

THE EPISTEMIC ORIGINS OF AMERICAN EMPIRE

by

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Abstract

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The doctrine for American Empire began when state-centered actors introduced preemption and nation building into U.S. policy at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1890, law makers used the new doctrine to authorize a battleship program that placed the United States upon a path-dependant course toward military parity with Europe. I argue that naval theorists, not political or economic actors, were responsible for producing and extending the imperial doctrine and policy. These actors framed a new outward reaching national vision and created networks of support that ensured their program's passage through Congress. The project began from an intellectual reassessment of American security. It succeeded because state actor's designed a strategy that could circumvent the era's fragmented political landscape. Once military reform was complete, the United States possessed the tools for global hegemony. My findings confirm and modify predictions generated from the Offensive Realism school of International Relations.

The evidence I present is at variance with other explanations of late-nineteenth-century foreign policy adjustment. I found that politicians or "principles," followed an imperial program developed by subordinate state actors. American Political Development (APD) scholarship suggests possibilities for such an outcome. One explanation is Daniel Carpenter's theory of bureaucratic capacity which notes how late-nineteenth-century state actors were able to advance

new domestic proposals once they had demonstrated the value of their programs to the public. I apply Carpenter's theory to American strategic adjustment. My findings indicate that state actors established autonomy, capacity, and altered the direction of U.S. foreign policy without demonstrating the value of their program. Strategic adjustment was possible, I argue, because state actors functioned as an epistemic community that achieved political support by monopolizing specialty knowledge during a period of technological uncertainty.

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To Lawrence and Judith Haugen

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CHAPTER ONE BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE



Fig. 1. Operation planning at Naval War College, Fran Leslie's *Illustrated Newspaper*, January 1889

Looking Outward

The centerpiece of George W. Bush's national security policy is the "War on Terror," which contends that preemption and state building are necessary for the application of U.S. military and political power to promote democracy in strategic areas throughout the world. President Bush, it should be noted, was not the first to incorporate preemption or state building into American policy. These doctrines emerge and recede throughout American history. This dissertation will illuminate how they came into existence. I examine the original doctrine of American Empire and explain how epistemic communities functioned as the critical mechanism that translated preemption and state building into foreign policy.

Unfortunately, the common historical explanation that American imperialism begins in 1890 with Alfred T. Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783* lacks

precision and raises additional questions.¹ Mahan was an obscure naval scholar who showed little interest in American expansion. How could he have influenced the extension of American, German and Japanese military policies well into the twentieth century? This dissertation will clarify the issues under debate by interjecting American Political Development (APD) concepts such as bureaucratic entrepreneurship and epistemic communities into foreign policy theory. I suggest that a more complete understanding of America's imperial ascension requires us to focus upon the ideational process that shaped the original doctrine of American Empire. I argue that the imperial policy was an outcome of specific policies favored by a specific community of state actors. Ideas produced and advanced within the state therefore played a crucial role in translating potential state power into actual state capacity.

Between 1890 and 1910, American foreign policy underwent a revolutionary change. In this twenty-year period, the United States dramatically altered its armed forces and foreign services. The transformation began in 1890 with a fundamental shift in America's strategic military posture. Congress approved, for the first time, the appropriation of funds to construct battleships designed to launch offensive campaigns. Additional battleship legislation was passed in 1894 and 1896. The legislation of 1896 marked the complete transformation of naval capacity and mission. America's national security strategy had shifted from coastal defense and commerce raiding to the acquisition and maintenance of a modern fleet capable of dominating the hemisphere. By the time of the Spanish-American War (1898), the United States had repositioned itself as an international naval power, moving from the fourteenth largest fleet to the fourth.

¹ In a cursory survey of 15 American history textbooks that addressed the rise of American imperialism in the late nineteenth century, 11 claimed Alfred Mahan's book was largely responsible.

Naval reform was but the first step in a broader shift in America's international posture. Congress passed army reform legislation in 1901, 1903, and 1906. By 1910, American land forces had been reorganized and transformed from many semi-autonomous state-based militia organizations, responsible for protecting individual state borders, into a professional national force designed to defend the U.S. federal borders from foreign invasion. This dissertation will address the timing and specific policy content of America's late nineteenth century strategic adjustment.

According to much political science scholarship, dramatic change in American strategic military posture and foreign policy should have been propelled by forces originating outside the military or foreign services bureaucracy. Two distinct bodies of literature point to the role of external factors. First, international relations scholars suggest that a shift in the context of international security interests or the appearance of new opportunities for states to gain power at the expense of rivals might drive change in strategic doctrine or capacity.² These approaches, however, tell us little about the process by which potential threats are translated into new doctrine. Second, the literature on American political development (APD) examines a number of domestic factors outside the military bureaucracy that might account for organizational development and foreign policy change. Naval expansion might have resulted from broad state-building tendencies unleashed in the era of industrialization or from the advent of a sectional

² Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Stephen Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994-1995): 5-49. Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

political coalition with an expansionist agenda.³ However, both are problematic because of their timing. The great wave of national bureaucratic expansion began around 1900, when the naval construction program was well under way; similarly, naval expansion began before sectional political forces embraced an imperialist agenda.

From either the international relations literature or the APD perspective, then, the battleship boom, military and foreign services reorganization, and the associated strategic adjustment of the late nineteenth century present a puzzle. Without question, the measures taken by the United States represented a fundamental change in its international position, and placed it upon a path to becoming a global power. No major change in international threat precipitated the approval of battleship construction or military and foreign services reorganization. Also, the idea of constructing a modern battleship fleet took hold before the conditions propitious for state building were in place or an expansionist sectional coalition came to power.

Therefore, we need to look elsewhere to account for the far-reaching changes in military capacity and foreign policy. Another line of inquiry, common to both international relations and APD, stresses the role of political entrepreneurs, especially bureaucratic leaders, in fashioning

³ Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Skowronek offers the original narrative of American state construction and in his study of civil service and army reform and the early evolution of economic regulation, he holds presidential prerogatives to be the driving force behind institutional innovation. In this respect, Skowronek's analysis builds upon Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) which places centralized executive authority at the core of modern states. Following Skowronek but lending greater emphasis to developments within the executive bureaucracy, Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold "State Capacity and Economic intervention in the Early New Deal" (*Political Science Quarterly* 97, no.1, 1982: 255-278) argued that the evolution of strong capacity in the US Department of Agriculture was less the result of agriculture interest group pressure than the development of the agency itself. Richard Franklin Bense, *Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984) provides the theoretical underpinnings for the legislative enactment narrative. He argues that sectional antagonism – based upon disparities in industrial advancement and resulting economic interests between the industrial core of northeastern states and the agrarian periphery of western and southern states – has been the decisive influence of American political development over the last century.

supportive political conditions.⁴ Scholars have examined how bureaucratic entrepreneurs identified new missions and programs for their organizations with the effect of transforming and extending the agencies' responsibilities. Notwithstanding the patronage networks of the nineteenth-century American party state, autonomous bureaucratic actors emerged and were able to initiate and direct organizational evolution.⁵

This dissertation offers an explanation drawn from the literature on bureaucratic autonomy. The primary impetus for foreign policy change during the late nineteenth century, I argue, came from within the military bureaucracy. Military actors developed autonomy within the American state system. They created a new military doctrine and a new vision of American foreign policy. Naval professionals advanced their agenda by creating a community that leveraged their collective expertise into networks of political support that could expand military capacity. Finally, these bureaucratic actors influenced their supporters to employ the new vision of American foreign policy to pass battleship legislation. This legislation would alter the mission of the American navy, American foreign policy and American state capacity.

These findings contribute to our understanding of American political development. First, they challenge the common belief among APD scholars that national institutions largely resisted

⁴ Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). Jameson W. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove, eds., *Leadership and Innovation: A Biographical Perspective on Entrepreneurs in Government* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). Eugene Lewis, *Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). Adam D. Sheingate, "Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political Development," *Studies in American Political Development* 17, no. 2 (2003): 185-203.

⁵ Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*, 33. It is Carpenter's contention that during the Progressive Era state capacity and autonomy were forged neither in statute nor executive and administrative initiative alone, but in the relations that prevailed between national bureaucracies and organized social interests and the congressional-partisan policy coalitions which oversaw them. Contrary to the narrative of legislative enactment, which tends to ignore bureaucratic and executive politics, Carpenter suggests that the proper focus is upon the relations of bureaucracy with other institutions of national government, particularly Congress, as well as local publics and elites.

structural change before 1896. Second, they reveal the influence of bureaucratic actors upon the redirection of American foreign policy. Third, they demonstrate that bureaucrats do not need to demonstrate agency capacity in order to influence significant change.

Theoretical Framework: Bureaucratic Autonomy and Foreign Policy Change

This dissertation explains how state actors created a doctrine that changed American foreign policy. The explanation will be structured as a sequence of outcomes. A few scholars have similarly recreated political order from specific historical examples. Barry Weingast is one example. He uses an analytic narrative approach to explore “the elements underpinning democratic stability during the antebellum years” in the United States.⁶ By focusing upon institutions, Weingast explains the “general stability of the party system prior to 1850, the punctuation of political stability by episodic crisis,” and the “emergence of a sustained crisis in the 1850s, leading to democratic failure and civil war.”⁷ Weingast’s scheme for arranging political narrative is grounded in an interpretation of nineteenth century American economic history, namely, his view that most Americans of the time sought a national government strongly limited in scope. In this way sectional balance, the process of giving equal political power to both North and South, “proved a major element in making a credible commitment to limited national government.”⁸ The balancing game collapsed, he says, when the Democratic Party tried to adopt a system to meet the new challenges of western expansion and uneven economic development.

⁶ Barry Weingast, "Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy," in *Analytic Narratives*, ed. Robert H. Bates (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 149.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, 190.

This dissertation will employ a method similar to that used by Weingast. It will combine analytic tools using narrative form, commonly associated with history. Weingast's narrative approach combines traditional political history (and its focus on national politics) with history that emphasizes local politics and the concept of party incentives to form a new synthesis. I intend to have the narratives focus upon how institutions can address sources of political order that interact between international and domestic political economy. I consider the contribution of the APD literature, which suggests a number of domestic factors that might account for organizational development and foreign policy change.⁹

This dissertation explores the question of institutional change by drawing upon the concept of political entrepreneurship as presented in "new institutionalism" literature. This line of inquiry is concerned with institutions as sources of stability and instruments for change, depending on how structures constitute and constrain the behavior of actors in political, social, and economic contexts. Entrepreneurship within the studies of new institutionalism stresses the way in which "agenda-setting" controls and limits the alternatives from which actors choose appropriate heuristics that reinforce past choices and restrict future alternatives.¹⁰ Accordingly, institutions are understood as both formal legal structures of government organization and the informal political order from which they are produced. For the scholars of new institutionalism, an investigation begins with an identification of actors' preferences and an explanation of how this sort of informal order can be translated into formal order.¹¹ Formal order develops to protect

⁹ Robert H. Bates, ed., *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3. This dissertation builds upon political science literature from several areas, including scholarship on bureaucracy, policy development, and policy networking. I draw from relevant literature to define the concepts used throughout the study.

¹⁰ Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models," *American Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 1 (1979): 27-59. Shepsle folds together two distinct camps that take the label of "new institutionalists."

¹¹ Hugh Hecho, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions," in *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and*

policy subsystems by limiting access.¹² Institutions limit access and produce stability through “regulative, normative, or cognitive mechanisms” that limit or constrain the range of alternatives that actors confront.¹³

Working within the context of new institutionalist literature, this dissertation will focus upon institutional innovation as the product of institutional transformation, from informal networks of communicative discourse to formal institutions designed to unify and formalize knowledge, build consensus, and redirect public policy. Entrepreneurs will be depicted as individuals whose creative acts have transformative effects upon politics, policies, and institutions. Institutions will be understood as necessary to establish the authority and jurisdictions within which rules and norms operate. Concentrating on entrepreneurship draws our attention to the boundaries between institutions and the complexities of the entire American system.¹⁴ In Sheingate’s words, “entrepreneurial innovation seeks to establish or challenge jurisdictional monopolies, changing the boundaries of institutional authority.”¹⁵ As such, entrepreneurship will involve itself more with the interaction between institutions rather than the rules that operate inside institutions, with the political system as a whole, rather than single institutions.¹⁶

A particular concern of this dissertation is why bureaucratic autonomy asserted itself in the navy when it did, and why bureaucratic entrepreneurship was responsible for initiating the

Interpretations, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin C. Jillson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

¹² Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

¹³ Elisabeth S. Clemens and James M. Cook, "Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change," *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (1999): 441-66.

¹⁴ Sheingate, "Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political Development," *Studies in American Political Development*, (2003), 17: 185-203

¹⁵ *Ibid.*: 186.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

changes that altered naval capacity and naval mission. I argue that increased naval capacity was the product of bureaucratic autonomy and entrepreneurship that influenced the means and timing of reform in the American navy. The change in American naval capacity set the process of foreign policy transformation in motion, which triggered a causal sequence that was ultimately responsible for American foreign policy reform *in toto*. In short, I contend that we cannot understand the origins of American Empire, especially the initial impulse of twentieth century state centralization, without understanding how the foreign policy narrative was grounded in bureaucratic autonomy.

In order to explain how bureaucratic autonomy influenced the nineteenth century foreign policy process in America, it will be necessary for me to break from one part of the bureaucracy literature premised on “principal-agent” models of politics. These models assume that, as “agents,” bureaucratic actors follow the wishes of their “principals”—elected representatives. I instead take my lead from the current research on bureaucratic behavior that challenges the foundational assumptions of the principle-agent model. The research recognizes the emergence of bureaucratic autonomy as the moment when federal bureaucrats break from the traditional model of politics and establish links directly to citizens. This expression of bureaucratic autonomy can be identified when bureaucrats take actions consistent with their own wishes, “actions to which politicians and organized interests defer even though they would prefer that other actions (or no actions at all) be taken.”¹⁷ Bureaucratic autonomy becomes possible when agencies establish political legitimacy based upon a reputation for expertise and efficiency.

¹⁷ Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*, 4..

International Relations Analysis of Foreign Policy Change

The dominant mode of international relations analysis is the realist perspective. According to this approach, a nation's military planning and foreign policy will change in relation to shifts in the international strategic context, including the appearance of new opportunities for states to gain power at the expense of rivals. The most significant divide within realism is between offensive realism and defensive realism.¹⁸ On the one hand, offensive realists tend to argue that the international system promotes conflict and aggression. Security is scarce, scarcity promotes international competition, and this increases the likelihood of war. States are therefore compelled to find opportunities to adopt offensive strategies in their search for security. A state's ultimate goal is hegemony.¹⁹ On the other hand, defensive realists argue that the international system does not necessarily generate conflict and war, and that defensive strategies are often the best path to security. The state's ultimate goal is to achieve security by balancing power in the system, not necessarily upsetting the balance of power by seeking hegemony.²⁰

The debate between offensive and defensive realism has implications for foreign policy. According to offensive realism, policies that avoid war are limited, while defensive realism suggests a more optimistic estimate about the potential for states to acquire security without threatening others. This dissertation builds upon certain postulates of offensive realism. According to offensive realism, given the structure of the international system, states will seek to

¹⁸ For information about debates between offensive and defensive realists, see the preface of Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, International Security Readers* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1996): IX-XX. Rose Gideon, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144-72.

¹⁹ Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, 15, 1 Summer 1990, 5-56. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, 19, No. 3, winter 1994-1995, 5-49.

²⁰ Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*. Walt, *Revolution and War*; Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*.

expand when opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals become available. States maximize relative power with hegemony as their ultimate goal.²¹ I posit that offensive realism predicts American expansion; but underspecifies the timing and mechanism of strategic response. This dissertation will specify a combination of conditions necessary for expansionist opportunities to be realized. I focus upon the initial process of imperialistic doctrinal formation in order to highlight the motives (cost and benefits), magnitude and timing of American expansion at the end of the nineteenth century.

I argue that critical U.S. political and economic decision makers did not respond to extra-continental opportunities to expand until well after 1880, when intra-continental American consolidation was complete. After consolidation, the American political structure remained fragmented and continued to obstruct planning efforts intent upon directing the shape and size of extra-continental expansion. Plans for extra-continental expansion would require a new military doctrine that could explain the costs and benefits of Empire (regional, then global hegemony).

The problem of “selling” such a doctrine, says Mearsheimer, has to do with American culture.²² According to Mearsheimer, Americans dislike realism. Its pessimistic postulates are at odds with America’s deep-seated sense of optimism and morality. Not surprisingly, he notes, foreign policy discourse tends to sound like “it has been lifted right out of a Liberalism 101 lecture.”²³ The American public would find it unacceptable if a military doctrine or its proponents explicitly defined war as an attempt merely to change or preserve the balance of international power. A new military doctrine, to find general acceptance, would disguise its true intentions within the language of the liberal marketplace of ideas such as commensurate threat

²¹ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 22.

²² *Ibid*, 23.

²³ *Ibid*, 23.

response. As such, “a discernable gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy.”²⁴

My dissertation will explore the gap between rhetoric and policy execution. I argue that, at the end of the nineteenth century, human agency stood at the interstices between systemic conditions, knowledge, and state action. A community of knowledge-based state actors responded to opportunities for American regional hegemony. They developed a new doctrine for American security that explains the timing, motivation and magnitude of American expansion. The creators of this doctrine redefined American security by reassigning the costs and benefits of expansion. Using the language of the liberal market place to sell their new doctrine, these state-actors argued that extra-continental islands and canals needed to be included into existing definitions of American national security. In this case, the predictions of defensive realism largely overlap and further confirm those of offensive realism and are therefore not refuted.

Offensive realism differs from defensive realism, says Mearsheimer, over the question of how much power states want. For defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; offensive realists, by contrast, maximize their relative power because that is “the optimal way to maximize their security.”²⁵ Offensive realism would predict that the United States would switch military doctrine, from an intra-continental/territorial doctrine of strategic defense to an extra-continental/territorial doctrine of preemption and state building, when the opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals could be exploited because the benefits outweigh the costs. Under these conditions, states will behave aggressively by creating an intellectual foundation of a policy designed for

²⁴ Ibid, 25.

²⁵ Ibid, 21

hegemony. New foreign policies require new epistemic foundations. I argue that opportunities for expansion are critical, but policy actors also need decision makers to accept new doctrine. This requires a combination of epistemic actors, the creation of doctrine, and a degree of change in the international system enough to suggest the presence of strategic uncertainty.

The epistemic foundation for American Empire was created by a particular group of state actors. These actors functioned as an epistemic community by leveraging and translating threat perception into state-building opportunity. My causal sequencing of doctrinal formation and implementation explains the motive (the assignment of costs and benefits), and the timing of doctrinal implementation (the convergence of hegemonic opportunity, plus an epistemic community, plus a new hegemonic doctrine, plus sufficient crisis). Finally, my causal sequencing explains the shape of American expansion (a battleship navy large enough for Empire). As predicted, state actors operated according to the logic of aggressive realism.

State capacity began with an internal struggle. State actors broke down working relationships with private contractors who provided the state with the materials for the inter-continental doctrine. State actors then established new relationships with contractors able to provide materials for an extra-continental doctrine. The expansionist doctrine did not originate from a new political decisiveness. If we peer into the black box that is the state, we see that doctrinal reorientation did not result from a changing relationship between Congress and the executive. The point of origin is the decisiveness of actors within the state. State actors acquired capacity when they self-consciously re-conceptualized extra-territorial strategic locations within a framework of defensive threat assessment, then united the demands of competing social forces. A modification to the above-mentioned realist interpretations of the late nineteenth-century American battleship policy is offered by Fareed Zakaria. He interjected into the debate a variant

of offensive realism that emphasizes why actors sometimes respond to perceived opportunities, rather than threats, in the international environment. His theory begins with the assumption that states seek international power commensurate with their economic wealth, and that states have sufficient power over society to be able to enact their favored policies.²⁶ This variant of offensive realism contributes to the debate by formulating a “state-centered” approach by suggesting that countries expand when they acquire the state capacity. Zakaria presents a critique of defensive realism. He cites the model’s inability to explain the timing of American foreign policy change. Most important, he makes a case as to why foreign policy theory should incorporate internal state strength (the capacity of government strength in relation to society strength) as a component of national power. He argues that men, not states, are primary actors in international affairs, and their perceptions of power alteration are critical. “Statesmen can exploit the power resources of their nation only as transmitted through the state structure: foreign policy is thus the product of state power.”²⁷ As such, realism can generate new predictions.²⁸ Zakaria’s

²⁶ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Sectional interest groups cannot divert decision-making authority from the executive. Applying these assumptions to America’s naval modernization during the 1880s, Zakaria finds the balance of power between Congress and the executive branch shifting significantly in favor of the president between 1877 and 1896. The foreign services and military were professionalized and strengthened; congressional influence over executive appointments was weakened; and patronage was eliminated. By the 1880s, the executive had become powerful enough relative to the legislative branch that it could pursue an expansionist grand strategy, which required the construction of sea battleship fleet.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 42. With this analysis, Zakaria claims to have solved two puzzles about battleship construction. First, by assuming the executive decision-makers are innately predisposed to try to increase their state’s power internationally, he explains why the United States expanded in the first place, given that it was secure from foreign threats at the end of the century. Second, by focusing on the limits of the executive’s power before the 1890s, he shows why there was a gap between the growth of America’s economy and its international expansion.

²⁸ Van Evera, Walt, and Posen reject theories that attempt to explain international politics on the basis of state level perceptions. By contrast, Zakaria suggests that nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision makers *perceive* an increase in threats.

“state-centric” perspective is original because it concentrates on the linkage mechanism between state behavior and foreign policy.²⁹

Zakaria’s explanation might be refuted by several kinds of evidence. First, his theory anticipates a causal mechanism that links “the transformation of the state structure” and declining congressional opposition to expansion. Accordingly, if we look at naval modernization during the 1880s, we should see how institutional changes in that period made it more difficult for Congress to resist presidential naval reform initiatives. If the institutional shifts cited by Zakaria made the executive a more effective actor in the conduct of international affairs, we should be able to see how the change induced legislators not to exercise their formal power to vote against the expansionist initiatives of the executive branch. If there is no evidence of declining congressional opposition to expansionism in the 1880s, Zakaria’s state-centric theory will be problematic, and leave open the possibility that congressional opposition reflected policy disagreements (capable of being redirected by policy entrepreneurs) more than a perceived increase in state strength on the part of critical decision makers.

Zakaria’s model rests on the assumption that the United States, during the period in question, was secure from external threat. Unlike European states, which, he says, “developed largely to cope with war, the American state came to fore during a period that lacked rising threats.”³⁰ For him, the mechanism of increasing state strength is industrialization and its

²⁹ No APD scholar, to date, has examined the effect that changing state capacity might have on foreign policy, or the effect that changing foreign policy might have on state development. According to Zakaria’s theory, an enlargement of state capacity anticipates a unitary response among American presidents between 1865 and the 1890s. Presidents *perceive* a loosening of institutional constraints, then expand the state and enhance American military capacity. A lack of a consistent response, that is, variation among presidents between 1865 and the 1890s would be at odds with the state-centric approach. But even consistent presidential action still leaves open the possibility that actors inside the state shaped and directed a political consensus in which presidents merely acquiesced.

³⁰ Zakaria, 95. His claims are grounded in the assumption that a decline of congressional government was well under way before 1900. In fact, he says, the erosion began as early as 1877, and was sufficiently advanced by the 1890s to overcome critical obstacles to battleship acquisition and foreign policy adjustment. For Zakaria, the shift in state

associated problems, which could only be solved by a president. It is industrialization that reduces the obstructive power of the partisan state and enables the president to pursue his enlarged foreign policy and state aggrandizement project. He does not view bureaucratic agents as causal actors. Evidence to the contrary, such as an identifiable group of autonomous bureaucratic actors initiating foreign policy change based upon changing international threats or a new historically-based interpretation of military security, would become an additional problem for Zakaria's model. The following section will consider Zakaria's predictions in light of America's extra-territorial expansion and the associated change in levels of state strength after the Civil War.

An Alternative International Relations Explanation of Military Doctrine Change

Stephen Rosen offers an international relations perspective that provides insight into how foreign policy might change in the absence of military threat while accounting for the role of elite decision makers inside the state. Rosen stipulates conditions under which military bureaucracies during the twentieth century have been autonomous and have initiated foreign policy change. As he explains, bureaucracies are complex organizations that compete against one another. Military organizations are unique because competition within the organization necessarily involves an ideological struggle that redefines the organization's core values and services. Rosen suggests that we regard military organizations as complex political communities in which the central concerns are the political values subject to debate within the community. Military organizations would have this political character more than other bureaucratic organizations because military

capacity begins in 1877, when the Hayes administration confronts the Senate over the power of appointments. The president's authority is again expanded when Garfield, for a short period, made extensive use of the presidential veto, setting in motion a program for bureaucratic reform. These reforms expanded the constitutional prerogatives of the executive and made naval expansion possible.

organizations are less connected to the civilian world. His cases suggest that in the mid-twentieth century, foreign policy change occurred after the military redefined its purpose.³¹

Although he has not extended his model to the late nineteenth century, his idea of intra-military competition would suggest that the sources of foreign policy innovation could have originated inside the military bureaucracy.

In chapter three, I apply Rosen's concept. I trace the intellectual struggle among state-centered reformers that recast American military capacity in light of a reconceived American foreign policy. As Rosen suggests, the political character of the military organization helps to explain why inter-organizational competition within the naval bureaucracy produced reformers whose perception of international threat stood in opposition to that of political and economic elites, and the public.

Rosen's theory proves valuable because it turns our attention to changes inside the military bureaucracy, and reminds us that autonomous bureaucratic agents can be more than mere epiphenomenon. As such, we avoid the pitfalls of much of the international relations literature that views state action in automatic terms. His model of inter-organizational conflict folds comfortably into the APD perspective, which generally recognizes how agents of change must operate in a historical and institutional context that mediates and directs competition. If inter-organizational competition is relevant to the case of naval modernization during the 1880s or the 1890s, forces inside the state structure could account for the changes in American foreign policy at the end of the nineteenth century.

³¹ Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 5.

American Political Development (APD) and Foreign Policy Innovation

The potential for APD to make a contribution to foreign policy theory lies in its ability to recognize that foreign policy decisions, like domestic policy decisions, rarely occur in a political or historical vacuum, and that state actors can be autonomous and initiate policy innovation.³² Analysis of policy change often focuses on how exogenous shocks momentarily destabilize institutional order, demand adjustment, and result in a new or transformed institution that then induces stability. Punctuated equilibrium models rest on the occurrence of political or economic crisis that produces a critical juncture or window of opportunity in which possibilities for change become viable.³³ The balance-of-power theory is a classic example of how institutional change

³² APD has, thus far, not addressed strategic adjustment. The strategic adjustment of the late-nineteenth century has been characterized in terms of business pacifism by Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) or as institutional reform and technological change by Jan S. Breemer, Emily O. Goldman and Edward Smith; in Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes, eds., *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests, New Directions in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), chapter 6. Goldman, Smith, and Breemer argue that changes in military organization must underscore any changes in military posture, since bureaucracies can carry enormous influence in periods of technological transition. Strategic adjustment has been viewed as a struggle over ideological hegemony by Mark R. Shulman in *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995) and “Instituting a Political Idea” in Trubowitz, Goldman, and Rhodes, eds., *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment*. Shulman analyzes political struggles over ideological hegemony between traditional elements that supported Jeffersonian ideas of defense and Hamiltonian progressives. Edward Rhodes offers a cultural-cognitive approach in his chapter “Constructing Power” in Trubowitz, Goldman, and Rhodes, eds., *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment*. Rhodes examines a late 19th-century change in core beliefs, about the nature of the state and the state’s relationship to the outside world, to explain the transformation in naval policy as a quest for foreign markets. Both Thomas J. McCormick in his *China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire 1893-1901* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967) and Walter LaFaber, in *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898* extend the “over-production” hypothesis, in which a surplus or a glut in American goods created the necessity to build a large navy to open new markets in Latin America. Julius Pratt, in his *Expansionists of 1898* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), denies that expansion reflected the interest of American exporters. He concludes that the business community was largely opposed to market expansion in conjunction with naval expansion. Instead, he cites an earlier generation of “social expansionists” such as John Fiske, Josiah Strong and John Burges as most influential in paving the way to “American Greatness.”

³³ Baumgartner and Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (The University Of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1993).

can be understood as the product of exogenous shifts that alter the distribution of preferences, resulting in new institutional arrangements or equilibrium outcomes.³⁴

APD promises foreign policy theory an alternative endogenous account of stability and change. An endogenous account of foreign policy change would emphasize the ways institutions themselves make change possible, and therefore does not rely on the occurrence of an exogenous event to dictate when and how change takes place. Whereas an exogenous approach considers international institutions as mechanisms that reduce or eliminate uncertainty, an endogenous APD analysis emphasizes how entrepreneurship affects the way actors exploit uncertainty to advance a policy agenda. An endogenous APD approach that focuses upon political entrepreneurs can complement an exogenous view of institutions as equilibrium outcomes. An exogenous approach sees international institutions and the design of the international system as mechanisms that reduce complexity by limiting issue choices. Attention to entrepreneurs, instead, considers why the complexity of choice makes entrepreneurial action possible. What APD lacks is a model that can link foreign policy change to the unique characteristics of military organization and the corollary imperatives created for state aggrandizement. I propose that organizational competition wedded to the APD research on state autonomy directs our attention to a new brand of foreign policy specialist –the bureaucratic entrepreneur.

This dissertation will proceed from the political corollary to the market approach, presenting late nineteenth century entrepreneurs as actors who exploited gaps in the pervasive American party system, created “new combinations” of policy products, and obtained a monopoly over policy alternatives. As such, “innovations are endogenous developments in a

³⁴ The best example is Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, no. 2 (1989): 131-47.

dynamic economic system.”³⁵ APD scholars have begun to describe market-style political opportunities. Jens Becket described choice complexity as the necessary part of “institutional innovation brought about by the entrepreneurial act of creative destruction, tearing down existing political economic arrangements in order to create new ones.”³⁶ In a similar way, a non APD scholar, John Kingdon describes how innovation involves a recombination of policy issues. Kingdon focuses upon the entrepreneur and his creative efforts at recombining problems, policies, and politics in order to “join solutions to problems, proposals to political momentum, and political events to policy problems.”³⁷ Becket and Kingdon work from assumptions consistent with a market context in which entrepreneurs seek monopoly profits, “by being the first to introduce a ‘new combination,’ the entrepreneur obtains temporary monopoly power.”³⁸

One important strain within APD scholarship has used rational choice principal-agent models to explain expanded state capacity, modernization, and reorganization. This literature treats bureaucrats as agents directed by their political masters or principals.³⁹ McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast argue that during the late nineteenth century, agencies depended upon an “enacting coalition” of politicians who used administrative procedures to induce agencies to respond only with actions desired by the political coalition.⁴⁰ According to this line of APD scholarship,

³⁵ Mirjam C. van Praag, "Some Classic Views on Entrepreneurship," *De Economist* 147, no. 3 (1999): 322.

³⁶ Jens Beckert, "Agency, Entrepreneurs, and Institutional Change: The Role of Strategic Choice and Institutionalized Practices in Organizations," *Organization Studies* 20, no. 5 (1999): 787.

³⁷ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (New York: Harper Collins, 1984), 182. This is not an APD model per se, but it has been employed by one important strain of APD work.

³⁸ William J. Baumol, *Entrepreneurship, Management, and the Structure of Payoffs* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).

³⁹ Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond*, ed. Oliver E. Williamson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

⁴⁰ Randall L.M Calvert, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast, "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 3 (1989): 588-611. In most of these models the agency is effectively created from nothing by the legislature, and bears no prior expertise in the particular domain. The legislature and the agency are presumed to interact for the first time, and the agency has no attributes other than its normally divergent preferences and its assumed ability to ascertain information effectively.

change in bureaucratic agencies is produced exclusively by politicians—bureaucratic actors respond to rather than initiate change. Although bureaucratic agents may create compliance problems for their principals, the servants do not control their masters. Placed in the light of nineteenth century politics, change in American military and foreign policy could have resulted only from politicians who created and designed the agencies. Battleship construction would therefore result from political elites who directed state actors to carry out construction orders. I challenge this assertion in chapters three, four, and five by presenting evidence that the coalition of political elites began advocating battleship construction as a result of pressure from autonomous state actors.

This dissertation will extend the endogenous APD approach by demonstrating that agents dealing with issues of national security can have publicly recognized expertise, independent access to organized citizens, and autonomy over the procedures of their agencies. This dissertation will test this set of causal claims and identify the mechanism (epistemic communities) by which bureaucratic leaders developed independent sources of power. I will then explain how these state actors employed their independently-derived power to redirect the interests of principal actors.

The APD State Building Approach

Although much APD research is focused upon change that results from large historical imperatives such as industrialization and capitalism, there is also a vein of APD scholarship receptive to entrepreneurship; it speaks directly to national state formation and specifically to military modernization and foreign policy expansion. Stephen Skowronek, Peter Trubowitz, and

Daniel Carpenter offer three possible explanations for the shift in American foreign policy during the late nineteenth century.

Stephen Skowronek's work on American state-building between 1877 and 1922 bears on naval strategic adjustment and the battleship program in two ways.⁴¹ First, he offers a general model of state-building that suggests the role of both bureaucratic actors and other political figures. According to Skowronek, reformers who envisioned a modernized and rationalized national state apparatus were thwarted prior to 1900 by the existing "state of courts and parties," which favored judicial and partisan solutions to policy challenges. Only after 1900, when assertive presidential leadership helped shatter old political constraints, did reformers begin the reconstruction of national administrative capacity. From this perspective, naval reform before 1900 is best understood as incremental "patchwork"; this change left the navy having more in common with the service as it had existed throughout the nineteenth century than with the modern fleet of the 1900s. Such a claim represents an alternative explanation to the one I advance in this dissertation.

Second, Skowronek offers a detailed account of army reform politics in the late nineteenth century that might be compared to naval reform in an effort to highlight the role of domestic political factors to explain shifts in strategic doctrine. Army reformers before 1900 found themselves impeded by a decentralized service bureaucracy that had strong support in Congress, by Southern opposition to any changes that would enhance the national military capacity, and by the value parties attached to state militia organizations. Organizational and political decentralization thus checked the reform agenda and permitted only modest change,

⁴¹ Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920*. On the evolution of the War Department as the centralizing integrating administrative apparatus for the nation's armed forces see chapters four and seven.

despite passionate advocacy by a reform cadre in the army. Skowronek's explanation suggests that military reform is a function of both advocacy and constraint. In both the army and navy, an organized body of reformers pushed for change.⁴² Thus, if far-reaching changes occurred in the navy before 1900, this would have been because the political constraints that inhibited army reform did not operate on naval policy.

Comparing the success of naval reform to the failures of army reform during the period after 1887 and before the political realignment of 1896 will draw our attention upon a separate naval and army strategy. Since institutions hostile to reform impeded both army and navy reformers, the question arises whether naval reform was possible before 1900 because the political constraints that inhibited army reform did not operate on naval policy? I argue that the same constraints applied to both army and navy reformers. The difference was that naval reformers proved uniquely effective in employing a set of strategies designed to penetrate preexisting institutions in an effort to initiate policy change.

Applying Skowronek's model of army reform to naval reform generates predictions about the nature and direction of naval reform during the 1880s and 1890s. Given the existing institutional constraints (the nineteenth century partisan state), a distributive tendency was present in Congress that in turn would lead it to build naval ships during the 1880s and 1890s that reflect logrolling and pork barrel politics.⁴³ The prevailing state system should have enabled naval reformers to advance nothing more than a "patchwork" attempt at reform during

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power*. Harold and Margaret Sprout described the situation like this: Civilian leadership and imagination, always important, were to prove indispensable in the initial stage of the technological revolution, for the professional bureaucracy tended to resist change. Only the superior authority of the civilian political Executive (the President, Secretary of the Navy, etc.) could compel a hearing and trial for new ideas offered by professional and civilian inventors. Likewise, only the political Executive could prevent the Navy from becoming a football of party politics and a victim of political patronage and the spoils system.

the 1880s and 1890s. Patronage would have encouraged partisan spoils and bureau balkanization. In a partisan state guided by patronage considerations, we would expect the legislation to deliver the maximum distributive benefits to the enacting coalition, with the largest share going to the pivotal lawmakers, such as the committee chairs. These structural obstacles to reform should be evident in the ship designs of the period. Assuming that the partisan state and bureau decentralization persisted from the 1870s through the 1890s, ship design should reveal incremental advances and construction resulting from political compromise.⁴⁴

Skowronek's model of late nineteenth century modernization constraint is tested in chapter two (Naval Modernization: the 1880s) and chapter five (Naval Modernization: the 1890s) against my model of bureaucratic autonomy. I consider how a partisan state, reflecting the distributive tendency prevalent in Congress, actually built ships in the each period, and compare these findings to predictions derived from Skowronek's framework. I argue that the battleship construction of the 1890s, unlike the previous decade, reflected a comparatively high degree of consensus among political and military decision-making elites over issues of military capacity and purpose. This consensus is evident in the singularity of intended function observable in the battleship designs and appropriations of the 1890s.

In chapter two, I find that as Skowronek's model predicts, during the 1880s the partisan state encouraged a decentralized naval bureau system. These obstacles to modernization were highlighted by Commander Gorringe, who in 1882 noted that under the then-prevailing system, "the hull, the engines, the guns, and the sails were designed independently of one another and in different bureaus, the offices of which generally entertain antagonistic views on every question

⁴⁴ Examples: ships too small to confront battleships, ships too slow to raid commerce.

that arises.”⁴⁵ In combination with the distributive tendencies in Congress, reform was very much a patchwork affair. Yet Congress, during the period 1890 through 1896, passed legislation that produced a navy unlike the one that existed during the 1880s. The difference was not simply one of degree. The integration of new military doctrine set the stage for a new offensive navy. The modernization of the 1890s suggests that it was possible for political actors to overcome institutional inertia, create working majorities, and expand state capacity.

Sectionalism, APD and Nineteenth Century Foreign Policy Change

The second APD explanation, offered by Peter Trubowitz, is a variant of Richard Bense's account of late nineteenth century American sectional conflict that pits “imperialism” against “continentalism.”⁴⁶ The forces propelling these competing tendencies were economic and geographic. Northern industrialists represented imperialistic interests, while southern planters resisted attempts at extra-continental expansion. By extension, Trubowitz contends that late-nineteenth-century foreign policy change resulted from the activity of policy actors who responded to the imperatives of regional competition.⁴⁷

Sectional analysis requires an examination of the relationship between geography, economics, and politics. According to Trubowitz, late-nineteenth-century foreign policy change resulted from the activity of policy actors who operated against a backdrop of regional competition. Political leaders sought electoral advantage and responded to the interests of geographically defined constituencies. The international interests of these constituents reflected

⁴⁵ Charles O. Paullin, "A Half Century of Naval Administration," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XXXIX (1913): 1234.

⁴⁶ Bense, *Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-1980* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1984)

⁴⁷ Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy, American Politics and Political Economy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

different rates of economic development and integration into the world economy. Trubowitz explains how sectional political leaders used the new offensive military doctrine as a tool that could bridge Western and Northern economic and political interests.⁴⁸ He isolates the activities of the Republican Party leaders who dominated the industrial Northeast and viewed naval expansion as part of a larger political strategy that could stimulate growth in urban-industrial centers and check the spread of agrarian discontent in the trans-Mississippi West.⁴⁹ Republican leaders coupled the strategic arguments made popular by Alfred Mahan with the promise of foreign markets to forge a coalition of sectional interests that enabled the construction of a battleship navy.

While Trubowitz's sectional account may explain how the new military doctrine was used by sectional elites to redirect American foreign policy, his perspective cannot account for the timing and magnitude of battleship construction or how a broad intersectional coalition came to back it. Trubowitz fails to address the initial source of strategic adjustment—the change in the foreign policy doctrine itself, the relevance of bureaucratic autonomy, entrepreneurship, or

⁴⁸ In my account, the causal mechanism for doctrinal change is epistemic community activation made possible by bureaucratic autonomy and capacity. Trubowitz develops the “new left” interpretation of American diplomatic history originally proposed by William A. Williams and Walter La Feber, and Richard Bense. Trubowitz argues that strategic adjustment is best explained as the product of competing material interests of different geographical sections of the country. I isolate and trace the activities of a particular epistemic community during the 1880s. I suggest that such tracing process helps to inform the sectional account and answer why specific policies were favored by sectional coalitions during the 1890s.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* Trubowitz's contribution to APD and international relations scholarship is made problematic in both theoretical terms and as an overarching historical interpretation of American foreign policy. He devotes no attention to executive decision-making, instead he concentrates on Congress using econometric analysis of roll-call voting to show state-to-state variations. Yet even in periods of American history in which the executive branch was highly constrained by congressional opposition, it still had the sole power to set the agenda and initiate new policies. Congress's power in foreign relations has always been negative. As the saying goes, the president proposes, the Congress disposes. Thus, one might consider Zakaria's analysis of strategic adjustment in the 1890s to be perfectly compatible with that of Trubowitz: the executive, elected by the entire country, attempts to carry out policies that he believes are in the unitary national interest; while legislators, who are elected by local districts, attempt to adjust those policies to suit their parochial constituencies' material needs. If the political economy perspective is to offer clear-cut, a priori predictions about how states will behave under specific constraints, it must explain the specific decisions of executives in terms of partisan coalition's interests.

capacity. He begins with the assumption that an alternative military and foreign policy doctrine simply existed, and sectional political leaders used the doctrine as a device that could bridge western and northern economic and political interests.⁵⁰

If the analysis of naval modernization offered by Trubowitz is correct, we should expect policy development as early as the 1880s to follow a particular order. First, the political leaders of the dominant sectional coalitions and sectional economic beneficiaries of battleship construction would initiate critical battleship legislation and frame foreign policy. Second, we should see evidence of cross-issue linkage during critical stages of congressional debate. Third, we should be able to find evidence that decisive cross-sectional cooperation for naval appropriations was predicated on the expectation of export expansion. Fourth, we should observe that backing for battleship appropriations comes primarily from legislators who represent Northern interests. I test these sectional predictions in chapter two (Naval Reform: the 1880s), and conclude that the mechanism for sectional change is left unidentified. I find strong evidence that foreign policy change was influenced by the formation of an epistemic community that advocated an expansionist reform agenda. The community formed policy support networks, consisting of politicians, economic elites, and the public, that advanced expansionist preferences into foreign policy outcomes.

⁵⁰ Ibid. Republican leaders coupled new strategic arguments with the promise of foreign markets to forge a coalition of sectional interests that enabled the construction of a battleship navy. The sectional explanation of American expansion would maintain that the executive pursues the agenda of the dominant sectional coalition, while portraying that agenda as the unitary national interest.

Bureaucratic Autonomy and State Building

Daniel Carpenter, the third APD scholar, speaks to the possibilities of bureaucratic entrepreneurship in his path-breaking account of American political development during the Progressive Era. Carpenter highlights the conditions conducive to bureaucratic autonomy and calls to task the principal-agent model of American political development. Carpenter challenges the received wisdom of bureaucratic constraint by recasting the agency leader as an actor who is uniquely positioned to experiment with new programs and convince diverse coalitions of interests, the public, and politicians of the value of his bureau's mission. According to Carpenter, this form of bureaucratic entrepreneurship comprises two components: incremental program development and assemblies of network-based political coalitions for the purpose of passing legislation. Bureaucratic actors are effective innovators when politicians believe that agencies can organize a system of administration that will satisfy the politicians' interests in unforeseen ways.⁵¹ Carpenter's approach to entrepreneurship is centered upon the role of bureaucratic autonomy. According to him, the degree of bureaucratic autonomy is the product of an organization's reputation and the networks that support it. Carpenter finds that during the Progressive Era, some bureaucracies had unique goals and achieved autonomy. Bureaucratic autonomy can create ties to organized interests and the media, which "induce politicians to defer to the wishes of the agency even when they prefer otherwise."⁵²

Carpenter's understanding of bureaucratic autonomy differs from previous state development scholarship, which tends to view bureaucracy as the product of "legislative specification" or limited discretion. This understanding of state development limits late-

⁵¹ Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 4.

nineteenth-century policy change to the discretion of dominant economic actors and political elites. Carpenter instead stresses the need to reconsider bureaucratic autonomy. Autonomy exists, he says, “not when agencies can take any action at will but when they can change the agendas and preferences of politicians and the organized public.”⁵³

Carpenter does not apply his theory to military organizations or foreign policy change. Nevertheless, his theory offers a promising means for explaining aspects of foreign policy design and institutional transference (institutions that evolve from preexisting institutions). He directs our attention to the fulcrum of institutional transformation. Expertise, access, and autonomy can be used by entrepreneurs to leverage political legitimacy; legitimacy then becomes the foundation of coalition formation and policy change. Carpenter points to a precise timing sequence in which we should expect to see the formation and extension of bureaucratic autonomy. Autonomy exists, he says, when “bureaus have acquired lasting esteem and durable links to social, political, and economic organizations, links that rival or surpass those of politicians.”⁵⁴ When agencies “by virtue of their superior publicity, and established reputations, can make it politically costly to oppose their innovation, they have achieved a form of autonomy that modern political science fails to recognize.”⁵⁵ For Carpenter, legitimacy is the foundation of bureaucratic autonomy. When politicians and the public become convinced that a bureaucracy can provide a unique and efficient service, create valuable programs, and gain the allegiance of coalitions of citizens, autonomy becomes possible.

According to Carpenter’s model, it is necessary for an agency to demonstrate its effectiveness to other political and economic actors in order to enact its preferences. By contrast,

⁵³ Ibid., 17.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 355.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

my model of bureaucratic entrepreneurship will explore how bureaucratic actors can sometimes form into epistemic communities with an authoritative claim over a specific issue area prior to any demonstration of special competence. In my case, authoritative claims emerged from an assertion of foreign policy and national security expertise that successively yielded consensus, legitimacy, coalition formation, and policy change. Evidence of autonomous bureaucrats forging agency expansion and advancing state capacity without having demonstrated capacity would frame an alternative APD account of bureaucratic entrepreneurship.

Other Ideational Models

In addition to international relations and APD models of foreign policy, Edward Rhodes and Mark Shulman offer explanations of late nineteenth century American expansionism that privilege cognitive-cultural and ideational variables.⁵⁶ According to Rhodes, challenges to the country's unity necessitated new political beliefs: "In the absence of other common institutions--religion, language, freehold agriculture--citizenship became the essential element in social membership. The state thus became essential to social identity."⁵⁷ Rhodes's analysis might

⁵⁶ Edward Joseph Rhodes, "Sea Change: Interest-Based Vs. Cultural-Cognitive Accounts of Strategic Choice in the 1890s," *Security Studies* 5 (1996): 73-124. Rhodes explores why the United States constructed a blue water navy during the 1890s. He argues that the cause lay in the new image of the state, a new image of war, and a new image of military victory. He calls this a cultural-cognitive shift that is attributable to the social upheaval of the nineteenth century. A powerful navy became a means of redirecting national attention toward a large national project that might encourage social cohesion within the United States.

⁵⁷ Edward Joseph Rhodes, "Constructing Power: Cultural Transformation and Strategic Adjustment in the 1890s," in *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, ed. Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 62. Since Americans still viewed centralized government as a threat to their personal liberty, the logical response of policymakers was to strengthen the state vis-à-vis the outside world, where it could promote American virtues and serve as a symbol of American greatness. The battleship fleet was perfectly suited for this role. First, the country's existing navy was too defensive to challenge European powers. Ocean-going ships, however, could exert influence and win respect. Second, open sea battles typified the ideal of warfare as a chivalric duel rather than a life-or-death struggle between whole societies. The reorientation of the cultural connotations of war would help heal the Civil War divisions by recasting it as a struggle between respected equals, not a bitter struggle over mutually opposed ways of life. Finally, an enlarged navy, unlike

account for differences between army reform and naval reform during the 1880s and 1890s. His explanation, however, is problematic. For one, it is not certain that any re-conceptualization of the state as outward-looking was actually considered by political actors of the period, either consciously or subconsciously, to address a cognitive crisis afflicting America. If Northerners had felt a great need to heal the wounds of the Civil War, they should have tried to gain favor with Southerners by supporting issues that had a strong cross-regional consensus. Furthermore, the timing of the decision to build battleships needs to be explained, since Reconstruction ended in 1877, more than a decade before the first battleship was authorized. If the “reintegration of the South into the national polity” was such a critical goal, why did policymakers wait thirteen years after the end of military occupation of the South, and 25 years after the end of the Civil War to address the issue in this way?⁵⁸

Mark Shulman examines process-level variables that are needed to cross-examine Rhodes’s cultural cognitive interpretation.⁵⁹ Shulman does not believe that strategic adjustment in the 1890s was primarily a response to social problems. He argues that it was produced by the vigorous advocacy of an amorphous group of naval officers and like-minded civilians. They first reformed the navy itself, institutionalizing their ideals by taking control over key positions within the organizational structure. Then through the use of printed essays, patriotic novels and music,

a powerful army, could not be used as an agent of repression. Battleships offered all the benefits of European militarism (patriotism, power, and unity) but did not pose any threats to American liberties.

⁵⁸ The linkage between an outward-looking state and the problems of social crisis is also tenuous. Progressivism is a better explanation of how political forces bridged societal divisions and reoriented American’s beliefs about the role of the state. Theodore Roosevelt used the power of the executive office to reign in monopolies and trusts. These measures helped heal the growing rift between labor and capital. Rhodes must explain why naval reform succeeded in the early 1890s but progressivism did not take hold until a decade later. I argue that bureaucratic autonomy, entrepreneurship, epistemic community formation, and policy networking can explain the reason the success of naval reform better than Rhodes.

⁵⁹ Mark R. Shulman, "Institutionalizing a Political Idea: Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power," in *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, ed. Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 79-104.

parades, fairs, historical revisionism, and media manipulation, they managed to convince the country of the value of their cause. Strategic adjustment occurred because battleships were well marketed, not because they necessarily served any compelling strategic, economic, or cultural purpose.

Shulman's analysis is different from mine. New policy initiatives that receive support from the public are likely to also have some support from the media and Congress. In this case, if Congress supports a new program, we should expect to find some support from the public. In the case of naval modernization we might instead ask: what factors made it possible for enough support to exist within Congress and the electorate for battleship legislation to pass?¹ I suggest that propaganda alone could not have convinced the public to support a project without the support of experts that had the appearance of possessing neutrality, unanimity, and the public interest. Congress and the public needed to be convinced that the battleships of the 1890s were a continuation of essentially the same policy as the 1880s and that defensive cruiser ships had become irrelevant. I contend that battleship advocacy began with a specific group of naval theorists in 1877. The group acquired a theoretical consensus, then expanded that view outward to other academics, congressmen, and special interests. This is important because in order for bureaucratic autonomy and entrepreneurship to affect policy change through epistemic advocacy, the community needs to be perceived as having technical and scientific expertise that is not being used to advance special interests. Popular and academic journals, novels and public speeches that promoted a vision of American naval power, as Shulman points out, were almost non-existent before 1890.

This dissertation will demonstrate how Rosen's concept of inter-organizational competition can induce bureaucratic actors to form epistemic advocacy communities that can

function in lieu of demonstrated capacity as a linkage mechanism between policy entrepreneurs and policy outcomes. I argue that late-nineteenth-century foreign policy innovation can be understood by combining Rosen's concept of organizational competition, Carpenter's model of bureaucratic autonomy, and current literature on epistemic communities to an explanation of foreign policy innovation. If epistemic advocacy matters in this case, battleship construction and America's aggressive turn in foreign policy could be understood as the outgrowth of bureaucratic competition, publicity, and intellectual networking.

Why the Navy?

This dissertation examines naval reform and the subsequent impact it had upon military doctrine and American foreign policy. By focusing upon naval reform, I highlight how bureaucratic autonomy enabled a mechanism (epistemic community formation) to change American military doctrine and foreign policy during the late nineteenth century. The foreign policy preferences of the presidents and Congress during the time in question reveal no clear direction or process by which US military capacity or mission was changed. The service mission of the navy was not altered in a manner that demanded the acquisition of ships with inter-continental offensive capabilities; neither presidents nor majorities in Congress appeared interested in advancing the construction of such ships. Unless the military was prepared for extra-continental battle, neither the president nor Congress could have considered imperial actions. Actors within the navy initiated the extension of operational planning; only after the formulation of a new policy could political elites formulate costs and benefits associated with the strategic imperatives of regional hegemony.

The current literature in American politics assumes that change in military doctrine and foreign policy has followed, not preceded, change in the foreign policy preferences of the president or Congress. I have selected this case because I wish to explore the conditions under which bureaucratic autonomy existed, or failed to exist, in each of these services, and how bureaucratic actors used their autonomy to alter the foreign policy preferences of political actors and special interests. If bureaucratic autonomy and epistemic communities matter in this case, we have a better understanding of the origins of American Empire.

The re-conceptualization and extended applications of bureaucratic autonomy to untested aspects of political science continues to challenge traditional scholarship. During the past two decades, a tentative consensus has formed over the proposition that between the Civil War and the New Deal, a national state was constructed in America that was distinct from the feeble structure that preceded it. Still, considerable disagreements persist over precisely how the American state emerged, precisely which institutional authorities and social interests helped construct it, and precisely who among these actors came to control the resulting structure. My central argument is that the original doctrine of American Empire is foundational to the direction of state expansion during the twentieth century.

The Argument: Bureaucratic Autonomy and Foreign Policy Change

My analysis of America's late-nineteenth-century foreign policy change will be depicted as a sequence of outcomes. This dissertation will trace the process by which the theoretical justification for promoting a transformed naval mission and foreign policy were shaped and extended. This project treats bureaucratic leadership and the work of epistemic advocacy

communities as independent variables, while adjustments to naval doctrine, battleship construction, and change in grand strategy are sequential dependent variables.

The initial transformation of U.S. foreign policy begins when a group of naval theorists started to assess the costs and benefits of modernization in light of changes in naval science and technology. These theorists challenged many traditional notions of American security long accepted by the naval hierarchy. The debate created organizational competition between those theorists who protected the navy's traditional security mission and theorists who worked to create a new mission. Throughout this process, bureaucratic entrepreneurs structured and directed the action. First, the doctrine of national defense was altered from an essentially defensive concept to an essentially offensive one. The offensive military strategy required a corollary doctrine that would stress the benefits of having an aggressive foreign policy. The reformulation of foreign policy doctrine began in 1877 with the creation of a bureaucratic community that established a reputation for theoretical expertise among a network of actors. Second, a consensus among reformers within the navy emerged between 1884 and 1888. Third, the actualization of offensive doctrine required the bureaucratic community to build a network of supporters outside the bureaucratic organization to advocate the construction and deployment of battleships with offensive capabilities. This occurred between 1888 and 1896. The newly converted political elites became battleship advocates, they began to employ the bureaucratic reformers' transformed conception of American foreign policy in an effort to direct major legislation through Congress (1890, 1894, and 1896). Fourth, the coalition effort assured the passage of the principal battleship construction bills, and construction proceeded promptly.

The sequence of outcomes can be explained in light of the central causal claims that I will briefly summarize: First, America would not have possessed a battleship navy capable of

launching offensive military operations without first having an intellectual reorientation.

Bureaucratic actors, not political or economic elites, reconceived the theoretical roots of an offensive American foreign policy. Naval reformers began their intellectual reorientation in response to pressures from within their organization, not pressures arising from political elites or sectional coalitions. Also, naval reformers, unlike their army reform counterparts, were able to overcome obstacles imposed by existing institutions (partisan opposition) because the former leveraged epistemic legitimacy into networks of support. Second, bureaucrats were responsible for injecting their agenda into the legislative debates of the 1890s. Critical battleship advocacy was supplied by an inter-sectional coalition of supporters using the theoretical logic supplied by naval reformers. The same level of support and theoretical coherence cannot be observed during the legislative debates pertaining to naval shipbuilding during the 1880s.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ After the Spanish American War (1898), the naval reform movement began to influence army reformers toward the creation of an Army War College, which was established in 1901. This shift was predicated on the demonstrated capacity of the battleship strategy of the naval service during the Spanish-American War. Naval reformers encouraged army reformers to produce their own theoretical justification for land forces that function to augment offensive naval strategy. Army reformers produced a community of experts from the Army War College that claimed the army needed leaders trained in modern, technically specific methods of warfare and logistics, the implications of which meant a centralization of knowledge that pointed toward a centralization of command, the reorganization of American land forces, and the subordination of the state militias to federal control. With the establishment of the Army War College, army reformers cobbled together a network of support for army reorganization legislation based on the theoretical logic supplied by naval reformers a decade earlier. The inter-sectional coalition of army reform moved critical army reorganization legislation through Congress in 1903, 1904, and 1906. With the success of army reform after 1900, the extended capacity of the U.S. military now required an extended infrastructure of the foreign services. Naval officers helped reorganize the foreign diplomatic service in an effort to help implement a new American foreign policy dedicated to an increasingly assertive approach to world affairs.

