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1953-1977--LINKAGE POLITICS IN A CHANGING
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JAPANESE-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS: 1953-1977

--LINKAGE POLITICS IN A CHANGING

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM--

by

JUNG HYUN SHIN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the City
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1979

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty
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J. H. Shin

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DPRK	Democrtatic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JCPIT	Japanese Council for the Promotion of Inter- national Trade
JKA	Japan-Korea (North) Association
JKTA	Japan-Korea (North) Trade Association
JRC	Japan Red Cross
KCPIT	Korean (North) Committee for the Promotion of International Trade
LDP	Liberal-Democratic Party
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
NDA	National Defense Agency
NKRC	North Korea Red Cross
NKWP	North Korean Workers' Party
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
SPA	Supreme People's Assembly

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Outline of problems

Several events which have occurred in Asia in the 1970's-- the Sino-American rapprochement, the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, the collapse of South Vietnam, and the death of Mao Tse-tung--reflect much more uncertain international relations in Northeast Asia today than in the 1950's or 1960's. Moreover, the Korean peninsula still remains one of the most troubled spots in the world. Under these circumstances, one conspicuous trend that emerges is the growth of Japanese-North Korean relations.

Recently, bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea have become closer both politically and economically. Unlike the previous pattern of informal relations based on North Korea's "people's diplomacy" and Japan's passive response towards it, a number of political leaders in both Japan and North Korea are increasingly concerned with developing formal diplomatic relations. In Japan, some ruling LDP's members and businessmen, much encouraged by the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, are participating in the move of promoting friendly relations with North Korea. They argue that their government should adopt a policy aimed at conducting an "equal-distance" diplomacy towards Pyongyang and Seoul.

North Korea, in turn, has responded to this pro-Pyongyang

move from Japan with flexibility. The Pyongyang regime urges the Japanese government to adopt a policy favoring diplomatic normalization between the two countries. Unlike his previous position, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung has even suggested that the Japan-ROK Treaty would not be an obstacle to the establishment of Japanese-North Korean diplomatic relations.

Economically, Japanese-North Korean relations became closer. Especially, trade between the two countries increased remarkably during the early 1970's. North Korea has now become Japan's major trading partner among Communist countries. The business community of Japan has also shown its growing interest in commerce with North Korea.

Despite their growth, Japanese-North Korean relations still involve some fundamental questions which will be seriously treated in this research.

First, why are Japanese-North Korean relations growing closer politically and economically? Why did such close relations not develop in the 1950's or 1960's? In other words, what factors have affected Japanese-North Korean relations in recent years?

Second, are Japan and North Korea really riding the same boat for the purpose of promoting their bilateral relations? More specifically, are their respective motives and interests basically congruent with each other?

Third, how have Japanese-North Korean relations developed

since the Korean war ended in 1953? And how and in what form will they develop in the near future? Will diplomacy between the two countries remain non-official? If not, will their relations follow the pattern of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization? Are there any "third alternatives" in which their bilateral relations can be further crystalized?

Fourth, what effects will growing Japanese-North Korean relations have on South-North Korean relations? Will they contribute to the reduction of tension, and to the territorial reunification of Korea? Furthermore, if relations between Japan and North Korea advance further, what effects will they have on Japanese-South Korean diplomatic relations?


Fifth, how will the other major powers view the growth of Japanese-North Korean relations? Will they consider such relations compatible with their already entangled interests in the Korean peninsula? Or, will they regard such relations as infringing on their basic interests there?

2. Variables and bilateral relations

In approaching these questions, I will focus on the impact of several variables, which can be divided into two categories: external and internal, as shown in Figure I, on the course of bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea.

The selection of the variables is based on a proposition that the process of a nation's foreign policy making is constantly affected by its external and internal setting. Such

Figure I
External and internal variables



a proposition has been adopted by foreign policy analysts, including Richard C. Snyder, James Rosenau and Michael Brecher.

Richard C. Snyder and his associates applied the decision-making theory to foreign policy, and provided a wide range of variables, deriving from internal and external settings.¹

James Rosenau, the exponent of "linkage politics," suggested five sets of variables, such as the individual, role, governmental, societal and systemic variables, all of which a pre-theory of foreign policy can involve. Especially, Rosenau stressed the need to identify "a penetrated political system"

1. But in the Snyder model, the motivation of individual decision-maker is treated as a major determinant of a nation's foreign policy. See Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, ed., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 137-171. Especially, for a conceptual treatment of foreign policy analysis, see Howard H. Lentner, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach (Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1974).

in the analysis of foreign policy, which means that national political systems become increasingly linked to their international environment in certain kinds of issue-areas.²

Furthermore, Michael Brecher presented an input-output model as a tool of foreign policy analysis. He explored two kinds of environment within the realm of inputs: operational and psychological. These settings included international systems on different levels, domestic factors and elite images, which can affect a nation's decisions--outputs. With regard to the relationship among international systems, Brecher also assumed that the global (dominant) system, which consists of relations between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, could have great influence on a subordinate system or a bilateral system.³

In general, external variables, which can be also termed as international system variables, refer to the most relevant factors and conditions that affect the making of a nation's foreign policy. I assume in this research that Japanese-North

2. See James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 95-150. The linkage model has difficulty in its application to the analysis of a nation's foreign policy. For example, it is hard for analysts to find clear cut "linked points" between various variables (actors) at the governmental and non-governmental level in certain issue-areas.

3. Michael Brecher, B. Steinberg and J. Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, 1969, pp. 75-94.

Korean relations have been most significantly affected by their respective alliance relations.⁴ After World War II, both Japan and North Korea were deeply involved in the cold war international system characterized by its bipolarity. Japan was closely allied with the American bloc, while North Korea with the Soviet one.

The relations of Japan and North Korea with South Korea constitute another external variable in the analysis of Japanese-North Korean relations. The contours of relations between Japan and South Korea or between South and North Korea were basically shaped by a bipolar structure of the international system. But emphasis here is given to the fact that South Korea has become a particular factor in influencing Japanese-North Korean relations. North Korea's hostility toward South Korea had grave consequences for the formation and execution of Japan's North Korea policy. And, North Korea's approach to Japan has been considerably obstructed by the Japanese government's policy of giving priority to the maintenance of close diplomatic and economic ties with South Korea.

Moreover, Japanese-North Korean relations have been determined by their own national security interests. Historically, because of its geographical position, Korea was regarded as vitally important to Japan's national security.

4. For the theory of international alliance, see O. R. Holsti, P. T. Hopmann and J. D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973).

Japanese leaders used to consider Korea as a buffer zone for making their country secure from threats from the continental powers. After World War II, Japanese perceptions of South Korea as an important zone to their country's security interest inevitably had adverse effects on Japanese-North Korean relations. For North Korea's part, Japan's close ties with the United States and South Korea were regarded as a potential threat to its national security. Therefore, the North Korean regime was particularly concerned with weakening the Japanese-American and Japanese-South Korean ties.

Internal (domestic) variables pertain to some societal factors of Japan and North Korea which can affect their bilateral relations. The variable of social values and ideology⁵ is important to the understanding of Japanese-North Korean relations because there are still the deep psycho-cultural conflicts between the two peoples, mainly rooted in Japan's colonial rule over Korea in the early twentieth century. Japanese rule, above all, left emotional splits between the

5. Generally speaking, there are two views on the definition of ideology: one is to understand ideology in the broad sense as value systems, and the other prefers to define it in the narrow sense as doctrinal. In this research, I will treat ideology in these two senses. By Japanese ideology, I mean general belief systems of the Japanese. But referring to North Korean ideology, I will define it as specific revolutionary doctrine, such as Marxism-Leninism and Kim Il-sung's idea of "juche." For the detail of the concept of ideology and its relationship with foreign policy, see George Schwab, ed., Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Global Perspective (New York: Cyrco Press, 1978).

Japanese and Korean peoples. This historical legacy often caused the North Korean Communists to invoke anti-colonial nationalism against Japan.

The differences of North Korea's Communist revolutionary doctrine and Japan's postwar conservatism also influence bilateral relations between the two countries. The Pyongyang authorities maintained close ideological ties with Japanese leftists, including the opposition parties, but severely denounced the conservative leadership for being reactionary. A most interesting question arises over how Kim Il-sung's idea of "juche" (self-reliance) is translated into North Korea's foreign policy towards Japan. North Korean leaders emphasize the idea of juche as an ideological foundation for their foreign policy.

Another internal variable refers to political structure and leadership of Japan and North Korea. The utility of this variable is well expressed by Henry Kissinger, who points out that the domestic structure of a nation is "the amount of the total social effort which can be devoted to foreign policy."⁶

In Japan, several domestic factors have had an impact on the substance and the behavior of Japanese foreign policy. They are party organizations, the bureaucracy, businessmen's groups, labor unions, the mass media and public opinion.⁷

6. Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 262.

7. For the understanding of the relationship of domestic

Especially, Japanese political parties are divided into numerous intra-party factions. The factional division within the parties, including the LDP, has significant effects on the Japanese policy-making process. There is also an ethnic organization, the Chosoren, which consists of left-wing Korean residents in Japan. Chosoren became a major channel through which North Korea could communicate its interests to Japan.

North Korea's domestic structure is fundamentally different from Japan's. North Korean society is characterized by a totally mobilized Communist system under the personal dictatorship of Kim Il-sung. The analytical focus is on the investigation of how such an authoritarian political structure and leadership has contributed to the making of foreign policy towards Japan.

Lastly, the economic systems and policies adopted by Japan and North Korea are quite different from each other. Since the end of World War II, Japan has developed a capitalist economic system based on free-market operations. But North Korea, under socialism, put economics under the complete control of a centralized state, and pursued policies aimed at collectivizing the means of production. Moreover, there is a great disparity in economic and technological capability between the two countries. Japan has already grown into an economic power, while North Korea remained a developing state.

politics and foreign policy in Japan, see Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), and Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (University of California Press, 1977).

Despite its intensive efforts, North Korea has not achieved significant economic development. The industrial and agricultural output of North Korea lags far behind that of Japan. The asymmetry in economic growth between Japan and North Korea can considerably affect their bilateral relations. In view of the fact that Japan has developed an advanced industrial technology and is geographically close to North Korea, the Pyongyang authorities have been much more concerned with promoting the economic exchanges with Japan.

On the whole, the six variables illustrated above have important consequences on the course of Japanese-North Korean relations. But the scope of their impact on such relations has not remained constant over more than two decades. It has at times changed. In light of the changes in the impact of the variables, I will divide Japanese-North Korean relations since 1953 into four major periods.

The restrained relationship: 1953-1959.--During this period, there were some interactions between Japan and North Korea, including a North Korean proposal for diplomatic normalization between the two countries, non-official trade agreements, and the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea. Despite these moves, bilateral relations between the two countries did not progress further because of the East-West bipolarity. In this sense, Japanese-North Korean relations during this period is defined as restrained.

The "seikei bunri" relationship: 1960-1964.--This period

is characterized by the development of a dual relationship between Japan and North Korea. Political relations between the two countries grew tense. But the two countries gradually moved toward the promotion of trade and cultural exchanges. The growth of economic and cultural relations between Japan and North Korea had much to do with the Japanese government's "seikei bunri" (the separation of economic affairs from politics) policy. This policy was aimed at expanding Japan's trade with Communist countries in spite of the absence of formal diplomatic relations.

The antagonistic relationship: 1965-1970.--After the Japan-South Korea Treaty was formally concluded in 1965, Japanese-North Korean relations became extremely tense. The North Korean authorities bitterly denounced the Sato government of Japan for pursuing a militaristic policy towards the Korean peninsula. In addition, North Korea moved to increase tension on the Korean peninsula by instigating provocative acts against the United States and South Korea, including the Pueblo incident. Such acts led the Japanese government to take a more antagonistic position toward North Korea.

The accommodative relationship: 1971-1977.--In the early 1970's, when detente emerged among the major powers, Japan and North Korea were also much more concerned with a readjustment of their own bilateral relations. The Japanese government modified its previous anti-Pyongyang policy and took measures of encouraging social and economic exchanges between the two countries on a non-official level. North Korea has similarly

displayed significant flexibility in approaching Japan. As a result, bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea improved remarkably, even though they had not yet established formal diplomatic relations.

3. A note on the materials

In sum, the current Japanese-North Korean relations are not only a reflection of a changing international system in Northeast Asia, but also are themselves a major factor in generating the change in such system.

Japanese-North Korean relations, however, have not yet been sufficiently studied. To date, they have been treated only as part of several general works which examine each country's foreign policy. Although a few articles have touched on these relations as a whole, they have only described bilateral events of particular period.

B. C. Koh's study of the North Korean foreign policy,⁸ which is based on Jan Triska's model, includes a treatment of relations between Japan and North Korea, but the major portion of this work is allotted to the analysis of North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and China, South Korea and the Third World countries. Koh points out that bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea have been increasing on a non-official basis since their first contacts in 1953. But he

8. B. C. Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 189-198.

concludes that these relations have always been restrained by the Japan-United States alliance and Japanese-South Korean ties.

In his research on North Korea's foreign relations,⁹ Wayne S. Kiyosaki describes the role of internal variables, such as Kim Il-sung's personal leadership and ideology, in shaping the North Korean foreign policy. But he does not concretely mention North Korea's relations with Japan, even treating her as an external variable to affect the formation of the Pyongyang regime's foreign policy. Dae Sook Suh's book written on the Korean Communist movement¹⁰ well explains the historical links between the Korean Communists and Japanese leftists, especially the JCP.

In 1964, Kiwon Chung treated Japanese-North Korean relations as a major subject, and attempted to compare South and North Korea's approaches to Japan during the period from 1953 through 1963. According to his article,¹¹ South Korea had tried to first solve impending political and diplomatic issues with Japan, while North Korea had concentrated on the promotion of trade and cultural exchanges with that country even prior to the normalization of diplomatic relations.

9. Wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea's Foreign Relations: The Politics of Accommodation: 1945-1975 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 9-11.

10. Dae Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

11. Kiwon Chung, "Japanese-North Korean Relations Today," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 4, April 1964, pp. 788-803.

Soon Sung Cho intensively examined Japan's "two-Koreas" policy, and pointed out that the conclusion of the Japan-South Korea Treaty was a function of Japan's growing concern about her own national security. But he did not touch on bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea.¹² Kang In-dok, in his research paper,¹³ provided the specific materials concerning Japanese-North Korean relations during the period from 1951 through 1967.

Recently, Donald S. Zagoria and Young-kun Kim cautiously foresaw the Japan-North Korea detente.¹⁴ They observed that the changing international system, in addition to the shift in North Korea's tactics on national reunification and its increasing economic interest, would lead to the improvement of bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea.

In Japan, there is some literature about Japan's relations with North Korea. But most of this literature has been confined to describing the historical and cultural relations between Japan and Korea rather than the current bilateral

12. Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Koreas Policy and the Problems of Korean Unification," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 10, October 1967, pp. 703-725.

13. Kang In-dok, "Pukhan ui Daeil Chongchaek Baljon Kwachong e Kwanhan Yonku," (A study of the development of North Korea's Japan policy) The Journal of Asiatic Studies (Seoul), Vol. XIII, No. 1, March 1970, pp. 40-111.

14. Donald S. Zagoria and Young-kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," W. J. Barnds, ed., The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 19-59.

relations between Japan and North Korea.¹⁵ And some other works in Japanese have been written by left-wing Japanese and Korean authors, relying on particular ideological biases and propaganda favoring the Pyongyang regime.¹⁶

Besides selected secondary sources, the materials used in this research consist of pamphlets and journals, official governmental documents, the memoirs of past political figures, and newspapers published in the United States, Japan, and South and North Korea. There is a difficulty in selecting and screening the materials about North Korea because that society still remains closed to the outside world.

However, access to the materials about North Korea is available through two other channels. First, it is possible to find some "esoteric" data about North Korea from publications written by the Japanese visitors to Pyongyang and the Chosoren leaders. Second, a number of research institutes and governmental agencies in South Korea provide varied information and data concerning the specific affairs of North Korea.

In this research, Korean terms and names will be romanized largely according to the McCune-Reischauer system.

15. For example, see Hidetaka Nakamura, Nissen Kankeishino Kenkyu (Study of Japanese-Korean relations), Vol. I, II, III. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1965-1970), and Nihon to Chosen (Japan and Korea) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1970).

16. See Chun-sok Ko, Sengo Cho-Nichi Kankeishi (History of postwar relations between North Korea and Japan) (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1974).

This romanization system is applied for all but well-known names commonly spelled in other ways. Also, Korean and Japanese names will be indicated in accordance with the Oriental name order putting the surname first with the exception of some authors who have individually adopted the Western name order.

CHAPTER II

EXTERNAL SETTING

This chapter concerns the explanation of external variables, such as the relations of Japan and North Korea with the other major powers and South Korea, and both countries' national security interests. I will, first of all, look at the development of both countries' respective relations with such major powers as the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and with South Korea since the end of World War II. The main analytical focus is given to some specific aspects of these relations, which can substantially affect the course of Japanese-North Korean relations.

Then, I will briefly describe both countries' concerns about their own national security. More attention will be paid to an inquiry into Japanese perceptions of the Korean peninsula in terms of their national security interest. I will close the chapter by offering a summary concerning some implications of these variables in the shaping of foreign policies and behaviors in both Japan and North Korea.

1. Relations with the major powers

Japan's relations with the United States.--Throughout the postwar period the fundamental basis of Japan's foreign relations lay in the development of Japanese-United States relations. Even though Japan was nominally occupied under the authority of the Allied Powers, it was the United States that

guided and determined both domestic and foreign policy of early postwar Japan.

From the moment of surrender, the United States assumed the main responsibility for realizing the goals of the Occupation in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration.¹ The Occupation's ultimate goal was to establish "a peaceful and responsible government" in Japan which would contribute to the "maintenance of international peace and security." To achieve this goal, the United States launched a series of concrete programs, including the complete destruction of Japan's militarist elements, the founding of a democratic constitutional system, and various measures to change social and economic structures.

While the Occupation authorities, led by the Supreme

1. The Potsdam Declaration, signed by the President of the United States (Truman) and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Attlee) and concurred in by China on July 26, 1945, included the following points concerning the Occupation policy.

A. For a new order of world peace, the authority and influence of Japanese militarists must be eliminated.

B. Until Japan's "war-making" power is completely destroyed, the Allied Powers shall occupy Japanese territory.

C. According to the terms of the Cairo Declaration, Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and "such minor islands as we determine."

D. Japanese war criminals shall be punished.

E. The occupying forces of the Allies will stay in Japan until "there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government."

See "Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 318, July 29, 1945, pp. 137-138.

Allied Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, tried to implement these programs, they were soon faced with serious problems. Internally, the increasing shortage of basic foodstuffs and raw materials in Japan, mainly resulting from the complete collapse of the Japanese economy by the war, constituted a major problem for the Occupation authorities. A more serious problem arose out of an early postwar international system featuring the sharp East-West confrontation. The emergence of a Communist regime in China (1949) and the outbreak of the Korean war (1950) forced American policy-makers to consolidate their containment stand in Northeast Asia.² Under these circumstances, the United States' policy towards Japan began to shift from the previous one characterized by "retribution and reform" to one based on Japan's rehabilitation and protection.³

Japan became a vital factor in American policy aimed at containing further Communist expansion in Asia. In 1951, the United States and Japan entered into a new era of mutual security with the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the concomitant bilateral Security Treaty. With the effectuation of the Peace Treaty, Japan formally regained independence. The Security Treaty provided Japan with a firm defense guarantee by the United States.

2. For American containment policy in Asia, see A. Doak Barnett, A New U. S. Policy toward China (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1971), pp. 4-14.

3. For the detail of American policy toward early postwar Japan, see Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (3rd Rev.) (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 235-289.

Under the context of the mutual security system, bilateral relations between Japan and the United States became increasingly intimate. But as M. E. Weinstein pointed out,⁴ the nature of the bilateral relationship between the two countries could not be based on equality, because Japan was so weak that she could not assume her mutually shared obligation with the United States. In this sense, Japanese-United States relations might be defined in terms of a patron-client relationship. In the bipolar international structure of the postwar period, Japan had no option but to remain as a loyal-dependent member of the broad security system constructed by the United States in Northeast Asia.

In the late 1950's, there was a growing feeling among the Japanese that their country should be more independent in handling foreign affairs. This reflected the substantial changes in both domestic and international situations surrounding Japan. The Japanese economy had grown to a self-sustaining level, and domestic political process had undergone a stable phase under the conservative leadership. Furthermore, by joining the United Nations in 1955, and by establishing formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, Japan was able to improve her international stature. Many Japanese leaders felt that the international situation

4. Martin E. Weinstein, "Strategic Thought and the U. S.-Japan Alliance," James W. Morley, ed., Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 35-84.

was less threatening to Japan's national security than earlier in the decade.

The new Kishi government of Japan exerted its efforts to revise the 1951 Security Treaty with the United States, which had been designed to be transitional in character. At their meeting in 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke agreed to formulate a new security system on a basis of more "equal partnership and close cooperation" between the two countries.⁵ These basic principles were incorporated into the Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed in Washington in 1960. But it was widely agreed that this Security Treaty also failed to establish Japanese-United States relations on an equal and reciprocal basis.⁶

After concluding the revised Japan-United States Security Treaty, the Japanese government placed greater emphasis on achieving economic prosperity. The Ikeda cabinet, while taking a "low posture"⁷ in domestic politics, tried to apply the

5. See "Joint Communique on Talks between the Prime Minister of Japan and the President," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 37, July 8, 1957, pp. 51-53.

6. This view was mainly based on Article VI of the revised Security Treaty, providing that America is granted to use its military bases in Japan. See the Text of the Treaty, Edwin O. Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 379-381.

7. In contrast with Kishi's "high-handed" approach to the conclusion of the revised Japan-United States Security Treaty, the new Prime Minister Ikeda tried to project a more soothing image in domestic politics. See the Japan Times, July 20, 1960.

principle of equal partnership to the expansion of economic relations with the United States. This Japanese policy was basically contradictory to the United States' expectation that Japan would more actively assume political and military burdens in dealing with the troubled areas of Asia, including Taiwan, Korea and the countries of Indochina.

In the 1960's, Japanese-American relations were somewhat undermined by the Vietnam war. The two countries held divergent viewpoints over the war in Vietnam. The United States were increasingly involved in the war. Its military involvement was primarily associated with America's long-established containment policy toward Asian Communist countries. But in light of their country's national security interest, Japanese leaders did not want the escalation of the Vietnam war. They feared that the growing American involvement in the war might expand into a Sino-American war, and that Japan would become automatically involved because of the United States' military bases within Japanese territory.⁸ Therefore, the Japanese government was quite reluctant to positively cooperate with the United States in the war, even though it continually let American troops use their military bases and facilities in Japan in compliance with the Security Treaty.

Meanwhile, the United States gradually moved to reassess its policy towards Asia. Such a reassessment was primarily

8. Edwin O. Reischauer, "Our Dialogue with Japan," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 2, January 1967, pp. 218-219.

caused by the following factors: growing American frustration over the Vietnam war, the intensifying conflict between China and the Soviet Union, and Japan's rapid economic growth. A framework for America's shifting policy towards Asia was provided with the so-called Nixon Doctrine. Its objective was to reduce the American military presence in Asia, and simultaneously to urge its allies to carry more of the burden for their own defense. Shortly after the enunciation of the Doctrine in 1969, the Nixon administration decided to return the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan.⁹ It was hoped that the reversion of Okinawa would lead Japan to play a more active role in maintaining the regional security in Northeast Asia.

The close cooperative basis of the Japan-United States alliance was greatly disturbed by President Richard M. Nixon's sudden announcement of his plan to visit Peking. The considerable "shock" caused by this shift in America's China policy forced Japanese leaders to readjust their previous policy toward China. The newly-installed Tanaka government made intensive efforts to normalize diplomatic relations with the Peking regime. The Japanese perceived two elements in America's shifting China policy: one was that despite the "prior consultation clause" provided by the Security Treaty, Japan had been alienated from the process of Washington's new China

9. The United States' decision to return the administrative rights over Okinawa was finally made at the 1969 Nixon-Sato meeting. See "the Joint Communiqué," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1969, pp. 555-558.

policy making; and the other that America's new China policy involved a significant departure from its previous containment policy. They realized that the value of the Japan-United States Security Treaty as a means to ensure Japan's defense would be lessened. These perceptions by the Japanese raised a critical question: how to defend Japan safely.

According to the terms of the Security Treaty, Japan was to be protected by the United States' nuclear umbrella against any external nuclear threats. In fact, America's nuclear guarantee caused the Japanese government consistently to advocate its non-nuclear policy as embodied in the "three non-nuclear principles:" non-production, non-possession, and non-permission of the entry of nuclear weapons in Japan.¹⁰ But as Zbigniew Brzezinski noted, the decline of Japanese confidence in the nuclear reliability of the United States would be a major factor to force Japan to enter a phase of large-scale rearmament, including the development of nuclear weapons.¹¹ If Japan attempts to arm herself with nuclear weapons, it would further strain bilateral relations between the two countries because of the United States' official position on nuclear non-proliferation.

In the economic area, Japanese-United States relations grew more complex. Recently, the United States has been con-

10. For Japan's non-nuclear policy, see Daniel I. Okimoto, "Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy: the Problem of the NPT," Asian Survey, Vol. XV, No. 2, April 1969, pp. 313-327.

11. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), pp. 136-137.

cerned with its growing trade deficit with Japan. In 1971, when the Nixon administration announced its policy of import controls to defend the value of the dollar,¹² the Japanese were again "shocked." It is noteworthy that James Reston pointed out that the United States' deficit in trade with Japan amounted to about US \$8.5 billion in 1977, while Japan's over-all trade surplus marked over US \$13 billion.¹³ Unless the trade imbalance between the two countries is solved, there will continue to be some strains in their bilateral relations.

Faced with these diplomatic and economic problems, Japan seemed to seek a more independent stand in her relations with the United States. Japan's unilateral dependence on the United States, which had been formulated during the cold war era, was substantially reduced by her own remarkable economic growth, and by the emergence of a multipolar power structure of the international system.

Japan's relations with the Soviet Union and China.--Since the end of World War II, Japan been estranged from the two Communist powers, while being closely allied with the United States. As a member of victorious allies, the Soviet Union occupied Manchuria, the northern part of Korea and the northern territories of Japan, and was also involved in the process of

12. In 1971, the Nixon administration announced that it would impose a 10 percent tariff surcharge on about half of all imports. See the Japan Times, August 17, 1971.

13. James Reston, "Did Japan Misperlead Carter?," The New York Times, December 14, 1977.

formulating the Occupation policy in Japan together with the other Allied Powers.

In 1949, when the Chinese Communists came to power, the Soviet Union moved to consolidate its ideological and military alliance with the new Peking regime. In February 1950, the two Communist powers concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Four months later, the North Korean Communists armed with Soviet military weapons launched the Korean war across the 38th parallel. Against this solidarity and expansion of the Communist bloc, Japan was firmly allied with the United States.

At the same time, the Soviet Union refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and strongly denounced the formation of the Japan-United States security system.¹⁴ The Chinese regime also assailed the conclusion of a separate Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty as an "open insult and act of hostility to the Chinese people."¹⁵ As a result, Japan's relations with these two Communist powers remained antagonistic for some time.

Unlike the Yoshida cabinet, the new Hatoyama cabinet took a more favorable position towards the Soviet Union and China. Immediately after assuming the premiership, Hatoyama

14. The Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs: 1951 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 193.

15. See Oppose the Revival of Japanese Militarism: A Selection of Important Documents and Commentaries (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960), pp. 18-25.

Ichiro declared that his central policy goal was to improve relations with the two Communist powers. This policy goal was quite consistent with the Hatoyama government's general position that Japan should be more independent in her foreign relations. In 1956, Japan finally normalized diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but failed in establishing a similar normalization with China.¹⁶ Instead, the Japanese government moved to encourage the effort of the business community to widen trade relations with China without extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic.

In spite of diplomatic normalization, Japanese-Soviet relations have been occasionally irritated by the territorial dispute¹⁷ which was not settled by the 1956 Agreement. Even today, this issue constitutes a major stumbling block to the further improvement of bilateral relations between the two

16. Japan's failure to normalize relations with China was mainly due to her close diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru at that time said that "it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make a peace settlement and open up diplomatic relations with China within the framework of the existing treaty with Formosa." The London Times, December 12, 1954.

17. The territorial dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union derived from the latter's occupation of such islands as Kunashiri and Etorofu, known as the southern Kuriles, and Shikotan and the Habomai Islands, which are close to Japan's Hokkaido, during World War II. The Kurile chain is divided into three groups: southern, central, and northern. The Japanese claim that the southern Kuriles be returned to Japan. But the Soviets continually refused to return those islands to Japan. For the details, see John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power: The Japanese Dilemma (New York: Dunellen, 1971), pp. 230-237.

countries.

Japan's relations with the Soviet Union and China have been influenced by the Japan-United States security system. The Soviets have regarded Japan's security ties with the United States as threatening to their country's national security. They often held that unless foreign troops were completely removed from Japan, the Soviet Union would not return the northern islands to Japan.¹⁸ Their major concern was raised in regard to the alleged revival of Japanese militarism under America's patronage.

Nevertheless, economic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union have gradually improved. Even though trade between the two countries dropped to a moderate level in the mid-1960's, their over-all economic relations have developed to such an extent that the two countries agreed in 1965 to establish the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee.¹⁹ Moreover, the Soviet plan for joint development of Siberia with Japan has become an important factor in furthering Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation in the near future.

Japan has also made efforts to improve her relations with China, though maintaining close diplomatic and economic ties with Taiwan. The Ikeda government took several measures aimed at strengthening the Sino-Japanese economic diplomacy.

18. Donald P. Whitaker and others, Area Handbook for Japan (Library of Congress, 1974) (3rd ed.), p. 372.

19. Kajima Morinosuke, Modern Japan's Foreign Policy (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1969), p. 141.

They were the exchange of trade liaisons, the separation of trade from politics, and the unlimited grant of credit to China.²⁰ But subsequent relations between the two countries were somewhat strained by such events as China's first nuclear test in 1964, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku's pronounced pro-Taiwan position, China's hard-line policy on the Vietnam war, and the Cultural Revolution in China.

Japan's economic relations with China, however, were not significantly hampered by these political and military events. In 1965, for example, the total volume of a two-way Japan-China trade surpassed that of Japan-Soviet trade, and these trade relations continued to flourish.²¹

Domestically, with regard to Japan's China policy, there appeared two diverging pressure groups within the ruling LDP: the Asian Problems Study Group and the Asian-African Problems Study Group. The former advocated Japan's pro-Taiwan policy, while the latter urged the government to take a pro-Peking position. In 1972, the Tanaka government, under pressure from the growing pro-Peking forces in conservative political and economic circles, and much influenced by the Sino-American rapprochement, finally established formal diplomatic relations

20. Chae-jin Lee, Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 46 and 145.

21. In 1965, the total volume of a two-way trade between Japan and China amounted to about US \$470 million, while that between Japan and the Soviet Union was about US \$410 million. See Donald P. Whitaker and others, op. cit., pp. 512-519.

with China, and recognized that Taiwan is an "inalienable part" of the Chinese territory.²²

With the shift in American policy towards Asia, Japan has been more concerned with maintaining a triangular relationship with the two Communist powers.²³ This concern was prompted by the unremitting Sino-Soviet conflict, the growing detente among the major powers, and Japan's quest for a more independent role in foreign affairs. The basic assumption is that as long as the Soviet Union regards China as its number one enemy and vice versa, Japan can become a central target of rivalry between the two Communist powers. Both the Soviet Union and China are very reluctant to take any drastic steps which might force Japan into one side against the other. Japan also seems to be keeping on a parallel course with the Soviet Union and China to avoid getting too close to one at the risk of antagonizing the other.²⁴

22. See "Joint Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan," Peking Review, No. 40, October 6, 1972, pp. 12-13.

23. For the conceptualization of a triangular relationship among the major powers, see Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York: Pegasus, 1967), R. R. Simons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975), and Sheldon W. Simon, "The Japan-China-USSR Triangle," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2, Summer 1974, pp. 125-138.

24. Japan's cautious move toward the Soviet Union and China was well explained by Miki Takeo. He states that Japan's relations with the United States and China can be maintained on the basis of friendly triangular relations. But he warned that Japan should consider the realities of the Sino-Soviet

Recent events have helped to make a Moscow-Tokyo-Peking triangle more sensible. When the Soviet Union attempted to approach Japan by suggesting a joint Siberian development project and an Asian collective security scheme, the Chinese regarded these as part of Soviet plots to strengthen its military potential in Asia and to eventually encircle China. As a countermeasure, the Peking regime decided to sell crude oil to Japan and to purchase industrial facilities and equipment from Japan.²⁵ Additionally, China moved to support Japan's claims for the early return of the northern territories from the Soviet Union.

On the Soviet side, the Kremlin leaders have been concerned with the negotiations for a peace treaty between Japan and China. The Peking leaders insisted that an "anti-hegemony" clause should be included in any future peace treaty with Japan.²⁶ But in June 1975, the Soviets warned officially that

conflict and seek "a path of friendship that does not favor one over the other." See Miki Takeo, "Future Japanese Diplomacy," Japan Quarterly, No. 1, January-March 1973, pp.20-22.

25. Gene T. Hsiao, "Some External Constraints in the Development of Sino-Japanese Relations," Morton A. Kaplan and Kinhide Mushakoji, ed., Japan, America and the Future World Order (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 313-314.

26. China's position on the "anti-hegemony" clause was based on Article 7 of the 1972 Sino-Japanese statement, which provides that "the normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." Peking Review, No. 40, October 6, 1972, p. 13.

"in developing its relations with third countries, the government of Japan will not undertake anything that could be detrimental to the development of relations between the Soviet Union and Japan."²⁷

In this complex diplomatic triumvirate, Japan has been considered vital to the foreign policy interests of both the Soviet Union and China. As a result, Japan will be in a position to play a more flexible role in dealing with these two Communist powers.

North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and China.--
North Korea is particularly linked with the two Communist powers. It shares geographical proximity with them and the same ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism. From the time of its inception, the North Korean regime has been greatly indebted to the Soviet Union. The Soviet red army, which had occupied the northern part of Korea to disarm the Japanese armed forces in late August 1945, soon moved to hasten the course of "sovietization" of North Korea. The red army actually helped the Communists in North Korea build up their party and governmental organizations, through which Kim Il-sung was able to rise to power. It is not by accident that Kim has occasionally praised the Soviet Union as the "benevolent liberator of the Korean people from the Japanese imperialist jolt."

27. The Japan Times, June 19, 1975.

In 1949, North Korea concluded a ten-year economic and cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, and also established formal diplomatic relations with the new Communist regime of China. Immediately after consolidating its bonds with the two Communist powers, North Korea launched a massive invasion into South Korea for the purpose of unifying the entire Korean peninsula. However, the war resulted in the devastation of the North Korean economy. Because of China's participation in the war, Sino-North Korean relations grew closer. After the war ended, North Korea and China signed the Treaty for Economic and Cultural Cooperation, in which China pledged to aid North Korea's postwar economic recovery program.²⁸ In addition to Chinese aid, North Korea received a large amount of postwar foreign assistance from the Soviet Union and other Communist bloc states.²⁹

In the late 1950's, North Korea, in its relations with the Soviet Union and China, was faced with a serious dilemma, mainly derived from the widening Sino-Soviet conflict. In

28. According to the Treaty, China waived all war debts incurred by North Korea during the war. China also granted approximately US \$320 million to North Korea to assist in its Three-Year Economic Plan (1954-1956). See Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978), pp. 18-19.

29. For instance, in 1953, the Soviets granted about US \$250 million, and in 1956, \$75 million, to North Korea in Economic aid. Moreover, during the 1953-1956 period, the East European Communist states, such as East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, supplied North Korea with economic aid, totalling about US \$298 million. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

1956, when the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev announced such "revised" ideological formulae as peaceful coexistence and de-Stalinization, North Korea was obviously puzzled. Khrushchev's ideological notions were quite contrary to the Stalinist revolutionary tradition to which the North Korean leadership had strictly adhered. Nevertheless, North Korean leaders were very cautious not to offend the Soviet stand.³⁰ While the Peking leaders denounced it as a sort of revisionism, the North Korean Communists tried to maintain friendly relations "sealed in blood" with both the Soviet Union and China.

In 1961, Kim Il-sung visited Moscow and signed a new Mutual Defense Alliance pact. And on his return to Pyongyang, he also visited Peking and concluded a similar military pact with China. These pacts appear to have been arranged as a common response of the three Communist powers to the revision of the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1960.³¹

Meanwhile, as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated to the point of border clashes, North Korea's position became more

30. At this time, Choe Yong-kon, North Korea's chief delegate to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in Moscow in 1956, fully supported Khrushchev's ideological position. See B. C. Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 47.

31. The former Soviet Premier Khrushchev emphasized in his speech that the Soviet-North Korea pact must be concluded because the United States and Japan did not do away with "military bases and aggressive military bloc," and further consolidated their aggressive military alliance. See Soviet News (London: Press Department of the Soviet Embassy), July 8, 1961, p. 14.

untenable. Its neutral position toward the Sino-Soviet conflict could no longer be successfully maintained. Instead, the Pyongyang regime has attempted to conduct a "pendulum diplomacy" towards Moscow and Peking. This kind of diplomacy has proceeded through two distinctive phases during the 1960's. The first phase (1962-1964) was marked by the formation of a common ideological front between North Korea and China against Khrushchev's "revisionism." When the Sino-Indian border clash and the Cuban missile crisis took place, North Korea sided firmly with the Chinese. As a punitive measure, the Soviets curtailed its economic and military aid towards North Korea.³²

The fall of Khrushchev in 1964 was the key to the development of the second phase (1965-1969), in which the rift between North Korea and the Soviet Union could be considerably reconciled. In welcoming the new Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, who made a four-day state visit to North Korea in February 1965, Kim Il-sung emphasized the unbreakable bonds of friendship between the two countries. Following Kosygin's visit, North Korea concluded the two new military assistance agreements in 1965 and 1967 with the Soviet Union. Since then, the Soviet Union has increased its trade with North Korea, and has also become North Korea's principal military weapons supplier.³³

32. B. C. Koh, op. cit., pp. 65-67.

33. During the 1964-1973 period, North Korea bought about US \$600 million worth of weapons from the Soviet Union, while about US \$200 million worth of weapons from China. Nena Vree-

It seems that three factors contributed to the reconciliation between Pyongyang and Moscow. First, while carrying out the Seven-Year Economic Plan, North Korean leaders needed economic and technical assistance from the Soviet Union. In October 1967, the two countries agreed to establish the Inter-Governmental Economic and Scientific Consultative Commission, through which they could coordinate programs relating to North Korea's economic development.³⁴

Second, the North Korean leadership came to appreciate the Soviet military strength through its commitments in the Vietnam war. It was perceived that only the Soviet military power could properly cope with the threats of American "imperialism." This implies that North Korea's foreign policy was formulated more or less on a practical basis rather than on ideological terms.

Third, the Chinese Cultural Revolution had an adverse effect on relations between North Korea and China. It contributed to the widening estrangement between the two countries, and consequently stimulated a Pyongyang-Moscow reconciliation. During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Red Guard often branded Kim Il-sung as a revisionist.³⁵

In the early 1970's, North Korea began to strengthen its

land and Rinn-sup Shinn, Area Handbook for North Korea (Library of Congress, 1976) (2nd ed.), p. 205.

34. The Far Eastern Research Institute, Pukhan Chonso (General book on North Korea) (Seoul: 1974), Vol. I, p. 299.

35. Ibid., p. 306.

neutral position toward the sharpening Sino-Soviet rivalry. Since the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai visited Pyongyang in April 1970, Sino-North Korean relations had been growing warmer. But after the death of Mao Tse-tung, relations between the two countries have again become somewhat chilly.³⁶ However, North Korea's relations with the Soviets have not extended far beyond the level of reconciliation the two countries reached in the mid-1960's. Rather, as Donald S. Zagoria observes, since 1975, there have appeared some signs to herald strains in Pyongyang-Moscow relations.³⁷ Shortly after the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, Kim Il-sung visited several socialist states, including China, but failed to call on the Soviet Union. At present, neither Moscow nor Peking would like to endorse Pyongyang's position concerning Korean reunification, which, if materialized, might greatly increase military and political tensions in Northeast Asia.

Until the mid-1970's, North Korea had tried to keep aloof from the harsh rivalry between the Soviet Union and China. At the same time, it has turned to its 1966 proclamation of independence as a means of gaining flexibility in its relations

36. This view was based on the fact that the existing North Korean leadership had been closely linked with the purged Gang of Four of China. It was known that Chang Chun-chiao and his associates had strongly supported Kim Il-sung's ideological and political position. See Hong Yung Lee, "Korea's Future: Peking's Perspective," Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 11 November 1977, p. 1099.

37. For the details, see Donald S. Zagoria, "Korea's Future: Moscow's Perspective," *Ibid.*, pp. 1103-1112.

with the two Communist powers.³⁸ The North Korean leadership had underlined that "there can be no superior party or inferior party nor a party that gives guidance and a party that receives guidance."³⁹

North Korea's relations with the United States.---There are more than three decades of hostility between North Korea and the United States. The division of Korea was the historic event which caused the hostility between the two countries. Under the Japanese surrender, the American Occupation in South Korea had been confronted with the Soviets in North Korea. The two Occupation powers failed to establish a unified and independent government in the Korean peninsula. They were mainly concerned with strengthening their own positions in each zone.

The new Pyongyang regime buttressed by the Soviets began overtly to accuse the United States of being an "antagonistic" enemy nation. Meanwhile, the United States has pursued a non-recognition policy towards that regime. In December 1948, it led the United Nations to adopt a resolution declaring the ROK as the only legal government based on a "valid expression

38. See the Nodong Shinmun editorial of August 12, 1966, entitled, "Let Us Defend Our Independence." The Pyongyang authorities have argued that the independence line was based on Kim Il-sung's idea of *juche*, which was first expounded in Kim's speech in 1955, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing *Juche* in Ideological Work," Kim Il-sung, Selected Works (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1971), Vol. 1, pp. 582-606.

39. The Nodong Shinmun, August 12, 1966.

of the free will" of the great majority of the Korean people.⁴⁰

The hostility between North Korea and the United States reached its height during the Korean war. As soon as the war broke out, the United States quickly mobilized the United Nations to brand North Korea as an aggressor and to impose collective military sanctions. Moreover, the United States itself employed its superior military power to repulse North Korea's armed forces. On the other hand, the United States was firmly allied with South Korea, which the North Korean Communists vowed to "liberate." After the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the United States concluded the Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea in 1954. American troops have been continually stationed in South Korea, and have directly confronted the North Korean armed forces along the de-militarized zone.

The North Korean Communists have fomented ideological and propaganda campaigns against the United States, while also undertaking certain military provocations. They have accused the United States of being "the principal barrier to national unification," and demanded the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. In the late 1960's, North Korea initiated military ventures quite hostile to America, such as the seizure of the Pueblo in 1968 and the downing of an American

40. For the United States' action through the United Nations to insure the legal standing of the South Korean government, see Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 215-224.

reconnaissance aircraft (EC-121) in 1969. These incidents caused to increase tension on the Korean peninsula, and resulted in further consolidating the South Korea-United States alliance against North Korea.

It seemed that such incidents were aimed at disrupting the allied military operations between the United States and South Korea in the Vietnam war. Kim Il-sung had stressed that a united front of the international Communist movement must be established in order to finally to defeat American "imperialism." At this time, Le Van Ha, head of the Vietcong mission in Pyongyang, praised North Korea's seizure of the Pueblo as "powerful support for the South Vietnamese people."⁴¹

In response to the provocative tactics of North Korea, the United States took prompt steps to reinforce its military ties with South Korea. At his meeting with President Park Chung-hee in Hawaii in 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson reaffirmed American commitments to its allied Asian nations, including South Korea. On the other hand, North Korea's tension-fomenting tactics were not endorsed by either the Soviet Union or China.⁴² Although these two Communist powers shared North Korea's accusations of American "hostile espionage," they feared that such incidents might bring about an over-all

41. The London Times, February 12, 1968.

42. Donald S. Zagoria and Young-kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," W. J. Barnds, ed., The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 19-59.

confrontation among the major powers.

In the early 1970's, the North Korea-America hostility seemed to ease. There were several signs to herald North Korea's willingness to modify its hostile confrontation with the United States. In February 1972, Kim Il-sung reportedly suggested that the United States need not withdraw its troops in South Korea until after South and North Korea formally sign a mutual non-aggression pact.⁴³ A few months later, he told American journalists and scholars visiting Pyongyang that North Korea would like to expand "people-to-people" contacts with the United States.⁴⁴ These gestures of North Korea were quite different from its previous position that the American military forces should be first withdrawn from South Korea as a condition to improve relations with the United States.

Furthermore, in 1973, North Korea took an unusual step by sending a letter to the Congress of the United States, in which North Korean leaders denounced the Nixon administration's Korea policy and urged that American military aid to South Korea should be stopped in order to prevent the outbreak of another Korean war.⁴⁵ No doubt, this step was a propaganda gambit aimed at influencing American domestic opinion so that the Nixon administration could not continue to pursue its

43. The Yomiuri Shimbun, January 11 and 14, 1972.

44. Selig S. Harrison, "North Korea: A New Approach," The Washington Post, July 3, 1972.

45. The Washington Post, April 7, 1973.

economic and military aid policy towards South Korea.

In March 1974, North Korea went a step further by making a surprise bid for a bilateral peace agreement with the United States. In his speech, Ho Tam, North Korean Foreign Minister, argued that the 1953 Korean Armistice should be replaced by a peace agreement to be concluded between North Korea and the United States. He further added that the conclusion of such an agreement would be the best way to avoid "a daily increasing danger of war" on the Korean peninsula.⁴⁶

The United States reacted very coolly towards these proposals from North Korea. Its first official response was that "the Korean problem should be settled by the two Korean sides."⁴⁷ After the fall of South Vietnam, the United States has repeatedly stressed its firm defense commitments to South Korea. The hardening attitude of the United States towards North Korea was underlined by the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who declared that the United States still has

46. Ho Tam's bid for a peace agreement with the United States included the following points:

A. not to invade each other and to remove all the danger of direct armed conflict,

B. to stop the arms race and the introduction of any weapons into Korea,

C. to withdraw all foreign troops in South Korea "at the earliest possible date, and

D. not to make Korea a military base of any foreign countries. See his report to the Third Session of the Fifth SPA meeting of North Korea, Journal of Korean Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 1, April 1974, pp. 46-49.

47. The Washington Post, March 26, 1974.

an option to use nuclear weapons in case of a North Korean invasion upon South Korea.⁴⁸

On the other hand, as a means to solve the Korean problem through diplomacy, the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a proposal in 1975 to hold a four-party conference, including South and North Korea, the People's Republic of China and the United States. This proposal was a reply to North Korea's offer to conclude a bilateral peace agreement with the United States. Kissinger also urged the United Nations simultaneously to admit South and North Korea to full membership, and suggested that the United States was willing to improve relations with the Pyongyang regime, if North Korea and its allies, the Soviet Union and China, would take "similar reciprocal measures" towards South Korea.⁴⁹

North Korea, however, turned down Kissinger's "two-Koreas" approach as a plot permanently to divide Korea. During the presidential election campaign in the United States in 1976, North Korean leaders were very interested in candidate Jimmy Carter's pledge to withdraw American troops from South Korea. After its inauguration, the Carter administration materialized the plan to phase out American ground forces by 1982. As a result of this plan, the Pyongyang authorities manifested somewhat favorable attitudes towards the United States. An

48. The Korea Week, June 30, 1975.

49. See Henry Kissinger's statement at the United Nations, September 22, 1975, Journal of Korean Affairs, No. 3, October 1975, p. 50.

official of the Chosoren applauded President Jimmy Carter as "a man of justice," and proposed a Washington-Pyongyang meeting to discuss a wide range of problems pending between the two countries, such as a bilateral peace agreement, the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, and the promotion of "people-to-people" contacts.⁵⁰ Besides, the Pyongyang regime continued to make its efforts to approach the United States. In September 1977, Ho Tam visited New York, obviously hoping to meet officials of the United States government, although the official aim of his visit was to attend an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of the non-aligned states.⁵¹

Moreover, North Korea attempted indirectly to communicate its willingness to negotiate for the solution of the Korean problem to the Carter administration. During the year 1977, Kim Il-sung reportedly delivered his letters to President Carter through the heads of foreign countries who had visited North Korea, including Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.⁵²

These developments, which might contribute to the avoidance of hostile confrontation between the two countries, seemed to be attributed to two main factors: the United States' shifting Asia policy and North Korea's new approach to a changing international system. North Korean leaders accepted the Sino-

50. The New York Times, March 18, 1977.

51. The Korea Herald, September 29, 1977.

52. B. C. Koh, "North Korea in 1977: Year of Readjustment," Asian Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, January 1978, p. 41.

