of it. That is to say, when we make the judgment, "This is round," what we suppose ourselves to know requires two propositions to express it fully: (1) "If this is round, then further experience of it will be thus and so (the empirical criteria of objective roundness)" and (2) "This present given is such that further experience (probably) will be thus and so." The first of these is a priori; the second is our statement of the probable empirical truth about the given object.[54]

Before the injunction implicit in this claim is to be understood clearly, Lewis feels compelled to note some important points which may have a bearing on the above. It is clear from Lewis' first point that given the limitations on the human mind he does not expect the individual to entertain, simultaneously, or even sequentially, the possible experiences

which may confirm the hypothesis in a predication. Through the web of connections which meanings have established with one another it is possible to retain a minimal conception of some empirical predicate. In light of the fact that the person must be capable of responding to a variety of situations, any of which may be relevant to the confirmation of a hypothesis he entertained some time ago, it is necessary that the concepts which he employs have in posse "the complexity of consequences" which he may encounter. "We may further note - indeed must - have this unlimited meaning in denotation in mind in a figurative sense, when we do not have it in mind explicitly. The possession of the concept or meaning is utterly irrelevant to any experience whatever, unless we could - with sufficient time and attention at least - say whether certain eventualities of experience would or would not be compatible with its application."[55] This point is incidental to our basic account of Lewis' view of the structure of justification.

The second important point which Lewis notes in explication of his two fold distinction concerns the nature of the statements employed to express the anticipations of eventualities in experience. The general form of such a statement is that of a conditional. However, it is more complex than a simple conditional, for the consequent of the original conditional is itself comprised of a conditional. " 'If this is round, then if I take two steps to the right, it will look more elliptical! 'If this is round, then if it be measured with precision instruments, the result will be thus and so.' 'If this is round, then it will not look elliptical if it is viewed from directly in front'."[56] In An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, these compound conditionals are the terminating judgments, sets of which serve to constitute the potential confirmations of the objective judgments or non-terminating judgments which express our

knowledge claims about the world. Furthermore, in that book, Lewis claims that each component of the compound conditional is itself an expression in expressive language and has as its primary referent appearances, or the given; consequently, its confirmation or verification differs from that which the truth or falsity of the conditional itself confers on the objective judgment. The consequent of the original conditional is important in another respect. "The totality of the complex 'then' clauses expresses the complete and a priori meaning of the concept 'round' in denotation."[57] The problem which this claim should raise is why what appears to be an empirical generalization, regarding the movement of a body, or an object and the subsequent occurrence of certain other experiences, should express the a priori meaning of a concept? In what sense are such empirical generalizations a priori? Are the conditionals in the consequent of the original conditional really empirical generalization? I shall return to a consideration of this problem below.

Lewis implicates empirical generalizations, and hence memory, in knowledge claims such as "This present given is such that further experience (probably) will be thus and so." A typical example of such a generalization is"'Things which look as this does, under conditions like the present, usually turn out to satisfy the criteria of roundness in further experience'."[58] The peculiarity of these empirical generalizations is that they themselves do not represent knowledge in the sense in which knowledge is restricted to objects or objective states of affairs. The subject of these empirical generalizations is the presentation which we apprehend in an act of cognition and which serves as a clue to the presence of an objective state of affairs. "Our recognition of the object - 'This is a round penny' - is the interpretation itself. But the recognition of the presentation is simply the classification of it with other

qualitatively similar appearances. The basis of our interpretive judgment is the fact that, in past experience, what appeared as this does, under circumstances like the present, has turned out to be, for example, a round penny - in a sufficiently large proportion of cases to warrant probable judgment."[59] As has occasionally been pointed out, the use of "appears" and "looks like" are often taken to signal a degree of uncertainty regarding the claim which they are employed in. Lewis implies that reports of our immediate experience are always couched in such expressive language and thus the real object is never touched by our locutions, and most certainly not by our perceptual encounters with it. Therefore, it seems puzzling for him to speak of something such as "in past experience, what appeared as this does, under circumstances like the present has turned out to be,...a round penny." The only sense in which something may turn out to be a round penny for an observer is the sense in which his subsequent experiences, the appearances which he receives, continue to be qualitatively similar to earlier penny experiences. There does not appear to be any particular type of experience in which it is conclusively confirmed or divulged to one that the object of which he has been receiving appearances is without question a solid, copper penny.

There is an interesting parallel between how Lewis conceives of the objectivity of an empirical claim and the manner in which an inductive generalization comes to be verified. He urges a parallel between the diagnostic activity of the physician and our own diagnoses of appearances on the basis of past appearances. He remarks that the type of generalization about appearances which may justify the complex conditional of our original statement is one which is rarely explicit. "Our collation of the given with similar appearances in the past is too swift and instinctive for that. This is presumably the element in human knowledge which is evolutionally basic

and is shared by us with the other animals." In support of his contention he offers the following analogy:

> The physician is often called upon to diagnose a case, not by some decisive test, but by "the picture" which the case presents. (A clinical picture is, of course, much more complex than any single presentation, but it is, so to speak, preeminently presentational in character, requiring to be identified by direct inspection and difficult or impossible to put in words.) If the physician decides, "This is measles," he does so by means of a generalization from past experience. The subject of this generalization is the class of clinical pictures like the present one. The basis of the judgment is the frequency with which such appearances in the past have been followed by a later case-development which answers to the elaborated medical concept "measles." The ascription of this concept is an interpretation, whose main significance is that of prognosis.[60]

"Our knowledge of objects in general is such a diagnosis of appearances." The upshot of our ascription of a concept to an appearance is that we implicitly make a prognosis on the course of the appearances which we can expect to encounter in the course of our future experience. Naturally, as in the case of the medical diagnosis, the tenability of the diagnosis made of the present appearance depends on the course of our antecedent experience, and on the degree to which regularities of experience were found to be followed by the presentation which we now find ourselves encountering. The implication of Lewis' remarks is that one is arguing from the occurrence of past regularities and the occurrence of a particular present appearance to the nature of future regularities. Such reasoning is probabilistic. As the bulk of our knowledge about the empirical world requires the use of empirical generalizations about past experience and is thus probabilistic, the problem of the validity of our knowledge turns ultimately on the degree to which we can accord credibility to our probability judgments. It is to consideration of this point that I now turn.

In the chapter entitled "The Empirical and Probable" Lewis turns to a consideration of that issue to which, I noted, he accorded such importance in his review of Dewey's The Quest for Certainty. He is concerned

with the relationship between the validity which we can ascribe to a knowledge claim and the grounds in reality for the validity which we do ascribe. What is presupposed about the actual nature of the world and of experience so that the ascriptions of validity which we do make are not merely ad hoc but represent sound policy? The emphasis on knowledge as implicitly predictive makes more urgent the problem of a substantial guarantee for the continuity of experience as we have had it up to a certain point. Despite the existence of conceptually necessary truths expressible in analytic statements, the major problem confronting a theory of the nature of epistemological justification is that of the subsumption of particulars under a concept. "Our subsumption of the given under concepts is, thus, always contingent upon future experience, and the a priori knowledge of universal principles does not secure any a priori knowledge of empirical particulars."[61] Lewis seems to take as his model of certainty the necessity characteristic of analytic truths. However, this certainty which attaches to the a priori principles formulating our criteria of reality is reserved for universals, and cannot take under its wing the knowledge of particulars; the certainty of the a priori principles is not transmitted to knowledge of particulars either. The divergence from a priori certainty also bespeaks a similarity between types of empirical knowledge. The similarity flows from the thesis of temporal spread.

The basic thrust of the similarity is that in the case of knowledge of particulars, just as in the case of knowledge of generalizations or laws, our knowledge "runs beyond what is given and asserts a certain regularity or predictable interconnection between experiences."[62] As all empirical knowledge entails the identification of that about which something is to be said, and there is no guarantee that that which is identified is a

term contained in an analytic judgment, i.e., it does not have its intension contained within that of another term, our knowledge of the object is fraught with the uncertainty which the use of concepts introduces. The identification of that which may be given in a particular experience "as genuinely a case which falls under the concept is something which immediate experience does not make absolutely certain."[63] While the content of that experience is as it is experienced, the justification of the identification falls ultimately on the generalizations from past experience and the anticipated future confirmations of the hypothesis which is this current identfication. It is because empirical knowledge must look to the experiential antecedents that Lewis feels the problem of its validity is analogous to the threat posed by Hume's contention that there are no necessary connections in nature. In seeking a basis for the validity of our empirical knowledge, Lewis deems it imperative to avoid solutions which relativize the contents of experience to the mind or which introduce some metaphysical hypothesis regarding the general conditions of intelligibility.

Lewis notes three differences between his own conception of the validation of empirical knowledge and Hume's skepticism; however, only the last difference is of major significance for my account of the problem of justification. Whereas Hume's skepticism was directed at the possibility of knowledge of laws, Lewis suggests that there is an affinity between that problem and the problem surrounding the identification of things. The actions and natures of things are the kinds of features which we presume to connect in our lawlike statements. Both laws and identification of things presuppose a degree of order or "reliable relatedness." The anticipations implicit in Lewisian classifications of objects only have meaning, are only understandable, if they are based on

the presumption of the possibility of a certain type of experience as actually occurring. The second point seems to hinge on Lewis' belief that Hume may not have taken Berkeley's conception of an idea as a sign seriously enough. Hume should have not been content merely to note the fact of association of ideas. He should have examined the precondition of such association; why do ideas which seem to occur together repeatedly do so? Our a priori principles encapsulate the affinity which ideas have to fall into certain categorial slots. Without the presumption that experiences do so, the conception of a law itself could never arise.

The major difference between Lewis' approach and the Humean problem arises over the validity of empirical knowledge. Having indicated the tenuous nature of identifications due to the thesis of infinite spread, Lewis retreats to showing that if empirical knowledge is seen to involve probable judgment and probable judgment can be assured, then the validity of empirical knowledge can be guaranteed. He notes that if more than the assurance of probable judgment were needed to offset the specter of skepticism then our defenses would crumble in the face of skepticism's onslaught. However, while assuring the ground of probable judgment, we must not allow ourselves to fall back on metaphysical presuppositions such as "the uniformity of nature." Lewis sets off the logical considerations relevant to the validity of a probable judgment from the empirical considerations which may bear on validity. I turn to the logical point first.

There is an important indication that Lewis does not conceive of the problem of the validation of probable judgments as one which requires for its solution considerations independent of those circumstances of the making of a particular judgment or the holding of a

belief. It is essential to retain a distinction between what is stated in a judgment and the stating of it by a particular individual. "We must not confuse what is stated with the judgment of any informed and intelligent person who makes the statement. The intent of the judgment is not the statement judged probable, but that it is probable."[64] The implication that the validity of a probability judgment rests either on the existence of an objective fact with which the judgment accords or on a probability assessed independent of the circumstances of someone's actual belief is wholly erroneous. "Probable knowledge is always relative to him who has it, in the sense that it depends on whatever other relevant knowledge he may possess."[65] A probability judgment is analogous to a deductive argument, although the premisses are not what confer certainty on the conclusion. The probability expressed as the conclusion of some bit of reasoning is asserted on the strength of the data which one entertains as premisses, and which stand as grounds to the probability judgment. It is the difference between the strength of the data for different people which accounts for the difference between the degree to which a person entertains as credible or as well grounded one probability judgment in comparison to another. A probability judgment not only implicitly asserts that "A is B is not certain", but it also asserts that the probability of A's being B is relative to certain premisses.

Once the probability judgment is assured as valid, its validity is taken as a mark of truth. This is an important relationship. There is little in the way of an explicit account of truth in Lewis. His thesis of temporal spread would not seem to allow for the kind of direct inspection and confirmation which are hallmarks of a correspondence theory. Similarly his claim that the validity of a probability judgment does not concern any direct relation between the judgment expressing the probability and a fact

also supports the view that Lewis doesn't adopt an unabashed correspondence theory of truth:

> The conclusion "A is probably B" is elliptical; what is validly meant is "On the premises such and such, A is probably B." This might easily be overlooked. One might say, "But since my premises are true, it is true without qualification that A is probably B." So phrased, the conclusion "A is probably B" seems to refer directly to some objective fact. But it is just this oversight which must be guarded against. As referring directly to objective fact, some new bit of evidence or the next moment's experience may completely alter the probability - may turn what was probable into something certainly true or certainly false or something more probable or less probable than before.[66]

This conception throws important light on the way in which apprehensions of sense may be absolutely certain to the person having them at the time of having them. Initially, the having of a qualitative experience does not conform to the strictures of the thesis of temporal spread; insofar as there is no conceptualization involved, the confirmation of the content of the experience is immediate. Lewis' above remarks may be taken to imply that in the case of the apprehension of the given there may be no further objective fact which may increase or decrease the probability with which the belief that a certain experience had a certain quality is entertained.

Perhaps the notion of data relative to the apprehension of the content of a presentation is conceptually confused. Lewis does suggest that the evaluation of the situation with the intent of asserting a probability judgment is a conscious affair, does involve inference. On the other hand, the assertion of the content of a presentation which is given is thought to have the certainty it has because it represents a non-inferential belief. Thus, strictly speaking, there may be no sets of relevant data which may serve to increase or decrease the probability of the apprehension of the given. When faced with the given one cannot commit logical error about the relationship of probability premisses to

the conclusion, nor can one reveal ignorance about the relevance of certain data to the credibility with which the belief in the occurrence of the presentation is held. There are no relevant data.

The relationship between validity of the probability judgment and its truth is not meant to represent a claim on the possible nature of objective fact. The validity of the probability judgment is an assessment of an argument, analogous to speaking of a deduction as valid. If a probability judgment is valid then it can be said to follow from the premisses which constitute its data. That the judgment does follow from such grounds constitutes reason for an individual to believe as true that which the probability judgment asserts. The fact of their being data from which the judgment follows may be said to constitute the warrant increasing ground of the probability judgment.

Lewis turns next to a distinction between empirical generalizations which deserve the status of law, and those which while not unexceptionable, nevertheless do serve our everyday practical needs with a relatively high degress of efficiency. This latter class of generalizations are in need of justification in light of the fact that they are defeasible. He refers to this class as "statistical generalizations". Insofar as the bases of generalizations are to be found in the countless empirical particulars which we encounter, their validity seems to stand or fall with the validity of our singular judgments:

> It is obvious that all empirical knowledge eventually goes back to knowledge of empirical particulars. Generalizations have their ground in the coincidence of such particulars. Knowledge of the particular functions also as the basis of the <u>applicability</u> of general principles which are not empirical but a priori. And knowledge of the particular is rooted in immediate experience. The first apprehension, so to speak, is of given appearances, having a specific and later recognizable character, and of their continuity with further equally specific experience. Coincidence of such progressions in immediacy give rise to habits of action, which may become explicit in generalizations of the form "What appears like

> this will turn out thus and so." Granted that such coincidence in experience can establish the probability for the future, we have in the immediate awareness of the given that certainty which becomes the basis of a probable knowledge of the particular object or the occurrence of an objective property.[67]

SUMMARY

While most foundationalist positions recognize a two-tiered conception of knowledge and thus modes of justification, Lewis' reliance on sense certainties argues for two types of generalization each of which requires its own justification. The primary encounter with an object engages our classificatory sensibility. The application of a concept to an appearance is probable, requiring for its justification an antecedent generalization not about objects but about the concordance of appearances in past experience. Properly categorized or conceptualized this appearance, now on the road to objecthood, in turn, itself becomes a particular about which and from which further generalizations are made. These second level generalizations assert "a universal connection between what is denoted by some concept and a further character or property, not implied by that concept."[68] The probability attaching to the generalization at the second level is a compounding of the probability of the first order generalization. Despite the fact that our knowledge may be measured in terms of these compounded probabilities what is not altered is the basis of the probabilities themselves in the immediate experience of an individual.

Footnotes to Chapter IV

[1]Clarence Irving Lewis, "Review of John Dewey's The Quest for Certainty", Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis, ed. John D. Goheen and John L. Mothershead Jr. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 69.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Clarence Irving Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1956), p. 39.

[8]Ibid., p. 46.

[9]Ibid., pp. 60-61.

[10]Ibid., p. 121.

[11]Ibid., p. 62.

[12]Ibid., p. 118.

[13]Ibid., p. 120.

[14]Ibid., p. 121.

[15]Ibid., p. 123.

[16]Ibid., p. 131.

[17]Ibid., p. 135.

[18]Ibid., p. 65.

[19]Ibid., pp. 135-36.

[20]Ibid., p. 132.

[21]Ibid., p. 157.

[22]Ibid., p. 158.

[23]Norman Malcolm, "The Verification Argument", Knowledge and Certainty, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 1-58.

[24]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 125.

[25]Ibid., pp. 152-53.

[26]The memory image or memory trace, must on Lewis' account, bear the "marks of pastness". It is not acceptable to claim that a memory image is a faded impression of a past event, and because of its "fadedness" is recognized to be related to the past. It is plausible to maintain that we should tamper with the nature of the memory as little as possible, if at all, so as not to allow the charge that the memory is not an accurate representation of the event of which it is thought to be the memory. (Of course it is possible that we could be said to remember accurately or remember correctly without mentally reproducing all the particulars and details of the original occasion). The previous objection, however, implies that the uniqueness thought intrinsic to a memory is lost if the memory trace or the memorial residue of the event is modified so as to incorporate a mark of pastness. Lewis is quite unrevealing about those "given characters which are the marks of pastness." (Mind and the World Order, p. 153.) The temptation may be to conceive of those characters along the lines of the phenomenally given, as being sensuous or feeling in quality and as being unalterable by the activity of thought. It is not helpful to urge that the characters are, in their own right, qualia which are peculiar to past occurrences, but which when "appended" to or "ingredient in" the memories of past occurrences are "intrinsically recognized" to be signs of the pastness of the occurrence to which they are attached. In light of the epistemological importance which Lewis accords memory in his account of the justification of empirical beliefs a clear cut statement by Lewis on the involvement of concepts and images in recollection would have been welcome. He is none too helpful in offering adequate "marks of pastness". If memory can be understood to be given then it has an uninterpreted component as well as an interpreted one. Are we to invest the uninterpreted, the given, aspect with the marks of pastness, or are these marks to be nothing more than consequences of our present interpretation of some presented content? Dealing with memory, other than on the traditional empiricist criterion of vivacity, seems very much a problem of classification. If memory is an achievement in the sense that we could have failed to remember correctly, then it seems that there is reason to think of memory as involving interpretation. But what exactly is it which receives this interpretation? We should eschew attempts to pinpoint mental features of memories and attempt to understand memory claims as relative to other statements which can be made in the logical space of statements of everyday discourse. When Lewis speaks of certain marks identifiable in presented experience the natural inclination is to think of some phenomenally presentable aspect of a memory trace. When he says that one item would be a certain kind of unalterability and unresponsiveness to desire and purpose, we are not provided with a criterion which necessarily gets us beyond the kind of givenness which, Lewis alleges, characterizes our ordinary perceptual encounters. To be presented with the same image repeatedly doesn't necessarily entail that the image therefore has some present(ed) and presentable mark of pastness relevant to our taking the image as connected with a past occurrence. On the other hand,

it may be claimed that the ability to make a comparison as expressed in a locution such as "the same x" entails the existence of earlier occurrences of some perceptual encounter. But a claim of similarity is only covertly a claim about the past. Our paradigm claims about the past are not covert references to the similarity of earlier events to presently occurring ones. In offering indubitability and unresponsiveness as criteria, Lewis is creating an ambiguity. It is true that for a memory to be accurate to the occurrence the memory should not betray the actual nature of the occurrence, but the unalterability of the memory with respect to the occurrence is not necessarily the unalterability of some presented or presentable aspect which is a residue of or a token of the memory. For further materials relating to Lewis' views on memory and their relation to his general epistemological concerns, the reader is directed to Arthur Danto's Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 34-44, and Charles Hartshorne's "Lewis' Treatment of Memory" in The Philosophy of C.I. Lewis, ed. P.A. Schilpp (La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Co. Inc., 1968), pp. 395-414.

[27]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 151.

[28]Ibid., p. 152.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Alvin I. Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing" Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, ed. Michael D. Roth and Leon Galis (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 83. The relevant article by Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" is included in the same anthology, pp. 35-39. In addition, a bibliography will direct the interested reader to other articles spawned by the Gettier analysis of knowledge.

[31]Ibid., p. 71.

[32]Goldman's analysis here might serve as an account of what it is to remember, but it does not explain (and this is Lewis' concern) how we recognize something as past, how we detect the "marks of pastness", or what these marks are. Consider the remarks in footnote 26 beginning on page 157.

[33]Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 195.

[34]Ibid., pp. 195-96.

[35]Ibid., p. 196.

[36]Ibid., p. 197.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid., p. 198.

[39]Ibid., p. 199.

[40]Ibid., p. 198-99.

[41]Ibid., p. 211.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid., p. 212.

[45]Ibid., pp. 212-13.

[46]Ibid., p. 222.

[47]Ibid., p. 223.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Ibid., p. 227.

[51]Ibid., p. 279.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid., pp. 279-80.

[54]Ibid., pp. 284-85.

[55]Ibid., p. 286.

[56]Ibid., p. 288.

[57]Ibid., p. 289.

[58]Ibid., p. 290.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid., p. 291.

[61]Ibid., p. 315.

[62]Ibid., p. 319.

[63]Ibid., p. 318.

[64]Ibid., p. 324.

[65]Ibid., p. 326.

[66]Ibid., pp. 329-30.

[67]Ibid., pp. 335-36.

[68]Ibid., p. 336.

CHAPTER V:

THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION IN AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND VALUATION

INTRODUCTION

At the close of the last chapter I sought to indicate how Lewis' account of valid probable judgment served as a norm for a theory of reasonable belief. Apart from occasional references to the sources of error in judgment, Lewis has devoted little attention to the belief element in judgment and in the development of an account of knowledge. This deficiency is more than made up for in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. My primary purpose in this chapter is to review his account of knowledge as justified true belief and to compare the views in Mind and the World Order and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation with respect to the nature and degree of the foundationalist commitment in each. Apart from necessary excursions to other parts of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, the bulk of the discussion will focus on the materials of Book II.

Beginning with an account of the relationship between the three types of statements which Lewis employs to lay out the scheme of expressing and justifying our empirical beliefs, I then turn to an account of the elements of metaphysical realism which connect up with the analysis which the three statements imply. The necessary contrast between the verification relevant to the terminating judgments and the justification characteristic of our empirical beliefs is drawn. Reference is made to an article of

Peter Unger's in which, on the basis of an analysis of being reasonable or being justified in a belief, he concludes that there must be a sense in which someone must know something for certain if that same someone can be said to know anything at all. This point meshes well with the kind of foundationalism which Lewis espouses and provides an added dimension from which we can assess Lewis' own account of justified belief. A parallel account of probable knowledge and probable data is discussed in order to further refine Lewis' account of belief. The remainder of the chapter concentrates on the importance of Lewis' contention that we must accord deliverances of memory a prima facie credibility. By examining an article of Roderick Chisholm's an effort is made to bring the idea of memory's prima facie credibility within the pale of Lewis' account of the given.

