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THE ROOTS OF JAMAICAN LOYALISM, 1760-1766

by

CARL A. LANE

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1978

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in History in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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For Carolyn,

Philip, and Elizabeth

PREFACE

At the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 England became undisputed master of North America and much of the Caribbean. Its empire consisted of more than thirty colonies stretching from the frozen Canadian Arctic to the sun-scorched islands of the West Indies. But this vast domain soon fragmented. In little more than a decade thirteen colonies revolted and in 1776 declared national independence. Why they did has fascinated historians ever since. During the last two hundred years the literature on the American Revolution has grown enormous, and, indeed, it has studied the revolt from nearly every conceivable perspective.

Yet American Revolutionary historiography has always suffered from a lack of peripheral vision. Despite the work of writers like Charles M. Andrews and Lawrence Henry Gipson, the body of scholarship examining why the majority of England's colonies remained loyal to the Crown is slim compared to that explaining why thirteen rebelled. This, of course, is understandable. Action and change are more susceptible to analysis than inertia. But the disparity suggests that our understanding of loyalism within the empire is incomplete, if not sketchy and misleading. If so, a gap exists in our knowledge of the American Revolution.

This study is an effort to narrow that gap. It attempts to explain why one of the loyal provinces--Jamaica--did not respond to Parliamentary measures the way the thirteen mainland colonies did. Specifically, it maintains that the years 1765-1766, the era of the Stamp Act crisis, were especially crucial in determining Jamaica's future.

Preliminary research on this subject began during an extended stay in Jamaica during the summer of 1972. In the spring of 1973 the results of that investigation were submitted to a seminar in early American history led by Dr. Harold C. Syrett, then the Executive Officer of the Ph.D. Program in History at the City University of New York. With Professor Syrett's approval, that seminar paper became the nucleus of this dissertation.

No work of this kind is ever solely the result of one person's interest and effort. I am indebted to numerous people. Very special thanks go to Dr. Syrett, who encouraged me to pursue this theme and whose advice has immeasurably enhanced the quality of this essay. Professors Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Richard C. Wade of the City University read this manuscript on short notice and at what must have been great inconvenience to themselves. I deeply appreciate their kindness, their assistance, and their understanding and take this opportunity to express my gratitude.

I am also particularly indebted to Mr. Clinton V. Black and his staff at the Jamaica Archives. Their interest and generosity eased the burdens of research in a hundred

ways. Others also deserve special mention. The staffs of the Institute of Jamaica in Kingston and the Library of the University of the West Indies at Mona provided much needed help. So too did Mr. Frank J. Seegraber, Special Collections Librarian at Boston College. The library staff at Upsala College was always helpful.

Friends and family also contributed to the completion of this study. I will always be grateful to two old and dear friends, Roy and Enid Creary of Kingston. Were it not for their kind and generous hospitality, this work could never have been undertaken, much less concluded. Special thanks also go to my good friends Bob and Ginger Iverson of Montclair, who facilitated the typing of this essay at an important stage in its development, and to Gerry Rafferty of Montclair, who, on short notice, provided a desperately needed copy of the manuscript. I am grateful to Mr. and Mrs. Rick Weinberg of Newton, Massachusetts. Their hospitality allowed me to do important research at the Boston College Library. Thanks also go to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Carl W. Lane of New York City, who made chapter copies whenever I needed them and who xeroxed the final version. I am also grateful to my mother- and father-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. George P. Tierney of Palo Alto, California, who, although they may not realize it, contributed through their patience and understanding. Lastly, my wife Carolyn deserves the greatest thanks of all. She has both contributed to and endured this project for six very, very, long years.

This study is as much hers as it is mine.

C.A.L.

Upper Montclair,
New Jersey,
Spring, 1978

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

Jamaica, by Parish--1760



Jamaica, Principal Ports and Towns--1760

CHAPTER I

JAMAICA IN THE MIDDLE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS

In the seventeenth century Englishmen looked beyond their shores for economic opportunity and religious liberty. The planting of Jamestown in 1607 and its ultimate survival demonstrated the feasibility of New World colonization. Within twenty years Englishmen had not only penetrated the rich Chesapeake but New England and the Caribbean as well. All the settlements, whether founded for faith or fortune, provided for themselves as much as possible while searching for staples. The Chesapeake colonists very quickly discovered that tobacco was a suitable substitute for gold. Godly New Englanders first looked to furs but soon found that fish and lumber were more reliable and profitable commodities. Caribbean settlers, after experimenting with cotton and tobacco, by 1650 were on the brink of discovering that sugar was king. At midcentury a string of developing English outposts stretched from the St. Lawrence to the southern Caribbean.

These settlements were far from secure. Hostile Indians menaced all the mainland communities. The French in Canada rendered New England's future uncertain. The Dutch

not only occupied the Hudson and Delaware valleys, but their unrivaled carrying trade threatened to retard Anglo-colonial commercial development. Between Virginia and Spanish Florida stood a no man's land soon to be called Carolina. In the Caribbean, a Spanish lake, His Catholic Majesty's warships and guarda costas merely tolerated the English presence in Barbados and a few of the Leeward Islands.

Cromwellian imperialism, both economic and military, began the long process, successfully concluded at the end of the Seven Years' War more than a century later, by which England acquired commercial and industrial ascendancy and undisputed mastery of North America. The Lord Protector's chief contribution to the infant empire was the 1655 conquest of Jamaica, a Spanish outpost in the Caribbean ever since Columbus discovered it in 1494. The island remained under martial law until organized under civil government in 1661, a circumstance which, chronologically at least, warrants classifying Jamaica among the so-called Restoration colonies. Like some of the latter, notably Carolina, the new province initially expected that emigration from older colonies rather than from England would result in settlement. But unlike the other Restoration colonies Jamaica never became a proprietary province, nor, indeed, did it ever acquire a formal charter from the Crown. The legal foundation of the colony rested solely on Charles II's Proclamation of December 14, 1661, that "all the children of our natural borne subjects of England to be born in Jamaica,

shall from their respective births, be reputed to be, and shall be, free denizens of England, and shall have the same privileges, to all intents and purposes, as our free born subjects of England."[1] On that basis Jamaica joined the not always amiable fraternity of English colonies and began the difficult process of economic, social, and political development.

Economic Development

Until the final decades of the eighteenth century England's West Indian colonies were the most important element in its Atlantic empire. Not only had the islands acquired, especially after 1689, immense strategic value, but they were also the hub of English commercial activity. Between 1770 and 1775 the Caribbean possessions absorbed 45.7 per cent of all English exports to the western hemisphere and in return provided the mother country with 65.5 per cent of all the latter's imports. Moreover, collectively the islands maintained a favorable trade balance with England which between 1772 and 1774, for example, amounted to as much as £221,000 sterling. Ordinarily the surplus was invested in Great Britain.[2] John Campbell, a contemporary, appreciated the importance of England's West Indian connection. "It is we that reap the benefit of their labours," he wrote, "the wealth they acquire centers here."[3]

Of all the islands Jamaica was the wealthiest. Professor Richard Sheridan has calculated that on the eve of

the American Revolution the island's aggregate wealth "was no less than £18,000,000 sterling."[4] The colony sold nearly 60 per cent of all the tropical produce consumed in Great Britain and Ireland, and the profits from these sales in 1773 alone amounted to about £1,547,000 sterling.[5] In the same year British imports from Jamaica were five times greater than from all the middle colonies; at the same time British exports to Jamaica were one-third greater than those to all of New England.[6]

Jamaica's wealth derived from slave-produced sugar and its by-products. In the late seventeenth century Jamaica, following the examples set by Barbados and the Leeward Islands, shifted from provision to sugar agriculture and simultaneously increased its dependence on African labor.[7] The reason for the transition is not obscure. By the eighteenth century, as one writer has pointed out, "cane sugar was probably the most valuable commodity in all the world's trade," because the British as well as the European demand for the sweetener had become insatiable.[8] English sugar consumption between 1700 and 1740 tripled what it had been in the preceding four decades; and between 1741 and 1775 the new volume doubled. Moreover, although muscovado arriving in Britain bore duties, the rates were considerably less than those borne by foreign sugars attempting to penetrate England's mercantile wall.[9]

To exploit the growing and protected English market Jamaica rapidly expanded sugar production. While in 1700 it

had only produced 4,474 tons, about one-third the Barbadian output that year, by 1720 Jamaica's sales to England surpassed those of its sister colony and were catching up with the collective output of the Leeward Islands as well. By the third quarter of the century both Jamaica and sugar were entering their golden ages.[10] Jamaica, Richard Dunn has written, "was making more sugar than all of the English islands put together in 1700."[11] Between 1756 and 1760 Great Britain imported 1,330,600 cwts.; of this amount 581,900 came from Jamaica. During the subsequent decade the mother country imported 1,517,300 cwts.; Jamaica accounted for 700,400 of this total. In the five years preceding the American War for Independence British sugar imports amounted to 1,765,100 cwts.; nearly 880,000 came from Jamaica.[12]

Sugar planters did not worry much about overproduction. War, periodic bad weather, and particularly the continued growth of the English population--all sustained an upward price spiral which began in the 1730's. In 1735 sugar sold in London at 19s. 5½d. per cwt.; three years later, just before the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear, it sold for 24s. 9d. per cwt. By 1747 muscovado had climbed to the unprecedented price of 42s. 9½d. per cwt. Although peace subsequently readjusted prices downward, in 1755, on the eve of the Seven Years' War, London sugar prices stood at a healthy 38s. 7 3/4d. per cwt.[13] West Indian sugar growers, Professor Sheridan has concluded, "enjoyed a period of excessive profits which continued with little abatement from

the late 1730's to the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763."[14] Peace did not ruin prosperity, however, since the dozen years preceding the American War were hardly lean ones for sugar growers. Despite a post-war decline to 30s. 9d. per cwt. in 1764, sugar prices bounded back to 38s. 3¼d. in 1766. In fact, during the twelve years after the Peace of Paris sugar commanded an annual average price of 36s. 7d. per cwt.[15]

Continued high prices despite increased production reveal only one facet of planter good fortune. The plantation system, a costly operation, required extensive investment and reinvestment in slaves and mill machinery. Moreover, sugar cane depleted soil nutrients, and every few years new fields needed planting to ensure a quality crop. Lastly, a plantation's success in large measure depended not only on management's skill in overseeing a reluctant work force, but also in its capacity to make informed judgments on matters--the timing of the harvest, for example--which were crucial to the final condition of the product. Had the planters been raising anything other than sugar, maintenance and mismanagement would have bitten deeply into profits. But the West Indian sugar grower was fortunate in that his product yielded waste material which could be recycled and sold at a profit.

Sugar's valuable by-products were molasses and rum. Jamaica and the other islands used some molasses as an inexpensive sweetener of slaves' rations and exported some to

distilleries in North America. But many estates throughout the islands had distilling equipment, and during the eighteenth century local rum manufacturing increasingly became a part of plantation routine. This aspect of West Indian production became more and more lucrative as rum's popularity grew. British imports of the beverage reflected the swelling demand for "kill devil." Between 1700 and 1704 England and Wales imported only 1,950 gallons from all the British Caribbean colonies. A half century later, however, between 1751 and 1755, they imported 821,912 gallons; and in the five years preceding the American War for Independence total British imports of the drink amounted to 2,336,760 gallons.[16] Jamaica, which enjoyed a large share of this trade, exported rum not only to England and Wales but to Ireland and the North American colonies. In 1764 it exported approximately 10,000 puncheons, the equivalent of one million gallons.* Four years later it exported 15,551 puncheons, and in 1774 an astounding 26,074 puncheons.[17] Rum was no less a big business than sugar.

Rum production, like sugar, could not keep abreast of demand, and throughout the century prices climbed. Jamaica benefited from this situation not only because it was the leading rum producer but also because its rum was reputed to be the best on the market. Between 1728 and 1733 Jamaican rum sold in London for 7s. per gallon. In 1734 the

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*One puncheon equaled one hundred gallons.

price rose to 7s. 3d. and within twenty years to 7s. 9d. Because of the 1757 British prohibition of gin, rum prices skyrocketed, Jamaica's reaching an all time high of 14s. per gallon.[18] This boom lasted until the gin ban ended in 1760, at which time rum prices declined to their pre-1757 levels.[19]

In addition to sugar, molasses, and rum Jamaica also exported other products to the British Isles and North America. These included pimento, coffee, ginger, cotton, mahogany, fustic, and logwood, but unlike sugar and rum all these commodities suffered price declines during the third quarter of the eighteenth century. As a consequence, they became less and less important aspects of the island's agriculture and export trade.[20]

The profits of the sugar industry were such that by the third quarter of the eighteenth century almost every parish on the island was engaged in it. Although more and more areas along the north shore were now put to cane, the chief producing regions were still along the southern coast where most of the population lived. In the rich river valleys--the Rio Minho, the Black River, the Cabaritta--cane grew tall under the hot tropical sun.[21] But despite planter emphasis on sugar Jamaica, unlike Barbados and the Leeward Islands, never developed an "intensive" mono-crop economy. Only a fraction of the island's arable land raised sugar. John Ellis, a Jamaican planter, reported that in 1775 only 500,000 of the island's four million acres were under culti-

vation and that only 160,000 of them produced sugar.[22] On a portion of the remainder, of course, grew ginger, coffee, cotton, and allspice--the colony's secondary export items. But most of the acreage was devoted to provision crops. Ever since the seventeenth century planters had customarily allotted an acre or so to each adult male slave, allowing him Saturday afternoons and Sundays to tend it. On these provision grounds blacks raised yams, bananas, pumpkins, calalue, plantains, and other tropical fruits and vegetables. By the third quarter of the eighteenth century the slaves had, in fact, created an institution--the Sunday market--which went a long way toward solving the island's food problems.[23]

While the slaves' provision grounds also raised some livestock, most of the province's chickens, hogs, and cattle were raised on uncultivated estate lands or "penns." In 1753, for example, St. Andrew's Parish contained 154 estates, twenty-six of which produced sugar. All of them provided pasture land ranging from as few as four to as many as four thousand acres.[24] James Dawkins' Parnasus plantation in the southern part of the island devoted twenty-two acres to cattle grazing.[25] Indeed, Professor Sheridan has calculated that in the early 1740's livestock accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the value of the median sugar estate.[26] "This island," wrote one observer in 1764, "produces many of the conveniencies, and more of the luxuries of life" than one expected of a sugar colony.[27]

Yet, despite its potential to do so, Jamaica never became self-sufficient. As early as 1731 Governor Robert Hunter had complained that efforts at self-sufficiency failed because "the inhabitants are so Intent upon making of Sugars" that all else seemed of secondary importance.[28] This preoccupation with sugar deepened as the century advanced and even alarmed the commentator who had found the variety of Jamaican production so astonishing in 1764.[29] A chief reason for the increased dependence upon cane was the system of credit finance which matured in the eighteenth century. London commission agents provided machinery, replacement parts, and many plantation needs on credit; they, in turn, secured payment annually when, as marketing agents, they disposed of the sugar crop. Because of the many perils which beset successful sugar growing, including mismanagement, many planters overextended their dependence upon creditors and endangered their own positions. Many fell victim to the system. Between 1752 and 1772, for example, more than 170 Jamaican estates were sold to meet obligations, and at least ninety-two others fell into the hands of creditors.[30] Like their tobacco-growing counterparts in Virginia and Maryland, Jamaican and other West Indian planters lived under the shadow of indebtedness. In fact, on the eve of the American Revolution West Indian indebtedness vastly exceeded that of North America. North American obligations stood somewhere between £2,000,000 and £6,000,000 sterling; the West Indian hovered between £14,000,000 and £16,000,000

sterling.[31]

The dangers the commission system posed impelled sugar growers to concentrate more heavily on their cash crop, and, as a consequence, although Jamaica never developed a mono-crop system, provision and livestock agriculture suffered. In the third quarter of the eighteenth century planters began reducing the number of hours their slaves could tend provision grounds.[32] Penn acreage disappeared before advancing fields of cane. By 1775 livestock accounted for only 15 per cent of the total value of the median sugar estate.[33]

These cut-backs in livestock and provisions occurred at a time when the white and black populations were growing. This meant that as the eighteenth century progressed Jamaica became increasingly dependent upon external sources not only for credit, labor, and equipment, but also for much of its daily bread. For the latter the islanders looked to their sister colonies in the north. One historian has called the North American connection "an essential condition of his [the West Indian's] prosperity, almost of his existence."[34] Another has written that North American trade permitted the West Indian islands to survive.[35] Indeed, the list of vital commodities Jamaica imported from the mainland was lengthy. In addition to staves, horses, rope, brick, and pineboard, New England sold Jamaica corn, onions, salted meat, and dried cod, an important element in the slaves' diet. The middle colonies provided flour, while Virginia sold

the island beef, pork, peas, corn, and beans. Charleston and Savannah shipped rice to Kingston and Jamaica's small port towns.[36] In the third quarter of the century the island had even begun importing from North America the vital boiling-house fuel without which sugar could not be made. In 1762 John Watts of New York wrote to Gedney Clarke of Barbados that lumber was as much in demand in Jamaica as it was in the smaller islands.[37] In short, Jamaica's future depended in very basic ways on its trade with North America.

Precisely how dependent was it? An exact determination is, of course, impossible, but available trade statistics suggest the growing importance of the mainland trade to the island's economy. At the beginning of the eighteenth century combined North American-West Indian imports and exports amounted to some £210,000 sterling; by midcentury the sum exceeded £500,000; and on the eve of the American Revolution it was well over £1,000,000.[38] Jamaica, the most populous of the English islands, accounted for a substantial portion of this trade. For example, of 666 ships which entered Jamaican ports in 1773, 293 arrived from North America.[39] Conditions in Jamaica after this trade collapsed at the beginning of the American War dramatically illustrate the importance of the North American connection to the island. The suspension of mainland imports induced a food shortage which, according to one contemporary, ultimately claimed the lives of 15,000 slaves.[40] This tragedy demonstrates the truth of what Charles M. Andrews hinted at a

half century ago: Jamaica's vital interests, and perhaps those of the other island colonies as well, rested on close and continued association with the mainland of North America, not with the mother country.[41]

Jamaica's relations with external buyers and sellers aggravated a problem to which all England's colonies, continental or insular, were prone: cash shortage. The commission system of finance, which invested rum and sugar profits in England, returned little actual money to the island. At the same time, the North American trade, always against Jamaica's favor, drained specie from the colony. Lastly, the slave-dominated internal provision marketing system took money out of white hands. It has been estimated that a slave at Sunday market earned about 2s. 6d., creating a situation in which, according to Edward Long in 1774, "the greater part of the small silver" on the island was in black pockets.[42]

Unlike other colonies which experienced the problem of "fleeing money," Jamaica never issued a paper currency or established a land bank. Instead, bills of exchange drawn in England and foreign coins served as exchange media. The island's "current money," however, never exchanged at par with the coin of the realm. Spanish <u>reals</u>, for example, which passed in Jamaica as 7½d., bought only 5d. sterling. In other words, a 40 per cent differential existed between the colonial money and sterling. This exchange rate remained remarkably stable throughout the third quarter of the

century. Although it may have fluctuated somewhat during the final stages of the Seven Years' War and the immediate post-war period, the 40 per cent differential which existed in 1755 existed in 1774 as well.[43]

It was Jamaica's trade with the Spanish colonies that provided the island its foreign coins. This commerce, always in Jamaica's favor, allowed the province to endure the persistent drain of its specie and to buttress its bills of exchange. The Spanish trade dated back to the years immediately following the Royal African Company's loss of its slave trade monopoly in 1698. During the free trade era Kingston's merchants supplied slaves and other products to Spanish markets. This commerce was so lucrative that between 1706 and 1713 Jamaica annually earned between £200,000 and £250,000 in Spanish gold and silver.[44] After England secured the <u>asiento</u> at Utrecht in 1713 and awarded, over Jamaican objections, the South Sea Company privileges under the contract, the island's independent trading became illegal. This constituted no serious problem, however. Colonial merchants simply ignored restrictions and reaped enormous profits.[45] In fact, Richard Pares suggests that England went to war over Jenkins' ear in order to protect and expand this illicit but profitable commerce.[46] Because the Spanish paid in cash, the trade vitalized the island's economy, and the status of the commerce at any given time served as a barometer of Jamaica's financial health. Without it many merchants might have faced the poor house or debtor's pri-

son.[47]

Although Jamaica sold flour, English manufactures, and other commodities at retail to the Spanish, the heart of the trade was slavery. Professor Curtin has calculated that between 1700 and 1775 the island re-exported some 135,900 blacks.[48] While it is true that not all these slaves went to Spanish ports, those that did must have provided Jamaica an enormous specie income. Between 1748 and 1765 the Bank of England received £2,368,484 in bullion deposits from Jamaica, a sum one thousand times that which arrived from all the other English islands combined.[49] Jamaica's commercial stake in slavery was as important as its agricultural investment.

Perhaps it was more important, because when the slave trade was dull or disrupted, the island suffered. In 1749 William Lloyd wrote his father that island prices were depressed and "money scarce by reason the Trade to the Spanish Main and to the South Keys on the south side of Cuba being much retarded . . . ."[50] What most often disrupted the trade were war, rumors of war, and recurrent skirmishes between the Spanish and the English in the Caribbean. During the 1750's both London and Madrid made every effort to maintain peace.[51] This was not easy because nationals on either side continually harassed each other, creating potentially explosive situations. Jamaica's Governor Charles Knowles reported in 1753, for example, that an officer in the King's army, Captain Robert Hodgson, was attempting, without au-

thority, to widen the English settlements along the Mosquito Shore, thereby confronting the Spanish with outright aggression.[52] Similarly, in 1754 Jamaican authorities learned that the Governor of Cartagena, without Madrid's approval, was fitting out vessels to prey upon English shipping within ten leagues of the New Granada coast.[53] The uneasy peace endured until France dragged Spain into the Seven Years' War in 1762, causing serious although temporary economic difficulties in Jamaica.

In summary, by the third quarter of the eighteenth century Jamaica had forged a prosperous and productive economy. Although beset by financial difficulties common to other colonies at the time, the island nevertheless reached a level of economic development comparable to that along the Chesapeake or in the Carolinas.

Social Dynamics

Jamaican society was organized hierarchically. At the uppermost stratum stood the great sugar planters and the wealthy merchants. Below them were middling farmers engaged in livestock production and coffee, ginger, and pimento agriculture; lesser merchants like shop, tavern, and inn keepers; and a professional class comprised of lawyers, doctors, clergymen, newspaper editors, and Crown functionaries. Beneath these middle elements were indentured servants who labored in the rural areas as overseers, assistants, and bookkeepers and in the towns as artisans and mechanics. The

lowest tier of whites included the amorphous and transient soldier and sailor populations who, in one sense, were not really part of the society at all. At the very bottom of this structure were a small number of free blacks and, of course, an overwhelming number of slaves.[54]

This class structure, except for its non-white base, was much less rigid, especially after 1739, than has often been supposed.[55] Intermittent violence and outright war within the island stunted colonial growth for many years. From the earliest days of the Cromwellian conquest armed free blacks called Maroons* resisted English settlement. Originally held as slaves by the Spanish, these blacks had been emancipated by their retreating masters in order to harass the English until His Catholic Majesty could muster enough force to reconquer the island. Spain, of course, failed to retake the colony, and the Maroons, fearing reenslavement under the British, skillfully avoided defeat and capture. Several Maroon groups established communities in Jamaica's mountainous interior, and during subsequent decades they maintained their numbers not only through natural increase but through the recruitment of plantation slaves. The latter policy deepened English hostility toward the black mountaineers, and sporadic violence characterized colonial and Maroon relations. When in the 1720's some pio-

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*The term derives from the Spanish cimarron. In Hispaniola it referred first to lost cattle and escaped Indian slaves. In the mid-1500's the word described runaway blacks.

neers tried settling the interior of Portland Parish, the Windward Maroons went to war against the English. In a short time the Leeward Maroons from the west-central region joined the struggle. Repeated efforts by both militia and royal troops to crush the guerrilla fighters failed, and after fourteen years of conflict the colonials sought and secured a negotiated settlement. By the peace treaties of 1738 and 1739 the whites recognized the freedom and territorial independence of the black mountain men. In return, the Maroons pledged to capture fugitive slaves, help suppress rebellions, and allow an English observer to live among them.[56] These agreements had enormous impact upon white society.

The pacification of the island's interior meant that new lands became safe for settlement and cultivation.[57] In 1730, early in the Maroon war, about 4,000 persons out of a white population of more than 7,000 owned land. Most other whites were indentured servants.[58] As the conflict dragged on, the incidence of landownership declined. In 1737 approximately 1,000 individuals were proprietors. Yet Jamaica's total white population remained somewhat more than 7,000.[59] This suggests that indentured servants, on completing their contractual obligations, left the island instead of claiming a 300 acre headright to which an early proclamation of Charles II entitled them.[60] New servants evidently replaced those who departed. After the Maroon Treaties this situation began to change and was so complete-

ly reversed by the 1760's that in 1774 there were about 11,000 proprietors.[61] Many, if not most, of the new landholders were former servants who took advantage of the headrights offered them to establish farms in previously unsettled areas.[62] Patent records at the Jamaica Archives in Spanish Town indicate that these headright grants were common, especially during the third quarter of the century.[63]

Peace with the Maroons created opportunities not only for indentured servants but for merchants and professionals as well. Both these groups, instilled with the English notion that landholding and gentility went hand-in-hand, welcomed the opening of the frontier. Kingston merchants Zachary Bayley and Philip Pinnock became proprietors. Even an obscure London merchant, Samuel Vaughan, purchased land and turned it to account. Starting out in St. James Parish in 1757, within twenty years Vaughan built an estate employing 200 slaves.[64] Doctors, lawyers, and Crown officials--people who earned high salaries and fees--also bought land. Professor Sheridan has correctly written that there were "merchant-planters, lawyer-planters, doctor-planters, and provost marshal-planters."[65]

An ambitious road construction program served the settlers moving into Jamaica's interior. It reflected the expansion and at the same time accelerated it. By 1760 the road along the Wag River to the north shore, known today as the Junction Road, was already in use.[66] In 1764 the island's Assembly appropriated funds for a road over Guy's

Hill to Port Maria, a project completed in 1772.[67] The important highway over Mount Diablo, today one of Jamaica's major arteries, was begun in 1769 and completed before the outbreak of the American War.[68]

The opportunities expansionism created fostered social fluidity in frontier Jamaica. William Beckford, a planter, wrote:

> It [Jamaica] is . . . (and I believe that it is generally confessed to be) the best poor man's country in the world: and that country must be surely good that can convert poverty into independence, can smooth the brow of sorrow and despair, and occasion the heavy heart to leap for joy: and where a man can acquire a competent fortune by perservering industry and honest gain, the liberal mind will be less willing to envy, than it will be desirous to applaud.[69]

J. B. Moreton, a bookkeeper in Clarendon Parish, observed that "It is not thought strange for a peasant's son from Glasgow, or Aberdeen" to improve himself "if he enters into the planting line . . . ."[70]

This social fluidity underscored and complemented the crude egalitarianism which characterized life among the rural whites ever since the plantation system and large-scale slavery developed. Isolation, loneliness, fear--all these eroded quasi-medieval class distinctions and substituted for them a sense of racial unity. In 1740 Charles Leslie reported that masters and their white indentured servants ate the same food and shared the same living conditions. Sometimes, he noted, masters rewarded their servants with fine clothes, horses, and slaves.[71] Such social intercourse made subsequent relations between former master and

indentured servant-turned-proprietor easy and amiable. According to Bryan Edwards of Kingston, there was "a display of conscious equality throughout all ranks of life."[72] "The poorest white person," he remarked, " seems to consider himself nearly on a level with the richest."[73]

"Nearly on a level with the richest" is an important qualifying phrase. Whatever egalitarianism rural Jamaica fostered among the whites was always constrained by inherited medieval notions regarding the social underpinnings of politics. The smaller landholder, the newcomer--these people assumed as a matter of course that the long established and well-to-do planters, usually large land and slaveholders, were the natural leaders of their districts, and to them they deferred on matters of public concern. As a consequence, over generations the same families dominated local and provincial government.[74] For all its egalitarianism, then, rural Jamaica was not democratic. This aspect of eighteenth century Jamaica strongly resembled the sociopolitical structure on the North American mainland.

J. B. Moreton, who believed a Glasgow peasant's son could become a successful Jamaica planter, also maintained that the same poor immigrant could "in the space of four or five years, . . . commence merchant, and in a few years afterwards to make a pretty independence."[75] But on this matter the Clarendon bookkeeper seems to have exaggerated. If anything, in the middle of the eighteenth century mercantile opportunities were declining. Long established merchants

had by then dominated the major avenues of commerce--the domestic and Spanish slave trades, the North American and British import-export connections, illegal traffic with the French, and the insular coastal trade. Moreover, experience had provided these controlling mercantile elements important contacts abroad as well as the expertise for enterprises which had become increasingly specialized as the eighteenth century wore on. Perhaps most importantly, over many years the established traders had discovered and tapped sources of credit which enabled them to endure not only wartime cash shortages but also the increased charges which periodic international conflict imposed on insurance premiums and cargo space. With none of these advantages even the most industrious latecomer to Jamaica's commercial scene found himself severely handicapped and unable to compete. Declining opportunities in Kingston, the island's urban commercial center, sharpened class distinctions between the rich successful merchants who, Moreton wrote, "in general live elegantly," and the artisan and mechanic groups.[76] In the middle eighteenth century little of the egalitarianism typical of the rural parts characterized Kingston life.

Among white Jamaicans two societies had emerged, each with its own elite, and real interests divided one from the other. In the early years of the sugar industry the planter class had depended upon the local merchants not only for credits and loans but also for the bulk purchase of its sugar crop. The merchants, of course, had always sought to

maintain low purchasing prices in order to maximize profits when they sold the produce abroad. In time, the planters looked to eliminate these middlemen. The commission system grew grew and matured as a result, and in the eighteenth century the large sugar growers traded on their own accounts.[77] Although the merchants resented the growing independence of the planters, the latter never really secured economic or financial autonomy. The growers still relied on the merchants for slaves, consumer goods, and, especially in unforeseen emergencies, for ready cash. Credits and loans could be hard to come by, however, particularly in wartime when the disrupted Spanish trade made money scarce.[78] The bargaining advantage accordingly lay with the merchant, often resulting in difficult terms for the planter. Wrote Moreton:

> A man by lending a small sum of money to a planter in distress, may get the attorneyship of his plantation, and a mortgage thereon by way of security; and it often happens in the end, that the mortgagee possesses himself of the whole estate, whilst the mortgager reflects with horror on his extravagance and folly.[79]

Debtor-creditor antagonisms were accordingly deep-seated. The planters who, according to Professor Curtin, perceived "the mercantile interest as . . . a leech on the really productive activity of the colony . . . ," used their considerable political power from time to time to ease their position.[80] Laws declaring sugar legal tender below the market price were not unknown; nor were laws impeding imprisonment for debt.[81]

Another planter-merchant conflict concerned the slave trade. Local merchants sold Africans to the domestic and the Spanish markets. From the planters' perspective, Spanish competition kept local prices high, much to the merchants' advantage.[82] Moreover, many planters suspected that the traders re-exported the best blacks to the Spanish colonies where strong and healthy laborers reputedly sold for more than they did locally.[83] Throughout the eighteenth century, despite repeated disallowances by the Privy Council, the planter-dominated Assembly imposed taxes on re-exported blacks.[84]

A third conflict between planter and merchant concerned the well-known but clandestine trade the latter carried on with the French sugar islands. It was widely believed that this illegal trade resulted in the shipping of French sugar, under the pretense that it was English grown, to the protected home market.[85] This suspicion so outraged the planters that in the early 1750's the island's Assembly legislated the death penalty for smuggling foreign sugar, molasses, and rum, a measure which the Privy Council disallowed in 1756.[86] Jamaica's trade with the French continued during the Seven Years' War, and it constituted one element of the large colonial commerce with the enemy which infuriated William Pitt. Admiral Charles Holmes, Commander of the Jamaica Naval Station (1760-1761), tried to implement Pitt's instructions to stop these unpatriotic dealings. As a result, he incurred the wrath of Jamaica's merchants who peti-

tioned for his removal.[87] But the island's planters supported the Admiral, applauded his efforts, and denounced "the illegal and forbidden trade."[88]

The specific issues over which Jamaica's planters and merchants clashed manifested in concrete fashion a more basic concern of both groups: status. Each faction solicited and felt entitled to the deference of the entire society. Planter pretension to privilege derived primarily from the ancient association of aristocracy with land.[89] Reinforcing this notion were the gangs of slaves whose labor in the cane fields acknowledged the superior rank not only of whites in general but of the large growers in particular. The "great houses" these planters built for themselves and the conspicuous consumption in which they engaged reflected the self-image they cultivated and cherished. Feelings of responsibility characterized planter self-importance. Public service in the local vestry, the various island courts, or the colonial Assembly was the natural concomitant of large plantership, and from district to district and parish to parish smaller agriculturalists respected these claims and ordinarily cast votes for their more successful neighbors. The military titles the militia service offered also puffed the inflated egos of the great sugar growers.

Several factors, however, marred planter pretensions. The rough egalitarianism and easy amiability among whites of whatever rank in the country parts and on the frontier made it difficult for outsiders to distinguish be-

tween the rural elite and the rest of the whites. Moreover, the perennial indebtedness of many planters and the occasional foreclosures they suffered dramatized the ephemeral nature of their condition. These circumstances buttressed the rival pretensions of the merchants who, mainly centered in Kingston, perceived themselves as the rightful colonial elite. In the city the established traders were a very visible sort of aristocracy, and they enjoyed, like the planters, the deference of their less successful neighbors who expected civic leadership from them. Believing that as creditors they could survive without the planters, but that the planters could not survive without them, the merchants saw their class as the colony's vitalizing and sustaining agent.

The planter-merchant rivalry over status is important for two reasons. First, it belies a traditional view that after 1763 specific conflicts of interest between planter and merchant evaporated into an "era of good feelings" because the contest for preferment, the fundamental issue, remained unresolved during the remainder of the century.[90] Secondly, the confusion over status energized island politics and explains, at least in part, the latter's characteristic instability.[91]

Government and Politics

The political institutions in which the contending elites struggled for preferment were carbon copies of those

that existed in Virginia and the Carolinas. Although Jamaica was divided into counties(Middlesex, Surrey, and Cornwall), on the local level authority reposed in the various parish vestries. Each vestry consisted of the Parish Rector, the Justice of the Peace, ten vestrymen chosen annually by the parish freeholders, and the Custos Rotulorum, the equivalent of the Lord Lieutenant of an English county. The vestry performed a variety of functions(such as maintaining local roads and the parish jail), and it assessed district taxes for these purposes.[92]

On the provincial level Jamaica's government was organized like royal colonies on the mainland. The Governor, as agent of the Crown, represented the prerogative, and, accordingly, it was his responsibility to uphold royal authority in the colony. His commission and instructions empowered him to enforce the Navigation Acts; summon, prorogue, or dissolve the provincial Assembly; appoint judges; issue letters patent; grant escheated lands; declare martial law; and oversee the religious and moral life of the colony. In addition to these executive functions the Governor also played a part in the legislative process, exercising an absolute veto over provincial legislation. Lastly, he served as the colony's chief judicial magistrate, presiding over the Chancery, Ordinary, and Vice Admiralty Courts.[93] In case of the absence or death of the Governor all these responsibilities devolved on the Lieutenant Governor, ordinarily a native colonial.[94] Because of the island's wealth and

prestige in the eighteenth century, Jamaica's governorship was the most important office the colonial service had to offer in the western hemisphere. According to Eric Williams, it was second only to the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland.[95]

Assisting the Governor was a Council of ten men and a President.[96] Nominated by the Governor and appointed by the Crown, Councillors also played executive, legislative, and judicial roles.[97] The Council served as the Governor's advisory board, met as the upper house of the legislature, and sat with the Governor as the Court of Appeals.[98] Five members constituted a quorum.[99] The Governor's instructions required him to respect full freedom of speech in Council sessions, and, although he could suspend members for a number of offenses, final authority for removing a Councillor rested in the Privy Council.[100]

Jamaica's Assembly constituted the third and popular branch of Jamaica's colonial government. Each of the nineteen parishes sent two representatives to the capital except Kingston, Port Royal, and St. Catherine (where Spanish Town was located), each of which elected three. Accordingly, the House of Assembly consisted of forty-one members. This number rose to forty-three in 1773 when Trelawny Parish was created.[101]

Throughout the eighteenth century this popular branch of the government expanded its power at the expense of the Crown, just as the Assemblies in Virginia and the

Carolinas were doing.[102] Aggressive, self-conscious, seeing itself as a miniature House of Commons, Jamaica's Assembly by the middle of the century had reached that stage of development where, to use Jack Greene's phrase, it could "speak for" the colony.[103] One cannot read Leonard Woods Labaree's study of Royal Government in America and be unaware of the Jamaica Assembly's consistent opposition to royal encroachments on what it considered its own constitutional sphere of legislative activity. The island's House, for example, was in the forefront of the struggles to maintain the right of initiative, to secure sole authority in drafting money bills, and to determine judicial tenure.[104] In addition, "none of the provinces which revolted in 1775," wrote Labaree, "ever dared to oppose officially the suspending clause with as much vigor as did Jamaica."[105] In brief, the island's Assembly was as mature as any of its counterparts on the mainland.

Several factors accounted for this significant development. Jamaica's Assembly, like those on the mainland, controlled the colonial purse, and, despite a 1728 permanent revenue law, a host of public responsibilities, including subsidies to the regular troops stationed in Jamaica, demanded additional annual appropriations. The Assembly could and often did withhold necessary funds in order to extract concessions from reluctant Governors. What further emboldened the Assembly was the inverse of this situation, the Governor's inability to control provincial politics or dis-

cipline local politicians. Despite the broad authority his commission and instructions granted him, legal authority even greater than the King's in England, the Governor lacked the means of translating his theoretical power into effective action. Unlike the King, for example, Jamaica's chief executive lacked any extensive patronage by which to secure the cooperation if not the loyalty of local politicians. Only a handful of jobs were available, and these, in fact, the Secretary of State, not the Governor, distributed.[106] Again, unlike the King, the island's Governor could not manipulate colonial elections through bribery and purchase because, first, he lacked the resources, and, second, he faced a wide electorate. Despite property suffrage requirements most white settlers qualified for and exercised the vote.[107] These combinations of circumstances promoted the instability on which planter-merchant rivalry thrived.[108]

Nothing more vividly illustrates planter-merchant rivalry than the midcentury struggle over the location of the colonial capital. Since the days of the Spanish St. Jago de la Vega, more commonly called Spanish Town, had served as the seat of government. In 1750 only a few hundred persons made this inland village in St. Catherine their permanent home. Spanish Town's sole business was government. Whatever enterprises existed there--small shops, taverns, inns--were "supported alone by the concourse of people, whom business with the government brings to" the town.[109] There were places in Jamaica more hospitable to

the administration of government than the lowlands of St. Catherine. The tropical heat, uncooled by sea breezes, never relented. "The afternoons and nights here are more intolerably warm," wrote Lord Adam Gordon in 1764, "than I felt them in any other part of Jamaica."[110] Remote, isolated from the eastern parts of the island when the rainy seasons swelled the Rio Cobre River, vulnerable to attack, Spanish Town seemed as unlikely a place for a colonial capital as one could imagine. As far as Governor Charles Knowles could figure it out, Spanish Town became the English capital in 1655 because Cromwell's victorious armies had thought "it was more convenient to sit down in Houses they found ready built than to build new ones." "It is the more surprising," he added, "when that reason no longer subsisted the Thing [relocation of the capital elsewhere] should not have been done."[111]

Most anxious for the "Thing" to be done were Kingston's merchants. To them the seventeen miles of "sandy country" between the capital and Kingston constituted more than a mere inconvenience; they believed that the distance damaged trade and perpetrated an injustice. Under provincial law, for example, "All Masters of Vessells are obliged to wait on the Governor," a requirement which entailed time and expense, and, when the Rio Cobre was impassable, aggravation as well for visiting sea captains.[112] A regulation of this sort hardly promoted commerce, but it was inconsequential next to the inequities which befell the mercantile

community on account of the capital's location. Merchants elected to the island's Assembly often regretted the honor bestowed on them because service usually entailed three months at Spanish Town, an absence from business which even the most prosperous merchant could ill-afford. As a result, merchants in the Assembly often failed to attend full sessions.[113] Moreover, law suits involving litigants from different parishes and sums of more than 40s. required adjudication at the Supreme Court in Spanish Town. But since most island suits involved merchants, the costs and burdens of travel fell more heavily on them than on any other group. Sometimes merchants simply did not bother to press suit for what was theirs, preferring the loss to the time and expense of a stay in Spanish Town.[114] Other aspects of law and government posed much the same problem. Most colonial juries were drawn from Kingston "as the Great Body of the People resides there," and jury duty required a "whole month at a time" away from home and business.[115] The merchants also feared for the government's safety at Spanish Town. They maintained that both geographically and demographically the town was vulnerable to domestic and foreign enemies.[116]

The capital's location galled the merchants for reasons beyond convenience, commerce, justice, and security. Spanish Town was, quite simply, the planters' town. Unlike the merchants, the planters endured little financial hardship by entrusting their estates to overseers a few months each year. Nor did a lengthy stay in Spanish Town cause

them any great personal inconvenience. Rather, they probably relished the opportunity to quit the loneliness of rural Jamaica for the companionship and social activities which Spanish Town offered. Many of them built town houses. Charles Price's home on Red Church Street near the Governor's mansion occupied an entire block lot.[117] The planters' presence, in fact, permeated the capital. They not only controlled the island's Assembly and most of the judgeships, but they constituted and dominated what passed for haut monde in the quiet St. Catherine village. By midcentury St. Jago de la Vega symbolized planter status and influence.

Kingston was very different from Spanish Town. It did not exist at the time of the English conquest. Rather, it was born in the decade following the great 1692 earthquake which dumped much of Port Royal into the sea.[118] Then as today, it enjoyed one of the finest harbors in the world, and it very quickly became the busiest port in the colony, reducing what was left of Port Royal to satellite status. During the first half of the eighteenth century its white and black populations grew, and by the 1750's, like today, the city housed nearly one-fourth the island's inhabitants.[119] In 1764 Lord Adam Gordon wrote that Kingston

> is now the most trading and only very considerable Town in the island. It is large and very well Inhabited, the Streets spacious, and regularly laid out, cutting one another at right Angles, . . . It would [be] very warm here, but for the Sea Breezes, which commonly set in about 10,--A.M.--and last 'till 4 OClock P.M.[120]

Put simply, Kingston recommended itself to the merchants as the only reasonable location for the colonial capital.

Kingston, of course, was the merchants' town. There, "in the upper part of the Town, called the Savannah, are many Sumptuous houses, with Gardens, and offices" belonging to the wealthy traders.[121] The mercantile community dominated not only Kingston's politics but its social life--the theater, the balls, the coffee houses, clubs, and restaurants. It cultivated fashion, formulated opinion, and set standards. Kingston, in short, symbolized merchant status and influence.

Removing the capital from Spanish Town to Kingston would not only foster commerce, alleviate various injustices, and provide increased safety for the government, but it would constitute an enormous political, social, and psychological merchant triumph over the planters. Moreover, it would indirectly bolster the Crown's position in the colony, or so Governor Knowles believed. Increased merchant influence on the administration, he maintained, would serve good government by "creating a counter ballance [sic] " to and "destroying the Power" of the planter bloc. In this regard "something should soon be done," he warned, "or there will be an end of all Royal Authority here."[122]

Planters and merchants engaged each other over the relocation issue after 1750. Governor Edward Trelawny (1738-1751), Charles Knowles's predecessor, had secured a degree of political harmony and stability by yielding again

and again to Assembly demands. Among other things, he approved legislation without the legally required suspending clauses, and by so doing he tacitly acknowledged colonial notions concerning the rights of Englishmen and the nature of the British Constitution. In effect, he bartered away much of the royal prerogative. Colonial leaders hoped to perpetuate this situation under Trelawny's successor. Accordingly, in 1751 Charles Price, the Assembly Speaker, organized twelve men, three of them merchants, into the Jamaica Association in order to confront the new Governor with, as Professors Craton and Walvin have written, a "united front."[123]

But Governor Knowles refused to let Price and his cronies intimidate him. Taking his commission and instructions seriously, he sought to reassert the royal prerogative, and, as part of this program, he vetoed bills which lacked suspending clauses.[124] The upshot was that in October, 1753, the Assembly adopted five resolutions defending its right to legislate without suspensions, declaring that the hated clauses constituted

> a very great alteration of the known and established constitution of this island, and as the same is derogatory to the undoubted right of the subject hath [sic] of proposing laws to the Crown, this house cannot consent to the insertion of such clauses in public bills without giving up the rights of the people, their own liberties, and the happy constitution which they have enjoyed under his present and most gracious Majesty and his royal predecessors for above seventy years.[125]

Knowles responded by dissolving the Assembly. This action, however, created such an uproar that he fled Spanish Town

and took up residence in Kingston.[126]

At this juncture the formal effort to relocate the capital began. Knowles had realized from the beginning that the Jamaica Association was an instrument of planter politics and that he enjoyed a reservoir of support among the merchants in whose city he now lived. Enlisting the latter in support of relocation was not at all difficult. Five hundred and eighty-three "merchants, factors, and agents" petitioned the King to transfer the capital to Kingston.[127] Neighboring St. Andrew Parish, an agricultural but not sugar producing region, joined the movement. Sixty-seven of that district's inhabitants, including judges and vestrymen, also petitioned the King for the capital's removal.[128] At the same time, quietly and behind the scene, Governor Knowles urged Whitehall to relocate the provincial capital.[129]

Maneuver and counter-maneuver characterized the bitterly fought elections of 1754.[130] The Governor and merchants won these contests, the latter controlling the new Assembly for the first time in many years. Thomas Hibbert, a prominent Kingston merchant, became Speaker. Subsequent House sessions became so quarrelsome and disorderly that at one point Charles Price and fifteen of his colleagues were arrested and jailed.[131] Despite this factiousness the Assembly enacted legislation, approved by Knowles (ironically, without suspending clauses), relocating the seat of government at Kingston.[132] Shortly afterward, on May 14, 1755, the Council and Assembly formally petitioned George II for

his royal approbation.[133]

Nearly a year later, on March 9, 1756, the Board of Trade considered the dispute between "the merchants, factors, and agents . . ." representing "the metropolis of our . . . island and the principal seat of its trade" and "the planters and other proprietors and occupiers of lands."[134] The Board publicly avoided interfering in the matter. It pointed out that the location of the capital was a local question best settled by the "unprejudiced and dispassionate sense of the legislature of our . . . island."[135] But the Privy Council subsequently recalled Governor Knowles and disallowed the relocation legislation because it lacked suspending clauses.[136] In the wake of these events the planters reasserted control over the Assembly and enacted legislation returning the capital to Spanish Town.[137]

The matter did not end there. To complete their victory planters in the Assembly wanted to oust from the Council merchants and merchant-sympathizers whom they considered especially responsible for recent developments. In this effort the planters had an ally, Lieutenant Governor Henry Moore, himself an estate owner, who assumed executive responsibilities upon Knowles's departure. When the Assembly brought charges against the merchant Councillor Philip Pinnock, Chief Judge of the Supreme Court, Moore suspended him.[138] The other Councillors defended themselves as well as Pinnock by attempting to procure the Lieutenant Governor's support with the hope that he would at their bidding

dissolve the Assembly. They even went "so far as to offer me," Moore wrote, "such a sum of money as I should please to name, if I would [illegible] to the dissolution propos'd, & call a new Assembly at Kingston."[139] Moore was contemptuous of the bribe and the people who offered it. He refused to be bought.[140]

Rumors of an imminent French invasion led Moore to declare martial law on November 6, 1756.[141] The seven Councillors who had failed to purchase the Lieutenant Governor's cooperation now perceived a way of achieving their goal without him. They maintained that the imposition of martial law ipso facto dissolved the Assembly, and, accordingly, they refused to consider any of the money bills the popular branch of the legislature was then sending to them for the defense of the island.[142] Moore objected to the Council's reasoning and urged it to get back to work. But the Councillors, insisting on new elections, stood their ground. Consequently, the Lieutenant Governor suspended the seven "till his Majesty's Pleasure be known."[143]

Moore's action amounted to a purge of the merchant element in the Council and constituted a clear victory for the planters. The Assembly applauded the Lieutenant Governor's defense of "justice" against "those who have been Principally Concerned in Attempting to Overturn the Constitution."[144] When news arrived in 1758 that the Privy Council had approved the legislation returning the capital to Spanish Town, planter triumph on this issue seemed complete.

Spanish Town residents, burning an effigy of former Governor Knowles, celebrated in the streets.[145] The question of the capital's location was not raised again for many years.

In the middle eighteenth century Jamaica prospered, and new agricultural opportunities kept its social structure fluid. A deferential society, Jamaica spawned rival elites who struggled for status and preferment. The political institutions in which much of the contention took place corresponded to institutions elsewhere within the empire. The most striking characteristic of Jamaica's government was the ever-increasing power of its popular House of Assembly. In short, Jamaica's development in the eighteenth century did not differ much from that of the colonies on the mainland, especially those in the South.

NOTES

[1]Great Britain, Encouraging Settling in Jamaica: By the King a Proclamation (London: December 14, 1661).

[2]Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623-1775 (Baltimore: 1973), 295-96, 309, 470.

[3]John Campbell, Candid and Impartial Considerations on the Nature of the Sugar Trade (London: 1763), 73.

[4]Richard B. Sheridan, "The Wealth of Jamaica in the Eighteenth Century," Economic History Review, XVIII (2nd series, 1965), 303.

[5]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 470-71.

[6]Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (4th ed., New York: 1966), 54.

[7]Brief treatments of the transition to sugar are available in Clinton V. Black, History of Jamaica (3rd ed., London and Glasgow: 1965), 97-104 and Samuel J. Edith F. Hurwitz, Jamaica: A Historical Portrait (New York: 1971), 30-33. For more in depth discussions the following are valuable: Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 119-21; Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies (Chapel Hill: 1972); Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line: The English in the Caribbean, 1624-1690 (New York: 1972). For the introduction and development of sugar on one Jamaican estate, see Michael Craton and James Walvin, A Jamaica Plantation: The History of Worthy Park, 1670-1970 (Toronto and Buffalo: 1970), 46-67.

[8]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 11.

[9]Ibid., 21, 43-67. By the tariff of 1661 English muscovado Great Britain bore aduty of 1s. 5d. per cwt.; by the same las foreign sugars bore a duty of 3s. 10d. per cwt.

In 1747 the tax on English sugar was increased to 2s. 11d., and in 1759 it was increased to 4s. 5d. These later laws maintained protection, however, by raising the duties on foreign muscovado.

[10]Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 203; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 418.

[11]Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 204.

[12]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 450.

[13]Ibid., 417.

[14]Richard B. Sheridan, "The Molasses Act and the Market Strategy of the British Sugar Planters," Paul Goodman, ed., Essays in American Colonial History (New York: 1967), 381.

[15]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 497. London sugar prices are fair indicators of Jamaican income during the quarter century preceding the American War because the bulk of the island's sugar was exported directly to the mother country. In contrast, Jamaica's sugar exports to North America entailed only a fraction of the island's total output. For example, between 1745 and 1748 only 3.3 per cent of the island's sugar exports went to the northern colonies; between 1749 and 1751, only 4.0 per cent; in 1768, a mere 1.9 per cent; and in 1773, 3.0 per cent. Ibid., 34.

[16]Ibid., 348.

[17]Bryan Edwards, The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies (4 vols., Philadelphia: 1801-1807), I, 302-03. Jamaica also exported large quantities of raw molasses, particularly to North America. In 1768, for example, the island sold 201, 960 gallons to the mainland colonies, mostly to New England. Ibid., I, 303.

[18]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 348-49.

[19]Ibid., 349. The high prices Jamaican rum commanded in the mother country meant that during the third quarter of the century hardly a market for the commodity existed in North America. The latter, with its own distilling industry, sought access to cheap molasses outside the empire. Ibid., 352.

[20]Ibid., 468.

[21]Ibid., 208-10.

[22]See quote in Ibid., 210. On the eve of the American Revolution one of the allegations against the unpopular Jamaican planters was that they deliberately underproduced in order to maintain high prices. Ibid., 217.

[23]Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 349; Orlando Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery: An Analysis of the Origins, Development and Structure of Negro Slave Society in Jamaica (London: 1967), 217-25; Sidney Mintz, "origins of the Jamaican Market System," Caribbean Transformations (Chicago: 1974), 180-213.

[24]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 223; Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 221.

[25]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 225-26.

[26]Ibid., 230.

[27]Lord Adam Gordon, "Journal of an Officer in the West Indies who Travelled over a Part of the West Indies, and of North America, in the Course of 1764 and 1765," Newton D. Mereness, ed., Travels in the American Colonies (New York: 1916), 380.

[28]Quoted in Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 220. It must be remembered that few of the mainland colonies were fully self-sufficient. An active coastal trade supplied the wants of one region with the goods of another. All relied on external sources for at least one basic commodity--salt. Collectively, the American colonies approached self-sufficiency. Jamaica was an element within this integrated system.

[29]Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 380.

[30]For an examination of how plantation finance worked see Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 282-305. For a description of how one planter family experienced increasing indebtedness see Craton and Walvin, A Jamaica Plantation, 157-64; See also, Richardson Wright, Revels in Jamaica, 1682-1838 (New York: 1937), 249-50.

[31]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 464.

[32]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 220.

[33]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 230. Worthy Park's provision grounds were never able until the 1790's to sustain its slaves. That estate, like many plantations, used its cattle as beasts of burden. It also relied on its livestock to fertilize depleted fields. Cattle served purposes other than providing beef. Craton and Walvin, A Jamaica Plantation, 135-37.

[34]Herbert C. Bell, "The West India Trade Before the American Revolution," American Historical Review, XXII (January: 1917), 287.

[35]Richard Pares, Yankees and Creoles: The Trade Between North America and the West Indies Before the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: 1956), 1.

[36]Ibid., 25-26, 84n. 1; Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 210.

[37]John Watts to Gedney Clarke, January 2, 1762, Dorothy C. Barck, ed., Letter Book of John Watts: Merchant and Councillor of New York (New York: 1928), 8.

[38]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 315.

[39]Ibid., 334.

[40]Edwards, History, Civil and Commercial, II, 515; Richard B. Sheridan, "The Crisis of Slave Subsistence in the West Indies during and after the American Revolution," William and Mary Quarterly (October: 1976), 615-641.

[41]For a brief discussion see Charles M. Andrew, The Colonial Background of the American Revolution (17th ed., New Haven and London: 1969), 89-91. Jamaica did not enjoy a good reputation among North American merchants and sea captains. One reason for dissatisfaction lay in the fact that North American shippers often glutted the Jamaican market with products to such a degree that prices on the island fell sharply. Benjamin Wright, for example, a representative of Aaron Lopez, informed his Rhode Island employer in 1768 that he had sent "our tender to allmost every Port in this Island, found the marketts no ways inviteing, and many and many of the ports everything dull and much glotted."

Benjamin Wright to Aaron Lopez, March 9, 1768, Worthington C. Ford, ed., "Commerce of Rhode Island, 1726-1800," Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston: 1914-15), IX, 230. Glutted Jamaican markets and low island prices is a recurring theme in North American commercial correspondence in the fifteen years or so before the outbreak of the American Revolution. See, for examples, ibid., IX-X.

North American merchants were also unhappy with the notorious slowness with which Jamaica's planters paid their debts. Abraham Lopez of Savanna-La-Mar, Aaron's nephew, even refused to handle Jamaica-bound consignments for his famous uncle because, among other reasons, he could not guarantee prompt payment for whatever goods he might market on the island. Abraham Lopez to Aaron Lopez, November 16, 1766, Ibid., IX, 175.

[42]Edward Long, History of Jamaica (3 vols., London: 1774), II, 411. According to Long, "industrious and frugal" slaves often acquired life savings of £20 or £30 as a result of the internal marketing system. Some even saved as much as £200. Ibid., II, 410-11.

[43]Ibid., I, 587;"An Account of Expenses that Hath Attended the Reinstating His Majesty's Subjects in their Former Possessions in the Bay of Honduras," 1755, C.O. Papers 137:60, III; William Henry Lyttelton to the Earl of Egremont, May 12 and June 15, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III; Hurwitz, Jamaica, 42. Jamaica's most common "current coins" included Portugese gold pieces called "half-johannes," valued at 55s. each; Spanish doubloons valued at £5 5s. each; Pistoles valued at 26s. 3d. each; Spanish silver dollars worth 6s. 8d. each. Robert C. Dallas, The History of the Maroons (2 vols., London: 1968), I, lxviii. In 1763 John Mouat of Clarendon Parish in Jamaica wrote his brother, an English merchant, the following: ". . . if you can indent one or two young men carpenters & if they are Tradesmen Give them from £20 to £30 a year & for four years from ye Day they arrive in Jamaica I will allso pay their passage when you have the Indenture wrote do not add the word Sterling after the Sum you agree for with them As there is 40 pr cent Difference betwixt our money & sterg." John Mouat to Hugh Mouat, July 20, 1763, John Mouat's Letters, Typescript copies, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town.

[44]"The Assiento Contract Considered," January 20, 1713, Elizabeth Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America (4 vols., 2nd ed., New York: 1965), II, 151; K.G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London: 1957), 334-35.

[45]The Board of Trade to the Queen, February 1, 1710/11, Donnan, ed., Documents, II, 137; Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies (London: 1936), 120 et passim.

[46]Pares, War and Trade, 126.

[47]Ibid., 416-17; Hurwitz, Jamaica, 42. Kingston merchants often reexported flour purchased from the middle colonies to the Spanish possessions. Pares, Yankees and Creoles, 84n. 1.

[48]Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison: 1969), 26.

[49]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 506.

[50]William Lloyd to Henry Lloyd, April 29, 1749, Dorothy C. Barck, ed., "Papers of the Lloyd Family of the Manor of Queens Village, Lloyd's Neck, Long Island, New York, 1654-1826," Collections of the New-York Historical Society for the Year 1926 and 1927 (2 vols., New York: 1927), I, 422.

[51]Contemporary records document Spanish and English efforts to maintain peace. See C.O. Papers 137:60, I.

[52]Charles Knowles to the Earl of Holdernesse, March 26, 1753, C.O. Papers 137:60, I.

[53]Deposition of Thomas Price, September 23, 1754, ibid.

[54]This general description of the class structure is available in most of the standard accounts. See, for example, Frank Wesley Pitman, The Development of the British West Indies (New Haven: 1917), 3-4. Free blacks were very few since the island discouraged manumission. According to Michael Craton, they "never amounted to more than 4 percent of the Jamaican population before 1800--or less than half the total of whites." Craton, "Jamaican Slavery," Stanley L. Engerman and Eugene D. Genovese, eds., Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere: Quantitative Studies (Princeton: 1975), 257. Robert V. Wells's study of colonial census data verifies this assertion. Wells, The Population of the British Colonies in America before 1776: A Survey of Census Data (Princeton: 1975), 196. On manumission in Jamaica see also

Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 90-92 and Samuel J. and Edith F. Hurwitz, "A Token of Freedom: Private Bill Legislation for Free Negroes in Eighteenth Century Jamaica," William and Mary Quarterly (July, 1967), 423-31. More will be said about free blacks in the ensuing chapters of this study, as well as about slavery.

[55]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 363-64; Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 46-48.

[56]There were five Maroon settlements. In the Leeward region were Accompong and Trelawny Town; in the Windward, Scott's Hall, Charles Town, and Moore Town. In 1739 the Maroons numbered about 600. By 1760 their population increased to at least 800, perhaps 1,000. There is a vast and growing literature within several academic disciplines concerning the Maroons. A full and up-to-date bibliography, as well as several fine essays on this subject, is contained in Richard Price, ed., Maroon Societies (New York: 1973). An old and still valuable account is by the Jamaican colonial writer Robert C. Dallas, already cited above. Dallas's History of the Maroons also includes the texts of the Maroon treaties. The best recent account of the Maroon War is Orlando Patterson, "Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Sociohistorical Analysis of the First Maroon War, 1665-1740," Social and Economic Studies, 19(1970), 289-325. This essay is also available in Price, ed., Maroon Societies, 246-89.

[57]The subsequent growth of the Jamaican colonial population reflects the increased opportunities. The size and growth of the white population constitute a special historical problem which will be dealt with in chapter 2.

[58]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 48. See also Wells' analysis of Jamaica's 1730 census. Population of the British Colonies, 196.

[59]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 48.

[60]Hurwitz, Jamaica, 61; Patents, Libers 31-32, Mss., Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town. A 1736 act of the Jamaica Assembly provided that the headrights be distributed in the following manner. Fifty acres to the head of a family, fifty to his wife, twenty for each child, fifteen for each white servant, and ten for each slave. The maximum grant per household constituted the 300 acres. Pitman, Development, 120. It should be noted here that Pitman maintained that midcentury land settlement never developed. He supported this contention by writing that there were only 208

grants of Crown lands between 1734 and 1754, and that the white population increased by only 1500 between 1734 and 1752. Ibid., 121-23. A few observations are in order. Pitman's selection of data was not the most appropriate in that it included the years 1734-1739, war years during which potential settlers drifted away. As a result he unwittingly delimited the number of patents he counted and ensured a conservative tally. Moreover, by relying on Colonial Office reports instead of the patent records at the Jamaica Archives, Pitman drew his conclusion on the basis of incomplete information. Pitman missed the elevenfold increase in proprietorships in the decades following the Maroon Treaties because he did not extend his study into the 1760's and 1770's.

[61]Long, History, I, 377-78. Long also wrote that after 1739 the servant population began to decline, but his own numbers contradict him. "After the pacification with the wild Negroes in 1739," he remarked, "the planters, beginning to think themselves perfectly secure from any further disturbances of the like nature" began getting rid of their white servants. Ibid., I, 386. Yet Long also maintained that in 1739 there had been a total of 3,360 white indentured servants and that in 1768 there had been 5,983. Ibid., I, 377. The apparent contradiction may be resolved if Long is understood to mean that the increase in servants did not keep pace with the increase in proprietors, the latter increasing eleven times but the former only 1.6 times during the decades following the Maroon treaties. Servants-turned-proprietors of small holdings most likely did not contract for many indentured servants.

[62]Hurwitz, Jamaica, 61.

[63]They were the most common patents issued during the 1760's. Patents, libers 31-32.

[64]W. Augustus Low, "A Record From an Eighteenth Century Jamaican Estate," The Journal of Negro History (April: 1974), 169.

[65]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 377.

[66]Lieutenant Governor Henry Moore dispatched troops over this road in 1760 in order to quell the St. Mary slave rebellion. See chapter 3.

[67]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaica Plantation, 82.

[68]Ibid., 83. Today it is highway A-1. Edward Long believed that this road as well as the others had "great merit." He considered the road over Guy's Hill "inferior to none in Great Britain." History, I, 468. The three roads mentioned in the text illustrate post-1739 construction, but they were not the only highways built during that period. Others were those connecting Savanna-La-Mar and Montego Bay and the latter and St. Ann's Bay, two roads which still serve as important island thoroughfares. Ibid., I, 468. According to Long, this road construction program was overdue. "It has been principally from the want of good roads," he wrote, "that the planting interest in Jamaica has not advanced more rapidly . . . . It was of late only that surveyors were employed with instruments to assist in laying out roads . . . . Every new road of communication brings the tract, through which it passes, so much nearer the barquadier, raises the value of the soil, and is of advantage to the whole region confining on it; by the settlements it introduces, and the new supply it gives of those materials and merchandizes, which before were dear or unattainable." Ibid., I, 466-67.

[69]William Beckford, A Descriptive Account of the Island of Jamaica (2 vols., London: 1790), I, 45-46.

[70]J. B. Moreton, West India Customs and Manners (London: 1793), 64.

[71]Charles Leslie, A New History of Jamaica (London: 1740), 304-05.

[72]Edwards, History, Civil and Commercial, II, 7.

[73]Ibid., II, 7.

[74]For illustrations see John Roby, Members of the Assembly of Jamaica: From the Institution of that Branch of the Legislature to the Present Time (Montego Bay: 1831).

[75]Moreton, Customs and Manners, 64.

[76]Ibid., 64.

[77]Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 207-08. Richard Sheridan has written that the merchant system of finance "played a key role in the transition from small to large units of sugar production." Sugar and Slavery, 281.

[78]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 278-79.

[79]Moreton, Customs and Manners, 72. Local debts sometimes reached enormous sums. Aaron Baruh Lousada, a Kingston merchant, was owed £69,484 at the time of his death; George Paplay, £67,837; Alexander Harvie, £52,388; Zachary Bayley, £42,800. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 294.

[80]Philip D. Curtin, Two Jamaicas: The Role of Ideas in a Tropical Colony, 1830-1865 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1955), 47-48.

[81]At times legislation also lowered interest rates. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 336; Moreton, Customs and Manners, 63.

[82]Donnan, ed., Documents, II, xxxviii; Hurwitz, Jamaica, 43.

[83]Donnan, ed., Documents, II, xxxviii.

[84]Ibid., II, xxxviii-xlix; N. A. T. Hall, "Some Aspects of the Deficiency Question in Jamaica in the Eighteenth century," Jamaica Journal (March/June: 1973), 40.

[85]Edward Long to Henry Moore, December 31, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 57-58.

[86]Richard Sheridan, "The Molasses Act and the Market Strategy of the British Sugar Planters," Goodman, ed., Essays, 370.

[87]Charles Holmes to William Pitt, February 14, April 14, 17, May 13, 31, June 16, 1761; "Evidence Supporting the Second Memorial of December 1760 Respecting Monte Christi and the Trade Carried on There with the Enemy;" "An Account of Ships and Vessells Spoken with in Monte Christi by His Majesty's sloop Port Royal, John Hinkman, Esq^{r}, Commander." C.O. Papers 137:60, VII. See also the "Petition to the King by the Merchants, Factors, & Agents in the island of Jamaica," October 1, 1761. Ibid.

[88]"Memorial Respecting Monto [sic] Christi in Hispaniola, and the Correspondence and Trade Carried on with the Enemy from the Bay of Monto Christi, by the King's Subjects, and the Subjects of Neutral Powers, under the Pretense of this Place being a Free Port and protected by a Neutral Power," December, 1760, C.O. Papers 137: 60, VI.

[89]Moreton pointed out that even the small proprietor sought status as a consequence of his landlordship. He often insinuated himself among the parish elite, hoping to secure office and the prestige attached to it. He did this "by giving a few good dinners etc. etc." Sometimes this approach worked. Moreton maintained that he knew islanders who, despite ignorance of the law, became judges and legislators with the aid of the local elite. Moreton's observation not only illustrates status-seeking among landlords but also the fluidity and egalitarianism of white society in rural Jamaica. Customs and Manners, 101-02.

[90]See, for example, Craton and Walvin, A Jamaica Plantation, 76.

[91]Rivalries of this sort characterized North American colonial politics as well. For a discussion of this phenomenon and its influence on politics see Bernard Bailyn, The Origin of American Politics (New York: 1968), 95-105.

[92]Curtin, Two Jamaicas, 75; Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 22.

[93]Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America: A Study of the British Colonial System before 1783 (2nd ed., New York: 1964), 6, 99,107,115; Leonard Woods Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors (2 vols., 2nd ed., New York: 1967), I, 334-35, 294; II, 781-82.

[94]Labaree, Royal Government, 19.

[95]Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 108.

[96]Beckford, Descriptive Account, I, xxxii.

[97]Labaree, Royal Government, 135-37.

[98]Ibid., 134.

[99]Ibid., 147.

[100]Ibid., 155-58.

[101]Beckford, Descriptive Account, I, xxxiii. For a fine description of the Assembly see Edward Brathwaite, The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770-1820 (Oxford:

1971), 40-59.

[102]See, for comparison, Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689-1776 (Chapel Hill: 1963).

[103]Ibid., 4; Also see Jack P. Greene, "The Role of the Lower Houses of Assembly in Eighteenth-Century Politics," Journal of Southern History (November: 1961), 451-74.

[104]Labaree, Royal Government, 220-22, 297-98, 390-91. The island's Assembly also fought for Parliamentary privileges, the right to self-adjourment, and the right to determine where it would convene. Ibid., 204-07, 210-12, 260. According to Labaree, in ultimately securing the right to tax imported slaves, Jamaica's Assembly won a unique victory in that, for once, colonial interests overrode mercantile interests in the mother country. Ibid., 235-47.

[105]Ibid., 260.

[106]Ibid., 102n., 103-04. Only six important posts were available for patronage: Secretary of the Island, Provost Marshal, Clerk of the Court, Customs Collector, Receiver General, and Treasurer of the Island. Hurwitz, Jamaica, 21.

[107]That there was an extensive exercise of the suffrage seems evident from a Council statement to Lieutenant Governor Moore in 1756: ". . . it appears doubtfull to us whether a Freeholder by Patent, tho' recorded in the Secretary's office has a Right to Vote within the Letter of the Law, altho' it is notorious that such have constantly taken the Oath and voted and have been Warranted in so doing by universal Opinion." Address of the Council to Henry Moore, October 15, 1756, C.O. Papers 137:60, V.

A freehold estate worth £10 per annum constituted the property qualification to vote. For membership in the Assembly a £300 per annum freehold estate or £3,000 personal property was required. William Henry Lyttelton, "Description of Jamaica, 1764," 19-20, Ms., Institute of Jamaica, Kingston.

[108]See Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, chs. 2 and 3.

[109]Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 378.

[110]Ibid., 378.

[111]Governor Knowles to the Merchants of Kingston, January 20, 1754, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[112]"The Most Humble Petition of the Merchants, Factors, and Agents residing in the Island of Jamaica, in Behalf of Themselves, and their Constituents, and all others the Merchants of Great Britain, Ireland, & the Colonies in North America Trading the Same," C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[113]Ibid.

[114]Ibid.

[115]Ibid.

[116]Ibid.

[117]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 84.

[118]Wilma Williams, "Early Kingston," Jamaica Journal (June/September, 1971), 3.

[119]Ibid., 5.

[120]Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 377.

[121]Ibid., 377.

[122]Governor Knowles to the Earl of Holdernesse, February 5, 1754, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[123]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 77. One of the merchants, Charles Archbould, was Price's brother-in-law. Other members of the group were related by either blood or marriage to Price: Rose Fuller and Richard Beckford, for examples. Research is needed to determine the degree to which the Jamaica Association was a family rather than a class affair.

[124]Labaree, Royal Government, 257-59.

[125]Quoted in ibid., 259.

[126]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 78.

[127]"The Most Humble Petition of the Merchants, . . ."

[128]"The Humble Petition of the Justices and Vestry, and the rest of the Planters and Inhabitants of St. Andrew," C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[129]Governor Knowles to the Earl of Holdernesse, February 5, 1754.