American rapprochement as reality, and appeared to be relatively relaxed in America's new policy to reduce its military presence in Asia and the Pacific.

In recent years, North Korean leaders also seemed to be more conscious of the liabilities involved in a hard-line approach to their basic goal: national reunification. They have exhausted themselves in conducting their carefully-manuevered diplomacy with Moscow and Peking. Rather than clinging to the "unmanageable" relations with the two Communist powers, they seem to realize that it is now consistent with North Korea's national interest to show a growing inclination for thawing the hostile relations with the United States.

2. Relations with South Korea

Japan's relations with South Korea.--Postwar relations between Japan and South Korea have been considerably influenced by a deeply-rooted mutual animosity between the two peoples. The unfortunate relations are historically traced to Japan's colonization of Korea in the late nineteenth century. Japan, which had been built as a modern nation-state armed with a highly developed industrial and military power, annexed the entire Korean peninsula as her colony in 1910. Japanese militarists had ruled Korea through an outright colonial-military dictatorship. During Japanese rule, there were a number of strong anti-Japanese movements calling for Korean independence.

This historical legacy, in fact, was a crucial factor

in impeding the early normalization of postwar relations between the two countries. In 1951, when the first negotiations were held, the viewpoints of both delegations were diametrically opposed. The South Korean delegates held that prior to diplomatic normalization, the Japanese should apologize for their past immoral and illegal occupation of Korea. To the contrary, the Japanese delegates argued that they had no cause to apologize. The chief Japanese delegate Kubota Kanichiro even stated that "Korea had benefited from Japanese rule."⁵³

During the negotiating process, one of the most disputed issues⁵⁴ was the fishery problem related to the Peace Line. In 1952, the Rhee government of South Korea proclaimed the so-called Peace Line, referred to as the Rhee Line by the Japanese, which extended out about 60 nautical miles off the Korean coast on average. This line was to replace the MacArthur Line declared in 1945 in order to restrict Japanese fishing

53. More concretely, Kubota's statement included the following points.

A. Korea's independence before the conclusion of a peace treaty was not normal.

B. The Japanese reserved the right to claim their property in Korea.

C. Japanese rule had brought remarkable advances to Korea in such fields as education, health, transportation, and agriculture.

D. The Cairo Declaration, which considered the Korean people being in enslavement, was an exaggeration. See Yu Chin-o, Minju Chongchi eui Gil (Road to the democratic politics) (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1963), pp. 262-264.

54. Besides the fishery problems, there were other problems relating to the resumption of basic diplomatic relations, that is, the jurisdiction of the ROK, to property

and to avoid troubles between a defeated Japan and her neighbors. According to the official statement of South Korea, the Peace Line had two purposes: to protect "all natural resources in the shelf adjacent to the Korean peninsula" and to insure Korea's national defense against external infiltration.⁵⁵

But the Japanese government did not recognize the ROK's jurisdiction over the Peace Line. It held that Japanese fishing rights stretch across the Line. This issue was a major cause of the serious deterioration of bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea.⁵⁶

In the early 1960's, there appeared several factors which contributed to the conclusion of the Japan-ROK negotiations for diplomatic normalization. First, the United States anxiously desired the early resolution of this rupture between its two close allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea. The American interest in reconciliation of Japanese-South Korean relations increased in proportion to the escalating Vietnam war and to

claims, to the legal status of Korean residents in Japan, and to the dispute over Dokto (Takeshima). For the details, see Won Yong-suk, Hanil Hoedam Shipsanyon (Fourteen years of the ROK-Japan negotiations) (Seoul: Samhwa Chulpansa, 1965), pp. 1-288.

55. Hong-kee Karl, "Questions at Issues between Korea and Japan" (Seoul: ROK Office of Public Information, 1965).

56. The increasing number of the Japanese fishermen who were captured inside the Peace Line became a major factor to seriously deteriorate Japanese-South Korean relations. During the 1952-1964 period, it was known that a total of 232 Japanese boats were seized, and 2,784 fishermen were caught by traversing the Peace Line or engaging in fishing operations. See Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 60.

the growing domestic pressure to reduce the over-all economic and military aid to foreign countries. Under these circumstances, the United States expected that Japan would share the cost of its economic aid to South Korea. On occasion, American policy-makers suggested that diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea would not only be of benefit to one another, but also contribute to strengthening the United States' strategic interest in Northeast Asia.⁵⁷

In addition to the pressing interest of the United States, another factor which furthered diplomatic ties between the two countries was the increase in Japan's concern with South Korea. Many Japanese leaders began to feel uneasy about the growing Chinese strength as demonstrated in its nuclear test. Moreover, Japanese businessmen expressed their desire for an early conclusion of the Japan-South Korea negotiations in prospect of founding a new foreign market in South Korea. They formed an influential "Korean lobby" closely associated with with the pro-Seoul factions within the ruling LDP.⁵⁸

Finally, the Sato government of Japan declared that one

57. Ibid., pp. 78-80.

58. During the negotiations for the Japan-ROK diplomatic reconciliation, the pro-Seoul forces consisted of such conservative politicians as Former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Minister of Justice Ishii Mitsujiro, Vice-President of the LDP Ōno Bamboku, Former Minister of Finance Shibusawa Keizo, and Former Chief of the NDA Funada Naka, and such businessmen as Uemura Kogoro, Adachi Tadashi, Doko Toshio, and Anzai Masao. Ibid., p. 88.

of its major tasks was to establish formal diplomatic relations with South Korea.

Lastly, the establishment of the military government in South Korea in 1961 was a crucial factor in hastening the effort to bring about an early normalization of Japanese-South Korean diplomatic relations. Unlike the Rhee government which had shown an adamant opposition to reconciliation with Japan, the new South Korean government led by General Park Chung-hee stepped up its efforts to normalize relations with Japan. The military leaders of South Korea, including Kim Jong-pil, held that normalization would be economically advantageous to the ROK.⁵⁹ Even prior to the formal signing of the Japan-ROK Treaty in 1965, trade between the two countries had continued to increase.⁶⁰ Accordingly, most leading Korean businessmen greatly supported their government's policy. They expected to grasp new business opportunities through the opening of close ties with Japan. But there was still a wide

59. Ibid., p. 86.

60. Japan's trade with South Korea: 1960-1965
(US \$ million)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Japan's Exports	100	126	138	160	109	180
Japan's Imports	19	22	28	27	42	41
Total	119	148	166	187	151	221

Source: Tsusho Hakusho (White Paper of the MITI) (Tokyo: Tsusansho, 1961-1967).

range of opposition in South Korea to diplomatic reconciliation.

Through the conclusion of the Japan-ROK Treaty, Japan formally recognized the Seoul government as the "only lawful government" in Korea as provided in the United Nations Resolution.⁶¹ And the two countries agreed to strengthen substantially political and economic cooperation. One year after diplomatic normalization, Japan participated in the ministerial meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council held under the initiative of South Korea in Seoul to promote regional cooperation among its members.⁶²

More striking are growing economic ties between the two countries. Japan has become South Korea's major trading partner. As shown Table I, the volume of a two-way trade between Japan and South Korea increased from about US \$210 million in 1965

61. Article III of the Japan-ROK Treaty was based on the Resolution of the United Nations in 1948, which declared that there has been established "a lawful government" in Korea. But the authorities of both governments expressed different viewpoints. The South Korean authorities held that the words "the lawful government in Korea" mean that the jurisdiction of the ROK extends over the whole Korean peninsula. But the Japanese authorities construed them as "limited only to the area where the present jurisdiction of South Korea extends." Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Koreas Policy and the Korean Unification," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 10, October 1967, pp. 706-707.

62. For the formation of the Asian and Pacific Council and its role, see the ROK's Foreign Ministry, Asea-Taepyongyang Giyok Gakryoheui (Ministerial meeting of the Asia and Pacific region) (Seoul: 1966). This council, however, extinguished itself in 1973 when the Philippines refused to attend the annual meeting.

Table I
South Korea's trade balance with Japan: 1965-1977
 (US \$ million)

Year	S. Korea's Exports	S. Korea's Imports	Total
1965	44.0	166.6	210.4
1966	66.3	293.8	360.1
1967	84.7	443.1	527.8
1968	99.7	624.0	723.7
1969	133.3	753.2	886.5
1970	234.3	809.3	1,043.6
1971	262.0	953.8	1,215.8
1972	407.1	1,031.1	1,438.2
1973	1,241.5	1,726.9	3,018.4
1974	1,380.2	2,620.6	4,000.8
1975	1,235.4	2,433.5	3,668.9
1976	1,801.6	3,099.0	4,900.6
1977	2,113.8	4,079.6	6,193.4

Source: The Korean Trade Yearbook (Seoul: The Korean Trade Association, 1966-1978).

to about US \$6,193 million in 1977. A serious problem, however, is South Korea's heavy trade deficit, still remaining 2 to 1 in Japan's favor. Japan has also been the prime source of foreign investment in South Korea. During the 1962-1975 period, Japanese investment amounted to approximately US \$ 616 million. More than two-thirds of Japanese investment was made during the three years from 1973 through 1975.⁶³ In 1974, both governments of Japan and South Korea even agreed jointly

⁶³. Jin-hyun Kim, "Hanil Kyungje Kwanke ui Guzozuk Gal-deung," (Structural conflict of Japanese-South Korean economic relations) Shin Dong-A, June 1976, pp. 71-87.

to develop the oil fields on the southern part of the continental shelf adjacent to the two countries.

To facilitate further Japanese-South Korean relations, the two countries agreed to convene annually a Japanese-Korean Ministerial Conference aimed at discussing matters of common interests, including those of promoting economic cooperation. In addition, several quasi-official and private organizations were formed between the two countries, such as the Japan-Korea Cooperation Committee and the Japan-Korea Economic Cooperation Committee.

But in the early 1970's, Japanese-South Korean relations have been somewhat strained by the Tanaka government's adoption of a "two-Koreas" stand, the kidnapping incident of Kim Dae-jung,⁶⁴ and an attempt by a Korean resident in Japan to assassinate President Park.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, a basic rift in diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries

64. The incident occurred on August 8, 1973 when Kim Dae-jung, a leader of the opposition party, was kidnapped by several persons from Tokyo to Seoul. The Japanese government held that the incident was a violation of Japan's sovereignty by the South Korean authorities. By this incident, bilateral relations between the two countries were considerably strained.

65. On August 15, 1974, a young Korean resident in Japan, Mun Se-kwang, attempted to assassinate President Park, but he failed. Instead, he killed the President's wife. In conjunction with this incident, the South Korean government blamed the Japanese government for its failure to prevent such incident, plotted in Japan, and demanded its strong pledge effectively to control the activities of the Chosoren, the North Korean front organization in Japan. This incident made bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea more complex.

did not take place. With the inauguration of the Miki government in Japan, bilateral Tokyo-Seoul relations were restored to a normal state.

North Korea's relations with South Korea.--The divided occupation of the Korean peninsula by the two rival world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, inevitably resulted in an uncontrollable hostility between the opposing halves of a nation which had long maintained the traditions of cultural homogeneity and political identity. The Soviet occupying army in North Korea, led by Colonel General Ivan Chistko, took intensive actions to eliminate all elements of Japanese colonial rule and at the same time to establish tight Communist control over the northern half above the 38th parallel. On the other hand, the American occupying forces, led by General John R. Hodge, received the Japanese surrender in South Korea, and set up the military government as a temporary controlling body.

After the two powers completed their occupation tasks in the peninsula, they soon moved to search for a formula to unify the divided two parts into an independent political entity. Their efforts were originally based on the Cairo Declaration, which provided that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent."⁶⁶ The first effort to bring about the Korean unification appeared as a trusteeship pro-

66. L. M. Goodrich and M. J. Carroll, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1945), Vol. VI, July 1943-June 1944, pp. 232-233.

posals, by which Korea was to be governed under a four-power trusteeship led by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China (the nationalists) for a period of up to five years.⁶⁷ This proposal was made at a conference in Moscow in December 1945, where representatives of the three powers, China excluded, gathered in order to discuss the general postwar problems. They further agreed to form a joint American-Soviet commission to assist in organizing a single "provisional Korean democratic government."

But this four-power trusteeship proposal was strongly opposed by all Koreans except the Communists.⁶⁸ In particular, the right-wing Korean forces led by Rhee Syngman and Kim Koo

67. Specifically, the trusteeship proposal included the following points.

A. In order to create conditions necessary to set up an independent state in Korea, a provisional Korean democratic government shall be established.

B. A Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States in the south and the Soviet Union in the north shall be formed in order to assist the organization of a provisional government. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and shall be presented to the governments of the four powers prior to final decisions.

C. The tasks of the Joint Commission are to assist Koreans develop democratic self-government.

D. To discuss some urgent problems affecting both South and North Korea, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union in Korea shall meet within a period of two weeks. See U. S. Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, p. 1030.

68. When the trusteeship proposal was first announced, the Korean Communists opposed it. But later, they changed their attitudes in support of it. See Cho Kyu-ha, Lee Kangmun, and Kang Sin-jae, Nampuk ui Daehwa (South-North dialogue) (Seoul: Hanul Mungo, 1972), pp. 207-210.

denounced that proposal as "an insult to Korea," and launched a nation-wide anti-trusteeship movement. Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet Union took different positions on how to implement the trusteeship proposal. The Soviets insisted that the anti-trusteeship forces should be excluded in the process of organizing the "provisional democratic government," but the American authorities did not agree with that viewpoint.

As the trusteeship proposal failed to reach fruition, the United States submitted the Korean problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947. The Soviet Union and its allies fiercely opposed the debate on the Korean problem at the international forum of the United Nations, denouncing it as a direct violation of the Moscow Agreement. Nevertheless, the General Assembly adopted the American draft resolution, providing that elections be held on the basis of adult-secret ballot and proportional representation from the indigenous population, and that a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea be established to supervise elections.⁶⁹ But this resolution could not be implemented because of the "negative attitude" of the Soviets in North Korea. In February 1948, the Interim Committee of the General Assembly adopted another resolution which urged the Commission to hold elections "in such parts of Korea as are accessible."⁷⁰

69. U. N. Official Record, Second Session, General Assembly Resolution 112 (11), pp. 16-18.

70. U. N. Document, A/583.

Meanwhile, the Korean nationalists, led by Kim Kyu-shik, Kim Koo and Cho So-ang, launched a move to convene a South-North conference to discuss the problem of national unification by Koreans themselves.⁷¹ But this move also resulted in failure, because there were basic differences between the Communists in North Korea and the nationalists in setting up "a unified and democratic government" in Korea.

Following the general election held on May 10, 1948, the government of the ROK was founded on August 15 in South Korea, with Rhee Syngman as the first President, and the American military government was terminated. One month later, on September 10, the Communists in North Korea proclaimed the establishment of the DPRK with Kim Il-sung as Premier. The newly-founded Rhee government put great emphasis on strengthening its anti-Communist posture while the United States withdrew its occupying forces. The Communist regime in North Korea was greatly concerned with building up its military strength through the Soviet aid. The Soviet Union pulled out its occupying army in 1948, but continued to maintain a mili-

71. The South-North conference was held in Pyongyang in April 1948. A total of 695 representatives from sixteen political parties and forty special organizations of South and North Korea attended. See U.N. Document, A/AC. 19/W. 43/Add. 4, pp. 3-6. The conference produced a communique calling for several points as follows:

- A. to call for the immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops in Korea;
- B. not to bring about any civil war;
- C. to form a democratic provisional government on a free election; and
- D. not to support a separate election.

See U. N. Document, A/AC. 19/SC. 4/SR. 8, p. 9.

tary advisory group in North Korea.

About five months after the Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared an American defense perimeter,⁷² which excluded the Korean peninsula, the North Korean armed forces launched a full-scale invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. It was eventually crushed by the South Korean military forces and the sixteen-nation collective security forces under the flag of the United Nations. Three years of fratricidal war ended with the Armistice Agreement concluded by representatives of the United Nations Command, North Korea and China in July 1953. South Korea refused to sign the Agreement.⁷³

After the end of the war, South and North Korea confronted one another as "front" members of opposing power alignments. South Korea was closely aligned with the "free" world bloc sponsored by the United States, while North Korea became a loyal member of the Soviet bloc.

It appears that South-North Korean relations since 1953 have evolved through four distinguishable phases as follows: the first phase covering the period from 1953 through 1959, the second from 1960 through 1964, the third from 1965 through 1970, and the fourth from 1971 through 1977. The division of these phases is largely corresponding to the changes in North

72. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, pp. 111-116.

73. At that time, the Rhee government aspired to achieve national reunification even by using force. Kim Sok-yong, Panmunjom (Seoul: Shin Munhwasa, 1972), pp. 228-232.

Korea's tactics on national reunification and South Korea's reactions.

In the first period (1953-1959), both sides strove to rebuild their own domestic systems destroyed by the war. In the north, Kim Il-sung succeeded in consolidating his political power within the NKWP. And in the south, the Rhee government gradually moved towards authoritarianism. Both sides were also considerably interested in expanding their own formulae concerning Korean reunification.

Since the Geneva Conference in 1954,⁷⁴ North Korea had undertaken peace offensives towards South Korea and its allies. The North Korean Communists insisted that all foreign troops should be withdrawn in South Korea so that unification could be peacefully achieved by the Korean people themselves. But South Korea rejected this proposal as a propaganda gambit, and continued to advocate the position that a United Nations-supervised free election should be held in order to establish a unified government in the peninsula.

The second phase (1960-1964) was largely characterized by North Korea's adoption of the dual tactics of the peace offensives and a united front. Immediately after Rhee's strong

⁷⁴. In accordance with paragraph 60 of Article IV of the Armistice Agreement, a political conference was held at Geneva from April 26 through June 15, 1954. Representatives of the sixteen nations of the United Nations and North Korea, China and the Soviet Union attended at the conference to discuss the postwar Korean problems, including national reunification. For more details, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1954) (Publication No. 5609).

anti-Communist government was overthrown by the April 19 student revolution in 1960 in South Korea, the Pyongyang regime proposed peaceful unification through a confederation scheme. But the military-led South Korean government opposed such a proposal, and rather devoted itself to strengthening its domestic anti-Communist preparations.

As South Korea showed a firm stand against peace offensives from North Korea, the Pyongyang authorities turned to the intensification of united front tactics, and moved to accelerate a "self-reliant" defense program designed to modernize military equipment. During this period, North Korea proposed a three-stage formula for national unification: the withdrawal of foreign military forces from South Korea, the establishment of a people's government, and finally national reunification.⁷⁵

In the third phase (1965-1970), South-North Korean relations notably included an increase in tensions. During his visit to Indonesia in 1965, Kim Il-sung re-emphasized new revolutionary tactics, such as the reinforcement of "three revolutionary forces:" North Korean, South Korean, and international.⁷⁶ Especially, he was concerned with achieving a

75. Kim Il-sung, Selected Works (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1971), Vol. III, pp.148-150.

76. These tactics were originally presented by Kim Il-sung at the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the NKWP held on February 27, 1964. Ibid., pp. 84-103.

unity of the revolutionary forces among socialist states. With the adoption of these tactics, North Korea intensified provocative acts against South Korea. In January 1968, North Korea sent a 31-member commando group to invade the presidential residence in Seoul, and two days later seized the Pueblo off a North Korean port, Wonsan. During the 1967-1969 period, the number of incidents allegedly violating the Armistice Agreement along the de-militarized zone rapidly increased.⁷⁷ To cope with the growing tensions, the South Korean government took some measures to step up its defense preparations, including the new organization of the Homeland Reserve Force.

Since the early 1970's, South-North Korean relations have entered the fourth phase, in which tension between both sides began to ease. In August 1970, President Park of South Korea urged the Pyongyang leadership to stop provocative acts and to join a peaceful competition between both sides.⁷⁸ But North Korea rejected this proposal as "an empty gesture." Nevertheless, there occurred two dramatic events in the history of South-North Korean relations. One was the holding of the Red Cross meeting between South and North Korea. The other was the announcement of the July 4th Communique, by which the South-North Coordinating Committee was formally

77. Donald S. Zagoria and Young-kun Kim, op. cit., p. 23.

78. Public Relations Association of Korea, South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: 1973), No. 002, p. 63.

inaugurated.⁷⁹

By opening a new era of the South-North dialogue, both sides set forth three general principles: (1) unification shall be independently achieved without external interference; (2) it shall be also achieved through peaceful means; and (3) national unity shall be sought transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems. Furthermore, as a means to ease tensions, both sides agreed to install a "hot line" between Seoul and Pyongyang, and to refrain from slandering one another.⁸⁰

During the South-North dialogue, however, both sides still adhered to their own approaches to national reunification, which could not be easily reconciled. South Korea continued to advocate a "step-by-step" formula, while North Korea called for an over-all solution of military and political problems at the outset. Moreover, mutual distrust between them still remained so deep that each side doubted the other's sincerity. At last, Kim Young-joo, co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee on Pyongyang side, declared in

79. The South-North Coordinating Committee was formed according to item VI of the July 4th Joint Communiqué, issued after a series of talks between high-ranking officials from both sides in 1972. The Committee is composed of ten officials from both sides, and its major function is to discuss and settle a wide range of problems pending between South and North Korea in order to expedite national reunification. For the details, see Ibid., No. 003, pp. 39-44.

80. Ibid., No. 001, p. 23.

August 1973 that he would no longer continue the dialogue with Seoul's co-chairman Lee Hu-rak.⁸¹ This virtually suspended the South-North Korea Dialogue.

On June 23, 1973, President Park announced a shifting policy not to oppose the simultaneous entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations, and about six months later proposed a "South-North Korea non-aggression agreement" to achieve a peaceful reunification.⁸² But instead of responding positively to these proposals, the Pyongyang regime called for the conclusion of a bilateral peace treaty with the United States.

Without reconvening the South-North Korea negotiations, both sides continued doggedly to cling to their respective positions. Rather, there were new developments of increasing tensions between South and North Korea. Most ominous was North Korea's proclamation of a military sea boundary in August 1977, which is "up to 50 miles from the starting line of the territorial water in the East Sea and to the boundary line of the Economic Sea Zone in the West Sea." The Pyongyang authorities announced that the military line was aimed at

81. Kim Young-joo, North Korea's co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee, rendered the following reasons for suspending talks with South Korea: (1) the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, (2) South Korea's use of a "double-dealing tactics," and (3) South Korea's adoption of a "two-Koreas" policy. See Kim's statement, Journal of Korean Affairs, Vol. III, No. 3, October 1973, pp. 56-59.

82. See President Park's statement on June 23, 1973, and his new year press conference on January 18, 1974, East Asian Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1974, pp. 103-113.

safeguarding the 200-mile economic sea zone and at ensuring its national defense, and that foreign ships and planes would be banned from entering the zone without "appropriate prior agreement or approval."⁸³ But South Korea promptly refused to recognize North Korea's claims over the zone. Consequently, this action of North Korea increased the possibility of new clash between South and North Korea, because the military sea boundary extended out waters around five South Korean-held islands off North Korea's west coast.⁸⁴

Meanwhile, South and North Korea have embarked upon a policy of diplomatic competition, each redoubling its efforts to occupy a more advantageous position in international relations. The South Korean government had already cast aside the so-called "Hallstein" doctrine as a principle of its diplomacy,⁸⁵ and extended its efforts to improve relations with

83. The Dong-A Ilbo, August 2, 1977.

84. In accordance with Article II of the Armistice Agreement, five islands off North Korean west sea, such as Paeng-yong-Do, Taechong-Do, Sochong-Do, Yonpyong-Do, and U-Do, are now under the military control of the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command. See the Armistice Agreement, U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, No. 736, August 3, 1953, pp. 132-140. These islands are situated 80 to 100 miles off North Korea's shoreline. There was tension between South and North Korea in the fall of 1973 when North Korea claimed its jurisdiction over the islands.

85. The Hallstein principle was originated in December 1955 when the Western German Foreign Minister Herr von Brentano declared that Bonn would refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with any states which formally recognized the German Democratic Republic (East German). Following this principle, the ROK had also taken the position that it would not establish diplomatic ties with any states which extended diplomatic

the Third World countries, which were considered a "bulwark" of North Korea's diplomacy. Moreover, it proposed to improve relations with "non-hostile Communist states," and sought informal contacts even with the Soviet Union and China.

North Korea has also enhanced its international status. It has established diplomatic relations with a large number of the Third World countries. With mainland China's entry into the United Nations, the Pyongyang regime was able to enlarge its influence there, finally gaining permanent observer status. Through its extensive diplomatic activities, North Korea has tried to establish a diplomatic superiority over South Korea, and eventually to isolate it in the international community. As a means to achieve this goal, North Korea has sought to expand diplomatic and economic relations with the Western countries, including the United States and Japan.

3. National security interest

Japan's security interest in Korea.--Two constants should be mentioned to understand Japan's interests in Korea in terms of her own national security. One is the geographical proximity of Japan and Korea. The other is the postwar political condition on the peninsula, that is, the division of Korea. Japan is geographically separated from the Korean peninsula

recognition to the DPRK. But the Hallstein principle became substantially invalid on June 25, 1972 when the ROK announced that it would maintain its diplomatic relations with Chile, which had opened diplomatic relations with North Korea on June 1, 1972.

only by the narrow Straits of Korea (Tsushima). Some Japanese islands, such as Honshu and Kyushu, lies within 120 miles of the peninsula.

Korea borders the northeastern areas of China for about 850 miles and the Soviet Union for some eleven miles. Because of its adjacency to the continent, Korea has played a role as a transmission-belt through which Chinese culture could reach the Japanese. On the other hand, Japan, due to her geographical isolation, was immune to the expanding continental powers. For example, Japan was protected from two Mongol expeditions in the thirteenth century.

Historically, Japanese leaders have been concerned with using the peninsula as a buffer zone to ward off threats from the continental powers, China and Russia. From time to time, they also tried to use the peninsula as a "bridgehead" to make inroads into the continent. A good example was Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea in 1592. In the late nineteenth century, Japan succeeded in detaching Korea from Chinese suzerainty. Through the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Japan completely eliminated Chinese influence over Korea. But Japan's ascendance over Korea was soon challenged by Russia, which had been traditionally interested in penetrating the Far East.⁸⁶ In particular, Russia was greatly concerned with

⁸⁶ Russia was traditionally interested in ensuring warm-water port in the Far East. For the detail, see David J. Dallin, Rise of Russia in Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 36.

the growing Japanese power in the region. Both countries' rivalry over Korea was well expressed by their leaders at that time.

The Russian Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdordd said: "If Japan should build fortresses along the Korean coast, it should cut off communications between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, a thing which Russia, for her own protection, cannot overlook." The Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi responded that "it goes without saying that the problem of Korea is almost a matter of life and death of Japan." Furthermore, the Japanese Marshal Yamagata Aritomo held that "it you look at the geographical position of Korea, you will see that it is like a sword pointing to the heart of Japan.... If Korea is occupied by a foreign power, the Japanese Sea ceases to be Japanese, and the Korean Straits are no longer in our control."⁸⁷ Although Russia and Japan concluded the Yamagata-Lobanov Agreement⁸⁸ as an attempt to coordinate their competing interests in Korea, it could not be a final solution. Their rivalry eventually exploded into the Russo-Japanese war in 1905.

87. Rec. from Robert R. Simons, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

88. To coordinate their growing rivalry over Korea, Russia and Japan concluded the Yamagata-Lobanov Agreement in 1896. This agreement provided that the two countries would recognize Korea's independence, and that they would dispatch equal number of their troops to maintain their lines of communications and order. See Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan: 1838-1922 (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 174-175.

As a counter-balance to the growing Japanese influence, Korea turned to the United States. But this effort was doomed to failure because Japan had already gained American recognition of her dominance over Korea by signing the secret Taft-Katsura agreement.⁸⁹ As a result, Korea was absorbed into the Japanese colonial empire.

After the end of World War II, Russia's traditional interests in advancing southward could be realized at least in part by its occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula. A different feature of the postwar situation was the United States' positive commitments in Korea on behalf of Japan. Rather, Japan's security was to be safeguarded by the United States' military forces against the Soviet threat.

In the mid-1960's, as Edwin O. Reischauer pointed out, the Japanese began to perceive the problem of their country's national security "not in terms of how Japan should react to American or Communist contentions, but in terms of Japan's own interests and goals."⁹⁰ Accordingly, Japanese leaders were more and more concerned with the security problem of their country in relation to the Korean peninsula. During the nego-

89. By the agreement concluded in 1905, Japan obtained American approval of her dominance over Korea, while denying her designs on the Philippine islands in which the United States had great interests. See M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (New York: Russell & Russell, 1945), pp. 257-258.

90. Edwin O. Reischauer, "Our Dialogue with Japan," op. cit., p. 225.

tiations of the Japan-ROK Treaty, Japan's security interests in Korea again surfaced as a critical issue in her domestic politics. Most conservative leaders tended to agree that the longer South Korea remained a free nation, the better it would be for Japan's long-term national security. They held that the protection of South Korea against Communist threats would be directly linked with Japan's stability and security.⁹¹ In a sense, these views of the conservatives, pertaining to the importance of the peninsula in terms of Japan's national security, seemed to be identical with those of prewar Japanese leaders.

But the opposition forces, including the socialists and the Communists, strongly opposed Japanese close ties with South Korea. Most of them believed that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea would be nothing but a supplement to the American security framework set up for the purpose of containing Communist expansion in Northeast Asia. In this respect, they argued, the conclusion of a Japan-South Korea treaty would be harmful to Japan's national security because it might provoke countermeasures by one or all of the three Communist powers, North Korea, the Soviet Union and China. They urged their government to end its anti-Pyongyang policy in view of Japan's long-term

91. These views of conservative leaders were summarized in Asahi Shimbun's article entitled "the ratification of the treaty: five aspects," September 29, 1965.

security interest. Their basic position was that Japan should not become entangled in another Korean conflict.⁹²

It seemed, however, that both the conservatives and the opposition forces held the same view that peace and stability on the Korean peninsula would be good for Japan's national security. But they differed in their views of how to maintain peace on the peninsula. Many conservative leaders took the position that Japan should provide South Korea with substantial economic and diplomatic support in order to prevent North Korea from initiating another war. On the other hand, the opposition forces set forth the position that Japan should pursue a policy equally favoring South and North Korea.

At the 1969 Nixon-Sato meeting, the two leaders expressed the same view that "the security of the ROK is essential to Japan's own security."⁹³ In the early 1970's, this view, however, had been criticized by some members of the ruling LDP. For example, Kimura Toshio, former Japanese Foreign Minister, stated in 1974 that "peace on the Korean peninsula, not the security of the ROK, is important for Japan's security."⁹⁴ This argument seems to be self-contradictory simply because

92. Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Koreas Policy," op. cit., pp. 703.

93. See "Joint Statement by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato," R. P. Stebbins and E. P. Adam. ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1968-1969 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1972), pp. 336-341.

94. The Asahi Shimbun, September 6, 1974.

the security of South Korea can be regarded as part of the peace-keeping warrants on the peninsula.

In spite of Kimura's statement, the linkage between the security of Japan and that of South Korea was further confirmed by the 1975 Ford-Miki meeting. These two leaders made public that "the security of the ROK is essential to the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula, which in turn is necessary for the peace and security in East Asia, including Japan."⁹⁵

Recently, Japan's national security seemed to be significantly affected by two factors: the plan of the United States to phase out its ground forces in South Korea and the build-up of Soviet military power in the Pacific. Japanese leaders feel that the premise of the American military presence in South Korea, which enabled Japan to enjoy a strong sense of security, has become more doubtful. Under these circumstances, they have often emphasized that the security-linkage between Japan and South Korea should be more closely intertwined. It is obvious that Japan is prepared to play an active role in assisting South Korea to maintain its security because the security of South Korea is considered vital to her own.

In terms of her own security interests, Japan is primarily concerned with keeping the status quo on the Korean peninsula rather than breaking it. For any attempt to endanger the existing balance between South and North Korea would in-

95. The New York Times, August 7, 1975.

volve the risk of war among the major powers, which would be detrimental to Japan's national security. The Japanese government officially acknowledged that "the international equilibrium and the existing international framework have contributed to making peace on the peninsula."⁹⁶ In view of ensuring peace without breaking the status quo on the Korean peninsula, the Japanese government is now concerned with the resumption of the suspended South and North Korea dialogue.

North Korea's security interest in Japan.--With regard to North Korea's security interests, the Pyongyang leadership's perception of Japan was mainly drawn from the historical relations between Japan and Korea. Kim Il-sung still emphasizes that the legitimacy of the DPRK is rooted in "the glorious revolutionary tradition of anti-Japanese struggle." According to official accounts, this tradition of anti-Japanese struggle has given further impetus to North Korea to cope with the vulnerability of the peninsula to new Japanese aggression. Immediately after his regime was inaugurated in 1948, Kim Il-sung declared:⁹⁷

The revival of Japanese militarism should be a threat to the independence of our nation and thus, our government will regard any nation that conspires to revive Japan as an imperialistic nation as an enemy of our nation.

Throughout the postwar era North Korea's security in-

96. See the text of the Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi's policy speech, the Japan Report, March 1, 1976.

97. Kim Il-sung, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 275.

terests have been associated with its leaders' uneasiness about the possible revival of Japanese militarism. As soon as the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, North Korean leaders announced that Japanese militarism had already revived, and that it had become a dangerous force which threatened the peace and security in Asia. Leninist ideological contention that "as long as monopoly capitalism prevails, imperialist wars are inevitable" was evoked in support of their position. Accordingly, the North Korean Communists have argued that Japan has reached a phase of monopoly capitalism, and that she has begun to attempt to invade not only the Korean peninsula, but also other Asian countries. They asserted that the contemporary Japanese "reactionaries" had not cast away their old dream of "the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Although it is easily discernable that these assertions of the North Korean Communists were to some extent ideologically exaggerated, it also appears clear that they were more and more concerned with the growing Japanese economic and military power.

North Korea's concern about its own security in relation to Japan peaked in 1965, when Japan normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea. At this time, Kim Il-sung argued that "a tripartite military alliance has been formed among the United States, Japan and South Korea."⁹⁸ This demonstrated his fear that Japan's close ties with South Korea might weaken

98. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 338.

the conditions of North Korea's national security. The Pyongyang authorities seemed to apprehend that diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea would result in strengthening the latter's economic and military power. Although they still continue to denounce the Japanese economic and cultural penetration of South Korea, it seems clear that they are uneasy about the growing economic and diplomatic cooperation between Japan and South Korea.

4. Summary

Since 1945, Japanese-United States relations have become the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policies and behaviors. Japan was initially allied with the United States not only through the mutual security treaty, but also through growing economic ties between the two countries. At least during the 1950's, bilateral relations between Japan and the United States were characterized by a patron-client relationship. But starting in the 1960's, the Japanese were increasingly concerned with putting their relations with the United States on a more nearly equal and reciprocal basis. The revision of the Security Treaty in 1960 was a sign of stressing "equal partnership" in the Japan-United States alliance. Especially, Japan's remarkable economic growth during the 1960's led her to play a more influential role in foreign affairs. Consequently, Japanese unilateral dependence on the United States which had prevailed in the 1950's no longer fitted Japanese-

American relations in the 1960's.

In the early 1970's, relations between the two countries began to display some strains in economic and diplomatic areas. The growth in Japanese exports to American market had the adverse impact on the trade relationship between the two countries. The United States adopted a policy of regulating its imports from Japan in order to solve its increasing trade deficit. Moreover, the abrupt change in the United States' policy towards Asia somewhat undermined Japanese confidence in the Japan-United States alliance.

On the other hand, Japan's relations with the two Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, have been fundamentally affected by her relations with the United States. During its occupation of Japan, the United States had implemented policies aimed at holding Japan under its sphere of influence. The conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the subsequent signing of a bilateral security treaty between Japan and the United States were made to that effect. While being closely tied with American containment policy, Japan kept aloof from the two Communist powers.

With the emergence of a multipolar structure of the international system, Japan seemed to be more concerned with gaining diplomatic advantages through two ways: one is to maintain close economic and security ties with the United States; and the other to seek in a balanced way the improvement of relations with the two Communist powers within a

Washington-Moscow-Peking triangle.

North Korea's relations with the other major powers were quite in contrast with Japan's. From the beginning, North Korea was closely tied to Soviet expansion policy in the Far East. Therefore, the domestic and foreign policies of North Korea were basically dictated by the Soviets. After the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, North Korea was also under its influence. During and after the Korean war, Sino-North Korean relations became closer because of Chinese participation in the war.

Meanwhile, the North Korean regime increased its hostility toward the United States. It accused the United States of being the major stumbling block to Korean reunification, and insisted on the immediate withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. However, the United States continued to pursue a policy of not only containing the North Korean Communists militarily, but also isolating them in the world community.

In the early 1960's, North Korea strengthened diplomatic and security ties with the Soviet Union and China by signing mutual defense pacts with them. But as relations between the two Communist powers grew tense, North Korea moved to take an independent stand vis-a-vis them. The Soviet Union and China harshly competed with each other for winning North Korea over to its own side. Thus, North Korea's relations with the two powers had at times changed. For instance, during the 1962-

1964 period, North Korea sided closely with China against the Soviets. But after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, North Korean-Soviet relations began to improve.

Disenchanted with the harsh rivalry between the Soviet Union and China, North Korean leaders were more concerned with gaining flexibility in relations with them. As detente emerged among the major powers in the 1970's, North Korea embarked upon a policy aimed at ending its international isolation. For this purpose, North Korea joined various international organizations, and tried to improve its diplomatic and economic relations with some Western countries, including the United States and Japan.

Japan's relations with South Korea since the end of World War II had changed from confrontation into detente. In the 1950's, the strong sense of anti-Japanese nationalism in South Korea blocked diplomatic reconciliation between the two countries, even though they shared a common strategic interest in coping with Communist threats. But in the early 1960's, a Japan-South Korea thaw began to appear. It was mainly caused by renewed interests of the Japanese and South Korean governments in reconciling their bilateral relations, and by growing pressure from the United States. In fact, the continuous friction between Japan and South Korea had been directly against the American economic and security interest in Asia. After Japan and South Korea concluded the Treaty of

Basic Relations in 1965, their bilateral relations improved rapidly. Most striking was the growth in economic ties between the two countries.

North Korea's relations with South Korea have continually demonstrated a high degree of hostility. Since the Korean peninsula was divided into two parts, they have doggedly confronted one another. Even though both sides opened the talks in the early 1970's, there was no substantial reduction of tension on the peninsula. North Korea still adhered to its hard-line unification policy. In response, South Korea put greater emphasis on strengthening its military capacity as a means of defending itself.

Historically, Japanese leaders have perceived the Korean peninsula as basic to their country's national security. They wanted Korea not to come under the control of any continental powers. This perception of Korea by the Japanese remained unchanged even in the postwar era. In fact, Japan's policy toward South and North Korea has been shaped mainly by Tokyo's perception of South Korea as a buffer zone to ward off Communist threats. When the Japanese government conducted the negotiations for diplomatic normalization with South Korea, its primary concern lay in the protection of South Korea against Communist threats, which would be vitally important to Japan's national security.

Both Japan and North Korea have not feared any direct

military threats from each other. The Japanese felt that if North Korea instigated another war in order to reunify Korea, such a war would endanger Japan's security arrangements. In terms of its own security interest, North Korea perceived Japan in two ways. First, it regarded Japan as an American military base, which was seen as the main potential threat to its security. Second, it feared that Japan would further weaken the conditions of its security by being closely tied with South Korea. North Korean leaders have worried that growing economic relations between Japan and South Korea would eventually contribute to the build-up of South Korea's military strength. Thus, North Korea's policy towards Japan was always aimed at dissociating Japan from the United States and South Korea.

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL SETTING

This chapter includes a brief description of Japanese and North Korean domestic variables, such as social values and ideology, political structure and leadership, and economic-technological capability. I will put emphasis on understanding some social, political and economic factors of the two countries, which can substantially affect the making of their own foreign policies.

1. Social values and ideology

Japan's social values and ideology.--To understand the contemporary social values and political ideology in Japan, it is necessary briefly to examine their prewar backgrounds. Even though early postwar Japan had undergone the processes of democratization and industrialization, she still retains certain traditional values, such as strong family bonds, hierarchical order in social and human relations, and the "seishin" (spirit) legacy.¹ Lewis Austin demonstrated in his survey on postwar Japanese social values and behavior

1. "Seishin" is considered a central element in Japanese traditional values. It implies "the complex of loyalty, discipline, esprit de corps, and indomitable perseverance," which are quite different from the Western values, such as democracy, individualism, universalism, and materialism. See Robert Frager and Thomas P. Rohlen, "The Future of a Tradition: Japanese Spirit in the 1980's," Lewis Austin, ed., Japan: The Paradox of Progress (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 255-278.

that "the developmental convergence or value modernization hypothesis is not borne out in case of Japan."² His conclusion was that Japan remains in many ways essentially unchanged.

Throughout the last century one of the most prevailing ideological forces in Japan had been nationalism. The Japanese had been initially awakened to a sense of national identity by the impact of the eastward advance of Western imperialism. Since the late Tokugawa period, Japan had been forced by the superior Western powers to open her hermetic islands. Under these circumstances, the Meiji leaders undertook the unification of the many feudal realms into a modern nation-state system, ruled by the strong central authority of the Emperor. Their ultimate goal was to make Japan "a prosperous nation equipped with modern military power" so as to cope with the threats of the Western powers.

As a means to achieve this goal, the Meiji government sought to adjust itself to the technologically superior Western civilization. It moved rapidly to accept the Western capitalist system, and to accelerate efforts at industrialization. The character of Japanese nationalism was essentially defensive.³ It was at the outset aimed at preserving Japanese

2. Lewis Austin, "The Political Culture of Two Generations: Evolution and Divergence in Japanese and American Values," *Ibid.*, pp. 231-254.

3. The concept of "defensive" nationalism is referred to C. E. Black's explanations on defensive modernization in "late-coming" countries. See Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 71.

values and integrity against the threats of Western expansion.

How could this nationalism evolve into the aggressive ultra-nationalism of the late 1930's? Masao Maruyama revealed several convincing causes.⁴ First of all, in its initial stage, Japanese nationalism was not based on a broad national consciousness. It was associated only with the interests of the small ruling class which had been primarily concerned with protecting its own social and political privileges. The vast majority of common Japanese people were alienated from the nationalist movement. In this respect, Japanese nationalism in the prewar era was basically different from the Western nationalism initially grounded on a bourgeoisie-led popular democracy. Moreover, it evolved as a "state-nationalism," in which fanatical patriotism could be fostered among the people.

Second, Japanese nationalism was thoroughly based on a notion of "power politics." The nationalists in prewar Japan were inclined to regard relations between sovereign states as the domination of inferiors by their superiors. To make Japan a superior nation, they put great emphasis on building up her military strength.

Third, the nationalist leadership in Japan was dependent strictly on such traditional values as patriarchy and authori-

4. Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (Ed. by Ivan Morris) (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 1-24.

tarism. Therefore, the Emperor became the superior ruler as well as the symbol of national unity. Japan could not be a nation of independent individuals, but a conglomerate of subjects royal to the Emperor.

Lastly, it has been pointed out that Japanese nationalism contained a peculiar psychological trait, that is, "the transfer of oppression." Fukuzawa Yukichi put:⁵

The Japanese make a clear distinction between the moral codes that apply to people above and to people below, and an equally clear distinction in the field of rights and duties. As a result, every individual is in one capacity the victim of coercion, while in another capacity he metes coercion to his fellow men.

It seemed that this dualism of morality had something to do with the emergence of Japanese militarism featuring the conquest of small neighboring nations.

Consequently, Japanese nationalism, which had emerged as an ideology to transform the traditional society of Japan into a modern industrial society, failed to foster democracy and individual freedom. In spite of the early Meiji reformers' efforts to introduce modern democratic institutions,⁶ Japan

5. Fukuzawa Yukichi, Outline Theory of Civilization, Vol. 1, rec. from *ibid.*, p. 18.

6. The early Meiji reformers believed that the Western democratic system would contribute to making Japan a strong nation. Accordingly, in 1868, the Emperor issued a Charter Oath, which promised that Japan would be governed by "public discussion." In 1889, the Meiji government also promulgated the constitution, which provided the organization of a bicameral Diet. The first Diet was formed in 1890. For more

came under the control of growing ultra-militarists. These forces totally oppressed the aspirations of not only bourgeois liberalism, but also leftist-socialism in modern Japan.

With the rise of ultra-militarism as the dominant political force, there appeared a totalitarian dogma which consecrated the Emperor of Japan as "the supreme divine entity." The Emperor was regarded as being "coeval with heaven and earth," and his "august virtue" as the light to "shine on all the nations of the world."

This kind of militarism died the day Japan was defeated in the Pacific war. Obviously surprised by the superiority of the Allied Powers, the Japanese soon moved to cooperate with them, and to learn as much as possible from them. A wave of enthusiasm for pacifism and internationalism strongly influenced the defeated Japanese people. The nationalistic aspirations were resurrected only as a means of regaining national independence and of promoting economic well-being. Under these circumstances, there appeared diverse political ideologies, such as conservatism (the radical and the moderate), socialism (the rightists and the leftists), and Communism.⁷

details, see Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (3rd ed.) (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 187-193.

7. For Japanese conservatism, see Nathaniel B. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), and Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy-Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). For socialism, see Allan B. Cole, George O. Totten, Cecil H. Uyehara, Socialist Parties

In spite of the diversity of political ideologies, the main virtue of nationalism still remained pervasive. Although the Emperor's divinity was denied, he became a different sort of symbol for preserving national integrity. Japanese conservatism emerged as a leading torch of the prewar liberalism whose main principles had been included in the Emperor's Charter Oath of 1868. The Japanese Liberals had believed that in order to preserve Japanese traditional values and unity, it was necessary for the Japanese to accept the Western democratic system. The postwar conservatives emphasized the importance of the Japanese cooperation with the Occupation in carrying out its programs of reform and recovery. Internally, they were not enthusiastic about the processes of radical reforms in the early postwar era. Their main concerns were directed toward the maintenance of political stability and the improvement of economic conditions in Japan. Externally, the conservatives were significantly concerned with ensuring national independence and security by entering Japan into an alliance system with the United States.

Postwar socialism in Japan was greatly embarrassed by the split into leftist and rightist factions. But its basic character was defined as an ideology for "the national rally

in Postwar Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). For Communism, see Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

of the laboring strata." Unlike the conservatives, the socialists argued that capitalism should be replaced by socialism, and that democracy be operated on a more equitable basis. On the other hand, they, unlike the Japanese Communists, have been reluctant to use a united front tactic to overthrow the conservative government. The socialists agreed that through "peaceful revolution" it is possible to build a socialist society in Japan. But there were some differences between the leftists and the rightists. For example, the rightists have taken a position that the construction of a socialist society in Japan can be made through the evolutionary-parliamentary method, while the leftists have placed greater emphasis on taking certain radical countermeasures, such as general strikes and mass demonstrations. They differ further in their views on the international socialist movement. The rightists have usually supported democratic socialist movements in the world, but the leftists have tried to maintain their links with the world Communist movements.

In contrast with the conservatives, the Japanese socialists have focused their attention on foreign affairs rather than domestic politics. They have argued that the conservatives' foreign policy has always been designed to increase Japan's dependence on the United States, and that it has consequently brought about her isolation in the international arena. In particular, they have proposed that Japan should take a non-aligned position in her foreign relations as a

means of safeguarding her own national security. In accordance with their nationalistic tones, the socialists have also voiced the belief that Japan should seek a more "Asian" position rather than a Western-oriented one. Moreover, while the conservatives have concentrated on promoting economic and commercial ties with non-Communist Asian countries, the socialists have shown a particular interest in improving economic and diplomatic relations with Communist states as well as non-Communist ones.

The Japanese Communists have claimed that they truly bear the revolutionary legacy of Marxism-Leninism. The JCP in its radical formative period pursued a two-stage revolutionary tactic. It was first to foment the bourgeois-democratic revolution based on a united front with all the progressive and patriotic forces, and then to lead the proletarian revolution under the leadership of the working class. In spite of the self-assertion that it has taken the orthodox-left line, the JCP has undergone the process of de-radicalization. After its "lovable" programs⁸ were bitterly criticized by the Cominform in 1950, the JCP leadership pursued an

8. Immediately after the surrender, the JCP under the leadership of Nosaka Sanzo presented the so-called "lovable" programs, a moderate tactic based on a united front, at the first postwar party congress held on December 1, 1945. At this time, the JCP leadership thought that a democratic revolution was possible as a result of the defeat of Japan. But this tactic was bitterly attacked by the Cominform as "a Japanese variety of the anti-Marxist and anti-socialist theory." See Robert A. Scalapino, op. cit., pp. 48-78.

extremely radical course of action. But this radical tactic proved ineffective in the 1952 elections.⁹ Then, the JCP quickly adopted the tactics of "peaceful revolution" through the parliamentary process. These tactics were basically related to an effort to accelerate the "Japanization" of Marxism-Leninism.

