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THE MILITANT ACTIVITIES OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD (I.W.W.): A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

THE PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY

This chapter will consist of the following items: a close look at the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.); review of the literature on the I.W.W.; the utilization of historical sociology as a methodological device in sociological research; as well as analysis and review of the dominant I.W.W. doctrines and strategies.

Chapter 2 will be based on the reaction of the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) to the founding of the I.W.W. in June of 1905. The founding of the Wobblies constituted a direct challenge to the A.F.L. and its affiliated locals, trades assemblies, union centrals, and international unions, as well as the conservative and reactionary policies of its leadership. Before getting into the nature of the conflict that ensued between the two labor organizations, I will go back to the latter part of the nineteenth century and discuss the impact of industrialization and migration, as well as immigration of large numbers of people from the peasant cultures of Eastern, Southern, and Central Europe, into the growing urban centers of America.

My discussion in this chapter will also deal with the impact of migration from the rural parts of the United States, and immigration from the rural areas of Eastern, Southern, and Central Europe, on the new urban centers of America, as well as the type of low-skill jobs that were available to them. I will touch on the very sensitive issue of unionization or union activity and how it was accelerated by the nature of the relationship that existed

between the workers and owners of industrial establishments, coupled with the deplorable working conditions and low wages.

Some of the prominent labor unions that emerged during this era were the Knights of Labor, National Labor Union and their affiliates. I will explain how these unions set the stage for the emergence of the A.F.L. and the I.W.W..

Chapter 3 will address the Lawrence, Massachusetts, strike of 1912. The success of that effort is considered to be one of the most significant events in the heyday of the I.W.W.. The strike was inspired and organized by the I.W.W. in support of textile workers, who were protesting the inhuman working conditions and low wages in the textile manufacturing plants of Lawrence.

Chapter 4 will be focused on the issues involved in the Paterson, New Jersey, strike of 1913, which turned out to be a fiasco. The strike was to protest the actions of mill owners on matters pertaining to wages and working conditions in the plants manufacturing textile products.

Chapter 5 will deal with the impact of the I.W.W. experience on continuing research into the Wobbly phenomenon in the United States.

A CLOSE LOOK AT THE I.W.W.

Founded on June 27, 1905, in the city of Chicago by a conglomeration of social activists and militant unionists, the I.W.W. developed great expertise in the utilization and manipulation of the strike weapon, which it viewed as the workers' equalizer in the perennial struggles with the capitalist economic system and its corporate structure represented by the management of big business (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; Thompson 1955).

The master-plan of the I.W.W. was to organize workers in the United States and all over the world into one big industrial union, whose guiding doctrine would be syndicalism or anarcho-syndicalism--a labor union doctrine, which espouses the eventual overthrow of the capitalist economic system through such direct action tactics and strategies as the strike, sabotage, demonstration, passive resistance, etc., rather than through the tactics of parliamentary action (Dubofsky 1969).

After the ouster of the capitalists, a number of so-called industrial departments patterned after those of capitalism were to be established. The new society to be known as the industrial commonwealth of the working class, was to be governed by the workers themselves through their appointed representatives (Foner 1965).

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE I.W.W.

In order to ensure the smooth dissemination of doctrines, strategies, and tactics, to the rank and file--with the goal of creating a more cohesive labor movement--, the leadership of the I.W.W. launched a number of publications, such as Solidarity, Industrial Union Bulletin, Industrial Worker, and I.W.W. Bulletin. These official publications played a dual role as newsletters and instruments of political education under the direction of the I.W.W. hierarchy.

Apart from the official publications, a number of biographies and autobiographies have been written about a number of I.W.W. leaders (e.g., William Haywood, John Reed, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Joe Hill, Vincent St. John, Thomas Haggerty, etc.).

Literature Written by I.W.W. Members

Some I.W.W. members have also written books, articles, and reviews, explaining the goals and aspirations of the movement. In The Truth About the Paterson Strike (1913), Elizabeth Gurley Flynn discussed the factors that accounted for the failure of that effort, which was aimed at securing better wages and work conditions for the workers employed in the textile manufacturing plants located in the city of Paterson, New Jersey.

What social role (Durkheim 1951) was she playing in writing this book? What level of objectivity (Znaniecki 1936) did she exhibit? I have elected to ask these empirical questions; because, after the failure of the Paterson strike, the I.W.W., especially its collective leadership (Simmel 1950), became the target of intense disapproval (Blau 1964) from labor and left-wing political circles (Marx and Engels 1939) for what was described as deviations from normative expectations (Merton and Barber 1962) about how the strike should have been effectively organized.

There were a number of criticisms; however, the two specific areas of concern centered around the management of the Pageant at Madison Square Garden, and the decision to conduct mass demonstrations, which resulted in the mass arrest of striking workers and some I.W.W. leaders, even though the municipal authorities had given prior warnings to the effect that such demonstrations would lead to charges of incitement to riot and illegal assemblage.

The criticisms did tremendous damage to the influence (Kroeber 1952), prestige (Levi-Strauss 1949), and legitimacy (Weber 1946) of the I.W.W. as a militant labor union. Thus, the decision by Flynn represented an undisguised attempt to mold public opinion (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) in

favor of the I.W.W.. She did so by declaring that even though the labor organization took responsibility for the failure of the strike (since it was staged under its auspices), other groups had to be held accountable for their lack of support.

She attacked the loom weavers for their betrayal; the conservative elements in the Socialist Party for their refusal to give tangible aid in the form of monetary resources (Bierstedt 1950); the Socialist Labor Party and its Detroit-faction of the I.W.W.; as well as The American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) for their meddlesome activities; and the refusal of the textile manufacturers to bargain in good faith.

I am of the view that Flynn displayed tremendous political courage and acumen in very clearly articulating the viewpoint of the I.W.W. However, there remain some unanswered questions: what kind of consensus (Wrong 1959) was attained within the I.W.W. Executive Council during the process of decision-making (Parsons 1964), which led to enormous authority (Levi-Strauss 1949) being given to the general strike committee to make strike decisions, while the I.W.W. played just an advisory role? Which faction (Bierstedt 1950) within the I.W.W. leadership was instrumental in the advocacy of such a position? What were the reasons behind the reluctance of the I.W.W. to assume full command (Coser 1976) of the general strike committee? There were a number of I.W.W. Executive Council members on the scene during the Paterson strike, most of whom were arrested together with Flynn. Why was she the most vociferous in defending the I.W.W. conduct of the strike? Was that an indication of some dissensus (Dahrendor 1968) within the officialdom (Weber 1946) of the Wobblies?

In The I.W.W.: Its First Fifty Years (1955), Fred Thompson gave an account of the events leading to the founding of the I.W.W. and the various

experiences it went through in its half-a-century of existence as a labor organization. He portrayed the I.W.W. as an interest group (Bendix 1974) with an administrative structure (Weber 1946) that operated on the principles and institutional procedures of legality and rationality (Selznick 1943).

He was emphatic in stressing that the founding of the I.W.W. and its acceptance by militant elements within the American labor movement and left-wing political centers, was a social phenomenon (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) that was greatly precipitated by the on-going systemic arrangements (Dahrendorf 1968) of the American social structure (Coser 1956), because of the indiscriminate support that the government gave to big business during periods of industrial crises (Marx 1910) involving worker demands for better wages and improved work conditions.

In his assessment of the I.W.W. doctrines and strategies, Thompson conceded that as with any other autonomous association (Dahrendorf 1959), the labor organization made mistakes; however, he attributed the eventual demise of the I.W.W. to the conservative sociopolitical environment and social forces (Simmel 1950), such as big business, A.F.L., vigilante groups, and the government (at the federal, state, and local levels).

It is essential to point out that Thompson was writing as an insider (Sumner 1904) by virtue of his I.W.W. membership. Thus, he had the perspective and bias of his in-group (Sumner 1904). I wish he had answered the following questions: why did the I.W.W. spend a lot of assets (Etzioni 1968) on the campaign for free-speech even though it appeared to be headed for a fiasco? How did the I.W.W. expect to maintain internal cohesion (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) by picking up and leaving towns and cities after gaining victories without any local entity (Spencer 1897) to continue the struggle?

In The I.W.W.: Its History, Structure and Methods (1919), Vincent St. John dealt with the dominant social, economic, and political issues (Kroeber 1952) within the American social system (Coser 1976), which led to the emergence of the I.W.W. as a militant labor organization.

On the institutional level, he touched on such pertinent problems as: the distribution of power (Simmel 1950); recruitment of staff (Piaget 1951); agreement on values (Dahrendorf 1968); and the emergence of formal as well as informal relationships (Selznick 1943) within the rank and file.

Concerning the methods that the I.W.W. used to attain its stated objectives, he described the various components of direct action, sabotage, passive resistance, demonstrations, strikes, violence, etc., and the significance of syndicalism or anarcho-syndicalism, which was the cornerstone of the other I.W.W. doctrines and strategies. As a member of the I.W.W. inner circle (Michels 1915), it is quite apparent that he had the obligation (Levi-Strauss 1949) to handle matters in a manner that would help the labor organization in its desire to create and maintain a favorable public image (Coser and Rosenberg 1976).

To that end, he was very careful to avoid specific issues that might have created controversy. For instance, since he was discussing I.W.W. methods (tactics and strategies), and being one of the I.W.W. leaders arrested by the municipal authorities during the Paterson strike of 1913, why was the I.W.W. very reluctant to take charge (Selznick 1943) of the general strike committee? This is a very crucial question that he should have addressed in the interest of objectivity and clarity.

In Industrial Unionism (1909), William Trautmann stressed what he considered to be the significant factors, which made the doctrine of industrial unionism superior to that of craft unionism.

He posited that organizing workers into craft unions, based on occupational differentials (Merton 1957) rather than the industries in which they worked, created an environment of heterogeneity (Hughes 1945) among the working class and made it very difficult for them to engage in collective action (Ross 1910) to exert sustained pressure (Ross 1910) on the well-organized partnerships (Sumner 1904) of the bourgeoisie. And this, he indicated, led to a diminished state of class unity (Coser and Rosenberg 1976).

Since the craft unions were in effect operating as splinter groups (Bierstedt 1950) interested in signing their own contracts, the owners of big business were able to use their collective power assets (Coser 1976) to foment disunity among the workers through the skillful usage of gender, racial, ethnic, and craft biases.

Under the doctrine of industrial unionism, as practiced by the I.W.W., there was heightened class consciousness (Bendix 1974) within the rank and file, on account of the workers being organized on the basis of the industries in which they worked. Trautmann indicated that this was the quintessential example of proper union organizing and denounced the A.F.L. leadership for espousing craft unionism.

Trautmann's argument raise some very interesting questions, which he did not address: were the leaders of the A.F.L. aware of the fact that by promoting the doctrine of craft unionism they were indirectly acting in collaboration (Simmel 1950) with big business? Did they consider that to be a tactical necessity (Mead 1934) given the tremendous leverage of management in the negotiating process?

In Pages from a Worker's Life (1939), William Z. Foster gave an account of the feelings of powerlessness (Seeman 1959) and alienation

(Seeman 1959) from the value system (MacIver 1942) of mainstream American society that was observed among the Wobbly rank and file.

The sentiments in the foregoing, Foster posited, emanated from the social experiences (Mead 1934) of the workers as individuals (Olsen 1963), who on account of their lower socioeconomic status (Bendix 1974), were compelled to work very hard and for very long hours to feed themselves and their families in order to maintain any modicum of self-esteem (Wrong 1959).

What emerges from Foster's account is a phenomenon peculiar not only to the Wobbly workers, but also to all working class elements in countries under the aegis of the capitalist economic system, who suffer tremendous frustration and disorganization (Coser and Rosenberg 1976).

However, Foster neglected to point out that even though the I.W.W. was a working class organization with a large number of individuals of working class background, who experienced the feelings to which I have alluded, there were a number of I.W.W. members from middle class and upper-middle-class backgrounds. These individuals chose to identify with the aspirations of the working class.

In Wobbly: The Rough and Tumble Story of an American Radical (1948), Ralph Chaplin described the plight and social position (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) of the typical social and political radical, who lived in two distinct social worlds (Olsen 1963): the world of American society with its capitalistic ethos, and that of the new society envisioned by the I.W.W., without actually belonging to either one. Thus, the radical in his estimation, was the quintessential example of the marginal individual (Park 1928).

Because of that individual and collective marginality, the Wobblies were observed to exhibit classic manifestations of normlessness or anomic behavior (Seeman 1959), on account of their overt disregard for mainstream

American social expectations (Parsons and Shils 1952) and such institutions (Lipset 1970) as the family, church, courts, schools, etc., which they regarded as instruments of social constraint (Ross 1910) and domination in the hands of the power elite (Mills 1956).

Conceptually, radicalism is a very relative nomenclature, because, it has different variations and components: there are social actors, who are politically radical but economically moderate and even conservative. Therefore, not all individuals referred to as radicals belong to a homogeneous unit (Becker 1963). Chaplin did not delineate some of these crucial distinctions (Parsons 1964).

In The Trial of a New Society (1913), Justus Ebert described the kind of social, economic, and political spheres (Kornhauser 1961) that would obtain in the new society proposed by the I.W.W. after the expected overthrow of the capitalist state apparatus and its supportive agencies.

In the new society, the principles of social and political equalitarianism (Kornhauser 1959) were expected to be rigorously adhered to, because, the workers would assume control (Bierstedt 1950) of all branches of govennnent through their appointed representatives, who would be subjected to collective monitoring.

Also, the various governmental departments were to be patterned after those of capitalism. Thus, the old departments under the capitalist state would be revamped and given a new mission. However, Ebert did not describe the exact mechanism that would be instituted to prevent the appointed functionaries to the positions of responsibility (Gerth and Mills 1953) from eventually developing into a new ruling elite (Komhauser 1961).

In American Labor in the Jungle: The Saga of One Big Union (1968), Ben H. Williams dealt with the various actions of resistance (Simmel 1950)

encountered by the Wobbly field organizers as they moved into the hinterland to recruit heretofore unorganized workers in the mines, lumberyards, and on the farms, as part of its doctrine of industrial unionism, which put great premium on getting workers into unions regardless of racial, ethnic, gender, and job classifications (Weber 1946).

In some cases, the obstacles involved threats of violence or actual violence in order to discourage I.W.W. recruiters. At other times, the employers made it a matter of high priority to employ a workforce that was highly variable (Spencer 1897) in terms of race and ethnicity. The rationale behind this effort was predicated upon the notion that the ensuing diversity (Spencer 1897) would hamper working class solidarity as conflicting interests (Weber 1946) became overt.

It is a truism that big business had been very successful in thwarting working class unity through the very sophisticated exploitation (Olser 1970) of ethnic and racial disputes (Lieberson 1961) among the rank and file. However, Williams did not address this pertinent question: why do racial and ethnic issues have such significant effect on the labor rank and file to such a degree that they sometimes supersede differences with big business?

Literature by Outside Sources

As I stated earlier, there have also been books, articles, and reviews, written by individuals outside the I.W.W. about its activities, aspirations, and accomplishments. In I.W.W: A Study of American Syndicalism (1919), Paul Frederick Brissenben touched on the historical origin of syndicalism in France and how it was transported to England, Italy, Spain, and the United States.

As the doctrine was introduced into the various countries, idiosyncrasies in social order (Parsons 1962) and culture (Kluckhohn 1951)

played very important roles in how it was accepted, reformulated, and interpreted. It is quite apparent from this work of Brissenden that syndicalism or anarcho-syndicalism has had a history of more success in Continental Europe and Britain than in the United States, on account of dissimilarities in class structure (Bottomore 1965), social conditions (Olsen 1970), and political culture (Bottomore 1965).

In Continental Europe and Britain, due to the rigidity of the stratification systems (Bierstedt 1950), it has traditionally been easier to engender working class cooperation (Bendix 1974). Also, the relative similarity (Spencer 1897) of the population in those countries in terms of race and ethnicity has been very instrumental in the success of syndicalism.

Brissenden was very brilliant in his discussion of syndicalism; however, there is one crucial question, which should have been adequately addressed: were the collective factors (Orlinsky 1971) and forces (Simmel 1950) that aided in the success of syndicalism also pivotal in the growth of working class political parties in the European countries?

In American Syndicalism: The I.W.W. (1913), John Graham Brooks also discussed the advent of syndicalism in the United States and dealt with some of the points raised by Brissenden. However, he put more emphasis on the manner in which the I.W.W. as a social organization (Blau 1964) and pressure group (Bendix 1974) applied it in its various struggles.

What emerges from this work is the realization that in the hands of the I.W.W., the doctrine of syndicalism was greatly revamped to reflect the social realities (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) of American society. To that end, emphasis was put on the development of dual unions instead of boring from within existing unions.

The decision of the I.W.W. Executive Council to choose dual unionism instead of boring from within unions led to a split (Simmel 1950) within the ranks and the emergence of two opposing sectors (Coser and Rosenberg 1976), with one group espousing dual unionism while the other group stressed the importance of boring from within.

Since Brooks was discussing the use of syndicalist strategies and tactics in the United States with specific emphasis on the I.W.W., there is one question that ought to have been answered: in the hands of another labor group (Bierstedt 1950) would the doctrine of syndicalism been handled differently?

In History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol. 4, 1965, Philip Sheldon Foner wrote about the conditions that precipitated the emergence, development, and eventual demise of the I.W.W. as a viable workers' group (Simmel 1955).

He touched on such factors as the rapid industrialization and technological development in the western states, which resulted in the great waves of dislocation (Park 1928) from other parts of the country; the arrival of new immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe into the eastern states of the United States to replace those moving to the west; and how the population uniformity (Piaget 1915) in the west and dissimilarity (Piaget 1915) in the east set the stage for the rise of the I.W.W. as an organized collectivity (Bierstedt 1950).

Foner also made mention of the social organizational environment (Wrong 1959) within the American labor movement, with specific reference to the absence of a nation-wide labor movement that was organized along the lines of industrial unionism and how that vacuum also contributed to the effort to found the I.W.W.

Even though he remarked on the crises in governance (Selznick 1943) and the development of cliques (Bierstedt 1950), as well as feuds (Coser 1976) with other external enemies (Simmel 1950), he did not answer this empirical question: how did the policy differences with other groups and the United States government lead to the implementation of specific tactics and strategies?

In The Wobblies (1967), Patrick Renshaw gave an account of the doctrines and strategies that were used by the I.W.W. in its labor-oriented activities (Weber 1946). He was of the view that the I.W.W., operating as a roof organization (Selznick 1943) with a number of affiliated local unions, managed sometimes to neutralize the economic advantage of big business and other vested interests (Marx 1898) through its strategies of direct action.

However, Renshaw did not discuss the nature of the social interaction (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) among the I.W.W. members and that logically leads to this question: how did the formal administrative unit (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) and informal organizational system (Selznick 1943) within the I.W.W. affect tactics and strategies in some of the economic contests (Weber 1946) with other class interests (Marx 1898)?

In The Decline of the I.W.W. (1932), John S. Gambs listed some of the problems that precipitated the decline of the I.W.W. He pointed out the following: occasions of systematic social squabbles (Simmel 1950) with the government, big business, citizens' vigilante groups, and other labor organizations (i.e., the A.F.L. and some of its affiliated local unions); nature of the coalition (Dubin 1963) between big business and the executive branch of government (Marx and Engels 1937); the strong anti-labor value system (De Gre 1964) of the period; and the inability of the I.W.W. leaders to

correctly assess the mood of the nation and reformulate their doctrines and strategies.

Gambs did a very brilliant piece of work in clearly articulating the nature of the conditions (Etzioni 1968) that led to the demise of the I.W.W. as a militant labor organization. However, the question that he did not discuss is this: if the I.W.W. was aware of the antipathy toward it, then what were the considerations that went into the executive resolutions (Olsen 1970) vis-à-vis the doctrines and strategies?

In We Shall Be All (1969), Melvyn Dubofsky gave a very detailed account of the origin, development, and decline of the I.W.W. as a militant labor organization that was working to enhance organizational cooperation (Olsen 1970) within the American labor movement.

In his discussion of the social origins (Mizruchi 1964) of the I.W.W. rank and file, it does become obvious that even though as members of society (Parsons and Shils 1952) they came from differential socioeconomic backgrounds, the bulk of them hailed from the lower strata (Orlinsky 1971) of society. Thus, as a militant labor unit (Slater 1967), the I.W.W. identified with and utilized the wage workers as its reference group (Merton and Kitt 1968) in its struggle to create the kind of social atmosphere (Durkheim 1938) that would ultimately lead to meaningful social change (Parsons 1964) and the emergence of the new society envisioned by the organization.

Even though Dubofsky also touched on the intense rivalry (Etzioni 1968) with the A.F.L. and battles with the government, conservative civic organizations, and big business, as well as I.W.W. tactics, doctrines, and leadership problems, there is one aspect of the I.W.W. experience that he did not discuss and that leads to this question: if the I.W.W. had elected to use the syndicalist strategy of boring from within existing labor unions and taking

them over, would it have been more successful in overcoming some of the social obstacles (Mosca 1939) and financial problems that it encountered?

In Rebel Voices (1968), Joyce Kornbluh edited an anthology of essays by Wobblies (from the leadership to the rank and file), which gave us rare glimpses into the thoughts of I.W.W. operatives both as private persons (Olsen 1963) and as members of a militant group (Aron 1960), in relation to such issues as industrial unionism, craft unionism, violence, sabotage, working class solidarity, strikes, demonstrations, dual unionism, syndicalism, direct action, capitalism, etc.

In reading the various essays, the impression that one gets is that in spite of the general unanimity (Dahrendorf 1968) on doctrines and strategies, there was very serious disagreement (Dahrendorf 1968) on how to effectively utilize them in the struggle against the capitalist state apparatus. One of the issues that generated great debate was that pertaining to the use of violence. There was so much confusion and indecision on this issue to the extent that some I.W.W. members thought the labor organization had the right to use violence in response to violence from big business and its allies. However, some of the same individuals later proclaimed that they were opposed to violence under any condition.

Since she was operating from the posture (Aron 1960) of an editor, Kornbluh was not required to give her evaluation (Tocqueville 1961) of the varying and inconsistent nature of the views that individuals within the I.W.W. had on violence. On account of the controversy that developed over the selection of boring from within existing unions and the formation of dual unions, it would be interesting to know what her response will be to these questions: did the same type of controversies over violence and boring from within other unions spill over into other areas of the I.W.W. doctrines and

strategies? What effect did the controversies have on organizational unity (Mills 1956)?

In the preceding section, I reviewed some of the important literature about the I.W.W. experience. In dealing with each entry, I approached the subject matter sociologically by identifying the sociological import of certain issues raised by the text. I also concluded with comments and pertinent questions in order to pinpoint some of the areas that were not adequately tackled in the individual texts, with emphasis on their sociological utility.

In the next section, I will set up the background arguments about the significance of the substantive area of sociology known as historical sociology (with respect to its origin and development within the discipline of sociology) in support of my contention that a sophisticated use of historical sociological analysis, which deals with certain specific areas of the I.W.W. experience, has the potential for playing an essential role as a contribution to the disciplines of history, sociology, or both.

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

This study falls under the substantive area of sociology known as historical sociology. I elected to pursue this study, because, this particular area--historical sociology--has been given very limited emphasis not only in sociology, but also in the history of the I.W.W. What is historical sociology? What are its goals and epistemology? Historical sociology utilizes sociological concepts, propositions, hypotheses, and theories, to examine in an analytic manner historical data with the goal of placing them in a context (and interpretative framework) that is sociological.

In the main, sociological studies, which are classified under the substantive area of historical sociology, deal with such issues as the origin, development, and evolution of social systems; social structures; social attitudes; social and cultural differentiation; social and cultural environment (Chirot 1984); moral choices and human nature (Smith 1984); historical origin of social conflicts; as well as personality disorganization (Barnes 1967; Abrams 1982; Skocpol 1984).

In the works of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim, historical sociological analyses were used to bring about an understanding and appreciation of the link between the social experiences of social actors and the operation of social institutions. Their collective goal was to effect a significant synthesis of social action and social structure into that of social process, which recognizes the importance of such elements as space and time in works pertaining to human activity (Abrams 1982).

The works, which I discussed in the previous section, constitute what is referred to as narrative history; because, they contain empirical data from written and oral records. Even though these works contain some ideas of a sociological nature, they are not expected to engage in analyses and explanations pertaining to the theoretical underpinnings of sociological concepts, propositions, hypotheses, and theories, as well as their significance to the specific subject mater. The basic expectation that the narrative historian has to fulfill is the assurance that the narrative is factual and accurate as stated (Abrams 1982; Gellner 1974).

However, the historical sociologist has a different task: the vicissitudes and nuances of social life, intergroup social life and social relationships, national character, human behavior, attitudes, and social processes, are very mercurial and indeterminate. Thus, they can not be taken for granted. On the

contrary, they require excellent analytical capabilities on the part of the historical sociologist, in order to stress their connectedness to one another, and to the overall subject matter under discussion and scrutiny. Therefore, the historical sociologist is required not only to point out how certain events occurred, but also why they occurred (Gellner 1974; Abrams 1982).

I am persuaded that a historical sociological analysis of some carefully selected components of the I.W.W. experience will play a very significant role as an original contribution to the maintenance and enhancement of the epistemological bases of both sociology and history.

Contribution to Sociology

What are my reasons for arguing about the importance of historical sociological analysis to the discipline of sociology? These are the reasons:

Most of the dissertations in sociology that I reviewed before deciding on a dissertation topic were ethnographic works dealing almost exclusively with qualitative studies of demographic, racial, and ethnic groups, as well as communities (i.e., studies of women, occupations, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, Italians, Palestinians, unwed mothers, prostitutes, substance abusers, etc.).[1]

These ethnographic studies are very insightful; because, they do help in our understanding of the forces at work in these disparate communities and their relationship to the wider social matrix. However, after reading them and finding them to be of the same area, I elected to impose a moratorium on myself and do something more interesting and truly original.

I am of the view that we have attained a critical mass in relation to some of these studies. Hence, my decision to do something theoretical and more challenging: a sociological analysis of the militant activities of the I.W.W. On account of the incredible absence of works and dissertations in

relation to historical sociological analysis of social phenomena, I do posit that any work of that area in the current atmosphere will serve as an original contribution to the discipline of sociology.

Contribution to History

Why do I think a historical sociological analysis of the militant activities of the I.W.W. will serve as an original contribution to the discipline of history? These are the reasons:

As I stated earlier, the works in the section pertaining to literature on various aspects of the I.W.W. experience have some very essential sociological ideas. In some cases the sociological ideas were beneath the surface and had to be extrapolated. This was possible; because, I did approach the subject matter of the text from a sociological perspective.

Even though the works of Dubofsky, Foner, Brissenden, Renshaw, Gambs, Brooks, St. John, Thompson, Flynn, etc., which I reviewed do contain some sociological ideas, they are not historical sociology. These historical works fall under the rubric of what historical sociologists like Abram (1982) and Gellner (1984) have classified as narrative history.

What is the difference between narrative history and historical sociology? In his insightful discussion of the differential social roles played on the intellectual and pedagogical levels of scholarship by narrative historians and historical sociologists, Gellner (1984) likened the social status of narrative historians to that of sports journalists; because, the most important normative expectation of society, which the narrative historians and sports journalists are expected to fulfill is that they give us accounts of the games and events with the highest degree of accuracy and factuality. On

account of that, they are not required to stop and analyze the various components of the games or events, which they cover.

However, as Abrams (1982) and Gellner (1984) have posited, unlike sports journalists and narrative historians, the historical sociologist has a dual role; because, he or she is normatively expected not only to ensure that the empirical data about events are factual and accurate, but also to approach the empirical data as raw historical material and analyze them sociologically.

In order to sociologically analyze the relevant data in a specific study or investigation, the historical sociologist has to do the following: dissect, reformulate, and synthesize, all the various components and put them in an interpretive framework, which has its basis in sociology. On account of all the processes that have to be exhausted, the final product that will emerge from the analysis will yield greater understanding of human nature and social processes in general (macro level) and that of the specific issues in particular (micro level). Therefore, this work about some aspects of the militant activities of the I.W.W. will definitely serve as an original contribution to the discipline of history.

Nevertheless, as Skocpol (1984) has pointed out, the process of historical sociological analysis leads to the empirical data being disjointed and not as smooth-flowing as the accounts of narrative historians (e.g., Dubofsky, Foner, Gambs, Brissenden, etc.). Since the narrative historians do not have to stop and analyze the various aspects of the raw historical data, they tend to be more neat in terms of their organization of temporal sequences. Even though the exigencies of analysis lead to some interference with the flow of historical data, the ensuing product is intellectually and pedagogically superior; indeed, it helps to increase our appreciation of the

intersticial areas that pervade social life and ensure the smooth functioning of social structures and social systems.

Sources of Data Utilized by Historical Sociologists

With respect to those of us engaged in historical sociological analysis, from where do we get our empirical data or raw historical material? In the main, the data fall into two categories: primary and secondary sources. What are the basic differences between primary and secondary sources of data? In the language of research methodology, we use the term primary source of data to refer to the kind of empirical data or historical material that emanate from the social actors, who were directly involved in the social phenomena under discussion or scrutiny.

Based on the yardstick that I have discussed, how would that apply to the literature on the I.W.W.? The following will be considered primary sources: the official publications of the I.W.W. (i.e., Solidarity, Industrial Union Bulletin, Industrial Worker, and I.W.W. Bulletin); works dealing with the views of I.W.W. members; and autobiographies of individual members of the I.W.W..

A classic example of a primary source data is Flynn's work: The Truth About the Paterson Strike, which I reviewed in the section on the literature pertaining to the I.W.W.. It is primary; because, she did not report what someone told her or heard someone telling somebody else. In fact, she was right there on the spot in Paterson and was one of the I.W.W. leaders arrested on charges of illegal assemblage and incitement to riot. Her account is what could be classified as coming from the horse's own mouth.

Even though, as I indicated in my review, she was writing from the vantage point of the I.W.W., there is no denying of the fact that she was an active participant and observer of the events surrounding the Paterson strike of 1913. If the police chief Bimson, or any other member of the Paterson political community had elected to write a book from the perspective of the Paterson authorities, that work would also qualify as primary source material, since the writer was also on the scene. In that kind of situation, there would be two contending and antithetical primary source materials about the same social phenomenon. In any case, that is not an unusual situation in relation to historical data, as all parties attempt to present data that would conform to their definition of the situation.

In research, essays and books written by individuals in reference to specific social phenomena are classified as secondary sources (Skocpol 1984). How does this model apply to the history of the I.W.W.?

With respect to the empirical data about the I.W.W. experience, the writings of individuals outside the I.W.W. would qualify as secondary sources of data. Prominent among these secondary sources are: Dubofsky, We Shall Be All; Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol. 4; Gambs, The Decline of the I.W.W.; Renshaw, The Wobblies; Brooks, American Syndicalism, the I.W.W.; and Brissenden, I.W.W.: A Study of American Syndicalism.

These works are secondary source materials; because, unlike Flynn, Haywood, St. John, Thompson, and Trautmann, etc., these historians and scholars were not directly involved in the phenomena, which they reported. Instead, the they relied on the written reports of individuals, who were the actual participants in the activities under discussion. In fact, in some cases they did utilize material from other social actors, who based their data on

what they heard from individuals, who were actual participants in the events, or witnesses to some aspects of the phenomena.

Based on the facts to which I have alluded in the foregoing, primary source data are considered by researchers to be superior to secondary source data. However, as Skocpol (1984) has posited, sometimes in historical sociological analyses, the primary source data are simply not enough to give the historical sociologist adequate raw empirical data upon which proper analysis could be based. Therefore, under those conditions, as Skocpol (1984) has indicated, secondary source data from very reliable historians have to be used in conjunction with data from primary sources.

She argued that the use of secondary sources by historical sociologists, is a practice is not unlike that of researchers involved with survey studies, who at times engage in elaborate social science analyses of the viewpoints, ideas, and conclusions, of works undertaken by other researchers, instead of drawing survey questionnaires of their own. She also likened the use of secondary sources by historical sociologists to that of social science researchers, who in a bid to expand the scope of their own work, tend to engage in analyses of conclusions arrived at by other experts in the same field.

Nevertheless, as Hunt (1984) and Skocpol (1984) have pointed out, historical sociologists ought to be very cautious in their utilization of secondary sources as empirical data, by being cognizant of and alert to the implicit and explicit biases of social actors, and endeavoring to acquaint themselves, if possible, with the primary sources upon which conclusions and viewpoints have been made by these secondary sources. They also suggested that the primary sources behind some of the secondary sources could also

serve as useful tools for the expansion of research into other related areas that were not adequately dealt with in earlier studies.

I do agree with the perspectives of Skocpol and Hunt regarding the use of primary and secondary sources of documentation by historical sociologists. To that end, I will be utilizing both the primary and secondary sources that I reviewed in the section dealing with the literature on history of the I.W.W., while being duly cognizant of the limitations of secondary sources that have been discussed by Hunt and Skocpol.

In any case, unlike Hunt and Skocpol, I am of the view that historical sociologists involved in analyses of historical data also have to be very alert to the shortcomings of primary sources and not be tempted to consider them as sacrosanct. Because, the social actors, who sometimes happen to be the sources of primary data (by virtue of having been actual participants in or observers of certain specific social phenomena), may and actually do have their own biases and prejudices, which could influence their selection and presentation of data.

In this section, I discussed the basic aspects of the substantive area of sociology known as historical sociology; some of the historical phenomena, which act as subjects of research and analysis by historical sociologists; the basic differences between the social status of historical sociologists and narrative historians; issues pertaining to the utilization of historical data from primary and secondary sources; and the expected original contribution of this dissertation to the epistemology of sociology and that of history.

In the next section, the matters will be related to the doctrines, tactics, and strategies, that were espoused and practiced by the I.W.W. as part of its mission as a syndicalist organization operating under the aegis of the capitalist state and seeking to effect a meaningful transformation of society.

THE DOCTRINES AND STRATEGIES OF THE I.W.W.

As I indicated at the beginning of my discussion in the section pertaining to the review of the literature on the I.W.W., the Wobbly officials (Riesman 1951) used the official publications as instruments of socialization (Mead 1934) for their rank and file in relation to the tactics, strategies, and doctrines, of the labor organization (Foner 1965). After the founding of the I.W.W. in 1905, all the doctrines and strategies were published in the Industrial Union Manifesto,[2] and an ad hoc committee under the leadership of William Trautmann was mandated to disseminate it to all labor organizations in the United States and to selected ones in Europe (Foner 1965; St. John 1919).

The Western Influence

The doctrines, strategies, and tactics, of the I.W.W. did not emerge in a vacuum. On the contrary, there were some major background conditions, which set the stage for their formulation by the labor organization. The precipitating conditions were prevalent throughout the country; however, they were more pronounced in the western states, where a number of pitched battles (Marx 1910) took place between very powerful labor unions and business monopolies (Mills 1958), as workers fought for higher wages and better working conditions (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965; Foster 1955).

The struggles that ensued between such powerful unions as the Butte Mine Workers Union, Coeur d'Alene Executive Mine Workers Union, and big corporations, led to tremendous distrust of industrial concerns and government, as well as disillusionment with the political process on the part

of western labor rank and file. The collective antipathy toward the capitalist state made it very easy for western workers to accept and espouse the following doctrines and strategies: violence, sabotage, direct action, syndicalism, unwillingness to sign contracts with employers, and refusal to form alliances with political organizations (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; Brissenden 1919).

In any case, it is important to note that even though western workers exercised a tremendous amount of leverage (Nisbet 1953) within the I.W.W. and able to influence its selection of doctrines and strategies, as I stated in the section dealing with the review of literature on the I.W.W., there was great uproar (Lynd 1957) within the ranks over boring from within existing unions and the formation of dual unions to compete with others (Foner 1965).

At the founding convention of the I.W.W., there were numerous battles over the so-called political cause, with some delegates calling for alliance with political parties, while others virulently opposed it. The dispute over alignment with political parties was so intense that even though attempts at a compromise were made, it eventually led to the split within the organization and the various encounters between the regular I.W.W. and the so-called Detroit faction led by Daniel De Leon (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; Thompson 1955).

Even though the Wobblies were led to embrace militant doctrines and strategies as a result of their social standing (Weber 1946) as workers operating under the aegis of capitalism, they were also influenced by the works of Marx, Engels, Sorel, Hegel, Debs, etc., as well as the syndicalist doctrine of left-wing unionists in Europe, who had very strong opinions on violence, sabotage, passive resistance, class struggle, abolition of the state,

dual unions, boring from within, and lack of compromise with employers (Brissenden 1919; Brook 1913; Thompson 1955).