[130]Long described the means by which Knowles and the merchants secured control of the Assembly as a series of "very iniquitous and illegal practices." History, II, 38. Long, a planter, may have had an axe to grind because the the Governor and the merchants were not the only ones to resort to questionable election tactics. For example, on the advice of Charles Price and another Jamaica Associate, John Morse, Francis Delap, the island's provost marshal, refused to deliver writs of election for the parishes of Kingston, St. Andrew, and Port Royal, the centers of mercantile strength. Rumor had it that if the election went against "Mr. Price & his friends" in Port Royal, rioting would break out there. Delap's subsequent refusal to surrender the writs, his escape from arrest, his surly attitude before the Governor and Council--all this led to his citation for contempt. He was fined and jailed. The Delap affair enraged Price and his allies. "Representation of both the Governor and Council of Jamaica to the King," November 11, 1754, C.O. Papers 137:60, III.

[131]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 78.

[132]Labaree, Royal Government, 260n. 82; Black, History of Jamaica, 91-92.

[133]"Petition of the Assembly and Council of Jamaica," May 14, 1755, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[134]Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 71.

[135]Ibid., I, 72.

[136]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 78.

[137]Ibid., 78; Black, History of Jamaica, 92.

[138]Pinnock was especially hated because by his decision Francis Delap was fined and jailed in 1754. (See note 130 above.) "Petition of the Assembly," October 9, 1756, and Moore's response to it; Address of the Council to Moore, October 15, 1756, C.O. Papers 137:60, V.

[139]The underlines are in the original. Henry Moore to the Secretary of State, November 8, 1756, C.O. Papers 137:60, V.

[140]Ibid.

[141]Ibid.

[142]"Reasons . . . Offer'd to His Honour the Lieutenant Governor for Calling a New Assembly," December 4, 1756, C.O. Papers 137:60, V.

[143]Moore to the Council, December 4, 1756, C.O. Papers 137:60, V. The suspended members were Edmund Hyde, Charles Dawes, Samuel Long, Henry Nedham, Edward Manning, Ballard Beckford, and John Scott, in addition, of course, to Philip Pinnock.

[144]The Assembly to Henry Moore, December 22, 1756, C.O. Papers 137:60, V.

[145]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 78. Nevertheless, according to Edward Long, even after 1758 the planters were "scarcely yet free from apprehensions of another removal" of the capital. Long, History, II, 38.

CHAPTER II

THE PITMAN-RAGATZ TRADITION: A CRITIQUE

Historians have been severe critics of the white societies in the Caribbean. Early in this century Frank Wesley Pitman and Lowell J. Ragatz contended that in contrast to the mainland colonies the British West Indies were purely materialistic enterprises which never established true and viable societies, that the islands were cultural and intellectual deserts, that they were, in short, dismal and tragic failures.[1] More recent scholarship has sustained these judgments. Richard S. Dunn has described the Caribbean colonies as "disastrous social failures."[2] Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh have portrayed them as "incomplete societies" characterized by "impressive material accomplishments," but "overborne by social failure and human tragedy."[3] Orlando Patterson has depicted Jamaica as a "monstrous distortion of human society."[4] David Lowenthal's sociological study of the Caribbean accepts these conclusions.[5] In short, scholars' assessments of the English societies in the tropics have not changed in more than half a century, and what might conveniently be called the Pitman-Ragatz tradition or interpretation still prevails.[6]

How writers reached these harsh verdicts may be

briefly and easily summarized. The Pitman-Ragatz tradition emphasizes the smallness of the white population in the islands. It asserts that ordinary family life never developed among the colonists, that would-be settlers avoided the West Indies because the great planters had monopolized the land, and that absenteeism not only drained people away from the Caribbean but deprived the islands of talent and leadership, obstructed the growth of provincial loyalty, and created a powerful "interest" in England whose influence was out of all proportion to the numbers it represented. Typically, the traditional view maintains that because the whites were few and only interested in exploiting land and labor they were never able, indeed never attempted, to reproduce English institutions in the tropics. As with family life, so too with church and education. The parasitic planters, the argument goes, were an irreligious lot who rendered religious institutions impotent. The absence of publicly supported elementary schools and institutions of higher learning reveals the fact that the islanders, consumed by greed, created and lived in an environment inhospitable not only to education but to all intellectual and cultural activity as well. According to the Pitman-Ragatz tradition, therefore, the island societies were <u>sui generis</u>, altogether and totally different from those which existed on the North American mainland within the colonies which later became the United States. The Bridenbaughs summed up in substance, if not in all particulars, the Pitman-Ragatz view:

> The family, the church, and the community were the prime institutions that had made English civilization what it was; they provided the safeguards against barbarism. Human events and conditions in the predominantly rural West Indies stunted them all with the consequence that true societies never developed.[7]

However validly the Pitman-Ragatz tradition may depict colonial life in Barbados and the Leeward Islands, it does not correctly describe Jamaica's development. Jamaican social, intellectual, and cultural life was neither retarded nor misdirected, and, in fact, it was not unlike that which existed on the mainland, particularly in the southern colonies. Historians writing from within the accepted tradition have misunderstood the island's early colonial history because basic methodological and conceptual errors crept into their work. Most, for example, have drawn sharp contrasts between Jamaica's development and New England's, castigating the former for failing the duplicate the cultural life which emerged in Massachusetts and the other Bible societies.[8] The problem, of course, is of the "apples and oranges" variety. Sharp cultural contrasts also existed between South Carolina and Puritan New England. Obviously, a more fruitful comparative analysis entails matching Jamaican development against that which characterized the Chesapeake or, even better, the Carolinas.[9] Moreover, the tendency within the Pitman-Ragatz tradition to stress, as the Bridenbaughs did, that Englishmen in the tropics never achieved "more than a partial success in transferring English institutions and civilization to the Caribbean" ignores the im-

portant fact that North American colonials also had only a "partial success."[10] On the mainland as in the islands, for instance, those twin pillars of English social, cultural, and political life--the aristocracy and the Anglican episcopacy--were never established. In short, over the years scholars have consistently applied one standard to judge North American development and another to judge West Indian.

These methodological problems derive from a more fundamental conceptual one. Studying Jamaica from this side of 1776 ipso facto distorts perspective. The knowledge that the island did not wrench itself loose from the empire at the time of the American revolt has led historians to the understandable but not necessarily correct conclusion that Jamaica was, somehow or other, an entity very different from the colonies on the mainland. Recent history has reinforced this judgment. Although Jamaica has become increasingly "Americanized" since the 1960's, today's island culture is quite different from United States culture, and the presumption is that this was always so.

Resolving the conceptual problem requires the proverbial "imaginative leap" into the past to conceive of the empire not only as an economically integrated unit but also as a single social, cultural, and political fabric. Dr. Edward Brathwaite's important and scholarly effort in this direction, The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770-1820, led Jack P. Greene to suggest that there was no "sharp break" between the North American and the Caribbean colo-

nies.[11] "Rather," Greene wrote,

> there was a social continuum that ran from the Caribbean through Georgia and South Carolina to the Chesapeake through Pennsylvania and New York to urban and then rural New England. The social contrast between a sugar plantation in Barbados and a small homogeneous farming community in New England was considerable. But it would no doubt have been less apparent to a contemporary traveler had he proceeded not directly from one to the other, but through a series of intermediate stops along the coast.[12]

A Small English Population?

The Pitman-Ragatz tradition has always emphasized the "smallness" of Jamaica's white population, citing it as proof that the island failed to develop. But nothing is ever small except in relation to something else, and it is therefore important to consider the size of the British population not only in absolute numbers but also according to several relevant standards: the white populations of the other English islands; the mainland populations; the colony's total land area; its population in earlier decades (ie., population growth rate); and the size of the black population.

What was Jamaica's white population in the years preceding the American Revolution? A recent survey of census data indicates that in 1774 the English numbered 12,787, but the accuracy of this total is questionable for several reasons.[13] Compared to twentieth century census methods (which, incidentally, do not provide accurate population figures), eighteenth century techniques were primitive. Secondly, although contemporaries could not agree on num-

bers, they consistently estimated the white population to be more than 15,000. In 1774 Edward Long counted 22,500 whites.[14] A decade earlier Lord Adam Gordon tallied 25,000.[15] In 1762 Governor William Henry Lyttelton calculated about 16,000.[16] Lastly, multiplication of the militia roll by four, a longstanding formula for estimating colonial populations, also indicates a white society of more than 15,000.[17] It is impossible, however, to determine precisely how much greater than 15,000 the white population might have been because disagreement exists regarding the size of the militia. Robert V. Wells's study of census information reveals that 4,846 whites comprised the citizen-soldiery in 1774.[18] (Quadrupling this number suggests a white population 7,000 in excess of what the 1774 census itself reported.) Yet in 1774 Edward Long maintained that the 4,526 men enrolled in the late seventeenth century constituted "a greater number than they have ever since mustered."[19] But Bryan Edwards considered Long's assertion "a strange mistake--they muster'd near 7000 in the year 1760."[20] On the other hand, Governor Lyttelton officially reported that in 1762 the white militia amounted to 4,568 men.[21] From these estimates one might conclude that the total white population numbered between 18,000 and 28,000. Whatever the precise figure may have been in any given year, it seems safe to assume that during the dozen years preceding the American War for Independence Jamaica's white population stood at about 20,000. The 11,000 proprietorships which existed in 1774

render this estimate conservative.[22]

In comparison to the other island colonies this population was not small. Jamaica's 20,000 or so settlers constituted approximately 40 per cent of the whites living in England's eleven Caribbean possessions. They were the largest English concentration in the tropics.[23] But in comparison to the North American colonies the island's colonial population appears small. On the eve of the American Revolution 660,500 colonials lived in New England, about 290,000 of them in Massachusetts alone.[24] Virginia and Maryland also boasted populations in the hundreds of thousands.[25] Beside such numbers Jamaica's total seems scant indeed. What is most significant, however, is that in the deep south, closer to Jamaica, the sharpness of the contrast diminishes. In 1751 only 25,000 whites lived in South Carolina, not many more than in Jamaica a decade later.[26] Although the former's population increased to almost 70,000 by 1776, even this total was small compared to the New England, Middle, and Chesapeake colonies.[27] Moreover, in 1775 fewer whites--some 18,000--lived in Georgia than in Jamaica.[28] Were South Carolina and Georgia "failures" because their populations were "small?"

Jamaica's 4,450 square miles closely approximates the land area of Connecticut.[29] The latter's population, overwhelmingly white, had grown ever since the earliest days of settlement and by 1775 amounted to at least 191,500.[30] One study puts the number as high as a quarter of a mil-

lion.[31] Accordingly, in the third quarter of the eighteenth century Connecticut's population was nine and one-half, perhaps twelve, times greater than Jamaica's. Despite similar land areas, therefore, the English population densities of the two colonies dramatically differed. In Connecticut there were thirty-nine people per square mile; in Jamaica 4.5.[32] The contrast, of course, makes the latter seem underdeveloped. But in at least one respect these statistics are misleading. The 49,170 square mile colony of New York had a land area 5.6 times greater than that of Jamaica and Connecticut combined.[33] Yet New York, with only 148,000 colonials in 1771, had a smaller population than neighboring Connecticut.[34] White population density in New York averaged 0.3 people per square mile, in comparison to which Jamaica appears heavily populated. Was New York a "failure" because its population was "small?"

New York's case is especially relevant to this analysis. Despite its vastness New York remained a "small" colony throughout the colonial period largely because the presence of the "Six Nations" discouraged migration into the Mohawk Valley and the western region.[35] Jamaica, it will be remembered, faced a similar problem. The intermittent violence and outright war waged by the Maroons had rendered the island's interior unsafe for settlement until after the peace treaties of 1738 and 1739.[36] Jamaica's white population, hitherto concentrated along the southern coast, began to grow and expand. In 1730 there had been only about 7,000

whites.[37] But within the three decades subsequent to the treaties this number tripled, a growth rate suggesting the very opposites of stagnation and failure.

The only meaningful way Jamaica's colonial population can be described as "small" is in contrast to the island's black majority. It is impossible to determine how many slaves lived in Jamaica during the third quarter of the eighteenth century.[38] Governor Lyttelton wrote that in 1762 there were 146,500.[39] In 1764 Lord Adam Gordon believed that they numbered 160,000.[40] Professor Wells's study of census data indicates a total of 196,830 in 1774.[41] Whatever the precise figure might be for any particular year, slaves overwhelmingly outnumbered the masters. Edward Long observed that the ratio "nearest to exactness" was 100 blacks to every nine whites.[42] Did minority status impede or stifle white social and cultural development? The Pitman-Ragatz tradition assumes that it did, but is the assumption warranted? After all, in South Carolina white minority status evidently did not thwart colonial development.[43]

Family Life

A recurring theme within the Pitman-Ragatz tradition and one closely associated with the "small" population argument is the alleged absence of family life among the whites. Stated briefly, the standard view maintains that Jamaican colonials failed to transplant the basic unit of

English society to their tropical shores and thereby doomed themselves to social failure.

This view is not compelling. Professor Richard Dunn's analysis of St. John's Parish in the 1680's, while it reveals "plenty of evidence . . . of a broken family structure," indicates "that the big planters in St. John enjoyed, along with their other perquisites, a rather more satisfying family life than their small neighbors."[44] Dunn's study also shows that as early as 1680 two-thirds of the larger planters were married and had, on an average, more than two children per couple.[45] Plantation attorneys also very often had wives, either English or Creole.[46]

It is hardly surprising that family life became most typical of the well-to-do. The tropical frontier was a more forbidding, more demanding, and more challenging wilderness than any on the British American continent.[47] Unrelenting heat sapped the spirit and energy of a people accustomed to a more temperate climate, and cutting away dense rainforest to clear a piece of land for cultivation required long hard hours under that burning sun. Malaria, yellow fever, and a host of tropical illnesses were deadlier enemies than the hostile Indians who roamed the backcountries of the continental colonies.[48] Droughts, hurricanes, and earthquakes threatened life and property with a frequency and a severity which North American settlers never experienced. Like other intractable and hostile environments the Jamaican frontier tended to attract men, often as indentured servants in

search of future opportunities, rather than women.[49] But female servants did immigrate to Jamaica. Many, it seems, lived and worked in the cities. According to Professor Wells's analysis of the 1730 census, the number of white women exceeded the number of white men in Kingston and Port Royal. On a colony-wide basis, however, men outnumbered women by a ratio of two to one.[50] Male preponderance over females in the rural and frontier regions probably endured, but perhaps less dramatically, into the post-1739 era.[51] In any event, for the new and struggling male settler, free or servant, marriage was an unlikely immediate prospect.[52] But the same, in fact, was true of many frontiersman in the backcountries of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. What happened to family life in Jamaica, then, was not sui generis. The family developed there as elsewhere, but it tended to characterize the life styles of long settled and successful colonials for reasons far from extraordinary in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Absenteeism

Another facet of the "small" population theme emphasized by the traditional scholarship is the matter of absenteeism. No aspect of Jamaican history, indeed West Indian history, has been more misunderstood. The Pitman-Ragatz school contends that the incidence of absenteeism was high, that it reflected a lack of provincial loyalty, that it depersonalized the plantation system, and that it drained

away talent the island could ill-afford to lose. Lastly, the standard view is that absenteeism fostered the growth of the most powerful political lobby eighteenth-century England ever knew.[53]

Despite the conventional wisdom Professor Sheridan has recently reminded us that West Indian absentees "were only a fraction of the Britishers who remained in the tropics."[54] What was true of the islands in general was true of Jamaica in particular. In 1774 five out of every six proprietors resided in the colony.[55] Not until after 1775, when the hardships created by the American War disrupted provincial living, did absenteeism increase and ultimately, around 1800, become the prevailing pattern of land ownership.[56] Put simply, the high incidence of absenteeism portrayed in the Pitman-Ragatz tradition never existed before the final quarter of the eighteenth century.

Not only was absenteeism uncommon before 1775, but, to the extent it existed, it did not reflect an absence of loyalty to the colony. Absentees often removed to England to supervise the credit and marketing aspects of their sugar businesses. These roles, characteristically, entailed the formation of commission firms which looked after the London side of the sugar and rum industries.[57] As a consequence, many of the leading names among these early absentees--Beckford, Long, Dawkins, Fuller--were partners in firms trading with the island.[58] People of this sort do not fit the conventional portrait of the parasitic absentee planter who

forsook forever the colony which provided him with his wealth. Rather, by protecting their businesses they fostered the prosperity of their own estates and, accordingly but indirectly, the economic health of the entire island.[59]

Early absenteeism neither ruinously depersonalized the plantation system nor robbed the island of much needed talent. In the eighteenth century absentees tried to avoid leaving their property in the care of strangers whose honesty could not be depended upon and whose stake in the long term well-being of the estate was minimal. Instead, whenever possible, they entrusted their holdings to relatives. This custom "softened" the impact of absenteeism by counteracting harsh depersonalization of the plantation system. Often, relatives were themselves island residents. For example, Charles Price, the prominent Jamaican politician, looked after Worthy Park estate for his absentee brother, John.[60] Juline and Ballard Beckford kept watchful eyes on the 22,000 acres owned by their famous brother, Alderman William Beckford of London. Other absentees who left relatives in Jamaica were Richard Pennant, Henry Dawkins, Rose Fuller, Thomas Hibbert, and Nathaniel Bayley. The list could easily be extended.[61]

Sometimes relatives did not live in Jamaica, and absentees recruited them in England and dispatched them to the island. Edward Long, whose father owned 6,755 acres in St. Ann's Parish, went to Jamaica in 1757 to manage the family holdings.[62] William Beckford, the noted planter-historian,

inherited three plantations in Jamaica from his absentee father, Richard Beckford, and moved to the colony in 1774 to manage them.[63] Reliance on family members by non-resident proprietors is an important but overlooked aspect of eighteenth century absenteeism.

But kin were not always available for this kind of service, and sometimes absentees were forced to hire outsiders, usually lawyers, to manage family property. This was lucrative employment. In addition to their contracted salaries, plantation attorneys earned a six per cent commission on the net proceeds of annual production. Fringe benefits, such as use of the proprietor's home and facilities, supplemented the monetary rewards.[64] While these attorneys were widely suspected of being a dishonest lot (distrust of lawyers, of course, was neither peculiar to Jamaica nor the eighteenth century) who depersonalized and ruined the system, their impact on the pre-1775 plantation economy was minimal because the number of absentees was small and because many of the latter employed family surrogates.[65]

All this bears strongly on whether absenteeism debilitated the island by drawing away Jamaica's most talented men. The traditional view that by fleeing to England the richest planters deprived the island of its "best" rests on the dubious assumption that the colonials who remained in Jamaica were, somehow or other, less able or capable individuals. One would be hard put to prove such a pattern.[66] More important is the fact that the Atlantic Ocean served as

a highway not only for those leaving Jamaica but also for those who arrived. Absenteeism, if it drained talent away, also infused new talent into the colony. Relatives of absentees who came to Jamaica to manage estates were usually educated and competent men. Edward Long, for example, was an accomplished lawyer, writer, and historian.[67] The same was true of William Beckford.[68] Furthermore, the influx of plantation attorneys represented a growing reservoir of trained and able men who, whatever their moral and professional standards, offered much to the colony.

The greatest myth concerning absenteeism is that it contributed wealth and personnel to a powerful "West India Interest" whose influence in and out of Parliament constituted the most effective political lobby in eighteenth-century England.[69] This legend originated among contemporaries on both sides of the Atlantic. West Indians who resided in the mother country were nouveaux riches displaying new wealth's tendency to ostentation. Great riches combined with coarse manners commanded little respect in Georgian England, and high West Indian visibility offended the sensibilities of the English gentry. Those who purchased seats in Parliament created the impression that behind their vast wealth was even greater power. They became convenient targets for sarcasm, criticism, and suspicion. Like Englishmen at home, many North Americans shared a low opinion of the West Indian sugar magnates, whether absentee or not. The latter's famed ostentation and reputed loose morals espe-

cially offended New Englanders. North American attacks on the islanders began during the debates over what became the Molasses Act of 1733, the legislative rock which allegedly evinced the strength of the West Indian clique. But what Professor Pares describes as "mere attempts to create prejudice" afterward became standard themes in North American political literature.[70] In his Essay on the Trade of the Northern Colonies in 1764 Stephen Hopkins attributed the Sugar Act to "the rich proud, and overbearing planters of the West-Indies" who used "all their weight and influence to limit and distress" North American trade with the French sugar islands.[71] In 1775, on the eve of the American Revolution, John Adams was still denouncing "the collusion and combination" of the West India interest and the royal prerogative for attempting to subjugate North American commerce by the Sugar Act.[72] In short, during the third quarter of the eighteenth century many in England and North America believed that absentee West Indian planters, island commission and colonial agents, and London merchants trading with the Caribbean collectively constituted an enormously influential bloc. Popular opinion also maintained that this interest group reached into the House of Commons itself, where the so-called "Jamaica Cousinhood" led by William Beckford and Rose Fuller served as its political arm.[73] Few, particularly mainland colonials, would have disagreed with Benjamin Franklin that "the West Indians vastly outweigh us of the Northern colonies."[74]

Recent writers as well as contemporaries have exaggerated West Indian power and influence.[75] In the first place, the "West India interest" was not as monolithic as the term implies. It represented not only different islands but different and often conflicting aspects of the sugar industry. Jamaica, for example, in many ways more diverse than the other Caribbean colonies, had special interests which did not coincide with those of her sister sugar colonies. The slave trade with the Spanish territories was one such concern. In other respects Jamaica's diversity sparked dissension within the West India interest. Merchants and refiners apparently believed that Jamaican settlers deliberately undercultivated the island in order to inflate sugar and rum prices. Early in the century London, Bristol, and Liverpool merchants dealing with the colony petitioned the King to divest Jamaican proprietors of uncultivated lands.[76] In the early 1750's London sugar refiners denounced what they thought was contrived Jamaican under-production.[77] Indeed, the refiners had attacked the 1739 legislation permitting sugar growers to export directly to Europe on the ground that it was a planter plot to keep English prices high.[78] Lastly, the antagonism between the London merchants of the West India Committee, who extended credit to the plantocracy, and the indebted sugar growers who lived under the threatening cloud of foreclosure, added another and perennial element of disharmony to the presumably monolithic West India interest.[79]

The "West India interest" was reputedly powerful. Professor Sheridan has counted some seventy Parliamentarians who, between 1730 and 1775, were directly connected with the Caribbean.[80] But forty-five years is a long time. Could such a group have been as influential as tradition says? Its most notable successes were the 1733 Molasses Act and the decision, incorporated into the 1763 Treaty of Paris, to retain Canada instead of the sugar producers, Guadaloupe and Martinique. Yet, if these legislative and diplomatic "plums" derived from West Indian power and influence, how was it that the island lobby was unable to block inimical laws and policies? In 1747, for example, and again in 1759, despite West Indian opposition Parliament increased duties on English sugar entering the British Isles.[81] Similarly, in 1760 the allegedly powerful West Indian forces were unable to block repeal of the gin prohibition which had so greatly increased the demand for plantation rum.[82]

The Sugar Act of 1764, often described as a West Indian legislative victory, merits attention. To the extent that the law promised to reduce North American trade with the French islands, it undoubtedly benefitted English Caribbean interests. But the Sugar Act also provided for matters other than foreign molasses and sugar, and these additional elements rendered the legislation a "mixed-package" for the islanders. The bond-posting requirement of the new law adversely affected Jamaican as well as North American merchants. The now extended enumerated list included, among

other items, "all coffee, pimento, [and] cocoa nuts," tropical products almost exclusively Jamaican. The duties on Madiera imposed taxes on wine drinkers in the islands as well as on the mainland. Lastly, the freedom from suit and liability which the law conferred on customs officials threatened Jamaican as well as North American illicit trading.[83] In short, the Sugar Act was, at best, only a partial victory for the West Indian clique.

Over the years the "West Indian interest" has enjoyed an inflated reputation for power and influence. But, in fact, its record never matched, indeed it paled in contrast with, North America's ability to extract from Parliament what it wanted, mainland protestations notwithstanding. North American victories with respect to the Stamp Act, Townshend's duties, and other Parliamentary measures demonstrated strength which the island interest lacked.[84] It is interesting to note that the English merchants who rallied to the American cause during the Stamp Act crisis have never been referred to as part of a great lobby called the "North American interest." Nor, for that matter, has Barlow Trecothick, the Boston-born London merchant who led England's mercantile forces against the Stamp Act, ever been called a "New England absentee."

Religious Development

In addition to maintaining that Jamaica failed to develop a large colonial population, to perpetuate family

life, and to keep its residents from fleeing the island, the Pitman-Ragatz tradition holds that religious institutional growth in the Caribbean colony lagged behind North American development, that the local ministry was third-rate, and that, in any case, the clergy were pawns of the planters.[85] But this is misleading. As early as 1676 the Jamaica Assembly had established the Anglican Church and by 1686 had provided for its administrative structure throughout the island.[86] This compares favorably with what transpired in the southern mainland colonies. South Carolina did not establish the church until 1706, North Carolina until 1715. Moreover, by 1681, twenty years after the establishment of civil government, Jamaica had seven churches, including St. Paul's Cathedral at Port Royal.[87] This was a respectable total in view of the fact that on the eve of the American Revolution there was not as many in all of North Carolina or Georgia.[88] Jamaica had a steady supply of ministers to staff its churches. Between 1745 and the outbreak of the American War for Independence the Bishop of London appointed as many as twenty-nine clergymen to Jamaican assignments.[89]

If Jamaica failed to attract a first-rate ministry (and there is no reason to suppose that it did), neither did the southern colonies on the mainland. ". . . there is enough evidence to show," wrote Professor Jameson, "that there was much looseness among the Virginia clergy, and, if not much evil living, at any rate much want of zeal."[90] Louis B. Wright is even more to the point: "Throughout the

colonial period, churches in Virginia had difficulty attracting able ministers."[91]

There can be little doubt that planter domination of the parish vestries, which assessed and collected parish rates, produced a ministry congenial to the Jamaican planter class.[92] Yet this was precisely the condition in which the Virginia clergy found itself. Indeed, this problem was at the root of the Parson's cause controversy of the late 1750's and early 1760's. A recent study of religion in colonial America observes: "In Virginia the local vestry, dominated by the leading families in the parish, had rendered impotent [sic] virtually every Anglican clergyman in the colony."[93] In brief, the Anglican Church was no less vital an institution in Jamaica than in the southern mainland colonies.

Furthermore, a considerable degree of religious diversity and toleration characterized eighteenth-century Jamaica as it did the North American colonies. Governor Thomas Modyford's instructions of 1684 required him to ensure liberty of conscience and freedom of worship.[94] This directive was well-timed. Long before the end of the seventeenth century a Quaker community had established itself at Port Royal. George Fox himself visited the island's Friends.[95] At about the same time eighty families of Sephardic Jews, refugees from northern Brazil, settled in Jamaica and prospered. A synogogue at Port Royal and later, after the 1692 earthquake, at Kingston, served this community. By the

1730's several hundred Jews lived in the colony.[96] Irish and Scot-Irish immigration infused Roman Catholic and Presbyterian elements into the society. The latter were especially numerous. By 1754 Presbyterians constituted one-quarter of all the landholders on the island.[97]

The emotionalism of the Great Awakening had more impact on New England and the Middle colonies than on the continental south and the Caribbean.[98] But few of the provinces escaped evangelical Protestantism altogether. Even in Jamaica some found themselves spiritually awakened. In 1766, for example, John Mouat of Clarendon received the grace of God. In a letter to his nephew many years later he described the experience:

> I can asure you my Dear H. that my misfortunes and Trubles has not lessend my Naturall affection and care: But awakened its Soul to more worthy objects than Shadows, not worthy of its care; for believe me, was Mankind to be asured of as I have been of the Reward of the Righteous and the Punishment of the Wicked, they never could be cabbable of the unworthy actions and pursuits too, often practised . . . . For you must know 1766 the almighty Father made me sensible of the Punishment of the Wicked and the Glorious state and happiness of the Righteous, and how unmindfull turned of there Celestial Pedegree; and that He was to Punish the World for there Disobedience to his Glorious Commands, and Laws; Cruelty, and oppression, to his People whom He had chosen and to bring in the Glorious times foretold by all the Prophets, and Restore his Ancient People the Jews: and that I was the Person mentioned 41 cha: Isaiah and this mountain was the Place as described Isaiah 2d chap: Micah 4th chap: etc etc etc.[99]

The eighteenth-century revival most directly affected Jamaica as a result of the efforts of two absentees. William Foster and John Foster Barham, swept up by the religious fervor of these years, joined the Moravian Brethren, a Ger-

man Pietist sect, and in 1754 dispatched a mission to the western region of Jamaica; its job was to save black souls.[100]

Intellectual and Cultural Life

In addition to its negative assessment of Jamaican religious development, the Pitman-Ragatz tradition holds that the island colony was an intellectual and cultural desert. According to this view, the absence of a publicly supported school system, libraries, intellectual achievements, and cultural activities demonstrates that ideas and creativity failed to develop, much less flourish, in the crassly materialistic world of the sugar plantations.

It is true that Jamaica lacked a publicly supported school system of the New England type.[101] Yet this is hardly a fair test by which to judge the island's society, for the southern mainland colonies--indeed, old England itself--had no public schools. Jamaica, however, had several privately endowed free schools. One established in St. Andrew in 1695 functioned for many years until it ran into financial difficulties in the middle of the eighteenth century. Martin Rusea in 1710 and John Woolmer in 1734 bequeathed funds for the founding of schools in Hanover and Kingston respectively.[102] The descendants and namesakes of both their schools still function. Thomas Manning's school in Westmoreland opened in the 1730's and Peter Beackford's at Spanish Town in the 1740's.[103] At the latter a free black

named Francis Williams taught "reading, writing, Latin, and the elements of mathematics."[104] Finally, in 1740, allotting money contributed by several donors, the Assembly established a free school in the parish of Vere.[105] All in all, in 1770 there were five free schools in Jamaica, four in actual operation.[106]

While there were no publicly supported lending libraries in eighteenth-century Jamaica, there were privately owned collections. Thomas Fearon, one time Chief Justice, reputedly owned the finest library on the island at his home, Teak Pen, in Clarendon.[107] A survey of will inventories indicates that it was not uncommon for the smaller or middle sized farmer as well as the merchant and planter to own books.[108] Many of the less financially successful owned a "parcell of old books" or a "parcell of books of different kinds."[109] Will inventories of more well-to-do individuals identify specific volumes. Alexander Seton of St. Thomas in the East owned four volumes of Bacon's Works, Dryden's Virgil, eight volumes of The Spectator, a complete set of the Laws of Jamaica, and more than sixty other books.[110] Edward Chambers of Hanover had a library containing two volumes of Tillotson's works in folio, seven common prayer books, two Bibles, two dictionaries, and the Laws of Jamaica.[111] John Wren of Hanover owned Hackhouse's two volume History of the Bible, Chambers' History, Jacob's Law Diet, Dalton's Justice, Instructor Dencales, Shakespeare's Works; British Apollo, Persian Tales and The Arabian Nights,

Seneca's Morals, and "sundry other books."[112] William Aberdeen, a St. Ann merchant, owned a large collection of French literature including The Devil Upon Two Sticks.[113] Another settler, Alexander Lowe, possessed three volumes of the British Muse, the Compleat Tradesman, The State of Great Britain, History of Scotland, Rodham's Works, Chubbs's Works, and some seventy additional books including a pair of Bibles.[114] Scattered throughout individual libraries in the island were issues of Cato's Letters, The Craftsman, The Spectator, essays by Benjamin Hoadly, Viscount Bolingbroke, and others, writings which influenced political thought in the English colonies.[115] Jamaican private book collections suggest that the colonials valued books as exterior manifestations of learning (status badges), that illiteracy was not as common as has often been supposed, and that the island was not as intellectually impoverished as the Pitman-Ragatz tradition maintains.

Buttressing these conclusions is the fact that during the third quarter of the eighteenth century Jamaica simultaneously supported three newspapers. The Jamaica Gazette, founded about 1745, was published weekly for thirty years. The Kingston Journal, another weekly, was founded in 1756 and published until 1788. The St. Jago Intelligencer, the third weekly, thrived during the 1760's, but the exact dates of its existence have not been determined.[116] Few mainland colonies could boast of so many newspapers. In 1763 the thirteen provinces which later became the United

States published twenty-three, an average of less than two per colony.[117] Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire each supported only one newspaper.

Besides newspapers, in Jamaica as in North America, pamphlets became the accepted medium for political instruction, propaganda, and exhortation. The island's heated and often confused politics provided an environment congenial to this eighteenth-century literary genre. Jamaican pamphleteers, like their North American counterparts, were heir to the Whig political tradition, and they drew heavily from it.[118]

In addition to journalism, Jamaica fostered scientific study. From the earliest days of settlement the island, disease-ridden as it was, offered numerous opportunities to young and aspiring doctors. Many migrated to the province, and, as the number of Jamaica's slaves increased, physicians soon discovered even greater opportunities. Plantation owners, seeking to keep their bondsmen fit for work, hired doctors to provide medical care for the blacks. Although some of these doctors were transients, many remained on the island and acquired, probably with reason, a bad reputation. One contemporary wrote that Jamaican doctors "are ignorant pretending quacks, apothecarie boys, and such trash, who have a smattering of Latin . . . . real physicians are rarely to be met with, indeed."[119] But among the host of incompetents and quacks who came to the island

over the course of a century were a few dedicated medical practitioners and scientists. Several made serious contributions to their profession. Dr. William Hughes's treatise The American Physician (1672) analyzed the origin of Jamaican scurvy. Dr. Thomas Trapham's A Discourse of the State of Health in the Island of Jamaica (1679) studied the relationship between white dietary habits and poor health. Dr. Hans Sloane's A Voyage to the Islands (1707) examined the nature of Jamaican vegetation.[120] Scientific investigation continued throughout the eighteenth century. Dr. John Quier, for example, came to Jamaica in 1767 and established permanent residence at Shady Grove in Lluidas Vale. In the 1770's he developed a technique for diagnosing measles which was not utilized elsewhere for nearly a century. Dr. Quier also devised an effective smallpox innoculation.[121]

If colonial American interest in identifying and classifying New World flora and fauna reflected, as has been suggested, the basic precepts of the Age of Reason, then Jamaica shared the intellectual Enlightenment.[122] Dr. Patrick Browne in the 1750's not only studied tropical illnesses but extended the investigation into tropical vegetation begun by Hans Sloane a half century earlier. Whereas Sloane had collected some 800 specimens, Browne collected 1200. Moreover, Browne studied fossils, insects, and reptiles, classifying them according to the Linnean system. His work, The Civil and Natural History of Jamaica, was published in 1756.[123] The identification of Jamaican plant and wild life also pre-

occupied the planter-historian, Edward Long.[124] There were two botanical gardens in Jamaica before 1775.[125]

Jamaican interest in science revealed itself in other ways. Charles Price, wealthy planter and long time Speaker of the Assembly, pursued his interest in animal life by importing birds and mammals not indigenous to Jamaica, thereby transforming his Decoy estate in St. Mary into something resembling a zoological park.[126] Price also masterminded the construction of a two and one-quarter mile "gutter wall" which, completed in 1760, brought running water to his Worthy Park estate in Lluidas Vale. Worthy Park's historians describe this accomplishment as "an impressive feat for the Jamaica of its day."[127]

The most striking intellectual achievements of eighteenth-century Jamaica were in the areas of history and narrative description. William Beckford of Roaring River estate published in 1790 his two volume A Descriptive Account of the Island of Jamaica, a model of this genre. A Jamaican merchant, Robert C. Dallas, father of Alexander J. Dallas, future Secretary of the Treasury in the Madison administration, wrote The History of the Maroons, an important and highly readable account of the island's independent blacks. The most enduring contributions were the handiwork of two talented colonials, one a planter, the other a merchant. Edward Long, a St. Ann estate owner, published his three volume History of Jamaica in 1774, and Bryan Edwards of Kingston produced his monumental The History Civil and

and Commercial of the British Colonies in the West Indies between 1793 and 1801. Both histories constitute invaluable sources for the student of eighteenth-century Jamaica.

Poetry fared worse than history in the tropical colony. Anonymous satiric verse on political themes appeared now and then in the newspapers, but these ephemeral jingles hardly constituted serious literature. One islander, calling himself "Philanthropos," composed "The Simkiniad: A Poem in Four Cantos," a pretentious effort which was published in an anonymous travelogue.[128] More accomplished poetry came from the pens of Francis Williams, the black school teacher, who wrote Latin verse, and Bryan Edwards, the historian.[129] The latter's "Ode to the Sable Venus," perhaps because of its theme, is the best known poem from eighteenth-century Jamaica:

Sweet is the beam of morning bright,
Yet sweet the sober shade of night;
  On rich Angola's shores,
While beauty clad in sable dye,
Enchanting fires the wond'ring eye,
 Farewell, ye Paphian bowers.

When thou, this large domain to view,
Jamaica's isle, thy conquest new,
  First left thy native shore,
Bright was the moon, and soft the breeze,
With wanton joy the curling seas
  The beauteous burden bore.

Her skin excell'd the raven plume,
Her breath the fragrant orange bloom,
  Her eye the tropic beam:
Soft was her lip as silken down,
And mild her look as ev'ning sun
  That gilds the Cobre stream.

The loveliest limbs her form compose,

Such as her sister Venus chose,
  In Florence, where she's seen;
Both just alike, except the white,
No difference, no--none at night,
 The beauteous dames between.

Do thou in gentle Phibba smile,
In artful Benneba beguile,
  In wanton Mimba pout;
In sprightly Cuba's eyes look gay
   Or grave in sober Quashiba,
  I shall find thee out.

Gay Goddess of the sable smile!
Propitious still, this gracious isle
  With thy protection bless!
Here fix, secure, thy constant throne;
Where all, adoring thee, do ONE,
  ONE deity confess.[130]

If the poetic spirit survived in Jamaica, the fine arts apparently did not. Sketching, painting, and scupting were unknown. "During my residence of nearly thirteen years in the island," William Beckford wrote, "I did not meet with one single artist who could take an exact outline of nature."[131] Eighteenth-century Jamaica spawned no playwrights either, but the colony enjoyed the drama and welcomed visiting troupes of players to its shores. Indeed, the island supported two theaters, one in Spanish Town from about 1740, the other in Kingston, built somewhat later.[132] In all these areas--science, history, poetry, art, and drama--Jamaica does not compare badly, and in fact in some respects it compares favorably, with similar undertakings and productions in the southern mainland colonies.

Jamaica's theaters were social as well as cultural establishments, but they were not the only island institutions which allowed for friendly gatherings, entertainment,

and recreation. As in the mainland colonies, inns and taverns were favorite meeting places, and every port town had its share. Some catered to sailors and "people of the vilest characters," while others developed upper class clienteles. Mark Howard's South Sea House in Kingston, for example, was "elegant" and "conducted with such regularity" that it acquired an enviable reputation. The Ranelagh House, also in Kingston, was a public building where "ladies and gentlemen hold public balls and assemblies."[134] Vauxhall, a similar establishment, served as the meeting place for Kingston's Society of Merchants, a prototype of the modern Chamber of Commerce.[135] In addition, Kingston had two Masonic Lodges, St. Andrew's and St. Patrick's, as well as a debating society.[136]

Spanish Town also had its inns and halls, but the focal point of social life at the capital was the Governor's mansion, which underwent extensive renovation beginning in 1762. The annual ball honoring the King's birthday was the highlight of Spanish Town social life.[137] The annual March horse races ranked not far behind.[138] "In manner of living," Edward Long wrote, "the English here differ not much from their brethren at home, except in a greater profusion of dishes, a larger retinue of domestics, and in wearing more expensive clothese."[139]

Lavish, extended parties characterized rural entertainment, but city dwellers devised simpler recreations. On Sunday afternoons Kingstonians often drove their rigs to

Spanish Town, Liguanea, or the cool hills just beyond the plain.[140] To the country planter and the urban merchant the mineral springs at Bath in St. Thomas in the East offered a pleasant vacation. Any Virginian and Carolinian could have felt at home in Jamaica.[141]

White society in Jamaica was exploitative. It extracted wealth from sugar, slavery, and the slave trade. But greed did not smother important social institutions or deprive the colony of an intellectual and religious life, the Pitman-Ragatz tradition notwithstanding. The island's culture was as developed as that of other exploitative, slaveholding societies on the mainland. In 1756 Patrick Browne, the naturalist, praised Jamaica's sophistication. In the island "you frequently meet with men of as good a taste, as much learning, and as well acquainted with the world," he wrote, "as may be met with in any part of Europa; nor is it uncommon to find those who, (though never out of the Island) shine in many parts of life, with as much delicacy and judgment, as if they had been bred in the most polished courts."[142]

NOTES

[1]Pitman, Development and Lowell J. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833 (New York: 1928). Pitman wrote that the white societies "decayed." (p. ix) He specifically dealt with Jamaica's lack of schools and intellectual life (pp. 24-25), its social and cultural backwardness (p. 26), and all the ill effects of absenteeism (pp. 30-41), attributing to the latter the "degraded state" of white society (p. 39). He wrote at length about the "smallness" of the white population, seeing it primarily as a labor shortage responsible for consequent colonial non-development (ch. 2). Ragatz, who picked up where Pitman left off, wrote in the same vein.

[2]Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 340.

[3]Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, ch. 5 and 412ff.

[4]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 9.

[5]David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies (New York: 1972), 33-36.

[6]A fine review of recent scholarship on the West Indies and its roots in the Pitman-Ragatz tradition is Jack P. Greene, "Society and Economy in the British Caribbean," American Historical Review (December, 1974), 1499-1517. It should be noted that Richard Sheridan has cautiously disassociated himself from the view that the island societies were total failures. "One must be sceptical," he wrote, "of generalizations which spring from a rather narrow base of primary data . . . ." Sugar and Slavery, 363.

[7]Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 413.

[8]For examples, see Pitman, Development, 1-2; Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 337-38; Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 33.

[9]Common sense dictates that if Jamaica (or any of the island colonies for that matter) was uniquely different from the provinces which rebelled in 1775, then the southern mainland colonies, particularly South Carolina, ought to be the standard by which Jamaica is judged. Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 (New York: 1974) is a useful starting point.

[10]Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 4.

[11]Edward Brathwaite, The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770-1820 (Oxford: 1971); Greene, "Society and Economy in the British Caribbean," 1517. If one can imagine away the Caribbean Sea and conceive Jamaica attached to Georgia or South Carolina, many of the perceived discontinuities vanish.

[12]Greene, "Society and Economy in the British Caribbean," 1517.

[13]Robert V. Wells's Population of the British Colonies . . . A Survey of Census Data, cited earlier, is perhaps the most important study of early American demography published in recent years. Its section on Jamaica, however, is disappointing. In part this is not Wells's fault. Evidently, the census report of 1774 was not as complete as the report of 1730, and, as a result, while the author provides a thorough and informative analysis of the latter, he provides hardly any analysis of the former. The disparity is important because in the years between census reports the island secured peace with the Maroons, and a new era of settlement and expansion began. Wells, however, seems ignorant of the Maroon War and treaties. For example, in discussing the 1730 census he correctly points out that "the bulk of Jamaica's population . . . lived" along the southern shore but asserts that the "uneven distribution is easily explained by hills, excessive rain, and, possibly, the proximity of Spanish islands, which discouraged planters from taking their slaves into the northern region." (p. 198) Again, Wells correctly points out that "about 1750" the whites "began to increase again" as a result of "the number of servants who were persuaded to go to Jamaica." (p.197) The author fails to realize that the new opportunities created in Jamaica by the Maroon agreements attracted these settlers. Finally, Wells points out that as the eighteenth century progressed the average size of Jamaican households "probably more than doubled." (p. 206) But Wells's data does not determine whether the increase reflected growth upon the part of the big planters only or a more general growth in the number of families combined with a wider

distribution of slaves. This question, Wells judiciously concludes, "may well be one of the most important topics in the social history of eighteenth century Jamaica which should be explored." (p. 206) The standard study of Jamaica's population is George W. Roberts, The Population of Jamaica (Cambridge: 1957), but the material on the seventeenth and eighteenth century is not as useful as Wells's.

[14]Long, History, I, 377-78. Long also maintained that in 1768 the white population numbered 15,300. Ibid., II, 319.

[15]Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 379.

[16]Lyttelton, "Description of Jamaica, 1764," 7.

[17]Wood, Black Majority, 147.

[18]Wells, Population of the British Colonies, 206-07.

[19]Long, History, II, 15.

[20]Bryan Edwards' marginal note in ibid., II, 15, Ansell B. Hart Collection, University of the West Indies Library, Mona, Kingston.

[21]Lyttelton, "Description of Jamaica, 1764," 8.

[22]See again p. 19.

[23]Sheridan estimated Jamaica's English population on the eve of the American Revolution to have been 18,400, about 45 per cent of the total 51,000 whites living in all England's Caribbean possessions. Sugar and Slavery, 13.

[24]Stella H. Sutherland, Population Distribution in Colonial America (New York: 1966), 10-13. Wells's study indicates that the Massachusetts population in 1764 was 245,698. Of this total 97.2 per cent were white. Population of the British Colonies, 79-80.

[25]Sutherland, Population Distribution, 174-76. Wells counts 164,007 in Maryland in 1762. Virginia took no census after 1703. Population of the British Colonies, 147, 161.

[26]Evarts B. Greene and Virginia Harrington, American Population before the Federal Census of 1790 (Gloucester, Mass.: 1966), 175. Wells's figures for South Carolina do not go beyond 1708. Population of the British Colonies, 168.

[27]Sutherland, Population Distribution, 240.

[28]Ibid., 260. Wells's study indicates that in 1756 Georgia's total population was 6,355. Of these 4,469 were white. Population of the British Colonies, 170.

[29]Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 35. Actually, Connecticut is fifty-nine square miles larger than Jamaica.

[30]Sutherland, Population Distribution, 23. Wells's study puts the population at nearly 198,000. Population of the British Colonies, 90.

[31]Greene and Harrington, American Population, 50.

[32]Sutherland, Population Distribution, 37.

[33]Ibid., 71-72.

[34]Ibid., 70. Wells's study supports this estimate. Population of the British Colonies, 112.

[35]Sutherland, Population Distribution, 67-71; Lawrence Henry Gipson, The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775 (New York: 1954), 129.

[36]See again pp. 17-19. Governor Edward Trelawny in 1739 wrote: "The chief reason of this island's being so thinly inhabited is because there is hardly any Good Land which has been hitherto safe from the Incursions of those Rebels unoccupied, at least unpatented; there is enough & upon all Accounts as good as that already patented which has remained desert for fear of those Incursions, and many who have begun Plantations expos'd to that danger have been forced to abandon them on that account." Quoted in Pitman, Development, 117.

[37]Wells, Population of the British Colonies, 196; Hurwitz, Jamaica, 57.

[38]Whatever their precise numbers might have been, the white and black populations, taken together, made Jamaica one of the most populous of England's colonies. It ranked only behind Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. Wells, Population of the British Colonies, 194.

[39]Lyttelton, "Description of Jamaica, 1764," 7.

[40]Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 379.

[41]Wells, Population of the British Colonies, 196.

[42]Long, History, II, 318. Long estimated that the black population in 1768 was 170,000. Ibid., II, 319.

[43]See, for example, Wood, Black Majority. Black numerical superiority indeed had consequences on the white population, a matter to be dealt with in later chapters. But those consequences did not equate social, cultural, and political underdevelopment.

[44]Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 172.

[45]Ibid., 172.

[46]Philip D. Curtin, Two Jamaicas: The Role of Ideas in a Tropical Colony, 1830-1865 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1955), 18. Professor Curtin also made the important point that proprietors and estate attorneys preferred to hire unmarried men as overseers and bookkeepers in order to avoid the expenses which maintaining white women on the plantation entailed.

[47]For a fine description of life and death on the tropical frontier see Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, chs. 8-9.

[48]According to the Bridenbaughs, physical adaptation to tropical life was the most difficult adjustment Europeans had to make. ". . . health was not merely a matter of well-being, it was a matter of life or death." No Peace Beyond the Line, 123.

[49]See n. 46 above. Also, Wells, The Population of the British Colonies, 41.

[50]Wells, Population of the British Colonies, 201-02.

[51]The 1774 census did not provide data on sex ratios. Ibid., 196-204.

[52]The frequency of 300 acre headrights during the 1760's at least suggests that marriages became more common. Patents, Libers 30-31.

[53]The pioneering and still influential study of absenteeism is Lowell J. Ragatz, "Absentee Landlordism in the British Caribbean, 1750-1833," Agricultural History, V (1931), 7-24 as well as his Fall of the Planter Class. Patterson's Sociology of Slavery, outdoes the tradition by maintaining that absenteeism was "the root of all the evils of the system."

[54]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 13.

[55]This figure is Patterson's calculation derived from Edward Long's data. Sociology of Slavery, 36. Actually, Long's statistics indicate a fifteen, not a sixteen, per cent incidence of absentee proprietorship. History, I, 377-78. Richard Sheridan, studying only sugar-growing properties, estimated that 234 out of 775 such estates were owned by absentees. This constitutes an incidence of about 20 per cent. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 385. More research is needed to determine the precise dimensions of absentee landlordship in the years before the American Revolution, but it is clear from available materials that this type of landownership was the exception and not the rule. Rather, it might more properly be described as a trend in the nature of Jamaican proprietorship. Long evaluated it in this way in 1774. "It has of late years," he wrote, "been . . . the custom for proprietors of estates in t[56]Problemsto emigrate . . . to Europe." Long, History, I, 389.

[56]Problems created by the American War did not disappear with the peace. The old trade links with North America were not put back together again. Several disastrous hurricanes aggravated the difficult economic conditions. The Wars of the French Revolution and the Haitian revolt raised questions of security. Throughout the years after 1775 the trend toward absenteeism accellerated. In a sense those who left the island were refugees, persons displaced by war. In the nineteenth century absentee landlordship became the prevailing pattern of land tenure. By the 1830's two-thirds of all land under cultivation belonged to absentees. Curtin, Two Jamaicas, 15.

[57]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 282-85.

[58]Ibid., 299 and n. For example, several of the firms in which Jamaican absentees were partners were: Bannister, Hammond, and Manning; Beckford and James; Hibbert, Puirier, and Horton; Long, Drake, and Long; Morse and Smith; Sir Samuel Pennant. In 1774 there were approximately fifty-five commission firms in England, eighteen of which dealt almost exclusively with Jamaica. Ibid., 299 and n.

[59]Jamaican proprietors sometimes resided in England for reasons other than credit and marketing. John Price, for example, owner of Worthy Park estate, established residence in the mother country for medical reasons. Or, again, the younger Charles Price temporarily relocated in England in 1774 in order to unweave the web of debt into which family properties had fallen. Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 120, 164.

[60]Ibid., 86.

[61]Compare the absentees listed in Sheridan, "The Wealth of Jamaica," 308-09 with the names listed in Vere Langford Oliver, ed., Caribbeana: Being Miscellaneous Papers Relating to the History, Genealogy, Topography, and Antiquities of the British West Indies (6 vols., London: 1910-19), IV, 95. The latter document provides a roster of prominent Jamaican landholders. Also compare Sheridan's list with the names of prominent residents assigned by the Jamaica Assembly in 1762 to recruit blacks for service at Havanna. C. O. Papers 137:61, III.

The custom of assigning family surrogates, either formally or informally, is an aspect of absenteeism which needs research. Because of the complex intermarriages among among the wealthy planters, exhaustive genealogical work is necessary for any complete analysis of the subject.

[62]Robert M. Howard, ed., Records and Letters of the Family of the Longs of Longville, Jamaica, and Hampton Lodge, Surrey (2 vols., London: 1925), I, 121-22; Oliver, ed., Caribbeana, IV, 95.

[63]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 228-29; Oliver, ed., Caribbeana, IV, 95. The Vaughan family provides another example. Samuel Vaughan Jr. lived almost all his life in Jamaica, managing his absentee father's St. James estate. Low, "A Record from an Eighteenth Century Jamaican Estate," 168.

[64]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 387.

[65]For example, J.B. Moreton believed that the plantation lawyers engaged in various dishonest practices which defrauded absentees and ran plantations into the financial ground. Customs and Manners, 69-72. William Beckfors also had a low opinion of estate attorneys. On arriving in Jamaica in 1774 he discovered that his lawyers had been dishonest and negligent. William Beckford to Thomas Woodward, September 27, 1776, Thomas B. Brumbaugh, ed., An Unpublished Letter of William Beckford of Hertford (Jamaica Monograph Number Seventeen: University of the West Indies, Mona, Kingston).

[66]The argument goes that since the ultimate goal of planters was to leave Jamaica just as soon as they had enriched themselves, then those who did were more talented than those who did not. Both the premise and the conclusion are dubious. Yet the strength and pervasiveness of the Pitman-Ragatz tradition has been so great that recent writers have ordinarily accepted such assumptions and conclusions, even in the face of conflicting evidence. Consider the following passage maintaining that Jamaican planters shared no sense of provincial loyalty:

> "Colonel Charles Price had never seen the land of his ancestors, . . . but in the tradition of his class he never quite came to regard Jamaica as his motherland. Hurricane, earthquake, disease, the constant threat of the revolt of the African blacks, and the fear that even the land might revert to bush and the Crown if economic and political conditions changed, made it natural that Jamaican whites should look with nostalgic longing to the comparative security of Britain's milder climate and more polished society.
>
> "Colonel Charles Price was merely among the first of a long line of those who saw sugar wealth not as a solace for residence in Jamaica but as a means of escape; if not for them, for their sons and daughters."

Yet the authors proceed to write that Colonel Price (1678-1730) never absented himself and that his children, all educated in England, "returned to their lands in Jamaica for most of their lives." Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 67. One of the children, Charles Price (1708-1772), earned the sobriquet "the Patriot." Michael Craton, "The Real Sir Charles Price," Jamaica Journal, 4(December: 1970), 10.

[67]Long became a prominent Jamaican politician and judge. More will be said about him in the course of this study.

[68]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 228-29.

[69]General references to the power of the West Indian bloc are commonplace. Black, History, 99; Hurwitz, Jamaica, 45; Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 71-72; Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 325; Sheridan, "The Molasses Act and the Market Strategy of the British Sugar Planters," Goodman, ed., Essays, 325. Also see Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 92-97; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 58-65; Lillian M. Penson, The Colonial Agents of the British West Indies (London: 1924).

[70]Pares, Yankees and Creoles, 53.

[71]Stephen Hopkins, "Essay on the Trade of the Northern Colonies," Merrill Jensen, ed., Tracts of the American Revolution, 1763-1776 (Indianapolis: 1967), 10-11.

[72]John Adams, "Novanglus," February 13, 1775, ibid., 313.

[73]Penson, Colonial Agents, 90 et passim; Willaims, Capitalism and Slavery, 92-97; Sheridan, "The Wealth of Jamaica," 306-10.

[74]Quoted in Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 90n. 2.

[75]See notes 69 and 73 above.

[76]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 431.

[77]Ibid., 439-40.

[78]Sheridan, "The Molasses Act and the Market Strategy of the British Sugar Planters," Goodman, ed., Essays, 374.

[79]The planters, like the merchants, had their own organization--the Planters' Club. They and their merchant creditors conducted business at the famed Jamaica Coffee House in St. Michael's Alley. Penson, Colonial Agents, 190-92; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 60, 283.

[80]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 60. Much of the dif-

ficulty on this matter concerns defining the phrase "directly connected" with the West Indies. Sheridan's calculation included not only absentees who had been born in the islands but absentees who never saw their estates, colonial agents, and London merchants who traded with the islands. Sir Lewis Namier, whose labors in eighteenth-century English history were Herculean, preferred a narrower definition: Only those who had been born and lived part of their lives in the Caribbean. Only thirteen such people, seven from Jamaica, were elected to the House of Commons in 1761. Namier discovered only eight or nine other members who qualified for what he called the "outer ring" of the West Indian clique. Lewis Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution (2nd ed., New York: 1966), 235. Namier suggested that West Indian power and influence were illusory. "What in reality helped the West Indians much more than some twenty votes in a House of 558," he wrote, "was that their commercial demands were in accordance with the mercantilist doctrines of trade, which at that time were universally accepted and punctiliously adhered to in Great Britain." Ibid., 238-39.

[81]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 43, 67.

[82]Ibid., 349.

[83]Jack P. Greene, ed., Colonies to Nation, 1763-1789: A Documentary History of the American Revolution (New York: 1975), 19-24.

[84]The nature of Jamaican opposition to the Stamp Act is the subject of chapter VII.

[85]For examples, see Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 393, and Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 339.

[86]Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 370.

[87]Ibid., 393.

[88]John F. Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement (Princeton: 1926), 84. Indeed, before 1732 there were often no Anglican clergymen in North Carolina at all. Georgia, in the three decades after its establishment, was not much better. Louis B. Wright, The Cultural Life of the American Colonies, 1607-1763 (New York: 1957), 88; Edwin S. Gaustad, A Religious History of America (New York: 1966), 103-06.

[89]Hurwitz, Jamaica, 68.

[90]Jameson, American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement, 87.

[91]Wright, Cultural Life, 75.

[92]Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 339, maintains that this control "muzzled" the clergy "and made sure that the Anglican clergy tried no mission work among the slaves.

[93]J. M. Bumstead and John E. Van de Wetering, What Must I do to be Saved? The Great Awakening in Colonial America (Hinsdale, Illinois: 1976), 57.

[94]Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, II, 494, 497-98; Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 384.

[95]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 365.

[96]Ibid., 367.

[97]Ibid., 369-70.

[98]Perhaps, as has been suggested, because colonial Anglicanism simply was not prone to revivalism. Bumstead and Wetering, What Must I Do to be Saved?, iv-v, 60.

[99]John Mouat to his nephew, Hector, November 20, 1786, John Mouat's Letters, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town.

[100]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 482; Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 252-53; Richard S. Dunn, "A Tale of Two Plantations: Slave Life at Mesopotamia in Jamaica and Mount Airy in Virginia, 1799-1828," William and Mary Quarterly, XXXIV(January, 1977), 35-36. Both the Baptist and Methodist Churches developed in Jamaica after 1783. Curtin, Two Jamaicas, 36.

[101]It is nevertheless interesting to note that a committee of the Jamaica Assembly resolved in 1770 that "a free-school being established in each of the several parishes of this island, wherein no such school is now established, will not only tend early to improve the minds of the youth thereof, but also to render them better and more useful members of the community." Quoted in Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 270.

[102]Ibid., 269; Hurwitz, Jamaica, 70; Pitman, Development, 24n. 41.

[103]Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 269; Pitman, Development, 24n. 41.

[104]Long, History, II, 476.

[105]Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 269; Pitman, Development, 24n. 41.

[106]Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 269. Rusea had ceased operation for some years.

[107]Wright, Revels, 131.

[108]Jamaica Archives, Inventories of Wills, 163 Libers.

[109]Ibid. Libers 40 and 41 cover the years 1760-1762.

[110]Ibid., 40, 63.

[111]Ibid., 40, 80.

[112]Ibid., 40, 77.

[113]Ibid., 41, 66.

[114]Ibid., 41, 72.

[115]Ibid., Libers 40-41; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: 1967), 34-54.

[116]Frank Cundall, The Press and Printers of Jamaica Prior to 1820 (Worcester, Mass.: 1916); Lowell J. Ragatz, A Guide for the Study of British Caribbean History, 1763-1834, Including the Abolition and Emancipation Movements (Washington: 1932), 396-97; Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 31-39. The St. Jago Intelligencer seems to have been the organ of the Jamaica Association. If so, it was not founded before 1751. See p. 35 above. Also, Long, History, II, 440.

[117]David Hawke, The Colonial Experience (Indianapolis: 1966), 454.

[118]Several Jamaican pamphlets will be dealt with in later chapters of this study. On the role of pamphlets in the colonies see Bailyn, Ideological Origins, ch. 1.

[119]Moreton, Customs and Manners, 18. Patrick Browne, himself a Jamaican doctor, agreed with Moreton's assessment. Browne wrote that many a doctor in the colony was a "raw youth, or ignorant assumer, that is hardly skilled enough to breath a vein, or dispense a dose of physic." Patrick Browne, The Civil and Natural History of Jamaica (New York: 1972), 25. But not all shared this low evaluation of Jamaica's medical profession. For positive contemporary comments see Edwards, History, Civil and Commercial, II, 127-28 as well as Beckford, Descriptive Account, II, 304-06. A recent favorable estimate of Jamaican doctors is Richard B. Sheridan, "Mortality and the Medical Treatment of Slaves in the British West Indies," Engerman and Genovese, eds., Race and Slavery, 285-307.

[120]Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 401-02; Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 305-07, 309-11.

[121]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 132-33.

[122]See, for example, Henry Steele Commager, "America and the Enlightenment," Library of Congress Symposia on the American Revolution, The Development of a Revolutionary Mentality (Washington: 1972), 9.

[123]Browne's Civil and Natural History, cited above, devoted only the first twenty-five pages or so to non-scientific matters. The bulk of the study concerns Jamaican plant and animal life.

[124]Long, History, III.

[125]One, Spring Gardens, was near present day Gordon Town. The other was at Enfield. Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 128.

[126]Craton, "The Real Sir Charles Price," 10; Wright, Revels, 131.

[127]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 87.

[128]A Short Journey in the West Indies, in which are Interspersed, Curious Anecdotes and Characters (2 vols., London: 1790), I.

[129]Selections of Williams' Latin verse are in W.J. Gardner, A History of Jamaica (London: 1873). Michael Craton has described Williams as "probably the best Jamaican Latinist of his day, white or black." Craton, "Jamaican Slavery," Engerman and Genovese, eds., Race and Slavery, 262n. 33. Williams' career as poet, teacher, and opponent of slavery merits study.

[130]Edwards, History, Civil and Commercial, II, 35. The poem is also available in Michael Craton, Sinews fo Empire: A Short History of British Slavery (Garden City, New York: 1974), 225-26.

[131]Beckford, Descriptive Account, I, 43-44. This observation applies only to the white population. Art, including music and dance, thrived among the slaves. Blacks seem to have been especially creative in ceramics. R. Duncan Matthewson, "Archaeological Analysis of Material Culture as a Reflection of Sub-Cultural Differentiation in 18th Century Jamaica," Jamaica Journal, 7(March/June: 1973), 25-29.

[132]Leslie, New History of Jamaica, 28-29; Moreton, Customs and Manners, 34. Wright, Revels, deals at length with the theater in colonial Jamaica. Lewis Hallam's noted company of players performed in Jamaica in 1755. Hallam died during the tour. Wright, Cultural Life, 183.

[133]Moreton, Customs and Manners, 35.

[134]Ibid., 34.

[135]Report of the Society of Merchants, March 4, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV; Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 117.

[136]Moreton, Customs and Manners, 34. In 1774 the debating society evaluated the slave trade, and by a majority vote declared it immoral. Richard B. Sheridan, "The Jamaican Slave Insurrection Scare of 1776 and the American Revolution," Journal of Negro History, LXI(July, 1976), 307-308.

[137]Long, History, II, 33.

[138]Ibid., II, 32.

[139]Ibid., II, 32.

[140]Moreton, Customs and Manners, 36.

[141]Many, in fact, ultimately made Jamaica their home. In early 1783 more than 1,200 American loyalists, including children, arrived in the island from southern states. Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 88-89.

[142]Browne, Civil and Natural History, 23.

CHAPTER III

SLAVERY AND THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL SECURITY

The basic fact of island life, like that of South Carolina, was the slave majority whose labor sustained the colony.[1] The black population grew dramatically throughout the eighteenth century, and during the twenty-five years preceding the American Revolution it approached 200,000.[2] Jamaica's continued dependence upon the slave trade, not natural increase, accounted for this steady growth.

Among Jamaica's slaves the incidence of mortality was high while the birth rate was low. Several factors caused this situation. The horrors of the "middle passage" left slaves in a debilitated condition, making subsequent survival of the so-called "seasoning period" problematical.[3] If they had not fallen victim to disease aboard ship, blacks became, in their weakened states, susceptible to those which awaited them in Jamaica.[4] Moreover, poor nutrition, back-breaking labor (as many as eighteen and one-half hours per day at crop time), exposure to Jamaica's chilly and often damp night air, inadequate medical care, depression, and general ill-treatment conspired to cut black lives short. Many died. At the same time few were born, and of them only a minority was healthy enough to reach maturity.[5] The atti-

tudes, sexual mores, and work regimen of female slaves discouraged child-rearing and, it has been said, even impaired fertility.[6] Masters, it has also been said, preferred to maintain the work force by purchase rather than natural increase.[7] Black life expectancy in Jamaica was about five years less than the "break even age" at which a planter began realizing a profit on slave children born and raised on the plantation.[8] Accordingly, slaves were expendable. One overseer told Henry Coor, a 1774 visitor to the island: "I have made my employers 20, 30 and 40 more hogsheads per year than my predecessors and tho I have killed 30 or 40 negroes per year more, yet the produce has been more than adequate to the loss."[9]

All these circumstances caused an annual average decline in the island's slave population. Between 1701 and 1725 this decline measured 3.7 per cent; between 1726 and 1750, 3.6 per cent.[10] But between 1751 and 1775 the annual loss dropped to 2.7 per cent, and some writers have argued that this statistic indicates that the quality of slave life improved during the third quarter of the century.[11] Even Orlando Patterson, a sharp critic, maintains that brutality became less the "norm" after 1750.[12] Be that as it may, one wonders how appreciable a difference in the living standard a seventy-five years-long 1.0 per cent decline in the annual average loss constituted. Was such "improvement" even perceptible to Creoles, those most likely to benefit from ameliorative policies? Philip Freneau, who visited Jamaica in

the 1770's, described island slavery in one of his poems as "hell."[13]

To offset losses Jamaica relied heavily on the African slave trade. Between 1751 and 1760 the island imported 63,800 Africans, 32.6 per cent of all slaves brought to British America during those years. In the following decade the colony absorbed another 62,300, 26.7 per cent of the Anglo-American total. In the five years before the American War Jamaica bought 39,500 more, or 35.5 per cent of the British trade those years.[14] Most Jamaican imports, 39 per cent, came from Africa's Gold Coast, while the remainder arrived from a variety of slaving regions, particularly the Bight of Biafra.[15] If the continued influx of Africans who swelled slave ranks satisfied certain economic needs, it was not without cost to the whites. The latter, living among and oppressing foreign and strange speaking peoples, often worried about their own safety.

Black Unrest and White Control and Defense

To many observers Jamaica's slaves seemed docile. One traveler, repulsed by the "servility of mind" he perceived among island blacks, believed the whites were fortunate because "this unhappy race yield as easily, or perhaps more easily, than any of the race of Adam . . . . This easy admission of fear . . . is the melancholy effect of that depression inevitably produced by slavery."[16] The commentator was, of course, describing "Quashee," Jamaica's version of

what Stanley Elkins called the "Sambo" syndrome and what Eugene Genovese, with greater precision, labeled the "slavish personality."[17]

But Quashee's outward behavior, like Sambo's, must be properly understood. It often disguised as ignorance and laziness an unslavish impulse to disrupt the system. According to Edward Long, for example, slaves made "excellent marksmen" because of their keen "vision," but, he believed, they were unable to "place a dining table square in a room." "They are excellent dissemblers and skilful flatterers," he concluded.[18] William Beckford agreed:

> The dispositions of many negroes are so very capricious, so hardened, and provoking, that the best temper may be soured by contention, be inflamed by opposition, and be made severe by obstinacy; and many people who have the command of slaves may have been apparently guilty of rigour, if not of cruelty, whose nature would rather have inclined them to forgive than punish: but the tricks that are constantly practiced by the former . . . are sufficient to make their superintendants cautious.[19]

What has often been called "day-to-day resistance" characterized Jamaican as well as North American slavery.[20] It allowed blacks, as a West Indian proverb goes, to "play fool to catch wise."[21] Jamaica's slaves also protested their bondage in specific acts of resistance: theft, arson, flight, murder, even suicide.[22] These modes of defiance were not uncommon on the North American mainland.[23]

But two aspects of Jamaican resistance to slavery are unique. First, the Maroons who lived in the interior parts of the island waged a long and successful struggle against subjection and enslavement. Throughout the years

of intermittent war between whites and blacks the plantation system emerged. Indeed, Jamaica was the only British slave society to emerge under such a circumstance. Inevitably, the Maroon presence helped shape the colony's system of bondage, particularly the black response to it. Accordingly, the second unique aspect of Jamaican slave resistance--the frequency of large scale rebellions--was a function of the first. While the disproportion between the white and black populations and the hardships of slave life encouraged revolt, the Maroon presence in the interior, more than anything else, invited insurrection. As long as the black mountaineers warred against the whites, a slave revolt, to be successful, did not require the destruction of colonial society and institutions. Rather, a successful rebellion was one in which the insurgents escaped to the freedom and safety of the Maroon hideaways. Indeed, by about 1700 the Maroons relied heavily upon plantation recruits to keep their numbers strong.[24]

Jamaica's slaves chalked up an impressive record of revolt.[25] Extensive uprisings occurred in 1673, 1678, 1685-1686, 1690, 1702, 1717, and 1722.[26] "Sometimes . . . ," wrote Moreton, "those unhappy wretches . . . grow desperate at their fate, and resolve to redress their Wrongs, and gain their freedom, or to perish in the contest."[27] Even Edward Long, the pro-slavery historian, grudgingly acknowledged that Jamaica had found it difficult to maintain internal security.[28] An early twentieth-century West Indian scholar

noted that "In slavery days . . . in Jamaica alone there were about twenty-eight" slave insurrections.[29]

As a consequence of these circumstances a sense of insecurity pervaded the white population. As early as 1703 Governor Thomas Handasyd had bemoaned the situation. "Our number of slaves augment dayly," he wrote the Board of Trade, "but to my great grief the number of white men dayly decrease."[30] During the subsequent turbulent decades colonial anxiety deepened. At the height of the Maroon War Governor Robert Hunter directly addressed the problem in a message to the Assembly.

> The slaves in rebellion, from the increase of their numbers by the late desertions from several settlements, or from the bad success of common parties, are grown to that height of insolence that your frontiers that are no longer in any sort of security, must be deserted, and then the danger must spread and come nearer if not prevented.[31]

For security the islanders devised control as well as defense systems. Methods of regulating slave behavior and maintaining plantation discipline were numerous, and some, it seems, were not consciously contrived. Although cod supplemented their diet, island blacks lived mainly on protein-deficient foods like yams and plantains. Despite poor nutrition they labored long hours the year round under a blistering sun at strenuous and monotonous jobs. In Professor Dunn's view, hard dull work and an inadequate diet thwarted "mischief and rebellion" by sapping the strength and spirit of many a potential insurrectionist.[32] But these miserable conditions hardly guaranteed plantation tranquil-

ity, as the frequency of revolt indicated. Rather, they were as likely to spark a rebellion as to deter one.