Research Design

I demonstrate my first causal claim by identifying the unique preferences, interests, and ideologies of the relevant policy actors inside and outside of the naval bureaucracy. If naval strategic planning was autonomous, it would have been politically differentiated from the actors who sought to control it. Political differentiation can be demonstrated by contrasting the agenda of the actors inside the Naval War College with the interests of the political actors who sought to control the organization. Before 1890, perception of international threat had not been collectively formulated. But a group of naval reformers working through the Naval Institute's *Proceedings* and eventually the Naval War College began to identify patterns of change in foreign military operations. These American theorists interpreted European developments and began to shape the preferences of American policy makers. I trace the evolution of these preferences and demonstrate how they differed from the preferences of prevailing political and economic elites. Because bureaucratic autonomy requires the development of unique organizational capacities to define problems and create solutions, I illustrate how and why the naval reform movement had the capacity to act upon its own preferences and innovate.

To demonstrate my next causal claim I highlight the significance of organizational competition through a systematic content evaluation of the reform theory from 1879 to 1888.⁶¹ This investigation will examine the struggle for intellectual hegemony within the navy. The struggle for hegemony was shaped by arguments that lay claim to being the most appropriate intellectual foundations for pursuing naval strategy, tactics, and mission. The debates centered on the work of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval War College. The Office of Naval

⁶¹ Content analysis and comparison will be drawn from the *US Institute Proceedings*, the *Annual Reports of the Navy Department*, and the *Army and Navy Journal*. The debate among army officers is highlighted from the *Army and Navy Journal*, *Journal of the United States Infantry Association* and the *Annual Report of the War Department*.

Intelligence desired a technical foundation for the navy, in line with the technological underpinnings of European navies. The Naval War College reformers felt the navy should redefine naval mission using a historical and comparative approach.

The traditional approach to strategic evaluation and military policy was rarely subjected to a scientific/historical analysis before 1880, when a new intellectual reasoning began to appear in the Proceedings and the Army Navy Journal. I compare the timing and growth of this rationale to the evolution of the epistemic community that produced it. Theoretical competition within the bureaucracy will rest on the assumption that the bureaucracy was autonomous. This explanation highlights how the specialized knowledge offered as a consensus of epistemic actors altered the policy commitment of relevant decision makers. Legitimacy was grounded in and transferred through support networks that advocated battleship construction and American expansion.

The next process to be identified, networking, examines coalition formation resulting from personal communications and interest group participation. I present evidence that relevant political actors were linked to one another through the sharing of information disseminated by reform advocates. This involves an analysis of actors' publications, private letters, and correspondences. I note the growth of network participation and its relationship to preferred policy outcomes. Evidence of coalition formation by non-political actors will highlight the mobilization of economic interests after exposure to the work of naval reform theorists and their supporters. After being converted to new theories of American foreign policy, specific economic interests began to advocate in favor of battleship legislation. I chart the activities of business groups, critical economic elites, trade organizations, and other ad hoc interest groups that adjusted their focus upon battleship acquisition as additional evidence of coalition formation.

Next, I discuss the conversion of significant actors engaged in battleship advocacy (1884–1896). Following the process-tracing procedure, I critically evaluate the sources of information that actors were exposed to before shifting their position on American military doctrine and American foreign policy. If my prediction is correct, actors should have switched their positions after being exposed to naval reform work, and activated by its perceived legitimacy. I examine the content of principal battleship legislation in the Congressional Record (1890–1896). I do a systematic, critical evaluation of the pro-battleship coalition. I will compare the timing of congressional battleship advocacy rhetoric to the timing of change in network and coalition formation.

Throughout this dissertation, I test my core claims and assess alternative explanations. I consider the relative contribution of other political actors — Congress, parties, presidents, and special interests — to the process of policy innovation. If a given stimulus (bureaucratic leadership, autonomy, legitimacy, and networking) caused a given response (change in naval doctrine, the construction of battleships), the evidence should be found in the sequence and structure of events, and also in the testimony of actors explaining why they behaved as they did. Although people do not always cite the actual reasons for their actions, my analysis should reveal pressure from naval theorists for policy change happening before policy actors changed their view of American foreign policy. Furthermore, this pressure should also be reflected in documentation indicating that the decision to convert was the result of a bureaucratically created network of supporters. If networks shaped elite and congressional opinion, shifts in elite and congressional opinion should quickly follow public relations campaigns, publications, and speeches, which reveal that the actors absorbed the message and changed their view in response to it. My process prediction must be unique and correct. No other theories (balance of power,

principal-agent, sectional coalitions, party constraint) will predict the same pattern of events or the testimony and motives of critical actors. After following these predictions, I speculate in my conclusion how the transformation of American naval capacity influenced the means and timing of American army reform during three critical periods.⁶² In the conclusion of this dissertation I speculate that the Spanish American War provided demonstrated the value of the epistemic community's theoretical project.⁶³ I suggest that the deployment requirement was leveraged into networks of civilian supporters who assisted the passage of army reform legislation through Congress in 1903, 1904, and 1906.⁶⁴

⁶² First, in 1879–1888, a segment of military theorists began to formulate a new mission for the army, supported by the inception of military science. The new military mission was intended to address potential security threats to American borders. Second, military officers responded to reform concerns by initiating the Endicott Board in 1885, which began the regimented usage of federal border protection duties between the army and the navy. After 1885, a cross-service exchange between the two services began to flourish. This exchange launched an informal “proto-institutional” mechanism for critical dialogue that would redirect the army service mission. The critical discourse is traceable in the pages of the two prominent military professional journals of the time. As with the navy, the army consensus for changing service mission began to crystallize through intellectual debate and was formalized by the establishment of the Army War College. Third, the Army War College was formed in 1901, dominated by army reformers who, in conjunction with naval reformers, had redefined the army's mission in light of the operational capacity demonstrated by the navy during the Spanish-American War.

⁶³ With the assistance of the naval reformers, reformers within the Army War College established an elite consensus pertaining to the army's organizational mission. The redefined army mission was then bounded to the reputations of naval reformers and leveraged into civilian support. This support was committed to the idea that the army's central mission should be the protection of the United States borders, which required that American land force have deployment capacity in foreign lands.

⁶⁴ Russell Frank Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, The Wars of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 160-63. William Addleman Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942), 335-56; Maurice Matloff, *American Military History* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1969), 286-89. Throughout the nineteenth century the United States Army service mission was centered upon constabulary duties on the western frontier. The state militias, on the other hand, were expected to maintain order within the states and were to be mobilized in the event of war. The inefficiencies of this fragmented military arrangement first became apparent during the Civil War. The American system did not allow the commanding general direct communication with militia leaders or command of the overarching logistical elements of the service. Thus, the military system provided no policy for war mobilization. These deficiencies were made increasingly obvious with the logistical demands of the Indian wars. The separation of line and staff branches often complicated and delayed operations. Inside the army it became clear that a central command system was needed to enable the army to coordinate all service branches in peace and war.

Also, I speculate in my conclusion that among members of Congress a growing network of reformers began to advocate for Foreign Service reform.⁶⁵ Military reformers were becoming increasingly aware that information services were required to support an aggressive foreign policy.⁶⁶ Representative George B. Wise of Virginia thought that the maintenance of a naval establishment was the first step toward the preservation of friendly relations with other powers and the best guarantor against aggression.⁶⁷ These demands led to the assignment of military attachés in each of America's principal embassies.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Speech by Representative Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio. *Congressional Globe*, Senate, 39th Congress, 1st Session (May 16, 1866): 2618. Cited in Warren Frederick Ilchman, *Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939: A Study in Administrative History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 22. An American Navy, with a military capacity and grand strategy designed to preemptively battle dominant world powers in decisive battles, required the establishment of international intelligence gathering services. The United States was the only Western nation in the nineteenth century without permanent diplomatic services. By 1910 diplomacy in America had achieved a career status. A reorganization scheme was in place that ensured that the foreign services would create a vastly increased number of diplomats who had passed comprehensive testing and was selected on the basis of merit rather than patronage. The transformational development occurred largely after 1900 and resulted from the changing service mission of the American military.

⁶⁶ Robert Seager, 491-512; Daniel J. Carrison, *The Navy from Wood to Steel, 1860-1890* (New York: Watts, 1965). The demand for specialty abilities in the foreign services stems from the outgrowth of reform in the military services. By the late nineteenth century it was generally a naval officer, rather than a civilian official, who cared for America's interest in distant outposts. Naval strength was asserted in the naval reform movement as a concomitant of the effective naval capacity. The possession of a navy, or even the capacity to stage an effective naval demonstration, was apt to enhance attention of government representatives in underdeveloped areas. Some thinkers had early perceived the relationship between enhanced naval power and a more effective diplomacy. By the late 1880s the United States had become a first-class power in population, wealth and political importance, yet possessed a navy that was an obsolete, inefficient defense mechanism for the American coastline.

⁶⁷ *Congressional Record*, 49th Congress, 1st session (June 18, 1886): 17, and spec. sess. A244.

⁶⁸ Lieutenant William L. Sachse, "Our Naval Attaché System: Its Origins and Development to 1917," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* LXXII, no. 5 (1946): 661-62; Elizabeth Bethel "The Military Information Division: Origin of the Intelligence Division," *Military Affairs* 11, no. 1 (1947): 17-24.

Chapter Overview

This dissertation examines how the change in U.S. foreign policy resulted specifically from bureaucratic innovation, autonomy and capacity. Bureaucratic actors in the navy created strategies to overcome existing intuitional obstacles to reform. These actors not only framed a new outward-looking foreign policy for the United States, but also created necessary coalitions of relevant policy actors to pass legislation that reformed the military and influenced the reorganization of the foreign services. These reforms occurred incrementally over a twenty-year period. The reforms structured an imperial foreign policy predicated upon state security. The new foreign policy, together with a reconstituted military created the foundation for the American state apparatus of the twentieth century. This state structure was, for the first time, constituted to preserve itself from forces outside the state and could therefore advance state capacity based on national security.

The second chapter presents the historical origins of American military doctrine and foreign policy in light of the competing interests and constraints from which late-nineteenth-century military reformers began to pursue their alternative agenda by forging bureaucratic autonomy. I test competing models that explain transformation in late nineteenth century American foreign policy. I contend that each of these models is inadequate for explaining naval modernization, and fails to capture the autonomous development of naval doctrine during the period in question. Chapter three further investigates the conditions from which a shift in naval doctrine occurred through an extensive examination of the intellectual development of naval reform literature. I isolate the organizational dynamic that propelled the reformulation of military doctrine, tracing the path by reform acquired an authoritative voice.

In chapters four through six, I trace the development of an epistemic community that came to dominate and direct the strategic discourse of the 1880s.⁶⁹ The epistemic community transformed naval doctrine from intellectual consensus into networks of support for a battleship agenda. The networks were a product of bureaucratic entrepreneurship and came to include critical legislative decision makers and special interests. Chapters four and five explain why my bureaucratic autonomy model can operate without the concept of demonstrated capacity. I trace the pattern of battleship advocacy from 1889 until 1896 and focus upon the process by which the epistemic community mobilized and advanced battleship legislation. Chapter six will detail the triumph of the imperial doctrine. Finally, the conclusion of this dissertation will assess and discuss my findings.

⁶⁹ I speculate in the conclusion that the transformation in naval doctrine created an imperative for army reorganization, and the transformation of the military services made it necessary for the military to initiate a reorganization scheme for the American foreign services. The sequence of events illuminates two spheres of transformational change: first, how autonomous bureaucratic actors initiated change in their organizational missions, and second, how autonomous bureaucratic actors created networks of supporters to pass legislation that would change American foreign policy in light of new organizational mission.

CHAPTER TWO NAVAL REFORM: THE 1880S



Fig. 2 USS Atlanta, an example of the hybrid ships appropriated during the 1880s.⁷⁰

Introduction

In this chapter I argue that, during the 1880s, American policy makers dismissed efforts to seek regional hegemony or parity with the navies of Europe. Full-scale battleship construction was therefore rejected. Instead, a patchwork approach to modernize the existing navy was favored. For an inward-looking country, occupied with continental expansion, a foreign policy that used battleships to gain parity with the imperial powers of Europe made no sense. Since battleships functioned to confront other battleships and wrest control of the seas, such ships were not consistent with the policies of an agrarian nation that, from its birth, declared itself free from

⁷⁰ The “ABCD” ships appropriated during the 1880s had steel hulls, rifled guns, steam power, and *sails*. Although they were called warships, they were too lightly armored and too few in number to battle any first-rate European fleet

the tyrannies of imperial Europe. America remained committed to *La Guerre de Cote* (coastal defense and commerce raiding) strategy.⁷¹ Some new ships were built during the 1880s, best described as hybrid types, but there was no fundamental reassessment of naval strategy.

This chapter argues that naval reform during the 1880s was a patchwork phenomenon. The term *patchwork naval reform* suggests that the American navy was out of step with the social and economic changes of the period, and that attempts to reform the naval service were haphazard. According to Stephen Skowronek, agencies resisted reform because those actors in a position to support change were limited by their local settings, organizational orientations, and intellectual talents.⁷² This chapter will explore attempts to modernize the American Navy during this period. I ask whether the same forces that thwarted army reform, as described by Skowronek, also thwarted naval reform. I will use these findings to test predictions derived from American political development (APD) models, in order to advance my own theory of late nineteenth century battleship construction. I assess the post-Civil War naval policy and the principle institutional obstacles to service reform during the 1880s. The patchwork modernization efforts of the 1880s will be considered in light of changes that occurred in American “state strength” (the strength of state vs. society), as well as changes in relevant organizational capacity, and interest articulation during the same period.

⁷¹ Walter R. Herrick, *The American Naval Revolution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 3. The Naval Act of 1890 appropriated the construction of America’s first three battleships. The decision to obtain battleships ended the coastal strategy and became “the onset of a revolution in doctrine which transformed the United States Navy from a loosely organized array of small coast defenders and light cruisers into a unified battle fleet of offensive capability.”

⁷² The phrase “patchwork reform” was first coined by Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). In part II, he explains why America’s retarded state growth before 1900 can be understood as patchwork reform. Although government institutions were out of step with social and economics developments, patronage politicians resisted reforms because they threatened the traditional base of power within the party system of nineteenth century.

From the American Political Development (APD) perspective, three explanations account for differences between the army and naval reform efforts during the 1880s. Fareed Zakaria's executive-driven model, Peter Trubowitz's sectional-interest-driven model, and, by implication, Stephen Skowronek's patchwork army reform model, all speak to the case at hand. I wish to demonstrate that while some pieces of these models help us to understand naval modernization during the period in question, Skowronek's model has the best fit.

Post-Civil War Naval Policy: Modernization and the 1880s

This chapter assesses three very different claims about the strength of the American state during the 1880s, and how changes in state strength may have created opportunities for military reform. APD scholars have considered these factors in light of prevailing institutional arrangements and how those arrangements created obstacles or incentives for reform initiatives. On the one hand, Skowronek finds little change in state strength during the 1880s. Reformers, says Skowronek, were limited to patchwork efforts at modernization. Fareed Zakaria, on the other hand, finds significant change in the power relationship between state and society during the period in question.⁷⁷ According to Zakaria, state change created new opportunities for expansionists to advance American military capacity and enlarge foreign policy. In the section that follows, I define state power, and then examine competing claims. I suggest that Skowronek's observations best describe the relationship between the state, society and naval reform during the 1880s. The growth of executive and congressional capacity was symmetric

⁷³ Barry Weingast, "Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy," in *Analytic Narratives*, ed. Robert H. Bates (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 149.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 190.

⁷⁶ Robert H. Bates, ed., *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3.

⁷⁷ He also finds a significant shift within the state, from subnational to national and from legislative to executive.

during the 1880s. State strength changed little and preexisting institutions continued to operate against reform efforts. Finally, I contrast the findings of Zakaria and Skowronek with the sectional-interest model proposed by Troubowitz. I suggest that his sectional model raises questions about why specific expansionist policies favored by sectional coalitions were developed during the late 1880s and implemented during the 1890s.

Assessing State Strength: the 1880s

The concept of state building became central to APD research during the 1980s. Skowronek describes American state building as a process in which new government bodies contend with preexisting institutional structures. He says, “states change (or fail to change) through political struggles rooted in and mediated by pre-established institutional arrangements.”⁷⁸ Progressive Era reformers attempted to build a centralized administrative state to deal with the problems of modernization and industrialization, but they encountered a preexisting state whose representatives wished to protect their institutional turf. Skowronek demonstrates how important institutions were to political development, since political elites and social movements encountered inherited institutions as they attempted to promote their agendas.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920*, 4. The modern state emerges at the same time as the concept of *sovereignty*: a self-determining body, not merely a conglomerated structure held together by bargaining between the parts. According to this line of thought, a state becomes stronger when there is a sharper dividing line within the body politic or between one body politic and another. In other words, the law within the body politic becomes far more ‘positive.’

⁷⁹ For another prominent APD explanation of institutional obstacle to state development during this period, see, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9. Skocpol explains, “states conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society.” She says that “unless such independent goal formulation occurs there is little need to talk about states as important actors.” According to Skocpol, the form of rule within the body politic is

Skowronek distinguishes two periods of administrative expansion. During the first period, between 1877 and 1900, “the state of courts and parties was stretched to the limits of government capacity.”⁸⁰ While intellectuals and middle class reformers tried to direct new bureaucratic institutions, the existing governing arrangements were able to resist their advance. The pivotal conditions necessary for state expansion, he explains, required the realignment of 1896, when Republicans controlled the executive office and Congress. State expansion required the leadership of a strong executive such as Theodore Roosevelt. After 1900, there was unified partisan control, realignment offered a period in which institutional innovation was possible, and state builders could advance their agenda.

State-centered realism, explains Zakaria, rests on the argument that as a state becomes relatively more powerful, it expands in an attempt to maximize its influence and control its international environment. It is the state’s strength vis-à-vis society that determines how much national power can be used for its foreign policy purposes. Zakaria argues that “state-power” (the scope, autonomy, cohesion, and extractive capabilities of the state) must be taken into account in assessing the impact of changes in national power (resources and industrial productivity).⁸¹ Zakaria demonstrates that congressional opposition was a serious obstacle to presidents’ attempts at expansion in the period from 1865 to 1889. He argues that the balance of power between Congress and the executive branch was shifting significantly in favor of the president between during this period. The military and foreign services were strengthened, congressional influence over the executive appointments was weakened, and patronage was

rightfully decided and constituted by the people or nation as a single entity. A state should reveal the people’s will to act effectively and secure the defense and welfare of the whole, while maintaining the rights of the parts.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 16.

⁸¹ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 35-40.

eliminated. By the 1890s, the executive had finally become powerful enough relative to the legislative branch that it could pursue an expansionist grand strategy.

In the following section, I consider the relationship between the Constitution, the state, and naval administration. Then I consider two predictions derived from the state-center model. First, leaders (in the executive branch) will try to expand expansionist foreign policies when they *perceive* a relative increase in their state's power. Second, the encroachment of the legislative powers on the executive office will lead toward an incoherent foreign policy that mismatches international pressures and incentives.⁸²

The Constitution, the State, and Naval Administration

For those who attempted naval reform during the 1880s, the system of political administration proved hostile to their initiatives.⁸³ The original understanding of the government structure articulated in 1787 was followed throughout the nineteenth century. As such, checks and balances served to limit reform efforts that sought to enhance state capacity through naval modernization. To further aggravate reform efforts, the Navy Department functioned under a bureau system instituted in 1842. There was no inter-bureau coordination except by the naval

⁸² While the concentration and insulation of executive power leads to a more coherent foreign policy, tuned more to these pressures.

⁸³ APD literature speaks to critical institutional obstacles to domestic reform during the late nineteenth century. Elizabeth Sanders and Barry Weingast on "legislative dominance" argument; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 3, no. 2 (1987): 243-77. These authors notes that presidents and interests groups create a "structural politics" in which bureaucracies are not designed to be effective because so many interests are involved in the design of agencies. A similar observation is also made in "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," in *Can the Government Govern?* John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990). Structurally speaking, the basis for bureaucratic authority rests in the US Constitution which frames the dynamic relationship between the state and society. In representative systems, such as the United States, bureaucracies receive their authority and resources from the national legislature; Congress has Article One power to create and empower bureaucracies. The president also has been given extra-constitutional authority to shape the structure of agency budgets and direct agencies through executive orders and appointments. Bureaucratic decision making, it would appear, is limited by legislative specification, administrative procedures, and budget control.

secretary who administered the service through eight independent bureaus, each headed by a senior officer who competed for power, prestige, and money.

Naval secretaries directed the service from the State War Navy building in Washington D.C. The Secretary was the only central figure in the decentralized administrative scheme.⁸⁴ He was the focus of the administrative apparatus and in charge of maintaining the fragmented inter-departmental structure. He personally sent all operational instructions to the five squadrons in the North and South Atlantic, East Pacific, East Asian, and European waters.⁸⁵ In addition, the Secretary was burdened by the responsibility of coordinating activities between the Naval Academy, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of Naval Records, the Bureau of Ordnance (which controlled the Naval Torpedo Station), and the Bureau of Equipment (responsible for the Naval Training Station).

For advocates of reform, the central obstacle, bureaucratic fragmentation, was additionally complicated by the tension between civilian and military control. The short-term nature of political secretaries and their technical limitations encouraged a competitive bureau system in which each bureau jealously guarded its separate domain, and fought against any consolidation of its authority. In such a situation, policy innovation threatened officers within the departments with potential job loss. Since the president appointed the naval secretary and Congress controlled the navy's budget, civilian control held administrative fragmentation in place. The consequence was a feeble departmental administration seemingly incapable of modernization.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, and John R. Wadleigh, eds., *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1984), 3.

⁸⁵ Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 16-24.

⁸⁶ B. Franklin Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy* (Hamden: Archon

In terms of a centralized focus, the secretary was in charge of inter-bureau coordination, yet there was almost no chain of command. There was an admiral of the navy, however, the position was seen as having little central power. After 1870, Admiral David Dixon Porter held the job. His attempts to bring authority to the position ended in frustration. Secretaries after Porter also realized the constraints posed by the formal restrictions on the secretary and the admiral. In chapters five and six, I explain a process by which secretaries began to realize that their position had critical agenda setting potential that could advance new intellectual and policy agendas.⁸⁷ Still, the obstacles to naval reform were many. The Navy Department was riddled by bureaucratic red tape, which prohibited passage of naval legislation. Divided political power and bureaucratic separatism would continue, it appeared, to impose roadblocks on any path to aggressive naval modernization.⁸⁸

Naval Reform in Congress: the 1880s

In this section I examine naval reform in Congress during the 1880s. I challenge Zakaria's proposition that in the 1880s, there was a tilt in the domestic balance of power toward the executive branch.⁸⁹ The available evidence indicates that Congress fought less with the president over foreign policy during the 1880s because there was popular support for a small naval modernization program. The support generated more cooperation between the branches for naval modernization than during the previous decade.

Books, 1973), chapters 3 and 4.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 18-19.

⁸⁸ Harold Hance Sprout and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 1st. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 198.

⁸⁹ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power*, 35-40.

In Congress, Democrats and Republicans remained committed to the traditional strategic theories of American national security—they believed that commerce raiding and passive coastal defense should remain the navy's two wartime functions.⁹⁰ The view was rarely challenged throughout the 1880s.⁹¹ For Congress, America's geographic and political isolation held sway.⁹² Attention given to potential invasion was limited; seaboard senators and representatives who attempted to expand naval capacity generally did so to secure appropriations for oversized navy yards to create jobs for party loyalists.⁹³

During the 1880s, fragmented political authority meant that local party machines were also obstacles to reform. The constitutional structure provided a power base apart from the national center. The patronage system, therefore, controlled members of Congress. State, district, and local politicians were entrenched in electoral politics and were obstacles to progressive reform and government activism.⁹⁵ Legislative power in Congress rested with the party chiefs, who derived their power from the support of the party caucus. Party leaders were able to supervise the work of the congressional committees by concentrating important work in a small number of committees, and by controlling the appointments and tenure of committee chairmen. Committees were "little legislatures," each of which went "its own way at its own pace, did not consult and concur with other committees in the adoption of homogenous and

⁹⁰ *Congressional Record*, 47th Congress, 1st Session, H, Ex. Document No. 1 Pt III: 27-38.

⁹¹ Robert Seager II, "Ten Years before Mahan: The Unofficial Case for the New Navy, 1880-1890," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 40, no. 3 (1953): 491-512.

⁹² Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 197.

⁹³ *Ibid.* These yards became a source of Republican scandal throughout the 1870s and continued to slow the advancement of appropriation and construction in the 1880s.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 141.

⁹⁵ Richard Hofstadter, *The Progressive Movement, 1900-1915* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 5.

mutually helpful measures,” and had “no thought of acting in concert.”⁹⁶ These institutions were insufficient for the challenges of modernization.⁹⁷

Congress, during the 1880s, was also fragmented into a multiplicity of regional interests and was not united by strong ideological parties.⁹⁸ It might have yielded authority over substantive policy to the president. But as Nelson Polsby has shown, Congress instead chose to protect its institutional prerogatives, creating an elaborate committee system that devolved political authority for particular policy decisions to individual committees.⁹⁹ The transformation in the role of committees was a product of two changes in the structure of Congress. First, in accordance with schemes for categorization, important legislative work was divided among a larger number of committees by the end of the century than it had been earlier. Second, committee chairmen came increasingly to hold their posts by virtue of their experience and seniority rather than their loyalty to party programs.

Most scholars of Congress date the rise of committee seniority to the period following the 1910 revolt against the House Speaker Joseph Cannon.¹⁰⁰ Yet in the House, a minor change in the jurisdiction of committees occurred around 1880. This move prompted a debate that continued until 1885, when jurisdiction over appropriations bills was given to eight different committees who divided up the weakened appropriations function. Those who sought to distribute the appropriations function to committees argued that Congress was not “simply

⁹⁶ William Edward Nelson, *The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1830-1900* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 114.

⁹⁷ During the 1880s, this appears to be the case. Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920*, 13.

⁹⁸ However, Scott C. James, *Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884-1936* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) demonstrates that party unity could be strong in the 1880s. See also, James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1973).

⁹⁹ James, *Presidents, Parties, and the State*; Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *The American Political Science Review* 62, no. 1 (1968): 144-68.

¹⁰⁰ James, *Presidents, Parties, and the State*, 43.

engaged in a division of spoils.” They maintained that specialization and division of labor were essential to government and it was “not possible...for any one committee to investigate and understand everything necessary and proper to originate legislation, to raise money for it, and to divide and appropriate that money.”¹⁰¹

In Congress, it was claimed that because each committee had “relations...with the different departments,” and therefore had “special knowledge and special information that the committee on appropriations cannot have,” each committee ought to have jurisdiction over appropriations bills related to its substantive field of expertise. Committees could develop close and friendly working relations with the department in their area of jurisdiction. As one congressman explained, it was “in the very nature of things reasonable and just that fifteen men who have had the matter of the building of the navy as the one theme for their investigation during the entire session in Congress” should have “in their hands the naval appropriations bill, for they would give it the most intelligent consideration.”¹⁰²

The Senate, it should be noted, acted slower than the House, and it was not until 1899 that a resolution for distributing appropriations bills among eight committees was adopted without debate.¹⁰³ The debates on rules changes indicate that many congressmen clung to the conviction that political parties responsible to the majority of the people ought to dominate the proceedings of both houses. In fact, political parties may have had more influence in Congress late in the century than they had in mid-century. According to Leonard White, party regularity in floor votes seems to have increased.¹⁰⁴ If, as Zakaria suggests, presidents became more powerful

¹⁰¹ Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*, 120.

¹⁰² *Congressional Record*, 49th Congress, 1st session (1885): 171-172.

¹⁰³ George B. Galloway, *History of the House of Representatives* (New York: Crowell, 1962), 96.

¹⁰⁴ Leonard Dupee White, *The Republican Era, 1869-1901: A Study in Administrative History* (New York:

via-a-via Congress during the 1880s, it was not because Congress was becoming a less decisive institution or handing over its constitutional prerogatives.¹⁰⁵

Cooperative Efforts at Naval Reform: the 1880s

The year 1881 signaled a change in naval reform. When James Garfield entered the White House in March 1881, conditions were favorable for naval reconstruction. The New York Herald noted “the accession of General Garfield to president closed the cycle in which our politics turned upon the Civil War and its immediate consequences.”¹⁰⁶ Garfield’s secretary of state, James G. Blaine of Maine, took a more aggressive position than previous secretaries, especially his denunciation of European control of the isthmian canal. He proposed an American policy that could enforce the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁰⁷ Garfield invited William H. Hunt of Louisiana to lead the Naval Department. Although Naval Secretary Hunt was “invited” by Garfield, he was, in fact, the favorite among senators and the departing Naval Secretary William Chandler, who picked Hunt to replace himself.¹⁰⁸ Thus, we observe a consensus for naval modernization existing among both parties in Congress.

Naval secretaries appeared energetic in their desire to reform the navy. Secretary Hunt assisted nearly all efforts upgrade the service. He brought in professional advisors to advance the naval construction approved by Congress. Senators and representatives discussed naval

Macmillan, 1958), 119. Also, Lawrence A. Lowell, "The Influence of Party on Legislation in England and America," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1901* 1 (1902): 319, 36.

¹⁰⁵ White, *The Republican Era, 1869-1901: A Study in Administrative History*, 157.

¹⁰⁶ Harold Underwood Faulkner, *American Economic History* (New York: Harper & Bros, 1926), chapter 23.

¹⁰⁷ Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel Flagg Bemis, eds., *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1963), 109-73. Sources include, “An Imperative Duty,” *New York Herald*, December 5, 1881; “The Panama Canal and the Navy,” *New York Herald*, December 9, 1881; “Our Foreign Relations and a Need of a Navy,” *New York Herald*, December 12, 1881.

¹⁰⁸ Charles O. Paullin, "A Half Century of Naval Administration," *US Naval Institute Proceedings XXXIX* (1913): 752.

reform. According to Leonard White, during the 1880s, executive leadership of the navy was weak under both Grant and Hayes, and “professional leadership was marred by faction.”

Therefore, the most Republicans could hope to do was to repair vessels in service. By 1882, this had changed, and both political parties aligned themselves in favor of new naval construction.¹⁰⁹

The question in Congress was not if modernization should take place, but the form it should take. Republican leaders generally wanted reform to proceed at a faster pace and with the construction of larger ships. Democrats wanted a modest reform, wed more to the Jeffersonian ideal.

Although Congress reached a new consensus to initiate a modest modernization program during the 1880s, this consensus does not reflect a new decisiveness by the executive that outgunned an institutional resistance prevalent in Congress. Reform efforts during the 1880s encountered the same institutional obstacles that existed in the 1870s.¹¹⁰

Territorial Acquisition and Foreign Policy after 1865

Territorial expansion was one of the main activities of post-Civil War U.S. foreign policy.¹¹¹ Postwar expansion, however, was not a steady process, contrary to what Zakaria’s model suggests. In fact, there was an initial phase of expansion that was aggressive and lasted approximately ten years, from 1865-1875, followed by a considerably less aggressive period that

¹⁰⁹ White, *The Republican Era, 1869-1901: A Study in Administrative History*, 160.

¹¹⁰ Kenneth J. Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 179-91. During the 1880s, party control of Congress changed every two years. The Democrats, when in the minority, obstructed Republican naval bills on the grounds that it was best to proceed with caution; the Republicans, when in the minority, criticized Democrats for not moving fast enough, yet voted against the construction proposals the Democrats offered.

¹¹¹ For several different perspectives on the growth of American Empire during this era, see Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963). Ernest N. Paolino, *The Foundations of the American Empire: William Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973). William Appleman Williams, *The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society* (New York: Random House, 1969). Milton Plesur, *America's Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971).

lasted approximately twenty years, from 1875-1895. There is little evidence that during the post-Civil War period central decision makers either perceived a change in American state strength or sought expansion in accordance with a perceived change in American state capacity. The Republican Party sometimes sought to expand the military commensurate with the expansion of the U.S. economy, but Republican presidents generally wanted military retrenchment or expansion in response to the policies of the Democratic Party.¹¹²

The initial post-Civil War extra-continental expansion was largely the work of one man. Long before 1877, the date cited by Zakaria as the impetus to state power, President Johnson's Secretary of State, William Seward, announced his belief that United States should be the seat of power for an empire that stretched into Latin America and Asia. After the Civil War, Seward worked to achieve this.¹¹³ Seward began his effort in the Danish West Indies, by attempting to buy the islands in 1865. In 1867, he signed a treaty with Denmark that would have transferred the islands to U.S. control for \$7.5 million, but the impeachment trial of President Johnson sidetracked Senate passage of the treaty. Johnson's successor, Ulysses S. Grant, never submitted the treaty to the Senate, and Denmark retained the islands until the United States obtained them in 1917. Seward also tried to purchase the main port of the Dominican Republic in 1866, but this effort also failed. Seward was more successful acquiring Alaska and Midway Island, both in 1867. The Secretary of State negotiated Alaska's purchase from Russia for \$7.2 million, and the

¹¹² Leonard Dupee White, *The Republican Era, 1869-1901: A Study in Administrative History* (New York: Macmillan, 1958), chapter 2. Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 167, refers to the reforms that occurred before 1900 as mere patchwork, as opposed to the reconstitution of America's government system that followed. Zakaria, by contrast, identifies changes during the 1880s that would lay the groundwork for later reform. Zakaria, however, fails to cite actual observations by executives demonstrating they perceived a change in state strength that created an opportunity for new foreign policy initiatives. Further, we do not observe a predictable pattern indicating that nineteenth-century presidents shared an interest in expanding American naval capacity. According to White, presidents in the Democratic Party during the late nineteenth century generally situated their platform upon military retrenchment.

¹¹³ A good discussion of Seward's time as Secretary of State can be found in Paolino, *Foundations of the American Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).

U.S. Navy claimed the mid-Pacific Midway Island for the United States.¹¹⁴ After Seward's departure and before 1877 efforts at territorial expansion continued at a more modest pace. Soon after Grant took office in 1869, his personal secretary, working with American business interests in the Dominican Republic, negotiated two treaties with the Dominican president.¹¹⁵

Zakaria's model suggests that we should expect that presidents continued to initiate attempts at territorial expansion after Dominican annexation failed. This, however, was not the case. For the next decade, as the story goes, with no real champion within senior government circles, territorial expansion took a back seat to domestic issues, especially rebuilding the country, consolidating control over contiguous territory that the United States had already acquired, and growing the economy.¹¹⁶

After the Civil War, Presidents showed little interest in extra-territorial expansion or assessing state strength. Johnson devoted only a few lines to the navy in his annual message. He agreed with Congress that the annual naval appropriations should be reduced to pre-war levels of about \$10 million.¹¹⁷ Between 1865 and 1890, Grant was the president most concerned with naval decay, giving somewhat more attention to naval affairs than his predecessor. He told the country in his message of 1872 that, "the size of our population, and wide range of our relations

¹¹⁴ See Ronald J. Jensen, *The Alaska Purchase and Russian-American Relations* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). Under the first treaty, the United States would annex the country and assume its national debt. The second treaty said that if the Senate did not ratify the first, the United States could purchase the main harbor in the Dominican Republic for \$2 million. Grant sent the message to Congress with his personal approval. He pointed out that the Dominican Republic had raw materials and potential markets for American products. The Senate was not convinced and rejected the first treaty by a 28-28 vote, well short of the two-thirds majority needed for ratification. The second treaty never came to a vote. Some senators who opposed the treaties believed that they had been improperly negotiated. Others felt pressure to oppose the treaty from anti-imperialists, some of whom rejected the treaties because they were opposed to imperialism on principle. Still others feared that treaties would add more nonwhites and Catholics to the United States.

¹¹⁵ For details see Charles Callan Tansill, *The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873: A Chapter in Caribbean Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938).

¹¹⁶ Russell Frank Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 119-26.

¹¹⁷ Stephen Howarth, *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991*, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1991), 75.

with foreign powers, made a vigorous demand for a larger navy.” He also noted that, “unless early steps are taken to preserve our navy, in a few years the United States will be the weakest nation upon the ocean.”¹¹⁸ Nowhere has it been cited that the strength of the American state entered into his calculations. Noted historian George Davis saw Grant as only slightly more interested in naval expansion than other executives of his era. Generally speaking, presidents failed to lead Congress toward a vision of American security.

Lacking intelligent executive leadership, preoccupied with internal problems, and torn by partisan strife, Congress did little but mark time. The Democratic majority in the House, eager to expose Republican derelictions, probed into the administration of the navy department. Senators and Representatives showed a strong disposition to curtail appropriations.¹¹⁹

After the Civil War, presidents as well as Congress reasserted the old tradition of maintaining small American military establishments. With the economic panic of 1873, the emphasis was on cutting spending for the military. Congressional hostility toward the military and military contempt for Congress stood in the way of easy progress on appropriation bills.¹²⁰ In the next six years, the income of the national government was greater than before, but naval funding was no longer an executive priority. President Hayes was considerably less aggressive toward naval reform than had been the Grant administration.¹²¹ The Democratic Party, which controlled the House of Representatives between 1874 and 1880, did not support increased naval appropriations.¹²² There was not a single plank in the platform of “American parties, major or

¹¹⁸ As cited in George Theron Davis, *A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy* (New York: Harcourt, 1940), 13.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Harold Hance Sprout and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 1st. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 147.

¹²¹ Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York: Putnam, 1956), 122.

¹²² Howarth, *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991*, 98.

minor, on naval policy until the Republican platform of 1882 called for a revival of the American fleet.”¹²³

Contrary to Zakaria’s assumption, presidents often lagged behind congressional initiatives to enhance America’s naval capacity. Francis Bayard, Cleveland’s secretary of state in the mid-1880s, noted possible dangers from European powers. He thought that Germany might try to establish bases in the Western Hemisphere and felt that America needed to show strength in the region. Cleveland’s naval secretary, however, believed these were unnecessary concerns for American foreign policy.¹²⁴ According to Grenville and Young, Cleveland’s own approach to problems of foreign relations was dominated by domestic political considerations. He gave little thought to America’s role in world affairs and instead reiterated the Founding Fathers’ advice: to avoid foreign complications, to settle disputes amicably, and to limit American responsibilities as far as possible. Cleveland saw no serious danger from abroad, and was content to leave the conduct of foreign policy to his secretary of state.¹²⁵ Furthermore, presidential platforms between 1875 and 1889 do not reflect a predictable interest in naval reform commensurate with an increasing American economy, government reform, or technological gap. Unlike the expectations derived from the Zakaria model, prior to 1889 presidents spoke of naval reform sporadically and sparingly.¹²⁶ To the extent that extra-territorial expansion continued

¹²³ Ibid., 24.

¹²⁴ Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel Flagg Bemis, eds., *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1963), 120-32.

¹²⁵ J. A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 41.

¹²⁶ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, chapter 11. David L. Anderson, *Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China, 1861-1898* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). As a rule, during the 20 years between 1875 and 1895, the United States followed the European states as they extended their influence and control in China and Africa. The United States, unlike the major powers of Europe, was mostly interested in expanding its trade, not its territorial control. Even the expansion of US trade in China and Asia was relatively small. US trade with Asia totaled only 5 percent of all American trade in 1890. African trade made up less than 5 percent.

after the attempt at Dominican annexation, the focus in the 1880s shifted to acquiring sites for coaling stations. U.S. interests focused on Hawaii, Samoa, and Latin America, not Asia and Africa.¹²⁷

There is no clear evidence that state strength changed between 1878 and 1890, and no evidence that decision makers *perceived* a change in state strength. Although Zakaria may be correct in his assertion that presidents Hayes and Garfield brought a new level of authority to the executive office, he seems to miss the fact that congressional centralization also increased from the 1880s onward as we enter the period of the dominant House speaker. In principle, there is no reason why *both* Congress and the president cannot gain capacity at the same time.

Zakaria's work is original in its effort to bring the concept of state development into foreign policy theory. However, it is not clear from his analysis whether factors such as aggregate national power or international incentives for expansion contribute more to policy formation than the strength or weakness of the state. Further, Zakaria argues that the United States was slow to expand in the nineteenth century because it had a weak state, but some of his measures of state strength indicate an absence of consensus among decision makers, not the state's actual strength. Zakaria suggests that "as the state goes, so goes foreign policy." I challenge this assertion in chapters three through six, revealing the process by which a new consensus was formed among critical foreign policy decision-makers. The emergence of this

¹²⁷ See Merze Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). Paul M. Kennedy, *The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American Relations, 1878-1900* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974). The United States, Germany, and Great Britain all were interested in the Hawaiian and Samoa Islands, even though the US Senate in 1878 ratified a treaty with a Samoan chief that gave the United States rights to build a naval station and to intercede in Samoan disputes with other countries. An 1887 conference between the three countries failed to resolve lingering disagreements, and Germany landed troops in Samoa. Fearing that the Samoan crisis was out of control, the three countries met again in 1889, this time splitting Samoa into three parts, one each for Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. With this partition, the United States had acquired a permanent presence in the Pacific. The acquisition of this tiny parcel of land is the only actual American extra-territorial expansion between 1870 and 1898.

consensus predates changes in American state capacity. In contrast to Zakaria's claim, my evidence suggests that only after the opportunities for intra-continental expansion had been exploited through consolidation, could extra-continental opportunities for expansion be considered. Reaching a consensus as to the shape and direction of such a policy demanded an expansionist strategy that could overcome America's fragmented political structure and its commitment to minimal security.

Zakaria offers one solution to the timing of the first American battleship fleet. He suggests when an emerging economic power will translate its economic hegemony into military force. My dissertation argues that his theory under-specifies when a nation like the U.S. would make a move to claim military superiority. I therefore disagree with Zakaria's solution. My work, however, supports the underlying logic of offensive realism. What I am adding is a different explanation for the timing, motivation and magnitude of American military assertiveness by highlighting the specific form it took – construction of a battleship navy. I use of the concepts of epistemic community, bureaucratic entrepreneurship, and networking to fill out the blank space in offensive realism.

An Alternative International Relations Explanation of Military Doctrine Change

Stephen Rosen offers an international relations perspective that provides insight into how foreign policy might change in the absence of military threat while accounting for the role of elite decision makers inside the state. Rosen stipulates conditions under which military bureaucracies during the twentieth century have been autonomous and have initiated foreign policy change. As he explains, bureaucracies are complex organizations that compete against one another. Military organizations are unique because competition within the organization

necessarily involves an ideological struggle that redefines the organization's core values and services. Rosen suggests that we regard military organizations as complex political communities in which the central concerns are the political values subject to debate within the community. Military organizations would have this political character more than other bureaucratic organizations because military organizations are less connected to the civilian world. His cases suggest that in the mid-twentieth century, foreign policy change occurred after the military redefined its purpose.¹²⁸ Although he has not extended his model to the late nineteenth century, his idea of intra-military competition would suggest that the sources of foreign policy innovation could have originated inside the military bureaucracy.

In chapter three, I apply Rosen's concept. I trace the intellectual struggle among state-centered reformers in their attempt to recast American military capacity and American foreign policy. As Rosen suggests, the political character of the military organization helps to explain why inter-organizational competition within the naval bureaucracy produced reformers whose perception of international threat stood in opposition to that of political and economic elites, and the public.

Rosen's theory is valuable because it turns our attention to changes inside the military bureaucracy, and reminds us that autonomous bureaucratic agents can be more than epiphenomena. As such, we avoid the pitfalls of much of the international relations literature that views state action in automatic terms. His model of inter-organizational conflict folds comfortably into the APD perspective, which generally recognizes how agents of change must operate in a historical and institutional context that mediates and directs competition. If inter-organizational competition is relevant to the case of naval modernization during the 1880s or the

¹²⁸ Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*.

1890s, forces inside the state structure could account for the changes in American foreign policy at the end of the nineteenth century.

American Political Development (APD) and Foreign Policy Innovation

The potential for APD to make a contribution to foreign policy theory lies in its ability to recognize that foreign policy decisions, like domestic policy decisions, rarely occur in a political or historical vacuum, and that state actors can be autonomous and initiate policy innovation.¹²⁹ Analysis of policy change often focuses on how exogenous shocks momentarily destabilize institutional order, demand adjustment, and result in a new or transformed institution that then induces stability. Punctuated equilibrium models rest on the occurrence of political or economic crisis that produces a critical juncture or window of opportunity in which possibilities for change

¹²⁹ APD has, thus far, not addressed strategic adjustment. The strategic adjustment of the late-nineteenth century has been characterized in terms of business pacifism by Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) or as institutional reform and technological change by Jan S. Breemer, Emily O. Goldman and Edward Smith; in Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes, eds., *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests, New Directions in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), chapter 6. Goldman, Smith, and Breemer argue that changes in military organization must underscore any changes in military posture, since bureaucracies can carry enormous influence in periods of technological transition. Strategic adjustment has been viewed as a struggle over ideological hegemony by Mark R. Shulman in *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995) and “Instituting a Political Idea” in Trubowitz, Goldman, and Rhodes, eds., *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment*. Shulman analyzes political struggles over ideological hegemony between traditional elements that supported Jeffersonian ideas of defense and Hamiltonian progressives. Edward Rhodes offers a cultural-cognitive approach in his chapter “Constructing Power” in Trubowitz, Goldman, and Rhodes, eds., *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment*. Rhodes examines a late 19th-century change in core beliefs, about the nature of the state and the state’s relationship to the outside world, to explain the transformation in naval policy as a quest for foreign markets. Both Thomas J. McCormick in his *China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire 1893-1901* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967) and Walter LaFaber, in *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898* extend the “over-production” hypothesis, in which a surplus or a glut in American goods created the necessity to build a large navy to open new markets in Latin America. Julius Pratt, in his *Expansionists of 1898* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), denies that expansion reflected the interest of American exporters. He concludes that the business community was largely opposed to market expansion in conjunction with naval expansion. Instead, he cites an earlier generation of “social expansionists” such as John Fiske, Josiah Strong and John Burges as most influential in paving the way to “American Greatness.”

become viable.¹³⁰ The balance-of-power theory is a classic example of how institutional change can be understood as the product of exogenous shifts that alter the distribution of preferences, resulting in new institutional arrangements or equilibrium outcomes.¹³¹

APD promises foreign policy theory an alternative endogenous account of stability and change. An endogenous account of foreign policy change places emphasis upon the ways institutions themselves make change possible, and therefore does not rely on the occurrence of an exogenous event to dictate when and how change takes place. An exogenous approach considers international institutions as mechanisms that reduce or eliminate uncertainty, whereas an endogenous APD analysis emphasizes how entrepreneurship affects the way actors exploit uncertainty to advance a policy agenda. An endogenous APD approach that focuses upon political entrepreneurs differs from the exogenous view of institutions as equilibrium outcomes. An exogenous approach sees international institutions and the design of the international system as mechanisms that reduce complexity by limiting issue choices. Attention to entrepreneurs instead considers why the complexity of choice makes entrepreneurial action possible. What APD lacks is a model that can link foreign policy change to the unique characteristics of military organization and the corollary imperatives created for state aggrandizement. I propose that organizational competition wedded to the APD research on state autonomy directs our attention to a new brand of foreign policy engineer –the bureaucratic entrepreneur.

This dissertation will proceed from the political corollary to the market approach, presenting late nineteenth century entrepreneurs as actors who exploited gaps in the pervasive American party system, created “new combinations” of policy products, and obtained a

¹³⁰ Baumgartner and Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*.

¹³¹ The best example is Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, no. 2 (1989): 131-47.

monopoly over policy alternatives. As such, “innovations are endogenous developments in a dynamic economic system.”¹³² APD scholars have begun to describe market-style political opportunities. For example, Jens Becket described choice complexity as the necessary part of “institutional innovation brought about by the entrepreneurial act of creative destruction, tearing down existing political economic arrangements in order to create new ones.”¹³³ In a similar way, a non APD scholar, John Kingdon describes how innovation involves a recombination of policy issues. Kingdon focuses on the entrepreneurs and their creative efforts at recombining problems, policies, and politics in order to “join solutions to problems, proposals to political momentum, and political events to policy problems.”¹³⁴ Becket and Kingdon work from assumptions consistent with a market context in which entrepreneurs seek monopoly profits, “by being the first to introduce a ‘new combination,’ the entrepreneur obtains temporary monopoly power.”¹³⁵

One important strain within APD scholarship has used rational choice principal-agent models to explain expanded state capacity, modernization, and reorganization. This literature treats bureaucrats as agents directed by their political masters or principals.¹³⁶ McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast argue that during the late nineteenth century, agencies depended upon an “enacting coalition” of politicians who used administrative procedures to induce agencies to respond only with actions desired by the political coalition.¹³⁷ According to this line of APD scholarship,

¹³² Mirjam C. van Praag, "Some Classic Views on Entrepreneurship," *De Economist* 147, no. 3 (1999): 322.

¹³³ Jens Beckert, "Agency, Entrepreneurs, and Institutional Change: The Role of Strategic Choice and Institutionalized Practices in Organizations," *Organization Studies* 20, no. 5 (1999): 787.

¹³⁴ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (New York: Harper Collins, 1984), 182. This is not an APD model per se, but it has been employed by one important strain of APD work.

¹³⁵ William J. Baumol, *Entrepreneurship, Management, and the Structure of Payoffs* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).

¹³⁶ Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond*, ed. Oliver E. Williamson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

¹³⁷ Randall L.M Calvert, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast, "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 3 (1989): 588-611. In most of these models the agency is effectively created from nothing by the legislature, and bears no prior expertise in the particular domain.

change in bureaucratic agencies is produced exclusively by politicians—bureaucratic actors respond to, rather than initiate, change. Although bureaucratic agents may create compliance problems for their principals, the servants do not control their masters. Placed in the light of nineteenth century politics, change in American military and foreign policy could have resulted only from politicians who created and designed the agencies. Battleship construction would therefore result from political elites who directed agency actors to carry out construction orders. I challenge this assertion in chapters three, four, and five by presenting evidence that the coalition of political elites began advocating battleship construction as a result of pressure from autonomous bureaucratic actors.

This dissertation will extend the endogenous APD approach by demonstrating that agents dealing with issues of national security can have publicly recognized expertise, independent access to organized citizens, and autonomy over the procedures of their agencies. This dissertation will test this set of causal claims and identify the mechanism (epistemic communities) by which bureaucratic leaders developed independent sources of power. I will then explain how bureaucratic actors employed their independently-derived power to redirect the interests of principal actors.

The legislature and the agency are presumed to interact for the first time, and the agency has no attributes other than its normally divergent preferences and its assumed ability to ascertain information effectively.

Changing Naval Capacity: the 1880s

This section will address the extent to which naval reform efforts during the 1880s altered the pattern of naval acquisitions. Skowronek's reform model yields a set of predictions about the pattern of naval reform during the 1880s. According to his model, the existing institutional constraints of the nineteenth-century-partisan state produced a distributive tendency in Congress.¹³⁸ Given this distributive tendency, Congress would build naval ships during the 1880s and 1890s that reflect logrolling and pork barrel politics. This prevailing state system should have enabled naval reformers to advance nothing more than a "patchwork" attempt at reform during the 1880s. Therefore, if incremental reform occurred, the change in ship design should be evident in the partisan state that produced it. In a partisan state guided by pork barrel considerations, we would expect legislation to deliver the maximum distributive benefits to the enacting coalition, with the largest share going to the pivotal lawmakers, such as the committee chairs. Assuming that the partisan state and bureau decentralization persisted from the 1870s and through the 1890s, the ship designed during the 1880s should reveal a patchwork effort to incrementally modernize.

Naval Construction: the 1880s

Immediately after the Civil War, the U.S. Navy fell into disrepair due to neglect and inactivity. By the early 1880s, as discussed, the Democratic and Republican leadership agreed that the service was a "satirical semblance of a navy."¹³⁹ The question was, how to spend naval appropriations more effectively. Both parties railed against spending money on a fleet that could

¹³⁸ Bernard Brodie refer to the warships appropriated during the 1880s as "too weak to make good battleships and too expensive as cruisers." Bernard Brodie, *A Guide to Naval Strategy*, 5th ed. (New York: Praeger, 1965), 28. Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 200.

¹³⁹ "The U.S. Navy," *Nation*, February 5, 1880.

neither fight nor run, and by 1882, mounting criticism led toward building a new navy.¹⁴⁰ With both political parties finally in favor of naval modernization, Congress began to discuss new threats and old conversations that generally translated into proposals that would enhance the traditional United States policy of passive defense.

Although both political parties came to accept this assessment, there was great uncertainty over how modernization should proceed.¹⁴¹ “The uncertainties about whether wood or iron should be used to construct ships had largely been resolved. There was uncertainty about the use of steam or wind as the principal motive powers; between armored and unarmored ships; between ordnance and armor; and between ships and torpedoes.”¹⁴² All options remained undecided, debated but without resolution. Naval historian Charles Paullin declared that, uncertainty more than anything” impeded progress.¹⁴³ Certainly, traditional American attitudes also worked against the navy.¹⁴⁴ Such beliefs allowed congressmen such as William T. Hamilton and Fernando Wood to dismiss the navy as unessential. Hamilton’s vision of the country’s “manifested and prospective power” convinced him that the nation could build ships on demand. He said, “We can, in the event of war, build in two weeks a navy that could compete with any in the world.”¹⁴⁵

With a state structure resistant to change and traditional values still prevalent in Congress, how was a modest modernization program possible during the 1880s? I have suggested that during this period, a consensus was emerging among policy elites that the U.S. navy was no

¹⁴⁰ *Congressional Record* (January, 24 1883): 1563.

¹⁴¹ Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*, 67.

¹⁴² Paullin, "A Half Century of Naval Administration," 1224.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*: 1222.

¹⁴⁴ Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986), chapter 10.

¹⁴⁵ Cited in Paullin, "A Half Century of Naval Administration," 1194.

longer adequate to fulfill its traditional roles. In response to this emerging awareness of deficiency, a modest modernization program was undertaken during the 1880s. The aim and consequence of this program was a more cost-effective use of existing levels of funding that could produce modern warships designed to fulfill the traditionally limited strategic role assigned to the navy.¹⁴⁶

However, naval modernization would need a policy that could satisfy both political parties. The direction of naval construction was therefore politicized and passage needed to offer something for everyone: some speed, some cruising distance, some armor, some guns, and some economy.¹⁴⁷ Some legislators wanted modest reform, because of the perceived cost, while other policy actors such as Chief Engineer Benjamin Franklin Isherwood wanted to construct state-of-the-art defensive armored cruisers. His report called for oceangoing, heavy-armed ironclads instead of smaller cruisers.¹⁴⁸

The House Naval Affairs Committee needed to listen to testimony before considering reform legislation.¹⁴⁹ In March 1882, the committee recommended that Congress authorize fifteen ships at a total cost of ten million dollars.¹⁵⁰ In its conclusion, the committee offered to build up defensive forces with monitors, torpedo boats, and a few cruisers. Representative Harris noted that,

Extort from an enemy terms of honorable peace, by aggressive war upon the high seas...(with cruisers) of speed sufficient to enable them to choose time

¹⁴⁶ George Theron Davis, *A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy* (New York: Harcourt, 1940), 41.

¹⁴⁷ Generally, the greater the armor and speed the less efficiency and distance. Also, since the size of the ships was limited by these factors, armor came at the expense of guns.

¹⁴⁸ *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1881, 38-39.

¹⁴⁹ Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Rowena Reed, *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 209.