Concerning specific policy issues, the JCP has taken a strong leftist position. It officially held that the Japanese Communists should wage lasting struggle against the two main enemies: American imperialism and Japanese monopoly capitalism. The Communists, together with the socialists, have long advocated neutralism and peaceful coexistence. But while the socialists have taken a middle-of-road position, that is, a stance of "positive neutralism,"¹⁰ the Communists have used neutralism as a tactic to detach Japan from the United States. Moreover, they warned that the principle of peaceful coexistence should not be distorted in such a way that American imperialism could gain greater advantage. According to their

9. The JCP lost its all 35 seats in the House of Representatives in the 1952 elections, and its popular vote also dropped from about 3 million in 1949 into 897,000 in 1952. For the details, see Hong N. Kim, "The JCP's Parliamentary Road," Problems of Communism, March-April 1977, pp. 19-20.

10. Of the socialists, the leftists presented a stance of "positive neutralism" aimed at building up a third force in foreign affairs, while the rightists took a more realistic position advocating that Japan's alliance with the United States was inevitable. See Allan B. Cole and others, op. cit., pp. 33-36.

arguments, the United States was still the principal opponent of Japanese independence and world peace. The JCP has also attacked revisionism as a dangerous deviation from the orthodox doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, and taken a neutral position toward the Sino-Soviet conflict.

North Korea's social values and ideology.--Before Marxist theory was first introduced to the Korean left-wing intellectuals in the early 1920's, Korea had long enjoyed its own social and political order. The sense of unitary national identity had been strongly pervasive. But historically, the Korean people's social values and cultural orientations had been predominantly influenced by Chinese Confucianism. Since the founding of the Yi-dynasty in 1392, which accepted Confucianism as its governing ideology, it has provided Koreans with a moral standard for social and human relations.¹¹

The basic feature of Confucianism lay in its emphasis on the co-relationship between man's inner morality and the social and political order. According to its precepts, man's higher morality and correct behavior could be elevated only in a harmonious society ruled by good government. The Confucian notion of political order was derived from the family system. It presented specific virtues to which members of the

11. Confucianism includes five virtues relating to man's correct behavior in social and political relations: benevolent compassion (jen), righteousness (i), propriety (li), wisdom (chih) and faithfulness (hsin). See Lucian W. Pye, China: An Introduction (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), p. 41.

family should comply, such as filial piety, fraternal duty, and the hierarchical norm. These virtues were stressed as the foundations for man's social and political relations.

The Confucian tradition left the Korean people a legacy of political authoritarianism. The paternalism in family life became a major factor in encouraging "submissive deference" of the ruled to the ruler. Moreover, the ruler's will was regarded as "the mandate of heaven," through which man's higher morality could ultimately be realized. These political values contributed to the birth of a highly-centralized officialdom in the Yi-dynasty. The king and his court were the center of political power, and they controlled the country through a bureaucratic organization composed of civilian officials.¹²

Under the influence of Confucianism, Korean society was hierarchically stratified. There were strict distinctions between the upper and lower classes.¹³ This social structure

12. In particular, civilian officials in the Yi-dynasty were recruited through a competitive examination based on a test of the Confucian knowledge. This examination system was regarded as the principal avenue of social advancement, and was strictly controlled by the central government. As a result, it contributed to the maintaining of a strong bureaucracy in the Yi-dynasty. U-gun Han, Hankuk Tongsa (History of Korea) (Seoul: Eul Yu Munhwasa, 1971), pp. 253-256.

13. Besides the ruling class (yangban), the lower classes were divided into three categories: the chungin, a small middle class, such as technicians or clerks, the sangmin, the commoner, such as merchants and farmers; and the chonmin, the "low-born," degraded class like staves. For more details, see Gregory Henderson, Korea, The Politics of the Vortex (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 36-55.

further facilitated the strengthening of the king's central authority in the Yi-dynasty.

The Japanese militarists attempted to disrupt the fabric of traditional values of Korea in many ways. They tried to establish modern administrative agencies and a capitalist economic system in Korea. They further tried to dislodge the social values and behavior of the Korean people through the introduction of a modern educational and legal system. But the Japanese colonial rule failed to bring about a fundamental change in Korean cultural values. For these efforts were primarily aimed at making the control over Korea more efficient. Rather, by using the method of "divide and rule," the Japanese intensified social and political splits among the Korean people. They divided the Korean ruling class, including landlords and officials under the Yi-dynasty, and recruited only part of it into the colonial administration.

One important aspect of the Japanese rule was the reinforcement of the tradition of highly-centralized bureaucratic system that made it possible for the Japanese firmly to control Korea for more than three decades. Now, the tradition of bureaucratic rule in Korea, which had grown since the founding of the Yi-dynasty, was strengthened by the Japanese rule.¹⁴

14. Immediately after Japanese militarists annexed Korea, they set up a colonial administration machinery, known as the Government-General of Korea (Chosen Sotokufu) in Seoul.

On the other hand, under the Japanese colonial rule, Korean nationalism began to gain impetus through the independence movements. During this period, Korean nationalism was largely characterized by a tenacious resistance to the colonial power of Japan.¹⁵ But the nationalist movements in Korea were neither well organized, nor armed with a strong leadership. Popular uprising erupted quite sporadically and spontaneously by the Korean masses.

At this time, a small group of leftist Korean intellectuals, influenced by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, began to be concerned with utilizing the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism to achieve their goal of national independence. They were particularly attracted to Lenin's premise on national liberation, which stressed a united front between Communism and nationalism as a means of fighting against the colonial powers. Russian Bolsheviks gradually moved to assist leftist Korean nationalists in fighting against the Japanese. Under the direction of the Comintern,¹⁶ the first Korean Communist Party was formally organized in 1923, and dedicated itself

15. For example, March 1, 1919, when a group of thirty-three Korean leaders proclaimed the Declaration of Independence, the anti-Japanese movement reached its height. But this movement was soon crushed by the colonial police of Japan. For the detail of the Korean anti-Japanese movement, see Chong-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

16. For the relationship between the Korean Communists and the Comintern, see Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 25-45.

to the liberation of Korea. But the fledging Communist forces of Korea could not wage an effective anti-Japanese movement. It was further weakened by intra-party factional strife.¹⁷

It was not until 1945, when the Soviet red army occupied the northern half of the peninsula, that Communism came to be solidly implanted in Korean soil. The Soviet-led Korean Communists first moved to liquidate all vestiges of the indigenous nationalist forces.

The North Korean Communists have professed that they are armed with the orthodox doctrine of Communism. They claim to act on the scientific laws of social development based on dialectical and historical materialism, and to use the class struggle, mass mobilization, and the proletarian dictatorship as a revolutionary weapon to construct a socialist society in North Korea. But like those in other Asian Communist states, the Communists in North Korea were much more influenced by Leninism rather than Marxism, which had theorized that a nation could not make the proletarian revolution if its economic system was still based on an "Asiatic mode of production." Through the success of the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin provided historic evidence that the proletarian revolution was possible even in not-fully industrialized countries. Kim Il-sung of North Korea has often applauded Leninism as a revolutionary ideology which "creatively developed, and

17. Ibid., pp. 25-186.

further enriched Marxism to suit the new historical conditions of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution."¹⁸

Lenin's theory of imperialism led the North Korean Communists to emphasize the extension of the class struggle against their external enemies, the imperialist powers. They have also adhered to Lenin's precept of the party as the vanguard of the proletariat. The NKWP was officially defined as "the vanguard, organized detachment of the working class and all of the toiling masses." On the other hand, in line with Mao Tse-tung's populist doctrine,¹⁹ Kim Il-sung emphasized the principle of the "mass line," to which the NKWP should strictly adhere. He urged the party cadres to "go into the masses, to work with them, and to learn from them," and argued that the revolutionary tasks could not be realized without a close link between the party and the masses.

The North Korean Communists also held that their party should be led by the supreme leadership. It was regarded as "one organic body with the leader's revolutionary thought." The NKWP became synonymous with Kim Il-sung's leadership. It was ideologically strengthened by Kim's own presentation of "juche." The idea of juche was interpreted as an effort to

18. Li Yuk-sa, ed., Juche: The Speeches and Writings of Kim Il-sung (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972). p. 209.

19. For Mao Tse-tung's version of Chinese populist doctrine, see Maurice Meisner, "Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives in Marxism-Leninism in China," The China Quarterly, No. 45, January-March 1971, pp. 2-36.

accelerate the process of national Communism. It was officially defined as a dynamic revolutionary ideology created by Kim Il-sung to apply the general principle of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete situation of North Korea.²⁰ This idea was basically aimed at elevating Kim Il-sung's status to that of Stalin in the Soviet Union, and Mao Tse-tung in China.

More specifically, the idea of *juche* was to serve two purposes. First, it was an effort to consolidate Kim Il-sung's power within the NKWP. Kim has frequently used this idea to attack his political opponents, charging them with the advocacy of "factionalism, parochialism and nepotism."²¹ As a result, he was able to solidify his power base to such an extent that nobody in North Korea would dare challenge his personality-cult. Second, it was designed to enlarge North Korea's diplomatic autonomy of precluding any interference from the Soviet Union and China. In a sense, it was an ideology aimed at stimulating a kind of "socialist patriotism," rejecting any manifestations of "big-power chauvinism" or "flunkeyism." According to Kim Il-sung's arguments, the idea of *juche* strongly precluded any attempt to increase national dependence on the major Communist powers or to isolate North Korea in the international community.

20. Li Yuk-sa, op. cit., p. 1.

21. Kim Il-sung, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 125.

While continually advocating the purity of Marxism-Leninism, the Pyongyang leadership upheld *juche* as an ideological force to inflict a frontal assault on "revisionism." Especially, Kim Il-sung attacked the revisionists as the "anti-party elements," who weaken the vigor of the class struggle. The North Korean Communists accepted the principle of peaceful coexistence as being quite identical to the idea of *juche*. They stressed the principle of peaceful coexistence as a means to expand North Korea's foreign relations with the Afro-Asian nations.

But as far as the problem of Korean reunification is concerned, North Korean leaders are still reluctant to apply the principle of coexistence. In fact, they feared that detente among the major powers might have an adverse effect on their hard-line position in regard to South-North Korean relations. They continue to oppose "peaceful coexistence" between South and North Korea.

2. Political structure and leadership

Japan's political structure and leadership.--Japan's domestic structures which are considered important to the understanding of her relations with North Korea can be roughly divided into five categories: the political party system, the bureaucracy, economic interest groups, and the mass media and public opinion, and the Chosoren.²²

22. The selection of Japan's domestic factors is based on

A. The political party system: Japan's postwar party system has been characterized by two things. First, it consists of several different party organizations, such as the LDP, the JSP, the DSP, the JCP, and the Komeito. Second, these parties, except for the Komeito, are divided into many intra-party factions. Among these parties, only the conservative LDP has ruled the government since 1955.²³ And the JSP has become the second majority party, even though it has never gained more than 36 percent of the Lower House seats.²⁴ Other major parties have not won any significant portion of the Japanese electorate. In view of these party organizations, postwar Japan's party system is defined as "a one and one-half party system."²⁵

Donald C. Hellmann's analysis on the relationship between Japan's foreign policy and her domestic political structure during the Japan-Soviet negotiations. Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

23. Following the 1955 election, the two major conservative forces, the Liberals (the Yoshida forces led by Ogata Taketora) and the Democrats (the anti-Yoshida forces led by Hatoyama Ichiro) agreed to merge. It was mainly stimulated by the growing socialist power, which gained 156 seats, just one seat more than one-third, in the 1955 election, while the Democrats 185 seats, and the Liberals 112 seats, in the Lower House. For more details, see Nathaniel B. Thayer, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

24. In 1958, the JSP won 35.5 percent of the House seats, the largest one it had ever gained since 1947. See Kan Ori, "Political Factors in Postwar Japan's Foreign Policy Decisions," Morton A. Kaplan and Kinhide Kushakoji, ed., Japan, America and the Future World Order (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 150.

25. Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties

The LDP has exerted the dominant influence on the formation of Japan's domestic and foreign policy. Major foreign policy decisions have been made through the deliberations of the LDP's formal organs, such as the Policy Affairs Research Council and the Executive Council. Frank Langdon noted that these deliberations in the LDP have virtually become "a part of the governmental process" in Japan.²⁶ More important is the fact that the major intra-party factions²⁷ within the LDP have considerably influenced Japan's foreign policy decisions. The factional system has been highly institutionalized, and the ministerial cabinets have consisted of coalitions of the major factions within the LDP. In accordance with the success of a major faction's boss in forming a coalition to capture the party leadership, the intra-party factions are generally divided into two groups: a main-current majority and an anti-main current minority.

Moreover, it was noted that the exercise of Japanese leadership in foreign affairs was significantly associated with the phenomena of "foreign-linked factionalism."²⁸ Some

and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 41.

26. Frank Langdon, "Japan's Foreign Policy-Making Process," Y. C. Kim, ed., Japan in World Politics (Washington, D. C.: Institute for Asian Studies, 1972), p. 8.

27. It is known that the LDP has about ten intra-party factions. For more details, see Haruhiro Fukui, op. cit., pp. 107-143.

28. For the understanding of "foreign-linked factionalism," see Alan Dowty, "Foreign-Linked Factionalism as a

of the Japanese prime ministers, including Hatoyama Ichiro, Kishi Nobusuke, and Tanaka Kakuei, had lost their premiership as the outcome of factional struggles linked to major foreign policy issues.

Some critics point out that Japan's decision-making process is characterized by "immobility" or a lack of initiative. The foreign policy of Japan, they argue, is formulated as a result of compromise among factional bosses. It is actually made through the process of "consensus" decision-making,²⁹ which makes it impossible to find any clear sources of responsibility for the results. In addition to this criticism, it is also said that the exercise of political leadership in modern Japan tends to be more dependent upon reacting to situations in foreign relations than upon taking any initiatives in handling foreign policy issues.³⁰

On the other hand, the opposition parties tried to put

Historical Pattern," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1971, Vol. XV, No. 4, p. 431.

29. The process of "consensus" decision-making is characterized as "a series of lengthy meeting in which issues are discussed in a very vague and non-committed way until gradually an opinion begins to form around what seems to be the group's common denominator." Masataka Kosaka, "Political Immobility and the Uncertain Future," Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin, ed., United States-Japanese Relations in the 1970's (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 19-34.

30. G. Scalera and H. Kahn argue that the Japanese tend to act in accordance with a "situational ethic," that is, with what they consider appropriate in a specific environment. In dealing with foreign affairs, the Japanese leadership is criticized for its trait of reacting a time-lag problem. See

some constraints on foreign policy decisions dominated by the conservatives. But they are as "faction-ridden" as the LDP, and each faction takes different positions on the objectives and execution of Japanese foreign policy.

B. The bureaucracy: There are several governmental organs directly related to Japan's foreign policy decisions. They are the MFA, the MITI, the NDA, and the Office of the Prime Minister. Depending upon the character of the particular policy issue, other governmental agencies may also become involved in the decision-making process. Among the governmental organs, the MFA plays the major role in determining Japan's foreign policy.³¹

Recently, the importance of the bureaucracy in the process of foreign policy-making has increased.³² The Japanese bureaucracy has concentrated on strengthening its own domain due to its growing role-specialization and professionalism. The officials of Japan increased their own expertise on specific issues, and their ability to control the necessary

Garrett Scalera and Herman Kahn, "Japan's Role in the World," Morton A. Kaplan and Kinhide Mushakoji, op. cit., p. 207, and Kan Ori, op. cit., p. 155.

31. Eto Shinkichi points out that in postwar Japan, the importance of the MFA in handling foreign affairs is relatively declining, because some of its functions are performed by other governmental ministries and agencies. Eto Shinkichi, "Foreign Policy Formation in Japan," Japan Interpreter, Vol. 10, No. 3-4, Winter 1976, pp. 251-266.

32. Kan Ori, op. cit., pp. 168-172.

information concerning them. They became powerful enough to ensure their own sphere of autonomy without being influenced politically.

In particular, Japan has a strong tradition of allowing the bureaucracy to take an active part in the process of policy-making. Since the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese bureaucracy has been well established within the governmental system of policy-making. With this background, middle-echelon officials occupying key positions in various governmental organs play a major role in the formulation of Japan's domestic and foreign policies. They usually collect the materials necessary to the making of governmental decisions, and prepare reports to be submitted to policy-makers at the top levels. Prior to a final decision among the top policy-makers, middle-echelon bureaucrats also make efforts to coordinate the differing views and interests among specialized organs of the government. Then they move to persuade their superiors to share their coordinated viewpoints. Consequently, the role played by the middle echelon of the bureaucracy substantially contributes to the creation of consensus in Japan's policy-making process.³³

The bureaucratic system of Japan is further featured by a close relationship between high-ranking officials and

33. For the understanding of the role of middle-echelon bureaucrats in Japan's decision-making process, see Chihiro Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan," World Politics, April 1974, pp. 353-369.

the party politicians. Considerable segments of the LDP members in the Diet consist of former high government officials. These ex-officials tend to cooperate with their former bureaucratic organs in the policy-making process.

In the Japanese decision-making structure, however, there exists to some extent compartmentalism between governmental ministries and agencies. In solving the China Issue, for example, the MFA was basically pro-Taiwan, while the MITI took a more pro-Peking stand.

C. Economic interest groups: These groups are divided into two categories: big business and labor organizations. Japanese big business consists of three sub-groups.³⁴ They are the Zaikai composed of the leading financial and economic organizations, such as the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nippon Shoko Kaigisho or Nissho), the Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Doyukai), and the Federation of Business Manager (Nikkeiren); the Gyokai representing specific industrial interests, such as steel, electricity, and banking; and the last subgroup made up of many individual corporations. Among these big business groups, the Zaikai is known as the most powerful pressure group in Japan. The Gyokai is closely connected with governmental agencies. In spite of the Occupa-

34. Sadako Ogata, "The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy: Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China," Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 175-176.

tion's anti-zaibatsu measures,³⁵ the big business groups have grown as an important force in influencing the foreign policy-making process of Japan. They became the major source of the LDP's political funding. Moreover, they took vary similar positions to those of the conservatives. In fact, Japan's pursuit of "economic diplomacy" was closely related with the interests of big business.

On the other hand, Japanese labor organizations, which had gained great impetus by the Occupation's policy of democratization in the early postwar era,³⁶ have been more or less involved in the foreign policy-making process. But their role has been confined to protesting the conservatives' foreign policy. The major labor organizations include such groups as Sohyo (The General Council of Trade Union of Japan), Domei (The Japanese Confederation of Labor), Shinsanbetsu (The National Federation of Industrial Organizations), and Churi-

35. For the anti-zaibatsu measures taken by the Allied Powers, see Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 133-159.

36. The Occupation took the following major steps favoring Japanese labor movements:

A. the Trade Union Law of 1945, which was formulated to protect the right of labor to organize, to engage in collective bargaining, and to strike;

B. the Labor Relations Adjustment Law of 1945, which provided the procedures for the grievance machinery; and

C. the Labor Standards Law of 1947, which provided the minimum standard for working hours, vacations, safety, labor conditions, etc.

But as the labor movements intensified so greatly as to endanger the postwar Japanese economy, the Occupation moved to regulate the power of labor unions. Its first step was General MacArthur's threat to use military forces to stop a general strike in 1947. See *Ibid.*, pp. 162-167.

tsuroren (The Federation of Independent Unions). Among these groups, both Sohyo and Domei are known as the most influential pressure groups in Japan's domestic political process. But there are differences in their political orientations. Sohyo is affiliated with the JSP, while Domei, since its formation in 1964, has supported the DSP.

D. The mass media and public opinion: During the postwar period, the Japanese masses' political consciousness has grown remarkably. With the emergence of a pluralistic industrial society, they have increasingly participated in the election of their representatives, and also raised their voices to influence the decision-making process. Akio Watanabe, who had analyzed the wide impact of Japanese public opinion on certain foreign policy issues, concluded that the government's policy decisions have been more and more influenced by it.³⁷ The increasing importance of public opinion in Japan is mainly due to the rapid diffusion of information by communications media.

Among the mass media, the press, and radio and television broadcasting have dominated the field. Recent surveys show that each household in Japan reads more than one newspaper, radio broadcasts are received by almost all Japanese households, and television programs reach more than 97 percent of Japanese

37. Akio Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1964-1973," Robert A. Scalapino, ed., op. cit., pp. 105-145.

home.³⁸ The communications media became the major channel linking policy-makers and the masses. First, the mass media usually play a central role in leading and organizing the masses' views about any specific policy issue. Second, they provide policy-makers with an articulate public opinion as a source of information necessary for their decisions. However, the Japanese mass media were often criticized for the lack of journalistic objectivity and responsibility. Such criticism was centered on the sentimental treatments of certain controversial issues and on the "inside-dopester" reports about complex factional disputes.

E. The Chosoren (The General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan): Japan has an unusual pressure group organized by leftist Korean residents, called the Chosoren. When the second World War ended, there were more than two million Koreans in Japan, most of whom had been forcefully conscripted into the Japanese imperialist army. The Korean residents were frustrated by the Occupation's uncertain policy towards them. The Occupation did not make itself clear whether they should be treated as "liberated nationals" or as "enemy nationals."³⁹ Under these circumstances, some of Korean residents moved to

38. Donald P. Whitaker and others, Area Handbook for Japan (Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress, 1974), p. 183.

39. Changsoo Lee, "Chosoren: An Analysis of the Korean Communist Movement in Japan," Journal of Korean Affairs, July 1973, Vol. III, No. 2, p. 5.

organize a non-political group named the Choren (The Korean Resident League in Japan) as a means to protect their own interests. But from the outset this group was led by leftist Korean residents. Moreover, the Choren became closely attached to the JCP. While forming a united front with the JCP, it waged a series of violent protests against both the Occupation and the Japanese government.

But the Choren was dissolved by the Organization Control Law enacted by the Japanese government in April 1948.⁴⁰ Then, the Occupation's "red purge" considerably restricted the activities of the Japanese and Korean Communists. During the Korean war, the former Choren members formed another organization called the Minsen (The Democratic Front in Japan for Korean Unification). This organization waged militant radical activities. After the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, the nationalist faction within the Minsen, led by Han Dok-su, began to establish its supremacy by arguing that the Korean Communists should take a position independent of the Japanese Communists. At last, in May 1955, the Minsen was replaced by a new organization, the Chosoren. This new organization set forth the following goals: to support North Korea's efforts to unify the country; to protect the rights of Korean residents in Japan; and to contribute to the pro-

40. This law was aimed at outlawing any organization which tried to influence the governmental policy by using violent force.

motion of friendly relations between North Korea and Japan.⁴¹ Structurally, the Chosoren is linked with North Korea. Several members of the Chosoren's Central Committee, including its Chairman, are officially elected to serve as delegates of the SPA of North Korea. They act as the representatives of the DPRK in Japan. Today, it includes not only a tightly organized central agency, but also a far-flung local system.⁴²

North Korea's political structure and leadership.--In the process of North Korea's foreign policy-making, the most influential are such structural factors as Kim Il-sung's leadership, the NKWP and the formal government system.

A. Kim Il-sung's leadership: The pervasiveness of Kim Il-sung's personality-cult became one of the most striking characteristics of the North Korean political structure. In fact, his eventual ascendancy to the top power position in North Korea had been made through the factional struggle and purges following a Stalinist method in the 1950's.⁴³ It is widely known that he exercises absolute political power. The

41. The Far Eastern Research Institute, Pukhan Chonso (General book on North Korea) (Seoul: 1974), Vol. III, pp. 163-164.

42. The Communist Affairs Research Institute, Pukhan Chonggam: 1945-1968 (Complete book on North Korea) (Seoul: 1968), p. 279.

43. For more details, see Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East: Communism in North Korea," Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 116-119.

North Korean Communists idolized Kim Il-sung as "the great leader of the 40 million Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander, and the founder and leader of our party."⁴⁴ This deification of Kim Il-sung's personal leadership seemed to be mingled with certain traditional values of Korean politics: centralism, authoritarianism and paternalism. Of course, it is true that these traditional elements can be further strengthened by virtue of the ideological aspects of modern Communism, such as the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

On the other hand, Kim Il-sung's leadership was more firmly enshrined upon the adoption of the 1972 socialist constitution.⁴⁵ In accordance with the new constitution, he was elected the President of the DPRK by the SPA. He became the actual as well as symbolic head of state. One of the most outstanding features of the new constitution was that it provided a strong presidential system. It empowered the Presi-

44. The Pyongyang Times, November 3, 1970.

45. According to North Korea's official accounts, the 1972 constitution was defined as a socialist constitution of reflecting "the achievements made in the socialist revolution," while the old constitution that had been adopted in 1948 was necessary for the "bourgeois-democratic stage" in North Korea. Article 7 of the new constitution provides that "the sovereignty of the DPRK rests with the workers, peasants, soldiers, and working intellectuals," while Article 2 of the old constitution stated that "the sovereignty of the DPRK resides in the people." See the text of the old constitution, Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), Vol. II, p. 1319, and the text of the new constitution, Journal of Korean Affairs, Vol. II, No. 4, January 1974, pp. 46-57.

dent to perform vast administrative functions, including those of ratifying or abrogating treaties with foreign states, and of receiving the credentials of foreign envoys. The President also leads the newly-installed Central People's Committee, which in reality possesses the major powers that had been assigned to the SPA and its Presidium under the old constitution. Kim Il-sung's absolute power was further solidified by the NKWP and the centralized administrative system.

B. The NKWP: According to official accounts, the NKWP represents the interests of the laboring masses, and assumes a central role of carrying out the "Korean revolution" with Marxism-Leninism as its leading general principle. It is also regarded as the ultimate embodiment of Kim Il-sung's idea of *juche*.

The NKWP is a mass party. It constitutes more than 65,000 primary organizations or cells, and its total membership is approximately 1.7 million, representing about 11 percent of the total North Korean population.⁴⁶ This rate of party membership is the highest of any Communist states. The NKWP is also an elite party. Its rules provide that all party positions must be filled by elections, and that "party members shall obey the party organizations; the minority, the majority, a lower party organ, the higher party organ; and all party organizations shall absolutely obey the Central

⁴⁶. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 713-714.

Committee of the party."⁴⁷ In other words, the powers and functions of the NKWP are to be concentrated into the hands of a few party leaders in accordance with the organizational doctrine of "democratic centralism."

The party cadres of the NKWP are highly disciplined and faithfully devoted to their supreme leader, Kim Il-sung. In accordance with the mass line, these cadres are urged to establish close links with the masses. Kim Il-sung argued that such links were necessary to prevent the party cadres from degenerating into "mannerism" or bureaucratism."

Under the leadership of Kim Il-sung, the NKWP assumed the major responsibility for both formulating and executing North Korea's domestic and foreign policies. It was often described as the "general staff," formulating the general programs necessary to carry out the revolutionary tasks. Among the intra-party organs, the party Congress usually provides the general outlines relating to foreign policy. Most specific issues are deliberated through the Central Committee and the Political Committee. In the North Korean power structure, the Political Committee is the most powerful decision-making organ. According to the NKWP's rules, this Committee is to control "all tasks of the party under the name of the Central Committee." The Secretariat of the NKWP is also an important organ involved in North Korea's foreign policy-making process.

47. See the NKWP's rules as amended on April 28, 1956 and September 16, 1961, *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 1337.

It is not only responsible for the implementation of general policies and resolution of the party, but also for the supervision of routine party activities, including those relating to personnel and administration. The Secretariat further controls various agencies installed by the Central Committee. Of them, the Foreign Affairs Division plays a most crucial role in handling foreign policy issues. It actually gathers the information necessary to formulate North Korea's foreign policy, and submits it to the upper party organs. This Division is also responsible for guiding and controlling all administrative ministries and agencies which are involved in the execution of foreign policy decisions.⁴⁸

C. The formal government system: In addition to the presidency, there are two other state power organs: the Central People's Committee and the State Administration Council. According to the new constitution, the Central People's Committee is "the highest leadership of state power" in the North Korean political system. It consists of the president, two vice-presidents, the secretary, and its regular members. Its powers and functions are wide reaching in scope. It is involved in the process of North Korea's domestic and foreign policy-making and is also empowered to appoint or remove the members of the State Administration Council.⁴⁹

48. Nam-sik Kim, "The Decision-Making Process in the Foreign Policy of North Korea," East Asian Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1974, pp. 84-86.

49. See Article 103 of the DPRK's new constitution, op. cit.

Most of the members of the Central People's Committee hold positions in the higher party organs, such as the Political Committee or the Secretariat. In order effectively to exercise its powers and functions, the Central People's Committee has several sub-Committees, such as the Internal Policy Committee, the External Policy Committee, the Defense Committee, and the Judicial Security Committee. With regard to foreign policy decisions, the External Policy Committee plays a major role in close collaboration with the party organs.

In contrast with the magnitude of power concentrated in the Central People's Committee, the State Administration Council performs largely executive functions under the "guidance of the President of the DPRK and the Central People's Committee."⁵⁰ It consists of a premier, several vice-premiers, commission chairmen, and ministers. In carrying out foreign policy decisions, three departments of the Council have major responsibilities: the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Trade, and the Department of Foreign Economic Operations.⁵¹

Generally speaking, the Department of Foreign Affairs is mainly responsible for executing North Korea's foreign policy decisions, including the conclusion of treaties and agreements with foreign countries, the expansion of diplomatic relations, and the management of embassies and legations

50. See Article 107 of the DPRK's new constitution, *ibid.*

51. Nam-sik Kim, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-84.

abroad. It is known that the role of this Department is confined to the execution of foreign policy rather than its formulation. The other two Departments are mainly in charge of expanding North Korea's economic relations with foreign countries. But the Department of Foreign Economic Operations seems to put its major emphasis on the promotion of economic relations with those countries with which North Korea has no diplomatic ties.

In sum, in a monolithic-closed society like North Korea, it is impossible to draw clear lines of structural division between the leader, the party, and the state organs. These power structures are interlocked with Kim Il-sung as the pinnacle. In North Korea, only one thing is clear: the supreme leadership of Kim Il-sung is the most crucial determinant of its foreign policy.

3. Economic-technological capability

Japan's economic-technological capability.--At the present time, the Japanese economy is considered to be the third largest in the world behind only those of the United States and the Soviet Union. According to governmental figures,⁵² Japan's gross national product, which had recorded about US \$10,000 million in fiscal year 1950, increased to a level of


52. The Economic Planning Agency of Japan, Keizai Hakusho (White paper on economy) (Tokyo: 1971), preface.

more than US \$200,000 million in fiscal year 1970. Japanese per capita income also rose from US \$100 to over US \$1,500 during the same period. With the remarkable growth in economy, Japan has entered into a fairly affluent-consumer society.

Rebuilding from the ruins of World War II, Japan has achieved spectacular economic success. Until the early 1950's, Japan's economic recovery had been largely attributed to the economic aid from the United States, and to the outbreak of the Korean war.⁵³ Since then, Japan has attained an average annual economic growth rate of about 10 percent. There are several characteristics of Japan's economic development.

First, it was dependent on a rapid increase in foreign trade. During the 1960's, the total volume of Japan's two-way trade significantly increased from about US \$8,546 million in 1960 to about US \$38,199 million in 1970, an increase of 4.5 times as much as that of 1960, as shown in Figure II. The pattern of Japanese economic development dependent upon foreign trade can be traced to the prewar period. The Japanese had always considered that foreign trade was vital to Japan's economic development because of her lack of raw materials and sources of energy. They believed that Japan should export

53. During the Korean war, Japan became a major source for military supplies and services. Edwin O. Reischauer noted that the war marked Japan's economic turning point. See Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan, op. cit., pp. 205. And Yoshida Shigeru also put that Japan's industrial production in 1946 fell to as low as 30.7 of the 1934-35 level, but increased to 83.6 in 1950, when the war broke, rose to 114.4 one year later. See Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs:

Figure IIJapan's exports and imports: 1955-1975

These figures are taken from Donald P. Whitaker and others, Area Handbook for Japan (Library of Congress, 1974) and from the Japanese Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical Yearbook (Tokyo: 1977).

manufactured goods abroad in order to secure supplies of industrial raw materials.

In the regional balance of Japan's over-all trade, the United States is still Japan's largest trading partner, receiving more than 30 percent of Japan's annual exports.⁵⁴ But Japan's trade with non-Communist Asian and Middle Eastern countries has increased remarkably in recent years. With the

The Study of Japan in Crisis (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 282.

54. Donald P. Whitaker, op. cit., p. 510.

resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, it is expected that trade between the two countries will increase greatly.

Second, Japan's economic development was led by large-scale enterprises, such as Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui and Company, and Marubeni Corporation. These giant enterprises also monopolized Japan's over-all trade by employing a high capital investment policy and by developing an advanced technology. In fiscal year 1972, about 50.5 percent of Japan's and about 10.6 percent of her imports were made by these big trading companies.⁵⁵ In fact, the Japanese economic system is characterized by a sort of dualism, a small number of large-scale enterprises dominating a large number of small- and medium-scale business.

Third, Japan's economy is fundamentally based on a free market-capitalist system. But it also features a well-balanced cooperative system between government and business. The role of the government was to set the general directions for national economic development. But the Japanese government avoided any direct involvement in economic activities. Instead, in some public-related fields, such as banking and finance, transportation, communication, and in specific technical developments, the government exercised its powers. Moreover, mediation of disputes between capital and labor is considered an important function of the government.

55. Ibid., pp. 527.

Fourth, the Japanese economy seems to be increasingly involved in foreign investment. It appears as the form of a multi-national corporation. Japanese foreign investments have been made largely by giant companies. These companies have been interested in both securing natural resources abroad and expanding trading markets for their manufactured goods. Until fiscal year 1970, the cumulative volume of foreign investments made by Japanese companies amounted to approximately US \$3,595 million, about 40 percent of which was associated with resource-oriented investments.⁵⁶

Lastly, more important is the fact that postwar Japan's economic development has run parallel with technological advancement. The government, in close collaboration with the private sector, made intensive efforts to improve the scientific and technological capabilities of Japan. From the late 1960's, the Japanese economy became more dependent upon the growth of technology-intensive industries. The technological advancement was made in two ways: the importation of foreign technology and domestic technological innovations. Japan has invested a large amount of money to import highly sophisticated technology from the Western industrial countries. During the period from 1960 through 1970, Japan spent about US \$255 million

56. Koichi Hamada classified Japanese firms' foreign investments into four patterns: market-oriented, resource-oriented, labor-oriented, and environment-oriented ones. See Koichi Hamada, "The Prospects for Japan's role in the World Economy," Morton A. Kaplan and Kinhide Mushakoji, ed., op. cit., p. 187.

for the importation of foreign technology.⁵⁷ Also, the expenditures for promoting domestic scientific and technological innovations increased steadily.⁵⁸

With regard to Japan's scientific and technological capability, Herman Kahn once observed that by the late 1970's, Japan would have enough plutonium byproducts to make five hundred to a thousand small nuclear bombs per year.⁵⁹ It seems clear that Japan's actual nuclear and aerospace capability in both industrial and military fields is still far below that of the United States and the Soviet Union. But in other industrial fields, such as steel, automobiles, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, aluminium, and electricity, Japan's technological capability appears to be equivalent to those of the advanced Western countries.

The level of Japan's economic and technological capability is also related to her military preparations. In the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan (1972-1976), the Japanese government made it clear that Japan's military equipment should be renewed and modernized in proportion to her scientific and technological advances. According to this plan, the total expenditures for Japan's military preparations amounted to about US \$15.3 billion, more than double that of the Third Defense Build-up

57. T. Dixon Long, "Technology and Power: Japan Catches Up," Lewis Austin, ed., op. cit., p. 156.

58. Ibid., p. 160.

59. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000: Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 244-245.

Plan.⁶⁰

The full-scale development of nuclear weapons in Japan is still obstructed by constitutional restraint, and by the low level of missile-delivery capability. But Japan continually strengthened her conventional "Self-Defense" forces. In fact, Japan has already reached a stage of selling abroad Japanese-made conventional military weapons, such as rifles, ammunition and small naval vessels. In 1965, the Japanese government endorsed the offer of a Japanese firm to sell meteorological sounding rockets to Indonesia, and the number of Japanese firms exporting military weapons continued to increase.⁶¹

North Korea's economic-technological capability.--Since its founding, the North Korean regime has set forth two basic economic goals: a socialist industrial construction and the achievement of a self-reliant national economy.⁶² To achieve these goals, North Korea established a centrally-planned economic system.

After the end of the Korean war, the Pyongyang regime first made efforts to recover its war-torn economy. By re-

60. Jiei Nenkan: 1977 (Yearbook on self-defense) (Tokyo: 1977), pp. 119-121.

61. T. Dixon Long, op. cit., p. 151.

62. North Korea's gross national product amounted to about US \$4,820 million in 1974, and its per capita income was estimated at about US \$390 in the same year. Myung-sun Yun, "Kyungje kehoek Chajil kwa Kisul Hyuksin" (Failure in economic plan and technological innovations), Pukhan, January 1976, pp. 87-88.

receiving large-scale economic and technical aid from the Communist bloc countries, North Korea's economy recovered in 1956 to its level of the prewar period.

1957, North Korea launched the First Five-Year Economic Plan. Kim Il-sung emphasized that this plan was aimed at laying down "the foundations of socialism" in North Korea. During this plan, ambitious economic targets were mapped out, such as the rapid growth in industrial fields of steel, electricity and chemicals. At the same time, greater emphasis was placed on the mobilization and organization of the masses as a means of facilitating a socialist economic development. In the field of industry, North Korean leaders inaugurated in 1958 the "Chollima" (Flying horse) movement (a Korean Great Leap Forward) to give the workers the ideological motivation to increase their industrial productivity. It was based on the assumption that industrial construction should be simultaneously achieved alongside the "cultural revolution." Under the movement of Chollima, the Pyongyang regime began to organize work teams designed to serve two major purposes: to promote socialist competition in production and to effectuate mass education for workers. This movement was closely connected with the process of Communist indoctrination of the North Korean people. The organization of work teams quickly spread into all social and economic fields.⁶³

63. By March 1959, according to official sources of North Korea, 8,620 work teams with the total of 178,406 members

In addition, North Korea began to collectivize the agricultural field as a means to organize the peasantry. Earlier, in 1946, North Korea accomplished the land reform. The process of agricultural collectivization, which had already started in 1953, ended in August 1958.⁶⁴ At the same time, the Pyongyang regime made efforts to introduce modern technology in the countryside. Such efforts were centered on three major areas: irrigation, mechanization and electrification.⁶⁵

With the completion of the First Five-Year Economic Plan in 1960, a year ahead of schedule, the North Korean regime announced that heavy industry grew by approximately 3.6 times, light industry by 3.3 times, and agriculture by 1.4 times. The average annual growth rate was announced as 36.6 percent.⁶⁶ But this plan resulted in a sharply unbalanced growth between industry and agriculture. Kim Il-sung said in 1960: "Frankly speaking, prior to the Five-Year Plan, the peasants' living standard was somewhat better than that of the workers, but now it is worse than the workers."⁶⁷ It was true that during

had been organized in North Korea. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1219.

64. The Far Eastern Research Institute, Pukhan Chonso, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 545.

65. Kim Il-sung, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 307.

66. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, op. cit., pp. 1223-1224.

67. Kim Il-sung, op. cit., p. 550.

this plan North Korea did not increase the production of consumer goods due to its "heavy industry-first policy." The relative decline in consumer products constituted a major weakness of the North Korean economy.

The Second Seven-Year Economic Plan went into effect in 1961. This plan was projected so as to fulfill the average annual growth rate of 18 percent in industry. From the outset, it was to be divided into two periods: the first three years (1961-1963) to insure a higher rate of state investment in light industry and in agriculture, and the second period (1964-1967) with more emphasis on heavy industry. While implementing this plan, North Korean leaders adopted the so-called "Chong-san-ni method"⁶⁸ effectively to manage the workers of agricultural cooperatives. Also, they introduced the "Tae'an system" as a new management and guidance system for all industrial plants.⁶⁹

The new industrial management system was based on a sort of collective leadership composed of the members of the factory's party committee, the workers and the technicians.

68. The "Chongsan-ni method" was originated in 1960, when Kim Il-sung visited a village called Chongsan-ni to demonstrate how to carry out the work of rural development effectively. Here, Kim stressed that a decentralized management method would be effective for the increase in agricultural output. Specifically, he proposed that a management board in each cooperative should be formed, and that it should be operated through the participation of all members of cooperative. See *ibid.*, pp. 450-483.

69. The "Tae'an system" was initiated by Kim Il-sung's visit to the Tae'an Electrical Appliance Plant in December 1961. See *ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 108.

This was quite different from the previous system controlled by one manager. These new steps were considered part of an effort to decentralize the local industrial and agricultural management systems.

Besides, North Korean leaders began to be concerned with promoting the material incentives, and with bringing about technological innovations. They took such incentive-promoting measures as prizes, paid vacations and honorific titles for work teams. The Pyongyang regime even abolished taxes altogether at the end of 1965.

North Korea's official figures indicated that the total production in agriculture during the period from 1967 through 1968 increased 27 percent. It was announced that this increase was mainly due to the significant progress of the above-mentioned three technological innovations in the countryside.⁷⁰ But the actual rate of economic growth during this plan proved to be very modest. This was revealed in an industrial growth of 12.8 percent, much less than the initially-projected rate of 18 percent.⁷¹

The economic setback in North Korea seemed to have been caused by the sizable increase in its defense expenditures. During this period, North Korea moved to enhance its military strength "in order to cope with the increasing danger of war."

70. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, op. cit., pp. 1119-1123.

71. Ibid., p. 1261.

In conjunction with this move, Kim Il-sung announced in 1966 that the Seven-Year Economic Plan would be extended until 1970. During the five years from 1967 through 1971, the rate of defense expenditures in North Korea's national budget increased remarkably, totalling more than 30 percent as compared with about 10 percent in 1966.⁷² It was during this period that North Korea did its utmost to strengthen the so-called "four major point military lines: to arm all the people, to turn the whole country into a fortress, to make the army a cadre one, and to modernize it."⁷³

Meanwhile, the Fifth Party Congress of the NKWP adopted the new Six-Year Economic Plan, covering the period from 1971 through 1976. This plan was designed to attain an annual growth rate of 14 percent in industry. In setting forth this plan, Kim Il-sung acknowledged that the development of light industry would be achieved without making a larger state investment by using locally available raw materials and labor. Of the state investment to be made under the Six-Year Economic Plan, 49 percent was to be allocated to industry (of this, 83 percent was to be invested to heavy industry and 17 percent to light industry), and 18 percent to agriculture.⁷⁴ This

72. Donald S. Zagoria and Young-kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," W. J. Barnds, ed., The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 35.

73. Kim Il-sung, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 379

74. Nena Vreeland and Rinn-sup Shinn, and others, Area Handbook for North Korea (Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress, 1976), p. 239.

allocation of state investment showed that North Korea still put greater emphasis on the development of heavy industry.

Moreover, the Six-Year Economic Plan set a target of producing 7 to 7.5 million tons of grain in 1976.⁷⁵ But it proved that the actual output of grain had not increased as projected. Its annual growth rate was estimated at about 6.3 percent for the past ten years from 1960 through 1970.⁷⁶

While carrying out the Six-Year Plan, North Korea also began to import foreign technology from non-Communist states. This move seemed to be connected with North Korea's efforts to increase industrial productivity and to enhance its domestic technological level. It was known that during the 1970-1974 period, North Korea's purchases of industrial plants from the Western countries amounted to approximately US \$573 million.⁷⁷

The North Korean regime announced in August 1975 that most of the targets in industry set at the Six-Year Plan, except for such a few fields as steel and cement, were achieved. If industrial outputs increased actually as announced officially, North Korea's industrial growth during the six years should have recorded as much as the cumulative increase of the past ten years. (See Table II)

It was further reported that the output of agriculture

75. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, op. cit., p. 1129.

76. Nena Vreeland and Rinn-sup Shinn, op. cit., p. 253.

77. Chong-sik Lee, "New Paths for North Korea," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXVI, March-April 1977, p. 57.

Table IINorth Korea's major industrial products:
1961-1975

Item	1961	1970	1975
Electricity (in 1,000,000kwh)	9,700	16,500	28,050
Coal (in 1,000tons)	12,000	27,500	49,500
Steel (in 1,000tons)	790	2,200	3,300
Chemical fertilizer (in 1,000tons)	700	1,500	3,000
Cement (in 1,000tons)	2,400	4,500	7,750

Sources: The figures for 1961 and 1970 are taken from Il-pyung Kim, "Changing Perspectives in North Korea," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXII, January-February 1973, p. 54, and the figures for 1975 are estimated by using the growth rate published in Nitcho Boeki (Japan-North Korea trade), No. 104, October 1975.

amounted to 7 million tons at the end of 1974, two years ahead of schedule, and that its target was revised to 8 million tons by 1975.⁷⁸

During the Six-Year Economic Plan, North Korea also imported a large amount of foreign capital goods and raw materials. As a result, the total volume of its two-way trade with foreign countries amounted to about US \$1,261 million in 1973, as compared with US \$463 million in 1966. During the 1970-1973 period, North Korea's foreign trade had increased

78. Nena Vreeland and Rinn-sup Shinn, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

at the annual growth rate of about 15 percent.⁷⁹

North Korea's major trading partners are still Communist countries, including the Soviet Union and China. In 1973, about 67 percent of the total volume of its foreign trade was conducted with Communist countries. But recently, trade between North Korea and non-Communist countries have increased steadily. Japan became North Korea's third largest trading partner. Other Western countries, such as France, West Germany, Austria, Sweden and Denmark, have also conducted commerce with North Korea.⁸⁰

One of the most serious phenomena in North Korea's foreign trade is that it has resulted in a large amount of trade deficit. This was derived mainly from trade with the Soviet Union and Japan.⁸¹ In recent years, it was acknowledged that the cumulative trade deficit of North Korea had considerably damaged its international balance-of-payments, and also weakened its credit position in the world market.

79. Ibid., p. 301.

80. Ibid., pp. 293-303.

81. During the 1968-1973 period, a total of North Korea's trade deficit was estimated at approximately US \$1 billion, and about 50 percent of this amount was derived from trade with the Soviet Union. And during the 1972-1974 period, North Korea's trade deficit with Japan amounted to about US \$226 million. See Nena Vreeland and Rinn-sup Shinn, op. cit., p. 291, 300 and 301, and Eung-yul Chon, "Pukhan Woechae Padong kwa Muyuk Kuzo," (The crisis of North Korea's foreign debts and trade structure), Pukhan, August 1976, pp. 72-85.

4. Summary

Postwar Japanese conservatism has significantly influenced the formation and execution of Japan's domestic and foreign policies. It was much different from the ultra-militarism which had prevailed in the 1930's. The conservative values shared by members of the ruling LDP and business circles no longer required the government to pursue a policy of external expansion. In addition, the diversity of political ideologies in modern Japan had some implications in her foreign policy. Most conservative leaders of Japan believed that it was necessary for Japan to maintain close diplomatic and security ties with the United States and other Western nations in order to preserve Japan's national independence and external safety. But the opposition parties, including the JSP and the JCP, argued that Japan should take a neutral position in her foreign relations as a means of safeguarding her own national security.

By contrast, North Korea is governed under a monolithic revolutionary doctrine. From its inception, the Pyongyang regime adopted Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology, and advocated the Communist international movement. From the mid-1960's, it tried to establish Kim Il-sung's idea of *juche* as a foundation for its foreign policy. This idea was designed to serve the purpose of preserving North Korea's independent stand toward the intensifying rivalry between the Soviet Union and China.

In Japan, various domestic groups, including party organizations, participate in the process of foreign policy-making. Of these groups, the LDP, business circles, and the bureaucracy have exercised the most profound influence on the making of Japanese foreign policy. Especially, numerous intra-party factions within the ruling LDP and other parties had some implications for the formation of Japanese foreign policy. Each faction had a somewhat particular perspective on Japan's foreign policy. For example, the Yoshida faction within the LDP had placed greater emphasis on the maintenance of close diplomatic and economic relations between Japan and the United States. But the Hatoyama faction was much more concerned with improving Japanese relations with the Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China.

The process of North Korea's decision-making is entirely dominated by Kim Il-sung's personal leadership. As described earlier, the North Korean constitution empowers Kim Il-sung to perform the vast political and administrative functions. Under the absolute leadership of Kim Il-sung, the NKWP assumes the major responsibility for formulating North Korean foreign policy. Besides, the central organs of state power, such as the Central People's Committee and the Administration Council are also involved in the process of decision-making in close collaboration with the NKWP.