Accordingly, the whites also relied on a control mechanism more sophisticated than the spiritual and physical debilitation of the black population. By awarding skilled and domestic slaves benefits--extra food and clothing, for example--the masters fostered a class system among the blacks in which the specially privileged constituted an elite. At the apex of this crude hierarchy stood the "head man" or "head driver," while field workers made up the lowest rank.[33] White manipulation of the elite by "carrot and stick" often secured its aid in maintaining plantation discipline.[34] Slave informers usually turned out to be artisans, drivers, or domestics, especially the latter.[35] Even the most clever management of this group, however, could not secure effective control. The slave elite had emerged, not surprisingly, from among Creoles. They, of course, spoke English, or at least enough to get by, had had opportunities to acquire skills, and were familiar with plantation routine. But until the nineteenth century Creoles always remained a distinct minority amidst a vast reservoir of African-born "salt water" Negroes. To the latter tribal origins and associations were more meaningful and powerful social distinctions than any they encountered on the plantation.[36] This was true of all newcomers, but it was especially the case with Gold Coast blacks who constituted the largest African ethnic group on the island. Commonly called

Coromantees, they were clannish and aloof, voluntarily isolated from the rest of the slave community.[37] To them the prestige and influence of the Creole elite meant little. Whites considered Coromantees the most rebellious of all island blacks.[38]

Like other New World slave societies Jamaica sought internal security through legislation. In 1664 Jamaica enacted Barbados' slave code almost verbatim.[39] Afterward the colonial government amended the legislation as the need arose. The laws defined the slave as chattel, denied him the right to marry, hold property, sue, and the like. They imposed severe penalties for moving about without a pass, striking or killing a white, stealing, and a variety of other offenses.[40] In brief, Jamaica's slave code revealed the depth of white anxiety. Benjamin Quarles, while not discussing Jamaica specifically, summed up the matter some years ago:

> As a rule, a slave code was an accurate reflection of the fears and apprehensions of the colony, the extent to which the white settlers thought it necessary to go to keep the slaves from getting out of hand--staging a revolt, disturbing the peace, or running away. Hence the more numerous the blacks, the more strict the codes.[41]

But Jamaica's slave code failed to provide control because, as often happens, custom superseded law. While the latter treated blacks as property, the realities of plantation life demanded that they be treated as persons. The integrity of the law was compromised in a thousand ways. The provision ground system and the Sunday market, for exam-

ples, were facts of Jamaican life which trampled on the legislation against slaves owning property and "hawking or peddling goods."[42] Unmarried whites who cohabited with slave women--apparently a common practice--created an environment which rendered strict adherence to the slave code inconceivable.[43] Edward Long maintained that many masters ignored slave laws as a result of a "faulty indulgence" of their laborers.[44]

Jamaica's colonial government sought internal security through other legislative programs. For example, it penalized proprietors who failed to maintain a specified ratio of whites to blacks on their plantations. The first Deficiency Law was passed in 1703 and received the royal assent in 1704.[45] It required property holders to maintain on their estates two whites for the first ten blacks, and one for every subsequent ten. Failure to maintain this standard entailed a £3 5s. fine per quarter annum.[46] Proprietors, however, preferred to pay the fine rather than recruit indentured servants, and, as a result, they undermined the social ends the deficiency legislation was designed to promote.[47]

Other control legislation aimed at restricting slave imports to local labor needs. The first measure to regulate the black influx in this fashion, enacted in 1715, imposed a 10 per cent duty on each incoming slave. Politics, however, rendered this device ineffective because, in order to attack the privileged status of the South Sea Company whose New

World headquarters were at Kingston after the Peace of Utrecht, the law also levied a 20s. tax on each slave exported from Jamaica. Initially the export tax enjoyed the support of local merchants who could no longer trade with the Spanish Empire and island planters who believed the company shipped its best laborers to His Catholic Majesty's territories. In any case, the Privy Council disallowed the law in 1718.[48] But Jamaica circumvented the disallowance and subsequent royal vetoes by enacting new and different import and export tax rates in 1721, 1724, and 1731. The last measure, passed during the Maroon War, imposed a 30s. tax on each imported slave, a one hundred per cent increase in the 1724 schedule.[49] Irritated by the Jamaica Assembly's evasiveness and obstinacy, the Privy Council in 1732 instructed the island's governor to deny assent to any such measure regardless of the tax rate. Undaunted, the colonial legislature that same year adopted a new import tax.[50] After the outbreak of the war with Spain in 1739, the South Sea Company declined, but the tax program, re-enacted intermittently, remained one way in which the whites tried to purchase a measure of internal security. But to the extent the import-export tax issue became snarled in merchant-planter politics, it failed to achieve its social objective.[51] By the third quarter of the eighteenth century the head tax, like the Deficiency Laws, was more a revenue than a security measure.

Because of inadequate controls the whites knew their

security ultimately depended upon a strong defense. The island's militia, of course, provided some protection. Made up of males more than fifteen years old, the citizen soldiery numbered about 2,500 before 1740 and swelled to perhaps as many as 7,000 by 1760.[52] But mustering this largely untrained force posed problems which were never solved. The plantation economy spread the white population thinly over wide distances, and the island's rugged and densely vegetated topography made rapid communication difficult. In addition, many whites, opting to pay fines, ignored the alarm rather than leave their property and families unprotected.[53] This was especially true of Kingstonians who looked on militia service as lost time and, therefore, reduced profits.[54] As a consequence of all these problems it was often difficult to bring sufficient force to bear at the site of an uprising before it had had time to spread. Unavoidably, the militia's first encounter with rebels was always crucial. A poor showing meant that the rebel numbers swelled because the timid and the half-hearted were encouraged to join the insurgents.[55] Ill-trained militiamen then faced their greatest danger: the threat of being overrun by a numerically superior force. In the 1720's the Reverend William May, Rector of Kingston, wrote the Bishop of London that there were twenty-five hundred "rag, tag, & bobtail" whites capable of bearing arms in Jamaica. "Now," he asked, "what is this number to govern at least 90,000 or 100,000 Negroes?"[56]

The sorry state of the militia compelled the islanders early in the century to seek help from London. His Majesty's government obligingly sent regular troops to provide "security" against "the rebellious and runaway Negroes" as well as foreign enemies.[57] Whitehall insisted, however, that permanent garrisons in Jamaica depended upon colonial willingness to provide "for their subsistance."[58] The Jamaica Assembly responded affirmatively, even generously. It appropriated revenue earned from the Deficiency legislation to supplement the soldiers' regular pay.[59] By the 1760's the allotments, calculated on a weekly basis, provided 3s. 6d. for privates, corporals, and sergeants and 14s. 6d. for captains and higher ranking officers.[60] In addition, the colony built barracks to accommodate two thousand men. Located at fifteen sites, these quarters differed in size. The larger ones, housing two hundred troops, were situated at the island's principal defense works: Fort Charles at Port Royal, Fort Augusta at Mosquito Point across Kingston harbor, Rock Fort on the Windward Road, and the forts at Savanna-La-Mar and Lucea.[61]

Whitehall kept its word, at least until after the Seven Years' War. Before 1764 it stationed two regiments, each comprised of a thousand troops, in Jamaica. But the islanders still had cause for anxiety. The two royal regiments did not really provide the colony two thousand fighting men. Detachments of Jamaica's regulars stood duty along the West African coast and, since the 1750's, at the Mos-

quito Shore and the Bay of Honduras.[62] In addition, malaria, yellow fever, and other tropical illnesses depleted company ranks. One officer reported a 15 per cent illness rate for each of the last six months of 1756 and an average 12.7 per cent for all 1757. In January, 1758, 20 per cent of his regiment was sick.[63] William Master of the 49th Regiment complained shortly after arriving in Jamaica that "we have upwards of 150 sick, . . . & had it not been for the assistance given us by Admiral Coates, we should by this time very probably have lost half our men."[64]

If Jamaica's control mechanisms and defenses failed to provide the security the islanders sought, the Maroon treaties of 1738-1739 offered grounds for hope.[65] Peace in the interior opened new lands for settlement, and the white population rapidly increased.[66] Road construction, by improving insular communication and transportation, promised to enhance militia effectiveness. One observer believed that as a consequence of the new highways "order and good police are better maintained; seditions are soon quelled, by the dispatch which can be used in encountering them; and insurrections are prevented by the facility that appears of marching to suppress them."[67] In addition, the treaties provided the colonials a valuable counter-insurgency force. The Maroons' knowledge of hidden caves, inaccessible valleys, obscure mountain passes, and, above all else, their long experience as guerrilla fighters made them an important ally in the colonial quest for internal security. George

Haldane, who served briefly as Jamaica's Governor following the recall of Charles Knowles, thought highly of Maroon combat effectiveness. In 1759 he urged using Maroons in an invasion of San Domingue. "I hope to be employ'd [in the campaign], " he wrote, "as I can carry one very good season'd Regiment from hence, with Five hundred Wild Negroes armed, which are better than three thousand Europeans in a War of this sort."[68]

The Maroon treaties, of course, did not guarantee internal peace. History, after all, is littered with broken treaties, and there was no special reason to believe that these would long endure. (Indeed, the agreement with the Leeward Maroons collapsed in the 1790's.) The whites remained suspicious of their new allies, as the treaty provisions requiring resident colonial observers in the Maroon communities indicate. Edward Long maintained that during emergencies Maroon behavior was "most insufferable."[69]

Despite outward calm and optimism (contemporaries did not know it, but the Maroon treaties inaugurated twenty years of internal peace--the longest such period in Jamaica's history from the beginning of English settlement to the abolition of slavery in 1834) a sense of insecurity still pervaded the colony.[70] It remained customary, for example, for planters to prohibit the cultivation of fruit trees near slave quarters because "if the negro-houses be surrounded with clumps of vegetation, they may carry on every species of villainy without reserve; and to counter-

act which they are in many places entirely exposed."[71] Private bills extending the rights of manumitted slaves continued to confer only the narrowest "privileges."[72] The obligation to help quell "insurrection, mutiny, rebellion, or invasion" remained a requirement for land grants.[73]

The security issue, in fact, figured prominently in the midcentury merchant-planter debate over the location of the colonial capital. St. Andrew's supporters of the transfer to Kingston argued that "All the Records in which your Petitioners titles to their Estates & Judgments are recorded, are kept at St. Jago de la Vega, a place open & defenceless, & liable to be destroyed by . . . domestick Insurrection, which would prove the Ruin, not only of your Petitioners, but also of the other Inhabitants of this Island, & of Great Numbers of Your Majesty's trading Subjects of Great Britain, Ireland, & the Colonies."[74] Kingston's "merchants, factors, and agents" maintained that Spanish Town "might in one Night be . . . destroyed by an Insurrection of a few of its own, or neighboring slaves."[75] This danger "creates continued Fears & Anxieties to the Merchants who imagine their Property altogether unsafe in so defenceless a Repository of the Public Records."[76] Since the records contained "the Securities for the sums credited to this Island," their destruction would entail "the Ruin of great Numbers of your Majesty's other Subjects, as well as most of the Inhabitants of this Island."[77] To Jamaica's mercantile class a slave uprising at Spanish Town could be

catastrophic.

Governor Knowles, who had many reasons to support the merchants' plea for relocation, employed the same argument. He pointed out that the May-June, September-October rainy seasons often flooded the Rio Cobre River, making it "impassable for Days together." Whenever this happened, communication and travel between Spanish Town and Kingston broke down. To Knowles the danger was clear. "In case of an Insurrection . . . ," he predicted, "the Negroes who are acquainted with those Things would choose the rainy season as a proper time to put such a horrid Scheme into Execution."[78]

Insecure societies, it seems, spawn Cassandras. Jamaica was no exception. At midcentury the anonymously published Essay Concerning Slavery and the Danger Jamaica is Expos'd to stated: "The island of Jamaica, being of the greatest importance to its mother country, and at the same time so insecure that the inhabitants are under the greatest apprehension, frequently from their own slaves, it becomes a matter of public concern how to render so valuable a possession free from the danger from which it is so manifestly threatened."[79] Not surprisingly, the author advocated improving the island's control and defense systems to secure better slave discipline. But he did not conclude with this commonplace proposal. Instead, he also recommended several radical reforms which, he believed, could save the colony from disaster. First, he urged a complete

and permanent halt to slave imports. Second, he advocated meeting Jamaica's future slave labor needs through natural increase alone. Aware that these proposals meant disrupting the island's economy, the writer also recommended legislation barring blacks from skilled and domestic work. Such a prohibition, he maintained, would confine blacks to agricultural labor, where they were needed most, force compliance with the Deficiency Laws, encourage greater white immigration, and, accordingly, diminish the impact of the dislocations his reforms were likely to induce. These proposals aimed at the total Creolization of Jamaica's black population. The alternative, the author believed, was disaster.[80] These warnings and recommendations, however, went unheeded.

NOTES

[1]For a brilliant examination of slavery in colonial South Carolina See Peter Wood, Black Majority. Orlando Patterson's Sociology of Slavery carefully examines Jamaican bondage. Valuable supplements to Patterson include: Curtin, Two Jamaicas; Craton, "Jamaican Slavery," in Engerman and Genovese, eds., Race and Slavery; Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation. Sheridan's Sugar and Slavery is, of course, invaluable.

[2]For estimates of the black population see p. 63.

[3]The well-known horrors of the Middle Passage are described in Daniel P. Mannix and Malcolm Cowley, Black Cargoes: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1518-1865 (New York: 1962), ch. 5; Also, Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 99.

[4]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 69, 98-100.

[5]Craton and Walvin studied birth and childhood death rates at Worthy Park estate during the slave era. They found a high infant and child mortality rate. A Jamaican Plantation, 133-34.

[6]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 106-12.

[7]Ibid., 105-06. This, a long accepted view, has lately become a matter of dispute. For differing accounts see Craton, "Jamaican Slavery" and Sheridan, "Mortality and Medical Treatment of Slaves in the British West Indies," Engerman and Genovese, eds., Race and Slavery, 249-84, 285-310.

[8]Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery (Boston and Toronto: 1974), 155-56.

[9]Quoted in Mannix and Cowley, Black Cargoes, 52.

[10]Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 247.

[11]Ibid., 244-45, 481; Richard B. Sheridan, "Africa and the Caribbean in the Atlantic Slave Trade," American Historical Review, 77(February, 1972), 27; Craton, "Jamaican Slavery," Engerman and Genovese, eds., Race and Slavery, 249-84. Philip Curtin has provided somewhat different figures on the net natural decrease of Jamaica's slaves. Atlantic Slave Trade, 58, 63.

[12]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 82.

[13]Fred Lewis Pattee, ed., The Poems of Philip Freneau (3 vols., Princeton: 1902-07), II, 258. The first verse of "To Sir Toby," written in Jamaica, is:

"If there exists a hell--
The case is clear
Sir Toby's slaves enjoy
That portion here."

[14]Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, 137.

[15]Ibid., 160; Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 137, 143.

[16]A Short Journey in the West Indies, I, 30-31, 83.

[17]Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (New York: 1959), 82-86; Eugene D. Genovese, "Rebelliousness and Docility in the Negro Slave:A Critique of the Elkins Thesis," Civil War History, 13(December, 1966), 293-314; Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 174.

[18]Long, History, II, 407-08.

[19]Beckford, Descriptive Account, I, ix.

[20]Compare Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 261, with Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution (New York: 1956), ch. 3 and Wood, Black Majority, ch. XI. Also Raymond and Alice Bauer, "Day to Day Resistance to Slavery," Journal of Negro History, XXVII(October, 1942), 388-419.

[21]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 180.

[22]Ibid., 262-66.

[23]Stampp, Peculiar Institution, ch. 3.

[24]This was especially true of the Leeward Maroons. Patterson, "Slavery and Slave Revolts," Price, ed., Maroon Societies, 258. Concernin Maroon communities Sidney Mintz has written: "These cases of slaves who made good their escapes and maintained their freedom are significant; they represented to the still-enslaved something that was possible . . . . The very existence of such communities is immensely important to our understanding of slavery, of the proslavery ideology, and the capacities and perceptions of the slaves themselves. "Slavery and the Afro-American World," Caribbean Transformations, 78-79.

[25]Patterson, "Slavery and Slave Revolts," Price, ed., Maroon Societies, 246; Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 266; Monica Schuler, "Ethnic Slave Rebellions in the Caribbean and the Guianas," Journal of Social History, 3(Summer, 1970), 374-85.

[26]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 267-69; Robert Montgomery Martin, History of the Colonies of the British Empire (London: 1843), 1.

[27]Moreton, Customs and Manners, 148.

[28]Long, History, II, 441-46.

[29]Frank Cundall, Political and Social Disturbances in the West Indies: A Brief Account and Bibliography (Kingston: 1906), 3.

[30]Thomas Handasyd to the Board of Trade, October 5, 1703, Donnan, ed., Documents, II, 5.

[31]Quoted in Patterson, "Slavery and Slave Revolts," Price, ed., Maroons Societies, 263.

[32]Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 200, 249. Dunn believes that the work-diet combination fostered genuine elements of the Quashee syndrome.

[33]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 58-59, 63.

[34]Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, 147.

[35]See, for example, Schuler, "Ethnic Slave Rebellions."

[36]Ibid.

[37]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 153.

[38]Edward Long, for instance, considered Gold Coast blacks the most rebellious element on the island. Long, History, II, 445-46.

[39]Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 243.

[40]Laws of Jamaica (St. Jago de la Vega: 1792); Most of the pertinent legislation is contained in Long, History II, 485-92; For commentaries see Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 70-79 and Robert Worthington Smith, "The Legal Status of Jamaican Slaves Before the Anti-Slavery Movement," Journal of Negro History, XXX(July, 1945), 293-303.

[41]Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America (1st rev. ed.; New York: 1969), 40.

[42]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 80, 224-25.

[43]Ibid., 42, 159. According to Dallas, "the white people on estates have as many sable wives as they please, and change them as often as they please; and there are few proprietors in the West Indies on which families of mulattoes have not been left by each succeeding overseer and bookkeeper." History of the Maroons, I, 127. Browne referred to the male settlers' "great attachments to Negroe-women" as "vicious habits." Civil and Natural History, 23n. a.

[44]Long, History, II, 443.

[45]Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 147.

[46]Ibid., I, 148-49; Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 56.

[47]Hurwitz, Jamaica, 59; Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 24-25. The revenue raised by the laws ordinarily went to defense related expenses such as barrack construction and allowances for royal troops. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 148-49.

[48]Donnan, ed., Documents, II, xxxviii; Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, II, 655.

[49]Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, II, 317-18; Donnan, ed., Documents, II, xxxviii.

[50]Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, II, 440n. 2.

[51]N. A. T. Hall, "Some Aspects of the Deficiency Question in Jamaica in the Eighteenth Century," 36-41.

[52]Lyttelton, "Description of Jamaica, 1764," 8; Long, History, I, 606; Bryan Edwards' marginal notes in ibid., II, 15, Ansell B. Hart Collection, University of the West Indies Library, Mona, Kingston.

[53]"Petition of the Council and Assembly," May, 1754, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[54]Minutes of the Council, April 10, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[55]Long, History, I, 123; II, 452-54.

[56]Reverend William May to the Bishop of London, Oliver, ed., Caribbeana, III, 8.

[57]Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 423.

[58]Ibid., I, 423.

[59]Ibid., I, 424-25. Edward Long was a critic of this system. "We should not applaud that economy," he wrote, "which, to save five shillings, spends fifteen or twenty . . . . We should suppose the planters might well afford to help one able white man for every fifty negroes; which would add somewhat to their security, stand in place of more regiments, and be maintained with greater ease." History, I, 383. In any event, as long as regulars garrisoned the island supplementary pay was necessary because the cost of living was higher in Jamaica than in England. Ibid., I, 383; Pares, War and Trade, 258. In 1764, for example, Lord Adam Gordon found that in the colony beef and poultry were very expensive. "Journal of an Officer," 380.

[60]Order in Council, March 10, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[61]List of Barracks in the Island of Jamaica, Shewing the Number of Men they are Capable of Containing, n.d. C.O. Papers 137:60, V; Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 379; Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 148-49.

[62]Long, History, II, 464; C.O. Papers 137:60, I-II. These files contain information concerning English activities at the Mosquito Shore and the Bay of Honduras.

[63]A List of Effective Men in Colonel Walsh's Regiment according to the Monthly Returns made by him to the Lieutenant Governor, C.O. Papers 137:60, V.

[64]William Master to Major General Napier, November 15, 1758. C.O. Papers 137: 60, VI. The facilities the island provided probably contributed to the illness rate. Master observed that "except at Port Royal there is not a Barrack proper to receive Soldiers in the Whole Island." The facilities at Fort Augusta, he wrote, were built close on one another, unfloored, and incomplete. He said "our people suffer in them." Ibid. In 1764 Lord Adam Gordon made a similar evaluation. He found the barracks "in general bad" and "much out of repair." "Journal of an Officer," 379.

[65]According to Long, after "the pacification with the wild Negroes in 1739, the planters [began] to think themselves perfectly secure from any further disturbances of the like nature." History, I, 386.

[66]See pp. 18-20.

[67]Long, History, I, 466-67.

[68]George Haldane to the Secretary of State, May 24, 1759, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[69]Long, History, II, 334.

[70]Ibid., II, 447; Martin, The Colonies, 1. Only minor disturbances in 1745 and 1758 marred the tranquility of these years.

[71]Beckford, Descriptive Account, I, 232.

[72]Hurwitz, "A Token of Freedom," 423-31.

[73]Patents, Libers 30-31.

[74]"Petition of the Justices and Vestry, and the Rest of the Planters and Inhabitants of St. Andrew," 1754, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[75]"Petition of the Merchants, Factors, and Agents Residing in the Island of Jamaica," 1754, C.O. Papers 137: 60, II.

[76]"Petition of Jamaica's Merchants, Factors, and Agents to the Board of Trade," 1754, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[77]"The Most Humble Petition of the Merchants, Factors, and Agents Residing in the Island of Jamaica," 1754, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[78]Charles Knowles to the Merchants of Kingston, January 20, 1754, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[79]Essay Concerning Slavery and the Danger Jamaica is Expos'd to From the Too Great Number of Slaves, and the Too Little Care that is Taken to Manage Them, ii. The essay is undated, but it is certainly midcentury. See David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithica: 1966), 143-44.

[80]Essay Concerning Slavery and the Danger Jamaica is Expos'd to . . . .

CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLTS OF 1760

Despite twenty years of internal peace, in 1760 St. Mary's parish in the northeast remained one of the least developed areas in Jamaica. Thickly forested, mountainous, accessible from the land side through only three passes, it was less attractive to would-be settlers than more expansive and easily cultivable parishes like Clarendon and St. Elizabeth. By the time Beckford wrote, St. Mary had only eighty sugar works, 120 settlements, and a mere 18,000 slaves.[1] Its chief center, Port Maria, was little more than a village, and the few whites who resided there eked out livings from fishing and the coastal trade. The road over Guy's Hill was not yet under construction, and at the moment the settlers were vulnerable. Isolated and numerically few, both town and rural whites were virtually defenseless against foreign naval attack (French raids along the northeast shore were becoming increasingly frequent[2]) and servile insurrection. The colonial government understood this and, to provide the parish greater security, was presently building a fort on the cliff overlooking Port Maria's fishing beach. It was here, in St. Mary, that the convulsions of 1760 began.[3]

On the night of Easter Tuesday, April 8, about fifty slaves from the Whitehall, Frontier, Heywood Hall, and Trinity estates slipped away under the covers of darkness and rain and made their way toward Port Maria a few miles northward. The bulk of the rebels came from Trinity, the property of the prominent merchant-planter and politician, Zachary Bayley. Their leader was Tacky, a Gold Coast black whom a white contemporary described as "a young man of good stature, and well made; his countenance handsome, but rather of an effeminate than manly cast."[4] Tacky's chief lieutenants--Fortune, Kingston, and Jamaica--were all African-born Trinity slaves as well. These leaders carefully planned this insurrection. It was no coincidence , for example, that the escape occurred after a holiday. The rebels hoped to maximize the element of surprise by catching the whites off-guard after the heavy drinking which characterized colonial festivities. Moreover, the speed and deliberateness with which the insurgents went about their work indicate coordination and forethought. Upon reaching Port Maria undetected, they made straight for the partially completed fort. There they quickly killed a sleeping storekeeper, who supposedly kept watch, and made off with forty-five firearms, four barrels of powder, and some musket balls. The rebels then descended the steep precipice to the beach and collected the drilled bullets which the colonials customarily used as net sinkers. These things done, they marched back in the direction from which

they came.[5]

The insurgents only partially succeeded. They failed to achieve the degree of surprise they had anticipated. A Creole house servant at Trinity, discovering that slaves were missing, informed Zachar Bayley.[6] On receiving this information, Bayley rode off alone toward Port Maria, hoping to catch up with the runaways and exhort them to return to their plantations. He met the rebels as they returned from the town, however, and saw that they were armed. He wheeled his horse about, drew some rebel fire, and retreated. Trinity's master, escaping unscathed, alerted nearby plantations and arranged a militia rendezvous.[7]

In the meantime the insurgents attacked Heywood Hall, burning the Great House, the mill works, and the cane fields. Afterward, on the way to William Beckford's nearby Esher estate, they met and killed a white man "traveling on foot" and recruited fifteen more "salt water" slaves. The Whites at Esher were caught unprepared. The rebels were already surrounding the house before the colonials realized their danger. Unarmed, the latter barricaded doors and windows as best they could. A Creole domestic named Yankee helped them. But these efforts proved ineffective. Under assault the make-shift defenses caved in, and the insurgents entered the house. In the ensuing confusion Yankee escaped, but he was the only one to get away. The rebels killed the overseer, another white, and severely wounded a doctor whom they left for dead. Several raped the dead overseer's mu-

latto mistress but spared her life because Esher slaves insisted that she had interceded on their behalf numerous times.[8]

Yankee by then had already reached an adjacent estate and with the cooperation of a friend there alerted the whites to the situation. He even tried but failed to drum up support among the slaves to fight beside their masters. Nevertheless, his alarm, together with Bayley's, ended once and for all any likelihood that Tacky might again use surprise to his advantage. District whites knew that an insurrection was in progress.[9] But Tacky's swift "victories" drew recruits. As the rebels withdrew from Esher to Heywood Hall so many slaves joined the march that in a short time Tacky commanded a force of about four hundred. With them was the booty of the brief campaign: hogs, chickens, and large quantities of rum. In Ballard's Valley, at a heavily foliaged location away from the road, the insurgents celebrated.[10]

Zachary Bayley's alarm had gathered seventy or eighty mounted men who rode to the troubled area. Noise from the rebel feast pinpointed the slaves' whereabouts and allowed Bayley to avoid riding by the screened area and into possible ambush. But the blacks noticed movements from within the dense vegetation as militiamen scrambled for defensive positions. The insurgent celebration ended abruptly, and those with weapons fired sporadically into the woods. They accomplished little. Most could barely see

their targets, and those who shot net sinkers merely arched projectiles harmlessly over white heads. This ineffective barrage encouraged a militia advance. But the colonials discovered that they too had an ammunition problem. The supply was so low that "if equally divided" it "did not amount to more than one charge each man."[11] As a result, only a small but well supplied party of indentured servants moved against the insurgents. Advancing as far as safety allowed, the militiamen opened fire, hitting several rebels. The vast majority of Tacky's force escaped, however, disappearing into the thick rainforest.[12]

News of the uprising was on its way to Spanish Town. At Bayley's first alarm whites at Ballard Beckford's property sent two trusted slaves to the colonial capital. Riding horseback, they reached their destination at about one o'clock the following morning. They reported that St. Mary slaves had risen and had killed sixteen whites since darkness fell the night before.[13] Lieutenant Governor Moore acted promptly to suppress and contain the revolt. He ordered a sixty-man detachment from the 74th Regiment at Spanish Town to march at once over Archer's Ridge into St. Mary. He also ordered an equivalent force from the 49th Regiment at Port Royal to proceed immediately through Liguanea and over the Wag River road to the troubled parish. Through special messengers he instructed the commanders of the Cranford Town, Nanny Town, and Scott's Hall Maroons to send companies to St. Mary. Lastly, executive orders directed horse

and foot militia to muster and prepare to march to check the possible spread of the revolt.[14]

Kingston and Spanish Town militiamen balked at these last orders. Townsmen maintained that even a few days service entailed severe financial losses. Accordingly, they informed their officers, with "insolence," that they intended to pay the 10s. fine the Militia Act required for failing to muster, rather than serve in arms.[15] This concern for private interest over the public's welfare outraged Henry Moore. With a bare quorum of Councillors present at an emergency meeting, the Lieutenant Governor told the executive board of the St. Mary revolt and the measures he had taken "to give as speedy a Check as possible to the desolation which was then Spreading . . . ." He went on to denounce the "so Unnatural . . . behavior" of the Kingston and Spanish Town militiamen "in a time of Public Calamity" when "the whole Country was threatened . . . ." Moore concluded that the "only means left of compelling them to their Duty" was to impose martial law. The Councillors agreed, and a formal declaration was composed.[16]

BY THE KING
A PROCLAMATION

> Whereas a great Number of Negroes in the Parish of St. Marys are now in an actual State of Rebellion and have killed many white People and destroyed several Settlements in that Part of the Country, We have thought fit for the Service of this our Island and to prevent any Attempts that may be made by the Slaves of other Parishes to join with those concerned in the present Insurrection, that for the Defence and Security of this our said Island and for the Immediate Suppressing of the said Rebellion Martial Law should be put in force--

> We have therefore caused this Proclamation to be published hereby commanding and requiring that the Artcles of War be publicly read upon this Ninth day of April Instant in the Towns of Saint Jago de la Vega, Port Royal, and Kingston from which Publication Martial Law is hereby declared to be in force.[17]

Now vested with broad authority Moore issued new orders. First, he instructed the Spanish Town troop to march with two field pieces to St. Mary via the road through Bagnells.[18] Second, he sent a detachment of Kingston militiamen over the Wag River road to the distressed parish. Third, he ordered two additional units of the 74th Regiment to secure positions at Lluidas Vale and Guanaboa in St. John's parish and to wait in those places for further instructions.[19]

The Council unanimously approved all these measures "for the relief of that Distressed part of the Country, and for the service and General Security of the whole Island." "Martial Law," the Council asserted, "was absolutely Necessary . . . to crush the Rebellion in its Infancy, and prevent those fatal Consequences which must have Arisen if the Negroes of the other Parts of the Island could have time to join those concerned in the present Insurrection."[20]

Despite forced marches by regular, Maroon, and militia units, none arrived on the scene until the revolt was well into its second day.[21] Scott's Hall Maroons, with the least distance to travel, reached the turbulent region first. But they informed local militia officers--probably Zachary Bayley, among others--that they would not move im-

mediately against the rebels because in recent months the colonial government had failed to pay "head money" on returned runaway slaves, bounties to which the 1739 treaty entitled them. To save time, the militia leadership assured the Maroons that funds were forthcoming and that, in addition, they would receive a reward for each rebel they captured or killed.[22] On the strength of these quasi-official pledges the Scott's Hall Maroons advanced into the forest in pursuit of Tacky's force.

While the Maroons scoured the woods other military personnel arrived in the parish. The 74th Regimental detachment which had crossed Archer's Ridge advanced toward the seacoast and pitched camp there just before nightfall, converting an abandoned house into command headquarters. The 49th Regimental detachment from Port Royal, weary from its long hard march along the Wag River, arrived after dark. Both army units quickly encountered rebel resistance. At night insurgents infiltrated the 74th's coastal encampment, killing a guard, and escaped without casualty. Others struck the late-arriving 49th shortly after it crossed the parish border, wounding an officer, Lieutenant Bevil. The next day both regular units skirmished with the rebels.[23]

At Spanish Town Lieutenant Governor Moore kept abreast of events in St. Mary and aided the forces there. Mounted militia from the capital began escorting food, arms, and ammunition to the combat soldiers.[24] Yet military operations were far from successful, not only because Tacky re-

mained elusive, but also because two separate but related problems complicated the pacification effort. The first was a growing refugee-relief problem. Panic-stricken white St. Mary residents were fleeing their homes in large numbers and gathering in the small coastal village at Annotto Bay. To deal with this situation Moore asked Vice Admiral Thomas Cotes to supply the refugees by sea. Responding promptly, Cotes victualed a small vessel from his own flagship and dispatched it to the north shore. But this speedy action failed to meet the needs of the increasing number of colonials at Annotto Bay, and shortly afterward Cotes also sent the H.M.S. Lively there with fresh food and munitions. The Vice Admiral, understanding the danger Jamaica faced, promised Moore that a second ship would "be kept ready to sail at a moments warning" if peace was not soon restored in St. Mary. He also assured Moore that if the insurrection spread and it became necessary to commit the rest of the 49th Regiment at Port Royal to combat, then marines from the H.M.S. Marlborough would assume the defense of Kingston harbor.[25]

Since quick and effective suppression of the revolt entailed denying Tacky recruits from among peaceful St. Mary slaves, white flight aggravated the second difficult problem--intra-parish control. The colonial rush to Annotto Bay left slaves unsupervised, disrupted plantation routine and discipline, and generally created a confused and explosive condition. While these circumstances themselves em-

boldened reluctant slaves to rebel, they also fostered an environment in which rumors of countless sorts acquired credibility, further inflaming the volatile situation. The most provocative of such rumors was that Tacky, with the aid of conjurers, had rendered himself invulnerable to white attack.[26] This belief originated in and reflected the West African myal contention that certain powders and potions provided initiates protection from whites as well as their weapons.[27] Jamaican myal priests maintained that the "herb of the branched calalue" conferred this immunity.[28] Troops in St. Mary therefore faced considerable difficulties. They not only had to quell the rebellion, but patrol and guard disorganized properties and counter the recruiting power of gossip concerning Tacky's invulnerability. On one plantation the soldiers caught what Edward Long said was an obeahman, although he was probably a myal priest, preaching Tacky's invulnerability and encouraging slaves to revolt. He had already distributed the magical powder and had told the bondsmen that rubbing it on their bodies would render them as invulnerable as Tacky.[29] "The old impostor was caught whilst he was tricked up with all his feathers, teeth, and other implements of magic."[30] The soldiers hanged him on the spot, destroying the invulnerability myth on that estate and disspiriting the onlookers.[31]

While dealing with the problems involved in suppressing the rebellion, Moore also worked hard to contain it. In order to "prevent" slaves in western parishes having

"any communication with the rebels," he quarantined St. Mary by posting troops at strategic locations. The 74th Regimental units awaiting instructions in St. John moved to new positions in St. Thomas in the Vale. One detachment quartered itself at the foot of Guy's Hill to seal the Bagnell Pass, while the other guarded the pass over Archer's Ridge. The Spanish Town troop with two field pieces joined the latter. Lastly, to stifle the flow of information and, perhaps, to minimize the losses of the townspeople, the Lieutenant Governor imposed a total embargo. All ships in island ports were to remain at anchor until the emergency was over.[32]

In the St. Mary forest, meanwhile, Tacky demonstrated considerable military skill in eluding the enemy. Even someone as hostile as Edward Long grudgingly admired the black Spartacus, calling him "General Tacky" and "Generalissimo."[33] But Tacky's time was running out. As the area of freedom around him shrank, his force's maneuverability became more and more restricted. Rebel recruitment declined, while losses to death, desertion, and capture increased. A frigate at Port Maria jailed growing numbers of insurgents.[34]

On or about April 16 Tacky and his depleted force encountered the Scott's Hall Maroons not far from Heywood Hall. The rebels stood their ground at first, but broke and ran when the mountain men unleashed their first barrage. In the ensuing confusion Tacky could not keep his followers together, and fragments of the rebel band scattered in the

surrounding forest. Tacky himself fled with one of the splinter groups.[35]

The emergency seemed ended. The militia commander ordered the mounted Spanish Town and Kingston units home, since their presence was no longer needed. But the officer realized that as long as isolated rebel groups roamed the forest, St. Mary remained unpacified. Accordingly, he kept several Maroon detachments "scouring the woods" for the fugitives.[36]

News of the rebel defeat near Heywood Hall reached Spanish Town on Thursday, April 17. Henry Moore promptly summoned the Council and advised it of the turn events had taken in St. Mary. While approving the return of the Kingston and Spanish Town units, Moore, like the militia commander on the scene, did not want to ease the pressure on the scattered fugitives. Consequently, he endorsed the "directions to the Captains of the Negro Towns to keep their parties constantly out in the woods till further orders." Moreover, he "proposed to keep a Detachment of the Regulars quartered in that part of the Country where the Insurrection began." The Lieutenant Governor regretted the need for martial law because, "although Conducted with the greatest prudence," it "could not fail of being productive of inconveniencies to a trading people." He insisted he "was Desirous of putting an end to it as soon as the situation of affairs could justify . . . such a step." Such a situation, he led the Councillors to believe, was imminent. He confi-

dently predicted, incorrectly as it turned out, that the remaining rebels would be "totally Destroyed in a few days."[37]

In response the Council congratulated Moore, giving him its "unanimous opinion that nothing could have contributed more to the safety of the whole Island than the Vigilance he had shown . . . . and his readiness in sending such a number of Troops into that quarter to prevent the Spreading of a Rebellion which seemed to threaten the whole country with Destruction."[38] Further, the Council agreed that the "continuing of the Regulars and parties from the negro Towns" was "a very prudent measure." Lastly, the Council urged that the colony "be relieved as soon as possible from the inconveniencies of the Martial Law." It recommended that the "Colours should be Lodged," signaling the emergency's end, on Monday, April 21, provided that no "Tumults or Disorders" broke out "in other parts of the island." The port embargo, the board suggested, should be lifted at the same time.[39]

The final pacification of St. Mary did not proceed as smoothly as the optimists at Spanish Town had expected. Scott's Hall Maroons, who had gone off in pursuit of the rebel fragments, failed to carry out their mission promptly and honestly.[40] They returned after "a day or two" with "a collection of human ears" they claimed to have taken from insurgents they caught and killed. Being believed, they were paid accordingly. Whites learned afterward, however,

that the ears had been severed from the unburied dead at Heywood Hall.[41] Maroon conduct also undermined pacification efforts a few nights later. Captain Forsyth of the 49th and his men encamped with a Maroon detachment near Down's Cave. After dark insurgents attacked, killing the sentinels and setting the makeshift huts afire. Forsyth, apparently surrounded, organized his men into a square, returned the fire, and drove the unseen rebels off. By action's end several of the Captain's men were dead. Forsyth, who had not seen any of the Maroons during the fight, initially suspected that they had been the assailants. But a quick on the spot investigation revealed that the Maroons had hidden during the skirmish.[42] It was obvious that rebels still remained at large in St. Mary.

Nevertheless, on Monday morning Lieutenant Governor Moore, following his Council's advice, ended martial law and lifted the embargo. Within hours, however, Moore received information that "an Insurrection of all the Negroes" had erupted in Westmoreland, Jamaica's leewardmost parish. This news "oblig'd" him "to recall the Orders given and to continue the Martial Law . . . ." He sent "speedy assistance" to the troubled area "both by Sea and Land," but military personnel arriving in Westmoreland found that all was peaceful there. They discovered instead that rumor, feeding upon white insecurity, accounted for the tale of insurrection. "The fears of the people," Moore wrote, had inflated a mere "Disturbance on the Estates of the late Mr.

Richard Beckford" into a massive uprising.[43] "Everything is quiet there," the Lieutenant Governor reported on April 24, "and appears to be so in the other parts of the Island," except in St. Mary where military operations continued against the remaining rebels "who have secreted themselves in the Woods." "Great numbers of suspected Negroes are now under Confinement," he wrote, "who will be soon try'd and punish'd according to their Deserts." Moore now intended to end martial law on Saturday, April 26, or on the following Monday at the very latest.[44] As April ended, Moore, and perhaps other colonials, believed the tempest had spent itself.

Events four weeks later shattered this confidence. Westmoreland's April fears materialized. On Wednesday, May 28, rebellion flared on the property of Captain Arthur Forrest, second in command of the Jamaica Naval Station. A band of plantation slaves quietly surrounded the Great House while a Mr. Smith, the attorney for the estate, the overseer, and a visiting merchantman captain named Hoare (Forrest was away at the time) sat for dinner. The insurgents suddenly broke in, killed Smith and the overseer, and severely wounded Hoare.[45] Three Creole domestics fled the scene and alerted adjacent estates.[46]

Former French slaves joined Gold Coast blacks in this uprising. The misfortunes of war accounted for their presence in Jamaica. After participating in the unsuccessful defense of Guadaloupe, which succumbed to British might

in 1759, they were captured, delivered to Jamaica, and sold at auction to Captain Forrest. The Guadaloupe group constituted an important element among the Westmoreland insurgents because they brought to this daring undertaking valuable experience: they were men all trained in the care and use of firearms. But the problem of recruiting new rebels initially but temporarily offset this advantage. The successful escape of Forrest's house servants cost the insurgents any chance of storming the district by surprise and drawing blacks on nearby properties into the movement. Aware of the uprising, neighborhood plantations tightened discipline to deny their slaves the opportunity of absconding to the rebel band. Accordingly, despite the massacre of whites at Forrest's estate, local blacks did not join the revolt. Frustrated and enraged by this failure, the insurrectionists terrorized blacks as well as whites in nearby settlements. They killed several people; burned homes, sugar works, and cane fields; and captured whatever arms and ammunition they could find. After this rampage they gathered along one of the parish roads and barricaded it, "creating a little fort." There they waited.[47]

In the meantime some Westmoreland militiamen had hastily assembled. Undisciplined and poorly trained, the unit was ill-prepared for the task at hand.[48] Nevertheless, after discovering the whereabouts of the small rebel force, the colonials decided to assault the barricade. Now the experience of the Guadaloupe group paid off for the insur-

gents. Militiamen rushed directly into withering fire. The heavy barrage from behind the makeshift wall "butchered" some of the men. They panicked. Officers could not control them. The little cohesion the unit had had evaporated. Some men broke bones leaping a precipice to safety. Others fled for their lives along the road. What was left of the troop "narrowly escaped being all cut off."[49]

This rebel victory over the militia solved the recruitment problem. News of what happened along the Westmoreland road must have spread very quickly. Plantation discipline collapsed, and district blacks in a short time swelled the insurgent numbers dramatically. Samuel Cleland, a Westmoreland attorney, reported early in June that "most" of Forrest's slaves were then in rebellion as well as "all Geo. Williams' and Jones' and most of Woodcock's . . . and a great many from other plantations to the amount of near 1000 Negroes."[50] James Barclay of Westmoreland believed the rebellion involved 1,100 slaves.[51] Reports submitted to the colonial Assembly by parish residents maintained that the rebels numbered at least one thousand.[52] Edward Long's recollection sustained these estimates. The militia defeat encouraged wider rebellion, he wrote: "The whole number very soon amounted to upwards of a thousand, including their women . . . ."[53]

In one instance slaves joined the revolt in what must have been an odd circumstance. A proprietor who enjoyed a reputation for kind and humane treatment among his

laborers believed he could rely on some slaves to keep the rest under control. Accordingly, he distributed arms and powder to twenty African-borns, instructing them to police the plantation. But, once armed, these trusted blacks informed him that, while they meant him no harm, they nevertheless intended to aid the rebels. They simply walked off the property with their new weapons and, presumably, melted into Westmoreland's growing black army.[54]

As the insurrectionary force increased, Lieutenant Governor Moore reinstated martial law and sent reinforcements to the distressed parish. Regulars under Captain Forsyth, a veteran of the recent struggle in St. Mary, as well as a party of Leeward Maroons, arrived in Westmoreland. Fresh militiamen from various districts also came to help suppress the revolt. How was this to be done? Forsyth determined to move immediately and directly against the rebel barricade, the regulars leading the assault. He deployed the Maroons deep in the woods on both sides of the road to guard against ambush and directed the militiamen to protect the rear. The troops and rebels clashed during the first week of June. As the regulars moved against the barricade, the insurgents shot "incessantly" at them. A soldier was wounded. The troops held their fire until near the barricade and then let loose a concerted volley, killing some rebels and driving the rest into the wooded hillside along the road. But the regulars did not pursue the retreating insurgents. Instead, they began searching the ramshackle

rebel huts for food and drink, and, successful, they ate and rested. The blacks seized the advantage this blunder offered. From the hill above the road they rained heavy fire down on their old encampment. While the entrapped soldiers took cover, Maroons slowly ascended the hill from the other side. The dense foliage concealed their movements. At length they struck the rebels from the rear, killing some and taking many prisoners. This action ended the battle along the Westmoreland road.[55]

Edward Long exaggerated the importance of this engagement. Writing that escaping rebels subsequently remained on the defensive, that their numbers dwindled, and that many even committed suicide, he concluded that the battle broke the back of the revolt.[56] Other sources, however, do not sustain this judgment. Rather, they indicate that the surviving rebel force remained formidable. On June 10, for example, Samuel Cleland of Westmoreland wrote that "there is at this instant a dreadful rebellion of the Negroes in this parish," despite the facts that "about 100 of them" had been killed "and many come in."[57] Eight days later James Barclay, another Westmoreland resident, reported that "the greatest rebellion that ever was known is now in this parish," even though he estimated that about three hundred insurgents had been slain.[58] In fact, rebel strength remained such that colonial military operations in Westmoreland continued for several months.[59]

If the battle along the Westmoreland road failed to

smother the rebellion, of what significance was it? First, it hindered further rebel recruitment. "Many other negroes would have joined them," Samuel Cleland observed, "but the party pursuit that was made after the rebels certainly prevented it."[60] Secondly, it fragmented, at least to some extent, the insurgent force. One group, for instance, led by a rebel named Damon, trekked eastward and established itself for a year or more at Mile Gully near Carpenter's Mountain in Clarendon.[61] Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it transformed the character of the revolt. Never again did the rebels risk a pitched battle with colonial forces. Instead, the many fugitives at large found safety in Westmoreland's hills and from those natural bastions waged guerrilla warfare against militiamen and regulars for nearly the remainder of the year.

While these events unfolded in Jamaica's western region, actual and abortive uprisings elsewhere alarmed the whites. "Ther [sic] is a turbulent and rebellious spirit among them [the slaves]," wrote Samuel Cleland, and "it may be observed all over the island."[62] Early in June, while Westmoreland's blacks gathered in large numbers at the barricaded road, incipient rebellion was suppressed in St. John. Slaves on the Langher property in Lluidas Vale planned to break into the Great House, seize the arms stored there, and spark a more general insurrection. Three informers alerted whites at Langher, however, and the conspirators were apprehended before implementing their scheme.

They were given a trial of sorts and found guilty. Those "who turned evidence" were transported from the island, and the rest executed.[63] At about the same time another conspiracy to revolt was uncovered at Manchioneal in the easternmost part of the island. A slave named Coffee betrayed would-be rebels who had confided in him. As many as sixty blacks were believed involved in the plot.[64] Around mid-June a violent insurrection erupted but was quashed at Thomas Hall's Tryall estate in Hanover.[65] In the latter part of the month an abortive revolt in St. Dorothy was smothered, "and the partizans secured."[66]

Neither black unrest nor white fear confined itself to the rural regions. In Kingston white anxieties concerned a mysterious slave woman named Cubah. Urban slaves deferred to her, perhaps because she had once enjoyed status in West Africa or because she now practiced <u>obeah</u>. In any case, they called her "the Queen of Kingston." "At their meetings," wrote Long, "she sat in state under a canopy, with a sort of robe on her shoulders, and a crown upon her head."[67] As tensions mounted throughout June, whites became convinced that Cubah was the leading figure in a plot to revolt. Matters came to a head in late June or early July. A "wooden sword" was discovered, "a peculiar structure, with a red feather stuck in the handle," which, whites believed, served "as a signal for war" among Gold Coast Africans. White Kingstonians rounded up suspects, including Cubah, who was transported from Jamaica.[68]

In July rebellion broke out in St. James. One observer later recalled that it "threatened to become very formidable."[69] Unleashed first at the Gordon estate at Windsor, the revolt spread to the Barnett, Ewing, and Dunbar properties.[70] In a short time the rebels were drawing recruits from as far away as the Rose Hall estate east of Montego Bay, transforming that stretch of Jamaica's north shore which nowadays is a popular resort into battleground.[71] News of this outbreak deepened the anxieties of the master class. "We have had an agonizing (?) time of it for this month past," wrote Samuel Cleland.[72] Captain Forsyth in Westmoreland dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Robert Spragge, a twenty-year veteran of Jamaican service, and a force of regulars to the scene. General Norwood Witter of the militia and some of his men accompanied the troops on a forced march along the Savanna-La-Mar--Montego Bay road. The insurgents struck these forces hard as they approached Montego Bay, but the latter sharply counterattacked and dispersed the blacks, most of whom escaped into the hills.[73] By coincidence many of the St. James fugitives met and joined Damon's refugee band from Westmoreland, then moving east toward Clarendon.[74] These fortunate individual survived for some time.[75] Others, however, were not so lucky. Even before troops and militia arrived in the parish, plantation slaves implicated in the plot were jailed and executed.[76] After the dispersal of the rebels twenty more were executed, and others were deported from the island.[77] By

the end of July St. James had been pacified.

In St. Mary, meanwhile, three splinters from Tacky's original force remained at large, hiding and trying to survive. Scott's Hall Maroons, now accompanied by parish militia, hunted them. In July the colonial forces trapped one of the rebel remnants, including Tacky and his friend Jamaica. The fugitives could neither resist nor escape. Jamaica was killed. Tacky, unarmed and separated from his companions, tried to flee.[78] Davy, a Maroon officer, gave chase and, drawing close to the rebel leader from behind, raised his musket and shot Tacky in the back of the head.[79] In fact, the chieftain's head was severed, delivered to the colonial capital, and impaled upon a pole along what is now the Spanish Town Road.[80]

News of Tacky's death must have reached and disspirited the other rebel fragments still lurking in the St. Mary forests. Both groups acted, but in different ways. The larger, about twenty-five men, gathered at Down's Cave and committed mass suicide.[81] The other surreptitiously contacted a St. Mary planter named Gordon, someone the rebels evidently trusted, and offered to surrender on the condition that the colonial government deport rather than execute the fugitive band. Lieutenant Governor Moore approved this arrangement. The rebels, accordingly, gave up and were subsequently transported from Jamaica for sale, probably at the Bay of Honduras.[82]

The St. Mary revolt was over, but the colony was far

from pacified. While the August sun seared the island, disorder persisted in three regions. Some fugitives still eluded capture in St. James, and rebel refugees from that parish and from Westmoreland, under Damon's leadership, hid at Mile Gully in Clarendon. The area of major conflict, however, remained Westmoreland. There a large rebel force in the mountains stalemated the militiamen, Maroons, and regular troops assigned to crush it.

On Thursday, September 18, Jamaica's House of Assembly convened for the first time since the outbreak of the rebellions. Lieutenant Governor Moore informed the legislators that "the various scenes of distress, occassioned by the insurrections which broke out in so many different parts of the country" might have warranted summoning them sooner. In his judgment, however, colonial security had been so threatened in the preceding months that each member's presence had been needed in his district "to prevent the spreading of an evil so dangerous in its consequence to the whole island." He assured the Assembly that military personnel had performed well during the crisis and that order would shortly be restored in those regions where rebellion still persisted. He acknowledged the important aid rendered by the Navy, maintaining that its prompt actions helped frustrate rebel designs in a circumstance "where total destruction had been threatened." He regretted imposing martial law, especially for such a long period, since its burdens would be "severely felt" by everyone. He maintained, never-

theless, that it had been necessary. After reviewing recent events, Moore offered several recommendations to the lawmakers. He urged improving the island's defense posture by repairing forts and fortifications. He advocated buttoning up loopholes in the Militia Act in order to promote compliance rather than evasion. Here he digressed and launched into a bitterly anti-semitic speech, denouncing Kingston Jews as particularly unmindful of militia duty and the public welfare. Returning to his recommendations, he proposed revision of the slave laws to foster better discipline and prevent future violence.[83]

After Moore's report and proposals had been read, the Assembly began three months of work which, to the exclusion of almost everything else, dealt with the slavery crisis. As Edward Long remembered it, the Assembly's 1760 session concerned itself "with every measure that could be suggested, either for remedying the disorders under which the island had suffered so much" or "for baffling the machinations of future insurgents."[84] One of the first things the Assembly did was appoint a committee of five to examine the effectiveness of legislation concerning slave control.[85] The next day, September 19, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, the House determined "to enquire into and take into consideration the state of the island." It resolved:

> It is the opinion of this committee, that a committee should be appointed, to inspect all such laws as are relative to the fitting out parties [sic], for the suppression of former rebellions in the windward parts of the island . . . [and] . . . that a message be sent

> to his honour the Lieutenant Governor, to desire that he would be pleased to give immediate orders for the proclaiming of martial law, in order to suppress the present rebellion in the leeward parts of the island.[86]

To implement these resolutions, the House assigned another committee to examine the militia system and the laws governing it and formally petitioned Henry Moore to reimpose the martial law which had lapsed sometime earlier. The Lieutenant Governor responded affirmatively, agreeing fully "in the necessity of laying on martial law again, and continuing it until the rebels are entirely reduced, or until such time as the legislature shall establish some means of vesting the officers of the militia with power sufficient to enforce their orders, without distressing the country by martial law."[87] Accordingly, for the fourth time in 1760 martial law prevailed.

On September 20 the committee investigating the militia laws reported that eight enactments since 1696 concerned the muster and the fitting out of volunteer parties, but that none was "properly adapted for the purpose of suppressing the present rebellion" in Westmoreland.[88] Two days later the House heard a similarly pessimistic report on the effectiveness of laws against "the enticing or inveighling of slaves." Committee Chairman Edwardes maintained that existing statutes were unenforceable and largely ignored throughout the island.[89] The House, accordingly, instructed both committees to devise new and effective legislation.[90] On September 23 the Assembly appointed a third

committee to investigate the condition of colonial forts and fortifications and at the same time resolved to reenact the Deficiency Law.[91] In summary, by the end of September the Assembly was wrestling in various ways with the problem of providing Jamaica with greater internal security. But in the meantime, with martial law again in effect, the military situation in Westmoreland remained stalemated.

On October 2 William Hynes, a Kingston wheelwright and veteran of militia duty in St. Mary earlier in the year, sought a commission to raise a hundred free black volunteers for service in Westmoreland. Hynes promised, "for the satisfaction of the public," to sever the head of every rebel he caught or killed and to display the trophies in the nearest town.[92] The next day the Assembly approved Hynes's application, passing a bill authorizing him to lead a party of blacks against the Westmoreland rebels.[93] The Council passed the measure as well, and on October 2 Lieutenant Governor Moore signed into law "An Act for Raising a Voluntary Party to Suppress the Present Rebellion in the Leeward Parishes of this Island."[94] Hynes gathered his volunteers and shortly afterward marched to Westmoreland.

Hynes's mission, of course, was to assist as much as possible the militia, Maroon, and regular troops bogged down in the west. The Assembly was bent on giving those forces all possible aid. On October 7, for example, it urged each of the parishes of St. Catherine, Clarendon, Vere, St. Elizabeth, St. James, St. Mary, and St. Ann to send "a party of

thirty white and black shot" together with thirty "baggage negroes" to Westmoreland as quickly as possible.[95] It is doubtful that any of these parishes responded, however, and, as a result, the only reinforcements colonial forces received in October were Hynes's volunteers. When Hynes and his men reached Westmoreland in about the middle of the month, they found that despite skirmishes now and then, the rebels held fast to their mountain retreats. The Kingston wheelwright and his black volunteers then launched what would nowadays be called counter-insurgency warfare. They tracked individual suspects and killed individual rebels or those in small groups of two or three. Psychological warfare constituted part of Hynes's campaign. The decapitation of rebels caught or killed was designed to terrorize and intimidate the insurgents as much as it was to satisfy white vengeance. Despite Hynes's atrocities and his belief that he had waged a successful campaign, his efforts made little impact on the ultimate outcome in Westmoreland. Only on one occasion did Hynes and his men score a combat victory. One night he assaulted a rebel hideout of considerable size, killing some insurgents and capturing at least a dozen others.[96] Nonetheless, the stalemated military situation remained unchanged.

At Spanish Town the Assembly continued working on crisis-related matters. For example, it awarded Thomas Monsell of Westmoreland £100 for issuing arms and powder and guarding prisoners at Savanna-La-Mar.[97] On October 11 it

appropriated £450 to the Windward Maroons for their services in St. Mary earlier that year.[98] Ten days later it finally passed a new slave bill and sent it to the Council for approval.[99] If the legislators felt themselves laboring under pressure, black rioting, which erupted in Kingston at the end of October and continued intermittently for almost two weeks, undoubtedly increased the tension.[100] But the Assembly pressed forward, and on November 19 it voted compensation to masters whose slaves had been executed for participation in the rebellions or insurrectionary conspiracies.[101]

While the Assembly legislated and military action quelled the Kingston disturbances, the situation in Westmoreland changed. In the strictest secrecy General Witter of the militia began negotiating with the rebels in the hope of ending the stalemate. It is not clear whether Witter or the insurgents initiated these talks. But the discussions led to a possible agreement involving a simple quid pro quo. In exchange for the safe transport of fifteen black leaders, the remaining insurgents would cease hostilities, abandon their hideaways, and return to their plantations. Witter, of course, had no authority to approve and implement this bargain, but he confidentially made Lieutenant Governor Moore aware of its terms. The latter, also acting in the greatest secrecy, accepted the arrangement. When Witter informed the rebels of Moore's approval, insurgents began disbanding and came down from the hills. Moore, for his part, pardoned the fifteen leaders and provided for their deporta-

tion. By the first week in December the Westmoreland rebellion was over.[102]

News of the deal outraged the Assembly. It talked of censuring General Witter and sharply criticized Lieutenant Governor Moore for granting the pardons.[103] But Assembly wrath soon gave way to acquiescence, reflecting the underlying attitude of many representatives that the alternative to a deal had been perpetuation of the military stalemate and martial law, both of which undermined the reputation and general welfare of the island. By December 17 the Assembly dropped all discussion of censure and at least acknowledged that although Witter may have acted unwisely, he had done so "with good intentions."[104]

Despite order and quiet in Westmoreland colonials could not be complacent. Fresh news of rebellious conspiracies reminded them, if, indeed, they needed reminders, of the volatile condition in which they lived. On December 5 the Assembly learned that an incipient revolt in St. Thomas in the East had been quashed.[105] Three days later it was informed of another abortive uprising, this one in St. John.[106] Intelligence of this sort simply spurred the Assembly forward in its legislative efforts to provide greater internal security. On December 9 the House voted cash rewards for the blacks who had helped suppress the Westmoreland revolt.[107] It appropriated funds for the upkeep of forts, fortifications, and arms and ammunition supplies.[108] But measures like these did not and could not provide the

genuine security the islanders wanted. The colony required military might greater than that which it could obtain locally. The legislators recognized this fact, and in the final days of the session they addressed themselves to this problem. "The insufficiency of the number of the regular troops in this island hath," the Assembly declared, "by fatal experience, in the late dangerous rebellions, been fully evinced."[109] On December 15 the Assembly formally petitioned Lieutenant Governor Moore to use his influential office to obtain an augmentation of the regulars serving in Jamaica. It specifically urged him to secure the recall of one company from the 49th Regiment then on duty at the Mosquito Shore and of another from the 74th stationed along the West African coast.[110]

In the meantime the Council had passed and sent to the Lieutenant Governor for approval, the Assembly's bills on the militia, deficiency, and slave control. The last of these was the most important legislation of the session. On December 18 Moore signed into law "An Act to Remedy the Evils Arising from the Irregular Assemblies of Slaves." "Whereas," the law began, "there hath lately been very dangerous rebellions and rebellious conspiracies amongst the slaves of this island," new regulations concerning plantation discipline were necessary:[111]

1. Under penalty of lashing, no slave was to leave his plantation without the written permission of his master.

2. Any white who permitted drum-beating or use of the abeng (a slave horn) among his slaves was liable to six months imprisonment.

3. Slave holidays were restricted to Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide.

4. Security on plantations was to be sufficiently tight to deny slaves access to guns, bayonets, "or any other military offensive weapon." Whites violating this provision were subject to a fine of £100.

5. The practice of obeah was punishable by death or deportation.

6. Free Negroes and mulattoes were required to register with their parish vestry and receive both a certificate and a badge of freedom, the latter to be worn at all times. Violators were liable to six months in jail.

7. Slaves deported from Jamaica were never to return.[112]

The next day, December 19, the House of Assembly adjourned, and its members began going home for Christmas. One can only wonder what thoughts gripped their minds as they made their lonely journeys back to their plantations and what pangs of fear they experienced with each black face they met along the roads or saw at work in the fields.

A Note on the Rebellions

Although Jamaican whites had coped with black rebellions before, the uprisings of 1760 seemed especially menacing. The chief source of "distress," in Henry Moore's judgment, was that "the insurrections . . . broke out in so many different parts of the country" almost simultaneously.[113] But no one could have been aware of this aspect of the 1760 phenomena before the end of May, since until then

the colonials had only confronted Tacky's revolt in St. Mary. Frequent and widespread disorders actually began in June, while the Westmoreland rebellion was gathering force, lasted into July, and then reoccurred in the final months of the year. Henry Moore's letter to the Secretary of State on April 24 is, therefore, of interest. Writing little more than a week after the Maroon victory over the insurgents near Heywood Hall, the Lieutenant Governor maintained:

> I am fully persuaded that the Insurrection began in St. Marys was intended to be general, by some discoveries which have been lately made and from the quantity of hidden Arms which have been found. Great numbers of suspected Negroes are now under confinement, who will soon be try'd and punish'd according to their Deserts.[114]

Moore's assertion that "the Insurrection" in St. Mary "was intended to be general" may be understood in several ways. For example, what does the word "intended" mean in this context? There are two possibilities: first, that Tacky and his original rebel band had hoped that their example would generate greater conflagration; or, secondly, that the St. Mary rebels had arranged for a wider rebellion before absconding to Port Maria. The difference is important because, if Moore's contention was correct, then, according to the first alternative, Tacky and his men depended on the spontaneous rising of other slaves whereas, according to the second, the rebel leader and his friends did not depend on spontaneity at all. To pose the question simply, did Tacky and his core of supporters recruit other rebels from the Port Maria area before or after the night of

April 8? The answer to this question bears on another ambiguity. What did Moore mean that the rebellion was "to be general?" Did he mean that Tacky either expected or had secured beforehand the support of slaves only in the area around Port Maria, or did the Lieutenant Governor believe that Tacky was more ambitious than that? Did "general" revolt mean most or all of the slaves in St. Mary, the Windward region, or all Jamaica? The resolution of these ambiguities would, of course, shed important light on the nature of the events of 1760.

But Moore did not provide enough information to clarify what he meant. He supported his assertion that "the Insurrection . . . was intended to be general" by alluding to "some discoveries which have been lately made" and to "the quantity of hidden Arms which have been found." But what were the "discoveries . . . lately made?" Moore's subsequent reference to the many black prisoners awaiting trial and punishment suggests that the "discoveries" derived, at least in part, from the interrogation of captured rebels. If so, one must wonder how truthful and unbiased the testimony of these unfortunate individuals was. For example, did the fatal circumstance in which captured insurgents found themselves encourage them to respond "correctly" to leading questions concerning the aim and extent of the conspiracy in order to seem cooperative and, perhaps, secure leniency as a result? If this, in fact, was the case, then rebel testimony, whatever it was, must be discounted. The

stockpiled weapons the colonials found, however, cannot be discounted. The hidden arms indeed indicate preplanning, but to what extent? The Lieutenant Governor did not suggest that weapons were found anywhere other than in St. Mary or, for that matter, anywhere other than in the area around Port Maria where Tacky and his followers rebelled. Where did the arms come from? Some at the time believed that French or even Spanish raiders had smuggled them into Jamaica to foment revolt.[115] But Edward Long, among others, rejected this theory. In his judgment "the heedless practice" of carelessly storing "large stands of firearms and cutlasses" without adequate plantation oversight had simply allowed the slaves to pilfer and collect them.[116] The provision of the 1760 slave law requiring rigid control over estate weapons supports Long's view.[117] In summary, whatever Henry Moore may have believed, he offered no evidence that Tacky's plot extended beyond the original group of conspirators who raided the fort at Port Maria.

All this is of considerable importance because fourteen years later Edward Long described the revolts of 1760 as the product of a single colony-wide conspiracy to overturn the island's slave system. Correctly observing that despite "some trifling disturbances" now and then the Maroon treaties had introduced Jamaica to a long period of internal peace, Long went on to assert:[118] "But in the year 1760, a conspiracy was projected, and conducted with such profound secrecy, that almost all the coromantin slaves throughout

the island were privy to it, without any suspicion from the whites."[119] The Coromantees, Long alleged, with their "martial ferocity," deliberately struck first in St. Mary because it was "thinly peopled with whites," and because it had "extensive woods, and plenty of provisions."[120] Accordingly, St. Mary offered the Coromantee "grand enterprize" the best chance of success. To the St. Ann planter, Coromantee objectives included "the entire extirpation of the white inhabitants; the enslaving of all such Negroes as might refuse to join them; and the partition of the island into small principalities in the African mode; to be distributed among their leaders and head men."[121] The virtual concurrence of widespread disorders and insurrections, wrote Long, "shew the great extent of the conspiracy, the strict correspondence which had been carried on by Coromantins in every quarter of the island, and their almost incredible secrecy in the forming their plan of insurrection; for it appeared in evidence, that the first eruption in St. Mary, was a matter preconcerted, and known to all the chief men in the different districts; and the secret was probably confided to some hundreds; for several months before the blow was struck."[122] Long concluded his narrative of the events of 1760 with this observation: "Thus terminated this rebellion; which whether we consider the extent and secrecy of its plan, the multitude of the conspirators, and the difficulty of opposing its eruptions in such a variety of different places at once, will appear to have been more formidable

than any hitherto known in the West Indies."[123]

Historians have repeated Long's single conspiracy theory ever since it first appeared in print in 1774. In the nineteenth century, for example, W. J. Gardner maintained that one conspiracy, masterminded by Tacky, caused all the revolts of 1760.[124] Recent scholarship has failed to reevaluate this thesis.[125] Orlando Patterson accepted it uncritically.[126] Eugene Genovese, following Patterson, refers to the 1760 uprisings as "Tacky's rebellion."[127] C. Roy Reynolds, a Jamaican writer, attributes to Tacky's genius the emergence of "an island-wide revolutionary organization" in 1760.[128]

It is remarkable that twentieth century scholars have accepted Long's thesis; other contemporary sources simply do not sustain his view. Henry Moore, for instance, who suspected some sort of "general" uprising in April did not reiterate this belief in September when he addressed the House of Assembly, despite the fact that in the interval Jamaica had endured several revolts and had uncovered four conspiracies. The Assembly too perceived not one but many "rebellions and rebellious conspiracies," as the preamble to the 1760 slave law indicates. Moreover, someone like Samuel Cleland, who realized that there was a "turbulent and rebellious spirit" among island slaves, apparently understood that each rebellion had been generated locally. Miserable living and working conditions as well as black numerical superiority were the underlying causes of rebellion. Rumors

concerning events elsewhere on the island, combined, perhaps, with special grievances on this or that plantation, sparked the conflagrations. Religion too, it seems, played some role in the events of 1760. Certainly myalism propagated the notion of Tacky's invulnerability and helped the St. Mary revolt to spread. White concern over Cubah's activities in Kingston and the 1760 slave law's prohibition against obeah (whites did not understand the difference between myalism and obeah) indicate that the colonials perceived a relationship between religion and the disturbances. In this sense Professor Genovese is correct in writing that "Myalism . . . became deeply implicated in such major risings as that of 1760 in Jamaica."[129] But the sources do not permit a more precise assessment of religion's role. It is not known that Tacky or the rebels in Westmoreland and elsewhere rebelled as a result of a commitment to or because of the pressures upon West African traditions.

The single conspiracy thesis affronts the informed common sense by which scholars usually judge historical circumstances and events. The integrity of Long's theory hinges on whether Tacky was able to communicate with and direct the activities of Gold Coast slaves all over the island. But effective communication for the purpose of coordinated activity, or for anything else for that matter, was not easily secured in eighteenth century Jamaica. Rugged terrain, dense vegetation, swollen rivers in rainy seasons--all these obstructed the flow of information and transporta-

tion in such ways that even the militia, not burdened--as the great conspirator Tacky would have been--by either secrecy or the inability to travel island highways freely, could not always function in concerted fashion. The proposition that Tacky overcame all these obstacles and spun a colony-wide web of insurrectionary conspiracy is simply incredible and should be discarded.[130] Tacky led the revolt in St. Mary but had nothing to do with uprisings in other parts of the island (although rumor and anxiety among the whites probably fostered disorders elsewhere). Indeed, the lack of central planning and coordinated rebel activity was a major reason why the 1760 uprisings failed. The Westmoreland revolt, after all, erupted seven weeks after Tacky's raid on Port Maria. Had these insurrections occurred simultaneously, the colonial government would have found its capacity to deal with such large disorders seriously strained.

The lack of an island-wide rebel plan of concerted action was only one reason why the revolts failed. There were others. First, the insurgents could not move about as freely or as quickly as the whites. Colonial expansion and settlement since 1739 had reduced the area of uninhabited territory, rendering the wild bush country more remote from the seacoast than ever before. As a consequence, safe escape to the peace and freedom of such places was no longer as easy an undertaking as it had been in earlier times. By 1760 flight to the wilderness demanded a long journey through settled regions and, as a consequence, required at

least a basic knowledge of Jamaican geography, topography, and population centers. African newcomers to the island, however, were unlikely to be familiar with the distribution of the white population and the layout of the land. From this perspective Damon's odyssey to Clarendon's interior was a remarkable achievement. But in general these circumstances confined the rebels to the districts near their work sites.

The whites, on the other hand, enjoyed a great degree of maneuverability. Not only did they know the island's geography and terrain, but they had access to an avenue of communication and transportation completely denied to the blacks: the sea. It will be remembered, for example, that the navy played an important role during the crisis in St. Mary. More importantly, the whites controlled the roads. Two factors accounted for this. First, because they were well supplied with arms and ammunition and were assisted by regulars and Maroons, the provincials mustered superior power along vital transportation arteries and secured them. Second, mounted units traversed these highways quickly, permitting the whites to offset with speed their inferiority in numbers. The horses themselves were, of course, imposing weapons against rebel footmen.

Restricted maneuverability created another problem for the rebels. Since it forced them into defensive positions, whether the forests of St. Mary or the hills of Westmoreland, the insurgents found themselves cut off from nec-

essary supplies. Food was scarce. Ackee, mango, and breadfruit, provisions so commonly available in rural Jamaica today, were not introduced to the island until after 1775. Moreover, while ensconced in their natural fortifications, the blacks could not replace dwindling supplies of shot and powder. These difficulties were likely among the reasons why the Westmoreland rebels ultimately negotiated an end to their revolt.

Resupply problems, however, did not burden the colonials. They continually maintained access to and control over food, weapons, and munition stores. As the need arose, they rushed food and equipment to stricken areas by land and sea. Although the whites, for obvious reasons, deemed a long struggle undesirable, they were in a better position to fight one than the rebels.