¹⁵⁰ *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1882, 137.

and occasion and fight or flee at will, and administer just retribution upon an enemy by the destruction or capture of his commerce.¹⁵¹

The ships built for the new navy were designed to do everything, but ultimately they did nothing well. Harris captured this dilemma when he said,

We cannot expect at once to build up a Navy powerful enough to meet in mid-ocean and successfully contend with the monster iron-clad of England, France, and Italy, nor do we desire that the attempt should be made.¹⁵³

The reform was set in motion when Naval Secretary William Hunt established the Naval Advisory Board. The Board began the work of deciding what construction plan the navy should follow.¹⁵⁴ Reflecting the strategically small size of the 1881 navy, the board proposed a major navy buildup that promised a slightly improved version of existing ships. The board's report on November 7 called for the following construction with a total cost of \$29,607,000: 8 first-rate cruisers, 10 second-rate cruisers, 24 wooden ships, 5 torpedo boats, 10 cruiser torpedo boats, and 9 harbor torpedo boats.¹⁵⁵

The 1883 appropriation came in response to the request of Secretary William Chandler, as expressed in the Annual Report of 1882. In Congress, the issue was how to get the authorization for two cruiser ships. Chandler, in correspondence with Congress on January 2, 1883, recommended that the first (large) cruiser, which Congress had authorized, not be built yet,

¹⁵¹ Ibid, B. H. Harris chaired the committee between 1881 and 1883. The passage here demonstrates a desire to remain attached to the "*jeune ecole*" of commerce raiding, even as it is being abandoned by the larger world powers.

¹⁵² The Appropriations Committee authorized the two ships but with funds that were insufficient to develop the project. See *Congressional Record* (January 24, 1883): 1562-1564.

¹⁵³ Benjamin H. Harris (R-MA), the house Committee on Naval Affairs "House Report No. 169, 46th Congress, 2nd session 1880.

¹⁵⁴ "The Advisory Board," *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1881, Appendix 1, 28.

¹⁵⁵ "Construction of Vessels of War for the Navy", *Congressional Record*, 47th Congress, 1st Session, House Report 653: xxiv. The combination of cruisers and torpedo boats without capital ships serves no particular strategic objective.

since “so large and expensive a vessel is not now required.”¹⁵⁶ In a statement that reflected uncertainty and compromise, Chandler suggested that the construction proceed,

neither with the largest nor smallest, but with medium sized ships. The large vessel, when finished, would not be adapted to the present condition of our service.¹⁵⁷

The board’s proposal was favored within the House Naval Affairs Committee. The resistance, along party lines, did not dissuade the basic desire for naval modernization. Much of what appeared to be reluctance was in fact, minor dissention over general points of agreement.

In light of the tide of rapidly changing technology, Representative Atkins illustrates this concern,

I do not believe this government will lose anything by waiting another year. Let us see what the tests shall prove. Let us see whether investigations will be made, there have been greater changes in the last five years than one could have predicted.¹⁵⁹

Democratic representatives, indeed, wanted credit for reform efforts.¹⁶⁰ Republicans agreed that constructing armored ships did not alter America’s strategic defense position. As one Representative put it,

We have no colonial dependencies to hold in unwilling subjection, nor jealous rival nations upon our order to overawe by an exhibition of power. We have no temptation to make aggressive war upon the seas for conquest upon any trans-oceanic nation.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ *Congressional Record*, 24 January 1883, 1562-1564.

¹⁵⁷ Chandler to Speaker, 47th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Report 1882, 8-9.

¹⁵⁸ William Hovgaard, *Modern History of Warships, Comprising a Discussion of Present Standpoint and Recent War Experiences, for the Use of Students of Naval Construction, Naval Constructors, Naval Officers, and Others Interested in Naval Matters* (London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1920), 102.

¹⁵⁹ Atkins in *Congressional Record*, (January 24, 1883): 1564.

¹⁶⁰ See William Holman (D-Ind), *Congressional Record*, (January 24, 1883): 1567.

¹⁶¹ Benjamin Harris (R-2nd MA), the House Committee on Naval Affairs “House Report” No. 169, 46th Congress, 2nd Session, (May 8, 1880): 1165.

Rather than an extra-territorial empire, naval modernization would concentrate on building a stronger democracy at home. “We have an Empire equal to our own ambition, not too large let us hope to be successfully governed as one nation upon republican principles.”¹⁶²

On March 3, 1883, Congress appropriated money to construct the ABCD ships, *Atlanta*, *Boston*, *Chicago*, *Dolphin*, and monitors.¹⁶⁴ The ships represented a tentative consensus for reform. Mark Shulman says the ships were like the proverbial camel, a horse designed by a committee.¹⁶⁵ The program has also been termed a cost-effective use of existing funds that could produce modern warships, limited by the traditional strategic role of the U.S. Navy.¹⁶⁶ They had steel hulls, rifled guns, steam power, and sails. Although they were called warships, they were too lightly armored and too few in number to battle any first-rate European fleet.¹⁶⁷ Yet their anticipated speed, endurance, and armament made them useful for protecting American commercial interests from unarmed native populations. The cruisers, therefore, were the 1880s means of accomplishing the navy’s unchanging peacetime mission: stimulation and protection of overseas commerce.¹⁶⁸

During the 1880s, discussions of rams, mines, torpedoes, gunboats, and monitors filled pages of the Congressional Record, and reveal the extent to which senators and representatives

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ See, for example, *Congressional Record* (January 24, 1883): 1650-1567.

¹⁶⁴ See “Naval Appropriation Act of 1884,” 47th Congress, 2nd Session, *United States Statutes* 22 (March 3, 1883): 477.

¹⁶⁵ Shulman, *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882-1893*.

¹⁶⁶ Herrick, *The American Naval Revolution*, 4-60.

¹⁶⁷ See “Naval Appropriation Act of 1884,” 47th Congress, 2nd Session, *United States Statutes* 22 (March 3, 1883): 477. For a debate on why thee early ships of the new navy were fully or partially rigged, see William Michael McBride, "The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology: The American Battleship from Santiago Bay to Pearl Harbor, 1898-1941" (Ph. D. Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1989), XII, which claims that the “pro-sail hierarchy used strategic discontinuity to justify the anti-technology policies of the period.”

¹⁶⁸ Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*.

continued to limit national strategic policy to coastal defense and commerce raiding.¹⁶⁹ Land fortifications remained the bedrock of the passive defense policy throughout the 1880s. The function of the new cruisers was simply to fortify the existing policy: extending commerce protection by extending land fortifications.

In March 1885, Congress voted for two more unarmored cruisers, the U.S.S. *Charleston* and *Newark*, and two new gunboats, the U.S.S. *Yorktown* and *Petral*—ships designed to further the navy's peacetime role of commerce protection.¹⁷⁰ Again, the new ships could protect American commerce against enemy merchantmen, but lacked the armament to successfully engage European armored ships. In 1886, a group of army and navy officers headed by Secretary of War William C. Endicott (the Endicott Board) continued the expansion program of fortifications for ten major seaports.¹⁷¹ By 1889, the New Navy had 38 modern warships functioning to assist the land fortifications and reduce naval degeneration.¹⁷² Simply put, naval modernization during the 1880s, as Representative Warren Keifer said, served to acquire more gunboats for coastal defense.¹⁷³

This incremental course of naval modernization reveals the technical compromises among members of Congress. However, beneath the technical disagreements were shared assumptions that shaped congressional debate.¹⁷⁴ The program was to be a cost-effective

¹⁶⁹ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 196.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 188-89.

¹⁷¹ *Report on the Board on Fortifications or Other Defense*, House Exec. Doc. No. 4a, 49th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 5-26. These efforts can be contrasted against the findings in Randall L.M Calvert, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast, "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 3 (1989): 3.

¹⁷² Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 188-89.

¹⁷³ *Congressional Record*, 48th Congress, 2nd Session: 1970.

¹⁷⁴ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*; Davis, *A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy*; Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York: Putnam, 1956); Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963); Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern*

production of modern warships, limited by the traditional strategic role of the U.S. Navy. The ships were each lightly armored, and built upon completely original plans because no existing plans would have convinced Congress to fund them. The outcome of ship designs was what Skowronek's patchwork model would predict. The ships had to be inexpensive, as well as reasonably large and fast. The size and speed, therefore, had to come at the expense of quality, endurance, or power. The hybrid ships appropriated during the 1880s are consistent with what Skowronek's model would predict.

Interest Articulation: the 1880s

Peter Trubowitz offers perhaps the best explanation of why sectional interests formulated a battleship policy during the late nineteenth century. He focuses upon the activities of policy actors who sought electoral advantage and responded to the interests of geographically-defined constituencies. The international interests of these constituents reflected differential rates of economic development and integration into the world economy.¹⁷⁵ Trubowitz isolates the activities of the Republican party leaders who dominated the industrial Northeast and viewed naval expansion as part of a larger political strategy that could stimulate growth in urban-industrial centers and check the spread of agrarian discontent in the trans-Mississippi West.¹⁷⁶ The steel industry was concentrated in Pennsylvania; shipbuilding was concentrated in the Middle Atlantic and New England; and manufacturing was concentrated in the Northeast and the

American Fighting Navy; and Herrick, *The American Naval Revolution*.

¹⁷⁵ Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy, American Politics and Political Economy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* The executive pursued the agenda of the dominant sectional coalition, while portraying that agenda as the unitary national interest.

upper Midwest. Increased naval spending would provide a justification for the tariff, which protected northeastern manufacturers and penalized the South.

If we follow the logic of the sectional model, we should expect policy development to follow a particular order. First, the political leaders of the dominant sectional coalitions and sectional economic beneficiaries of battleship construction would initiate critical battleship legislation and frame foreign policy. Second, we should see evidence of cross-issue linkage during critical stages of congressional debate. Third, we should be able to find evidence that decisive cross-sectional cooperation for naval appropriations was predicated upon the expectation of export expansion.¹⁷⁷ Fourth, we should be able to observe the endorsement for battleship appropriations coming from legislators who represented Northern interests.

Specifically, we should see evidence of cross-issue linkage (connecting naval capacity to larger issues of economic positioning or national defense) during critical stages of congressional debate. This should occur during the 1880s from a coherent Northeastern group, using a coherent message, acting in concert. Evidence to the contrary will leave open the possibility that elite opinion change might have resulted from a re-estimation of American national security based on specialized knowledge.

¹⁷⁷ Inferences drawn from Trubowitz's sectional model anticipate an identifiable coalition of defined sectional blocks on foreign policy expansion. During the 1880s these blocks would be responding to the preferences of East Coast manufacturers and forming coalitions around battleship advocacy. This should be evident in the voting patterns of Republicans and Democrats as they pursued disparate agendas toward naval modernization legislation. For a sectional explanation of ship modernization during the 1880s to be persuasive, we also should observe the political leaders of the dominant sectional coalition, in conjunction with sectional economic beneficiaries of battleship construction, initiating and/or advocating critical battleship legislation and framing foreign policy.

The Armed Services and American Society

This section will test Trubowitz's sectional model by mapping the preferences of critical economic interests, which, according to his model, would be concerned most with battleship acquisition during the 1880s. I begin by suggesting that it would not be in the interest of eastern banks and manufactures associated with exporting finished goods, or the Southern and Western interests associated with exporting raw materials such as wheat, cotton, or tobacco, to advance a policy that might antagonize Europeans, and particularly the British. Given the security and free trade advantages provided by the arrangement of Pax Britannica, even eastern bankers and manufacturers did not wish to upset the status quo.¹⁷⁸

The enlightenment ideals of prosperity through peace were as relevant in the 1880s as ever. A departure from the coastal defense and commerce-raiding strategy was dangerous to Eastern producers who were increasingly benefiting from the status quo arrangement. The naval reform program of the 1880s reflected this desire to stay within the boundaries of the passive defense doctrine, and would contain "none of those vast, unwieldy, and monstrous structures which have consumed millions of the money of other powers."¹⁷⁹

The sectional argument assumes that the shift from lightly armored and armed cruisers to battleships meant an increase in the navy's demand for steel. Yet the transition in ship armor did not affect the interests of American steel producers. Only a few firms became involved in forging the required weapons and armor, and these firms were not able to cooperate in order to

¹⁷⁸ David A. Lake, *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 91. He makes an extended case that it in no way served the northeast interests to provoke the powers of Europe.

¹⁷⁹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. XXXIII: 5494; and Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1925), 1: 511.

find monopoly profits. Further, the profit that colluding oligopolies could make on armor contracts remains a matter of debate. What is clear, however, is that the arms and armor business remained a relatively minor sideline for the steel corporations. Andrew Carnegie was willing to stay out of the armor business altogether; he thought the investment cost was too steep.¹⁸⁰

The shipbuilding industry explanation of naval modernization fails for three reasons. First, there is no evidence that shipbuilders lobbied for an increase in warship construction, either individually or as a group. Second, far from pressuring the state to create naval production, private shipbuilders do not seem to have been particularly interested in taking on such work. In 1883, when the navy began its construction program, few contractors even placed bids.¹⁸¹ Third, in 1889–1890, at the dawn of America’s battleship policy, the government understood shipbuilders to want “unarmored vessels which could be produced quicker and more profitably.”¹⁸² Thus, the economic interests of ship builders were understood to run counter to battleship acquisition.

An excellent example of military-business cooperation in the late nineteenth century is Dean Allard’s thesis expressed in The Influence of the United States Navy Upon the American Steel Industry, 1880–1900.¹⁸³ According to Allard, American steel mills, before 1884, had not rolled hull plates, and vessels had never been built completely of American steel. Naval reform then required a modernization scheme that constructed armored steamships when steel producers

¹⁸⁰ Lake, *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939*, 133, 40.

¹⁸¹ B. Franklin Cooling, *Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex, 1881-1917* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1979), 89.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Dean C. Allard, "The Influence of the United States Navy Upon the American Steel Industry, 1880-1900" (M.A. Thesis, Georgetown University, 1959). Allard traces the origins of that cooperation to the plight of the steel industry, and his description of the collapse of the “partnership” between the navy and the steel industry provides the first indication that the relations between the nation’s military and civilian elites did not constitute an enduring, conspiratorial network promoting class or group interests in the direction of armored ship building.

were not prepared to forge steel for ship ordnance, they focused instead upon continental expansion and urban development.¹⁸⁴

At that time, 90 percent of steel output went to the manufacturing of steel rails. The unpredictable pace of railroad construction repeatedly threw the industry into depression, and demanded the presence of other buyers. The armed services appeared willing to provide help.¹⁸⁵ This assistance begins with the establishment of the Naval Advisory Board, which insisted that domestic steel be used in the construction of America's new navy, thus creating the demand for steel plates. At the same time, the high standards of the navy's steel inspectors led American producers to make greater use of the superior open-hearth process and to de-emphasize the Bressmer system, which produced a low-grade steel of inconsistent quality. The navy knew, according to Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, "that pot metal was cheaper than steel, and that our people would go on making pot metal until we forced them to do something better."¹⁸⁶

In fact, it was a naval actor who initiated appeals to private contractors. Secretary Whitney played a pivotal role in Bethlehem's acquisition of heavy presses to forge the steel ingots needed for modern naval guns between 1883 and 1885. Congress and two governmental boards, the joint army-navy Gun Foundry Board and the Army Fortifications Board, determined that the services should purchase the forgings for the heavy guns from private industry.

Secretary of the Navy Chandler said that patience, and liberal treatment of the manufacturers was

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 5-14, 38-48.

¹⁸⁶ "Army's Need of Merchant Ships in War," *Army and Navy Journal* XLIII, January 20, 1888, 582-92. Also, according to Allard, creating a market for steel plates made with the open-hearth process, simply stimulated wider use of a technology already known to American producers. The military services induced American steel producers for the first time to acquire both the plant and the technical ability to manufacture steel armor and the forgings for heavy guns. The new capability, in turn, enabled the industry to fabricate high-quality steel for building American cities.

necessary in order to encourage them to undertake the development of steel plates and armor for naval vessels.¹⁸⁷

By 1886 Congress authorized construction of two armored cruisers, the USS *Maine*, and the USS *Texas*. The statute provided that the armor contract go to an American firm only if it could provide high quality armor at a reasonable price. The new Secretary of the Navy, William C. Whitney, Believed that government had a duty to aid American industry, he therefore set out to ensure that the steel industry acquired the capacity to satisfy this ideal. Because he recognized that the French firm of Schneider-Cruesot made the world's best armor plate, Whitney used the possibility of a large government contract to entice Joseph Wharton of Bethlehem Iron Company to purchase from the French producer the necessary patents, technical assistance, and machinery to duplicate its process. In addition to the implied promise of a contract, Whitney facilitated negotiations by employing the services of U. S. Navy Lieutenant Francis M. Barber, the exclusive American agent of the French.¹⁸⁸

In 1889, the next Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Tracy, lured a second American steel maker to develop the capacity to produce armor plate and large steel ingots. Tracy encouraged Andrew Carnegie, Phipps, and Company to obtain the rights and equipment to manufacture the new steel armor developed by Le Ferro Nickel of France. Tracy did not ask for competitive bids; instead, he signed an agreement with Carnegie at a negotiated price.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Chandler, *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1884 quoted in Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy*, 51.

¹⁸⁸ Donald W. Mitchell, *History of the Modern American Navy, from 1883 through Pearl Harbor* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1946), 19.; Allard, "The Influence of the United States Navy Upon the American Steel Industry, 1880-1900", 40.

¹⁸⁹ Mitchell, *History of the Modern American Navy, from 1883 through Pearl Harbor*, 89-99.

Far from pressuring the government to create work, the steel companies repeatedly had to be induced to produce products required for the battleships and armored cruisers. Cooling notes how the navy needed to “actively woo the elusive steel men.”¹⁹¹ It was only in 1890 that Carnegie could be convinced to become a second supplier of armor to the navy.¹⁹² Also, the transition from armored cruisers to battleships made little difference to suppliers. Jan Breemer notes that heavily armored coastal defense monitors were at least as steel intensive as battleships: as long as warships were ironclads, it made little profit-making difference whether they were cruisers, ironclads or battleships.¹⁹³

The principal problem with the sectional hypothesis is that the shape of interests was not uniform, but complex. East Coast steel manufacturers were advocates of tariff protectionism, as were their senators and representatives in Congress. However, many east coast manufacturers were also interested in reducing tariffs, believing peace and free trade were the keys to market export. Thus, it is simplistic to assume a monolithic bloc of east coast preferences existed. By the mid-1880s, many seaboard producers felt the development of a U.S overseas empire, particularly if it involved conflict with European imperial powers, was unnecessarily expensive and potentially counterproductive.¹⁹⁴

Julius William Pratt’s classic analysis of business sentiment concluded that the business community’s belief in the efficacy of free trade led it to oppose political expansion. As a consequence, exporters tended to plead for restraint, not expansion, in U.S. foreign policy.

¹⁹⁰ Chandler, *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1884* quoted in Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy*, 51.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁹³ Jan S. Breemer, *U.S. Naval Developments* (Annapolis: Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co., 1983), chapter 3.

¹⁹⁴ Lake, *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939*, 111-12.

“American industry had reached a point where it could meet the world on more than even terms in both price and the quality of its products.” Government could aid them, not by acquiring colonial markets but by “removing or lowering the barriers that restricted imports of raw materials and exchange commodities.”¹⁹⁵

Likewise, David Lake notes that President Harrison and Secretary of State Blaine “were not pushed toward their imperialist policies by business interests; to the contrary, they pushed business interests to pursue exports more aggressively.”¹⁹⁶ Producers of goods for Latin American markets would not see the benefit of challenging the British Navy. As Breemer points out, the fact that “America’s exporters might be shut out from foreign markets was hardly a convincing reason for a fleet of expensive battleships. If a naval presence was believed necessary to capture and hold onto foreign markets, a few cruisers would have sufficed. The same type of ship was also the weapon-of-choice to protect shipping and to attack the enemy.”¹⁹⁷

Evidence of Sectionalism in Congress during the 1880s

This section attempts to locate sectional blocks of political and economic representation in Congress by identifying patterns of sectional bloc activities that advocated naval modernization. Overwhelming evidence suggests that during the 1880s, northeastern bankers and exporters identified their interests as running counter to the requirements of battleship construction.

¹⁹⁵ Julius William Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), 257.

¹⁹⁶ Lake, *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939*, 111-12.

¹⁹⁷ Jan S. Breemer, "Technological Change and the New Calculus of War: The United States Builds a New Navy," in *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, ed. Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 3.

William E. Chandler replaced Hunt as Secretary of the Navy in 1881 and was appointed to the Naval Advisory Board to advise the plan for naval development. The Board recommended the continuation of the peacetime navy policy to direct the naval building programs authorized by Congress in October 1882.¹⁹⁸ Chandler decided that the mission dictated that modernization should be restricted to make a navy for “the protection of our people and our commerce abroad.”¹⁹⁹ Members of Congress concurred. Several speakers pointed out that isolation from Europe was disappearing, and America’s defenseless seaboard cities might be a great temptation to an aggressive nation. These ideas carried weight with congressmen because of the realization that such an attack would destroy the nation’s trade. The nation, it was claimed, was vulnerable to attack by any of the stronger navies.

Who were the most likely enemies and what were their naval capacities? First, Latin American nations were considered potential foes. Between 1865 and 1889, references to the potential alliance of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay were mentioned in Congress, because each possessed vessels that could bombard the American coasts.²⁰⁰ Second, Congress expressed concern that a threat to the Monroe Doctrine would come from the nations with the largest navies; England, Spain, France, and Italy. Among those congressmen most concerned with reassessing America’s threat level were outspoken Democrats such as John Thomas who noted,

With this humiliating condition of our Navy staring us in the face and with the consciousness of our utter weakness and inability to protect our flag when assailed by the smallest naval power of Europe or even by Chile, can any

¹⁹⁸ James L. Abrahamson, *America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power* (New York: Free Press, 1981), 20-24.

¹⁹⁹ Chandler to Speaker of the Senate, 47th Congress (May 22, 1884): 4400.

²⁰⁰ Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History*, 143-48. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 171-76.

gentleman stand in his place and say that appropriations for new vessels is inadequate.²⁰¹

Representative William McAdoo, a New Jersey Democrat, also warned that Americans should not become too complacent. He noted,

The sword has frequently made way for liberty and afterwards defended its existence against its enemies, and as against universalism in politics I am deeply impressed that the spirit of nationality has elevated and ennobled and advanced mankind and secured the freedom and prosperity of people against the incursion of their more ignorant, debased, or vicious neighbors. The mission of nations and races has not yet ceased, much as we desire the consummated fraternity of all mankind.²⁰²

With Congress generally concurring that naval modernization was necessary to maintain a minimal defense against the smaller navies of the world, the questions turned on the size and cruising range of the vessels necessary to prevent cities and national wealth from being destroyed. The prescription most advised for meeting the European challenge to American hegemony in Central America and islands in the Pacific was the establishment of coaling stations that would allow warships to go into battle with full power to maneuver.

Those in Congress who disagreed usually explained their position in respect to an American tradition that did not seek commercial extension beyond North America. These representatives could be Republicans or Democrats—from the western, mid-western, or southern regions of the country.²⁰³ Many of the strongest voices promoting commerce protection were congressmen representing the commercial interests of the South and West. Representative E. John Ellis of Louisiana in 1882 advanced the assumptions that “if we ever expect to obtain commercial supremacy, if we ever expect to have our proper rank among the nations of the earth,

²⁰¹ Representative John R. Thomas, *Congressional Record*, 47th Congress, 2nd Session: 1416.

²⁰² *Congressional Record*, 1st Session (March, 1884): 1602; *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1887, 35.

²⁰³ *Congressional Record*, 1st Session: 1587.

we must have a navy.”²⁰⁴ Senator John F. Miler of California, with reference to commercial expansion in Latin America, noted that,

The time has come now when the country is prosperous, when manufactures are springing up all over the land, when new markets are necessary to be found in order to keep our factories running. Here lies to the south of us our India, and if we have the nerve, and the foresight, and the sagacity to utilize it by proper methods we shall have new markets for our products and for our manufactures which will keep every loom, and every anvil, and every manufactures in this country in motion. If we reach out and attempt to secure this great prize of commerce we shall excite the jealousy of other peoples, and we shall be led, perhaps, into complications, which we shall extricate ourselves from if we prepare to meet our enemies.²⁰⁵

Along these lines was the idea that taking a strong foreign policy position without naval support was dangerous. When the empire of China acquired two battleships, both larger than any ships in the American navy, Congressman Wilkerson said that it would be part of ordinary precaution to build ships equal in power to the ships of the nation we treat with such contumely.²⁰⁶ Such statements were balanced by official declarations that the purpose for which the United States maintains a navy is not conquest, but defense, since America has no wish for foreign conquest.²⁰⁷

The sectional model assumes tight geographic blocks and neglects the broad consensus present in Congress during the 1880s. The leading authority on Congress and naval modernization during this period, Kenneth Hagan, notes that the degree to which solutions reflected a broad consensus is striking. In any single session of Congress, differences over naval matters did not revolve around sectional interpretations or imperatives. Rather, differences

²⁰⁴ *Congressional Record*, 47th Congress, 1st Session (July, 1882): 5652.

²⁰⁵ *Congressional Record*, 48th Congress, 1st Session (February 1884): 1454. Similar comments, Representative Benjamin W. Harris (Mass.), *ibid.*, 46 51 Cong., 2 Sess., 3263 (April, 1890) Representative George W. Dargan (S.C.) *ibid.*, 48 Cong., 1 Session, 662 (March, 1884), and Senator Matthew C. Butler (S.C.).

²⁰⁶ Representative Theodore S. Wilkerson (La), *Congressional Record*, 51st Session (April, 1890): 3218.

²⁰⁷ *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1890, 41.

largely concerned small details. Typically, extremes of opinion were expressed within, not outside of, the consensus.²⁰⁸

Hagan characterizes three features of congressional actions towards naval policy during this period; sectional policy preferences were not discussed. First, representatives who engaged in the debates accepted the primary responsibility for setting policy, insisting that Congress define the terms of naval mission; they set the operative limits of naval modernization. Second, they acted from a conviction that the navy was an instrument of larger governmental aims, and that naval policy was subordinate to prior definitions of American foreign goals and policy. Third, they argued from conceptions of the national interest.²¹⁰

The sectional model assumes that Congress will adjust proposals to parochial interests. However, available evidence on Congress during the 1880s suggests that naval policy adjustments were influenced by policy boards on the decision making process. Technical specialists began to emerge as critical players in the naval reform appropriation debates, because the technical problems involved in the transition from wood and sail to steel and steam were simply beyond the understanding of the average legislator. Thus, a new variable had been introduced into the policy process. For the first time, congressmen were at the mercy of the Naval Department for the factual information on which to base intelligent opinions.²¹¹

In Congress, many questions on the floor during the naval debates in the 1880s were attempts to understand salient facts. It was these esoteric aspects of the technological revolution

²⁰⁸ Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*, 42-43, 71.

²⁰⁹ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 190. Herrick, *The American Naval Revolution*, 15-28.

²¹⁰ Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*, 187.

²¹¹ James R. Soley recommended a united public relations front in the department for the purpose of overwhelming the Congressional laymen, thus ensuring steady appropriations, in "Our Naval Policy," *Scribner's Magazine* I (February 1887): 234.

in naval building that dictated a close working relationship between the Naval Department and the Naval Affairs Committees of both houses.²¹² Representative Benjamin W. Harris of Massachusetts described one meeting between his House Committee on Naval Affairs and the department: “We assembled at the Navy Department and listened to the advice of naval officers, and our bill was changed in obedience to their views.”²¹³

The opinion of both Republicans and Democrats began to reflect the arguments being produced by strategic specialists within the naval bureaucracy. Many Democrats during the 1880s were, in fact, intent on using these specialized arguments to out-hawk the Republicans.²¹⁴ One such man was Washington Curran Whitthorn of Tennessee, who became one of the chief spokesmen for naval preparedness. He explained in 1877, “The United States Navy has sunk so low as not to have a standing among the nations of the world.”²¹⁵ Whitthorne, like most naval reform advocates, was not taking cues from the party leadership, but was advancing arguments framed from those being presented by the naval reformers in the Naval Institute. After his initial contact in the late 1870s, with the emerging naval reform leader Stephen B. Luce, Whitthorne introduced the modern reform argument into Congress:

I assume, somewhat axiomatically, that civilization is the elevation and improvement of the race, and that the wealth, progress, and improvement of a nation or people is evidence in a large degree by its merchant marine or commerce, and that the health and wealth of the commerce of any country are supported first by its resources in production, and second by the means given for its defense and protection. It is singular to note what is the seeming lesson in the history of those nations which have attained the higher rank in

²¹² Representative Frank Hiscock (NY), *Congressional Record*, 48th Congress, 1st Session (March 8, 1884): 1538; Representative Charles A. Boutelle (Me) *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress, 1st Session (April, 1890): 3171. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1881, 95. Simpson, “United States Navy in Transition,” *Harper’s Magazine* LXXIII, June 1886, 22-23.

²¹³ *Congressional Record*, 47th Congress, (July, 1882): 5650.

²¹⁴ Kenneth J. Hagan, ed., *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 151.

²¹⁵ *Congressional Record*, 44th Congress, 2nd Session (February 14, 1877): 1567.

dominion, power and civilization that they have flourished in wealth and prosperity when they had powerful navies and commercial marine. I need not ask you in order to establish this to review in detail the history of Phoenicia, Carthage, Rome, Venice, Naples, Spain, Portugal, France, and England. The mere mention of these names in connection will make manifest the proposition I assert. Pause for a moment and grasp the rank and power of the civilized nations of today; and doing so you with but an exception or two fix the rank and power of their navies and commercial marine; and thus serving as no exception to the lesson of the past history of the world.²¹⁶

This historically-based modernization argument continues for ten years, in Naval Institute's Proceedings and the Congressional Record, without identifiable sectional actors as proponents. It is framed according to a perceived connection between military power and the advancement of civilization.²¹⁷ In the following chapters, these connections will be traced through network formations—from the specialized works of naval theorists into the congressional debates of the 1880s and 1890s, without reference to sectional representation or social influence.

Many of the strongest supporters in Congress for modernization were Democrats, often from the South and West; conversely, many of the strongest opponents of naval modernization were from the coasts and the Northeast.²¹⁸ The demands for naval rehabilitation were both bipartisan and intersectional. Indicative of this was the debate on the floor of the House in 1889,

²¹⁶ *Congressional Record*, 46th Congress, 2nd Session (April, 1880): 142-43. Compare with Alfred T. Mahan, *From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1907), 276-77, as well as William David's theory of Sea Power. Mahan claimed no originality for the idea, but credited his own awareness of it to Theodore Mommsen. This process will be developed in chapter 3 and 4. According to Robert Seager II, the concept is Hellenic and is found in the minor works of Xenophon. The relationship between Luce and Whitthorne points toward the contribution Luce had in Whitthorne's formulation. Luce met Congressman Whitthorne when the Tennessee Representative was inspecting the Norfolk Navy Yard in February 1876. The meeting was the beginning of 15 years of correspondence. Throughout his letters to Whitthorne, Luce clearly presented his views on the state of the Navy and his ideas on reforms. In 1878 Luce advocated reforming the Navy Department, as well as his ideas of history and national power. Whitthorne acted as Luce's chief outlet in Congress for his views and further channeled Luce's views to future allies in Congress such as Eugene Hale, Charles Boutelle, Hilary Herbert, and Henry Cabot Lodge.

²¹⁷ Stephen B. Luce, "Christian Ethics an Element of Military Education," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XXXII (1906): 1367-86.

²¹⁸ *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress, 1st Session: 3270

in which both parties fought for their share of the historical credit for naval regeneration.²¹⁹ In general, naval modernization arguments in Congress during the 1880s centered not upon whether there should be an effective navy, but on its nature, function, and size, and the most efficient method of rebuilding it.²²⁰ The charts below compare the levels of support for armored ship construction.




Table 1 Congressional Support for Naval Buildup, 1880-1890

²¹⁹ Edward Mead Earle, "The Navy's Influence on Our Foreign Policy," *Current History* XXIII (1926): 649-50. Edward Simpson, "United States Navy in Transition," *Harper's Magazine* LXXIII, June 1886, 16.

²²⁰ Seager II, "Ten Years before Mahan: The Unofficial Case for the New Navy, 1880-1890," 498. Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 190-92. Representative George M. Robertson (N.J.) *Congressional Record*, 47th Congress, 1st Session (June 1882): 5522. Robertson had been Secretary of the Navy from 1869 to 1877.




Figure 2.2 Congressional Support for Naval Buildup, 1890-1901

Table 2 Congressional Support for Naval Buildup, 1890-1901

Trubowitz suggests, quite plausibly, that the crucial change in the 1890s was the formation of the alliance between northern finance, industry, and western farmers. Foreign policy expansionism, like any other policy, is one with distributional consequences within the American economy. The sectional model predicts that foreign policy change occurs when the interests of the coalition in power change; more specifically, that states expand when and only when expansion serves the particular interest of the ruling coalition.

Accordingly, we should see more concentration in the Northeast in the 1890s as sectional actors are increasingly aware of opportunities for commercial and military expansion. Yet we see less concentration in the northeast in the 1890s. In fact, it appears that a greater number of non-northeastern actors found it in their interest to respond in favor of battleship legislation. Although Trubowitz does not measure battleship support in the Senate, sectional and partisan support was similarly blurred.²²¹ Trubowitz's sectional account helps to explain how the new

²²¹ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 212.

military doctrine was used by sectional elites to redirect American foreign policy during the 1890s, but it cannot explain the timing or content of the battleship program or the broad intersectional coalition that backed it. Trubowitz fails to address the initial source of strategic adjustment—the change in the foreign policy doctrine itself.

During the 1880s, no person in Congress suggested that America look toward naval parity with Europe.²²² It is clear that the naval modernization debates represent a general agreement about the purposes of the navy. However, the patchwork attempt by Congress for a more aggressive navy did not have a consistent rationale for its acquisition. Some statements appear to encourage the commercial interests of the merchant marine.

Conclusion

The United States did expand its naval policy during the 1880s, albeit in a limited incremental manner. Naval modernization was a patchwork affair that required inter-sectional support.²²³ The concept of sectionalism is relevant to naval politics of the period. Regional features and interests throughout the century shaped naval policy. Still, sectionalism does not explain why modernization was possible in the 1880s. Support for reform was bipartisan and cross-sectional. We cannot identify a coherent group of northeastern congressmen acting in concert to direct modernization during this period. We cannot connect the activities of special northeastern interests to naval modernization or battleship advocacy inside Congress. In the following chapters, I trace the evolution of a battleship doctrine that began in the mid-1880s, and developed with no regional logic. Because Trubowitz's sectional model cannot tell us why the specific policies favored by sectional actors during the 1890s were developed, it is necessary to

²²² However, by 1887, a small community of naval theorists (outside Congress), reached a consensus that America begin a battleship program that expanded in accordance with the largest navies of Europe.

²²³ Davis, *A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy*, 11.

track the development of the actual doctrine and shed light upon the direction of battleship interest articulation the following decade.

According to Skowronek's theory, naval reform should have been contained by the existing structures of parties and distributive politics. The fact that a modest program of naval reform occurred needs to be explained. Clearly, the partisan state played a critical role throughout the century in keeping reform efforts in check. Still, modest naval reform was possible in the 1880s and it reflected the political compromise evident in the hybrid cruiser design, neither heavy enough to function as a battleship nor light and fast enough to function as a commerce riding ship. Finally, no evidence was found to support Zakaria's assertion that American state capacity changed during the 1880s. Presidents did not become more decisive relative to Congress.

Chapter Three

NAVAL REFORM: COMPETITION BENEATH THE SURFACE



Fig. 3 Navy War Building under construction throughout the 1880s (National Archive, Washington, DC)

Introduction

Nineteenth-century naval policy was rooted in international considerations, nonintervention in Europe, maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, and the promotion of foreign trade. The central premise of American foreign and military policy branched from the Enlightenment belief that free trade would be beneficial to all nations and serve as an instrument of international peace.²²⁴ The passive defense coastal protection strategy was the navy's

²²⁴ Harold Hance Sprout and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 1st. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 192-94. Accordingly, the navy would help America become a great trading nation by building ships designed to protect America's overseas commerce and by deploying these ships where they could promote mercantile growth. America would rely on its geographic isolation to preserve national sovereignty and amicable relations with Britain to protect and extend foreign commerce. Since the British Navy protected major trading routes, the American navy needed only a small number of ships to police its trading routes

principal means of accomplishing its trade-expanding mission.²²⁵ During peacetime, the navy was expected to protect U.S foreign commercial interests by patrolling American trading routes. Because the trading interests of Great Britain generally coincided with those of the United States, the arrangement known as Pax Britannica protected American commercial ships in major trading routes. Thus, the U.S. Navy could concentrate on patrolling less-traveled routes of non-industrialized nations in an attempt to promote commerce by opening new ports and creating new markets.²²⁶

In national defense terms, the coastal defense and commerce-raiding strategy did not require the navy to construct battleships designed to operate as a fleet in order to concentrate firepower at a similar fleet in a decisive naval battle.²²⁷ Instead, the United States built smaller vessels, which independently cruised the world's oceans for extended periods. During wartime, these cruisers were expected to raid the enemy's merchant ships in an effort to inflict economic damage and force a negotiated peace.²²⁸

and provide a passive defense of its major ports and cities.

²²⁵ The defensive aspects of American nineteenth century foreign and military policy are discussed in Allan Reed Millett and Peter Maslowski, eds., *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: Free Press, 1984); Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Rowena Reed, *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980); Russell Frank Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, The Wars of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York: Putnam, 1956).

²²⁶ Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 3-9. The navy also had a wartime mission, which was to protect major cities and ports from bombardment or seizure, while extended costal fortifications were designed to produce a military stalemate. In addition to fortifications, the navy was to attack enemy commerce and raid its coasts. This commerce-raiding strategy was intended to impose a cost on the enemy great enough to force peace negotiations. The wartime mission was therefore limited to protecting American commerce from being impeded by foreign attacks, while coastal defense and commerce raiding depended upon fortification and a small number of coastal warships of limited range. For this limited defense, a small navy was considered sufficient.

²²⁷ Kenneth J. Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power* (New York: Free Press, 1991); Lance C. Buhl, "Maintaining 'an American Navy,' 1865-1889," in *Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984*, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984).

²²⁸ Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*, 24-28.

In chapter two, I noted that the level of change in American state strength, naval capacity and interest articulation during the 1880s was negligible and the passive coastal defense strategy was left unchallenged. In this chapter I argue that, although politicians and special interests had limited interest in battleship programs during the 1880s, beneath the surface, a competition to address strategic battleship options had developed. I will trace the evolution of these ideas into doctrine. I emphasize the role of bureaucratic entrepreneurship in the policy process. I will argue that during the 1880s, the formation and expansion of an epistemic community of naval theorists was the mechanism that produced and then advanced a new vision of American strategic defense and foreign policy.²²⁹ The outcome of naval expansion during the 1890s can therefore be understood as the full-flowering of far-reaching reformist tendencies that were incipient in the 1880s.

Despite the apparent consensus among naval theorists regarding the maintenance of America's traditional policy, by the mid 1870s the passive defensive theory was opened for reconsideration by a small group of senior officers.²³⁰ This community of officers noticed changing patterns of naval construction in Europe and South America. Ship designs were shifting from wooden sail-powered vessels to armored steam-powered machines of destruction that traveled in fleet formations and communicated via telegraph.²³¹ Senior reform officers

²²⁹ Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 27. An "epistemic community" is a network of knowledge-based experts or groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain of their expertise. Members hold a common set of causal beliefs and share notions of validity based on internally defined criteria for evaluation, common policy projects, and shared normative commitments.

²³⁰ Lance C. Buhl, "The Smooth Water Navy: American Naval Policy and Politics, 1865-1876" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 12. To most naval officers, a defensive fleet seemed an appropriate policy, given that the shallowness of the American coasts made attacks difficult. The great distance from Europe meant enemy ships would have to follow the shallow coast, making them vulnerable to attack. Naval theorists were in agreement that the conditions of the American coastline served as a natural defensive moat.

²³¹ Arthur Jacob Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1940), 89.

asked: given what appears to be evidence of changing fleet formations, does America need a war navy that can respond, and what should be the repercussions for the American peace navy?²³²

Furthermore, the appearance of new technologies begged the question: was passive defense still the appropriate national defense strategy?²³³

Theoretical Concerns: APD

American Political Development literature offers three explanations to account for naval reform efforts during this period. Fareed Zakaria's executive-driven model, Peter Trubowitz's sectional-interest-driven model, and, by implication, Stephen Skowronek's patchwork army reform model, all speak to the case at hand. I wish to demonstrate that while some pieces of these models help us to understand naval modernization during the period in question, they tend to misdirect our attention. Much of the explanation lies elsewhere.

I seek to demonstrate why the concepts bureaucratic autonomy and epistemic communities illuminate the mechanism by which American foreign policy changed during the late nineteenth century.²³⁴ I maintain that a segment of the naval bureaucracy (independent of social influence) responded to opportunities for military modernization. The uncertainty associated with the direction of American naval modernization produced competing views inside the naval organization. This intellectual development took two forms. One group of officers developed technical expertise to understand the use of armaments. A second group of officers

²³² Lieutenant E. W. Very, "The Type of (I) Armored Vessel, (II) Cruiser Best Suited to the Present Needs of the United States," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII, no. 1 (1881): 43ff; Lieutenant Nathan E. Sergeant, "Suggestions in Favor of More Effective Fleet Exercises," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* X, no. 2 (1884): 234-35.

²³³ J. A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 2.

²³⁴ After the Civil War, while there appeared to be no immediate threat to American security, Europe was undergoing a dramatic transformation in military thinking and policy that became the impetus for epistemic community formation. An autonomous community of naval theorists, acting independent of social group pressure, began using history as a mode of modernization analysis.

developed critical skills to examine the purpose of naval power and to formulate effective strategy. These two lines of development were complementary in their purpose, but were built on different intellectual foundations that required different sets of academic values and different approaches.²³⁵ These different approaches created rivalries among officers who believed that one or the other outlook should be the exclusive basis of development.²³⁶

A particular group of naval reformers created an alternative intellectual foundation for naval operations and began to redefine naval mission. These reformers realized that the American Constitution (separation of powers and federalism) posed the greatest roadblock to full-scale military modernization. They devised strategies that enabled their reform agenda to circumvent the fragmented late nineteenth century political landscape. They built a support network outside of the military in a deliberate effort to advance their reform vision. This network of civilian supporters, after being converted to the requirements of reformer's vision, moved battleship legislation through Congress.

If bureaucratic autonomy produced and successfully advanced battleship legislation during the 1890s, during the 1880s we should observe: First, some level of military change abroad during the 1870s and 1880s; second, the formation and competition of military theory in response to international military change; third, an attempt to imitate foreign advances by incorporating their practices into U.S. policy. If the conditions of bureaucratic autonomy

²³⁵ John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, and John R. Wadleigh, eds., *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1984), 194.

²³⁶ America's late nineteenth-century strategic adjustment developed after naval reformers employed history to assess security knowledge. The reformers intended to leverage authoritative claims into political support for their policies. The change in naval mission set the process of foreign policy transformation in motion. In this light, bureaucratic autonomy and entrepreneurship were responsible for initiating the changes that altered naval capacity and American foreign policy. I suggest that by understanding how bureaucratic autonomy matters, we have a better understanding of the origins of American Empire.

mattered, new doctrine was formulated without input from competing social and political interests.²³⁷

Epistemic Communities

Michael Foucault was the first scholar to use the term epistemic communities. He noted how people search for a common home by forming systems of science, a mind set, or process of validating a story.²³⁸ Peter Haas and John Ruggie, in a series of articles published by International Organization during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, detailed how the epistemic community concept could be applied to international relations and comparative politics.²³⁹ According to them, epistemic communities reveal a dominant way that society looks at reality. Epistemic communities, they note, identify a set of shared symbols and inferences, and mutual expectations. These symbols are shared in order to construct an alternative social reality, and sometimes, to implement the alternative reality into policy.

I apply the epistemic community concept to the puzzle of late-nineteenth-century American expansion. I suggest that the origins of this foreign policy adjustment involve knowledge distribution.²⁴⁰ As Haas and Ruggie say, technological change may create public

²³⁷ APD scholarship notes how state actors can be autonomous, that is to say, their reform efforts can be created and advanced independent of elected policymakers and society. Reformers would be required to overcome the obstacles of the preexisting state structure in order to influence social conflict and political outcomes. Such a reform project would begin from cooperative working patterns and then advance an agenda. In my case, state-building entrepreneurs extend their collaborative working relationships into networks of support for late-nineteenth-century naval reform.

²³⁸ Michael Foucault, ed. Jeremy R. Carrette, *Religion and Culture* (New York, Routledge, 1999), 217.

²³⁹ Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination." *International Organization* 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992): 1-35. Also, Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program." *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter, 1992): 367-390. John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International Institutionalization* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).

²⁴⁰ Two other theories of late nineteenth-century strategic adjustment highlight ideas and entrepreneurs. Edward Rhodes suggests that in response to new social problems, "cultural and cognitive changes in the world of ideas, unrelated to changes in the world of objective interests, resulted in major shifts in the type and levels of military

policy challenges. Policymakers therefore face ever-larger asymmetries of information, particularly in areas that require technical expertise. Epistemic communities are afforded more deference in public policy circles, and more influence. Although the number of members in these epistemic communities tends to be relatively small, the political infiltration of an epistemic community into governing institutions can lay the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community's beliefs and ideas about the proper construction of social reality. The research agenda, according to Peter Hass, involves an identification of community membership, a determination of the community members' principled and causal beliefs, and a tracing of their activities in an effort to demonstrate their influence on decision makers.²⁴¹

I suggest that state actors formed an epistemic community to effectively influence politicians and special interests.²⁴² It was not necessary for them to demonstrate the value of their theories in an effort to advance reform. If epistemic community advocacy replaced demonstrated capacity, the logic of the epistemic community approach suggests that certain conditions were present, namely, a high degree of technological *uncertainty* that stimulated *competition* among groups of actors to address the uncertainty. We should see competition

forces states maintained.” in *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, ed. Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Also, from the same volume, Mark R. Shulman, chapter 3, "Institutionalizing a Political Idea: Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power; and Mark R. Shulman, *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882-1893* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995). Shulman does not agree that strategic adjustment was a response to changing social conditions. Strategic adjustment, according to Shulman, was produced by the vigorous advocacy of naval officers and like-minded citizens who used propaganda to sell the American public on the virtues of battleship construction and national greatness.

²⁴¹ Epistemic communities influence state interest in several ways. First, they elucidate cause and effect relationships and provide advice about the likely results of various courses of actions following a shock, crisis or period of uncertainty. Second, such communities shed light on the nature of the complex inter-linkages between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to take action or from instituting a particular policy. Third, they help to define the self-interests of a state or factions within it and to formulate policies through framing of alternatives actions.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, Unlike the ideational theories of Rhodes and Shulman, my ideational model associates the sources of the new American foreign policy, first, with shifts in European technology and European standards of military education and, second, with the entrepreneurial efforts of bureaucratic actors. I trace the roots of American Empire using APD scholarship, and concepts advanced by the epistemic community literature.

producing a group of policy advocates that dominated the selection of policy alternatives. We should also see *deference* to this group resulting from the impression that their proposals were scientifically verifiable or were an outcome of elite consensus.

My Model of Bureaucratic Innovation

My model is derived from two APD concepts, state capacity and epistemic communities. I argue that human agency stood at the interstices of international systemic conditions, knowledge, and national action. An autonomous community of naval theorists, acting independent of social pressures, created a new military doctrine and advanced a strategy for battleship acquisition.²⁴³ America's late-nineteenth-century strategic adjustment developed after naval reformers established a convincing and authoritative claim to change their service's mission, based upon the possession of specialized security knowledge.²⁴⁴ If my predictions are

²⁴³ For an alternative ideational account that claims a role for social pressure, see Edward Joseph Rhodes, "Constructing Power: Cultural Transformation and Strategic Adjustment in the 1890s," in *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, ed. Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 62. Also, Rhodes, "Sea Change: Interest-Based Vs. Cultural-Cognitive Accounts of Strategic Choice in the 1890s." Edward Rhodes argues that the construction of a blue water navy by the United States depended upon a new image of the state, a new image of war, and a new image of military victory. The production of new images was a response to the social upheaval of the nineteenth century. A powerful navy became a means of redirecting national attention toward a large national project that might encourage social cohesion within the United States. According to Rhodes, Americans still viewed centralized government as a threat to their personal liberty. The logical response of policymakers was to strengthen the state vis-à-vis the outside world, where it could promote American virtues and serve as a symbol of American greatness. Battleship construction contained the solution for nationalizing America. First, the country's existing navy was too defensively orientated to challenge European powers. Battleships, however, could exert influence and win respect. Second, open sea battles typified the ideal of warfare as a chivalric duel rather than a life-or-death struggle between whole societies. The reorientation of the cultural connotations of war would address Civil War divisions by recasting it as a struggle between respected equals, not a bitter struggle over mutually opposed ways of life. Finally, an enlarged navy, unlike a powerful army, could not be used as an agent of repression. Battleships offered all the benefits of European militarism, patriotism, and unity, but did not pose any threats to American liberties.

²⁴⁴ Rhode's argument does not demonstrate what it anticipates. It is not clear that any re-conceptualization of the state as outward-looking was intended to address a cognitive crisis afflicting America. The linkage between an outward-looking state and the problems of social crisis is also questionable. Another reading of the debates from that period is more straightforward, and illuminates the mechanism by which policy change occurred. Once methodological consensus was reached inside the naval organization, the reform community was positioned in an asymmetrical relationship between themselves and Congress, and could speak with authority about naval matters.

accurate I should be able to identify three elements of doctrinal reorientation: strategic uncertainty, the growth of organizational competition among bureaucratic actors in an attempt to resolve uncertainty; and institutional transference, in the form of the establishment of a permanent institution to develop operational planning using authoritative claims.

From the 1870s and through 1890s, changing naval technology stimulated a demand for information concerning foreign military developments. This produced a demand for specialty knowledge to interpret the information.²⁴⁵ Confusion also precipitated organizational conflicts among members who claimed the power and legitimacy to correctly interpret the changing technologies and strategies. As a result, disparate reform theories came into existence, and opened the possibility for entrepreneurial activity to converge these competing theories.

I argue that naval policy makers, after being exposed to the epistemic community work, found their arguments sufficiently convincing (scientifically verifiable or a product of elite consensus), and acted upon the solutions offered by the community.²⁴⁶ Such a claim is less convincing if

The shift set in motion a foreign policy transformation. Without understanding how bureaucratic autonomy was salient in this case, we cannot understand the origins of American Empire.

²⁴⁵ Mark Shulman claims that battleship legislation was able to pass Congress in the 1890s because “navalists” (naval enthusiasts), inside and outside the naval organization, were proficient in marketing ideas. Through the use of printed essays, patriotic novels, music, parades, fairs, historical revisionism, and media manipulation, the navalists managed to convince the public that battleships would make the country great. In accordance with Shulman’s theory, during the 1880s, we should expect: First, the original re-casting of American naval doctrine as the work of “navalists,” a group of both bureaucrats and civilian actors; Second, the navalists’ propaganda efforts should be self-induced and not in response to external strategic change; Third, the propaganda efforts of the navalists should have been under way before 1890.

²⁴⁶ My model of naval modernization notes that efforts to alter American strategic doctrine were well underway during the 1880s. Congress and the public needed intellectual reassurance for whatever reform path was chosen. I contend, however, that propaganda alone could not have convinced Congress and the public to support a project that was not supported by an authoritative knowledge base. Shulman does not trace the work of “navalists” back to a starting point. As I demonstrate in this chapter, battleship advocacy began with a specific group of naval theorists in 1877. The group forged a theoretical consensus then expanded their view outward to other theorists, congressmen, and special interests. This is an important distinction. APD concepts such as bureaucratic autonomy and bureaucratic entrepreneurship explain policy change through epistemic advocacy. In this case, bureaucratic actors operate as an epistemic community, capable of advancing and authorizing a program for battleship construction. Also, Shulman has the timing wrong. Popular and academic journals, novels and public speeches that promoted a vision of American naval power, as he himself points out, were almost non-existent before 1890. The

constructed through inference. I will attempt to demonstrate my claims by offering evidence based upon the exposure of relevant actors to the messages of the epistemic actors, the written or spoken recognition (by these actors), that their conversion resulted from epistemic community advocacy, in addition to evidence that the political and economic actors adopted the symbols, ideas, and mutual expectations of epistemic actors into their rhetoric.

Late-Nineteenth Century Historiography

To understand how late-nineteenth-century American theorists were able create and implement military doctrine, it is necessary to understand the relationship between history and science at that time. According to Peter Novick, the central problem for any new cognitive structure is to legitimize its epistemological foundation. For entrepreneurs seeking to advance epistemic constructions during this period, one option was to approach the myth of historical objectivity, as a “neutral, disinterested judge.”²⁴⁷ I suggest that Novick’s assessment of late-nineteenth-century historiography helps us understand the intellectual and policy context of the day. Naval theorists were able to successfully fashion the prevailing notion of “historical objectivity” into a mode of analysis that was accepted within their community, and eventually by politicians and special interest groups. As mid-level state actors, the community could create a scientific language for military reform without appearing to be captured by social interests.

By 1888, the year the American Historical Association was founded, American historians had constructed professional norms of objectivity by drawing heavily on “various European currents of thought.” During the late nineteenth century, German historical scholarship provided

modernization program had already been in effect nearly 8 years and was almost complete by the time the public encountered the popularized battleship discourse.

²⁴⁷ Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" And the American Historical Profession*, 21.

American scholars with the borrowed prestige needed to distinguished professionals from amateur historians.²⁴⁸ It is important to clarify the interests of American importers of German historical scholarship, says Novick, because

Based on their understanding of these currents--often, as we shall see, based on their misunderstanding of them--American historians laid the foundations of professional historiographical thought and sensibility in the United States.²⁴⁹

Ranke is regarded as the father of modern historical scholarship; his contribution was to apply documentary and philological methods to the discipline.²⁵⁰ He is considered the romantic reaction against the universalistic, materialistic, and critical philosophical thought of the Enlightenment. This reaction stimulated the great flowering of historical studies in the nineteenth century.²⁵¹ Ironically, Ranke's reaction to the French Revolution, and its progressive ideas, and his "abstention from moral judgment, rather than manifesting disinterested neutrality, was, in its context a profoundly conservative political judgment."²⁵²

²⁴⁸ Ibid. American historians needed to look abroad. Graduate training was virtually nonexistent in the United States until the late nineteenth century. English universities were concerned with turning out gentleman rather than scholars, and French Universities such as the Sorbonne were generally considered inaccessible to the American student. German universities offered the aspiring American intellectual not only an affordable alternative to leading American universities, but a model that would inspire a revolution in American education. Universities in cities such as Gottingen, Heidelberg, Leipzig, Freibourg, and Berlin informed the creation of new universities like Johns Hopkins, Clark, and Chicago, and the transformation of older ones, like Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Also, the status of the German professor made a great impression on the American students. A full professor in Germany made nine times more than an equivalent American instructor.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ This view was originally advanced in Georg G. Iggers, "The Image of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought," *History and Theory* 2, no. 1 (1962): 17-40.

²⁵¹ Felix Gilbert, *History: Politics or Culture? Reflections on Ranke and Burckhardt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 32.

²⁵² Iggers, "The Image of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought," 17. For Ranke, the task of the historian was to penetrate the "essence" of things. His trademark phrase "*eigentlich gewesen*" advised scholars to translate the past "as it actually was". This phrase was the source of much confusion. Iggers notes that in the nineteenth century *eigentlich* had an ambiguity it no longer has: it actually meant "essentially," and it was in this sense that Ranke used it. According to Novick, all German historians saw Ranke as the antithesis of a non-philosophical empiricism, "while American historians venerated him for being precisely what he was not."

To American historians, their mythical hero became “empirical science incarnate.” This is important says Novick, since the alleged authority of the Ranke was so often used to “legitimate consensual American practice, it is worth considering the grounds of the misunderstanding.”²⁵³ Americans understood and enthusiastically adopted Ranke’s critical use of sources and his historical method, “but they had no appreciation of the gulf which divided German and Anglo-American throughways, and as a result either distorted or disregarded what they couldn’t comprehend.”²⁵⁴ For the epistemic community I discuss, this meant that Ranke’s dictum “*eigentlich gewesen*” could be used to reinforce a notion of detached neutrality.²⁵⁵

To the late-nineteenth-century American historian, Francis Bacon provided a definitive account of the scientific method. It was unscientific to go beyond what could be directly observed, to “anticipate nature.”²⁵⁶ Good science involved the creation of taxonomies. Simon Newcomb, the dean of American astronomers, noted in 1888 “the work which really occupies

²⁵³ Gilbert, *History: Politics or Culture?*, 38-39. Ranke had retired from his professorship before the great influx of American students in Germany, so few Americans had firsthand contact with him. To the extent that American historians were aware of his work, it was generally an interpretation of him that promoted the concept of neutral detachment. During the 1880s and 1890s, the high point of American scholarly pilgrims to Germany, Ranke’s reputation as an unphilosophical empiricist underscored an already existing American hostility toward philosophical speculation. Despite the fact that many American historians spent time in Germany, there was little understanding among them of the differences between German and American culture and philosophical contexts. Not until the arrival of James Harvey Robinson, just before World War I, was there a course offered in European intellectual history at an American University.