NON-TERMINATING and TERMINATING JUDGMENTS

In Chapter IV, I have already indicated the manner in which Lewis conceives of encounters with direct experience and attempts to report the contents of those experiences. He noted that there is a predominance of certain types of locutions, such as "looks like", "seems like", "appears to be", etc. When language is being used to "formulate a directly presented or presentable content of experience" it is being put to its expressive use. Such use, however, because of the implication that the speaker may not be absolutely certain about that which he takes himself to be delivering a report about, is meant to stand in contrast to language in its objective use. The implication conveyed by the objective use of language is that a certain factuality has been established as true. The difference however goes deeper. The primary referents of expressive uses of language are appearances; on the other hand, objects are the primary referents of objective uses of language. The expressive use of language

is intentional. There is no implied commitment regarding the objective reality of that which has appeared. The use of expressive language should alert the hearer of a report made in such language that the intent of the speaker is not to transcend the content of the presentation in any way, but is rather to limit himself to describing the features of the presentation. Lewis retains his commitment to the thesis of infinite temporal spread of an object or occurrence and sees the ultimate cognitive worth of a statement of empirical fact as lying in the occasions for potential verification of the initial claim made in expressive language. In Mind and the World Order he introduced the complex conditional which expresses the procedure for verifying the hypothesis expressed in an expressive judgment. In An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation we are given a name for the type of judgment which is an implied consequent of the original objective judgment. The complete verification of an objective judgment, a judgment of objective fact, would require a potentially infinite set of verificatory experiences. However, the warrant of the hypothesis which the original objective judgment expresses may be increased, piecemeal, by single occasions of experiencings of predicted consequences. "Prediction of a particular passage of experience, describable in expressive language - may be called terminating." [1] Insofar as the referent of the expressive statement is an appearance, even though apprehensions of the given are not knowledge, Lewis allows that the terminating judgments have decisive and complete verification and falsifications. A judgment of objective fact, because it spins out a trail of terminating judgments for all time, is itself spoken of as non-terminating judgment. Such a judgment can never really receive decisive confirmation or falsification; the warrant with which it is believed can only be incremented or decreased depending on the fortunes of the particular terminating judments which constitute

a potentially infinite confirmation class. The cognitive worth of an objective judgment is wholly dependent on the possibility of there being some experience which could constitute confirmation or even disconfirmation of the classification (or predication) which is projected in the making of the objective judgment. "If particular experiences should not serve as its corroborations, then it cannot be confirmed at all; experience in general would be irrelevant to its truth or falsity."[2]

Lewis places great store in the distinctions represented by the three types of statement recently noted. He as much as suggests that they facilitate the laying out of the justificatory hierarchy implicit in knowledge; they make perspicuous the relations which serve to sustain our knowledge claims. If we grant, as Lewis obviously feels we must, that our empirical claims are ultimately justified by reference to presentations of the given, then, unless "the fact of presentation itself be distinguished from the objective fact it is cue to or corroborates, we shall never be able to understand or formulate the manner in which objective belief receives its warrant, or to explain how a belief which has some justification may nevertheless prove later to have been mistaken."[3]

In strengthening the account of terminating judgments in Chapter VIII of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Lewis delivers a wealth of material which it is necessary to present in brief compass. Its relevance for the discussion of the justification of empirical belief is less direct than is its importance for conveying a sense of Lewis' philosophical allegiance. It is evident from the remarks in Chapter VIII that the mechanics of Lewis' analysis in terms of objective judgments and terminating judgments is very much a means of resolving the question

of realism and phenomenalism or idealism as a philosophical issue. However, in the course of supporting a certain analysis of the conditional contained in the terminating judgment it becomes evident that Lewis does not merely propose this particular reading because it is most consonant with purely logical insights, but because it is meant to preserve deeper intuitions about the basic nature of the structure of epistemic justification. Terminating judgments literally do not touch the physical objects or events in the same manner that the objective judgment, when asserted, is meant to. However, this does not mean that the terminating judgment does not have its ultimate referent in experience. The virtue of the terminating judgment in contrast to the objective judgment is that, in not touching objective reality in the manner that the latter type of judgment does, it allows for the possibility of an open future wherein confirmatory experience may lie in wait for the projection of a hypothesis represented in one of our classifications. "Only by confining statements to an intent thus formulatable in expressive terms can anything be proved conclusively by single experiences: and only if <u>something</u> is conclusively true by virtue of <u>experience</u>, can any existence or fact of reality be rendered even probable."[4] Terminating judgments are an essential ingredient in the basic program of Lewis' foundationalism. They express those expected experiential circumstances which, when they occur, conclusively confirm or disconfirm the prediction; in this sense the <u>having</u> of an experience is a truth certifying ground for the terminating judgment.

As though bending over backwards to accommodate the instrumentalist emphasis of Dewey, Lewis seeks to stress the importance of man's active nature in the confirmation of terminating judgments. He suggests a view of experience somewhat consonant with out reading of his approach in <u>Mind and the World Order</u>. Experience as distinct from reality is constituted

by the assumption of an active attitude by the individual. Lewis deems it important to sever the problem of determinism of the physical order from that which may relate to the individual and the course of experience which that individual may encounter. Our objective judgments are asserted with the intent of asserting categorical facts about the world; in this sense the world of independent physical reality represents the trans-temporal stability which accounts for the possibility of having experience and validating knowledge; this is a concern which, we saw, was central to Lewis' critique of Dewey. Lewis has nothing to say in the direction of a metaphysical thesis about the status of a person. However, his emphasis on man's active nature and its importance in furthering knowledge would seem to imply that Lewis might conceive of a person as a locus of certain dispositions which, in Dewey-like fashion, are actualized upon occasions of felt-need, be that need biological or epistemological. The cognitive import of all our categorical claims about objective reality can only be brought out if experiences in which discrete confirmations of the terminating judgments which are implied by our objective judgments may occur. Obviously such a view places a heavy burden on the notion of experience or 'possible experience.' But Lewis directs little attention to revealing the implications of such a notion. The occurrence of possible experiences presuppose the ability to act in certain ways. In that sense, a possible experience is the outcome, or upshot of a mode of action. Lewis does not suggest that an individual is forever the subject of experiences in the sense that he is forever acting. Without the mediation of action, the categorically predictable realities which we aim to capture in our knowledge claims do not cease to exist but merely elude us as occurrences which <u>we</u> as opposed to some other may be able to verify. The determinism which directs the elements of objective reality

has no bearing on us in the most obvious sense. Nevertheless, they do attract our interest, either because of conceptual problems which arise regarding their natures, or simply because, by accident, we happened to have been a casual spectator at the occurrence of one of these events. We are drawn into the complexity of its causal history; our attention is arrested; we are momentarily unsettled to the point of initiating certain experiments which can serve to answer questions about the phenomenon which may have arisen.

The apparent severing of connections of the verificatory experience from the experience or objective reality which is verified requires a conceptual antidote. The emphasis on chosen modes of action as productive of experiences which may serve to confirm a hypothesis may imply to the reader that the objective realities themselves are wholly dependent for their existence on an individual's assumption of and implementation of an active attitude. But it is the cognitive significance of some objective reality and not the actual existence of that reality which is dependent on such action. As noted above, the objective reality is the occasion for our action but may not itself be the explicit cause in the sense in which one ball pushing a second may cause the second to move. There is no inexorable causal relation between an objective reality and our assumption of an investigative posture. We may desist from asking questions and initiating experiments. However, it should be realized that the constraints on our modes of experimentation are those dictated by an objective reality; we <u>can</u> choose some facets of the experiment but we <u>cannot</u> choose to dictate the reality with which we are confronted.

In addition to offering an analysis of the "If-then" relationship involved in the terminating judgment, Lewis demonstrates that the

proper logical construal of the relationship between the antecedent and consequent of the conditional will make perfectly perspicuous the implied commitment which one would have if one believes a statement of objective fact. In the analysis of the relationship it is important to preserve the counter-factual element. The belief in an objective reality independent of one's mental activity entails that even if the antecedent of the conditional is not fulfilled, nevertheless the truth of the conditional can be affirmed. "I believe that if I should turn my eyes the predicted consequence would follow: and it is only because I believe the validity of such untested predictions that my belief is taken to be significant of objective fact."[5] From further remarks apropos of this point it seems as though Lewis does not necessarily view a belief as episodic in the sense of being entertained and requiring justification on occasions when challenged. He entertains a notion of sets of partial beliefs which are constituents in or of a larger belief about some objective state of affairs. "My belief that if I should turn my eyes right (though I do not do so at present), the thing seen would be displaced to the left, is part of my belief in the objective reality of what I am looking at."[6] It is not clear to what extent such a belief may constitute a part of the belief in the objective reality. At times Lewis seems to imply that the full import of an objective statement lies in the set of terminating judgments which are implied by the objective judgment. Does Lewis mean to imply that the objective judgment is nothing more than the set of possible experiences signified or predicted by the terminating judgments which are implied by the objective judgment? He is firm in his belief that it is the decisive confirmations of single terminating judgments which add to the credibility of the objective judgment. Is he saying that before we can believe in the reality which the objective judgment signifies we

must believe in each of a set of potentially infinite terminating judgments which are implied by the objective judgment? This is a highly unlikely view. There is perhaps a plausible sense in which we can understand what it means for something to be a partial belief or a constituent belief of a larger belief and that is the sense in which the partial belief is implied by the larger belief, and where whatever serves to confirm (in some degree) the partial belief may also serve to confirm (partially) the larger belief.

The belief in an external world has interesting repercussions in Lewis' account of belief and justification. Lewis is not inclined to suggest that belief in an external world is an act of animal faith required to counter the force of skeptical theses. At the same time it is evident, as I noted, that belief is not something which is continuously requires defence. The hallmark of a rational or reasonable individual is his capacity to offer a reconstruction or justification of how he comes to his belief. Obviously in the case of an objective belief in Lewis' sense the mode of justification involves reference to terminating judgments. What is presupposed in the possibility of a rational justification is the assumption of potential future verificatory instances consequent upon my own action. "In fact it is obvious that our sense of reality is a kind of continuous belief in innumerable objective facts which, at any given moment, we do not test at all."[7]

Lewis continues to emphasize the notion of partial beliefs or constituent beliefs. If one has a belief in some objective reality then what distinguishes that belief from "the subjectivistic conception that it exists only when and as perceived" is the fact that my belief in the objective reality includes belief in and commitment to a number of other propositions regarding the status of an ideal but normal observer, who

would satisfy certain conditions if he were to take up his role of observer in certain circumstances. The importance of this normal observer is that he serves to represent a kind of operational elaboration of what would happen if we were to encounter experiences or objects or events which we in fact do not, and yet which we believe to exist during the time that we are not experiencing them.

The analysis of the 'if-then' connection which preserves the truth of the hypothesis irrespective of the truth of the antecedent of the conditional is the one most consonant with the Humean suggestion that there may be connections of fact in experience. The tenability of such analysis presupposes the transtemporal realities of which Lewis spoke in his review of Dewey. There must be basis in objective fact for the connection which our belief in the truth of the hypothesis represents independent of the truth value of the antecedent. Such basis in objective fact is constituted by what Lewis terms "matter-of-fact-connections" or "natural connections" or "real connections.""The consequences of a hypothesis in this sense of 'consequence', might be called 'its natural consequences' or 'real consequences'. These names would be appropriate because this sense of 'if-then' is the one connoted in any assertion of causal relationship or of connection according to natural law. It is the kind of connection we believe in when we believe that the consequences of any hypothesis are such and such because of 'the way reality is' or because the facts of nature are thus and so."[8]

Unlike Hume, Lewis does not insist that the real connections which make possible the expectation of future verificatory experience should necessarily be inexorable and unbreakable connections which exist between objective states of affairs. To insist on such necessary connection is to open the road to skepticism. The occurrence of the

action spoken of in the antecedent of a terminating judgment is to be understood as serving as a valid probability index to the occurrence of the consequence of the conditional.

CONFIRMATION OF TERMINATING JUDGMENTS

Lewis turns to consider two questions which he postponed considering earlier in the chapter on the relation between terminating judgments and objective beliefs. In the discussion of the degree to which the disconfirmation of the consequent of a terminating judgment may serve decisively to overthrow the objective judgment of which it is an implication we first come to see hints of the commitment to a coherence theory of justification. We shall return to the problems which Lewis feels attend the adoption of such a view. Direct inspection of cognitive experience itself will confirm the doubt that the non-occurrence of an expected experience does not constitute decisive disconfirmation of the objective judgment. "For example; what I see arouses belief in a real doorknob in a certain position before me. And when I put out my hand to grasp it, the eventuation of the expected feeling of contact will constitute a confirmation of this belief as highly probable. But suppose I fail to locate and turn the knob with my hand: shall I be convinced forthwith that my belief in a doorknob where I seemed to see it is false? As a fact, no."[9] (The dilemma seems to be analogous to the one we are confronted with in the Quine-Duhem view on the falsification of the component of a hypothesis.[10]) "If such failure occurs, I shall be puzzled; but perhaps as much inclined to doubt my sense of touch as my sense of sight, and rather more disposed to doubt the accuracy of my coordination than either of these. The test in question is the most usual and practical one which could readily be suggested for the belief in question, and as nearly decisive as any."[11] One way

of accounting for our intuition that a contrary instance or the non-occurrence of an expected consequence may and should constitute decisive disconfirmation of the objective statement is that of assuming that the consequences are thought to be solely relevant to the hypothesis implicit in the objective judgment. Another way to say this would be to claim that they constitute evidence only for the assertion made in the objective judgment. It is problematic as to how this can be ascertained and if ascertained even assured. Lewis, as I have already indicated, views our belief in an objective judgment as tied into the belief in terminating judgments, as implied by the objective judgment. However, he does not indicate, as perhaps he should, that the belief in the credibility of the objective judgment extends beyond the terminating judgments to other auxiliary beliefs which we implicitly believe though do not explicitly assert whenever an objective judgment is affirmed. In such a case the non-occurrence of an expected consequence would force us to reconsider the tenability of any of a number of these auxiliary hypotheses rather than the objective judgment itself.

Even though, as the immediately preceding quote notes, we choose our tests so as to be as decisive as possible, we haven't such a degree of assurance in the outcome or the relevance of the test to the objective belief that "one would hazard his life and hope...on it without a second thought."[12] As Lewis notes, there may be too many alternative and equally plausible alternatives for the explanation of the outcome of any particular terminating judgment. These alternatives may be more credible in their own right than the truth or falsity of the objective judgment which is being subject to test. Lewis is acutely concerned with the problem of how much objectivity we are to accord to the standing test conditions the factuality of which necessarily may be presupposed in increasing the weight of a

hypothesis when the hypothesis is put to the test. Insofar as objective claims can be practically though not theoretically certain, the objective state of affairs referred to or implied in the test conditions which may be necessary before a test of an objective belief is run, are themselves uncertain and could justifiably require their own confirmations. Were the test conditions to be stated in objective terms, "the statement of test procedure and results will omit the questions centrally important for the epistemological problem of our assurance of objective physical facts."[13] The validity of our test results must be weighed against what we can reasonably be sure of at the time of initiating the test. Ultimately, as Lewis' foundationalism compels him to urge, such assurance must be formulatable in terms of what can be actually given. But this provides a clue to the problem's solution:

> Thus if there are conditions of objective fact for the carrying out of any test, result of which will confirm or disconfirm an objective belief, still the <u>determinable</u> conditions, which should qualify the resultant confirmation or disconfirmation, are not those of objective fact but only those which may be directly given and ascertained and which may be <u>indicative</u> of the objective and 'ideal' conditions of test. What we may fully determine, for example, is that the apparatus <u>appears to be</u> a standard test apparatus in good working order.[14]

The solution involves the eliding of the standing conditions' observable signs into the given aspect of the objective belief which is to be put to the test. "Thus those conditions which are directly pertinent to a confirmation and genuinely ascertainable are not objective facts but must be included amongst the given appearances at the time of test."[15]

RATIONAL BELIEF

Even though the most frequent avowals of his foundationalism stress the importance of sense certainties in order to add weight to the probabilities which are the bases of judgments, Lewis is attuned to the general problem of erecting a criterion of rational belief and

consequently stresses the problem of justification, distinguishing it from that of the verification of an empirical belief. Cognitive evaluation of an assertion looks not only to the truth of what is asserted but also to the warrant or ground of the belief. The a priori establishment of our meanings constitutes adequate rational grounds when it comes to justifying our analytic statements, however such grounding is not available for empirical beliefs. Unlike statements of what is immediately given, whose only ground is the immediate experience which also serves to determine the statement as true, empirical judgments have both the forward looking and retrospective dimension. The test of an objective judgment, as we have seen, involves the testing of terminating judgments which predict expected experiential consequences in the future. However, the justification of that same judgment "looks only to the grounds of its credibility which lie in the present and past."[16]

Lewis suggests an image of knowledge and belief as subject to the Heraclitean flux of added confirmations. The belief entertained about a subject matter today is not the same belief as was entertained yesterday even though it may be expressed in the same proposition. The salient difference accounting for their non-identity is that discrete verifications may have occurred in the intervening period; consequently, the degree of warrant which the presently entertained belief now has may have been increased if the test confirmed the earlier objective belief.

Amidst qualifications about the certainty of our empirical knowledge claims, Lewis,with his remarks about probability and the prima facie credibility which may be accorded to reports of memory, developed an account of rational or justified belief which would provide adequate grounds for the acceptance of beliefs on seemingly rational grounds. A recent article by Peter Unger poses an interesting dilemma to theories

of knowledge which, on the one hand, seem to contend that there can never be absolute assurance about an empirical knowledge claim, and those which, on the other hand, still attempt to develop an account of what it means for an individual to be reasonable in holding a belief or to be justified in holding a belief. Numerous analyses of knowledge recruit an evidence or justification condition, at the same time, if knowledge, in the strict sense which entails absolute certainty, is not fulfilled, then we must look to shortcomings at some point in the analysans. Are we to look to the justified belief condition, for which advocates of the particular analysis of knowledge have developed an account, or are we to put pressure on other points of the analysans? The upshot of Unger's argument is that unless one knows something for certain then one is never reasonable or justified in believing anything. Clearly, in Lewis' view, one never knows anything for certain and yet one can be said to be reasonable or justified in his belief of certain matters of empirical fact. The obvious escape that Lewis employs is the incorrigible apprehensions of presentations. Either we can assume that Unger means for us to take his implication as endorsing a conclusive skepticism about both knowledge in general and justified belief or else as endorsing the existence of something akin to epistemic givens though not necessarily analogous in properties to those urged by Lewis in his phenomenalistic account of the given in Mind and the World Order.[17]

A further point in Unger's paper is that retreat may be made to notions such as consistency in order to deliver adequate analyses of 'reasonableness' and 'being justified'. However, reliance on such pragmatic notions as consistency is not sufficient to the task. Lewis also denies the efficacy of a retreat to the notion of coherence as espoused by advocates of the coherence theory of truth; however, it is

not clear that he does so for reasons comparable to Unger's; as already noted, being reasonable and being justified are compatible with not knowing something with absolute certainty. Lewis' reasons for rejecting coherence as an adequate pragmatic guideline for justifying belief stems from some other feature of the notion of coherence; we shall have occasion to look at his reservations about it.

LEWIS'S ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE

I shall seek to build up to an account of the intricacies of Lewis' conception of knowledge commencing with his preliminary statements about the notion in the first chapter of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation:

> First, it is requisite that knowing be an assertive state of mind; it must intend, point to, or mean something other than what is discoverable in the mental state itself. Further, this believing attitude lays claim to truth: it submits itself to appraisal as correct or incorrect by reference to this something which it intends. Its status as knowledge is, by such intent, not determinable through examining the state of mind itself but only by the relation of it to something else. And again, no believing state is to be classed as knowledge unless it has some ground or reason. It must be distinguished not only from false belief but also from that which is groundless and from the merely fortunate hazard of assertion. Knowledge is belief which not only is true but also is justified in its believing attitude.[18]

Inspection of an idea in the mind is not adequate to determining the degree of accordance which that idea may have with that which it is an idea of. Lewis conceives two challenges which are appropriate to a knowledge claim and which must be answerable if the knowledge claim is to be accorded any credibility. The emphasis on correspondence is meant to offset or answer the first challenge; this challenge in asking what one means by a particular knowledge claim is asking for a specification of that "fact or state of affairs" which one intends, or points to in the making of his statement. Lewis considers the challenge about meaning more

fundamental than one about the grounds or warrant for the belief. It would seem that the intuition behind this assumed priority is the same intuition as governs Lewis' theory of meaning. The point of his theory of meaning is that the full import of a term or a proposition is secured by the future and potentially verificatory experiences which one is apt to encounter. However, in order that future experiences themselves have the cognitive import of evidences for the experiences which they may serve to confirm, it is essential that the individual understand that they are implied by the original judgment that he has made, that they are a part of the intensional meaning of the original claim. Were that not the case he could not count them as constituting confirmations or evidences for his initial claim.

Lewis gains in distinguishing between what is meant by a knowledge claim and what may constitute evidence or warrant for the belief in the knowledge claim. "Knowledge shades off, on the one side, into those active attitudes, induced by past experience, which are its counterpart in animal life and presumably represent the phenomenon from which genetically the human type of knowing has arisen. On the other, it merges into unconsidered response such as was originally accompanied by explicit consideration and judgment but has now become habitual and semi-automatic because it characteristically leads to satisfactory results. In such cases, the sense of what is meant is vague or indicated only by the active attitude itself; and any justifying ground is adumbrated rather than explicit."[19] In criticisms of the foundationalist positions it is often argued that the advocates of such positions have not demonstrated the necessity of the existence of immediate non-inferential knowledge. The main thrust of those criticisms has relied on the notion that advocates of immediacy have offered as cases of immediate and non-inferential knowledge instances where

the original grounds or experiences which could account for the current knowledge have been forgotten. Consequently, it is claimed that at best only a relativized conception of epistemically prior statements can be defended; this, of course, is not license to construe every proposition, grounds for which may have been forgotten or lost in the depths of memory, epistemically prior. The emphasis by foundationalists is on the proximate grounds of knowledge claims. Claims regarding the meaning or intent of a knowledge claim are themselves never considered as epistemically prior. There is a sense in which they are prior for Lewis both in Mind and the World Order and in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, but insofar as there is no hazard in venturing them as true they haven't a sufficient status to constitute the epistemically basic constituents on the basis of which we come to justify the upper reaches of our knowledge.

The emphasis on the intended meaning of a cognitive claim creates problems if yet another desideratum is attached to our initial laying out of what is involved in knowledge. If we insist that knowledge be certain, while allowing that belief be merely probable yet justifiable, we are confronted with a problem. If it is assumed that the content of an empirical claim which could be knowledge is an objective state of affairs, then the intended meaning of the knowledge claim is (in some sense) that state of affairs. However, if the closest we can approximate to knowledge is to have a probable belief then we may question whether the referent or intended meaning of our probable belief is not something different from the intended meaning of the knowledge claim? Is not the new state of affairs, that which is believed in, the fact that the state of affairs has genuine probability? The nature of the tension is not altogether straightforward. Lewis claims that the content of cognition

"must have meaning in the sense that something is signified, believed in, or asserted which lies beyond or outside of the cognitive experience itself."[20] If we were to replace the requirement of knowledge as absolutely certain with the notion of probable belief then we substitute 'So and so is genuinely probable' for 'So and so is fact'. A substitution such as this would, for Lewis, "threaten to eliminate empirical knowledge altogether. ... it would appear to substitute for assertion of the empirical fact believed in, the assertion of a logical connection (according to rules of probability) between the proposition stating this fact and certain other propositions taken for granted as premises. Such statement of a logical connection of probability may have good ground; but it is not statement of any empirical fact at all, and apprehension of it is not empirical knowledge."[21] One problem which shall require consideration is whether Lewis' opposition to the coherence theory of justification (which he criticizes for converting a logical relation into one which purports to be able to justify claims about objective matters of fact) ultimately hinges on the meaning condition attached to knowledge claims, and whether the fact that the claim that something is genuinely probable is not a "cognitive phenomenon" in the same sense as the objective state of affairs which is intended by our first belief can be a cognitive phenomenon, and whether being a cognitive phenomenon ultimately devolves on the possibility of the thing so spoken of being given in experience?

Despite the relation which Lewis' notion of verifiability has to his conception of the objectivity of an objective judgment the import of "verifiability" for the issue of justification should not be lost. Implicit in the belief that a state of affairs which is recorded in a non-terminating judgment is objective is, of course, the belief that the full import of that non-terminating judgment is revealed through further verifications. That

an individual is taken to know something is often understood to mean (among other things) that he is justified in believing that which he takes himself to know; he can be justified in believing that which he takes himself to know if he is either certain about that which he takes himself to know, or is certain about the evidence on which he may base his justification. One of the consequences of Lewis' thesis of infinite temporal spread is that theoretical certainty is an ideal and is not attainable; however, theoretical certainty is replaceable by practical certainty, and the demonstration that a belief is practically certain constitutes sufficient justificatory grounds for holding the belief. The potentially infinite chain of verificatory experiences is what stands between our objective judgments and truth. However, the fact that truth is contingent on the carrying out of predictions only serves to confirm the view that truth is not essential to an individual's entertaining a belief on a particular occasion. In one important respect this may mean that the truth of what a person takes himself to know is not a necessary condition of any analysis of what it means to say of that individual that he knows p.

The possibility of justification without complete verification, in other words, theoretical certainty, does not eliminate our concern with the truth of what we take ourselves to be asserting altogether. Much of what goes on in Lewis' account of justification occurs at the level of the implicit or the intensionally implied; the same seems to be the case here:

> Thus it lies in the nature of empirical knowledge that what we say we know, we are not sure of; and what we are sure of, does not function as cognition. The truth of empirical affirmation cannot be certified to the judgment which affirms it; it can only be assured as rationally credible. In a sense it may be said that our interest in the belief as itself cognitive still remains an interest in the truth of it. Because the success or failure of acting upon it depends upon

> its truth; and if the belief be false, then action based upon it is equally liable to disaster, whether it was justified or not. Thus our interest in the warrant of the belief as credible is sort of indirect interest in the truth of it. Still, since this truth per se is not disclosed to the judgment, we can only assess its validity as credible on the given grounds.[22]

Perhaps Lewis would have been wiser to replace "truth" in the above with "objectivity", for that clearly seems to be what he has in mind. His reservation about using that term may stem from a residue of a view in Mind and the World Order which conceives of the objectivity of an experience as consisting of the limitless chain of future experiences in which the experience may be confirmed. Lewis obviously cannot claim that we ascribe justificatory force to rationally credible propositions on the ground that we have an ultimate faith in the truth of the proposition. We can be justified on the basis of available evidence in believing something to be the case without it turning out that in fact it was the case.

We have seen that Lewis forecloses the possibility of certain knowledge by maintaining the distinction between the objective judgments and the terminating judgments which constitute classes of discrete confirmations of the former. Having replaced theoretical certainty with practical certainty an examination of rationally credible beliefs justified by reference to probabilities must engage our attention next. However, rather than examining his conception of probability in a vacuum, I shall try to indicate the points at which his account of justification comes to a rest on the account of probability before examining probability in its own right.