In the following pages, I will discuss some of the basic doctrines and strategies that were instituted by the I.W.W. during its heyday as a syndicalist organization that was interested in securing better wages and work conditions for its members.

Opposition to Political Action

In the Industrial Union Manifesto of the I.W.W., it was clearly stipulated that the labor movement would confine its activities to the economic domain without any parallel organizational effort in the political sector. This doctrine constituted the basic goal of the syndicalist or anarcho-syndicalist principle (Brooks 1913; Brissenden 1919; Kornbluh 1968).

The proponents of syndicalism did argue that parliamentary reforms do not go far enough to help the working class in their struggles with the management teams of big business, which in their view, exercise tremendous restraint (Weber 1946) over a substantial portion of legislators through their huge financial contributions to election and re-election campaigns. The Wobblies were very cognizant of the nexus between financial resources (Galbraith 1967) and the acquisition of social power (Bierstedt 1950) by individuals and conglomerates (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; Kornbluh 1968).

Industrial Unionism and Craft Unionism

Under craft unionism the unions were segregated on the basis of craft and skill (e.g., if a carpenter, blacksmith, electrician, plumber, etc., all worked in a building construction company, they were compelled to sign up with different unions based on their expertise), leading to craft jealousy, craft

exclusivity, and craft elitism. Under industrial unionism, workers were organized not on the basis of craft, but rather on the basis of the particular industry in which they worked (e.g., the carpenter, blacksmith, welder, electrician, etc., working in a building construction company, belonged to the Building Trades Industrial Union), in spite of their different skills (Trautmann 1909; Debs 1948).

In the operation of craft unionism, there were occasions when persons belonging to the same craft could not work in other localities without the permission of the craft locals, which had jurisdiction (Kornhauser 1961) over those areas. The ensuing territorial disputes (Riesman 1951) made it easier for the owners of big business to exploit the animosities to their advantage (Marx 1898). They did all that they could to exacerbate the battles through the use of spies, informants, and agents provocateurs, who were paid huge sums of money (Foner 1964; Dubofsky 1969; Trautmann 1909).

During periods of industrial strife (i.e,. strikes), it was difficult for workers in the same industry to unite under one banner due to the separation (Bottomore 1965) brought on by being organized into craft unions with sometimes competing and divergent interests (Lenski 1966). Also, since the craft unions worked as independent units (Mills 1953), they tended to act in ways that did not advance the goals of the working class (e.g., if the carpenters in a particular building construction company went out on a strike, the craft unions belonging to the electricians, painters, blacksmiths, plumbers, etc., crossed the picket lines). This state of affairs did violence to class awareness (Marx 1898) within the ranks of the proletariat (Trautmann 1909; St. John 1919; Thompson 1955).

One of the principal consequences of industrial unionism was that class consciousness was greatly enhanced among the rank and file (e.g., if a

carpenter in a building construction company was either suspended or dismissed under conditions that the union felt to be unfair, all the workers in that company went out on a strike called by the industrial union representing all the workers in the building trades) and made them very formidable in their struggles with management (Trautmann 1909; Debs 1948).

Sometimes, even workers in the same industry from other companies, as well as those in related industries, went out on sympathy strikes as a gesture of solidarity (Bell 1960). This state of affairs led to what Marx (1898) referred to as a class for itself, indicating an awareness on the part of the working class of their collective identity as a social group (Bottomore 1965) with a distinct agenda. On account of the foregoing, the I.W.W. considered industrial unionism to be superior to craft union and made it the cornerstone of its organizing effort (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; Debs 1948).

Refusal to Sign Contracts with Employers

One of the dominant I.W.W. doctrines--and to some extent a strategy--, was its aversion to signing time contracts with employers. Most of these contracts had clauses stipulating that management be informed in advance--within a certain time period--of an impending strike. The I.W.W. considered this to be strategically erroneous; because, it worked to the disadvantage of the workers by depriving them of the utilization of the element of surprise, which is very powerful in a strike situation (St. John 1919; Thompson 1955).

Based on advance knowledge of impending strikes, management did all that it could to preempt the labor unions through the use of strikebreakers, agents provocateurs, and private detectives. There was widespread intimidation of workers to prevent them from joining strikes and demonstrations as craft unions sought to fulfill the terms of their individual

contracts with management. Black workers were pitched against whites, while the white ethnics were brought into competition (Boulding 1962) with one another as their traditional prejudices and stereotypes were exploited by big business to its advantage (St. John 1919; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

The ensuing discord (Thoenes 1966) created a social environment (Aron 1960) that was ripe with suspicion among the workers and did harm to their unity (Michel 1962). With the passage of time, the workers started to perceive one another as the opponent instead of management. This type of consciousness or state of mind is what Marx (1898) referred to as false consciousness among the proletariat (Trautmann 1911; Foner 1965; St. John 1919).

The Militant Minority

Even though the I.W.W. constituted only a small percentage of the total labor movement, it did subscribe to the doctrine of the militant minority and considered itself as such in relation to the entire labor movement. The I.W.W. thought of itself as being the elite vanguard unit of the labor movement and actually did believe that it had both the mandate and overwhelming support of the working class; because, the goals and aspirations of the organization were in consonance with that of the entire working class (Trautmann 1909; St. John 1919; Foner 1965).

The I.W.W. leadership (Selznick 1943) was aware of the fact that in order to promote working class unity within the ranks, it had to put in place some mechanisms for social regulation (Ross 1910) and imperative coordination (Weber 1946). To that end, it set up libraries filled with books containing the works of people like Marx, Engels, Sorel, James, etc., as well as propaganda leagues and workers' education bureaus, which organized

seminars pertaining to such concepts as capitalism, socialism, class struggle, class consciousness, class solidarity, industrial unionism, direct action, syndicalism, etc. (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; St. John 1919).

I.W.W. Songs

One of the chief exponents of the use of songs as a strategy in engendering class consciousness and class solidarity was Joe Hill,[3] who was the view that since the bulk of the I.W.W. rank and file were individuals oriented to concrete acts, rather than theoretical propositions (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) about capitalism, expressive symbols (i.e., poems, songs, speeches, etc.) had to be utilized to reach them. He stressed that this could be done by taking a few abstract concepts, simplifying them into easily comprehensible ideas, and turning them into lyrics and songs of an inspirational nature (Chaplin 1948; Kornbluh 1968; Foner 1965).

Sabotage

The I.W.W. hierarchy considered sabotage to be not only an integral part, but also a legitimate strategy in the struggle to dismantle the capitalist state apparatus and its economic system. It ranged from the destruction of goods, machinery, etc.,[4] without management being able to find the source of the act (Flynn 1915; Dowell 1939; Williams 1911).

It is essential to note that the strategy of sabotage was always evident, on account of the adversarial nature of the connection between labor and management (Simmel 1950). The I.W.W. had always indicated that under the capitalist state, management, on account of its ownership of the means of production (Marx 1910) and the right to hire and dismiss workers, did exercise a disproportionate amount of power during negotiations involving

friction over work conditions and wages (Weber 1946) in various industries. For their part, the bourgeoisie effectively used their resources to recruit spies an agents provocateurs, who were charged with the task of sometimes infiltrating the I.W.W. to foment acts of insurrection, in order to destroy the social valuation (Merton and Barber 1962) of the labor organization and galvanize popular opposition (Etzioni 1968) against it. However, the official position of the I.W.W. as a progressive and radical group (Olsen 1970) was that it did oppose any and all acts that would result in injury to individuals, while putting more emphasis on the destruction of goods, machinery, buildings, etc., (St. John 1919; Thompson 1955; Foner 1965).

Violence

Even though as a matter of principle the I.W.W. was opposed to violence, individual members had their own views as to when, how, and where to use violence: Big Bill Haywood, for instance, stressed that the I.W.W. ought to concentrate its efforts on the strike option to achieve its ultimate goal. However, in a speech before a meeting of the Socialist Party, he was perceived as advocating violence in violation of the official stance of the political organization. This action led to his dismissal from its National Executive Committee. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and Vincent St. John were in agreement that violence was unavoidable, on account of the tumultuous relationship (Parsons and Shils 1952) between big business and labor. St. John emphasized that while the I.W.W. would not be the first to use the option of violence, it would not hesitate to resort to it if the labor union became the target of such action (St. John 1919; Flynn 1915; Foner 1965).

Boring from Within and Dual Unions

Another issue which served to draw attention to the multipilicity of perspectives (Parsons 1964) within the I.W.W. was that pertaining to the debate over boring from within and dual unions. As a strategy, boring from within was very prevalent among militant unionists in Europe (i.e., France and Britain). It involved highly-trained and well-organized cadres of militant unionists not forming industrial unions to oppose existing conservative or reactionary ones, but rather joining these unions, taking over the principal positions (Parsons 1964), changing the policies, and converting them into militant industrial unions (Brissenden 1919; Brooks 1913; Foner 1965).

One of the fiercest proponents of boring from within was William Z. Foster, a former member of the Socialist Party, who joined the I.W.W. after its founding and a veteran of the so-called Free Speech Fights that were organized by I.W.W. operatives in cities like Spokane, Seattle, San Diego, Fresno, etc., to assert their First Amendment right to stand on soapboxes at street corners to recruit potential members for the various union locals with which the organization was affiliated (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

Foster was one of the Wobblies arrested during the campaign and spent six month in jail. Upon his release, he made trips to France and Britain, where he met syndicalists and militant unionists, who used rhetoric and other forms of persuasion (Etzioni 1968) to apprise him of the tactical superiority of boring from within over that of dual unionism. However, on account of widespread opposition to his views within the I.W.W. after his return, he left to found his own organization, which he named The Syndicalist League of North America (Kornbluh 1968; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

Demonstrations

Under the aegis of the I.W.W., there were a number of demonstrations that were carefully planned to ensure greater success and maximum publicity (Park 1916). As a strategy in the class warfare between the labor movement and the ruling capitalist establishments, the I.W.W. did not regard demonstrations as being distinct from its other strategies. On the contrary, demonstrations were considered to be adjuncts to the propaganda that emanated from official I.W.W. publications (Thompson 1955; St. John 1919; Renshaw 1967).

The I.W.W. organizers were very cognizant of the emotional impact of symbolism (Blauner 1956) in social relations and made it a point to have hundreds of women and their children at demonstration sites. The heavy presence of women and children was carefully orchestrated to elicit public support and influence popular sentiment (Nisbet 1953) in favor of the I.W.W. and its cause (Flynn 1915; Thompson 1955; St. John 1919).

Strikes

As part of its tactical armamentarium, the Wobbly organization had a number of strikes--ranging from sit-down strikes to the ultimate strike: the general strike--in order to create the appropriate social environment (Moore 1958) for a revolutionary transformation of society (Spencer 1857) involving the ouster of the bourgeois class from positions of social and political dominance (Mills 1956) within society (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; St. John 1919).

Syndicalism and Direct Action

All the strategies of the I.W.W. were classified under the category of direct action, which put emphasis on the workers' own initiatives to change their job-related grievances, rather than reliance on political action in the form of legislatively-inspired measures aimed at social and political reform. The I.W.W. did not trust the capitalist state to be benevolent toward the working class; because, the political apparatus of the capitalist state, in its opinion, exists for the sole purpose of protecting the bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels 1937). In left-wing political circles and among militant unionists, direct action was considered to be the very essence of syndicalism or anarcho-syndicalism (Renshaw 1967; Brissenden 1919; Brooks 1913).

SUMMARY

In this introductory chapter, I did the following: reviewed some of the pertinent literature on the I.W.W. from within the labor organization itself and also from external sources; discussed the importance of historical sociology as a methodological devise in sociological research and analysis; and gave an overview of I.W.W. doctrines and strategies.

In the next chapter, the areas for discussion will be those pertaining to the rapid industrialization of the late nineteenth century; the growth of trusts and monopolies; the emergence of labor unions such as the Knights of Labor and the National Labor Union; the factors that led to the founding of the I.W.W. and the A.F.L.; as well as the situation of conflict that ensued as they began to compete for turf and membership.

NOTES

1. During my search for a suitable dissertation topic, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of scholarly work, I reviewed dissertation abstracts dating back several years from all over the United States, including those in the Dissertation Room of the Mina Rees Library at the Graduate Center of The City University of New York. Therefore, my reference to the observed monotony in dissertation topics, constitutes a rather interesting phenomenon, which is endemic to sociology departments in all regions of the country.

2. The Industrial Union Manifesto was the official communiqué or mission statement that was promulgated by the I.W.W., after the founding convention on June 27, 1905, in the city of Chicago. This document set out the goals and aspirations of the labor organization in terms of its economic identification and social relationship with the working masses, other labor organizations, the business community, and the sociopolitical structure of American society.

3. Joe Hill was one of the most prolific and very dynamic emotional leaders within the I.W.W.. He came to the United States from Sweden in 1901 when he was just 19 years of age. In a move that is typical of some Caucasian ethnic immigrants to this country, he sought to identify himself with the dominant Anglo-Saxon cultural ethos by changing his original Swede name Joel Emmanuel Haaglund to Joe Hill. He gained his facility in the English language during his English-education classes at YMCA in his community in Sweden and during his work on ships that were traveling between the ports of Sweden and England.

He became a member of the I.W.W. in 1910 and took part in a number of I.W.W. activities in California during the San Pedro dock workers' strike, the fight for free speech in San Diego, and the failed effort to convert lower California into a commune, which started at Tia Juana. While a member of the I.W.W., he also wrote a number of labor-related inspirational songs and poems, which were later compiled into an anthology and later published in official I.W.W. publications such as Solidarity and Industrial Worker.

At the age of thirty-three, and only three years after joining the I.W.W., Joe Hill was executed on November 19, 1915, at the Utah State Penitentiary, after being convicted of the murder of a grocer by the name of Morrison. Even though the government considered the evidence against him to be very strong, in left-wing labor and political circles it was considered to be a sham. In fact, there was the widespread belief and suspicion that his arrest, conviction, and execution, were all part of a gigantic conspiracy by some very powerful vested interests (i.e., the Copper Trust and the Mormon Church) for his organizing activities among the workers during their successful strike in 1913 against the United Construction Company of Bingham, Utah.

Within the Wobbly rank and file, the arrest, conviction, and execution, of Joe Hill on what they defined as trumped-up charges of murder, was seen as another empirical evidence of the theory formulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1937), pertaining to the capitalist state functioning as an executive committee, whose primary goal is the protection of the vested interests of the bourgeois class and the bourgeois order.

In the artistic community and in left-wing union and political circles, Joe Hill was considered to be a cultural icon or leader. His poems, songs, and political views, were published in the Industrial Worker, Solidarity, Industrial Pioneer, International Socialist Review, and various editions of the I.W.W. Songbook. A number of books, articles, and reviews, have also been written on various facets of his remarkable career.

The most prominent of the works on Joe Hill are the following: John Greenway, American Folksongs of Protest (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), 179, 192; Philip Sheldon Foner, The Case of Joe Hill (New York: International Publishers, 1965), 9-11, 16-18, 23-24; History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol. 4 (New York: International Publishers, 1965), 151-157; Barrie Stavis, The Man Who Never Died: A Play About Joe Hill With Notes on His Times (New York: Haven Press, 1953), 3-114; Barrie Stavis and Frank Harmon, The Songs of Joe Hill (New York: Oak Publishers, 1960); Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, I Speak My Own Piece (New York: Masses and Mainstream, 1955); Gibbs M. Smith, Joe Hill (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1968); Ralph Chaplin, Wobbly: The Rough and Tumble Story of an American Radical (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Joyce Kornbluh, ed.,

Rebel Voices: An I.W.W. Anthology (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968), 127-157; Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), 147; Wallace Stegner, The Preacher and the Slave (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950).

4. Written in 1910 by Emile Pouget, Le Sabotage was considered by militant unionists in France to be the most authoritative and hence definitive work on the subject of violence with respect to its applicability in the labor-management relationship. Of all the tactics that were promulgated under the banner of direct action, the one on sabotage proved to be the most sensitive and controversial.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the French labor organization, Confederation Generale du Travail, consisted of syndicalists, anarchists, and other left-wing elements. Pouget was considered to be one of the leading anarchist intellectual lights of the era. Thus, when he started to discuss the nuances of sabotage and its place on the factory floor, he attracted a very wide audience.

His ideas about the efficacy of sabotage began to gain momentum after an appearance in 1897 before a meeting of the labor group, Confederation Generale du Travail. At that meeting, he gave an account of his research on the methods that workers in other parts of Europe had used as an equalizer to the intimidation and other acts of violence that had been employed by the business community.

Thereafter, militant unionists in France began to use the word "sabotage" in their private and public discourse. In France the word was "sabot", and it is a noun that comes from the verb "Saboter", which means to botch or bungle. Out of this came the English word "saboteur", which is used in the sociopolitical sphere to refer to terrorists or subversives, and in militant labor circles to refer to scabs, strikebreakers, and agents provocateurs. As a matter of fact, Pouget got his ideas about sabotage from his research on Scottish unionists, who used a tactic known as "ca'canny", which meant doing things "slowly" or "soldiering".

Even though, as I stated earlier, sabotage as a tactic of direct action was very provocative and sparked controversy, its initial usage in an official I.W.W. publication did not occur until 1910, when William Trautmann made reference to it in an article that was published in the June 4, 1910, issue of the I.W.W. organ, Solidarity.

The article was written in relation to the strike of six hundred clothing workers employed at the Chicago plant of Lamm and Company, over the dismissal of a worker by management.

While the founding convention of the I.W.W. was attended by a number of left-wing elements from the Socialist Party, there were some right-wing elements, who stayed away; because, they were of the view that a new labor organization would create too many divisions among the working class and render the labor movement ineffective as an interest group. These individuals continued to engage in periodic controversies with the I.W.W. and the left-wing elements within the Socialist Party.

One of the issues that helped to exacerbate the rift between the I.W.W. and the right-wing forces in the Socialist Party, was that pertaining to the tactic of sabotage. At its 1912 convention, the right-wing forces, who happened to be in the majority, managed to use their numerical superiority to pass a resolution (over the objection of the left-wing forces) to rescind Socialist Party membership to anyone who supported the tactic of sabotage.

In his status as a member of the executive board of the Socialist Party, Haywood undertook the role of a delegate to the 1910 Congress of the Second Socialist International in Europe. However, upon his return to the United States, he went on a lecture tour during which he discussed the strategic benefits of direct action methods, including that of sabotage. This led to his expulsion from the party and the loss of his status as an executive board member.

In her book Sabotage: The Conscious Withdrawal of the Workers' Industrial Efficiency (1915), Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was very emphatic in pointing out that in the eyes of the I.W.W., the tactic of sabotage was considered to be indispensable, given the nature of the asymmetrical relationship that exists between the bourgeois class and the proletariat within the occupational system of the capitalist state apparatus. The tactic of sabotage has also been widely discussed by a number of other individuals both within and outside the I.W.W.. The following works have contributed immensely to the understanding of the tactic: Walker C. Smith, Sabotage: Its History, Philosophy, and Function (Spokane: Published by author, 1913), 8; William Trautmann, Industrial Unionism (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1909), 16-18; Direct Action and Sabotage (Pittsburgh: n.p., 1913); Paul F. Brissenden, The I.W.W.: A Study of American Syndicalism (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 6, 76-82; Vincent St. John, The I.W.W.: Its History, Structure, and Methods, rev. ed. (Chicago: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, 1919), 12, 17-18, 40-45; E.F. Dowell, A History of Criminal Syndicalist Legislation in the United States (Baltimore: n.p., 1939), 36; E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels and Social Bandits (New York: n.p., 1969), 57-59, 108; Grover H. Perry, The Revolutionary I.W.W. (Cleveland: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, 1916), 11-12; Vernon Jensen, Heritage of Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), 70-71; Andre Tridon, The New Unionism (New York: Huebsch, 1913), 32; John Spargo, Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism (New York: n.p., 1913), 13-15; Marion D. Savage, Industrial Unionism in America (New York: Ronald, 1922), 97; Wilfred H. Crook, The General Strike (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1931); William D. Haywood, The General Strike (Chicago: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, n.d.), 2; E.T. Hiller, The Strike (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928); Fred Thompson, The I.W.W.: Its First Fifty Years (Chicago: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, 1955), 40, 47, 81-82, 85; Patrick Renshaw, The Wobblies: The Story of Syndicalism in the United States (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967); David H. Grover, Debaters and Dynamiters (Corvalis, Oregon: n.p., 1964); John G. Brooks, American Syndicalism: The I.W.W. (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 103; Flynn, I Speak My Own Piece, 81-84; Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 146-170; Foner, History of the Labor Movement, 157-167; Kornbluh, Rebel Voices, 35-63.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IMPACT OF THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION ON UNION ACTIVITY AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE A.F.L. AND I.W.W.

In order to clearly articulate the issues that acted as triggering mechanisms for the formation of the I.W.W. and the hostility (Bailey and Feder 1973) that this state of affairs generated with the A.F.L., the following empirical questions ought to be effectively addressed in conjunction with others: what was the nature of the external foes (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) within the American social ethos (Simmel 1950), who together with elements within the A.F.L. elected to found the I.W.W..? What pivotal roles did the Knights of Labor and the National Labor Union play in laying the groundwork for union activity in the United States after the onslaught of the industrial revolution? What were their policies and aspirations for the working class? What critical issues led to the conflict between the I.W.W. and the A.F.L.? What constituted some of the basic doctrinal differences and approaches between the two labor organizations? What was the state of the organizational environment (Bierstedt 1950) within the American labor movement, which made it possible for the I.W.W. to emerge on the scene?

After establishing the fact that the A.F.L. and I.W.W. were empirically in conflict, I will then answer this question: what were the organizational attitudes and behaviors (McNeil 1965) that were manifested by both associations as a result of being in a state of conflict with each other? In the literature on social conflict, there are a number of hypotheses dealing with changes in attitudes and behaviors, which most social combines (Durkheim

1953) undergo during periods of intergroup skirmishes (Kriesberg 1973). In the concluding paragraphs of this chapter, I will select one of the hypotheses and link it with empirical data, which either converge with or differ (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) from it. In dealing with the hypotheses, I will not select data just for the purpose of confirming some implicit hypotheses. Thus, the analyses will be value-free (Znaniecki 1936) in this context.

THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION ON LABOR UNION ACTIVITY

The labor movement in the United States did not operate in a state of social isolation (Seeman 1959) from other agencies (Eisenstadt 1964) of organized society (Olsen 1963). On the contrary, the social perspectives (Mead 1934) of the labor rank and file have always been influenced by economic and social alterations (Spencer 1897) in the wider society. Of all the sociocultural and economic phases (Marx 1904) that occurred in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution, which took place between 1877 and 1917 with the growth of industrial concerns and urbanization (Park 1915), affected all sectors (Parsons 1964) of the social union (Slater 1967) including of course the labor movement (Boyer and Morais 1976).

Prior to the changes to which I have alluded, the United States was, in the main, an agrarian society (Comte 1896). However, the newly-built industrial concerns led to great waves of demographic shifts (Park 1928) from the farmlands (involving American citizens), and massive movement of newly-arrived ethnics from Eastern and Southern Europe, with most of these also coming from peasant cultures and looking for employment in the industrial establishments (Diamond 1963).

The factories of the fledgling industrial system provided the migrants and immigrants with jobs in such areas as construction, meat packing, steel mills, and coal digging. The jobs were very strenuous but the wages were very low and the working conditions deplorable. Apart from the frustrations (Merton 1949) emanating from their menial jobs, the new workers also experienced a tremendous amount of culture shock as they scrambled to adjust themselves to the urban setting, which was very different from their rural environments (Durkheim 1951) in this country and Europe (Boyer and Morais 1976).

The emphasis on industrialization and modernization (Park 1916) led to the development of massive industrial combines and the rise of a bourgeois class (Marx 1910; Marx and Engels 1937), which was very adept at using its access to the means of production to merge financial and industrial capital (Galbraith 1967) into huge trusts and monopolies (Foner 1964; Dubofsky 1969).

THE CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY AND THEIR ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES

The following social functionaries (Merton and Barber 1962) were among those, who played prominent social parts (Merton and Barber 1962) during the period between 1897 and 1904: Andrew Carnegie sold his steel and iron plants to J.P. Morgan, who made them part of his Federal Steel Company (United States Steel); Rockefeller had Standard Oil; James Duke had tobacco; Gustavus Swift controlled meat packing plants; Ward and Roebuck had department stores; while James Pillsbury had grain processing plants. The activities of these individuals led to the interplay of financial and

industrial assets (Etzioni 1968), which control Wall Street (Moody 1904; Foner 1964).

One of the most essential aspects of the new industrial order was the fact that the entrepreneurs (to whom I have referred) were able to maintain and enhance the supremacy of their corporate economic system (Lieberson 1961) by acquiring ownership of companies (Lynd 1957) in different industries. In pursuance of that goal, Carnegie took ownership of plants in such diverse fields as steel, coal, iron, blast furnace, finishing mill, railroad, and ore; J.P. Morgan became the financier to other industrialists and had a number of his operatives sitting on the boards of several leading corporations; while Rockefeller had oil fields, refineries, plants for mining and smelting of copper, steel complex in Pueblo, Colorado; transcontinental railroads, local utilities, and investment banks in New York (Boyer and Morais 1976).

On account of the growth of such enormous material interests (Coser 1956), the United States was able to emerge as the most wealthy nation in the industrial world. However, the industries that served as the bases of that economic structure (Olsen 1970) were in the hands of an oligarchy (Galbraith 1967). These industrialists were able to use their wealth (Weber 1946) to exercise checks (Bierstedt 1950) over price levels, supply and demand of goods and services, as well as the right to dictate wage levels and work conditions for the workers employed in their enormous economic empires (Dubofsky 1969).

POVERTY IN THE MIDST OF PROSPERITY

In the 1980s one of the basic hypotheses in Ronald Reagan's economic policy was the notion that the government, by helping business to grow and

prosper was also helping the working poor to gain steady employment and participate in the ensuing prosperity through the trickle-down process.

While this hypothesis is very logical and sound, in the actual operation of capitalism, that is not always the case. Because, around the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, even though the professional classes (Mizruchi 194) and skilled workers benefitted economically on account of the very high demand for their expertise, a large number of workers (most of whom were either newly-arrived immigrants to this country or migrants from rural America) lived in grinding poverty and on the verge of starvation (Hunter 1965; Foner 1965).

With the passage of time, the poor working conditions, low wages, and occasional unemployment, coalesced (Spencer 1897) to create an environment (Mead 1934) of malaise (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) within the ranks of the wage workers, as they began to see themselves as an oppressed class (Coser 1976) in the American social configuration (Moore 1958). Within the ranks of the workers, a number of questions were being raised in connection with the great disparity in the life chances (Weber 1946) between those segments of the population that were becoming affluent (Bell 1960) and the poor, who had to contend with meager wages (Gutman 1965).

In the informal discussions that took place among the wage workers, the one issue around which an accord (Parsons 1960) emerged was the need for some sort of security for the working class in the form of union organizing. However, their deeply-ingrained prejudices and biases made it very difficult for them to engage in any form of group action (Ross 1910) in pursuit of self-determination (Galbraith 1952) in the economic sphere (Foner 1964).

As I indicated in my discussion of industrial unionism (see section on I.W.W. doctrines and strategies in chapter 1), the management teams of big business skillfully used the differences in race, ethnicity, and craft, to foment distrust within the ranks of the workers. This state of affairs also contributed to the initial lack of solidarity among the working class elements, as they began to view one another with suspicion. In spite of the obstacles to which I have alluded, the workers were able to put aside their problems and resist the machinations of big business to create divisions as they engaged in activities aimed at advancing their common goals (Mead 1918). Some of their activities led to the emergence of very powerful labor unions that fought tirelessly for workers' rights. One of those unions was the Knights of Labor (Dubofsky 1969; Ravage 1917).

THE FORMATION OF THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR

On account of the dedicated actions of a number of very courageous workers, the Knights of Labor became the first nation-wide labor organization to come into existence during the period of rapid industrialization in the United States. It was initially operated as a secret society in 1869; however, in 1878 it became a nation-wide organization with the motto, "An injury to one is the concern of all." Membership in the new organization was open to all workers, who saw it as a labor organization (Parsons 1960) that would help them to gain better working conditions and higher wages (Ware 1929; Foner 1955).

Under the stewardship (Riesman 1951) of Terence Powderly, the total membership grew to about a million in 1886. With such an impressive increase in group membership, the new organization was in a position to help

the working class; however, it considered strikes to be tactically ineffective in the struggle for better working conditions and higher wages and actually issued warnings to its affiliated trade assemblies to desist from support of any strikes. The use of coercion (Etzioni 1968) by Powderly to prevent strikes stemmed from his fear that such strategies would arouse public resentment and antagonism (Pareto 1935) against the new organization (Boyer and Morais 1976).

As part of its support for worker rights, the Knights of Labor gave its enthusiastic endorsement (Kornhauser 1961) to the fight for an eight-hour day. For its part, the corporate world considered the movement for an eight-hour day as part of an effort (Aron 1960) by the labor movement to subvert its economic responsibility (Bell 1960) in directing the terms of employment within the confines of the work place. There was a tremendous increase in recruitment for the Knights of Labor between 1885 and 1886 (from 100,000 to 700,000), on account of the railroad strike that was successfully organized against the Wabash and Gould's Southwestern System in 1885, during the movement (Dahrendorf 1959) for an eight-hour day (Boyer and Morais 1976).

Even though the growth in recruits helped to solidify its social appeal (Parsons 1964) as an inclusive combination (Slater 1967), which embraced all workers regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and craft, the frequency of strikes coupled with increased militancy among the rank and file during the eight-hour day campaign became problematic for Powderly. In his strategic assessment (MacIver 1942), some of the mass actions in support of the eight-hour day (i.e., singing, dancing, demonstrating, and striking) would only help to confirm the fears and apprehensions of most people about the

dangerous nature of the labor movement in general and the Knights of Labor in particular (Foner 1955; Boyer and Morais 1976).

The propaganda (Etzioni 1968) of the big corporations was so intense that in the wider society (Merton 1949) the Knights of Labor was viewed as having communist ties and bent on destroying the new industrial order (Park 1916) with its support of the campaign for an eight-hour day, which would eventually result in rioting, gambling, debauchery, and drunken behavior. This perspective of the big companies was repeated several times by their allies in the media for weeks and months as thousands of workers marched throughout the country in support of the eight-hour day (Foner 1955).

Dissension over Doctrines and Strategies

Even though Powderly was well-respected as the leader of the Knights of Labor, some very serious internal debates (Bierstedt 1950) began to develop as the movement for an eight-hour day gained a lot of momentum throughout the nation. Powderly was against strikes while embracing the idea of education and the establishment of workers' produce cooperatives to gradually replace the capitalist economic system as the best strategy for the working class (Foner 1955).

In pursuance of that objective, Powderly objected very strenuously to the call for a mass strike action by workers on May 1, 1886, in support of the eight-hour day. However, the more militant segments of the Knights of Labor under the leadership of African-American organizers like Frank Ferrell and Leonora Barry, rejected the notion of reliance on education and workers' cooperatives as the most effective weapons to be used against capitalism (Boyer and Morais 1976).

In fact, there was such a total breakdown of popular mandate (Gerth and Mills 1953) for the leadership, as the rank and file of the Knights of Labor rejected the admonitions of Powderly for a moratorium on militant labor action. In the city of Chicago, support for a call by the Central Labor Union was so widespread to such an extent that thousands of workers were taking up arms to defend themselves and maintain their bargaining position (Galbraith 1952), as companies began to recruit people for their own military units, where rifles were given and military discipline imposed (Boyer and Morais 1976).

A number of socialist associations and trade unions were also busily recruiting workers and training them to form the backbone of worker defense companies in opposition to the employers, who were not even satisfied with their militia and the Pinkertons (The Pinkerton Detective Agency) as effective elements in their struggles with the ever-increasing militant workers in the Chicago area (Boyer and Morais 1976).

The spate of value-laden conflicts (Merton 1957) and general breakdown of the cooperative structure (Eisenstadt 1959) within the Knights of Labor reached some very dangerous heights when the rank and file defied the instructions of Powderly and called a strike, which shut down the Gould Southwestern System in protest against wage cuts and for company recognition of their union. While this was happening, a massive confrontation erupted between striking workers and the National Guard supported by the Pinkertons in Texas, Missouri, and Mississippi (Boyer and Morais 1976).

In any case, Powderly did all that he could to assert his rule (Selznick 1943) by issuing a directive on March 13, 1886, which forbad all affiliated assemblies from engaging in any strike action in support of the eight-hour day without explicit permission (Parsons 1964) from his office. His action was

denounced by workers both within and without the Knights of Labor. In the meantime, union locals in Chicago representing gas fitters, furniture makers, machinists, iron molders, plumbers, brickmakers, and freight handlers, passed resolutions in support of the May 1, 1886, strike vis-à-vis the eight-hour day, only to be followed in April by stockyard workers, hod carriers, plasterers, butchers, toy makers, boot and shoe workers, dry goods clerks, and printers, all acting in unison (Emerson 1962) to call attention to their rightful demands (Blumer 1956) in the industrial sector (Foner 1955).

While this was going on, the owners of the companies were busily making preparations to mobilize the National Guard, special police forces, and Pinkertons, while the Knights of Labor held giant rallies with seven thousand people inside the Cavalry Armory on April 1, 1886, and another fourteen thousand outside on Sunday, April 25, 1886 (Foner 1955).

Effect of Bomb Explosion at Haymarket Square on Union Activity

The events of May 1, 1886, at Haymarket Square do raise a number of questions: who threw the bomb? Why did it occur on a day that the workers were on strike and rallying in support of the eight-hour day? Who stood to gain from the ramifications of the bomb explosion? Was it the work of agents provocateurs recruited by the big corporations? In order to effectively address the preceding questions, it is essential to be cognizant of the fact that the Chicago police were of the view that the bomb explosion was the work of a hired agent provocateur (Boyer and Morais 1976).

In spite of police acknowledgement that the bombing was not carried out by the labor movement, the incident was used by the big corporations, the press, and clergy, to charge, indict, and convict Parsons, Fielden, Schwab,

and Spies, for being on the scene and having political views (Tocqueville 1961) that were thought to be supportive of revolutionary violence (Moore 1958) and political insurrection (Bottomore 1965) against the state (Boyer and Morais 1976).

The incident was also utilized in calculated political terms (Kornhauser 1961) by power and ideological interests (Lenski 1966) in a massive manipulation (Nisbet 1953) of the political community (Mills 1956) and the larger society to discredit the Knights of Labor and the entire labor movement. As part of this strategy: homes were broken into; workers were beaten and jailed; citizens were given bribes to give false testimony; while top officials of the Knights of Labor were arrested in cities like Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and New York, on charges of alleged rioting and conspiracy (Boyer and Morais 1976).

In 1893, the Knights of Labor attempted to reestablish itself as a viable labor organization with the election of James R. Sovereign as the new leader. Unlike Powderly, he was very astute politically and eclectic in his choice of ideological perspectives. To that end, he managed to achieve organizational understanding (Kornhauser 1959) through the synthesis (Bell 1960) of opposing ideas (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) that had been considered during the tenure of Powderly (Boyer and Morais 1976).

Having been able to suppress any semblance of revolt (Killian and Grigg 1964) within the affiliated trades assemblies and the entire rank and file, Sovereign gained tremendous approbation (Blau 1964) from militant labor circles by openly advocating the termination of the wage system that had acted as the backbone of the capitalist economic system and the creation of a more equalitarian society (Kornhauser 1959) in which the working class would not only be the owners, but also the managers of strategic industrial

establishments in the areas of mining, utilities, mills, and railroads (Boyer and Morais 1976).

The Knights of Labor and Political Action

Unlike Powderly, Sovereign was more inclined to identify himself with the very militant elements within his rank and file, and this became more evident as he moved to establish attachments (Simmel 1950) with other bodies (Weber 1946) to form the People's Party or the Populists. In forming such a conglomeration of progressive elements (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) with the United Mine Workers, farmers, and trade union locals, Sovereign gained the reputation of being against the capitalist state and was treated as such by the corporations and their propaganda groups (Bierstedt 1950), which were very vociferous in their diatribes (Foner 1955; Pollack 1962).

On account of their numbers, the farmers with their Farmers' Alliances, Northern Alliance, Southern Alliance, and other regional associations, began to exert tremendous amount of authority (Gerth and Mills 1953) within the People's Party as they traveled throughout the country in a political campaign, which stressed the need for: lower interest rates, cheaper freight rates, government loans on crops, people's ownership of railroads, easier credit, and silver coinage (Foner 1955).