While disorganization as well as space and supply shortages undermined the rebellions, they did not altogether destroy black chances for victory. Other conditions also thwarted rebel success. Internal divisions among the slaves eroded black unity and seriously damaged rebel prospects. The proud and clannish Coromantees from the Gold Coast constituted a distinct element within Jamaican slave society and, as it happened, provided the leadership and most of the manpower for the revolts.[131] In this sense the rebellions of 1760 were not merely black rebellions, but rebellions of one ethnic group within the black community. Monica Schuler, who has investigated ethnicity among Caribbean

slave populations, maintains that the Coromantees discriminated against other slaves, creating a reservoir of dissatisfied ethnic minorities within the black society. Some of the latter, she speculates, were "pushed . . . over to the side of the Europeans."[132] The so-called "faithful" slave informed on conspirators as a consequence of these ethnic antagonisms.[133] Schuler's thesis explains the repeated betrayals of conspirators by other slaves, especially Creoles, in 1760. Schuler concluded: "Ethnic slave rebellions . . . although persistent and in some cases spectacular in terms of initial surprise and success were not effective in the long run."[134]

The chief factor which doomed the 1760 revolts to failure were the Maroon treaties of 1738-1739. In the first place, under these agreements the Maroons fought side by side with the whites. Despite their occasional lapses in enthusiasm, as in St. Mary after the battle at Heywood Hall, the Maroons were an important colonial ally. Not only did they provide the provincials additional fire power, but their intimate knowledge of island terrain enabled these skilled guerrilla fighters to give relentless pursuit to rebels on the run. But of far greater importance to the outcome of the revolts than Maroon service was the fact that the treaties redefined what a successful Jamaican slave rebellion constituted. Before 1739 mere escape to the well supplied and secure mountain men meant freedom. After 1739, however, a successful rebellion was either one of two

things: first, a safe escape to the wilderness and successful reduplication of the Maroon experience of creating independent, self-sufficient, viable societies; or, second, the total destruction of the society and institutions upholding the slave system. The fact that the rebels of 1760 found their maneuverability restricted rendered the former an unlikely possibility; the latter, of course, was an exceedingly formidable, though not impossible, task. In summary, the Maroon treaties sharply narrowed the options available to the rebels of 1760 and, consequently, made the insurgents' quest for liberty nearly futile. Jamaican white society was far more secure than it realized.

Although Jamaica's 1760 revolts failed, it would be incorrect to assume that they were without consequence. The costs were staggering. In the eight months of nearly continuous revolt between three and four hundred blacks died. Some had been killed in action; others had committed suicide; still others had been caught and executed for their participation. Total slave losses, including those who were deported, were "not less than one thousand."[135] The large number of rebels transported and sold, probably to the British loggers at the Bay of Honduras, represented an effort by the colony to defray in part the cost of compensating whites whose slaves had been executed. White fatalities amounted to about sixty. Total property losses in slaves, buildings, cane, and cattle reached an incredible £100,000.[136] Suppressing the rebellions cost the colonial government

£15,000.[137] To finance the resulting provincial debt, the Jamaica Assembly enacted a special tax--a stamp tax--to raise revenue. It renewed this measure in 1761 and again in 1762 but discontinued it after 1763.[138]

The rebellions also entailed hidden costs. Embargoes imposed during the frequent periods of martial law not only damaged island commerce but delayed sugar and rum shipments which were often timed to secure the best possible prices in the British market. Although these circumstances created hardship, the embargoes were designed to prevent what many considered a more severe and potent threat to the island's economy. News of widespread local disorders would discourage investment in Jamaica and make credit difficult to obtain. "Those rebellions will hurt the credit of this island," Samuel Cleland wrote, "as a mans [sic] whole interest may thereby be at once destroyed."[139] The embargoes, accordingly, constituted news blackouts.[140] (During an insurrection scare sixteen years later Simon Clarke of Lucea advocated embargo in order to suppress local news and protect Jamaica's credit.)[141]

The guarded optimism which had characterized white society and promoted expansion and growth in the years after 1739 suffered as a result of the revolts. Internal security became one of the colony's preoccupations. When the Jamaica Assembly convened in 1761, the problem still consumed much of its time. On April 3, in a memorial congratulating George III on his recent accession to the throne, the Assem-

bly asked the new King to augment the island's military force. "We are every day more and more convinced of the absolute necessity of such an addition," the House declared, "for the preservation of this valuable island, and the safety of the lives and properties of Your Majesty's loyal subjects."[142] Later in the year the Assembly explored ways to secure "further and better governing and regulating of slaves" as well as means "to prevent the concealment of slaves offending against the laws."[143] Although the Assembly learned late in November that the Clarendon fugitives under Damon had been finally captured or killed, this news did not allay the delegates' fears.[144] Within a week the legislators found out that, with the aid of an informer, incipient revolt in St. Elizabeth had been suppressed.[145] By the end of the 1761 session the Assembly had amended the slave legislation of the preceding year by imposing heavier fines and stiffer prison penalties.[146]

NOTES

[1]Beckford, Descriptive Account, I, xx.

[2]For more on the French raids see ch. 5.

[3]Despite recent interest in such matters contemporary scholarship, as Michael Craton has pointed out, has largely ignored Jamaica's 1760 slave revolts. Craton, "Jamaican Slavery," Engerman and Genovese, eds., Race and Slavery, 272n. 52. Craton himself briefly discusses the uprisings in Sinews of Empire, 166, 228. Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 271, provides a single and inadequate paragraph on the subject. C. Roy Reynolds, "Tacky and the Great Slave Rebellion of 1760," Jamaica Journal, 6(June, 1972), 5-8, is misleading. Critical of Reynolds is Carl A. Lane, "Concerning Jamaica's 1760 Slave Rebellions," Jamaica Journal, 7(December, 1973), 2-4. Nineteenth century writers who studied the revolts were also few. The two most prominent were George Wilson Bridges, Annals of Jamaica (London: 1828), 91-103, and W. J. Gardner, A History of Jamaica (London: 1873), 132-35. But Bridges and Gardner largely repeated what Edward Long and Bryan Edwards had written. The latter were contemporaries of the revolts, but their recollections of events and interpretation of them were faulty, especially Edwards'. The latter, who relied heavily on Long, was especially biased against the Maroons. Abbe Raynal, the eighteenth century French historian, confused the St. Mary insurrections of 1760 and 1765. Raynal, A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies (6 vols., New York: 1969), 59-60.

[4]Long, History, II, 457n. y.

[5]Ibid., II, 448.

[6]Ibid., II, 448.

[7]Ibid., II, 448.

[8]Ibid., II, 448-49.

[9]Ibid., II, 449.

[10]Ibid., II, 449.

[11]Ibid., II, 450.

[12]Ibid., II, 450. According to Edwards, eight or nine rebels were killed in this skirmish. Bryan Edwards, "Introduction" to The Proceedings of the Governor and Assembly of Jamaica, in regard to the Maroon Negroes (Westport, Conn.: 1970), xxxv.

[13]Henry Moore to the Secretary of State, April 19, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI. The slave messengers came from either Whitehall or Frontier estate.

[14]Minutes of the Council, April 10, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid. Also, Council Minutes, April 17, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI. From the early 1730's there had been a barrack at Bagnell Thicket in St. Mary, an outpost against Maroon incursions. Edwards, "Introduction" to The Proceedings, vi.

[19]Minutes of the Council, April 10, 1760.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Long, History, II, 450.

[22]Ibid., II, 451; Edwards, "Introduction" to The Proceedings, xxxv.

[23]Long, History, II, 451.

[24]Minutes of the Council, April 17, 1760.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Long, History, II, 451-52.

[27]Ibid., II, 451-52; Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 186. Contemporaries attributed this belief to obeah, or voodoo, and Patterson maintains that this "art" played a role in the 1760 uprisings. Ibid., 192. But Patterson's own analysis of the difference between obeah and myalism suggests that the former was not involved in the invulnerability myth. Obeah was (and still is) sorcery practiced by an individual to harm another. Myalism, on the other hand, was a group activity aimed at protection from evil. Ibid., 188. Also see the discussion in Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll (New York: 1974), 171-73.

[28]Long, History, II, 416-18. It should be noted that blacks did not attribute invulnarability to members of their race alone. The Leeward Maroons, for example, believed that Ranger Captain John James, one of their great enemies before 1738, was invulnerable to all flesh wounds. They also believed that his son, the younger John James, appointed Superintendant of the Trelawny Town group in 1763, was similarly invulnerable. Dallas, History of the Maroons, I, 131.

[29]Long, History, II, 451.

[30]Ibid., II, 452.

[31]Ibid., II, 452.

[32]Minutes of the Council, April 17, 1760.

[33]Long, History, II, 451.

[34]Ibid., II, 457.

[35]Ibid., II, 457; Minutes of the Council, April 17, 1760.

[36]Minutes of the Council, April 17, 1760.

[37]Ibid.

[38]*Ibid*.

[39]*Ibid*.

[40]Precisle how dilatory and dishonest the Maroons were in 1760 became a matter of controversy more than thirty-five years later. When London investigated the outbreak of the second Maroon War in 1796 and the circumstances surrounding the deportation of the Windward group to Nova Scotia, defenders and detractors of the Maroons jumped into the breach. Bryan Edwards, for example, who maintained that he was an eyewitness to events in St. Mary, portrayed Maroon behavior as outright duplicity and cowardice. He even accused the mountain men of Cannibalism. R.C. Dallas, however, who even sought the aid of Edwards' notes, maintained that the Maroons "stood forth with a determined spirit against the insurgents" and "in the conflicts of the year 1760, lost several of their men." Edwards, *History, Civil and Commercial*, I, 543-45 and "Introduction" to *The Proceedings*, xxxvi-xxxvii; Dallas, *History of the Maroons*, I, 102. This post-1760 debate defamed the Maroons. It has also made it difficult for historians to reconstruct exactly what happened in the St. Mary woods following the battle near Heywood Hall.

[41]Edwards, "Introduction" to *The Proceedings*, xxxvi.

[42]*Ibid*., xxxvi-xxxvii. Edwards' references to Major Forsyth and the 74th Regimental unit appear incorrect.

[43]Henry Moore to the Secretary of State, April 24, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[44]*Ibid*.

[45]Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, June 10, 1760, West India Reference Library, Institute of Jamaica, Kingston, Cleland Letter File; Long, *History*, II, 452. After the death of Admiral Charles Holmes in 1761, Forrest became Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Jamaica Naval Station. He served in that capacity until April, 1762. Pares, *War and Trade*, 616. Hoare, who had been severely wounded, survived the attack.

[46]Long, *History*, II, 452.

[47]*Ibid*., II, 453.

[48]Ibid., II, 453.

[49]Ibid., II, 453.

[50]Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, June 10 1760, Cleland Letters.

[51]James Barclay to Thomas Hall, June 18, 1760, West India Reference Library, Institute of Jamaica, Kingston, Barclay Letter File.

[52]Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica (47 vols., Spanish Town: 1829), V, 210-11. Hereafter cited simply as Assembly Journals.

[53]Long, History, II, 453.

[54]Ibid., II, 452.

[55]Ibid., II, 454.

[56]Ibid., II, 454.

[57]Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, June 10, 1760, Cleland Letters.

[58]James Barclay to Thomas Hall, June 18, 1760, Barclay Letters.

[59]See Assembly Journals, V, 161-248.

[60]Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, June 10, 1760, Cleland Letters.

[61]Long, History, II, 456. Today the place is Sixteen Mile Gully in the parish of Manchester.

[62]Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, June 10, 1760, Cleland Letters.

[63]Long, History, II, 455.

[64]Ibid., II, 455; Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, June 10, 1760, Cleland Letters.

[65]James Barclay to Thomas Hall, June 18, 1760, Barclay Letters.

[66]Long, History, II, 455.

[67]Ibid., II, 455.

[68]Ibid., II, 455. The captain who transported Cubah released her on the west coast where rebellion still flared. Her return was discovered, however, and she was apprehended and executed.

[69]Ibid., II, 456.

[70]Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, July 21, 1760, Cleland Letters.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Long, History, II, 456; Lt. Col. Robert Spragge to William Henry Lyttelton, April 19, 1762, C.O. Papers 137: 61, II.

[74]Long, History, II, 456.

[75]Ibid., II, 456. While this enlarged rebel band sought refuge in Clarendon, a parish white armed a dozen of his slaves and sent them in search of the insurgents whose arrival in the district had been learned. The armed twelve, however, deserted to the rebels. Clarendon militiamen also hunted the fugitives, but Damon and many of his men avoided capture and defeat until November, 1761. Ibid., II, 456-57; Assembly Journals, V, 306.

[76]Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, July 21, 1760, Cleland Letters.

[77]Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, July 31, 1760, ibid.

[78]Long, History, II, 456; Edwards, "Introduction" to The Proceedings, xxxviii and note. Edwards maintained that he was present at this final encounter.

[79]Long, History, II, 457; Edwards, "Introduction" to The Proceedings, xxxviii.

[80]Long, History, II, 457; Edwards, "Introduction" to The Proceedings, xxxviii. The reports of Maroon cannibalism, referred to in note 40 above, concern the circumstances surrounding Tacky's death. The white assault on the reputation and integrity of the Maroons in the 1790's included the allegation that besides decapitating the rebel leader, the Windward Maroons ate his heart and entrails. There is no reason to believe such assertions. The Maroons, quite simply, were not cannibals.

Legend has it that admiring and sympathetic slaves stole Tacky's severed head and gave it a decent burial.

If what happened to Tacky was brutal, he at least suffered very little. His compatriots, Fortune and Kingston, were captured alive. Delivered to Kingston's parade ground, they were hung in irons on a gibbet. One took a week to die, the other nine days. Long, History, II, 458.

[81]Long, History, II, 458.

[82]Ibid., II, 458.

[83]Quoted in ibid., II, 458-60.

[84]Ibid., II, 464-65.

[85]Assembly Journals, V, 163.

[86]Ibid., V, 164.

[87]Ibid., V, 164.

[88]Ibid., V, 165.

[89]Ibid., V, 165.

[90]Ibid., V, 165.

[91]Ibid., V, 167. Because several of the uprisings had started on the properties of non-residents, the legislation enacted in 1760 increased the deficiency fines to which absentees were liable.

[92]Assembly Journals, V, 177; Long, History, II, 461.

[93]Assembly Journals, V, 178.

[94]Ibid., V, 179.

[95]Ibid., V, 179.

[96]Long, History, II, 461. Hynes was eventually awarded £562 12s. 6d. for his services. Ibid., II, 462.

[97]Assembly Journals, V, 179.

[98]Ibid., V, 181.

[99]Ibid., V, 183.

[100]Ibid., V, 217.

[101]Ibid., V, 215. Appropriations from the colonial treasury were to imburse owners the assessed value of their executed slaves, provided that no award exceeded £40.

[102]Ibid., V, 232-33. The fifteen pardoned leaders had accomplished something unique in the history of post-1739 slave revolts in Jamaica. They had fought the master class to a stand-off, and for this reason their names should be remembered: Blackberry, Peter, Primus, Davy, Bristol, Leicester, Prince, Jonathan, Robin, Adjaquao, Isaac, Tackey, Quamina (alias Gubbee), Jack, and Boatswain. Ibid., V, 232.

[103]Ibid., V, 232-33.

[104]Ibid., V, 246.

[105]Ibid., V, 231.

[106]Ibid., V, 234.

[107]Ibid., V, 236.

[108]Long, History, II, 463-64.

[109]Assembly Journals, V, 244.

[110]*Ibid.*, V, 244; Long, *History*, II, 464.

[111]"An Act to Remedy the Evils Arising from the Irregular Assemblies of Slaves, December 18, 1760," West India Reference Library, Institute of Jamaica, Kingston.

[112]*Ibid.*

[113]Quoted in Long, *History*, II, 458.

[114]Henry Moore to the Secretary of State, April 24, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[115]Long, *History*, II, 456.

[116]*Ibid.*, II, 443, 456.

[117]"An Act to Remedy the Evils Arising . . . ."

[118]Long, *History*, II, 447.

[119]*Ibid.*, II, 447.

[120]*Ibid.*, II, 446-47.

[121]*Ibid.*, II, 447.

[122]*Ibid.*, II, 455-56.

[123]*Ibid.*, II, 462.

[124]Gardner, *History of Jamaica*, 132-35.

[125]An exception is Lane, "Concerning Jamaica's 1760 Slave Rebellions," 2-4.

[126]Patterson, *Sociology of Slavery*, 271.

[127]Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll*, 589.

[128]Reynolds, "Tacky and the Great Slave Rebellion of 1760," 5.

[129]Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll, 173.

[130]It could be argued that drums and abengs provided the slaves a means of communication. The 1760 slave law's prohibition of these instruments supports such a contention. But although these devices probably served as signals in one district or another, it is far from conceivable that conspiratorial planning traversed Jamaica's air all over the island.

[131]Long, History, II, 445-46; also, pp. 108-09 of this essay.

[132]Schuler, "Ethnic Slave Rebellions," 384.

[133]Ibid., 384.

[134]Ibid., 385.

[135]Long, History, II, 462.

[136]Ibid., II, 462; Martin, The Colonies, 1.

[137]Long, History, II, 462.

[138]Jamaica's local stamp tax will be closely examined in ch. VII.

[139]Samuel Cleland to Thomas Hall, July 31, 1760, Cleland Letters.

[140]Herbert Aptheker's American Negro Slave Revolts (New York: 1943) does not deal with revolts or rebellious conspiracies beyond the mainland colonies which later became the United States. Aptheker, however, quoted the South Carolina Gazette, May 30, 1760: "Good Reasons have been suggested to us, for not inserting in this Paper any Account of Insurrections, especially at this time." Aptheker speculated that the remark concerned Cherokee Indian activities which caused restlessness among Carolina slaves. Ibid., 197n. 98. But in view of the publication date, one must wonder whether the remark referred to Jamaican affairs. If so, the comment reflects the concern that widespread publicity of the revolts might endanger the island's reputation.

[141]Sheridan, "The Jamaican Slave Insurrection Scare of 1776," 296.

[142]Assembly Journals, V, 256.

[143]Ibid., V, 273.

[144]Ibid., V, 306.

[145]Ibid., V, 311.

[146]Ibid., V, 322.

CHAPTER V

WAR AND INSECURITY, 1761-1762

Foreign as well as domestic dangers often threatened Jamaica's security. The recurrent conflicts which plagued the Caribbean sometimes resulted in islands being conquered in war or exchanged at the peace. To be sure, all West Indian colonies were insecure in this way. But to Jamaica international hostilities added another dimension to the problem the island already faced. After all, a successful invasion could spark black revolt; so too, in fact, could an unsuccessful one.

Jamaica in the Sea of Strife: Background

Rivalry among the great powers over the Caribbean dated back to Columbus' voyages. In 1493 King John II, reminding Europe of the 1449 Treaty of Alcaçovas, claimed as Portugese all the territories the Admiral had discovered on Spain's behalf.[1] King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella secured the intervention of Pope Alexander VI, who drew his famous demarcation line defining Spanish and Portugese zones. The subsequent Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) shifted the line westward, finally ending the dispute between the Iberian nations. England and France, of course, recognized neither

the Papal statement nor the grandiose claims of the 1494 treaty. But in the early post-discovery years both countries challenged Iberian pretensions only indirectly. They sponsored exploratory expeditions to northerly regions where a confrontation with either Spain or Portugal was unlikely.

When Spain began extracting treasure from Mexico and Peru in the early sixteenth century, the English and the French grew bolder. As early as 1523 Jean Fleury, a French corsair, plundered galleons laden with precious metals, and very shortly other French adventurers, based in Florida, intercepted Spanish shipping in the Indies. Englishmen resorted to piracy somewhat later, but secured more spectacular results. A half century after Fleury, Francis Drake marauded the Spanish West Indies and climaxed a swashbuckling career in the region by looting Cartagena and Santo Domingo in 1585. Spanish power waned after the defeat of the Armada three years later, and in the early seventeenth century permanent English and French settlements emerged in the islands and on the mainland. By midcentury Spain was unable to resist the conquest of Jamaica. In the three decades following 1655, the age of the buccaneers, Jamaica served as a pirate nest from which the likes of Henry Morgan preyed on Spanish wealth.

Spain's decline did not bring peace to the Caribbean, for it coincided with the rise of rival English and French ambitions in both the Old and the New Worlds. The first clash came after England's Glorious Revolution of

1688. The War of the League of Augsburg (King William's War) brought armed conflict to the Caribbean and elsewhere. This struggle demonstrated to English pioneers in Jamaica just how vulnerable they were. In June, 1694, French forces under Jean du Casse landed at what is now Port Morant on the southeast shore and pillaged the surrounding region. The invaders destroyed more than fifty sugar works, seized numerous slaves, and killed the English colonials residing there. Du Casse then sailed to Carlisle Bay for an assault upon Spanish Town itself. Jamaican settlers rallied to defend the capital, however, and the French finally withdrew. Jamaica was saved, but the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) created a permanent menace to the island's security, for under the terms of that treaty France acquired half of Hispaniola, a dagger which pointed ominously at Jamaica's back for the next one hundred years.

The threat from San Domingue, as the new French colony was called, demanded response when the War of the Spanish Succession (Queen Anne's War) broke out in 1702. A fleet of English ships under Admiral John Benbow stationed itself at Port Royal and successfully checked the movement of an enemy naval force at the French province. Despite heavy fighting elsewhere in the Caribbean Jamaica remained untouched. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) recognized territorial changes, created important commercial links, legal and otherwise, with the Spanish Empire, and, in all, ushered in quarter century of fragile peace.[2] But conflict brewed

again in 1738 because of Spanish efforts to interdict illegal trading. Jamaican authorities then hurried to make peace with the Maroons to avoid what otherwise would have been a "two-front" war. Armed conflict erupted in 1739 over Jenkins' ear, and for the next half decade rival armies and navies fought throughout the Caribbean.[3] For the first year Jamaica remained clear of danger, but in 1740 Sir Chaloner Ogle's forces at Port Royal prevented a threatened French invasion.[4] The island's involvement did not remain purely defensive. Indeed, the colony contributed a slave contingent to a combined Anglo-North American effort to capture Cartagena in 1741. Dissension among the commanders and disease among the troops led to the failure of this project.[5] A Jamaican regiment also participated in the subsequent attempt to take Panama City, a campaign which also ended in failure.[6] In March, 1744, France formally joined the war against England. Although by then most of the West Indian fighting was over, Jamaican settlers once again lived under the threat of invasion from San Domingue.[7] The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) broke the tension by establishing the status quo ante bellum.

The peace, of course, was more a truce than anything else. It collapsed when George Washington and Virginia militiamen, failing to drive the French from the forks of the Ohio, surrendered in 1754. During the first two years of renewed conflict, however, the sparks of war did not touch Jamaica or the other island colonies. Governor Knowles, in

fact, worked hard to avoid hostilities.[8] Only after Frederick II of Prussia's invasion of Saxony in 1756 ignited a general European conflagration did the Caribbean colonies suddenly feel endangered again. In November, 1756, it will be remembered, rumors of an impending French invasion caused Henry Moore to declare martial law in Jamaica.[9] At that time, and in the three following years, Jamaican anxiety was ill-founded. Pitt's determination to focus the thrust of military operations against Canada diminished the intensity of the war in the West Indies. But by 1759 Louisburg, Ticonderoga, Frontenac, Niagara, and Duquesne had all fallen, and in that year Wolfe scored his stunning victory at Quebec. Even before Montreal fell in 1760, the war in the north was actually over, and the theater of campaigning shifted southward. (In 1759, for example, the British began operations against Guadaloupe.) This was an ominous development for Jamaican colonials since it deepened anxiety over the island's security. If the wave of slave revolts in 1760 reminded the islanders of the danger they faced internally, the proximity of war after 1760 reminded them how vulnerable they were to foreign attack. Yet this--insular vulnerability--was a matter which some could turn to advantage.

The Trade with the Enemy

Just as the merchants exploited the security issue in the 1754 effort to relocate the capital, in the Seven Years' War they used it as a weapon to promote their own

interests. As long as the war was confined to distant Canada, island merchants, as much as possible, went about business as usual. This included, among other branches of commerce, trading illegally and directly with the French at San Domingue under flags of truce or dealing clandestinely with them at Monte Christi, a neutral Spanish port near the French province to which smugglers from many English colonies, particularly those on the northern mainland, came.[10] By these methods Jamaica's merchants procured French sugar, dye, and other commodities. In Jamaica, as elsewhere, it was something of an open secret that this forbidden traffic existed, but royal officials who were not themselves corrupted by it were hard put to prevent it. In 1754 Vice Admiral Cotes informed the merchants, tongue in cheek, that he supported their plea to relocate the capital because transferal of the government to Kingston would help "stop the pernicious Practice of smuggling."[11]

An Order in Council of May, 1756, instructed colonial governors to sever all trade and correspondence with the enemy.[12] In response, Lieutenant Governor Moore, "complaining of such a trade being Suffer'd," assumed the responsibility of writing North American Governors about the extensive provincial commerce at Monte Christi. He even sent them a list, compiled by Admiral Cotes, of colonial vessels seen and positively identified at the Spanish port. All were suspected of illegally trading for French produce there.[13] Moore got little satisfaction from this effort.

Only Lieutenant Governor James DeLancey of New York replied to the Jamaican's indignant letter. The former told Moore that nothing could be done about his colony's trade at Monte Christi because the Collector of Customs at New York knew of no law by which to deny clearances to ships bound for that neutral port.[14] Moore, of course, could hardly denigrate the performance of other royal executives and Crown officials. After all, Jamaican merchants traded at Monte Christi too.

Nor were Moore and Cotes able to prevent the illegal commerce conducted under flags of truce. Earlier, during his brief tenure as Commander of the Jamaica Naval Station (1748-1749), Charles Knowles had tried to curtail this trade. He was especially effective in suppressing the North American branch of it but apparently winked at Jamaican involvement, a policy which explained, at least in part, his popularity within Kingston's mercantile community.[15] Jamaica's illicit trade under flags of truce thrived during the 1750's, both during Knowles's governorship and Moore's stewardship of the island's administration. Although Richard Pares suspected that both the Lieutenant Governor and Admiral Cotes had been involved in the unlawful commerce, no evidence supports the allegation.[16] Rather, it seems that both opposed the trade but, like other colonial officials and navy commanders, found it difficult to prevent. The chief problem derived from London's refusal until 1761 to assume responsibility for exchanging prisoners of

war. The burden of this duty consequently fell on the various colonial governments which, to minimize expenses, regularly engaged private vessels to make the exchanges. The provincial administrations simply issued flags of truce to shippers willing to undertake voyages for this purpose. Merchants, poorly paid for the service, characteristically used their flag-protected visits to French ports in San Domingue as opportunities to trade with the enemy. Crown officials could not police what went on at Port Louis or Cap Francois when colonial vessels went to those places or elsewhere under flags of truce. Moreover, Vice Admiralty Courts were notoriously reluctant to condemn ships from their own colony, a disposition which complicated the successful prosecution of cases involving the trade and which probably undermined the morale of those who tried.[17]

The widespread colonial trade with the enemy outraged William Pitt, and in August, 1760, while Jamaica reeled under the impact of multiple slave revolts, the Great Commoner issued a famour Circular Letter, which reads:

> The Commanders of His Majesty's Forces and Fleets, in North America, and the West Indies, having Transmitted repeated and certain Intelligence of an illegal and most pernicious Trade carried on by the King's Subjects, in North America, and in the West Indies . . . by which the Enemy is, to the greatest Reproach & Detriment of Government, supplyed with Provisions, and other Necessities whereby they are, principally, if not alone, enabled to sustain, and protract, this long and expensive War . . . It is His Majesty's express will and Pleasure, that you do forthwith make the strictest and most diligent Enquiry into the State of this dangerous and ignominious Trade . . . and that you do take every Step authorized by Law, to bring all such heinous Offenders to the most exemplary and condign Punishment.[18]

By the time Henry Moore turned his attention to this directive, Jamaica's slave uprisings had ended and the island's Assembly had adjourned; and, coincidentally, a major part of the problem angering Pitt was being solved.[19] Rear Admiral Charles Holmes, Cotes's recent successor at the Jamaica Naval Station, had begun attacking the colonial flag-of-truce trade, including Jamaica's, shortly after arriving on the island. Both the repeated embargoes of 1760 and a £10 tax Jamaica's local stamp law imposed on flags of truce undoubtedly facilitated the Admiral's efforts, but Holmes also acted more boldly to abolish the unlawful commerce than any of his predecessors.[20] He opened negotiations with San Domingue's Governor, Philippe François Bart, on ways to obstruct trading under flags of truce. His ships vigorously patrolled the waters near the French colony, and, as a result, seizures of flags-of-truce vessels sharply increased. When the 1760 dismissal of the lenient Thomas Bullock resulted in the appointment of Edward Long to Jamaica's Vice Admiralty Court, Holmes acquired a powerful ally. Judge Long was not reluctant to condemn Jamaican as well as North American vessels engaged in the commerce. In December, 1760, when Lieutenant Governor Moore responded to Pitt's Circular Letter, the entire flag-of-truce trade at San Domingue was expiring.[21]

Meanwhile, the commerce with the enemy at the neutral Spanish port of Monte Christi flourished.[22] Accordingly, it was this branch of the illicit traffic which preoccu-

pied the Lieutenant Governor when he reported to the Secretary of State on December 28. Moore recounted how he and Cotes had tried to impede the commerce. He recalled his effort to enlist the cooperation of other colonial governors, and, alluding to James DeLancey's reply, wrote that "we were so far from any expectation of redress from that Quarter [North America], that they thought themselves authorized by law to do it [trade at Monte Christi]." The Lieutenant Governor assured the Secretary of State that he would make every effort to sever this illegal connection with the enemy. After all, Moore reminded the Secretary, he himself was an island planter and aware that the introduction of French sugar into the English market depressed the price of Jamaican muscovado.[23]

Judge Long, in the meantime and at Moore's direction, had been investigating the Monte Christi trade. On December 31, 1760, he reported on how the commerce was carried out. Monte Christi residents, Long wrote, ordinarily "lend their names" to foreigners calling at the port, and the latter, as Spaniards, then traded freely with whomever they pleased.[24] This subterfuge succeeded because Spanish authorities collaborated with the illegal dealers. The former earned large sums selling clearances, certificates, bills of parcels, and fictitious receipts, all written in Spanish and signed with Spanish surnames--"the better to cloak the produce brought from the French part of Hispaniola, and Embargoed at Monte Christi on board British or

neutral bottoms."[25] No disguise, however, could conceal the truth. Since these cargoes invariably included sugar, and since Spanish Hispaniola did not cultivate cane, the produce clearly came from San Domingue.[26] The Spanish, in effect, factored for the French. This situation raised difficult legal questions. A recent decision of the London Admiralty Court had held that "British Subjects have an undoubted right of Trading at Monte Christi provided they carry on their Trade Bona fide with the Spaniards only."[27] Englishmen trading with the French at Monte Christi violated the spirit of this decision, but did they, in fact, violate the letter?[28]

Under these conditions implementing Pitt's directive was bound to be difficult, but Henry Moore at least had strong backing. Jamaica's planters solidly supported all efforts to suppress the trade with the enemy. In two lengthy memorials of December, 1760, they denounced "the Trade Carried on by His Majesty's Subjects to the French Settlement in Hispaniola under the Colour of Flags of Truce" and "the Correspondence and Trade carried on with the Enemy from the Bay of Monto [sic] Christi . . . under the Pretense of this Place being a free Port and protected by a Neutral power." The memorialists repudiated the illegal trade as "intirely opposite to national honour" and insisted that it "ought to be Detected and Severely prosecuted." The planters maintained that the Monte Christi dealings constituted "an illegal and forbidden trade" and that "No Free

Port is, or can be erected there, during this present War: and that all Ships belonging to His Majesty's subjects, or Neutrals, coming from thence ought to be . . . intercepted, taken and condemned."[29]

Formal statements of this sort may have encouraged the Lieutenant Governor, but they hardly provided the bold action needed to suppress the trade. Admiral Holmes, of course, was Moore's most important ally. Indeed, the responsibility for ending the illegal commerce ultimately devolved upon the commander; and Holmes, who had recently suppressed the flag-of-truce trade, determined to do the same to the illegal dealings at the "free" Spanish port. He had, in fact, conducted his own investigation into the transactions at Monte Christi and concluded that legitimate colonial business with the Spanish and illegal business with the French were actually one and the same enterprise. His patriotism offended, Holmes had "advised His Majesty's Squadron to hinder and obstruct both [the lawful and the unlawful commerce at Monte Christi], as a trade illegal in itself, hurtful to His Majesty's Service, & intirely opposite to the Interest of Great Britain."[30]

In this matter, however, Holmes felt less sure of himself than he had in dealing with the flag-of-truce trade. In the first place, he was not fully confident that the London ministry would approve strong measures against the Monte Christi trade because a vigorous campaign might provoke difficulties with the Spanish government. Suppressing the

trade, he wrote Pitt, probably raised "many doubts and difficulties . . . at Home," since Monte Christi was a "Free Port, belonging to a neutral Power . . . ."[31] He sought Pitt's support nonetheless, defending his view that the colonial commerce at Monte Christi constituted trade with the enemy. In early January, 1761, the Admiral asked for instructions on how to proceed.[32] Until he heard otherwise from London, however, he pressed his war against the trade. His diligent efforts during the first half of 1761 resulted not only in numerous seizures but in a growing body of evidence proving that colonial trade at Monte Christi was with the enemy, evidence which Holmes dutifully sent to William Pitt.[33]

In addition to his concern over the lack of Whitehall's support, Holmes also worried about the enemies he was making in Jamaica. Kingston's merchants had already suffered as a consequence of his suppression of the flag-of-truce trade. Now, as they watched the Admiral begin destroying their one remaining avenue to French sugar and indigo, they mobilized to restrain him. The merchants launched their campaign cautiously. Holmes recalled that in the early weeks of 1761 "I was closely applied to, under various Colours and Pretexts, to admit of it [the illegal trade] in a certain degree; and to overlook it Under this & the other Limitation; I was soothed, caressed, and flattered; but all to no purpose."[34] The Admiral "remained inflexible," and the merchants, "in despair . . . of gaining

their Point," finally "left off their Importunities."[35] Indeed, the merchants declared their own private war against Holmes. "From this time," the Admiral wrote, "the People concerned in this Trade and all whom they could influence and connect, became Enemies to me."[36]

The merchants subsequently devised a new scheme, one which exploited Jamaican concern over security. Recent developments provided them a pretext by which they hoped that they could persuade the Admiral to redeploy ships in a way which would diminish the pressure on the illegal trade. During the preceding months French raiding parties had destroyed property and kidnapped slaves along the northeast shore. These incidents, of course, disturbed the colonials: the forays not only pillaged but threatened to incite unrest among the blacks. In short, they dramatized how closely related internal and external security were and how vulnerable the island was to foreign attack. These concerns played into the hands of the merchants. The latter duped and won support among the planters, especially those in the northeast, for whom the French incursions were a particularly troubling matter. Together, planters and merchants petitioned Holmes to provide greater protection to Portland Parish. Specifically, they wanted the Admiral to station one ship at Port Antonio permanently and to assign another to patrol duty near the coast.[37] Such a defense, presumably, would lessen the intensity of Holmes's campaign against the Monte Christi trade.

The Admiral, however, denied the request. An anchored ship, he maintained, had little military value. Not only was it vulnerable to attack, but its offensive and defensive capabilities were severely restricted. Moreover, Holmes considered the whole proposal absurd because it could not possibly secure the end for which it was allegedly designed. As he put it,

> All the Sqaudron lying in Port Royal Harbour could not prevent a Row Boat of Twenty Men from Stealing a Negroe or Burning a Plantain Boat at Old Harbour which lies . . . within a very few Hours sailing to Leeward; or of doing the same Thing at Cow Bay, which lies but a few Miles to Windward. What they [the French] do in these little petty Thefts is done in a moment.[38]

The failure of their stratagem led the merchants to direct action against the Admiral and his program, action which further exploited the island's insecurity. They began disseminating false information calculated to scatter the Commander's vessels and, accordingly, to disrupt the navy's efforts to suppress the Monte Christi trade. "I know of their Enmity and the Extent and virulence of their inveterate spirit;" wrote Holmes, "which diffused itself in Falsehood and Lies upon the Whole Squadron. There is hardly one ship in it, which they have not, at one time or other, given out to have been taken, sunk, burnt, or destroyed by the Enemy."[39] The merchants combined this harassment with a campaign to vilify the Admiral. Kingston gossip had it that, among other offenses, Holmes neglected Jamaica's security, seized colonial vessels chiefly to get his share of the prizes, and, in general, performed incompetently.[40]

"Their malice," Holmes reported, ". . . impelled them on to attack me personally."[41]

Despite harassment and disparagement Holmes maintained strong pressure on the illegal trade. Hibbert and Jackson, a Kingston firm which had already had two of its vessels seized, now suffered the loss of the Guadaloupe. The ship, caught carrying French produce, was condemned before Judge Long. Another Kingston merchant, Robert Stirling, lost two ships in the same fashion. Both had been found in possession of French indigo. Samuel Bean, Daniel Moore, and Richard Watt, all merchants, also had their vessels condemned for carrying enemy goods.[42]

The hostility of the merchants continued to increase. On July 4 handbills and street posters summoned planters as well as merchants to Mrs. Rogers' house on July 10 "to concert proper measures for the Better Protection of the Trade of this Colony."[43] In the intervening week, according to Holmes, the "malcontents" campaigned throughout the city to "increase their numbers."[44] At 10:00 A.M. on the appointed day the merchants (apparently no planters attended) met. After lengthy discussions they agreed to compose and send a formal letter to the Admiral.[45] In this document the merchants denied any knowledge of commerce with the enemy. They expressed concern, however, over the recent wave of French raids along the northeast shore and the consequent abduction of plantation slaves. Indeed, they implied that Holmes was doing nothing to deter

the marauders. In addition to accusing Holmes of negligence, they implicitly questioned the Admiral's competence by lecturing him on naval strategy. They insisted that the Jamaica squadron, which had recently sailed from Bluefields on the southwest shore, had departed the island at a bad moment. According to the merchants, His Majesty's vessels now lay open to attack by French forces at Port Louis. Moreover, the merchants alleged, this ill-conceived maneuver (of which Holmes, of course, was the author) needlessly endangered the colony's trading ships. As a consequence, they felt entitled to a special consideration, and they asked Holmes to provide them a ship, one they could speedily dispatch to England to find out what current insurance rates were. Post-dated July 11, the letter bore the signatures of sixty-two merchants and partnership firms.[46] On July 13 a deputation from the meeting--Zachary Bayley, Augustin Gwyn, and Simon Taylor--delivered the document to Holmes.[47]

The Admiral considered the letter "insolent, false, & abusive." Because of its "Indecency and Rudeness," he "dismissed" Bayley, Gwyn, and Taylor "immediately out of my house" and refused to dignify the communication with a reply.[48] Instead, he complained to the Secretary of the Admiralty that "all the Gentlemen who sign this letter cannot but know that there is an illegal Trade and Correspondence carryed on with the Enemy at Hispaniola." After all, he pointed out, Hibbert and Jackson, Robert Stirling, and others--all signatories--had had vessels condemned for posses-

sion of French produce. In fact, just eight days after the arrival of the letter, Holmes declared, the navy intercepted another of Stirling's ships as it was leaving a French settlement in San Domingue.[49] Holmes felt nothing but contempt for these men he considered liars and hypocrites.

The merchants' July meeting and letter accomplished nothing but the final and irrevocable rupture of relations between the naval commander and the commercial community. Holmes, with greater zeal than ever, interrupted the French trade. He struck his most audacious blow in September when the H.M.S. Defiance seized about twenty Spanish vessels sailing from San Domingue to Monte Christi.[50] But the merchants responded in kind. At the end of the summer they escalated their war against Admiral Holmes.

On October 1 Jamaica's "Merchants, Factors, and Agents" petitioned both the King and the Lords of Admiralty for Holmes's removal. In their appeal to the King they wrote that French raiders terrorized the island's shores, "making daily seizures of . . . coasting vessels . . . plundering and carrying off slaves and even white inhabitants . . . ." They attributed these atrocities to the Admiral who, "neglecting the defence of this island, and its trade, hath constantly employed Your Majesty's Ships on distant services." Holmes's management of the Jamaica Naval Station, they asserted, was "calculated for his private Advantage, [rather] than the publick good." He pursued prizes,

not the enemy. The Admiral's self-serving policies, the petitioners maintained, became especially odious when he "introduced" the practice "of taking the Sailors from on Board Your Majesty's ships of War, and employing them to navigate prize Vessels, the private property of himself and others . . . ." This novel expedient allegedly depleted the ranks of navy servicemen and forced Holmes into "supplying the deficiency by a vigorous impress from the Merchant Vessels." These policies, the merchants wrote, entailed "the most destructive consequences." The petitioners also explained that they had sought relief directly from Admiral Holmes but had been rebuffed.[51]

The petition was signed by seventy-five commercial men.[52] The appeal to the Lords of the Admiralty differed little from it in substance and bore the same signatures.[53] On October 14 Lieutenant Governor Moore sent the documents to London and dispatched copies to Admiral Holmes.[54] The latter wrote Pitt that he had consistently done his utmost not only to protect the island and its lawful commerce but also to harass the enemy. At the same time he had worked hard to obey orders concerning colonial trade with the enemy. He was especially proud of his record regarding the flag-of-truce commerce. In this connection he wrote:

> I endeavoured to discountenance the open Trade then carried on with the French, in all their Ports in Hispaniola, by fictitious and nominal Flags of Truce from this Island, as well as North America; by which they were supplied with every species of Provision, every Superfluous Conveniency of Life, and Shielded against every Accident and Infelicity Attending War, by disposing of

> the Produce of their Settlements, in the most perfect Security and to the highest advantage: While Jamaica & North America are Stript of their Treasure, and the Kings ships deprived, so far, from giving any considerable annoyance to the enemy's Trade and Commerce.[55]

The Admiral informed Pitt that Jamaica's Lieutenant Governor, Council, and Assembly had formally praised, congratulated, and thanked him for effectively prosecuting smugglers, defending the island, and attacking the enemy.[56] Only the merchants were dissatisfied.

What caused discontent within the commercial community? Holmes told Pitt plainly that Kingston's merchants sought "solely" to protect "their trade with the Enemy, which, on the arrival of your letter, Sir, to the Governours of America . . . . I became fully determined to interrupt by Seizing on all vessels concern'd in it." He recapitulated events since the merchants' meeting in July, concluding that the petitions to the King and the Admiralty Lords merely represented the latest mercantile attack on him. The petitioners' very complaints, Holmes declared, "prove clearly . . . that my obstructing their Traffic & Commerce with the Enemy, not my want of attention to the Security of the island & its Trade, is the true cause of the offence I have given."[57]

Although the navy commander acknowledged that French privateers sometimes landed on the north shore and kidnapped slaves, he insisted that the raids could not be prevented even "had all His Majesty's Fleet been here." The allegation that these incidents occurred frequently and resulted

from his negligence he dismissed as "intirely false." Jamaica did not endure "distress," as the petitioners maintained, on account of sporadic enemy marauding; rather, Holmes asserted, the only distressed colonials were those whose trade with the French the navy was presently destroying.[58]

The Admiral denied that self-interest determined his strategy and tactics. He insisted that "no private advantage has ever arose to me, from stationing the Ships under my Command." Moreover, he declared that, contrary to the assertions of the merchants, he had never employed His Majesty's sailors aboard prize vessels when the men were needed on royal ships. Once or twice, he admitted, he had relied upon impressment, but never for the reasons alleged in the petition. Desertion from His Majesty's to the merchants' vessels had occasionally become such a problem that he had had no alternative but to use the press gang. Holmes reminded Pitt that this widely despised procedure was "agreeable to the Custom of the Service and the Practice of Commanding officers." His implementation of the press, nevertheless, had been milder than any of his predecessors' in Jamaica. Not only had he relied on it infrequently, but he had voluntarily complied with a request from Lieutenant Governor Moore and his Council to restrict it to one man in seven rather than the traditional one man in five. The petitioners' assertion notwithstanding, Holmes believed that impressment imposed no hardship on the island's mercantile

community. After all, he wrote, the comings-and-goings of many ships deposited a surplus sailor population at Kingston, and, as a result, the city's merchants never found manning their vessels a difficult task.[59]

Lastly, Holmes denounced as "false and full of malice" the assertion that the petitioners had applied to him for relief but were rebuffed. Never, he insisted, had they "addressed me, and went away unanswered," except on July 13 when they had approached him with such "rudeness and Impurtinence" that they received the sort of reply "they Meritted." But the July incident, Holmes emphasized, differed from the kind of situation the petitioners described.[60]

After discussing the charges against him, Holmes tried to discredit the long list of names attached to the petitions. He wrote:

> Their Petition expresses them to be the Merchants, Factors, & Agents in the Island of Jamaica: At the same time, it is most Certain, They are only, at the best they can make of it, Some of the Merchants, Some of the Factors, and Some of the Agents at Kingston. And one half of the whole Subscribers are, at most, but retailing Hucksters, Shop keepers, or People of no Trade, Bussiness [sic], occupation or Importance at all. So far are they from being the Voice of the Island, that very few of them have any Property in it; and so little concern have they for its true interest, that they are combined in a Trade and Commerce Most ruinous and destructive to it.[61]

According to the Admiral, the self-styled "Merchants, Factors, and Agents" had such little ground for legitimate complaint that they had been forced "to form felicitous articles in behalf of others." He was referring, of course, to the French raids along the northeast shore, a matter of pe-

culiar concern to the planters. "Yet," he observed, "the Gentlemen and Planters of the Island are intirely silent: the Whole Legislature is Silent: Even many of those who signed the Libell" of July 11 "Against me, have not Signed this Petition . . . ."[62] "So that in all," he concluded, "there may be about Twelve Veteran Smugling Merchants, who may have Influence over Twelve or Sixteen More, and those united surprise weak, ignorant, or depending people to give their Names to fill up their Petition."[63] Holmes then rested his defense. However, to counter the second merchant petition, he dispatched a similar brief to John Cleveland, Secretary of the Lords of Admiralty.[64]

But none of Holmes's protests mattered. He died November 21, and Captain Arthur Forrest of Westmoreland, senior officer, assumed command of the Jamaica Naval Station.[65]

The Invasion Scare of 1762

After Holmes's death circumstances changed quickly. In early 1762 the war in the Caribbean not only expanded (England declared war on Spain January 2), but for the first time it immediately and directly threatened Jamaica. The man upon whom the burdens of the crisis fell was the island's new Governor, William Henry Lyttelton. Born in 1724 to a well-to-do family, Lyttelton had studied at Eton, Oxford, and Middle Temple, and in 1748 he was admitted to the bar. That same year the borough of Bewdley in Worcester-

shire elected him to Parliament, a seat he retained until 1755 when he became Governor of South Carolina. In North America he acquired broad experience. He dealt with matters as diverse as the Acadian refugee problem and frontier war against the Cherokees.[66] Lyttelton also learned to defend the royal prerogative against encroachments by the popular Assembly. According to Jack Greene, the Governor "had the skill to challenge established rights successfully without raising the wrath of the lower house."[67] In 1760, after four eventful years in South Carolina, he returned to England. His career in colonial service, however, was not over. On May 2, 1761, he received a royal commission to Jamaica's Governorship. Soon after his appointment, Lyttelton married, and the new couple prepared for the journey to the West Indies. When he and his wife Mary boarded the Jamaica-bound Deptford late in 1761, the Governor was not quite thirty-seven years old.[68]

Lyttelton was a young man who had come a long way. By any standard he was successful. He enjoyed the title, the prestige, and the power of high office. Nevertheless, his career was not an unbroken string of easy advancements, and he was no stranger to adversity. In 1755, for example, enroute to South Carolina, he was captured by the French and unable to inaugurate his administration until after his release the following year.[69] Such reverses, as often happens, toughened his character and, in this sense, helped school him for the rigors of a colonial governorship. But

men of mettle had served as Jamaica's chief executive before, and fortitude alone did not guarantee successful administration. When Lyttelton arrived at Kingston on January 20, 1762, he could not have anticipated the problems and challenges awaiting him in the months and years ahead.[70] Indeed, crisis confronted him immediately.

Three days before the Lytteltons arrived, the H.M.S. Pembrooke intercepted the French schooner St. Devote out of Cap François and captured it. The Pembrooke's skipper, Captain Wheelock, searched the vessel and discovered ten letters from military personnel stationed in San Domingue to friends and relatives at home. The substance of these letters was so important that Wheelock turned them over to Acting Commodore Forrest as soon as possible, and the latter, in turn, rushed them to the new Governor.[71]

The letters contained threatening news. One, from a French officer on the Dragon to a Bordeaux merchant, January 14, revealed a troop build-up at Cap François. "The news here is," the correspondent remarked, "that a Squadron of Men of War and transports is expected soon and intended for an Expedition to Jamaica." In another letter the same officer wrote: "The report here is that a Squadron from Brest is expected to make a descent on the Island of Jamaica."[72]

Other correspondence was more specific. Lieutenant De Dessande of the Dragon, once a prisoner in Jamaica, wrote M. de Martineau of Blarimont on January 16:

> The troops here including those arrived in the four frigates amount to the number of twelve hundred men . . . . The Expedition is intended for a descent on the Island of Jamaica, I can very confidently speak of this News having it from M. de Langeron whom we brought over as Commanding officer of the Troops . . . . I should be glad to have an opportunity of being revenged on those Rascals who have made me suffer for two and twenty months, I remained among them in that very Island I am acquainted with the good houses and should not be Contented with only demanding the keys of them.[73]

Dessande also wrote his father, asking:

> Do you recal [sic] to mind the place where I have formerly been a Prisoner for two and twenty months . . . ? I promise you that such great preparations are not necessary to the taking of this place . . . .[74]

Another letter from the Dragon indicated that "The expedition from Brest . . . is intended for Jamaica We likewise learn that the Negroes of that Island have revolted."[75] Another correspondent revealed that "the Destination of the Troops we have brought over, are intended to land on the Island of Jamaica."[76] The remaining captured letters contained similar information.[77]

This intelligence understandably alarmed Governor Lyttelton, but in addition he shortly learned that the island was not prepared to meet an invasion. The regulars, he reported, "scarcely amount to a thousand Men fit for Duty." Jamaica's fortifications seemed "incomplete & unsupplied with common accessories." Despite the recent "Insurrection of the Negroes," the colonial militia remained "ill-trained" and could be "brought into tolerable order" only "with Difficulty." The island, Lyttelton judged, was "in a State of extreme Weakness in many Respects," including

its naval capacity. Forrest's squadron "consists only of seven Ships of the Line (of which three are of fifty guns) & nine frigates."[78]

Lyttelton pledged to defend the island boldly nonetheless. "I shall exert myself to the utmost," he wrote the Secretary of State, "to defeat the Designs of the Enemy should their Troops be employed against the Island . . . ."[79] To accomplish this, he wanted to squeeze maximum benefit from the modest naval force stationed at Jamaica. He recommended, and Acting Commodore Forrest agreed, that the capital ships remain at Port Royal to guard Kingston harbor while the frigates cruised the coastal waters watching for enemy movements.[80]

But the Governor knew these measures, by themselves, were inadequate. At best they provided an early warning against invasion and protection to the colony's chief port. An enemy landing could occur almost anywhere, and provincial forces would be hard put to stop it. Accordingly, on January 25 he wrote Admiral George Rodney and General Robert Monckton at Martinique "to send such reenforcements as could be spared."[81] The next day, at a "Council of War," he secured a "unanimous Determination" for the imposition of martial law. He also summoned the Assembly to meet as soon as possible and directed local magistrates to make sure that all slave laws were rigidly enforced. These things done, Lyttelton felt ready "to put the Island into a Posture of Defence with all possible Dispatch."[82]

In the meantime Lyttelton and the islanders did not know that hostilities against Spain had begun until the arrival of a communique from Rodney on January 28.[83] The news, of course, placed Jamaica in an even more difficult situation, and the Governor acted promptly to deal with the changed circumstances. On January 30, with the Council's support, he embargoed all shipping "to prevent intelligence being conveyed to the French and Spanish Islands."[84] (With a scratch of his pen Lyttelton accomplished what Admiral Holmes had died trying to do: the Governor's order severed altogether the no-longer neutral trade at Monte Christi.) Moreover, he seized enemy vessels then in port and detained "all stragling Spaniards and other Foreigners aboard their ships at Port Royal."[85] Two days later he met the island's popular Assembly, now in emergency session, for the first time.

In his address to the legislature Lyttelton described the scope of the crisis, explaining that the captured enemy documents had necessitated martial law and that Spain's entry into the war had demanded additionally stringent measures. More than anything else, the colony needed adequate defense. For that reason, the Governor told the lawmakers frankly that he was "oblig'd to ask an extraordinary supply of you."[86] The Council and Assembly expressed approval of the steps that the new Governor had taken to secure the island and during the ensuing two-week legislative session responded affirmatively to his request. The Assem-

bly appropriated £3,981 1s. 6d. for military needs. It also "passed a vote of Credit" amounting to £3,018 18s. 6d. for defense spending.[87] On February 11 it approved a petition, subsequently endorsed by the Council, asking the King for aid. The appeal maintained that Jamaica's climate had eroded available artillery and that the colony, as a result, needed new heavy weapons. These "would be /of/ the utmost service against a foreign and Intestine Enemy." "Some Mortars are extremely wanted for the Forts which defend . . . Port Royal and Kingston, and cannon of small bore six, nine, and twelve Pounders will be highly usefull . . . in time of war (especially with Spain)."[88]

While the Assembly worked, fresh, albeit flimsy, intelligence arrived. Captain William Lessly of the H.M.S. Port Royal informed Acting Commodore Forrest on February 9 that if the French failed to hold Martinique, an enemy countermove against Jamaica should be expected.[89] Moreover, Kingston merchant Moses Pereira da Costa, recently returned from a legitimate flag-of-truce visit to San Domingue, reported a major French build-up at Cap Francois. Da Costa remarked that "the French officers at Port au Prince often joked . . . that they should soon pay him a visit at Jamaica."[90] Such bits and pieces of information allowed the island no relief from war-related tensions. The Assembly concluded its work on February 17, and, during the remainder of the month and throughout March, Jamaica nervously awaited a French invasion.

In March Lyttelton received instructions from the Earl of Egremont, but the Secretary of State's orders did not pertain to Jamaica's crisis. (In fact, Egremont did not learn of the island's plight until March 24.)[91] Instead, the Secretary's letter, dated January, concerned an upcoming British offensive, "a secret Expedition against some of the Spanish Colonies in the West Indies." While Egremont concealed the true target, Havana, he informed the Governor that "a certain Proportion of Free Negroes, added to a Body of Troops . . . would greatly contribute to the Success of the Enterprize . . . ." Accordingly, he instructed Lyttelton to "collect about 500 of those free Negroes" living in Jamaica and to do his "utmost . . . in giving every facility & Dispatch in your Power, towards carrying this measure speedily & effectually into Execution."[92] That was not all. The Secretary of State then reminded Lyttelton that during the War of Jenkins' Ear "a considerable Number of Slaves" had proven "Extremely Usefull" in Britain's second effort to take Cartagena. Therefore, Egremont wrote: "I have the King's Commands to recommend it to you, as an object of utmost Importance, to provide . . . two thousand Slaves at Jamaica to go upon immediate Service."[93] Proprietors, the Secretary continued, would receive the same compensation they did in the earlier war. Lyttelton, however, would remain "at liberty" to offer greater incentive, if necessary, to secure white cooperation. Egremont concluded: ". . . and tho it is greatly to

be hoped, that your zeal for the Success of this indispensable object will enable you to accomplish the Scheme up to the necessary Number of at least two thousand, yet if unluckily that cannot be effected, you will, at all Events, provide as many as you can find."[94]

This double assignment added new burdens to the Governor's already difficult labors. While preparing Jamaica for an expected enemy invasion, Lyttelton somehow had to devise ways of recruiting volunteers from among the colony's free black population (in all there were about 3,400 free non-Maroons[95]) and at the same tim marshal two thousand slaves for overseas service. At least the former task could be implemented directly, but the latter required enabling legislation. As a consequence, Lyttelton, obeying orders, summoned the Assembly to meet again, this time in April.

In the meantime, the Governor began work on recruiting a free black regiment. Following Egremont's suggestion that raising the force "may be very practicable, with the Assistance of the chief Planters," he sought the aid of the island's social and political leaders.[96] He "immediately" wrote parish magistrates, asking them "to use their utmost endeavours to dispose the Free Negroes to inlist."[97] Lyttelton did not anticipate much difficulty. After all, the inducements to voluntarism, he thought, were strong: "large Bounty Money to the Recruits" and military commissions "to such gentlemen of the Island as had the greatest

Credit" among free blacks.[98]

But Lyttelton misjudged the situation. Neither blacks nor whites responded enthusiastically. Few freedmen, despite their circumscribed liberty, were willing to gamble their lives on such a dangerous undertaking whatever the financial reward. Philip Prieleau, commander of the Kingston militia, was, unlike most whites, willing to accept a commission in a free black regiment. But he found Kingston's freedmen unresponsive. "None as yet have applied," he informed the Governor early in April. Nor did he believe any would. "The majority of the free people," he wrote, "are, Tradesmen, and get a tolerable livelihood and have families and small habitations of their own, therefore would not chuse to leave them for any Uncertainty."[99] Lyttelton received a similar reply from Captain Hugh Mackay of the St. Mary Rangers, who wrote: "They [free blacks] all happen to be so engag'd in the care of Gentlemen's Estates that they cannot in honour think of quitting their different trusts on so short a notice."[100]

Responses like these discouraged the Governor, but his growing conviction that white islanders preferred seeing the project fail especially perturbed him. From his correspondence with local magistrates he had learned the identities of the whites with "most Credit" among the free blacks. In many instances they were those "who had been out in parties with them during the rebellion of the Slaves, which happen'd a short time before my arrival here, & had

distinguished themselves as Officers over them . . . ."[101] Lyttelton had assumed, in other words, that men like William Hynes would accept commissions and encourage free blacks to join the service. But few did. Moreover, and more importantly, the island's planter and merchant elites failed to support the program. The Governor believed the project would have been successful "had it been the inclination of the gentry here to serve & encourage the free Negroes to inlist . . . ."[102] "The Free Negroes," he wrote, "are Allmost universally in such circumstances as must make them unwilling to inlist . . . & they are found so serviceable in quiet times from the Trades they exercise, & in case of any commotion among the slaves, from the attachment they have to the white people, that I found few persons here dispos'd to excite them to quit this Country & go upon a service from which many of them were likely never to return."[103] Lyttelton later recalled that "several persons of consideration & well acquainted with the State of this Island told me plainly that they judg'd the measure impracticable in the extent that was propos'd, tho' some few Men might possibly be collected."[104] The plan failed, the Governor concluded, because "the Inhabitants in general were averse to it."[105]

Meanwhile, although the islanders did not know it, a combination of bungling and bad luck had disrupted French operations.[106] Accordingly, the anticipated invasion of Jamaica never developed, but the tension which had gripped the island since late January did not break until April 9 when

Sir James Douglas arrived at Port Royal with eight sail of the line from Rodney's fleet.[107] The crisis was over. When the Assembly met on schedule four days later, Lyttelton announced the arrival of the squadron and used the happy occasion to end martial law and lift the embargo.[108] The Governor then explained the reason for this extraordinary legislative session. He informed the representatives of Egremont's request for two thousand slaves and outlined the terms of service.

The proposal raised concerns among the lawmakers. Slaves sent off to war would probably learn to use firearms and possibly even acquire combat experience. Did this project, in light of the events of 1760, serve the colony's best interest? In addition, the legislators worried about how and at what rate proprietors would be paid for their slaves. What guarantee was there, besides Egremont's word, that the royal and not the colonial treasury would bear the expense? Would 1741's compensation suffice? Governor Lyttelton allayed these anxieties. On April 15, for example, he assured the Assembly that the slaves sent to service would be "employed as pioneers, and not as soldiers or shot negroes."[109] Moreover, he agreed to a legislative formula assuring royal payment at a predetermined rate.[110]

Relieved and satisfied, the Assembly began working on "An Act for Providing Two Thousand Negroes for the Immediate Service of His Majesty." Passed by both the House and the Council on April 17, the measure "agreed to provide for

your Majesty's Service two thousand slaves notwithstanding the great distresses your faithful subjects in this Island labour under from the late Rebellions of Slaves within this Island and from the various heavy taxes to which your faithful Subjects property in this Island and the produce thereof is subject both in this Island and Great Britain."[111] What encouraged the colonials to cooperate, the law stated, was the "entire confidence . . . that the pay of the Negroes to be raised by this Law and the value of such as shall be lost will be made good to their respective proprietors."[112] The legislation provided for commissioners who were required to raise specified numbers of slaves within each parish.[113] These were to assess, under oath, the value of each slave, record it, and ready the quotas for transport to whatever assembling area the Governor assigned. Commissioners who failed to comply with the law or were negligent in implementing it were liable to a £50 fine. The same penalty awaited anyone who pledged a slave, had him assessed, but then failed to deliver him. The law assured proprietors that they would be imbursed for lost slaves at the listed valuation, except that no compensation would exceed £70 current money (£42 sterling). Lastly, and this was Lyttelton's concession, the legislation required no proprietor to deliver his bondsmen unless an agent of the King, presumably the Earl of Albemarle, commander of the Havana expedition, or his deputy, met with and agreed to pay Jamaica's Receiver General 7½d. current money (5d. sterling), per diem, per

slave.[114]

The law pleased Governor Lyttelton. Before the Assembly adjourned, he congratulated its members, citing the measure as "very signal proof of your Zeal for the King's service."[115] He also reminded the lawmakers that, when the fleet sailed, the island would be vulnerable again to both foreign attack and domestic insurgency. The latter danger especially worried him, and he urged the legislators "to use your utmost care and vigilance, to preserve the internal peace of the Country in your respective districts, and to enforce by your authority and example, the execution of such orders and regulations as have ensued the proclamation of martial law, and are at this time so essentially necessary to the public welfare and security."[116]

The new law, of course, could not be implemented until Albemarle or his representative dealt with the colony's Receiver General on the matter of money. Lyttelton simply assumed that the Havanna-bound fleet would stop at Jamaica to transport the slaves and that such a meeting could easily be arranged. While he awaited the Earl's arrival, he made a final effort to recruit a free black regiment. He understood from militia officers that, among other reasons, free blacks were reluctant to enlist because they feared capture and enslavement by the Spanish. Early in May the Governor tried to dispel such fears. He pledged that all black volunteers who presented certificates of freedom to Major Thomas Fuller, commander-designate of the regiment,

would be exchanged, if captured, "and set at liberty in the same manner as His Majesty's white subjects, being soldiers in the Army, shall be."[117] This offer, like the earlier promise of money, did not arouse much enthusiasm among freedmen. After two months of work Lyttelton had recruited no more than one hundred free blacks. He finally admitted failure. "I have not been able," he wrote, "to get above one Company to send upon the service, for as most of them have beneficial Trades and find a comfortable maintenance here with their wives and families it is extremely difficult to prevail with them to inlist."[118]

For the moment the Governor could at least console himself that he had been able to secure the legislation for the two thousand slaves. But even this satisfaction was short-lived. Implementing the new law encountered unexpected difficulty when Albemarle and his fleet did not touch at Jamaica. Lyttelton learned that Sir James Douglas was to transport Jamaica's slaves to Havanna. This meant that since neither the Earl nor his deputy would now meet with the Receiver General to guarantee the stipulated pay, Jamaican slaveholders were no longer bound by the terms of the law.[119] After considerable anxiety Lyttelton decided to underwrite, on Albemarle's behalf, the security of the per diem compensation.[120] He did this in May, and proprietors promptly dispatched their slaves to one of three embarkation sites: Kingston, Passage Fort, or Greenwich. Douglas began shipping the blacks around the leeward side

of the island and then north to Cuba. After carrying 1,600, however, the Commodore suddenly informed Lyttelton that "from Obstacles not to be removed" it was "improper that any more shou'd be brought from the Country to be embark'd."[121] Yet the Governor had another four hundred gathering at the various assembly points. Although the navy commander did not explain what the "Obstacles" were, Lyttelton assumed that additional transport ships were not available and that this problem had prompted Douglas' decision. Consequently, the Governor immediately impressed merchantmen anchored in Kingston harbor. But he shortly afterward learned that royal vessels were not lacking and that the commander's failure to carry the remaining slaves had had nothing to do with the number of ships on hand. Lyttelton then countermanded the order for impressment and sent the four hundred blacks back to their respective plantations. He never found out why Douglas canceled the final delivery.[122]

In any event, British forces began the seige of Havana in June. One hundred free blacks and sixteen hundred slaves from Jamaica participated. Two months later, on August 12, the city capitulated, and the war in the Caribbean ended.[123] Jamaican settlers, however, had little about which to cheer. Although the island had escaped invasion, it nevertheless endured many hardships. The anticipated enemy landing and Spain's entry into the war had necessitated prolonged martial law and embargo, which, in

turn, led to a general decline in the colony's commerce and the disappearance of the vital Spanish trade. Quite simply, Jamaica's economy stagnated. Governor Lyttelton described the island's dismal condition in June, 1762:

> How great so ever the resources of this Island may formerly have been and whatever may have been its reputation for Wealth and opulence I am very sorry . . . it is now in a very different State. It's Publick Credit is at as low an ebb as can well be imagined. The King's Revenue is Greatly anticipated and the Orders made upon it for the most part cannot be discharged till many months after they are presented, and the extraordinary Taxes are paid in so slowly that those whose demands are to be satisfied out of those levies must also wait a long time for their Money. There is now no Cash at all in the Receiver General's office and it is thought all that is in the island is but a very Moderate sum perhaps forty or fifty thousand pounds Sterling. This . . . in a Country where no Paper Currency is allowed, is productive of many and great difficulties in the executive part of Government and induced me to lend to the Island £3981. 1. 6 towards repairing the fortifications during the late alarm.[124]

The war also entailed human costs. Eight hundred of the slaves sent to Havana never returned.[125]

Jamaicans put aside class interest and political division whenever an immediate danger imperiled the colony. In 1760 merchants and planters in the Assembly and on the Council cooperated with each other and with Lieutenant Governor Moore to crush the slave revolts and tighten internal security. Even town militiamen, despite their initial reluctance, served dutifully in arms that year. But once the crisis was over, each interest group went its own way. The merchants, for example, by trading with the enemy, not only

outraged the planter class but relentlessly fought Admiral Holmes's efforts to abolish the illicit commerce. During the invasion scare of 1762 consensus emerged again. As a result, Governor Lyttelton enjoyed broad support for both martial law and an embargo. Lyttelton, in fact, failed to raise a full free black regiment because the current consensus deemed the project adverse to Jamaica's security. Quite simply, the islanders knew that their survival depended upon unity as much as upon anything else.

Naturally, this understanding affected the course and conduct of governmental processes in a number of ways. Not only did it facilitate legislation, but it also altered the character of political strategy and tactics. In calm times the islanders ordinarily exploited their own insecurity for partisan advantage. The colony's insecurity had been a major issue in the divisive struggle to relocate the seat of government. It had also served as a potent weapon in the merchants' war against Admiral Holmes. At moments of impending catastrophe, however, this distinctive feature of Jamaican politics evaporated. Security became the real and non-partisan concern of all white settlers. Factionalism served as a barometer of the island's sense of security at any given moment: Division and conflict reflected periods of security; consensus reflected periods of insecurity.

NOTES

[1]This treaty, between Spain and Portugal, gave the latter all known islands in the Atlantic except the Caries. King John maintained that the islands Columbus arrived at lay close enough to the Azores to be considered part of that group.

[2]It will be remembered that by this treaty England acquired the asiento and the privilege of sending one ship annually to trade with the Spanish, a provision which encouraged illegal trading. Other important Caribbean changes included England's retention of all St. Christopher and the acquisition of Nevis.

[3]The best account is still Pares, War and Trade.

[4]France was not yet in the war, but a force under the Marquis d'Antin was under instructions to aid the Spanish Bourbons by attacking Jamaica. The plan never developed because of English strength at Port Royal. Ibid., 161-78.

[5]Pares minimized the importance of the dispute between Vernon and Thomas Wentworth. Disease was chiefly responsible for the disaster. Ibid., 91. See also Black, History of Jamaica, 90.

[6]Jamaica's Governor Edward Trelawny accompanied the expedition. For an account of the Panama campaign, see Pares, War and Trade, 95-97.

[7]There was one notable action, however. Admiral Knowles and Governor Trelawny captured St. Louis in San Domingue. Ibid., 182-83.

[8]Colonial Office records for the period are replete with evidence that European officials in the Caribbean tried hard to prevent their nationals from creating the kinds of incidents which could lead to wider war.

[9]See p. 38.

[10]Gipson, Coming of the Revolution, 28-34.

[11]Admiral Cotes to Kingston's merchants, January 20, 1754, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[12]Gipson, Coming of the Revolution, 29.

[13]Henry Moore to the Secretary of State, December 28, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[14]James DeLancey to Henry Moore, May 25, 1759, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[15]Pares, War and Trade, 449, 452.

[16]Ibid., 451 and n. 4.

[17]For a fine analysis of this trade see Ibid., 446-55. Cotes seems to have tolerated the trade only to the extent that it involved trading for French indigo. Ibid., 418.

[18]Quoted in Gipson, Coming of the Revolution, 33.

[19]Henry Moore to the Secretary of State, December 28, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[20]For the specifics of Jamaica's local stamp tax see ch. 7.

[21]Pares, War and Trade, 452-55; Holmes's correspondence with Governor Bart, C.O. Papers 137:61, I; Moore to the Secretary of State, December 28, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[22]Pares, War and Trade, 460. See Pares's essay on the Monte Christi trade in ibid., 456-68.

[23]Henry Moore to the Secretary of State, December 28, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[24]Edward Long to Henry Moore, December 31, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI. The documents were so forthrightly false that Long, as Vice Admiralty Judge, ignored them as evidence in cases brought before him. Pares, War and Trade, 460.

[25]Edward Long to Henry Moore, December 31, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[26]Ibid. Lieutenant Governor Francesco Cavrejas was just completing the construction of a sugar work in order to close this obvious loophole in the illegal trade. Pares, War and Trade, 459.

[27]Edward Long to Henry Moore, December 31, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[28]In 1762 the Court of Prize Appeals upheld the legality of the trade. It ruled that French residents at Monte Christi had to be considered Spanish. Pares, War and Trade, 466.

[29]"Memorial respecting the Trade Carried on by His Majesty's Subjects to the French Settlements in Hispaniola under the Colour of Flags of Truce," December, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI; "Memorial Respecting Monto Christi in Hispaniola, and the Correspondence and Trade Carried on with the Enemy from the Bay of Monto Christi, by the King's Subjects, and the Subjects of Neutral Powers, under the Pretense of this Place being a free Port and protected by a neutral power," December, 1760, ibid.