²⁵⁴ Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" And the American Historical Profession*, 31.

²⁵⁵ Allan Janik and Stephen Edelston Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), chapters 1 and 2. Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin note that it has often been unfortunate “to have his ideas ‘naturalized’ by the English.” Ranke’s epistemology was “naturalized.” His “*wie es eigentlich gewesen*” was understood to mean that truth was an accurate representation, a view not held in Germany since Kant. Ranke’s desire to “empty himself” into the text, was interpreted by Americans as the blank slate psychology of John Locke. Thus, German *Wissenschaft* became Anglo-American science.

²⁵⁶ John Merle Coulter, *Mission of Science in Education: An Address Delivered at the Annual Commencement of the University of Michigan, June 21, 1900* (Ann Arbor: The University, 1900), chapters 1 and 2. This helps to explain why “objective science” was never more highly valued in the United States, “never more of a cult, than in the late nineteenth century.” In the name of objectivity, philosopher and scientist Karl Peterson noted, self examination would lead to more efficient citizenship and increased social stability. He felt that minds trained to scientific methods are less likely to be led by mere appeal to the passions or by blind emotional sanctions. Astronomer and geologist Thomas C. Chamberlin understood “facts and rigorous inductions from general principles, all favorite theories, the dearest doctrines, the most fascinating hypothesis, the most cherished creations of reason and the imagination are put in subjection of the facts.”

the attention of the astronomers is less the discovery of new things than the elaboration of those already known.”²⁵⁷ This was true for the American historian, science could be identified if the pursuit was rigidly factual and empirical, it shunned hypothesis, and maintained neutrality. If systematically pursued, “it might ultimately produce a comprehensive, “definite” history. It was in the light of this concept of *wissenschaftliche Objektivität* that American historians regarded themselves as loyal followers of Ranke.”²⁵⁸ Naval historians, I argue, used the concept to extend taxonomies of warfare that related universal principles of land and sea combat to American audiences.²⁵⁹

The professionalization of history begins in the 1880s, but the process of replacing the amateur was slow, and unlike the other disciplines, “nothing approaching a monopoly by certified professionals was ever achieved.” The transition to professionalism meant that imported methodologies often went unchallenged by amateur historians as well as the newly trained.²⁶⁰ For the late-nineteenth-century historian, whether trained or untrained, the professionalization of the discipline advanced the norm of objectivity, while the posture of objectivity simultaneously facilitated professionalism.²⁶¹ As Novick notes, the word objective,

²⁵⁷ Simon Newcomb, “The Place of Astronomy among the Sciences,” *Sidereal Messenger* 7 (1888). Cited in Gilbert, *History: Politics or Culture? Reflections on Ranke and Burckhardt*, 50.

²⁵⁸ Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" And the American Historical Profession*, 37.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 48. Often American historians had no more credentials than their audience. During the 1880s, only one out of thirty-four contributors to Justin Winsor’s *Narrative and Critical History of America* had received professional historical training. Although this number would increase over the next two decades, the level of training that the nineteenth-century American historians received, whether in Germany or the U.S., was not impressive. American students in Germany generally received the doctorate within two years of their arrival, usually for a brief dissertation based on printed sources, what today is considered a seminar paper. Edward Channing’s Harvard dissertation was 75 handwritten-page long, completed a year and a half after finishing his B.A. While universities offering the Ph.D. thought of themselves as centers, according to Novick, they generally functioned as service stations for legitimating.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 50. The most distinguished historical work continued to be done by armatures, J.B. McMaster’s *History of the Peoples of United States*, Ellis Oberholtzer’s *History of the United States Since the Civil War*, James Schouler’s *History of the United States Under the Constitution*, James Ford Rhode’s *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850* all were universally acclaimed by the professional historical establishment, although the authors had no formal training or university affiliation.

²⁶¹ Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920, The Making of America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967);

when applied to knowledge, has many meanings and implications. One of the most problematic, but at the same time one of the most highly valued connotations is ‘authoritative.’²⁶² Objective knowledge is knowledge that commands assent and is clearly distinguishable from mere “subjective opinion.” Advancing the concept of objectivity to forward an authoritative agenda, then, is most likely when intellectual confusion is present.

Was there a widespread crisis of intellectual authority in nineteenth-century America? Thomas Haskell, among others, argues that there was a severe crisis and a need for intellectual legitimacy that demanded upon the separation of objective truth from “charlatanism” and “quackery.” This, he notes, was a central concern of Americans in the late nineteenth century. Haskell demonstrated that many scholars and scientists experienced such a crisis, and sought its resolution in the creation of professional “communities of the competent” which were to identify competence, cultivate it, and confer authority on those who possessed it in accordance with universalistic criteria--or, more realistically, criteria that were not in any obvious way personal, partisan, or particular. The criteria of judgment had to seem truly a product of consensus among the competent, beyond the power of any individual, clique, or party to control, and hence impersonal, objective, value-free-not mere opinion but “truth.”²⁶³

Burton J. Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America* (New York: Norton, 1976). John Higham, Leonard Krieger, and Felix Gilbert, eds., *History: The Development of Historical Studies in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 8-9.

²⁶² Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" And the American Historical Profession*, 50.

²⁶³ Thomas L. Haskell, *The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977). Historical professionalism provided the underpinning, advanced through the norm of objectivity. Objectivity offered a standardized technique, the means of operationalization, and an appropriate mode of discourse. Since the relationship between professionalization and objectivity was reciprocal, professional historians and their readers preferred that historical work was objective (however defined), and amateur historians were aware that professionalization required them to cast a larger projection of authority.

Similarly, Novick identifies a late-nineteenth-century cult of objectivity that became a myth-making project, and the myth encountered competing values. In the following sections, I explore how late-nineteenth-century military theorists took advantage of the climate of intellectual uncertainty by engaging competing values and formulating an authoritative doctrine. I then identify three conditions that lead to doctrinal reorientation²⁶⁴

Military Reform: the International Context

The American Navy that emerged between 1789 and 1820 was an outcome of a desire to maintain a minimal naval presence.²⁶⁵ The navy could be small since commerce raiders were able to elude blockades, and their attacks on the stronger power's merchant marine could dampen morale, even if it did not win the war. A passive coastal defense strategy, therefore, made sense. Naval officers and Americans at large did not think U.S. security required a battleship fleet or command of the seas.²⁶⁶ The most common policy concern of mid-century naval officers was the issue of maintaining both a war navy and a peace navy.²⁶⁷ Officers assessing the need for a separate war navy generally premised their arguments upon two geographic truisms: the shallowness of the American coasts and the country's isolation from

²⁶⁴ First, a growth in foreign military modernization schemes that established an imperative to develop alternative paths for American modernization. Second, the growth of organizational competition among bureaucratic actors in an attempt to resolve the uncertainty associated with foreign modernization. Third, bureaucratic competition precipitated the need to establish an authoritative modernization discourse. These conditions are sequential. After 1870s, new technologies stimulated a demand for information concerning naval evolution. The increased demand for specialized information, in turn, produced divergent stances and interpretations of operational planning. The variation of professional opinion created an opportunity for entrepreneurs to combine disparate views to produce consensus and direct modernization efforts with the appearance of issue authority.

²⁶⁵ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 188-203; Donald W. Mitchell, *History of the Modern American Navy, from 1883 through Pearl Harbor* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1946), 13-17.

²⁶⁶ George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 10.

²⁶⁷ George Theron Davis, *A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy* (New York: Harcourt, 1940), 22.

Europe. To most officers, a defensive fleet seemed an appropriate policy, given that the shallowness of the American coasts made attacks difficult. The great distance from Europe meant enemy ships would have to follow the shallow coast, making them vulnerable to attack. Naval theorists were in agreement that the conditions of the American coastline served as a natural defensive moat.²⁶⁸

According to defensive realism, change in American foreign policy should result from changing military realities that threatened American territory directly. According to Sean Lynn-Jones, the definition of threat is sometimes broadened to include an increase in the level of danger posed to the hemisphere, such as an international level change in military technologies and capabilities. Thus, states attempt to expand when expansion increases their security. A state might expand when three conditions are met: (1) a threat exists; (2) expansion is an effective strategy for reducing threat; (3) the state has the capability to adopt an expansionist strategy.²⁶⁹

Historians continue to debate whether the United States or its interests were ever under threat during the late nineteenth century. Most historians recognize that the possibility of an invasion by a European power was unlikely. Russel Weigley notes that “there was no threat to American security from overseas, and none was rationally conceivable. Steam power and the dependence on coal so limited the range of warships that no great power, not even England and her Canadian bases, could have risked a large scale invasion of America.”²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ Lance C. Buhl, "The Smooth Water Navy: American Naval Policy and Politics, 1865-1876" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 12.

²⁶⁹ For information about debates between offensive and defensive realists, see "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, International Security Readers* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1996); Rose Gideon, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998).

²⁷⁰ Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, 169. According to this line of thinking, the changing pattern of European and South American ship formations actually decreased the international threat level.

I argue that new technology presented a potential danger to US interests. Although the period 1865–1889 was a time of unprecedented world peace, tensions between nations did exist, and military doctrines were changing. In 1865, Spain bombarded the ports in Chile and Peru. American property claims in Cuba spawned moments of economic panic. More important, beneath the appearance of world peace during the 1870s and 1880s, the French and Russian war fleets were growing rapidly. The Samoan crisis of 1888 also highlighted a dramatic new tension in the Western Hemisphere. As these tensions were playing out, the Italians were building two monitor battleships, and in Germany, Emperor Wilhelm II was beginning his plans for naval expansion. In response to the escalation in shipbuilding, the British journalist W. T. Stead published his famous article, the “Truth about the Navy,” in the Pall Mall Gazette in September 1884, which set off naval scares among the citizens of England for the next thirty years.²⁷¹

In chapter two, I noted that American presidents and Congress during the 1880s had little interest in European military modernization. European leaders, however, were acutely aware that major military powers were changing. According to Stead’s article, leaders realized that the destructive power of warships was increasing more rapidly than at any other time in history.²⁷² In 1858, the French built *Gloire*, the world’s first armored ship equipped with firing guns. The British followed in 1861 with the construction of the *Warrior*, the largest, thickest-hulled ship in the world, armored with 4.5 inches of wrought iron. Only five years later, the British and French were using 7 inches of iron on their ships. The real transformation in naval construction began during the 1870s, when armored warships had become altogether different from the ships of the

²⁷¹ Similar scares were not present in the American naval debates. For example, the *New York Times* reported the decade’s key piece of naval legislation, Senator Hale’s 1884 naval modernization bill, in an obscure “Army and Navy News” section on the bottom of page 3 of the February 13, 1884 edition.

²⁷² William Hovgaard, *Modern History of Warships, Comprising a Discussion of Present Standpoint and Recent War Experiences, for the Use of Students of Naval Construction, Naval Constructors, Naval Officers, and Others Interested in Naval Matters* (London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1920), 52-53.

1860s. The rate of change was truly revolutionary. In 1875, the standard of armor was increased to 14 inches, and by 1881 the *Inflexible* had 24 inches of iron around its hull.²⁷³

Not only was armor increasing, a new strategic philosophy emerged in the 1870s: the idea that offensive gunfire was a ship's best protection.²⁷⁴ Until then, thick hulls were considered a ship's optimal defense. With the advent of large guns, it was now thought that a ship needed to be capable of piercing the enemy's armor. In 1865, the standard British 9-inch gun was capable of penetrating 10 inches of iron plating at a range of 1,000 yards. By 1875, the heaviest armor measured 12 inches, and the standard 12-inch gun could penetrate 15 inches of iron.²⁷⁵ Despite the rapid increases in armor, the new philosophy indicated that the destructive power of ships' guns could outperform the heaviest armor. Warships had always been fundamentally defensive. Sailing ships were made of thick wood, and were better at resisting gunfire than at sinking other ships. After 1875, the power of guns could predictably overcome the resisting power of armor.

The firepower breakthrough sent a message to ship designers throughout the world. It was now possible for navies to acquire technology without the prohibitive cost of research and development.²⁷⁶ Before 1880, the comparatively slow pace of technological change allowed ship construction to level off until an impending war.²⁷⁷ Now battleship guns were capable of destroying any coastal city, without troops disembarking from the vessel. As ship designs

²⁷³ Nathaniel Barnaby, *Naval Development in the Century* (Toronto: Linscott, 1904), 420.

²⁷⁴ P. H. Colomb, *Memoirs of Admiral the Right Honble. Sir Astley Cooper Key, G.C.B., D.C.L., F.R.S., Etc* (London: Methuen, 1898), 340. Cited Jan S. Breemer, "Technological Change and the New Calculus of War: The United States Builds a New Navy," in *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, ed. Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 221.

²⁷⁵ Breemer, "Technological Change and the New Calculus of War: The United States Builds a New Navy," 221.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 226.

²⁷⁷ Jeffery M. Dorwart, *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 43.

moved toward bigger guns, naval fleets needed to be prepared to fight against the largest guns or die at sea.²⁷⁸ Coupled with this trend came the opportunity for a second-rate power such as Japan or the United States to bypass the R & D stages of development and copy the technological advantages of the major European powers.²⁷⁹ Such concerns heightened the intellectual uncertainty that entered into the modernization debates of the 1880s.

The Germanization of Military Education

New ship designs were but one of the military changes that occurred. By the mid-1870s, the military services of the major world powers were becoming increasingly professionalized. After 1870, Germany began to replace France as the model for military service. The change was likely due to the success of the German army in its campaigns against Austria and France. The German army academy, *Kriegsakademie*, had been designed to combine the strategic principles of military campaigns with tactical principles of military warfare. The academy's military approach began to spread rapidly after mid-century. In 1859, about 50 percent of all military literature was produced in Germany. By 1870, that level had reached 75 percent. The increased demand for German military learning translated into a demand for entire systems of German military thinking to be exported. In the 1870s, military schools patterned on the *Kriegsakademie* were started in Great Britain and France — the Royal Military Staff School in 1873 and the *Ecole Militaire Superieure* in 1878.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁸ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 222. Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*, 185. Stephen Howarth, *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991*, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1991), 129.

²⁷⁹ Jan S. Breemer, *The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of the First World War* (Newport: Naval War College, 1993), 32-35.

²⁸⁰ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 89.

The transition in military learning in Europe gave pause to American observers. The American naval policy of the 1880s was still premised upon the French *Jeune Ecole* strategy, which challenged the intensive production of heavily armored vessels. According to them, the advent of the torpedo made big guns superfluous. Defensive power, they thought, should rely on speed and a large numbers of small, fast cruisers, not battleships.²⁸¹ Adherents of *Jeune Ecole* believed that the key to success in war was not the defeat of the enemy fleet but the destruction of his economic power. As Gabriel Charmes, one of the leading spokesmen of the school, declared, “will not the ruin of Marseilles and the capture of the boats of our maritime companies be altogether as disastrous as the destruction of some forts outside Toulon or the scattering of our battle squadron.”²⁸²

During the 1880s there was a transformation of military learning from France to Germany, which marked a pivotal moment in nineteenth-century continental military strategy development. In Germany, opposition to passive defense began with a reevaluation of the *Jeune Ecole* and its assessment the future of war making. The German’s initiative put in motion a transformation in whole systems of military education.²⁸³ European military reformers began to argue that naval strategies could not remain static. Knowledge was changing because the world was changing said, Edward Mead White and the continental doctrines of war had shifted. In the age of sail, overseas squadrons were easy to maintain. The advent of steam created a situation in

²⁸¹ Hovgaard, *Modern History of Warships, Comprising a Discussion of Present Standpoint and Recent War Experiences, for the Use of Students of Naval Construction, Naval Constructors, Naval Officers, and Others Interested in Naval Matters*, 52-53.

²⁸² Gabriel Charmes, *La réforme de la marine* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1886), 71. Cited in Ronald H. Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1977).

²⁸³ The best discussion of the paradigmatic shift in continental military strategy is Theodore Ropp, "Continental Doctrines of Seapower," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, ed. Edward Mead Earle, Felix Gilbert, and Gordon Alexander Craig (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 446-57. Passive defense could not content with the weapons of modern war. The future required preemptive capabilities.

which squadrons required coaling stations and overseas colonies. During the 1880s, European military theorists, not surprisingly, began to question the future of *La Guerre de Cote*.²⁸⁴

The Unique Character of Military Organization

In this section, I consider the unique role that military organization had in influencing modernization trends. I describe the how a group of military theorists, began to explore the implications of Europe's transition to German theory, and Europe's apparent rejection of coastal defense and commerce raiding doctrines.

Stephen Rosen explains why international military modernization can have a different impact upon military organization than upon other segments of society. Rosen notes that the military is a complex arrangement of political communities in which political values are subject to debate.²⁸⁵ Because one function of the military is to assess changing strategic trends in an effort to make operational assessments for future wars, a segment of the service will always be questioning the core values of the service. Therefore, in military bureaucracies, competition within the organization necessarily involves an ideological struggle that redefines the organization's core values and services. This competition will produce bureaucratic entrepreneurs who compete to reinterpret organization mission and purpose. From time to time, they experiment with new programs and try to convince politicians and special interests of the value of the bureau's mission.²⁸⁶ Because military bureaucracies have a unique responsibility to

²⁸⁴ Edward Mead Earle, Felix Gilbert, and Gordon Alexander Craig, eds., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 452.

²⁸⁵ Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

assess national security intelligence, they are sometimes able to exploit policy uncertainty. They do so by creating institutions that limit policy choice and thus reduce policy issue complexity.

Strains within the APD perspective also focus upon ways in which entrepreneurial activity can produce bureaucratic autonomy and innovation by formulating and advancing policy preferences, independent of politicians or society. Following this line of research, I suggest that the adjustment to late-nineteenth-century U.S. foreign policy began when a specific community of naval theorists responded to opportunities and imperatives of foreign military expansion. Reform entrepreneurs established an alternative theoretical discourse to evaluate changes in the international strategic context. The development of this discourse involved an ideological struggle that redefined the organization's core values and mission. The struggle for intellectual hegemony shaped the arguments that would lay claim to being the most appropriate intellectual foundations for adjusting military doctrine.

Responding to Uncertainty: The Development of Naval Intelligence

According to Rolf Haugen, the overarching goal of late-nineteenth-century naval reformers was to create a General Staff to direct naval modernization. The obstacle to this long awaited development of "general administration to promote an agency-wide view to guide and direct naval activity" was what Haugen calls "the problem of unity."²⁸⁷ In this section, I identify two organizations that emerged during the 1880s in an effort to reassess and centralize the development of military doctrine; the Office of Naval Intelligence and a group of reform officers inside the Naval Institute. Both organizations confronted the patchwork state structure of the

²⁸⁷ Rolf Nordahl Brun Haugen, "The Setting of Internal Administrative Communication in the United States Naval Establishments 1775-1920: A Study of the Conditions Affecting Processes of Internal Communication, and the Administrative Action Exerted to Control Their Impact" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1954), 311.

period, which made unity a problem since, “the necessary independence attached to each bureau’s special competence would continue to be a force for dispersion as long as vertical pressures for general guidance and direction were too weak.”²⁸⁸

These pressures functioned, according to Haugen, to promote “mutuality of understanding and to elicit contributions from personnel to the content of that understanding under changing conditions.” The goal then, was to provide the Secretary with a staff, since “it became increasingly obvious to many that, alone, he could not exert strong pressure. Nor could he do it with the limited assistance of ad hoc boards and commissions.”²⁸⁹ In Haugen’s estimation, the navy failed to acquire a general staff because leading officers could not conquer the impediments to unity--the fragmented state structure and bureau system. The general staff plans were opposed, he says, because they “indicated a potential diminution of bureau autonomy.”²⁹⁰ I argue that although no formal structure was in place, bureaucratic autonomy allowed the formation of an epistemic community that functioned as a mechanism to address changing military conditions and advocate change. This community was not influenced by social pressure and functioned as a quasi general staff to guide naval modernization.

American naval intelligence gathering began during the Revolutionary War, when agents collected information in Europe. Throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S. Navy continued to explore the world and collect information. During the American Civil War, operational intelligence remained an essential concern for the war effort of both North and South. Although the period between 1865 and 1882 marked a low point for the American navy in terms of equipment and operational effectiveness, it was during this time the navy launched its first

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 312.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 327.

intelligence agency. As officers began to demand improvements in naval equipment and training to keep abreast of international developments, it became apparent that to fulfill these demands, information would have to be made available to direct naval reform efforts.²⁹¹

American naval officers arranged expeditions to collect information about technological developments of foreign ships. These expeditions combined scientific investigation with analyses of economic and strategic questions.²⁹² Officers observed sweeping developments in naval weapons throughout the world. European naval forces were making rapid advances in rifled artillery, armor plating, and machine guns. In 1876, American officers noticed that most wooden ships had disappeared from foreign fleets, replaced by such ships as the new armored *Inflexible* of the British Navy, the French *Redoubtable*, and the German *Deutschland*. The largest U.S. warship at this time was a wooden ship, half the size of the *Inflexible*, with antiquated sail riggings and muzzle-loading cannon.²⁹³

The pace of European modernization created a surge in American intelligence gathering efforts. The first comprehensive intelligence gathering was produced after Chief Engineer James W. King's travels to Europe between 1869 and 1876. King compiled a report of his observations into a book that sold more than 3,000 copies in 1878.²⁹⁴ The book helped convince officers that the increasingly technical characteristics of naval information required engineering expertise. He

²⁹¹ Dorwart, *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918*, 24-25.; Haugen, "The Setting of Internal Administrative Communication in the United States Naval Establishments 1775-1920: A Study of the Conditions Affecting Processes of Internal Communication, and the Administrative Action Exerted to Control Their Impact." 54.

²⁹² Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*, 32.

²⁹³ J. W. King, *Report of Chief Engineer J.W. King, United States Navy, on European Ships of War and Their Armament, Naval Administration and Economy, Marine Constructions and Appliances, Dockyards, Etc., Etc* (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1878).

²⁹⁴ J. W. King and N. J. M. Campbell, *The War-Ships and Navies of the World, 1880: Containing a Complete and Concise Description of the Construction, Motive Power, and Armaments of the Modern War-Ships of All the Navies of the World ; Naval Artillery, Marine Engines, Boilers, Torpedoes, and Torpedo-Boats* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982).

demonstrated the importance of his specialization in technical journals such as Engineering, the Engineer, and L'Annee Maritime that provided an overview of naval progress.

Between 1877 and 1880, Secretary of the Navy Richard W. Thompson promoted King's intelligence work. Thomson supported the acceleration of information-gathering by sending James Russell Soley of the Naval Academy and Lieutenant Commander French Chadwick to collect data on overseas naval questions.²⁹⁵ Although information-gathering increased during Secretary Thompson's tenure, the department still had no coordinating office to distribute information and no central planning board to organize data and apply it to larger policies.²⁹⁶

In July 1879, the naval department selected Lieutenant Bailey Myers Mason as its first intelligence officer. Mason reported to Bureau of Navigation Commodore John Grimes Walker. Mason and Walker became responsible for the birth of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Both men shared a concern with the navy's technological decline, and used ONI to combat what they viewed as public indifference. The officers' crusade was aimed to inform and convert opinion in favor of modernization and expansion through the development of the intelligence office.²⁹⁷

In 1879, war broke out between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, providing an opportunity for intelligence observers to publicize the operation of newer warships in actual combat. Since Latin American navies possessed European-built ironclads, a U.S. board took it as an opportunity to examine how the ships performed in combat. Officers Edward Dunham Robie, Ingersoll Kennedy, and T.B.M. Mason were surprised at how the small warships were able to withstand

²⁹⁵ Charles Oscar Paullin, *Paullin's History of Naval Administration, 1775-1911: A Collection of Articles from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1968), 39-46.

²⁹⁶ Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*, 188-91.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, chapter 2.

shooting. The information was sent to Secretary Thompson, who prepared a group of future intelligence officers to collect information in an effort to reform the service.²⁹⁸

Mason then articulated a vision of how ONI should strive to generate interest in naval modernization through the distribution of technical information to the public.²⁹⁹ The intelligence officer who helped Mason realize his objective was Charles Curtis Rogers. He arrived in September 1882, and began writing monographs on recent British naval operations. Also, Rogers began collecting material on foreign resources and coastal defenses. His 1883 essay provided the service with its strategic underpinning. Rogers explained how an intelligence officer served in the peacetime navy by collecting vital information to prepare it for future war. “The necessity for readiness becomes every day more absolute, while the means for obtaining the latest information increases with the growth of national armaments...steamers, railways and telegraphs.”³⁰⁰

Rogers and Mason soon realized that no organization existed to assess the new intelligence information. They noted the importance of the Prussian general staff in planning military campaigns against Austria and France, and began to suggest that ONI could serve that capacity in an American context. In light of these advances, they argued that only a naval general staff could prepare the American peacetime force for war. For Rogers, ONI was the critical first stage in the creation of a formal naval general staff and operational planning.³⁰¹ He emphasized why the U.S. needed to coordinate fleet operations with integrated tactics and strategic plans in order to protect American interests. Mason felt that if ONI was to have an

²⁹⁸ T. B. Mason, "The United States Naval Institute," *The United Service* I (1879): 295.

²⁹⁹ T. B. Mason, "A Medal of Honor for Officers," *The United Service* IV (1881): 10. *Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, 1882 and 1883*, Washington, DC, 1884.

³⁰⁰ Charles C. Rogers, "Naval Intelligence," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* IX (1883): 678-79.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*: 659.

impact on naval modernization, bureau chiefs and senior officers would need to view ONI as a centralized intelligence service. He used political pressure to convince Secretary Chandler to advance the idea that ONI should function as a general staff.³⁰²

The suggestion that the service needed a centralized staff to assess intelligence prompted a clear division among the officers of the old guard. Opinions ranged from the conservative Admiral David Dixon Porter to the more progressive Carlos G. Calkins. The differences emphasized unresolved construction issues. Some officers favored cruisers and monitors for passive coastal defense and commerce raiding, while others preferred deep-water ironclads to extend a more forceful defensive strategy. Some advocated combinations of sail and steam power; others called for total overhaul of the navy. Most officers insisted that whatever the type of warship or strategy adopted in the future, naval expansion had to be attentive to the pace of European modernization efforts.³⁰³

Henry Beers summarizes how ONI attempted to centralize these disparate views, Its early efforts were directed toward obtaining data pertaining to ships, armament, organization, and other information useful in the rehabilitation of the Navy. After the New Navy had come into existence the office gave its attention to securing information for the employment of the navy in war.³⁰⁴

He also notes that “its duties included war plans,” but that “it never accomplished much along this line.”³⁰⁵

³⁰² Dorwart, *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918*, 18.

³⁰³ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 190-97; Davis, *A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy*, 37-43.

³⁰⁴ Henry P. Beers, "The Bureau of Navigation, 1862-1942," *American Archivist* 6 (1943): 47. The attempts to extend these functions into a general staff are evident in the titles of the pamphlets issued to the service under the designation *General Information Series*.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

Competition: The Creation of the United States Naval Institute

Because ONI had difficulty creating a monopoly that centralized and controlled its intelligence, the possibility for such an endeavor lay open. As a result, a group of naval reform officers founded a semi-official United States Naval Institute at Annapolis in 1873 to discuss the application of intelligence and scientific data. The institute held seminars and published scholarly articles in its Proceedings. Views exchanged by members formed a discourse intended to crystallize thinking on naval problems and focus on areas in need of reform.³⁰⁶ It taught naval officers to collect and publish information on technical progress, foreign affairs, naval organization, and commercial relations. It also became a platform to assess new intelligence information from ONI, perhaps even to challenge ONI's efforts at organizing toward a general staff.

In October of 1873 a small number of naval officers met in the lecture room of the Philosophy Department at the United States Naval Academy to discuss the advancement of scientific knowledge throughout the service.³⁰⁷ The meeting was the official inception of the United States Naval Institute, initially designed to elevate the service to professional status by defining problems that faced the navy in a changing world.³⁰⁸ The institution was modeled after the Royal United Services of Great Britain. Officers were to publish a journal to meet the central goal of the new organization, the advancement of professional and scientific knowledge in the navy.

³⁰⁶ Dorwart, *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918*, 24-25.

³⁰⁷ Mason, "The United States Naval Institute," 290.

³⁰⁸ Rear Admiral Bruce McCandless, USN, "History of the United States Naval Institute," ms (Annapolis). Cited in Paullin, *Paullin's History of Naval Administration, 1775-1911: A Collection of Articles from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 320.

The United States Naval Institute served as a “professional forum” for the “advancement of knowledge and dissemination of scientific and professional knowledge.”³⁰⁹ Its membership grew from 36 in December 1873 to 5,789 in March 1919. It started as a non-governmental organization and has remained so, but has maintained close connections with the Naval Academy and with the Navy Department.³¹⁰ The idea of the institute has been attributed to Commodore Foxhall Parker and Stephen Luce. Both men read papers at its first meeting on October 9, 1873. Future papers were to be read and discussed at monthly meetings held subsequently in Annapolis.³¹¹

The Institute began by concentrating on publications. Volume I of the Institute’s Proceedings appeared in 1874. Within a few years, issues were published quarterly.³¹² The Proceedings has continued to be the principle medium by which the Institute has advanced its discussions. The annual “Prize Essay” contest was established in 1879. An important note, the Institute’s officers (generally, it was Luce) prescribed the essay topics through 1888.³¹³ Within the broad outlines of debate, a small group of officers began to articulate a view that competed against those at the ONI. The pages of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings detail the development of an alternative direction for naval modernization. The original participants included Stephen B. Luce, French Chadwick, J. D. Kelly, Richard Wainwright, Edward W. Very,

³⁰⁹ Roy C. Jr. Smith, "Fifty Years of Service," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XLIX (1923): 1601-08; G. V. Stewart, "The Admirable Servant, Occasionally," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* LXXIV (1948): 1199-210.

³¹⁰ The Institute has maintained headquarters at Annapolis. Its roster of officers has regularly included the names of officers on duty in Washington as well as members of the faculty of the Naval Academy. Admiral David D. Porter was the first President and professor James R. Soley, Secretary.

³¹¹ Smith, "Fifty Years of Service," 1607.

³¹² Volume I includes eight papers. Volume II, dated 1876, also includes 8 papers, and Volume III, 1877, six. Two issues in 1878, and five in Volume V, 1878 and 1879.

³¹³ For example: “Naval Education,” 1879; Naval Policy,” 1880; “The Merchant Marine,” 1882; “Reconstruction and Increases of the Navy,” 1884; “Retaining Trained Seaman,” 1885. The remaining part of the dissertation will argue that Luce is responsible for directing the mode of analysis, the agenda, and direction of discourse for the new intellectual elite.

Carols Calkins, Seaton Schroeder, William H. Beehler, Alfred T. Mahan, W. W. Kimball, and Charles Curtis Rodgers. This group was only a small fraction of the 481 members of the Naval Institute.³¹⁴

My bureaucratic model examines the growth and centralization of this epistemic community. I argue that in response to new and uncertain aspects of naval modernization, bureaucratic actors used the Naval Institute Proceedings as a proto-institution to assess the nature and causes of military change. As the Naval Institute worked through the outlines of European modernization, it became apparent that assessing military theory required more than the facts from abroad offered by ONI. The new information would require a new analytic methodology.

Assessing Modernization: The Naval Institute

After the Civil War, the United States continued continental expansion. American naval officers remained attached to the impulse to preserve its traditional passive defense strategy. However, during the 1870s, a small number of officers (members of the Naval Institute) began to use a comparative analytic approach to question the prospect of naval parity with Europe. They asked whether the industrial history of America was more similar to the industrial development of England or France?

England had developed a worldwide trading network using wooden ships. However, by the early nineteenth century, its timber resources were being depleted, and steam was an appealing alternative, since it could be used for coal and iron to build metal ships. The outcome

³¹⁴ Francis Duncan, "Mahan, Historian with a Purpose," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* LXXXIII (1957): 499. Stephen B. Luce, "Our Future Navy," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XV (1889): 544. They became distinct through their shared objective of naval rehabilitation based upon historical analysis, contemporary naval developments, and a set of strategies to gather the support from the naval intelligence community, special members of Congress, and relevant special interests.

of this decision was that metal was needed, and it required banks and insurance companies to invest in the industrial base of steam; as a result, England became a leading industrial power.³¹⁵

Unlike England, America placed most of its capital-intensive efforts during the nineteenth century into westward rather than colonial expansion.

France developed differently from England. It was rich in agriculture and timber, and required less sea travel to expand its industrial base. The French economy could develop around the soil; therefore, it was less dependent on world resources and was less industrialized. This lack of dependence on world resources meant that they could continue their commitment to the national defense model of the French, *La Guerre de Cote* (war on the coasts).³¹⁶ Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, American naval theorists, by and large, were convinced that American economic development was more similar to France. Still, the question remained, was *La Guerre de Cote* as produced by the *Jeune Ecole*, the optimal U.S. security policy?

The *Jeune Ecole* began in 1874 with the publication of *L'Avenir de la Marine Francaise*. The movement's spokesperson was Theophile Aube, and his work was the subject American theorists considered when comparing strategic frameworks. Aube recognized the economic constraints of France's industrial system and advocated the 1874 naval rehabilitation program. At that time, France had no friends in Europe and enemies on all sides. French naval rehabilitation was an attempt to enhance its coastal defense strategy against Britain and assure its commerce raiding capabilities over Germany and Italy if attacked.³¹⁷

Like France, the long American shoreline meant coastal cities could be attacked from nearby English, French, and Spanish bases. Yet American officers were concerned that without

³¹⁵ Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*, 78.

³¹⁶ Ropp, "Continental Doctrines of Seapower," 446.

³¹⁷ Theodore Ropp, "The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871-1904" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1937), chapter 5.

a war navy, *La Guerre de Cote* doctrine directed the United States to defend against four offensive contingencies: invasion, bombardment of the seacoast cities, blockade, and attack on sea commerce. French naval modernization had taken into consideration the changes in naval armor, guns, and fleet communications, and was able to accommodate all these contingencies at once. I now consider how a small group of naval officers began considering whether Aube's *La Guerre de Cote* strategy was remained appropriate for American security.³¹⁸

By 1877, the Naval Institute Proceedings reveals that officers began to criticized *La Guerre de Cote* by questioning its application to American technological development. Before 1870, the slow evolutionary change of ship technology had a predictable pace and could easily be calculated by other navies. After 1870, navies acquired the ability to inflict unprecedented levels of destruction. Future wars, it was thought, would be "sudden, without formal declaration, and likely initiated by surprise attack."³¹⁹ This realization further spurred reformist naval officers to consider the advances in military technology and strategy in light of American naval modernization efforts.³²⁰ These discussions began to fill the pages of the Army Navy Journal and the Naval Institute's Proceedings.³²¹ The Proceedings, in particular, provided a forum to criticize *La Guerre de Cote*.³²²

During the 1870s and well into the 1880s, officers did not have a consensus upon an appropriate methodology to inform naval doctrine.³²³ This lack of consensus meant that competing views would need to be reconciled for comprehensive reform to occur. The views of

³¹⁸ Especially since France placed an unprecedented level of resources into advancing a war navy after 1870 as their peace navy began to vanish. Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), chapter 4.

³¹⁹ Peter Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism* (New York: Free Press, 1972), 65-69.

³²⁰ Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*, 178.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 43-44.

³²² Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 8.

³²³ *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1889.

the senior officers during the 1870s would serve as the foundation for the next generation of officers to debate naval modernization. Although officers Charles Belknap, David Porter, and Robert Shufeldt remained committed to *La Guerre de Cote*, each began to challenge peripheral aspects of the doctrine. Porter believed that national prestige demanded that the United States construct more seagoing ironclads, as France had done. Porter felt that the size of the American coast demanded the creation of enlarged monitors backed by new fortifications. He did note, however, that the American posture vis-à-vis enemy warships should be strictly defensive. In his annual report for 1874, Porter said, “contests between hostile fleets of powerful ironclads, whatever the outcome, would not determine victory in war.” He said, only by destroying the “commerce of the opponent could the United States bring him to terms.” Thus, one vessel “like the Alabama roaming the Ocean, sinking and destroying, would do more to bring about peace than a dozen unwieldy ironclads cruising an enemy of like character.”³²⁴

During the 1870s, the most important controversy among these officers was over the merits of steam-driven warships. Porter seemed to realize that the strategic role of US ships needed to address new technical realities.³²⁵ He repeated his opinion that in time of war the United States must rely principally on commerce raiding by fast, independently-operating cruisers constructed of steel frames and wood sheathing. These should be larger ships, but should not contest for mastery of the seas. They were “simply to destroy commerce and to avoid an action with superior or equal forces.”³²⁶ Porter’s suggestions, although not intended to challenge the defensive tradition, would prove to destabilize that strategic policy. He was among the first officers to advocate full-scale implementation of steam propulsion for the naval ships.

³²⁴ *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1870, 174.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 176

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 175.

Porter seemed to realize a limitation of steam for America; it required a large number of overseas coaling stations and was thus contrary to the traditional small-scale U.S. national security policy.

The most avid supporter of American overseas commercial expansion was Commander Robert Wilson Shufeldt. His world-view was built upon a liberal philosophy of free trade and political relations with Europe. He wished to create stability and prosperity for the United States and avoid European-style political domination. His focus was to establish a commercial “empire of the seas.”³²⁷ This meant America needed a strategy for maintaining an exporting surplus. Shufeldt did not attack American naval doctrine, but he did consider warfare beyond the confines of the defensive doctrine, “low down as the American Navy is to day,” he said, “I think I could select a fleet which would make a respectable demonstration in these eastern seas.”³²⁸

Shufeldt, in fact, favored a balanced strategy of strong coastal defense combined with commerce-destroying cruisers. This balancing was part of his vision to reform the service so that it would foster commerce in peace, while halting enemy shipping in war. This meant that cruisers had to be fast enough to avoid battleships.³²⁹ Although Shufeldt’s philosophy was consistent with *La Guerre de Cote*, his suggestion that the navy ultimately would bring American commerce to parity with the nations of Europe, opened the door to a reassessment of naval mission. In a letter to Congressman Leopold Morse of the Naval Affairs Committee, Shufeldt explained his idea of relations between the Navy and commerce. He advised Morse that

³²⁷ Frederick C. Drake, *The Empire of the Seas: A Biography of Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt, Usn* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 87.

³²⁸ Robert Wilson Shufeldt, *The Relation of the Navy to the Commerce of the United States. A Letter Written by Request to Hon. Leopold Morse, M.C., Member of Naval Committee, House of Representatives* (Washington: J. L. Ginck, 1878).

³²⁹ R. W. Shufeldt, “The American Navy. A Criticism of Our Naval Critics” *Sunday Chronicle*, November 6, 1878.

commerce was important to a nation for two reasons: first, it served as an index of national greatness; second, foreign markets could absorb surplus production.³³⁰

Shulfeldt's proposal was considered by the leading officers of the day: Henry Clay Taylor, Daniel Ammen, Thomas O. Selfridge Jr., Albert Barker, and Samuel R. Franklin.³³¹ These officers confirmed the notion that strategic power struggles would likely follow a nation, whose commerce approached parity with Europe.³³²

The first direct attack upon *La Guerre Cote* came from Lieutenant Charles Belknap. He noted that battles between squadrons should not be left to the chance of weather conditions. Among the navy's most important wartime objectives was the destruction of hostile men-of-war, and "carrying the war into an enemy's country." Belknap asked for construction of a class he described as "an offensive, sea-going, armored man-of-war." Anticipating the contingency plans of later generations, Belknap advised preparation of plans for naval campaigns "involving combined naval and military operations against assailable portions of an enemy's territory."³³³

The Emergence of Entrepreneurship

The navy's premier philosopher-historian in this era, Stephen B. Luce, was leading the charge to claim history as an essential tool for strategic analysis. Revealed in the following passage is his intention to establish founding principles for a new American strategic doctrine. He suggested using history as a means to uncover similarities between land and sea combat as

³³⁰ Cited in Milton Plesur, *Creating an American Empire, 1865-1914, Major Issues in American History* (New York: Pitman Pub. Corp., 1971), 36-41.

³³¹ Ammen details their views in his memoir, *The Old Navy and the New*. Daniel Ammen and Ulysses S. Grant, eds., *The Old Navy and the New* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1891).

³³² During the 1880s Taylor would become a founding member of the Naval War College, and was instrumental in collaborating and formulating plans for battleship advocacy.

³³³ Charles Belknap, "The Naval Policy of the United States," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* IX (1883): 5. Such an attack was in violation of *La Guerre Cote*.

early as 1865. Years after his initial meeting with General William T. Sherman, Luce described his epiphany.

After hearing General Sherman's clear exposition of the military situation the scales seem to have fallen from my eyes. "Here," I said to myself, "is a soldier who knows his business." It dawned upon me that there were certain fundamental principles underlying military operations which it were well to look into; principles of general application whether the operations were conducted on land or at sea...³³⁴

To compete for the right to assess intelligence, Luce realized, an accepted and objective mythology was needed. In 1874, in the first published papers of the Naval Institute—"The Manning of Our Navy and Merchant Marines," Luce proposed the historical method be used as a means of analyzing naval warfare. He drew on historical examples from the British and French.³³⁵ In 1877, Luce's historical insights appeared again in his review of Parker's "Fleets of the World" in the Proceedings. In the review, Luce set down his perception of the naval uses of history, which eventually grew into a framework for tactical, strategic, and political applications. Luce's concerns were limited to tactics and technology. He wrote that the navy needed new ships that could contend with rams. To fight these ships, a new tactical system was needed, and to find it Luce urged the officers "to study naval tactics...in connection with the study of military and naval history."³³⁶

Luce began to engage in intelligence analysis when science and history offered the promise of objectivity. As Luce, an armature historian, announced his theories of history, Moses

³³⁴ Even before this, Luce had been interested in spreading knowledge of certain fundamentals. He had prepared a textbook for the use of mid-shipmen while he was on duty at the Naval Academy in 1862-1863. "There being no textbook in Seamanship..., I have been compelled to prepare a course for the class." See his letter to the Commander of Midshipmen, quoted in Albert Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College* (New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1925), 77.

³³⁵ Stephen B. Luce, "The Manning of Our Navy and Merchant Marine," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* I (1875): passim.

³³⁶ Stephen B. Luce, "Fleets of the World," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* III (1877): passim.

Tyler took the first history chair at Cornell University.³³⁷ Charles Adams had introduced a history seminar to the University of Michigan in 1872 while training the first Harvard University history doctorates. In 1881, the first chair in American History was established. History, it appeared, was becoming a legitimate academic discipline, and naval reform theorists would co-opt this development.³³⁸

At the time, the ram appeared to be the premier weapon of the new age of steam. With rapid technological developments appearing at sea, Luce urged officers to begin focusing their studies on the practices of the ancient Greeks and Romans.³³⁹ According to Luce, the Greeks were “our masters in the art of war” and exemplars of military professionalism. This was evident in their conviction that it was necessary to understand the theory of war. As Luce emphasized, the Greeks maintained schools in which they taught the principles and rules of war. He especially noted the Spartans, who were first to develop a regular tactical system and taught it as a part of a man’s education.

Luce addressed international developments in naval technology and military education. In light of these changes, he thought the wisdom of the ancients was more important than ever before. With the advent of steam propulsion, fleets would no longer be constrained in battle, unable to execute assigned tasks when the wind died. “Steam gave the commander an instrument with precision, predictability, and management. Therefore officers could again

³³⁷ Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, eds., *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College*, 6-8.

³³⁸ D. M. Schurman, *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 1-5.

³³⁹ They had employed the ram at sea. Luce, “Fleets of the World,” 23. The remainder of this section is heavily influenced by the work of Lawrence Carroll Allin, *The United States Naval Institute, Intellectual Forum of the New Navy, 1873-1889* (Manhattan, Kan.: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian Pub., 1978).

consider the age of the oar when these factors were more relevant.”³⁴⁰ Luce felt the freedom from the wind brought by steam must direct naval minds to develop new systems of tactical and strategic thinking.

From Historical Analogies to Universal Principles

During the heyday of the ram in the 1870s, Luce demanded that officers emulate the Greeks and study the rules of land warfare as the basis for a historical approach to the problems posed by the shift to steam and steel at sea. The educational practices of the ancients were thus imperatives for the moderns.³⁴¹ He believed the ram had again become the principal weapon of naval warfare and “rendered a quasi-military education” indispensable to the naval officer.³⁴²

Luce advised officers to make tactical studies from history to begin a science of naval war. They could then learn strategy by examining history. Pointing out that the Greeks had their sea generals and naval strategists, he urged the officers to think like the Greeks. He suggested that they study campaigns such as Demosthenes’s battle at Pylos and Sphacteria. From such demonstrations in history, it would become evident that strategy, unlike tactics, was unchanging and offered a broad range of examples for study. Luce proposed that officers study the ancients because their rules, principles, system, and science were rooted in the general guidance they could offer for solving the problems confronting the American Navy. He then suggested that studying the methods of the ancients could become a science of naval warfare to develop strategic principles. He realized that tactical changes in ships and their armament could change

³⁴⁰ Stephen Bleecker Luce, *Seamanship*, 4th ed. (Newport: J. Atkinson, printer, 1863).

³⁴¹ Luce, "Fleets of the World," passim; Stephen B. Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XII (1886): 180; and Stephen B. Luce, "War Schools," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* IX (1883): 58.

³⁴² Luce, "Fleets of the World," 18-20.

the rules of tactics. But, he asserted, strategy's independence from technical learning and scientific advancement made its principles more enduring. Luce argued that strategy constituted the essential core of the science of naval warfare.³⁴³ He further expanded upon the naval uses of history from the extrapolation of strategic principles to its value as a guide to national policy.³⁴⁴

Strategy, said Luce, was the officer's profession and should constitute his primary study. Luce showed that the comparative method of analysis and study was applied to anatomy, physiology, grammar, religion, philosophy, and literature. Why not, asked Luce, have officers apply the comparative method to war, in an effort to create a science of warfare?³⁴⁵

Movement toward a General Staff

In 1877, Luce began directing officers to use a historical methodology, especially in the Naval Institute Proceedings. I will trace the development of the new methodology designed to reassess American military doctrine. Although members of the Naval Institute agreed that the navy should be used to inform policy, their early contributions to the Proceedings lacked a coherent mode for analysis. Analysts seemed to realize that military education was being transformed throughout Europe, and it was deemed important to reassess the education of the U.S. Navy. So with education reform as their new focus, officers initiated a formal discourse in 1878. Stephen Luce and Lieutenant Commander Allan D. Brown proposed that the Naval Institute sponsor an annual Prize Essay Contest. Commander William T. Sampson was picked to

³⁴³ Stephen B. Luce, "On the Study of Naval History," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XIII (1887): 179-80; Alfred T. Mahan, "The Necessity and Objects of a Naval War College," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XIV (1888): 632.

³⁴⁴ Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," 541.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*: 536.

head the committee. They were asked to explore the service knowledge unique to their profession.³⁴⁶

The Prize Essay Contest of 1879 dealt with the specialized knowledge an officer should possess, and what should be the nature of military education. The essayists of 1879 differed on the value of specialty knowledge in relation to advanced technical education for officers. The debate turned around the professional problem of the navy and differences between line and staff officers. In particular, the debate centered upon officers' basic duties. Whereas Commander Goodrich felt officers needed extensive technical training, Mahan thought officers should acquire diversified fields of knowledge to discharge their duties. He wrote derisively of the "necessarily materialistic character of mechanical science which tends rather to narrowness and low ideals." According to Mahan, "Strength of character or moral power, were required for an officer to retain physical vigor and 'intellectual equipment' to discharge his duties."³⁴⁷ Mahan and Goodrich did agree that officers should know subjects not taught at the Naval Academy, such as foreign languages and international law.³⁴⁸

While the essayists accepted the Naval Academy's role as the navy's basic educational institution, they differed on the dimensions of the officers' higher professional training. Mahan would have sent engineering and ordinance specialists to postgraduate courses on graduation from the Naval Academy. Goodrich desired more sweeping reform. He suggested eliminating the distinction between line and staff. The engineer was no longer an engine driver, said Goodrich: "Like his colleagues, [he] was a man of culture, science, and reflection."³⁴⁹ To further

³⁴⁶ Roy C. Jr. Smith, "The First Hundred Years Are...?" *US Naval Institute Proceedings* IC (1973): 62.

³⁴⁷ Casper F. Goodrich, "Naval Education, (I) Officers, (II) Men," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* V (1879): 329-30. Alfred T. Mahan, "Naval Education," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* V (1879): 347-49.

³⁴⁸ Goodrich, "Naval Education, (I) Officers, (II) Men," 330-33. and Mahan, "Naval Education," 348-50.

³⁴⁹ Goodrich, "Naval Education, (I) Officers, (II) Men," 325-26. Mahan, "Naval Education," 367.

these ends, Goodrich wanted to establish an advanced college at Annapolis. To broaden the navy's scientific abilities, Goodrich wanted to assign officers to civilian instruction in the natural sciences.³⁵⁰ Although there are small differences between the views of Goodrich and Mahan, they began to define a voice that could direct professional development.

The moment that defined naval reform theory came in 1880. In that year, Lieutenant Charles Belknap won the Naval Institute's Prize Essay Contest with his essay, "The Naval Policy of the United States." After that essay, the policy discussions of the officers gained depth and assumed direction.³⁵¹ His essay contained recommendations for what would become their duties. It formed an outline for policy guidance and supplied many insights into the nation's strategic problems, in short, what would become the American naval philosophy.³⁵² His essay focused on the nation's past and its prospective needs, the conditions that should influence naval policies, the uses of a navy, and the possible enemies of the United States. Ultimately, his essay laid the theoretical groundwork for naval modernization.

Before Belknap's essay, the major school of thought within the Naval Institute was based upon Daniel Ammen's thinking about the uses of a wartime fleet. According to Ammen, the Navy's two essential wartime functions were defending the coast and raiding the enemy's commerce. He dismissed the efficacy of a blockade.³⁵³ Belknap took a more complex view of the problem and framed a second school of thought when he argued that the blockade presented an extreme danger to the nation. Whereas Ammen held that the delay in assembling a convoy and its slow speed would be ineffective to prevent commerce raiding, Belknap thought that

³⁵⁰ Goodrich, "Naval Education, (I) Officers, (II) Men," 377.

³⁵¹ Belknap, "The Naval Policy of the United States," passim.

³⁵² Stephen B. Luce, "Naval Administration," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XIV (1888): passim; and Rogers, "Naval Intelligence," passim.

³⁵³ Daniel Ammen, "The Purposes of a Navy and the Best Methods of Rendering It Effective," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* V (1879): 31.

during war the United States Navy needed to be strong enough to provide convoy service in order to maintain the fleet.³⁵⁴ He suggested that defense against invasion and protection of commerce ought to be the prime wartime duties of the navy. He advocated the use of a fleet to bombard an enemy's coast or invade a portion of its territory to hold it hostage for an indemnity.³⁵⁵ Belknap's argument for providing convoy service now framed the intellectual outlines of the naval reform.

Participants of the Naval Institute's Prize Essay Contests used Belknap's essay to examine, define, and systematize all aspects of naval theory. Historical objectivity became the new term upon which reform essays were to be judged. For example, the topic of the 1882 essay, "Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline and the Means to be Taken for Its Revival" advanced all the theoretical taxonomies defined by Belknap. Lieutenant J. D. J. Kelly won the Gold Medal and Carlos Gilam Calkins received First Honorable Mention. Lieutenant Richard Wainwright and Lieutenant Commander French E. Chadwick wrote an essay that tied for Second Honorable Mention.³⁵⁶ Of interest, the categories that define a country's potential sea power are offered here for the first time. Naval Institute theorist, William Glen David, fortified and systematized Belknap's theoretical groundwork for American Empire. In what became the template for acquiring empire he laid the conditions: (I) Geographic Position; (II) Physical Conformation; (III) Extent of Territory; (IV) Number of Population; (V) Character of People; and (VI) Character of Government.³⁵⁷ For the first time, a systematic, historical argument

³⁵⁴ Ibid. Belknap, "The Naval Policy of the United States," 380. Rogers, "Naval Intelligence," 679.

³⁵⁵ Belknap, "The Naval Policy of the United States," 386-88; William T. Sampson, "Coast Defense," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII (1881): 171-72; 75-76.

³⁵⁶ J. D. J. Kelley, "Our Merchant Marine: The Cause of Its Decline and the Means to Be Taken for Its Revival," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII (1882): passim. French E. Chadwick, "The Relationship of the United States and Spain," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII (1882): passim.

³⁵⁷ Ensign W. G. David, "Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline and the Means to Be Taken for Its

assessing the requirements for naval greatness was fully developed. David's model served as the theoretical catalyst that united the naval reform movement.

Although David formulated the content of the naval reform argument, the lesser-known theorist, Alfred Mahan, was eventually credited with this achievement.³⁵⁸ According to this now-famous account, David explains past maritime greatness and failure. He surveyed man's record on the sea from the rise of Phoenician power to the period of the English Navigation Acts that destroyed the Dutch shipping, and from which "British supremacy on the high sea may be said to date." He found six causes for the rise of Phoenician shipping: The greatest national attributes for expansion were extended seacoast, good harbors, a favorable geographic position, wise policy, strong shipping capacity, and rich colonies. He added Carthage, Rome, Constantinople, Venice, Portugal, and Spain as ideal examples of naval greatness.³⁵⁹ In the following year, Lieutenant Edward W. Very, J.F. Meigs, Henry C. Taylor, Charles G. Calkins, and Kelly continued to extend the historical methodology initiated by Luce.³⁶⁰

As the epistemic model predicts, naval reform theorists began to use the historical method to form collaborative working relationships in response to changing international developments. History and the notion of objectivity applied to naval warfare was taking hold, as theorists realized the importance of developing a common and consistent approach to military reform.

Revival," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* III (1882): 155-58.

³⁵⁸ Alfred T. Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1600-1783* is generally credited as the first systematic theoretical development for naval reform. However, Mahan's arguments are merely an extension from the foundations developed by Belknap, David, Very, Kelly and Calkins. Mahan had never contributed to operational theory in a historical or geo-strategic context until he began to lecture at the Naval War College in 1885.

³⁵⁹ David, "Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline and the Means to Be Taken for Its Revival," 155-58.

³⁶⁰ Carlos G. Calkins, "How May the Sphere of Usefulness of Naval Officers Be Extended in Times of Peace with Advantage to the Country and to the Naval Service?," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* IX (1882): 165 and 67.

The historical method began its ascent toward general acceptance with the comparative studies of Lieutenant J. F. Meigs in “An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun...” and Commander Henry Clay Taylor’s “Battle Tactics...”³⁶¹ Meigs applied Luce’s comparative method on general history to the problems of technology. When he wrote on the tactics of the gun, he explained that the development of the gun and the art of rigging sails grew together over a long period of time. He claimed those changes were as great as those of the years from 1850 to 1860, when steam, shell guns, and torpedoes came to naval warfare. While both clusters of change had great impact on naval warfare, Meigs emphasized that history showed that no material changes occurred suddenly. As a result, Meigs demanded that the officers know both the current history of material and the broad sweep of its evolution. Such knowledge had the practical virtue of preventing the officer and his command from being victimized in battle by sudden technical changes.³⁶²

Naval problems were formally addressed between 1877 and 1889. During this time, the Naval Institute organized its Prize Essays Contest. The Contest was designed to challenge the position that naval modernization should continue to serve the traditional mission of defending the nation’s coasts and protecting its commerce. Before 1887, no officer writing in the Proceedings suggested that the American navy look toward parity with European navies. The primary offensive function of the American Navy was to remain the destruction of enemy commerce.³⁶³

³⁶¹ Luce, "On the Study of Naval History," 179-80. Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," 529. J. F. Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (1879): 658; Taylor, "Battle Tactics," 168; Mahan, "Naval War College," 632.

³⁶² Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 658, 62.