PROBABLE KNOWLEDGE

At the outset of the chapter on Probable Knowledge, Lewis raises anew the problem of the intent of our claims of empirical knowledge or objective belief. When we claim to know, the intent of our claim is the

factuality in which we believe. That what we take ourselves to know is not known with absolute certainty and is thus not justified in the optimal sense does not diminish our tendency to 'assert' "the factuality we be believe as being what we know."[23] As we have already noted, the problem in supplanting the factual empirical claim which is the intent of my knowledge claim with the probability claim which better represents the "fact" which I am expressing, is that it is unclear whether the empirical intent of our claim is retained. Probability is a logical relation which sustains between evidence and hypotheses and not the recording of an empirical factuality. It is not a state of affairs which could be determined by experience. (Obviously this seems to constitute one of Lewis' reasons for opposing the empirical or frequency theory of probability.)

Not only does Lewis endorse the notion that practical certainty may replace theoretical certainty as a sufficient ground for belief, i.e., as a means of justifying a belief, he clearly implies that justification itself cannot occur fixed for a particular proposition, but is synchronic and depends on available data. Insofar as the data may alter in successive apprehensions of an empirical circumstance, the only factor which seems to remain constant is the rules of induction or principles of probability. Lewis requires two senses of justification. The theory of meaning which enforces the verificationist conception of truth seems to generate an unbridgeable gap between the assertion of empirical fact (characterized by uncertainty, but potentially infinitely confirmable) and certain claims, though of doubtful status, as empirical fact. It is this tension which Lewis is recording in his worries over the conflating of claims of knowledge and claims of probabilities. He is placing claims about the probability of factual occurrences in a way analogous to the claims by

which we capture apprehensions of the given; insofar as those latter claims are not subject to disconfirmatory experience in the future they are certain at the moment of experiencing. Similarly, Lewis claims that "the point of saying that so and so is probable, instead of asserting it unqualifiedly, is that a probability statement which we are justified in making does not have to be recanted on account of any future disappointment."[24] It is doubtful, despite what Lewis seems to be suggesting in the way of a parallel between the indubitable nature of apprehensions of the given and the resistance of probability statements to disconfirmation once made, that he intends us to understand probability statements as not requiring justifications in the sense in which the apprehensions of the given do not require justification.

In turning to an account of Lewis' conception of justified belief, we find a seemingly untoward consequent but one which nevertheless is meant to preserve the epistemic distinction between certainty and probability. Lewis countenances the possibility of saying that a matter of fact may be known even though it is not strictly speaking a matter of fact, in other words is not wholly certain. The upshot of such a claim is that "we may, on occasion, 'know' something which is false."[25] Rather than rebuke Lewis for the counterintuitive tenor of this claim we should proceed to understand the more general account of justification which could allow him to make such a claim, then if that account is found wanting we may wish to return to the claim to examine it anew and draw our conclusions about its tenability accordingly.

Empirical knowledge is not basic knowledge in the sense in which basic knowledge is meant to signify that knowledge which may be arrived at without the mediation of inference. Empirical knowledge "arises as inference from empirically given data."[26] Our belief, the mode

in which our empirical knowledge is expressed, recruits a term of epistemic appraisal. "The inferable conclusion is 'Probably P,' or '"P" is probable in degree a/b.'"[27] One is justified in holding one's belief- Lewis' term here is "rational" - if the degree of assurance with which these expectations are entertained conforms to a/b, the degree of probability with which 'P' is assured. Lewis places us on notice that we are not to confuse the warranting feature of some felt psychological characteristic with that which accompanies the calculation of probabilities. A "psychological 'felt intensity'" of belief may accompany beliefs which are held with rational assurance but it need not do so. The first condition above must be supplemented by two others, which Lewis claims are needed "in order to be in accord with customary speech,... First, the degree of probability of what is believed,must be high:... And second, the grounds "D" of our inference, must be well taken; they must include all pertinent data open to our inspection."[28] Clearly all the pertinent data may include all the possible data, but all the possible data may not be open to our inspection. Certainly all the potential future verificatory experiences are discounted from the class of pertinent data which may influence the grounds on which we come to believe a certain statement. There is no room for retrospective criticism of an individual if he has satisfied the three criteria noted. Though a future experience may turn out to be other than expected and in that sense partially disconfirm the hypothesis, the credibility of which was being endorsed in the continued belief in the hypothesis, the occurrence of such a disconfirming instance can never constitute reason to say of the person holding the belief that, at the initial time that he came to entertain the belief, he was irrational, unreasonable or unjustified in doing so.

Lewis generates further problems for his definition of justified

true belief by the addition of another requirement. "If a belief 'P' is to be justified as probable knowledge, then the categorical probability statement, 'On data D, it is probable that P,' must be true and be known to be true."[29] The use of "true" and "know" in the preceding quote should not alarm; there are not two distinct senses of these two terms which Lewis is using. He definitely intends us to understand that probability relations are known with certainty and in that sense are true, and represent objective factuality. The truth of the premises asserted in 'D' must be true and the truth of them must be perspicuous to the judgment expressed in the probability inference. It is this further condition relating to what must be known antecedent to the justification of an empirical belief that creates further difficulties. "Is there any ground sufficient to warrant such belief as credible which is actually in mind? ...second; In such cases, is it possible to attest the truth of these supporting premises of the judgment?"[30]

I had noted at an earlier point that our ability to justify a present statement may hinge on the availability of statements about some fact or occurrence relevant to the content of the statement being made. Whether a statement is non-inferential or inferential may not reflect a hard and fast distinction but may hinge rather on the availability of such antecedent materials, especially in the form of memories. Lewis finds in the fact of earlier experience a possible ground for present credible belief. Earlier judgments contribute to the creation of habitual attitudes. They serve as an implicit base of present judgment in the sense that any judgment made now may be made and felt to be made credibly without "any explicit revival of those contents of previous experience"[31] which may be the basis of the habitual attitude. Lewis believes that, if necessary, it might be possible to reconstruct the formation of a belief attitude which

currently serves as the justification of an action or judgment, but that in principle such justifications are never sought. If the actions and judgments we make on the basis of the "vague and fused reminiscence" are vindicated then we have an indication of the degree to which these reminiscences are credible, and consequently serve as adequate grounds to the further projection of our hypotheses. In this way, Lewis feels we are able to skirt the problem of skepticism, for the reminiscences constitute "a given ground of this believing attitude and a genuine relation of that ground to the present belief which is sufficient to attest the validity of it as cognitive."[32] Lewis basically endorses the conception that a justification for a belief need not be occurrent or simultaneous with the belief for which it is to serve as justification. All that seems to be required is that such justification or reconstruction of how one came to believe and what one's grounds were be in principle available. Not only is the need for such justification infrequent and the grounds remote but there is the added factor that our own cognitive interests seem more concerned with future confirmations of a hypothesis than with the validity of it.

The reference to immediate and sometimes more remote data to sustain a probability inference is sufficient as far as assuring the probability judgment itself goes. However we can press the demand for a justification further, turning also to those data which constitute the premises of our categorical probability judgments, at that point we must establish that there are certainties to which all threats of justificatory regress could return and be dissolved. While the apprehensions of sense themselves constitute a class of self-certifying statements about experience Lewis contends that the kind of classification which the ascription of a quality term to a particular represents could not have been made had there

not been antecedent experiencings of similar or resembling particulars and had this fact of their resemblance not been remembered; consequently, the full pressure of the justificatory regress may come to fall squarely on the tenability or credibility of our claims to have remembered some earlier occasion correctly. The fact that the justification may fall ultimately on memory is particularly acute in two ways: 1) the possibility of a regress concerning memory itself may be generated, especially if the validity of a memory claim hinges on its truth for expectations about future experience which in turn involve memory; and 2) insofar as a generalization which presupposes memory is involved in or constitutes data for a categorical probability judgment according to the conditions for justified true belief which I have noted, those data must be known to be true, and unless the memory claim can be shown to be valid then our first thrust at any belief which comes under the stipulations of the conditions must fail of hitting the mark. It is Lewis' response to this terminal problem of justification which shall occupy my attention for the bulk of the remainder of this chapter.

JUSTIFICATION and MEMORY

While allowing that what we remember about a past occasion may be wrong, or may not even have happened, Lewis claims that we should be inclined to view our memories and discrete occasions of rememberings as analogous to cognitively significant performances which may inform us about the present or about the future, the difference being naturally that memory or remembering informs us about the past however remote. "Whatever is remembered, whether as explicit recollection or merely in the form of our sense of the past, is *prima facie* credible because so remembered."[33] At first reading we might be inclined to view Lewis as making a claim somewhat

analogous to that which he makes for apprehensions of the given, viz., that we cannot be mistaken about the content of an apprehension when we are actually undergoing the experience which provides the content of that apprehension. Furthermore, the content of the apprehension when received can never through subsequent experience be shown to be other than that which we took it to be and is in that sense immune from revision and is in that sense certain. Lewis is not claiming that we can never discover that that which we take a memory to be about may, on further experience, turn out not to have been the case; consequently, memory claims are in that sense not certain, are not immune from revision. Implicit in according a memory claim prima facie credibility is the claim that on past occasions memories have proved to be or have turned out to be accurate indicators of earlier experience. But such a principle already seems to implicate memory and induction in a manner for which Lewis has failed to account. Without generalizations resulting from experience, the presently given and indubitable data of sense are never sufficient to effect a justification of an empirical belief. An adult, unlike an infant who has had limited organized experience, is able to predict and expect certain eventuations of experience he may currently be undergoing on the basis of the generalizing he has done. The nub of the difficulty for Lewis is that while the generalizations are available for the making of justifications, their availability is simply memorial availability. "What is available directly, to my present reflective examination of my present belief, is only given presentations having the qualitative character of memory, and not the facts of past experience which are requisite."[34]

Lewis acknowledges the threat of a regress in urging that memory claims must be accorded a prima facie credibility when remembered. However,

he distinguishes between a theoretical and a practical predicament, and suggests thatthe possibility of a regress represents a theoretical problem. It is at this point that greater weight comes to be placed on his correlative notion of the congruence of memory beliefs. In both his account of memory, however, limited in Mind and the World Order and in the account of knowledge of the past in earlier sections of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation the testability of memory claims was played down. If the nature of a memory claim is understood then it should be manifest that that of which the memory purports to be an accurate record has consequences throughout time on the basis of the thesis of infinite temporal spread. Consequently, one can expect to encounter consequences of the eventremembered which may or may not serve to confirm the content hinted at by the initial memory claim.

It is strange that Lewis should fear the identification of his proposal of 'congruence' with the coherence theory of truth. The notion of 'congruence' is meant as a yardstick for assessing the degree to which statements which we believe can be retained in the set of statements which we entertain without test at a particular time; its function lies within the context of justification. The coherence theory of truth on the other hand is a criterion and a test for truth. Lewis certainly does not want congruence to constitute the criterion of the truth of a proposition though he might allow that it constitute a test for the truth of a proposition. Remember, however, that 'truth' has a rather special meaning for Lewis, tied in with his conception of a verification which is never completed.

Lewis was troubled about how we were to understand the intent of an empirical judgment if what was being judged, or rather what was being asserted was a probability relation and not something whose content was

determinable in experience. This same concern pervades his account of the a priori theory of probability as well as his characterization of the coherence theory of truth. This opposition comes to be repeated in an article entitled "The Given Element in Empirical Knowledge"; Lewis it seems finds that a merely logical relationship, such as he construes probability to be, is insufficient as a ground of belief. It is not that he is opposed to logical relationships or to probability but such relationship "of statements believed" does not contribute the critical ground of their believability.[35] The saving grace of the 'congruence' relation is that it cannot constitute the final authority for the credibility of that which might be deemed credible on the basis of its being congruent with other propositions. 'Congruence' itself must come to rest on grounds given in experience, in apprehensions of immediate experience. "The feature of such corroboration through congruence which should impress us, is the requirement that the items exhibiting these congruent relationships must - some of them at least - be independently given facts or have a probability which is antecedent. There must be direct evidence of something which would be improbable coincidence on any other hypothesis than that which is corroborated."[36] It strikes me that to speak of some occurrence as being an "improbable coincidence" is to suggest that the occurrence was not expected, or could not be expected, but such claims themselves seem to implicate something akin to explanation. To say that something is not expected is to say that the thing is not explainable.

Lewis countenances remote as well as proximate grounds for the belief in a judgment presently entertained. His doing so is not merely the result of some principle of charity or desire to conform to our basic intuitions about the kinds of things which can serve as

acceptable justificatory grounds for currently held beliefs, but clearly reflects his metaphysical conception of an object or an event as that which has pervasive consequences throughout time; it is our encounters with the residue of past occurrences, be they in the form of verbal reports, written inscriptions, memory traces that we come to confirm the occurrence of these past events. But it should be obvious by reflecting on the nature of the situation in which remote grounds are called for that the question of memory's own validity is uncompromisingly and unrelentingly introduced. There are suggestions that memory would be involved in questions of justifications even if remote grounds of current beliefs were not acceptable; Lewis, however, short circuits such a suggestion by introducing the notion of an epistemological present in which memory's involvement is minimal and consequently the question of its validity does not arise.

Lewis must have the notion of unimpeachable sense-certainties; consequently, he also must have the notion of a modulus of time in which such sense certainties can be apprehended; this is called the 'epistemological present'. His description of the epistemological present is not free of ambiguity. "We shall suggest that knowing takes place in the epistemological present, a present in which what is sensuously given is surrounded by or embedded in a mass of epistemically pertinent surrogates of past experience, in the form of memories or of the sense of past experience as having been so and so; and that such present-as-past items are capable of being elicited by attention and reflection and brought into relation with one another and with the sensuously given - all without going beyond the bounds of what is genuinely present now."[37] In Mind and the World Order the given is understood to be an abstraction which, by attention, can be lifted from the context in which it is embedded; therefore, it seems that

there is nothing controversial in Lewis' claim that the sensuously given is "surrounded by or embedded in" a context. "Epistemically pertinent" should be understood to mean "relevant to the having of knowledge." What is unclear is whether the context in which the sensuously given is currently embedded is epistemically pertinent to the having of the present experience as given, or is epistemically relevant to the having of any experience of a certain sort. When Lewis speaks of not "going beyond the bounds of what is genuinely present now," he is not saying that there is necessarily some aspect of immediacy which accompanies the memories themselves (even though that is compatible with his conception of memory,) he is trying to block an objection to the account of justified belief he is offering which sees knowledge as impossible because the confirmation of some current empirical cognition must await experience in the future. If the grounding of a presently held belief can be seen to fall within the temporal confines of the having of a particular empirical content then he feels the objection need not have force. While it does seem true that phenomenologically it appears as though there is a continuum of time surrounding the occurrence of experience such that we can, perhaps violating slightly the strict discreteness of time, think of other occurrences or facts as being simultaneous with the occurrence which is the content of our empirical cognition. However, that there may be such a mass of pertinent materials does not seem sufficient to guarantee that they alone can constitute the ground of the belief which we may be having at any particular time.

There is perhaps a more charitable reading of the claim that we need not go beyond the bounds of what is genuinely present now. Just as we do not necessarily justify every belief which we might entertain every time we entertain it so we do not necessarily remember ever occurrence at all times. In fact, it seems impossible to do so. But just as we can,

in principle, offer a justication for every belief we entertain (that is, if we implicitly mean to convey, to other people, our rationality in holding to the belief) we can also, by an act of selective attention, bring to the surface memories of past occurrences which are potentially within us. The memories are always present, even though they may not always be accessible. There are those who would argue that it is meaniggless to speak of the existence of or presence of memories other than on the occasions when they are remembered, but I shall not scout that controversy here. The memories are genuinely present in the sense that they may upon demand become accessible, but every memory which may be accessible is not necessarily given when it is demanded or called for. Once it is brought to the surface, when it can be spoken of as the object of an act of remembering, then it is given to us, at the moment of remembering, as forcefully and as unmistakenly, as if it were some phenomenal given. We naturally must distinguish between the unmistakable aspect of a memory's being given and the memory's not being mistaken about that occurrence of which it is taken to be a memory. Lewis is not claiming that a memory, when had, is necessarily an infallible record of a particular event; his claim is that there is a prima facie reason to accord the memory some status as reporting on the fact of a past occurrence. Lewis is less concerned about the representational accuracy of memory than he is about the fact that memory can secure some prima facie belief in the existence of a past (however hazily remembered) so that our inductive projections do not appear to be wholly de nuovo.

As noted in an earlier chapter, the paradigm of an empirical knowledge claim for Lewis is one made in classifying the content of a presentation; it is in judgment, where a concept is used, that the possibility of error (and thus knowledge) arises. But, in Lewis' view,

the apprehension of a presentation is non-conceptual and thus not fraught with the possibility of error which arises with the introduction of a concept in the classificatory judgment. This means that the content of the presentation as had is unmistakeable but the judgment made on the basis of the qualitative nature of the presentation is not credible solely on the basis of the infallible reception of the content of the representation. "These sense data which provide our cues to empirical belief are not, by themselves, sufficient to assure what is believed as even credible."[38] What is absent is a generalization from past experience which induces us to take the current sensuously given presentation as an indicator of the presence of some objective property. "We must be able to say; 'When so and so is given, such and such may be expected, because thishas been so in past cases'."[39] Generalizations presuppose in their formation (though not in their being explicit to the person who may have them) the occurrence of experiences qualitatively similar to the one now encountered and at a point earlier in time than the time of the present experience. But between my recollection of earlier experiences and those earlier experiences there is a world of difference. The acceptance of a memory as itself a plausible index of the real occurrence of past events itself presupposes a memory about memory claims and their general reliability; consequently, if we press the justificatory challenge we are well on our way to a regress which seems limitless.

The problem of the nature of memory on Lewis' account is an interesting one in itself, even apart from the question of how memory becomes implicated in the problem of justifying a current empirical belief. There are points at which Lewis speaks of memories as "memorial presentations", comparing them to the "sense presentations" which are the basis of our knowledge. Not only does he use the term "presentation" but

asserts a claim about memorial presentations which seems analogous to the epistemological and metaphysical claim made expressly in Mind and the World Order about the relationship which appearances have to that of which they may be appearances. One of the reasons that an occurrent memory is not a sufficient probability index of the event of which it seems to be the memory, and consequently cannot serve as a ground for the credibility of a belief without a further generalization regarding the reliability of memories in general, is that "memorial presentations, like sense presentations, are not equivalent to the empirical fact they suggest to us."[40] It will be recalled that the quale which was the content of an experience, while intrinsically recognizable, was, nevertheless, not exhaustive of the full empirical import of the object which, it was felt, the quale was a sign of. Underlying this view in Mind and the World Order was the thesis of infinite temporal spread. That thesis was intended for the purpose of insuring the possibility of future confirmation of a present experience; the basic thrust of the thesis is that any momentary experience is not completely verified in the having of the experience because that of which one has the experience has consequences throughout time which a percipient could encounter. If memorial presentations are analogous to sense presentations in this way then Lewis must mean that the experience, when initially encountered, was not exhaustively experienced. In other words, in accordance with the thesis of infinite temporal spread, there were consequences which we did not experience. The memorial presentation, on this view, is virtually identical with the sense presentation except for the fact that it is seen to have a reference to some earlier point in time. In equating the two types of presentation, Lewis is not suggesting that the memory of an occurrence is empirically deficient with respect to the occurrence of which it is the memory. There are

numerous senses in which memories are deficient; they may be unclear; they may have failed to capture many of the distinctive characteristics of the event of which it is the memorial residue. We cannot understand Lewis to be saying that a memory presentation is a poor specimen. There is the literal sense in which a memorial presentation is not equivalent to the empirical fact which it suggests to us; it is caused by the event or the empirical fact and is in that sense a consequent of it. On the thesis of temporal spread as I have urged earlier, the memorial presentation is a consequence of the original event remembered in as legitimate a sense as other indications of the earlier occurrence are consequences of it. Lewis' theory of the memorial presentation cannot be logically equivalent to the empirical fact which it suggests to us because it is a part of that event. As sympathetic as this reading is to Lewis, it is also the one which spawns difficulties for his conception of memory. If we think of a memory as discretely related in a representational sense to that of which it is a memory, then we can pose difficulties about the accuracy of the representation, etc.; nevertheless, these difficulties do not necessarily imply that the view of memory is somehow counterintuitive. On the other hand, if we ask how a memory can be related to an earlier occurrence of which (or on the basis of another part of which) it comes to be known or reintroduced to our cognitive present, we do seem to land in a counterintuitive situation. If a memory is literally one of the consequences of an earlier occurrence (of which it may be the memory) then insofar as the totality of that occurrence (which includes a memory as a part of itself) is the event or occurrence ostensibly remembered, then our present memory should include a memory of itself or at least some trace of itself. It will not do to say that a memory cannot contain itself as a part of that which is

remembered because a memory must always be a memory of something temporally antecedent to the occasion of the present remembering. A memory cannot be equivalent to the empirical fact which it suggests to us precisely because, if it were it would include itself in that which is taken to be its equivalent.

There are reasons for doubting the applicability of the thesis of temporal spread as it relates to memories: "Andthe practical resolution of any doubt as to the correctness of a memory, is to make some further test of it, by looking to some present or future consequence of its truth."[41] If, as we are inclined to believe, a memory is caused by the event of which it is the memory (in some sense of the term 'cause')then every memory caused by a particular occurrence is a consequence of that occurrence. Now, it would seem that we should come to grips with the question of whether a memory of the occurrence which is said to have caused the memory is a unique memory on each occasion that it is remembered even though the 'empirical fact' it suggests to us is presumably the same from occasion to occasion. If we adhere strongly to the memory-as-consequence conception of a memory then it seems that we should not countenance every remembering of the occasion captured in the memory as itself a consequence of the original occasion. After all the recollection on different occasions of the original event need not be caused by the original eventin the same sense in which the original memory as trace in the mind was caused by the original occurrence.

Lewis is suggesting, though he does not explicitly rule out, that the confirmation of a memory occurs not in further memorial experience (though any experience in some way ultimately does implicate memorial residues) but in experiences which are more immediate and occur on the field of publicly observable experience. My decision to remember

the same memory tomorrow as I had today, a memory of my trip to Yugoslavia last summer, does not by itself seem to constitute sufficient confirmation of the veracity of the memory I had today. It is parallel to the case of staring at an object for a longer time in order to make certain that the object is as one had originally thought. Presumably, in the longer scrutiny, one is not getting any further data or information which would serve to corroborate one's initial classification of the object as a piece of quartz. Remembering the same memory (if in fact it were the same, though how that could be demonstrated is itself quite problematic) would not constitute confirmation because it is the same memory; it is the memory which requires confirmation. If we stick firmly to the thesis of infinite temporal spread and say that a remembering R1 of memory M1 at t1 is distinct from remembering R2 of memory M2 at t2 then it is possible that memory M2 may constitute (through some relation such as congruence) a ground for the validity of memory M1; all that would be problematic on this conception, where the two memories are not identical, or are at least discrete rememberings of the same or similar memories, or most weakly, the same occurrence, though recorded in different memories, is that, insofar as we think of memories as consequences of occurrences which temporally precede them, we would have the situation of the later temporal part of an occurrence serving as corroborating evidence for a temporally earlier part of that same occurrence.

CHISHOLM on LEWIS'S ACCOUNT of MEMORY

We have seen the difficulties which attend Lewis' account of the justification of memory and his attempt to halt the possibility of an infinite justificatory regress of memory claims by suggesting that each memory when had constitutes prima facie grounds for believing in the

objective occurrence which the memory is ostensibly about. I should like to direct my attention to an attempt to interpret sympathetically Lewis' conception of the prima facie credibility of memory claims. The suggestion is Roderick Chisholm's and represents at once an extension of his own conception of "perceptual taking" to the area of memory claims, and is also a useful means of attempting to unify Lewis' conception of the indubitability of apprehensions of the given with the claim of memory's prima facie credibility.