Economically, Japan had already developed into a modern

industrial power. The rapid economic growth of Japan was largely due to the following factors: the United States' economic aid, the rapid increase in Japan's foreign trade, the adoption of a free-market system, and the technological advancement. As an economic power, Japan has gradually expanded her influence on international affairs. In other words, the Japanese economy and technology became a major factor to lead Japan to increase her political influence in the East Asian region.

North Korea had launched a series of economic development plans under centralized-state controls. These plans were officially aimed at constructing a socialist economy in North Korea. Immediately after the end of the Korean war, the Pyongyang regime strove for the recovery of its war-torn economy with the massive economic assistance from Communist countries, including the Soviet Union and China. During the First Five-Year Economic Plan, started in 1957, North Korea made efforts to lay down "the foundations of socialism." For this purpose, it collectivized the agricultural field and launched campaigns for mobilizing the workers, such as the "Chollima" movement. During the Second Seven-Year Economic Plan, North Korean leaders introduced a new management system aimed at increasing industrial productivity, such as the "Tae'an" system. Nevertheless, during this plan, North Korea did not achieve significant economic development. Rather, the North Korean economy was considerably suffered from the sizable increase in its defense

expenditures.

In 1971, the North Korean regime also launched the Six-Year Economic Plan. While conducting this plan, North Korea moved to end its "autarkic" economy, and increased foreign trade with non-Communist countries. But the rapid expansion of North Korea's foreign trade resulted in a large amount of trade deficit, which in turn weakened its credit in the international market seriously.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESTRAINED RELATIONSHIP: 1953-1959

With the Armistice Agreement ending the Korean war in 1953, Japanese-North Korean relations began to develop within a very limited scope. In February 1955, North Korea made its first official bid for normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. But the Japanese government turned down this North Korean initiative as "unacceptable." Although the Japanese government under Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro, the successor of Yoshida Shigeru, set as its policy goal a reconciliation with neighboring Communist powers, it was stubbornly opposed to North Korea's offer of diplomatic normalization. Consequently, there was no diplomatic breakthrough between the two countries.

Instead, bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea progressed in non-official areas, such as various types of contacts between the peoples of the two countries, the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea, and the opening of trade relations. In fact, during the 1950's, Japan's relations with North Korea were substantially affected by several of the following factors: the Japan-United States security system, North Korea's close ties with the Soviet Union and China, Japan's basic policy assigning higher priority to the early resumption of formal diplomatic relations with South Korea, a wide gulf of ideological feud between Japanese

conservative leaders and the North Korean Communists, and Japan's domestic political process featuring a complex factional struggle within the ruling conservative LDP.

1. The cold war stalemate

Japan's "independent" foreign policy.--After the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in 1952, the Japanese government under Yoshida Shigeru was faced increasingly with a dilemma of major proportions. In domestic politics, Yoshida's uncontested "one-man" rule was endangered by a growing factional conflict within conservative political circles. The reinstatement of the old prewar politicians, who had been forced to resign from their public posts by the issuance of the "purge order" from the Occupation in 1946,¹ constituted a major factor threatening Yoshida's power base which was firmly entrenched in early postwar Japanese politics.

The old prewar politicians were able to gain a signifi-

1. The purge program initiated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was aimed at "removing from key positions in the political, social and economic structure of Japan those persons who could not be trusted to guide the future development of Japan solely toward peaceful ends." Its implementation was divided into two phases: the first phase, started in 1945, resulted in the removal and exclusion of about 1,000 incumbents of and candidates for important positions in the national government; the second phase, which was coincided with the general election of April 1947, brought about the removal of some 7,000 persons from positions of leadership in the local government. For more details, see Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945-September 1948, pp. 8-45.

cant victory in the 1952 election, when Prime Minister Yoshida and his Liberal Party suffered a loss in their popularity.² These emerging anti-Yoshida forces were led mainly by Hatoyama Ichiro, who had served as Minister of Education in the prewar era, and who had played a key role in reorganizing the Japanese Liberals immediately after the end of World War II. In addition to Hatoyama's overt challenge, the stability of the Yoshida government was also seriously undermined by various political corruption scandals involving conservative politicians, such as the shipbuilding affairs.³

Meanwhile, the Yoshida government was faced with a more serious problem of adapting itself to a temporary thaw in the East-West confrontation, which was hailed as a new era of peaceful coexistence. Following the end of the Korean war and the truce in Indochina in 1954, Japan was favorably disposed to the peaceful overtures undertaken by the two Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China. In June 1954, the Chinese

2. Of the 329 of the depurged politicians who ran in the 1952 election, 139 were elected, including the Liberals and the Progressives. For the detail, see Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy-Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 45.

3. The shipbuilding scandal revealed that many high-ranking politicians, including the Liberals, the Progressives, and the right socialists, were suspected of having bribes from shipbuilding companies. Especially, Yoshida's two pivotal confidants, Sato Eisaku and Ikeda Hayato, were suspected of being involved in the scandal. For the detail, see "Review of Political Situation," Shukan Asahi (Trans. by American Embassy, Tokyo, Political Section, Translation Services Branch), April 25, 1954.

Premier Chou En-lai, together with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, set forth the so-called "five peace principles" as a basis of cooperation among the Asian states.⁴ Later, Chou also suggested that these principles should be applied for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Furthermore, the Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov told a correspondent of the Chubu Nippon Shimbun of Japan in September 1954, that "the time is ripe for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union."⁵ These overtures by the two Communist powers manifested themselves in their joint communique announced following the 5th celebration of the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1954. It said:⁶

The policy of the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the Soviet Union in their relations with Japan is based on the principle of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems, and on the conviction that this conforms with the vital interests of all peoples. They stand for the development, on mutually beneficial terms, of broad trade relations and the establishment of close cultural ties with Japan. They also express their readiness to take steps to normalize their relations with Japan, and declare that Japan will meet with the full support of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union in its efforts to establish political and economic relations with the People's Republic of China and the

4. New China News Agency (Bulletin), January 20, 1954.

5. FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), Daily Report (Far East: Japan), October 14, 1954.

6. For the text of the Sino-Soviet joint communique, see

Soviet Union as well as in all measures Japan undertakes to secure the conditions for its peaceful and independent development.

This communique led to many serious repercussions in Japan. Yoshida and his government dismissed it as being part of a peace offensive designed simply for propaganda purposes. Prime Minister Yoshida denounced the Sino-Soviet joint communique as a ruse intended to deceive the Japanese and even opposed the opening of trade and cultural relations with the two Communist powers prior to the resumption of diplomatic relations.⁷ In contrast with Yoshida's staunch anti-Communist stand, Hatoyama and his associates averred that Japan should pay due attention to such overtures. They argued that the Japanese government should be ready to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China, while correcting its foreign policy predominantly dependent upon the United States. This position of the anti-Yoshida forces also corresponded to the growing interest of the business community of Japan in trading with the two Communist powers.

While the Sino-Soviet overtures widened the already deep split in conservative circles, the anti-Yoshida forces hastened their efforts to topple the Yoshida government. In November 1954, they agreed to form a new party named the Japan Democratic Party under the slogan of "new leadership, new poli-

the Mainichi Shimbun, October 12, 1954, or FBIS, op. cit. (China: Communist), October 12, 1954.

7. The Mainichi Shimbun, October 21, 1954.

cies and new organizations." Hatoyama Ichiro became the head of the new Democratic Party. With the formation of this party, the Yoshida cabinet was dissolved, and a new government was inaugurated in December 1954 with Hatoyama as Prime Minister, and with Shigemitsu Mamoru, the former head of the Progressive Party, as Foreign Minister.

The new Hatoyama government outlined its foreign policy as follows: (1) it would pursue a policy of making Japan a genuinely independent and peaceful country; (2) in conjunction with this policy goal, it would try to improve relations with neighboring Communist states, including the Soviet Union and China; (3) even prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations with these Communist countries, it would make efforts to promote trade with them; (4) it would never conduct "secret diplomacy," but instead would employ the method of "people's diplomacy."⁸ Of particular importance to the Hatoyama government's foreign policy was its willingness to seek the improvement of relations with Communist countries. This was a big departure from Yoshida's unyielding anti-Communist position. Even though it still put great emphasis on keeping close ties with the United States and with other "free world" nations, the Hatoyama government was much inclined to take steps favoring the Sino-Soviet overtures to Japan.

Explaining his government's foreign policy, Hatoyama stressed that Japan should act independently of the two

8. Ibid., December 11, 1954.

opposing world camps, and that by doing so she could contribute to the maintenance of world peace and security. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu went a step further by stating that Chou's "five peace principles" were consistent with the Japanese government's foreign policy.⁹

North Korea's bid for normal relations.--Apparently encouraged by the peaceful overtures undertaken by the Soviet Union and China toward Japan, and by the Hatoyama government's move toward an independent policy, North Korea also began its courtship of Japan. In February 1955, Nam Il, North Korean Foreign Minister, made an unprecedented conciliatory statement in regard to relations with Japan. It stated:¹⁰

The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, upholding the principle that it is possible for all states of different social systems to live in peaceful coexistence, has been prepared to establish normal relations with all states which are desirous of having friendly relations with our country, first of all, to establish trade and cultural relations in conformity to mutual interests. For Japan to establish the aforementioned relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not only conform to the vital interests of the Korean and Japanese people, but also greatly contribute to the preservation of peace in the Far East and the easing of international tensions.

In addition, Nam Il praised the Japanese people for striving to pursue their foreign policy independently of the United States, and to achieve normal relations with the Com-

9. Ibid., December 16, 1954.

10. The Nodong Shinmun, February 26, 1955.

munist bloc states, including the Soviet Union and China. Like the Sino-Soviet joint communique of 1954, Nam Il's statement also underlined the principle of peaceful coexistence as a basis for the improvement of bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea. Most noteworthy in this statement was that North Korea, in spite of the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, demonstrated its willingness to promote trade and cultural exchanges with Japan as a prelude to diplomatic reconciliation. Strongly supporting Nam Il's statement, Kim Kwang, North Korean Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, urged in March 1955 that Japan should take steps necessary for the promotion of economic and cultural relations with North Korea.¹¹

The Japanese government, however, did not take any actions favoring North Korea's bid to establish formal diplomatic relations. Prime Minister Hatoyama, replying to questions at the Upper House plenary session on June 22, 1955, said that the government should take a "cautious attitude" towards North Korea's bid. He further pointed out that Nam Il's statement had certain points unacceptable to Japan and made clear that his government had no intention of promoting economic and cultural relations with North Korea as long as they had an adverse impact on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu also stated that the Japanese government should first strive to

11. Ibid., March 4, 1955.

normalize its diplomatic relations with South Korea.¹²

Although the Hatoyama government reacted negatively towards the North Korean bid, various segments of Japanese society, including many leftist politicians and businessmen, began to show their interests in such a bid. In particular, as a result of Nam Il's statement, a number of the Japanese socialists and Communists visited Pyongyang, and ardently endorsed North Korea's position.

In October 1955, the first delegation from Japan's Diet, headed by Furuya Sadao, a member of the JSP, visited North Korea at the invitation of Li Yong, Chairman of the SPA of North Korea. Members of the delegation talked with the Pyongyang leadership. A joint Japanese-North Korean communique was announced after the talks between Furuya Sadao and Kim Ong-ki, Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of North Korea's SPA. It included the following points.¹³

(1) Both sides shall make positive efforts to bring about the normalization of diplomatic relations.

(2) Both sides, although diplomatic relations are yet to be normalized, must throw open the door to trade at the early date and shall make efforts to establish the necessary missions.

(3) Recognizing that cultural exchange between the two countries is beneficial to promoting peace and friendship

12. The Mainichi Shimbun, June 22, 1955.

13. The Nodong Shinmun, October 21, 1955.

between North Korea and Japan, both sides shall make efforts to this end.

(4) Both sides shall give positive consideration so that nationals residing in the other country may freely visit their homeland and shall make efforts to insure internationally recognize legitimate rights for these alien residents.

(5) Both sides shall make efforts to work out concrete measures to insure free fishing activities of Korean and Japanese fishermen on the high seas off the coasts of Korea and Japan.

The Furuya-Kim joint communique encompassed most of the critical issues pending between Japan and North Korea. Although this communique was a product of the talks between the Pyongyang authorities and a Japanese socialist delegation, which did not represent Japan's official position, it provided North Korea with an important opportunity to further clarify its position on bilateral relations with Japan. The Hatoyama government again refused to approve this communique. At the cabinet meeting on October 25, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu reported that Japan would not recognize the Furuya-Kim joint communique.¹⁴

Upon the arrival of the second Japanese Diet delegation composed of such members of the JSP as Hoashi Kei, Tahara Haruji, and Onishi Seito in Pyongyang on October 26, North Korean leaders further intensified their efforts to make con-

14. The Asahi Shimbun, October 25, 1955

ciliatory overtures to Japan. Reaffirming the main points of the Furuya-Kim joint communique, the North Korean Communists and the Japanese delegates jointly declared that "the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan is in conformity with the national interests not only of the people of both nations, but also contribute to the consolidation of peace in the Far East and the world."¹⁵ These declarations and overtures exchanged between the North Korean Communists and leftist Japanese politicians were fundamentally aimed at pressing the Hatoyama government of Japan to take a more favorable attitude towards North Korea.

The Hatoyama government, however, remained opposite to North Korea's overtures in spite of its firm pledge to improve relations with neighboring Communist states in Asia. In an interview with Akimoto Hideo, correspondent of the Yomiuri Shimbun, in November 1956, Kim Il-sung complained that in spite of the manifestation of North Korea's sincere desire for friendship, the Japanese government did not yet take any measures to establish formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. He also added that "if the Japanese government shows sincerity for the establishment of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan, we are ready to negotiate on this question at any time."¹⁶ It indicated that North Korea's bid to normalize relations with Japan was not the mere pro-

15. The Nodong Shinmun, October 28, 1955

16. Ibid., November 22, 1956.

paganda ploy usually undertaken by Communist states, but was a true reflection of its interest.

No diplomatic breakthrough.--One important question should be raised: why did North Korea want so badly to normalize its relations with Japan? There were two major reasons. First, North Korea's policy was aimed fundamentally at detaching South Korea from Japan diplomatically. As a matter of fact, since the end of World War II, Japanese-South Korean relations had been deteriorating mainly due to a lingering mutual animosity and to complex issues pending between the two countries, such as the Peace Line and the fishery dispute. Especially, the Rhee government of South Korea, which took an ever-hardening anti-Communist stand, severely blamed the Hatoyama government for its adoption of "two-faced" diplomacy with the free world nations and the Communist bloc.¹⁷ As a result, this Japan-South Korea confrontation provided North Korea with an impetus to accelerate its bid for normalizing the diplomatic relations with Japan.

Second, North Korea was considerably interested in gaining the economic benefits necessary to recover its war-torn economy and to fulfill the targets of the First Five-Year Economic Plan through commercial transactions with Japan. Kuroda Hisao, Chairman of the Japan Labor-Farmer Party, who visited Pyongyang in 1954, acknowledged that the North Korean authorities were very eager to purchase construction materials and other

17. FBIS, op. cit. (South Korea), July 24, 1955.

industrial goods from Japan.¹⁸ Nagamine Masaki, who visited Pyongyang on June 21, 1955 as a Kyodo correspondent, observed that "what Japan once built in North Korea still constituted the basis for the country's rehabilitation." For this reason, he added, North Korea seemed to have an unusually strong interest in trading with Japan.¹⁹

These two political and economic interests which North Korea had in dealing with Japan, however, could not be easily attained. There was no diplomatic breakthrough between Japan and North Korea during Prime Minister Hatoyama's tenure. The Japanese government continued to reject North Korea's bid to establish direct diplomatic relations. Basically, such a bid from North Korea did not correspond to Japan's foreign policy interests. Japan's vital interests still lay in the maintenance of close ties with the United States, diplomatically as well as militarily. This was the most crucial factor restraining Japan's approach to Communist states. In a bipolar structure of the postwar international system, Japan was considered strategically vital to America's containment policy towards Asian Communist countries, including China. With this knowledge of the United States' strategic interest in mind, the Hatoyama government was very cautious not to strain Japanese-United States relations even during the negotiations with the Soviets.

On occasion, Hatoyama asserted that Japan would not esta-

18. The Nodong Shinmun, August 24, 1954.

19. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), July 21, 1955

blish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union "at the risk of Japan's existing cooperation with the free nations." At this time, the United States were deeply concerned with Japan's move toward Communist countries. Immediately after the Japan-Soviet agreement was concluded in August 1956, the United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated officially that "a provision of the San Francisco Peace Treaty prohibits Japan from granting more favorable peace terms to Communist states than it agreed with the Allied nations which were signatories of the Treaty."²⁰ Dulles' statement was widely interpreted as a strong warning against further Japanese rapprochement with Communist countries, including China and North Korea.

Under these circumstances, it was impossible for Japan to extend diplomatic recognition to the Pyongyang regime, whose armed forces directly confronted American troops along the demilitarized zone of the Korean peninsula. Moreover, North Korea's bid was blocked by the Japanese government's policy aimed at bringing about the early normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea. Although there were some strains in bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea, the Hatoyama government did not renounce its basic position of attaching higher priority to diplomatic reconciliation with the Seoul government, another close ally of the United States

20. For the details of the so-called Dulles' warning toward Japan, see the Mainichi Shimbun, August 30, 1956.

in Northeast Asia. Toward the question over why Japan should first normalize diplomatic relations with South Korea rather than with North Korea, Japanese conservative leaders stressed two considerations. First, they pointed out that South Korea was considered vital to Japan in terms of her own national security interest because of the geographical proximity between the two countries. Second, they mentioned the fact that the ROK was formally recognized as the legitimate government on the Korean peninsula by the United Nations, and that it was also strongly supported by the United States.

In June 1955, Prime Minister Hatoyama made clear that he would not like to extend the formula of "two-Chinas" to the case of North Korea.²¹ Furthermore, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu also told the Lower House Budget Committee in February 1956 that it was necessary for Japan to maintain close ties with the United Nations-recognized ROK, but not to accord a similar treatment to North Korea, which remained extremely hostile to South Korea.²² In accordance with this basic policy concerning relations with South and North Korea, the Hatoyama government was very cautious to avoid extending its de jure or de facto recognition to the Communist regime in Pyongyang.

Another important consideration was that the capacity of the Hatoyama government to deal with foreign policy issues was significantly undermined by the growing intra-party fac-

21. The Asahi Shimbun, June 6, 1955.

22. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), February 10, 1956.

tional split. The Yoshida faction still remained opposed to Hatoyama's party leadership. Especially, in connection with the Japan-Soviet negotiations, the Hatoyama cabinet was severely attacked by the opposing factions, respectively led by Ikeda Hayato, Ishibashi Tanzan, Ashida Hitoshi, and Miki Takeo.²³ These anti-Hatoyama factions accused the Hatoyama government of adopting an "appeasement" policy towards the Soviets and of failing to insure Japan's territorial claims on the Soviet-occupied northern islands and Japanese rights on fishing in the northern seas off the coast of Russia.²⁴ Faced with a widening split within the ruling LDP, Hatoyama announced his retirement in August 1956, and was then able to conclude the Japan-Soviet agreement.

This fluctuating domestic political situation did not lead the Hatoyama government to respond carefully towards North Korea's bid. Instead, the Hatoyama government could only make some measures conducive to the opening of various types of intercourse between Japan and North Korea on a non-official basis.

The growing ideological feud.--With the inauguration of the Kishi government in Japan, which succeeded Ishibashi's interim government in February 1956, North Korea's initiative was frustrated even further. Kishi Nobusuke was a deeply com-

23. Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 52-53

24. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

mitted anti-Communist. As soon as he assumed the premiership, Kishi placed great emphasis on the maintenance of Japan's close ties with the free world nations, including the United States. At the same time, Kishi was not hesitant in taking an attitude hostile to China or North Korea. For example, he once declared that the Japanese government could not extend diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China because the United Nations had charged it with an aggressor.²⁵

While taking a strong anti-Communist position, the Kishi government stepped up its efforts to revise the existing Japan-United States security treaty. It also stressed the need to improve bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea. In January 1958, Japan and South Korea agreed to resume the long-suspended negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations between themselves. As the Kishi government took steps to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties with the United States, and to improve relations with South Korea, the North Korean leadership issued blunt ideological and personal attacks against Kishi Nobusuke and his government. On October 18, 1958, the Nodong Shinmun, the organ of the NKWP, carried an article denouncing Kishi as "a militarist and faithful follower of the United States aggressive policy."²⁶ On another occasion, the Pyongyang authorities argued that Prime Minister Kishi

25. Chae-jin Lee, Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 34.

26. The Nodong Shinmun, October 18, 1958.

was trying to reestablish the "Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Orient with the assistance of America."

In connection with the Japan-South Korea accord on the resumption of the negotiations, Nam Il issued a statement holding that "since the South Korean government does not represent all the Korean people, any unilateral negotiations and agreement will be completely invalid."²⁷ At this time, a statement by Sawada Renzo, chief Japanese delegate to the Japan-South Korea talks, further exacerbated the situation. He said that "the true aim of the Japan-South Korea talks is to push the borderline back from the 38th parallel to the Yalu."²⁸ North Korean leaders as well as pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan immediately denounced Sawada's statement as a reflection of the Kishi government's intention to take part in America's imperialist policy towards Korea. North Korea's bitter campaign towards the Kishi government continued, and its bid for diplomatic reconciliation with Japan consequently suffered a setback.

2. The dynamics of people's diplomacy

While repeatedly making its formal bid for diplomatic normalization with Japan, North Korea was also involved in conducting various types of "people's diplomacy" towards

27. FBIS, op. cit. (North Korea), December 31, 1957.

28. Jotaro Kawakami, "Party Stand on Japan-ROK Normalization Talks," Japan Socialist Review, October 1, 1962, p. 8.

Japanese personages and groups. It covered a wide range of activities including economic transactions, cultural exchanges, and political rallies between the Japanese and North Korean peoples.²⁹

In general, the method of people's diplomacy is used as a means to promote mutual understanding between different peoples on a non-governmental basis. But in the narrow sense, it has ideological implications. According to the Communist interpretation, the conduct of people's diplomacy is based on the assumption that the people in a capitalist country like Japan should be differentiated from the government because the latter does not represent the true interests of the former. On occasion, the North Korean Communists held that the conservative government of Japan acted quite contrary to the interests and aspirations of the "peace-loving" Japanese people.

In the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, North Korea tried to realize its objective of communicating its position to Japan through the practice of people's diplomacy. It was largely designed to project a more favorable image regarding North Korea among the Japanese people, and to strengthen the solidarity with leftist groups within Japan. Of course, North Korea's long-range objective

29. For the understanding of the concept of people's diplomacy, see Herbert Passin, China's Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963), pp. 1-21.

was to cause the Japanese government to change its anti-Pyongyang policy.

North Korea conducted its people's diplomacy towards the Japanese through three major channels. First, it tried to organize and mobilize the leftist Korean minority in Japan. Second, the North Korean Communists sought to strengthen their ideological affinity with leftist Japanese forces, including the JSP and the JCP. Lastly, they made efforts to establish friendly relations with Japanese visitors to Pyongyang, especially with influential members of the political, business and media establishment.

Chosoren and its affiliates.--Even before the Chosoren was formally inaugurated in May 1955, the North Korean Communists had maintained close connections with Korean residents in Japan. As soon as the Choren was formed as a non-political organization aimed at protecting the interests and rights of Koreans in Japan in 1945, it soon fell under the control of Korean Communists, including Kim Chon-hae (Kin Ten-kai in Japanese),³⁰ and became affiliated with the JCP. Until it was dissolved in September 1949 by the order of the Japanese government, Choren took part in a series of violent movements initiated by the JCP.

30. Kim Chon-hae was a veteran Korean Communist who had spent most of the 1930's and the entire wartime period in prison, and was released by the Occupation in October 1945. For more details, see Richard H. Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 106.

During the Korean war, leftist Korean residents in Japan formed another organization called the Minsen (the Democratic Front in Japan for Korean Unification), and launched various activities to assist North Korea's war efforts. In forming a united front with the JCP, Minsen became deeply involved in waging militant actions in Japan. When the violent revolutionary tactics of the JCP were bitterly criticized as "irresponsible adventurism," especially after the 1952 election, Minsen was also faced with the problem of revising its position. It split into two major factions: the pro-JCP faction and the nationalist one. The former held that Minsen should continue to maintain its tactical unity with the JCP in order effectively to fight against American imperialism and Japanese reactionary forces. But the latter argued that Minsen should take an independent line.

What was more embarrassing to Minsen was the announcement of Nam Il's statement in February 1955, declaring that North Korea was prepared to establish normal diplomatic relations with Japan. Nam Il's statement made it impossible for Minsen to carry out its revolutionary tactics aimed at overthrowing the Japanese government. In addition, the Nodong Shinmun carried in March 1955 an article entitled "the Safeguarding of the Legitimate Rights of Korean Residents in Japan," in which the Pyongyang authorities pointed out that the Hatoyama government was showing the signs of encouraging the diplomatic normalization between Japan and North Korea. They also urged

that the Japanese government should take appropriate measures to safeguard the rights of Korean residents in Japan as an indication of good faith for promoting friendly relations with North Korea.³¹

Leftist Korean residents in Japan finally organized the Chosoren as a substitute for the dissolved Minsen on March 11, 1955. The new organization led by Han Dok-su, who had also led the nationalist faction within Minsen, seceded from the JCP. But from its inception, Chosoren was directly controlled by the North Korean Communists. It still maintained links with the JCP, but what is different from the old Minsen is that it pursued its own independent goals and did not just echo the JCP's policies.

The Chosoren was primarily organized to perform two functions: one is to make every effort for the promotion of friendly relations between Japan and North Korea, and the other to capture the leadership of all the Korean residents in Japan. Chosoren, under the direct control and with the financial support of North Korea, installed the Chosen Tsushinsha as its major propaganda network. This agency, affiliated with the North Korean Central News Agency and the Broadcasting System, publishes a daily newspaper and is widely involved in other publications designed to represent the interests of the Pyongyang regime. Chosoren is also concerned with the task of

31. The Nodong Shinmun, March 12, 1955.

educating young Koreans residing in Japan. For this purpose, it set up the Central Educational Institute in Japan, which is authorized to supervise all activities concerning the education of Korean youths.

Numerous leftist social and political groups of Japan were closely linked with Chosoren. They were the Zainichi Chosenjin Shorengokai (the Association of Korean Businessmen in Japan), the Chosen Chuo Geijutsudan (the Korean Central Art Group), and the Chosen Mondai Kenkyusho (the Korean Problems Research Center). Moreover, Chosoren's activities are usually carried out in close collaboration with such sympathetic Japanese organizations as the Nitcho Kyokai (the JKA), the Nitcho Boekikai (the JKTA), and the Zainichi Chosenjin Kikoku Kyoryokukai (the Cooperation Association for the Repatriation of Korean Nationals in Japan).³³

Of these groups, the most active are the JKA and the JKTA. The JKA was organized in June 1951 by a group of Koreans and Japanese who were interested in social and cultural exchanges between the two countries. But one year later, the organization was under the leadership of a Communist faction. After Hatanaka Masaharu began to dominate the organization in 1955, it became more closely associated with North Korea. Hatanaka stopped in Pyongyang on his return to Tokyo from

33. For the detail of Chosoren's affiliates, see the Far Eastern Research Institute, Pukhan Chonso (General book on North Korea) (Seoul: 1974), Vol. III, pp. 185-189.

the Asian Nations' conference held in New Delhi in April 1955, and conferred with the Pyongyang authorities. After he returned to Japan, he soon became the new director general of the JKA. Under Hatanaka's active leadership, the JKA held its first nationwide meeting in November 1955, and since then its membership rapidly increased.³⁴ In cooperation with Chosoren, the JKA initiates various economic and cultural exchange programmes between Japan and North Korea, and plays a crucial role in fostering pro-Pyongyang forces in Japanese society.

Equally important is the JKTA. It was formed in 1954 by Tanabe Minoru, a standing member of the Japan-Soviet Trade Association. The JKTA included among its members many Korean and Japanese trading companies which had special interests in conducting trade with North Korea. This organization played a central role in promoting trade between such trading companies and North Korea on a non-official basis.

By establishing close link with these sympathetic Korean and Japanese organizations, Chosoren became the center of the influential North Korean "lobby" in Japan's domestic political process. Whenever certain controversial issues, such as the repatriation of Korean nationals in Japan, were raised between the two countries, Chosoren became active in mobilizing these "lobbyists" so that they might press the Japanese government

³⁴. Hatanaka Masaharu was once a reporter from Moscow for the Asahi Shimbun. See Richard H. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 124.

to adopt a policy favoring the North Korean position.

The JSP and the JCP.--While the conservative government turned its back on North Korea's bid for diplomatic normalization, the North Korean Communists tried to maintain close ties with such Japanese opposition parties as the JSP and the JCP. Although the JSP's official position was not compatible with that of the NKWP in many ways, the Japanese socialists gradually demonstrated their interest in expanding contacts with North Korean leaders. In particular, the Japanese socialists were interested in forming a common front with North Korea in advocating such issues as the termination of the Japan-United States Security Treaty, the neutralization of Japan, and the opposition to the Japan-South Korea talks. Frequently, the JSP expressed its official view urging the conservative government to adjust relations with North Korea.

In October 1955, the two Japanese socialist delegations visited Pyongyang, and talked with the North Korean leadership. The first delegation produced the Furuya-Kim joint communique touching on most of the pending issues between the two countries. The second delegation enhanced North Korea's position by declaring that they would fight against the reactionary forces which were obstructing the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea.

Besides, many members of the JSP visited North Korea as the delegates of various good-will missions. In November 1955, Tetsu Katayama, a JSP member of the Diet, stopped in Pyongyang

on his return from Peking to Tokyo. In October 1956, Aoyama Shoichi and Ishino Hisao visited Pyongyang as members of the Japanese Diet goodwill mission. One month later, Matsumoto Jiichiro and his party also visited North Korea and had conversations with Kim Il-sung and other North Korean leaders. In July 1957, Ishino Hisao, a JSP's Diet member and the secretary of the JKA, again visited Pyongyang and talked with Choe Yong-kon, North Korean Vice-Premier. At this meeting, Ishino delivered a letter from Suzuki Mosaburo, the JSP's President, addressed to Kim Il-sung, and Choe urged that the JSP should play "a signal role in strengthening friendly relations" between North Korea and Japan. In September 1957, Kazami Akira, the JSP's advisor, together with Abe Kimiko, Vice-President of the JKA, visited Pyongyang, and accused American imperialists and Japanese reactionary forces of blocking the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea.³⁵

These frequent visits of the JSP's members to Pyongyang contributed to the strengthening of political and ideological ties between the Japanese socialists and the North Korean Communists. For North Korea, such Japanese politicians' visits could be used to exert concerted pressures on the conservative government's anti-Pyongyang policy. In fact, during the period from 1953 through 1959, the promotion of relations between the two countries in such non-official areas as repatriations, cultural exchanges, and trade was mainly attributable to fre-

35. The Nodong Shinmun, September 13, 1957.

quent contacts between the Japanese socialist delegates and the Pyongyang authorities.

In comparison with the Japanese socialists' vigorous efforts to enlarge non-governmental contacts with the North Korean Communists, the Japanese Communists remained relatively inactive. Throughout the 1950's, the JCP's activities were significantly constrained by the government's tight security control, and also by a complex intra-party factional strife.³⁶ After the end of the Korean war, the JCP's delegation headed by Miyamoto Kenji, Secretary of the JCP's Central Committee, visited Pyongyang for the first time in February 1959 on its return from the 21st Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union held in Moscow. Miyamoto's visiting party included such high-ranking members of the JCP as Kasuga Shoichi, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Tokyo JCP Municipal Committee, and Nishizawa Tomio, Deputy Head of the Research Section of the Central Committee. Most interesting was that these JCP delegates were able to stop in North Korea with passports issued by the Japanese government.

Ardently welcoming Miyamoto's party, Kim Il-sung stressed the need to solidify relations between the two parties in order to safeguard peace and to prevent the revival of Japanese militarism.³⁷ In his reply, Miyamoto said that "the American

36. For the detail of the JCP's factional split during the 1950's, see Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

37. The Nodong Shinmun, February 27, 1959.

imperialists are the common enemy of the Korean and Japanese peoples," and declared that the JCP would wage a staunch struggle against such imperialists. The need to strengthen the ideological bond between the two Communist parties of Japan and North Korea was further emphasized by a Nodong Shinmun editorial on February 27, 1959, entitled "Firm International Solidarity between the Korean Workers's Party and the Japan Communist Party." It said:³⁸

The visit to our country by the Japan Communist Party's delegation represents an event of great significance, which will consolidate the peace in the Far East and Asia by further strengthening international solidarity between our party and the Japan Communist Party and the bond between the working class of the two countries, and by promoting friendship and mutual understanding between the people of Korea and Japan.

Japanese goodwill missions.--After the Korean war ended in 1953, the first Japanese visitor to Pyongyang was Oyama Ikuo, winner of the International Stalin Peace Prize. Oyama, who led the delegation of the leftist Japan Peace Liaison Committee, composed of such members as Oyama Yanagiko (Oyama's wife), Tan Tokusaburo, and Kameda Togo, members of the Peace Liaison Committee, arrived at Pyongyang via Peking on November 5, 1953.³⁹ The official purpose of Oyama's visit was to commemorate the Korean Armistice. But the activities of this mission in North Korea were far-reaching.

38. Ibid., February 27, 1959.

39. For the detail of Oyama's visit to Pyongyang, see FBIS, op. cit. (North Korea), November 6 and 10, 1953.

At the meeting with Kim Il-sung, Oyama Ikuo expressed the view that "the Korean and Japanese people shall further strengthen their friendship and solidarity in the struggle against the American imperialists." Kim Il-sung responded that the mistreatment and suppression of Korean residents in Japan by the conservative government should cease.⁴⁰ After he returned to Tokyo, Oyama played a role as a pro-Pyongyang lobbyist in Japanese society. He argued that North Korea should be given the moral support of the world in its effort for the rehabilitation of its war-torn economy. Moreover, Oyama revealed that North Korea, like the Soviet Union and China, was ready at any time to restore formal diplomatic relations with Japan, and that it was also prepared to accept the visits of private Japanese missions "so long as they were not militarists."⁴¹

After Oyama's visit, relations between the Japan Peace Liaison Committee and the North Korean regime became more intimate than ever. In 1954, the Committee sent its two goodwill missions to Pyongyang. The first mission, composed of Okada Haru and Kushida Fuki, visited in January, and the second led by Kuroda Hisao, Chairman of the Japan Labor-Farmer Party, in August. Announcing the accounts of their trips in Japan, members of these missions always called for immediate steps by their government to improve bilateral relations between

40. Ibid., November 12, 1953.

41. Ibid. (Japan), December 7, 1953.

Japan and North Korea.

After Nam Il announced his statement in February 1955, the number of Japanese visitors to Pyongyang increased notably. According to reports from Pyongyang, there were 53 Japanese visitors to North Korea during the year 1955.⁴² The most important of them were a delegation to the Asian Nations' conference headed by Hatanaka Masaharu, a group of journalists, a delegation to the World Youth Festival, a delegation to the Helsinki World Peace Assembly, a delegation of the Michurin Society, an economic delegation headed by Tanabe Minoru, and a trade union delegation.

As the number of the visiting Japanese to North Korea increased, the Japanese government moved to discourage them. The MFA of Japan announced in July 1955 that the government would not issue passports to people going to North Korea. Furthermore, the Japanese Vice-Ministers' meeting held on October 24, 1955 decided that any personal or material exchanges with the authorities of North Korea would not be officially recognized.⁴³ In accordance with this basic policy, the Japanese government did not permit the entry of North Koreans into Japan. For example, it refused to grant a visa to Han Sol-ya, Chairman of the Asian-African Liaison Committee of North Korea, who tried to head a delegation to the World Congress Against A-H Bombs at Hiroshima in 1955. Because of Japan's policy

42. Ibid. (North Korea), January 3, 1956.

43. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 26, 1955.

banning the entry of North Koreans, the traffic between the two countries flowed solely in one direction.

This policy of the Japanese government, however, was not successful. The flow of Japanese visitors to North Korea did not cease. Rather, the composition of visiting Japanese groups became more diverse. It included the delegation of Japanese artists, the press exchange delegation, the delegation of the "Sanbetsu" (the National Congress of Industrial Unions), the delegation of the National Railway Workers, the Tokyo peace delegation, the delegation of the National Federation of Japanese Peasants Unions, the delegation of the Japan radio and television performers group, and so on. Most of these delegations extended their trips to Pyongyang by way of Peking or Moscow.⁴⁴

In connection with increasing Japanese visitors to North Korea, the Nodong Shinmun wrote on October 3, 1957, an article entitled "Relations between Korean and Japanese Peoples Developing." The article stated that "the mutual contact, friendly relations, and business-like links between the Korean and Japanese peoples are developing more rapidly than ever," and it also disclosed that North Korea's tactics of people's diplomacy toward Japan were basically intended to remove the "artificial obstacles" built by the American imperialists and

44. Kang In-dok, "Pukhan ui Daeil Chongchaek Baljon Kwachong e Kwanhan Yonku" (Study on the development of North Korea's policy toward Japan), The Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 1, March 1970, pp. 112-113.

the Kishi government to the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea.⁴⁵

It is impossible to judge the extent to which the Japanese visitors had affected the direction of their government's policy toward North Korea. But it seems clear that they had given the government certain information necessary to the formulation of its foreign policy concerning North Korea. In the absence of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries, much of North Korea's intention to negotiate their outstanding issues could be indirectly transmitted to delegates visiting Pyongyang, including those of the opposition parties.

3. Repatriation of Korean residents

The repatriation of Koreans constituted a major foreign policy issue for Japan. The triangular interest among Japan and South and North Korea concerning the repatriation of Koreans complicated the situation further. While Japan had not yet established formal diplomatic relations with either South or North Korea, the two governments of Korea tried to use the Korean minority as a lever in their respective approaches to Japan. Both South and North Korea were considerably concerned with the problem of capturing the allegiance of Koreans residing in Japan. The Rhee government of South Korea insisted that the Japanese government should give Korean residents a

45. The Nodong Shinmun, October 3, 1957.

special status so that they could receive all the benefits of full Japanese citizenship if they chose, otherwise treat them as citizens of the ROK.⁴⁶ By contrast, the Pyongyang regime argued that the legitimate interests and rights of Koreans in Japan as citizens of North Korea should be recognized.

While bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea were worsening, and while the Rhee government did not make any concrete offers to Japan to assist the Korean minority, North Korea, particularly after the end of the Korean war, began to demonstrate its interest in the affairs of Korean residents in Japan. In 1953, when the Japanese government renewed the registration of all foreigners, about 75 percent of of Koreans in Japan totalling about 600,000 were identified as "chosen" in the nationality column, as shown in Table III.

Table III

The breakdown of national identity
of Korean residents in Japan

Month	Year	ROK	%	Chosen	%
March	1950	39,418	7	495,181	93
December	1950	77,433	14	467,470	86
December	1951	95,157	17	465,543	83
September	1952	116,546	20	454,462	80
December	1953	131,437	24	424,658	76
January	1955	138,602	25	425,620	75

Source: These figures are taken from "Koreans in Japan" (2), Korea Journal, No. 5, May 1962, p. 50

46. "Koreans in Japan" (2), Korea Journal, May 1962, p. 49.

The North Korean authorities insisted that Korean nationals identified as "Chosen" should be treated as citizens of the DPRK.

In August 1954, Nam Il made an official statement protesting against the mistreatment of Koreans by the Japanese government. It read:⁴⁷

The Japanese government has been persecuting the Korean people residing in Japan in various forms, suppressing their freedom and activities to fight against the Syngman Rhee "clique" and foreign aggressors for the freedom, unification, and independence of their fatherland; forcing on them the citizenship of the so-called Republic of Korea of the Syngman Rhee clique, disregarding their legitimate rights as citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; forcibly deporting them; unlawfully arresting them; confiscating their properties; withholding jobs from them and depriving them of their rights to democratic, national education.

This statement was the most comprehensive accusation of the Japanese government for its handling of the affairs of the Korean minority issued by North Korea.

No sooner did North Korea show a growing concern about Koreans in Japan than the Japanese authorities also became increasingly interested in repatriating Japanese nationals detained in North Korea. On January 6, 1954, the JRC sent a telegram to its counterpart in Pyongyang through the International Red Cross at Geneva asking for the repatriation of Japanese nationals from North Korea. In this message, the JRC expressed the hope that its counterpart in Pyongyang would

47. The Nodong Shinmun, August 31, 1954.

provide information on the remaining Japanese and cooperate for their repatriation to Japan. At the same time, the JRC added that if the Japanese were repatriated, it was willing to aid in the repatriation of Koreans residing in Japan to North Korea if they wished.⁴⁸ The JRC's message indicated that from the very beginning the Japanese authorities intended to repatriate Koreans in Japan to North Korea.

On February 6, the NKRC sent its reply answering that a few Japanese remained in North Korea, and that if they wanted to go back home, it would offer assistance to them.⁴⁹ Moreover, at the meeting with Hatanaka Masaharu in Pyongyang in 1955, the NKRC suggested that the JRC and the JKA in Tokyo jointly dispatch their representatives to North Korea for negotiations.

In conjunction with the JRC's move, Kadowaki Suemitsu, the Japanese Vice-Foreign Minister, gave notice to Kim Yong-sik, the South Korean Minister in Tokyo, on September 23, that Japan would launch talks with North Korea for the repatriation of Japanese nationals detained there, and that the negotiations would be pursued through the JRC.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, the Pyongyang authorities began to express their concern about the repatriation of Koreans living in Japan. They communicated their concern to visiting Japanese

48. The Asahi Shimbun, January 7, 1954.

49. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), February 9, 1954.

50. The Mainichi Shimbun, September 24, 1955.

socialist Dietmen and other influential figures. Paralleling North Korea's growing interest, the JKA sent its delegation in December, composed of its Vice-Chairman, Mrs. Abe Kimiko and Director General, Hatanaka Masaharu, to the Japanese Justice Ministry Immigration Control Bureau to discuss the matters concerning the repatriation of Koreans to North Korea.⁵¹

North Korea's concern was gently placated by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu's remark on December 16 that Japan would repatriate those Koreans to North Korea who wished to return. In reply to questions at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House, Shigemitsu told that Koreans now in Japan were quite free to choose either South or North Korea when they were repatriated. He further explained that as long as North Korea had already announced its readiness to accept Koreans from Japan at any time, the Japanese government would strive to make it "as convenient as possible" for Koreans who wanted to return to their homeland to do so.⁵²

As an immediate response to this attitude of the Japanese government, Nam Il stated on December 29 that North Korea "is ready to send its representatives to Japan in order to settle satisfactorily all problems concerning Korean residents in Japan."⁵³

On February 9, 1956, the Japan-North Korea Red Cross

51. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), December 15, 1955.

52. Ibid., December 16, 1955.

53. The Nodong Shinmun, December 29, 1955.

conference was formally convened in Pyongyang to negotiate for the repatriation of Japanese nationals in North Korea. The Japanese side was represented by Kasai Yoshisuke, Vice-President of the JRC, and the North Korean side by Yu Ki-chun, Vice-Chairman of the NKRC's Central Committee. They concluded the talks on February 29 with the issuance of a joint communique providing that out of the 48 Japanese detained in North Korea, only 36 persons would be repatriated because 12 Japanese did not want to return home.⁵⁴

After the talks, Kasai Yoshisuke said that the JRC would make an effort to arrange for the voluntary repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea.⁵⁵ He also disclosed that on a humanitarian basis the problem of repatriation would be discussed with two officials of the International Red Cross who were slated to visit Japan in May. In accordance with these officials' reports, the International Red Cross proposed that the Red Cross Societies of the three countries, Japan, South and North Korea, open talks on that problem. But the South Korean Red Cross rejected the proposal, and the effort of the International Red Cross came to naught.⁵⁶

With the inauguration of the Kishi government, the pros-

54. The Asahi Shimbun, February 29, 1956, or the Nodong Shinmun, February 29, 1956.

55. The Asahi Shimbun, February 28, 1956.

56. Changsoo Lee, "Chosoren: An Analysis of the Korean Communist Movement in Japan," Journal of Korean Affairs, Vol. III, No. 2, July 1973, p. 20.

pect of a solution of the repatriation problem seemed to dim because of Kishi's strong anti-Communist posture. In a Nodong Shinmun editorial on June 17, 1957, the Pyongyang authorities charged that the Kishi government attempted to use the Korean minority in Japan for the purpose of resuming the Japan-South Korea negotiations.⁵⁷ They soon moved to mobilize its front-machine in Japan, the Chosoren, as a means of placing pressure on the Kishi government. North Korea sent a large amount of money totalling more than 220 million yen to Chosoren under the cover of an education fund.⁵⁸ Such a fund, regardless of its motives, was presumably enough for maneuvering Chosoren to favor North Korea's interest by launching a grass-root movement in Japan calling for repatriation.

On August 12, 1958, Chosoren sponsored a meeting celebrating the Liberation of Korea, and resolved to petition the Kishi government as follows: to insure free repatriation of Koreans in Japan who want to go to North Korea, to permit the entry of the North Korean delegation to the World Congress Against the A-H Bombs, and to allow the re-entry of the Chosoren delegation to the tenth anniversary celebrating the founding of the DPRK in Pyongyang.⁵⁹ All these requests were denied by the Kishi government.

57. The Nodong Shinmun, June 17, 1957.

58. The Far Eastern Research Institute, op. cit., p. 178.

59. See "Hokusen Kikoku Undono Tenpo" (The tempo of campaign for repatriation to North Korea), Korea Hyoron, III:1, January 1959, p. 34.

In order to encourage Chosoren's activities in Japan, Kim Il-sung delivered a speech in Pyongyang on September 9, 1958, contending that "we regard it as our national duty that the government of the Republic should provide Korean nationals in Japan with all the conditions required to lead a new life after their return to the homeland."⁶⁰

At the enlarged meeting of its Central Committee held on October 8, Chosoren adopted another resolution addressed to the Kishi government calling for entry permits for the representatives of the NKRC, who were coming to Japan to discuss procedural matters concerning the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan. And on October 17, under Chosoren's sponsorship, some bipartisan political figures of Japan gathered to form an organization named the Association for Helping Korean Nationals in Japan Return Home.⁶¹ Besides, Chosoren made efforts to foment a series of nation-wide demonstrations urging the Kishi government to permit free repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea by mobilizing its far-reaching local organizations.

In addition, North Korea made appeals to such Japanese influential personages as Nosaka Sanzo, Suzuki Mosaburo and Hatoyama Ichiro for cooperation, and also endeavored to mobilize a large number of social and political organizations

60. The Nodong Shinmun, September 9, 1958.

61. Changsoo Lee, op. cit., p. 21.

in Japan. They included the ruling LDP, the JSP, the JCP, Sohyo, the Japan Peace Liaison Committee, the JRC, the JCPIT, the JKA, the JKTA, and other various unions and numerous newspapers which had supported North Korea's position.⁶² At this time, the pro-Pyongyang lobby indeed became a sizable force in Japan.

Under growing pressure from various social strata, the Kishi government finally decided to permit the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea. Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro disclosed at the meeting with representatives of Chosoren on January 30, 1959, that the Koreans who want to return to North Korea would be able to go there soon. And at a press conference on the same day after a cabinet meeting, Fujiyama also said that "concrete measures will be taken before long" in regard to the repatriation of Koreans to North Korea. One day later, Fujiyama's utterance was further confirmed by Prime Minister Kishi, who stated that the repatriation issue of Koreans in Japan should be handled from the "humanitarian point of view."⁶³

Following this decision of the Japanese government, the first meeting between representatives of the Red Cross Societies of Japan and North Korea was held at Geneva on April 13, 1959. The negotiations continued up to the 18th

62. Kiwon Chung, "Japanese-North Korean Relations Today," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 4, April 1964, p. 797.

63. The Yomiuri Shimbun, February 1, 1959.

meeting on June 24, when both sides reached an agreement which was later formally signed in Calcutta on August 13. As the repatriation agreement was announced, the South Korean government lodged a strong protest with the Japanese government. As a countermeasure, the Rhee government of South Korea announced that it was suspending all business operations pertaining to Japan-South Korea trade, including the issuance of consular certificates. Therefore, the Japan-South Korea talks were again halted.⁶⁴

The Calcutta agreement on repatriation, signed by Kasai Yoshisuke and Yi Il-kyong, Vice-Chairman of the NKRC's Central Committee, included the following major points.⁶⁵

(1) Returnees shall be Koreans in Japan, including Koreans who have acquired Japanese citizenship, who wish voluntary repatriation.