³⁶³ Sprout and Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 13-17; *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1880, 34; 1881, 3; 1882, 35.

Luce's historical mythology provided his reform community with an basis for consensus. They could now build from one another's work and design a comprehensive object for American foreign policy.³⁶⁴ The notion of historical objectivity held this promise. As Luce put it, "Science is contributing so liberally to every department of knowledge and has done so much toward developing a truer understanding of the various arts that it seems only natural and reasonable that we should call science to our aid to lead us to a clearer conception of naval warfare."³⁶⁵ Historical analysis provided Naval Institute theorists with a powerful tool. It began to form a unified methodology which has been assessed as follows:

...the Naval Institute...imparted a tremendous spiritual and intellectual driving force to the Navy, not only by stimulating and encouraging thought and writing but also by furnishing the equally important means of publication, distribution, and discussion. Moreover, the response of the Prize essay contestants...has created a reservoir of highly sensible and practical recommendations many of which have streamed into veins of the service and thereby furnished life-blood to assist the vigorous development of the United States Navy in such matters as policy, diplomacy, strategy and tactics, personnel and materiel, and naval aviation.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁴ Or, as stated earlier, the nature and causes of warfare.

³⁶⁵ Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," 529.

³⁶⁶ Ellery H. Jr. Clark, "The Significance of the Prize Essay Contest, 1879-1950," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* LXXVII (1951): 799.

Conclusion

In this chapter I applied an epistemic community model to the development of the historical methodology used to consider strategic ideas during the 1880s. The new methodology was an outcome of a competition to assess naval intelligence and operational planning. I contend that the introduction of historical methodology into American naval doctrine resulted from the efforts of a specific group of naval theorists. These theorists painstakingly addressed specific implications of European modernization. Reform officers were concerned with developing an accepted and objective methodology for naval reform. How these actors created an institution to legitimize the historical method and influence naval modernization is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR THE STRUGGLE FOR DOCTRINAL HEGEMONY




Fig. 4 Roosevelt at the Naval War College, circa 1897 (Naval Historical Center)³⁶⁷

Introduction

The previous chapter described nineteenth-century trends in European military modernization and the formation of two organizations created to address these trends — the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), which collected and assessed information on foreign military development, and the Naval Institute, which also assessed the intelligence provided by ONI. American military theorists, we see, began competing over the right to authoritatively assess naval doctrine.³⁶⁸ The formation of these groups is not surprising given that a unique character

³⁶⁷ I argue that this group functioned as an epistemic community to translate their ideas into American doctrine. The value of their theories would finally be tested the following year in the Spanish American War.

³⁶⁸ Theda Skocpol had noted how collaborative working relationships as institutional foundations, see Theda

of military organization is to plan for war during times of peace. In this chapter I track the activities of Naval Institute theorists during the 1880s. Under the leadership of Stephen Luce, this community monopolized operational planning by constructing a quasi-general staff.

These theorists focused their attention upon appropriating naval tactics from the age of oars to future strategic directives in an age of steam. During the 1880s, this community of theorists wanted to function as a general staff that could adjust naval doctrine and develop operational planning. As mentioned in chapter three, after meeting General Sherman in 1865, Luce suspected that universal principles existed and could tie together past and future military strategy. To uncover these principles, officers needed to examine the relationship between land and sea warfare. For the next thirty years, Luce set about to develop a research project to enlarge this idea. His project of unlocking universal principles that aligned both land and sea warfare drove the centralization of operational planning and the creation of a new military doctrine.

What did Luce mean when he called for the application of universal principles? One thing it did not mean for professional historians during the late nineteenth century, says Novick, was to be involved in a “nomothetic” (law-generating) rather than an “ideographic” (particular describing) activity. There had been historians earlier in the century concerned with the development of laws of history (e.g., John William Draper and Henry Thomas Buckle, admired by Luce); there were contemporary American amateur historians who sought such laws –such as Brooks Adams. But, by the turn of the century, American professional historians considered “scientific history” to mean historical investigation carried out according to “the scientific

method.”³⁶⁹ The problem for Luce, during the 1880s, was that comparative history was generally not considered by professional historians to meet standards of empiricism.

Because the process of professionalization in the historical profession was slow, Luce would need to overcome the appearance of amateurism by forming a community of competent specialists that agreed upon a set of “objective” outcomes. As Novick points out, a central problem for any new cognitive structure is to legitimize its epistemic foundation. During the late nineteenth century, the discovery and interpretation of facts, carried out by trained investigators-- were sources of “historical rationality.” Novick notes “recent work in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science has made us increasingly aware of the influence of external and social factors in theory choice, in deciding what is a ‘fact,’ and even in defining rationality.”³⁷⁰

I argue that such external and social factors played an important role in the policy choices made by naval theorists. In his attempt to create a science of naval theory, Luce sought to provide an “objective” guide for the military services. Luce and his followers formed communities of the competent, or “epistemic communities.” At the dawn of the American professional movement, such a strategy made sense, as Novick points out, a community cannot be satisfied that its discourse is objective, without substantial agreement on values, goals, and perceptions of reality.³⁷¹

I have argued that Luce’s community of reform theorists functioned as an epistemic community. An epistemic community is a network of knowledge-based experts or groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain of their expertise.

Members hold a common set of causal beliefs and share notions of validity based upon internally

³⁶⁹ Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" And the American Historical Profession, Ideas in Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 33.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., 10. I substitute the notion of epistemic communities in place of what Novick calls “communities of the competent.”

³⁷¹ Ibid., 61.

defined criteria for evaluation, common policy projects, and shared normative commitments.³⁷²

Epistemic communities tend to be afforded more deference in public policy than other actors.

Although the number of members in these epistemic communities tends to be relatively small, the political infiltration of an epistemic community into governing institutions can lay the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community's beliefs and ideas about the proper construction of social reality. For scholars seeking to examine the impact of an epistemic community, Peter Hass argues, the research agenda involves an identification of community membership, a determination of the community members' principled and causal beliefs, and a tracing of their activities, in an effort to demonstrate their influence on decision makers.³⁷³

I argue that a group of naval theorists functioned as an epistemic community in order to create a new military doctrine. In 1877, this community began the process of forging a theoretical consensus.³⁷⁴ Over the next ten years, as they approached consensus, the group expanded their position outward to other theorists, congressmen, and special interests.³⁷⁵

³⁷² Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 27. Epistemic communities influence state interest first, by elucidating cause and effect relationships and providing advice about the likely results of various courses of actions following a shock, crisis or period of uncertainty. Second, they shed light on the nature of the complex inter-linkages between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to take action or from instituting a particular policy. Third, they help to define the self-interests of a state or factions within it and help to formulate policies through framing of alternatives actions.

³⁷³ This hypothesis stands in contrast to Edward Joseph Rhodes "Sea Change: Interest-Based Vs. Cultural-Cognitive Accounts of Strategic Choice in the 1890s," *Security Studies* 5 (1996): 73-124. My bureaucratic epistemic approach to late nineteenth century strategic adjustment is an ideational model that differs from the ideational models of Edward Rhodes and Mark Shulman. Edward Rhodes argues that the United States constructed a blue-water navy during the 1890s as a response to the social upheaval of the nineteenth century. A powerful navy became a means of redirecting national attention toward a large national project that might encourage social cohesion within the United States. According to Rhodes, because Americans still viewed centralized government as a threat to their personal liberty, the logical response of policymakers was to strengthen the state vis-à-vis the outside world, where it could promote American virtues and serve as a symbol of American greatness.

³⁷⁴ Mark R. Shulman, "Institutionalizing a Political Idea: Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power," in *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, ed. Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 83.

³⁷⁵ I take issue with Mark Shulman's argument about the forces behind the transformation of the Navy in the 1890s. He claims that battleship legislation was able to pass Congress in the 1890s because "navalists" (naval enthusiasts), inside and outside the naval organization, were proficient in marketing their ideas. Through the use of printed

Concepts such as bureaucratic autonomy and bureaucratic entrepreneurship help explain how it was possible for state actors to operate as an epistemic community in order to advance a battleship construction program.

If bureaucratic autonomy produced the conditions necessary for the epistemic community formation that successfully advanced new military doctrine, we should be able to observe: first, a rapid advance in foreign naval technology during the 1870s and 1880s (chapter two); second, the presence of competition among naval theorists in response to changing international technologies (chapter 3); third, reform officers attempting to monopolize operational planning (chapter 4).

Directing Methodological Consensus

In this section, I trace the process by which a new methodology for strategic threat assessment became increasingly favored by a specific group of naval theorists. As the navy's chief historian, Stephen Luce saw an opportunity for officers to combine the universalizing tendencies of the late-nineteenth-century historical approach. During the 1880s writers like Burkhardt, Nietzsche, Buckle, Seeley, and Bury presented comprehensive and universal theories

essays, patriotic novels, music, parades, fairs, historical revisionism, and media manipulation, they managed to convince the public that battleships would make the country great. In accordance with Shulman's theory, during the 1880s we should expect to see: first, the original re-casting of American naval doctrine as the work of "navalists," a group of both bureaucrats and civilian actors; second, the navalists' propaganda efforts should be self-induced, not in response to external strategic change; and third, the propaganda efforts of the navalists should have been under way before 1890. I contend that propaganda alone could not have convinced Congress and the public to support a project that was not sanctioned by an authoritative knowledge base. Moreover, Shulman does not trace his group of "navalists" back to its starting point. I do so by tracing the development of military doctrine in the Naval Institute's *Proceedings*.

of historical development.³⁷⁶ Luce, I argue, directed the use of the historical approach in order to monopolize doctrinal development and application.³⁷⁷

According to Rolf Haugen, Luce's efforts fit into a general pressure to promote "mutuality of understanding and to elicit contributions from personnel to the content of that understanding under changing conditions." The goal then, was to provide the Secretary of the Navy with a staff, since "it became increasingly obvious to many that, alone, he could not exert strong pressure. Nor could he do it with the limited assistance of ad hoc boards and commissions."³⁷⁸ In Haugen's estimation, the navy failed to acquire a general staff because leading officers could not conquer the impediments to unity, the fragmented state structure as it was manifest in the bureau system. The general staff plans were opposed, he says, because they "indicated a potential diminution of bureau autonomy."³⁷⁹ I argue that although no formal general staff was established, Luce's epistemic community monopolized operational planning and became the mechanism (a quasi-general staff) that overcame the impediments of the fragmented American state, in order to translate their ideas into American military doctrine.³⁸⁰

In chapter three, I explained that Luce established the U.S. Naval Institute in 1873 to provide naval theorists with a forum to consider potential threats to American security brought

³⁷⁶ Page Smith, *The Historians and History* (New York, 1964), 56. Cited in John B. Hattendorf, *The Influence of History on Mahan: The Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of Alfred Thayer Mahan's the Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1991), 14.

³⁷⁷ Rolf Nordahl Brun Haugen, "The Setting of Internal Administrative Communication in the United States Naval Establishments 1775-1920: A Study of the Conditions Affecting Processes of Internal Communication, and the Administrative Action Exerted to Control Their Impact" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1954), 311. According to Haugen, the overarching goal of late nineteenth century naval reformers was to create a General Staff to direct naval modernization. The obstacle to this long awaited development of "general administration to promote an agency-wide view to guide and direct naval activity" was, what Haugen calls "the problem of unity." The patchwork state structure made unity a problem because, "the necessary independence attached to each bureau's special competence would continue to be a force for dispersion as long as vertical pressures for general guidance and direction were too weak."

³⁷⁸ Ibid., 312.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., 327.

³⁸⁰ Bureaucratic autonomy made epistemic community formation possible. The community was not influenced by social pressure and could therefore function as a quasi general staff to guide naval modernization.

about by rapid changes in military technology and education. Reform theorists used the Naval Institute's Proceedings to rail against the widespread tendency among officers to emphasize technical skills at the expense of theoretical knowledge. The most common concern among these reformers was for officers to develop a specialized body of knowledge to consider the broader implications of naval development in relation to American foreign policy and national defense.³⁸¹ These theorists also created an essay contest to propose a broader vision of naval reform and national security. Historian John Hattendorf also noticed that the scholars working with Luce, shared a working relationship that helped to “professionalize naval theory by separating it from civilian arts and sciences, and insure the naval officer an authoritative voice in the conduct of national affairs by demonstrating that the profession was vital to the general welfare.”³⁸²

After Luce worked to establish the Naval Institute in 1873, he, together with Foxhall Parker and David Porter, organized its Proceedings to become the vehicle for the advancement of knowledge among naval officers.³⁸³ It was from the Proceedings that Luce led the movement to employ history as a method to advance naval analysis, “the navy officer must cease to be exclusively a navigator, a seaman, a hydrographer, or an engineer and if technological change was a relatively new problem....he must become a specialist in his own unique field—the conduct of war.” His reform was centered upon creating an independent core of the service's

³⁸¹ William Hovgaard, *Modern History of Warships, Comprising a Discussion of Present Standpoint and Recent War Experiences, for the Use of Students of Naval Construction, Naval Constructors, Naval Officers, and Others Interested in Naval Matters* (London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1920), 1.

³⁸² John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, and John R. Wadleigh, eds., *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1984), 5. Luce was the most respected theorist in the Navy, and was involved in the education and training of the navy's personnel for many years. After the Civil War he served at the Naval Academy as Commandant of Midshipmen under David Dixon Porter. By the early 1870s, he was considered the most learned officer in the navy. He wrote the Naval Institute's first paper, served on the Naval Academy's Board of Visitors and made the first proposal for a school of higher education for the navy.

³⁸³ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 529.

knowledge to be brought together and validated within the organization. Luce observed: “We make ample provision for specialization but none for centralization. There is no provision for an educated directorate.”³⁸⁴

As discussed in chapter three, the collaborative working relationship among Luce’s contingent of naval reformers was marked by their use of naval history as a method of intellectual inquiry. Naval theorists were growing dissatisfied with the increasing narrowness of the technological point of view within the naval service.³⁸⁵ Luce’s community used a common historical approach to explain and advocate naval reform. They did this in a series of articles that appeared in the Naval Institute’s Proceedings during the 1880s. They suggested the establishment of an institution dedicated to the historical method that could serve as the basis of a general staff. Such an institution would allow officers to develop the intellectual faculties necessary to incorporate new naval technologies into American strategic doctrine.

Movement toward a General Staff

Luce led the effort to create military doctrine. He began by advocating educational reform for naval officers. In an 1877 letter to Secretary of the Navy Thompson, Luce explained “the navy officer whose principle business it is to fight is not taught in the highest branches of the profession.”³⁸⁶ Luce followed the letter by encouraging a discussion of the subject among members of the Naval Institute. In the same year he announced that an annual prize would be

³⁸⁴ Stephen B. Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XII (1886).

³⁸⁵ Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, eds., *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College*, 7. These reformers felt that too little thought was given to the purpose of the new naval technologies. According to Novick, historical inquiry offered a means to consider issues from a broad and varied perspective, and the possibility of appearing objective and authoritative.

³⁸⁶ Albert Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College* (New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1925), 168.

awarded for the best essay submitted on naval education. It was Lieutenant Commander C. F. Goodrich who recommended the establishment of a Naval War College.³⁸⁷ Although it would be several years until its creation, a collaborative working relationship of theorists had begun. Over the next fifteen years, the reformers writing for the Naval Institute's Prize Essay contests would agree upon a common methodological approach, publicize their work, develop a following, and create the foundation for a quasi-general staff that could develop military doctrine and direct battleship legislation.³⁸⁸

Luce fashioned the Naval Institute's Proceedings in order to establish an institution that could function to assess naval doctrine. He began by selecting the investigative direction of the Prize Essay Contest. In 1877, the annual prize for the best essay on naval education was announced. Luce asked members of the institute to submit articles to the sympathetic editor of the Army and Navy Journal.³⁸⁹ Luce continued to select Prize Essay topics, but parted with the project for a number of years while establishing a new training program for enlisted men. Luce had Admiral Porter keep the idea alive in the annual report.³⁹⁰

Mahan and Goodrich contributed to the project by suggesting the type of specialization a new educational institution should provide. Mahan thought that progress of the mechanical sciences, and vast changes in naval ships, made it necessary for the organization to have a corps of specialists. Mahan felt, however, that a technological foundation would not be adequate to

³⁸⁷ Casper F. Goodrich, "Naval Education, (I) Officers, (II) Men," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* V (1879): 322-44.

³⁸⁸ Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," 27. To Naval Institute theorists were to function as an epistemic community, members would need to develop a common set of causal beliefs based on internally defined criteria for evaluation, and a common policy project. In the late 1870s Naval Institute theorists focused their minds upon military education. The *Proceedings* offered a forum for officers to formally address common sets of causal beliefs, criteria for evaluation.

³⁸⁹ J. A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 15-17.

³⁹⁰ *Annual Report of the Naval Department*, 1881, 39; 1883, 393.

resolve the larger issue of naval doctrine, he said, “no amount of mental caliber, far less, any mere knowledge can compensate for a deficiency in *moral force* in our profession.”³⁹¹

Lieutenant Goodrich, on the other hand, said that postgraduate studies might help reformers overcome cultural and institutional resistance to modernization. Goodrich said, “The American people, as a natural deduction from their keen love of liberty, have ever cherished an equally keen antipathy to a large standing army and navy.” Naval education, “when viewed in this light, will be found to assume new dignity as the well advised means towards a noble and laudable end.” Therefore, he suggested “the establishment of a post graduate course for encouraging, fostering, and developing specialties within the profession.”³⁹²

Commander F. E. Chadwick and Lieutenant Soley weighed into the essay contest with concerns about America’s geo-strategic position. Chadwick said, “While England, France, Italy, and Germany were all making radical changes in their training and treatment of men, we...only wait for them to come.”³⁹³ Lieutenant Soley noted how the training of soldiers needed to be reconsidered in light of America’s position in the world. “We must first of all train up a body of men to fight on the sea; but so long as there exists a possibility of our having to fight on shore, let us prepare for that exigency too.”³⁹⁴

Although the Naval Institute reform officers agreed that graduate studies would advantage the service, there was still not a consistent rationale for creating a post-graduate institution. This changed after Luce wrote his “War Schools” Article. Admiral Porter confirmed

³⁹¹ Commander A. T. Mahan, *The Record of the United States Naval Institute*, February 13, 1879, 345, 346.

³⁹² Lieutenant Commander C. F. Goodrich, *The Record of the United States Naval Institute*, February 13, 1879, 324, 325, 326.

³⁹³ Commander F. E. Chadwick, *The Proceedings of the United States Navy*, February 19, 1880, 17.

³⁹⁴ Lieutenant John C. Soley, *The Proceedings of the United States Navy*, May 20, 1880, 271.

that reform required a coherent methodological approach. In his annual address of 1880, he cited from Luce's "War Schools,"

Every lover of science becomes familiar not only with the great laws of nature, but also with the operations of these laws in multitudes of details, appreciates the co-relation of natural forces, and thus becomes a more intelligent worker in his own specialty....History generally gives enough of the essential facts concerning what was actually done, or not done, to give all the data which the military student needs for his purposes.³⁹⁵

Luce was referring to the kind of historical application done at the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and the new Infantry and Cavalry Schools of Application. The Department of Military Art and Science at Fort Monroe particularly impressed Luce. The army schools derived from the examples of German military education. Their model was the Berlin *Kriegsakademie*, which had stored and studied all of the strategic principles of great campaigns. According to the Prussian view, war was a distinct body of knowledge; it could only be mastered by long years of study and practice.³⁹⁶

Emory Upton was the man who brought German military education to the United States. Upton visited Japan, China, India, Persia, Russia, Italy, Austria, Germany, France, and Great Britain, and returned in 1878 to publish a book on his tour, *The Armies of Asia and Europe*. He observed that many governments had established postgraduate meritorious institutions; officers could study strategy, grand tactics, and the science of war. Upton recommended that the U.S. Army establish similar schools. When he was appointed to head the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, he revamped its curriculum and introduced courses in "Universal History," "The Operations of War," and "Military Logistics." Upton said that his aim was to develop a sort of

³⁹⁵ *Journal of the Military Institute*, May 1880, 4-6.

³⁹⁶ Ambrose, *Upton and the Army*, 89. The Prussian view also enforced the notion that doctrine should be created by the specialist, the expert, the scientist. Others were to act deferentially to expert opinion, especially if based upon science.

military general staff, “to train a corps of officers who in any future contest may be the chief of reliance of the government.”³⁹⁷

Luce “War Schools” article builds from Upton’s efforts. He asked Upton for advice to help advance a naval postgraduate program.³⁹⁸ With Upton’s encouragement, Luce began to plan a similar school, which would do for naval officers what Upton’s school was attempting to do for artillerymen. In 1877, Luce wrote to Secretary of the Navy R.W. Thompson, explaining his proposal. Luce attempted to gain wide support for the idea by sending a copy to William Conant Church, editor of the Army Navy Journal. The Naval War College, he explained, was to be based on the same revolutionary idea that had inspired the German staff schools; the idea that war was a unique body of knowledge that could be taught and learned by other professionals.³⁹⁹

Luce took no further action on the matter until 1883. Then, at the founding meeting of the Newport branch of the Naval Institute, he read his “War Schools” address, in which he reviewed the activities of the army’s three advanced schools with attention to the Artillery School at Fort Monroe. There, he said, the course of study was calculated to qualify the officers for highest command. The army’s school was to prepare both officers and enlisted men “for the great business of their lives...the operations of war.” Luce underscored the navy’s need for such schools, saying it was essential for its officers to be educated in the sciences of war.⁴⁰⁰ Since the principles of strategy were of general application, one method of “discovering” them would be to

³⁹⁷ Emory Upton, *The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and England* (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1878), 362.

³⁹⁸ Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College*, 169-71.

³⁹⁹ Russell Frank Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, The Wars of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 169-70. This was Luce’s revolutionary contribution to naval doctrine. European general staffs, in particular the Prussian general staff, was made up of land officers using land tactics to develop grand strategy. Luce wanted to develop this function using naval theorists.

⁴⁰⁰ Stephen B. Luce, "War Schools," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* IX (1883): 635-37.

have military strategy taught to naval officers. The other method was to study history in order to discover examples of correct application of the principles in past campaigns.

The 1882 Prize Essay Contest incorporated Luce's "War Schools" suggestions. For the first time, historical analysis was used as the principle methodological approach to naval analysis. The essays were to address lessons that could be gleaned from history and applied to doctrine. Luce noted, "no less a task is proposed than to apply modern scientific methods to the study and raise naval warfare from the empirical stage to the dignity of a science."⁴⁰¹ He confirmed this belief when he wrote to Navy Secretary William E. Chandler in 1884, saying, "I take the ground that naval warfare can best be studied by the comparative method adopted by the great scientists with such eminent success."⁴⁰²

Establishing the Naval War College

The monopolization of doctrinal development proceeds with the establishment of an institution devoted to the application of the historical method and operational planning. Luce began a campaign to have the institution at Newport Rhode Island. To aid in the campaign, he enlisted Porter, the Admiral of the Navy. Porter arranged an interview for Luce with Naval Secretary Chandler. Luce then told Chandler that, like the Artillery School, the Naval War College was to be a "school of application" where new tactical ideas could be carried in the field. The Secretary had Luce present his plans to the bureau chiefs.⁴⁰³ After a series of meetings, the board issued a report that said an advanced course of naval education is brought about by the "constant changes in the method of conducting naval warfare imposed by armored ships, rams,

⁴⁰¹ Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," 529.

⁴⁰² Luce to Chandler, March 8, 1884, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁴⁰³ Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College*, 146. The chiefs of the Bureau of Navigation, Ordnance, and Steam Engineering, were the professional heads of the navy.

torpedoes and high powered guns.”⁴⁰⁴ In response, Chandler issued General Order No. 325, dated October 6, 1884: “A college is hereby established for an advanced course of professional study to be known as the Naval War College.”⁴⁰⁵

Chandler appointed the officers suggested by Luce, the participants of the Naval Institute’s Prize Essay contests that used the comparative historical method. James Soley, John Meigs, French Chadwick, William Sampson, Alfred Mahan, Charles Stockton, Henry Taylor, Charles Rogers and Casper Goodrich.⁴⁰⁶ Of the thirty-two naval officers who served on the War College faculty through 1889, thirty were members of the Naval Institute and twenty-eight contributed to the Proceedings.⁴⁰⁷

For over a decade Luce had been developing a community designed to explore the relationship between land and sea warfare, and to form a science based upon the principles underlining both. Now Luce had a corps of theorists working together to fulfill his ambition. Lieutenant Commander Casper F. Goodrich and Captain William T. Sampson were members of the Naval War College Board. Prized professor James Soley, member of both the Naval Institute and ONI, was to arrange operational planning. Also, Charles Rogers from ONI and Bainbridge Hoff, Meigs, specialists in land tactics, were expected to help discover the general principles underlying all warfare. These men would define the corpus of naval doctrine, largely from the new direction of military schools in Europe. Finally, Luce included Tasker Bliss, from West Point. Bliss was given the specific duty of discovering the link between the new military science, developed in the European staff schools, and the reform officers who were to apply it to sea warfare. In November 1885, Luce told the Secretary of the Navy:

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 169.

⁴⁰⁵ *Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1885, 114.

⁴⁰⁶ Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College*, 48.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 52.

The absence of this officer would materially change the most important object of the curriculum. The recommendation...was made with a special view to a comprehensive course of study in the art and science of war and by method which will have the merit it is believed of being entirely original with our navy.⁴⁰⁸

University postgraduate education was not a concept in 1885. As a result, the Naval War College idea was not fully supported by naval officers. The project was also hampered since Luce, Mahan, Sampson, and Hoff were not able to agree completely upon the curriculum — its focus and purpose. Because the college was created when Congress was authorizing new ships, the Naval War College idea had to compete for resources with officers and politicians who preferred spending for the acquisition of new ships. As a result Edward Simpson, who was building the ships, and not Luce, who was building the intellectual infrastructure, was elected president of the Naval Institute in the transformative years 1885–1887.⁴⁰⁹

At a time when conflicting concepts for rebuilding the navy were being debated, it is not surprising that the competition spawn some alternatives to the Naval War College for postgraduate education. To understand the formation of its curriculum, it is necessary to assess the points of view about its purpose. Tied to Luce's concept of professionalism was his dictum that the comparative method had to be applied to naval warfare. For the individual officer, Luce thought, the method of study was all-important. He warned that some men had "consumed their lives in fruitless industry, not because their labor was slack but because their method was sterile." If the navy were to avoid similar futility, Luce felt, they must employ the scientific method. He demanded consensus on this point.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁸ Luce to Chandler, November 28, 1885, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁴⁰⁹ Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College*, 44-52.

⁴¹⁰ Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," 528.

Luce delivered a lecture in 1885 at the college titled “On the Study of Naval History (Grand Tactics).” In this presentation he told students and faculty members that “naval victory had generally been with that leader who had the skill to throw two or more of his own ships upon the enemy. That is one of the most valuable lessons of naval history and...is one of the fundamental principles of our science.”⁴¹¹ He urged naval officers to undertake a “philosophical study of military and naval history that we can discover those truths upon which we are to generalize.” He added,

In the pride of advanced civilization, we are too apt to look with contempt upon the old sailing tactics, and the battles fought under them. But even in the days of steam and electricity, we may study with advantages the works not only of John Clark and Paul Hoste, but of Thucydides and Herodotus.⁴¹²

When Naval War College classes began in 1885, Bliss was called in from the army to lecture on military strategy and tactics, while James R. Soley was to lecture on international law. Luce, Sampson, and Goodrich were on the first Board of Control; their task was to further consider the direction of the institution. Although comparative historical methodology was the catalyst that brought the group together, the function of the institution was not fully grasped at the time of its creation. Its purpose was debated at a meeting of the Naval Institute on October 13, 1886. On that occasion, A. P. Cooke read his paper on “Naval Reorganization” and Sampson chaired the discussion, which was carried on by Hoff and Commander Harrington. Although the founding board had written that one of its tasks was to “bring to the investigation of the various problems of modern naval warfare the scientific methods of other professions,” questions

⁴¹¹ Stephen B. Luce, "On the Study of Naval History," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XIII (1887). In this lecture he called attention to the works of various military and naval historians worthy of study, in particular General Henri Jomini. Luce said, “the existence of fundamental principles, by which all the operations of war should be conducted, has been by the researches of Jomini,” Luce noted what had been done by Jomini in land warfare: “is yet to be done for naval science.” It was yet to be done for warfare in general.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*: 178-79.

remained about the precise function of the War College.⁴¹³ Over the next three years, they attempt to define the mission of the institution by refining a method of historical analysis that would unite the faculty. Harrington, Bliss, Soley, Taylor, Hoff, Meigs, and Rogers, each utilized increasingly similar versions of historical methodology, each designed to illuminate aspects of naval doctrine.

Sampson explained that the college was founded to teach subjects that were taught nowhere else. He felt that its original purpose was to be a type of general staff, operating to create, examine, and study war plans. After long, rigorous study and investigation, its students would come to understand war. They would then apply their knowledge to current problems and produce plans to guide the pursuit of larger strategic objectives during war. The Naval War College was not merely to be a postgraduate school. For Sampson, it was to serve a higher, more comprehensive purpose as an advanced institution for professional instruction and practices that might instruct other services.⁴¹⁴

Not every member of the Naval War College faculty accepted the idea that the school should engage in operational planning or grand strategy assessment. For Hoff, its purpose was to develop tactical thinking and stimulate a few officers to further development and more study in “some postgraduate” courses. Hoff said that if the Naval War College would not offer this instruction, it could only point the way for further advanced study elsewhere.⁴¹⁵

Sampson defended Luce’s position by rebutting Hoff’s argument. Sampson created a taxonomy of naval knowledge, and placed Luce’s science into this framework. The problem, he felt, was that the president, his cabinet and the secretary of the navy needed knowledge on which

⁴¹³ Luce, "War Schools," 633.

⁴¹⁴ Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," 528. Sampson discusses Cooke, "Naval Reorganization," 525.

⁴¹⁵ Bainbridge Hoff discusses Cooke, "Naval Reorganization," 533-534.

to base wartime decisions. Decision makers had to understand the enemy, his resources, and his capabilities.⁴¹⁶ The Naval War College was to exist at a higher level, he said; “it was founded for the purpose of fulfilling the functions of a general staff.”⁴¹⁷ Sampson understood such a staff in the European terms of the day, it was to function in order to create and implement grand strategy.⁴¹⁸

The original plan for the Naval War College, said Sampson, called for the assembly of a class of officers to study a war problem, indulge in months of consideration and perfect a war plan for future use. Sampson congratulated Luce for seeing this need and for establishing the institution, but, he said, Luce’s plan was not functioning as it had been envisioned.⁴¹⁹ Speaking to the faculty, Sampson urged them to stay with its original plan and teach the science of war and Naval History, the studies necessary for the creation and application of broader U.S. policy, taught nowhere else.⁴²⁰

Hoff responded by differentiating levels of postgraduate education for the officers. He thought the Naval War College was an intermediate step between the Naval Academy and further instruction for the elite. Those higher professional courses could be offered, “perhaps best here at Annapolis. It is not its province to instruct in this regard,” he said of Newport.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁶ Sampson discusses Cooke, “Naval Reorganization,” 533-534.

⁴¹⁷ Sampson discusses Cooke, “Naval Reorganization,” 524.

⁴¹⁸ D. M. Schurman, *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 10. In Europe, the general staff was given decision-making autonomy and authority, separate from the legislative assemblies and the executive

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 525.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.* The content of the officer’s professional education and the physical location of its instructions were two other problems facing developers of the Naval War College. After the publication of Luce’s “War Schools,” officers joined the debate and raised questions on these points. Writing in 1886, Rogers called for a postgraduate school for mature officers. He would have sent them there after they had practiced their specialties and the “novelties of naval science” at sea. He thought there was “no place so fit as Annapolis” for this advanced work, as it was “a complete and well organized...establishment.”

⁴²¹ Bainbridge Hoff discusses Cooke, “Naval Reorganization,” 525.

Sampson responded again to Hoff, saying the Naval War College was “not a rival of the Naval Academy.” He continued, this “course demands mature minds for its study....It was not a fanciful scheme to increase the already endless examination for naval officers.” Rather, he emphasized, the college “evolved from the necessities of the service.”⁴²²

A review of the varied preferences for advancing theoretical education illustrates the diversity of views that would need to be reconciled. Goodrich wanted a fifth year at Annapolis. Rogers wanted a few advanced courses for mature officers. Mahan favored specialty schools such as that at that at Torpedo Station. Calkins wanted some officers sent to civilian universities to master the sciences. He also wanted to offer courses in naval history and warfare at a postgraduate level. Rogers and Hoff wanted less technical and more comprehensive instruction at Annapolis.⁴²³

The preferences also were varied regarding the function of the Naval War College. The preferences were a mix of personal, political, and educational desires. It was an administrative organization to some. Others claimed its facilities should be devoted to the solutions of tactical problems. Also, its relationship with the office of Naval Intelligence was uncertain, as were their respective roles in planning a general staff. It could not meet all of the needs expressed by the officers for advanced education.

Between 1885 and 1888, the function of the institution and its relationship to larger educational objectives became more clearly defined in the pages of the Proceedings. Intellectual uncertainties gave way to unity of purpose and mission. Naval War College faculty came to understand the function and mission of their institution to serve as a general staff prototype,

⁴²² Sampson discusses Cooke, “Naval Reorganization,” 510.

⁴²³ Bainbridge Hoff discusses Cooke, “Naval Reorganization,” 510. Rogers, “What Changes in Organization and Drill Are Necessary to Sail and Fight Most Effectively Our Warships of the Latest Type?,” 365.

similar to that proposed by Luce's article, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science,"

September 1885:

Naval History abounds in materials whereon to erect a science....and it is our present purpose to build up with these materials the science of naval warfare. There is no question that the naval battles of the past furnish a mass of facts amply sufficient for the formulation of laws or principles which, once established, would raise maritime war to the level of science. Having established our principles by inductive process, we may then resort to the deductive method of applying these principles to such a changed art of war as may be imposed by later inventions or by introduction of novel devices. Hence, to elevate naval warfare into a science, as we now propose doing, we must adopt the comparative method...we must co-ordinate the study of naval warfare with military science and art. That is the theory on which we are now to proceed...For having no authoritative treatise on the art of naval warfare under steam...we must resort to the well-known rules of the military art with a view to their application to the military movements of a fleet, and, from the well-recognized methods of disposing troops for battle, ascertain the principles which govern fleet formations....It is by this means alone that we can raise naval warfare from the empirical stage to the dignity of a science.⁴²⁴

In this declaration, Luce claimed that his theorists had acquired methodological consensus. He also suggested that the War College was about to realize what his "War Schools" article anticipated, a general staff for operational planning.

Incorporating the Old-Guard

Donald M. Schurman argues that from Luce's science, naval historians participated in the "birth and development of serious scientific history to direct American Policy."⁴²⁵ This effort required the incorporation of senior officers. Luce encouraged David Dixon Porter⁴²⁶ and Robert

⁴²⁴ Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science." An explanation of Mahan's view of naval science at this time is provided by Robert Seager II, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 163-65.

⁴²⁵ Schurman, *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914*, 6.

⁴²⁶ Porter favored subsidies to American shipping as the best way to create a merchant fleet. Porter listed over 175 industries that would benefit from an increase in domestic shipping. The American Shipping and Industrial League

W. Shufeldt⁴²⁷ to consider the British bombardment of Alexandria, Egypt, in July 1882. Luce wanted them to ask whether it taught the lesson that fortifications were a poor match for rifled cannon.⁴²⁸ Porter and Shufeldt's position in the mid-1880s reflected the territorially conservative view of U.S. foreign policy.⁴²⁹ The admirals rested their argument on the premise: "We have no colonies; we neither anticipate nor advocate their acquisition."⁴³⁰ At this time, reformers felt that "the surest deterrent will be a fleet of swift cruisers to prey on the enemy's commerce... This threat will deter a possible enemy, particularly if coupled with adequate defense of our principal ports."⁴³¹

It was Shufeldt who first criticized the traditional defense policy. He said that the "man-of-war precedes the merchant man and impresses rude people with the sense of the power of the flag which cover the one and then the other."⁴³² This idea, that America possessed the qualities for naval greatness, was passed along by Luce in correspondence to Representative Washington C. Whitthorne and Naval Institute theorist William Glen David.⁴³³ Luce was looking abroad, largely motivated by the work of Shufeldt and German theorists; he also thought highly of England's leading naval theoretician, John Laughton, and France's Aubude and the *Jeune Ecole*.

compiled the list. *Congressional Record*, 48th Congress, 1st Session (1883): 406-407.

⁴²⁷ Robert Wilson Shufeldt, *The Relation of the Navy to the Commerce of the United States. A Letter Written by Request to Hon. Leopold Morse, M.C., Member of Naval Committee, House of Representatives* (Washington: J. L. Ginck, 1878). Shufeldt lays out what became a standard argument, "The old paths of commerce are well known, but as manufactures increase, new markets must be found and new roads opened." His solution: "The Navy is, indeed, the pioneer of commerce." Shufeldt remained a traditionalist; commerce protection, in his view, did not require battleships with offensive capabilities.

⁴²⁸ Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 13-26. Edwin Bickford Hooper, *United States Naval Power in a Changing World* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 85-89. Robert William Love, *History of the Us Navy*, 2 vols. (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 348-52.

⁴²⁹ Quoted in Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*, 20.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Mahan to Ashe, March 1882. Cited in Peter Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism* (New York: Free Press, 1972), 334.

⁴³² Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*, 24.

⁴³³ Read Seager II, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters*, 198-201.

It was Laughton's "The Scientific Study of Naval History"⁴³⁴ and "An Essay on Navy Tactics"⁴³⁵ that Luce began to quote in the 1880s.⁴³⁶ History, he said, "has showed that good soldiers, familiar with the principles of strategy and tactics had been more successful in fleet actions than experienced sailors who were ignorant of these principles."⁴³⁷ The statesman must be aware of these principles, yet no institution existed for them to be taught.⁴³⁸

Monopolizing History's Lessons

In October 1885, Mahan officially joined the faculty of the Naval War College. Luce told him little about the school's educational mission. Luce did explain to Mahan his strong conviction that the institution would explore the principles by which human activity and progress was regulated. He cited Henry Thomas Buckle, and explained that the school could uncover scientific law and point out the fundamental interchangeability of military and naval tactics. "Not surprisingly," says Robert Seager, Mahan's "mentor's concepts of the mission of the War College soon became his, as did many of Luce's views on naval history and tactics."⁴³⁹ Mahan had difficulty comprehending Luce's vision and imagining tactics relevant for a steam-centered navy. There was little literature on that highly technical subject. Eventually, however, Mahan would arrive at conclusions that conformed to Luce's proposal: The principles for land and

⁴³⁴ *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution* XVIII (1875): 508-527.

⁴³⁵ In Gerard H. U. Noel, John Knox Laughton, and Charles Campbell, *The Gun, Ram and Torpedo: Manoeuvres and Tactics of a Naval Battle in the Present Day...Prize Essay* (London: Griffin, 1874).

⁴³⁶ Luce would acknowledge in his footnotes, "to whom we are indebted for many valuable lessons." Stephen B. Luce "Tactics and Naval History" *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 1887, cited in Stephen Bleecker Luce, John Daniel Hayes, and John B. Hattendorf, *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce* (Newport: Naval War College, 1975), 71.

⁴³⁷ Luce, "On the Study of Naval History," 192.

⁴³⁸ Ronald H. Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1977), 38.

⁴³⁹ Seager II, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters*, 165. Luce instructed Mahan on which line of inquiry to pursue (he was instructed to explore Jomini rigorously) and to tackle the application of land tactics to war at sea, "a subject Mahan knew virtually nothing about."

ground combat are unchangeable, said Mahan, ergo the central thrust of naval strategy ought to center upon firepower concentration and fleet formation under sail. “This idea, more easily conceived than accomplished, was of uncertain practical applicability to the fast new steam and steel warships being built by the world’s navies in the 1880s.”⁴⁴⁰

Mahan also considered the elements of the tactics of land warfare used in the Napoleonic wars. He drew upon Napoleon’s rapid deployment and movement of infantry and cavalry, as this technique was explained by Jomini in his The Summary of the Art of War. For Jomini, successful war turned on the capture and possession of an enemy’s major military points, not necessarily its capital city. He emphasized the tactical importance of concentrating superior troops or (firepower) in combat. Also he advocated the speed provided by cavalry and the swift movement of infantry to achieve momentary firepower concentration in the field against an inferior segment of the enemy’s force. The idea was to destroy the enemy’s armies gradually by preventing their junctures (concentrations).⁴⁴¹

Mahan came to see a combat relationship between a fleet’s ram vessels, its torpedo boats, and its fast ships of the line (battleships) in much the same way Jomini viewed the relationship of cavalry to the main body of the army. It was an argument derived from historical analogy designed to explain the manner in which sail or steam fleets ought to concentrate firepower upon the enemy.

In 1886 Mahan hit upon the idea that his best prospect of making a lasting contribution to the theory of modern naval tactics was to “keep the analogy between land and sea naval warfare before my eyes.” Luce had given Army Lieutenant Bliss the same task. The two men worked

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., 167.

⁴⁴¹ Thus the destruction of the enemy army in the field, rather than the occupation of its territory or the siege of its cities, was the strategic key to victorious warfare.

toward theoretical parsimony, it was Mahan, who confronted the problem of how to treat modern naval tactics. He reported his solution to Luce:

Now I believe myself to have a good working knowledge of most of the important naval campaigns of the years 1660-1815, and the tactics of the various battles. Of course the question thrusts itself forward: under all the conditions of naval warfare of what use is the knowledge of these bygone days...I believe that knowledge of the great battles between sailing fleets will help in the solution of the problem. There will too always remain the great naval lessons...of preponderance gained by activity, promptness, watchfulness, care foresight and attention to details...I think these are most true to an army, land force. By February 1st I expect to begin with Jomini and having naval conditions constantly before my mind, I shall hope to direct analogies.⁴⁴²

He wrote a week later to Sam Ashe.

How to view the lessons of the past so as to mould them to the lessons of the future, under such differing conditions, is the nut I have to crack. To excogitate a system of my own, on wholly a priori grounds, would be comparatively simple, and I believe wholly useless. We are already deluged with speculation and arguments as to future naval warfare...I want if I can to wrest something out of the old wooden sides and 24-pounders that will throw some light on the combinations to be used with ironclads, rifled guns, and torpedoes; and to raise the profession in the eyes of its members by a clear comprehension of the great part it has played in the world than I myself have hitherto had.⁴⁴³

Luce realized that tactical claims based upon comparative history needed consensus to acquire authoritative weight. He also realized that only a community of specialists working in tandem could make a convincing claim that future naval battles would be fought much like they had been during the age of oars. Mahan appeared to be following Luce and moving the group in this direction.

Mahan became a part of an emerging consensus within the College that wanted to extend these lessons of history into formal analysis. Since the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings did

⁴⁴² Mahan to Luce, January 23, 1886, Mahan Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁴⁴³ Mahan to Sam Ash, February 1, 1886, Mahan Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

not run a single article on strategy or tactics from its founding in 1874 until 1886,⁴⁴⁴ the faculty needed to generate consensus from the fragmentary and unsystematic professional opinions of the time. Mahan said:

There is an entire lack of textbooks upon which to base a course of instruction. There is nothing in the range of naval literature to place alongside the many elaborate treatises on the art of war on land and its various branches. Much indeed has been written. But what has thus been produced is for the most part fragmentary, representative of special views, partial and unsystematic in treatment. No attempt has been made to bring the whole subject under review in an orderly well-considered method.⁴⁴⁵

Tasker Bliss would have the greatest influence upon the organization of this knowledge. He brought a fully-developed organizational approach from West Point. Bliss also adopted the system that emphasized the new military science as developed in the German staff schools to American naval men.⁴⁴⁶ By 1885, Hoff, Meigs, and Mahan endorsed this approach,⁴⁴⁷ signaling the first critical effort to cohere around the intellectual foundation of the organization.⁴⁴⁸

The community realized that strategic lessons of history did not exist in any current textbooks. They needed to “map the uncharted seas of the future and think creatively about the strategic and tactical capabilities of weapons the public didn’t particularly like or understand.”⁴⁴⁹ This meant clearing away the intellectual confusion surrounding grand strategy.⁴⁵⁰ Luce

⁴⁴⁴ Articles in the *US Naval Institute Proceedings* during this period were concerned largely with technical problems in ordnance, naval architecture, navigation, electrical engineering.

⁴⁴⁵ Quoted in *Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1887, 163.

⁴⁴⁶ Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*, 29.

⁴⁴⁷ “Reminiscences of Rear Admiral A.T. Mahan, March 24, 1908,” Naval War College Archives, Newport.

⁴⁴⁸ Example of this view include: Harold Hance Sprout and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 1st. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939). *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy* (1889): 1-50; Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown & co., 1890), 1-89. Alfred T Mahan, “The United States Looking Outward,” *Atlantic Monthly* LXVI, 1890, 816-824.

⁴⁴⁹ Robert L. O'Connell, *Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the Us Navy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 61. Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 60.

⁴⁵⁰ Edward Mead Earle, Felix Gilbert, and Gordon Alexander Craig, eds., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 210.

remarked, “The first great fact that presented itself to us was that in the entire related naval tactics, naval strategy, and the naval policy of a state, not only were there no instructors but there were no text books.”⁴⁵¹ Advancing Luce’s agenda required actors to define the self-interests of the state and formulate policies by framing alternative actions.⁴⁵²

Calkins, Chadwick and Soley began using the historical method to consider the personnel aspects of military doctrine. In their consideration of history, these officers found it could contribute to the development of individual character and abilities. Calkins saw it demonstrating the values of discipline and patriotism, as well as offering examples of past naval practices. Soley, now the Navy Department librarian and director of the Office of Naval Records and author of The Blockade and Cruisers, agreed with Calkins. He argued that history serves to train the mind and “widens the scope of man’s observation and interests.” He advised sailors to study naval history and the biographies of their predecessors to develop themselves in those directions.⁴⁵³

History was becoming more than a useful analytic tool for reformers. In addition to its value as a science of naval warfare, they felt history could serve to influence public opinion. Luce used it to such an end when he took the *Minnesota* on a training cruise up the Hudson River to Kingston, New York. While there, he entertained a member of the Naval Institute, B.W. Loring, whom he encouraged to write a history of the navy in an attempt to popularize the

⁴⁵¹ Luce to Tracy, March 14, 1889, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁴⁵² Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," 27. As an epistemic community, the group began to define knowledge based upon common sets of causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a common policy project. Naval reformers, working from a clean slate during a period of uncertainty, had an opportunity to first elucidate cause and effect relationships and provide advice. As the epistemic community model explains, Luce’s efforts would shed light on the nature of the complex inter-linkages between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to take action or from instituting a particular policy.

⁴⁵³ J.R. Soley discusses Calkins, “Usefulness of Officers,” 259.

service.⁴⁵⁴ In the same vein, Lieutenant W.R. Jacques's "The Establishment of Steel Gun Factories in the United States" expanded the Gun Foundry Boards report.⁴⁵⁵ It detailed the past history of American military manufacturing and explained current European trends. Jacques's report demonstrated the need to adapt past experiences to present conditions and the wisdom of Luce's comparative method.⁴⁵⁶ Similarly, Lieutenant Jacob Miller used a historical explanation to highlight how the German Krupp firm's production could be emulated by American producers. The analysis employed a chronological methodology and focused upon the unfortunate disconnect between American armor producers and American naval policy.⁴⁵⁷ The essays advanced the methods and agenda suggested in Luce's War Schools article, chronology, narrative development, and policy advocacy.

In addition to the specific uses of history enumerated by the Naval Institute reformers, Calkins, Chadwick, and David suggested that the study of history could develop personal discipline, a sense of patriotism, and critical and evaluative faculties in the individual officer. History's examples could show how others had met naval problems in the past. Its study could give an officer the background to effectively represent his country abroad when dealing with other nations. Lieutenant F. L. Winslow asserted the "similarity of the broader features of naval warfare in all times."⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵⁴ Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College*, 153-54.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Luce, "War Schools," 656.; Mahan, "Naval War College," 629; J. F. Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (1879): 694-96. Edward Simpson, "A Proposed Armament for the Navy," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII (1880): passim.

⁴⁵⁷ Jacob W. Miller, "The Development of Armor as Applied to Ships," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* V (1879): 512.

⁴⁵⁸ Lieutenant F L. Winslow, USN, discusses Calkins, "Usefulness of Officers," 249. To these factors, he applied informed reason of the professional inquiring into the history of his service. Through the application of history he attempted to ascertain the naval objectives, required by modern warfare. He said that the study of the history of war

Firepower: an Intellectual Consensus

What exactly were to be the lessons of strategic history? This question continued to be debated. However, by 1886 the elite group of Naval War College reformers worked through differing ideas about the ultimate purpose of American security. They began to converge upon a common criticism of *La Guerre de Cote*. The War College faculty (Casper F. Goodrich, Captain Henry C. Taylor, Commander William T. Sampson, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, French Chadwick, Commander Carlos Calkins, John F. Meigs, H. L. Abbott, William Little, and Washington I. Chamber) became interested in rooting out many traditional beliefs. Taylor told a class at the Naval War College that the lack of actual experience in large-scale naval warfare over the past eighty years had encouraged the growth of many erroneous beliefs:

It has bred fancies in our brains, very positive fancies, and, in many cases positively wrong....In the last 20 years there have been a large number of officers who have stated that there would be no fleet fighting...nor has it been in the newspapers alone that we have heard commerce destroying upheld as a good and cheap way of making powerful maritime nations sue for peace...In no way does a War College appear more needed than to dispel such ideas by bringing to bear upon the matter, the united attention of a number of officers of matured experience who...may combat fallacies dangerous to naval efficiency and national safety.⁴⁵⁹

Still, advocates of the *Jeune Ecole* continued to hold the position that the day of the large heavily armored vessel had passed. According to this view, the torpedo made the big gun superfluous and fleets should secure more speed than heavy armaments.⁴⁶⁰

at sea could “establish these characteristics and their structure.” With this method, “the general principles of war could be extrapolated from history.”

⁴⁵⁹ Henry C. Taylor, “Naval Tactics” (unpublished lecture, 1894) Chambers Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Cited in Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*, 203.

⁴⁶⁰ Theodore Ropp, “Continental Doctrines of Seapower,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, ed. Edward Mead Earle, Felix Gilbert, and Gordon Alexander Craig (Princeton: Princeton

The War College faculty, in 1887, stood together in opposition to this view and agreed that it would organize around the German military model. The question that remained was the changing nature of sea power and what should be done. The technological revolution persuaded Luce, Mahan, Meigs, and Bliss that the fleets and squadrons of the future would “perform military movements” with the same precision as armies. The faculty of the War College began to coalesce around increasingly similar conclusions in response to these two points.⁴⁶¹ They suggested that much of the technological confusion about naval construction had been resolved. The construction of the British *Admiralty*-class battleship, they thought, mark the emergence of a well-defined capital ship.⁴⁶² Generally the faculty agreed that the school needed to protect itself from “too close contact with the mechanical and material advance...to be found in the spirit of the age.”⁴⁶³

By the late 1887, members of the War College faculty began to forging a new naval doctrine. Bliss, Luce, Meigs, Abbott, and Soley used historical comparative methodology to rework the existing passive defense doctrine. The group had been building upon one another’s

University Press, 1943), 446-57.

⁴⁶¹ Hattendorf, *The Influence of History on Mahan: The Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of Alfred Thayer Mahan's the Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, introduction.

⁴⁶² Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land; Lectures Delivered at U.S. Naval War College, Newport, between the Years 1887 and 1911* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), 4. Luce and Mahan continued to promote the idea that immutable principles of strategy could be “discovered” by using the comparative method to apply military strategy to naval strategy. As Mahan told the class of 1887, “History being the record of experience, if exhaustively studied, brings out all the factors which enter into war. Principles and historical illustrations, each is a partial educator, combined you have in them the perfect instructor.” The “lessons of history” began to tell the faculty to challenge the relevance of *La Guerre de Cote*.

⁴⁶³ Mahan, “Naval War College,” 624. Speaking in 1886, as he was appropriating the theory of firepower concentration, Mahan demanded that history, not mechanics, shape thinking at the Naval War College. He explained his conviction in terms of the British, the French, and the American Revolutions. Through his analogy, Mahan prescribed a balanced approach that joined consideration of the arts of the tacticians and shipbuilders with the perceptions of the naval theoreticians. He showed that the French had time for thought while the British daily practiced the arts of the seaman when cruising offshore waiting for battle. Because of this, the English gave little thought to theory. As a result, Mahan pointed out, at the most critical juncture of the American Revolution, the French managed to outthink the practiced British seamen and American gained independence. From this example of history’s teaching, Mahan explained that the Naval War College would be able to provide unique guidance and instruction to both theory and practice.

work since the 1877 Prize Essay Contest, when they began to advance a systematic and comprehensive adaptation of parts of European naval doctrines. The critical questions were; how do national conditions affect a relationship to the sea? Did steam alter this relationship or were truly immutable principles at work? The faculty now held a coherent view, history and strategy seemed to resolve critical tensions. These ideas had been developed and debated in the Prize Essay contests; naval history, it was agreed, would be used to show how sea power was “vital to the national growth, prosperity, and security of great nations.”⁴⁶⁴

This was quite an advance, only two years earlier central figures in this reform group, such as Mahan and Calkins, agreed with the *Jeune Ecole* position; that a defensive coastal posture should remain the centerpiece of American security policy. Mahan agreed with Calkins that, command of the seas based upon fleets has only worked for Great Britain...and it has “never been able to maintain it for any long period.” Also, he felt that the construction of a fleet of battleships to “secure command of the sea...is unlikely to be approved by Congressmen because of expense and by professional opinion on the ground that types must become obsolete.”⁴⁶⁵

By 1886, Mahan moved away from his commitment to *La Guerre de Cote*. His lectures began to engage the most contentious issues addressed by the Prize Essay contests. He began to participate in the development and advancement of a coherent doctrine of American sea power. Naval evolution, he said, was possible only by expanding foreign commerce, because commerce was essential to national power and prosperity. To compete successfully in the worldwide

⁴⁶⁴ Margaret Tuttle Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, ed. Edward Mead Earle, Felix Gilbert, and Gordon Alexander Craig (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943).

⁴⁶⁵ Carlos G. Calkins, “The Coast Line of the United States Considered with Reference to Attacks and Defense,” 1888, Washington Chambers Paper, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

struggle for markets, a nation must have a strong merchant marine. It was the “wish of every nation” to confine “this business to its own vessels.”⁴⁶⁶ The merchant vessels must have secure ports at their destinations and protection throughout their voyages. A nation must have overseas colonies and a powerful navy. A strong navy was also essential to defend the colonies; and the colonies, in turn, provided indispensable bases to support oversea naval operations.⁴⁶⁷

In the first chapter of his work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan identified “those factors which tend to make a nation a great sea power.”⁴⁶⁸ This was hardly a novel speculation. William David laid out the six basic conditions in 1882. After that, Naval Institute reformers accepted David’s taxonomy as the foundation for theoretical speculation. Using David’s taxonomy as his foundation, Mahan could operate within an existing consensus. His community believed that to guarantee security to a nation’s merchant shipping, a prosperous merchant marine was central to its naval power.⁴⁶⁹

When, however, as in the case of the United States, a nation had neither colonies nor a large merchant marine to engage in foreign commerce, the problem was altogether different. For the U.S., the objective of naval policy was not to support a program of commercial expansion overseas, but to insure to foreign neutral shipping free access to U.S. ports.⁴⁷⁰ It was no longer

⁴⁶⁶ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, 26.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., 26-27 and 82-83.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., 49. After an examination of these factors (geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, national character, population and governmental institutions), Mahan came to the conclusion that England was uniquely fitted to be the mistress of the seas. The United States also possessed the potential to become a great naval power if the country could acquire suitable bases, enlarge its merchant marine, complete the “proposed Isthmian Canal” across Central America, and build battleships.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., 88. Most important, merchant shipping and strong maritime industries provided “a shield of defensive power behind which” a people could gain time “to develop its reserve of strength.” In countries with representative institutions, decision makers would exert the pressure necessary to keep the navy at a high standard of power and efficiency.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., 84.

sufficient to stop an enemy at the coast.⁴⁷¹ Hostile fleets could maintain an effective blockade of principal ports. The only way to avoid such blockades was to have a military force to endanger a blockading fleet.⁴⁷²

Mahan's formulation was a synthesis of Belknap, Kelly, David, and after 1885, Goodrich, Soley, and Bliss. For the first time, they created a single, coherent formulation of naval and national power, coupled with an argument for more national security and greater profits.⁴⁷³ Only a battleship navy could provide benefits in peace and in war. Even Mahan's synthesis had been anticipated in print. In 1887, as he collected his Naval War College lectures into a manuscript, Henry Taylor of the Naval War College published an influential article with the same strategic formulation. Taylor argued for the need to expand and control the Pacific. As Taylor explained, "It was not, therefore, until steamships became numerous upon the ocean highways that a canal joining the Mediterranean and Red Sea became justified by existing facts."⁴⁷⁴ These arguments were virtually identical to Mahan's and worked in combination to articulate a comprehensive alternative to *La Guerre de Cote*.⁴⁷⁵

Before Mahan and Taylor published their theories, attacks on *La Guerre de Cote* had been mounting inside the War College. In 1885, Sampson and Goodrich had dissented from the Endicott Board's recommendation to fortify everything from Florida to the Great Lakes by calling for armored seagoing warships that would "act offensively and not be confined to

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., 87.