Chisholm, in attempting to impose some sense on Lewis' conception of the given, tries to join together the not naturally connected ideas of a 'given' and 'adequate evidence', thereby capturing some of the intuition behind the foundationalist position as espoused by Lewis. "If we can know anything about the world, if there is any proposition or hypothesis for which we have adequate evidence, then something is given to us by means of which we can test the proposition or hypothesis. 'Experience' is another name for what is thus given."[42] ("Experience" is that which we have in the course of apprehending the content of some presentation of some putatively real object; "reality" is that complex of experiences which our categories will enable us to have without casting any of them out of the realm of the possible.) There are two correlative but equally insufficient grounds for the justification for a present belief; on the one hand we have the presentation of the object about which we may be making the judgment, on the other hand we have the generalization which itself substantiates the predication made in the judgment. This generalization implicates memory however, relying on the tenability of projections about future similarities on the basis of past ones. There is a present element, that which is given, and a memorial residue, which in light of the need for simul-

taneous justification is present-as-pastness, and in Lewis' terms is epistemically pertinent to the presentation which one is having at the moment. It is in light of these two facts that Chisholm's statement quoted above is less than clear. It does not seem that we test the proposition or hypothesis on the basis of some given; it is the given which occasions the making of a judgment which itself is then in need of justification or is in need of future confirmation in terms of the kinds of experiences which are implied by the claim made in the objective judgment. The temporal dimension is absent from Chisholm's claim and this creates confusion. It is true that a judgment which we presently may be justified in believing will undoubtedly present future experiences which serve to corroborate the judgment originally made. It also seems evident that the use of expressive language (apart from securing the distinction between the immediately presented and the underlying objective reality to which Lewis holds) serves to assert the element of uncertainty in that which one is taking himself to have an experience of. Consequently, though it may appear that there is a red spot c the side of the kitchen cabinet, there may in fact be no such red spot; as a result it cannot be the independently real ostensible object or complex of sense data independent of some percipient which is understood to be given, if one takes himself to have adequate evidence for the belief about some feature of the public world. On this basis (the apparent intentionality of employments of expressive language), Chisholm finds that he has an open field for suggesting some warrant increasing ground for the percipient's belief that there is in fact a red spot on the side of the kitchen cabinet on the basis of something's literally being given in experience which is reported on in the expressive locution "There seems to be (appears to be) a red spot on the side of the kitchen cabinet.)"

However, as this given thing cannot be the red spot itself there must be something else. What could this be?

That element which is at once given and which serves as adequate evidence for a belief and which does not suffer the shortcoming of being the possibly non-existent object of an intentional activity, is the act of experiencing some ostensibly given sensuous presentation. "We could say that a state of affairs is <u>given</u> to a believer at a certain time, provided only that, at that time, no matter what else he should believe, it would be impossible for him to believe that the state of affairs is <u>not</u> taking place."[43] Notice here, that implicit in this conception is the view that something cannot really be given unless it exists. This however, does not alter the point about the red spot on the kitchen door, for while the red spot doesn't exist, there is no question in the percipient's mind that he believes it to exist. His belief is actual. Chisholm is on the road to endorsing a concept of 'givenness' most consonant with the insight behind the Cartesian <u>cogito</u>. The activity of thought occurs in a variety of modes; regardless of the mode in which it occurs, when it does occur, that person in whom an acitivity of thought is occurring cannot be mistaken about the fact that it is occurring. The occurrence is therefore ground for the belief that the occurrence is taking place; the belief is self-intimating or self-authenticating.[44] It seems that the sense in which Chisholm wants us to think of a mental activity of belief as self-intimating is that regardless of what the content of such a belief may be, in the mind of the person who is having the belief, there cannot be any mistake about the fact that he, himself, is believing a certain thing; the closest parallel using Firth's own formulation would be to say that the individual who has the belief, 'believes his belief to exist'. In this sense it would not be

inappropriate to speak of a belief (as distinct from its content, that which it is about) as being given.

When Chisholm comes to consider Lewis' account of memory and the problem of the justification of the prima facie credibility which Lewis accords to memory, Chisholm transfers the general criterion of what having knowledge entails about something's being given, to the realm of memory. "Given the fact that what we take to be our memory is thus fallible, we may ask what ground we have for accepting any ostensible memory as genuine. In asking this, we are looking 'for some other and supporting grounds beyond the immediate item which presents itself with the quality of recollection.' Any "supporting ground" for memory must itself be something which, in a broad sense of the term is 'given'."[45] It would seem evident from Chisholm's claim that that which is given and which is to serve as the supporting ground of a memory must be something in the present, and must be contemporaneous with the memory. Even though, at the moment we apprehend some content of a presentation, our reception of it is indubitable; we cannot advert to something which is in the past and which, in order to serve its purpose of being a supporting ground, would have to be remembered, for in such a case we would rightfully seek supporting ground for the recollection of an experience which was certain at the time it was experienced. Just because the apprehension of some sensuous content is infallible at the moment of experiencing, does not mean that a recollection of such an experiencing is infallible and certain, even though it may very well be prima facie grounds for believing in the actual occurrence of the initial experiencing. Chisholm discounts various images as those which may be given and therefore the supporting ground of a memory. The only other thing which seems, on his view, to be a plausible candidate and which is present, in fact

contemporaneous with the remembering is the act of remembering. "Using the terms of an older psychology, we might say that, according to Lewis, the supporting ground for any particular memory is not the content or imagery that is before the mind when one thinks one remembers; it is, rather, the act of thinking that one remembers. The 'act' of thinking that one remembers is something that is given to the one who thinks he remembers."[46] Chisholm urges that Lewis ought perhaps to have used the terminology of adequate evidence, saying that a person who remembered something had, in the act of remembering, adequate evidence for the hypothesis that the event occurred. It is up to us to give sense to the notion that an act of thinking that something may have occurred is given.

Chisholm discounts memory images as those elements which are given when one remembers. It is not clear that Chisholm would necessarily want to retain Lewis' basic criteria from Mind and the World Order: 1) sensuous feel or quality, and 2) unalterability by thought. If we sought to use criterion 1, it would appear that we might return from whence we have just come, the realm of images or imagery. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand the sense in which an act has an image. A baseball pitcher's motion, when looked at as an act eventuating in the delivery of the ball to homeplate follows a certain pattern; we might want to speak of that pattern as the image of the act of pitching. It seems possible to stretch our conception of an image to include such cases. However, it does not seem equally plausible to stretch the notion so far as to include mental acts. Mental acts are, more often than not, differentiated from one another by attending to the objects at which they are directed; here I mean the mental objects or the intentional objects. But we seem to have no clear cut conception of those 'objects' apart perhaps from the imaging which may accompany discrete occasions on which they

stand in some relation to a particular mental act. As regards the second criterion, that of unalterability by thought, it would seem that the hallmark of most of my mental acts is that by attending to a different object or by being differently related to an intentional object I am engaged in a different act and that consequently, I somehow have altered the nature of the act. On the other hand, if we recall Lewis' example from Mind and the World Order there is a case to be made for the second criterion. Lewis notes that if one is presented with a hard, yellow object one cannot by taking thought take the object to be soft and blue. Chisholm's point would be that when one is thinking that one believes that there is a snow capped mountain in some location, one cannot be mistaken. What is it about which one cannot be mistaken? If it is the act of thinking that one remembers which is to be viewed as being on a par with the given of sensuous presentations, then it would seem that one could not be mistaken about the kind of mental act by which one was related to a particular mental content. One could not, by taking thought, think himself to be wishing (as opposed to believing, or remembering) that there is a snow capped mountain in some place.

Chisholm is heartened by his conception of the givenness of an act of thinking that one remembers, or of ostensible memory, and attempts, by suggesting a parallel notion, the 'act' of ostensible perceiving, to shore up the deficiencies he feels inhabit Lewis' reliance on sense-certainties for the justification of all our empirical claims. "Should we say that, whenever a man thinks he perceives that a certain condition obtains, he is ipso facto, justified in believing - or he has adequate evidence for believing - that that condition obtains? Thinking-that-one-perceives is like thinking-that-one-remembers."[47] Discounting the implied concordance of this conception of 'givenness' with Lewis' conception of

that notion, and problems over what it means for an act to be self-presenting or self-warranting, it seems that pressure must be placed on Chisholm's conception of adequate evidence. it is in the belief that the ostensible rememberings and ostensible perceivings afford adequate evidence for one's belief that one remembers or perceives a certain content, that the real import of Chisholm's view lies.

SUMMARY

With this chapter, I have completed my detailed critical account of the structure of Lewis' epistemological views as presented in his two major treatises devoted to that topic. We have now seen, how, through the apparatus of the three types of judgment, objective, terminating and expressive, Lewis has effected a thickening in his account of empirical knowledge and how the relationships between these statements serve to embody the justificatory structure which Lewis finds essential for grounding a belief as credible. When I speak of a thickening, I am thinking of the element of metaphysical realism which seems to recur constantly in the midst of a position which smacks of epistemological phenomenalism. At the same time the role of past generalizations as bases for present classificatory judgments was set out; the problem of the credibility of memory deliverances which the use of generalizations implied was examined with special emphasis placed on the affinities between Lewis' account of the givenness of sensuous presentations and memorial presentations. In an attempt to further understand the precise nature of prima facie credibility from a more phenomenological standpoint we turned to Chisholm's account of Lewis' views on memory.

Footnotes to Chapter V

[1]Clarence Irving Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1962), p. 181.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 185.

[4]Ibid., p. 204.

[5]Ibid., p. 214.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid., p. 215.

[8]Ibid., p. 227.

[9]Ibid., pp. 231-32.

[10]For some accounts of the Quine-Duhem view the reader should look at Willard Van Orman Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963), especially p. 41.; Pierre Duhem's The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), especially pp. 183-90, and Adolf Grunbaum's Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), especially pp. 106-15.

[11]Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 232.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid., p. 243.

[14]Ibid., p. 244.

[15]Ibid., p. 246.

[16]Ibid., p. 255.

[17]Peter Unger, "Two Types of Scepticism", Philosophical Studies 25 (February, 1974) 76-96. Unger seeks to defend a particularly virulent strain of scepticism in which simple scepticism about the material world cannot retreat to the view that scepticism about rationality (being justified and being reasonable) is not justified. Consequently, simple scepticism about the possibility of knowledge about the world entails scepticism about rationality itself.

[18]Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 9.

[19]Ibid., p. 10.

[20]Ibid., p. 27.

[21]Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[22]Ibid., p. 258.

[23]Ibid., p. 316.

[24]Ibid., p. 318.

[25]Ibid., p. 323.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., p. 324.

[29]Ibid., p. 325.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid. pp. 325-26.

[32]Ibid., p. 326.

[33]Ibid., p. 334.

[34]Ibid., p. 335.

[35]Ibid., p. 352.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid., p. 332.

[38]Ibid., p. 334.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid., p. 336.

[41]Ibid., p. 337.

[42]Roderick M. Chisholm, "Lewis' Ethics of Belief", The Philosophy of C.I. Lewis, ed. P.A. Schilpp (La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1968) p. 234.

[43]Ibid., pp. 234-35.

[44]There is a sense of the 'given' noted by Roderick Firth in his article "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory" which is analogous to this self-intimating quality which Chisholm accords to activities. Even though the context in which Firth's point occurs is a discussion of perceptual consciousness, it is nevertheless, relevant to our considerations. "There

are some possible interpretations of the word 'given', of course, according to which it may be quite obviously true that physical objects, as popularly conceived, are given to the man in the street during perceptual experience. Thus it is not unlikely that there is some sense of the verb 'to believe' such that the man in the street may correctly be said to believe, whenever he is perceptually conscious, that there exists a physical object of a certain kind; and the word 'given' might accordingly be interpreted to mean 'believed to exist'." (Roderick Firth, "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory" in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. Robert J. Swartz (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1965), p. 253.

[45]Chisholm, "Lewis' Ethics of Belief", p. 239; also, Chisholm quoting Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 334.

[46]Chisholm, "Lewis' Ethics of Belief", p. 240.

[47]Ibid., p. 241.

CHAPTER VI:

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE GIVEN

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I propose to examine some contemporary responses to Lewis' advocacy of an epistemological given. Some of these responses come less in the form of direct responses to Lewis than as discussions directed at the problem of perceptual knowledge and epistemic justification. I have sought to show that Lewis was concerned with both of these problèms, laying greater emphasis on the former in the earlier work, and laying greater emphasis on the latter in the later work.

While I have not sought to attempt a catalogue of the senses in which something may be said to be given in experience, it will be evident to readers of the earlier chapters that Lewis recruited a conception strongly phenomenalistic in tone and despite the emphasis on the certainty of apprehensions of the given, he never expressly spoke of the certainty as accruing from the non-inferential and intuitive sureness which comes with self-knowledge.

At first, I examine a recent attempt of James Cornman's to characterize various senses in which we can speak of something's being given. He relates his distinctions to the epistemological and metaphysical attacks which the idea of givenness has sustained. Effort is made to connect Cornman's distinctions to Lewis' own phenomenological criteria of givenness.

In examining Sellar's significant attack on the idea of givenness

in his essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", I treat separately two strands of that article which are, for Sellars, intimately related. This is done for expository purposes. On the one hand, I consider his general attack on the sense-datum theorists' accounts of perceptual knowledge. I turn then to an examination of his conception of the nature of inner episodes and how the development of the Jonesean myth itself may involve the assumption of a given, the idea of being evidentially related.

The last major part of the paper seeks to shed light on the vulnerability of Lewis' position when seen against sympathetic though critical evaluations such as Roderick Firth's. This is done by looking at whether Lewis is adopting a coherence theory of concepts or not. The problems regarding conceptual priority are themselves examined. Further light is cast on this issue by examining recent comments of Wilfrid Sellars on the notion of a self-presenting state of affairs.

CORNMAN'S CATALOGUE of the GIVEN

A recent attempt at a catalogue of senses of the given by James Cornman merits our attention both as an indication of where Cornman believes Lewis' given to lie and the direction in which critics such as Wilfrid Sellars are headed. Cornman distinguishes between epistemological and metaphysical attacks on the conception of givenness. The former attacks have been motivated by a desire to blunt the skeptical import of views of the given which take the privacy of sensory experience as the paradigm of givenness. One manner of attack would be to deny that statements about one's sensory experience were in any way more privileged than other statements which one could make; to broaden the category of statements which are acceptable as given is not, of course, to question the legitimacy

of the drive toward givenness characteristic of analyses of perceptual consciousness such as Lewis'. A second form of the epistemological attack does not expand the range of statements which are acceptable as given. Critics such as Quine and Goodman go to the heart of the matter and deny any privileged status to any class of statements. In their view, "empirical knowledge does not require a foundation with certainty at its base."[1]

An equally significant though differently oriented challenge comes from advocates of alternative ontologies. Cornman speaks of these as metaphysical assaults on the conception of givenness. The two leading exponents are Wilfrid Sellars who espouses scientific realism and Richard Rorty, who defends eliminative materialism, or, as Cornman terms this latter view, the sensation elimination theory. While not wishing to assess independently the status or tenability of Sellars' own views, it will be important to establish whether or not the kinds of criticism he levels against the notion of givenness and against Firth's reconstrual of a position of Lewis' are damaging to a conception of the given such as Lewis'. To this end it is important to pursue some of Cornman's distinctions a bit further.

Cornman speaks of four kinds of given: the phenomenologically given, the factually given, the epistemologically given, and the linguistically given. Within each of these groupings there are further refinements only some of which are important for my purposes. Cornman reinforces the distinctions by assorted criteria. A factually given entity, unlike a phenomenologically given one does settle the issue of the existence of that which is thought to exist. If an entity is given in the phenomenological sense, in that one is said to be ostensibly presented with the entity, the construction "P is given to X" is an intentional one.

Characterizations of the factual given do not involve reference to either epistemological or linguistic characterizations. There is a parallel between the factual and epistemological givens; however, characterizations of the epistemological given make reference to the fact that that which is thought to be given functions as a foundation in a hierarchy of knowledge and, in addition, is known in a manner which assures the certainty of a type of knowledge. Before turning to linguistic givens and Cornman's locating Sellars in the group of those who advocate linguistic givens, let me turn to his classification of Lewis.

Cornman distinguishes two types of factually given. He thinks that the second one (his number 4) is the one most closely allied with Lewis' conception, at least as that conception is presented in Mind and the World Order. "P's are given = df. P's are presented to perceivers non-inferentially and without interpretation."[2] This definition does not strike one as capturing the formal element in Lewis' own characterization of the given. He claims that the given is characterized by quality and unalterability by thought. It is possible that Cornman may think that if something is presented without interpretation a fortiori it is unaffected by thought. As I have sought to indicate at numerous points throughout the preceding material, there may be a sense in which a statement or classification is only relatively non-inferential or without interpretation. Lewis repeatedly emphasizes the importance of earlier experience as a necessary condition for one's making the classification that one now makes. He does not, however, say whether or not the initial classification of a presentation was itself non-inferential or without interpretation. Lewis packs a great deal into the notion of a quale's being repeatable and intrinsically recognizable. Many of the problems regarding the degree

to which an identification of a sense content is or is not recognizable may be hidden in those notions.

I don't think it is fair to criticize Cornman for playing down the obvious phenomenological and epistemological aspects of Lewis' view of the given. Cornman's factual given is a middle ground between the extremes of the phenomenological and the epistemological. It is, of course, obvious that he wants us to understand a substantive difference between the two. There is, however, an important sense in which the notion of something's being factually given meets up again with an observation of both Sellars' and Firth's regarding the manner in which perceptions are self-warranting. We shall return to the point later in this chapter. Part of the difficulty in giving an adequate account of foundationalism is ascertaining the level at which the foundation becomes secure. Cornman's picture allows us to see that because something is phenomenologically given doesn't entail that that which is taken to be given necessarily exists. Furthermore, the fact that something is phenomenologically given and may exist does not necessarily mean that because it exists it is therefore known with certainty. There undoubtedly is an intimate connection between the general intuition of a foundationalist that in order to stem the threat of an infinite regress resulting from repeated justificatory challenges there must come a point at which no further justification can be sought for a statement. What has happened, however, is that two thoughts have been brought together, each of which may require separate treatment and development. The epistemologically based response to the challenge needn't necessarily view the challenge as arising for perceptual beliefs; it is the assumption that perceptual beliefs are most often challenged which leads to the notion that there must be a terminating point beyond which no further justification can be given. But the retreat is to internal

replicas of publicly observable objects and consequently sensations are viewed as private and as privileged objects of our own introspective and self-certifying acts. Consequently, the objections which may be raised against notions of internal episodes becomes leverage against a more liberal foundationalist position which sees a need for a termination point other than that provided by reports of one's own sensory experiences. (Of course, Sellars' reconstruction of the genesis of intentionality as a category applicable to thoughts arises out of just such a delimitation of the foundationalist program.)

Part of the issue with which we have been grappling all along is that of which entity Lewis would think of as being given. I have, at various points, suggested that it might be feasible to construe Lewis as advocating a variant of the theory of adverbial sensing, however, I believe that there are difficulties with this interpretation insofar as it would be difficult (assuming no reductionist propensities) to effect a point by point identification between the distinguishable elements in Lewis' view and those found in the view of an advocate of adverbial sensing. Awareness is integral to Lewis' conception, whereas it is precisely awareness which the advocate of adverbial sensing can leave out of an analysis of perceptual experience. The most likely substituends for "P" in Cornman's locution (P's are given = df. P's are presented to perceivers non-inferentially and without interpretation.) are, of course, Lewis' qualia. It is superfluous to say that Lewisian presentations are what are presented to perceivers. The presentation is the unique historical occasion in which something is presented, but it itself, properly speaking, is not what is presented. There is no presentation of the presentation. One 'recognizes' it to be a presentation not in virtue of certain distinguishable features apart from the quale or complex of quale, but simply

because one recognizes the quale or complex of qualia. Lewis sets no conceptual preconditions on recognition of the given. There is no required and antecedent act of awareness which informs one that a presentation is coming or is occurring and that, consequently, the content of the presentation is an intrinsically recognizable quale or complex of qualia.

While Lewis is striving to assure a connection between the contents of our presentations and those contents functioning as certain bases of our empirical knowledge, his distinction between the "is" of objective judgments and the 'looks like' of expressive statements in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation would allow for the possibility of ascribing to him a conception of the given in Cornman's senses 1 and 2, where the cardinal notion is "ostensible presenting". The epistemological import of the "looks like" locution as authors such as Sellars and Chisholm and Austin point out is that there is an element of uncertainty about the veridicality of that which is presented. Chisholm at least has sought to secure the assurance of acts of immediate apprehensions in terms of notions such as 'taking', 'seeming to perceive' and 'seeming to remember', where the content of the perceptual or cognitive verb is no longer a state of affairs which may have independent existence, independent of some act of conception, but is rather the entire complex which includes the cognitive verb with its object and which in turn becomes the object of "seem to". The upshot of this maneuver is to secure the indubitability of one's own monitorings of one's own mental experiences.

Until his characterization of the linguistic given, Cornman is somewhat ambivalent about possible substituends for the "P's" in his various schema. He speaks either of P's being directly presented or ostensibly presented, or about P's being entities or about beliefs about

P's. When he turns to the linguistic given he comes to speak of P-terms. In clarificatory comments, Cornman notes that in the primary sense it is undoubtedly physical objects and not sensa which are most properly spoken of as being phenomenologically given. This qualification clearly cannot work for Lewis. Even though I have not offered an analysis of the sense in which objects for Lewis may be logical constructions out of sets of actual and possible experiences of qualia, it is evident that Lewis wants only qualia and not objects to be given in the phenomenological sense of which Cornman is speaking. As I have repeatedly noted, this desire of Lewis' is predicated on his conception of verification and the need to insure that there will exist verifiable consequences of a particular classification made now, at some time in the future. In an important sense, physical objects and not qualia (if they can be shown to have some causal dependence on our perceptual attitudes) are the kinds of things which can be phenomenologically given without interpretation and non-inferentially. Cornman sticks to his rigid conception of what may be given; however, he seems willing to countenance the possibility of sensa being given, if sensa can be shown to be theoretically necessary in order to explain certain features of our perceptual experience. To this extent there is harmony between his view and that of Sellars.

As a prelude to a direct consideration of Sellars, let us see how his rejection of the given, which Cornman terms metaphysical, falls in under Cornman's distinctions. Consider Cornman's number 7: P's are given = df. P-terms are correctly used by perceivers to give a direct response to (report) their perceptual experiences.[3] Cornman's concern with sensations stems from a desire to decide issues between competing forms of materialism; that issue is not directly related to the attacks on the given. The givenness of terms purporting to refer to sensations stems

from the fact that in the reports of our perceptual experience we presuppose that we are making true or accurate reports of such experiences; consequently, sensation sentences are true sentences. However, if we reconstrue what we do, in the use of sensation terms, as making identifying references rather than making reports which may be true or false, then sensation terms may be used but they need not be, and their givenness is no longer an epistemological requirement.

Sellars is not opposed to the reporting role of sensation terms when such reporting is limited to reporting the contents of certain inner experiences; from this fact Cornman concludes that Sellars is not opposed to givenness in the following sense: "P's are given = df. P-terms are correctly used by perceivers to give a direct response to (report) their perceptual experiences." What Sellars does reject however, (and this becomes the focal point of our assessment of his attacks against the general framework of givenness) is the use of sensation terms or observation terms which may play a reporting role for perceptual experiences. As Cornman notes, "this is because Sellars' scientific realism requires that the best description of what there is be provided by those theoretical terms of a unified science that are needed for the best scientific explanations. For Sellars, sensation terms, unlike observation terms, are theoretical terms (although also reporting terms), because, very roughly, they are used to explain, but not describe, observable human behavior."[4] We have seen that Lewis does not distinguish between the expressive use of language for the report of presentations which are external to one and those which might occur within the physical locus of one's body; consequently, it would be difficult to reinforce a distinction between sensation terms and observation terms in viewing his position. The occurrences within one's own body have, in Lewis' view, as much of an

element of givenness as do perceptual experiences of bodies external to one. What Lewis doesn't attempt, and Sellars does, is to fix on the conceptual priority of observation terms over sensation terms. Sellars urges that sensation terms are analogically derived from observation terms. It might appear that Lewis could use something akin to Sellars' theory of the genesis of reporting terms, but rather than turning to as complex a conception as Sellars' myth of Jones, Lewis, at best, reverts to his conception of meaning and the distinction between reports of qualia and predications made of objectively real things.

There is another feature of Sellars' view which prevents a less than unequivocal account of the relationship between concept formation and epistemic priority. In his development of the Jonesean myth he seeks to demonstrate that the notion of inner episodes and the feature of intentionality which it is felt such episodes have result from a desire to explain overt verbal episodes; consequently, the notion of internal episodes of thought are seen to be analogically related to overt verbal episodes, and the semantical properties of such episodes. Sellars notes, however, that even though thoughts are causally and existentially prior to overt verbal episodes, conceptually they are discovered later than overt verbal episodes, especially if we are to accord any plausibility to the Jonesean myth. Similarly, in responding to Bruce Aune's comment on his own work, Sellars notes that "priority in the order of concept formation must not be confused with ontological priority."[5] The Platonic conception of knowledge relates the degree to which something is known with its ontological status; however, neither in Sellars nor in Lewis do we get any sense that ontological priority is necessarily related to the epistemic priority which we deem essential in a foundationalist reconstruction of knowledge.

SELLARS on the GIVEN

I turn now to an examination of the most sophisticated and sustained attack on the notion of givenness, that presented by Wilfrid Sellars in his classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". The essay represents a single argument with several critical conclusions. While I shall not attempt to assay all of the conclusions which Sellars draws, I shall attempt to provide, in brief compass, characterizations of the views which are most critical for an assessment of Sellars' attack against a Lewisian position.