(2) The JRC shall request the International Red Cross Committee to take necessary measures to ensure the actual operations of repatriation in conformity with humanitarian principles.

(3) Vessels for the returnees shall be provided by the North Korean side at its own expense. The Japanese side shall designate the port of Niigata as port of embarkation, and the North Korean side Najin, Chongjin and Hungnam as ports

64. The Dong-A Ilbo, June 15, 1959.

65. For the text of the Calcutta agreement, see the Japan Times, August 14, 1959.

of disembarkation.

(4) This agreement shall be valid for one year. However, in case the repatriation work can not be completed during this period, it may be renewed through consultation between both sides.

In accordance with this agreement, the delegates of the NKRC arrived for the first time in Niigata, Japan on December 11, 1959 to handle the business of repatriation. With the arrival of North Koreans in Japan, the Japanese government's official decision of 1955 not recognizing any personal exchanges with North Korea was no longer valid. The first repatriation ships carrying 975 returnees left Niigata for Chongjin on December 14. By June 17, 1960, the number of Koreans repatriated to North Korea amounted to 26,969.⁶⁶

On the whole, Japan's basic policy in regard to the repatriation of Koreans had been consistently pursued. From the beginning, when they first talked with their counterparts in North Korea for the repatriation of Japanese nationals detained there in 1954, the Japanese authorities had shown a favorable attitude toward North Korea.

A major question is raised: why did the Japanese government decide to permit repatriation of Koreans to North Korea in spite of South Korea's strong protest? Officially, it was explained in terms of humanitarian reasons. But it seemed

66. For the statistics of returnees to North Korea, see Chosen Kenkyu Geppo (A monthly review of Korean study), February 25, 1962, pp. 68-69.

that there were other reasons why the Japanese government was led to adopt such a policy. First of all, the Japanese government was basically interested in solving the problem of the Korean minority. Shortly after the end of World War II, the Japanese public opinion of Korean residents in Japan was worsening considerably mainly due to mutual historic animosity between the two peoples. Korean residents demanded that they should be treated as "victorious" nationals, but the Japanese authorities did not pay due attention to them. They were often treated as backward foreigners. Under these circumstances, a mutual antagonism between the two peoples was ever increasing.

Moreover, many Koreans residing in Japan, led by the leftist Korean and Japanese forces, became increasingly involved in various violent activities. For instance, the Japanese authorities contended that Koreans played a central role in the Tokyo riot in the Imperial Palace Plaza in 1952.⁶⁷ Some conservative figures even accused Koreans of "destroying the social order" of Japan.

Another problem which plagued the Japanese government was the badly deteriorating economic situation of Koreans in Japan. Most Koreans in Japan were living in such urban areas as Osaka, Kyoto and Tokyo. The majority of them were unemployed,

67. It was reported that the incident resulted in one death and more than one thousand casualties. For the details, see Richard H. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 120.

and most of the employed were unskilled laborers. Except for a few who entered the upper strata of Japanese business and intellectual circles, most Korean residents were excluded from the mainstream of Japanese economic life. Owing to the early postwar economic depression in Japan, the living conditions of Koreans continued to deteriorate. Thus, the Japanese government was bound to bear a significant burden to aid Korean residents. It is meaningful that the JRC announced on June 26, 1959, that 75 percent of the Koreans who were registered to return to North Korea were unemployed in Japan.⁶⁸ As a result, the repatriation of Koreans in Japan provided the Japanese government with an opportunity to lessen the pressure caused by the Korean minority.

On the other hand, why did North Korea become so eager for the repatriation of Koreans residing in Japan to its side? Even by September 1955, the North Korean leadership was not enthusiastic over the repatriation issue. For example, Kim Il-sung suggested that "Koreans should try to build their living foundation in Japan." But North Korea rapidly shifted its position in favor of repatriation. There seemed to be two basic motives: one was related to North Korea's efforts to improve bilateral relations with Japan, and the other to its economic interest in solving a manpower shortage.

Since the announcement of Nam Il's statement calling for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Japan

68. Ibid., p. 144.

and North Korea in 1955, the Pyongyang authorities unceasingly stepped up their efforts to improve relations with Japan. Politically, these efforts were primarily aimed at preventing the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea. In contrast with the Rhee government's adamant anti-Japanese posture, North Korean leaders were always interested in seizing the opportunity through which they could bring about friendly relations with Japan. In this sense, the Calcutta agreement on repatriation marked a diplomatic victory of North Korea.

Furthermore, the repatriation of Koreans apparently corresponded to North Korea's interest in finding a partial solution to an industrial manpower shortage. In 1957, two years before the repatriation began, North Korea initiated the Five-Year Economic Plan with the emphasis on the development of heavy industry. But it did not have enough manpower necessary for the implementation of the Economic Plan. As a matter of fact, during the Korean war, North Korea had lost a vast number of its population not only due to battlefield casualties but also to a massive movement of Koreans across the 38th parallel from the North into the South. It was during this period that North Korean leaders launched the nationwide "Chollima" movement as a means of insuring an effective management system of industrial labor. On occasion, Kim Il-sung complained of the shortage of industrial manpower in North Korea, and stressed its effective use for economic develop-

ment.⁶⁹ In this context, it is undeniable that the repatriation issue had been significantly linked to North Korea's efforts to solve its problem of a manpower shortage.

4. The opening of economic relations

Talks on fishing.--After the Korean Armistice, the Japanese fishermen were considerably interested in insuring the safety of their fishing operations in waters off the North Korean coast. Unlike the Rhee government of South Korea, which put strict restrictions on the fishing activities of the Japanese fishermen within the boundary of the Peace Line, the Pyongyang regime took a more flexible attitude. In 1955, when they met with Hatanaka Masaharu, the Pyongyang authorities revealed their willingness to talk with the Japanese fishery mission, and also induce Japanese fishing techniques into North Korea.

Also, North Korea pledged to take concrete measures to insure free fishing activities for the Japanese fishermen on the high seas of its coast in the Furuya-Kim joint communique of 1955. The communique also provided that Japan and North Korea should make efforts towards the mutual exchange of their fishery representatives. Meanwhile, the North Korean leadership denounced the establishment of the Peace Line by the

69. Jongwon A. Kim, "The Peak of Socialism in North Korea: The Five and Seven Year Plans," Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 5, May 1965, p. 261.

Rhee government as "utterly absurd" from the standpoint of international law.

Because the Furuya-Kim joint communique was officially repudiated by the Japanese government, the agreement on the mutual exchange of fishery representatives between the two countries could not be implemented. But North Korea's conciliatory gestures were enough for the Japanese fishermen to accelerate their approach to the Pyongyang regime. They soon organized the Japan-North Korea Fisheries Negotiating Committee, and sent its delegation for direct talks with the Pyongyang authorities. At the meeting with members of the delegation, Kim Il-sung reportedly stated that in principle North Korea had no objection to the fishing activities of the Japanese fishermen near its territorial waters.⁷⁰

Since then, North Korea had taken a similar conciliatory stand toward the Japanese fishermen. It was largely due to North Korean leaders' keen perception of the strong political influence of the Japanese fishermen. It seemed clear that North Korean leaders tried to use such an influential pressure group within Japan as a lever in their approach to the conservative government.

Trade relations.--From the beginning, North Korea was greatly interested in promoting trade with Japan. Even before Nam Il's statement in 1955 calling for an early establishment of trade relations between Japan and North Korea, the Pyong-

70. Kiwon Chung, op. cit., p. 793.

yang authorities informed Hirano Gitaro, advisor of a local Japanese firm, who visited North Korea in 1954, of their intention to open trade with Japan. In talks with Hirano, they stressed that although no diplomatic relations have yet established, trade could be conducted between the two countries.⁷¹

In response to the "trade-first" policy of North Korea, Japanese business circles began to display their interest in trading with that country. In February 1955, a few Japanese trading companies asked the MITI to authorize their barter trade contacts with North Korea. But these applications were all denied because of strong opposition by the MFA. At this time, as the MITI officials revealed,⁷² there were two major obstacles to commercial transactions between Japan and North Korea. One was the efforts being made by the United States to improve Japanese-South Korean relations. The Japanese government, above all, feared that its permission to trade with North Korea would have an adverse impact on such efforts. The other was South Korea's threat to suspend commerce with Japanese trading companies which tried to establish trade relations with the Communist bloc countries. In addition, Japan-North Korea trade was practically barred by the COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Exports to Communist area) embargo.

71. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), November 6, 1954.

72. Ibid., July 5, 1955

The Japanese officials pointed out that if Japan wanted to trade with North Korea, the government had to negotiate first with the COCOM before starting transactions with that country.

In spite of their government's non-recognition policy, Japanese businessmen made efforts to open trade relations with North Korea. In October, a private trade agreement calling for exports worth 5 million pounds by each side was signed in Peking by representatives of the North Korean Trade Corporation and Kobayashi Takaji of the Toko Bussan Trading Company of Japan. According to the agreement, trade was to be conducted on a barter basis, and Japan was to export such items as electric wire, paper, fishing nets and equipment, medical instruments, machine tools, and textile, in exchange for North Korean anthracite, red beans, flourite, and about 20 other types of raw materials.⁷³

At about the same time, in Pyongyang, a memorandum on the promotion of trade between Japan and North Korea was concluded between Kim Che-son, standing director of the KC PIT, and Tanabe Minoru, managing director of the Japan-Soviet Trade Association. The memorandum contained such major points as follows.⁷⁴

(1) Recognizing that the time was ripe for the realization of trade between Japan and North Korea, both sides agreed

73. For the details, see the Nodong Shinmun, October 22, 1955.

74. New China News Agency, October 24, 1955, p. 22.

to endeavor to take concrete steps in this direction.

(2) Both sides pledged to make positive efforts to realize free exchange of trade missions between the two countries.

(3) Considering that a clearance system is necessary to facilitate trade payments between the two countries, both sides agreed to make efforts to bring about an agreement between governments or a payment agreement between the banks of the countries.

(4) Both sides agreed that North Korea shall open such two ports as Chongjin and Chaho for trade with Japan.

The Tanabe-Kim memorandum became an important springboard for the subsequent development of trade relations between Japan and North Korea. For it included some pending issues necessary to be solved for the normalization of trade relations between the two countries.

The main points of the Tanabe-Kim memorandum were again underscored in a record of the talks on the promotion of trade and on general conditions for the exchange of commodities, which was signed on February 26, 1956 by Cha In-dok, member of the KCPIT, and Miyakoshi Kisuke, Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee for Trade of the JKA. In the talks, both sides agreed to make common efforts for the solution of such issues as (1) the exchange of trade missions, (2) the travel to and fro of personages engaged in trade, (3) the opening of commodity fairs, and (4) the conclusion of a payment agree-

ment on the basis of clearance system between the banks of the two countries. Moreover, Miyakoshi on behalf of several Japanese trading companies concluded a private trade agreement with North Korea, whose total volume was to be amounted to 5 million pounds sterling.⁷⁵

In another joint communique issued on September 6, 1957 between the KCPIIT and a Japanese economic delegation headed by Sashikawa Kenzo, Deputy General Secretary of the JKA, the Japanese side pledged to endeavor to normalize trade relations between the two countries by "arousing nationwide opinion."

Until the end of 1959, there were two major private trade agreements between Japan and North Korea. The first agreement was signed on September 27, 1957 between the KCPIIT and a Japanese trade team composed of representatives of the JCPIT, the JKA, and the JKTA. In the agreement, both sides envisaged the volume of trade at 6 million pounds sterling each, and agreed to set concrete regulations on the classification and rating of the export items, the inspection of commodities, the transport of goods, clearance, and arbitration. Both sides also noted that sample fairs should be held in each other's country, and that trade liaison offices should be established at an early date. The second agreement was concluded on April 23, 1958 between the North Korean Trade Corporation and the 25-member Japanese businessmen's group headed by Yoshimura

75. The Nodong Shinmun, March 1, 1956.

Magosaburo, Vice-Chairman of the JCPIT. The agreement provided for the volume of a two-way trade totalling 6 million pounds sterling.⁷⁶

But the second agreement could not be brought to fruition because the indirect trade between Japan and North Korea through Communist China (Dairen) could no longer be conducted following the suspension of Japan-China trade since May 1958, when the Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident took place.⁷⁷ After this incident, the Peking regime suspended all trade relations with Japan as a countermeasure. As a result, the total volume of trade between Japan and North Korea in 1958 dropped a little, compared with that of the previous year, as shown in Table IV.

Table IV

Annual volume of trade between
Japan and North Korea: 1955-1959
(US \$1,000)

Year	North Korea's Exports	North Korea's Imports	Total
1955	507	92	599
1956	507	98	605
1957	2,005	2,130	4,135
1958	1,928	2,120	4,008
1959	769	2,831	3,600

Source: These figures are taken from Ajia Boeki (Asia trade), August 19, 1962.

76. Kang In-dok, op. cit., p. 68.

77. The incident took place on May 2, 1958, when a small People's Republic of China flag was torn down by a Japanese youth at the Chinese Stamp exhibit show in a Nagasaki department store. For more details, see Chae-jin Lee, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

In particular, North Korea's imports from Japan decreased sharply from about US \$1,928,000 in 1958 to about US \$769,000 in 1959.

Throughout the 1950's, Japan-North Korea trade did not make any progress. Although some Japanese businessmen and the North Korean authorities had continually announced joint communiques on the promotion of trade, and concluded several private trade agreements, actual trade relations between the two countries still remained in an inchoate stage.

During this period, North Korea's major exports to Japan were such raw materials as anthracite, magnetic iron ore, silica, and graphite, while its major imports from Japan were such industrial goods as electric wire, machine tools, papers, fishing nets and equipment, and gas pipes. But Japan-North Korea trade was greatly restricted by the Japanese government's basic policy of prohibiting all trade with that country. The conservative government of Japan did not permit any direct transactions with North Korea, and only a limited amount could be carried out by way of Hong Kong or Dairen in Manchuria on a non-official basis. In accordance with their government's trade-ban policy, big trading companies of Japan tried to avoid undertaking commerce with North Korea.

Meanwhile, such pro-Pyongyang Japanese economic organizations as the JCPIT, the JKA, and the JKTA intensified their activities for the purpose of normalizing trade relations between Japan and North Korea. In May 1959, a nationwide rally

for the realization of direct trade between the two countries was held under the auspices of these three associations, and a resolution concerning the promotion of Japan-North Korea trade was adopted there, which was later addressed to the Kishi government.⁷⁸ Since then, Japan-North Korea trade gradually gained momentum. In June, the barter trade between Japan and North Korea through Hong Kong was tacitly approved by the Japanese government. In December, for the transport of exports only, which did not require the government's permission and were negotiated in a country other than North Korea, direct shipment to that country was allowed by Japan's trade regulations for the first time. Owing to these steps by the Japanese government to ease trade regulations with North Korea, the trade volume between the two countries began to increase rapidly during the latter half of the year 1959.

5. Summary

During the period from 1953 through 1959, no remarkable progress was made in Japanese-North Korean relations. Although North Korea had consistently sought a rapprochement with Japan, such an effort had been turned down as mere propaganda by Japanese conservative leaders. Only in non-governmental areas, such as social and cultural contacts, the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan, and trade, bilateral relations

78. For more details, see Kang In-dok, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

between Japan and North Korea developed appreciatively.

The unfolding of relations between the two countries within such limited areas was initiated by North Korea's intensive approach to Japan. From the beginning, the North Korean regime was considerably interested in improving bilateral relations with Japan in social, cultural and economic areas, even though no diplomatic relations were yet established.

As Kiwon Chung pointed out, North Korea's policy towards Japan formed a striking contrast to that of the Rhee government of South Korea attaching its higher priority to the solution of the complicated political and diplomatic problems pending between the two countries.⁷⁹ Moreover, North Korea's approach to Japan was different from that of China constantly linking trade and cultural relations with the issue of resuming formal diplomatic relations. The Peking regime tried to apply the principle of "politics in command" in their efforts to improve relations with Japan. Paralleling this principle, Chinese leaders suspended all economic and cultural relations with Japan when the Kishi government intensified its anti-Communist posture.

In spite of North Korea's flexibility, the full-scale development of bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea was substantially hampered by the impact of certain factors. First, the most crucial factor was Japanese-United

79. Kiwon Chung, op. cit., pp. 789-790.

States relations. Since the end of World War II, Japan's foreign relations had been fundamentally influenced by American containment policy in Asia. The United States was interested in solidifying its alliance with Japan as a means of strengthening its anti-Communist stand. By contrast, North Korea was closely linked with the two Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China. Under these circumstances, the Japanese government was strongly inclined to insure Japan's national security through the mutual security system with the United States. Consequently, Japan's approach to Communist states, including North Korea, was inevitably restricted.

Second, Japan's policy of giving higher priority to the normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea also put a limitation on the development of Japanese-North Korean relations. Even while relations between Seoul and Tokyo were strained, the Japanese government could not change its basic policy on rapprochement with South Korea. There were two major reasons which led the Japanese government to adopt such a policy: one was Japan's own national security interest, and the other America's strategic interest in South Korea as a bulwark to prevent the expansion of Asian Communist states. Of course, the Rhee government of South Korea was adamantly opposed to Japan's approach to North Korea.

Third, the persistence of ideological feud between the Japanese conservative leadership and the North Korean Communists constituted an obstacle to progress in bilateral rela-

tions between Japan and North Korea. Even though the East-West confrontation was gradually thawing after the end of the Korean war, the Japanese conservatives, including such leaders as Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke, still tended to regard Communism as a threat not only to Japan's national security, but also to world peace. Although the Hatoyama government set forth its policy aimed at reconciling Japan's relations with Communist states, it seemed clear that it had nothing to do with Communist ideology itself. Rather, Prime Minister Hatoyama's policy orientation was basically derived from the aspiration of Japanese nationalism to revise Yoshida's policy which was heavily dependent upon the United States.

Lastly, it is readily understandable that Japanese-North Korean relations were somewhat affected by Japan's domestic political fission among conservative factional leaders in connection with certain foreign policy issues. The LDP itself was formed as a broad coalition of many factions rivaling each other for the leadership of the party. The Hatoyama cabinet, consisting of a coalition of the anti-Yoshida factions, was seriously embarrassed by the growing disaffection of factional leaders opposing its policy in regard to the Japan-Soviet negotiations. Once again, a political crisis, which took place in connection with the revision of the Japan-United States Security Treaty, resulted in the fall of a Japanese government; this time the cabinet of Kishi Nobusuke.

While Japanese cabinets were suffering from ever-widening

intra-party factional splits linked with their handling of foreign policy issues, it is conceivable that they could not pay proper attention to another controversial issue, that is, North Korea's bid for the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. In a sense, the timing was not yet opportune for a rapprochement between Japan and North Korea.

CHAPTER V

THE "SEIKEI BUNRI" RELATIONSHIP: 1960-1964

When the new Ikeda government was inaugurated in July 1960, Japanese-North Korean relations entered upon a new phase. They were largely affected by Japan's dual position on diplomacy towards Communist states, especially towards the People's Republic of China. Under Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, the Japanese government initiated a policy of "separating politics from economic affairs" (seikei bunri). This policy presumed that Japan's diplomacy vis-a-vis China could be conducted on two distinct levels. On the one hand, Japan would maintain close ties with the United States, which had taken a hard-line stand towards Asian Communist states. In accordance with this policy perspective, the Japanese government gave a high priority to the early resumption of diplomatic relations with South Korea, which was considered pivotal to America's strategic interest in containing Communist expansion in North-east Asia.

On the other hand, Japan set forth a policy aimed at its irregular contacts with Communist states, even those which were quite hostile to the United States. These contacts included social and cultural exchanges as well as commercial transactions, even though there no formal diplomatic relations. Accordingly, the Japanese government began to adopt a policy of faciliating social and economic exchanges with North Korea

without extending diplomatic recognition.

As a result of this dual policy, Japanese-North Korean relations during the period from 1960 through 1964 became more and more strained politically, whereas trade relations between them were considerably expanding. More specifically, bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea during this period were influenced by such factors as the conclusion of the Japan-ROK Treaty, North Korea's conclusion of two defense pacts with the Soviet Union and China, and Japan's pursuit of economic diplomacy.

1. Growing political strain

Japan's "low posture" and foreign policy.--The major task the new Ikeda government faced was to defuse a serious crisis resulted from the ratification of the revised Japan-United States Security Treaty. In May 1960, when the Japanese Diet ratified the Security Treaty under the "high-handed" leadership of Prime Minister Kishi, Japan's domestic politics seethed with formidable opposition and confusion. Most of the major newspapers criticized the Kishi government for the arbitrary manner in which it pushed through the Treaty, and called for its immediate dissolution. Also, there were massive demonstrations organized by the opposition parties and labor unions furiously protesting the passage of the Security Treaty in the Diet. What exacerbated the situation were violent demonstrations led by a group of ultra-radical students, which

resulted in a postponement of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan.¹

Amid this political turmoil, Ikeda Hayato assumed the premiership, and soon announced his government's new position on restoring political stability in Japan through cooperation between the ruling and opposition parties. In a statement issued upon the inauguration of his cabinet, the new Prime Minister pledged his efforts to "straighten out the confused politics of the nation and implement policies in a steady and prudent manner."² This position of Ikeda Hayato has been termed as a "low posture." As Chalmers A. Johnson noted, Ikeda's "low posture" politics was characterized by his intention to restore the Japanese people's trust in the Diet, and to settle the intra-party factional strife by integrating all factional bosses into his new cabinet. At the same time, he tried to avoid any controversial issues on which the party could not reach a consensus.³

While striving to formulate a basis for consensus and cooperation in domestic politics, the Ikeda government also pledged to make efforts to achieve economic prosperity and to improve the people's livelihood. For this purpose, the govern-

1. For the details, see Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 125-153.

2. The Japan Times, July 20, 1960.

3. Chalmers A. Johnson, "Low Posture Politics in Japan," Asian Survey, Vol. III, No. 1, January 1963, p. 17.

ment adopted a long-range economic program aimed at doubling the national income in the coming decade. The program, originated from the LDP's policy in September 1960, projected as follows: "For three years starting next year 1961 we will continue growth at 9 percent per year so that in 1963 the gross national product will be 17.6 trillion yen, an increase of over 30 percent and our aim will be to attain a national income increase of over 26 percent at approximately 150,000 yen per capita."⁴ This income-doubling program became an important factor in invigorating the Japanese economy.

Concerning Japan's foreign policy, Prime Minister Ikeda, like his predecessors, emphasized closer cooperation with the free world nations, while rejecting neutralism. He was especially interested in enhancing Japan's international prestige by carrying out a U. N.-first policy,⁵ which had been considerably weakened as a result of the Treaty crisis. At the same time, the Ikeda government sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, including China. Japan-China trade was considered important in connection with the Ikeda government's long-range economic program.

However, under the Ikeda government, Japan's approach

4. The Asahi Shimbun, September 6, 1960.

5. While refraining from positive commitment to any controversial foreign policy issues, the Ikeda government tried to strengthen its United Nations diplomacy. Prime Minister Ikeda once stated that the fundamental aim of Japan's foreign policy was to base its security on the United Nations Charter. For more details, see the Summary of Ikeda's policy speech, the Japan Times, January 31, 1961.

to Communist countries was somewhat limited by the growing tension following the crash landing of an American U-2 reconnaissance plane in the Soviet Union and the subsequent breakdown of the summit meeting between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev in Paris. Considering this international situation, the new Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentaro stated in October 1960 that Japan, first of all, should make efforts to strengthen her diplomatic and security ties with the free world nations. Moreover, Prime Minister Ikeda noted that Japan's policy on relations with Communist states, particularly with China, should be made from the standpoint of a general framework of current East-West relations.⁶

More interesting was the Ikeda government's adoption of a policy aimed at promoting economic diplomacy. This policy was obviously coordinated with the government's efforts to insure the sustained growth of the Japanese economy, which had already reached a stage of self-reliance. The policy of economic diplomacy was basically intended to accelerate Japan's access to advanced Western markets. But under the principle of "politics is one thing and economy another," it was further projected to the widening of trade relations with Communist countries, such as China and North Korea. This was quite in line with the interests of business circles, which were increasingly concerned with the expansion of overseas markets.

6. Ibid., October 22. 1960.

North Korea's defense pacts with the Communist powers.--

Starting in the early 1960's, North Korea tried to avoid any explicit involvement in the growing Sino-Soviet conflict. But it simultaneously made efforts to receive economic and military aid from the two Communist powers. After the revision of the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1960, the Pyongyang regime tried to strengthen its military ties with both Moscow and Peking. For this purpose, Kim Il-sung and his party visited Moscow and Peking in 1961, and concluded mutual defense pacts with the two powers respectively. These pacts put emphasis on the undertaking of mutual defense among the contracting parties. For instance, Article II of the Pyongyang-Peking pact stipulated that "in the event of one of the contracting parties becoming the object of an armed attack by some state or a coalition of states and thus finding itself in a state of war, the other contracting party render it military and other assistance with all means at its disposal."⁷

The defense pacts had an adverse impact on Japan's policy towards North Korea. The Japanese Foreign Office interpreted them as reflecting the Communist bloc's intention to hasten its expansion policy and to show off its unity. Most Japanese leaders concluded that the conclusion of the defense pacts

7. For the clauses on mutual defense, see Article I of the North Korea-Soviet pact, Soviet News, No. 4493, July 8, 1961, and Article II of the North Korea-China pact, Choson Chungang Nyongam (North Korea's central yearbook) (Pyongyang: Choson Chungang Tongshinsa, 1962), p. 162.

among the three Communist states would contribute to the creation of new tensions in Northeast Asia. They also predicted that the United States would make more active efforts to cooperate with the South Korean government in order to cope with the uncertain moves of the Communist bloc. More explicitly, the Foreign Minister Kosaka told at the Upper House's Foreign Relations Committee in July 1961 that North Korea's military pacts with the Soviet Union and China made Japanese cooperation with South Korea necessary, and that they also made it impossible for the two Koreas to reunite.⁸ Consequently, the conclusion of the defense pacts had provided the Japanese government with an incentive to improve relations with South Korea.

Japan-South Korea negotiations.--In accordance with its policy of stressing good neighbor relations with Asian Countries, the Ikeda government began to make extensive efforts to normalize bilateral relations with South Korea. As a practical measure to achieve diplomatic reconciliation with that country, the Japanese government sent its Foreign Minister Kosaka to Seoul to confer with political leaders of the new Chang-myon government, which succeeded the interim government set up following the fall of Syngman Rhee in 1960. Kosaka, leading a goodwill mission to congratulate the inauguration of the new South Korean government, arrived at Kimpo airport

8. The Minju Choson, August 2, 1961.

in Seoul on September 6, 1960. It was noteworthy that he was the first high-ranking Japanese official ever to visit South Korea since the end of World War II. In the joint statement issued between South Korean Foreign Minister Chong Il-hyong and Kosaka Zentaro, both sides agreed to make joint efforts to settle various long-standing issues between the two countries as early as possible.⁹ Kosaka's visit to Seoul was immediately condemned by North Korea. The Pyongyang authorities denounced Kosaka's visit as a hostile action towards them. They argued that the Ikeda government's efforts to improve relations with South Korea was nothing but active participation in America's imperialistic plot to form a "Northeast Asian Treaty Organization (NEATO)" in the Far East.¹⁰

Japan's hope to bring about an early rapprochement with South Korea, however, was temporarily blocked by the military coup d'etat in South Korea on May 16, 1961. This event cast cold water on the Japanese government's decision to normalize diplomatic relations with the Chang-myon government. Japanese government and party leaders took a very cautious attitude towards the new military government of South Korea. Meanwhile, the Japanese government held close consultations with the United States on the political and economic conditions of South Korea.

At the summit meeting between President John F. Kennedy

9. The Japan Times, September 7, 1960.

10. The Nodong Shinmun, September 8, 1960.

and Prime Minister Ikeda held in Washington in June 1961, both leaders discussed some problems facing South Korea. At the meeting, President Kennedy reportedly told his counterpart that Japan should take a more active role in a long-range economic development program for South Korea.¹¹ A few days after the conclusion of North Korea's separate defense pacts with the Soviet Union and China, the Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced a statement officially supporting the military government of South Korea. In the statement, Rusk said that the United States welcomed the vigorous steps taken by the military government in South Korea, and that it was now preparing to establish a basis for closer cooperation with that government.¹² This statement had considerable effects on the Japanese government's move towards the negotiations with the ROK for diplomatic normalization.

The new military government of South Korea also began to demonstrate its interest in reopening the suspended talks with Japan. On July 6, 1961, General Park Chung-hee, Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of South Korea, sent a goodwill mission, led by General Choi Dok-sin, to Tokyo, through which he delivered a personal letter to the Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda, expressing his hope for closer relations

11. The Japan Times, June 22, 1961. Also, see the text of the joint communique issued by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda, *ibid.*, June 23, 1961.

12. The Mainichi Shimbun, July 28, 1961.

with Japan.¹³ Subsequently, Kim Yu-taek, Vice-Premier and Minister of the Economic Planning Board of South Korea, visited Japan in August, and talked with Japanese leaders on the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan. On October 20, the Japan-South Korea talks were formally reopened at the Japanese Foreign Office. Japanese-South Korean relations were further strengthened by General Park's visit to Japan in November. Similarly, the Ikeda government began to hasten its efforts to establish friendly relations with the Park government. In his policy speech in January 1962, the Prime Minister stated that "stability in South Korea is closely related to the security of Japan," and that his government was willing actively to conduct the negotiations with the South Korean government to normalize diplomatic relations between the two countries.¹⁴

In fact, from the moment of its inauguration, the Ikeda government had been firmly committed to the normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea. Although it tried to shun any "high-political" issues under the politics of "low posture," Prime Minister Ikeda and his government did not hesitate to tackle the normalization issue with South Korea, which might have become a sequel to the bitter dispute over the revised Japan-United States Security Treaty. Such Japanese

13. The Japan Times, July 6, 1961

14. See the text of Ikeda's administrative policy speech, *ibid.*, January 20, 1962.

policy was significantly linked with the United States' Asia policy aimed at preserving stability and security in North-east Asia. Under the Kennedy administration, the United States was highly concerned with growing tension and instability in such areas as Laos and South Vietnam. It also perceived North Korea's separate defense pacts with the Soviet Union and China as an ominous sign of increasing tension on the Korean peninsula.

These fluid and uncertain international situations led the United States to step up the effort to solidify the unity of its allies. For instance, President Kennedy strongly urged Japan to act as a close partner with the United States to prevent "the domination of Asia by Communism," and to refrain from expanding trade with Communist countries, including China.¹⁵ In particular, the United States increased its pressure for both Japan and South Korea to establish formal diplomatic relations as quickly as possible. In an interview with the Mainichi Shimbun in December 1962, Averell Harriman, the United States Assistant Secretary of State, expressed his view that the Japan-South Korea negotiations be concluded during the next year, and that both Japan and the United States should help South Korea develop its economy.¹⁶

Paralleling the growing American interest, the Japanese themselves began to recognize that it was quite consistent

15. Ibid., December 20, 1962.

16. The Mainichi Shimbun, December 20, 1962.

with Japan's national security interest to establish close ties with South Korea. These views had been well summarized in a report by an official of Japanese bank, who had visited South Korea for the purpose of observing its general situation shortly before the military coup d'etat. It said:¹⁷

Korea is not the only country where one finds such economic and political conditions: in Southeast Asia, Laos, Indonesia, and Vietnam are much the same. But what is different about Korea is that it is next door to us; if things are left as they are now, there is no assurance that a nation identical with the present North Korea will not extend all the way to Pusan. For this reason I felt very keenly while I was there that we Japanese must pay more attention to Korea.

This point of view was clearly shared by many Japanese conservative leaders. It reflected the view that South Korea was important for Japan not merely as an object for economic transactions, but as a shield against the Communist threat to her own defense. However, the Ikeda government's efforts to bring about an early settlement of the negotiations with South Korea was soon faced with strong protest and criticism from both domestic opposition forces and North Korea.

North Korea's campaigns against the Japan-South Korea talks.--No sooner did both Japan and South Korea become sincere in solving the long pending issues between them than North Korea heightened its efforts to block such a Japan-

17. Rec. from Lawrence Olson, Dimensions of Japan (New York: American Universities Field Staff Inc., 1963), pp. 353-354.

South Korea rapprochement. The North Korean authorities not only publicized their firm position of opposing the Japan-South Korea negotiations through various propaganda media, especially through many Japanese personages or groups visiting Pyongyang, but also tried to mobilize a wide range of Korean and Japanese organizations sympathetic to their position in Japan, including the JSP and the JCP. Moreover, North Korea often took hostile actions towards Japan. For example, on October 10, 1960, one month after Kosaka's visit to Seoul, North Korea seized Japanese fishing boats on charges of intrusion into its territorial waters.¹⁸

North Korean leaders offered the following reasons why they opposed the Japan-South Korea negotiations:

(1) economically, it was closely linked with the plot of Japanese militarists to establish the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity;"

(2) militarily, the Japan-South Korea talks were aimed at setting up "a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization" under the sponsorship of the United States;

(3) the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea would consequently obstruct the peaceful reunification of Korea, and would instead serve to perpetuate the division of Korea; and

(4) it was illegal that the Japanese government tried to discuss problems concerning the interests of all Korean people,

18. The Nodong Shinmun, October 11, 1960.

such as the Japanese-held property claim rights, only with South Korea.¹⁹

Besides these arguments, there is no denying that the Japan-South Korea talks were fundamentally inimical to North Korea's basic interest in detaching South Korea from Japan diplomatically as well as economically.

North Korea's position was strongly supported by Japanese leftists who opposed their government's approach to South Korea. They expressed very similar viewpoints to those of the North Korean authorities as follows: first, Japan should avoid the talks with the military government of South Korea, and instead await the birth of a civilian democratic government there; second, diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea at the present time would only serve the interests of the United States rather than those of Japan; third, the normalization of Japanese-South Korean relations would be helping to maintain the split between the two Koreas; fourth, any future rapprochement between Japan and North Korea would be more difficult; and fifth, once the Japan-South Korea talks have been concluded, the United States would bring the two countries into a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization.²⁰ Most

19. These arguments had been frequently expressed through such major newspapers of North Korea as the Nodong Shinmun and the Minju Choson. Especially, see the Minju Choson, January 17, 28, 1961, and the Nodong Shinmun, February 11, November 2, 1961.

20. The views of Japanese leftists in regard to the Japan-South Korea talks were well demonstrated in the Akahata's

of these views were stemmed from Japanese leftists' distrust of the United States, which was trying to strengthen its anti-Communist posture in Asia.

Under a common front, the North Korean Communists and Japanese leftists began to launch intensive campaigns to halt the negotiations between Japan and South Korea. On January 13, 1961, representatives of 21 Japanese political parties and social organizations, including those of the JCP, the JSP, Sohyo, and the JKA, organized the Liaison Council Against the Japan-South Korea Talks, and adopted a resolution strongly urging the Ikeda government to abandon a policy hostile to North Korea. Nosaka Sanzo, Chairman of the JCP's Central Committee, argued at the meeting that the Japan-South Korea talks should be immediately halted because they were aimed at laying the groundwork for a Northeast Asian military alliance.²¹ Moreover, on February 8, after his return from a visit to the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, Matsumoto Shichiro, head of the JSP's Department of Foreign Affairs, stated that the normalization talks between Japan and South Korea would seriously hinder the long-range efforts of Korean reunification.²²

editorials on August 23, December 28, 1962, and in Kawakami Jotaro, "Party Stand on Japan-ROK Normalization Talks," Japan Socialist Review, October 1, 1962, pp. 7-18.

21. FBIS, Daily Report (Far East: Japan), January 14, 1961.

22. Ibid., February 8, 1961.

In conjunction with these moves of Japanese political and social organizations to oppose the Japan-South Korea talks, Kim Il-sung sent a telegram in April to Hatanaka Masaharu, Director General of the JKA, in which he reaffirmed that North Korea was firmly opposed to the talks, and urged that every effort should be made to that effect.²³ On November 6, as part of the Party's official policy, the JSP's Central Executive Committee decided to launch a series of nationwide campaigns to protest the talks between Japan and South Korea in collaboration with the JCP and other organizations.²⁴

In the year 1962, the campaigns to oppose the Japan-South Korea talks were more vehemently launched. On January 13, the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries of North Korea sent messages to Japanese political parties and various social organizations, in which the Pyongyang authorities stressed that the Japanese people should wage an active fight against the talks. In connection with North Korea's appeal, on February 15, the JSP decided to set up a special party organ, the Congress of Socialist Members for the Promotion of Friendship between Japan and North Korea, with Asakata Ichiro as its Chairman. This organ was apparently designed to mobilize all Japanese leftist forces into the campaigns against the Ikeda government's decision to proceed

23. The Nodong Shinmun, April 6, 1961.

24. The Yomiuri Shimbun, November 7, 1961.

with the normalization talks with South Korea. Furthermore, the Akahata, the JCP's organ, began to accelerate its propaganda activities. In an editorial on August 23, the Akahata charged that Japanese monopolists were attempting to hasten the economic infiltration of South Korea by means of the Japan-South Korea talks, and urged all social and political organizations, which had opposed the revised Japan-United States Security Treaty, immediately to join a nationwide campaign to thwart such an intrigue.²⁵

There occurred a large number of demonstrations throughout Japan against the Japan-South Korea talks. Most of them were sponsored by the JSP, the JCP, the Democratic Youth League of Japan, Sohyo, the Japan-China Friendship Association, the Yamaguchi Prefecture Council Against the Japan-United States Security Treaty, the Federation of the Japanese women's Organizations, and other leftist Korean and Japanese organizations, including the JKA and the JKTA. These demonstrations and mass rallies were further augmented by the strong support of the national and local councils which were against the Japan-United States Security Treaty.

Under these circumstances, the Ikeda government's "low posture" politics came to lose its original character. It seemed, again, that Prime Minister Ikeda, like his predecessor Kishi Nobusuke, was faced with the task of solving another disputable foreign policy issue. The opposition parties in-

25. The Akahata, August 23, 1962.

creased pressure on the Ikeda government by arguing that it was entirely improper for the Japanese government to negotiate bilaterally with the South Korean government in spite of the existence of a government in North Korea. As a mollifying measure, Ikeda made a proposition relating to a "two-Koreas" policy. Replying to the socialist Diet member Okada Haruo at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House on August 29, he said that Japan's claims to property seized in areas north of the 38th parallel on the Korean peninsula remained unsolved even after the Japan-South Korea negotiations were concluded. Especially, by saying that "his government was negotiating with the South Korean government, bearing in mind that its role does not extend to areas north of the 38th degree north latitude," Ikeda conceded that there existed a de facto government in North Korea. From this standpoint, he further suggested that the Japanese government might conduct negotiations with North Korea "some day" in order to settle property disputes.²⁶

Meanwhile, the Chosoren presented a proposal calling for a tripartite parley among Japan, South and North Korea as the alternative to the current bilateral talks between Japan and South Korea. The proposal was made in January 1963, when a delegation led by Yi Sang-chol, Chief of Chosoren's Department of Foreign Affairs, and also accompanied by Shimagami

26. The Japan Times, August 30, 1962.

Zengoro, Chairman of the JSP's Diet Policy Committee, visited the Prime Minister's office and met with the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kurogane Yasumi.²⁷ A few days later, the proposal was reaffirmed by the JSP. On January 12, Narita Tomomi, Secretary General of the JSP, argued that representatives of Japan, South and North Korea should hold a meeting in a neutral country to discuss their mutual over-all relations.²⁸

But the Ikeda government did not make any response towards the proposal of a tripartite meeting. Instead, it seemed to harden its previous stand. At a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Upper House on February 21, Ikeda repeated that his government was deeply committed to the early settlement of the bilateral talks with South Korea. At this time, a large number of Japanese leftists urged that the government should suspend the talks immediately in view of the confused political situation in South Korea.

While the Japan-South Korea talks continued, the Park government was seriously plagued by growing demonstrations led by students and the opposition parties urging the government to change its current position towards the negotiations with Japan.²⁹ Because of this uncertain situation in South

27. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), January 9, 1963.

28. Ibid., January 12, 1963.

29. For the detail of a political crisis the South Korean government faced in 1964, see Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 95-119.

Korea, even within the ruling LDP there appeared a split among factional leaders over the Japan-South Korea talks. The pro-Seoul group, including Kishi Nobusuke, Sato Eisaku, and Ishii Mitsujiro, advocated that the government should make efforts to conclude the negotiations as quickly as possible, regardless of South Korea's domestic political situation. But such leaders as Kono Ichiro and Fujiyama Aiichiro held that the Japan-South Korea talks should proceed very cautiously.³⁰ Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi once admitted that it was somewhat doubtful whether the negotiations could continue because of the uncertain political situation in South Korea.

While the Ikeda government was being faced with strong opposition from home and North Korea with regard to the talks with South Korea, leftist Korean residents in Japan began to launch another campaign calling for the free travel of Koreans in Japan to and from North Korea. This campaign was initially motivated by the entry of a 10-member ice-skating team from North Korea into Japan on February 14, 1963, to take part in the World Speed Skating Championship Meet. Subsequently, on April 9, the Central Standing Committee of Chosoren adopted a resolution concerning "the launching of all Koreans campaign for insuring free travel of Koreans in Japan to and from the fatherland (North Korea)." Then, the Committee of Koreans in Japan Demanding Travel To and From the Fatherland was formally

30. Chalmers A. Johnson, op. cit., p. 27.

installed at Chosoren's headquarters.³¹ On June 5, there were mass rallies in all the major areas of Japan under Chosoren's sponsorship, urging the Ikeda government to allow the free travel of Koreans in Japan to and from North Korea.

In an effort to foster the campaign of leftist Koreans in Japan, the Foreign Ministry of North Korea issued on July 20, a statement charging the Japanese government with the mistreatment and suppression of Korean residents in Japan. In the statement, the Pyongyang authorities argued that Koreans in Japan were persecuted under the Ikeda government in many ways, and that they should be given "all lawful rights and treatment due foreigners."³² Moreover, the North Korean regime legislated the law of nationality, which provided that all Koreans in Japan were North Korean citizens. Article III of the law also stipulated that Koreans residing in foreign states could freely travel to and from their homeland.³³ These steps, of course, were primarily aimed at legitimating the concurrent campaign for free travel of Koreans in Japan.

Meanwhile, Chosoren made an extensive appeal to all strata of Japanese society for the campaign for Koreans' free travel, including political parties and influential public figures.

31. Kang In-dok, "Pukhan ui Daeil Chongchaek Baljon Kwa-chong e Kwanhan Yonku" (Study on the development of North Korea's policy toward Japan), The Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 1, March 1970, p. 106.

32. Choson Chungang Tongshinsa, Choson Chungang Nyongam (North Korea's central yearbook) (Pyongyang: 1964), p. 106.

33. Ibid., p. 56.

Specifically, it sent letters to all Japanese political parties and some influential politicians, such as Diet members. It also sent letters to many political parties and trade unions, various social and cultural organizations of other foreign countries, including the Soviet Union and China. By the end of March 1964, more than 10 million Japanese had signed petitions in support of the campaign for Koreans' free travel, and approximately 1,000 social and political organizations, including political parties, labor unions and local self-governing bodies, joined that campaign.³⁴

As the campaign for free travel intensified, the Ikeda government seemed to show a lukewarm gesture. On June 3, Foreign Minister Ohira did state at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House that it was highly irregular that there was no personnel exchange between Japan and North Korea, and that the government was studying measures to open personnel exchange between the two countries.³⁵ In the fall of 1964, the Ikeda government even permitted the entry of a large group of 145 North Korean athletes into Japan to participate in the Olympic Games as a "special case."³⁶

Six months later, the new Sato government, which replaced the Ikeda cabinet, reaffirmed its previous position by saying that because the campaign for free travel was obviously linked

34. Kang In-dok, op. cit., p. 107.

35. The Japan Times, June 6, 1964.

36. The Tokyo Shimbun, November 28, 1964.

with the political aim of obstructing the talks between Japan and South Korea, it would not allow Korean residents' demand for free travel to and from North Korea.³⁷ It was not until December 30, 1965, when the Japanese government for the first time allow two Korean residents in Japan to re-enter the country after their visit to ancestral graves in North Korea, that the campaign for Koreans' free travel could be brought to a partial fruition.

In fact, by coordinating a wide range of Japanese organizations opposing the Japan-ROK talks, and simultaneously requesting free travel of Koreans in Japan to and from North Korea, Chosoren was able to mobilize a sizable pro-Pyongyang lobby in Japan. But the Ikeda government did not modify its basic policy in regard to the talks with South Korea, and it was still supported by a large number of the LDP members.

More crucial was that South Koreans intensified their movements against the early conclusion of Japan-South Korea talks. Thousands of South Korean students launched massive demonstrations opposing the government's policy on the talks with Japan. These movements were based on a historical Korean distrust of Japan. On June 3, 1964, the South Korean government was finally forced to proclaim martial law in order to restore political stability, which had been considerably disturbed by demonstrations organized by students and the opposition parties. Under these circumstances, South Korea could not

37. Kang In-dok, op. cit., p. 108.

proceed with the negotiations with Japan. As a result, the normalization talks between Japan and South Korea could not be concluded during Ikeda's tenure. The task of normalizing the diplomatic relations between the two countries became the responsibility of the new Sato government.

On the whole, the Ikeda government's firm commitment to the negotiations with South Korea, and North Korea's strenuous efforts to obstruct them continually contributed only to the deterioration of political relations between Japan and North Korea.

2. Improving economic relations

As described earlier, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Ikeda set as its long-range policy goal the achievement of economic prosperity. To realize this goal, the government put emphasis on the strengthening of economic ties with advanced Western countries. At the same time, as an excuse for expanding Japan's trade relations with Communist states, the Ikeda government established the principle of separating politics from trade. Even though Ikeda repeatedly stressed the importance of Japan's close ties with the free world nations, he was also considerably interested in carrying out an independent economic policy aimed at conducting trade with Communist states.

From its inception, the Ikeda government was under growing pressure from the ruling LDP and business circles to take steps

favoring the improvement of relations between Japan and China. However, Prime Minister Ikeda declared in January 1961 that it would be impossible for Japan to conclude a government-to-government trade agreement with China in the immediate future, simply because it would mean formal diplomatic recognition. Instead, he indicated that his government would endeavor to improve bilateral relations with China "step by step." Since then, the Ikeda government has taken some measures to facilitate trade with China and other Communist countries. The MITI announced in April 1961, that it would abolish the compulsory barter trade with China and five other Communist countries, such as Albania, East Germany, Hungary, the Mongolian People's Republic, and North Vietnam, and that it would permit trade with these countries to be conducted on a cash payment basis.³⁸

In connection with the Japanese government's shifting policy on trade with Communist countries, Japan-North Korea trade also gained momentum. Some Japanese businessmen and leftist organizations, which were involved in trading with North Korea, accelerated their efforts to influence the Ikeda government to change its policy banning trade with North Korea. In particular, the JKTA made intensive efforts to stimulate direct bilateral trade between Japan and North Korea. The Ikeda government also moved to change its toughening attitude

³⁸. For the details, see the Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 1961.

on trade with North Korea.

On April 1, 1961, North Korea was placed under the regulations of compulsory barter trade by the Japanese government, and a direct commercial shipping service was permitted between the two countries. By virtue of these steps, a Japanese freighter, the Uraga Maru of the Nippon Kai Steamship Co., could enter Kawasaki near Tokyo on April 6, with a cargo of 2,500 tons of pig iron from North Korea.³⁹ Meanwhile, a group of leftist Korean merchants and industrialists organized a trading company named Tonghae Trading Co., which was designed to assume a major responsibility for expanding trade between Japan and North Korea.

Japanese-North Korea trade relations were greatly influenced by some measures taken by the Japanese government in October 1962. They were: (1) the government would adopt a standard accounting system in trading with North Korea, by which a direct trade account could be opened between the two countries; (2) the barter trade system under which trade between the two countries was conducted would be terminated; and (3) instead, trade between Japan and North Korea in the future would be conducted under a prior approval system.⁴⁰ These measures, though still far short of normal commercial transactions between the two countries, marked significant progress. They were ardently welcomed by the Pyongyang author-

39. Kang In-dok, op. cit., p. 69.

40. Ibid., p. 72.

ities, who had argued since Nam Il's statement in 1955, that even in the absence of formal diplomatic relations, trade relations between the two countries should be established.