[30]Charles Holmes to William Pitt, January 4, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:60, VI.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid. Vice Admiral Cotes had also sought additional instructions regarsing the Monte Christi trade. Neither he nor Holmes ever received any. Pares, War and Trade, 460.

[33]Holmes's evidence of illegal trading is included in Holmes to Pitt, February 14, April 14, 17, May 13, 31, June 16, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:60, VII; Also, "Evidence Supporting the Second Memorial of December 1760 Respecting Monte Christi and the Trade carried on there with the Enemy," ibid.; "An Account of Ships and Vessells Spoken with in Monte Christi by His Majesty's Sloop Port Royal, John Hinkman, Esq^{r}, Commander, ibid.

[34]Charles Holmes to John Cleveland, July 23, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[35]*Ibid*.

[36]*Ibid*.

[37]Charles Holmes to John Cleveland, March 18, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I. The request may seem modest, but Holmes did not have a large naval force on hand: only seven ships of the line and nine frigates. "An Account of Ships employed in Guarding Jamaica and Protecting its Trade from November 1760 to the 11th October 1761 & Proceeding from the Island of Port Royal in the Said Island," C.O. Papers 137:61, I; Also, William Henry Lyttelton to Earl of Egremont, January 26, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[38]Charles Holmes to John Cleveland, March 18, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[39]Charles Holmes to John Cleveland, July 23, 1761, *ibid*.

[40]See, for examples, the "Petition to the King by the Merchants, Factors, & Agents in the Island of Jamaica," October 1, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:60, VII.

[41]Charles Holmes to John Cleveland, July 23, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[42]*Ibid*.

[43]Handbill, July 4, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[44]Charles Holmes to John Cleveland, July 23, 1761, *ibid*.

[45]Kingston's Merchants to Admiral Holmes, July 11, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[46]*Ibid*.

[47]Charles Holmes to John Cleveland, July 23, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[48]*Ibid*.

[49]*Ibid*.

[50]Pares, War and Trade, 463. This action was ill-considered. As a result, the Secretary of State officially rebuked Holmes for what was an outrageous violation of Spanish neutrality. Holmes, who had no instructions regarding the Monte Christi trade, merely considered his action another way of striking at the illegal colonial commerce with the enemy. Ibid., 463-64.

[51]"Petition to the King by the Merchants, Factors, & Agents in the Island of Jamaica," October 1, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:60, VII.

[52]Ibid.

[53]"Petition to the Lords of the Admiralty by the Merchants, Factors, & Agents of Jamaica," October 1, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[54]Henry Moore to the Secretary of State, October 14, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:60, VII.

[55]Charles Holmes to William Pitt, October 27, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Ibid. Holmes overstated this point. Thirty-five signatories to the July 11 letter did not sign the October petitions. Two names on the latter, however, are illegible. Moreover, while Zachary Bayley and David Beveridge, for examples, did not sign the petitions, their brothers did. Also, individual members of partnership firms signed the petitions, while the firms signed the July 11 letter as a unit. Holmes perhaps inferred too much from the discrepancy in signatures.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Charles Holmes to John Cleveland, October 27, 1761, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[65]Pares, War and Trade, 616; Barck, ed., Letter Book of John Watts, 9n. 5.

[66]Dumas Malone, et al., eds., Dictionary of American Biography (New York: 1928-37), VI, 538-39. Lyttelton, unfortunately, remains unbiographed.

[67]Greene, Quest for Power," 10-11; Greene, "Role of the Lower Houses of Assembly," Goodman, ed., Essays, 432-33.

[68]Malone, ed., DAB, VI, 539; Patents, 30, 1-3, Jamaica Archives; William Henry Lyttelton to the Earl of Egremont, January 26, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[69]Malone, ed., DAB, VI, 538.

[70]Lyttelton to the Earl of Egremont, January 26, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Extract of Letters found in the St. Devote a French Schooner Taken the 17th of January, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[73]Ibid.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Ibid.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Ibid. Dessande, for example, wrote his uncle on January 16 that "all these Movements in France is intended for the Surprizal of Jamaica." A passenger aboard a French frigate wrote, January 12: "They talk much of transporting the troops we have brought over to the Island of Jamaica We have not far from here a Squadron of 18 Sail of Spanish

Ships who only wait for the Squadron Commanded by Monsieur de Bellehunse." "It should be presumed . . . ," wrote another French voyager, "that should the King's Squadron pass without interruption the Expedition is intended for Jamaica." Lastly, a gentleman from the Intrepid wrote Lieutenant General Le Noir, January 9: "Our arrival here causes great Conjectures, and very little pleasure to some people There is a great deal of talk on the Subject of this Embarkation." Ibid.

[78]Lyttelton to Egremont, January 26, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II. See also n. 37 above.

[79]Lyttelton to Egremont, January 26, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[80]Ibid. Forrest had intended to lie off Cap Francois and strike the enemy squadrons as they arrived. Such an operation, according to Richard Pares, would have been more effective than the defensive strategy for which the Governor and Council opted. Pares believes that Forrest should not have deferred to Lyttelton on this matter. War and Trade, 591.

[81]Lyttelton to Egremont, January 26, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[82]Ibid. That Lyttelton ordered strict internal security can be deduced from his address to the Assembly in April. See p. 217.

[83]Admiral Rodney to Charles Holmes, January 23, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II. Rodney was apparently still unaware of Holmes's death. See also Lyttelton to Egremont, February 27, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[84]Lyttelton to Egremont, February 27, 1762, ibid.

[85]Ibid. Lyttelton also presented the Council a letter from Acting Commodore Forrest containing a document entitled "Manifesto of the Court of Spain." This declaration of hostilities also induced the Council to support an embargo as well as the seizure of Spanish vessels and the arrest of Spanish crewmen in island ports. Council Minutes, January 30, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[86]Assembly Journals, V, 323-25; Kingston Gazette, February 13, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[87]Assembly Journals, V, 323-34; Kingston Gazette, February 13, 1762 and Lyttelton to Egremont, February 27, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[88]Lyttelton to Egremont, February 27, 1762; Petition of the Council and Assembly of Jamaica to the King, February, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[89]William Lessly to Arthur Forrest, February 9, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[90]Deposition of Moses Pereira da Costa, February 9, 1762, ibid. It must be remembered that flags of truce for the legitimate exchange of prisoners remained legal and could still be secured.

[91]See endorsement of Lyttelton to Egremont, January 26, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II.

[92]Egremont to Lyttelton, January, n.d., 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[93]Ibid.

[94]Ibid.

[95]Long, History, II, 337.

[96]Egremont to Lyttelton, January, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, I.

[97]Lyttelton to Egremont, May 12, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[98]Ibid.

[99]Philip Prieleau to Lyttelton, April 8, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[100]Captain Hugh Mackay to Lyttelton, May 2, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[101]Lyttelton to Egremont, January 11, 1762 (1763, actually, but the Governor had not yet adjusted to the new year.) C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[102]*Ibid*.

[103]*Ibid*.

[104]*Ibid*. This was a realistic evaluation. After all, five hundred free black males constituted a huge percentage of the freed population.

[105]*Ibid*.

[106]Pares, *War and Trade*, 590-93.

[107]Lyttelton to Egremont, May 12, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III. Immediately upon Douglas' arrival a quarrel broke out between him and Governor Lyttelton. The latter, to conserve ammunition, had not allowed the guns at Port Royal to give the naval commander the traditional salute. Douglas considered this an insult and declined an invitation to dine at King's House. The result was an unfriendly exchange of letters between the two men during the ensuing weeks. See the Lyttelton-Douglas correspondence, April-May, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, II, III.

[108]*Assembly Journals*, V, 335; Newspaper reprint of Lyttelton's Address to the Council and Assembly, undated, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[109]*Assembly Journals*, V, 336, 338.

[110]See p. 216 and n. 114 below.

[111]"An Act for Providing Two Thousand Negroes for the Immediate Service of His Majesty," C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[112]*Ibid*.

[113]*Ibid*. The commissioners, all prominent islanders, were to begin raising the slave units within forty-eight hours of receiving copies of the law. Parish quotas, based on estimated slave populations, were as follows:

St. Catherine	94
Port Royal	15
Kingston	196
St. Andrew	114
St. Thomas-East	156

St. David	25
St. Thomas-Vale	114
St. John	79
St. Dorothy	43
Vere	72
Clarendon	180
St. Ann	98
St. James	189
St. George	28
St. Mary	118
St. Elizabeth	122
Westmoreland	192
Portland	30
Hanover	135

[114] Ibid.; Assembly Journals, V, 341. Lyttelton thought the terms of payment quite reasonable in that the per diem rate was only 5d. sterling (or one ryal, a Spanish coin current in Jamaica). This rate, he believed, was less by two-thirds that which Antigua and Windward Island planters had let their slaves for the campaign against Martinique. Lyttelton to Egremont, May 12, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III. Lyttelton justified the provision regarding the Receiver General on the ground that it was assumed that the Havanna-bound fleet would touch at Jamaica. Ibid. London did, in fact, provide the funds, but Lyttelton drew criticism from Whitehall as a result of the arrangement. See ch. VI.

[115] Newspaper reprint of Lyttelton's address to the Assembly, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Lyttelton to each Colonel of the Foot Militia, and to Captain Mackay of the Rangers, May 5, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III. Richard Pares wrote that even if this assurance had drawn free blacks into the service, it probably would not have secured their freedom if they had been captured: ". . . Spanish authorities, who were past masters of evasion, would certainly have declared with the deepest regret that the prisoners had been sold and dispersed, and could by no means be traced." War and Trade, 257.

[118] Lyttelton to Egremont, May 12, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[119] See p. 216. Also, Lyttelton to Egremont, June 15, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[120]See n. 114 above.

[121]Lyttelton to Egremont, June 15, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[122]Ibid.; "Post-script" to a letter to the Earl of Albemarle, May 16, 1762 and Copy of a Letter to Captain Hankeison, May 28, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III. See also Lyttelton to Egremont, January 11, 1762 [1763], C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[123]For a progress report on the Havana campaign see James Trower to Lyttelton, August 14, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III. See also David Syrett, ed., The Seige and Capture of Havana, 1762 (London: 1970).

[124]Lyttelton to Egremont, June 15, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[125]Long, History, II, 432.

CHAPTER VI

POLITICS, 1762-1765

Unity of purpose did not outlive the wartime crisis any more than it did the near hysteria of 1760. Once Havana fell and hostilities actually, although not formally, ended, divisiveness resurfaced along with the habit among provincial leaders of exploiting the colony's insecurity for political gain. Bitter struggles between the Governor and the Assembly characterized the post-war period. The popular legislature, which over many years had eroded royal authority in the province, resented William Henry Lyttelton's efforts to impede further Assembly encroachment upon spheres of legitimate Crown competence.[1] In several disputes between 1762 and 1765 the Assembly, like those in the mainland colonies, repeatedly relied on its "power of the purse" to extract concessions from the Governor. In Jamaica, however, this technique had an unusual feature. Because the island had enacted in 1728, like Virginia a half century earlier, a Perpetual Revenue measure, a refusal to appropriate funds did not totally paralyze government.[2] Nevertheless, the withholding of annual grants put enormous pressure on the colonial administration. The Assembly refused, with especially powerful effect, the yearly allotments to the troops

stationed on the island.[3] Depriving the soldiers of their supplementary pay, of course, entailed grave risks. Mutiny, an inherent danger, would throw the island into turmoil, leave it vulnerable, and invite, if not incite, internal rebellion. Accordingly, the Assembly's tactic constituted another example of the exploitation of the colony's security for partisan advantage.

Lyttelton's First Struggle with the Assembly

In one sense Jamaica's chief executive created many of his own problems.[4] Despite his personal charm--one visitor wrote that "nobody could be more polite, friendly or agreeable" than Lyttelton[5]--the Governor's high-mindedness, independence, and devotion to the King's service rendered him unwilling to perceive his role as an essentially political one. He lacked the kind of flexibility which the effective governing of a contentious colonial people required.[6] He tried to abide by his instructions while remaining aloof from the factional infighting which characterized the island's public affairs.[7] Ironically, by doing so, he allowed himself to become hopelessly enmeshed in political turmoil. In 1764 Lord Adam Gordon considered Lyttelton's policy of "siding with no party, and governing by no faction" an example of the Governor's "prudence."[8] If Gordon had been more familiar with colonial affairs, however, he might have concluded the opposite. Lyttelton's non-partisanship merely antagonized both merchants and

planters.[9]

On the other hand, much of Lyttelton's difficulty was circumstantial. It was happenstance, for instance, that he had assumed office at a moment of great danger to Jamaica. While the crisis of 1762 had allowed the Governor to demonstrate his courage, intelligence, and decisiveness, it had also compelled him to betray his weaknesses. Although he had acted swiftly to defend the colony, Lyttelton nevertheless proved unable to implement successfully the double assignment given him by the Secretary of State. The failures embarrassed him, and he soon learned, if he had not already known it, what many a colonial executive had learned during the years of empire-building: while administering a provincial government one always needed to guard against criticism from Whitehall where jobbers eagerly sought "places" to distribute. At first Egremont only gently chided Lyttelton. In August, 1762, the Secretary informed the Governor of the King's disappointment over the way the project for a free black regiment had fizzled and advised Lyttelton that "it would have been better" had the per diem clause not been included in the legislation mustering two thousand slaves into service.[10] But in October the Secretary's criticism grew sharp. He flatly told Lyttelton that the failure to send the full complement of slaves to Havana had impeded the success of that campaign. In Egremont's opinion the plan had broken down on account of ill-feeling between the Governor and Commodore Douglas.[11] These

allegations stung, and Lyttelton felt compelled to defend his performance.[12]

If the new Governor's double failure caught the attention of authorities at home, in Jamaica it seemed even more obvious. Colonial leaders measuring the caliber of the chief executive concluded that Lyttelton had performed less than excellently. Like vultures, local politicians sensed the Governor's vulnerability and, once the wartime crisis ended, did not wait long to exploit it. Developments in England soon provided the islanders their first opportunity to defy the Governor.

In January, 1762, the Board of Trade had disallowed Jamaica's Revenue Acts of 1756, 1759, and 1761 because the laws had lacked suspending clauses.[13] In September the Assembly, which had always opposed the suspension and customarily ignored it, retaliated by withholding all appropriations until Governor Lyttelton agreed to sign all legislation regardless of whether the hated proviso was necessary.[14] Lyttelton refused to submit to such pressure, and, by the time the Assembly adjourned on October 12, no money bills had been enacted, including those supplementing the pay of the royal troops.[15]

Faced with the problem of running the government with little revenue, Lyttelton reconvened the Assembly. But contrary to his hopes, the delegates on October 19 passed a resolution, adopted four days later by the Council, declaring that the suspending clause was ". . . a misrepre-

sentation of the Constitution of this Colony and would if admitted deprive us of some of our most valuable and established Rights abridge the power of the legislature and draw this Colony into many inconveniencies as well as into a dangerous and unconstitutional dependence on that board [of trade]."[16] Lyttelton was enraged. A week earlier he had written the Board of Trade that the Assembly was "eager . . . to be freed of [mercantile] restraints."[17] Now he wrote the Board again, denouncing the political pretensions of both the Council and the Assembly. He charged that the Council, deeming itself "one of the three estates," functioned as if it were the House of Lords, often acting without instructions from or approval by the Governor. The Assembly, on the other hand, having modeled itself on the House of Commons, believed it had authority in the colony corresponding to the authority of Commons in England.[18] ". . . [T]he causes of the difficulties I experience . . . ," Lyttelton lamented, "grow out of the opinion which they have formed of the Constitution of this government, and of their rights and privileges."[19] He declared that the Assembly's refusal to appropriate funds unless he recognized the "validity of [its] pretensions" constituted a mode of extortion in which the public peace itself was held hostage. What endangered the public peace? The Governor feared the breakdown of discipline among the troops to whom, he believed, the withholding of supplementary supplies was nothing less than an invitation to mutiny. To avoid throwing

"this country . . . into a state of the greatest confusion and distraction," might not the royal treasury, he asked, provide the troops their additional pay?[20]

Whitehall never had to respond to Lyttelton's request. Within a month the Governor capitulated to the Assembly's "pretensions," and the various money bills, including those augmenting the soldiers' salaries, were enacted. But despite the Assembly's victory, the whole affair engendered open hostility between the Governor and several prominent legislators, most notably the wealthy, long-time Speaker of the House, Charles Price.[21] For several months Price had been suspicious of the new administration, particularly of William Langham, Lyttelton's secretary. During the emergency legislative session in April, for example, Price alleged that Langham was soliciting payments for certain transactions and even offered a resolution that "the governor's secretary, being no public officer, hath no right to demand fees, for civil or military commissions."[22] This charge, true or not, was raised again during the September and October controversy over the suspending clause, but this time with a twist. Now Price accused Lyttelton himself of demanding "unusual fees for commissions," maintaining that had it not been for such extortion, Lyttelton could have raised a free black regiment earlier in the year.[23] Moreover, the Speaker declared that the Governor had done the island a disservice by insulting the colony's savior, Commodore Douglas, in April.[24]

The matter came to a head before the Assembly adjourned. On November 19 Price, together with his son and fellow delegate, Charles Price, Jr., sponsored a resolution to petition the King for Lyttelton's recall. The Price resolution accused the Governor of corruption, held him responsible for the failure to organize a free black regiment, and asserted that Lyttelton had been insolent to colonial and royal officials alike.[25] Despite the Speaker's enormous prestige, the measure was defeated eighteen to four.[26]

Lyttelton was not the sort of man to let such an attack go unanswered. On November 24 he denounced the "violent and factious measures of three or four among you" who attempted to undermine confidence in the administration by "a false show of zeal for the general good . . . ."[27] He declared that no demogogue who sought "an undue influence in the community" and whose ambitions were "destructive of the good order of government and the Rights . . . of his fellow citizens" would make him falter in carrying out the duties of the Governorship or drive him from office.[28] ". . . I shall willingly resign my office," he said, "the moment the King my master shall judge it to be conducive to his service, and that those who may wish my removal, shall have no other motive to desire it but the Welfare of this Island."[29] On that pronouncement the difficult legislative session ended.

Further Problems: Troops and a Colonial Agent

A week later Lyttelton received good news. A letter from Egremont revealed that a cease-fire was in effect. Accordingly, the Governor "caused His Majesty's Proclamation for a Cessation of Arms to be Published."[30] The following February the Peace of Paris was signed.

Englishmen everywhere exulted in the hour of triumph, but Jamaica's colonials felt more than national pride. Peace, of course, solved their external security problem, and the treaty forged at Paris provided them additional benefits. French retention of Guadaloupe and Martinique meant that the considerable sugar production of those islands would not be injected into the English market. Moreover, the treaty improved the colony's internal defense. Article XVII required the destruction of all British fortifications at and the withdrawal of all British troops from "the Bay of Honduras, and other places of the territory of Spain in that part of the world . . . ." The evacuation was to be accomplished within four months of the treaty's ratification. In return, His Catholic Majesty pledged to let English subjects in those places freely pursue their "occupation of Cutting, Loading, and Carrying away Logwood."[31]

Article XVII accomplished what the islanders had wanted ever since the slave revolts of 1760: the return of Jamaica-assigned regulars from faraway places. The Assembly, it will be remembered, had petitioned for these redeployments in 1760 and again in 1761.[32] In fact, in Decem-

ber, 1761, the House's Committee of Correspondence directed Lovel Stanhope, Jamaica's London agent, to lobby for the recall of the company then stationed at the Mosquito Shore. The committee informed Stanhope that unless those troops returned, the Assembly would discontinue their supplementary pay at the end of the year.[33] The colonial agent apprised the Secretary of War, Charles Townshend, of the Assembly's stand. Townshend admitted that he did not know what the future status of the Mosquito Shore troops was going to be but pledged that if regulars remained on duty there, a fund would be found to supply them, relieving Jamaica of a financial burden.[34] Nothing, however, was done. By the time the Peace of Paris was signed, the soldiers at the Mosquito Shore no longer received subsidies from Jamaica.

In any case, the Bay of Honduras was the only location specifically mentioned in the treaty from which British regulars had to withdraw. Since the English settlement there was really a Jamaica protectorate, not, administratively, a colony in its own right, implementation of Article XVII devolved upon Governor Lyttelton. Egremont sent him the appropriate orders in April, 1763. The Governor was to send Lieutenant Robert Hodgson of the 49th Regiment and an engineer to the Bay of Honduras to supervise the demolition and evacuation. General oversight of the operation rested with Lyttelton.[35] The Governor, of course, obeyed instructions. In August he sent Hodgson and Lieutenant Robert Brereton to the Honduran coast to begin implementing

Article XVII.[36]

But what of the troops at the Mosquito Shore? The Secretary's directive said nothing about them. Lyttelton therefore acted cautiously. He dispatched Captain Joseph Otway to Black River at the Shore and ordered him to wait there for instructions.[37] The Governor then sought advice from London.[38] But the ministry, which apparently had not considered the matter of the Mosquito Shore detachment, had no immediate reply. Instead, it submitted Lyttelton's inquiry to the Board of Trade for study.[39]

In the meantime, Hodgson and Brereton were dismantling fortifications at Honduras Bay and withdrawing the garrison stationed there. But no similar activity occurred at the English settlements at the Mosquito Shore where Captain Otway awaited orders. The delay troubled Lyttelton. Since January 1 the soldiers at the Shore had not received supplementary allotments from Jamaica, and the Governor was certain that extra pay was not forthcoming from London. The preceding October he had sought to verify Townshend's pledge to find a "fund" for the troops, but Lyttelton's letter drew no response.[40] Moreover, Otway, who soon found managing the soldiers increasingly difficult, began drawing bills of exchange on Jamaica's Receiver General. But the bills were "protested for want of a Fund in this Island to defray the amount of them."[41] The danger of mutiny at the Shore constrained Lyttelton to withdraw the troops. Nevertheless, he remained reluctant to act. He worried whether

Article XVII applied to the Mosquito Shore. Lieutenant Hodgson, who opposed withdrawal from that place, badgered him with queries "whether the Mosquito Shore is a Spanish Territory or not" under the treaty's provisions. Lyttelton did not believe that this was "a point proper for me to determine."[42] A mistaken interpretation, of course, could cause him trouble at home.

By November Lyttelton found a way out of his dilemma. A letter from the Secretary of War in June had stated that the 49th Regiment constituted part of "the Garrison of . . . the Island."[43] Reasoning that the 49th "cannot be said to [garrison the island] while one company of it is Stationed on the Mosquito Shore," the Governor finally acted.[44] On November 2 he wrote Hodgson, who by then had joined Otway at Black River, ordering him to return the troops to Jamaica.[45] At long last the colonial Assembly was securing the withdrawal of the Mosquito Shore detachment.

Although the Central American evacuations seemed to be steps in the direction of stronger internal defense, the redeployment of troops to Jamaica did not, as it turned out, enhance the island's security. The withdrawals, in fact, constituted elements of a wider post-war plan, formulated at Whitehall, to reduce the British military presence throughout the Caribbean. Soaring national indebtedness justified, if it did not dictate, this policy. Jamaica, as a consequence, suffered. London implemented measures which

reduced by five times the strength which the return of two hundred regulars from the Spanish mainland provided the island. As early as May 10, 1763, Egremont informed Lyttelton that the 49th Regiment would "be reduced" to five hundred men, "the Establishment fixed for Time of Peace." Moreover, the Governor learned that the 74th, a veteran of Jamaican service, would be replaced, presumably by a unit of no more than five hundred men.[46] Official instructions followed shortly. In letters dated June 15 and July 4 Welbore Ellis, Secretary of War, told Lyttelton that the five hundred-man 43rd Regiment was on its way to relieve the 74th and that the 49th was to be reduced by half. The communiques directed the Governor to implement the changes.[47] Lyttelton received these orders in August and quickly went to work. On September 28, more than a month before he had decided to recall the troops from the Mosquito Shore, he reported that he had "carried into Execution His Majesty's Orders, with regard to the Troops at Jamaica."[48] Indeed, the reduction of the island's forces might well account for Lyttelton's decision to withdraw the Mosquito Shore detachment.

The military cut-backs displeased the colonists. Few believed that one thousand men could properly police the province. One observer maintained that "one thousand men are scarcely sufficient to garrison the island."[49] Another, a Colonel in one of the regiments stationed in Jamaica in 1764, wrote: ". . . altho' it appears they have already over built themselves, as they wished and calculated

as if they should always have two compleat Corps, on the old high Establishment of 1000 men each, and indeed that number seems not more than sufficient to secure them from intestine rebellions and insurrections of their negroes, who are daily increasing beyond the proportion of white people."[50]

When the Assembly convened on October 11, it heard the disappointing news concerning the troops. Lyttelton appealed for understanding and cooperation:

> His Majesty, ever mindful of the safety of this island of Jamaica, has not contented himself with compelling the enemies of his crown to lay down those foreign arms, which might have been employed to annoy you, but has graciously provided for your domestic security, by alloting two regiments to guard this country from intestine commotions of rebellious slaves, or other sudden and unexpected dangers; and I persuade myself you will readily manifest the just sense you have, of his Majesty's goodness therein, by granting such supplies for the maintenance and accommodation of those troops, in addition to the king's pay, as shall appear requisite for his Majesty's service; and I must particularly observe to you, that the forty third regiment has hitherto had no allowance from the island.[51]

The Assembly responded affirmatively. The next day a committee reported that the soldiers of the 43rd Regiment were entitled to the "same provision for their subsistence" as those of the 49th.[52] In a matter of days the appropriate legislation underwent its first reading. All seemed well.

But the Assembly was disenchanted and sought to attribute blame for the troop reductions and the obvious dangers they created. Whose job was it to guard the island against adverse policies emanating from London? Lovel Stanhope, the colony's agent, had manifestly failed to persuade

the ministry to maintain old troop levels in Jamaica. Nor had he done well the preceding year when negotiating with Townshend over the Mosquito Shore detachment. On that occasion he had acquiesced in an empty promise. Among Jamaica's lawmakers a determination to remove Stanhope developed.

Securing a new London lobbyist, however, was no easy matter. In earlier times the Assembly had had sole authority to appoint the agent but lost it in 1718 when royal instructions required the Council to share that power.[53] Since Stanhope had ties with the island's merchants, Council support for his dismissal was doubtful. In any case, the Assembly believed that the Council should have no voice in the matter at all. The 1718 rule had always irked the legislators. By 1763 Jamaica was the only colony south of the Chesapeake whose Assembly did not have absolute control over the London agency.[54] The situation, it seemed, needed correcting. Sharing authority over the agency was out of character for an Assembly historically aggressive and mindful of its rights and privileges as a mini-Parliament. Moreover, as Professor Penson pointed out, the Assemblymen wanted "to secure for themselves . . . the support of the agent at home" in case of "difficulty" with either the Council, in which the merchant class had some strength, or the Governor.[55]

In November the Assembly made its move. It passed "An Act for Raising Several Sums of Money . . . for Subsisting for One Year the Officers and Soldiers of His Majesty's

49th Regiment of Foot" with a rider which gave the popular branch of the legislature sole authority to choose the London agent.[56] Since riders to money bills were illegal, the Council reacted sharply when the bill came before it for consideration.[57] It denounced the Assembly's action as "unparliamentary," complaining that it put the Council in the "disagreeable" position "of suffering such an unconstitutional measure . . . or of rejecting a bill of such salutary and beneficial consequences to the public."[58] Unanimously opposing the bill, the upper chamber fixed responsibility squarely on the Assembly by declaring that "the House . . . must be answerable for all the bad effects which may attend the measure."[59] Because the Council did not specify what "bad effects" it had in mind, there is no way of knowing whether it shared the Governor's fear that privation would induce disorder among the troops. In any case, because of the failure of the appropriation, on December 1 Lyttelton prorogued the Assembly for six days.[60]

On December 7 the Governor asked the Assembly to supply "the same aids which I applied to you for at the commencement, and during the course, of your last session."[61] The next day the Assembly seemingly prepared the way for the supplementary military appropriations by informing the Council that the House was willing to settle the matter of the London agent in the customary fashion. Recognizing that the House was, in effect, disavowing its earlier "unconstitutional measure," the Council quickly ac-

cepted the Assembly's offer. A joint House-Council committee began work on the agency question. Within twenty-four hours, however, these negotiations broke down because the conferees could not agree on a nominee.[62] Councillors supported Lovel Stanhope, but the Assemblymen wanted to dismiss the present agent and appoint someone new. Nothing broke the deadlock.[63]

The joint committee's failure prompted the Assembly on December 10 to send a memorial to the Governor, assuring him of the popular branch's good faith and strongly implying that the supplementary military appropriations would shortly be enacted.[64] But despite its assurances the Assembly's address ended on a curious note: ". . . we shall . . . . be as tender and cautious of infringing the prerogative of the Crown, as we shall be firm in support of the rights and privileges of the people."[65]

The memorial, it turned out, represented not an olive branch but a thorn with which to prick the legislative power of the Council. The Assembly apparently defined its earlier claim to sole authority over the London agent as one of "the rights and privileges of the people." On December 14 it passed a bill conferring on the House the right and the power to appoint the island's agent. The Council immediately and unanimously rejected the measure.[66] Governor Lyttelton was equally outraged. What strategy, he must have wondered, was at work here? A week had passed since his prorogation of the Assembly had ended, but the

but the deputies had not yet enacted the Additional Duty bills for the troops. Was the House making adoption of its agency bill a prerequisite for the appropriation of the supplementary military pay? Whatever the case might have been, Lyttelton responded swiftly to the agency bill. He summoned the delegates to his chamber and announced that because of "the miscarriage of a bill, very requisite for the welfare of the island . . . it [is] necessary for me to put you under a short prorogation."[67]

This second suspension lasted only one day, but it seems to have had the desired effect. On December 15 the Assembly proposed an agency bill creating a commission of three to represent the colony in London. Within a day representatives and Councillors were discussing the merits of this compromise. The Assembly also appointed a committee to draft new legislation providing supplementary pay to the 49th Regiment, and on December 16 this Additional Duty bill underwent its first reading.[68] During the next few days the Governor and members of the House and Council held a series of discussions concerning the matters under consideration. What went on at these meetings is far from clear, but as a result of them the Assembly reversed its position. It abandoned its compromise agency scheme and acquiesced in the Council's determination to retain Lovel Stanhope as Jamaica's representative in London. Then it went ahead and passed the Additional Duty bill which Lyttelton signed into law on December 21.[69] In brief, the

Assembly's effort to gain control of the island's agent failed.

Why the Assembly abandoned its quest is no mystery. The fact that the House did not adjourn on December 21, even though the public business had been taken care of and time still remained for most members to get home for Christmas, suggests that the Assembly, Governor, and Council struck some sort of bargain during their five days of talks. The three-day House session which followed a brief holiday recess provides a clue to what happened. Although the Assembly enacted no noteworthy legislation, it did, on December 30, compose two lengthy and important petitions. Very possibly the Assembly bartered its agency bill in exchange for Lyttelton's and the Council's endorsements of these appeals to the King. The first concerned English rum and sugar duties and their effect on Jamaica's depressed economy. The petitioners reminded George III that during the recent war "we bore all the additional expences and inconveniences" the crisis demanded. Peace, however, had not brought relief: ". . . unfortunately for us the duties imposed on the staple commodities of this country, sugar and rum, particularly, on the latter, are so high that they do not afford us any adequate subsistence or give us any encouragement for the manufacturing thereof."[70] The petition ended with a request for lower tariffs.[71]

The second appeal concerned current troop levels in Jamaica and the danger they posed to the colony. The Assem-

bly's message was unmistakably clear:

> . . . to represent to your majesty, that your Majesty's 49th and 74th regiments consisted jointly of two thousand men; a number, in our humble apprehension, absolutely necessary, and scarce sufficient, to secure and preserve the peace and tranquility of this island, from the secret machinations and open insurrections of our internal enemies: That the 74th being lately recalled, was succeeded by your majesty's 43 d regiment; which, jointly with the 49th, do not, upon the present establishment, amount to more than nine hundred men:
>
> That your Majesty's poor and loyal subjects of this island, in expectation of always having the full complement of two thousand men above-mentioned on this establishment, have at a very heavy expense, built many good and convenient barracks, proper for their reception and accommodation; which, if not properly garrisoned, will run to decay, and give encouragement to our slaves to disturb the peace and happiness we enjoy, under your majesty's most mild and gracious government.
>
> We do, therefore, most humbly beseech your majesty, to take the premises into your royal consideration, and grant us such an augmentation of forces as your majesty, in your great wisdom, shall think fit.[72]

A Question of Privilege

In March, 1764, according to "a Plan of Rotation, which the King has been pleased to establish for the Relief of his Troops in his American Dominions," London replaced the army units stationed in Jamaica. Whitehall ordered the 36th and 66th Regiments of Foot to assume the responsibilities of the 43rd and 49th respectively. Despite the island's plea of the preceding December, the new units consisted of five hundred men each.[73]

While London issued these orders, events unfolded elsewhere which, in light of existing troop strength, directly affected Jamaica's security. In March Phillipe Remirez de Estenoz, Governor of Yucatan, drove British log-

gers from the Rio Hondo in Honduras and forced them to retire to Belize.[74] William Henry Lyttelton promptly protested this action of the Spanish Governor and in early April informed Halifax of the violation of the Peace of Paris and how he had responded to it.[75] Shortly after Whitehall received this news, England's ambassador in Madrid denounced the incident at the Spanish Court and demanded that the loggers be returned to the Rio Hondo.[76]

In the meantime, Governor Remirez replied to Lyttelton's protest of March 30, explaining that he had merely wanted English loggers to secure certificates of nationality. Moreover, he maintained that Article XVII of the 1763 treaty protected only English settlers engaged in the logging industry, not those involved in other pursuits, and only those along the New and Walis Rivers, not elsewhere.[77] Remirez did not, therefore, restore the refugees; nor, for that matter, did the government in Madrid. Throughout the spring and summer Whitehall wrestled with the problem.

Finally, on September 21 Grenville's ministry determined to restore the loggers, peacefully if possible but by force if necessary.[78] Two days later Halifax wrote Lyttelton: "I am now to inform you, that His Majesty being determined, in Consequence of the advice and opinion of His Principal Servants, to take effectual Measures for the Reestablishment and Protection of His Subjects, the Logwood-Cutters in the free Enjoyment of the Rights and Privileges secured to Them by the Late Treaty of Peace . . . ."[79] How

was this to be done? Four ships of the line, two ready to sail, the others to follow in a fortnight, would reenforce the Jamaica Squadron. After these vessels arrived, Rear Admiral William Burnaby, now Commander of the island's naval station, would "proceed with all the force which can be collected, to the Bay of Honduras, where He is to inform the Logwood-Cutters of His Majesty's Resolution to protect them in the Rights secured to them . . . ."[80] Then Burnaby was "to apply, in an amicable manner, to the Governor of Yucatan to restore the Logwood-Cutters . . . to the free Exercise of their occupation . . . And, in case of the Delay or Refusal of the Spanish Governor, he is to land such force, and to give the . . . Logwood-Cutters such Protection, as shall be necessary for their Reestablishment and future Security . . . ."[81] The Admiral, however, was required "to refrain from any Act of Hostility, other than such as shall be absolutely necessary for the Defence of His Majesty's Subjects . . . ."[82] If troops, indeed, were landed, Burnaby was to withdraw them as soon as the Spanish government gave "effectual orders" to abide by Article XVII.[83] Governor Lyttelton had a role to play in this plan. He was not only to cooperate with Burnaby bu to provide him substantive aid. "It is therefore His Majesty's Pleasure," Halifax wrote the island's chief executive, "that . . . you should furnish Him [Burnaby] with such a Detachment of Troops from the Island under your government, as shall be judged necessary and expedient."[84]

Authorities in Madrid learned of London's decision long before those in Jamaica, and they acted quickly to avoid a possible confrontation. The Spanish Crown ordered Governor Remirez to restore the loggers at the Bay. This sudden turnabout caused Whitehall to modify Burnaby's instructions. New orders canceled the requirement that Burnaby "apply" to Remirez for the resettling of the loggers. Instead, Burnaby was to present the Spanish Governor a copy of His Catholic Majesty's edict and see that Remirez executed its directive in a "faithful and speedy" fashion. If Remirez failed to comply, the Admiral was to follow the proceedures outlined in the original orders.[85]

None of this information was known in Jamaica when the Assembly convened on October 17. At the outset of the session Lyttelton announced that relief regiments had arrived and urged the Assemblymen "to vote such a pay to them, in addition to that of the Crown, as was given to the corps which they have relieved; and I hope you will take an early day for that purpose."[86] Two days later the representatives pledged to appropriate such funds, assigned a committee to draft the bills, and asked the Governor for the kind of information necessary for the measures: the dates when the new units arrived and the number of men and officers in each.[87] A week later the Council also assured the Governor that it would approve extra pay for the relief regiments.[88]

Real harmony characterized the first weeks of the legislative session. Very likely, the Governor, Council,

and Assembly all sought to sustain the cooperation and good will which the joint discussions of December, 1763, had spawned. Even the agency question, which came up again at this time, did not disrupt relations within the government. During the summer Lovel Stanhope had resigned his post, and, as a conciliatory gesture, the Council now supported William Morrison, the Assembly's favorite for the position the year before. Morrison, however, declined.[89] For two weeks the Assembly considered what position it should take on the agency matter while the Council watched and waited. At last, on October 31 the Assembly resolved not to renew its 1763 claim to sole authority over the appointment.[90] This pronouncement cleared the way for speedy House-Council action, and on November 9 Stephen Fuller, Rose Fuller's brother, became Jamaica's new London agent.[91]

The concord within the government was, however, short-lived. Conditions began to change on November 1. Lyttelton, who had not yet sent the Assembly the data it requested regarding the new regiments, received another query from the popular branch. The Governor responded the same day, and the lawmakers learned officially what they probably already knew through hearsay: that their petition of the preceding December had had no effect in London and that only a thousand regulars garrisoned the island.[92] Despite disappointment, the Assembly seemed resigned to this situation. It submitted the information on the troops to committee, and a few days later an Additional Duty bill for

the 36th Regiment came before the full House. On November 7 the measure underwent its first reading.[93]

Both Lyttelton and Admiral Burnaby received their orders concerning the Bay of Honduras at this time. Both men, accordingly, conferred. Discussion centered on the number of Jamaica-based troops to accompany the expedition. How many were "necessary" for the success of the operation? How many was it "expedient" to send away from the island? Burnaby asked for five hundred men, an entire regiment. The Governor refused. A contingent that large, he believed, would leave the colony virtually defenseless. He wrote:

> . . . the 66th Regiment alone has lost ninety-two by death since its arrival here, and the Companies are so very sickly that it appears by the last returns there are only Six Hundred and thirteen men out of both Regiments at present fit for duty in this Island it was not in my power to comply with his request without leaving the King's Forts destitute of Troops to do the most necessary Garrison Duty and exposing the Island to suffer greatly by Insurrections of rebellious Slaves.[94]

But Lyttelton was willing to compromise. He offered Burnaby "a Detachment of Four hundred Men, officers and Non-Commission'd officers included from His Majesty's 36th and 66th Regiments," a composite unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave, Sir Philip Musgrave's brother.[95] On November 20 the Admiral, "sensible" that the Governor "spared as many" soldiers as he "possibly cou'd considering the present situation of the Troops," accepted this proposal.[96]

The special force was to assemble for embarkation whenever Burnaby announced the fleet ready to sail. The Admiral, following orders, planned to set out for Honduras

"without any delay" after the four awaited warships arrived. But by the end of November only the Essex and Africa had dropped anchors at Port Royal. The other vessels, presumably, were still en route to Jamaica. Burnaby, as a result, could not depart the island at once.[97] This delay, however, did not perturb Governor Lyttelton. The chief executive apparently still believed that the Honduras mission, if lengthy, would endanger Jamaica. He wrote the Secretary of State, asking for an augmentation of the island's military force. Since ". . . the island will be in a very weak state when the Men of War have left it with the Detachment on board and the Service they are going upon may possibly prove of long duration, I beg leave to submit to your Lordships Consideration whether a reinforcement of Troops shou'd not be sent hither."[98]

Others shared the Governor's fear. Lyttelton informed the Assembly of the Honduras Bay expedition on December 4.[99] Details of the operation startled the lawmakers. For an indefinite period only 405 infantrymen would be left on the island; of them 104 were ill and on the inactive list.[100] The representatives were clearly disturbed by what seemed a callous disregard for the colony's safety, and many believed that the Governor could have minimized the number of troops involved in the expedition if he had been more firm with Burnaby. After all, Lyttelton was ex officio the highest ranking military officer in Jamaica.[101] The Assembly expressed its outrage by amending the Additional Duty

bill for the 36th Regiment in such a way that only those troops who remained on the island qualified for supplementary pay. On December 15 the Council rejected the measure on the ground that the sum appropriated was insufficient to maintain the entire regiment.[102] The harmony of the first weeks of the legislative session was collapsing.

While the political climate was changing, an incident occurred which threw the colonial government into near paralysis. On December 8 Deputy Marshal Richard Thomas Wilson, acting on a suit by Pierce Cooke, Secretary to the island's Receiver General, executed a writ of venditioni exponas on the coach horses of the well-to-do planter John Olyphant, an Assemblyman from Vere.[103] Horses, it is true, were extremely difficult to purchase in Jamaica and almost impossible to hire, so that the seizure would have undoubtedly inconvenienced Olyphant when the Assembly adjourned and it was time to go home.[104] But instead of filing a counter-suit, Olyphant raised the matter with his colleagues, charging that the writ violated one of his privileges--freedom from legal proceedings against property necessary for transportation to and from and accommodation during an Assembly session.[105] The House accordingly ordered Wilson to appear at its bar to respond to the accusation.[106] Nearly a week later, on December 14, Wilson obeyed the summons and testified. He admitted executing the writ against Olyphant's horses and maintained that Pierce Cooke had actually assisted him in doing it.[107] The House then

demanded that Cooke also answer a breach of privilege charge.[108] When Wilson the next day told the Assembly that he had executed the writ on the instruction of another deputy marshal, Lachlan M'Neil, the lawmakers summoned the latter as well.[109] It seemed that in a short time the House would lodge formal charges against the three men.

Investigating the Olyphant case consumed most of the Assembly's time and attention during mid-December, and the legislative process came to a standstill.[110] Since all existing appropriations were due to expire on New Year's Day and the House had not yet passed any money measures other than the amended Additional Duty bill which, it will be remembered, the Council rejected, Governor Lyttelton watched what was happening with increasing anxiety.[111] On December 16 he summoned the Assembly's Speaker, the Attorney General, and the Chief Justice to his residence and urged them to use their influence to get the House to abandon the privilege issue.[112] He said that the Assembly's stand in the matter was of dubious legality because Article XIII of his royal instructions, which he read to the three men, did not permit him to recognize any claim of Parliamentary privilege respecting property.[113] He warned that, if legal proceedings resulted from the Assembly's actions, he would have no alternative but to oppose the popular branch's pretensions. Since such a confrontation could only be detrimental to the island's welfare, the avoidance of legal proceedings was, Lyttelton said, the only "prudent course."[114] When the

interview was over, the Governor believed the three colonials had all agreed that the House should drop the privilege question and devote its attention instead to the important legislation still pending.[115]

Lyttelton was wrong. Not only did the Assembly resume its investigation the next day, but Charles Price, the Speaker, the most influential of the men whose cooperation the Governor had sought, actively participated in the proceedings. On Tuesday morning, December 18, the House formally charged Wilson, Cooke, and M'Neil with breach of privilege and issued warrants for their arrests. By afternoon Edward Bolt, the Assembly's messenger, had taken the three into custody, but the prisoners, by promptly applying to the Governor's office for writs of habeas corpus, raised the legal question Lyttelton wanted to avoid.[116] Although he ordered the writs drawn up, the Governor had decided on a plan which, he hoped, would prevent the bitter confrontation he was certain would develop if he, as Chancellor, rendered a decision on the case. Late Tuesday afternoon, with the unanimous consent of the Council, Lyttelton prorogued the Assembly for a day.[117] The ostensible purpose of the suspension was, as Lyttelton declared, "to preserve the public tranquility, and to keep the Assembly in such a temper that the supply bills . . . might be passed."[118] But these were not the only reasons. Since the Assembly had no power of detention except when actually in session, the prorogation automatically freed the three prisoners, relieving the

Governor of the unpleasant task of issuing the writs of habeas corpus. "The persons in custody," Lyttelton wrote shortly afterward, "were . . . set free, without having been brought before me, or any decision having been given, whether the commitment of them was legal or not."[119] The prorogation also bought Lyttelton more time in which to secure an acceptable settlement of the problem. The chief executive later recalled that "no little pains were taken to prevail with the Assembly to let the matter drop there, and not revive it when they met again."[120]

By avoiding the legal questions the case presented, Lyttelton adhered to what he had earlier defined as the only "prudent course," and, as a result, he considered the suspension any thing but provocative. This was a serious error of judgment. His appeal to the House the next day to "grant the proper supplies for the support of the government" without "unnecessary delay" was ignored.[121] The Assembly organized itself into a Committee of the Whole and adopted eleven extraordinary resolutions, all of which either broadly defined the privileges the House claimed or proposed specific measures for dealing with the case at hand.[122] Article XIII of the Governor's instructions notwithstanding, the third resolve upheld Olyphant's view by maintaining that Parliamentary immunity extended to property "necessary for [an Assemblyman's] accommodation during his attendance on the house."[123] The eighth resolution stated that anyone "committed" by the House for breach of privilege could be

freed only on a direct "order or warrant" of the Assembly.[124] What the eighth resolve implied, the ninth specifically demanded: it ordered Edward Bolt to arrest Wilson, Cooke, and M'Neil for a second time.[125] Unlike the Governor, the Assembly was less interested in prudence than in the integrity of its privileges.

The following day, December 20, Cooke and M'Neil (Wilson could not be found) were in Bolt's custody, and they applied, as Lyttelton expected, for writs of habeas corpus. The Governor ordered that the men appear before him the next morning at ten o'clock at which time he would decide on their cases.[126]

In the meantime Lyttelton had a lot to think about. He had directed all his efforts at avoiding formal court proceedings, but there now seemed no alternative to a judicial decision on the matter. There was no legal ground on which to deny the writs. In 1728 Jamaica had incorporated recourse to writs into its own colonial law.[127] Nor, on the other hand, did Lyttelton deem it practical to disclaim jurisdiction in the case: Article XIII of his instructions could not be circumvented.[128] Yet the Governor was aware that a judgment in accordance with his instructions would spark a controversy between himself and the Assembly, the duration and results of which could not be foreseen. But he had dealt with the Assembly long enough to know that in any such conflict the representatives would withhold needed appropriations. Since the House had not yet enacted a sin-

gle money bill, the future looked bleak indeed.

On Friday morning, December 21, Lyttelton, in his capacity as Chancellor, issued writs of habeas corpus on behalf of Cooke and M'Neil and filed a judgment explaining his reasons for doing so:

> His Excellency the Chancellor was pleased to declare: That it did not appear . . . from the words of any act of Parliament, or of any act of the Governor, Council and Assembly of this island; or of His Majesty's Commission or Instructions to His Excellency, as Governor of this island, or by any other means whatsoever, that the commitment of the [defendants] into the custody of . . . Edward Bolt is legal. And His Excellency the Chancellor was therefore pleased to order, adjudge and decree . . . that the [defendants] be . . . released and discharged from the custody of . . . Edward Bolt.[129]

Outraged by the Governor's release of Cooke and M'Neil, the Assembly adopted a set of resolutions more extraordinary and self-assertive than those of December 19. The first four stated:

> Resolved . . . that his excellency William Henry Lyttelton . . . in taking upon himself, as chancellor, to determine against the privileges of this house, and to discharge Pierce Cooke and Lachlan M'Neil, who were committed to the custody of the messenger of this house, for a contempt and breach of privilege of this house, has acted in an unjustifiable manner, and has been guilty of a flagrant breach, contempt, and violation, of the privileges of this house, and the liberties of the people.[130]
>
> Resolved . . . that this house cannot, with any dignity to itself, or justice to the people, proceed to any other business, under such a violent and unexpected breach of its privileges.[131]
>
> Resolved . . . that this house will not proceed to any other business, until it shall be righted in its privileges, and has received ample reparation for the indignity that has been offered to this house.[132]
>
> Resolved . . . that Mr. Pierce Cooke, and Lachlan M'Neil, be severally taken into and kept close in the

> custody of the messenger of this house, for a contempt and breach of the privileges of this house; and that Mr. Speaker do sign warrants for that purpose.[133]

The fifth resolve, the last and lengthiest, denounced Lyttelton's action as an "unprecedented . . . determin/ation/ against our privileges." It asserted that Jamaica's Assemblymen had "uninterruptedly" enjoyed immunity in property "necessary for their accommodation during their session." The resolution also pointed out that representatives considered the "right" of "committing" people for breach of privilege "essential to their very being as a free Assembly." Finally, the fifth resolve proposed petitioning George III to "interpose His royal authority" and restrain Lyttelton's "arbitrary exercise of power as Chancellor." The King's intervention, the resolution said, will "protect us from such open and manifest violations, destructive of our Rights, and subversive of our constitution."[134]

Immediately upon receiving the resolutions Lyttelton prorogued the Assembly, and, three days later, he dissolved it.[135] In both actions the Council supported him unanimously.[136] But dissolution of the Assembly hardly solved the Governor's problems. Without the popular legislature there could be no appropriations for the regular troops, nor, in fact, for any other purpose. Lyttelton, consequently, while dissolving the Assembly, ordered writs of election issued, returnable March 5, 1765.[137]

Christmas Eve, the day of the dissolution, was also

Lyttelton's fortieth birthday, but there was no merry-making in the Governor's mansion that night. Instead, the master of the house sat alone in his office, writing a lengthy report to the Board of Trade concerning all that had happened. He recalled, almost nostalgically, how in October the Assembly had undertaken the public business "with the greatest harmony." Ignoring the House's displeasure over the use of Jamaica-based troops in the Honduras Bay expedition, Lyttelton wrote that "their [the Assemblymen's] good agreement continued till a late event unfortunately interrupted it." In detail he described the Olyphant incident, subsequent developments, and his own efforts to avert a crisis. He admitted that his diplomacy had been "ineffectual," as the Assembly's eleven resolutions of December 19 proved. With no other available alternative, he had implemented Article XIII of his instructions, only to be challenged by "the very violent resolutions" of December 21. At that point, the Governor believed, there had been no course open to him but to dissolve the Assembly.[138]

Lyttelton made no effort to conceal his anger and frustration. He maintained that the "rights and privileges" the Assembly claimed were dubious at the very best because Jamaicans "never have had any charter, grant, or concession whatever from the Crown," other than a century-old proclamation by Charles II that ". . . all children of natural born subjects of England, to be born in Jamaica, shall be reputed to be free denizens of England, and shall have the same

privileges to all intents and purposes as free born subjects of England."[139] Lyttelton rejected the proposition that such a statement conferred special privileges on the island's Assembly, and he ridiculed the notion that custom had established the legality of the House's claims. "And with respect to the prescriptive right and custom," the Governor wrote, "which is the last foundation on which the Assembly ground their Pretensions, I submit to your Lordships, how far it can be admitted in a colony, the civil government of which is of no more ancient establishment, than the reign of King Charles the 2^{d}, especially in cases where the prerogative of the Crown, the course of public Justice, and the liberty of the subject may be affected by it."[140] In other words, in Lyttelton's opinion ninety years were not long enough to transform a practice into a custom.

The Governor went on to write about himself and the immediate problems his administration faced. He portrayed himself as something of a martyr to the cause of the royal prerogative. "I need not observe to your Lordships," he wrote, "how grossly ill I have been treated, for having done a judicial act as the King's Chancellor . . . ." His personal misfortunes, however, were also the military's. The regulars could not subsist on the King's pay alone, Lyttelton contended, and unless the royal treasury supplied the additional pay which the colonial government usually provided, mutiny would most likely result. "I know not how the commanding officers of the troops will be able to re-

strain them from committing Disorders in the country," Lyttelton wrote, "though all possible means shall be used for that purpose." He assured the Board of Trade that the expense to the treasury "would not be very great, as the Regiments are far from compleat . . . ."[141]

This was the second time since his arrival in Jamaica that Lyttelton called on London to provide the supplementary military pay.[142] If he were not embarrassed by the experience, neither did he feel presumptuous in suggesting what revenue might be drawn on to subsidize the regiments. "Perhaps the monies that will be received by the [Sugar Act] Duties imposed the last session of Parliament on Madeira Wines etc. imported here will be found sufficient to reimburse [the supplementary allotments]." The Governor urged swift approval of his proposal. He had little faith that the March elections would return an Assembly very much different in membership from the one he had just dissolved. As a consequence, he had no reason to believe that the crisis would be short-lived or that patience would accomplish what prudence would not.[143]

The Board of Trade received Lyttelton's report on March 1, 1765, and that same day sent it and its enclosures to the King in order that the Privy Council might act promptly in this "case of . . . great emergency" to prevent Jamaica's falling into "the greatest confusion."[144] Nine days later an Order in Council tentatively approved Lyttelton's proposal, and on March 19 the Privy Council, in a

lengthy letter to Jamaica's beleaguered chief executive, praised the Governor for having "acted in conformity to the oath and duty of your office" and expressed confidence in him by conveying the "royal approbation."[145] The Council predicted favorable results in the Jamaican election and the island's quick return to routine affairs: "His Majesty is persuaded, that the new Assembly will not adopt the doctrines and principles of the former Assembly; but that they will in every respect proceed with temper and moderation in carrying on the business of the publick; and expects to hear that the new House of Assembly has passed the necessary supply bills for the support of the government and for the payment of His Majesty's troops . . . ."[146] Then on March 20 the Privy Council directed the Board of Trade to inform Lyttelton that he was free to interpret the March 10 Order in Council in any way that "appears to him expedient for His Majesty's Service, and . . . the exigency of affairs in the . . . island may require."[147] This granted Lyttelton a virtual carte blanche for supplying the troops their additional pay.

There was not just a little irony in the Privy Council's communique to Lyttelton on March 19. On the very day the King's Council was expressing confidence in the good conduct of the new Assembly, the delegates took their seats in the House at Spanish Town. Except for a handful they were, as Lyttelton had predicted, the same men who had comprised the old Assembly, and they were not in a concilia-

tory mood.[148] The representatives quickly organized themselves into a legislative body, chose the elder Charles Price Speaker, and sent him to the Governor with the customary petition for privileges.[149] Price's requests were embodied in three statements, encompassing, for the most part, the standard Parliamentary immunities--freedom of debate, access to the Governor, and the like.[150] One, however, asked that ". . . We ourselves and our attendants may be free both in person and goods from all arrests."[151] Lyttelton's reply tactfully sought to avoid the issue of property immunity. All the requests were granted, he said, insofar as they were not "repugnant" to his commission and instructions.[152] This response, in fact, had served earlier Jamaican Governors as a device by which to avoid conflicts over the question of privilege in property.[153]

But the Governor's evasion failed to mollify the Assembly. The delegates tabled his opening day appeal for "the ordinary supplies . . . especially those which are wanted for his Majesty's troops" and adopted a series of nine resolutions, the first eight of which were virtual repetitions of the December 19 resolves.[154] The ninth resolution, passed by a vote of thirty-one to four, was a "petition" to the Governor, denouncing his December decision in Chancery as "absolutely destructive" of an "essential" House privilege and blaming him for "the deficiency in the treasury."[155] The "petition" concluded with an ultimatum warning that unless Lyttelton expunged from the records of the

Chancery Court the decision of December 21, 1764, the Assembly would enact no money bills.[156] The next day, March 20, the Assembly delivered the "petition" to Governor Lyttelton.[157]

On March 22 the chief executive responded:

> Your application to me . . . is of so Extraordinary a nature, that it is difficult to give it the answer it deserves: Surely, you cannot seriously propose to me, to obliterate a determination which I myself have made; or be ignorant, that a judge, who should expunge a record of the court in which he presides, would deservedly incur the highest censures: But I see, with concern, that all my endeavours to promote that peace which you affect to desire, and to maintain that fair correspondence with you, which might contribute to the welfare of this country, are unsuccessful; and that I must look for no supplies from you, unless I will consent to such things, as you must know, are alike inconsistent with my honour, and my duty: I must therefore dismiss you . . . .[158]

Since the Governor announced no date for the Assembly's reconvening, this prorogation was to last indefinitely. In the meantime the colonial government lacked funds for administration, and, until Lyttelton received the March 10 Order in Council and had time to act on it, the royal troops remained without their additional pay.

The political battles of 1762-1765 reveal that Jamaica's Assembly was as jealous of its rights, powers, and privileges as any colonial Assembly on the mainland. In addition, those struggles illustrate how the issue of security affected Jamaica's public affairs in the immediate post-war period. The islanders, concerned for their own safety, opposed peacetime troop reductions and sought an augmentation

of the regular force guarding the province. Nevertheless, local lawmakers again and again withheld supplementary pay from the troops who protected them. Of course, this feature of island politics merely constituted another manifestation of the colonial habit of exploiting the security issue for partisan advantage. In short, the island's safety served as a pawn in the contest for power.

This exploitation reflected the fact that no great internal or external peril immediately endangered the colony following the invasion-scare of 1762. As crisis receded, factious politics resurfaced. Yet withholding the supplementary allotments from the troops implicitly threatened the peace and safety of Jamaica. In this sense the tactic amounted to a kind of brinkmanship: it risked mutiny among the soldiers, a development which would inevitably create chaos and very possibly spark servile insurrection. Simply stated, whenever the Assembly denied the troops their additional pay, it actually held the security of the island hostage in order to win this or that concession from the Governor or his Council. Why did the legislators resort to what seems so suicidal a tactic? The answer suggests itself. Apparently the lawmakers never believed that the troops would revolt. Assemblymen, it seems, not only assumed but felt assured that the regulars, as disciplined or as undisciplined as they might have been, would remain passive and never interfere in domestic colonial politics, even when they were among the chief victims of the infighting

which characterized the island's public affairs.

NOTES

[1]See pp. 28-30 of this essay, along with the appropriate notes. For a fine essay on the growth and development of Jamaica's Assembly see also Brathwaite, Development of Creole Society, 40-59.

[2]Labaree, Royal Government, 275-83. The perpetual revenue amounted to £8,000 per annum.

[3]For the annual subsidies to the troops see p. 113 of this essay.

[4]Colonial governors, of course, faced problems with popular Assemblies which were more fundamental than individual executive personalities and attitudes. See again pp. 29-30; also, Bailyn, Origin of American Politics, chs. 2 and 3.

[5]Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 378.

[6]Jack P. Greene has pointed out that in the southern colonies the Assemblies made "their greatest gains under those governors with whom they enjoyed the most harmony . . . ." Quest for Power, 10. The governors alluded to here were those who skillfully played colonial politics and who interpreted their instructions broadly, as guidelines, rather then as literal royal commands. Edward Trelawny, Governor of Jamaica from 1738 to 1751, was one such executive. Knowing when to bend and when not to, he presided over a comparatively tranquil period in Jamaican politics. See again pp. 34-35 of this essay.

[7]This is what another able colonial governor, Francis Bernard of Massachusetts, had attempted. One historian wrote of Bernard's policy: "Such a course might have been possible for a man with the Olympian character to carry it out . . . ." Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis (Chapel Hill: 1953), 23. Just as Bernard lacked divine attributes, so did Lyttelton.

[8]Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 381.

[9]The Governor had several opportunities to cultivate an alliance with either group, especially the merchants, but this he did not do. The merchants, especially those on the Council, often supported him against the planters, but vigorously opposed his execution of the Navigation Laws. See ch. 8 for more on Lyttelton's enforcement of mercantile regulations and the merchants' opposition.

[10]Egremont to Lyttelton, August 7, 1762, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[11]Egremont to Lyttelton, October 2, 1762, ibid. For the quarrel between Douglas and Lyttelton, see p. 230, n. 107.

[12]Lyttelton to Egremont, January 11, 1762 [1763], C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[13]Journal of the Council of Jamaica, October 23, 1762, Microfilm Ms., Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town. Hereafter cited as Council Journals.

[14]See pp. 29, 35 of this essay for the Assembly's view of the suspending clause.

[15]Assembly Journals, V, 359-60.

[16]Ibid., V, 359; Council Journals, October 23, 1762.

[17]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, October 13, 1762, Assembly Journals, V, 617-18. This remark referred to the Assembly's displeasure over the Board's criticism of Jamaica's lax enforcement of customs regulations, a matter to which the Board of Trade had also addressed itself in the announcement that the island's revenue laws had been disallowed. Lyttelton also complained of widespread smuggling in Jamaica. "Many things brought here . . . , "he wrote in 1764, "have never been reported at the customs house." In 1765 he confided to the Earl of Halifax that French wines and brandies were continually smuggled into the island, and that no matter how diligently the Collector of Customs went about his work, no end to the illicit trade seemed in sight. Lyttelton, "Description of Jamaica, 1764," 2; Lyttelton to the Earl of Halifax, February 21, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[18]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, October 24, 1762, Assembly Journals, V, 617-18.

[19]Ibid., V, 618.

[20]Ibid., V, 618.

[21]Born in 1708, Charles Price became one of Jamaica's most influential citizens. His three estates--Decoy, Worthy Park, and Rose Hall--comprised more than 26,000 acres and employed more than 1,800 blacks. He was the largest landholder and slaveholder in Jamaica. He was active in local politics from young manhood and in 1746 was chosen Speaker of the House, a position he retained almost without interruption for the next twenty years. He distinguished hihself as an exponent of the rights of the Assembly and as a critic of the royal prerogative. A cousin of Rose Fuller, a West Indian member of Parliament during the 1760's, Price was widely considered a man with important political connections in London. His designation as baronet in 1768 seemed to confirm this view. For more on Price see chs. 1 and 2 of this essay. Also, Leslie Stephen, et. al., eds., Dictionary of National Biography (New York: 1885-1900), XLVI, 323-24; Craton and Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, chs. 1-5; Craton, "The Real Sir Charles Price," 10-14; Roby, Members of the Assembly of Jamaica, 2-3.

[22]Assembly Journals, V, 382.

[23]Ibid., V, 382.

[24]Ibid., V, 382. This, of course, was specious. Price must have known that the guns at Port Royal did not offer Douglas the traditional salute because powder and shot were in short supply. See page 230, n. 107.

[25]Ibid., V, 382. See also Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, January 12, 1763, ibid., V, 619.

[26]Ibid., V, 382.

[27]Council Journals, November 24, 1762.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid.

[30]The Secretary's letter is referred to in Lyttelton to Egremont, February 14, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, III.

[31]Robert C. Cotner, et. al., eds., Readings in American History (Boston: 1976), I, 46; Egremont to Lieutenant Robert Hodgson, March 16, 1763, C.O. Papers 137: 61, II.

[32]See pp. 165, 170 of this essay. Also, "Extract of Lovel Stanhope Esq[r]'s Letter to the Committee of Correspondence in Jamaica dated 5th June 1762," C.O. Papers 137: 61, IV.

[33]"Extract of Lovel Stanhope Esq[r]'s Letter . . . ," ibid. Stanhope, a law clerk in the office of the Secretary of State, served as Jamaica's London agent from 1757 to 1763. Penson, Colonial Agents of the British West Indies, 168, 251.

Withholding funds from troops stationed off the island was a tactic employed by the Jamaica Assembly at least as early as 1753. Governor Knowles reported that "the Assembly complain of the expence of supporting that Detachment upon the Mosquito Shore as they say they receive no Service from them. They had framed a Bill to subsist them no longer than for three Months but as I told them I would not give my Assent to the Bill they did alter it to eleven, and if they do not alter it again and subsist the Detachment for the same length of time as the Regiment . . . . I cannot pass it at all." Governor Knowles to the Earl of Holdernesse, October 13, 1753, C.O. Papers 137:60, II.

[34]"Extract of Lovel Stanhope Esq[r]'s Letter . . . ," C.O. Papers 137:61, IV.

[35]Egremont to Lyttelton, April 26, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV. Hodgson, by this time, was already under orders from Egremont to undertake this work. Egremont to Hodgson, March 16, 1763, ibid.

[36]Lyttelton to Hodgson, August 19, 1763, and Orders to Lieutenant Robert Brereton of the 49th Regiment, August 19, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV.

[37]Lyttelton to Joseph Otway, August 19, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV.

[38]Lyttelton to Egremont, August 30, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV.

[39]The Board of Trade made no statement on the matter until December 2, 1763. It advised Halifax that it was "ex-

dient" to maintain at least a "superintendant" at the shore. Since a number of Englishmen lived and worked there, they were not to "be left without some person authorized to preside over them." The Board recommended that the superintendant correspond directly with it, maintain law and order within the settlement, and keep the peace with the Spanish and the Indians. By implication the Board approved the withdrawal of troops. The Board of Trade to the Earl of Halifax, December 2, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV. On December 9 Halifax informed Lyttelton of the Board's decision and recommended Otway for the superintendant's post. Halifax to Lyttelton, December 9, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV.

[40]Lyttelton to Halifax, November 18, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid. Robert Hodgson's career in the Caribbean in the 1750's and 60's demonstrates that he typified, if not personified, the eighteenth-century English imperialist mentality. His life and work deserve study, indeed, a full biography.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Lyttelton to Hodgson, November 2, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV. Hodgson repeatedly delayed withdrawing the troops. As late as May 31, 1764, Lyttelton was complaining that Hodgson had not yet implemented his directive. The Governor at long last recommended that the "extraordinary" allowance of 20s. per diem paid to Hodgson be terminated. The detachment from the 49th did not actually arrive in Jamaica from the Mosquito Shore until July 1, 1764. See Lyttelton to Halifax, May 31 and July 15, 1764, C.O. Papers: 137:61, V.

[46]Egremont to Lyttelton, May 10, 1763, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV. Caribbean troop reductions contrasted sharply with England's policy, then taking shape, concerning future troop strength in North America. See, for examples, Gipson, Coming of the Revolution, 58-59 and especially John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton: 1965), ch. II.

[47]See Welbore Ellis to the Earl of Halifax, November 2 and 26, 1763, for the substance of the Secretary's

letters to Lyttelton. C.O. Papers 137:61, IV.

[48]The letter is not among the records but is cited in Ellis to Halifax, November 26, 1763, ibid.

[49]Long, History, I, 383.

[50]Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 379.

[51]Assembly Journals, V, 385; Council Journals, October 11, 1763.

[52]Assembly Journals, V, 388.

[53]Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 386-87.

[54]Penson, Colonial Agents of the British West Indies, 159; Greene, Quest for Power, 285-86.

[55]Penson, Colonial Agents of the British West Indies, 159. For the importance of the Assembly control over the colonial agent see Greene, Quest for Power, 266-67.

[56]Assembly Journals, V, 418-28; Council Journals, November 30, 1763. The supplementary military pay bills were commonly called Additional Duty bills. This essay adheres to that convention. The Additional Duty bill for the 43rd Regiment had not reached passage-stage by the time this controversy began.

[57]Labaree, Royal Government, 222; Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 126.

[58]Council Journals, November 30, 1763.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid., December 1, 1763; Assembly Journals, V, 428.

[61]Assembly Journals, V, 429.

[62]Council Journals, December 8 and 9, 1763.

[63]Ibid., December 9, 1763. House members favored

William Morrison, whom Council members opposed. The Councillors instead proposed that the committee agree on a third person. However, for whatever reason, House members rejected this compromise.

[64]Assembly Journals, V, 434-35.

[65]Ibid., V, 435.

[66]Ibid., V, 436; Council Journals, December 4, 1763.

[67]Assembly Journals, V, 436; Council Journals, December 14, 1763.

[68]Assembly Journals, V, 436-38, 441; Council Journals, December 16, 1763.

[69]Assembly Journals, V, 436-37, 447; Council Journals, December 21, 1763. The Additional Duty bill for the 43rd Regiment also became law.

[70]Council Journals, December 30, 1763; Assembly Journals, V, 459-60.

[71]Council Journals, December 30, 1763; Assembly Journals, V, 459-60.

[72]Council Journals, December 30, 1763; Assembly Journals, V, 460.

[73]Halifax to Lyttelton, March 9 and March [no day specified], 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV. Originally the 62nd Regiment, then in Ireland, was assigned to relieve the 49th. But that order was shortly changed.

The 36th Regiment arrived on the island May 29, 1764, before the 43rd had prepared to depart. This caused the men of the 36th some difficulty. Many could not find barrack space and had to secure their own lodging. This burdened them with considerable expense. Assembly Journals, V, 468.

[74]Halifax to Lyttelton, July 12, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, V.

[75]Ibid. See also Lyttelton to Halifax, September 25, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, VI.

[76]Halifax to Lyttelton, July 12, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, V.

[77]Ph. Remirez de Estenoz to Lyttelton, June 10, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, VI.

[78]John R.G. Tomlinson, ed., Additional Grenville Papers, 1763-1765 (Manchester: 1962), 329-30.

[79]Halifax to Lyttelton, September 23, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, V.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Ibid.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Ibid.

[85]Halifax to Lyttelton, September 28, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, V.

[86]Assembly Journals, V, 462. At the time of the Governor's report the 66th Regiment was still en route to Jamaica. Three weeks later, however, the unit finally arrived. Ibid., V, 466, 468, 482-83.

[87]Ibid., V, 465-66.

[88]Council Journals, October 25, 1764.

[89]Ibid., October 19, 1764.

[90]Ibid., October 31, 1764.

[91]Ibid., November 7-9, 1764; Assembly Journals, V, 486. Rose Fuller, who left Jamaica for good in 1756, was Charles Price's cousin and an early member of the Jamaica Association. (See again p. 35 of this essay.) By 1764 he had become a member of Parliament. The Fuller family interest in Jamaica exceeded 6,000 acres. Craton and Walvin,

A Jamaican Plantation, 90; Oliver, ed., Caribbeana, IV, 95.

Stephen Fuller, Rose's brother, was a lawyer, often oversaw the affairs of young Jamaicans studying in England, and corresponded with leading island politicians. He was also interested in medicine, particularly eye surgery. Stephen Fuller Letter Books, I, 1-45, Williams Collection, Boston College Library.

Fuller was an excellent choice for agent because he was closely connected with both the merchant and planter groups. Apparently the movement to get him assigned to the agency began quietly in late 1763. On February 4, 1764, nine months before his appointment, Fuller wrote Zachary Bayley:

> "I look upon myself as very particularly obliged to you for your voluntary interposition in my favour in regard to the Agency of your Island. It is an Office which I should like, as it would give me Access to Gentlemen of the Greatest Consequence in this Kingdom, and afford me frequent opportunities of serving the Island in General & my Friends in particular. But I think it would be unfair in me to make any particular application at present as such Applications might have a tendency to obstruct the Justice that Mr. Stanhope may be intitled to. I cannot conclude this Letter without repeating the gratefull sense I have of this Obligation which you have laid upon me, and assuring you that it will give me the greatest Pleasure to have any opportunities of returning it."