Lewis does not accept 'sense-data' in the connotation of that term used by Broad and Russell; this does not mean that Lewis' stipulations regarding qualia and presentations do not allow us to extract an account of perceptual knowledge which is not similar to those accounts which explicitly speak of sense-data. Sellars commences his attack on the notion of givenness by looking at advocates of a sense-datum view of perceptual knowledge. As Sellars notes the notion of givenness has assumed many forms during the history of philosophy; seemingly, its point at each of many historical junctures was to offer a means of grounding, in indubitable fashion, the totality of our knowledge of the empirical world. Those who advocate analyses of perceptual knowledge have offered sense data with a two-fold function. On the one hand, sense data capture the salient characteristics of physical objects and our knowledge of them while at the same time preventing the errors or a direct realist analysis of perception. On the other hand, sense-data, insofar as they are intimately related to an act of perception and the percipient who is the subject of that act, provide an unimpeachable foundationalist base for all empirical knowledge. It is the attempt by advocates of sense-data to reconcile two functions which causes them problems on Sellars' view. In accounting for perception, they

are quick to point out that particulars are the objects of our perceptual acts; on the other hand, in speaking of knowledge, both inferential and non-inferential, it is facts which are the objects of our cognitive postures. Facts stand in striking contrast to particulars ; they are items "of the form something's being thus-and-so or something's standing in a certain relation to something else."[6] Unless the objects of sensing are reconstrued to include facts as opposed to only particulars then sensing cannot constitute knowing, and that sense-data exist does not logically imply the existence of knowledge. The other alternative is that sensing does constitute a form of knowing and consequently facts are included amongst the kinds of things which can be sensed. This distinction leads to an important one for Sellars' philosophy and one which recurs in his advocacy of the adverbial theory of sensing. If we do not allow sensing to include knowing facts, in other words if it is particulars alone which are the proper objects of acts of sensing, then "the fact that a sense content was sensed would be a non-epistemic fact about the sense content."[7]

This distinction creates discomfort in our reading of Lewis. We should ask of Lewis exactly what is it he takes to be gotten from the givenness of an apprehension of some quale in a presentation. It is evident that Lewis conceives of their being some difference. The person who has had much experience stands a better chance of recognizing a particular object as being of a certain sort than the infant who has had no prior experience of it. On what does this ability hinge apart from the having of more experiences? What is known in a Lewisian apprehension? Is it the fact that the quale which we are currently being presented with is a red quale, is it a fact and epistemic and thus inferential? Lewis repeatedly contends that apprehensions of the given do not provide us with

knowledge; in this sense, apprehensions of the given are non-cognitive. His criterion, however, is simply that the apprehension of the given does not involve the possibility of error or truth. So he has disconnected apprehensions of the given from the epistemic dimension. This does not mean that there is non-inferential knowledge of sorts. We are clearly recognizing that the red quale is red; therein lies the impact of Lewis' contention that qualia are intrinsically recognizable. They are intrinsically recognizable and yet in being intrinsically recognizable there is no element of interpretation; consequently , there is no element of conceptual mediation; consequently, that the quale is of a certain color is a non-epistemic fact about the quale.

Having discerned one error in the sense datum theorists' account, Sellars turns to another. This theme, too, is one which recurs in much of his own writing and is thus due special emphasis. Of a piece with the attempt to analyze epistemic facts in non-epistemic terms, advocates of givenness have "taken givenness to be a fact which presupposes no learning, no forming of associations, no setting up of stimulus-response connections."[8] The difficulty of this conception is that it controverts the teachings of empiricist philosophers who have placed great emphasis on the necessity of learning. Sellars finds that the sense-datum theorist is confronted by an inconsistent triad consisting of three propositions:

> A. X senses red sense content s entails x non-inferentially knows that s is red.
> B. The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired.
> C. The ability to know facts of the form x is $\emptyset$ is unacquired.

Faced with an inconsistent triad, the advocate of sense data can choose to abandon any one of the three positions. A expresses the view that sensing may have an epistemic dimension; to abandon it is to view sensing as a non-cognitive fact. "He can abandon B, in which case he must pay the price of

cutting off the concept of a sense datum from its connection with our ordinary talk about sensations, feelings, afterimages, tickles and itches, etc. which are usually thought by sense-datum theorists to be its common sense counterparts."[9] This latter point is important. Sellars has driven the first wedge of his attack against the notion of inner episodes as primary. He implies in the above comment that the assimilation of sense-data to internal goings on or impressions is mistaken, and that advocates of sense-data theories trade on the conflation of the two. To assimilate the two is obviously erroneous given Sellars' ultimate objectives. For in assimilating the two, one is denying that the circumstances under which the genesis of their use arises can be an important epistemological and conceptual fact. The basic point of the Jonesean myth is that overt verbal episodes and the use of language to refer to publicly observable entities is conceptually prior in the reconstruction of our coming to have a notion of mental episodes. Not only are overt verbal episodes conceptually prior, they form the evidential base from which we then construct a theory which recruits the notion of internal episodes.

The main philosophical confusion arises when attempts at explaining the facts of standard cases of perception are taken to be paradigmatic for non-inferential knowledge; that knowledge then serves as the foundation for the remainder of our empirical knowledge claims. In Sellars' view, the classical concept of a sense-datum represents "a mongrel resulting from a crossbreeding of two ideas". The first idea encompasses our explanatory intuitions about the facts of sense perception, and represents an attempt to explain them in "scientific style". It says that there are certain inner episodes, sensations which may occur to individuals without either learning or other conceptual involvement and which are necessary conditions for that individual's seeing (or hearing)certain objective facts about

physical objects. This claim obviously construes sense data as causally necessary conditions for the possibility of acts of sensing. The second point, however, squares more closely with Lewis' own emphasis on the role of qualia in our knowledge of empirical matters. This point maintains that inner episodes which are non-inferential knowings of the fact that certain sensations have the character which they "do are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as providing the evidence for all other empirical propositions."[10] There is an easy source for conflating these two idea. The proximity of one's mental contents for inspection seems to accord them a prima facie status of unimpeachability. The tendency to assimilate the having of sensations to the having of thoughts is fostered by the seeming intentionality of the former as well. Replicas of red triangular objects are more intimately related to the mental processes of an individual than are the actual objects of which one may be having a sensation; consequently, sensations of red triangular things come to serve as likely candidates for the explanations of facts of sense perception. These are Sellars' characterizations of the retreat to sensations both as explanatory model for the facts of perception and as impetus for the idea that sensations are paradigmatic of the type of entity which can serve a foundational role in the reconstruction of empirical knowledge. We have not settled on where Lewis wants qualia to lie. It is difficult to ascribe to him the first view of Sellars' which finds sensations are causally necessary conditions for the having of experience; nevertheless, in all perceptual experience, in Lewis' account, there is a given element, a quale is a constituent of every perceptual experience one has. It would not seem contradictory, therefore, to suggest that qualia do serve in the role of causally necessary conditions for the having of perceptual experience.

We turn to another critical difficulty in the foundationalist thrust of accounts of givenness, their reliance on the concept of awareness. "One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be noninferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter of fact, or of general truths; and (b) such that the noninferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims - particular and general - about the world."[11] It is a point which is important for our discussion. Part of the difficulty of understanding foundationalism, apart from the reliance it may place on internal episodes in violation of some philosopher's canons of verifiability, stems from the difficulty of formulating a sense in which statements which stand at the justificatory terminus of all of our other claims can at once enjoy the dual status of being credible and yet being non-inferential. Sellars insists that the basic statements in our hierarchy are not ones which enjoy intrinsic credibility in the sense in which analytic statements may enjoy such credibility. Intrinsic credibility is for him that which is not derived from other sentences. "The credibility of some sentence types accrues to them by virtue of their logical relations to other sentence types, thus by virtue of the fact that they are logical consequences of more basic sentences. It would seem obvious, however, that the credibility of empirical sentence types cannot be traced without remainder to the credibility of other sentence types. And since no empirical sentence types appear to have intrinsic credibility, this means that credibility must accrue to some empirical sentence types by virtue of their logical relations to certain sentence tokens, and indeed, to sentence tokens the authority of which is not derived, from the authority

of sentence types."[12] Sellars further notes the similarity of observation reports (or Konstatierungen) and analytic statements.[13] It is a necessary and sufficient condition of the truth of observation reports that they be correctly made. The error, however, lies in inferring from this connection to the notion that " 'correctly making' the report 'This is green' is a matter of 'following the rules for the use of "this", "is" and "green" '."[14] Sellars is unwilling to sever the connection between the efficacy of our verbal utterances and the factual circumstances which tend to ground that efficacy. His foremost objective in the paper under discussion is the demonstration that the intentionality of internal episodes of thought is an analogous feature of the semantical properties which characterize our overt verbal utterances. (In an earlier section where he is discussing the common propositional content of various locutions of seeing and existential and qualitative lookings, Sellars notes that "when we use the word 'see' as in 'S sees that the tree is green' we are not only ascribing a claim to the experience, but endorsing it. It is this endorsement which Ryle has in mind when he refers to seeing that something is thus and so as an achievement, and to 'sees' as an achievement word. I prefer to call it a 'so it is' or 'just so' word, for the root idea is that of truth. To characterize S's experience as a seeing is, in a suitably broad sense - which I shall be concerned to explicate - to apply the semantical concept of truth to that experience."[15]) The relevance of these parenthetical remarks is evident in light of Sellars' comments on the "following a rule" construal of observation reports. Following a rule implies that a person is aware of the fact that he is following the rule and is not merely acting in a manner which accords with a regularity. If the uttering of observation reports is construed as an action "then it is the knowledge or belief that the circumstances are of

a certain kind, and not the mere fact that they are of this kind, which contributes to bringing about the action."[16] The credibility which it is felt accrues to the observation reports, which are correctly expressed in the following of a rule, arises because of the attention to the circumstances in which the utterances are made. "If the authority of an observation report is construed as the fact that making it is 'following a rule' in the proper sense of this phrase, then we are face to face with givenness in its most straightforward form. For these stipulations commit one to the idea that the authority of Konstatierungen rests on nonverbal episodes of awareness - awareness that something is the case, e.g. that this is green."[17]

Sellars, on the one hand, wants to institute a certain model of conceptual primacy as regards the theoretical postulation of both sensa and thoughts to account for aspects of behavior which in the manifest image of man cannot be sufficiently accounted for by confirmable inductive generalizations. At the same time, however, in developing his attack on the given in the various forms of it which he displays, it is evident that Sellars is neither averse to allowing for direct knowledge of certain conceptual episodes nor is he opposed to implying that at least at the level of concept acquisition a coherence model prevails. There is a point where he avows a strongly Quinean conception of the manner in which our conceptual structure confronts its test situations. In light of the preceding paragraph, there appear to be two prime desiderata in Sellars' characterization of the nature of observational knowledge. On the one hand, he is concerned to eliminate the retreat to awareness as the element which confers authority on the observation reports, on the other hand, he is concerned to retain the connection with objective features in the world so that the semantical property of truth is, in a sense,

applicable to the report of experience.

In offering an alternative proposal, Sellars refuses to adopt the stance of foundationalists'. The implication is that advocates of foundationalism come to their conclusion because they view the conditions antecedent to and contemporaneous with the holding of a belief as somehow instrumental to that belief. Their emphasis on being reasonable and being justified leads them to think in terms of the basically hierarchical model of justification through inference. Sellars adopts what might be termed a performative model of knowledge; that this is so is evident from his discussion of qualitative and existential lookings where the element of endorsement plays a significant role. If a sentence must have authority if it is taken to express knowledge, wherein can that authority lie? Here again, the answer stems from the assumed connection between knowledge and an objective world of which propositions are supposed to provide an accurate accounting. "Clearly, on this account the only thing that can remotely be supposed to constitute such authority is the fact that one can infer the presence of a green object from the fact that someone makes this report."[18]

We find a very strong expression of a coherence theory of concepts in the further elaboration of Sellars' account of epistemic authority. Authority of a report is insufficient without awareness of the authority. It is this requirement which poses a problem. "If the authority of the report 'This is green' lies in the fact that the existence of green items appropriately related to the perceiver can be inferred from the occurrence of such reports, it follows that only a person who is able to draw this inference, and therefore who has not only the concept <u>green</u>, but also the concept of uttering 'This is green' - indeed, the concept of certain conditions of perception, those which could correctly be called 'standard

conditions' could be in a position to token 'This is green' in recognition of its authority. In other words for a Konstatierung 'This is green' to 'express observational knowledge,' not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions. But the perceiver must know that tokens of 'This is green' are symptoms of the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception."[19]

Sellars inverts the model of inductive support familiar to traditional empiricism. It is this inversion which substantiates a coherentist account of the relatedness of meanings in observational reports. Sellars does not find it anomalous to suggest that a great deal of knowledge is presupposed before one can offer an observation report. In part, what is presupposed is knowledge of the fact that observational reports of the type one is about to token are taken as reliable indicators of the presence of the kind of object that one takes it to be. The suggestion that an infinite regress might arise if Sellars' view is adopted is countered by him through a retreat to the pragmatic dimension of reasons and knowing. In mere form of words undoubtedly a regress could be generated, a regress which might induce the same type of terminus as advocated by those who espouse the given. Recall that Lewis contends that unless something is known with certainty then not even probable knowledge is possible. Sellars' defense of his position rests on a realignment of what it means to speak of someone as knowing some proposition p. It is insufficient to characterize a knowing as a state or episode without at the same time realizing that "we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says."[20]

It is indeed interesting that Sellars should be able to use the pragmatic dimension of justification in support of his own construal of

of episodes of knowing; such a construal is not that alien to the kind of pressure which may drive empiricists to foundationalist conclusions. Roderick Chisholm has a convincing picture of the structure of a justificatory regress and the ensuing choice of a terminus which effectively is thought to stem the regress. The significant point of difference, is of course Sellars' refusal to implicate certainty in his conception of "the logical space of reasons". If we recall Peter Unger's skepticism about knowledge, we note that it resulted from the view that something had to be known for certain if anyone was ever justified or reasonable in believing anything. Sellars does not absolutize the conception of knowing in such fashion. It is true that it is necessary that other propositions be known on Sellars' view if certain empirical propositions are to be known, but there is no implication that those presupposed statements must themselves be known with certainty.

Despite these divergences from Lewis, there is a striking similarity to Lewis' account of the ultimate retreat to generalizations and the prima facie credibility of memory urged in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. A necessary condition for S meaningfully saying at a time t, that "This is green" with the intent that his statement be taken as an expression of observational knowledge is that it be correct to say of S that he now knows (contemporaneous with t) the appropriate fact of the Form X is a reliable symptom of Y,..."And while the correctness of this statement about Jones rquires that Jones could now cite prior particular facts as evidence of the idea that these utterances are reliable indicators, it requires only that it is correct to say that Jones now knows, thus remembers, that these particular facts did obtain. It does not require that it be correct to say that at the time these facts did obtain he then knew them to obtain."[21] For Lewis, categorical judgments

are basically valid estimates on the basis of the data of probability estimates. The present categorization of an experience is made on the grounds of a past generalization; the applicability of which to the present case is sustained on the basis of inductive considerations and memorial recollection of the appropriateness of the generalization to qualitatively similar experiences in the past. Altogether, Lewis' notions are not that radically different from Sellars' of 'reliable indicators.' Evidently Sellars believes that if someone presently knows that something did obtain in the past then that entails that he remembers that it did obtain. It seems evident to me that the notion of "now knowing, thus remembering, that these particular facts did obtain" is not that different from Lewis' conception of memorial deliverances having prima facie credibility. Lewis does not insist that a justification be necessarily given before something is believed with practical certainty. His point, like Sellars', seems to be that such justification could be given. Sellars, however, refuses to speak in terms of justification apart from the one occasion already noted. Neither Sellars nor Lewis has freed himself from the need for some consideration of the role of memory in grounding current observational claims. The difference between them would ultimately come to depend on their respective analyses of universals and the degree to which an imagist theory of memory is relied on. There is no clear cut sense in which Lewis' account of memory can be brought under his Mind and the World Order conception of givenness without ascribing to him an imagist conception of memory, but it is less than certain whether he would adhere to such phenomenalistic strictures on givenness in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation where memory is of paramount importance in the justification of knowledge claims.

Not only is the past directly implicated in the making of current observational reports, a whole battery of conceptual knowledge seems to

be presupposed. "Not only must the conditions be of a sort that is appropriate for determining the color of an object by looking, the subject must know that conditions of this sort are appropriate. And while this does not imply that one must have concepts before one has them, it does imply that one can have the concept of green only by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element. It implies that while the process of acquiring the concept of green may - indeed does - involve a long history of acquiring piecemeal habits of response to various objects in various circumstances, there is an important sense in which one has no concept pertaining to the observable properties of physical objects in Space and Time unless one has them all - and, indeed, as we shall see, a great deal more besides."[22] Though Sellars allows for the concept of evidence both in his account of perceptual knowledge and in his account of Jones' development of the concept of a thought on the basis of behavioral grounds, in advocating his coherentist picture of concepts, he seems to defend an account of the evidential relationship between statements analogous to the Carnapian or Austinian underplaying of relationships of evidential priority. "If I reject the framework of traditional empiricism, it is not because I want to say that empirical knowledge has no foundation....On the other hand, I do wish to insist that the metaphor of 'foundation' is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former."[23] While it does not necessarily follow from this objection, Sellars adds another dimension of criticism. The foundationalist picture is too static. "Empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in

jeopardy, though not all at once."[24] The image of Neurath's ship is not too distant from Sellars' thought at this point.

SELLARS' CONCEPT of a THOUGHT

The theme of coherence is carried along into the second major portion of Sellars' essay. In it he seeks to provide an account of the genesis of the concept of thought. He provides a piece of anthropological science fiction in which Jones comes to develop a theory which attempts to explain the occurrence of overt verbal behavior as well as the possibility that there may be occurrences between discrete bits of verbal behavior. What initially began as the postulation of thoughts in order to explain the occurrence of overt verbal episodes has become on the field of behavior and linguistic reinforcement a vehicle for the reporting of internal occurrences, occurrences which were postulated to exist. "What began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role."[25] We can infer from Sellars' remarks that he believes that foundationalism, especially as espoused by advocates of the sense-datum analysis of perceptual experience, inverts the relationship between the acquisition of a concept and the use of the concept in reporting presumably private materials, the contents of one's own experiences. One of the most striking objections to foundationalism is its reliance on the authority of first person reports with the apparent threat of solipsism which accompanies such reliance. It is evidently against such reliance that Sellars has marshalled his argument:

> As I see it, this story helps us understand that concepts pertaining to such inner episodes as thoughts are primarily and essentially intersubjective, as intersubjective as the concept of a positron, and that the reporting role of these concepts - the fact that each of us has a privileged access to his thoughts - constitutes a dimension of the use of these concepts which is built on and presupposes this intersubjective status.[26]

The force of Sellars' objection is predicated on the assumption that an unquestionable aspect of a foundationalist position is the view that observation reports are meant to refer to inner episodes, but that they do so, in Sellars' view, could not have been discovered without the complex battery of conceptual involvements which his view of concept formation holds out.

Sellars is not opposed to the privacy dimension of the observation reports of the foundationalist program."My myth has shown that the fact that language is essentially an intersubjective achievement, and is learned in intersubjective contexts - is compatible with the 'privacy' of 'inner episodes'. It also makes clear that these concepts have a reporting use in which one is not drawing inferences from behavioral evidence, it nevertheless insists that the fact that overt behavior is evidence for these episodes is built into the very logic of these concepts, just as the fact that the observable behavior of gases is evidence for molecular episodes is built into the very logic of molecule talk."[27] Thus far Sellars' account is very convincing; however, examination of his notion of 'evidence' seems to create problems. Evidently, the general idea that certain propositions may serve as evidence for other propositions is not anathema to Sellars. It couldn't be. The development of the Jonesean theory presupposes the possibility of using certain facts, perhaps as propositions, as evidence for the creation of certain explanatory hypotheses. The structure of inferential justification which is a central tenet of foundationalism is riddled through with the idea that sets of propositions constitute evidence for other propositions. To attack foundationalism, of course, is not necessarily to attack the idea that propositions can stand in relations of evidential or inductive support. It is rather the candidates for the ultimate propositions which usually become the bone of

contention between foundationalist and coherentist accounts of epistemic justification.

It strikes me that one could raise a problem for Sellars' account regarding the genesis of the concept of 'evidence'. Much seems to hinge on the fact that an individual can take either a proposition, or perhaps in a more extended sense, a piece of behavior as evidence for something else. The thrust of Sellars' account of Jones' theory hinges on the notion. Let me backtrack a bit. The import of Jones' theory is that it goes behind the scenes and offers an account of the development of the notion of a thought and the idea that an individual can engage in self-description. Jones teaches his compatriots to make use of his theory in interpreting each other's behavior. There is nothing counter-intuitive in the idea that a theoretical account intended for the purpose of explaining certain phenomena should be turned to use for the purposes of interpretation. Consider Sellars' account:

> Thus, when Tom, watching Dick, has behavioral evidence which warrants the use of the sentence (in the language of the theory) "Dick is thinking 'p'" (or "Dick is thinking that p"), Dick, using the same behavioral evidence, can say, in the language of the theory, "I am thinking 'p'" (or "I am thinking that p.") And it now turns out - need it have? - that Dick can be trained to give reasonably reliable self-descriptions, using the language of the theory, without having to observe his overt behavior. Jones brings this about, roughly, by applauding utterances by Dick of "I am thinking that p" when the behavioral evidence strongly supports the theoretical statement "Dick is thinking that p"; and by frowning on utterances of "I am thinking that p," when the evidence does not support this theoretical statement.[28]

So much of Sellars' attention is focused on the notions of conceptual primacy. It is possible that his conception of theoretical statements diverges from his earlier account of the semantical dimension of observation reports. The correct making of a theoretical statement about my thinking may not imply that there is in fact an internal episode occurring, nor that I take myself to be reporting the occurrence of such an episode.

Such divergence seems unlikely, especially as it is the semantical dimension of overt verbal episodes which Sellars transfers to the internal realm. Recall that Sellars maintains that observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y. Strictly speaking, the theoretical terms of the Jonesean theory are not observational terms and yet they can serve a reporting role, perhaps it is possible that therefore, they, unlike standard claims of observational knowledge, do not presuppose general facts correlating the occurrence of utterances with the presence of internal episodes. If Tom applauds Dick's utterance of "I am thinking that p" because Tom has behavioral evidence which strongly supports the above theoretical statement) in what sense is Dick dispensing with behavioral evidence? Sellars' point is that he does not observe his own overt behavior (including utterances of the proposition 'p'), but not that he can disregard Tom's applaudings. His using Tom's applaudings as reliable indicators is implicitly parasitical on the behavioral evidence which Tom himself uses in ascribing the theoretical statement about Dick's internal state. It is true that Dick is not introspecting the fact that he is thinking of a certain proposition; he inductively comes to acquire the notion that there may be an internal episode which correlates well with his overt verbal behavior, but Sellars' point is that he comes to do so on the basis of Tom's behavior in the appropriate contexts. But why should Dick come to accept the idea that Tom's behavior can constitute evidence for a particular fact about himself? Obviously the notion that a proposition can serve as evidence for another proposition does not presuppose the development of the concept of internal episodes or thoughts, but rather it is the other way around on Sellars' view.

The disturbing element in Sellars' account is the residual feeling

one has that in destroying one variant of the myth of the given he has effectively presupposed another variety. It would be difficult to show this; I do not propose to examine the credibility of the psychological theory of concept acquisition with which Sellars is in obvious agreement - (he cites Skinner approvingly) - nor to examine the Quinean concept of an "innate quality space" which provides a continuum into which our concepts fit once they begin to be amassed piecemeal in the course of reinforcements by users of the same language. Sellars strongly connects his rejection of the Myth of the Given with his view on concept acquisition. In his correspondence with Chisholm he notes this point: "...of a piece with my rejection of this myth is my contention that before these people could come to know noninferentially (by 'introspection') that they have thoughts, they must first construct the concept of what it is to be a thought."[29] To this he appends a note which contains a significant quotation from the essay which we have been examining so extensively for the past several pages. In support of his view that we cannot offer an intrinsic characterization of "impressions" he urges the following:

> And this line of thought is reinforced by the consideration that once we give up the idea that we begin our sojourn in this world with any - even a vague, fragmentary, and undiscriminating - awareness of the logical space of particulars, kinds , facts and resemblances, and recognize that even such "simple" concepts as those of colors are the fruit of a long process of publicly reinforced responses to public objects (including verbal performances)in public situations, we may well be puzzled as to how, even if there are such things as impressions or sensations, we could come to know that there are, and to know what sort of thing they are. For we now recognize that instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, and cannot account for it.[30]

The emphasis on coherence is unmistakeable. Whether Sellars would be willing to extend his account of "having a concept" to those which are not manifestly applicable to observable situations is less clear. The import of his claim underscored in the above quote, is that we in some

fashion have, in embryonic form, the concept of an internal episode, or a thought, which through the genius of Jones is made manifest to us. It might be possible that a Jonesean account could be constructed for the genesis of the concept of'evidence'; undoubtedly Sellars would claim that we have, and must have the use of the concept of evidence even if we do not recognize it for what it is. Our reasonings, including the construction of myths and the leading of our Rylean ancestors out of the public world into the recesses of private episodes, presupposes such a notion.