Even more interesting was that the Ikeda government's move to lift the trade restrictions towards Communist states coincided with North Korea's inauguration of a Seven-Year Economic Plan. This plan, covering the period from 1961 through 1967 (later, it was extended until 1970), was envisaged to achieve the target of an average annual growth rate of 18 percent. Implementing this plan, North Korea needed the importation of modern industrial goods and technology from abroad. But North Korea's access to the Soviet market became more and more difficult. As mentioned in Chapter II, from the early 1960's, North Korean-Soviet relations were deteriorating because of Pyongyang's closer ties with Peking. In the increasing Sino-Soviet split, North Korea, together with China, did not hesitate to deliver ideological assaults on Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization. As a punitive measure, the Soviets virtually suspended their economic and military aid to North Korea.

Thus, North Korean leaders became even more anxious for the promotion of trade with Japan. They were especially interested in purchasing certain machinery from Japanese market. During the first three months of 1961, more than 3 billion yen worth of contracts for the export of Japanese industrial goods were concluded between the two countries. North Korea's imports

included such items as stainless steel pipes, electric wiring and cables, tires and tubes, light machinery, and industrial and agricultural chemicals. The Pyongyang authorities often complained that there was some difficulty in purchasing industrial goods from socialist countries. For instance, at the meeting with a visiting delegation of the Japanese trading companies in Pyongyang on April 8, 1962, the North Korean Trade Minister Yi Il-kyong said that "North Korea is still buying factory machinery from various socialist countries, but this is extremely unfavorable because of the high freightage and other circumstances."⁴¹ In other words, Yi's remarks reflected the view that Japan could be a more favorable market for North Korea's purchase of industrial products because of the geographical proximity between the two countries.

Meanwhile, several steps were taken for the promotion of trade between Japan and North Korea. In November, as an effort to further the liberation of foreign trade, the Ikeda government nullified the Trade Embargo Act which had restricted trade with Communist states. Also, at this time, an agreement on a regular shipping service was concluded between a Japanese trading company and the North Korean External Transportation Corporation. One year later, the Ikeda government took steps to allow the settlement of trade accounting through the regular banking system, and offered short-term deferred payment and bank loans to North Korea. In line with the government's moves,

41. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), April 10, 1962.

the Mitsui Bank of Japan and a North Korean bank agreed to issue direct letters of credit, while suspending the earlier method of settling the trade account through a third country. In April 1964, the Ikeda government formally approved the case of a one-year deferred payment on the shipment of steel materials to North Korea, totalling about US \$2.24 million.⁴² Moreover, in July, the KCPIT of North Korea and the JKTA agreed to hold an industrial trade fair in Pyongyang in May 1965.⁴³

With the development of these favorable conditions, the number of Japanese businessmen visiting Pyongyang increased accordingly. Large-scale trading companies of Japan also began to pay attention to trade with North Korea. The first business delegation of Japan arrived in Pyongyang in December 1963. This delegation, headed by Yagi Kozo, President of the Japan Koyo Trade Co., was composed of representatives of a wide range of industrial areas, such as trade, production, and transportation. During its stay in Pyongyang, the delegation concluded a private trade agreement for the first half of 1964 with North Korean companies, its total volume amounting to about US \$1.1 million. One year later, in November 1964, the second delegation of Japanese businessmen, composed of representatives of 18 trading companies, visited North Korea, and signed a trade agreement for the year 1965 with North Korean

42. Masao Miyahara, "Nitcho Boeki no Keika to Genjo" (Progress and present situation of Japan-North Korea trade), Chosen Kenkyu, No. 32, August 1964, p. 6

43. Kang In-dok, op. cit., p. 75.

trading companies, including the Kumkang Trading Co. Both sides also discussed such matters as the exchange of personages or groups engaged in trade between the two countries, and terms of deferred and installment payments. The North Korean side expressed its desire to import industrial plant from Japan totalling about US \$84 million under the condition of a two- or three- year deferred payment, and urged the delegation of Japan to press the Ikeda government to permit the entry of North Korean technicians into Japan.⁴⁴

The annual trade volume between Japan and North Korea had sharply increased. As Table V shows, in 1960, the total

Table V

Annual volume of trade between
Japan and North Korea: 1960-1964

(US \$1,000)

Year	North Korea's Exports	North Korea's Imports	Total
1960	3,090	1,852	4,942
1961	3,460	4,456	7,916
1962	4,553	4,781	9,334
1963	9,430	5,347	14,777
1964	20,231	11,284	31,515

Source: The figures for 1960 were taken from Miyahara Masao, "Nitcho Boeki no Keika to Genjo" (Progress and present situation of Japan-North Korea trade), Chosen Kenkyu, No. 32, August 1964, p. 7, and other figures for the 1961-1964 period were taken from Tsusho Hakusho: 1964, 1965 (White paper of the MITI) (Tokyo: Tsusansho).

44. For the trade agreements concluded between Japanese business groups and North Korea, see *ibid.*, pp. 73-75.

volume of a two-way trade between the two countries amounted to about US \$4.9 million. But in 1961, when the barter trade system was formally approved, and direct commercial shipping service was opened, the trade volume between the two countries increased rapidly, totalling about US \$8 million. In 1962, the trade volume did not increase because trade between the two countries was still restricted to the barter system. With approval of a direct accounting system and the abolition of barter restrictions by the Japanese government in 1962, the volume of trade between them jumped up to about US \$15 million in 1963. In this year, a new trend also developed in Japan-North Korea trade. During the year, North Korea's exports to Japan exceeded its imports from that country by almost 2 to 1, amounting to about US \$9.4 million and US \$5.3 million respectively. In 1964, when the practices of deferred and installment payments in trading between the two countries were approved, the total volume of trade doubled, amounting to about US \$32 million, with the trade imbalance still remaining about 2 to 1 in favor of North Korea's exports.

During the period from 1960 through 1964, the volume of two-way trade between Japan and North Korea increased almost 10 times as much as that of 1959, which had amounted to only US \$3.6 million. In view of the commodity structure in Japan-North Korea trade, most of North Korea's imports consisted of steel products, chemicals, including urea fertilizer, machinery and electric facilities, textile goods, and other light industrial products. On the other hand, North Korea exported

such items as foodstuffs, iron ore, non-metallic minerals, and non-ferrous metals. For instance, North Korea's major imports in 1964 were about US \$3 million in textile goods, US \$2 million in chemicals, US \$4 million in metallic products, and US \$1 million in machinery, accounting for about 90 percent of its total imports. At the same time, its major exports were about US \$2 million in non-metallic minerals, US \$7 million in pig iron, and US \$3 million in non-ferrous metals, accounting for about 85 percent of its total exports.⁴⁵

These figures indicate that Japan has become a major market for North Korea's purchase of manufactured goods, while North Korea became a supplier of mineral resources for Japanese industry. This may be a major reason why Japanese businessmen were so interested in establishing trade relations with North Korea. On occasion, they asserted that North Korea was useful for Japanese industry because of its abundant deposits of minerals, such as zinc, copper, lead, and pig iron.

But when compared with the total volume of Japan's foreign trade, the volume of her commerce with North Korea was still negligible. In 1964, the volume of Japan's two-way trade amounted to about US \$13,000 million. Moreover, Japan's trade with North Korea was far below her trade with South Korea, its total volume amounting to about US \$150 million in 1964. It should be noted that the increase in Japan-North Korea trade

45. Tsusho Hakusho: 1965 (White paper of the MITI) (Tokyo: Tsusansho, 1965), pp. 657-658.

was closely related to an over-all trend in Japan's trade with Communist countries. From the early 1960's, trade between Japan and the Communist bloc began to significantly expand. The volume of Japan-China trade increased from about US \$47 million in 1960 to about US \$310 million in 1964. Even though Japan's trade volume with North Korea was almost ten times less than that with China in 1964, it was obvious that Japan-North Korea trade had developed along the same pattern as that between Japan and China.

3. Summary

During the 1960-1964 period, bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea had shown two distinct patterns. As discussed earlier, relations between the two countries were politically strained, while economic relations made some headway. Under the Ikeda government, Japan took a firm position on the resumption of diplomatic relations with South Korea. But this position was confronted with serious opposition from North Korea. To halt the Japan-South Korea negotiations, North Korea launched a wide range of campaigns through its own organizations and through other Japanese groups, including the JSP and the JCP, sympathetic to its position. Therefore, political confrontation between Japan and North Korea continued to increase.

First of all, Japan's policy toward a rapprochement with South Korea was closely tied with the United States' strategic

interest in pursuing its containment policy toward Asian Communist states. In the early 1960's, the Kennedy administration was increasingly concerned with the occurrence of uncertain situations in Asia, and tried to solidify America's alliance with Japan and South Korea. In particular, it was interested in bringing about diplomatic reconciliation between Japan and South Korea as early as possible. After the fall of the Rhee government, which had stubbornly opposed an early reconciliation with Japan, both governments of Japan and South Korea became considerably eager to resume formal diplomatic relations between them. These common efforts among the United States, Japan and South Korea had a serious blow at bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea.

Second, although the East-West confrontation seemed to ease because of the growing Sino-Soviet conflict and the Franco-Chinese rapprochement, Japanese conservative leaders still felt that Japan was highly vulnerable to the threat from the Communist bloc. Particularly threatening was North Korea's separate conclusion of two defense pacts with the Soviet Union and China. They perceived these military pacts as devices to flaunt the unity of the Communist bloc as well as "to stymie South Korea, Japan and the United States." Furthermore, the explosion of China's atomic bomb in 1964 provided Japanese leaders with an urgent necessity to consider the problem of Japan's national security. In response to the fluid international situation in Northeast Asia, the Ikeda

government re-evaluated the strategic importance of South Korea to Japan's national security. As noted earlier, the Ikeda government stressed the link of Japan's security with the stability of South Korea. This was a major reason why from its inception the Ikeda government had put such a high priority on normalization of diplomatic relations with the ROK government.

Meanwhile, the Ikeda government sought to expand trade relations with Communist countries, including North Korea. By devising the principle of separating politics from economics, it was able to promote trade with them without extending diplomatic recognition. This principle was also a means of sidestepping American pressure, which was directed to check Japan's initiatives in seeking trade with China and other Communist countries. The Ikeda government linked its efforts of increasing trade with the Communist bloc with its long-term policy goal of achieving economic prosperity. In accordance with this goal, the Ikeda government also began to remove the trade restrictions imposed on commerce with North Korea. This shifting policy of the Ikeda government coincided with the growing interest of the Japanese business community in trading with North Korea. For their part, the North Korean authorities, while carrying out the Seven-Year Economic Plan, were much eager to trade with Japan. As a result, the trade volume between Japan and North Korea increased sharply during the period.

Japan-North Korea trade, however, was conducted with great caution. For the Ikeda government feared that Japan's growing trade with North Korea might antagonize the United States and South Korea. At this time, Japan's two-way trade with America still accounted for almost 30 percent of her total foreign trade volume. Moreover, American policy-makers seemed to worry that growing trade between Japan and the Communist bloc might negate their efforts to contain Communist expansion in Asia. Likewise, South Korea was greatly anxious about Japan's trade policy possibly favoring North Korea. The South Korean government warned on several occasions that the Japanese government's measures relating to the promotion of trade with North Korea would be considered an unfriendly act. For these reasons, the Ikeda government was always very careful to insure that its shifting policy on trade with North Korea would not be harmful to the progress of the Japan-South Korea normalization talks.

CHAPTER VI

THE ANTAGONISTIC RELATIONSHIP: 1965-1970

The year 1965 marked a turning point in Japanese-North Korean relations. In this year, the deadlocked 14-year diplomatic negotiations between Japan and South Korea were finally concluded. With the signing of the Japan-ROK Treaty, the Japanese government formally recognized the government of South Korea as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, while adhering to its previous non-recognition policy of the Communist regime in North Korea. However, North Korean leaders not only denied the legality of the Japan-ROK Treaty, but also they hardened their hostile attitude towards the Sato government of Japan. Consequently, antagonism between Japan and North Korea grew more intense than ever.

The Japan-North Korea antagonism has developed largely on ideological, psychological and diplomatic levels. It did not include any form of direct military confrontation between the two countries. North Korea continually criticized the Japan-ROK Treaty as a foothold for Japanese militarists to reinvade Korea, and tried to invoke within the Korean people the memory of Japan's colonial rule. Moreover, North Korea adopted a tough policy line towards South Korea, which had the significant effect of increasing tension on the peninsula in the late 1960's. Most conservative leaders of Japan were gradually inclined to regard the tense situation on the Korean

peninsula as a possible danger to Japan's national security. In this context, they began to link Japan's security problem to the stability and security of South Korea. After the conclusion of the Japan-South Korea Treaty, the Sato government became increasingly committed to strengthening its diplomatic and economic ties with the Seoul government. This was also a major cause of increased North Korean hostility towards the Sato government.

Nevertheless, the channel through which the peoples of Japan and North Korea could make some contacts was not entirely blocked. Trade relations between the two countries on a non-official basis were still allowed, and cultural exchanges were conducted. In this sense, the Japan-North Korea antagonism, which had gained momentum in 1965, was of a limited nature. It was mainly caused by the following three factors: the conclusion of the Japan-South Korea Treaty; the United States' policy on the Vietnam war and its effect on bilateral relations with Japan; and North Korea's hard-line policy towards the United States and South Korea.

1. The process of political hostility

Japan's normal ties with South Korea.--With its inauguration, the Sato government of Japan set the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with South Korea as one of the major foreign policy issues facing Japan, and made efforts to resolve that issue as early as possible. In particular,

new Prime Minister Sato Eisaku demonstrated more eagerness about settling the knotty Japan-South Korea problem than his predecessor Ikeda Hayato.

Sato's pro-Seoul position was associated with his government's broad policy line of stressing the promotion of diplomatic and economic relations with many Asian states. By the 1950's, Japan had already normalized diplomatic relations with most of her neighboring Asian nations, that had once been her colonies. Now, Japan, with her remarkable economic power, was in a position to further economic cooperation with them. For this purpose, the Sato government adopted a policy of "pushing forward diplomacy towards Asia" and emphasized as its first step the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea. The Prime Minister once said that "the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea is the starting point for Japan's diplomacy towards Asia."¹

The Sato government's firm stand on the Japan-South Korea diplomatic reconciliation, however, was severely criticized by the opposition parties and various social organizations within Japan. The JSP and the JCP accelerated their common efforts to block the current Japan-South Korea talks in close collaboration with Sohyo and its affiliates.

In February 1965, when Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo visited Seoul to sign the Basic Treaty of providing a general

1. Rec. from "Japan-ROK Problem and Future of Diplomacy" (Part II), the Asahi Shimbun, December 13, 1965.

framework for diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea, Japanese opposition forces furiously launched a nationwide campaign against the signing of the Treaty. Leaders of the opposition parties argued that the Japan-South Korea rapprochement was part of a United States' design for conducting the Vietnam war more effectively. In a very similar tone, North Korean Vice-Premier Yi Ju-yon also accused the Sato government's policy on the Japan-ROK negotiations of being linked to the United States' Asia policy of having the Asians fight among themselves in Asia.² These charges were basically intended to attract particular attention from many segments of the Japanese public who felt that Japan might eventually become involved in the Vietnam war. Thousands of Japanese and Korean people in Japan participated in mass rallies sponsored by the JCP, the JSP, Sohyo, the Peace Liaison Committee, and Chosoren and its affiliates.

During the ratification process of the Japan-South Korea Treaty, the Sato government was faced with more formidable opposition. As a last-ditch effort to forestall the Treaty, the opposition parties intensified their anti-Treaty campaigns within and without the Diet. While the Diet deliberated over the Treaty, the most controversial point between ruling conservative circles and the opposition parties was the issue concerning the territorial jurisdiction of the South Korean

2. Ibid., February 18, 1965.

government on the Korean peninsula. Article III of the Japan-ROK Treaty stipulates the following regarding this matter:

"It is confirmed that the government of the ROK is the only lawful government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly."³

In regard to this provision, the government officials of Japan and South Korea held differing viewpoints. The South Korean officials asserted that this provision proclaimed that the ROK was the only legitimate Korean government, and that its territorial jurisdiction should extend over the area north of the 38th parallel. But the Japanese government took the position that the ROK's territorial jurisdiction was limited to South Korea according to the Basic Treaty and that the property claims included in the Treaty did not cover those belonging to North Korea. Likewise, it argued that the sea area, which was to be under joint control of the two countries in accordance with the Fisheries Agreement,⁴ did not extend over the Armistice Line between South and North Korea. The Japanese opposition parties strongly demanded that the Sato government clear up these contrasting interpretations on the

3. See the ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Daihan Min-kuk kwa Ilbonkuk kwa ui Choyak mich Hyopchong (The treaties and agreements between the ROK and Japan) (Seoul: 1965), p. 2.

4. The Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement, which was included in the Basic Treaty between the two countries, provided that both sides shall establish a sea area to be placed under Japan-ROK joint control outside the 12-mile zone under the ROK's exclusive control. Ibid., pp. 8-12.

provision of the Basic Treaty between two governments of Japan and South Korea.

Major concerns of the opposition parties and social organizations, which were opposed to the ratification of the Treaty in the Diet, were concentrated on its impact on the future relationship between Japan and North Korea. They held that the Japan-South Korea Treaty would be a big obstacle to progress in Japanese-North Korean relations. Their apprehensions rose further following the South Korean Prime Minister Chong Il-kwon's statement. He said: Now that it is recognized that the ROK is the only legal government on the Korean peninsula under the Japan-ROK Treaty, we can force out diplomatic and all other relations between Japan and North Korea." The Chong statement had significant repercussions in Japanese political circles. The Sato government tried to mitigate the effect of Chong's statement by declaring that after the ratification of the Treaty in the Diet, it would not be necessary for Japan to consider the response of South Korea on every bilateral problem with North Korea.⁵

Even amid intensifying protests from the opposition parties, the Sato government's position was strengthened by support from the majority of the Japanese people. According to a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in October 1965, 31 percent of those polled were in

5. The Sankei Shimbun, October 24, 1965.

favor of the government's position, while only 12 percent were in opposition.⁶ In another public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office at almost the same time, 41.2 percent of the total of 1,250 adults supported the ratification of the Japan-South Korea Treaty, and 11.8 percent opposed it. The survey also showed that 52.9 percent of the respondents characterized the establishment of friendly relations between Japan and South Korea as being "good," while only 2.7 percent were "opposed to it."⁷

The result of these surveys further reflected the variations in the Japanese perception of South Korea. A growing number of the Japanese people began to feel more positively towards the ROK. In the Yomiuri poll, the number of Japanese who designated the ROK as "the nation I dislike" dropped to 3 percent from 9 percent in the previous year. Moreover, the poll indicated that the Japanese people tended to consider South Korea a friendlier nation than North Korea.⁸

Owing to this popular support, the LDP and the Sato cabinet were able to complete procedures for the ratification of the Japan-South Korea Treaty in the Diet in December 1965. In spite of strenuous protests from the opposition parties and numerous social organizations against the ratification of the Treaty, a serious situation like that of the

6. The Yomiuri Shimbun, October 17, 1965.

7. The Sankei Shimbun, October 27, 1965.

8. The Yomiuri Shimbun, op. cit.

Japan-United States Security Treaty crisis in 1960 did not occur. The conclusion of the Japan-South Korea Treaty, as the Japanese Foreign Minister said, marked the opening of a new era in bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea. In fact, after more than sixty years of conflict and animosity since Japan annexed Korea by force in 1910, Japan and South Korea now resumed full diplomatic and economic relations. But it also became a crucial cause of the further deterioration of Japanese-North Korean relations, which had developed on only a limited scope since the end of the Korean war.

North Korea's hostile reactions.--Immediately after the signing of the Japan-South Korea Treaty, North Korea issued a lengthy and strongly worded memorandum declaring the Treaty null and void. In the memorandum, the Pyongyang authorities argued that the Japan-South Korea negotiations were initiated by the United States from the outset as an effort to form an anti-Communist military alliance in Northeast Asia, and that they were also closely linked to a Japanese militaristic ambition to reinvade Korea.⁹

North Korean leaders insisted that such an ambition of Japanese militarists was well expressed in the so-called "Three Arrow Studies," which were alleged to have been written by the Joint Staff Council of the Japan Self-Defense Agency.

9. The Nodong Shinmun, June 19, 1965.

Okada Haruo, a Diet member of the JSP, revealed in February 1965, that the Studies examined such serious problems as the bringing of nuclear weapons into Japan, the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces overseas, and the areas of Japan-United States joint operations in case of another Korean war.¹⁰ Although Prime Minister Sato tried to minimize the significance of the Studies by saying that "it was merely a war game on paper among the rank-and-file staff of the Defense Agency," the opposition parties bitterly denounced it as a secret war plan closely associated with the United States' strategic interest in making South Korea cooperate with Japan in the internationalization of the Vietnam war and the renewal of aggression against China and North Korea.

North Korea also stepped up its propaganda activities against the Sato government. Its major uneasiness stemmed from the deepening political and economic ties between Japan and South Korea. For example, in June 1967, when Sato visited Seoul to attend the presidential inauguration of Park Chung-hee, the Foreign Ministry of North Korea published a statement condemning Sato's visit to Seoul as an attempt to intensify Japanese militarists' aggressive maneuvers against South Korea. The statement went on that "the Japanese government is supplying South Korea with quantities of military goods and equipment needed for the preparation of a new war,

10. For the details of the so-called "Three Arrow Studies," see the Mainichi Shimbun, March 3, 1965.

while frequently sending its military personnel to South Korea to let them inspect military establishments and the area around the military demarcation line."¹¹

North Korea's denunciation of the Sato government continued. The Nodong Shinmun carried on August 31, 1967, an article entitled "Scheme of Japanese Militarists to Disorganize Anti-Imperialist Front in Asia." In the article, the Pyongyang authorities wrote that the Japanese government had tried to strengthen an anti-Communist alliance by accelerating its economic relations with developing countries in Asia and the Pacific. To this end, the article argued, Japan was deeply involved in forming a number of regional cooperative organizations, such as the Conference of Asian and Pacific Cooperation, the Asian Development Bank, the Conference for Agricultural Development in Southeast Asia, and the Ministerial Meeting for Southeast Asia Development.¹²

Although these North Korean accusations were mainly for the purpose of propaganda, one thing seemed clear: it was that the North Korean leadership had felt more and more insecure about the matter of national defense. It believed that the Japan-South Korea rapprochement would substantially contribute to the increase of the latter's economic and military capacity, thus eventually offsetting North Korea's military

11. The Nodong Shinmun, June 29, 1967.

12. Ibid., August 31, 1967.

strength.

Moreover, it was obvious that North Korea's anxiety about its national security had been considerably increased by the strengthening of the South Korea-United States alliance, and by the growing Sino-Soviet conflict. Since the mid-1960's, the alliance between South Korea and the United States had been further consolidated by the Park government's decision to dispatch its troops to the Vietnam war. The Johnson administration of the United States in turn pledged to extend its military assistance for the modernization of the South Korean armed forces.¹³

On the other hand, North Korea was dismayed by the widening split between the Soviet Union and China. These two Communist powers were the major sources of the security for the Pyongyang regime. As a means to detach itself from the Sino-Soviet conflict, North Korea proclaimed an independent line in its foreign relations. At the same time, it made a concerted effort to accelerate its military build-up, and adopted a policy aimed at intensifying its confrontation with South Korea and the United States. This North Korean policy made the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula more intense. Under these circumstances, the Sato government became

13. The Johnson administration's intention to assist South Korea in modernizing its armed forces was well expressed at the summit meeting between Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Park Chung-hee in Hawaii in April 1968. See the New York Times, April 18, 1968.

further concerned with keeping its close alliance with the United States and South Korea, while enforcing strict restrictions on relations with North Korea.

Growing tension on the Korean peninsula.--While carrying out the Seven-Year Economic Plan, Kim Il-sung stressed that greater efforts should be made to hasten the build-up of North Korea's military power. In accordance with this policy, North Korea allocated annually more than 30 percent of its national budget for military expenditures during the three years from 1967 through 1969, a big increase compared with the early 1960s' share of 19 percent.

Despite its proclamation of an independent policy line, the Pyongyang regime again turned to the Soviet Union in order to increase its military capacity. As a matter of fact, North Korea has been heavily dependent on Soviet military power. After the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, as described in Chapter II, North Korean-Soviet relations improved, while Sino-North Korean relations were cooling during the Cultural Revolution.

North Korea's tilt towards the Soviet Union was further stimulated by the United States' growing military operations in Vietnam, and by the emerging tripartite cooperation among the United States, Japan and South Korea after the conclusion of the Japan-South Korea Treaty. To cope with these situations, the North Korean leadership felt it necessary to lean on the Soviet Union, which was perceived as the only socialist state which could rival the United States in terms of modern mili-

tary strength. Following the Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Pyongyang in February 1965, North Korea and the Soviet Union signed a military agreement in Moscow, which provided that the Soviet Union should extend its military aid to further promote North Korea's military capacity. In accordance with this agreement, the Soviets supplied North Korea with jet fuel, anti-aircraft missiles, and a number of MIG-21's necessary to strengthen the North Korean air force.¹⁴

With the reinforcement of its military power, the North Korean regime also took a tough position toward South Korea. It was adopted at the 14th plenary meeting of the NKWP's Fourth Central Committee held in Pyongyang in October 1966. At the meeting, Kim Il-sung urged that the policy of seeking to unify Korea by peaceful means should be abandoned, and that a military policy towards South Korea should be pursued. Moreover, along with the adoption of such a hard-line position, the North Korean power structure was filled with such leaders as Kim Il-sung, Choe Yong-kon, Kim Il, and Kim Kwang-hyop, all of whom had military backgrounds. By contrast, such members of the NKWP's Presidium as Pak Kum-chol and Yi Hyo-sun, whose backgrounds were largely civilian in nature, were removed from the top-elite hierarchy of North Korea.¹⁵

14. Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975 (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978), p. 119.

15. For more details, see the New York Times, February 1, 1968.

In line with this militant policy, North Korea staged a number of armed confrontations towards South Korea and the United States. The most serious was the infiltration of the presidential residence in Seoul on January 21, 1968, by a North Korean commando team composed of 31 members. Two days after this provocation, the North Korean navy seized the USS Pueblo off the North Korean port city of Wonsan, and on April 15, 1969, North Korean forces shot down a U. S. reconnaissance plane EC-121 with 31 persons aboard. Because of these incidents, the Korean situation became the tensest since the Korean war.

The Japanese government took a very cautious attitude towards this tense situation. It ultimately sought to avoid a further deterioration of the situation, which might lead to a large-scale international conflict. Again, the opposition parties argued that Japan would run the risk of being embroiled in armed conflicts because of America's military facilities and bases on Japanese soil.¹⁶

But Japan was allied with the United States under the mutual security system. Prime Minister Sato criticized North Korea for its provocations towards South Korea and the United States, and warned that such provocative acts would considerably threaten peace and security of Northeast Asia. In conjunction with the tense Korean situation, the Sato government

16. Ibid., April 18, 1969.

tended to pay more attention to the matter of Japan's national security. It stressed that Japan should promote the Self-Defense Forces' capacity in consonance with her economic prosperity, and that she should also maintain close security ties with the United States.

Moreover, the Japanese government began to emphasize the practical necessity of linking the national security of Japan with that of South Korea. At the third regular Japan-ROK ministerial conference held in Tokyo in August 1969, both sides confirmed that the two countries were closely related to each other in "matters of security and prosperity."¹⁷ One month later, Sato said that as the international situations surrounding Japan remained as threatening as ever, as illustrated by the Vietnam war and by the North Korean military provocations on the peninsula, Japan should play a leading role in ensuring the stability of her neighboring nations.¹⁸ Once more, the Nixon-Sato joint communique, which was issued following the summit meeting in November 1969, declared that the security of South Korea was essentially linked to that of Japan.

In response, North Korea severely reproached the Sato government with its moves to bolster Japan's security arrangements. In July 1968, the Foreign Ministry of North Korea

17. See the text of the Japan-ROK joint communique, the Japan Times, August 29, 1969.

18. Ibid., September 26, 1969.

issued a memorandum censuring "Japanese Militarism." It said:¹⁹

The Japanese militarists, who are historically accustomed to acquiring a "windfall" with the support of a big power, and who had imposed upon the Korean people immeasurable calamities and sufferings by occupying Korea for nearly half a century, have been revived with the zealous patronage of the United States imperialists. They are again stretching tentacles of aggression and subjugation to South Korea.

North Korea's criticism of the revival of Japanese militarism was further advocated by the Kim Il-sung-Podgorny joint communique issued following the Soviet leader's visit to Pyongyang in May 1969. In the communique, both leaders argued that the United States, Japan and South Korea were trying to concoct a new military and political organization behind the signboard of Asian and Pacific cooperation.²⁰

One year later, in April 1970, when Chinese Premier Chou En-lai visited North Korea in an effort to win that country to his side against the Soviets, the Pyongyang regime was able to form a united front with China in denouncing the threat of "revived Japanese militarism." The joint communique issued after the talks between the two countries' leaders said that "Japan is planning to expand overseas by rapidly increasing her military power, increasing the number of military bases to a great extent, and hastening her pre-

19. The Nodong Shinmun, July 8, 1968.

20. Ibid., May 20, 1969.

parations for a war in Asia."²¹ This joint Sino-North Korea criticism of Japanese militarism was interpreted as a counter-move to the Nixon-Sato joint communique the previous year that announced that "the ROK and Taiwan are important for Japan."

But most noteworthy was that the communique between China and North Korea regarded Japan as a replacement for the United States. It pointedly affirmed that Japan wanted to participate in a war conspiracy against the Korean people and annex Taiwan into her sphere of influence. This communique also made it clear that both North Korea and China considered that after the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine, and especially after the Nixon-Sato agreement to return the administrative right over Okinawa to Japan in 1969, Japan might become a substitute for the United States in coping with Communist forces in Asia.

With these intensified verbal attacks, North Korea defined the Sato government as the most reactionary government that Japan had elected since the end of World War II. Accordingly, the Sato government did not try to soften its anti-Pyongyang position.

2. Confrontation diplomacy

Despite increasing antagonism between Japan and North Korea, the Sato government did not close its channel of com-

21. Ibid., April 9, 1970.

munications to that country. It tried to continue contacts with North Korea in social and economic areas without extending diplomatic recognition. But this policy was disturbed by North Korea's ever-toughening policy line, as described earlier. The Pyongyang regime embarked upon a policy of fomenting confrontation with the Japanese government. Such a policy was conducted primarily in two ways. One was to seek the solidarity of North Korea's ties with some leftist forces within Japan, including the JSP and the JCP, and even with certain members of the ruling LDP sympathetic to its position. The other was to raise some critical issues directly related to the Korean minority, with which the Sato government could not easily deal because of its relations with South Korea.

North Korea succeeded in making direct contacts with the LDP's Diet members in May 1965, when Utsunomiya Tokuma and his party, composed of a large number of Japanese Dietmen and businessmen, visited Pyongyang to attend the Japanese Trade Fair there. Utsunomiya Tokuma went to North Korea as President of the fair, and conferred with Kim Il-sung. He later stated that Kim Il-sung was greatly concerned with the promotion of bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea. It was reported that Kim Il-sung said at the meeting with Utsunomiya as follows: "Even though Japan may be a capitalist nation, there is a possibility for a big development of friendly relations between the two countries as long as Japan confirms the five principles of peaceful coexistence as proposed at

the Bandung Conference, and as long as Japan does not cooperate with America's aggression against Korea."²² Utsunomiya's visit was a good chance for North Korea to further its access to Japanese conservative circles. After his return to Tokyo, Utsunomiya became an influential lobbyist representing North Korea's interests. He once described the North Korean leadership as being imbued with "great dignity," and urged the Sato government to reverse its anti-Pyongyang policy.

The "comradely" ties between the Japanese and North Korean Communists were further bolstered by the visit of a 5-member JCP delegation, led by Miyamoto Kenji, member of the Presidium and General Secretary of the Central Committee, to Pyongyang in August 1968. In his speech welcoming the Miyamoto party, Kim Il-sung applauded the JCP as the vanguard of the Japanese working class struggling resolutely against American imperialist aggression in Vietnam, for the abrogation of the Japan-United States Security Treaty and the Japan-South Korea Treaty, and against the revival of Japanese militarism. As a reply, Miyamoto Kenji said that the international Communist movement and the world's people opposed to imperialism should be unified.²³ One year after the Miyamoto party returned to Tokyo, the JCP decided to station a permanent representative in Pyongyang, Yoshida Sukeharu, an alternate

22. The Yomiuri Shimbun, June 8, 1965.

23. The Nodong Shinmun, August 26, 1968.

member of the Presidium. The appointment of Yoshida seemed to be intended to gather information concerning North Korea's moves at a time when the Korean situation grew tenser than ever as a result of the Pueblo incident and the downing of a U. S. EC-121 aircraft.

North Korean leaders have continually made efforts to maintain close relations with the JSP. In August 1970, when such high-ranking party members as Narita Tomomi, Chairman of the JSP's Central Committee, and Ishibashi Masashi, Director of the JSP's Department of Foreign Affairs, paid a goodwill visit to Pyongyang, the North Korean Communists brought them to their side by attacking the Sato government's "reactionary" posture. In the joint communique, both sides insisted that the Sato government should stop its economic infiltration into South Korea, and strongly urged that it should abrogate the Japan-South Korea Treaty. The communique further stated that the Nixon Doctrine was part of the American aggressive policy of combining such Asian countries as South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, and Thailand into an anti-Communist military alliance with Japanese militarists as its backbone.²⁴

Also, as a means of intensifying its propaganda activities against the Sato government, North Korea tried to expand contacts with such Japanese and Korean organizations as the JKA and Chosoren. The Pyongyang authorities frequently invited

24. The Nodong Shinmun, September 3, 1970.

representatives of these organizations, and persuaded them to support North Korea's position. For instance, Hatanaka Masaharu, the JKA's Director General, visited Pyongyang in May 1969 following the downing of the U. S. EC-121 aircraft. During his three-week stay, Hatanaka talked with Kim Il-sung and other North Korean leaders. After his return to Japan, he busily engaged in communicating North Korea's position to various strata of Japanese society. In an interview with the Mainichi Shimbun on June 12, Hatanaka revealed that Kim Il-sung had said to him that the tense Korean situation was entirely created by America's provocations.²⁵

Meanwhile, North Korea increasingly confronted the Sato government by letting its front organization, Chosoren, raise several pending issues. These concerned the extension of the repatriation agreement, the free travel of Korean residents in Japan to and from North Korea, the education of the Korean minority, and the nationality of Korean residents.

The extension of the repatriation agreement.--This issue again came to the fore because of the Japanese government's formal decision to terminate the eight-year-old Calcutta agreement in April 1967. Following the government's decision, the JRC notified its counterpart in North Korea that the repatriation work would end as of November 12. There were two major reasons why the Sato government wanted to terminate

25. The Mainichi Shimbun, June 12, 1969.

the Calcutta agreement. One was that its original purpose had almost been achieved, as shown by a sharp drop in the number of Koreans wishing to go to North Korea. The other was that because the number of trading ships plying between Japan and North Korea had increased remarkably, ample opportunity for Koreans in Japan to travel to North Korea was available without any special subsidy by the Japanese government.²⁶ The JRC announced that under the Calcutta agreement, which had been put into effect on December 14, 1959, a total of 88,611 Korean residents were transported by Pyongyang-chartered Soviet ships until December 1967.²⁷

But the NKRC's Central Committee bitterly reviled the Japanese government's decision as a unilateral move directly violating Article 9 of the Calcutta agreement, which provided the problem concerning the extension of the repatriation should be made through the negotiations between the two sides. The authorities of the NKRC argued that there still remained some 600,000 Korean residents in Japan, and that the Japanese move was a naked challenge to humanitarianism and the principles of international law.²⁸

In particular, the North Korean Vice-Premier Pak Sung-chol condemned the Japanese government's decision as part

26. The Far Eastern Research Institute, Pukhan Chonso (General book on North Korea) (Seoul: 1974), Vol. III, p. 192.

27. Ibid., p. 191.

28. The Nodong Shinmun, May 16, 1967.

of its hostile policy towards North Korea.²⁹ From their standpoint, the Pyongyang authorities have made extensive efforts to extend the repatriation agreement. Chosoren and its affiliates launched campaigns for the extension of the Calcutta agreement. They actively sponsored mass rallies and increased their propaganda activities for the purpose of pressing the Sato government to change its position on the termination of the repatriation agreement. These campaigns were strongly supported by Japanese opposition parties and labor unions.

However, the Sato government and the JRC would not change their basic position, although they tried to talk with the Pyongyang authorities in order to discuss the further repatriation of some 15,000 Koreans, who had already applied but could not return by the time the old repatriation agreement expired on November 12. Representatives of the JRC and the NKRC met as many as 16 times in Moscow (August 25 through September 23, 1967), and 25 times in Columbo (November 27, 1967 through January 24, 1968).³⁰ But these talks were unsuccessful because of their diametrically opposing positions. The Japanese side proposed that the 15,000 Koreans should be repatriated to North Korea over a "provisional" period of six months on terms similar to those of the old agreement, and that at the end of that period, those Koreans wishing to

29. Ibid., July 14, 1967.

30. The Far Eastern Research Institute, op. cit., p. 192.

return to North Korea would be accorded the same treatment as ordinary aliens. In opposition to these proposals, the North Korean side insisted that the repatriation work be conducted according to the previous methods over an indeterminate period.³¹ Moreover, according to the report of the chief delegate of the JRC, Tanabe Shigeo, the North Korean side had taken a tough position during the last stage of negotiations by proposing to "write the contents of the talks into a document and let the document have legal binding forces."³² Owing to these differences between both sides, the repatriation issue could not be solved until February 1971, when representatives of the JRC and the NKRC signed a new agreement.

It seemed clear that the negotiations had been affected by the Japan-South Korea rapprochement. During the talks, the Seoul government had lodged strong protests with the Japanese government. It even warned that if the Japanese government permitted the repatriation anew, the diplomatic ties between Japan and South Korea would be jeopardized.³³ At the same time, it was surmised that the North Korean delegation's sudden tough position at the talks might be linked to its government's

31. For North Korea's position in regard to the repatriation talks, see the Nodong Shinmun, September 27, or November 28, 1967.

32. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 29, 1968.

33. FBIS, Daily Report (Asia and the Pacific: South Korea), November 30, 1967.

hard-line policy towards South Korea at that time. This view was supported by the fact that the infiltration of a North Korean commando team into Seoul and the seizure of the Pueblo took place when the talks came to a halt.

Korean residents' free travel to North Korea and the entry of North Koreans into Japan.--The demand of Koreans in Japan for free travel to and from North Korea had continually remained a major issue pending between North Korea and Japan. What worsened the situation further was North Korea's request for the Japanese government to allow North Koreans to visit Japan. Since 1965, the Pyongyang authorities have urged that personal exchanges between the two countries should be equal and reciprocal. In an interview with the Asahi Shimbun in February, just before the signing of the Japan-South Korea Treaty, the North Korean Vice-Premier Yi Ju-yon criticized the Japanese government for its continuous opposition to the entry of North Koreans into Japan. He said that "thousands of Japanese trading company representatives have visited North Korea since the Korean war, but the North Korean delegates have never visited Japan, because the Japanese government was firmly opposed to it."³⁴

The Sato government, however, was not willing to change its previous position on that matter. It took a position that personal exchanges between Japan and North Korea should be

34. The Asahi Shimbun, February 18, 1965.

conducted on a case-by-case basis. In accordance with this policy line, the Sato government had not permitted the re-entry of Korean residents after their travels to North Korea except in a few special cases, such as visits to relatives and ancestral graves. For instance, in August 1968, the Justice Ministry of Japan turned down the applications for re-entry permits of twelve pro-Pyongyang Koreans who were to attend celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK on the grounds that they were linked to political activities. By contrast, the Japanese government had issued reentry permits to Koreans wishing to travel to North Korea twice in 1965 and 1968. In response to South Korea's protests, the Japanese government explained that these measures were taken "entirely from the humanitarian point of view."

With regard to the entry of North Koreans into Japan, the Sato government adhered to the policy of not approving any entry except for those concerned with the NKRC and with athletic contests, such as the Tokyo Olympics in 1965, and the Sapporo Winter Olympic Games in 1972. Accordingly, a four-member group of the Olympic Committee of North Korea arrived in Tokyo on December 22, 1970, for the purpose of inspecting facilities of winter sport arenas in Sapporo. But the applications for North Korean entry into Japan in other cases had been refused. In August 1966, despite the opposition parties' strong protests, the Sato government made a final decision not to issue visas to North Korea technicians, who had been

promised entry into the country under a provisional contract between a Japanese company and North Korea two years previously.³⁵ The North Korean authorities insisted that prior to the conduct of plant transactions with Japanese companies, North Korean technicians be able to inspect personally.

In July 1968, the government of Japan also refused the entry into Japan of North Korea's delegation to attend the 14th World Meeting Against A-H Bombs. Again, North Korea's attempt to send a powerful delegation to the JCP's 11th national convention held in Tokyo in July 1970 was frustrated by the Japanese government's opposition to its visit. This policy of the Japanese government was reaffirmed by Vice-Foreign Minister Mori Haruki's statement on July 30, 1970, declaring that his government had no intention of changing its long-established policy of banning the issuance of visas to North Koreans and reentry permits to Korean residents in Japan after their visits to North Korea.³⁶

It was obvious that these measures against North Korea and leftist Korean residents in Japan were taken by the Sato government because of its commitment to the promotion of friendly relations with South Korea. But they were character-

35. On June 3, 1966, Toko Busan Co. filed applications with the Justice Ministry of Japan on behalf of four North Koreans wishing to enter Japan to negotiate about a chemical plant transaction. The four included Gong Jin-tai, Director of the North Korean Plant Imports Corporation, and three technicians. For more details, see the Japan Times, June 4, 1966.

36. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), July 30, 1970.

ized by the Pyongyang authorities as a criminal act against the will of the entire Korean people.

The education of the Korean minority.--North Korea also assaulted the Japanese government's policy in regard to the education of Korean residents in Japan. Since the end of the Korean war, the Pyongyang authorities have been considerably interested in educating Korean youths in Japan. They have sent a large amount of educational funds to Chosoren,³⁷ which had a major responsibility for carrying out the so-called "democratic, national education" of Koreans in accordance with the rules and regulations of the North Korean educational system. Chosoren organized the Korean Education Association in Japan (Zainichi Chosenjin Kyoikukai) as its sub-organ for supervising all educational activities. This association was also assisted by two other organizations, such as the Korean Teachers League and the Korean Student League.³⁸

The authorities of North Korea and Chosoren were primarily interested in establishing schools throughout Japan for the education of the Korean minority. In 1956, they founded a two-year college named Choson University at the campus of a Korean high school in Tokyo. It moved to the present site in Kodaira city, Tokyo in 1959. As Han Dok-su, the Chosoren's Chairman,

37. Until October 1970, North Korea had sent to Chosoren a total of 362,850,500 yen under the name of educational funds. For more details, see the Far Eastern Research Institute, op. cit., p. 178.

38. Ibid., pp. 183-184.

said, the basic goal of Choson University was not only to provide Korean youths with a democratic, national education, but also to arm them with a Communist political ideology.³⁹ The Japanese government frowned upon Chosoren's educational activities aimed at indoctrinating Korean residents with Communism. But it could not exercise any legal administrative control over them, because under the School Education Law of 1947, the jurisdiction of the educational facilities and activities of "miscellaneous schools" was held by local government.⁴⁰

Under these circumstances, the Sato government began to feel it necessary for the central government effectively to control the aliens' over-all educational activities. For this purpose, the Ministry of Education attempted to revise the School Education Law of 1947, and submitted a new bill called "the Alien School System" bill to the Diet in 1966. This bill was intended to put restrictions on Chosoren's educational activities. It provided a clause forbidding alien schools from

39. See Changsoo Lee, "Chosoren: An Analysis of the Korean Communist Movement in Japan," Journal of Korean Affairs, Vol. III, No. 2, July 1973, p. 25.

40. According to Chapter VIII, Miscellaneous Regulations, of the School Education Law of 1947, miscellaneous schools are not regular schools but the schools which conduct education for particular vocational skills or techniques. The Law also provided that necessary matters concerning miscellaneous schools should be decided by the prefectural governor. For more details, see General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Post-war Developments in Japanese Education (Tokyo: 1952), Vol. I, pp. 129-147.

conducting education which was considered harmful to Japan's national interests. The bill was also designed to provide the Ministry of Education with the final authority to decide what aspect of education could be considered harmful. Furthermore, according to the bill, the Ministry of Education was to have the authority to establish or close alien schools and to investigate school administrations, teaching courses, and textbooks.⁴¹

North Korea strongly opposed the bill. Its opposition to the bill was supported by some leftist jurists of Japan, who argued that the Korean right to conduct national education was secured not only by principles of international law, but also by the Japanese constitution.⁴² The situation grew worse in April 1966, when Chosoren formally submitted the application for accreditation for Choson University to the Tokyo prefectural government. After the application was filed, Azuma Ryutaro, then Tokyo prefectural governor, postponed his decision, and the Prime Minister's Chief Secretary stated its acceptance as undesirable.

41. For contents of the Alien School System bill, see the Akahata, March 27, 1966.

42. In the fall of 1966, leading Japanese jurists held a symposium to discuss the "Alien School System" bill. Some opponents of the bill, including Yamazaki Masahide, argued that the Japanese constitution provides that all people shall have the fundamental right to receive an equal education in Japan regardless of their national origins. For more details, see Changsoo Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

Faced with the Japanese government's negative response, Chosoren and its affiliates, under the direction of North Korea, launched a campaign against the Alien School System bill and for the accreditation of Choson University. They tried to mobilize support from all quarters of Japanese society. Many Japanese and Korean forces which had been doggedly opposed to the conclusion of the Japan-ROK Treaty participated in such a campaign.

In April 1967, when Minobe Ryokichi, economics professor and socialist, was elected the new governor of the Tokyo prefecture, Chosoren gained a great ally. Shortly after his inauguration, Minobe took the measure of transferring the matter of accrediting Choson University to the newly-installed Private School Council for recommendation. Meanwhile, the Sato government and the LDP asked Governor Minobe not to make his final decision until the Alien School System bill was passed in the Diet. But some leftist Japanese groups formed an organization called the Petitioning Assembly of the Scientists Demanding the Accreditation of Choson University in September 1967, and rendered a strong warning to the Ministry of Education to refrain from exerting any undue pressure on Governor Minobe.⁴³ This new organization also launched a campaign to obtain the signatures of all university professors sympathetic to the accreditation of Choson University.

43. Ibid., p. 29.

Moreover, the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly adopted in December a petition requesting the accreditation, and many public figures, such as Nakano Yoshino, Watamori Taro, and Mutai Risaku, strongly demanded its quick approval. Under growing pressure from many quarters of Japanese society, the Governor, despite the Private School Council's report pointing out "inadequacy of approval,"⁴⁴ announced on April 18, 1968, his decision to grant accreditation to Choson University. And the LDP also decided to delay the deliberation of the Alien School System bill to a later date.

As a result, North Korea and Chosoren succeeded in obtaining the accreditation of Choson University, but the matter became another factor to further trouble bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea.

The nationality of Korean residents.--The confrontation between Japan and North Korea was further intensified by the latter's intense protests against the Sato government's policy on the treatment of Korean residents in Japan. After the conclusion of the Japan-ROK Treaty, the Japanese government clarified its formal position in regard to that matter as follows: (1) among Korean residents in Japan, the nationality registration as "Kankoku" (South Korea) in the column of foreigners' registration books would be recognized as the "ROK"

⁴⁴. "Establishment of North Korean University Was Recognized," Japan Socialist Review, No. 155, May 11, 1968, pp. 22-24.

officially; (2) conversely, the entry "Chosen" (North Korea) in such registration books would not be interpreted as any indication of nationality, but would be treated as a mere term indicating Koreans who came to Japan from the Korean peninsula; and (3) the government would permit Korean residents to switch their registration from "Chosen" to "Kankoku" or "Daikan Min-koku," but not recognize in principle a change in reverse.⁴⁵

These actions actually ran counter to North Korea's interest in bringing the loyalty of the Korean minority to its side. In regard to this matter, the Pyongyang authorities bitterly attacked the Sato government. They argued that the "reactionary" Sato government tried to impose the ROK nationality on Korean residents under the pretext of renewing the foreigners' registration books, and by using all methods of deception, threat, and coercion against them.

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, a large number of Koreans in Japan have switched their nationality to that of "Kankoku" in the registration books, and obtained permanent residency under the Immigration Control Ordinance of Japan. By contrast, the number of Koreans who applied for the registration of their nationality as "Chosen" continued to decrease.⁴⁶

Generally speaking, all these bilaterally-pending

⁴⁵. For the details, see the Yomiuri Shimbun, October 27, 1965.