THE PEOPLE'S PARTY

At its founding convention on July 4, 1892, the People's Party adopted a preamble in Omaha, Nebraska, which attacked: the existing social order (Weber 1946); the corruption of the political system (Bendix 1974); cooptation (Olsen 1970) of the press by the corporations; the diminution of

moral and cultural values (MacIver 1942); as well as the harassment of workers by the military. Other charges dealt with: the concentration of the nation's wealth (Olsen 1970) in the hands of a few; institutionalization of a system that sanctioned unequal opportunities (Weber 1946); suppression of the right of urban workers to form unions in order to fight for better wages and work conditions; as well as the chaotic environment brought on by mounting dissatisfaction (Killian and Grigg 1964), which had become very pervasive (Foner 1955).

In a demonstration of its fledgling organizational might (Mills 1953), the People's Party managed to send shockwaves throughout the political arena by giving its nomination for president to the Union general James Baird Weaver of Iowa, and for vice-president, the Confederate general James C. Field of Virginia. However, the killing of seven workers and three Pinkerton operatives during the wage dispute (Bottomore 1965) at the Carnegie Steel Mills in Homestead, Pennsylvania (between Henry Frick and the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers), helped to slow down the momentum of the People's Party. The confrontation was so intense that the Pennsylvania National Guard had to be called out on July 11, 1892, to restore law and order as the workers engaged in mass action (Bendix 1974) to oppose Frick's decision to cut wages and engage in a union lock out (Boyer and Morais 1976).

Also, on the same day, pitched battles were taking place between troops and workers in Pennsylvania, while similar events were also observed in the Coeur d'Alenes, Idaho, as workers fighting for better wages got into serious confrontations (Lieberson 1961) with strikebreakers and the military. In Buffalo, New York, over six thousand armed militia engaged in combat with railroad switchmen, who were also on strike in protest against wage

cuts. The decision to resort to wage reduction constituted the organized response of the business community to the decline in economic abundance (Bendix 1974) that reached its apex toward the latter months of 1892 and finally led to the severe depression of 1893 (Pollack 1962; Foner 1955).

The repressive measures (Killian an Grigg 1964) to which the political rulers (Coser 1976) resorted in their bid to destroy the political capability (Linton 1936) of the People's Party or Populist movement were very successful; because, with the deterioration in political and economic conditions (Marx 1904) that were brought on by the depression of 1893, the class awareness that had been established among all the disparate organizations began to fade. Thus, the People's Party lost the chance to demonstrate its strength (Kornhauser 1961) within the political order (Pollack 1962; Foner 1955; Boyer and Morais 1976).

My goal in this section was to describe the nature of the transformations that took place in the social and economic spheres of the society as a result of the rapid industrialization that took place in the latter part of the nineteenth century, when huge waves of migrants and immigrants flooded the urban centers of America in search for jobs in the newly-opened industrial plants.

I also touched on the initial obstacles to union organizaing that were brought on by the very skillful activities of the big corporations in exacerbating racial, ethnic, and craft distinctions, among the working poor. In spite of those initial attempts to disrupt union organizing, the working class was able to found the Knights of Labor under the leadership of Powderly.

As an inclusive organization that opened its doors to all workers regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and skill, the new labor organization had the support of its rank and file. However, sharp differences

arose between the conservative and moderate leadership and an increasingly militant rank and file that openly defied the instructions of the leadership and opted to engage in strikes and demonstrations. I pointed out the consequences and ramifications of the bomb explosion at Haymarket Square in Chicago on May 1, 1886, during a workers' strike and rally in support of the eight-hour day and the suspicion that this was the work of an agent provocateur in the pay of big business.

The election of James R. Sovereign marked a change in organizational direction on the part of the Knights of Labor. Because, while he was very adept at making compromises to achieve consensus, unlike Powderly, he aligned himself with the most revolutionary segments of his rank and file. This was amply demonstrated by his call for the proscription of the wage system and the worker ownership of strategic industrial centers (e.g., railroads and utilities). He was also willing to form coalitions with the United Mine Workers Union, farmers, and other union locals, to establish the People's Party or Populist movement, which was not able to achieve it goals on account of the depression of 1893, and the ensuing persecution of workers in different parts of the country.

The experiences of the Knights of Labor were not the only ones that set the stage for the emergence of the I.W.W. and A.F.L. Because, there were a number of other labor organizations that were also very active during the latter part of the nineteenth century and acted collectively to create the proper social organizational environment that precipitated the founding of both the A.F.L. and the I.W.W., as well as the conflict that later ensued between them. In the next section, I will elaborate on the organizational effectiveness, strategies, and aspirations, of another labor organization, which also operated on a nation-wide basis.

THE FOUNDING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR UNION

The National Labor Union was founded in Baltimore, Maryland, in the midst of great crisis (Mizruchi 1964) within the ranks of wage workers in August of 1866. The workers were disheartened by the huge disparity between their social life (Levi-Strauss 1949) and that of the owners of capital. The crucial factor that accounted for the decision to form the N.L.U. was the fact that the labor movement was under attack throughout the whole country, while the owners of capital were quietly mobilizing their allies (Durkheim 1951) through the formation of bourgeois organizations (Bendix 1974) in the form of employer associations. One such organization was the American National Stove Manufacturers and Iron Founders Association that was formed in 1866 and which proceeded immediately to engage in a lockout of iron molders in a number of cities (Josephson 1934; Adamic 1934).

Also, as the owners of the big corporations were locking out unions and cutting wages due to the demise of war contracts, the owners of plantations in the south were very busy planning to create a system of peonage based on debt and vagrancy to replace the outmoded institution of slavery. To that end, they resorted to widespread killing and lynching of blacks, most of whom were dragged from their homes by mobs (Aptheker 1951).

The Vision of William Sylvis

The impetus (Bierstedt 1950) behind the founding of the N.L.U. was the vision of William H. Sylvis, who was named president of the National Molders Union during its January 1863 convention at Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania. His decision to fiercely support the formation of the N.L.U. was predicated upon the rationale (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) that since the captains of industry were in the process of forming mutual benefit groups (Blau 1964) to help maintain and enhance their financial and industrial primacy (Wrong 1959), it would be in the interest of the labor unions to also strengthen their own power instruments (Eisenstadt 1959) by organizing themselves on a nation-wide basis (Adamic 1934).

It was the contention of Sylvis that since the southern plantation owners, who were using physical threats (Bierstedt 1950) against the blacks in order to maintain their social supremacy (Aron 1960), were also acting in consonance with northern industrialists in their suppression (Moore 1958) of workers, it would be essential for northern workers and southern blacks to come together and act as a cooperative entity (Durkheim 1951) under the aegis of the N.L.U. (Allen 1937).

As it was the case with the Knights of Labor, the N.L.U. under the direction (Simmel 1950) of Sylvis also stressed the need for the American labor movement to start negotiations (Olsen 1970) with blacks and farmers to form an independent political party, which would counteract the clout (Thoenes 1966) exerted by southern planters and northern industrialists in the Democratic and Republican Parties. However, the ideas of Sylvis were met with opposition (Nisbet 1953) by certain elements in the labor movement, who had misgivings about joining blacks in a demonstration of direct action (Znaniecki 1936) and class consciousness among the socially underprivileged (Sylvis 1872; Spero and Harris 1931).

Even though Sylvis was very disappointed with the discriminatory practices (Silverman 1964) of some organizers within the N.L.U., he persisted in espousing his liberal views (Tocqueville 1961) by advocating the

establishment of political ties (Kornhauser 1959) with women (by admitting them into the trade union movement) and also with the International Workingmen's Association. As he had done with respect to blacks, Sylvis was equally passionate in his advocacy of integration (Killian and Grigg 1964) in relation to the entry of women into the trade union movement (Foner 1955).

In his address to various groups, he constantly condemned their exploitation and subjugation (Moore 1958) of women within the social structure and argued that the initiatives (Emerson 1962) of men to gain better working conditions and higher wages would be hypocritical if they failed to support women in their quest for those same benefits (Foster 1955).

The refusal of some trade unions to admit women in spite of their efforts on behalf of the movement for an eight-hour day, was considered by Sylvis to be inexcusable and capricious (Nisbet 1953), as well as antithetical to the notion of social equalitarianism (Bottomore 1965). He was very instrumental in changing the social beliefs (Nisbet 1953) of a number of individuals within the leadership of the N.L.U. and succeeded in getting the organization to invite women to its conventions. He also led the fight to issue a call to all trade unions, pleading with them to struggle for the well-being (Mills 1953) of all workers regardless of gender and to admit women into their rank and file (Spero and Harris 1931).

The decision of the N.L.U. policy makers (Aron 1960) to consider organized political activity (Mead 1934) as an adjunct to that of trade unionism led the labor organization to get involved in the presidential campaign of 1872 (through the National Labor Reform Party) and the concern with currency reform. However, the trade unionists in the organization resented the domination (Mosca 1939) of the N.L.U. by farmers, doctors,

lawyers, preachers, editors, and others from the middle class (Marx and Engels 1937), who had little or no interest in traditional trade union issues such as eight-hour day, higher wages, shorter hours, and the right to organize (Sylvis 1872).

The increased emphasis on political matters led to the mass withdrawal from the N.L.U. of a number of affiliated trade unions (e.g., Cigar Makers, Bricklayers, National Typographical Union), and the blacks, who were more interested in civil rights, land reform, job security, and voting. The mass defections did violence to the stability of the N.L.U. as an organization (Emerson 1962) on the national labor scene (Cayton and Mitchell 1939).

SOME PERSPECTIVES ON THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND THE N.L.U.

It is quite obvious from the discussions on the Knights of Labor and the N.L.U. that between 1866 and 1886, during which the two labor organizations were in their heyday, there was a normative pattern of significant uniformity (Taylor 1891) within a large segment of the American labor movement in relation to doctrines and strategies.

What made that state of affairs so obvious? What were the pivotal issues involved? What were the dominant ideas of that period within the American labor movement? As I stated in earlier paragraphs, both organizations were operating in the United States during the incipient phases of industrialization, modernization, and urbanization (Park 1916). Thus, there were some core issues that were given top priority by these two labor groups. Regardless of the reasons, the similarities in organizational patterns (Bierstedt 1950) and normative character of officialdom (Weber 1947) were very interesting and noteworthy.

Even though Sylvis encountered tremendous defiance (Etzioni 1968) and criticism (Aron 1960) in his efforts to gain general backing (Dahrendorf 1959) within the N.L.U. concerning the admission of blacks and women, both associations (Mills 1953) had pragmatic governing bodies (Riesman 1951) with the foresight to appreciate the strategic significance of establishing functional relations (Nisbet 1953) across racial and gender lines (Kornhauser 1959) to counteract the growing popularity (Mills 1958) of employers' associations and their hold on the political structure (Tocqueville 1961) of society.

Both organizations also believed in the pluralism of power (Bell 1960), enhancement of class cohesion, as well as class identity (Marx and Engels 1937) through social and political agitation (De Gre 1964). Thus, the Knights of Labor forged a merger (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967) with farmers, women, blacks, and the United Mine Workers Union, to form the People's Party or Populist movement, while the N.L.U. also formed alliances (Emerson 1962) with women, farmers, blacks, and middle class elements, to form the National Labor Reform Party.

There were also occasional disputes (Merton and Barber 1962) between the leadership and some segments of the rank and file in both labor groups due to differences in viewpoint (Marx 1904) over their common goals (Lenski 1966). In the Knights of Labor, the rift (Wrong 1959) was over the strategic importance of strikes, demonstrations, as well as singing and dancing in support of higher wages and improved working conditions (i.e., the eight-hour day). In the N.L.U., the debate (Mosca 1939) was over the efforts of Sylvis to admit blacks and women to membership.

The two labor organizations were generous in giving their support (Blau 1964) and funds (Bierstedt 1950) to the movement for an eight-hour

day within the occupational system (Parsons 1964) for wage workers and allowed their rank and file to take part in most of the demonstrations (Lynd 1957) that were organized in numerous parts of the country by Eight Hour Leagues and other groups (Silverman 1964).

The policies of the N.L.U. and the Knights of Labor coalesced (Bottomore 1965) to create the proper normative environment (Parsons 1964) within the organizational structure (De Gre 1964) of the American labor movement that set the stage for the formation of the A.F.L. and I.W.W., as well as the competition and confrontation (Olsen 1958), which later ensued between them. In the next pages, the focus will be on the role activities (Emerson 1962) of the A.F.L.

THE FOUNDING OF THE A.F.L.

Earlier in the chapter, I pointed out that after the founding of the I.W.W. it got into a protracted struggle (Dahrendorf 1959) with the A.F.L.. I also indicated that later in the chapter, I will discuss the essential points in relation to a hypothesis about the attitudinal and behavioral traits of most social groups during conflict situations and ascertain the extent of its relevance to the problems that obtained between the A.F.L. and I.W.W..

The crucial questions that I will address are the following: were the I.W.W. and A.F.L. actually in conflict? Over what issues were they in conflict? What efforts were made to settle the conflict? Were the issues involved negotiable? What effect did the the division have on the stability of both labor camps? How did they react attitudinally and behaviorally to the pressures that emanated from the conflict?

This section on the founding of the the A.F.L. is very important; because, for the the first time in the chapter, I plan to elaborate on the

doctrines, strategies, tactics, and significant policy decisions of the A.F.L. and its Executive Council, which had the unintended consequence (Weber 1946) of creating the social organizational ambience (within the American labor movement) that made it easy for the I.W.W. to emerge and compete for turf and membership with local unions, trades assemblies, union centrals, and internationals, that were affiliated within the A.F.L.

The A.F.L. was founded in 1886 in the midst of the economic scarcity (Lieberson 1961) created by the depression from 1883 to 1885, and frontal attacks (Bottomore 1965) on the labor movement by various employers' associations and other antagonistic agencies (Simmel 1950), as a result of strikes in such industrial settings as railroads, lumber, mines, transit, textile, communications, etc., as well as the Haymarket Square bomb explosion. The individuals, who became very prominent in the new national labor organization (the A.F.L.) had had prior affiliation (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967) with left-wing political organizations: Samuel Gompers had espoused the economic and political ideology of Marx, while Peter J. McGuire had been instrumental in the formation of the Carpenters Union and the English-speaking section of the Socialist Labor Party (Boyer and Morais 1976; Dubofsky 1969).

As I indicated in my earlier discussion, the N.L.U. and the Knights of Labor, together with a number of other less prominent local unions throughout the country, were under attack by well-organized opposition groups (Moore 1958). In 1886, the Knights of Labor, under the new leadership team of Sovereign, had created great consternation by taking positions that were antithetical to the capitalist economic system. The Knights of Labor and the N.L.U. had also been very active in supporting the

various Eight-Hour Leagues throughout the country that were engaged in massive demonstrations (Foner 1964).

On account of their activities, they unwittingly created great indignation (Killian and Grigg 1964) in conservative political circles (Mosca 1939) and were in actuality regarded as hostile organizations (Cressey 1955). Also, on account of their political doctrines (Aron 1960), they ushered in the organizational and social conditions that were exploited by the A.F.L. as it sought to present itself as more responsible and moderate in its political posture. In spite of their previous left-wing political actions (Lipset 1970), the leaders of the A.F.L. found the new strategy (Bierstedt 1950) of moderation to be very advantageous and in so doing allowed themselves to be neutralized (Olsen 1970) by the vested interests (Dahrendorf 1959) that acted as the controlling organs (Olsen 1963) of bourgeois capitalism (Boyer and Morais 1976; Foner 1964).

The opportunistic leadership of the A.F.L. and the owners of capital considered their new policy of cooperation (Slater 1967) to be mutually beneficial (Tocqueville 1961). Thus, the labor group began to implement a number of policy agreements (Parsons 1964) that were thought by left-wing unionists to be detrimental to the overall aspirations (Parsons 1964) of the labor movement (Dubofsky 1969).

In the next paragraphs, I will elaborate on some of the critical practices (i.e., policies) and how they helped to lay the groundwork for the movement, which eventually led to the founding of the I.W.W. as a rival labor organization.

THE CAMPAIGN FOR AN OPEN-SHOP

One of the significant issues that formed the bases for the hostility (Simmel 1950) that erupted between the A.F.L. and I.W.W., was the decision of the former to establish a relationship of collaboration (Lenski 1966) with the National Civic Federation. What was the National Civic Federation? What were its goals and aspirations? Why did the A.F.L. elect to join that organization? Was it a decision made solely by Gompers or by the entire Executive Council of the A.F.L.? What was the nature of the resolution (Killian and Grigg 1964) on that specific issue?

In order to fully appreciate the political argument (Mills 1953) advanced by the A.F.L. in support of the decision for that economic arrangement (Mills 1953) with the N.C.F., it is imperative that adequate reference is made with regard to the type of emotional climate (Lipset 1970) that existed within the social structure (Parsons 1960) after the bomb explosion at the Haymarket Square rally that was called to support the campaign for an eight-hour day. The widespread persecution (Etzioni 1968) of union officials and workers was also supplemented by sentimental appeals (Parsons 1964) and organized pressure (Kornhauser 1961) on the part of employers' associations and so-called Citizens' Alliances to proscribe all unions and their activities (Perlman and Taft 1935).

The campaign for an open-shop reached its apex during the industrial depression that occurred around the latter part of 1903, and even though the A.F.L. executives had considered it strategically prudent in view of the anti-union bias of the social landscape (Olsen 1958) to pursue a policy of moderation, the employers' associations and Citizens' Alliances that sprang up throughout the country were intent on suppressing all union activity including

that of the A.F.L. and not in th the mood for any kind of compromise (Mills 1958) with organized labor.

The movement (Moore 1958) for an open-shop was spearheaded by the leading industrial and commercial interests within the business community (Lynd 1957), who used their enormous power systems (Olsen 1970) to stir up public anger (Parsons 1960) against the labor movement. The Rockefellers, Morgans, Harrimans, and others, wanted to destroy the trade unions, which they considered to be very subversive and unAmerican by virtue of their activities (Foner 1964).

The employers' associations and Citizens' Alliances, Anti-Boycott Association, National Association of Manufacturers, and other open-shop advocates, sought to convince workers that they did not need union representation in order to gain higher wages and better working conditions; because, they were their friends and colleagues, who merited their trust (Corey 1930; Foner 1964).

When the employers' associations and their allies found their initial efforts in utilizing the technique of persuasion (Etzioni 1968) to be ineffective in getting the workers to resign en masse from trade unions and deal directly with them, they resorted to the technique of coercion (Bottomore 1965). In pursuance of the new effort, they started a movement to boycott union goods, union services, and used their monetary resources to help employers in their bid to have open-shops (Foner 1964).

They took further steps to put pressure on the unions by urging citizens to: stop buying newspapers that were deemed to be pro-union in their reporting and editorial policies; recruited an army of workers to be used as strikebreakers to enforce the existence of open-shops; gave large sums of money to corrupt union officials in order to enlist their help in the open-shop

movement; set up an enemies list consisting of the names of workers thought to be still loyal to their unions; and recruited individuals to act as spies, informants, and agents provocateurs (Perlman and Taft 1935; Foner 1964).

In the continuing effort to strengthen the open-shop drive, workers were compelled to sign yellow dog contracts, in which they pledged not only to refrain from joining unions, but also to restrain others from doing so; rumors were spread accusing union officials of being corrupt for their alleged misuse of union dues paid by workers from their hard-earned wages; police, militia, and other private armies, were used to break strikes; courts were urged to proscribe certain unions; and huge sums of money used to get lobbyists to influence legislation in support of the open-shop campaign (Foner 1964; Perlman and Taft 1935).

THE NATIONAL CIVIC FEDERATION AND THE A.F.L.

Even though, as a partisan group (Simmel 1950), the employers were collectively united in their bid to destroy the labor movement, there was a division (Nisbet 1953) within the ranks; because, a sub-group (Bierstedt 1950) of employers became convinced that the open-shop campaign had become too contentious and not the appropriate reaction (Merton and Barber 1962) to the growth of trade unionism or the collectivization of labor (Emerson 1962). The sub-group of the nonconformists (Pareto 1935) favored mediation (Simmel 1950) and settlement of problems involving conflict of interests (Weber 1946) between labor and management (Foner 1955).

Marcus Alonzo Hanna, an Ohio businessman, was selected as the head of the new industrial department of the N.C.F., which had representatives from three crucial communities (Kornhauser 1959): labor, business, and the

public. The labor unions were represented by the leaders of such groups as: the Railroad Brotherhoods; iron, steel, and tin workers; carpenters and joiners; bricklayers and masons; street railway employees; boat and shoe workers; bottle blowers; stationary firemen; and textile workers' unions (Foner 1955).

The most prominent (Levi-Strauss 1949) representatives from the labor sector were: Samuel Gompers, president of the A.F.L.; John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers, and vice-president of the A.F.L.; as well as Daniel J. Keefe, president of the International Longshoremen, Marine and Transport Workers' Union, and member of the A.F.L. Executive Council (Foner 1964).

The business community was represented by: J. Ogden Armour of Armour and Company; Louis F. Swift of Swift and Company; Charles Schwab of United States Steel Corporation; Elbert Gary, president of Federal Steel Company (an affiliate of U.S. Steel); Cyrus McCormick, president of McCormick Harvesting Machine Company; and others. The unique aspect of their social character (Eisenstadt 1964) was that they all had a history of anti-union activity in their establishments (Foner 1964).

It should be noted that the individuals selected to represent the public turned out to have had very extensive professional and social contacts (Merton and Barber 1962) with big business. Thus, their impartiality (Parsons 1964) as neutral citizens from the wider society (Kornhauser 1959) became suspect. Among them was Grover Cleveland, trustee of New York Life Insurance Company, and president of the United States during the Pullman strike of 1894 (Foner 1964).

There was Cornelius Bliss, ex-secretary of the United States Treasury; director, American Cotton Company, Equitable Life Insurance Company;

trustee, American Surety Company and Central Trust Company; Charles Francis Adams, former president, Union Pacific Railroad; director, Kansas City Stock Yards Company, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company; Isaac N. Seligman, banker; member, Advisory Committee of Stockholders' Audit Company of New York; treasurer and director, City and Suburban Homes Company (Foner 1964).

Rounding off the list were: David Francis, president, Louisiana Exposition; vice-president, Laclede National Bank; director, Mississippi Valley Trust Company of St. Louis and Waters-Pierce Coal Company; James Speyer, director, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; trustee, General Trust Company; director and trustee of Standard Oil-affiliated companies numbering more than twelve; and many other with similar social and professional relations (Foner 1964).

DISSENSION WITHIN THE A.F.L. OVER MEMBERSHIP IN THE N.C.F.

The decision to join the N.C.F. led to the rise of doctrinal debates (Bottomore 1965) within the A.F.L. and its affiliated unions. What were the root causes of the division? How did it affect group cohesion? In order to fully appreciate the precipitating factors, it is essential to point out that the empirical data do not give specific figures with respect to percentages. However, it was quite evident that some members of the A.F.L. rank and file embraced the idea to join the N.C.F. and regarded the increased acceptance (Kroeber 1952) of their leaders by big business and the social ties (Nisbet 1953) they were developing with the economic, financial, and industrial elite (Galbraith 1967), as an indication of their collective importance to the country (Foner 1964).

However, there was another bloc (Selznick 1943) that was not enthusiastic (Simmel 1950) about the move when it was first proposed and continued to oppose it at every turn. The individuals within this sub-group were very class conscious (Marx 1910) and militant in their rhetoric and refused to give their endorsement (Aron 1960) to the N.C.F. In their letters to editors of publications dealing with labor and socialist affairs, they advanced arguments in support of their position and also tabled resolutions at labor and socialist meetings, where they denounced the conservative and moderate inclination of the leadership (Boyer and Morais 1976).

THE SOCIOECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF THE DISSENSION

While it is true that the decision to join the N.C.F. did generate some controversy within the A.F.L., the empirical data clearly indicate that the internal debate was exacerbated by the socioeconomic consequences and ramifications of such an affiliation. In the following paragraphs, I will elaborate on those issues. They are very significant; because, they also formed some of the bases for the conflict that later ensued between the A.F.L. and I.W.W. (Foner 1964).

The Doctrine of Identity of Interest between Business and Labor

The militant segments of the A.F.L. rank and file registered their collective distrust of the notion that there existed a relationship of harmony (Kornhauser 1961) between big business and the trade unions. Thus, they rejected the N.C.F. doctrine pertaining to the identity of interest between the aspirations of management and organized labor. In fact, they were very indignant that some labor leaders (e.g., Mitchell and Gompers) were

embracing the doctrine and espousing the viewpoint that there should be no feeling of distrust between big business and labor; because, the prosperity of one eventually becomes that of the other (Foner 1964).

Equally disturbing to the militants, were public pronouncements of Gompers and Mitchell indicating their collective interest (Blau 1964) in what they considered to be the egalitarianism (Bottomore 1965) of Marcus Alonzo Hanna in his status as an employer. The militant wing of the A.F.L. was also disturbed by the fact that some of the individuals, who had been selected to act as the representatives of the business community and civic society (Merton 1949) on the N.C.F., were involved with companies that were known for their endorsement (Gerth and Mills 1953) of open-shop and general anti-union activities (Foner 1964).

Organizational Ineffectiveness and Diminution of Class Consciousness

As a result of the alliance with the N.C.F., the A.F.L. had become an entity (Kornhauser 1961) that was basically interested in changing the motivational orientation (Parsons 1962) of the employers toward their workers. On account of that posture, the need for an effective labor organization that would utilize its system of cooperative social relations (De Gre 1964) to engender class consciousness was not given top priority (Foner 1964).

Also, due to the new social bond (Bell 1960) and advocacy of common interest (Bendix 1974) with employers (under the aegis of the N.C.F.), who still embraced the institutionalization and tolerance of conflict (Weber 1946) with labor, the collective consciousness (Durkheim 1951) of the working class was being replaced with sentiments (Nisbet 1953) of understanding and

compromise (Aron 1960). Thus, the traditional confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which had acted as the catalyst for class interest and class identity (Marx 1904) was being systematically abandoned (Green 1956).

Use of Media for Social Control

On account of its easy access to the media of mass communication (Park 1916), the N.C.F. was able to use ideas (Bierstedt 1950) and other outlets of social direction (Kornhauser 1959) to portray itself as a civic group (Slater 1967) that was very interested in helping to change negative social views (Blau 1964) about the labor movement. However, it was unwilling to present the views (Tocqueville 1961) of the labor unions to the public during periods of labor-management negotiations over such issues as higher wages and better working conditions, as well as the refusal of some employers to bargain in good faith (Green 1956).

Imposition of Agreements on Workers

As part of its policy aimed at enforcing universal consensus on prevailing practices (Dahrendorf 1968) within the labor-management structure, the N.C.F. sought to impose agreements (Killian and Grigg 1964), which in most cases tended to work in favor of the employers. However, the labor leaders, who acted as the representatives of labor on the N.C.F., defined such practices as being indicative of a relationship that was based on mutual understanding, which would be to the benefit of all interested parties (Simmel 1950) in the economic sphere (Corey 1930).

Marginalization of Union Militants

The N.C.F. was quietly being utilized in various ways by a cadre of union leaders to isolate and marginalize labor activists, who were considered to be too militant in their posture, in order to discourage any move toward confrontational and aggressive unionism. On account of these viewpoints and suspicions within the labor union vis-à-vis membership in the N.C.F., those who disagreed with the A.F.L. leadership became very vociferous in their diatribes against Mitchell and Gompers during A.F.L. conventions after 1901 and tabled a number of motions calling for a vote of no confidence in the N.C.F. In fact, a number of A.F.L. leaders (e.g., Thomas I. Kidd, president of The Amalgamated Wood Workers International Union and a member of the A.F.L. Executive Council; and Victor Berger, socialist leader from Milwuakee), as well as the Central Federated Union of New York and a number of A.F.L. affiliated publications--Wood Workers Journal and Union Labor Advocate--all joined the anti-N.C.F. movement (Green 1956; Foner 1964).

Thus far, the discussion has been on the internal divisions (Dahrendorf 1968) that emerged within the A.F.L. over the labor organization's membership and participation in the N.C.F. As I emphasized, in previous paragraphs, the fact that has become very noteworthy is this: the reasons given by the opposition elements for their squabbles (Simmel 1950) with the A.F.L. leadership under Gompers also turned out to be the very reasons that accounted for the emergence of the I.W.W. and the battle over turf and doctrine that erupted between the two labor organizations. In the next section, the discussion will deal with another issue and how it helped to exacerbate an already tense and chaotic situation within the A.F.L.

BUSINESS UNIONISM AND CORRUPTION WITHIN THE A.F.L.

What is business unionism? What are its basic presuppositions and goals? What were its ramifications for group integration within the A.F.L.? Who were the principal advocates of business unionism within the A.F.L.? In the initial stages of union growth, the trade unions were managed like small family business or neighborhood-oriented primary groups (Mead 1934). Therefore, the concept of fiscal responsibility was not given serious consideration. With the advent of business and commercial conglomerates, together with sharp increases in union membership and funds, the need to introduce an element of discipline within the unions became paramount. They started to put more emphasis on financial management, proper accounting procedures, and up-to-date membership lists (Foner 1964).

When the concept of business unionism began to take hold around the turn of the century, the individuals involved in union activity were basically men and women, who were very idealistic and altruistic in their worldview. Therefore, they derived great satisfaction from the knowledge that their integrative activities (Aron 1960) were helping to generate class consciousness within the trade unions. However, on account of their initiatives (Tocqueville 1961), a number of them were subjected to retribution (Blau 1964) by employers, who also recruited informants and agents provocateurs to create an environment of instability within the unions (Seidman 1938; Debs 1910; Foner 1964).

In view of employer intransigence (Nisbet 1953), the local unions of the A.F.L. realized that if their organizers were ever going to be in a position to discharge their duties without fear of job loss and having their names on employer blacklists, ways and means had to be found to insulate them from

economic censorship (Bierstedt 1950). To that end, they put in place a new system whereby they (the unions) themselves hired organizers, who were paid from union funds (Debs 1910; Foner 1964).

The organizers were known as walking delegates or business agents, and given the mandate to discharge the following duties (Merton and Barber 1962): help union members to get employment and assume supervisory responsibilities over individuals in the unions in terms of their job performance and level of competence. They were also required to make decisions in relation to: the type and nature of economic measures (Lynd 1957) to be applied against uncooperative employers; help in the organization of strike actions; collect dues from union members; make the requisite payment of benefits to union members, who needed such assistance; as well as play a role as representatives of the local unions on the Central Labor Union (Debs 1910; Seidman 1938; Foner 1964).

The decision to bring in union organizers, who were paid by the unions in order to protect them from dependence on employers for their livelihood, was part of the process of bureaucratization (Weber 1946), whose goals were increased competency (Selznick 1943) and proper functioning (Slater 1967). However, that action led to some consequences, which were related to corruption within the ranks of the union organizers. Some of the walking delegates or business agents were individuals with great expertise in their craft together with union organizing. Thus, they strongly empathized with the daily problems of the rank and file and sought to discharge their responsibilities (Parsons 1964) with skill and honesty. However, there were others, who used their administrative rank as an avenue to enrich themselves (Debs 1910; Foner 1964).

THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF CORRUPTION

The corruption within the various local unions of the A.F.L. took the following forms and manifestations: stealing of union funds; receipt of bribes from employers to prevent strikes and other forms of militant action; receipt of money from employers to maintain or enhance their competitive advantage in certain businesses; receipt of money from employers for the right to use the union label on their products; and the receipt of money from the sale or rental of union work permits to nonunion workers (Debs 1910; Foner 1964).

Stealing of Union Funds

As I pointed out earlier, one of the essential undertakings (Kornhauser 1959) of the new union organizers or business agents, was the disbursement (De Gre 1964) of large sums of union dues that were supposed to be deposited in local union bank accounts. However, this financial requirement (Merton and Barber 1962) was not fulfilled. Because, in spite of the trend toward bureaucratization among the local unions affiliated with the A.F.L. and the proper use of funds, the business agents were not compelled to open bank accounts, where union funds could be deposited (Debs 1910; Foner 1964).

The absence of proper accounting procedures opened the door for widespread diversion of union funds into the personal fortunes (Bierstedt 1950) of some business agents, and the emergence of distrust (Dahrendorf 1968) within certain union locals. A number of union members displayed their anger (Killian and Grigg 1964) in letters to Gompers and Morrison, with complaints about not being given receipts for their dues payments. One of the top operatives to be charged with stealing union funds was Peter J. McGuire,

secretary-treasurer of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, founding member of the A.F.L., and member of its Executive Council (Seidman 1938; Foner 1964).

Receipt of Money to Prevent Strike Action

The payment of money from employers to some of the union organizers took on the character of social exchange (Blau 1964), in which union officials got money while the employers obtained industrial peace. The employers, who declined to take part in this exchange process (Homans 1958) were subjected to punishments (Parsons and Shils 1952), which took the form of strikes, sabotage, and in other cases threats of physical violence (Debs 1910; Foner 1964).

On some occasions, money was paid to the business agents in order to negotiate contracts that were very favorable to the employers; in other instances, the union officials got bribes or graft from employers in order to delay the implementation of certain clauses in agreements (Olsen 1963) that they had signed. As it was the case with workers not getting receipts for union dues (to which I alluded in my previous discussion), there were numerous letters from workers to A.F.L. headquarters with complaints about union officials signing agreements or contracts, which did not include some specific demands that the workers had requested to be made part of the accord (Seidman 1938; Debs 1910).

Payment of Bribes by Businesses to Gain Competitive Advantage

The principle of reciprocity (Levi-Strauss 1949) in the exchange of social rewards between employers and union organizers also took the form of

graft or bribes that were paid to encourage strike action against specific employers, who had declined invitations to join associations within the business community. There were also reports of graft being paid to union organizers to call on their members to stage boycotts against products manufactured by businesses that certain associations of employers considered to be too independent (Foner 1964).

For instance, in the city of San Francisco, the Millowners Association and the Building Trades Council of the A.F.L. had a secret understanding (Parsons and Shils 1952), which stipulated that the union leaders would desist from using any materials in the construction of buildings that were not produced in the plants of the Association. It led to an acute inflation in the price of such products and huge profits that worked to the mutual benefit (Homans 1958) of the Association and the union organizers. There were a number of such cases involving organizers of local unions throughout the country (Foner 1964).

Payment of Bribes for Right to use Union Label

Another practice in the sub-culture of corruption, which involved a social network of employers and union organizers, was the exchange of money by employers for the right to utilize the labels of local unions and that of the A.F.L.. This practice, like others, also worked to the benefit of the employers and union organizers (Sullivan 1936).

Payment of Bribes by Business to Rent Union Work Permits

The administrative machinery (Gerth and Mills 1953) of the union organizers was so geared to the promotion of their financial aspirations

(Bierstedt 1950) to such a degree that nonunion workers often paid bribes that led to the exchange of union permits, which enabled them to work in certain establishments. In other instances, the union work permits were bought by employers for the right to hire nonunion labor. Even though business unionism advocated the proper accounting of union funds, in this situation (as in all the other corrupt transactions) no receipts were issued nor records kept with respect to these practices (Foner 1964).

In this section on business unionism and the onset of corruption, which involved some of the new business agents or union organizers of local A.F.L. unions and employers, I discussed the conditions that led to the introduction of business unionism, which put great emphasis on proper coordination of local union affairs in those local districts, which had heretofore relied on the courage of union organizers, who were at the mercy of employers.

The issue of accountability in relation to the disbursement of union funds was of great concern to workers. In dealing with the problem of corruption that went along with business unionism, I delineated the various forms and manifestations that it took, as well as the disarray (Thoenes 1966) that occurred within the rank and file, based on the content of letters and other forms of communication that reached A.F.L. headquarters. In the next section, I will deal with another problem that generated serious debate within the A.F.L. and also acted as a catalyst for the conflict that ensued with the I.W.W.

CRAFT AND INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE A.F.L. AND I.W.W.

As I pointed out in the section on I.W.W. doctrines and strategies that were promulgated at various stages of its growth (see chapter 1), the basic and significant differences between the two doctrines dealt with their impact on the rank and file with respect to labor unity. The local unions that were affiliated with the A.F.L. operated on the principles of craft unionism, which advocated the recruitment and organization of workers on the basis of craft and skill. Thus, they were, in the main, interested only in the maintenance and enhancement of their vested interests during periods of labor-management negotiations (Trautmann 1909).