See the Fuller Letter Books, I, 35. In January, 1765, Fuller wrote all the Jamaica Assemblymen who helped him secure the London agency, thanking them for their support. Ibid., I, 35ff. Fuller served as Jamaica's agent for the next thirty years.

[92]Assembly Journals, V, 482-83.

[93]Ibid., V, 483, 486.

[94]Lyttelton to Halifax, November 21, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Ibid.

[97]Ibid. In early December the other capital ships arrived, but Burnaby postponed departure "till the North

Winds which prevail very much at this Season, and which render the navigation of the Bay of Honduras difficult and dangerous, shall be somewhat abated." The fleet, in fact, did not sail until February 21, 1765, but then only with three ships of the line. Instead of joining the voyage as first planned, the Essex returned to England in January. Lyttelton remained unaware of the fate of Burnaby's mission for some time. As of April 9, 1765, he had heard nothing from the Admiral. The operation had, in fact, gone smoothly. As a result of a satisfactory meeting with the Governor of Yucatan, Burnaby had no reason to land his troops. His mission was a success. Only one soldier was lost: a Sergeant Major died of illness at Rattan. By May 15 the elements of the 36th and 66th Regiments which had participated in the operation were back in Jamaica again. William Henry Lyttelton to Halifax, December 11, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, VI. William Burnaby to Lyttelton, December 14, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, III; Lyttelton to Halifax, February 21, April 9, and May 15, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[98]Lyttelton to Halifax, November 21, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, IV.

[99]Assembly Journals, V, 504.

[100]Ibid., V, 506. Lyttelton said that the sick were expected to recover and return to active duty in a short time.

[101]Labaree, Royal Government, 107.

[102]Assembly Journals, V, 514-15; Council Journals, December 15, 1764. The Additional Duty bill for the 66th Regiment had not yet reached this stage in the legislative process.

[103]Assembly Journals, V, 508. In 1750 Olyphant's property amounted to 5,880 acres. Oliver, ed., Caribbeana, IV, 95.

[104]Gordon, "Journal of an Officer," 379. The supply of horses in Jamaica at this time was short, and, as a consequence, prices for them had soared. But since horses were essentials, few people, it seems, despite rising prices, were in a position to sell.

[105]Jamaica's Assembly had claimed this privilege as early as 1688. Mary P. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilge in the American Colonies (New Haven: 1943), 65.

[106]Assembly Journals, V, 508.

[107]Ibid., V, 515.

[108]Ibid., V, 515.

[109]Ibid., V, 518.

[110]Early accounts of this case are strongly biased against Lyttelton. George Wilson Bridges, for example, maintained that during the Lyttelton administration "Jamaica [did] languish and groan under the dominion of a tyrant . . . ." The Governor's actions during the privilege crisis constituted, for Bridges, evidence of tyranny. Annals, 105-10.

The modern, standard treatment of the Olyphant affair is Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, 88-90, 252-61. The narrative presented in this study, however, differs from Mrs. Clarke's in some matters of factual detail. For example, she wrote (p. 253) that Lyttelton issued writs of habeas corpus at the time of the first prorogation of the Assembly. This he did not do. Moreover, Professor Clarke characterized circumstances and motivations somewhat differently from the presentation here. For instance, she ignored the way the Honduras expedition affected the mood of the Assembly. Similarly, she ignored Lyttelton's instructions regarding Parliamentary privilege with respect to property as well as the Governor's efforts to negotiate a way out of the impasse. Part of the difficulty with Mrs. Clarke's account derives from her reliance on the highly partisan pamphlet The Privileges of the Island of Jamaica Vindicated with an Impartial Narrative of the Late Dispute Between the Governor and House of Representatives upon the Case of Mr. Olyphant (London: 1766). Since the Olyphant case lingered for eighteen months, portions of it will be dealt with in proper sequence in subsequent chapters. Significant differences between this account and Professor Clarke's are noted.

[111]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I. The government's financial condition was grim. It was operating at a deficit of roughly £20,000. "Report on Revenue," Council Journals, December 15, 1764. The Council sent its revenue report to the Assembly, asking the representatives "to take into their consideration the report now laid before them and from the necessity which will thereby appear, grant to His Majesty Such a Supply as to themselves shall seem sufficient to enable the Governor and Council to discharge the present debts of the government." Ibid. In the Council's judgment

the "expences of the government cannot be supported with less than 10,000 £ per annum." Assembly Journals, V, 517.

[112]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[113]Ibid. Article XIII of Lyttelton's instructions said: "And whereas the members of several of the Assemblies in the plantations have frequently assumed to themselves the privilege of being protected from suits at law during the term they remain of the Assembly, to the great prejudice of their creditors and the obstruction of justice; and whereas it was declared by her Majesty Queen Anne in Council on the 31st of May, 1713, upon a full examination of the matter that there was no ground for the claiming such pretended privileges, nor have you our governor any authority by our commission to you to allow the same; it is therefore our will and pleasure that no such pretended privilege be allowed any member of the Assembly or Council (otherwise than in their persons), which you are also to signify to them that all officers and other persons whom it may concern may take notice hereof and pay due obedience hereunto." This statement was first included among the general instructions of a Jamaica Governor in 1728. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 114-15; also, see Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, 87.

[114]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[115]Ibid.

[116]Ibid.; Assembly Journals, V, 516-18.

[117]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I; Assembly Journals, V, 519; Council Journals, December 18, 1764.

[118]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[119]Ibid.

[120]Ibid.

[121]Assembly Journals, V, 520.

[122]Ibid., V, 520-21. Mary P. Clarke described these resolutions as the "strongest, most striking statements of privilege to be found in the records of all colonial America, in spite of the fact that they come from an island province, and not from one of the seceding thirteen." Parliamentary Privilege, 262.

The resolutions, all adopted unanimously, were:

> "Resolved . . . that every member of this house enjoy the privileges of his person against arrests and imprisonments in such manner as has been heretofore used and accustomed."
>
> "Resolved . . . that no Member of the house have any privilege in cases of Treason, Felony, Breach of the Peace or forcible Entries or forcible Detainers."
>
> "Resolved . . . that no Member of this house hath any privilege in regard to his goods & Chattels, except such as are necessary for his accommodation during his attendance on the house."
>
> "Resolved . . . that no Member of this house has any privilege against payment of any Aids, Supplies or Taxes granted for the support of his Majesty's government of this Island or of any parish Duties."
>
> "Resolved . . . that the reflecting upon the proceedings of this house or any member thereof or relating to the Service therein, is a high Violation of the Rights & Privileges of this House."
>
> "Resolved . . . that the misrepresenting the proceedings of this House is a breach of Privilege & destructive of the freedom of this house."
>
> "Resolved . . . that to assert this House have no power of Commitment but of their own Members tends to the Subversion of the Constitution of the House."
>
> "Resolved . . . that no person committed for breach of a Privilege by order of this house ought to be discharged during the session of Assembly, but by order or Warrant of this house."
>
> "Resolved . . . that Richard Thomas Wilson, who was in Custody of the Messenger attending this house the last session of Assembly for a Breach of Privilege of this House, in executing a writ of venditioni exponas on the Coach horses of John Olyphant Esq., a member of this house, the house then sitting, and Mr. Pierce Cooke who was likewise in Custody last session of Assembly for

assisting the said Richard Thomas Wilson in the execution of the said writ, and Lachlan M'Neil Deputy Marshal, who was likewise in custody the last session of Assembly for directing the said Richard Thomas Wilson to execute the said writ, be again severally taken into the custody of the messenger; and that Mr. Speaker sign warrants for that purpose."

"Resolved . . . that Edward Bolt Esq. Messenger of this House, in having received and detained and in receiving and detaining in custody person or persons committed by order of this house, shall have the assistance and Protection of this house."

"Ordered . . . that the above resolutions be printed in the publick newspapers."

[123]Assembly Journals, V, 520.

[124]Ibid., V, 520.

[125]Ibid., V, 521.

[126]Ibid., V, 522.

[127]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I. In a 1759 ruling the Privy Council maintained that the Assemblies were obliged to honor writs of habeas corpus. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, 245.

[128]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I. Mary P. Clarke pointed out that writs of habeas corpus were "occasionally" involved in questions of Parliamentary privilege throughout the colonial period, situations which resulted from "conflicts of jurisdiction." She wrote that "it is a curious fact that the Assembly was always ready to resort to this writ in order to save its members from imprisonment, and equally ready to deny the right of anyone else to make use of it if the imprisonment was by order of the house. The theory was, of course, that the Assembly's jurisdiction was the highest in the land, . . ." Parliamentary Privilege, 237.

[129]Decision of the High Court of Chancery, December 21, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[130]Assembly Journals, V, 523.

[131]Ibid., V, 523. In the version of this resolution which Lyttelton sent to the Board of Trade the word "violent" is transcribed as "violation." Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[132]Assembly Journals, V, 523.

[133]Ibid., V, 523.

[134]Ibid., V, 523. Underlying the Assembly's assertion that its members had "uninterruptedly" enjoyed privilege respecting property was the belief that usage established legality. Whatever the theoretical merit of this view was, the fact was that Jamaica's legislators had not "uninterruptedly" enjoyed such privilege. In fact, it was pretension to property immunity which led to the inclusion of Article XIII among the Governor's instructions in 1718. Labaree, Royal Government, 204-07.

All the resolutions were adopted by wide margins. Resolutions II, III, and IV were unanimously approved. Resolution I carried by a vote of eighteen to four. Resolution V passed by a vote of nineteen to three. All the resolutions but the fifth were ordered published in the newspapers.

[135]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I. There exists confusion respecting the dates of prorogation and dissolution. Mrs. Clarke maintained that the Governor prorogued the Assembly on Christmas Eve and dissolved it sometime later. Parliamentary Privilege, 255. The records of the Assembly indicate that dissolution occurred on December 21. Lyttelton's version, as described in the text, seems the most reliable account of events.

[136]Council Journals, December 21, 1764; Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[137]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I; Assembly Journals, V, 523.

[138]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I. Enclosed with Lyttelton's report were copies of the Assembly's resolutions of December 19 and 21 as well as a copy of the December 21 decision in Chancery.

[139]Ibid.

[140]Ibid.

[141]Ibid.

[142]The first occasion was in the fall of 1762. See pp. 237-38 of this essay.

[143]Lyttelton to the Board of Trade, December 24, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[144]The Board of Trade to George III, March 1, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[145]Order in Council, March 10, 1765; The Privy Council to Lyttelton, March 19, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, I. Only tentative approval was given on March 10 because, technically, the Lord Commissioners of the Royal Treasury also had to consent to the disbursal of funds. The latter's approval was shortly forthcoming, and by summer the commanding officers of the regiments in Jamaica received orders to bill the Treasury for supplementary pay allotments. See, for example, Thomas Whately to Gervas Remington, Commander of the 36th Regiment, July 3, 1765, and Lyttelton to Remington, September 25, 1765, Assembly Journals, V, 619-20.

For all 1765 and through March 24, 1766, the 36th Regiment alone received £8,630 1s. 5¼d. Ibid. Much of this sum, of course, consisted of the troops' ordinary pay. The total amount drawn to provide supplementary pay was £3,561 14s. Roger Hope Elletson to Charles Lowndes, July 11, 1766, West India Reference Library, Institute of Jamaica, Kingston, Elletson Letter Books, I. The amount drawn on the Treasury to sustain the 66th Regiment for roughly the same period in its supplementary compensation was £2,500. See the testimony of Captain Frederick Bridges Schaw, Assembly Journals, V, 620.

[146]The Privy Council to Lyttelton, March 19, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, I. The Privy Council concluded its letter by saying that if the new Assembly did not pass the necessary supply bills, the entire matter would be brought to the attention of Parliament.

[147]William Sharpe to John Pownall, March 20, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, I. The several documents--the Order in Council, the Privy Council letter, and the Sharpe letter--were mailed to Lyttelton on March 21 by the Board of Trade.

The packet did not reach Lyttelton until sometime in May. See the Board of Trade to Lyttelton, March 21, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, I.

[148]Throughout the period this essay surveys the membership of the Jamaica Assembly remained largely unchanged.

[149]Council Journals, March 19, 1765. Throughout the British colonies the request for privileges was standard proceedure at the beginning of a legislative session. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, 60ff.; Labaree, Royal Government, 203.

[150]Council Journals, March 19, 1765. The customary privileges sought included the assurance that the acts of the Speaker and the House would be construed in the most favorable way, freedom of speech, freedom from arrest and molestation, and access to the Governor. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, 61, 71.

[151]Council Journals, March 19, 1765.

[152]Ibid.

[153]Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, 88-89.

[154]Assembly Journals, V, 525-27. After his opening address was tabled and the debate on the resolutions began, Lyttelton sent another message to the House, stating unequivocally that he would not observe any "pretended privilege" among Assemblymen "otherwise in their persons." Ibid., V, 527. Professor Clarke maintains that the March resolutions were restatements of the December 21 resolves. Parliamentary Privilege, 256. For the most part, however, they were restatements of the December 19 resolutions.

[155]Assembly Journals, V, 527.

[156]Ibid., V, 527. The ninth resolution was adopted by a vote of thirty-one to four. Six members abstained.

[157]Ibid., V, 528.

[158]Ibid., V, 528. Following precedents set by the House of Commons, colonial Assemblies on occasion reversed court decisions. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, 50-51.

CHAPTER VII

JAMAICA AND THE STAMP ACT: PROBLEMS IN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

On the day Governor Lyttelton prorogued the new Assembly the Stamp Act, a measure aimed at raising revenue in America to defray the costs of imperial defense, became law.[1] This enactment, Parliament's first direct tax on the colonies, precipitated crisis within the empire.[2] In newspapers, pamphlets, and Assembly resolutions the mainland provinces, which later became the United States, denounced the innovation as unconstitutional. The measure, the colonials insisted, violated the "undoubted right" of Englishmen not to be taxed except by their own representatives. Moreover, since the law reposed jurisdiction in cases arising from the act in admiralty courts, the provincials maintained that it impinged upon their ancient right to a jury trial. Lastly, because the act required the tax to be paid in sterling, the colonists argued that the resulting drain of cash from America would impoverish the provinces.

After every lawful effort to block passage of the act failed, Americans resisted. Violence and the threat of violence forced stamp officials to resign. Merchants in port towns began boycotting British products. An unprece-

dented intercolonial conference at New York formally declared that the Stamp Act had "a manifest Tendency to subvert the Rights and Liberties of the Colonists."[3] On November 1, 1765, the day the law became effective, commercial and legal activity ceased throughout North America. In the ensuing months the authority of the colonial governments withered while real power increasingly lodged itself in extralegal organizations called "Sons of Liberty." The colonists had not only effectively nullified the stamp law but had at the same time created para-revolutionary regimes. Only Parliamentary backtracking deterred open revolt. The most distinguished student of this momentous era has called the Stamp Act crisis "prologue to revolution."[4]

Yet historians usually slight and often overlook anti-Stamp Act sentiment and activity beyond the confines of the thirteen mainland colonies which later revolted. Barbados, for example, ordered its London agent to lobby for the law's repeal because the tax allegedly imposed intolerable hardships on the colony.[5] Nevis and St. Kitts also protested, but in a bolder fashion. In those tiny islands angry mobs seized and destroyed the stamped paper.[6] Since North Americans criticized Barbadian timidity and praised the Leewards' daring, they evidently expected the Caribbean colonies, though uninvited to the Stamp Act Congress, to close ranks with them and stand firmly against the tax.[7] But what of Jamaica? How did it respond to the Stamp Act?

The traditional view is that the island dutifully

acquiesced and paid the tax. Professor Morgan put it succinctly: "Jamaica," he wrote, "consistently made use of stamps . . . ."[8] This assertion, which, it will be seen later, overstates what actually occurred in the island, derives from an inadequate appreciation of the political and social turmoil which beset the colony during the Stamp Act period. Internal crises preoccupied the islanders and drew attention away from the new tax. Surviving source materials reflect these local concerns. As a result, historians have oversimplified and therefore misinterpreted a complex situation.

The Colonial Government Paralyzed

The struggle between Governor Lyttelton and the Jamaica Assembly, which crippled the royal administration, endured throughout the Stamp Act period. In the spring and summer of 1765, following Lyttelton's prorogation of the Assembly, the question of Assembly privilege was debated in a series of pamphlets which kept the issue before the public. One tract, An Historical Account of the Establishment of the Colony of Jamaica, surveyed the island's history from 1655 to 1684, deducing from a point by point series of propositions that in Jamaica's first thirty years as an English possession enough precedents existed to demonstrate that the Assembly enjoyed not only privilege with regard to property but also complete authority to detain and to release individuals summoned before its bar.[9] "A. N.," as the author of

this work called himself, concluded that since privilege in property and full power of commitment had not been disallowed in the days of Charles II, then the Assembly necessarily possessed both in the reign of George III.[10]

In the meantime Governor Lyttelton decided that matters could not continue as they then stood, not, at least, without one last attempt to secure the Assembly's cooperation. Accordingly, in July he summoned House members to meet the following month.[11] On August 10, as delegates were arriving in the capital for the Assembly's opening session three days later, another pamphlet was published in Spanish Town. Concerning the Privileges etc. contended that all English precedents in cases of privilege supported the Assembly's and opposed the Governor's view on the issue.[12] "Will it be asserted," the treatise asked, "that the Assembly of Jamaica have not the privileges of the house of Commons?"[13] The anonymous pamphleteer answered his own question:

> The Assembly . . . has an exact resemblance of that Part of the British Constitution, which it stands for here: It is, indeed, an epitome of the house of Commons. Called by the same authority, deriving its power from the same source, instituted for the same ends, and governed by the same forms; it will be difficult, I think, to find a reason, why it should not have the same privileges and the same powers, the same superiority over the courts of justice, and the same rank in the system of our little community, as the house of Commons has in that of Britain.[14]

The Jamaica Assembly's privileges, like those of the House of Commons, the writer argued, emanated not from the King but from the English right to representation.[15]

The author of Concerning the Privileges etc. maintained that the issue at hand had nothing to do with whether Lyttelton was a good Governor or not. In fact, while implying that Lyttelton was not the worst chief executive in Jamaica's history, the pamphleteer nevertheless declared: "We should not yield to any illegal or unconstitutional act of a good Governor, which may be drawn into precedent, and made an oppressive use of, in the time of a bad one."[16] In an eloquent, stirring conclusion the writer appealed to Jamaicans to stand firm in defense of their rights:

> . . . we have received our liberties, as an inheritance from our fathers, and we are bound to transmit them to our children, unimpaired. If we do so, we shall do our duty; if we do otherwise, we shall act with the basest treachery and impiety: we shall deservedly incur the censure, the contempt, the abhorrence of all honest men, and entitle ourselves to the curses of posterity.[17]

The effect of Concerning the Privileges etc. on the Assembly must have been considerable. The pamphlet's emotional but intelligent approach to the issue as well as its timeliness stiffened the resolve of the delegates who discussed the treatise over rum and ale in the inns and taverns of Spanish Town. Subsequent events provide no evidence that the Assembly ever considered compromising on the privilege question, despite the fact that the government was now in its eighth month of operating without funds.

The Assembly convened on August 13, and, because the elder Charles Price was ill, chose his son Speaker.[18] Contrary to tradition, however, the younger Price ignored the ritual of applying to the Governor for the Assembly's cus-

tomary privileges. The next morning (while distant Boston was getting its first taste of anti-Stamp Act protest) Lyttelton, appealing for "concord and unanimity," insisted that the Assembly provide without delay "a liberal supply" for "the civil and military establishments . . . ."[19] Immediate funds, he declared, were "very necessary . . . for the public welfare."[20] The Assembly, nevertheless, took no action, and the Governor, meanwhile, still waited for Charles Price, Jr., to seek the usual privileges. After a day's recess the House met again on Friday, August 16. Lyttelton promptly summoned the members to the Council's chamber where he directly confronted the new Speaker.[21]

> As you omitted, at the time when I approved of the choice which the house of Assembly made of you, to be their speaker, to apply to me for the usual privileges, I have sent for you to ask, whether you will make application for them or not.[22]

Price answered that he would not. The Governor then repeated his question, and Price a second time said he would not apply for the usual privileges.[23] Consequently, Lyttelton, undoubtedly somewhat embarrassed, felt obliged to come to the rescue of the Assembly's traditional privileges.

> As it is my duty to see, that the just order of the proceedings of the house of Assembly is preserved, and their usual privileges maintained, as well as that his Majesty's prerogative suffers no violation, I do, in his Majesty's name, dissolve this general Assembly, and it is dissolved accordingly.[24]

The Council, as it had the December before, unanimously supported the Governor's decision on the ground that the Assembly's "pretended privilege" had thrown the island

into the "greatest confusion."[25] But an important difference distinguished this latest dissolution from the one in December: This time Lyttelton did not order the issuance of writs for new elections. This omission cast an air of finality over what had happened. The political stalemate froze: no appropriations, no Assembly. Who could hold out longer--the Governor or the Assembly? Nearly a year passed before that question was answered, but it was the question which most preoccupied the islanders while the North Americans were going about the business of nullifying the Stamp Act.

Revolt in St. Mary

Shortly after the Stamp Act became effective, another local problem further diverted Jamaican attention from imperial affairs. On Sunday night, November 24, slaves at Whitehall estate in St. Mary set trash houses afire, lured two whites to the scene and killed them. Capturing a few weapons, they escaped.[26] The insurgents, about twenty or thirty Coromantees in all, moved northward and attacked the Valley plantation. One black died in an exchange of gunfire there.[27] By that time the whites had sounded the alarm, and Zachary Bayley, now a Councillor, reenacted his role of five years before. He summoned parish militiamen who set out after the rebels. At sunrise shots from within the woods near a district crossroads alerted the whites to an insurgent position. Approaching cautiously, militiamen found, partially

concealed by the foliage, the bodies of four fugitives. Bayley guessed they had committed suicide. Four others, however, were attempting a getaway. The white irregulars pursued and shot them dead. The unit recovered five muskets, which Bayley believed were "all the arms they [the rebels] had." The Councillor surmised that the fifteen or so other insurgents had slipped back to their platations "under cover of the foggy wet morning."[28] Bayley's opinion, probably correct, reflected initial white confidence that the outbreak amounted to nothing more than a "drunken sally of a few new negroes."[29] Bayley nevertheless assured Governor Lyttelton that he would "be exstremely [sic] carefull to find out & bring to punishment all that have been any ways concerned in this Insurrection . . . ."[30] For these purposes he prepared a formal investigation.

One observer later recalled that "it is probable, if they [the rebels] had not met a repulse soon after their first outrage, the insurrection would have been general, from the encouragement the better success would have given to the rest of the conspirators."[31] Nor did this overstate the danger. During the week after the violence authorities in St. Mary, acting on the advice of an informer, arrested suspects on several plantations and brought them to trial at Nonsuch on December 4.[32] The court "separately examined" the indicted slaves "in regard to their Plan of Operations, as well as the number of Conspirators." The resulting "discoveries" disclosed a widespread plot.[33]

A conspiracy, it seemed, had existed in the parish for several months. Its chief organizer had been a Whitehall Coromantee named Abruco, otherwise known as Blackwall, who had recruited other Coromantees at the Valley, Unity, Gray's Inn, and other estates. The plan had called for an uprising immediately after Christmas. The scheme had gone awry, however, because another Whitehall black named Quamin had rejected Abruco's leadership and, with a small following of his own, had launched the revolt prematurely. As a result, he had caught blacks as well as whites by surprise.[34]

Nor was this all that the court learned. At the trial Cambridge, a black millwright whose information had led to the arrests, "positively asserted that all the Coromantee Negroes at Albion, Frontier, and Trinity Estates" had been involved in the conspiracy.[35] This was the first that parish whites heard allegations against slaves on those properties. Although the court adjourned after sentencing the suspects, it left the investigation of these new charges to James Charles Sholto Douglas, the master of Hopewell estate and Jamaica's Collector of Customs. Douglas acted immediately. The next morning, December 5, light cavalry militia "secured" under armed guard all the Coromantee men at Albion, Frontier, and Trinity. The authorities arrested the alleged ringleaders at two of these properties and placed them in solitary confinement. Albion's "chief" was locked up in the fort at Port Maria; three of Frontier's leaders

were separately imprisoned aboard a merchantman in the harbor. Then Cambridge, who had accused these men, was brought to Port Maria "to confront" them.[36]

Douglas felt justified in taking bold action. The revelations made in court frightened him. "For my own part," he admitted, "notwithstanding the seeming absurdity & improbability of the Scheme, I am somewhat uneasy to learn that such a one was even thought of."[37] Yet Douglas feared that the trials had failed to uncover the true extent of the rebel conspiracy. "For my own part," he wrote, "I have all along considered this Insurrection in a serious light, and I sincerely wish I may be mistaken in my Belief that it has been long concerted, and more general than has been conjectured."[38] Danger, in his judgment, still threatened the parish.[39]

Douglas' suspicions, as it turned out, were correct: Conspiracies existed at his own Hopewell estate as well as neighboring Esher.[40] On Sunday, December 8, a Hopewell slave who had been involved in the planning betrayed his colleagues.[41] Douglas first investigated the tale, "lest the informer should have formed the story out of his own head . . . ."[42] The Customs Collector soon concluded, however, that there "was no Room left to doubt that there was a conspiracy formed . . . ."[43] He promptly implemented the same security measures he had used at Albion, Trinity, and Frontier a few days before. Early on Monday morning those "impeached" by the informer's testimony were "taken up."[44]

Once the prisoners were secured, Douglas undertook a formal investigation. These hearings, conducted in the presence of William Ross, an overseer at Charlottesburg estate, and William Craigie, a Hopewell employee, shed additional light on the plot.[45] Various Hopewell and Esher slaves "confessed" their own guilt and implicated others. Douglas learned that the conspiracy, as he had suspected, had been more widespread than at first understood.[46] He reported that "the Evidences" proved "that there was a general Plan concerted by the Coromantees to massacre the White People throughout the Parish . . . . They who have confessed own that they expected their Freedom from the Governour on the same footing as the Wild Negroes [Maroons], that is to say after they killed all the buckras [whites] & were joined in a formidable Body."[47]

The whole affair, of course, had not come anywhere near achieving such a goal. To be sure, the conspiracy and the abortive Whitehall uprising entailed a human cost: two whites and five blacks died in the November fighting, four blacks committed suicide, thirteen more were executed, and thirty-three were deported from the island.[48] Property damage, while difficult to estimate, was minimal. The catastrophe of 1760 had not been repeated. The episode, however, disturbed whites like Douglas. The inquiries had demonstrated that the outbreak at Whitehall had been something far more dangerous than a few "salt water" slaves on a drunken binge. This fact raised obvious questions. Why

were regulars not sent to St. Mary as soon as news of the violence had reached Spanish Town? Governor Lyttelton, with four companies then stationed outside the capital, had made no effort to dispatch a force to the scene of the disturbance.[49] It is likely, of course, that the Governor, after receiving Zachary Bayley's report that the revolt had been crushed, saw little reason to commit troops to St. Mary, particularly in view of the sorry state of the colony's treasury. To island whites, however, Lyttelton's inaction seemed irresponsible.[50] Moreover, why was the new fort at Port Maria so dangerously undermanned? Only eighteen soldiers occupied the structure at the time Quamin and his men broke out of Whitehall.[51] Testimony at the December slave trials revealed that the rebels knew of the fort's weak condition and that that weakness had encouraged the plotters to go ahead with their plans.[52] At the end of 1765, then, and in 1766 internal security was again a subject of public debate.[53]

The Problem of Sources

Jamaica's prolonged political crisis and the St. Mary slave conspiracy diverted colonial attention from the Stamp Act. This distraction, of course, did not necessarily mean that the islanders were indifferent to innovative Parliamentary measures. It did mean, however, that Jamaica's order of concerns during the Stamp Act period differed markedly from Virginia's, New York's, and Massachusetts'. Con-

sequently, the Jamaican equivalents of the sources historians ordinarily consult in studying a mainland colony's attitude toward the Stamp Act manifest this difference. For example, while the records of the House of Burgesses and other colonial Assemblies are rich in material on the Stamp Act, Jamaica's Assembly Journals are not because the popular branch of the island's government was temporarily defunct. Secondly, while North American pamphleteers debated and propagandized against the Stamp Act, their Jamaican counterparts dealt with the issue immediately confronting them--Assembly privileges. Other common sources present different problems. Although surviving Jamaican parish records do not mention the Stamp Act, this omission cannot be interpreted as a sign of the public's lack of interest in the matter because the vestry records also fail to mention the Assembly's struggle with the Governor, an issue of widespread concern.[54] In addition, while the flow of letters to the North American press provides the historian an important barometer for measuring popular anti-Stamp Act sentiment, it appears that issues of Jamaica's three newspapers, the Jamaica Gazette, the Kingston Journal, and the St. Jago Intelligencer, if extant at all, are rare from the Stamp Act period.[55] Because such customary repositories of information are either unrewarding or unavailable, historians have not been encouraged to probe other colonial sources to determine Jamaica's attitude toward the Stamp Act. Instead, they have created the impression that Jamaicans were indif-

ferent to the constitutional questions the Stamp Act raised.[56]

Contemporary North American testimony has buttressed the view that Jamaicans simply acquiesced in the payment of the stamp taxes. It is important to remember in this connection that what passed for news in the colonial era was often a mixture of fact and error. Misinformation sometimes bore important consequences. The famous Virginia resolves against the Stamp Act, for example, were inaccurately reported in New England newspapers, giving those colonies the false impression that the southern colony had taken a strong stand against the tax and emboldening Rhode Island and Massachusetts to adopt radical positions.[57] Continental colonists received inaccurate news about Jamaica as well. One sea captain, for example, arriving in Philadelphia in December, 1765, reported that the "Stamp Act passed [in Jamaica] without opposition, and . . . the Inhabitants of the Town of Kingston fed so voraciously on them, that no less than 300 of them died in the month of November last."[58] This sort of information shaped mainland attitudes toward Jamaica during the Stamp Act crisis, and North Americans expressed their bitter resentment in ink. Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina condemned the island's conduct and swore that despite his colony's black majority "there are no lengths but many gentlemen and others who are to be depended on will go to maintain our liberties." Gadsden developed this theme, declaring:

> We are a very weak Province . . . our weakness (though at the same time 'tis part of our riches) consists in having such a number of slaves amongst us, and we find in our case according to the general perceptible workings of Providence where the crime most commonly though slowly, yet surely, draws a similar and suitable punishment that slavery begets slavery. Jamaica and our West India Islands demonstrate this observation which I hope will not be our case now . . . . I am persuaded with God's blessing we shall not fail or disgrace our sister Colonies at this time.[59]

Presumably, Jamaica failed and disgraced her sister colonies.[60] No North American denounced Jamaica more vehemently than John Adams. In January, 1766, the New Englander confided to his diary:

> The freemen of Talbot County, in Maryland, have erected a gibbet before the door of the court-house, twenty feet high, and have hanged on it the effigies of a stamp informer in chains, in terrorem till the Stamp Act shall be repealed . . . . So triumphant is the spirit of liberty everywhere . . . . But can no punishment be devised for Barbadoes and Port Royal in Jamaica, for their base desertion of the cause of liberty, their tame surrender of the rights of Britons, their mean, timid resignation to slavery? Meeching, sordid, stupid creatures, below contempt, below pity, they deserve to be made slaves to their own negroes! But they live under the scorching sun, which melts them, dissipates their spirits, and relaxes their nerves. Yet their negroes seem to have more of the spirit of liberty than they. I think we sometimes read of insurrections among their negroes. I could wish that some of their blacks had been appointed distributers [sic] and inspectors, etc., over their masters. This would have but a little aggravated the indignity.[61]

From this kind of "evidence" historians have concluded that Jamaicans acquiesced in the payment of the stamp duties.

The lack of full and accurate information confused Anglo-American even more than it did inter-colonial relationships. One of London's chief difficulties during the Stamp Act crisis was its inability to secure fresh and re-

liable information from the provinces.[62] Indeed, one scholar has pointed out that some Governors did not report on the status of the Stamp Act in their colonies at all.[63] One of these was William Henry Lyttelton who, wrestling with other problems, did not write to Whitehall about Jamaica's response to the tax. In short, Lyttelton's correspondence during the Stamp Act era constitutes no source for studying the island's reaction to the new law. If the Governor's papers misled authorities in London in 1765 and 1766, they have also misled historians ever since.

The Influence of Jamaica's Local Stamp Law

Having concluded that Jamaicans acquiesced in the payment of the stamp taxes, scholars have explained the islanders' passivity in various ways. One explanation concerns the influence of an earlier island stamp law. In December, 1760, the Jamaica Assembly passed "An Act for Raising a Tax by a Duty on Vellum Parchment and Paper Ascertained by Stamps and Applying the Same to Several Uses" in order to discharge a public debt of more than £10,000 incurred as a result of the slave rebellions that year.[64] "Whereas," the law reads, "the Annual means hitherto used for raising Supplies for the support of the government of this Island are not sufficient for the present extraordinary Exigencies and Contingincies and to discharge the public debts which have accrued for the further Supply thereof," a series of stamp taxes had become necessary.[65] On

November 4 the following year the Assembly passed the measure again, the Council approved it, and Lieutenant Governor Moore signed the bill into law on November 7.[66] In 1762 the tax was also reenacted.[67] But in 1763, even though the colony still faced a deficit, the law failed a fourth passage, probably because of the hardship this extraordinary taxation imposed during the post-war depression.

Some scholars believe that Jamaica's local stamp tax explains the island's response to Parliament's 1765 measure. "The stamped papers," one historian has written, "carried taxes as high as £10 and as low as sevenpence halfpenny, according to a report of a committee of the Assembly on December 4, 1764. The American stamp tax placed by Parliament in 1765 was undoubtedly considered so moderate that no question relating to it appears in the Jamaica Assembly minutes."[68] The islanders, in other words, had taxed themselves so severely that Grenville's law seemed mild.

Several problems inhere in this explanation. First, the committee report upon which the implied contrast between the two stamp taxes rests concerned the amount of revenue which the local measure raised, not the specific duties which raised it. The House document, in fact, provides only a partial list of rates and ratables.[69] Accordingly, the report lacks the very information which any comparison of the local and Parliamentary taxes requires. Secondly, the assertion that Jamaicans "undoubtedly" found the 1765 tax "moderate" because the Assembly failed to discuss it derives

from an invalid application of negative evidence. The Assembly's struggle with Governor Lyttelton began before the Stamp Act was passed and ended months after the law was repealed. During that crisis, which lasted eighteen months, the popular branch of the legislature met for only three days.[70] In those brief August, 1765, sessions, it will be recalled, the Assembly did nothing but stand its ground on the privilege issue. Accordingly, if the Assembly's minutes contained no reference to the Stamp Act, it was for good reason: There were no Assembly minutes for almost the entire Stamp Act period.

The view that Jamaica's local stamp tax favorably disposed the islanders to the Parliamentary measure involves substantive as well as methodological problems. One difficulty lies in the very notion that generalizations concerning the relative severity of two tax laws whose rates differed substantially from one taxable item to the next can be made with any certainty. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that the local tax was payable in "current money" while the Parliamentary measure demanded specie payments. A forty per cent differential, it will be remembered, existed between one currency and the other.[71] Ordinarily, six shillings sterling bought ten shillings "current." But by 1765, as a result of the post-war depression, sterling's value increased in the open market, and the same six shillings probably bought more than ten in island money.

Any comparison of Jamaica's local stamp tax and the

Parliamentary duties of 1765 must allow for the monetary exchange rate. Table 7A lists those items upon which both the colonial and imperial measures imposed duties and what those duties were. It also reveals the sterling equivalents of the local law's rates. The conversion is based on the standard, but for 1765 probably conservative, forty per cent differential.

TABLE 7A

COMPARISON OF TAX RATES UNDER JAMAICA'S COLONIAL STAMP LAW (1761-63) AND THE PARLIAMENTARY STAMP ACT OF 1765

Items Taxed	Duty under Jamaica's Local Law		Duty under the Stamp Act
	Current Money	(Sterling Equivalent)	Sterling Rate
Presentations for Benefices	£10	(£6)	£2
Judicial Appeals	£ 5	(£3)	10s.
Special Bail	5s.	(3s. 7d.)	2s.
Court Affidavits	2s. 6d.	(1s. 6d.)	1s.
Deeds	3s. 9d.	(2s. 1d.)	2s. 3d.
Conveyances and Reconveyances	3s. 9d.	(2s. 1d.)	2s. 6d.
Leases	3s. 9d.	(2s. 1d.)	2s. 6d.
Mortgages and Releases	3s. 9d.	(2s. 1d.)	2s. 3d.
Writs of Copias	2s. 6d.	(1s. 6d.)	1s.
Warrants; Grants; Appointments	£ 5	(£3)[a]	£6[b] or 10s.[c]

[a]For posts with fees of more than £100 per annum.

[b]For posts with tenure longer than a year.

[c]For posts with fees of more than £20 per annum.

TABLE 7A--CONTINUED

Items Taxed	Duty under Jamaica's Local Law		Duty under the Stamp Act
	Current Money	(Sterling Equivalent)	Sterling Rate
Letters of Attorney	2s. 6d	(1s. 6d.)	2s. 3d.
Any Notarial Act	2s. 6d.	(1s. 6d.)	2s. 3d.
Bills of Lading	7½d.	(4½d.)	4d.
Demurrers; Pleas; Replications	2s. 6d.	(1s. 6d.)	3d.
Admittances for Attorneys and Other Court Officers	£10	(£6)	£10
Letters of administration and Guardianship	10s.	(6s.)	10s.
Insurance Policies	2s. 6d.	(1s. 6d.)	2s. 6d.
Will Probates	10s.	(6s.)	10s.
Land Grants	3s. 9d.	(2s. 1d.)	3-5s.[d]
Institutions	10s.	(6s.)	£2
Letters of Mark	10s.	(6s.)	£1
Wine Vending Licenses	5s.	(3s.)	£4
Wine and Spirit Vending Licenses	10s.	(6s.)	£3
Writs of Error, Ceriorari, and Dower	2s. 6d.	(1s. 6d.)	10s.
Writs of Replevin and Possession	2s. 6d.	(1s. 6d.)	5s.
Passports and Let Passes	2s. 6d.	(1s. 6d.)	5s.

Sources: Laws of Jamaica, V, 103-05, Island Record Office, Spanish Town; Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 35-41.

[d]Depending upon the size of the grant.

Table 7A reveals that in two areas--presentations for benefices and judicial appeals--Jamaica's local tax considerably outweighed Parliament's. The local duties had also borne more heavily than the imperial measure, but not by much, on several other legal and commercial documents: special bails, court affidavits, writs of copias, bills of lading, demurrers, pleas, and replications. But Table 7A clearly suggests that in most instances the Parliamentary duties of 1765 were heavier than those which Jamaica's earlier stamp law had imposed.

Nevertheless, Table 7A does not provide data comprehensive enough to warrant a firm conclusion. Jamaica's stamp law taxed several items which the Stamp Act of 1765 did not, and vice versa. A thorough comparison of the two laws requires an account of these exclusions. Table 7B identifies those documents upon which the island's act required stamps, but upon which the Parliamentary measure did not. The table also indicates the duty, in current money and its sterling equivalent, on those documents.

TABLE 7B

ITEMS TAXED UNDER JAMAICA'S STAMP LAW BUT EXCLUDED UNDER PARLIAMENT'S

Items Taxed	Current Money Duty	(Sterling Equiv.)
Pardons for Crime or Debt	£5	(£3)

TABLE 7B--CONTINUED

Items Taxed	Current Money Duty	(Sterling Equiv.)
Forfeitures for Debt	£5	(£3)
Warrants of Reprieve and Relaxation	£5	(£3)
Land and Beneficial Orders exceeding £20	2s. 6d.	(1s. 6d.)
Militia Commissions (by schedule)	£10--£1 5s.	(£6--15s.)
Marriage Certificates	1s. 3d.	(9d.)
Jewish Marriage Licenses	10s.	(6s.)
Flags of Truce	£10	(£6)
Certificates of Naturalization	£10	(£6)

Sources: Laws of Jamaica, V, 103-05; Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 35-41.

Several of the taxes identified in Table 7B may have incurred social costs the island could ill-afford. The duties on marriage and naturalization certificates, for example, hardly encouraged the growth of the white population. Similarly, the taxes on militia commissions did not promote an effective and well-managed citizen-defense. But however socially counterproductive some of these stamp obligations may have been, it appears that the taxes did not financially overburden the islanders generally. Table 7B suggests that each of the taxes devolved principally on specific segments of the population. The heavy duty on flags of truce, for

instance, fell mainly on the commercial community, particularly on those merchants who engaged in illegal trade under the cover of such commissions. Indeed, the cost of flag of truce stamps probably aided Admiral Holmes's efforts in 1761 to smother clandestine commerce with the French. The discriminatory tax on Jewish marriage licenses also burdened a particular social group. Each of the other duties listed in Table 7B affected only distinct and narrow elements in Jamaican society: convicted criminals, debtors in default, Anglican clergymen, aspirants to military titles, newly weds, and foreigners seeking citizenship. Quite likely, few colonials paid more than one or two, if indeed they ever paid any at all, of the taxes identified in Table 7B. In short, the duties included in Jamaica's local stamp law but excluded under Parliament's imposed no general hardship.

The Stamp Act of 1765, on the other hand, taxed numerous items which the local law had not. Many of these duties, listed in Table 7C, devolved upon large segments of Jamaican society. Bills of sale, calendars, advertisements, newspapers, playing cards, dice--none of these articles and documents were utilized more commonly by one group than another. If the duties upon them were burdensome, then they were generally burdensome.

Jamaica's local stamp law, Tables 7A, 7B, and 7C suggest, hardly made the Parliamentary taxes of 1765 seem "moderate." More likely, the reverse was true. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the island's stamp law had

TABLE 7C

ITEMS TAXED UNDER THE STAMP ACT
BUT EXCLUDED UNDER JAMAICA'S LOCAL LAW

Items Taxed	Sterling Rate
Any Register, Testimonial and University Degree	£2
Licenses for Vending Spiritous Liquors only	£1
Writs of ad Quod Damnum	10s.
Statutes Merchant and Staple	10s.
Indentures, Bills of Sale, and Articles of Protest	2s. 6d.
Monitions, Libels, Answers, Allegations, Inventories, and Renunciations in Ecclesiastical Courts	1s.
Monitions, Libels, Answers, Allegations, Inventories, and Renunciations pertaining to Wills other than Probates	6d.
Monitions, Libels, Answers, Allegations, Inventories, and Renunciations in Admiralty Courts	6d.
Any Liberty, Privilege, or Franchise granted under the Seal or Sign Manual of the Governor	£6
Warrants of Survey	1s. 6d., 1s., or 6d. (depending upon the size of the tract)
Apprenticeship Contracts	6d. per 20s.
Almanacks and Calendars	2d.
Advertisements	2s.
Newspapers and Pamphlets	From 1s. to ½d.
Playing Cards	1s.
Dice	10s.

Sources: Laws of Jamaica, V, 103-05; Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 35-41.

been constitutionally less offensive than the imperial measure. The provincial enactment never denied violators a jury trial. It never impinged upon the Assembly's control of the revenue earned.[72] It was framed and passed by the popularly elected branch of the colonial legislature. Put simple, Jamaica's local stamp law, regardless of how moderate or burdensome it might have been, constituted an example of how colonials throughout the empire believed the taxation process was supposed to work. It was the sort of measure which even New England "radicals" could not have denounced on constitutional grounds. In conclusion, no evidence supports the view that Jamaican colonials, after enduring hardships under their own stamp law, considered the Stamp Act of 1765 fair and reasonable.

The Role of the Army

Another widely held theory explaining alleged Jamaican acquiescence in the Stamp Act is that the presence of regular troops in the island secured the law's enforcement. This theory is not new. Contemporaries, in fact, first advanced it. On January 15, 1766, for example, Captain John Montresor listed in his diary the colonies which he believed were using stamps and remarked: "The singular advantage of troops and fleets to enforce his Majesty's orders are here plainly demonstrated."[73] Many agreed with Montresor. Several mainland Governors who experienced difficulties during the Stamp Act crisis maintained that if they had had troops

on hand the law would have been upheld.[74] Modern historians have often reiterated this view. A distinguished twentieth-century scholar, for instance, has written that "wherever royal armed forces were available--be it Quebec, Nova Scotia, Georgia, East Florida, West Florida, Jamaica, or Grenada--each governor was able, at least for a period, to carry out the terms of the law. By contrast, where the stamps were destroyed, it was due to a lack of military support, as was the case on the islands of St. Christopher and Nevis."[75]

These observations are in certain respects misleading. The qualifying phrase "at least for a period" means that a military presence did not guarantee effective and lasting law enforcement. Georgia's example illustrates this. That colony's stamp distributor, George Angus, was on the job only a few days before learning that his was a dangerous occupation. Troops or no troops, Angus, as Professor Morgan wrote, soon "left for parts unknown."[76] Moreover, the physical destruction of the stamped paper constituted the least common of several methods by which the colonists nullified the Stamp Act. Violent demonstrations in several colonies where no troops were stationed forced stamp distributors to resign. If destruction of the stamped paper, wherever such occurred, was "due to" an absence of troops, then did other modes of resistance succeed only because soldiers were not on hand. Nullification in New York where a regular garrison stood duty demonstrates other-

wise.[77] Indeed, all evidence indicates that the Sons of Liberty were prepared to take on the entire British army, if necessary, to prevent the implementation of the Stamp Act.[78]

If a relationship existed between a regular military presence and successful execution of the stamp law, then it must be demonstrated that in the colonies to which both circumstances applied the provincials perceived the troops as a potential bludgeon against them. Yet Jamaicans hardly feared the garrison on the island. Time and again, it will be recalled, the Assembly victimized the regulars, using their welfare as a pawn in political struggles with the Governor. Indeed, throughout the Stamp Act period the troops received no subsidies from the colony. The Lyttelton administration so feared that this would drive the soldiers to mutiny that it asked London for the funds. There is, in brief, no reason to believe that the regular troop presence in Jamaica determined the island's response to the Stamp Act one way or another.

The Defense Aim of the Stamp Act

Historians have sometimes suggested that Jamaica complied with the Stamp Act because the law promised to diminish the colony's security problems.[79] After all, this argument goes, the Stamp Act was passed to help defray "the expences of defending, protecting, and securing, the British colonies in America."[80] Jamaica, needing a strong military presence to guard itself against servile insurrection and

foreign attack, could hardly oppose a measure aimed at bolstering provincial defense. The island, in other words, acquiesced in the Parliamentary tax because it was in its interest to do so.

On the surface, at least, this view is as compelling as it is simple, but close examination reveals its inadequacies. It was clear in 1765, as it is now, that Stamp Act revenues would defray the costs of defending trans-Appalachia and newly acquired Canada, those areas which Whitehall believed required ten thousand troops to garrison. North America, in other words, and not the island colonies, was to be the chief beneficiary of the future military build-up. Indeed, after the Peace of Paris, it will be remembered, Jamaica's regular force was reduced by fifty per cent, and there were no plans afoot in London to increase the size of the island's troop contingent.[81] For Jamaica the Stamp Act merely constituted a pay-more but get-less proposition.

Jamaica's preoccupation with internal affairs in 1765 distracted the islanders from the great constitutional questions the Stamp Act raised. As a result, many ordinary sources for gauging colonial opinion--pamphlets, Assembly resolutions, and others--have not provided historians information concerning the province's attitude toward the imperial measure. Accordingly, scholars have often turned to misinformed or prejudiced North American testimony alleging

Jamaican acquiescence in the tax. Accepting such "evidence" unquestioningly, students of the American Revolution have spun various theories explaining Jamaican passivity in the face of Parliament's provocation, none of them supported by fact or logic. As a consequence, the island's response to the Stamp Act has long been misunderstood. Indeed, it has been lost in obscurity.

NOTES

[1]The best treatment of how Grenville's ministry opted for a stamp law and secured its passage is P. D. G. Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis (Oxford: 1975), chs. 1-6.

[2]The most important study remains Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis.

[3]Greene, ed., Colonies to Nations, 64.

[4]Morgan's Stamp Act Crisis bears the subtitle Prologue to Revolution. See also Morgan's documentary collection Prologue to Revolution: Sources and Documents of the Stamp Act Crisis (Chapel Hill: 1959).

[5]"A Letter from the Committee of Correspondence in Barbadoes, to their Agent in London," John Dickinson, The Political Writings of John Dickinson (2 vols., Wilmington: 1801), I, 101-03.

[6]See Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution, Vol. X: The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 1763-1766 (New York: 1961), 327-28; Bernhard Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution, 1759-1766 (New York: 1960), 235; Richard Pares, A West-India Fortune (London: 1950), 92.

[7]Agnes M. Whitson, "The Outlook of the Continental American Colonies on the British West Indies," Political Science Quarterly, XLV(March, 1930), 76-81. For a North American critique of Barbados' moderate response to the Stamp Act see John Dickinson's "An Address to the Committee of Correspondence in Barbadoes Occasioned by a Late Letter from Them to their Agent in London," Political Writings of John Dickinson, I, 104-06.

[8]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 215.

[9]An Historical Account of the Establishment of the Colony of Jamaica (Kingston: undated, but certainly 1765), xiii.

[10]Ibid., xiii.

[11]Assembly Journals, V, 529.

[12]Concerning the Privileges, etc. (St. Jago de la Vega: August 10, 1765), 25.

[13]Ibid., 27.

[14]Ibid., 33-34.

[15]Ibid., 38-41.

[16]Ibid., 52.

[17]Ibid., 67.

[18]Assembly Journals, V, 529.

[19]Ibid., V, 529.

[20]Ibid., V, 529.

[21]Ibid., V, 530.

[22]Ibid., V, 530.

[23]Ibid., V, 530. The dramatic face-to-face confrontation between Governor Lyttelton and the Speaker is also recorded, with very minor differences, in the Journal of the Council, August 16, 1765.

[24]Assembly Journals, V, 530.

[25]Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, IV, undated and unpaginated, Microfilm, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town.

[26]The most readily available sources for the 1765 revolt are Long, History, II, 465-70 and Assembly Journals, V, 592-94. But the most thoroughly detailed evidence is contained in Depositions of Slaves Examined in Connection with the premature slave revolt of a group of Coromantees in St. Mary, Jamaica, 1765, Yale University Library; also important are Zachary Bayley's and James Charles Sholto

Douglas' letters to William Henry Lyttelton, 1765, Yale University Library.

It should be noted that Edward Long dated the outbreak November 29, a Friday. History, II, 465. The records of the Assembly indicate Saturday, November 23, as the date of the revolt. Assembly Journals, V, 592. But the documents at Yale University clearly establish Sunday, November 24, as the day of the uprising.

[27]Long, History, II, 467; Assembly Journals, V, 593.

[28]Zachary Bayley to Governor Lyttelton, November 25, 1765, Yale University Library, Bayley-Lyttelton Letters.

[29]Assembly Journals, V, 592.

[30]Bayley to Lyttelton, November 25, 1765, Bayley-Lyttelton Letters.

[31]Long, History, II, 468.

[32]"The Examination of Cambridge, a Millwright belonging to Alexander Grant, November 29, 1765," Yale University Library, Depositions of Slaves Examined in Connection with the premature slave revolt of a group of Coromantees in St. Mary, Jamaica, 1765; James Charles Sholto Douglas to William Henry Lyttelton, December 5, 1765, Yale University Library, Douglas-Lyttelton Letters.

[33]Douglas to Lyttelton, December 5, 1765, Douglas-Lyttelton Letters.

[34]"Examination of Cambridge . . . ;" "Memorandum of the Confession of George," Depositions of Slaves Examined in Connection with the premature revolt of a group of Coromantees in St. Mary, Jamaica, 1765; Long, History, II, 465-70.

[35]Douglas to Lyttelton, December 5, 1765, Douglas-Lyttelton Letters.

[36]Ibid.

[37]"Memorandum of the Confession of George," Depositions of Slaves Examined . . . 1765.

[38]Douglas to Lyttelton, December 5, 1765, Douglas-Lyttelton Letters.

[39]"Memorandum of the Confession of George," Depositions of Slaves Examined . . . 1765.

[40]In October Quaon, an obeahman at Esher estate, on Abruco's behalf recruited Coromantees at Hopewell. The latter planned to murder Douglas and join the rebels from other estates. This element of the conspiracy did not come out at the December 4 trials because Cambridge, the informer, was unaware of Hopewell and Esher involvement in the plot. The slave named George who testified after being sentenced to death concealed the Hopewell and Esher conspiracies but tried to implicate the St. Mary Maroons instead. "Examination of Cuffee a Negro Man Belonging to James Charles Sholto Douglas Esqr.;" "Memorandum of the Confession of George," Deposition of Slaves Examined . . . 1765.

[41]"Examination of Cuffee . . . ," Depositions of Slaves Examined . . . 1765.

[42]Ibid.

[43]"Information of Cuffee [and others] Belonging to Ja. Ch. Sh. Douglas Esqr. Given Dec. 8th 1765," Depositions of Slaves Examined . . . 1765.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid.; Assembly Journals, V, 592-94.

[46]The results of Douglas' investigation implicated slaves on at least eleven estates. The Assembly's inquiry into the affair a year later put the total at seventeen. Assembly Journals, V, 592.

[47]"Information of Cuffee . . . ," Depositions of Slaves Examined . . . 1765.

[48]Long, History, II, 470.

[49]Ibid., II, 470; Assembly Journals, V, 592.

[50]Long, History, II, 470; Assembly Journals, V, 592.

[51]Long, History, II, 470; Assembly Journals, V, 592.

[52]"Memorandum of the Confession of George," Depositions of Slaves Examined . . . 1765.

[53]The Assembly's 1766 investigation of the uprising illustrates the island's continued concern over the situation in St. Mary. A special committee, chaired by Edward Long, interviewed parish residents and recounted what happened. Not surprisingly, the committee sharply criticized the performance of the by then departed Governor Lyttelton who had failed to deploy troops. Assembly Journals, V, 592-94. It should be noted that the degree to which Governor Lyttelton took blame in this circumstance reflects again the colonial tendency to exploit the security issue for partisan advantage. The attribution of failure to the Governor merely further discredited an already defeated political opponent.

[54]Kingston Vestry Minutes, IV; St. Catherine Vestry Minutes, II, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town.

[55]This writer has been unable to locate any extant Jamaican newspapers from the Stamp Act period.

[56]Records in Jamaica do not contain discussion of the constitutional questions the Stamp Act raised. It is interesting to note, however, that the historian Bryan Edwards, a twenty-two year old Jamaican at the time of the Stamp Act, later discussed the development of the American Revolution in a manner which supports Professor Morgan's view that the colonists distinguished between taxation and legislation, not between internal and external taxes. Wrote Edwards: "If Great Britain had no right to interfere with the internal legislation of the colonies, she could have no possible right to tax them for the purpose of raising revenue; yet, it does not follow, that she would have had a right to tax them, even if she had possessed just authority to make laws for their internal government." Edwards went on to quote Lord Chatham's dictum: "Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power." History, Civil and Commercial, III, 215 n.

[57]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 132-38.

[58]Quoted in Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 325. Oddly enough, one could draw the opposite conclusion from the equally erroneous report of shipmaster George Champlin in early 1766. Writing from St. Eustatius, Champlin said:

> "I have cleared from Dominica in Balast for Rhode Island and therefore if we can tun [sic] it we can enter our Vessell with a good face. as for selling the Vessell I dont expect it as every man that has a Vessell here has

one to sell, as to stamps ther's none passes in the Island except at Barbados and Granada. I have proper Certificates from the Collector that theirs no stamps to be had." George Champlin to Christopher Champlin, February 17, 1766, Ford, ed., "Commerce of Rhode Island," 9, 144.

[59]Christopher Gadsden to William Samuel Johnson, April 16, 1766, Richard Walsh, ed., The Writings of Christopher Gadsden (Columbia, S.C.: 1966), 72.

[60]Gadsden seemed aware of the Jamaica Assembly's struggle with Governor Lyttelton. In December, 1765, he wrote: "The late attacks upon different parts of the Constitution are very alarming, and has the appearance of design; in New York on one point, in our Province on another, in Jamaica on a third, in Maryland on several; and the striding encroachments of the Council almost everywhere etc etc." Gadsden to William Samuel Johnson and Charles Garth, December 2, 1765, ibid., 67.

[61]John Adams, "Diary," January 2, 1766, Charles Francis Adams, ed., The Life and Works of John Adams (10 vols., Boston: 1856), II, 173-74.

[62]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 130-31.

[63]Ibid., 131.

[64]Assembly Journals, V, 246-48; Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 324. Jamaica was not unique in having had its own stamp law. Massachusetts enacted such a measure in 1755. Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 79.

[65]Laws of Jamaica, Island Record Office, Spanish Town, V, 103.

[66]Assembly Journals, V, 279, 282.

[67]Council Journals, November 16 and 24, 1762; Laws of Jamaica, V, 105.

[68]Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 324-25. For the committee report to which the statement refers see Assembly Journals, V, 504-05.

[69]Assembly Journals, V, 504-05.

[70]See pp. 294-96 of this essay.

[71]For the exchange rate see again pp. 13-14 of this essay.

[72]Jamaica's 1762 reenactment of the stamp measure defined ten specific appropriations including, among others, the salary of the Clerk of the Committee of Correspondence, funds for the commissioners of the Bath in St. Thomas in the East, and even a £300 prize for an upcoming horse race. Laws of Jamaica, V, 105.

Control over the disposition of revenue was, of course, an important Assembly power. See Greene, Quest for Power, 87-107. Professor Greene, it might be noted, quoted a 1753 resolution of the Jamaica Assembly which maintained that it was "the inherent and undoubted Right of the Representatives of the People to raise and apply Monies for the Service and Exigencies of Government." Greene asserted that the island's Assembly, by making such a pronouncement, "was forcefully and categorically asserting the representatives' right to stipulate how each farthing of the public money should be spent. That assertion might well have been made by any of the lower houses in the southern royal colonies during the same decade had their executives seriously challenged their equally 'inherent and undoubted' right." Ibid., 87.

[73]G. D. Scull, ed., "The Montresor Journals," Collections of the New-York Historical Society for the Year 1881 (New York: 1882), 346.

[74]"Precis of Correspondence from North America, August-November, 1765," Colonial Documents, Bancroft Collection, New York Public Library, VII, 101-45.

[75]Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 328-29.

[76]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 202-03.

[77]In New York an angry mob gathered about Fort George on November 1 and harassed the troops inside. Major Thomas James who commanded the garrison later reported that as many as nine hundred colonists would have died if his men had opened fire. But such a massacre, he believed, would have drawn fifty thousand Americans into the streets and his

men would have been overrun. General Gage concurred with this opinion. Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 254-55.

Concerning the importance of troops to the Stamp Act's enforcement it is worth remembering Benjamin Franklin's testimony before the House of Commons during the debate over the law's repeal.

> "Q. Can anything less than a military force carry the stamp-act into execution?
> A. I do not see how a military force can be applied to that purpose.
> Q. Why may it not?
> A. Suppose a military force sent into America, they will find nobody in arms; what are they then to do? They cannot force a man to take stamps who chuses to do without them. They will not find a rebellion; They may indeed make one."

Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 144.

[78]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 255-58; Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 114-18.

[79]For this view see, for example, J. H. Parry and Philip Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies (London: 1960), 135.

[80]Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 35.

[81]See again pp. 243-44 of this essay.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COMING OF THE STAMP ACT: THE REASONS FOR AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAMAICAN OPPOSITION

When George Grenville announced in the House of Commons on March 9, 1764, that stamp taxes might be imposed on the American colonies, he unwittingly introduced a new chapter in human history.[1] The prospect of a Parliamentary tax sparked a colonial debate which outlined the limits of Parliament's authority, and the age of the American Revolution dawned. Resistance, of course, did not ensue immediately. Throughout the period the stamp bill was under preparation, colonial opposition remained both peaceful and legal. Americans drew up petitions against the measure and relied on their agents abroad to safeguard their rights and protect their interests. Jamaica participated in the anti-Stamp Act campaign. The island, like the thirteen mainland provinces which later became the United States, had many reasons to object to the proposed taxes.

The Grounds for Opposition

Jamaica had as many, if not more, constitutional and economic reasons to oppose the Stamp Act as the North

American provinces. The colony's popular Assembly, it will be recalled, had reached a level of maturity comparable to that of any on the mainland. Perceiving itself as a mini-House of Commons, it considered itself the expression and defender of English liberty in the island and, accordingly, jealously guarded its rights and privileges. Ever since its birth as a legislative body in the seventeenth century, it and it alone had taxed island residents. There is no reason to suppose that Assemblymen and their constituents did not consider the Stamp Act an innovation as dangerously destructive of the constitution as William Henry Lyttelton's actions in the Olyphant privilege case. The Governor himself once remarked that the islanders deemed even traditional expropriations like port and anchorage fees "illegal, because not warranted by the words of any Act of the Assembly . . . ."[2] In addition, there is no reason to suppose that Jamaican colonists considered the admiralty court provision of the law any less an infringement upon their right to a jury trial than their counterparts on the continent.

There is, on the other hand, every justification to believe that Jamaican settlers found the Parliamentary tax offensive. The imperial legislature passed the Stamp Act to provide for the defense of the American colonies; but Jamaica, it will be remembered, was not to be among the chief beneficiaries of the future garrison of ten thousand men. In effect, the new law required the islanders to pay for North American security despite the fact that for many

years they had borne the costs of their own protection by building and maintaining barracks and subsidizing the pay of the regulars stationed in Jamaica. This in itself may have seemed unfair, but it was more than that: it was dangerous. Control over the military's supplementary salary constituted the Jamaica Assembly's principal weapon in its perennial conflicts with the royal administration. An American defense fund, financed by stamp revenues, threatened to deprive the Assembly of that weapon. The Stamp Act, therefore, implicitly undermined the integrity, autonomy, and power of the local legislature.[3] Although Jamaica was not to be a chief beneficiary of Parliament's 1765 law, the island could well have become its principal victim.

Some historians, of course, have maintained that economic interest, not constitutional issues, determined the North American response to the Stamp Act. The law's sterling-payment clause, it is said, would have increased the volume and velocity of the cash flow from America where coin was already in short supply. As a result, colonial obedience to the measure would have inflated prices and wages, driven many businesses into bankruptcy, and perpetuated insolvency for innumerable debtors.[4] The Stamp Act Congress declared that "the scarcity of specie" made payment of the tax "absolutely impracticable."[5] Rather than acquiesce in economic depression, North Americans resisted.

Jamaica was hardly immune to the deleterious economic consequences which collection of the stamp taxes

seemed to threaten. The island's economy had not yet recovered from the post-war recession when the Stamp Act was passed, and the colony's economic malaise remained acute largely because the Spanish trade, Jamaica's principal source of coin, failed to revive in the years immediately following the Peace of Paris. Misguided instructions from London and Governor Lyttelton's diligence in following them accounted, at least in part, for the continued stagnation of this vital branch of provincial commerce. On July 9, 1763, Secretary of State Egremont directed Lyttelton to assist the navy in stopping the "Clandestine Running of Goods into any part" of Jamaica.[6] The Governor did not receive this order until early January, 1764. Whatever the reason for the delay, Lyttelton promptly directed the Collector of Customs, the naval officer, garrison commanders, and "all other officers Civil and Military in the Maritime Parts" to take whatever steps seemed necessary to ensure obedience to His Majesty's command.[7] But he relied chiefly on the army to suppress "all contraband trade" and to protect "the Officers of the Revenue from the violence of any desperate, __(?)__, and lawless Persons, who shall Attempt to resist the due execution of the Laws . . . ." He not only ordered commanding officers to use troops against any "foreign vessel" surreptitiously entering any Jamaican port, bay, creek, or inlet, but also posted guards on non-English ships legally anchored in island waters, including, some charged, those stopping at Jamaica for refreshment.[8]

Governor Lyttelton's thoroughness discouraged speedy resumption of the Spanish trade because British military surveillance frightened foreign shippers away from island ports. As a consequence, merchants in Kingston and the West India Committee in London protested, accusing the chief executive of seizing Spanish vessels and destroying the bullion trade altogether.[9] The Governor, of course, defended himself against these attacks. He denied "seizing" any Spanish ship since the end of the war but admitted posting sentries on visiting vessels in order to prevent illegal trade. Misinterpretation of this policy, Lyttelton maintained, accounted for mercantile criticism of him. He wrote that the "placing of . . . guards was I believe misunderstood by some persons in this Island, to have been meant as a seizure, and may have been made the ground of the complaint" heard at Whitehall.[10] The Governor may have been right, but he nevertheless missed the point. Seizures or no seizures, his forceful implementation of Egremont's order hindered the recovery of the Spanish trade.

But Lyttelton's zealous efforts to deter illegal commerce were not solely responsible for the decline in bullion imports. Even after Grenville's ministry made it clear in 1764 that bullion importation did not violate the Navigation Acts, the Spanish trade did not revive.[11] Countless rumors had it that Crown officials in Jamaica, demanding extraordinary and even extortionate fees, drove Spanish shippers away from island harbors. Such allegations became so

widespread that on November 16, and again on December 6, 1765, Henry Seymour Conway, Secretary of State in the new Rockingham ministry, directed Lyttelton to investigate the charges. Conway specifically wanted to know if there were any truth to the tale, heard at Whitehall, that Jamaica's naval officer, William Murray, had denied a Spanish vessel carrying $80,000 permission to enter Kingston harbor because the ship's captain had refused to pay him five per cent of the cash cargo.[12]

While these orders were en route to Jamaica, Governor Lyttelton learned that the rumors concerning corruption were not without foundation. Late in 1765 a Spanish sea captain complained to him personally that William Glasse, a deputy naval officer, had demanded unusual fees for harbor services. Lyttelton investigated the matter, discovered that Glasse was using his position to extort money, and dismissed the officer on January 17, 1766, three weeks before Conway's instructions arrived.[13] When the Governor finally received the Secretary's directives on February 6, he launched a full investigation. He not only inquired into the activities of William Murray, against whom a specific charge had been leveled, but also tried to find out how responsible corruption was for the distressed state of the Spanish trade.[14] The chief executive initiated this wider probe by interviewing two of Kingston's leading merchants, Thomas Hibbert and Peter Furnell.[15] Whether these gentlemen shed any light on the matter is unclear, but they evidently

promised to raise the question with their commercial colleagues. They kept this pledge. At Vauxhall on March 4, 1766, the Society of Merchants met. Led by the organization's president, George Paplay, a member of the defunct Assembly, the merchants discussed the relationship between official corruption and the desperate condition of the Spanish trade, drew up a report on the subject, and submitted it to Governor Lyttelton four days later.[16]

The merchants pointed out that the Spanish trade had been suffering since 1762. The "principal and most fatal interruption to the Commerce of foreign Vessels importing bullion," Article I of their report began, "was given by the seizing and condemning all such foreign vessels and their Money as was found here, when the first accounts arrived of hostilities against Spain."[17] Since the peace, the report continued, both harassment by the military and extortion by customs and other officials discouraged Spanish ships from entering island ports.[18] The mercantile analysis emphasized the problem of corruption and described specific illegalities. The merchants charged that Captain James Trower, Commander of Fort Charles at Port Royal, exacted one pistole from every Spanish ship entering Kingston harbor, an "illegal fee," as the report said, "and mal practice."[19] The merchants also accused William Glasse, who had already been dismissed, of extorting £6 10s. from Spanish bullion ships under the pretense that the payments constituted pilotage and anchorage fees.[20] Although they doubted that William

Murray's demands had ever forced a vessel bearing $80,000 to seek better treatment elsewhere, the merchants nevertheless maintained that the naval officer customarily insisted on "various high and illegal fees" from visiting Spanish ships.[21] "Finally," the Society of Merchants concluded, "it appears . . . that upon the whole, the delays and obstructions which are given to the Spaniards upon their arrival to and departure from this Island, together with the above mentioned extortions, are great discouragements to the said Spaniards from importing bullion here and highly detrimental to the Commerce of this Island."[22]

Although Governor Lyttelton did not accept all the Society's allegations as either fair or true, he could not and did not deny that the Spanish bullion trade had sharply declined since 1762 and that, as a result, Jamaica endured an acute specie shortage.[23] Hard money remained scarce throughout 1765 and 1766. If the Stamp Act's sterling-payment clause would have imposed burdens on North Americans, it would have burdened Jamaicans too.

Which groups in Jamaica faced hardships as a result of the Stamp Act? Historians have often maintained that the Stamp Act distressed the merchants and lawyers of the commercial North more than it did the planters of the agricultural South and West Indies.[24] This view is misleading, at least insofar as it pertains to Jamaica. Kingston, it will be recalled, was a busy trading center with several thousand residents. The city's merchants, particularly the larger

entrepreneurs, exercised considerable political and economic power and influence.[25] The legal profession, it will also be recalled, thrived in Jamaica. Lawyers not only provided the services which constant litigation between merchant and planter and merchant and merchant required, but they also frequently managed plantation accounts.[26] If the Stamp Act stung the commercial and legal communities in the northern colonies sharply, it stung their counterparts in Jamaica as well.

Indeed, the stamp tax burdened Jamaica and the other West Indian islands more heavily than the mainland provinces, a matter which contemporaries, not to mention subsequent historians, either missed or ignored. Daniel Dulany of Maryland, for example, believed that the Stamp Act would produce "a larger sum . . . from a tobacco colony than from Jamaica" because the amount of revenue collected depended not on a colony's ability to pay but on its "multiplicity" of legal procedures, quantity of salable land, and commercial and monetary practices.[27] Presumably, Jamaican affairs were such as to preclude a large revenue. The presumption, of course, was unwarranted. But, more importantly, Dulany and other critics of the law failed to perceive that in several areas the stamp duties fell more lightly on the mainland colonies, Bermuda, and the Bahamas than on the Caribbean provinces. Several clauses of the Stamp Act, in other words, discriminated against the West Indian islands.[28] For instance, "any probate of a will, letter of

administration, or of guardianship for any estate above the value of twenty pounds sterling" bore a 5s. tax in North America, Bermuda, and the Bahamas but required a sum twice that amount in the sugar provinces.[29] Moreover, "any original grant, or any deed, mesne conveyance, or other instrument whatsoever" transfering ownership of as much as one hundred acres were taxed at 1s. 6d. on the continent, in Bermuda, and the Bahamas but at 3s. in the West Indies. Similar transactions involving between one and two hundred acres, and between two and three hundred twenty acres, were taxed at 2s. and 2s. 6d. respectively on the mainland and in Bermuda and the Bahamas. But the same transferals were taxed at 4s. and 5s. in the Caribbean, twice the North American rates.[30] Lastly, "any grant, appointment, or admission, of or to any publick beneficial office or employment . . . above the value of twenty pounds per annum sterling," excluding commissions to military officers and Justices of the Peace, required a £4 stamp in the mainland colonies as well as Bermuda and the Bahamas, but a £6 stamp in the West Indies.[31] Although he was not expressly referring to the discriminatory features of the law, Professor Gipson correctly pointed out that the Stamp Act "bore more heavily . . . on the people of the West Indies than on the inhabitants of North America."[32]

If Jamaica had reasons to oppose the Stamp Act, then how did it respond to the measure?