⁴⁷² Ibid., 86. Defensive armored cruisers were unsuited for this purpose. They could not drive off an enemy's capital ships blockading the American seaboard. Commerce raiding, the chief function of cruisers, would neither relieve our own coast nor cripple a powerful maritime enemy. Moreover, commerce raiders, since the advent of steam, required secure and open ports for fuel, supplies, and repairs. Only a fleet of capital ships could keep ports open to receive U.S. cruisers.

⁴⁷³ Ibid., This formulation came with sectional profit making implications.

⁴⁷⁴ Henry Clay Taylor, "The Control of the Pacific," *Forum*, June 1887, 407-416.

⁴⁷⁵ Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*, 307.

defensive ports.”⁴⁷⁶ By 1887, the three members of the War College Board, Luce, Sampson, and Goodrich, all favored an offensive fleet. Other members of the War College faculty worked through supporting explanations. Discussing Luce’s article in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings, Commodore P. F. Harrington pointed out, “cruisers cannot prevent the descent of a hostile naval force upon our coast” and expressed the hope that “a dozen armored vessels will be built as soon as the material can be obtained.”⁴⁷⁷

The tide was also turning among the “old guard.” Throughout the 1880s, Admiral Porter had maintained his conviction that American naval strategy must be largely defensive. He thought fortifications and monitors lying just outside important harbors would repulse any enemy fleet attacking the American coast. However, by 1888, Porter began to fall into line with the Naval War College. Porter now sensed the increasing ability of fast armored ships to protect merchantmen and recognized that the closing of neutral coaling facilities in time of war made a definitive role unlikely for commerce-destroying ships of the future.⁴⁷⁸

Indeed, progressive officers came to agree that a large and competitive navy did not challenge the dominant strategic assumptions of the period. Even the most progressive of them, like Luce,⁴⁷⁹ believed that while the evolution of ships’ designs indicated that offensive fleet tactics were inevitable, the basic strategic posture of the nation must be defensive. Significantly, Mahan’s prescriptions in 1890 for offensive capital ship strategy and tactics were projections from the British global position.⁴⁸⁰ Officers could now, on one hand, advocate, with an

⁴⁷⁶ 49th Congress, 1st session, House Exec. Doc. No. 49.

⁴⁷⁷ “Comments and Discussion” section of *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (1889): 555.

⁴⁷⁸ Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889*, 21.

⁴⁷⁹ His *The North American Review* (1889) calls for the construction of seventy new warships, including ten battleships, and sixty cruisers. The most aggressive formal request made until that time.

⁴⁸⁰ Kenneth J. Hagan, ed., *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 156.

authoritative claim to specialized knowledge, the acquisition of offensive battleships; on the other hand, they could use the same argument, with the same authoritative claim, to profess that offensive battleships did not represent a fundamental shift in American policy. History could be perceived as scientific and objective, even when reformers selected cases that neatly conformed to a priori theory. This logic would buttress battleship advocacy throughout the 1890s.

By 1888, the rationale for acquiring battleships was accepted by the War College faculty.

As professor of tactics Lt. John Forsyth Meigs said:

It might first appear...that naval warfare might with advantage make a war upon commerce alone...and that therefore there was no use in building ships of the line...But history positively stamps this policy as false. Never has a powerful impression been created in war by mere commerce destroying. The control of the sea has again and again powerfully contributed to deciding great wars and the fate of nations...But this control has been and must always be decided by battleships, by ships that when united in fleets can overcome the enemy's fleets."⁴⁸¹

What was unique about this argument was how it embraced a specific policy conclusion — acquiring imperial battleships — which necessarily signaled the death of *La Guerre de Cote*. This argument is consistent with the postulates of offensive realism, the new doctrine was an attempt to acquire parity with European navies and the tools for regional hegemony. Luce realized that the evolution of ship design indicated that offensive fleet tactics were inevitable; however, he felt (most likely, only rhetorically) the basic strategic posture of the nation must be defensive.⁴⁸² If the strategic prescription of the War College reformers appeared constrained, they were well-positioned to persuade civilian audiences that battleships were merely a continuation of existing policy.

⁴⁸¹ Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 655-98.

⁴⁸² In the July issue of *The North American Review*, 1889.

History Confirms Battleships

For military writers in the 1880s, understanding “strategy” meant understanding the writings of Jomini. Antoine Henri Jomini was a military historian and “general de brigade” in Napoleon’s army. Switching sides late in 1813, he became military advisor to the czar and helped to found the Russian Military Academy.”⁴⁸³ Luce understood that Mahan was uniquely qualified to adopt European strategy. His father, Dennis Hart Mahan, had been the leading American exponent of Jomini during his career as a professor at West Point. He stressed the concentration of communication and strategic points.

In combination with the work of his fellow reformers, Mahan’s strategic writings became more than an adaptation of Jomini. Together these theories created a systematic treatise on the potential use of naval forces in peace and war. Moreover, the measures prescribed were diametrically opposed to traditional American practice. Mahan’s work provided a persuasive answer to the advocates of coastal defense and commerce raiding. His selective use of history pointed out that commerce raiding had never won a war, and that it had been the ability of the stronger navy to gain “control of the sea” and deny its use to the enemy that had been decisive in the end. To those who argued that the main function of the navy was to protect the seacoast cities, reformers could now use the new “science of naval theory” and reply, “the proper main object of a navy is the enemy’s navy.”⁴⁸⁴

Mahan’s contention was that to gain “command of the sea,” battleships, not cruisers, were necessary, and since the rule of concentration was the key to success at sea as well as on land, the battleships should be combined into a single fleet to be flung into action at the decisive

⁴⁸³ Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, ed. Edward Mean Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 85.

⁴⁸⁴ Mahan, *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land; Lectures Delivered at U.S. Naval War College, Newport, between the Years 1887 and 1911*, 107.

point. It was one of Jomini's fundamental principles that to bring one's major forces to bear upon the decisive areas of a theater was "maneuvering in such a manner as to engage one's major forces against parts only of those of the enemy."⁴⁸⁵ Most important, Mahan's work stressed Jomini's belief in the close connection between diplomacy and warfare, between the political and the military aspects of foreign policy. As Mahan later told the War College class of 1909, "I cannot too entirely repudiate any casual word of mine reflecting the view that political questions belong to the statesman rather than to the military man...I very soon learned better from my best military friend, Jomini."⁴⁸⁶

In 1889, Stephen Luce summed up the arguments of the battleship advocates in the North American Review⁴⁸⁷ and the Naval Institute's Proceedings.⁴⁸⁸ At this point, the entire faculty was in agreement; an offensive battleship fleet would be required for American national security.⁴⁸⁹ "The battleship" Luce said, "is the very foundation of the navy. The United States has no battleships; therefore she has no navy." Cruisers were merely auxiliaries; they were built to run away from battleships, not fight them. One of the functions of light infantry is to protect

⁴⁸⁵ Brinton, Craig, and Gilbert, "Jomini," 85.

⁴⁸⁶ Mahan, *Military Strategy*, 107.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 191. The members of the Naval War College faculty began to actively promote their work. Discussing Luce's article in the *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Comdr. Harrington, lecturer in tactics at the College, noted that the Naval War College faculty now believes "cruisers cannot prevent the descent of hostile force upon our coasts."

⁴⁸⁸ B. Franklin Cooling, *Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex, 1881-1917* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1979). Luce argued that a balanced fleet should be built around battleships and its primary duty should be offensive. In May of 1890, Mahan's manuscript for *Influence of Sea Power on History* appeared and provided the detailed historical argument that, in addition to Luce's article, would be employed by the War college faculty. These two works became the codification and expression used by Secretary Tracy to propose the first official plans for an offensive battleship navy and a new aggressive American foreign policy.

⁴⁸⁹ Walter R. Herrick, *The American Naval Revolution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). The Naval War College's agenda was further advanced in 1888 when Luce acquired the teaching and publishing services of Theodore Roosevelt. Luce continued to lobby in Washington. In July 1890, the college gained even greater support when professor Soley, instructor of tactics at the Naval War College, was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Tracy. His supporters suggested he become interested in the work of the college. After reading the combined work of Soley, Meigs, Luce, Roosevelt and Mahan, (the War College Faculty) Naval Secretary Benjamin Tracy was convinced that, "The War College is of the highest importance, nothing should be done to interfere with its efficiency."

the flanks of the army. “Our cruisers are to protect the flanks of what? Nothing! There is no main body, no line of battle, no battleships, no navy, nothing but accessories.” The United States, declared Luce, “needs twenty battleships at least.” The naval modernization of the 1880s built cruisers to maintain the *La Guerre de Cote*. These cruisers required battleship to assure their effectiveness.⁴⁹⁰

Conclusion

In this chapter I traced the collaborative working relationship of military theorists who were intent upon monopolizing the naval reform discourse of the 1880s. Officers reached a methodological consensus and the discourse became increasingly centralized and policy directed. As they came to use a common methodology, their work became a unified voice for battleship advocacy. Before 1887, there was no consistent theoretical rationale for acquiring battleships. After 1887, an identifiable epistemic advocacy began to construct a strategic doctrine in response to the uncertainty surrounding changing technological advances. The creation of the new doctrine was consistent with the predictions of offensive realism. Its creators took advantage of opportunities to pursue parity with European navies and to continue upon a course of regional hegemony. The doctrine, as the predictions of offensive realism have it, was an attempt to alter the balance of international power, but concealed in a language that sought simply to continue American’s liberal tradition. The new doctrine, therefore, assigned a commercial and military calculation of the costs and benefits associated with a new battleship policy. In the next chapter, I trace the networking process of the epistemic community as they extended battleship advocacy beyond the War College

⁴⁹⁰ Stephen B. Luce, "Our Future Navy," *The North American Review* 149 (1889): 63.

CHAPTER FIVE
EXTENDING THE REACH: MONOPOLY TO NETWORK



Fig. 5 The US Congress, 1889

Introduction

Chapter four traced the process by which Stephen B. Luce and his group of naval reformers came to share a common agenda—to organize operational planning and develop an organization to advance the higher functions of naval mission. By 1887 Luce’s reformers had centralized operational planning and directed American foreign policy toward extra-continental ship deployment. This meant advocating ships with armor and guns large enough to challenge the navies of Europe and command regional hegemony.⁴⁹¹ Reformers united around the belief

⁴⁹¹ I traced this evolution through an examination of the *US Naval Institute Proceedings*. Officers refined one

that commercial supremacy was a product of naval competitiveness.⁴⁹² This intellectual consensus was forged during the 1880s in light of the “unmistakable indications of growing unrest and dissatisfaction with traditional doctrines,” and would “herald the shift in focus to armored seagoing vessels increasingly aggressive and increasingly away from defensive ports.”⁴⁹³

In this chapter I explore the process by which this working relationship among military theorists was expanded into an advocacy reform movement. The networks that supported this effort included naval officers, politicians, and special interests.⁴⁹⁴ This chapter will continue to challenge principal-agent claims and demonstrate that bureaucratic actors developed the capacity to network by taking action consistent with their own preferences, actions to which politicians and organized interests deferred.⁴⁹⁵ Bureaucratic networking became possible when naval reformers reached an intellectual consensus to orchestrate a reorientation of America’s strategic doctrines⁴⁹⁶ If bureaucratic networking influenced battleship construction during the 1890s, during the 1880s we should see the epistemic community of naval theorists, described in chapter

another’s positions as they created a discourse that could function as a central voice for naval planning. The reformers included: Edward Simpson, Commodore John G. Walker, William T. Sampson, Casper F. Goodrich, Bainbridge Hoff, French B. Chadwick, F. M. Barber, Lieutenant Charles Very, William McCarthy Little, and Alfred Mahan.

⁴⁹² US Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, *Recent Naval Progress*, June 1887. Issues of *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (1879-1889) are discussed throughout the chapter. The process of refining a common methodology I called the mechanism that translated consensus into a monopoly over the reform discourse. See Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" And the American Historical Profession, Ideas in Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

⁴⁹³ Harold Hance Sprout and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 1st. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 198. Also, see J. A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 5-10.

⁴⁹⁴ Actors that successfully advanced battleship reform legislation through the late nineteenth-century patronage politics system.

⁴⁹⁵ Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4.

⁴⁹⁶ I argue that these actors used networking to overcome the critical obstacle to reform (state structure), by devising a strategy to go over the heads of intransigent bureau chiefs and oppositional congressmen.

four, extending into an advocacy reform community. The advocacy community would create support networks that included naval officers, politicians, and special interests.

Theoretical Considerations

It is controversial to suggest that state-centered actors were responsible for directing politicians to expand the state capacity. The “principal-agent” model of American politics assumes that bureaucratic actors follow the wishes of their “principals.” For example, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast argue that during the late nineteenth century, agencies had an “enacting coalition” of politicians that used administrative procedures to induce agencies to respond exclusively to the desires of the politicians to which they were beholden.⁴⁹⁷ By this logic, military theorists could not have produced change in American military doctrine or foreign policy. Such change could result only from the directives of politicians.

Richard Bensele noted how bureaucratic actors sometimes break from the principle-agent model, design new policies, form advocacy communities, and drive policy. He focuses on the activities of influential individuals within the state. According to Bensele, independent coalition-building is a central feature of bureaucratic autonomy and state capacity. When the structural principles associated with bureaucratic autonomy are satisfied, state bureaucrats, he says, develop “administrative capacity.” State actors are able to exploit political opportunities for future “societal penetration” by creating and leading political coalitions that support further enhancement of central state authority.⁴⁹⁸

Theda Skocpol also notes how state actors can pursue objectives that do not evolve from social pressure. Reformers can resolve solutions to institutional entrenchment by developing network-based coalitions. This is possible, she says, if a monopoly over a particular expertise

⁴⁹⁷ Randall L.M Calvert, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast, "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 3 (1989): 3.

⁴⁹⁸ Richard Franklin Bensele, *Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 110.

can attract talent for the state. State capacity, in this case, depends on “historically evolved relationships among educational institutions, and state organizations, that competes with the state for educated personnel.”⁴⁹⁹ She calls these “networks of attachment.” They are cooperative patterns of work forged through political networking, which occur after officials “develop attachments both to their fellow officials and to their bureaus as structured contexts of collaboration.”⁵⁰⁰

Daniel Carpenter agrees that network formation is a necessary part of overcoming institutional entrenchment. This capacity becomes possible, he says, when bureaucratic entrepreneurs developed program and network-based coalitions for the purpose of passing legislation. Bureaucratic actors are effective innovators, says Carpenter, when politicians believe that agencies can organize a system of administration that will satisfy the politicians’ interests in unforeseen ways.⁵⁰¹ This process of organizing is understood as an approach to entrepreneurship that centers upon the role of bureaucratic autonomy. According to him, bureaucratic autonomy is the product of an organization’s reputation and the networks that support it. Autonomy exists, according to Carpenter, when “bureaus have acquired lasting esteem and durable links to social, political, and economic organizations, links that rival or surpass those of politicians.”⁵⁰² More important, he says, when agencies “by virtue of their superior publicity, and established reputations, can make it politically costly to oppose their innovation, they have achieved a form of autonomy that modern political science fails to recognize.”⁵⁰³ For Carpenter, legitimacy is the

⁴⁹⁹ Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 16.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁰¹ Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*, 30.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, 355.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

foundation of bureaucratic autonomy. When politicians and the public become convinced that a bureaucracy can provide a unique and efficient service, create valuable programs, and gain the allegiance of coalitions of citizens, autonomy becomes possible.

In this chapter I argue that bureaucratic actors, as discussed in chapters three and four, were autonomous and influenced policy without, as Carpenter insists, first demonstrating organizational capacity. My model of bureaucratic entrepreneurship will explore how actors can function as “epistemic communities” in an effort to reshape electoral preferences. In this case, by leveraging the perception of national security expertise into consensus, then legitimacy, coalition formation, and finally, policy change. We see that attachments to these networks form, not because the community demonstrated the value of their service to outsiders, but because, as the epistemic community model suggest, conditions for epistemic advocacy and bureaucratic entrepreneurship were present.⁵⁰⁴

Epistemic Networking

As mentioned in chapter four, since the mid-1870s, Stephen Luce had refined the questions and methods of analysis used by a burgeoning community of theorists. During the early 1880s, Luce began a naval reform networking campaign that reached out to the media. Throughout the 1880s, he elicited support from leading journalists and editors. Publisher Daniel

⁵⁰⁴ Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 3-4. In this case, entrepreneurs from within the state were able to influence the development of the state by functioning as an epistemic community. Naval reform officers elucidated cause and effect relationships for the public, and provided advice during a period of uncertainty. They shed light on policy proposals, and helped define the interests of factions within the state through framing alternative actions.

⁵⁰⁵ The congressional naval debates of the 1880's reveal a lack of agreement about the purposes of the Navy and the direction of U.S. foreign policy. By contrast, the congressional naval debates of the 1890s reflect a comparatively high degree of consensus about U. S. naval mission and the future direction of U.S. foreign policy.

⁵⁰⁶ *Army and Navy Journal* XXVIII, January 3, 1891, 317.

Van Nostrand was the first to help Luce get his reform efforts into print. Next came the future editor of the North American Review, William H. Rideing, who championed Luce's cause in an article for Harper's Monthly.⁵⁰⁷

Others followed, including Jeannette and Joseph Gilder, founders and editors of the Critic; Lloyd Bryce, editor of the North American Review, and John Austin Stevens, author and editor of the Magazine of American History. The most important editor to embrace the Luce's agenda was William C. Church, founder-editor of the Army and Navy Journal and The Galaxy. Church had been with Luce at Port Royal during the Civil War, and when approached, he agreed that his journals would be the most effective means of publicizing the reform debate.⁵⁰⁸ The reform community also used acquaintances, letters, and articles to impress their ideas upon the public.⁵⁰⁹

Luce brought attention to the work of promising young reformers and introduced them to journal editors.⁵¹⁰ As early as 1879, Naval Institute theorists began to publicize points of agreement and shared objectives. On July 16, the Journal's editorial staff noted:

The officers of our Navy, belonging to the various branches of the Naval Institute, are shortly to engage in the discussions of the question of our naval policy; This being the case we hope that the purpose and the result of the proposed discussion will be to reconcile, rather than to increase the difference of opinion among officers, which are one cause of the indifference with which the question of our policy is viewed outside the naval circles.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁷ Nautical School Ship "St. Mary's," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, LIX, no. 351, August 1879, 340-349.

⁵⁰⁸ Luce to Church, October 1881, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1132.

⁵⁰⁹ Luce to Church, February 1882, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 1193. Luce suggests hyperbolic lead lines for future articles. The ideas were debated, and soon after, opposition emerged. The Naval Department bureau chiefs saw Luce's proposals as a threat to their own power and position. They resisted attempts to establish an alternative intellectual foundation for naval affairs. They saw little point in considering the broad aspects of warfare and preferred, instead, that officers immerse themselves in technical developments.

⁵¹⁰ Ronald H. Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1977), 21. His most significant scholarly contribution was the transmission of *avant-garde* ideas from contemporary European military thought to the American Navy. As Hayes and Hattendorf say, Luce's work may be seen as "an extension of the great trend in European military thought, particularly evident after the Franco-Prussian War, to seek more effective methods for military control."

⁵¹¹ *Army and Navy Journal*, July 1879, 175.

This reform effort, I argue, centralized and monopolized information pertaining to operational planning. Calkins described the process like this,

The navy will secure consideration just in proportion that it commands the respect for the individual intelligence and capacity of its members....For the development and cultivation of these faculties, a system of advanced education and training is proposed and the opportunities for the useful employment of naval officers in branches of public service which are not at present under control of the Navy Department.⁵¹²

Luce understood that the success of this networking campaign was tied to the success of the War College. He knew that many officers opposed the idea of a postgraduate institution to promote new strategic thinking.⁵¹³ He contacted Admiral Porter to ask if his office might serve as a meeting place for officers and politicians to discuss the War College.⁵¹⁴ Porter was an ally and had participated in Luce's reform discourse. Porter explained to Luce that his proposals aroused derision from many officers, and that most of the bureau chiefs were opposed.⁵¹⁵ To win over obstructionist officers and bureau chiefs, Luce would need to take his case to the people.

Networking Congress and the Public

Luce realized that, if research done by his community was to receive consideration in Washington, he needed to enlist help outside of the capital. Luce therefore enlisted Senator Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island, a prominent Republican senator and future majority leader. Luce explained "with the interests of the navy and the people of Newport running in the same

⁵¹² "Naval Necessities and Prospects," *Army and Navy Journal*, March 31, 1883, 766.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Grenville and Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917*, 17.

⁵¹⁵ Ronald H. Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1977), 21.

direction, we can pull together our mutual advantage.”⁵¹⁶ Luce won the support of Aldrich. The decision to have the college in Newport was critical to breaking the control of the state imposed bureau system. Since Newport was separated from the location of existing bureaus, the possibility of influencing all bureaus was possible.⁵¹⁷

As Luce secured a location with Aldrich, Admiral Porter secured an interview for Luce with Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler. Chandler was impressed by Luce’s proposal for a college. “Warfare has become so much a matter of science and precision,” he agreed, “that it would be utterly folly not to set all younger officers to study modern developments.”⁵¹⁸ Chandler arranged for Luce to present his plan to a meeting of the bureau chiefs. The chiefs were, however, unimpressed. Captain Montgomery Sicard of the Bureau of Ordnance actually found the idea preposterous.⁵¹⁹ Fortunately for Luce, one chief, the more influential Commodore James G. Walker, who headed the Bureau of Navigation, was enthusiastically in favor of the idea. As it turned out, Walker’s support was enough for Chandler to appoint a board headed by Luce to consider the question of postgraduate courses for the navy. Luce was careful to choose two members of the board, Captains Sampson and Goodrich, who had worked to advance the historical methodology. Goodrich and Sampson, had also helped found the college in 1884. Luce wrote to Goodrich, “in the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, you will find my ideas sketched out. Whenever you feel prepared to meet and draw up plans for the operation of such a school...inform me and I will convene the board.”⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁶ Luce to Aldrich, March 15, 1889, quoted in Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*, 98.

⁵¹⁷ Luce to Aldrich, May 19, 1884, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵¹⁸ Chandler to Luce, September 28, 1883, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵¹⁹ Luce to Chandler, February 21, 1883, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵²⁰ Luce to Goodrich, May 6, 1884, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Luce used the conflict with the bureau chiefs to publicize his intentions. In the Army Navy Journal he explained, “as has been more than once stated in these columns, the tendency of technical schools is to exalt theory at the expense of its co-partner, practice, and in any scheme of instruction for a naval college, this should be carefully guarded against.”⁵²¹ Luce continued his lobbying by asking Goodrich to persuade Secretary William Whitney to submit an appropriation bill, which provided \$10,000 for a building. In addition, Luce coaxed his friend, Representative Charles R. Boutelle of Maine, a former naval officer, to help lead the cause of the War College.

Luce’s insistence on having the War College at Newport aroused the opposition of the bureau chiefs, particularly Captain Earl English, chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, who was in charge of naval training facilities at Newport and who had not been consulted about the choice of a site. Similarly, Captain Ramsay, superintendent of the Naval Academy, felt that the college was a threat to the navy.⁵²² To which, Luce responded, “it must occur to them that our service is very far from perfection in directions apart from the void the school is to fill, and even independent of the wrongs done by the economical Congress.”⁵²³

Finally in 1884, Secretary Chandler succumbed to his campaign. He appointed Luce, Sampson, and Goodrich to design postgraduate courses, “giving in detail the reasons for establishing such a school, the scope and extent of the proposed course of instruction, and an opinion as to the best location thereafter.”⁵²⁴ Luce contacted members of Congress, such as Representatives Charles A. Boutelle and Washington C. Whitthorne, to include them in the planning phase. With the support of Porter, Walker, and Chandler, the objections of the other

⁵²¹ “Naval War College,” *Army and Naval Journal*, May 10, 1884, 842.

⁵²² Luce to Aldrich, December 7, 1883, Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵²³ “Naval Schooling,” *Army and Navy Journal*, July 12, 1884, 1090.

⁵²⁴ U.S., 48th Congress, 2nd session (1885) S. Ex. Doc. 8, *Instruction of Naval Officers*, p.2.

bureau chiefs were overruled, and Luce was appointed to head a board of inquiry. A few weeks later, the board submitted a report in favor of the establishment of the college.⁵²⁵ The Naval War College began March 8, 1884, when Secretary Chandler appointed Luce to head a board with Sampson and Goodrich.

Luce's networking efforts were set back when his idea for an institution to develop strategic planning set in motion new opponents. Congress had trouble coming to terms with the concept of a War College. The strongest opposition came from Captain Ramsay, who in 1884 wrote to Luce saying, "I cannot see the advantage in cutting down the present course for cadets in order that a postgraduate course may be established for officers. Neither can I find a reason for establishing another Naval Academy." Ramsey repeated his views to anyone in Congress willing to listen.⁵²⁶

Luce realized that he needed to continue to leverage the reform theories into Congressional support. He publicized the position that prevailing naval reform overemphasized engineering at the expense of universal strategic theories and restricted new technology from being harnessed.⁵²⁷ The Naval War College, he said, was designed to combat "technicism" and advance naval strategy into "the dignity of a systematic well digested system." Luce intended to expand the public's appreciation of their profession, and demonstrate the value of a "wide spread, deeply rooted, civil interest, such as merchant shipping would afford us." They also recognized that the age needed a prophet to arouse the people "to the need of naval power."⁵²⁸

⁵²⁵ *US Navy Department Annual Report*, 1885, 103.

⁵²⁶ Ramsay to Luce, January 10, 1884, in Albert Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College* (New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1925), 175.

⁵²⁷ Hayes, and Hattendorf, *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce*, 12. Luce called this tendency "technicism," and depicted it as a hostile force that hindered commercial progress and could be overcome only by those who understood how to employ the historical method.

⁵²⁸ *Report to the Secretary of the Navy*, February 11, 1885, 114. Cited in Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in*

William McCarthy Little was considered a potential prophet. He had adapted Belknap's theory of commercial expansion and naval modernization. As a theoretician, Little elucidated the relationship between national power and naval capabilities. He also developed naval war-gaming for the purpose of publicizing the work of the College.⁵²⁹ Other members of the War College faculty were also considered potential spokesmen, Mahan, Soley, Meigs, C. C. Rogers, and Bainbridge Hoff; all were integrating Little's work. Luce encouraged each of them to step up and give favorable accounts of the College in the Secretary of the Navy's Annual Reports of 1885 and 1886.⁵³⁰ In the mean time Luce would function as the prophet. He thought his contributions to Johnson's Encyclopedia, Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary, and Hamersley's Naval Encyclopedia, would provide him an opportunity to express what he viewed as the potential contributions of the institution.⁵³¹

These efforts made no headway with the Bureau chiefs, who continued to oppose the college. The opposition appears to have spilled into Congress, which refused to provide any money for the College in the 1885 and 1886 Naval Appropriation Bill. Fortunately for Luce, Aldrich had been able to secure funds in the 1886 Sundry Civil Appropriations Bill, and the following year he was responsible for having the North American squadron sent to Newport during the war college session.⁵³² For the year 1887, Aldrich and Luce hoped to secure an appropriation of \$12,000 for the War College, but the prospects were not promising.

In June 1886, Luce, now a Rear Admiral, was appointed to command the North Atlantic Station. Mahan, who came to the College in 1885, was assigned to prepare lectures and assume

American Military History (New York: Putnam, 1956), 114.

⁵²⁹ William Little, "The Strategic War Game or Chart Maneuver," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XXXIII (1884): 1212.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*, 10-13.

⁵³¹ "Naval Schooling," *Army and Navy Journal*, July 12, 1886, 1090.

⁵³² Luce to Aldrich, July 20, 1886, Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

the position of president. That summer the college survived by a narrow margin. Luce's attempt to secure an appropriation during the previous spring had failed, despite the support of Senator Aldrich.⁵³³

Mahan was encouraged by Luce's effort to extend support networks to the public. Since appropriations for the College did not appear, Mahan sought the support of special interests.⁵³⁴ When the Secretary of the Naval Institute sought to publish Mahan's lectures in the Institute's Proceedings, he declined by saying the audience was too narrow.⁵³⁵ In 1886, Mahan passed this approach along, and encouraged other faculty to expand the enterprise. Their sights were set upon exporters, manufacturers, farmers, shipbuilders, and "expansionists," as well as the public at large, saying, the profession was vital to the nation's commerce and wealth.⁵³⁶ He believed that this new direction would shape public opinion in favor of the college, naval modernization, and American prosperity.⁵³⁷

In the House, the enemies of the College were led by Representatives William McAdoo of New Jersey and Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama, both Democrats. The college's most determined supporter was Representative John R. Thomas, an Illinois Republican. In the Senate, the chief opponent of the War College was Eugene Hale, a Republican from Maine. Given the opposition in Congress, garnering support would be an uphill battle. "If I succeed in getting an

⁵³³ Aldrich to Luce, May 27, 1886, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵³⁴ Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Administration and Warfare: Some General Principles, with Other Essays* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1908), 229. Mahan to Scudder, October 11, 1890, and November 22, 1892, Mahan Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown & co., 1890), 76, 79.

⁵³⁵ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, 116-21, 404.

⁵³⁶ Alfred T. Mahan, *From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1907), 295-96.

⁵³⁷ Bradley A. Fiske, *From Midshipman to Rear-Admiral* (New York: The Century, 1919), 88.

appropriation for the Naval War College at all, it will be all that I shall be able to do,” wrote Aldrich to Luce.⁵³⁸

Luce worked to overcome this opposition by a networking effort that reached out to private citizens. He invited leads of Newport to attend the War College ceremonies of 1886 and 1887. Luce invited anyone of influence, the friends of the naval officers, congressmen and senators.⁵³⁹ Meanwhile, Commodore Walker was trying to raise money. He wrote to Luce in August 1886, “I shall hope to tide over the college until it has more friends. I have had pretty hard work to carry it, as the secretary is not at all in its favor.”⁵⁴⁰ Walker kept the War College alive during 1886. He wrote to Luce in November of that year: “I think the War College is now on pretty safe ground. I think the boon given it last summer has modified the Secretary’s views very considerably...it came very near being broken up last summer.”⁵⁴¹

In that year, Luce forged a bridge to the academic community. Congressional legislation authorized the appointment of twenty officers as university professors of military science and tactics provided. The authorization was raised to one hundred by 1893; Lieutenant Alfred C. Sharpe wrote that his service had found the professorships a useful way to create a proper “military sprit” among both civilian faculty and students, who might in turn influence the country at large.⁵⁴² The addition of human resources came as Walker managed to insert \$12,000 in the naval appropriation of 1887 to equip the College.

⁵³⁸ Aldrich to Luce, July 2, 1886, Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵³⁹ Luce Papers, in Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College*, 68.

⁵⁴⁰ Walker to Luce, August 21, 1886, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵⁴¹ Walker to Luce, November 28, 1886, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵⁴² Sharpe, "Military Training in Colleges," *Journal of Military Service Institution of the United States VIII* (1887): 405.

Then, Luce experienced a set back. On February 25, 1887, naval appropriations for the College were debated on the floor of the House. Commander Ramsay attempted to persuade the House that the college harmed the service. The Republican representatives from Connecticut and Rhode Island, John Ransom Buck and Henry Joshua Spooner, both spoke in favor of the college, but Democratic representatives William McAdoo of New Jersey and Hillary Herbert of Alabama made a mockery of the idea saying, “It is a great misfortune that our military schools should be established in connection with watering places, and characterized in certain seasons of the year as scenes of social display.”⁵⁴³ Opponents won the day. Appropriations were defeated.

Luce continued to rally support for the college. He organized a petition against its removal from Coaster Island, and he appealed to senators, congressmen, and members of the naval committees. Then, he redoubled his efforts. Looking around for more allies, he remembered Theodore Roosevelt, whom he had met before. Roosevelt was already a naval historian of some note, having published The Naval War of 1812. Luce figured he might be interested in the work of the College. Moreover, he was reported to have powerful friends in the councils of the Republican Party.

Luce’s letter to Roosevelt is a good example of the way in which he attempted to win friends for the college. It also reveals how Roosevelt became a part of the epistemic community after his association with the War College. Luce informed Roosevelt that “there is no question in my mind that your work must be accepted as the very highest authority we have on the subject,” and that it would be used as a textbook at the War College. “May we hope,” Luce inquired, “that the study you have given to the early history of the Navy will lead you to take some interest in

⁵⁴³ *Congressional Record*, 49th Congress, 2nd session (February 25, 1887): 18, 2287-90.

naval institutions now struggling through the ills of infancy.”⁵⁴⁴ Luce invited him to the War College to meet its then president, Alfred T. Mahan.

Roosevelt at the time was staying with his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, whose sister-in-law was married to Luce’s son. The future assistant secretary of the navy responded favorably. Roosevelt told Luce that he could not remember receiving “any letter which gave me more genuine pleasure than yours did; it gives me a real pride in my work. Praise coming from you is praise which may indeed be appreciated.” Roosevelt knew the college by reputation noting, “It is needless to say that I shall be delighted to do anything in my power to help along the Naval College.”⁵⁴⁵ When he visited the college he stayed a semester to lecture the “True Conditions of the War of 1812.”⁵⁴⁶

Still, the support network was far from complete, the College was repeatedly threatened with dissolution or removal to Annapolis. Commodore Ramsey induced the House Committee on Naval Affairs to deny the school appropriations even for essential needs as coal. Luce, Porter, and John G. Walker responded by rallying the forces favoring the college.⁵⁴⁷ So aggressively did Luce respond, in 1887, the New York Herald described him as “that meddling garrulous sailor.”⁵⁴⁸

Luce continued the campaign. He wrote to Secretaries of the Navy Whitney and composed a petition which Porter and members of the War College class of 1888 signed. Using this petition, he induced Washington C. Whitthorne, a leading Democratic member of the House

⁵⁴⁴ Roosevelt came to the class of 1888 and was treated to a series of lectures on “The True Conditions of the War of 1812.”

⁵⁴⁵ Roosevelt to Luce, February 13, 1888, Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵⁴⁶ Grenville and Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917*, 22-23, 210.

⁵⁴⁷ Walker to Luce, December 4 1887, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵⁴⁸ *New York Herald*, August 11, 1887.

Naval Affairs Committee, and family relation, Henry Cabot Lodge, then a rising young representative from Massachusetts, to actively back the College. This support added momentum in the Senate, after Chandler, a critical ally, was elected to the chamber in 1886.⁵⁴⁹

Now the network was reinforced through links to civilian elites, and by personal contacts. Henry Cabot Lodge became a receptive correspondent.⁵⁵⁰ Luce emphasized that the support was for an organization that could engage in operational planning.⁵⁵¹ In Luce's mind, those who had supported the War College understood the need for a science of warfare. He noted:

Each was unique, of its kind, and bore little or no resemblance to any other institution in the land. One had to do with Material, the other with personnel. One had to do with Manufacture of a single implement of War; the other with the intelligent uses of all implements of war. The sphere of one was limited to mechanical appliances and manual training; the other was scientific, and embraced the widest fields of research of the warrior and statesman.⁵⁵²

Circumventing the Fragmented State

This section will highlight the process by which the reform network exploited technological uncertainty to influence Congress. Luce's campaign strategy was to relay naval reform theory to relevant policy actors, especially in Congress. In a letter to his friend William C. Church, editor of the Army and Navy Journal, Luce wrote: "The scheme is so feasible that it

⁵⁴⁹ Luce to Aldrich, March 15, 1889, quoted in Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*, 98.

⁵⁵⁰ Luce to Lodge, February 13, 1888, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵⁵¹ Luce to Aldrich, March 4, 1889, Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵⁵² Luce to Tracy, March 14, 1889 Record group 45, National Archives.

only needs a little talking and writing up to get it started. Should you take hold and give us a hand please keep my name out.”⁵⁵³

Church complied, and for the next ten years the journal loyally reported on Luce’s campaign. He defended their work against its enemies and praised it to friends. Luce furnished Church with news and often wrote letters to the journal under a pseudonym, attacking his own articles in order to draw attention to them. In addition, Luce occasionally sent editorial remarks, which Church would run under his own name. Few readers suspected that Luce himself had written them.⁵⁵⁴

Luce and Belknap began to address the issue of political fragmentation. Lieutenant Charles Belknap, identified in chapter three as a foundational theorist in this epistemic community, networked for Luce. He understood Luce’s desire to have the emerging reform agenda translated to Congress. Belknap presented a plan to circumvent the American state structure,

I think there is another reason for the illiberal policy shown toward the Navy. Evidences are not wanting that upon several occasions of late, the national legislature would have been willing to make ample appropriations for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the Navy had they been persuaded that a fixed policy would be adopted which would bring about the desired result. Or, to give expression to the idea, it seems to have been about as follows, “if you officers of the Navy, can agree upon settled policy which will best tend to the development of our strength, we, members of the naval committees of Congress, shall not be found wanting in the proper spirit to aid you to accomplish the effect.”⁵⁵⁵

Belknap observed how the existing state structure obstructed progress, but could be penetrated.

“A definite navy policy,” he said, “has not been accomplished because of the ‘bureau system’

⁵⁵³ Luce to Church, November 2, 1883, seen in Naval War College Library, Newport.

⁵⁵⁴ Donald N. Bigelow and Bruce Rogers, eds., *William Conant Church & the Army and Navy Journal* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 220.

⁵⁵⁵ Charles Belknap, "The Naval Policy of the United States," *US Naval Institute Proceedings IX* (1883): 383.

and ‘Congress’ which decides the naval policy of the country,” and it is to “Congress therefore, that we must look for the means to accomplish our end.”⁵⁵⁶

Naval Institute reform officers were instructed to concentrate their message toward the policy boards. “The times have changed,” Lieutenant Commander Casper Goodrich told readers of the Proceedings in 1879. He asked for “greater congressional acceptance of steam and the engineer.” He noted, “more is demanded of the officer now...the engineer is no longer the engine driver and mechanic, but an officer, like his colleague, of culture, science, and reflection.”⁵⁵⁷

The navy’s most influential figure, Admiral Porter, agreed that new thinking about ships design and naval mission needed to be interjected into the boards.⁵⁵⁸ Alan Brown instructed the boards saying, “the introduction of steam propulsion has made it necessary for the Naval Officer to not only know how to sail his vessel, but how to steam her.”⁵⁵⁹ The implication, according to Rear Admiral Daniel Ammen, was that reforms needed to direct ship construction in, “accordance with vessels built actually for war purposes.”⁵⁶⁰

The reformers’ message to the Naval Advisory Board was most forcefully conveyed in a series of articles entitled, “How About Ironclads?” Here the concern was presented to Congress as expert opinion, “perhaps it has been thought wise by the board to confine itself to general recommendations in this respect, taking the money that would produce but indifferent ironclads

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid.: 391.

⁵⁵⁷ *Army and Navy Journal*, April 1879, 45

⁵⁵⁸ *Army and Navy Journal*, July 1879, 68.

⁵⁵⁹ Casper F. Goodrich, "Naval Education, (I) Officers, (II) Men," *US Naval Institute Proceedings V* (1879): 323-44. Brown, *The Proceedings V* (1879) 306-307.

⁵⁶⁰ Daniel Ammen, "The Purposes of a Navy and the Best Methods of Rendering It Effective," *US Naval Institute Proceedings V* (1879): 119.

⁵⁶¹ B. Franklin Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1973), 60.

⁵⁶² “The New Navy,” *Army and Navy Journal*, December 31, 1881, 478-479.

⁵⁶³ “The New Naval Vessels,” *Army and Navy Journal* (November 12, 1881): 343.

and devoting it to more pressing matters.”⁵⁶⁴ Reformers suggested Congress redirect its attention to the “ironclad of the Future,” in which new armor, “besides being enormously lighter and more than one-half cheaper, will be better in every other respect; capable moreover of serving either as a fast cruiser or as a heavy armored vessel for offensive and defensive warfare.”⁵⁶⁵

Commodore Simpson said that, at the very least, Congress must be made aware that “the days of the wooden vessels are over and that, while the navy should comprise several classes of ships, the immediate necessity is an ironclad fleet.”⁵⁶⁶ He realized, however, Congress gave too little attention to naval mission and needed to be made aware of new technologies.

Each fleet must be of a strength proportionate to the importance of the position of the covered, and at least equal in offensive power to any that is likely to be opposed to it. But the true function of the navy is aggressive, and therefore the perfect system requires other armored cruisers sufficiently formidable to drive off capture, or destroy the enemies’ vessel that may venture too near.⁵⁶⁷

Simpson followed a few months later, in an article entitled “Our Navy,” saying that “nobody expects naval officers to put their hands in their pockets and pull out the money to build ships. But they can point out to Congress the great needs of the navy.”⁵⁶⁸ In particular, Goodrich explained in “Our Sea Coast Defense,” that the 44th Congress needed to consider the opinions circulating within the Naval Institute, and avoid the possibility that “the machinery of civil administration were destroyed.”⁵⁶⁹ Earlier, Goodrich noted Congress’s lack of information and fear of naval modernization:

⁵⁶⁴ “The Naval Advisory Board,” *Army and Navy Journal*, November 12, 1881, 320.

⁵⁶⁵ “The Ironclad of the Future,” *Army and Navy Journal*, February 21, 1882, 669.

⁵⁶⁶ “Our Need of a Navy Policy,” *Army and Navy Journal*, January 17, 1880, 470.

⁵⁶⁷ *Army and Navy Journal*, October 25, 1879, 225.

⁵⁶⁸ “Our Navy,” *Army and Navy Journal*, February 14, 1880, 560.

⁵⁶⁹ “Our National Danger,” *Army and Navy Journal*, February 24, 1883, 671

The great fault of ordinary Congressional legislation in Army and Navy matters is that, in place of taking up measures suggested by the twelve month's experience, most of the time is devoted to considering schemes sprung upon Congress in a hair-brained way—schemes usually so large or so revolutionary in character that after wasting many days in trying to discover their scope and probable results, they are dropped all together.⁵⁷⁰

America, he suggested, should not regard naval aggrandizement as a threat, recalling Luce's article, "The Navy and Civil Liberty," in which he rebutted the fear that powerful navies would become permanent establishments, detrimental to national prosperity and dangerous to civil liberty. Luce added, "the navy can claim preeminence in taking ground for the personal liberty of all human beings."⁵⁷¹

Simpson expanded upon and the historical arguments developed by Kelly, David and Belknap, in an effort to influence naval policy. "If we go back to Greece and Rome, even their fleet formation will teach a lesson as to the value of rams." Simpson declared conclusions not yet presented by the community. He said, "If the War of 1812 teaches anything, it is that the two most important mechanical elements entering into victories are the strength and speed of ships."⁵⁷⁴

This conclusion was seconded by Admiral Porter in a series entitled, "Congress and Coastwise Defense." Porter recommended that mine acquisition did not prevent the need for guns and armor: "Congress itself may increase its appropriations for heavy guns." He felt that Congress should listen to those officers who are paying the most attention to mine technology

⁵⁷⁰ "Congress and the Service," *Army and Navy Journal*, December 6, 1879, 346.

⁵⁷¹ "The Navy and Civil Liberty," *Army and Navy Journal*, December 27, 1879, 408.

⁵⁷² "Compound and Steel Armor," *Army and Navy Journal*, August 4, 1883, 3.

⁵⁷³ Theodore Roosevelt, *The War of 1812* (New York: Putnam, 1881)

⁵⁷⁴ "The Naval War of 1812," *Army and Navy Journal*, March 11, 1882, 919.

and “understand perfectly their limited, if not subordinate, role, as we showed last week.”⁵⁷⁵

Porter said of the mine controversy, “there is not a harbor in the country, where an ordinary ironclad cannot pass the batteries, choosing its own time for doing so.” Can there be any question, he said, “that Congress should provide for the manufacture of heavy guns?” Especially now, he insisted, since “it will take probably a year and a half to mount the first of these guns in the forts after the order for their manufacturing is given.”⁵⁷⁶

Church and Luce continued to enforce the linkage between the reform agenda and relevant policy actors. They noted that the working relationship among reformers had been translated into a consensus that could direct congress:

It is certainly the most encouraging one for the friends of the improved and reconstructed Navy. For the first time in many years, members appear to have given some study and thought to the subject; and as a result, we have seen a greater appreciation, not only of the needs of the service, but of its actual condition and of the reforms that are yet needed to make it a homogeneous and united structure.... It is a matter for congratulations that there was no division on party lines, and both Democrats and Republicans vied with each other in their commendations of the personnel of the service, and in their expressed desire for a stronger and modern navy...⁵⁷⁷

There was an early appreciation in Congress that the service had been allowed to slip into disrepair. In response, the immediate need was for heavy ordnance so that Congress could “make an appropriation which invested in guns, torpedoes and fortifications to-day and save us from national humiliation.”⁵⁷⁸ With the 1883 Naval Appropriation Bill, Congressional members of both political parties “vied with each other in their expressions in favor of an expansion and a rehabilitation of the Navy.” Public relations efforts, it appeared were circumventing institutional

⁵⁷⁵ “Congress and Coastwise Deference,” *Army and Navy Journal*, January 31 1880, 514.

⁵⁷⁶ “Our Defenseless Sea Coast,” *Army and Navy Journal*, February 9, 1884, 566.

⁵⁷⁷ “The Naval Debates in the House,” *Army and Navy Journal*, March 15, 1884, 670.

⁵⁷⁸ “Harbor and Coastal Defense,” *Army and Navy Journal*, February 14, 1884, 737.

resistance, so that “public sentiment as evidenced in the press of the country, not only the seaboard, but in the interior, is largely in favor of increased appropriations.”⁵⁷⁹ With new public support, it was possible to make the case that:

the navy needs six fine modern iron-clads, as many rams as the greatest power, a suitable number of torpedo boats, and a splendid fleet of unarmored cruisers of the greatest speed, carrying heavily rifled guns.⁵⁸⁰

Reformers suggested to Congress new types of armament, guns, and production. “We neither have the guns nor the means of making them with proper speed, and we are not likely to get them any way but through the contract system. Best or worse, if we understand Congress, that is the only road to reach the desired goal.”⁵⁸¹ Reformers pointed Congress in the direction of European construction models that required more integration between the armed services, members of Congress and private contractors, since “in a country based on popular government it is almost equally necessary that other agencies should be aroused if we would impress the average Congressman, active enough in political questions, but slow to move in things that have only distant future application.”⁵⁸²

In particular, reformers directed the attention of Congress toward England, as “the respective merits of public and private works have lately been under discussion.” At this time, it was advised to observe the legislative successes of, “Krupp and Armstrong in producing the heaviest artillery...in and out of Parliament.” The U.S. should not repeat the same mistake in which, “Private manufacturers have outstripped it.”⁵⁸³

⁵⁷⁹ “The Naval Outlook,” *Army and Navy Journal*, June 7, 1884, 922.

⁵⁸⁰ “Harbor and Coastal Defense,” *Army and Navy Journal*, February 14, 1884, 738.

⁵⁸¹ “Coast Defense,” *Army and Navy Journal*, October 9, 1880, 186.

⁵⁸² “The Naval Outlook,” *Army and Navy Journal*, March 15, 1884, 727.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid*, 727.

These efforts proved useful. By 1890, Luce's project needed support in Congress. As Benjamin Cooling notes, the ships suggested by Luce made little sense to economy-minded Congressmen.⁵⁸⁴ Fortunately for Luce and his reformers, Congress established policy boards to provide information about costs associated with naval construction: "Our foreign relations have lately become so important and so unexpectedly entangled that the need of a strong navy has become apparent."⁵⁸⁵ In particular, Congress was interested in information pertaining to the proper size and type of naval vessel to underwrite the nation's foreign policy. Luce saw the boards as the critical mechanism to influence Congress "to commence to build a navy." It was felt there was "sufficient genius" among the naval advisory board members "to build a creditable one."⁵⁸⁶

Networking Special Interests

In addition to eliciting the support of Congress, the naval reform community began to communicate with private contractors that might be interested in battleship legislation. These included the Atlantic Carriers Association, the Ship Owners' Association of the Pacific Coast, the New York Board of Trade, the Secretary of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers.⁵⁸⁸ In the 1880s, military actors began to invite businessmen to meetings that discussed topics of mutual

⁵⁸⁴ Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy*, 60.

⁵⁸⁵ "The New Navy," *Army and Navy Journal*, December 31, 1881, 478-479.

⁵⁸⁶ "The New Naval Vessels," *Army and Navy Journal*, November 12, 1881, 343.

⁵⁸⁷ Field S. Pendleton, Atlantic Carriers Association, to Luce, May 15, 1902, Leighton C. Powell Robinson, Ship owners' Association of Pacific Coast, to Luce, December 1, 1904, Luce to Winthrop L. Marvin, secretary to the Merchant Marine Commission, May 20 and 24, 1904, Luce to Senator Jacob Gallinger, Chairman of the Merchant Marine Commission, November 17, 1904, and Luce to William McCarroll. New York Board of Trade, April 13, 1907, all papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, General Correspondence, cont 11 and 12.

⁵⁸⁸ Field S. Pendleton, Atlantic Carriers Association, to Luce, May 15, 1902, Leighton C. Powell Robinson, Ship owners' Association of Pacific Coast, to Luce, December 1, 1904, Luce to Winthrop L. Marvin, secretary to the Merchant Marine Commission, May 20 and 24, 1904, Luce to Senator Jacob Gallinger, Chairman of the Merchant Marine Commission, November 17, 1904, and Luce to William McCarroll. New York Board of Trade, April 13, 1907, all papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, General Correspondence, cont 11 and 12.

interest such as the inability of American industry to fabricate heavy guns and the wartime management of the nation's railroads.⁵⁸⁹ Furthermore, to ensure cooperation with business professionals, the reformers established contacts with groups such as the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Institute of Mining engineers, the American Institute of Mechanical Engineers, and the American Institute of Electrical engineers.⁵⁹⁰

Naval officers took informal exchanges as an opportunity to shape preferences.. They entered the employment of shipping companies and the industries that supplied the services with ordnance, munitions, and armor plate. While still on active duty, Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Barber served as agent for French armor manufacturer Schneider-Creusot, and Lieutenant William Jacques similarly represented Sir Joseph Whitworth, an English manufacturer of the hydraulic forges used in making armor plate. Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy ordered Lieutenants Charles A. Stone and John F. Meigs and Commander Robley to duty with the Bethlehem and Carnegie steel works. It was at Tracy's request that Carnegie "first seriously considered the question of starting a plate mill for the manufacture of ships plates."⁵⁹¹

Throughout the 1880s, reformers cooperated with the Atlantic Carriers Association, the Shipowners' Association of the Pacific Coast, the New York Board of Trade, the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, and the Merchant Marine Commission of Congress to acquaint the public with the advantages of subsidizing the merchant fleet.⁵⁹² Officers and business groups cooperated by advocating federal subsidies for America's ailing merchant

⁵⁸⁹ Benjamin Cooling refers to these bureaucratic initiatives as the beginning of the "American military industrial complex." Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy*, chapter 4.

⁵⁹⁰ *Proceedings XIII* (1887): 1-126.

⁵⁹¹ Peter Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism* (New York: Free Press, 1972), 176.

⁵⁹² J. D. J. Kelley, "Our Merchant Marine: The Cause of Its Decline and the Means to Be Taken for Its Revival," *US Naval Institute Proceedings VIII* (1882). "America's Need of Merchant Ships in War," *Army and Navy Journal XLIII*, January 20, 1904, 546-572.

marine. Reformers suggested that the advisory boards examine examples of public/private relationships that appeared effective in producing ships. “We deem it wise to put before our readers the opinions of European shipbuilding authority gathered for the board... Disleve, a French contractor, Italian Naval Chief Constructor, Romato, and the Austrian Chief Naval Constructor, are all strong advocates of steel for ship construction.”⁵⁹³ U.S. producers were advised to follow suit and help “build a government factory that will be as persistent in its methods, as sagacious in its practice, as the great private makers.”⁵⁹⁴

These public relations efforts proved effective. In 1885 the Endicott Board concluded that it was dangerous for the US to depend upon foreign sources for the heavy guns and armor plate needed to create a modern naval force. The government should spend its defense appropriations within the United States, where they “would encourage home industries, promote the national wealth, and render defenses independent of other countries.”⁵⁹⁵ Other boards made the same point: without the capacity to fabricate steel armor, the United States lacked a vitally important defense industry. Convinced that the United States must cultivate domestic sources for its military hardware, naval reformers urged the development of government arsenals or continued reliance upon private manufacturers. The experience of European states had convinced American officers that private armaments companies generally achieved higher quality and technological innovation than government armories.

Luce doubted that Congress would ever vote the money to establish a government facility adequate for the manufacture of armor plate and heavy steel forgings.⁵⁹⁶ The Army and Navy

⁵⁹³ “The Plan of the Advisory Board,” *Army and Navy Journal*, December 10, 1881, 408.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 407.

⁵⁹⁵ Report of the Naval Advisory Board, *Annual Report of the Naval Department*, 1881, 234.

⁵⁹⁶ “Public and Private Ordnance Work,” *Army and Navy Journal* XIX, October 15, 1881. “Coast Defense,” *Army and Navy Journal* XVIII, July 16, 1881, 186.

Journal agreed with reform officers, they speculated that a government-owned plant would prompt a congressional investigation, “while losing the plant’s secrets, and end as a victim of political patronage when the party in power put its supporters in favorable positions.”

Luce believed that a steady annual appropriation for guns and armor would induce businessmen to invest in the needed technology and equipment. If done, claimed the members of the Gun Foundry Board, the nation would benefit from “the ingenuity and inventive talent of the private industries of the country” while the economy generally prospered from the stimulation of the domestic distribution of federal monies and the private acquisition of new technology. To ensure that the government avoided becoming “the slave of the corporation...dependent entirely upon the private industries of the country, which might combine to the detriment of the public service,” the board also recommended establishment of two new federal arms factories. Those arsenals, which in peacetime could preclude such combinations by threatening to switch to foreign suppliers, would serve to check the greed of private steel makers — presumed to be the source of new ideas and superior workmanship.⁵⁹⁷

Reform officers advanced strategic concepts that would disrupt the long-standing relationship between bureau chiefs, members of Congress, and local businessmen,⁵⁹⁸ To succeed, the reformers had in fact to destroy, rather than to create, a partnership that served private greed and political success. Naval reformers threatened the very cornerstone of an old relationship when their concern for economy and security led them to advocate concentration of the navy’s repair work at a few large, modern facilities — one on the Pacific coast and two on the Atlantic.

⁵⁹⁷ “Report of Endicott Board,” *Annual Report of War Department*, 1886, 520-22. The naval department, anxious to protect its annual budget, allowed its individual bureau chiefs to lend support to “pork barrel” tactics. The influence of those naval bureaucrats in Congress—and their success in slowing the course of naval reform—reflected their willingness to award repair contracts that produced desired political results.

⁵⁹⁸ Bryant, *The Sea and the States* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1947) 348.