As part of their approach to union organizing on the national level, the Knights of Labor and the N.L.U. had a policy of offering union membership to all workers regardless of skill, race, ethnicity, gender, or creed, and even formed links with farmers' organizations. They strongly believed in the amalgamation (Park 1928) of all workers and farmers under one banner, in order to be properly positioned to request the newly-emerging trusts and monopolies to grant wage increases and better working conditions to their workers. Therefore, even though they did not refer to their doctrine as industrial unionism, they did in actuality practice it. In fact, the so-called mixed assemblies of the Knights of Labor had all the organizational characteristics (Eisenstadt 1959) of industrial unions (Ware 1929; Foner 1964).

However, the A.F.L., under Gompers, argued very vociferously against industrial unionism; because, it was of the view that the aspirations (Bendix 1974) of the working class would be better fulfilled through the doctrine of

craft unionism, due to the independence (Dahrendorf 1959) that it gave to the individual unions to aggressively pursue their agendas at the negotiating table with management teams. In fact, the A.F.L. leadership considered industrial unionism to be too complicated and cumbersome and attributed the decline of the Knights of Labor to that doctrine (Foner 1964; Ware 1929).

Conflict in the A.F.L.
over Craft Unionism

One of the interesting discussions within the A.F.L. over the doctrine of craft unionism, involved the brewery workers and the attempt by their union--The United Brewery Workers--to bring together all the various craft unions in that industry under one powerful industrial union. Even though, all the workers in the breweries were represented by the United Brewery Workers, they also had local unions, which represented workers in different segments of the industry. In fact, there were local unions representing such diverse groups of workers as teamsters, firemen, engineers, bottlers, brewers, etc., and had separate contracts with employers (Debs 1910; Trautmann 1909).

With the passage of time, a number of union operatives within The United Brewery Workers began to express their disgust (Killian and Grigg 1964) with the multiplicity of craft unions within the industry and their opposing perspectives (Merton and Barber 1962) in relation to work issues. In order to rectify the situation, these union activists began to explore ways and means to unify all the craft unions under the aegis of the United Brewery Workers. However, the attempt to turn the United Brewery Workers into an industrial union involving all the local craft unions in the brewery industry was met with tremendous displeasure (Killian and Grigg 1964) on the part of

the A.F.L. Executive Council and set the stage for a contest of wills (Lenski 1966) between the A.F.L. and the Brewery Workers Union (Debs 1910; Foner 1964).

One of the main arguments that the A.F.L. Executive Council gave for its opposition to the notion of the United Brewery Workers becoming an industrial union with a centralized administrative system (Selznick 1943) was its fear that since the unskilled workers tended to be in the majority (Bierstedt 1950) in such mixed assemblies (as was the case with the Knights of Labor), their issues (Bell 1960) might take precedence over those of the skilled workers, who were in the minority. And this state of affairs, the A.F.L. thought, would lead to chaos (Bailey and Feder 1973) within its ranks (Foner 1964).

Categorically speaking, the relationship between the brewery workers and the A.F.L. Executive Council had been very tenuous and problematic from the very beginning; because, apart from their socialist-orientation and militancy, it was also quite apparent that when their union--The National Union of United Brewery Workers--first applied for affiliation with the A.F.L., it was an industrial union and was accepted for membership with the understanding that it would retain that privilege (Parsons 1964) and act accordingly (Foner 1964; Trautmann 1909; Haywood 1911).

However, after 1887, the increasing militancy of the union's rank and file became a source of great concern (Killian and Grigg 1964) for the A.F.L. Executive Council. On account of that turn of events, a number of attempts were made to dismantle the National Union of United Brewery Workers and replace it with small local unions. In pursuance of that goal, the A.F.L. Executive Council began in 1896 to encourage the engineers, firemen, and

teamsters, within the union to terminate their ties and join the national craft unions of their occupation (Foner 1964; Trautmann 1909).

The friction (Boulding 1962) between the A.F.L. Executive Council and the National Union of United Brewery Workers was greatly exacerbated by efforts that were made by the former to issue new statutory regulations (Parsons 1964) aimed at enforcing submission (Weber 1964) to its edicts. It warned the National Union of United Brewery Workers to desist from issuing new charters to unions representing its brewery engineers and firemen and to recognize the membership cards that were submitted to these workers from the national craft unions. The union considered the actions of the A.F.L. Executive Council to be very arbitrary and calculated to destroy it as an industrial union and took steps to challenge the right (Gerth and Mills 1953) of the A.F.L. to issue those specific directives (Trautmann 1909; Debs 1910).

A number of other unions outside the A.F.L. and others in the A.F.L. supported the National Union of United Brewery Workers in their fight with the A.F.L. Executive Council and also denounced the actions of the A.F.L. leaders as constituting a flagrant violation of their own charter. There was also the suggestion that the union was being punished for its left-wing political leanings (Toqueville 1961) and advocacy of industrial unionism (Foner 1964; Trautmann 1909).

Therefore, they joined forces to sponsor a resolution at the 1903 convention of the A.F.L., in which they collectively called for the recognition of industrial unionism as superior to craft unionism in advancing the cause of wage workers. The actions and counter-actions of the A.F.L. Executive Council and the National Union of United Brewery Workers together with its allies created an atmosphere of confusion within the A.F.L. in particular and the American labor movement in general (Trautmann 1909; Foner 1964).

In spite of the position taken by the A.F.L. officials, the National Union of United Brewery Workers refused to abandon its belief in industrial unionism and accused them (the A.F.L. leaders) of acting as agents of destruction and confusion within the labor movement. On account of the increasing militancy of the brewery workers and their union officials, at the 1906 convention of the A.F.L., the Executive Council voted to sever all ties with the union and proceeded to revoke its status as an affiliate organization on May 30, 1907 (Foner 1964; Trautmann 1909).

Throughout this discussion on the A.F.L., I have indicated very emphatically that the initiatives (Ross 1910) of the Knights of Labor and the N.L.U. were instrumental in laying the foundation (Wrong 1959) within the American labor movement, which eventually led to the emergence of the A.F.L. as a national labor organization. They also made it easy for the A.F.L. founders (e.g., Gompers and Mitchell) to abandon their initial left-wing leanings and present themselves not only as friends and supporters of the capitalist economic system, but also as the more responsible alternative to the militant elements within the labor movement.

I identified the three main reasons: membership in the National Civic Federation, business unionism, and craft unionism, as the root causes of the turbulence that arose within the A.F.L. and the sparks that set the scene for the competition and conflict that ensued with the I.W.W.

In the next section, the discussion will be directed toward the various stages in the organizational evolution (Moore 1958), which reached its peak with the founding of the I.W.W. in 1905 as a national labor organization that was dedicated to the advocacy and practice of militant industrial unionism as well as revolutionary syndicalism.

THE THREE EVOLUTIONARY PHASES OF THE I.W.W.

Even though the I.W.W. was officially founded in 1905, the movement or social process that culminated in that event went through three distinct but inter-connected phases. Some labor activists and groups participated in some of the phases while others were involved in all the phases. What were the phases? What was the nature of their linkage? Who were the leaders? Which groups coalesced in the various phases? All these pertinent questions will be answered as I discuss the three stages.

The Primary Phase: Western Labor Union

Western labor unions have traditionally had a very tenuous relationship with national labor organizations (e.g., the A.F.L.), on account of their belief that their regional affairs and proposals (Dahrendorf 1959) had been treated with levity by labor leaders with backgrounds in the east or north. The ideas became so widespread to such an extent that in November of 1897 and in December of that year, the Western Federation of Miners and the Montana State Trade and Labor Council tabled resolutions at meetings of their executive boards in which they called for the formation of a western labor organization (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1964).

In furtherance of that move, the Western Federation of Miners sent letters to all its affiliated locals, asking them to send delegates to a conference on May 10, 1898, if they agreed with the concept of a regional labor organization. Most of the affiliated locals from such places as: Rossland, British Columbia; Galveston, Texas; San Francisco; South Dakota; Colorado;

Montana; Wyoming; and Washington, sent representatives to the conference (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1964).

In his speech to the assembled delegates, Ed Boyce, president of the Western Federation of Miners, pointed out that the goal of the miners union in sponsoring the conference was not to stir up regional or provincial cleavages within the American labor movement, but rather to join other groups to found a new national labor organization in which both men and women would fight for higher wages and better working conditions for all workers regardless of craft, race, ethnicity, and religion (Haywood 1929; Foner 1964).

After a number of discussions, a proposal to form the W.L.U. was adopted with the Western Federation of Miners as the first chartered organization and the Montana State Trades and Labor Council as the second. Also, Daniel McDonald, president of the Molders' Union of Butte, Montana, and vice-president of the Montana State Trades and Labor Council, was elected as the first president of the W.L.U. (Haywood 1929; Foner 1964).

In its policy statement, the W.L.U. advised its members to maintain their existing ties with their respective state central bodies and national trades associations. However, it indicated that its future goal would be to engage in a massive recruitment (Bottomore 1965) of unorganized and unskilled workers and bring them under its auspices in consonance with the doctrine of industrial unionism (Haywood 1929; Foner 1964).

By October of 1899, the W.L.U. had sixty-five trades and labor unions in Montana, Colorado, and Idaho, as well as one in Rossland, British Columbia. The trades and labor unions represented such diverse groups of workers as waiters, cooks, butchers, clerks, musicians, lumbermen, bricklayers, and stonemasons. Of all the labor groups that were affiliated with the W.L.U., the Western Federation of Miners was the most stable in

terms of numbers, organizational performance, and funding (Bierstedt 1950). Therefore, it was not a surprise that it turned out to be the sponsor of the founding convention (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1964).

As I stated earlier, the formation of the I.W.W. was not just an episodic event (Aron 1960), but rather the culmination of a dynamic social movement, which went through its primary phase with the founding of the W.L.U. under the sponsorship of the Western Federation of Miners with the assistance and unqualified support of the Montana State Trades and Labor Council. In the next section, the item for discussion will be the secondary phase of the movement.

The Secondary Phase: American Labor Union

In June of 1902, the Western Federation of Miners, the W.L.U., and its affiliate--the United Association of Hotel and Restaurant Employees--, all held a convention at Denver, Colorado. This was a very auspicious social organizational environment for the W.L.U., due to its very rapid rise in membership (it had 71 charters, 17 to unions in Denver, and another 54 to unions in the mountain states of the west) between May of 1901 and February of 1902 (Foner 1964).

In terms of social prestige (Olsen 1958), the most prominent individual at the Denver convention throughout all the discussions was Eugene Victor Debs.[1] He had been the presidential candidate of the Socialist Party in 1900 and as leader of the American Railway Union (A.R.U.), he became a strong advocate of militant industrial unionism while leading the Pullman strike of 1894. Thus, his presence at the Denver convention helped to strengthen the W.L.U. Based on his advice, the delegates voted to transform the union into

a national organization to be called the American Labor Union. He also urged the delegates to embrace socialism and concentrate their recruitment campaign in the eastern part of the country (Foner 1964; Dubofsky 1969).

The A.L.U. also embraced the doctrine of industrial unionism, political participation (Bendix 1974) on the part of the working class, and the political platform of the Socialist Party of America. Daniel McDonald was elected president; D.F. O'Shea, vice-president; Clarence Smith, secretary-treasurer; and an executive board with members from Colorado, Montana, Washington, and Wyoming. In order to effectively apprise its affiliated unions and rank and file with information about its policy orientation (Weber 1946) on specific issues, the A.L.U. established the American Labor Union Journal as its official publication (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1964).

By 1903, the A.L.U. had grown from 50,000 to 100,000 members and issued charters to 151 local unions, five district unions, and one international union--the United Brotherhood of Railway Employees--, which had a total membership of 35,000 and ranked second only to that of the Western Federation of Miners. The A.L.U. was most powerful in Colorado, Montana, Idaho, Washington, California, and British Columbia. In the east, it had four locals in New York City, one in New Jersey, eight in Massachusetts, and three in Ohio (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1964).

In accordance with the doctrine of industrial unionism, the A.L.U. elected to pursue a policy of inclusion (Blumer 1956) and racial pluralism (Lieberson 1961), by voting to extend membership privileges to Chinese and Japanese workers during its 1903 convention. It also voted to extend its recruitment activities to Canada and Mexico. All these policy decisions were in accord with section 2 of the A.L.U. constitution, which pledged

membership to all workers regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or religion (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1964).

In spite of the tremendous growth in organizational membership and increasing diversity (Weber 1946) within the labor movement as a result of its eastward expansion, the A.L.U. began to experience a very precipitous decline in membership after September of 1903, because, the dues being paid were very minimal and not sufficient enough to sustain the expenditures of many union locals. Thus, most of the affiliates had to disband (Dubofsky 1969).

Since the affiliated union locals were in no position to support their own edifices (Eisenstadt 1959) due to lack of funding, they were equally weak to act as the supporting networks of the A.L.U. Due to that state of affairs, the official publication of the A.L.U.--The American Labor Union Journal--was forced to publish monthly instead of weekly and changed its name to that of the Voice of Labor. Also, around the same time--July of 1904--, the headquarters of the A.L.U. was transferred from Butte, Montana, to Chicago as part of the continuing changes (Foner 1964; Dubofsky 1969).

The Voice of Labor had articles in the early days of 1905, which expressed the conviction (Riesman 1959) of the leadership to the effect that the A.L.U. was no longer able to effectively implement its goals and aspirations for the working class of American society. Therefore, the need for an organization that would be better able to do so was considered imperative. In the last issue of the Voice of Labor published in June of 1905, it indicated that due to the fiscal constraints, which had rendered the A.L.U. incapable of carrying out the principles (Merton and Barber 1962) of industrial unionism, a number of groups were meeting to lay the groundwork

for an organization that would be better equipped to perform that task (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1964).

In this section, I emphasized the fact that the emergence of the A.L.U. played a very pivotal role in serving as the national (and international) arm, as well as the organizational manifestation of the secondary phase (in the movement by labor unionists and left-wing political activists) to recruit and unite all workers within the American social structure in industrial unions under the ambience of a national labor organization. While the A.L.U. was on the verge of disbanding as a national labor group, as I pointed out in the preceding section, a number of references were made by the Voice of Labor and some members of its leadership team with respect to some meetings that were being held to ensure the doctrinal and strategic continuity of the movement for industrial unionism.

The issues in the next discussion will be based on the conclusions of those meetings and how they led to the tertiary phase of the movement for industrial unionism on the national level, with specific reference to its organizational and structural component, as well as activism.

The Tertiary Phase: The I.W.W.

It is axiomatic that the founding of the I.W.W. was by no means an episodic social phenomenon (Bierstedt 1950), but rather the culmination of a trend (Parsons 1964), which began with the formation of the W.L.U. (in the primary phase) and that of the A.L.U. (in the secondary phase).

In my discussion of the A.F.L., I identified three specific factors, which formed the bases for the infighting (Deutsch 1973) within the labor organization and the processes, which led to the founding of the I.W.W. (see section on the A.F.L.). It comes as no surprise that the very issues, which

created the intra-group conflict within the A.F.L. also laid the groundwork for the uni-directional movement (Moore 1958), which eventually brought about the unity that ushered in the I.W.W.

The reason for the lack of surprise is due to the fact that some of the union activists and labor organizations involved in the various phases of the movement were previously associated with the A.F.L., but had to sever their secondary social relations (Park 1916) with the former, on account of their collective antipathy (Pareto 1935) toward the A.F.L. leadership. Among the unions were: the Western Federation of Miners led by Haywood and the National Union of United Brewery Workers led by Trautmann (Foner 1964, 1965).

As I indicated in my discussion in the section on the A.L.U., there were articles in the Voice of Labor and comments by the A.L.U. leadership, in which the union gave its support to efforts that were under way to found another labor organization. Those meetings were chaired by Trautmann, who apart from being a member of the leadership team of the National Union of United Brewery Workers, also occupied the position as editor of its official publication, Brauer Zeitung (Foner 1964, 1965).

Haywood, who was elected as the permanent chairman of the I.W.W. at its founding convention, was also the president of the Western Federation of Miners, when it terminated its ties with the A.F.L. Haywood and Trautmann were among the most vociferous figures within the opposition group (Kroeber 1952) that got involved in the conflict with the A.F.L. leaders over their policies. The Western Federation of Miners was also the leading organization in the movement for a new national labor organization that would practice the principles of industrial unionism and became very instrumental in the success of all the three phases. Therefore, it did enjoy a

tremendous degree of prestige and power within the I.W.W. (Haywood 1929; Foner 1964, 1965).

THE SETTING OF THE STAGE FOR CONFLICT BETWEEN THE A.F.L. AND I.W.W.

The reasons for the withdrawal of support for the A.F.L., which led to the process to found another national union were clearly articulated by Trautmann, Haywood, Debs, and others, in the Industrial Union Manifesto, which became the official communiqué or policy statement of the I.W.W. It was first drafted in January of 1905, during which the plans for a new national labor organization were discussed and officially promulgated in June of 1905 during the founding convention.

The Industrial Union Manifesto dealt with the same issues, which led to the disorder (Boulding 1952) within the A.F.L. Thus, the A.F.L. leaders were confronted with adversaries (Simmel 1950) from within their own rank and file, as well as from others with whom they were previously associated.

Apart from a discussion of the three issues, which the Industrial Union Manifesto cited as pivotal in the emergence of the long-standing disunity (Thoenes 1966) within the A.F.L., I also pointed out that the goal of the I.W.W. was not only to compete with the A.F.L., but also to replace it and become the only national labor organization. The I.W.W. also pledged to recruit and organize workers into industrial unions regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, creed, and skill. Thus, the founding of the I.W.W., which started with the W.L.U. (primary phase), and A.L.U. (secondary phase), was in actuality an anti-A.F.L. movement and a direct challenge (Galbraith 1952) to its station (Aron 1960) as a national labor organization. The conflict that

ensued dealt with the determination of both parties to demonstrate their resolve and become victorious in the struggle.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETAL CONFLICT IN RELATION TO THE A.F.L. AND I.W.W.

I elected to use conflict theory, because, the social organizational environment within the American labor movement starting with the rise and demise of the Knights of Labor and the N.L.U., followed by the A.F.L. and I.W.W. with their competitive struggles, constitutes a veritable laboratory for an investigation of the origin and development of societal conflict in the industrial sphere.

The first part of the discussion on societal conflict will answer the question: was there a relationship of conflict between the A.F.L. and I.W.W.? Having established that there indeed was a relationship of conflict between the A.F.L. and I.W.W., the second part of the discussion will answer this question: did the conflict situation between the A.F.L. and I.W.W. either enable the two parties to be adequately positioned to assess each others strengths and weaknesses, or did it lead to one or both parties actually engaging in activities to secure such information?

In the language of sociological research methodology, this process of taking the proposition embedded in a hypothesis and then testing its structural integrity as well as empirical validity in the social world, constitutes what is known as hypothesis testing or the process of deductions Therefore, after discussing the nuances of societal conflict in relation to the A.F.L. and I.W.W. in part one, part two will constitute a hypothesis testing of the notion that societal conflict enables the conflicting parties to have knowledge of each other's (or one another's) strengths and weaknesses, as well as in some cases

actually taking steps to get such data. This process of hypothesis testing or deduction will be done in relation to the conflict that took place between the A.F.L. and I.W.W..

A sociological analysis of the conflict that ensued between the A.F.L. and I.W.W. is a study that will deal with feelings, actions, reactions, and meaning, which cannot be subjected to numerical or quantitative scrutiny. Because, feelings and actions are qualitative elements of an intangible nature. Therefore, in the language of sociological research and methodology, this study also falls under the aegis of qualitative methodology or qualitative approaches.[3]

Simmel

What constitutes social conflict? What are its manifestations? In the sociological literature, there are a number of approaches with respect to a basic definition of the conflict phenomenon. In his classic work on the subject, Simmel (1955) defined social conflict as an aspect of social interaction or sociation. Thus, in accordance with that viewpoint, the struggle between the A.F.L. and I.W.W. was not an aberration, but rather an expected and normal component of social relationships in all social structures.

Kriesberg

Kriesberg (1973) posited that a conflict situation is presumed to be operative, if in a given social relationship two or more of the parties begin to define themselves as having goals or aspirations that are divergent. In another of his works, Kriesberg (1973b) indicated that social conflict ought to be considered as a social relationship involving two or more parties, in which the social actors considered to be leaders or spokespersons have the

perception that the goals and aspirations of their respective groups are antithetical.

He later elaborated on his viewpoint by stressing that in order for social conflict to emerge, the elements of group independence and collective dissatisfaction with the status quo ought to be present. Apart from those two elements, he was also of the belief that the dissatisfied groups must be convinced that it will be tactically expedient for them to reduce the source of their frustration by engaging in activities, which will compel the privileged groups to take notice.

Based on Kriesberg's formulation, a situation of social conflict became operative between the A.F.L. and the leaders of the movement for industrial unionism, when the Western Federation Miners and the Montana State Trades and Labor Council used the dissatisfaction of western workers with the policies of the A.F.L. leadership, which they felt were inimical to their collective interest, to start the primary phase of the movement with the formation of the W.L.U.

Another reason for their discontent, from the perspective of Kriesberg's formulation, was their collective perception that the A.F.L. leadership had been less concerned with their interests, compared to those of workers in other regions of the country. Thus, the western workers considered themselves as occupying the social status of an underprivileged social, regional, and demographic group.

The formation of the W.L.U. also constituted a symbolic manifestation of the collective sentiments of social alienation, frustration, and powerlessness. The subsequent formation of the A.L.U. and the I.W.W., was an attempt to institutionalize the sentiments (to which I have alluded) on a

national level and join forces with other social actors and labor organizations with similar sentiments.

Coser

Writing along the same lines as Kriesberg, Coser (1956) posited that in order for social conflict to emerge within the context of a social relationship and social environment, and before the feelings or sentiments of antagonism, hatred, and hostility, can be effectively channelled into effective social action, it becomes not only imperative, but also paramount that the social groups in a situation of diminished social status or privilege, actually develop the consciousness of being indeed in a situation of diminished social status and privilege, entitled to rights to which they have been denied access, and ready to reject any institutional justification for the status quo.

Brickman

Writing from the same perspective as Kriesberg and Coser, Brickman (1974) indicated that a situation of societal conflict exists when social groups are compelled to divide resources in a manner, which leads to some of the parties getting more while others get less. It is quite obvious that the western workers felt they were not getting their fair share of resources (i.e., funding), due to the eastern-orientation of the A.F.L. leadership. In fact, they were of the view that while workers in other regions of the country were getting more resources, they were getting less. In forming the W.L.U., they were in actuality sending a message of defiance to the A.F.L. and rejecting its prevailing institutional procedures with respect to the disbursement of strike funds and other privileges that came with being affiliated.

To the degree that they dealt with the presuppositions of and prerequisites for societal conflict, the perspectives of Coser, Kriesberg, and Brickman, were very helpful; because, they enabled us to discover the underlying motivational orientation of social and collective action, especially that of the western workers in forming the W.L.U. and their other attempts to move to the national and international stages and win the support of other unionists from other regions of the country and abroad through the formation of the A.L.U. and later the I.W.W..

As I indicated earlier, having established the fact that a situation of societal conflict did indeed exist between the I.W.W. and the A.F.L. in part one of this discussion, I will now move on to the second part to select one of the hypotheses pertaining to the observed changes in attitude and behavior of some social entities during periods of societal conflict. I will then discuss the various perspectives and finally try to ascertain the extent to which it (the hypothesis) was manifested during the conflict that ensued between the A.F.L. and I.W.W..

The conflict definitely reached its apex with the founding convention of the I.W.W. in the city of Chicago and with the subsequent efforts of I.W.W. operatives and organizers to form dual unions, which competed for turf, membership, and other resources, with local unions that were affiliated with the A.F.L. and also practiced craft unionism. As I also stated earlier, the hypothesis that I plan to discuss deals with the link between conflict and mutual assessment of strengths and weaknesses.

MUTUAL ASSESSMENT OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES BY GROUPS IN CONFLICT

The main focus of the hypothesis is the observed tendency for situations of social conflict between and among social groups to afford the parties in contention the opportunity to mutually assess their individual strengths and weaknesses. Thus, they are able to make the appropriate adjustments, in order to either maintain or enhance the areas of strength and improve upon the areas of weakness.

Simmel

In his discussion of the phenomenon, Simmel (1955) indicated that in most situations of societal conflict, due to the difficulty that certain groups have in being able to estimate their own strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of others, the exigencies of conflict usually make such assessments a matter of priority.

Kriesberg

Kriesberg (1973) pointed out that on account of the mercurial nature of group strengths and weaknesses, such assessments ought to be made by the individual contending parties (as well as their various supporters and allies with great interest in the outcome of the conflict) with specific reference to, and emphasis on the particular issues, which became the triggering mechanisms for the emergence of the conflict situation.

Bailey and Feder

Bailey and Feder (1973) stressed that during such periods, when contending social groups are eager to get information about others with respect to their strengths and weaknesses, the groups that are more likely to be successful tend to be those with the most adequate information, on account of the strategic advantage that such data gives them.

Deutsch

In his formulation, Deutsch (1973) pointed out that during situations of incipient or protracted social conflict between and among social groups, it is paramount if the individual parties are to be successful, to have strategic intelligence data in relation to what the contending groups are most likely to define as constituting a reward, punishment, gain, or loss. He also emphasized the significance of such factors as the kind of expertise, resources, etc., available to other groups and the conditions under which they will be utilized.

For our present purpose, the critical task will be to ascertain the extent to which this phenomenon was manifested during the conflict that ensued between the A.F.L. and I.W.W.. This raises some empirical questions: which of the contending groups did more to manifest this tendency? Did both groups manifest the tendency equally? What do the empirical data specify? The empirical data indicate the following:

From his perspective, Samuel Gompers, president of the A.F.L., considered the founding of the I.W.W. and the two previous phases of the movement for industrial unionism (W.L.U. and A.L.U.) as nothing more than a calculated attempt by the left-wing elements within the Socialist Party and militant unionists to destroy the A.F.L.. His response and that of the A.F.L.

Executive Council to this threat was to issue directives to all affiliated unions requesting them to refrain from establishing any relationships with social actors, who had ties to the new labor organization. Specifically, they were instructed to cross I.W.W. picket lines during strikes. Also, leaflets containing three editorials by Gompers entitled "The Trade Unions to be Smashed Again," were distributed to unions throughout the country, and all union organizers were asked to put the greatest priority to the task of convincing their rank and file that the chief goal of I.W.W. was their destruction (Gompers 1905; Foner 1965).

On account of its pivotal role as the premier labor group that became the catalyst in the movement to form a national union along the lines of industrial unionism and also took part in all the three phases, The Western Federation of Miners became the object of severe diatribes from the A.F.L. Executive Council. The leaders of the miners' organization (especially Bill Haywood) were accused of being corrupt and stealing funds that had been given to the W.F.M. by the A.F.L. and transferring them to the I.W.W., instead of using them for the original purpose of paying for the legal defense of W.F.M. members, who were being prosecuted in Colorado courts. Therefore, all A.F.L. affiliates were instructed to suspend the payment of donations to the W.F.M. toward that effort in Colorado (Jensen 1950; Dubofsky 1969).

The manifest function of the virulent attacks against the I.W.W. and the W.F.M. were to prevent union locals that were affiliated with the A.F.L. from leaving to establish ties with the I.W.W.. However, the latent and immediate function of the attacks was to prevent them from sending delegates or observers to the I.W.W. founding convention. Even though most of them accepted the request of the A.F.L. Executive Council to stay away from the

convention, the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, the Cloth Hat and Cap Makers Union, State Convention of the United Mine Workers' Union of Illinois, and a few others, simply ignored the directive from the A.F.L. Executive Council (Gompers 1905; Dubofsky 1969).

LUKE GRANT: THE SECRET AGENT OF GOMPERS AT THE FOUNDING CONVENTION OF THE I.W.W.

While Gompers was very busy trying to apply a lot of pressure on union locals, trade assemblies, union centrals, and international unions, to desist from sending any of their leading operatives and organizers, as well as members of their rank and file to the founding convention of the I.W.W., he made it a matter of very high priority to send an emissary to the convention with orders to observe the proceedings and send him confidential intelligence information. The name of this spy or informant was Luke Grant, who was paid a cumulative sum of fifty dollars. He sent Gompers a total of eight separate reports, which covered a number of events starting with the first day of the convention on June 27, 1905 (Grant 1905; Gompers 1905; Foner 1965).

Grant submitted to Gompers a detailed account of the opening speech that Haywood delivered in his capacity as the chair of the I.W.W. founding convention. In that speech, he emphatically proclaimed to the assembled delegates that the goal of the newly-formed labor organization was to unite all workers in the United States under the banner of a national labor organization that would engage in the class struggle of the proletariat and free them from the oppressive conditions under which they had to work within the capitalist economic system. He also called for the workers to be put in charge and

possession of the means of production, which had heretofore been the sole preserve of the bourgeois class (Grant 1905; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

In a very strong defense concerning the founding of the I.W.W., Haywood pointed out that there existed no national labor organization, which had the capability to unite the working class under the banner of industrial unionism and thereby engender labor solidarity and working class unity at that time. The A.F.L., he clearly stressed, did not have the mandate to consider itself as a national labor organization that was actively struggling to improve the social life of the working poor. Also, there were union locals, trades assemblies, union centrals, and international unions (as well as other civic organizations associated with the A.F.L.), with constitutions, which explicitly prohibited the recruitment and admission of blacks and newly-arrived immigrants (Grant 1905; Thompson 1955; Simons 1937).

Based on those factors, Haywood was convinced that as a labor organization, the A.F.L. had betrayed the trust of the working class as a social group in this country. Also, by its failure to be cognizant of the cleavage that existed in the social structure between the proletariat and bourgeoisie in terms of their life chances, it had demonstrated its woeful lack of political sophistication (Foner 1965).

On the other hand, the I.W.W., Haywood indicated, would be different in its approach; because, it would have as its basic goal the formation of a bureaucratic structure that recognized the existence of the class struggle until the basic rights of the working poor to have adequate wages and better working conditions had been addressed. And this, he emphasized, was a demand that the I.W.W. (as a militant industrial union) considered to be non-negotiable (Grant 1905; Debs 1905; Foner 1965).

With respect to his reports to Gompers about the various cliques and interest groups at the convention, Grant wrote that there were about two hundred delegates from forty-three organizations, which had a total membership of close to sixty thousand. He also reported that a ntunber of individuals from local unions, trades assemblies, union centrals, and international unions affiliated with the A.F.L., were also present at the convention. However, he emphasized that most of them tended to be predominantly socialist in their political ideology (Grant 1905; Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

In those areas of his written reports that dealt with the procedures, deliberations, and the nature of the sub-groups, as well as factions that were developing on the convention floor, Grant made several references to the diatribes and acrimonious remarks that were being exchanged in the daily deliberations of the various committees between Algie Simons, leader of the Socialist Party delegates and Daniel De Leon, leader of the Socialist Labor Party. Grant considered the rift between Simons and De Leon to be the first indication of any discord at the founding convention of the I.W.W. The dissension, he indicated, had developed over the sensitive issue of whether the I.W.W. should put emphasis on political or economic action (i.e., tactics, strategies, and techniques) in its struggle with the capitalist state (Foner 1965; Grant 1905; St. John 1919).

In the burgeoning feud, the Socialist Party members were the most eclectic, because, they favored a very strong emphasis on both political and economic action. However, the Socialist Labor Party delegates were solely interested in stressing political action, while the anarchists believed in the strategic significance of carefully-planned economic action over that of political machination (Grant 1905; Debs 1905).

Even though, in the final report the compromise proposed by the constitution committee for the inclusion of a language favoring both political and economic action was accepted, in his report to Gompers, Grant was of the opinion that the cleavages that had developed over the so-called political clause were too deep and unsettled. Therefore, they had the potential to throw the entire founding convention of the I.W.W. into a state of confusion. In spite of this negative appraisal, Grant later pointed out that taking everything into consideration, the convention made more progress than he had reported, due to the consensus that was reached on a number of other important issues (i.e., election of officers, setting up of standing committees and departments, etc.) during the deliberations (Grant 1905; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

As I pointed out in my earlier discussion, Grant gave Gompers eight separate reports pertaining to the deliberations at the founding convention of the I.W.W.. The actions of Gompers, in first using coercive force to prevent some of the affiliated local unions, trades assemblies, union centrals, and international unions, from sending delegates to the convention, but then electing to secretly send Grant to the convention for the purpose of giving him information, were actions or behaviors that were in consonance with the basic tenent of the hypothesis pertaining to the tendency for social groups during conflict situations to seek information on one another.

The decision of Gompers was in accord with the perspectives of Simmel (1955), Bailey and Feder (1973), as well as Deutsch (1973). However, the reports that Grant gave to Gompers were so extensive and all-encompassing to such an extent that they represented an acute divergence from the exhortation of Kriesberg (1973). His emphasis was that on account of difficulties that arise in any relative estimation of group strengths and

particular factors that become instrumental in the development of the conflict situation.

It is obvious from his formulation that Kriesberg was very concerned with such factors as specificity, coordination, and technical relevance, in the collection of intelligence data so that groups in conflict situations do not over-extend their resources in gathering irrelevant data. However, in the conflict situation that developed between the A.F.L. and the I.W.W. during all the three phases of its formation, there were so many social groups at the founding convention and a multiplicity of issues most of which were very complex and just in the process of being adequately considered. Therefore, in terms of technical and political strategy, it would have been erroneous for Gompers to instruct Grant to limit his written reports to just a few relevant issues.

By encouraging Grant to send him eight separate reports, which dealt with the development, discussion, and resolution of a number of issues, Gompers was in a very good position to make his own determination and tactical evaluation as to what in the reports were of great relevance to the specific and pivotal issues, which had formed the bases of the conflict with the I.W.W., as the new labor organization was in the process of implementing its goals and developing as an independent national entity.

It is quite apparent that the basic goal of Gompers in secretly sending Grant to the founding convention of the I.W.W. was not to send a message of greetings to the leadership of the new labor organization, but rather to give him information about the new labor group that would enable him (Gompers) to assess its strengths and weaknesses any other areas of interest. Therefore, we can state that in the conflict between the A.F.L. and I.W.W, the hypothesis was given some credence with respect to the A.F.L..

However, there was no comparable effort on the part of the I.W.W. to actively engage in activities, whose goal was the extraction of information that would enable it to be adequately positioned to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the A.F.L. There were reports of some I.W.W. operatives going into areas that were traditional strongholds of union locals affiliated with the A.F.L. and urging the membership to leave and join dual unions that were associated with the I.W.W. There were also reports indicating that in the local unions affiliated within the A.F.L., some militant segments were sympathetic to the I.W.W. (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

In spite of those developments, there are no concrete data, which indicate that the members of these militant sub-groups in the local unions provided information about the strengths and weaknesses of the A.F.L. to the I.W.W. operatives and organizers with whom they were in regular contact. In any case, while it is true that the hypothesis was given some credence based on the actions of the A.F.L., it did not fare so well in relation to the I.W.W..

CRITIQUE OF HYPOTHESIS

In the preceding paragraphs, I discussed the hypothesis from the empirical angle (i.e., the conflict that occurred between the A.F.L. and I.W.W.). I will now deal with it in terms of its structural integrity as a hypothetical formulation. Categorically speaking, it is an inextricable omission of monumental proportions for a hypothesis that purports to advance the notion of conflicting parties gaining the benefit of knowing about each other's (or one another's) strengths and weaknesses just by being in conflict and sometimes actively seeking to find such data, to be very negligent in adequately dealing with the over-arching element of the methodology to be used in such efforts.

What do I mean by the element of methodology? For instance, all the approaches advanced by Simmel, Kriesberg, Deutsch, as well as Bailey and Feder, dealt at length with the typology of data that could be crucial to the conflicting parties, but gave absolutely no information at all about the appropriate or efficient methodology by which the data could be obtained. If this very significant aspect of the hypothetical formulation had been addressed, Simmel et al. would have been more proficient and thereby produced a hypothesis that was well-rounded and structurally complete. Thus, in its present state, this is a hypothesis that will not be able to stand the test of structural scrutiny.

SUMMARY

I started this chapter by stressing the social, cultural, economic, and political significance, of the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century and how it led to the development of trusts and giant monopolies. I also emphasized that there was a causal relationship between the rise of giant conglomerates, concentration of the nation's capital in a few hands, and growing dissatisfaction among the working poor, most of whom were predominantly of immigrant origin.