The thrust of my objection to Sellars' account of the Jonesean myth is that it presupposes the givenness of the concept of something, particularly a proposition, serving as evidence for something else, presumably another proposition. This is not an objection to the idea that the intuitive possession of evidence is essential, but rather that Sellars fails to take into account an element of givenness in his own theory. There are difficulties with my attempt to oppose Sellars. On the one hand, the relationship of 'evidence' is not an empirical quality in the sense of 'red' or even in the sense in which 'thought' is a quality of a mental substance. On the other hand, the postulated thoughts of Jones' theory are felt to have the analogue of the semantical properties of overt verbal episodes, which we call intentionality. That two propositions may have an evidential relationship to each other is, of course, an epistemic dimension of those properties and not a semantical one. The significance of the intentionality of Jonesean thoughts, which is analogically based on the semantical properties of overt verbal episodes, is of course that it underpins the possibility of reporting uses of expressions referring to those thoughts. As Sellars notes, his myth begins <u>in medias res</u>, with a community that has mastered a Rylean language.

Jones takes the verbal behavior as a model for the theory of mental episodes which he proposes to develop. In other words, the model which he adopts (and which shall serve to demonstrate the intentionality of mental episodes) is already enriched with the semantical resources. That Sellars begins in this fashion does not discharge him from the obligation of explaining how individuals acquire the semantical picture of the overt verbal episodes they produce. Without attempting to give an account of Sellars' view regarding the 'means' relation, suffice it to say that for an expression to mean something is for it to have an established function within the complex of potential utterances of a particular language. The semantical dimension of the verbal episodes in which we engage is intimately related to the notion that we use our language to express ideas, to get things done, to express truths, etc. Sellars is asking a great deal when he says: "Let it be granted, then, that these mythical ancestors of ours are able to characterize each other's verbal behavior in semantical terms; that, in other words, they not only can talk about each other's predictions as causes and effects, and as indicators (with greater or less reliability) of other verbal and nonverbal states of affairs, but can also say of these verbal productions that they <u>mean</u> thus and so, that they say <u>that</u> such and such, that they are true, false, etc."[31]

The scientific image with its postulation of theoretical entities to secure explanatory objectives supersedes the manifest image with its reliance on inductively confirmable generalizations. Evidently, the Rylean view, with its emphasis on mongrel-categorical hypotheticals for the characterization of human behavior, is an insufficient picture of the complexity of the organism's behavior. Nevertheless, it does not seem as though Sellars can escape reliance on the Rylean framework. It is into the Rylean framework that Jones comes and it is from the materials

available to him in such a framework that he develops his account of internal episodes, both thoughts and impressions. The above quote suggests that the truth of semantical characterizations of overt verbal behavior presupposes in some sense that certain facts about regularities of verbal behavior and occasions of use do hold. These facts of behavior, in a Rylean framework, must be understood to constitute the criteria for the truth of the semantical statements. My basic point about Sellars' formulation is that it is important to decide on the sense in which an individual's ability to utilize behavioral evidence both for the genesis of an explanatory theory (the case of Jones) and for the transformation of theoretical accounts to self-reporting episodes hinges on a conscious awareness of the degree to which propositions are tied to each other through evidential relationships. Philosophers such as Austin and Carnap have both criticized the view that certain propositions are intrinsically evidential; Sellars' emphasis on a Quinean image of science conforms with those views. Nevertheless, Sellars suggests that the movement from the cave to the drawing room (with the historical episode of postulating sense-data) requires an intuition that propositions do have evidential roles. Of course, neither Austin nor Carnap need deny that propositions can serve as evidence; they oppose the foundationalism implicit in some conceptions of evidential relationships.

The Rylean approach is most appropriate to the Pre-Jonesean phase as it serves to correlate observable causes of observable verbal behavior. The retreat to propositions, as opposed to behavioral manifestations, may pose some problems. Sellars places great emphasis on the use of language as somehow evincing what he terms pattern-governed behavior. Surely, one of the uses to which language is put is to draw inferences and to express conclusions of inferences. Part of what is involved, implicitly,

at least, in the idea that one can draw an inference on the basis of other propositions is that those propositions function as evidence for the individual drawing the inference. If Sellars' account is adequate, it should be able to account for the employment of propositions in an evidential role. What I am driving at is a reading of Sellars which indicates that he has compromised his account of the development of the psychological concepts carried with the Jonesean myth by presupposing psychological elements in the very use of the semantical model of overt verbal behavior as a model for the intentionality of mental episodes.

THE COHERENCE THEORY of CONCEPTS

In examining Lewis' philosophy we must attend to distinct aspects of his account of the given. On the one hand, reports of the contents of immediate experience constitute the non-inferentially known bases of empirical knowledge. On the other hand, in the context of Lewis' epistemological views in Mind and the World Order, the machinery of the given serves the purpose of explaining our simple perceptual beliefs. That the given is implicated in perceptual beliefs does not of course mean that perceptual beliefs may not be in need of justification.

We have two vehicles for examining some critical points in Lewis' view in a set of articles by Roderick Firth and Wilfrid Sellars. The account of what Firth terms material object predicates constitutes an interesting test case for the account of empirical knowledge which Lewis proposes. I have already indicated the prevalence of certain perceptual locutions both in Lewis' early account of the given and in his linguistic account of expressive language. Most of the critical discussions of the problems of perceptual knowledge have concentrated on qualities which are visually discernible, shapes and colors. I shall also restrict myself to consideration of these types of qualities; Lewis' account of sense-meaning

and signification seems to warrant such restricted consideration. The object complements for the perceptual verbs are invariably names of qualities, the table appears blue, the coin looks round. The predicates have dual roles for Lewis; on the one hand, in their primary use, they are the names of empirical properties such as redness or roundness, on the other hand they designate the qualia which are the contents of the presentations which we receive in acts of immediate apprehension. This distinction between properties which may objectively be possessed by a state of affairs and names for the qualia which may present themselves when we attend to such a state of affairs stems from Lewis' thesis of infinite temporal spread. It is, however, not free of difficulties other than those involved in a proper analysis of the relationship between objective and terminating judgments.

There is a tradition in perceptual epistemology which contends that the presence of certain locutions such as "appears", "looks like", "seems", etc., signify the speaker's intent to withhold endorsement from the content of his perceptual claim. The view further maintains that if the speaker were certain about the objective reality or the factuality of what he took himself to see then there would be no reason to withhold endorsement and such perceptual assurance would be indicated by his willingness to employ a locution which eliminates the element of tentativeness of the locutions noted earlier. Claims made with assurance would be characterized by their making categorical predications of the object presented to an observer. It is interesting that this performative account of expressions of belief should originate in the views of those who are fundamentally opposed to foundationalist conceptions of knowledge. It would seem that the distinction which the verbal locutions signify presuppose some intuitive hallmarks of when a statement is certain and

when it isn't, but I do not wish to examine the validity of the performative approach.

Roderick Firth, in his paper "Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority," implicitly accepts the distinction of the performative account but finds a deeper basis for it in terms of competing accounts of concept acquisition. One of the clear implications of Lewis' distinction between the use of objective language to record factualities and the use of expressive language to report on the contents of one's immediate experience is that in expressive language one is never asserting something about the nature of objective reality (in Lewis' sense of that term). Furthermore, if the import of objective judgments, ones which do purport to assert something about the nature of objective reality, is to be unpacked (and ultimately justified) in terms of locutions referring to the contents of one's immediate experience, then there is reason to believe that Lewis accords a certain primacy to the locutions by use of which we effect those reports. Firth's point in discussing this issue is to indicate that what he terms the coherence theory of concepts may be acceptable to or at least compatible with Lewis' account of concepts even though Lewis is opposed to the coherence theory of justification. The latter view contends that ultimately, whether or not belief in a statement is credible, hinges on whether or not that statement coheres with ones held antecedently. It is because we do make judgments in expressive language which for Lewis constitutes a means of avoiding the coherence theory of justification. The threat to Lewis' account from the coherence theory of concepts stems from the fact that the coherence theory of concepts countenances the possibility that there is no conceptual priority between locutions which express objective facts and those which express contents of one's immediate experience. "But if the coherence theory of

concepts is correct, and we cannot fully understand 'looks red' unless we possess the contrasting concept 'is red,' then it would seem that it is not logically possible to have the concept 'looks red' before we have the concept 'is red'."[32] One would not, in using expressive language, be able to assert something about the content of one's immediate experience without at the same time asserting something about the content of objective reality. "If it should turn out that these judgments all make some covert reference to physical objects, then depending, of course, on the kind of 'covert reference' - it might no longer be possible to make the epistemological distinction that Lewis requires."[33]

"Covert reference" is not a perspicuous notion. If reference carries with it the notion that one succeeds in individuating an item for the hearer of one's utterance then, in making a statement such as "The President of the United States is a powerful man", I needn't be referring to any particular holder of the office in order that my statement be understood. Naturally, anyone hearing my statement may chance to think of the present occupant of that high office, but the fact that someone might think of Richard Nixon does not entail that I intended, by the use of the definite description, to make a covert reference to that individual. It would seem that if a person could succeed in making covert reference to some entity or individual by some referring device then it should be possible to make the covert reference overt. The covert reference to the entity or the individual which the speaker succeeds in making for his hearer should be made perspicuous by the use of a proper designating expression for the item to which covert reference can be made. But it seems that the point of conceptual priority, as opposed to conceptual interdependence is that there is an asymmetrical relationship between the concepts one uses. If "looks red" is conceptually prior to "is red" then

the latter presupposes the former but not the other way around. One could not, by using"looks red", be making a covert reference to objective reality, for what is understood in speaking of the former locution as conceptually prior is that there is no logical dependence on the "is red" locution before the "looks red" locution could be understood. There is of course an important sense in which "looks" expressions on Lewis' account can never assert something about objective reality, because the referents of terms in expressive judgments are the contents of one's immediate experience, i.e. appearances, whereas the referents of objective judgments are objective states of affairs in the world. (Of course, if we accord some credence to the idea of covert reference, or at least to the notion that an expressive judgement may have certain implications, then, following a certain suggestion of Roderick Chisholm's as to what constitutes the basis of certainty in an expressive judgment, one is making a covert reference to the objective state of affairs which is one's taking a certain perceptual content to be present to oneself, i.e., that one is undergoing an experience.) Lewis' contention that an objective judgment is intensionally equivalent to an infinite set of terminating judgments, the components of which are expressive statements, may invite the charge that Lewis has succeeded in covertly introducing the element of covert reference into his account of empirical knowledge claims. A defence by Lewis would almost surely fall back on his distinction between various types of meaning, more specifically between the signification of a term and the sense meaning of a term. In light of Lewis' own criterion two statements which are intensionally equivalent have the same signification. But the terms in objective judgments denote physical objects and their properties whereas the terms in expressive judgments denote subjective appearances. So either the objective judgment and the set of terminating

judgments is not intensionally equivalent, or else the judgments do in fact signify the same state of affairs. If they do signify the same state of affairs there is strong reason to agree with Firth's contention that covert reference is made, only the reference is more than covert. Lewis would not want to deny that the intensional equivalence stands. Were it not to stand, the structure of justification implicit in his account of empirical knowledge would be overthrown.

While Firth grants that Lewis is at odds with the coherence theory of justification, he seems to feel that the coherence theory of concepts is not necessarily incompatible with Lewis' own conceptions as implicit in the distinction between objective judgments and expressive statements. Firth wants to say that the paradigm cases in which one learns to employ certain material object predicates are such as to encompass both veridical and non-veridical observings of circumstances in which the predicate may be applicable. The learning of the predicate's use does not depend, at first at least, on whether the circumstance in which it is employed is veridical or not veridical. What Firth would want to say is that there is a phenomenological dimension in which the experience which one characterizes with a certain predicate unquestionably appears to one to actually have the quality which one is ascribing to the experience. The development of an individual involves the ability to distinguish between correct ascriptions of characteristics to experiences and incorrect ones, between veridical and non-veridical perceptions. From the fact that the young child seems to acquire the concept "red" in circumstances which do not differentiate between veridical and nonveridical perceptions, Firth concludes that the child is acquiring a concept "red" which "expresses a primitive form of the concept "looks red". It is not clear why Firth contends that the "child says 'red' just in those circumstances in which...

adults could truthfully say "Looks like red to me now." If "looks red" is meant to harbor the element of tentativeness which I noted earlier, the use of "looks red" may be restricted to circumstances in which the state of affairs may be red but where the individual making the claim is not absolutely certain of that fact. Firth is unclear as to the kinds of situations in which adults truthfully say "looks red to me now." He may be trading on an ambiguity. On the one hand, an individual can truthfully say that something looks red to oneself, if one takes oneself to be having some red sense impression, or some similar internal occurrence. On the other hand, and this need not express the element of tentativeness, there is the intent on the part of the individual making the report to make a comparative claim, in which that which currently appears to him is being compared to some object the quality of which has been determined and is known to be of a certain nature.

What is also unclear is why Firth deems it necessary to claim that a child who has acquired a primitive form of the concept "looks red" does not lose the concept when he develops. Clearly, the development of the child includes among other things ability to distinguish between cases of veridical perception and cases of ostensible seeing. Once both concepts are evident to the child, now grown up, it seems needless to speak of his retaining the primitive concept. It is even questionable whether he remembers or can remember exactly what the extent of his primitive concept was, that is, the range of cases to which it was applicable. It seems that the only reason Firth urges that the concept not be lost is so that some sense can be given to the claim that there is a concept of "looks red" which is logically prior to "is red." But he offers as support of this view Lewis' contention that the scientist and nonscientist are able to share "our common world" "precisely because the scientist does not necessarily forget

how to use words in their nontechnical senses."[34] Firth is confusing the order in which one may have come to learn certain concepts with those concepts being logically prior; it certainly seems that the former kind of order is wholly contingent, whereas the latter, if it is a logical order, cannot be. Firth does not suggest that the order must be as we find it because of the assumed logical priority. It would be up to Firth to demonstrate the sense in which a physicists's concept of the word 'force' is somehow continuous with and logically dependent on the more common sense notion which he might have encountered as a boy. It seems that the correct contrast is not between technical and nontechnical as Firth seems to suggest, but between earlier and later common-sense employment of standard concepts. The fact that we may continue to have a concept "looks red" (which is in a sense the content of the child's primitive concept "is red") does not necessarily mean that we continue to use the concept. In fact it is fair to ask, in a dispositional spirit, whether it makes any sense to speak of continuing to have a concept without at the same time being able to point to instances of the concept's legitimate employment, and more importantly, unsupplanted employment.

To further the spirit of rapprochement, at least between the coherence theory of concepts and Lewis, Firth suggests a distinction between a baptismal rule and a semantical rule. As an instance of the former he offers Lewis' suggestion that a sense experience should be "named after" its normal condition. This, he contends, is a linguistic rule, one which reflects the decision to follow a certain convention in referring to experiences. Part of what the use of this rule signifies is the fact that our descriptions of experiences as they appear in locutions such as "appear", "looks like", etc., is in fact derivative from or logically posterior to employments of the material object predicates in paradigm cases of their

use. An examination of Lewis' views on value judgments will reveal that the order of priority as suggested by Firth is tenable only for material object predicates, and is not acceptable in the context of reports of the experiential content of a judgment of objective value.

Firth wants to endorse the suggestion that it is possible for a child consistently to identify things which appear to be a certain quality without that child's having any conception of what it may be for something objectively to have that quality. Firth is seeking to modify the traditional conception of the coherence theory of concepts so that it is not anathema to the conceptual priorities which Lewis' view seems to presuppose.

> The fact that Young Rufus is named after Old Rufus does not prevent us from learning to recognize Young Rufus before we have met Old Rufus. Analogously, the fact that key words in our "looks" and "seems" expressions are inherited from our "is" expressions does not prevent the child from consistently identifying things that look red to him (or situations in which he seems to see a doorknob) before he can consistently identify things that <u>are</u> red (or situations in which he really sees an "objective" doorknob.) If we do not confuse baptismal rules with semantical rules (e.g., the semantical rule followed by the child who says "red" when something looks red to him) the coherence theory of concepts does not seem to be incompatible with Lewis' theories of meaning and knowledge.[35]

It is striking that Firth could be oblivious to what appear to be rather obvious facts about baptismal rules. There is not the slightest implication that Young Rufus is named after Old Rufus because he looks like or resembles him. The use of the same name or term facilitates the grouping of similar entities into classes. The basis of such grouping may vary and needn't necessarily reflect visual similarities. Things possess differing properties, both manifest and dispositional properties; by our grouping entities into classes we are either indicating that we realize that there are resemblances or indicating our belief that closer examination will reveal resemblances. Firth says that "when Lewis describes his sense experience by saying 'I seem to see a doorknob' his choice of

words appears to reflect a linguistic rule to the effect that a sense experience should be 'named after' its normal condition." It is true that in terms of Lewis' proposal we may have a linguistic rule, but to suggest, as Firth does, that it is merely a linguistic rule, seems to be an error.

Statements using the "appears" locutions are, when uttered, meant to be informative, even if they may not carry a full endorsement by the speaker. Firth thinks that there is no import in the linguistic proposal, but I contend, it is the normal condition, which, in a sense, constitutes the ground for the meaningfulness and thus legitimate employment of the expressions with the "appears" locutions. The distinction that Firth is driving at in speaking of linguistic or baptismal rules is not evident. It would seem that the critical feature of his account comes less in terms of the adoption of a conventional rule for the naming of an experience than from what the experience may bespeak about the actual conceptual abilities possessed by the individual using the concepts. In urging a relative to name the baby after its grandfather or father I am endorsing the continuity of a unique family name, or something of the sort. On the other hand when I urge that a sense experience be named after its normal condition I am proposing the continuity (the projectability of a certain predicate) of a certain manner of grouping experiences.

I have passed over some important points in Firth's laying out of his account to which I now wish to turn as it will serve as an introduction to the more fundamental dispute between Sellars and Firth. The discussion of the coherence theory of concepts comes in the context of perceptual knowledge claims, where it is suggested that certain material object predicates are analyzable in terms of predicates which are used

to describe sense experience:

> It is a genetic fact, but a fact with philosophical implications, that when a child first begins to use the word 'red' with any consistency he applies it to things that look red whether these things are, as we should say, "really red," or whether they are merely made to appear red by abnormal conditions of observation. Thus the child calls white things "red" when he sees them through red glass. In fact at this stage the child says 'red' just in those circumstances in which we, as adults, could truthfully say "looks red to me now," so that it would not be unreasonable to assert that the child is using 'red' to express a primitive form of the concept "looks red".[36]

Advocates of givenness, including Lewis, place great store in the acts of awareness in which that which is given is presented. It would seem that if the child applies the word 'red' with consistency there might be some minimal conceptual awareness on the child's part. Firth obviously must claim that minimal conceptual awareness is so minimal as not to require awareness of what being "really red" is like. After all, the child can discriminate things which "look red" from those which "look green" without necessarily possessing the concept "is red" or "is green". While I can thus grant Firth his point even if minimal conceptual awareness is involved, it is more difficult to understand the idea of a concept expressing a primitive form of an adult concept. The point of the adult concept "looks red" is to preserve the contrast between those contexts in which something is red and others in which something merely appears red. If the child were using his concept of red, the undifferentiated one, we would expect that it would, in gross outline, not only express the difference between being and looking red, but that the child, in using it, would be aware. But that supposition is of course contrary to the supposition that it is a primitive concept. Naturally, insofar as the child termed 'red' everything which looked 'red', it is safe to assert that each of the experiences to which he applied 'red' could now be named by the locution 'looks red'. Among the experiences the

child may have named were ones which actually were red; in that case, the applicability of the adult concept 'looks red' to an experience which actually 'is red' is guaranteed, though it expresses the tentative claim, which I noted earlier, such locutions may on occasion serve to express.

In many respects the foregoing discussion has been preliminary to a host of critical issues which bear more directly on the issue of foundationalism. Even though Firth does not mention it, and in fact seems to discount it with his notion of a linguistic rule, there appears to be a causal dimension to the ascription of a certain predicate to an experience. The causal dimension is most surely captured in our possession of a conceptual skill. In saying that the child consistently applies the term 'red' to those things in his experience which look red, it would seem that what is involved is at least a partial recognition or awareness that the experience is in some fashion qualitatively of a certain nature, and it may be <u>that</u> recognition which contributes to the application of the particular predicate. From the situation as Firth describes it, it is evident that 'red' is applicable to an object which is not in fact 'red' but which is qualitatively red to the child. Unaware of the presence of the red tinted glass between himself and the white object, in calling the experience 'red' the child is not describing the experience of the red glass, for there is no such experience for him; his intent clearly is to describe the primary object of his interest, the object which objectively is white but which, nevertheless, appears to be red. But to speak of the child's intent as that of describing the object before him which he takes to be red is perhaps a bit premature.

Firth speaks as though cognizant of the distinction between the ascription of a quality to an object and the description of one's own sense experience, yet he does not draw some fairly straightforward

implications from the distinction. That he does not do so is even more surprising in light of the involvement of Lewis in the discussion. Firth notes that it is possible that the coherence theory of concepts may compromise Lewis' distinction between statements about the content of one's immediate experience and those which purport to say something about objective reality.

I said a short time ago that it is premature to characterize the child who uses the primitive concept "looks red" as in some way intending to describe a particular object in his experiental field. To secure the distinction it is useful to recruit a distinction suggested by Wilfrid Sellars between conceptual and nonconceptual experiences. We can understand what the child is doing in either of two ways. Sellars takes the application of a term, which designates a predicate, to an experience as an act of conceptualization; it is a means of bringing the experience within the fold of our conceptual scheme. In this respect his suggestion is not alien to Lewis when Lewis suggests that the reality of an experience is constituted by its being parceled out to a category. (The mechanics of their respective view-points are not critical for the substance of this discussion.) Sellars' suggestion is that insofar as the child is using 'red' to express a primitive form of the adult concept 'looks red', and that adult concept involves the contrast between merely appearing red and objectively being red, the child's concept not involving that contrast may not even involve the idea of there being an object which is being characterized by the predicate 'red'. Nevertheless, there is something which the child is 'characterizing', or which he conceptualizes. It is "a <u>nonconceptual</u> experience which is <u>somehow</u> red in a sense of 'red' to which the distinction between looking red and being red is irrelevant."[37] Consequently, when the child conceptualizes his experience with the term

'red', it is a feature of his experiencing, and not a feature of some ostensible physical object which he is characterizing. 'Red' used in this sense can best be understood as an adverbial characterization of his experience. (The virtue of the adverbial theory of sensing is of course that it avoids the reification of appearances so characteristic of traditional sense-data theories of perceptual knowledge.) The predicate 'red' in and of itself does not necessarily carry with it the implication that it is intended for use in the characterization of objects as opposed to being used in adverbial fashion to characterize the manner in which an experience is had. If the experience which the child terms 'red' is a conceptual experience, as opposed to a nonconceptual experience, then "According to one form of this alternative, the experience contains the idea of <u>there being a red object over there</u>, where the concept of "red" mobilized by this idea is not paired with a concept of "looks red". According to a second form, the experience the child conceptualizes involves the idea of <u>my seeing there to be a red object over there</u>, where the concept of 'seeing' involved in the experience itself is not paired with a concept of 'seeming to see.'"[38]

The fact that an experience is conceptual does not preclude the possibility that the experience itself has a certain characteristic, has what might be termed a phenomenological dimension. The important point of Sellars' distinction is that it makes perspicuous what he terms the propositional content of an experience. The two 'ideas' involved correspond to degrees of endorsement implicit in the making of the claims in which the qualitative ascription is made. The former idea carries with it the implication that there in fact is an object which may or may not be red; the existence of the object is itself not in question. There is a blend of tentativeness and assurance. The latter 'idea' on the other hand carries

with it a full endorsement; not only is the presence of the object assured, but by terming it a 'seeing' the applicability of the predicate term is assured. It is a Rylean achievement.

There are difficulties in characterizing what Sellars may mean by speaking of a conceptual experience, or of what might be meant by speaking of an 'experience containing an idea'. (Part of what Sellars understands by a conceptual experience is one which does not involve mere receptivity or passivity on the part of the subject. Furthermore, a conceptual experience is one which has a propositional content which, for Sellars, involves the occurrence of a Mentalese sentence. Such a sentence is one which does not belong to the order of overt verbal tokens, but is modelled on them and is the name of an idea.

The basic point with which both Firth and Sellars are grappling is the nature and degree of conceptual interdependence between the notions of 'looking 'red' and its correlates and 'being red.' On the one hand this concern is fundamental to an adequate account of perceptual knowledge and devolves on the issue of whether we can develop a full-blooded account of how we come to have the knowledge which we do have from perception without necessarily having a concept of the objective possession by an object or state of affairs of a particular property. The issue impinges squarely on some of the cardinal questions raised both explicitly and implicitly by Lewis' account of the given. In Lewis there are concerns at a number of levels. When a Lewisian observer makes an expressive judgment, apart from the apprehension of the content of a presentation being certain, there must be some relation between the observer and what it is that he takes to be the content of the presentation which he is observing. In one respect, Lewis' view about the relation of an expressive judgment to an objective judgment (one which makes an assertion about objective reality)

does and does not conform to the insight which Sellars' distinction is meant to capture.