The General Board consequently met heavy opposition from bureau chiefs and from Maine's Senator Eugene Hale when it proposed closure of the Portsmouth Navy Yard because of its inability to accommodate modern battleships.⁵⁹⁹

This dispute over military facilities highlights the expectations of the epistemic community model. Breaking and forging relationships among military officers, politicians, and businessmen during the late nineteenth century was essential to the epistemic networking process. These relationships were transfigured into a support network that disrupted an order that benefited local interests. The Army and Navy Journal was aware that technology focused naval reform on the largest, most modern industries, and drew attention away from local interests incapable of equipping or supporting a modern armed force. The journal advocated that, "local interests must yield to the general welfare of the nation."⁶⁰⁰ They also suggested that the members of Congress favor military reform to the extent as they "could make capital or influence out of them or handle the appropriations—which stuck tightly to the hands they passed through."⁶⁰¹

1888: Networking Consensus

In 1888, the epistemic networking process continued by presented points of epistemic consensus to popular journals. In an article entitled, "The Crowning Glory of the Navy," the

⁵⁹⁹ Secretary of the Navy Chandler, *Annual Report of the Navy Department*, 1883, 17.

⁶⁰⁰ *Army and Navy Journal*, January 1889, 1232.

⁶⁰¹ Officer quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 259.

editor of the Army Navy Journal stated, as the title suggests, that the new college now appeared to be the corpus of naval planning. The editor reassured those outside the navy that the “intelligent men in Congress who recognize the physical and intellectual needs of the service as represented by the War College, and who will not allow the debilitating conflict between brain and muscle to continue any longer.”⁶⁰² The letter was followed up by an anonymous representative of the College in an article entitled “Our Naval College.” The spokesman listed the current courses and instructors and explained that the College has in fact succeeded in providing more planning than done by any other organization and, “just to that extent shall we have the advantage in the day of trial provided always that our vessels and our fighting machines are inferior to none.”⁶⁰³

In the Annual Address of 1888 to the Naval Institute, Luce laid out the War College’s intention to plan operations. He confirmed that the Institute had been effective in bringing together disparate naval reform voices. He said, “opposition is not always necessary to healthy development. Indeed, it may retard or stifle growth...Are we not as a body, wanting in discipline which subordinated the individual to the body corporate, and closes the mouth of opposition to lawfully constituted authority?”⁶⁰⁴ The problem facing naval modernization efforts, said Luce, was “due entirely to the peculiar system under which we exist, or in plain terms, to the absence of a proper form of naval administration by which the navy may be held together and its policy shaped.”⁶⁰⁵ Surely, he noted, “no profession as a whole, can hope to achieve an enviable distinction under such disturbing influences as these.”⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰² *Army and Navy Journal*, 1888, 461.

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, 469.

⁶⁰⁴ *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XIV: 2.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*: 4

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*: 3.

According to Luce, the solution was to make Congress aware of “the advancement of professional knowledge in the Navy.”⁶⁰⁷ Although the Proceedings of the Naval Institute served to bring together reform-minded officers, Luce asked, “what has the Institute accomplished?” Rehabilitation requires a “head and must dominate the members.”⁶⁰⁸ How then, Luce inquired, could the agenda of rehabilitation be advanced? “Naval officers, like members of other professions, have friends in both houses of Congress, and they can make their own personal representations to those friends.” Luce called for a broadside attack on all branches of government at once so that the service could “enlighten the public mind.” Most important, they must begin with a “consensus of opinion as to what is really needed.”⁶⁰⁹

In August 1888 the Proceedings published Mahan’s address to the Naval War College.⁶¹⁰ Mahan, for the first time, asserted that the College should speak for the service because operational planning was not being adequately done in the service. Who else, asked Mahan, is the authority on the art of war, “when the Navy almost exclusively pays its attention to the material of the service?”⁶¹¹ According to Mahan, the operational planning of the War College had a superior voice because elsewhere, “too exclusive attention to mechanical advance, and too scanty attention to the noble art of war, which is the chief business of those to whom the military movements of the navy are entrusted.”⁶¹²

Mahan told the War College audience that they alone possessed the principles to plan war. “In a word, the management of ships in battle was a matter dependant on the oral tradition, not

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.: 4.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.: 5.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.: 6-7.

⁶¹⁰ Alfred T. Mahan, "Address of Captain A. T. Mahan, President of U.S. Naval War College," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XV (1888): 621-39.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.: 626.

⁶¹² Ibid.: 627.

upon recognized authority; upon the zeal of the individual officer for professional improvement, not upon government instruction.”⁶¹³ Strategy, he explained, must be independent of particular weapons. “I wish to throw whatever weight my personal opinion may carry against the easy assumption that we have nothing to learn from the past.”⁶¹⁴

Mahan followed these assertions with a letter to the Secretary of the Naval Institute November 27, 1888. The mechanism for naval reform, for the first time, is made public:

On several occasions there has been urged upon me the wish that the text of the lectures given at the Naval War College should be published; and the opinion has been expressed that, by using the pages of the Naval Institute for the vehicle for such publication, a much larger audience would be reached than can be expected to assemble from year to year at the college. I have therefore thought it well to commit to writing the general considerations which have imposed me to adopt such a policy.⁶¹⁵

In April 1889, Naval War College faculty members Commander Harrington and Captain Sampson confirmed the reform agenda in the Proceedings. The officers explained that naval theory has reached consensus about coastal defense, the “fixed principles and a guiding policy.”⁶¹⁶ The officers noted that “although the professional opinions of the service have not yet received the attention they merit, this does make it the duty of the service to express its opinions untiringly, and to see that these opinions are based upon sound and thorough professional knowledge.”⁶¹⁷

Popularizing the New Doctrine

⁶¹³ Ibid.: 631.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.: 633.

⁶¹⁵ Mahan’s Letters, “To the Secretary of the Naval Institute,” November 27, 1888.

⁶¹⁶ William T. Sampson, “Outline of a Scheme for the Naval Defense of the Coast,” *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XV (1889): 170.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.: 169.

Sampson and Harrington set the stage for Luce's 1889 article "Our Future Navy." Here Luce explains a revolutionary strategy for American defense for the first time in a popular journal, the North American Review⁶¹⁸ Citing the British announcement that the U.S. was to construct seventy new warships, included ten battleships and sixty cruisers, Luce proclaimed that the United States Navy was devoid of any comparable "battle" vessels, and cited the need to build them immediately. He argued that the country was reconstructing a navy without the necessary constituents of a line of battle. Calling a navy a type of sea army, Luce said:

We are building cruisers of various sizes, which correspond to the cavalry and light artillery of the land army; and we have monitors for coast and harbor defense, which supplement our fortifications; but we have no battleships to correspond to the infantry of the line, which constitutes the main strength of the line of battle.⁶¹⁹

Luce explained why the battleship must be the foundation of the navy. Since the United States had no battleships, Luce said, it really had no navy. The navy possessed merely cruisers and coast guard ships. Drawing upon historical precedent, Luce enumerated the navy's offensive needs: "It should consist of balanced fleets, each fleet built around twenty battleships and their auxiliary vessels, the cruisers, torpedo boats, depot-ships, and hospital ships. Cruisers might still act independently against enemy commerce and for protection of the merchant marine."⁶²⁰

The Proceedings followed Luce's article by republishing the War College lectures. The direction of the naval reform discourse was increasingly coherent. On May 5th Lieutenant Richard Wainwright assessed; "If it is true that the march of progress has so altered the conditions of warfare as to make the study of naval warfare useless, we now have a guide."⁶²¹

⁶¹⁸ Stephen B. Luce, "Our Future Navy," *The North American Review* 149 (1889): 541-49.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*: 449.

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*: 452.

⁶²¹ Lieutenant Richard Wainwright, *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (1890): 65.

The members of the Naval War College were prepared to tell the public that “it is possible to deduce certain rules, and it will be found that these rules agree with those found in historical examples, and that it is only minor tactics which must be changed with improvements in weapons.”⁶²²

The Naval War College faculty, it was declared, was united in its endorsement of a battleship program. Admiral David Porter, defender of the old guard, added his stamp of approval. “Not one of the new vessels hitherto planned or built is fit for war...cruisers cannot cruise...and battleships cannot enter into battle for want of endurance.”⁶²³ On the following page, Lieutenant A.B. Wyckoff agreed with Porter, “In my opinion, the essayist’s solution of this question is the correct one.”⁶²⁴ Lieutenant Wainwright responded to Luce’s proposal by suggesting the cruiser ships remain fast by maintaining their sails, but “reduced to a marginal position that might accompany battleships.”⁶²⁵

In March 1890, two path-breaking articles were published in popular journals. Henry Abbot published an article in Forum explaining the case for offensive coastal defense.⁶²⁶ With the publication of Abbot’s article, two leading journals had placed the War College agenda before the public.⁶²⁷ Bradley Fiske reiterated Abbot’s case only two months later. With reference to Luce’s 1889 proposal, Fiske explained the implications and potential benefits of

⁶²² Lieutenant William Very, “The Howell Automobile Torpedo” *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (1890): 334.

⁶²³ Rear Admiral David, D. Porter, responding to S.B. Luce, *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (1890): 391.

⁶²⁴ Lieutenant A.B. Wyckoff, *Proceedings*, 393.

⁶²⁵ Lieutenant Wainwright, *Proceedings*, 394.

⁶²⁶ Henry L. Abbot “War Under New Conditions,” *Forum*, March 1890, 13-23. Abbot challenges current methods of coastal defense and explains why profits are possible in times of peace.

⁶²⁷ During the 1890s five journals had a monthly circulation of more than 500,000; *Atlantic Monthly*, *Forum*, *North American Review*, *Ladies Home Journal*, and *Youth’s Companion*. Other leading publications included; *Century*, *Harpers New Monthly*, and *Comfort*. See Frank Luther Mott, *History of American Magazines* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

battleship defense to the American people.⁶²⁸ The most talked about article of 1890, was Mahan's Atlantic Monthly article, "The United States Looking Outward." The article became an overnight sensation.⁶²⁹

Mahan's article ushered in a surge of battleship propaganda. In 1891, Porter and Luce continued to advocate the reform agenda. Porter gave the American people a short history of U.S. naval operations and explained the urgency in adjusting American foreign policy.⁶³⁰ In the same month, Luce used the historical method to advocate a new program for American greatness. The theoretical project was initiated by Belknap, David and Kelly in the Prize Essay Contests 1879-1882. "Throughout history, great nations have possessed great navies."⁶³¹ Officers Theodore Dodge and Jacob Miller worked to reinforce the notion that the navy had reached a consensus that pointed toward a program for an expanded American role in international affairs,⁶³² while Porter and Luce submitted a version of the battleship program to the American youth.⁶³³

⁶²⁸ Bradley A. Fiske "The Naval Battle of the Future," *Forum*, May 1890, 323-332. Fiske explains why the battleship has become imperative to modern defense, also the involvement of shipping yards and the lead-time in construction and the implication for jobs and revenue.

⁶²⁹ Alfred T. Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward," *Atlantic Monthly* LXVI (1890): 816. Mahan condensed the reform argument into a few pages that were fit for public consumption.

⁶³⁰ Admiral Porter "American Shipbuilding and Commercial Supremacy" *Forum*, November 1891, 386-397. Porter links armored ship construction to agricultural, railroad, and mine development as well as the shipbuilding eastern economies.

⁶³¹ Admiral Luce "The Benefits of War" *North American Review*, November 1891, 673-683. Luce begins with the familiar argument began by Balknap, advanced by the War College faculty, culminating with Mahan's classic work *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. Luce then makes a case similar to the case advanced by Porter that same month, "War is one of the great agencies by which human progress is effected." He explains that the defense provided by modern ships is essential for commercial prosperity, stating, "Peaceful commerce is one of the forces by which this end may be attained; and the Pacific and its further shores the field of its operation," 675.

⁶³² Theodore Dodge "The Needs of Our Army and Navy," *Forum*, October 1891, 247-26. Dodge makes an argument for the ineffectiveness of coastal defense. Jacob Miller, "A Naval Militia and a Naval Reserve" *Forum*, October 1891, uses the current "science" of naval warfare to supply a historical explanation why the interiors of strong naval countries have benefited. He calls the young men of the West to service on the new ships.

⁶³³ Stephen Luce, "The Powder Monkey," *Youth's Companion* LXV, no. 17, April 23, 1891, 248. David Porter, "My First Ship," *Youth's Companion* Volume LXV, no. 51, December 22, 1892, 673-674.

In 1892, battleship advocates explained the benefits for private contractors in the popular press. “The navy and merchant marine must go hand in hand,” wrote Lieutenant Richard Wainwright. “Whatever capital is invested in shipping becomes interested in the navy, without such an interest being created, adequate appropriations for naval force cannot be obtained.”⁶³⁴ As mentioned, naval reformers consequently cooperated with Atlantic carriers Association, the Shipowners’ association of the Pacific Coast, the New York Board of Trade, the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, and the Merchant Marine Commission of the Congress to acquaint the public with the advantages of subsidizing the merchant fleet.⁶³⁵ As naval reform theory began to advocate the advantages of battleship operations, reformers encouraged special interests to consider the benefits of battleship construction.⁶³⁶

The Conversions of Henry Cabot Lodge, Hillary Herbert and William McAdoo

Henry Cabot Lodge was perhaps the man most responsible for pushing through the House appropriations for battleship legislation.⁶³⁷ He was a convert to the battleship philosophy as espoused by Luce’s reform community. Lodge’s biographers have demonstrated that his

⁶³⁴ Richard Wainwright, "Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline, and the Means to Be Taken for Its Revival," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII (1882): 147.

⁶³⁵ Field S. Pendleton, Atlantic carriers Association, to Luce, May 15, 1904, Leighton C. Powell Robinson, Shipowners’ Association of the Pacific Coast, to Luce, December 1, 1904, Luce to Winthrop L. Marvin, secretary to the Merchant Marine Commission, May 20 and 24, 1904, Luce to Senator Jacob Gallinger, chairman of the Merchant Marine Commission, November 17, 1904, and Luce to William McCarroll, New York Board of Trade, April 13, 1907, all in Luce Papers, Library of Congress, General Correspondence 11 and 12.

⁶³⁶ Charles H. Cramp states a case for the many social benefits of battleship construction in “The First Cost of Ships,” *North American Review*, September, 1892, 76-84. Fred T. Jane, “Naval War Past and Present,” *Forum*, October 1893, 442-451. F.M. Barber “Armor for War Ships,” *Forum*, December, 1893. Charles H. Cramp uses Mahan exclusively to make a case for steel construction, in “Sea Power of the United States,” *North American Review* (August, 1894): 136-148. Eugene Chamberlain, “A Present Change for American Shipping” *North American Review* March, 1894, 276-282. Albert Matthews, “The Evolution of a Battleship,” *Century*, July, 1894, 247-352. Henry Cabot Lodge “Our Blundering Foreign Policy,” *Forum*, February, 1894. Lodge begins with Mahan’s thesis “sea power has been one of the controlling influences in history.”

⁶³⁷ John Arthur Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1965), 148.

passionate concern for America's foreign policy developed gradually from his childhood.⁶³⁸ His interest in naval affairs was stimulated by many high-ranking officers, and after coming to Washington he was in close contact with navy politics. Given his lifelong interest in naval affairs, it was not surprising that Lodge became a member of the Naval Affairs Committee. As noted, Luce introduced Lodge to the work of the Naval War College. According to Lodge's biographer, he was quickly converted to the reform theory of sea power.⁶³⁹

Lodge had scarcely arrived on the political scene when he announced his support of a more vigorous foreign policy.⁶⁴⁰ In 1888 he complained that the public was not paying sufficient attention to the conduct of foreign affairs and was conducting a feeble American foreign policy.⁶⁴¹ When sending his book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History to Lodge, Mahan expressed the hope that he could "make the experience of the past influence the opinions and shape the policy of the future."⁶⁴² The argument from history was the one most likely to influence Lodge. His approach to history established a framework for his thinking about foreign policy. As a historian, Lodge was concerned with the early Federalist leaders' visions of national greatness. He wrote of how Washington repeatedly referred to the United States as an "infant empire" and Hamilton's idea of an "imperial future, which stretched before the United States."⁶⁴³ He expressed the idea that manifest destiny dictated that Canada would become part of the United States.⁶⁴⁴ His imperialistic tendencies were developed and prepared for activation.

⁶³⁸ Grenville and Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917*, 208-10.

⁶³⁹ Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography*, 49.

⁶⁴⁰ *Congressional Record*, 50th Congress, 1st Session (1888): 481.

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴² Alfred Thayer Mahan to Lodge, May 19, 1890, Lodge MSS.

⁶⁴³ Lodge, *George Washington*, II, 7.

⁶⁴⁴ Lodge, "The Fisheries Question," *North American Review* 146 (February 1888): 130.

Lodge's support of the three battleships in the 1890 legislation was not surprising. He tended to think of American foreign policy in historical terms.⁶⁴⁵ The "traditional" Federalist conception of American security dominated his outlook. His thinking reflected the Federalist preoccupation with securing a proper rank among the nations.⁶⁴⁶ Lodge thought an assertive nationalism was a prerequisite for the exercise of international influence. Nationalism brought with it the sense of power, which made a larger world role possible.⁶⁴⁷

According to Grenville and Young, Lodge was deeply indebted to Luce and Mahan for their solution to America's strategic needs. Lodge felt the three battleships projected in 1890 were only to possess the coal capacity to fight within a thousand-mile radius of the American coasts. He believed this was a return to traditional policy, and struggled to get American people to accept instead the naval reform vision of America's future. There was the question of whether a people that had an inborn and "carefully cultivated dread of standing armies and military power" could attain that "social efficiency in war, peace and government without which all else is vain."⁶⁴⁹

Lodge had a message he wanted to get across to the American people, that force was a prerequisite for dealing with all problems, domestic and foreign.⁶⁵¹ Character had to be demonstrated in adversity. The enemy was "materialist complacency." As Lodge said, "there is

⁶⁴⁵ Grenville and Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy*: 210.

⁶⁴⁶ Henry Cabot Lodge, *Speeches and Addresses, 1884-1909* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 198.

⁶⁴⁷ Robert Endicott Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 45.

⁶⁴⁸ Grenville and Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917*, 209.

⁶⁴⁹ Lodge, *George Washington*, I, 324.

⁶⁵⁰ Alfred T. Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political* (Boston: Little, Brown, and company, 1902), 17.

⁶⁵¹ Theodore Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography* (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1920), 23. "True Americanism," in Lodge, *Speeches and Addresses, 1884-1909*, 23.

a great deal more than a business questions in the life of a great nation. Our flag is a great deal more important than the sign of a successful national shop.”⁶⁵²

Lodge held Mahan’s opinions in high regard, considering him to be the “greatest living authority living or dead on naval warfare.”⁶⁵³ That is not to say that Mahan alone led him to those conclusions. Lodge already advocated a stronger navy and had a Federalist interest in expansion in 1884, a period in which Mahan still advocated a small defensive navy.⁶⁵⁴ The process by which Lodge incorporated Mahan’s ideas into his own arguments suggests that Lodge used Mahan’s concepts as rhetorical devices to influence congressional debate.⁶⁵⁵

The epistemic communities’ ideas, then, became a part of Lodge’s essentially Federalist framework for a larger navy and for expansion. This led Grenville and Young to assert that Lodge “did not grasp at first the full significance of Mahan’s doctrine of sea power.”⁶⁵⁶ In 1890 his appropriation for three “sea-going coastline battleships” was a plea for tradition. He did not advocate an offensive navy, which “might bring us into needless conflict with the other nations of the world, but...one which is true to the American policy and the American idea of a navy.”⁶⁵⁷ The authorization passed the House by a vote of 139 to 104.⁶⁵⁸ The next year his argument on the naval bill was much the same, but he now added the injunction (he had by that time read Mahan’s book) that “naval power, as every one knows who has studied history, has had, from the

⁶⁵² Lodge, *Speeches and Addresses, 1884-1909*, 285-87.

⁶⁵³ Lodge to Mahan, October 19, 1898, Mahan Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁶⁵⁴ W. D. Puleston, *Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan* (New Haven: Yale university press, 1939), 67-72.

⁶⁵⁵ Henry Cabot Lodge, “Our Blundering Foreign Policy” *Forum*, February 1894, 4. Lodge begins the article with Mahan’s thesis, “Sea power has been one of the greatest controlling influences in human history.”

⁶⁵⁶ Grenville and Young, eds., *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917*, 219.

⁶⁵⁷ *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress, 1st session (1890): 3169-70.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*: 6495.

days of Hannibal, more to do with determining the fate of a nation than almost anything else.”⁶⁵⁹ Similarly, in 1892 Lodge introduced Mahan’s argument that “the development of commerce has followed naval supremacy” and generally argued that “commerce cannot be guarded except by a navy”⁶⁶⁰

By 1895 the reform community pleaded that “commerce follows the flag,” that a powerful navy is “one of the essential conditions of a great and world-wide commerce.” Reflecting fifteen years of arguments developed by Luce’s reform community, Lodge said,

The sea power has been one of the controlling forces in history. Without the sea power no nation has been really great. Sea power consists, in the first place, of a proper navy and a proper fleet, but in order to sustain a Navy we must have suitable post of naval stations, strong places where a navy can be protected and refurnished.⁶⁶¹

In five years, the doctrine had shifted from coastline battleships to far-flung naval stations. This required a virtual revolution in American political and strategic thinking. After conversion to the arguments of the naval reform movement, Lodge led the political vanguard. His training as a Harvard historian made him a quasi-expert in strategic planning who served to legitimize, link, and leverage the reform arguments in Congress.

Hillary Herbert was perhaps as influential as Lodge in tailoring the reform doctrine to the exigencies of politics. In 1893, he was the new Secretary of the Navy. During the 1880s he was not impressed by the work of the naval reformers and opposed the first appropriations for the War College. His opposition to the College was based mainly upon his fear that it would grow into another expensive bureaucracy like the navy bureaus.⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁹ *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress, 2nd session (1891): 1804.

⁶⁶⁰ *Congressional Record*, 52nd Congress, 2nd session (1892): 3362.

⁶⁶¹ *Congressional Record*, 53 Congress, 3rd session (1895): 3107.

⁶⁶² Mahan, *Strategy*, 71.

His mind was changed in the summer of 1893. Herbert embarked for Newport on the USS *Dolphin* on the pretext of making an inspection tour but actually he was about to abolish the College. The *Dolphin's* skipper, Capt. B.H. Buckingham, a friend of Luce, suggested that Herbert read Mahan's latest book, The Influence of Seapower Upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812.⁶⁶³ By the time the *Dolphin* reached Newport, Herbert was a convert. Upon his arrival he declared, "if this institution has produced nothing more than this book it is worth all the expense incurred for it."⁶⁶⁴ After his conversion, Herbert always regarded himself as a friend of the college. He maintained a steady correspondence with the presidents and even suggested subjects for lectures.⁶⁶⁵

Lodge and Herbert now approach the battleship philosophy with the fervor of the newly converted. They proselytized the message, particularly to critical decision makers in Congress. The final significant battleship convert during the 1890s was William McAdoo (D-NJ). A foe of the War College and large naval expenditures throughout the 1880s, McAdoo was by the mid 1890s part of the battleship consensus. In an article entitled "The Navy and the Nation," he said:

The great lesson that sea-power goes hand in hand with the right to rule on land was then little understood in the world. Indeed, strange as the statement may be, it is no exaggeration to say that, until within the last few years, when Captain Mahan of our navy wrote his now universally accepted doctrine of the influence of sea-power on history, even the greatest naval historians never realized the truths which he has so admirably demonstrated.⁶⁶⁶

Epistemic Networking: Continued

As early as 1890, the epistemic community had predicted the end of American isolation. Mahan expressed his view that the nation's land frontier had vanished, placing its destiny beyond

⁶⁶³ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*.

⁶⁶⁴ Herbert to Mahan, October 4, 1893, Mahan Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁶⁶⁵ Herbert to Taylor, April 30, 1896, RG 1, Naval War College Archives, Newport.

⁶⁶⁶ William McAdoo, "The Navy and the Nation," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XX (1894).

its coastline. He pointed to the development of new interests in the Far East, which would necessitate the participation of the United States in the worldwide quest for bases.⁶⁶⁷ In a second series of articles, Mahan reinforced his earlier stand for the annexation of Hawaii and the construction of an Isthmian canal by forecasting the imminent emergence of Japan as a sea power of consequence. He called for the acquisition of Hawaii and for a great extension of U.S. power to protect this outpost of Western Civilization.⁶⁶⁸ The epistemic community of battleship advocates began to use these arguments to awaken the public to battleships and expansion. Expanding foreign commerce, they said, was essential to national power and prosperity. To compete successfully in the worldwide struggle for markets, a nation must have a strong merchant marine. It was the “wish of every nation” to confine “this business” to its own vessels.”⁶⁶⁹ These merchant vessels must have secure ports at their destinations and protection throughout their voyages. A nation must have overseas colonies. A strong navy was also essential to defend the colonies, while they in turn provided indispensable bases to support overseas naval operations.⁶⁷⁰

As translations of Mahan’s work appeared abroad, his reputation as a naval theoretician became international in scope. By 1895 he had received the acclamation of academics in the form of honorary degrees by Oxford, Cambridge, McGill, Harvard, Yale and Columbia. In Germany, Emperor Wilhelm sent a message to the *New York Herald* in May of 1894 saying “I am just now, not reading but devouring, Captain Mahan’s book; and am trying to learn it by heart. It is a first-class work and classical on all points. It is on board all my ships and

⁶⁶⁷ Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward," 816-24.

⁶⁶⁸ Mahan “Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power” *New York Times*, January 31, 1893.

⁶⁶⁹ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, 26.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 26-27, 82-83.

constantly quoted by my Captains and officers.”⁶⁷¹ In Japan Mahan’s books became required texts in all naval and military colleges. 1800 copies were circulated to naval officers and other high-ranking Japanese officials.⁶⁷²

Conclusion

This chapter traced the networking efforts of an epistemic community during the 1880s and 1890s. In response to the uncertainty associated with advancing foreign technology, a community of naval theorists created an authoritative voice to advocate change. As an epistemic community, these theorists successfully employed a strategy to go over the heads of intransigent bureau chiefs and oppositional congressmen. They would direct the preference of politicians, not by demonstrating the effectiveness of their programs, but by monopolizing the reform

⁶⁷¹ Charles Carlisle Taylor, *The Life of Admiral Mahan, Naval Philosopher, Rear-Admiral United States Navy* (New York: George H. Doran company, 1920), 131. Cited in Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 437.

⁶⁷² Robert Seager II, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 146.

discourse and networking their agenda. They elucidated cause-and-effect relationships and provided advice about the likely results of various courses of actions in relation to the issues of uncertainty. They shed light upon the nature of the complex inter-linkages of operational strategy and policy.

As offensive realism would predict, the doctrine created by this community demanded the tools for regional hegemony, but presented their argument as a continuation of America's commercial narrative. As a networking coalition, the epistemic community explained that American commercial interest and individual liberties would expand by using battleships to extend trade. The following chapter will explain how the epistemic community positioned itself inside Washington DC, in a pivotal effort that transformed their doctrine into policy.

CHAPTER SIX TRIUMPH OF THE IMPERIAL DOCTRINE



Fig. 6 Navy Department officers at the Navy War Building, 1905 (Naval Historical Center)

Introduction

According to Stephen Skowronek, reformers who envisioned a modernized state were thwarted prior to 1900 by the existing “state of courts and parties,” which preferred judicial and partisan solutions to policy challenges.⁶⁷³ Only after 1900, when assertive presidential leadership helped to shatter old political constraints, did reformers begin the reconstruction of national administrative capacity. Organizational and political decentralization thus checked the

⁶⁷³ Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). On the evolution of the War Department as the centralizing integrative administrative apparatus for the nation’s armed forces. see chapters 4 and 7.

reform agenda and permitted only modest change, despite passionate advocacy by a reform cadre in the army. In both the army and navy, an organized body of reformers pushed for change. If far-reaching changes occurred in the navy before 1900, according to Skowronek, this would have been because the political constraints that inhibited military reform did not operate on naval policy. Skowronek's model, therefore, would expect patchwork military reform to continue from the 1880s into the 1890s.⁶⁷⁴

In this chapter, I challenge Skowronek's patchwork state-building model. I argue that America's imperial ascent began in 1889 with Naval Secretary Benjamin Tracy's Report.⁶⁷⁵ The report began a sea change in the articulation and advancement of naval modernization. Battleship legislation moved through Congress, an imperial fleet was born, and state capacity expanded, all before 1896. Tracy's report set America on a path-dependant course to acquire and operate an imperial battleship fleet. We cannot understand the epistemic origins of this program without attention to the ideational process that shaped the timing and content of the new doctrine.⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., chapter 3. Skowronek's American warships produced during the 1880s had a compromised design that reflected the strategic confusion of naval thinkers. During the 1890s, battleships replaced the coastal and defensive-orientated cruiser ships. This outcome is the result of army reform politics in the late nineteenth century which highlight the role of domestic political factors in explaining shifts in strategic doctrine. Army reformers before 1900 found themselves impeded by a decentralized service bureaucracy that had strong support in Congress, by Southern opposition to any changes that would enhance the national military capacity, and by the value parties attached to state militia organizations.

⁶⁷⁵ Secretary of the Navy, *Annual Report*, 1889. For the first time, an offensive strategy was advanced as the fundamental logic underpinning American security. Tracy said, "we must have a fleet of battleships that will beat off the enemy's fleet on its approach, for it is not to be tolerated that the United States...is to submit to an attack on the threshold of its harbors. Finally, we must be able to divert an enemy's force from our coast by threatening his own."

⁶⁷⁶ I have argued that Luce's reform community played a crucial role in translating potential state power into actual state capacity. It is important then to realize that the timing and content of the imperial doctrine matters. It was the outcome of the work of a specific community operating at a specific time. Luce's favorite historian, Jacob Burckhardt, noted that the application of laws into doctrine has been a causal force throughout history. Burckhardt said, "To each eye, perhaps, the outline of a great civilization presents a different picture. In the wide ocean upon which we venture, the possible ways and directions are many; and the same studies which have served for my work

I argue that naval capacity and operational strategy changed during the 1890s.⁶⁷⁷ The change was revolutionary and well beyond the expectations of Skowronek's patchwork model.⁶⁷⁸ To explore the process that set this change in motion, I trace the activities of Luce's epistemic community 1887-1893. I argue that the community positioned itself in Washington DC in an effort to influence the direction of American policy. The result of this centralization effort was that Naval Secretary Tracy incorporated Luce's interpretation of "historical laws" and advocacy of a battleship program into his 1889 report. The incorporation of these laws became the theoretical foundation and outline for battleship construction in Congress throughout the 1890s. Thus, it was state level actors who were responsible for creating the elite consensus that framed and advanced the imperial battleship policy.⁶⁷⁹

might easily, in other hands, not only received a wholly different treatment and application, but lead to essentially different conclusions."

⁶⁷⁷ "Strategy" here signifies the planning that goes into wars: mostly in construction and deployment plans.

"Tactics" refers to the details of engaging in battle.

⁶⁷⁸ Skowronek's model would expect, given the stasis of American state development during the 1880s, that a doctrine that was a new departure would not pass Congress before 1896. I argue that Naval Secretary Benjamin Tracy's message to Congress initiated a watershed in American security theory. For the first time, a Secretary demanded a national defense fleet. Tracy defined a fleet differently from previous Secretaries, who envisioned a temporary arrangement of fast cruisers for hit-and-run destruction. By contrast, Tracy stated, "We must have a force to raise blockades...and be able to attack the enemy's own coast." Tracy then defined national defense in terms never before discussed in public. He said, "For a war, though defensive in principle, may be conducted most effectively by being offensive in operations." By interchanging principles of offence and defense, Tracy became the first to formally present an explanation for pre-emptive attack. "The nation that is ready to strike the first blow will gain an advantage which its antagonist can never offset."

⁶⁷⁹ Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 35. Carpenter argues that it is not surprising that state actors can be successful in realizing their policy preferences. More than other actors, bureaucratic actors can appear not captured, and their solutions can appear neutral when multiple and cross cutting networks support an image of their public-spirited service, 32.

The Epistemic Community: 1888-1890

I have argued that the group of reformers described in chapters three, four, and five constituted an epistemic community, a network of knowledge-based experts.⁶⁸⁰ This group seized upon Luce's contention that the coming of steam would foster a return to ancient Roman and Greek ramming tactics. Like the oar-powered galley, steam powered man-of-war ships could sail independently of the wind, maintaining an exact course and speed, and respond to orders with precision. By comparing conditions of fighting war on land with those on sea, Luce believed military theorists could further develop their profession.⁶⁸¹ Acceptance of this analogy narrowed policy alternatives toward the conclusion that a steam ship with a ram was needed to beat an enemy at sea in a decisive battle.⁶⁸²

Luce called principles of history, a potential "school of application." He described a science of naval warfare that combined the efforts of many individuals. Together, they would study fields of science, chemistry, geology, and astronomy in order to link facts into generalizations. Gradually, a distinct body of generalizations would accumulate for purposes of war planning. Luce described his intentions in "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science."⁶⁸³ He enlarged these reflections in his "Study of Naval History."⁶⁸⁴ This work analyzed the accounts of military campaigns and naval engagement of the major powers, with the intension of finding the "immutable principles" applicable to land and sea forces. Luce delivered a lecture

⁶⁸⁰ Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 27. These members held a common set of causal beliefs and shared notions of validity based on internally defined criteria for evaluation, common policy projects, and shared normative commitments or group with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain of their expertise.

⁶⁸¹ Stephen B. Luce, "On the Study of Naval History," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XIII (1887): 180.

⁶⁸² J. F. Meigs, "Details Concerning the Capture of the Huascar," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VI (1880): 295.

⁶⁸³ Stephen B. Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XII (1886): 527-546.

⁶⁸⁴ Luce, "On the Study of Naval History," 175-201.

based on these writings in September 1886. From there, the faculty of the Naval War College expanded upon these correlations, across time and between land and sea warfare. Harrington, Meigs, Mahan, and Taylor incorporated these principles into their writings. In the period, 1887-1889 they published essays on battleship tactics, comparing oar methods with steam methods, in an effort to advance a science of naval warfare.⁶⁸⁵

Luce instructed Lieutenant Tasker Bliss, a professor of artillery tactics at West Point Academy, to work with naval reform theorists to combine principles of army and naval combat into a coherent doctrine. In 1886, Luce said of Bliss, “[he] fully understands the theory on which our studies are to be conducted. He is not here to teach us our profession, as has been vainly imagined.” Instead, Luce continued, “he is here to teach us what he knows of his own profession.”⁶⁸⁶ Bliss eventually combined the army command principles with the formation of naval campaign orders.⁶⁸⁷ His work helped to codify Luce’s research project that was to establish a common set of universal principles to applicable to land and sea warfare.⁶⁸⁸

By 1888, reform theorists were united in their attempts to combine operational planning for land and sea.⁶⁸⁹ Under Luce’s supervision, Alfred Mahan had followed Bliss and began to examine the relationship between army and naval combat. Mahan also built upon the shared

⁶⁸⁵ Albert Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College* (New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1925), 187-198, 217.

⁶⁸⁶ Luce, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," 545. Also see Frederick Palmer, *Bliss, Peacemaker. The Life and Letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1934), 30-31.

⁶⁸⁷ Naval War College, “Notes on the applicatory system.” The author noted: “The form for naval campaign orders, this in turn being based on the German ‘Operation Orders.’ Some alterations in the army form have already been made to adapt it to naval conditions and organization, and it is possible that other changes may become necessary after sufficient experience in use of the form.” The authors refer generally to “various German authorities and to the Field Service Regulations of the Army,” 1025.

⁶⁸⁸ J. F. Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (1879). Stephen B. Luce, "Our Future Navy," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XV (1889). Commander P.F. Harrington discusses Luce, “Our Future Navy.” *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 6, No. 4 (1889): 541-543; William T. Sampson, "Outline of a Scheme for the Naval Defense of the Coast," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XV (1889): 169-170.

⁶⁸⁹ Luce, "On the Study of Naval History," 175-201. This was read at the Naval War College in September 1886.

work of R. W. Shufeldt, W.G. David, S. B. Luce, William Sampson, and James Soley. Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts revealed that Mahan's interest was, "to make the experience of the past influence the opinions and shape the policy of the future."⁶⁹⁰ Meigs also advanced the work of Ensign W. G. David in order to explain the command of the seas.⁶⁹¹ In the spring of 1889, William Sampson's essay, "Outline of a Scheme for the Naval Defense of the Coast," appeared in The North American Review and was reprinted that fall in the Proceedings. During the summer Luce published an article in North American Review entitled "Our Future Navy."⁶⁹²

Luce argued that the country was re-constructing a navy without the necessary constituents of a line of battle. Calling a navy a type of sea army, Luce said:

We are building cruisers of various sizes, which correspond to the Cavalry and light artillery of the land army; and we have monitors for coast and harbor defense, which supplement our fortifications; but we have no battleships to correspond to the infantry of the line, which constitutes the main strength of the infantry of the line, which constitutes the main strength of the line of battle.⁶⁹³

Luce explained that the battleship must be the foundation of the Navy. According to Luce, since the United States had no battleships; it really had no navy. The Navy possessed merely coastguard cruiser ships. Drawing upon historical precedent, Luce requested that each fleet be

⁶⁹⁰ Lodge to Tracy, July 1889, Tracy Papers, LOC Box 3.

⁶⁹¹ Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 693-694. Builds upon, J. D. J. Kelley, "Our Merchant Marine: The Cause of Its Decline and the Means to Be Taken for Its Revival," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII (1882): 3. Carlos G. Calkins, "Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline and the Means to Be Taken for Its Revival," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII (1882): 35; French Chadwick, "Our Merchant Marine," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII (1882): 75. Ensign W. G. David, "Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline and the Means to Be Taken for Its Revival," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* III (1882).

⁶⁹² Stephen B. Luce, "Our Future Navy," *The North American Review* 149 (1889): 541-559. Luce's writing cited the British announcement that they would construct seventy new warships, ten battleships and sixty cruisers. Luce proclaimed the United States Navy was devoid of any comparable "battle" vessels, and cited the need to build them immediately.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*: 449. Luce combined the elements of American military intelligence into a single unit of analysis. The logic of the cavalry would be the common denominator of land and sea combat and would serve to ground American foreign policy change.

built around twenty battleships and their auxiliary vessels, the cruisers, and torpedo boats. Cruisers were to continue acting independently against enemy commerce.⁶⁹⁴

The Centralization of Planning: The State, War, Navy Building

Luce and his community had, by 1889, successfully centralized operational planning and positioned themselves to influence the shape and direction of Tracy's battleship doctrine. This process of centralization was realized in the State, War Navy Building in Washington D.C. According to the National Archives Records Administration, the State, War, Navy building (today the Eisenhower Executive Office Building) commands a unique position in American national history and architectural heritage. It was built between 1877 and 1888 to house the growing staffs of State, War, and Navy Departments, and is considered one of the best examples of French Second Empire architecture in the U.S.⁶⁹⁵

August 1882, Act 21 officially established the library as a department institution. The Act centralized operational intelligence because it directed the head of each cabinet department to ascertain and report at the next session of Congress. Noted Professor James Soley, member of the Naval Institute, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and Naval War College, was assigned to consolidate the library system under the office of ONI in the Bureau of Navigation.⁶⁹⁶ He used this opportunity as a steppingstone to consolidate all naval intelligence. Soley supervised

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid, 452.

⁶⁹⁵ The physical setting of the building was to approximate European diplomatic opulence and ornamentation. Soley opinions therefore were given the additional weight of operating from the most lavish room in the largest government building of its time.

⁶⁹⁶ Soley lectured in history and tactics at the Naval War College from 1885-1889. From 1886 to 1890, he was a professor in the Navy, Corps of professors of Mathematics, rising to the rank of Commander. Soley wrote several books with regard to naval affairs. From 1873 to 1882, he was the head of the Department of English, History and Law at the Naval Academy, and from 1882 to 1890, he served as the librarian of the Navy Department in Washington. During this period, he was also Superintendent of the Naval War Records Office, Annapolis and continued this work at Columbia (later George Washington) University, receiving his law degree in 1890.

activities operating under the title of “Office of Library and Naval Records.” These offices were transferred from the Bureau of Navigation and placed under the Secretary of the Navy’s office in 1889. Soley then became the Assistant to the Secretary, with an office located next to Tracy’s. He was thus in an ideal position, physically and bureaucratically, to explain the sea power theory to the Secretary with the support of his community and a new centralized collection of European military operations. Soley advised Tracy from the “Indian Treaty Room.”⁶⁹⁷ The State, War, Navy building served to facilitate the process by which the sea power theory developed by Luce’s epistemic community was converted into Secretary Tracy’s strategic doctrine.

Luce described the new access to the Secretary,

I trust the report that Prof. J. R. Soley is to become Asst. Secretary of the Navy is true. It would be difficult, indeed, to find another man, in or out of the Navy, so singularly well qualified for the position, both by education and training. He would, moreover, command the confidence of the entire service. I beg you will pardon this free expression of my private opinion: but as the contemplated measure is one that will mark an important era in the history of naval administration, refrain from offering my congratulations in advance.⁶⁹⁸

For Luce, Soley’s appointment marked the culmination of efforts to establish a more formal link to the office of the Secretary that had commenced in 1888. He supported a strengthening of the Secretary’s position by giving him two principle assistants; one for civilian affairs and one for military affairs.⁶⁹⁹ Congress responded by passing the Naval Reorganization Act of 1890. The act established an Assistant Naval Secretary position.⁷⁰⁰ Luce saw the

⁶⁹⁷ The Indian Treaty Room is described by the historical registry as the most outstanding room in the most outstanding building in the U.S. during the late nineteenth century.

⁶⁹⁸ Luce Box 615, Francis SE, Newport, R. I. July 7 1890

⁶⁹⁹ Stephen B. Luce, "Naval Administration," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XIV (1888): 586-588.

⁷⁰⁰ Congress had appropriated a salary for an Assistant Secretary in 1882, but blocked the provision in 1883. Charles Oscar Paullin, *Paullin's History of Naval Administration, 1775-1911: A Collection of Articles from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1968), 1251.

establishment of the Assistant Secretary as a fulfillment of his plan to centralize strategic planning in Washington.⁷⁰¹

Although it was possible for Soley to transplant a European strategic collection to Washington, transplanting an entire formal system of a European-style general staff would prove more difficult.⁷⁰² I contend that the link between Luce, his community, and Tracy functioned as a quasi-general staff to affect policy. An actual general staff would have either a “chief of operations” or a “chief of staff,” with the chief in a position similar to that of an assistant secretary.⁷⁰³ Thus, he would have been both an “advisor” and an “assistant” to the secretary. This function was deemed absolutely necessary by the line officers that were charged with the problems of organization. Luce pressed in 1888 for recognition of “military” administration as a “major” function of the agency charged with administering the navy. But his proposal did not formally place the general staff in a position of authority over the bureaus in the jurisdiction of the secretary’s “civilian assistant,” the Assistant Secretary.⁷⁰⁴

Naval Secretaries and bureau chiefs had stalled attempts to establish a general staff. Such an arrangement, it was felt, indicated a potential lessening of civilian control and bureau

⁷⁰¹ From 1873 to 1882, Soley had been librarian of the Naval War Department. He was a “professor” in the Navy from 1876 to 1890, rising to the rank of commander. Apparently, Soley and Tracy were able to “see eye-to eye” on important issues. After his post, Soley practiced law in New York City with his former naval chief, Benjamin Franklin Tracy (Secretary of the Navy March 6, 1889 to March 6, 1893), in the firm of Tracy, Boardman, and Platt (later Boardman, Platt and Soley). Soley’s mere presence signifies a unity in operational intelligence and planning. He participated in the establishment of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1883. He collected, organized, and disseminated information, and was engaged in its first planning activities. Soley also was present during the establishment of the Naval War College in 1884, and helped the institution arrange its materials based on transplanted European Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) methods.

⁷⁰² Proposals for a general staff would have consolidated responsibilities for the performance of these essentially military functions in a single organization.

⁷⁰³ This idea is expressed by Captain A. P. Cooke, “Naval Reorganization,” *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XIV (1888): 561-588. See also Captain H. C. Taylor, “Memorandum on General Staff for the US Navy,” *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XXVI (1900): 444-445.

⁷⁰⁴ French Chadwick, “Naval Department Organization,” *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 493-506 (1894): 493-506.

autonomy.⁷⁰⁵ Still, many acknowledged the need for operational planning. The issues at stake concerned the qualifications of the selected few at the highest level. According to Rolf Nordahl Haugen, staff officers believed that direct access to the Secretary was necessary to maintain participation in the formulation of policy proposals. Haugen noted that the United States did not provide the grounds for transplanting foreign institutions, such as the General Staff system of Germany or France, since they appeared to be military autocracies. Congress, preferred instead to maintain the “bureau system.”⁷⁰⁶ In spite of these structurally imposed restrictions upon the development of a general staff, the Naval War College was able to function as a quasi-general staff, through access provided from the office of the Assistant Secretary.⁷⁰⁷

Epistemic Linkage

In this section, I consider the influence of Mahan upon Tracy’s Report. I challenge the simplistic assumption that Mahan’s theory worked in isolation to advance a battleship program. During the 1888-1890 period, Bliss, Meigs, Sampson, Luce, Mahan, Goodrich, and Soley worked together to advance a battleship policy. According to Benjamin Cooling, these men were in continuous contact with Tracy before the Battleship Act of 1890. “If not physically in Washington, these men had a direct line to the Secretary through Admiral Porter.”⁷⁰⁸ My

⁷⁰⁵ Rolf Nordahl Brun Haugen, “The Setting of Internal Administrative Communication in the United States Naval Establishments 1775-1920: A Study of the Conditions Affecting Processes of Internal Communication, and the Administrative Action Exerted to Control Their Impact” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1953), 327.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 328.

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 410. The centralization of operational intelligence in Washington meant that Naval War College faculty could extend their ideas and objectives to other parts of the naval establishment, and beyond. The officers who founded and promoted the establishment of the Naval Institute and the Naval War College and pressed for a general staff, in Haugen’s estimation, witnessed a fulfillment of the centralization project with the placement of Soley in D.C.

⁷⁰⁸ B. Franklin Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1973), 70.

appendix details a pattern of communications between the epistemic community and Tracy.⁷⁰⁹ I have also found correspondence between Senator Aldrich and Army Navy Journal editor Church, which informs and advocates the work of Luce's community.

The epistemic community contributed to the project and collectively they supported one another. An example of their support came after the publication of Mahan's sea power book, published in 1890. Personal notes of congratulations came to Mahan from Goodrich, Soley, Sampson, Stockton, and Bliss. I will note, however, that Mahan's work made no initial impression upon publishers or the public. Mahan, at one point, believed the book would not be published. He wrote to Luce on September 21, 1889, "I am not willing to go on begging publishers. It both distracts, vexes and hinders me in my other work."⁷¹⁰

Fortunately for Mahan, one week later, James Soley persuaded a personal friend and editor to consider Mahan's work.⁷¹¹ The stipulation was that Mahan was obliged to promise to purchase a number of copies. Mahan himself pledged \$100 and John Ropes, a War College lecturer, also guaranteed \$100. Luce helped Mahan secure support within the service to purchase books in bulk lots. Bliss agreed to purchase 100 copies for the Department of War; J.G. Walker of the Bureau of Navigation agreed to buy 50 copies for ships' libraries, and Casper Goodrich promised to buy 100 copies for the Naval War College.

Once published, the book came to the attention of naval reviewers. Luce assessed the book in the Critic, calling it an altogether exceptional work. He notified Theodore Roosevelt, who in October 1890 reviewed it in the Atlantic Monthly. Other War College faculty members began to advance the sea power theory through newspaper editorials and book notes. According to Robert Seager II, these efforts framed Mahan's message for the reviewing fraternity:

Generally they accepted uncritically the author's opinion that rapid and radical changes in weapons and propulsion systems in no way compromised the known

⁷⁰⁹ Manuscripts included. Shulman and Rhodes failed to notice Mahan's efforts as part of a collective community.

⁷¹⁰ Gleaves, 43.

⁷¹¹ James W. McIntyre, a selling agent of Little, Brown, and Company of Boston, agreed to buy the book, but refused to pay any additional fees for plates and illustrations.

existence of certain immutable principles. Some even accepted his dubious contention that wind-wafted fire ships of the Age of Sail had the same tactical function as contemporary small, swift, steam-driven, torpedo boats.⁷¹²

Multiple Links to Tracy

This section continues to challenge the proposition that Mahan's efforts were the sole influence upon naval policy. Luce said that before 1889 naval secretaries "had absolutely no appreciation for the systematic study of naval warfare."⁷¹³ Before 1889, Tracy, the new Secretary, also had little interest in naval strategy. Tracy, nevertheless, was intent upon having Luce brief him on the activities of his community and Tracy quickly became a friend of the community. It was not long before Tracy wrote Luce the note, "I can assure you that I consider no matter of greater importance than the education of our officers in the subjects that have been introduced into your college."⁷¹⁴

Luce's 1889 article prompted Tracy to appoint a Policy Board to recommend new naval policy. Tracy named Commodore W. P. McCann, of the Boston Navy Yard, to head the board. Tracy wanted to know how many years should be allowed to build the fleet proposed by Luce, "both for cruising and for coast defense purposes." Also, he asked about the number and types of ships that should be requested from Congress in the next session and the cost of the project.⁷¹⁵

The McCann board was to make recommendations to the Secretary.⁷¹⁶ The board would take several months to arrive at a conclusion. At about the same time, Secretary Tracy called Mahan to Washington for a consultation to discuss his manuscript. The manuscript that would emerge a year later as The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, reinforced Luce's observations

⁷¹² Seager II, 211.

⁷¹³ Herrick, 48.

⁷¹⁴ Luce-Tracy, 19 Mar. 1889, Box 7, cited in Cooling, 72.

⁷¹⁵ Tracy-McCann, 16 Jul. 1889 printed as Appendix A to U.S. Congress, cited in Ibid., 73.

⁷¹⁶ *New York Times*, 31 July 1889.

in the North American Review. Tracy studied the proposition that sea power required a permanent fleet of battleships under unified command; such a fleet would need to acquire overseas bases for support. Colonies would subsequently develop around these bases and serve as sources for raw materials and markets for surplus products.⁷¹⁷

At this time, Luce was at sea in command of the North Atlantic Squadron. His ideas on naval policy needed to be conveyed to Tracy by Porter. Later, Porter would introduce J.R. Soley to Tracy as the man who best embodied the work of Luce and the college.⁷¹⁸ Porter also supplied information about recent concepts published in the Proceedings.⁷¹⁹

Tracy submitted his annual report the following month. The report contained proposals that represented a shift in naval policy. The document was forceful, and further codified the naval theory advanced by the Naval War College.⁷²⁰ According to the report, capture of enemy merchantmen was not going to prevent an enemy fleet from shelling American cities. Tracy spoke of fighting a defensive war, with a force that could raise blockades, beat off the enemy's fleet on its approach to American waters, and even carry combat to the enemy's coastal waters. Tracy denied that such offensive operations reflected a policy of aggression. Rather, he predicted that future naval battles would be short, fought with the force available at the beginning of hostilities. "To strike the first blow," he said, "will gain an advantage and inflict an injury from which an antagonist can never recover."⁷²¹ The report noted that first-strike

⁷¹⁷ Porter and Soley, acting on Luce's behalf, explained to Tracy arguments made in the *Proceedings* during 1888 and 1889. For differences of opinion as to Mahan's influence on Tracy and others at this time, see William Edmund Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), 43. Herrick, 43.

⁷¹⁸ Herrick. Hagen claims Luce's "Our Future Navy" influenced Tracy's report, in Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 33.

⁷¹⁹ Cooling, Herrick, Sprouts.

⁷²⁰ Compare the traditional interpretation of Mahan's influence on the document as found in Herrick, Sprout, LaFeber, and Millis, with Grenville and Young who offer a more likely attribution to Luce's influence since Tracy's figure of capital ships coincided with that of Luce's in *Our Future Navy*.

⁷²¹ US Naval Department, *Annual Report*, 1889, 5.

capability required two fleets of cruisers, and called for immediate Congressional authorization of “twenty seagoing armored capital ships.” Twelve would go to the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, while the other eight would be in the Pacific. Tracy’s report symbolized a new departure from traditional doctrine, specifically by proposing that the navy’s size be gauged in comparison to selected foreign navies.⁷²²

Content Assessment: The 1889 Annual Report

The central propositions of Tracy’s report can be traced to the sea power theory advanced by Luce’s epistemic community.⁷²³ I will assess and compare the content of Tracy’s report to the articles published by Luce’s community, 1887-1889.

Meigs had advanced the sea power ideas of Kelly and David in order to explain the command of the seas.⁷²⁴ The next advance of these ideas came in the spring of 1889, William Sampson’s essay, “Outline of a Scheme for the Naval Defense of the Coast,” first appeared in The North American Review and was later reprinted in the fall in the Proceedings. That summer, Luce published “Our Future Navy.” The ideas of Luce and his community were elaborated upon in three official documents: Secretary Tracy’s Annual Report for 1889, which appeared in

⁷²² Report to the Policy Board, *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 16 (1890): 206-207. Cited in B. Franklin Cooling, *Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex, 1881-1917* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1979), 90.

⁷²³ Herrick, 48-51. Harold Hance Sprout and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 1st. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 207. Herrick, like most scholars, overstates Mahan’s contribution to the Annual Report of 1889. Mahan published nothing before 1890 that can be identified in Tracy’s report. My appendix includes a correspondence between Mahan to Tracy from May of 1890. In the letter, Mahan provides a copy of his book and explains the principles of sea power. Mahan and Tracy reportedly became intimate associates during the summer of 1889, when publishers were reading the manuscript for Mahan’s sea power book. Undoubtedly Mahan’s opinions made an impression upon Tracy, and confirmed the War College position. Mahan’s theory was explained and repeated to Tracy by Admiral Porter, a friend of Naval War College. He introduced Mahan to Tracy. Porter pointed out to Tracy that he and Mahan helped remove the school from bureau control and capture by factions.

⁷²⁴ Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 693-694.

November after Mahan's Sea Power manuscript was available in September; The Report of the Naval Policy Board which was presented to Tracy the following January; together these proposals became the Naval Appropriations Act of 1890, which appeared in spring. These documents demonstrate the epistemic community's codification of Luce's 1865 proposal, geared for the evolution of a comprehensive military doctrine.

The ideas of Sampson, Luce, Meigs, Harrington, as discussed in the Proceedings closely resembled those that appeared in Tracy's Report. In his essay, Luce explained the importance of England's Naval Defense Act. There were strong agreements between officers and the Secretary on three important points. First, the 13,000 miles of American coast required a naval defense; second, such a defense was best offered by the "armor clad," the battleship; and third, future wars would be short and sharp. These therefore would be fought with material on hand at the begging of hostilities.⁷²⁵ Tracy and Luce both spoke of the offensive uses of battleships. These were expected to protect American commerce, destroy the enemy's coast, and defeat the enemy's battleships at sea.⁷²⁶ Defensively, battleships would protect colonies, meet the needs of international relations, preserve national dignity, allow enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and permit intervention in problems arising from the Isthmian canal.⁷²⁷

The epistemic community advocated that battleships operate with coast defending "armorclads" to control enemy attack points on the coasts, prevent raids and block invasion attempts. Once notified of attack, the coast defenders would protect the coasts, prevent

⁷²⁵ Also, Harrington discusses Luce, "Our Future Navy," *Proceedings* 541-543; Sampson: 169-170. Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown & co., 1890), 26. *Annual Report*, 1889, 4 and 11.

⁷²⁶ Harrington discusses Luce, "Our Future Navy," 556-557; Luce, "Our Future Navy," 542. Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 693-694. S. William T. Sampson, "Coast Defense," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* VIII (1881): 171-173. Mahan, 86. *Annual Report*, 1889, 4.

⁷²⁷ Harrington Discusses Luce "Our Future Navy," 556 and 558; Luce, "Our Future Navy," 549. Sampson, "Coast Defense," 170-180. *Annual Report*, 1889, 5. Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 694.

blockades and the bombardment of seacoast cities and naval dockyards, check enemy raiders, and meet invading forces.⁷²⁸ The authors also asked for ships to expand and protect American trade. This was necessary, according to Luce, because there was no effective navy in place. Commander Harrington suggested that U.S. cruisers were no longer equipped to protect American shipping. He noted that it would be better for Americans to turn their attention away from internal concerns and toward expanding sea trade.⁷²⁹

Tracy explained the needs of commerce and warships to promote national welfare. He said that seacoast cities would stagnate and the American economy would decline if the Navy could not protect ocean trade.⁷³⁰ The epistemic community and Tracy agreed that the need for ships should be commensurate with the nation's defensive requirements and the strength of its potential enemies. Assessments of size and strength were to proceed from this proposition. Harrington requested ships to fill a distinct role in naval policy;⁷³¹ so did Luce, when he suggested that the battleships should operate in a fleet and that twenty were needed. Harrington asked for the same number, saying twelve should be built immediately, with two laid down every year for twenty-five years. Tracy concurred with the broad contours of this shipbuilding agenda, asking for twenty-five battleships, twelve for the Atlantic, and eight for the Pacific. He wanted eight battleships laid down immediately and his program completed in twelve years.⁷³²

⁷²⁸ Harrington discusses "Our Future Navy," 556-557; Luce, "Our Future Navy," 542. Sampson, "Coast Defense," 171-173. *Annual Report* 1889, 4; Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 693-694. Mahan, 14-18.