I indicated that in being impervious to the need of the workers, the owners of big business were faced with the development of labor organizations to which the workers had turned in their bid to get a fair share of the socioeconomic benefits that accrued from their labor power. I also discussed the emergence and growth of specific national labor organizations (i.e., the N.L.U. and the Knights of Labor), as well as their alliances with farmers and other civic organizations, coupled with their support for the eight-hour day, which created the atmosphere that led to the Haymarket

Square bombing of May 1, 1886. That event set in motion the forces that led to the subsequent emergence of the A.F.L..

I did point out that even though the leaders (e.g., Gompers and Mitchell) of the A.F.L. started out as socialists and Marxists, they exploited the anti-Knights of Labor and anti-N.L.U. environment in the business community to offer the A.F.L. as the rational, responsible, and conservative alternative. In discussing the activities of the A.F.L., I also stressed that on account of its policies (i.e,. seeking membership in the National Civic Federation and emphasis on business unionism that led to tremendous corruption among labor leaders), it inadvertently helped to nurture the discontent, which later led to the onset of the three phases in the development of the I.W.W. and the conflict that in due course ensued between the two labor organizations.

In dealing with the concept of societal conflict, I discussed a number of perspectives that have been attempted by some theorists and linked them to the confrontation between the A.F.L. and I.W.W. I also went a step further to discuss the hypothesis and its associated perspectives, pertaining to the observed changes in attitude and behavior of most social organizations and social groups during conflict situations. For purposes of this study, I elected to discuss the hypothesis dealing within the tendency on the part of groups to seek valuable intelligence data that would help them to mutually assess their relative strengths and weaknesses.

In the next chapter, I will discuss the Lawrence strike of 1912 and relate the issues that were central in the dispute to the phenomenon of societal conflict.

NOTES

1. Even though it is a truism that he was not officially a member of the I.W.W., Eugene Victor Debs was involved in all the three phases of the movement for industrial unionism, which was accelerated by the power of his ideas. In order to engender class consciousness and integration within the labor movement, he called for the synthesis of class struggle on the political front with militant industrial unionism in the economic sector. His writings were very insightful and provocative due to their frank content.

The following works bear the imprint of his goals and aspirations for the workings masses: William D. Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book: The Autobiography of William D. Haywood (New York: International Publishers, 1929), 62, 72, 174; David Karsner, Debs (New York: n.p., 1919), 10-11, 168; Eugene Victor Debs, Writings and Speeches of Eugene Victor Debs (New York: Hermitage Press, 1948), 95-125; Ray Ginger, The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene Victor Debs (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1949), 240; St. John, The I.W.W., 23-30; Savage, Industrial Unionism in America; Brissenden, A Study of American Syndicalism, 65-66, 350; Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 15, 60-87; Foner, History of the Labor Movement, 13-39.

2. In the area of sociological theorizing, the process of formulating a theoretical proposition is a dynamic one, which goes through two phases. In the first phase, a researcher in the field observes a social phenomenon (e.g., the housing patterns of various ethnic and racial groups in an inner city or suburb). He or she then draws some tentative conclusions based on the observation of that particular phenomenon. The process of making tentative conclusions or broad generalizations about an aspect of social life based on empirical observation or data from a specific social phenomenon, constitutes what is known in the language of social science methodology as the process of induction; because, it moves from the specific to the general.

The second phase of theorizing occurs when the same researcher or investigator, or even another takes or uses the initial tentative conclusion or generalization as a point of reference or working hypothesis and goes out into the field to test it in one or more vicinities. The process of going into the field with a hypothesis and then testing its validity, constitutes what is known as the process of deduction or hypothesis testing.

In the social sciences in general and in the discipline of sociology in particular, there are a number of works pertaining to the practice of theory construction, hypothesis testing, the potential biases of researchers, and the politics that sometimes affect the selection of subject matter and conclusions obtained.

Among the literature are: Scott Greer, The Logic of Social Inquiry (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), 109-125; Quentin Gibson, The Logic of Enquiry, International Library of Sociology and Social Construction (London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, New York: Humanities Press, 1960), 113-150; Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1973), 5-22; Survey Research Methods (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1973), 5-20; Russel C. Ackoff, The Design of Social Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 178-290 passim; Ralph L. Beals, The Politics of Social Research: An Inquiry into the Ethics and Responsibilities of Social Scientists (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), 1-19; Herbert Blalock, Jr. and Ann B. Blalock, eds., Methodology in Social Research, McGraw-Hill Series in Sociology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 7-27, 155-197; Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science, Chandler Publications in Anthropology and Sociology (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1964), 294-326; Russel Keat, The Politics of Social Theory: Habermas, Freud and the Critique of Positivism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); 133-166; John Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research, Basic (Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, London: George Allen & Unwin, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 309-388, 451-490; Methodology and Ideology, Basic (Bucharest, Romania; Ilexim, 1977), 190-213; Papers on Methodology, Basic Social Science Monographs from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (Copenhagen, Denmark: Christian Eilers, 1979), 65-81; Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, eds.,

Language of Social Research: A Reader in the Methodology of Social Research (New York: Free Press, London: Collier-Macmillan, 1955), 175-183; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Ann Pasanella, and Morris Rosenberg, eds., Continuities in the Language of Social Research (New York: Free Press, London: Collier-Macmillan, 1972).

3. Qualitative methodology is the name given to a number of interpretive procedures in the social sciences that are utilized to facilitate proper understanding and appreciation of the meaning behind the actions of social actors rather than the frequency of such actions. Some of the techniques classified under the rubric of qualitative methodology are: participant observation, content analysis, construction of life histories of social actors, ethnographic studies, in-depth interviews, unobstrusive measures, structured interviews, etc.

There are a number of works that seek to address the various issues and facets of these methodological techniques in the social sciences and their impact on the understanding of societal dynamics. Among them are: Buford H. Junker, Field Work: An Introduction to the Social Sciences (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 1-11, 138-157; Felix Kaufman, Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Humanities Press, 1944), 141-198; Robert Boner and Priscilla de Gasparis, Ethics in Social Research: Protecting the Interests of Human Subjects, Praeger Special Studies (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Praeger Publishers, 1978), 12-35; William H. Shaffir, Robert Stebins, and Alan Turowetz, eds., Fieldwork Experience: Qualitative Approaches to Social Research (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 56-90; William J. Goode and Paul Hatt, Methods in Social Research, McGraw-Hill Series in Sociology and Anthropology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), 313-340; Norman K. Denzin and Yvonne S. Lincoln, eds., Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1994), 1-45; G.C. Helmstadter, Research Concepts in Human Behavior: Education, Psychology, and Sociology, The Century Psychology Series (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Herbert H. Hyman et al., Interviewing in Social Research, A Research Project of the National Opinion Research Center (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 1-33; Geoffrey Keppel, Design and Analysis: A Researcher's Handbook, Prentice-Hall Series in

Experimental Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Charles M. Judd, Eliot R. Smith, and Louise Kidder, Research Methods in Social Relations (n.p.: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1951), 477-528; Chava Frankfort-Nachmias and David Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 271-290; David Krathwohl, Social and Behavioral Science Research: A New Framework for Conceptualizing, Implementing and Evaluating Research Studies (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985), 51, 247; John Van Maanen, ed., Qualitative Methodology (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1979), 9-18, 117-147; Michael Quinn Patton, Utilization-Focused Evaluation (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1978), 37-58; Qualitative Evaluation Methods (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), 21-117 passim; Claire Selltiz et al., Research Methods in Social Relations, rev. ed. in 1 vol., A Holt-Dryden Book, Published for the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (n.p.: Henry Holt, 1959), 35-40, 80-143; Julian Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social Science: The Art of Empirical Investigation (New York and Toronto: Random House, 1969), 35-38.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PIVOTAL ROLE PLAYED BY THE I.W.W. IN THE SUCCESS OF THE LAWRENCE, MASSACHUSETTS, STRIKE OF 1912

The Lawrence, Massachusetts, strike of January 11, 1912, is considered by some observers of the American labor scene (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969) to have been one of the most highly organized and effectively executed strikes in the history of the I.W.W. in particular and the American labor movement in general. The strike was initiated by textile workers employed in the mills of Lawrence, who were protesting among other things decrease in daily wages and unhealthy work conditions.

In this chapter, I will discuss the issues, which precipitated the strike; the pivotal role played by the I.W.W.; the nature and scope of the conflict that erupted between the workers and mill owners; as well as the kind of attitudinal and behavioral changes that took place within the ranks of the contending parties as a consequence of being in a situation of social instability (Wrong 1959).

As I indicated in the previous chapter, there are a number of hypotheses in the sociological literature dealing with the attitudinal and behavioral postures of most social groups as they get involved in conflict situations with their adversaries. I will discuss one of the hypotheses and then make a determination as to whether or not it was manifested during the conflict, which ensued between the workers and textile mill owners in the city of Lawrence.

THE SETTING

In terms of its natural topography (Arendt 1958), the city of Lawrence was (is) located at a distance of about thirty to thirty-five miles north of Boston in the Merrimack River Valley area. It was predominantly a working class or blue-collar community (Kornblum 1974; Lynd 1937; Park 1928; Cressey 1966; Whyte 1955). The historical development (Moore 1958) of its sociocultural base (Nisbet 1953) as a blue-collar community began in 1845 during the onset of industrialization in New England, when a network (Kornhauser 1959) of business services (Bottomore 1965) known as the Boston Associates elected to develop it as a textile-manufacturing location, on account of its structural ecological system (Blumer 1956) as a water-power site on the Merrimack River (Ebert 1913; Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

Within the social categorization (Olsen 1958) of the textile industry, there was a tremendous degree of variation (Kornhauser 1961) with respect to social wealth (Olsen 1970) and access (Wrong 1959) to the market. The American Woolen Company, which was under the aegis of the J.P. Morgan economic empire and the most profitable (Bendix 1974) of all the textile companies in America, had three huge factories in Lawrence: the Washington had about six thousand four hundred employees; the Wood with five thousand two hundred; and the Ayer with two thousand people. The George E. Kundhardt Company was the only one that was unaffiliated with the Morgan group and had about nine hundred and fifty employees (Dubofsky 1969; Cahn 1954).

In relation to the production of cotton, there were four large mills for that purpose in Lawrence: the Arlington Company had about six thousand

five hundred workers; the Pacific Company had five thousand two hundred workers and also happened to be the largest producer of cotton print items in the world; the Everest Company had about two hundred employees; while the Atlantic Company employed one thousand three hundred people. Apart from these large companies, there were two cotton mills, which operated on a smaller scale and had a total workforce of about one thousand one hundred workers. There was also a very large textile dyeing mill, which was owned by the U.S. Worsted Company and had a workforce of six hundred. The total number of woolen and cotton mills was twelve with a total workforce of about thirty-two thousand people--men, women, and children--(Ebert 1913; Foner 1965).

By 1912, Lawrence had become the leading producer of woolen worsted in the United States, with the American Woolen Company acknowledged as the most productive enterprise (Eisenstadt 1959). The number of people employed in the city was close to thirty-five thousand, and sixty thousand (out of the eighty-five thousand eight hundred and ninety-two individuals in the city) depended upon the textile mills for their daily sustenance (Dubofsky 1969; Adamic 1963).

THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF LAWRENCE

In terms of social character (Moore 1958), Lawrence had undergone a great deal of sociocultural evolution (Olsen 1970) from its founding in 1845 to 1912. Before 1912, the ethnic composition (Lieberson 1961) of the population and workers in the textile mills was predominantly native American, English, Irish, Scotch, and French-Canadian. In spite of their

ethnic distinctions (Bottomore 1965), they shared the similar trait of being skilled workers in the occupational sphere (Foner 1965).

However, with the acceleration of technological progress (Bottomore 1965) in the textile industry, there was a process of succession (Park 1928) in the latter part of the 1880s and 1890s, as a new wave of immigrants came in from Italy, Russia, Armenia, Syria, Poland, Lithuania, Greece, Portugal, and other places, to replace the original ethnic groups. Therefore, at the time of the strike in 1912, most of the workers in the mills were from these most recent immigrant groups (Foner 1965; Dergan 1924).

It should be noted that the emergence of Lawrence as a working class community in 1845 coincided with the potato famine of the mid-nineteenth century, during which large waves of immigrants came in from Ireland and Germany. They were followed by skilled textile workers from Yorkshire and Lancashire in England, as well as unskilled workers of French-Canadian origin (Foner 1965).

The first wave of immigants practiced traditional values (Aron 1960), which put emphasis on social mobility (Mosca 1939) and personal discipline (Blumer 1956). Thus, they were able to move up the social ladder (De Gre 1964) through very careful utilization of their entrepreneurial talent (Galbraith 1967) and easily accelerated their level of assimilation (Lieberson 1961) within the Lawrence community (Dubofsky 1969; Yellin 1936).

The density of the second wave of immigrants was greatly helped by the competency (Weber 1946) of the American Woolen Company, which mounted an elaborate campaign (Etzioni 1968) in the countries of Southern Europe. The process involved the distribution (Kornhauser 1959) of photographs in which textile workers in the mills of Lawrence were seen with

bags of gold, enormous bank accounts, and standing in front of nice homes (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

Upon arrival, most of the new immigrants discovered the true nature of the reward system (Parsons and Shils 1952) in Lawrence to be quite different from what they had heard: the wages were very low and the working conditions unsatisfactory; housing facilities of the immigrants were very substandard (Olsen 1958); and were also subjected to abuses by the more entrenched and older residents of the community (Foner 1965; Brissenden 1957).

In the preceding sections, the issues were the physical setting (i.e., geographical position; various textile companies; their specific areas of expertise; number of workers; ethnic make-up of the community; as well as employees in the textile mills). The discussion also touched on the wave of immigration into the Lawrence community by a number of groups from Eastern and Southern Europe, together with the system of segregation (Mills 1953) that occurred between them and the initial wave that involved ethnic groups from Western Europe. In the next discussion, the subject matter will be on the conditions that obtained on the factory floor and their impact on the various immigrant groups.

CONDITIONS AT THE TEXTILE MILLS AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE NEWLY-ARRIVED IMMIGRANTS

When the workers in the mills were predominantly native New Englanders and Western Europeans, they were able to save some of their income and live very comfortably; because, skilled workers were in very great demand. However, when the Eastern and Southern Europeans began to

arrive at the turn of the century, the lack of skill of the incoming workers, coupled with their large numbers, diminished their earning capacity (Weber 1946) within the textile mills (Dubofsky 1969; Brissenden 1957).

Studies conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics indicated that around December of 1911, the highest weekly wage for workers was approximately $8.75, with some unskilled workers getting as low as $6.00. In order to enhance their income (Bendix 1974), a number of workers elected to have wives and children (over fourteen years of age) working together with them in the factories. The drive (Ross 1910) to make more money became so intense that in some cases parents lied about the ages of their children in order to secure them employment in the factories (Foner 1965).

The frequent absence of family members from the home led to the development of strain (Wrong 1959) on primary relations (Park 1916) within that unit as very young children were left in the care of relatives and neighbors. Also, in the textile mills, there was wide disparity (Merton 1957) in wages not only on the basis of skill, but also on the basis of the ascriptive criteria (Wrong 1959) of gender and age. Because, women and children were given lower ages than their men counterparts with comparable skills (Dergan 1924; Foner 1965).

With the support of some citizens groups in Lawrence, the mill owners defended their payment of low ages and the hiring of women and children by resorting to the process of rationalization (Nisbet 1953). They emphasized that the exigencies (Bendix 1974) of the economic front (Marx and Engels 1937) had made the introduction of long hours, low wages, and the hiring of women and children very necessary. They also indicated that in terms of relative deprivation (Merton and Kitt 1968), the plight of textile workers in

Lawrence was far superior to that of their counterparts in other parts of the country (i.e., the south). Thus, in the face of strong economic challenges (Galbraith 1967) from other textile mills, the plant owners wanted their efforts to maintain and enhance their system to be seen as an appropriate reaction to conditions in the textile industry (Adamic 1963; Dubofsky 1969).

In spite of the claims of the mill owners and their influential supports to the effect that they had to use stringent economic measures in order to maintain their leverage within the textile industry, the empirical data (Znaniecki 1936), which were based on a survey by the U.S. Bureau of Labor, clearly pointed out that most of the companies were actually making huge profits with some in the process of expanding their economic activities. In fact, based on the data, there appeared to be an inverse relationship (Lipset 1968) between increase in profits and wage levels (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

Results of investigations conducted by Socialist Party Congressman Victor Berger of Wisconsin, showed that even though the total amount of profit for the entire textile industry rose to about $164,589,665 in 1890, the total for wage workers was just about 22 percent. Also, in 1905, with a precipitous increase in profit to about $212,690,084, only 19.5 of the percentage went to the payment of wages (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; Cahn 1954).

In this section, my goal was to give an account of the atmosphere (Eisenstadt 1959) within which the textile workers had to make a living in Lawrence, and the reluctance of the mill owners to share the profits (Olsen 1958) with them. I also provided data to indicate that while the owners of the textile factories were making huge profits, they tried to blame other companies and their competitive practices for the low wages that they were

paying the workers. The central issue in the next discussion will be the type of housing that was available to the workers and their families.

THE HOUSING FACILITIES OF THE TEXTILE WORKERS

In the city of Lawrence, there existed a pattern of social discrimination (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967) and residential separation (Blumer 1956), because, most of the workers in the textile mills lived in the slums. The rooms in some cases were poorly ventilated and the toilet facilities very substandard. The toilets were located in the halls with some four-story tenements equipped with two for all the residents in the buildings and their visitors (Dergan 1924).

In a report issued by the Inspector of Buildings in Lawrence for the year 1912, he expressed great indignation with respect to the very high population density (Lieberson 1961) in the tenements and the crowded conditions, due to the propensity of the landlords to utilize every available space for rent. Those conditions, he emphasized, posed great threat to the health of the occupants. He also showed his impatience (Dahrendorf 1968) with the City Council, which had refused to take steps (Lynd 1957) to rectify the situation in spite of his annual recommendations for an emergency review of the Building Ordinances in Lawrence. The reluctance of the City Council, the Inspector felt, stemmed from its very close links with the property owners (Dergan 1924; Foner 1965).

Most of the property owners in Lawrence did not live in the city, but rather in very exclusive neighborhoods in New York and Boston. Thus, their physical distance (Killian and Grigg 1967) from the slums made it easy for some of their supporters and counterparts serving on the City Council to

justify their annual rejection of the recommendations of the Inspector of Buildings by stating that the social services (Bottomore 1965) of the slum neighborhoods did not merit top priority. This attitude emanated from their disdain for the ethnic populations (Lieberson 1961) in these areas, whom they classified as Hunkeys, Poles, and Wops. The attitude of indifference to the plight of the mill workers also helped to exacerbate their social condition of migrant subordination (Lieberson 1961) in Lawrence (Dubofsky 1969; Yellin 1936).

The inability of the City Council and the Inspector of Buildings to resolve their dispute about improvement in the housing conditions of the mill workers led to a steady deterioration (Dtirkheim 1938) in the physical structure (Parsons 1964) of the slum neighborhoods. Apart from the unsanitary conditions, the wooden tenements were so closely erected together in most places, as landlord tried to turn available spaces into rental units. The rents in the slums were very high with some families paying as high as $2.75 for four-room apartments, while others paid $4.50 for five- and $5.00 for six-room apartments (Foner 1965; Brissenden 1957).

In one of his annual reports, the Director of the Department of Public Health and Charities stated that in most sections of the working class neighborhoods (Slater 1967), it was not unusual to have about four to five people living in a room. In one of its reports, the U. S. Bureau of Labor indicated that the Italian-dominated neighborhoods of Lawrence were experiencing a cost of living that was higher than similar Italian areas of Mlwaukee, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, and some other large metropolitan centers, because, most of the people in the slum neighborhoods of Lawrence paid more in terms of rent for a room (Foner 1965).

The Effect on Health

Apart from the very high rents, the slum dwellers were also forced to endure very high costs in other basic necessities as fuel, food, and clothing. This state of affairs became a fundamental source of stress (Olsen 1963) in these communities. The management of daily life was also complicated by the high price of meat, which was eaten only on very special occasions and on Sundays. The regular diet of most workers during the work-week was black bread, coffee, molasses, and in some cases lard. The price of milk was about seven cents a quart. Thus, most families could not afford to purchase this food item, which is very essential for the growth of children. The price of coal was very high; thus, the poor tenement dwellers could not afford to purchase them cheaply in large quantities. Also, on account of the crowded conditions, which made it very difficult to find adequate storage facilities, they had to buy them in small quantities at very high prices. The cost of a twenty pound bag of coal was between ten and thirteen cents (Foner 1965; Dergan 1924).

Due to the unequal distribution of wages (Bottomore 1965) in the economic sector (Lieberson 1961), the textile workers were also unable to purchase such basic items as suits, coats, shirts, etc., which they themselves produced in the factories. This state of economic deprivation (Killian and Grigg 1964) affected not only the quality of social interaction (Simmel 1955) within the slum neighborhoods, but also the collective health of the workers and their families. Apart from being the most densely populated urban center in the nation, Lawrence also had the highest rate of infant mortality. In 1910, the number of reported deaths in the city was 1,524. Out of this, 711 were children under six years of age. The contributory factors were: unhealthy tenements; inadequate supply of warm clothing during the cold season; high

rate of tuberculosis brought on by poor nutrition; and over-crowding in wooden tenements (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965; Yellin 1936).

In the last few sections of this chapter, I discussed the significance of skill or expertise in the occupational system of the Lawrence textile mills and how that accounted for the observed variation in opportunity (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) that existed between the native New Englanders and Western European ethnic groups from the first wave of immigration (as a unit) and the second wave that consisted of ethnic groups from Eastern and Southern Europe.

I also described the type of family disorganization (Znaniecki 1936) that occurred as a result of women and children working for very long hours on the factory floor, together with fathers and husbands in order to be properly positioned to afford the minimum level of basic necessities (i.e, food, shelter, clothing, etc.).

In discussing the housing situation of the new immigrant workers in the working class slum neighborhoods, I pointed out that the high rents, together with the exorbitant cost of basic necessities, created an atmosphere of malaise (Parsons 1951), while the unsanitary conditions led to increased rate of illness and death (i.e., infant mortality).

The issues to which I have alluded, raise some very important empirical questions: what kind of labor union protection was available to the workers? Why did the deplorable conditions on the job and in the slum neighborhoods persist for such a long time? The next section will be devoted to the nature of union activity in Lawrence while the women and children were working for all those long hours together with the men at very low wages.

LABOR UNION ACTIVITY IN THE LAWRENCE COMMUNITY

In order to assert their economic rights (Marx 1898), the workers in the textile mills had been involved in a series of job actions (Bendix 1974) to form trade unions. However, in the price wars (Weber 1946) that resulted, the natural fortifications of the bourgeoisie (Marx 1898) rose to the occasion, proved to be formidable (Galbraith 1952), and managed to hold their ground (De Gre 1964) on the factory floor. Even though the tenacity (Simmel 1950) of the bourgeoisie was very instrumental in the diminution of labor union activity in Lawrence, there was another reason (Orlinsky 1971) that also contributed to the lack of a significant labor union presence and activity: the large influx of newly-arrived immigrant workers and their initial reluctance to join workers from other groups to form very viable labor unions (Foner 1965; Adamic 1963).

The empirical data indicate that at the time of the strike in 1912, there were about 25 ethnic groups represented in the mills. All these groups had worldviews (MacIver 1942), which at times did not converge. The differences led to the emergence and in some cases enhancement of biases, prejudices, and stereotypes. Some of the new immigrants were very ambivalent about the economic significance (Olsen 1970) of unionism and instead elected to concentrate their energies on ethnic-based groups (Lieberson 1961) or religious organizations (Foner 1965; Brissenden 1957).

During the period that immediately preceded the strike of 1912, of the 30,000 workers in the textile mills only about 2,500 were in labor unions. These were craft unions, which represented mostly English-speaking workers, who were the loom-fixers, mule-spinners, warp preparers, wool sorters,

cotton and woolen yarn workers, engineers, and machinists (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

All the craft unions were also locally-based and founded, except the Mule-spinners' Union with a total membership of 200, which was affiliated with the American Textile Workers Union (associated with the A.F.L.) and Local 20 of the National Industrial Union of Textile Workers (associated with the I.W.W.), which represented for the most part unskilled workers from such diverse ethnic groups as the French, Belgian, Italian, etc. (Adamic 1963; Foner 1965).

There were two basic ideological cleavages (Coser 1956) between the American Textile Workers Union and the National Industrial Union of Textile Workers: the former did not demonstrate any motivational orientation and commitment (Emerson 1962) toward the formation of a strong and united labor movement to fight for higher wages and better working conditions on behalf of wage workers in the textile industry. Therefore, the recruitment and mobilization of the vast number of unskilled and non-English speaking immigrants was given very low priority. On the other hand, the latter organization believed in the doctrine of industrial unionism and made a very serious effort to organize all its mobile systems (Parsons 1964) toward the formation of a national industrial union, which would embrace all textile workers regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, or creed (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965; Wolman 1924).

The ability of the I.W.W. to translate its doctrinal goal of industrial unionism into fruition was greatly tested in August of 1911, when the Atlantic Mill changed its wage system by asking workers to take charge of 12 looms at 49 cents for each cut, instead of the previous system of seven looms at 79 cents for each cut. As if that was not enough, the Atlantic Mill also

announced the dismissal of about 40 per cent of the workers. On account of the unwillingness of the Atlantic Company to enter into meaningful negotiations, the workers responded by forging a friendship coalition (Parsons 1964) with the I.W.W. and declared their readiness to stop all productive activity. The ensuing strike lasted for a period of four months during which the I.W.W. was able to bring together English, Italian, Polish, Belgian, and French workers (Ebert 1913; Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

Even though the strike against the Atlantic Mill was not successful, the enthusiasm that it generated among the workers led to the realization that in spite of their social distance (Olsen 1970), they could unite to fight for better working conditions and higher wages in the textile mills. In order to build upon the foundation of trust that had just been established among the workers, in October of 1911, William Yates, national secretary of the National Industrial Union of Textile Workers, asked Fred Thompson, general organizer of the I.W.W., to visit Lawrence and carefully assess the labor situation (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

Yates was of the view that the activities that had taken place among the highly differentiated workers (in terms of ethnicity) had also created a constellation of events (Mosca 1939) that was very conducive to the aggressive dissemination of I.W.W. doctrines and strategies. Upon his arrival in Lawrence, Thompson immediately convened a meeting with the officials of the I.W.W. affiliate Local 20, urged them to carefully observe the state of affairs and contact Joseph Ettor, eastern organizer of the I.W.W., in the event of a strike (Dergan 1924; Abrams 1964; Foner 1965).

In this section, I discussed the fact that even though there had been a number of labor-management disturbances (Michael 1962) in the textile mills of Lawrence (since its founding by the Boston Associates in 1845) over the

perennial issues of higher wages and better working conditions, most of them had ended up in fiasco, due to the organized resistance on the part of the bourgeois class, as well as internal distinctions (Parsons 1964) among the workers themselves in relation to their ethnic and other sociocultural differences.

The next discussion will be on the immediate issues, which laid the groundwork for the strike of 1912, and how the I.W.W. was able to unite mill workers from 25 ethnic groups and turn Local 20 into an effective industrial union that successfully executed one of the most significant and controversial strikes in the history of the American labor movement in general and that of the I.W.W. in particular.

The Role of the I.W.W. and the Issues in the Strike of 1912

At the time of the strike in 1912, Local 20 of the National Industrial Union of Textile Workers (the local affiliate of the I.W.W. in Lawrence) constituted the only organized presence (Dahrendorf 1959) in terms of union activity in the community with a few hundred members. However, in spite of its small size, it was a labor union with workers from 25 ethnic groups that were represented in the textile mills. The willingness and tenacity of the I.W.W. to persuade this diverse group of workers to unite under the banner of Local 20, helped to enhance its power network (Emerson 1962) within the workforce, as well as class awareness on the factory floor (Adamic 1963; Abrams 1964; Dubofsky 1969).

In 1911, as a result of a well-organized strategy involving a number of sustained appeals by the labor movement, the Massachusetts State Legislature enacted a law, which made it illegal for women and children under 18 years

of age to work for more than 54 hours. A similar legislation had been enacted in 1910 putting the work limit for a week at 56 hours. Nevertheless, the mill owners elected to pay the workers the same wages that they had given them for a 58 hour week (Foner 1965).

In 1912, even though the mill owners complied with the new law by posting notices, which alerted the workforce to the effect that the new weekly work hours would be 54 for all workers, they deliberately refused to post any notices about wages. The uncertainty about the wage issue generated a lot of consternation (Marx and Engels 1937) among the entire rank and file. In view of that chaotic situation, the Loom-fixers' Union had a meeting with the agents of the mill owners on January 4, 1912, in order to apprise themselves of the decision on wages. After being informed that unlike 1910 the mill owners had decided not to pay them the wages that had obtained for a 56 hour week, they (the loom-fixers) voted to seriously consider a strike if the wage scale for a 56 hour week was not restored (Dergan 1924; Wolman 1924; Dubofsky 1969).

The worker insurrection (Mosca 1939) over the wage aspect of the new system was so widespread that on January 3, 1912, Local 20 of the I.W.W. had an urgent meeting of the membership during which concerns over the wage issue were raised and discussed. At the meeting, there was a general acclamation (Michels 1962) over the desirability of a meeting with the mill owners in order to ascertain the true state of affairs. To that end, a delegation was appointed and given the mandate (Merton and Barber 1962) to engage in such meetings (Foner 1965; Ebert 1913).

On account of its business links (Aron 1960) with the J.P. Morgan industrial and economic empire (I alluded to this earlier in the chapter), the American Woolen Company was considered to be the industrial leader

(Bottomore 1965) in Lawrence. Thus, it was not surprising that the delegation from Local 20 of the I.W.W. elected to have its first meeting with officials or agents from that company. However, the agents had not been apprised of any policy changes regarding the wage situation. Therefore, they asked the delegation to refer the matter to company headquarters in Boston. Even though the delegation corresponded directly with William M. Wood in his capacity (Weber 1947) as president of the company, it got no response to its letter (Dergan 1924; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

In its assessment of the situation (MacIver 1942), Local 20 interpreted the lack of response to the letter it sent to company headquarters as indicative of an apparent change in policy on the wage issue and proceeded to organize a meeting under the sponsorship of the Italian community, which had the largest group of workers in the textile mills of Lawrence. Based on its numerical superiority (Bierstedt 1950), the support of the Italian community was deemed to be very crucial in any kind of worker action aimed at asserting the rightful demands (Linton 1935) of the working class in the textile mills. The meeting was held in the morning of Wednesday, January 10, 1912, during which it was decided that a strike would be called on Friday, January 12, 1912, if the workers noticed any cut in wages (Abrams 1964; Cahn 1954; Foner 1965).

The Everett Cotton Mill became one of the main centers of militancy, when the weavers decided to leave their position on the factory floor on Thursday, January 11, 1912. Their total number was about 1,750, and in a display of communal action (Weber 1946), were followed by afbout 100 spinners from the Arlington Mill. The workers staged a massive demonstration, during which they declared their intention to engage in strike

action in the event of a cut in wages, which were to be given on Friday, January 12, 1912 (Adamic 1963; Yellin 1936; Dubofsky 1969).

In the early part of this section, I emphasized that even though there had been a number of labor-management battles, and an environment of distrust (Seeman 1959) over the issue of higher wages and better working conditions in Lawrence since the building of the textile mills in 1845, most of those organized cooperative activities (Durkheim 1951) on the part of the workers were not successful; because, there were differences in outlook (Merton 1949) that had developed within the ranks due to the elements of race, ethnicity, craft, and creed. I also stressed that the textile manufacturers were able to hold their ground due to better class awareness (Marx 1909).

In addressing the issue of craft or skill as one of the stumbling blocks in the way of the workers in their organized efforts to gain some of the perquisites (Blau 1964) of the textile industry in Lawrence, I pointed out that two distinct differences existed between the National Industrial Union of Textile Workers and the American Textile Union with respect to their labor union doctrines (i.e., craft and industrial unionism) about the nature of the capitalist ethos and the responsibility of labor unions.

I also brought out the fact that contrary to the widespread speculation (Tocqueville 1961) in some segments of the American labor movement about the new immigrant workers, the I.W.W. was able to prove that it was possible to bring together such a heterogeneous group of workers from about 25 ethnic groups and inspire them to consider their social formation (Bierstedt 1950) as the in-group (Sumner 19094). The I.W.W. was able to do so, through an effective program of political education, which involved (among other components) voluminous reading of literature dealing with such concepts as: working class solidarity; class consciousness; bourgeois ideology; industrial

capitalism; socialism; class struggle; syndicalism; militant industrial unionism; etc. (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; Kornbluh 1968).

I made reference to the moral courage of the Massachusetts State Legislature in making known its rejection (Nisbet 1953) of the sectional interests (Bottomore 1965) that were represented by the textile manufacturers, as it voted to enact legislation (in 1910 and 1911) to limit the work week (from 58 to 56 and later to 54 hours) for women and children under 18 years of age.

Regarding the reaction of the textile manufacturers to the enactment of the legislation, I indicated that even though they agreed to comply with the provisions of the new law by posting notices dealing with the new weekly work hours, they refused (in spite of repeated requests from the workers and their union officials) to apprise the rank and file of any corresponding changes in the wage scale as a result of the change in the work week. I also stressed that there were a number of meetings during which the workers threatened to take strike action if they noticed any cut in wages on Friday, January 12, 1912.

The matters to be addressed in the next discussion will revolve around the reaction of the mill workers on the factory floor as they opened their pay envelopes on Friday, January 12, 1912, and discovered that there had been a reduction in wages due to the shortened work week in the textile mills.

The Reaction of Mill Workers to Pay Cuts on January 12, 1912

Even though, the mill workers and their unions had served notice to the mill agents warning that any projected wage cuts would be met with a strike call, the inter-group and inter-personal animosities (Etzioni 1968) within their

ranks (as had obtained in the past) caused the mill owners and their local agents in Lawrence to underestimate their level of despair and determination (Emerson 1962) in relation to the wage issue (Foner 1965).

The workers in the Washington Mill were the first to take action in response to the wage cuts as they got their pay on Friday, January 12, 1912. They resorted to the tactic of sabotage by systematically dismantling machinery and electrical supplies to various production units, while issuing threats to cause bodily harm to workers, who were deemed to be reluctant to take part in the work stoppage and other components of the direct action (Ebert 1913; Adamic 1963; Foner 1965).

Even though, at that stage the striking workers were not operating as a tightly disciplined group, they managed to storm the Wood Mill, where they used the tactics of sabotage and intimidation of reluctant workers. They then went to the Ayer Mill, where they were also successful in getting more workers to join them in that outbreak of spontaneous demonstration (Foner 1965).

While their attempts to enter the Duck, Pacific, and Prospect Mills, were counteracted with manifest force (Parsons 1964) by the police, who had been called at the insistence of the textile manufacturers, the willingness of the workers (with the help of Local 20 of the I.W.W.) to surmount their racial and ethnic nationalism (Lieberson 1961) to form a cohesive unit within a very short period of time, was a phenomenon of great surprise to the textile industry in Lawrence. The demarcation (Bottomore 1965) along ethnic lines (Killian and Grigg 1964) had proven to be one of the greatest impediments to working class unity in other areas. And this, as I stated earlier (see section on labor union activity), was also the case in Lawrence in the years preceding the strike of 1912.

As I indicated in prior discussion in this chapter (see section on issues that precipitated the strike and the role played by the I.W.W.), the Italians were the largest ethnic group. Thus, their support was considered to be very essential in any mass action aimed at demonstrating the resolve (Aron 1960) of the workers. Therefore, it was not unusual that the mass walk-out at the Washington Mill and the subsequent attacks on others were led by the Italians. Due to the strong presence of police and militia groups that had been recruited and mobilized to protect the various companies, a mass meeting was held under the auspices of the Italian section of Local 20 in the afternoon of Friday, January 12, 1912, to discuss strike strategy and other associated tactics of direct action.

As I stated in my discussion of previous job actions in the textile mills, as the workers and textile manufacturers began to argue over resource distribution (Bendix 1974) within the textile mills, Fred Thompson, general organizer of the I.W.W., was invited by the leadership of Local 20 to come to Lawrence. In his meetings with the workers and union officials, he urged them to ask for Ettor, eastern organizer of the I.W.W., in the event of a strike action. Therefore, at the meeting to which I alluded in the preceding paragraph, an accord (Dahrendorf 1968) was reached about the proposed invitation to Ettor.

The Planning of the Lawrence Strike of 1912

Due to the significant role of the Italian community in Lawrence, the I.W.W. found itself in a very auspicious position, because, its eastern organizer, Ettor,[1] whose jurisdiction included Lawrence, was Italian. His arrival in Lawrence was carefully managed in order to solidify the bond that

had already existed between the Wobbly organization and its Lawrence affiliate, Local 20 (Foner 1965).