The given, those elements in our experience which are denoted, or signified by the terms in our expressive judgments, are understood to serve as signs of objective realities which are 'behind' - so to speak - the momentary presentation which we receive of some objective reality. In this respect, the experience which is the apprehension of some given element contains the idea of there being an object, characterizable in a certain manner, out there. Strictly speaking , the experience is not a seeing of the objective reality; consequently, there is only a partial degree of endorsement of the Sellarsian propositional content. On the other hand, insofar as the apprehension of the given element is certain or indubitable, there is an inclination to suggest that it is analogous to a non-conceptual experience which,when characterized by the terms in the expressive judgment,is experienced. This inclines one to view Lewis as advocating something along the lines of the adverbial theory of sensing. Consequently, when one speaks of 'seeming to see yellow' or of 'somethings looking yellow', the root idea is that one is having an experience of a certain qualitative sort, but which does not entail any commitment to the idea of there being an object out there to which the quality is applicable. The mere fact that apprehensions of the given are certain for Lewis does not implicate the idea of truth. It is the idea of truth, however, which is at the base of Sellars' conception that a conceptual experience may be a 'seeing of a red object over there.' "To characterize S's experience as a <u>seeing</u> is, in a suitably broad sense...to apply the semantical concept of truth to that experience."[39]

The inclination to understand givenness in a rather one-sided fashion may be fostered by the embeddedness of givenness in accounts of

perceptual knowledge. The primary examples which Lewis offers us of given element in experience are those features of presentations which in an obvious sense are phenomenally manifest to us. In this way the whiteness of a cube of sugar is something which could be given in an experience of the sugar cube; on the other hand, the fact of the cube's solubility is not something which could be given in that same experience. Once we take the path directed by the phenomenal bias it is a short step to introduce a distinction between those features of an experience which are added by concepts and which can only be added by concepts and which can never be given in an experience of the object under discussion. This distinction is then buttressed by speaking of that which is noninferentially evident as opposed to that which can only become inferentially evident about some entity.

On the supposition that there is some pure sensory core which constitutes the having of an experience the adverbial theory of sensing offers itself as an attractive proposal. But what guarantee have we that the conceptual is deeply and inextricably caught up in our sensing or having certain experiences, the sensory cores of which we try to isolate and term the given? Attacks on the given such as Scheffler's stem from the intuition that there must be conceptual involvement in the having of all experience. Even though the qualia which are experienced in the course of a presentation may be signs of the objective properties of the objects which are 'behind' them, we would not say that all of the actual properties of the object are exhausted by those properties of which we can receive phenomenal presentations.

One of the difficulties which attends a foundationalist conception of knowledge is that, if the accepted modes of deductive inference constitute the means whereby the upper tiers of our knowledge come to be

generated, then those non-inferentially known basic statements must be amenable to formulation as premisses which can serve in deductive inferences. If the basic statements are understood to express facts, then we may wonder as to whether or not in 'apprehending' a fact one may not be employing conceptual skills.I shall not, however, attempt to reconnoiter the rugged territory of Lewis' theory of facts in order to see the degree to which his theory of the given may interact with it. Such a pursuit would bear little fruit as there is no accepted canonical formulation of what a fact is. If the continuing discussion emphasizes the dispute between Sellars and Firth it does not mean that we have abandoned Lewis along the way. I find that much light is shed on the kind of issue Lewis is grappling with by attending to the contemporary dimension of the debate about perceptual knowledge.

Facts may be thought to have a causal dimension in the following sense: If a fact, in the most general sense of that term, is understood to signify or name a state of affairs in the world, then we may think of the fact, or the state of affairs which it names as contributing to, causing, or bringing about our belief in the state of affairs. In the case of the foundationalist approach to knowledge, it is affirmed that a subject is somehow directly related to a fact; nevertheless, the paradigm of being directly related is the kind of relation one may sustain to some sensory presentation, and if these are construed as particulars in a sense distinct from the particulars which facts may signify, then the charge is that one takes a paradigm from sensing, immediate apprehension, and converts it so that it becomes applicable to facts. There is a further sense in which facts are explanatory. In adjudging a belief to be true one is disposed to suggest that it is because there is a fact to which the belief corresponds. In the case of non-inferential beliefs, or

immediate apprehensions, it is the factuality of the state of affairs and the transparency of the state of affairs to a cognitive act which confers certainty or self-authentication on the belief. How do these reflections bear on the earlier discussion?

We noted that the occurrence of a statement which contains a "looks" or "appears" locution signals the occurrence of an experience, which at once is fraught with a certain degree of tentativeness, in that the individual producing the utterance is uncertain as to whether that which he takes himself to 'see' actually has the quality which he ascribes to it. In fact it is possible that there is no object present to him which is endowed with the quality which he believes it is endowed with. Nevertheless there is the fact of his seeming to have an experience of a certain qualitative sort; the occurrence of this experience requires explanation. But we are less concerned about the genesis of the experience in a causal sense than in a diagnosis of why the individual apparently takes the experience he is having as one about which he can have no doubts, which for him is certain, indubitable and non-inferential. It is in an attempt to explain this that Sellars offers us an account of what it is for a state of affairs to be self-presenting:

> Now many will be inclined to expostulate that the whole point of givenness is that, when it is <u>given</u> that something is the case, one has an <u>authoritative awareness</u> that something is the case which is not simply a special case of <u>believing</u> something to be the case. Thus, many philosophers have distinguished between the "direct apprehension" of a fact, which does not involve the use of "ideas" or "concepts", and a mere thinking or believing, which does. The latter if true, corresponds to a fact. Even if adequately justified, however, it remains at best a second-class form of knowledge as contrasted with direct apprehension.
>
> Many philosophers have indeed thought that the epistemic authority of certain <u>beliefs</u> is grounded in the fact that what the believers <u>believe</u> to be the case has been <u>directly apprehended</u> to be the case. Thus, the idea that certain facts are directly apprehended and, in particular, the idea that certain states of one's mind are known by virtue of being directly apprehended has been thought to explain how certain beliefs acquire an epistemic

> authority that is not a matter of their inferential relations to other beliefs.
>
> Of course, one who holds that the self-presenting character of certain facts is the fons et origo of the epistemic authority of beliefs need not hold that this role requires the acquisition of epistemic authority by occurrent beliefs to the effect that one is in such and such a self-presenting state. It is, he might hold, beliefs with certain other contents which acquire authority through their relation to directly apprehended facts. The facts, and not the beliefs pertaining to them, would be "evident" as well as "true" by virtue of being self-presenting and obtaining states of affairs.[40]

It is evident from the foregoing that Sellars is not restricting his conception of a fact to those kinds of things which are the objects of acts of thinking or believing. There is consequently a sense in which a fact can be directly apprehended. The difficulty stems from the manner in which a fact is directly apprehensible. That such direct apprehension does not involve the use of 'ideas' or 'concepts' evidently means for Sellars that it is nonconceptual, and does not involve the occurrence of a Mentalese sentence. What is unclear however is whether we are entitled to infer from this that directly apprehensible facts are the kinds which can be phenomenally presented. In certain respects Sellars inclines us to accept this construal for he ties direct apprehension into the acquisition of conceptual skills. Yet as examples of such conceptual skills he offers the acquisition of the concept 'red'. "One acquires the idea of what it is to be red, the ability to think or believe that there is something red, by virtue of having directly apprehended something to be red."[41] It is more difficult to understand what it means to say of an individual that "He is directly apprehending that Albuquerque is the capital of New Mexico." The natural suggestion might be that there is some structural isomorphism between the state of affairs in the world and the concatenation of sensory qualities which are apprehensible. But, does one have to be within a fifty-mile radius of

Albuquerque to directly apprehend this fact about it? Or, is there perhaps a sense in which a memory of Albuquerque's situation on a map of the Southwest directly presents to us this directly apprehensible state of affairs? Sellars skirts the questions which arise from an overly phenomenalistic approach to his account and retreats to epistemological characterizations of self-presentingness:

> ...historically there have been two competing strands in the concept of a "self-presenting state of affairs."
> (a) A self-presenting state of affairs is one which is such that, if the relevant person at the relevant time <u>believes</u> it to obtain, the believing is noninferentially warranted or self-warranting....
>
> The <u>second</u> strand can be formulated as follows:
> (b) A self-presenting state of affairs is a <u>fact</u> (an obtaining state of affairs) which is known to obtain, <u>not</u> by virtue of the occurrence of an act of "warranted" belief, but by virtue of a unique cognitive act (direct apprehension) which is more basic than that of any believing, however, warranted. [42]

Formulation (a) effectively denies that the question which I raised above, in the phenomenal guise, is legitimate. It is the believing and not the content of what is believed that is non-inferentially warranted. What is Sellars' packing into the underscored 'believes' in characterization (a)? Naturally, someone can believe something to be the case without its actually being the case; this is reflected by our distinction between 'knowledge'and 'belief'. On view (a) then, it would seem that anything which one finds himself believing, on any occasion, is sufficient indication that his believing the content is warranted, noninferentially. No independent characterization of the state of affairs is offered; it is the relatedness of the state of affairs as content to an act of believing which is warranted which constitutes the epistemic authority of the state of affairs, or more strictly, of the believing of the state of affairs. The second formulation is no more revealing about the exact nature of a self-presenting state than is the first. Unlike the first,

however, it suggests that the self-presenting state of affairs is an actual occurrence (a fact, or obtaining state of affairs), but what Sellars' claim seems to come to is that a self-presenting state of affairs on the second strand view is the cognate accusative of the special mode of cognition which is appropriate to the apprehensions of such states of affairs. In light of the fact that no state of affairs may actually obtain in case (a) it is evident why the weight of epistemic authority must be placed in something actual, an act of believing. That there is such an occurrent act of believing does not deny that the experience which is the believing of a certain content (even though that content may not be an existent state of affairs) has a qualitative dimension. The child authoritatively takes himself to be believing that the white object is in fact red; in addition there is a sense in which his experience must be phenomenologically red in an important way so that he is induced to describe his experience in just the fashion that he does.

It may repay us to cast our glance backward for some summary. What began as a practical problem in perceptual epistemology has brought us through a series of transformations to a more general concern with the viability of epistemological positions which place emphasis on a ground floor of non-inferential knowledge on the basis of which the higher tiers receive their inferential warrant. The original point of concern arose when we looked at whether there was a viable sense in which "looks red" as a predicate of experiences could be seen to be logically prior to the predicate "is red." Part of the answer to that question devolves on the issue of whether an individual could employ the locution without having learned it within the context of discourse about publicly observable objects in Space and Time (as Sellars adamantly urges.) A sub-problem

within the original one is the attempt to explain what is occurring when an individual characterizes an experience in a certain fashion when either the experience is not really describable in that fashion, or when the experience which he takes himself to be characterizing is not objectively real. The suggestion in response to the problem was that there could be a sense in which the individual could be understood to be characterizing his experience, if the manner of the experience turned out to be that which was being characterized, as opposed to some independent object which constitutes a part of the experience. It was also suggested that the fact that a state of affairs obtains is contributory to the truth of the belief in the state of affairs. But we were then left with the problem of giving a sense to a situation parallel to the one where the object of one's experience was red without our believing it to be red. When there is no state of affairs which obtains and which occasions a belief in the state of affairs can we understand what it means for someone to be non-inferentially aware of the fact of his believing even though the content of his belief may be vacuous?

Firth, in the context of a discussion of Lewis' opposition to the coherence theory of justification wishes to contend that there is no logical contradiction involved in saying that an empirical proposition is warranted and not true, or that a proposition is true yet not warranted. Some advocates of the thesis of epistemic priority, he claims, are apt to find that the source of the assumed epistemic priority which they ascribe to expressions about immediate experience stem from the fact that what is asserted is true. This not only obliterates the distinction between truth and warrant, but in placing the emphasis on truth, results in the drawing of an unwanted conclusion because of the similarity to a

similar notion regarding incorrigibility. It is often asserted that the incorrigibility of a belief, or a statement is constituted by the fact that the truth of the statement follows from the mere fact of the statement's being believed. This, it will be seen, is a close relative of the view that a self-presenting state is intimately related to a believing. The warrant of the self-presenting state stems from the fact that there is a believing of which the proposition which expresses the state of affairs is the content. Firth suggests that it is better to tie the warrant which a statement has to the fact that the statement purports to characterize "(and only to characterize) the content of my present experience." But this in and of itself is not sufficient; its having non-inferential warrant resides in the additional fact of my believing the statement to be true. It is not the mere occurrence of an act of believing which confers the epistemic authority on the statement which purports to characterize my experience. The necessity of belief in the analysis of what it means for a statement to have epistemic authority indicates that Firth's conception of the apprehension of a state of affairs is not one which relies on non-conceptual sensing of the state of affairs in question. The involvement of belief also inclines us to suggest that it is the first of Sellars' characterizations of a self-presenting state which is appropriate to Firth's analysis of non-inferential warrant. For the essential ingredient in that sense of a self-presenting state of affairs is not whether that state of affairs obtains but is rather whether it is believed to; it is the believing which constitutes the core of the epistemic warrant.

SUMMARY

While not occurring in the context of the particular debate

which we have been looking at, there is a close relation between the idea of a self-presenting state and Sellars' rejection of the Myth of the Given. Sellars' rejection of the notion of givenness is strongly tied into his own positive account of the development of the theoretical notion of inner episodes, both thoughts and impressions which serve to explain and make perspicuous common sense occurrences, verbal behavior and perceptual knowledge the explanations of which otherwise involve the postulation of inadequate notions such as sense-data. Lewis' idea that the qualia, which are the contents of presentations, are intrinsically recognizable, as being of a determinate nature, red quale, is the paradigm of the kind of givenness against which Sellars argues. The suggestion that an object's possessing a particular determinate quality is wholly perspicuous to a conscious observer smacks of the idea that that quality, or the possession of it by the object is analogous to a self-presenting state. Sellars seems to urge a view akin to that of the theory ladenness of observation. "Instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, and cannot account for it."[43]

The conception of givenness is at odds with the evolution of the scientific picture of the world; it serves as the handmaiden to a metaphysics which believes that by acts of direct apprehension the structure of the world can become manifest, without paying heed to the needs of explanation which the scientific image has fostered. The error of the given is its tendency to foster the view that what is erected for explanatory purposes (thoughts and impressions as inner episodes) are there to be found as basic data. "And notice that while our 'ancestors' came to notice impressions, and the language of impressions, embodies a 'discovery'

that there are such things, the language of impressions was no more tailored to fit antecedent noticings of these entities than the language of molecules was tailored to fit antecedent noticings of molecules."[44] The very use of what hitherto has been taken as given, the private episodes of thoughts and impressions, require, in order to serve a theoretical explanatory role, the existence and awareness of the public dimension of the concepts on which they are analogically based.

When Sellars asks the question "How could we come to have the idea of an 'impression' or 'sensation'?" we are apt to put a very similar question to Lewis. "How could we come to have the idea of a 'given'?" While not necessarily urging that the very concept presupposes a public dimension on which it is analogically based, (what would such a concept be like?) there is nevertheless the suggestion that as something extracted from the 'thickness of experience' it too is meant to serve as an explanatory entity. It may be an explanatory entity, however, which ought not spawn questions about the location or phenomenological characteristics it may possess, or one which carries with it the implication that, like Sellarsian thoughts and impressions, once well entrenched in the conceptual framework of our world, becomes the referent of terms occurring in the reporting use of speakers of the newly enriched language. But before we accept these caveats, we might do well to ask in a skeptical spirit, assuming as a general presupposition a thought implicit in Sellars' entire approach, what exactly is it that it is felt the given serves to explain?

Footnotes to Chapter VI

[1]James Cornman, "Materialism and Some Myths About Some Givens", Monist 56 (April, 1972), 215.

[2]Ibid., p. 216.

[3]Ibid., p. 217.

[4]Ibid., p. 225.

[5]Wilfrid Sellars, "Rejoinder" Intentionality, Minds, and Perception (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967), p. 296. These remarks were in response to Bruce Aune's comments on Sellars' paper "Phenomenalism" contained in the same volume.

[6]Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science ed. Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), I, 255.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid., p. 258.

[9]Ibid., p. 259.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid., p. 293.

[12]Ibid., pp. 294-95.

[13]"Konstatierungen" the German equivalent of the English "confirmations" was offered by Moritz Schlick, a member of the Vienna Circle, as the name for a class of basic statements which a person makes about his own experiences and which constitute an indubitable foundation for all of our knowledge. They have the following characteristics: "(1) They have the form 'here,now, so and so'; examples are 'here two black points coincide,' 'Here yellow borders on blue,' 'Here now pain.' (2) In the case of other synthetic statements, understanding their meaning is quite distinct from the actual process of verifying them, and their meaning does not determine their truth-value; but in the case of a Konstatierung (since ' "this here" has meaning only in connection with a gesture...one must somehow point to reality'), the occasion of understanding it is the same as that of verifying it. Therefore a (significant) Konstatierung cannot be false. (3) Unlike 'protocol sentences,' these statements cannot be written down or recorded at all because of the fleeting reference of the demonstratives that occur in them; but they provide the occasions for the formation of protocol sentences. (4) They are the only empirical statements which are not hypotheses. (5) They are not the starting points of science in either a temporal or a logical sense, but simply the

momentary consummations of the scientific process; they are the means by which all scientific hypotheses are confirmed." (R.W. Ashby, "Basic Statements," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, I (1967), 251.

[14]Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", p. 295.

[15]Ibid., p. 272.

[16]Ibid., p. 296.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid., p. 297.

[19]Ibid., pp. 297-98.

[20]Ibid., pp. 298-99.

[21]Ibid., p. 299.

[22]Ibid., p. 275.

[23]Ibid., p. 300.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid., p. 320.

[26]Ibid., p. 321.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., p. 320.

[29]Letter from Wilfrid Sellars to Roderick Chisholm dated August 31, 1956. This is one of several letters exchanged, and appearing as an appendix to Roderick M. Chisholm, "Intentionality and the Mental" Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958) II, 257.

[30]Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", p. 306.

[31]Ibid., p. 310.

[32]Roderick Firth, "Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority" The Journal of Philosophy LXI (October, 1964), 547.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid., p. 548.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid., p. 547.

[37]Wilfrid Sellars, "Givenness and Explanatory Coherence" The Journal of Philosophy LXX (1973), 615.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" Science Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1963), p. 145.

[40]Sellars, "Givenness and Explanatory Coherence", pp. 616-17.

[41]Ibid., p. 617.

[42]Ibid., pp. 617-18.

[43]Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", p. 176

[44]Ibid., p. 195.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUDING REMARKS

REMARKS ON FOUNDATIONALISM

The foundationalist strain in epistemology has been only too familiar to us since Descartes' thoughts in The Meditations; nevertheless, the Cartesian strain was grafted on to Aristotelian stock. I have made no attempt to offer an unquivocal or non-controversial account of what foundationalism entails. I have assumed that Lewis is a foundationalist insofar as he seeks a certain base for probable knowledge in order to stem the threat of an infinite justificatory regress.

In its barest form foundationalism draws its essential tenet from Aristotle's picture of science in the Posterior Analytics.[1] The epistemological disputes of empiricist philosophers have often revolved around establishing certain classes of entities or propositions as the most likely candidates for halting the threatened regress of justification. Aristotle's concern with establishing indubitable grounds of belief stems from an analysis of the dialectic of justification; the fact that individuals entertain beliefs and assert propositions which express those beliefs is itself a given.

We enter the world of knowledge in the middle, so to speak. This is as true for Lewis as it is for Peirce even though the latter eschews a foundationalist reconstruction of justification.[2] Foundationalism may be an adjunct either to a program of rational reconstruction such as Descartes' or to a program of pragmatic justification of beliefs actually held by an individual at a particular time.

The contrast between knowledge and true belief on the one hand, and the mere parroting of words on the other, is often made by providing a gloss on the notions of 'reasonable account' or 'justification', as these terms apply to what one holds to be true. The ignorant person, like the person who guesses, is subject to the vagaries of chance. Genuine belief, like genuine doubt,must be reasonable. It must have grounds relative to the other facts which the individual does or does not know. This seems to be the thrust of the objections of both the opponents of foundationalism and the supporters of a coherentist approach to epistemic justification. The quest for a regressive though not necessarily infinite hierarchy of justification is warranted only where the holding of either a belief or a doubt is relevant to subsequent beliefs or actions related to those beliefs.

The foundationalist retreat to epistemically prior states or beliefs is predicated on the legitimacy of a challenge to justify one's presently held belief in some matter of fact. The entire dialectic of justification presupposes that we are at home with the correlative notions of 'giving reasons' and 'understanding what it means for a statement to serve as evidence for another statement.' 'Evidence' is by no means a perspicuous notion. It is not at all clear that only statements can constitute evidence for other statements. When we speak of the evidence for a theory, we are colloquially understood to be referring to the facts which support the theory or to the occurrences which have rendered the theory's predictions true. There may be agreement with the view that 'justification', 'reasons', and 'evidence' form part of an inseparable complex of notions without at the same time following the foundationalist drive to epistemically basic entities or statements.

If Lewis can be thought to be developing a neutral conception

of the given, it may be because he was seeking to renounce the Cartesian retreat to proximate sources of indubitable foundations. Despite the attempt to corner foundationalism by depicting it as a theory of epistemic justification, an examination of the foundationalist position in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics reveals less a concern with the pragmatic dimension of actual justification than with the logical dimension in which premisses serve as logically conclusive grounds for the conclusions of arguments. The tendency away from his geometric conception of cognitive systematization retains the notion of "reasons as supporting" but softens the criterion of logical conclusiveness, replacing it with the more contextual notion of "good evidential reasons."[3] The emphasis thus is no longer on the actual necessity of a regress in order to justify a belief which one may hold at a particular time but rather on the possibility of providing a reason which, in the context in which the belief is held, makes the holding of that belief, at that time, perspicuous to one who may have occasion to question the belief. The retention of the logical armature of deduction as the optimal warrant conferring mechanism reveals foundationalism's most vulnerable point. As soon as justification is seen in terms of argument schemata we must have canonically formulated substituends for those schemata. How are propositions about sensory experiences to be couched in the formal premisses suitable for use in a deductive argument?

It might be suggested that the foundationalist can offset the problems he encounters if he relinquishes the desiderata of incorrigibility and phenomenal dimension which he deems essential to the epistemically basic premisses. They have, after all, fixated on the alleged self-intimating aspect of sensory apprehensions, attempting on that basis to reconstruct all of empirical knowledge. Part of the objection to such an emphasis may stem from the fact that we are rarely, if ever, in the phenomenological

state of mind requisite to a discovery of elements such as the phenomenally given.

There are two strands of attack against a view of empirical knowledge such as Lewis'; The interconnection between Lewis' theses and the manner in which they are mutually supportive is difficult to sift out. On the one hand, we have (perhaps most forcefully in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation) the espousal of a fallibilism regarding knowledge of the material world. There are intimations of this view in Mind and the World Order in the thesis of transcendental reference of the terms used to describe the given. The Lewisian version of fallibilism is tied to his phenomenalism, specifically to the conception that objective judgments are related to sets of statements about possibilities of sensation. Implicit in any such fallibilism, with its reductionist phenomenalism, is a view regarding the certainty of an objective claim as opposed to a claim about appearances. The second major aspect of Lewis' view is the foundationalist conception of knowledge. The claim is that if any knowledge is even probable then something must be certain. There are two points at which foundationalism is subject to question. On the one hand the foundationalist tenet as expressed above can be questioned. On the other hand, the terminal entities or propositions which are felt to confer certainty or probability in an hereditary sense can be questioned. Clearly, the link between the two general strands of Lewis' view is the notion of certainty.

I have tended to shy away from the issue of certainty because the issues and writings about it have less an air of freshness than the metaphysical and epistemological concerns with the given. The lack of an unequivocal sense of 'certainty' occasions difficulty in discussions of Lewis. Of course, much of the plausibility of a Lewis-like argument for foundational premisses rests on an assumed different propositions having

different subject matters. It is implicit in Lewis' fallibilist-foundationalism that reports about material objects are intrinsically less certain than those made about sensory experiences (even though, as in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, the sensory experiences are causally related to the material objects.)

In concluding, we should satisfy two questions. While I have not conclusively answered either one it is possible to suggest why an examination of Lewis' philosophy was worth undertaking. The general problem with which I have been concerned has been the extent of the involvement of Lewis' conception of the given with his view of empirical knowledge. On the one hand, this involved an attempt to examine some of Lewis' pronouncements regarding the given or givenness. In an important respect however, this, while a major part of the textual exposition, is but a subordinate part of the philosophically more interesting issue regarding the viability of an approach such as Lewis' to establish the superstructure of knowledge on a foundation of certainty. After all, the given is Lewis' specific solution to the particular epistemological problem of knowledge with foundations.