⁷²⁹ "Cruiser no longer equipped," *Annual Report*, 1889, 4; Harrington discusses Luce's "Our Future Navy," 556; Luce, "Our Future Navy," 550.

⁷³⁰ Harrington discusses Luce "Our Future Navy," 556; Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 693-694. Mahan, 85. *Annual Report*, 1889, 4.

⁷³¹ Harrington discusses Luce "Our Future Navy," 556 and 559, Sampson, "Coast Defense," 177 and 185. Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 693-694. Mahan, 84 and 86-87. *Annual Report*, 1889, 4.

⁷³² Harrington discusses Luce "Our Future Navy," 554; Luce, "Our Future Navy," 542, 552. *Annual Report*, 1889, 8-9.

The centerpiece of Tracy's report turned upon one seminal idea as expressed by Luce's reform community. The explanation for acquiring battleships was extended from the belief that the wisdom of ancient oarsmen should be applied to future warfare. Sampson and Meigs framed an oar to steam parallel and supplied the lesson of history.⁷³³ Tracy incorporated this rationale.

The Naval Policy Board

The policy board appointed by Tracy in July 1889, had an additional influence upon Tracy's ideas.⁷³⁴ Headed by Commodore W.P. McCann, its members included Captain R.L. Pythian, Captain Sampson, Commander William F. Folger, Lieutenant Commander Willard H. Brownson, Naval Constructor Richard Gateswood, and Ensign Phillip R. Alger. Four of the seven were associated with the Naval War College; all members were associated with Luce and had contributed to the Proceedings.⁷³⁵

Due to McCann's illness and lack of familiarity with naval policy, Sampson gained inordinate influence upon the decisions of the Naval Policy Board.⁷³⁶ Sampson had lectured at the War College, served on previous boards, published his seminal essay on the defense of the coast, and had just completed a tour of duty as superintendent of the Naval Academy. He participated with Luce in the establishment of the Prize Essay Contest, helped to found the Naval War College, defended it from attacks by critics, and served in various offices of the Naval Institute. Given the respect with which he was held in the service and his many contributions to

⁷³³ Sampson, "Coast Defense," 215 and 217-218. Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 693-694. *Annual Report*, 1889, 12 and 25.

⁷³⁴ Herrick, 73. Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York: Putnam, 1956) 158-159. Sprout and Sprout, 213.

⁷³⁵ Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy*, 73. *Report of the Naval Policy Board*, and the *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 16, no. 2 (1890): 272-273.

⁷³⁶ Seager II, 211.

the Navy's intellectual life, it is not surprising that Sampson was an important influence upon the Board.

Like Tracy's document, the board's report reads as if it were a summary of Luce's epistemic community. Board members based their findings on a series of assumptions consistent with the rationale that the epistemic community had published in the Proceedings. They insisted that the size of the Navy should be predicated on five conditions: the danger of war, the strength of potential enemies, the proximity of the enemies' coaling stations, the geographic areas the nation had to defend, and the interests it had to protect.⁷³⁷ The board summarized much of the consensus of Luce's community. It admitted that the nation was economically self-contained, threatened by few foreign powers, and insulated from the possibility of serious invasion by the wide Atlantic Moat. Its members said that only England, France and Spain possessed bases from which prolonged attacks could be mounted, and only England and Italy possessed ships capable of crossing the Atlantic and operating without bases. Sampson and the board made the same point: the nation had to defend its coast, and "essential security" included protection of the Isthmian canal and surrounding routes.⁷³⁸

The board requested ten long-range "armorclads" to assume the offensive in distant waters and to attack enemy coasts.⁷³⁹ It then asked for twenty-five "armorclads" of "limited endurance," as expressed through Luce's community.⁷⁴⁰ Just as Sampson had done, the board divided its twenty-five "armorclads" into three classes, which were designed to operate a thousand miles from their bases. Unlike the ships of the 1880s, these would be designed to

⁷³⁷ *Report of the Naval Policy Board*, 207.

⁷³⁸ Herrick, 63-64. Millis, 158-159. Sprout and Sprout, 210-211. and *Report of the Naval Policy Board*, 202-203.

⁷³⁹ *Report of the Policy Board*, 207.

⁷⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 211-212; Harrington discusses Luce, "Our Future Navy," 556-557; Luce, "Our Future Navy," 542. Meigs, "An Essay on the Tactics of the Gun, as Discoverable from Type Warships," 693-694. Sampson, "Coast Defense," 171-173. Mahan, 86. *Annual Report*, 1889, 4.

attack enemy bases off the American coast. Shallow draughts would allow “armorclads” to operate on call and keep ports open. As Sampson noted, this aspect of design—similarity of speed and maneuverability—would allow them to combine and operate together as a manageable fleet.⁷⁴¹

At this time, Luce and associates existed in a state of policy hegemony. There was no fundamental intellectual dissent from his central proposition that American strategic policy will succeed in the future if it operates according to the same principles that applied to the ancient Roman and Greek victories.⁷⁴² Luce’s community also had consensus about the needs of the American Navy. This consensus aided the additional theoretical codification provided by Tracy’s Report and the Naval Policy Board, which called for battleships capable of assuring “the protection of our own coast.”⁷⁴³ All three sources agreed that the existing monitor type had become obsolete. The Board advised against adding more of these vessels to the fleet.⁷⁴⁴ Since Belknap’s article in 1880, Luce’s community had concentrated upon centralizing and monopolizing operational planning and directing it toward the most critical decision making position (the Naval Secretary). With Luce’s apparatus in place (the institutions he developed to

⁷⁴¹ Sampson, "Coast Defense," 171-173.

⁷⁴² Seager II, 213, provides a lengthy and detailed discussion of international reviews immediately following the arrival of Mahan’s book. Generally, naval theorists thought it was an acceptable argument. However, one voice stood in contrast to Luce and Mahan’s central proposition. Professor John K. Laughton, lecturer of naval history at the Royal Naval College, and most knowledgeable living reviewer, criticized Mahan for contending that the principles of war, on land and on sea, were fixed and immutable. As for the tactical implications of changes in the propulsion and armaments of warships down through the centuries, he held contrary to Mahan, that “the differences of motive power or of arms, are so great that points of divergence will commonly be more prominent than points of resemblance.” As discussed in Chapter 3, history as a discipline was still too much an infant to present a formidable challenge to a master armature speaking from his field. Certainly, in other hands the American defense debate could have been framed differently.

⁷⁴³ Ibid., 212.

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid., 274-277.

advance his research agenda), the proposition that principles of warfare were fixed and immutable had intellectual hegemony and motion.⁷⁴⁵

The Triumph of the Sea Power Doctrine in Congress

The Naval Appropriations Act of 1890 has been interpreted as a “congressional endorsement of a revolutionary departure in our system of naval defense.”⁷⁴⁶ One writer called it an “evasion of the underlying policy issue.”⁷⁴⁷ Another scholar wrote that it “spelled a decisive victory for the supporters of Mahan’s document.”⁷⁴⁸ The 1890 Naval Appropriations Act has also been seen as a “new departure” from established policy. I conclude that its success in Congress reflects the culmination of Luce’s drive to centralize operational planning.

The centralization efforts were apparent when the appropriations came before Congress. The Act of 1890 provided for a torpedo boat, a torpedo cruiser, a protected cruiser and three “sea-going, coast line battleships.” The defense of the coast was the premier strategic question at hand. Many in Congress still felt the defense could be solved with cruisers, ships capable of fulfilling traditional strategic requirements. Cruisers, as early as 1886, had been referred to as “sea-going coast line battleships.” The “armor clads” authorized in 1890 used the same terminology. Each of the six bills passed by Congress from 1890 until the turn of the century authorized the building of ironclads and provided for building “sea-going coast line battleships,” exactly as Luce and Tracy had advocated. Not until the turn of the century did the Congress

⁷⁴⁵ The general thrust of mid-century American, English, and German professional historians was the mania surrounding Ranke (considered the father of historical induction). In America, by the 1880s, Novick argues, accomplished armatures had the upper hand in publishing and selling history. Still, as Burkhart suggests, in a different time and with different hands, grand historical assertions take different paths.

⁷⁴⁶ Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy*, 87.

⁷⁴⁷ Herrick, 71.

⁷⁴⁸ Millis, 158.

authorize a capital ship for any other purpose than to protect the American coast. The *Arizona*, authorized in 1913, was the ship first designated simply as a battleship.⁷⁴⁹

In his 1889 inaugural address, President Harrison expressed his determination to build up the Navy along the lines proposed by Tracy. Harrison called for “the acquisition of “convenient” bases for the general maintenance of the fleet in foreign sea.”⁷⁵⁰ The President followed these proposals with more specific recommendations after he ruminated over the content of Tracy’s report. In his first message to Congress, Harrison urged the authorization of eight battleships to determine their adaptability in wartime.⁷⁵¹

Luce attempted to influence the process by telling Congress that, “Mahan is doing for naval science what Jomini did for military science.”⁷⁵² Many officers and congressmen appeared eager to support the scheme.⁷⁵³ Luce informed military and naval officers through the Proceedings and the Army and Navy Journal. Scholars and professional literary men were addressed in the Critic, leaders of the civilian community in the North American Review.⁷⁵⁴

In Congress, Luce’s supporters were put in contact with Porter and Aldrich.⁷⁵⁵ Speaker Reed, Chairman of the House Naval Committee Charles Boutelle, Admiral Luce, Henry Cabot Lodge, Hilary Herbert of Alabama, William G. McAdoo of New Jersey, and Senator Eugene Hale of Maine were prepared to advance the epistemic community’s ideas into legislation. Luce

⁷⁴⁹ Herrick, 73. Millis, 158-159. Sprout and Sprout, 213.

⁷⁵⁰ *Messages and Papers*, IX, 10.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid*, 44.

⁷⁵² Luce to J.S. Barnes, August 5, 1889, Luce Papers LOC.

⁷⁵³ Seargent to Walker, June 17, 1889, Seargent Correspondence, cited in Jeffery M. Dorwart, *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 25.

⁷⁵⁴ Stephen Bleecker Luce, John Daniel Hayes, and John B. Hattendorf, *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce* (Newport: Naval War College, 1975), 32.

⁷⁵⁵ Gleaves, 26-42.

lobbied these men in particular during the congressional sessions between 1890 and 1893.⁷⁵⁶

When not physically present in Washington, his community had a communicated to Tracy through Admiral Porter and Soley.⁷⁵⁷

Boutelle questioned Porter and Luce as to the needs of the Navy. Porter advocated a policy similar to that of the McCann board report. He saw a requirement for no less than twenty-eight “line-of-battleships,” twenty-eight coast defense vessels, ten flagships, forty cruisers, forty gunboats, fifty torpedo boats, and five dispatch boats as part of a long range plan. Boutelle backed the Secretary’s program for meeting the immediate needs of the Navy. Tracy concluded, “These ideas may startle some members of Congress but they will be much more startled if within the next decade we should be involved in a difficulty with some foreign power, for no man knows.”⁷⁵⁸

Boutelle informed Tracy that he would seek additional consultation from Luce regarding legislative planning.⁷⁵⁹ After consulting Porter and Luce, Boutelle decided to pare down the number of battleships in the appropriations bill. Moreover, Boutelle was instructed about the degree to which the ships cruising radius could be cut, so as to seem less offensive in nature. The three men agreed that it would not be disingenuous to redefine the ships as “seagoing coastline battleships.” In a letter to Luce, Boutelle explained the political deceptiveness of his compromise: “By building such ships, we should avoid the popular apprehension of jingoism in naval matters, while we can develop the full offensive and defensive powers of construction.”⁷⁶⁰

⁷⁵⁶ Luce, Hayes, and Hattendorf, *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce*, 32.

⁷⁵⁷ Cooling, *Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the Modern American Fighting Navy*, 70.

⁷⁵⁸ Porter-Boutelle, 3 Jan. 1890, Box 8, General Correspondence, 1890-1899.

⁷⁵⁹ Boutelle-Tracy, 7 March 1890.

⁷⁶⁰ Boutelle-Luce, 6 March 1890.

Boutelle sent the views of the Committee on Naval Affairs to the House of Representatives on April 1. After reflection, his committee had sanctioned only three sea-going coastline battleships designed to carry the heaviest armor, with a displacement of about 5,000 tons. Boutelle told the House that his committee desired a simple defensive squadron, not a fleet of long-range battleships. But he wanted the defensive vessels to be fighting ships, capable of standing out to sea against an enemy. The committee studied the Naval Policy Board proposals. Boutelle thought it was unwise to request too many battleships in the initial legislation. He told one correspondent that such vessels could equal “foreign cruising battleships” in all but speed and fuel capacity.⁷⁶¹

When the bill was finally introduced, the battleship provision became the focal point for opposition among populists and westerners led by Congressmen Joseph Cannon of Illinois, Joseph B. Sayers of Texas, Samuel Peters of Kansas, and William Holman of Indiana. These legislators termed the bill a “new departure” and were not inclined to endorse its strategic implications.

Tracy’s allies quickly rallied support for the measure. Tom Reed lent his support along with the second ranking member of his committee, Massachusetts’ Henry Cabot Lodge. Fortunately for Tracy, Lodge was very influential in convincing Hilary Herbert of Alabama and William G. McAdoo of New Jersey to consider battleship construction plans.⁷⁶² Perhaps the most influential spokesman for naval expansion in the Senate was Eugene Hale of Maine, who ranked second on Chairman James Camerson’s naval committee. Hale’s correspondence with Secretary Tracy reveals the senator’s interest in upgrading the fleet.⁷⁶³ Tracy also met with

⁷⁶¹ Boutelle-Luce, 6 Mar. 1890, Box 9, SLLC.

⁷⁶² *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress, 3167-69.

⁷⁶³ Hale to Tracy, December 1889.

Speaker Reed and Congressman Boutelle. Tracy knew he could depend on the Senator from Maine when Congress prepared to debate his proposals in the spring of 1890.⁷⁶⁴ The second ranking member of Boutelle's committee was Henry Cabot Lodge, and across the chamber sat Hilary Herbert of Alabama and William McAdoo of New Jersey. Others who participated in supporting the legislation included Senator Eugene Hale of Maine, Theodore Roosevelt of the Civil Service Commission, and Charles Dana of the New York Sun.⁷⁶⁵

In debate, Boutelle explained the purpose of the bill was "to assume the actual defense of our coast, to break the blockade of any of the great marine ports... to drive off foreign aggression from our shores and to seize and hold the bases of supply in the immediate area of the American coast which...would be absolutely essential to the maintenance of the safety of our coastline."⁷⁶⁶ This new emphasis was consistent with the strategic requirements proposed by Luce. Lodge explained to Congress that the new ships departed from the monitor principle only in having a somewhat higher freeboard, enabling them to "steam and fight" in the open sea.⁷⁶⁷

By the time the House Committee of Naval Affairs formally investigated the options, the legislation had succeeded and the question became one of how many battleships to build. The proposal called for construction of three first-class battleships, one apiece on the coasts of the Pacific, Atlantic, and the Gulf of Mexico.

Congressional battleship advocates mixed arguments to win support for new ships. On one side, they insisted (somewhat disingenuously and perhaps only rhetorically) that the vessels

⁷⁶⁴ Sprout and Sprout, 209.

⁷⁶⁵ Cooling, *Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex, 1881-1917*, 69-75.

⁷⁶⁶ *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress, 1st Sess., 1890, 3261.

⁷⁶⁷ *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress 1st Sess., 1890, 3265.

represented nothing more than a continuation of the longstanding policy.⁷⁶⁸ On the other side, they rested their case for parity with European ships upon the intellectual consensus of Luce's epistemic community. Speaker Reed, Boutelle, and the bipartisan effort of Herbert and his Democratic colleagues won in the end. Henry Cabot Lodge, after briefing by Luce and his community, explained to Congress that the bill "introduced nothing new, but was merely the continuance of a policy settled by the war of 1812, and followed consistently thereafter."⁷⁶⁹ Boutelle had reinforced this opinion to Congress by noting the "authority" that legitimates the policy. He continually boosted their claim to authority.⁷⁷⁰ As Boutelle introduced the bill into Congress, he explained,

The experts of the Navy Department, the advisers of the Secretary of the Navy, those upon whom Congress and the committee must necessarily rely to a great extent for information as to what is going on abroad and what is possible of accomplishment in our own country in the line of naval construction, have given a great deal of thought to this subject of the construction of high-power fighting ships for our Navy, and to-day in the Navy Department that consideration and study of the subject have come, I may say, to be practically formulated in the general outline or design of two or three classes of vessels of the type designated as battle-ships.⁷⁷¹

Further, Boutelle went on to repeat the arguments framed by Luce's community:

[T]he construction of warships that will be powerful enough to assume actual defense of our coast, to break the blockade of any of our great maritime ports, to drive off foreign aggression from our shores, and to seize and hold those bases of supply in the immediate vicinity of the American coast which, in case of hostilities, would be absolutely essential to the maintenance of our coastline.⁷⁷²

Luce's community conferred with Congress during the passage of this bill. The appendix includes manuscripts that demonstrate a steady correspondence between Hale, Chandler, and

⁷⁶⁸ *Congressional Record*, 51 Congress, 1st Sess. 1890, 21. Pt., 3170.

⁷⁶⁹ *Congressional Record*, 51 Congress, 1st Sess. 1890, 21. Pt., 3169-70. I have included a manuscript in which Lodge explains to Tracy, Luce's assurance that the proposal was consistent with his policy.

⁷⁷⁰ Carpenter.

⁷⁷¹ *Congressional Record*, 51 Cong., 1st Sess, 3163 (April 8, 1890).

⁷⁷² *Congressional Record*, 51 Cong., 1st Sess, 3163 (April 8, 1890).

Aldrich in Congress, and Sampson, Goodrich, Mahan and Soley in the Navy.⁷⁷³ Luce's community continued skillfully planting articles and news releases by prominent naval officers who favored the college and its mission.⁷⁷⁴

1893: Policy Confirmation

In 1893 William McAdoo was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Formerly a Democratic representative from New Jersey in the House, the Secretary came to an understanding of the epistemic community through Mahan. For Naval Secretary Herbert, the conversion to the strategic principles occurred with a reading of Mahan's second sea power book, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Second Empire, which the Secretary read in the spring of 1893. Mahan's reasoning impressed Herbert as favorably as it had Tracy, and he too resolved to incorporate it in his first annual report to the President.⁷⁷⁵ Herbert remained in contact with Luce. By 1893, there was a fear among proponents of the new imperial doctrine that Herbert remained unconvinced of the battleship philosophy and that he had "thrown away the chance to give us an absolutely unique position in naval affairs."⁷⁷⁶ The Secretary's report for 1893, however, revealed his full acceptance of capital ship theory.⁷⁷⁷

When they took office in 1893, neither Herbert nor McAdoo subscribed wholeheartedly to the capital ship theory; their conversion to the imperial doctrine had yet to come.⁷⁷⁸ Herbert

⁷⁷³ NHF, Luce collection, Aldrich to Luce, May 17, 1886 Luce to J.F. Meigs, October 29, 1890, Chandler to Luce, February 5, 1890, and Tracy's correspondence with Luce and Mahan, January-May, 1890, in Tracy papers.

⁷⁷⁴ Taylor to Luce, 23 August 1894, *Luce Papers*.

⁷⁷⁵ Herbert to Mahan October 4, 1894, in Mahan papers, Sprout and Sprout, 218. Herrick, 158. Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 230.

⁷⁷⁶ Roosevelt to Mahan, May 1, 1893, in Mahan Papers.

⁷⁷⁷ Herrick, 159.

⁷⁷⁸ Both men initially opposed the battleship clause in the Act of 1890, see *Congressional Record*, 51st Cong., 1st Sess, 3161, 3256-71. Both men later endorsed the clause when the House defeated an attempt to replace it with a monitor provision.

recommended the construction of at least one battleship. “We must keep our Navy in such a condition...as to give weight to whatever policy it may be thought wise on the part of government to assume.”⁷⁷⁹ After his conversion to Mahan’s sea power principles in 1893, Herbert became the chief spokesmen, advocating deference to the elite few guiding the new policy. Herbert encouraged Congress to defer opinion upon a growing intellectual consensus,

I think we ought to build some battle-ships such as are provided for in this bill. It is often said that navy officers differ in their opinion, and so they do, as to what kind of ships we should have. There will always be individual differences of opinion; absolute unanimity among thinking men is impossible. But there is a remarkable consensus of elite opinion all over the world, among all nations, or at least among those who control the naval policies of all nations, that battleships heavily armored are essential. England, France, Germany, Spain, China, Russia, all are providing for and building new battleships.⁷⁸⁰

By 1895 battleship legislation had gone full-circle. A bill was introduced that demanded the construction of only battleships, no cruisers. The battleship legislation that advanced between 1890 and 1896, signaled an attempt to develop parity with European powers. The outcome of this legislation matched the requirements set fourth by Luce and Tracy in 1889 and signified a revolution in American national defense policy.

⁷⁷⁹ Herbert’s requests are consistent with those advocated by Mahan’s article “The Isthmus and Sea Power” *Atlantic Monthly* October, 1893. Mahan attacks the isolationist rejection of Hawaii and reasons that a canal solely in American hands was fundamental to its commercial linkage of the East, West, and Gulf coasts.

⁷⁸⁰ *Congressional Record*, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 3257 (April 10, 1895). Mahan.

Conclusion

I argue that the epistemic community led by Stephen Luce positioned itself to advance a new direction for American national security. The community was able to translate theory into policy by centralizing operational planning and creating an asymmetric knowledge exchange among policy actors. After 1890, it was generally accepted that freedom from the wind would demand ships to operate in fleets, at sea, rather than independently, on coasts. During a period of policy uncertainty and limited intellectual resistance, the epistemic community convinced relevant policy actors that ancient oar tactics should inform future American strategy. This analogy would make it possible to concentrate firepower at close range upon an adversarial fleet. The epistemic community presented the case for battleships and the acquisition of critical Pacific islands to Congress as an extension of America's liberal policy, which sought only to protect American territorial interests.

I argue that the ships built after 1890 were constructed in accord with Tracy's new doctrine, and were not simply the result of previous reform efforts. These ships represent a revolution in naval doctrine and American foreign policy. Bureaucratic actors created the imperial doctrine and enhanced the conditions for its success through Congress. According to Skowronek, this should not have been possible, given the political fragmentation that existed at the time. The success of battleship legislation during the 1890s demonstrates that fundamental state development occurred before 1896, and that state actors succeeded in expanding the state. War made the state and state made an imperial battleship policy that expanded its capacity.

CONCLUSION




Fig. 7 The United States Battle Fleet prior to WWI (Naval Historical Center)

At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States began a battleship program that placed it on a path-dependent course toward military parity with Europe and regional hegemony. I argued that naval theorists, not political or economic actors, were responsible for producing and extending the imperial doctrine and policy. These agents framed a new outward reaching national vision and created a network of actors that ensured the program's passage through Congress. The project began from an intellectual reassessment of American security. The policy succeeded because it was designed to circumvent the fragmented political landscape of the era. Once military reform was complete, the American state possessed the tools for global hegemony.

The evidence I presented is at variance with other explanations of late-nineteenth-century foreign policy adjustment. I found that politicians or “principles,” followed an imperial program developed by state actors. American Political Development (APD) scholarship offers an explanation of this phenomenon. I tested a theory of bureaucratic capacity developed by Daniel Carpenter. He said that late-nineteenth-century state actors were able to advance new proposals once they had demonstrated the value of their programs to the public. My findings serve to modify his conclusion. The evidence from my case suggests that state actors established autonomy and capacity without demonstrating the value of their program. This was possible because they functioned as an epistemic community that gained political support by monopolizing specialty knowledge during a period of technological uncertainty.

During the late nineteenth century, the world experienced a revolution in military planning. My dissertation addresses the question of how policy entrepreneurs harnessed these changes into new strategic possibilities by reassessing military doctrine. Skills mattered, organization mattered. The critical mechanism, however, was the formation of an epistemic community that successfully linked policy solutions to strategic uncertainty.

My findings support assumptions common to realist theories in international relations. My case highlights the mechanism by which new ideas were translated into doctrine, then into policy. During the 1880s, an epistemic community of theorists operating inside the state took the initiative and began asking questions about the implications of changing technologies upon doctrine. The community created an asymmetric communication exchange with relevant political actors. The exchange translated epistemic beliefs into doctrine. The epistemic community, therefore, was the mechanism that linked changing international conditions to foreign policy change. The epistemic community shared methodological assumptions and a

specific policy agenda. They functioned as a community, and members supported one another. The new military doctrine did not originate from both state actors and civilians. The doctrine for imperial expansion began from a consensus among autonomous state actors, who agreed upon a common agenda, then created coalitions that included non-state actors. Therefore, concepts developed by APD scholars, such as bureaucratic autonomy and entrepreneurship are essential to understand the operative conditions that made it possible for state actors to function as an epistemic community and change policy.

The sequences of doctrinal formation and doctrinal implementation I presented are consistent with the prediction of offensive realism; the state expanded aggressively when the benefits for regional hegemony appeared to outweigh the costs. This new calculus, however, required a new doctrine to reassign costs and benefits associated with the capture and maintenance of extra-territorial territory. The networking of epistemic actors explains the timing of the hegemonic doctrine. The doctrine explains the shape of state expansion (a navy capable of wresting regional hegemony). Future research might want to consider the role of state actors and epistemic communities in other cases in which nations adjusted from an inter-territorial security doctrine into an extra-territorial security doctrine.

Future research might also consider the impact of state actors and epistemic communities on other American services. After the 1889 Tracy Report was received in Congress, Luce's epistemic community began to inform the direction of army policy. Lieutenant William McCarthy Little developed operational planning at the Naval War College using "maneuvering boards" for "war games."⁷⁸¹ With these exercises, the college developed the idea of a "problem

⁷⁸¹ For instruction on the use of the term "war-game" see Bradley A. Fiske, *The Navy as a Fighting Machine* (New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1916), 210.

approach” for use as a teaching and learning device. In connection with this work, the College prepared a plan for operations in the Caribbean area.⁷⁸²

After 1890, strategic planning became increasingly centralized and followed the requirements of Tracy’s 1889 policy. America’s unprecedented deployment of armed forces overseas had precipitated a sweeping reassessment of national military policy. The reassessment engaged the attention of military officers over the next decade. Most officers looked outward, accepting the new mission initiated by naval reformers. In fact, a consensus began to develop. Army officers, after 1903, expressed satisfaction with American foreign policy as initiated by Tracy in 1890.⁷⁸³ The postwar advancement in America’s coastal fortifications, which then approximated the program advanced by the 1885 Endicott board, encouraged confidence in the Army’s potential capacity to secure the continental United States. The Army Navy Journal described the “magnificent” new forts and guns as “the strongest chain of sea coast defense in the world,” that placed the U.S. “almost beyond the possibility of successful assault by an enemy, no matter how powerful.”⁷⁸⁴

These findings point toward a number of future research paths. I suggest that the timing of naval centralization influenced the shape of army reform. The Spanish-American War finally demonstrated the value of the epistemic community’s theory. Only then did army reform have a clear invitation to advance. I speculate that after 1898, it was evident to military theorists, even civilians, that the previously unrealized efforts to reform the American Foreign Service were now necessary to sustain America’s expanding imperial ambitions.

⁷⁸² Rolf Nordahl Brun Haugen, “The Setting of Internal Administrative Communication in the United States Naval Establishments 1775-1920: A Study of the Conditions Affecting Processes of Internal Communication, and the Administrative Action Exerted to Control Their Impact” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1954), 405.

⁷⁸³ *Army Navy Journal* (August 29, 1903): 1307.

⁷⁸⁴ *Army Navy Journal* (October 13 1903).

The war with Spain was a milestone in the rise of American naval power. After a decade of experimental development, the war tested the battleship navy under conditions “sufficiently arduous and exacting to reveal hitherto concealed and unsuspected weakness.”⁷⁸⁵ The war “in plainly demonstrating these fundamentals recently systematized in naval reform books and articles, provided material for naval education designed to overcome obstacles to reform.”⁷⁸⁶ I speculate that the Army was not able to harness the currents of technological change and was forced to follow in the wake of naval success and subordinate their command and control as a result. Also, the experience of the Spanish-American War demonstrated the capacity of the Navy to pursue its imperial agenda and the need for the Army to adjust its mission accordingly. Also, I speculate that naval and army reform after 1900 likely initiated a new reform impulse from within the foreign services.

After a quarter century of discussion, army reform advocates finally resolved their differences by following the direction of naval reform. It appears that it was not until 1903, with the assistance of the Navy War College, that army reform advocates had their own centralized voice for the Army’s operational intelligence and *de facto* central command. These developments gave military officers a national and international perspective to further advance army reform legislation, and I speculate, assisted the extension of the American Foreign Service.

The War College problem-recognition work was sent to the Navy Department in the form of plans and supplementary data. In 1912, Captain William T. Rodgers recalled that the value of the planning work at the War College. At the outset of the war with Spain, he noted:

⁷⁸⁵ Harold Hance Sprout and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, 1st. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 223.

⁷⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 224-225.

The only plan for the war which the administration had worked out at this War College in the summer of 1895, and as it was the only one at all carefully digested, it was perforce the one which *both the army and navy followed*.⁷⁸⁷

The Naval War College had endorsed the value of planning prior to a conflict, and a temporary Board of Strategy had demonstrated the value of having senior officers freed from other responsibilities to assist the Secretary in planning during a conflict. The creation of the General Board in 1900 was a result of these demonstrations.⁷⁸⁸ The General Board took over some of the planning functions that had been the basis of Navy Department assignments to the Naval War College.⁷⁸⁹

Captain William S. Sims continued to extend the teaching and learning methods of the Naval War College. He introduced the use of planning procedures, campaign orders, and a system of evaluations, which had been developed at the college. Before the start of squadron exercises, preparatory doctrine was tested in chart maneuvers. According to Haugen, Sims used the “war college principles and methods,” to foster “mutual understandings of objectives and methods within the organization.”⁷⁹⁰ This was largely through his adaptation of the War College system of conference discussions during the preparatory stage of evaluation.⁷⁹¹ The Naval War College staff directed attention particularly toward the formulation of “campaign orders.”⁷⁹² The need for various orders was recognized to be:

⁷⁸⁷ William T. Rogers, "The Relations of the War College to the Navy Department," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XXXVIII (1912): 843-844. Captain Rogers was then president of the College.

⁷⁸⁸ Gleaves, 234-238.

⁷⁸⁹ Jarvis Butler, "The General Board of the Navy," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* LVI (1930): 702.

⁷⁹⁰ William S. Sims, "Naval War College Principles and Methods Applied Afloat," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* XLI (1915): 383-403.

⁷⁹¹ Haugen, 407.

⁷⁹² Naval War College, "Notes on the Applicatory System," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 38 (1912): 1025-1036. The authors noted: "The form for naval campaign orders, this in turn being based on the German 'Operation Order.' Some alterations in the army form have already been made to adopt to naval conditions, and organization, and it is possible that other changes may become necessary after sufficient experience in the use of form." The authors refer

Both before and during the progress of military and naval operations, the general plan and strategy will probably be laid down in letters of instruction issued by the commander-in-chief or other superior authority.⁷⁹³

Naval reformers began to create managerial structures capable of studying that environment, devising plans for its domination, and coordinating the organization's efforts to impose order. They recognized the deficiencies of the local order and used the organizing potential to further their goals.⁷⁹⁴

After 1900, Sims and his contemporaries at the Naval War College believed that their ideas should be expanded to every part of the military establishment, and later to naval forces in Europe.⁷⁹⁵ Army reformers were finally able to follow the example set forth by the Navy and argue that they, too, possessed a body of specialized knowledge that could be acquired only from professional education and many years of training. Modern war, they claimed, had become a science so complicated that only those having special education and engaged in constant study of warfare could hope to achieve success during combat.

In 1901, Secretary of War Elihu Root fulfilled army reformers' hopes by initiating the establishment of an Army War College that, like its naval counterpart, would prepare officers to meet the wartime demands of senior command and plan for the organization, training, and employment of land forces. As a planning agency that might coordinate the actions of combat

generally to "various German authorities and to the Field Service Regulations of our Army" 1025.

⁷⁹³ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁴ Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920, The Making of America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 111-132. Samuel P. Hays, "The New Organizational Society," in *Building the Organizational Society. Essays on Associational Activities in Modern America*, ed. Jerry Israel (1972), 1-15.

⁷⁹⁵ See Sims description of the work of the Planning Section of the Organization at London, in William Sowden Sims and Burton Jesse Hendrick, *The Victory at Sea* (London: J. Murray, 1920), 253-256.

forces with the work of Washington bureaus, the College was to act as a temporary general staff to assist in Root's reform efforts.⁷⁹⁶

Tasker H. Bliss and William H. Carter transported the template for Naval War College operations over to the Army War College. Root and Roosevelt realized that if the institution could function as the Navy War College had, educational reform might be possible. Determined to assist the Army in their efforts, naval officers Casper Goodrich, Tasker Bliss, and Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor concluded that, "these things work slowly and must be reformed slowly--or else reform is transitory."⁷⁹⁷ Meanwhile, the Navy War College would perform planning duties assigned to the army's general staff.⁷⁹⁸

As Skowronek notes, the American army of the 1870s and the American army of the 1920s were "two entirely different institutions."⁷⁹⁹ The newly empowered Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, the General Staff, and nationalized militia system, were all the products of the War Department, and were initiated and directed through the centralization of operational intelligence that began with the ad hoc General Staff function of the Army War College. These developments might have happened in another manner at another time, but the shape of army reform does not appear to be adequately explained without reference to the development of operational planning within the navy.

⁷⁹⁶ "The General Staff System" *Army Navy Journal* (October 13, 1906): 179; Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire. The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 308, 314-320.

⁷⁹⁷ Taylor to Rear Admiral Stephen Luce, April 8, 1902, Luce Papers, LOC, general correspondence, 11.

⁷⁹⁸ Daniel J. Costello, "Planning for War. A History of the General Board of the Navy, 1900-1914" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1968).

⁷⁹⁹ Skowronek, 246.

The reassignment of coastal duties was complete with the new military missions that emerged after the Spanish-American War. Root informed officers that these events were channeled through the Army War College:

The purpose of the Department in establishing this college is to further the highest instruction of the Army, to develop and organize, in accordance with a coherent and unified system, the existing means of professional education and training, and to serve as a coordinating and authoritative agency through which all means of professional military information shall be any time at the disposal of the War Department.⁸⁰⁰

William H. Carter was assigned to create the General Staff Law for the College. Carter continued to fulfill College functions “in this legislative campaign the roles of all the staff departments, as Root directed the operations.”⁸⁰¹ The War College went as far as “existing law made possible in the urging of further legislation.”⁸⁰² In 1903, Root recognized the expertise of General Tasker Bliss for his critical role in coordinating the relations of the General Staff to existing operational knowledge.⁸⁰³ This coordination was instrumental in casting the critical reform legislation of 1903 and 1906.

To the new outward minded turn-of-the-century reformer, naval strength was concomitant to effective foreign relations. The possession of a navy, or even the capacity to stage an effective naval demonstration, was apt to enhance attention to government representatives in underdeveloped areas. Indeed, some thinkers had already perceived the relationship between enhanced naval power and a more effective diplomacy. Representative

⁸⁰⁰ The program was described in Roots’ address at the establishment of the Army War College, February 21, 1903. Cited in Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (New York: Dodd Mead & company, 1938), 259.

⁸⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 260.

⁸⁰² *Ibid.*

⁸⁰³ *Ibid.*, 263. Bliss had served at West Point during the 1870s and 1880s. However, the critical knowledge to which Root referred was the knowledge Bliss obtain at the Naval War College, where he was in charge of systematizing (making operational) their knowledge base.

George B. Wise of Virginia thought that the maintenance of a naval establishment was the first step toward the preservation of friendly relations with other powers and the best guarantor against aggression. This assessment initiated calls for a foreign services reform to keep pace with the expanding American military⁸⁰⁴

I suggest that the epistemic community model can be applied to other periods of American foreign policy change. The centerpiece of George W. Bush's national security policy is the "War on Terror," which concedes that preemption and state building are necessary for the application of U.S. military and political power to promote democracy in strategic areas throughout the world. President Bush, it should be noted, was not the first to incorporate preemption into American policy. The doctrine emerges and recedes throughout American foreign policy history. My current and future research will explore epistemic communities as the mechanism that translated America's foreign policy adjustment, from a doctrine of parity with Europe, into a doctrine of containment after WWII. The containment doctrine was later translated into the state-building model initiated by President Bush. My research will apply epistemic community theory to these periods in an effort to clarify the conditions present during these points of adjustment.

I argue that the conditions, which existed during the 1890s, are comparable to the cold war and post 9/11 periods when preemption and state building were introduced again into American foreign policy. In each case, state autonomy mattered. To overcome the obstacles imposed by the existing state structure, actors not only framed a new outward-looking foreign policy for the US, but helped to create the coalitions necessary for relevant policy actors to pass new legislation.

⁸⁰⁴ *Congressional Record*, 49th Cong., 1st sess. (June 18, 1886)17, pt. 8, and spec. sess., A244.

I suggest that future American foreign policy research consider the origins and transitions of American strategic adjustment by tracking the relationship between the expansion of imperial doctrine and the expansion of the American state. Questions about the nature of this relationship remain unanswered. Perhaps more than any sub-fields, APD scholars can contribute to these questions by testing foreign policy models against APD models that highlight the linkage between American state development, bureaucratic entrepreneurship, and American foreign policy change.⁸⁰⁵

⁸⁰⁵ Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 12.

APPENDICES

be sure that ~~no effort~~ every possible effort will
 be made to secure republican success and if
 we do not carry the States in this election
 of course will not be carried by the republicans
 for many years to come. Please let me
 know as soon as possible when you will reach
 Providence.
 Very truly
 Wm. D. Aldrich

for us but he does not feel
 that he could come. Will ask
 you or the President use before
 him the importance of this service
 to the party. He can even
 in the face of all the opposition
 get a plurality ^{for the State tickets} if we have
 the assistance the importance
 of the campaign demands. Our
 people are united & enthusiastic
 and under the old registration
 we should be sure of a sweeping
 victory. Where the new voters will
 go is the unsolved problem and
 it is to reach and educate
 these that we need effective
 speakers and no man is so
 effective with the workingmen
 as Senator Frye. You can

Doc. 1 Aldrich to Tracy, March 27, Library of Congress, Tracy Papers 111/1197, Box 5

59 BROADWAY,
BANGOR, ME.

Received

700 P.M.

April 25 89
Mr. C. Tracy
Secretary of the Navy.

Dear Sir:

I have previously referred to impen-
dence the Department in regard of many
navy officers seeking promotion as-
signments, as I do not meet & anticipate
any request against the regular and orderly
system of details. I will now, not to offer
advice, but to ask you to look personally
into the case of Paymaster J. Q. Boutelle,
who after 27 years at the Maine Station,
Chapin's is advised that he is to be
retained on a 3 years cruise before being
allowed to come home. If this detail is
entirely regular & proper there nothing
to say, but Mr. Boutelle is from my
State's section & I would like to
have him put by detail with those

had a feeling that ex Paymaster Boutelle
which was very hardly dealt with that
among the officers associated with him
suffered from the same influences. Mr.
Boutelle was on duty in the Bureau at the
time. His services to the office was
usually allowed to return home after
three years absence, and I hope
simply that Mr. Boutelle may be
treated with the usual equity.

Yours very truly
J. Q. Boutelle

Boutelle to Tracy, April 25 1889. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 1.

Ans'd Aug 26 90

Machias,

Aug. 22. 90

My dear Secretary Tracy:

I have been here attending a County Convention, and find the good people of the region very much interested in the proposition that one of the new gunboats building at Bath, shall be named the "Machias" in commemoration of the first naval fight of the Revolution. I have told them that I have made formal request to that effect, and if I could give some assurance that it will be granted, it would be very gratifying to my people all along this coast.

Return to Bangor today.

Yours sincerely

C. A. Boutelle.

Hon. B. F. Tracy, Secy. of War.

Doc. 4 Boutelle to

59 BROADWAY,
BANGOR, MAINE.

Dear

Nov 11/90

Nov 11, 90.

My dear Secretary Tracy:

Frankly I failed to see, during my recent campaigning, the any location of the Standard and many of the Chicago Daily News in relation to the matter on Copple's. I do not return your clippings covering the details of the recently published report in that paper.

The whole thing is so absurd as well as outrageous, that I am so incensed that my paper must publish it. But the amazing thing to me is that such a scandal should be set out from the West- ington Bureau in charge of Mr. W. D. Curtis, who has been and I think is now traveling

an important and confidential position in the State Dept. under Mr. Davis, who, with his printing, is involved in the attack. The newspaper printing such falsehoods should be recalled from the press. I beg of the Capital and Department. We have had a hard struggle in the States and must have another Worcester case. His words will be set the most important in all accounts. I shall not read Wash- ington until a day or so before the coming, & if you have any sug- gestions I do early a train should be sent to hear from you.

Yours very truly
W. D. Curtis

Doc. 5

Morning Newspaper,
 Devoted to the Interests of the
 ARMY & NAVY,
 & National Guard.

OFFICE OF THE
 United States Army & Navy Journal,
 240 BROADWAY,
 New York, March 4, 1889

Dear General Tracy:
 I have been, as you know,
 for twenty-five years in connec-
 tion with the Navy service, and
 probably know it better than almost
 any man not actually a part of it.
 It is for this reason that I have
 not thought my expression of senti-
 ments that you have been chosen
 Secretary of the Navy.
 It is not to be expected that
 we should have at the head of
 the Navy a man who is thoroughly
 familiar with these technicalities; I
 cannot say that I think it is to be
 desired. It is important, however,
 that the Secretary should be a man
 of sound judgment, clear intelligence,
 whose will is able to see into
 a petty human weakness, & have

we can then be satisfied. It is
 because I know, by my knowledge,
 that our new Secretary possesses these
 requirements that I shall have been
 his pleasure in congratulating the
 man upon his selection.
 It is a subject to which I have
 given some reflection, & I am satis-
 fied that our Naval Bureau offers
 opportunities showing the vast pro-
 gress which we are making by
 those of my class. If I can render
 you any advice which you may
 be invited at the time, you may
 be sure that I stand as it will
 the greatest pleasure.
 With sincere regards
 I am
 Very truly yours
 Wm. Rufus Tracy
 Mr. C. S. Brown

Doc. 6 Church to Tracy, March 4, 1889. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 1.

Record
 Weekly Newspaper,
 Devoted to the Interests of the
 ARMY & NAVY,
 & National General.

OFFICE OF THE
 United States Army & Navy Journal,
 240 BROADWAY,
 New York, May 14 1889

See to Tracy. Am May 17
 I do not feel quite comfort
 after about our home here, for I
 suspect that I have suggested you
 for the payment of a commission, with-
 out relieving you of a share. If that
 is the case please let me know how
 much it is, & I will send a check
 for the amount.

I have been so charmed with the
 Enclosure's paper for the past
 month & more, that I have been
 not little time in writing. I have
 been in his correspondence for
 the past thirty years, including all
 of the correspondence with you de-
 partment, & press publications,
 concerning his mission & other
 words. It is very interesting, &
 on file & in the case concerning

those matters that I feel quite
 confident to let you know.
 If you please take a note
 to say I am in your
 In writing the new laws
 I have been on now for some
 years but living so much in
 these papers. If I have written
 you I shall give it in the
 Appendix I am writing for
 numbers of public.

Hoping that you are en-
 joying your exhibition as
 well as I -

Very sincerely yours
 Wm. Church

I am all yours
 Wm. Church

Doc. 7 Church to Tracy, May 14, 1890. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 2.

a great officer should re-
 serve a market advance -
 Right Man
 Wm Goodrich

Doc. 8 Goodrich to Tracy, March 1, 1890. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 3

LAW OFFICES OF
 GOODRICH, DEADY & GOODRICH,
 59 & 61 WALL STREET
 (Between Broadway & Nassau)
 NEW YORK, March 1 1890

WILLIAM W. GOODRICH,
 JOHN A. DEADY,
 HERMAN W. GOODRICH,
 JOHN F. TUCKER.

Mr. J. B. Tracy
 Sir - I should be very
 much pleased by the appointment
 of Capt Phillips to the position of
 your clerk, for which in I
 understand he is every way
 qualified. I write at the sugges-
 tion of some of Capt Phillips
 friends who know him well
 and who are anxious that
 one whom they believe is

NAVAL TORPEDO STATION AND WAR COLLEGE.
 NEWPORT, R. I., Aug 24, 1889.

My dear Mr. Tracy,
 While you were absent in the States, I received a telephone message from Senator Standish at Warwick Week asking me to raise the States for him and Senator Stockwell either then or tomorrow morning as they prefer to call on you. So this I replied that the States was already

in use by you so that the afternoon call was unnecessary, but I added that I would return their message to you and I doubt not that you would order me to send the States for them in the morning unless you had some other arrangement for the that night hereat.

What are your orders?

Sincerely & respectfully
 C. F. Goodrich

Doc. 9 Goodrich to Tracy, August 27, 1889. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 3.

Doc. 11 Boutelle to Tracy, December 19, 1890. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 7.

Form No. 1.

THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.⁴

This Company TRANSMITS and DELIVERS messages only on conditions limiting its liability, which have been assented to by the sender of the following message. Errors can be guarded against only by repeating a message back to the sending station for comparison, and the company will not hold itself liable for errors or delays in transmission or delivery of Unrepeated Messages, beyond the amount of tolls paid thereon, nor in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days after sending the message.

This is an UNREPEATED MESSAGE, and is delivered by request of the sender, under the conditions named above.

THOS. T. ECKERT, General Manager. NORVIN GREEN, President.

| NUMBER | SENT BY | RECD BY | CHECK |
|--------|---------|---------|-------|
| 97 | W. Ma | 28 Pd | |

Received at 85 Main St., below Cottage St., Bar Harbor. 8/14 18

Dated Nahant Mass 14

To Hon B F Tracy Secy Navy

Cannot mackay whom I recommended receive a vacancy at Annapolis understand nephew of Payers Texas has received. This is a personal matter in which I take deep interest

H C Lodge

Doc. 12 Lodge to Tracy, August 14, Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 3.

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH LINE.

Dated House of Rep's 19th 1890

Received at Navy Department

To Hon B. F. Tracy

USN

Please telegraph me the least amount that it will be necessary to add to the appropriation bill to cover expenditures that would be made upon a cruiser similar to number twelve, which we authorize in present bill

C. A. Boutelle

Am. 1,000,000 Dec-19-

THE UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
MESSAGES IN AMERICA. CABLE SERVICE TO ALL THE WORLD.

DELIVERS messages only on conditions limiting its liability, which have been assented to by the sender of the following message. It only by repeating a message back to the sending station for comparison, and the Company will not hold itself liable for errors or delays in repeated messages, beyond the amount of tolls paid thereon, nor in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days of the Company for transmission.

RECEIVED MESSAGE, and is delivered by request of the sender, under the conditions named above.

W. H. T. General Manager. NORVIN GREEN, President.

| SENT BY | REC'D BY | CHECK | |
|---------|----------|-------|--|
| | | (2) | |

RECEIVED at Corcoran Bldg., S. E. Cor. 15th & F Sts., Washington, D. C. 189

made to fact rumored report
 is doing ~~us~~ us harm and
 will do great deal more
 please enable me to deny
 it it is of most
 serious importance.

H. C. Lodge
 31 Beacon St

Doc. 14 Lodge to Tracy. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 3

Private.

15 Francis St.
 Newport, R. I.
 July 7, 1890

Dear General Tracy -

I trust the report that
 Prof. J. N. Cheney is to become what
 Secretary of the Navy is true.

Edward Keiffers, indeed, is
 first in the Navy, second of the Navy, is
 especially well qualified for the position,
 and of Education and Training.

He will, however, discharge
 the functions of the Secret Service
 they can will prefer his free
 expression of my private opinion: but
 as the latter pleased because is not
 that will make the important case in
 the history of the Navy's Administration,
 I cannot refrain from offering
 my congratulations in advance,
 hoping they may mark the beginning
 of a long and happy career.

Very truly Yours
 W. S. Luce.

Doc. 15 Luce to Tracy, July 7, 1890. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 6.

Received
 Hon. B. F. Tracy,
 Danvers:
 Danvers Hill House
 Danvers Hill, N. H.
 Aug 31st 1889

Referring to our recent conversation
 in the establishment of the Library - Dept. they & invite
 your attention to pamphlet on "Local Administration,"
 copy of which I forward to this office. Pages 579
 will be found the reason why we are not doing things better.
 The principal argument of the pamphlet is to show the
 necessity of being united the Department, in a large
 measure, is responsible to the President 372.

As the Secretary reports that the other party,
 both within jurisdiction, in a failure to legislate
 in the matter they respectfully,
 Dear Sir,
 A. S. Luce
 Ad. T.

Doc. 16 Luce to Tracy, August 31, 1889. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 3.

August 17. 9.
 May 10. 1890
 Oct
 1891

Hon. B. F. Tracy
 Secretary of the Library
 Dan:
 I beg your acceptance of a copy of
 a work published by me, called the "Lectures
 of the House upon Whiskey" which I have
 forwarded to your address.

The work has its origin in a series
 of lectures, delivered by me at the Warren Her
 College, during the past few years, upon
 Whisky Whiskey. The object first in view
 throughout the series, addressed at that
 which is comprised in the title and appears
 in the prospect, was to lay a formal ground.

above for the study of naval warfare, under
 Western Civilization, by a systematic present
 and analysis of the naval strategy
 and tactical methods of the past. A sympho-
 nic of this character is uniformly accompa-
 nyed by military critics, and has the emphatic
 approval of the greatest modern writers;
 but then critics such as strong impression,
 that all investigation of the naval past
 is a mere groping among the dark, that
 I have felt the advisability of explaining
 and defending, even to a person of your
 rank and liberal views, the attempt
 which is embodied in these pages.
 With much respect, I remain
 Your Obedt. Servant
 W. T. Mahan
 Captain U.S.N.

Doc. 17 Mahan to Tracy, May 10, 1890. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 5.

Hall Cottage, Merton Road
 Newport R. I. Sep. 6th, 1890.

Hon. B. F. Tracy
 Secretary of the Navy.

Dear Sir:

Can you without inconvenience have orders of some kind is-
 sued to me? Those under which I am now acting expire shortly, and
 in writing to the Detail Office, I am fettered by your directions
 not to speak on the subject of which you spoke to me.

The vague term Special Duty covers everything. I beg to sub-
 mit to you again my wish to be allowed to choose my residence, with-
 in reasonable limits, on account of my means, as I can expect no
 quarters.

I wrote to Ramsey on the matter of residence on the 1st, but
 I see in the papers that he has left Washington. I should not
 trouble you, but that I have to decide immediately whether to keep
 this house or not.

Very respectfully,
 Your Obedt. Servant
 W. T. Mahan
 Captain U.S.N.

Doc. 18 Mahan to Tracy, September 6, 1890. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 6.

75 Oct 52 R et. 49.
May 12. 1891
ms 1091/9

Yours B. F. Tracy

Secretary of the Army

Dear Sir: I have been asked by Wharton to prepare a copy of official language, to be ready this year, and I have consulted, notwithstanding from you and from Ramsey that it was not the Department's wish to send so on in that line. I think I may also then find some I am encountering in the Army. Do you disagree, will you let me know shortly?

The architect's protest, and his plans and estimate for the College building, and copy as rapid dispatch as possible, that he might get around in his letter. Forward them at once, after examination, & Ramsey.

Very Respectfully
Samuel M. Armstrong
S. F. Wharton

Doc. 19 Mahan to Tracy, May 12, 1891. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers, Box 9.

McHamilton.
Wash. D.C.
Mch. 7th '90.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I desire very much to have the conference with you which I yesterday proposed for today, but finding that I shall have to look after a public building bill in the House to-day, after the meeting of Naval Committee, I will have to defer coming to the Department until tomorrow.

Yesterday we struck our first hitch in Committee, on the

persistency of Mr. Elliott for
 a dry dock at Port Royal,
 in favor of which he quotes the
 reference in your report, and
 of Mr. Coleman, for a whole
 Navy Yard at New Orleans.
 The Pennsylvanians are also
 in line of battle for League
 Island and appropriations.
 So I am obliged to be at
 the committee room in good
 season today.

Yours very truly,
 C. A. Boutelle.

P.S. My daughter desires me to thank you for
 the invitation to Christen the Harriet, and will do so with pleasure.

Doc. 2 Boutelle to Tracy, March 9, 1890. Library of Congress, Tracy Papers 111/1197, Box 5

Navy Department,
 Office of the Secretary,
 Washington.

Aug. 3. 90.

My dear General,

There are no antagonisms
 of any kind to report, and I
 went to bed last night at
 the end of my first week
 with nothing in particular
 on my mind. It is not the
 perplexity of questions, but
 their multiplicity, that gives
 me most concern.

The Emerson letter went out
 yesterday. It was Smellons' work
 by the Sunday pudding that

the New York papers pick up once a week, but all the comment I have seen or heard is favorable. Even the Times speaks well of it. All the subsidiary letters, to the Ex^{rs} &c have been attended to.

My first care now is to make the arrangements for the President's trip.

Amos Cummings has introduced the enclosed resolution. I only hope they will convert it into an ordinary resolution of inquiry, which will give the Dept. an opportunity to make a hit with its reply. We can give them a

very effective rejoinder, & I began the preparation of the papers as soon as the resolution was published yesterday morning.

The Deficiency bill will be coming up shortly. ^{I have had a long conference with Halle} Could you give me a rough mem. of the proviso you wish to insert (if you still wish it) in reference to authority to contract abroad for armor?

As soon as Remy gets through with the Gillis-Reed inquiry, I shall be prepared to act on it if you desire. Or, it can keep for your return. The Court exonerates Reed & recommends a court martial of

Gillis. I spent five hours over it with Remy & Remby this morning, of course not reading the evidence of which there are 700 pages. My rough conclusion is that Gillis allowed himself to make a series of unwarantable charges, which could not be sustained. I should advise the approval of the findings, except as to the Court martial, & in the general order put in some pretty warm observations upon Gillis' reckless statements. We will thus get the reprimand, which is about all that a court martial will give him, & Reed will be perfectly cleared. It is a very small business - (not small in importance,

telegram. Chewton is not a
 married man, though he is
 very much the other thing.
 His record since '78 when he became
 an Ensign, shows nothing but
 broken cruises, & a sort of
 fitful service making altogether

Seaduty 4 y. 4 mo.

Coast survey 1 y. 4 "

Shore duty 4 y. 8 mo.

Leave etc. 1 y 8 "

Every thing goes smoothly,
 the papers are friendly, &
 I shall have a great deal to
 tell you when you return

Always sincerely yours
 J. S. Soley

Navy Department,
 Office of the Secretary,
 Washington.

Aug. 8. 90.

My dear General,

Your despatch in
 reference to Kearsarge
 arrived today, but had
 been already answered. I
 talked with the President
 & the State Dept. about the
 situation in Chocoma,
 and came to the conclusion
 that the Kearsarge had
 better go to Boston. So

She was ordered yesterday,
with the other vessels mentioned
in my despatch.

The arrangements have
been gone over by me most
carefully in consultation
with the President, & I do
not see any chance of a
hitch, if the orders are
carried out.

The President is to arrive
Monday 4 P.M., and by
his request the Squadron
does not accompany

him but will be present in
Boston to receive him.

In regard to Chewton,
I must say in view of his
record, I don't like to send
him to the Boston unless you
want it very much. There
is no vacancy on her, as she
is going into dock for four
months, I ordered her there
yesterday. The Essex will
not sail for three or four
days, so that if you wish
you can send me a peremptory

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