Ettor arrived on Saturday, January 13, 1912, in the company of Arturo Giovannitti, leader of the Italian Socialist Federation of New York. The Lawrence strike of 1912 was taken very seriously by the I.W.W. to such an extent that the entire leadership team elected to be on the scene, in order to actively participate in the deliberations of that revolutionary opportunity. In fact, the level of enthusiasm over the situation in Lawrence was such that Haywood came out of retirement (Foner 1965).[2]

The massive turnout of thousands of striking workers at the railroad station on January 24, 1912, to welcome Haywood to Lawrence, attested to his mass appeal among the militant elements within the working class. The presence of Haywood, Ettor, and other members of the I.W.W. leadership team on the scene, led to great jubilation and anticipation within the ranks of the workers and panic on the part of the municipal authorities, textile manufacturers, and civic organizations. Thus, they started a series of measures to neutralize the strike effort (Foner 1965).

In this section, the discussion was on the attitude (Aron 1960) of the textile workers as they noticed cuts in their weekly wages in the morning of January 12, 1912. Their reaction, as I stated, Involved the destruction of machinery on the factory floor; intimidation of reluctant workers through threats of bodily harm; mass walk-out from the textile mills; and the decision to ask the I.W.W. to send Ettor to Lawrence for the purpose of helping to come up with strategies and tactics toward the strike effort.

The next set of issues to be addressed in the next discussion will be based on the level of coordination that existed among the various committees

and sub-committees that were set up to ensure maximum functional unity among the various ethnic groups represented at the textile mills.

The Strike Committees and their Functions

The major goal of the I.W.W. was to help create an atmosphere of friendship (Selznick 1943) within the ranks of workers from 25 ethnic groups, who spoke 45 languages. In pursuance of that objective, a decision was made to involve every nationality in the deliberations of the various committees and sub-committees: all the ethnic groups were given representation on a 56 member general strike committee. The 14 largest ethnic groups were allotted four votes each on the committee, which was empowered (Weber 1946) to act on behalf of all he strikers (Dergan 1924; Foner 1965).

Under the aegis of the general strike committee, a number of subcommittees were set up to deal with such wide ranging issues as: organization, publicity, finance, relief, and investigation. All the ethnic groups were given one vote each on all the sub-committees. Later, the general strike committee was expanded to 60 and each representative had an alternate, who was apprised of all the deliberations and ready to step in and serve in the event a particular member either got sick or was arrested by the police (Dergan 1924; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

Even though the general strike committee had the authority to make decisions on behalf of ll the striking workers, the I.W.W. deemed it tactically beneficial to hold mass meetings on weekends during which all the workers--men, women, and children--were given the opportunity and platform to give suggestions pertaining to the conduct of the strike. The mass meetings

proved to be very useful in bringing about social tolerance (Linton 1936) within the ranks of the striking workers. Because, by being given the floor to actively participate in the strategic decisions, the I.W.W. leadership proved to the textile workers that it was not only concerned with espousing equalitarian principles, but also interested in practicing them on a daily basis (Dubofsky 1969).

As part of its continuing effort to present itself as anti-elitist (Bell 1960), the I.W.W. did not seek to dictate policy decisions, but rather to become an advisory team that was helping to develop instrumental and emotional leaders (Weber 1946) from among the striking workers themselves. Therefore, all the I.W.W. leaders, who came to Lawrence (i.e., Haywood, Ettor, Trautmann, Flynn, Thompson, Mazerella, and others) were very tactful in giving directives to the general strike committee and the various sub-committees that were set up (Brissenden 1957; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

By allowing individuals from all the ethnic groups to serve on the general strike committee and the sub-committees and by espousing a policy of inclusion (Hamilton and Carmichael 1967) in relation to the discussion of strike tactics (i.e., mass meetings of all the striking workers), the I.W.W. was making it very clear to the workers that it was not a labor organization that was dominated by a team that sought to impose its will on the rank and file (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

The open-door policy led to a mass exodus of thousands of workers from some craft unions to join the local I.W.W. affiliate, Local 20. Most of the newly-arrived immigrants began to perceive the I.W.W. as a labor group, which offered the same type of primary relations that obtained in their individual ethnic associations and other informal groups. Thus, the I.W.W. was able to gain the loyalty (Blau 1964) of the textile workers; because, they

also became aware of the fact that issues of interest to them would be aggressively pursued (Adamic 1963; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

The ability of the I.W.W. to forge a single self-identity (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967) for textile workers from 25 ethnic groups, who spoke 45 languages, was a significant manifestation of its effective institutional discipline (Olsen 1970) and political mood. The A.F.L. had indicated that newly-arrived immigrants were very difficult to organize, on account of their poor command of the English language, as well as biases and stereotypes, which made it very difficult for workers from certain ethnic groups to establish associational and social ties with others (Dergan 1924; Foner 1965).

During the initial stages of the strike, the mill owners agreed to accept the workers' demand that they get the same wages that had obtained during the operation of the 56 hour week. However (as it does happen in such cases), the militant elements within the ranks began to command massive support as a result of their revolutionary rhetoric and confrontational posture. Therefore, they were able to put in additional demands, which led to an acute escalation of the conflict situation. The new demands dealt with the following: wage increases of fifteen percent; a 54-hour week; proscription of the system dealing with the premium and bonus; double pay for overtime; and no retribution against the workers for their participation in strike action (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965; Dergan 1924).

Even though the textile workers had a lot of grievances, which they felt needed to be adequately addressed by the textile manufacturers, they were able to obtain a consensus on the issue to which I have alluded and considered them to be virtually non-negotiable. However, the mill owners and their friends in the press referred to the demands as nothing more than a prelude to revolutionary action (Moore 1958) by the I.W.W., which in their

view, was operating as an anarchist movement (Moore 1958). In order to demonstrate their revolutionary zeal (Emerson 1962), the general strike committee asked the striking workers to send letters to the agents of the various mill establishments, indicating emphatically that there would be no end to the strike action until their demands were met by the textile manufacturers of Lawrence (Foner 1965; Yellin 1936).

The discussion, thus far, has been based on the structure of the general strike committee and the various sub-committees that were established on the advice of the I.W.W. to help the striking workers. It has also dealt with the care that was taken to ensure the participation of all the ethnic groups represented in the textile mills on the general strike committee and the sub-committees, as well as the decision of the general strike committee to ask workers to send letters to their various textile plants, in order to politically educate them on the need for unity as they proceeded toward a settlement.

The next discussion will feature the strategies and tactics employed by the I.W.W. in conjunction with the general strike committee and sub-committees as the strike action progressed. I will deal first with the rallies and picketing.

Demonstrations During the Strike

In my discussion of demonstrations (see section on I.W.W. doctrines and strategies in chapter 1), I indicated that within the labor organization, demonstrations were considered to be very effective adjuncts to the other tactics and strategies that were used in the various conflict situations. Because, they had the effect of bringing much-needed publicity to the grievances of the workers. During the Lawrence strike of 1912, the I.W.W.

considered it to be tactically effective and advantageous to have thousands of textile workers and their families on the picket lines everyday. Because, apart from the obvious benefit of bringing added publicity to the demands of the rank and file, the thousands of workers and their families in the so-called moving picket lines that were posted throughout the mill district, used abusive rhetoric and threats (Etzioni 1968) to prevent scabs or strikebreakers from crossing the picket lines to work in the textile mills (Foner 1965).

The decision of the I.W.W. and the general strike committee to quickly resort to the moving picket line tactic after being dispersed by the police (when blocking entrances to the various textile plants), attested to the effectiveness of the Wobbly organization in relation to its institutional mechanism of adjustment (Lieberson 1961) to novel situations on the industrial front. The sidewalk parades that were conducted (after the police ban on picketing in front of the mills) proved to be another manifestation of the competence (Kornhauser 1961) that was exhibited by the I.W.W., the general strike committee, and the sub-committees that were created to enhance the strike effort (Dubofsky 1969; St. John 1917).

In fact, the emotional significance of thousands of women and children demonstrating side-by-side with fathers and husbands on the picket lines, and the impact that such a phenomenon was likely to have on public opinion, was a factor that was taken very seriously by the I.W.W., the general strike committee, and the sub-committees that were set up during the Lawrence strike of 1912. Because, during the mass picketing outside the mills, moving picket lines, and sidewalk parades, the I.W.W. made a strategic decision to place women and children conspicuously in front of the lines (Ebert 1913; Dubofsky 1969).

It is important to observe that during those confrontations, the foreign-born women proved to be very equal to the requirements (Merton and Barber 1962) of the strike by openly taunting police and scabs. Also, most of them refused to pay fines imposed on them during the demonstrations and opted to go to jail. Their courage and tenacity drew praise from a number of reporters on the scene, as well as from I.W.W. leaders like Haywood and Flynn (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; Ebert 1913).

The taunting of scabs or strikebreakers at industrial sites in order to discourage or prevent them from crossing the picket lines to work in the textile mills was not limited to the picket lines during the Lawrence strike of 1912. Because, the I.W.W. and the general strike committee came up with an elaborate strategy, which involved such tactics as: securing the names and residencies of individuals acting as scabs; sending letters to the residencies of scabs; and warning them to desist from their activities (Brissenden 1957; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

Other tactics involved: the splashing of red paint on the homes of scabs with threatening symbols (Nisbet 1953); the publication of the names and addresses of scabs (some were sent to their home countries); the making of surprise visits to the homes of scabs while they were at work, and the wives given messages indicating that their husbands were in danger of being hurt; as well as the staging of very elaborate demonstrations at night in front of the homes of scabs (Foner 1965; Brissenden 1957; Dubofsky 1969).

In terms of focus, this section dealt with matters related to the adaptation (Lieberson 1961) of the I.W.W. and the general strike committee as they came up with very ingenious tactics (i.e., the moving picket line and sidewalk parades), in order to circumvent the regulations (Michels 1962) of the municipal authorities with respect to the conduct of the strike. I also

discussed the intimidation of scabs on the picket lines and in other areas (i.e., their homes) in the hope of preventing them from coming to work in the textile mills. In discussing the impact of I.W.W. demonstrations on public life (Mosca 1939) and the tactical advantage of including a large number of women and children, I made reference to the significant social role played by foreign-born women at the front lines.

In the next discussion, the issues to be addressed will revolve around another strategy that was utilized by the I.W.W. and the general strike committee. This pertains to the aspect of funding and how it was administered.

The Provision of Relief during the Strike

It is quite obvious that the I.W.W. was very cognizant of the utilitarian impact of funding in strike situations. Thus, when it was confronted with that task (Levi-Strauss 1949) during the Lawrence strike of 1912, great care was taken to ensure that there was effective coordination between the general strike committee and the sub-committees, which had representatives from each of the ethnic groups. The creation of a special relief committee was also a clear indication (on the part of the I.W.W.) of the important role played by adequate relief as the strike grew longer and tensions increased among the rank and file.

The special relief committee helped each of the ethnic groups to set up their own relief committees. The relief committees were given the authority to scrupulously ascertain the relief needs of people, who had submitted applications and also to find ways of providing such items as : shoes, fuel, medicine, rent, etc. In making all these moves, the I.W.W. was cognizant of

the fact that it would be very difficult to adequately prepare the striking workers to confront big business, if they lacked the basic necessities of life for themselves and their families (Ebert 1913; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

On account of its own lack of a strike fund (that would be sufficient enough to take care of the relief needs of the striking workers and their families), the I.W.W. was compelled to use its connections (Emerson 1962) with other organized groups within the labor and socialist communities to gain access to much-needed funds for the purpose of supplying such items as: food, clothing, medicine, etc., to the striking workers and their families (Foner 1965).

While it is very obvious that the I.W.W. did a very splendid job in organizing the strike, its efforts were greatly helped by a constellation of contingent actions (Parsons and Shils 1952) on the part of the textile manufacturers, municipal authorities (i.e., police, militia, judiciary, mayor, etc.), and civic groups. Because, as these entities began to unite against the strikers, that action resulted in more financial help being given to the latter by individuals, labor unions, and socialist organizations, who found the actions of the mill owners to be very oppressive and inconsiderate (Brissenden 1957; Dubofsky 1969).

The Decision to Send the Children out of Lawrence

As part of its overall strategy aimed at bringing relief to the striking workers, the I.W.W. and the general strike committee decided to send the children of the workers out of the city of Lawrence, in order to adequately prepare the parents to engage in class warfare (Marx and Engels 1937). The initial suggestion for that action was made around the latter part of January

1912 by a group of Italian socialists in New York with ties to Arturo Giovannitti. The tactic of sending out children in order to enable the parents to concentrate their energies on the battle at hand had been tried successfully in Belgium, France, and Italy (Dergan 1924; Foner 1965).

When the decision was published in the socialist newspaper New York Call, over four hundred families in New York City offered to take in the children. After reviewing the applications of individual families, the general strike committee made it a matter of high priority to send representatives to New York City for the purpose of investigating the reliability of the families. After a very meticulous appraisal of the various logistical issues involved in the transfer, the I.W.W. and the general strike committee embarked on the task of selecting the children to be involved in the transfer (Adamic 1963; Dubofsky 1969).

There was a total number of one hundred and nineteen children in the first group to be sent to New York City. The children's arrival generated great media interest on February 11, 1912. Because, among the crowd that welcomed them was a large contingent of blue-collar immigrant workers and their relatives, who demonstrated their support and tenacity (Blau 1964) with loud cheers and applause (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

The success of that initial effort to send the children to homes in New York City generated very favorable reaction from progressive organizations all over the country and many offers from working class immigrant families to take the children. The I.W.W. and the general strike committee viewed the massive support for the decision to send the children out of Lawrence as constituting a very positive evaluation (Aron 1960) of their sophisticated techniques (Olsen 1970) in the management of the strike and elected to gain

more favorable publicity by sending out more children (Adamic 1963; Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

The municipal authorities and mill owners considered the decision to transfer the children and the favorable publicity it had gained as constituting a challenge to the legal order (Michels 1962) and decided to take steps to proscribe the practice by stating that it represented parental neglect. Therefore, on February 17, 1912, an order was issued to the effect that the strike committee could send children out of Lawrence only with the written permission of the parents. When the I.W.W. and the general strike committee decided to comply with the new order by submitting the written permission of the parents, the city officials came up with a new order forbidding any more children to be sent out of Lawrence (Brissenden 1957; Foner 1965).

The decision of the municipal authorities in Lawrence to use obstructionist tactics (Pareto 1935) in order to stop the exodus of children was put to the test on February 24, 1912, by a number of socialists from Philadelphia, who came to Lawrence in order to secure the written consent of the parents and proceeded to take some children out of Lawrence. The confrontation that erupted at the train station between the mothers and the police resulted in more public following (Kornhauser 1959) for the Lawrence strike (Foner 1965).

It was not very clear as to the rationale (Nisbet 1953) behind the decision to openly confront women and children in such a public place in order to enforce the new regulation against the transfer of children to other states. However, it did appear that the municipal authorities in Lawrence were more inclined to operate as lions rather than foxes (Pareto 1935) in social situations (Durkheim 1934) involving demands from the lower strata (Lenski 1966) for social justice (Cahn 1954; Foner 1965; Adamic 1963).

Due to the widespread publicity that was generated by the behavior (White 1949) of the police, which resulted in injury to mothers and children, a number of investigations were ordered at the federal and state levels, with some federal officials traveling to Lawrence to conduct an on-sight inquiry into the grievances to which the I.W.W. and the general strike committee had alluded. The federal officials were followed by a contingent of journalists and left-wing political activists from all parts of the country, who were also interested in being apprised of the issues involved in the strike. The nation-wide publicity and interest (Park 1916) in the plight of the strikers generated a great deal of class solidarity and cohesion, as much-needed funds and other relief for the workers and their families began to flow in (Ebert 1913; Yellin 1936; Dubofsky 1969).

The main emphasis in this section was that when the I.W.W. and the general strike committee elected to implement that tactic, it was done within the context of bringing relief to the workers and their families in order to enable them to concentrate on the mass actions (Kornhauser 1959) related to the strike. However, it is also obvious that the structural restrictions (Killian and Grigg 1967) of the local authorities in Lawrence, which led to the fracas between the mothers and police (as children were being transferred to Philadelphia), clearly demonstrated the irresponsible conduct (Blumer 1956) of the ideologically motivated elites (Lenski 1966) within the community.

By resorting to violence in order to assert their political hegemony (Bell 1960), the authorities were faced with the unintended consequence of having given more publicity to the I.W.W. and the striking textile workers. The nation-wide sympathy and support that accrued to the I.W.W. and the strikers helped to elevate the class consciousness within the ranks of the workers. As a result of the sudden change in their fortunes, the textile

manufacturers decided to take appropriate measures (Bell 1960) in order to gain control. The next discussion will elaborate on the measures that were taken by the mill owners and their allies in the municipal government and other sectors of the community to neutralize the strike.

Efforts by Textile Manufacturers to Stop the Strike

The moral vindication (Blau 1964) that had been gained by the I.W.W. due to the widespread support from all regions of the country, left the mill owners with no choice but to seek an early settlement of the strike. Operating in its social role as the industrial leader among the textile manufacturers in Lawrence, the American Woolen Company offered a five percent increase in wages for all workers. Even though the offer was gladly accepted by a number of craft unions affiliated with the A.F.L., the I.W.W. and the generated strike committee decided to continue the strike action in order to decisively defeat the mill owners and their allies (Ebert 1913; Dubofsky 1964; Foner 1965).

On account of the decision by the I.W.W. and the general strike committee to reject the across-the-board offer of five percent, a number of communication channels (Mills 1958) were hastily opened between them and the mill owners in order to facilitate subsequent negotiation. After a number of meetings between March 3 and 12 of 1912, the American Woolen Company and the general strike committee came to a consensus on the following: 5 percent increase in wages for all pieceworkers, and a 5 to 25 percent increase for all employees in the hourly rate system. The proposed agreement was endorsed by a mass meeting of all the striking workers within a few days. The settlement of the strike became an occasion for a celebration

of working class solidarity and an affirmation (Lipset 1970) of the leadership role of the I.W.W. within the militant segments of the American labor movement (Cahn 1954; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

In the discussion throughout this section, the issues addressed were focused on the pressures that forced the textile manufacturers to seek a negotiated settlement of the strike by granting the I.W.W. and the general strike committee all the four demands that they had made. As I stated in earlier discussion in the chapter, it should be noted that even though the textile manufacturers initially made the strategic error of refusing to give the workers the same wages for a 54 hour week that they had received for a 56 hour week, they did attempt to rectify that mistake by offering to give the workers the same wages that had obtained during the 56 hour week. However, the I.W.W. and the general strike committee had already committed themselves to the strike option. Thus, by the time the textile manufacturers became aware of their error, the strike had taken on a life of its own and become virtually difficult to control.

In the next pages, the subject for discussion will be on the machinations of the contending social forces during the Lawrence strike of 1912, within the overall context of social conflict.

THE LAWRENCE STRIKE OF 1912 AND THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETAL CONFLICT

I consider it appropriate to utilize conflict theory in a sociological analysis of the Lawrence, Massachusetts, strike of 1912, due to the atmosphere of tension that had existed in that community between the textile workers and mill owners since its founding in 1848 by the Boston Associates. A strike situation is in actuality a phenomenon of societal conflict in the

industrial sphere. Thus, the entire (sociocultural, sociopolitical, and socioeconomic) environment of Lawrence constitutes an excellent setting to engage in the process of deduction or hypothesis testing in relation to conflict theory.

As I did in relation to chapter 2, this discussion will also have two components: the first component will deal with societal conflict with respect to its emergence in Lawrence. Having established the fact that there indeed was a situation of conflict in connection with the Lawrence strike of 1912, the second component of the discussion will answer this question: did the situation of established societal conflict lead to the emergence of any alliances and associations? In answering that question, I will be utilizing the process of deduction or hypothesis testing to test the proposition in the hypothesis, which posits that there is the tendency for alliances and associations to emerge among otherwise unrelated social groups and social forces during periods of societal conflict.

It is axiomatic that the Lawrence strike of 1912 was precipitated by the basic issue of distrust on the part of the textile workers with respect to the wage component of the textile industry, which was under the control of the mill owners. The distrust and discontent were exacerbated by the decision of the mill owners to withhold vital information about proposed changes in the wage scale that became operative due to the reduction in the work week. On account of the confrontational and adversarial nature of the relationship between the textile manufacturers and workers, the two social groups found themselves in a situation of protracted social conflict.

Marx

In his discussion of societal conflict, which he classified under the rubric of class struggle, Marx (1909) pointed out that in order for conflict to emerge in the occupational relationship between the bourgeoisie--owners of the means of production (i.e., capital, job sites, machinery, etc.)--and the proletariat--wage workers--, and before the sentiments of frustration and hostility can be transformed into effective class action in the economic sector, the proletariat must develop the consciousness of being negatively privileged and collectively exploited. Also, he emphasized that in terms of political socialization, the workers must be educated to facilitate their transformation from the status of being just an aggregate or class in itself to that of a group that is very conscious of its rights and position as an exploited group. Marx referred to this metamorphosis as making the workers a class in itself.

Marx and Engels

In their assessment of the concept of societal conflict, Marx and Engels (1937) emphasized and elaborated on all the basic aspects of Marx (1909). Because, they did posit that under the aegis of the capitalist state, the economic sphere invariably becomes the primary battleground for the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. They also viewed the phenomenon of societal conflict in capitalist society as being the consequence of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie, who have a disproportionate amount of power and control by virtue of their ownership of the means of production, and the proletariat, who on account of their lack of capital and other aspects of the means of production, are compelled to sell their labor power for meager wages.

Dahrendorf

Writing along the same lines as Marx and Engels, Dahrendorf (1959) indicated that one of the significant causes of social conflict between and among social groups is the unequal and asymmetrical distribution of authority, which leads to some social actors and groups feeling they have been victimized and deprived by the opportunity structure and stratification system of societies and communities.

The perspectives of Marx, Engels, and Dahrendorf, were very germane to the conflict relationship that obtained between the textile manufacturers and textile workers. In the textile industry of Lawrence, the mill owners were the bourgeoisie and had the authority to hire and dismiss workers, on account of their access to and ownership of the means of production, while the textile workers formed the proletariat class that lacked access to and ownership of the means of production. Thus, having no material resources in the form of capital, job sites, machinery, etc., they had nothing to offer except their labor labor power for which they received very low wages.

In the discussion of the work place ambience and social lifestyle of the textile workers (see section dealing with the conditions on the factory floor and standard of living of the textile workers), I stressed that owing to their collective lack of skill and expertise, most of the Eastern and Southern European workers were in no position to influence the monetary value of their labor power. Thus, their bargaining leverage was very substantially diminished within the textile industry of Lawrence.

Marx and Engels (1937) also dealt with the differential lifestyles of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat with respect to the stability of their family systems. Because, as I pointed out in prior discussion (see section on conditions in the textile mills and the standard of living of the newly-arrived

immigrant workers), there was a tremendous amount of family disorganization among the workers. Because, on a number of occasions, most of the wage workers were compelled to work together with their wives and adolescent children, in order to bring in enough money that would afford them the basic necessities of life. As I further indicated in that section, the children of the immigrant workers had to be taken care of by neighbors and relatives as husbands and wives went to work. Therefore, they were deprived of parental care and interaction. Also, on account of long hours on the job, the parents got home with time only to sleep and get up for the next day's job assignment.

There were cases of parents lying about the ages of their children in order to help them secure employment in the textile mills of Lawrence. This was a very desperate move on the part of the proletariat in order to improve their socioeconomic status, which was very deplorable; because, most of the workers were unable to purchase the shirts, suits, and coats, that they helped to produce (see section pertaining to conditions in the textile mills and the standard of living of the new immigrant workers).

While most of the property owners lived in exclusive neighborhoods in New York and Boston, the workers were forced by circumstances to live in crowded and unsanitary tenements in urban ghettoes, where they paid very high rents. The spatial and residential segregation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, as well as other factors (e.g., the attitude of indifference on the part of the bourgeoisie toward the plight of the textile workers; refusal of the landlords to improve the living conditions of the workers and reduce the high rents; as well as the high rate of infant mortality among the workers), raised the level of collective dissatisfaction and discontent within the ranks of the workers and set the stage for a situation of intense social conflict between

the textile manufacturers and workers (see section on conditions in the textile mills and standard of living of the newly-arrived immigrants).

Based on the perspectives of Marx, Engels, and later Dahrendorf, it should be noted that while the textile workers were operating as individual social actors within the occupational system of the textile industry in Lawrence, they constituted a class in itself. Because, there was no coordination of effort and organizational structure within which their collective frustrations could be transformed into a movement for social action or direct action in the economic sector.

However, with the arrival of the I.W.W. leadership, coupled with the strenuous work of Local 20 of the I.W.W., the frustrations of the workers were utilized in a strategic fashion to transform the heretofore atomized aggregate of individual workers into an effective pressure group that was committed to a goal and also very conscious of its rights and social position as an oppressed class in the textile industry of Lawrence. Based on the consciousness of being an in-group, the textile workers became a class for itself.

The direct action of the textile workers was also in concert with some of the specific aspects of Dahrendorf's (1959) formulation in relation to the distribution of authority among social groups and the sentiment of being relatively deprived of social and economic opportunities, as well as benefits, which others enjoy by virtue of their social position within the stratification systems of social structures.

Dahrendorf's approach was very insightful and well-thought-out; because, within the occupational system of the textile industry, the mill owners (or local bourgeoisie) were invested with rational legal authority, by virtue of their ownership of the means of production and the legitimized

power to hire or dismiss workers. This authority had the cumulative effect of giving the bourgeois class of mill owners a very disproportionate power advantage and economic leverage in the labor-management relationship.

The power of the bourgeois class (mill owners) was also reflected in the attitude and behavior, which it exhibited after the passage of the 54 hour week by the Massachusetts State Legislature. It is quite evident that if the mill owners had been very frank and forthright in disclosing the specific changes in wage scale that were to become operative (on account of the change in work-week from 56 to 54 hours), the atmosphere of suspicion and dissatisfaction that grew in the work-place and further exacerbated the smoldering conflict could have been adequately contained before it became a full-scale strike action (see section on issues that precipitated the strike of 1912 and the role of the I.W.W.).

As I indicated in chapters 1 and 2, as well as in the introductory section of this chapter, there are a number of hypotheses in the sociological literature that deal with the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of social conflict in relation to the posture of social groups and social organizations. For purposes of this particular study, I have elected to discuss the phenomenon of associations and alliances during periods of societal conflict.

CONFLICT WITH SOME GROUPS LEADS TO ASSOCIATIONS WITH OTHERS

One of the hypotheses in conflict theory, pertains to the proposition that conflict situations have the tendency to lead to the formation of alliances and associations among sometimes unrelated groups and organizations. A number of theorists have discussed it with their own varying perspectives.

Oberschall

Oberschall (1973) posited that sometimes societal conflict leads to major shifts of resources from groups at the top of the stratification system to those at the lower levels. He also indicated that as other social groups are drawn into the conflict nexus, they bring along their own resources, which further solidify the new alliances and associations.

Deutsch

In his approach, Deutsch (1973) maintained that the consequences of involvement in situations of societal conflict have the tendency to be very far-reaching for all interested parties to such an extent that after the end of the conflict, the contending groups and other interested parties are compelled to redefine their original alliances and associations.

Park and Burgess

Park and Burgess (1921) were of the view that the emergence of alliances and associations in conflict environments are all part of what they classified under the rubrics of accommodation and adjustment in the relationship of social entities.

Simmel

In his perspective, Simmel (1955) indicated that in the main, conflict situations tend to bring about more cohesion and integration within the individual social groups in conflict, as well as set the stage for the realignment of forces and the redefinition of social relationships. And this, he stressed, leads to the formation of new alliances and associations.

Having stated the basic component of the hypothesis and dealt with the perspectives of the theorists in the foregoing, the logical question that arises is the following: how and to what extent was the hypothesis manifested during the conflict situation involving the Lawrence strike of 1912? The empirical data do indicate the following:

As I pointed out in the section on labor union activity in Lawrence before and during the strike in 1912, at the time of the strike in the afternoon of Friday, June 11, 1912, there were two dominant unions in Lawrence: the American Textile Workers Union, which had links the A.F.L., and the United Textile Workers, which was also known as Local 20 of the I.W.W. As I also indicated in that section, there was a total number of 30,000 workers in the textile mills. However, out of that number only about 2,500 were in the trade unions.

The workers in the unions tended to be predominantly English-speaking, and the unions that represented them were the craft unions that had no affiliation with national labor groups, with the exception of the Mulespinners' Union with a total membership of 200 and associated with the American Textile Workers Union (the A.F.L. affiliate). With respect to Local 20 of the I.W.W., it tended to represent mostly unskilled immigrant workers from such ethnic groups as the Italians, French, Belgians, etc.

Apart from the factor of being segregated in labor organizations with two divergent doctrines (i.e., craft and industrial unionism), there was a very high degree of social differentiation and heterogeneity with respect to ethnicity. Because, when the strike began, there was a total number of 25 ethnic groups that spoke 45 languages in both the larger community and in the textile mills.

As I stressed in the section on labor union activity in Lawrence before and during the strike of 1912, the activities of trade unions had been curtailed by the following factors: differential value systems and normative structures among the multi-ethnic group of workers; ethnic and religious biases on the part of some workers; and the lack of appreciation of the economic importance of labor unions on the part of some immigrant workers, who preferred membership in ethnic- and religious-oriented organizations.

As I later indicated in the section, in spite of the mutual suspicion and distrust that had existed among the 25 nationalities in the textile mills, the refusal of the mill owners to negotiate in good faith by apprising the workers of potential changes in their weekly wages (due to the reduction of the work-week from 56 to 54 hours), exacerbated the already strained relationship between management and labor.

The steady deterioration in the relationship between the mill owners and textile workers definitely laid the groundwork for the emergence of societal conflict. Thus, the I.W.W. was able to exploit the anti-management environment and use the strike as a triggering mechanism to persuade workers from the disparate ethnic groups to overcome their biases, competitive struggles, and animosities, and form alliances under the aegis of Local 20 of the I.W.W.

In Oberschall's approach to the phenomenon addressed by the hypothesis, he made two very important points: transfer of resources from groups at the top of the social ladder to those at the bottom, and the bringing in of additional resources as other outside groups are drawn into conflict situations. These two points were very germane to the situation that obtained in Lawrence.

As I emphasized in the section dealing with the issues that directly precipitated the strike of 1912, and the pivotal role played by the I.W.W., the strike was called due to what the workers considered to be vacillation and unwillingness to negotiate in good faith (on the part of the mill owners). Therefore, based on Oberschall's perspective, the wage issue represented a conflict over the transfer of monetary resources from the textile manufacturers, who were also the most wealthy occupational group in Lawrence, to the textile workers, whose wages were the lowest among the workforce in Lawrence.

Oberschall's second point was also very germane to the conflict that existed during the strike; because, as the strike gained momentum and nation-wide publicity (due to the confrontation that occurred between the police and mothers, who were at a railroad station to send their children out of the city), a number of labor organizations in the U.S., Europe, and politicians, who heretofore had not been involved in the conflict, called for a congressional investigation.

As I stated in the section pertaining to the provision of relief during the strike, the incident led to a major shift in public opinion in favor of the textile workers. There were: offers of funds; offers from cities to receive the children of striking workers; more support from politicians in congress (some of whom went to Lawrence accompanied by media from all parts of the country to conduct an on-the-spot investigation); and increased unity as well as resolve among the rank and file. Also, most of the nation's media outlets, which had earlier referred to the strikers as anarchists and subversives, printed articles and editorials in which they condemned the actions of the police against the women and children.

Based on Oberschall's second point, the increase in funds; favorable public opinion; support of the nation's press; and the crucial support of politicians in congress; all represented additional resources at the disposal of the striking workers due to the formation of alliances and associations with these other interest and pressure groups, which had earlier been on the sidelines.

Park and Burgess considered the processes of accommodation and adjustment as very essential elements in the creation of alliances and associations during situations of societal conflict. Those two elements were very evident during the Lawrence strike of 1912. Because, in order for the textile workers to abandon their prior animosities, biases, and prejudices, they had to undergo a period of political education, which socialized them to start thinking in strategic and pragmatic terms. This made it easier for them to appreciate the strategic significance of reaching mutual accommodation with workers from other ethnic and religious groups and making attitudinal adjustments, in order to coalesce as a united front under the auspices of the I.W.W. in their own individual and collective self-interest.

Deutsch considered the process of redefining original associations and alliances to be one of the major consequences of societal conflict. I consider his assessment to be also pertinent to the Lawrence strike of 1912. Its relevance stems from this fact: prior to the conflict situation that was signified by the textile workers' strike, organized participation in union affairs had played a secondary role in the social life of most immigrant workers.

As I stressed in the sections dealing with labor union activity in Lawrence before and during the strike of 1912, the provision of relief during the strike, and the efforts made by the textile manufacturers to bring an end to the strike, most of the immigrant textile workers were more interested in

ethnic-based mutual aid associations and religious organizations. However, after coming to the realization about the socioeconomic benefits of militant industrial unionism as a result of the victory under the leadership of the I.W.W., most of them began to redefine their initial appraisal of labor organizations as demonstrated by their increased involvement in the activities of Local 20 of the I.W.W. after the strike.

Simmel's perspective, pointing to the emergence of more cohesion and integration within contending social forces as some of the ramifications of societal conflict, was also germane to the Lawrence strike of 1912. Because, as I also stated in the sections dealing with the provision of relief during the strike, and the efforts made by the textile manufacturers to bring an end to the strike action, the increased involvement of workers from 25 ethnic groups and 45 language classifications in the activities of Local 20 had the cumulative effect of increasing working class cohesion and integration among the textile workers in the mills of Lawrence.

It must also be pointed out that the striking textile workers from 25 nationalities and 45 language groups under the leadership of the I.W.W. were not the only party to the conflict that solidified its ranks through the formation of alliances and associations. Because, as I emphasized in the sections pertaining to labor union activity in Lawrence, the issues that precipitated the strike of 1912, as well as the pivotal role played by the I.W.W., the textile manufacturers of Lawrence were also able to forge an alliance and united front among themselves, as indicated by their collective refusal to initially disclose any details of impending changes in the wage system due to the reduction in the work week (by the Massachusetts State Legislature) from 56 to 54 hours. They also had the support of the press, municipal authorities, civic organizations, A.F.L., and Lawrence community, in their struggle with

the I.W.W., general strike committee, and sub-committees, that were created during the strike. Thus, they also had alliances and associations that were created and solidified by the exigencies of the conflict situation.

CRITIQUE OF HYPOTHESIS

The basic proposition of the hypothesis was very sound and the various perspectives of the conflict theorists in the foregoing have all contributed immensely to our understanding of the complexities involved in the area of societal conflict. The empirical data clearly underscore the fact that a number of alliances and associations emerged as a consequence of the conflict that developed between the textile workers and mill owners during the Lawrence, Massachusetts, strike of 1912. Thus, the conflict situation around the strike definitely acted as the primary catalyst for the formation of alignments and combinations among some social forces and social groups that had been heretofore unrelated.

The organizational proficiency and political acumen of the I.W.W. were amply demonstrated by the ability of the fledgling labor organization to persuade the diverse group of workers from 25 ethnic groups and spoke 45 languages to forego their initial reservations about labor unions and join forces with others to gain victory with the strike weapon.

The textile manufacturers, on their part, also succeeded in forming alliances among themselves in spite of their suspicions and competitive struggles based on their status as business units. They also had the support of the political elite in the form of the municipal authorities, conservative labor organizations, and the press, who were very eager to form an alliance with them in order to neutralize the power of the I.W.W. and crush the strike effort.

However, there was a weakness, which proved to be a pivotal flaw in the hypothesis and the perspectives that have been advanced by the various conflict theorists: they did not address the pertinent issue of permanence with respect to the alliances and associations that are formed as a result of societal conflict. In fact, they failed to address some issues that could have helped to shed more light in this area.

The following questions should have been answered in the various perspectives: how solid and enduring are the associations and alliances that emerge as a result of conflict situations? Since the parties that form alliances in some cases have had nothing in common ideologically prior to the conflict, do they splinter after the cessation of conflict due to their initial differences? Do the differences in doctrine and social policy that are subsumed in order to facilitate the formation of associations resurface after the cessation of conflict? What factors account for the permanence or lack thereof of alliances and associations that spring up in conflict situations?