⁴⁶. The Far Eastern Research Institute, op. cit., p. 197.

issues were provided by North Korea for the purpose of embarrassing the Sato government, which had just established diplomatic relations with South Korea. By bringing these issues to the surface, the North Korean Communists were able to draw some anti-Sato forces in Japan nearer to their position. Moreover, they tried to use such forces as a lever on the Sato government's basic policy aimed at promoting the diplomatic and economic cooperation with South Korea.

3. Stagnant economic relations

During the 1965-1970 period, economic relations between Japan and North Korea were affected to some extent by the increasing political hostility between the two countries. There were no significant moves towards progress in their economic relations. Although the Pyongyang authorities expressed their desire of expanding trade with Japan even after the conclusion of the Japan-ROK Treaty, commercial transactions did not flourish between the two countries.

The Sato government had kept its stern attitude towards commerce with North Korea. Sato declared in the Diet in June 1966, that Japan was not in a position to promote economic relations with North Korea in line with her policy of separating economic affairs from politics. Instead, all pending issues between the two countries, he said, should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.⁴⁷ This signified a minor retreat

47. The Japan Times, June 7, 1966.

from Japan's previous position, which had been formulated under the Ikeda government, stressing the principle of "seikei bunri" as a policy line to expand cultural and economic relations with Communist countries, including North Korea. Furthermore, the Prime Minister stated that in consideration of the growing tension on the Korean peninsula, Japan-North Korea trade should be subject to severe restrictions.⁴⁸

In accordance with this policy, the Sato government did not approve the entry of North Korean technicians into Japan, long-term deferred payment exports (the maximum period was limited to three years), and the use of Export-Import Bank funds for trade with North Korea.

Despite these obstacles, economic exchanges between the Japanese business community and North Korea continued on a non-official basis. In May 1965, the Japanese Trade Fair was held in Pyongyang for the first time since the end of World War II. This fair had originally been planned under an agreement between the JKTA and North Korea the previous year. About 80 representatives from Japanese trading companies, including a number of Diet members, participated in the fair. Utsunomiya Tokuma, as described earlier, visited North Korea as President of the fair, and had conversations with such North Korean leaders as Vice-Premier Yi Ju-yon and Foreign Trade Vice-Minister Kye Ung-te. At the meeting, both sides agreed to make

48. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), March 29, 1968.

efforts to facilitate North Korea's plant imports from Japan. But it was reported that the fair had some difficulties. The period of the fair was shortened from three weeks as scheduled to one week from May 25 through 31 as a result of the imminent signing of the Japan-South Korea Treaty. Utsunomiya later said that the fair had been dominated by an anti-Japanese mood. Moreover, business negotiations at the fair were minimal because of the great difference in the comparative prices of commodities.⁴⁹

Five years later, in May 1970, the first North Korean Commodity Fair was held in Tokyo. It was sponsored by the Tonghae Trading Co. of Japan with the cooperation of Chosoren. In his opening address, Han Dok-su again argued that Japan-North Korea trade was mainly hindered by the Sato government's hostile policy toward North Korea.⁵⁰

The annual trade volume between Japan and North Korea has exhibited a varying rate of fluctuation. As Table VI indicates, during the first two years after the conclusion of the Japan-ROK Treaty, the volume of two-way trade between the two countries decreased a little as compared with that of 1964. In 1965, it amounted to about US \$31.2 million, a decrease of almost 1 percent over that of the previous year (US \$31.5 million). In 1966, it further dropped to about US \$27.7 mil-

49. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 31, 1965.

50. The Choson Shinbo, May 16, 1970.

Table VI
Annual volume of trade between
Japan and North Korea: 1965-1970

(US \$1,000)

Year	North Korea's Exports	North Korea's Imports	Total
1965	14,723	16,505	31,228
1966	22,692	5,016	27,708
1967	29,606	6,370	35,976
1968	34,632	20,748	54,780
1969	32,186	24,159	56,345
1970	34,414	23,344	57,758

Source: Nitcho Boeki (Japan-North Korea trade) (Tokyo),
 March 1975.

lion. This decrease in Japan-North Korea trade was a direct result of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea. As the long-delayed negotiations between Japan and South Korea were concluded in 1965, major Japanese trading companies tended to refrain from conducting their commerce with North Korea. They adopted an attitude of "waiting and seeing" the effect of the Japan-South Korea rapprochement on economic relations between Japan and North Korea. In 1966, the total volume of North Korea's exports to Japan amounted to about US \$22.7 million, while its imports from Japan dropped sharply to about US \$5 million, the trade balance running in North Korea's favor by a margin of 5 to 1.

In 1967, North Korea's imports from Japan remained at the level of the previous year, totalling about US \$6.4 million. But the volume of its exports to Japan increased slightly

to about US \$29.6 million, when compared with approximately US \$22.7 million the year before. Starting in 1968, trade between Japan and North Korea began to expand rapidly. During the year, the total volume of two-way trade between the two countries amounted to about US \$54.8 million, an increase of some 50 percent over the previous year. Most noteworthy was the rise of North Korea's imports from Japan from about US \$ 6.4 million in 1967 to almost US \$20.7 million in 1968. This was mainly due to a sudden increase of North Korea's machine tool purchases from Japanese markets. At this time, North Korea stepped up its buying of industrial facilities and equipment, including lathes, drill presses, and other machine tools in order to implement the Seven-Year Economic Plan which was finally getting under way.

Since then, the volume of trade between Japan and North Korea increased at a modest annual rate. In 1969, a total of US \$56.3 million exchanged hands in direct trade between the two countries. Of this amount, North Korea's exports were worth about US \$32.2 million, while its imports about US \$ 24.2 million. The trade balance was still in favor of North Korea. The year 1970 showed a similar trend in Japan-North Korea trade to that of the previous year. Its total volume in 1970 amounted to about US \$57.8 million, an increase of about 2.5 percent over 1969.

But Since 1969, a new tendency has appeared in trade between Japan and North Korea. It was caused by North Korea's

growing concern about a large-scale purchase of various plant equipment from Japan. Until late 1969, North Korea had submitted to Japanese trading companies inquiries about such large equipment purchases as a 10,000-ton freighter, a power generation plant, a synthetic fiber plant and an oil refining plant.⁵¹ Paralleling this tendency, North Korea's imports from Japan in 1970 were heavily concentrated on such industrial products as machine tools and chemicals, amounting to more than 65 percent of its total imports (US \$23.3 million). On the other hand, most of its exports to Japan consisted of raw materials, such as iron ore, zinc, and various non-ferrous metals, their total volume accounting for about 60 percent of its total exports (US \$34.4 million).⁵²

However, the high-priced business transactions between Japan and North Korea were considerably restricted by the previously-mentioned obstacles. To conduct these transactions, the entry of North Korean technicians and personages in charge of trade with Japan had to be secured, and long-term deferred payments for trade between the two countries had to be approved by the Japanese government.

Although in 1970 North Korea became Japan's fourth largest trading partner among Communist countries behind

51. The Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, April 24, 1970.

52. Tsusho Hakusho: 1971 (White paper of the MITI) (Tokyo: Tsusansho, 1971), pp. 735-738.

China, the Soviet Union, and Poland, the trade volume between the two countries was still negligible, when compared with that of Japan-China trade, its total amount that year increasing to about US \$822.7 million. In fact, Japan-China trade increased sharply under the Sato government. It was mainly attributed to the growing interest of Japanese businessmen in trade with China, and also to the emerging pro-Peking forces within the ruling LDP. But trade relations between Japan and North Korea did not improve because of the Sato government's firm policy aimed at strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with South Korea. In line with the government's policy, major Japanese businessmen were increasingly concerned with the expansion of their commercial transactions with South Korea rather than North Korea. As a result, the total trade volume between Japan and South Korea in 1970 amounted to about US \$1 billion, almost 20 times as large as that between Japan and North Korea in the same year.

4. Summary

In general, Japanese-North Korean relations during the period from 1965 through 1970 were characterized as a high degree of antagonism. The North Korean leadership defined the Sato government as an embodiment of Japanese militarism in the postwar era. For its part, the Sato government did not want to modify its anti-Pyongyang position, while still considering North Korea a possible threat to peace and security

in Northeast Asia. Moreover, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku often emphasized that in terms of Japan's national security interest, she should endeavor to promote diplomatic and economic ties with South Korea.

In accordance with this policy line, the Sato government, from its inauguration in 1964, attempted to deal with the critical issues pending between Japan and North Korea, including the extension of the repatriation agreement, free travel of Korean residents in Japan to and from North Korea, the legal status and treatment of Korean residents, and the terms of trade with North Korea, on a case-by-case basis.

First of all, the conclusion of the Japan-South Korea Treaty was the most crucial factor in the deterioration of Japanese-North Korean relations. In the Treaty, Japan officially recognized that the ROK was the only sovereign state on the Korean peninsula divided into two parts. As an immediate response, North Korea declared that the Japan-South Korea Treaty was entirely "null and void," and denounced it as a plot of the United States to bring Japan and South Korea into its aggressive policy in Asia. The opposition parties and some social organizations in Japan also launched nationwide campaigns against the ratification of the Treaty in the Diet. Even after the Diet finally ratified the Treaty, Japanese opposition forces, including the JSP and the JCP, continued to support North Korea's position in regard to many pending issues between Japan and North Korea, such as the extension

of the repatriation agreement, Korean residents' education and free travel to and from North Korea. However, these leftist forces failed to lead the conservative government to change its basic anti-Pyongyang policy.

Since 1965, South Korea has constantly sought to exert pressure on the Japanese government not to adopt any measures of encouraging North Korea's approach to Japan. Whenever the Sato government seemed to soften its position towards the Pyongyang regime, the Park government of South Korea lodged strong protests with it, saying that such moves would run counter to the basic purpose of the Japan-ROK Treaty. On these occasions, Japanese leaders responded by declaring that in view of Japan's "special" relations with South Korea, they could not pursue a policy of furthering cultural and economic exchanges between Japan and North Korea.

Second, the Sato government seemed to strengthen its anti-Pyongyang posture in proportion to the intensity of North Korea's confrontation with the United States. As the Vietnam war was escalating, the North Korean Communists heightened their propaganda activities and military provocations against the United States. They argued that all socialist nations should cooperate with each other to assist North Vietnam and the South Vietnam National Liberation Front (Vietcong) in their fight against the American war machine. In addition, as the Japan-South Korea negotiations were concluded, the Pyongyang authorities were inclined to regard the Japan-ROK

Treaty as a springboard for the anti-Communist military alliance in Northeast Asia, which the United States had long sought. In spite of the criticism North Korea leveled against the United States, the tripartite relationship among the United States, Japan and South Korea became closer than ever after the conclusion of the Japan-ROK Treaty.

South Korea, which had concluded the mutual defense treaty with the United States, dispatched its troops into the Vietnam war, and Japan, despite her intention not to cooperate with the United States in the war, continually let America use its military bases and facilities in Japan in accordance with the Japan-United States Security Treaty. Under these circumstances, the North Korean regime began to feel a sense of insecurity in regard to its external defense. The North Korea-United States confrontation had reached its peak in the late 1960's, when the Pueblo was seized and the U. S. EC-121 aircraft was shot down by the North Korean armed forces. In response to these provocations, the Sato government of Japan gave support to the United States, while bitterly denouncing North Korea.

Lastly, Japanese-North Korean relations were further troubled by the growing tension between South and North Korea. Such tension was initiated by North Korea's adoption of a tough policy line toward South Korea. Starting in the mid-1960's, North Korea emphasized the strengthening of its military power. In the late 1960's, it embarked upon a policy of

infiltration and guerrilla activities against South Korea, climaxed by the invasion of Seoul in 1968 by a 31-member commando team. Faced with threats from North Korea, the South Korean government made extensive efforts to solidify its alliance with the United States and to reinforce its own defense capacity.

As North-South Korean relations became the tensest since the Korean war, Japanese conservative leaders began to look upon the Korean situation very seriously. They tended to regard it as potentially detrimental to Japan's national security. At last, Prime Minister Sato agreed with President Nixon in declaring that a secure South Korea was essential for Japan in terms of her own national security interest, as revealed in their joint communique of 1969. Moreover, Sato took the position that Japan should play a positive role in deterring North Korea's threat to stability on the peninsula. As a result, Japan's national security problem led the Sato government to strengthen its ties with South Korea, while maintaining an unfriendly attitude toward North Korea.

CHAPTER VII

THE ACCOMMODATIVE RELATIONSHIP: 1971-1977

From the early 1970's, bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea have taken a new course. Both Japan and North Korea began to make concerted efforts to improve their relations, even though there were considerable differences in political beliefs and social systems. The Japanese government moved to soften its anti-Pyongyang posture and officially sought to promote economic and cultural exchanges in spite of the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Moreover, a broad spectrum of Japanese political and economic groups, including some members of the ruling LDP, urged the government to end its policy of antagonizing the Pyongyang regime.

North Korea had similarly shown a more flexible attitude toward Japan. For example, Kim Il-sung stated in October 1971, that his country was ready to embark upon a policy of seeking friendly relations regardless of the differences in their respective social and political systems.¹ This statement was a reflection of North Korea's willingness to improve relations with Japan in view of the changing international environment highlighted by the emergence of detente among the major powers.

1. FBIS, Daily Report (Asia and the Pacific: Japan), October 8, 1971.

Owing to these accommodative moves by the two countries, social and cultural exchanges between them increased remarkably and trade relations nearly achieved normality during the period from 1971 through 1977. But the Japanese government still held the position that the time was not ripe for Japan to extend diplomatic recognition to the DPRK. The development of this relationship between Japan and North Korea has basically been affected by the following factors: the Sino-American rapprochement, the South-North Korean dialogue, Japan's domestic political cleavages, and North Korea's growing economic interest.

1. Towards political reconciliation

Detente and Japan's North Korea policy.--In general, detente means that the international system is changing from the East-West bipolar structure into a "polycentric" alignment. This structural change was particularly striking in Northeast Asia, where the strategic interests of the major powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, were so intricately intertwined. In this region, the emergence of the four-power alignment was mainly due to such factors as the growth of Soviet military strength into that of a superpower, the ever-widening conflict between the Soviet Union and China, Japan's advance as an economic power, and America's quandary with the Vietnam war.

Under these new international circumstances, Japan was

forced to re-evaluate her previous policies toward China and North Korea. The most critical problem facing Japan was to resolve the China issue, which had been pending for more than two decades. Since the conclusion of the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty in 1954, the Japanese government had recognized the Taiwan government as the sole legitimate Chinese government. But in the early 1970's, this perspective was seriously challenged by the occurrence of two historic events: the sudden announcement of President Nixon's plan to visit Peking and the United Nations decision to seat the People's Republic of China in place of the Republic of China.

Most critics of Japanese policy pointed out that the Sato government demonstrated little flexibility in coping with the rapidly changing international situation, being much too dependent on the policy of the United States. They also said that in view of "an emerging triangular relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union and China," the Japanese government should have made efforts to increase its independent diplomatic maneuverability.² As soon as his government was inaugurated in July 1972, new Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei declared that the solution of the China issue was Japan's number one foreign policy priority. Upon his visit to Peking in September, the Japanese Prime Minister finally succeeded in normalizing diplomatic relations with the Peking regime.

2. The Asahi Shimbun, March 15, 1972.

With the settling of the China issue, the Tanaka government started to pay more attention to Japan's relations with North Korea. Unlike the former Sato government, it began to take a shifting position on a wide range of economic, cultural and other non-political exchanges with North Korea. The Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi officially stated that Japan would not establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, but tried to improve relations with that country in non-political areas.³ Going beyond this formal stand, certain members of conservative political circles strongly urged the government to show greater flexibility in its Pyongyang policy. They even argued that Japan's policy of linking her own security to that of South Korea, as envisaged in the 1969 Nixon-Sato joint communique, should be renounced, and that the government, in view of the new international situations, should pursue a "two-Koreas" policy on the basis of de facto recognition of the Pyongyang regime.⁴ Some of them tried to make direct contacts with North Korean leaders as a means of

3. The Japan Times, October 30, 1972.

4. This view, for example, was expressed by former Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio. He argued that if a major change in regard to the Korean problem in the United Nations, Japan should consider recognizing the Pyongyang regime. Moreover, he said that Japan's national security was linked not to peace and stability of South Korea, but to peace on the entire Korean peninsula. In other words, Kimura tried to modify the so-called "South Korean clause," as provided in the 1969 Nixon-Sato joint communique. See *ibid.*, August 20, 1974.

promoting friendly relations between the two countries. These moves resulted in a growing split within the ruling LDP over the Korean problem.

Japanese political cleavages.--Advocates of the Japan-North Korea rapprochement were greatly boosted by the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between Japan and China. They believed that the next logical step for Japan was to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea. They were further encouraged by the opening of South-North Korean talks. Now that representatives of South and North Korea were holding talks in order to peacefully reunify their country, they argued, the Japanese government should put a halt to its "discriminatory" policy towards North Korea, and instead strive for the establishment of diplomatic relations with that country.⁵

A great impetus to the seeking of better relations between Japan and North Korea was given in November 1971, when a large number of the LDP Dietmen participated in a meeting to form a supra-partisan Dietmen's League for Promotion of Friendship between Japan and North Korea held at the Lower House Dietmen's hall in Tokyo. The meeting adopted a resolution declaring that "it is regrettable that we have been neglectful of establishing friendly relations with North Korea; normalization of diplomatic relations and the estab-

5. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), August 27, 1971.

lishment of friendly relations between the two countries, Japan and North Korea, should be quickly materialized."

The participants in the meeting also agreed to make the utmost effort to realize the early normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and to launch various activities, such as the expansion of exchanges in the areas of economy, culture, arts, sports, science and technology; continuation of the repatriation work for Koreans in Japan; guarantee of their free travel to North Korea and protection of their livelihood; and support of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.⁶

A sizable number of Dietmen, 246 out of 751 members in the Diet, participated in the new organization, as shown in Table VII. At the meeting, Kuno Chuji, a senior LDP member, was elected Chairman; Ashika Kaku, a JSP member, and Nozue Kazuhiko, a Niin Club member, Deputy Chairman; and Antaku Tsunehiko, a JSP member, Secretary-General. The inauguration of the Dietmen's League was a sign of the intra-party conflict within the LDP over the Korean problem. It seemed to follow the same pattern as the debate over the China issue.

But the LDP members who participated in the Dietmen's League were still weak in numerical strength when compared

6. For the details of the formation of the Dietmen's League, see the Tokyo Shimbun, or the Japan Times, November 17. 1971.

Table VII
The composition of the Dietmen's League

Party	Lower House	Upper House	Total
The LDP	31	none	31
The JSP	90	65	155
The Komeito	10	5	15
The DSP	10	5	15
The JCP	14	10	24
Independent	2	none	2
Niin Club	none	4	4
Total	157	89	246

Source: The Tokyo Shimbun and the Japan Times, November 17, 1971.

with 428 LDP Diet members in all.⁷ But it should be noted that most of the LDP participants in the Dietmen's League belonged to the Afro-Asian Problems Study Group within the LDP, which had played a leading role in bringing about the Sino-Japanese rapprochement.

North Korea immediately welcomed the establishment of the Dietmen's League as "a fruit of the valuable efforts of the Japanese people and progressive figures who have tirelessly struggled to develop friendly relations between the Korean and Japanese people."⁸

7. As of August 1972, the number of LDP Lower House members amounted to 295, while that of its Upper House members to 133. See Nihon Seikei Shimbunsha, Kokkai Benran (Handbook for the Diet) (Tokyo: 1972), p. 57 and 84.

8. The Nodong Shinmun, November 18, 1971.

The Dietmen's League soon started making contacts with North Korean leaders. As its first step, the organization sent a goodwill mission headed by Kuno Chuji to North Korea in January 1972.⁹ This mission was composed of Kuno, three members of the JSP, two members each from the Komeito, the DSP and the JCP, and a member of the Niin Club. During their stay in Pyongyang, the members of the Kuno mission held talks with the North Korean leadership. After a series of talks, both sides issued a joint statement signed by Kang Yang-uk, Chairman of the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and all the members of the Japanese mission. As the basic principle underlying the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, the statement included the following points.¹⁰

(1) The removing of the abnormal relations between Japan and North Korea as early as possible is to meet equally the interests of the two peoples.

(2) It is necessary for both countries to promote personnel, economic, and cultural exchanges on the basis of reciprocity.

9. Originally, three other LDP Diet members, besides Kuno Chuji, had been scheduled to visit Pyongyang. But they cancelled their plan because of the LDP leadership's strong opposition. The LDP Secretary General Hori Shigeru reportedly told them that the trip was ill-timed in view of the tense situation on the Korean peninsula. See the Japan Times, January 14 and 15, 1972.

10. Ibid., January 26, 1972.

(3) The Japanese government should refrain from any attempt to obstruct peaceful unification of Korea or to intervene in Korean internal affairs.

(4) The Japanese government should also stop pursuing any unfriendly policies towards North Korea.

(5) Korean residents in Japan should be given all rights of activities under the principle of international law.

Kuno's mission also signed an agreement on the expansion of trade between the two countries. (This agreement will be discussed later.) The visit of the supra-partisan mission of Japan to North Korea obviously created a major channel for communicating the Pyongyang regime's interests to the Japanese public, especially to ruling conservative circles. In response to the Kuno-Kang joint statement, Prime Minister Sato made it clear that his government still had no intention of establishing governmental-level contact with the North Korean regime, but would not take any unfriendly position towards that regime.¹¹

The activities of the Dietmen's League were substantially reinforced by such opposition forces as the JSP, the Komeito, the JCP, and many leftist mayors and local assemblymen. In particular, Chosoren was closely linked to the Dietmen's League in promoting friendly relations between the two countries. Vigorous efforts were made especially by the JSP and

11. Ibid., February 2, 1972.

the Komeito. The JSP, maintaining that "the postwar period will not end until Japan's relations with North Korea are normalized," pressed the conservative government to modify its passive policy towards North Korea. Just one week before the departure of Kuno's mission to Pyongyang, the JSP sent a delegation, headed by Kawasaki Kanji, Director of the JSP's International Bureau, to North Korea, and let its members open talks with North Korean leaders. At the meeting with Kawasaki, Kim Il-sung revealed his sensitivity to the changing international situation. For example, Kim said that now that China occupied its seat in the United Nations, the United States should abandon its containment policy towards Communist countries in Asia.¹²

Relations between North Korea and the Komeito grew closer with the visit of a Komeito delegation to Pyongyang in May 1972. It was the first time that a Komeito delegation had visited North Korea since the end of World War II. The delegation, led by Takeiri Yoshikatsu, Chairman of the Komeito, conferred with North Korean leaders, including Kim Il-sung, and signed a joint communique declaring that the Komeito would strive for the promotion of trade and cultural exchanges between Japan and North Korea.¹³

While the JSP and the Komeito have played an active role

12. Kawasaki Kanji, "Talks with Premier Kim Il-sung," Japan Socialist Review, No. 246, March 1972, p. 6

13. The Japan Times, May 31, and June 7, 1972.

in the promotion of friendship between Japan and North Korea, the JCP as a party did not take any positive step. In fact, with the emergence of detente among the major powers, relations between North Korea and the JCP were under strain. First of all, the JCP denounced the Sino-American rapprochement as a design of false illusions about "easing tensions," while the North Korean leadership welcomed it as a triumph of the Chinese.¹⁴ Moreover, in regard to the opening of South-North Korean talks, the JCP gave a negative response by saying that it "has nothing to do with detente in the Far East."¹⁵ A most serious blow was the JCP's criticism of Kim Il-sung's personality cult through its propaganda organ, the Akahata.¹⁶

This rift also triggered the JCP's decision to withdraw its representative stationed in Pyongyang since 1969 in the fall of 1971. Starting in the 1970's, there were no major contacts between high-ranking party officials of the NKWP and the JCP. However, the JCP still maintained an early

14. The JCP's criticism of the Sino-American rapprochement had originated from the meeting between Chinese leaders and members of a JCP delegation visiting Peking, led by Miyamoto Kenji, in 1966. At the meeting, the Peking leadership took sharply differing viewpoints over the JCP's policy of seeking power through parliamentary methods, and of stressing an independent line in its relations with other Communist states. For more details, see the Japan Times Weekly, September 9, 1972, and John K. Emmerson, "The Japanese Communist Party After Fifty Years," Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 7, July 1972, pp. 564-579.

15. The Japan Times, July 24, 1972.

16. The Japan Times Weekly, March 18, 1972.

normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea as part of its platform.

Furthermore, many socialist mayors and local assemblymen of Japan began to participate in the process for the promotion of friendly relations with North Korea. Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryokichi, upon his arrival in Pyongyang in October 1971, apologized for the Japanese colonial rule over Korea in the prewar era and expressed the opinion that the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries would greatly contribute to the maintenance of peace in Asia.¹⁷ Subsequently, the delegation of the Japan National Socialist Mayors Association visited Pyongyang in May 1972, and proposed at the meeting with Kim Il-sung that the two countries should increase regional economic and cultural interchanges and also exchange agricultural techniques.¹⁸

In September 1973, amid a growing anti-Seoul feeling within social and political circles, which had been primarily caused by the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, South Korea's opposition party's leader, the opposition parties and leftist social forces of Japan met in Tokyo to form a National Council for the Normalization of Relations between Japan and North Korea. The new organization was designed to coordinate the

17. For the details of Tokyo Governor Minobe's trip to Pyongyang, see the Nodong Shinmun, October 28, and the Tokyo Shimbun, November 1, 1971.

18. The Yomiuri Shimbun, May 15, 1972.

campaign in Japan to normalize relations with North Korea. More specifically, political figures who took the initiative in creating the National Council included Narita Tomomi, Chairman of the JSP, Takeiri Yoshikatsu, Chairman of the Komeito, Kasuga Ikko, Chairman of the DSP, Ichikawa Makoto, Chairman of the Sohyo, and Utsunomiya Tokuma, a leading member of the left-of-center group of the LDP.¹⁹

The entire campaign for the promotion of close relations between Japan and North Korea had been launched in collaboration with Chosoren. This North Korean front-organization not only arranged visits to Pyongyang by influential Japanese figures, but also sought to rally the Japanese people towards supporting the North Korean position. The underlying direction for Chosoren's activities was provided by the Pyongyang leadership. For instance, in his New Year's message to Chosoren in 1972, Kim Il-sung asked the organization to maintain close links with "the Japanese people, progressive political parties, public organizations and personages of all social strata."²⁰

Chosoren particularly intensified the wooing of the Japanese mass media. On November 23, 1971, Kim Byung-sik, Chosoren's Vice-Chairman, made for the first time a speech at a dinner party sponsored by the Japan Press Club. During his address, Kim explained that North Korea's Japan policy was

19. The Japan Times, September 8, 1973.

20. The Choson Shinbo, January 2, 1972.

based on the promotion of amity and friendship between the two peoples in accordance with the idea of Kim Il-sung's *juche*.²¹ The Japan Press Club's invitation of a Chosoren member signified that Japanese social circles were much more concerned with bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea than ever.

North Korea's diplomatic maneuvers.--Japanese-North Korean relations were also significantly influenced by the Pyongyang regime's diplomatic maneuvers aimed at raising its international status in the early 1970's. No matter how rigid its ideological and political system grew, North Korea could not remain entirely immune to the rapidly changing international environment. Basically, detente among the major powers had made a critical impact on North Korea's unification and foreign policies in two ways. First, it made North Korea modify its unification policy. The Pyongyang authorities feared that detente would result in perpetuating the status quo of a divided Korea. For this reason, they repeatedly argued that the territorial reunification of Korea was an internal Korean problem to be settled by Koreans themselves, while welcoming the Sino-American rapprochement and the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization as a step of encouraging the reduction of tension in Asia.

As a means of hastening its efforts to reunify Korea,

21. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), December 3, 1971.

North Korea adopted a new policy, which was quite in contrast to its earlier militaristic approach. On August 6, 1971, just three weeks after the announcement of President Nixon's plan to visit China, Kim Il-sung issued a statement proposing the negotiations with "all political parties, including the ruling Democratic-Republican Party, all social organizations, and all individuals" in South Korea in order to search a means of the peaceful and independent national unification.²² This proposal was regarded as unique in the sense that Kim included the Democratic-Republican Party as party to the negotiations.

One week later, North Korea accepted the proposal of the Red Cross Society of South Korea to hold talks between representatives of their respective Red Cross Societies for the purpose of discussing the humanitarian problem of reuniting separated families across the 38th parallel. Then, South and North Korean relations entered a new era of dialogue, which encouraged both sides to launch high-level political contacts through the establishment of a South-North Coordinating Committee in accordance with the July 4th joint communiqué.

Second, detente provided North Korea with an opportunity for extending its diplomatic activities beyond the boundary dividing the Eastern and the Western camps. As Selig S.

22. The Nodong Shinmun, August 7, 1971.

Harrison observed, the Pyongyang leadership seemed to realize that as long as the two Communist powers, which were doggedly opposed to each other, tried to improve relations with the United States, it was impossible for North Korea to expect massive economic and military assistance from them as it did during the cold war period.²³ Thus, North Korea was gradually concerned with establishing an independent posture in its relations with its two Communist patrons, the Soviet Union and China. At the same time, it was strongly inclined to end its long isolation in the world community by embarking upon a diplomatic offensive towards the Third World and some Western countries, including the United States and Japan.

North Korean leaders emphasized the idea of *juche* as an ideological foundation for their foreign policy. They argued that "only when it defends independence and sovereignty can a Marxist-Leninist party work out a correct foreign policy according to the specific conditions of its country."²⁴ To the extent that it has underlined the necessity of an independent and revolutionary foreign policy, the idea of *juche* was somewhat appealing to the Third World leaders, who abhorred the big powers' dominance over international relations.

Whatever consequences the idea of *juche* had on its diplomatic activities, by the mid-1970's, North Korea had developed

23. The Washington Post, July 3, 1972.

24. FBIS, op. cit. (North Korea), April 10, 1975.

various diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with more than 90 countries in the world. Moreover, the Pyongyang regime was officially admitted to the World Health Organization, a specialized organization of the United Nations, in May 1973, and soon set up its permanent observer's mission at the United Nations in New York. It also joined numerous international organizations, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Meanwhile, as described in Chapter II, North Korea had undertaken a cautious approach to the United States. It not only showed a readiness to conduct "people's diplomacy" toward the American public, but also attempted to make governmental-level contact with the United States, making surprise bid for a bilateral peace agreement between the two countries. But North Korea's overtures have been rejected so far by the United States, which proposed a new three-party conference with South Korea as a participant. Recently, the North Korean leadership complained that the Carter administration, unlike its earlier pledges, did nothing in connection with the solution of the Korean problem.²⁵

With its elevated status in the international community, North Korea stepped up its approach to Japan. Apparently buoyed by the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, and also by increasing strength of the domestic forces in Japan,

25. The Nodong Shinmun, May 2, 1977.

which advocated an early normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, the Pyongyang authorities made a bid for facilitating governmental-level contact with the Japanese government.

The call for an "equal-distance" diplomacy.--At his talks with visiting Kawasaki Kanji in Pyongyang in August 1971, Kim Il-sung made a significant statement in regard with relations between Japan and North Korea as follows:²⁶

The Japanese government concludes the "ROK-Japan Treaty," which is a bad treaty. One article of this treaty states that "the Republic of Korea is the only legitimate power of the Korean peninsula," and this is a grave interference in the internal affairs of our country. If diplomatic relations are normalized and established between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan, it is possible that the unfriendly measures taken against us in the past will be automatically invalidated.

North Korean Vice-Premier Pak Sung-chol further developed this position. He stated at the meeting with Japanese correspondents in September 1972, that "even if Japan established diplomatic relations with North and South Korea, it would not impede the reunification of the two divided countries." It was the first suggestion from a high-ranking North Korean official that Japan might be able to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea without the abrogation of the Japan-South Korea Treaty. Pak also said that the Japanese government

26. Kawasaki Kanji, op. cit., p. 17.

should stop its "favoritism" towards South Korea, if it wanted to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea.²⁷ This remark implied that the Japanese government should conduct the so-called "equal-distance" diplomacy towards South and North Korea.

Pak's statement was later confirmed by Kim Il-sung. In an interview with a Tokyo Shimbun correspondent in February 1973, Kim said that the Japan-ROK Treaty would not preclude the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea. He pointed out that North Korea had opened diplomatic and economic relations with a number of nations which have maintained relations with South Korea.²⁸

These statements marked a great departure from North Korea's long-established policy concerning relations with Japan. As a prerequisite for the establishment of friendly relations with Japan, North Korea had held the following four points: (1) the Japanese government should stop its hostile policy towards North Korea; (2) it should abrogate the Japan-South Korea Treaty; (3) it should immediately give up economic infiltration into South Korea; and (4) it should not intervene in the reunification of Korea.²⁹

27. The Japan Times, September 8, 1972.

28. The Tokyo Shimbun, February 3, 1973.

29. North Korea's previous position on relations with Japan was clearly expressed in Kim Il-sung's interview with a Yomiuri Shimbun correspondent in Pyongyang in January 1972. For the text of Kim's interview, see Choson Chungang Tongshin-

In retrospect, the Peking regime's demand for the liquidation of Japan's diplomatic ties with Taiwan was a major obstacle to the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. In view of this fact, the statements of the North Korean leadership were regarded as a necessary compromise which would expedite the negotiations for establishing formal diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea when they would arise in the future. The shifting position of North Korea was mainly aimed at pressing the new Tanaka government of Japan to take steps in favor of the Japan-North Korea rapprochement. Kim Il-sung even said in July 1972, that the Tanaka government has taken "a step forward" in its policy towards North Korea. This appraisal resulted from the Tanaka government's decision to call North Korea by its official name--the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.³⁰

However, the Tanaka government did not respond positively to North Korea's call for "equal-distance" diplomacy. It still adhered to Japan's previous "two-Koreas" policy of stressing that she would officially maintain diplomatic relations with South Korea, while promoting economic and cultural exchanges with North Korea. Immediately after Pak Sung-chol's statement was released, Foreign Minister Ohira explained that the government had no idea of "treating the two countries (South and

sa, Choson Chungang Nyongam (North Korea's central yearbook) (Pyongyang: 1973), pp. 43-45.

30. The Japan Times, July 29, 1972.

North Korea) equally."³¹ Later, Prime Minister Tanaka reaffirmed this position by saying that the Japanese government could not maintain an "equal-distance" in its foreign policy towards South and North Korea because Japan had concluded the Treaty of Basic Relations with South Korea.³²

Instead, the Tanaka government, which took the initiative in normalizing diplomatic relations with China, made it clear that it preferred to improve relations with North Korea in stages through exchanges of sportsmen, cultural leaders and technicians. In accordance with this policy line, the Ministry of Justice refused to issue visas to a 12-member North Korean political delegation invited by Tokyo Governor Minobe on the grounds that its visit to Japan was obviously linked to political purposes.³³ The delegation, to be led by Kang Yang-uk, had been invited in July 1972, reciprocating the Governor's visit to Pyongyang the previous year. But the Tanaka government moved to allow North Koreans engaged in non-political areas to enter Japan.

Informal political contacts.--Despite the government's official position of denying any form of governmental-level contacts with North Korea, Japanese political figures, including government authorities, gradually widened their con-

31. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), September 11, 1972.

32. The Japan Times, November 2, 1972.

33. Ibid., July 27, 1972.

tacts with North Korean leaders. Advocates of political contacts between the two countries offered two major reasons. First, they would contribute to the promotion of correct mutual understanding between the two countries. Second, through increasing contacts, Japan could function as a mediator not only between South and North Korea, but also between North Korea and the United States, consequently helping to preserve peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

In January 1973, Chong Kwang-son, head of a 25-member North Korean high school soccer team visiting Japan, called on the Japanese Cabinet's Chief Secretary Nikaido Susuma, and discussed the matter of increasing sportsmen's exchanges between the two countries.³⁴ This was the first time that a ranking North Korean official met a Japanese cabinet member.

North Korea's relations with the JSP became closer in September 1974, when a JSP delegation, headed by Narita Tomomi, visited Pyongyang. The JSP delegation issued a joint communique after a series of talks with North Korean leaders. In the communique, the delegation revealed the following five point tasks.³⁵

(1) It opposes all the measures to hamper friendship between the peoples of Japan and North Korea.

(2) It supports the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

34. Ibid., January 30, 1973.

35. Ibid., September 9, 1973.

(3) It endeavors to put an end to the abnormal situations between Japan and North Korea.

(4) It defends the democratic, national rights of Korean residents in Japan.

(5) It demands the immediate withdrawal of the American troops from South Korea.

Shortly after the JSP's delegation returned to Tokyo, nineteen members of the North Korean delegation to the 61st General Meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union arrived in Japan. The delegation was led by Hong Ki-mun, Vice-Chairman of the SPA's Standing Committee. It was also the first time that North Korea participated in such a meeting. The members of the delegation pledged that they would not make any contact with Japanese government officials during their stay in Japan. But they attended an informal party given by the Afro-Asian Problems Study Group of the LDP at the private residence of the Group's President, Utsunomiya Tokuma. At the party, the North Korean delegates met with members of the Group, including Fujiyama Aiichiro and Kono Yohei, as well as members of the JSP and the Komeito.³⁶

In 1975, the number of LDP Dietmen visiting North Korea increased steadily. In July, Utsunomiya Tokuma made a secret side trip to Pyongyang during his China tour, and met with Kim Il-sung. When he returned to Tokyo, Utsunomiya, who was

36. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), October 16, 1974.

known to be close to new Prime Minister Miki Takeo, carried Kim Il-sung's personal message to the Prime Minister. According to Utsunomiya, Kim Il-sung called for a peace agreement with the United States to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The influential pro-Pyongyang lobbyist also revealed that Kim's message was given due consideration during the summit meeting between President Gerald Ford and Prime Minister Miki Takeo held in Washington in August 1975, and did not rule out the possibility of contact between North Korea and the United States.³⁷

At almost the same time as Utsunomiya's visit, a 13-member Diet delegation of the LDP, headed by Tamura Hajime, former Minister of Labor and Chairman of the Committee of Korean Affairs of the Afro-Asian Problems Study Group, made a trip to Pyongyang. At the meeting with the Tamura delegation, Kim Il-sung again stressed the importance of the conclusion of a peace agreement between North Korea and the United States. Referring to bilateral relations between North Korea and Japan, Kim urged Japan to stop economic assistance to South Korea as soon as possible.³⁸

Another contact between government officials of Japan

37. The Japan Times, August 10, 1975.

38. In fact, a LDP delegation, including Tamura Hajime, had been scheduled to visit Pyongyang in 1973. But because of the LDP leadership's opposition, the plan was postponed. See the Japan Times Weekly, August 11, 1973. And for more details of talks between the Tamura delegation and Kim Il-sung, see FBIS, op. cit. (North Korea), July 28, 1975.

and North Korea was made in May 1976, when Kimura Toshio, former Foreign Minister and Japan's chief delegate to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, invited his North Korean counterpart, Kim Gion-ryon, to an official meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya.³⁹

In addition, Hori Shigeru, Speaker of the Lower House of Japan, met with an eight-member North Korean parliamentary delegation in May 1977. The delegation, headed by Hyun Chunksuk, a member of the SPA of North Korea, was visiting Japan at the invitation of the Dietmen's League. Kuno Chuji, Chairman of the Dietmen's League, and Antaku Tsunehiko, its Secretary General, were present at the meeting. Hori and the North Korean delegates reportedly discussed the promotion of friendly relations between the two countries and the matter concerning the reunification of Korea. In particular, the North Korean delegates expressed their view that Japan would not interfere in the problem on Korean reunification.⁴⁰ It was regarded as a significant change in the Japanese government's policy towards the Korean peninsula that Hori met with the North Korean delegation in his capacity as House Speaker.

But the Japanese government did not yet modify its basic policy of not seeking any governmental-level contact for diplomatic normalization with the Pyongyang regime. Especially, as

39. The Japan Times Weekly, May 22, 1976.

40. The Japan Times, May 13, 1977.

the North Korean leadership apparently intensified an effort to reunify Korea even by using force immediately after the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, Japanese conservative leaders became more reluctant to take any favorable step towards North Korea. Instead, they were increasingly concerned with keeping close ties with South Korea. In light of this concern, Prime Minister Miki reaffirmed in his meeting with President Ford the so-called "South Korean clause" providing that the security of South Korea was essential for that of Japan.⁴¹

Recently, the Japanese government shared deep anxiety with South Korea over the planned phase-out of American troops from South Korea, and moved to further strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries. Moreover, in collaboration with the South Korean government, the Japanese government has advocated the simultaneous entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations, and opposed the withdrawal of American ground forces from South Korea on the grounds that it might create a vacuum of power in Northeast Asia. This position of the Japanese government was clearly antithetic to the North Korean interests.

Meantime, the Pyongyang leadership began to recognize that Japan would not go further in her relations with North Korea. In an interview with a Yomiuri Shimbun correspondent

41. Ibid., September 7, 1977.

in May 1977, Kim Il-sung listed a significant point regarding bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea. He said that Japanese-North Korean relations could not develop further because the Japanese government had always followed the United States' policy of stressing close diplomatic and economic ties with South Korea. From this standpoint, he concluded that there would be no progress in relations between Japan and North Korea until relations between North Korea and the United States had improved.⁴²

Kim's statement reflected his cognizance of the reality that there existed some limitations in establishing formal diplomatic relations with Japan. At the present time, it is hard to expect that despite vigorous moves for the promotion of friendly relations between Japan and North Korea, an abrupt breakthrough will be made in the direction of diplomatic normalization between the two countries.

2. Social and cultural exchanges

In the early 1970's, the Japanese government relaxed its previous position of imposing tight controls on relations with North Korea. This change coincided with the reduction of East-West tension in international relations and also with the increasing concern of the Japanese people about the promotion of friendship with North Korea. As a result, there have oc-

42. The Nodong Shinmun, May 2, 1977.

curred several developments that encourage social and cultural exchanges between the two countries.

First of all, a new agreement on repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea was signed by representatives of the Red Cross Societies of the two countries in Moscow in February 1971. In accordance with the agreement, about 15,000 Koreans, who had submitted their applications, could be returned to North Korea within a period of six months after the resumption of repatriation. Moreover, it provided that after the lapse of the temporary six months, groups of 250 to 300 Koreans wishing to go to North Korea could return to that country through ships supplied by the North Korean side.⁴³

The Japanese government, despite strong protests from the South Korean government, accepted the repatriation agreement as "fair," and assisted the JRC in the repatriation work. It resumed four years after the old Calcutta agreement had expired in 1967. The first repatriation ship carrying 202 returnees arrived in North Korea on May 14. But during the transitional period, the number of returnees totaled only 1,081, accounting for 7.2 percent of the 15,000 applicants.⁴⁴

Another development was the signing of the first agreement on cultural exchanges between Japan and North Korea. The

43. The Japan Times, February 5, 1971.

44. The Far Eastern Research Institute, Pukhan Chonso (General book on North Korea) (Seoul: 1974), Vol. III, P. 193.

agreement was signed between Iwai Akira, who led a delegation of the Japan-Korea (North) Cultural Exchange Association (It was organized in September 1972.), and Kim Kwang-hyop, Vice-Chairman of the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. In its preamble, the cultural agreement said: "It would serve the promotion of the interest of both nations to strengthen the ties of friendship and solidarity, to strive for the establishment of normal relations and to step up mutual visits of persons and cultural exchanges on the basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity." It also set forth the following concrete exchange programs between the two countries.⁴⁵

(1) Both sides should strive for broader exchanges in the fields of culture, art, education, public health, physical education, publications, communications and broadcasting.

(2) Both sides, on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, should endeavor to realize the permanent stationing in Tokyo and Pyongyang of correspondents for newspapers, news service and radio and TV broadcasting.

(3) The Japan-Korea Cultural Exchange Association would invite six North Korean artist groups to Japan in two or three years.

This private cultural agreement was not officially approved by the Japanese government, but it provided both Japan

45. FBIS, op. cit. (North Korea), September 26, 1972.

and North Korea with an important framework for promoting further social and cultural contacts between them on a non-official basis.

In December 1972, a new organization called the League for Promoting Japan-Korea (North) Sports Exchange was inaugurated by pro-Pyongyang Japanese sportsmen. Yamaguchi Hisata, an Executive of the Japan Amateur Sports Association, was selected as its President. This organization was designed to conduct liaison activities in regard to sports exchanges between North Korea and Japanese athletic organizations.⁴⁶

These developments concerning social and cultural exchanges between Japan and North Korea reflected the Pyongyang regime's growing interest in their expansion. In his talks with Kawasaki Kanji in January 1972, Kim Il-sung expressed the view that in light of the increase of Japanese visitors to Pyongyang, and "partly due to the changes in the world situation," the year 1972 would be a year marking a big advance in developing friendly relations between the two peoples of Japan and North Korea.⁴⁷

Even more important was the Japanese government's decision to allow North Koreans to enter Japan, and to issue reentry permits for Korean residents in Japan to travel to North Korea. Consequently, the flow of visitors between Japan and North

46. Ibid., December 3, 1972.

47. Kawasaki Kanji, op. cit., p. 4.

Korea increased sharply, as Table VIII indicates.

Table VIII

The number of visitors between
Japan and North Korea: 1971-1977

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
North Koreans to Japan	25	32	315	161	84	94	124
Japanese to North Korea	275	924	770	877	615	587	408

Source: The figures of 1971 are taken from Pukhan Chonso (General book on North Korea) (The Far Eastern Research Institute, 1974), Vol. I, p. 369, and those from 1972 through 1977 taken from Japan, Gaimusho, Waga Gaiko no Kinkyō (Recent development of our diplomacy) (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsu Kyoku, 1974, 1977, 1978).

Above all, the pattern of personal contact between the two countries deviated from the previous one, which had been characterized by a one-way traffic enabling only Japanese to visit North Korea. In the 1970's, a certain degree of mutuality in social and cultural exchanges between Japan and North Korea could be realized by an increase of the North Korean visitors to Japan.

More specifically, there were contacts between journalists of Japan and North Korea. Japanese journalists, who had visited North Korea previously, were interested in inviting their North Korean counterparts to Japan. In May 1973, they persuaded the Ministry of Justice to issue visas to an 8-member delegation of North Korean journalists. This delegation was headed by Chong Chun-ki, the Chief Editor of the Nodong Shinmun

and a member of the SPA's Standing Committee (He later became Vice-Premier.), who had a wide range of contacts with Japanese journalist circles. In a meeting with Goto Motoo, Managing Editor of the Asahi Shimbun, the head of the North Korean delegation said that North Korea was resolutely opposed to the "two-Koreas" idea, and that Japan should stop obstructing the reunification of Korea by unilaterally supporting South Korea.⁴⁸

In the field of art, a most remarkable exchange between Japan and North Korea was inaugurated in July 1973, when a 220-member North Korean artist delegation called the Mansudae Dancing Troupe arrived in Niigatta, Japan. The North Korean troupe was invited by the Japan-Korea Cultural Exchange Association for a 20-day performance schedule in major Japanese cities, such as Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kyoto, and Hiroshima.⁴⁹ It was the largest North Korean artist delegation which had visited Japan since the end of World War II, and was headed by a high-ranking North Korean official, Yun Ki-pok, former Minister of Common Education.

Sports exchanges were also relatively active. The Japanese government had always maintained a permissive attitude on the exchange of sportsmen between Japan and North Korea. Likewise, North Korea also showed a growing interest in promoting ath-

48. The Asahi Shimbun, May 16, 1973.

49. The Japan Times, July 31, 1973.

letic intercourse with Japan. Kim Il-sung repeated his view that Japan should allow more athletes of North Korea to visit Japan in order to deepen friendship between the two countries. In January 1971, an eleven-member North Korean athletic team arrived in Tokyo to attend the Sapporo International Winter Olympics, and in November 1972, a nine-member delegation of Japanese sports officials, headed by Yamaguchi Hisata, visited Pyongyang.⁵⁰

In July 1977, the Japanese government made an unusual decision to issue visas to a four-member North Korean delegation to the World Meeting Against A-H Bombs. In the past, the Japanese government did not permit the entry of such a North Korean delegation into Japan, on the grounds that it was associated with political activities. The Minister of Justice Fukuda Hajime explained that the government made such a decision in consideration of future relations between Japan and North Korea.⁵¹

With the Japanese government's measure of issuing reentry permits, the number of Korean residents in Japan, who returned from their visits to North Korea, increased rapidly. For example, the total number of Korean residents, who got reentry permits from the Japanese government, rose from 27 in 1971 to

50. FBIS, op. cit. (North Korea), November 22, 1972.

51. The Korea Herald, July 26, 1977.

710 in 1974.⁵² Let me illustrate the most important cases.⁵³

In March 1972, the Justice Ministry of Japan issued reentry permits to a six-member group of Korean residents. This group, headed by Yi Kye-paek, Vice-Chairman of Chosoren, was to attend the anniversary of Kim Il-sung's 60th birthday on April 15. Again, in July, a soccer team of the Tokyo Korean middle and high school, and a music and dance circle of the Yokohama Korean middle school obtained reentry permits. Two months later, in September, the Justice Ministry also allowed 45 Korean residents to reenter Japan after their visits to relatives and family graves in North Korea.