Jamaican Opposition in London

On August 11, 1764, Secretary of State Halifax instructed all colonial governors to compile "a List of all Instruments made use of in Public Transactions, Law Proceedings, Grants, Conveyances, Securities of Land or Money within your Government, with proper and sufficient Descriptions of the Same . . . ."[33] This directive, intended to secure data concerning colonial legal and commercial procedures, reflected the ministry's desire to hammer out a stamp law tailored to provincial practices.[34] Governor Lyttelton received the order in October and delegated the assignment to Thomas Gordon, Jamaica's Attorney General.[35]

Gordon went to work at once. He began itemizing the legal and commercial documents used in Jamaica and, given the order of his compilation, apparently drew heavily from the text of the island's old stamp law. He also annotated his report as Halifax had instructed. He pointed out that in Jamaica "recognizance" was used only in "Criminal matters," that "few Acts properly called Notarial" were performed, and that platts [diagrams of landholdings] "were not stamped under the late act of this island, as the number necessary to draw a diagram to to [sic] shew the Boundaries of land disputed would be very great, and Consequently too expensive."[36] Similarly, Gordon observed that writs emanating from the Provost Marshal's office "are very numerous and therefore the Duty laid on them by the late Stamp Act in this island, was very small."[37] The Attorney General

even offered some advice to the policy-makers in London who, presumably, would read his report. He warned that "if a Stamp Duty is laid" on affidavits or copies of affidavits sworn before customs officers and Justices of the Peace, then a heavy "burthen . . . would fall upon the King's Revenue" which, established in 1728, was raised from court fees and customs suits usually involving "trifling" sums.[38] The point was clear. A tax on such documents would discourage litigation of cases involving less than forty shillings and, as a result, would dry up the source of the annual £8,000 perpetual revenue.

On October 18 Gordon completed his survey, and Lyttelton, sometime later, sent it to London.[39] It is doubtful that this annotated list, like similar compilations dispatched to London from other colonies, in any way shaped the contents of the legislation Grenville's secretaries were then preparing. Despite the data collected in 1764, the original draft of the stamp bill remained largely unchanged.[40] It was opposition lawmakers at Westminster and paid lobbyists there and at Whitehall, not colonials in distant provincial capitals, who made the most significant efforts to influence, if not abort, the ministry's handiwork. When it became clear that Grenville would introduce a stamp bill early in 1765, friends of the colonies in London worked feverishly to prevent its passage and, failing that, to modify its provisions. Jamaica, like other provinces, had "friends" in the imperial capital, and they were deeply in-

volved in the anti-Stamp Act campaign.

Jamaica's most prominent spokesman in the House of Commons was William Pitt's friend and protege, Alderman William Beckford of London. Beckford, who owned 22,000 acres in Jamaica, emerged early as a leading opponent of Grenville's colonial tax program.[41] On March 7, 1764, during the debates over the Sugar Act, he reminded the House of Commons that "American legislatures" existed and questioned Parliament's right to tax the provinces.[42] Although he may have hedged on the constitutional issue two days later, he nevertheless remained a vigorous foe of the forthcoming Stamp Act.[43] When Charles Townshend declared on January 21, 1765, that he favored maintaining "the supremacy of this country over the colonies" and "would not have them emancipated," Beckford two days later denounced the speech on the ground that it implied the provinces were enslaved. The future architect of another American tax program tried to explain what he meant by "emancipated," but Beckford retorted that Townshend had heaped a "diarrhoea of words" upon House members.[44]

Beckford was not the only Jamaica-connected anti-Stamp Act spokesman in the House of Commons. Rose Fuller, who also had large holdings in the island, opposed the tax bill too.[45] Jamaica's "friends" outside Parliament also campaigned against the revenue measure. The most conspicuous and most important among these was Stephen Fuller, the island's new agent. Although by February, 1765, Fuller had

not yet received a copy of the colonial law which designated him as agent, a circumstance which meant that he lacked the proper credentials to assume his new responsibilities, he nevertheless worked hard in Jamaica's behalf.[46] Even before Grenville introduced the stamp bill in the House of Commons Fuller "had prepared," he later reported, "a Petition myself" against the imminent tax.[47] Fuller also joined other colonial agents in the campaign against the Stamp Act. For example, he met with "all the Agents for the Plantations on Saturday," February 2.[48] At this conference he "found that," like himself, "most of the N. American Agents had prepared Petitions, or had had them sent over from their respective Colonies."[49] But this information did not encourage Fuller very much because he also learned at the meeting that "as it is an established rule of the House not to receive Petitions against a Money Bill, the N. American Agents could get no Members to present their Petitions."[50] Presumably, his would encounter the same obstacle.

Fuller, uncertain how to proceed, solicited the aid and advice of the merchants who traded with the West Indies. He met with them on February 5 at their regular Tuesday night meeting.[51] Discussion first focused on the agent's draft petition, but the merchants at length "determined" that offering such a document to the House of Commons was "improper."[52] Indeed, they decided that a petition "could do no good, & might possibly do mischief."[53] The merchants, in fact, believed that only one hope of averting the Stamp

Act remained: blocking passage of the bill by rallying the handful of House members with interests in Jamaica. This, admittedly, was a slim hope, but "the only thing that could be done . . . ."[54] The merchants accordingly advised Fuller "to desire the Attendance of all the Jamaica Members of my acquaintance, & that they, the merch^{ts}, would do the same."[55]

Fuller suspected that the merchants' plan was futile, especially since time was running out. Events shortly proved his suspicions correct. The next day, February 6, Grenville introduced preliminary resolutions on the Stamp Act, and an important debate ensued.[56] William Beckford, first to respond to the minister, began by defending Parliament's "right of taxing the imports and exports of the colonies," even arguing that "the colonies all admit this principle."[57] The Sugar Act, the Alderman thought, constituted a proper and legitimate exercise of Parliamentary authority over the provinces. But, he maintained, American colonists "do not think an internal and external duty the same."[58] Beckford ridiculed the theory of virtual colonial representation in Parliament, the legal ground on which Grenville defended his measure. "As to representation," the absentee planter declared, "all England is not represented, but it is a written part of our constitution, that it is so . . . ."[59] The West Indian's speech impressed Jared Ingersoll who listened from the gallery. It was Beckford, the Connecticut observer wrote, "who, and who only, seemed to deny the Au-

thority of Parliament . . . ."[60]

But neither Beckford's oratory nor his constitutional opinions could persuade House members already convinced of their right to tax the colonies and of the need to do so to change their minds. Beckford knew this and at last resorted to maneuver. He moved that the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole vacate the chair, a Parliamentary device which, if approved, would secure an adjournment and prevent a vote on Grenville's resolutions.[61] Colonel Isaac Barre seconded the motion. "We are working in the dark," he said, "and the less we do the better . . . There are gentlemen in the House from the West Indies, but there are very few who know the circumstances of North America . . . . The tax intended is odious to all your colonies and they tremble at it."[62] In the heated debate which followed Barre delivered his famous "They planted by your Care--Sons of Liberty" speech which soon made him a popular hero in the colonies.[63] Rose Fuller, denouncing the Stamp Act as imprudent, also supported Beckford's motion.[64] Connecticut's Jared Ingersoll, watching from the gallery, noted that the Stamp Act's opponents consisted chiefly of "gentlemen interested in the West Indies . . . a few members . . . particularly connected with some of the colonies and a few of the heads of the minority who are sure to thwart and oppose the ministry in every measure of what nature or kind soever."[65]

When the debate drew to an end around 9:00 P.M., spectators, as was customary before the House voted, were

escorted from the gallery. Concerned observers like Jared Ingersoll waited anxiously outside while the House divided. Among them was Stephen Fuller who "waited upon all our Jamaica Members, & upon several other Members connected with the Colonies" to learn the outcome of the vote and, more specifically, the identities of those who supported Beckford's motion.[66] The news, although discouraging, was not unexpected. The motion to adjourn lost by a vote of 245 to 49.[67] Fuller reported that "The major part of the number 49 consisted of gentlemen interested in the Colonies."[68] Jared Ingersoll described the minority somewhat more specifically. "West Indian gentlemen," he wrote, "and a few others connected with America" cast the 49 votes for adjournment.[69]

The outcome in the House disappointed Stephen Fuller. "I am sorry to send you the unwelcome News," he wrote Jamaica's Council and Assembly, "that Yesterday in a Committee of the Whole House it was resolved to lay a Duty by way of Stamps upon the British Colonies & Plantations in America."[70] Fuller, pessimistic, considered the Stamp Act inevitable. The colonies could only hope that the taxes would not be burdensome. "As we are now at the mercy of the Treasury;" he wrote his Jamaican employers, "their [sic] remains nothing to be done, but most earnestly to request it of them that the Tax may be as light as possible. As to the Quantum intended to be laid, we are at present in the Dark, but I shall inform you of it as soon as I can get to the knowledge of it."[71]

Fuller kept his promise. A day or two after Beckford's motion failed in the House of Commons, he learned the specifics of the bill and on February 10 sent a copy of the "intended Stamp Duty particularized" to Jamaica.[72] If the defeat on February 6 had made the agent pessimistic, the range of taxes the ministry was proposing now alarmed him. Nor was Fuller the only one worried. Disclosure of the stamp bill inspired opponents of the measure to continue the struggle against it. Jamaica's "friends," of course, remained active in the campaign. "Many of the gentlemen interested in the Island" met again with Fuller to consider what could be done.[73] Specifically, they wanted to review the agent's draft petition because, as Fuller put it, during the February 6 debate the ministry "Seem'd to build much" on the argument "that none of the Colonies had made any objection to a Stamp Duty, tho' appriz'd of it as long ago as the March past."[74] Jamaica's agent and his associates knew that the government's allegation was false. "The truth was," Fuller wrote, "that the Agents of the several Colonies had Petitions ready to present, but could get no Member to present them, as being contrary to an Establish'd Rule of the House."[75]

Outraged by both the scope of the tax bill and the ministry's duplicity, the merchants, at what Fuller described as this "extraordinary" meeting, reconsidered formally petitioning Parliament.[76] They at last advised the agent to compose a new memorial, "whether they [House members]

will receive it or not," one which would be "liable to as few objections as possible."[77] This last proviso meant, of course, that the merchants wanted a petition which questioned the expediency of the tax and not Parliament's right to impose it.[78] Fuller agreed, and in a short time he, with the aid of Gilbert Ford, a friend with commercial ties to Jamaica, prepared a new document.[79] The petition stated:

> To the Hon^{ble} the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament Assembled,
> The Humble Petition of Certain Persons interested in and Trading to the Island of Jamaica Most humbly Sheweth
>
> That the Inhabitants of the said Island are under the utmost Difficulties to pay the Taxes imposed upon them to supply the necessary Exigencies of Government, which Taxes were greatly increased by the Calamity of the Rebellion which happen'd in the year 1760. That during the said rebellion, which threatened not only the Destruction of themselves but the loss of that valuable Colony to Great Britain, they had no other means of providing a Sufficient Fund to defray the Expences that accrued on account thereof, than by laying a Tax by way of Stamps, at the sitting of the Assembly in the year 1760. Which Tax was continued till Dec^{r} 1763, and was then discontinued as a burthen no longer tolerable.
>
> That the Inhabitants of the said Island are in general greatly distressed in their Circumstances, and Indebted to a very large amount to the Merchants and Traders of this Kingdom; Not, as has been generally supposed, for the Luxuries of Life, but for the Supplies of the Necessary means for the Cultivation of their lands: and they have been so far from being able to keep down the Balance, that it has been increasing for many years, and that the Publick as well as private Credit of the Island is at the utmost Stretch.
>
> Your Petitioners therefore most humbly pray that their case may be taken into Consideration, and such relief granted to them as to this Hon^{ble} House shall seem meet and your Petitioners shall ever pray.[80]

Fuller was proud of his handiwork. "Whether received or not," he wrote, "it may remain as a Monument of our unwillingness to submit to and our inability to bear

such a burthen."[81] He thought that the emphasis on expediency rather than right constituted a wise tactic. "You will be pleas'd to observe," Fuller wrote to Jamaica, "that the prayer of the Petition is that relief may be granted," a message more likely to secure a reading in the Commons than a challenge to Parliament's authority.[82] Some of the "Principle [sic] Gentlemen" interested in Jamaica signed the document at once, "excepting those," Fuller explained, "that may possibly want to be examined as Evidences in Case the House will give us a Hearing."[83] The agent, of course, intended to secure as many signatures as possible, but he also planned to do some political spadework first.

On February 13 Grenville introduced the stamp bill in the House, and the measure underwent its first reading.[84] The same day Fuller discreetly sent a copy of his petition to the King's minister "in order that" the document "might give no offence" to him when it was offered to the House.[85] A request accompanied the memorial. Fuller asked Grenville "the Honour of seeing him, and conversing with him upon it [the petition], before I presented it to the Merchants" for additional signatures.[86] The leader of the ministry agreed and scheduled a meeting with Fuller for 11:00 A.M. the next day.[87]

Fuller went to the interview determined to safeguard Jamaica's interests, but at the same time he feared embarrassment. Since his credentials were not fully in order, he was not properly entitled to speak for the island,

and he knew it.[88] If Grenville challenged his authority, Fuller realized that the meeting might end at the moment it began. Unsure of himself, the agent resolved to approach Grenville deferentially.[89]

The two had "a long conference." Grenville read the petition and assured Fuller that its presentation "would give him no sort of offence."[90] He told the agent that "his rule in public business was fortiter in re, suaviter in enado," but warned that "if the House look't upon it as a Petition against a Money Bill, they would not receive it."[91] Nevertheless, the minister said that "the Sense of the House might be taken upon it."[92]

Fuller stressed that the petition was a plea for "relief." Grenville interjected that the parties concerned "ought to be ready in regard to what particular relief [they] expected."[93] Jamaica's agent may have anticipated this point. Perhaps he and the "gentlemen" who had recommended the petition had discussed this matter. In any event, he "took the liberty" of suggesting a program which, he thought, might make the Stamp Act more palatable to Jamaicans. Admitting that he "had no authority to mention it," he informed Grenville that a reduction in the duty on rum entering the British Isles, together with a corresponding increase in the duty on French brandy, "would be a very considerable relief to the Planters" in Jamaica.[94] Specifically, Fuller recommended reducing the tax on the one by a shilling or six pence per gallon while increasing the tax

on the other by the same amount.[95] He assured Grenville that this formula for Jamaican relief "would not diminish in the least the Public revenue" but added that it would have "no great Effect," nor "could" any "be expected," unless "the most effectual methods to prevent Smuggling" into the kingdom were pursued.[96] Fuller asked Grenville "to turn this [the proposal] in his Mind," and "he said he would."[97]

Fuller blundered badly but did not know it. His suggestion diverted conversation from the Stamp Act and the petition against it, and Grenville quickly perceived this. The minister solicited Fuller's "sentiments as to what further methods could be pursued for the effectual prevention of smuggling."[98] This inquiry flattered the agent. Here was the King's chief minister seeking his advice on a matter of considerable importance to the realm. Fuller promised that "in four or five days" he would "give him my thoughts in writing."[99] On that pledge the conference ended.

Fuller left the meeting feeling satisfied and self-important. Although he could not be sure that anything positive would result from the interview, he felt certain that the meeting had done no harm. To the Committee of Correspondence in Jamaica he wrote:

> I wish I could promise you any solid Effect from this Conversation, as it would be very advantageous to the gentlemen in whom I have the honour to serve and at the same time give me great reputation, but all I can promise is, that I will use my utmost endeavours to accomplish it. It gives me great Satisfaction that I sent the Petition to Mr. Grenville before I even presented it to the Merchants. I found that he looked upon it

> as a particular respect which I have reason to think was not paid him by the Agents of the Other Colonies, but this I do not take upon one to affirm.[100]

After his interview with Grenville Fuller went immediately to work. He began examining the problem of smuggling, gathering data on rum and brandy duties, and collecting signatures for his petition. He accomplished the latter task quickly. In two days he added to his memorial the names of twenty merchants who traded with Jamaica, creating a total of twenty-six signatures altogether.[101] He then gave the document to his brother, Rose Fuller, for presentation to the House of Commons.[102]

On Friday, February 15, the stamp bill underwent its second reading, the customary occasion for debating a measure and hearing petitions for and against it.[103] Discussion began when Rose Fuller offered the petition from "certain Persons interested in & trading to the Island of Jam^{a}."[104] Grenville replied. He opposed Fuller's motion on the ground that it violated a longstanding rule of the Commons against receiving petitions pertaining to money bills. The minister cited precedents to butress his contention.[105] Although William Dowdeswell challenged the validity of Grenville's analysis, both Jeremiah Dyson and Gilbert Elliot convincingly supported the minister's view. They demonstrated that the House had not received a petition against a money bill since 1714.[106] Then Sir William Meredith, who planned to present Virginia's petition against the stamp bill spoke. He maintained that the House had postponed consideration of

a stamp bill for an entire year in order to allow the colonies time to petition. Grenville promptly rejected Meredith's contention, arguing that the postponement had been aimed at getting information, not opposition, from the provinces.[107] At this juncture General Henry Seymour Conway rose to speak. He felt "sure," he said, that the year's postponement had been designed "to give to the Americans Time to represent their Inability, or to suggest the Propriety of a less burthensome Tax than the Stamp Duty. This Time has been given;" Conway continued, and "the Representations are come from the Colonies. And shall we," he asked, "shut our Ears against that Information, which . . . we alloted sufficient Time to reach us? For my own part, I must declare myself just as much in the dark as I was last Year . . . . I expected . . . to receive such Information, as in Consequence of the Notice given, might be transmitted by the Colonies, by which my Judgment might be directed, my Conduct regulated."[108] If the Fuller brothers and others connected with Jamaica took heart as a result of Conway's speech up to this point, their optimism soon faded. The General continued: "In a Question so important, which regards Two Millions of unrepresented People, I lay aside every Consideration of Party, and shall therefore make no Scruple to declare my Opinion, that the Jamaica Petition is not admissable, because it does not come from the Colony, and of Course cannot contain those Lights, which I am sure, I am desirous of receiving, and which the Colonists them-

selves can only give."[109] When Conway concluded, Rose Fuller withdrew the Jamaica petition.[110] In the end it hardly mattered. The House, despite Conway's eloquence, refused petitions from South Carolina, Virginia, and Connecticut.[111]

The outcome disappointed Stephen Fuller, who listened to the debate from the gallery. With him were Gilbert Ford, who had helped write the memorial, James Irwin, an absentee planter, and several others who had expected to testify against the stamp bill if the House had received the petition.[112] They too were undoubtedly discouraged. But, unlike them, Stephen Fuller now seemed increasingly preoccupied with matters other than blocking passage of the stamp taxes. Since his interview with Grenville the agent had spent much of his time gathering data affirming his contention that a revision of rum and brandy duties would afford Jamaican settlers relief from the financial burdens the Stamp Act would impose. He probably wanted to persuade others of the merits of his proposal as well as justify his having taken "the liberty" of suggesting it in the first place. On February 16 he crowded the results of his research into three pages of a letter to his provincial employers.[113] Grenville's query concerning the prevention of smuggling also distracted Fuller from the stamp bill. The colonial agent devoted much of the week following February 15 to studying the problem, and on February 22 he summarized his ideas in two lengthy letters to the King's chief minister.[114]

While Fuller pondered the complexities of tariffs and the difficulties of preventing smuggling, the stamp bill made its way through Parliament. As the legislation moved forward, efforts to block the bill's passage died. A few staunch opponents in the House now only hoped to secure modification of the measure, but by February 21 even these efforts failed.[115] On February 27 the bill underwent its third reading and passed the House without a division.[116] Nine days later the House of Lords approved the measure without amendment and without debate.[117] On March 22, when George III assented to it, the stamp bill became law.[118]

NOTES

[1]Whether Grenville on that occasion offered the colonies a year in which to avoid a Parliamentary tax by devising revenue measures of their own to defray defense costs is a matter of scholarly debate. For differing views see Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 77 and Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 73-74.

[2]William Henry Lyttelton to Henry Seymour Conway, March 13, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV. For the full context of this remark see n. 23 below.

[3]The law, in fact, threatened to deprive every colonial Assembly of its "power of the purse." Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 90. But the threat to Jamaica's Assembly was more immediate and more direct than to others. The island's most important "purse string" was its control over military pay. The defense fund the Stamp Act was intended to create could have easily been used to disarm the Assembly of Jamaica.

[4]See, for example, Andrews, The Colonial Background of the American Revolution, 134ff. It is questionable whether the Stamp Act would have imposed such hardships because the law provided for the expenditure of the revenue in the colonies.

[5]Greene, ed., Colonies to Nation, 64.

[6]Cited in Lyttelton to Halifax, January 12, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, V. Because the order was widely interpreted to mean interrupting the bullion trade to Jamaica, it deeply embarrassed the Grenville faction in Parliament in late 1765 and early 1766 when it became a topic of public discussion. See Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 254-56. Note that Professor Thomas incorrectly refers to Governor Lyttelton as Thomas Lyttelton. Ibid., 254.

[7]Lyttelton to Halifax, January 12, 1764; Lyttelton to the Colonels of the Militia & Civil Magistrates in the Maritime Parts, to William Murray, naval officer, and to James Charles Sholto Douglas, Collector of Customs, January 4, 1764; Lyttelton to the Commanding Officers of the

Forts and Garrisons in the Maritime Parts, January 4, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, V.

[8]Lyttelton to Lieutenant Colonel Dalling of the 43rd Regiment and Lieutenat Colonel Spragge of the 49th Regiment, March 27, 1764; Lyttelton to Halifax, July 15, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, V; Lyttelton to Halifax, December 11, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, VI.

[9]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 254 ff.; Lyttelton to Halifax, December 11, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, VI.

[10]Lyttelton to Halifax, July 15, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, V.

[11]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 254-55. See also, Treasury Minutes, November 15, 1765, Hardwicke Collection, New York Public Library, vol. 133.

[12]Henry Seymour Conway to Lyttelton, November 16 and December 6, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[13]Lyttelton to Henry Seymour Conway, March 13, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[14]The Governor demanded, for example, that William Murray respond to the allegations against him. Murray, of course, denied accepting illegal payments from ships entering Kingston harbor with bullion or anything else. He admitted, however, receiving a doubloon for services such as recording a ship's cargo, but this fee was provided by law. Moreover, Murray correctly pointed out that under "An Act to Prevent Clandestine Trading," passed by the Jamaica Assembly some years earlier, the island's naval officer became the authorized factor for foreign vessels in colonial ports. This legislation entitled him to a five per cent commission on the sale price of whatever goods the ship purchased while in Jamaica and a five per cent commission on whatever the ship sold in Jamaica. Murray maintained that in order to encourage the revival of the Spanish trade he had at times accepted commissions less than those provided by law. He wrote that his income from port fees and commissions was at an all-time low and that he was willing to testify so under oath. The naval officer categorically denied ever demanding five per cent of an $80,000 bullion cargo. Richard Reynell to William Murray, February 10, 1766; William Murray to Governor Lyttelton, February 12 and March 13, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[15]Lyttelton to Conway, March 13, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[16]Ibid.; Report of the Society of Merchants, March 4, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[17]Report of the Society of Merchants, March 4, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid. Lyttelton subsequently questioned Trower regarding the accusation. The Commander, however, denied collecting "excessive fees." He wrote that the pistole he earned from arriving ships constituted "recompence to the commanding officer . . . for his trouble in sending messengers on board (which he always does) the said vessels on their arrival . . . ." Nor was this charge, according to Trower, an innovation: it had been collected as a matter of course for at least sixteen years. James Trower To Lyttelton, March 13, 1766; Lyttelton to Conway, March 13, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[20]Report of the Society of Merchants, March 4, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Lyttelton believed that the merchants misrepresented or at least exaggerated the truth on several points. He reminded Conway, for example, that the seizure of Spanish vessels in 1762 had been justified by the declaration of war. At that time the Council, several members of which were merchants, had unanimously supported the action. Lyttelton to Conway, March 13, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV. See also p. 209 of this essay.

In addition, on the basis of his investigation the Governor concluded that the merchants had exaggerated the degree to which corruption had crept into the customs service and had been responsible for the decline in the bullion trade. He wrote that "upon the whole, it appears to me, that they [the merchants] have considered every fee that has been taken by long usage here as illegal, because not warranted by the words of any Act of Assembly, altho' the King has been pleased to direct me by His Order of Council of the 21st of June last to support the public officers in receiving such fees as have by long custom been taken by

them or their predecessors in office, altho the same should not have been settled by Act of Assembly . . . ." Lyttelton believed that the merchants really wanted foreign vessels to come and go without permits, passes, or inspection, and that, above all else, they wanted freedom from the restraints imposed by the Navigation Acts. Lyttelton to Conway, March 13, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

On the matter of specie scarcity after the war, see p. 220 of this essay. Also see Long, History, I, 561-77 for a discussion of the coin shortage as a recurrent problem in Jamaica.

[24]See, for examples, Andrews, Colonial Background of the American Revolution, 134, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution (New York: 1918), 65-74. This view tends to slight the fact that Virginia's House of Burgesses passed the first important resolutions against the Stamp Act.

[25]See pp. 21-26, 31-39 of this essay.

[26]See pp. 68-69 of this essay.

[27]Daniel Dulany, "Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies for the Purpose of Raising a Revenue," Bernard Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1776 (2 vols., Cambridge: 1965) I, 628-29.

[28]Only one section of the law discriminated in favor of the West Indian islands. Those colonies were exempted from the 6d. duty on "any bond for securing the payment of any sum of money, not exceeding ten pounds sterling . . . ." This obligation devolved only upon "the British colonies and plantations upon the continent of America, the islands belonging thereto, and the Bermuda and Bahama Islands . . . ." Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 38.

[29]Ibid., 38.

[30]Ibid., 39.

[31]Ibid., 39-40.

[32]Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 274-75.

[33]See Lyttelton to Halifax, December 11, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, VI; also, Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 80.

[34]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 80.

[35]Lyttelton to Halifax, December 11, 1764, C.O. Papers 137:61, VI.

[36]"A List of All Instruments made use of in Public Transactions Law Proceedings, Grants, Conveyances, Securities of Land or Money within the Island of Jamaica," C.O. Papers 137:61, VI.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid. For the Perpetual Revenue measure of 1728 see again p. 233 of this essay.

[39]Lyttelton sent the report as an accompaniment to his letter to Halifax, December 11, 1764. Why he waited nearly two months before dispatching it is unclear.

[40]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 79.

[41]For Beckford see again p. 67 of this essay.

[42]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis,

[43]Ibid., 61, 74.

[44]Ibid., 88.

[45]Ibid., 92. For more on Rose Fuller see again p. 280 n. 91.

[46]Stephen Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence of the Assembly of Jamaica, March 18, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 89.

[47]Fuller to the Council and Assembly of Jamaica, February 7, 1765, ibid., I, 66.

[48]On February 2, 1765, colonial agents Benjamin Franklin, Richard Jackson, and Charles Garth, together with Jared Ingersoll, called on Grenville in a fruitless effort to secure the minister's agreement to allow "the several colonies . . . to lay the Tax themselves." It was during this conference that Grenville did not reveal how much reve-

nue was to be raised in toto or from each of the colonies but, astonishingly, asked the agents for this data. Jared Ingersoll to Thomas Fitch, February 11, 1765, Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 33; Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 89-91.

It is not clear from the records if the meeting Fuller attended on February 2 was the meeting which selected the delegation to meet with Grenville or if it was a meeting held afterward to hear the four agents report on what happened in the minister's office.

[49]Fuller to the Council and Assembly of Jamaica, February 7, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 66.

[50]Ibid., 66.

[51]Ibid., 66.

[52]Ibid., 66.

[53]Ibid., 66.

[54]Ibid., 66.

[55]Ibid., 66.

[56]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 89. The preliminary resolves consisted of re-reading the resolutions of March, 1764, which asserted that Parliament had the authority to tax the colonies and that stamp duties constituted a proper exercise of that authority. Grenville also moved that the House consider implementing these declarations. Ibid., 89; Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 92.

[57]Quoted in Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 91.

[58]Quoted in ibid., 91.

[59]Quoted in ibid., 91.

[60]Jared Ingersoll to Thomas Fitch, February 11, 1765, Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 31. Lawrence Henry Gipson wrote that "only one member of the House of Commons, Alderman William Beckford, returned from London but with great interests in Jamaica, consistently affirmed both in 1765 and 1766 that Parliament lacked the authority." The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 388. Professor Thomas suggests that this may be an exag-

geration and that Beckford merely articulated the colonial view concerning Parliament's taxing authority, not his own. Colonials listening to the debates, according to Thomas, misunderstood this. British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 93.

[61]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 94; Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 91.

[62]Quoted in Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 91-92.

[63]See ibid., 92-93; Jared Ingersoll to Thomas Fitch, February 11, 1765, Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 31; Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 94.

[64]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 92.

[65]Quoted in David Hawke, The Colonial Experience (Indianapolis: 1966), 537.

[66]Fuller to the Council and Assembly of Jamaica, February 7, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 65.

[67]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 93; Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 94.

[68]Fuller to the Council and Assembly of Jamaica, February 7, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 65.

[69]Quoted in Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 93.

[70]Fuller to the Council and Assembly of Jamaica, February 7, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 65.

[71]Ibid., I, 66-67.

[72]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence of the Assembly of Jamaica, February 10, 1765, ibid., I, 68.

[73]Ibid., I, 68.

[74]Ibid., I, 68.

[75]Ibid., 68.

[76]Ibid., 68; Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence of Jamaica, February 16, 1765, ibid., I, 69.

[77]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence of the Assembly of Jamaica, February 10 and 16, 1765, ibid., I, 68, 70.

[78]Other colonial petitions against the Stamp Act also avoided the constitutional question. Agent Charles Garth, for example, in his petition on behalf of South Carolina, objected to the tax on the ground of expediency, not right. These evasions emanated from the knowledge that Parliament would reject any petition which denied its authority to tax the colonies. Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 95.

[79]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 16, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 72.

[80]Ibid., I, 87-88.

[81]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 10, 1765, ibid., I, 68.

[82]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 16, 1765, ibid., I, 69.

[83]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 10, 1765, ibid., I, 68.

[84]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 94; Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 94.

[85]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 16, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 70.

[86]Ibid., I, 70.

[87]Ibid., I, 70.

[88]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, March 18, 1765, ibid., I, 89.

[89]Ibid., I, 89.

[90]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 16, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 70.

[91]Ibid., I, 70.

[92]Ibid., I, 70.

[93]Ibid., I, 70.

[94]Ibid., I, 70-71.

[95]Ibid., I, 70-71.

[96]Ibid., I, 71.

[97]Ibid., I, 71.

[98]Ibid., I, 71.

[99]Ibid., I, 71.

[100]Ibid., I, 71.

[101]Fuller Letter Books, I, 88; also, Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 16, 1765, ibid., I, 73-76. Those who signed the petition were: Beeston Long, Robert Scott, Marmaduke Hilton, Vincent Biscoe, Thomas Fuller, Stephen Fuller, Richard Beckford, Thomas Collett, David Evans, Thomas Vassall, Thomas Stoner, John Gray, William Beckford, John Morse, Nathaniel Bayly, John Ewer, George Chandler, John Currie, Andrew Seton, John Vernon, Duncan Davidson, John Shakespeare, William Innis, Isidore Lynch, Allen Nesbitt, and John Serocold(?).

[102]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 10, 1765, ibid., I, 68.

[103]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 94; Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 94.

[104]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 16, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 72; Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 94. Professor Morgan does not mention the Jamaica petition in the Stamp Act Crisis.

[105]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 94.

[106]Ibid., 94.

[107]Ibid., 94.

[108]General Conway's speech in the House of Commons, February 15, 1765, Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 34.

[109]Ibid., 34-35. Conway went on to assert that the petitions sent directly from the colonies should be heard. He maintained that the House rule regarding petitions against money bills was not so inflexible that it could not be departed from, that it was absurd to maintain that the colonies were virtually represented in Parliament, and that Parliament need not fear challenges to its authority as a result of the petitions because the petitions themselves implied Parliamentary authority over the colonies. Ibid., 35.

[110]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 16, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 72; Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 94. Professor Thomas maintains that Rose Fuller changed sides after withdrawing the Jamaica petition because "he was presumably influenced by the implicit challenge to Parliament." Ibid., 96. The contention, however, is unsupported. If Fuller, in fact, changed sides, the reason more likely was different from what Thomas contends. After all, the Jamaica petition avoided the question of Parliament's right to tax the colony. Rather, Fuller probably realized that his petition had no hope of being heard, particularly after Conway's address, and that pressing the matter further could only irritate the ministry. Rose Fuller was certainly aware of his brother's conversation with Grenville and probably did not want to jeopardize whatever chance there was of Jamaica's receiving relief in the area of rum duties. He may even have appeared to shift ground in order to keep that possibility alive.

Horace Walpole, it might be noted, incorrectly wrote that the House voted down hearing the Jamaica petition: "The House ill-relishing opposition to a tax which was not to fall on themselves, the petition was rejected." Horace Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, Sir Denis Le Marchant, ed., (4 vols., London: 1845), II, 78.

[111]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 95; Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 95-96.

[112]Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, February 16, 1765, Fuller Letter Books, I, 72.

[113]Ibid., I, 73-76.

[114]Fuller to George Grenville, February 22, 1765, ibid., I, 80-84. Fuller urged reducing much of the discretionary authority enjoyed by customs officers, but, in general, his recommendations were innocuous.

[115]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 96.

[116]Ibid., 98.

[117]Ibid., 98.

[118]Ibid., 98.

CHAPTER IX

OBSTRUCTION OF THE STAMP ACT IN JAMAICA

Mercy Otis Warren was almost alone among contemporaries in appreciating North American-West Indian solidarity during the Stamp Act crisis. "Several of the West India islands," she wrote, "shewed equal violence, in the destruction of the Stamp papers, disgust at the act, and indignation towards the officers who were bold enough to attempt its execution. Nor did they at this period," she added, "appear less determined to resist the operation of all unconstitutional mandates, than the generous planters of the southern, or the independent spirits of the northern colonies."[1] Mrs. Warren may not have had Jamaica in mind when she composed those sentences, but that island not only opposed passage of the Stamp Act but obstructed its implementation within the province and helped secure its repeal.

Jamaica's Stamp Distributor

Once the friends and agents of the British colonies in America failed to block passage of the Stamp Act, active opposition shifted to the provinces. In the thirteen mainland colonies peaceful and lawful opposition gave way to outright resistance, and in one provincial capital after another intimidated stamp distributors resigned. As a con-

sequence, the stamped papers were never distributed, the taxes never collected. The North Americans, in effect, nullified the law.

What made this chain of events possible was, as Professor Morgan has pointed out, Grenville's appointment of native colonials to the stamp distributorships.[2] This conciliatory policy backfired. Since the distributors had their families, property, and careers in the provinces, Grenville's gesture merely gave "the colonists," as Professor Morgan put it, "a lever by which to pry them loose from their positions."[3] The tax men, susceptible to various pressures, had to bow to the demands of public opinion. "If the stamp masters had been Englishmen," Professor Morgan concluded, "strangers to the country, with no property or interests invested in it, they could have withstood the pressure of the populace much longer."[4]

Jamaica's stamp distributor, Dr. John Howell, was the exception which proved the rule. Unlike his North American counterparts, he was not a native colonial. He secured his position as a result of circumstances and events which, dating back to the Seven Years' War, deprived George Grenville of full freedom in selecting Jamaica's distributor.[5] Howell, a ranking army doctor, served five years in Germany where he became a close friend of Count Lippe, a grandson of George I and the sovereign of the tiny principality of Buckebourgh. When Spain entered the war in 1762 and threatened Portugal, Lippe took command of the Iberian

nation's defense and secured Dr. Howell's transfer to the new war zone. In Portugal Howell held two positions, Inspector of Regimental Infirmaries and Surgeon to the Commander-in-Chief. In these capacities he widened his circle of influential acquaintances, cultivating the friendships of Lord Blayney, Lord Townshend, and George Gordon Lenox, the Duke of Richmond. By far the most important of Howell's new friends was George Augustus, the Prince of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, brother-in-law and confidant of King George III. When Mecklenburg collapsed from illness at the end of the war, Howell took charge of the Prince's medical care and returned with him to London. The doctor remained away from his post for several months, and, as a result, he forfeited half of his salary.[6]

Not being a man of independent means, Howell, who had a family to support, sought Mecklenburg's assistance. After recovering, the Prince intervened on his friend's behalf by going directly to the source of the patronage power, the royal family. He brought Howell's plight to Queen Charlotte's and then to the King's attention.[7] Mecklenburg's influence eventually resulted in Howell's securing two important positions in the colonial service. On June 13, 1765, Dr. Howell received a royal warrant naming him Jamaica's stamp distributor.[8] In addition, three weeks later, on July 2, Howell received a patent making him Jamaica's provost marshal.[9] By the middle of that month he, his wife, and his children were sailing for Kingston.

When Governor Lyttelton took the oath to uphold the Stamp Act on September 17, both the stamped paper and its distributor were on the island.[10] By that time, since news of anti-Stamp Act disturbances had spread quickly throughout the colonies, Jamaicans were aware of the kinds of pressure North Americans had brought to bear on their stamp distributors in order to force their resignations. The question is: did John Howell experience similar pressure as November 1, 1765, approached? According to the doctor's own testimony, he did. Howell, for example, later reported to Secretary of State Conway that he initially undertook his work as stamp distributor "in opposition to repeated threats of violence Torrents of personal abuse and many other very disagreeable circumstances I had to contend with."[11] Many of his friends on the island, he wrote, including Governor Lyttelton, "know how cruelly I've been treated."[12] Howell's very commission as stamp distributor was not officially recorded among the patents filed at Spanish Town.[13]

But Howell, unlike his counterparts in the mainland colonies, refused to be intimidated and driven from office. He bore the pressure, and, he said, "these [tactics] were subdued in the end, and the disposal of the stamps effected . . . ."[14] Three factors account for Howell's maintaining his position in the face of opposition similar to that which had forced other distributors to quit. First, of course, was his status as a newcomer to Jamaica. Howell had no property or long established business which could become

the hostage of anti-Stamp Act individuals or groups. Secondly, Howell's setting up office in Spanish Town, seventeen long, hot miles from Kingston, kept him out of the immediate reach of that city's mercantile community. Distance very likely diluted whatever pressure came from the commercial quarter. Lastly, Howell's authority as provost marshal included the power to arrest, a power no North American distributor enjoyed. Although this authority did not become effective until late in December, the distributor's forthcoming police power may well have deterred excessive lawlessness against execution of the Stamp Act.

No evidence indicates that there were any groups in Jamaica similar to the Loyal Nine or the Sons of Liberty. The identities of those who threatened Howell remain a mystery, and, as a result, whether they acted individually or in concert cannot be ascertained. Nevertheless, one thing is clear. Whoever they were, those who tried to pressure Howell into resigning aimed at nullifying the Stamp Act. Their failure raises an interesting but unanswerable question. Had nullification rather than other matters been the island's first order of business, how long would the several advantages Howell enjoyed have protected him? To ask the same question in another way, had Jamaicans mobilized themselves against the Stamp Act in the same way they did against Governor Lyttelton's stand on privilege, what would Howell's fate have been?

Tax Avoidance and Evasion in Jamaica

The failure of nullification, however, did not result in full colonial compliance with the law. The islanders, for example, welcomed and traded with North American vessels which eventually cleared mainland ports with unstamped papers. Although these ships arrived at Jamaica illegally, local officials and merchants treated them as if their documents were all in order and allowed business to proceed as usual. The islanders probably pursued this policy out of necessity as much as anything else. John Watts, a New York merchant, understood and summed up the problem a place like Jamaica faced if it refused to deal with ships sailing under unstamped cockets and clearances. Three weeks after the Stamp Act became effective Watts wrote that "at present Nothing is done in the Commercial Way, the Stamps cannot possibly be distributed, & if Vessels should be permitted by this & the other government's [sic] to go without them, tis uncertain what Treatment they may receive abroad, & yet go they must at all Hazards, or Ireland must be without its necessary Supply of Seed, the West Indies without their Food, His Majesty's Fleets & Garrisons without their Supplys etc etc."[15] Jamaica, like many other places, bowed to the demands of survival and cooperated with those who broke the law. Even Professor Morgan recognizes this as non-compliance of a sort.[16]

Jamaica also obstructed implementation of the Stamp Act in other ways. John Howell informed Secretary of State

Conway in 1766 that although the tax law raised £4,000 in the island, the sum would have been greater "had not the people conceived a repeal of the law as unavoidable which they inferred from the conduct of the N. Americans . . . for in consequence of the supposed repeal the publick business was impeded."[17] Howell, of course, was in a position to know, but what precisely did he mean? How did the Stamp Act affect Jamaica's "publick business?"

During the months the stamp duties were in effect, Jamaicans avoided the taxes by reducing the volume of various legal activities, in some areas to the point of total boycott, by resorting to practices of dubious legality, and, occasionally, by outright evasion of payment.

All these patterns of obstruction affected the operations of the Court of Ordinary. This court, presided over by Jamaica's Governor, served as the island's probate court. It proved wills, of course, but bore responsibilities in related matters as well. The Ordinary Court, for example, oversaw and validated appointments to executorship. It issued letters testamentary to persons designated by will to such positions. The court exercised similar authority when persons died intestate. In this circumstance it assigned executors by granting letters of administration. Matters were rarely as simple as they seemed, however. Executorships designated by will, not to mention the wills themselves, were often contested. Moreover, when nomination of an executor rested with the court, there were usually sev-

eral aspirants to the position. To settle these controversies the Ordinary Court, before granting letters testamentary or of administration, summoned, by special citation, disputants to formal hearings at which the rival parties presented their cases. The court could hardly fulfill any of these responsibilities properly unless it assessed the real and personal property of deceased individuals. This, accordingly, was one of the court's duties also. To meet this obligation it issued warrants of appraisement to parish officials, usually Justices of the Peace but sometimes vestrymen, requiring them to list and evaluate the property holdings of the recently deceased. After local officers compiled these inventories, they filed them with the court.

The Stamp Act taxed all the documents the Court of Ordinary used in performing its several functions: wills, letters testamentary, and letters of administration at 10s.; citations, warrants of appraisement, and inventories of wills at 1s.; and official copies of both probates and inventories at 6d.[18] But Jamaicans did not consistently pay these duties. Indeed, the reverse was true.

Wills, which were probated in Jamaica before and after the Stamp Act became effective, illustrate colonial avoidance of the Parliamentary taxes. In August, 1765, the Court of Ordinary probated seven wills and in September, ten.[19] In October, as collection of the stamp duties drew near, the court grew busier; it probated sixteen. Interestingly, seven of these, or nearly half, were verified on Oc-

tober 31, the very eve of the Stamp Act's effectiveness.[20] This pattern at least suggests that some colonials made an eleventh hour effort to bring probate proceedings to a close in time to avoid the 10s. tax.

This last minute rush on the court, it seems, was unnecessary. The Court of Ordinary, it turned out, proved wills drawn up on unstamped paper while the Parliamentary law was in effect. Nor did the court require that official copies of the probates be written on unstamped paper. On November 12, for example, it probated Richard Biddle's will, but this document did not bear a 10s. stamp.[21] Four other wills probated during the remainder of the month also lacked stamps.[22] The court's business remained light in December. It probated only four locally written wills, those of George Spark of Kingston, Edward White of Vere, Robert Latchwood of St. Elizabeth, and Edward Redwell of St. Thomas in the East. None of these bore stamps.[23] A fifth will, proven by the court on December 31, belonged to Henry Royle, an absentee. This document portrayed a 10s. stamp, but the tax had been paid in England.[24] In January, 1766, the Court of Ordinary acted on nine local wills, including that of Norwood Witter, the late militia commander. None of these documents was stamped.[25] The court also approved the wills of two absentees, John Brereton and Charles Nassau, but the 10s. stamps portrayed on these testaments had been secured in England.[26] The court's activities in February followed the same pattern. Seven wills were probated, but only one of these, an

absentee's, bore a 10s. stamp. That duty, of course, had been paid in England.[27]

In March the court grew busier. It acted upon seventeen wills. None of them bore stamps.[28] Two, however, merit attention. One was Henry Goulburn's. Goulburn had been in New York in 1765 and had revised his will while there.[29] The new document, of course, not only required the signatures of New York witnesses, but also, for its probation in Jamaica, those of island witnesses as well. Governor Lyttelton, as presiding judge in the Ordinary Court, issued a non-compulsory summons formally soliciting witnesses to swear that the new will was indeed Goulburn's.[30] Under the law this document required a 1s. stamp, and in this instance the tax was paid.[31] The other March will of special interest is Richard Crutchor's. This St. Elizabeth resident had appointed Thomas Brooks, a parish neighbor, guardian of his estate. But in a formal declaration attached to the probated will Brooks refused the responsibility.[32] The Stamp Act taxed such renunciations 1s., and, in fact, the disclaimer, unlike the will itself, portrays a stamp revealing that Brooks paid the duty.[33]

The Court of Ordinary's work declined in April. That month it proved only a half dozen wills, none of them stamped.[34] One of the six, however, deserves comment. The court issued a non-compulsory summons for witnesses to verify the will of Francis Brown. As in Henry Goulburn's case the month before, this solicitation bore a 1s. stamp as the

Parliamentary law required.[35]

After May 1, of course, stamps became unnecessary as a result of Parliament's repeal of the tax. But throughout the period the law was in effect, Jamaica had not used stamps for will probates. Between November 1, 1765, and May 1, 1766, the Court of Ordinary approved fifty-one wills. Four of these, the testaments of absentees, bore 10s. stamps paid for in England. The other forty-seven, all wills of resident colonials, bore no stamps at all. The court simply acknowledged all wills which had been drawn up before November 1, 1765, but not probated until after that date, as valid, even though they had not been rewritten on stamped paper. This practice was of dubious legality. Moreover, the requirement that copies of such probates be transcribed on paper bearing a 6d. stamp was also ignored. Yet summonses emanating from the court during those months bore stamps, as did Thomas Brooks's renunciation of a guardianship.

Other documents issued directly by the Court also bore stamps. The citations which summoned claimants in cases of disputed executorships to special hearings constitute a case in point. Such directives handed down by Governor Lyttelton after November 1, 1765, bore the appropriate embossment.[36] But, interestingly, after April 3, 1766, the court ceased using stamped paper for these citations.[37] Why it did remains unclear, but this represented an early termination of the tax.

In any event, despite the citations issued by the

court, no letters testamentary were granted while the Stamp Act was in effect.[38] A gap exists in the records between October 31, 1765, and May 22, 1766; it indicates that during those months no colonial accepted an executorship under such latters.[39] Jamaicans evidently believed that such appointments were not worth the 10s. tax the stamp law required. In fact, there seems to have been a last minute rush by potential executors to validate their positions before the new law became effective. In October, 1765, Governor Lyttelton issued ten letters testamentary, six of them on the last day of the month.[40]

If Jamaicans boycotted letters testamentary in order to avoid the stamp tax, they also boycotted letters of administration for the same reason. The Court of Ordinary issued no such certificates between October 31, 1765, and May 22, 1766.[41] A comparable gap exists nowhere else in these records.[42] Apparently would-be executors, preferring to avoid the 10s. stamp duty, did not apply for certification of their positions. Indeed, they too hurried to court before the Parliamentary tax became effective. During the first four weeks of October, 1765, the Court of Ordinary awarded six letters of administration; on the last day of the month it awarded five.[43]

What pattern, if any, characterizes colonial compliance and non-compliance with the law? Legal processes, it seems, which the Court of Ordinary initiated, conformed to the requirements of the Stamp Act (although the early cessa-

tion of stamps on citations remains inexplicable). On the other hand, those legal processes which depended upon citizen action either ceased or circumvented the law. In the latter category the court appears to have acquiesced, as in the case of will probates. Writs of appraisement issued by the Court of Ordinary and the estate inventories drawn up and filed at Spanish Town in response to them followed this pattern. Inventories filed at Spanish Town in reply to writs issued before November 1, 1765, fall into two categories: those registered before and those registered after the Stamp Act became effective.[44] Some parish officials apparently rushed to report their inventories before the tax fell due. In October, 1765, a total of sixteen were filed, all of them in the final week of the month. Indeed, the court processed seven on October 31.[45] But local officers who failed to beat the November 1 deadline found, probably to their surprise, that they could register inventories without stamps. A total of twenty-seven unstamped inventories were filed at Spanish Town between November 1 and December 31, 1765.[46] These registrations, of course, were of dubious legality.

Naturally, the Court of Ordinary continued issuing writs of appraisement after November 1. All these documents bore Parliamentary stamps.[47] But, significantly, parish officials did not register inventories in response to these stamped directives until after the Stamp Act had been repealed. None appears among the records until June 1,

1766.[48] In short, Jamaicans simply never paid the tax the Stamp Act imposed on will inventories.

Jamaican obstruction of the stamp law, however, was neither total nor uniform. Several areas of the island's "publick business" reveal partial compliance.

The colony's "Act for Preventing of Frauds and Breaches of Trust by Attornies or Agents of Persons Absent from the Island; and by Trustees, Guardians, Executors, and Administrators acting for and on behalf of Minors and Others" required those managing the property of absentees and minors to declare annual estate proceeds in affidavits sworn before the Chief Justice of their respective parishes. The law also required the filing of copies among the public records at Spanish Town.[49] Estate attorneys and administrators upon whom these obligations fell evidently could fulfill them at any time--the affidavits bear dates from January through December of any given year--but they most commonly registered copies at the capital when it was most convenient--in March before the planting season or in November after the harvest or "cropover" time.[50] The affidavits, variously called "Accounts Produce" or "Crop Accounts," as well as official copies of them, bore a 1s. duty under the Stamp Act.[51]

In the year preceding the Stamp Act 118 "Crop Accounts" were recorded at Spanish Town. Table 9A reveals the monthly incidence of registration during that period.

TABLE 9A

CROP ACCOUNT REGISTRATIONS AT SPANISH TOWN, NOVEMBER 1764--OCTOBER 1765

Month	Year	Number
November	1764	27
December	"	1
January	1765	3
February	"	3
March	"	59
April	"	5
May	"	3
June	"	4
July	"	0
August	"	2
September	"	6
October	"	5
Total		118

Source: Crop Accounts, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, vol. 4, 78-126.

The table reveals that in November, 1764, and in March, 1765, many of those upon whom "Crop Account" obligations fell visited the capital to register their affidavits and, perhaps, to take care of other business as well.

The Stamp Act, however, disrupted routine. In November, 1765, not one "Crop Account" was recorded at Spanish Town.[52] The interruption in registration lasted until December 2 when the "proceeds" of James Irwin's Iron Shore and Hartfield estates in St. James were recorded without stamps. The managers of the respective properties, however, had sworn the original affidavits before Justice William Barnett on July 25, more than three months before the Parliamentary tax became due.[53] Two other "Crop Accounts" registered at

Spanish Town in December followed this pattern: one for Bogue estate, filed December 6, lacked a stamp but had been sworn on October 2; the other, for Spring Garden, filed December 10, also lacked a stamp but had been sworn on July 1.[54] The post-November 1 registration of unstamped copies of "Crop Account" affidavits sworn before the Stamp Act became effective continued into January, 1766. Such a document for Venture estate, signed under oath by James Murray on September 1, 1765, was registered untaxed on January 2.[55] Another "proceeds" affidavit, sworn by Richard White for Philip Haughton's property as long before as July, 1760, was officially recorded without a stamp on January 9.[56]

The pattern resembles that which charcterized will inventories: documents drawn before but not officially recorded until after November 1, 1765, went unstamped. But the similarity between "Crop Accounts" and will inventories ends there. While parish officials declined to file inventories until after the Stamp Act was repealed, estate personnel upon whom "Crop Account" obligations fell failed to hold out against the tax. In February, 1766, plantation managers and attorneys began turning up at Spanish Town with affidavits sworn after November 1. That month six such "Crop Accounts" were registered at the colonial capital, and each bore a 1s. stamp.[57] In March the Keeper of Records found himself processing the large number of affidavits customarily presented during that month of the year. Fifty-one "Crop Accounts" were recorded, each had been sworn after No-

vember 1, 1765, and each displayed a 1s. stamp.[58] In April another sixteen were registered, all but three of them sworn after November 1. All but those three were stamped.[59]

Jamaicans, in other words, ultimately complied with the Stamp Act as it pertained to "Crop Accounts." At first they apparently avoided going to Spanish Town to record them. In December the colonial government began registering official but unstamped copies of such documents sworn before November 1. But, finally, the islanders paid stamp duties on these affidavits. Why they did remains unclear, but the answer probably rests in the fact that swearing and recording these affidavits, unlike the filing of will inventories, were not matters that could be legally postponed until after the Stamp Act was repealed. Legal tax avoidance, in short, was not possible regarding "Crop Accounts."

Nevertheless, "Crop Account" records reveal an inexplicable instance of outright tax evasion. On December 21, 1765, John Kinlock, Arthur Forrest's attorney, appeared before William Lewis, Chief Judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Westmoreland, and swore a "Crop Account" affidavit for the Captain's properties in Westmoreland and St. Elizabeth. On the same occasion, because he was the executor of Charles Mitchell's estate in Westmoreland, Kinlock swore to the proceeds of that property also.[60] Neither document was drawn up on stamped paper, however, nor was either taxed when officially copied among the records at Spanish Town on January 10, 1766.[61]

If Jamaicans sought to avoid the stamp taxes due on "Crop Accounts" but in the end generally paid them, they manifested a similar lack of resolution in other areas of the public business. Slave manumissions illustrate the point. Although the colony frowned upon and officially discouraged private emancipations, islanders occasionally freed slaves as a reward for years of loyal service, in exchange for a money payment, or, often enough, as a consequence of paternity.[62] Three steps secured legal manumission. First, a master drew up and signed a document of freesom; secondly, he presented it to a parish judge for verification and signature; and, thirdly, he filed an official copy among the records at Spanish Town. (Presumably, both manumitter and manumittee retained copies of their own.) A slave manumission constituted, in effect, a deed because it conveyed property ownership from one individual to another. Jamaica's local stamp law had taxed these documents; so did Parliament's 1765 enactment. The latter legislation imposed a duty of 2s. 6d. if the manumission were in exchange for a cash payment (ie., a bill of sale) and 2s. if it were a simple "grant" of freedom.[63]

The records of Jamaican slave manumissions are available for examination at the Jamaica Archives in Spanish Town.[64] Although some volumes are deteriorating, all are legible. Yet one peculiar problem these documents present warrants mention. Very often the registration of manumissions occurred many years after the grant or sale was made

and validated by a district judge. Negligence upon the part of "generous" masters probably accounted for this situation. In any case, a "jumbled" chronology characterizes the records. The registrations, however, unlike the manumissions themselves, follow one another in sequence and permit analysis of Jamaican attitudes toward the Stamp Act.

Table 9B reveals the monthly incidence of slave manumissions recorded at the colonial capital the year before the Stamp Act became effective.

TABLE 9B

SLAVE MANUMISSIONS REGISTERED AT SPANISH TOWN, NOVEMBER 1764--OCTOBER 1765

Month	Year	Number
November	1764	18
December	"	12
January	1765	7
February	"	5
March	"	13
April	"	1
May	"	14
June	"	17
July	"	5
August	"	10
September	"	12
October	"	39
Total		153

Source: Manumissions of Slaves, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, vol. 8, 99-196.

The table suggests that the imminence of the Stamp Act drew manumitters to the capital to file their documents before the tax became due. Thirty-nine manumissions, more than twice the highest total of any of the preceding eleven

months, were recorded at Spanish Town in October, 1765.[65] Indeed, the October figure represents more than 25 per cent of all the registrations made between November 1, 1764, and November 1, 1765. Moreover, the daily incidence of registrations in October (Table 9C) underscores Jamaican anxiety over the impending stamp tax. More slave manumissions were filed at the colonial capital the day before the Stamp Act became effective than in any of the preceding eleven months.

TABLE 9C

SLAVE MANUMISSIONS REGISTERED, OCTOBER, 1765

Day	Number
October 8	1
" 9	1
" 14	1
" 21	1
" 24	2
" 29	7
" 30	2
" 31	24
Total	39

Source: Manumissions of Slaves, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, vol. 8, 141, 174-96.

Jamaicans may have avoided the stamp taxes on slave manumissions, but they also complied with the law, at least in part, after November 1, 1765. Table 9D lists all slave manumissions registered at Spanish Town while the Stamp Act was in effect and indicates whether the appropriate duty was paid.

TABLE 9D

SLAVE MANUMISSIONS REGISTERED AT SPANISH TOWN, NOVEMBER 1, 1765--APRIL 30, 1766

Date of Registration	Master	Slave	Date Signed	Date witnessed	Tax
11-20-65	Joseph Haden	Nancy	9-10-63	9-12-63	2/6
11-25-65	Henry Archbould	John	11-25-65	11-25-65	2/-
11-25-65	Peter Gerard	Aba	11- 8-65	11-23-65	2/6
11-26-65	Ph. Livingston	James	8-13-65	9-28-65	2/-
11-26-65	Sarah Morris	Bessy	11- 2-65	11-25-65	2/-
11-30-65	Edward Long	John	10-28-65	10-29-65	---
12- 2-65	William Bolt	Nancy	10-30-65	10-30-65	---
12- 6-65	Jane Rodon	Ann Berry	10- 5-65	10- 8-65	---
12- 7-65	Thomas Rose	Matthew	1-21-62	11-23-65	2/6
12-19-65	John Watson	Bunny	10-12-65	10-29-65	---
12-20-65	Thomas Anderson	Venus	10-14-65	10-22-65	---
1-13-66	Moses Almeyda	Prue & Children	1- 4-66	1-13-66	---
1-15-66	William Perrin	Peter	1- 4-66	1-11-66	2/6
1-16-66	John Thompson	Pegg	7- 3-65	7-10-65	---
1-18-66	Prudence Hewes	Elizabeth	10-21-65	10-30-65	---
1-27-66	Adam Tinling	Celia	10-20-63	10-26-65	--a
2-15-66	Benjamin Allen	Grace	4-25-65	4-26-65	---
2-18-66	Edward Hughes	Toby	5-28-65	2- 3-65[b]	---
3- 6-66	John Williams	Cuffee	9-25-65	10-30-65	---
3- 5-66	Charles Dawes	Mimba	1-13-66	1-15-66	2/6

[a]But this document did bear a local Jamaican stamp.

[b]The mistaken date order is in the original.

TABLE 9D--CONTINUED

Date of Registration	Master	Slave	Date Signed	Date witnessed	Tax
3- 7-66	John Holland	Patience	2- 1-66	3- 1-66	2/6
3- 4-66	Mary Wright	John Hart	7-16-61	1- 3-66	2/6[c]
3-11-66	Ann MacKenzie	Judy	2-20-66	2-20-66	2/6
3-22-66	Andrew Hasty	Mary Burke	3- 2-66	3-22-66	2/6
3-24-66	Daniel Pereira	Lucy	7-24-65	10-11-65	---
3-27-66	George Smith	Sabina	7- 4-63	3-24-66	--[d]
4-15-66	Joseph DeLara	Fidelia & Mary Wilkinson	11-22-65	11-25-65	2/3[e]
4-21-66	Robert Thwaites	Hannah	3-22-66	3-22-66	2/6
4-21-66	Richard Middleton	Nancy	3-22-66	3-22-66	2/6
4-28-66	James Bees	Hannah	1-18-66	4-26-66	2/6
4-29-66	John Ireland	Sally	4- 5-66	4- 9-66	2/6
4-30-66	Thomas Bradley	Nancy	5-28-60	1-30-65	---

Source: Manumissions of Slaves, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, vol. 8, 177, 196-217.

Table 9D reveals significant data. Between Novem-

[c]This document also bore a local Jamaican stamp.

[d]But this document did bear a local Jamaican stamp.

[e]Why this document bore a 2s. 3d. stamp is a mystery.

ber 1, 1765, and April 30, 1766, thirty-two manumissions were recorded at Spanish Town, a total less than that of October, 1765. More interestingly, fifteen, or nearly 47 per cent of the documents, were registered on unstamped paper, violating that provision of the Parliamentary law which taxed "any register, entry, or enrollment of any grant, deed, or other instrument whatsoever . . . ."[66] Thirteen of the unstamped registrations conformed to the pattern already noted for will inventories and "Crop Accounts." Drawn up and countersigned by a judge before November 1, they were evidently simply accepted by the Keeper of Records.

Two unstamped manumissions, however, illustrate flagrant tax evasion. Moses Almeyda freed Prue and her children on January 4, 1766, and secured judicial validation of the document nine days later. Although the Stamp Act was in effect, Almeyda did not compose the manumission on embossed paper, nor did he pay a duty when he registered a copy of it on January 13. George Smith of Kingston somehow evaded the stamp tax also. He had emancipated Sabina on July 4, 1763, but did not obtain legal verification of the manumission until March 24, 1766. Smith, however, failed to rewrite the grant of freedom on stamped paper as the Parliamentary law required. Instead, he merely presented the original draft which, in fact, bore an old, local Jamaican stamp. Nor did Smith pay a duty when he recorded the manumission at Spanish Town on March 27, 1766.

What about manumissions granted while the Stamp Act was in effect but not registered until after the law's repeal? It is in answering this question that the failure of many manumitters to register their papers promptly poses a problem. Some may have filed manumissions from the Stamp Act era in 1770, 1775, or 1780. Only an exhaustive study of the many volumes of archival records would provide complete information. Yet some slaveholders were responsible enough to record manumissions within a year or two of the grant of freedom. As a result, at least a sample of private emancipations awarded during the Stamp Act era but registered after repeal can be analyzed.

Table 9E reveals that fourteen manumissions signed, witnessed, or both during the Stamp Act era were registered at Spanish Town in the two years following the law's repeal. Twelve of them bore stamps. An interesting case is Richard Bowen's 1755 manumission of Bessy and Rachael. Bowen, a Hanover resident, evidently rewrote a decade old document on stamped paper when he finally secured the countersignature of a judge in February, 1766. Why Bowen paid a shilling or 6d. more than he should have, however, is unclear.

While Table 9E indicates general compliance with the Stamp Act, it also reveals two instances of tax evasion. Abraham DeLeon of Kingston manumitted Anthony on January 15, 1766. Although DeLeon should have utilized stamped paper, he did not. The same was true of Robert Anderson of St. James. Anderson freed Susanna on February 1, 1766, but did

not compose the manumission on the taxed paper which the Stamp Act required.

TABLE 9E

SAMPLE OF MANUMISSIONS DRAWN UP AND/OR WITNESSED DURING THE STAMP ACT ERA BUT REGISTERED AFTER REPEAL

Date of Registration	Master	Slave	Date Signed	Date witnessed	Tax
5-13-66	Abraham DeLeon	Anthony	5- 1-66	1-15-66[a]	---
5-17-66	Jane Stockton	Devonshire	4-25-66	5- 8-66	2/6
5-27-66	Susanna Ketch	Sappho	3-27-66	4-16-66	5/-[b]
8- 4-66	Edward Woolery	Balberina	4-18-66	5- 3-66	2/6
8- 6-66	Christopher Crooks	Cubah	2- 7-66	3- 4-66	2/6
9- 4-66	Richard Bowen	Bessy & Rachael	2- 3-55	2-11-66	3/-[c]
10-11-66	Robert Foster	Quashy	3-22-66	3-31-66	2/-
12- 5-66	John Demetres	Olive	4-30-66	11-17-66	2/6
12- 5-66	John Demetres	Nelly & James	4-30-66	11-17-66	2/6
12-10-66	Robert Anderson	Susanna	2- 1-66	6-28-66	---
1- 9-67	Dugald Malcolm	Sally & Bess	3- 8-66	12- 8-66	2/6

[a]These dates appear in the original but, for whatever reason, are mistakenly reversed.

[b]Why Ketch paid a 5s. tax is unclear.

[c]Why Bowen paid a 3s. tax is unclear.

TABLE 9E--CONTINUED

Date of Registration	Master	Slave	Date Signed	Date witnessed	Tax
4- 4-67	Charles Gordon	Sally	12-14-65	3-31-67	2/6
1-12-68	James Stirling	Tidy	5-10-66[d]	12- 5-67	2/6
3- 3-68	William Harris	Bessy	3- 7-66	3-19-66	2/6

Source: Manumissions of Slaves, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, vol. 8, 196-97, 216-17; vol. 9, 1-85.

The records of slave manumissions indicate that Jamaicans first sought to avoid the stamp tax but then complied, although in a less than total fashion, with the law. Letters patent issued during the Stamp Act period illustrate similar colonial reluctance to pay the Parliamentary duty. The provincial government awarded patents for several purposes: public office, naturalization, church livings, and land.[67] Like manumissions, patents required registration at Spanish Town. Ordinarily, patentees recorded their grants at the time they received them or shortly afterward. The colonists' diligence in this matter, as contrasted with their negligence in filing slave manumissions, probably stemmed from the desire to validate fully and promptly their

[d]Strictly speaking, this document lies beyond the sample. Tidy became free after repeal of the tax. Yet the paper bears a stamp, probably because it was purchased before news of the repeal reached the island.

titles.

The patents the colonial government most commonly issued were for land.[68] The Stamp Act, it will be remembered, taxed Jamaican land grants at 3, 4, or 5s., depending upon the size of the plot.[69] But patentees, it seems, were less than happy with the prospect of paying these sums. Table 9F suggests that they made a last minute effort to secure their titles before November 1, 1765.

TABLE 9F

PATENTS REGISTERED AT SPANISH TOWN, NOVEMBER 1764--OCTOBER 1765

Month	Year	Number
November	1764	8
December	"	17
January	1765	8
February	"	4
March	"	19
April	"	2
May	"	0
June	"	11
July	"	6
August	"	6
September	"	8
October	"	24
Total		113

Source: Patents, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, Liber 31, 1-70.

More than 20 per cent of all patents recorded between October 31, 1764, and November 1, 1765, were enrolled in the month before the Stamp Act became effective. Four were registered on October 19, another four on October 21, three on October 29, ten on October 30, and three on Octo-

ber 31.[70]

Business at the patent office declined after the Stamp Act went into effect. If twenty-four patents were recorded in October, 1765, only as many were enrolled between November 1, 1765, and May 1, 1766. Indeed, these two dozen were less than half those registered during the corresponding six-month period the year before.[71]

TABLE 9G

PATENTS REGISTERED AT SPANISH TOWN, NOVEMBER 1, 1765--MAY 1, 1766

Date of Registration	Patentee	Tax
11-22-65	John Osborn	5/-
11-25-65	Hugh McMillan	---
11-26-65	George Hall	5/-
11-26-65	Rooke Clarke	5/-
12- 5-65	Hugh Monro	5/-
12- 5-65	Thomas Wistness	5/-
12- 5-65	John Cuniffe	5/-
12-14-65	Robert Gray	5/-
1-17-66	Richard Brisset	5/-
1-17-66	John Millword	5/-
1-17-66	Edward Cairns	5/-
1-17-66	Rebecca Hilton	5/-
1-20-66	James Blackwell	---
3-13-66	James Thompson	5/-
3-13-66	George Speid	5/-
3-14-66	Peter Scott	5/-
3-14-66	Peter Scott	5/-
3-14-66	Thomas Gally	5/-
3-18-66	William Murray	2/6
4- 3-66	James Turner	5/-
4- 3-66	James Turner	5/-
4-20-66	William Shields	5/-
4-24-66	Matthew Gregory	5/-
4-28-66	John Schickle	5/-

Source: Patents, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, Liber 31, 71-86.

Table 9G reveals two oddities. Three-hundred acre grants to Hugh McMillan and James Blackwell did not bear stamps, most likely because the patents, unlike the others, were issued before November 1. Yet other areas of Jamaican legal activity present problems which are not so easily explained.

Jamaica's Grand Court had jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. Since the stamp taxes applied only to documents in civil cases, the Grand Court required both stamped and unstamped paper to fulfill its responsibilities. The court, in fact, met in November, 1765, just after the Stamp Act became effective.[72] Nonetheless, the court rendered no judgments until March, 1766, and no judgments emanating from the court after that date bore stamps, regardless of the nature of the case.[73] Perhaps the court had heard rumors concerning repeal of the tax and simply postponed determinations until it felt it was safe to proceed without stamps.

The Grand Court, however, certainly utilized stamps in certain areas of business: in issuing writs of extent, for example.[74] These orders authorized Jamaica's provost marshal to possess land and dwellings when one party in a legal dispute failed to pay court-awarded damages to another. Ordinarily, this drastic action occurred only after an effort to provide compensation with goods and chattels had failed. Although the provost marshal executed the writ, he did not assess confiscated property nor determine final set-

tlement. Twelve "good and lawful" freeholders of the district performed these functions.[75] But after implementing the writ the provost marshal filed an official report with the court that its order had been executed. Under the Stamp Act both the writs and the marshal's reports bore taxes: the one, a shilling; the other, a shilling and 6d.[76]

During the months the Stamp Act was in effect the Grand Court handed down twelve writs of extent.[77] Two, issued in November, 1765, devolved upon James Elmslie, John Howell's predecessor as provost marshal. Both were stamped, as were Elmslie's reports. But the other ten became the responsibility of the stamp distributor who assumed the marshal's office in December. All but one of these writs, as well as the reports in reply to them, bore stamps. The exception, the first writ of extent John Howell executed, was issued by the court in February, 1766, on behalf of Hugh Mackay of St. Mary against John M'Anuff of St. Anne.[78] Interestingly, the court's order was not the only untaxed document in this case. Howell's official report was also unstamped.[79]

These papers are as remarkable as they are inexplicable. They constitute the most striking oddities among all Jamaica's records from the Stamp Act era. In executing the writ and in filing his report to the court, the island's stamp distributor, who, one would expect, would have utilized stamped paper as a matter of course, ignored the very tax it was his job to collect.

The Jamaica Archives at Spanish Town contains various private as well as public records. Among the former are the papers of the Tweedie estate in St. Anne. This collection reveals another instance of stamp tax evasion in Jamaica. An indenture entered into between Thomas Murphy of St. Mary and Rook Clarke of St. Anne, dated January 24, 1766, and registered at Spanish Town March 3, 1766, did not bear the 2s. 6d. tax the Stamp Act required.[80] The agreement, of course, had no legal standing, but apparently nobody cared.

In summary, Jamaican colonials did not dutifully acquiesce in the Stamp Act. Instead, they harassed the stamp distributor and tried to make him resign. Although nullification failed, many islanders avoided the taxes by securing various legal documents before the Parliamentary law became effective or by postponing their acquisition until after the act was repealed. Moreover, local authorities respected the validity of documents filed at Spanish Town after November 1, 1765, even though some documents and official copies of them required stamps. Jamaicans did their best to avoid and sometimes to evade Parliament's taxes.[81]

Repeal

If Jamaicans opposed enactment of the stamp law and avoided and sometimes evaded obligations under it, they also actively fought for the measure's repeal.