To the degree that the hypothesis and the various perspectives of the theorists put a lot of emphasis on the ability of societal conflict to generate alliances but then failed to discuss the factors that may or may not account for the permanence, or temporary nature of such alliances, the focus of the hypothesis became very delimited in scope and structurally weak.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, the discussion dealt with a number of issues pertaining to the Lawrence strike of 1912. Among these were: the setting; the racial and ethnic composition of Lawrence; conditions at the textile mills and the standard of living of the newly-arrived immigrants; housing facilities of the workers; labor union activity in the Lawrence community; the issues that

precipitated the strike; pivotal role of the I.W.W.; reaction of the workers to pay cuts on January 12, 1912; the planning of the Lawrence strike; structure of the various strike committees and their functions; efforts made by the textile manufacturers to bring an end to the strike; as well as the relationship of the strike to the phenomenon of social conflict. In the next chapter, the discussions will involve similar issues in relation to the Paterson strike of 1913.

NOTES

1. Joseph Ettor's parents came to the United States as immigrants from Italy, and was born in the borough of Brooklyn in the city of New York in 1886. He had his formative years in Chicago and later moved to San Francisco as an iron worker. He was very active in the recruitment and organizing efforts of the I.W.W. on the West Coast, where he visited workers in such industrial settings as mining, construction, and lumber.

During his stay on the west coast, the I.W.W. was very busy trying to unionize workers in the lumberyards and farmers in the fruit and wheat fields. Therefore, it started the campaign for free speech, during which its organizers asserted their First Amendment right to stand on soapboxes at street corners and recruit members for its various union locals. He was very active in the effort from 1905 to 1908 and quickly gained the reputation as a social actor, who was very revolutionary and adept in the militant tactic of effective mass communication, as well as other aspects of propaganda warfare.

He is reported to have had his early socialization in working class solidarity and industrial warfare from his father, who told him stories of those phenomena. Those childhood experiences had a very tremendous impact on his later social and political orientation concerning the moral efficacy and political legitimacy of bourgeois capitalism. Thus, it was not surprising that from the west coast, he proceeded to the east during the McKees Rock strike of 1909, where he helped to organize steel workers and coal miners in Pennsylvania.

He was very fluent in English, Polish, Yiddish, Italian, and Hungarian. The facility in languages made him a very great asset to the I.W.W. in its recruitment activities among immigrant groups from those linguistic classifications. From Pennsylvania he went back to Brooklyn and took part in efforts by shoemakers of Italian origin to stage a strike. From Brooklyn he went to Lawrence to help the textile workers in their fight with the mill owners. The political philosophy of Ettor and his militant activities on behalf of the working class have been documented in a number of works including the following: Joseph Ettor, Industrial Unionism: The Road to Freedom (Chicago: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, n.d.); I.W.W., Ettor and Giovannitti Before the Jury

at Salem, Massachusetts (Cleveland: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, 1913); Justus Ebert, The Trial of a New Society (Cleveland: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, 1913); Samuel Yellin, American Labor Struggles (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1936), 183; Horace B. Davies, The Worker and the Industry (New York: n.p., 1940), 180-182; Richard Abrams, Conservatism in Progressive Era: Massachusetts Politics 1900-1912 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: n.p., 1964), 226-227, 273-276; Fred Beal, A Proletarian's Journey (New York: n.p., 1937), 39; Leo Wolman, The Growth of American Trade Unions 1880-1923 (New York: n.p., 1924), 168-169; Louis Adamic, Dynamite (Gloucester, Massachusetts: n.p., 1963), 16; Maurice Dergan, History of Lawrence, Massachusetts (Lawrence, Massachusetts: n.p., 1924), 44; Paul F. Brissenden, Earnings of Factory Workers 1899-1927 (Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1929), 45, 96, 104, 113-114; A Study of American Syndicalism, 291; Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book, 252; Flynn, I Speak My Own Piece, 139; Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 334-262; Foner, History of the Labor Movement, 317-350; Kornbluh, Rebel Voices, 159-196.

2. William Haywood was born in Salt Lake City, Utah, in 1896 and spent his early childhood years in a single family home. Thus, he was compelled to work as a child. He worked as a hard-rock miner for fifteen years, starting at the age of twelve. Those early experiences in the mining industry, social contacts, and political education, enabled him to take a very good look at civic society and the entire capitalist ethos from the perspective of wage workers and their families.

From 1896 to 1905, he became a husband and father. At that same time, he worked as an official in his union local as well as its international while living at Silver City, Idaho. Based on his appraisal of the American social structure, he came to the conclusion that if the working class was ever going to be in a position to negotiate with big business from a position of strength, it should unite under the banner of industrial unionism.

On the political front Haywood embraced socialism and became a member of the Socialist Party's national executive committee. Later, he joined the revolutionary syndicalist movement and helped to spread its ideas for a radical social redirection. During his tenure as the leader of the Western Federation of Miners, he developed the reputation of

being an effective administrator. His recruitment and organizing of workers into labor unions prepared him for his subsequent tenure as the leader of the I.W.W., during which he made significant changes in its administrative apparatus in order to enhance the coordination of the various units.

Haywood's views on the sociopolitical order of society and his contribution to the growth of the labor movement have been effectively addressed in a number of works. Some of them are: William D. Haywood and Frank Bohn, Industrial Socialism (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1911); Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book; Kornbluh, Rebel Voices, 1-34; Foner, History of the Labor Movement; Dubofsky, We Shall Be All.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PATERSON, NEW JERSEY, STRIKE OF 1913 AND THE FAILURE OF THAT EFFORT

The I.W.W. management of the Paterson strike of 1913 is one of the issues that have generated a series of debates among students of the American labor movement and also within the labor community itself. There are individuals, who posit that the I.W.W., on account of its success in Lawrence, became over-zealous in its handling of the strike and made a number of strategic errors, which eventually led to the failure of that effort.

In this chapter, I will discuss: the various issues that became the subject of contention between the silk workers and the mill owners; the attitude of the municipal authorities toward both parties; the strategic errors on the part of the I.W.W. that led to the failure of the strike; and the various attitudinal as well as behavioral changes that were manifested by the silk workers and mill owners by virtue of being involved in such a volatile situation of societal conflict.

In my discussion of conflict theory in chapters 2 and 3, I made reference to hypotheses in the sociological literature dealing with the attitudinal and behavioral metamorphoses that most social groups and social organizations experience, as a result of the social pressures and tensions that emanate from societal conflict. At the end of the chapter, I will discuss one of the hypotheses and then utilize the empirical data to ascertain the extent of its manifestation or lack thereof among the conflicting groups during the Paterson strike of 1913.

In the next pages, the issues to be addressed will be centered on the physical environment and geographic location of Paterson, in order to identify the forces that collectively contributed to its designation as a textile manufacturing center.

THE SETTING

In 1913, Paterson was a working class or blue-collar community. It is about twenty miles from New York City and a hundred miles from Philadelphia. It is very close to a number of canals, highways, and railroads, which made it easy for the textiles produced to be sent out of the city and for other essential items needed by the city to be brought in. Paterson is also divided into two parts by the Passaic River, which enables the textile mills to utilize a tremendous amount of water-generated electricity (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

As far back as the 1790s, during the onset of technological development brought on by bourgeois revolution (Moore 1958), Alexander Hamilton chose the city of Paterson as the proposed site for his so-called Society for the Encouragement of Manufacturing. His choice of Paterson emanated from the city's location and other physical attributes to which I have alluded. However, there were a number of additional characteristics pertaining to the following factors: easy access to centers of economic affluence (Olsen 1970) based on its proximity to New York City, and ready supply of cheap labor (Marx and Engels 1937) due to the great influx of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, who were actively looking for menial jobs at very low wages in all the industrial centers of the northeast (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF PATERSON

In the preceding section, I discussed Paterson in terms of its historical situation (De Gre 1964) as an industrial center and organic environment (Olsen 1970). In this section, the emphasis will be on its social context (Nisbet 1953). The initial inhabitants were Dutch and British. The potato famine of the 1840s and 1850s led to the influx of a large wave of Irish immigrants, who were in the city at the same time as the Germans, who were also in the process of making the community their home. The Irish and Germans were followed around the turn of the twentieth century by a wave of mostly Southern and Eastern Europe immigrants (mostly Italians and Jews), who were very eager to work at very low wages by virtue of their lack of skill. There were also workers of Austrian, French, Belgian, Swiss, Scotch, and Canadian origin (Matsu 1930; Foner 1965).

In this section, as well as in the previous one, I discussed the physical environment and social landscape of the Paterson community, with emphasis on the racial and ethnic composition of the population and workers in the textile mills. The next discussion will touch on the type of conditions under which the mostly unskilled and newly-arrived immigrants had to work in the textile-manufacturing plants of Paterson.

THE WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE TEXTILE MILLS

There was a total number of: two hundred mills serving the textile industry in Paterson and the whole state of New Jersey, about thirty-five throwing mills, and close to twenty-five dye houses. Ninety percent of all these establishments were located in Paterson and its environs in 1912. Of the seventy-three thousand workers in Paterson, about twenty-five thousand

were working in the silk industry, with close to seventeen thousand working as weavers of broad silk and ribbon (Hicks 1936; Haywood 1929).

In the transitional period (Moore 1958) immediately preceding the strike of 1913, the employees in the dye houses worked an average of about fifty-six hours a week, with both the skilled and unskilled getting an annual wage of about $563.60, while those working in the broad silk and ribbon mills worked an average of fifty-five hours a week, with the unskilled and skilled earning about $498.00 a year. Therefore, with the exception of those employed in the dye houses, the typical silk worker, who worked for about ten hours a day and got a yearly wage of about $580.00, was the lowest paid worker in all the twenty-five industries located throughout the state of New Jersey (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

Due to the low wages and very long hours on the job, the workers in the silk industry of Paterson were unable to get their fair share of the socioeconomic privileges (Bierstedt 1950) that obtained within that mode of production (Marx 1909). Apart from the long hours and inadequate wages, the textile mills had inadequate heating facilities during the winter months; the workers had to wear heavy overcoats on the job; there were no exits through which workers could escape in cases of emergency (i.e., fire); and in some of the establishments dealing with dyes, most workers were compelled to work in rooms that were filled with steam to such an extent that it was difficult at times to see other workers. The unsanitary conditions, poor ventilation facilities, and long hours of bending and standing, all became instrumental in the development of health problems (e.g., emphysema, bronchitis, asthma etc.) among the workers, who had no health benefits (Matsu 1930; Dubofsky 1969).

The issues discussed in this section dealt with the type of conditions under which the workers had to perform their tasks within the silk industry and their inability to get good medical care, coupled with rather low wages. The next discussion will be in relation to the type of labor-management conflict situations that had obtained within the silk industry of Paterson prior to the strike of 1913 and how they were precipitated by the same workplace conditions to which I have alluded.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT CRISES IN THE PATERSON SILK INDUSTRY PRIOR TO THE STRIKE OF 1913

The Lawrence strike of 1913 was by no means the only incident of polarization between the bourgeoisie and proletariat in the silk industry. On the contrary, it was just one in a series of such actions for better working conditions and higher wages. Why did the other job-related social actions not get the same nation-wide publicity as that of 1913? A number of social factors contributed to the attention received by the strike of 1913. Significant among them were the following: the presence of the I.W.W. on the Paterson scene fresh from the victory in Lawrence, coupled with the publicity and dynamic equilibrium (Eisenstadt 1959) it has gained; both strikes came a few months apart and were in the textile industry; they were both in the northeast and involved workers, who were predominantly of immigrant stock; also both strikes involved demands on the part of the workers for higher wages and better working conditions (Dubofsky 1969; Luhan 1936).

The Strikes between 1829 and 1910

In the textile industry of Paterson, the first job action undertaken by the workers in the silk mills was in 1828. Specifically, it was a strike staged by cotton weavers in protest against the reduction of the work day from eleven to nine hours and hence a cut in their weekly wages. Between 1828 and 1910, a number of strikes were called in the silk mills with about twenty-four occurring in 1906 (Matsu 1930; Dubofsky 1969).

The Strike of 1911

In 1909, during a visit to a number of mills in the states of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, by Henry Doherty of the Henry Doherty Mill, he observed that a number of weavers were operating either three- or four-power looms. Upon his return to Paterson, he elected to introduce the same system in his mills to replace the two-power looms that his workers were operating. In order to make the introduction of the new system the outcome of consultation (Dahrendorf 1968) with the workers and their union representatives, he agreed to give the A.F.L. affiliate, the American Textile Workers Union, the right to undertake union activity among the craft unions in his mills in return for allowing him to bring in the new system (Luhan 1936; Foner 1965).

In 1910, a year after his visit and agreement with the union, Henry Doherty introduced the four-loom system at his Doherty Silk Company for a specific group of weavers. However, in 1911, he elected (without coming to another agreement with the union) to extend the four-loom system to other groups of workers, who had not been specified in the original accord (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

The union and its rank and file considered the move to be antithetical (Kroeber 1952) to the original understanding of 1910 and decided to bring a halt to the production process (Marx 1904) with a strike in September of 1911. Even though the workers from the Silk Weavers Local 607 of the United Textile Workers Union returned to work, the failure of arbitration (Simmel 1950) created an ambience of malaise within the ranks and eventual strike action in November of 1911. However, the strikers were later suspended; because, their action was considered to be in contravention of their contract with the company (Haywood 1929; Foner 1965).

The Involvement of the Detroit Faction of the I.W.W.

The militant actions of the Paterson silk workers, which were directed against the textile manufacturers in the years before 1913 did not escape the attention of the opposing factions within the I.W.W..[1] Because, as far back as 1910, the Detroit faction of the I.W.W. (under the leadership of Daniel De Leon) had dispatched some of its organizers to Paterson in order to establish proper representation (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967) among the silk workers. These organizers and operatives worked under the leadership of Rudolph Katz, who also happened to be head of the Paterson branch of De Leon's Socialist Labor Party (Haywood 1929; Foner 1965).

The Meeting of February 12, 1912

Due to the failure of the efforts aimed at reaching a conciliation (Simmel 1950) during the 1911 strike, the weavers in the Doherty Silk Company began to question the leadership of the A.F.L.-affiliated American Textile Workers Union and decided in calculated political terms (Nisbet

1953) to establish an alliance with the Detroit wing of the I.W.W. Acting on the advice of the Detroit I.W.W., the weavers made a strategic decision (Olsen 1970) not only to demand an end to the four-loom system, but also to put in additional requests pertaining to improvement in work conditions and to extend the strike to other mill establishments. To that end, a large meeting attended by weavers from other companies was held on February 20, 1912, to discuss issues of economic, political, and moral rights (Blumer 1956) and to reach a consensus in relation to a blue-print for action (Matsu 1930; Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

At the meeting, a number of committees were set up and a demand made for a wage increase (from seven to nine cents a yard). In addition to that, the workers wanted the four-loom system to be proscribed and Local 25 (affiliated with the Detroit I.W.W.) recognized as their official representative with the mandate to make cooperative ventures (Bottomore 1965) and other forms of negotiation during labor-management meetings (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

The Strike Actions of 1912

A few days after the meeting--February 25, 1912--, the committees (that were set up) met with the membership of Local 25, in order to discuss issues of common interest (Lenski 1966) that were later sent to about seventy textile-producing companies. The policy decisions that were endorsed at the joint meeting were the same ones that were made during the earlier meeting of February 20, 1912 (Foner 1965).

Only seventeen of the companies acceded to the demands of the weavers and Local 25 of the Detroit I.W.W. However, a large number of firms elected not to recognize Local 25 as the legitimate representative of the

weavers. In response to the intransigence of the firms, the workers demonstrated their public confidence (Tocqueville 1961) by staging strikes against them, while continuing to work in the companies that had agreed to their collective demands (Hicks 1936; Haywood 1929).

The Entrance of the Regular I.W.W.

While De Leon was well-known for his revolutionary fervor (De Gre 1964), his Detroit I.W.W. was opposed to extremist politics (Olsen 1970) and elected to put more emphasis on a peaceful and conservative posture during labor-management negotiations. In pursuance of that policy, the Detroit I.W.W. and other strike leaders informed the rank and file of their decision not to support any worker, who engaged in militant actions that contravened the law (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

The political priorities (Thoenes 1966) of the Detroit I.W.W. became a source of disquiet (Pareto 1935) among the striking silk workers, who had expected a strategy that was more in line with what had happened in Lawrence. Therefore, a number of them sent a message to the regular I.W.W., asking it to dispatch an organizer to Paterson for the purpose of helping them in their struggle with the silk manufacturers. In response, the regular I.W.W. sent Haywood, James Thompson, and Edmondo Rossoni to Paterson, with the mandate to quickly organize the striking workers and conduct their strike effort in accordance with the doctrines and strategies of revolutionary syndicalism (Haywood 1929; Brissenden 1919).

The Strike of April 4, 1912

As part of a system of functional coordination (Dahrendorf 1959) between the striking workers and the silk manufacturers, over four thousand

workers elected to return to the shop floor in response to the decision of the mill establishments to increase their wages, even though they had refused to officially grant any kind of recognition to the Detroit I.W.W. and its committees on the shop floor as the representatives of the silk workers (Matsu 1930).

However, it later became apparent that the silk manufacturers did not intend to bargain in good faith, because, as soon as they were able to fill out orders and about to approach a season of slow industrial activity (regarding the purchase of textile goods), they refused to honor the terms of their compromise (Lipset 1970) with the striking workers. They claimed that the shop committees set up by the Detroit I.W.W. had interfered with their daily operations on the factory floor. Thus, on April 4, 1912, about a month after their return to work, the silk workers again went out on strike in protest against the decision of the mill establishments not to abide by the terms of their mutual agreement (O'Connor and Walker 1967; Dubofsky 1969).

The concrete symbolism (Nisbet 1953) of the April 4, 1912, strike was quite different from that of earlier strikes that were conducted under the aegis of the Detroit I.W.W. Because, the workers, under the activism (Kornhauser 1959) of the regular I.W.W. operatives (some of whom were just returning from the tremendous victory at Lawrence) decided to reject the policy formulation (Olsen 1970) of the Detroit I.W.W. and opted for a more forceful approach involving the utilization of direct action tactics in the economic sphere (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969).

In pursuance of the new approach, the striking silk workers moved from one mill establishment to the other, complete with provocative placards and other tactics of extreme behavior (Komhauser 1959) when necessary, in order to get other workers to abandon their work places on the shop floor and

join the massive strike of textile workers in the Paterson community. While the striking workers did not cause bodily harm during their movement through the textile district, a number of them were subjected to the public consequence (Galbraith 1967) of arrest, a fine, and time in jail (Flynn 1955; Dubofsky 1969).

Even though a consensus was reached (between the striking workers and silk manufacturers) on May 1, 1912, pertaining to such issues as wages, hours, and loom systems, the mill owners again demonstrated their aversion to any compliance (Killian and Grigg 1964) with the terms of the economic arrangement (Mills 1953) that they had signed with the workers (Haywood 1929).

The actions of the mill establishments had the effect of clearly defining the contradictory principles (Lenski 1966) that had already existed between the Detroit I.W.W. and the regular I.W.W., as they began to engage in accusations and counter-accusations for the failure of the negotiation with the silk manufacturers. In spite of the confusion created by the spectacle of two I.W.W. sub-groups engaged in a bitter squabble over tactics and doctrine, the workers in the industry elected to join forces with the regular I.W.W., due to successes that the labor organization had recorded in a number of strike situations including that of Lawrence (Robinson 1948; Thompson 1955; Haywood 1929).

My goal in these sections was to give an overview of the nature and scope of the issues that were instrumental in the various labor-management confrontations that took place in the silk industry of Paterson prior to the strike of 1913. It is very interesting to observe that since 1828, the demands of the immigrant workers in Paterson had always dealt with the perennial concerns of higher wages and better working conditions.

The next discussion will address: the pertinent issues that precipitated the strike of 1913; the attitude of the municipal authorities toward the textile workers; the actions of the police in support of the textile manufacturers; the mass arrest of striking workers and a number of I.W.W. leaders on trumped-up charges of illegal assembly and incitement to riot that were so vague that any police officer could easily arrest a striking worker; as well as the failure of the strike (that became imminent) after the pageant at Madison Square Garden.

THE ISSUES IN THE PATERSON STRIKE OF 1913

Why did the silk workers' strike of 1913 gain such widespread publicity? Was it different from other preceding strikes? The answers to these questions are not very far to seek. Because, as I stated in the previous section, the issues involved in the Paterson strike of 1913 were not quite different in terms of objective significance (Simmel 1950) from those of earlier years in the textile industry of Paterson. It is very evident that the victory of the Lawrence strike (and the publicity that it gained as a result of the involvement of the regular I.W.W.) spilled over to the collective action of the silk workers in the Paterson community.

The Actions of the Henry Doherty Silk Company

How did the strike begin? The Henry Doherty Silk Company had become very notorious for being the center (Dahrendorf 1968) of most labor-management confrontations in the silk industry of Paterson, on account of its institutional functioning (Mead 1934) in matters pertaining to basic values (Coser 1956) on the factory floor. As it was the case in 1911 and 1912, the

Doherty Silk Company elected in the latter part of January 1913 to dismiss the leaders of the workers' committee that had represented the silk workers in their protest against the re-introduction of the three- and four-loom systems in the workplace. Therefore, on January 27, 1913, the entire workforce at that particular establishment elected to stage a walkout as a demonstration of its cynicism (Goffman 1959) in relation to the silk manufacturers (Flynn 1955; Valentine 1913).

Categorically speaking, it must be pointed out that the strike of 1913 did not originally begin under the superstructure (Hughes 1945) of the regular I.W.W. However, due to a systematic process involving the perpetuation of inequalities (Wrong 1959), the workers from the Doherty Silk Company and Local 152 of the regular I.W.W. formed an alliance (Bendix 1974) after a series of meetings, which were held under the leadership of Ewald Koettgen and Adolph Lessig (Haywood 1929).

Prior to the meetings to which I have alluded, Local 152 of the regular I.W.W. had been quietly establishing informal contacts (Selznick 1943) with workers in various mill establishments and given support to their group demands since its formation in 1907. Therefore, when the weavers from the Doherty Silk Company elected to stage the strike, the I.W.W., working through its affiliate--Local 152--, decided to strengthen its identification (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) with the workers by actively taking part in strike-related activities in the form of picketing, demonstrations, and selection of pertinent slogans for placards (Flynn 1955; Haywood 1929; May 1959).

The Mass Meeting and Parade of February 24, 1913

The structural circumstances (Merton 1957) between the striking silk workers and the regular I.W.W. were greatly demonstrated on February 24, 1913, at a mass meeting of striking workers, during which Local 152 exhorted the rank and file to regard themselves as part of a national union (Marx 1898), which embraced workers in all the silk mills. The announcement of the imminent arrival of Haywood to direct the strike, and the call by the Executive Committee of Local 152 to all workers requesting them to prepare for a general strike, created an atmosphere of great jubilation among the rank and file (Haywood 1929; Flynn 1955).

As an indication of their militancy and aggression (Selznick 1943), a number of weavers from the broad silk unit demanded an end to bourgeois control of the workplace, by parading through the streets of Paterson on February 24, 1913, under the leadership of the regular I.W.W. They numbered in the thousands and their protest led to more workers joining the massive display of working class unity (from the ribbon units to the dye-houses). At the height of the parade, there was a total number of about twenty-five thousand workers from the silk industry in the streets of Paterson (Vorse 1935; Dubofsky 1969).

Even though Local 152 of the I.W.W. had a total membership of about one thousand at the time of the strike in 1913, it was able to use its structural characteristics (Eisenstadt 1959) to inspire twenty-five thousand workers from the silk industry to stage a walk-out under its leadership. It was able to do so, on account of its distrust (Seeman 1959) of and hostile feelings (Merton and Barber 1962) toward the A.F.L., which stemmed from its previous link with the organization and the disastrous consequences.

Therefore, the regular I.W.W. was compelled to become a compensatory mechanism (Slater 1967) for the thousands of workers, who heretofore had felt powerless under the control of the bourgeois order (Valentine 1913; Foner 1965).

The main objective of this section was to elaborate on the fact that the Paterson strike of 1913 was not different from those of earlier years. However, the victory of the Lawrence strike of 1912 (that was attained as a result of the involvement of the I.W.W.) and the ensuing publicity, spilled over to the Paterson strike of 1913 and made it greater than it actually was compared to those of previous years.

I also stressed that the issues involved in the 1913 strike were very similar to those of earlier years. Because, they all dealt with loom systems, higher wages, and better working conditions for the thousands of silk workers in the Paterson textile industry. In discussing the relationship between the silk workers and the regular I.W.W., I stated that their decision to form an alliance with the labor group was not an episodic phenomenon, but rather the outgrowth of contacts (Parsons 1964) that had existed between the silk workers and the I.W.W. Local 152.

The next discussion will deal with the strategies and tactics hat the regular I.W.W. implemented in conjunction with Local 152 and the striking silk workers to ensure a very victorious outcome in their struggle with the mill owners and their allies.

I.W.W. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS DURING THE STRIKE

In order to establish the appropriate administrative machinery (Arendt 1958) for the strike effort, the I.W.W. did what had proven to be successful in

Lawrence by setting up a general strike committee with Haywood as the chair. The executive board of the general strike committee consisted of about twenty striking workers, who were invested with popular authority (Kornhauser 1959) over the conduct of the strike. The I.W.W. leaders in Paterson: Haywood, Flynn, Tresca, Lessig, and Quinlan, assumed the posture of an advisory committee to the general strike committee. In order to maintain and enhance the functional specialization (Olsen 1970) of the general strike committee, a number of sub-committees were also set up to deal with the following social services (Bottomore 1965): information, ways and means, publicity, strike relief, etc. (Flynn 1955; Dubofsky 1969; Vorse 1935).

The Tactic of Non-cooperation

In terms of political direction (Mills 1953), the regular I.W.W. adopted the attitude of non-cooperation with the silk manufacturers, until they agreed to eliminate the four-loom system from the shop floor. However, as the strike began to gain momentum and widespread support from the silk workers, a number of new demands emerged from the deliberations of the general strike committee and its sub-committees. The issues dealt with the following items: minimum wage of twelve dollars a week, establishment of an eight-hour day in the mills of Paterson, and recognition of the I.W.W. as the official representative of the striking workers in the silk industry of Paterson (Matsu 1930; Flynn 1955; Foner 1965).

The Setting up of Picket Lines

With regard to the mood (Kornhauser 1961) of the striking workers on the picket lines, the I.W.W. and the general strike committee set up picket

lines, which were crowded with large groups of enthusiastic workers and their families each morning. In response to that tactic, the silk manufacturers tried to sway public sentiment in their favor by claiming that the workers were behaving like a community of gangsters (Riesman 1951), in order to prevent scabs from coming in to work. However, the I.W.W. leaders on the scene and a number of Paterson residents described those accounts of violence and anarchism (Moore 1958) as part of the overall strategy on the part of the mill owners and their friends in the press and municipal government to label the I.W.W. and the strikers as subversives (Haywood 1929; May 1959; Foner 1965).

While the mill owners were accusing the I.W.W. and the general strike committee of instigating violence among the striking silk workers, they were busily preparing to bring in private detectives, some of whom shot at unarmed striking workers on April 17, 1913, during a debate (Olsen 1970) of insults between them and a number of scabs, who were being escorted into one of the mills by a contingent of private detectives. The indiscriminate shooting resulted in the injury and eventual death of a Paterson resident, Modestino Valentino, who was standing in front of his home (Dubofsky 1969; Vorse 1935).

Mass Meetings and Demonstrations

In order to maintain the dramatic victories (Grigg 1964) that had been attained by the striking workers, the I.W.W. and the general strike committee invariably considered it to be tactically prudent to have mass meetings and mass demonstrations as had been the case in Lawrence. However, in Paterson, on account of the ban that had been imposed by the municipal authorities on public demonstrations in support of the strike effort, they

elected to accept the offer of William Beckman, mayor of Haledon, for the striking workers to have their demonstrations in his city (Foner 1965).

Mayor Beckman was able to do so, due to his central function (Blumer 1956) as a socialist. The Sunday meetings in Haledon, which involved thousands of striking workers and their families, generated a tremendous amount of interest, because, there was no pattern of social segregation (Killian and Grigg 1964) in terms of ethnicity or gender, as the striking workers stood side by side singing inspiration songs and listening to powerful speeches from I.W.W. leaders and members of the general strike committee (Haywood 1929; Flynn 1955).

This section has shed light on the various strategies and tactics that were implemented by the I.W.W. for the purpose of maintaining the social base (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967) of the strike and establishing solidarity within the ranks of the striking silk workers and their families. In the next section, the discussion will deal with the organized response of the municipal authorities to the I.W.W. and the striking silk workers.

THE REACTION OF THE PATERSON POWER STRUCTURE TO THE STRIKE

In the city of Paterson, the municipal officials maintained a political life (Bottomore 1965), which had the effect of making them insensitive to the social boundaries (Olsen 1958) within the community. Thus, it was very easy for them to align themselves with the corporate circles (Mlls 1956) within the silk industry. In pursuance of that pattern of support (for the bourgeoisie), the Police Chief Jolm Bimson found it necessary to personally go to a meeting hall, in order to apprise the striking workers of the fact that it would be illegal for them to hold meetings near the silk mills, parade through the streets, or

allow individuals, whom he defined as outside agitators to address them. Also, Carlo Tresca, Patrick Quinlan, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and William Killingbeck, were arrested in the early days of the strike on trumped-up charges of incitement to riot and illegal assemblage (Dubofsky 1969; Hicks 1936).

Mass Arrest of I.W.W. Leaders, Workers, and Others

Apart from the I.W.W. leaders to whom I have referred, about five thousand workers were arrested, while two thousand were convicted and jailed on charges of incitement to riot and illegal assembly. In fact, Alexander Scott, editor of the Passaic Weekly Issue, which operated as an organ with a socialist perspective, was arrested on February 28, 1913, and his establishment raided by police for criticizing the actions of the Paterson authorities (Foner 1965).

During the police raid, copies of the Weekly Issue were seized. Scott, together with four of his employees were arrested for what the police described as incitement to riot. Because, in his diatribes against the city administration, he accused the authorities of using the constitution (Tocqueville 1961) to advance the cause of the silk manufacturers, while neglecting to investigate the social and economic conditions (Olsen 1970) within the textile industry, which had led to the strike action on the part of the workers (Haywood 1929; Foner 1965).

Criticism of the Paterson Authorities

The indiscriminate arrest and conviction of striking workers and their leaders, as well as others, just for being critical of the municipal authorities for their support of the silk manufacturers and general partiality (De Gre 1964), generated a great deal of interest (Bell 1960) throughout the country. The criticisms came not only from socialist circles, but also from conservative organs like the Outlook in New York City, which openly posited that the striking silk workers had genuine needs (Nisbet 1953) that merited an unbiased investigation on the part of the Paterson governing class (Pareto 1935) and its allies in the textile industry (Haywood 1929; Flynn 1955; Foner 1965).

Utilization of the Media for Social Control

In the Paterson community, the textile manufacturers constituted the single most powerful social unit and functionally indispensable (Mills 1962). Thus, they were adequately positioned to use their property relations (Marx 1904) to influence the power system (Parsons 1964) and the media of mass communication. Within the news media, the conservative newspaper Press, became the most vociferous propaganda mouthpiece of the manufacturers and did all that it could to shape social opposition (Bierstedt 1950) against the striking workers and the I.W.W. (Matsu 1930; Foner 1965; Flynn 1955).

In its editorials, the Press openly advocated the use of vigilantism and other control mechanisms (Hawley 1963) against the striking silk workers and their families. The intensity and zeal with which the Press condemned the I.W.W., the general strike committee, the striking workers, and their families, attested to the social ordering (Olsen 1963) that existed within the city of

Paterson. The inability of the elites (Eisenstadt 1964) in the community to fully appreciate and address the legitimate demands of organized labor, created a societal environment in Paterson that was not conducive to political effectiveness (Foner 1965; Haywood 1929; Vorse 1935).

In their diatribes against the I.W.W. and the general strike committee, the media under the leadership of the Press, launched a campaign of slander, which was fueled by extremist propaganda and unconventional persuasions (Slater 1967), during which the labor group was labeled as a subversive organization that was under the control of anarchists, who were seeking to destroy the capitalist state through the agency of political partisanship (Moore 1958), violent class war, and desecration of the flag (Dubofsky 1969; Flynn 1955).

The purpose of this section was to discuss the organized response of the vital power centers (Kornhauser 1959) within the city of Paterson to the strike of 1913. On account of their pre-eminence (Lynd 1957) as the most wealthy sub-group within the economic order of Paterson, the textile manufacturers were able to use the vast monetary resources at their disposal to gain the support of the municipal authorities and other influential segments within the news media.

The next discussion will touch on the type of posture that was assumed by the A.F.L. and its local affiliates in Paterson during the strike of 1913, the effect that it had on the conduct of the strike, as well as the counter-measures of the silk manufacturers.

THE A.F.L. AND THE STRIKE

During the strike of silk workers of 1913 (just as it was the case in previous Paterson strikes), the workers had to confront the political

directorate (Mills 1956) of silk manufacturers, municipal authorities, and mass media. Thus, they were reduced to the level of social subjects (Coser 1976) in the political, economic, and sociocultural affairs of Paterson (Dubofsky 1969; Foner 1965).

However, it must be pointed out that the workers were also compelled to confront some reactionaries (Marx and Engels 1937) from within the labor movement itself. Because, in early April of 1913, due to the deleterious consequences of the strike on the economic and social life of the community, the mayor and the Board of Alderman elected to convene a meeting with representatives of the silk workers and the textile manufacturers. However, the mill owners refused to sit down with the general strike committee; because, they considered it to be dominated by the I.W.W., which they had defined as a symbol of subversion, anarchism, and sectional bitterness (Lipset 1970) in the affairs of the community (Matsu 1930; Luhan 1936; Foner 1965).

In refusing to deal with anyone associated with the I.W.W., the mill owners also declared their intention to enter into negotiation with other labor organizations that had given legitimacy to the capitalist economic system and the on-going social contract (Simmel 1950) of American society. The A.F.L. and its local Paterson affiliate--the American Textile Workers Union--considered the references to a more responsible labor organization on the part of the mill owners as constituting a tacit endorsement of their moderate and pro-capitalist policies. Therefore, they tried to come in and assume the status of leadership over the strike (Matsu 1930; Dubofsky 1969).

In any case, the I.W.W. and its Paterson affiliate--United Textile Workers Union--had the allegiance (Coser and Rosenberg 1976) of the striking silk workers and their families. Because, they staged a mass walk-

out at a meeting that had been called by the Central Labor Council and the American Textile Workers Union on April 21, 1913, and rejected calls by them to form a committee that would work in conjunction with the A.F.L. (Dubofsky 1969; Flynn 1955).

In the main, the major focus of this section was to stress the fact that even though the privileged groups (Wrong 1959) in Paterson worked in conjunction with the silk manufacturers and the press to engage in social polarization (Bendix 1974), the mayor and the Council of Aldermen decided to bring the two contending groups together to engage in the process of negotiation, due to the effect that the strike was having on the economic order of the community.

I also made reference to the reluctance of the mill owners to engage in meaningful negotiation with the general strike committee due to its policy coordination (Simmel 1950) with the I.W.W., and the entrance of the A.F.L. into the strike situation (only to be rejected by the strikers) after offers from the manufacturers to engage in a dialogue with conservative labor organizations.

The focus of the next discussion will be on the efforts that were made by the I.W.W. to secure much-needed funding for the striking workers and their families, as well as the social and economic constellations (Merton and Barber 1962) that led to the staging of the workers' pageant at New York City's Madison Square Garden.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR FUNDS AND THE PAGEANT

Even though, by refusing to align themselves with the A.F.L. and its local affiliate, the general strike committee and the silk workers were giving

their negative social response (Znaniecki 1940) to the conservative policies of that labor organization, while endorsing those of the I.W.W., the absence of a strike fund led to demoralization (Mizruchi 1964) within the ranks. On account of the deplorable financial status, an urgent appeal was made by the I.W.W. and the general strike committee (for funding and other forms of relief) to socialist-oriented organizations and Italian associations (most of the twenty-five thousand silk workers on strike were of Italian descent). While it is true that a number of contributions were made, they were not enough to take care of the most basic needs of twenty-five thousand striking workers and their families (Haywood 1929; Foner 1965; May 1959).

The Actions of John Reed

The originator of the idea to hold the pageant was John Reed.[2] In his social situation (Bendix 1974) as an active member of the I.W.W., he became an organizer and made a number of trips to Paterson during which he led workers in the singing of inspirational songs, which were interspersed with powerful speeches pertaining to such concepts as class struggle, working class unity, revolutionary syndicalism, direct action, class consciousness, etc. (Foner 1965).