In July 1973, a large group of Koreans in Japan was permitted to reenter Japan after their visits to North Korea. This group was divided into two parts: one was composed of 73 Korean educators, and the other was a 48-member music and dance and sports group of Choson University. A significant change in Japan's policy in connection with reentry permits for Korean residents took place in August 1973, when the Justice Ministry decided to permit 10 Koreans in Japan to reenter the country after their attendance at ceremonies marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK. This decision was quite different from the Japanese government's previous stand of

52. See Seung K. Ko, "North Korea's Relations with Japan Since Detente," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, Spring 1977, p. 32.

53. See the Nodong Shinmun, March 21, 1972, July 23, 1973, and September 5, 1973.

not permitting Korean residents to attend such national anniversary functions of North Korea. In this respect, the Japanese government's decision was regarded as a critical step for the promotion of social and cultural exchanges between Japan and North Korea.

In view of these decisions, it seems clear that the government of Japan had been broadening the criteria for the issuance of reentry permits for Korean residents in Japan. Opposing this shifting policy, the South Korean government has asked the Japanese government not to expand the issuance of reentry permits to Korean residents wishing to go to North Korea, because it would result in strengthening the Pyongyang regime's influence on the Korean community in Japan. But the Japanese government explained that the issuance of reentry permits to Koreans was based entirely on humanitarian reasons. This matter still remains a critical issue pending between Japan and South Korea.

3. Normalizing economic relations

Trade relations.--While diplomatic reconciliation has not yet become a reality, trade relations between Japan and North Korea in the 1970's have greatly developed mainly due to both countries' renewed interests in the expansion of trade. North Korea, launching a new Six-Year Economic Plan from 1971, was more concerned with adding Japanese industrial equipment and technology to its economic development than ever. The

Japanese government, in view of the emerging detente among the major powers, began to ease its restrictions on trade with North Korea. Especially, with the rapid growth of commerce with China, Japanese business circles were also gradually interested in promoting trade with North Korea.

First of all, North Korea tried to develop trade relations with Japan into a method of "memorandum trade" in the wake of Japan-China trade. In November 1971, the North Korean Minister to China Yu Song-chun told Asukata Kazuo, chief delegate of the National Council for Restoration of Sino-Japanese Relations of Japan, that it was possible for North Korea and Japan to conduct memorandum trade just like the Japan-China memorandum trade as a means of expanding economic relations between the two countries.⁵⁴

Moreover, North Korea continually urged the Japanese government to remove any obstacles to progress in trade re-

54. See the Yomiuri Shimbun, November 16, 1971. The Japan-China memorandum trade started in November 1962, when the LDP Dietman Takasaki Tatsunosuke and Liao Cheng-chih, Deputy Chief of the Foreign Affairs Staff Office in the State Council of China, signed a memorandum on "over-all" trade for the period from 1963 through 1967. In the memorandum, both sides agreed to conduct a two-way trade at about US \$100 million per annum, to establish a trade mission in Tokyo and Peking, and to apply long-term deferred payments for trade between the two countries. The memorandum trade between Japan and China also called the L-T trade after the initials of Liao and Takasaki. In 1964, Japan and China exchanged trade missions. For more details of the Japan-China memorandum trade, see Chae-jin Lee, Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era (Baltimore: John Hopkins University press, 1976), pp. 141-158.

lations. In his talks with Kawasaki Kanji, Kim Il-sung argued that the Japanese government had carried out various discriminatory measures against North Korea, such as non-permitting the entry of North Korean technicians into Japan, and the denial of long-term deferred payments and the use of Export-Import Bank funds for trade between the two countries.⁵⁵

A most significant event occurred in January 1972, when a private Japan-North Korea trade agreement was signed between the Japanese Dietmen's League and the JKTA on one side and the KCPIIT on the other. Admitting that the expansion of trade was in the best interests of the two peoples of Japan and North Korea, both sides reached the following comprehensive agreement.⁵⁶

(1) Each side will work for the expansion of trade between the two countries so that in 1976 the total volume of two-way trade will amount to 100 million or 200 million pounds.

(2) Individual contracts will be concluded between the trading companies of Japan and North Korea in order to conduct transactions stated in this agreement.

(3) The transactions of large amounts will be settled by deferred payments over an eight-year period.

(4) Each side will work to have its government issue export and import approval certificates on a timely basis.

55. Kawasaki Kanji, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

56. See the Dong-A Ilbo, January 24, 1972.

(5) Each side will make efforts to hold trade fairs in Pyongyang and Tokyo respectively.

(6) Each side will also promote exchanges of trade delegations and technicians. Each side will work so that the concerned organizations in its country will guarantee the entry into its country of delegations and technicians from the other country.

(7) Each side will establish a trade mission in the other's capital. Concrete procedural matters concerning the establishment of the trade mission will not be determined before the government of each side approves its establishment.

(8) This agreement will go into effect on the day it is signed and will be effective until December 31, 1976. Even after this agreement is terminated, contracts concluded on the basis of this agreement will be carried out in accordance with the clause of this agreement.

With the signing of this new trade agreement, Japan and North Korea opened the so-called "agreement trade," which was very similar in character to the Japan-China memorandum trade. In several respects, the terms of the new trade agreement were different from those of trade agreements concluded between the two countries previously on the private level.

First, the new trade agreement was collectively negotiated between the Dietmen's League and the JKTA on behalf of Japanese trading companies, and a North Korean non-governmental agency. Second, it contained a semi-official element because

it was signed by a member of the ruling LDP, and because its implementation substantially required the Japanese government to approve long-term deferred payments and the use of Export-Import Bank funds for trade with North Korea. Third, it included large-scale transactions to be conducted between the two countries for a few years to come.

The Japanese government avoided any official comment on this private agreement on the expansion of trade. It informally recognized that the trade agreement would greatly contribute to the increase of two-way trade between Japan and North Korea during the coming five or six years. At the same time, the government sources of Japan doubted whether or not the clauses of the agreement, especially those concerning the establishment of a trade mission in each country and long-term deferred payments, could be implemented in view of the existence of the dominant pro-Seoul forces within the LDP and business circles.

By contrast, the Japanese opposition parties and mass media ardently welcomed the conclusion of the trade agreement. The JSP issued a statement demanding that the government approve the establishment of a North Korean trade mission in Tokyo, to admit the use of Export-Import Bank funds for Japan-North Korea trade. In a similar statement, the Komeito also argued that the government should positively support the agreement in consideration of the easing of tension in Asia.⁵⁷

57. For the responses of the Japanese government and

A most serious criticism of the government's policy on trade with North Korea came out of an editorial entitled "Expand Pyongyang Trade" carried in the Asahi Shimbun on January 26, 1972. It said:⁵⁸

It is our contention that the Japanese government should pose--along with the restoring of normal diplomatic relations between Japan and China--the improvement of our ties with North Korea as one of the vital tasks confronting Japan this year. And the best way to move in this direction is to expand equal and reciprocal trade relations.

North Korea considered the conclusion of the trade agreement a positive factor in the implementation of its Six-Year Economic Plan. Kim Il-sung reportedly told the visiting mission of the Japanese Dietmen's League that the Japan-North Korea trade agreement might cause an adjustment in the Six-Year Economic Plan, forcing the country to produce more iron ore and coal than scheduled in the plan.⁵⁹

But South Korea was strongly opposed to the trade agreement. Immediately after its conclusion, the South Korean government issued a statement urging the Japanese government to prevent it from being carried out. The statement also argued that the trade agreement would eventually facilitate the reinforcement of North Korea's military potential and thus endanger

opposition parties to the trade agreement, see the Japan Times, January 24, 1972.

58. The Asahi Shimbun, January 26, 1972.

59. The Japan Times, January 25, 1972.

the security of South Korea.⁶⁰ In connection with this protest, the Japanese government was cautious not to offend the South Korean government. In March 1972, Japanese Ambassador to Seoul Ushiroku Torao stated that his government would not permit the exchange of politicians and contacts with North Korea other than for "pure private trade."⁶¹

Despite this protest from South Korea, the Japanese government has, since the conclusion of the trade agreement, taken steps in favor of Japan-North Korea trade. In September 1972, the Ministry of Justice for the first time allowed the entry of a 7-member economic delegation of North Korea into Japan. The delegation, headed by Kim Sok-chin, Vice-Chairman of the KCPIT, arrived in Tokyo on October 21. The purpose of its visit was to make technical-level arrangements on the trade agreement concluded in January.

During their 25-day stay in Japan, members of the North Korean economic delegation were busily engaged in contacts with Japanese financial and industrial leaders. At a round-table meeting sponsored by the Japan National Federation of Bank Associations on October 27 at the Bank Club in Tokyo, they met with such Japanese financial figures as Nakamura Toshio, President of the Mitsubishi Bank and Chairman of the Federation, and the cadres of 17 other banks of Japan. That

60. See the Dong-A Ilbo, January 24, 1972.

61. FBIS, op. cit. (South Korea), March 14, 1972.

evening, the North Korean delegates also had talks with cadres of the Mitsui group. Subsequently, they met with a group of 24 Japanese financiers and industrial leaders from Osaka and other parts of western Japan. Throughout these meetings, the North Korean delegates explained the Six-Year Economic Plan to Japanese financiers and businessmen, and suggested that North Korea would like to import a large number of industrial plants from Japan, including those for chemical production and electric power generation. In addition, they held that such transactions should be conducted on a long-term credit basis.⁶²

With the visit of the North Korean economic delegation to Japan, a major trade barrier between the two countries was virtually eliminated. It also paved the way for the further improvement of economic relations between Japan and North Korea.

In January 1973, a large-scale economic delegation of the JKTA, composed of 56 representatives of various trading companies of Japan, visited North Korea. Aikawa Riichiro, Managing Director of the JKTA, led the delegation, and conferred with the Pyongyang authorities about trade to be conducted between the two countries during the year.⁶³ After his return to Japan, Aikawa worked hard to solve the problem of setting up private trade missions in Tokyo and Pyongyang in accordance with the

62. See the Japan Times, September 26, 1972, and FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), November 1, 1972.

63. FBIS, op. cit. (North Korea), January 19, 1973.

1972 trade agreement. But the problem has not yet been solved because the establishment of such trade missions must be approved by the governments of both countries.

In May, the JKTA adopted a resolution at its regular general meeting, which demanded that the Japanese government permit the Export-Import Bank funds to finance Japan's exports to North Korea. This resolution said further that Japan should repeal COCOM-imposed restrictions on trade with North Korea and officially set up a trade mission in Pyongyang.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, as the volume of trade between Japan and North Korea continued to increase, the Japanese government moved to consider carefully the approval of long-term bank loans by the Export-Import Bank for trade with North Korea. Prior to the government's decision, the Mitsui Bank and eight other city banks tried to form a consortium to provide North Korea with bank-to-bank loans. Finally, in December 1973, the Japanese government approved the extension of an Export-Import Bank loan for trade with North Korea, amounting to some 300 million yen.

It was the first time that such a loan was permitted for trading with North Korea, with which Japan had not yet established diplomatic relations. The loan, along with Japanese commercial bank lines, was to help finance the export of a 500 million yen towel manufacturing plant to be constructed

64. Ibid., May 24, 1973.

by Enshu Manufacturing Co. and Shinwa Bussan Co. It was to be repaid in installments over three years and to bear the interest of 6.5 percent annually, the same interest rate in effect for other Communist countries.

Announcing its decision, the MITI stated that it was mainly due to moves encouraging detente in Asia, such as the Sino-American rapprochement, the resumption of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, the cease-fire in Vietnam, and the reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula. It also added that future Japanese loans to North Korea would be extended on a case-by-case basis.⁶⁵

All these measures have triggered a substantial increase of trade volume between Japan and North Korea. As shown in Table IX, in 1971, the annual volume of two-way trade between the two countries remained at the same level as that of 1970, totalling about US \$58 million. But in 1972, when the private agreement on the expansion of trade was signed, it jumped to about US \$132 million, more than twice as large as that of the previous year. This great stride in trade between the two countries also coincided with the inauguration of regular cargo liner service between them in January 1972.

The year 1972 also demonstrated a peculiar trend in Japan-North Korea trade. While the total volume of two-way trade between the two countries doubled over that of the

65. The Japan Times, December 29, 1973.

Table IX

Annual volume of trade between
Japan and North Korea: 1971-1977

(US \$1,000)

Year	North Korea's Exports	North Korea's Imports	Total
1971	30,059	28,907	58,966
1972	38,311	93,443	131,754
1973	72,318	100,160	172,478
1974	108,824	251,914	360,738
1975	64,839	180,630	254,469
1976	71,627	96,056	167,683
1977	66,618	125,097	191,715

Source: Nihon Kanzei Kyokai (Japan Tariff Association),
Gaikoku Boeki Gaikyo (The summary report of
 Japan's trade) (Tokyo), June 1978, p. 60.

previous year, North Korea's imports from Japan exceeded its exports by almost 2.5 to 1, amounting to about US \$93 million and US \$38 million respectively. Consequently, a heavy imbalance of trade began to appear in Japan-North Korea trade.

The following year, the volume of Japan-North Korea trade amounted to about US \$172 million, an increase of about US \$40 million over 1972. Of this amount, North Korea's exports were worth about US \$72 million, while its imports worth about US \$100 million. In 1974, Japan-North Korea trade took another great leap, its total volume rising to about US \$361 million. But this year, North Korea's imports from Japan exceeded its exports by more than 2 to 1. During the three years from 1972 through 1974, North Korea's imports from Japan grew nearly ten-fold, but its exports only 3.5 times. This

was mainly caused by North Korea's increasing import of high-priced industrial products from Japan.

During the three-year period, North Korea's major imports from Japan included such goods as engines for ships, satellite communication equipment, trucks, power generation facilities, cement, cigarette manufacturing machines, and synthetic design molders. Especially, major Japanese trading companies exported to North Korea large numbers of industrial plants, including chemical fertilizer plants, aluminium processing plants, towel manufacturing plants, automatic fire-proof brick manufacturing plants, and ethylene manufacturing plants.

As a result, of North Korea's imports from Japan in 1974, totalling about US \$252 million, heavy industrial and chemical products were responsible for more than 75 percent. On the other hand, North Korea's major exports to Japan in the same year included raw materials, such as raw silk and non-metallic minerals, and manufactured goods, including non-ferrous metals, their total volume amounting to more than 83 percent of its annual exports worth about US \$109 million. Although the volume of Japan-North Korea trade in 1974 marked a great increase, it still fell far behind that of Japan's trade with South Korea or China, totalling about US \$4,224 million and US \$3,289 million each.

Trouble in trade.--In contrast to its phenomenal growth during the 1972-1974 period, Japan-North Korea trade began to decline starting in late 1974. It was largely due to North

Korea's increasing debts to the Soviet Union, Japan and the Western creditor nations, totalling about US \$2.1 billion as of March 1976,⁶⁶ and to its inability to finance the debts. In particular, North Korea's liabilities to Japan have reached over US \$270 million as of October 1976, of which US \$70 million was already in arrears.⁶⁷

The accumulation of North Korea's debt was caused by a number of internal and external factors, such as the rise of oil prices, the decline in price of mineral resources, and the rapid expansion of North Korea's import of high-priced industrial goods from Western Europe and Japan. But the most crucial factor was North Korea's unfamiliarity with the fluctuating Western market system. Starting in 1973, North Korea had purchased large quantities of expensive plant equipment outside the Communist bloc in order to implement its Six-Year Economic Plan. The Pyongyang authorities thought that the payments for such imports could be financed by exporting its minerals to the Western markets. This calculation, however, went awry as the World recession struck Western Europe and Japan, forcing down the prices and demand for North Korea's main exports, such as iron ore, zinc and copper.⁶⁸

North Korea's debt default to Western Europe and Japan

66. See Foreign Report (London), No. 1416 and 1432, February and March 1976.

67. The Japan Economic Journal, October 5, 1976.

68. The Washington Post, April 10, 1976.

had serious repercussions. First of all, North Korea lost its credit in the world market. Most of the Western nations, which had been engaged in trading with North Korea, stopped extending further credit to that country. They also tried to maintain a de facto moratorium on commercial transactions with North Korea.

Japan, the largest non-Communist trading partner of North Korea, was most seriously affected by its delinquent payment of debts. Japanese trading companies refrained from exporting their products to North Korea. Thus, Japan-North Korea trade considerably declined. In 1975, the total volume of two-way trade between the two countries dropped to about US \$245 million, approximately 32 percent less than that of the previous year. Most striking was the decrease in Japan's exports to North Korea from US \$252 million in 1974 to US \$ 181 million in 1975.

The declining trend in Japan-North Korea trade was further evident in 1976, its total volume amounting to about US \$168 million. Of this amount, Japan's exports to North Korea dropped about 47 percent (US \$96 million) from that of the previous year (US \$181 million). Moreover, the Export-Import Bank of Japan, which had first granted its loan of 300 million yen for exporting Japanese towel manufacturing plants to North Korea in 1973, changed its position by rejecting any additional loans to that country.⁶⁹

69. See the Dong-A Ilbo, April 26, 1976.

Japanese government and business circles were greatly concerned with the settlement of North Korea's liabilities. The JKTA, a private organization representing Japan in trade negotiations with North Korea, assumed a major role in seeking the solution of that matter. In May 1976, the JKTA sent a delegation, headed by Aikawa Riichiro, to North Korea. In talks with the Japanese delegation, the Pyongyang authorities requested a two-year moratorium in installment payments, probably with additional interest payments at a 7.5 percent rate of interest annually. But the Japanese delegates refused the proposal, and instead insisted that North Korea's debts should be paid off on the basis of deferred payment contracts only at an interest rate of 10.45 percent per annum.⁷⁰ Thus, the negotiations were ruptured.

The Japanese government, however, took a conciliatory attitude in regard to North Korea's debts. In October, Finance Minister Ohira Masayoshi revealed at a meeting of the House of Councillors' Finance Committee that the government would give serious consideration to the problem of a delay in settling North Korea's debts. He also viewed that economic relations between the two countries would not be hurt by North Korea's debts to Japan.⁷¹

Obviously encouraged by this official position of the

70. See the Japan Times, September 26, 1976.

71. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), October 26, 1976.

government, the JKTA again sent a 12-member delegation to North Korea for further negotiations. The delegation was led by the JKTA's Managing Director Murakimi Sadao. After a series of negotiations, both sides signed a private agreement on the settlement of payments of North Korea's debts to Japan. Although its contents were not publicized, it became known that the agreement included a two-year moratorium on payments of the principal, but with a provision that a 7.5 percent rate per annum would be charged during the two-year grace period.⁷²

With the signing of this agreement, Japan-North Korea trade again began to increase. In 1977, the total volume of two-way trade between the two countries amounted to about US \$192 million, an increase of 14 percent over that of the previous year. But North Korea's imports (US \$125 million) still exceeded its exports (US \$67 million) by almost 2 to 1.

The fishery accord.--Since the Korean war ended in 1953, Japanese fishermen have been intensely concerned with ensuring the safe fishing operations off the North Korean coast. For this purpose, they sent their delegation to Pyongyang immediately after the end of the Korean war. As noted in Chapter IV, this delegation had talks with the North Korean leadership. In his talks with the Japanese delegation, Kim Il-sung

72. See the Japan Times, December 30, 1976, and "Pukhan (North Korea) Radar," Pukhan (Seoul), February 1977, pp. 132-133.

made a conciliatory gesture by saying that his government would not oppose the fishing operations of Japanese fishermen outside 12-sea miles of North Korea's internal waters.

Nevertheless, from time to time, Japanese fishing vessels and crews have been captured by North Korea for alleged violations of its territorial waters. A most serious incident took place on September 2, 1975, when the Japanese fishing boat Shosei Maru was fired on and captured by a North Korean patrol boat in the Yellow Sea. During the incident, two crew members were killed and two other members were seriously wounded.⁷³ The fishing boat soon returned to Japan. But this incident provoked the grave concern of the Japanese public about the safety of Japanese fishermen in the sea near North Korea.

Commenting on the Shosei Maru incident, Agriculture-Forestry Minister Abe Taro asserted that a private fishing agreement between Japan and North Korea was necessary for safe Japanese fishing operations off the North Korean coast. He said further that the government should take some measures to prevent another incident, and that the safety of fishing operations near the Soviet Union and China had been maintained under private agreements even when Japan had no diplomatic ties with them.⁷⁴ Shortly after his return from a visit to

73. For the details of the Shosei Maru incident, see the Japan Times, September 3, 1975.

74. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), September 9, 1975.

Pyongyang in September, Yamamoto Masaharu, Director of the JSP's Party Organ Bureau, urged the government to radically change its position towards North Korea in order to prevent a recurrence of the North Korean seizure of a Japanese fishing boat.⁷⁵

Japanese fishermen were also increasingly concerned about the conclusion of a private fishery agreement with North Korea guaranteeing safe fishing operations near that country. For this purpose, a Fishermen's Cooperative Federation in western Japan decided to send a mission to North Korea in September.⁷⁶ Paralleling these growing concerns, Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi stated in the Diet in January 1976 that the government would be ready to consider any proposal to help conclude a private fishery agreement with North Korea. He went on that the government would not oppose a plan by fishermen to conclude such an agreement with that country.⁷⁷

What expedited the move for concluding a fishery agreement between Japan and North Korea was the latter's proclamation of a 50-mile military border line within the 200-mile economic zone off its coast. As noted earlier, North Korea established the military border line as a means of strengthening its national defense and declared that all foreign ships

75. The Japan Times, September 14, 1975.

76. FBIS, op. cit. (Japan), September 18, 1975.

77. Ibid., January 29, 1976.

and aircraft would be barred from entering the line.

This North Korean action perplexed the Japanese government as well as fishery circles. They worried that North Korea's action would greatly endanger the safe fishing operations of Japanese fishermen. In July 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo stated that the government wanted to settle at the private level the fishery problem stemming from North Korea's establishment of a 200-mile economic sea zone and a 50-mile military border line.⁷⁸

In response, Kim Il-sung, in his interview with a correspondent of the NHK (the Japan Broadcasting Corporation) on July 5, hinted that even though no diplomatic relations existed between Japan and North Korea, the two countries could settle the fishery problem in accordance with "the principle of reciprocity."⁷⁹

Under these circumstances, the Dietmen's League of Japan took the initiative in solving the fishery problem. In August 1977, it sent a 16-member delegation, headed by Kuno Chuji, to North Korea for the purpose of conducting the negotiations in regard to the fishery problem. After the Kuno delegation and the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries of North Korea held talks, both sides issued a joint statement including the following agreement

78. The Japan Times, July 3, 1977.

79. Ibid., July 6, 1977.

on the pending fishery problem.⁸⁰

(1) On the basis of friendship between the Japanese and Korean peoples, North Korea takes the temporary step of guaranteeing fishing operations of the small fishermen of Japan from October 1, 1977, to June 30, 1978, in the economic sea zone outside the military border line.

(2) Each side shall ensure in the economic sea zone or fishing zone of its country the safe navigation of fishing boats of the other side and offer all possible convenience for emergency.

(3) The Japanese fishing boats and fishermen shall observe the law and order of North Korea which are in force in "the tentative fishing zone."

Also, in the joint statement, both sides argued that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from South Korea, nuclear weapons should be completely abolished, and the reunification of Korea should be achieved peacefully and independently. Because of the insertion of these clauses in the joint statement, the Japanese government reacted coolly and took the position that the statement had nothing to do with its official views.⁸¹

But Japanese officials tended informally to recognize the joint statement as "something made on a private level."

80. Ibid., September 6, 1977.

81. Ibid., September 7, 1977.

Whatever attitude the Japanese government adopted towards the "interim" fishery agreement, it for the first time provided a framework for solving the fishery problem between Japan and North Korea in the absence of formal diplomatic relations.

4. Summary

As described so far, during the period from 1971 through 1977, substantial progress has been made in Japanese-North Korean relations. Both Japan and North Korea have tried to adjust their bilateral relations in many ways without giving rise to any serious conflict. Although no diplomatic relations existed between the two countries, the channels for informal political contacts between ruling conservative circles of Japan and North Korean leaders have been ever increasing. In search of the restoration of diplomatic ties, a growing number of Japanese politicians have made contacts with their counterparts in North Korea. For the purpose of facilitating their contacts with the Pyongyang authorities, some Japanese Diet members, including Kuno Chuji, a senior LDP Diet member, set up the superpartisan Dietmen's League for Promotion of Friendship between Japan and North Korea. This pro-Pyongyang organization has performed the function of pressing the conservative government to change its policy towards North Korea.

The Japanese government, denying its intention of seeking

the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Pyongyang regime, stepped up its efforts to pursue a "two-Koreas" policy more explicitly than ever before. It moved toward promoting cultural and economic exchanges with North Korea, while not recognizing its regime diplomatically.

North Korea also began to demonstrate greater flexibility toward Japan. The Pyongyang leadership regarded the Tanaka government's China policy as an encouraging sign for North Korea, and hastened its efforts to improve relations with Japan. For this purpose, Kim Il-sung suggested that the existing Japan-South Korea Treaty would not be a barrier to the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea. Moreover, he repeatedly urged the Japanese government to conduct an "equal-distance" diplomacy toward South and North Korea. Although the Japanese government did not respond positively to Kim Il-sung's urgings, this new proposal spurred the leftist forces of Japan, including some conservative members of the LDP, to launch a wide range of campaigns for diplomatic normalization between the two countries. Advocates of diplomatic reconciliation between Japan and North Korea asserted that their widening contacts with North Korean leaders would contribute to the increase of mutual understanding, and finally to the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula adjacent to Japan.

In accordance with the Japanese government's policy of easing its restrictions on exchanges with North Korea in non-

political areas, cultural and economic intercourse between the two countries became active. Korean residents in Japan could be repatriated to North Korea under a new agreement concluded between the two Red Cross Societies of Japan and North Korea, and various social and cultural delegations of North Korea, including the Mansudae Dance Troupe, were allowed to enter Japan. Moreover, a large number of Koreans in Japan obtained reentry permits from the Japanese government.

As a means of promoting trade relations between the two countries, the Japanese government took several steps, such as the entry of North Korean technicians into Japan, the approval of long-term deferred payments and the grant of the Export-Import Bank funds. These steps were unthinkable in the late 1960's, when the Sato government had maintained tight restrictions on over-all relations with North Korea.

The development of this bilateral relationship between Japan and North Korea, first of all, was caused by the emergence of detente among the major powers and its consequences on Japan's foreign policy. Obviously affected by the Sino-American rapprochement, Japanese conservative leaders came to realize two important points. One was that the government had been too passive in carrying out its foreign policy to respond properly to the rapidly changing international environment. The other was that with the growing detente alignments in the international system, Japan should pursue

better relations with Communist countries. The first fruit of this new thinking was the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in September 1972. Following this event, the problem of ending the "abnormal relationship" between Japan and North Korea gained great momentum. Japanese political and economic circles urged the government to adopt a policy favoring diplomatic reconciliation between the two countries. They even argued that the time had come for Japan, considering her geographical location, to take positive steps for normalizing diplomatic relations with the DPRK.

Second, the opening of talks between South and North Korea, starting with the meeting of representatives of both sides' Red Cross Societies in 1971, had an impact on the improvement of bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea. Leaders of the Japanese opposition parties held that there was no reason why the Japanese government must maintain its non-recognition policy of the Pyongyang regime, as long as South Koreans sit together with North Koreans for negotiations. This argument had a delicate influence on the Japanese government's policy toward North Korea. For even Prime Minister Tanaka had said that "the conclusion of South-North Korean talks is a prerequisite to the improvement of Japan's relations with North Korea."

Third, Japanese-North Korean relations were also considerably influenced by the growth of Japanese political cleavages over the Korean problem. An increasing number of

Diet members of the LDP made efforts to promote friendly relations with North Korea. In the past, such moves had been launched primarily by the leftist Japanese and Korean forces. But now even members of conservative political circles began to resist the government's official position of not extending diplomatic recognition to the North Korean regime. With the formation of the Dietmen's League, some Diet members of the ruling LDP were able to make direct contacts with the Pyongyang leadership. Moreover, when certain issues arose between the two countries, such as the fishery dispute, they, on behalf of their government, assumed a major role in conducting negotiations with North Korean leaders on a private level.

Lastly, North Korea, launching its ambitious Six-Year Economic Plan, was greatly interested in utilizing Japan's advanced industrial capability for the implementation of the plan. This desire of North Korea grew in proportion to the reduction of economic assistance from its two Communist patrons, the Soviet Union and China. North Korea's excessive import of Japanese industrial products resulted in a heavy imbalance of trade in favor of Japan, eventually putting a severe blow at Japan-North Korea trade. As noted earlier, because of North Korea's delinquent debt payments, trade between the two countries has been on the decline since late 1974. But the trouble stemming from North Korea's debts was to some extent settled by the signing of a private agreement between representatives of the JKTA and North Korea. Now,

both Japan and North Korea are inclined to maintain "good" economic relations with each other in spite of the absence of normal diplomatic relations. Also, it seems clear that through growing economic relations between the two countries, Japan, as a major creditor nation, will increase her political influence on the North Korean regime.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

For a quarter century after the end of the Korean war in 1953, Japanese-North Korean relations have developed within a limited scope. At the present time, there are no diplomatic relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, a certain degree of interaction between them has existed in non-official areas. Starting in the early 1970's, both Japan and North Korea have shown significant flexibility in promoting their own bilateral relations.

These developments may be characterized as the operation of linkage politics in the context of a changing international system. They were shaped by the operation of a number of variables that were present throughout the time under consideration, but the importance of each variable changed in different periods. The most important variable was Japanese and North Korean relations with the other major powers, such as the United States, the Soviet Union and China. In addition to this variable, the other external variables at work were the relations of Japan and North Korea with South Korea, and the specific interests of Japan and North Korea concerning their own national security.

As the structure of the international system evolved from a bipolar one in the early 1950's to a multipolar power structure in the 1970's, the internal variables of each

country had more scope in which to function. They were: social values and ideology, political structure and leadership, and economic-technological capability.

This chapter reviews the impact of these variables on bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea in each of the four periods. It concludes with an assessment of the future of the bilateral relationship.

1. External variables

Relations with the major powers.--During the first period (1953-1959), a bipolar structure of the international system had substantially influenced the basic policies of Japan and North Korea towards each other. Japan was closely allied with the United States by their mutual security system. In line with American containment policy toward Communist states, Japan was very cautious in approaching either the Soviet Union or China. Even after diplomatic relations were restored between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1956, the Japanese regarded the Soviet military presence in the Far East as a major potential threat to their national security. Also, the government of Japan refused to extend its diplomatic recognition to the Communist regime in Peking, and instead treated the Taiwan government as the legal government representing all the Chinese.

On the other hand, North Korea was deeply drawn, economically and militarily, into the Communist bloc. Since it

signed a 10-year economic and cultural agreement with the Soviet Union in 1949, North Korea had received a large amount of military and economic assistance from the Soviets. Moreover, as a result of Chinese participation in the Korean war, Sino-North Korean relations became closer than ever. After the war, China was significantly involved in North Korea's postwar economic recovery program by concluding the Treaty for Economic and Cultural Cooperation with North Korea in 1953. While it established close ties with the two Communist powers, the Pyongyang regime intensified hostility toward the United States, calling for the immediate withdrawal of its troops from South Korea.

After a Japanese government rejection of its bid to normalize diplomatic relations, North Korea turned to a "people's diplomacy" aimed at wooing the Japanese to support its position. Even during the second period (1960-1964), Japanese and North Korean relations with the other major powers had significant consequences on their bilateral relations. In 1960, Japan rearranged her security system by concluding the revised Security Treaty with the United States. The revised Treaty reaffirmed the firm United States' commitment to Japan's national security. But both the Soviet Union and China regarded it as threatening to their own national security. Consequently, Japan could not but maintain an estranged relationship with the two Communist powers.

North Korea, while seeking to keep a neutral position

towards the Sino-Soviet conflict, made cautious efforts to strengthen political and military links with each of the two Communist powers. In 1961, North Korea concluded mutual defense pacts with the Soviet Union and China respectively. These pacts stipulated that the contracting parties should commonly meet in "the event of one of them being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly."

As long as the international system remained sharply divided into the two major blocs, the Ikeda government of Japan was not able to grant diplomatic recognition to the Pyongyang regime. Instead, it pursued a policy of allowing gradual cultural and economic exchanges with North Korea under the principle of "seikei bunri" (separating economic affairs from politics). In accordance with this principle, Japan first opened direct trade with North Korea.

The Japan-North Korea antagonism, which had grown considerably during the third period (1965-1970), accelerated with American involvement in the Vietnam war. With the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the United States was seriously concerned with the strengthening of alliance relations with Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, Soviet-North Korean relations began to improve following the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. But Sino-North Korean relations were under strain. The Chinese, who were frenetically engaged in launching the Cultural Revolution, criticized the Pyongyang regime as a revisionist one.

Under these circumstances, North Korea also launched a series of provocative acts against the United States on the Korean peninsula, including the seizure of the Pueblo and the shooting-down of U. S. EC-121 aircraft. As a result, North Korea-United States hostility grew intense.

In view of the escalating hostility between North Korea and America, the Japanese government regarded North Korea as a potential menace to peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and imposed severe restrictions on bilateral relations with that country. In response, the Pyongyang leadership harshly condemned the Sato government of Japan as a mere tool of the United States' Asia policy, and also as the most reactionary government which Japan ever had since the end of World War II. Thus, Japanese-North Korean relations were at their lowest ebb since the time when the Korea war ended.

During the fourth period (1971-1977), the emerging detente relationship among the major powers led Japan and North Korea to readjust their bilateral relations. As the United States, in a shift away from its long-established containment policy, sought to initiate reconciliation with China, Japan was urged to reevaluate her previous policy towards Communist states, including North Korea. The Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization was a reflection of Japan's shifting policy aimed at adjusting quickly to a changing international system. Moreover, with the growing triangular relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union and

China, Japan was increasingly concerned with strengthening her own autonomous diplomatic operations.

Amid the mood of detente among the major powers, North Korea was greatly geared to avoiding its isolation in the world community. In the early 1970's, the Pyongyang regime intensified its diplomatic activities towards the Third World and some Western countries, including the United States, and also joined a number of international organizations.

These steps, taken by Japan and North Korea, consequently contributed to the promotion of their bilateral relations. The Japanese government did away with restrictions on travel and trade with North Korea, and moved toward allowing members of conservative political and economic circles to make informal contacts with the North Korean leadership.

Accordingly, North Korea presented a new proposal for reconciliation with Japan. Unlike his previous position, Kim Il-sung suggested that the Japan-ROK Treaty concluded in 1965 would not be an obstacle to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea. He also urged the Japanese government to conduct an "equal-distance" diplomacy towards Pyongyang and Seoul.

Relations with South Korea.--The bilateral relationship between Japan and North Korea has been significantly affected by their respective relations with South Korea. Frequently, Japanese conservative leaders explained that Japan's relations with North Korea could not further improve because of her

close diplomatic and economic ties with South Korea. The North Korean leadership even recognized that Japan's growing links with South Korea were a most critical factor to prevent the promotion of Japanese-North Korean relations.

During the first period, when Japan's relations with South Korea deteriorated seriously, North Korea hastened the opportunity to improve its relations with Japan. At this time, the deterioration of Japanese-South Korean relations was mainly due to the Rhee government's stubborn anti-Japanese stand, and to some Japanese leaders' statements justifying Japan's prewar colonial rule over Korea.

Starting in the second period, improving relations between Japan and South Korea triggered strains in Japanese-North Korean relations. The new military government of South Korea and the Ikeda government alike stepped up their efforts to bring about an early normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Moreover, there was growing pressure from the United States for both governments of Tokyo and Seoul to reconcile their bilateral diplomatic relations as quickly as possible.

The conclusion of the Japan-ROK Treaty in 1965 was a decisive blow at Japanese-North Korean relations. Under the Treaty, the Japanese government formally recognized the ROK as the legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, while refusing to extend any diplomatic recognition to the North Korean regime. The Treaty, of course, was strongly repudiated

by the North Korean Communists, who charged that it was a sign of the revival of Japanese militarism. Also, North Korea adopted a hard-line policy towards South Korea. It made South-North Korean relations extremely tense. As a result, the Japanese-South Korean rapprochement and the tense confrontation between South and North Korea led to further antagonism between Japan and North Korea during the third period.

A Seoul-Pyongyang thaw in the early 1970's, which was highlighted by the opening of the South-North Korea dialogue, contributed to the easing of antagonistic relations between Japan and North Korea during the fourth period. Above all, it provided Japan with an opportunity to adjust to the reality of North Korea. The Japanese government was much more inclined to carry out a "two-Koreas" policy aimed at expanding trade, and cultural contacts with North Korea in spite of the absence of diplomatic relations.

National security interest.--Since the end of World War II, it has been of vital interest to Japan's national security that South Korea should be protected from military aggression from North Korea or its allies, the Soviet Union and China. Japanese leaders perceived South Korea as the buffer against Communist threats. Therefore, the conservative government of Japan had fundamentally attached higher priority to the resumption of formal diplomatic relations with South Korea. This security interest of Japan was also congruent with the

American strategic interest in containing Communist states in Asia.

North Korea was always concerned with isolating South Korea from Japan in terms of its own national security interest. The Pyongyang authorities did not believe that Japan would launch any direct armed attack upon North Korea. Rather, they perceived that Japan's close ties with South Korea would contribute to the strengthening of South Korea's economic and military power.

These conflicting perspectives of Japan and North Korea on their respective security problems have been strongly pervasive throughout all the periods. In recent years, Japanese security interest concerned the problem of keeping the balance of power on the Korean peninsula. In fact, all the major powers were more interested in maintaining the current situation than in pressing for any drastic change on the peninsula. It became evident that both the Soviet Union and China were quite reluctant to support substantially North Korea's plan to reunify Korea even by using military means. Similarly, the United States would not like to take any abrupt step of solving the Korean problem at the cost of its relations with the Soviet Union and China.

Japan is now opposed to America's plan to phase out its ground forces from South Korea on the basis that it might endanger the balance of power in Northeast Asia. In this respect, the Japanese security interest is entirely in contrast to

North Korea's unification policy of involving the risk of war.

2. Internal variables

Social values and ideology.---Japanese-North Korean relations were characterized as a sort of "ideological asymmetry." Ideologically, North Korea had always taken an offensive stand towards Japan. But Japan did not take such a stand. These phenomena were mainly due to two factors: first, North Korea was equipped with a systematically organized doctrine, that is, Communist ideology, but Japan with a multiplicity of ideologies, including postwar conservatism; second, North Korea was in a position to invoke anti-colonial nationalism against Japan, which had once been a colonial power.

The North Korean Communists often made ideological attacks on the conservative governments of Japan, which had taken an anti-Pyongyang position. During the first period, they severely charged the Kishi government as an embodiment of Japanese militarism. From the second period, North Korea's ideological vigor was primarily directed toward denouncing the Japanese government for its move to reconcile diplomatic relations with South Korea. The Pyongyang authorities sought to maintain close ideological links with the Japanese opposition parties and leftist Korean residents' organizations in order to obstruct the on-going Japan-South Korea negotiations. Their ideological bombast towards the Japanese government

reached its climax during the third period, when the Japan-ROK Treaty was finally concluded. They criticized the conclusion of the Treaty as a springboard for revived Japanese militarists to reinvade South Korea. This denunciation, however, did not effect any change in Japan's North Korea policy. Rather, it led the Japanese government to take a tough position towards the Pyongyang regime.

During the fourth period, North Korea's doctrinal influence on its foreign policy towards Japan seemed to decline with the emergence of a detente structure of the international system. The Pyongyang regime has adopted a more pragmatic approach to Japan in the early 1970's. It was increasingly concerned with expanding economic transactions with Japan without reference to its doctrine.

Political structure and leadership.--After her defeat in World War II, Japan was restructured into a pluralistic-democratic society. By contrast, North Korea was organized into a totalitarian-Communist system, following the Soviet model. This asymmetry in political structure provided the context for linkage politics, in which the North Korean regime maintained links with Japanese private organizations and political groups. These links were given greater scope to operate as the international system structure moved from a bipolar condition to a more diffuse condition.

During the first period, the opposition parties and some leftist social organizations, such as the JCP, the JSP and

Sohyo, were closely allied with the North Korean regime. They tried to drive a wedge in the conservative government's primary concern with normalizing the relations with South Korea. These moves were carefully coordinated by Chosoren.

Bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea during the second period were affected by the Ikeda government's "seikei bunri" policy and Japanese business circles' growing interest in trade with Communist countries. But at this time, most leading Japanese trading companies were much more inclined to conduct their transactions with South Korea than with North Korea. Thus, Japan-North Korea trade developed on a very limited scale.

With the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, the pro-Seoul factions within the LDP and business circles increased steadily. These factions gave strong support to the Sato government's policy of stressing the maintenance of close ties with South Korea. What worsened Japanese-North Korean relations further was the consolidation of the North Korean power structure by political leaders, who advocated a hard-line policy towards South Korea, including Kim Il-sung, Choe Yong-kon and Kim Il. They were somewhat responsible for heightening tension on the Korean peninsula in the late 1960's.

In the early 1970's, there occurred a conflict within the LDP over the government's policy towards North Korea. In 1971, a number of the LDP Diet members participated in the

organization of the Dietmen's League, which was designed to promote friendly relations between Japan and North Korea. Some of them, in spite of the party leadership's strong opposition, visited Pyongyang and had conversations with North Korean leaders. They, in collaboration with members of the opposition parties, including the JSP and the Komeito, continually urged the government to take steps in favor of the normalization of relations with North Korea. The move to improve relations between Japan and North Korea was further supported by some Japanese businessmen and mass media. In particular, the Japanese press often took the position that the government should strive for the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Under growing pressure from a wide range of domestic groups, the Tanaka government took some measures of encouraging trade and other contacts with North Korea on a non-official level. It issued visas to North Koreans wishing to visit Japan, and approved long-term deferred payments and the use of Export-Import Bank loans for trade with North Korea. Moreover, it allowed a large number of Korean residents to re-enter Japan after their visits to North Korea. The government and the LDP of Japan also permitted their members to have informal political contacts with North Korean leaders.

Economic-technological capability.--No matter how strongly it might be preoccupied with Communist revolutionary doctrine, the Pyongyang regime never took any step of suspending

economic relations for political reasons. From the time when relations between the two countries started opening, North Korea's major interest lay in trade with Japan. Two factors stimulated North Korea to have such an interest. One was geographical affinity between the two countries. The Pyongyang authorities considered that because of the geographical condition they could cut down expenses necessary to commerce with Japan. The other factor was that Japan had a highly advanced industrial and technological capability. However, Japan did not regard North Korea as important to her economy. Rather, Japan's major interest in relations with North Korea lay in her quest for the solution of national security problem.

During the first period, because of the Japanese government's policy of prohibiting trade with North Korea, only indirect trade had been conducted between the two countries on a private level. During the second period, Japan and North Korea first established direct trade relations. Under the Ikeda government, Japan moved to expand trade with Communist countries. This move was substantially connected with a long-range economic program, which the Ikeda government set forth to achieve Japan's economic prosperity. Owing to this policy, Japan-North Korea trade also increased steadily. During the third period, Japanese-North Korean economic relations were somewhat impeded by growing political hostility between the two countries.

Remarkable progress in Japan-North Korea trade was made during the fourth period. The Japanese government adopted a policy of favoring trade with North Korea. Japanese business circles also increased their interest in economic transactions with North Korea. The North Korean regime was similarly concerned with buying industrial equipment and facilities from Japan for the implementation of its Six-Year Economic Plan.

Rapidly expanding economic relations between the two countries produced an unexpected problem, the accumulation of North Korea's overdue debts to Japan. This significantly worsened Japan-North Korea trade. But the two countries concluded in 1976 a private agreement on the settlement of North Korea's debts to Japan. Moreover, Japan and North Korea signed an "interim" fishery agreement on a non-official level in 1977. This reflected a congruity of interests in further improving their bilateral relations. In view of these steps taken by the two countries, their economic relations, including trade, are expected to be steadily expanding in the future.

3. Summary

On the whole, the most critical variable, which affected bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea since 1953 was both countries' respective relations with the other major powers. Especially, Japan's relations with the United States

had most crucial effects on the course of Japanese-North Korean relations. Until the United States decided to make overt moves toward detente with China, Japan's policy toward North Korea was constrained primarily by American containment policy toward Communist states in Asia.

Also, since the mid-1960's, the bilateral relationship between Japan and North Korea have been particularly influenced by the growing diplomatic and economic ties between Japan and South Korea. The conclusion of the Japan-ROK Treaty had a most disruptive impact on Japanese-North Korean relations.

In the early 1970's, when detente among the major powers became fairly tangible in Asia, and amid the ever-widening Sino-Soviet conflict, the internal variables of Japan and North Korea, such as political structure and economic capability, have somewhat expanded their scope in which to operate. In other words, Japan and North Korea became more capable of handling their bilaterally-related affairs by themselves than ever.

4. The future

Now, one important question arises over where Japanese-North Korean relations are heading. It is very difficult to predict the future course of bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea. Much of the difficulty stems from the fact that relations between the two countries are in transition,

but it seems clear that their bilateral relations will eventually take a course of diplomatic reconciliation. This prospect derives from two facts. One is that the international situation surrounding the two countries will stimulate them to improve their relations. In recent years, a growing number of nations in the world have had diplomatic relations with the Pyongyang regime. Moreover, to the extent that North Korea is trying to end its isolation in the international community, it will be more difficult for Japan to maintain its present relationship with North Korea. The other fact is that as long as commercial and cultural relations between the two countries continually improve, the Japanese government will be under increasing pressure from domestic groups to take a more favorable step toward a diplomatic reconciliation with North Korea.

But the future course of Japanese-North Korean relations will also have much to do with the following factors: North Korean-American relations, the other major powers' foreign policies toward the Korean peninsula, North Korea's approach to the Korean unification problem, and the pro-Pyongyang forces within Japan.

First, if there occurs a North Korean-American rapprochement, Japan will be propelled to reconcile further with North Korea. This prospect derives from the fact that Japan had intensified her effort to normalize diplomatic relations with China following the Sino-American rapprochement. But it does

not imply that Japanese-North Korean relations will follow the pattern of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization, which required Japan to terminate her diplomatic ties with the Taiwan government. If North Korean-American relations improve to the extent of the Sino-American rapprochement, it can provide the Japanese government with an opportunity to persuade the South Korean government to tolerate its move to detente with North Korea. However, a Pyongyang-Washington rapprochement is unlikely in the immediate future because of unrelenting tension on the Korean peninsula. As long as the two Koreas are doggedly confronted with each other, it is unreasonable for the United States, which is under mutual defense obligations with South Korea, to move unilaterally to court North Korea.

Second, if the other major powers change their present policies toward South and North Korea, and move to recognize them diplomatically, Japan will also promptly move to establish formal diplomatic relations with North Korea. But as Donald S. Zagoria observes, this sort of thing is not likely to happen in the near future. Neither of the two Communist powers shows a sign of improving its relations with South Korea. Instead, each of them is still more interested in holding North Korea under its own sphere of influence. Moreover, the major powers have greater interests in maneuvering their complicated relationship rather than seeking the solution of the Korean problem.

Third, if North Korea adopts a more pragmatic approach to the Korean problem, including the acceptance of a "two-Koreas" idea, it will speed the process of change in Japan's policy toward North Korea. Obviously, North Korea's hard-line position in regard to Korean reunification had an adverse impact on Japanese-North Korean relations. The Japanese regard such a position of North Korea as a potential threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, which is regarded as vital to Japan's national security. But the Pyongyang leadership still adheres to a revolutionary zeal to reunify even by force if necessary.

Lastly, Japan's policy toward North Korea has been considerably affected by the dominant pro-Seoul forces within conservative political and economic circles. There is still a great disparity in numerical strength between the pro-Seoul and the pro-Pyongyang forces within the ruling LDP. If the pro-Pyongyang forces grow to the extent that such a disparity disappears, the Japanese government will be forced to extend diplomatic recognition to the Pyongyang regime. But in view of growing diplomatic and economic links between Japanese conservative circles and South Koreans, it is hard to expect a rapid growth of the pro-Pyongyang forces within Japan in the near future.

Putting all these possible factors together, it is unrealistic to conclude at this time that there will occur any dramatic change like Japan's diplomatic recognition of the

Pyongyang regime in Japanese-North Korean relations. Thus, Japan and North Korea alike will have no choice but to maintain for the time being their present relationship.

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