Parliament's retreat in 1766 is, of course, a famil-

iar story.[82] Responsibility for dealing with the colonial crisis devolved upon the Marquis of Rockingham whose ministry succeeded Grenville's. But what could be done? Political problems complicated the new minister's task from the beginning. American denials of Parliament's right to tax the provinces and the violence which had nullified the Stamp Act in several colonies outraged many members of both the Lords and the Commons. Under this circumstance no ministry would have found repealing the Stamp Act easy, but for Rockingham's government it was an especially difficult assignment. The Marquis enjoyed only weak support in Parliament, and William Pitt, whose immeasurable prestige could have done much to overcome this difficulty, refused to join the administration. Knowledgeable observers felt certain that Rockingham's government could not last very long and that the American crisis might well bring it down.

But Rockingham was resourceful. To secure support for the Stamp Act's repeal he looked beyond Parliament and enlisted the aid of the mercantile community. Led by Barlow Trecothick, a former Bostonian, the merchant class bombarded Parliament with petitions for repeal, arguing that the American boycott threatened domestic firms with bankruptcy and, consequently, endangered the economic health of the kingdom.[83] The commercial lobby proved especially formidable because, as Professor Morgan has pointed out, merchants trading with North America and those trading with the Caribbean islands stood firmly together on the repeal ques-

tion.[84]

Jamaica's "friends" in London actively supported repeal of the Stamp Act. William Beckford, for example, took part in the campaign. When Parliament met in December, 1765, the diarist James Harris noted that Beckford still questioned England's right to tax the colonies.[85] According to Henry Seymour Conway, the Alderman was one of those who "distinguish'd" himself speaking against the opposition's motion to lay the American papers concerning the Stamp Act before Parliament.[86] In January, 1766, the wealthy Jamaican absentee favored rescinding the order to print the American papers.[87]

Beckford was not the only "friend" of Jamaica promoting repeal. On February 11, 1766, Stephen Fuller, acting on Jamaica's behalf, submitted an anti-Stamp Act petition to the House of Commons.[88] But, unlike the year before, in 1766 the colonial agent did not become the most influential of the island's defenders. Instead, his brother emerged as the most effective Jamaica-connected proponent of repealing Parliament's taxes. Rose Fuller was Chairman of the Committee of the Whole dealing with the American crisis. Although the Chairmanship required non-partisanship, he nevertheless used his position to advance the cause of repeal.[89] He made sure, for example, that his brother's petition received a hearing.[90] Again, when opposition witnesses were to be heard, he instead called upon two Jamaica planters--James Carr and James Irwin--to testify. These

gentlemen reviewed the island's economic difficulties, described the burdensome impact of Jamaica's earlier local stamp law, and predicted that the Parliamentary tax would ruin the colony unless rescinded.[91] Fuller was not only partial but adroit. According to Lawrence Henry Gipson, this friend of Jamaica was chiefly responsible for guiding the controversial resolutions for the Stamp Act's repeal through the House of Commons.[92]

The campaign to repeal the colonial tax finally succeeded on March 18, 1766. That same day Stephen Fuller wrote Governor Lyttelton the news.[93] Jamaica's chief executive received confirmation of the agent's report from ministerial sources somewhat later. On April 10 Secretary of State Conway sent a circular letter to the Governors of Jamaica, Barbados, Grenada, and the Bahamas. "I am glad to find," he wrote, "there have been no disturbances in your government on this occasion; and I am confident," he added, "[that] I need not point out to you the behavior, which it becomes the colonies to use at this time, or the arguments which you ought to employ to enforce the necessity of such behavior in the present situation of things."[94] Colonial gloating over Parliament's retreat, in other words, would be ill-received in London and play into the hands of the Grenville faction which had opposed repeal. Parliament should hear humble expressions of gratitude, not shouts of self-congratulation, from the provinces. Accordingly, the Secretary reminded the Governors how lenient and

indulgent Parliament had been during the recent crisis and expressed his belief that imperial tranquility had been restored.[95] Copies of the Declaratory Act and the act repealing the stamp tax accompanied the circular letter.

The repeal gratified Jamaican settlers. North American newspapers reported that the islanders celebrated the event as enthusiastically as the mainlanders.[96] Even Governor Lyttelton was pleased. He understood from Stephen Fuller that once "the business of the Stamp Act was over in Parliament the state of the political divisions subsisting here" would be laid before the ministry in order "that some course might be taken to reestablish Harmony in the colony . . . ."[97] Lyttelton especially hoped that "when it shall appear . . . what measures the Parliament shall have thought fit to pursue in its present session concerning the government and pretensions of His Majesty's American Dominions in general, the difficulties which obstruct the settlement of the Peace of this Island in particular may perhaps in good measure be removed."[98]

John Howell seemed the only man in Jamaica distressed by the stamp law's repeal. It cost him one of his jobs and, accordingly, part of his income. Recalling that he had served well as Jamaica's stamp master, and pointing out that he needed more money to support his family, Howell appealed to Secretary Conway for compensation for "the loss I sustain by the repeal of the Stamp Law."[99]

NOTES

[1]Mercy Otis Warren, History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American Revolution (3 vols., New York: 1970), I, 29.

[2]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 198.

[3]Ibid., 198.

[4]Ibid., 198.

[5]It should be remembered that in 1765 Grenville and George III were at odds over patronage questions. Indeed, by the time that many of the stamp distributors had been nominated, the King and his minister were embroiled over the regency issue which ultimately toppled Grenville from power. Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 115-19.

[6]John Howell to Henry Seymour Conway, May 31, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 277.

[9]This appointment did not become effective until December 24, 1765. Technically, Howell secured this post from James Hayes, Jamaica's deputy provost marshal who was living in England and who supposedly acted in behalf of Provost Marshal Richard Neville, who was also living in England. Hayes, an absentee deputy, therefore relied on a deputy of his own in Jamaica, James Elmslie. Elmslie's indenture did not expire until December 24, 1765.

On July 2, 1765, however, Hayes formally surrendered his post to "John Howell now of Albemarle Street in the parish of St. George, Hanover Square in the County of Middlesex." James Hayes to John Howell, July 2, 1765, Patents, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, Liber 31, 29.

The office of provost marshal in Jamaica was a post often deputed to others. For the deputy and the office-holder it was a lucrative job. Both earned fees for vari-

ous functions. Moreover, they were empowered to seize slaves for debt and earn profits off the forced sales. For a discussion of the provost marshal's role in Jamaica, see Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 373-74.

[10]Council Minutes, IV, September 17, 1765.

[11]John Howell to Henry Seymour Conway, May 31, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Patents, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, Libers 29-31. Despite the thoroughness of these records Howell's commission as stamp distributor is not among them.

[14]John Howell to Henry Seymour Conway, May 31, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[15]John Watts to General Monckton, November 22, 1765, Letter Book of John Watts, 404.

[16]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 215-16.

[17]John Howell to Henry Seymour Conway, May 31, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[18]Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 36-38.

[19]Will Probates, Island Record Office, Spanish Town, XXXVI, 11-18, 44. Special thanks go to the staff of the Island Record Office for making volume XXXVI, despite its deteriorating condition, available for examination. Also see in vol. XXXVI pp. 19-26, 35.

[20]Ibid., XXXVI, 26-36.

[21]Ibid., XXXVI, 36.

[22]Ibid., XXXVI, 37-38. These were: Joseph Pope of Kingston, November 21; Isaac Stanton of St. Thomas in the East, November 22; Daniel Fleming of St. Andrew, November 28; and Isaac Harris of Kingston, November 28.

[23]Ibid., XXXVI, 39-40, 45.

[24]Ibid., XXXVI, 44.

[25]Ibid., XXXVI, 41-43, 61-64. The other eight were: Jonathan Allan of St. Elizabeth, January 14; Joseph Wright of Vere, January 16; Samuel Ewers of St. Catherine, January 16; Edward Thomas of St. Catherine, January 23; Richard Burrell of Kingston, January 23; Daniel McDead of Kingston, January 23; and William Powell of St. Thomas in the Vale, January 30.

[26]Ibid., XXXVI, 47.

[27]Ibid., XXXVI, 48, 67-74. The absentee was John Hay. His will was probated February 22. The others were: Bernard Senior of Westmoreland, February 6; John Ross of Kingston, Jeremiah Collins of St. Catherine, and John Granger of Kingston, all February 20; William Robson of St. Elizabeth, February 22; and Israel Clark of St. James, February 15.

[28]These were the wills of: Charles Carow of Westmoreland and George Cameron of St. Elizabeth, March 1, 1766; Elizabeth Fisher of St. Catherine, Patrick Conochor of Westmoreland, and Duncan McDonald of St. Ann, March 6, 1766; Edward Gaboudon of St. Ann, March 12, 1766; William Forbes of Kingston and Henry Wyatt of Kingston, March 13, 1766; Richard Crutchor of St. Elizabeth, March 18, 1766; Samuel Tenners of Vere, Joseph Waite of St. George, William Matthews of St. Catherine, Hector Munro of St. Thomas in the East, Edward Goulburn of Vere and Henry Goulburn of Vere, and Henry Strawbridge whose residence is not clear from the document, March 20, 1766; William Cook of Westmoreland, March 27, 1766. Ibid., XXXVI, 78-85.

[29]See Collections of the New-York Historical Society for 1897 (New York: 1898), vol. 30, 422-23.

[30]Lyttelton's declaration accompanies Goulburn's will among the probate records. Will Probates, XXXVI, 85.

[31]Ibid., XXXVI, 85; Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 37.

[32]Will Probates, XXXVI, 81-82.

[33]Ibid., XXXVI, 82; Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 36.

[34]Will Probates, XXXVI, 87-94. These six were: Robert Whitfinch of St. Thomas in the East, April 1; Robert Camden of St. James, April 7; James Child of Kingston, Francis Brown of St. Catherine, George Warsfold of Kingston, and David Henriques of Kingston, all April 17.

[35]Ibid., XXXVI, 88.

[36]Records of the Court of Ordinary--Citations, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, I. The first volume in this collection covers the years 1764-1772.

[37]Ibid., I.

[38]Letters Testamentary, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, XX, 87-88.

[39]Ibid., XX, 87-88.

[40]Ibid., XX, 78-87. In September Lyttelton issued thirteen and in August, eleven. Ibid., XX, 55-77.

The number of letters testamentary issued during the preceding year provides a striking contrast to that of the Stamp Act era. In October, 1764, the court issued one, in November, nine, and in December, fourteen. In January, 1765, it awarded eighteen, in February, ten, and in March, eleven. Ibid., XIX, 165-231.

[41]Letters of Administration, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, XIII.

[42]Ibid. Perusal of these volumes reveals that the court issued letters of administration regularly and frequently the year round.

[43]Ibid., XIII.

[44]The writs of appraisement are included among Inventories of Wills, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, XXXXV, Microfilm.

[45]Ibid., XXXXV, 164-182.

[46]Ibid., XXXXV, 188-212.

[47]Ibid., XXXXVI, 1ff.

[48]Ibid., XXXXVI, 1ff.

[49]Central Government File, I. R. O., Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, 4.

[50]Crop Accounts, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, 99 vols.

[51]Central Government File, I. R. O., 4; Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 37.

[52]Crop Accounts, IV, 126.

[53]Ibid., IV, 126.

[54]Ibid., IV, 126.

[55]Ibid., IV, 128.

[56]Ibid., IV, 128-29.

[57]Ibid., IV, 130-31.

[58]Ibid., IV, 127, 131-51.

[59]Ibid., IV, 151-57.

[60]Ibid., IV, 129.

[61]Ibid., IV, 129.

[62]Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 90-92; Smith, "The Legal Status of Jamaican Slaves Before the Anti-Slavery Movement," 297-99.

[63]Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 40.

[64]Manumissions of Slaves, 70 vols., Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town.

[65]Ibid., VIII, 141, 174-96.

[66]Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 40.

[67]Central Government File, I. R. O., 1.

[68]See Patents, Libers 30-31. Also see p. 19 of this essay.

[69]See p. 336 of this essay.

[70]Patents, Liber 31, 27, 31, 59-70.

[71]See Table 6F. Between October 31, 1764, and May 1, 1765, fifty-eight patents were registered.

It is interesting to note that in May, 1766, following repeal of the Parliamentary tax, business at the Patent Office revived. Thirteen grants were registered that month. More interestingly, eight of them bore stamps. This seems to indicate that patentees had already secured stamped paper and, having paid the tax, simply went ahead and used the paper. The other five, recorded on the last day in May, bore no Parliamentary stamps. Patents, Liber XXXI, 83, 87-88, 89-94.

[72]Hurry Books of the Grand Court, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, IV, November, 1765.

[73]Grand Court Judgments, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, Liber 143, 1766.

[74]Writs of Extent, 13 vols., Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town.

[75]Central Government File, I. R. O., 19.

[76]Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution, 36-37.

[77]Writs of Extent, I.

[78]Hugh Mackay vs. John M'Anuff, February, 1766, ibid., I.

[79]Ibid., I.

[80]Indenture between Thomas Murphy and Rook Clarke, January 24, 1766, Tweedie Estate Records, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town.

[81]These judgments, of course, are drawn from the foregoing material. The only body of evidence in Jamaica which this writer was unable to explore is the large collection of deeds (855 volumes) stored at the Island Record Office at Spanish Town. Deeds were taxed at various rates under Grenville's measure, and it would be interesting to know if land was exchanged during the Stamp Act era, if stamps were commonly used, and if there were a last minute rush to avoid the tax in October, 1765. However, the deeds are not filed chronologically, and, as a result, examination of the pertinent deeds entailed time and expense which this writer could not afford.

[82]For analysis of the repeal movement see Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 327-52 and especially Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 185-252.

[83]Barlow Trecothick wrote Rockingham on the likely consequences of the North American refusal to use stamps. He pointed out that "our sugar islands will be deprived of their usual supplies of provisions lumber etc and perhaps be disabled from sending home their produce or even subsisting their slaves. The British merchants will have little or no chance of remittances . . . these accumulated disappointments must prove fatal to many of the British merchants trading to America . . . a total stop must be put to all purchase of manufactures for a country whence no returns can be expected: from this state it naturally and unavoidably follows, that an exceedingly great number of manufactures are soon to be without employ and of course without bread!" Quoted in Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 144-45.

[84]Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 330-31; see also Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 187-88. This alliance, of course, was especially effective because the administration favored repeal.

[85]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 156 n. 3.

[86]Henry Seymour Conway to George III, December 19, 1765, Sir John Fortescue, ed., The Correspondence of King George III (6 vols., London: 1967), I, 205.

[87]Ibid., I, 236.

[88]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 217, 226.

[89]Walpole, Memoirs, II, 300; also Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 226.

[90]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 226.

[91]Ibid., 226.

[92]Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 396.

[93]Stephen Fuller to Governor Lyttelton, March 18, 1766, Council Journals, IV.

[94]Henry Seymour Conway to the Governors of Jamaica, Barbados, Grenada, and the Bahamas, April 10, 1766, C. O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Whitson, "The Outlook of the Continental American Colonies on the British West Indies," 82.

[97]Lyttelton to Henry Seymour Conway, May 12, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[98]Ibid.

[99]John Howell to Henry Seymour Conway, May 12, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION: TOWARD LOYALISM IN 1776

The Triumph of the Jamaica Assembly

The repeal of the Stamp Act did not render John Howell poverty-stricken. He retained his commission as provost marshal and served in that capacity for another two years.[1] Governor Lyttelton was not so lucky. In the months following his dissolution of the Assembly his political problems worsened. In addition to maintaining government without public appropriations, Lyttelton had to defend himself against charges of irresponsibility during the recent slave uprising in St. Mary. Moreover, he learned that he was out of favor with the Rockingham ministry. Not only did rumors concerning corruption in his administration embarrass him at Whitehall, but even his professional performance drew fire from London.[2] As early as September, 1765, Secretary of State Conway wrote Lyttelton curtly: "As I do not find in my office any communication from you on the subject of your disputes on the affair of privilege, and as you will have rec^{d}, thro other channels, the proper answers and instructions upon this head, I shall trouble you no further on it than to say, that, being so much a matter of state I should have thought it not improper some advice had been re-

ceived thereof in our Department."[3] All this took its toll on the Governor. By early 1766 both the strain and a bout with tropical illness reduced his once stately and self-assured signature to a light and shaky series of scratches.[4] As a consequence, shortly after the slave violence in St. Mary, Lyttelton, citing reasons of health, applied for a year's leave of absence.[5] Under the circumstances the request amounted to a resignation. On February 25, 1766, the Privy Council approved the application, and within three weeks Secretary Conway sent Lyttelton official permission to return home.[6]

While awaiting confirmation of his leave, Lyttelton tried to put the machinery of government back into order so that his successor would assume the duties of the Governorship under politically viable circumstances. An Order in Council of November 29, 1765, had given the chief executive discretionary authority to summon an Assembly, and on March 26, 1766, Lyttelton exercised it. He ordered writs of election issued for an Assembly "returnable" May 13.[7] But the day before the newly elected House was to convene, the Governor abruptly prorogued it on the ground that "the sentiments and disposition of those who will have the greatest weight in the Assembly . . . would not do the public business and proceed with that temper to points of privilege . . . ."[8] Within ten days of the prorogation Lyttelton received the Secretary of State's permission to leave Jamaica.[9] Conway used the occasion to describe Whitehall's hopes

concerning the political stalemate in Jamaica. "It is much wished," the Secretary wrote, "that such a temper prevailed as that some mode of conciliation could be suggested there, without the interference of government, & since unfortunately it could not, or has not hitherto been effected, His Maj^{y} hopes that the measures taken in regard to the payment of the troops, with such other steps as your own prudence has suggested, have prevented any publick disasters flowing from this unfortunate difference."[10] In any event, the task of reconciliation and the burden of keeping the public peace now devolved upon someone other than Lyttelton.[11]

If Lyttelton was bitter, he concealed it. He saw his departure as another obligation to the Crown. "I would, "by no means make use of the permission His Majesty has been pleased in his great goodness to give me to return home from a regard to my health or any other consideration did I conceive that I might . . . advance his service by remaining longer here."[12] Even as he prepared to leave Jamaica Lyttelton continued working hard to ease the burden on his successor, Lieutenant Governor Roger Hope Elletson. He met with his Councillors and other influential islanders to devise strategies by which they and Elletson might induce the new Assembly, which was expected to meet after Lyttelton had gone, to forgo the question of privilege and resume the public business.[13] He gave Elletson his instructions and allowed him to read recent communications from London. The Lieutenant Governor learned that he was "to find some method

whereby the Honor and dignity of the Crown might be preserved, and the matter [of privilege] adjusted to the public satisfaction" without Whitehall's interference.[14] Lyttelton was confident that this could be done. Aware that personalities often aggravate political problems, he expected that the situation would improve as soon as he relinquished authority. "Those men," he wrote, "may consent to do business with Mr. Elletson who would have made a point of perservering in their opposition while the administration continued in my hands from a resentment of the conduct I have esteem'd it my duty to hold in relation to the pretensions of the assembly . . . . I have determined to leave the island sooner on that account . . . ."[15] On June 2 William Henry Lyttelton and his family left Jamaica.[16]

Lyttelton's assessment of the situation had merit. The thirty-nine years old Elletson, master of Hope estate in St. Andrew, was a former Assemblyman.[17] Jamaican legislators undoubtedly preferred dealing with a native colonial than with an "outsider." Elletson himself tried hard to appear conciliatory. For example, shortly after assuming authority on June 3, he offered the city of Kingston free use of water at his nearby Hope plantation.[18] Moreover, he summoned the Assembly to meet at Spanish Town on June 24.[19]

In his first address to the House Elletson asked that the "late unhappy differences" be forgotten, reminded the members that only unity and hard work could remedy the island's problems, and appealed for the passage of desper-

ately needed money bills.[20] But the Assembly was in no mood to forget, much less to forgive. On June 26 it ordered George Ramsay, Registrar of the Court of Chancery, to surrender "the record of a determination of William Henry Lyttelton . . . upon the writs of habeas corpus granted by him" in the Cooke-M'Neil case.[21] The next day it formally responded to Elletson's opening message. Although cordial with the Lieutenant Governor, the Assembly notified him that it would not drop the privilege issue. The House attributed all responsibility for the problems of the preceding eighteen months to Lyttelton's "rapacious and unconstitutional conduct."[22] It blamed the ex-Governor for the sad state of the Spanish trade from which "alone our supplies of currency have been . . . obtained."[23] It denounced Lyttelton's dissolutions of the Assembly and accused the former chief executive of accepting illegal fees and engaging in various "other scandalous extortions."[24]

Events moved quickly forward. On June 28 George Ramsay gave the Assembly the hated chancery decision and various papers relating to it.[25] Three days later, after a committee had reviewed the records, House members adopted twelve resolutions defending their rights and privileges as Englishmen, defining the Court of Chancery as an institution with no authority over the Assembly, and declaring the determination of December 21, 1764, "to be vacated, cancelled, and rendered void and damned, to all intents and purposes."[26] The Assembly petitioned Lieutenant Governor El-

letson to void the chancery decision too. It urged him to obliterate it "in such a way, that no traces may remain of so wicked and dangerous a precedent."[27] A joint nullification, the Assembly believed, would vindicate "the honour and dignity of this house, and the rights, liberties, and privileges of the people" and would defend the island against "the dangerous and unconstitutional doctrine which the said record is calculated to inculcate."[28]

Elletson received the Assembly's petition on July 2. The next forty-eight hours were tense.[29] The Council, with which Elletson conferred, insisted that Governor Lyttelton had upheld the laws of England by freeing Cooke and M'Neil and urged the Lieutenant Governor not to yield to pressure.[30] But Elletson knew, as he wrote Secretary of State Conway a few days later, that unless he accepted the proposal ". . . from the temper of people without doors, I could hardly entertain hopes that the business of the country would be quietly dispatched . . . ."[31] At length the Council agreed with Elletson and advised him to issue a necatur nullifying the chancery decision of December, 1764.[32] Accordingly, on July 4, 1766, Lieutenant Governor Elletson declared that "the said determination and entry thereof amongst the records of the court of Chancery is unprecedented and irregular . . . and it is hereby ordered and adjudged and decreed that the said determination & all and every other proceedings upon which the same is founded be vacated and made void."[33]

Elletson, of course, did not know how his capitulation to the Assembly would be received in London, and he tried hard to put the best possible appearance on the outcome of the affair. As if the result had been a victory for the royal prerogative, he wrote Stephen Fuller: "We have at last got rid of our stumbling block privilege."[34] Yet the matter troubled the Lieutenant Governor, and not until several months passed did he receive the assurance he wanted. Jamaica's agent in London wrote him that it was "with singular pleasure I reflect upon your having taken the only step in my opinion to restore peace & harmony to the Island, & that you took that step on the Advice of your Council who recommend it as the Only Expedient that will be effectual to quiet the minds of the People."[35] Most importantly, Fuller informed him that Whitehall intended to let the Jamaican situation rest:

> I have very little doubt of your being justified in every part of your conduct upon this occasion [and] from several conferences I had with Gen[l] Conway I found it as much wished for by the Administration that Matters might be made up in the Island, without their being put to the trouble of determining upon points pregnant with innumerable & almost insuperable difficulties. From whence, I conclude, and I think with some reason, that the present administration will let the matter sleep, rather than throw the whole Island again into fresh Distractions, & themselves into a complication of distinctions of so very great nicety, that after all it is impossible to draw the line, & ever will be so.[36]

Elletson, indeed, had little to worry about. True, he had capitulated to the Jamaica Assembly, but, in fact, so too had the King and his Council. Although the Lieutenant Governor did not know it, on June 18, sixteen days before

the nullification of the chancery decision, the Privy Council issued an addendum to Article XIII of the Governor's instructions. This order modified the earlier rule by permitting privilege with regard to property necessary for an Assemblyman's accommodation during as well as six days before and after a legislative session. The new directive said:

> . . . in consequence of several extraordinary resolutions and proceedings of the House of Representatives in our island of Jamaica touching their privileges . . . it is our will and pleasure that, in addition to the privileges already allowed to the members of our council and assembly in our said island by our general instructions to you, there be allowed to every member of the said council and assembly respectively during the sitting of the general assembly and for six days before the meeting of such an assembly and for the like number of days after an adjournment, prorogation, or dissolution of such assembly a further privilege from arrests in all civil suits for such servants and equipage only as are absolutely necessary for the personal accommodation of the said members in attending their respective duties in general assembly.[37]

On July 5 Stephen Fuller sent the substance of the new instruction to Jamaica.[38] In November the Assembly learned officially that its views on Parliamentary privilege had been upheld.[39]

The successful nullification of Lyttelton's chancery decision and the Privy Council's new instruction concerning privilege constituted an unqualified double victory for the Jamaica Assembly. Legislators gloated over their triumph. One anonymously published The Privileges of the Island of Jamaica Vindicated, a one-sided and self-serving account of the colony's recent troubles.[40] The pamphlet characterized the struggle over privilege as a contest between Assemblymen mindful of the public welfare and a Governor scornful of the

people's liberties. It first recalled the harmony with which the Assembly had undertaken its work in 1764. "There was scarcely a debate, nor anything that looked like party in the house."[41] Ignoring the Assembly's displeasure over the Honduras Bay expedition and the way the lawmakers amended the Additional Duty bill for the 36th Regiment, the tract asserted that "business was in great forwardness on the 8th of December . . . ."[42] But then John Olyphant's horses were seized, and the Vere Assemblyman contended that the action violated his privileges as a lawmaker. According to the author, this claim annoyed many House members because it was already late in the session and they wanted to conclude work and go home. But they yielded "to enquire, whether the privilege in question was such, as every member had a constitutional right to. Upon this occasion, the ablest lawyers in the house were consulted . . . from [whom] it did appear, to the conviction of every man in the house, that the privilege, claimed by Mr. Olyphant, was a lawful and constitutional right."[43] The legislators, the pamphlet maintained, had never intended to spark a bitter controversy by ordering the arrests of Cooke and M'Neil. In fact, according to the author, several Assemblymen had even advised the prisoners to explain that the seizure of the horses had not been meant as an insult to the legislature's honor and authority and to petition the House for their freedom. But "this easy method of getting released was declined, and so low was the assembly held . . . that

they did not attempt to make any application for their liberty to the house, but applied in the first instance to the chancellor for an Habeas Corpus."[44] Governor Lyttelton also insulted the House by granting the writs instead of advising Cooke and M'Neil to petition the legislature. As a result, "the Assembly found themselves . . . called upon by an indispensable duty, to assert their rights and vindicate their jurisdiction."[45] The House, in a "calm, orderly, and moderate manner," adopted resolutions defending its honor and its authority.[46] This noble act, however, led to its dissolution.

The pamphlet denied House responsibility for whatever privation the regular troops endured as a result of the conflict. The essay reminded readers that in December, 1764, the Assembly had passed a bill providing additional salary to the 36th Regiment. The Governor and Council, however, had objected to the terms of payment, and, consequently, the measure failed passage.[47] Accordingly, William Henry Lyttelton and his advisers, not the Assembly, bore responsibility for the army's misfortunes. The pamphlet even implied that the former Governor had acted illegally in that matter:

> There is no maxim better known or established in our constitution, than that the people by their representatives, have the sole right of raising and applying money in what proportions and in what modes they think proper; the other two branches of the legislature, having only a bare negative or affirmative, without any right of proposing or making alterations to a money bill. The governor could, therefore, have no constitutional right, of objecting to the aforesaid bill for subsisting the troops . . . .[48]

No aspect of The Privileges of the Island of Jamaica Vindicated distorted the record as much as the section dealing with the brief March, 1765, legislative session. The writer omitted altogether the fact that the Assembly's "petition" to Lyttelton constituted an ultimatum demanding him to obliterate his December decision in chancery. Rather, the pamphleteer maintained that the House had merely sought the customary Parliamentary privileges and had been dissolved by the Governor for this innocent action. Indeed, the essay also insisted that in August, 1765, the younger Charles Price had declined to request the usual privileges without the Assembly's approval and that Governor Lyttelton had unjustly punished the entire House for the action of the Speaker.[49] "The reader will observe," the pamphlet said, "that two assemblies were thus dissolved, for asserting their liberties and vindicating their violated jurisdiction."[50]

The Assembly not only justified itself in print, but it vengefully attacked old opponents as well. One target was Pierce Cooke, Secretary to the Receiver General and one of the defendants in the Olyphant case. On June 27, the day the House replied to Elletson's opening address, the lawmakers voted to investigate whether the revenue raised under Jamaica's "late Stamp Act" had been properly accounted to the public.[51] The purpose was clear. Cooke had been in charge of the funds the local law had generated. A committee began examining the accounts and a month later reported

that they were £5,000 in arears. (Total receipts had been £31,000.) It accused Cooke of embezzling the money. Since rumor had it that the Deputy Receiver was planning to leave the island, the committee advised that he be detained.[52]

But Cooke was small fry. The Assembly's chief target was William Henry Lyttelton. In August, 1766, the House finally began hearing testimony concerning the charges it itself had leveled against the former Governor on June 27. Edward Long, chairman of the committee investigating Lyttelton's conduct, served, in effect, as a prosecuting attorney in a kangaroo court.[53] Witnesses testified that the former chief executive and his secretary, William Langham, had demanded and shared various illegal fees. For example, the holder of a royal commission worth £100 per annum swore that he had had to pay Lyttelton £9 10s. and Langham £4 15s. for the warrant's renewal. Similar testimony supported the accusation, first leveled in 1762, that Lyttelton's greed had obstructed the raising of black regiments for the Havana campaign. One witness maintained that he had applied to lead such a unit but found that Lyttelton wanted £250 and Langham £50 for approval of the commission.[55] Another swore the commission entailed a payment of £1,000.[56] Other testimony indicated that the Lyttelton administration had, as a result of corruption, caused the post-war depression. Kingston merchants informed the House of bribery within the customs service and attributed Jamaica's money shortage to these exactions.[57]

The charges against Lyttelton went beyond corruption. They included negligence of duty as well as unjustifiable uses of executive power. Richard Ellis, a lieutenant at Fort Haldane in Port Maria, gave information which portrayed the ex-Governor as irresponsible. He testified that at the time of the recent uprising in St. Mary the number of men on duty at the fort "did not exceed eighteen able to march."[58] Others testified to the broad power Lyttelton had wielded. The former Governor, it was said, had tried to intimidate Spanish Town printers to prevent publication of the Assembly's resolutions of December, 1764.[59] Lyttelton, others swore, had detained Spanish ships in Jamaican harbors during peacetime.[60] Lastly, the ex-Governor had applied for "power to draw upon the treasury" to subsist the troops. "Unhappily for us," Long's committee reported, "his application in this respect met with too much success."[61]

In the committee's judgment, greed had motivated Lyttelton from the beginning. "Almost immediately after [his] arrival, it was perceived, that the acquisition of wealth was his Chief object."[62] But the popular Assembly had constituted a restraint upon and an obstacle to his acquisitiveness. Lyttelton, as a consequence, had sought arbitrary power.[63] He had seized upon the Cooke-M'Neil affair in order to determine how far he could go in subverting traditional rights and freedoms. The Governor's attacks upon liberty constituted, in the committee's view, his worst offense:

> All was insufficient to attach him [Lyttelton] to the real interest of the country, or prevent him from pursuing his schemes for debasing and abolishing assemblies, and subverting our liberties; and it will appear, that he industriously went out of his way, to lay hold of an occasion which he thought presented itself, for invading the rights of the assembly, disputing their most ancient and established powers and jurisdiction in cases of privilege, and rendering them contemptible and useless.[64]

The Assembly had impeached Lyttelton in absentia and found him guilty on all counts.

Free Ports

In 1766 Jamaicans had much to be jubilant about. The Assembly had scored a complete victory over the royal prerogative, and the island had rid itself of a detested Governor. In addition, the Stamp Act had been repealed. But these developments constituted only a part of the good news the colony received that year. Jamaica, it turned out, benefitted from Parliamentary legislation which, among other results, restored the island's economic and financial well-being.

It is often maintained that the North American non-importation agreements of 1765-1766 imposed such severe economic hardships on the mother country that the boycott accounted for the Stamp Act's repeal. But, in fact, the decline in British trade with North America antedated the colonial crisis.[65] The revitalization of that commerce, therefore, required more than repeal of the stamp duties. Many on both sides of the Atlantic believed that once the problems caused by the Stamp Act had been resolved, the

Rockingham ministry would pursue programs aimed at restoring imperial prosperity. Modification of the 1764 Sugar Act, for example, seemed likely. Henry Cruger, Jr., predicted that the 3d. per gallon duty on foreign molasses entering the colonies would be reduced. From Bristol he wrote:

> The Parliament have not yet done any thing about the Sugar Act and other destructive restraints on your trade. It will come as soon as ever the Stamp Act is settled. I imagine they will rescind all the restrictive clauses, and grant you everything you ask. Their Eyes are at last open'd and they seem convinc'd what vast Benefit will accrue to this Kingdom by giving you almost an unlimited trade, so far as doth not interfere with British Manufactures. The West Indians are collecting all their Force to oppose us; I have reason to say they will at length be defeated.[66]

John Broome of New York shared this optimism. This merchant wrote to an associate:

> I cheerfully congratulate You, on a Repeal of the Stamp Act . . . the happy consequences resulting from so glorious an Event, will doubtless be sensibly felt, by all who have Embark'd in a Mercantile bottom . . . The restrictions on our Trade to the West Indies (which Prov'd so great an Embarrassment to Navigation) are in a Likely Way to be greatly mitigated, if not entirely taken off; which consequently will greatly increase the Demand of Lumber Among the Islands in the West Indies.[67]

These widely held views concerning the future of the molasses duty proved correct, but revision of the 1764 legislation was not the only economic reform the Rockingham ministry contemplated. It also envisioned the opening of a free port in the West Indies. This idea was not new. As early as February, 1763, Lieutenant Colonel Campbell Dalrymple, an officer then stationed at Guadaloupe, had urged the opening of a free port at Dominica in order to corner the French Caribbean trade and to curtail illegal North

American commerce.[68] The idea developed slowly and reached maturity in 1766.[69]

British West Indians looked askance at these proposals. Reducing the duty on foreign molasses meant losing a special protection their own sugar growers had long enjoyed. English molasses would become less competitive in the North American market. Moreover, the price of French sugar would probably decline because foreign producers would profit from increased molasses sales. A free port at Dominica could only further damage the interests of the English islands. After all, would not such a port become a funnel through which French sugar poured into the home market disguised as English produce?[70] Rockingham's commercial policies, it seemed, sought to purchase Anglo-American prosperity at British West Indian expense. Accordingly, continental and insular colonials shared different views on the merits of the reforms. This division of provincial opinion reflected itself in the imperial capital. If friends of North America and Jamaica had fought in common cause against the Stamp Act in 1765, they became antagonists in 1766.

Merchants who traded with Jamaica and the mainland colonies sought to resolve the issues which divided them through compromise.[71] But William Beckford, with Pitt's assistance, fought the Rockingham measures tooth and nail for several weeks until he had extracted from the ministry concessions of such a nature that the American Duties and Free Port bills finally became acceptable to Jamaica. Under

the revised American Duties bill of 1766 the tax on foreign molasses entering the colonies was reduced to a penny per gallon, the customary cost of smuggling the product. However--and these were the concessions Jamaica received--English molasses entering North America became subject to the same duty.[72] Moreover, English sugar, despite pleas from refiners, maintained its protected status in England and even secured a degree of protection in colonial markets. Henceforth, English sugar would enter North America duty free while foreign sugar bore taxes. Lastly, Stephen Fuller's 1765 proposal concerning rum and brandy duties became part of this legislation. The tax on English rum entering the mother country was reduced by 6d. per gallon while the duty on each gallon of French brandy was increased by a shilling.[73] Fuller, it will be recalled, had devised this formula to provide Jamaica "relief" from the burdens the Stamp Act seemed sure to impose. Oddly, Jamaica obtained this "relief" after the Stamp Act had been repealed.

Under the Free Ports bill of 1766 Dominica indeed became a free port, but the measure required that all sugar entering England from North America be deemed foreign. This provision relieved Caribbean fear that the free port would allow foreign sugar to penetrate the home market. Moreover, and for Jamaica more importantly, Kingston, Savanna-La-Mar, Lucea, and Montego Bay also became free ports. Although neither foreign manufactures nor West Indian produce could enter these ports, the law nevertheless legitimized Jamai-

ca's Spanish trade and opened the island unequivocally to foreign coin.[74] Passage of the American Duties and Free Ports bills in May and June, 1766, meant that Jamaica was on its way to economic recovery. According to one historian, the island entered its most prosperous phase of development.[75]

Security

The political and economic difficulties which had plagued Jamaica in 1765 were either solved or on their way to being solved in 1766. But the island's social problems persisted. Slave unrest kept concern over internal security smoldering. One episode in 1766 involved an abortive attempt to kill James Charles Sholto Douglas, the Collector of Customs. Although it is possible, it seems unlikely that the conspiracy arose from a desire to avenge those who died the year before as a result of Douglas' relentless investigation of the St. Mary revolt. Recent arrivers from Africa actually planned the murder and induced other Hopewell blacks to participate.[76] Whatever their motivation, the plotters determined to ambush Douglas along a shortcut he customarily traveled from Spanish Town, yank him from his horse, and wring off his head.[77] Their plan, however, failed. Official duties unexpectedly detained Douglas at the colonial capital, a development the rebels had not anticipated. The delay proved fatal. An informer betrayed the conspiracy, and the Collector learned of it before departing for home. Douglas returned to Hopewell along a different

route, subsequently apprehended the rebels, "tried" them, and had them condemned.[78]

A more serious instance of black resistance occurred in Westmoreland during the latter part of the year. Coromantees rampaged through the parish, "massacring all the white people they met with."[79] Nineteen colonials died in the violence.[80] Militiamen who pursued the rebels finally engaged them in rugged and densely vegetated terrain. Outnumbered, the whites concealed themselves amidst the thick foliage. Yet the insurgents became convinced that the militia force was larger than it was and finally decided to withdraw. The exhausted whites failed to follow but by luck met a party of Maroons who were hog-hunting and recruited them for service. In less than twenty-four hours the free blacks killed or captured two-thirds of the rebel force, and during the next few days they rounded up those who were still at large.[81]

Slave violence, of course, evoked white anxiety. On October 15 the vestrymen for St. Catherine ordered a notice published in the St. Jago Intelligencer announcing that the the "Act Entitled an Act to Remedy the Evils Arising from Irregular Assemblies of Slaves" would be strictly enforced in the parish.[82] Lieutenant Governor Elletson believed that St. Catherine's authorities acted wisely. Six weeks later he wrote to the Custodes of the various parishes: "It is with very particular concern I take notice that the Insurrections and rebellions amongst the slaves in

many parts of this island, are become very frequent."[83] He maintained that violence recurred again and again not because the colony's slave legislation lacked merit but because it was not strictly and consistently enforced. He referred specifically to the law of December 18, 1760, and pointed out that local authorities and slaveholders who looked the other way when slaves traveled without passes, beat drums, or engaged in other illegal activities undermined that law's effectiveness and unwittingly encouraged disruptions. The Lieutenant Governor reminded the Custodes of their responsibility to uphold the law fully.[84]

But reminders and directives from Spanish Town could never secure full enforcement of the law of December, 1760, or, for that matter, of any of the slave regulations. The sheer magnitude of the police work which full enforcement required rendered such enforcement impossible. Moreover, custom as well as personal relationships between white and black encouraged laxity. For these reasons rigid implementation of the slave code always eluded Jamaican colonial society, and perhaps for the latter's own good. Strict, consistent, and indiscriminate enforcement of the law might have sparked more slave violence than it checked.

Internal security legislation aimed at deterring slave disturbances, but it never satisfactorily achieved prevention. Jamaica, in the final analysis, maintained internal security by reacting to black violence whenever and wherever it flared. The islanders met force with greater

force, violence with greater violence. Although they always sought more regular troops, the provincials in fact enjoyed enough power to crush any insurrectionary movement which challenged colonial society. This was particularly true as long as the agreements with the Maroons held firm. Colonial, regular, and Maroon fire power always outmatched that which insurgents could muster, and the Maroon treaties denied escaping rebels sanctuaries of freedom. These circumstances doomed any uprising, just as they doomed Tacky's and the other revolts of 1760.[85]

All this sheds light on the nature of Jamaican insecurity. White society and the institutions of government and economy it had created were as secure and as permanent as any in England's Atlantic empire. Persons, to be sure, remained insecure. But in this their plight did not differ much from that of many American city dwellers, whatever their ethnic background, in our own time. Jamaican settlers felt individually vulnerable to violence: it could strike anywhere at any time. They experienced the kind of fear which many New Yorkers, Detroiters, and Chicagoans experience: the fear of sudden, seemingly random, brutality. This parallel runs deeper. Like many urban residents today, Jamaican colonials learned to live with personal insecurity. It became part of their lives; they endured it or became inured to it. The colonists were also as jaded as many twentieth-century urbanites to the conditions which bred violence. Finally, Jamaica's settlers reacted to particu-

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larly outrageous acts of violence in the same fashion that modern Americans respond to especially gruesome and well-publicized crimes. Americans demand more police, tougher and more effectively enforced laws, and stricter judicial penalties. The islanders sought more troops, more rigorous slave legislation, and more stringent enforcement by the authorities. But despite high crime rates modern American cities endure as social, political, and economic entities. Some like San Francisco even thrive. Jamaica's situation was similar. It remained internally secure despite its social tensions.

This perspective on Jamaican insecurity solves one of the riddles of the colony's politics. It explains how island politicians casually exploited the security issue for partisan purposes. Local leaders realized far more than they were ever willing to admit that their institutions were virtually invulnerable to black insurrection. They knew that they were not risking the survival of their country when, for example, they withheld pay from the regular troops who guarded the island. The tactic was neither suicidal nor even foolhardy. Rather, since the denial of subsidies to the army extracted concessions from both Governors and Kings, it enhanced the colony's well-being by fostering self-determination.

Internal tensions had not posed the only security question with which Jamaica had had to deal. Foreign aggression had always seemed a grave danger. Invasion would

not only unleash internal disorders but would, if successful, sweep away the political and economic institutions which made the island "free" and prosperous. Jamaica had often felt threatened during wartime. But after 1763 the colony faced no foreign menace. The Peace of Paris ushered in an era of external security for the island as much as it did for the continental colonies. His Majesty's naval power in the Caribbean dwarfed its French and Spanish counterparts, and the recently defeated enemies understood that they could not challenge English supremacy. In 1764 France backed down in the face of British might during the Turks Island affair.[86] In 1765 Spanish authorities ate humble pie during the Honduras incident.[87] In 1766 eleven capital ships manned the Jamaica Naval Station.[88] In that year Jamaica was probably more secure than it had ever been before.

The Significance of 1765-1766

The years 1765-1766 were significant in Jamaica's history for reasons other than the political and economic victories the island won and the security it had acquired. In those years the colony began to part company with her sister provinces on the mainland. The former drifted toward loyalism while the latter marched toward independence and nationhood.[89]

This separation began during the Stamp Act era and was a function of the divergent experiences Jamaica and the continental colonies underwent during those turbulent years. Jamaica's victory in the struggle over privilege was in at

least one way akin to the North American victory in the Stamp Act crisis. Both represented successful assertions of local over imperial authority. But the differences between the two crises outweighed this similarity. The Jamaica Assembly triumphed over the royal prerogative while the North Americans triumphed over Parliamentary power. Accordingly, the Jamaica Assembly's victory lay very much within the mainstream of eighteenth-century colonial political and constitutional development. It represented merely another step forward in what Jack Greene has called the "quest for power." Put simply, the nullification of the December, 1764, decision in chancery did not raise new constitutional questions: North American nullification of the Stamp Act did. Moreover, while the Jamaica Assembly's victory in the privilege struggle was total, the North American victory in the Stamp Act crisis was not. Parliament retreated expediently in 1766, but it did not surrender a jot of its authority. Westminster did not permit the American question to "sleep" as Whitehall had allowed the Jamaican controversy to. Instead, Parliament declared its authority over the colonies "in all cases whatsoever." This assertion, substituted as it was for the defective but at least plausible theory of "virtual" colonial representation in Parliament, poisoned subsequent Anglo-North American relations. On the other hand, the issues which had paralyzed the Jamaican government during the Stamp Act era remained permanently resolved.

These contrasts contain ironies. Jamaica owed its

victory in the contest over privilege to the Stamp Act controversy. It is doubtful that Rockingham's ministry would have first postponed considering and later have allowed the Jamaica affair to "sleep" had it not confronted a colonial crisis of enormous proportions. On the other hand, Jamaica's political paralysis prevented the Stamp Act's emergence as a major issue in the colony, incipient resistance to and various obstructions of the Parliamentary measure notwithstanding.

Events in 1766 did not alter the island's priorities. On June 28, the day George Ramsay turned over Lyttelton's chancery decision to the Assembly, Lieutenant Governor Elletson submitted to the House "the resolutions of the house of commons of Great Britain on the occasion of the late disturbances in America."[90] The resolves were merely referred to committee while the lawmakers prepared to press Elletson for nullification of the hated 1764 judicial decree.[91] Ignoring patterns of Jamaican obstruction of the stamp law, the Lieutenant Governor could cheerfully inform the Secretary of the Treasury, Grey Cooper, early in July:

> . . . you will be pleased to acquaint My Lord Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury that the Stamp Act having been duely carried into Execution in this Island, and no Tumults or Disorders happening to oblige the Distributor to resign his office; the Stamp'd Parchment and Paper not issued remain in the custody of Mr. Howell the Distributor, to whom I shall signify their Lordships Commands to take the most safe and expeditious manner of returning them to the Commission-for managing His Majesty's Stamp Duties in Great Britain.[92]

Indeed, Jamaica's seemingly good conduct respecting the

Stamp Act helped alleviate whatever concerns London may have had regarding recent events in the island. In August Elletson received a letter from the Duke of Richmond, the new Secretary of State for the Southern Department, informing him of the King's pleasure over Jamaica's behavior during the recent colonial crisis.[93] Anyone aware that the island's government had been nearly paralyzed throughout the entire controversial period would have found the Lieutenant Governor's reply amusing. "I shall," he wrote, "immediately communicate to the two branches of the legislature . . . the gracious approbation His Majesty is pleased to Express of the dutiful and discreet conduct observed in this government during the unjustifiable disturbances in other parts of America."[94] The Assembly, however, did not accept the royal approbation as graciously as George III might have wished. Later in the year it instructed Stephen Fuller, the London agent, to recover the revenue Jamaica yielded under the Stamp Act.[95]

This directive underscored the most important aspect of Jamaica's experience with the stamp law: the £4,000 England raised in the island. In other words, the enduring significance of Jamaica's response to the Stamp Act rested in the stamps purchased, not in the stamps unpurchased. Each time a Jamaican had used stamped paper he acknowledged, perhaps unwittingly, Parliament's right to levy the tax. Those who had avoided or evaded the tax had, by their actions, protested against the new law, but, as a matter of

fact, their protests went unheard. For all practical purposes Parliament had established, albeit by default, its right to tax Jamaica. By the end of 1766 the question which shook and finally disintegrated much of England's Atlantic empire had been resolved insofar as it pertained to that island colony. If Rockingham's ministry had accepted defeat on the important but local question of Assembly privilege, in exchange it had scored a lasting victory on a crucial imperial matter. Indeed, the colonial policies of both the Grenville and Rockingham ministries, as applied to Jamaica, proved remarkably successful.

Jamaica's response to the Stamp Act entailed other consequences. Unlike the continental colonies, the island did not witness the rise of a class of politicians whose prominence derived from anti-Stamp Act activity. Although Jamaica developed its own unique "spirit of '65," the experience did not foster "radical" politics. Conversely, no Jamaican politicians were discredited as a result of support for acquiescence in the Parliamentary tax. Jamaica's power elites remained the same both before and after the Stamp Act era.[96]

The Stamp Act crisis promoted unity among the mainland colonies, but Jamaica did not share this revolutionary experience. Had the island nullified the stamp law, it would have escaped the censure of its continental sisters. Moreover, Parliament would have perceived North American and Jamaican resistance as a unitary challenge to its authority.

Such circumstances might have pushed Jamaica into consultation and cooperation with the other provinces. But, as it turned out, while North American provincials grew less provincial-minded, Jamaicans remained insular not only geographically, but politically and psychologically.

The Road to Loyalism

The thirteen mainland colonies revolted because they believed that conspirators at Whitehall planned to eradicate American liberties. Indeed, this perception of a conspiracy against liberty, Professor Bailyn has pointed out, provided the rebellion with its "logic."[97] Americans discerned the malevolent intentions of successive ministries from the pattern of their assaults on colonial rights: the Stamp Act, the several Townshend enactments, the new admiralty court system, the Boston Massacre, the Tea Act, the Intolerable laws, and a host of other unprecedented acts, policies, and occurrences. What else other than design could explain this series of outrages? In the Declaration of Independence Jefferson stated the American view concisely: ". . . when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them [the people] under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the present King of Great Britain

is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states."

Whig political ideas, to which Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic were heir, molded American thinking. This tradition taught that while government was established to protect liberty, throughout history the power vested in government had corruptly and forcibly aggrandized against it. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the settlement which followed it had, according to Whig thought, resolved the ages-old conflict between power and liberty. The Revolutionary Settlement produced a "mixed constitution" composed of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. These modes of government, pitted against each other in the Kingship, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons, checked and balanced each other, making liberty safe and secure.[98]

While most eighteenth-century Englishmen believed the system worked well, some worried that the constitutional arrangement, especially after Robert Walpole's rise to power, had become dangerously unbalanced. Anti-Court politicians and other disaffected elements maintained that the King's ministers managed Parliament by distributing places and pensions and by purchasing elections. These corruptions, because they upset the balance of power within the constitution, threatened English liberty. Cato's Letters and other anti-establishment Whig publications sounded the alarm. Essayists like Benjamin Hoadly and Viscount Boling-

broke warned that "Robinocracy" endangered the nation's freedoms. Malevolent manipulators of power and people were destroying England's heritage.[99]

This brand of Whiggery shaped colonial American political thought. Opposition Whig literature poured into the provinces and intellectually nourished more than one generation of Americans.[100] It taught them to beware of ministerial aggression against their liberties. It adminished them to remain alert for signs of corruption. It warned them of the danger of peacetime armies. Only virtue and vigilance could keep them free. These ideas encouraged Americans to impose meanings upon and to discover motivations behind events and circumstances which the events and circumstances themselves did not warrant. Americans, in brief, became conditioned to seeing conspiracies where conspiracies did not exist.[101]

Jamaican colonials, like other Englishmen, shared the Whig tradition. Eighteenth-century political rhetoric and literature reflect its influence. Any number of illustrations exist. The Jamaica Assembly in 1756 declared that "when power, and the authority of high stations are made use of to purposes destructive of the Rights and liberties of the People, and to pervert mens [sic] minds and lead their consciences astray, such a person becomes an object of Parliamentary Enquiry, and a fit person for . . . resentment."[102] Bryan Edwards wrote: "A government exercising . . . an inquisitorial authority . . . must necessarily sink

into the basest Tyranny."[103] William Beckford, the planter-historian, observed: "Let those who have made an unhallowed use of power, and who have converted the enviable source for doing good, from the channel of benevolence, to augment the current of collusion and injustice . . . consider that feeling extends beyond the grave, and that where there has been a worldly iniquity there will not fail to be an eternal judgement."[104] Edward Long echoed the refrain concerning power and liberty.[105]

Anti-Court Whig literature, unsurprisingly, constituted part of the Jamaican intellectual diet. Issues of The Spectator, The Craftsman, and Cato's Letters, it will be recalled, as well as other tracts and essays bearing the gloomy message that ministerial power was crushing English liberty, were not uncommon island possessions.[106] But these writings did not determine Jamaican colonial perceptions of events before the American Revolution.

Unlike the mainland colonists, Jamaicans did not perceive a ministerial conspiracy against liberty. The island's failure to nullify the stamp law in large measure accounted for its different interpretation of imperial measures. The revenue the Stamp Act raised in Jamaica had, in effect, settled the question of Parliament's right to tax the colony. Consequently, subsequent imperial taxes like Townshend's duties of 1767 created no stir in the province. The island had no political faction whose popularity stemmed from anti-Stamp Act activity and whose survival depended

upon frustrating other Parliamentary revenue measures. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, although the Declaratory Act applied to it as much as any other province, Jamaica became less and less an object of Parliament's self-proclaimed authority. Rather, the colonies which had nullified the Stamp Act became the chief targets of restraining imperial policy and law. The reorganization of the admiralty court system in 1768, for example, which fueled North American suspicion and resentment, simply did not apply to Jamaica.[107] Parliament, understandably enough, felt little need to demonstrate its authority where it seemed unchallenged but felt compelled to uphold the Declaratory Act wherever its authority seemed in doubt. As a consequence, after 1766 Jamaica began sliding into a relationship with the mother country which resembled the so-called "salutary neglect" of an earlier era. After 1766 Jamaican and North American experiences and rationalizations of those experiences differed sharply.

According to eighteenth-century English political thought, power corrupted those who wielded it, and, according to the anti-establishment brand of the Whig tradition, government patronage constituted a chief means by which the ministry extended its power at the expense of the "mixed constitution." The multiplication and distribution of jobs created a horde of officeholders subservient to the ministry and unmindful of the rights of the people. For these reasons North Americans looked askance at the creation of an

independent American Customs Commission in 1767. This reorganization of the customs service entailed an increase in the number of placemen obligated to the Crown.[108] The implicit threat which the new board posed to colonial liberties became real when a host of unscrupulous officers--"racketeers" one historian has called them--arrived at their posts and began, through unfair and extortionate methods, bleeding American commerce.[109] For the colonials this development seemed to indicate that authorities in London were bent on extending their corrupt power and influence to American shores.

Jamaicans, of course, also worried about corruption and the danger it posed to liberty. Many of the charges the Assembly leveled against former Governor Lyttelton in August, 1766, expressed this concern.[110] Indeed, the islanders had even decried misconduct in His Majesty's customs service.[111] But Jamaicans never endured the wholesale extortion the North Americans endured: the independent American Customs Commission established in 1767 simply did not have jurisdiction in Jamaica. Greedy placemen, as a consequence, did not invade the island as they did the mainland. Jamaicans, accordingly, did not feel the long tentacles of ministerial power reaching out to crush their liberty and rob their property.

Nor was this all. The islanders had another reason to remain preoccupied with local rather than alleged ministerial corruption. North American allegations concerning

the latter not only rang hollow but offended the Caribbean colony. Mainlanders, especially those in New England, considered the notorious West Indian absentees, who seemed to walk so conspicuously the corridors of power, the most corrupt element in England. North Americans implicitly, and often explicitly, linked West Indians in London with those who conspired against liberty. Jamaicans, of course, had a different view. "If the West Indians have influence in Great Britain," the Jamaica Assembly once declared, "it is their fortune and their own good Behavior that gives it them; and this is a natural, fair, and honest Influence."[112]

These contrasting views provide another dimension for understanding Jamaican complacency in the face of an alleged ministerial conspiracy against liberty. Although the reputation of power is, as Hobbes pointed out,* power of a sort, both North Americans and Jamaicans inflated the real weight of West Indian influence in London.[113] This was peculiar. By attributing undue influence to the West Indian element in London, North Americans in effect admitted that the theory of "virtual" colonial representation in Parliament worked. Yet, and despite the fact that English merchants had rallied to the American cause and secured repeal of the Stamp Act, mainland colonists repeatedly rejected the notion that they were "virtually" represented in the imperial legislature. On the other hand, while Jamaicans also

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*Leviathan, ch. 10.

attributed great influence to their London lobby, they failed to perceive that despite occasional successes, as in 1766, the so-called West India interest did not serve their island's needs effectively. The Jamaica bloc had been unable to prevent passage of the Stamp Act. It also failed to secure an augmentation of the number of troops stationed in the colony, a matter of special concern to the islanders. At risk of overstatement, one might conclude that "virtual representation" worked for the North Americans, who did not believe it did, and that it did not work for Jamaicans, who believed it did.

If official corruption constituted a danger to liberty, according to the Whig tradition standing armies were an even greater threat.[114] Consequently, North American colonials found post-war British military policies deeply troubling: the Stamp Act had been designed to provide support for a large American garrison; New York's Assembly faced suspension for failing to comply fully with the Quartering Act of 1765. The role of the army became increasingly suspect after four regiments undertook duty outside Boston in 1768. These forces, everyone knew, were meant to give the royal government of a turbulent colony greater power. The troops, it seemed, were to intimidate the colonists, and, according to A Journal of the Times, a contemporary Boston publication, the soldiers tried hard to do just that. Undisciplined regulars committed one outrage after another and brought their atrocities to a climax by

killing several colonials in March, 1770. The Boston Massacre not only brutally dramatized the dangers of a standing army but provided North Americans further evidence that authorities in London aimed at suppressing American liberty.[115]

Jamaicans did not share the North American fear of the army. Indeed, the realities of life in the sugar colony caused the islanders, probably without their realizing it, to reverse an important element of Whig political thought. To Jamaicans the army was not a threat to liberty but a source and protector of it. The military was a source of liberty in that the recurrent denials of supplementary pay to the troops constituted the most effective tool with which the popular Assembly chipped away at the royal prerogative and expanded its own power. The "salutary neglect" the island enjoyed after 1766 perpetuated this situation. From time to time the Assembly withheld pay from the troops, but Jamaica never provoked coercive Parliamentary legislation as New York did in 1767. In this sense Jamaica continued to enjoy in substance whatever degree of self-determination it had surrendered in form when some islanders bought stamps in 1765 and 1766.

The army, of course, also protected Jamaican liberty. Every petition to the King for more troops bore this message. The regulars defended the island against foreign enemies and secured life and property against an unpredictable black majority. The regiments sent to Boston in 1768

must have aroused Jamaican envy. One wonders how different subsequent history might have been had those troops been sent to Spanish Town instead.

In 1765-1766 Jamaica had had an opportunity to follow the political and constitutional pathways the North Americans were traveling. It did not. As a result, after 1766 the island did not encounter the same Parliamentary challenges the North American provinces did. Accordingly, its perception of imperial policies differed from those of the mainland. Unlike the North Americans, the islanders preoccupied themselves more with local than with imperial affairs. The only conspiracies they perceived were those, real or imagined, among their own slaves. Jamaicans remained myopic. They remained, in short, good colonials. In December, 1774, as the Anglo-American crisis deepened, the island's Assembly petitioned George III to maintain peace and constitutional justice within the empire and announced that Jamaica, as a result of its "peculiar situation" as well as its "attachment to, and reliance on, our fellow subjects in Great-Britain [Parliament]," did not "now intend . . . resistance to Great-Britain."[116]

NOTES

[1]Documents relevant to Howell's subsequent career in Jamaica are among C. O. Papers 137:62, V. Howell's tenure as provost marshal ended in 1768. Writs of Extent, I, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town.

[2]For the allegations of corruption see pp. 331-34 and the appropriate notes.

[3]Conway to Lyttelton, September 12, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, I. Lyttelton replied to Conway's rebuke by pointing out that his instructions required him to communicate with Whitehall through the Board of Trade. But the Governor assured the Secretary that he would keep the latter informed of events. Lyttelton to Conway, November 29, 1765, C.O. Papers 137:62, II.

[4]This observation is based on the innumerable documents Lyttelton signed during his four years as Governor. See, for examples, Patents, Libers 30-31.

[5]The application is not among the records, but other documents suggest that he made the request in December. Lyttelton's instructions, incidentally, did not allow him to return to England without written permission from Whitehall. But his instructions did permit him "in the case of sickness . . . [to] go to New York or any other of our Northern Plantations and there stay for such a space as the recovery of your health may absolutely require." Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 69.

[6]Minutes of the Council, IV, February 25, 1766; Conway to Lyttelton, March 13, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, III.

[7]Lyttelton to Conway, March 26, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[8]Lyttelton to Conway, May 12, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[9]Conway to Lyttelton, March 13, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, III.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.; also, Lyttelton to Conway, May 23, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV. Lyttelton's successor was Roger Hope Elletson. The latter's commission as Lieutenant Governor arrived at the same time as Lyttelton's leave of absence did. See Patents, Liber 31.

[12]Lyttelton to Conway, May 23, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Roger Hope Elletson to Conway, July 7, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[15]Lyttelton to Conway, May 23, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[16]Roger Hope Elletson to Conway, June 5, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[17]Elletson, born in 1727, was the son of Richard Elletson of Hope estate, a property which in 1750 totaled 5,495 acres. He served in the Assembly in the late 1750's, became Lieutenant Governor in 1766 and held that post until 1773. He died November 28, 1775. Oliver, ed., Caribbeana, IV, 81, 95; Martin, The Colonies, 1; Roby, Members of the Assembly of Jamaica, 5.

[18]Kingston Vestry Minutes, June 30, 1766. Offering access to water was an important gesture since Kingston, then as now, suffered from periodic droughts. In the colonial era a dry period sharply increased the threat of fire.

[19]Elletson to Conway, June 5, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[20]Assembly Journals, V, 532-33; Council Journals, June 24, 1766.

[21]Assembly Journals, V, 534-35, 539.

[22]Ibid., V, 537-38.

[23]Ibid., V, 537-38.

[24]Ibid., V, 537-38.

[25]Ibid., V, 539.

[26]Ibid., V, 542.

[27]Ibid., V, 544.

[28]Ibid., V, 542.

[29]For another account of the events described here see Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, 258-60.

[30]Council Journals, July 2 and 3, 1766.

[31]Elletson to Conway, July 7, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[32]Ibid.; Council Journals, July 4, 1766.

[33]Determination of Lieutenant Governor Roger Hope Elletson, July 4, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[34]Elletson to Stephen Fuller, July 8, 1766, West India Reference Library, Institute of Jamaica, Kingston, Elletson Letter Books, I.

[35]Stephen Fuller to Elletson, October 2, 1766, Fuller Letter Books, I, 132.

[36]Ibid., I, 132-33. Fuller also informed Charles Price, Jr., that the ministry planned to let the Jamaica affair "sleep." Fuller to Charles Price, Jr., October 2, 1766, ibid., I, 135.

[37]Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions, I, 115.

[38]Stephen Fuller to the Committee of Correspondence, July 5, 1766, Fuller Letter Books, I, 131.

[39]See Elletson to the Earl of Shelburne, December 31, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, V; Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, 257.

[40]The Privileges of the Island of Jamaica Vindi-

cated; with an Impartial Narrative of the Late Dispute between the Governor and the House of Representatives, upon the Case of Mr. Olyphant (Jamaica: 1766).

[41]Ibid., v.

[42]Ibid., v.

[43]Ibid., vi.

[44]Ibid., vii.

[45]Ibid., viii.

[46]Ibid., ix.

[47]The House, it will be recalled, had allotted supplementary pay to those soldiers who remained on the island but not to those who accompanied Admiral Burnaby to the Bay of Honduras. See pp. 257-58 of this essay.

[48]Privileges of the Island of Jamaica Vindicated, xiii.

[49]Ibid., xvi-xvii.

[50]Ibid., xix.

[51]Assembly Journals, V, 539.

[52]Ibid., V, 562-69.

[53]Ibid., V, 609-15.

[54]Testimony of Samuel Howell, ibid., V, 620.

[55]Testimony of Arthur Gordon, ibid., V, 621.

[56]Testimony of John Brodbelt, ibid., V, 622. See also the testimony of George Rosewell Bennett, ibid., V, 620-21.

[57]Petition of Kingston's Merchants to the Assembly, August 2, 1766, ibid., V, 589.

[58]Testimony of Richard Ellis, ibid., V, 596.

[59]Ibid., V, 613.

[60]Ibid., V, 614-15. This refers to the charges that Governor Lyttelton seized Spanish vessels in 1764. See p. 331 of this essay.

[61]Assembly Journals, V, 609.

[62]Ibid., V, 609.

[63]Ibid., V, 609-11. Jamaica's concern over the way gubernatorial greed threatened the liberties of the people in general and of popular assemblies in particular paralleled the concern of Massachusetts in this regard. That colony feared attacks which emanated from "official avarice" on the constitution. See Richard Bushman, "Corruption and Power in Provincial America," Library of Congress Symposia on the American Revolution, The Development of a Revolutionary Mentality, 63-96.

[64]Assembly Journals, V, 611.

[65]Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 214-15.

[66]Henry Cruger, Jr., to his father, February 14, 1766, Ford, ed., "Commerce of Rhode Island," Vol. 9, 143.

[67]John Broome to John Lloyd II, May 30, 1766, Barck, ed., Papers of the Lloyd Family, II, 697.

[68]Campbell Dalrymple to Lord Bute, February 27, 1763, Fortescue, ed., Correspondence of King George III, I, 44-50.

[69]The standard study remains Frances Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies (London: 1953).

[70]Proponents of the reforms maintained that reducing the molasses tax would stimulate the North American economy and allow for the greater absorption of British products. Supporters of the free port plan argued that trade at Dominica would be in England's favor, accelerating the flow of bullion into the empire. They also maintained that the free port would encourage the growth of the Africa trade and the

trade to the West Indies because raw materials would become cheaply available. See Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 264-67.

[71]In March, 1766, the merchants arrived at an understanding, but they were unable to market their formula in Parliament. Ibid., 256-57.

[72]This reduced the chances of fraud, but it also made it unmistakably clear, as Professor Thomas correctly points out, that the Sugar Act of 1764 was a tax and not a regulation of trade. Under the new regulation the molasses duty earned Great Britain more than £80,000 between 1768 and 1772 alone. Writes Thomas: "The Rockingham ministry alone devised an effective means of taxing the American colonies during the Revolutionary period--a reversal of tradition by fact." Ibid., 271.

[73]Ibid., 270-72. For Fuller's proposal on rum and brandy duties see pp. 347-48 of this essay.

[74]See An Act for Opening and Establishing Certain Ports in the Islands of Jamaica and Dominica, for the More Free Importation and Exportation of Certain Goods and Merchandizes . . . . (London: 1766); Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, 270-72; Armytage, Free Port System, 42-43.

[75]Gipson, Coming of the Revolution, 160.

[76]Dallas, History of the Maroons, I, 131-32 n.

[77]Ibid., I, 131-32 n.

[78]Ibid., I, 131-32 n.

[79]Ibid., I, 102.

[80]Long, History, II, 471; Elletson to John Scott, Superintendant of Trelawny Town, October 18, 1766, Elletson Letter Books, I.

[81]Dallas, History of the Maroons, I, 102-03.

[82]St. Catherine Vestry Minutes, October 15, 1766, Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town.

[83]Elletson to the Custodes of the Several Parishes, November 24, 1766, Elletson Letter Books, I.

[84]Ibid.

[85]See pp. 164-67 of this essay.

[86]England, France, and Spain all claimed the tiny Turks Islands, which are located north of Hispaniola. In 1764 only a few hundred people lived on these remote islets, which were valuable chiefly as sources of salt. On May 31, 1764, the French man-of-war Brilliant and several other vessels out of Cap Francois raided the islands, burning whatever could be burned and stealing whatever seemed worth stealing. The plundering did not end until June 3. Eight English colonial ships were taken, and various commodities such as rum, salt, corn, pork, and tobacco were carried away. Altogether sixty-nine persons suffered losses, including, in addition to local residents, traders from Bermuda, Canada, and Massachusetts Bay.

The French excused the raid on the grounds that no government administration existed at Turks Islands and that the settlements were therefore beyond legitimate protection. Nevertheless, France offered a tripartite division of the islands, a proposal which met no success because neither England nor Spain was willing to surrender its claim to sovereignty over the island cluster. Grenville's ministry, instead, threatened military action unless the islands were given up and compensation provided to those who suffered losses. The French were not prepared to face the British challenge. Count D'Estaing, the Governor of San Domingue, apologized for the attack and informed Governor Lyttelton that his government would pay for damages. Lyttelton took charge of accounting the costs of the raid. From his investigation he concluded that the French attack destroyed £5,260 9s. 6d. worth of property. Although D'Estaing believed that Jamaica's Governor had inflated the sum, in November, 1765, the French officer sent Lyttelton the full sum in Portugese gold. Lyttelton then imbursed individuals who had suffered from the raid. C. O. Papers 137:62, II, include numerous documents pertaining to the raid and the settlement. See especially: Lyttelton to D'Estaing, January 12, July 29, and November 28, 1765; Lyttelton to Conway, November 30, 1765; Lyttelton to Halifax, January 24, 1765; D'Estaing to Lyttelton, January 12, 1765; and Conway to Lyttelton, March 13, 1766. For a brief general discussion of the Turks Islands affair, see Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492-1969 (New York: 1970), 89-90.

[87]See p. 281, n. 97.

[88]"Report of the Admiralty Office," February 13, 1766, New York Public Library, Hardwicke Collection, vol. 133.

[89]Edward Brathwaite explores the independence option for Jamaica in Development of Creole Society, chs. 5-7. These essays merit attention because they shed light on an important subject, but they are grounded in the view that Jamaica was so internally insecure that it could not associate itself with the American movement.

[90]Assembly Journals, V, 540; Elletson to Conway, July 7, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[91]Assembly Journals, V, 540.

[92]Elletson to Grey Cooper, July 8, 1766, Elletson Letter Books, I.

[93]The letter, dated June 12, is referred to in Elletson to the Duke of Richmond, August 31, 1766, C.O. Papers 137:62, IV.

[94]Ibid.

[95]Assembly Journals, V, 662. The directive stemmed from the conviction that London's retention of the revenue was unfair since other colonies had not paid the tax and since Parliament had repealed the tax under pressure from those colonies. Nothing ever came of the instruction.

[96]In the mainland colonies the rise of "radical" politicians was a major result of the Stamp Act Crisis. Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 366-67.

[97]Bailyn, Ideological Origins, ch. 4.

[98]Ibid., ch. 3.

[99]Ibid., 34-54.

[100]Ibid., 35-36; 43-45.

[101]See "A Note on Conspiracy" in ibid., 144-59.

[102]Petition of the Assembly to Henry Moore, Octo-

ber 9, 1756, C.O. Papers 137:60, V.

[103]Bryan Edwards' marginal note in Long, History, I, 47, University of the West Indies Library, Mona, Kingston, Ansell B. Hart Collection.

[104]Beckford, Narrative Description, II, 263.

[105]Long, History, I, 39-41.

[106]See p. 79 of this essay.

[107]On the admiralty court measure see Carl Ubbelohde, The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: 1960).

[108]Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 59-60; 102-05.

[109]On customs racketeering see Oliver M. Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (Philadelphia: 1951); also Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 102-05.

[110]See pp. 417-19 of this essay.

[111]See pp. 333-34, 418 of this essay.

[112]"Memorial Respecting the Trade Carried on by His Majesty's Subjects to the French Settlements in Hispaniola under the Colour of Flags of Truce," December, 1760, C.O. Papers 137:60, V.

[113]See again pp. 69-73 of this essay.

[114]Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 61-63.

[115]For the army's role in fostering discontent see John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army and the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton: 1965); also Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 112-16.

[116]Assembly Journals, VI, 569. The petition is especially interesting because of its outspoken sympathy for the North Americans.

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