In summary then we should come to an appreciation of the general deficiencies behind a foundationalist view and we should also have a better appreciation of the manner in which Lewis conceived of the given.

Part of the difficulty in assessing Lewis in the light of a challenge to the foundationalist position is that of distinguishing between what is actually given and ineffable, and the expressibility of what is given. As is repeatedly pointed out, the given, as content of a sensory experience, is neither true nor false, nor is it certain or uncertain. It is a brute fact of our actual experience, or so Lewis would have us believe. Yet the thrust of the anti-foundationalist criticism is that there

is no need for a set of statements which are incorrigible. If the objection is to touch Lewis then the claim that the intended reports of the given are statements must be made good.

It is important to distinguish two questions when evaluating an epistemological position such as Lewis', and the failings of responses to one should not be visited on responses to the other. The general problem with which a foundationalist view of knowledge concerns itself is whether empirical knowledge requires a foundation of beliefs which are not dependent for their status as beliefs on other beliefs. This question itself spawns a host of distinct issues. On the one hand, it can be understood to ask for a simple descriptive account of empirical knowledge with a view to showing either that empirical knowledge does or does not rest on such unjustified beliefs. On the other hand, it may be understood to ask whether empirical knowledge, to be so considered, may not require (in the sense of logically necessary condition) a basis of uninferred belief. It is evident that Lewis engages in the second type of investigation.

The second question which clearly is significant in examining Lewis is whether there is a belief or set of beliefs about the given. It is difficult to enter into a debate with a philosopher who shrouds one of his cardinal doctrines in the cloak of ineffability or inexpressibility. So much of the dialectic surrounding the foundationalist view is in terms of the actual putting forth of sustaining reasons that when the basic beliefs about sense experiences, which are felt by Lewis to constitute the base of the chain of justification, are not expressed, or need not be expressed, one begins to question the sincerity of Lewis' claims. Of course we can realign our critical insights inclining instead to the view that Lewis has nothing to hide and that his view is too

metaphorical to acquire our assent rather than being simply wrongheaded. Even Roderick Firth, perhaps Lewis' most sympathetic interpreter and the one most responsive to his philosophical program, is impelled to interpret Lewis to mean judgmental apprehension of the given on the grounds that otherwise the epistemic role which Lewis accords the given could not be understood.

Both Aristotle and Lewis are unclear as regards the extent to which their respective forms of foundationalism require a set of states or beliefs in order to offset the possibility of a regress. However, insofar as Aristotle is discussing the formalization of branches of science for pedagogic purposes,[4] it is possible that the kinds of premisses which he envisions as prior are not only logically prior, but are uninferred in the strictest sense of not having any independent justification. Lewis' retreat to sensory experience is a guarantor only of the possibility or priority or intuitiveness but not of the necessity of it. It might be possible that we actually do justify our beliefs in our sensory experience on the basis of certain other environmental clues which are subtle and not amenable to easy articulation. (The tendency in traditional foundational quests has been to single out first person sensory reports because of the epistemic proximity; this proximity has in turn been blown up into the characteristics of incorrigibility or indubitability. It is also possible to suggest that apart from the quest for certainty which foundationalism represents it has acquired more than its warranted share of supporters by taking too stringently a genetic fact about our development as cognitive creatures and transferring that fact into an epistemological setting. The Aristotelian position is understandable in light of the didactic role attributed to the Posterior Analytics. On the other hand, as sentient beings there is invariably a time

at which we come to have and to entertain beliefs which perhaps have never been explicitly justified either by ourselves to ourselves or by others.

There is no doubt but that we do not justify every belief which we entertain. Nor does it seem therefore that what we believe is less important to us as information either about the physical world or about our own psychological lives. One often has the impression that foundationalists have converted the existence of seemingly unjustified beliefs into the view that there must be other beliefs on the basis of which the unjustified ones can and must be justifiable. The most promising response to the foundationalist regress is the attempt to seek a belief, or a premise, which can function as the basic seed of the attenuated certainty which accrues to the statements inferred on its basis. The search has most often been for reports of mental states, but this should not be taken to signify that mental states were accorded an a priori status of having greater or absolute certainty. The epistemic function which the basic propositions are believed to serve stems from their certainty. Certainty is glossed in terms of incorrigibility. As regards their candidacy as basic however, the logic is that they are self-evident or self-authenticating and this is a somewhat different property than incorrigibility or indubitability. What self-authentication means is that there is a dimension of authentication or warrant increase which is intrinsic to the circumstance in which the proposition is made.

Now Lewis has set out to establish the necessity of certain foundational premisses on the basis of which to ground a reconstruction of empirical knowledge. In addition to remarking, in the spirit of the Peirceian objection to the Cartesian program of indubitable premisses, that methodological doubt does not keep astride the true course of inquiry

and consequently settles nothing, there is a more significant charge which can be levelled against the logic implicit in Lewis' regressive program. On the one hand, Lewis has settled on the importance of a contextual dimension for assessing the credibility of statements which are less than certain, which are probable. He contends that statements are probable relative to the evidence on which they are based. At the same time he seems to have "absolutized certainty" in Michael Slote's sense so that it excludes the possibility of partial warrant as a ground of credibility.[5]

Lewis does not offer adequate justification for the distinction beween objective beliefs and expressive statements independently of the difference in degrees of warrant which such statements are understood to have. On the one hand, statements about empirical matters of fact do not enjoy maximum warrant, nor could they enjoy such warrant. On the other hand, there is the suggestion that whatever warrant a statement which is less than certain enjoys it has on the basis of that class of experiences which constitutes potential evidence for it. Lewis has not shown that the same is not true or cannot be true for the class of statements which are the termini of justification, and which presumably, because of their position as termini, do have maximum warrant or credibility.

One of the chief problems which hinders Lewis' account is his failure to offer a clear cut indication of the type of certainty or incorrigibility he wants to accord to apprehensions of the given. Even if we could agree that there must be something certain for anything to be even probable, the sense in which the terminal elements are certain is left entirely in need of explication. It seems entirely conceivable to adopt a conception of credibility which does not place an emphasis

on maximum warrant, and which allows us to say that apprehensions of the given are certain or are believed but are not incorrigible in the sense of being immune from revision or correction, as Lewis attempts to urge.

THE PROBLEM of INTERPRETATION

In a cooperative volume on American and French philosophy, Charles Baylis, in an article entitled "The Given and Perceptual Knowledge", expresses faith in the importance of an empirical and non-stipulative search for the given. "The main contention of this paper are then: (1) If we seek to determine the nature of the given by empirical examination rather than by prescriptive definition, we shall find it very much richer than is ordinarily supposed and consequently a much more adequate basis for knowledge about perceptual objects."[6] There seems little to quarrel with in the first conjunct of Baylis' claim. However, if we assume, as I believe that Lewis explicitly did, that the given has a significant epistemological role then Baylis' second claim is far from clear. It is clear to the extent that there is no explicit connection between the 'richness' of the given as a phenomenological aspect of our experience and the epistemological task which we ascribe to the given.

Lewis captures the bittersweet essence of man's cognitive situation. Just as man is the ultimate beneficiary of the knowledge which he may acquire in the course of his inquiries he is also the ultimate source of error. In interpreting experience, man renders that experience uncertain. Lewis is an epistemologist first and foremost. He is not concerned with a piecemeal reconstruction of material objects on the basis of diverse sensory patches. His concern is with the logical

adequacy of accounts of pieces of knowledge which intimate the belief in an actually existing material world.

It is difficult to classify the kind of view which Baylis is avowing in the first conjunct of the above quoted statement. The difficulty is compounded by a remark of Lewis' in Mind and the World Order which asserts the priority of epistemological questions. "Basic problems of category and of the general nature of knowledge are antecedent to the special sciences and cannot, therefore, legitimately depend upon their particular findings. Especially is this important as regards psychology."[7] I cannot argue the merits of the debate between a view such as Lewis' and one such as Quine's, which perhaps, seems more consonant with the spirit of Baylis' remark. "Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science."[8]

It seems that one import of Baylis' view is to deemphasize the epistemological dimension of the nature of inference as an instrument of amplifying our knowledge. The notion of inference however is often central to accounts of knowledge which seek to effect a distinction between basic or non-inferred knowledge and non-basic or inferred knowledge. It is not clear that 'empirical' in Baylis' sense is intended to bear any suggestion as to which sense of inference is appropriate to learning about the given. That something is inferred does not of course entail that it is non-empirical, or, for that matter, that we cannot reason about that thing. This is not the issue. The issue is rather whether we come to know about the thing or about its existence on the basis of conscious inference. On one construal the given can be deepistemologized and can be taken to be paradigmatically empirical in the sense in which our awareness of it is psychologically uninferred.

TWO VIEWS

There seem to be two general directions in which we can attempt to reconstrue, and thereby make perspicuous, Lewis' conception of the given. On the one hand, we can urge that the given is the sensory core of our perceptual experience, the physiological effect on our sensory apparatus of some actual existent in the physical world. On the other hand, we can adopt Roderick Firth's strategy of liberalizing the given to include, first and foremost, the ostensible physical objects which we take to be parts of our physical environment, so as to conceive of qualities as actually resident in objects. Interpretation, and thus error, enter when we make judgments regarding these ostensible physical objects.[9]

Turning to the first view, we should understand that it is not direct perception of the actual physiological process that is meant. What we find as given are expanses of color and not chemical activities in the nerve endings of the retinal cone. One important consequence of the sensory core construal of the given is that it severs the given from acts of conscious apprehension. It also vitiates the objection that discovery of the given requires the adoption of a phenomenologically reducing state of mind, a state which we rarely if ever find ourselves in. On this view that which is given is not necessarily discovered in the course of ordinary experience. Everything which is experienced, for Lewis, may reveal an aspect of givenness, but there is no given, which as such presents itself to us.

There is an affinity between the suggested interpretation and a current view of Gilbert Harman's about knowledge as inference to the best explanation. We find that Harman urges a close analogue of foundational data though without the foundational trappings of incorrigibility and

indubitability. (Ultimately though, Harman's sympathies must be seen to be coherentist because of the emphasis he places on comparison of a current belief with past and concurrent ones.) Harman presents a problem analogous to the regress of justification:

> Direct perceptual knowledge is based on inference, but not just on inference from prior beliefs, since then there would be no connection with perception. Perception must give us data that are not themselves the result of inference but which permit the inference on which perceptual knowledge is based. The data cannot be provided by sensory experience, since that experience is constituted by representations which are themselves the products of inference of a more or less automatic sort. But then what could these data be?[10]

Meeting a possible objection that perceiver's inferences are not based on data which "contain claims <u>about</u> sensory stimulations," Harman answers his own question by suggesting that these foundational data are "the sensory stimulations that provide the input to the complex information processing system composed of brain and nervous system."[11] "The data are not <u>about</u> sensory stimulations, they <u>are</u> sensory stimulations. Sensory stimulations serve the perceiver as nonlinguistic representations which cannot easily be put into words."[12] We should recall that I am looking at Harman's view as a possible means of fleshing out a construal of Lewis' account of the given. The segment of experience which Lewis speaks of as given is prior to interpretation, and is, in that sense uninferred even though apprehended. Unlike Harman's sensory stimulations however, Lewisian apprehensions, when true, are seen to be about real objects of experience, about the causes of sensory stimulations.

Harman has mysteriously underscored 'are' in his claim that the "data <u>are</u> sensory stimulations." Certainly, we are almost wholly ignorant of the subliminal physical processes which occur in our bodies yet which nevertheless have causal effects which may eventuate in some knowledge. 'Data', for epistemological purposes, is perhaps best understood as a

relational term. This is certainly not the case for 'sensory stimulations'. But the success of an identity or alleged reduction is not significant for our purposes. The significant detail is that the occurrence of sensory stimulations in a sentient being is coordinated (causally) with the occurrence of some cognitive state within that same individual.

It is by introducing the notion of 'representation' without ample explication that Harman obscures his own account. "The stimulations of the perceiver's retinal nerve represent something for him in the way that input represents something for a computer. They have a role in some system of representation. Their representational characteristics derive from that system, a system that also admits of linguistic representations if the perceiver has also acquired a language."[13] Can one take something to have representational characteristics non-inductively? It seems that the stimulations of the retinal nerve only function as representations insofar as they incline the individual, whose retinal nerves they are, to believe that he is in a certain state. The salient characteristic of these representations is their potential employment in inferences about perceptual matters. But why should we be inclined to use them in such a fashion? There seems to be an implied reliable connection between the actual sensory stimulation and the accuracy of the representation connected with the sensory stimulation. There is an affinity betweeen Harman's view and Alvin Goldman's causal theory of knowing. Not only is the sensory stimulation the cause of the representation which one may have but one's representation is true on the basis of the state of affairs which is related to the sensory stimulation. However, one does not make representations about the physiological aspects of the sensory stimulations.

There are also indications in Harman's view that do not seem

entirely alien to the idea of statements accorded 'initial credibility' as developed by Goodman.[14] Harman conceives of a percipient as using the noninferred data of sensory stimulation. "Different sorts of stimulation of his retinal nerve represent different things to the perceiver. The data of his inference include not the claim that his eye is being stimulated in one or another way but rather whatever is represented by that stimulation. Does he believe the data? He uses them in the way one uses beliefs in inference. So there is some reason to say that he believes them."[15] Harman's data are basic in an important sense, yet he supplants the traditional characterization of them by foundationalists as incorrigible by turning to a functionalist account. They are clearly unjustified beliefs even though they are employed as one would employ justified beliefs in inference. What can be the basis for employing them in such a manner?

"The beliefs thus constituting the data of perceptual inference are not themselves based on inference, and the same is true for many beliefs about your own psychological states."[16] The process is as follows: there is sensory stimulation of one or more of one's sensory modalities. The stimulations cause the formation of a representation. This representation is related to the initial cause of the sensory stimulation in the sense that the representation may be said to depict the state of affairs causally responsible for the sensory stimulations. The representation is unjustified in the sense that it is the result of a causal process and not the result of a process of inference; nevertheless, one is inclined to believe what is represented as actually being the case. If the representation is uninferred what substantiates the treatment of the representation as a belief in subsequent inferences? Unlike the Lewisian apprehension of simple sensory qualities, on Harman's view a

a sentient creature is led to represent full-bodied facts both about external occurrences and internal ones. Harman does not in any way suggest that the formation of the representations on the basis of sensory stimulations is not a defeasible process. Furthermore, there is no suggestion that the representation cannot be mistaken with respect to that which it is taken to represent. There is no allegation that the representations are certain.

Harman leaves an interesting issue unexplicated. Being strongly disposed to let a representation function as a belief in subsequent inferences even though the representation itself may not be the product of inference, must lead us to say that the representation is accorded a certain initial credibility. Having initial credibility is, in Firth's terminology, a warrant increasing property. Is the initial credibility which we accord representations which we are inclined to use as beliefs in future inferences, itself an inferential or a non-inferential warrant increasing property?[17]

Harman also contends that the representations, though uninferred, are nevertheless inferrable. Goodman, in "Sense and Certainty", suggested that a statement, though initially credible, could be "dropped if its retention - along with consequent adjustments in the interest of coherence - results in a system that does not satisfy as well as possible the totality of claims presented by all relevant statements."[18] Harman recruits coherence to suggest that the representation based on sensory stimulations can, in a certain sense, be seen as inferential. "However, other considerations may inhibit your disposition to treat as a belief the representation of yourself in certain psychological states. As a result you may prevent yourself from using the representation as a datum for further inference."[19] So the picture we are left with is that of an individual in diverse psycho-

logical states which involve both inner and outer sensory experiences. There is a causal relationship between the existence of sensory stimulations, the formation of representations and the utilization of those representations as coordinated beliefs. Insofar as the representations may serve as beliefs in some future inferential process, they are accorded some initial credibility. However, as these representations are concurrent with prior dispositions and beliefs, which are capable of being entertained, their role as potentially basic beliefs for some inferential process is always subject to revision on the basis of the currently held beliefs.

There is no suggestion that because these representational states are basic in Harman's sense that we are necessarily certain about them. However, such a possibility does not seem to be entirely incompatible with his claims. If there is a sense in which we can speak of the corrigibility of the basic representations, it is not the traditional sense of possibly being mistaken about the content of the representation. The mistake arises in treating the representation as a belief in future inferences. I have not established that there is or is no connection between attempts to reconstrue the given as a sensory core of our perceptual experience and the tenability of some doctrine of epistemological priority. The virtue in the proposed reconstrual of Lewis lies in the fact that the given becomes the proper study of psychology or physiology. There is no longer the implied liberal ontology of Mind and the World Order.

We turn from a circumscribed view of the given to a more liberal one, though one not fraught with the dangers of ontological overindulgence. We may suggest that anything which is potentially an object of our experience, and is so taken by us, may be given. Concepts, for Lewis, introduce the element of error into our empirical knowledge. In the interpretations which we place on sensory presentations, we generate

the uncertainty of a future and possibly refractory experience. We might be prompted to suggest that the given is somehow coordinated with the qualitative aspects of our ordinary everyday sensory experience. However, to make that claim successfully would depend on eliminating the gap between something unaffected by interpretation and that which is the product of such interpretation. The upshot of such a dissolution of borders would be to dilute the impact of givenness, at least to the extent that we would no longer connect sensory apprehensions of the given with the alleged certainty which is often attributed to it.

If it can be sustained, as Austin attempts to, that there is no prima facie reason (apart from the philosophical objectives of foundationalism) to accord a differential status to claims about the contents of sensory apprehensions and to claims purportedly about material objects, then the status of givenness is weakened.[20] However, dogmatic assertion of the view that apprehension of sensory qualities involves apprehension is insufficient to close the breach. Here again, Harman is of help in characterizing a particular view: "How things look to a person represents a kind of sensory experience. But how things look is not just directly caused by sensory stimulation, since it is itself the product of inference. Furthermore, there does not seem to be any basic level of visual experience not itself the product of inference, and used itself as data for inference to how things look."[21] The upshot of this suggestion is to obliterate the distinction between the given element in experience and its interpretation. The content of perceptual consciousness is no longer distinct modes of apprehending the given but is rather the ostensible physical object, the presence of which is intimated by the sensory qualities which it presents. Consequently, what is understood to be given is the object in the course of ordinary experience.

It is not evident that these alternatives are jointly exhaustive of the possible interpretations of a notion such as the given. On the one hand, the notion of experience itself is ambiguous. We might say that sensory stimulations are causal facts about our coming to have beliefs and perception but they are rarely, if ever, the objects of our sensory consciousness. To speak of them as given does not seem particularly enlightening. On the other hand, to suggest that that which is given is identical to that which we take ourselves to believe in is again an expansion of the range of potential givens to include not only physical objects but other types of things which are not manifest to direct perception.

In Roderick Firth's view the only thing that Lewis need do in order to retain the epistemological objective of his program is maintain a distinction between sensing and perceiving. It is possible, on Firth's view, to do this by adopting a Gestaltist conception of the integral nature of the ostensible physical object, in which case the object in our perceptual consciousness which extends itself to us is the given, and the judgments we make about the real object would be part of what Lewis calls our interpretation of the given.[22] What is accomplished with this view? In the phenomenological sense our basic units are the results of concatenating qualitatively diverse segments of the object in which the qualities actually appear to be coordinated. We term these basic units 'apple', 'chair', etc. We are no longer prompted to speak of appearances or patches as is customary in the sense-datum terminology. What remains problematic, however, is whether or not the apprehension of the connectedness which the qualities of an ostensible physical object reveal to us is in some fashion intuitive or non-inferential. Firth's proposal does not insure that by redrawing

the boundaries of the notion of givenness to include ostensible physical objects we have still maintained the distinction between basic, noninferential knowledge, and non-basic, inferential knowledge, unless he believes that the distinction between sensing and perceiving retains the distinction. A standard objection against the dichotomy between an object and the given (which it may present us with) is that there is no reason to believe that we are less certain about the material object than about the given. Surely it seems that in the present construal there is even less reason to conclude that the differential certainty can be sustained between a conception of a holistic object (which may involve inference) and an object which definitely does.

It does not seem that the shortcomings of a phenomenological account of the given should weigh heavily on the epistemological objective of foundationalism. At the same time there are sufficiently strong arguments against the kind of foundationalism espoused by Lewis. The shift in emphasis from Mind and the World Order to An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation itself attests to the extent to which the foundationalist program of Lewis was not reliant on the phenomenological development of the given in the former work. In An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, the emphasis on real connections in order to sustain the analysis of objective judgments in terms of terminating judgments leads to a greater emphasis on an object as a potential source of confirmatory experiences, and as a causal source of sensory stimulations. At the same time, the object has also become more of an independent reality in its own right than it was understood to be in Mind and the World Order. The introduction of verbal reports about the given in the latter of Lewis' two major epistemological works reduces the emphasis on acts of

apprehension as themselves being given, and squares better with our intuitions that certainty is a term of epistemic appraisal appropriate to statements.

Lewis' concern with a given element in empirical knowledge, which arose perhaps in the context of a larger dispute between direct and critical realists, has, in subsequent epistemological writings of more recent philosophers, become elaborated into a dispute between foundationalist and coherentist theories of epistemic justification. The concern with the given has also spawned a related controversy in the philosophy of science between advocates of a common core of meaning between descriptive terms of competing theories and those who argue for a radical meaning variance. Are the observation statements which do the work of confirming a theory theory-laden or are they neutral, standing between differing theories for which they might serve as observation statements? These issues remain for consideration at another time; they are beyond the scope of this work.[23]

Footnotes to Chapter VII

[1]Let me offer a brief account of the outlines of the foundationalist program as presented by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics. His remarks in this work are of interest both for what he says about the primary elements of knowledge and about the knower. However, I shall limit my remarks to his reflections about the former. On the assumption that the source of knowledge is demonstration, a certain school (as Aristotle refers to it) is led to believe that there is no knowledge. They see us involved in an infinite regress "on the ground that we cannot know posterior truths by prior truths unless the latter themselves depend upon primary truths." (Posterior Analytics I, 3, 72b10-15.) On the other hand should the series terminate with first principles, then, insofar as these are non-demonstrable, they are unknowable. Aristotle does not deny that the infinite regress of justification is a threat, he seeks rather to counter the view that unless something is demonstrable it is not worthy of the title 'knowledge.' To this end he suggests a non-inferential mode of knowledge; a type of intuition or a "definite first principle of knowledge by which we recognize ultimate truths." (Posterior Analytics, I, 3, 72b25.) This move is not insignificant, for in an attempt to avoid infinite regress Aristotle is led to suggest two not uncontroversial theses: first, that there is a special mode of cognition applicable to these primary truths, and second, that in fact this special mode of cognition has its proper objects in the form of these truths, and that "qualitative" differences can be drawn between truths on the basis of where they stand in the scheme ofthe justification of inferences. If we are to avoid the problem of an infinite regress in the justification of our knowledge claims, knowledge must be understood to have non-demonstrable grounds which are at the same time true (and presumably known to be so as the result of there being a special mode of cognition.) (Aristotle, The Posterior Analytics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941.)

[2]For an illuminating account of the contextual dimension of inquiry in Peirce the reader is urged to turn to H.S. Thayer's chapter on Peirce (especially section 7) in his Meaning and Action: A Study of American Pragmatism (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1973.) Also worthy of attention is C.F. Delaney's article "Peirce's Critique of Foundationalism" The Monist, 57 (April, 1973), 240-251. For a full expression of Peirce's own view the relevant papers are "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" in Volume V of Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-58).

[3]Nicholas Rescher, "Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization," The Journal of Philosophy, LXXI (November, 1974), 695-708.

[4]Jonathan Barnes defends the view that the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle is a pedagogic treatise and not a normative treatise on

correct scientific procedure in his article entitled "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration" Phronesis, XIV (1969) 123-152.

[5]Michael Anthony Slote, "Empirical Certainty and the Theory of Important Criteria", Inquiry 10 (1967) 21-37.

[6]Charles A. Baylis, "The Given and Perceptual Knowledge," Philosophical Thought in France and the United States, ed. Marvin Farber (Buffalo, New York: University of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy, 1950), p. 447.

[7]Clarence Irving Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1956), p. 56.

[8]Willard Van Orman Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," Ontological Relativity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 82.

[9]Roderick Firth, "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory," Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. Robert J. Swartz (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 204-270.

[10]Gilbert Harman, Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 184-85.

[11]Ibid., p. 185.

[12]Ibid., p. 186.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Nelson Goodman, "Sense and Certainty" The Philosophical Review 61 (1952) p. 163.

[15]Harman, Thought, p. 186.

[16]Ibid., p. 187.

[17]Roderick Firth's views on the topic of warrant increase and warrant increasing properties can be found in two articles. "Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority," The Journal of Philosophy LXI (1964), pp. 545-57, and "The Anatomy of Certainty," The Philosophical Review LXXVI (1967) pp. 3-27.

[18]Goodman, "Sense and Certainty", p. 163.

[19]Harman, Thought, p. 187.

[20]John Langshaw Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 111.

[21]Harman, Thought, p. 181.

[22]Roderick Firth, "Lewis on the Given," The Philosophy of C.I. Lewis, ed. P.A. Schilpp (La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1968), p. 333.

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