His decision to organize the pageant stemmed from his concern with the lack of funding for the striking workers and their families. Thus, in order to concentrate his attention on the preparation of the pageant, he resigned from his journalistic position at the American Magazine. Another intended consequence (Merton 1949) of the pageant was increased public following (Kornhauser 1959) for the I.W.W. and the striking silk workers (Hicks 1936; Foner 1965).

The plan was to get a representative group of about two hundred silk workers, who would be taught to act in certain specific scenes dealing with the strike action, in order to inform the audience at Madison Square Garden and the public at large about the basic issues involved in the strike. The chosen workers were also supposed to march from Paterson to New York City's Madison Square Garden for the pageant. However, just as the plans were being finalized, some of the striking workers began to express their unified opposition (Killian and Grigg 1964) to the idea of their exclusion. Therefore, a decision was made to increase the contingent to one thousand and twenty-nine striking workers (Haywood 1929; Flynn 1955; Foner 1965).

The pageant consisted of six episodes, which depicted various components of the strike. The audience of more than fifteen thousand was greatly moved by the emotional intensity and realism of the pageant. As a result of the Wobbly history of revolutionary rhetoric and militant action, the New York City Police Department mobilized an army of police officers to counteract any violent demonstrations that might ensue in support of the strike effort (Flynn 1955; Valentine 1962; Foner 1965).

The Failure of the Pageant

The reaction of the media of mass communication was very diverse and mixed: the New York Call, which had a socialist orientation and The Independent declared their organizational support (Blumer 1956) for the causal dynamics (Olsen 1958) of the pageant. However, The New York Times labeled the entire exercise as nothing more than a part of the I.W.W. campaign of distraction (Mills 1958) aimed at garnering public confidence (Tocqueville 1961) and fomenting social anarchy (De Gre 1964) in the city (Foner 1965).

While it was true (as the New York Call and The Independent pointed out) that the pageant achieved great success with respect to its depiction of the totalitarianism (Arendt 1958) in Paterson, it did not succeed in providing the much-needed funds that had been anticipated by the I.W.W., the general strike committee, and the striking silk workers. The failure stemmed from the fact that, even though the audience was very large, a couple of minutes before the event, the seats that had been designated for a dollar or two dollars had not been occupied. Therefore, a decision was made to admit the large number of people, who had purchased twenty-five cent tickets and allow them to take the one dollar and two dollar seats (Dubofsky 1969; Flynn 1955; Hicks 1936).

Subsequent investigation into the debacle at Madison Square Garden indicated that on account of very poor regulatory mechanisms (Mills 1956) in relation to security at the gates, a number of individuals were able to sneak in and occupy most of the seats costing twenty-five cents without paying for them. The failure of the pageant to bring much-needed funds to the striking silk workers and their families, did a lot of damage to the political character (Marx 1910) and behavioral preparation (Merton and Kitt 1968) toward the strike effort. The ranks of the strikers were also diminished by propaganda emanating from the mill owners and their allies to the effect that some of the organizers of the pageant had engaged in very corrupt practices (Haywood 1929; Dubofsky 1969).

This section has addressed the following matters: the effect of the lack of a strike fund at the disposal of the I.W.W. on the conduct of the Paterson strike; diminution of working class cohesion and solidarity within the ranks of the striking silk workers due to lack of funds for basic necessities; the conditions under which John Reed, a Harvard graduate of upper-middle class

background, elected to join forces with the silk workers of Paterson and use the I.W.W. as his reference group in terms of political identity (Nisbet 1953); his tireless efforts to secure the much-needed funds for the workers and their families; as well as the failure of the strike to bring in funds on account of administrative and logistical errors.

The next discussion will be based on issues pertaining to the effect of the debacle at Madison Square Garden on the intensity with which the strike was managed, and the eventual decision to settle in order to bring much-needed funds to the strikers and their dependents.

CRITICISM OF THE I.W.W. AND THE DECISION TO SETTLE THE STRIKE

The failure of the pageant to bring in funds led to a number of charges and criticisms against the I.W.W. and the general strike committee in relation to competence and honesty. The silk manufacturers considered the failure of the pageant and lack of funds as having substantially disrupted the communal ties (Kornhauser 1959) among the silk workers and did all that they could to exploit the ethnic barriers (Killian and Grigg 1964) within the ranks through the spread of propaganda. The organizers were accused of having stolen money that was received in order to create their own private wealth. The propaganda and lack of funds created an atmosphere of suspicion, in spite of constant denials on the part of the I.W.W. leaders and the general strike committee. Within the I.W.W., the general strike committee, and the striking workers, there were individuals, who attributed the failure of the pageant to sabotage on the part of the silk manufacturers and their paid agents (Haywood 1929; Flynn 1955; Foner 1965).

On August 1, 1913, due to the turmoil (Lieberson 1961) within the ranks of the silk workers, the strike was declared over by the I.W.W. and the general strike committee. However, before that, a number of striking workers had already elected to abandon the effort and go back to work. In spite of the defeat, the I.W.W. declared that the silk workers had won a moral and symbolic victory; because, they had proven to the centers of power (Lenski 1966) in Paterson that they were capable of utilizing their social and political development (Parsons 1960) in a positive fashion in order to draw attention to the complex economy (Mills 1956) in the silk industry, which was predicated upon extorted obedience (Tocqueville 1961) to the bourgeois order (Haywood 1929; Flynn 1955; Foner 1965).

The goal of this section was to address a number of issues pertaining to the use of rumors and propaganda (on the part of the silk manufacturers and the power elite of Paterson), which were aimed at creating discord and suspicion among the workers, and the eventual decision of the I.W.W. and the general strike committee to settle the strike, as thousands of workers abandoned ship and elected to go back to work. In the next section, the discussion will be focused on the Paterson strike of 1913 in terms of its significance to the concept of societal conflict.

THE PATERSON STRIKE OF 1913 AND THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETAL CONFLICT

As it was the case with the A.F.L. and I.W.W. in chapter 2 and the Lawrence strike in chapter 3, I do not find it difficult to use conflict theory as a catalyst to analyze the state of affairs in Paterson during the strike of 1913; because, the municipal authorities in Paterson (like their counterparts in

Lawrence) sowed the seeds of social discontent by implementing a policy that was patently anti-labor and pro-business.

As I also did with respect to the A.F.L. and I.W.W., as well as the Lawrence strike in chapters 2 and 3, this discussion will have two parts. The first part will seek to establish the fact that a situation of conflict did actually exist in Paterson. Due to the very strong ideological positions that were adopted by the conflicting parties, I have elected to engage in the process of deduction or hypothesis testing of the proposition in the hypothesis, which posits that doctrine-related conflicts have the tendency to lead to greater inflexibility in positions and more commitment to causes.

As I pointed out in some of the preceding sections of this chapter, the relationship between the mill owners and the silk workers within the occupational system of the Paterson textile industry was not unlike that of other industries under the aegis of the capitalist system, where occasional confrontations are endemic, on account of the adversarial element that pervades the labor-management relationship.

As I also indicated earlier, there had been a number of labor-management confrontations in the silk industry of Paterson (dating as far back as 1828) and they all stemmed from demands on the part of the labor rank and file for better working conditions and higher wages. Therefore, the strike of 1913 was not a unique phenomenon, but rather the continuation of a relationship of protracted social conflict that had existed between the silk workers and mill owners.

Marx, Engels, and Dahrendorf

As I stated in my discussion of societal conflict in chapter 3, Marx and Engels (1937) and Marx (1909), as well as Dahrendorf (1959), considered

societal conflict in industrial society as having its major center in the economic sector, where a relationship of subordination and superordination exists between the bourgeois class and the proletariat.

Coser

The strike action on the part of the silk workers was also in accord with the perspectives of Coser (1974), which I stated in chapter 2. Those perspectives were also in consonance with the views of Marx, Engels, and Dahrendorf. Because, they were in agreement that the only strategy by which the oppressed proletariat can have their grievances addressed in an adequate manner is to take part in collective action (i.e., strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, etc.). Thus, they should be prepared to withhold legitimacy to the ongoing institutional arrangements within the textile industry (or any other industry) with respect to the distribution of socioeconomic benefits (i.e., wages, promotions, working conditions, etc.).

With specific reference to the textile industry of Paterson, the silk workers were the proletariat, while the owners constituted the bourgeoisie, due to their ownership of the means of production (i.e., capital, machinery, etc.). Like their counterparts in Lawrence, the Paterson workers had nothing in terms of resources. Therefore, they had to sell their labor power for meager wages. They also considered themselves as being the subordinate social group and viewed the collective action of strikes, public parades, demonstrations, and rallies, as part of a grand strategy to influence public opinion and gain the attention of official society to their plight within the textile industry (see sections pertaining to the concept of social conflict in chapters 2 and 3).

As I stated in chapter 3 in relation to the perspectives of Marx and Engels (1937), Marx (1909), and Dahrendorf (1959), by being just an aggregate or collection of workers, the proletariat in the Paterson textile industry constituted a class in itself. When the workers became aware of their common or shared plight and elected to join forces in a united front to declare a strike they became a class for itself. The declaration of a strike always occurs within the context of a conflict relationship. As I stated in chapters 2 and 3, and earlier in this chapter, social groups and organizations tend to manifest certain attitudinal and behavioral characteristics during situations of conflict. I will discuss one of the hypotheses and determine the extent to which it applies to the Paterson strike of 1913.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOCTRINE AND SOCIETAL CONFLICT

The link between doctrine (i.e., symbols, values, ideas, etc.) and inter-group conflict is one that I have elected to discuss in this chapter, with emphasis on its emergence and intensity.

Simmel

In his assessment of the phenomenon, Simmel (1955) pointed out that conflicts, which develop over differences in doctrine tend to have two possibilities: they could be very civil and benign (a lot of doctrines put great emphasis on such concepts as love, respect, dignity, and forgiveness). However, sometimes, the consciousness of being the representatives of a higher cause, has the propensity to imbue such confrontations with the type of ruthlessness and intensity that are absent in conflicts over other issues. He also posited that the ruthlessness and intensity emanate from the fact that the

groups and organizations involved tend to commit to the cause their total personalities, become over-zealous, and thereby crate an environment for the conflict to take on a life of its own.

Oberschall

In dealing with the phenomenon, Oberschall (1973) posited that the reason for the observed ferociousness of doctrine-oriented inter-group conflict situations and the apparent difficulty in controlling their intensity and parameters, all stem from the fact that doctrines are usually associated with such emotion-laden elements as group and community identity, social status, morality, integrity, and consensus. Also, he indicated that the groups and organizations in such conflicts tend to assume a posture of self-righteousness (i.e., ethical and moral superiority), which makes them less circumspect in their dealings with those, who have dissenting perspectives.

Deutsch

Writing along the same lines as Simmel and Oberschall, Deutsch (1973) observed that in situations of inter-group conflict, where the matters involved deal with doctrine, the self-image of certain social entities tend to become intermingled with other objective factors to such an extent that the situations of social conflict spin out of control and become more difficult to resolve.

Park and Burgess

Park and Burgess (1921) were of the view that, in the main, conflicts over doctrine tend to be more violent and protracted; because, there are social actors (in groups and organizations), who do not consider it wrong to work

long hours under deplorable conditions for meager wages, but will engage in violent behavior in response to what they define as insult to their dignity and honor.

Boulding

In his evaluation, Boulding (1962) stressed that symbols play a very significant role in conflicts and further indicated that sometimes even conflicts, which may be overtly defined as related to such matters as resources, land, and property, may be covertly linked to issues dealing with self-image, mores, values, and principles.

The approaches to which I have referred in the foregoing, raise a number of empirical questions: how do they relate to the conflict that ensued between the textile manufacturers and the striking silk workers during the Paterson strike of 1913? What role did doctrine play in the actions and reactions of the contending social forces? What do the empirical data indicate? How volatile were the issues involved?

As I pointed out in the section dealing with an inventory of labor-management confrontations in the silk industry of Paterson prior to the strike of 1913, there had been a history of intermittent conflict in the textile industry of Paterson as far back as 1828. As I also stated, all the labor disputes dealt with the introduction of the three- or four-loom systems without any wage increases to account for the additional work.

Even though the confrontation in 1913 also began as a wage issue, as Boulding (1962) stipulated in his perspective, a conflict situation over resources (i.e., wages and work conditions) may also be intermingled with self-image, values, and principles. This phenomenon was evident in Paterson; because, after becoming disenchanted with the conservative approach of the

Detroit faction of the I.W.W., the silk workers demonstrated their option for a more militant and revolutionary labor union representation by sending an urgent request to the regular I.W.W. to send some of its operatives and organizers to advise them on direct action strike strategies and other forms of collective action.

Boulding's perspective was very astute, because, the arrival of I.W.W. leaders: Haywood, Flynn, Thompson, Rossoni, and others, represented a sharp change in doctrine on the part of the striking workers in favor of a revolutionary-syndicalist approach, which had been associated with the I.W.W. in its various strikes. The change in doctrine was amply demonstrated by the decision of the I.W.W. leadership on the scene and the Executive Committee of its Paterson affiliate (Local 152) to convene a mass meeting of all the striking workers on February 24, 1913. As I discussed in the section pertaining to the issues that became pivotal in the Paterson strike of 1913, at that meeting, the workers were given speeches on the need for working class unity, as well as diatribes against the silk manufacturers and official society.

The perspectives of Deutsch, as well as those of Park and Burgess, merit very close scrutiny, because, while they did agree with Boulding's observation about the connection between objective and subjective elements in conflict situations, they went one step further to call attention to some of the other ramifications of doctrine-related conflicts. Deutsch put great emphasis on the tendency for conflicts to sometimes take on a life of their own and thus difficult to manage, due to the mixture of emotional factors with rational issues, while Park and Burgess emphasized the aspect of diminution in tolerance of others as groups assume the posture of self-righteousness in doctrine-related conflicts.

Simmel's approach was very similar to those of all the other theorists; because, he made the same observations to which I alluded in the preceding paragraph. However, he was the most adventurous; for, he also stressed that doctrine-related conflicts could be either civil or benign, while also pointing out that as groups begin to regard themselves as representatives of a higher cause they tend to become less tolerant of others.

The varying perspectives of Oberschall, Deutsch, Boulding, Park and Burgess, as well as Simmel, were very germane to what happened during the Paterson strike of 1913 due to the following additional reasons:

During the course of my discussion in the section on the reaction of the Paterson power structure to the strike, indicated that the workers and their I.W.W. supporters endured a great deal of hardship and intimidation on the part of the municipal authorities in Paterson--mayor, police board, police chief, courts, etc.--, who openly supported their wealthy friends in the textile industry. A number of I.W.W. Leaders: Haywood, Flynn, Lessig, Quinlan, Tresca, and others, were arrested on trumped-up charges of incitement to riot and unlawful assembly. Also, during a meeting of striking workers at Turn Hall, the police chief himself went to the hall, disrupted the proceedings, and warned the assembled workers to desist from any violation of the laws pertaining to unlawful assemblage and incitement to riot.

As I also stressed in that section, the most interesting aspect of the situation was the fact that the language of the laws was so vague and broad to such an extent that any police officer could arrest anybody he chose, based on his own definition and interpretation of the law. Also, the civil authorities banned all public rallies, parades, and demonstrations, in support of the strike and classified any such actions as falling under the rubrics of incitement to riot and illegal assemblage. When the publisher of the socialist newspaper

Weekly Issue, Scott Armstrong, criticized the actions of the Paterson authorities and labeled them as illegal for their violation of due process, he himself was arrested on a charge of incitement to riot.

In spite of the bullying tactics and other acts of intimidation on the part of the Paterson authorities, coupled with the lack of funds, which made it difficult for the workers to purchase food, clothing, and other necessities, for themselves and their families, they elected to stand their ground. Because, they believed in the rightness of their cause and also had the conviction that they were fighting not only to seek redress of their individual grievances with regard to wages and work conditions, but also saw themselves as the representatives of the working class and operating under the I.W.W. doctrine of militant industrial unionism in general and that of the militant minority in particular.

In my discussion of I.W.W. doctrines and strategies in chapter 1, I indicated that the labor organization regarded its affiliated unions, union centrals, trades assemblies, and international unions, as being the elite force of the revolutionary movement that was destined to lead the proposed general strike, which would usher in the industrial commonwealth of the working class after the overthrow of the capitalist state apparatus. Operating from that perspective, the I.W.W. viewed the Paterson strike of 1913 as just one in a series of dress rehearsals. The tremendous resistance, fortitude, and resilience, that were displayed by the striking workers and their I.W.W. supporters (in the face of the mass arrest of their colleagues and I.W.W. leaders on vague charges) attested to the monumental impact of doctrine in conflict situations.

The decision of the silk manufacturers to reject the demands of the workers; the action of the municipal authorities to order the mass arrest and

jailing of striking workers, a number of I.W.W. leaders, as well as others in the civic community; on trumped-up charges of incitement to riot and illegal assembly, did not occur in a vacuum. Because, the reaction of the authorities was also predicated upon their doctrinal conviction in the legitimacy of the capitalist economic system and its distribution of socioeconomic benefits (i.e., wages and work-place amenities). Thus, they also viewed themselves as being the genuine practitioners and representatives of a higher cause (i.e., bourgeois capitalism), while the I.W.W. and the striking silk workers were defined and labeled as anarchists and subversives, who were fighting (not to get their fair share of the resources that accrued from their labor power) to undermine civic authority and overthrow the capitalist state.

Based on the empirical data in the foregoing, it is evident that both the silk workers and textile manufacturers in Paterson and their allies engaged in a myriad of activities that validated the proposition in the hypothesis, as well as the insightful perspectives of the theorists.

However, it is also a fact that the textile manufacturers emerged as the victorious faction in that conflict, while all the striking silk workers and the I.W.W. suffered a great defeat. In order to understand the factors that accounted for the victory of the textile manufacturers and the defeat of the silk workers, the pertinent questions to be addressed are these: what accounted for the difference in fortunes? Did the textile manufacturers succeed because they were more tenacious and more committed ideologically to their cause? Were the silk manufacturers successful due to their better organization as an interest group?

CRITIQUE OF HYPOTHESIS

The empirical data do clearly rule out stronger ideological commitment on the part of the textile manufacturers as the decisive factor that accounted for their victory. If greater doctrinal commitment was not the crucial factor then what brought the victory? The basic proposition of the hypothesis and the varying perspectives of the theorists deserve tremendous approbation for helping to improve our understanding of some aspects of social processes with their insights on the link between doctrine and societal conflict.

However, the hypothesis in its basic form, and the associated perspectives of the theorists were weak and defective in one crucial area as a result of what happened during the Paterson strike of 1913: they over-emphasized the importance of doctrinal commitment and failed to acknowledge the pivotal role of financial resources.[3] It is evident from the empirical data that the victory of the silk manufacturers stemmed not from their greater doctrinal commitment, but rather from their access to tremendous monetary resources, which enabled them to have additional plants in Pennsylvania, where they transferred some of their operations during the course of the strike (Foner 1965).

On the other hand, in spite of their strong commitment to their cause and belief in the rightness of their demands, the silk workers began to waver in their determination when the Pageant at Madison Square Garden failed to provide much-needed funding for themselves and their families. The failure of the Pageant was the last straw that broke the back of the strike; because, it led to massive defection of workers from the picket lines. In fact, thousands of them were already back at work before the I.W.W. and the general strike committee officially called off the strike.

The defeat of the I.W.W. and the silk workers indicated that it is very difficult to sustain any kind of social movement (i.e., strikes, revolutions, etc.) with hungry followers. The I.W.W. experience at Paterson clearly underscored the fact that in spite of people's commitment to causes and readiness to endure harsh sacrifices, hunger brought on by lack of funds for food can be very detrimental to the stability of any social movement.

In failing to address the critical importance of financial resources as a very stabilizing factor in their discussion of the link between doctrine and societal conflict, the hypothesis and the perspectives of the various theorists have made the focus too narrow. They should have broadened their approaches to take into account the fact that even when doctrinal commitment and readiness to endure sacrifices are strong, the lack of adequate funding to take care of basic needs could be a very significant component.

SUMMARY

This chapter has addressed the following items: the setting; demographic composition of Paterson; working conditions in the textile mills; inventory of labor-management confrontations in the silk industry of Paterson prior to 1913; the issues involved in the strike of 1913; the strategies and tactics used by the I.W.W. during the strike; reaction of the Paterson power structure to the strike; the decision of the A.F.L. to inject itself into the strike; the scramble for funds leading to the decision to hold the pageant at Madison Square Garden; the decision to settle the strike; and the role of conflict theory in the strike.

In the next chapter, I will have a discussion of the entire study and put forth some suggestions about probable areas of research for further inquiry into the I.W.W. experience, in its social position as a labor organization that

was dedicated to eventual social change through the doctrines and strategies of revolutionary syndicalism.

NOTES

1. During the second convention of the I.W.W., which opened on September 17, 1906, the labor organization was beset with internal crisis following the removal of Charles O. Sherman from his post as the president of the labor union. The decision to oust Sherman was prompted by charges, which listed among others misappropriation of funds and insufficient adherence to the doctrines, strategies, and tactics, with which the labor organization had become identified. The crisis led to the development of two centers of power: the De Leon and Sherman wings. The De Leonites (supporters of Daniel De Leon) left and formed what later became known as the Detroit I.W.W., while supporters of Sherman became known as the regular I.W.W.

The nature and scope of the charges that led to the conglomeration of forces against Sherman and other issues that took center stage at the second convention of the I.W.W. in September of 1906, have been addressed in a number of works. These are some of them: Thompson, I.W.W.: Its First Fifty Years, 23-26; Brissenden, A Study of American Syndicalism, 130, 136-154, 182-183, 207, 211; Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 109-119; Foner, History of the Labor Movement, 71-80; Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, 184-187.

2. John Reed was a member of the Harvard University class of 1910 and later became known in the journalistic community for his analytic insight. Due to his upper-middle class background and social contacts, as well as higher education, he started out as a beneficiary and ardent supporter of the capitalist economic system and its distribution of social rewards. If he had all the benefits of high socioeconomic status within the capitalist state, then why did he choose to join forces with the I.W.W. and the striking silk workers of Paterson in 1913?

The acute metamorphosis in Reed's political ideology occurred while working as a journalist with the socialist publication, Masses. The individuals with whom he came in contact on the publication were well-versed in the tenets of Marxism and socialism, as well as the underpinnings of popular discontent within social structures.

Reed's initial perspectives pertaining to the equity in the distribution of social power and social rewards were severely shaken after a meeting with Haywood in New York City. At that meeting, Haywood was able to impress Reed with very persuasive arguments in support of the silk workers' strike and other struggles of the working class for higher wages and better working conditions. On account of Haywood's performance, Reed decided to make a trip to Paterson for an on-the-spot investigation, so that he could be adequately apprised of the issues involved in the labor dispute.

It is significant to observe that while Reed originally made the trip to Paterson as a detached observer due to his occupational status as a journalist or reporter, he later became a participant. Therefore, as a result of his own evaluation of the issues involved, he in actuality became a participant-observer. His arrest, conviction, and eventual sentence, of four days in jail (just for being on the scene of what the municipal authorities had classified as an illegal assemblage) together with other I.W.W. leaders, did more to educate him about the nature of the class relations that had existed in Paterson between the socially privileged groups and the striking textile workers, as well as the tremendous social power of the bourgeois class.

Reed's transition from a social actor born into privilege to that of a revolutionary leader of the working class (as well as his political views) is a phenomenon that has been discussed in the labor literature. Prominent among the works are the following: Richard O'Connor and Dale Walker, The Last Revolutionary: A Biography of John Reed(New York, n.p., 1967), 74-75; Mabel Dodge Luhan, Movers and Shakers (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), 188-189, 204-205; Granville Hicks, John Reed: The Making of a Revolutionary (New York: Macmillan, 1936), 98, 100-103; John Stuart, ed., The Education of John Reed: Selected Writings with a Critical Introduction (New York, n.p., 1955), 39; Flynn, I Speak My Own Piece, 152, 156; Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book, 262, 269; Chaplin, Story of an American Radical, 137-138; Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 263-290; Kornbluh, Rebel Voices, 197-226; Foner, History of the Labor Movement, 351-372.

3. The crucial role of financial resources, assets, or capital, in societal power relations and power struggles, is a phenomenon of great

import that has been discussed in a number of works in the sociological literature. In the discipline of sociology, the investigation of societal conflict and power, with respect to their origin, development, and maintenance, falls under the rubric of the substantive area known as political sociology. The following works have substantial discussions pertaining to the impact of financial resources, assets, and capital, on societal power and conflict situations: Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern, Societies (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1960), 203-220; David Riesman et al., The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), 243-247; Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and eds. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 181-186; Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1968), 315-320; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 271-285; John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 109-120; The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 47-58; Daniel Bell, End of Ideology (Glencoe, Illinois: Macmillan, Free Press, 1960), 47-50, 59-65; Marvin Olsen, The Process of Social Organization (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968); Ralf Dahrendort, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (California: Stanford University Press, London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1959); Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (New York: International Publishers, 1937); T.B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society (New York: Random House, Pantheon Books, 1965), 88-96.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR CONTINUING SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON THE I.W.W. PHENOMENON

In the preceding chapters of this work (see chapters 2, 3, and 4), I utilized a number of sociological hypotheses (under the banner of conflict theory) dealing with the attitudinal and behavioral posture of most social groups in conflict situations, to analyze the militant activities of the I.W.W. in the following areas: struggle for power and turf with the A.F.L.; the Lawrence, Massachusetts, strike of 1912; and the Paterson, New Jersey, strike of 1913.

In this concluding chapter, I have selected some other areas of the I.W.W. experience and developed some questions, which could form the bases for continuing sociological research into the fascinating world of the I.W.W.: the decision of the I.W.W. to make public its intention to oust the government; decision to leave localities after successful campaigns without leaving any viable infrastructure to build upon the gains; struggle for power within the I.W.W.; criticisms dealing with the manner in which the I.W.W. managed the Paterson strike of 1913; the debate over dual unions and boring from within existing unions; the decision to publicly oppose U.S. entry into World War One; the dismissal of Haywood from the Socialist Party; and the presence of Daniel De Leon at the founding convention of the I.W.W..

THE DECISION OF THE I.W.W. TO PUBLICLY DECLARE ITS INTENTION TO OUST THE GOVERNMENT

Due to its stated goal of eventually overthrowing the capitalist state and its corporate structure--represented by big business--, the I.W.W., from its very inception, became an organization that was closely watched and monitored by the intelligence community and other agencies of law enforcement. Even, when there was no cause for suspicion, the I.W.W. was still suspected of either having instigated a strike, inspired a murder, or committed an act of violence (Foner 1965; St. John 1917; Konibluh 1968).

I am of the view that the I.W.W. made a strategic error by openly advocating the overthrow of the capitalist state and replacing it with a workers' democracy. It was prudent to oppose the conservative policies of the A.F.L., which were centered around craft unions that were discriminatory and exclusionary in their recruitment practices, because, the power structure of American society was adequately positioned to tolerate militancy on the part of revolutionary labor unions so long as they confined their militant activities to the labor scene (Foner 1965).

The power structure of American society did not perceive itself as being threatened by a labor movement that stressed and embraced the doctrine of militant industrial unionism, as well as the abolition of craft unionism, because, that was seen as emanating from doctrinal differences between competing elements in the labor movement. Therefore, the ensuing conflict was not considered to be one that was capable of threatening the substructure of the capitalist state. The doctrine of industrial unionism that was practiced and propagated by the I.W.W. was not new to the ruling centers of American society, because, it had been advocated by the Knights of Labor in

the latter part of the nineteenth century and in the early part of the twentieth century. Thus, it was not considered to be a very dangerous doctrine that needed preemptive measures to combat it (Foner 1965; Trautmann 1909; Dubofsky 1969).

What the ruling elite found to be very dangerous about the I.W.W. was the fact that in addition to its advocacy of industrial unionism, it also believed in class struggle and class warfare. In the business community and in conservative political circles, those concepts were synonymous with violence, anarchy, and communist subversion. Thus, while it is true that the I.W.W. got its inspiration with respect to the efficacy of industrial unionism from the Knights of Labor, unlike the I.W.W., it did not subscribe to the doctrine of syndicalism (St. John 1919; Foner 1965; Thompson 1955).

The Knights of Labor, unlike the I.W.W., was willing to be respectable and work within the system by cooperating with the capitalist state and its corporate structure (i.e., big business). What the Knights of Labor sought in its advocacy of industrial unionism was for the opportunity structure of the capitalist state to be benign enough to offer employment, good working conditions, and reasonable wages, to all workers regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, creed, and skill. It also wanted the workers to be accorded the right to join industrial unions of their choice, which would fight for their rights both as citizens and wage workers (Foner 1955; Kornbluh 1968; Dubofsky 1969).

By publicly declaring its intention to overthrow the capitalist state, the I.W.W. left itself wide open for preemptive strikes by social groups, which felt they had much to lose if it were to become successful in the attainment of its goals. It also violated one of its own basic operational strategies in relation to the rules of revolutionary engagement (i.e., the labor organization was adamant in its refusal to sign time contracts with employers; because, it

felt that since such contracts stipulated that employers had to be informed in advance of an impending strike, they got sufficient time to engage in preemptive measures, which involved the use of scabs, spies, informants, and agents provocateurs).

The I.W.W. was careful not to disclose details of impending strikes; because, it considered that to be tactically unsound. Yet, it did not consider it erroneous to inform the whole world of its plans to overthrow the capitalist state apparatus, as well as the kind of strategies that were to be used to accomplish that goal (see chapter 1). Why did the I.W.W. consider it prudent to disclose its revolutionary aspirations of social change involving the overthrow of the capitalist state apparatus? Which social group within the I.W.W. had the greatest influence in dictating policy during the deliberations that eventually led to the formulation of the organization's decision to publicly disclose its revolutionary goals and how they were to be accomplished? What kind of consensus was arrived at during the deliberations, which led to the formulation of specific doctrines and the execution of particular strategies?

DECISION TO LEAVE LOCALITIES AFTER SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS WITHOUT LEAVING ANY VIABLE STRUCTURES IN PLACE

The I.W.W. has been the target of numerous criticisms for its policy to leave places after successful recruitments and strikes, without any local entities in place to continue the struggle.[1] A number of critics are of the view that this lack of continuity did play a very significant part in its eventual demise (Foner 1965). What were the reasons for that decision?

RUMORS OF STRUGGLE FOR POWER WITHIN THE I.W.W.

Behind the scenes, there was a fierce struggle for power and control between Haywood and some members of the I.W.W. leadership, due to his rising popularity among the Wobbly rank and file and also on the labor scene (Dubofsky 1969). Were these accounts correct? Apart from Haywood, who were the other principals in this power game? If it is true that there was such a struggle, then what effect did it have on internal consensus and cohesion? Did it affect the selection of some strategies at specific locations?

CRITICISMS PERTAINING TO I.W.W. MANAGEMENT OF THE PATERSON STRIKE

A number of individuals both within and outside the I.W.W. have criticized it for what they consider to be strategic errors during the Paterson strike of 1913. Some of the criticisms deal with the methodology used in organizing the Pageant at Madison Square Garden and the decision to engage in mass demonstrations and mass picketing of strike sites, knowing fully well that such actions would lead to the mass arrest of striking workers on charges of incitement to riot and illegal assemblage (Flynn 1955; Haywood 1929; Foner 1965).

What kind of tactical benefits were expected to be gained through this policy of open confrontation with the civil authorities in Paterson? What kind of consensus was attained with respect to that decision? How did the I.W.W. expect to sustain the strike for a long period after being apprised of the fact that mass arrest of striking workers would be the consequence of mass demonstration and mass picketing?

THE DEBATE OVER DUAL UNIONS AND BORING FROM WITHIN EXISTING UNIONS

One of the issues that generated a great deal of debate within the I.W.W. (it almost destroyed the labor organization) was that pertaining to the strategies of dual unionism and boring from within existing unions. One of the principal proponents of boring from within was William Z. Foster. As I indicated in previous discussion (see section on I.W.W. doctrines and strategies in chapter 1), he was one of the left-wing members of the Socialist Party, who joined the I.W.W. and a participant in the Free Speech Campaign, which was staged by the labor organization (Foner 1965).

Later, the I.W.W. officially supported the strategy for the formation of dual unions, while opposing that of boring from within existing conservative unions and taking them over. What kind of consensus was attained in arriving at the decision to support the formation of dual unions? When Foster decided to resign from the I.W.W. and form the Syndicalist League of North America, did he do so voluntarily? Was he forced out of the I.W.W.? Which group in the I.W.W. was most instrumental in leading the opposition to Foster?

THE DECISION OF THE I.W.W. TO OPPOSE U.S. ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR ONE

As I pointed out in prior discussion (see section on I.W.W. doctrines and strategies in chapter 1), the I.W.W. was not unaware of the surveillance activities of law enforcement agencies. Thus, it frequently exhorted the rank and file (in public and private discourse) to exercise a great deal of caution in

their dealings with individuals suspected of being used to destroy the public image of the labor organization (Kornbluh 1968; St. John 1919; Foner 1965).

In view of the foregoing, why then did it elect to openly oppose the war effort (during the First World War), knowing fully well that the decision had the potential to exacerbate the already heightened suspicion of the organization? Why did the I.W.W. sanction the strategy of selectively calling strikes against industries, which also happened to be of great significance to the war effort? What kind of consensus was reached in relation to that decision? Was the I.W.W. aware of the fact that the strategy would leave the organization wide open to charges that it was in the pay of and under the influence of the German government? Was the I.W.W. ever in the pay of or under the influence of the German government?

THE DISMISSAL OF HAYWOOD FROM THE SOCIALIST PARTY

Haywood had been very active in the labor movement: he started out as a mine organizer in Butte, Montana; rose to the presidency of the I.W.W.; and also became a member of the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party, during which he played some very prominent roles in its deliberations. As I pointed out in chapter 1 (see section pertaining to I.W.W. doctrines and strategies), during a speech before some Socialist Party members, he stated that the I.W.W. would respond to violence from big business with violence. On account of that declaration on his part, he was dismissed from the Socialist Party and also relieved of his position as a member of its National Executive Committee (Haywood 1929; Kornbluh 1968; Foner 1965).

When Haywood made the speech on violence, was he aware of the Socialist Party's policy on the subject? In his capacity as a member of the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party, was he duly positioned to know of the policy? If he knew of the policy, then why did he choose to openly defy it? Did he do so in order to ingratiate himself with the more militant elements within the I.W.W.? Which faction within the Socialist Party was most insistent on his dismissal?

THE PRESENCE OF DANIEL DE LEON AT THE I.W.W. FOUNDING CONVENTION

One of the problems that the left-wing elements within the Socialist Party had with the I.W.W. at its very inception was the presence of Daniel De Leon at the founding convention of the I.W.W. The uneasiness with the presence of De Leon stemmed from his past activities on the labor scene. He is considered in labor circles to have been one of the most controversial and contentious actors to have entered the American labor scene. As founder of the Socialist Labor Party, he also formed the Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance to act as the labor wing of his party. From that vantage point, he initiated the formation a number of dual unions, which competed with existing labor unions over turf and membership (Foner 1965; Dubofskv 1969; Kombluh 1968).

Some of the right- and center-wing elements in the Socialist Party, who also happened to be members of the A.F.L., were very uncomfortable with the prominent role that De Leon was allowed to play at the founding convention of the I.W.W., because, they felt that he would once again use his position to turn the I.W.W. into another version of the Socialist Trades

and Labor Alliance and form a number of dual unions that would compete with unions affiliated with the A.F.L., thereby creating disunity within the labor movement (Foner 1965; Dubofsky 1969; Kornbluh 1968).

Why did the I.W.W. invite De Leon to its founding convention? What kind of role was he expected to play? Were the right- and center-wing elements of the Socialist Party within the A.F.L. just using De Leon as a political punching bag to justify their decision not to join the I.W.W.? Were they really afraid of De Leon? Was the role that he played at the founding convention very constructive? Did he make any significant compromises? Did he and Eugene Debs really put aside their past differences?

NOTES

1. A quintessential example of the I.W.W. propensity to leave some places without solid local entities in place occurred after the monumental victory of the Lawrence strike of 1912 (involving textile workers). Immediately after the euphoria of the successful effort, the I.W.W. could have stayed longer, solidified the organizational structure of its Lawrence affiliate--Local 20--, and turned the union into a very powerful local and regional entity. Instead, it chose to move on to Paterson, New Jersey, in order to support another strike (of silk workers).

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